



BANCROFT LIBRARY



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN

MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN

CLARK UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES

EDITED BY

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE

Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University

NEW YORK

G. E. STECHERT AND COMPANY

1920

COPYRIGHT
CLARK UNIVERSITY

COMPOSED AND PRINTED AT THE
WAVERLY PRESS
BY THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY
BALTIMORE, Md., U. S. A.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. George H. Blakeslee vii

MEXICO

FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS

- I. ARE THE MEXICAN PEOPLE CAPABLE OF GOVERNING THEMSELVES? Honorable T. Esquivel Obregón, Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of Mexico, 1913; Lecturer on International Law, Columbia University 1
- II. THE MEXICAN PEOPLE. Frederick Starr, of the University of Chicago 15
- III. UPON THE INDIAN DEPENDS MEXICO'S FUTURE. James Carson, National Councillor of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico; Formerly Chief of the Associated Press Service in Mexico 35
- IV. THE FACTOR OF HEALTH IN MEXICAN CHARACTER. Ellsworth Huntington, Ph.D., Research Associate, Yale University; Formerly Research Associate of the Carnegie Institution for Climatic Investigations in Mexico and Central America 44

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

- V. THE MEXICAN OIL SITUATION. Frederic R. Kellogg, General Counsel of the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company 54
- VI. THE RAILROAD SITUATION IN MEXICO. A. W. Donly, formerly Trade Commissioner of the Dominion of Canada in Mexico 73
- VII. LABOR IN MEXICO. James Lord, Treasurer, Pan American Federation of Labor; Member of Labor Commission to visit Mexico, 1918 91
- VIII. RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS IN MEXICO. E. D. Trowbridge, General Manager of the Mexico Company; formerly General Manager, Mexican Light and Power Company, Mexico City 106

RECENT CONDITIONS

- IX. RECENT CONDITIONS IN MEXICO. Francis R. Taylor, Chairman of the recent Commission to visit Friends' Missions in Mexico 119

4/4/21
Merian Ross. Carb. Univ.

THE NEW MEXICAN GOVERNMENT

- X. MEXICO AND THE PRESENT REVOLUTION. John Vavasour Noel, President of the Noel News Service 132
- XI. GREETINGS TO THE WORLD FROM THE NEW LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY IN MEXICO. Señor Manuel de la Pena, Commercial Agent in New York of the Liberal Constitutional Government of Mexico 141

AMERICAN POLICY

- XII. HOW TO RESTORE PEACE IN MEXICO. Honorable Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, 1909-1913 147
- XIII. A CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY FOR MEXICO. Roger W. Babson, President of the Babson Statistical Organization; Member of the Federal Central American Commission of 1916 . . . 156
- XIV. THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. John F. Moors, LL.D., Senior Member, Moors and Cabot, Bankers; President, Boston Associated Charities 162
- XV. COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY. Edwin M. Borchard, Professor of Law, Yale University 166

THE CARIBBEAN

- XVI. THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. William R. Shepherd, Ph.D., L.H.D., Professor of History, Columbia University 184
- XVII. THE PRESENT AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI. Judge Otto Schoenrich, formerly President of the Nicaragua Mixed Claims Commission; Connected with the Reorganization of Dominican Finances; Author of "Santo Domingo" 206
- XVIII. AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS IN SANTO DOMINGO, HAITI, AND VIRGIN ISLANDS. Colonel George C. Thorpe, United States Marine Corps, Recently Chief of Staff of the Brigade of Marines in Occupation of the Dominican Republic 224
- XIX. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN. Samuel Guy Inman, Executive Secretary of the Committee on Coöperation in Latin America 248
- XX. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS AND THEIR PROBLEMS. Webster E. Browning, Ph.D., Educational Secretary, Committee on Coöperation in Latin America; formerly President of the American College in Chile 277
- XXI. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. Jacinto Lopez, Editor of *La Reforma Social*; author "The War on the Pacific" and many essays on American and International Questions 301
- XXII. AMERICA'S "MARE NOSTRUM." Kirby Thomas, Consulting Mining Engineer, New York 314
- XXIII. PORTO RICO AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM. Pedro Capó Rodríguez, Spanish Editor of the *American Journal of International Law*; Member of the Bar of Porto Rico 333

INTRODUCTION

The chapters in this volume were first given as addresses during the Conference upon Mexico and the Caribbean, at Clark University, May 20, 21 and 22, 1920. This was the seventh Conference upon International Relations held at the University. First organized in 1909, they met annually until the outbreak of the world war, after which they were discontinued until the present year.

The aim of the University in organizing these sessions has been to do its part in bringing about a more intelligent understanding of our international problems, a more sympathetic appreciation of the attitude of other peoples, and a keener realization of our own international duties. In presenting the various and different sides of international questions, and in emphasizing the points of view held by others, which are often different from the popular views held among ourselves, the University believes that it is fulfilling an obligation which it owes not only to its own students but to the wider community of which it is a part.

If democracy is to control foreign relations, it has been well said that democracy should know something about the subject. And what more helpful service, along this line, can a University render than to bring together a large group of experts upon some foreign country, or closely connected group of countries, men who represent not only our own but other lands, owners and organizers of big business enterprises, missionaries, educators, investigators, authors, past and present government officials—and give them a forum from which to present the facts, as they see them, and a recommendation of a national policy based upon these facts?

Since the world war has ceased to dominate our thought and focus our entire attention upon Europe, it is now possible to study the international relations of our own hemisphere, the most important of which are those connected with the two closely related fields which were chosen for this Conference, Mexico and the Caribbean.

Mexico admittedly presents a genuine problem, but one due primarily to the inherent weakness and political instability of the country. How may it develop into a law-abiding, capable nation, with an effective, educated, reliable middle class? In the following chapters various and conflicting proposals are presented. A former member of the Mexican cabinet urges that the only hope lies in granting complete power to the small educated upper class in the country; others state that upon the Indian depends Mexico's future; while some, even including a few Mexicans, believe that the present situation can be remedied only by outside help. But if the United States undertakes to settle the Mexican situation, what means shall it adopt? Armed intervention and the creation of a buffer state in Northern Mexico is suggested by one of the Conference speakers, a distinguished diplomat; financial and economic pressure, is urged by others; a widespread system of education, lasting for a hundred years, is the general proposal of the American educators and missionaries from Mexico; while assistance along sanitary lines, in order to lower the death rate, lessen sickness, and increase efficiency, is still another solution. The outstanding fact is that there is a genuine Mexican problem, but that no general agreement exists as to its proper solution.

In the Caribbean region—Central America and the islands of the Caribbean Sea—the United States has made an extension of actual power, within the last twenty years, which has been one of the most striking features in the whole history of American expansion; yet our country seems relatively unconscious of this fact. Since 1898 it has secured sovereignty over Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and practical sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone; it has obtained a definite protectorate over the republics of Cuba, Panama and Haiti, and a financial protectorate over Santo Domingo; today it is in full military occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo, and has a garrison of marines in the capital of Nicaragua. This extension of power has been particularly rapid during the past few years; so much so that many European observers believe and many Latin

Americans fear that the United States is in the midst of an expansion in this region which will continue until it dominates, either as sovereign or overlord, all the islands of the Caribbean and all the republics of Central America. Do the American people wish this expansion to continue? In fact do we have any definite policy for the Caribbean? A distinguished Latin American diplomat once said to the writer: "The United States ought to have a policy in the Caribbean; now it can do anything it wishes there; but in thirty years other nations may be strong enough to prevent it." A keen analysis of the possible policies which may be adopted, with the reasons in favor of each, is given in the opening chapter of the Caribbean section of this volume.

But whatever general policy be adopted, the political instability throughout much of this region, as well as the interests of the United States, both economic and military, will undoubtedly force this country for many years to come to exercise a certain amount of supervision over the Caribbean and to undertake occasional intervention. It is important however that both supervision and intervention should be carried out in accord with the best American traditions, not only of efficiency but of regard for the well-being and even the susceptibilities of the peoples affected. It is at least doubtful whether this has been done; many of the Latin Americans, as is clearly shown by certain of the following chapters, regard the United States as actuated by a thoroughly imperialistic policy. The difficulty of judging fairly the acts of American officials is shown by the difference in the evidence presented at the Conference regarding the naval administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Three writers, each of them entitled to rank as an expert, present three different pictures: one condemns the administration severely, another believes it to be notably excellent, while the third balances failings against striking achievements.

However difficult it may be to learn the actual situation in the Caribbean, as well as in Mexico, it is nevertheless a task which should be undertaken by the thoughtful element of the American democracy. To permit public sentiment to exert its proper influence, both in determining American

policy and in insisting upon the highest standards in American administration, there is need of much definite information and of a frank discussion of national aims by men, broadminded and sympathetic, who are themselves intimately acquainted with the problems involved.

To the distinguished contributors who have given both definite information and frank discussion in the chapters of this volume the University wishes to express its grateful appreciation. It is their willing coöperation which has made possible both the Conference upon Mexico and the Caribbean and the publication of these addresses.

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE.

*Clark University,
November 18, 1920.*

ARE THE MEXICAN PEOPLE CAPABLE OF GOVERNING THEMSELVES

*By Honorable T. Esquivel Obregón, Minister of Finance in the
Cabinet of Mexico, 1913; Lecturer on International
Law, Columbia University*

The question: Are the Mexican people capable of self-government? In the light of present facts and of the history of the country from her independence from Spain a century ago, it seems to require a negative answer, because during that period there was only about thirty years of peace which came under the autocratic government of General Porfirio Diaz.

I intend, however, to demonstrate that the Mexican people can govern themselves, and that all the restless life of Mexico is due to social factors which can be controlled and must be if we ever shall have peace and orderly progress; if we ever have to meet our obligations to the world, and the responsibilities inherent to our geographical position, and to the wealth lying in our soil.

In order to support my conclusion let me begin by stating facts which nobody can deny:

FIRST FACT

All Americans who have been in Mexico, as serious observers, can bear witness to the statement that there are in Mexico intelligent lawyers who would refuse their support to any cause, no matter how promising of high fees and compensation, whenever they see that justice would be hurt thereby; physicians who are not business men, and who know how to combine science and charity; merchants who have laboriously built up fortunes, without any one observing that they defaulted on their obligations—not even now, when the revolution has destroyed so many fortunes honestly

won, and affords a pretext for defaulting; business men who show executive ability, which is one of the greatest needs of a good ruler; and farmers, hard workers, who live a simple life and are contented when they leave for future generations a new dam or a new ditch for the irrigation of their land, a new plot reclaimed for cultivation, or a new tree by the roadside for the relief of the traveler. Finally, I do not know of any Mexican who does not love his country, even though that love may be misguided or overshadowed by passions of a less elevated character; it is a love which is everywhere demonstrated by the fact that in spite of the great sufferings and misery of Mexico at the present time, and of the benefits which may be derived from naturalization as a citizen of the United States, I do not know of any Mexican who has asked for his first papers in this country, because, while we all admire the United States, we cannot help feeling an irresistible desire that there, where our forefathers lie, there our remains may be united with theirs forever in the bosom of the same mother country.

If these virtues are the crucial test of a man capable of undertaking the government of a country, we have plenty of men who possess them, who know how to govern and how to sacrifice themselves for the love of it if need there be. If I had the time, I could tell you wonderful tales of sacrifice for the good of our people and for the glory of Mexico.

SECOND FACT

The second undeniable fact is that Mexico was in peace during three centuries under the Spanish rule. Much has been said to discredit that rule: to think of the Spanish colonial system is to bring to the mind of many persons tales of slavery, humiliations and atrocities; tales of inquisition and of denial of all rights that we think are most sacred. But it is my first duty to warn you against such misconceptions of the Spanish régime, because those prejudices which were first spread by malice, are, in my opinion, the source of all the mistakes made in the United States in its relations with

Mexico, and the most abundant spring of evil for the latter.

Many persons have heard of the submission under which Spain kept the Indians, but they do not seem to have heard of the submission under which the Indians were accustomed to live from time immemorial under the sway of their native chiefs, and they do not know that some form of subordination was necessary in order to make the Indians who were accustomed to it, contribute to the formation of the new society. They seem not to have heard that the Indians had to give their very flesh for the feasts of their chiefs, and that Spain rescued them from this cannibalistic tribute. They do not seem to have heard either that Mexico was populated, except in a small portion of her southern territory, by hunting tribes, and that Spain organized these tribes into agricultural and industrial towns; that Spain incorporated the prominent Indian families into the Spanish nobility in order to make a practical application of the Christian precept which blots out all differences of race, and makes men equal over the world; that from the beginning of the conquest many Indians were educated by the Spaniards and distinguished themselves among the learned; and that the Spanish language was so widely spread that now, wherever you go in Mexico, you hear Spanish, and in most of the regions the Indians have even forgotten that their tribe had a dialect of its own. They seem not to have heard that the first printing press of America was established in Mexico, and the second University of America was founded in Mexico; that the rich classes of Mexico in the Colonial period could vie with the richest of the world, and that the Mexican archives are filled with the records of their endowments for the civilization of the natives and for the welfare of the people; that the monetary unit of America, India and China was the Mexican peso, showing the economic world power acquired by the country under the Spanish régime; and that the land property of the Indians was preserved intact—nay it was even increased by Spain. If those persons had merely read the statements made by impartial

scientific observers, such as Humboldt, they would know what Mexico contributed in those times to the world in matters of character and culture; they would be able to understand why a peaceful life was lived in that country in previous epochs, when the Spanish customs and methods were not spoiled by unwise imitations.

How can these facts be reconciled with the tales of atrocities so generally spread.

You, in organizing this wonderful Commonwealth, did not experience any of the difficulties which confronted Spain. You could build up a new society upon a basis of freedom and democratic coöperation, because you had an homogeneous cultural ground, the same European mind. You created, we may say, a European freedom, since you fought the Indian almost to his complete extinction, and discouraged the political activities of the negro, where those activities could be effective, until you have practically kept the negro a merely passive element in your political organization. You therefore reared your building entirely to your own satisfaction, without experiencing any of those inconveniences which confront the engineer who undertakes to adapt an old building intended originally for a tenement house, into a big modern factory.

Spain followed an entirely different policy. She tried by all means to save the Indians from the clash with a stronger race, to bring them up to modern culture by slow evolution, through the only possible way—discipline; and, in order to safeguard their civil rights and material interests, Spain withdrew from them, temporarily, the political franchises, except in reference to town government.

When Mexico was open to free trade with other countries, Europeans as well as Anglo-Americans rushed into it, and they were disappointed with what they saw. They saw there a peculiar society, a preposterous organization, a combination of childish mentality with vices which appeared like decadence; most of the people entirely ignorant; some, although possessing a more or less advanced education, were more inclined to display their knowledge as a token of superiority than as a moral and intellectual asset and prac-

tical social force; and, finally, a group of persons really refined and mentally strong who were trying in vain to infuse common sense and good judgment into the public administration. Those foreigners, as a rule, did not go beyond their observation of present facts; they did not realize that that state of affairs was the natural resultant of two opposite forces, the European culture, and the Indian culture which had been fighting each other during three centuries, and that to have arrived at that point had been a wonderful achievement on the part of Spain; they, on the contrary, concluded that the Spanish system of colonization had been a complete failure, that all that was Spanish had to be swept away; and the Anglo-Americans thought, furthermore, that the only remedy which could produce a quick relief was the application of the principles of democracy—that same democracy which in the United States had never been the rule of the Indians or the negroes or any other race but the Europeans. They did not stop to think that the Indians in their own country were left aside, dispossessed and dislodged, abandoned in their primitive savagery; and therefore, they were unable to appreciate the painstaking task of Spain in suppressing cannibalism, in teaching a Christian-like culture and religion, in bringing up those people to that semi-civilization.

I insist on this fact because in my opinion the injustice done to Spain, in not recognizing that during her rule a constant work of civilization was going on in her colonies, with a liberality that would be surprising to many, is a mistake which constitutes a real cancer which eats into all your system of thinking and dealing with the Spanish American countries; and which has been dangerous to us, and may produce many misunderstandings resulting in actual damage to your trade and commerce with our countries. I regard myself as a real and sincere friend of the United States, and at the same time a real Mexican patriot, in warning you against these misrepresentations.

THIRD FACT

I have said that Spain instead of granting political rights to uneducated people, gave them ample protection in their material interests and placed them under strict discipline. This system naturally produced abuses on the part of the superior race, almost inevitable as the result of the survival of the fittest; but in order to reduce these abuses to a minimum so that they would not be a grave obstacle in the cultural development of the country, the king of Spain was scrupulously careful in the selection of his officials; he gave to Mexico statesmen of the highest intellectual and moral character who ever ruled her. Of the 64 viceroys in Mexico during three centuries, no less than twenty could be cited as models of statesmanship; the civic virtues which they displayed, those virtues which were responsible for their success and for the peace of three centuries, were honesty, justice and modesty. Modesty in a ruler is the strongest guaranty for the people that conditions of living and social organization will be studied humbly and attentively, and that dangerous experimental innovations will be prevented, when they are not warranted.

FOURTH FACT

The fourth undeniable fact is that General Porfirio Diaz ruled in peace during thirty years. He went into power by a revolution backed by the intellectual and liberal, as well as by the sound conservative elements of Mexico. The reason for this support is very simple: when General Diaz entered the city of Mexico, after defeating the imperialist forces of Maximilian, he showed great moderation, and also at the same time, great tolerance and sympathy with the enemy; he distinguished himself by surrendering to the federal government some \$250,000 as a surplus, after paying his troops and the administrative expenses of the states under his military command. Thus he appeared before the nation as possessing the qualities of moderation, honesty and administrative ability. From that moment he was a leader. Those qualities were the cause of his success.

When he was president he inaugurated an autocracy in order to continue in power; he had recourse to the electoral farce which in alternation with revolution has always been the method of appointing presidents in Mexico. The necessity of aping the electoral proceedings of the United States, without the indispensable background of a trained people, was responsible for the final undoing of that régime, and for the lowering of the moral character of the people under it. In order to carry on the farce of elections, the political atmosphere of Mexico was filled with lies. The reëlections of General Diaz required complicity from the governors of the states down to the mayors of the towns and to the lowest deputy police, and that complicity entailed a full system of abuses, injuries and misrule. The country, however, availed itself of that period of peace to frame an organization, which although primitive and defective, was the natural resultant of two opposite forces: an uneducated people, by racial tendencies and by centuries of tradition looking towards an autocracy, and the necessity of appearing to enforce a political constitution which prescribed methods of government suitable for a different stage of culture. Under those circumstances General Diaz confined himself to the economic development of the country, but, due to the unethical political methods, there resulted an inharmonious accumulation of wealth; and to the education of the people and the reform of the schools, which for the same reason, resulted in mere pedantry. That defective and vicious organization was, however, the natural outgrowth of our own society, the best we could obtain under such adverse circumstances. It could be used as a ground work; it was the painfully built foundation, laboriously designed by the best intellectual elements which helped General Diaz.

That lack of education among the masses, you may argue, was the fault of Spain, and is the unpardonable sin of the upper class of Mexico. This argument leads me to the fifth fact to which I must call your attention.

FIFTH FACT

There is in Washington a bureau which, it seems to me, does not attract great attention; it is called the Commission of Indian Affairs. Its activities and methods are most interesting, and its reports should be read by all those statesmen of the Spanish American countries in which the Indians abound, as is the case in Mexico. After many of the tribes had disappeared and the whole number of Indians within the territory of the United States had been reduced to three hundred thousand, you began to be apprehensive of their complete annihilation, which would mean the passing away of one of the picturesque features of the life of the United States. You felt equally alarmed over the possible destruction of the Indian and of the buffalo, and you provided against such a result by reducing both, the Indian and the buffalo, to reservations in which you could see to it that they were well kept. Once you decided upon this course, you went into the task with the characteristic ardor and impetus which you put into your undertakings. An appropriation, which in 1913 was more than ten million dollars, has been yearly granted for the supervision and education of the natives in the reservations; the rentals of the land belonging to them were also devoted to that use, and even the wages of the Indian workers were put in a bank for their welfare. A system of guardianship was planned; political rights were practically withdrawn from them, and even the disposition of their property was strictly controlled by the inspector of each reservation. In reading the reports of the Commission I have been greatly surprised by the similarity of methods employed by the Commission of Indian Affairs to those of the Spanish missions in Mexico. So striking is that similarity that I could not help thinking that either one of two things is true: that the policy of the Commission of Indian Affairs was planned after that of the Missions, or the system of the latter was so near to perfection that after various centuries, and in spite of the advancement of pedagogical and social science, the Commission of Indian Affairs had been led by force of facts to the same

conclusions. The basis of that system is common sense; they do not aim to develop the Indians by the use of the political franchise, but do try to prepare them for the franchise through education and external discipline, so long as discipline does not come from their own character. They compel the Indians to carry on a more comfortable life in order to make them love sociability and coöperation, from which that comfort must come. After thirty years of this intensive work of civilization, the Commission of Indian Affairs has succeeded in teaching some sixty thousand Indians to read and write.

Now, if with more than ten million dollars a year for the education of merely three hundred thousand Indians in reservations, kept in control by an overwhelming majority of white population, and under the strict discipline of guardianship, you have, as a result of thirty-eight years efforts, taught only sixty thousand Indians to read and write, how much money does Mexico need to develop twelve millions of illiterate population, who show every opposition to be educated, are scattered over the territory of the republic, and are almost incapable of discipline, due to the extreme ideas of democracy and political rights which they have absorbed. And how long will it take to have at least the majority of the population educated in order that under the present system of universal suffrage the educated people of Mexico may have a chance to control the country?

The government of Mexico, however, has shown a great interest in popular education; schools are found practically in all towns; the educational system is so liberal that not only primary schools but all professional schools are free for students, who can undertake any career without the need of paying tuition. Besides the schools of the government, there are others supported by religious or charitable institutions, or endowed, so that if the people do not send their children to school it is because, in some cases, they lack ambition, in others it is due to some economic reason that bars that ambition.

The whole system of education is defective, however, because in educating the people without giving them better

economic opportunities and presenting to them higher standards of morality in political life, many unsatisfied and uncontrolled ambitions are raised which endanger the community. Mexico City, which was better supplied than any other city in the country with educational facilities, showed a greater criminality, because education made the people long for a higher standard of living and made them realize their misery. The problems of Mexico, consequently, must be confronted at the same time from an economic, educational and ethical point of view; to try a solution from one standpoint alone is a vain and dangerous attempt.

The wonder is that with our defective system of education we have succeeded in getting 20 per cent of the population educated (just the same per cent that you have obtained among the Indian population, with all your inexhaustible resources); and, moreover, that we have succeeded in raising many Indians to prominent places in the scientific, artistic, and political fields, even to occupy the Presidency of the Republic, while in the United States I have never heard of any Indian distinguishing himself in any way whatsoever.

An American explained to me that this was due to the fact that the Indians on this side of the Rio Grande are very stupid and lazy, and the other side of the river they are very intelligent and ambitious; but he did not tell me to what circumstances the psychological effect of the line of the Rio Grande was due.

As a matter of fact there is no such psychological mystery in this; the explanation is very simple. You are willing to give the Indians education, but you will never give them a social status on the same footing as a European. To think of an Indian being a President of the United States is like thinking of a whale building a nest in a tree.

In Mexico, on the other hand, if we do not have so many and such good schools, we have instead that sense of equality inherited with our Spanish traditions. We welcome an Indian in our highest society whenever he adopts our manners and culture; an Indian can marry the daughter of an upper class family if he only shows a proper behavior; and if he is a learned man, the Mexican young men are proud of calling

him their teacher, just as in the colonial times the Indian entered the ranks of the Spanish nobility and the descendants of Indians were appointed viceroys. That moral equality, encouraging the Indian, is responsible for his success in life, and explains the mystery of the Rio Grande.

SIXTH FACT

Finally we have another undeniable fact, namely, the decisive influence of the United States on Mexico. The first revolution in Mexico was the effect of two causes: the condition of Spain under the sway of Napoleon, and the desire of the Mexican people to take advantage of that condition—imitating the United States—believing that independence from Spain would produce for Mexico the same results that the United States had secured by its independence from England. Although Mexico was a country which had long lived under a centralized form of government, and that common sense indicated that centralization was a benefit, they nevertheless created a fictitious federation in order to imitate the United States; the consequent endless struggle between federalists and centralists with all its sad consequences, was at least the pretext for uprisings, revolutions, and counter revolutions, which disturbed Mexico until 1860, when Juarez, with the moral and material support of the United States, succeeded in establishing definitely the federal system. And finally, I do not see any better illustration of that influence in Mexican affairs than the policy of the present administration in overthrowing Huerta and substituting Carranza, with the results that all Americans and Mexicans know well.

These are the most substantial facts in regard to Mexico, and the conclusions must be the direct consequence of those facts.

The first conclusion is that in those periods in which Mexico has enjoyed peace, this peace has been produced by the rule of the cultured section of the people and the subordination of the unlearned class to that rule. If the country is to be governed in accordance with the rule of univer-

sal suffrage, then the majority of the population, that is to say, the illiterate section of it, will have the control of the cultured class. In other words, that class which for its own benefit was subordinated under the Spanish régime, which in the United States is kept under guardianship, would rule in Mexico. If such should be the case, we must in candor confess that the Mexican people are not capable of self-government. This is mere common sense. The Indians and illiterate class of Mexico do not know in some cases even the Spanish language, do not know the political constitution, and the functions of the different branches of the administration. If their vote is to decide, then they will be the tools of wire pullers who may preach to them democracy or communism or any other word which will excite them and stir them into warlike action; or they will be the raw material for the government electoral machine. In both cases the sober honest citizen prefers to abandon the field to his opponents because he can see no possibility of overcoming that machinery, nor is he disposed to compete in machinations. There is no country in the world in which the most intelligent and capable class, in the long run, does not obtain in the government the preëminence it deserves, unless there is some external power, which interferes with the inner forces of that country.

But, on the other hand, if the Mexican people are left to their own resources and discretion they will prove their capacity for self-government, just as they give daily proofs of their intelligence as members of the professional classes, and of their ability and honesty as business men. If they do not find it necessary to misrepresent the facts, they may start again that work of civilizing the Indians which they undertook in the epochs of greater prosperity for Mexico. Let the educated class of Mexico assume before the world the responsibility for the culture of their own fellow citizens. They will show that they are trustworthy.

I am not advocating an autocratic irresponsible government; what I believe is a primary necessity for the life of Mexico is to restrict the exercise of political rights in Federal matters to those who at least know how to read and

write, who thus have an opportunity to know what politics and justice and political economy may mean. If we continue the rule of universal suffrage, we may have the opposite effect of what you had in the South, where the majority of the whites suppressed the vote of the colored people, and we may be forced to suffer the well-known evils of the reconstruction period, with all the political manoeuvres of the carpet-baggers. In Mexico the enormous majority of the unlearned class discourages and overcomes the vote of the literate. If you remember the history of the Indian territory of the United States, and the reasons why you were compelled to withdraw the political franchise from the Indians there, you may realize that the present situation in Mexico is a mere duplication of conditions in that territory; and you may be compelled to admit that my suggestion is the only possible solution for the Mexican problem.

Up to the present the adoption of any kind of literacy test for the exercise of the franchise has met with opposition principally from two sources: the government which controls the illiterate class by means of the political machinery of the administration; and the clergy which hopes to control it by means of religious fanaticism and prejudice. The strength of this opposition comes from current opinions on democracy and from the indiscriminate application of the principle of equality; this opposition is so powerful that even men of culture and character do not have the courage to express their conviction and to attack universal suffrage, for the benefit, nay, for the very life of Mexico as an independent country. It is due to my lack of political ambition, that I can state the truth, and can speak with the utmost positiveness and frankness.

The second conclusion refers to the influence of the United States upon Mexico. If that influence, due to geographical proximity, has been so decisive in the past and continues so decisive in the present, let us utilize that for the reconstruction of Mexico. The only way in which we may succeed is by securing the alliance of men of intelligence and high character in the two countries; then instead of preach-

ing to the Mexicans the enforcement of principles the practicability of which is doubtful, explain to us the valuable lessons which you have learned from your dealings with people of a lower degree of culture; your experience in the South during the reconstruction period, your troubles and difficulties with the Indian Territory in the middle of the nineteenth century, the valuable suggestions which may be gathered from the methods adopted by the Commission of Indian Affairs, as well as from the studies made with laborers of different races and origin, which are found in the reports of the Department of Labor. If you wish really to help us to organize our country as it must be in accordance with existing facts and future possibilities, do not pay so much attention to what the politicians of Mexico may say in order to gain your support; notice carefully what they do in order to obtain the support of their own people, particularly whether they or their followers grow rich in their campaign for democracy and the welfare of their country, and reserve your applause for those who deserve it from an ethical point of view. Then, as the blame or the applause of the people of the United States is in itself a strong force in the world, the whole world may see that that force is used in the service of practical ethics, and Mexico will be the first to reap the benefits thereof. That is the only thing that I think we need from the United States for our reconstruction, for a sound and solid reconstruction. Nothing else. Is the United States willing to give us that help?

Now it seems that a new set of men are coming into power in Mexico. I, for the benefit of my country and the country of my forefathers, and that of my children, and for the fair, friendly and beneficial intercourse between Mexico and the United States, wish for the new rulers, whoever they may be, those virtues which characterized all of our good rulers in the past: honesty, modesty, and justice, in order to make good my last conclusion: that the Mexican people, if left alone to the natural forces of their own society, are capable of self-government.

THE MEXICAN PEOPLE

By Frederick Starr, of the University of Chicago

I shall estimate the population of Mexico at fifteen million people. I shall divide this population into three ethnic elements. The population is made up, first, of pure Mexican Indian tribes; second, of a mixed population with a basis of Indian and a mixture of Spanish or other foreign blood; third, of the foreign element of fairly pure blood, or unmixed with Indian—chiefly, of course, Spanish.

Now, I shall claim that there are six million pure-blood Indians out of the fifteen million, and about eight million of the *mestizo*, or mixed-blood population; that will leave about one million foreigners of fairly pure blood. You know that these figures are worth absolutely nothing, but they are probably as good as any that can be suggested. When we listened to Señor Esquivel Obregón, he emphasized the fact that Mexico is not to be considered ethnically: it is to be considered from the point of view of education and economic and social development. That is all right. There is no reason why we should not look at the same population from different points of view, and we may look at it from that point of view just the same as we do from my own viewpoint. He claims that 80 per cent of this population might be called uneducated, and about 20 per cent might be called educated. Now, this educated percentage would include, of course, the great majority of those of foreign blood; it would also include a certain number of those who had risen from the *mestizo*, or Indian masses; in other words, it would be larger than the pure blood population, through a slight admixture and increase of the population from the other two sources.

Let us look at the Indian of Mexico. Señor Esquivel Obregón, in talking with me, suggested that we cannot say

“the Indian of Mexico,” because there are so many different Indians of Mexico. He was right. There is no one type of Mexican Indian; there are many types. Nobody knows that better than I do. I have visited twenty-three tribes, each with its own language. Thousands of pure Indians have passed through my hands for careful examination. I have known their men, women and children; I have slept in their poor houses; I have eaten their *frijoles* and *tortillas*; I have drunk their black coffee; I have gone without anything for my comfort except my *zarape* over those mountains. I know them as few white men do and as even few Mexicans do.

There are many different kinds of Mexican Indians—many. I was talking once with the archbishop of Oaxaca. He said, “In my diocese we have Indians as yellow as lemons and as black as coal; we have them so short that you could call them pigmies, and we have them taller than the ordinary white man; we have Indians who are good, and Indians who are bad.” These differences are tribal differences. The old Aztecs, when they wanted to speak of someone who was stupid, would call him an Otomi. Those of you who know Mexico have seen their bands come in to the capital city with their loads of charcoal. You recognize them by their primitive dress, their little stature, their quiet, timid manners, and their heavy burdens. Those Otomi are the very essence of stupidity; and so when a man was notably stupid, the Aztecs said, “Oh, you Otomi, you Otomi.”

Don Porfirio Diaz was a great man; he was a great ruler. During his power and greatness I never joined in that indiscriminate paean of praise which foreigners were raising to him—and I am glad to say that since the time of his downfall I have never joined in that indiscriminate criticism and hostility which those same people too often have shown and which have been fashionable since the days of 1911. Diaz was a great man and a great ruler, and he owed it to his Indian blood. He was one-eighth Indian. His father was a Spaniard of pure blood. His mother was one-fourth blood Indian. He took after his mother. His

strong character was due to his Indian blood and what success he gained came more from that side than from the other. Diaz looked with me through my picture book of Mexican Indian types and when he came to the Otomi, the old man looked at one of those types with straw in his matted, dirty hair, clothes tattered and torn, and he said, "My schools will make the Otomi over again." It was false. His schools could do a great deal more for an Aztec than for an Otomi, because of original difference. We must remember those differences in the Mexican Indians. It is not as if they were a unit to deal with. I was a little surprised at one thing that Señor Esquivel said. He claimed that all the Indians knew Spanish well. Of course, I did tell him that my own Spanish was picked up among the Indians of the mountains, and so it was. What Spanish I know I learned in the Mexican mountains and with those poor Indians around me—but, I have been in towns of six thousand Indian population where there were not, perhaps, a dozen who could talk Spanish, and I have been in many Mexican towns where there was only one man who could talk Spanish. In those old days, Diaz always saw that there was one person in every Indian town who could talk Spanish. If he was not there beforehand, he was sent there to act as *secretario* of the town, to conduct necessary dealings with strangers. I think there are large Zapotec towns where every man, woman and child speaks the two languages, but there are other Indian towns where only the *secretario* speaks Spanish. I can take you from the City of Mexico, by electric-line, out about twenty minutes in the direction of Guadalupe, and until we are in sight of its famous churches in the distance. Let us get off and go across the fields, and in five minutes' walk I will take you to a village where the people still speak regular Aztec as their home language. Only twenty minutes from the Plaza of the City of Mexico! That little village knows Spanish—yes, but they all talk Aztec as their common language.

There are then many different tribes of Mexican Indians. There were a hundred and fifty different languages spoken

in that country at the time of the Conquest. More than fifteen languages are spoken in the State of Oaxaca today, and more than 90 per cent of its population are pure blood Indian. How would you like a problem like that? What would you do with a nation where six out of every fifteen persons was a full-blooded Indian? It is a difficult proposition to handle.

Let us look at the Indians. They are ignorant, superstitious, suspicious. How ignorant they are! None of them can read, but I do not care much about that. Illiteracy does not seem to me such an awful thing. More than half the people I know, anyway, do not know how to read and write, and many of the nicest people I ever met in my life are absolute illiterates. Illiteracy is no crime. It is, of course, a great disadvantage, sometimes. It is a great disadvantage where the majority of the population knows how to read and write. There the poor person who, through some accident of birth, is prevented from having that knowledge, is at a serious disadvantage—yes. But, what would those poor things read, anyhow, if they knew how to read down there in the Mexican mountains? I heard one of our speakers groaning because our poor boys in Haiti cannot see a newspaper once in four months! Is not that a *beautiful* situation? I know all about it, for there have been times when I have not seen a newspaper for months and months, and I did not feel any serious loss.

