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
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QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

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ART. I.—*A System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive; being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Method of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. First American, from the London Edition. New-York: Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-street.

ALL science, all knowledge is directly relative to, and deeply rooted in, the human understanding. The celebrated inscription of the Delphic temple, Γνώθι σεαυτόν, (Know thyself,) was worthy of a god, not only as a precept of moral conduct, but also as a principle of philosophical inquiry. In reference to the former of these grand objects, however, the maxim has always been but too little practiced. Its applicability to the other is scarcely yet recognized. Of the various sciences and arts of our day, there is not one that has been based directly, or distinctly, upon that which is the centre and soul of them all—the human mind. The science of number does not tell us what number is, how our idea of it is formed, or how we came by this and the other abstract notions. The science of extension leaves us equally in the dark concerning our knowledge—its nature and origin—of this property of bodies, upon which the science is built. The sciences conversant about the action and operations of these bodies and their several modes of existence, do not begin with explaining what these laws of material objects consist in *with relation to our means of apprehending them*, nor how far, or if at all, we may be assured of the reality of their existence. But that description of our knowledge which has more immediately for its subject the moral and political “sciences,” (as we call them,) is still more defective in this particular, still more distant from the source of light, than even the mathematical, or the physical departments. Instead of having been grounded upon an analysis of the mental

operations in the acquisition of knowledge, these sciences all begin with a set of assumptions—whether, as in some subjects, axioms and definitions, which are termed self-evident, or, as in others, loose traditional prejudices and popular impressions, which are dignified into “laws of belief,” or “principles of common sense.”

But, verily, this is no better, logically viewed, than the Indian cosmography; which, setting the elephant that props the earth on the back of a tortoise, leaves the latter unhappy wight to find footing as it may. The questions, of course, recur:—What is our evidence for these laws of belief?—How came we to know the attributes denoted by the definitions?—Might there not be some illusion in our assurance of the axioms? For to silence all such inquiries by the word “self-evident,” is both improper and unphilosophical: improper, for, in strictness, the term evident applies but to what is made known through a medium subjective or objective; whereas, the pretension here is, that these “truths” are apprehended intuitively: it is unphilosophical, because nothing of a *general* nature is, in fact, ever so apprehended. All our perceptions, whether of facts or objects, are necessarily particular: all generalities, that have any real foundation, are the results of induction, and, as such, susceptible of, and subject to, analysis and evidence.

No doubt, those sciences—even the most crude of them—have always contained truths of great positive value. But they were debarred, by the notions described, from all systematic progress. They had accordingly remained for ages in a state of stagnancy. They had been under the doom of barrenness, like the vestal virgins, (to borrow a favorite simile of Lord Bacon,) for want of the proper instrument and method of cultivation. This want was to be supplied by first discrediting the mysterious efficacy ascribed to fundamental principles, decomposing them into their elements, tracing them back to their sources in the human mind, and by then observing the synthetic processes of nature in their formation and deduction. Such was the grand idea of the celebrated inductive logic or method of philosophizing, the promulgation of which, opportunely, (for really he has contributed little more than the direction,) has insured the proudest, perhaps, of earthly immortalities to the philosopher just named. That this logical reform was, in fact, the essential condition and clew to any advancement of the sciences, is strikingly visible in the immediate and rapid progress of such of them as have already been brought under its rule. We have a negative example, also, in the state of political and moral doctrine, which—partly, indeed, from the greater difficulty of the

application—remains still unrescued from the chaos of empiricism, and is now merely emerging from that “outer darkness” wherein astronomy, medicine, and chemistry were wrapped, in the days of alchemy, magic, and judicial astrology.

It is not to be hence supposed, that this empress of human knowledge, this “science of sciences,” (as it has been well termed by Bacon,) had remained entirely unconceived, or even uncultivated. It was dimly included in the metaphysics of the ancients. It was indicated, though but implicitly, in the “*philosophia prima*” of Bacon—a circumstance, by the by, which showed him not yet quite rid himself of the “idol” worship he sapped so successfully. In its scientific character it is substantially the same as what the Scotch philosophers have followed up under the name of mental philosophy. But in the several systems, as far as it has been developed at all, it was either mystified by wild imaginations, or confused with foreign matters, or biased by philosophical theory. There had been nowhere attempted a thorough and exclusive investigation of the mode of formation, expression, and generation, of human knowledge, together with a system of rules to correspond, for its extension and application. Writers on logic seem even still to comprehend it with some difficulty, in this its proper compass and twofold quality of science and art. Most of them continue partisans either of the syllogistic or of the inductive method; as if these were things mutually exclusive. A consequence of the career, now in its subsiding oscillations, which logic has had to run, like the other systems based upon the “first principles” above alluded to: a proof that here too the fluctuations of hypothesis are not yet quite fixed into science.

A sketch of this career will best illustrate the subject and ascertain its actual condition. But what is still more pertinent to our purpose as reviewer, it will enable us to judge exactly how far Mr. Mill, in the work before us, has supplied the defects of his predecessors, and responded to the exigences of the present posture of intelligence and of science.

Aristotle, with whom logic may be said to have commenced as a system, has treated the subject chiefly in its character of art. Not that this great intellect did not comprehend its scientific importance, as is commonly supposed. That he did, there needs no further evidence than his attempt to catalogue ideas under the ten classes, well known as the Categories. Nor has he overlooked that other element of the science, the doctrine of signs or language; which is considered, with the usual acuteness, in the book entitled, *On Interpretation*. The error was, in the former case, to have

begun with general ideas, to have founded his crude classification on the popular notions respecting external objects and their supposed virtues and relations, instead of taking for its basis the *facts* of the mind and its processes: the error in respect of signs, or words, was no more than consistent, in giving us arbitrary, instead of analytical, definition.

Quite consonant, too, with his theory of these preliminaries, was the method of ratiocination which they had been prepared to subserve; a system so elaborately ingenious, so prodigiously coherent and complete, for a "first concoction," as to have prevailed throughout the civilized world as the perfection of logic, both science and art, during twenty centuries, and to retain even to this day some respectable adherents to the full latitude of these pretensions—pretensions, however, disclaimed by Aristotle's own express declarations. In fact, the syllogism has never been assailed with much success, unless by the mode of argument employed by Diogenes against the sophist who denied motion: that is, it has been supplanted rather than refuted, vanquished, but not subdued. The secret of its strength lay in the weakness of its adversaries, who sought a refutation everywhere, save where alone it was to be found,—in the analysis of the faculties and operations of the mind. Admit the "general ideas" of the Categories, admit the theory of "universal essences," (subsequently known as the doctrine of Realism,) and the syllogism is impregnable, and must be regarded not only as a legitimate mode of reasoning, but, in the language of Whately, as *the type* of all reasoning whatever. But take it by the base, question its fundamental assumptions; *there* resides the error, and there, moreover, it is utterly impotent for its own defense.

This is what was done by Bacon, who, appearing in the fullness of time, proclaimed, that these pretended "first principles" were themselves to be examined, to be elementized; that nature was to be investigated through the medium of particular facts, and the principles deduced from them; that the actual knowledges were incapable of augmenting "human power," and the prevailing logic utterly impotent for the advancement of science. The facts, however, which he designated for elementary study, were the phenomena of matter rather than those of mind. His logical reform, as we have already intimated, consisted more in the inverse direction given to the inquiry, than in the "New Organ," which he provided for its conduct. In fact, this celebrated system, so much lauded and so little known, contains, as left by the author, but three of the six rules, or methods, of investigation now to be found in the book

of Mr. Mill. How inferior in this, to the mischievous perfection of the syllogism! But take an example of its application, as we find it in the *Novum Organum* itself, Second Book. The subject of inquiry is the "form" (essential cause) of heat; and the lengthy process results in the following definition: the form of heat is, "That which excites a dilating or expansive motion in any natural body, and represses that motion and forces it on itself, so as not to allow the expansion to proceed equally, but only to be partially exerted and partially repressed . . . without any consideration as to whether the body be of earth, or imbued with celestial influence, luminous or opaque, rare or dense, locally expanded or contained within the bounds of its first dimensions, verging to dissolution or remaining fixed, animal, vegetable, or mineral, water, or oil, or air, or any other substance whatever, susceptible of such motion."(!)

Would not this pass upon nine in ten of the votaries of Bacon, at least the American and English, for a capital burlesque upon the "scholastic logic?" We are sure nothing more ludicrous has ever been pointed out in Aristotle, even by the bitter zeal and keen dialectics of Galileo or Gassendi. It is evident, then, that Bacon's conception of the logical science was as deficient in point of clearness, as his construction of the art was seen to be grossly incomplete. For the rest, it were affectation to protest that we have here had no disposition to disparage a man who is equally above all blame and praise. Our sole object has been, first, the truth; and then to rectify certain prejudices, pro and con, which must be fatal to a due comprehension and an intelligent cultivation of this subject.

Soon after, but without any knowledge of Bacon's writings, Descartes, in France, taught substantially the same logical doctrines. The celebrated four principles, or rules, of the Discourse on Method, suggest, perhaps, a better, though less ostentatious, organ than Bacon's. In its specification—though it was otherwise with its principle—the latter was laid no deeper than the facts and phenomena of external perception. The French philosopher had first the merit of desecrating the vast region still behind, in the exploration of the means and the modes of this perception. Having accordingly resolved to recompose, upon indubitable evidence, not only the whole contents of his understanding, but also the *understanding itself*, (thus anticipating the shrewd criticism of Leibnitz upon Locke,) he began with the notable induction, *Cogito, ergo existo*, (I think, therefore I exist,) which placed his own existence itself in doubt. Some English philosophers, incapable, apparently, of fathoming the real depth or the logical importance of this procedure, have slipantly attempted to turn it

into ridicule. It were as well, say they, to have written, *Esurio, ergo existo*, (I hunger, therefore I exist.) And so, no doubt it was. Nay, it would have been better; though they, of course, did not perceive it. In fact, *csurio* denotes a more simple feeling than that signified by *cogito*, which it is now manifest was susceptible of ulterior analysis, and subject, of course, to intermediate induction. Strictly, the first step was, *sentio*, (I feel,) denoting abstract sensation, which is incapable of either, because the ultimate principle of both, as it seems to be the foundation of all merely natural reality and certitude. However, Descartes soon dropped this admirable clew in the dark, emerging, at a bound, into the airy regions of "innate ideas;" as if even his transcendent intellect was incapable of breathing longer in the abyss. And in fact, the analysis in question is the supreme effort of mental vigor; a circumstance which partly accounts for logic's being the latest to be *constituted*, though the earliest to be *practiced*, of the sciences. The power to turn the thinking or feeling faculty back upon itself—to make the eye, as it were, an object of its own *direct* inspection—this, we hold, for our part, to be the strongest natural proof of the spirituality of the human soul:—meaning here, by "spirituality," no more than something totally different, not merely from all that is known to result, but all that can be even imagined to result, from matter or its laws, in any of their conceivable combinations.

The most distinguished of Bacon's successors, in England, are Locke and Hobbes. The latter seems to have had the clearer conception of the province and place of logic generally, which he has considered a necessary preliminary to his Elements of the Sciences. His explication of the syllogistic system is peculiarly correct. Indeed, Archbishop Whately has added little to Hobbes; and, it must be said, that little not in point of profundity or discretion. Hobbes' estimate of the system was not favorable. He was wont to say of the syllogism, that, as a means of forming the reasoning faculty, it was like attempting to teach an infant to walk by prescribing it a code of rules, instead of setting it to practice; and, as a means of conducting an argument, that it became applicable only when and by whom it was not wanted. His objection, then, was its inutility, not the common, the cant one of absurdity. But, what more concerns our historical survey, the contribution of Hobbes to the progress of logic was mainly in the article of language; he having, the first or the best, not only shown its use, but proved its necessity, in the process of thought.

But the *analysis* of the process itself was reserved for Locke. The Essay on the Human Understanding is, however, not to be

regarded a regular treatise on logic. Its original object was to refute the "innate ideas" of the followers of Descartes, especially the Port-Royal logicians, so estimable in other respects. But, though not designed for a system of logic, it has not the less furnished essential materials, and given a new impulse, to that science.

Condillac receiving the impulse, besides carrying the decomposition of the mental phenomena still further back than Locke, conceived, moreover, a less vague account of the reasoning process; which he defines to be, as a science, a process of equation; as an art, a perfect language—*une langue bien faite*. Here is the opposite to the syllogistic method; a method for which, accordingly, Condillac has all the contempt of his school, and of which he gives, among others, the following rather sharp description:—*On prend pour principes des notions vagues, des mots vides de sens; on se fait un jargon scientifique, dans lequel on croit voir l'évidence; et cependant on ne sait dans le vrai ni ce qu'on voit, ni ce qu'on pense, ni ce qu'on dit. On ne sera capable d'analyser ses pensées, qu'autant qu'elles seront elles-même l'ouvrage de l'analyse.*—*Art de Penser*, part 2, chap. 4. The concluding sentence alludes, it will be observed, to his own method.

The latest, and probably (perhaps necessarily) the last, of this line of logicians in England, is Mr. James Mill, the distinguished father of our author; who, if he has made no new discoveries in mental philosophy, has at least presented us (in the *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*) the researches of his predecessors—chiefly we think the French—with that felicity of arrangement, precision of thought, and perspicuity of language, which, in our opinion, assign him a still higher rank among *English* philosophers as a *writer*, than even his scientific genius and manful independence as a thinker.

In fine, by the law of mental equilibrium (so to call it) above alluded to, we find, at last, a reaction take place toward the exiled syllogism, in the skillful treatise of Archbishop Whately.

Such is a summary sketch of the career of logic. Such, too, its ultimate condition, with proper limits still unsettled, the organic principles unreconciled. The materials, however, accumulating for ages, are now abundant, and the light of science let in on all sides, for the construction of a complete system. The period for eclecticism seems to have arrived: and there was wanted but a man who, without attachment to either of the rival methods, had a perfect knowledge of both, in their qualities and their defects, together with the requisite power of intellect to combine the former upon sounder

principles, and to harmonize the whole into a body of logical doctrine.

This seems, accordingly, the purpose and the plan of Mr. Mill's book; which he candidly describes in the Preface, "An attempt not to supersede, but to embody and systematize, the best ideas which have been promulgated on the subject by speculative writers, or conformed to by accurate thinkers in their scientific inquiries." Such a work, well executed, ought to form an era in intellectual progress. Whether Mr. Mill be the man just designated for the task we now proceed to examine.

His principle of compilation is discussed at length in a preliminary discourse on the nature and province of logic; which results in defining it, "The science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence: both the process itself of proceeding from known truths to unknown, and all intellectual operations auxiliary thereto." The elasticity of the latter clause allowed for, there appears to be no material exception to this definition; especially pretending, as the author declares it does, but to designate the scope and leading topics of the inquiry. The mistiness of that most indefinite of terms—the understanding—is much cleared by the explanatory sequel. But why does the latter confine itself to the "operations," &c., in exclusion (are we to infer?) of the *faculties* that operate? This would be a serious omission in itself. But there is reason to fear, moreover, that some mental phenomena, which, in fact, are "operations," may, upon our common theories of the "faculties," escape analysis under this name. This, we have observed, was the radical error of all the writers on logic down to Locke and Condillac. Mr. Mill affects to relegate the more delicate duties of mental inquisition to the "transcendental metaphysicians;" to whom he also surrenders all jurisdiction "over the original data or ultimate premises of our knowledge; the determination of their nature and number, the mode in which they are obtained, and the tests whereby distinguished." Perfectly plausible! This appears a large division, a loose license, to such arrogant claimants. But it is appearance only; perhaps prudential concession, rather than intimate conviction. Be the motive what it may, the fact will be manifest, that these gentlemen are, in the sequel, left scarce a foothold, at least on the *terra firma* of the mind. The usurpation (or "re-annexation") is even intimated in the next paragraph of the Introduction; where we are told, that "logic, when viewed under *another of its aspects*, stands on the same relation to *metaphysics*, as it does to all the other sciences. For metaphysics, in endeavoring to solve

its own *peculiar* problem, must employ means, the validity of which falls under the cognizance of logic." The author's definition, then, does not comprise logic in *all* its aspects. It is otherwise, we think, with his book. A more comprehensive description is therefore requisite. The following is submitted as at least more curt:—Logic is, as a science, the knowledge of our *means*; as an art, of our *modes* of KNOWING. We leave the intelligent readers of Mr. Mill to say, which of the definitions best fits the actual contents of his work.

The "System of Logic" is divided into six Books; making about as many hundred pages of the American edition. It professes a fundamental survey of the whole structure of human knowledge; its origin, its nature, the processes by which acquired, the methods whereby perfected. Of course, then, any account of it here possible must be extremely summary; unless we too should make our article a table of contents. The mere nomenclature of the topics treated would fill our remaining space; topics, upon each of which entire volumes, not to say libraries, have been written. Our comments will, therefore, dwell but upon those portions of the work where the author shall appear to have improved upon the precedent writers, in point of either addition, explication, or arrangement. At the same time especial care will be taken to present a correct outline of the general scheme, and to indicate, as we proceed, the filiation of the leading ideas. This is a strict duty, and will be our best service, to both author and reader: a duty, nevertheless, we are sorry to say, in which critics and commentators are too commonly delinquent. But let it also be acknowledged, that it is far the hardest of the trade. Any cobbler may criticise the slipper of a Minerva. It is another thing to appreciate the symmetry and expression of the celestial whole.

As logic, like all the sciences of which it is the sovereign, is to be written about, or learned, through the medium of language, our author properly opens with the consideration of terminology. For to attempt the study of methods of inquiry, without a knowledge of the right use of language, would be, as he appositely remarks, like making an astronomical observer of one who had never learned to adjust the focal distance of his optical instruments. Indeed, the common logics, from Aristotle down, have all accorded it this preliminary importance. But the fullness and ability with which it is here treated, and under the twofold relation of names and propositions, constitute a feature rather new, and not the least valuable distinction of this treatise. There is not, at least in an equal compass, so good a dissertation upon general or philosophical grammar in the language.

It is true the author has had here no better to do than elucidate Hobbes; qualifying, however, and (as we think) correcting his ultra Nominalism. This profound thinker was perhaps the first to unfold clearly the use of language as an instrument essential not only to a train of reasoning, but to even a simple act of thought. He also made the important distinction between its double purpose as a *mark* and as a *sign*—the one for private use, the other for public; the one for memory, the other for communication. The distinction is, we hope, established conclusively by Mr. Mill, who, appropriating the word *denotation* to the former of these purposes, has assigned to the other the term *connotation*; a word from the excellent vocabulary of the schoolmen. We may remark that, in this theory of the dependence of thought upon language, Hobbes is supported by several respectable philosophers of the present day, especially among the French. Mr. Mill, however, seems unwilling to go so far. His opinion may be gathered generally from the following passage; which we quote, moreover, for its forcible rebuke of a certain philosophic cant of our day, by no means peculiar to the country to which no doubt it was especially addressed. The author says:—

“It may be objected, that the meaning of names can guide us at most only to the opinions, possibly the foolish and groundless opinions, which mankind have formed concerning things; and that as the object of philosophy is truth, not opinion, the *philosopher should dismiss words and look into the things themselves*, [the very terms of the charlatan, mark,] to ascertain what questions should be asked and answered in regard to them. This advice (which fortunately no one has it in his power to follow) is, in reality, an exhortation to discard the whole fruits of the labors of his predecessors, and demean himself as if he were the first person who had ever turned an inquiring eye upon nature. What does any one's personal knowledge of things amount to, after subtracting all which he has acquired by means of the words of other people?”—*Chap. i, § 3, p. 14.*

We should have no objection to see one of these “common-sense” philosophers thus stripped, to make the experiment!

Having made us acquainted with the properties and use of the medium through which things have to be viewed, the author proceeds to consider the things themselves, as thus denoted. Aristotle's enumeration of existences, known as the “Categories,” is rigorously sifted, and shown to be, as a classification, grossly redundant and defective: redundant, in being like a division of animals into “men, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies.” Incomplete, in omitting the operations of the mind considered irrespectively of external relation. This omission of Aristotle probably is the source of what we have

noted as the cardinal defect of the old logics. It is here supplied in the spirit of the new, and properly assigned the foremost place. The demolished ten Categories are replaced by the four Predicaments which follow, and which are presented as an enumeration and classification of all nameable things :—

1. Feelings; which are subdivisible into sensations, thoughts, emotions, volitions; the so-called faculties of perception and belief being, the former merely a case of the latter, and the latter itself but a kind of thought.

2. The minds which experience these feelings.

3. The bodies, or external objects, which excite certain of those feelings, (for several are excited by internal causes,*) together with the powers or properties whereby they excite them.

4. The successions and co-existences, the resemblances and differences between feelings or states of consciousness.

The second and third of these new categories seem to us not quite untainted with the philosophy of the rejected; at least on the principles of what may be termed the extreme left of the conceptualist logicians. In regard to the third, the concession is indeed avowed by the author, who pleads deference to the established phraseology and general prejudices. For Mr. Mill shows himself as eminently the man of moderation and wisdom, as of logic and science. He, however, admits, in fact, that we can know nothing of substances—whether bodies or minds—except the *sensations* which they respectively cause and experience. And, in truth, this is all. The multiform world which appears to be around us is actually *within* us; is to each of us but a panorama of his own sensations. This is not, as people hasten to assume, a denial of an absolute, external world. On the contrary, a panorama presupposes a *real* original. Be this as it may, our exception alludes but to the practical consequences of the compromise, as, perhaps, tending to multiply, or complicate, the technicalities of the logical art. However, we repeat, the author's course is the more sensible, if not the more scientific. But whatever may be thought of the exactness of any of these conclusions, the reader will be sure to find, in this chapter of some twenty pages, a discussion of mental philosophy—of the fundamental principles of human knowledge, and the leading theories on the subject—which, for amount, interest, and ability, he would look for in vain elsewhere.

Names and things being now examined in their individual or isolated capacity, the next transition is to that combination of them

* For an admirable exposition of them, see Cabanis's *Rapports du Physique et du moral de l'homme*.

which, viewed psychologically, is called a judgment; regarded grammatically, a proposition. In the three succeeding chapters, the author accordingly treats of the nature, import, and several sorts of propositions. His chief peculiarity here is an elaborate investigation of the question, "What is the object of belief in a proposition? What is the matter of fact signified by it?" The answer at which the author arrives himself is this: that "the object of belief in a proposition, when it asserts anything more than the meaning of words, is either the co-existence, or the sequence, of two phenomena—that is, states of consciousness." But these facts of sequence and co-existence are predicable not alone between phenomena, but also between noumena (the unknown causes of our impressions, which we call external objects,) and between a phenomenon and a noumenon. So that these combinations result in four sorts of assertion; which, together with the peculiar case of resemblance, are presented as "an exhaustive classification of matters of fact—of all things that can be believed or proposed for belief; of all questions possible and all answers to them." Of these predicables, in fine—denominated existence, co-existence, causation, sequence, resemblance—some one or other is affirmed, in every proposition, of some fact or sensation, or of some object, the unknown cause of a fact or a sensation. Of course, no idea can be here conveyed of the admirable process of analysis which has led to these results, and the interesting discussion of the previous systems. Among the latter, the *dictum de omni et nullo* of Aristotle—the principle of the syllogistic logic—is tried and soon found wanting. Hobbes' equally celebrated, and far more solid, theory of predication is also examined at great length, and, we think, refuted victoriously. It may not be generally known that, according to this theory, what is affirmed, in all propositions, is the agreement or disagreement between the *meaning of the terms* or words; not between the *ideas*, as the Conceptualists have it; nor between the external *objects*, according to the Realists. A consequence of this doctrine of Hobbes was, that truth and falsehood depended upon language, and like it, were of course arbitrary: a conclusion, for the rest, which he was a sturdier logician than good moralist in very freely avowing.

The remainder of the First Book is occupied with the two operations the most essential to scientific progress, as, indeed, they are the basis of all science,—namely, classification and definition. The latter, it might be imagined, should precede; as objects, before being classed, ought to be precisely conceived. But, as the author well remarks, the purpose of a definition, in any scientific sense,

“is not to expound a name, but to help to expound a classification.” The latter being a process to a great extent conventional, it is evident that the assemblage of objects and of relations to which it is to be applied, should be enumerated and arranged before we can venture to assign the situation or significance of individuals in the scheme. Whence it follows, that no definition can be perfect while the science it relates to is incomplete. Ponder upon this, ye who rely so religiously upon definitions in those subjects, where (as in our common law jurisprudence) there is scarce a semblance of scientific regularity! Speaking of jurisprudence, the application of the process in question to it is what is meant by codification. And if well executed in ours, where there are now the best materials, definition might become not only possible but perfect, and reduce legal reasoning and adjudication to the consistency, simplicity, and certainty of a deductive science.

The Second Book proceeds to the more proper province of logic, which is reasoning. The functions of language and the import of propositions—that is, the theory of notation and predication—were only preliminaries, though of course essential. Logic being, as Mr. Mill conceives it, the “theory of proof,” before its object could be made intelligible, it was necessary to know what it is—to which proof is applicable—“what that is which can be the subject of belief or disbelief, of denial or affirmation.”

As a proposition was remarked to be the conjunction by virtue of a certain relation of two ideas, (or two names, in propositions merely verbal,) so a somewhat similar association of propositions is what constitutes an act of reasoning; which is termed technically, when only two are employed, an enthymeme, when three, a syllogism; and an argument of whatever length is simply a series of such combinations. Corresponding to these two forms are two methods of inference, named the inductive and the deductive: the one proceeding from particulars to generals, the other inversely. Thus far there is general agreement. But here a question arises, in which our author takes an important position. What is the principle of inference? In what consists its validity? Is it in a general proposition expressed or implied? Or, is it rather in the particular facts, of which that proposition is, confessedly, no more than a collective designation? Mr. Mill has been the first, we believe, among English philosophers, to declare decidedly for the latter opinion. He maintains, that “all inference is from *particulars to particulars.*” This, of course, is vehemently disputed by the votaries of the syllogism. It has been argued, in reply to the author, that there is, at least, *convenience* in the syllogistic rea-

soning from principle. But convenience was not the question. It has been urged that, in *fact*, people commonly do so reason. But it is also a fact, that people commonly do reason from prejudice, from imagination, from absurdity; but above all, from words: which are, for the most part, expressive of a certain sort of generality, very apt, especially in this matter, to pass for the generality of principle. Mr. Mill's consideration was not, what most people *do* (or think they do) reason from; but, what is the ultimate basis of all legitimate reasoning. This he finds in the agreement (or disagreement) perceived between the thing inferred, and the thing (or things) from which the inference is made, in respect of a certain attribute, or set of attributes, recognized as the ground of the class or the conjunction. The subject of the conclusion, then, (to speak syllogistically,) is not inferred by virtue of the universality of the major term. And how should it? This term is a mere denomination given to a collection of particulars, for purposes of brevity and memory. It brings them no accession of number, or attribute, or evidence. Whence, then, the mystic efficacy claimed for it? Why, it is *called* the general; and the general, of course, includes the particular, the individual. But is this true? So far otherwise, that the very reverse is the truth: it is the particular that includes the general; the individual that contains the genus. We may say, every oak is a tree; but not, every tree is an oak. Why? Because the oak possesses (that is, contains) *all* the attributes denoted by the term tree, and others besides, which constitute its specific difference. And any particular oak would be still more capacious; because it would include, in addition to the genus and species, some things peculiar to the individual. The error lies in confounding this sort of capacity, which is called the *comprehension* of the term or proposition, with another, called the *extension*, which has reference to the number of the individuals the class comprises, not to that of the ideas, the attributes, the particulars it contains. To the false notions introduced into the general understanding, and established in the language, by this grotesque classification, it is owing, we doubt not, that the imaginary generality of barren verbal formulas becomes, in the hands (or rather head) of a syllogizer, as prolific as the Sabine sow.

To take these imaginary formulas for realities of experience was the grand error of the ancient philosophers. To employ them without examination is the pedant perversity of many of the modern. The organization of the reasoning process, while yet but an art, upon such a basis, namely, the "*summa genera*" of the categories, and the universals, or "*dictum de omni*, &c., of the syllogism—

this, we think, it was that retarded, during twenty centuries, the progress of logical science; and by that means, of course, of all the other sciences not purely deductive. And if logic still is among the latest to own the influence of the great scientific reformation, it is, that it affords the last entrenchment to those scholastic errors. Being itself the most abstract as well as abstruse of the sciences, it is thus the remotest from corrective contact with the reality of things, with Nature, who is the irresistible "*novator rerum*"—the great innovator; not as Lord Bacon has it, "Time," who, in fact, is but the minister that brings her measures into light. It was only to a state of general scientific development that the syllogistic system was adapted at all. But let it not be imputed, we in justice repeat, to Aristotle, that he delivered this system as the whole *science* of logic,—which, however, a man of Whately's sagacity is not ashamed to proclaim in the nineteenth century. That great man (Aristotle, we mean, of course) has expressly commended its *scientific* cultivation to others, and intimates that the syllogism was chiefly designed as a mode of circumventing the cavilers, or sophists, of his time, and entrapping them in their own verbal meshes. In truth, and fine, the syllogism is not only not *the* science of logic, but it is *no* science at all. It is merely a convenient formula for expressing and conducting *one* of the methods of that science: for it is applicable to but one half the reasoning process, namely, that which proceeds from "principles" (as it is expressed) to particulars. But we do not call the system of algebraical equations the *science* of algebra, nor the calculus the science of fluxions. The confusion probably arises from the actual conformity of the syllogism to the corresponding mental operation, which is the real subject of the science. The conclusion, as Mr. Mill well remarks, is in effect drawn *according to* the general premises, but *from* the particulars, of which it is but the "register." The fallacy is the old one of *cum hoc, ergo propter hoc*; which has been, we believe, exposed by Whately himself. Or, at all events, if the syllogism be a science in any sense, we should consider it the science of interpretation.

It will have been now apparent that we side with the author in his contested theory of the reasoning process. We have, however, chosen to assign our own reasons for the faith that is in us, both because we were unwilling to mar by abridgment the powerful and ingenious argument of Mr. Mill, and because we desired, if but in self-justification, to offer a word in rejoinder to certain strictures made upon this part of the "System of Logic," by an intelligent critic in one of the English Reviews. The latter circumstance

has occasioned, and we trust will excuse, our length upon this topic.

What, then, is the syllogism utterly useless? The negative might, indeed, be presumed, *à priori*, from its general reception and long duration: nothing entirely without truth or utility has ever so endured. Nor does Mr. Mill say so. Unlike the herd of its assailants, he has not suffered himself to be hurried into inconsiderate rejection of it, either by the mischievous abuses of its past doctors or the ludicrous pretensions of its present champions. He has distinguished from both, its real nature and value, and determined its proper place. There are cases, he finds, where the syllogism is not only an admissible, but is the only applicable, form of reasoning. Such are all subjects delivered to us upon authority, and in the form of general propositions. But it is hardly necessary to remark, that of this character are the two departments, the first in importance and most universal in concernment of all those of human inquiry, namely:—*Scriptural theology* and *positive law*. Mr. Mill observes:—

“In both these cases the generalities are given to us, and the particulars are elicited from them by a process which correctly resolves itself into a series of syllogisms. The real nature, however, of the supposed deductive process is evident enough. It is a search for truth, no doubt, but through the medium of an inquiry into the meaning of a form of words. The only point to be determined is, whether the authority which declared the general proposition intended to include this case in it; and whether the legislator intended his command to apply to the present case, among others, or not. This is a question, as the Germans express it, of *hermeneutics*; it relates to the meaning of a certain form of discourse. The operation is not a process of inference, but a process of interpretation.”—P. 130.

With this, too, we have particular pleasure in expressing our concurrence. We only regret the want of space to give these pregnant observations the development they deserve, but which was beside the design of the author. It is not without reason, then, and propriety, that the syllogistic art has been in such vogue with the doctors of the middle ages, and the theologians of every age.

Having thus canvassed and confuted the pretensions of the syllogistic method on the one hand, and corrected, on the other, the analytic theory of Condillac and Brown, the author goes on to establish the universal type of the reasoning process; which he finds to be, in all cases, inference from particulars. By an extension of the common acceptation, he gives it the name of induction; restricting the

term deduction to the syllogistic form, determined to be but a process of interpretation. The other chapters of this Book discuss the mode of carrying on trains of reasoning, which consist in the combination of inductions or syllogisms, in like manner as these were seen to be themselves a conjunction of propositions, (or judgments,) and the latter, in turn, a copulation of terms (or things.) Here, then, we have the ladder complete whereby man may scale the highest heaven of science. But not yet content, Mr. Mill proceeds to examine the principle of its strength, and the nature of the ground upon which it rests. And here, accordingly, follow some of the most interesting discussions of the book, on the force of demonstration; and on the so-called "first principles" of the deductive and mathematical sciences. The latter are shown to be all founded upon hypothesis; with the exception of some axioms of geometry, which, though commonly taken to be "necessary truths," are proved to be, like any others, mere inductions from experience: in the author's words, "the simplest and easiest generalizations from the facts furnished to us by our senses, or by our internal consciousness." This is to carry the analysis of the "self-evident" and *à priori* principles beyond every preceding English writer upon logic. It is also, we suspect, to trespass somewhat, at least in principle, on the stipulation made by Mr. Mill, it will be remembered, with the "metaphysicians," in the Introduction.

At this point the previous writers on logic had ended; with the addition of a chapter on Fallacies—a subject properly here postponed to the corresponding stage of the work. At this point it is that Mr. Mill's logic may be said to begin—what of it is *his*, exclusively or pre-eminently. Hitherto, he had been occupied mainly with discussing the old system, its principles and processes, lopping off the decayed branches, and removing from about the roots the rubbish of ages and the brambles of modern wranglings. Having found that all inference, consequently all proof, and all discovery of truth not self-evident, consist of inductions and the interpretation of inductions; and having proved the latter process to be the proper province of the syllogistic art—a province both limited and subordinate—the author, in the Third Book; enters upon ground entirely new, the principal province of logic as now conceived—the inductive method.

It is impossible for us, at so late a point of our space, to enter this vast region of the most profound and various investigation, erudition and criticism. The whole article would be too short to do it tolerable justice. Composing the Third and Fourth Books, in some thirty chapters, it makes within a few pages of one half

the entire work. Nor is it to our taste to give a bare enumeration of titles; we detest it in speaking whether of books or men. Even results would be idle, in subjects most of which would be found so new, and so far above the level of general comprehension—though made as plain, it should be added, by Mr. Mill, as language could render them, to minds not familiar with abstruse speculation. In skipping this part of the book, however, we have the comfort to feel that it is of interest chiefly but to a rather limited class among us; we mean philosophers and inquirers in the physical sciences. And as, to such, there will be something of significance in even a title, it can be no breach of our scruple to give them a few, by way of sample.

The first chapter investigates the Foundation of Induction; which *lands* the inquirer upon the Laws of Nature. These, in turn, are resolved into the Law of Universal Causation. Then succeed, in several chapters and serial analytical order—the Composition of Causes, Observation and Experiment, the Methods of Experimental Inquiry, (presenting the complete development of the *Novum Organum*, and which Bacon might have termed rules for the “cross-examination” of nature,) on Plurality of Causes and the Intermixture of Effects. Here the inductive procedure is exhausted; and the author inverts his course into the Deductive Method, Explanation of the Laws of Nature, Examples of it from the theories of natural philosophers, of the Limits to Explanation and of Hypothesis, Progressive Effects and the Continued Action of Causes, (one of the most interesting chapters in the book,) Empirical Laws, the Doctrines of the Elimination and of the Calculation of Chances, of Analogy, of Approximate Generalizations, and Probable Evidence. But enough: the Fourth Book concludes with an admirable disquisition on the Classification subsidiary to induction, (different from the fantastic one of the syllogism,) by groups and series.

The principles being now established and the processes explained whereby we arrive at all truth, all knowledge, whether in the way of ratiocination or of experience, this is the proper place to consider the errors to which both the operation and the operator are severally liable. Accordingly, the Fifth Book is given to the subject of Fallacies; which are treated in seven chapters under the following divisions:—Fallacies of Inspection or *à priori*, of Observation, of Generalization, of Ratiocination, of Confusion: the two introductory chapters being occupied with an exposition of their general nature and their grounds of classification. We can assure our readers of finding here not only the most profound discussion, but also the most complete enumeration, of fallacies

that has yet appeared. Not only are the technical ones of the preceding logical treatises presented in a new light, but those descriptions of sophistry merely exemplified by Bentham are also included, and some others, incident to philosophical inquiries, which had not been even noted, we believe, elsewhere. Published apart, this single Book would have been accounted one of the most useful, as well as curious, productions of the day. We had a few remarks to make upon some of these classes—the *à priori*, especially—but find our space inexorable. The little that remains we are desirous of consecrating to the Sixth (and last) Book; both because, in its matter, it is of more general interest and cognizance; and in the conception, the most original feature of the “System:”—it is the logic of the moral sciences.

It was remarked in the commencement of this paper, that man himself, though said to be the “proper,” yet seems destined to be the latest, study of man. His first flights of speculation are made in the regions of phantasy: he must know the origin and intimate nature of things. He thence descends into the more real, or at least more regular, inquiries of abstract mathematics; which are, we see, the earliest of the *sciences* to be brought to any perfection. Wandering on through this “vast inane,” he stumbles upon the heavenly bodies—somewhat such, one may fancy, as the noodle does against a ship’s masts in a fog. So, his next step is to astronomy; as if this preposterous creature must exhaust the objects of air as well as of imagination, before taking any speculative concern in the realities around him. Arrived at last upon the *terra firma* of his own planet, the physical sciences are the first, by reason of his material wants, to engage his attention. All this has taken place, through a multitude of ages, before science is conceived to be applicable to the laws of mind; much less (and therefore later) to the phenomena of society, which is an aggregation of minds and wherein the psychological problem becomes incalculably complicated. Such, it may be observed, has been the order of scientific development in the civilizations of antiquity, as well as in our own. It is universally the order of the development of our species, of which all the particular civilizations are but fragmentary phases.

Nor, after all, is this inversion of the course of inquiry so preposterous in man as it may appear. Paradoxical though it seem, it is in fact the order of facility and simplicity; the order, therefore, best adapted to the infancy of the human intellect and to the progressive education of its force. Those modern philosophers, then, who inveigh against the “visionary systems” of their predecessors of

antiquity, (and, indeed, of all time, save the "present enlightened age,") how superficially do they know the profound wisdom and ways of the Creator! This order is the easiest; for the earliest speculations—poetry, mythology, and metaphysics—are the product of imagination, the faculty first developed in childhood: it is the simplest, because the succeeding sciences, the pure mathematics—resting as they entirely do upon hypothesis, upon certain defined suppositions—require but the inferior power of *consecutive deduction*. This, we have seen, is the province of the syllogism: this accordingly was the intellectual period of its invention. We may add, that no other logical method could have been then devised or discovered, because no other method could have been applicable. The human intellect, thus gradually grown into vigor, would find itself, at length, of force to embrace the multitude, and to penetrate the mysteries, of material objects. For this were requisite the maturer faculties of observation and analysis. Here is the period of true philosophy. The logic befitting it was the inductive method. Accordingly have we seen, that Bacon, like Aristotle, made his appearance in due time. But this method has, in its turn, proved inadequate to the exigence of the moral sciences, of which man is at once the *subject* and object; and which are infinitely more complex than the preceding, in their relations and details. Experiment is unavailable for want of means of tentation *in animâ vili*; and for any comprehensive observation, we are placed *too near* the object. The mind cannot contemplate itself at the requisite distance. Its view is (to speak geometrically) taken in *section*, not in *plan*. And even this view is too painful for the patience necessary to any success, as it is far too partial for the purposes of science.

It was not, therefore, until after the cycle of adjacent knowledges had been elementized and methodized, and the theory of method itself commensurately perfected, that it could have been possible, or appeared practicable, to extend the like process, for the same purpose, to the phenomena of man, first in his individual, and after in his associated, condition. For, from the variety of the points of observation (so to speak) thus afforded by these surrounding sciences, we can ascertain the mind's position and many of its bearings, which are utterly inaccessible to direct analysis; and by a method such as enables the surveyor to take the dimensions of a piece of land, to which he could not apply the chain because of an intervening river. As the method of the surveyor is the strictly synthetical one of trigonometry, so the method of the mental and the political philosopher can be only the deductive. Accordingly, this is the method which Mr. Mill proceeds to urge

as *the* logic proper to the moral and political sciences. And seeing he has had to strive against the quacks of the day, who linger still in this department of the sciences under the imposing titles of "practical" men, men of "common sense," etc.—persons who will have the phenomena of society to be ascertainable but by the "inductive method," (of which they know at least the name,) and cant about "facts" as if they were so many chemical, nay *crucial* experiments,—in view of this, and the circumstance that the pest is of peculiar rife and malignancy in this country, we have thought the foregoing little dissertation, psychological and historical, would not be amiss, in justification of his enlightened and important views.

The general (we might say the philosophical) intelligence seems, then, to be still in that state, where not only the proper method is misconceived, but the possibility of this science itself continues to be questioned. All science presupposes invariable laws for its basis. In matters wherein the phenomena are successive, this scientific basis is constancy of causation. Does this prevail among human actions? If yes, is man a "free agent?" If no, there undoubtedly can be no *science* of mind, or of morality, or of polity. Here, then, is the everlasting question of "free-will, foreknowledge, fate," set, as it were, like the triple-mouthed Cerberus, to guard the entrance of our author's inquiry. He recognizes the obstacle, and proceeds to remove it, in this wise.

The state of the *controversy* is represented to be as follows. The doctrine of necessity asserts that human volitions and actions are necessary and inevitable. The opposite tenet maintains that the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by antecedents, by motives, but determines itself; "that our volitions are not, properly speaking, the effects of causes, or, at least, have no causes which they uniformly and implicitly obey." This, we believe, is a correct exhibition of the case. Mr. Mill declares for the affirmative opinion; but goes on to explain, that the term "necessity" it is that makes all the mischief, and that the doctrine, rightly conceived, means but innocently this: "That given the notions which are present to an individual's mind, and given, likewise, the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event." This proposition he considers a mere interpretation of universal experience, a statement of what every one is internally convinced of: of which we think there can be no doubt. And yet, he argues, we do not *feel ourselves* the less free because

of this full assurance. The argument, then, is, this *consciousness of our freedom*. But to this there are at least two objections: first, *its reality is not proved*; especially in the face of the apparently repugnant sentiment just alledged by Mr. Mill in support of his position, and the existence of which is in fact entirely unequivocal. But, in the second place, were this consciousness ever so real, it would, it seems to us, be worth nothing as an answer to the doctrine of necessity. We would not be understood to place in doubt this feeling of our freedom. So far otherwise, we are of opinion Mr. Mill might have proved it as conclusively as he argued for the contrary sentiment of causation. For instance, the remotely consequential (and therefore less suspicious) feeling of remorse for crime, is inconceivable upon any other supposition than this feeling of our freedom. But, after all, the question is this:—Are we free effectually to do a particular act *merely because we feel* we are? In a chamber, with the door locked and the key abstracted, all unknown to me, would I be confined any the less for my *feeling* that I was perfectly at large? If not, the feeling that my conduct is chosen freely, makes nothing at all for the *fact* in controversy; which is not, whether I *felt* that I chose freely, nor even whether I did so choose in *fact*, but whether it was *in my power, had I happened to choose otherwise than I did, to have changed the event?* And if it was not, is it to be held that this illusory feeling of free agency attaches morality to conduct, gives equity to the infliction of punishment, either here or hereafter, by man or by God?

Mr. Mill, apparently to elude this consequence (for he nowhere meets it) pretends that, while a man's acts are the inevitable results of his character, etc., and his character is in like manner the consequence of other antecedent acts generally external, yet is it also true that his will must be reckoned an element in these antecedent acts. A loop-hole, doubtless, through which to let in moral responsibility. But we are given no proof of this power of the will to modify one's own character, except that we *feel* we can do so: the old argument, which we have considered already.

But it is, that people revolt, says Mr. Mill, from the idea of constraint conveyed by the word *necessity*. Whereas, all that is meant by causation of any sort is simple succession. Even no material cause is to be supposed to exercise any compulsion over its effect. "It would be more correct to say that matter is *not* bound by necessity, than that mind *is* so." But does this mend the matter? If we are to suppose, (in the spirit of Brown's theory of causation, here alluded to,) that motives, good or bad, (as they are commonly qualified,) exert no influence in the production of the consequent volitions, nor these in

that of the subsequent actions; but that all occur independently, by a sort of pre-established harmony, where, we ask, is the principle of moral merit or demerit, in this hypothesis, any more than in that of the fastest fatalism? But we have passed due proportion on this point. It was all important, however, that the force, both of the arguments and objections for the freedom of the will, should not be left liable to misapprehension from the insufficient, not to say biased, account of them by Mr. Mill. More we cannot do here. But we can tell the reader where to find an ample supplement to Mr. Mill's representation; we refer to the admirable "Edward Search"*—the deepest and most diligent searcher, we do not hesitate to affirm, that has entered, since the days of Pelagius, this most gloomy and intricate of metaphysical labyrinths.

For the rest, it is not to be denied that Mr. Mill has made good his own case. He has shown, by the common sentiment of mankind, supported besides by the analogy of all nature, that human actions, volitions, and their external antecedents, constitute a chain of invariable succession, of constant causation. And if he has not adequately reconciled human liberty and morality with this fact, it is, doubtless, that he did not write as a theologian or a metaphysician; his view being merely logical, his object scientific. The result of his discussion seems to be recapitulated with sufficient accuracy, as well as with brevity, in the following passage, which we will, perhaps, be pardoned for quoting from a slight notice of Mr. Mill's work, which appeared, on its original publication, in one of the Magazines of this city.† "That every effect has a cause, every (voluntary) action a motive, both the parties will agree. That every motive is, in turn, the effect of some cause, must, if but by consequence, be also admitted. That the will is free *to choose the motive it will act upon*, though *not* to act without a motive, neither logic nor consciousness will allow to be denied. How, then, stands the question? As regards the *motive*, the will, or more accurately

* Tucker's Light of Nature. Chapter, On the Will.

† Regard to truth alone (the writer's identity being unconcerned) induces the avowal here of several material inaccuracies in the notice alluded to; some, by the writer, and not a few, as may be easily observed, by the intelligent proof-reader or editor, who assumed the supervision of the press. It was written hastily, from a cursory glance through the book, and moreover, with exclusive reference to the legal profession. For all this, he does not regret its appearance; having the satisfaction to know, that by its humble means the great work of Mr. Mill has been introduced already to much of the proper attention in this country. If it has also conducted to the present republication, the writer will claim "to have deserved well of the republic."

the volition, is free; the consequent *action* is 'necessary'—but NECESSARY, as importing simply *a fact of succession*, a certainty of conjunction; not at all implying the *compulsion* of an extraneous agency. But it is the motive, not the act, that makes the morality of conduct. Thus, then, the will, or volition, may be morally 'free,' while the actions and the motives (which are effects, too, as well as causes) are *philosophically necessary*."

The law of causation among the mental phenomena established, the author examines, in the two subsequent chapters, whether the laws of the phenomena themselves are ascertainable; in other words, whether the science of mind be not merely possible, but also practicable. He comes to an affirmative conclusion, after discussing with the usual ability, and discarding, the physiological or "materialist" theories of Hartley, Cabanis, and others; which go to place mind and its operations among the physical sciences. The proper object of the mental science he thinks to be the formation of character; or as he terms it, (after *M. Comte*,) ethology. The method applicable to it, (as we demonstrated in the observations prefatory to this Book, a few pages back,) he shows, from the nature of the subject, to be by possibility no other than the deductive—"setting out from general laws, and verifying their consequences by specific experience." To the double process he gives the name of the concrete deductive method. It will be remarked that the exact reverse of this is the method, or rather usage, in vogue with the herd of political and historical writers. The "specific experience"—which they call *facts*—is with them everything. The "general laws" are invoked at all only to color a cause or round a system. To this Mr. Mill gives the name of the chemical or experimental method. Far too respectable, we think. The practitioners themselves would be proud, probably, to name it the "practical" method. Empirical were more appropriate than either—that is, vulgarly, quack. May we expect that this description of our own politicians—we address ourselves to them as an "undoubted majority"—will meditate on this portion, at least, of "The System of Logic!"

The error just characterized is that of the pettifoggers of politics. There is, also, an error peculiar to the erudite and speculative, who, by a like analogy, might, in certain particulars, be called the pedants. These gentlemen disdain to seek political knowledge by any other road than the "high *priori*;" in like manner as the practicals would think as soon of seeking it by the Milky-way, as by this, or indeed any other, course than the intricate purlieus and dirty lanes of party. The learned method Mr. Mill terms the geometrical, and exemplifies by the political systems of Plato,

Hobbes, and the "Bentham school"—in which his own father holds a pre-eminent place.

Having first ascertained the laws of mind as manifested in the isolated, purely natural individual, and in the next step pursued them through the modifications to which they should be submitted in the formation of character, (which is the *science* of education,) the third, and final, task is to examine and to systematize their varied phenomena as exhibited in the multiplied relations of social life. This is the science of society, which Mr. Mill denominates sociology. This term, too, is borrowed from *M. Comte*; a philosopher to whom Mr. Mill (as he has himself repeatedly acknowledged) is indebted for *things* as well as terms, and whom we are happy to consider with our author to be—irreligion, of course, excepted—at once the most profound and practical living thinker of Europe. This Book, and the work, closes with a particularly instructive chapter on the Logic of Practice and Art generally, including those of morals and politics.

Looking back upon what we have written, it is, in some sort, painful to perceive its disproportion to the treasures we have been obliged to leave unindicated by notice, or even name. But the design was not to retail to our readers, in a necessarily mutilated condition, what they will find (as we trust they will hasten to seek) in the work itself. The desire was rather to prepare them to discover its merits themselves; to present a *connected* and *comprehensive* view not merely of the book, but of its subject also; to provide them the map of a region so vast in extent, so obstructed with difficulties, and so unfamiliar, we fear, to most readers in this country. For it is, we believe, a fact that there is not in the world another people, with one half our general information, so deficient in either the scientific knowledge, or the practical observance, of logic and method. This is visible—*ad nauseam*—in our political writings and public documents. Those executive "messages," we see "long drawn out" (though neither "sweet" nor "linked") to an octavo volume, might, with a little method, be presented, and in a more comprehensible and effective shape, in general in one tenth the compass, their impertinences even inclusive: impertinences, it is to be observed, which spring from the same ignorance of logical order, without which the writer can have no distinct conception of either the principle of the subject, or the pertinences of the object, or the proprieties of the occasion. Here is also the cause of that diluted jumble of common-places which compose our parliamentary speeches. Such speakers have no determinate beginning; and as to coming to any end, they can hardly be said to be "free agents." Their exordium and peroration might interchange places indiffer-

ently. The reality of their rhodomontade transcends the imagination of the poet, who gave his monster a head and tail, though but that of a horse and of a fish; whereas a Congress speech has neither head nor tail, of any sort whatever.

It is time these wholesome truths were told: it is time these defects should look for remedy. In such circumstances, we fondly regard the present publication as destined, sooner or later, to have a most salutary effect upon the intellectual condition of our people. "A good logic," says a great master of the subject, Condillac, "may be slow in effecting a revolution in the general mind, and time alone may be able to evince the extent of its utility." O.

ART. II.—*Memoir of the late Rev. Alexander Proudfit, D. D. With Selections from his Diary and Correspondence, and Recollections of his Life, &c., by his Son.* By JOHN FORSYTH, D. D., Minister of Union Church, Newburgh. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846.

IT is not unfrequently said, that the life of a village pastor can afford but few, if any, materials for interesting biography. Hence, but little more than a brief obituary notice has been taken of many men, who might have labored through scores of years for the cause of God!—as if it were a trivial work to which they devoted themselves unto death; or an ordinary circumstance for men to gain the mastery over the pride and ambition of our fallen nature, and to deny themselves for the sake of perishing souls; or, as if there were not as weighty lessons to be gathered from the recorded exercises of a mind in its deep longings after God, and in its irrepressible desires for the deliverance of other minds from the bondage of error and sin, as from the adventures of a traveler, or the exploits of a hero.

Here is the secret of that indifference with which the life of a clergyman is too often regarded. Few, it may be, have any idea of interest, save that which is attached to outward events and spirit-stirring scenes. Indeed, the general mind has been conversant solely with military achievements, political movements, or the operations of successful trade—perhaps, with the scenic representations of the drama, or the fictitious characters of the novel; while, either from educational biases or worldly inclinations, it has no sympathy with mental pursuits and enjoyments; much less with the ex-

ercises of a soul smitten with the love of doing and receiving good—with the longings of a soul to discover and communicate saving truth.

None but minds of kindred aspirations can enter with zest into the life of a man of letters; and to such, no biography, however replete with thrilling incidents or brilliant actions, affords such materials for thought, or such incentives to studious retirement; and the interest is enhanced by the absence of all those things which serve to constitute vulgar greatness. We want to know the mode of mental discipline to which this man of genius, whose philosophy elevates or whose poetry refines our nature, was subjected in early life; what circumstances attended the incipient development of his faculties; what authors quickened his slumbering energies, enlarged his vision, or modified his views; what suggestions, or processes of thought, contributed to the grand result.

And so in relation to the life of a minister of the gospel: be it that he lived remote from the din and smoke of crowded cities; or, that few outward circumstances relieved the even tenor of his everyday walk; if he were a man of earnest thought and action, of active beneficence, and consistent piety, true to the great ends of the Christian ministry, we must turn to the pages of his biography with feelings of more than curious interest, if so be that we ourselves have any sentiments in unison with the "truth as it is in Jesus," or would secure that benefit which may result from a serious comparison of our own views and experiences with those of others. Hence it is, that the biography of a Christian minister should refer more especially to the nature of his first convictions of truth and duty, to the manner in which he was brought to take the step which decided his future course, to the views and feelings with which he entered the ministry, to his mental as well as spiritual preparation for that high office, to his subsequent course of study and effort, to whatever spiritual conflicts he may have sustained, whatever doubts and fears may have at times environed his faith; whatever special communications of light, and love, and peace, he may have enjoyed; what peculiar views may have shaped his thoughts; what features characterized his words and actions; what difficulties and discouragements he may have labored under; what obstacles he may have overcome which thwarted the path of known duty; what sacrifices he may have made to principle; what were the teachings of his life as well as of his lips; and what the influence of his ministry on the cause of sound learning as well as of true religion; and in such things, no matter how retired his field, or obscure his apparent lot, though his church might not have been thronged by the

devotees of wealth and fashion, nor his ear greeted by the sounds of popular applause, there are materials enough for an interesting and instructive biography;—the very materials which he should covet who would write a Life for those who most need it—fellow-laborers in the vineyard, stewards of the mysteries of God, who are themselves soon to be called on to render up their own solemn account.

It is the *inner life* which we wish to see delineated in all its varied phases—that life which imparts its form and complexion to the outward man, without which we are still a stranger to *himself*, though we may have been told where he lived and preached, how many were added to his church, or how many objects he favored and promoted; without which we have gathered no valuable hints, nor received any essential aid; without which, though we may have followed the course of the narrative, we have not been led to introvert our thoughts on our own internal being.

As the worldly mind ponders with eager interest the various plans and movements by which one accumulated riches, or another rose to power, so, if we are at all concerned for our own or the spiritual interests of others, we would find in religious biography something that may tend to confirm our faith or to encourage our hope, and increase our usefulness. If the subject of the memoir was a minister of the gospel, we would see him in his family, in the social circle, by the wayside, as well as in his pulpit. As the end of all good preaching is right practice, as the strongest argument in favor of Christianity is a good life, we would know whether his daily deportment exemplified the principles which he professed and inculcated. As nothing is of such vast moment as religious truth,—did he *feel* as he spoke? As there is a great diversity of religious views,—what were his *peculiar* sentiments? What the foundation of his faith and hope? What the ground on which he dared to combat, nor vainly dared to encounter the world, the flesh, and the devil?

It is for the Christian minister to instruct the ignorant, to reprove the erring, to confirm the doubting, to embolden the timid, to soothe the wounded spirit, to cheer and fortify the soul against its last enemy; and we would gather some lessons of wisdom from the pages of his recorded life, lest we should break the bruised reed, or quench the smoking flax—distress, where we should comfort, or mislead, where we should guide.

It is in some respects painfully interesting to trace the history of those who have undertaken the work of the ministry: some beginning in the spirit, but ending in the flesh: some prostituting their noble gifts to idle theory, or, by irregular and misdirected effort,

accomplishing less than the feeblest powers moved and concentrated by singleness of eye: some cherishing the loftiest thoughts, breathing the holiest desires, yet clogged with the meanest wants, denied as it were their very bread by the people for whose spiritual good they labored, thwarted in their warmest efforts, reviled for having humbly aimed to lead some lost soul back to the fold of Christ:—thrust out! One toiling in obscurity, with small means of subsistence, amid privations and discouragements: another occupying the pulpit of a costly and magnificent edifice, supported in affluence, flattered by the crowd. One tenanted the snug parsonage, enjoying the smiling scene which adorns his hearth, living comfortably and quietly, though not without some fruits of his ministry: another pursuing his solitary way amid the heat of summer or the snows of winter, over dreary and uncultivated tracts, to meet the few scattered *poor ones* who await his coming—it may be in some far-off land beneath a tropical sky, to “preach Jesus and the resurrection” to some worshipers of demon gods. One greeted with hosannas, but soon sinking into obscurity: another bringing to his work a fine mind and glowing heart, securing the respect of the aged and the attachment of the young—at once eloquent in speech and energetic in action, bidding fair to extend and adorn the borders of Zion, suddenly cut down,—it may be prostrated by over exertion, and either falling into premature decay, or sinking into an early tomb: while here and there one may be found, who, having changed from place to place, now essaying this, and then adopting some other plan, doing some good despite his indiscretions, at last survives his usefulness, becomes a burden to himself and to others. Comparatively rare are the instances where one attains to advanced years, having labored in one field; or, continuing to labor, sees still the evidences that he has not lived too long to be useful.

Yet among these are to be found some of the purest, noblest specimens of humanity; men who address themselves to the good of our souls; who inspire us with higher aims than power or pleasure; who point to brighter worlds, and lead the way.

The life of any one among them, however obscure his post of duty, or imperfect his character, might not be without benefit, if candidly written, with all its lessons either of encouragement or of warning: but the life of an aged minister, one who ceased not day nor night to make supplication to God, and who abounded in works of faith and charity, we shall be disappointed sadly if it repay not our perusal.

For this reason, we have deemed it a not unwelcome task to

call the attention of the religious community to the above-named work: a work to which its author was prompted by a desire to subserve the cause of piety and benevolence, not less than by a generous regard for the memory of his venerable friend; and for which he richly merits the thanks of all who either knew the subject of this Memoir, or who value the influence of a holy life.

It is not our purpose, however, to enter into a particular criticism of the work. We have noticed certain repetitions, some new forms of words, the introduction of a few unimportant particulars, and perhaps, in general, a freer use of Dr. Proudfit's diary and correspondence than was necessary, either to an analysis of his character or to the interest of the narrative.

Certain things, too, are omitted, which, if supplied, would have enabled us not only to form our own judgment respecting the points involved, but to treasure them up amid other useful remembrances, in case we ourselves should ever be subjected to similar trials.

Writing amid the multiplied engagements of parochial life, it cannot be expected that everything would have occurred to the author's mind, or that no facts should have escaped his inquiries: but to these we will briefly advert for the sake of certain suggestions which may not be in vain.

It is painful to think, for example, that any occurrence should have tended to impair the friendship which so long subsisted between Dr. Proudfit and the late Dr. John Mason; a friendship which elicited the warmest expressions of reciprocal regard, and occasioned the epistolary interchange of those sentiments which ever characterize true hearts, when enamored with truth and burning with holy zeal; and if the writer did not feel himself at liberty to advert to the cause, it had been better to pass over the fact in silence. Possibly, both might have been in some respects culpable; though we are by no means inclined to indorse this common solution of personal difficulties—a solution frequently resorted to by those who are either incapable of discriminating, or selfishly averse from exercising a dispassionate judgment, lest they should incur the enmity of one or the other party. In most instances of the kind there is a *right* and a *wrong*; and, as a general rule, he who has done the wrong, to shield himself at once from merited rebuke and self-reproach, vociferously maintains that he himself has been wronged. Such is human nature; such at times the imperfection of even good men!

As nothing more than a bare allusion has been made to this occurrence, we are left only with an unpleasant impression on our

minds; without an opportunity of improving such an occurrence to the more judicious regulation of friendly intercourse.

In like manner is it painful to reflect, that Dr. Proudfit should have been threatened, on several occasions, with the loss of his "peace and reputation;" and, though it is gratifying to see him recording the goodness of God in having "wonderfully interposed in his behalf, when he himself could devise no method of deliverance, when to human appearance there was no possibility of escape, when perplexity and ruin were seemingly unavoidable;" yet, as the circumstances are not detailed, how are we to respond to his glowing sentiments of devout gratitude? Or, how can any good man apply these facts to his own case? The natural impression of any man in trouble is, that no one was ever so cruelly assailed, or in such a strait before: other persons might have experienced deliverance, but it was not in such an emergency! Was an *innocent* man ever so suspected and traduced? Hence, the encouragement which may be derived while laboring under false and foul imputations, by reading such cases of refuted calumny and exposed malice against some of the holiest of God's servants, as may be found in the lives of Baxter, Tennent, and Payson.*

It also seems to us, that another important omission occurs in the absence of all specific reasons for leaving his pastoral charge. After having been settled for forty years in Salem, we cannot but wonder that either he should have been willing to leave, or that his people should have permitted him to depart. Weighty reasons, doubtless, induced the step; but it might have been of benefit to others had these reasons been made known; serving, too, among other instances, to enable us to decide with more wisdom the question—how long a minister may profitably remain in one location.

Another deficiency may be noted in passing: the Memoir furnishes us with no idea of the manner in which a minister, who

* See Orme's Life and Times of Richard Baxter, vol. ii, p. 56. Payson's Memoir, 2d edition, p. 305. Life of Rev. Wm. Tennent, jr., by the author of a recent work entitled, "LOG CABIN," p. 194. It is such facts as these to which reference is made, which should render us exceedingly backward to accord disparaging reports of the character of those who stand high in the church; though it by no means follows from such facts, that any charge which may be adduced against a clergyman of high repute, cannot possibly be true. In either case the law of evidence should be observed—ever presuming innocence—ever hoping that the matter may in some way be explained without violating candor,—in consistency with the interests of truth and righteousness; and never condemning, save where the proof of guilt is at once palpable and complete.

preached for so many years, prepared for the pulpit; or, by what division of his time he was able to compass so many objects, and write so much for the press; nor have we any critical analysis, much less any specimen of his sermons, though it appears from the Memoir that they have passed through several editions.

Whatever tends to illustrate habits of mind and modes of thought, to suggest a plan of efficient labor or of success in preaching, though not of general interest, cannot be without importance to any one who is studiously preparing for the gospel ministry.

One preaches extemporaneously; another reads, or memorizes, and his sermons may either be the rambling and superficial suggestions of the moment—mere extemporaneous writing—or the result of thoughts often revolved, closely connected, forcibly expressed. The mind of one seldom advances beyond its multiplied divisions and subdivisions, amid which it moves as in a beaten circuit; another, instinct with native energy, and regardless alike of formal arrangements and needless explanations, pursues its brilliant course to a grand and impressive conclusion. One is essentially reproductive in all its thoughts; another thinks for itself—thinks deeply, moved by quenchless desires, inexpressible emotions. But whatever diversity of mental character may appear in the pulpit, the connection between early training and future standing may be always traced: the importance of a right state of heart as well as of a disciplined intellect, to the best, the most effective style of preaching. In a preacher, worthy of the name, it will always be found that the powers of the intellect are indissolubly interwoven with both the moral sentiments and the religious affections. Hence, it has occurred to us, as the subject of this Memoir was pre-eminently a man of prayer, that a spirit of heartfelt piety must have breathed through all his sermons; that most of them might have been suggested during his hours of devout and meditative retirement; and if it were so, it would have furnished us with an additional exemplification of the truth of Luther's well-known adage:—*Bene orasse, est bene studuisse.*

We should like also to have seen, at the conclusion of the Memoir, a chapter embracing the great outlines of his character, as illustrated by the habits and incidents of his life. A passing remark is not enough for the general reader; and when the incidents are recalled at the close in illustration of the various traits of character, they appear more as parts of a whole, and tend to produce a more decided and lasting impression.

This, however, has been in a measure supplied by a letter from Dr. Proudfit's son, which is inserted at length toward the close of

the volume—a most beautiful filial tribute—bearing the impress of classic culture and religious sensibility : and on account of this, Dr. Forsyth probably thought it unnecessary to enlarge.

His own remarks, such as are scattered throughout the narrative, are pertinent and sensible,—evincing at once his correct appreciation of Dr. Proudfit's character, and his desire to promote sound views on various matters of importance to the church of Christ.

We apprehend, therefore, that few can read this Memoir without profit ; none, who enjoyed an acquaintance with Dr. Proudfit, without decided interest : and as there is no obtrusion of sectarian views, we can have no hesitation in recommending it to the perusal of all denominations.

It is delightful to contemplate the life of one who, in his early freedom from sectarian biases, seems to have been in advance of his times ; who could look beyond his own narrow pale and see in other evangelical communions the true followers of the Lord Jesus Christ ; who, amid circumstantial varieties, could discern and appreciate substantial unity ; who, amid denominational separations, could recognize, in simple, cordial love to Jesus, a bond of widespread spiritual union ; who, without compromising truth and duty, could be charitable toward those who differed from him, and either invite them to his own, or unite with their communion ; who, while aiming to do good himself, could rejoice in whatever good was instrumentally effected by others, and even especially plead with God for their success.

Was this so ? We have only to refer our readers to pages 53, 93, and 137, among others ; but more particularly to the eleventh resolution entered in his diary, to be satisfied that his was a truly catholic spirit.

“ That I will endeavor to remember in my spiritual exercises of meditation and prayer, ministers of the gospel, whatever may be their communion, or wherever their residence may be, because I know by experience that their work is an arduous one, their discouragements many, and in their fidelity the honor of Jesus, the success of the gospel, and the eternal welfare of souls, are deeply involved.”—P 85.

We have no recollection of having anywhere met with a similar resolution : it breathes a spirit of tender sympathy with all who are laboring in the common cause,—of unaffected concern for the honor of Christ and the good of souls. To our mind there is something inexpressibly touching in the reason assigned for this resolve ; it tells us in a manner which cannot be mistaken, that

“ He is honest in the sacred cause ! ”

Indeed, there can be no surer criterion of a minister's sincerity than a disposition to promote the interests, and to rejoice in the success, of other laborers for Christ; and we regard it as one among the few favorable signs of the present, that there is a growing disposition among the ministers of different evangelical denominations to unite in benevolent projects, to join together in holy prayer, and in occasional instances to exchange pulpits.

This temper of heart in Dr. Proudfit, while it impelled him to devise ways and means for doing good, was strengthened by his unrestrained and cordial intercourse with others, and his active co-operation with different benevolent objects.

He lived at the time of the commencement of the missionary effort in this country, together with the formation of the prominent benevolent societies. That he hailed them with joy, that he was among the first to unite for such purposes, might be readily inferred from his early solicitous regard for the religious welfare of those who, scattered throughout the land, were destitute of the means of grace.

He who was moved to write tracts for the frontier settlements, and who could occasionally traverse the western wilds for the sake of preaching the gospel to a few scattered families, was not likely to stand aloof from a missionary society, or to look with the jealous eye of a high-church dignitary on the formation of a society for circulating the Word of life. Years before the date of those beautiful towns and villages which now attract the notice of the traveler as he pursues his rapid way to the west—before the woods were leveled, on the ground where now so many pastors resort in summer months for healthful recreation—the subject of this Memoir undertook his first missionary tour.

It is such facts as these which give importance to the life of Dr. Proudfit, and must serve to identify his name not only with the leading benevolent objects of the day, but with the early history of northern New-York; the history of that which pertains to churches and societies, and to the cause of education.

He might not have created much excitement, or been greeted with those marks of popular favor which the modern system of newspaper puffing has secured to not a few preachers; but by pursuing his noiseless way, attending this or that meeting, this or that board either of education or of benevolent movement; now preaching to his own people, and then to those who seldom heard the message of salvation; now writing for publication, and then conversing with this young man on the subject of religion, or assisting that one in his academical course; and all this with uniform action

year after year; and at last living to see many of the youth of his flock occupying important posts both in the church and in the state—he became his country's benefactor, and that in a higher sense than he who has merely warded off from her borders the prowling savage.

When will the efforts of Christian ministers be justly appreciated? How different the state of this community, had it not been for those who left the mother country to preach the gospel in America! Bringing with them the resources of educated minds and the energies of pure hearts, they denied themselves for the sake of truth and righteousness, and, dying as they lived, left their sons to exemplify their principles and perpetuate their influence.

For ourselves, we love to go back and retrace the course of the former generations of ministers in this country, no matter to what denomination they belonged. Whether they were settled preachers or itinerants, whether connected with a college or an academy; each in their respective sphere exerted an influence which, though difficult to trace in every line, is not now unfelt.

There is scarcely an institution for learning throughout the land which may not in its origin be directly or indirectly traced to the forecasting intellect and the patriotic promptings of some humble preacher of the cross; while the cause of the American Revolution numbered from among the same class some of its most ardent supporters. True religion is identified with the love of country; all that tends to render that country intelligent and virtuous, and by consequence permanently free and prosperous; and who will say, that the prayers of our fathers have not been answered, as we think of the dangers which we have escaped, and of the advancement which we have made in all that constitutes the true glory of a people?

It is a common impression, that the ministry of the present day is more oppressed by labor than in times past; but if there were then less to be done because there were few churches and few people, or, it may be, less demand on the ministry, let it be recollected that the ministers of the Word were few and far between; and therefore much devolved on each individual.

We presume it was then, as it is now: there are *drones* now—men who rest content with a formal routine of duty, availing themselves of every possible assistance and relief: there were such before our time. But there was then enough, and more than enough, to do, for any minister whose heart beat with anxiety for perishing souls, or who, foreseeing the destinies of this country, aimed to scatter wide the good seed of the Word. Such a one was Dr. Proudfit.

Perhaps few of us will be able to read his Memoir without the obtruding thought of many a misspent hour, or neglected opportunity of doing good.

Whether we can form a correct estimate of any one from his diary, is a matter of doubt. Self-deception here is as possible, it may be as common, as in other things. On this account, as well as from its tendency to induce a morbid sensitiveness in relation to one's personal religion, diaries are thought by many to be a questionable means of promoting a sound and cheerful piety. Nevertheless, Dr. Proudfit's diary seems to be exempt from the faults which have not unfrequently called forth the animadversions of the well-balanced Christian mind. It is full without tedious minuteness, and candid without exaggeration—a simple record of those various states of mind which have passed under the serious notice of every one's consciousness, who realizes his own need of God's grace, alike to his peace and his usefulness. Unless, however, the general tenor of a diary be supported, as in the present instance, by one's daily walk and conversation, we are free to confess that we attach but little importance to it, when cited in evidence of superior piety.

That Dr. Proudfit is also to be regarded as pre-eminently a man of prayer, on account of those peculiarities of manner to which the Memoir alludes, will not perhaps be admitted by all. As he wished to be left free himself, no one who adopts a different mode should be condemned as devoid of a spirit of prayer. What in him was well received and rightly construed, might give offense or preclude confidence if adopted by others. Let it not be forgotten, that there is a great diversity of gifts, and that grace manifests itself not only in different degrees, but in different ways.

Be this as it may: it will not be questioned that Dr. Proudfit was a truly pious and devoted minister of the gospel. That he could have been such without perseverance in prayer, no Christian will assert; that he was, is evident not merely from the results of a ministry which witnessed so many accessions to his church, and such a number raised up to preach that gospel which in youth they had been led to embrace through his instrumentality,—for one may be faithful, and yet not always witness any immediate fruits from his labors; but from the manner in which he addressed himself to pastoral duty, his desire not only to embrace opportunities but to seize possibilities, his tender watchfulness over the young—aiming to endear them to himself that his instructions might have the more influence—his endeavors to reclaim or discipline the erring, his efforts to teach his people through the press as well as the pulpit, his sympathy with the afflicted, his compassion for the poor and

the ignorant, his concern for his pulpit whenever he was obliged to officiate elsewhere; and though last not least, his remembrance of his people in his prayers and in his letters whenever he was absent, though only for a short time.

That his first published sermon was on "Family Religion," is to our mind a significant circumstance. It speaks to us of one who was not only intent on doing good, but desirous of laying the foundations of deep and permanent usefulness. If religion be not exemplified in the family relation, can there be piety in the church? And unless a minister regulate his own household, unless all his words and actions, his temper *there*, his influence over the inmates of his dwelling, be in accordance with his profession and the spirit of his sacred office, must not he himself be destitute of the grace of God?

If the subject of this Memoir gave evidence that he was conscientious in his pastoral charge, it is equally clear that he was consistent and exemplary in his family. It is as a Christian parent, not less than as a Christian minister, that he appears to us in so favorable a light. What a blessed inheritance!—the blending teachings and example, the counsels and prayers, of a Christian parent!

Were it consistent with our limits we should enlarge on this point: so deep is our conviction that domestic piety is the truest exponent of a minister's sincerity; and that, were Christian duty more generally observed in families, religion in churches would be in a more flourishing state. We care not how eloquently one may preach; we want to know what he is when retired from the gaze of the world: how he may pray in public, if the influence of his domestic example be not favorable to religion.

There is, therefore, many a useful lesson to be gathered from this Memoir. He who is doubtful of his own spiritual state, may see in the experience of a man of God the same hopes and fears, the same joys and sorrows. He who is environed by dangers, threatened with evils, may be reminded of the Christian's resource. He who is surrounded by enemies, may enjoy peace of mind by imitating the manner in which a Christian should ever view and receive ill treatment.—P. 182.

The minister of the gospel may be encouraged by such recorded incidents as go to show that God is often better than our unbelieving fears—that good is often done when none was anticipated; or, if dissatisfied with his retired field of labor, may see the evidence that a rural settlement, however small, is no obstacle to wide-spread, permanent usefulness.

The private Christian, too, may be led to appreciate more highly

the work and the character of a faithful pastor. Even the worldling, could he be induced to read it, might be constrained to say, "Truly there is a reality in religion—these men watch for souls as they who must give account."

Dr. Proudfit lived to a good old age; and it is pleasing to reflect that as his natural strength did not abate, neither did his love grow cold. As in the early days of his ministry, so in the latter days of his life, he was the same spiritually-minded man.

What an encouragement this! and how does it tend to invigorate our faith to see one, through all toils and trials, all temptations and discouragements, holding on to the good profession which he made before many witnesses; still adhering to the principles and grasping the promises of that gospel which he had so often preached,—in the close of a long life, adoring in deeper strains of praise the protecting goodness and redeeming grace of God, praying with only the deeper earnestness for larger measures of a sanctifying spirit; and while looking with a steadier gaze toward heaven, still mindful of the interests of Zion, still seeking the salvation of the lost,—breathing sentiments of expansive benevolence, and active to the last in every good word and work!

How different our feelings when the bright and shining light sets in darkness; or when the young minister of growing usefulness becomes careless, or by some false step counteracts the influence of former days, destroys his character and wounds the cause! Ah! when a minister does what in his youth he denounced—becomes the very character against which he was wont to warn the people of his charge—if it be not enough to destroy our confidence in any man's sincerity or to humble ourselves, surely there can be no more appalling illustration of the depravity and deceitfulness of the human heart. Too many instances have there been of these sad changes in the character and standing of ministers of the gospel, and some of late,—enough to clothe the ministry in sackcloth, if not to stagger the faith of the faithful; but were the instances multiplied, whatever their tendency, it would be more than counteracted, we apprehend, by the contemplation of one such life as is set forth in this Memoir:—there is a *reality* in religious experience. Though some may be chargeable with hypocrisy or with apostasy, here and there is one whose life gives evidence of his faith. "The path of the just is as a shining light, shining more and more unto the perfect day."

"He taught us how to live, and ah! how high,
The price of knowledge, taught us how to die!"

Thus have we followed Dr. Forsyth in his interesting narration of the life of this good man; seen him in the days of his studious application and growing preparation for the gospel ministry; seen him in the pulpit, in the social meeting, in the midst of his loving family, in his self-denying journeys, amid his various labors of love; marked what he was, and how he thought and felt in the secrecy of his retirement; and at last, when he was probably-unfitted for regular pulpit duty by increasing years, exerting himself in every appropriate way for the cause of the Bible and of missions,—in an especial manner for the cause of colonizing and Christianizing Africa.

Let us now accompany him, as he goes for the last time to that spot so sacred in his memory, where for forty years he had declared the everlasting gospel. How appropriate his reflections!

“I have the prospect of preaching to-morrow to this dear people, to whom I long sustained the relation of a spiritual overseer in the Lord, and upon a retrospective view of days which are past, how much do I recollect which may call forth the language of thanksgiving, and how much to humble me in my Master’s presence! How little, comparatively, did I feel the awful responsibility of the trust! How rarely, in addressing them from the pulpit, did I realize as I ought that each hearer was an immortal being, and must soon, very soon occupy either a mansion in heaven, with angels and the spirits of just men made perfect, where there is fullness of joy, or be tormented in hell without abatement or end! How often—to my shame be it acknowledged—have I preached my own insignificant self rather than Him whom the hosts of heaven admire, and who is the only hope of the perishing sinner—seeking their momentary applause rather than their souls’ everlasting salvation! Thou wouldst have been just, insulted Saviour, in confounding me before them for such daring presumption; but, having obtained mercy, I faint not, and am yet honored to appear as thine ambassador, and have the prospect of proclaiming to them once more thine own unsearchable riches. Wilt thou condescend, blessed Master, to aid me on the present occasion? O, for thy Spirit to shed light upon my understanding, which must otherwise remain dark, and with his influences to enliven and expand a heart contracted and cold! O, for the tongue of the learned, that I may speak a word in season to all who attend! Often, *often* have I felt thy power and seen thy glory within those sacred walls which I expect to enter on the ensuing sabbath; often have I there experienced a degree of delight in proclaiming thy message which I have not language to express, and which, during the lapse of eternal ages, cannot be forgotten. Thou art still the same; thy power is the same to support, thy fullness to replenish an empty earthen vessel; thy mercy is the same to pardon every imperfection; and thy faithfulness to accomplish every promise in me, and by me, and for me. In this I rejoice, that thou art the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.”—*Memoir of the Rev. Dr. Proudfit*, pp. 295–297.