The Indians are suspicious and ignorant. Why, yes; they do not know anything about the outside world. I remember at one time I was in a Chinantec town where they asked me about the outside world. Once in a while they are interested. Occasionally you find an old man who has a little knowledge of Spanish and a little curiosity about the world outside. One such man said to me, "Sir, where do you come from?" And because I have learned how to answer that question, I said, "I come from *El Norte*—a long way. Have you ever been down to Cuicatlan and seen the railroad line?" "Yes." "You have seen a railroad train, and know how fast it goes?" "Yes." "It takes us two days to go from here to Cuicatlan; the next day

we go to Puebla by train; we sleep there that night and next day take a train to the City of Mexico; after traveling several hours we stop and rest, and then we travel all the next night and the next day, and the next night and the next day, and the next night and the next day to reach my place." A look of pain, and surprise and sympathy came over his face, and he said: "Ah, sir; what a remote, out-of-the-way place you come from!" He had never heard of Chicago! He had never heard of New York! He had not heard of William McKinley, or Roosevelt, or any of those people! One time one said to me, "Sir, is the place you came from Don Porfirio's country?" The name of Diaz was the only name, almost the only name, in Mexico, that hundreds and thousands of those Indians really did know. "It is Don Porfirio's country?" "No; I answered; it is not Don Porfirio's country." "Then it must be *Papa?*" (i.e., the Pope, at Rome). "No; it is not the country of the Pope, either." When they are told that it is neither the country of Don Porfirio nor of *el Papa*, they are completely lost. Ignorant? Yes. What a broad grasp he has on world affairs! How ready he is to grapple with the serious problems of life! How definite his national ambitions must be! Suspicious? They hate even to have a stranger stay one night in their village. They say, "The next town, sir, is only a little way on." Suspicious? Poor things! Why should they not be suspicious? What friends have they ever had that came as strangers to their town? And superstitious? Yes; they are superstitious. They are good Catholics, but they do not know anything about the church. I remember that one day I was at Chicahuaxtla. When I arrived I thought it a most beautiful place. We came there one morning at ten o'clock. The sun was bright, and the air fine, and as we reached the height, we looked down yonder, seventy-five miles and could just see the blue waters of the Pacific. It was a beautiful mountain scene. Poor, little village with its few hundred Indians! We stopped there several days. About two o'clock everything changed; great billows of waves of mist came up from the sea; by three o'clock one could not see a thing anywhere;

by four o'clock we were suffering, and the poor fellows all had on their blankets and were sitting cold and shivering. I thought this was just one day, you know, but I now believe that it happens there every day of the year. From nine o'clock in the morning until eleven o'clock a beautiful, clear sky and balmy air, and the rest of the time shivering in that penetrating fog and mist. Poor things! They are drunkards, of course—there, under such circumstances. To show you what good Catholics they are: I was measuring my subjects one day; until I saw more people out than usual, I did not realize that it was a Church holiday; presently I happened to look out toward the church, and there came a poor fellow with his head broken open and with blood flowing from the wound, his white shirt soaked with blood, hands drenched and face covered. He came up crying, with his hands out. I said: "What is the matter with you?" He said, "I am the *mayordomo* of the church here. It is our feast day. The priest was to come, and he is not here, and the people are so outraged that one has broken my head open with a club." No wonder they were irritated over the loss of religious privileges. "You look bad," said I to him. "Go back to your house and have your woman wash you and put on another shirt; if you die, I will see that the man is punished." He went away quite happy. About two o'clock I was still at work, and there came a crowd from the other direction. They were carrying a pole, and there was someone hanging from the pole, to which he was tied with cords; two held his hands, and two were holding his feet; he was hanging by a loop, and as he came by he was struggling, and snarling and howling. I asked, "What is the matter with him?" "Well," they said, "it is a *fiesta*, and he got drunk and cut his friend, and we are taking him to the jail." At evening, at six o'clock, we were in the house of the one *mestizo* that lived there, the *secretario* of the town. We were eating our evening meal and heard a noise outside. I said, "What is the matter?" "Probably something going on up at the jail." "Well," said I, "let's go and see." "No," said the *secretario*, "better stay here." "There may be some harm being done; let us

see what is the matter," said I. We went up there. The police force was all there. There was a fire blazing outside the jail, which was a single room built of logs, or slabs, with one door and no windows. When we got there, the police were standing in a half-circle around the door, and all the villagers from that part of the village were looking on. Here were some holding torches. Here was the blazing fire. In the midst of the group was a man, frightfully drunk. He was like an insane, crazy creature—screaming, yelling, clawing and doing all sorts of horrible things, and the police stood around, hopeless and helpless. "What is the matter? What is the matter?" I said. "Why don't you put him into the jail?" Well, they closed in, under my direction; they seized the man, opened the jail door, and thrust him in. I found out then that he was the thirty-fifth one out of the population of three hundred and fifty that went into that jail that day! And it was a church holiday! It was the only day of the year that they would usually have had the services of a priest. Once a year, in those Indian towns, a priest visits the town and says mass and baptizes the children that have been born, most of them out of matrimony. That is a picture of an Indian village in Southern Mexico. To finish the story before we leave it, one of the police came limping up to me, and another came up with a blazing torch, and I saw then why they had been afraid. The man's leg was bleeding, and as I looked at him I realized what had happened. They had tried to put that crazy, drunken fool into the jail before, and he had bitten a mouthful of living flesh out of the leg of the policeman! An Indian town in Southern Mexico—yes.

There are perhaps six million of the population like that—a problem, is it not? I am thankful to say that it is not all like that. Think of Benito Juarez. He was a full blood Indian. When he was a well-grown boy he could speak scarcely a word of Spanish. He found his way to the capital city of Oaxaca, found a good priest as a friend, learned all he could, became a local official, later represented his district at Mexico City, became a Supreme Court judge, and then, when there was no legal president, because he was

Justice of the Supreme Court he became president of the Republic of Mexico. Pretty good work for a pure-blood Indian boy who did not know Spanish until well past the days of boyhood. Today Señor Esquivel Obregón and I were talking about Altamirano, famous among the writers of Mexico and Latin America—one of the best stylists that the American continent has ever produced; he was a practically pure-blooded Indian from one of those poor towns of Oaxaca, in Southern Mexico. He represented his nation at the courts of Europe, and finally died at the court of Paris, of homesickness. They love their mountains so!

There were other things I was going to tell you about them. I did not mean to tell you any stories at all! They are hard-working; they are affectionate; they are clannish. The Indian father loves his little ones. He is not "mushy," but he loves his wife. He knows his town and his own people; that is all he knows, and that is all that he has confidence in. His poor village means everything to him. He will stand for his town and his people against anything—everything.

Industrious? Yes, they all work. They work those little fields diligently, and they raise just about enough to keep them until the next harvest. They burn a little charcoal; they make a few pots; they weave some mats and braid some hats. They make a trip once in a while to Oaxaca to trade and buy with their produce. In their little towns they are all right. They have a good government. It is pure democracy. They elect their own officers. They are honest people, and form hard-working, industrious, simple communities. If they are drunkards, they are so because of special circumstances, such as that awful mist driving up from the sea. I found that all towns situated like that are drunken towns; drunkenness is the result of that situation; I would be a part of that drunken town if I lived there long enough and for the same reason.

I was going to tell you about their laboriousness. When these people carry burdens to Oaxaca to sell or to trade in the market, they carry the heavy burden on their back for perhaps a hundred miles. They will be two, three, five,

or more days on the road. They trade their goods, sleeping on the stone pavements of the corridors in front of houses or shops, and when they have disposed of their little stock, they are ready to go home. They then pick up stones and load themselves, carrying the load of stones back to their towns, the weary miles over the mountains. It looks foolish, doesn't it? They do it to keep themselves in training; they do it because if they began to spare themselves a little, they might not have strength enough to go on. Are they fools? No; they are not fools; there is nothing the matter with their brains.

Let us look at the second element of the population—the *mestizos*. Some *mestizos* and Indians rise; they are the exceptions. Of course, more *mestizos* rise than Indians. The *mestizo* is the person whom we are fond of calling a "greaser." I know him pretty nearly as well as I know the Indian. He is the common, every-day mixed-blood Mexican. Poor, miserable greaser—ignorant, superstitious, eminently pious; gay, thoughtless, improvident. We are told that he will work until he has a little money, and then he will not work again until it is gone. Why should he not live that way? How many of us would work if there was not a constant spur on us? A few of us would; I am quite sure that I would, but I am not sure about you! Why should *they* work more than they must? They are gay and careless—even to the beggars on the streets of Mexico. We have heard the beggars mentioned today; they are a sad, sad sight, and yet, you know, they smile. They come up with the saddest looks and say to you, "Señor etc." You say, "Mañana, amigo mio," and smile back at them, and they smile at you with a smile that is radiant. You would think they never had a pang in their hearts, when in reality they never had a belly-full of decent food in their lives. So happy, and kind, and gentle—and so poor! There are thousands of them—millions of them—the *mestizos*, and most of them are very poor, in Mexico.

Let us look at some of their other qualities. They are brave—yes—brave and cowardly! Villa is an example. He is a very devil of fearlessness; and yet has more than

once shown himself an abject coward. It is a common thing in the *mestizos*, this combination of fearlessness and absolute cowardice. They are not afraid to die. If there is anything that they are interested in that involves the risk of death, they will throw themselves into it just the same. They love a leader. Any leader will do, as long as he is a leader—somebody who will say, "Let us do this." They will flock behind him to do it. It is irrational, of course; but they are frequently faithful. They are faithful, and they are treacherous sometimes. I have had some most faithful servants from these people. There was a Mexican boy of the *mestizo* class who came to me at fifteen years of age, and through fifteen years every time I needed him he stood by me, and I knew I could never be taken unawares so long as his eagle eye was watching my surroundings. The boy was murdered in Mexico, sleeping in his bed, in 1912. He had worked with me in America, Europe, Asia, Africa. He had traveled 200,000 miles with me. The *mestizos* are frequently faithful. Any person who has had genuine experience in Mexico, either as mistress in a house or master in a shop, or superintendent of labor, knows that there is a great deal that is fine and useful and valuable in those *mestizo* people—common greasers. They are not fools, either. They know what they want, and they are learning what they ought to want. One of the most interesting experiences of my life dates to the time when Diaz first began to draw the line between Bernardo Reyes who had been Minister of War and whom the people expected would be the next President of Mexico, and Limantour. The *mestizos* were interested in that contest, and I saw the birth and development of actual interest in politics such as they had not been accustomed to before. From that day on, Mexicans—the common Mexicans—have been thinking sanely and sensibly about what they want, but they need leadership to realize and to achieve it.

I was going to say of the Indian, finally, that he is cruel and bloodthirsty, and of the *mestizo* that he is cruel and proud. Cruel in both cases, with the cruelty of the old Indian; and in the *mestizo*, proud with the splendid pride of Spain.

Such are the people of Mexico. There are different ways of looking at their problem. Señor Esquivel Obregón says that the problem finds its solution in the handling of that mass of Indians and *mestizos* by the *ilustrados*. It is a mode of solution; it is the natural mode. It is the mode that was to be hoped for, and it is the mode which would most promptly and naturally solve the problem. But little progress has been made along that line. For four hundred years the common people have been exploited. I admire the old Spanish days a great deal. There are beautiful things to be said about the times of the viceroys. Spain did wonders in Mexico. There was a magnificent development even in the sixteenth century. All that we have been told about that development is true; but, after all, it was a period of dreadful exploitation.

Let us examine the kinds of exploitation through which Mexico has passed and under which it has suffered for more than five hundred years. First, is the exploitation of the common Indian, which began long before the Spaniard ever landed down there near Vera Cruz. Do you realize what a language means that contains deferentials? There are deferentials in the Japanese language. The Japanese say a thing politely to a superior, or impolitely to an inferior, and naturally to an equal. There are deferential forms in many other languages, but I know of no language where it comes to the perfection that it comes to in some Mexican Indian tongues. Deference is shown in most languages in the general construction of the sentence and in special forms of verbs and pronouns. But in Aztec adjectives are deferential, adverbs are deferential and prepositions and conjunctions; in other words, it is not only the nouns and pronouns that show an attitude of cringing, servile respect to those above and of contempt for those below, but all the parts of speech. And this attitude of the common man to his superior antedates the coming of the Spanish. In the ruined cities of Central America and Mexico, the buildings that are left are only those that were used for religious and governmental purposes. Thus, at Mitla there is nothing of ruins except government and religious buildings—yet thousands of people must have lived

at Mitla. The people generally lived in poor huts, and the priests and the rulers had substantial buildings constructed with sweat and labor for their benefit; in other words, exploitation of the common people antedates the Conquest. Then, four hundred years ago, came the Spaniard with his career of conquest. There is no question about the excellent things he brought in. There is no question that frequently fine things were developed, but the people were pitilessly exploited. The Indians of Central America and Mexico were put to work in the mines and fields and driven by hard masters. I realize all that the Council of the Indies did—all the good laws that were passed—all the efforts made by such priests as Bartolome de las Casas. But the situation was that of slavery for the Indian. He toiled in the fields and the mines; he had to do all under pressure; he was the last thing to be considered, so long as the *conquistadores* got something out of it.

The next exploiters were the Frailes. Many of the missionaries were good and devout men, devoted and friendly to the Indians; splendid developments they made. You may still see those magnificent churches here and there all over that wonderful country; and around those churches, in the old days, were the huts of the Indians. The labor was done under direction and wealth was produced; the priests lived in luxury; the Indians were no doubt happy to fall into the hands of the priests rather than outsiders, but they were exploited for the Church. There is much unjust criticism of the Catholic Church in Mexico. It drained the population, yes; but the priests would have been less than human and more than human if they had not taken advantage of the situation they found. They came upon a people who were accustomed to yield everything to authority and to religion, and why should not they expect the same kind of contributions that the Indians had been in the habit of giving their own bloodthirsty gods?

Who were the next exploiters? *Los dueños, los amos*. When those fine old properties, given to the *conquistadores*, passed permanently into the hands of old families—splendid great possessions of land, wide-stretching, rich, fertile,

and not only land properties, but hundreds and thousands of men, who worked them were really owned by the *dueños*. The laborers were entitled to their *tortillas* and *frijoles*, to their poor clothing and simple shelter, and they contributed to the wealth of the owners. The situation might have been worse than it was but the common laborers were serfs on the lands. It was exploitation, and the peons got out of it but a bare living, while the *amos* and *dueños* lived in splendor.

Then came the revolution, one hundred years ago. For a hundred years the form of exploitation has been different. Today it is largely the exploitation of *los politicos*, the leaders, the men who can, through the hands that they control, mount to power. Sad, is it not? One sort of exploitation after another: is it *always* going to keep on? It might have been hoped that the old situation would end with the coming of the Spaniards; but things were worse; when liberty and independence came, it might have been hoped that things would improve, but they have gone right on under the modern *politico*.

Such is the population of Mexico—the Mexican people. Let us look at the Mexican Republic. From the beginning it has been a land of prosperity and wealth; but only for a few—always but a few. The priests, the chiefs, the conquerors, the land-owners, the politicians, the leaders—have had an easy time. It has been the people, who have carried them. As Señor Esquivel Obregón says, the natural thing is for an evolution to have taken place, but I see no signs of upward evolution in that career of exploitation. The situation of the Mexican population today is no better than it was four hundred years ago, and yet in any genuine development and evolution it should have been vastly improved. The *ilustrados* should have helped that evolution. They have been content to leave the Indians just a bare existence, so long as they were comfortable. One of the most serious mistakes of Diaz in his long period of rule was the fact that he did not develop those Indians—those fellows in the mountains, talking their languages, living in their little villages, into citizens of the Republic. During thirty-

five years Diaz should have instilled into their minds the fact that they were part of a great nation; if he had done that, they would be part of a great nation today. But instead, he dealt with them in the easiest, simplest way. They would pay their contribution, their personal tax for the sake of being left alone. It was the easiest way to deal with a serious problem. It was Diaz's way. He left the six million Indians absolutely alone as long as they paid their contribution. They do not know today that they are a part of a nation. They do not know today their duties toward anything outside their village. Porfirio Diaz made a serious blunder in dealing with that problem in the easiest way, instead of making the Indians realize that he was President of Mexico, and that they were Mexicans—not only Aztecs, and Mixtecs and Zapotecs, and so on, but Mexicans.

There is a great deal of talk about the land problem. There was a time when President Wilson used to talk about the agrarian problem of Mexico. I do not think he has the slightest idea of the real problem. There are two agrarian problems, both of which are of importance. We have seen how the great estates came into existence. Hundreds and thousands of people often labored on the lands of one owner. That is an agrarian problem, and that is what Mr. Wilson was thinking of; it is what most people in the United States mean when they talk about the agrarian problem of Mexico. But that problem can wait. Those great estates, landed properties of old families, with the common laborers upon them in actual serfdom, are undesirable. They will pass, of course, in time, if Mexico really progresses. It is too late in the world's history for such conditions to be normal. But there is another agrarian problem; it is more serious; its solution is urgent. Only a few years ago, within the memory of hundreds and thousands of Indians still living, some new laws were passed in Mexico the purpose of which was simply to get possession of the common lands of the Indians. In many towns the Indians do not own individual land. A man *occupies* individual ground, his father before him, and his grandfather before him, occupied

it. He looks upon it practically as his, but it is really not such. It is the property of his village, but he has the use of it. Laws were passed that took such land into consideration. These lands were taken away, here and there in the Indian districts, land on which the Indians had lived for years and years. The law said, such lands should be registered; if not registered by a given date they become public land. What did those poor Indians know about registering land that they had lived on for years and their ancestors before them? They were not *expected* to register these lands; it was known that they would not register. The land was taken; the Indians were evicted from the soil. That is the problem that *hurts*. It is the lands that have been taken from the Indians during our memories, which should be given back to them before the present generation of them dies, that is the urgent agrarian problem of Mexico.

With the eviction of Indians from their lands—from their common lands—there were troops of homeless, propertyless, wandering, tramping beggars, subjected to every kind of temptation and degradation! Let the old masters, as many of them as treat their people right, alone for the present. Take whatever time is necessary to deal with them, but something should be done with these comparatively recently evicted Indians. Their lands were sold to outsiders *ilustrados* in Mexico and newspaper owners and others in the United States.

There is another thing in this connection. I have been in towns which, a little before my visit, were fine towns of hundreds of people, which were practically depopulated or left with but a few women and children in the place. What had happened? American investors who wanted to try a futile experiment in raising rubber or in developing coffee plantations needed help. Do you get the idea? American investors, German investors, French investors, people who wanted agricultural labor where there was none available needed hands, and whole towns were depopulated against the wishes of the townsfolk in order to supply contract laborers to neighboring foreign plantations. Well, that is one way of lifting and improving, teaching, giving the results of Western culture to the Mexican people.

It seems as if a critical moment has come. It seems as if the question is whether the future is to see a similar exploitation. Are the Mexican common people to continue to be slaves? After having been slaves of their own leaders, of the *conquistadores*, of the *misioneros*, the *dueños*, and the *politicos*, are they to be similarly exploited by *los extranjeros*—the foreigners? It appears quite possible. It looks as if we would expand; it looks as if we would crowd; it looks as if we must have labor. Labor is not common; it can be had. It may be paid well. We have paid better wages usually than the *ilustrados* have. Yes; but after all, it is slavery. And it is a slavery that is particularly hard where the master knows nothing about the particular psychology, or the makeup, or the past, the pleasures, the desires of the laborers. I wish the *ilustrados* would wake up. I wish that twenty per cent of educated population would help the evolution a little bit. They have not done much in a long time. They must wake up, because if they do not, they are as sure to lose their hold as the common people of Mexico are sure to lose theirs.

The only leader who seems to have said anything in favor of the people of Mexico or to have made any public utterance in their behalf, was the man of whose death we have just heard—President Carranza. I have heard much criticism of Carranza. He was not my choice for President; still, when he was recognized I said: "Thank Heaven; Wilson has recognized someone!" It was time that he did. There were reasons why I believed that Carranza would be a failure. Compared with what I expected, he has proved an extraordinary success. Some things that he has done are foolish. Like almost every man who has come into power in Mexico, he threw his promises to the winds after he was once in control. Yet he did some remarkable things, considering the situation that he found. Well, he has gone, I suppose. The ex-Ambassador (Hon. Henry Lane Wilson) told us last evening that we did not know anything of what had taken place in Mexico for the last thirty days, and then immediately afterwards told us a detailed story of Carranza fleeing into the mountains with

27,000,000 pesos! Probably he has gone, and it is too bad that he did not do more. His real weakness was the same that President Roosevelt showed and that Mr. Wilson showed. President Roosevelt, you remember, as he neared the end of his term of office, was obsessed with the fear lest his policies would be neglected—"My policies must be continued." It is an idea that people in power often get. It is always a mistaken idea. There is no man whose policies are so strong and so absolute that something else will not do; but people are often taken that way, and Mr. Roosevelt was. So he put Mr. Taft in, and you know how that came out. It led to a rupture from which the party is still suffering. Wilson came to a point once where he felt that his policies were the one and only thing, and so he made an appeal to the American people, and he said, "You must," and they gave him a Republican Congress! The situation in Mexico is that same thing. Carranza insisted on having his policies continued, and they answered that demand by arms, and that is all. It is not to insure a fair election of our kind, which is a thing they know nothing about in Mexico. What is the use of making pretenses, when we all know better?

Is it probable that Mexico will really be absorbed by United States capital? Is it probable that the Mexican people will now be the slaves of a new exploiter? Is it possible that after 500 years of absolutely living for the benefit of others and getting nothing but a scanty living, that they are to pass into hands quite as ruthless, harsh and cruel as anything they have had before? My own belief is that it depends on who they have as President in Mexico for the next fifteen years.

This is my last point. Let me call your attention to what is essential in a President of Mexico for the next few years, if the people of Mexico are not to pass into the hands of new exploiters.

The first thing is that the president of Mexico must have some Indian blood. That was one point against Madero—he was a Portuguese. Carranza was a Spaniard. The man to solve Mexico's problems must have some Indian blood.

What are the two names that stand out conspicuously among the names of the presidents of Mexico? Benito Juarez and Porfirio Diaz. Diaz had only one-eighth Indian blood, but he was a good deal of an Indian.

Second, the president of Mexico for the next fifteen years, should have a strong hand. We talk a great deal about tyranny, overriding public rights, and all that. My dear friends, I am as interested in having every man, woman and child have all their rights as anyone can possibly be, but the president of Mexico for the next fifteen years, if there is to be evolution or progress, must be a man with a strong hand; and, if he is a man with a strong hand, as president of Mexico he will unquestionably override some human rights during the period of his administration.

In the third place, the president of Mexico during the next fifteen years must be a just man and must be prepared to protect foreign interests and investments, but he must think first, and always first, of the Mexican people.

In the fourth place, the president who is to help Mexico within the next fifteen years must think much more of the Indian and the common, poor *mestizo* than he does of the *ilustrado*. I have no fear that the *ilustrado* will be thrown down and trampled upon. It is not impossible—such things have happened in other lands, in other times, but both the Indian and the common man in Mexico are men of extraordinary docility and gentleness of character, and if only a little attention is given to their elevation and only a little is done to help them, a great deal is accomplished. You remember that we heard someone suggest that they should be fed before they are taught. That idea has my heartfelt sympathy. I do not think so much of books. Books are all right, in their way, and when the time comes, give the Mexican children books—yes, put them in school; but wash them, dress them, clothe them, feed them—yes, give them something on which the digestive juices may act—first. When I say give it to them, I mean let them earn it; but let them earn it at a decent rate, in their own way, in work for Mexicans.

Consider some of the men who have lately been presidents of Mexico. There was old man Huerta. He was probably a pure-blood Indian. He came into power entirely legally; every legal step was observed when Victoriana Huerta became president of Mexico. More than that, Huerta's hands were not stained with the blood of Madero at the time he became President. He is said to have been an awful drunkard, and they tell dreadful tales about the way he took his whisky. I imagine that the people in this audience do not know anything about whisky. Dr. Cummings has gone, so I shall feel safe in making some observations! *Gentlemen* take whisky by measured "fingers," and put a certain amount of some kind of effervescent water in with the whisky, and according to the amount of "fingers" and the amount of effervescent water, the gentleman's position is gauged. The finger measure must not be too small, but it must not be too large. Probably Huerta was no gentleman. Personally, I do not think that Huerta was so popular that if left alone he would have remained in power, but before we got through with him, he was the fittest man to occupy the presidential chair of Mexico, and I have always regretted that Wilson did not recognize him. Huerta represented almost everything that I considered bad in Mexican politics, but he was the legal ruler of the country; he was an Indian by blood; he was a man with a strong hand; he would not have granted anything to the Mexican people as long as he did not have to do so. But Huerta was no fool. He had seen Porfirio Diaz fall from his splendid height; he had seen Madero, who had been the popular idol, in less than two years absolutely destroyed. Being no fool, Huerta would grant grudgingly, he would give slowly, what was necessary, and that is what the successful president of Mexico must do. It is a mistake to throw too much at one time to a struggling population. I hope the Mexican people will get their rights; I hope they will struggle and insist upon their rights; I hope that, no matter who comes to the Presidential chair, he will be forced, gradually, to give them their rights. But, let them get their rights gradually, in

the same way that we did through the days of English history. So much for old man Huerta.

And there was Carranza. I have said all I care to about him. And here is Obregón. I do not know Obregón. I believe that Carranza promised that he should follow him and that more than one year ago it was fully arranged in detail. It was expected that when Carranza got through and the election came, Obregón should be the one candidate, and that he would have the president behind him. Perhaps they quarreled; perhaps it was only the obsession that his policies were essential; at all events Carranza raised up his personal candidate, Bonillas. The Mexican people expected Obregón to become president. He expected it. Carranza meant it, up to a certain point. It looks now as if he will be president.

Rodolfo de la Huerta must be an interesting man. He has a good deal of Indian blood, and he is something of a ruler. He is a reformer. Like most Mexicans, he has his warm friends and his bitter enemies. His friends say nothing but good of him, and his enemies nothing but bad. It is asserted by his friends that he made Sonora "dry as a bone;" his enemies say that what he really did was to corner all the drinks and sell them out at a sharp advance. In either case, he must be quite a notable man. He is the present power. We have heard something about Alvarado. My suspicion is that Mexico is not big enough for both Obregón and Alvarado. It is perhaps large enough for Obregón and de la Huerta. Pablo Gonzales, who enjoys the nickname of "The Squash," perhaps will get on with Obregón, but they will find the confines narrow when Obregón and Alvarado come to really work together. Whichever of those men comes in, it is to be hoped that he may build on the foundations which Carranza has laid.

UPON THE INDIAN DEPENDS MEXICO'S FUTURE

By James Carson, National Councillor of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico; Formerly Chief of the Associated Press Service in Mexico

The year 1920 will perhaps figure in Mexico's history as the most momentous since that of 1821 when Mexico first attempted to walk alone. The overturning of the Carranza government may mean the first real, though somewhat uncertain, step toward self-government as we know it here in the United States. This assumption is predicated on the fact that the Mexicans are weary of war, after a nine years' orgy of bloodshed, during which time almost every crime was committed in the name of liberty and of democracy.

Much of the confusion which has clouded the minds of many observers of Mexican affairs has been occasioned by non-consideration of the history of the Mexican people and the consequent failure to comprehend the true character of the natives. It is but natural that North Americans should apply the yardstick of experience in measuring the happenings and judging of the future of the republic to the south of them, but such a procedure must inevitably result in wrong conclusions. The first question, therefore, which one must endeavor to answer, in order to dispassionately judge the present-day Mexican situation, is: Who are the Mexican people?

Their beginning is shrouded in mystery. No field offers such fascination for the archeologist. We know from the ruins of Palenque and of Mitla that a race peopled Mexico some 2000 years before Christ. From the inscriptions chiseled on the ruins of the stone temples which have been unearthed it seems probable that these people were star-worshippers and their hieroglyphics bear a resemblance to those of the early Assyrians and Egyptians.

The beginnings of Mexico, however, cannot be traced to this dim past. The modern Mexican is a descendant of the Toltecs and the Aztecs. Just what influence the first of these races had in moulding the character of the present-day people is questionable. The Toltecs left imposing monuments in the shape of great pyramids rivaling some of those of Egypt. The best two examples of these which have endured until today are those at San Juan de Teotihuacan, about thirteen miles southeast of Mexico City, and one at Cholula on the outskirts of the City of Puebla.

The real forefathers of the present-day Mexicans were the Aztecs. These people were of undoubted Mongolian origin and their migrations from that part of the United States now occupied by the States of Oregon, California, Arizona and New Mexico, into Old Mexico, can be easily traced to this day. We know that these people had some strong qualities; that they had imagination, and some capacity for civil government and a sort of genius for building. All this can be read in the structures which they left in New Mexico, in Chihuahua and in the ruins of the Teocali which was built upon the site of the present Cathedral in Mexico City.

When Hernando Cortez, with his little band of supermen, landed at Vera Cruz and burned his ships behind him, the Aztec was the dominant race in Mexico. If we can rely upon the very fascinating accounts of Prescott and the garrulous notes of that old *conquistador*, Bernal Diaz, we may be sure that these people were in many things as far advanced as were the Europeans of their day. They had built great temples, had an educated priesthood, paid some attention to public instruction, possessed a judiciary, members of which were appointed for life, and had a ruler who was elected to office. We know that they built a great city in the valley of Anahuac in the high plateau region. This city contained 300,000 inhabitants, had a great market place where on certain days a fifth of the population gathered to purchase finely woven cloths, gold and silver ornaments, sweetmeats, and foodstuffs of various kinds. The city was everywhere intersected by canals, for it had been

built upon the bed of a disappearing lake. It was such a community that Cortez and his doughty warriors found after they had fought their way up from the tropics to the foot of the majestic Popocatepetl.

What happened is familiar to all of you. The Spaniards, with insatiable greed for gold and fanatical zeal to advance the cross, crushed these people with a cruelty, the relentlessness of which shocks readers of the history of that period even to this day. It would be unfair to the Spaniard to attribute to him all of the ills of present-day Mexico. Some time ago I heard Vicente Blasco Ibañez, that gifted novelist, brilliant orator and sparkling conversationalist, pay an eloquent tribute to the courage and dauntlessness of this little band that conquered an empire, and they deserved it, if bravery and the spirit of adventure are the only measures to be applied in judging of their conduct. The conquest of Mexico is an epic the like of which has never been paralleled in history. But while the Spaniards built magnificent temples and stamped some of the strength of the Iberian on the country, not even the eloquence of an Ibañez can erase the blot which is all that remains of the civilization of the early Mexican people. There can be no quibble over this fact of history, for we have it from the pen of a Spaniard himself—Las Casas—who devoted his life in an attempt to right the great wrong committed by the Spaniard.

The man from Spain and his descendants dominated Mexico for three centuries, and the work of cruelty begun by Cortez extended over that entire period, until the Mexican became a mere serf, almost a dumb creature. When the war for independence was begun, it was not the Mexicans, but the Spanish creoles who started it. Iturbide was of almost pure Spanish blood and he was the first hero in Mexican history. His empire did not last longer than some of the succeeding presidencies. That Spain wrote her rubrics large across the face of Mexico and the rest of Latin America is a fact; that she crushed the Mexican people in the process is, for our purpose, a more important truth.

Since the last of the Spanish troops, under O'Donojú, marched down the slopes to Vera Cruz, that port through which the Spaniards had first entered the country three centuries before, Mexico, with two exceptions, has been dominated by men of mixed Spanish blood, *mestizos* who have retained the political traits and traditions of the one-time mother country. These men constitute less than three per cent of the population and are known to the outside world and designated by many foreign observers as "the Mexican people." They are not. The real Mexican people consist of some 13,000,000 of Indian blood, the dregs of a once powerful and progressive race. The Mexican problem resolves itself into a question of whether or not these people can come back if the opportunity is given them.

Critics and scoffers of this view point (and unfortunately these two terms are often too nearly synonymous when treating of Mexican affairs) point to the fact that since the days of the first presidency of Guadalupe Victoria, in 1821, there have been seventy-three distinct administrations, and that the average tenure of a chief executive of Mexico has been less than one year. This, of course, is historically true, but this long and discouraging record of constant treacheries, revolutions and governmental turnovers was broken by two régimes characterized by real patriotism and progress. Is it not hopeful that these two administrations were those of men of Indian blood?

When we speak of an Indian in Mexico we speak of a Mexican. What are the facts, historically? Seventy-three administrations in less than one hundred years. One of these, that of Benito Juárez, a pure-blooded Indian, saved the sovereignty of his country and drove the foreign invader from its shores; the other, that of Porfirio Díaz, an Indian, gave to the land thirty-six years of peace and prosperity, and a material development and wellbeing which demonstrates the possibilities of the future. Seventy-one administrations by inheritors of Spanish traditions were failures, two by men of Indian blood were successes. Is it not fair to assume that it is within the realm of probability that the Indian can come back?

The character of the Mexican Indian is much misunderstood. He is naturally serious, docile and industrious. Centuries of domination have made him childlike, and for that reason he is easily led. The *mestizo*, politician and military chieftain, take full advantage of this trait and thus find it comparatively easy to keep the revolutionary pot boiling. Under the leadership of such men the Indian has committed horrible atrocities, but the belief that by nature he is bloodthirsty and warlike is wholly erroneous.

For the past nine years the Indian has been fighting furiously, now at the beck of one leader, again at the call of another. There are abundant signs at present that this sort of thing is at last palling upon him; that after decades of deceit he is beginning to see the light. He is tired of fighting. He is commencing to see that the type of leader he has so long blindly followed is more interested in sustaining himself than in ruling for the benefit of the country. In this awakening lies the hope of the future for Mexico.

Two factors have been largely responsible for this change in the native Mexican. One of these has been the disillusionment resulting from years of bloody fighting which have brought him nothing but poverty and misery; the other, the uplifting influence of great American and other foreign business enterprises and American business men who have gone into his country to develop its natural resources. No single thing has done as much to promote the welfare of the Mexican of the lower class as has the example of the progressive foreigner. Americans built the railways in Mexico, more than 15,000 kilometers of them. In doing so they developed artisans, such as machinists, carpenters, blacksmiths, and a multitude of other skilled craftsmen. They raised the standards of living and the daily wage of the worker. They did this deliberately, and the influence of these pioneer builders spread to other great concerns operating mines, mills and factories. These mechanics formed the nucleus of the middle class which in the near future will for the first time in the history of Mexico begin to assert itself. These Americans taught, but they did so by example rather than by precept. Mexico has an educational sys-

tem, but like much that was inherited from Spain it is hollow—a matter of form rather than substance. The great need of the people today is for vocational training, and the genius of the American for organization will supply this if he is given an opportunity to help the Mexican to develop the vast riches of his country. This is the only kind of intervention that is thinkable. Armed intervention by the United States would be a calamity, the effects of which would be felt for many decades to come in the suspicion and lack of esteem in which the United States would be held by the other republics of the western hemisphere. Such a movement would be a mistake, not only from the standpoint of justice, but also from that of political expediency.