And now his end approaches: what his feelings were in reviewing life, and in looking forward to the endless future, may be gathered from the following extract, which, without comment, we submit to our readers' reflections:—

“I have now advanced nearly four years beyond the prescribed period of human life. I am therefore forewarned by the purpose of God, and the natural course of things, that I must shortly be called to leave time for eternity. How solemn is the prospect of retiring from a world which I have so long inhabited, and in which I have seen so much to excite my admiration of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator! How often have I been led to admire his bounty in the almost infinite variety of the productions of this world, some of them more substantial and necessary, others more delicate, designed, apparently, to gratify our taste! In the contemplation of this variety, often have I been led to exclaim with the Psalmist, ‘O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all.’

“But in retiring from this world, where there is so much to awaken our admiration, the eye of faith can look forward to scenes still brighter and more glorious, to new heavens and a new earth; and if in this world there is so much to fill us with adoring thoughts of God, how magnificent beyond conception must heaven be, where he dwells in light, where Jesus sits effulgent in the midst of the throne; but how little do we know of the mode of our future existence; in what province of the divine dominions the New Jerusalem is established; what are the exercises and joys of the redeemed; in what manner are they admitted to fellowship with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; what is implied in seeing God face to face, and knowing even as we are known; in what way shall spirit commune with kindred spirit during the space which intervenes until the resurrection of the body; what are we to understand by bodies, powerful, spiritual, incorruptible, glorious, which shall hunger no more nor thirst any more, capable of serving God night and day!

“Little as is now known of these things, in the ordinary course of nature they must soon, very soon be realized by me; and in taking a retrospective view of my journey through life, who of the human family is more indebted than myself to a forbearing, forgiving, beneficent God? Truly goodness and mercy have followed me so far in every step through the wilderness. I have been favored with an exemption from torturing pain and loathsome disease, with a competency of temporal blessings, and an unusual measure of health to enjoy them. I have also been favored with the affections of a large circle of friends, and with the confidence of a church to which I ministered for more than forty years; and by offices of a more general nature I have had opportunities of extending my acquaintance with many thousands in various parts of our country, and of every Christian name, with whom I hope to be associated for ever in the kingdom of our common Father; and although far advanced in years, I am scarcely sensible of the infirmities common to persons of my age. I enjoy the various senses of the body unimpaired, the exercise of memory, and of other powers of the mind.

“Amid favors thus multiplied, I have only to complain of myself, of my ingratitude for mercies innumerable; of opportunities lost, which might have been improved in doing good or receiving good; of indolence and insincerity in the service of my Master and of my generation; of the inconsiderable advancement in spiritual wisdom, in faith, love, and all the other graces of the divine life. For all these transgressions, for my omissions of duty required, for my commission of sins forbidden, I humble myself this moment before a holy God.”—*Memoir*, pp. 304-307.

If a man who thus preached and wrote, thus lived and died, whose memory is enshrined in the hearts alike of his family and his flock, and to whose successful efforts in their behalf various benevolent societies have paid a just tribute, were not a true minister of Christ—though *Prelacy* might not have recognized him—where shall we find one?

If the gospel of Christ, whose doctrines he believed, and on whose promises he relied; whose discoveries of love and mercy opened his eye to behold God in his works, and moved his heart to retrace the image of God in his fallen creatures; whose spirit shed a hallowed influence over the intercourse of his daily life, and poured a flood of glory around his dying pillow,—if this gospel be not true, worthy our warmest appreciation and self-renouncing efforts to extend and perpetuate its blessings, what *can* be true; or, amid all earth-born interests, worthy a moment's thought?

ART. III.—*A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening, adapted to North America; with a View to the Improvement of Country Residences: comprising Historical Notices and General Principles of the Art, Directions for laying out Grounds and arranging Plantations, the Description and Cultivation of Hardy Trees, Decorative Accompaniments to the House and Grounds, the Formation of Pieces of Artificial Water, Flower Gardens, &c. With Remarks on Rural Architecture.* Second edition, enlarged, revised, and newly illustrated. By A. J. DOWNING, Author of *Designs for Cottage Residences, &c.* Pp. 497, 8vo. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1844.

THE natural course of things is from the physical to the intellectual. Man first appears as a physical organization; his first wants are corporeal, and his first impressions and ideas are received from external objects. But in due time appears also the intellectual.

Impressions from external objects are not passively received merely, as they are by the brute. On the contrary, they give rise to certain mental phenomena, and receive various accessions and modifications from the inherent power and spontaneous activity of the soul. With the awakening of the internal faculties, man becomes conscious of a new class of wants and aptitudes. The mind has its necessities and demands, which are not less imperative in their way than those of the body. It requires knowledge to satisfy its curiosity, and appropriate objects to gratify its sensibilities.

Among the various susceptibilities of our nature, and not the least interesting and important of them, is taste, or a power to perceive and delight in the beautiful. The manifestation of this impulse is very early in the history of the mental development, and so universal, that every one must be conscious of its operation within himself. The child shows it in preferring certain colors, sounds, and forms, before others. It is seen in the rudest state of uncivilized life. The savage must not only be warmly clad; his clothing must be attractive to the eye. It is not sufficient that his war-club and paddle should be strong and serviceable; they must also be ornamented. In civilized life, buildings of the simplest form satisfy the first demands; but as the means of comfort multiply, they are constructed with some regard to beauty, until at length architectural embellishment becomes a regular and systematic branch of study. Hence, we perceive that æsthetics, or the science of beauty, embracing all the principles applicable to the fine arts, as well as those pertaining to the works of nature, and to the departments of mind and morals, has its foundation in man's primitive constitution.

In entering upon the field of literature belonging to the domain of taste, it would be agreeable to our own feelings to make some remarks on the connection between taste and morals, and on the relation between æsthetics and Christianity. But this, our limits do not permit. We may, however, lay down a few principles very briefly, as an appropriate introduction to what may follow.

We have already seen that the mind has its demands, its impulses, or whatever else you please to call them, as well as the body. Nor do we see any reason why its intimations are not as clear, and, at least, quite as authoritative, as those of the other. If the inclination for food intimates a law of the physical constitution, certainly our inclination for the beautiful as clearly intimates a law of our mental constitution. And if our preference for one kind of food before another is a reason, if there be no stronger to the contrary, why we should eat it, so our preference for certain

sights or sounds is, to the same extent, a reason why we should enjoy them. If we pay something more for agreeable objects of the physical taste, I do not see why we should not do so for agreeable objects of intellectual taste. Certainly the latter is not less dignified than the former; nor is it more healthful or more virtuous to pay for the gratification of the bodily senses, than to pay for the gratification of the mental aptitudes.

But if we regard the human constitution as the product of divine wisdom and goodness, and then see how God has made the world without correspond to the world within us; if we see how each internal impulse points to some fitting external object, it cannot be doubted that taste is intended by the all-wise Creator for some beneficent and useful end. He that denies the lawfulness of indulging in the pleasures of taste, presents the divine Being in the light of a capricious tyrant. He tells us, in effect, that man, though endowed with such a capacity, and placed in the midst of such scenes of beauty as this world affords, is still under the ban of the Almighty if he throw open his senses to catch the harmony which everywhere breathes and floats around him. This, indeed, were a libel on the Creator!

There is this further analogy between the mental taste and the corporeal; they are both, when inordinately indulged, the frequent occasion of vice. Indulged beyond due bounds, they corrupt the heart, consume an undue portion of wealth, cripple our charities, enervate the mind, and produce luxury, idleness, and dissipation. This, to be sure, is a hard catalogue. But it is as strong against eating, as against seeing and hearing, what pleases us. But it all teaches us, that it is not the use, but the abuse, of our faculties, that does the mischief. It is not in the indulgence, but in the inordinate or incorrect indulgence, that the crime consists. Let, therefore, the sound moralist strive, by ascertaining the laws of our constitution and the relation our faculties sustain to each other, to restrict each to its own appropriate sphere, and to define the limits within which each may be properly indulged. In this way he will render most service to mankind and to sound morality; while he will, likewise, honor his Creator by showing the benevolence and harmony of his workmanship in the department of morals, as well as in that of external nature.

The most common objections to the indulgence of taste are two, viz., that it tends to sensualize the mind, and consume an unreasonable portion of wealth. We grant that there is weight in the argument; and yet taste will be indulged. To prevent it is impossible; and I cannot but add that it were foolish to prevent it, if

it were possible. We might as well think to blot all beauty out of creation, and erase a large portion of the human sensibilities. But since we cannot and ought not to prevent the gratification of taste, it becomes very desirable to direct the faculty to the most suitable objects, and show how it may be indulged most virtuously and beneficially. And I cannot but think that he who can help to bring into requisition the least objectionable and most improving objects of æsthetic gratification; he that shall serve to bring into contempt the most frivolous, extravagant, and demoralizing tastes, and substitute such as answer the purposes obviously intended by the Creator in this part of our constitution, deserves, at least, to rank with him "who makes two blades of grass to grow where only one grew before."

Now of all the modes of gratifying the taste, there is no one less objectionable on the score of moral influence, or from politico-economic considerations, than the one we propose to consider in this essay. Gardening is a department of the fine arts, so pure, so innocent, so simple, and so natural, that it affords very little opportunity for any corruption of the heart. Then its influence is so soothing, the scenes it presents so chastening to the mind, it is such a source of natural, gentle, elevating, and improving thoughts; the emotions it excites are so genial and tranquilizing, and possess so little of ardent or strong excitement, that little apprehension of evil from it need be entertained. And, withal, a moderate attention to its cultivation requires no great outlay of capital. A little ground, a little skill and taste, some time and healthful labor, or rather genial recreation, are all that are requisite to secure a large amount of gratification. Far different is it in these respects with the sister arts. Poetry and music, though not necessarily vicious, may much more readily be made productive of vicious thoughts and emotions. Painting, sculpture, and architecture, are very expensive, and not likely soon to attain to any high degree of excellence in a country where property is not entailed, and where there are but few overgrown estates. Besides, all the other fine arts we have named, except architecture, are more selfish in their character. They are shut out from the public eye, and serve to gratify the proprietor only, and a few chosen friends. But gardening is more diffusive in its influence. The public can enjoy it. The humblest and poorest man, if he have a virtuous and contented heart, can delight in the beautiful scenery which taste may throw around a rich man's dwelling. And it is among the great recommendations of this art, that, more than any other, it enables men of taste and moderate possessions, by multiplying and diffusing agreeable emotions through

objects the most simple, natural, and innocent, to increase the general happiness around them, and throw a refining influence over the sentiments and manners of their neighborhoods.

Entertaining these views, we hailed with great satisfaction the publication of Mr. Downing's work, the title of which is prefixed to this article. It appeared just at the right juncture. For years there had been a growing attention to this subject in the country; but for the want of any just standards of judgment, it had resulted, with some pleasing exceptions, only in the production of expensive incongruities and ridiculous extravagances. Mr. Downing's work came just at the right season to direct and form the public mind, and furnish correct models to those who needed them. Already it has had an extensive influence. One sees everywhere throughout the land a great improvement in the construction of private residences, and in the disposition and embellishment of the grounds about them.

Mr. Downing's book is so well known, and so generally appreciated, as to supersede the necessity of any minute examination of its claims. It has been justly pronounced *THE BOOK* on this subject; and no doubt it will long be referred to as a standard in regard to rural embellishment. The design of this article, therefore, shall not be to introduce to the reader the work itself, so much as the subject on which it treats. Should we succeed in awakening in his mind a desire to learn more in regard to it, we can assure him that he will find nothing in our country, or indeed in any other, better adapted to his wants than Mr. Downing's work. But let him be sure to inquire for the second edition, which possesses numerous and important advantages over the first.

Landscape or ornamental gardening may be considered the youngest daughter of taste; for it is only recently that it has aspired to a place among the fine arts. By the ancients, we do not perceive that any systematic attention was paid to it. It had no professors, there were no treatises on the subject, and there appear to have been, so far as we have been able to discover, no regularly digested rules or method of procedure. That there were gardens, however, in the ancient world, does not admit a doubt. There were, for instance, the hanging or terrace gardens of Babylon, built by Nebuchadnezzar, and celebrated both in profane and sacred history. His wife, Amytis, born in Media, a hilly country, pined among the dull plains of Babylon, and for her gratification these famous gardens were constructed. They covered an area of four hundred feet square, and were carried on terraces, rising tier above tier, to an elevation equal to the city walls. The structure was

vast, and made at immense expense; but was not at all conformable to our modern ideas of a garden. We find mention made also of the gardens of Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes, but the notice is too brief to afford any clear idea of their character. Of gardening, also, among the Greeks we have no satisfactory accounts. History tells of their poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture; but no such descriptions are given of their gardens as would lead us to suppose that they ranked this branch of the arts with the others, or that they formed any adequate conception of its capabilities. The garden of Alcinous, described by Homer, is more creditable to the powers of the poet than to the state of the art. It was little more than an orchard and vineyard, with some rude attempts at embellishment. The whole covered no more than four acres—rather a paltry area for royal pleasure-grounds, to be graced, moreover, by the lays of the prince of song. In a later period of her history we read something of the gardens of Plato and Epicurus; while we know that the Athenians were fond of flowers, and had baskets of them daily exposed for sale in the markets. But for all this, gardening seems to have made no great figure among them, or, at least, was far from holding the position which it does at present.

Rome, in the unsettled and troublous periods of her history, had but little leisure for rural embellishments; and gardening, at least as a science, does not appear to have been understood or appreciated. We read, indeed, of the gardens of the magnificent Lucullus, and no doubt most of the wealthy and luxurious Romans had ornamental grounds about their elegant villas. But it is remarkable that when the bard of Mantua, at the request of his patron, Mæcenas, wrote a poem professedly on rural affairs, in which he discusses various subjects relating to fruits, trees, and vegetables, yet he says nothing of gardening for ornamental purposes. He seems, too, to have felt that his subject, or at least some portions of it, had scarcely dignity enough or sufficiently close affinity with the imagination to furnish a theme for a poet, and that a special effort was necessary to elevate his topic to the demands of his muse. Such is his language,—

“Nec sum animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum
 Quàm sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorem.
 Sed me Parnassi deserta per ardua dulcis
 Raptat amor: juvat ire jugis, quâ nulla priorum
 Castaliam molli devertitur orbita clivo.”

Or, to use the elegant translation of Sotheby,—

“I, conscious of the toil, will strive to raise
 The lowly theme, and grace with labor'd lays;

Train'd by sweet love, o'er unfrequented heights
Where no smooth trace to Castaly invites,
I pierce the wild by mortal foot untrod,
And lonely commune with the Aonian god."

To those who are curious in such matters, it would be interesting to know what was the style of gardening that prevailed among the wealthy and luxurious Romans. Fortunately for such, one description, and I believe only one, we have, sufficiently minute to afford us much satisfaction. It is from the elegant pen of the younger Pliny, and is a description of his Tuscan villa. He describes very minutely his house, with its portico, in front of which is a terrace embellished with various figures. He tells us of the walk or *ambulatio*, inclosed with tonsile or clipped evergreens; and of the *gestatio*, ornamented in the middle with box, cut into numberless figures, together with a plantation of shrubs prevented by the shears from running too high. Afterward, coming to the garden proper, he proceeds:—"You enter a straight walk which breaks out into a variety of others, divided off by box-hedges. In one place you have a little meadow, in another the box is cut into a thousand different forms; sometimes into letters expressing the name of the master; sometimes that of the artificer; while here and there little obelisks arise intermixed alternately with fruit-trees: when, on a sudden, in the midst of this elegant regularity, you are surprised with an imitation of the negligent beauties of rural nature; in the centre of which lies a spot surrounded with dwarf plane-trees. Beyond these is a walk interspersed with the smooth and twining acanthus, where the trees are also cut into a variety of names and shapes. At the upper end is an alcove of white marble shaded with vines, supported by four small Carystian pillars. From this bench the water, gushing through several little pipes, as if it were pressed out by the weight of the persons who repose themselves upon it, falls into a stone cistern underneath, from whence it is received into a fine polished marble basin, so artfully contrived that it is always full without ever overflowing." Here the elegant owner used to sup with his friends, using this basin for a table, placing the larger dishes round the margin, and allowing the smaller ones to float about on the surface of the water in the shape of little vessels and water fowl. "Corresponding to this is a fountain, which is incessantly emptying and filling; for the water, which it throws up to a great height, falling back again into it, is by means of two openings returned as fast as it is received. Fronting the alcove, (and which reflects as great an ornament to it as it borrows from it,) stands a summer-house of exquisite marble, whose doors project

and open into a green inclosure; as from its upper and lower windows the eye is presented with a variety of different verdures. Next to this is a little private closet, (which, though it seems distinct, may be laid into the same room,) furnished with a couch; and notwithstanding it has windows on every side, yet it enjoys a very agreeable gloominess, by means of a spreading vine which climbs to the top and entirely overshades it. Here you may lie and fancy yourself in a wood, with this difference only, that you are not exposed to the weather: in this place, also, a fountain rises and instantly disappears: in different quarters are disposed marble seats, which serve, as well as the summer-house, as so many reliefs after one is wearied with walking. Near each seat is a little fountain; and throughout the whole hippodrome several small rills run murmuring along, wheresoever the hand of art thought proper to conduct them, watering here and there different spots of verdure, and in their progress refreshing the whole."

Such is Pliny's description of the gardens of his Tuscan villa. Who, then, will say that the Romans knew nothing of ornamental pleasure-grounds? Those, therefore, who argue from Virgil's silence on this subject, that ornamental gardening was unknown in his day, should remember that his subject necessarily led him in a different direction. The design of the *Georgics* was to draw the attention of the public to the cultivation and improvement of the soil, which, during the civil wars, had been so much neglected that there was a scarcity of even the necessaries of life. And his success was marvelous. The charms of elegant verse were lent to cheer the tiller's toil; husbandry was celebrated by the muses, a new interest invested the labors of the field, and the husbandman felt his labor lightened, and his heart cheered by the dignity and elevation given to his employment. And as with alacrity he pursued his cheerful toil, hill and valley bore testimony to the efficacy of the poet's lays, and poured in rich profusion their treasures for the support and comfort of human life.—But we must return to our topic of landscape gardening.

The garden which Pliny has described to us may be regarded as a fair specimen of the art as it existed from his time, through the middle ages, down to the period whence we may date the beginning of the modern style, and when, from a new art, it assumed the character of a science, and took its rank with sculpture, painting, and architecture. It may not, then, be uninteresting to look for a moment at the prevailing characteristics of the art as it then existed. It is now denominated the geometrical style, from the preference which was shown for uniformity and regularity in its plans

and figures. Its walks were generally straight, and, instead of describing curves, usually crossed or intersected each other at right angles. The beds and grass-plots were square, diamond, or heart-shaped; sometimes, however, they were laid off in fantastical figures, as in the form of a man, with trunk, head, and limbs, all regularly figuring in earth and grass. The trees were planted in straight rows, set uniformly *vis a vis*, nodding one at another as stiff and formal as the lords and ladies in waiting on a levee day or a queen's drawing-room, regularly prinked up with buckram, starch, and whalebone. There was a special fondness for evergreens that "bore the shears well," and which could therefore be clipped and trimmed into all sorts of fantastic shapes,—peacocks, monkeys, and men. Of these there was a great profusion in the garden of Pliny, who dwells with especial delight on his tonsile hedges and topiary work, as it was called. Fountains were in great requisition, and in themselves were delightful enough; but then they must always embody some petty conceit or frivolous device—something as far as possible unlike anything seen in nature. Thus there must be a dolphin, with a boy on its back, who spouts the water from his mouth; or a nymph with a swan upon her shoulder shooting up the water above her head, which returned upon her in a perpetual drizzle. Lions, dragons, and hippogriffs were favorite devices for this purpose, all pouring out incessant streams of water from their mouths. The same artificial taste prevailed in the arrangement and disposition of shrubbery. The milder and more soothing emotions were not much called out; and surprise, wonder, and noisy merriment were the principal effects produced. In those days it was not uncommon to plant trees and shrubbery so as to form a labyrinth, which exercised one's curiosity, ingenuity, and patience, in threading one's way through its perplexed and multifarious windings.

Such is the character of the old gardens, some of which still remain in the different countries of Europe. Of these the garden of Versailles in Paris is on the most gigantic scale. Two hundred acres of ground and two hundred millions of francs were placed by Louis XIV. in the hands of his artist, Le Nôtre, for the construction of this celebrated garden. Here we have the geometrical style in magnificent proportions. Here, says a writer in the London Quarterly,* "was the well-known labyrinth, not such a maze as is really the source of much idle amusement at Hampton Court, but a mere ravel of interminable walks, closely fenced in with high

* For June, 1842, p. 110 of the American reprint.

hedges, in which thirty-nine of Æsop's Fables were represented by painted copper figures of birds and beasts, each group connected with a separate fountain, and all spouting water out of their mouths. A more dull, fatuitous notion, it never entered into the mind of bloated extravagance to conceive." Here, too, were groups of *jets d'eau*, so contrived as to imitate a grove of trees. These fountains "are stated to have been played only seven or eight times a year, at an expense of ten thousand francs, or two thousand dollars, an hour." The same puerile conceit found its imitators among the English. We have all heard of Chatsworth, the splendid seat of the duke of Devonshire. One of the marvels of this magnificent domain was a copper-tree, every limb and branch of which was a pipe for the conveyance of water, so contrived that they could be made to play in an instant, by means of a secret spring or stop-cock. A favorite amusement was, when visitors passed under the magical tree, to douse them, especially the ladies, with an unexpected shower. However, this most ungallant, and withal silly contrivance has been abolished by the hand of modern taste; and Chatsworth now glories in a conservatory of glass, through which its princely owner; it is said, can drive a coach and four.

We feel some inclination in this place, before we pass on to notice the dawn of the new era, to spend a few moments in explaining the origin of the geometric style of gardening. We are aware, however, of the danger of trespassing on the time and patience of our readers, and our remarks shall be brief. In that period of the world when the science of international law was unknown, when might made right, and appeals to the sword were the only way of settling international questions, and when war was at once the business and amusement of nations,—of course there could be little inducement to expend much attention or wealth on the embellishment of the ground. This was the age of nothing but municipal civilization, or civic refinement. Taste and wealth were confined to towns and cities, glad to retreat within walls and moats for security against sudden irruptions by hostile bands. Such was the case also with our British ancestors. When the principles of government were yet unsettled, and every man carried the law on the point of his spear or edge of his sword, the feudal lord ensconced himself with his retainers in his stronghold, shut in by moat and drawbridge, and secured by warder and portcullis. In such a state of society there was little opportunity or inducement to cultivate elegant gardening, and money would have been thrown away in beautifying a landscape. All the land they could bring under this sort of cultivation was inclosed within the walls

of their castles, many of whose quadrangular courts were partly appropriated to flower-beds, separated by graveled or paved walks, and planted with trees and ornamental shrubs. Here then we see the origin of the geometric style. How should they arrange their small plots of ground but in geometric figures? And it was most natural that their quadrangular courts, surrounded by high walls, should suggest straight walks crossing at right angles. But the times at length became more peaceful. Human life and property were made secure. The power of law went forth in its might and majesty to restrain the spirit of the nobles, and to put the weak on a par with the strong. Manufactures and commerce began to flourish; and with these arose an important class of middlemen, scarcely known in the feudal times. Wealth, taste, and elegance, found their way among the people, and were no longer confined to palaces and baronial castles. And as these were diffused through the community, then commenced attention to rural elegance, and the *cottage orné* and the landscape garden arose to cheer the heart and glad the eye. But still as the castle of the noble was the *beau idéal* of taste and elegance, it is no wonder that the middleman should copy in his cottage garden the model of the baron's courtyard; nor is it any wonder that when the baron put his garden outside his walls, he should follow his old models, while he merely enlarged the size. Such, then, I suppose, is the philosophy of the geometric style of gardening.

But, besides this, another reason may be assigned. It requires very little taste or discrimination to appreciate artificial and regular figures, and expensive decoration. Scenery, such as nature never produces, bears evident marks of the hand of art. In proportion as it recedes from nature, it is supposed to exhibit the triumph of ingenuity and human power, as well as indicate the outlay of wealth. In a rude state of society, moreover, the obstreperous emotions prevail over the more gentle. To all these causes may be assigned a preference for uniform and geometric figures, long rows of trees, straight walks, artificial looking beds, strait, smooth, lazy looking streams of water; all mingled with unexpected grottoes, statues, urns, and vases, with an abundance of topiary work. On the other hand, nature, to ordinary eyes, looks common and unimpressive. A tree of a natural shape exhibits no art, and excites no surprise: a copse, a thicket, a natural waterfall, bear no marks of expense or of ingenuity. But to see and feel the real beauty of natural objects require a higher development of taste. It is not every one that can appreciate harmony and congruity, or discern the value of shading and grouping, or understand

the difference in the character of trees or foliage. "Men of refined sensibilities," says our author, "perceive that besides mere beauty of FORM, natural objects have another and a much higher kind of beauty, namely, that of EXPRESSION." The former is more obvious, and the latter more recondite, and requiring greater mental development to perceive it, it is not duly appreciated except in a more advanced state of refinement.

England is the nation that first broke over the trammels of the ancient school, and struck out a new and adventurous path in this delightful art. Glimpses of the natural style were gained by several minds before any well-developed system appeared. The first who seems to have perceived the superiority of the natural over the geometric or ancient style was Milton, whose description of the garden of Eden shows the beauty and truthfulness of his conception. Next to him was Lord Bacon, whose leaning indeed was decidedly to the old style, yet with some perception of its incongruities. One expression we quote for its oddness: "As for the making of knots, or figures, with diverse colored earths, that they may lie under the windows of the house on that side on which the garden stands, they be but toys: you may see as good sights many times in tarts." Mr. Addison, in the *Spectator*, attacked very vigorously the old school, and made a bold push for a better theory. "Our British gardens," he says, speaking of the Chinese, and recommending their more free and natural manner, "Our British gardens, on the contrary, instead of humoring nature, love to deviate from it as much as possible. Our trees rise in cones, globes, and pyramids. We see the marks of the scissors on every plant and bush. I do not know whether I am singular in my opinion, but, for my own part, I would rather look upon a tree in all its luxuriance and diffusion of boughs and branches, than when it is thus cut and trimmed into a mathematical figure; and cannot but fancy that an orchard in flower looks infinitely more delightful than all the little labyrinths of the most finished parterre." He also recommends throwing a whole estate into a kind of garden, by a judicious distribution of arable and wood land, pasture and grain field, upland and lawn, interspersed with plantations, in such a manner as to turn at once to the profit and pleasure of the owner. This idea has, to a great extent, been carried out by the large landed proprietors in many parts of the British Isles.

To that of Addison we may add here the name of Alexander Pope, for they took substantially the same views of gardening, and the two succeeded in completely subverting the old-fashioned geometric style, and bringing into public favor a juster and purer

taste. Both these gentlemen carried their theory into practice : the one at Bilton, near Rugby ; and the other in his famous garden at Twickenham, on the bank of the Thames, where, "on a little spot, of not more than two acres," says Downing, quoting the *Encyclopedia of Gardening*, "Pope practiced what he wrote," "and produced some highly picturesque and natural looking scenery."

To these names we ought to add that of Shenstone, who followed faithfully and successfully in the footsteps of the tasteful innovators in the art. "Now," says Dr. Johnson, in his *Life of Shenstone*, "was excited his delight in rural pleasures, and his ambition of rural elegance : he began from this time to point his prospects, to diversify his surface, to entangle his walks, and to wind his waters ; which he did with such judgment and fancy as made his domain the envy of the great, and the admiration of the skillful—a place to be visited by travelers, and copied by designers." Such was his delight in his grounds, that he very much neglected his house, which, says his biographer, "was mean ; and he did not improve it : his care was of his grounds. When he came home from his walks, he might find his floors flooded by a shower from the broken roof ; but he could spare no money for its reparation." This, according to our taste, was too much. A little in-door decoration we might very well dispense with, for the sake of external beauty ; but we could not go quite so far as to sleep in the rain, or prefer a beautiful grotto to a sound roof.

So far gardening had not deserved the name of a science. It had no well-digested rules, nor any authoritative standards, nor any regular professors of the art, who should make it their exclusive study and vocation. But now a new era was about to dawn. A person was coming on the stage of action, who, with a genius to originate new principles, combined the power to generalize and classify the principles which had already been here and there suggested, but which yet no one had thought of gathering up and reducing to system and order. They were like the principles of international law before the days of Grotius, and of political economy prior to the labors of Adam Smith. The ultimate principles existed in the philosophy of things, and were partially discerned and applied ; but it required a master mind fully to comprehend their bearings, to find system where others saw only fortuitous hints, to reduce the chaos to order, to lay down rules so founded in philosophy that there should be no appeal from them ; in a word, to elevate ornamental gardening to the height and dignity of a science.

Things had long been tending to this result; especially in England. The country had for ages been free from civil wars and intestine commotions. Her insular position secured her from being the theatre of the wars she waged against other countries. While her armies carried destruction into other lands—which were, moreover, frequently ravaged by one another—she enjoyed constant tranquillity. Hence, while the continental nations of Europe were frequently hurled back from far advanced civilization into a state of semi-barbarism, England was all the time advancing in the arts of peace, and in the comforts and elegances of refined existence. The continental nations still enjoyed but a sort of municipal refinement. The wealthy, with their elegant arts, clustered together in walled towns and cities, leaving rural life to a debased, ignorant, and stupid peasantry. Far otherwise was it in “merry England.” Safe in her ocean fortification and her wooden walls, settled in her theory and form of government, with the rights of the rulers and the ruled well defined, and secured by the strong hand of law, vigorously and impartially administered, the strongholds of her barons were now rendered useless, and the cottage of the poor man became as secure as the castle of his lordly neighbor. And thus, as the peaceful arts flourished, wealth became more generally diffused; and with this a new order of society arose. As the wealth of the productive classes increased, so also they became elevated both in character and in social importance. They became more intelligent and more refined. Their children were better educated; they acquired not only the rudiments of a substantially useful education, but also a taste for languages, for the sciences, for polite literature, and for the fine arts. And as the perception of the beautiful in nature and in art was developed, they began to indulge their taste by creating scenes of loveliness around their dwellings. What commenced with the richer classes, descended by degrees to the poorer; so that at this day in England you find few rural dwellings, however humble, in which there is not some attempt at simple embellishment, rendering the cottages of England the universal subject to foreign tourists of admiration and panegyric.

Still the subject of rural embellishment came to be understood and appreciated only by slow degrees. Whatever just views the public possessed in regard to it had been casually thrown out by writers on elegant literature, while yet no one had ventured to enter on it as a distinct field of investigation and literary labor. There was still wanting some adventurous spirit, possessing suitable qualifications, who would dare to tread this new path to fame

—gather up, and weave into a coherent system, the scattered elements of thought and taste; and place ornamental gardening in the rank to which it is justly entitled. By an admirable arrangement of Providence, what the world needs, and is prepared for, nature soon provides. In the year 1685, a few years after Addison, and a little before Pope, was born William Kent. He was originally a coach-painter, but early in life he exhibited a capacity for higher things. His genius and talent secured him the notice and patronage of some distinguished amateurs of the fine arts, and among others those of the earl of Burlington. By their liberality he went to Rome, to improve himself in the arts of coloring and design. He found, however, that he was not destined to excel as a painter—his vocation was of another kind. Availing himself of the principles of taste which he had acquired, he turned the resources of his mind to the creation of beauty in a new and almost untried sphere. With a keen eye for the picturesque, a just appreciation of the beautiful both in art and nature, a bold and ready genius, quick to perceive and daring to execute, he directed his attention to the subject of rural embellishment, and thus laid the foundation of a new science. He was employed by many of the nobility and gentry to improve their domains. Among other places, the gardens of Stowe; the palace of the dukes of Buckingham; Holkham Hall, the splendid seat of the late Mr. Coke, raised to nobility by reviving the title of earl of Leicester; and Burlington House, the seat of his principal patron,—contain memorials of his taste and genius.

Kent, having led the way, has been succeeded by many adventurers in the same path, several of whom have ventured into new styles, so that gardening has almost as many schools as painting, and those schools not less distinctly marked. To say nothing of the Dutch, the Italian, and the French schools, which are all modifications of the geometric style, we have several varieties of the new or natural style.

Kent was followed by Brown, known by the *sobriquet* of *Capability* Brown, from his frequent use of that term in reference to the adaptation of ground for the purposes of gardening. He was the author of the clump system, with the belts of shrubbery. It is of him that the poet of Olney speaks when he says,—

“Lo, he comes!

The omnipotent magician, Brown, appears!
Down falls the venerable pile, the abode
Of our forefathers—a grave, whiskered race,
But tasteless. Springs a palace in its stead,

But in a distant spot ; where, more exposed,
 It may enjoy the advantage of the north,
 And aguish cast, till time shall have transformed
 Those naked acres to a sheltering grove.
 He speaks. The lake in front becomes a lawn,
 Woods vanish, hills subside, and valleys rise ;
 And streams, as if created for his use,
 Pursue the track of his directing wand,
 Sinuous or straight, now rapid and now slow,
 Now murmuring soft, now roaring in cascades,
 E'en as he bids."

Some additional principles were brought out by Whately, who in 1770 wrote a work called *Observations on Modern Gardening*. In 1794 were published Price's *Essays on the Picturesque*; and the next year, 1795, was published Repton's *Observations on the Theory and Practice of Gardening*. Several other works have appeared since that time on this subject, such as Horace Walpole's *History of Gardening*, Mason's *Poem*, the voluminous and excellent works of the Loudons, *cum multis aliis*; so that this alone forms within itself no contemptible department of literature.

The influence of these writers has effected in England a complete revolution in gardening. True, in some of the older places, the geometric style is, for antiquity's sake, or from prejudice, or perhaps a little out of perverseness, still retained; yet the new style has become triumphant. Clipped hedges and topiary work find but little quarter. Instead of trimming up their trees into artificial forms, they allow them to assume the rich variety of shape that nature gives, each retaining its own peculiar and characteristic expression; while they take care to adapt the various classes of trees—round headed, spiry topped, or drooping—to the situation; and study, by a judicious mixture, to produce the most agreeable effect. Instead of planting them, as formerly, in straight rows, or exact figures—which Pope satirizes in the often-quoted couplet,

"Grove nods to grove, each alley has its brother,
 And half the platform just reflects the other"—

they copy the more agreeable variety of nature, leaving now a single tree alone in its unique beauty; and now forming graceful, but not unnatural looking, groups and clusters, taking care to make them harmonize with the surrounding scenery, and so disposing them as to shut out every disagreeable or unsightly object, and leave in view whatever serves to add beauty, richness, and interest to the prospect. Straight, stiff walks, and formal beds, have been

abandoned to make way for the graceful, waving, flowing lines of the modern school. Fountains are no longer constructed in imitation of animals—dolphins, dragons, or hippogriffs—pouring from their mouths everlasting streams of water; nor like “a sturdy washerwoman, washing and winding of linen clothes, in which act she wrings out the water which made the fountain,” so hugely commended, according to William Howett, by Sir Henry Wotton, “as a graceful and natural conceit in Michael Angelo.” Water is now managed more in accordance with nature. It is made to tumble over what appear to be natural cascades, or bubble out of a pile of rock work, or gush forth from some well-contrived and partly-concealed fissure. Streams of water are made to wind their way through the grounds, now gurgling unseen through well-arranged foliage, and now appearing full in view, flashing brightly in the sunbeams. We have no more stereotyped models, drawn by the rule and compass, made to look well on paper; but the artist of genius adjusts his plan to the nature and capabilities of the ground before him, taking care to preserve the whole in harmony and keeping with the circumjacent scenery.

But we cannot multiply our illustrations. We designed nothing more than to give a rapid sketch of the progress of the art, and indicate its present condition. To go into details, and describe all the resources and capabilities of the art, with the various styles and their respective adaptations, would require a volume. Happily the reader will find this admirably done by Mr. Downing, to whom we must refer him for further information.

We cannot close this article without commending this interesting branch of the fine arts to the attention of such of our readers as are in a situation to cultivate it. We think it has peculiar claims upon them, especially in comparison with other modes of gratifying the æsthetic impulse. Where this impulse is strong, and the person has the means at his disposal, it will be gratified in some form. Now the lowest mode of this gratification is in fine dress, gaudy furniture, and showy equipage; a mode of taste so inferior as scarcely to deserve the name, since the monarchs and umpires in this department are persons generally having the smallest pretensions to education and intelligence. Hence the love of finery usually abates in proportion as the higher elements of taste are developed. Next in order, and vastly above it in dignity, is a love of the beautiful in architecture. To reside in a large and expensive house is the grand object of many rich men. But it may be easily shown that there can be no correct taste in domestic architecture without an acquaintance with the principles of landscape

gardening. It is the deficiency here that is filling our country with such multitudes of ill-designed, incongruous, and unsightly masses of masonry and wood-work, under the semblance of the fine mansion, the *cottage orné*, or the miniature palace; selected according to the prevailing fashion, and stuck down at hazard, without the least regard to the situation, the nature of the ground, or the surrounding objects. To look well, a house must be in keeping with the scenery about it. But this is a principle seldom thought of by those who copy designs out of books, or draft models for buildings without inspecting the ground.

In another class of society, marked not only by wealth, but by education and refinement, considerable attention begins to be paid to painting and statuary. To this, under proper restrictions, we have no objection; and yet we beg leave to suggest that these are not the objects of taste the best adapted to the character and condition of our country. They are very expensive. A single collection of the best paintings is itself a fortune. Very few people among us can afford to indulge their taste in this form, and still fewer can in justice to their families invest so large a portion of their property in a manner so unproductive. It answers better in a country having an hereditary aristocracy, and entailed estates. Besides, painting and statuary, like architecture, are the branches of the fine arts adapted to a state of only municipal civilization. Hence they flourished amid the wars, distractions, and despotisms of the ancients, and amid the darkness and barbarities of the feudal ages; and they still flourish in several of the present continental nations of Europe, amid the oppressions, the ill-divided wealth, the squalid poverty, and utter degradation of one class, and the heartless, selfish arrogance, and indolent indulgence of another. Gardening has great advantage in all these respects. The rich man, it is true, may lay out his extensive grounds at what cost he will; but in no other way can an inconsiderable sum be expended to secure an equal amount of tasteful and elegant gratification. You may satisfy moderate desires simply by saving a portion of what other persons in like circumstances would expend on the dwelling and its superfluous decorations. And even the poor man, though he may not create around him an artificial landscape, yet may he plant his flowers before his window, and train the honeysuckle and eglantine over his door, and see the rose-bush and wax-berry flourish in his court-yard. And why should he not? Why should he consider his home only as a place to eat, drink, and sleep in? May he not render his humble dwelling redolent with nature's perfume, and make it attractive to the eye, by simple, economic beauty? Can

he not pay a little to nurture a sentiment, to awaken humanizing sensibilities, and add the charms of external beauty to the comfort, affection, and tranquillity that reign within? Surely no country possesses facilities for this purpose equally with our own. In no other country is land so abundant and cheap, property so equally divided, or labor so well remunerated. If ever there was a country capable of making an approximation to the visions of Arcadian beauty and innocence, it is our own highly favored, peaceful, prosperous, and happy land.

We must then be allowed to express the wish that this beautiful art will find special favor among us. It is a pursuit at once innocent and healthful, improving to mind and manners, a producer of neatness, order, and simple elegance. It is so well adapted to the character of our nation and our political institutions, it tends so much to make the country attractive, and abate the unhealthy, injurious love for pent-up city life, the rage of monetary speculation, and the stimulating, pernicious pleasures that always spring from crowded population,—that we cannot but consider landscape gardening as destined to become THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE FINE ARTS. And when this comes to pass, we shall see our country everywhere bearing the marks of general comfort, well-diffused intelligence, and an all-pervading refinement and civilization; for of these gardening is the legitimate and inevitable offspring.

“O friendly to the best pursuits of man,
 Friendly to thought, to virtue, and to peace,
 Domestic life in rural pleasures pass'd!
 Few know thy value, and few taste thy sweets;
 Though many boast thy favors, and affect
 To understand, and choose thee for their own.
 But foolish man forgets his proper bliss,
 E'en as his first progenitor, and quits,
 Though placed in Paradise, (for earth has still
 Some traces of her youthful beauty left,)
 Substantial happiness for transient joy:
 Scenes form'd for contemplation, and to nurse
 The growing seeds of wisdom; that suggest,
 By every pleasing image they present,
 Reflections such as meliorate the heart,
 Compose the passions, and exalt the mind.”—*The Task*.

- ART. IV.—1. *The Catholic Doctrine of Redemption vindicated; or Modern Views of the Atonement, particularly those of Dr. Wardlaw, examined and refuted.* By ANDREW MARSHALL, D. D. LL. D. Glasgow, 1844.
2. *Of the Moral Principle of the Atonement. Also of Faith, and of its two Sorts, Conviction and Confidence, and of the Connection between them.* By the Rev. JOHN PENROSE, M. A. Formerly of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; Author of the Bampton Lecture Sermons for 1808, &c. London, 1843.
3. *Christ the only Sacrifice: or Atonement in its Relations to God and Man.* By NATHAN S. S. BEMAN, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Troy, N. Y. With an Introductory Chapter by SAMUEL HANSON COX, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. Second edition. New-York, 1844.

IT has been well said, that, "in its simplest form, the problem of a religion may be expressed thus:—given a supreme Deity, the Creator and Governor of all things, and an intelligent creature in a state of alienation and estrangement from his Creator:—to determine the means whereby a reconciliation may be effected, and the creature restored to the favor and service of his God."

That the world is under a providential government which partakes distinctly of a moral character is proved from the constitution and course of things, and is a belief in which all people in all ages have participated. The progress of civilization, of ethical science, of public morality and political freedom, has tallied, in every age, with the advance of theological science. We make this statement with our eye resting clearly upon the annals of the past, and upon the influence which religious opinion has always exerted upon individuals and upon nations. Theology has always held the foremost rank in the sciences of every people, whether pagan or Christian; and thus will it continue to be regarded, while the constitution of the human mind remains as it is. Co-extensive with the belief in a moral government is the conviction, more or less distinct, of having offended against the supreme Administrator. A consciousness of guilt produces dread of punishment, and the unhappy delinquent betakes himself to measures whereby the apprehended vengeance of Heaven may be averted, and reconciliation attained. Meantime, by an eternal law of our moral nature, conscience appropriates each temporal calamity, or natural evil, as an omen of vindictive wrath.

The state of theological knowledge among any people has been distinguished by nothing more than by their views respecting the placability of the divine nature. The lowest type of the Gentile superstition invested the gods with a malicious and turbulent disposition toward mankind, "το Θειον παν φθονερον τε και ταραχωδες;" and, if we may believe Herodotus,* this was the sentiment, and these the words, of the wise and good Solon. From the gloomy horrors of such a faith, the heathen mind arose by degrees to a more distinct idea of the divine benevolence, and to the hope that penitence might be accepted, and the divine Being be disposed to regard again with favor the offending creature. From the lips of the great Cicero we hear the almost inspired statement that piety and holiness will render the gods propitious: "*Deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas.*"†—a declaration which calls to mind the beautiful words of David: "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." Some idea of the principles of reconciliation the heathen mind attained; still, after the lapse of four thousand years, the melancholy fact of pagan ignorance was confessed by Porphyry, that learned and bitter enemy of the Christian faith, "that there was wanting some universal method of delivering men's souls, which no sect of philosophy had ever yet discovered."

From the nature of the case, if ever the human mind attains to just views of the plan of reconciliation, it must be by explicit revelation from God, and we turn to the Bible as to the only authentic source of information on the subject. But in approaching the sacred volume to deduce from it the true moral theory of the universe, the reader must be premonished that it is a book of *facts*, rather than of *philosophy*. All the great truths connected with our well-being are, indeed, clearly stated; but they are stated as facts. Nor are even these collected and arranged in any topical order, so as to present us with a regular system, but lie scattered over a vast field, falling out, rarely in set discussion, generally in an easy, matter-of-course way, in narrative, or song, or familiar colloquy, or hortatory address, as the particular occasion might suggest. To arrange these subjects in natural order, and illustrate and defend them by appropriate argument, is the business of systematic divinity,—if we would reduce theology to a *science*, in the proper sense of that word, we must advance a step further, we must offer the *rationale* of these facts. The atonement presents itself to us in

* Lib. 1, cap. 32.

† De Offic., lib. 2. See also Horace, Odes, b. 3, od. 23.

these two aspects—as a *fact*, and as a *scheme of government*. To prove the *fact*, we appeal to the text of Scripture explained by the common laws of language; to understand the *theory*, we burst from the mere exegetical (we had almost said chrysalis) state of the inquiry, and advance to those generalizations by which the facts of revelation are explained, appealing to the principles of abstract truth. The text itself must never be lost sight of, must never be contradicted, must be implicitly followed without addition or diminution. The object is not to improve upon the sacred oracles—to proceed to new discoveries in religion—nor to alter the plain, practical bearing of Bible statements, but to adduce those general principles of which the facts of revelation are predicated, and by which the reasons of the divine conduct may be, in some humble sense, disclosed to the admiration of intelligent creatures. - The fact of atonement is proved when it is shown by fair, defensible exegesis of the sacred text, that the mediation of Christ, including his active obedience, his sacrificial death, and his intercession, has the efficacy to procure pardon to the guilty: the philosophy of atonement is concerned with the question, *On what principles* does this mediation avail to this end?

Full well we appreciate the magnitude and awful sanctity of this stupendous theme. It extends through all time, stretches through eternity, and loses itself from our view in the unfathomable counsels of the only Wise. The greatest minds have stood awe-struck at the contemplation of those heights and depths which the human intellect can never adequately reach. The great Butler stood here, as Moses before the Mount of Horeb: we, too, will “take off our sandals.” “Angels desire to look into this;” not into the fact—that a little child understands—but into the only mystery which belongs to it—the *reasons* of this wonderful plan. We imitate the celestial example. It is not inquiry that is prohibited, but only irreverent inquiry. The whole analogy of providence and of revelation authorizes the belief, that somewhat of the reasons of the divine conduct may be sought out and comprehended by us. God has revealed to us somewhat of the philosophy of this subject. All men have had theories of atonement, and of moral government, just as of natural philosophy, and so will they have to the end of time. The question is not, Shall we have a *theory*? but, Shall we have the *right* one? Two errors we should avoid. We have no right to deny an authenticated fact, because we cannot explain all its relations to all other facts; nor should our inability to discover all the connecting links of cause and effect, nor the manifest impiety of an attempt to penetrate into the secret counsels of the Almighty,

operate to disparage a reverent and humble inquiry into the great principles of the mediatorial administration.

Everywhere in Scripture the mediation of Christ is asserted to have a connection with the pardon of the sinner. Few, even among Unitarians, deny this. It is only the lowest type of Socinianism, which is scarcely a shade different from Deism, that has the hardihood to reject this doctrine. But the important question is, What is this connection? How do the life and death of Christ exert an influence to procure pardon and eternal life to the penitent guilty? It is not our intention to discuss the Socinian theory, nor yet that "middle scheme," as it has been called, for which H. Taylor, Dr. Price, and others, have so earnestly contended; we confine our remarks to the views entertained by the orthodox party.

Three opinions respecting the nature of atonement, or satisfaction, made by Christ, divide orthodox divines of the present day. First, we may mention that which is advocated by Dr. Marshall, in the work whose title is given at the head of this article. This theory supposes the divine Lawgiver, in providing and accepting the atonement, to have proceeded throughout upon the principle of retributive justice; that the penalty of the law, being due from the offender after transgression, was still rigorously exacted, but was accepted from Christ as the sinner's substitute. According to this scheme, the rectoral honor and integrity of the divine Governor could be vindicated in no other way than by a literal process of law. Satisfaction, therefore, must consist of an exact fulfillment of the original demand,—the life of Christ satisfying for a broken precept, his death for a non-inflicted penalty.

The second theory we notice is at the opposite extremity from this, and among late writers has not found a more able advocate than Mr. Penrose, whose work is mentioned at the head of this article. This theory bases itself upon what is called the natural availableness of repentance. Its fundamental principles may be thus stated:—God is infinitely good, and of his own nature disposed to make his creatures happy. To secure their happiness he has given them rules for their government, and in case of defection from these rules, he requires only that they return to their duty with penitence for their sin, when he graciously receives them, and from his spontaneous goodness forgives their past delinquency. As true repentance is the grand prerequisite and only condition of pardon, so the gospel is but one vast system of means adapted to induce right moral exercises in the heart; and the death of Christ, which is fundamental to the gospel scheme, operates as a powerful motive to repentance and reformation, in which suasive power all

its saving efficacy consists. Take the following as Mr. Penrose's notion of pardon through a mediator. He says:—

“As a prisoner is redeemed by paying a ransom, so all they who choose to escape from the bondage of corruption may obtain liberation from it if they will lay hold of the price which Christ has paid to set them free: that is, if they will lay hold of it *as an effectual motive to break its chain*. As a creditor, when satisfied by payment, remits a debt, so God, *when we have made to him that offering of faith and repentance which Christ enables us to make*, remits our heavy offenses. . . . Christ's death, moreover, is to be especially regarded as the hinge, the moral hinge of the whole gospel system; *inasmuch as it teaches us, in the most expressive manner, the necessity of dying to sin; of expunging through the same moral application of this doctrine, and through the preventing aid of the Spirit, the blot on our nature which sin makes; and as it also teaches us the necessity of a new creation to holiness.*”—Pp. 38, 39, 181, 183.

However defective this theory may be regarded, and however ultra Socinian its aspect may seem, it is not unsanctioned by the authority of great names in the orthodox family. It is well known that Bishop Warburton has long been complained of for lending the influence of his powerful mind in support of views essentially the same,* while Dr. Johnson, though not of so high authority in matters of faith, is also claimed, and justly, by the same school.† Bishop Gleig sides with the same view‡ against Archbishop Magee, and others. The advocates of this theory are thorough trinitarians, and subscribe to the sacrificial and piacular character of Christ's death as heartily as do their orthodox opponents; but they, of course, adopt Scripture terms upon their own principles of explication. With much truth and plausible semblance to plead in its defense, this theory must, nevertheless, be regarded as radically defective. It does not so much teach doctrines palpably false, as omit those which are essentially and fundamentally true. It embraces at most but half the truth. We readily admit that the whole character of Christ, and the entire gospel system, are admirably adapted to exert a moral, reformatory influence upon man; but this does not disclose the proper *primary* ground whereof the necessity of Christ's death is predicated. It leaves out of view the public character of offense, and makes it a mere private affair with Deity, whose natural generosity is supposed to be the only requisite secu-

* See his 9th Book of the Divine Legation, &c.

† See Rambler, No. 110.

‡ Study of Theology, pp. 215-220. See the same view held forth in Dr. N. Lardner's Sermon on Gal. iii, 13, 14; Works, vol. v.

ity for the pardon of the penitent. Could we thus limit the effect of transgression—had sin no relation to a published law and to a lawmaker, and its treatment no influence on other moral beings—we cannot see but this theory would be the true one. But the case is otherwise. Sin is an infraction of the moral law and order of the universe, and however noble and magnanimous it may be for an individual to extend forgiveness of all offenses which are merely personal to himself, upon due acknowledgment, the question of forgiveness, and the moral principles it involves, become quite different matters when the person dispensing pardon is a magistrate, and when the offense itself lies not merely against his private person, but against the public law of the state. In this grand omission lies the radical error and fatal poison of this theory.

The third theory we notice is the one advocated by Dr. Beman, in his able and spirited treatise already mentioned. In Great Britain, Dr. Wardlaw is justly ranked at the head of writers of this school, and in America none have excelled in cogency of argument, in depth and compass of thought, and felicity of expression, the author of the "Atonement in its Relations to God and Man." In this unpretending volume we are presented with the outlines of a noble structure. The great principles of the Christian scheme are lucidly discussed and triumphantly vindicated. The work is the product of sound learning, discriminating thought, logical acumen, and a method of candid, though bold, independent, and original inquiry. From our personal acquaintance with the venerable author, and our familiarity with the first edition of his book, we were prepared to welcome the appearance of the new edition, as a powerful and timely auxiliary to the cause of truth, and a sovereign antidote to the erroneous and imperfect views that often obtain with respect to the true philosophy of the Christian scheme. Of course, these commendations do not apply to his few side-long hints of a limited and sovereign application of atonement.

The theory now to be considered proceeds upon a distinction made between a personal and a public offense—between justice as it applies to individuals in a course of exact retribution, and justice as it respects the general ends of good government. Sin is considered as an offense against Deity, not merely in a *personal* sense, but as *lawgiver* and *judge*; and atonement is not a mere *private satisfaction* to the divine Governor for personal insult and dishonor done to him, but a measure adapted to the support and vindication of his *public administration* during a suspension of the penalty. In granting a dispensation of mercy to the sinner the penalty must be waived; and to make provision for the support of law and govern-

ment under such an administration, was the grand primary object of atonement. The sufferings of Christ were not a literal, or a substantial, endurance of the penalty, in whole or in part, in kind or degree, but a substitute for penalty—something which answered with equal efficiency, under the circumstances, the ends of good government. The necessity for an atonement did not lay in any moral indisposition of Deity to forgive. He was always placable, immutably and eternally the “Father of mercies.” No extrinsic influence, no bribe or inducement, was necessary to move him to forgive; he demanded only some safe ground of procedure, whereby the exercise of his mercy should not be construed into an abandonment of his own published law, or a laxity of justice, truth, and holiness. If penalty was to be suspended or finally remitted, he demanded something in its place that should answer the same governmental ends. This he demanded as the public administrator—the posture of government required it. Atonement furnishes this safe ground for the exercise of pardoning favor to the penitent believer in Jesus. In accepting the death of Christ in lieu of the penalty, the divine Lawgiver did not fulfill the *letter*, though he did most fully meet the *spirit*, of the law. He exercised an authority above the *statute*, and appealed (if we may so speak) to the *genius of the constitution*. He waived, conditionally, the claims of retributive justice, and provided for pardon upon a scheme which equally guaranteed the integrity of his throne. “As a scheme of government,” says Bishop Gleig, “and in no other light, ought the atonement to be viewed.”

Here, then, are disclosed the nature and necessity of atonement. But when we speak of atonement as being necessary, we do not limit the physical ability of Deity to save men by one or another mode. Nor yet do we dogmatize upon the resources of his wisdom. We know not by how many other expedients infinite Wisdom might have devised the escape of the sinner. We know, on Scriptural authority, that God has chosen this, and from the fact we infer that it was the fittest means, which, by the necessity of his character, the divine Being will always choose. “By *moral necessity*,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “is meant *propriety* and *fitness*. But propriety and fitness constitute a necessity absolutely inseparable from the procedure of an all-wise, almighty, and perfectly holy Being. His acting according to propriety and fitness is as necessary in his *conduct*, as the attributes of wisdom, and prudence, and moral rectitude, are in his *nature*, or *character*.”* The grant

* On the Socinian Controversy, dis. 9.

of pardon to the guilty would involve in it more than a simple expression of the divine goodness—it would be a practical declaration of principles vital to all moral law and order in the universe. The natural goodness of God might, indeed, have been discovered in a system which offered pardon to the penitent without a public satisfaction, but how could the “*righteousness* of God” be vindicated by such a system? “God hath exhibited Christ for a demonstration of his righteousness, in the remission of sins which are past, according to the forbearance of God; for a demonstration, I say, of his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus.” Rom. iii, 25, 26.

The remission of the penalty, without some special provision to the contrary, would naturally draw after it the following consequences:—a disbelief in the fitness and excellence of the precept—a belief that sin is not extremely odious to God—a doubt respecting the divine intention ultimately to punish sin—a practical disregard of that authority by which the divine government is upheld and administered. The ultimate consequence of all this would be a prostration of all moral law and order. To avert such a catastrophe, satisfaction was demanded—that is, something equivalent to penalty was demanded—something that should answer the same practical ends of government. “An equivalent,” says Professor Stuart, “is of two sorts: the first has respect to *kind* and *quantity*, and requires equality, or sameness, in regard to both; the second is where the substitute answers the same *end*, as that would have done in the place of which it is put.”* It is in this latter sense that Christ’s death was an equivalent for the penalty of the moral law—it answered the same *ends*, and hence gave satisfaction to the divine Lawgiver. “Satisfaction,” says Dr. Hill, “is a word known in Roman law, from which it is borrowed, to denote that method of fulfilling an obligation which may either be admitted or refused. When a person, by the non-performance of a contract, has incurred a penalty, he is entitled to a discharge of the contract if he pays the penalty; but if, instead of paying the penalty itself, he offers something in place of it, the person who has a right to demand the penalty may grant a discharge or not, as he sees meet. If he is satisfied with that which is offered, he will grant the discharge; if he is not satisfied, he cannot be called unjust: he may act wisely in refusing it.”†

Such is a brief glance at the position of the great doctrine of the

* Two Discourses on Atonement, p. 10.

† Lectures on Divinity, p. 435.

atonement at the present day in the orthodox world. We shall devote the remainder of this article to a more particular discussion of what we regard as the true and only defensible theory, in the three following propositions:—

I. The design of penalty, showing the possibility of a substitution.

II. Christ did not endure the penalty of the law.

III. The adaptation of the death of Christ as a substitute for the penalty.

I. Design of penalty. So far as we can comprehend the great system of the universe, we find it “one stupendous whole”—the product of one mind, originated and adjusted to answer a specific end. The Bible declares the primal, characteristic attribute of Jehovah to be “*love*,” and to this sentiment his works affirmatively respond. If there is any truth in the doctrine of final causes, the happiness of all rational and sentient beings is the ultimate end of creation. But in both the providential and moral governments, pain is an inevitable and uniform result under given circumstances. This, to a short-sighted, partial observer, might seem a contradiction of the benevolent disposition of the Creator; but to enlightened reason it is just the opposite. For what is the *end* of all physical sufferings? Is it not to *guard* the animal system? Liability to pain becomes a necessary condition of our present being; not because the Creator delights in the misery of his creatures—just the contrary—he would *protect* them in the full, harmonious exercise of all their functions. Pain urges upon us attention to our natural wants, checks our carelessness, imposes self-preservation, and a judicious treatment of that nature which God constituted to be happy, but left, on condition of neglect or abuse, liable to misery. Thus man’s existence is invested on all sides, and watched at every point, by these sleepless guards, which almighty Goodness has stationed about him for his security. Physical pain, then, is a condition of the animal nature, made necessary in a plan of the most comprehensive wisdom and goodness.

So is it with penalty in the moral government. The precept of the moral law is infinitely excellent, and its observance indispensable to the happiness of men; but just in proportion to its importance do we rate the necessity of guarding against a failure in its observance. Penalty is this guard, whether it fall out in a course of natural consequences, upon transgression, or be superadded and administered by positive infliction. It is instituted, not to gratify a vengeful spirit in Deity, not to reimburse him for the damages of a broken law, but purely to guard the precept, and thus secure

the ends of government—the happiness of the governed. If the divine Lawgiver loves the precept as the fittest means to secure the highest happiness of his creatures, so also he loves the penalty as the fittest means of preventing a failure of this scheme. The precept *advances* the happiness of moral beings, the penalty arrests their *retrograde* movement, when they have broken from their allegiance to government. The precept leads on to *success*, the penalty guards against *defeat*. The precept points out the path of happiness, the penalty awes and checks the wayward who anon depart from that path. Thus justice becomes the armed and invincible body-guard of love. But this love is expansive, universal; it is love for the whole. The general well-being of man is the object contemplated by both precept and penalty.

To deter man from sin, and to reform the offender, are the two objects proposed to be effected by penalty. “Them that sin, rebuke before all, *that others may fear*,” is a Bible maxim of government. “Thou shalt stone the idolater, that he die,” says Moses, “*and all Israel shall hear and fear, and shall do no more any such wickedness*.” Punishment as a corrective is alluded to by Amos, chap. iv. 6–11. “I have chastened you,” says God, “*yet have ye not returned unto me*.” Punishment, says Puffendorf, is “an evil inflicted according to law, for the security of human society.” “As for punishment,” says Blackstone, “this is not by way of atonement, or expiation of the crime, but as a precaution against future offenses of the same kind.” Paley says, “The proper end of human punishment is . . . the prevention of crimes. . . . It is an evil to which the magistrate resorts, only from its being necessary to the prevention of a greater.”

From these hasty glances we would establish a few principles. First. The office of punitive justice is subsidiary to the general ends of benevolence. In other words, the ends of justice coincide with those of benevolence. Bishop Stillingfleet defines justice to be “goodness directed by wisdom.” It is “wisdom actuated by love,” says another. Wardlaw calls it “the attribute that gives to every one his due;” while Dugald Stewart says, “Justice denotes that disposition which leads us . . . to determine and to act without being biased by partial considerations.” All these coincide in this one doctrine, that justice is the guardian of the public good. “God’s justice in punishing,” says Bishop Gleig, “far from being the offspring of wrath or vengeance, is nothing else than a modification of divine benevolence;” and, to quote again from Dugald Stewart, we say, if the ultimate end of creation was the communication of happiness, “we must conclude that the Deity

bestowed on us our moral constitution as a *mean* toward a further end—the happiness of our nature—and *distributed rewards and punishments only to secure this end more effectually.*”

Secondly. The ultimate end of penalty is not achieved by the infliction of so much pain merely, but by producing a certain *moral impression*, reformatory of the individual, where that is practicable, and preventive of crime in others.* It is not the suffering of the criminal, in itself considered, but the *salutary effect of that suffering upon himself*, if not incorrigible, and upon *the minds of others*, to which the divine justice looks. The divine Legislator enacted the penalty at first as a guard and security of the public good, and it becomes so by creating a certain moral impression upon the minds of his subjects. It follows, therefore, that in introducing a substitute for the penalty, the great object to be effected is the same salutary moral impression on the minds of all, deterring them from sin, and illustrating the divine rectoral justice; and it would be the adaptation of such a substitute to secure a result exactly similar to that of penalty, when duly inflicted, that would impart to it the character and quality of a *satisfaction*. The case of Zaleucus is in point, and we offer it as an illustration. He enacted a law against adultery, the penalty of which was the loss of both the eyes of the offender. His own son was the first to transgress. The father is plunged in the deepest sorrow. He loves his son: he loves his law. How can he ruin the former? How can he abandon the latter? The compassion of a father, and the justice of a sovereign, struggle together in his breast. At last he hits upon an expedient: he resolves to take one of his own eyes, and only one of his son's. His eye is the substitute for that of his son. Here the penalty is not literally executed, it is in part waived on the ground of a substitution; but the ends of government are secured, justice is satisfied. The king has demonstrated his affection for his law, his resolute purpose to insist upon obedience, and to punish offense. No license is given to crime, no impunity

* Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Law of Nations, mentions a singular case, wherein the military law, which devoted the deserter to be shot, proved of no avail. Soldiers, accustomed to danger, despised death, and desertions were multiplied. At length the penalty was changed, and the deserter simply branded in his forehead, and permitted to go at large. But this mark, which fixed upon him dishonor for life, was more terrible to the soldier than death itself, and had the effect to cure the evil. It was not the *amount of pain*, but the *moral impression*, that gave penalty its efficacy. This adaptation of penalty to prevent crime is an important thought, and in the present subject deserves our most solemn consideration.

to offenders. If his sufferings were an expression of his paternal compassion, they were no less so of his regal justice. Such is an imperfect illustration of a fundamental principle of that stupendous-scheme of mediatorial government, founded on atonement, which the Son of God has established over our world.

II. Christ did not endure the penalty of the law. The constant vascillation of opinion on this point requires that we be very exact in defining our position. Logical and theological consistency would force men to the exact positive or negative of the proposition; but a conflict between prejudice and truth has originated a mixed theory, which holds between the two, so that, as Archbishop Magee says, "They who hold the doctrine of a *vicarious punishment* feel it not necessary to contend that the evil inflicted on the victim should be *exactly the same in quality and degree* with that denounced against the offender."* Dr. Dana, a vehement advocate for the penal theory, is arrested at this point by a foresight of logical and doctrinal consequences, and attempts to escape by saying, "As to his sufferings, we contend not that the Redeemer endured *precisely the same* misery, in *kind and degree*, to which the sinner was exposed, and which must otherwise have been endured. . . He endured in his soul all that perfect innocence could endure of the penalty of the divine law, of the anguish due to sin."†

Singular as is the absurdity, nothing is more common than for writers on this subject to assume the doctrine of legal substitution, and then deny it, as convenience or the exigency of the argument demands. Dr. Symington, who has written a valuable treatise on Atonement, says, "*Satisfaction* properly denotes that the sufferings of Christ *were not the identical punishment required by the law*, but a proper equivalent. . . What Christ endured *was not the precise penalty* of the law, but something equally satisfactory." On the next page he says, "The doctrine of substitution supposes that Christ takes the place of offending sinners, bearing their guilt and suffering their punishment. As surety for man he voluntarily holds himself responsible for **ALL THEIR GUILT**, and bares his bosom to the **FULL AWARD OF THE THREATENED PENALTY** due to them for sin."‡ Dr. Hill, very contrary to his characteristic clearness and force of reasoning, proceeds to lay down principles subversive of the penal theory of atonement, interspersing all along statements and positions which directly conflict with himself. At last he completely vacillates between two irreconcilable theories. He

* On Aton. and Sac., dis. 38.

† Sermon on Atonement, pp. 8, 11.

‡ On Atonement, pp. 10, 11.

says, "Although the sufferings of Christ became the punishment of sin, it is plain that they were *not that very punishment* which the sins deserved."* Far more "plain" is it that the venerable author's wonted discrimination forsook him at this important point. We are still more surprised, however, to find our favorite author, Dr. Pye Smith, falling into the same incongruity of opinion. Evidently his orderly and powerful mind was jostled and confused by the counter influences of opposite opinions. He says, "By the sacrifice of himself, JESUS CHRIST voluntarily SUSTAINED that suffering which was the MARKED PUNISHMENT of sin, and expressly with this view he was made a curse for us." In another page he says, "It is, I humbly conceive, worse than improper to represent the sufferings of JESUS CHRIST, in their last and most terrible extremity, as THE SAME *with those of condemned sinners in a state of punishment.*"† But how they could be the "*marked punishment* of sin," and yet not "*the same with those of condemned sinners in a state of punishment,*" we frankly confess ourselves unable to divine. True, the same author tells us, that "the glory of eternal wisdom is here manifested in the formation of a moral constitution, by which the guilt and punishment of sin, *so far as was necessary for the purposes of sacrificial atonement,* were assumed by the sinless victim."‡ But this method of solution only shifts the difficulty without at all relieving it.

To all these fluctuating and conflicting statements it is enough to reply, that Christ either did, or did not, endure the penalty of the law. If he did not, then the controversy is at an end; if he did, then he suffered it in *kind* and *degree*. To say he suffered the punishment due to sin, and at the same time say that he suffered neither the kind nor quantity due, is to aver direct and palpable contradictions. If Christ suffered the penalty in part, then in just so far our release from the law's arrest takes place on legal principles; while in respect of that part of the penalty which was freely remitted, our pardon is a matter of grace. Thus this mixed theory confounds in one discordant system the antagonistic principles of legal and evangelical pardon, a theory more logically absurd than that which supposes the Son of God to have endured the full weight and measure of the Father's wrath. But our objections to the penal theory of atonement must now be more fully stated.

1. It involves the doctrine of *imputed guilt* to God's "beloved Son." In assuming that the sufferings of Christ were of the nature of punishment, it has always been felt to be incumbent to establish the fact of his previous guilt. Accordingly, as the immaculate

* Lect. in Divinity, p. 435. † On Sacrifice, &c., pp. 37, 43. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 36.

Saviour was without personal fault, the doctrine of *imputed guilt* has been resorted to, whereby, by legal transfer, he was made answerable for the sins of our apostate race. Guilt is commonly defined to be *liability to punishment*; and divines have distinguished this liability into two sorts: 1. *Desert of punishment*, (*meritum pœnæ*;) 2. *Exposure to punishment* without personal demerit, (*reatus pœnæ*;) as when one becomes a surety or hostage for another. It is in this latter sense that the adorable Saviour has been accounted guilty, according to the theory of most divines. Shielded by this definition, they have boldly advanced to the vindication of penal infliction upon the immaculate person of "the only begotten of the Father." The entire force of the argument for imputed guilt rests upon the assumed principle that a person may be *liable* to the punishment due to sin, without being *in fact* a sinner. Archbishop Magee, after an elaborate examination of Isaiah liii, concludes, "The plain result of the whole is obviously this: that the righteous servant of Jehovah, having no sin himself, was to submit to be treated as the vilest of sinners; and, having the burden of our transgressions laid upon him, to suffer on account of them."* Even Dr. Jenkyn, who is a strenuous and able—and, we had almost added, an ultra—opponent of the penal theory, proposes to paraphrase 2 Cor. v, 21, thus: "He hath made him to be liable to punishment for us, who was not conscious of having done wrong, that we might not be liable to punishment through him." Again: "His sufferings are altogether inexplicable except on the principle that he was by a divine institution treated as if he were liable to punishment for us."† It is not pretended by this class of writers that Christ was reckoned a sinner *de facto*, but that by legal substitution he became liable for the punishment due to our sins.

To all this refinement of distinctions we object, for the following reasons:—Sin is a *fact*; and as such it is not irreverent to say, omnipotence itself cannot annihilate or change it. It is the act of an individual agent which defines his *character*—his *moral identity*. The *moral quality* of the act is as much the property of the agent, and as intransferable, as the act itself. The *resultant consequences* of the act are inseparable from its moral quality, and also incommunicable. Eternal justice, and the law of natural necessity, confirm this view. "The soul that sinneth IT shall die." To make the *penal consequences* of an act separable from its *moral quality*, making the former transferable while the latter remains the incommunicable property of the actor, is to make distinctions which

* On Aton. and Sac., dis. 42.

† On Atonement, p. 221.

have no foundation in nature, and are as repugnant to justice as to the natural reason of man. Furthermore, this doctrine of transferable punishment, or transferable *liability* to punishment, from the guilty to the innocent, confounds the essential difference between a *crime* and a *civil debt*. The obligation to cancel the latter may be legally assumed by a surety, because it lies against *property* merely; but the punishment due to a crime lies against the *person*, and can never be endured by a substitute without annihilating moral distinctions, and subverting the foundations of law and government. Indeed, we say of this, as Archbishop Magee says of the translation of guilt to the immolated victim under the Mosaic law, that it is "a thing utterly incomprehensible, as neither guilt nor punishment can be conceived but with reference to *consciousness*, which cannot be transferred."

If it be said that children and innocent persons are often punished, as in the visitations of public judgments upon nations, without personal blameworthiness; we answer, to such their sufferings are not a punishment proper, but a calamity, permitted for disciplinary ends, and as a partial evil resulting from the operation of general laws. So Jeremiah suffered when the judgments of Heaven fell heavily upon Judah. To the people, who as a body were corrupt, they were a punishment; but not to the prophet. Suffering and punishment are not synonymous terms. It is surprising that the acute mind of Butler* should have confounded such sufferings with the absurd notion of "vicarious punishment."

The following extract from the manuscript writings of one† whose ability, and Christian candor, and high standing in the Calvinistic school, entitle his opinions to no ordinary respect, will be seen to cut loose almost entirely from the system of imputation. He inquires, "Were the sins of men imputed to Christ when he suffered in their stead? Answer: He was *treated* as a sinner on their account; but their sins were not so reckoned to him that his sufferings were *deserved*, or that he was *legally responsible* for them. If no more is to be understood by the term *imputation* than what is meant in *treatment*, we do not object to the phrase; but if by imputation is meant that in point of *law* or *justice* he became liable to answer for their transgressions, we see no warrant for such a doctrine. This would seem to involve the notion of transfer of moral character, which we suppose to be absurd and impossible; or at least of that kind of legal responsibility which occurs in com-

* Vide the Analogy, part 2, c. 5.

† The late venerable Dr. James Richards, Principal of the Theological Seminary, Auburn, N. Y.

mercial transactions, but which can have no place in the concerns of a moral government founded on the principles of exact justice. Sin and holiness do not change hands like debt and credit." We cannot admit, however, that Christ was "*treated* as a sinner" on any other ground than that he actually *was* a sinner. His *treatment* accorded with his *character*, personal or official. But He in whom the Father was ever "well pleased," who was the highest pattern of moral excellence in the universe, could not have been treated as the object of the divine displeasure. The truth is, we must repudiate *in toto* this ill-favored dogma of imputation, or adopt it in all its extent, with the appurtenances and logical consequences thereunto belonging. Do you ask, What is the entire whole of this doctrine of legal imputation? We beg leave to answer in the words of Martin Luther:—

"Our most merciful Father, seeing us to be oppressed and overwhelmed with the curse of the law, sent his only Son into the world, and laid upon him all the sins of all men, saying, Be thou Peter, that denier; Saul, that persecutor, blasphemer, and cruel oppressor; David, that adulterer; that sinner which did eat the apple in Paradise; that sinner which hanged upon the cross; and, briefly, be thou the person which hath committed the sins of all men: see, therefore, that thou pay and satisfy for them. Here now cometh the law, and saith, I find him a sinner, and that such a one as hath taken upon him the sins of all men, and I see no sins else but in him; and so he setteth upon him, and killeth him. By this means the whole world is purged and cleansed from all sins, and so delivered from death and all evils. Now, sin being vanquished and death abolished by this one man, God would see nothing else in the whole world, if it did believe, but a mere cleansing and righteousness." For, "if the sins of the whole world be in that one man, Jesus Christ, then are they not in the world; but if they be not in him, then are they yet in the world. Also, if Christ be made guilty of all the sins which we all have committed, then are we delivered from all sins. But if he be innocent, and bear not our sins, then do we bear them, and in them shall we die and be damned."* Here is an honest expose of the rugged features of this system. Is the reader captivated?

2. But Christ could not, from the nature of the case, have endured the penalty of the law.

Charnock says: "Christ endured all that the law imposed upon sinners, whether in regard of loss by desertion, or of sense by malediction. . . He suffered that which the law demanded of

* Commentary on Galatians iii, 13.

us. . . He suffered the torments of hell, without the iniquities of hell. . . He suffered those agonies which were of the nature of the torments of hell, and that desertion of God which is the sting of hell."* Statements like these, so palpably adverse to all correct psychological and moral reasoning, hardly deserve a formal refutation. Yet this is the only consistent position to be taken in defense of the penal theory, and is necessarily involved in the idea of a legal substitution. The consciousness of having offended against a God of purity and love, and of having defeated the great ends of moral existence, must lie at the foundation of all those sufferings which are the due "wages of sin." This consciousness cannot be transferred to a substitute; and a holy soul could never be agitated by a feeling of insubordination, and the dread emotions of remorse and self-reproach. The torments of the lost soul, therefore, could not have been endured by Christ. It is true, the sufferings of the Son of God are represented by the terms "chastisement," "stripes," "a curse," "smitten of God;" and it is said of him that his soul was "sorrowful," "troubled," "sore amazed and very heavy," "in an agony," &c.—expressions which seem to borrow a hue of moral punishment; but when we take their exact import, we find some of them figurative, and all of them concurring indeed to represent unutterable anguish and ignomy, and a disturbed state of mind, but not the effects of a remorseful conscience, or of unholy passions.

Equally incapable was the divine Saviour of enduring the *extent* of those sufferings due to the sins of our race. The Godhead is impassible—the humanity alone suffered, and this only for a few years, and particularly a few hours. To prop the system of penal substitution, however, omnipotence is called to their aid. "The support," says Dr. Hill, "which the human nature of Jesus received from his divine, enabled him to sustain that wrath which the Lawgiver saw fit to lay upon a person who was bearing the sins of the world." But where is the proof of this statement? Unfortunately it is not at hand: an *alibi* that strongly indicates a *nullibi*.

3. The doctrine of legal substitution has been justly charged with degrading the whole subject of atonement to the level of a commercial transaction. Witsius says, "It is a doubtful matter, not explained by the law, whether that perfect righteousness [which the law required] must necessarily be performed by the very person to be saved, or whether a surety may be admitted." Such a

* On the Acceptableness of Christ's Death. Works, vol. ii, p. 571. London, 1699.

suretiship he says Christ undertook, and in respect of both conformity to the precept and endurance of the penalty, "performed an obedience of such value as to be *more than equivalent* to the obedience of all the elect."* Bishop Beveridge thus states it: "Man, in Adam, proving bankrupt, becomes non-solvent." A suitable person to cancel these debts can be found nowhere but "among the persons of the Trinity, every one of which is perfectly God, and therefore none is bound to do more than the other; but whatsoever he does which the other does not, may justly be accounted as a work of supererogation, and therefore, without violation of justice, may be imputed to others, who may be accounted as obedient by and through it."† Here we are presented with an exact *quid pro quo* transaction—a system of exchange and barter—so much grace to the delinquent for so much suffering and obedience by the surety! Is this the transcendent mystery of the sublime doctrine of atonement? It is true the Bible speaks of our being "redeemed" by a ransom price, "purchased," "bought," &c.; but this is figurative language, representing the *effects* of the atoning act, not its *nature*. "Forgiveness of sin," says Coleridge, "the abolition of guilt, through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of his perfect obedience during his voluntary assumption of humanity, is expressed, *on account of the resemblance of the consequences* in both cases, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred. Now the impropriation of this metaphor—that is, the taking of it literally—by transferring the sameness from the *consequents* to the *antecedents*, or inferring an *identity in the causes* from a *resemblance in the effects*—this is the point on which I am at issue, and the view or scheme of redemption grounded on this confusion I believe to be altogether unscriptural."‡

4. The theory that supposes the claims of vindictive justice to be met in the person of the Saviour is justly charged with making a difference between God's goodness and that of Christ. The Father is the personification of justice, the Son of love; the Father is spoken of as implacable till the Son quenches his wrath in his own blood; the Father is the stern, inflexible Judge, relaxing nothing of the law's demand, but exacting full payment,—the Son is a milder kind of Deity, meekly undertaking to appease this wrath and liquidate this demand. It is in vain to deny the justness of these charges upon the advocates of penal atonement, when the

* On the Covenants, vol. i, pp. 175, 176.

† Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles, pp. 93, 94.

‡ On Spiritual Religion, aph. 19.

world is flooded with books containing often the same statements, and often positions involving the same views. We admit that these statements stand connected with much that is true, and are often but the unguarded effusions of learned and pious minds; but this cannot justify, or render them less noxious. The truth is, they are the legitimate verbiage of a false theory.

Bishop Beveridge says: "Man naturally is at odds with God. God hates man's person, and man [hates] God's precepts. To make up this enmity betwixt them, Christ joins both their natures in one person; and so by shedding the blood of the human, appeased the wrath of the divine nature; and so reconciled his Father to us, not only by quenching the fire of his anger toward us, but also by purchasing his love and favor for us."* The death of Christ is often represented as exerting some extraneous influence upon the mind and feelings of Deity.

"'The expiation on the cross,' says Grotius, 'moves God to remit.' 'God,' says Barrow, 'in consideration of what his beloved Son hath performed and suffered . . . is become reconciled.' Secker says, 'In consideration of this meritorious goodness of his . . . the Most High established with him a covenant of grace. This consent of his to be crucified, our heavenly Father has been pleased to consider . . . an inducement to bestow pardon,' &c. Doddridge speaks of Christ's death as a 'valuable consideration' with God; and again, as making 'some ample and honorable amends.'"—*Penrose*, pp. 10, 11.

We admit that many of these expressions when received with due qualification may convey no improper meaning. But is the common mind likely to receive these requisite qualifications? Is the antidote always at hand—always perceived and applied? And why should terms be employed which are so obviously liable to mislead the common mind, and which require great explanation and care to prevent such injury? The atonement was not necessary in any sense as an inducement to Deity to forgive. He needed no extraneous motive influence to excite his compassion toward our miserable race. He is unchangeably and eternally the God of love; and this love is the *cause*, not the *fruit*, of atonement. How then can we magnify his grace by understanding literally the following distich?

"Our all-loving Saviour hath pacified God,
And paid for his favor the price of his blood."

Methodist Hymn-Book, p. 175.

* Exposition of the Articles, &c., pp. 107, 108.

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Let the reader compare such views with John iii, 16; Romans iv, 8; and 1 John iv, 9; with the parable of the "lost sheep;" with the whole analogy of revelation.

The starting point of all these erroneous representations is, as we have said, the pressing of figurative language into literal significations, and also of not apprehending the exact points of similitude to which such language applies. The word כַּפַּר , translated to *atone*, *expiate*, primarily means *to cover*, *to overlay*. Its secondary sense of *expiate* is derived from two circumstances: 1. The resemblance between *forgiveness*—thus putting sin, as it were, out of sight, *concealing* it—and *covering* anything from view; 2. The fact that the high-priest sprinkled the blood of the atoning victim upon the כַּפֹּתֵי *cover* or *lid* of the "ark of the covenant," (Lev. xvi, 11, *seq.*) whence this *cover* was called by the Seventy *ἱλαστήριον*, in Latin, *propitiatorum*; English, *mercy seat*, *propitiation*. "And the priest shall make *expiation* for him from his sin:" and the priest shall cause his sin *to be covered*. Here is the analogy. The *result* of the atoning act is the point to which the word applies. If the idea of *propitiation* attaches to these words in any place, or to any other words of Scripture, it is only by an anthropopathy—a figure of speech whereby the passions of men are ascribed to God; a figure, we may add, whose very nature indicates with what caution it is to be interpreted.

5. We object to the theory under consideration, because it would make the release of the sinner from the penal demand of the law to take place on *legal* principles to the exclusion of *grace*. "By *grace* we are saved," by God's "free gift;" but if the penalty has been paid, the enlargement of the prisoner follows according to the exact awards of justice, not from the favor of government. The prisoner may then demand his liberty as his legal right, and no power but that which would bid defiance to law and justice could longer detain him. If Christ has met the penalty of the law, the Father, as the administrator of justice, would have no further claim. Pardon, so far as the Father is concerned, is impossible; the debt is canceled.

6. Finally, if Christ endured the penalty of the law, then no *wisdom* is displayed in the plan of redemption. The same amount of misery which the original sentence denounced, is still endured in the human nature, though not in the persons, of the offenders.

"This is not such a gospel as inspiration reveals. A system which prevents no misery, and which brings no accession of happiness to the universe—a system whose grand and distinctive characteristic is, that

it devises a way in which the innocent may suffer a certain amount of misery which was due to the guilty, would hardly excite, as the gospel does, the wonder and admiration of the angels of heaven."—*Beman*, p. 108.

But we cannot pursue this part of the subject further.

III. The adaptation of the death of Christ as a substitute for the penalty.

We have already forestalled much that belongs to this section, in our remarks on the design of penalty. A few words only we add. Keep in mind that the atonement was not needed as a *compensation* to Deity for his favor; not to *appease* any divine wrath; not in any way to effect a change in the disposition, or moral feelings, of the Godhead; but primarily for the support of law, as a substitute for the penalty, during a dispensation of pardon. The crowning glory of the Redeemer's achievements is, that he "honored the law." But how can a moral law be honored? The answer is at hand:—By keeping its precepts, and by the due administration of its promised rewards to the obedient; or, in default of obedience, by the full and exemplary infliction of the penalty. But where the precept is violated and the penalty waived, and pardon offered to the guilty penitent, how *then* can the law be honored? In general terms we may answer: By producing the same impressions upon the minds of the governed, by some other means, which the literal and regular administration of law would effect. In order to this, Christ accomplished two objects. First, he illustrated the moral excellence of the precept in his life, demonstrating its perfect fitness to exalt and make happy the moral subject. He proved the fitness of the divine law to man's moral, and social, and physical constitution, and by his life gave afresh the divine approval to it as our rule of conduct, and the divine pledge that it would not be changed in its nature, or abated in the ratio of its requirement. Secondly, his death became, by the Father's appointment, an expression of the evil of sin, of the divine abhorrence of it, and of the unalterable purpose of God to insist upon obedience and punish future transgression. The penalty reveals God's hatred of sin by actual infliction; the death of Christ effects the same end by offering a pledge that God has not unconditionally abrogated the penalty, nor abandoned his own law. "To GIVE PROOF that he will punish," says President Griffin, "is certainly disclosing everything of God which PUNISHMENT ITSELF can reveal."* "I perceive important reasons," says Dr. Richards, "why God's clemency should not be

* On the Atonement, p. 25.

exercised toward man, without an adequate atonement for his offense. This course, while it magnifies his mercy a thousand-fold, finds its justification *in creating in the mind of every rational being a GREATER CERTAINTY that punishment will follow transgression*, than if pardon had been extended upon mere clemency.* This is the point. God might have written this truth in burning letters over the vast arch of heaven, he might have uttered it in the voice of "seven thunders" from the sky; but Infinite Wisdom saw, such was the constitution of man, such the laws of moral evidence, such the avenues to the heart and sensibility, that nothing could produce those deep, abiding, practical impressions upon our race, so effectually as the humiliation, the spotless life, the sufferings and death of "the Only Begotten of the Father." These impressions produced, the law being honored, the ends of penalty being answered, and the integrity of government asserted, the obstructions to the divine clemency would be removed, and the grace of pardon would freely, because it could now consistently and safely, flow forth to every penitent believer in Christ.

The atonement, then, may be considered both as a scheme of government, and as a system of moral means. As a government measure, it removes those obstructions which public justice would oppose to an exercise of clemency to the guilty; as a system of means, it is adapted to exert a moral, reformatory influence upon man.

In order to render the atonement efficacious, the following requisites must be met:—

1. It must be by the formal appointment of the supreme legislative power. It must be a government measure. Thus the Scriptures represent the Father as APPOINTING, ANOINTING, and SENDING his Son to accomplish this work.

2. The mediating person must be such as shall be fully capable of sustaining the responsibilities of government on the one hand, and sympathizing with man on the other. To be capable of the former, he must be God; to be capable of the latter, he must be man. So our Mediator is "God manifested in the flesh." The dignity of such a person imparted value to his sufferings,—not a *commercial*, but a *moral*, value. The dignity of his person, and his official designation to this work, gave his sufferings a high significance; they were God's "*declaration* of his own righteousness in granting remission of past sin."

3. Although the mere *quantum* of suffering was not the highest

* Thoughts on Atonement, unpublished MS.

quality, or consideration of value, yet they must be in that degree of intensity which is suited to the awful-import and object of their appointment.

4. The *nature* of the sufferings must be of a character to illustrate the evil of sin, and the divine opposition to it, and the certainty of its punishment. How peculiarly marked were the Saviour's sufferings in all these respects!

5. They must be endured "FOR sin;" that is, in the stead of those sufferings due to the sinner. They must be distinctly and publicly understood to be substitutionary. Not vicarious *punishment*, but vicarious *suffering*.

6. They must be *voluntary* on the part of him who suffers.

7. The case must be such as to admit of a compensative arrangement, whereby the person suffering, as a moral being of unexampled virtue, shall be rewarded. Christ, "for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross." "God, also, hath highly exalted him."

8. The evil to be prevented and the good to be secured by this measure, must be such as to justify the greatness of the means employed.

Geneva, N. Y., April 15, 1846.

ART. V.—1. *An Epitome of the History of Philosophy; being the Work adopted by the University of France for Instruction in the Colleges and High Schools. Translated from the French, with Additions, and a Continuation of the History from the Time of Reid to the Present Day.* By C. S. HENRY, D. D., Professor of Philosophy and History in the University of the City of New-York. 2 vols., 18mo., pp. 311, 276. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1841.

2. *The Philosophy of History, in a Course of Lectures.* By FREDERICK VON SCHLEGEL. *With a Memoir of the Author,* by JAMES BURTON ROBERTSON, Esq. 2 vols., 12mo., pp. 319, 302. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1841.

3. *Philosophy of History.* Methodist Quarterly Review for July, 1842. Art. IV.

A WRITER of eminent ability, but of erratic genius, has defined philosophy, "the science of life." As such it comprehends all sciences and all systems. As such, in its highest and best acceptation, it is the echo of primeval tradition, the coadjutor and ex-

pounder of revelation, the never silent voice of God. It is the nurse that guides the steps of infant humanity, the teacher that instructs its youth, the prophet that points its manhood to a higher and more glorious destiny. It walks hand in hand with the Bible, in simple and beautiful harmony—a text and a commentary, which, rightly understood, illustrate and adorn each other.

Unfortunately, the greater number of philosophical writers, in their attempts to solve the abstruse problems of the science of life—the nature, duties, and destiny of man—have overlooked this mutual relation and dependence, and even shown a disposition to avoid the lights of revelation. So self-confident is their pride of intellect, that they bury in the earth a rich legacy of wisdom, and disdain to employ any capital which their own industry has not accumulated. They close their windows to keep out the sun, and then grope in darkness for treasures, which a single beam of light would reveal. The ancient heathen philosophers relied on reason alone, because they had no other guide in their researches, save a few scattered rays of old tradition refracted into fantastic shapes and hues, by the medium through which they had passed. The modern, and self-named Christian philosophers, undismayed by the fruitless toil and wild vagaries of their less fortunate predecessors, reject the proffered clew to the labyrinth, and persist in unaided efforts to explore its bewildering mazes. What wonder if they grope along the same dark path, with toil equally fruitless, into vagaries equally wild? Neophytes of a holy priesthood, they refuse to open the volume which unfolds the mysteries of their order, or to know anything which themselves do not discover. What wonder if they “darken counsel by words without knowledge,” and hurry themselves and others into inextricable error?

Philosophy, living and life-giving, has two functions. It must teach men how they ought to live, and how to live as they ought. Such a philosophy, if we may use a mathematical illustration, is the product of two factors—revelation, a constant co-efficient; and reason, a variable. By operating with the variable alone, the speculative intellect has never been able to develop a formula, which satisfies the conditions of humanity, and is applicable to all its wants. Plato, whose transcendent genius constructed a system of wonderful extent and beauty, was tolerably successful in showing men how they ought to live, but signally failed in persuading them to live as they ought. Like the Apollo Belvidere, exquisite in finish, perfect in symmetry, godlike in expression, but cold and motionless, it was animated by no fire from the celestial altars: There it stood, and there it still stands, a miracle of art, life-like,

but not living. A philosophy which combines no elements drawn from the infallible and authoritative, though it may recognize a God of its own conception, is essentially godless; and a godless philosophy is as inert and powerless as would be a godless universe. Its heralds cannot command, for they hold in their hands no warrant signed and sealed in the chancery of the Infinite. Its precepts issue from a court whose jurisdiction is limited and incompetent, and no eternal sanctions compel their execution.

But philosophical opinions, however false, if they once obtain currency in practical life, exert no feeble influence upon the ages and nations by which they are adopted and applied. The filial ethics of Confucius checked, in the Chinese mind, every impulse toward improvement, and bound it fast in a kind of static equilibrium. The sensualism of Epicurus, after degrading Grecian morals, passed into Italy, where it speedily made its own exposition in Roman selfishness, injustice, and corruption. The materialists and ultra-spiritualists of the modern schools, who profess faith in God and his written word, and yet, by giving these no prominent place in their systems, virtually deny both, have brought the speculative intellect of the present age into a state of oscillation between atheism and pantheism, and reduced the practical intellect to a condition of cold, selfish, faithless, heartless egoism.

Now we want a philosophy that shall infuse into society a more benignant spirit. "Man was made for himself," said Epicurus. "Man was made for himself," echoes this amalgam of Epicurus and Midas, which we call *our age*. True; but for something more. "Man was made for God," cried the Stylite, as with contemptuous eye he looked down from his column upon toiling, suffering humanity. "Man was made for God," answered the monk, as he barred the portals of his cloister, and left the world to struggle and welter as it might. True; and for something more. Man was also made for man. His duties are three-fold: to God, to himself, and to his race. But this triad is a unit. He who performs his whole duty to one of the three, cannot but perform, at the same time, his whole duty to the other two. The great practical error lies in the false estimate which men make of the value and relation of duties; and its consequence is the introduction of conflict where God established harmony.

The vital elements of a philosophy, we do not say of a philosophical religion, but of a religious philosophy, which shall renovate and exalt society, are contained in the books of revelation. These elements, we may venture to predict, will be some day combined, not with the visionary speculations of the oriental

schools, as Manes and the Gnostics attempted, but with the immutable truths of nature discovered by the best efforts of reason, so as to form a system of harmonious unity and life-renewing power. It is not our purpose, however, in the present article, to trace even an imperfect outline of such a system. We shall do nothing more than glance at the "*membra disjecta*" of revealed philosophy, and at some of the problems which revelation has solved, and some for whose solution it has furnished data.

The domains of philosophy are intersected by numerous avenues in which amateurs may pursue the beaten track, and gather, with little effort, the flowers and fruits which bloom and ripen by the wayside. But other tracts are rugged and difficult; rock and forest oppose the progress of the explorer, and conceal the treasures which he alone can appropriate who has the heart and the arm to break ground and open a new highway. There are also deep and dark recesses, defended by barriers hitherto impassable, and from whose voiceless solitudes no response but echo greets the eager questioner.

"Porta adversa, ingens, solidoque adamante columnæ,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi excindere ferro
Coelicolæ valeant: stat ferrea turris ad auras."

To these obscure localities belong such problems as the nature of vital forces, the origin of evil, the relation of spirit to matter, and the co-existence of the finite with the infinite. The existence and attributes of God, and the origin and destiny of man, were also once enveloped in profound mystery. Long and earnestly did reason seek their solution, till it sunk down, exhausted, into the repose of a despondent skepticism. In those ages of anxious and arduous philosophical toil, which preceded the diffusion of the light vouchsafed to the descendants of Abraham, the speculative intellect was in a condition somewhat similar to that of a human being, brought into existence at the centre of the earth, with some indefinite notion of light, and a perpetual consciousness of the want of it. "What, whence, wherefore am I?" These are the first earnest questionings of his awakened thought; but no voice replies from upper air. His prayer, like that of Ajax, is for light; but no ray penetrates to his dark prison. "There is light, and I can find it." Such is the language of *faith*, which rouses him to action. With ill-directed force, delving in his narrow concave, at length he sees, or thinks he sees, a gleam of that unknown somewhat, which he believes may somewhere be found. "Brahma," he exclaims; "First Knowledge: Ormusd, First Light." But Brahma

vanishes, and Ormusd fades. They are but the phosphorescence of the brute elements which surround him. They are not sufficiently clear and steady to show him where he is, and whither he is tending. How long, think ye, before our darkling worker, cheered by hope alone, and a deceptive, tantalizing phosphorescence, will mine his dreary way through the stubborn crust of the globe into the sunlight? Faith staggers. Reason, baffled, lets go her pride, and bows her head, dejected. Weary and despairing, he falters, "*There is no light.*" This is God's time. From surface to centre the rocks are rent asunder, and a flood of living radiance from the eternal throne is poured in upon the doubting, despairing soul. Humble and grateful he looks up, and gazes upon the face of a Creator and a Father.

The very first sentence of revelation solves the problems of God and the universe. God existed in the beginning, and is therefore eternal; an underived, uncreated, self-existent Being. "God created the heaven and the earth." This material universe, then, is not eternal, for it had a beginning. It is not an emanation from the Eternal, a mere phasis of divinity, an ever-changing succession of forms developed from the same infinite and formless substance, and returning to the same; for it was *created*. It is neither a fortuitous aggregation of atoms, nor a necessary product of mechanical and chemical dynamics; for intelligence brought forth order from the formless void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Here, then, at once and for ever, we are extricated from the pantheism of Vyasa, and the dualism of Thales; from the atheism of Anaximander, and the materialism of Epicurus. We also escape from the din of that time-long conflict between spirit and matter, which was the leading characteristic of the dualism of Zoroaster; for the creation of God was his own, "And he saw that everything which he had made was very good."

Again, creation was progressive, not instantaneous. Light, the firmament, the seas, the dry land, plants, animals, man, each followed the preceding in natural order, and all were results of successive exertions of creative power, in successive portions of time. The cosmogony of Moses, rightly understood, is the mean of truth between two extremes of error. It teaches that creation was neither a sudden effect of a single almighty fiat, nor the spontaneous product of the gradual operation of material laws. It was God's work, in God's time.

The origin and nature of man are revealed, with similar clearness, in a proposition which Schlegel takes as the key and pivot of his Philosophy of History. "God created man in his own

image." Man, then, is not a being of chance, tossed blindly upon the stream of existence, for no purpose but to toil and repose, enjoy and suffer, live and die. He is not an electro-chemical machine, evolved from a monad after countless ages of transmutations through inferior animals, and capable of mere physical progression. He is not a strange imbodiment of some force of nature still more inexplicable than himself, which, finding itself in dynamical mood, in sheer sport and wantonness sprung forth a phenomenon, and called itself man. He is not a ripple on the ocean of life—an atom of spray, thrown up by the agitation of Brahma's unfathomable waves, to sparkle a moment in the sunlight, and then to fall back and be absorbed, unconsciously and unconscious, in the infinite abyss of being. Nor is he the highest development and personification of that universal spirit which lives in this endless succession of forms called *nature*, and which reveals itself as Deity in these forms alone. However flattering to human pride such an apotheosis of the race might be, men revolt instinctively from the dilemma in which it places them. They must reject all moral distinctions, or admit God to be the author of evil. Pope, however, who invested this doctrine with the drapery of some of his finest poetry, did not shrink from its consequences. He grasped the first horn with a firm and bold hand:—

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul,
That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth, as in the ethereal frame,
Warms in the sun; refreshes in the breeze;
Glow in the stars; and blossoms in the trees;
Lives through all life; extends through all extent;
Spreads, undivided; operates, unspent;
Breathes in our soul; informs our mortal part,
As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart;
As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns;
To him, no high, no low, no great, no small;
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all."

Beyond question, these are magnificent verses; but their brilliancy can only dazzle, not illuminate; it is an *ignis fatuus* to bewilder, not a beacon to guide. The gorgeous diction is but a whited sepulchre, which conceals the loathsomeness of death. Death to virtue, to moral agency, to religion and truth, veiled from sight by the beautiful imagery which adorns and hides it, at last stands suddenly forth, revealed in undisguised deformity, when

the poet announces his fearless, yet fearful conclusion, "*Whatever is, is right.*"

On all such theories of man, revelation stamps the seal of falsehood. Man is a *creation*; therefore he is not a part of the Creator's substance—not an emanation. Man became a *living soul*. He has, then, a distinct and separate personality. He is not a fraction of being, but an entity; not a manifestation of some higher Being, but a creature of that higher Being, conscious of individuality and identity. In a word, he is made *for God*, and *by him*, but not *of him*. He, therefore, owes obedience, and expects protection. The ideas of duty and Providence spring immediately and necessarily from a knowledge of his relations to his Maker. But duty is a relative term, and cannot be understood without a simultaneous conception of its opposite. If duty exist, something contrary to duty must exist also, at least in possibility. There is, then, a right and a wrong; good and evil. Pope's *one clear truth* is therefore the very absurdity of error. If whatever is, is right, then nothing is right; for right implies a distinction which vanishes whenever wrong becomes impossible.

The absolute standard of right and wrong is the will of God; obedience and disobedience to that will, are their manifestations in act. But as God is eternal, his will is unchangeable; hence right is immutably right, and wrong immutably wrong. What is usually termed conscience, is the reflection of the divine will in the human soul; and is that part of the original image of God which has been least of all effaced by evil. By recognizing the immutability of moral distinctions, conscience rejects the rule of expediency as inapplicable to moral conduct, and refuses to bend or mutilate the steadfast principles of rectitude to suit the changing conditions of time, place, and circumstance.

"Justum ac tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster,

"Dux inquieti turbidus Adriæ,
Nec fulminantis magna manus Jovis:
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ."

We have seen that evil, in possibility, exists of necessity. The origin of *actual* evil can be found nowhere but in the moral liberty of the intelligent creature.

“Man had of me

All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.

Such I created all the ethereal powers

And spirits, both them who stood, and them who fail'd;

Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.”

But is such moral liberty revealed? May not this consciousness of a self-determining power within us be, after all, an illusion? An equivalent inquiry would be, Does revelation contain any commands to men? Had the human will been bound fast to the divine by the chains of an iron destiny, obedience and disobedience had been alike impossible. A command, in such a condition of things, would have been an absurdity. But God does command; therefore man is free. To obey or disobey is in his own power. The history of the first command, temptation, and disobedience, plainly teaches the great lesson of human freedom, and all subsequent revelation unites with the testimony of every man's consciousness to confirm its truth.

But why did a good and almighty Being create man capable of evil? and why, having so created him, did he not shield him from temptation? and why, the first transgression having been committed, did he permit evil to extend and multiply itself upon the earth, till its dismal pall has darkened his entire creation? O how many hearts, under the suffocating pressure of this question, have doubted the benevolence or the power of God! Why have ambition and hate trampled the green earth under the blood-stained hoofs of war, and scathed her fair surface as with the march of demons? Why does the pure air vibrate with malediction and blasphemy? Why do envy, falsehood, and slander pollute society with their pestiferous breath? Why do poverty, disease, and death stare at us upon every side? Why this violence and conflict, which resound through every department of nature, and cause the great globe to send up to heaven one continuous voice of mingled rage and wailing? This question, in whatever form it has been proposed, and whatever starting-point men have assumed for its solution, has never yet been satisfactorily answered. The human intellect has stumbled at the existence of evil ever since it awoke to reason, and began to doubt and inquire. On this subject even revelation itself is silent, and the only data on which the mysterious problem could be unraveled are concealed in the depths of the Infinite.

“Whatever light an elevated metaphysics may throw upon this question, it implies, nevertheless, a mystery, that is, a limit, beyond which

human reason cannot pass. We have seen that the co-existence of the infinite and the finite, or the question, how it is to be explained that anything can exist which is not infinite, contains an incomprehensible element. From this primordial mystery is derived, at every step, at every stage of the human reason, corresponding obscurities. The co-existence of a supreme good and of evil is an example. This question is the first transformation of the problem of the co-existence of the infinite and the finite; and we must not, therefore, be surprised at the obscurities which it involves, since, touching immediately upon the generative source of all other mysteries, it falls within the thickest shadows which that mystery of mysteries casts."—*History of Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 244.

Unable to explain the origin of evil, men have attempted to escape from the difficulty by persuading themselves that it has no existence. The Vedantist takes refuge in the bosom of the Infinite, and declares all else illusion. Valentinus, a Gnostic pantheist, taught that evil is but good taking a false direction, and striving after something higher than the limitations of its nature permit it to attain. According to Manes, evil impels beings toward goodness, and therefore contains some portion of good, by which its power, like that of a house divided against itself, is diminished, and will be at last overthrown. The Alexandrians assert that "the world is perfect, everything is good. Evil is nothing but the inequality of souls, or the manifestation of that inequality." Several of the Christian fathers deny the positive existence of evil, and regard it either as the privation or the imperfection of good. Augustine declares that "everything which is, is good; and evil, of which I sought the origin, cannot be a substance." Ambrose says, "Evil is only the destitution of good." According to Dionysius, "evil can exist only as something not absolutely evil, as containing some portion of good, which is all there is positive." The modern optimists take a still bolder position, and contend that evil is such only in appearance; and that, really and actually, it is absolute good. Seeming evil is neither more nor less than a means of producing some positive good which never could be realized without it.

"All discord, harmony, not understood;
All partial evil, universal good."

Now revelation, though it declines to answer our inquiries as to the origin of evil, emancipates us from these and kindred errors. Everywhere in the sacred writings, from the history of the expulsion of our first parents, and the placing of "cherubims and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life," down to the prediction that Satan "shall go out to deceive the na-

tions which are in the four quarters of the earth, Gog and Magog, to gather them together to battle" against the saints, evil is recognized as something positively existing, which disturbs the order and harmony of the world, and which, being hostile to the will of God, and destructive to his creatures, he requires men to subdue.

No clear knowledge of the destiny of men after the present life was ever attained by the ancient philosophers. The salvation promised by the Brahminical teachers to those who should conform to the precepts of the Vedas was a virtual annihilation; for absorption of the soul into God, which was the highest aim of their religion and science, necessarily implied the utter extinction of individual consciousness. Plato's principal argument in favor of a future life rested on a false theory of man. Concisely stated, it runs thus: The divine substance is imperishable; the soul of man, being united to ideas of which God is the substance, partakes of that substance; therefore the soul is imperishable. The error lies in the minor proposition. Cicero, who loved to contemplate the doctrine of immortality, admitted that he was able to believe it only when all the arguments in its favor were present in his mind at the same time. These sages failed to exalt the undefined and feeble hope of an endless existence, which, whether obtained by intuition or derived from primitive tradition, seems to have been almost universal among men, into anything like that invincible belief which might be called the "full assurance of faith." Even the earlier revelations throw but an uncertain light into the abyss of futurity, and lay but an insecure foundation on which to build the doctrines of the resurrection and immortal life. The rewards promised, in the Old Testament, to the good, and the punishments denounced against the wicked, generally relate to the present world. A numerous sect among the Jews, at the time of our Saviour, though they professed faith in the Hebrew Scriptures, denied the existence of spirits and the possibility of a resurrection. But in the New Testament every doubt on these subjects is set at rest. That truth which philosophy had toiled in vain, through long centuries, to demonstrate, awaited the sublime confirmation, pregnant with hope and fear, that "all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of condemnation."

The doctrine of future retributions for the deeds of the present life has a profound significance. It implies a plan and purpose, conceived in the Infinite Mind, in the accomplishment of which men are the agents of God in this world. Rewards and punish-

ments in a future life would be incomprehensible on any other supposition, than that a portion of mankind perform their part of some work which God has assigned to the human race, and thus obey the divine will by helping forward the divine purpose; while another portion either neglect their allotted work, or act in opposition to the divine plan.

Here a new problem is presented for solution. What is the destiny of the human species in time; or, so far as the present world is concerned, what is the final cause of the continued existence of the race? What has humanity gained by its ceaseless and laborious efforts? What may it hope to gain hereafter? What means this wonderful fact which we call civilization? Does human activity contribute to its progress, and improve its condition? If so, according to what law; and how far may the improvement extend? In a word, we have here the *problem of humanity*, the solution of which is the end and aim of the philosophy of history.

Man may be compared to a projectile, whose path and striking-point the mathematician proposes to investigate; or, changing the figure, he is a planet, whose orbit the astronomer seeks to determine. Within a year from the discovery of Uranus by the elder Herschel, Lalande calculated, with a close approximation to truth, the position, form, magnitude, and period of its entire ellipse. By observing the motion of the new planet, while it was passing through a few degrees of its curve, he obtained data from which he deduced the elements of its orbit. So, by observing the progress of humanity, as far as the records and monuments of its activity permit, philosophy endeavors to ascertain some fundamental facts and laws, which may serve as the basis of a generalization wide enough to embrace all the phenomena of history. Could such a generalization be made, we should have an inductive philosophy of humanity. But the author of the article which stands third on our list of titles, in whom we recognize a profound thinker as well as an elegant writer, has clearly shown that the difficulties of this problem are insuperable by the inductive method. The observer traces the footsteps of humanity but a short distance, before he discovers that its path is neither a straight line nor a simple curve, but a curve of double curvature, with involutions and evolutions so numerous and complicated as to transcend the powers of analysis. Add to this, that the phases of humanity are perpetually changing. We are unable to mark its lineaments with accuracy, because they are seen, not only in remote perspective, but also from an unstable standpoint. As the true and apparent motions of the planets, when seen from the earth, do not correspond to each other; so, in the still

more complicated movements of society, the seeming retrogradation may be an actual advance. Again, the observer of humanity is bewildered and disheartened by the multiplicity and complexity of the objects which claim his attention. These are nothing less than all the products of human thought and action;—religion and morals; politics and war; philosophy and literature; science and art; manners, customs, and laws; opinions, sentiments, and passions; in a word, the universal history of the species. And finally, copious as are the sources of information on all these subjects, they are still exceedingly defective, and present views of men and nations which are often partial, and always indistinct.

Discouraged by these difficulties, philosophers have either abandoned the problem as hopelessly insolvable, or sought to magnify some particular fact into a universal principle that might serve them as a nucleus and centre, toward which all other facts should gravitate, and around which they should revolve. Hence the slender success which has attended this department of philosophy, and the unsubstantial theories of humanity which have been proposed.

The reviewer, already referred to, has left us nothing to say of Herder's scheme of man's perfectibility, nor of Hegel's theory of the progress of human freedom; both of which he has refuted with signal ability. He has also exposed the fallacy of that part of Herder's earlier theory, which made the progress of humanity analogous to the different ages in the life of an individual. But we understand him to assent to another part of the same theory, which may be expressed in the poetic formula,

"Westward the star of empire takes its way;"

not indeed as the central idea of history, but as an interesting and important historical fact. We believe that this opinion is popular, especially in America. A few years since, we heard the doctrine expounded before a learned society, in an address which appeared to be well received. The exposition was briefly as follows. That product of man's intellectual, moral, and physical activity, which we call civilization, has a westward and nearly circular movement of undulation. Starting into life in the remote east, in the land of Lao Tseu and Confucius, it gradually extended to India, Persia, and Egypt. From Egypt the great tide-wave took a lateral direction to Greece; thence it moved on to Rome, and from Rome to western Europe, where it is now high tide. From Europe the undulation will sweep across the Atlantic to the American continent, which is destined to be the theatre of its syzygistic altitude. Afterward, proceeding onward to the islands of the Pacific, or to a new

continent, which some geological catastrophe may upheave from the bosom of that ocean, and of which those islands will be the mountain summits, its cycle complete, it will revisit the land of its origin, and the world's great year begin anew.

Of course the reviewer is not responsible for so fanciful a scheme as this; but though it out-Herders Herder, it is only a generalization based upon the assumed fact, that there was a development of the human mind in China anterior to that in India, in India before Persia, and in Persia before Egypt. This order of succession, so far as we have been able to learn, has never been proved from history. The reverse seems equally probable; and a simultaneous development in those countries may be regarded as the most probable of all. Moreover, how are we to account for the reflex current to Alexandria in the second century of our era; and to Constantinople in the fourth; and from France and England to Germany in recent times? And why, at the present moment, is the reaction of European civilization more strongly felt in the remote provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and even on the banks of the Ganges, than its direct influence in poor fallen Spain?

This undulatory theory, whether we regard it as the expression of a great historical fact, or the key to the problem of humanity, opens no vista of hope to the race. Successive segments of mankind emerge from barbarism for a time, but the force which raised them up, passes by, and they sink down again into barbarism.

The theory of Cousin is far more profound and philosophical, but, when pushed to its consequences, not much more cheering. He makes humanity pass through three epochs, corresponding to the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and the idea of the relation between the two. Having exhausted its cycle, it returns to its starting-point to go through the same eternal round, again and again, reproducing, with endless toil, the same series of ideas, and reconstructing the same civilizations.*

By this theory the individual is swallowed up and lost in the species, and both in God. So far as the movements of the race are concerned, the will of the individual, directed by his own personal and reflective reason, can accomplish nothing. The spontaneous and impersonal reason, that is to say, the Infinite Intelligence itself, urges round the ponderous wheel on which humanity is placed as in a tread-mill, and by the irresistible motion of which, every man, whether he will or not, is impelled onward. This system has been called, and we think not inappropriately, a refined rationalistic pantheism. Though the author declares himself the

* See Introduction to the History of Philosophy, by Victor Cousin.

champion of personal freedom, and does actually give a certain scope to the individual will, yet his system, considered in relation to entire humanity, contains the elements of a strict and rigorous fatalism.

Another philosopher reconstructs, in a new form, the antagonistic dualism of the Persians, and represents man and nature, spirit and matter, freedom and fate, as irreconcilable enemies, and history the recital of their conflict.* From a particular point of observation this may be true, but from a higher and more general one it certainly is not. Matter, it is true, is not inert and powerless. It acts in accordance with its own laws; and its forces are sometimes destructive to man and his works. But must we hence infer that nature is hostile to man? Most of the physical evils which men suffer, are not the inevitable results of physical laws, but the necessary punishments for their violation. They are self-inflicted through negligence, passion, or ignorance. The forces of nature, in their regular and ordinary operation, are subservient to him who knows how to use them, and friendly to him who lives in harmony with them. Their purpose and general action are to bless and preserve, not to harass and destroy. Even those irregular and disorderly actions which sometimes occur, as exceptions to the usual working of these forces, though attended by real evils, often produce an ample equivalent of good. The tempest that ruins man's harvest, purifies the air which he breathes. The mountain that nurses the glacier and gives birth to the avalanche, sends forth its countless rills to fertilize his fields. The bird that pecks his ripe fruit, only repays itself for having destroyed the insect that would have blighted the germ, and the larva that would have killed the tree. The ocean that ingulfs an argosy, bears safely to port the merchandise of a thousand. Nature, then, is not a churlish stepdame, but a benignant mother; and though she may frown for a moment, she loves always. Even when she seems to be angry, she has the good of her children at heart, and would teach them the true use of her gifts.

From this point of view, history, so far from being the epos of the successive triumphs of man over the fatal power of nature, is the recital of his victories over his own ignorance, appetites, and passions.

Another supposes that the movements of the human intelligence, and the civilizations which are its exponent, may be regarded as a series of oscillations between the extremities of an arc. This oscillatory motion is said to be observable in every department of intellectual activity; in theology, between atheism and pantheism;

* Michelet, Introduction a L'Histoire Universelle, p. 9.

in logic, between intuitive belief and absolute skepticism; in psychology, between spiritualism and sensualism; and in politics, between anarchy and despotism.

We admit the fact of these oscillations in multiplicity, but deny that they can be reduced to unity. The arcs do not coincide with each other, nor is the motion through them regular and isochronous. How then are we to obtain a resultant through which all the forces may be referred to a common axis? How shall we determine the poles between which the great pendulum, that governs the motions of all the rest, and carries them with it, swings backward and forward?

This theory, it appears to us, confounds two things which are different;—the method by which humanity approaches truth, with its method of applying truth after it is found. To the former, the mechanical illustration, already employed, is appropriate. Truth is situated in the middle of an arc, and human reason moves toward it with accelerated velocity. But the practical intellect possesses inertia as well as gravity, and, passing the truth-point, is impelled by a kind of momentum toward an extreme of error opposite to that from which it started. A reaction toward truth then takes place, and the motion continues through a gradually diminishing arc, till the common mind settles down at last into the equilibrium of truth. Thus, after oscillating for ages between atheism, which admits nothing but the finite, and pantheism, which admits nothing but the infinite, reason rests at last in monotheism, which admits both. Thus, after successive trials of anarchy and despotism, we may venture to hope and predict that truth will be realized in a government directed by the common mind for the common weal.

Civilizations, on the contrary, are results of the application of truth, supposed to be already known, in the practical affairs of life. Among these no mechanical oscillations are perceptible, but changes occur which are somewhat analogous to the transformations produced by chemical forces. Were we permitted to carry out such an illustration, we would call society a complex body, composed of elements which are the admitted truths of each age. Whenever new truths are discovered, they are thrown into the solution, and frequently produce violent effervescence and copious precipitation. In the conflict of hostile affinities, society is sometimes convulsed to its centre, and threatened with total destruction; but after a time, in obedience to the new forces, the elements combine in another order, a new adjustment is effected, and the transformation is complete. This new crystalization of the social compound, will, as a general rule, exhibit a more perfect structure and a more

beautiful form than the one which preceded it, because it will contain more truth. The condition of humanity, then, may be expected to improve with every transformation of its social elements. It is progressive.

What we have just stated only asserts the fact, and explains the mode of human progress. The momentous question, what is the *end* of this progress; what is the purpose of an all-directing Providence in relation to man in time; or, returning to our illustration, what will be the composition of the social body when no new reagent shall be sufficiently potent to disturb its quiescent affinities, still remains unanswered. What then does revelation, from beginning to end, in a thousand voices and tones, enjoin upon every man? Simply this: to love good, to cherish it, to multiply it; to hate evil, to subdue it, to destroy it. Such is the will of God in respect to the *individual*; such the work assigned to him. Now, can the work of the individual be anything else than the work of man—the work of humanity? If not, then the great scheme of Providence, to the accomplishment of which all human activity is tending, under the divine direction, is the subjugation of evil, and the final triumph and supremacy of good.

This view of humanity is similar to Schlegel's; and from a Christian stand-point it would seem hardly possible to take any other. According to that author, the problem of history is the restoration in man of the lost image of God.

“To point out the progressive restoration in humanity of the effaced image of God, according to the gradation of grace in the various periods of the world, from the revelation of the beginning, down to the middle revelation of redemption and love, and from the latter to the last consummation, is the object of this Philosophy of History.

“This divine image implanted in the human breast is not an isolated thought—a transient flash of light, like the kindling spark of Prometheus; nor is it a mere Platonic resemblance to the Deity—an ideal speculation of the human mind, soaring beyond the range of vulgar conception. But, as this likeness to God forms the fundamental principle of human existence, it is interwoven with the internal structure of human consciousness; and the triple nature of the soul is intimately connected with the principle of the divine resemblance.

“Undoubtedly, historical philosophy can and ought to assume the divine principle in man—the divine image implanted in the human breast—as the great pivot of human destiny, the main and essential point in universal history, and the restoration of that image as the proper purpose of mankind.

“Thus the philosophic historian may endeavor, as I have attempted, to point out the divine truth contained in the primitive revelation, the original word which was current among the nations of the primitive

age: in the second period of the world—the decisive crisis between ancient and modern times—he will discover, in the Christian religion, the sole principle of the subsequent progress of mankind; and the distinctive character and intellectual importance of the third or last epoch of the world, he will find only in that light, which, emerging from the primitive revelation and the religion of love established by the Redeemer, has shone ever clearer and brighter with the progress of ages, and has changed and regenerated not only government and science, but the whole system of human life. Here is the principle which furnishes the plan of classification for all the great epochs of history.”—*Philosophy of History*, vol. i, pp. 81, 270; vol. ii, pp. 39, 40.

The restoration of the divine image in man, or progress toward that restoration, can be effected only by a successful warfare of good against evil. Hence, the condition of humanity is a continual struggle, in which, as Schlegel says, man is exposed to the influences of two contending powers, and which commences with the first earthly mission of Adam. “That man only who recognizes the permission of God given to evil, in its at first inconceivably wide extent, is capable of understanding the great phenomena of universal history, in their often strange and dark complexity, so far at least as human eye can penetrate into those hidden and mysterious ways of Providence.” This warfare is waged simultaneously both in the natural and spiritual world; between physical good and physical evil in the one, and between moral good and moral evil in the other. In the conflict of physical good and evil, the most powerful allies of good and faithful coadjutors of humanity are science, the mother of arts, and industry, their handmaid. With these, man protects himself from the excessive and destructive forces of nature, and even makes them obedient to his commands, and subservient to his necessities. With these, he teaches the sterile rock to teem with food, and extracts health from poisonous drugs; with these, he unlocks the treasures of air, earth, and waters, and compels the stars to guide him when he goes forth on his ocean path to gather in the harvests of every clime; and with these he curbs “the lightning’s fiery wing,” or bids it speed, the messenger of his intelligence,—the herald of his will.

On the contrary, for the triumph of moral good and the subjugation of moral evil, the armory from which humanity draws its most effectual weapons is *Christianity*. The warfare was, indeed, commenced at the earliest era of man’s history, long before Christianity was promulgated in the world; but the hostilities were only preliminary and preparatory,—a skirmishing of outposts which usually precedes the shock of dense battalions; or rather, the contest, during the first forty centuries, resembled the early movements of a

campaign, by which the way is cleared to place the main force in an impregnable position and commanding attitude. Of the invading army, which comprises all the elements of moral good, and which is destined to achieve the conquest of our world, Christianity is the base line; the centre and pivot of operations; the rallying point in disaster; the unfailing source of supply and reinforcement. No assault of the enemy can carry it, no stratagem surprise it; for its fortress is the Rock of ages; Omniscience, its sentinel; Omnipotence, its champion.

“Christianity is the emancipation of the human race from the bondage of that inimical spirit, who denies God, and, as far as in him lies, leads all created intelligences astray. Since this divine era in the history of man, since the commencement of his emancipation in modern times, this spirit can no longer be called the prince of this world, but the *spirit of time*, the spirit opposed to divine influence, and to the Christian religion, apparent in those who consider and estimate time and all things temporal, not by the law and feeling of eternity, but, for temporal interests or from temporal motives, change or undervalue, and forget the thoughts and faith of eternity.

“It is only with sentiments of grateful admiration, of amazement, and awe, we trace in the special dispensations of Providence for the advancement of Christianity, and the progress of modern society, the wonderful concurrence of events toward the single object of divine love, or the unexpected exercise of divine justice long delayed. With this faith in primitive revelation, and in the glorious consummation of Christian love, I cannot better conclude this Philosophy of History, than with the religious hope I have more than once expressed, and which is more particularly applicable to these times—the dawn of an approaching era:—that by the thorough religious regeneration of the state, and of science, the cause of God and Christianity may obtain a complete triumph on the earth.”—*Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, pp. 300, 302.

The reviewer, to whom we have several times alluded, and for whose opinions we entertain the highest respect, makes “the history of redemption the basis and nucleus of the history of the world. The great central point is the cross of Christ—the great central fact the manifestation of God in the flesh.” If he refers only to the moral and spiritual regeneration of the world, this is unquestionably true; but the theory does not embrace all the elements of humanity, and therefore does not solve the problem in its utmost generality. There must be a physical and an intellectual, as well as a moral and spiritual, progression; and it is not clear that the latter necessarily includes the former. It is conceivable that the war against physical evil might have been successfully prosecuted, even though Christianity, by which the conflict with moral evil is not only made possible, but the victory over it

certain, had never been introduced into the world. While, therefore, we believe that Christianity is incomparably the most important fact in history, and the most powerful element of human renovation and progress, we must still contend that it is but an *element*, and not the *soul* and *centre* of history. We must still believe that the *propter quam* of humanity is the gradual, but effectual triumph of *every species* of good, over *every species* of evil. In short, we must believe that Christianity exists for man, and not man for Christianity.

If the subjugation of evil and the consequent restoration of the divine image in man, is the true solution of the complex enigma of history, we are presented with a plan worthy of its Author, and a work worthy of man. Every individual, whatever sphere of life he occupies, has a part assigned him, which, if rightly and faithfully performed, will help forward this glorious consummation. He that stands idle in the market-place and says, "No man hath hired me," is false to his nature, deaf to his vocation, traitorous to humanity, unprofitable to his Master. He defeats the purpose of his existence, and, so far as in him lies, the destiny of the human race which is implicated with his own. But the work which he has neglected, must and will be accomplished. The wicked and slothful servant will be cast into outer darkness, and his work and its wages will be given to another. Humanity has need of all her children. Every member of the countless brotherhood has the power, and is required to do something for its interests;—something to elevate himself and others a little higher on the ascending scale, whose limit is the highest attainable perfection.

Toil on, then, whoever thou art, man of thought, or man of action, for Heaven has endowed thee with energy for an immortal work. Toil in faith; for thou canst hasten the times foretold by ancient seers, "when the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord; and when they shall not hurt nor destroy in all his holy mountain." Toil in hope; for in the darkest storms of life the clouds are spanned by the bow of promise, to which the weary and desponding may look up and "hail its sacred sign." Toil with courage; for high above the dust and din of the conflict, streaming in light, "the harbinger of victory," thou beholdest

"A banner with the strange device,
Excelsior."

And thou, poor brother, unpitied, perhaps down-trodden, with sweat and pain delving in the dingy mine for scanty bread, or poisoned by the noxious fumes of the factory, or scorched by the hot

breath of the furnace, let thy dim eye brighten; for thou art not man's hireling, but God's coadjutor. As a gleam of unwonted hope lights up thy countenance, from which the image of thy Creator is not yet effaced, listen with joy, and learn

“The accents of that unknown tongue,
Excelsior.”

And thou, unfriended son of genius, who starvest in Otway's garret, or pinest in Tasso's prison, while thy full soul travails with thoughts that echo through eternity, though misunderstood or unknown by the little men around thee, yet fear thou not; for thy communion is with beings of nobler mold, and on thine ear, also, strikes the music of that voice which sounds

“Through the startled air,
Excelsior.”

And thou, great humanity, that toilest, like a bewildered child, along thy mysterious path, and strugglest, ever, with the foes that feed on thy Promethean vitals, despair not. Upward an unseen hand guides thy steps; and upward *shall* guide them, evermore. And from the throne of the universe, which is thy Father's,

“A voice falls, like a falling star,
Excelsior.”

Dickinson College, April 15th, 1846.

- ART. VI.—1. *A Sketch of the History of Wyoming.* By the late ISAAC A. CHAPMAN, Esq. To which is added, an Appendix, containing a Statistical Account of the Valley and adjacent Country, by a Gentleman of Wilkesbarre. 12mo., pp. 209. Wilkesbarre: Sharp D. Lewis. 1830.
2. *The Poetry and History of Wyoming: containing Campbell's Gertrude, and the History of Wyoming, from its Discovery to the beginning of the Present Century.* By WILLIAM L. STONE, author of "The Life of Brant," "Life and Times of Red Jacket," &c., &c. Second edition, enlarged. 12mo., pp. 398. New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1844.
3. *History of Wyoming, in a Series of Letters, from Charles Miner, to his Son William Penn Miner, Esq.* Royal octavo, pp. 488. With an Appendix, pp. 104. Philadelphia: J. Crissy. 1845.

WYOMING is a beautiful vale on the Susquehannah, in the state of Pennsylvania, and is situated about one hundred and twenty miles north of west from New-York, and the same distance west of north from Philadelphia, and east of north from Harrisburg. "The valley" is about twenty-five miles in length, and three in breadth, environed by mountains, generally covered with oak, chestnut, and pine, and here and there studded with peaks and cliffs of rocks. The height of the eastern range averages about one thousand feet, and that of the western about eight hundred. These mountains are variegated with forests, bald rocks, and deep gorges: and though they do not present a view so sublime and picturesque as portions of the Allegany, yet nothing can surpass their beauty and grandeur. The valley is formed of flats and plains, the latter being diversified with small elevations. The noble Susquehannah takes a serpentine course through the vale, and is fringed with a luxuriant growth of maple, elm, buttonwood, and willow. From all points you have a view of some portion of the beautiful plain, the river, and the surrounding mountains. From Prospect Rock, above Wilkesbarre, on the east, you have open before you a view of the old and flourishing town of Wilkesbarre; the new and rising village of Kingston, immediately opposite; New-Troy, six miles above; the rich and highly cultivated farms of the valley, with their elegant houses and barns, and the Kingston Mountain, which is fast yielding to the process of cultivation, and presents a prospect, from this point, of a lovely ascending plain, varied with luxuriant forests and cultivated farms. From

the side of the mountain west of Forty Fort the prospect is still more extensive and enchanting. At the north, the eye takes in the Lackawanna Valley, at the east Abram's Plains and Wilkesbarre, and at the south Hanover and Newport. Here you have spread before you a most lovely and beautiful view of a rich plain under the highest state of cultivation, ornamented with the choicest drapery of both nature and art; the waving fields, the sparkling river, flourishing towns, and the proud Eastern Mountain, which, as yet, defies the hand of cultivation. Our description is wholly inadequate, though drawn from a vivid picture of the favored spot which has been filling up and deepening its impressions upon the tablet of the soul for twenty-seven years. We love the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime. We have gazed with rapture upon the scenery of the east, the north, and the west. We have traced the Connecticut, the Hudson, the Mohawk, the Genesee, the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Mississippi, and, after all, we must say, for beauty and loveliness we have seen nothing which so completely fills our eye as Wyoming. Some, we doubt not, will say, "Hereby hangs a tale." In Wyoming, the reviewer found the companion of his youth, here he had his earthly home, and here, Providence permitting, he means to be buried. All this is true; and yet we are as firm in our opinion as the monomaniac is of the truth and importance of his "one idea," that our notions and impressions are founded upon sober truth, and that no man of good taste, upon an actual survey of the scene at any period between May and October, will question the truthfulness of the convictions and impressions herein briefly sketched.

Our object, however, is not eulogy, but *history* and *incident*. The spot to which we would direct the attention of our readers is rich in historical facts, stirring incidents, and the very genius of romance. The associations of every inch of Wyoming are profoundly interesting and inspiring. Whether we turn attention to the occupancy, the struggles, and the fate of the original inhabitants; or to the privations, the toils, the dangers, the woes, and achievements of the early settlers; or to the diplomacy, negotiations, contests, and compromises of the states which set up rival claims to the soil, we see materials for the record of the historian and the speculations of the philosopher, while we have grave lessons of instruction for the moralist and the Christian.

The first work, placed at the head of this article, was the earliest essay at a connected "History of Wyoming;" and, considering the materials with which the author constructed his delineations,

is by no means a contemptible performance. The narrative is perspicuous, bold, and true to the records and relations upon which the author relied—the discussions and speculations are able and enlightened, and the work is by no means barren of incident. But the author was called to an early grave, and, consequently, had not the time and opportunity for a thorough investigation of records, and other sources of information necessary to a complete History of Wyoming. The work is out of print, and perhaps will hereafter only be sought as a literary curiosity, and be consulted by such as wish to see all that has ever been written upon the subject. The name of the author, however, deserves to live, and will live, among the historians of the country—and the editor and publisher is deserving of much praise for the ability and correctness with which the work is executed. Works of this class are wholly above criticism. The enlightened scholar and antiquarian will treasure them up as precious specimens of the literary standard of the times, and as a portion of the materials which must always be carefully surveyed and impartially considered, in forming a comparative estimate of the past and the present, and in studying the philosophy of our country's history.

The second work is an improvement upon the first. The author, the late lamented *Col. Stone*, added much from his large collection of documents and records in relation to Indian affairs. His reflections, descriptions, and illustrations are highly instructive and entertaining, and his style is pure classic English, as every composition is which remains as the fruit of his prolific pen. Of the sweet poem of Campbell—"Gertrude of Wyoming"—with which the colonel commences his book, we need say nothing. It has passed through its probation, and has, by universal consent, taken its position among the prettiest tales and the most beautiful specimens of the poet's art which modern times have produced.

But it was reserved for another hand to do full justice to this subject. The man best qualified to write the History of Wyoming—and the man to whom those who have felt special interest on the subject have looked for these fifteen years past—was the *Hon. Charles Miner*. Mr. Miner came to Wyoming in 1799, and since that time has enjoyed the best advantages for procuring the necessary information. Having access, personally, and by his friends, to the records at Washington, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg; and having an extensive and intimate acquaintance with the ancient families—mingling with the fathers and mothers who still live, and stand out upon the face of society like old weather-beaten oaks in a thicket, and being employed *con amore* with

them in conversations about olden times; it has long been hoped that before he should follow the fathers who have fallen before the all-devouring tooth of time, he would give to posterity the results of his researches in the form of a History of Wyoming. We are happy that he has finally met this cherished expectation, and that we have before us, in the third work above, the fruits of his toil.

Mr. Miner's History is of a mixed character—being a narrative, a documentary and a philosophical History. As to facts, our author is reliable; as to the political controversy between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, which so long agitated the country, he is a thorough Yankee; and in this we confess we have a strong leaning to his side, and think him, in the main, wondrously right. And as to the interests of literature, morals, and religion, his puritanical education always shows itself—and here, too, we are of one heart and of one mind with him. The style of his book is free and popular, and we have ever before us the scintillations of a vigorous imagination: if anything, the author's fancy is a little too luxuriant. There is nothing of this, however, of which we would complain, as calculated to pervert the truth of history. The flashes of wit and humor, which the author gathers from the actors in the tragedy and brings out of his own resources, give an interest and power to his narrative which nothing else could supply. We pronounce, without much fear, that no one but a mopish drone, who is hopelessly fettered by arbitrary rules of composition, and wholly unsusceptible of emotions from a good story well told, or a splenetic literary Vandal, will ever make Miner's History of Wyoming the butt of hyper-criticism. It will live, and be read—and be read, too, with pleasure and delight—long after the venerated author shall have slept with his fathers.

After these brief notices of the books at the head of this article, we shall proceed to present to our readers a sketch of the history which they record:—

“The name Wyoming was long supposed to mean, being interpreted, ‘A field of blood;’ but Mr. Heckewelder, perfectly versed in Indian language, to the inquiry of Mr. Chapman, replied, ‘Wyoming is a corruption of Maughwauwama, by which it was designated by the Delaware Indians, being a compound of *maughwau*, meaning *large*, and *wama*, signifying *plains*, so that it may be translated ‘THE LARGE PLAINS.’”—*Miner's History*, p. 15.

“The Large Plains,” when first visited by the whites for purposes of settlement, were in the possession of the Delaware Indians. The Delawares had once been a powerful tribe, but had been sub-

jected by the Iroquois, or the six confederated nations, and by them were ordered to leave the country on the Delaware, east of the Blue Ridge, and occupy Wyoming. The Nanticokes had settled on the lower extremity of the valley on the east side of the river, and the Shawanese were located on the flats immediately over against them on the west side. But these tribes finally removed—the Nanticokes up the river, and the Shawanese to Ohio. How the Delawares became sole masters of the valley may be learned from the following interesting relation:—

“While the warriors of the Delawares were engaged upon the mountains in a hunting expedition, a number of squaws, or female Indians, from Maughwauwame, were gathering wild fruits along the margin of the river, below the town, where they found a number of Shawanese squaws and their children who had crossed the river in their canoes, upon the same business. A child belonging to the Shawanese having taken a large grasshopper, a quarrel arose among the children for the possession of it, in which their mothers soon took a part, and as the Delaware squaws contended that the Shawanese had no privileges upon that side of the river, the quarrel soon became general; but the Delawares, being the most numerous, soon drove the Shawanese to their canoes, and to their own bank; a few having been killed on both sides. Upon the return of the warriors, both tribes prepared for battle to revenge the wrongs which they considered their wives had sustained.

“The Shawanese, upon crossing the river, found the Delawares ready to receive them and oppose their landing. A dreadful conflict took place between the Shawanese in their canoes and the Delawares on the bank. At length, after great numbers had been killed, the Shawanese effected a landing, and a battle took place about a mile below Maughwauwame, in which many hundred warriors are said to have been killed on both sides; but the Shawanese were so much weakened in landing that they were not able to sustain the conflict, and after the loss of about half their tribe, the remainder were forced to flee to their own side of the river: shortly after which they abandoned their town and removed to the Ohio.”—*Chapman's History*, pp. 24, 25.

The first white man who ever visited “The Large Plains” was the celebrated *Count Zinzendorf*. The following account of this event will, we doubt not, be read with interest:—

“Soon after the arrival of the Delawares, and during the same season, (the summer of the year 1742,) a distinguished foreigner, Count Zinzendorf, of Saxony, arrived in the valley on a religious mission to the Indians. This nobleman is believed to have been the first white person that ever visited Wyoming. He was the reviver of the ancient Church of the United Brethren, and had given protection in his dominions to the persecuted Protestants who had emigrated from

Moravia, thence taking the name of *Moravians*, and who, two years before, had made their first settlement in Pennsylvania.

“Upon his arrival in America, Count Zinzendorf manifested a great anxiety to have the gospel preached to the Indians: and although he had heard much of the ferocity of the Shawanese, formed a resolution to visit them. With this view he repaired to *Tulpehoeken*, the residence of Conrad Weiser, a celebrated Indian interpreter, and Indian agent for the government, whom he wished to engage in the cause, and to accompany him to the Shawanese town. Weiser was too much occupied in business to go immediately to Wyoming, but he furnished the count with letters to a missionary of the name of Mack, and the latter, accompanied by his wife, who could speak the Indian language, proceeded immediately with Zinzendorf on the projected mission.

“The Shawanese appeared to be alarmed on the arrival of the strangers, who pitched their tents on the banks of the river, a little below the town, and a council of the chiefs having assembled, the declared purpose of Zinzendorf was deliberately considered. To these unlettered children of the wilderness it appeared altogether improbable that a stranger should brave the dangers of a boisterous ocean, three thousand miles broad, for the sole purpose of instructing them in the means of obtaining happiness *after death*, and that, too, without requiring any compensation for his trouble and expense; and as they had observed the anxiety of the white people to purchase lands of the Indians, they naturally concluded that the real object of Zinzendorf was either to procure from them the lands at Wyoming for his own uses, to search for hidden treasures, or to examine the country with a view to future conquest. It was accordingly resolved to assassinate him, and to do it privately, lest the knowledge of the transaction should produce a war with the English, who were settling the country below the mountains.

“Zinzendorf was alone in his tent, seated upon a bundle of dry weeds, which composed his bed, and engaged in writing, when the assassins approached to execute their bloody commission. It was night; and the cool air of September had rendered a small fire necessary to his comfort and convenience. A curtain, formed of a blanket, and hung upon pins, was the only guard to the entrance of his tent. The heat of his small fire had aroused a large rattle-snake, which lay in the weeds not far from it; and the reptile, to enjoy it more effectually, crawled slowly into the tent, and passed over one of his legs undiscovered. Without, all was still and quiet except the gentle murmur of the river at the rapids, about a mile below. At this moment the Indians softly approached the door of his tent, and slightly removing the curtain, contemplated the venerable man, too deeply engaged in the subject of his thoughts to notice either their approach or the snake which lay extended before him. At a sight like this even the heart of the savage shrunk from the idea of committing so horrid an act, and quitting the spot, they hastily returned to the town, and informed their companions that the *great Spirit* protected the white man, for they had found him with no door but a blanket, and had seen a large rattle-snake crawl over his legs without attempting to injure him. This circum-

stance, together with the arrival, soon afterward, of Conrod Weiser, procured Zinzendorf the friendship and confidence of the Indians, and probably contributed essentially toward inducing many of them, at a subsequent period, to embrace the Christian religion. The count, having spent twenty days at Wyoming, returned to Bethlehem, a town then building by his Christian brethren on the bank of the Lehigh, about eleven miles from its junction with the Delaware."—*Chapman's History*, pp. 19–22.

History records considerable success in the labors of the United Brethren to Christianize the Indians of the Six Nations and the tributary tribes. And how much further their efforts might have succeeded, had it not been for the wars which followed, first between France and England, and then between England and her colonies, it may now be difficult to determine. But it is certain that, in consequence of the Indians taking "the war path," there was soon little fruit to be seen of the labors of the self-denying men who came among them, and labored for a time with the most encouraging prospects.

The conflicts which occurred between the people of Connecticut and Pennsylvania, in relation to the right of settlement and jurisdiction, constitute so prominent a part of the early history of Wyoming, that it will be proper here to notice the grounds of their respective claims. The charter granted to "The Plymouth Company," by James I., covered the territory "from the fortieth to the forty-sixth degree of north latitude, extending *from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean*." This charter was granted under the great seal of England, on Nov. 3, 1620, to the duke of Lenox, the marquis of Buckingham, the earl of Arundel and Warwick, and their associates, "for the planting, ruling, ordering, and governing of New-England, in America." The charter of Connecticut was derived from the Plymouth Company, of which the earl of Warwick was president. This grant was made in March, 1621, to Viscounts Say and Seal, Lord Brook, and their associates. It covered the country west of Connecticut "to the extent of its breadth, being about one degree of latitude *from sea to sea*." This grant was confirmed by the king the same year, and also in 1662. "The New-Netherlands," or New-York, being then a Dutch possession, was excepted in these grants under the general limitation of such portions of territory as were "then possessed or inhabited by any other Christian prince or state."—See *Col. Stone's History*, pp. 128–131.

By the terms of this charter, the people of Connecticut very reasonably considered themselves entitled to the territory within

the latitudes above specified, west of "the New-Netherlands," and began to cast a longing eye upon the fertile lands lying upon the Delaware and Susquehannah. About fifty years after the charter to Lords Say, Seal, and Brook, the crown granted a charter to William Penn, which covered a portion of the grant to Connecticut, equal to one degree of latitude and five of longitude, which embraced the rich and inviting valley of Wyoming. This was the first ground of the feuds which arose between the Connecticut and Pennsylvania people, and which occasioned much trouble and distress to the early settlers.

In 1753 an association was formed in Connecticut, called "The Susquehannah Company," for the purpose of forming a settlement in Wyoming. But that this company might not come into conflict with the native occupants of the soil, a commission was appointed "to explore the country, and conciliate their good will." The company now embraced about six hundred persons, many of them men of wealth and high respectability. A deputation was appointed to meet a great council of the Six Nations at Albany in 1754, and, if possible, effect a purchase of the land. As the transaction was not secret, Governor Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, wrote to Governor Walcott, of Connecticut, remonstrating with him upon the subject, and sent to Albany a deputation, consisting of "*John and Richard Penn, Isaac Norris, and Benjamin Franklin*," to prevent the purchase by the Susquehannah Company. Notwithstanding this formidable opposition, strengthened as it was by the influence of Sir William Johnson, the purchase was effected. The sum paid was "two thousand pounds, of current money, of the province of New-York." Col. Stone has given us, in an Appendix to the second edition of his History, a "copy of the deed of purchase," duly executed by the "chief sachems and heads of the Five Nations of Indians, called the Iroquois, and the native proprietors," &c. Among these "chief sachems" is the famous Mohawk chief *Brant*, who subsequently figured so largely in the war of the Revolution. The names of the purchasers are also embraced, owners of full shares "five hundred and thirty-four in number," and of "half shares": "one hundred and thirty-six;" most of them from "ye colony of Connecticut, in New-England," some "of the colony of Rhode Island," some "of the government of Pennsylvania," some "of the province of ye Massachusetts Bay," and some "of the province of New-York." The following are the boundaries of the purchase:—

"Beginning from the one and fortieth degree of north latitude at ten miles distance east of Susquehannah River, and from thence with a

northwardly line ten miles east of the river, to the forty-second or beginning of the forty-third degree north latitude, and so to extend west, two degrees of longitude, one hundred and twenty miles south, to the beginning of the forty-second degree, and from thence east to the afore-mentioned bound, which is ten miles east of Susquehannah River."—*Col. Stone's History*, p. 389.

Having thus procured what they considered a valid title to the soil, the Susquehannah Company took preparatory steps for the planting of a settlement in Wyoming; but the agitations among the Indians, occasioned by "the French war," prevented them from accomplishing their purposes until the year 1762, when about two hundred men pushed their way into the valley, and commenced clearing farms, just below Mill Creek, and at a sufficient distance from the Indian town, which was situated on the flats below the present town of Wilkesbarre. They felled the timber, and constructed huts, and, before winter set in, had sown extensive fields of wheat. They secured their implements, and returned to Connecticut to winter. In the spring they returned with their families, cattle, furniture, &c., but little meditating the dreadful fate which awaited them.

"The season had been favorable; their various crops on those fertile plains had proved abundant, and they were looking forward with hope to scenes of prosperity and happiness; but suddenly, without the least warning, on the 15th of October, a large party of savages raised the war whoop, and attacked them with fury. Unprepared for resistance, about twenty men fell, and were scalped; the residue, men, women, and children, fled, in wild disorder, to the mountains. Language cannot describe the sufferings of the fugitives, as they traversed the wilderness, destitute of food or clothing, on their way to their former homes."—*Miner's History*, p. 54.

The following instance of suffering and of providential escape will be read with interest:—

"Among the individual incidents marking this singular tragedy was the following:—Some of the fugitives were pursued, for a time by a portion of the Indians, and among them was a settler named Noah Hopkins—a wealthy man from the county of Dutchess, in the state of New-York, bordering upon Connecticut. He had disposed of a handsome landed patrimony in his native town, Amenia, and invested the proceeds as a shareholder of the Susquehannah Company, and in making preparations for moving to the new colony. Finding, by the sounds, that the Indians were upon his trail, after running a long distance he fortunately discovered the trunk of a large hollow tree upon the ground, into which he crept. After lying there several hours, his apprehensions of danger were greatly quickened by the tread of footsteps. They approached, and in a few moments two or three savages

were actually seated upon the log, in consultation. He heard the bullets rattle loosely in their pouches. They actually looked into the hollow trunk, suspecting that he might be there; but the examination must have been slight, as they discovered no traces of his presence. The object of their search, however, in after-life, attributed his escape to the labors of a busy spider, which, after he crawled into the log, had been industriously engaged in weaving a web over the entrance. Perceiving this, the Indians supposed, as a matter of course, that the fugitive could not have entered there.—After remaining in his place of concealment as long as nature could endure the confinement, Hopkins crept forth, wandering in the wilderness without food, until he was on the point of famishing. In this situation, knowing that he could but die, he cautiously stole down into the valley again, whence five days before he had fled. All was desolation there. The crops were destroyed, the cattle gone, and the smoldering brands and embers were all that remained of the houses. The Indians had retired, and the stillness of death prevailed. He roamed about for hours in search of something to satisfy the cravings of nature, fording or swimming the river twice in his search. At length he discovered the carcass of a wild turkey, shot on the morning of the massacre, but which had been left in the flight. He quickly stripped the bird of its feathers, although it had become somewhat offensive by lying in the sun, dressed and washed it in the river, and the first meal he made therefrom was ever afterward pronounced the sweetest of his life. Upon the strength of this turkey, with such roots and herbs as he could gather in his way, he traveled until—after incredible hardships, his clothes being torn from his limbs in the thickets he was obliged to encounter, and his body badly lacerated—he once more found himself among the dwellings of civilized men.”—*Col. Stone's History*, pp. 151–153.

After this massacre, the Indians, anticipating a military movement against them on the part of the governor of Pennsylvania, left the valley, the Christian portion of them removing east to the Moravian town, Gnaddenhutzen, and the others north to Tioga. Six years now intervened before the Connecticut people made another attempt to settle Wyoming. But in the mean time “the proprietaries of Pennsylvania” availed themselves of an Indian council assembled at Fort Stanwix, in 1768, and purchased the disputed territory from some of the chiefs. A deputation of four chiefs from the Six Nations had been sent to Hartford in 1763, to disclaim the sale made to the Susquehannah Company; and in the talk of the speaker, he asserted that the Six Nations knew nothing of the sale of this land, and furthermore remarked,—“What little we have left we intend to keep for ourselves.” This was a mere ruse, as is evident from their selling the same land five years subsequently to the proprietaries of Pennsylvania. They were, in fact, ready to sell land whenever they could find purchasers; and as to

any conflict which might afterward arise among rival claimants, that was not their look out. After all, the poor Indians were not so much in fault as were the designing white men who had interests to serve by involving them in improper and contradictory acts.

This fair valley was next to be made the scene of civil war; and in contending for the rich prize, the blood of one white man was to be spilt by the hand of another white man. The parties had exhausted their diplomatic skill—each had sent deputations to the mother country, and in turn obtained the most respectable legal decisions in their favor. Nothing seemed left to them but to maintain their claims by force. “And now,” says Mr. Miner, “commenced the strife, foot to foot, and hand to hand, of the conflicting parties, for the possession of the beautiful valley. Gallant spirits, with a will to do, and courage to dare, met spirits equally gallant and determined.” The parties engaged in conflict were familiarly called *Pennamites* and *Yankees*, and the scenes enacted were marked with a skill and courage, and characterized by a romance, which give almost unrivaled interest to their story.

The Susquehannah Company sent a body of forty pioneers into the valley in February, 1769, to be followed by two hundred more in the spring. But the Pennsylvanians, anticipating the movement, had leased the valley for seven years to *Charles Stuart*, *Amos Ogden*, and *John Jennings*, on condition that they should establish a trading house for the accommodation of the Indians, and adopt the necessary measures for defending themselves, and those who might settle under their lease. These men, with a small party, had proceeded to Wyoming, and fortified themselves in a block house, where the forty Yankees found them upon their arrival.

A series of conflicts now ensued, which we cannot occupy space to detail, but which were characterized by the usual circumstances and elements of war upon the largest scale: * fortifications, in-

* One battle was of so peculiar a character that we presume our readers will be gratified with its brief history. There was a disciple of William Penn among the settlers, who, as he practiced upon the principle of non-resistance, could neither be a good Yankee nor a good Pennamite, and, consequently, suffered no little vexation from the high partisans of both sides, when they, for the time being, had the ascendancy. When the Pennamites were in possession of the fortification at Wilkesbarre, this good Quaker lived in his cabin, upon the flats, and as he had, by industry, gathered a plentiful crop of corn, which was nicely stored in the garret, the hungry Pennamites thought to rob this peace-loving settler of the fruit of his labor. The information as to the scheme was brought to him by some friend, and that very evening, after dark, it was to be executed. The old gentleman could not fight, and as to courts

vestments, escalades, capitulations, surprises, ambuscades, battles, marches, countermarches, retreats, taking prisoners, violating pledges for the security of property, &c., &c. During this period the Yankees were three times driven from the valley, and obliged to thread their way, with their wives and children, through an unbroken wilderness of two hundred miles, back to their former homes. But they as often rallied and returned to the charge with accumulated numbers, until, finally, they were able to keep possession of the prize. The proprietaries were unpopular even in Pennsylvania, and it became impossible for them, even with the aid of all the industry and skill of Capt. Ogden, to raise a sufficient force finally to dispossess the Yankees, until the rupture between Great Britain and her colonies directed the attention of all parties to the common defense of the country, and for the time being put a period to the civil war.

The object of the Connecticut people had been the establishment of an independent colony, and they had accordingly petitioned the parent government to this effect. But as this object could not be secured without much delay, and as the legislature of Connecticut was cautious of assuming any responsibility which would involve the state in the quarrel, the Susquehanna Company met at Hartford, June 2, 1773, and adopted a provisional plan of government, on truly republican principles, and every way worthy of the heads and hearts of the best statesmen of the age.*

Under this form of government the people lived in great harmony and prosperity, and the colony rapidly increased in numbers. In

and magistrates, there were none to resort to. While he sat in the corner, brooding over his helpless condition, his two daughters—large, muscular, and courageous—hit upon a plan of defense, and upon opening it to the good old *Friend*, it seemed to look so little like *war* and *bloodshed* that he gave it the sanction of silence. The girls hung over the fire a large iron kettle, and filled it with water, which, when the assailants made their appearance before the door, was boiling hot. They then took a *water gun*, constructed of the barrel of an old musket, and through the chinks between the logs sent a jet of the boiling water into the faces and eyes of the assailants. A few shots were enough to conquer the courage of the gallant band, who immediately took to their heels, and put themselves beyond the reach of the formidable engine, so efficiently served. The assailants ran home, frantic with pain, while the girls almost split their sides with laughter; and the good old Quaker was scarcely suspected of a dereliction of principle, though nobody doubted but he enjoyed the sport to a high degree. This story is not in the books, but was related to us by one personally acquainted with the facts.

* For which see Mr. Miner's History, pp. 146-149.

the mean time, the legislative assembly of Connecticut made an effort to procure a settlement of the difficulty, but Governor Penn closed his ears to all propositions, and even refused to recognize the deputation sent from Connecticut. Upon this, the assembly made up a case, and transmitted it to England for the legal opinions of the ablest counsel.

"This case was submitted to Edward, afterward Lord Thurlow, Alexander Wedderburn, Richard Jackson, and J. Dunning—all famous for their learning in the law, who gave a united opinion in favor of the company. Thus fortified, the general assembly of Connecticut took higher ground, and perceiving how greatly the colony was flourishing, in October, 1773, they passed a resolution asserting their claim to the jurisdiction of the territory, and their determination, in some proper way, to support the claim."—*Col. Stone's History*, p. 184.

The following year Wyoming was constituted a town, by the name of *Westmoreland*, and connected with *Litchfield* county, and a census taken at the close of the year showed that the town numbered one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two inhabitants.

The great events of 1775 seriously affected the inhabitants of *Westmoreland*. The Indians committed some outrages within the limits of the town, and though they made hollow professions of a pacific disposition, were evidently preparing for war. Several families from the north, who were hostile to the American cause, came into the settlement, who, with good reason, were considered bad neighbors. The following notes of the town meetings will show the spirit of the people in taking incipient steps for the common defense:—

"At a town meeting, held March 10, 'Voted, that the first man that shall make fifty weight of good salt-petre in this town, shall be entitled to a bounty of ten pounds, lawful money, to be paid out of the town treasury."

"Voted, that the selectmen be directed to dispose of the grain now in the hands of the treasurer, or collector, in such way as to obtain powder and lead to the value of forty pounds, lawful money, if they can do the same."

"At a town meeting legally warned and held, in *Westmoreland*, *Wilkesbarre* district, August 24, 1776,

"Col. Butler was chosen moderator for the work of the day.

"Voted, as the opinion of this meeting, that it now becomes necessary for the inhabitants of this town to erect suitable forts, as a defense against our common enemy."—*Miner's History*, pp. 189–191.

A regiment of militia having been established, the meeting voted that "the three field officers should be a committee to fix on the sites of the forts, lay them out, and give directions how they should

be built." Then was adopted what Mr. Miner calls "the following beautiful vote; which," says he, "we leave in its simplicity to speak its own eulogium:"—

"That the above said committee do recommend it to the people to proceed forthwith in building said forts without either fee or reward from ye town."—*Miner's History*, p. 191.

In November of this memorable year, (1776,) Westmoreland was, by the legislative council of Connecticut, erected into a county, with a complete civil and military organization. Congress also ordered that "two companies, on the continental establishment, be raised in the town of Westmoreland, and stationed in proper places for the defense of the inhabitants of said town, and posts adjacent, till further orders from congress." The companies, consisting of eighty-two men each, were organized, and officers appointed. But when the British took possession of New-York, Washington crossed the Delaware, and congress were taking measures to retire from Philadelphia to Baltimore, the two companies were ordered to join Gen. Washington "with all possible expedition." This order was promptly obeyed, which took nearly all the able-bodied men and arms from the settlement.

In the summer of 1777 the Six Nations were brought into the field as auxiliaries of the British forces, and commenced their operations in their own peculiar mode of warfare, all along the frontier. Wyoming was peculiarly exposed, being situated at a distance of sixty miles from the white settlements, east and south, and their strength having been drawn away by the emergencies of the war. For in addition to the two companies above referred to, further enlistments were made, in all amounting to some three hundred. (*Col. Stone's History*.) Application was made to congress for aid, but without effect. The helpless females sent to the army the most pressing calls to their sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers, who constituted the Westmoreland companies, to hasten to their relief, and the men begged for the privilege of fulfilling the purposes of their enlistment—"the defense of the inhabitants of said town." But congress and Connecticut were both deaf to every entreaty. All that was done, was an order passed by congress that "one full company of foot be raised in the town of Westmoreland, for the defense of the said town," and "that the said company find their own arms, ammunition, and blankets!" This amounted to nothing, as it did not increase the force of the settlement. The commissioned officers resigned, and, together with twenty or thirty men who obtained leave, or went without

leave, returned to the settlement to share the common peril, without adding much to the strength of the feeble army of militia, which had organized themselves, and had purposed bravely to stand for the defense of their hearths and lives. The Indians made a great show of peace; but a drunken Indian on a revel—one of a company of spies who came upon a pretence of negotiation—let out the secret of a meditated onslaught upon the settlement. This, together with the suspicious movements of the tory settlers, several families of whom were situated at the head of the valley, and seemed to be acting the part of spies, created no inconsiderable alarm. The settlers had erected, on each side of the river, several *forts*, some of them consisting of logs planted in the ground, and standing about fourteen feet high, and others mere log pens, or block houses, with loop holes. The former were provided with log huts, in which the women and children might find shelter in cases of danger from the enemy. The principal fort on the west side of the river was called *Forty Fort*, constructed by the *forty* pioneers who came into the valley in the winter of 1769, situated two miles above Wilkesbarre. In the arrangements for the defense of the settlement, as will be seen by the following, the women acted a conspicuous part:—

“Justice and gratitude demand a tribute to the praiseworthy spirit of the wives and daughters of Wyoming. While their husbands and fathers were on public duty, they cheerfully assumed a large portion of the labor, which females could do. They assisted to plant, made hay, husked and garnered the corn. As the settlement was mainly dependent on its own resources for powder, Mr. Hollenback caused to be brought up the river a pounder; and the women took up their floors, dug out the earth, put it in casks, and run water through it, (as ashes are leached.) Then took ashes, in another cask, and made ley—mixed the water from the earth with weak ley, boiled it, set it to cool, and the saltpetre rose to the top. Charcoal and sulphur were then used, and powder produced for the public defense.”—*Miner's History*, p. 212.

We need add nothing by way of completing the picture. While fathers and sons, *grandfathers* and grandsons, were scouring up their old muskets, mothers, daughters, and *grandmothers* were busily employed in *manufacturing powder!*

On the 29th or 30th of June, 1778, Col. John Butler, with about four hundred British provincials, partly made up of *tories*, together with six or seven hundred Indians, under the command of the celebrated Brant, entered the head of the valley, and took possession of Forts Jenkins and Wintermoot without opposition. On that morning eight men and a boy, who had gone from Fort Jen-

kins to their work with their arms, three miles above, fell into the hands of the enemy; five of the men were killed, and three taken prisoners, the boy escaping by throwing himself into the river, and hiding in a clump of willows.