The two great dangers which confront the present Government are those of militarism and the inaccessibility of vast stretches of territory which make the Central Government little more than a name to the people inhabiting them. Militarism has always been the curse of Mexico and if the liberal government, which has just taken over the reins of power, allows itself to be dominated by the ambitions of the various chieftains who have hastened to give it allegiance, it will be in great danger of going the way of other governments. Nullifying this threat of disaster is the general sentiment of the country against a further continuance of fighting of any kind.

Conditions existing at the present time are somewhat analogous to those which prevailed in the early seventies, just before Porfirio Diaz assumed supreme control. At that time the country had been bled white by a succession of revolutions which had stretched over the previous half century. It wanted a strong hand at the helm to stamp out banditry and give the people an opportunity to follow their peaceful pursuits. Diaz proved to be such a man. Will Obregon measure up to these standards? Those who know him well believe that he will do so. He is young, vigorous and patriotic and his expressed desire to live on friendly terms with the United States will greatly aid him in his tremendous task. Carranza might have been the

greatest man in Mexican history had he been willing to link the destinies of his country with those of the United States and her allies in the great world war. When he chose to do otherwise he sealed his doom.

Even with peace, the task of reconstruction in Mexico is one that calls for administrative genius of the highest order. Few people realize the great extent of Mexico territorially. It has more than 767,000 square miles, comprising an area greater than all of Western Europe, and equalling that of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, the German Empire, Switzerland, Italy, Greece and Cuba. Although telegraphic communication is maintained with practically all of this territory, and more than 10,000 miles of railway connect up its principal cities, there are still entire regions where the inhabitants live in most primitive style, weaving the fabrics for their very simple clothing and obtaining their food as did their ancestors centuries before. Often these people know no Spanish, speaking their native dialects of which philologists tell us there are sixty-five separate and distinct ones. To attempt to judge Mexico by its capital city, or by the various other thriving centers of population in some of the better known states, is as futile as to try to get a picture of our own country by examining a cross-cut section of the East Side of the City of New York.

There are certain natural and economic laws which work inevitably. Because of her geographical position, Mexico must always be closely linked to the United States of America. No false Chauvinism on the part of Mexican politicians can change this condition of affairs. Furthermore, the vast riches of the country are needed by the entire world. This is an age of steel and oil, and just as coal and iron spelled dominance in the past half century, so these two first mentioned commodities will determine leadership in the present. Mexico is rich in the elements of both of these. She is also abundantly provided with everything else man wants. What Baron Humboldt said more than a century ago is true today: Mexico is "The Treasure House of the World." If her people can be aided and

guided in developing them, her future is secure; but always it is essential to differentiate the Mexican people from the Mexican politician.

I have found it helpful, in trying to think logically on the Mexican question, to consider that country as a patient and to endeavor through an analysis of the happenings of the past to arrive at a diagnosis that may be reasonable, intelligent and sympathetic. There is nothing uncomplicated intended towards that nation in this method of approach for I have always been a warm admirer of the Republic and its people.

It is undeniable that Mexico is suffering from a disease which from time to time during the past one hundred years has threatened its existence as a sovereign State. It is deep seated and its source can be traced to the Iberian peninsula and the Spaniard. Like most grave illnesses it is complicated, and seemingly contradictory evidence baffles the efforts of the diagnostician. It is the sick man of the West as is Turkey of the East. It is suffering from an ailment produced by the political philosophy of the Iberian as contrasted with that of the Anglo Saxon. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the foreign penetration of the Aztec Empire been postponed one hundred years and a man of the stripe of Sir Walter Raleigh had sailed into the harbor of Vera Cruz instead of one of the ilk of that giant of adventuresomeness, Hernan Cortez.

While there is much to admire in the character of the Spaniard and some of the pages he has written in history are unmatched by the achievements of any other, the genius for self-government is not one of these. This is true despite the fact that individualism is the basic note of Spanish psychology, an Iberian characteristic which has all the force of an imperious atavism, and that the present-day Latin American is the product of that fierce strain of religious fanaticism which the Moors brought into Spain, and of that assertive love of self-government expressed in the charter of Leon in the year 1020, antedating the Magna Charta wrested from King John and making liberty and democracy of more ancient date in Spain than in England.

What is wanted now in Mexico is an invasion of capital, books, ideas and ideals which shall rid the country of the political poison which lingers as a Spanish inheritance. This is the sort of an intervention which will be the salvation of that country. Whether or not it will come depends upon the attitude of the new régime towards the outside world, and, particularly, the United States of America.

THE FACTOR OF HEALTH IN MEXICAN CHARACTER

By Ellsworth Huntington, Ph.D., Research Associate, Yale University; formerly Research Associate of the Carnegie Institution for Climatic Investigations in Mexico and Central America

People who talk about Mexico often go to extremes. Those at one extreme maintain that the Mexicans are as capable as any race in the world. All they need is education, religion, good government, and a "chance." Those at the other extreme say that the Mexicans are racially inferior; the Indians are hopelessly stupid and dull, while the Spaniards are by nature mercurial and volatile. Every sensible person recognizes that neither of these extremes is true; yet they color our thinking to a dangerous extent. Many of those who are most unselfishly interested in the future of Mexico seem to be wasting much of their effort because they will not squarely face the fact that the Mexican is different from the American of the United States, and no amount of education, religion, good government, or opportunity will make him the same. On the other hand a great many people who know Mexico thoroughly and sympathetically destroy their own influence by assuming that the evils which are so patent in Mexico are due to the supposed racial incapacity of the Mexicans.

The truth seems to be that the Indian blood does give Mexico an inheritance different from that of our own people, and even the Spanish blood is marked by inherent traits which differ from those of the races of northern Europe. Nevertheless, we have no right to assume that the condition of Mexico as we see it today is due solely, or even primarily to this inheritance. In fact, we do not know what the Mexican inheritance is, or what it might achieve if placed under the right surroundings. On the other hand it is

equally unscientific to assume that if the educational, social, political, and religious conditions of Mexico were made perfect, the Mexicans would be able to maintain what we commonly call a high civilization. How can we know until we have a clear idea as to the racial capacity of Mexico?

One of the greatest reasons for our blurred ideas as to the relative importance of race on the one hand and social organization on the other, is our almost complete disregard of the great realm that lies between the two. The name of that realm is health. A nation of chronic and incurable invalids cannot possibly make great progress no matter how fine may be its inheritance or how perfect its social system. At least it cannot make progress unless it finds some means of curing itself.

Mexico may almost be called a nation of invalids. It has three times as much sickness as the northern United States. The death-rate is universally recognized as by far the best measure of the health of a nation. The outstanding fact about the death-rate in Mexico City is that for the past ten years it has averaged not far from forty-five. Yet Mexico City lies on the cool, lofty plateau and has been supposed to be one of the healthiest parts of Mexico. Of course the Mexican mortality statistics are very imperfect; but that only makes the situation worse. No matter how bad may be the system of mortality records, a death that does not occur is never put on record. A great many deaths however, fail to be recorded because no physician or priest is summoned. Or if the priest and physician are present they forget to send in the record. Until one studies the mortality records in a supposedly advanced country like our own, one has no idea of how difficult it is to secure accuracy even when fine organizations like our Census Bureau and our local boards of health are making the most strenuous efforts. Thus it seems practically certain that in Mexico City the amount of sickness and death is at least three times as great as in the cities of the northern United States.

In extenuation of this deplorable state of affairs it has sometimes been claimed that Mexico City suffers from a low swampy situation and from worse conditions of drain-

age than do other parts of the Mexican plateau. As I have shown elsewhere,¹ however, there is no evidence that the capital is any worse than the smaller Mexican towns and villages except as all large cities are at a disadvantage simply because of their size and the consequent poor housing, over-crowding, and bad air. Moreover, the supposed bad effect of the low swampy situation of Mexico City in the bed of what was once a lake can hardly account for the city's poor health, for strangely enough the death-rate falls notably as soon as the wet season begins. Yet that is the very time when the lake-bed becomes swampy and its bad effects should be at a maximum. In a word, it appears that aside from the handicap of its size, Mexico City is fairly typical of the plateau regions of Mexico where the great majority of the population is located. The lowlands certainly are no better. At Vera Cruz, the only other Mexican city where the mortality statistics are of any appreciable value, the death-rate appears to be about the same as at the capital. Vera Cruz has the advantage of being only a tenth as large as Mexico City, but even so, it is surprising that a low, hot, tropical city on the sea-coast should be no worse than the high, cool, temperate city on the plateau. Nevertheless a study of the comparative mortality of many parts of the world indicates that if a few plagues like yellow fever and malaria are kept down, the cities of tropical sea-coasts are at least as healthy as those of dry tropical interiors and perhaps even of plateaus.

What has been said above implies that Mexico as a whole is at least three times as unhealthful as a state like New York, for example. But the disparity between the Mexican conditions and those among the readers of this article is even greater. It is well known that intelligent people of the educated classes suffer much less from sickness and

¹ Ellsworth Huntington: *The Relation of Health to Racial Capacity: The Example of Mexico*. To be published shortly in the *Geographical Review*. The article here referred to deals with the same subject as the present article, but considers it from the geographic standpoint with special reference to climate and with comparisons between Mexico and other regions. Thus the two articles supplement each other and should be read together.

death than do the ignorant and poverty stricken. Hence it seems conservative to say that among Mexicans as a whole there is four times as much sickness and death as among the readers of this article and their families and friends; while even among the upper classes of Mexico there is three times as much as among our similar classes.

The effect of widespread ill health upon children is much worse than upon adults. For Mexico I have not been able to secure the exact figures, but a comparison of the most healthful countries of Europe, namely, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, with three of the most unhealthful, namely Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania as they were before the Great War, will make the matter clear. Making a slight allowance for the imperfections of the records in the more backward countries,² and eliminating other errors by the use of a "standard population," it appears that the death rate in the three Balkan countries under normal conditions is about 2.2 times as great as in the four Scandinavian countries. This ratio, however, varies according to age, as appears in column A of the following table:

	A	B
Children under one year of age.....	4.0 (?)	7.2 (?)
Children one to 4 years of age.....	3.5	6.3
Children 5 to 14 years of age.....	3.0	5.4
Young people, 15 to 24 years of age.....	2.2	4.0
Adults, 25 to 34 years of age.....	2.1	3.9
Adults, 35 to 44 years of age.....	2.0	3.7
Adults, 45 to 54 years of age.....	1.9	3.5
Adults, 55 to 75 years of age.....	1.8	3.3

Between Mexico and the United States the difference in health likewise is greatest in early youth and decreases with age. If we assume that the change from age to age is the same as in Europe, the amount of ill health and death in Mexico compared with the upper classes in the United States varies as appears in column B. In other words, where one baby under a year old dies among the babies of your acquaintances, over seven probably die in Mexico. Where one of the children aged one to four is ill among

² The method of making these corrections together with a full discussion of the significance of the data in respect to Europe will form part of a volume to be published shortly under the title "Europe."

your friends, six are ill in Mexico. Even among adults there is three times as much disease and death as among your friends, but the older people are much better off than the children.³

³ Since this article was in type Mr. Wallace Thompson has kindly furnished me with the Mexican mortality rates given below in column A. They are taken from a book on Mexico which he expects to publish shortly, and are based on the Mexican census of 1910. This census makes the death rate for Mexico as a whole 30.8 for the year in question, or approximately two thirds of the average rate for Mexico City. Anyone who is familiar with mortality statistics will realize that Mexican data collected only for a single year in connection with the decennial census are sure to be much farther below the truth than are the statistics for Mexico City which are collected regularly every year. In Mexico, as in the more backward countries of Europe, there is especial negligence in recording the deaths of young children, and to a less degree, of old people. Hence in column A the first two numbers and the last are scarcely worth regarding. The rest are fairly consistent, although their irregularity when plotted denotes inaccuracy. Column B shows similar figures for native whites of native parentage in the registration area of the United States as it existed in 1911, but excluding the three most southerly states included at that time, namely, Maryland, Kentucky, and North Carolina. Column C gives the number of times by which the Mexican figures exceed those of the United States. The last column D, is an attempt to correct the Mexican figures on the basis of two assumptions: (1) that they should show a regularity corresponding to that which is found in the figures of advanced regions like the United States; and (2) that the Mexican figures are 10 per cent too low in the better portions of the table, an assumption which is almost certainly too low. This last column approximates the truth, although it makes no claim to be more than an estimate. It is important, however, that this estimate based on figures for the whole of Mexico in comparison with the most populous part of the United States is in substantial agreement with the previous estimate based on Mexico City in comparison with Europe.

	A REPORTED MEXICAN DEATH RATE PER THOUSAND 1910	B DEATH RATE AMONG NATIVE WHITES OF NATIVE PARENTAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1911	C RATIO OF A TO B	D CORRECTED ESTIMATE OF TRUE RATIO OF A TO B
Under 1 year.....	365.0	102.2	3.6	7.7
Under 5 years.....	89.5	29.8	3.0	6.9
5-9 years.....	16.0	3.1	5.2	5.7
10-14 years.....	11.0(?)	2.2	5.0(?)	4.8
15-19 years.....	12.1	3.4	3.6	4.0
20-29 years.....	14.4	5.0	2.9	3.4
30-44 years.....	19.9	6.2	3.2	3.2
45-60 years*.....	35.2	12.8	2.8	3.1
Over 60 years*.....	97.7	64.6	1.5	3.0

* 65 years, United States.

Let us now apply our results to character. In order to gain some idea of what ill health does in Mexico, try to picture a community in which the children have from five to seven times as much illness as have the children of your neighbors, and where the adults have three or four times as much illness as have you and your friends. Ask yourself how much difference it would make in will power, self-control, initiative, originality, education, and many other qualities. The answers are so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to set them forth in detail. That they apply to Mexico can scarcely be doubted when one considers the physique, education, temperament, and achievements of the Mexicans whom one has known.

Since children are more plastic than adults and are more affected by conditions of ill health, we may briefly sketch what would be likely to happen in our own community if a generation should grow up having six times as much ill health as is the lot of our present generation. The first result would be that as infants the children would fret and cry much more than now, and they would continue to do this to a later age than at present. That in itself may seem no great matter, but it leads to serious consequences. The fretful, sickly child is apt to be pampered by its parents; its little whims receive undue attention; it gets the toy, the petting, and the candy that it cries for; it learns to think that its desires are the thing that all the world must satisfy. If that sort of training goes on till a child is a dozen years old, the child is "spoiled." It becomes selfish, self-indulgent, and self-willed. Such spoiled children are under another serious handicap. They are apt to be very trying to their elders, and if the elders are not strong minded and self-controlled, they are likely to lose their tempers and treat the children roughly. Among sickly, nervous parents this is much more likely to happen than among those who are well. Almost everyone has seen the sad results when weak parents alternately pamper their children and then turn on them in sudden rage. With children of a nervous type such treatment combined with poor health is apt to lead to irritability and high temper. The duller,

slower types, on the contrary, are apt to become phlegmatic, listless, and patiently submissive.

When the time comes for the sickly child to begin its education, there is often much delay. Then when school work is finally begun, it is irregular. Because the child is sick it is kept at home, and naturally it falls behind in its classes. Even when it happens to attend school regularly for some time, not only its teachers and parents, but the child itself makes excuses for its shortcomings on the ground of its previous handicaps. Of course a bright child who suffers from poor health will do much better work than a dull child who has the best of health, but that is not the point. The essential point is that the bright child will not learn to apply himself steadily and constantly. He will lose that sense of shame which comes to any right-minded child when he finds himself falling behind his peers. Or if he keeps the sense of shame, he will be tempted to resort to subterfuges to hide his deficiencies. And often he will be filled with jealousy or perhaps will be led to cheat.

It would be easy to go on with a long category of the moral handicaps which come to a child that suffers from ill health. An adult who has had good health in youth may make poor health a stepping stone to great sweetness of character. Sometimes even a child may do the same. Yet as we look around at the people of our acquaintance we see that in general those who have suffered much from poor health in childhood have not developed the strength of character nor the power of concentration, self-control and achievement that have come to those who have been well. The faults of those who have had poor health, their superficial education, their tendency to resent the implication that they cannot achieve as much as their more fortunate fellows, and their tendency to excuse their own short-comings and to magnify those powers which they do possess—all these are typical of the faults of the Mexicans who possess a large share of Spanish blood. So, too, the phlegmatic submissiveness of the sickly child who is born with a stolid brain, and his tendency to lose his self-control completely when once the breaking point is reached are characteristic of the

duller Mexican types—those with a greater share of Indian blood.

Health stands, as it were, between inheritance or racial character on the one side, and the social, political, religious, and educational systems on the other. It neither adds to, nor takes away from inheritance, but it helps to determine the skill and energy with which inherent traits shall be developed and used. Nor can health in itself add anything to the social and other systems in which the Mexicans live, but it is of the greatest value in providing good material on which those systems may work. No sane teacher would hesitate a minute between a class of healthy, hearty, happy little urchins, even though they were full of the Old Nick, and a class of sickly, weakly, self-centered little youngsters no matter how submissive. So, too, a teacher of religion, a social worker, an office-holder, a business man who has grown up in sturdy self-reliance without much thought of himself and his ills is likely to prove much more useful than one who has grown up with the habit of relying on others and who is constantly wondering whether he does not need to take a day off because he does not feel quite like work.

If it be true that health plays an important part in molding the character of the Mexicans, the inevitable conclusion is that those who have Mexico's regeneration at heart should do as much for health as they are doing for education, religion, politics, and business. It is not enough to heal the sick, or to stamp out epidemics. Disease must be *prevented* and good health must be made the rule. The task will not be easy. In fact, as I have shown elsewhere,⁴ the climate of Mexico, even on the highlands, interposes a handicap which can probably never be overcome entirely. Nevertheless, if to our present knowledge of sanitation and preventive medicine there be added an equally thorough knowledge of just what effects are produced by climate and how they can be met, there is little doubt that the amount of ill health in Mexico can be reduced at least one half and perhaps more. To make Mexico a healthful country

⁴ Ellsworth Huntington: *The Relation of Health to Racial Capacity: The Example of Mexico.* *Geog. Rev.*

through education alone is a long and discouraging task. Unquestionably education in hygiene and health will do much, and is a vital necessity. With it, however, there is need of actual demonstration. Moreover, in this, as in many other things, the Mexicans need foreign leaders in whom they have full confidence. During the war the Red Cross showed as never before what can be done by a vast organized effort to promote the general health. The Rockefeller Foundation is doing the same thing here and there over the world, just as our own Public Health Service is doing it in various parts of the United States. We talk about our duty to Mexico. We realize that if we are to live happily with her we must bring about many changes and yet must bring them gently and without arousing the bitter antagonism which flames out so easily when we are arrogant and self-assertive. Moreover, as a nation we must be very careful not to give the Mexicans the feeling that we are trying to exploit them politically and commercially. Even the most chauvanistic Mexican, however, ought not to object if the International Red Cross should take the health of Mexico in hand. If that were done it would seem natural that the majority of workers should be from the United States even though the control remained absolutely international.

If tactful methods were used it would probably be possible to secure abundant cooperation on the part of the Mexicans themselves. Towns might be persuaded to advance a certain sum of money and let the Red Cross direct its expenditure, with the understanding that the Red Cross itself should expend a proportional amount. At first the sums pledged by the Red Cross would presumably be much larger than the Mexican appropriations. Yet if the value of the work were realized, and if real cooperation were established between the Mexicans and the outsiders, there is a reasonable prospect that Mexico herself might see the need of large expenditures. Undoubtedly there are many and great difficulties in any such plan. Probably rebuffs would be experienced in many quarters, but there is one great advantage. The plan does not call for any vast

expenditure at first. It merely calls for a trial in one town. If the authorities could be persuaded to enter into a five or ten-year agreement whereby they should cooperate with the International Red Cross in making the city thoroughly healthful, the results would speak for themselves. If they were good, many other places would soon be clamoring for cooperation. If Red Cross workers, with the spirit which usually animates them, were spread through Mexico in only a tenth as great numbers as business men, the feeling between the United States and Mexico would assume a warmth and cordiality which it never can have while the Mexicans feel that we are trying to exploit them, and while we feel that they are not doing their share to make their own land civilized. Such a spirit would be good for Mexico and good for us; good for business and good for politics. What could be finer than for thousands of our young people to have a year or two of Red Cross service in an interesting land like Mexico at the end of their college courses. Among all the countries of the world Mexico is the one where our responsibility is greatest. Among all the fields wherein we can help that country none is so neglected as public health. Perhaps this open field offers the avenue whereby each country can most fully serve the other.

THE MEXICAN OIL SITUATION

By Frederic R. Kellogg, General Counsel of the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company

I do not think that you would have invited me to speak on the Mexican oil situation tonight if the title of my address were to be strictly construed; and I have, therefore, taken the liberty of interpreting it in a somewhat broader sense.

It is true that we shall deal with Mexican problems; but the same considerations which relate to matters which happen to have arisen in Mexico, relate also to every other part of this earth where American men, money and enterprise may penetrate.

It is true that we are to speak of oil; but the questions involved in this discussion are not limited to this particular commodity, but affect all commodities.

It is also true that while we are to look tonight upon a situation which from its nature can only be a temporary one, nevertheless the principles which underlie that situation and upon which it must eventually be resolved, are those which will determine the future of our entire foreign commercial policy.

Before I go into details let me confess that the years which I have spent in constant struggling with these questions, finding them on my desk every morning and not even being able to leave them there at night—of constant scanning of the horizon to see what new spoliatory schemes had been or might be devised by the ingenious and alert minds of the Carranzista faction—of unremitting endeavors to assist in shaping our own course so that such schemes might be counteracted and avoided, have not—I admit it freely—predisposed me to a really neutral view of the subject. Nor have they predisposed me to look with favor upon

glittering generalities about the "brotherhood of man" and the "spiritual unity of all Pan-America," uttered by gentlemen who have had no actual dealings with Carranza officials, and no practical experience in Mexican commercial affairs. Nevertheless, it will be my effort to limit my statements tonight in such a manner that at the conclusion of my remarks you will find that the greater part of which I shall say to you is not merely a matter of opinion or assertion on my part, but is capable of verification from documentary and official records.

The Mexican oil question is this:

Shall any nation within whose borders American citizens have ventured their capital and their lives in the promotion of industrial enterprises be considered as having the right to take from these Americans the fruits of their enterprises when success has been attained, without any pretense of compensation or any shadow of title other than that which physical force may furnish?

The question resolves itself into two subdivisions. In the first place, it involves a statement of the circumstances which especially interest the oil companies themselves. In the second place it is my intention to inquire what interest you and all of your American fellow citizens have in the outcome of this controversy.

First, as to the situation of the oil companies.

The commercial development of petroleum in Mexico began in 1900. Prior to that time its existence in Mexico had been recognized as a scientific fact; but until that year no successful effort was made to produce it commercially. In 1900 Messrs. Edward L. Doheny and Charles A. Canfield went to Mexico and acquired their first properties. They acquired them by purchase from private owners who had held them from the crown of Spain by continuous chains of titles dating back three hundred years. Messrs. Doheny and Canfield were not then and never since have been "concessionaires." They have never asked nor received anything from the government of Mexico. They never

acquired any public lands, but continued their acquisition of properties from private owners. They were followed by other American oil companies, all of whom likewise pursued the same policy. An English company obtained a concession from the government covering a large extent of territory, but so far as my information extends no oil has ever since been produced from it.

The essential point that I wish to make entirely plain at the present moment is that despite the many reports and statements that have been made by our enemies to the contrary, the truth is *that no American company has ever had an oil concession from Mexico at any time since the beginning of the commercial development of petroleum in that country.*

At all times during the acquisition of these private properties the law of Mexico relative to titles to petroleum was contained in three statutes: First, the law of 1884; second, the law of 1892; and third, the law of 1909.

All of these statutes contained provisions which are substantially identical and are entirely unequivocal, to the effect that petroleum belonged to the owner of the surface of the lands and might be developed and dealt with by the surface owner as he saw fit without governmental license or interference.

In other words, the Republic of Mexico in these enactments issued unmistakable invitations to all the world to come and invest its money, its brains and its labor in this industry, to endeavor to establish it upon a basis of mutual advantage to the enterprises and to the government of Mexico, to acquire lands for that purpose by private treaty and not by public license or denouncements, and in short, to pursue this business as petroleum men have been accustomed to pursue it in the United States.

There has never been the least doubt as to the meaning of any of these statutes—a point which is not only demonstrable by an examination of the language itself, but which was decided at a special session in 1905 of the Academy of Jurisprudence of Mexico, an association resembling the American Bar Association, and containing all the leading jurists

of Mexico among its members, at which with only one dissenting vote it was determined that under the laws of 1884 and 1892 petroleum did not belong to the Mexican nation and could not be taken by the Nation from private owners without full compensation.

In reliance upon these statutes and their uncontradicted interpretation, petroleum development progressed. A country which had been almost a trackless jungle—the conquest of which cannot be appreciated by those who have not seen it—was made into one of the greatest producers of petroleum in the world today. Enormous pipeline systems for the collection of petroleum were established. Great storage and terminal facilities were supplied. Large fleets of tank steamships were built. The sum total of all of these investments aggregates several hundred millions of dollars.

During the presidency of Porfirio Diaz all went well; and it was not until Carranza—the apostle of liberty—became dictator that any change in the spirit of the Mexican legislation concerning petroleum became manifest. As soon, however, as he had been recognized *de facto* by the American government he conveniently forgot his previous pledges to respect the rights and properties of foreigners, and set himself to work, together with Luis Cabrera (who may fairly be called the “*ame damnée*” of the Carranza administration) to concoct detailed methods of accomplishing what Mr. Cabrera had declared it was his intention to accomplish, to wit: to drive Americans out of Mexico and take over their property. In making this statement I am not indulging in generalities, for I have before me the sworn testimony as to this declaration given by a gentleman who was present at a dinner in Vera Cruz at which the declaration was made, and at which not only Cabrera but Carranza were present.

Pursuant to this plan Carranza first took possession of the railroad systems, and since that day no security holder has received a dollar upon his securities, and all net revenues have been confiscated by the Carranza government. The Wells Fargo Express Company's business seemed

thriving. Hence Mr. Carranza took that over. He then found that the tramway systems of the metropolis seemed to be productive and decided that they should be added to his collection. He learned that two of the leading banks, one controlled by English and one by French interests, had large stores of gold coin in their vaults, and, perhaps to show that his theories of liberty were not limited to the acquisition of American properties, compelled these bankers to make what he was pleased to term a "loan," and by force of arms removed all of the specie which he was able to discover. He also took over the English owned railroad running from Vera Cruz to Mexico. As long as it earned money he kept it. Occasionally he turned it back to its owners, resuming, however, its possession as soon as its finances showed improvement.

During all of this time his mind had been working upon the petroleum situation. How to get hold of these properties with the least friction and the greatest effectiveness evidently gave him and the wily Mr. Cabrera some concern. Fortunately for them, as they considered it, the World War created a situation which made it somewhat unlikely that the United States government would be able to give much attention to any aggression against its petroleum companies; and finally, with the aid of some of the leading German representatives in Mexico, they adopted a plan to amend the constitution so as to purport to assert that the Mexican nation, and not the petroleum companies, owned these properties and that the nation could enforce its alleged rights to them without any shadow of compensation to the men who had bought, paid for and developed them.

As compared to this plan, let me again refer to the solemn written pledge given in October, 1915, by Carranza's accredited representative, Mr. Arredondo, to the United States government, in which it was stated that the Carranza government

conscious of its international obligations and of its capability to comply with them, has afforded guarantees to foreigners and shall continue to see that their lives and property are respected, *in accordance with the practices established by civilized nations.*

As a method of carrying out his ideas Mr. Carranza convened what he was pleased to term a "Constituent Congress" for the purpose of amending the constitution. This course, in harmony with the greater part of Carranza's proceedings, was wholly unauthorized by the provision of the then existing law; for the Constitution of 1857 contained perfectly reasonable provisions for its own amendment "by the congress of the union by a two-thirds vote of the members present and approved by a majority of the state legislatures."

Not only did Carranza (probably because of his incomplete control over the country) adopt this extra legal method, but with commendable frankness he decreed publicly that in the selection of delegates to this Constituent Congress only such persons should be allowed to vote as were members of his own faction. All other voters were disqualified. Moreover, with respect to certain states, such as Oaxaca, where his authority was not recognized, methods even more arbitrary and illegal were adopted in order to secure the ostensible nomination of delegates who would be subservient to his wishes.

The decisions of this "Constituent Congress" as to petroleum are contained in the well-known Article 27 of the new constitution, which provides that "in the nation is vested direct ownership of . . . petroleum and all hydro-carbons."

Curiously enough the language of the constitution does not go expressly to the extent to which Mr. Carranza in his subsequent decrees sought to carry it. It does not in so many words declare that petroleum under *private* lands belongs to the nation, and in Articles 14 and 126, it provides that no "laws" (the constitution itself being stated to be a law) "shall be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of any person whatsoever."

Article 27 contained a number of other provisions of great importance to the petroleum companies, such as one prohibiting corporations from acquiring, holding and administering rural properties, except in such area as the executive might fix as absolutely necessary for their estab-

lishments. There is also a provision preventing foreigners from acquiring direct ownership of land within 50 kilometers from the seacoast—which includes almost all of the present known petroleum territory.

After the adoption of the constitution nothing was done for a year. Then, between February and August, 1918, a series of executive decrees were issued by Carranza purporting to carry the constitution into effect. In all these decrees he disregarded Articles 14 and 126 and purported to construe the constitution as retroactively affecting all lands acquired for petroleum purposes by foreigners even prior to the date when the constitution took effect.

As illustrative of Carranza's habitual disregard of law, even of the law of his own country, it is interesting to note that these decrees were issued by him *with no power or authority whatsoever to do so*. He had been granted by Congress a limited power to act in matters involving the country's finances; and disregarding this limitation, he treated the congressional authority as a blank check entitling him to make decrees which would completely alter the system of land titles which had long been in force.

The essential provision common to all of these decrees was that those who claimed to be the owners of petroleum lands must file statements of the lands thus claimed by them *and must pay rentals and royalties to the government as a condition of being allowed to continue in their operation*.

Please note particularly that these decrees were not based in any sense at all upon the theory of eminent domain with which we in this country are so familiar, for in every civilized nation the taking over of private property by the government for its own necessities can only be done if just compensation is paid to the owner of the property thus taken. In this case there was not even a pretense of compensation, whether just or otherwise. The situation was precisely the same as though the State of Massachusetts should come to a man who for seventeen years had owned the house in which he lived, and which he originally bought and paid for, and in the title to which there are no defects, and say to him "We have decided to take over the owner-

ship of your property. If you desire to do so, you may still occupy the house, but only upon condition that you pay the government such rental as we may now fix, subject to any increase hereafter that we may see fit to make, and that you comply with such other conditions as we may impose."

Please do not for a moment think that I am exaggerating in giving this illustration; for the course which the Carranza government attempted to adopt toward the owners of these petroleum properties was identical with that which the State of Massachusetts would have followed in the case supposed. And in my opinion it is because of the utter inability of the American mind to conceive such arbitrary and conscienceless action on the part of the government of a nation which claims to be civilized, that the petroleum companies have found such great difficulty in making the justice of their position apparent to the American nation at large. You will, I think, search in vain in the peace time history of civilized nations for any parallel to the wholesale plan of governmental thievery which Carranza attempted to follow out.

If anyone of you had owned the house which the State of Massachusetts in my hypothetical illustration had claimed, what would you have done?

Exactly what we did—fought.

The principal petroleum companies of the United States organized themselves into an association whose one and only purpose was and still is to contest in every practical and decent way the confiscation of their properties; and in making that fight we relied and are still relying solely upon two weapons. These weapons do not consist of machine guns or implements of war. We had no armed force either of our own contriving or of any government to support us. But we stood and are standing today upon the propositions, first, *that we are morally right*, and that the Ten Commandments still possess vigor even when attempted to be disregarded by an alleged government, and, secondly, that the public opinion of the United States, if our citizens once but knew the real facts, would never permit the consummation of such a shame.

We refused to comply with the Carranza decree. We allowed the day upon which Carranza had ordered that we must file our declarations or lose our properties to pass, and told his government that we should not file any such documents. This attitude was something which he had not looked for, and he at once revealed his consciousness of the weakness of his position by issuing a decree at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour postponing the time within which we were required to obey his commands. Greatly encouraged by this demonstration of our own strength and his recognition of his own weakness, we again refused, and on four successive occasions refused to do so, until finally becoming somewhat alarmed at the prospect of the possibility of a direct conflict with the United States upon this question, Carranza announced that he would turn the whole matter over to the Mexican Congress, which should adopt the "organic law" regarding the petroleum industry.

No such law had ever been adopted up to the time of the end of the Carranza régime.

But although Carranza was unwilling to force a direct issue upon this question, we soon found that the campaign had taken a different turn and that he was seeking to accomplish his aims by indirect action. This assumed many different forms.

In the first place, many regulations of an harassing nature hitherto unknown became adopted and a maze of red tape was established in respect of almost every necessary activity of a petroleum developing concern.

In the next place, governmental officers allowed the filing of claims against our properties by others who claimed to be entitled to acquire them under the terms of the Carranza decrees.

In the third place, concessions began to be granted to Carranza favorites permitting drilling upon certain lands which in fact are comprised within the titles held by the petroleum companies.

In the next place, provision was made so that no company was allowed to drill on its own land unless it had a drilling permit, and that no permit would be granted unless in the applications therefor the petroleum companies agreed to abide by the terms of *any petroleum law that might be enacted in the future*. This resulted in stopping drilling and was one of the most serious difficulties with which we had to contend, for it set back the entire plan of petroleum development in Mexico for over six months—a loss which we have never since been able to make up, and which has been directly reflected in this country in the great damage to our mercantile marine, which depended upon this supply of oil for its fuel, to many great manufacturing establishments, likewise thus dependent, and to the users of gasoline in automobiles throughout the length and breadth of the United States.

Lastly, and this was the most serious of all the steps which he took, he sent his armed forces into the oil regions. Up to that time these properties had been in the control of Pelaez, himself a petroleum land owner and supported by many other Mexicans in the same position who had risen in revolt against the confiscatory plan of which I have spoken. During the whole period of his occupation of this territory perfect order had prevailed. Our properties had not been looted, our men had not been injured or even insulted. From the moment, however, that the Carranza forces entered upon the scene a practical reign of terror was inaugurated. Attacks upon messengers carrying money with which to pay workmen in outlying districts became every day matters. Many hundreds of thousands of dollars were stolen. A continuous line of insults and assaults were committed upon our men and—worst of all—the natural ferocity and lawlessness of these people resulted in a long chain of murders of our employees. On one occasion Carranza soldiers entered a camp where four Americans were at work and, although they made no resistance, yet they were lined up and shot in cold blood. On another occasion a launch bearing payroll money was shot at from ambush and a man was killed, others being wounded. On another

occasion five men were killed under similar circumstances. In all, twenty of our employees were thus murdered and not a single Carranzista was ever brought to justice for any of these murders. So far as my information is concerned, despite reports to the contrary, no arrests were even made in respect of any of these atrocities. But, although our employees have never been allowed to carry guns or to adopt any means of defending themselves, they were not men who allowed themselves to be driven from their work even with death staring them in the face. They held on—through the war period when every drop of the Mexican oil was most urgently needed—through the following so-called peace period, which for them was worse than that of the war—up to the day when Carranza with his schemes of dictatorial power and arbitrary spoliation set at naught, himself experienced the death to which his policies had condemned so many American citizens.

The campaigns conducted against us in Mexico were paralleled by other campaigns in this country. Carranzista propagandists, acting under direction from Mexico, supplied with funds from the Carranza treasury, formed in this country organizations bearing various camouflaged titles, and succeeded in persuading certain American citizens to join with them. Some of those people are in this room tonight. I am not contesting the good faith with which these gentlemen acted, but I have no hesitation in characterizing their mentality as—to say the least—somewhat peculiar. Two particular elements were much in evidence. The first one was a singular credulity with regard to every statement made by any properly authenticated Carranzista against the probity and honor of any American; and the second was complete incredulity as to the possibility of the truth being told by any American—especially if he were engaged in the petroleum industry. This Carranzisto-American combination commenced and carried on a systematic campaign for the purpose of poisoning the mind of the American public against the oil companies and in favor of the Carranza administration and of its spoliatory

attempts. Instances of misrepresentation regarding these various points appeared almost daily in our press. For instance, if a paymaster was robbed one was quite sure to see in a few days a suggestion that he had connived at his own robbery. If one of our employees was murdered there never was lacking a dispatch from Mexico to the effect that he had been drinking and had unwarrantably attacked a faithful Carranzista soldier. So far as the effort to confiscate our properties was concerned, abundant argument was forthcoming to show that we who desired to keep that which was ours were in the wrong and that the Carranzista government was actuated by the highest principles and with ample justification in its effort to enrich itself at our expense.

Constant repetition was made of the old assertion that we were "cessionaires" when, as I have already shown, no American ever held a concession.

We were accused of being tax-dodgers, although no question of taxation was ever at any time involved and the only moneys which we refused to pay were the "rentals and royalties"—payment of which would have admitted that our own properties no longer belonged to us but to the government.

We were said to have fomented rebellion against the Carranza administration, when the fact was that the only rebellion in the oil regions was the Pelaez rebellion which was originated and continued by the Mexican land owners who themselves were affected by the spoliatory Carranza decrees.

The argument was solemnly made—and has been repeated by John Lind, former governor of the State of Minnesota, in his sworn testimony before the Fall Committee within the last two weeks, that the law of 1884 was adopted as the result of a corrupt intrigue conducted by oil men with President Diaz. In this connection I cannot refrain from specifically quoting what Mr. Lind said under oath at this hearing. I wish to read you his exact language:

The state in Mexico owned the oil until some time during Diaz's administration, when Lord Cowdray discovered oil. Then they secured an act of the Mexican Congress relinquishing the State

claim to the oil and real property. Of course, Lord Cowdray and his organization in Mexico, under Diaz, were in position to virtually dictate, and they did dictate to the Mexican government what they wanted, and they got what they wanted.

Senator Fall gave me the privilege of appearing before the committee to answer these statements of Mr. Lind's. This task was not a difficult one for the following reasons: first, that Lord Cowdray was not the discoverer of oil in Mexico, as Messrs. Doheny and Canfield were the pioneers and Lord Cowdray never entered the oil business until three years later; second, Lord Cowdray did not dictate the oil law of 1884 because it was dictated nineteen years before he had anything to do with the oil business; third, Lord Cowdray did not intrigue with President Diaz with reference to the passage of this law because Gonzales and not Diaz was president when this law was enacted; fourth, no oil operator dictated or intrigued for the adoption of this law because the oil industry did not commence in Mexico until sixteen years after the date when the law of 1884 went into force.

Another accusation of the same class was that we were refusing to obey the laws of Mexico. There is not a word of truth in this accusation except insofar as we refused to obey the so-called law (which had no legal validity) under which we were menaced with the loss of our properties.

Another common argument used by these dextrous propagandists was that before the law of 1884 the Mexican nation owned the petroleum, and that in 1917 the nation simply resumed that which she had temporarily and erroneously allowed to pass out of her control. To this attack there are two answers. In the first place, even if this claim were justified historically, there is no possible theory upon which, after Mexico had changed any previous law and had adopted the law of 1884 and after foreigners in reliance upon this law had invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the petroleum industry, the Mexican government could turn around, ignore what it itself had done and, with one stroke of the pen, destroy the rights of the petroleum operators to the properties which they had acquired and developed in reliance upon the law in question and the good faith of the Mexican

nation. But in the second place, there is no basis for this claim in legal history. In 1559 Philip II, the King of Spain, incorporated certain sub-soil substances into the "royal patrimony," thus taking them away from their private owners. But these substances were simply metalliferous substances—a clear distinction being drawn between metalliferous minerals and non-metalliferous minerals. Moreover, this absolute monarch, more enlightened than Caranza, who posed as the president of an ostensible republic, expressly provided for just compensation to any private owner from whom rights were thus acquired. In 1783 other decrees were issued by Charles III which were somewhat broader in their scope and contained ambiguous language. It will be remembered that at this time, as well as at the time of Philip II, coal and petroleum, the principal hydrocarbons found in the sub-soil, were not recognized as being of great importance. Shortly after the decree of 1783, however, the importance of coal was perceived and other decrees were issued in 1789 and 1792 providing that, irrespective of any language which had been used in previous laws or of any interpretation which had been given to them, coal, *since it was neither a metal nor a semi-metal*, should not be considered as belonging to the royal patrimony. Of course, you will immediately observe that although petroleum was not then under discussion, yet that the reason given for the exemption of coal from the operation of the decree covers precisely the situation as to petroleum.

The Republic of Mexico took over the rights which the crown of Spain had enjoyed. In the eighteen-seventies and the early eighteen-eighties questions arose as to the scope and effect of these Spanish laws and as to whether coal (the petroleum industry not then having commenced in Mexico) should be considered as belonging to the nation or not. Litigation took place upon the subject; but the entire matter was settled once and for all by the voluntary act of the Mexican nation itself which, after adopting an amendment to the constitution providing for the promulgation of mining laws by the federal government, proceeded to adopt

the law of 1884 which expressly provided, as already shown, that petroleum belonged to the owner of the surface and not to the nation at large.

Another frequent ground of attack was the accusation that the petroleum companies had no right to complain of any treatment which the Mexican government submitted them to, provided Mexican citizens themselves were treated in a like manner. This is the so-called "Carranza doctrine" for which he hoped to obtain the approval of Latin America. It is only necessary to observe that it is and always has been completely contrary to the universally accepted principles of international law, as will appear from the following quotations:

Where a government asserts that its citizens in a foreign country have not been duly protected, it is not competent for the government of that country to answer that it has not protected its own citizens. (Moore's *Digest of International Law*, vol. vi, pp. 803-804.)

Each country is bound to give the nationals of another country the same redress for injury which it gives to its own citizens and neither more nor less; *provided the protection which the country gives to its own citizens conforms to the established standard of civilization.* If any country's system of law and administration does not conform to that standard, although the people of that country may be content or compelled to live under it, *no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment of its citizens.* (Secretary Root's Address to Pan-American Conference.)

The alien, therefore, is not bound to accept the treatment accorded to nationals if such treatment is in violation of the ordinary principles of civilized justice. (Borchard, *Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, p. 107.)

But perhaps the favorite ground upon which the oil companies were assailed was that they were seeking to bring about armed intervention by the United States of America in the affairs of its smaller neighbor to the South for the purpose of subserving their own greed and financial ambitions. On analyzing these statements it will always be found that they are based upon our efforts to educate the American people as to the wrongs to which we were being subjected in Mexico. It was easy for the Carranzista propagandists

and their American allies to raise a cry of violent and unjustifiable behavior and conspiracy against those of us who were defending ourselves from attacks; but they were never able to see anything wrong in the attacks themselves which were being committed against us.

By a parity of reasoning, if a man is attacked by a thug in the street, and if he ventures to defend himself the responsibility for the resulting damage is his and not that of the highwayman. Likewise, if a man while walking with his wife sees her attacked by a human brute, he should, according to the complacent doctrines of these individuals, keep his hands off lest he be guilty of the wrongful use of force. On the same theory the Belgians should be most seriously condemned for having had the hardihood to resist the Germans, who simply wished to occupy their country. And there would seem, likewise, to be little doubt as to the terrible responsibility of the owners and crew of the *Lusitania* for venturing to travel in waters from which they had been already solemnly warned. Unless these grossly distorted views of right and wrong have some foundation which is not apparent to the ordinary sane man, the petroleum companies believe that there can be no doubt that the responsibility for the present petroleum situation in Mexico rests upon the Carranzista faction who endeavored to steal their properties from them, and not upon the petroleum companies who have done their best to prevent the consummation of this thievery. And they have no doubt but that when the simple facts are given the wide publicity which it is our desire that they should have, the American public will entirely agree with us.

The petroleum companies neither desire nor have any reason to desire armed intervention by the United States in the affairs of Mexico except possibly as a last resort after all other means have failed and when not only the petroleum industry but the entire principles at the bottom of our foreign commerce and our national honor as well are at stake. And, furthermore, they not only do not desire intervention—which if it should come would expose their properties to enormous hazards and themselves to great pecuniary loss—

but they are firmly convinced that no intervention is or will be necessary provided that any faction in Mexico which seeks or may seek to accomplish such an injustice shall be told by the United States of America in the kindly but absolutely firm language which was used by Secretary Evarts in 1878, "Thus far shalt thou go, but no farther."

As the second part of this talk, how does the Mexican oil situation affect the United States at large?

In many ways.

First and foremost, because of the moral principle involved. For this country never has reached, and I believe, never will reach a point of spiritual degradation such as to result in the deliberate approval of a violation even by another nation of any one of the ten commandments.

Second, because of the necessity of Mexican oil produced by American companies to the industries and consumers of America.

Our navy is largely dependent upon fuel oil for its motive power. Over five hundred of the leading industries of New England have substituted fuel oil for coal beneath their boilers. Our merchant marine now uses sixty million barrels of fuel oil a year, and before long will need over one hundred million barrels. There are today nearly eight million internal combustion gasoline-consuming engines in the United States and before the end of this year their number will probably have increased to nearly ten millions.

The internal production of petroleum in this country is no longer adequate for the needs of our consumption, despite the enormous prices which it is bringing. During the current year the sum total of these needs will require the importation into this country of approximately eighty million barrels of Mexican oil if it can be produced.

Should the operations of our producing companies be further hindered and delayed or should they be compelled to cease entirely, through aggressions committed against them, millions of American consumers will be directly and indirectly affected, not merely so far as any question of price is concerned, but with reference to their ability to obtain petroleum and petroleum products at all.

Lastly, the matter affects this country in its entirety because, as I have suggested at the beginning of this talk, the principles upon which the Mexican oil conflict must be decided lie at the basis of our entire future foreign commerce.

It is beyond question that foreign commerce is today an essential to the industrial well-being of any nation. No country in the present stage of the world's history can live a hermit existence and still prosper; and this principle is as true of our own great land, despite its enormous markets and resources, as of any other country. But if we are to have a foreign commerce our citizens must be willing to devote their lives and their capital to its development; and this will no longer be true if it becomes known that the United States of America has adopted the policy of abandoning those of its children who are endeavoring to promote its foreign trade and of allowing them to be subjected, without protection, to any attacks and assaults which governments such as the Carranza government may desire to commit upon them. Men will not risk their health, their fortunes and their lives in discovering and developing the natural resources found within the borders of foreign lands and which are so necessary to our own national development if they know that when success has been achieved its fruits may be snatched from their hands by those who, themselves lacking in courage, initiative and ability, nevertheless always stand ready to fatten upon the achievements of others.

Our individual citizens cannot stand alone against the organized power of foreign lands. They are entitled to the support and the help of our own government in their legitimate enterprises lawfully conducted. With that support they will hold their own against the citizens of any other nation in this world. But they cannot do this by themselves. They must be protected, where they are entitled to protection. And such a policy on the part of this government is simply one of respect for its citizens and for itself as well. It involves no bullying of small nations, for there is no law of man or of God that suspends the operation of the eighth commandment merely because of the small size of the human being or an international being who may seek

to transgress it. It does not mean any "big stick" or "chip on the shoulder" policy, but on the other hand a policy which is willing to give a square deal to all square men and insists upon a square deal for ourselves in return. It is not a policy of intervention, for intervention is promoted not by the man who believes in square dealing, but by the man who advocates the approval of crooked dealing at the expense of our citizens by governments or nationals of other nations. It is not a policy of war, but is a policy of peace.

Without such a policy our foreign commerce cannot be prosperously continued. But with such a policy once established and understood by the rest of the world our men, our money, our ability and our energy will penetrate into all parts of the world where commercial success is to be achieved and where stores of natural resources are to be found. Our ships will without aggression sail the seven seas; the lives and enterprises of Americans will be respected; and our flag, instead of being considered as a rag which may be safely dragged in the dust and defiled, will be universally recognized among all civilized men as the emblem of a kindly and long suffering—but always mighty and majestic nation—AMERICA.

THE RAILROAD SITUATION IN MEXICO

*By A. W. Donly, formerly Trade Commissioner of the
Dominion of Canada in Mexico*

Except in the minds of the rainbow chasing visionary and the half-baked pacifist, it is generally accepted that the flag must either go ahead of commerce or follow so close in its wake that the two shall not be separated by any great distance. It is equally true that, if commercial development is to prosper, adequate means of transportation must be provided. The fact that any certain district or country may be fertile in soil, or possessed of other great natural wealth, is not sufficient. Until transportation is provided, this potential wealth must remain practically unproductive and of little worth.

The truth of the foregoing statements has never been better illustrated than in the case of Mexico. A country of great fertility and of vast natural resources, her lack of interior and exterior means of communication had kept her, previous to 1876, in a most primitive state, so far as commercial development and prosperity are concerned. Up to that time, one single line of railway, 264 miles in length, connected the port of Vera Cruz with the capital city and this was the then sum total of railroad development. In 1911, when Porfirio Diaz retired from office, the total number of miles was nearly seventeen thousand.

Mexico, being a land without adequate inland waterways, must depend for her internal transportation in bulk almost exclusively upon her railroads. These have been of comparatively recent origin, the first line to operate in the republic having been inaugurated in 1873. This road, financed and constructed by British enterprise, is known as the Mexican Railway. It connects the capital of the country with its most important seaport, Vera Cruz.

Various concessions were granted for the construction of this line; the first one as early as 1853, but no serious effort was ever made to construct the line until 1856; even then the constant disturbances in Mexico so delayed the work that for eleven years little was accomplished. With the overthrow of Maximilian in 1867, the problem was formally taken in hand, and by the law of November 27, 1867, the road was granted an annual subsidy of 560,000 pesos, equivalent at that time to so many dollars, to run for twenty-five years. The following year the clause giving the Mexican Railway the sole right to construct a line between Mexico City and Vera Cruz was cancelled, but the government pledged itself to subsidize no other line between these two points for a period of sixty-five years. It may be noted that this concession was granted ten years prior to the presidency of Porfirio Diaz, who is frequently accused of being the author of the practice in Mexico of granting concessions to foreigners. As a matter of fact it was under the imperial government in 1864 that the Mexican Railway Company Limited was incorporated in London, the company's concession being confirmed after Maximilian's overthrow by the government of Benito Juarez, as has been stated. Under the final form of the concession, the Mexican government secured for itself the right to demand a revision of freight and passenger tariffs every two years, and to be represented on the board of directors.

The main line of the Mexican Railway is but 264 miles long; its branches aggregate 57 miles. The construction of the road was exceptionally difficult, owing to the steep grades and the nature of the ground encountered, there being a climb of over 8000 feet in the first 160 miles. This alone would have rendered the road costly, but in addition to this source of expenditure the Mexican government insisted upon the clause in the concession demanding that the construction of the line be carried on simultaneously from both ends. This involved an immense outlay of energy and money in hauling rails and other material from the sea-coast up to the high table-land in carts and enormously increased the cost of the undertaking. The object

of this action on the Mexican Government's part is not quite clear, the explanation generally offered being that experience in other Latin American Countries showed that concessionaires frequently became discouraged and abandoned their work unfinished, if it were possible to do so without too great a loss, but that having hauled their material to an inland point, it would be hopelessly lost should the road not be finished. At all events the road was built under these conditions and the capitalization is correspondingly high, being as follows:

	<i>Pounds sterling</i>
Ordinary share capital stock.....	2,254,720
First preferred share capital stock.....	2,554,100
Second preferred share capital stock.....	1,011,960
Perpetual debenture stock.....	2,000,000
	<hr/>
Total.....	7,820,780

The venture was profitable only in a moderate degree, the exceedingly steep grades involving heavy operating charges and what with this and the large capitalization, it was long before any dividends were declared. In 1902, only the first preferred shares paid a dividend, and then only at the rate of about 2.5 per cent per annum. In 1907 the first preferred paid 8 per cent and the second preferred about 5 per cent; the ordinary shares paid nothing. Until 1914 the Mexican Railway suffered comparatively little through the disturbed conditions prevailing in Mexico since 1910, but beginning with the American occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914, during which a portion of the track was torn up, and from that time until 1919, the road has suffered enormously. Since November, 1914, it has been the scene of constant battles and assaults upon trains, with the result that a very large part of its rolling stock and most of its buildings were destroyed. The Carranza government took over the property and has been operating it for its own profit. It managed to keep the line open by constructing numerous block-houses along the right-of-way and by sending heavy military escorts on all of the trains. This discouraged the rebel raiding-parties and a fairly regular service was maintained throughout 1919, though the traffic was

far below normal. It was stated by persons claiming to know that of the eighty odd locomotives included in the company's equipment in 1914, only eight or ten were in service in 1919. The yards at Apizaco and Orizaba are filled with wrecked cars, and almost every one of the smaller station buildings along the line is damaged beyond repair, but the roadbed itself has escaped with comparatively little damage, the tunnels and more important bridges being intact.

The desirability of rail connection with the United States was recognized at the time the Mexican Railway was completed, but President Lerdo de Tejada, at that time the Mexican executive, did not favor the project, regarding it as a strategic menace to the safety of his country. He did, however, grant charters for lines to the interior of the republic from its capital, without extending to the frontier.

Under his successor, Porfirio Diaz, a different policy was adopted and railroad building was encouraged, particular attention being given to the construction of lines covering the northern and central plateaus, at that time the best developed and most productive portions of Mexico.

As a result of this policy it was not long before the region in question was traversed by extensive systems of railroads which added incalculably to its commercial prosperity. The principal lines, three in number, were built in the eighties. They were: The Mexican Central Railway, connecting Mexico City with El Paso, Texas, as its main trunk, from which branches ran from Irapusto through Guadalajara to Manzanillo on the Pacific, from Aguascalientes via San Luis Potosi to Tampico on the Gulf of Mexico, and another from Torreon to the same port via Monterrey; the Mexican International Railroad, running from the City of Durango to Eagle Pass via Torreon; and the old Mexican National Railroad, the shortest route from Mexico City to the United States border, via San Luis Potosi, Saltillo and Monterey to Laredo.

According to the franchises or "concessions" under which these roads were built, they all received government subsidies at an average rate of 7000 pesos a kilometer or 11,200

pesos a mile. At the time the subsidy was granted, this represented an equal number of American dollars; it is to be noted, however, that the subsidy was not paid in a lump sum, but spread over a long term and that the fall in the price of silver, which came in the late eighties, reduced the value of the government help by one half. According to the testimony of Mr. E. N. Brown, at one time president of the National Railways of Mexico, before the Senate Investigating Committee (Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Part I, p. 1793), the subsidy was from 15 to 18 per cent of the cost of construction of the line. The concession carried with it:

(a) The right to construct the railroad.

(b) The right to build a telegraph or telephone line.

(c) The right to exploit the railroad and the telegraph or telephone line during the entire period of the franchise. This period might not exceed ninety-nine years.

At the close of this period the railroad, with its "lands, stations, piers, warehouses, etc.," in good condition, became the property of the nation.

There were numerous other requirements exacted by the government, such as the free carriage of mails, half-rates for all government employees and for soldiers, whether on or off duty, and for all their equipment, horses and artillery. All tariffs, freight, and passenger, must be revised every three years, such revision to receive the approval of the Department of Communications and Public Works.

The concessionaires on their part had the following privileges: Fifteen years exemption from federal and local taxation except the stamp tax; for five years, importation free from customs duties and from taxes, of fixed material for tracks, rolling-stock and repair parts, material for telegraph lines, turntables, cranes, water tanks, etc.; and protection against competing lines for a period of not more than ten years within a zone agreed upon. (Railroad law of Mexico as amended to April 29, 1899.)

THE TEHUANTEPEC NATIONAL RAILWAY

The Tehuantepec National Railway crosses the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; which is situated in the southern part of Mexico in the States of Vera Cruz and Oaxaca. The distance from ocean to ocean, as the crow flies, is 125 miles, and the idea of utilizing it in one way or another had long suggested itself to the authorities of Mexico, even in colonial days. The project of a canal was also considered, as was a combination of a canal and land transportation. One well known American engineer even advocated a ship-railroad, for the building of which he was given a concession, though the work was never undertaken.

In 1878 a concession for a railroad was given to Mr. Learned of New York, but this was forfeited in 1882; several others obtained the concession, but all failed to construct the railroad until 1892, when Messrs. Hampson, Stanhope and Corthell obtained the franchise and began the work which was completed in 1894. They lacked, however, port facilities at the two tidewater terminals, Salina Cruz on the Pacific and Coatzacoalcos, as the port on the Gulf of Mexico was then called. The project of constructing these works was beyond the means of any private firm; furthermore, the Mexican government was determined to exercise full control over a route so important strategically. It therefore took over the railroad and entered into a contract with the British firm of S. Pearson & Son for the construction of the terminal facilities and for making such improvements to the railroad as were necessary to enable it to carry the traffic which it was hoped to develop. The government further entered into partnership with Pearson & Son for the operation of the property, the agreement between the two contracting parties being signed in its final form in May, 1904. The contract, as made in 1902, had a life of fifty-one years, the firm of Pearson & Son being the managers of the property, the working capital of \$7,000,000 being furnished in equal amounts by the contracting parties. The following disposition was to be made of the earnings: (1) Payment of operating expenses, main-

tenance of track and a reserve fund set aside for repairs. (2) Payment of interest on loans. (3) Payment to the two partners of 5 per cent on the capital furnished by them. (4) Refundment of losses for previous years which had been charged to capital. (5) Payment of interest at 5 per cent annually for capital invested in Coatzacoalcos port works. (6) Surplus to be divided between the partners of which the government was to receive during the first thirty-six years, 65 per cent; during the next five years, 68.5 per cent; during the next five years, 72.5 per cent; and during the remaining years 76.5 per cent; the balance in each case going to Pearson & Son.

The route presents no engineering difficulties of note; the highest point being only 730 feet above sea-level. The port works at both terminals are elaborate, those at Coatzacoalcos, or Puerto Mexico as it is now called, consisting of extensive jetties and wharves, while at Salina Cruz an open roadstead has been converted into an artificial port capable of accommodating six vessels and susceptible of being enlarged to double that capacity at a small outlay. Both terminals were equipped with electric cranes and other loading devices, which at the time of their installation were the most modern of their kind. There were also magnificent warehouse and storage facilities.

The line as rebuilt was inaugurated in 1907, the Hawaiian American Steamship line making use of this route for the transportation of the sugar it carried from Hawaii to your Atlantic ports, the trans-shipment charges at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec being reasonable and the service excellent; products from California, Oregon, British Columbia and Alaska were also routed across the isthmus in preference to being sent by Panama, there being a saving of some 1200 miles by the former route for cargoes shipped from San Francisco for Atlantic ports.

The unusually substantial character of the road-bed has to some extent protected it from injury at the hands of the fighting factions which infested the territory through which the Tehuantepec National Railway runs; but the rolling stock has shared the fate of that of other lines, a great por-

tion of it having been destroyed by fire or dynamite, accident or wear. Moreover, the Tehuantepec line, though managed with remarkable ability, did not, even before the revolution began, develop the traffic that had been hoped for, the Panama Canal proving a more serious competitor than had been anticipated. Nevertheless, a fair business was being built up, and had anything like normal conditions prevailed, the road would in all probability have developed into a paying investment. The revolution which broke out in 1910 did not at first cause the Tehuantepec line much loss, but from 1913 the disorders, which prior to that time had been confined to the north of the Republic of Mexico, spread over the south as well, and from that time on there was a constantly growing shrinkage of Mexican products to be shipped across the isthmus as well as more or less destruction of the railroad's property.

A large part of the freight carried consisted of raw Hawaiian sugar, brought to Salina Cruz from Honolulu by the Hawaiian American Line steamers, and transferred by rail to Puerto Mexico, whence steamers of the same line took it to the refineries on your eastern seaboard. When the United States entered the European war, the Hawaiian American Line boats were taken over by the American government and the traffic across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was still further reduced. It has now shrunk to insignificant proportions with little prospect in sight for any improvement in the situation. Much of the rolling stock has been destroyed or diverted to use upon other lines, and the port works at both terminals are suffering from neglect, the revenue of the late Carranza government being swallowed up by the demands of his military establishment. The present outlook for the future of the Tehuantepec National Line is anything but roseate.

In 1903 Mr. Jose Y. Limantour, Minister of Finance under President Porfirio Diaz, began work on a program having for its object the government control of one or more of the principal railroads of the country. The first property in which he acquired such a controlling interest was the Mexican National Railroad, and some years later he carried to

a successful conclusion a merger, by which he took into the system now known as the National Railways of Mexico, the line already mentioned, the Mexican Central Railway, the Mexican International Railroad and two short standard-gauge lines in the southern part of the republic, the Vera Cruz and Pacific, which connects Santo Lucrecia on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec with the cities of Vera Cruz and Cordoba, and the Pan-American which joins Sano Geronomo on the Tehuantepec National Railway with the frontier of Guatemala. In addition, the merger controlled the very extensive narrow-gauge Interoceanic Railway of Mexico, which extends from Vera Cruz well into the State of Morelos, passing through Jalapa, Puebla and Mexico City, and its subsidiary line, the Mexican Southern Railway, which runs between Puebla and Oaxaca. The two last named properties, though operated as part of the system of the National Railways of Mexico, do not belong to it, and in the statements which follow as to mileage, equipment and capitalization, these two lines are not included.

As stated by the annual report of the National Railways of Mexico for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, the company's liabilities at that time were:

	<i>Mexican currency</i>	<i>U. S. currency</i>
Capital stock.....	448,014,716	
Funded debt.....	407,672,380	
Stocks and bonds of original lines in hands of public.....	3,833,495	
Assumed obligations.....	2,226,912	
Interest on bonds and notes.....	7,879,250	
Unclaimed dividends.....	25,878	
Notes payable.....	67,364,824	
	<hr/>	
Total, less current liabilities.....	937,017,455	\$468,508,727.50

The same report gives the total mileage of the system, exclusive of yards and sidings, but including several short leased lines of an aggregate length of less than sixty miles as:

	<i>Miles</i>
Standard gage.....	6,468
Narrow gage.....	387
	<hr/>
	6,885

The gathering of these particular data presents no great difficulty, even in time of revolution, as they are a matter of record and easily accessible. For all practical purposes both the liabilities and the mileage for 1914 were the same as they were at the time of the formation of the merger in 1908. On the other hand, correct information as to the physical condition of the road, and of the rolling stock on hand is by no means so easy to obtain, as may be gathered from the "Remarks" taken from the report already quoted:

These statements (covering rolling-stock) are inserted this year only because it has been customary to publish such data in our annual reports.

Comparing the figures with the equipment on hand at the close of the last fiscal year, they indicate that during the year under review but 1734 freight and 40 passenger cars and no engines were destroyed. As stated elsewhere in this report, many districts or divisions were out of our hands either for brief periods or during the entire year and consequently it was impossible to get accurate data as to the destruction. The reports were kept as accurately as official data was received for them from division officers, but from current reports of casualties received by us, during the year, it is believed that the above list is not complete.

During the year the daily reports received indicated at times the destruction of complete trains. In regard to locomotives the report does not show any as destroyed from revolutionary causes, but undoubtedly many of the engines which were dynamited, burned or otherwise wrecked during the year were reduced to such a condition that they should be called destroyed. In the attack on Monterrey, October 23 and 24, 1913, 17 engines were burned in the round house and a total of 637 cars were burned; when Monclava was attacked, March 11, 1914, 9 engines and 281 of our cars were burned.

The superintendent of the mechanical department closes his annual report by saying: "Condition of engines on Northern Cardenas, Monterrey, Chihuahua, Monclava, Torreon and Durango Divisions and Tampico Terminal cannot be shown, on account of no reports having been received due to present situation."

Mr. E. N. Brown, whose testimony has been referred to, states that in 1913 the "National Railways and the subsidiary lines had some 22,000 freight cars in service, and 729 locomotives." In the Tenth Annual Report of the National Railways of Mexico, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, there is given in review the following information as to the rolling-stock on hand June 30, 1913, as compared with that on hand at the time the report was issued:

	<i>June, 1913</i>	<i>June, 1918</i>	<i>Decrease</i>
National railways.....	16,661	10,538	6,123
Freight cars, standard gage.....	1,831	1,193	638
Freight cars, narrow gage.....	435	345	90
Passenger coaches, standard gage..	118	84	34
Passenger coaches, narrow gage...	620	362	258
Locomotives, serviceable.....			

Bearing in mind the dates, it will be noted that the above inventory applies to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913, nearly three years after the political disturbances in Mexico began; already the railroad properties had suffered considerably, but far worse was to come.

It is well to digress here for a moment for the purpose of discussing briefly a certain important factor in the railroad situation in Mexico, to wit, its personnel. At first owing to the utter unfamiliarity of the Mexicans with every branch of this industry, it was necessary to fill all positions requiring mechanical knowledge and skill, or a familiarity with railroading and its allied professions, with foreigners, in this case almost exclusively Americans. Practically all of the locomotive engineers, conductors, station agents, telegraph operators, boiler-makers and others connected with the repair shops were of that nationality, as well as a large proportion of the office force.

It was early recognized by the Mexican government that from a national point of view this state of affairs was highly undesirable, and steps were taken to remedy the situation with the coöperation of the railroads themselves. Schools for educating apprentices were established as early as 1890. Boys desiring to learn railroading were taken at fourteen or fifteen years of age, under a four-year contract, beginning at 62½ cents a day for the first year, with a gradual increase in wages which for the fourth year were 3½ pesos. A forfeit of 25 cents a day was held back and this was paid to them on completion of the contract, when they received a certificate of service constituting them as what was known as journeymen (*jornaleros*). They were then free to remain with the railroad or to seek work elsewhere. In 1912 there were 2000 such apprentices under contract to the National Railways, and from the time the system had been put in

effect, a period of twenty-two years, it was estimated that 15,000 or 18,000 boys had received training under it. Between 1907 and 1912, fifteen schools of a more advanced character were established to educate men in the operating service, to make them "proficient on train rules, air signals, air brakes and other mechanical appliances," and they had lectures given periodically by experts in these lines, principally Americans. There was also apparatus installed in these schools to demonstrate the appliances. (Mr. E. N. Brown's testimony.)

In 1912, under the presidency of Madero, a sweeping change of personnel was decided upon. Possibly the unfriendly attitude of the United States government at that time influenced the decision, for threats of intervention were constantly in the air and under the circumstances, the Mexican government can hardly be blamed for not wishing the country's means of transportation to remain in the hands of the citizens of a nation with which hostilities appeared highly probable. But, while no valid objection can be raised as to the propriety of making the change, the method employed provided a great deal of criticism, not wholly undeserved. If I remember rightly, a decree was issued making compulsory after a certain date the use of the Spanish language in all business connected with the operation of the roads; this virtually forced the resignation of a large part of the American employees, few of whom spoke that tongue with the necessary degree of fluency and still fewer could either read or write it. It was an ungracious return for the years of service they had rendered and worked great hardships upon the many who were too old to begin life over again in other countries, and it is to be regretted that the Mexican government, in exercising what was its right, could not have shown greater consideration.

As might have been expected, the immediate results of the change were not beneficial to the railroads, for many men were moved into positions of responsibility which they were unqualified to fill. It is but fair to the Mexicans to say that in time they rose to the occasion, and that they have since developed railroad men quite equal to many of those whom they succeeded.

The political disturbances which for the last ten years have afflicted Mexico, have profoundly affected most of her industries and none more so than that of railroading, for from the beginning of the fighting, the roads were used for moving troops; indeed, on the arid plains of the north, where many of the campaigns were waged, they furnish the only practical method of transportation. So closely have the military movements in Mexico been tied to the railroads that it may be said with substantial accuracy that 90 per cent of the fighting there has taken place within ten miles of the nearest line.

At first the railroads suffered chiefly from the interruption of commercial traffic and from the rough usage incidental to armed movements the world over; but as their strategic importance became more clearly understood, they came to be regarded in many cases as the main objectives; he who had possession making every effort to retain it, he who did not, resorting to every method to capture or damage his enemies' means of communication. In the beginning these methods were such as are sanctioned by the rules of civilized warfare; the attacks were directed exclusively against troop trains by means of artillery fire, the tearing up of rails or the hemming in of trains by the destruction of bridges behind and in front of them. As time went on, however, and preventive measures were devised against the old methods of attack, new ones were evolved, and just as in the European war the Germans sank all merchantmen, enemy or neutral, on the theory that they were or might be used to convey supplies to the Allies, so in Mexico, a faction driven to bay inflicted all possible damage upon the railroad with the intention of causing its opponents the greatest amount of harm. As a result, in a very short time the operations were not confined to attacks on military trains, but were directed at every moving thing, animate or inanimate, along the railroad, and soon degenerated into brigandage, pure and simple, only too often accompanied by acts of the most fiendish cruelty against the passengers, the mutilation, torture and murder of men, and the kidnapping and violation of women. On more than one occa-

sion, the wounded victims of an assault were drenched in oil and burned, together with the car in which they lay helpless.

Destructive as was the rebel activity of those days, it was at least confined to a small part of Mexico, there being little of it outside of the states of Chihuahua and Morelos. Following Madero's fall, however, the disorders spread over the entire country, much of the destruction became purely wanton, and men calling themselves soldiers did not shrink from perpetrating outrages usually associated with criminals of the lowest order. With the triumph of the Carranza revolution against Huerta in 1914, matters grew still worse for immediately after ousting their common enemy, the two victors, Villa and Carranza, quarreled and the civil war which followed exceeded in ferocity anything that Mexico had ever known.