Col. Zebulon Butler, who was a continental officer, knowing the perilous condition of the people, and desirous to give his personal aid in any way possible, had obtained leave to visit the valley, and now, by common consent, assumed the command of the little army. The whole consisted of "two hundred and thirty enrolled men, and seventy old people, boys, civil magistrates, and other volunteers," the whole embracing six companies, which were mustered at Forty Fort, where the families of the settlers, on the east side of the river, had taken refuge. "Indian Butler," as he was called, summoned the Connecticut people to surrender Forty Fort and the valley. A council of war was called on the 3d of July, and though it was the opinion of *Col. Butler*, *Col. Denison*, and *Lieut. Col. Dorrance*, and others, that "a little delay would be best," in hopes of the arrival of reinforcements, which it was thought might be on their way, yet a large majority were for marching at once upon the enemy and giving them battle. *Col. Butler* mounted his horse, saying, "I tell you we go into great danger, but I can go as far as any of you," and "the column, consisting of about three hundred men, old men, and boys, marched from the fort," some time in the afternoon, with drums beating and colors flying. The devoted little band marched up the plain with the river on the right and a marsh upon the left, until they reached Fort Wintermoot, which was on fire.

"*Col. Z. Butler*, on approaching the enemy, sent forward *Captains Ransom* and *Durkee*, *Lieutenants Ross* and *Wells*, as officers whose skill he most relied on, to select the spot, and mark off the ground on which to form the order of battle. On coming up, the column displayed to the left, and under those officers every company took its station, and then advanced in line to the proper position, where it halted, the right resting on the steep bank noted—the left extending across the gravel flat to a morass, thick with timber and brush, that separated the bottom land from the mountain. Yellow and pitch pine trees, with oak shrubs, were scattered all over the plain. On the American right was *Capt. Bidlack's* company. Next was *Capt. Hewitt's*, *Daniel Gore* being one of his lieutenants. On the extreme left was *Capt. Whittlesey's*. *Col. Butler*, supported by *Major John Garrett*, commanded the right wing. *Col. Denison*, supported by *Lieut. Col. George Dorrance*, commanded the left. Such was the ground, and such the order of battle. Everything was judiciously disposed, and conducted in a strictly military and prudent manner. *Captains Durkee* and *Ransom*, as experienced officers, in whom great confidence was placed, were stationed, *Durkee*

with Bidlack on the right wing—Ransom with Whittlesey on the left. Col. Butler made a very brief address just before he ordered the column to display. 'Men, yonder is the enemy. The fate of the Hardings tells us what we have to expect if defeated. We come out to fight, not only for liberty, but for life itself, and, what is dearer, to preserve our homes from conflagration; our women and children from the tomahawk. Stand firm the first shock, and the Indians will give way. Every man to his duty.'

"The column had marched up the road running near the bank on which our right rested. On its display, as Denison led off his men, he repeated the expression of Col. Butler, 'Be firm, everything depends on resisting the first shock.'"

"About four in the afternoon the battle began; Col. Z. Butler ordered his men to fire, and at each discharge to advance a step. Along the whole line the discharges were rapid and steady. It was evident, on the more open ground the Yankees were doing most execution. As our men advanced, pouring in their platoon fires with great vivacity, the British line gave way, in spite of all their officers' efforts to prevent it. The Indian flanking party on our right kept up from their hiding places a galling fire. Lieut. Daniel Gore received a ball through the left arm. 'Captain Durkee,' said he, 'look sharp for the Indians in those bushes.' Captain D. stepped to the bank to look, preparatory to making a charge and dislodging them, when he fell. On the British Butler's right, his Indian warriors were sharply engaged. They seemed to be divided into six bands, for a yell would be raised at one end of their line, taken up, and carried through, six distinct bodies appearing at each time to repeat the cry. As the battle waxed warmer, that fearful yell was renewed again and again, with more and more spirit. It appeared to be at once their animating shout, and their signal of communication. As several fell near Col. Dorrance, one of his men gave way: 'Stand up to your work, sir,' said he, firmly, but coolly, and the soldier resumed his place.

"For half an hour a hot fire had been given and sustained, when the vastly superior numbers of the enemy began to develop their power. The Indians had thrown into the swamp a large force, which now completely outflanked our left. It was impossible it should be otherwise: that wing was thrown into confusion. Col. Denison gave orders that the company of Whittlesey should wheel back, so as to form an angle with the main line, and thus present his front, instead of flank, to the enemy. The difficulty of performing evolutions, by the bravest militia on the field, under a hot fire, is well known. On the attempt, the savages rushed in with horrid yells. Some had mistaken the order to fall back, as one to retreat, and that word, that fatal word, ran along the line. Utter confusion now prevailed on the left. Seeing the disorder, and his own men beginning to give way, Col. Z. Butler threw himself between the fires of the opposing ranks, and rode up and down the line in the most reckless exposure. 'Don't leave me, my children, and the victory is ours.' But it was too late."

"Every captain that led a company into action was slain, and in every instance fell on, or near the line. As was said of Bidlack, so of

Hewitt, Whittlesey, and the others: 'they died at the head of their men.' They fought bravely—every man and officer did his duty, but they were overpowered by threefold their force. In point of numbers the enemy was overwhelmingly superior."—*Miner's History*, pp. 221-224.

It was a dreadful hour! The few old men who were left in the fort, and the women and children, lined the bank of the river with throbbing hearts, listening to the noise of the battle. And as the firing became more scattering, and advanced down the plain toward the fort, the fearful reality of a defeat was but too plainly indicated. "The boys are beat—they are retreating—they will be all cut to pieces!" exclaimed Mr. *Thomas Bennet*, who had been pacing the bank, and catching every indication borne upon the breeze from the scene of action.

A portion of the numerous, strange, and fearful scenes which followed are upon record, and many of them are still in the recollection of a few survivors, for which we must refer the reader to our authors. Mr. Miner says, "About one hundred and sixty of the Connecticut people were killed that day, and one hundred and forty escaped. The loss of the enemy was never known—probably from forty to eighty fell." Many were first made prisoners, and then massacred in the most cruel and barbarous manner by the savages: but we should have no heart for the recital of these diabolical scenes, if we could afford the space. Colonels Butler and Denison, being mounted, first entered Forty Fort, and confirmed the terrible apprehensions of the poor defenseless people, then waiting in a most fearful state of anxiety and suspense. They sat down by a table in Thomas Bennet's cabin, and adjusted the terms of capitulation, which were to be proposed to the enemy. Col. Butler then crossed over to Wilkesbarre, and the next day threw a feather bed across his horse, and seating his wife upon the animal, behind him, left the valley. He was a brave officer, and having distinguished himself in several gallant enterprises in the revolutionary struggle, had reasons enough for not wishing to be made a prisoner of war. At night fall the fugitives came into the fort, exhausted with the toils and terrors of the day. But O, how many husbands and sons came not! The sadness of that night will never be adequately sketched. O the horrors of war! who can paint them? who can conceive of them? None, indeed, but the victims themselves.

The people in the fort at Wilkesbarre, on the east side of the river, early on the 4th commenced their flight, but in such haste as not to furnish themselves with provisions for a long and toil-

some journey through the wilderness. A large number of women and children, with a few men, took the old war-path toward the Delaware, some perishing on the way through fatigue and hunger. The few regular soldiers who had escaped, knowing that they, if taken, would be doomed to exemplary punishment, made a hasty escape under the orders of Col. Butler.

On the evening of the fatal 3d, Captain John Franklin arrived at Forty Fort with a company of militia from Huntington and Salem, which gave a little strength to the remnant of the army who had escaped. On the morning of the 4th, Col. John Butler summoned Col. Denison to surrender Forty Fort, inviting him to his head-quarters to agree upon the terms. After some negotiation, the following articles of capitulation were duly executed:—

“ *Westmoreland, July 4th, 1778.* ”

“ **CAPITULATION AGREEMENT**—Made and completed between John Butler, in behalf of his Majesty, King George the Third, and Colonel Nathan Denison of the United States of America.

“ **ART. I.** It is agreed that the settlement lay down their arms, and their garrison be demolished.

“ **ART. II.** That the inhabitants occupy their farms peaceably, and the lives of the inhabitants be preserved entire and unhurt.

“ **ART. III.** That the continental stores are to be given up.

“ **ART. IV.** That Col. Butler will use his utmost influence that the private property of the inhabitants shall be preserved entire to them.

“ **ART. V.** That the prisoners in Forty Fort be delivered up.

“ **ART. VI.** That the property taken from the people called Tories be made good; and that they remain in peaceable possession of their farms, and unmolested in a free trade through this settlement.

“ **ART. VII.** That the inhabitants which Col. Denison capitulates for, together with himself, do not take up arms during this contest.

(Signed)

“ **JOHN BUTLER,**

“ **NATHAN DENISON.** ”

Accordingly, on the 4th or 5th, the gates of the fort were thrown open, and Butler, at the head of his rangers, and Brant, at the head of the Indians, marched in. The arms of the men were stacked and given by Butler to the Indians, with these words: “ See what a present the Yankees have made you.” The Indians went about sneakingly peeping into the doors of the cabins, but for that day molested no one. On the next day, however, they began to plunder the people. Col. Denison remained in Mr. Bennet’s cabin, a place formerly occupied as a horse-shed. When Butler came into the fort, Col. Denison sent for him, and remonstrated with him upon the conduct of the Indians—alleging that it was a breach of a most solemn engagement. Butler said, “ My men shall not molest the

people, I will put a stop to it." But he was no sooner gone than the plundering was resumed. Col. Denison again sent for Butler, and again he came into the shed and gave assurances that "the plundering should cease." Toward night a company of Indians came in, some of them drunk, and commenced ransacking the houses and rifling them of their movables. Col. Denison had another conversation with Butler, who now said, "To tell you the truth, I can do nothing with them." Col. Denison chided him severely, but, waiving his hand, he repeated the same words, and finally left the fort no more to return.

The Indians now threw off all restraint. A stout Indian came into Mr. Bennet's cabin and demanded Col. Denison's "hunting-shirt,"—an outside linen garment "made with a double cape and fringed." The colonel objected, but upon the Indian raising his tomahawk, and the interference of Mrs. Bennet, who stepped up and unbuttoned the wristbands, he gave it up. Soon after, an Indian demanded his beaver hat. As in the former case he hesitated, but the lifted tomahawk and Mrs. Bennet's entreaties brought him again to terms. They took Mrs. Bennet's bonnet from her head, and her shawl from her shoulders; and broke open a large chest and rifled it of all its contents. An old Indian, called Capt. Henry, who had lived in the country on terms of intimacy with the family, came in with a fine broadcloth coat on, which belonged to Mr. Bennet, and had been taken from the chest. He said, "Where's old Bennet." Mrs. B. replied truly, "Gone through the swamp to Stroudsburg." "Ah!" said he, stroking the sleeves of his stolen coat, "me old Bennet now." They took the feather-beds, and, ripping open the ticks and giving the feathers to the wind, crammed in, pell mell, whatever they could lay hold of, then threw them across horses, and disappeared. The Tories generally kept aloof from the fort. One, by the name of Paschal Terry, who was in the battle under Indian Butler, and had a brother in the battle on the side of the Connecticut people, painted himself and came in to see his friends. He was very shy, but was recognized.

Some Indians came in, who appeared quite friendly. They painted the women and children, and tied white bands around their heads, that they might, as they said, be known as prisoners of war and not be killed by strange Indians. In about a week the buildings of the settlement were all fired simultaneously, and the people in the fort saw the smoke curling up toward heaven from every point of the valley, and forming a dense cloud over their heads, but too striking an emblem of their future prospects. Soon after this, two young widows, whose husbands had fallen in the battle, accompa-

nied by two maiden ladies and Mrs. Bennet, visited the battle-field to see if they could find the bodies of their husbands. They found the bodies of the poor fellows who had fallen, burning in the sun, but were not able to distinguish one from another. After the lapse of another week, two weeks after the battle, it was rumored that the Tories and Indians had again entered the valley, and would probably kill all that remained of the inhabitants. The people then all left the fort, some going down the river in canoes, and others taking the path "through the swamp" to Stroudsburg. Thus this beautiful valley was deserted by its inhabitants, with the exception of those who lay bleaching upon the plain, unconscious of what transpired, and beyond the reach of further wrongs from the invading foe.

Among the many personal adventures, hair-breadth escapes, and providential deliverances, which are related and sustained by the most authentic testimony, we can occupy space but for one or two. Mr., afterward, successively, Colonel and Judge, Hokenback—we knew him well, while yet a stirring old gentleman, capable of conducting a large business—swam to an island in the river, Monocknock Island, and thence to the east side. Solomon Bennet, son of Thomas Bennet before mentioned, also escaped by the same means. We had the relation from Mr. Bennet, when on a visit to his friends in Wyoming, in 1819. He was an expert swimmer, and, though hotly pursued, threw himself into the river, and, turning upon his back, kept close watch of half-a-dozen Indians upon the shore, who successively made him their mark. When they drew up and fired, he would dodge under the water like a duck, and the balls would glance over him; and when he rose, the savage fiends would raise a loud laugh and try again. They continued this sport until he was beyond their reach. Upon arriving at the east bank of the river he found Hokenback naked, as he had stripped himself of his clothes. Young Bennet, having performed the feat of swimming the river with his shirt and pantaloons on, spared to his friend one of his garments, and they both safely found their way into the fort at Wilksbarre. The day following, Bennet recrossed the river to Forty Fort to inform his friends there that he was not dead, which, until then, they supposed to be the fact; himself, father, and younger brother, not willing to "trust the Indians," then fled through the swamp.

The wonderful escape of Joseph Elliott and Lebbeus Hammond was briefly as follows: Elliott and Hammond were taken prisoners, and with many others were led to a rock just at the top of the bluff, which rises above the river along the battle-ground. This

rock is often visited by travelers, and is called "Bloody Rock." The prisoners were each held by two or more Indians, and paraded in a circle around this rock, one at a time being stripped and seated on it, and there tomahawked by Queen Esther, who took this opportunity of taking sweet vengeance for having Capt. Henry and some other Indians detained as prisoners by Col. Denison, and, probably, for the loss of some friend in the battle. Five or six had suffered death in this dreadful manner. When Hammond's turn was about coming, he whispered, "Let us try;" and instantly Hammond and Elliott shook themselves from the grasp of the Indians and dashed down the bluff. Elliott threw himself into the river, and dove and rose alternately, while a shower of balls made the water foam all round him. He received a ball in one of his arms which broke the bone, but, notwithstanding, reached the east bank of the river, crossing the island, and found his way to the fort at Wilkesbarre, and, through medical aid, finally recovered. Hammond's escape was, if possible, still more providential. A tree-top extended just above the brow of the bluff immediately against the fatal rock. Hammond had made but two or three bounds when his toe was caught by a root, and he plunged headlong down the bank under the spreading limbs of the fallen tree; and thus escaped observation, though the Indians flew instantly by on both sides of him. Though diligent search was made for him, he here remained undiscovered until, covered by the darkness of the night, he safely found his way to Forty Fort.

We have not given the details of the savage cruelties which are found in our authors. But there are two well-authenticated instances of the diabolical spirit of the *tories* which we shall recite. We do this not only to show what kind of men embraced the royal cause, but as a fearful illustration of the dreadful havoc made by the spirit of war upon all the better feelings of humanity, and all the ties of kindred.

"A short distance below the battle-ground there is a large island in the river called 'Monockonock Island.' Several of the settlers, while the battle and pursuit continued, succeeded in swimming to this island, where they concealed themselves among the logs and brushwood upon it. Their arms had been thrown away in their flight, previous to their entering the river, so that they were in a manner defenseless. Two of them in particular were concealed near and in sight of each other. While in this situation they observed several of the enemy who had pursued and fired at them while they were swimming the river, preparing to follow them to the island with their guns. On reaching the island, they immediately wiped their guns and loaded them. One of them with his loaded gun soon passed close by one of these men who

lay concealed from his view, and was immediately recognized by him to be the brother of his companion who was concealed near him, but who, being a tory, had joined the enemy. He passed slowly along, carefully examining every covert, and directly perceived his brother in his place of concealment. He suddenly stopped and said, 'So it is you, is it?' His brother, finding that he was discovered, immediately came forward a few steps, and falling on his knees, begged him to spare his life, promising to live with him and serve him, and even to be his slave as long as he lived, if he would only spare his life. '*All this is mighty good,*' replied the savage-hearted brother of the supplicating man, '*but you are a d****d rebel;*' and deliberately presenting his rifle, shot him dead upon the spot. The other settler made his escape from the island, and having related this fact, the tory brother thought it prudent to accompany the British troops on their return to Canada."—*Chapman's History*, pp. 127, 128.

"This tale is too horrible for belief; but a survivor of the battle, a Mr. Baldwin, whose name will occur again, confirmed its truth to the writer with his own lips. He knew the brothers well, and in August, 1839, declared the statement to be true."—*Col. Stone's History*, p. 215.

Elijah Shoemaker was seen wading in the river, not knowing how to swim, by one Windecker, a tory, who had been treated by Shoemaker with the kindness with which a father would treat a son. Windecker said to him, "Come out, Shoemaker." "I am afraid," said Shoemaker, "you will give me up to the Indians." "No," said Windecker, "I will save you, they shan't hurt you." But no sooner did Shoemaker come within his reach, than the perfidious wretch dashed his tomahawk into his head, and set his body afloat. The body was taken up at the fort, and Mrs. Shoemaker, with a child in her arms—the late Col. Elijah Shoemaker, of Kingston—came down to the water's edge, to be agonized with a sight of the mangled corpse of her husband. The body was buried in the fort before the capitulation. The circumstances of Shoemaker's death were related by Esq. Carpenter and Aning Owen, who were concealed under a tree-top which lay out in the river.

These instances of horrid brutality defy all precedent. The priestess of the hellish orgies of "Bloody Rock," had she witnessed the above spectacle, would have been ashamed of the demons concerned in the transaction. She, in the true spirit of savage warfare, was taking sweet vengeance for the loss of a brother or an intimate friend. But these furies inbrued their hands in the blood of *friend* and *brother*! Alas for poor humanity! Of what a height of corruption and wickedness is it capable!

"Indian Butler" soon made his exit from the valley. The following is a picture of the departure:—

“With Butler, a large portion of the Indians withdrew, and their march presented a picture at once melancholy and ludicrous. Squaws, to a considerable number, brought up the rear, a belt of scalps stretched on small hoops around the waist for a girdle, having on, some four, some six, and even more, dresses of chintz or silk, one over the other; being mounted astride on horses, (of course all stolen,) and on their heads three, four, or five bonnets, one within another, worn wrong side before.”—*Miner's History*, p. 237.

Mr. Miner presents two charges against Col. John Butler which will lie against his name to the end of time; and in mitigation of which there is not a relieving circumstance. The first is “his position—accepting command, lending his name, and associating with those blood-thirsty and unprincipled savages who were placed under his orders.” His confession, after the capitulation, that he could “do nothing with them,” brands him with infamy. How came he to lead on a band of murderous savages, whom he knew he could not control, to an assault upon a defenseless settlement? But “the deepest stain on the character of Butler, next to his taking the command of such a horde of merciless and ungovernable wretches, arises out of the fact that but *two* prisoners were taken and saved at the time of the battle.” It is altogether likely that the greatest number who fell, were cruelly massacred upon the retreat; and it is certain that many of them were first made prisoners and then tortured and butchered in cold blood. That his own men took part in the pursuit and butchery on the day of the battle, there can be no doubt; and that he tried to prevent the subsequent massacres, there is no evidence. But to return to the narrative.

We shall now only be able to touch a few details of the history. In August Col. Butler returned with Capt. Spaulding's company and some of the settlers, and buried the remains of those who fell upon the field of battle, and labored to secure some of the grain which was now ripe. But companies of Indians infested the country, who took prisoners, shot men who were laboring in the fields, and stole horses, and whatever else they could carry away.

Col. Hartley, of the Pennsylvania line, was ordered to join Col. Butler. A detachment of one hundred and thirty men marched on the 8th of September to the West Branch, and thence to Sheshequin. On the 29th a battle ensued, in which several on both sides were killed. The Indian settlement was broken up, and besides horses and cattle recovered, a considerable amount of plunder was taken.—*Miner*, p. 240.

But the savages followed almost upon the heels of Hartley's

men, and resumed their work of murder, kidnapping, and plunder.

Immediately after Col. Hartley's expedition in 1779, Gen. Washington took measures to carry out a plan, which had been under consultation, of sending a powerful armament into the country of the Six Nations, to destroy their towns and chastise them for their incursions upon the frontier settlements, and the cruelties and barbarities which they had perpetrated. The expedition was committed to the charge of *Gen. Sullivan*, who collected his forces at Wilkesbarre, and thence transported his artillery and baggage up the river in boats, and forming a junction with a division of the army under the command of Gen. Clinton, at Tioga Point, proceeded to the prosecution of the objects of the expedition. Col. John Butler, at the head of the British and Tories, and Brant, in command of the Indians, made a stand, a little below Newtown on the Chemung River, with fifteen hundred or two thousand men; but were routed with considerable loss, and left the Indian towns, and the fields loaded with fruit, to be overrun and desolated by an avenging foe.

“Not a moment of delay was allowed. Being now in the Indian country, hundreds of fields, teeming with corn, beans, and other vegetables, were laid waste with rigid severity. Every house, hut, and wigwam, was consumed. Cultivated in rude Indian fashion for centuries, orchards abounded, and near a town, between the Seneca and Cayuga Lakes, there were fifteen hundred peach trees, bending under ripe, and ripening fruit; all were cut down. The besom of destruction swept, if with regret and pity, still with firm hand, through all their fair fields and fertile plains. Deeply were they made to drink of the bitter chalice they had so often forced remorselessly to the lips of the frontier settlers within their reach. Some idea of the extent of country inhabited by the Indians, the number of their towns, and the great quantity of produce to be destroyed, may be formed, when it is stated that an army of four thousand men were employed, without a day's (except indispensable) remission, from the 29th of August, until the 28th of September, in accomplishing the work of destruction. The furthest north-west extent of Gen. Sullivan's advance was to Genesee Castle, at the large flats on the beautiful river of that name.”—*Miner's History*, pp. 271, 272.

But notwithstanding the success of Gen. Sullivan's expedition, it did not result in the security of Wyoming from the incursions of the savages. Still, parties of Indians continued their visits, and from time to time exercised their propensities for plundering, kidnapping, and murder. For three years the settlement was in a constant state of alarm, and many strange and interesting incidents

marked its history. The capture and escape of Thomas Bennet and Lebbeus Hammond, of Pike, Vancampen, and Rogers; the kidnapping and late discovery of Frances Slocum; with a multitude of other events as full of romance as any of the scenes found in the writings of Sir Walter Scott; are all detailed by Mr. Miner from the best authorities, and would be interesting to our readers, but want of space forbids their introduction here.

“The number of lives actually lost in Wyoming, during the war, it is impossible to estimate with certainty; probably three hundred, being one in ten of every inhabitant, or exceeding one-third of the adult male population at the commencement of the war. Connecticut, to have suffered in the same proportion, would have lost near twenty-three thousand, and the United Colonies three hundred thousand.”—*Miner's History*, p. 307.

Upon the termination of the war with Great Britain, the supreme executive council of Pennsylvania presented a petition to congress, praying for a hearing touching the difficulties with Connecticut in relation to the title to the lands upon the Susquehannah. To this, Connecticut promptly responded, and the question was submitted to an arbitration agreed upon by the parties, and assembled in Trenton, N. J., in Dec., 1782. The following was the decision:—

“We are unanimously of opinion that Connecticut has no right to the lands in controversy.

“We are also unanimously of opinion, that the jurisdiction and pre-emption of all the territory lying within the charter of Pennsylvania, and now claimed by the state of Connecticut, do of right belong to the state of Pennsylvania.”—*Ibid.*, p. 308.

Of this decision the people of Wyoming did not complain, fully expecting to be “quieted in their possessions” under the government of Pennsylvania. They supposed their individual claims to the right of pre-emption had not been submitted nor adjudicated, and with them, as things stood, it was not a matter of much importance whether they were to be subject to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania or Connecticut, provided they might remain in the peaceable possession of their lands. But from the proceedings which followed, the settlers soon found that the object of Pennsylvania was their utter expulsion from the homes which had already cost them infinite vexation and much precious blood. There was an affectation of conditions of compromise, but they resolved themselves into these points:—

“1st. Pledges to be given, such as could not admit of denial or evasion, for their obedience.

"2d. A disclaimer in writing, publicly, plainly, and unequivocally given, of all claims to their lands held under title from Connecticut. Then follow the merciful terms.

"3d. The settler to take a lease of half his farm for about eleven months, giving up possession at once of the other half. On the first of April following to abandon claims, home, possession, to his adversary.

"4th. The widows of those who had fallen by the savages, to be indulged in half their possessions a year longer.

"And 5th. The Rev. Mr. Johnson to be allowed to occupy his grounds (under disclaimer and lease, of course) for two years."—*Miner's History*, pp. 324, 325.

The settlers remonstrated, and stood firmly to their positions. The agents of the government of Pennsylvania proceeded to constitute townships, and take possession of the lands. The settlers were not subdued by the dangers and troubles through which they had passed. Though war had diminished and weakened them, they were not prepared tamely to submit to downright usurpation and oppression. The soil which had drunk the blood of their dear friends—fathers, brothers, and sons—was too sacred to be lightly abandoned. Their homes they were determined to hold, peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must. Seeing themselves likely to fail of maintaining their rights, the law being in the hands of those interested, they seized their old rusty guns and hurled defiance at their oppressors. Col. Butler, Col. Jenkins, and Col. Franklin led on the Connecticut people in the maintenance of their rights, always exhausting negotiation and diplomacy before they had recourse to forcible measures. Col. Armstrong, the author of the famous "Newburg Letters," was commissioned to visit the scene of strife, with an armed force of four hundred men, and restore peace. Finding the *Pennamites* and *Yankees* in the field in the attitude of war, he required both parties to give up their arms and cease hostilities, promising "impartial justice and protection." The *Yankees* feared "treachery," but Col. Armstrong "pledging his faith as a soldier and his honor as a gentleman" that the opposite party should also be disarmed, they finally submitted.

"They paraded, were ordered to 'ground arms'—they were then commanded—'right about—march ten steps—halt—right about!' which they obeyed; when Col. Armstrong ordered his men to advance and take up the grounded arms. Thus far was according to their expectations; but their surprise was merged in bitterest mortification, when Col. Armstrong gave rapid orders, as rapidly obeyed, to surround the disarmed settlers, and make them all prisoners—resistance was vain, and escape hopeless. Not a musket was taken from Patterson's forces, but

they beheld the successful treachery of Col. Armstrong with unrestrained delight, and taunting exultation. A soldier's faith should be unsullied as the judicial ermine—the pledged honor of a gentleman, more sacred than life. Both were basely violated, and language is too poor to paint in proper colors the detestable deed.”—*Miner's History*, pp. 354, 355.

The poor fellows were now bound with cords, and hurried off, some to Easton, and others to Northumberland, and thrown into prison. Armstrong returned to Philadelphia to herald his triumph; but to his great mortification he almost immediately learned that most of the Yankees were released on bail, and were again in the field. Skirmishes ensued, and lives were lost on both sides.

A sympathy was now quite general in Pennsylvania for the settlers. Armstrong's perfidy was known and execrated, and when he returned to Wyoming, having been authorized to raise a force sufficient to reduce the Yankees, he could only bring into the field about one hundred men. In an assault upon a party who occupied three block houses at Tuttle's Creek he was repulsed, and one of his subalterns, a Capt. Bolen, was killed. This was the last blood that was spilt in these unfortunate conflicts. September 15, 1784, the legislative assembly of Pennsylvania “ordered the settlers to be restored to their possessions.”

A portion of the settlers had, by means of the oppressive measures of Pennsylvania, become wholly disaffected with her; and led on by Col. Franklin, a most active and able political demagogue, they made a stand against the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, and actually commenced incipient measures for the organization of the disputed territory into a new state. The settlers were now themselves divided into two factions; one under the influence of Col. Pickering, who acted under the authority of Pennsylvania, and the other led on by Col. Franklin, who acted partly for himself, and partly for the dear people. The feud was, however, finally terminated by the apprehension and imprisonment of Franklin, who, after he had lain in jail in Philadelphia for several months, so far lost his ardor as to ask pardon of the legislature, and promise allegiance to the state; which promise he, for many years, faithfully fulfilled. So terminated all the wars of the valley of Wyoming.

Of various other interesting particulars connected with the history of this far-famed spot, we have not space to speak. The reader will find ample satisfaction in the perusal of the works at the head of this paper, in relation to a multitude of important and interesting matters to which we have not been able to make the least allusion. To them we refer our readers, and particularly to the work

of Mr. Miner. The "Appendix" will by no means be found the least interesting. There are many personal adventures, and particular memoranda relating to the original families of the valley, which are especially interesting to their descendants. And here, too, is a just tribute of respect to the forefathers of the present generation of the Wyoming people. Of "Mrs. Myers," the daughter of Thomas Bennet, who was in Forty Fort at the time of the battle, Mr. Miner makes very respectful mention. As this lady is our *mother-in-law*, we ought to feel, and do feel, personally obliged to our friend for a tribute of respect which he doubtless considers a piece of sheer justice. This lady is still living, and though eighty-three years of age, and has not seen the sun, nor the faces of her children and grand-children smiling around her for the last twelve years, being entirely blind, yet she enjoys the unimpaired exercise of her intellectual faculties, and converses as intelligently as ever of the scenes of her youth and the stirring events of early times. We have in MS. her whole story, taken from her own lips, from which we have drawn occasionally in this paper. The whole may possibly see the light at some future period; but at what time and in what form we cannot now definitely say.

ART. VII.—*Capital Punishment.*

WE advocate no undue severity in penal legislation. On the contrary, we hail with delight that spirit of philanthropy which has wrought such mighty changes in the penal codes of the Christian world. From the time of its appearance, in the immortal labors of Sir Samuel Romilly, down to its glorious triumph in 1837, we have followed it with a profound sympathy. Through its trials and difficulties, through all its conflicts with ignorance, and sophistry, and prejudice, and passion, and indifference, we have followed it with the most lively interest. We have felt its defeats; we have rejoiced in its victories. Above all, have we rejoiced in its recent, most decisive, and brilliant triumph in the kingdom of Great Britain; by which it has transformed the once bloody code of that great nation, and stricken more than two hundred offenses from her list of capital crimes. And no philanthropist, we think, can fail to rejoice at this bright and beautiful manifestation of the spirit of the age.

But, like every other great and powerful impulse, it should be restrained within proper limits: "the spirit of the age" should be

kept in strict subordination to the Spirit of God. There is the greater need for this, as having broken loose from a blind admiration of the past, it is in danger of being dazzled and misled by false visions with respect to the future. We have reason for this fear, we think, when we listen to the confident and glowing predictions of statesmen and philosophers in regard to the happy results which are to flow from the entire abrogation of capital punishment. We would pause, then, and consider these prophecies, whether they be true prophecies; whether they appeal to the mere blind feeling of humanity, or to that calm and enlightened benevolence which is the highest attribute of the Christian statesman. This is one of the great problems of the day; and there is no other problem in the whole range of penal jurisprudence more worthy of the deep, calm, patient, and earnest consideration of the philanthropist and the philosopher.

It is well known that the entire abrogation of capital punishment has been advocated by a Beccaria, a Livingston, a Roscoe, and a Dymond, as well as by other names of equal distinction. If they have not shown their cause to be strong, it must be because it is intrinsically weak. Whether they have done so or not, we trust will in some degree appear when we come to examine their arguments. These arguments may be arranged under three general heads:—

I. The argument from abstract principles.

II. The argument from expediency; and,

III. The argument from revelation.

It is in this order that we shall proceed to notice them.

I. *The argument from abstract principles.*—It is contended that no human government has a right to inflict capital punishment. This position is assumed by Beccaria, as well as by other distinguished writers; and he endeavors to determine this question of right by an appeal to what he calls the social compact—a splendid fiction, which may serve to amuse the merely speculative reasoner, who is accustomed to found laws and governments upon pure abstractions, and to regulate all their workings by the rules of logic, without the least regard to actual events, or to the manifold wants and passions of mankind. Governments are not founded upon social compacts, or upon any such airy and unsubstantial formation; they spring up spontaneously and irresistibly from the nature and the necessities of man. In its outward development government may be made to yield, if you please, to the form and pressure of a social compact, to the plastic power of the nation's will; but its foundation hath been established by the same hand which hath laid the

foundation of nature itself. If it were necessary, we might easily expose this fallacy—this figment of the brain—this dream of the imagination—by which its foundation and its authority are sought in the abstractions of the closet; but, for our present purpose, we may safely concede to our opponents that civil government is based upon a social compact, from which it derives all its powers.

Granting, then, for the sake of argument, that government is based on a social compact, what is this compact? and what are its terms? According to Beccaria and his followers, when men enter into society, each agrees to give up “the smallest possible portion” of his natural liberty, in order that he may the more securely enjoy the rest. He does not agree that his life may be taken away, and therefore he cannot be deprived of it without a violation of the terms of his contract.

This may appear specious; for how plain is the premise, and how irresistible the conclusion: but yet a fallacy must lurk somewhere in the logic. For, if each man has given up only “the smallest possible portion” of his natural liberty, and if society can take from him only what he has agreed to surrender, how can it wrest the whole of that liberty from him by imprisonment for life? Is it not plain, that if society derives all its power and authority from such a contract, it no more has the right to incarcerate the murderer for life than it has to put him to death?

Admitting, as we have done, the truth of the doctrine of a social compact, we may yet deny that Beccaria’s view of it is correct. No government should ask the individual member of society in what way, and to what extent, he is willing to be punished for the public good; if all civil authority is derived from consent, it is certainly not from the consent of each and every individual member of society, but from the consent of the majority. Hence, when government is ratified and confirmed by such consent, the individual is bound by its provisions. How bitterly soever he may hate them, and how fiercely soever he may denounce them, he is just as much subject to their control as if they had received his free, full, and perfect consent. His submission does not result from the terms of any contract made by him on his entrance into society; it is a matter of stern and inexorable necessity. The right to inflict punishment, whether it be imprisonment or death, is not derived from his consent, but from the general consent of the community in which he lives. Indeed, by referring to the individual consent of the criminal, as the foundation of the right to punish, Beccaria deprives law of all its majesty, and reduces civil government to one of the most inconceivably weak and crazy things on earth.

Beccaria also contends, that as no man has a right to take away his own life, so he cannot confer this right upon society. In this argument there is a double fallacy. In the first place, it proceeds on the supposition already noticed, that the rights of government are derived from the individual consent of its members; so that if a man does not consent to its provisions he is not bound by them. Secondly. It proves too much. No man has a right to imprison himself for life; that is to say, no man has a right to seclude himself from society, and thereby incapacitate himself to discharge the duties of the station to which Providence has assigned him; and hence, according to the argument in question, he can confer no such right upon others, and therefore society has no such right. Thus, the argument cuts both ways, and concludes quite as much against the right for which the eloquent marquis himself contends, as it does against that which he so strenuously opposes.

We have not yet done with this famous sophism. What is meant by the expression, that "*a man has no right to take his own life?*" Does it mean, that he has no legal, or that he has no moral, right to do so? According to the common use of the words, a man has a right to do anything, no matter how wrong in a moral point of view, against which there is no human law; that is to say, he has a legal right to do it, provided it is not prohibited by the law of the land. If the words are to be understood in this sense, it is not true that a man, previous to his entering into society, has no right to take his own life; for as, in a state of nature, as it is called, there are no human laws, so in the above sense we may say with Hobbes, that each man has a right to all things. And having a right to all things, he may transfer all his rights to society; and thus we may begin with Hobbes in a state of nature, and, using the word *right* in the above sense, we may construct an absolute and unlimited despotism.

But we suppose the meaning is, that it is not morally right in a man to take his own life; it is evident that the words must be so understood, if we would not make nonsense of them. If this be the meaning, the argument will stand thus:—*It is not morally right* for a man to take his own life, and therefore he cannot make it morally right in society to deprive him of it as a punishment for the crime of murder;—a specimen of logic of which few persons, we apprehend, will be able to feel the force.

Again: supposing it to be true that no man has a right, in a state of nature, to take his own life, it does not follow that no other man has a right to take it in case he should become a murderer. And if any other man, or set of men, possessed this right,

it might have been transferred to society, just as well as if he had possessed it himself. It will not do, then, in any point of view, to argue that society has no right to take the life of the murderer, because he had no such right himself, and therefore could not have conferred it upon society. Indeed, this whole argument, which has been a thousand times repeated by the followers of Beccaria, and boastfully held up as a "demonstration" of the iniquity of the capital punishment, is a most flimsy sophism. When searched to the bottom, it appears to be an attempt to decide the gravest question in the whole range of penal legislation, by a gross abuse of words, by an argument as intensely sophistical as it is in the power of man to invent. Is it upon such grounds that the practice of all ages and nations is to be set at naught, and the penal legislation of the world reformed? For our part, we are free to confess that we have but little confidence in the superior political wisdom of reformers, who are capable of using such an argument on such an occasion.

We have now seen the argument of Beccaria and his followers, from abstract principles, against the right of capital punishment, which he calls a "*demonstration*" that no such right exists in society. We shall next proceed to consider,

II. *The argument from expediency.*—"The punishment of death," says Beccaria, "is pernicious, from the example of barbarity it affords." This is very true in regard to minor offenses; but it is urged as an argument in favor of the entire abrogation of capital punishment; and, as such, we object to it. No law is justly chargeable with cruelty or barbarity, unless it is greater than the criminal deserves, or than the good of society demands. All undeserved and unnecessary punishment is cruel and barbarous; but neither of these conditions can be shown to attach to the punishment of the murderer with death. He deserves to die, and therefore, in a moral point of view, his punishment is not cruel: he himself, in most cases, will be the first to acknowledge the justice of his sentence. Before it can be affirmed, then, that such a penalty is barbarous, it must be made to appear that it is unnecessary, that the best interests of society do not require its infliction. This is the broad ground on which the question of expediency must be settled, if we would take a calm and enlightened view of the subject, and not suffer ourselves to be heated and misled by vague and passionate declamations about "cruelty," and "barbarity," and so forth.

Of a piece with such declamations is the practice of bestowing the most exalted eulogiums upon the cause of humanity, in general

and glowing terms, without stopping to show us what this great and glorious cause requires. We would yield to no man on earth in support of the cause of humanity: but *how* is this cause to be supported? This is the great question which we would fain have answered, so as not to influence our passions, but to enlighten our judgment. We can sympathize with Beccaria and Dymond, as the theme of humanity inspires their eloquence; but, after all is over, we feel that we have derived more heat than light from their learned discussions. And the interests at stake are so momentous, that the impetuous torrent of their eloquence has scarcely passed over us, before we feel constrained to inquire, whether the cause of humanity may not be made to suffer by relaxing the rigor of the law, by breaking down the protection which the terrors of death have thrown around the habitations of life.

Is not the punishment of death, then, the surest safeguard against the violence of the murderer? O, no! answers Beccaria; and, O, no! echo a hundred disciples. And why? Because, say they, with one consent, the punishment of death is not so terrible as imprisonment for life. This is the more dreadful punishment of the two, and, therefore, the more efficacious. But how is this? If imprisonment for life is more dreadful and terrific than death, how has it happened that Beccaria and his followers have advocated it out of pure humanity to the offender? Why do they wish, out of pure kindness, out of a melting compassion for the criminal, to lay upon him the heaviest burden it is in the power of man to impose? Why do they declaim against the severity of the punishment by death, if it be not, in reality, so severe as that for which they contend? These are a few of the questions which we would submit to their dispassionate consideration.

But this is not all. Beccaria has shown us the reason why imprisonment for life is more intolerable than death. "The mind," says he, "by collecting itself and uniting all its force, can, for a moment, repel assailing grief; but its most vigorous efforts are insufficient to resist perpetual wretchedness." Again, he says, "Our sensibility is more easily and more powerfully affected by weak, but repeated impressions, than by a violent, but momentary impulse." And yet, in another place, he says, "I shall be told, that perpetual slavery is as painful as death, and, therefore, as cruel. I answer, that if all the miserable moments in the life of a slave were collected into one point, it would be a more cruel punishment than any other; but these are spread over his whole life, while the pain of death exerts all its force in a moment."

It must be confessed, that the marquis Beccaria has made a

wonderful discovery. He has discovered a punishment which is far preferable to that of death,—first, because it is more severe, and, therefore, more efficacious; secondly, because it is less severe, and therefore more humane. It recommends itself to the legislator by its incomparable dreadfulness; and to the philanthropist by its superior mildness and leniency. It is more insufferable than death, because it is perpetual wretchedness, because it is long-continued suffering; and yet it is less painful than death, because it spreads over one's whole life. For the very same reason that it is lighter, it is also heavier; and it is to be adopted for the very same reason that its rival is to be rejected.

The law against murder is not only charged with barbarity; it is charged with murder itself. "There is much justice," says Dymond, "in an observation of Beccaria, 'Is it not absurd that the laws which detest and punish homicide should, in order to prevent murder, publicly commit murder themselves?'" It would be a waste of time to point out all the absurdities involved in this charge of absurdity against the laws. Let it suffice to state, that the *intention* has something to do with the crime; and that when there is no malice, there is no murder. There is a slight difference, we humbly conceive, between the law-maker, who, from a solemn sense of duty, and a regard to the public good, attaches the penalty of death to the crime of murder; and the dark assassin, who, from a spirit of malice or revenge, takes the life of his fellow-man; and such distinctions, it seems to us, should not be overlooked by men who aspire to become the moral regenerators of the age, the grand illuminators of the world. They must first reform the moral code of the universe before we can consent to touch the instruments by which they would reform the penal codes of the earth.

"The punishment of robbery," says Beccaria, "not accompanied with violence, should be pecuniary." What! should the laws which detect and punish robbery, publicly commit robbery themselves? Should they forbid a man to take the property of another by force; and yet, in view of all the world, forcibly take it themselves? Is it not wonderful that it did not occur to Beccaria and Dymond, that if capital punishment is "murder," then every pecuniary fine is robbery, and every penal infliction cruelty?

Beccaria has displayed no little ingenuity in contriving to throw the terrors of death far into the dim back-ground, and to give bold and striking prominence to the evils of imprisonment. But in spite of all his efforts to subdue it, the voice of nature will sometimes speak out, and we hear him deprecating death as the most dreadful of all evils. Such has been, and such will be, the voice

and testimony of nature in all ages and nations of the world : it has most emphatically proclaimed death "the king of terrors." In vain are we told, then, that the pain of death is not so great as the pain of perpetual slavery ; there is something more in death than the mere pang which attends the severance of soul and body. In vain are we told that some men can meet death with fearless intrepidity : where one criminal can thus meet it, there are a hundred to whom it is the cup of trembling and astonishment. In vain are we told that the execution of the criminal is but a momentary spectacle, while his perpetual servitude furnishes a continued and lasting example : the terrors of death may be felt by the evil doer, when there is no public exhibition to awaken them in his breast. They enter into his mind ; they take hold of his conscience ; they form a part and parcel of his very being ; and though he should fly to the uttermost ends of the earth, and bury himself in the profoundest depths of the universe, yet there will they be with him in all the awfulness of avenging wrath. No device of sophistry, and no coloring of rhetoric, can conceal the real terrors of death. We can measure all other evils ; but there is something in death which passeth understanding. It puzzles the will, it perplexes the sense, it confounds the imagination, and it wrings the soul of the guilty with a mysterious and awful agony which hath never been uttered. However it may be with particular cases, there is no other evil which makes so tremendous an appeal to the common passions of mankind as death ; and, when compared with the efficacy of its terrors, all other modes of prevention sink into perfect insignificance.

III. In the third place we shall proceed to consider THE ARGUMENT FROM REVELATION.—This argument we regard as directly and plainly in favor of capital punishment. It is said, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed ; for in the image of God made he man." Some have attempted to evade the force of this passage by saying, that it is a prediction ; and others, by alledging that it has been abolished by the precepts and spirit of Christianity.

That it is not a prediction may be clearly gathered from the context, in which God declares that he himself requires the blood of the murderer, and that he requires it at the hand of man. Even if it is a prophecy, we trust that no one who values his religious character will undertake to falsify it ; especially as it is a prophecy of which God himself requires the fulfillment. And, besides, supposing it to be a prediction, its divine Author has declared, that the murderer will be put to death, not because human legislators

are barbarous and bloody wretches, but because "in the image of God made he man." Now, our opponents may interpret this reason as they please; they may affirm that the murderer *will* be put to death by man, because his victim was made in the image of God, and, therefore, this punishment will be adjudged due to him and to the world; or because human legislators are made in the image of God, and, therefore, they will uphold his righteous law. In neither sense can it be made to serve their purpose.

The reason upon which this law is based, shows that it was designed to be universal and perpetual in its operation. The punishment of death is required to be inflicted upon those who shall wantonly and wickedly take the life of man; because "*in the image of God made he man.*" It is absurd to infer, as many have done, that this ordinance has passed away, because many of the Jewish institutions have been abolished. This formed no part of the Jewish code. It was delivered to man long before the Jewish nation had an existence. Nor was it founded upon any local reason, like those portions of the Jewish law which have been abrogated.

This ordinance, it will be perceived, was not enacted because it was adapted to any particular state of society. It derived its life, its energy, its being, from nothing that was circumstantial in the condition of man. If the whole Jewish code, and every other conventional system, were swept away, it would still stand upon its own foundation—a foundation which has been laid as deep as that of nature itself. It is applicable alike to the Jew, to the Gentile, and to the Christian. It regards neither the refinements of one age, nor the barbarism of another. It looks above and beyond all factitious distinctions; it passes by all that is local and transitory, all that is subject to time and change, and it fastens upon the essential and imperishable elements of man's nature, as its reason and its resting place. And here, so long as man is made in the image of God, are we persuaded it will stand unmoved and immovable.

But it is urged, with great confidence, that the punishment of death is abolished by the precepts and spirit of Christianity. Do unto others as you would they should do unto you, and, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," are the most comprehensive and beautiful precepts ever given to man: the one, as the guide of his external conduct; the other, as the rule and measure of his internal affections. These are the bright manifestations of brotherly love, which are supposed to be at war with the barbarous custom of punishment by death.

Yet these very precepts, in all the fullness of their spirituality and beauty, were borrowed from that very code with whose provisions it is supposed to be inconsistent. In Leviticus it is said, "Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, *but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*" And again, "If any stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you, shall be as one born among you, and *thou shalt love him as thyself.*" Now, does the gospel require more than this? Does it require a man to love his neighbor more than himself? If not, how can it be pretended that the gospel law of love requires the abrogation of a Jewish ordinance, with which this very law co-existed in the code from which it was borrowed? If this law required the abrogation of capital punishment now, why did it not require it then?

Both laws existed in the same code, established by the Almighty; the one as a rule of private conduct, the other as a rule of public justice: and yet we are told, by men professing to believe in their divine origin, that they are utterly irreconcilable, and exclusive of each other. It is true, that our Saviour, according to the common translation, said to his disciples, "A *new* commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another;" but the true rendering is,—a commandment *renew* I unto you; and, indeed, as we have already seen, this was but a republication of the precept given to the Jews. Thus, in so far as a spirit of brotherly love is concerned, the brightest and most attractive features of the gospel are but a faithful transcript of the Jewish law.

The great mistake, we conceive, which has been made by all those who have reasoned against capital punishment, and especially by those who have reasoned from the precepts and spirit of Christianity, is this,—they have supposed that the rules of public justice are precisely the same as those which are designed to regulate the private conduct of individuals. A greater fallacy could not be committed; and although few have openly and explicitly advanced such a position, yet the arguments and declamations of many have tacitly assumed its correctness.

But those who are so ready to brand the Jewish code as cruel and barbarous, do not scruple to appeal to it whenever they can make it subserve their purpose. They frequently appeal to the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," in order to show that society cannot rightfully take the life of man under any circumstances. Here, they exclaim, is a clear and unequivocal injunction, extending to all men, both in their social and individual capacity. But when they contend that the words, "Thou shalt not kill," are

to be taken in their strict and literal sense, they must forget that; according to their interpretation, we should have no more right to kill a furious wild beast in self-defense, than we should to take the life of a murderer. Nay, if we should be assailed by a host of devouring insects, we should remember the command, "Thou shalt not kill," and quietly submit to our fate like good Christian men. If such interpreters had read a little beyond the end of the tenth commandment, they would have seen that the great Lawgiver himself, who said, "Thou shalt not kill," had enjoined the infliction of capital punishment for a number of offenses. Now, we presume that the Almighty is fully as good an interpreter of his own law as is the most enlightened reformer of the present day; and, if so, we may safely conclude that the sixth commandment was made for the prevention of murder, and not for the protection of the murderer.

The argument of Dymond is replete with this error. "Look for a moment," says he, "upon the capital offender and upon ourselves. *He*, a depraved and deep violator of the law of God—one who is obnoxious to the vengeance of Heaven—one, however, whom Christ came peculiarly to call to repentance and to save. *Ourselves*, his brethren—brethren by the relationship of nature—brethren, in some degree, in offenses against God—brethren especially in the trembling hope of a common salvation. How ought beings so situated to act toward one another? Ought we to kill or to amend him? Ought we, so far as is in our power, to cut off his future hope, or, so far as is in our power, to strengthen the foundation of that hope? Is it the reasonable or decent office of one candidate for the mercy of God to hang his fellow-candidate upon a gibbet?"

All this is very well said, but most miserably applied. It is true we are all candidates for the mercy of God; and therefore, as we hope to be forgiven, we should also forgive. But does it follow that governments should proceed on the principle of the forgiveness of injuries, of overcoming evil with good? Does it follow that the criminal, standing convicted at the bar of justice, should be heard, when he admonishes the judge, under the pain of God's displeasure, to do unto others as he would be done by? If the object of such reasoners were to overthrow all government, and abolish all penal sanctions, then they would at least be consistent with themselves; but as such is not their object, how inconceivably futile is their logic? One candidate for the mercy of God should not hang his fellow-candidate on a gibbet, it is true, nor should he inflict any other evil upon him; he

should rather return good for evil; but what signifies this, in the present controversy, unless we wish to see all government torn up by the roots, and society set afloat upon the wild and lawless waves of human passion, and tossed amid all the contending elements, anarchy, and confusion?

Such reasoning is not more ruinous in its consequences than it is irreconcilable with the inspired wisdom of an apostle. St. Paul enforces the forgiveness of injuries by every consideration which can be brought to bear on the human mind, and by all the fervid and glowing eloquence of a divine inspiration. But does he teach that the civil power should be controlled by such considerations? So far from it, that he has taken the utmost pains to prevent others, if possible, from making such an abuse of them. In the very midst of the highest strain of the eloquence in which he enjoins the forgiveness of injuries, he does not forget to remind us that our wrongs shall not go unredressed, even in this life, if they are of such a nature as to require the interposition of temporal power. The powers that be, says he, are ordained of God, in order to avenge the community, and to protect the individual, by the punishment of the evil doer. Thus, according to the wisdom of an inspired apostle, the most unbounded love in the bosom of the individual, the most absolute and unconditional forgiveness of injuries, is perfectly consistent with the terrific power of the sword in the hand of the magistrate. Nay, these two things are joined together in the very same lesson; as if to prevent the infatuation and folly of man from setting up the one in opposition to the other. We are required, not to return evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good; because vengeance belongeth unto God, who hath ordained the civil power for our safety and protection.

The spirit of Christianity requires the abrogation of no penalty which is demanded by the exigences of society. Let it be shown that the punishment of death in the case of murder is not required for the protection of the innocent, and the repose of society, and it will then be time to talk about the spirit of the gospel and the dictates of humanity. We are not satisfied with vague and loose declamations. We wish to see what is really for the good of society, in order that we may know what is required, not by a weak, blind, and yielding compassion, which looks only to the criminal and his sufferings, but by that enlightened and far-seeing benevolence which seeks to secure the good of all. No doubt have we, that there are really good men who are laboring to heave from its old foundations the great institution of capital punishment for the crime of murder; and only let it be shown, that their benevolent

feeling is not misguided, that it would contravene neither the law of God nor the good of man, and most joyfully will we co-operate with them. But until this be done, we shall remain as deaf as adders to all the outcries and clamors against the barbarity of the law, and in behalf of what is called the cause of humanity. That cause we reverence, and most earnestly would we support it; but yet we cannot forget that the name may be applied to a dark feeling, wholly unenlightened either by reason or by revelation, as well as to the dictates of a true benevolence. There are men, whose compassion is so exceedingly tender, that they cannot believe there is a God in heaven, because there is suffering on earth. It is among such, we are persuaded, that the shallow philosophy of a Beccaria and a Bentham will make its most easy conquests.

On the other hand, there are really good men who shrink from the idea of putting the murderer to death, because it closes the period of his probation, and seals his fate for ever. This is an awful consideration; it is worthy of our most devout and earnest attention. But it will be found, we think, that it is only from a partial view of the subject that the opposers of capital punishment can hope to derive any support from such a consideration. When so much stress is laid upon the fact, that the murderer is a probationer for eternity, it seems to be forgotten, that those who are exposed to the shafts of murder are likewise candidates for the mercy of God, and that they may be cut off in their sins in an instant, in the twinkling of an eye, and without a moment's warning hurried into the presence of their Maker. Hence, the argument gains as much on the one side as it does on the other, by the consideration that we are immortal beings, and that our destiny hereafter depends upon our conduct in this life. If anything, it gives additional weight to the argument in favor of capital punishment: inasmuch as those who need to be protected against the crime of murder, are exposed to a sudden and instantaneous loss of life; whereas the murderer always has time for repentance. It shows that whatever is necessary to protect human life, against so sudden and unexpected a termination of it, is a matter of stern and inexorable necessity. Hence, if it is necessary to protect human life by the infliction of capital punishment on the murderer, on the supposition that we are mortal; much more necessary is it to guard it by such a penalty, on the supposition that we are immortal, and that this life is merely a state of probation.

The gospel is so far from weakening, that it presents in a clearer and stronger light the reason on which the law of murder was originally based. It has brought life and immortality to light. It

has illustrated the excellences and glories of the image originally impressed on the soul of man. By the eternity which it unveils, by the stupendous redemption which it reveals, it invests the life of man with an importance and value, of which the imagination in its highest flights can form no adequate conception. Hence, he who wantonly takes the life of his fellow-man, and thereby puts an end to his probation, is guilty of a crime which words were not invented to express, nor finite minds formed to grasp. No penalty is too great, no penalty bears the least appearance or shadow of severity, provided it be adapted to protect human life against the perpetration of such a crime. Why, then, should we lay an exclusive stress upon the life of the murderer, as if he were the only candidate on earth for the mercy of God? Shall the life of man cease to be protected by the most awful penalty known to the law, because the murderer may choose to incur it, by the perpetration of the most appalling crime that has ever stained the earth or outraged Heaven?

To conclude. The murderer deserves to die. This is the dictate of his own conscience. Hence, to punish him with death *is not unjust*. The good of society requires the penalty of death to be attached to the crime of murder; and hence the penalty *is humane*. The universal sentiment of mankind has declared this to be the most just, the most fitting, and the most efficacious punishment for the crime of murder; and hence it has stood till the present day. The Word of God has sanctioned it, and that, too, for reasons which have obtained in all ages and nations of the world; and therefore it is wise, and just, and good. These are the grounds on which the cause of capital punishment is founded. Though it has been assailed by the misguided philanthropy, by the incoherent and jarring sophisms, by the warm and impassioned declamation, of a thousand adversaries, we do not perceive that its foundations have been shaken.

B.

ART. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Companion for the Afflicted: designed for the Benefit of all who are distressed, whether in Mind, Body, or Estate.* By THOMAS H. WALKER. New-York: Lane & Tippet. 1846.

THE sufferings incident to mortality are numerous and pressing. To know how to endure them, and how to improve them, is an important point of wisdom. The *afflicted* constitute a numerous class; and whatever our prosperity to-day, to-morrow we may be of the number of those who suffer "chastisement." In a multitude of instances, those who are made to drink deeply of the cup of sorrow are deprived of the public means of grace, and even of the blessings of private religious instruction and intercourse. How important is it, under such circumstances, to have at hand a good book suited to the condition and wants of such, that they may not, in their despondency, forget that they "suffer according to the will of God," and that their afflictions may work for them "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory!" We have met with no merely human composition better calculated to instruct, to soothe, and to comfort the afflicted than the present work. We, therefore, earnestly recommend it to the church at large. Those who do not especially need its advices and consolations now, may need them but too soon. Let every Christian family, then, immediately procure a copy. May God give this precious book his blessing!

2. *Glances of the Dark Ages; or Sketches of the Social Condition of Europe from the Fifth to the Twelfth Century.* Edited by D. P. KIDDER. New-York: Lane & Tippet. 1846.

THIS is the second volume of our Monthly Series. It is sold in neat paper covers at the low price of 20 cts., and rarely has an equal amount of so valuable reading been offered to the public for that sum.

Its contents should be read and understood by all who would fully comprehend the history of the church or of the world.

The author has confined himself to one branch of the history of the middle ages. He attempts nothing more than a glance at the social condition of Europe, from the fifth to the twelfth century; political affairs, military transactions, the rise and fall of dynasties, the relation of European states to each other, and the lives and deeds of the heroes of those days do not come within the range of his plan. He has marked out the first six centuries of the middle ages for separate consideration, because in the twelfth century a new epoch commenced.

Much of what is true of the former period is not true of the latter.

New social elements were then formed, and old ones received new life—it was the dawn of modern civilization. It is difficult to draw a well-defined line between the two ages, but it may be placed somewhere about the twelfth century. Events and institutions which arose then, and which seem to belong to the latter period of social progress in Europe, have, therefore, received no notice in the work.

The author appears to have been careful in consulting authorities, though he has abstained from loading his pages with references.

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3. *A Dictionary of the English Language, containing the Pronunciation, Etymology, and Explanation of all Words authorized by Eminent Writers. To which are added a Vocabulary of the Roots of English Words, and an Accented List of Greek, Latin, and Scripture Proper Names.* By ALEXANDER REID, A. M., Rector of the Circus-Place School, Edinburgh, and Author of "Rudiments of English Composition," &c. With an Introduction by Henry Reid, Prof. of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. 12mo., pp. 564. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

THE very full title-page of this work precludes the necessity of a further description of its plan and design. So far as we are able to judge, it is the best dictionary of the English language, for its size, yet published in this country. For the use of schools it is, doubtless, unrivaled. The vocabulary is full without redundancy, and *good use* is made the standard. We most heartily wish this excellent dictionary a wide circulation.

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4. *The Farmer's Dictionary: a Vocabulary of Technical Terms recently introduced into Agriculture and Horticulture, from Various Sciences; and also a Companion of Practical Farming, &c.* Edited by D. P. GARDNER, M. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

WE regard this volume as timely, and of peculiar value: it is evidently the fruit of much industrious research, comprising a large amount of useful information for the farmer and agriculturist. Scientific farming has, of late, made great progress in our country; and as an aid to its still wider increase, the present volume of Dr. Gardner has been prepared. To those who desire plain, practical instruction on this important branch of human industry, this volume will prove a most welcome boon; and indeed it can scarcely fail of becoming a very useful book of reference to the general reader. The publishers have produced the work in excellent style, embellished by a large number of well-executed illustrations.

5. *A Grammar of the Latin Language*, by C. G. Zump, Ph. D. From the Ninth Edition of the Original, adapted to the Use of English Students, by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph. D. Corrected and enlarged by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THE high repute which this celebrated grammar of the Latin tongue has attained among scholars in the old world has at length begun to be re-echoed this side the Atlantic. The indorsement of Dr. Anthon is emphatic. He says:—"The high excellence of the present work is acknowledged by all European scholars, and now that it has received the last touches from the hand of its learned author, we may regard it as the best work on the subject of Latin grammar in the English language. The syntax, in particular, will be found exceedingly valuable, and this part of the volume alone would be sufficient to render the work an invaluable aid to the young scholar; it may be, therefore, confidently recommended as far superior to any grammar of the Latin language at present used in this country." The work is handsomely and strongly bound, price \$1 00; and we are happy to find it has already gained access to most of the leading colleges of the land.

6. *The Pictorial History of England: being a History of the People, as well as a History of the Kingdom down to the Reign of George III.* Profusely illustrated with many hundred Engravings on Wood. In Parts. Harper & Brothers.

As a popular History of Great Britain, we know of no work at all to compare with this: it is essentially one of the most attractive and entertaining, as well as the most competent and reliable, extant. Issued under the immediate sanction and auspices of the "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," it comes to us indorsed by good authority; and we understand that a number of eminent writers were employed on the several departments of the work, so that little is left us to desire in the way of completeness. As to the numerous pictorial embellishments, we can unhesitatingly pronounce them all that even a fastidious taste could desire. The Messrs. Harper have indeed rendered no mean service to the reading public in thus producing so elegant and cheap a reprint of this valuable work. It is to be completed in about forty numbers, price 25 cts. each, forming four large octavo volumes.

7. *Thoughts of Blaise Pascal. Translated from the French. Preceded by a Sketch of his Life.* 12mo., pp. 384. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1846.

THIS work contains the "Thoughts" of one of the most extraordinary characters of his age. The early history of Pascal was marked by

developments of genius of the highest order, and his controversy with the *Jesuits* has given immortality to his name. The "Provincial Letters," as specimens of logical reasoning, pleasant irony, and withering sarcasm, remain unrivaled. The work before us is composed of fragments which remained among the writer's papers, and have by various hands been collected and arranged. They are full of wisdom and instruction.

8. *A System of Intellectual Philosophy.* By Rev. ASA MAHAN, President and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the Oberlin Collegiate Institute. 12mo., pp. 330. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1845.

WE are likely to have a sufficient number of books upon the philosophy of the human mind, though all those who have an eye to this branch of literature are scarcely likely to believe, quite yet, that *the right book* has made its appearance. The work before us will probably take a respectable position among works of the class, but how far it will supersede, in the schools, its predecessors, we will not attempt to predict. The author is not remarkable for originality of mind, but culls from his predecessors whatever he conceives valuable in their investigations and discoveries. Coleridge, Kant, and Cousin, are his principal authorities. To that class who prefer these great masters to Locke, Bird, Dugald Stewart, Brown, Payne, &c., President Mahan's book will, doubtless, be considered as superior to most of those in use in the country.

9. *Lives of the Apostles of Jesus Christ.* By D. FRANCIS BACON. New-York: Baker & Scribner. 1846.

WE have here a large and labored volume. The theme is noble and inspiring to a Christian, and of course gives ample scope for the critical and historical knowledge of the author. As a literary production, the book has its faults; but those who are disposed not to mark them with severity, may gather from every page much instruction. So important a position did the original apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ occupy, that every scrap of authentic history which we have of their lives and labors is exceedingly precious. It happens, however, that we know very little of them, with any degree of certainty, excepting what we find in the New Testament. All besides is based upon uncertain tradition. We are often tempted to wish God had seen proper to give to the church in all succeeding ages a particular history of the lives and labors of all the twelve apostles and their coadjutors. But how little do we know as to what would have been best in this respect! God knows when to speak, and when to keep silence.

10. *The Missionary Enterprise; a Collection of Discourses on Christian Missions.* By American Authors. Edited by BARON STOW, Pastor of Baldwin-Place Church, Boston. 12mo., pp. 308. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1846.

THIS volume contains fifteen sermons upon the subject of *Missions*, by nearly as many authors. The names of Drs. Wayland, Griffin, Anderson, Williams, Beecher, Miller, Fuller, Beman, Stone, and Mason; and Messrs. Kirk, Stow, and Ide, are a strong guaranty for the success of this book. The sermons were delivered by these distinguished pulpit orators upon set occasions, and of course are thoroughly elaborated. We commend this volume to our readers with great confidence.

11. *Discourses and Essays of the Rev. J. H. Merle D'Aubigne, D. D.* With an Introduction by ROBERT BAIRD, D. D. Translated by CHARLES W. BAIRD. 12mo., pp. 466. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS is a handsome duodecimo volume, comprising, in complete series, the fugitive and occasional essays and discourses of the celebrated historian of the "Great Reformation." That such a collection must prove acceptable to the great body of the religious community we cannot doubt. Dr. Baird has prefixed a very interesting biographical notice of the distinguished author, from which, were it not for our restricted space, we should have presented some extracts; so beautifully has he sketched the man whose *useful* writings have been so extensively read and admired. Need we say aught more to induce our friends generally to peruse this valuable and delightful volume?

12. *The Design of the Church, as an Index to her real Nature, and the true Law of her Communion.* By JOHN MILLER, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Frederick, Md. 12mo., pp. 197. Phila.: James M. Campbell. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1846.

THE theme of the volume before us is one upon which a world of controversy has been expended, and yet the discussion of it continues to excite a high degree of interest. Mr. Miller has treated the subject with ability, and in a truly catholic spirit. The work is well worthy of a careful perusal, and we devoutly hope it may do much good.

13. *The Puritans and their Principles.* By EDWIN HALL. 8vo., pp. 41. New-York: Baker & Stedman. 1846.

WE shall not attempt to sketch the character of this work; as in a future number, after a more thorough examination than we have found time to bestow upon it, we purpose giving it an extended review.

14. *The Great Commission: or, the Christian Church constituted and charged to convey the Gospel to the World.* By the Rev. JOHN HARRIS, D. D., Author of "Mammon," "The Great Teacher," &c. With an Introductory Essay, by the Rev. Wm. R. Williams, D. D. Fifth thousand. Boston: Gould, Kendall, and Lincoln. 1846.

WE noticed the first American edition of this work, and are now happy to bring it again before our readers. It is greatly blessing the churches of these lands. May many times *five thousand* copies of this powerful and admirable work yet be issued and circulated!

15. *The Biographical Remains of Rev. George Beecher*, late Pastor of a Church in Chillicothe, Ohio, and former Pastor of a Church in Rochester, N. Y. 12mo., pp. 345. New-York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co. 1844.

THIS book consists of a Memoir of the late Rev. George Beecher, his Letters, Essays, and Sermons. The work is dedicated, and of course was got up, by *Miss Catharine Beecher*; and the whole exhibits the finish that might be expected, coming from such hands. The melancholy end of this young and promising minister of Jesus Christ was a subject of universal lamentation. The ways of Providence are mysterious. There is a melancholy interest about these "Remains." They are truly instructive and interesting, and cannot fail to be useful.

16. *The Philosophy of Reform, in which are exhibited the Design, Principle, and Plan of God, for the full Development of Man, as a social, civil, intellectual, and moral Being; thereby elevating him in the Scale of Being to the Position he was created to occupy.* By Rev. C. BILLINGS SMITH. 12mo., pp. 352. New-York: Gates & Stedman. 1846.

THIS is a spirited book, and contains much that is worthy of serious consideration, especially at the present time. The author goes decidedly against "one-ideaism," and all organization for reform independent of the church. His thoughts upon these topics are pertinent and forcible, and contain much of truth; but he pushes some of his conclusions rather too far. As one illustration of the spirit of the work, we give the following paragraphs:—

"Now the church was organized for this very purpose. It is her legitimate work to breathe the breath of life into the world's dead carcass. In no other way can this good work be done. All other light is borrowed. Remove this central sun, and every proud reflector would cease to give light. It may be said that Christianity is the only active principle of truth in the world. Every other truth, from its nature, is quiescent, lifeless, until picked up and wrought into a system. Christianity is the internal fire that is constantly increasing and giving life

to all things. But even that would soon go out, were it not for this organization, which has been effected to propagate it."—P. 252.

"Fourierism is but a patent reformatory association—an attempted improvement on the gospel. It is the gospel of the law of progress of the race. It may have an angel's appearance, but it has a tiger's heart. The church being retarded in her work by the divorce referred to, these men have declared the gospel to be a failure. Hence, they have got up an association to gain for the world what God has sought but could not gain. Poor men! they will have their day and die. Thus we might account for all the modern *isms* which have taken the place of the church, and also for the existing and increasing fanaticism."—P. 268.

Our author, we have no doubt, will furnish matter for serious thought to those who are interested in sustaining the great "American" societies, which have but a slight connection with any particular church, and may scarcely be said to be under any regular ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Let the "gold, silver, and precious stones," remain, while the "wood, hay, and stubble," are consumed. To this let all evangelical Christians say, Amen.

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17. *Journey to Ararat.* By DR. FRIEDRICH PARROT, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Dorpat, Russian Imperial Counselor of State, Knight of the Order of St. Anne, &c. With Map, and Wood-cuts. Translated by W. D. COOLEY. Harper & Brothers.

THE peculiar and Biblical interest which attaches to Mount Ararat cannot fail to awaken a desire to become acquainted with the traveler who may visit it; and when, as in the present instance, that traveler brings to his aid the qualifications of high scholarship, the interest is redoubled. The personal narrative of Prof. Parrot is highly instructive and entertaining; and the information he presents respecting the Circassians and Georgians will be found no less valuable. The exploit of the perilous ascent of Ararat is a feat so difficult of accomplishment, that it has been doubted if even our author actually achieved the task. We commend this work, which forms part of Harpers' "New Miscellany of standard literature," to the especial notice of those of our readers who may not have seen it, assured that they will be charmed with its perusal.

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18. *Voyage of a Naturalist; comprising a Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries visited during the Voyage of H. M. Ship Beagle round the World.* By CHARLES DARWIN, F. R. S., &c. 2 vols., 12mo. Harper & Brothers.

THESE important volumes are divested of the too common defect of such works, viz., prolixity: there is a sententious brevity about them

that exhibits a practiced hand, and the matter they contain is yet of the most valuable and interesting kind. Besides detailing in a very graphic manner the account of a circumnavigation of the globe, the work of Capt. Darwin presents some highly instructive and important details concerning the local distribution of animals, their habits and peculiarities, together with much that will be regarded as of considerable value in geological science. Altogether, we consider these volumes as deserving a place among the best books of travel that have been offered for some time.

After noticing the above interesting and valuable works belonging to a cheap and elegantly printed series, we are astonished and mortified to find in the same series, No. XII, a book only fitted to disgrace the good company in which it is found. Here is the title:—

19. *Life in Prairie Land*. By MRS. ELIZA W. FARNHAM. 12mo., pp. 408. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

WE do not doubt that there may be persons with whom this book will be popular, since it is written in a readable style with sundry attempts at brilliancy; but we know not how an individual of refined taste or of sound moral feeling can peruse the work without sentiments of dissatisfaction, if not of disgust.

One of its chief glories seems to be to parade before the reader the greatest possible variety of western vulgarisms; while it takes more than one occasion to sneer at religion, and to scandalize those who profess it.

Were half as much abuse and ridicule of American character and manners to be found in the book of an English traveler, or resident of the west, our journalists would brand it as the production of a second Trollope. Altogether, we do not consider the work worth the space we have given it, and we would hardly have persuaded ourselves to notice it at all, but for the sake of expressing the hope that the respectable publishers of the "New Miscellany of *standard literature*" may not again be so unfortunate in their selection for this hitherto popular and valuable series.

20. *Lovest Thou Me; or, the Believer's Companion in his Hours of Self-examination*. By REV. DANIEL WISE. Boston: Waite, Peirce & Co. A delightful pocket manual, worthy of its title.

SUNDAY-SCHOOL DEPARTMENT.

Books published by Lane & Tippett, 200 Mulberry-st., for the S. S. Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

1. *The Visitor; or, Calls of Usefulness.*

Characters are here drawn with great skill and fidelity. Without any of the trappings of fiction, the reader is at once put in possession of facts respecting men and things which are very important for him to understand, and which will materially assist his observation and reflections in numberless circumstances of real life.

2. *The Life of Philip the Evangelist.* By a Sunday-School Teacher. Price 15 cts.

A newly written and instructive book.

3. *Memoir of Raffaele Ciocci*, an Italian monk. Followed by a Sketch of the Ronge Reformation in Germany. Price 14 cts.

The Memoir of Raffaele Ciocci will be very instructive to the youth of this country. It exhibits the influence to which young men in Papal countries are subject; and shows, in a vivid manner, the internal operations of Roman Catholic monasteries.

To it is subjoined a sketch of the Ronge Reformation in Germany, as an interesting fragment of the history of the times.

4. *A Brief Account of Sodom and Gomorrah.* Price 13 cts.

Nothing need be said to render this work acceptable. The subject is one of deep and paramount interest. It is here presented in a style that will not only be agreeable to children, but almost as a matter of course to older persons, should they take occasion to examine it. The author has compiled his geographical and historical facts with care; and his moral and religious reflections will commend themselves to all hearts.

5. *Pithy Papers*, for Week-day Reading. By Old Humphrey. No. 363. Price 24 cts.

Old Humphrey is a universal favorite. He is capable of making the dullest subjects interesting. What is still better, he turns every subject to a religious account.

The present volume is somewhat abridged from the London copy, just published under the same title by the Religious Tract Society. It contains, in fact, the pith of "Old Humphrey's Pithy Papers."

6. *April Fool; or, the Evils of Deception.*7. *The History of Pontius Pilate: with an Account of the Trial and Crucifixion of the Lord Jesus Christ.*8. *Pleasant Days with Aunt Clara Howard.*

All neat and sterling books for children.



REV. GEORGE PICKERING,

NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1846.

EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

ART. I.—*Sketches of Protestantism in Italy, Past and Present: including a Notice of the Origin, History, and Present State of the Waldenses.* By ROBERT BAIRD. Boston. 1845.

THE author of "Religion in America" has, in the present work, begun to furnish the American public with corresponding works on religion in Europe. He has selected that part of Europe for his first essay which is more interesting than all others to Christian people, as being the region where the religion of the gospel has been the most thoroughly perverted and the most wonderfully preserved. It professes to be a sketch of Protestantism; but of necessity unfolds, at the same time, to a great extent, the state, present and past, of the Roman Church. A leading inducement, which the learned and pious author felt for undertaking the labors of such a work, was to awake among Protestants a deeper interest in the restoration of Roman Catholic nations to the faith of the gospel, believing, that the world will never be converted to God but through the regeneration of the fallen churches, whose corruptions, lying in masses through the world, will, while they remain, virulently diffuse everywhere a deadly and destructive influence.

The work is divided into three parts. The first describes the rise, progress, and suppression, of the Reformation in Italy; the second presents a diversified view of the state of things in Italy since that time; and the third part is devoted to an account of the Waldenses, the most wonderfully preserved remnant of the ancient church of Christ. No Christian, Papal or Protestant, no mere scholar even, can glance his eye over this plan, and especially over the table of contents, without feeling the power of an attraction which will draw him on until he has finished the book; for the views that successively open to him are grand in importance, rich in incident, and thrilling in interest.

Italy before the Reformation.

Three mighty external causes of corruption brought the church of the apostles to its fall:—state patronage, which made the endowments of office the object of the ambition of worldly men, the employment of the religious machinery of paganism to conciliate and proselyte the heathen, and the overflow of the lands occupied by the church by the torrents of northern barbarians.

The empire of darkness did not spread over Italy and concentrate itself at Rome without resistance, from time to time, by the spirit of truth manifested in divers places. Near the conclusion of the fourth century, Ambrose, archbishop of Milan, lifted up his voice against the growing superstitions of the church and the arrogant assumptions of the bishop of Rome. And Claude, bishop of Turin, in the ninth century loudly denounced the worship of images, saints, and relics; set aside the merit of external works; denied the infallibility of the church, together with the supremacy of the Roman bishop; maintained the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and declared that real heretics were those that departed from the word of God. About two centuries subsequently, the Paulicians, carrying with them the doctrines of the apostle, from whom they derived their name, fled from their native land, Armenia, to escape the persecutions of the Greek emperor, and spread along the north of Italy. They also penetrated into the south of France, where they existed for a long time under the name of Albigenses. The true candlesticks, amid the gross darkness, were set up in their churches along the banks of the Po, and for a long time helped to stave off the impending doom of religion. In the Alpine valleys of Piedmont, the native inhabitants, isolated by their position from the mass of their countrymen, still kept a steady eye to the truths of the gospel, unseduced by the spirit of worldly ambition, and undazzled by the false glare of pagan superstitions. Thence, they sent forth their colonies to the south of Italy; their missionaries were dispersed in various cities and even at Rome itself, and affiliated societies threaded with a line of truth the whole country. Early in the twelfth century appeared a spirit worthy of a better age, Arnaldo da Brescia. He was a pupil of the renowned Abelard, who had so high an opinion of his learning and ability, that he chose him as his supporter in the defense he made of his opinions against Bernard and the bishop of Chartres in the Council of Trent. This was after he had fled from Brescia, his native city, to avoid the effects of excommunication, pronounced against him and his followers. From France he retired to Zurich, where he found refuge and a free opportunity to preach against the superstitions

and tyranny of Rome. He particularly denounced the civil power of the popes and the worldly riches of the church, and maintained that the ministers of Christ should possess only a spiritual authority, and depend altogether upon the voluntary contributions of the people for their support. In 1145 he appeared at Rome, and lifted up the standard of reform. The senate was won over to his opinions, the form of the ancient commonwealth was restored, and for ten years Arnaldo exercised a predominant influence over public affairs. But when Adrian IV. took the pontifical chair, he set himself to overthrow Arnaldo and the commonwealth. Joining alliance with Frederick Barbarossa, emperor of Germany, who was invading the states of Italy to rivet his authority over them, he accomplished his purpose. The new republic was crushed, and Arnaldo was sacrificed to the vengeance of the pope. Before his death, he is represented to have appealed to God against the wickedness and cruelty of the Roman hierarchy. "I call heaven and earth to witness that I have announced to you those things which the Lord has commanded. But ye despise both me and your Creator. Nor is it wonderful that ye are about to put me, a sinful man, to death, for preaching to you the truth, since if even Saint Peter were to arise from the dead this day, and were to reprove your many vices, ye would by no means spare him." He was crucified, his body burnt, and the ashes thrown into the Tiber.

Three hundred years elapsed before another master-spirit arose to assail the despotism of Rome. The name of Girolamo Savonarola deserves to be perpetuated, as one of the heroes of truth and martyrs to liberty of conscience. His bold attacks upon the corruption of the Papal court and church, and his tragic fate at the stake, possess more than dramatic interest, as sketched in this book.