Very early in this phase of the fighting, Carranza, who regarded himself as the only legally constituted authority in Mexico, seized such railroads as he could and operated them in the name of the government, as provided for under the laws of April 29, 1899, Chapter VIII, Article 145, pages 10 and 11, which say:

The federal authorities are entitled, in case in their opinion the interests of the country require it, to make requisitions on the railroads, their personnel and all their operating material, and to use them as they may consider advisable. In this case, the nation shall indemnify the railroad companies.

If no agreement is reached as to the amount of the indemnification, the latter shall be based on the average gross earnings in the last five years, plus ten percent, all expenses being borne by the company.

In the event of war or of extraordinary circumstances, the executive may take measures to render unserviceable either the whole or part of the line, also the bridges, telegraph lines and signals forming part of the road. Whatever may have been destroyed shall be replaced at the cost of the nation, as soon as the nation's interests allow of it.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the seizure of the railroads by the Carranza government has been the best thing that could have happened to the railroads themselves, insofar as it clearly fixes upon the nation the responsibility

for the damages sustained, and this responsibility becomes all the more clearly established through the recognition of Carranza by the United States as the de jure president of Mexico.

In the absence of a systematic survey the monetary equivalent of the damage must remain a matter of conjecture, though such a conjecture made by so competent an authority as Mr. E. N. Brown cannot but carry weight.

In his testimony, repeatedly quoted, he says: "Making repairs to rolling stock, bridges, stations, and other destroyed property, together with making good arrears of repairs, I should estimate at from sixty-five to seventy million dollars United States money." (Mr. E. N. Brown, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Part II, p. 1795.)

To this sum we must add the accrued interest upon the bonds and notes of the company, all of which has remained unpaid ever since Carranza seized the property. According to the balance sheet of June 30, 1919, appearing in the eleventh annual report of the National Railways of Mexico, these are:

	<i>Mexican currency</i>	<i>U. S. equivalent</i>
Interest on bonds and notes.....	117,140,489	
Unclaimed dividends on first preferred shares.....	25,114	
Notes payable, extended by agreement.	67,324,263	
	184,489,263	\$92,244,933

From this statement it will be noted that the accrued interest on bonds and notes have increased since 1914 from less than 8,000,000 pesos to more than 117,000,000, or by 109,000,000 pesos, \$54,500,000 in United States currency, about \$11,000,000 a year.

It would be useless to try to state the amount of indemnity to which, for the use of the property by the Mexican government, the railroad company will be entitled under the law cited, when the time for settlement comes. The wording of the law itself is somewhat vague.

If no agreement is reached as to the amount of the indemnification, the latter shall be based on the average gross earnings in the last five years, plus 10 per cent, all expenses being borne by the company.

It is evident from this provision that its framers had in mind the seizure of the country's railroads at the beginning, and not four years after the outbreak of hostilities, as was the case when Carranza commandeered the roads in 1914. Clearly, the five-year period immediately preceding the seizure of the properties is not a correct or fair index to their earning capacity, from the causes already sufficiently described, so that in the final casting up of accounts the question of equity and fair dealing will play as important a rôle as that of mere bookkeeping. How adversely the revenues of the company were affected by the Carranza revolution may be judged by comparing the net earnings for the year ending June 30, 1914, with those of the previous year. These were:

	<i>Mexican currency</i>
For 1912-1913.....	21,101,900
For 1913-1914.....	2,367,439
	<hr/>
	18,734,461

The gross earnings for the same two periods had fallen from 57,370,282 pesos to 34,273,341 pesos, a shrinkage of 40 per cent.

The number of unknown factors involved in this question make its further discussion unprofitable for the present, though it is safe to say that it will afford rich pickings for the legal profession when the proper time comes.

What we do know within reasonable limits of certainty is the arrears of interest and the amount needed to restore the properties to good physical condition. These are as follows:

	<i>Mexican currency</i>	
Accrued interest on bonds and notes 1919.....	117,140,489	
Less accrued interest on same 1914.....	7,879,249	109,261,240
		<hr/>
Interest for the fiscal year 1919-1920, approximate...	22,000,000	
Estimated cost of repairs at rate of exchange 2 to 1..	130,000,000	
		<hr/>
Total pesos.....		261,261,240

or 130,630,620 dollars in United States currency, for which amount the Republic of Mexico is unquestionably liable.

It is to be noted that this estimate does not include the notes payable amounting to over 67,000,000 pesos or \$33,500,000, as this item appears in the general balance of 1914 and is therefore not chargeable to government operation.

So much for the economic and physical condition of the railroads in Mexico. Before closing I shall refer briefly to their moral condition. Under the Carranza administration, it has been impossible for shippers to get cars unless graft is paid. Everything is regulated by schedule. I have heard it stated that a thousand pesos is the amount necessary to be paid, over and above the regular freight tariff, in order to secure from the "broker," who collects and distributes the graft, the guarantee of a car from the border to Mexico City.

Since the year 1911 Mexico has been indulging in an orgy of wild-oat-sowing for which she should be rebuked, sternly if necessary, certainly effectively. The injury to legitimate business and enterprise of all kinds has been in direct ratio to the deterioration of the railway service. The latest redeemers, who are now making their bow to the public, exude the same kind of promises to which we have so long been accustomed. I am not so pessimistic as to have lost hope; on the other hand I am not surcharged with expectations. A burned child dreads the fire and I am just returned from a sojourn of several weeks in Missouri. By their acts we shall know them and judge them thereby. It is well to bear in mind, in this connection, that the present revolt against the authority of Carranza is not a popular uprising but has been conducted by those very political militarists who were instrumental in placing him in power.

In any case, the government of this country still owes an undischarged duty and obligation towards many of its own nationals as well as to those of other countries. Our pacifist orators and Bolshevik agitators to the contrary notwithstanding, the bulk of the railway and other Mexican securities are not held by the frequently maligned "Barons of Wall Street," but by the small investors in this country and in France, Belgium and England. These were pur-

chased in good faith, all too frequently based upon information emanating from official or semi-official sources in Washington and it is now the duty of the American government to insist upon such a reestablishment of order and economy in the southern country as will insure their ultimate redemption with all accrued interest.

In conclusion, I do not hold the submerged masses in Mexico responsible for any of the present disaster and chaos. Even that element in the country which is most directly responsible, is entitled to some palliation for the gravity of its crimes, for were the Mexicans not encouraged to shed as much blood as they saw fit to lead them from the dark shadow of dictatorship into the full light of a glorious democracy? And the saddest commentary of all: today, Mexico is a bankrupt nation. With an abundance of potential assets, she will never be able economically to rehabilitate herself without outside help. The direct and indirect loss of the past nine years, must run well into the billions. With the capacity for production existing in 1911, had she not gone upon the rampage, she could have come through the years of the Great War a creditor nation to the extent of as many billions as she is now a debtor and occupy an enviable position. Instead she is still that eternal "Mexican problem" and a thorn in the flesh to those nations outside whose doors she must wait as a mendicant, if she is to re-achieve that political and economic status which she forfeited in the fateful years of 1910-1911.

LABOR IN MEXICO

*By James Lord, Treasurer, Pan American Federation of
Labor; Member of Labor Commission to Visit
Mexico, 1918*

I have been asked to say a few words at this conference regarding the labor situation in Mexico. I will try to give you the benefit of a few facts as they occur to me regarding my experience with Mexican and other labor for many years, and especially in connection with my experience the last time I was in Mexico in the summer of 1918, when I had a good opportunity to study at close range the new labor movement there as it exists now.

Labor in Mexico is in bad shape. Ages of industrial serfdom, exploitation, internal fighting and revolution have kept the people fairly demoralized in that unhappy country. The Mexicans, strangely, like other people are creatures of environment, and when in any locality the opportunity occurs through better environment or a greater measure of real liberty, a distinct improvement is manifest, and by the same token bad economic and social conditions find their reflex there, just as they do in other countries.

The present labor movement in Mexico was conceived in the throes of the revolution against President Porfirio Diaz. Prior to that time they had no opportunity of openly meeting in any way, or even discussing the wrongs they endured. The peon, under the Diaz régime, was always to be a peon. This was the *status quo* question all over again. When the revolution burst forth, the workers seized their opportunity and began to organize into local sindicatos. Later they united these local sindicatos into district organizations. They fought in the revolution as industrial units, or unions, and the officers of the Machinists' Union, or the Bricklayers' Union, or what-not, would be the officers of that particular unit of the army, in many cases. The leaders of

this movement in its inception—those who elected to lead the men—were men of education. In many cases they were men of culture, professors, theorists, men who had become radical by reading but who had learned nothing in the field of bitter experience, and this knowledge is necessary to one who would really understand the laboring man. Men with good intentions took charge of this movement, and it spread rapidly through Mexico. It was known as La Casa Del Obrero Mundial, or "House of the Workers of the World." The Mexicans have a strong admiration for the French. They like to do things as they think the French would do them, and this was shown in the formation of their labor movement. This explains the origin and the peculiar form of that movement in its beginning. Time and experience are changing their methods and ideas. They are getting their feet on the ground. They have already had considerable experience with other movements, and it is the sentiment of the workers throughout Mexico at this time to form a strong, practical trade movement, a national federation, composed of national, self-governed unions of trades and industries. They are also developing leadership among the workers—leadership that I prophesy will be heard from and will be known in the industrial world with no discredit to their ability. They are going along, trying their best to build the movement into such a form that they may get the best results for themselves. They realize that other people who came from lower depths, even, than the Mexican worker, have worked out their industrial redemption. They feel that they are to have at least one trial in their own country. We can pass a more intelligent judgment upon them after they have been given a fair trial. They are going to get that trial, and they surely have my best wishes.

Some years ago, a group of plucky forward looking men from the different Pan-American countries, together with a few of us in this American labor movement, began to talk things over, began to try to deal with the situation as it existed. We began by meeting periodically. The thing developed until a sort of committee was automatically formed to deal with Pan-American labor affairs. It grew so that

nearly all the time some representatives of Honduras, Argentina, the West Indies, or Mexico, were in Washington working away at the idea of a Pan-American Federation of Labor—a Pan-American International. They knew of the International of Europe—in fact, of the world—of which America is a part. The idea was to build another International to deal with the labor situation in the Western Hemisphere. Out of these efforts carried on by a few men grew the Pan-American Federation of Labor; and at the Laredo conference, in November, 1918, the organization was finally launched forth. Its first international meeting was a very good conference, the proceedings of which are well worth the time of any man or woman to read. It was a good beginning, but we expect to improve on the ideas that came before that Pan-American conference as time goes by.

Our first attempts were to set up an institution that would make for better fraternal relations between the workers of the different Pan-American countries—Make for better conditions for workmen emigrating from one country to another, set up a central bureau of information regarding the general economic conditions in these countries, and so on. We feel that we have been able, to a large extent, to prevent bloodshed on at least two occasions by the intelligent use of knowledge in our possession and the feeling that would be engendered in the workers of the different countries and the intelligent use of the prestige that we had attained through our comparatively small efforts. There is a great deal of work for the Pan-American Federation of Labor to do. There is a desire being manifested by the units composing it to “hew to the line” and do that work, and as time went on, it was decided that a committee from the American labor movement should go through Mexico, at least. There were certain things that needed to be attended to—certain things that needed doing. So, in the summer of 1918, John Murray, a Union printer, a man who was very familiar with the affairs of Mexico, one who has gone over the “divide” since that time, to the distinct loss of the workers of all the Pan-American countries, Santiago Iglesias, a native Spaniard, and your humble servant, were selected to undertake

this mission. I am going to tell you of just a few of our experiences that will give you an idea of the existing situation better than any other method that I can think of just now.

We went in by way of Laredo. We stopped at Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, for a considerable time. We found that the National Federation of Labor for Mexico had already been formed four or five days before our arrival. We knew there was considerable sentiment for this thing being done, but we had no idea that it would be done so quickly. We found that the governor of that state had taken it upon himself to send out an official call to all the labor centers in the country of Mexico, requesting them to assemble at Saltillo, or in the State of Coahuila, for the purpose of using their best endeavors to form a suitable solidified national federation. He made no attempt to fasten himself on the movement or to interfere with it in any way. He simply sent out the call, addressed the delegation, and gave a little wholesome advice, and said: "It is yours, go ahead."

We went to the places in Mexico where we could get in touch with the people who could give us information of the actual existing situation. We met President Carranza and the cabinet officers, and we talked the situation over very plainly with them. We found some encouraging sentiment, and we found some sentiment that was not very encouraging, in official circles. The Mexican who was holding office at that time would make the admission very soon after beginning conversation with you that he was a State Socialist and believed in State Socialism. In discussing with them what they really did believe, or how they construed State Socialism, one got something of a shock. They did not believe that labor unions were particularly needed. They did not think that workers ought to take it upon themselves to establish international relations. They thought the government should control not only the industries, but the actions of the individuals in their country. They would take care of their labor conditions, the matter of wages, and the general welfare of workmen. They would take care of the international relations, also. There would not be any more strikes. It was not good for the workers to have

strikes. They were State Socialists! That was a new definition of State Socialism to me. We found that many of these gentlemen had that idea and were using it in that way. We found that every bit of real opposition we encountered from the time we crossed the border until we got back came from those men who were handling the campaign of German propaganda. There was not anything else that appeared in it—those men and their tools and hirelings.

After having some meetings and after having one big, central meeting in Mexico City, it was decided that I should address a last meeting to be held in a large labor hall in that city. The papers came out—*El Democrata*, *Nationalista*—not pro-German, but German—absolutely German owned and sold as the German press. These papers had never been friendly to the workers' cause, but the reverse. They suddenly became ultra-radical. An article appeared in the editorial columns and on the front pages of a syndicalist, or anarchist nature, every morning and every evening, written by a man who knew how to write that kind of stuff—I have had some experience reading it! He was no ordinary man that wrote those editorials. They were warning the workers of Mexico against these *gringoes*, these tools. They were telling them that their only hope was to stay in the syndicalist camp. The only hope of the workers was to fight any attempt of the American labor movement to ensnare them. They were not advocating national ownership or public ownership, but they claimed that the industrial group could take that industry and determine in their wisdom what to do with that industry. They were getting out these articles all the time. They were running editorials saying that these *gringoes*, who should not be allowed to remain in Mexico another minute, were here to get Mexico into this war, to fight her good friend, Germany, alongside of the thief and the murderer, the United States, the "Colossus of the North." We got copies of all these papers and kept them. They make very interesting reading. No matter what we said at these meetings, they simply distorted them to suit themselves. Unfortunately for them, in this case, as well as in many other cases, these people showed

that they were hardly as intelligent as they were industrious. They overdid the thing to such an extent that the situation reacted in our favor. In the first mass meeting that I attended and addressed, they had a fine, choice collection of American wobblers—I. W. W.'s—who had slipped away from the United States to get away from the draft. The Pan-American countries are infested with these people today. They are anywhere where they can stir up trouble and inflame people's minds, just as buzzards gather around the carcass of a dead horse. Mexico City is a Mecca for them. They came into these meetings. They raised their objections. They tried to stir up insurrection in the audience. In every case I had a man who could point them out, and when they came in, I challenged them to come up on to the platform and ask their questions out in the open and say what they had to say, with the alternative of going out of the meeting. I put it up to them, and so did the other speakers. They would not face the music. They wanted to stir up a row and get the situation beyond control, and then their work would be done. They kept this up continually. We were gradually getting the workers to understand this campaign. We did not tell them to do as we had done; we told them plainly that our movement was not perfect, that we had made many mistakes, and that we expected to make many more. It was the movement that the workers of North America had made, and it would always be made to conform to the highest average intelligence and desires of the workers. It would be changed just as they wanted to change it. We told them that each country participating in the Pan-American Federation would have to build its own movement in its own way, according to its own light; but we could all learn by meeting on common ground and exchanging our views and experiences and possibly we could learn also by one another's mistakes. Nevertheless, the papers were warning the workers to stay out. We were trying to ensnare them. Stories were printed in *El Democrata* and *Nationalista* and *Universal* about the stealing of Texas and Arizona and California, of outrages committed daily on innocent women and children of the

border states. The story of almost every atrocity happening at that time on the Western front was taken almost literally, the names changed, and the thing made to apply to the "Colossus of the North!" I will simply say that for a few weeks down there it was not one of the kind of times when you got the blues because you had nothing to do or nothing to think about.

Now for the illiterates, for that great army, the beggar class, whose future no living man can forecast. Two halls, or *pulque* joints, were kept open in violation of the law. Third-rate whiskey is mild by the side of "pulky" and what it will do to you. One was called Hindenburg, and the other, U-Boat 38. They showed pictures of those atrocities in there. They told stories of these atrocities—what was going on in Coahuila, and Sonora, and Chihuahua. Nevertheless, while the sentiment dominating Mexico City at the time we were there was pro-German, the sentiment was created by those in control at that time, and the sentiment amongst the illiterates was surely pro-German because of the stuff they got in the Hindenburg and in U-Boat 38. The thinking class—the thinking class among the workers and in the business circles were *pro-Ally*. I made up my mind at that time, and I have never changed it, that Carranza was hopelessly pro-German. I say that because I saw what was going on every day. I know the stories I heard, but I am not going by the stories: I am going on what I saw, and I can believe that. The report was that Pablo Gonzales was pro-Ally. He was a sort of Secretary of War with the army taken away from him. He had no army. You could spot the officer—the military officer—who was taking the money. Any man or woman here could pick him out. They trained their mustaches to grow straight up. They tried even to do a little of the goose step when they were walking, shamelessly, brazenly, letting people know what they were at. The sentiment in Mexico City was that the Western front could not stand up. When the Germans went through to the Channel ports, the Mexicans believed that it was only a matter of time before the defense on the Western front would break utterly, and when that world

domination came, the young fellow who was a trained militarist would not be the worst off in that kind of a combination. That applied individually and nationally. All these things entered into our efforts to make clear to the workers there what the Pan-American was for.

Now, regarding conditions in Mexico, as to whether a part of the people are fit to rule, or not. We have had the universal ballot in this country, and I will say that unless that eighty per cent of the Mexican people used the ballot more intelligently than we do here, there would be no danger of the intelligent twenty per cent minority being submerged! Man is a creature of environment. If an American worker or a British worker had to go to his work continually on a diet of *frijoles* and *tortillas*, if there is any power on earth could make him do that, I do not know that his efficiency or his productivity would be as great, even, as that of the Mexican laborer. He might possibly stand a whole lot more than he stands. I have lived on that fare for a little while, but not more than a minute longer than I could help! Man is a creature of environment. Is it right, is it intelligent, to forever condemn the peon, who never got enough wages to enable him to get anything better than red beans and flapjacks, which do not produce enough strength for the work he is expected to do? For the amount of work he is able to do, he cannot earn any more, and therefore he cannot do any more, for he cannot obtain the necessary food on which to work. What chance has he? Somebody else has been unfit to govern, I should think, for they have evidently failed in their mission. The Mexican worker, as I understand him, is sick and tired of revolutions. He is sick and tired of the whole game. I do not know whether he ever would be any better than he is, for he has never had any chance to be any better. Give them better environments; give them something to eat; give them other conditions under which to live besides this state of constant revolution. Give them a living wage, and then pass judgment on them after they have had a reasonable chance to try to make better men of themselves. It may be, of course, that the Mexican has lost his mental stamina. People

talk about this proposition lightly. Perhaps if a man would live on a diet of *frijoles* and *tortillas* for twelve months and work in the mines on that kind of fare, he might be better able to pass judgment on these people. Let him put himself in the peon's place for once. And I respectfully recommend to the directors of industry in Mexico, whether British, American, or native, that they try out a system of joint relations with their workers, that they recognize at last the human equation in this thing, that they give them a living wage, that they build them better homes, that they teach them hygiene and cleanliness, that they teach them some things worth while—teach them some things besides hatred. A slave may have feared his master, but he never respected him. If a chain is fastened to a slave, the other end of the chain is fastened to his master. I have always revolted against this caste idea since I was able to understand what it was. That old prayer, "God bless me and my wife, my son John and his wife, us four and no more," will not save poor Mexico. The man who helps Mexico will have to help her in the spirit of a broader vision than that. The way to help Mexico, in my opinion, is to help without trespassing, to give them an opportunity to save themselves, and we will then see what they will do.

I remember, a few years ago, I was attending a meeting of the American Federation of Labor at San Francisco. There is a field down in southeastern Arizona known as the Clifton, Morenci Metcalf field, a field almost unknown to us at that time. I have been a miner since I was eleven years old, and I have been pretty much over the mining fields of the world. I have had some practical experience. This field was, however, unknown to me. I had never been in it. It is practically in old Mexico. Ninety per cent of the people there speak Spanish. There are a few Spaniards there, but the great majority of the people are Mexicans. They had gone on a strike in that field. They did not belong to any organization. They had simply got to the jumping-off place—to the place it is dangerous to let any group of workmen arrive at—to the place where they felt that they had *nothing to lose*. They all went out on strike.

There was not a speck of smoke in that field, from a miner to a smelter. Strangely enough, in that particular instance the sheriff was not against the strike, and it is the one lone case in the hard rock mining states that I know of. Strangely enough, in that particular case the governor of the state was not against it; and strangely enough, in that particular case the militia was not used to kill the strikers. The militia went in and kept the peace. The gunmen, the same group of which a few are dining in Paradise since a few days ago in West Virginia, were in there. Some of the best informed men went to them and said: "We do not want trouble with you; we have not done anything to you. Don't let the sun go down on you. If you come back the second time, we shall not be so polite to you as we are now." The gunmen went out; and that is the only strike I know of in the West where the peace was kept and not a dollar's worth of property was lost. Imagine my feelings. I was there merely to look it over and see if I could be of assistance to them or give them any advice. I found everything so different from anything I had ever experienced. Dick Franz was the groceryman there, and all his neighbors and customers were Mexicans. He extended them credit on beans and flour—the same old fare, for strike fare was the same fare that they got when they were working. He extended them credit to the extent of \$34,000, and was ready to fold up his tent and steal away when I got there. He had ruined his own credits. He had no regrets; he kept saying, "We got them licked, if only the beans had held out." In that situation, I sat down and wired every fellow in the labor movement I knew who would get a move on him, and donations began to come in. We got enough money to pay for a carload of beans, gave the money to Franz, who got the beans and re-established his credit all along the line. By this time the Department of Labor was interested and came into the situation, and one of the best men in that service happened to go out there—a man who was a thorough miner, hard rock and coal, and who knows the game. Through his efforts a stockholders' meeting was held in El Paso, and the stockholders all came from Scot-

land. It was their first time in this country. They were a set of very fine gentlemen. They had no idea of the corruption and the graft that had been practiced on these miners. As fast as cases were proven at the hearings, and as boss or sub-boss, or anyone else was proven guilty of graft or anything irregular, his head was cut off officially, and he was told to go. They carefully considered all the demands of the miners, and on their own statement, which is in writing, they admitted that the demands were not unreasonable and that they would meet them at once. The settlement finally hinged on what wages the miners were to get. They got the eight-hour day, better homes, better conditions underground, and the promise of things such as ventilation that meant a great deal to them. They could not agree on the wage. The men, in their first strike, and with victory apparently within their grasp, wanted to establish the standard wage in the copper mines of the Rocky Mountains. In this particular case the ore was not very rich; it is what they call low grade ore. In this case the production of ore per man was just a fraction more than half the production from any of the other camps. I knew the reason. You had only to look at the men to know why they did not produce more. They had not it in them to do it. But they wanted that wage. We told them it was a physical impossibility to do it, commercially. We said to them, "You will put this field out of business, and then you will all be through. You will get a good, substantial advance in wages. We advise you to take it. You can live better; you can get better food; you are going to have a lot better working conditions. Now try to raise the production and show that there is some benefit in these improvements; and whenever you do, they will go into conference with you again and discuss the question with you again." They went back to work, and by degrees the production per man was brought up until it was on par with the other mining fields. The miners lived better, had better homes, and did better in every way, and in six weeks—possibly two months—from the day they returned to work, Dick Franz was paid his \$34,000 by those Mexicans. There

is an instance that shows what can be done by the Mexicans when they are given something to eat and a chance to show what they can do.

I could cite many other incidents that have occurred in these United States with Mexican workmen where the same thing has taken place. In the mining camps in Colorado, New Mexico, and other states where the Mexican miner owns his home, has a small automobile, in some cases, he has proved that he is as good a miner as there is in the camp. Talk about going down to them—you can go down to them and bring them up to your own level; you don't have to stay down there with them. These things have been done before, and they can be done again; and until the Mexican worker is treated in that kind of a spirit, until some intelligence is manifested in connection with this problem, there will be no peace in Mexico.

I went through the coal fields and the hard rock mining fields in Mexico in 1918, and today the wage is a peso and a quarter a day—a dollar and a quarter (Mexican money) and the cost of living is higher there than it is here. How do they do it? How can they give their children enough to eat? How can they do their work? How can they raise decent children? How would you like to have such conditions exist in the United States? If men's environments are improved, they will become better and more tolerant men. There will be better little boys and girls, and they will become better men and women. Somebody is to blame besides the peon. I am not afraid to go down to him. I have been there often, and I have brought him up, too. I am not afraid of that 80 per cent, and I am not their judge, either. I have not been that good in my life that I can pass judgment on that 80 per cent. I have done many things in my life that have been wrong, but I have always tried to play the game squarely with my fellow worker. Well, a peso and a quarter is the wage down there. In the bituminous fields it is a little better, for it is mostly piecework, and they might make a dollar and a half or two dollars and a half. The only organizations that are national in character are those of the coal miner, the textile worker and the rail-

road worker. The "land of promise" for the Mexicans did not materialize under Carranza, by any means, and it never could. He was a disappointment to the workers; there is no question about that. I was in Mexico City one time when they forbade the street railway workers from holding a peaceable parade, and they were 100 per cent organized there at that time. They were told what would happen to them if they held it. I was in position to hear of these things, being in different parts of Mexico from time to time.

Regarding the new régime, it is superfluous for me to say that I do not know what will happen. Nobody can be a prophet regarding conditions in Mexico with any safety. I know the men in charge, and I would stake my future on the judgment and good intention of at least some of them. Certainly, it is true that they helped to put Carranza in power, and they were disappointed in him, for he did not make good. Many of us, with our splendid enlightenment and qualifications, might have been loud in our praise for Woodrow Wilson a little while ago and now be disappointed in him. That is human nature, and it does not belong alone to Mexico. You have got to give people a chance to save themselves. You cannot hand democracy down to anybody; it cannot be done. You must give them a chance to achieve democracy, and that is the only way it will exist in this world. The labor movement is what the workers make it. The syndicalist movement, as it appears in Latin-American countries, is the natural expression that comes after ages of repression and is the natural vent to the theories and ideals of the entire Latin race. We do not tell them what to do. We tell them our own experiences, and they are trying to make their own movement conform to ours. My judgment is that they will have a strong, virile movement in Mexico; and that in the other countries the labor movement will follow pretty much as the Mexican movement goes. Whether they succeed or not, there must be the opportunity afforded them to become real human beings, with the right to live as human beings should live, and until such conditions develop there will never be satisfaction or internal peace in Mexico. I am going to help

them all I can. My best wishes go with Obregon. I believe he will be the next president of Mexico. I said that a year ago. I personally hope he will be the one chosen. I believe he is big enough to do the things that must be done. I believe he can convince the people that the constitution of Mexico wants changing, that some of their idealism should be set aside, and that they should do the very necessary work that needs doing. As the constitution was drafted, where the Government owned everything below the surface of the ground and all other things, it would be very nice and it would not be very hard to manage or to carry it into effect, provided they could lick America and Great Britain and a few other countries; otherwise, the constitution is unworkable. Carranza knew very well that it was unworkable. I believe that these men know it and have said so, to the extent that they can change anything of that character to conform to intelligent, sensible progress. The Mexican worker is beginning to realize that he has unnecessarily wasted a lot of time shouting, "salute the revolution sociale" and "capital is internationale," and he is beginning to feel that the only thing that is international is labor, and that if it is intelligently organized, the worker has nothing to fear, no matter from what country capital comes. He is organized to the place where he can take care of his own affairs, and in this way he will take care of himself in a better way than he will by simply showing and demonstrating that he has a ton of philosophy and an ounce of real, intelligent fight—and that is the way the Mexican worker has been sized up, up to date. Let us not pass judgment upon him because he has suddenly acquired revolutionary ideas. Think of the environment. Think of his surroundings. Let us be glad that we have not had to endure the things that have been forced upon him. When we talk of social status, I may say that my own ancestors occupied a lower social status than the Mexican now occupies, and this not so long ago either. Think of the environment of the miners in Great Britain. It was not so long ago that the records showed that children were born in the mines. I have seen the record showing that one mine

manager traded a pony for a man with a neighboring mine owner. My grandmother worked in a coal mine in Britain when she was a very small child. My father was in the mines at the age of six. My mother worked in a woolen mill at seven years of age. They are both living in this country now, and they are intelligent people. I know something about this low status, for they came from it, and the British workers have come from a pretty low status in a comparatively short time; and I will convince every man and woman I can, at every opportunity that comes to me, that the thing to do is to throw their sheltering arms around these unfortunate neighbors of ours, and let us all try to see if we cannot make better progress; we will see if there cannot be industrial peace and progress achieved in this life. We will go on and do our best and see that the *frijoles* and *tortillas* standard of fare disappear forever from this world, that the word "caste" shall have gone the way of the oxcart, and that the sunlight of industrial liberty shall shine over all the children of men.

RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS IN MEXICO

By E. D. Trowbridge, General Manager of the Mexico Company; formerly General Manager, Mexican Light and Power Company, Mexico City

The recent turn-over in Mexico could scarcely be termed a revolution. It represents a revolt, within the same party, of a large faction which insists on a more progressive government, demands speedy pacification of the country and aims at more cordial relations with other countries. The turn-over is so recent that there has scarcely been time to even formulate a regular program.

The change was a quick one, practically all the important military units going over to the new movement. The government, while of a provisional character pending elections, may be considered a continuation of the liberal or revolutionary government of Carranza. While the new leaders are committed to certain reforms and to a more friendly attitude toward foreign capital, the problems with which the government has to deal have not changed. These problems are largely based on economic and social conditions. To understand them it is necessary to briefly review conditions prevailing in Mexico prior to the Madero revolution, and to outline the course of events during the past decade.

During the centuries of Spanish rule the Mexican Indian was, in most respects, a slave. Independence brought little improvement in his position, as independence brought nothing of democracy with it. Half a century of misrule by selfish and unscrupulous dictators was followed by a certain effort under Benito Juarez to improve the situation. Then came the French occupation, and the ambitious empire of Maximilian, followed by a long period of disorder and depression. Under Porfirio Diaz the country was pacified, public credit established, railways built and industry developed, but little was done for the mass of the people.

The scheme of government was a highly organized machine run by a few men, and in many respects, run for the benefit of the land-owning class. Eighty per cent of the population was illiterate and ignorant. There was nothing in the way of political education.

With the growth of a middle class, and the development of more liberal ideas, particularly in the north, came demands for reforms and for correction of abuses which had crept into the government. When the Madero revolution, laughed at in the beginning, swept over the country, the mass of ignorant people furnished the background for all sorts of disorder. The ignorant peon, easily led by eager and often unscrupulous leaders, knew no distinction between liberty and license. He was willing to loot, and was glad to wreak vengeance on those whom he considered as his oppressors. In a pure spirit of vengeance he burned crops, wrecked buildings, killed or drove off cattle, and, in general, put an end to production on the vast estates. When the peon, after his outburst of passion, wanted to go back to work, there was no work to be had. Moreover, with a partial suspension of production, food stuffs went up in price. The peon then quite naturally turned bandit. A score or more men, acting in a band, could raid a big rural estate or village, obtain loot and foodstuffs, and move on. After the reactionary movement under Huerta and his downfall, there followed a period of chaos, with Carranza who represented the majority of the Madero following, fighting for the control of the country against Villa, Zapata, Felix Diaz and other leaders who sometimes acted independently and sometimes together. Through 1914, 1915 and 1916, civil war swept over the country. The national capital changed hands eight times. Industry stopped, farm production ceased, railways were wholly or partially closed down, banks suspended, the currency was demoralized, people starved to death, there were serious epidemics of typhus, and, in general, a condition approaching anarchy prevailed.

Under the conditions it was inevitable that numerous local bands should be formed who proceeded to dominate

certain sections of the territory. Frequently these bands had the backing of rural property owners, who, by contributing to their support, could be assured of protection against other bands or against the incursions of the leading factions fighting for supremacy. These bands gave their support to Villa, Zapata, Feliz Diaz, Pelaez or other leaders, as the case might be, and in return were left in control of their own particular districts. They levied more or less irregular contributions from towns, villages and rural estates, and for a time were the substitute for any regularly constituted authority.

There are several phases of the matter to be considered. Brigandage at first was profitable, but gradually, as everything portable or salable disappeared from rural estates, the attraction in the life disappeared. In the confusion and disorder most of the owners of farms, ranches or estates had abandoned their properties, resulting, in many sections, in a complete suspension of production. The bandit then became half-farmer, half-bandit, scratching the earth to plant a little corn one day and roaming the country in search of plunder the next. Many who have been enjoying this life will not want to go back to peaceful pursuits, and the hardier characters will continue to give trouble until exterminated or compelled by thorough patrolling of the country to live orderly lives. For the majority of the bandits their roaming will cease by a process of sheer exhaustion. The government control of the railways, cities and towns has become, generally speaking, strong enough to make raids of any size out of the question. There is nothing left on rural estates. The bandits are beginning to realize that if crops are not grown they themselves will starve. Many of them are begging for the resumption of work on properties which they themselves helped wreck only a short time ago. Naturally every property put back in production will automatically cut down the amount of lawlessness. Many properties which were entirely abandoned for three or four years are again producing crops.

This resumption, coupled with abundant rains this year has reduced the price of corn, the staple of the country,

from \$2.50 per bushel a year ago to a price of \$1.10 per bushel, throughout central Mexico. Naturally, the drop in the price of corn will improve general conditions, through reduction in living costs.

In some sections everything is ready for a full resumption of agricultural activity, but there are many practical obstacles in the way. The greatest of these is the lack of money. Rural properties were stripped of everything portable—livestock needed for farm work was long ago driven off. Owners of properties have had no income and have nothing to start up with, either for re-equipping their properties or paying their labor until they can get return from crops. In the state of Morelos, for example, the great sugar estates lie helpless. Grinding mills and machinery were wrecked, and cane lands burned over. Fine estates, watered by elaborate irrigation systems, are producing nothing for the sole reason that there is no money available.

The upheaval in Mexico wrecked the banking system, and the banks, which are closed or are doing only a foreign exchange business, have no money to lend. The government has bought a considerable amount of farm machinery which it proposes to sell to farmers on time. While this will help somewhat, it is only a drop in the bucket.