The movements made against antichrist, from time to time, under the conduct of the distinguished men already mentioned, were only stars that were destined to rise and set in the long night of the dark ages: but in the commencement of the fourteenth century, the revival of learning indicated the dawning of a day, which, though it had been obscured by dark clouds, will never fully close, until time is no more. The fall of the Greek empire under the Turks contributed to it, by the dispersion through the West of many learned men; and the invention of printing, about the same time, opened a channel for the overspreading of light. Investigation was now extended into every department of human learning. The sacred Scriptures were brought forth to light, read in the original tongues and translated, astonishing many minds with the contrast between the original church of Christ, and the vast and corrupt

machinery of religion, which now bore its name. Learning of every kind is, directly or indirectly, the antagonist of Rome. It throws light directly upon the heresies and follies of Popery, or creates a habit of free inquiry which is hostile to its peace, and will never rest until antichrist is no more. The learned sons and daughters of Rome are her greatest enemies. They will throw open her gates to her invaders, or they will revolutionize her and force her to cast off her ignorance, her superstitions, and her despotism. If Rome will build colleges and schools enough, we have nothing to fear for the final issue.

“No Protestant has ever said harder things against the ‘mother of harlots,’ than some of the Italian authors. Dante’s *Divina Comedia* contains very many passages full of the most cutting satire upon the conduct of the Roman hierarchy,—popes, cardinals, bishops, priests, and monks. Many of his views respecting the divine and supreme authority of the Scriptures in matters of faith and practice were such as every true Protestant holds. This we could easily show by citations, if it were necessary. . . . In his treatise on monarchy, he is even more severe on the abuses of the church than in his poems. He would deprive the popes of temporal authority, and attacks tradition, which has justly been called the main pillar of the Roman Catholic Church. For doing this, his *Monarchia* found a place in the Index of forbidden books, in the year 1559, where it is wonderful that the *Divina Comedia* is not to be found also. . . . Nor was Petrarch less severe upon Rome and its hierarchy than Dante. In his Latin eclogues and Italian sonnets there are many strokes of satire, sometimes concealed, sometimes open. The Papal see is characterized as ‘impious Babylon;’ avaricious Babylon; the school of error; the temple of heresy; the forge of fraud; the hell of the living! . . . The writings of Boccaccio, Poggio Bracciolini, Ariosto, Berni, Bap- tista, and very many other Italian authors from the revival of learning to the Reformation, abound in severe ridicule and invective aimed especially at the vices of the clergy and monks. Laurentius Valla, ‘who,’ it is affirmed by Erasmus, ‘rescued literature from the grave, and restored to Italy the splendor of her ancient eloquence,’ wrote with great ability against the Papal claims and abuses. He lived in the beginning of the fifteenth century.”—Pp. 30–34.

Entrance of the Reformation into Italy.

All this time Rome abates nothing of her arrogance. Despising the growing uneasiness of society and the loud demand for reformation from various quarters, in 1526 a bull was issued from the Vatican forbidding the discussion of such subjects, and especially allusions to antichrist implicating the church. But the preparations for reform were silently moving onward in all lands. Greek, Latin, and Hebrew literature were bringing forth lights upon the real character of the age, and preparing many minds to understand the

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is found that the work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Council of the League of Nations. The progress made during the year is described in detail in the following paragraphs.

The second part of the report deals with the work of the various commissions and committees. It is found that the work of these bodies has been carried out in accordance with their mandates. The progress made during the year is described in detail in the following paragraphs.

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true gospel, when once the voice of Luther broke the suspense, declaring in opposition to Rome the unsearchable riches of Christ. John Reuchlin and Erasmus were the most distinguished of those learned men who contributed to the revival of learning, and opened the path for the study of the sacred oracles in the original tongues. The following glimpse of Reuchlin gives a lively impression of his important influence:—

“In one of the first years of the sixteenth century, a baptized Jew, of Cologne, named Plefferkorn, an intimate friend of the Dominican inquisitor, Hochstaten, aided by the monks of his order, succeeded in persuading the emperor Maximilian to give an order that all the Jewish books (the Bible excepted) should be burned. The reason alledged was, that they were filled with blasphemies against Jesus Christ. This was opposed by Reuchlin and other scholars, as a gross injustice. The emperor requested Reuchlin to examine the books. The learned doctor did so, and indicated those that came within the category of such books as the imperial order contemplated. These met their fate; but such as contained no attacks upon Christianity were saved. This enraged the Dominicans, who commenced a fierce war upon Reuchlin. They ventured to charge him with heresy, and quoted passages from his writings to prove it. But the able professor confounded them, in 1513, in his ‘Defense against his Detractors in Cologne.’ Hochstaten assembled a tribunal at Mayence against Reuchlin, and had his writings condemned to the flames. Reuchlin appealed to Pope Leo X. Leo, who had no love for the monks, referred the matter to the bishop of Spire, who declared Reuchlin innocent, and condemned the monks to pay the cost of the investigation. This affair made a great noise in Italy, where men of learning, as well as in Germany, almost universally took part with Reuchlin.

“While the controversy between Reuchlin and the Dominicans was yet pending, the monks received a blow from another quarter. Ulrich von Hütten took part strongly with the learned doctor, for he was the mortal enemy of the monks. To him has been attributed the famous satire which appeared in 1516, entitled *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*. But it appears, that a friend of his, whom he had known at the university, Crotus Robianus, and other Germans, were the real authors of this production, although it is probable that Hütten had no small part in the matter.

“In this work, Reuchlin’s adversaries, the monks,—the pretended authors of these letters,—are made to discourse of the current affairs of the day, and especially of theological matters, after their own fashion, and in their own barbarous Latin. They address the silliest and most unmeaning questions to Eratius, their correspondent at Cologne. They expose, in this way, their own gross ignorance, unbelief, superstition, pride, fanatical zeal, and vulgar and groveling spirit. Among other things, they reveal the profligacy and excesses of the chiefs of their party, and relate several scandalous anecdotes of Hochstaten and Plefferkorn. The mixture of hypocrisy and silliness in these letters ren-

ders them exceedingly comic; and yet so natural are they, that even the Dominicans and Franciscans in England received them as a genuine and faithful exhibition of the principles and conduct of their order.

“Great was the indignation, however, of the monks in Germany when the work fell into their hands; and great was the delight of their enemies. The affair was soon carried to the pope. But Leo refused to issue a bull against these letters, and the monks had to digest them as best they could. This controversy, if such it may be called, had some influence in Italy in preparing the way for more important things.”—Pp. 40–42.

Not only were the Scriptures in the dead languages studied with avidity by the learned, but the writings of the reformers, Luther, Melancthon, Zuingle, and Bucer, had a wonderful circulation among them. They were found in the hands of cardinals, and even in the palace of the pope himself. Some of them were translated into Italian and published with altered titles, so as to veil the names of their authors. What is more interesting still, the Holy Scriptures were translated into Italian and circulated among the people. The literary and commercial intercourse between Germany and Italy favored the dawn of the Reformation in the latter country: especially the wars of Charles V. with Francis I. of France, the theatre of which was mostly in Italy, and the subsequent conflict with Pope Clement VII., were overruled by Providence to prepare the way of the truth. The way in which this was accomplished is partly revealed in the following extract:—

“With such scandal in high places before their eyes, it is not strange that the attachment of the Italians to their religion should, for a season, at least, become weakened; nor that the Protestant German soldiers, who were in Charles's army, should speak and act with great boldness. Of this they gave many striking proofs. In order effectually to punish the audacious pontiff, the emperor advanced his armies to the walls of Rome, took the holy city, gave it up to his soldiers to pillage, and compelled the pope,—shut up in the Castle of St. Angelo,—to surrender at discretion. During that period of interregnum in the Papacy, if we may so call it, while Clement was shut up in the castle as a prisoner, the German soldiers, one day, took one of their number, a man by the name of Grünwald, remarkable for his noble countenance and lofty bearing, and having attired him like the pope, they put him on a richly-caparisoned horse, and placed a triple crown upon his head. Others were arrayed like cardinals, bishops, friars, &c.; and a procession was formed, which was followed by a vast concourse of the people. It moved through all the principal streets of Rome, the mock-pope stopping in front of the houses where the cardinals were confined, and blessing the people after the peculiar manner of the pope. Arriving at length at the Castle of St. Angelo, he drank to the safe custody of

this holiness. He then administered an oath to his own cardinals, binding them to yield due obedience to the emperor, and not to disturb the peace of the state by their intrigues, but as became them, according to the precepts of their heavenly Master, to be subject to the civil powers. After having made a speech, in which he rehearsed the crimes of which the popes had been guilty, and extolled the emperor as an instrument whom God had raised up for their chastisement, the pretended pontiff promised to make over all his authority to Luther, in order that he might purify the church of the corruptions with which it was infected, and refit the ship of St. Peter, which had so long been the sport of the winds and the waves, while the sacrilegious crew were engaged in drinking and debauchery. He then called upon all the soldiers to take an oath for the accomplishment of these good enterprises. Whereupon, all lifted up their hands, and shouted, 'Long live Pope Luther! Long live Pope Luther!' All this took place under the eye of Clement VII.

"There seemed to be little commiseration felt anywhere for the fallen pope. All appeared to think that his misfortunes were the just judgments of God for the sins of the times, and especially for his own amazing folly in provoking a war to which he was wholly unequal.

"Nor were there wanting men, high in rank in the Roman hierarchy itself, who had the courage to utter powerful truths even before the pope and cardinals. A remarkable instance of this occurred at the first meeting of the Apostolical Rota, held after Rome was delivered from the army of Charles V. On that occasion, Staphylo, bishop of Sibari, made a speech, in which he attributed the devastations which had taken place to the judgments of Heaven, inflicted upon the city because of its wickedness; and applied to Rome the striking language, which the prophet Isaiah addresses to Jerusalem. Still more; he pronounced Rome to be the Babylon of the Apocalypse; the 'woman sitting on many waters,' 'full of names of blasphemy, the mother of uncleanness, fornications, and abominations of the earth.' No Protestant has ever used stronger terms respecting Rome than this prelate did on that occasion."—Pp. 49–51.

Such was the break of day in benighted Italy. It is graphically described by the author, and awakens a deep interest in the reader to know the progress of a work which commenced under such promising auspices.

Progress of the Reformation in Italy.

On this part of the book we can only cast a passing glance. Commencing at the north and proceeding south, which was, in fact, the order nearly in which revival spread, the author describes its operation in Venice, Milan, Turin, Mantua, Locarno, Capo d'Istria, Ferrara, Modena, Florence, States of the Church, Lucca, Pisa, Sienna, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In all these places the Reformation had its apostles, and in a few of them churches were organized. Pastors, professors, students, and even bishops, were

its converts and supporters. Some noblemen and princes, and many learned and pious ladies, warmly advocated the truth. The progress of the cause was disturbed, somewhat, by unhappy controversies among the Protestants on the subject of the Trinity, and on Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation, and in none of the states did it secure the patronage of the government, under which to make a stand when assailed by the fury of Rome.

The author closes his account of the progress of the Reformation with the following paragraphs:—

“For awhile Rome was undecided what course to pursue. Reform was demanded from almost every quarter of Christendom. At first, it was thought that this voice must be listened to; and Pope Paul III., in 1537, appointed four cardinals and five prelates, to confer on the subject and give him their advice as to the best method of reforming the abuses of the church. This commission met at Bologna, and, after long deliberations, reported a number of evils,—such as the intrusion of improper persons into the priesthood, the sale of benefices and the disposition of them by testaments, the granting dispensations, and the union of bishoprics, including the incompatible offices of cardinals and bishops, &c.,—which called for speedy remedy. This ‘Advice’ Paul III. approved and published, but did not follow. And still worse, Cardinal Caraffa, one of the commission, when he ascended the Papal throne, as he did under the name of Paul IV., put this document in the Index of forbidden books! This ‘Advice,’ we may remark, afforded no little amusement in Germany. Luther translated it into German, and prefixed an engraving representing the pope seated on a high throne, surrounded by his cardinals, who were all busy sweeping the room, each with a broom made of a long pole with a fox’s tail fastened to the end! Among other things, the ‘Advice’ recommended that the *Colloquies* of Erasmus, the best work that ever came from his polished pen, should be forbidden to be used in the schools, because of its dangerous tendency. It was well for them that the learned author was in his grave, or they would soon have felt the effects of his caustic wit.

“But Rome at length abandoned her vascillating policy. She laid her schemes deep in diabolical cunning. She resolved, indeed, to call a general council; not to reform the church, but to complete the vast fabric of error, at which she had been toiling for ages, and place upon it the cap-stone. This she did by the Council of Trent. And at the same time she resolved that the ‘reformed doctrine’ should be exterminated everywhere in Christendom, where she had the power to do it by violence! And soon blood flowed from one extremity of Italy to the other, and the prayers and the groans of the victims ascended to heaven, one day to be answered and avenged, from many a city in that ill-fated land.”—Pp. 82–84.

Suppression of the Reformation.

The means employed by the court of Rome to suppress the Reformation, were the re-organization of the Inquisition on the

Spanish model, the arrest of the leading advocates of reform, the interdiction of heretical works by the Index Expurgatorius, and the employment of the secular sword. Language cannot depict the alarm, the distress, the bloodshed which marked the dreadful tragedy which took place everywhere in Italy. Our author has detailed it in a simple but most impressive and eloquent manner. His portraits of some of the distinguished martyrs and sufferers are true to nature. The most horrid scenes on an extended scale were the extirpation of the entire colony of the Waldenses, which for two hundred years had been established in Calabria. In Venice persecution took its mildest form, but even there it proved "the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." Look at it!

"For a long time the senate resisted the application of capital punishment to those who were convicted by the Inquisition of holding the new doctrines. But at length it yielded this point, also. How many suffered death in that city and its territories we have no means of knowing. The mode of putting them to death was by drowning. And though this was less barbarous than burning, yet circumstances sufficiently horrible were not wanting. The prisoner was taken from his cell at the hour of midnight and placed in a gondola, as the small and swiftly-gliding boat of Venice is called, with no other attendants than the rowers, and a priest to act as a confessor. After being carried out into the outer harbor, another boat approached and came alongside. The prisoner was laid on a plank, whose ends rested on the two boats. His hands were tied, and a heavy stone was attached to his feet. A signal being given, the boats separated, and the victim was plunged into the deep, to rise no more 'till the sea gives up her dead.'

"The first person who suffered martyrdom in the city of Venice,—though several had been previously put to death in the territories of that republic,—was Giulia Guirlanda. He sunk into the deep calling upon the Lord Jesus. He was in the fortieth year of his age. His death occurred on the 19th October, 1562. Antonio Ricetto, a most honorable man, was the next. Great efforts were made by the senate to induce him to recant. The entreaties of his little son were employed to move him; but all in vain. In the gondola he was firm, prayed for those who put him to death, and commended his soul to his Saviour. He was drowned on the 15th February, 1566. Francisco Spinula followed; he was drowned ten days after Ricetto. But the most distinguished of all the martyrs of Venice was Fra Baldo Lupetino. He was of a noble and ancient family, became a monk, and rose to a high rank in his order. After having proclaimed the gospel in various places, in Italy and out of it, both in the Italian and Slavonian languages, he was thrown into prison by the inquisitor and the pope's legate. There he lay almost twenty years. On the one hand, the Protestant German princes interceded with the senate for his life; on the other, the pope and his inquisitor and legate demanded his death—which he met with great firmness, and in peace.

“There is reason to believe that many others suffered death in Venice, of whose names history makes no mention. Besides these, many died in prison, or of diseases contracted during long confinement there. And great numbers escaped to other lands.”—Pp. 99, 100.

The work of extirpating heresy was successful everywhere except in the high valleys of Piedmont, where, though blood was shed in profusion, it did not extinguish the candle of gospel light, which, from apostolical times, the Waldenses, protected by those mighty forts of nature, the Alps, have kept burning with more than vestal vigilance. The refugees from persecution fled in all directions, to France, Switzerland, Savoy, the Netherlands, and England. Our author follows the most distinguished of them in their exile, and describes their labors in the Protestant churches. This is an instructive section of the work, and presents some scenes of touching interest.

Civil State of Italy since the Reformation.

Dr. Baird details the political changes of Italy since the Reformation, from which it appears that no part of it retains its former state, “save the little republic of San Marino perched upon its mountain top, and quietly looking down upon the distant Adriatic.” A good map will aid the reader to an accurate impression of the present political sections of the country. The following is the author’s summary of the population:—

Names of the States.	Extent in Square Miles.	Population.
Kingdom of Naples	43,052	7,434,300
Kingdom of Sardinia	29,534	4,123,000
Austrian Lombardy	18,450	4,278,902
Estates of the church	17,572	2,592,329
Grand Duchy of Tuscany	8,759	1,275,000
Duchy of Parma	2,253	437,400
Duchy of Modena	2,145	379,000
Duchy of Lucca	434	145,000
San Marino	44	8,400
	122,243	20,673,331

“The area of Italy is about equal to that of Great Britain and Ireland; but its population is three or four millions less.”—P. 176.

The book presents a more favorable view of the civilization of Italy, particularly in respect to agriculture and the conveniences of living, than we have gathered from the fragmentary sketches of occasional travelers;—it expresses a high opinion of the capacity of the Italian population for improvement. All they want is deliverance from the incubus of civil and spiritual despotism, to rise

up at once a thriving and accomplished nation. As it is, the genius and enterprise of the land have been developed to an unparalleled degree in the cultivation of the fine arts, which accorded with the spirit of a showy religion, and gave no alarm to tyranny. In architecture, sculpture, painting, music, Dr. Baird exhibits a constellation of great minds, such as adorn the history of no other nation. General education is in its lowest state in Italy. The masses are grossly ignorant, and it is a common thing to find men engaged in profitable business who cannot read; and some that are even in the highest ranks without any knowledge of letters.

“We are not aware that any governments in Italy have established systems of popular education for the instruction, at the public expense, of all classes of youth, save those of Tuscany and the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. In some states nothing whatever, so far as we have been able to learn, that is worthy of mention, has been done by law. We were assured by a distinguished professor, since deceased, of the University of Rome, when we were there for the first time, in 1837, that there was no general public provision for the education of the children throughout his holiness's realm! and that at least two-thirds of them were growing up in complete ignorance of letters. Nor is the state of things, in this respect, any better in the kingdoms of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies.

“In Tuscany and the Austrian Lombardo-Venetian kingdom it is different. In the former the grand duke, who is the most enlightened prince in Italy, has done much for the education of all classes of his subjects. Schools exist in all the principal villages, which are open to all classes. Gratuitous schools, on Thursdays and other holidays, are kept up, in which instruction is given, under the eye of the priests, particularly in the catechism of the Roman Catholic Church. Through the efforts of several benevolent persons at Florence, Pisa, and Leghorn, infant schools have been established in those cities, and maintained, for the most part, by the voluntary gifts of the well-disposed, from the grand duke down to the humblest individual. Several of the schools have been founded for the benefit of the children of the Israelites, who reside in considerable numbers in Tuscany, especially in the last named city.

“In the Austrian dominions in Italy the state of education is better than it is in Tuscany, so far as the lowest classes of the people are concerned. The government of Austria has, for more than a quarter of a century, imbibed the spirit of internal improvement and education which prevails in Germany, and which had its origin in Prussia. Nor is the government of that empire the only Roman Catholic one which has caught the sacred flame. Bavaria, Saxony, France, and, as we have just seen, Tuscany also, have entered upon the same course.

“The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom dates from the year 1814. During the thirty years which have since passed away, the Austrian government has done much for the instruction of all classes of people in this portion of its various dominions. Schools have been established

in all the communes, or townships, as well as in the villages and larger towns. These schools are of two classes, the minor and superior. In the former, the elements of an education—reading, writing, arithmetic, and religious instruction—and in the more advanced classes, Italian grammar, calligraphy, epistolary composition, the first rudiments of the Latin, the history of the Bible, and especially the lessons of the gospel, which occur on Sundays and other festivals, are taught. In the superior schools, which are mostly in the larger villages and towns, instruction is given in the elements of mathematics, geometry in its application to the arts, drawing, architecture, mechanics, geography, physics, and, in some of them, history, book-keeping, chemistry, and the French and German languages. Religious and moral instruction forms a part of every week's studies. This branch of education is intrusted solely to the Roman Catholic clergy. There are schools also for the girls, in which the instruction is adapted to the duties and pursuits of the sex. All the teachers have been trained in normal schools. Excellent moral and sanitary regulations are enforced, and all corporeal punishment is forbidden. Cleanliness, health, and propriety of conduct, are especially attended to, and the practice of every virtue sedulously inculcated."—Pp. 184—187.

The higher institutions of learning—lyceums, colleges, and universities—abound in Italy, but they are behind the age both in the method of communication and in the branches taught. It is the policy to pursue those studies which tend least to a discovery of the real truth of Christianity, and to awaken a spirit of reformation. Latin is studied, Greek and Hebrew neglected. Metaphysics are studied in the obsolete manner of the schoolmen. Casuistry is preferred to the exact sciences, while the modern languages and general geography are kept in the background.

The academies form an exception to this state of the literary institutions. They are designed for investigation and discussion, and have become so popular as to be found in every principal city. The literature of Italy had its Augustan period during the first century of reformation, but afterward declined on account of the wars by which the country was disturbed, the loss of commerce, the depravation of morals, and especially in consequence of the despotic restraints laid upon the press. The present century witnesses a partial revival. In the natural and exact sciences, in history, poetry, political economy, and jurisprudence, Italy has her stars. Manzoni is particularly noticed as "the Sir Walter Scott of that country. He is a universal genius, excelling at once as a philosopher, novelist, dramatist, and lyric poet. In his *Promessi Spori* he has given Italy the most perfect model of an historical romance."

"In the year 1819 a literary journal, entitled the *Conciliatore*, was commenced at Milan, of which Silvio Pellico was editor; and to whose

pages Gioja, Romagnosi, Ressi, Pecchio, the Marquis Hermes Visconti, the Counts dal Pozzo and Giovanni Arrivabene, Rasori, Plana, Carlini, Mussotti, Ugoni, Sclavini Ludovico di Breme, Borsiceni, Maronchelli, and other able writers, contributed. This journal was suppressed by the Austrian government in 1820, and several of its contributors, as well as its editor, were condemned to the prison of Spielberg. And although its career was short, the *Conciliatore* exercised a decidedly happy influence. One of the great objects which its founders had in view, was to infuse a more Christian spirit into the literature of Italy, which had, in fact, for a long time partaken largely of an infidel character. Another, was to promote the regeneration of the country. 'Through this journal,' to use the language of one of their number, 'they hoped to give a new literary direction to the intellect; or, in other words, to restore letters to their pure and primary end; that is to say, to lead to the true by means of the beautiful.' A noble patriotism seems to have actuated this able corps of writers, for they entered at once into admirable plans for promoting education, agriculture, and the useful arts. But, alas, their projects were soon interrupted; and, for indulging in them, some of their little circle were called to long years of cruel suffering in the gloomy dungeons of a prison.

"It is, however, an interesting fact, that both literary and political journals have greatly increased in numbers during the present century, notwithstanding the heavy restrictions on the freedom of the press. Including every description, there are now fully two hundred periodicals, newspapers, magazines, &c., in Italy, and some of them are conducted with much ability, especially those of a purely scientific and literary character."—Pp. 192, 193.

The sacred literature of Italy is comparatively insignificant.

The political condition of Italy is gloomy enough. The last spark of civil liberty quivers alone on the high skirts of the Appenines in the little republic of San Marino. The republican and free cities once flourishing in Italy are among the things that were. The revolutions of time have blended the states together more than formerly, but the consolidation is not favorable to liberty, inasmuch as there is less occasion for collisions, which, in former times, have made some states a refuge from the persecutions of others, and especially of Rome. The best governed state is Tuscany, because the present grand duke, Leopold II., happens to be a man of a liberal and enlightened mind. The estates of the church are cursed with a government which, for 'complicateness, imbecility, expensiveness, irresponsibleness, and whatever else constitutes a bad government, has not a parallel on earth. But there is a redeeming spirit abroad,—an undercurrent already beginning to heave the surface of things.

"In the mean while restlessness prevails almost everywhere. Secret associations ramify throughout the whole country. The *Giovane Italia*

—as the patriotic band of those who seek the deliverance of their country is called—numbers many thousands of members. It holds correspondence with exiled compatriots who reside in Switzerland, France, England, and other lands, and impatiently wait for the day of their country's redemption. That day will come; but those who desire it ought to know, that their efforts should be unremittingly directed toward doing all that is practicable, be it little or be it much, for the moral regeneration of the nation by the grand means which God has appointed, the reading of the sacred Scriptures, and the preaching of the pure gospel.

“Such is the severity of the censorship of the press in Italy, that it is only in indirect ways that the grief as well as the indignation of the oppressed people can find expression. In all periods of the world, the enslaved have had to employ allegory, fable; and apologue, in order to utter those unpalatable truths which they dared not to express plainly. Sometimes ancient events are brought forward to characterize those which are modern, and provoke the needed resistance. Such is the course pursued at present by the enemies of despotism in Italy. Niccolini, in his recent tragedy, entitled *Arnaldo da Brescia*, depicts, in the strongest colors, the corruption and profligacy of the spiritual and temporal powers by which his beautiful country is desolated, while relating the heroic and patriotic conduct, as well as the unfortunate end, of one who resisted tyranny unto death in the twelfth century. He has executed his task with singular ability. Nor will his vivid delineations of the present oppression and insolence of their spiritual and secular tyrants, though he professedly writes of what occurred six hundred years ago, fail to make an enduring impression on the minds of his numerous readers.”—Pp. 197, 198.

Our author defends the character of the native population of Italy from the aspersions of transient visitors, who have described them from a passing glance as indolent and vicious in the extreme. He makes a distinction between *idleness* and *indolence*, and declares that they are idle only through necessity, and not of choice. There is nothing for the beggar to do but to beg. How can it be otherwise in a country where heavy taxes discourage commerce, internal and external, and take away the inducement with the proper reward of mechanical and agricultural enterprise?

State of Religion in Italy since the Reformation.

Under this caption, Dr. Baird gives us a luminous account of the religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church. The old ones were revived and strengthened, and a new one was invented with peculiar adaptation to the emergency created by the Reformation. This was the order of the Jesuits, than which Satan has no greater masterpiece.

“The members of this order were forbidden to seek, or accept, any post of honor in the church, such as the office of a bishop, archbishop,

patriarch, pope, &c. They were not permitted to confess a woman, save in the presence of a third person, who should, however, be a Jesuit. They were not allowed to receive money for saying masses.

“On the other hand, they were permitted to enjoy not only all the rights of the mendicant and secular orders, and be exempt from all supervision of the bishops, and jurisdiction of civil magistrates, so that they should acknowledge no authority but that of the pope and the superiors of their order, but they could also exercise every priestly function, parochial rights notwithstanding, among all classes of men, even during an interdict. They could absolve from all sins and ecclesiastical penalties, change the object of a vow, acquire churches and estates, without Papal sanction; dispense themselves, in certain circumstances, from the observance of canonical hours, fasts, and prohibitions of meals, and even from the use of the breviary. Their general was invested with unlimited power over the members. He could send them on missions of every kind; could appoint professors of theology at his discretion, whenever he chose; and confer academical degrees, which were to be equivalent to those granted by the universities. These privileges secured to the Jesuits a power and an influence incomparably greater than those of any other order, and fitted them for any sort of work. They could mingle with the world as men of the world. They could be agreeable and accommodating confessors at courts, and the companions of the rich and the gay, as well as visit the poor, or carry the banner of the cross to the distant pagans, or undertake the conversion of the most desperate heretics.”—Pp. 222, 223.

The paternity of this marvelous contrivance can be imagined, when we reflect that the idea sprung up in the mind of a Spanish knight, while reading of the exploits of saints, as he was lying in a hospital sick of a wound received at the siege of Pampeluna. Luther caught his inspiration from the Bible, Loyola from a legend of the saints. Over which of these books, think ye, was the Holy Spirit hovering? The Council of Trent, which held its sessions from 1545 to 1563, (eighteen years,) fully settled and canonized all the multifarious errors and superstitions which were the growth of ages, and closing with loud curses upon all heretics, rallied the mighty hosts of Rome to conflict. That fiery organ, the Inquisition, followed next in the train; and civil wars, instigated for the purpose of extinguishing heresy, consummated the dreadful operation. The results are well known. The onward march of reformation was arrested, and thrown back to nearly the limits now marked in the geography of Europe. The following passages will reveal the links which connect the past with the present, and will furnish matter for deep and solemn meditation:—

“Another century passes away and we are brought to the year 1768. And what was then the state of the Protestants and Roman Catholics, relative and positive? Neither the one nor the other had gained much

upon its antagonist. Both had increased, especially in the new world, through the natural increase of the population of the countries in which they predominated. Both were content to maintain the *status quo*, and to consider Protestantism and Romanism to be political rather than religious elements, and only to be taken into account when there was question respecting the balance of power. Both had sunken down into a state of profound apathy. In the Protestant nations of Europe, with the exception of the partial revival of true piety in Great Britain, through the labors of Wesley and Whitefield, and in Germany through those of Francke and Spener, formalism had long prevailed in the churches. In some parts a cold Pelagianism, a lifeless Arianism, and even Deism, had been gaining ground; while in Roman Catholic countries, victory had led to insolence, and finally to carelessness, indolence, and worldliness on the part of the hierarchy. In consequence of this, a general disgust was felt among the higher classes at the doctrines and rites of Rome. Everywhere the way was fast preparing for the outbreak of infidelity and irreligion, which took place a few years later, when the seeds of political liberty which the Reformation had sown, more or less profusely in all Europe, as well as in America, after having long germinated, were about to produce an abundant harvest in both hemispheres.

"The revolution of 1789, in France, gave another dreadful blow to Rome. It was the fourth; but it differed widely from the three which preceded it, for it came from the hands of those who hated Christianity under every name and every form. Twenty-five years of war and revolution ensued, fatal to the interests of vital piety, but fraught with due punishment both to Roman Catholic and Protestant nations for their sins."—Pp. 232, 233.

The regular and secular clergy number about five hundred thousand, and the proportion of consecrated persons, male and female, to the whole population, is as one to forty-five! With such a host of agents one might think Christianity would exhibit the acme of perfection, did not the very fact reveal a corruption of religion. That must be a corrupt religion which separates so many persons from the common pursuits of life. Loaves and fishes without labor will always have a charm for the multitude. That there are many exceptions to this view our author cheerfully concedes. Some of the clergy are both learned and devout, and all the orders have a sprinkling of charity. The body of the priests, and especially the monks, are deeply sunk in ignorance, idleness, and sensuality. The priests, generally, have no acquaintance with the Bible, and it is a rare thing for them to preach a sermon. Many of them are infidels. Saying mass, repeating matins and vespers, hearing confessions, solemnizing marriages, and administering extreme unction, constitute their business. And those who are disposed to labor are sufficiently burdened. In such a state of things it is easy to conjecture the moral condition of the people.

“And what is absolutely confounding is the fact, that in proportion as you approach the city of Rome, come from which end of Italy you may, bad government, physical desolation, poverty, ignorance, irreligion, vice, crime, all increase! And when you reach Rome, and enter within the walls of the eternal city, you will find less of true piety and purity of morals than in any other city in all Christendom, if you may credit the testimony of Romans themselves.

“When we visited Rome, in the year 1837, one of the first things we heard the distinguished individuals, both natives and foreigners, to whom we bore letters of introduction, say, was, that we had come to the worst place within all the limits of the Roman Catholic world to see what religion is. And yet that city is the abode of the so-styled vicar of Christ, the centre of the whole Christian world, the seat of all the mighty influences which the Vatican sends forth throughout the earth! Why is this? We leave to others to assign the reasons, for we cannot, upon the supposition that the Roman Catholic religion is a true type and expression of the gospel.

“As to the alledged immoralities which prevail in Italy, including infidelity to the marriage relation, the absence of domestic happiness in so many families, the want of strict honesty in the business classes, the want of female virtue in the large cities and towns, &c., we will not undertake to speak of them. That there is much vice—less open, indeed, than in most countries, it is true—in Italy, is what is conceded by all. That the state of things is much better in this respect than it was three centuries ago, we seriously doubt. The same superstitions and the same sins prevail now as at the epoch of the Reformation.”—Pp. 256, 257.

Encouraging Signs in Relation to Italy.

Multitudes are growing restless under her spiritual and political despotism—many more are panting for a purer and more spiritual religion—an interest in education is felt by many, especially in Tuscany, and in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom the Holy Scriptures are coming to be read by the better classes, and by communication with Protestant nations through the native Italians abroad in business, or exiled by oppression, Italy is made to feel the impulse of the religious and civil enterprises of the age. In addition to this, there are, at the lowest computation, thirty thousand Protestants every winter visiting the different parts of Italy, and what is more important, is the fact, that these transient inhabitants are allowed to have ministers of their own faith to preach the gospel among them. There are two Protestant chapels at Rome. Outside of the city, near the Poita del Popolo, is the English chapel, in which about five hundred persons, during the winter season, hear the gospel in their own language; and at the residence of the Prussian ambassador, on the Capitoline Hill, is another chapel, in which the services of the Protestant religion are performed, and

the German residents hear the word of life from a faithful and excellent minister. In Naples are two chapels, one for the English, the other for those who speak French or German, which has two ministers attached to it; and connected with the Swiss regiments of the Neapolitan army are two Protestant chaplains. At Messina, in Sicily, are two chapels, one for the English and the other for all who understand French. The English Protestants have service from time to time at Palermo, which is visited by English and Americans engaged in the Italian trade. Leghorn is a free port, and has worship for the English, Germans, French, Swiss, and even for Italians. The Armenians and Greeks also have chapels, the Jews a synagogue, the Turks a mosque. There is a large English chapel in Florence, in which, also, the Swiss and French Protestants have a service. In Venice a Hungarian pastor, Mr. Witchen, is supported by the king of Prussia. At Genoa Protestant services are maintained for the benefit of the English, Prussian, and French residents. The Germans have a chapel at Bergamo; and at Milan the Austrian government has generously allowed a Protestant chapel to be established, to which are attached two pastors, one preaching to the citizens, the other to the soldiers. In the hotel of the Prussian ambassador at Turin is a chapel, in which a service is maintained. At Nice the English have a service, and occasional Protestant worship is observed in Lucca and Sienna, Sorrento and Castellamare.

Our author says :—

“It is a remarkable fact, that several of the Swiss and German ministers who are in Italy had obscure, and some of them very erroneous, views of the gospel when they went thither; but they have been brought to the knowledge of the truth, and made to feel its power, through God’s blessing upon the reading of the sacred Scriptures. Were it proper, we could name some very interesting cases of conversion, which have occurred among these ministers, who, at first, and for many years, preached what was another gospel!

“As to the English chaplains in Italy, while it is to be lamented that there are some among them who do not seem to comprehend the gospel, nor the true work of the ministry, there are some of a very different character. And the reading of the liturgy, where the minister does not comprehend his true mission and office, it is believed, exerts a great influence to keep alive in the hearts of those entering with interest into the service, the knowledge of God and divine things.”—Pp. 280, 281.

Waldenses.

But Protestantism in a more interesting form is found in Italy,—that which has existed from apostolical times in the church of the

Waldenses. They are pent up in a mountainous region by the spurs of the Alps in Piedmont, which is only twenty miles by sixteen in its largest extent, being forbidden by law to extend their domain. Their antiquity is fully proved by tradition, as preserved by themselves and admitted by their enemies; it is recognized by respectable historians and indicated by their language, which, according to M. Renouard, is "an idiom intermediate between the decomposition of the language of the Romans, and the establishment of a new grammatical system;" and by their religion, which is a relict of primitive Christianity. From the beginning they have protested against the corruptions of Papacy, and refused, at every sacrifice, to succumb to it. They have not only kept the lamp of original Christianity lighted at home among the mountains, but by missionaries they have diffused it abroad, and cherished its lingering sparks in almost every nation of Europe. Peter Waldo was a native of Piedmont. "Not only did preachers go out from the valleys to proclaim the glorious gospel, but humble, pious pedlers, or itinerant merchants, of whom there were many in the middle ages, scattered the truth by carrying some leaves of the word of life, or some religious tracts among their merchandise, which they engaged those whom they found to be favorably disposed to receive and read." Furious has been the hostility of Rome against this little flock of the faithful. Crusade after crusade has been instigated against them to the number of thirty-three! Not a peak of their mountains nor a cave in their valleys but is stained with innocent blood. The details of the great persecution of 1655, by the army under the marquis of Pianessa, are shocking. Milton's celebrated ode gives but too faint a view of the horrible scene.

An appeal to the Protestant states was made by the synod as soon as they could gather together, which called forth spirited remonstrances from some Protestant courts, some of whom sent envoys to enforce them. Cromwell, whose character appears better the more it is brought to light, not only sent an envoy to the duke of Savoy, but appointed a day of humiliation and prayer with collections in all the churches for their relief. He also addressed letters to many of the principal powers of Europe, soliciting their assistance, which were promptly responded to with many expressions of indignation at the outrage of humanity in the persons of the Waldenses. The last and most dreadful war was undertaken by the duke of Savoy at the instance and with the aid of the blood-thirsty fanatic, Louis XIV., in 1686, which resulted in the depopulation of the country by murder and exile. The exiles rallied

under the banner of the brave Henri Arnaud three years after, and forced the passage back to their native valleys.

“Upon the downfall of Napoleon, in 1814, the king of Sardinia recovered his ancient dominion, and none of his former subjects gave him a more cordial welcome than the Waldenses, though they had good reason to fear the change. They respectfully and loyally implored his protection. Lord William Bentick, the commander of the British forces in Italy, also interposed in their behalf; but it was in vain. The congress of Vienna made no effectual provision for the protection of these people in their rights. Lord Castlereagh, whose duty it was to look after this matter, was wholly indifferent to it. He did not even return an answer to the address of the deputy whom they sent to Vienna. The consequence was, what had been foreseen and feared by many, the ancient dynasty brought back all its bigotry, its subserviency to Rome, and its injustice toward the poor Waldenses. And though no persecution has taken place, yet there has been no year since in which these people have not been oppressed in one way or another. At this moment, they are not allowed to acquire or hold property beyond the ancient limits; they are prohibited from physicians, surgeons, and advocates, though they may be apothecaries and counselors in their own valleys; they are forced to serve as soldiers, and about forty of their young men enter the army as conscripts every year, but they cannot rise above the rank of serjeant; they are not allowed to work on the Romish holydays; their pastors, instead of receiving fourteen hundred francs each from the government, as in Napoleon's time, receive but five hundred, and that by means of a tax levied upon their people; they may neither build churches nor parsonages without special permission, and this it is often difficult to obtain; they are not allowed to have a printing-press in their valleys, nor to print anything within the kingdom, while the duties on books from abroad are enormous; they cannot prevent a Catholic priest from coming into their houses and trying to convert their children, if the boys have reached twelve, and the girls ten years of age; they can buy no land from a Catholic living in the midst of them, though the Catholic may buy theirs; it is death for them to proselyte a Catholic, though every encouragement is held out for their conversion to Romanism; and lastly, they are not allowed to intermarry with the Roman Catholics.—Pp. 364, 365.

The number of Roman Catholics is about four thousand; of Protestants, twenty-two thousand.

The author made a visit to the valleys in 1837, and another in 1843. His description of the aspects of the country and its inhabitants is lively,—but his description of the church is most interesting to us. The pastors are intelligent, laborious, and faithful. Their parishes are large in geographical extent, and in most the people are scattered widely, and in places difficult of access in the winter season.

“As to the style of preaching which prevails in these valleys, it is simple, affectionate, and persuasive, rather than powerful and exciting. Nevertheless, there are some ministers among them who have energy enough. They commonly write their sermons, and commit them to memory. In no case do they read their discourses; to this the people are strongly and universally opposed. Almost invariably the mode of conducting public worship is this: the regent, or teacher of the chief parish-school, which is always held in the village where the church of the parish stands, commences the service by reading two or three chapters from Ostervald's French Bible. At the end of each, he reads the practical observations which are contained in the old folio edition of that excellent translation. After half an hour has been spent in that way, and when the people are well assembled, the pastor ascends the pulpit and commences with a short invocation of the divine blessing, according to words of the liturgy which is in use in the Waldensian churches. After this he calls upon the people to listen with attention to the ten commandments, and the summary thereof given by the Saviour. Then follows what is called the ‘confession of sins,’ which is the same that is found in the liturgies of the French and Swiss churches. Next follows the singing of a psalm, in which the whole congregation join. A prayer of considerable length succeeds, taken from the liturgy commonly, though it is optional with the pastors, as it is with those in France and Switzerland, to make an extemporaneous prayer in place of the one in the book, if they prefer to do so. Then comes the sermon; which is followed by the singing of a psalm or hymn. Next there is a prayer from the liturgy, which is pretty rigidly adhered to. This prayer embraces the petitions for the king, royal family, government, church universal, and their own churches in particular, the afflicted, &c. This prayer is followed by the recital of the Lord's prayer, and the Apostles' Creed. A few verses are then sung, and the Aaronic benediction is pronounced.”—Pp. 382, 383.

The polity of the Waldensian church very nearly resembles the Presbyterian. There is a consistory in each church, consisting of the pastor, elders, deacons, and legal adviser. The next court is the Table or Board, consisting of three pastors and two laymen, elected by the synod and charged with the execution of its decrees and a general supervision of the pastors and churches.

“The synod embraces all the regular pastors and professors in the college who are ministers, the pastor-chaplain at Turin, and two elders as deputies from each parish. Besides these, superannuated pastors and candidates of theology may attend and speak, but not vote. The two elders from each parish have but one vote. The intendant of Pignerol, with his secretary, attends, not as a member, but to see that nothing shall be done which might injure the cause of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the synod confine itself to the subjects specified in the petition addressed to the government, asking leave to hold the present meeting.”—Pp. 387, 388.

“There is nothing in the organization or action of these churches, that in the slightest degree savors of prelacy. And in answer to our inquiries on this subject, the pastors have, without exception, stated that prelacy has never existed in the valleys; and that such has ever been the uniform opinion of their ancestors, so far as it has been handed down to them. As to the bishops spoken of in some of their early writings, they believe that they were nothing more than pastors. They say, what is undeniable, that their histories speak continually of their *barbes*, as being their religious teachers and guides, but that the word bishop is hardly ever met with.”—Pp. 389, 390.

In doctrine the Waldenses are Calvinists. The synod at Angrona, in 1535, adopted a creed of which the following are articles:—

“All that have been, or shall be, saved, were elected by God before all worlds.”

“They who are saved cannot miss of salvation.”

“Whosoever maintaineth free-will, wholly denieth predestination, and the grace of God.”—P. 395.

The other sixteen articles are such as we consider sound doctrine, and are decidedly anti-Papal. They will not acknowledge the name of Protestants, for they say they never were a part of the Roman Church. Our author speaks in the highest terms of the general morality of the inhabitants, not believing “it possible to find another community, of the same extent, which is equally virtuous.”

For purposes of education they have a college, a grammar school, and one hundred and fifty common schools. Funds for these have been raised in England by Rev. Mr. Sims, Dr. Gilly, and the excellent Colonel Beckwith, who, with singular benevolence, has adopted the country and devoted himself, his influence, and property, to its interests. The Waldenses are suffering under great political injustice. Yet they can bear it with meekness. Dr. Baird says:—

“In our interviews with the Waldensian pastors, we were struck with the kindness of feeling which they manifested in relation to their king. And many things, which they stated to us, certainly prove that he is not wanting in a disposition to do them justice. He has ever been ready to contribute to relieve those who have suffered from fire or any other calamity. When approached, privately, he has always granted the requests which these people have made. He has been disposed to suffer the severe edicts, published against them in former times, to remain unexecuted whenever he could. The Waldenses believe, that if he could have his own way, he would be everything that they could desire. But, poor man, there is a *power behind the throne*, in the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which he dares not provoke, for it is too powerful for him to resist. But whatever goes wrong, the Waldenses, with a charity which is certainly very lovely and very remarkable, are not

willing to believe that the king is the author of it, or that, if he knows it, he can prevent it."—Pp. 410, 411.

In conclusion, our author challenges the sympathies of their Protestant brethren in America for the Waldenses, and solicits means to supply them with libraries, to repair their churches, and to employ more ministers. Who would not feel it an honor to contribute something to preserve and increase this real remnant of the apostolical church?

In conclusion, we will remark that we have taken a ramble through this work, connecting the chief points of the history by the main thread of events, not so much for the purpose of making a critique upon it, as to excite an interest in the work of evangelization in the heart of the Romish empire, and to start an inquiry, What more shall be done for Italy?

The Foreign Evangelical Society will doubtless do something in aid of the Waldenses, and the "Christian Alliance" will devote itself principally to the interests of Italians; but is there nothing for the Missionary Society of the M. E. Church to do in this field? Is it not time that we should strike out for ourselves some part in the great work of restoring the gospel to those lands where it was first preached? It may be objected, we have no means. Let there be a call for special gifts for this purpose—the graduates of our colleges, if called upon, would furnish the means out of their own pockets. Moreover, a judicious enlargement of the missionary field will swell the amount of missionary feeling in the church, and so increase rather than diminish the capital. We need variety to stimulate every mind and to keep up the tone of interest. Scholars, particularly, will be more interested in reports from Italy, or any country bordering on the Mediterranean, than any other part of the world. It is true the American continent has a first claim—Africa next; but we must send our apostles to China—and Europe, especially classic Europe, must not be neglected, and least of all Rome. Shall we not say with Paul, "I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome also?"

T.

Chelsea, Mass.

- ART. II.—1. *Travels in North America in the Years 1827 and 1828.* By CAPT. BASIL HALL, R. N. Phila.: Carey, Lea & Carey. 1829.
2. *Domestic Manners of the Americans.* By MRS. TROLLOPE. London: printed for Whittaker, Treacher & Co. 1832.
3. *Men and Manners in America.* By the Author of Cyril Thornton, &c. Phila.: Carey, Lea & Blanchard. 1833.
4. *A Subaltern's Furlough.* By E. T. COKE, Lieut. of the 45th Regiment. New-York: J. & J. Harper. 1833.
5. *Society in America.* By HARRIET MARTINEAU, Author of "Illustrations of Political Economy." New-York: Saunders & Otley. 1837.
6. *Retrospect of Western Travel.* By HARRIET MARTINEAU. London: Saunders & Otley. 1838.
7. *A Diary in America; with Remarks on its Institutions.* By CAPT. MARRYAT, C. B. Phila.: Carey & Hart. 1839.
8. *Second Series of a Diary in America.* By CAPT. MARRYAT, C. B. Phila.: T. K. & P. G. Collins. 1840.
9. *American Notes for general Circulation.* By CHAS. DICKENS. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1842.

"An energetic and enterprising people," observeth the sage Capt. Marryat, "are naturally anxious for an investigation into cause and effect; a search into which is, after all, nothing but curiosity well directed: and the most curious of all men is the philosopher. Curiosity, *therefore*, becomes a virtue, or a small vice, according to the use made of it."

If this remark be correct, we infer that the British public must be particularly given to philosophical research, or they must include inquisitiveness among their easily besetting sins. Since the close of the last war, not a year has past during which there have not been divers tourists, duly equipped for the work, traversing our land for something wherewith to ravish the curious ears of their countrymen at home. Their efforts have been distinguished by the most commendable activity and perseverance. In the ardor of their search, they have hunted through every town, scaled every mountain, and sailed up every river. Nor have they been less active mentally than physically. Nothing can exceed the celerity with which they reason upon the marvels that met their eyes during their wanderings. They pass from a particular to a general with a careless ease, well calculated to astonish the timid logician; and,

with daring agility, leap from premises to conclusions, which, to common eyes, seem separated by an impassable gulf. Such gigantic labors could not go unrewarded. Some travelers, indeed, have returned to their own land under the impression that we enjoy a degree of freedom and happiness; and that we are destined, from our native energy of character, and our favorable position among the nations, to exert some influence upon the future destiny of the world. But others have been so fortunate as to escape all these delusions, and have assured their countrymen, that, under the combined influence of climate and republican institutions, we are rapidly decreasing in mental, moral, and physical stature, and are already far below the nations of Europe. Indeed, the dolorous reflections of some would almost lead us to imagine that the Americans have so deplorably degenerated, that in a few years they will be able to boast a "re-annexation" of the appendage with which Lord Monboddo supposed that the whole human race had once been adorned.

There have been tourists, however, who have been tolerably free from what we are led, possibly by our own predilections, to condemn as prejudices. Being men of enlarged minds, they have looked upon us with the eye of the philosopher. Not expecting absolute perfection in any nation, they have not been surprised to find that republicanism does not save from all the ills that flesh is heir to, and that America is not an Eden where primeval innocence holds sway, and beauty and happiness without alloy bloom upon every cheek and light every eye. What they deemed commendable, they have praised without reluctance; what they considered reprehensible, they have condemned without fear: and we honor them for their liberality and honesty. We confess that we have national faults, and we will not be indignant because foreigners can detect them as well as ourselves. Let us listen to all just criticism, and lift our eyes to the heights yet unattained, instead of being wholly absorbed in admiration of our present position.

But most of those travelers who have seen fit to give the world the benefit of their lucubrations have been those who had some ulterior object in view. Their hearts were fully set in them to make a book; and the great inquiry has been for the vendible, rather than the true. And the strong curiosity of the English public has afforded ample opportunity for writers of almost any calibre to strike a blow for fame and profit. These small gentry go up and down our land noting petty incidents, and gathering up fragments of gossip, of which the forth-coming volumes are to be fabricated. The greatest economy is employed in the consumption of material,

The number of smokers in the tap-room of an inn furnishes a paragraph; a dinner, underdone, or overdone, fills a page; and a jaunt to some unknown village, where they see nothing, is swelled into a chapter. Anything that will attract notice adds to the success of their performance. And, therefore, knowing the sensitiveness of some of the less considerate Americans, and the jealousy of the less liberal English, they season very highly with sneer, sarcasm, and malignant misrepresentation.

We are not at all offended when they declare their preference for their native land. The affections are not the creation of mere reason; they wait not for the labored deductions of the intellect, but spring up fresh and pure from the well of the heart. Men love their children, their native village, their country,—not because these are all perfect in their kind, but because to love them belongs to nature. The mother is not called upon to check the emotions of parental tenderness, until she has compared her child with those of her neighbors, and ascertained that its superiority absolutely demands her preference. Nor is she compelled, in order to justify her admiration of its person, to prove that its features are molded in accordance with Hogarth's line of beauty, and that all its attitudes are governed by the line of grace. A man may have some regard for himself, without proving his way with that logical accuracy which

“Can distinguish and divide
A hair 'twixt south and south-west side.”

And, indeed, we have often admired the kind provision of nature, who, whenever she is rather parsimonious in the allotment of her gifts, generally *compensates* the deficiency, as Paley would express it, by bestowing upon the individual a degree of self-complacency sufficient to keep him in blissful ignorance of his inferiority. And when we see a man thus well pleased with what nature has given, we do not feel like bringing him down from his exaltation by any skeptical remark, but would rather take him by the hand and congratulate him most fervently upon the exceedingly comfortable opinion he entertains of his own abilities. Still, when we see men, or nations, cherishing so exalted a degree of ill-natured vanity as to lead them to exult perpetually in their immeasurable pre-eminence above all others, we cannot but regard it as a lamentable perversion of the bounties of Providence.

This last remark is in some degree applicable to certain travelers who have condescended to sojourn for a time upon this side of the Atlantic. The Halls, the Trollopes, and the Marryats, seem gifted

with an inverse mental alchemy which transmutes all our republican gold into dross. But there have been writers upon America, compared with whom Hall was a Bacon, and Marryat an Aristides. A certain M. De Paw, a Prussian, among other absurdities, great and small, states, with all gravity, that in this country "the *dogs* suffer so much under the deteriorating influence of the climate that they lose the power of barking;" and he gives us to understand that its influence is full as deleterious upon man. Some infamous "notes by the way" have been written, like Ashe's "Travels through America," under the combined pressure of poverty and a lack of honest employment.* The worst of the works mentioned at the head of this article may be ranked among the better sort of descriptions of our land. Some of them are extremely defective, but their very defects are exalted into positive excellences, when compared with those of certain others, to one or two of which we have already alluded. But let us notice them more particularly.

Capt. Hall landed at New-York in 1827, traveled through the state to Canada, returned through New-England, visited Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and Charleston; journeyed through Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, ascended the great river to Cincinnati, crossed the Alleghanies to New-York, and returned to England after an absence of fifteen months, "having traveled eight thousand eight hundred miles without meeting with the slightest accident." The worthy captain was a stout English tory; and in this journey among the republicans, a great many wondrous things greeted his loyal eyes, whereon he expends much sage remark. His reasonings, so unutterably grave and profound, are the most amusing part of the work. Occasionally, he sets out with correct premises, and, by some rare good fortune, arrives at a correct conclusion. But most commonly, whenever republicanism is involved in his reasonings, he either comes to conclusions at variance with his premises, or draws inferences which have no visible connection

* A curious fact, which is given in the published correspondence of Lord Byron, sheds light upon the origin of this libelous publication. Ashe wrote to Byron,—alleging that want had driven him thus to prostitute his pen, and expressing his desire of gaining a livelihood honestly,—and asked for some pecuniary aid to enable him to carry his repentant schemes into effect. The great poet had compassion upon him, and offered the gift of £150, which Murray was to dole out at the rate of £10 a month. He also gives the famished author a little good advice:—"Whatever may be your situation, I cannot but commend your resolution to abjure and abandon the publication and the composition of works such as those to which you have alluded. Depend upon it, they amuse *few*, disgrace both *reader* and *writer*, and benefit *none*."

with them. Still, the captain has hardly, as yet, received his just due with us. He has some excellences as well as many faults. It is true, he is a stout tory, and travels through our land, as good Calvinistic Dr. Scott travels through the Scriptures, with his creed ever before his eyes. Yet, with all this, there is a certain *bon-homie* apparent, which goes far to disarm resentment. He is never out of humor with the republicans, his prejudices in favor of royalty being a shield through which no dart could reach him. There is a degree of self-complacency which borders upon the sublime; and the captain was evidently blessed with it. The convictions of other minds never troubled his peace. Very few men are perfectly sane upon all subjects; and his hallucination was upon the subject of democracy: but he was a harmless lunatic. He never willfully distorts facts, but contents himself with reasoning upon what he sees, till he loses himself in a fog of his own creation. His compassion is worthy of all praise. When he deems himself called upon to make an assertion which he supposes may wound our vanity, he does not inflict it at once, with malignant cagerness, as some others, but prepares the reader for it by a dull preface, which, the first time it occurs, amuses by its solemn commonplaces. The great fault of his style is prolixity; and these long, prosy preliminaries have a wonderfully sedative effect upon the reader. Like the manipulations of Mesmeric surgery, they seem designed by the benevolent captain to induce a state of happy insensibility to the pain of the operation.

Some of his statements are rather remarkable. He assures his readers that the Americans are a very grave, formal race of men, versatile and energetic, but eternally immersed in elections and litigation. He also states that we are most deplorably given to the use of intoxicating liquors. But he had the rare sagacity to discover the cause of this latter evil.

“Dram-drinking has been called the natural child and the boon-companion of democracy; and is probably not less hurtful to health of body, than that system of government appears to be to the intellectual powers.”

He expounds the rationale of the matter thus:—

“In a country where all effective power is placed in the hands of the lowest class of the community, the characteristic habits of that class must of necessity predominate.”—Vol. i, p. 261.

Here he takes it for granted that the majority which rules must include the lowest class, and be composed principally of that class: and his discovery resolves itself into this:—The characteristic

habits of the majority must predominate ;—whatever is, is. But we must not lay violent hands upon this exquisite specimen of reasoning, or insinuate that his facts are apocryphal. To refute the arguments of the sage captain would be as great an insult to our readers, as it would be to explain his witticisms. We may add, however, that this is a tolerably fair example of the style in which he pack-saddles our system of government, and piles on all inanner of enormities.

Mrs. Trollope, upon whom so many anathemas have been expended, arrived in this country about six months after the arrival of Capt. Hall, and remained here between three and four years. She first landed with her family at New-Orleans, where she remained a few days, and made sundry observations upon the manners and customs of the people, neither of which proved remarkably agreeable to her taste. Thence she sailed up the river to Cincinnati, where she commenced the great work which she came to achieve,—the establishment of a bazaar; or, as it is called in the Yankee vulgate, a fancy-store. She first erected a building, which Mr. Hamilton describes as a Græco-Moresco-Gothic-Chinese structure. Capt. Marryat, after an attentive survey of this extraordinary apparition, pronounced it of that “order of architecture which may be styled the preposterous.” The bazaar was finally completed and went into operation. In the mean time Mrs. Trollope was exploring the city and the regions round about, gathering the materials for her description of the “Domestic Manners of the Americans.” She found her residence among the “free-borns” anything but agreeable. The streets were muddy and filled with swine, living and dead. The people were all ignorant and boorish, the women being very childish and pious, and the men “redolent of whisky and onions.” Moreover, she was “taken sick, as the Americans call being unwell,” and when somewhat convalescent, had an opportunity of testing the relative worth of English and American literature. She read the whole of Cooper’s novels. The consequence was an immediate relapse, and an “additional ounce of calomel hardly sufficed to neutralize the effect of these raw-head and bloody-bones adventures.” Then a “happy thought struck her,” and she read the whole series of the Waverley novels, as the next prescription—not a homœopathic dose, certainly. She immediately began to recover: the “wholesome vigor of every page seemed to communicate itself to her nerves,” and “when it was over she had the pleasure of finding that she could walk half-a-dozen yards at a time.”

When she recovered, she was greeted with the fact that the

bazaar speculation was a hopeless affair, and must be abandoned. The cause of the failure is not given; but the truth of the case is, Mrs. Trollope's eldest son, who was the manager of the business department, was, in accordance with Capt. Hall's theory, overcome by the powerful influence of republican institutions! She therefore left Cincinnati in March, 1830, crossed the Alleghanies to Maryland, traveled through the northern and eastern states, and at the expiration of about a year returned to England and published her book. The work shows her by no means destitute of talent. There is a ready command of language—of plain, nervous Saxon—which is a merit in a literary point of view. Its defects are moral, rather than intellectual. Like Miss Martineau, Mrs. Trollope possesses wit, and a keen perception of the ridiculous; but she uses her powers to annoy rather than to please. In fact, she is a Martineau after the acetous fermentation. She adores England, and looks upon America with a sort of cool, malignant, fiendish scorn; we would set her down as the very incarnation of Johnson's idea of a good hater. We are very forcibly reminded of the "stupid, bigoted contempt of everything foreign," which a certain countryman of Mrs. Trollope, traveling in the Levant, declares characteristic of English *servants*. There are descriptions, absolutely beyond belief, of scenes which our fair author alledges that she saw with her own eyes; such, for instance, as the account of the "revival" in the "principal Presbyterian church in Cincinnati." But with all her faults, she told us some truths which we would do well to heed. Her charges are, at times, like her favorite department of literature, founded on fact, and are but caricatures of evils that have a real existence. And, in fine, we conclude, that had the gimcracks and confections gone off better in the bazaar speculation, this book would never have been written, or would have been very different in its tone.

A few months before the western hemisphere was deprived of the presence of this amiable lady, another hunter after foreign marvels arrived in the person of Mr. T. Hamilton. Like his illustrious predecessor, he was given to dreams and works of imagination; but he was a producer as well as a consumer. He had already written his "Cyril Thornton." Mrs. Trollope did not make any attempt, we believe, till her volume of travels was given to the public. She then published the "Refugee in America," in which she dispenses her sarcasm and bitter ridicule with all the ardor and liberality of one who has just discovered her *forte*, and is fully resolved to make the most of it.

Mr. Hamilton manifests some anxiety to impress the world with

the important fact that he considers himself a gentleman. He may have been one in conventionals, for aught we know, but he gives rather equivocal proof of his being endowed with any extraordinary elevation of mind. Like Capt. Hall, he views everything with loyal optics; but he shows a recklessness of assertion not very creditable in one of such lofty pretensions as he puts forth. He had a very important end in view. He had heard certain ignorant men in the reformed parliament quote the experience of the United States, as furnishing precedents for English legislation; and he then "certainly did feel that another work on America was yet wanted." And, moreover, he certainly did feel that he, T. Hamilton, Esq., was the gentleman destined to furnish this desideratum. He tells us that the Americans are fast degenerating; their government is an utter failure, and there is nothing upon which to rest a hope for its permanence. Our congressmen are not gentlemen; and our citizens are entirely absorbed in business, politics, and tobacco. The New-Englanders, in particular, "are not an amiable people." "Nature, in forming a Yankee, seems to have given him double brains and half a heart." We are generally afflicted with various minor defects. We are inordinately vain, and should bless our protective vanity, even as Sancho Panza pronounces a benediction upon the man who first invented sleep. Our ladies are very beautiful,—till the age of one or two-and-twenty. The gentlemen are "somewhat slouching in gait," "very expeditious bolters of dinner," and talk politics evermore in a tone of voice "partaking of a snivel and a drawl, by no means laudable on the score of euphony."

However, he was not willing to incur the displeasure of the Americans by a public expression of his opinions concerning them, until driven to it by pure love of country. And even now he is, doubtless, comforting himself with the sublime assurance, that he has shed a deluge of information upon many abstruse questions in political economy, and thereby turned multitudes of deluded liberals from the error of their ways. He confesses that his strictures are calculated to offend, but pleads patriotism in extenuation; and if his country is in as sore need of such a libel upon free institutions as he seems to imagine, let us verily don the panoply for which he so commends us, and bear his castigations with all long-suffering and patience.

A short time after the departure of the patriotic Mr. Hamilton, another writer of travels came over the wide ocean to look upon the "free-borns." This was Lieut. Coke of the British army. This gentleman is a very poetical personage; and each successive chapter is ushered in with a grand flourish of trumpets from Shakspeare,

Pope, or Byron. Although he is not so extremely careful to impress us with the extraordinary fact of his being a gentleman, as the patriotic, single-minded Mr. Hamilton, he shows that he possesses much more of the reality. Perhaps he writes in better style, because he is not burdened with the consciousness that he carries with him the fate of the new parliament. At all events, he does not possess in the same degree the "stupid, bigoted contempt for everything foreign." This book, upon the whole, is a very entertaining one, written in good temper and tolerably good style.

Miss Harriet Martineau, a very philosophic lady, arrived in this country in 1834, and remained two years. On her return she published her adventures and reflections in two different works, which she entitles, "Views of Society in America," and "Retrospect of Western Travel." These are, in general, very favorable to the Americans; and perhaps that is the reason why we think them the most correct and interesting of our array of delineations of American character. She, too, traveled with her theory before her eyes. But her system was one of mildness and benevolence. It may be well described by one of her own expressive phrases,— "heart-faith in man." She, indeed, pushed her theory to an extreme, which reminds us of the fantasies of the French declaimers during the great Revolution: but in her, the only result was to cause her to feel an intense joy in all that was commendable in man, and to look with the utmost tenderness upon his frailties. Although a most decided ultraist in abolition principles, she indulges in none of the fierce denunciation which has distinguished some of her associates in opinion. She had the good fortune to discover that her theory, touching the dignity of human nature and the value of human happiness, was susceptible of being applied to the master, as well as the slave,—a fact which some of our reformers seem, in some cases, rather to overlook. And with all her predilection for traversing the debateable regions of political science, Miss Martineau preserved the freshness of the kindly affections; and she appears equally in her element when discussing her free-trade principles with grave senators, or preparing a German Christmas-tree for the gratification of the youthful members of her friend's family.

The next year after her return to England, our country was honored with a visit of one who possessed not a tithe of the talent of his feminine predecessor. This new explorer of republicanism was Capt. Marryat, the author of divers coarse, vulgar, ninth rate works of fiction. In defiance of all effort to be charitable, we cannot but deem his work a very inferior performance. His style is

beneath criticism; his affectation of candor and truth is beneath contempt; and his reasoning is but a degree or two above that heard in the idiot ward of an asylum. He commences his work with a long disquisition upon books of travels in general, and discourses right eloquently, as he thinks, upon their manifold errors, intimating that he will most assuredly avoid them. On the last page of the former "series" he recurs to the same subject, and informs us that his determination to set down naught in malice, or carelessly, had been strictly carried out; and that he had "not written one line without deliberation and examination." After such magnanimous flourishes as these, the expectations of the reader are justly raised; but he will find the work a worthless affair, without anything original except some new follies. To those who have read the work that heads our list, we may describe Capt. Marryat by saying, that he is a very diminutive Capt. Hall, conscience being subtracted, and a very coarse comic almanac added. He offends against good taste continually; he contradicts all matter of fact, and ends by contradicting his own words. This last, however, is of little moment, as no one will, in any case, receive statements upon his mere assertion. Those who have had the misfortune to read his nautical stories, will recollect his continual ribaldry and profanity. Yet his longest chapter in the first two volumes is upon "Religion in America,"—an instance of unparalleled effrontery since Barère wrote his pious meditations on the Psalms, and Abner Kneeland published his edition of the Greek Testament. He remarks, by the way, that Methodism is "the most pure, most mild, and most simple of all the creeds professed;"—a commendation which we can quote from him, without leading, as far as the sin of vanity is concerned, the most bigoted of our readers into temptation. A modern Democritus, however, may find some amusement in his philosophic speculations. Here is the result of his investigation into the causes of the too general use of spirituous liquors in America:—

"I think that the *climate* is the occasion of two bad habits to which the Americans are prone, namely, the use of tobacco and of spirituous liquors. The system being depressed by the sudden changes, demands stimulus to equalize the pulse."—Vol. ii, pp. 208–9.

"In fact, the climate is one of *extreme excitement*. I had not been a week in the country, before I discovered how impossible it was for a foreigner to drink as much wine or spirits as he could in England."—P. 206.

The exquisite absurdity of this specimen of dialectics would lead us, did it not involve a Hibernicism, to imagine that these passages

were penned before the redoubtable captain discovered the disagreeable necessity of reducing his spirit rations. He also "unhesitatingly pronounces the climate bad," being "enervating to the body;" and then tells his readers in another place, that "there certainly is a most remarkable energy in the American disposition."

The Americans must, indeed, be men of a most marvelous construction, if the material and the immaterial parts of their natures are entirely independent of each other. In most other lands, we believe that the soul and the body possess some reciprocal influence.

However, we do not wish it understood that Capt. Marryat never arrives at a correct conclusion. We have, in at least one instance, a display of astonishing logical acumen. He was conversing with a Canadian settler who had been unused to labor, and who pointed out to him an enormous tree, which had just been felled, as a demonstration of his skill in woodcraft. Capt. Marryat's companion inquired if he had cut it down himself. The reply was that he "had cut through the north half, while his boys cut through the south." The acute captain straightway fell to reasoning upon the matter; his premise being the important fact that two boys, aged thirteen and fourteen years, had cut half through the tree. His powers did not fail him at this crisis: after due meditation, he arrives at a conclusion which he delivers with the most ponderous gravity:—

"This was really astonishing: for if the two boys had cut through half the tree, it is evident that they could have cut it down altogether."—Vol. i, p. 180.

The sagacious captain makes many discoveries in his exploring expedition among the republicans. He ascertained that our climate is "demoralizing," and that our government is "demoralizing" also, producing dueling, avarice, irreligion, and a multitude of other evils; and he then gives his opinion, that "democracy is the form of government best suited to the present condition of America." He also discovers another thing which had escaped his worthy predecessors. "There is no theatre in Connecticut. The consequence is, that Connecticut is the dullest, most disagreeable state in the Union."—Vol. i, p. 122. But it is needless to multiply quotations. The truth is, that Capt. Marryat took advantage of the public thirst for information concerning America, and attempted to palm off a worthless book upon his countrymen;—for he kindly tells us that he is not writing to be read here, but at home. To sum up the character of this work, we can say that the original part of it is

a compound of the reasoning of the nursery, and the wit and refinement of the galleys.

In the year 1842 we were honored with a flying visit from another of the scribbling fraternity. "Having pumped his imagination dry," as somebody remarks, Mr. Charles Dickens came to America to lay in a new store of material for future use. That there are some excellences in the productions of this author, no judge of nervous English can deny. He writes with all the strength of that most unpoetical of men, Wm. Cobbett, without any of his boorish coarseness. And this particular work is not without some excellences. Some passages are written with much force, and the general style is by no means devoid of beauty. There is, moreover, an exquisite vein of wide humanity running through his work; and this, we confess, we hold in high estimation. Still, we cannot say that these "Notes" deserve a very high place among works of a similar class. If we were to estimate Mr. Dickens from this work alone, we would pronounce him a man of narrow capacity. He is too much absorbed in the contemplation of petty matters. He dedicates his book "to those of his friends in America who can bear the truth:"—an announcement which, after reading the work, one hardly knows how to understand. The reader finds very little truth that was worth the telling, and his mind wavers between the conviction that this formal dedication is an example of cool effrontery, and the suspicion that it is an instance of the grave facetiousness for which the style of Mr. Dickens is noted. He is not the man to furnish an instructive book of travels. A calm, judicious portrayal of society can hardly be expected of an author who has applied all his mental energies to the setting forth of caricatures. It would be more rational to look for a perfect portrait from Cruikshank, than a just description of every-day life, and every-day people, from the pen of Dickens. He wields the wand of a magician, but his magic circle is a very small one. In his tour, he views everything through a Bozzian atmosphere. He wanders about among the people, but never witnesses an ordinary scene, or hears an ordinary conversation. All is strained and unnatural. And it is questionable whether he does not describe the swine as possessing more intelligence than the people. Indeed, these fascinating brutes were honored with much of his attention; upon them he cast the pearls of his eloquence, and for their misfortunes he cherished a deep and lively sympathy. We should judge from his "Notes," that he followed them from street to street, conjecturing their profound meditations, admiring their joyous gambols, and treasuring up the precious memorabilia of their history. However, it is hoped

that none will construe these remarks into a censure on Mr. Dickens for turning his attention to those trivial matters which would have escaped the notice of most men. No such censure is intended. Indeed, we consider it highly commendable in an author to choose a subject perfectly suited to his taste and capacity.

And we are not sure but that an apology may be made for him upon good classic authority. If he directed his attention first to the brutes of a city, and then looked upon the more rational inhabitants thereof, he was certainly following most strictly the example of the incensed Apollo, when he descended from high Olympus to avenge the wrongs of his Chryses.

Οὐρήας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπόχετο καὶ κυνασ ἀργούς.*

Even his allusions to his notable boots remind us very forcibly of οἱ εὐκνημίδες Ἀχαιοὶ.†

In all candor, we must confess that the book falls far below what our expectations had at first been. We do not complain of his strictures upon our national short-comings, although with regard to some evils he does not manifest any great degree of discrimination, and some others he denounces with much severity. The great defect of Mr. Dickens is a certain contractedness of intellect, which incessantly leads him into distorted representations of petty scenes and tedious lamentations over petty grievances. It is emphatically a book of little things.

But in order to learn the degree of importance which should be attached to the commendations or the denunciations of individual tourists, the proper mode would be to compare their statements and conclusions. It may cause some surprise to those who have been accustomed to place much value upon the remarks of foreigners, touching our manners, customs, and country, to learn that there is hardly a subject, great or small, upon which these sapient sight-seers do not differ as widely as the poles. Let us make this comparison. In selecting our field of observation, we will not inquire into the deep under-currents of national character, but choose those things which lie upon the surface, and which we would imagine could be decided almost with a single glance. The first thing which attracts the notice of a traveler is the general appear-

* "He twang'd his deadly bow,
And hissing fly the feather'd fates below,
On mules and dogs the infection first began,
And last the vengeful arrows fix'd in man."

† "The Greeks renown'd, as Homer writes,
For well-soled boots, as well as fights."

ance of the country through which he journeys. The ordinary consistency of our tourists upon this point may be illustrated by the following examples:—

“A more unpicturesque country is hardly to be found anywhere than America.”—*Hall*, vol. i, p. 134.

“Who is it that says America is not picturesque? I forget, but surely he never traveled from Utica to Albany.”—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 315.

“The traveler may well be excused for saying, again and again, that the Hudson River can be surpassed by none outside of Paradise.”—*Ibid.*, p. 320.

“I was disappointed: the highlands, taken separately, have nothing interesting; and no single reach of the river possesses any particular beauty.”—*Coke*, vol. ii, p. 166.

Here is certainly quite an amusing medley upon a subject which, we would think, does not admit of much contrariety of opinion, or require much depth of discernment. Let us see whether the great river of the west fares any better than the Hudson.

“There is grandeur in the scene.”—*Hall*, vol. ii, p. 281.

“Most certainly the Mississippi has neither beauty nor grandeur.”—*Hamilton*, vol. ii, p. 98.

“The hateful Mississippi—what words shall describe the great father of waters, who (praise be to Heaven) has no young children like him! An enormous ditch, running liquid mud six miles an hour!”—*Dickens*, p. 64.

“If there be an excess of mental luxury in this life, it is surely in a voyage up the Mississippi in the bright and leafy month of June.”—*Miss Martineau's Retrospect*, vol. ii, p. 25.

If these lucid remarks have enabled the reader to form some idea of the style in which tourists pass judgment upon American scenery, we will proceed to consult them touching the race of human beings that dwell upon these strange shores. They describe them as an amalgam of the most incongruous traits of character. Here is a description of the mood in which brother Jonathan listens to the critical lowings of his bovine visitors:—

“I must do the Americans the justice to say, that they invariably took my remarks in good part, though my opinions, I could see, were often not very flattering.”—*Hall*, vol. i, p. 12.

“Never was there so extremely sensitive a person as brother Jonathan. He lashes himself into a violent rage, if any one doubts that his own dear land is not the abode of *all* that is estimable. Mere approval will not do for him; it must be the most unqualified approbation; and he thinks that he is in duty bound to consider any national reflection as a personal insult, and to resent it accordingly.”—*Coke*, vol. i, p. 153.

“Jonathan may bless his vanity. He is incased in it from top to toe; it is a panoply of proof which renders him equally invulnerable to ridicule and argument.”—*Hamilton*, vol. i, p. 123.

"All the evidence upon the subject that I could collect, went to prove that the people can hear, and do prefer to hear, the truth. It is a crime to withhold it from them, and a double crime to substitute flattery."—*Miss Martineau's Soc.*, vol. i, p. 89.

In default of receiving any aid from these sage decisions, we are compelled to fall back upon our own conclusions. The Americans are a sensitive people, though not to the degree that some have asserted. And there is a rational explanation of the fact, that a denunciatory work upon America attracts more notice than such a production would in some other lands. In England, for instance, a satirical work upon their national follies does not obtain that universal notoriety that it would in our own country. Capt. Hall admits that, could the English become as well acquainted with the ill-natured observations of the Americans, as we are with theirs concerning us, they would manifest the same sensitiveness. He affirms that the coolness and equanimity of his countrymen do not proceed from indifference, but ignorance. There must be some truth in this remark. Doubtless, we have the full benefit of all that is alledged against us. The sarcasm and contempt in which every pettish cockney tourist vents his ill-humor, take the wings of the morning, and fly from the St. Croix to the Sabine, penetrating every nook and corner of our land. And sarcasm is sure to attract tenfold more notice than commendation. We pocket the one with quiet self-complacency, as a debt rightfully belonging to us, and commend the author for his honesty in giving us our just due. The other is looked upon as an infringement of the right of property, a grand larceny; and a hue-and-cry is immediately raised after the unlucky writer of "Notes" who commits it, and a whole nation turn out to chase him down. All denounce the unfairness of the work, when they read the lashing extracts; and, moreover, resolve to read the whole volume. Thus the tide of popular indignation is made to drive the machinery of the author and the publisher. And we verily believe that authors sometimes heap up censure and detraction, not from malice aforethought, nor from honest conviction, but because we pay for abuse with such passing liberality. Miss Martineau gives us a ray of light upon this matter. A New-York publisher wished to negotiate with her for the work which he supposed was forthcoming. She made reply, that as yet she had nothing to publish. "His answer, given with a patronizing air of suggestion, was,—'Why, surely, madam, you need not be at a loss about that, you must have got incident plenty by this time; and then you can Trollopize a bit, and so make a readable book!'"—*Retrospect*, vol. ii, p. 198.

Thus, the more general diffusion of this class of works tends to present a broader mark for the fiery darts of detraction. No arrow need, like that of Acestes, vanish in smoke for want of an object; and even those discharged from that peculiar style of bow which is the favorite weapon of some, generally prove the arrows of Eurytion, and transfix the game at which they are really aimed, although they may be compelled to soar to the clouds in the pursuit. In our land there are other incidental differences which may have their influence. In some European countries the different classes are separated by lines of demarkation, drawn with almost as much rigidity as those which divide the Hindoo castes. And when one class is satirized, the others feel it not. Dickens may lampoon the Mutanheds among the nobility, and the great body of the people feel that they have neither part nor lot in the matter. But in our own country all classes are more intimately blended, and when one member suffers, the whole body suffers with it. We imagine, too, that our government is regarded with more general and fervent love than the systems of many other nations. Mrs. Trollope assures us that she never heard an American say one word in disparagement of republicanism; and travelers tell us that this is the great national idol. If this be correct, then the general sensitiveness of our citizens is not weakness, but strength. We are not careful to answer touching this grave charge. We are well pleased to see an ungenerous sarcasm upon our government, or our countrymen, thrill along every nerve of the body-politic from Maine to Georgia, for we look upon this as a warrant for the stability of our institutions, and the perpetuity of the federal compact. And if this sentiment should, in some individuals, be pushed even to an extreme, we mourn not over it: for this unity of spirit is one of the elements of national strength, and occasional excess is far preferable to general deficiency.

But let us pass on and consult our peripatetic oracles upon another subject—the emotions with which we look upon England, and the reception we give visitors from the “mother country.” They respond as follows:—

“Of a spirit of generous rivalry, and of cordial international respect, there are but feeble traces in our relations with America; and not the slightest spark, I fear, in theirs with us.”—*Hall*, vol. i, p. 227.

“The excessive reverence with which England is regarded by the Americans seems to imply a deficiency of self-respect.”—*Miss Martineau's Soc.*, vol. ii, p. 165.

“There is a national feeling of, I believe, unconquerable dislike which lies at the bottom of every truly American heart against the English.”—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 132.

"It has often been said,—said, indeed, so often as to have passed into a popular apothegm,—that a strong prejudice against Englishmen exists in America. No assertion, more utterly adverse to truth, was ever palmed by prejudice or ignorance on vulgar credulity. The Americans are only too apt to throw their own partialities into the scale of the Englishman, and give it a preponderance to which the claims of the individual have probably no pretensions."—*Hamilton*, vol. i, p. 72.

"Let not the English be deceived by their asseverations. America, whatever her assertions may be, is deadly hostile to us."—*Marryat's Diary*, 2d. Series, p. 200.