The question of full resumption of work on the large Mexican estates is closely related to the general agrarian problem in Mexico. Under the Spanish rule great grants of land were made to court favorites, or were given as rewards for campaigns of conquest. These estates have, in many cases, passed down intact to present holders. The church acquired great estates, and many of these, passing into private hands, formed the basis of immense holdings.

The estate owners were the only people of wealth, and the tendency was for them to keep adding to their properties. In the past century the number of individual holdings has been cut in two. Ninety-six large estates are credited with 120,000,000 acres of land, or an average of nearly two thousand square miles each. Six thousand properties represent a total of 300,000,000 acres of land. It is self-evident that such a condition was calculated to keep the mass

of the people in practical slavery, to keep down wages, and to curtail production.

Much has been written by Mexican reformers on the agrarian question, and there has been a general demand for breaking up these vast properties. The reformers generally ignore the fact that the mere breaking up of the properties will not result in anything. The main difficulty is not agrarian but social. The average peon, turned loose on a piece of land, would starve to death. He has received, for four hundred years, wages which rarely exceeded seventy-five centavos, or thirty-seven cents. He has had to support his family on this. It goes without saying that he has no savings. He can not buy the simplest implements, and he has nothing to live on until harvest time, even if he did manage to get a crop planted. He must, by force of circumstances, work for someone else. Besides, while he labors well under the direction of an administrator, he knows little or nothing of farming, and would, in nine cases out of ten, be at a complete loss if placed on his own resources. He has no outlook, no hope, no vision. If he has a blanket and can get enough food to keep body and soul together he is content. His family is incidental, and he gives them food until they can shift for themselves.

But he is likeable, docile and apt, and a good, faithful worker so long as he needs work, but he does not care a hang for tomorrow. His nature is not going to be changed by the adoption of reform laws or new agrarian schemes. There are a great many of him to educate and to develop to the point where he will have some idea of the responsibilities of life and citizenship. This will take time.

Meanwhile the reformers, in their anxiety to aid the peon, have unconsciously placed obstacles in the way of his getting back to work. The constitution of 1917, while theoretically defensible in most respects, was so strongly anti-capitalistic in three or four features as to arouse the general hostility of organized capital, thereby greatly reducing the chances of securing the money necessary for reconstruction purposes. The assembly which adopted the constitution was extremely radical, and went on the theory that the way

to reform is to reform, without considering whether the reforms proposed were so drastic as to defeat their own ends. Many of those who favored extreme measures now realize that modifications must be made, and various government commissions are studying the questions involved.

Mexico, in point of natural progress, was behind other nations, and her form of autocratic government was out of keeping with modern ideas. The immediate effect of the revolution was to upset violently the economic equilibrium of the country and to produce a state of chaos. Then came the stage of re-establishing the regular authority, return to a metal currency basis, and a resumption of normal industrial activity. The material progress made in this stage has been surprisingly good—almost amazing. This is indicated by the figures of exports and imports, and by earnings of railways, public utility companies and industrial concerns. The question of full pacification of the country is interlocked with problems of government finance, rehabilitation of the banking system, international relations and internal politics.

Mexico's relations with other countries, aside from questions involving the protection of life and property, have an important bearing on her own internal development. A situation which from time to time threatens foreign intervention involves so much uncertainty as to retard the stabilizing of affairs. Moreover, this uncertainty greatly encourages those who are opposed to the government. Most important of all, any feeling of uncertainty prevents obtaining the money needed for reconstruction purposes. Mexican problems seem to go around in a circle. Foreign opposition cuts off a supply of money badly needed for public and private purposes; without money operation of the great agricultural properties cannot be resumed; without such resumption there is no work for thousands of people; this in turn results in a continuation of disorder and creates a lack of confidence in the ability of the government to handle the situation. Economic conditions cannot be fully stabilized until a banking system is created to take care of the ordinary needs of the country. The existing banks can do nothing because their assets are largely tied

up in properties which are producing nothing. The government cannot get money for a new banking system because of the lack of confidence. The various complications in foreign relations develop a generally hostile attitude on the part of foreign governments.

This appears to be a pessimistic picture. Actually, it is surprising that the situation is not much worse than it is. The amazing recuperative power of the country has been shown by the recovery to semi-normal conditions from a state of chaos three years ago. Exports and imports are higher than ever before, railway earnings are forty per cent higher than during the Diaz régime, government income is considerably higher than ever, and the country, after several years of suffering under a depreciated paper currency, is back on a gold-and-silver currency basis. Under the Carranza régime, while those best informed felt that the leaders of the movement were honest and patriotic, there is no question that a fearful amount of graft existed. Many have tried to paint all revolutionary movements in Mexico as nothing more than factional fights to control the national treasury. In this view I cannot agree, as it seems quite clear that, in spite of elements of personal greed, there was, in the Carranza régime, and there is under the latest revolt, a sincere desire to do something constructive for the country—something to elevate the status of the mass of the people. The country, ill-prepared as it was for anything like a democratic form of government, suffered through the opportunity given to a horde of greedy petty chiefs. The new government will doubtless learn that many of the unscrupulous have not, in changing their political clothing, made any change in their selfish motives. Graft may be expected, almost as a matter of course, but it must be checked and eventually eliminated if anything tangible is to come of the whole liberal movement in Mexico. So long as graft exists on a large scale there will be, both internally and externally, a lack of confidence in Mexico. A Mexican friend of mine observed some months ago that under Diaz graft was a monopoly, controlled by a small ring, but that it had been "democratized," and everyone

had a chance. This sort of feeling goes a long way to convince public opinion, both in Mexico and the United States, that the Mexican situation is well-nigh hopeless, and that nothing but a strong dictatorship, or outside intervention, will set up a government capable of handling affairs. It seems vital that the new government should, through securing the support of all intelligent classes in Mexico, make every endeavor to eliminate the grafting element. There are, fortunately, strong indications that the new government will secure the active support of many of the old conservative element in Mexico—an element at first opposed to any reforms but now convinced that any return to the old form of government is out of the question.

If foreign relations can be straightened out another step will have been taken toward getting everything in order. The general question of these relations may be subdivided under five heads: arrangements to avoid border troubles; protection for the lives of Americans and other foreigners resident in Mexico; claims for loss of life or damage to properties during the revolution; treatment of foreign capital invested in Mexico; and the controversy over the Mexican oil fields.

The question of border troubles is a part of the general problem of a complete pacification of the country. The large rebel bands in the Northern part of Mexico have been pretty well broken up, and in a large part of the territory conditions are good, or fairly good. Some Americans claim that the Mexican military do not want peaceful conditions restored, as they can, while any disorder exists, impose on the public. There are many cases of abuse on the part of unscrupulous military officials. It seems quite idle, however, to say that the military as a whole make no serious effort to restore peaceful conditions. The relative prosperity of the country, as compared with conditions two years ago, is proof that the government has been working steadily for pacification. If the government had a thoroughly organized and well equipped army the program of pacification would go on at a higher rate of speed. The

army sprung into existence during the revolution, and, generally speaking, was officered by men who knew little of organization or discipline. It is only within the past year that much has been done toward the development of efficient military standards. Many officers are unruly, and in certain sections there is much reason for complaint. However, there appears to be some improvement, and a realization, which scarcely existed before, that a central authority must be reckoned with.

It seems essential, in connection with maintenance of order along the border (and in other sections of the country) that the government should organize a strong force of light-cavalry to act as rural police—a force similar to the old *rurales*. Such a force, supported by scouting airplanes, would soon suppress the operations of bandits of any size, and would greatly reduce the chance of raids across the line. It would also result in greater security of life all over the country. The government is undoubtedly making efforts to protect the lives of foreigners, and there has been in the past two years, a marked diminution in attacks against the person. During the chaotic conditions prevailing in 1914, 1915, and 1916 many lives were lost, but the outrages in the past year have been few in number and generally in territory remote from regular control. Every American living in Mexico has a pretty fair idea of where it is safe to go, and where his chances of getting into trouble or danger are above the average. If he deliberately goes into dangerous zones he is partly responsible for any trouble he may get into. The question of whether Mexico should be in perfect order is quite another matter. The purpose of these statements is not to exonerate the Mexican government of its responsibility for the protection of the lives of foreigners, nor to minimize the liability of the American government in the matter, but rather to present the facts as they are. Whether the Mexican government is doing all that could be done to pacify the country thoroughly and thereby make it safe for foreigners and natives alike is a matter subject to discussion. That the government has done much in this direction is certain. It also seems certain

that with money and with more efficient organization pacification could be considerably speeded up. The question of foreign claims for loss of life or damage to property during the revolution is properly one for mixed claims commissions. The Mexican government some months ago named a commission to investigate claims and make awards. Few foreign claims have been filed with this commission. Alien claimants naturally do not want to submit claims to a commission named by the government against which the claims are made. Doubtless a mixed commission will soon be formed to deal with the question.

With the exception of the railway investment the large units of capital in Mexico suffered comparatively little damage during the revolution. Properties of the large mining, public utility, oil and industrial companies came through with little or no physical damage. The oil companies have prospered throughout. Many other properties suffered through loss of revenue because their receipts were depreciated in paper money. Others were obliged to shut down at times because of demoralized conditions. The smaller properties fared worse. Many ranches, farms and plantations lost heavily through raids, cattle and livestock being driven off and everything portable being carried away. Many small mines, located in remote districts, were abandoned by their owners. Some of these properties have resumed operations, but many located in out-of-the-way places are still closed down. The railroads suffered very badly. Stations were burned, bridges destroyed and rolling stock wrecked. For a long time earnings were in paper money and barely sufficient to pay running expenses, so that there was heavy depreciation of track and equipment. All the railways are four or five years in arrears on bond interest. The situation is all the more difficult because with one or two exceptions, the railway companies were in a weak financial position before the revolution broke out. The National Railways Company, owning two-thirds of the mileage in Mexico, has capital liabilities, bonds, stock and accrued interest amounting to \$500,000,000, with gross earnings of only \$40,000,000. The highest net earnings

before the revolution were slightly over \$10,000,000, or at a rate of about 2 per cent on the present capital liability. The complete demoralization during the upheaval in Mexico is clearly shown by the fact that receipts of the system, reduced to American currency, fell from an average of \$2,500,000 to less than \$100,000 in January, 1915. The earnings have increased very rapidly during the past two years, and now exceed pre-revolution figures. Wages and other expenses are, however, higher than formerly, and a deficit is certain for some time.

The Mexican government is in arrears on the national debt, but the prospects of resumption of payments are good. The total national debt, including accrued interest on various loans, damages payable to railways, and loans from banks, is about \$500,000,000, calling roughly for \$25,000,000 of interest annually. The present government revenue is at a rate of \$90,000,000, which, were it not for heavy expenses of a large army needed to restore order, would be ample to cover ordinary expenses and interest charges. An increase of 30 per cent in income will put the government in a position to meet all its obligations. Naturally, every property placed in production means a step nearer to this position.

It goes without saying that a situation which involved so much material loss for so many people—owners of properties or holders of government, railway or corporate securities, created many enmities. Foreigners in Mexico, generally speaking, were hostile to the revolutionary movement. With the improvement in conditions many have modified their views, but their attitude collectively has in the past been such as to increase friction in international relations. Another cause for friction was the greatly exaggerated impression held by Mexicans as to the amount of profits reaped by foreign investments in Mexico. A single case may be cited on this point. An article in a leading American periodical a few months ago, written in a sympathetic spirit, noted incidentally, and as evidence of good conditions, that one silver mine is shipping \$15,000,000 of bullion monthly. This would be at a rate of \$180,000,000 a year,

when, as a matter of fact, Mexico's total silver production this year, from all mines, will not reach \$100,000,000.

The controversy over the Mexican oil fields is a complicated affair. Foreign interests control practically all the developed territory. The rights of these companies to exploit their lands are quite clear, and the efforts of the Carranza government to annul such rights were based, not on legal grounds, but largely on questions of public policy. The Mexican oil fields have potential possibilities of yielding a billion barrels of oil annually, an amount far in excess of any other fields in the world. The government has feared that the control of such vast resources by a few foreign companies would be detrimental to national interests, and has endeavored to curb the development of the industry under such control. It seems as if some suitable arrangement could be reached by which the companies interested could go ahead with their program of development, the government retaining a reasonable control, through proper regulations, of the industry. Mexico lacks the capital to develop her natural resources, and should encourage foreign capital. She should, however, take precautions to prevent such capital becoming a dominant factor in her internal affairs. The attitude of the Mexican government in the oil controversy has been a narrow one. On the other hand, the collective attitude of the oil interests has not been one calculated to assist in any permanent and satisfactory settlement of the question.

Summarized, the immediate problems to be met are:

1. Rehabilitation of railways.
2. Resumption of agricultural activities.
3. Creation of a banking system.
4. Policing of rural districts.
5. Securing support of intelligent people of all factions.
6. Elimination of graft.
7. Reorganization of national debt on basis of partial payment of interest, with full payment later.
8. Settlement of foreign claims.
9. Settlement of oil controversy.
10. Modification of certain impractical features of the Constitution.

11. Restoration of full civil government throughout the country.

12. Efficient reorganization of army.

Co-incident with measures to meet these problems the government should study other problems of great importance. Of these the most important are the extension of popular education, the creation of a large class of small land-owners, the extension of transportation system to assist in a full development of agricultural and other resources, a general reform in the system of taxation, and a reform in the political system to establish the beginning of a representative form of government. Much has been accomplished in ten years in the creation of public opinion and the development of popular thought. Much more can be accomplished by patriotic and sincere effort to create a stable government. If all interested give unselfish devotion to their country the program of reconstruction will go forward steadily and surely, and the progress will leave no excuse for any outside interference in Mexico's future.

RECENT CONDITIONS IN MEXICO

*By Francis R. Taylor, Chairman of the Recent Commission
to visit Friends' Missions in Mexico*

My visit to Mexico was neither long enough nor extensive enough to qualify me for an opinion upon the conditions throughout the entire country, but only upon the sections which we traversed. Even then the things we saw for ourselves and the information we received constitutes, naturally, the chief sources of the conclusions at which we arrived.

My companion, Arthur L. Richie and I were sent out by the American Friends' Service Committee to visit the sections assigned to the Society of Friends for mission work as well as the Federal District, in anticipation of opening up work in Mexico similar to that about concluded in the stricken parts of Europe. This object was undertaken entirely in view of the international difficulties existing. It is of a broader and more temporary nature than the established form of missionary endeavor, particularly in the number of volunteer, short-time workers that are used, when available. The Friends' mission work is confined, under the agreement between the Evangelical Churches, to the state of Tamaulipas, and small portions of the states of Nuevo Leon and San Luis Potosi. Like all the other denominations, the Friends do not at all adequately cover their large extent of territory, but the range of our inquiry took us pretty generally over this section, and after that, by the main line of the railroad, to the capital city, through the varying and interesting states between, thence returning via Laredo. What I shall say, therefore, refers to that section only, except in those instances when such observations may be presumed to be typical of the nation as a whole.

We found agriculture in all stages of development—from the primitive ox-drawn, wooden plow, shod with iron, to the highly organized sugar or citrus plantation. Back of each was the pitiable lack of banking facilities. If there is any one boon that the farming population of Mexico needs, it is the bank, more for deposit and savings even than for credit, desirable and essential through the latter is.

We had entered Mexico with the preconception that the panacea for Mexico's ills lay in a division of the great landed estates. We left with the opinion that such a subdivision was greatly to be desired but that the peon would profit little by it at once. So great is the gulf between the classes and so remote the possibility of advance from the peon class, that two generations of education in thrift and elementary economy will be necessary before the full benefit of the division can be expected to affect the peon class in any but an incidental way. Even from that standpoint, however, the effort is worth while, just as the similar process is valuable to the Indian wards of the United States. Smaller land holdings, once achieved, will prove in any country an incentive to the sense of proprietorship that dwells at the root of thrift and national wealth. Moreover, the economic fitness, sufficient to justify peon land holding, will be developed, hand in hand with the increasing possibility of obtaining the land.

Two agricultural enterprises, now past the experimental stages, are noteworthy examples of the possibilities of the country. The Friends' Mission at Victoria, Tamaulipas, operates a dairy farm, having in view developing it into an agricultural school later. It would be practically impossible to train Mexican boys in this school as, their training complete, there would be no prospect for independent work. Small though his equipment would be, the cost of it would be entirely beyond the attainment of a peon youth, even if the land were obtainable. The trinity of insurmountable obstacles, facing such a youth—no land, no savings and no thrift, surely present a problem of vast magnitude and of no easy solution. In the meantime, this farm is serving its very useful purpose as an object lesson. In spite of

cattle raids, Mr. Gulley, a young Idaho Quaker, has gathered together a small herd of grade cows from which he supplies milk to the town. So superior is its quality that he cannot fill the demand for the "mission milk," and the old distinction between "leche con agua" and "agua con leche," which used to obtain in some sections of the country, has disappeared, and that too, upon a profitable basis. It would be hard to overstate the possibilities for good, inherent in such a farm, whether as an object lesson alone or later as a training school for the youth of a great state.

The second agricultural enterprise, typical of Mexico at her present best, was the vast sugar plantation of Foon Chuck, near Xicotencatl, Tamaulipas. It was an inspiration to see the manifest hum of industry evident in the cane fields and sugar mill of this enlightened and enlightening Chinese gentleman. To irrigation and a high sense of responsibility for his laborers, seems to be due, in an unusual degree, the air of solid accomplishment and satisfied contentment that marks his hacienda and particularly the village of "El Canton."

Foon Chuck is one of the most distinguished of Mexico's 28,000 Chinese. Beginning life in humble circumstances, he is an outstanding example of the possibilities in Mexico, open to thrift and industry. Like many of his countrymen he married a Mexican wife, and has acquired in the rearing of his large family, a veritable passion for the education of the Mexicans. In "El Canton" he has a school for the children of his 700 peons and, though not a professing Christian, is willing and anxious to have a Christian organization open up work on his hacienda.

To have experienced the hospitality of this remarkable little man and to learn from him the results (or rather the lack of them) of his efforts on behalf of his peons, was an instructive lesson in Mexican traits and foibles. Dressed in a soft shirt, a brown, broad-brimmed felt hat and knee boots drawn over tight khaki trousers, he was a "typical" enough planter to have starred for a movie film. Add to these the pleasant aroma of sugar about his person and you can picture the master of the mill, the home, and the hacienda.

Two of his experiments, long ante-dating the numerous "crises" between the United States and Mexico, are full of significance for the ultimate solution of their fundamental difficulties.

From his 8500 acres, Foon Chuck offered any of his peons an acre apiece, for their own cultivation, in beans and corn, as a side issue to their regular work on the hacienda. He also supplied seed and provided plowing and utensils for cultivation. All went well till the crop was harvested and then never a stroke of work did those peons do until the supply was exhausted.

Another experiment in this "welfare work" centered in a community store, at which Foon Chuck supplied goods to his peons at about two-thirds cost. Once again his altruistic efforts were baffled by the shiftlessness of his peons. The number of his employees greatly increased, the efficiency of the force greatly decreased and the business of the store prospered apace. In a short time he found he had twice as many men as before, each doing about half time work and all battening on the low prices at the community store.

It was at this time that Chuck decided upon education as the real and only solution of Mexico's ills, and, since most of his children are now Christians, he inclines of late to add Christianity as a determining factor in the issue.

I incline also to mention a third agricultural enterprise, as typical of the best of another kind of Mexican country life. Chuck's hacienda was started only thirty years ago, but another large hacienda, on the outskirts of Mexico City, dates far back into the last century with its low, rambling mansion house, fully equipped with all modern conveniences. It would be hard to overstate the delights of this cultured home, with a well watered patio, redolent with the fragrance of roses and honey suckle; its large grove of enormous eucalyptus trees, its gardens and shady walks and bowers. Moreover it is one of the most important of the city's milk supplies, with its 750 high grade Holstein cows and its score of bulls, many of both entitled to registry, if such a thing were known in Mexico.

Here also were the numerous peons, the very back bone of the whole enterprise, and yet few of *them* appeared in any way entitled to registration for any quality other than a sort of unquestioning and aimless fidelity to the manual tasks set for them and carried out by means of them, through the superior intelligence of an efficient Scotch-American manager. In our delightful visit to this ancient garden spot of Mexican culture, I felt unconsciously brought back into the heyday of a Virginia plantation, of the days, "before the war." Evidences of a luxury based upon an abundance of very cheap, and consequently inefficient labor, abounded. Tales of the childish dependence and shiftlessness, the gullibility, the simplicity, and withal, the loveableness of the peons and their families, were of direct kin to those known to us in the stories of Thomas Nelson Page, of the plantation negro.

One of these stories is worth recording. Our visit coincided with the day of Bonillas' triumphal entry into Mexico City, returning from Washington as the administration candidate for the presidency. Our hosts told us that seventy of their peons had asked and received leave of absence, the day before, to march in the parade, at one peso a head. Their sense of importance, in this national event, had been vastly increased by an appreciation in their value. The year before, they had only been "tostones"—at a toston, or half a peso a head; but this year, in Bonillas' ill-starred behalf, they had become "pesones." Imagine their delight and the consequent inconvenience on the hacienda, when the candidate's arrival was delayed a day and the loyal "pesones" were corralled like cattle, in the city, for delivery, en masse, the next day as a part of the vociferous, enthusiastic crowd, acclaiming the hero, who with his chief, was soon to be driven into exile by the next turn of the political wheel.

In all of these agricultural enterprises—the Quaker mission farm, the Chinaman's sugar plantation and the huge dairy farm of the Federal District, the management was solely in the hands of foreigners and the native Mexican was present only as a laborer of the lowest and least efficient

kind. There are great Mexican haciendas under native control, like those of the Osuna brothers, near Foon Chuck's, but it is safe to state that even on these the peons entirely lack that stimulus of possession, for which they are not and, without years of preparation, will not be ready. A few years ago they were little better than the yokels and knaves of old England, practically a part of and, upon transfer, passing with the land. Today the Mexican peon has in a real sense a far greater degree of freedom than he had before the recent series of revolutions. He has acquired the desire of and the ability to travel. If the campaigns of the past decade have done nothing else, they have stimulated and to a degree gratified this migrating instinct. The hacendados already complain of the greater independence of the laboring classes, not so much in the exorbitance of their wage demands as in the ease with which they can travel, family and all, on the top or floor of a box car, to another section in search of employment. Almost inevitably this migration is toward the North, and by thousands they have crossed the Rio Grande into the United States for work on the railroads and truck farms of Texas and the middle West.

Migratory or roving possibilities, coupled with the instability due to lack of land possession, are a large part of the unrest in Mexico today. The joy of ownership and the inspiration of possession, incident to the modest home or small farm must exist, at least as possibilities, in any nation that is to preserve its identity in the world of today. While therefore the agricultural situation in Mexico is far from the ideal, it does offer possibilities of development in the future. The millions of acres of arable land in Mexico that await only the magic presence of irrigation to break forth with some of the world's choicest products, are a vast promise of untold opportunity to the peon. Give him education in thrift, train him in agriculture and grant him fair means of obtaining his parcel of land with equitable access to the all important water supply and, in the course of years, the Mexican problem, like all others, will gradually rectify itself.

Of the industries of Mexico the casual visitor sees but little. The great breweries of the country have reaped rich prospects from prohibition in the United States. We heard of new plants being established by moving the entire plant from the states to one or another of the thriving northern cities of Mexico. Certainly the border towns did a thriving business in dispensing refreshment to the parched Americans who thronged them, particularly on Sundays. Allied to these are the pulque distilleries, as much of a social and political curse as were the whiskey distilleries in our older republic. The fermentation of the juice of the magaya, or century plant, into this pulque is on paper as strictly regulated as its sale. It is, however, as freely made for private consumption as for commercial use and any attempt to discourage it strikes at an important activity of innumerable people who collect the juice for market.

A still more important industry, though by no means on a factory basis, is the working of the hennequin fiber into ropes, bags, brushes and mats. The hennequin is also the source of practically all the binder twine in the United States, and its cultivation is one of the most important occupations in Mexico. The skill and deftness which many of the natives acquire in working upon the hennequin fiber is marvelous to those whose idea of industry is based upon the corrolated factory systems of a highly specialized community. The lack of machinery and the dependence upon simple hand looms and still simpler twisting devices places Mexico, in almost all parts, in the class of undeveloped nations, from the standpoint of specialized industry. The sole exceptions to this statement are the considerable wool weaving industry and the great mining and smelting operations—the former being largely of native enterprise.

The railroads of the country gave every appearance of improvement over what must have been the condition a short time ago. In the railroad yards of Monterrey was enough scrap and material to have assembled many badly needed locomotives. On the side lines the service was farcical, so far as any attempt at schedules was concerned. Engine 236 on the line from Matamoros to Monterrey was

a bye-word, we found, to those who frequented the road and the sophisticated would wait over a day rather than risk the imminent delay incident to its use. We experienced its vagaries and missed a night's sleep, due to some stoppage in the smoke flue which was remedied time after time, by the engineer ramming the poker down the smoke stack while the fireman worked at the difficulty in the roasting heat of the open boiler head.

Following the suit of the United States, the national government had taken over the railways and formed a national system. Rates of fare, though high, compared favorably per mile with those in the states, and in time consumed seemed much cheaper, an all day trip costing very little. Upon any train one can purchase a time table covering all the roads in the country, though one could never be certain of the schedule except when too late to meet it. On the line from Tampico to Monterrey we experienced a bad head-on collision, at 4 a.m., our train being long overdue and having gone ahead against its signal. The telescoping of two express cars and the enveloping of the two engines absorbed the shock so completely that all the passengers escaped injury and the engineers alone were hurt. As an aftermath to the nationalistic feeling resulting from the revolutions, the entire personnel of the railroads has been changed to Mexicans alone. The British, who used to predominate in the management of the roads have entirely disappeared from apparent operation, whether to the detriment of the service or otherwise, the casual observer cannot say. It was interesting to note, however, that the only trade union in evidence in Mexico City was the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers whose elaborate float was one of the conspicuous objects in the Bonillas parade.

For the main line of railroad from Laredo to Mexico City, a two days' journey, very few apologies are needed. Barring the slowness of the schedule, the service was as complete as on any first class road in the United States. The Pullman porters, both Mexican and negro, were courteous and efficient. There were no dining cars but meals

were served from buffet broilers in entirely satisfactory fashion.

All the traffic, however, was not in the first class compartments. Second class and in most cases, third class accommodations, were in more demand and here was most evident the travelling tendency, already mentioned. Box cars, fitted with rude seats, lengthwise, served for the vast majority of the travelling populace. The condition of these rough coaches after a day's occupation by crowded groups of both sexes and all ages, is more esthetically suggested than described. Food for these itinerants was most abundantly supplied at almost every station by swarms of slovenly women or decrepit old men whose Mexican delicacies were eagerly bought after hurried haggling over prices. These steaming concoctions seemed most unsavory to the gentler palates of the uninitiated and we went for long stretches with no other food than citrus fruits, hard boiled eggs or similar articles, obtainable in their original packages, beyond the need of adaptation by human endeavor.

Another inevitable accompaniment of these train loads, and practically the only apparent evidence of disturbed conditions, was the car load of soldiers. Sometimes in wooden box cars, again in specially constructed steel cars with elaborate loop holes for rifle fire, and always poorly accoutred and shabbily clothed, these details of a score or so of soldiers, gave evidence of the hand of the government in the protection of the traffic and the travelling public. Nor were they entirely for effect. In Sonora, where Villa held outlaw sway, a train was captured, the crew and guard killed and the passengers robbed, while we were in the country. Near Osorio, in Tamaulipas, just a day before we happened there, a small band of raiders had been beaten off by the guard without loss of life and the train had proceeded. Without knowledge of the affair, we went the next day, thirty miles back into the country from the railroad, in a dilapidated Ford car, with a half breed chauffeur and four other Mexicans, to visit Foon Chuck, as already related. Though our journey was necessarily at night and with no

other light than matches, on a tortuous road, full of bumps and ditches, we felt slight apprehension. Surely no metropolitan chauffeur could have handled a car more deftly than did that Mexican, and just as surely, no better chance ever offered to rob two unwary Americans. If the states produced any taxi-drivers as courteous as our half-breed, it would be a pleasing discovery to find them.

In currency, credits and banks, our sister republic finds her real weakness, which underlies and is at one and the same time the cause and effect of much of her business inefficiency. Near the border, United States currency is gladly circulated and is in fact more in evidence than the native. United States gold coins pass current throughout the country, as readily as the Mexican "azteca" a twenty peso piece, and the most beautiful coin I have ever seen. In central Mexico, the smaller United States coins are not accepted, and under the Carranza regime, the government issued "vales," paper money, of fifty centavos and one peso in value, and reputed to be upon an entire gold basis. Certain it is that they were very well received in the Federal District and, in sooth, change making without them was well nigh impossible. Frequently it was necessary to take postage stamps and street car tickets as change, due to the great scarcity of the small silver and copper coins.

In none but the largest towns were there any banks. Victoria, the capital of Tamaulipas and a city of 18,000 inhabitants had no banking facilities at all. In Monterrey there were several excellent banks, of modern and attractive appearance, equipped for English speaking business, and in general, most efficient in handling foreign credits. They appeared even more efficient than the greater banks in Mexico City. The latter were practically all branches of German or Canadian Banks, but business was not so pressing but that it could all be transacted in the three hours daily during which alone the institutions are open. Loans from these banks were restricted to the very smallest sums possible, checks were practically not used at all and the dealings of the large commercial houses were transacted almost entirely in actual exchange of gold.

Turning to the educational opportunities of the country, one is at a loss to describe the pitiable inadequacy of it all. To those of us whose heritage includes, indeed prescribes, educational possibilities beyond the ken of the Mexican youth, it is difficult to find a sufficiently accurate parallel to convey a correct impression. A school system there is, but it rarely leads beyond the sixth grade. The schools are usually held in the houses of typical Mexican architecture, built directly on the street, of thick walls to withstand the heat at mid-day, with few windows and little ventilation. The lack of school equipment is the most noticeable shortcoming. Most of the government schools have the antiquated desks, discarded in the states since the '80s. Paper and pencils are at a premium and in many of the schools slates were in evidence, with pencils carved from the limestone rocks near the village. In the city of Victoria, a large city school existed, better than anything we saw even in Mexico City. The Victoria school was of recent construction, with a large cinder paved patio which served as an athletic ground. The two great schools or preparatorios of Mexico City were distinctly creditable to the country, leading to a point about one year under graduation from our high schools. The University of Mexico covers about to the end of our second collegiate year and has suffered much from the revolution. Even at its best, it would not be considered of collegiate grade in the Eastern United States.

It is, however, in the primary and grade schools that one may judge most accurately of the life of the nation. Great areas of the country are entirely unschooled. No such institution as "the little red school house" exists and the inefficiency and inadequacy of the government schools are the more reflected by comparison with the mission schools, which in turn impress the visitor with a sinking feeling when one compares them with the schools in the United States. Suffice it to say that for the vast majority of Mexican children, school possibilities simply do not exist, and where they do exist, they are of so simple and elementary a character as to require years of consistent,

uninterrupted effort to bring them into anything like a real school system.

Local taxes and local government are in Mexico as in the states inextricably bound up with the school system. We were informed that subsidies from the federal government had been cut off from the local schools, they being thrown entirely upon the resources of the states, and that graft was so rampant in the state government that many of the government schools were being closed. The one bright feature of Mexican education is the presence and idealism of a large body of educators, mostly men, but including a few women, trained in the colleges of the United States, and earnestly endeavoring to keep themselves free from partisan politics. In the hands of these and the foreign missionaries rests the future of Mexican education, and that future is brighter than the present material situation would indicate.

I have outlined these features of Mexican life, fragmentary though our observation of them necessarily was, simply to indicate how pitiful is the situation of Mexico today. It is a situation which the United States, by reason of the admitted special interests of many of her business men, particularly of her oil companies, neither can nor ought to work out alone. It is one of an essentially international character in which the stable republics of South America must, of necessity, be called upon to aid us. A policy of military intervention, with all the suffering it would entail upon both sides of the Rio Grande, would be absolute folly. A policy of international penetration for the right definition and enforcement of the international obligations which the Mexican government has in all too many instances openly flouted, is the only one that can possibly lead to a definite solution of the problem. Together with this, must be assumed an attitude of ignoring in Mexico, as we do in other countries, cases of individual outrages and murder with which the Mexican government itself not only has nothing to do, but which are directly in contravention of its policy and efforts. American citizens should remember that the American public never heard of Mexican outrages until comparatively recent times, although they existed in

the past in greater number than they have recently. It has been the increasing importance of American investments in Mexico in the past two decades that have brought her laxity in law enforcement pointedly before the American public. Even now one can truthfully state that the situation is no worse than it was on our own frontier in California and Alaska, in the days of the gold rushes, and also that the murders and outrages in Mexico since 1910 have not equaled in number the accidental deaths in the coal mines of the eastern United States, where unimportant and unknown miners died unheard of and unheeded by the same American public that responds so sensitively to Mexican outrages.

The Mexican problem is one that will not be solved in a decade nor in a generation. Its solution lies in a process far more fundamental and far more tedious than anything that has yet come to the surface in the recommendations and findings of the Fall Committee. It is one that must emanate from the hearts and brains of the peoples of two Americas, rather than through the might and force of our nation or of any other. It involves fundamental reform and elementary education in Mexico. It involves a vast unselfish and somewhat costly educational process either by the United States government or by the Christian churches in the United States. I have no doubt whatever that Mexico could be subjugated by force of arms, but I rather entertain the vision of a vast host of the youth of America called to a higher standard than that of our war eagles, a standard of a peaceful mission to our neighbor in the south, a mission similar to that which, during my own college days, the youth were called upon to assume in the education of the Filipinos. We found difficulty in subjugating the natives of those Islands and after conquering them were forced to justify this by educating them. If there is one thing of which my observation in Mexico convinced me, it is that the education and development of Mexico is possible without a preliminary armed conquest and that the idealism of the young manhood and womanhood of America simply awaits the proper call from our government or our churches to fulfill the possibilities of which it is inherent.

MEXICO AND THE PRESENT REVOLUTION

By John Vavasour Noel, President of the Noel News Service

In discussing the frequent revolutionary movements in Hispanic America it is incumbent upon us, before passing judgment on them, to consider the history of their peoples and their racial and social components.

The Spanish settlement of a great portion of the New Hemisphere was truly a conquest, and as such it is generally known; differing essentially as to its purposes and character from the establishment of civilization in our own country. In one case gold was the objective, in the other religious freedom and liberty were the chief impulses. While it is true that we warred with the Indians and drove them from their lands we did not enslave millions of meek and submissive natives, nor cause their extermination under inhuman treatment on lands or in mines, nor utilizing them as tools to secure wealth for ourselves or for greedy monarchs at home.