Here is, indeed, as strange a *mélange* of opinion as even King Oberon's favorite messenger could have created with all his mischievous translations. We cannot conceive how some of these opinions were ever formed, unless the tourist considered himself an imbodiment of the dignity and glory of the British empire, and construed the treatment with which he met accordingly. Let us compare them upon this point:—

"The striking effect upon a stranger, of witnessing for the first time the absence of poverty, of gross ignorance, of all servility, of all insolence of manner, cannot be exaggerated in description."—*Miss Martineau's Soc.*, vol. i, p. 20.

"The manners of the poor are tinged with brutal insolence."—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 253.

"I never, even in mixing with the *canaille*, observed any impropriety, or, during the whole time that I was in America, received the slightest insult from (what I will term) the lower orders; and to which individuals, especially foreigners, are so subject in my native country."—*Coke*, vol. i, p. 34.

"They insulted and annoyed me from nearly one end of the Union to the other."—*Marryat*, vol. i, p. 9.

Poor Capt. Marryat appears to have been peculiarly unfortunate. He and his worthy companion in tribulation, Mrs. Trollope, are the only tourists in our list who attribute insolence to the Americans. All who mention the matter testify to their uniform civility. But the captain experienced another peculiar misfortune, as his own testimony will demonstrate, when compared with that of others.

"Everywhere in America, I found an absence of all idle concealments."—*Hall*, vol. i, p. 291.

"No people in the world can be more frank, confiding, and affectionate, or more liberal in communicating information than I have ever found the Americans to be."—*Miss Martineau's Pref. to Soc.*, p. 12.

"This was American all over; they would conceal the truth, and then blame us because we do not find it out."—*Marryat*, vol. i, p. 80.

Unhappy Capt. Marryat! His travels were a continual scene of affliction. He had come to America with the sole intent of con-

cocting another book, and the obstinate Americans not only refused to give him their confidence, but persecuted him even unto strange cities. In one of the western towns, so he tells us, they went so far as even to honor him with a grand parade in effigy. The solution of this anomaly is this: the captain had made a great blunder in choosing the land whereon to exercise his *insanabile cacoëthes scribendi*. He ought to have gone to some place where he was not known. His nautical fictions had gone over the land, and their day had passed away. Even those who were most amused by them, had no great respect for the author; and multitudes held him in utter contempt. The very circumstance which gave rise to the exclamation we have quoted, throws light upon the matter. He was traveling on board a canal-boat, "where, for the first time since his arrival in the country, no one knew who he was." Here, under cover of his *incognito*, he fell into conversation with a "very agreeable person," and talked, the whole day, upon the institutions of the country. But in an evil hour, Capt. Marryat revealed himself by presenting his card; and it appears from his own version of the affair, that the very agreeable stranger unceremoniously dropped the acquaintance, with the not remarkably flattering remark, that "had he known with whom he was conversing, he would not have spoken so freely." "This was American all over," adds the captain; but it does not appear that the stranger was either more or less of an American after the revelation, than previous to it: the change was caused by discovering the name of his curious examiner. He, doubtless, knew him to be a foreigner before the unhappy disclosure.

Mrs. Trollope, also, complains of the "brutal insolence" of a certain class of Americans; but we imagine that she would have found some difficulty in finding a country upon the face of the globe where so petulant, ill-natured a woman would be dignified with the title of "lady," instead of the ungracious appellation of "old woman," which the uncourtly Yankees applied to her.

It is somewhat amusing to follow these sage tourists in their cogitations. If they detect any peculiarity of manner or expression in individuals, almost the first step of their logic is to attribute these peculiarities to the whole nation. It is "American all over." Some of them are nearly as apt in generalizing as was the sagacious traveler in Salmagundi, who, observing that the host of a village inn had lost one of his eyes, straightway noted it down in his journal: "Mem. The inhabitants of this town have but one eye." Having thus decided that the individual is the type of the whole nation, and that things of which perhaps ninety-nine of every hundred Americans

never heard, are characteristic of the entire people, they proceed in equally rational style to explore the cause of these universal effects. If the tourist be an English tory, the cause is found at once; democracy is the scape-goat upon which the national sins are laid. Whatever is commendable is very coolly attributed to the Puritans or the first emigrants, who, indeed, fled from monarchy, but imported the virtues which flourish under no other form of government. Capt. Hall traced the general use of intoxicating liquors to our peculiar institutions; and Mrs. Trollope, relating the history of one of her "helps," whose "natural disposition must have been gentle and kind," assures us that her "good feelings were soured" by the false doctrines of a republic. Thus, almost every evil that exists in our land has been ascribed to our institutions, although the most amusing discrepancies are continually occurring in the logical chain by which they educe these alledged results.

But let us proceed with our examples of the opinions of our foreign visitors. Upon the subject of physical development they decide thus:—

"In stature and physiognomy a great majority of the population, both male and female, are strikingly handsome."—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 242.

"It must be acknowledged that the American women are the prettiest in the world."—*Marryat*, vol. i, p. 68.

"Unfortunately, beauty in this climate is not durable. Like the ghosts of 'Banquo's fated line,' it comes like a shadow, and so departs. At one or two-and-twenty the bloom of an American lady is gone."—*Hamilton*, vol. i, p. 23.

"Upon first landing, I was much struck with the personal appearance of the Americans, [the men] as being tall, slim, narrow-shouldered, and narrow-chested, with high cheek-bones, and sharp, sallow features. I think narrow shoulders and sharp features may be deemed characteristic of the Atlantic states; one never seeing any such sturdy, robust, rosy-faced, John Bull sort of people as Britain produces."—*Coke*, vol. i, p. 34.

That there is something in the climate, or our mode of life, or in the fusion of many nations into one people, that has wrought a change in the persons of the Americans, whereby they differ in some degree from the nations from which they have descended, is most abundantly proved by the testimony of our own countrymen, as well as of foreigners. Dr. Durbin intimates this, when he gives his first impressions of the French, on landing at Havre:—"Coming immediately from New-York, I could not but remark the contrast, in point of physical health and vigor, between the crowds you meet in the streets of that city, and the swarms we now encountered. Their elastic movements, fine, fresh complexions, and well-developed

persons, betokened high health and great enjoyment of life." He adds the remark that this superiority of *physique* is, doubtless, owing to their cheerful mode of living, and to their constant exercise in the open air. As far as the ladies are concerned, Dr. Durbin's opinion is corroborated by that of no less a personage than Mrs. Frances Butler, who unhesitatingly ascribes their pale complexions to their mode of life; and, in her romping style, tells them to eat less cakes and confections, and take more exercise out of doors. These things are not without their effect; but are they sufficiently prevalent to give rise to a *national* characteristic? We imagine that the dry climate of this country would, in itself, produce a race somewhat different, at least in outward appearance, from those who breathe the humid atmosphere of England. However, if it be so, it does not follow that we are degenerating in real stamina. Cobbett, as a reason why the Americans were victorious over the English in certain well-matched contests, during the wars, assigns the fact that the American soldiers, man for man, were physically superior to their antagonists.

It was a favorite idea of some philosophers, that on the western continent man's intellectual powers had dwindled most lamentably. On this great subject our tourists express themselves thus:—

"There is certainly no want of intellect. The Americans appear to me to have clear heads and active intellects; are more ignorant on subjects that are only of conventional value, than on such as are of intrinsic importance."—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 56.

"As a whole, the nation is probably better informed than any other entire nation."—*Miss Martineau's Soc.*, vol. i, p. 13.

"I have no hesitation in asserting that there is more practical information among the Americans, than among any other people under the sun."—*Marryat*, vol. ii, p. 218.

"None but a very intelligent population could be carried away to flatter and applaud a man who has neither rank, wealth, nor power, but is simply a man of genius."—*Lyell*, vol. i, p. 159.

Capt. Marryat even goes so far as to assert that foreigners in this country can hardly compete with the natives, in many of the walks of life in which mind comes in contact with mind, and the more acute and better informed come off victorious. But the captain, like his well-known seafaring comrade Sinbad, while steering for the port of truth, occasionally makes a vast amount of leeway. We may state, however, that some of those tourists who grant the possession of good intellectual powers, have qualified their praise by adding that the national mind has not been cultivated as it should be in the department of taste and imagination; and that American intellect is absorbed in the contemplation of the sub-

stantial, to the exclusion of the purely ornamental. There may be some ground for this remark, if we judge entirely by what the Americans have actually accomplished, in the way of splendid edifices and in the founding of those great institutions for the cultivation of the fine arts, of which some of the European nations can boast. But with us, the time of these things is not yet. It would be transcending the powers granted by their several constitutions, for the general or state governments to employ the public funds for the purpose, in imitation of Rome and France; and a Louvre or a Vatican is hardly within the reach of any voluntary combination of individuals. In the literary world, we acknowledge that comparatively little attention has been paid to those works which may be classed among mental luxuries; but we will not admit that we have been at all deficient in those which form the real aliment of the soul. In nations the law of individuals is reversed, and reason comes to maturity before imagination and the love of the fine arts.

With regard to another endowment, the Americans are thus described:—

“I never saw a population so divested of all gayety: there is no trace of this feeling from one end of the Union to the other.”—*Mrs. Trollope*, p. 171.

“There is not a more imaginative people existing. They prefer broad humor, and delight in the hyperbole.”—*Marryat*, 2d. Series, p. 142.

“They certainly are not a humorous people, and their temperament always impressed me as being of a dull and gloomy character.”—*Dickens*, p. 91.

“The only time when I felt disposed to quarrel with the inexhaustible American mirth was on the hottest days of summer. I liked it as well as ever; but European strength will not stand more than an hour or two of laughter in such seasons. I cannot conceive how it is that so little has been heard in England of the mirth of the Americans; for certainly nothing in their manners struck and pleased me more. One of the rarest characters among them, and a great treasure to all his sportive neighbors, is a man who cannot take a joke.”—*Miss Martineau's Retrospect*, vol. ii, p. 184.

“The Kentuckians are the only Americans who can understand a joke.”—*Hamilton*, vol. ii, p. 93.

Here is certainly as ludicrous a mélange of opinions as could be desired, even if it were penned for the express purpose of cultivating the organ of mirthfulness. And yet our peripatetic oracles all lay down their irreconcilable propositions with unutterable gravity. And the doleful groans of some of our countrymen at the misrepresentations of writers who differ from each other, *toto cælo*, are, if possible, a still more powerful stimulant to the sense of the

ludicrous. But let us not torture these poor authors without cause. We doubt not but that the Americans really appeared to them as they have described them. A sour, bitter "old woman," as Mrs. Trollope's writings seem to prove her to be, might travel from the river unto the ends of the earth, and never see a smile, except, perhaps, a stray one intended for somebody else. And another tourist, like Miss Martineau, who appears to be endowed with that pliability of mental constitution which enabled her, with equal ease, to discuss political economy with statesmen, and create all sorts of fun for the amusement of her companions, would conclude the "free-borns" a less gloomy people than Mrs. Trollope had imagined. Capt. Marryat qualifies his remark by adding, that although the Americans are fond of broad humor, they cannot comprehend refined, acute wit. How the captain should discover this, even allowing its truth, passes our calculation; as this very deficiency is notoriously his own. He is fond of humor, and makes prodigious efforts to be witty; but it is all of the low comedy order: and even then his witticisms, although concocted with so much labor, do not afford a tithe of the amusement which springs from the perusal of his profound reasonings. However, a blind philosopher once lectured upon optics.

With regard to what is called in common phrase *disposition*, our witnesses testify pretty unanimously. Capt. Hall, and of course his satellite, Capt. Marryat, declare the Americans a "very good-tempered people." Miss Martineau discourses thus:—

"If I am asked what is the peculiar charm, I reply with some hesitation: there are so many. But I believe it is not so much the outward plenty, or the mutual freedom, or the incessant play of humor, which characterizes the whole people, as the sweet temper which is diffused like sunshine over the land. They have been called the most good-tempered people in the world, and I think they must be so."—*Soc. in America*, vol. ii, p. 188.

If the Americans are as fond of flattery as some have asserted, these admissions ought to put even the few cynics among us in as good a humor as Diogenes doubtless felt when Alexander no longer stood between him and the sun. Miss Martineau attributes this peculiarity to our republican institutions, which render the Saxon race more amiable here than in some other regions. The theory of our government demands "reverence for man, as man." Capt. Marryat, with all his horror of republicanism and antiquated spinsters, here agrees with Miss Martineau, although he avoids mentioning her name, while he repeats her argument. The freebooter, however, generally erases all trace of former ownership.

But a mere theory would hardly keep a whole nation in good humor for half a century, nor would the abstract truth that "all men are by nature free and equal" have any very powerful effect in curbing passion. There are influences at work, however, which repress the insolence of office and of wealth. The politician knows that the humblest citizen can aid in exalting him to the station he covets, or in defeating his aspirations; and it is therefore his interest to conciliate him by urbanity. And demagogues, like their great prototype, Absalom, who, when any "came to do him obeisance, took him and kissed him," well know that this is the way to "steal the hearts of the men of Israel." Another corrective of outward deportment is found in our universal prosperity. The theory may render men more restiff under oppression, but nothing but mutual dependence, and independence, can repress haughtiness upon the one hand, and save on the other from cringing servility, or from that defensive insolence which turns at bay. Whatever peculiar good temper the Americans may possess is more the product of their real social equality, than of their abstract metaphysics.

But we might collect an indefinite amount of counter assertions by continuing our collation of what, if all true, would be parallel passages. Miss Martineau declares the manners of the Americans "the best she ever saw;" Mrs. Trollope declares the manners of certain classes "tinged with brutal insolence, by this empty assumption of equality;" while Lieut. Coke is astonished at their universal civility of demeanor. Miss Martineau tells us that the Americans are not so prone to overestimate wealth as the English; while Capt. Marryat assures us that the love of money is our grand distinguishing trait of character; but with his usual acuteness, accounts for it from the fact that we have a president instead of a queen. Mr. Dickens, when traveling in the railway train, tells us that "everybody talks to you, or to any one else who hits his fancy;" and Mr. Lyell, also, on the railway, tells us that "the Americans address no conversation to strangers;" disposing of the matter in a parenthesis, as if it were already known of all men. One will declare a certain city a perfect paradise; another describe the same city as a complete purgatory. Mrs. Trollope was so delighted with the beauty of one of the public buildings of Philadelphia, that she was accustomed to gather all her family and go, again and again, to contemplate, by moonlight, its magnificent proportions. Mr. Dickens, viewing the same structure, tells us that it has a "mournful, ghostlike aspect, dreary to behold;" but that his wonder at its dreariness vanished when he learned that it was that "tomb of many fortunes, the great catacomb of investment,

the United States Bank." But all this effort to raise a ghost is evidently made to give the more force to the epithets that follow. Irving shrewdly conjectures that, in Homer's wars, many a tall, good-looking Greek and Trojan was barbarously cut down and trampled in the dust, because he happened to have the proper mixture of longs and shorts in his name, to make it jingle in the poem. Mr. Dickens sometimes turns aside a little from the truth, to lay a train for a witticism.

But if our tourists are unfaithful in that which is least, it were folly unutterable to attach any great importance to either their satire or their commendations. In England there are, at this moment, two great antagonistic parties in existence;—those who believe that the people can govern themselves, and those who look with real alarm upon every accession to the popular influence in the state. And here many of the discrepancies of travelers have originated. If the tourist is of the liberal party, he will, like Miss Martineau, be disposed to look favorably upon the nation who are proving the soundness of his own principles. If he stands committed to the opposite faction, he dons the whole armor of his prejudices, declares everything public and private most certainly wrong in America, and returns home in deep despondency at the delusion of supposing the suffrages of two millions of well-informed freemen better presumptive evidence of a statesman's ability to rule, than the fact that somebody's ancestor did something nine centuries ago. We should remember, therefore, when a Hall or a Hamilton opens his battery, that although the shells are apparently aimed point-blank at us, they are intended to explode on the other side of the Atlantic.

Upon one point, however, our tourists are perfectly unanimous.

"All over America, even in those parts which have enjoyed the least advantages in the way of civilization and refinement, the women are treated with much kindness by the men."—*Hall*, vol. i, p. 297.

"I never once, on any occasion, anywhere, during my rambles in America, saw a woman exposed to the slightest act of rudeness, incivility, or even inattention."—*Dickens*, p. 56.

"One of the first peculiarities that must strike a foreigner in the United States, is the deference universally paid to the sex, without regard to station."—*Lyell*, vol. i, p. 57.

This candid statement, to which we can oppose no counter assertion, ought to console the lachrymose patriots who bewail the deep depravity of those travelers who charge our citizens with being great consumers of tobacco, "very expeditious bolters of dinner," and with sundry cognate enormities. We value such

a state of things more highly than we would the national reputation of executing bows of the exact degree of curvature recommended by Chesterfield. Capt. Hall, however, adds the remark that, although the sex are treated with the greatest outward respect, yet they have but little influence in society. He attended the great cattle-show in Massachusetts, and was "struck to the heart," as he pathetically expresses it, by the appalling fact that there were no ladies present to stare at the assemblage of bipeds and quadrupeds. But the gallant captain was not so overcome with grief as to be incapable of displaying his notable logic upon this most deplorable circumstance. After passing the fact through a sleight-of-hand process, he evolves two important inferences, to wit:—that the influence of the women is very feeble, and that this feebleness is owing to our republican institutions! The conclusion is about as correct as the premises, under the operation of the captain's acumen, would lead us to expect.

But we must leave our travelers to pursue their journey alone. We have not consulted them upon any point which requires profound research, or much depth of discernment. We have not touched upon the subject of government, morals, and religion, partly because we hope, upon some future occasion, to give these a more extended notice than present circumstances will admit, and partly for the reason that few of the authors upon whom we have been remarking have advanced much truth worth repeating, or much error that possesses sufficient plausibility to entitle it to the honor of a refutation. We are not bold enough to attempt to make bricks without straw; and hope that our readers will not rigidly enforce a demand that roused the spirit of rebellion, even in the peaceful land of Egypt.

We have compared their assertions upon a few matters which we would suppose most easily decided, and have found them a mass of counter statements and counter conclusions. This demonstrates the absurdity of undue sensibility with respect to the opinions of foreign "pencilers by the way." Even studied misrepresentations are of little moment. They certainly cannot destroy our confidence in our system of government. And if they are credited abroad, although they may somewhat retard the progress of liberal opinion, yet the most important direct consequence to us will be perhaps to lessen the tide of immigration. Whether, or not, this is a consummation devoutly to be wished, we leave to our readers to decide according to their own convictions.

It may not be out of place to offer, in conclusion, a remark upon another subject which has been frequently alluded to, especially by

military tourists. Some of them evidently imagine that when our rapidly increasing power shall have attained a certain degree, we, as other nations have been, shall be drawn into the whirlpool of warlike ambition. They look upon us as if we were to be judged as the despotisms of Europe, and estimate our disposition by our ability for conquest. But surely they have forgotten, or imagine that we shall forget, the essential difference of our institutions. The spirit of subjugation and conquest is utterly irreconcilable with the spirit of republicanism. The great truth, upon which our system of polity is based, is, that *all* men have certain inalienable rights,—all, of every kindred, and nation, and tongue, under heaven. But after having declared these truths before the world, we are not at liberty to trample upon those rights at the promptings of avarice or ambition. This declaration is not merely a cunning device to elicit a burst of applause in a Fourth-of-July oration. The principles which we have avowed are susceptible of direct application to our intercourse with other nations, and they will be violated, if we do not adopt a line of policy far more just and liberal than any other state has hitherto employed. We are not at liberty to emulate the exploits of those despotisms which have filled the world with wanton bloodshed.

It is true, republics, so called, have been as insatiably fond of conquest as ever were the tyrants of the earth; and the foulest, most detestable atrocities have been committed in the sacred name of liberty and equality. But we have founded our claims for independence upon certain fixed principles deduced from truth and nature, and not belonging only to some few isolated individuals, whom circumstances had enabled to cast off a foreign yoke, but of application as universal as their source. Consistency requires, therefore, that we concede to others the rights which we demand as our own. Liberty, like the air we breathe, or the refreshing dew, is the common gift of Heaven to all mankind.

But leaving justice and consistency out of the question, regard for our own welfare dictates the course which we have been advocating upon higher grounds. Very seldom are nations, who enlarge their dominions by conquest, really benefited. They may rise from obscurity, and advance rapidly in the career of fortune. Their armies may bear their flag in triumph over a continent, and their fleets unfurl it upon every sea. Cities may increase in wealth and luxury, and gorgeous palaces crown every hill. Emperors may ascend the throne, and give audience to the ambassadors of a hundred conquered realms. All this is but a splendid mockery. The temple which they have reared, without so magnificent and im-

posing, is but a whited sepulchre, filled with the bones of the unnumbered thousands who died to purchase its greatness, and blasted by the sighs of the widow and the fatherless. If America should enter the arena where nations are the combatants, and glory the prize, she may surpass her competitors, but her sole reward will be a fading wreath of laurel, and that, the price of blood. Her banner may wave in triumph above all others, but the breeze that stirs its folds will be the dying breath of her children, and the mount upon which it is planted, a pile of skulls. Then, let other nations pursue their career of mad ambition. Let them strew the plains of Europe with the bleaching bones of their slaughtered offspring. Let the Eagle gorge itself upon the bleeding limbs of fallen and dismembered Poland. Let the Lion batten upon his helpless Eastern prey. We boast a nobler spirit, and more exalted aims than these. And when the song of our rejoicing ascends to heaven, let no discordant note jar with that anthem which proclaimed, in celestial strains, peace on earth and good will to men.

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- ART. III.—1. *Puritanism; or, a Churchman's Defense against its Aspersions, by an Appeal to its own History.* By THOMAS W. COIT, D. D., Rector of Trinity Church, New-Rochelle, N. Y., and a Member of the New-York Historical Society. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.
2. *The Puritans and their Principles.* By EDWIN HALL. New-York: Baker & Scribner. 1846.

PURITANISM is destined to a sure and certain immortality. Leaving out of consideration all *principles*, two causes insure this,—the undying attachment of its friends, and the unceasing hostility of its enemies. Puritan blood and Puritan principles are wide spread; and staunch and able defenders, both of their faith and character, rise up daily. The press, with its thousand tongues, in the form of poems, essays, orations, or more elaborate works, constantly speaks in their praise.

The position which Puritanism has occupied in the history of England for the last three centuries, and in this country for the last two hundred and twenty-five years, and its intimate connection with religion, literature, and ecclesiastical and political economy, make it a necessary subject of investigation, and a fruitful theme of discourse, among all professions of men. Notwithstanding,

Puritan is as despised a name with some, at the present moment, as it was in the days of James; and the principles of the Non-conformists are as ardently hated by others as they were in the times of Laud. The subject must, therefore, be one of importance; and, perhaps, to none, judging from the signs of the times, can it be more important than to the present generation.

We place at the head of our article the titles of two works on this subject, both recently from the press. The author of the first, Dr. Coit, formerly president of the Transylvania University, is now the rector of Trinity Church, New-Rochelle, N. Y. Circumstances have conspired to place in his study a very large and valuable library; selected in part, we believe, by himself while in Europe, and which contains many rare and choice books. The duties of a small country parish allow him time to pore over his musty treasures, and bring out, for the edification of his readers, things "old," at least, from the records of the past. We may say, also, that he is in the full acceptance of the term a high churchman; happy, we presume, in the confidence and esteem of his church; and, until the publication of this book, enjoying, for aught we know, an enviable reputation.

The author of the second, Rev. E. Hall, is the respected pastor of the First Congregational Church in Norwalk, Conn.; a man devoted to the interests of his church, and rigidly attached to his own denominational order and discipline. We certainly mean no disrespect in saying he is a high Congregationalist. He believes that the "Puritanic system of church polity" is "broadly and solidly based on the Word of God;" and of course, therefore, of divine obligation.

As we have little space for extracts from these works, we shall, in noticing them, offer only a brief critique.

The main portions of Dr. Coit's work first appeared in a series of "Letters," published by the author in the "Churchman," during the year 1835. In the autumn of 1843 Dr. Coit received from "several of the bishops and a large number of the clergy a letter, relative to these communications," expressing "an earnest desire" that they should be "revised and published in a permanent form." This "was not the first nor the twentieth time, probably," says the author, "that I had been approached upon the subject—a subject which the recollection of abuse, (rain, hail, and horrid thunder-claps,) poured upon me without measure, determined me never to resume on my individual responsibility. But it was the first time that my brethren in the ministry seemed willing, by giving me their signatures, to share with me the responsibility of publishing

disagreeable facts."—*Preface*. Being thus furnished with the opinion and signatures of several of the bishops and a large number of the clergy, the author addressed himself to the work of revising, &c., without further hesitation. In the mean time, however, the "church" was pleased to ask him to edit a "standard Prayer Book." This, together with the necessity of rewriting most of the letters which had already appeared, delayed the publication till a later day than was expected.

From this it appears that our author was especially called to *defend* the church against the aspersions of the Puritans. The following extract shows the gist of his argument:—

"There seems to be no other mode left to teach some to look away from *our* magnified faults, but by calling the public to look at *their* forgotten ones."—P. 238.

The *title* of the work is a complete misnomer: "Puritanism; or a Churchman's Defense against its Aspersions." Whereas it is neither. A better title, and one more in accordance with its contents, would be, "A Churchman's Recital of the Follies, Persecutions, and various Barbarities, practiced by the ancient Puritans, both in England and America; drawn from all available Sources, authentic or otherwise: and furnishing abundant Evidence that they were in many Respects as bad as the Episcopalians." Setting out with this cognomen, we would readily concede that the author has labored most patiently and perseveringly to accomplish his purpose. And if he has not succeeded, the fault must be, in his case, not in himself.

Though this work contains more than five hundred pages, abounding in quotations from authors of all sorts, it has no "Index" to subjects; and the "Table of Contents" is a most meagre thing. Such neglect is inexcusable in the author of a work like this. And however valuable it might be as a book of reference, this deficiency will seriously detract from its worth.

The author's style is exceedingly hard. Long parentheses, quotations, explanatory remarks, and the regular thread of discourse, are sometimes huddled together in a strange and incongruous manner. The sense is obscured, and close attention is necessary to get at it at all. Take the following passage as a specimen:—

"But one was now approaching, who would make it a theme even for the 'meeting house,' and commend it to their own ears in such piercing words, that, like some of old, (Luke iv, 28, 29.) who professed greater *purity* than others, not a few 'were filled with wrath, rose up and thrust him out of the city.' 'He, passing through the midst of them,

went his way,'—was not to be found, when a warrant was issued to arrest him—or Witch Hill, or one of the summits of Tri-Mountain, might have told a tale, to make the rest of St. Luke's language applicable—'cast him down headlong.'—Pp. 290, 291.

The work gives evidence of having occasioned severe pain and protracted labor. We frankly confess it is not what we expected from the pen of Dr. Coit. Indeed, we are inclined to believe he has not done himself justice in its authorship. In reading the work, which we have done most carefully and patiently, not omitting the "Notes" and references which cover one hundred pages, in close and fine print, besides occupying considerable space on almost every leaf of the text, we were reminded of King *Henry's* speech to *Gloster* :—

"Thy mother felt more than a mother's pain,
And yet brought forth less than a mother's hope ;
To wit—an indigest deformed lump,
Not like the fruit of such a goodly tree."—*Henry VI.*

The spirit* of Dr. Coit's work has been severely censured. He seems sometimes at a loss for ungracious epithets for the Puritans and Puritan historians and authors: not at a loss from incapability to use such epithets—for the work is full of them; but from complete exhaustion of the vocabulary. The whole body are indiscriminately called a "clan," "a hirsute generation," "a mad faction," and "canting hypocrites." Mr. Neal is very sarcastically styled, "the candid Neal." Mr. Bancroft, though honored with a place in the title-page, "belies himself." And as for poor Bennett and Bogue, they are hardly allowed the benefit of clergy.

Dr. Coit writes with horror on the treatment Episcopalians, Baptists, Quakers, &c., received from the Puritans. And, if we admit all he says on the subject, what then? Why, it proves that they were as bad, in this respect, as the churchmen. Did the Puritans persecute, tax, fine, imprison, and banish? Did not the churchmen do the same? What if he make the Puritans as bad

* "They [the Puritans] rule with a superstition, and under the promptings of a priestcraft, unsurpassed in the annals of popes or of lords, of high-commissions or star-chambers:—and all this for a 'purely religious cause?' They arrest, try, condemn, fine, imprison, fetter, brand, lash, maim, curse, banish, hang, and leave naked and unburied (save in the bowels of beasts of prey) their brethren in a common Protestant Christianity:—and all this for a 'purely religious cause?' . . . They tolerate such grossness in the pulpit, and in the press, (and against those whose sex should have been sufficient protection,) as might disgrace a bar-room:—and all this for a 'purely religious cause?'"—Pp. 76, 77.

as Satan? Does he not, at the same time, prove his own ecclesiastical progenitors to have been the offspring of Beelzebub? This certainly outdoes the Calvinistic notion of disinterestedness and submission. To be *willing* to be damned that we may be *saved*, is ultra enough. But to make ourselves children of the wicked one, that we may fasten the same paternity upon others, seems to partake strongly of a malevolent disinterestedness.

We are assured by Dr. Coit, who quotes with approbation from the speech of Mr. Newton, made before the Board of Missions of the Diocese of Mass., at Boston, 1842, that the Episcopal Church is the "most tolerant, mild, and forbearing, toward those who differ from her, of any known body of Christians on earth." This is a very remarkable passage; and it is made and quoted with great self-complacency. But what does it mean? Is the Protestant Episcopal Church more "tolerant," in any distinct sense, than the other churches in this country? Wherein does she show herself so very "mild?" By un-churching all others, and arrogating to herself all the Christianity in the land? In what is her special "forbearance" seen? We were not aware that the other churches needed her "forbearance;" or that she sustained such a relation to them, that it was one of her peculiar prerogatives to show them clemency. Fortunately for the reputation of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and fortunately for the rights and liberties of others, she possesses no state power.

While we speak thus plainly of the Protestant Episcopal Church, we would speak just as plainly of all other churches. We would not trust one of them with civil power. In our opinion there is not one but would, in time, losing its evangelical spirituality, become a persecuting church, should it possess the requisite power. This is but the direct and certain result of all state church establishments.

Besides persecuting dissenters, such establishments tend to the subversion of evangelical Christianity, and to the substitution, in its place, of outward forms and unmeaning ceremonies. And, in addition to this, they indirectly spread infidelity with all the evils that follow in its train. This is clearly demonstrated (to go no further) in the history of Old and New-England. Indeed, from the days of Constantine down to the present time the curse of God has rested upon such church and state institutions. Christ says, "My kingdom is not of this world." And when the church is chained to the state, the divine Shechinah either wholly removes from the propitiatory, or shines but dimly. The church is never so lovely, and never does she so fully display her saving power and

glory, as when, simply leaning upon the arm of her Beloved, she walks through the length and breadth of the land in her own native strength and godlike dignity. She is then Heaven's almoner to mankind. Then is she "all glorious within," and "her paths drop fatness."

The remarks of our author on the self-banishment of the Puritans are very specious: "Persecution never *drove* them from home to seek the inhospitable shelter of a howling wilderness." In Holland "they might have had comfortable homes, by good Dutch peat fires, and lived and died unmolested and unfeared." And therefore, they they were not driven across the Atlantic. So, if a man is compelled to flee from the United States, and stops a little while at Fayal before he goes to France, where he has learned he can live without molestation, when he arrives on the shores of Normandy he is not a banished man! O, no. He might have stayed at Fayal! And if, for his comfort, he buy himself a lot of land and build him a house, and by honest industry in some lawful calling try to obtain a livelihood, why then, sure, he has gone there for "purposes of trade," to "catch fish," and indulge his "passion for land!" Now the English government did not drive the Puritans to *America*, it only persecuted them out of England. And when they had cleared from Dover, or Land's-End, they were at liberty to go to Holland, or anywhere else, so far as the government cared. This is like the logic of the Quaker, who, not disposed to hurt or harm his neighbor's unruly dog, did not drown him; he simply held him under water, and gave him the privilege of *breathing* as long as he lived!

Fully in keeping with this are our author's remarks on the kindness shown to Fox, Hooper, and Coverdale. Fox died, to be sure, "in his nest;" but he passed through trying reverses, and was neglected because he was a Non-conformist. The kindness shown to Hooper* may be seen in his banishment, his Fleet residence and confinement, and in his martyrdom. And how was it with "old Miles Coverdale," under whose direction, in 1535, the first translation of the *whole* Bible ever printed in English was completed?

The following interesting sketch of his life will answer:—

"He was born in Yorkshire, about 1486, and became an Augustine monk. At the time when he published his translation of the Bible he was in exile for the sake of religion, having embraced the principles of the Reformation. Being permitted to return to

* Vide Neal's History of the Puritans, Blake's Biographical Dictionary, and Fox's Book of Martyrs.

England, he was made almoner to Catharine Parr, the last wife of Henry VIII. During the reign of Edward VI. he was promoted to the bishopric of Exeter; but on the change of religion in Queen Mary's reign, he was deprived of his see and thrown into prison, out of which he was released at the earnest request of the king of Denmark; and, as a very great favor, was permitted to depart out of the kingdom. Soon after Elizabeth's accession to the throne he returned from his exile, but would not accept of his bishopric. The cause of his refusal was his attachment to the principles of the Puritans. Grindal, bishop of London, gave him the small living of St. Magnus, near London Bridge; but not complying with the terms of conformity then required, he was deprived of his living, *became obnoxious to government, and died in indigence*, May 20th, 1567, aged eighty-one. Such was the fate of this eminent translator of the Scriptures; a man universally esteemed for his piety, his Scriptural knowledge, and his diligence in preaching.*

It does not matter, says our author, speaking of Puritan persecution, if we are doomed to burn in an *Auto da Fé*, who fires the fagots. Neither, perhaps, does it matter if, for opinion's sake, we must die, whether it be by neglect, starvation, or fire. But still, if it were lawful under such circumstances to choose, most, probably, would prefer the stake. It is absolutely sickening to hear an American citizen of cultivated mind, and refined, independent feelings, in the middle of the nineteenth century, talk of the "lenient and courteous disposition" of the English government, in allowing Protestant ministers of Christ to lay aside Popish robes and rags, in "private," or even on a "most memorable public occasion," while, at the same time, it requires a "conformity" not authorized by the Word of God, tramples under foot their consciences, treats with scorn and contempt their enlightened religious scruples, and finally scatters their ashes to the winds of heaven. We do not envy any man his head or his heart who can discover in such a course of treatment a "lenient and courteous disposition." And if this be the exhibition of the "lenience" of a "full-fledged prelacy," we pray, in the language of the litany, "*From such, good Lord, deliver us!*"

But "in view of such evidence," says Dr. Coit, "a man must be voracious in appetite, and fastidious in digestion, beyond all reasonable dyspeptic liberty, if he could still demand proof of the lenient and courteous disposition of the government toward all who were moderate and gentlemanly in their objections and petitions for

* Townley's Biblical Illustrations, vol. ii, p. 97.

reform." This, besides being a *petitio principii*, sounds strangely to republican ears, and smacks very strongly of "my lord bishop." But let that pass. Were not these persons "moderate" in their objections, and "gentlemanly" in their petitions for reform? When Bishop Lloyd inquired of John Howe, as "sturdy an old Non-conformist" as "father Fox," what he thought would satisfy the Non-conformists, so that they might be taken into the church, Mr. Howe replied, that "he thought it would go a *considerable way* toward it, if the law was so framed, as that ministers might be enabled to *promote parochial reformation*." "For that reason," said the bishop, "I am for taking the lay chancelors quite away, as being the great hinderance of reformation." But was this "moderate objection and gentlemanly petition" heeded? "That very night the bill of exclusion was thrown out of the House of Peers by a majority of thirty voices, fourteen of which were bishops."*

Mr. Wesley says,† and surely he had sympathy enough for the English Church and government, "I stand in amaze: First, at the execrable spirit of persecution which drove those venerable men out of the church, and with which Queen Elizabeth's clergy were as deeply tinctured as ever Queen Mary's were. Secondly, at the weakness of those holy confessors, who spent so much of their time and strength in disputing about surplices and hoods, or kneeling at the Lord's supper." The manner in which Mr. Wesley refers to the surplices and hoods, shows that he thought they were "moderate" in their objection, at least. But in the place of a "lenient disposition," he discovered an "*execrable* spirit of persecution." And this was written in 1747, while as yet the English Church was a darling object in the affections of that great and good man.

But he places the "moderation" of the Puritans in a stronger contrast with this "lenient and courteous disposition," in his Letters to Mr. John Smith, who addressed a series of letters to him in manuscript, and who is supposed to have been Dr. Thomas Secker, bishop of Oxford, and subsequently archbishop of Canterbury. Speaking of Mr. Cartwright, he says, "I look upon him, and the body of Puritans in that age, (*to whom the German Anabaptists bore small resemblance,*) to have been both the most learned and the most pious men that were then in the English nation. Nor did they separate from the church; *but were driven out, whether they would or no!*"‡

The only kind of "moderation" that would have experienced "lenient and courteous treatment from the government" was hum-

* Life of John Howe.

† Works, vol. iii, p. 392.

‡ Works, vol. vi, pp. 643, 644.

ble submission to the *dicta* of the church. Conscience out of the way, the "church," right or wrong, was the test. The Non-conformists, could they have been thus "moderate and gentlemanly," would not have been regarded as "interlopers,"* or "squatters,"—to use the elegant diction of our author, who, we are informed, affects some fastidiousness in such matters,—but would, without doubt, have been furnished with livings, prebendaries, and bishoprics.

The truth is, every movement for reform in the estimation of some, is "immoderate" and "ungentlemanly." Put forth a little effort to reform any abuse, and demagogues, set on by interested partisans, immediately raise the cry of *ultraism*. The Waldenses were ultraists; the Lollards, rejecting the mass, extreme unction, and penance, were very "ungentlemanly." The Wiclifites were a "mad faction." The reformers were a spontaneous production of that "land of fierce fanaticism." It is no marvel, then, that the Puritans, or Non-conformists, should be regarded in the same light. The dissenters are placed in the same category.

We do not mean to offer a defense for the doings of lawless factions, or headstrong and ungovernable individuals. It seemed at times as though such would blast the fairest hopes and prospects of the reformation in Germany. And some such there were in the "troublous times" in England. Such may be found in every community. But *true* reformers are no more responsible for their fanaticism, than were the "sons of God," when they came to present themselves before the Lord, for the coming and presence of Satan. Job i.

It may be admitted that the Puritans were not always wise in their measures. Neither did they always arrive at the most desirable results. Mr. *Hall* well remarks:—

"It cannot be pretended that all their measures were entirely moderate or wise. The times were unfavorable. The English people were

* "These two thousand [ejected ministers] were interlopers—not even ecclesiastical squatters, as we Americans would say—absolute interlopers, who had driven away the lawful shepherds of the flock, and were covering themselves with the fleece, full warmly. The ministers of the Church of England were the real victims of banishment; and the Act of Uniformity was but an act of simple justice, to give them back their own."—Pp. 51, 55.

"Dr. Coit's 'interlopers,' worse even than 'ecclesiastical squatters,' were such men as Gilpin, Bates, Manton, Jacomb, Owen, Goodwin, Baxter, Newcome, Calamy, Pool, Caryl, Charnock, Gouge, Jenkins, Corbet, Mead, Howe, Vincent, Flavel, Philip Henry, and others of like character, though less known to fame."—*Puritans and their Principles*, p. 425.

not, like the American people at their revolution, prepared for a republic. The past history of the world did not hold out sufficient light to guide the great experiment. Causes beyond their control, casualties to human power inevitable, hindered the results of their labors."—*Puritans and their Principles*, p. 235.

Neither let it be supposed that we design to justify, or defend, the Puritans in their persecutions on these shores. *Far from it.* We are as really and heartily abhorrent of these as Dr. Coit affects to be. We simply remark, in the language of our author, "When *all* liberty has been taken from men, they are apt to abuse it, if regained by blood from their oppressors." Over-jealous of their liberties, when they came to enjoy the blessing of sacred freedom in the new world, and not fully comprehending the rights of others, they unfortunately found a majority, who, following the example of "fatherland," were disposed to oppress and persecute those who differed from them. It may, however, and ought to be added, that persecutions have long since ceased here. All Christian denominations are equal in the eyes of the law; and every man, without let or hinderance, worships God according to the dictates of his own conscience; *while to this very hour the government of England is OPPRESSIVE ON ALL DISSENTERS.*

We use the term Puritan, as Dr. Coit frequently does, to designate the great body of dissenters. "It was a common name given to all who, from conscientious motives, though on different grounds, disapproved of the established religion, from the reformation under Elizabeth to the Act of Uniformity, in 1662. From that time to the revolution, in 1668, as many as refused to comply with the established worship, (among whom were about two thousand clergymen, and perhaps five hundred thousand people,) were denominated Non-conformists. From the passing of the Act of Toleration, on the accession of William and Mary, the name of Non-conformist was changed to that of Protestant Dissenters."* It is true our author applies the term Puritan, when it suits the purpose in hand better, to the Independents, or Congregationalists. Hence, he dwells upon Puritan treatment of Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, &c. In the remarks we make we have no reference to this distinction. We are not set to defend Congregationalists, nor Baptists, nor Presbyterians, nor Quakers, nor Papists. These denominations, except the Papists, can make their own defense; and if they cannot, Dr. Coit is at hand.

Though well aware of the high churchmanship of our author, we were not prepared for a set defense of Laud. But Dr. Coit

* *Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*; Art., Puritans,

not only offers a justification for him, but "feels as if it were anything but sin to defend him." That he possessed excellences, we may admit; but his bad deeds greatly outweigh the good.* He was superstitious and oppressive; discovering, says Mosheim, a violent spirit of animosity and persecution through the whole of his ecclesiastical administration. He forced bishops upon the Scots—he beheld the Puritans with horror, and aimed at their *total extinction*, and revived Romish ceremonies in the church. And yet, according to our author, he was a noble defender of the Protestant faith!

There is one condition, on which Dr. Coit intimates he might be led to speak in a different strain of the Puritans. It is that they look away from Laud's "failings," and "honor his undoubted virtues." The latter part, we presume, they will readily do; but concerning the former we have some doubts. These "*failings*"—a mild term to express great enormities—cannot easily be forgotten. They are indelibly written on the page of history. This singular overture reminds us of a little incident that occurred soon after the passage of the last law by congress, on the claims of revolutionary soldiers. This law provided that each applicant should produce living testimony that he had done the amount of service required. Mr. G——, who had seen a small detachment of the army pass by his father's house in his boyhood, called upon Mr. W——, his neighbor, who was about the same age, and said, Well, Mr. W——, if you will "*remember*" me, I will "*remember*" you! But, much to the mortification of Mr. G——, Mr. W—— chose not to swear falsely. So, we opine, it will be with the Puritans. They will not eulogize Laud; even if Dr. Coit would stay his ire, forgive them all that is past, and attempt, in a "congenial strain," their praise.

King Jamie's "No bishop, no king," has, it seems, been generally misunderstood. Our author says:—

"Here is a churchman's familiar explanation of it. '*By no bishop, no king*, is not intended that bishops are the props of royalty, nor do Episcopalians understand it so: but that both one and the other are objects of the same fury; only the church goes first.' (*L'Estrange*, p. 170.)"—*Note*, p. 440.

But how do Episcopalians reason on the motto, "No bishop, no church?" and how do they "understand that?" That bishops are not

* The notice of Laud in *Blake's Biographical Dictionary*, published in N. Y. in 1845, is most one-sided and disingenuous. Who prepared that article? Had the author any sectarian purposes to serve? By the by, there are a number of articles in that work that need revision.

the "props" of the church? Do they not gravely tell us there can be *no church without* a bishop? Analogy would certainly lead us to the same conclusion respecting the phrase, *No bishop, no king*. Besides, what are the historical facts in the case? In all the Christian nations, where kingly power has been most oppressive, that power has been bolstered up by prelacy. Prelacy has ever been the foe of civil and religious liberty, and the "prop of royalty." Except for this, England would have long since, probably, administered "equal and exact justice" to all her subjects. Says Dr. Hook, whom Powell calls "the apostle and high-priest" of the high-church scheme of the present times, "Were all connection between the church and state to cease, we may be sure the *monarchy would be destroyed*."* But who shall decide when "churchmen" disagree?

Dr. Coit's account of the "origin" of Puritanism is as meagre as it is unsatisfactory. A few ignorant fanatics of the Munster school subvert the church and state, take off the heads of bishops and king, assume the reins of government, and banish the lawful shepherds of the flock. The statement is its own refutation.

Our author's caution to low-churchmen is altogether uncalled for. They will, without doubt, keep sufficiently aloof from all "anti-Episcopalians." The foot note on p. 443 might have been spared. Are the low-churchmen in leading-strings? Is it "*extra charity*" for churchmen to tell dissenters "how much they love them?" How "mild," "tolerant,"² and "forbearing," is the "church" toward all who differ from her!

But Dr. Coit's hand seems to be against every man. Even the American Bible Society, and the *American edition of the Bible*, fall under his ban! Our Baptist brethren may claim him as an ally. His objection is different; his aim may be the same. That society leave out the *Translators' Address* and the *Dedication!* He says,—

"One looks for it [the Address] in vain in the volumes of an association professing to give us a *genuine* book. A quarto Bible of the American Bible Society was put into my pulpit, because it was *cheap*; but I paid *dear* for it one day, when, turning to quote from it, I found not so much as even the old Dedication suffered to remain."—P. 316.

Indeed! We really sympathize with the doctor in this sad dilemma. We hope his congregation will take the hint, rid themselves of their *parsimony*, and raise money enough to *import* a "perfect Bible" for their pulpit, containing both the "Address" and "Dedication."

* Sermon before the Queen. See Powell, p. 311.

There is a note on this subject that ought not to be overlooked:—

“The whole Address of the translators, though a part of the furniture of the original translation of the Bible, in 1611, is deliberately cut out by the largest society for publishing the English Bible in these United States; and yet *Puritans* marvel that Episcopalians are ‘scrupulous’ about sanctioning its work, by uniting in it! Is not the scrupulosity rather on their side?”

When Dr. Reynolds objected to the phrase, in the marriage service, “With my body I thee worship,” the king “smiled him down,” as our author informs us. Cannot the American Bible Society “smile down” Dr. Coit? and get him to “sanction,” “by uniting in the work,” one of the most godlike enterprises on earth, to wit, the general circulation of the Holy Scriptures “without note or comment?”

The use of the term “Puritan” in the above extract shows that we have not misapprehended our author. This is further evident from another short sentence. “Puritanism would have done in ages past, what *dissent* is ready to do, and striving to do, in this current hour.”—P. 349. What our author has to offer in sympathy for some of the branches of the “hirsute” family, is, after all, mere “blarney.” He looks through the same glass with the British critic, and is hostile toward *all* dissenters.*

Before dismissing this book, we make one more brief extract. It contains the account of the origin of our author’s Episcopal blood.

“I find the following account of my Quaker ancestor, who became a churchman, in Deane’s History of Scituate, and give it in his own words. ‘He left Scituate in 1704, and settled in Newport. He had previously married Ruth, daughter of deacon J. B., sen. To this match there had been several objections: the Quakers disapproved of his marrying *out* of the society, and the Congregationalists of his marrying *into* theirs; and, moreover, the woman was very young. However, the sanguine temperament of — was not to be foiled; and he is said to have addressed the young woman in the presence of her family in the following words: Ruth, let us break away from this unreasonable bondage. I will give up my religion, and thou shalt give up thine; and we will go to the Church of England, and go to the d—l together.’ They fulfilled this resolution, adds my annalist, *so far* as going to church and marrying, and adhering to the Church of England during life.”—Pp. 332, 333.

Whether they “fulfilled” the resolution in the last *item*, history does not say.

* Vide p. 349, et passim.

Mr. Hall's book is composed of lectures delivered to his congregation in 1843 and 1844. The design of the author in this work, he tells us, is,—

“To set forth the causes which brought the Pilgrims to these shores; to exhibit their principles; to show what these principles are worth, and what it costs to maintain them; to vindicate the character of the Puritans from the aspersions which have been cast upon them, and to show the Puritanic system of church polity, (as distinguished from the prelatie,) broadly and solidly based on the Word of God, inseparable from religious purity and religious freedom; and of immense permanent importance to the best interests of mankind.”

The greatest portion of Mr. Hall's work is a rapid sketch of the history of the Puritans, dating from Wiclif to their settlement in this country. There are in this sketch many thrilling passages. Indeed, our author writes at times as though the scenes he portrays were present, and now being acted: he makes you see and feel the wrongs inflicted on his sires.

We are inclined to think, however, that our author lays himself open to criticism from the church party, by relying, perhaps, too much on what they have considered, and ever will consider, as *ex parte* testimony. Neal,* as a historian, is justly admired; but his History, though in the main correct, receives beyond doubt a party coloring. He is ready to attribute right motives to the Puritans, and to draw the most unfavorable inferences respecting the churchmen. So, on the other hand, Clarendon can find apologies and excuses for Charles and the church party, while he sees in the Puritans little but fanaticism and rebellion. Whoever wishes to arrive at safe and just conclusions concerning those times, must, without prejudice, con-

* The following remarks of *Dr. Bacon*, on Neal's History, are as just as they are happy:—“Neal's History of the Puritans is a work of great industry and research. The author wrote, indeed, with an undisguised sense of the injuries which the Puritans and their successors, the Non-conformists, had suffered from the English government; and his narrative is, therefore, to be considered as *ex parte*. It differs from any history of the Puritans which a writer on the other side would produce; very much as a history of England, written by an Englishman, would differ from a history of England written by a Frenchman. Yet the attempts which have been made to impugne its authority have not been successful. Few works of so great an extent, and including so many details, have better sustained the assaults of hostile criticism. Subsequent investigations, continued with great zeal for more than a century, have detected its errors, and have shown the power of party feelings on the author's judgment: but errors more serious have been detected in Hume's more complete and classical history; and in respect to the influence of partisanship upon the story, the little finger of Clarendon is thicker than the loins of Neal.”

sult the writers on both sides. He will then discover, what some Puritans are hardly willing to admit, that both parties in some things were wrong; and, also, what some churchmen are as loth to allow, that both parties in other things were right.

Mr. Hall has held much communion with the old Puritanic authors, and has become deeply imbued with their spirit. His work, written in nervous and perspicuous English, contains much important information, and will, without doubt, become a standard authority with the denomination. Its moral tone is what the present times need; and its glowing republicanism will meet with a warm response in thousands of American hearts. It plainly recognizes the essential doctrines of Christianity, and teaches the awakened sinner to rely on *Christ* for salvation. He says:—

“A sinner inquires, What must I do to be saved? We (I mean we ‘dissenters,’ Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists, and the whole Protestant world save the prelatists) say to him, The matter lies wholly between your own soul and your God. ‘No outward form can make you clean.’ No earthly priest can do you good.

Behold, I fall before thy face,
My only refuge is thy grace;
No outward forms can make me clean,
The leprosy lies deep within.

No bleeding bird, nor bleeding beast,
Nor hyssop branch, nor sprinkling priest,
Nor running brook, nor flood, nor sea,
Can wash the dismal stain away.’

If you had the apostles here themselves, instead of their pretended official successors, they could do you no good. You must ‘BELIEVE on the Lord Jesus Christ;’ that is, with a penitent and broken heart, despairing of all other help, commit your soul to the efficacy of Christ’s atoning blood, as set forth in the provisions and promises of the gospel. ‘*With the heart man believeth unto righteousness.*’”—P. 377.

Our author passes lightly over Puritan persecutions in New-England. We are disposed to regard in as favorable a light as we possibly can these errors of the Puritans, and to defend their general character. But, by attempting to *justify* their acts, by making the objects of their hate dangerous citizens, plotting against the state, we do their memory little service. When struggling for liberty of conscience, in the old world, they were clearly in the right; and, when oppressing and persecuting those who differed from them in the new, they were most certainly *in the wrong*.

It is claimed, however, that the Puritans corrected their own

errors; and that they did this *denominationally*. Mr. Hall says,—

“The old world has not yet seen an example of a single *denomination* holding an absolute and controlling power, and yet correcting her own errors by an *entire toleration of foreign hostile sects*.”—P. 402.

There is much more implied in this passage than can be readily admitted. This “single denomination,” as long as it had “absolute and controlling power,” did not grant toleration to the “sects.” But these “sects,” having greatly multiplied, united together; and, constituting a decided majority, demanded and obtained new and liberal constitutions in the different states. Many of the “denomination” were not a little chagrined when they found themselves a minority, and their “rights,” as some of them regarded their power to tax and oppress others, taken away. The “sects,” therefore, and not the “single denomination,” *were the authors of our present system of equal rights*.*

These “foreign hostile sects”—a rather Puseyic phraseology—were the Episcopalians, Methodists, Baptists, and some smaller associations. These denominations were no more “foreign” than the Congregationalists. They were not “hostile” to anything but the exercise of unrighteous, arbitrary power. In the offensive sense of the term, they were no more “sects” than the “standing order.” They were “dissenters,” we admit; and the fruit of their dissent we are now permitted to enjoy.

On the Puritanic, or, as he means, Congregational system of church polity, Mr. Hall takes very high ground. It is, he says, “*broadly and solidly based on the Word of God*;” and “*inseparable from religious purity and religious freedom*.” Push this to its legitimate results, and it leads to that exclusiveness, which, in the prelatical churches, our author so pointedly and justly condemns. If the Scriptures teach one uniform system of church polity, and the Puritanic churches, and they only, are framed in accordance with this system, then all other churches are in a state of schism. And if the Puritanic polity is “*inseparable from religious purity and freedom*,” then, by far the greatest portion of the Christian world, including Presbyterians and Methodists, are in religious impurity and bondage. This, considering the comparatively small number of Puritanic, or Congregational, churches, is more exclusive than high churchism. What is to become of the large denominations

* It ought, in justice to their memory, to be noticed that there were individuals, perhaps many, among the “standing order,” that were in favor of the change: these united with the “sects” in their efforts to obtain constitutional freedom.

which occupy intermediate ground between the Congregational and Prelatic churches? By one they are declared to be in a state of impurity and bondage; and by the other they are coolly handed over to the "uncovenanted mercies of God!" But our author is *not* such an exclusive; and this language can only be regarded as a rhetorical flourish to eulogize a favorite system.

The fact that different opinions respecting the constitution and government of the church have been entertained in all ages by great and good men, equally learned and pious, should be regarded as strong evidence that no perfect system of church polity is clearly specified in the sacred text. But when men write in view of previously settled convictions on the subject, it is quite easy,—at least it seems so to them,—to find the exact counterpart of their theory in the Scriptures. And should the Scripture pattern be either too full, or defective, a little clipping and stretching can, so they fancy, bring it to the required form! Mr. Hall can see no churches in the Scriptures but "Congregational churches," each an independent republic, having within itself everything that pertains to the constitution and government of the church. Indeed, he discovers in the apostolic churches the exact model of the New-England churches. He says—the capitals are his own—"AS VISIBLE ORGANIZATIONS, NO CHURCHES ARE RECOGNIZED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, EXCEPT SUCH AS ARE CONGREGATIONAL." But as there is an important connection between the Congregational and Presbyterian churches, a "note" immediately explains:—

"The word is not used here in the *technical* sense; that is, as distinguishing Congregational from Presbyterian."—P. 283.

So, the prelacy, with equal clearness, see in the apostles, and bishops, and deacons, of the primitive church, the prototype of their own orders; and in the union of the churches, and the general oversight of the apostles and elders, the establishment of diocesan episcopacy. One system professes to regard the church as a pure *republic*, the other as a *monarchy*. If these terms are used in a modified sense, we are not disposed to quarrel with either system. But, understanding them in their natural and legitimate sense, as recognizing authority in *man*, (as a member of the republic, or as the monarch,) to *make laws* for the church, and *impose doctrines* upon her, we believe they are both wrong. *Christ* is THE HEAD OF HIS CHURCH; and the WORD OF GOD is the LAW of the church. That Christ has delegated authority, as lawgiver, to a "congregation," constituting them a "republic," with power, by a majority, to *impose* doctrines or *enact* laws; or that he has committed such authority to any man, or any body of men, as distinct from the

“congregation,” has no foundation in fact. *His glory he will not give to others.* The *Scriptures* are the rule, and the only rule, both for faith and practice. “Whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be *required* of any man, that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought necessary or requisite to salvation.”—*Art. V.*

The only authority which Christ has delegated to man, for the regulation of the church and the enforcement of moral discipline, is *judicial* and *executive*. The manner in which the case of an offending brother is to be adjudicated, and the law executed, is plainly stated by the Lawgiver himself. *Vide* Matt. xviii, 15-18.

The great question in controversy is, To whom is this authority committed? Congregationalism claims that it is, by divine appointment, vested in the “congregation.” Prelacy, that it is by divine right, through apostolical succession, vested in the bishop. The truth, we apprehend, is between the extremes. The judicial authority, which is to try private members of the church for alledged offenses, is the “church.” The execution of the law upon such as are *thus* found to be offenders, is by the ministry whom Christ has appointed to “oversee” and feed the flock of God. Nor is there any authority in the *Scriptures*, in the case of a private member, for an appeal to another tribunal. The final adjudication of such a case is with the church. And when they have decided on the innocence or guilt of a member, the executive authority must act accordingly.

That the ministry whom Christ appoints have more authority in the church, and more to do with the administration of its discipline, than is acknowledged by Congregationalism, seems quite evident to us:—

1. From the *relation* which, by the appointment of the “Holy Ghost,” they sustain to the church. “Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you *overseers*, ἐπισκοπῶντες:” from ἐπί, upon, over, and σκοπεῖν, I look. Properly, to look over, to inspect. Acts xx, 28. “Hence, in Athens, ἐπίσκοποι were magistrates sent out to tributary cities to *organize and govern them.*”—*Robinson.*

1 Peter v, 2. “Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the *oversight*, ἐπισκοπούντες.” Discharging the duties of *overseers*, or *bishops*.

2. From the directions given them respecting the church. “Feed the church of God—*feed* the flock of God.” Ποιμαίνω literally means to pasture; tropically, to rule. The faithful pastor *feeds and governs* his flock.

“Reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine.”
2 Tim. iv, 2.

3. From the commission given by Christ to the disciples: “Go ye therefore and teach, μαθητεύσατε, *disciple*, all nations.” Matt. xxviii, 19. This word, when used transitively, signifies to *train*. It imports the duty which a teacher owes to his disciple or scholar—to impart *instruction* to him and exercise wholesome *government* over him.

4. From the directions given to the church in respect to the ministry: “Remember them which have the *rule* over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God. Obey them that have the rule over you, and *submit* yourselves: for they watch for souls as they that must give *account*.” Hebrews xiii, 7, 17.

5. From the reference of the church at Antioch to the apostles and elders at Jerusalem, concerning Gentile circumcision. “They determined that Paul and Barnabas, and certain other of them, should go up to Jerusalem unto the *apostles* and *elders* about this question. And the *apostles* and *elders* came together for to consider of this matter.” Acts xv, 2, 6. “And they delivered unto them the decrees, *δογματα*, for to keep, that were ordained of the *apostles* and *elders* which were at Jerusalem.” Acts xvi, 4.

“This,” says Dr. Clarke, “was the first council ever held in the Christian church; and we find that it was composed of the *apostles* and *elders* simply.”—*Com. in loc.*

The Congregational mode of explaining this transaction is by no means satisfactory. Mr. Hall says:—

“It was simply a question of advice made by one church to another.”—*Note*, p. 284.

Not exactly. The reference is made to the “*apostles* and *elders*” which were at Jerusalem, not to the church. And the “*apostles* and *elders*,” inspired by the Holy Ghost, (Acts xv, 28,) *ordain* certain “*decrees*” to be “*kept*” by the church at Antioch, and other Gentile churches. Does this look like simple “*advice*?” If it is “*advice*,” it is advice with the authority of the “*Holy Ghost*.” Observe, 1. That the church at Antioch *refer* the matter in dispute to the “*apostles* and *elders*” at Jerusalem. 2. The “*apostles* and *elders*” decide the question. 3. Their decision *settles* the dispute in Antioch. 4. Paul and Timotheus, traveling “*through the cities*,” deliver them the “*decrees*,” which henceforth are of standing authority in the Gentile church. 5. “*So were the churches established in the faith*, and increased in number daily.”

From the above considerations, and many more not adduced, for

want of space, there is little to countenance the notion of an irresponsible democracy in the church.

We think every impartial reader of the New Testament must be convinced that the apostles and elders exercised a general superintendence over the primitive churches. On no other ground can the above passages of Scripture be satisfactorily explained. These elders, variously styled presbyters and bishops, were not "lords over the heritage of God"—did not claim the prerogatives of our present *diocesan* bishops—but were accredited and authorized ministers of Jesus Christ, traveling extensively and overseeing the general interests of the church.

Mr. Watson, (Institutes, vol. ii, pp. 586, 587,) after quoting Moseheim on the "independence" of "each Christian assembly," and referring to the usurpations of the bishop of Rome, remarks: "The independence of the early Christian churches does not, however, appear to have resembled that of the churches which in modern times are called independent. *During the lives of the apostles and evangelists, they were certainly subject to their counsel and control, which proves that the independency of separate societies was not the first form of the church.*"

On account of our position we have received a constant fire, on the one hand from "diocesan episcopacy," with whose doctrines on that subject we have little fellowship; and, on the other, from Congregational writers, whose system of church government we have never admired. The former we regard as a usurpation; the latter, as a tame surrender to the "people" of rights and prerogatives inherent in the ministry of Christ's appointment. The one may become oppressive; the other is weak and inefficient. In proof of the correctness of this remark, we refer to the history of the two systems respectively.

Notwithstanding the *ad captandum* appeals constantly made to the "dear people," on their "rights"—the great hobby of every demagogue in church and state—Congregationalism, as a system of church government, does not rapidly spread. All important secessions from our own church, whatever may be their views respecting *our* government, do not adopt the Congregational form for their *own*. And it is conceded, and may be noticed as a remarkable fact, that *fifteen hundred Presbyterian churches were Congregational in their origin*. Our Congregational brethren will mourn over this departure from the "old paths," while our Presbyterian friends will rejoice to see their brethren walking in the "good way."

We had marked a number of passages in this work, that we designed to notice. Our article, however, has reached its pre-

scribed length. We must, therefore, take our leave of our author; but we do it reluctantly. The great candor with which he expresses himself on the "Puritans and their principles," and the questions incidentally introduced, have only tended to increase the esteem in which we before held him. And, though we do not subscribe to *all* his views of church polity, nor to his opinions respecting Arminianism and Calvinism, and the influence which they exert on the cause of civil liberty, yet we can most cheerfully recommend his book. And if our criticisms are considered free, they are so only out of compliment to the claims of the work.

Norwalk Conn., July 1, 1846.

H.

ART. IV.—*Phædon; or, a Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul. By Plato. Translated from the original Greek by MADAM DACIER. With Notes and Emendations. To which is prefixed the Life of the Author by Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray.* First American, from the rare London edition.

WE are told by St. Paul, that the heathen "world by wisdom knew not God." And it is equally clear they knew not man, but speculated most wildly upon his nature and destiny. It is true, they were not strangers to the idea of the soul's immortality; but it was so obscured and distorted by their fantastic imaginings, that its moral influence was almost wholly lost. Nor were they uniform in their speculations. Each philosopher struck out a new path, and confidently claimed the admiration of the world for the discovery of truths before unknown.

The fragments of Pythagorean philosophy which have come down to us are so wrapped up in fanciful notions and the mysteries of symbolical numbers, that it is difficult to extract from them any consistent view of the theory of this philosopher. In regard to the human soul, however, it is evident that he taught the notion of transmigration, and of consequence had no rational conceptions of its immortality. Anaxagoras and Archelaus, the instructors of Socrates, taught that animals and men had their origin in the action of the natural elements on each other. Fire acted on water; the earth was hardened by the process; the motion of water gave birth to air; air was held together by fire, and the earth by air. In the mean time the particles of matter being acted upon by the united influence of air, fire, and water, began to stir and form strange combinations: the

product was various grades of animals—among the rest men, who were distinct from all other kinds, and became the ruling race. The mind, or soul, was inborn in all animals alike; and, in all, subject to the same laws and vicissitudes. Socrates seemed in a good degree to disenthral himself from the prevailing darkness and confusion, and to enjoy a glimpse of the true light. And yet his mind appeared incapable of grasping, retaining, or adequately defining, the truths it seemed to perceive, and finally fell back upon the admission of principles irreconcilable with the elevated views that have been claimed for him. On the immortality of the soul, however, it must be conceded, he approached nearer the truth than any other heathen philosopher.

In some respects the writings of Aristotle present a contrast to the doctrines of Socrates. His ideas of God divested him of those attributes with which Socrates and Plato had clothed him; making his agency mechanical and necessary, if not depriving him of existence. And what he says of the soul is so low and unworthy of that elevated subject, as to render him obnoxious to the charge of materialism. The philosophy of Epicurus is still more gross and sensual, insomuch, that it becomes a question, whether his doctrine of “atoms,” and their varied motions and combinations, does not embrace all he acknowledges of agency, or existence, as to gods and men. This diversity in their philosophy of God and nature, is also a prominent characteristic of their teachings upon the subject of ethics. Some placed the rule of virtue in the will of the gods; others, in expediency; others, in the result of human actions; and others still, in present gratifications—making it the “*summum bonum*” of man, to endeavor to the utmost to increase his pleasures and diminish his pains. Thus we see there was little or no agreement among the sages of antiquity upon the first principles of religion and morals; which clearly enough evinces the necessity of an authoritative standard of doctrine and morals, to which an appeal might be made for a settlement of questions of this kind. The same fact shows the inadequacy of the light of nature to lead to just notions of God and virtue, while it demonstrates most clearly the defectibility and insufficiency of human reason. Without the aid of supernatural light, there is a point in the investigation of divine philosophy beyond which the human mind cannot proceed. There may be a sublime effort to advance, but exhausted by over exertion, and disappointed by the failure to grasp truths beyond its natural reach, the mind falls back to take low and unworthy views of the subjects it cannot comprehend. Failing to raise itself to the

elevation necessary to penetrate the sublime mysteries of natural and religious truth, it drags these subjects down to the groveling standard of its own comprehension. For this reason the philosophy of antiquity made no improvement for ages. If it moved at all, it was in a circle; which, instead of being spiral, became more prone and sensual at every turn.

And the same uncertainty and diversity are still seen in the reasonings of men, who, out of sheer vanity, or intellectual pride, or both, discard the aid of revelation in the pursuits of science and philosophy. The constitution of man, and the end of his existence, are subjects on which reason has repeatedly made demonstrations in proof of her weakness. And nothing can exceed the variety and wildness of the conclusions reached by those who have depended solely upon her deductions. Each one has struck out his own path, and pursued it long enough to involve himself and his followers in the grossest darkness. Some have made man all material—others, all immaterial. Some have degraded him to the meanness of a brute—others have invested him with the prerogatives and attributes of God. And others would make the death of his body the end of his being: while others, still, will allow him (if he can) to survive his physical dissolution, and live on beyond the tomb. And this is no more than might be expected where men either do not possess, or possessing, will not improve, the light of revelation. We might as well expect the moon to give light without the sun, as that reason should be a safe and sufficient guide in relation to such subjects. The philosophers of antiquity searched the productions of human lore: they traveled much, studied much, and wrote much; and yet their views of God and man, of the constitution of nature, of morality and religion, are weak and childish when compared with the consistent faith of even the illiterate Christian of a Christian land.

The above reflections have been suggested, for the most part, by reading the production which stands at the head of this article. We propose, in this paper, a brief review of the argument of the "Phædon" on the immateriality and immortality of the soul. We shall attempt, also, to point out wherein the proofs are inconclusive and defective; and then exhibit in contrast the clear and triumphant arguments which reason, rectified and strengthened by revelation, presents in support of this doctrine, connected with the decisive testimony of revelation itself.

It certainly cannot be otherwise than gratifying, even to the

Christian, to know what unenlightened reason can say in proof of a doctrine so closely connected with man's highest aspirations. We can have no motive for undervaluing testimony of this kind, but should rather rejoice that reason, though corrupted and erratic, has nevertheless struggled after truth amidst prevailing darkness. And we may safely allow her teachings all the force their intrinsic merit can justly claim. The Phædon of Plato embraces, without doubt, the concentrated wisdom of antiquity on the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Its author possessed peculiar advantages for collecting the most enlightened views within reach of the human mind, unenlightened by revelation. He was, if not the most able, yet certainly the most fortunate, of the ancient sages. Descended of a noble family, and born at a time which made him cotemporary with the wisest philosophers of the age, and gave him the benefit of their instructions, he was able to take a commanding view of the whole field of philosophy. Besides this, he was for eight years a pupil of the justly celebrated Socrates, and was allowed to be present and listen to the discourses with which he entertained his friends, during the confinement which preceded his execution. He also traveled extensively in Greece, Italy, Africa, and Egypt, consulting all the oracles of wisdom, and drinking from every intellectual and philosophical fountain. When to this we add the natural strength of his intellect, trained and improved by a long and rigid course of study and mental discipline, we need not wonder that he became "*princeps philosophorum*," and presented more consistent and exalted ideas of God, of nature, and of the human soul, than are found in the writings of his cotemporaries. The Phædon contains the summing up of all he had been able to learn from all the sources of information within his reach. We may be confident, therefore, that we have in this production the "*ne plus ultra*" of heathenism upon this interesting subject.

The style of Plato is truly captivating. It is placed by the judgment of Aristotle at an equal distance from the elevation of poesy and the simplicity of prose. Cicero was so pleased with it, that he remarked, "If Jupiter should converse like men, he would clothe his ideas in the language of Plato." Much of the grace and elegance of his style are lost in the process of translation, yet sufficient remains to indicate the ease and flowing eloquence with which he expressed his thoughts.

But though this book contains many just sentiments most beautifully expressed, and the perusal of it is a source of real pleasure to a correct taste, yet if we trace its pages with the expectation of finding those arguments which the mind

requires to *assure* it of immortality, we shall close it in disappointment.

The Phædon is written in the dialogue form, and in the character of Socrates; and claims to be a conversation held between him and his friends on the day of his execution. During the conversation the question was started, "Whether a philosopher should desire to die?" Socrates maintained the affirmative, and supported his position by reference to the good things he might expect in a future state, which constituted that state vastly superior to this. To support the idea of a future state, and of the conscious existence of the soul after death, against the objections of his friends, he offers the following arguments.

First. That man was made to know the truth, and it is the highest end of his being to arrive at this knowledge: but we are so clogged and hindered in our aspirations after truth, by the body, that we can never arrive at it until we quit the body. And therefore, the true philosopher should not only endeavor to abstract himself from the body as much as possible, that his views of truth may be the clearer, but he should even desire to die, that his knowledge of it may be perfect. He discourses as follows:—

"Now we have made it out that in order to trace the truth and purity of anything, we should lay aside the body and only employ the soul to examine the objects we perceive; so that we can never arrive at the wisdom we court till after death. Reason is on our side. For if it is impossible to know anything purely while in the body, one of these things must follow:—either the truth is not known, or it is known after death; because, the soul will then be left to itself and freed from its burden, and not before. And while we are in this life, we can only approach to the truth in proportion to our removing from the body, and renouncing all correspondence with it that is not of mere necessity, and keeping ourselves clear from the contagion of its natural corruption, and all its filth, till God himself comes to deliver us. Then, indeed, being freed from all bodily folly, we shall converse, *in all probability*, with men that enjoy the same liberty, and shall know within ourselves the pure essence of things, which, *perhaps*, is nothing but the truth."—Pp. 63, 64.

This reasoning is not destitute of force, though in the mouth of a heathen its conclusiveness is greatly weakened by the defectiveness of the prevailing notions of God, and of the work and designs of creation. Could he have known what the Christian knows, viz., that there is but one God, and he infinite in all his attributes,—that he *created* as well as formed the universe—that he created intelligent beings to be happy, only in knowing and communing with their Maker—that in knowing and enjoying God, we know and enjoy

the highest grade and idea of truth :—then, having established the fact that this knowledge cannot be perfectly attained in this life, it would follow as a legitimate corollary, that we must die to know, and live in a future state to enjoy, the highest end of our being. This is the form the argument assumes in the mouth of a Christian, and, for aught we can see, it is conclusive : but connected with the imperfect knowledge of heathenism in regard to the important facts named above, though not destitute of weight, the argument is necessarily weakened, and associated with doubts and misgivings which fully justify the use of the terms “*perhaps,*” and “*probably,*” employed in the preceding quotation. And, as might be expected, the argument proved unsatisfactory to his friends, who, though they agreed with him in much that he said, yet expressed their doubt upon the main point in the following language :—

“ There is only one thing that men look upon as incredible, viz., what you have advanced of the soul. For almost everybody fancies that when the soul parts from the body, it is no more ; it dies along with it ; it vanishes like a vapor, or smoke, which flies off and disperses and has no existence :—but that the soul lives after the death of a man, that it is sensible, that it acts and thinks ; that, I say, needs both insinuation and solid proofs to make it go down.”—Pp. 70, 71.

To supply this lack of evidence, Plato represents Socrates as introducing,—

Secondly. An argument founded on the fanciful notion that all things are produced by contraries. This dogma was intimately associated with the idea of transmigration. Which of these ideas claims precedence of the other, or which should sustain the relation of cause, and which that of effect, it seems now difficult to determine : but it is evident they are so related that neither can be dispensed with in making out the argument. Either the notion, that all things spring from their contraries, gave birth to the idea of transmigration, or it was probably invented to keep this last opinion in countenance. But whether the one or the other of these views be true, is not now material. In either case the argument for the immortality of the soul is defective. The position in regard to the material world is first *assumed*,—“ all things are produced by contraries ;” then the argument proceeds upon a supposed analogy between the laws which govern matter and spirit ; when no such analogy exists : and it makes death the cause of a positive effect, as though it had a positive existence. The dialogue proceeds :—

“ Is not death the opposite of life ? Yes.—And does not one breed the other ? Yes.—What is it that life breeds ? Death.—What is it that death breeds ? It must certainly be life.—Then, says Socrates, all living

things, and man, are bred from death. So I think, says Cebes.—And, therefore, continues Socrates, our souls are lodged in the infernal world after death. The consequence seems just.—Shall not we then attribute to death the virtue of producing its contrary, as well as life? Or shall we say that nature is lame and maimed on that score? There is an absolute necessity, says Cebes, of ascribing to death the generation of its contrary.—What is that contrary? Reviving or returning to life. If there is such a thing as returning to life, it is nothing else than the birth of the dead; and returning to life. And thus we agree that the living are as much the product of the dead, as the dead are of the living; which is an incontestable proof that the souls of the dead must remain in some place or other, whence they may return to life.”—Pp. 74, 75.

All this may have appeared very sound and imposing to Plato, or Socrates and his friends, who believed in the eternity of matter—had no just conceptions of the work of creation—and made death a part of nature—an agent as real, active, and efficient as life itself; but to minds enlightened and directed by the authoritative teaching of God’s Word, this phantasm disappears,

“As the vapor flies, dispersed by lightest blasts,
—and leaves no trace behind.”

The first fallacy in the argument consists in *assuming* what should have been proved, viz., that “all things are produced by contraries.” That all things have their opposites, is true: but that all things produce their opposites, or are produced by them, is not true. To assume this as truth, would be to fill the world with contradictions: it would follow from this, that the weakest is produced by the strongest, the slowest by the swiftest—that heat and cold, light and darkness, vice and virtue, produce each other; and that a conscious existence is generated by annihilation.

The second fallacy consists in arguing from material to immaterial; in making the laws which govern matter the basis of an argument in regard to spirit. If matter and spirit are entirely different substances, possessing not a single element in common, then it is both unphilosophical and absurd to suppose any analogy between them. Hence, to argue that because in some parts of the material world contraries succeed each other in obedience to the general law of increase and diminution,—therefore the soul must be immortal, is without the least shade of consistency. We can conceive how an analogical argument for the resurrection of the body might be reared upon this basis; but we cannot see how the argument can apply to the soul unless the soul be material, and then it would be too fanciful to have much weight with enlightened minds.

The third fallacy is also an absurdity, and consists in giving death a positive existence. Plato was not alone in this mistake; it was common to the ancients. They made death a part of nature, having his appropriate work assigned him. Hence, as life ended in death, they concluded death would end in life *ad infinitum*. That death will end in life, is an article of Christian faith; but not that it produces life. Death has no power, no existence—is a nonentity. And as that which is nothing can do nothing, hence death cannot produce life. Immortality is the gift of God, not the product of death. Death cannot act as an efficient cause in the production of life, because it has no positive existence. To expect life to arise from death, therefore, is to expect an effect without a cause.

The *third* argument of Plato for the soul's immortality is drawn from what he terms remembrance. And he uses the word, remembrance, as identical with knowledge. All our knowledge in this life, according to Plato, is made up of the remembrance of what we had known in some anterior state of being. As by the law of association, the sight of an object often suggests to the mind other objects with which we were previously familiar: so, when the idea of goodness, justice, or holiness is suggested to the mind; and, indeed, all our acquirements, purely intellectual, by whatever means gained, are but the remembrance and recovery of what we knew in a pre-existent state. From this he argues, (and conclusively enough, if the premise be valid,) that we had an existence anterior to this life, and therefore concludes it reasonable that we should live after death. The following extract we think justifies the above view of this argument:—

“But, continues Socrates, upon seeing the picture of a horse, or a harp, may not one call to mind the man? And, upon seeing the picture of Simmias, may not one think of Cebes? For we have agreed upon this: that it is very possible that a man seeing, hearing, or perceiving one thing by any of his senses, should form to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgotten:—so that one of two things must necessarily follow; either we were born with this knowledge, and preserved it all along, or else retrieved it afterward by remembrance: and of course our souls had a being before that time; that is to say, before they were invested with a human form; while they were without the body they thought, they knew, and they understood.”—P. 85.

The strength of this argument depends upon the pre-existence of the soul; and this again upon whether our knowledge in this life is remembrance of what we knew in a former life. If it be, then the soul must have lived in a previous state: if not, the idea

of the prior existence of the soul is an unfounded assumption, and affords no proof that the soul will live after death. As neither the doctrine of remembrance, nor the pre-existence of souls, is a self-evident truth, the whole argument moves in a circle; and, clogged as it is with the notion of metempsychosis, it excludes all just conceptions of immortality.

The *fourth* and last argument is drawn from the nature of the soul. The soul is not material, and consequently not subject to the laws by which matter is governed. Plato maintains the uncompounded and immaterial substance of the soul: 1. From the fact that it is always the same, and in the same condition. Material beings are constantly throwing off some of their elements, and receiving others into their composition; and sometimes material bodies are entirely dissipated. The human body is a subject of many changes; but inasmuch as the changes that affect the body do not affect the soul, the soul is not a part of the body; is uncompounded, is incapable of change, and is therefore immaterial.

The fact that the soul is intangible, is also presented as a proof of its immateriality. Material substances are objects of sense—in various ways tangible to the senses: not so the soul; therefore, the soul is immaterial. The same fact is argued from the superior and controlling power of the soul. “Nature orders the body to obey and be a slave, and the soul to command and hold the empire:” and this suits well to the idea of the immaterial and immortal nature of the soul. From the whole he remarks:—

“You see, then, my dear Cebes, the necessary result of all is, that our soul bears a strict resemblance to what is divine, immortal, intellectual, simple, indissoluble; and is always the same, and always like it: and that our body does perfectly resemble what is human, mortal, sensible, compounded, dissoluble; always changing, and never like itself.”—P. 95.

The following will show the most enlightened view of heathenism, in regard to the future condition of a soul leaving this world under favorable circumstances:—

“If the soul retains its purity without any mixture of filth from the body, as having entertained no voluntary correspondence with it, but, on the contrary, having always avoided it, and recollected itself within itself, in continual meditations; that is, in studying the true philosophy, and effectually learning to die;—for philosophy is a preparation for death:—I say, if the soul departs in this condition, it repairs to a being like itself, a being that is divine, immortal, and full of wisdom; in which it enjoys an inexpressible felicity, in being freed from its errors, its ignorance, its fears, its amors, that tyrannized over it, and all the other

evils pertaining to human nature ; and, as it is said of those who have been initiated in holy mysteries, it truly passes a whole course of eternity with the gods."—P. 97.

Such were the arguments employed, and such the conclusion to which Socrates conducted his auditors, as related by Plato. There is evidently considerable plausibility and some force in much that he presented ; but at the same time there is much that is assumed, vague, fanciful, and entirely unsatisfactory to minds enlightened by revelation. Even that which appears entitled to respect, becomes much more so when freed from the clogs of heathenism, and presented, as it may be, by reason, rectified and strengthened by God's Word. Under the elevated and sublime teachings of the Bible, what is chimerical and false is exploded ; and what is true, is rescued from the darkness in which its beautiful proportions were seen but dimly, if at all, and raised to the exalted rank of truths, grand and immutable. But these arguments, defective as they are, were all they had ; and though not unconnected with painful misgivings, were, nevertheless, relied upon by many with much confidence in proof of the soul's immortality. Cato, having carefully read the *Phædon* twice over, committed suicide : and Socrates, having finished his conversations with his friends, calmly drank off the fatal hemlock, apparently in the confident belief of a perpetuity of existence in another world.

But it is now time to turn our attention to the last, and to us the most pleasing, part of our present design ; viz., an exhibition of the arguments which reason and revelation furnish in support of the great truth under consideration.

It must we think be conceded that man did originally possess correct views of the immateriality and immortality of his nature. But the causes associated with his apostasy, which produced ignorance and corruption in other respects, also led the human mind astray upon this point, until it wandered in the mazes of unfounded speculation, under an entire misapprehension of his spiritual nature and exalted destiny. And for the most part the world remained in this state up to the time of the advent of Christ. To this, however, the Jews are an exception. To them were committed the oracles of God ; the incipient state of that revelation which to us is perfectly unfolded. And so far as they exerted a religious influence upon others, and others became acquainted with their sacred writings, darkness receded, and the true light advanced. This may account, in part at least, for the near approach made by some heathen writers to the true idea of the soul

and its immortality. The light of heathenism upon this point is either the "*reliquum*" of an ancient revelation, preserved by tradition, though variously corrupted; or it is a partial recovery of lost knowledge by the indirect agency of more recent divine communications. But whether it be the one or the other, or a combination of both, it leaves them without the *faith of assurance*, to endure the misery of a fruitless struggle between hope and fear. The Christian alone is raised above the influence of doubt, having arguments at command which amount to a moral demonstration. Not only does revelation speak out upon this point with a voice clear and authoritative; but reason, freed from her darkness and disabilities by divine influence, approaches the work of collecting and arranging arguments with advantages of a very superior character. In the remarks which follow,

I. Our first position is, that man possesses a spiritual nature, or that his soul is an immaterial essence or substance; and though mysteriously connected with a material body, yet differing entirely from it in nature, and not subject to the laws by which matter is governed. The works of creation, in all their vastness and variety, may be reduced to two grand divisions, matter and mind; and these two elements enter into the composition of man. We have as much evidence of the existence of matter and mind, therefore, as of our own existence; and no proof can exceed this. And the proof that mind exists is as great as that for the existence of matter. Indeed, if there is any difference, it is in favor of mind. The fact that we recognize the existence of matter is itself an evidence of the existence of mind, for it is only by the operations of mind that any ideas of matter can be formed. Though we cannot explain the nature or essence of either matter or mind, we are not on that account any the less sure of their being.

1. We argue the possession of a spiritual nature by man from the fact that he is a living, sensitive, self-moving being. The bare fact that man lives may not be a valid proof of his immateriality; but that he lives, a being of passion and volition, can only be accounted for by supposing the presence and influence of an immaterial soul. And for a very good reason: these phenomena are never exhibited by mere matter. We are acquainted with various forms of material substance, but we know of no form which of its own nature possesses the powers belonging to living and active beings. We behold around us various forms of matter in motion, but no one supposes material bodies move themselves; and the fact of their being in motion is proof to all, except the atheistic madman, of the existence of some power or influence superior to,

and independent of matter. But when we add to motion, sensation and volition, we have not only evidence of the existence of something superior to matter, but that that something is mysteriously connected with it, and makes it capable of its varied phenomena. If the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the order of the various parts of the material universe, are an evidence of the existence of an all-wise and almighty Being, by whose agency and skill all their complicated machinery is directed and managed; we argue, in like manner, that the ease with which man can manage the powers and parts of his body, and direct and control the whole physical frame, is no less an evidence of the existence, in mysterious union with the human body, of an immaterial nature, without which, though he might possess organic life and mechanical motion, yet he could not be a sensitive, self-moving being. This argument may be summed up as follows:—Matter, though it may be acted upon or moved, cannot move itself; but man can move himself: therefore man is not wholly a material being. Again: matter is incapable of sensation; but man is a sensitive being: therefore there is something besides matter which enters into the composition of man; and philosophy and religion have agreed to call it an immaterial soul.

2. The fact that man is an intelligent being is also in proof of his spiritual nature. It is true there has been a mighty effort on the part of a vain and skeptical philosophy to account for human intelligence without acknowledging an immaterial nature, but the failure has been as signal as the effort. The usual course pursued by materialists is to make intelligence the product of organization. Though they concede the point that unorganized matter has not the power of thought; yet, by a strange inconsistency, they contend, when organized in a certain form it becomes intelligent, and exhibits the varied phenomena of thought and feeling. But this notion is both unphilosophical and absurd. It is an axiom in philosophy that organized bodies do not and cannot possess any powers or tendencies which do not belong to the elements of which they are composed. If unorganized matter be destitute of the quality of thought, then it is absurd to suppose any possible combinations of material particles should create such quality. However we may vary the forms and combinations of matter, it is matter still, and nothing more—we can embrace no new circumstance in its description. And as the elements of which compound material bodies are composed are perfectly unintelligent, they must remain so in their compound state, however complicated and wonderful the combination may be. Hence the idea that intelligence is

the product of organization is a chimera. Nor does it obviate the difficulty to suppose, as some have done, that a faculty of thinking has been appended to some material bodies. For this faculty, or power to think, is something or it is nothing: if it be nothing, it can do nothing, and cannot be the subject of consideration; but if it be something, there must be some substance in which it inheres, and on which it depends for its existence, for it would be an absurdity to suppose it depends upon no substance at all; and as we have already seen it does not inhere in, and depend upon, a material substance, hence it must depend upon an immaterial substance, there being no other alternative. And this is all we contend for: this is what we mean by man's spiritual nature. Moreover, intelligence, though usually connected with the perfectly organized human body, is not a necessary concomitant. Proofs of this may be found in a consideration of the creation of the first man. God formed him of the dust of the earth; and we must suppose him to have been perfectly organized before "the inspiration of the Almighty gave him understanding." All parts of the system, including the *brain*, which all acknowledge to be the material organ of the outward manifestation of mind, were as perfectly arranged, and fitted for their several uses, as at any time afterward—he had all the attributes of the man, so far as relates to the material system; and yet was utterly destitute of life and motion, to say nothing of intelligence, and he remained so until God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he became a living soul." Here, then, is a clear case of a perfectly formed body without life or intelligence.

Finally. The phenomena of dreaming, of suspended animation, and of death, are in proof of the independence of thought and mind over matter. Intelligence does not always continue with the perpetuity of the physical organization, nor while continued is it always exhibited in the same degree of perfection. It may, and often does, cease, while the strictest examination cannot detect any disarrangement of the brain or any other part of the system. And this takes place where no external physical cause has acted upon the body, where the only agency to which the phenomenon can be referred is the action of intelligence on intelligence, or the independent action of thought. On the other hand, the body may be reduced by the action of disease to a mere skeleton, the physical powers are all prostrated, not one can be called into action; but the mind does not decay: the pulse ceases, the extremities become cold, the death rattle is in the throat; but reason holds her empire, and marked and clear is the manifestation of thought and in-

telligence. That which "triumphs within the jaws of mortality" must be independent of matter, and "is doubtless immortal."

The above considerations prove that intelligence does not and cannot arise out of the nature of compound material bodies, and by consequence prove man's spirituality. This argument may be summed up thus:—Intelligence can only arise from a spiritual substance; but man is an intelligent being: therefore man possesses a spiritual nature.

3. The immateriality of the human soul is clearly established by the Scriptures. The passage already referred to is in proof of this point. God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he became a living soul." From this it appears that man was not "a living soul" by virtue of his physical organization, but by virtue of that nature imparted to him when God "breathed into him the breath of life." Then first he received his spiritual nature, his "living soul:" then first he stood up, and walked forth erect into the world created to receive him, an intelligent being, capable of holding communion with his Maker, and dominion over the works of his hands. The passage which declares God made man "in his own image," is also decisive of the same fact. The corporal nature of man could not have been made in the image of God—God possesses no such nature, no such image; the allusion therefore must be to the spiritual nature of man, including his moral likeness. "God is a spirit," an intelligent spirit, and he made man in his own image; that is, he gave him a spiritual and intelligent nature. The language employed by our Lord (Luke xii, 4) makes a clear distinction between the body and soul: the former he declares may be killed, while the latter remains unhurt. The passage in Job xxxii, 8, is also directly to our purpose: "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." If "there is a spirit in man," then he is not wholly material; and if the "inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding," then his understanding, his intelligence, is not the result of any combination of the particles of matter, but of that spiritual nature given him of God when he "breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a living soul." As any further multiplication of Scripture testimonies seems unnecessary, we close the argument upon this point by simply repeating the remark, that in the composition of man we have as much proof of an immaterial soul as of a material body. Though we cannot explain the nature or essence of either, yet we know they exist, by the best of evidence, consciousness and our senses. We know matter exists, whether in our own composition or elsewhere, by an enu-

meration of its sensible qualities; and in like manner we prove the existence of mind, by a consideration of mental phenomena. We know we possess a body, by the evidence of our senses; and equally sure are we that we possess a mind, of a substance differing from the body, because we think, feel, remember, compare, reason, judge, will, &c. No proof can exceed this, and it is as conclusive in the one case as in the other. With these remarks in support of the doctrine of man's spiritual nature, we proceed

II. To the arguments furnished by reason and revelation to establish the soul's immortality. As our limits are prescribed, we shall not be able to give more than a general outline; and in doing this we will first listen to the voice of reason.

1. It seems necessary to allow a conscious existence in another and future state to justify the ways of God to man. God is a universal governor; and, as he is an infinitely good and just being, he must be a righteous governor. But if we confine our views of his administration to the present life, his government cannot be justified. God being infinitely perfect, his laws must be perfect; his laws being perfect, they must have an equal bearing upon his subjects: but if his administration be confined to the narrow precincts of this world, his laws and government bear most unequally, and there is no remedy. In this world, for the most part, the wicked bear rule. They are lofty in their claims, unjust and oppressive in their measures. Virtue is persecuted, down-trodden; and often receives the punishment due to crime. Where is the remedy, if the empire of God extends not beyond this life? We must change our views of the goodness of God, and the equity and impartiality of his proceedings; or enlarge the field of his operations, and give his government a broader sweep, that it may embrace both time and eternity. And if the government of God must pass over from this to another state that its perfect results may be unfolded, the existence of man must be perpetuated that he may reap the benefit of a perfect administration.

2. The credibility of man's future existence is supported by the analogy of nature. Almost every department of animated nature furnishes us with examples of a transition from one state of existence to another, as remarkable, and, before experience has established its certainty, as incredible, as any that can be supposed necessary to man that he may live in a future state. Not to dwell upon the examples usually employed upon this subject, we will refer only to a single illustration—man himself. That man in the embryo or infantile state should pass into a new world, or rise from helpless infancy to the active business man, the warrior, the

statesman, the philosopher, the orator, would be as incredible before the demonstration of experience, as that man as he now is should make his transit from this to a conscious future state. And the change he experiences in passing from the embryo or infantile state to the condition of perfect manhood is as *great* as that which we can suppose necessary that he may inhabit another world. But the change first mentioned, however incredible before experience, is a common and obvious fact, and hence excites no surprise. It follows, therefore, as man is in this life the subject of a change as great as may be necessary to introduce him to another life, it can never be incredible that he should pass through that other change, live in another world, and move in a higher and better sphere.*

3. The supposition of man's future state is further strengthened by the fact that the soul cannot be affected by the power of death. We cannot argue against the immortality of the soul from the nature of death, because we know nothing of its nature. And we cannot argue against the immortality of the soul from the effects of death, unless we can prove the soul to be a compounded substance. We see the effect of death upon the body. It is decomposed, resolved into its original elements. We are sure the body is dead; but we cannot say this of the soul. It is true we lose sensible communion with the mind that once animated the body; but it is not because the mind has ceased to exist, or has lost any of its original powers, but because of the dissolution of the material organ through which it made itself known to the external world. Moreover, the soul being a simple, indivisible essence or substance, not subject to the laws which govern matter, and hence indissoluble, cannot be affected by the power of death. For all that death can do, then, the soul may live for ever. Indeed, as our first introduction to this world was the vacation of our first sphere, or the incipient state of our being, that we might enjoy another more ample; so it seems to accord well both with philosophy and reason that death should be to us a sort of second birth, a vacation of our present sphere for one still more ample in means and opportunities for developing the capacities of our natures.

4. And this high destiny of the soul may be still further supported by a consideration of the nature and adaptation of its powers. It is capable of memory, reflection, imagination, contemplation, volition, reason, and of being moved with religious veneration. Most, if not all, these modes of the manifestation of mind are in

* See Butler's Analogy, where this point is illustrated in a most ample, able, and forcible manner.

their proper sense peculiar to man. And another peculiarity is that improvement of which the powers of the soul are susceptible. Brutes soon reach their zenith. There is with them no commencement to learn, and indefinite progression in knowledge and mechanical skill: their little all of knowledge flows in at once. Not so with man. "There is not a voluntary muscular movement, from that of the infant holding a spoon to the most skillful use of the hands and fingers in the nicest and most curious arts, where there is not a beginning of skill, and then a gradual growth toward perfection, induced by intense and persevering efforts on the part of the will to work according to some purpose or aim of the intelligence."* Under favorable circumstances "the patriarch pupil" goes on improving the powers of his mind, and enlarging the boundaries of mental vision, even to the sunset of human life; and, for aught we know, may continue to do so world without end. Also, the mind is adapted to the contemplation of subjects of an eternal nature. For instance, the idea of eternal duration. We have no evidence that any being made to inhabit this world, except man, can take in this idea, or pursue it a single step. To this we may add the moral government of God, and the infinite attributes of his nature. These are boundless subjects, involving considerations which pass beyond the present sphere of human activity, and afford eternal employment for immortal minds. It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that minds fitted by original constitution for the investigation and contemplation of such subjects should be immortal; otherwise there is no adequate opportunity for a full development of their powers, or to move in that elevated sphere for which their capabilities have prepared them. The mind is formed to contemplate the attributes, works, and government of God, and to be religiously affected by the survey. And is it reasonable to suppose that just as we begin to open our eyes upon the wonderful works of God, and to appreciate the evidences of his "eternal power and godhead," they will be closed to these subjects for ever? That the emotions of veneration and gratitude we feel rising within us toward the Author of our being, in view of his glorious perfections and bountiful goodness, will be checked and annihilated before they come to maturity? That just as we begin to develop the lofty attributes of mind in laudable pursuits, the corruscating fires of genius will be quenched in eternal night? That the aspiring soul, animated with the desire of immortality, will be suddenly checked in its upward tendency, and fall into nothingness? Is this reasonable? Is it not rather reasonable that

* Tappan on the Will, vol. iii, page 58.

we do but throw aside the old dress to assume a new one, and change our place of residence to pursue the objects of our being under circumstances of a more favorable character?

5. That the soul will live in immortality may be argued from its innate and indomitable desire for such destiny. By indulgence man may possess himself of many artificial appetites and desires, which are in no important respect necessary to his happiness; but so far as his desires are innate he cannot be happy without their gratification. Among his innate desires we may reckon the aspiration for immortality. This is universal. It is a concomitant of all forms of religion, and of every degree of civilization. It has its form of expression as well in the gloom of heathenism as the cheerful light of Christianity. The magnificent pyramids and rock-hewn tombs of Egypt are the outward imbodiment of this "longing after immortality." The mind may be in darkness and doubt as to the fact, but the desire still lingers, until depravity perverts our natures, and our crimes make us afraid to live.* The desire being inherent in our constitution, God is its author; and God being its author, he must have intended its gratification. For it is not supposable that God would give us a constitution, out of which arises naturally, and necessarily, the desire—the prospect of perpetual life—and provide no corresponding reality. The indulgence of such a thought would be a reflection upon the divine character. The bare fact that God has given us this ambition to live is itself a sure and certain pledge of an endless state of being.

"Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?
Or whence this secret dread, and inward horror
Of falling into naught? Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis the divinity that stirs within us;
'Tis Heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man."—*Addison's Cato*.

Without pretending to have given more than a brief synopsis of the argument from reason, our limits oblige us to check this train of thought here, and close by introducing the testimony of divine revelation.

6. The testimony of Holy Writ would be conclusive without any other; but supported as it is by arguments of another kind, it has peculiar force. Its voice is clear and distinct in the announcement of man's immortality.

* Fear of future retribution may overrule, or suppress, though it cannot annihilate, the desire for immortality.

First. It reveals the existence of spirit unconnected with matter. This it is true is a fact which now commends itself to our reason; but whether reason would have been able to discover it without the aid of revelation is very questionable. "God is a spirit," is the language of the Bible: a spirit who exists "from everlasting to everlasting;" whose influence is diffused through infinite space, and whose intelligence is seen in the formation and government of the universe. We have another example in the revelation given us of angels, who are denominated "ministering spirits;" and whose employment, and proximity to the throne of the uncreated God, prove they cannot be invested with corporeal natures like our own. But if intelligent spirits do exist unconnected with matter, we need not suppose the intelligent spirit of man in any sense dependent upon matter for its existence.

Second. The Bible goes further, and reveals the conscious existence of man in a future state. The fathers, where are they? Where are Enoch and Elijah, who went to heaven in a supernatural way? Where are faithful Abraham, pious Isaac, and wrestling Jacob? Our Lord tells us, "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living;" and yet he announces himself "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." The bodies of these old patriarchs crumbled to dust more than three thousand years ago; and yet they live in heaven, pure and spotless—they dwell in the presence of the God who made them. In regard to the future condition of infants, the Saviour remarks, "Their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven." And again, to the thief upon the cross, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." But enough upon this point: man lives in a future state.

Third. Finally, the Scriptures declare the *eternity* of man's future state. This we learn emphatically from the manner in which they speak of the rewards and punishments of men in another world. These are described in language which indicates being without end. The phrases, "eternal weight of glory," "eternal damnation," "everlasting punishment," "everlasting life," "eternal life," &c., establish with a clearness and authority indisputable the immortality of man as a subject of future retribution. Indeed, the whole gospel scheme proceeds upon the supposition that man is destined to a future and endless existence, without which much of it would be entirely unmeaning; and it is this fact that gives such tremendous weight to the sanctions by which obedience to its claims is enforced.

A just appreciation of the subject discussed in this article cannot fail to impress upon the mind the most lofty ideas of the dignity,

accountability, and destiny of man. It sheds a light upon this world which relieves the darkness of its dispensations; places it in fearful relation to another and endless state; and, as a probation for the future, invests it with an awful and unmeasured interest. Living, as we do, under the clear light and commanding voice of revealed truth, we cannot doubt as to the final issue. As Christians, "we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, *eternal* in the heavens." We know it by the authority, not of Plato, but of Jesus Christ.

ART. V.—*Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches: with Elucidations, by* THOMAS CARLYLE.

THANKS, many thanks, to thee, Thomas Carlyle! Truly thou hast set thee a task Herculean, and like a Hercules thou hast done it! A mighty diver, struggling with holden breath and strong agony of limb to bring up orient pearls from their deep sea bed, were but feeble type of thee! Thou hast brought up truth from the very bottom of Lethe, lustrous, dazzling, from its coffin of weed, as before the tide of time piled upon it its drift of things immemorable! Thou hast stormed the very refuge of lies! Thou hast rolled away a great stone from the grave of the virtues; and evoked from the forgotten world a new heroism to confound the skeptical in human earnestness! From the confused places of the unintelligible thou hast produced a living, consistent truth, to confirm the faith of the just! And for this, thy brave deed, we love thee, Thomas! Albeit thy speech be strange and wild, and thy brain fanciful, yet in thee there is heart of fire! It may be thou hast zeal surpassing knowledge, and ordinary eyes may see that thou lackest the peculiar virtue which truth to say is commonest and least virtuous of them all. Thou art not *prudent*, Thomas! And in thine enthusiastic zeal for truth thou art not always truthful. We speak not of thy story, for thy record is past question of fidelity; but thou dost not weigh thy hero fairly, evenly, in the balances. Thou layest thy heavy hand not gently on the beam, and givest light weight of virtue. Thou hast forgotten the human nature of great Oliver, and showed him forth immaculate. Yet, verily, there were spots upon him. Spots, as upon the glorious sun, seen only by excess of splendor. Points,

not dark, but less effulgent, which yet the common eye must veil to look upon.

How valuable the reproduction of these Letters and Speeches is to the present world will be judged very differently by different men. To the multitude it is entirely true that

“The age of the Puritans is not extinct only and gone away, but it is as if fallen beyond the capabilities of memory herself. It is grown unintelligible: what we may call incredible. Its earnest purport awakens now no resonance in their frivolous hearts. They understand not, even in imagination, one of a thousand of them, what it ever could have meant. It seems delirious, delusive. The sound of it has become tedious as a tale of past stupidities. Not the body of heroic Puritanism only, which was bound to die; but the soul of it also, which was, and should have been, and yet shall be, immortal, has for the present passed away.”

Indeed, practical Christianity (and Puritanism was but practical Christianity in unusual, but in natural and healthy, action) has always been a thing unintelligible to the great herd of mankind. In whatever way its wonderful nature has been developed, to them it has been utterly incomprehensible. Its principles are so diametrically opposed to the established rules of human policy, and its practices so inconsistent with the natural estimate of worldly good, that conduct governed strictly by its precepts must always confound the philosophy of this world. “Paul, thou art beside thyself,” conveys the most charitable decision of ordinary men upon cases of extraordinary virtue. More commonly dark designs are suspected to hide under the mask of unusual goodness, and greater purity is reputed only more cunning and more malignant evil. Even professed Christians for the most part are profoundly ignorant of the power of spiritual life. Many adopt the forms of religion who never comprehend its mysterious essence. They conform to its code of lesser morals, they acknowledge its laws, fear its penalties, and have some vague hope of its ultimate rewards; but its renewing power never calls into life the heroic energies of another nature, and inspires them with the holy and powerful passions of Christianity. Their religion is but a baptized and decent carnalism; better certainly than brazen wickedness, but resembling genuine piety only as the embalmed corpse resembles the living body. To them (and of such the churches mostly consist) the truly righteous appear to be enthusiasts in piety, and Pharisees in devotion. Earnestness in the great matter of salvation is to them unintelligible. They are men of order, they are men of peace; they would have the great question between

right and wrong adjusted upon the convenient principle of "uti possedetis." No matter if deadly error be disseminated; no matter though God's truth be outrageously assailed: it is uncharitable to encounter sin; it is not courteous to resist the devil; it only does harm to defend truth; it strengthens evil to enforce righteousness. From their very soul they abhor movements. To all such people the recollection of Oliver Cromwell is the memory of an incarnate fiend; or, if they allow him general honesty of purpose, he appears to them a fiery zealot, fierce, ruthless, and bloody; sanctifying violence by prayer, and celebrating slaughter with psalms. He was in no sense a man of the world, of this world, of their world; and they can by no possibility form any opinion of his conduct or character but what is entirely erroneous. Passive goodness completes their estimate of angelic perfection: untroubled rest is their maximum of heaven; and what know they, what can they know, of the powerful emotions of the living soul? How may they conceive of the stern will to die daily; to sacrifice present ease, life's ease, upon the altar of abstract hopes; to contend manfully, with every energy of soul, body, and spirit, against the dominion of sin, within the man and without? What know they of the courage that fears nothing in earth or hell which may thrust between the determined spirit and its destiny? What know courtiers and politicians, and bookmen and the common herd of men; what know they of the mind and soul, the resolves and purposes, of Oliver Cromwell? He was not one of them. A mad thunderbolt blazing across the confused darkness of a stormy time, striking down man and horse, king and commoners, parliament and presbytery, Scotch and Irish: having no law but its own impetus, no check but its own extinction; no object, no design; a mere instrument of evil, a grand firework of the mischievous devil: such is the vision of Oliver to many who think not at all. And there are others who think too much, after their fashion of thinking; the sagacious people; they who know how to divine men's thoughts, which they all unconsciously have thought; to uncover the secret springs of conduct, mysterious only to themselves. They can tell to the nicety of a homœopathic dilution the precise weight of ambition that turned the scale of Oliver's deliberations; and the very moment when his religion changed from gloomy to fanatical, and his fanaticism from crazy sincerity to crafty hypocrisy.

In short, Oliver Cromwell's character could not but be misunderstood in his own day, and in all days since; and the world must become vastly wiser and better before his fame can be appreciated upon just principles, and his rank among the heroes ultimately settled.

Under any circumstances it must have been so; but when we remember that Cromwell was the chief actor in a civil war, in which all that is worth fighting for and living for was at stake; a war against established wrong and habitual evil; against chartered rights, and old superstitions, and poetical recollections; a war against kings and priests, against dignities and vices; a war in which everything desirable by the one party was arrayed against all considered valuable by the other: when we remember the extraordinary and fearful details of the strife, and especially the great culminating act, in the then state of the world—the unspeakably daring, astounding act of executing a crowned king!—we may well believe that a truthful history of the man is not to be obtained from his enemies. Yet they have hitherto been his historians; and a sad history they have given us. Certainly, the genius of the present day had begun to raise doubts as to the degree of Cromwell's monsterhood; nay, some had even begun to conjecture that he might have been no monster at all; but few, perhaps none, were prepared for the truth. Yet he must be a prejudiced man indeed who can read these Letters and Speeches without conviction that the great man who wrote and uttered them was a pious, God-fearing man, sincere and humble to the last; altogether the best man and the best monarch that ever ruled the destinies of England. Yet how different the common notion of him! “Born of a good family, but early given to dissipation: afterward pretending to religion, and acting the hypocrite with such consummate skill as to deceive the most truly pious: suffering his affairs to fall into ruin by the length of his prayers and the general abstraction of his manner: urged by want to rebellion, fanaticism, and ambition: indebted to accident and intrigue for his success, he contrived to build up his fortunes on his country's ruin: waded through blood to the supreme power, being deterred by no crime from the prosecution of his own willful designs: suffered at the end of his career the agonies of remorse: and though in his domestic relations after his marriage altogether exemplary, yet leaving to posterity no better reputation than that of a character which was a compound of all the vices and all the virtues [small number, we opine] which spring from inordinate ambition and wild fanaticism.” Thus is Oliver described in the school books, and this is the image men see of him!

Now Mr. Carlyle, and Mr. Carlyle's researches, flatly contradict all this. Our author stands solitary and alone against an army of detractors, and against universal prejudice. He declares that all previous history of Cromwell is false, and unworthy of the least

credit ; a sheer gathering of lies and utterance of libels ; and this startling assertion is fully sustained by the unimpeachable evidence which this wonderful man has exhumed from piles of musty papers, long unread and hardly readable. There is, alas ! but little trust in what men call testimony. Even when observed most closely, and sifted most patiently, it often deceives us. The events of our own times, the deeds done in our own neighborhood and just beyond the scope of our own vision, are doubtful to us ; subjects of keen dispute and antagonist opinion. Human infirmity observes wrongly, remembers wrongly, narrates wrongly, infers wrongly : an infinity of questions are already postponed to eternity, as not possible to be settled in time. If such be contemporary history, what reliance can be placed upon that of ages past ? Were men less infirm then ? Did they observe better ? remember better ? Had they passions, prejudices ? When we were boys we firmly believed the beautiful stories of Greece and Rome. Hector, and Achilles, and Æneas, and Romulus, and Numa, were all realities to us then. Perhaps there were such men ; but how unlike the heroes of our sophomore year !

In fact, our knowledge and our opinions of past events, and of the characters of those who figured in them, are often utterly erroneous, even when gathered from the most authentic sources. To some extent this is unavoidable, since we can know nothing of the past but through history and tradition, which can never be entirely accurate and just ; but we often abandon ourselves to error when a little reflection and inquiry would save us from mistake. We are too apt to regard history as authority for belief ; and we rarely inquire by whom, and under what circumstances, and for what purposes, it was written. Still less are we disposed to go behind the author's statements, to inquire into the sources of his knowledge, to cross-examine his witnesses and estimate the force of their testimony. Few men think at all, and of the few who do, very few think logically. The time may come when the minds of men will be used in some sort as they were intended to be, but the time is not yet.

One thing is rapidly becoming certain as knowledge increases ; and that is, that the whole thing of human authorities is for the most part a delusion. We write things to-day which are denied and controverted by many, by the most : a hundred years to come, the book becomes respectable : should accident preserve it a thousand, it becomes sacred. Time will sanctify it, errors and all, as it has the records of the early churches. We have scarcely a book, whether it treats of things political or religious, which was

not written by a warm partisan, and is not full of as sheer special pleading as the efforts of lawyers in the courts of justice.

It is curious, when opportunity offers, to trace up a generally admitted fact, through its successive reiterations, as it has descended from generation to generation, to its original statement, and observe upon what authority the whole fabric rests. Frequently we may find the world upon the elephant, the elephant on the tortoise, and the tortoise on nothing. Will it be believed that our particular knowledge of Oliver Cromwell, the most extraordinary man, of the most extraordinary age, of the most extraordinary people under heaven, rests upon no better authority than that of a miserable, obscure pamphleteer, a mere court scribbler to Charles II., whose dingy libel was going through the press at the very time that the disinterred corpse of Cromwell was swinging in chains, and all Britain cringing under the scorpion lash of that wretched man whom God seemed to have sent back as the very worst plague for the obstinate king-worship of the people? Yet such is the truth. Mr. Carlyle went seriously to work to follow up the chain of narration from the present school-book histories to its beginning in contemporary writings; and after a search as laborious as the exploration of the Niger, he has discovered the first spring of all the foul and bitter stream in the

“Flagellium; or, the Life and Death of Oliver Cromwell, the late Usurper: by James Heath.’ Which was got ready as soon as possible on the back of the ‘Annus Mirabilis, or Glorious Restoration;’ and is written in such a spirit as we may fancy. When restored potentates and high dignitaries had dug up above a hundred buried corpses, and flung them in a heap in St. Mary’s church-yard, the corpse of Admiral Blake among them, and Oliver’s old mother’s corpse; when the dead clay of Oliver, and Ireton, and Bradshaw, were hanging on Tyburn gallows; when high dignitaries and potentates were in such humor, what could be expected of poor pamphleteers and gazeteers?”

True enough! And we should blush, every one of us who is capable of honest shame should blush, that we never thought all this before, but permitted the memory of Cromwell—dear to liberty, dear to God’s truth, as that memory is—to be lied out of all reality by such a creature as this “son of the king’s cutler” writing the history of a man whose fleshless bones were rattling on a gallows. Alas! to what painful truths does honest inquiry lead reluctant thought.

The biography now presented to us in the form of these Letters and Speeches is liable to none of the objections so forcibly urged against the authority of ordinary history. They present the facts,

the raw material of knowledge, in unadulterated purity. Mr. Carlyle has merely translated them from the antiquated, unintelligible language in which they were written, and elucidated them by such remarks as were, or seemed to him to be, necessary. They are now before us, in good modern print and white paper—the private, confidential, and business letters of Oliver Cromwell, written during a long series of years, full of his own reflections, and containing his own statements of the several great occurrences of his life. We have here a transcript of the mind and soul of Oliver, in every state of outward circumstances and inward emotion; and these must afford a correct account of the man and his times. His speeches, too, are full expositions of his own conduct, made before the men who knew him best; made, too, with a plainness and perspicuity which disprove all suspicion of sincerity. Hypocrisy so consummate as never for a moment to forget, during a long and extraordinarily busy life; dissimulation, perfect under all circumstances of triumph or adversity, preserved toward family and children, as well as friends and officers; deception begun in youth, maintained unflinchingly through life, and sustained completely even in the hour and article of death,—would be a miracle of art wholly inconsistent with human imperfection.

We have, therefore, an opportunity rarely offered in the prosecution of historical inquiry; an opportunity to judge the character of a great man and his times by evidence abundant and indubitable, not garbled by narrators, not liable to any suspicion of unfairness. We can try Oliver Cromwell far more justly than men of his own time could try him; we can judge the times in which he lived, and the characters prominent in those times, even better than he could judge them.

One of the most remarkable impressions made upon the mind of Mr. Carlyle himself upon the reading of all the old letters, speeches, and documents of all kinds belonging to Puritan history, is that the men of that day were true men; that we may read their utterances without painful effort to guess at hidden meanings concealed by artful words. The age was honest, in its goodness and its wickedness: whatever else it was, it was not deceitful. Our author says,—

“In the history of the civil war, far and wide, I have not fallen in with any such thing as deliberate falsehood. I will counsel the reader to leave all that of cant, dupery, Machiavelism, &c., decisively lying at the threshold. He will be wise to believe that these Puritans do mean what they say; and to try unimpeded if he can discover what that is. Gradually a very stupendous phenomenon may rise on his astonished eye, a practical world based on belief in God.”

Oliver Cromwell was born at Huntingdon, April 25, 1599. His father was Robert Cromwell, younger son of Sir Henry Cromwell, and younger brother of Sir Oliver Cromwell, "who dwelt successively, in rather sumptuous fashion, at the mansion of Hichinbrook, hard by." We will spare our readers his mother's pedigree, and all further notice of his ancestry. It matters little whether his family were obscure or noble, as certainly they owe all memory of them to him. It is well to observe, however, that he was not a brewer, or in any way associated with persons of coarse manners and vulgar minds. His family were highly respectable, and seem from what account we have of them to have been worthy of all respect. Oliver himself was carefully and religiously educated: first at the public school at Huntingdon, and subsequently at Cambridge. The death of his father recalled him from the university, when only eighteen, and he continued to live with his widowed mother until, and for many years subsequent to, his marriage.

There is not the smallest evidence that he was at any time a wild liver: on the contrary, all authentic information with regard to his early years confirms us in the supposition that he was grave, perhaps stern, even in his youth. His manners were formed in the society of sober and godly people, who were already forming that distinctive character and those close associations which in after times produced such extraordinary results. Oliver married before he was twenty-two years of age. His wife was Elizabeth Bouchier, daughter of Sir James Bouchier, knight, an opulent country gentleman. This connection shows that Cromwell was ranked among the gentry of the country, and disproves all stories of his original vulgarity. He was, in truth, a well-educated young man, of strong mind, severe morals, and good estate, who for ten years after marriage continued to farm his lands in quietness, and take care of his family with commendable prudence. One of Mr. Carlyle's characteristic paragraphs will be interesting to many of our readers:—

"In those years it must be that Dr. Simcott, physician in Huntingdon, had to do with Oliver's hypochondriac maladies. He told Sir Philip Warwick, unluckily specifying no date, or none that has survived, 'he had often been sent for at midnight.' Mr. Cromwell for many years was very 'splenetic,' often thought he was just about to die, and also 'had fancies about the Town Cross.' Brief intimation, of which the reflective reader may make a great deal. Samuel Johnson, too, had hypochondrias. All great souls are apt to have; and to be in thick darkness generally until the eternal ways and the celestial guiding stars disclose themselves, and the vague abyss of life knit itself up into firmaments for them. Temptations in the wilderness, choices

of Hercules, and the like, in succinct or loose form, are appointed for every man that will assert a soul in himself and be a man. Let Oliver take comfort in his dark sorrows and melancholies. The quantity of sorrow that he has, does it not mean withal the quantity of sympathy he has, the quantity of faculty and victory he yet shall have? 'Our sorrow is the inverted image of our nobleness.' The depth of our despair measures what capability and height of claim we have to hope. Black smoke as of Tophet filling all your universe, it can yet by true heart-energy become flame and brilliancy of heaven. Courage!

"It is therefore in these years undated by history that we must place Oliver's clear recognition of Calvinistic Christianity: what he, with unspeakable joy, would name his conversion, his deliverance from the jaws of eternal death. Certainly a grand epoch for a man: properly the one epoch, the turning point which guides upward or guides downward, him and his activity for evermore. Wilt thou join with the dragons; wilt thou join with the gods? Of thee too the question is asked. Whether by a man in Geneva gown, by a man in 'four surplices at Allhallow-tide,' with words very imperfect; or by no man and no words, but only by the silences, by the eternities, by the life everlasting and the death everlasting. That the 'sense of difference between right and wrong' had filled all time and all space for man, and boded itself forth into a heaven and hell for him: this constitutes the grand feature of those Puritan, old Christian ages; this is the element which marks them as heroic, and has rendered their works great, manlike, fruitful to all generations. It is by far the memorablest achievement of our species; without that element, in some shape or other, nothing of heroic had ever been among us.

"For many centuries, Catholic Christianity, a fit imbodiment of that divine sense, had been current more or less, making the generations noble; and here in England, in the century called the seventeenth, we see the last aspect of it hitherto: not the last of all, it is to be hoped. Oliver was henceforth a Christian man; believed in God, not on Sundays only, but on all days, in all places, and in all cases."

The earliest of these letters is dated St. Ives, Jan. 11, 1635. It seems that the writer, together with other leading Puritans, was at that time earnestly engaged in what we would now call a home missionary enterprise, an effort to supply the people with evangelical preaching. The mode of operation was to buy up "advowsons" or "impropriations" as they came into market, and invest them in trustees or "feoffees" for the support of lecturers. These latter were not commonly in "priest's orders," but had licenses to preach or lecture: which they did with such good effect that Laud set himself to suppress the whole system; which he did effectually, by his accustomed means, starchamber-law, fines, damages, &c. That so great an outrage upon the rights of property and conscience created great dissatisfaction we may readily believe. It was indeed one of the first movements toward the civil war; for

Cromwell, Hampden, Pym, and "in conscious act, or in clear tendency, the far greater part of the serious thought and manhood of England, had declared itself Puritan." This first letter of Cromwell has reference to these matters. Unless the writer was born a hypocrite—a supposition involving an absurdity almost too great even for the understanding of modern mitre-worshippers—this letter, written before he could have dreamed of greatness, or felt the first movements of ambition, must give us a true picture of Cromwell, when thirty-six years old, married, the head of a family, a substantial farmer at St. Ives.

"To my very loving friend Mr. Storie, at the Sign of the Dog, in the Royal Exchange, London, deliver these.

"St. Ives, 14th January, 1635.

"MR. STORIE,—Among the catalogue of those good works which your fellow-citizens and our countrymen have done, this will not be reckoned for the least, that they have provided for the feeding of souls. Building of hospitals provides for men's bodies; to build material temples is judged a work of piety; but they that procure spiritual food, they that build up spiritual temples, they are the men truly charitable, truly pious. Such a work as this was your erecting the lecture in our country; in the which you placed Dr. Wells, a man of goodness and industry, and ability to do good every way: not short of any I know in England: and I am persuaded that, since his coming, the Lord hath by him wrought much good among us.

"It only now remains that He who first moved you to this, put you forward in the continuance thereof: it was the Lord; and therefore to him lift we up our hearts that he would perfect it. And surely, Mr. Storie, it were a piteous thing to see a lecture fall, in the hands of so many able and godly men, as I am persuaded the founders of this are, in these times when we see they are suppressed, with too much haste and violence, by the enemies of God's truth. Far be it that so much guilt should stick to your hands, who live in a city so renowned for the clear shining light of the gospel. You know, Mr. Storie, to withdraw the pay is to let fall the lecture; for who goeth to warfare at his own cost? I beseech you therefore in the bowels of Christ, put it forward, and let the good man have his pay. The souls of God's children will bless you for it; and so shall I, and ever rest

"Your loving friend in the Lord,

"OLIVER CROMWELL."

Upon this letter Mr. Carlyle remarks:—

"Reverend Mark Noble says, the above letter is very curious, and a convincing proof how far gone Oliver was, at that time, in religious enthusiasm. Yes, my reverend imbecile friend, he is clearly one of those singular Christian enthusiasts who believe that they have a soul to be saved, even as you do, my reverend imbecile friend, that you

have a stomach to be satisfied ; and who likewise, astonishing to say, actually take some trouble about that. Far gone indeed, my reverend imbecile friend !”

The letter and the criticism are both important. The first exhibits Oliver as the civil war found him ; the latter teaches us what we are to understand by “enthusiasm” when used by writers of a certain school.

Until the age of thirty-seven Cromwell lived in the manner above mentioned, and with such views and conduct as the letter we have quoted sufficiently explains ; but events had now transpired which must call forth to their work the mighty men whom God had secretly chosen and prepared to do it.

Laud had at length got his liturgy and bishops ready for the Scotch ; and on the 23d of July, 1637, brought the whole machinery into action in St. Giles's Kirk, Edinburg. But they encountered an obstacle never heard of in history before, and entirely unprovided for in the archbishop's scheme of defense. In short, the whole apparatus was shivered to pieces by Jenny Geddes' stool. “Let us read the collect of the day,” said the pretended bishop from amid his tippets. “De'il colic the wame of thee !” answered Jenny, hurling her stool at his head ; “thou foul thief, wilt thou say mass at my lug ?” “A pape, a pape !” cried others : “stane him.” In fact, the service could not go on at all. The first blow in the civil war was struck ; and Jenny Geddes, the keeper of a cabbage-stall, had the honor of throwing the first missile in the fray. “All Edinburg, all Scotland, and behind that all England and Ireland, rose into unspeakable commotion on the flight of this stool of Jenny's ; and his grace of Canterbury, and King Charles himself, and many others, had lost their heads before there could be peace again.”

In England, too, things soon came to a crisis. The king, determined to rule by prerogative and the grace of God, levied ship money. John Hampden, cousin to Oliver, with more of grace than a thousand kings, refused to pay his twenty shillings of it. Then came the trial, and the serried array of the people against the crown.

The Scotch raised a formidable army wherewith to protect themselves against “liturgies” and the “four surplices at Allhallowtide.” The king could raise no force to oppose them, and was compelled to call a parliament. Oliver Cromwell was a member, and for the first time took part in public affairs. This parliament, however, was dismissed after a session of three weeks ; and his majesty again essayed to rule without his people. An army was

indeed got together, but they would not fight the Scotch, whom all the better people in England considered friends. The Scotch invaded England, and again was parliament convoked. Cromwell was once more a member: and they sat long enough this time, longer than Oliver thought enough.

We need not recapitulate historical details familiar to our readers. The king ultimately levied forces against the parliament, and the latter in their turn assembled a force to protect the country. In the organization of the army under Essex, Cromwell was appointed captain of a troop of horse, and was soon noted for his activity. Immediately assuming the duties of a soldier, he seized the arms in the castle of Cambridge, and prevented the university plate, worth £20,000, from reaching the king, to whom it was sent. He was in truth the life and soul of the revolution in the district confided to his care; and seems to have formed very early those extensive views of the nature of the change to be wrought, which, however startling they were at first, eventually became general through an inevitable necessity. The parliament at first determined to carry on the war as for the king, against his counselors, to rescue him, poor man, from the wicked men who were misguiding him, and inducing their gracious sovereign to abuse his loving subjects; but Cromwell from his soul loathed all such mummary as this, which, while it deceived nobody, showed timidity and irresolution in the popular leaders, very dangerous to their cause. Cromwell knew, as every other thinking man in England knew, that Charles Stuart was no puppet, no King Log; but a proud, bad man, who despised all restraints upon his will, and was bent upon reducing the government of Great Britain to an absolute tyranny; and Oliver openly declared that if he should encounter the king in battle he would fire his pistol at him as soon as at any other man,—doubtless sooner than at any other man. Strange as it may seem, this saying was considered so bold and dangerous, even by men in arms against the crown, that the earl of Manchester made formal complaint of it to parliament.

The first actions in the war were rather favorable to the king, for causes which Cromwell readily perceived, and which he diligently and patiently set himself to remove. As this perception of Oliver was the key to the subsequent triumph, we will quote his account of it, from one of his speeches, together with Mr. Carlyle's interpolations.

“I was a person who from my first employment was suddenly preferred and lifted up from lesser trusts to greater, from my first being captain of a troop of horse, and did labor as well as I could w

discharge my trust, and God blessed me [therein] as it pleased him. And I did truly and plainly, and in a way of foolish simplicity, as it was judged by very great and wise men, and good men too, desire to make my instruments help me to that work. And, I will deal plainly with you, I had a very worthy friend then, and he was a very noble person, and I know his memory is very grateful to all—Mr. John Hampden. At my first going out into this engagement I saw our men were beaten at every hand, I did indeed; and desired him that he would make some additions to my Lord Essex's army of some new regiments; and I told him I would be serviceable to him, in bringing such men in as I thought had a spirit that would do something in the work. This is very true that I tell you, God knows that I lie not. 'Your troops,' said I, 'are most of them old, decayed serving-men, and tapsters, and such kind of fellows; and their troops are gentlemen's sons, younger sons and persons of quality. Do you think that the spirits of such base and mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen that have honor, and courage, and resolution in them?' Truly I did represent to him in this manner, conscientiously and truly I did tell him, 'You must get men of a spirit, and take it not ill what I say. I know you will not. Of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go; or else you will be beaten still.' I told him so, I did truly. He was a wise and worthy person; and he did think that I talked a good notion, but an impracticable one. ['Very natural in Mr. Hampden, if I remember him well, your highness! With his close, thin lips, and very vigilant eyes; with his clear, official understanding, lively sensibilities to 'unspotted character,' 'safe courses,' &c., &c. A very brave man, but formidably thick quilted; and with pincer lips, and eyes very vigilant. Alas! there is no possibility for poor Columbus at any of the public offices till once he become an actuality, and say, 'Here is the America I was telling you of.'] Truly I told him I could *do* something in it. I did so. The result was—impute it to what you please—I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did. [The Ironsides, yea!] And from that day forward, I must say to you, they were never beaten; and whenever they were engaged against the enemy they beat continually. [Yea.] And truly this is a matter of praise to God; and it hath some instruction in it to our men who are religious and godly."

If genius be "the faculty of doing something new," the power of solving difficulties never solved before, of threading labyrinths never penetrated by others,—then Cromwell was a man of genius. He was a bold man who undertook to do what John Hampden declared impracticable: he was sagacious far beyond the limits of ordinary wisdom who succeeded in thus doing. There can be no question that Cromwell's regiment turned the fortune of the war, and revolutionized the kingdom. He not only knew how to raise troops, he knew better than any other man how to use them. Every important battle during the war was won by the generalship

of Cromwell and the excellent qualities of these particular soldiers. Winceby, Marston Moor, Naseby, Preston, Dunbar, and Worcester, all attest the sagacity and soldiership of this wonderful man. Indeed, regarded as a mere soldier, Cromwell has had few equals, perhaps no superiors. His courage was indomitable. The most threatening appearances never for a moment disturbed his calm and resolute mind. In circumstances the most disastrous, even on the very verge of destruction, he was always prepared for victory; and never did his vigilant eye fail to perceive an opportunity to overwhelm a confident foe by an attack so unlooked for, and yet so vigorous and well sustained, as to defy all resistance. He never was defeated, whether his foes were English, Scotch, or Irish. Whether animated by pride and crazy loyalty, or warmed by religious fervor, or mad with savage fury; whether posted advantageously or disadvantageously; whether superior in numbers or discipline; it mattered not, they were "as stubble to the swords" of Oliver's soldiers. His "battle glance was magical." A false movement of the enemy was the sure presage of destruction; for the swords of the terrible Ironsides, flashing among ruptured columns and broken ranks, swept all before them.

Perhaps the most extraordinary fact in Cromwell's history is that he does not seem to have been at all elated by military success. It is impossible to discover in any of his accounts of battles, whether official or private, any evidence of vain glory. In every instance he seems perfectly aware of the importance of the victory itself; but he never attributes it in any degree to his own extraordinary conduct. It is indeed doubtful whether Cromwell ever perceived his own greatness. He evidently regarded himself as a chosen instrument of the Almighty; and the sublimity of this commission, while it humbled him toward God, made earthly honor valueless. Could Moses or Joshua value themselves upon military success? Could Gideon be proud of victory?

"For the Honorable William Lenthall, Speaker of the Commons House of Parliament: these.

Harborough, 14th June, 1645.

"SIR,—Being commanded by you to this service, I think myself bound to acquaint you with the good hand of God toward you and us.

"We marched yesterday after the king, who went before us from Daventry to Harborough; and quartered about six miles from him. This day we marched toward him. He drew out to meet us; both armies engaged. We, after three hours' fight very doubtful, at last routed his army; killed and took above five thousand; very many officers, but of what quality we yet know not. We took also about two

hundred carriages, all he had; and all his guns, being twelve in number, whereof two were demi-cannon, two demi-culverins, and I think the rest sakers. We pursued the enemy from three miles short of Harborough to nine beyond, even to the sight of Leicester, whither the king fled.

"Sir, this is none other but the hand of God; and to him alone belongs the glory, wherein none are to share with him. The general (Fairfax) served you with all faithfulness and honor: and the best commendation I can give him is, that I dare say he attributes all to God, and would rather perish than assume to himself. Which is an honest and a thriving way: and yet as much for bravery may be given to him in this action as to a man. Honest men served you faithfully in this action. Sir, they are trusty: I beseech you, in the name of God, not to discourage them. I wish this action may beget thankfulness and humility in all that are concerned in it. He that ventures his life for the liberty of his country, I wish he trust God for the liberty of his conscience, and you for the liberty he fights for. In this he rests, who is your most humble servant,

"OLIVER CROMWELL."

The "honest men," who "served you faithfully," were doubtless the "Schismatics," or Independents, then so obnoxious to the dominant Presbyterian party. The hint about "liberty of conscience," and "the liberty he fights for," had meaning enough to the speaker.

And this is the account of the battle of Naseby, the great crown-victory of the war, by the man to whose conduct it was due. Cromwell commanded the horse on that memorable day. Rupert led the cavalry of the royal army. Each commanded the wing of his respective army distant from the other. Fiery Rupert charged through the infantry opposed to him, put it to flight, and scattered it in disorder; then, thinking the battle gained, his men dispersed for plunder. On the other wing Cromwell had also charged, had also broken the infantry before him, had also thrown the opposing army into wild disorder; but his men did *not* disperse for plunder. They rallied their disordered ranks, and quietly waited for Rupert, whom they also broke, scattered, destroyed, and chased thirteen miles. A rare achievement! Yet how modest, how Christian-like, the letter! Is there any *ambition* in it? Does Cromwell detract from Fairfax? Does he even tell how the fight was won? Where is the *cant*? Writes he not as a God-fearing man might write?

Time passed on, and strange events came rapidly to pass. The quarrel between the Presbyterians and Independents, represented by the city and the army, soon became quite as serious as the contest between the king and his people had been. Into

the details of this much-vexed controversy we cannot enter. Suffice it to say, that the discontents of the army were not fomented by Cromwell for selfish purposes, or any other purposes. They needed no fomenting at all. They were natural, necessary, inevitable. Never was such an army as Oliver's mustered before: and he will err sadly who shall proceed to account for the motives of their conduct by presuming them to be affected as soldiers commonly are affected. The army was not composed of well-trained mercenaries; nor was it made up of thoughtless men, mere fighting men. The officers had other things in view than promotion or great rewards; the soldiers lusted not for "blood, brandy, and free quarters;" nor was there to bind them together, and to their leader, a blind attachment to a conquering general, under whom they had triumphed and pillaged, and by whom they hoped to triumph and pillage again. This army was made of sterner stuff. Thousands of the decent, thoughtful men of England had taken arms in defense of rights the dearest to the heart of man. Deliberately they had resolved to deliver their country from despotism; and this solemn purpose they carried out with a perseverance, courage, moderation, and dignity never displayed by an army before: never equaled since except by an army of similar sort, which revived the contest in our own country with better success, though not with holier design nor with more heroic effort. It was not the purpose of the army to transfer the sceptre from the king to an irresponsible council, or the keeping of their consciences from the star chamber to courts of presbytery. It was no part of their magnificent design to "solder Christ's crown to Charles Stuart's." They intended to free England, and to do this at the peril and loss of every man and all parties of men who should stand between them and doomed abuses. Cromwell did not create this determination. God, and not he, had formed that unflinching, incorruptible host, and they would have trampled him into the dust had he dared to withstand them.

Let any man read the memorial from the army to the city of London, and say whether such memorial was ever sent from an army before, and whether the demands of the soldiers were not altogether just, altogether in keeping with the character we have given of the men who wrote it.

The result of this contest is well known. The army triumphed; the parliament was purged by Col. Pride; the king was tried for his treason, and in the face of all men condemned to merited death, and duly executed, upon "the open street before Whitehall." This was done by the *army*, and principally by *Cromwell*, the exponent

of the army's feelings. It was a bold deed, a just deed; such as was never equaled on earth before. It marked an epoch in the progress of man. One of these days we shall have reached another. Kings and their craft are the heaviest curse begotten by sin and entailed on the earth; but the earth will be rid of them some day; and then they shall have their meed of fame who first led the people to the foot of a throne, not with prayers and humble adoration, but with stern remonstrance and good sharp swords. Mr. Carlyle's comments upon this extraordinary act are characteristic:—

“‘More savage than their own mastiffs!’ shrieks Saumaise; shrieks all the world, in unmelodious soul-confusing diapason of distraction, happily at length grown very faint in our day. The truth is, no modern reader can conceive the then atrocity, ferocity, unspeakability of this fact. First, after long reading in the old dead pamphlets does one see the magnitude of it. To be equaled, nay to be preferred, think some, in point of honor, to ‘the crucifixion of Christ.’ Alas, in these irreverent times of ours, if all the kings of Europe were to be cut in pieces at one swoop, and flung in heaps in St. Margaret’s church-yard on the same day, the emotion would, in strict arithmetical truth, be small in comparison! We know it not, this atrocity of the English regicides: shall never know it. I reckon it perhaps the most daring action any body of men to be met with in history ever, with clear consciousness, deliberately set themselves to do. Dread phantoms, glaring supernal on you—when once they are quelled and their light snuffed out, none knows the terror of the phantom! The phantom is a poor paper-lantern with a candle end in it, which any whipster dare now beard.”

“This action of the English regicides did in effect strike a damp like death through the heart of flunkeyism universally in this world. Whereof flunkeyism, cant, cloth-worship, or whatever ugly name it have, has gone about incurably sick ever since; and is now at length, in these generations, incurably dying. The like of which action will not be needed for a thousand years again.”

It is not at all necessary for us to discuss the propriety of this extraordinary act. A few words, however, may not be unimportant. Charles was not executed because he had been a king, and was conquered; nor because as a king he had contended for the utmost stretch of prerogative; nor because he had violated the sanctity of law, suppressed all law, and reigned by “the grace of God,” or more properly by the instigation of the devil. James and Elizabeth were both tyrants, both might justly have been dethroned; but neither had committed the unpardonable sin of Charles I. The latter had entered into a solemn treaty with the people; he had, for value received in the shape of hard money, parted with what-

ever of odious prerogative he had claimed ; he had sworn to abstain from tyrannous acts ; he had solemnly ratified the Petition of Right ; and he had openly violated his oath, contemptuously trampled upon his obligation, and scoffed at the remembrance of his broken word. Here was what rendered Charles I. peculiarly a traitor, and here was what cost his life. His falsehood made it necessary to slay him. Men could not treat with him, because they could not trust him. Much stress has been laid upon his private virtues, by which seems to be meant his moderation compared with the abandoned profligacy of his son. But what have his domestic virtues to do with this question ? Suppose he were as continent as Joseph, as liberal as Cæsar, as grave and decent in his manners as a sexton. As one well expresses it : " If he break his word to his people, is it a sufficient defense that he keeps it to his companions ? If he oppress and extort all day, shall he be held blameless because he prays at night and morning ? If he be insatiable in plunder and revenge, shall we pass it by because in meat and drink he is temperate ? If he have lived like a tyrant, shall all be forgotten because he has died like a martyr ? He was a man who had so much semblance of virtue as might make his vices more dangerous. He was a ruler after the Italian fashion : grave, demure, of a solemn carriage and a sober diet ; as constant at prayers as a priest, as heedless of oaths as an atheist."

The new commonwealth had other battles to fight. The Presbyterian party, of whom the Scotch were the chief support, arrayed themselves in most formidable fashion for the restoration of the young king. Endeavoring to combine loyalty and rebellion, quixotic devotion to the king with open resistance to his authority and forcible control of his person and policy, Protestant piety with royal licentiousness, the solemn "covenant" with secret Popery,—this Presbyterian party undertook to solve the oddest paradoxes that ever contained the principles of political conduct.

" Given a divine law of the Bible on one hand and a Stuart king on the other. Alas ! did history ever present a more irreducible case of equations in this world ?"

The consequences might have been foreseen without the spirit of prophecy. To declare the king's conduct insupportably tyrannous, and his person inviolable ; to overthrow his government upon the ground of the sheer necessity of protecting themselves from shameful abuse, and yet to demand, as the greatest boon of Heaven, the perpetuation of his dynasty ; to clamor for the blood of his creatures, and to shrink with horror at the sight of his own ;

to exact pure morality by force of law, and to cut the throats of stern moralists like themselves in order to give dominion to a lecherous profligate, without conscience to restrain his appetite, or pity to mitigate his lust; to exact a pledge from conscious falsehood; and to suspend upon the extorted promise of a heartless, truthless man, the lives and liberty of his open enemies, who had slain his father, and hunted himself like a partridge in the mountains. These were some of the inconsistencies of the Presbyterians of that day. Absurdities not at all Presbyterian, neither engendered nor cherished by the religious notions of the sect; but the fruits of that idolatrous and senseless worship of kings merely as such, which, under the name of loyalty, had long been reckoned by the world, and more than all by the Scotch, a virtue hardly second to submission to God. In the righteous retributions of the Almighty, they at last got back their idol; and the dragoons of Claverhouse at once repaid their zeal and punished their inconsistency.

But they were not immediately successful. They were overthrown with a violence which might well have led them, by their own mode of interpreting events, to read the anger of the Almighty in the unexpected and unaccountable defeat that happened them. Indeed, the battle of Preston might have appeased their love of kings; but even the extraordinary overthrow at Dunbar could not quell it. It is not yet quelled; and even now we laugh, in spite of our commiseration, when we see the sedate Caledonians going mad with happiness because a young woman, facetiously called their sovereign, with a good-looking German gentleman, her husband, condescends to visit their country! Alas for poor human nature! the age of reason is a long way off yet.

The battle of Dunbar was certainly one of the most extraordinary actions ever fought.

Cromwell with eleven thousand men had retreated before the Scotch army of twenty thousand, and had finally been compelled to make a stand on the peninsula of Dunbar, scarcely a mile and a half broad. Behind, and on either hand, was the boisterous sea; before, the superior army of the Scotch, elated with assurance of victory. They had chased Oliver into a net whence there was no escape, and there they lay along the brow of "Doon Hill," waiting the fitting moment to destroy him. The paths through the hill were always difficult, and the dreadful weather made them almost impassable. Such as they were, the Scotch held them, and only waited until Cromwell in despair should essay to force them.

But Oliver never despaired. "In the dark perils of war," writes one who knew him, "in the high places of the field, hope

shone in him like a pillar of fire, when it had gone out in all the others."

"To Sir Arthur Haselrig, Governor of New-Castle: these.

"Dunbar, 2d Sept., 1650.

"DEAR SIR,—We are upon an engagement very difficult. The enemy hath blocked up our way at the pass at Copperspath, through which we cannot get without almost a miracle. He lieth so upon the hills that we know not how to come that way without great difficulty; and our lying here daily consumeth our men, who fall sick beyond imagination.

"I perceive your forces are not in a capacity for present release. Wherefore, whatever becomes of us, it will be well for you to get what forces you can together; and the south to help what they can.

* * * * *

"The only wise God knows what is best. All shall work for good. Our spirits are comfortable, praised be the Lord; though our present condition be as it is. And indeed we have much hope in the Lord; of whose mercy we have had large experience.

* * * * *

"Your servant,

"OLIVER CROMWELL."

This letter is worthy of great attention; it is a confidential note, written under the greatest possible embarrassment, and in view of the utmost dangers. Hypocrisy here is out of the question. If ever man's true character was exhibited in words, we have true character here. And what character is it? We ask the reader to place himself, as far as it is possible for fancy to place him, in Oliver's circumstances, and then judge. To us this letter is as noble a specimen of the heroic style as can be found in this world's writing.

After dispatching this remarkable note, Cromwell returned to his lines, and walking with Lambert in the garden of Brocks-mouth House, the extreme left of his army, he discerns that Lesley is gradually descending from the hills and moving his line further to the right, occupying the valley and the pass, outflanking Oliver as much as possible, and preparing to attack and overwhelm him whenever he should deem the proper moment to have come. This movement was full of intense interest. A common man, in Cromwell's place, would have read in it his knell of ruin; would have thought of capitulation; hard necessity; marching out with the honors of war, &c. The lord general's thoughts were somewhat different. He said to Lambert, "Does it not give us an advantage if we, instead of him, like to begin the attack? Here is the enemy's right wing coming out to the open space, free to be attacked on any side, and the main battle hampered in narrow, sloping ground

between Doon Hill and the brook, has no room to manœuvre or assist. Beat this right wing where it now stands; take it in flank and front with an overpowering force;—it is driven upon its own main battle, and the whole army is beaten.” Lambert eagerly assented. Monk coming up, is consulted, as other officers, and now everybody can see it. It must be done to-morrow morning before dawn.

The night was “wild and wet.” The Scots, lying in the open air under the stormy sky, let their matches go out; and, cowering down among the shocks of corn, sought what covering they might from the pitiless sleet. Oliver’s army stood to their arms, and made fervent prayer to God. “Major Hodgson riding along, heard, he says, a cornet praying with his men, and turned aside to worship and pray with them.” And now the moon gleamed forth; the appointed hour had come. The shock was terrible, irresistible. The advanced troops of the Scotch made fierce resistance while they might, but, overwhelmed by charges of horse and foot, and torn by discharges of artillery, they were forced back upon their own men; confusion, utter rout ensued; three thousand were killed upon the spot; ten thousand threw down their arms and surrendered; guns, ammunition, everything which constitutes an army, were taken; and, “over St. Abb’s Head and the German Ocean just then burst the first gleam of the level sun upon us, and I heard Nol say, ‘Let God arise, let his enemies be scattered!’”

“The lord general made a halt, and we sang the hundred and seventeenth Psalm.” And well might the lord general and his men give thanks. They had, as by a miracle, been extricated from an apparently inextricable situation. Chased by double their numbers till they could retreat no more, they had suddenly turned upon their pursuers, routed them, broken them to pieces, killed and taken more than half of them, and all this with the loss of thirty men! Has history a parallel to this action? Did Napoleon ever display more military genius than was here displayed by Oliver? Surely he never won a battle with so little loss,—surely no battle was ever won against greater odds, or more entirely under God, through the genius of a single man.

This was the greatest triumph of Cromwell’s triumphant career. Let us see how it affected him. Fortunately we have the best means of learning.

“*For my loving Brother, Richard Mayor, Esq., at Hursley: these.*

“*Dunbar, 4th Sept., 1659.*

“*DEAR BROTHER,—Having so good an occasion as the imparting so great a mercy as the Lord vouchsafed us in Scotland, I*

would not omit the imparting thereof to you, though I be full of business.

"Upon Wednesday we fought the Scottish armies. They were in number, according to all computation, above twenty thousand; we hardly eleven thousand, having great sickness upon our army. After much appealing to God, the fight lasted above an hour: we killed, as most think, three thousand; took thirty guns, great and small, besides bullets, match and powder, very considerable officers; about two hundred colors, above ten thousand men: lost not thirty men. This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvelous in our eyes. Good sir, give God all the glory. Stir up all yours, and all about you, to do so. Pray for

"Your affectionate brother,

"OLIVER CROMWELL."

"For my beloved Wife, Elizabeth Cromwell, at the Cockpit: these.

"(Same date.)

"MY DEAREST,—I have not leisure to write much, but I could chide thee that in many of thy letters thou writest to me that I should not be unmindful of thee and thy little ones. Truly, if I love you not too well, I think I err not on the other hand much. Thou art dearer to me than any creature; let that suffice.

"The Lord hath showed us an exceeding mercy—who can tell how great it is! My weak faith has been upheld. I have been in my inward man marvelously supported; though I assure thee I grow an old man and feel infirmities of age marvelously stealing upon me. Would my corruptions did as fast decrease! Pray on my behalf in the latter respect. The particulars of our late success Henry Vane or Gilbert Pickering will impart to thee. My love to all dear friends. I rest there.

OLIVER CROMWELL."

These two domestic letters are invaluable; and, we venture to say, incomparable. They establish beyond all dispute the sincerity of Cromwell's piety; they acquit of vain glory, nay, they show a mind too well schooled in Christianity to be affected, except to faith and thankfulness, by the most extraordinary elating causes. A letter to his wife, written the day after the battle of Dunbar by the hero of the fight, in the midst of the confusion of victory, and scarcely a word in it about the great event! Not an item of intelligence how it was won by his own great skill and undaunted courage! Not a single note of triumph in the whole strain! He remembers, at this moment of wild felicitation, almost adoration, when a sceptre is just before him,—he remembers "his corruptions" and "infirmities" stealing upon him! "For particulars of our late success," consult Henry Vane!—Never was such a letter written before! We almost believe, never was such a man before!

By this time our readers have made up their opinion of Oliver Cromwell; we doubt not for many of them, that their opinion is very different from any they had before. His letters have at last vindicated him, and he stands forth an honest man; strong in understanding, quick to perceive, mighty to execute—a soldier who feared God, a statesman who revered the truth; a conqueror without ambition, a king without a sceptre; yet the wisest and the strongest who ever ruled the nation. Knowing the man as we do now, we are prepared to understand his further history as we have not before understood it. He must be presumptuous, indeed, who can pronounce such a man entirely wrong in anything he may have done, unless he shall have mastered all the facts as Oliver perceived them, and invested himself with all the circumstances as they existed at each particular time, when the great man seems to have been inconsistent with himself. Many things for which Cromwell has been blamed most unsparingly, are very defensible even as we see the reasons of action, and his fortune will differ from that of other conspicuous men, if he be not often censured for the best deeds of his life, and praised for the least commendable.

For nothing has the Protector been more virulently assailed than for his severity to the Irish. It is true he undertook to cure anarchy and rebellion there upon another plan than “rose-water surgery.” But if he differed from modern wisdom in his mode of operation, it is certain that he succeeded in his object; he pacified Ireland—and kept it pacified, and happier than it has been since, or is likely to be again, under the “rose-water” system. It may be that, after all, less blood was shed in that unhappy land under the Cromwell rule, sieges and storms included, than has been, without sieges and storms, in *peaceful* times, by assassinations and the like. It is to be seen whether storms of “Drogheda,” or grants to Maynooth, are the more merciful means of “pacification.” Oliver writes, “Truly, I believe this bitterness (severity) will save much effusion of blood through the goodness of God.” Doubtless it did: how much may be shed or spared through the fruition of “rose-water” means, Maynooth, emancipation, &c., will be written in another history.

The forcible dissolution of the parliament, and the military control of the country, were certainly strange and strong measures, only to be justified by stern necessity. But the necessity was stern. Remember, that these were parts of the revolution. From the death of Charles to the protectorship there was no settled government in England. The parliament was a self-constituted power—as much so as Oliver's. The army was unquestionably the real

representative of the people of England. All government being disorganized, the armed people, who had unsettled everything by abolishing the previous government, were compelled, by the very necessity for which they took up arms, to put down all obstacles to an ultimate and judicious "settlement." As they could not procure this through the residuum, or *caput mortuum*, of the parliament, they had to do it through Oliver, and it was well done. Under his rule England prospered and triumphed; no man was oppressed at home, nor insulted abroad:—unfortunately there was but one Oliver, and he could not live always.

Such being the life of Cromwell, a natural interest attaches to his death. Was the "hypocrite," the "usurper," the "butcher," at last unmasked by the rude hand of the grim tyrant? Were his last moments spent in vain confessions of wickedness? Was he shaken by impotent horror of the grave? Did the ghosts of men wantonly slaughtered haunt his frenzied fancy? Was he deserted of God?

We are prepared to answer these questions in the words of Cromwell himself. We write for those who are familiar with the language of the dying; who know how to discern the strivings of a Christian soul through the lights and shadows of the fearful struggle, men well acquainted with the "shibboleth" which opens the passes of Jordan; and they will scrutinize the last words of Oliver. It might be presumptuous for us to anticipate their judgment by thoughts of our own: but nevertheless we have thoughts of our own; thoughts that have forced themselves upon us by many a "happy" death-bed; unwelcome thoughts! Alas! how "resigned" is self-righteousness! What solemn exhortations, and forcible admonitions, and sweet encouragements to good, fall from the lips of many, who, in their haste to preach, have forgotten to repent! What delightful anticipations of rest swell the hearts of those who have never labored! What ecstatic forethoughts of reunions to friends ravish the souls of those who never were united to Christ!

Nothing is more deceitful than a death-bed; yet nothing is more honest to men who are capable of discerning truth from falsehood. For such we write, and to such we commend the last chapter of the book we are considering. We cannot quote all the "last words" of the dying Oliver, but we would have them all read.

"Here are ejaculations, caught up at intervals, undated in these final days. 'Lord, thou knowest if I do desire to live, it is to show forth thy praise and declare thy works.' Once he was heard saying, 'It is a

fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.' But again: 'All the promises of God are in him; yes, and in him, Amen! to the glory of God by us,—by *us* in Jesus Christ.' 'The Lord hath filled me with as much assurance of his pardon and his love as my soul can hold.' 'I think I am the poorest wretch that lives: but I love God; or rather, am beloved of God.' 'I am a conqueror, and more than a conqueror, through Christ that strengtheneth me.'"

"He was heard to pray much, and his prayer ran thus:—'Lord! though I am a miserable and wretched creature, I am in covenant with thee through grace; and I may, I will come to thee, for thy people. Thou hast made me, though very unworthy, a mean instrument to do them some good, and thee service; and many of them have set too high a value upon me, though others wish and would be glad of my death. Lord! however thou do dispose of me, continue and go on to do good for them. Give them consistency of judgment, one heart, and mutual love; and go on to deliver them. Teach them who look too much on thy instruments to depend more upon thyself. Pardon such as desire to trample upon the dust of a poor worm, for they are thy people, too; and pardon the folly of this short prayer: even for Jesus Christ's sake.'"

Among his last audible expressions were such as these:—"God is good; he will not leave me." "I would live to be serviceable to God and his people, but my work is done."

Yea, his work was done! done fearlessly, done well! And in the manhood of his strength he rested from his labors. His cares were greater than man might bear and live; but his works do follow him.

"Ah, I think that Oliver's works have done, and are still doing! We have had our revolutions of eighty-eight, officially called glorious; and other revolutions not yet called glorious: and somewhat has been gained by poor mankind. Men's ears are not now slit off by rash officiality; officiality will, for long henceforth, be more cautious about men's ears. The tyrannous star-chambers, branding-irons, chimerical kings and surplices at Allhallow-tide, they are gone, or with immense velocity going. Oliver's works do follow him!"

ART. VI.—*An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE. Philadelphia: H. Hooker, 16 South-seventh street. 1845.

THE Inquiry of President Edwards into the Freedom of the Will has long been regarded, and with great justice, as a master-piece of human reasoning. It has been considered by its admirers as approaching the nearest to "demonstration" of anything out of the mathematics; and, unless we may except the writings of Chillingworth, certainly nothing in the whole range of theology can be accounted, in this respect, superior to it. Attempts had often been made to refute it, but all without success. The well-provided argument of Edwards, anticipating almost every objection which had hitherto been raised against it, like well-tempered armor, had resisted every attack, and turned the weapons of its adversaries broken or blunted to the ground. The Inquiry has always come out from the furnace of severe argumentation apparently purified, but not consumed. Still, the common sense of mankind has almost uniformly been found on the other side. Men have been puzzled and mystified by the acuteness of the reasoning, but have not been convinced. Reasons have been drawn *dehors*, (as the lawyers would term it,) to show that the consequences of the doctrine would be of the most absurd and ruinous nature; that they would involve the world in the iron bonds of fatalism, that the freedom of the will would be but a name. Still, the advocates of the doctrine, though denying that any such consequences would follow, have turned to the undisturbed argument of their champion, and replied, "Show us the defect there." "Point us to the step in the whole process of the reasoning which does not wait on the one preceding, and lead to the one beyond. Show us the fault in his premises, the *non sequitur* in his conclusions, then will we admit the argument of Edwards to be unsound; but not before." Mr. Bledsoe has taken up this challenge, and has shown himself fully adequate to the task assumed.

We deem the work of Mr. Bledsoe to be a full, direct, and incontrovertible refutation of the celebrated Inquiry of President Edwards. It is certainly a little remarkable that in the long and ingenious controversy which has been carried on upon this subject, it has always been taken for granted that the will *is determined*. The very language in which Edwards sets forth the question which comprehends the subject of his Inquiry, shows that it was not at

all within the scope of his design to discover *whether* the will is determined; but (taking it for granted that it is) to learn "*what* determines the will?" We would not wish to be otherwise than serious on so important a subject, but it brings to our mind a well-told anecdote related by Archbishop Whateley in his "Historic Doubts," as nearly as our memory serves us, to the following effect. "The question was propounded, as an objection to the system of Copernicus, when it was first introduced, 'Why it was, that when a stone was thrown into the air, it did not, on account of the revolution of the earth on its axis, fall to the westward of the person throwing it; just as a ball, dropped from the top of a mast, instead of falling at its foot, falls as far toward the stern of the vessel as the vessel has proceeded on its way?' The sage philosophers, not at a loss for a moment for a theory to explain the phenomenon, immediately took sides; some contending that it was because the centrifugal force of the earth differed from the motion of the vessel; others, that it was because the stone was a part of the earth, but no part of the vessel: each in turn attacking and repelling until, from being a war of words, it was like to become a war in deeds." At last it occurred to some one of the belligerents, to inquire whether the difference which had been made the groundwork and substratum of their discussion really existed. The experiment was tried, and strange to relate, the stone which was dropped from the top, instead of falling far astern, (as the terms of their discussion required,) fell quietly at the foot of the mast, and thus put an end to the fine-wrought theories which had thus playfully been started into existence.

The discussions on the freedom of the will might have been brought much sooner to a satisfactory determination, had the contending parties first inquired into the existence of the fact which was to be made the basis of their subsequent theories. But such was not their course. Both Edwards and his opponents, the libertarians and the necessitarians, have started from the same point—the admission that the will is determined—and their great difference has been in regard to the cause by which it is effected; the one contending that the will is determined by the strongest motive, and the other, that the will determines itself. It is singular, that when such unanswerable objections were raised to each of their theories respectively, that it did not occur to their advocates that there was an error at the very start. While on the one hand the unassailable *reasoning* of Edwards led to a system of necessity, of fatalism, (and that too by the same path that had been pursued by Hobbes and Collins,) a system which is repugnant to our feel-

ings, our ideas of religion, and the idea of moral responsibility; still, the self-determining power of the will had been reduced to an absolute absurdity by the author of the Inquiry, from which the believers in moral liberty had never been able to relieve it. Mr. Bledsoc is the only writer who has placed the doctrine of the freedom of the will upon its proper foundations. West may have had glimpses of the true doctrine, but if he had, he never boldly and strenuously followed it out. Others may have in terms denied the premises of Edwards, but they never placed their denial upon intelligible and tangible grounds. It is easy to deal in sweeping assertions, but it is sometimes difficult to commend them by logical deduction to the minds of those who are seeking for truth. And nowhere has this fact been more clearly manifested, than in the discussions which have taken place on the freedom of the will.

What then was the doctrine of Edwards? And what are the objections of Mr. Bledsoc to it? The great and leading idea in the work of the former is, that volition is an *effect*—that it is *caused* by the producing influence of something else—that it is an effect, precisely in the same way that the changes of matter are effects. True it is, that some of his disciples have denied that he has treated volition as an effect, in this sense; but nevertheless, we do not hesitate to affirm that in all parts of his reasoning *essential to his scheme*, he has used the term “*cause*,” for that which brings something to pass by its producing influence, and the term “*effect*,” for that which is thus brought to pass. We are aware that Edwards himself says:—

“Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I use the word *cause* in this discourse; since, for want of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a *positive efficiency* or influence to *produce* a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence, which are yet causes in this respect, that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are thus, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the night is not the cause of the fall of the dew at that time, in the same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascent of vapors in the daytime; and its withdrawal in the winter is not in the same manner the cause of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawal or absence of the sun is an antecedent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they depend; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though the ab-

sence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence. . . . Therefore, I sometimes use the word 'cause,' in this Inquiry, to signify any *antecedent*, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise: or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is true; whether it has any positive influence or not. And agreeably to this, I sometimes use the word 'effect' for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a cause, most properly speaking."—Pp. 50, 51.