Spanish civilization, as implanted in this hemisphere, was not without its virtues and has its defenders because of the civilizing influence of some of the religious orders of the Catholic Church. One cannot however escape the fundamental truth that, in the name of the king and under the cloak of religion, territories were dominated by force, their peoples enslaved and their lands and wealth taken from them. With it there was no idealistic thought, no message of a new world to be founded.

I emphasize these well-known facts in order that you may realize that force and autocracy dominated in Hispanic America from the moment daring and unscrupulous soldiers of fortune planted the flag of Castilla and Leon on discovered land.

Then came the adventurers of Spain, later the viceroys and numerous officials and with them traders and others.

Their aim was to exploit the natives, and thus a dominating caste composed of whites and half breeds was in control, the latter chiefly caused by Spain's unwillingness to allow the women to join their men in the new world. Under royal grants and by other means vast estates were founded, principalities in fact, owned by one family, constituting in time with others the oligarchies which even today exist in many of the republics of Hispanic America.

In the course of years self dependence developed in those lands. The French revolution and our own, as well as the tendency of the times, were causes that led them to revolt from the mother country. But changed political conditions meant to the masses of Indians only a change of masters, who fought among themselves for power, which meant the presidency of the republic.

There was no political education possible under such circumstances and no evolution as in other lands, which have all had their bloody struggles before public opinion was sufficiently enlightened to use the present day means of the ballot, often with chicanery and gold as the corrupting influences, instead of bullets.

The fair-minded individual will admit that the series of constant revolts all over Hispanic America were thus inevitable. Force was the only possible weapon. Some of the republics however have today progressed sufficiently to seek recourse in arms only as a last resort where some great principle is involved.

Mexico, concerning which I desire to make a plea for a more generous understanding of its problems, as history tells us, did not escape the common fate which I have described. I can find no better words than those of General Salvador Alvarado, one of the leaders of the present movement, and who is likely to be known in the future as its historian, who in a recent statement addressed to the American people said:

In the first place one should take into consideration the composition of our society when we gained our independence in 1821. It consisted of seven millions and a half of pure Indians and of mixed blood, belonging to the lower class, together with half a

million Spaniards and half-breeds, constituting the dominant class. This half million was made up of land and mine owners, merchants, clergymen, military men, lawyers and politicians. This class was conservative, obstructive and the enemy of all progress. The progressive elements of the country had not been able to freely develop their tendencies, and progress had to be made by constant struggles and clashes. With such a disproportionate social composition, the gradual social evolution was not possible with harmony among the different classes and their tendencies, because since their birth they brought as an original vice a great lack of equilibrium. That was the reason for the continuous wars of our early life; wars culminating in our War of Reform, 1855 to 1860. These retarding elements having been vanquished, resorted to intrigues abroad, to bring about French intervention in 1862, which ended in 1867 with the withdrawal of the French troops and Maximilian's execution.

After a few years came Diaz, courageous, cunning and daring. He won on a no reëlection platform and then perpetuated himself in power for thirty years. He governed as an autocrat, gave material progress to the privileged caste and to a small middle class. His record shows no great constructive work for the masses.

He encouraged arts and letters and sought the help of foreign capital, surrounding himself with able men, natives and foreigners, but he brooked no rivals and put down with an iron hand any opposition to his will or any attempt at individual expression.

A social conscience, as we understand it, was hardly to be expected of him, but I freely give him credit for having acted according to the best tenets of his times. It was my privilege to meet him and talk with him about his people and the problems of the day. He believed in paternalism and he thought that education and work for the masses would solve all problems. He sat on the lid of all political and social evolution, and in his later years, was surrounded by a group of self-seekers who, in alliance with foreign capitalists, sought to benefit personally by Mexico's great natural wealth.

Then came the storm. Powerful social forces long held in check, blew up the lid. Chaos has reigned for ten years, a long period indeed in a sense, but a brief one in the development of a nation. Madero came and for a time con-

quered, suffering a martyr's death. His principles live today and his disciples are continuing his pioneer work.

Carranza and Villa followed him and both have contributed toward Mexico's social progress. They have made fatal mistakes which led to the death of the first and the probable elimination of the second.

Carranza's contribution toward Mexico's regeneration cannot be ignored and time only will give it proper value. He loved his people and was devotedly followed by the younger and more progressive Mexicans of all classes until he failed to carry out the fundamental aims of the revolution; established a one-man government and allowed himself to be surrounded, as Diaz did, by a designing clique, which, with his dogmatism, his exaggerated nationalism and his efforts to have a civilian elected as his successor, were the causes of his downfall. He was the strong man needed to coördinate the forces of the revolution after Madero's death. His dominant will, his stubborn courage and patience were required in those days. He succeeded and I believe his countrymen will accord him a place in their hearts and remember his deeds more than his mistakes. He led his people from one mile-stone of progress to another and lost his life because of the very qualities which to them were useful during the days he led to victory.

Villa is a complex character. He has also contributed his share toward the regeneration of his country and toward social progress when he fought for the great principles of the revolution, before his break with Carranza and his acts of banditry. The real story of his part in Mexican affairs has not been told. I am inclined to doubt many of the tales about him and I know that, misguided as his methods are, there is a real love for his people in his heart. His hand is against society because of the oppressions and cruelties practised by the privileged caste toward him and his fellows.

The present successful revolutionary movement in Mexico had its origin in the realization, a conclusion reached with regret, by a great number of the followers of Carranza that he had, as they put it, betrayed the revolution.

They felt that their struggles and sacrifices and the thousands of lives lost, had brought so far a change in men and not in methods; that the same centralized autocratic power existed as in the time of Diaz and that no real effort was being made to improve the condition of the masses. Their belief that Carranza intended to perpetuate himself in power by having a dummy candidate elected was the cause for immediate action.

The responsibility lies with a group of men chiefly from Sonora, a virile state, led by Obregon.

He and other loyal supporters of the basic principles of the Madero revolt, and later followers of Carranza, held a number of meetings and on April 23, 1920, subscribed to a document known as the Agua Prieta Plan.

This now historic proclamation is a declaration of principles and outlines "an organic plan for democracy, law and order." Its preamble contains a declaration to the effect that the sovereignty resides in the people and charges Carranza with its violation; that having exhausted all peaceful means to convince the chief executive of his errors, he is charged with treason to the fundamental aims of the Constitutional revolution. In consequence it is time for the people of Mexico to assume its sovereignty.

The organic plan demands the relinquishment of power by Carranza, repudiates certain public officials, sustains others and provides that Adolfo De la Huerta, the governor of Sonora, shall be supreme commander and that a provisional presidency shall be established until elections may be held. It also adopts the constitution of February 5, 1917, as the fundamental law of the Republic.

This plan was made public when Carranza forces threatened Sonora, and met with immediate and, with a few exceptions, a general response among all those who had fought with Carranza for the great principles now again declared in the Agua Prieta plan. A bloodless and victorious revolution, unquestionably supported by public opinion, took place within a month.

What the future will bring forth is difficult of prophesy. Judging however from immediate results and with a knowl-

edge of the leaders of the movement, friends of Mexico ask for a fair deal, for a reasonable understanding, and for patience.

To again quote Alvarado:

We, Mexicans of today, through our progressive young men, do not ask more of the world than a little patience and a little faith in our ability to solve our problems and arrange our affairs. We can thus speak, because we are sure of the great political progress we have made in these nine years of struggle, and we feel doubly sure of it, on account of the powerful and irresistible current of opinion existing in Mexico today for peace, opportunity and reconstruction. We do not deceive ourselves, as every observer that goes to Mexico will note on every side eagerness for tranquillity and peace, and a strong and well-defined social conscience which demands a rapid reorganization of our public life.

Have faith in our sincerity and in our latent power and you will not regret it.

The searchlight of public inquiry is now directed on the men responsible for this revolutionary movement.

Among them Obregon stands as the central figure and after him De la Huerta, Alvarado, Calles, Benjamin Hill and a host of other progressive Mexicans.

I am convinced from my personal acquaintance with them and because of some knowledge of the character of the Hispanic Americans, gained by years of residence among them, of the sincerity and the necessary qualities of leadership of Obregon, De la Huerta and Alvarado. They are remarkably of the same mind in their intense purpose to regenerate their people. Whatever extreme or so-called radical views some of them may have had, the possession of power and responsibility will broaden their viewpoint. They will come in contact with many forces and will undoubtedly be content to labor slowly but consistently in their avowed purposes of social regeneration.

Obregon makes the more spectacular appeal on account of his brilliant military record. His courage, independence and versatility, and his ability to organize the present movement are desirable qualities for an administrator. Lovers of Mexico hope that he will surround himself with able and honest men, irrespective of party, and adopt a conciliatory

policy toward all those who desire to help in the work of reconstruction.

De la Huerta, whom I knew quite well when he was consul general in New York, is one of the most capable and modest men I have ever met. Essentially democratic, he dislikes all pomp and show and goes to the root of all issues, without preamble. He is one of the few men who have been able to befriend the Yaqui Indians, among whom he is an honorary chief. As governor of Sonora, serving two terms, his was a remarkable record of constructive achievement. As provisional president he will govern with moderation. After the elections for a new chief executive I know that his influence will be always for the under dog, the Mexican peon.

Alvarado became an international figure some years ago when he successfully executed a series of notable reforms as governor of Yucatan. All the forces of reaction and privilege, not only in his state but in this country, were aligned against him because he collected just taxes, improved the conditions of the peon and by a coöperative commission regulated the price of sisal hemp and brought prosperity to the land by distributing its wealth more equitably. As one of the great leaders of the new movement and its spokesman in this country he has a brilliant career before him in the service of Mexico.

Alvarado visited this country last February when it was my good fortune to meet him. I have a high regard for his dynamic personality, his sterling qualities and his absolute honesty. After handling millions in Yucatan, when Carranza, out of jealousy removed him, he had not enough money to pay his hotel bill on his return to Mexico City. During his temporary eclipse from public life he wrote a remarkable work entitled *The Reconstruction of Mexico*, which is soon to be translated into English and which I commend to students of the social and economic problems of that country.

So much for the past. We now face the future. The question before us is: Will Mexico continue to be the battle ground of conflicting military groups or are the new and progressive forces strong enough to suppress them?

Experience shows us that in social changes two factors are essential to stabilize and bring to fruition such upheavals. One is force used to hold in check conspiracy and the second is the support of public opinion. In the case of Mexico the leaders are men of action and determination. Obregon, their leader, is unquestionably Mexico's greatest military genius and the idol of the soldiers. As to the second requisite the astonishing success of the present revolutionary movement would seem to indicate that public opinion did support it; there is ample evidence of a great longing for peace and the reestablishment of normal conditions among all classes.

We can help our southern brothers by adopting a sympathetic attitude and refuse to be influenced by sensational news wired by newspapermen who make their living by inventing thrillers, or maliciously circulated by those who are interested in keeping alive distrust of Mexico in order to benefit materially. We must not let those who would possess the oil or any other source of Mexico's wealth force our government to adopt coercive methods toward a weaker nation.

The new group has declared its intention to give a liberal interpretation to article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 dealing with the vexing oil problem; to welcome foreign capital under equitable conditions and give it fair treatment and to gradually repay all foreign loans.

Is our attitude toward Mexico to be determined by covetousness and greed, thus placing us before the Hispanic American world in the light in which some of their Yankee-phobe demagogues portray us or shall we extend the hand of fellowship to a struggling nation and show the world that we have ideals beyond material things?

I prophesy success for this splendid effort on the part of the younger and more progressive element of Mexico, but I foresee that they will need the courageous help of all liberal forces in this country. Unless the new government can with dignity reach a fair settlement of the oil problem and meet the demands of other money interests a campaign of vilification and slander may take place at any moment.

Then we must act promptly and use all means at our command to prevent the crime of intervention. There may not always be a Wilson to prevent it.

Have we not sufficient evidence of the futility of intervention by force of arms in the internal affairs of other nations? Has not the Great War taught us something in that respect? Force, though necessary and unavoidable at times, brings its own reaction. If we attempt to dictate to Mexico concerning its laws, to take sides in its internal quarrels in order to gain material advantages, we shall only strengthen their nationalism and lose not only their good will but that of Hispanic America.

Let us be patient, tolerant and helpful. Our material and moral rewards will be immeasurably greater.

GREETINGS TO THE WORLD FROM THE NEW
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY IN
MEXICO¹

*By Senor Manuel de la Pena, Commerical Agent in New
York of the Liberal Constitutional Government of Mexico*

I have been kindly invited by Clark University to speak the thoughts of my fellow citizens, of the Liberal Constitutionalist Government which I have the honor to represent as Commercial Agent in New York, before this audience of intellectual men and women.

Were I speaking to an ordinary audience I would begin by recounting something of Mexican history; I would tell you something of the Aztec Indians and the Spanish conquerors; I would place before your imagination the wonderful landscapes of the Mexican mountain and plateau so as to set a background for my address. Such an exordium is not necessary; you are all well acquainted with those details. You know also the Mexican psychology; you know that we are not fundamentally different from other peoples; that we have virtues and defects, that we have in Mexicogood men and bad men, just as in any other country. You do not belong to that class of men who, when they read that a crime has been committed beyond the Rio Grande, at once brand as criminal the whole nation. You understand, because you have studied history, that the mere existence of a bad government does not mean that the people afflicted by that misfortune is a bad people; you know that sooner or later that people will react and will overthrow such obstacles as may stand in its way. You all know that such misfortunes as occasional bad government are apt to

¹An address delivered at the Clark University Conference on Mexico and the Caribbean, May 21, 1920.

exist anywhere; yet we all know and believe that in the end, whatever be the immediate trend of events, justice and righteousness will prevail.

Mexico is evolving from an epoch of darkness. Experience has opened the eyes of the people; sufferings and hardships have shown us the straight road toward progress; and if we have overthrown an objectionable régime, it is because we knew that it was moving in the wrong direction; that it had stepped aside from the path of justice and the right interpretation of the national ideals.

Long ago, when the Spanish "encomenderos," who were some of them practically slave drivers, herded the poor Aztec Indians, beating them in order to derive from their sufferings as much profit as possible, regardless of their anguish and fatigue, those unfortunate Indians had but two words to answer, two words in their wonderful language, full of bitterness and dignity: "Ni tlaca," which means, "We are also human."

Mexico has for a long time been made the target for many malicious blows. The faults of its presidents and the crimes of its outlaws have been regarded as characteristic of every Mexican; Mexico has been for a long time at bay; yet we believe that Mexicans are entitled to a fair trial, that we are entitled to be judged impartially and justly by those who know us: we are also human.

You Americans in the United States ask yourselves why it is that the elections being so near, scheduled to take place this coming month of July, we Mexicans could not wait for them in order to settle our differences through the ballot. But I would ask you what you would do, if one of your presidents showed that he was planning to manipulate the elections in favor of a candidate of his own choice, quite unknown to the people, because that candidate had offered to become a blind tool in his hands; if this man in order to carry out that plan intended to send troops into some of the states and even to overthrow the legal governor of one of them; if he were to use all the power which the people had vested in him, and the funds belonging to the

nation, in order to support his unpopular candidate, and at the same time set every sort of obstacle in the way of the other candidates; if you saw your country provoking the enmity of all other countries without accomplishing anything for the welfare of your own people; and if you understood that the coming election was to be merely a farce through which such a dishonest régime would perpetuate itself in power. Facing this situation, if you knew that you could not resort to the ballot, would you not then resort to bullets?

Unfortunately, that was the situation in Mexico.

Now you might ask: "How are we to know that this new government will afford adequate guarantees and justice? All revolutions have started with wonderful promises which were never fulfilled." To a certain extent that is true; but the present case is different. This popular movement which in so short a time has come to control the whole country, has been started, has gone on, and has won its goal without having offered any glowing promises; still it has fulfilled practically every hope. Even during the period of fighting life and property has been respected, no trespasses committed, no injuries inflicted upon anyone, no revenge satisfied. All have been afforded adequate guarantees, foreigners as well as nationals. It is not a logical consequence that such a movement deserves confidence? Is it not merely common sense to believe in results after they have been accomplished?

The American people have greeted with hope and sympathy a new Mexico. We have seen the favorable impression which the fall of the Carranza régime has caused; this sympathy is due to the fact that it was chiefly the Carranza régime as was well known, which has made impossible a real and true friendship between our two countries. Both the American and the Mexican peoples wish to become friends, to work in coöperation; but this result has been prevented by lack of mutual understanding; you, as well as we, have nearly always intrusted the task of settling our differences to men who knew little, if anything, of the

other country. I hope that in the future this will be otherwise, because I am perfectly confident that if Mexicans who know you, and Americans who know us, were allowed to arrange those so-called conflicts, they simply could not exist. There are no conflicts between both peoples. They have been many conflicts between men, Americans and Mexicans, whose duty it was to have avoided them.

We young men of Mexico, as well as all those who know the United States, have realized that, unless foreign capital and immigration be encouraged to go into our country and develop its natural resources, those resources will be lost to the world. Those who are willing to come to us, bringing with them the necessary capital to help themselves by helping us to develop our lands, our mines and our other natural resources, will not go into and settle in a country in which they are not properly protected by the laws. We know how the United States has been developed by foreign capital and immigration, because foreign investors and settlers found a country which received them with open arms and with just laws. We realize that our country has immense treasures which are waiting for the hands that are to make them useful to mankind; we realize that we need aid from outside, from the whole world, since no country has ever advanced by its own power when inclosed within an impassable wall, the existence of which the world has a right to forbid.

Therefore, the laws that we intend to uphold will protect foreign capital and immigration, so far as this may be done in accordance with the eternal principles of justice and equity.

We young men of Mexico who have had the benefit of observing the consequences that past mistakes have brought to our people, intend, in order to accomplish a truly patriotic work, to give especial attention to the education of the Indians who form the greatest part of the present population of Mexico. So far the governments of Mexico have forgotten the Indians, some of whom, to be sure, have risen from their former status, and made a name for themselves,

but the great majority of whom are still in much the same condition as their ancestors, prevented from amounting to anything because of their continuing ignorance.

Indians have been accused of being a turbulent race; they are not so. They are peaceful, but they are easily misled by anyone who offers to better their sad condition. Now we mean to better it, and to do it not by giving them arms, but by giving them schools and books.

The Liberal Constitutionalist government comes to you with open arms. All the leaders of the revolution have spoken to the American people asking their friendship and cooperation which we know you are willing to give. General Obregón, prominent among those leaders, has said:

My ideal for the relations between Mexico and the United States is to make the international border like the Canadian boundary, withdrawing troops, except customs officials.

Carranza's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was a mistake, although I believe Carranza was perfectly sincere in the belief that his policy was best for Mexico.

Further, I will quote a message from Mr. Adolfo de la Huerta, Provisional President of the new government, which was dated the thirteenth of May:

I beg to ask you to inform the government of the United States of America that we have given complete guarantees to natives and foreigners not only in this state, but by all civil and military authorities therein. The present government of Mexico will also maintain the firm purpose of following the same line of conduct by giving necessary and ample guarantees to the foreign capital that may be invested in this Republic in conformity with our laws.

Our government is also well disposed to develop relations with the United States, in conformity with the rules of international law and with the standards of absolute justice, equity and good faith.

We mean to banish hatred, that obstacle which stands in the way of mankind; we intend to create love and friendship through mutual understanding; we wish you to go to Mexico, to know us, to become acquainted with the real Mexican people. We also wish all Mexicans to go back to their country. We have eliminated the word "exiles;"

they are no longer exiled from Mexico. We have even banished the word "amnesty" because it means pardon. During our long and bitter struggle for freedom and democracy, some Mexicans have been mistaken, some misled; they were honest and sincere in their opinion; they need no pardon; they are guilty of no offense; Mexico is their country, and the doors are open to them. We wish the coöperation of every honest man.

The question has been raised whether the new Government will uphold the Constitution of 1917 or that of 1857. What I can assure you and the world is that Mexico will maintain laws which will satisfy and protect every legal right, every legitimate enterprise, laws which will encourage foreign capital to go into Mexico and to help us to develop our natural resources, laws against which no objection can be justly taken.

General Alvarado, now Minister of Finance, alluding to the thoughts of the new Government said:

We know that we have to guarantee the lives and properties of nationals and foreigners. We know that we have to pay our debts as gentlemen. We know that the difficulties of Mexico affect many parts of the world.

And because we are conscious of our situation and of our responsibilities, we wish to make gigantic efforts to comply with our duties, not to be run over as a hindrance, not to be regarded as a troublesome neighbor, but as a useful and excellent friend always ready to coöperate in every effort to advance civilization.

We Mexicans of today, through our progressive young men, do not ask more of the world than a little patience and a little faith in our ability to solve and arrange our affairs.

Have faith in our sincerity and in our latent forces, and you will not repent.

You have heard the words of those who are leading this movement, words which unquestionably inspire confidence; you have seen how national protest has eradicated a régime which failed to interpret the real will of a people anxious for peace and order; you have observed their conduct. We have indeed gained favor in the eyes of the world, to which, in the name of the new government of Mexico, and through the kindness of this most distinguished audience, I offer our very sincere greetings.

HOW TO RESTORE PEACE IN MEXICO

By Honorable Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, 1909-1913

Not even the most ardent supporters of the President are bold enough to attempt a defense of the humiliating and injurious policy which the administration has pursued toward Mexico during the last seven years; the Democratic National Convention of 1916 adjourned without having uttered a single sentence in its defense; such administration press as exists is apologetic, evasive and misleading. A policy which had its birth under radiant skies and with the patient though uncomprehending approval of public opinion now has none so poor as to do it reverence. From the Lind mission, with its harlequinic follies, to the tragedies of Vera Cruz and Tampico; from these unhappy incidents to widespread anarchy and chaos illuminated by the passage across the stage of seven bandit presidents shot in and shot out of power, the plundering of cities, the rape of women, the unrequited murder of hundreds of Americans and the exile of thousands, the farcical recognition of the buffoon military autocrat Carranza and the ghastly spectacles of San Ysabel, Columbus and Carrizal, there is not one ray of light to relieve the picture. The adventurous philandering and mischievous intermeddling of the Wilson administration, which by its policy made these things possible, has been witnessed with mixed feelings of sorrow and amusement by an American public accustomed to dignity, courage and moderation in the management of the foreign relations of this country; and Europe, though very busy just now, has looked on with wondering and speculative eyes.

Whether the President was misled by false or by ignorant agents or whether his breaking away from the century old traditions and practices of this government sprung from the funeral baked meats of a previous pedagogical environment,

it is quite evident from his amazing utterances from time to time that he has learned nothing by experience and that as we began so we shall continue. So far as this administration therefore is concerned the discussion of the establishment of any basis for the procurement of an enduring peace in Mexico is purely academic. We must wait for sounder statesmanship and stronger arms.

No clear discussion of the question of enduring peace in Mexico can proceed without a recital, however brief, of relative historical antecedents. Let us recall then the circumstance that Porfirio Diaz was the last of sixty-three Mexican presidents, all of whom attained power by revolutionary methods and were expelled by violence, and that since the time of Diaz seven chief executives have presided over the destinies of this unhappy country. Manifestly therefore anarchic and extreme revolutionary conditions prevail in the country and will persist indefinitely until true remedies are adopted.

These conditions can be cured by the application of two methods only: (1) By autocratic restraint; (2) by evolution.

The method of autocratic restraint was tried by Diaz for thirty-five years and succeeded largely because Diaz was not only an autocrat but also a wise and just ruler, a sincere patriot and an honest man. Diaz developed the material side of Mexico in a most marvelous way. He covered her soil with a network of railways; developed her mining, her agricultural and her manufacturing resources and with his army and rural police made life as safe upon a Mexican highway as upon one of the public thoroughfares of the state of Massachusetts. But he never found or awakened the soul of Mexico. Believing, as I know he did, that the moral and intellectual development of Mexico would follow her physical evolution, he founded a peculiar civilization and a new system of governmental control. Over a foundation of Aztec barbarism, ignorance and superstition he spread a thin veneer of Aryan supremacy. Working under this system the government was severe but just. It was not a democracy; it was not politically free, but no man, who obeyed the law, suffered either in life or goods.

But Diaz passed and then came Madero, a well intentioned man, of small capacity and hampered with an impossible program. Entering into power as the apostle of many flamboyant and subversive theories, he was driven by the stern necessities of the dangerous position which he occupied into the maintenance of a form of government precisely the same as that maintained by Diaz. He hacked away at the Aryan veneer but it resisted and persisted; he threw into confusion and disorder the system created by Diaz but gave the Mexican people nothing in place of it; he vacillated between extremists and reactionists and finally lost the support of all elements of society.

That a man of the Huerta type would succeed Madero was inevitable to those who know the Mexican psychology. Having had weakness the country wanted strength; in place of vacillation it wanted firmness. Therefore though Huerta came into power as the result of the violent overthrow of Madero he was received willingly if not enthusiastically by the Mexican people. Huerta was a man of strong passions, great courage and patriotism; his ambition was to restore the system of Diaz but he lacked the genius and constructive industry of Diaz. Lacking these qualities he fell a victim to conspiracies and was driven from power by the armies and fleets of the Government of the United States, leaving behind him chaotic conditions which endure to this hour.

None of these three governments tried the experiment of evolution (number two); that is to say, firm government accompanied by gradual extension of power to the people as they become more fitted for its exercise by education and by training in the principles of true democracy. Parenthetically it may be said that Mexico can never be *revolutionized* into the practice of constitutional and democratic methods. Eighty per cent of the population can neither read nor write and are as ignorant of the fundamental principles of true democracy or of constitutional methods as a Zulu or a Hottentot. Let us carry away from this part of the discussion therefore the *idée fixe*, that in any scheme for the restoration of peaceful conditions in Mexico the plan of *Evolution* must be included.

We come now to the consideration of constructive methods for restoration of peaceful conditions in Mexico. It must be borne in mind that any plan, originating with this government, for the restoration of peaceful conditions in Mexico will be, in a large measure, repugnant to the Mexican people. But it must be also remembered that the phrase "Mexican people" is merely a figure of speech; as a nation Mexico passed away with Diaz. What we have is a sick patient requiring a drastic surgical operation; the knife should be applied without consideration of the patient's wishes.

There seem~~s~~ to me to be three practical methods of procuring peace in Mexico. None of these methods have been considered by the present administration, a circumstance however, which ought not to weigh heavily against them. They are:

1. *Active and sympathetic support of the real governing elements in Mexico.* By the phrase "Real governing elements in Mexico" I mean the white race or those elements of the population in sympathy with the white race. Of Mexico's fourteen million population probably three million would fall under this description. Upon this element of the population a great responsibility has always rested; from it comes the great army of proprietors and farmers, the occupants of official executive and administrative positions, the bar, the bench, the military rank and to a very large extent the shop keepers of Mexico. This element of the Mexican population has been driven into exile by the barbarities and tyrannies of Carranza and Villa and their followers; with it has gone all precedent, tradition and practice. Most of these people are friendly to real constitutional government and in their ranks only are found those who understand the value of system, organization and science in government. By one road or another, sooner or later, they will come into control again in Mexico. Manifestly to those who know Mexico, it would be the part of wisdom to recognize the position of this element of the population, to weld it into an organized force, to support it with sympathy and direct espousal and having, in amends

for our misdeeds of the past, aided in the installation of a responsible government we should seal the birth of real democracy by provisions in a revised Mexican constitution which would lead to gradual enlightenment of the masses, improvement in the conditions of the laboring classes, a more equitable distribution of lands, an unbiased functioning of the courts of justice, and religious freedom. A political party armed with a program like this, energetically supported by this government, would quickly gain the ascendancy and with the good will and sympathy of the world might address itself to the task of restoring order, peace and reform with hope and confidence.

2. *The creation, organization and recognition of a new independent republic to extend from the Rio Grande to the twenty-second parallel.* This would include all of the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas and the territory of Lower California, an area more than thrice that of Texas and richer in resources. The creation of such an independent republic would have the following advantages.

(a) It would include a vast area of fertile agricultural and mining lands and under the direction and protection of this government and with liberal laws governing immigration and citizenship would ultimately develop into a prosperous and self sustaining nation maintaining order and democratic institutions.

(b) It would operate as a "buffer" state between this country and its parent country.

(c) It would afford self government to a part of Mexico which the central government at Mexico City has never been able to successfully control and which has been the breeding place of all recent Mexican revolutionary movements.

(d) It would leave remaining to Mexico the territory which is the center of her wealth and population and over which she might reasonably be expected to exercise successful control.

I do not advocate this plan as a desirable one from every standpoint. I would prefer to see a united and peaceful

Mexico within her present limits without an acre subtracted from her territories or a single citizen lost. I am nevertheless confident that the creation of such a buffer state would ultimately produce peace and order in both the old and new republic.

3. *Armed intervention.* Except to protect the lives and property of American citizens and for the punishment of those who unlawfully destroy either, I have always been opposed to intervention, armed or otherwise, in the affairs of Mexico. I have believed that while intervention might be an excellent thing for Mexico and her people its resultant effect upon our own body politic would be evil and disastrous. Political adventures undertaken in the name of civilization too often culminate in hypocritical cant about "pulling down the flag," "our manifest destiny" and the "pressure of population."

Nevertheless, there were in Mexico four years ago seventy-five thousand industrious, law abiding American citizens; pioneers of our commerce, of our traditions and customs, who had made homes there and were developing the riches and resources of the country. These peaceable people have been despoiled of their goods and chattels, have been expelled from the country and many hundreds of them have been foully and brutally murdered.

The President asked once in a speech in New York "what glory can be got out of a war with Mexico." It may be answered that we can get none, but we can discharge a sacred *duty* to those Americans, who under the administration of Cleveland, Roosevelt and Taft had not to seek the protection of the British flag but rather found Britons seeking and receiving the protection of the American flag. How can a peaceable and orderly republic such as ours quietly endure for an indefinite period disorderly and chaotic conditions within sight of our own border? If we have not a duty to fulfill to civilization we have one to fulfill to ourselves in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in this continent; unless we undertake this job of house cleaning we may later have to witness the task being done by a strong and powerful hand from across the sea. Though I

have not advocated intervention by this government in Mexican affairs, except in discharge of duty to our nationals, I have always believed it to be inevitable since the overthrow of Huerta by the present Wilson administration. On the occasion of my retirement from the position of ambassador to Mexico I made the subjoined recommendations to the President.

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MEXICO SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR WILSON TO THE PRESIDENT IN AUGUST, 1913, AND AFTERWARDS TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE SENATE

Recognition

Recognition under the present circumstances cannot be made with the same effects and the same results as immediately after the assumption of power by the new administration. It would be misconstrued, now, as a yielding to pressure and force, and would result in the loss of great prestige.

If recognition is accorded it should be done in the following way:

First: By a preamble, recognizing the remarkable and unprecedented situation in Mexico, the desire of the United States to contribute to the restoration of order in a neighboring and friendly state, and the necessity, on account of the important matters daily pending between the two governments, to establish full official relations with all the benefits and obligations resulting therefrom.

Second: No recognition should be accorded unless the important international questions, like the Chamazal, the Colorado River and the specific claims falling under a clear rule of international law, shall be immediately closed upon the basis presented by the government of the United States and agreed to by the government of Mexico in correspondence with the ambassador and verbally.

Third: Recognition should not be accorded unless an international claims commission, having jurisdiction over all kinds and classes of claims arising out of the revolutionary movements during the last three years shall be admitted in principle by the Mexican government.

Fourth: Recognition should not be accorded unless ample guarantees for the holding of a constitutional presidential election, during the month of October shall be given; and this would involve the removal of the present Minister of Gobernacion, who is a pure creature of Huerta, and the substitution therefore, of a Mexican of force and power—say Calero—who is thoroughly committed to the principle of constitutional government.

Fifth: Recognition should not be accorded unless the federal government is able to furnish evidence of its ability to restore peace and order to the 22nd parallel.

Sixth: Recognition should not be accorded unless an arrangement can be made by which the American Government, in cooperation with the Mexican Government, will be permitted to cross the border and aid the federal authorities in restoration of order down to the 22nd parallel, always giving ample stipulations for the retirement of our troops, whenever order and peace have been established, in the judgment of the United States and Mexican commissioners duly appointed.

Recognition accorded in this manner will restore our lost prestige, impress foreign and native opinion in Mexico and undoubtedly restore peace and prevent further bloodshed.

Intervention

If recognition is not accorded in some form or other, our duties as a civilized nation, pledged to the world to preserve the peace and order of this hemisphere, point directly to immediate and effective intervention.

This should be done in the following way:

First: By discreetly removing the already decimated and ruined American population from Mexico.

Second: By the transfer of the charge of our diplomatic and consular establishments to representatives of other powers.

Third: By the massing of our fleet in overwhelming proportions, aided by effective marine reserves, at every Mexican port on the Atlantic and Pacific.

Fourth: By the massing of our army, fully equipped for invasion, at every strategic point lying on the border states, and the calling out of the reserves in all border states.

Fifth: By the appointment of commissioners, one of whom should be the ambassador, another the general-in-chief of the army, another the ranking officer of the investing fleet and another a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The duty of this commission would be to seek, by a preliminary action, a reconciliation of all the contending forces in Mexico, with the understanding that their duties should be urgent, expeditious and not to be detained by any dilatory methods, and with a further understanding that they should follow in the path of invasion, re-establishing the rule of law and dispensing justice and order in the name of the United States.

Any invasion should be accompanied by a public statement that our purpose is not one of aggression, but that we are acting in the discharge of a duty to humanity and civilization and that when once constitutional methods and practices are re-established and firm government installed our troops will retire to the United States.

Since these recommendations were made Mexico has gone from bad to worse—we have forcibly intervened twice; we have called out the border militia and have penetrated

Mexican soil to practically the 22nd parallel. We intervened at Vera Cruz without reason or right and retreated amid execrations and ridicule. We justly intervened after the Columbus raid, but tardily and unpreparedly. In neither of these instances have we contributed to the protection of American citizens or to the restoration of peaceable conditions in Mexico. Intervention if it is to take place should be made by competent hands and not subordinated to political exigencies—no pin pricking, no wobbling, no epistolary bombardments. Bearing in mind the incompetency and vacillation which the present administration has displayed in the management of our own domestic and foreign affairs I doubt whether it can be trusted to successfully restore peace and order in Mexico through intervention.

I have stated here three methods by which peace can be restored in Mexico.

1. Active and sympathetic support of the real governing elements in Mexico.

2. By the creation, organization and recognition of an independent republic from the Rio Grande to the 22nd parallel.

3. Armed intervention.

All of these methods are fairly subject to attack and criticism; all have weak points; any one of them, if adopted, may produce enduring peace south of the Rio Grande.

A CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY FOR MEXICO

By Roger W. Babson, President of the Babson Statistical Organization; Member of the Federal Central American Commission of 1916

For some time the scenery has been set for some kind of intervention in Mexico. This came near happening during the early part of President Wilson's illness, and what occurred at that time was very largely responsible for Secretary Lansing's resignation. Had the Republicans then been in power, that incident would doubtless have been made an excuse for Mexican intervention.