He here seems to anticipate that this would be the point of attack, and has, therefore, under the cover of a most *general* definition, endeavored to conceal the real sense in which the term "cause" is used in the Inquiry. Mr. Bledsoe has collected a number of passages from the different portions of the Inquiry, and has shown from them that Edwards has almost uniformly used the word "cause" in the restricted sense. And it may be confidently asserted that there is no portion of the reasoning which is essential to his peculiar theory, in which he does not use, and to the force of which reasoning it is not necessary that he should use, the word "cause," as the *producing influence* of, and not the mere *occasion, ground, or reason for, volition*; and that if you take from the word this restricted sense, you take from the reasoning its very pith and marrow. No man who shall read the Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry, with his mind directed to this point, can fail to perceive that the *causality* of cause is "wrought into the very substance and structure of his whole argument." Take, for instance, the principal doctrine, that the strongest motive determines the will. Search the *reasoning* by which it is sustained, and say if its whole force does not rest in the idea that the influence of the motive *causes* the will to be *thus*, and not otherwise. What force is there in what is said about the strength of motives, if there is not something in that strength which acts with influence on the will? What is meant by the expression that "the *voluntary action*, which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is DETERMINED by that which appears most agreeable," unless this voluntary action, which is determined by what is most agreeable, is the effect *produced, brought to pass*, by a competent cause? Take the application which Edwards makes of the maxim, that "every effect must have a cause;" what pertinency is there in it in the connection in which he introduces it, unless *volition* is an effect which must have a cause? Every one knows the sense in which the term

“cause” is used in this maxim. It does not mean *occasion, ground, reason*, but it means that which calls the effect into being. It does not mean merely an antecedent, it is a *producing influence* which is meant. Now Edwards either used the maxim in the same sense, or he was guilty of an unpardonable trick; or else he was ignorant of its proper application: of neither of which last alternatives have we ever for one moment suspected him. Every one who has ever read the “Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will,” knows that he has made much use of the maxim referred to, *for the very purpose* of showing that *volitions* must have had a cause, and have, therefore, been effects *in the same sense*. And, when treating volitions as effects which must have a cause, and in reply to an objection respecting a difference in the nature of the free acts of the will from other things, he says,—“It is not the particular *kind* of effects that makes the absurdity of supposing it has being without a cause, but something which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz., that they are not self-existent or necessary in the nature of things.”

This quotation, we think, sets forth clearly the views of Edwards on the nature of volitions as effects, and the sense in which all his reasoning required that they should be understood. The phenomena of nature are divided into two kinds; those which are self-existent or necessary in the nature of things, and those which are not. The former require no cause; the latter do. Volitions are not self-existent or necessary in the nature of things; they therefore require a cause to bring them into existence. He makes no distinction here between volitions as effects, and any other events as effects.

Again: take his notion and reasoning respecting liberty. What is the end of his chapter on that subject? Why, to show that notwithstanding our volitions may be necessitated, notwithstanding they may be *effects* brought about by the prevailing influence of their causes, still liberty consists in *doing* what we *will*; to show that though the will itself may be bound by an adamant chain, still if we are not constrained to act against it, or restrained from acting in accordance with it, we are in a state of perfect liberty. The manner in which Mr. Bledsoe has exposed the sophistry of this argument, and taken from the system of Edwards the only prop that supported an apparent consistency between a necessitated will and moral liberty, by showing that liberty as thus understood is nothing more than *physical* liberty, is worthy of special notice. He has most clearly shown that Edwards skillfully (we will not say designedly) made use of a popular and almost political meaning of

the term liberty, and transferred that meaning into his reasoning on the freedom of the will. We might go on through all the important chapters of Edwards, and show that the idea that volitions are effects in the most strict sense of the word, is interwoven into the substance of his argument, and is inseparable from it without its absolute destruction.

Mr. Bledsoe meets this fundamental argument in the very outset. He denies that volitions are effects; that is, that they are effects *in the sense* in which they are necessary to the argument of President Edwards. He does not deny that in a certain sense they may be effects, but he expressly states the sense which his denial reaches. No man can for one moment fail to understand Mr. Bledsoe as meaning, that as the whole argument of Edwards was based on the doctrine that volitions are *effects brought into existence, produced, caused*, by something else, so it was *in this sense* (and in no other) that he was concerned to deny it. And as the doctrine of Edwards on this point runs through all the collateral subjects touched upon in the Inquiry, so does the counter doctrine of Mr. Bledsoe run into the same, giving them an entirely different aspect. But we prefer to quote from his book:—

“All that I deny is, that a volition does proceed from the mind, or from motive, or from anything else, in the same manner that an effect, properly so called, proceeds from its efficient cause. This is a point on which I desire to be distinctly understood. I put forth a volition to move my hand. The motion of the hand follows. Now I here observe the action of the mind, and also the motion of the hand. The effect exists in the body, in that which is by nature passive; the cause in that which is active, in the mind. The effect produced in the body, in the hand, is the passive result of the prior direct action of the mind. It is in this restricted sense that I use the term in question, when I deny that a volition is an effect. I do not deny that it depends for its production upon certain circumstances, as the conditions of action, and upon the powers of the mind, by which it is capable of acting in view of such circumstances. All that I deny is, that volition results from the prior action of the mind, or of circumstances, or of anything else, in the same manner that the motion of body results from the prior action of mind. Or, in other words, I contend that action is the invariable antecedent of bodily motion, but not of volition; that whatever may be its relations to other things, a volition does not sustain the same relation to anything in the universe, that an effect sustains to its efficient cause, that a passive result sustains to the direct prior action by which it is produced. I hope I may be *always* so understood, when I affirm that a volition is not an effect.”—Pp. 47, 48.

Again:—

“We always conceive of the subject in which such an effect resides, as being wholly passive. President Edwards himself has repeatedly

said, that it is the very notion of an effect that it results from the action or influence of its cause; and that nothing is any further an effect, than as it proceeds from that action or influence. The subject in which it is produced is always passive as to its production; and just in so far as it is itself active, it is not the subject of an effect, but the author of an action. Such is the idea of an effect in the true and proper sense of the word. Now does our idea of a volition correspond with this idea of an effect? Is it produced in the mind, and is the mind passive as to its production? Is it, like the motion of a body, the passive result of the action of something else? No. It is not the result of action; it is action itself. The mind is not passive as to its production; it is in and of itself an action of the mind. It is not *determined*; it is a *determination*. It is not a produced effect, like the motion of body; it is itself an original producing cause. It does seem to me, that if any man will only reflect on this subject, he must see that there is a clear and manifest difference between an ACT and an EFFECT."—Pp. 51, 52.

Again:—

"Now if a volition is an effect, if it has an efficient cause, what is that cause? By the action of what is it produced? It cannot be by the act of the mind, says Edwards, because the mind can produce an *effect* only by another act. Thus, on the supposition in question, we cannot ascribe a volition to the mind as its cause, without being compelled to admit that it results from a preceding act of the mind. But that preceding act, on the same supposition, will require still another preceding act to account for its production; and so on *ad infinitum*. Such is the absurdity which Edwards delighted to urge against the self-determining power of the mind. It is triumphantly based on the concession that a volition is an effect; that as such the prior *action* of something else is necessary to account for its existence. And if we suppose, in accordance with the truth, that a volition is merely a state of the mind, which does not sustain the same relation to the mind that an effect does to its efficient cause, this absurdity will vanish. The doctrine of liberty will no longer be encumbered with it."—P. 56.

Again:—

"It is easy to see how he constructs his system. Every change in nature must have a cause, says he: this is very true; there is no truth in the world more certain, according to the sense in which he frequently understands it. If he means to assert that nothing, whether it be an entity, or an attribute, or a mode, can bring itself into existence, no one disputes his doctrine. It is most true, that there can be no choice without a mind that chooses, or an object in view of which it chooses; a mind, an object, and a desire, (if you please,) are the indispensable prerequisites, the invariable antecedents, to volition; but there is an immense chasm between this position and the doctrine that the mind cannot put forth a volition, unless it is made to do so by the action of something else upon it. This immense chasm the necessitarian can cross only by stepping over from one branch of his ambiguous proposition to another; he either does this, or he does not reach the point in controversy at all."—P. 74.

These passages are sufficient to set forth the doctrine both of the Inquiry and of the Examination on this, the all-important point in the controversy. For a full exposition of his views, we can only refer the reader to the work of Mr. Bledsoe itself. Our limits will not permit us to extract all that he has said, and *less* than all will not do full justice to the author.

The section on "The Maxim that every Effect must have a Cause," and also that which follows it, "On the Application of that Maxim," will repay any one for an attentive and studious perusal. The two closing paragraphs of the latter rise into majestic and eloquent indignation at the supposition, that the doctrines maintained in regard to the activity of the soul, should be thought to deprive us of the *a posteriori* argument for the existence of a God; and urge home upon the advocates of the opposite system a tendency to the dark and unfathomable gulf of atheism.

The chapter on "The Relation between the Feelings and the Will" is one of great importance and originality. Mr. Bledsoe is the only writer, so far as we are informed, who has maintained that the desires and appetites do not determine volition. He considers the mind as composed of two faculties, the sensibility and the will. That the former is acted *on*, and that the latter *acts*. And that although the former may furnish *grounds, occasions, or inducements*, on which the latter may act, still it is not *creative* of that action.

A writer in the October number of the Princeton Review, in a notice of Mr. Bledsoe's book, says:—"But having said thus much in favor of the book, we are now constrained to say that we differ, *toto cælo*, from the positions which he assumes, and on which his whole system is founded. The first of these is, that human volitions can, in no proper sense, be called 'effects.' The other main position is, that our feelings, that is, our desires, passions, &c., have no causal influence on volition. As to this point, the ingenious author seems to think that he has placed the defense of liberty on entirely new ground. He labors to prove that none of the defenders of liberty have availed themselves of this principle. And no wonder; for there is scarcely a truth more evident to the consciousness of all men, than that their volitions are powerfully influenced by their feelings. If a man is in danger of perishing by hunger or thirst, have these appetites no influence to lead him to will to seize the food or drink within his reach? A system built upon such a false foundation cannot stand."

Now we observe, with great deference, however, that from the language used in this popular appeal to consciousness, we should judge the writer did not fully understand, or else had not maturely

considered, the portion of Mr. Bledsoe's work to which he refers. "If a man is in danger of perishing by hunger or thirst, have these appetites no influence to *lead him* to WILL to seize the food or drink within his reach?" Most certainly they have. Mr. Bledsoe does nowhere countenance any other doctrine. But the question is not what may "*lead him* to will;" what inducements, or occasions, or desires, may be in the view of the mind: but whether the *act* of the will is the act of the will, or whether it is the *effect* of appetites or inducements which would then, instead of leading the man to exercise his will, lead the will itself. Edwards himself seems to recognize the same distinction in his chapter on "Choosing of Things indifferent," p. 67, in which he says:—"The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant about the *objects presented*, but the *acts to be done* concerning these objects. . . . In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the objects, *unless indirectly and improperly*, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects." So we believe it is in all cases, with this difference, that in the cases of strong desire, appetite, &c., the attention is more strongly attracted to the object as an inducement to the mind to act; but that in *volition* itself the mind is only conversant about the willing or the not willing. If we desire to touch one of the squares on a chess-board, it is a matter of indifference, as to the squares themselves, which one we fix upon. But, says Edwards, the mind is not conversant about the *objects presented*, but about the *acts to be done*. "The man chooses to *take* or *touch* one rather than another; but not because it chooses the thing *taken* or *touched*, but from foreign considerations." Now let us look into this a little. The objects themselves are indifferent, and of course furnish no motive for choosing one rather than the other. But then, says the Inquiry, "the acts to be done are not indifferent, (because the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another . . . from foreign considerations.)" Now we would ask, why are they not indifferent? If I am indifferent as to two objects as matters of choice, why am I not equally indifferent as to the act of choosing between the two? Edwards says, "because of foreign considerations." Now foreign considerations may account for the exertion of the mind in willing, but they cannot account for an act of choosing where there is no choice. That I wish to put my hand on one square of the chess-board, will be a sufficient ground for me to exercise my will; and the fact that I cannot do so without touching at random, or fixing upon one in particular, will be a sufficient ground

or reason for touching at random or fixing on some one particular square; *on the supposition that motives are not the producing causes, but only the grounds or occasions, of volition.* But if we consider motives as the causes of volition, then we say that the fact that I cannot touch one of the squares, without touching at random or fixing on some one in particular, cannot be a cause of my touching this square rather than another. Now it may be asked, where is the difference between us? We answer, here. Edwards supposes motive to be the producing cause of volition; that "in every act of the will there is an act of choice;" that "in every volition there is a preference; so that in every act or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind one way rather than another." The volition then to touch that square on which the eye may fix at random, or otherwise fix, rather than to touch some other, is, according to Edwards, an act of choice or preference; which choice or preference must be founded either in the nature of the objects, or in the nature of the acts of choosing. But the objects themselves are indifferent. And the acts of choosing, as such, are indifferent. And the mere fact, that if one of two indifferent acts is not done, some evil would follow, though it may be a great inducement for acting in some way, is not a ground for acting in this way rather than in the other; or, in other words, is not a ground for any preference between the two acts. If there is no preference, then (according to Edwards) there can be no volition. This would bring the matter to this absurdity; that the mind exercises choice where there is no choice—and exercises volition, and does not exercise volition, at one and the same time.

But suppose motives not to be the causes, but only the occasions, of volition, and how easily is this matter explained. A man is urged to do one of two indifferent acts. This is a motive or inducement for an exertion of his will. He does this act and not the other, not because there arises from it any strength of motive causing it to prevail over the other, but because he has the power of acting without any such predominant motive, because the action of the mind in willing is an independent action. And here we can see the force of the important and just distinction which Mr. Bledsoe has made—and observed throughout his work—between action in its relation to the mind, and motion in its relation to matter. The action of the mind is almost always illustrated by the motion of matter; and yet, though it is in some respects analogous, in other respects there is no analogy at all. Motion is always passive. It is always a result. It possesses no self-acting principle. But on the other hand action is not passive. It is not a result in its strict

sense. And it is self-acting. And this difference is in the very respect which is the ground of controversy. We think, therefore, that all arguments and illustrations drawn from the analogy between action and motion should be abandoned where the discussion is upon that point where the analogy fails.

The chapter in Mr. Bledsoe's book on the connection of the foreknowledge of God with necessity, has been termed by the writer in the Princeton Review, to whom we have already alluded, as a "curiosity." If by this epithet it is meant that the chapter referred to contains new and important views on the subject of necessity, we agree with the writer. But if anything disrespectful, either to Mr. Bledsoe or his views, is intended, we differ from the reviewer entirely.

Let us then look into the argument of Edwards and the reply of Mr. Bledsoe. The former proves, by the most irresistible reasoning, that the foreknowledge of any future event proves the necessity of that event. In other words, an event cannot be foreknown unless it be actually and necessarily *certain* that the event will take place. Because if the event were not certain, the foreknowledge of it would not be certain, and to that extent would not, in a proper sense, be *foreknowledge*. Against this reasoning nothing can be urged successfully. Up to this point Mr. Bledsoe and President Edwards agree. But the latter proceeds further. After stating the different ways in which things may be necessary, as either necessary in themselves, or necessary by consequence, &c., he infers that unless an event is *caused* by something which is not contingent, the event itself would be contingent; if contingent, then it might or might not happen, and that foreknowledge predicated on it would be uncertain and contingent. To this Mr. Bledsoe has answered, that foreknowledge implies the necessity of the *event*; but implies nothing as to its *cause*. He considers the foreknowledge of a future event, as in the same condition as present knowledge of a present event; that as present knowledge of a present event can exist without any reference to the cause of that event, so divine foreknowledge of a future event may exist without any reference to its cause.

This idea is worthy of being followed into greater detail. Edwards takes it for granted that foreknowledge cannot subsist without *evidence* or *proof*: that there can be no evidence of a future event which is contingent, and consequently no foreknowledge of that event. But as foreknowledge is supposed, and that foreknowledge must be grounded on evidence, and the cause which produces an event is the only proper evidence of such future event, therefore

the cause must itself be certain. Now, the fundamental error here is in supposing that the *divine* foreknowledge is founded in evidence or proof. It is in taking for granted that the prescience of the Deity is arrived at in the same way, and by the same means, as what we may, perhaps, call the foreknowledge of man: that it is a conclusion derived from reasoning. If, for instance, I know that in the year 1854 there will be an eclipse of the sun, I know it, not because the fact is now present to my view, but because it is the necessary consequence of an unbroken process of mathematical reasoning. To *my* knowledge of this future event, the reasoning of Edwards is perfectly applicable. But to God all things, past, present, or to come, are distinctly in view. To him the knowledge of the eclipse is not the result of a process of reasoning. The event itself is before him. To be sure, the causes and connections are also present to his omniscient sight, but not as the *ground* of foreknowledge of the event with which they are connected; but simply because the Almighty sees all things "*in presenti.*" It is idle to say that *He* cannot foreknow without evidence, if by evidence is meant anything else than a full view of the event itself, without any reference whatever to its cause. God sees the thing itself in futurity, just as we see that which is before us. It is not faith, but sight. It is not inference, but experience.

But we think that the reasoning of President Edwards on this subject is obnoxious to one of two very serious objections. It either reduces volitions to the quality of divine decrees, or else it is liable to Edwards' favorite objection of an infinite number of causes. His argument is, that no contingent event (that is, no event which has not a cause) can be foreknown, because its contingency implies a possibility that it might not happen; which is against the supposition that it is foreknown. If then the event is necessary, the *cause* is necessary; for, as Edwards says, that which necessarily connected with something else which is necessary, must itself be necessary. The *cause* then is necessary. But if the cause is necessary, *that* cannot be contingent, but must itself be caused by something else which is also necessary. And so on for an infinite series of causes, unless we arrive at the first cause emanating from the bosom of the Deity. Now, without going further, and inquiring whether Edwards' theory of infinite causes could be still further applied to the volitions of the Almighty, (which we think would be the case,) we have the objection to offer, that the doctrine would comprehend the most rigid system of fatalism. A volition of the Deity is the producing cause of an event, which is itself the cause of something else, and so on; every successive step in which succession

of events is fixed, certain, *necessary*, until we reach the *produced* volitions of man. The last link in the chain is dependent on that which preceded it; and without it could never have had existence, or at least *necessary*, and therefore certain, existence: that event in its turn is dependent on another going before, until you come to the great *first* cause, in the mind of God, upon which this whole chain depends—and without which, and without its being just such as it is, no one of the successive effects would have been the same! Would the event be more certain, would the volition have been less free, if the same voice that said, “Let there be light, and light was,” had called forth that volition *without* the intermediate steps which we have supposed? *Could* fatalism bind more rigidly the will, the actions, the destiny, of man?

But the writer from whom we have quoted proceeds still further, and says: “He (Mr. Bledsoe) acknowledges the absolute certainty of all events, as foreknown, and admits that there is some kind of necessity that they should come to pass. And Edwards’ argument requires nothing more. The unfortunate use of the word ‘necessity,’ by Edwards and his followers, has done more to prejudice the minds of sensible men against his system, than all other causes. According to the proper usage of language, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; and to say a thing is necessary, and at the same time free, is a contradiction in terms. Certainty and necessity are not the same; for, although everything necessary is certain, everything certain is not necessary. Volitions, in certain given circumstances, may be as certain as any physical effects; but volitions are free, in their very nature. A necessary volition is an absurdity, a thing inconceivable.” Now, in this passage the writer concedes everything that the views of Mr. Bledsoe demand, though we think that they do not properly represent the views of President Edwards. It is true that the former “acknowledges the absolute *certainty* of all events, as foreknown;” but it is not true, we humbly conceive, that “Edwards’ argument requires nothing more.” The latter certainly goes much further, and *infers* FROM the certainty of foreknown events, that they *must be* NECESSARY, in the strictest sense of the word. For (as we have before seen) he contends that “it is impossible for a thing to be certainly foreknown to any intellect, without *evidence*;”—that “no understanding can *see evidence* where there is none;”—that “if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely *without evidence*.” Now, in what sense is the phrase, “without all necessity,” here used? Not to signify the *certainty* of the happening of the event;

for that would make nonsense. That would be to make President Edwards mean that an event which was *not certain*, could not be foreknown to be certain, WITHOUT EVIDENCE. Such was not the meaning of Edwards. He meant this—and the reasoning would be perfectly sound so far as *human* foreknowledge, if we may so speak, is concerned—that admitting the *event* to be *certain*, it could not be *foreknown to be* certain, without evidence. And if the event did not depend on something else as a cause, and this *cause* did not appear to the prescient, then there was no *evidence* to him upon which to found *foreknowledge* of the event, notwithstanding it might be certain.

We might extend this article to a much greater length, but that it would be tedious to those who have not read the "Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry," and useless to those who have. We would, however, take the opportunity of making a remark or two on the use which Mr. Edwards makes of the terms, "ground," "reason of," "occasion," &c. For instance: "Nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause or some antecedent ground or reason why it then begins to be." "Nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is," &c. The terms here used are perfectly familiar to us, and we have a perfectly distinct idea of the proposition into which they are introduced. And yet there is fallacy in the use that is made of them in President Edwards' Inquiry, and more especially in the writings of his disciples. If the terms, "ground," "reason," "occasion," &c., are used with reference to *matter*, they are either most absurdly misapplied, or else must be intended to convey the *identical idea* contained in the strictest sense of the term "cause." For to say that force is the *reason* of motion in that which has no reasoning faculty, or the *occasion* of motion in that which cannot perceive any fitness of opportunity, would be foolishness. And yet such are the only significations in which those terms can be used with meaning, *unless* we mean by them that force is the "producing *cause*" of motion. Will it be said that the withdrawal of the sun as the *occasion*, rather than the *cause*, of darkness and of cold, would better illustrate the meaning—that by occasion is meant a "*negative*," rather than a "*positive* cause?" To this we answer, that we know no such thing in the world as a "*negative* cause." It is a contradiction in terms. It is a solecism in ideas. The very essence of causality is *positiveness*. But the very instances adduced do not in the least support the form of expression. Darkness and cold are not *effects* in the connection, at least, in which they are here used. They are *states* or *conditions* of being. The sun, which is a posi-

tive cause, produces light and heat. When the cause of light and heat is withdrawn the effects cease; the prior state, or condition, which had been overcome and changed by an active cause, is restored. But we have said that the terms, "reason," "occasion," &c., are misapplied, when used with reference to *matter*, if they do not contain the strict signification of the term "cause." We now remark that these terms are equally misapplied, when used in relation to *intelligent beings*, if they *do* include that signification. There is something in the very terms themselves, and in their applicability only to beings endowed with the power of perception, as well as the ability for action, which would at once seem to denote a difference between a produced effect and an induced act; something which would imply, that the same language that would be proper to designate the connection between material agency and its effects, would not be proper to designate the connection between an *act* and an *inducement* to do it, where there is an intermediate agent, viz., the mind; which may perceive the inducement, and then act or not act. For to say that the "reason," "ground," or "occasion," for any particular volition, is strictly the *cause* of that volition, is the same as to say that the reason or ground *why*, or the occasion *when*, a thing should be done, is that which actually *does* that particular thing. But we are conscious that such is not the case. For it is the *mind* which wills, and not the ground or reason presented to it. It is the *man* who acts, and not the occasion which is offered for acting.

The very idea of a "ground" or "reason" in view of the mind, supposes the mind to take cognizance of it, to weigh it as a ground or reason, to decide upon it, to *act* upon it. It supposes an agent—an unpire. In short, it supposes *that very thing to exist*, the absence of which would render it necessary to employ the terms, when applied to *matter*, either with an absurd meaning, or else with the meaning of *causality*.

The style in which Mr. Bledsoe's book is written must commend itself to all. It is certainly clear, forcible, and without redundancy. The author from beginning to end evidently had his *subject*, and not its dress and ornaments, in his mind. The consequence is, that his language is made to convey, without any mistiness, his thoughts; and his illustrations, always good, are themselves arguments. Some may, perhaps, think that Mr. Bledsoe's work might have been more condensed without any injury to its effect. It is difficult, however, to fix on any standard, in this respect, for a treatise on a metaphysical topic addressed to men of different mental strength, education, and means of obtaining what may have been previously writ-

ten on the subject. The vigorous and well-trained hunter on the Alps will leap from cliff to cliff without impediment, while the more feeble and less-used stranger may be obliged to clamber up and down the chasms over which the other had passed with a bound. So, too, the well-schooled metaphysician will need but a mere statement of principles, while others less experienced will require the aid of the successive steps in the reasoning.

Mr. Bledsoe may well be proud of the part which he has taken in a discussion which has engaged, for such a length of time, so many and so distinguished writers in this and other countries. Were he never to contribute anything more to the literature of his country, he must still be regarded as having done much in advancing its reputation. To expect that his doctrines will command the assent of all—that his reasoning will break through old and familiar prejudices—or that his work will bring to a close a controversy which has been so long and so ably conducted—would be too Utopian an anticipation for any sober man to entertain. But we think it is not going too far to say, that he has placed the discussion on grounds from which it will not be easy for any successor to shift it.

The work of Edwards was at one time studied in many of our seminaries as a text book in intellectual philosophy, but has of late become disused. We cannot say that we approve of the change. As a means of disciplining the minds of students, and habituating them to modes of rigorous reasoning, we do not know of any work that can well be substituted for it. But we would have the Examination of Mr. Bledsoe to accompany it into our schools and colleges. We do not fear the moral risk of such a measure; for we believe that the Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will never had the effect of gaining proselytes to its doctrines, though it has always drawn forth homage to the superiority of its dialectics. But if it never before made much headway against the feelings and consciousness of men through the avenue of hard reasoning alone, it will not be likely to become very fatal, since there has been such an antidote furnished as the book we have been reviewing.

We can never, however, recur to the Works of Jonathan Edwards without expressing our admiration of his exalted powers, which in some respects have never been surpassed. We can never forget that he was one of the first of American writers who *wrung* from our transatlantic brethren some deference to American talent and learning. We can never forget that from out of the wild forests of the new world he sent forth, as an earnest of future contributions to theological literature, a work which all the ingenuity of foreign

criticism, pointed by a feeling of contemptuousness for the land from which it sprung, never could furnish an entirely satisfactory reply. And although the time may come when, as a guide in the doctrines of divinity, Edwards may have long ceased to be revered as he has been, we should regret ever to expect the time to arrive when his Works will cease to be regarded as a model of forensic argumentation, or to be studied by those who are in the training of education, and whose acumen might well be sharpened, and intellects strengthened, by a frequent recurrence to the pages of one of the greatest of metaphysicians.

ART. VII.—*A Treatise on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants. With an Appendix, containing several Memoirs on Capillary Attraction, Electricity, and the Chemical Action of Light.* By JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M. D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of New-York. Harper & Brothers. 1844.

THIS Treatise is an honor to the scientific character of our country. It is not a republication of transatlantic thought in American language; but whether some of its views may have been entertained before or not, it bears the impress of originality. Though its author has read much, he has evidently studied and experimented more, and his work has that unity in sentiment and continuity of parts so characteristic of the production of a single mind. Many of our scientific works are indeed original, but they remind us of the habitations of the semi-barbarous beings who dwell amid the ruins of some ancient city. Though these habitations are partially made up of ancient edifices, perhaps once the pride of the world, yet they exhibit an architecture perfectly unique. Ionic, Corinthian, and Gothic, are all blended together, and, perhaps, surmounted by a modern thatched roof. This Treatise is not a compilation. The mechanical beauty of the volume is but a suitable dress for the well-sustained views and interesting experiments of its learned and laborious author. It treats, too, upon a subject of interest not merely to the scientific man, but to the theologian and all who love to think. Science and religion are twin sisters, and never should be separated. The one is truth evolved from God's works by observation and reason, the other is truth evolved from revelation by the same powers; and all truth is of one nature. If the apparently legitimate

conclusions of science and theology are contradictory, the fault is in ourselves, who, from an improper use of the medium through which the observations are made, obtain a distorted image of the truth.

The great object of the first chapter of the Treatise is to show that organization and life are not originated and sustained by the indescribable "vital principle" of the old physiologists, but are the legitimate result of the same forces that regulate the movements of all inanimate nature. This subject in various phases has been discussed, sometimes angrily, from the earliest ages of the world. Many theologians, jealous of what might to the unreflecting appear a leaning toward atheism, have laid themselves open to severe attacks, on account of a careless, and, perhaps, contemptuous disregard of material laws, and a hasty ascription of observed phenomena to the direct agency of God without the intervention of law.

The one grand truth, that all nature is the emanation of a supreme Being, who upholds it and directs it in all its wondrous evolution of cause and effect, science never has controverted and never can; nay, it has not the slightest tendency thus to do: but, on the other hand, all its investigations and deductions rest upon this truth as a foundation—pointing undeviatingly to the power of God. But when the theologian leaves this ground and attempts to show how God works, and that, too, by one short sentence, by "speaking and it is done," irrespective of the laws with which he has previously invested nature, he lays himself open to attacks which he does not deserve and cannot withstand. We maintain that atheism never has appeared on the offensive with the slightest plausibility when the theologian confined himself to his own ground, for there, like Bunyan's pilgrim, he is invincible; it is only in the by-ways that he is exposed to discomfiture and defeat.

Ex nihilo nihil fit—From nothing, nothing comes—exclaims the skeptic, with all the dogmatism of one who professes to have stretched the tether of human reason, and is gazing proudly at the concentrated result of all his toils. But he is too hasty. This maxim, or axiom if you please, which he binds on his forehead and reveres as his creed, is capable of being turned against himself. It is a formidable weapon, and he alone is not to use it. It is not unlimited in its application, and where it does apply it is one of the strongest expressions that language can afford to show the existence of God. The origin of the existence of matter is wholly beyond the reach of human reason, and no maxim of man can apply to it; and were there no other evidence of the agency of God than the mere existence of matter—no subsidiary proof drawn from de-

sign or revelation—the theist and atheist would stand on precisely the same ground, neither could confute nor confirm the other.

Let the world be divested of all its beauty, disrobed of everything which shows the power and goodness of God, let it become

“Seasonless, herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless—
A lump of death—a chaos of hard clay—
The rivers, lakes, and ocean, all stand still,
And nothing stir within their silent depths;”

and on this desolate, dead globe, let one disembodied spirit roam, uninstructed, undirected—disembodied, for a body would, with its wonderful mechanism, speak to him of God—and though he might exclaim, “From nothing, nothing comes,” therefore, this mass of dead matter must have existed for ever, even then it would have no force, for it would still be beyond the province of human reason to decide whether matter is uncreated or not. But while he gazes, wrapped in darkness and meditation, let a wondrous revolution commence, even the “revolution of the heavenly orbs”—let light and life dawn upon the earth, and the shades of a past eternity roll grandly away—let the slumbering ocean begin to heave, and the silent streams to murmur, and the grass, and the flowers, and the trees to spring up, and the animate creation to revel, and the solitary spirit himself be enrobed in a body “fearfully and wondrously made”—and his first impulse would be, with arms extended to heaven, to exclaim, “From nothing, nothing comes: therefore, in all around me I recognize the works of a great Supreme, whose power, wisdom, and goodness I adore.”

Thus it would be, thus it is now. We have not seen the commencement of organized beings, but mere collocation of atoms never could have produced them; and every plant, from the humblest individual of that dense microscopic forest which forms a speck of mildew, to the oak which has breasted the storms of centuries; every animal, from the prince of the populous empire in a single drop of water to the elephant, all speak to us of a great Creator, resting their conclusion, too, on the much-abused truth,—“From nothing, nothing comes.”

But what sustains and regulates the ever-fading and ever-returning vesture of vegetation? Is it the result of light, heat, and electricity, or must we call in another agent to our aid,—the vital principle? It must appear evident that the reply to this question, whether affirmative or negative, cannot in the slightest degree intimate that nature is independent of God; inasmuch as all natural laws should be considered but expressions of the Almighty’s will,

and manifestations of his purposes. Holy Writ teaches us that God is unchangeable, "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever;" and this one truth is the substratum of natural science. On this one truth the whole universe, natural and spiritual, depends. Were God changeable, nature would be changeable; there would be no reasoning from analogy, the events of to-morrow could not be predicated from to-day; memory would be useless, conjecture impossible. But since God is unchangeable, order reigns supreme; and the conception of Plato becomes sublimely beautiful, so forcibly like truth is it, that the universe is a musical instrument—all its parts adjusted to each other in the most perfect harmony. There is not a discord in nature, save where, like a slight one in a splendid musical composition, it contributes to the beauty of the whole, and such discord is the most perfect harmony.

When the universe sprang into existence at the fiat of God, it was put into action—every atom received its command, its eternal task—and the work was gladly commenced. This work has continued till now, and will *for ever* continue. Every change has resulted, every future change will result, from the nature then given it, for God sees the end from the beginning.

These evolutions so varied, yet uniform, men call the laws of nature; they are rather the manifest purposes of God.

We can conceive of but two classes of individuals who have failed to recognize the hand of Deity in his works. They may be properly styled the idiotic and the insane. The idiotic are a striking exemplification of the propriety of the oft-quoted couplet of Pope, in its true sense,—

"A little learning is a dangerous thing,
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring."

Creatures of a day, they have looked upon the works of the Almighty and seen their beauty; but they do not, like the pagan, adore even that. Adoration, the noblest of emotions, seems to have perished from want of exercise. The divinity all around us they cannot, or rather will not, see. Such are the semi-educated skeptics of every corrupt neighborhood. They have but a smattering of science, if any; and a few unmeaning phrases and apparent enigmas, which have been retailed in their class from generation to generation with unremitting assiduity, though their absurdity has been demonstrated again and again, are their only stock of theological knowledge.

The other class of skeptics, of which there have been but very

few, are the insane. Much knowledge unsanctified will sometimes destroy the reason.

“An undevout astronomer is mad.”

Such a one was, perhaps, La Place. He studied nature faithfully and well. He probed its mysteries; but when the first impression of the Almighty was forced upon his mind, as it must have been, he failed to recognize and acknowledge it. He failed to adore it. From neglect, his adoration gradually expired, and he found himself deifying nature, admiring the laws without worshipping the Lawgiver, unraveling new mysteries which he himself in all their parts acknowledged incomprehensible, yet sublimely beautiful, without perceiving that there must be a wise and good Being to control the whole. Like the monomaniac, who passed his time among the ever-burning furnaces of Sheffield, and imagined that fire, which effected so much, must be a demon, and worshiped it, —not reflecting that it was all in the power of man and directed by an external intelligence—he almost worshiped nature instead of nature’s God. Fearful is the responsibility of the student; unless he exercise the heart as well as the intellect, destruction will be his reward. But scientific investigations have no dangerous peculiarity in this respect. Any one object, pursued solely and unremittingly without constant attendance to religious obligations, has a tendency to unhinge the mind and produce a species of monomania.

It being then premised that the “laws of nature” are but the manifestations of the will of an unchangeable Being, and that all true philosophy recognizes the constant superintendence of this Being, whether manifested immediately or through a series of causes, we are prepared to examine the views of our author upon the cause of organization and life. They are introduced as follows:—

“In this work the existence of the vital force of physiologists—a homogeneous and separate force—is uniformly denied. The progress of science shows plainly that living structures, far from being the product of one such homogeneous power, are rather the resultants of the action of a multitude of natural forces. Gravity, cohesion, elasticity, the agency of the imponderables, and all other powers which operate both on masses and atoms, are called into action, and hence it is that the very evolution of a living form depends on the condition that all these various agents conspire. There is no mystery in animated beings which time will not at last reveal. It is astonishing, that, in our days, the ancient system, which excludes all connection with natural philosophy and chemistry, and depends on the aid of a visionary force, should continue to exist; a system which, at the outset, ought to

have been broken down by the most common considerations, such as those connected with the mechanical principles involved in the bony skeleton, the optical principles in the construction of the eye, or the hydraulic action of the valves of the heart."—*Introduction*, paragraph 3.

The great error of philosophers has ever been an unwillingness to acknowledge their ignorance. Human knowledge is but a small, partially explored, and cultivated tract in infinite space, constantly enlarging, as was the "*totus orbis terrarum*" of the ancients, as daring adventurers sail into unknown seas. But the difficulty is, these adventurers are not contented to relate what they see and learn, but draw upon their own resources to complete the picture; and never did ancient traveler deviate more widely from the truth than some of these scientific voyagers. If the cause of phenomena was unknown, a *term* must be invented for that cause, and henceforth it must be considered as known. And what is still more, a high wall must be built, preventing all revisiting of that once explored region, and wo to the man who dares to doubt established opinion—the authority of ages trembles over him and threatens to bury him in its crumbling ruins. Hence the *horror vacui*, the *quinta essentia* of Aristotle, the vortices of Des Cartes, the oscillating ether and animal tubes of the materialist Hartley, and may we not add, the vital force of physiologists?

If the term is to be used as an open acknowledgment of ignorance, it is convenient and well: but let it be understood that it is a mere phantom, and let it not for an instant brandish a weapon or assume a substance to prevent the free advancement of such as would explore still further the great question of the origin of life.

The true system is the Baconian—to experiment and observe—and this is the system of our author. He begins by examining carefully all those circumstances which affect the organization of living beings.

"Organized beings and organized bodies spring forth in those positions only to which the rays of the sun have access. They are, therefore, limited to the atmosphere, the sea, and the surface of the earth. Periodical vicissitudes, which are observed both in vegetables and in animals, serve to show that this is not a mere fortuitous coincidence, but rather an intimate connection between the phenomena of life and the presence of the imponderables. When the sun is set, the leaves of plants no longer decompose the carbonic acid of the air, but a pause takes place in the activity of their functions, and they sink into a passive condition. The gaseous bodies brought from the ground by the action of the spongioles, percolate through the delicate tissues of the leaf, and escape away into the atmosphere. At night, also, in

many flowers the petals fold themselves together, and, for a time, all active processes cease. It is, therefore, through an instinctive impulse, that comes over them during this period, that all animals, except such as take their prey by night, seek places of rest. Darkness, and silence, and repose, are all connected together."—*Introduction*, paragraph 5.

The subject is pursued still further by a general yet philosophical examination of the effect of different climates upon the various tribes of plants and animals upon its surface. It becomes those who do not acknowledge that life is the result of the imponderable agents, light, heat, and electricity, to show why it does not appear except where these forces are exerted. Why is the organic character of the world graduated in undeviating conformity with the latitude and other influences which affect the climate? Can the "*vital force*" exist only where these agencies are found? Why is life confined to the limited range in temperature of one hundred and eighty degrees? But we must let the author speak for himself.

"In this manner we might proceed to show how the existence of individuals and races is completely determined by external conditions. How, for the same reason that an individual dies, so, too, does a tribe become extinct. Pursuing these considerations, we might show how closely the development of the intellect itself is connected with them: we might compare the effect of climates in the torrid, the temperate, and the frigid zones, and show how history bears out the truth of these views. We might appeal to individual experience for the enervating effects of hot climates, or to the common understanding of men, as to the great control which atmospheric changes exercise not only on our intellectual powers, but even on our bodily well-being. It is within a narrow range of climate that great men have been born. In the earth's southern hemisphere, as yet, not one has appeared; and in the northern they come only within certain parallels of latitude. I am not speaking of that class of men who, in all ages and in every country, have risen to an ephemeral elevation, and have sunk again into their native insignificance so soon as the causes which have forced them from obscurity cease, but of that other class, of whom God has made but one in a century, and gives him a power of enchantment over his fellows, so that by a word, or even by a look, he can 'electrify, and guide, and govern mankind.'"—*Introduction*, paragraph 26.

Well is it said that the sunbeam is the chain of the lion. He never ventures beyond the parched clime of his appropriate place. So with man and all organized beings. Matter has its laws, or rather its character, which never changes. The spirit may seem to control it, but in its own sphere it is supreme; and so long as the soul is connected with its present gross material body, it is under

a tyranny which cannot be escaped, the laws which regulate the movements of worlds.

The conclusion of our author in the last paragraph of the Introduction appears philosophical and sound. We bespeak its careful examination.

“What, then, are the final impressions left upon our minds by these general considerations? They teach us that life never occurs except in regions to which the imponderable agents can have access,—an observation which is equally true of vegetable and animal forms; that elementary organization, directly or indirectly, arises from the plastic energy of those all-pervading forces. Whether we consider the organic or inorganic world, all things around us are in incessant changes—changes which result from the fixed operation of invariable laws; that of the successive tribes of beings which have peopled our earth, each series may be regarded as expressing the general relation of all physical agents at the time of its existence, the brilliancy of the sun, the pressure of the air, and other such conditions; for we see that, between those conditions and the organization of the structures considered, there are fixed relations; that in the more highly complicated forms of beings mutations more readily take place, and in all time enters as an element; that, in the same way that whole races have disappeared from the face of the earth, and have become extinct, so, also, do individuals die and atoms change; that, whatever motion is accomplished, or whatever change is brought about, there is a consumption of material or expenditure of force; that, as the surface of the earth is continually remodeled by physical agents, so are the vicissitudes through which organized forms pass determined by physical powers, and bring about physical ends. The passage of a comet, never more to return, in a hyperbolic orbit past the sun, is a result of the same general law that keeps a planet revolving in repeated circles—the extinctions of races which have heretofore taken place, or which are going on before us, are not brought about by a direct intervention of supernumerary forces, but are the constant result of those which are always in action. If, moreover, our thoughts are directed to the relations which exist between climates and the character of races, the distribution of vegetables and animals, if we observe the antagonization of these great classes in the result of their vital processes, their position as respects the atmosphere, the control which astronomical events possess over everything, the action which currents in the air or currents in the sea exercise over the distribution of animated forms, and even over the well-being of man, we surely shall have but little difficulty in understanding that, as in the organic world, so, also, in the world of organization, these all-pervading forces, which natural philosophers and chemists recognize, are constantly employed.”—*Introduction.*

After having thus ably and philosophically stated and defined his theory, the author proceeds to relate and explain some simple and definite experiments which have led him to its adoption. He be-

gins on the very confines of life, where the organic and inorganic kingdoms are separated by an almost imperceptible line. The origin, the chemical nature, and the circumstances necessary for the production of the simplest organic substance, viz., that green flocculent matter which will invariably form in an open vessel of spring-water when exposed to sunlight, are rigidly investigated. This simplest of all vegetables, it is evident, derives its substance from the gases, carbonic acid, oxygen and nitrogen, with which water is usually saturated, and the power which effects the transfer of matter from the inorganic state to the organic, from the mineral to the vegetable, is light.

There, however, arises a question, which, though it has reference to infinitesimals in magnitude, is of great importance. It is a question upon which the materialist and the immaterialist would probably differ; and yet, granting the materialist his own view, the non-existence of spirit would not absolutely follow. The question is, are these minute vegetables produced *immediately* from inorganic matter, or must we suppose the existence of germs, products of previous organization in the water, to be brought into action by the vivifying influence of the sun? In other words, is the creation of new vegetables and animals continually going on around us, or have we good reason to conclude that there is not one more species now on earth than there were when, at the termination of the sixth day, "God saw everything that he *had made*, and behold, it was very good?" That species have become extinct is an historical fact—are others, by the action of material agents, brought into being to take their places? If so, was any special or miraculous exertion of Almighty power necessary to originate man? It has been quite a custom among philosophers of a certain class to endow "plastic nature" with wonderful powers. If we may believe them, the creation of animalculæ by this power is of daily occurrence, and the progression from inferior to superior species, constant. Therefore, so far from crediting the account that man was created six thousand years ago as man, it is much more flattering to suppose that he is the perfection of some species of vermin that a hot sun brought into existence on the muddy margin of some pond, fifteen or twenty millions of centuries ago. But waiving this insuperable difficulty in the theory of progressive development, that no transmutation of species can be shown to have taken place, and that all the accumulated effects of centuries upon organized beings often disappear in one or two generations, when unnatural influences are removed,*

* See Lyell's Principles of Geology. First ed., pp. 500-526.

thus showing the independence of species and their tendency to conform with the original character—the absolute origination of living beings from inorganic matter can never be proved to have taken place. The ovum must have existed. All experiments conducted with accuracy show it.* Were we endowed with sufficient keenness of vision, we should see myriads of myriads of germs of microscopic plants, and ova of animalculæ, floating in every part of the atmosphere. The atmosphere is burdened with them. On every object they settle, with every breath they are inhaled; they are in the sap of plants, the blood of animals; they live, thrive, and die in the tartar of the teeth. Wherever they find a soil or habitation fitted for their support, there are they found in rapid growth; but whenever suitable precautions have been taken to prevent their introduction, living objects have never been found.

Admitting, then, the existence of the germ, the process of formation and growth of the little vegetable is discernible and easily traced. All the solid part comes from the gaseous matter in the water, primarily flowing from the atmosphere.

The author has attempted to show, and we think, if not successfully, at least with great plausibility, that the circulation of sap in plants, and of blood in animals, is the result of a simple law of capillary attraction, thus expressed:—

“If two liquids communicate with one another in a capillary tube, or in a porous or parenchymatous structure, and have for that tube or structure different chemical affinities, movement will ensue; that liquid which has the most energetic affinity will move with the greatest velocity, and may even drive the other fluid entirely before it; that this is due to common capillary attraction, which, in its turn, is due to electric excitement.”—*Paragraph 88.*

The heart, then, will no longer be considered a pump, exerting a mechanical power almost incredible and perfectly unaccountable, but merely subsidiary to the circulation, in producing which every fibre of both the veins and arteries participates.

The greater part of this Treatise is an examination of the nature and effects of light. This, for want of room, we must pass over. Suffice it to say, however, that the author concludes yellow light to be the great agent in producing chemical phenomena. His concluding remarks show so strikingly the wonders of nature constantly taking place around us unobserved, that we cannot forbear to quote.

* See experiments of Prof. Owen, in *Edinburgh New Phil. Journal*, quoted in *Watson's Practice of Physic*, p. 738.

“An exogeneous forest tree, from its magnitude, rising, perhaps, a hundred feet above the ground, and spreading its branches over hundreds of square yards, may impress us with a sense of sublimity; a section of its stem might assure us that it had lived for a thousand years, and its total weight could only be expressed by tons. An object like this may, indeed, call forth our admiration; but that admiration is expanded into astonishment when we come to consider minutely the circumstances that have been involved in producing the result. If we conceive a single second of time—the beat of a pendulum—divided off into a million of equal parts, and each one of these inconceivably brief periods divided again into a million of other equal parts, a wave of yellow light during one of these last small intervals has vibrated five hundred and thirty-five times. Who, then, can conceive, when in the billionth of a second such enormous numbers of movements are accomplished, how many have been spent in erecting an aged forest oak! Who, also, can conceive the total amount of force employed from century to century in arranging the vegetation of the surface of the globe!

“The solar system is an orb of movement and light, full of vibrations of every tint visible and invisible, and which here and there envelops and enshrouds revolving points of organization and life.”—*Paragraph* 403.

Blind, indeed, must be the moral sense of that man who can examine these wonderful phenomena of nature, and not trace the workmanship of an infinitely wise and benevolent Being. The field is but yet partially explored, and every new phenomenon that is observed, every new law that is detected, adds to the evidence of design and benevolence already demonstrative. It is for this reason that we look upon such works as this Treatise, not only as creditable to the scientific character of our country, but as having a strong tendency to bring about an era when all shall recognize the constant superintendence of God, and strive to do his will.

H.

ART. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*. By JOHN KITTO, Editor of the "Pictorial Bible," &c., assisted by various able Scholars and Divines. Copiously illustrated with Maps and Engravings. 2 vols. 8vo. New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1845.

WE are truly delighted to see a good American edition of this valuable and standard work. Not long since we imported a copy from England at a heavy expense, but even that we were not able long to retain. A literary friend laid his eye and hand upon it, insisting that it was more convenient for us than for him to import another. But happily we are now relieved of the task, by finding upon our table a copy as well printed and better bound than that we had before procured.

This work was not compiled in the method hitherto usual with works of similar character, namely, on the basis of Calmet and the old learning of his day, with a few shreds of modern discovery interwoven. All the more important articles were written expressly for their present use, not by one individual, but by an arrangement between not less than forty different scholars of Europe and America, all of whom stand high in their several departments.

It will be understood that this is not a *theological* work in name or in fact. Confining itself to Biblical literature, it claims to explore thoroughly the great fields of BIBLICAL ARCHÆOLOGY and BIBLICAL INTRODUCTION. The following is the analysis given by the editor to the above topics. The object of Biblical archæology is to treat of,—

"1. The nature of the country in which those books have originated: to this branch of inquiry belong *physical geography* and *natural history*. By the latter we understand not only (a common mistake) a systematic survey of the natural productions, but also and chiefly an enumeration of the peculiar features of their origin, growth, continuance, cultivation, use, &c. It is, for instance, quite immaterial what place the date-palms or balsam-shrubs occupy in the system—such investigations being of no importance for the understanding of the Bible, the writers of which have disregarded those points; while, on the other hand, the peculiarities of the locality where the palm-tree stands, its external appearance at the different seasons of the year, its growth, fertility, use, &c.,—in short, all that particularly strikes the sense of the beholder, have frequently exercised considerable influence on the inspired writers; and these sources of external impressions on the senses and mind of man are to be particularly considered and noticed by Biblical archæology.

"2. The inhabitants of those countries; their peculiar character, manners, customs, way of living, and their intercourse with other nations.

"3. The vicissitudes of their people,—consequently, the history of the Hebrews and Jews, down to that time when the last books of the Scriptures were written.

"4. The politico-religious institutions, the civil and geographical order and division of the land and the people; and

"5. The mental development of the Hebrews and Jews, the regulations founded on it, and the degree of progress which the arts and sciences had attained among them.

"Biblical archæology may be further divided into two classes—that of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament: the former may again be subdivided into the *Hebrew* and the *Jewish* archæology.

"As soon as the foundation for Biblical researches is laid by the help of Biblical archæology, the theologian then turns to the solution of the second main question in theology:—What is meant by the Scriptures? How and when have they arisen? In what form do they lie before us? The answer to all these questions is the object of BIBLICAL INTRODUCTION, or, more correctly, of the *History of Holy Writ*. It is divided into Introduction to the Old Testament and Introduction to the New Testament. It must render an account—

"1. Of the origin of the individual books received into the sacred canon; not omitting to notice at the same time the various views that have been entertained on that point by critics of all ages, as well as those particular opinions which are seemingly the more correct.

"2. Of the origin of the collection of the books of Scripture as the repository of Christian knowledge, or of religion; constituting the *History of the Canon*.

"3. Of the spread of the Scriptures by transcriptions, translations, and printing.

"4. Of the vicissitudes and fate of the original text; forming the *History of the Text*; and,

"5. Of the various motives which have led to various modes of understanding the Bible; being the *History of Interpretation*."

Without dwelling upon the remaining contents of the work, we will content ourselves by recommending it earnestly for every minister's and student's library; remarking only, that several of the engravings are beautifully executed on steel.

2. *The Eclogues and Georgics of Virgil. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. Harper & Brothers.

THESE exquisite poems, justly admired by many as not inferior in beauty to the *Æniad*, have hitherto been too little read in our classical

schools, mainly, we doubt not, from the want of suitable editions, adapted to the capacities of the student. This want is now most happily supplied by this volume, in which the distinguished author has removed all difficulties from the path of the scholar, and thus enabled him to read the poems with a hearty appreciation of their peculiar and exquisite beauty. Dr. Anthon's series of classical books is universally regarded as by far the best that has ever been published; and we have no doubt that, like others, this will soon find its way into all our schools.

3. *A First Book in Latin, containing Grammar, Exercises, and Vocabulary, on the Method of Constant Imitation and Repetition.* By JOHN MCCLINTOCK, A. M., Professor of Languages, and GEORGE R. CROOKS, A. M., Adjunct Professor of Languages, in Dickinson College. Harper & Brothers.

WE are inclined to think that this book, and those which are to follow it by the same authors, will work a revolution in the modes of teaching Latin and Greek in our schools. The principles on which they are prepared were fully set forth in an article in this Journal for Jan., 1846; and we are able to say, on careful examination of the FIRST BOOK, that those principles are carefully adhered to and most admirably carried out for practical purposes. The advantages of Ollendorff's method are secured by exercises for imitation and repetition, which the pupil must prepare from his very first lesson; while the unscientific features of Ollendorff's book are avoided sedulously, and the learner is gradually carried on to a thorough knowledge both of etymology and syntax. As soon as forms are learned, they are employed in practice; no useless material is allowed to accumulate upon the pupil's hands; nor, on the other hand, is he ever required to "make bricks without straw,"—to work exercises for which he is not prepared, as is too generally the case in our elementary books.

But while we were prepared, by reading the article referred to, to find this work an excellent manual for oral instruction in Latin, we certainly did not expect to find in it so great a stock of etymological facts—least of all, to obtain with it any real addition to the science of philology. In these respects it is far more than we could have hoped. Not only has the whole range of German philology been ransacked to contribute to its methods, but new principles have been developed by the authors, which, we predict, will obtain for them a high place among the scholars of the country. Among these we would call attention especially to the doctrine of genders of nouns of the third declension—an instance of clear and beautiful generalization rarely to be met with in the science. Another novel and meritorious feature of the book is

the attention paid to prosody; the quantity being marked on *every syllable* requiring it, in Part I, so that the pupil will learn the rules of quantity by practice, from the very beginning. The syntax, too, is new in its arrangement, and presents some striking advantages, which the experienced teacher will readily perceive.

The First Book contains everything that a pupil can require, before entering upon the regular reading of the Latin authors, viz., grammar, exercises, reading lessons, and dictionaries; and as it will thus combine cheapness with excellence, we have no doubt of its general adoption in our academies and seminaries.

4. *A Greek Lexicon, based on the German Work of Francis Passow.* By HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL, M. A., and ROBERT SCOTT, M. A. *With Corrections and Additions,* by HENRY DRISLER, M. A., Adjunct Professor of Languages in Columbia College, New-York. Royal 8vo. Harper & Brothers.

WE received a copy of this noble work just as our present number was going to press, and can therefore do little else than briefly allude to it. We regret this the more, since even a cursory examination of the volume has convinced us that it is a production of singular merit, and destined to form a new era in classical scholarship. A more extended notice of it, however, will be taken on some future occasion. For the present, we can merely say, that of all the Greek-English lexicons which we have had an opportunity of inspecting, and we have seen not a few of them in our day, this one comes nearest to our idea of what such a work ought to be. Unlike the confused compilations of Donnegan, Dunbar, and many others whom we might name, it presents us with everything that a lexicon should contain, in so methodical and accurate a form, and evinces so much patient investigation and learned research, so thorough an acquaintance with both the nicest peculiarities of the Greek language and the pure idiom of our own tongue, that while the young student will find in it the most abundant materials for laying broadly and deeply the foundations of the soundest scholarship, even the accomplished Hellenist may derive from it no mean accession to his stores. The basis of the work is the celebrated lexicon of Passow, the Coryphæus in this department of literature,—and on it a capital superstructure has been reared by the combined labors of two eminent English scholars; and then the American editor, coming to the task with a degree of zeal and perseverance worthy of all praise, and a display of judgment and ripened scholarship of which, as his countryman, we feel truly proud, has put the finishing hand to the good work, and made the volume what it is, the *beau ideal* of a Greek and



English lexicon. Nor should the enterprising publishers be without their meed of praise. The publication of a Greek lexicon of seventeen hundred pages, with all the pleasing adjuncts of good paper, broad margin, and a beautiful type, is a feat of which our friends, the Harpers, notwithstanding the triumphs which they have already achieved, may, we think, be justly proud.

5. *A Treatise on Algebra.* By ELIAS LOOMIS, Professor of Mathematics, &c., in N. Y. University.

THE present work is the fruit of long experience in teaching, and diligent investigation of the science: it is designed to supply a deficiency long acknowledged to exist,—a work which leads the student on through the several gradations of the subject, by easy steps. The author has sought to avoid, on the one hand, unnecessary prolixity in demonstration of every principle, and undue brevity on the other: and with the observance of this happy medium, he has embodied all the latest improvements. Considerable care has been bestowed upon the general theory of equations; each proposition being distinctly enunciated and illustrated by appropriate examples. The work merits the attention of teachers, as well as students, generally. Harper & Brothers are the publishers.

6. *A Text Book on Chemistry, for the Use of Schools and Colleges.* By JOHN WM. DRAPER, M. D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of New-York. Harper & Brothers.

THE distinguished reputation of Prof. Draper will at once commend his able work to the notice of the several institutions of learning throughout the land. For a concise, lucid, and complete analysis of this delightful science, this manual must take undoubted precedence. The recent improvements and discoveries of the German and English writers on chemistry have their appropriate notice in the present volume, and, as far as we have been able to ascertain, Dr. Draper has given in a succinct form the best-arranged system of chemical lore yet offered to the student. The origin of the present work was the outline courses of the professor's lectures to his classes at the University.

7. *A School Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities.* Abridged from the larger Dictionary by WM. SMITH, LL. D. With Corrections and Improvements by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

HERE is a brief practical work that has passed under the hand of that successful editor of classical books, Dr. Anthon.

It is just the book for the elementary student of the classics, being sufficiently extensive for a *coup d'œil* of every important topic. It is rendered more valuable by numerous and graphic illustrations in outline. These, addressing themselves to the eye, will prove powerful aids to the comprehension and the memory.

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8. *A Greek Reader, selected chiefly from Jacobs' Greek Reader, adapted to Bullions' Greek Grammar.* With an Introduction on the Idioms of the Greek Language, Notes Critical and Explanatory, and an Improved Lexicon. By PETER BULLIONS, D. D. New-York: Pratt, Woodford & Co.

In the experience of our school-days we learned the great value of Bullions' Greek Grammar, distinguished for its clear analysis of the verb. This Reader, we perceive, has been prepared especially for the convenience of those who use the author's Greek Grammar. The object aimed at is to furnish to the attentive student the means of solving readily every difficulty he meets with in his preparations, by referring him to that part of the grammar in which the necessary explanation is contained, and to supply him with that assistance at his desk or in his room for which he might otherwise have to apply to his teacher. In this way the teacher may be relieved from much labor and interruption while engaged in other duties; much time may be saved to the student, while he is gradually led to a thorough and practical acquaintance with the grammatical structure and idioms of the language. The work will no doubt be extensively used.

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9. *Ollendorff's New Method of learning to read, write, and speak, the French Language.* With an Appendix, containing the Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers, and full Paradigms of the Regular and Irregular, Auxiliary, Reflective, and Impersonal Verbs. By J. L. JEWETT. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1846.

It is truly pleasing to witness the improvements of the present age, but in no department more than in that of philology.

Increased intercourse between nations calls for increasing facilities in the study of their mutual languages. While we may wonder how the old unnatural methods could ever have been brought into use, we may certainly rejoice to see them supplanted by systems more true to nature and reason.

The name and plan of Ollendorff at this day require no praise. The publishers who are offering his grammars in such elegant style to the American public deserve our high commendation. Students in the French will not fail to reward them, by generally procuring a work which must be considered quite in advance of anything of the kind that has heretofore been published.

10. *The Trees of America, Native and Foreign*; pictorially and botanically delineated, and scientifically and popularly described: being considered principally with reference to their Geography and History; Soil and Situation; Propagation and Culture; Accidents and Diseases; Properties and Uses; Economy in the Arts; Introduction into Commerce; and their Application in useful and ornamental Plantations. Illustrated by numerous Engravings. By D. J. BROWNE, Author of the *Sylva Americana*. 8vo., pp. 520. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS volume constitutes a rich contribution to the natural history of our country. It is printed and issued in a style corresponding to the permanent interest and importance of the subject.

Where can the person be found who is indifferent to the existence and beauty of trees? And who that has any regard for either their form, their shade, or their fruit, would willingly be ignorant of their origin, their history, and their uses?

It is a little surprising to observe how poorly informed many learned men are upon such common and practical subjects. Heretofore they may have had excuse, but hereafter they can have none, for a lack of knowledge of such obvious interest. This elegant book is prepared to discourse either to the learned or the simple. It details the most interesting particulars respecting the elm, the maple, the catalpa, or the ailanthus of the door-yard; while it is still more rich in materials respecting the fruit trees of the garden and orchard.

The author appears to have devoted much labor and expense to his task. He has traveled and resided in the four quarters of the globe, for the sake of studying the habits of trees in the places of their nativity; and he has at last brought his observations before the public in a form that we hope will be universally appreciated.

The botanical descriptions of each genus and species are handsomely illustrated by delineations of the leaf and flower, or fruit.

As a whole we should be very unwilling to part with this book, having once laid our hand upon it. In issuing such books as this, the Harpers place the scientific and reading public under real obligations to them.

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11. *A Practical Treatise on Dyeing and Calico-Printing; including the latest Inventions and Improvements, &c.* With an Appendix, &c. By an experienced Dyer, assisted by several scientific Gentlemen. With engravings on Steel and Wood. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS work claims to be a text-book on its subject. It is a subject, too, on which little has hitherto been written. It is anonymous, bearing

the mark of an American copy-right, but giving internal evidence of foreign production.

It begins with historical and general remarks upon the art and custom of producing beautiful and variegated colors, and proceeds with a scientific and practical discussion of coloring substances, and the processes of bleaching, dyeing, and printing, as applied to fabrics of silk, cotton, &c.

No intelligent person engaged in the arts here described will be willing to remain unprovided with this book.

12. *Pictorial History of England.* Nos. 5-7. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work continues to justify the favorable notice we have already given of it.

13. *Experimental and Practical Views of the Atonement.* By OCTAVIUS WINSLOW, Pastor of the Second Baptist Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1846.

THIS is a small volume, well-meant, and doubtless well-timed for those who will be its principal readers. We have glanced over the work to find, if possible, something on the extent and universality of the atonement,—this being in our estimation one of the most important and practical views of this great subject.

That point, however, seems to be carefully avoided. Perhaps the course taken is better than an expression of such views as the author might feel himself bound to present, if he were to write at all upon that question. Hence we will not object to it, but will cordially unite with the author in his endeavors and desires to promote spiritual piety in every branch of the church.

14. *Biblical Legends of the Mussulmans;* compiled from Arabic Sources. By DR. WEIL. Translated from the German. No. 15, Harpers' New Miscellany.

THIS book will be found interesting as a specimen of Arabic literature, and of the fictions which Mohammed imposed upon his followers in the name of truth.

15. *Life of Canning.* By ROBERT BELL. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

HERE is a book of real value. It comes fairly up to the character promised and expected in books numbered in the New Miscellany of the Harpers, of which it is the sixteenth. The personal detail, inseparable from the biography of George Canning, is of the most interesting

character, exhibiting as it does the rise of a young man from obscurity to the premiership, and actual sovereignty of England.

The light which it throws upon a most important period in the history of modern nations, renders it an admirable comment on graver works, as well as on the science of statesmanship. It is written in a graphic and pleasing style.

16. *Expedition to Borneo*. No. 18, New Miscellany. Harper & Brothers.

A WORK of great interest. We propose to notice it in full in our next number.

17. *Matthias's Manual; or Rules of Order for conducting Business in Deliberative Bodies*. Phila.: Harmstead.

A CONVENIENT work, adapted to an important object. It comes highly recommended, and will, doubtless, be extensively procured by those who from time to time take part—and there are few who do not—in public meetings.

18. *French Domestic Cookery: combining Elegance and Economy; describing new Culinary Implements and Processes; the Management of the Table, Instructions for Carving; French, German, Polish, Spanish, and Italian Cookery, in twelve hundred Receipts; besides a Variety of new Modes of keeping and storing Provisions, domestic Hints, Management of Wines, &c. With many Engravings*. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS work appears to be a *thesaurus* for the house-keeper. It is beautifully printed on soft callendered paper, and bound *a la mode Francais*.

Whoever follows the maxim, "We live to eat," will here find a book to his taste. Verdant young gentlemen, not yet *au fait* in the mysteries of carving, may receive from it some useful hints. We are sorry to perceive, however, from the title-page as well as from the text, that more or less chapters are devoted to the special benefit of those who manage wines. At this we should not have been so much astonished, had not the publishers been renowned for their temperance principles. It can certainly be no pleasure to them to sweeten the cup of the wine-bibber, or to give precepts for the management of those mixtures now so universally substituted for the juice of the grape. We cannot forbear recommending to them to bring out a tectotal edition of this book on Domestic Cookery, assuring them that they, no less than the intelligent public, will be better pleased with it than with any volume that savors of either foreign or domestic dissipation.

19. *Religious Maxims.* By Prof. UPHAM.

20. *Sacred Meditations.* By P. L. U.; understood to be Mrs. UPHAM.
Boston: Waite, Pierce & Co.

THESE are miniature volumes prepared and finished in the best style of the times. They are rich in Scriptural truth, beautifully and strongly expressed. They will prove excellent pocket companions for the thoughtful, and, as suited to impress religious truth upon the mind and heart, cannot be recommended too highly.

21. *Clarke's Commentary.* Lane & Tippett.

Nos. 1-8, of the new edition, have made their appearance. By means of the present cheap issue, this great work is being introduced to hundreds, and, we might hope, thousands, who have not hitherto had the opportunity of consulting it. It cannot be spread too widely, nor be too highly appreciated.

22. *The Wesley Family.* By Dr. CLARKE. 1 vol. 12mo. pp. 659.

THIS valuable work, which has been out of print in this country for many years, will be issued in a few days by Lane & Tippett in handsome style.

For the present we will only remark that this is a book which, while it will be interesting to most general readers, should certainly be in the possession of every Methodist family in the land.

THE MONTHLY SERIES.

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THE agents of the Methodist Book Concern have resolved to publish a volume every month, adapted to the new development and growing intelligence of the times. This series will be from the pens of authors of ability in their respective departments in literature and science: *Scriptural*, in the principles in which they are written:—*popular* in their style, so that instead of being limited to one class of the community, they may be generally acceptable:—*portable*, that they may serve as "hand-books" abroad and at home:—and *economical*, the twelve volumes of a year costing less than five cents per week. Thus, while the MONTHLY SERIES will be fully adapted to the educated *families* of our

land, to *Day and Sunday Schools*, and to the *libraries* of mechanics and others, they will supply interesting and valuable reading to a large number of the people, who can spare only time enough for the perusal of a small volume, and whose means will not allow of a more costly purchase.

We have already noticed Nos. 1 and 2 of this series, viz., the *Life of Julius Cæsar*, and *Glimpses of the Dark Ages*.

We now have before us "*The SOLAR SYSTEM :*" Parts I and II,—constituting Nos. 3 and 4 of the series.

These form a brief but comprehensive view of the science of astronomy, written evidently by a master of the subject. Such a work has long been needed on our list, and we trust it will meet with an extensive sale. The volumes are illustrated with numerous engravings, and thus rendered easy to the comprehension of persons who have not familiarized themselves with the intricacies of the science. We do not mean to intimate that any person, without thought and study, will be able to comprehend the contents of even these small volumes, enriched as they are with the results of the most modern discoveries. But we do think the books before us well calculated to excite, even in those who have but little time, a noble emulation to know more of God as he has displayed himself in his handiwork of the heavens.

We find in Part I a brief sketch of the history of astronomy, followed by three principal treatises, viz. :—1. On the general aspect and apparent motions of the heavens. 2. On the figure and motion of the earth. 3. A description of the bodies connected with the solar system. Part II goes on to give a description of the superior planets, comets, eclipses, and seasons.

We quote the following eloquent passages from the Introduction :—

"Of all the sciences which are the subject of human study and investigation, astronomy must be admitted to be the most interesting and sublime. It teaches us the motions, the magnitudes and distances of the heavenly bodies—their diversified phenomena, the laws by which they are directed in their varied movements, and the grand designs they are intended to fulfill in the vast system of the universe.

"The objects with which this science is conversant are so grand and marvelous—surpassing everything that could have been imagined in the infancy of science—that they tend to enlarge the field of human contemplation, to expand to an indefinite extent the conceptions of the human intellect, and to arouse the attention and excite the admiration even of the most incurious and uncultivated minds. The vast magnitude of the heavenly bodies, so far surpassing what could be conceived by their appearance to the unassisted eye ; their incalculable numbers ; the immense velocity of their motions, and the astonishing forces with which they are impelled in their career through the heavens ; the attractive influence they exert upon each other, at the distance of hundreds of millions of miles ; and the important ends they are destined to

accomplish in the universal empire of Jehovah; present to the human imagination a scene, and a subject of contemplation, on which the soul of man might expatiate with increasing wonder and delight, during the indefinite series of ages.

“Even to a common observer the heavens present a sublime and elevating spectacle. He beholds an immense concave hemisphere of unknown dimensions, surrounding the earth in every region, and resting as it were upon the circle of the horizon. From every quarter of this vast expanse—when the shades of night have spread over the earth—he beholds numerous lights displayed, proceeding onward in solemn silence, varying their aspects at different seasons, moving with different degrees of velocity, shining with different degrees of splendor, and all calculated to inspire admiration and awe. Wherever he travels abroad, either on the surface of the land or of the ocean, the celestial vault still appears encompassing this lower world; and, after traveling thousands of miles, it appears still the same, and seems to make no nearer an approach than when the journey commenced. While contemplating this wonderful expanse with the eye of reason and imagination, the mind is naturally led into a boundless train of speculations and inquiries. Where do these mighty heavens begin, and where do they end? Can imagination fathom their depth, or human calculations, or figures, express their extent? Have the highest created beings ever winged their flight across the boundaries of the firmament? Can angels measure the dimensions of these heavens, or explore them throughout all their departments? Is there a boundary to creation beyond which the energies of Omnipotence are unknown, or does it extend throughout the infinity of space? Is the immense fabric of the universe yet completed, or is Almighty Power still operating throughout the boundless dimensions of space, and new creations still starting into existence?

“Such views and inquiries have a tendency to lead the mind to sublime and interesting trains of thought and reflection, and to afford scope for the noblest energies and investigations of the human intellect. A serious contemplation of the heavens opens to the mental eye a glimpse of orbs of inconceivable magnitude and grandeur, and arranged in multitudes which no man can number, which have diffused their radiance on our world during hundreds of generations. It opens a vista which carries our views into the regions of infinity, and exhibits a sensible display of the immensity of space, and of the boundless operations of Omnipotence: it demonstrates the existence of an eternal and incomprehensible divinity, who presides in all the grandeur of his attributes over an unlimited empire. Amidst the silence and the solitude of the midnight scene, it inspires the soul with a solemn awe, and with reverential emotions; it excites astonishment, admiration, and wonder, and has a tendency to enkindle the fire of devotion, and to raise the affections to that ineffable Being who presides in high authority over all the movements of the universe. It teaches us the littleness of man, the folly of pride and ambition, and of all that earthly pomp and splendor with which mortals are so enamored—and that our thoughts and affections ought to soar above all the sinful pursuits and transitory enjoyments of this sublunary scene.

“Such being the views and the tendencies of this science, it ought to be considered as bearing an intimate relation to religion, and worthy the study of every enlightened Christian. It has been said, and justly, by a celebrated poet, that ‘an undevout astronomer is mad.’ The evidence of a self-existent and eternal Being, whose wisdom is inscrutable, and whose power is uncontrollable, is so palpably manifested in the arrangement and the motions of the celestial orbs, that it cannot but make an indelible impression on every rational and reflecting mind. Though the heavenly bodies have ‘no speech nor language,’ though they move round the earth in silent grandeur, and ‘their voice is not heard’ in articulate sounds, yet ‘their line is gone throughout all the earth, and their words to the end of the world,’—proclaiming to every attentive spectator, that ‘the hand that made them is divine.’ So that there is scarcely a tribe or nation on the face of the earth so inattentive and barbarous, as not to have deduced this conclusion from a survey of the movements of the celestial orbs. ‘Men,’ says Plato, ‘began to acknowledge a Deity when they saw the stars maintain so great a harmony, and the days and nights throughout all the year, both in summer and winter, to observe their stated risings and settings.’ Another heathen philosopher, Cicero, thus expresses his sentiments on this point: ‘What can be so plain and clear as, when we behold the heavens, and view the celestial bodies, that we should conclude there is some Deity of a most excellent mind by whom these things are governed—a present and Almighty God? Which he that doubts of, I do not understand why he should not as well doubt whether there be a sun that shines, and enlightens the world.’”

In hope of inducing the general attention of religious people to these cheap volumes, we add a few sentences from the conclusion of Part II. In these alone there is more material for devout reflection, than in a whole library of the flashy works that are so popular with many.

“The studies connected with the science of the heavens have a tendency to prepare the soul that has been previously enlightened and regenerated for the employments of the future world. In that world the glory of the divine perfections, as manifested throughout the illimitable tracts of creation, is one of the objects which unceasingly employ the contemplations of the blessed; for they are represented in their adorations as celebrating the attributes of the Deity as displayed throughout the material universe: ‘Great and marvelous are thy works, O Lord God Almighty. Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honor, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.’ Before we can enter that world and mingle with its inhabitants, we must acquire a relish for their employments and some acquaintance with the objects which form the subject of their sublime investigations; otherwise we could feel little enjoyment in the society of heavenly intelligences, and the exercises in which they engage. The investigations connected with astronomy, and the frequent contemplation of its objects, have a tendency to prepare us for such celestial employments; as they awaken attention to such subjects—as they

invigorate the faculties and enlarge the capacity of the intellect—as they suggest sublime inquiries, and excite desires for further information which may afterward be gratified—as they form the ground-work of the progress we may afterward make in that state, in our surveys of the divine operations—as they habituate the mind to take large and comprehensive views of the empire and moral government of the Almighty.

“It is here of some importance to remark, that it is not merely a scientific view of the mechanical fabric of the universe that will prepare us for the employment of the celestial world, but the moral principles and the holy affections with which we are animated in all our studies and contemplations. A man under the influence of evil principles and passions, whose mind is actuated by pride, malignity, avarice, or revenge, is unqualified for a right contemplation of the works of God, for joining in the associations of pure and holy beings, and for engaging in the exalted services of the heavenly world. Unless the principles of ‘love to God,’ and ‘love to man,’ be engraven on our hearts, and interwoven throughout the whole of our mental frame, and manifested in the general tenor of our conduct, we can never enjoy true happiness either in the present state, or in any other region of the universe; and such principles and dispositions can never be expected to be implanted in the soul, and brought forth into action, unless we comply with the requisitions contained in the word of God. The foundation of future felicity must be laid in ‘repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ.’ As sinners against the most high God we stand in need of pardon, peace, and reconciliation. And ‘this is the record of God, that he hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son.’ ‘This is his commandment, that we believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ,—whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins.’

“This is the first step in the path which leads to life eternal. And having entered on this course, we must be careful to bring forth ‘the fruits of righteousness,’ and to ‘glorify God in our bodies and spirits which are his.’ We must ‘add to our faith virtue; and to virtue knowledge; and to knowledge temperance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness; and to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness charity. For if these things be in us and abound,’ we shall neither ‘be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. For so an entrance shall be ministered unto us abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.’ Prosecuting such a course with activity and perseverance, holding communion with the ‘Father of our spirits,’ and exhibiting a pattern of every divine virtue and grace, we shall enjoy all that happiness which is consistent with our present state of trial and imperfection, and be gradually prepared for being ‘partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light;’ where there is ‘fullness of joy,’ and ‘pleasures for evermore.’ In short, animated by such divine principles and affections, we shall be fitted for holding intercourse with all the holy beings that constitute the moral and intelligent system, or the whole family of God throughout the universe, in whatever regions of the vast crea-

tion they may reside ; for the principles and dispositions to which we have adverted must be common to all the pure intelligences that people creation, that have retained their primeval innocence and rectitude. When implanted in the heart, and interwoven through the whole of the mental constitution, they assimilate us to angels and every other class of holy intelligences, and qualify us for associating with the superior orders of intellectual natures—for entering into their sublime and comprehensive views—for bearing a part in their extensive schemes of universal beneficence—and for contributing, along with them, to the order and prosperity of God's universal and everlasting kingdom !”

24. *Jamaica, Enslaved and Free.* No. 5, Monthly Series.

THIS is a racy volume on a subject of great interest to the naturalist, the statesman, and the Christian.

The great apostle of modern discovery, Columbus himself, was the first European who landed on the shores of Jamaica. This was on his second voyage, in May, 1494.

He had discovered the larger islands of Cuba and Hayti on his first voyage ; but he found that Jamaica far exceeded them in the combination of all the beauties peculiar to the tropics ; at the same time, he perceived the island enlivened by a greater number of villages. The scenery has a character entirely its own ; so that we need not wonder at the transports of his first gaze, nor at his language, when he reported to his royal master, that “these countries as far exceed all others in beauty, as the sun surpasses the moon in brightness and splendor.” But Jamaica was pre-eminent. Its towering mountains rising seven thousand feet, almost immediately from the level of the sea, and robed, nearly to the summits, with the deep verdure of perpetual summer, would appear to a stranger invested with majestic grandeur ; while the immense ravines, which are often found at the base of these mountains, would open to the view the most lovely valleys, whose beauty is still more inviting. Defining the boundary between sea and land, would be seen the belt of mangrove-trees, like a velvet girdle ; while towering over them, groves, or detached clumps of cocoa-nut, or the more stately mountain-cabbage, or the palm, wave their feathery coronets.

The wonder and admiration evinced by Columbus, as an enthusiastic adventurer, need surprise no one, when travelers of modern days have been carried away with similar raptures on a first view of Jamaica.

The death of Columbus and the settlement of Jamaica by Europeans occupy an appropriate space in this volume ; while the scenery, the natural productions, and the climate of the island, claim severally a chapter. Then follows a history of the slave-trade and its results, together with those movements which led to its abolition by the decrees of civilized nations.

The remainder of the volume is devoted to the missionary labors which have been expended by the Wesleyans and others upon the inhabitants of Jamaica, and concludes with an account of the recent emancipation and apprenticeship of the slaves of that island. As an authentic, well-written book on topics of so great interest, it cannot fail to be extensively sought for.

25. *The Martyrs of Bohemia; or Brief Memoirs of John Huss and Jerome of Prague.* No. 6, Monthly Series.

THE preceding volumes of the Monthly Series have been reprints of English books. The present, we perceive, has been contributed by an able American pen. A strictly original work could not of course be written at this day upon such a subject. An essential service has, however, been rendered to the religious community by the writer and publishers, who have furnished in the present form a cheap and attractive digest of the different, and, in some instances, rare books which contained the thrilling history of the life and martyrdom of Huss and Jerome.

26. *Sketch of the Waldenses.* No. 7, Monthly Series.

HERE is another sterling work on an interesting fragment of church history.

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27. *Memoir of Dr. W. F. Arnold; with Extracts from his Letters, written from the West Indies.* No. 372, Youth's Library.

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