Although Carranza should be given certain sympathy and respect for what he has done, yet his doom was sure to come. Like many others, he had over-reached himself, forgetting the ladder by which he climbed up. The only thing which had saved Carranza for some time was the fact that he had no strong opponent. Since the armistice, the European governments, and quite likely the United States, had been hoping for some strong opponent whom they could endorse and recognize.

Straight out and out intervention would be very dangerous and very costly, both directly and for its effect upon the whole of Latin America. If, however, there were two strong factions in Mexico, between which the United States and European countries would be compelled to choose, then these nations would be justified in backing the new party. Conditions are bad in Mexico. Both the Mexican people and the rest of the world are anxious for peace so that they can develop their country and its industries. Anything which can bring about such peace is justifiable and is to be desired.

FALLACY OF WAR

Although I do *not* take the pacifist's view regarding Mexican intervention, I am impressed by some figures which the leaders of the Interchurch Movement have recently

given out. They claim that the money spent during the first six months of General Pershing's border campaign would have been sufficient to establish a good public school system, an agricultural college and a modern hospital in every Mexican city of over 4000 people. In addition, there would have been available an endowment of several hundred thousand dollars for educational work in each of these communities. These figures are simply based on the cost of the first six months' military campaign. When the total cost and the present cost are considered, the figures would be most astounding.

The people of the United States have been opposed to military intervention. It has, however, been generally believed that intervention of some kind would some day be inevitable. By nature we are our brother's keeper, and the responsibility cannot be avoided either by the demands of the militarists or by the resolutions of the pacifists. The real question is—shall intervention be of military and destructive nature or shall it be of an educational and constructive nature? The idea that we can continue to sit by and take no sides in the troubles of our nearest neighbor is preposterous. Even if the present revolutionists are friendly to the financial interests of the United States, this does not obviate the probability of intervention in some form. Although we now do not have to intervene to get Carranza out (as was the common opinion a few months ago) we may be obliged to intervene some day in order to keep the new interests in power or to prevent them from fighting among themselves.

The moral question involved in Mexican intervention is the eternal question. Both those who favor military intervention and those who oppose it base their contentions on the "brother's keeper" theory. Granting, however, that we are our brother's keeper does not make *the end justify the means*. Two wrongs do not make a right, and in protecting others in Mexico, we should be very careful to use methods which cannot be questioned. This is another reason why, if there is to be any kind of intervention, it should be constructive intervention of the most unselfish type.

RELATIONS WITH ALL LATIN AMERICA

Irrespective of the moral issue involved, we should consider the effect of military intervention on Mexico and the other Latin American countries. Ever since we took Texas and California away from Mexico, the Latin Americans have been suspicious of us. This suspicion was increased when we took Porto Rico, Panama and began to interfere in certain other Latin American countries. "Dollar diplomacy," as the American policy is called, is very repugnant to the Central and South American people. It is true that the Wilson administration has healed these wounds to a large extent. Today we are on more friendly terms with Latin America than at any time since the days of Monroe. Military intervention, however, in Mexico, would smash our Latin American friendships and undo all the good which has been accomplished during the past eight years.

Psychologically, this would be a most dangerous time to temporize at this time with with the friendship of Latin America. During the past five years we have secured a grip on Latin American trade because the English, French, and Germans were unable to supply the goods or finance the purchases. The Latin Americans were compelled to trade with us or go without the goods. Now the markets of the world are again open, transportation lines are re-established, and the Latin Americans can again buy from either Europe or America as they desire. Moreover, it is only human nature that the English and French should make a strenuous effort to get back the trade which was formerly theirs and which we took while they were busy protecting civilization. Furthermore, the Germans, who were always unfair to us in connection with Latin American trade, will now renew their efforts with great vigor and resort to any means to get back again into the folds.

Under these conditions, it is evident that if we attempted military intervention in Mexico our European competitors would use this as an argument against us in connection with trading in Latin America. These Central and South American people are very sympathetic and almost sentimental

when it comes to trading. By nature they consider questions of honor and friendship vastly more important than questions of dollars and pounds sterling. Hence, if any kind of intervention is necessary, it must be a constructive, unselfish intervention, one which will not arouse the enmity of Central and South America.

CONSTRUCTIVE INTERVENTION

A constructive form of intervention in Mexico means more than the building of schools, agricultural colleges, and hospitals, or the supplying of teachers, doctors, and nurses. A constructive form of intervention in Mexico requires the rehabilitation of Mexican railways and banks, and the introduction of agricultural machinery, seed, fertilizer, and some form of supervision. In talking this over with Senators in Washington, I find that they are favorably disposed to such intervention, provided we can "police" the country in order to "protect" our investments. Some even say: "This is all we want to do now; but there is no need of the government's supplying this money. The financial interests of the United States and England are ready at any time to go to Mexico and operate the mines, develop the ranches, and teach the people how to work." This is very true, but they demand the control of the properties if not the control of the country. This is where the rub comes.

For a constructive policy in Mexico to succeed, the control of the properties must remain with the Mexicans *so far as further developments go*. We must have for our motto, "Mexico for the Mexicans," rather than "Mexico for the Americans." This is the rock on which the intervention discussions ultimately become shipwrecked. The Mexicans would rather go on in their present inefficient and unhappy way, but feeling that when they do work out their own salvation it will be their own, than to have immediate peace and prosperity and lose control of their properties in the process. Shouldn't we respect them for their willingness to sacrifice the present in order to insure the future? We people of the United States have twice been through

the same experience that they are going through; our revolutionary days extended over a generation; our Civil War tore the country asunder. At both of these times foreign governments, in the interests of immediate peace and prosperity, attempted to interfere and "make us behave." We know how we would have resented their intervention and that it would simply have prolonged the struggle and delayed the result.

It seems to be a law of nature that nations and individuals must work out their own salvation and find themselves through struggle and sacrifice. There is no short road to growth. Development takes time. We can truly aid a boy by helping him to help himself, but we cannot go any further. We can give him the help for which he asks, but we cannot force aid upon him without disaster. We can show him the error of his ways and urge him to follow other paths, but as soon as we use force or restraint, the reaction is very dangerous. It is the same with nations. We can remove the causes of war and revolution by giving more freedom to the people, supplying work to the unemployed, and furnishing tools, seeds and other things necessary to get industry established. When, however, we go any further, we tread on dangerous ground.

From what I have said, some readers may think I am opposed to intervention of any kind and believe only in the Wilson policy of "watchful waiting." Theoretically, I think the Wilson policy is correct and if the Europeans had the same vision, I would favor no form of intervention whatever. Europe, however, has not the vision. The practical situation is that if we do not intervene in some way Europe will. Such European intervention would be a distinct mistake. Therefore, as we cannot have the ideal conditions, we must make the best of the situation and choose the lesser of the two evils. As Grover Cleveland said: "We must adapt ourselves to conditions rather than to theories." It is very evident that some form of intervention is inevitable and that, if the Republicans are successful in November, the United States will intervene in Mexico. Therefore, the question is, what shall the form of intervention be? Shall

it be destructive, based on force, or shall it be constructive, based on the principles of righteousness, justice and brotherly kindness?

This is a suggestion: that we insist Mexico protect foreign interests on the legitimate investments made previous to 1917; but that we cooperate with the Mexican government in its present desire to bring about a new social order. In short, let us compromise by saying we conform to your new policy provided you do not make it retro-active.

RELIGIOUS STATESMEN NEEDED

The great need of the hour in Washington and the capitals of Europe is more religion. The great need is for religious statesmen who are afraid neither to tackle big problems nor to tackle them in new ways. A great difficulty today seems to be that our political leaders are largely made up of two classes—either they are fearless and strong men, like some of our senators, but stand for anti-Christian principles; or else they are weak-kneed men who stand for what is good, but who lack the stamina and courage to insist upon these Christian principles being carried out. The way the Mexican situation is being handled is a very good illustration of the way these two groups of statesmen work. The first group believe in military intervention so strongly that they are willing to kill, destroy, and *even wreck the League of Nations* in order to make intervention possible; while the pacifist group is too cowardly to do anything. *A great opportunity exists for some statesman to stand for intervention, but to insist on a sane, constructive form of intervention whereby the money will be spent on schools, hospitals, farming machinery, and transportation.* If one half the money being spent now by our Army and Navy in connection with Mexico were spent in helping Mexico agriculturally and industrially, used in improving the transportation systems and in doing other constructive work, we should be making real friends instead of enemies and the entire world would be infinitely better off.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

By John F. Moors, LL.D., Senior Member, Moors and Cabot, Bankers; President, Boston Associated Charities

This country entered the Spanish War primarily to help Cuba, though there were savage cries of "Remember the *Maine*" and certain sensational newspapers were doing their best to shove us into the war. We came out of the Spanish war still trying to help Cuba and determined that our promise to her of independence would be kept.

The diplomats of the old world ridiculed our virtuous professions at the time. Theodore Roosevelt, speaking at Christiania, Norway, in 1910, told how these diplomats poked fun at him, assuring him that these virtuous promises would be broken and he, insistent usually that insult should be resisted, accepted the jibes without offense, so habituated was everyone to the scandalous standards then prevalent in international diplomacy. In his autobiography, published in 1913 he wrote:—

We had explicitly promised to leave the island of Cuba, had explicitly promised that Cuba should be independent. When the promise was made, I doubt if there was a single ruler or diplomat in Europe who believed that it would be kept. As far as I know, the United States was the first power which, having made a promise, kept it in letter and spirit.

Unfortunately, half a century before the war with Spain, we had waged war from motives, which might easily be interpreted as ignoble, with Mexico and, defeating her, despoiled her of half her territory. This event sank deep into the minds, not only of Mexico, but of all Latin America. The "Colossus of the North" was feared and, because feared, was hated. Our habitual contempt for the revolution-torn Latin-American republics blinded our eyes to this hatred and accentuated it because it bred lack of caution and derisive nicknames.

Then, at the very moment when we kept our promises to Cuba, we took Porto Rico—took it from Spain but without consulting the Porto Ricans. Soon afterwards, in 1903, we “took” Panama. It did not belong to us. It belonged to Colombia. And we set up the plea that Colombia was anti-social, that her leaders were “mountain bandits,” that we had a mandate from civilization to take what did not belong to us. President Roosevelt in October, 1903, drafted a letter to Congress proposing that we take Panama by force. At 6.00 p.m., November 3, there was a skillfully prepared revolution on the Isthmus. Our warships prevented the Colombians from attempting to suppress it. We recognized the new Republic of Panama November 6. We promised to place all countries, including this country, on a parity in the payment of tolls for using the canal. In the administration of Mr. Taft we undertook to exempt our own coastwise trade from these tolls. The Wilson administration righted this wrong but so far has sought vainly to persuade Congress to vote \$25,000,000 to Colombia for the property taken from her.

Latin-America followed these events with keener interest than we followed them. When Secretary Root, on a mission of good-will, went to South America in 1906 he spoke excellently at Rio de Janeiro. But the people of South America were suspicious, applying to us as to all men the injunction: “By their deeds shall ye know them.”

The fall of the Diaz régime in Mexico, the accession and murder of Madero, the usurpation by Huerta, the long and bloody revolution, the agitation in this country for intervention, our interest in our big investments in Mexico, the development of rich oil fields there, the seizure of Vera Cruz and the Pershing expedition have increased the dread of us in Latin America and have made the Monroe Doctrine seem more a danger than a protection.

Today a new, brief and comparatively bloodless revolution has caused a new change in the kaleidoscope and brought with it new problems.

President Wilson’s address at Mobile in October, 1913, his efforts to befriend Mexico during the early years of the

long revolution, his refusal to be stampeded into war with Mexico in 1916 were cheering incidents in the almost endless story of distrust resulting from the fear of aggression. The A. B. C. Conferences in 1916, futile though they proved, were evidence of the good-will in Latin-America when assured of our respect and friendliness.

It is a sad commentary on our influence that the further the Latin-Americans are from us the happier they seem to be. Chile and the Argentine are not only prospering but, when they were on the verge of war with each other, they settled their difference by a conference, instead of by force, and they melted their engines of death and built of them a great statue to Jesus Christ and today the Christ of the Andes on a mountain summit three miles above the level of the sea, still commemorates that great achievement.

Mexico, on the other hand, is perpetually in hot water. And we are always talking about her and threatening her and despising her and investing in her riches. When we have invested, we have too often insisted that the only sound course is to "clean her up." It has become the law and the gospel with strong nations that their citizens and their citizens' property shall be protected, by fire and sword, if need be, wherever such citizens and their property may be. The conception that our citizens entrust their persons and their property at their own risk to the laws and conditions in weak and unsettled countries is widely looked upon as unsound and ignoble. Yet the transition from protecting our innocent citizens, to protecting our all too aggressive citizens, to championing their cause without much regard for the standards of unknown races is not only an easy transition but one which may be fraught with injustice, bullying, violence, and finally with the assessment of damages and the acquisition of the weak nation's property.

The official attitude in recent years of the United States toward Mexico has been admirable and was the precursor of that new diplomacy which found a fitting embodiment in the fourteen points. But during these same years the attitude of many influential Americans toward Mexico has been irritating in the extreme. The admirable official attitude

has been despised by most men of education. The exasperating attitude of threats and contempt has been accepted as the proper attitude. Vast, fundamental issues are today involved in what we think and do in regard to Mexico. The problems are at our very door. We cannot escape them. Shall we be a kind friend and neighbor, not officious, but ready to help when we are asked to help, respecting her and her rights, using reason, not force, simply because we are superior in the latter, patient, unselfish, with all the virtues which we profess in our religion? Or shall we throw all these to the winds and think first of our interests present and prospective in Mexico, and, knowing our strength, use it for selfish aims, leading our young men to slaughter other young men and forcing America again to fail the world when moral leadership is most needed?

These questions should be approached, not impatiently or scornfully or selfishly, but respectfully, discreetly, and with faith in men however outwardly unlike ourselves.

COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Edwin M. Borchard, Professor of Law, Yale University

The intelligent appreciation of economic facts and an understanding of the forces at work in shaping international relations is my interpretation of common sense in foreign policy. For the elaboration of my views in this respect, I shall ask your indulgence.

The principal material purpose of human activity, I take it, is the satisfaction of economic wants by opening the resources of the earth to a wider distribution at lower cost. The remarkable advance in these directions witnessed in the last century by improved methods of transportation and communication and by the application of machinery in agriculture, mining and manufacture has been unequalled in history. The end and aim of thus promoting the material comfort and prosperity of mankind being assumed to be true, conflicts have arisen in modern times in the methods of bringing the aims to realization, either in the economic principle pursued or in the attempt by various groups to arrogate to themselves advantages not conceded by other groups. The effort, on the one hand, to maintain and extend the advantage of one group has often run counter to similar efforts of other groups.

Within the domain of a nation this conflict of interest has thus far been fairly well adjusted by municipal law. In the United States, such statutes as the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, designed to prevent unfair competition, all evidence the continued purpose of the community to prevent unfair advantages by one group, interest or individual over the other. However short of perfection the system may still be, it has been amply manifested that when competition no longer adequately protects the interests of the public, governmental regulation and even governmental ownership

emerges as a check upon unfair advantage. The police power under the Constitution has served to impose ever greater burdens upon private property in the interests of the public welfare; and given free discussion and a free ballot our system is capable of adjusting itself to the expanding needs of a developing community, with its ever growing demands. The internal struggle now proceeding in many countries of the world is a reflection of this effort to adjust a political system to the increasingly insistent demands of important groups in the community; and in so far as that struggle ceases to be peaceful, it indicates the maladjustment of the political and legal machinery to the social or economic demands of the times.

In the international domain, we find this clash of conflicting interests possessed of but few instruments for conciliation or adjustment. Diplomacy, treaties, mediation, commissions of inquiry, arbitration, however effective they may have been in preventing many conflicts, and however promising they may be, have exerted but little influence in averting the trial by battle of those larger economic issues which lie at the foundation of most modern wars. Nations which unhesitatingly impose the restraint of law upon both the strong and the weak groups within the state, decline, notwithstanding Hague Conferences and arbitration agreements, to submit their more important international differences to adjustment by peaceful machinery. Impatient of such restraint when what they deem their "vital interests" are involved, they plunge into reprisals or war as the arbiter of the difference, and devote the periods between wars to the strengthening of alliances and physical resources so as to cope successfully with the prospective antagonist their very preparation frequently invites. War, of course, while a recognized method of adjusting international disputes, signifies in reality the breakdown of law, or if you will, the rule of the jungle. So defective is our modern civilization that at intervals all too frequent it sanctions in approving or reluctant impotence the armed clash of whole nations.

Why is this? Is it possible to prevent it? Are we going forward or backward?

Failure to understand the underlying causes of modern conflicts explains, in part, I believe, the apparent inability to prevent them. Mention has been made of the recent enactment of municipal statutes against unfair competition in the more advanced countries, coming as the outgrowth of a realization that powerful or unscrupulous groups or individuals seek to obtain advantages over others which are unfair, under a standard of business ethics created by the *mores* of our time. In the international domain, on the other hand, unfair competition flourishes among the great powers in a fashion that sooner or later must lead to conflict. No statutory code declares it to be unfair; for the attempt to monopolize the economic resources of backward nations by the creation of spheres of influence, mandates, protectorates or colonies, the effort to control markets, trade routes, cables and coaling stations, and by tariff barriers to obtain preferential treatment, discriminate against competitors, or stimulate home industry—all these are deemed worthy manifestations of state activity looking to national strength and prosperity. The fallacy lies in the fact that other nations seeking like outlets and instruments for their economic activity find their efforts thwarted or hampered by an advantage already gained or about to be gained by a rival nation; or a nation having secured control of a particular market, finds its predominance challenged by a new competitor. There being no legal machinery or any federal or international trade commission to adjust these conflicting interests, and the issue indeed presenting no question of legal right or wrong, each imperialist nation is driven by necessity to safeguard its own success in this continual struggle, by diplomacy and the force of arms, justifying its efforts under the name of self-preservation. Foreign policy is fashioned to the maintenance of supremacy in this struggle of the nations, and the fallacy in believing that any ultimate material benefit accrues to the people by engaging in this struggle, is what I would denominate as the primary manifestation of a want of understanding. Psychological repugnance and historical grievances, to be sure, often cooperate powerfully in producing conflicts, but in this day I regard the economic factor as of transcendent importance.

The growth of modern imperialism is coincident with the rise of the industrial system and the export of capital. Great Britain came out of the Napoleonic wars into a new era of industrial expansion and utilized her resources in coal and machinery in a happy combination with a strong navy and the then existing colonial system to extend British influence throughout the world. Her exports in goods and capital expanded British markets everywhere and led to that close association between the Foreign Office and the overseas investor which, except in Latin America, has all but insured the investment, and would, but for the Monroe Doctrine, have had the same result in Latin America. How far the masses of the British people have benefitted by this policy of overseas investment is questionable, according to Mr. C. K. Hobson, the English economist.

I will not undertake to detail the ramifications of the alliance between finance and politics, but that finance has had a vital influence in dictating political control no informed statesman or economist will deny. It was around 1850 that France began to accumulate capital for foreign investment, and tangible evidence of its influence in foreign policy is found in the fact that the alliance between Russia and France, which was so important a factor in the diplomatic background of the war, traces its origin to the first loan of 500,000,000 francs by French bankers to Russia in the late eighties. Further loans by France were conditioned upon the use of the money in particular directions. Germany entered the race at the end of the seventies and her rapid strides in combining commercial expansion with political influence in the Near East, with its threat to the political interests of Russia and England, had as much to do with the causes of the Great War as any other single factor. More recently Japan and the United States have entered the lists as foreign investors and whether they can resist the temptations of imperialism, with its dangers of conflict with competing imperialisms, is a question that the next decade or two will answer for us.

Our own record in the growth from the agricultural to the industrial stage, and thence from the mercantile to

the financial stage, from the status of exporters solely of raw materials to exporters of manufactured products has not been fraught with immediate political threats to foreign powers. Such political effects as have followed our quest for world markets have been confined principally to countries in and around the Caribbean, and there other factors also entered into the situation. We would probably not be administering Haiti today, but for the fact that France threatened to intervene if we didn't. Moreover, our control in those countries, speaking generally, is not conducted with any view to an American trade monopoly, as the foreign trade statistics of those countries for the last ten or fifteen years will attest. Our Philippine adventure was not premeditated but came as one of the unsolicited consequences of a successful war. On the whole, it cannot be said that we have exploited our position, and I have little doubt that if we could obtain assurance against the Philippines falling into the hands of an imperialist government, they could, like Cuba, have their independence almost any time. It is my opinion that, taking conditions as they are, and admitting many of the mistakes of our responsible and irresponsible officials, our policy in Central America and the Philippines as receivers in bankruptcy or self-appointed guardians, still furnishes one of the cleanest pages in the history of imperialism. It is a comparatively new game for us and was not entered upon with premeditation. We may improve with further experience, or we may, following European example, grow worse. The American people should be able to control the policy to be adopted.

But now new forces are in operation and the avoidance of international conflicts will require an unusual degree of common sense on the part of the administration and on the part of the people. Unless the people awake to the importance of foreign policy in its effect on their personal welfare, there is little hope, notwithstanding improved machinery, for any more sensible adjustment of international differences than the recent past has demonstrated. Some of the more obvious of the factors requiring attention and popular vigilance I shall take the liberty of pointing out as I proceed.

We have come out of the Great War with a trade balance of some ten billions and large loans to foreign governments. The gap will be difficult to close. We have already received much gold and bought back several billions of our foreign-owned securities, thus reducing our foreign interest requirements. Our merchant marine will reduce our payments abroad under this head. Being one of the few manufacturing countries whose industrial plant is apparently in good condition our exportable surplus will doubtless be large for many years. Countervailing factors, of course, are brought into operation as a result of these very facts. The unprecedented favorable trade balance has unbalanced exchange rates to such an extent that European merchants can buy from us only by paying excessive prices, and that has already curtailed our exports. If the world's credit structure is to remain unimpaired, Europe must ultimately repay us in goods and it would be wise policy for many reasons, not least of all, the interests of American consumers, to stimulate such imports in every way.

But one of the obvious methods of squaring the account is by investing our accumulated capital abroad, and this process has grown to unprecedented proportions since 1914. It would be very active today but for the fact that the financial world has little confidence in European stability, due, I believe, to the economic errors of the Treaty of Versailles, to which I shall advert in a moment. In the meantime, our investments abroad, in Latin-America and elsewhere, will bring a large volume of trade in their wake and our merchant marine is equipped to carry the products of our enlarged manufacturing capacity to all parts of the world. The adoption of a consistent foreign policy will inevitably become necessary. What form will it take and what factors will enter into consideration?

There is now a pressing demand from our large commercial and financial interests for an expansion of our foreign trade and of our merchant marine. Both results can be achieved, but the effort will encounter certain obstacles, to the negotiation of which foreign policy will have to be directed. Just as *laissez-faire* has been forced into con-

stantly smaller compass in domestic economy, so in international commerce the same phenomenon is apparent. Notwithstanding the intimate relation between the British Foreign Office and the investor, the British trader until lately enjoyed a considerable measure of *laissez-faire*. Its success constituted its justification. But as German trade in one quarter after the other entered into successful competition, the adoption of German foreign trade policy met with greater favor; and it now seems likely that the German cartel system and export associations and syndicates and the plans for governmental and trade coöperation will to a considerable extent be adopted by England and other exporting nations. The British Manufacturers Corporation, the British Trade Corporation, the reorganized Board of Trade with its Departments of Commerce and Industry and Commercial Intelligence, the various Trades Committees, all indicate that ever-growing coöperation between government and commerce which in its present general form is a recent phenomenon of foreign policy. We have already indicated our adherence to the principle by the creation of such governmental organs as the War Finance Corporation and the United States Shipping Board, and by such statutes as the Webb Act and the Edge Act. The promoting functions of the State and Commerce Departments will also doubtless be enlarged. Moreover, it is common knowledge that for the last half century European bankers making loans to governments have almost always obtained the preliminary consent and worked in coöperation with their Foreign Offices. Our own State Department is not only consulted by American bankers in the making of foreign loans, but new loans made to any country around the Caribbean by any bankers are not likely to be made without the acquiescence of the State Department. A sudden aversion to "dollar diplomacy" in 1913 induced a withdrawal of the American bankers from the Six Power Loan to China, President Wilson stating that there should be "no entangling foreign alliances even in respect to arrangements for supervising the financial compacts of weaker governments the responsibility of the United

States in the Six-Power group is obnoxious to the principles upon which this Government rests." But in 1918, American participation seems no longer to have been obnoxious to those principles, for Mr. Wilson approved our joining the Four-Power consortium, committing this Government to an extent unasked by the bankers in 1913. The official statement of the Department of State published July 29, 1918, reads in part: "the American government will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make prompt and vigorous representations and to take every possible step to ensure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands." It would not be easy to find a more complete reversal of foreign policy than is embodied in the declaration just quoted. Several proposals to refund the Honduran debt have been disapproved by the Department, and similar disapproval of the Pearson oil concession in Colombia, it will be recalled, induced those important British interests some years ago to withdraw from the field. We must assume that this is done by virtue of a liberal interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and to forestall political differences; but it indicates the intimate relation between Government and private enterprise which modern international politics discloses on every hand.

To obtain as free an outlet as possible for our expanding commerce will require the fullest governmental coöperation, and diplomacy will inevitably be involved. Then too will come the urgent need of those trained men whom we now find it so difficult to attract to the public service. As European governments recover their strength in competition, tariffs and preferences of various kinds will appear as cards in the game. The proposed imperial policy of Great Britain by which trade between the mother country and the colony is mutually to be promoted is a reminder of a colonial policy which prevailed a century ago. Its enforcement today to the disadvantage of foreign powers is likely to have large political consequences.

Within a phenomenally short time we have become the second maritime power, with nearly ten million tons of

shipping. As it is deemed important that American commerce should not have to rely on foreign bottoms, and as it is known that American ships are, by reason of fairer treatment of crew and better pay to builders, more expensive to operate than foreign ships, methods are now being proposed to insure us against American ships escaping to foreign flags and to promote American shipbuilding. A proposal which is now meeting favor is to give to goods imported in our vessels a tariff rebate, and thereupon abrogate numerous treaties. The device may prove distasteful to foreign governments, which may adopt countervailing restrictions. For example, it is conceivable that coaling stations in various parts of the world may refuse to sell bunker coal to American vessels; or foreign countries may discriminate against American goods or vessels. It is true that our distinctive interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause has not had serious results, and it may be that the discrimination proposed would not encounter retaliatory measures; but I am inclined to believe that under present conditions, when the recent belligerents are exerting every effort to recover and strengthen their economic position such a measure as that proposed will not go unchallenged. That it constitutes a decided violation of Point Three (on "economic barriers") of the famous Fourteen, has been overlooked by some of its advocates.

Again, a manufacturing and trading nation must have assured access to basic raw materials, and the quest for and control of raw materials, such as coal, iron and oil are likely to weigh heavily in the shaping of foreign policy during the next few decades. The pressure of a growing industry was combined with the revival of a historic claim to induce Germany to annex the iron fields of Lorraine in 1871, and unless her demand for raw materials is satisfied in Russia or elsewhere, we are likely to see considerable trouble in the future over Alsace and Lorraine. More recently oil has loomed up as the motive power of the future, and the desire to obtain an assured supply has inspired much of the diplomacy of the recent past and will doubtless influence greatly the immediate future. It has not gone unnoticed,

I assume, that Mesopotamia and Syria have not wanted for mandatories, whereas barren Armenia seems to have a good deal of difficulty in finding one. Indeed, it is common knowledge that Great Britain, always the most foresighted of nations, has adopted a governmental oil policy by which she hopes to control for British interests the oil supplies of all British possessions, from the United Kingdom to the smallest mandatory, and of as many other nations as possible, and expects to "buy into" such of the foreign oil companies as she can. An article in *Spelling's Magazine* last year explained the policy frankly; and more recently Mr. Walter Hume Long of the British Cabinet has given us a very convincing expression of his views on the subject. When it is recalled that our Geological Survey estimates that our own oil resources, at present rates of consumption, will be exhausted in twenty years, it is apparent that our quest for oil must more than ever be directed toward foreign fields. If there we encounter conflicting claims previously staked out by other nations, or if we are placed in the position of having to buy our oil from more favored nations at their price and conditions, its effect on our foreign policy will be readily apparent.

II

With these facts in mind, I wish to direct attention to the Treaty of Peace and to some of the events and phenomena of current history in order to point out what seem to me to be the lessons of the day in foreign policy. It is my belief that by an unbiased discussion and consideration of facts and the effort to draw honest conclusions from them our government and our people may be enabled to avoid some of the more obvious pitfalls of the immediate future. If, in the expression of my opinions, I should challenge some popular beliefs or what seem to me to be illusions, I trust my ideas will be received under the admitted limitation, so ably expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes, "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."

It is my conviction that the American people have less knowledge of foreign affairs than any people of Europe, due partly to our traditional isolation from international politics and partly to defective education. This innocence, combined with the crusading instinct of a pioneer in political liberty, makes our people peculiarly susceptible to a foreign policy of idealistic phrase-making and to the machinations of the propagandist. An examination of the facts and the effort to think upon them independently, so prominent in our political literature on foreign affairs down to 1860, seems now to be exceptional only. Emotion seems to have replaced logic in the consideration of events. Perhaps the movies or the kaleidoscopic daily newspaper have something to do with this responsiveness to emotional stimulus and want of critical analysis. At all events, it has not yet penetrated the popular consciousness that, as I believe, the professed purposes of "making the world safe for democracy," defeating militarism, promoting a lasting peace, preventing war and establishing a new principle of coöperation among the nations to bring about these ends are, in the realm of fact, conspicuous by their absence in the terms of the settlement. The terms of the Treaty proper impress the conviction that while preponderating force can terminate a war, as John Bassett Moore has expressed it, it is no guaranty of peace. Indeed, one hazards little in predicting that there is more war than peace likely to issue from the treaties of 1919, with their Balkanization of Eastern Europe and their challenge of fundamental principles of economics, as pointed out by Mr. Vanderlip. Efforts to amend the treaties seem to produce a hostile reaction from one or other of the Allies. The authors of the League of Nations, creating their own major premise in disregard of the substantive facts of the Treaty of Versailles and the minor treaties, and of the existing international economic system, have devised an elaborate machinery to stop the outbreak of war after its causes have been allowed, as in the past, freely to operate and ferment into hostility. However sympathetic we may be to the idea, the superstructure is out of harmony with its foundations, and this seems to me

an insuperable obstacle to success. That we have had similar leagues in the past, professing the same purposes, has been apparently dismissed from consideration, and the greater enthusiasm and credence aroused by this league is attributable, I believe, to a natural tendency, in time of crisis, to grasp at a panacea. The founders profess in a tense moment of history to have established a League for Peace, when they were unable, after full deliberation, to establish such a comparatively unimportant body as an International Prize Court. It is already apparent to many students of international affairs that the League of Nations, cordially as we may endorse its announced purposes, is, as I fear, essentially a military alliance of the principal victors, attracting to themselves a considerable number of neutrals who expect to profit by the association. Time will tell whether the history of this alliance will differ greatly from that of its predecessors. Unless I am greatly mistaken, it will last as long as the interests of the major members remain identical.

Can we find any present justification for a hope of peace? Are we going forward or backward? The question deserves passing consideration. It was fairly generally accepted during the war that our only chance of prolonged peace lay in disarmament, and the Covenant met that conviction by making provision therefor. With the enemy disarmed, the popular mind was encouraged in the belief that disarmament might be realized. As a matter of fact, the tendencies, I submit, are all the other way. The imperialist nations, notwithstanding the best of intentions and the pressure from taxpayers, do not dare to disarm for fear of losing their place in the sun and in the intensive competition for markets and raw materials which is now in process of development, a competition which at any time may require military support. Each nation has a satisfactory reason, conclusive upon its national conscience, why disarmament is impossible for it, although it would lend hearty encouragement to the disarmament of other countries. I do not charge this to evil influence in Government. The fundamental instinct of self-preservation, under the system of

international rivalry, motivates the policy. The fault is a manifestation of the weakness of the international order, in which I can, with the best of intention, find no tangible evidence of improvement.

We were encouraged to believe that international law would be strengthened by the Peace. The result, I venture to believe, is quite the contrary. Time forbids a detailed analysis of the Treaty in this regard; but attention may be called to one of the many dangerous precedents adopted in the Treaty. While it was proper to punish the German Empire for its admitted violations of law, the victors should themselves have manifested greater respect for the restraints imposed by law and long-established international practice. For law is intended to bind the strong as well as the weak. Since 1815, the doctrine that private property is immune from seizure to satisfy public obligations, has been deemed a fixed principle. It was an application of a distinction, incidental to the advance of civilization and enunciated in a classic phrase of Rousseau, between the public forces of the state and the private citizen. While the war had done much to wipe away the distinction, it was a shock to find that the Treaty adopts the principle of the practical confiscation of private enemy property and investments. The danger in this precedent can hardly be overemphasized. Not only does it subject every foreign investment to the precarious contingencies of war and peace, from which it should be completely removed, but it constitutes an assault from above upon the sanctity of private property at a time when that institution, which lies at the foundation of our social structure, is being challenged from below in a degree never before known. Should the principle prevail, disarmament becomes more remote than ever, for not only the integrity of public but of private property would now depend upon success in arms. This is only one of the many steps backward which in my opinion the Treaty has sanctioned.

Other recent phenomena likewise merit consideration. Prominent among these is the anti-alien legislation of many countries designed to keep out the foreign emigrant and

the foreigner's business. This will probably have considerable future effect. The period between 1880 and 1914 had witnessed a freedom of migration and economic activity which made overpopulation easily dilutable throughout the world and gave ready opportunity by economic freedom and liberality of corporation laws to the mobility of capital and entrepreneurs. The period since the war has witnessed a reversion to the restrictive policy of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Such measures as the Paris Economic Resolutions and the Balfour Report, the British Non-ferrous Metal Industry Act and similar measures adopted in various degree and kind by other countries, all designed to prevent competition from more favored or skillful producers and promote home or strategic industries for the purpose of achieving economic self-sufficiency and independence from reliance upon foreign supplies, not only increase the burden resting upon consumers but constitute measures of economic warfare which are likely to promote political hostility. I sympathize with the unfortunate dilemma of the gentlemen who are responsible for the Treaty—to punish Germany adequately and obtain reparation and yet preserve peace and the economic stability of Europe. On the horns of that dilemma, Europe is now impaled. However much the situation excuses their shortsightedness, the lessons of the last year and a half should have warned them of what in all probability lies before.

Certain obvious truths require brief mention in the correct public appreciation of an enlightened foreign policy. First, the assumption that your own motives are always higher and purer than those of others may be soothing to the conscience, but carries no conviction to your opponents or necessarily to third parties. Every act of imperialistic expansion is accompanied by invocations on the altar of self-sacrifice. Its motive will usually be found in a service to "humanity," a word used or abused in recent years with poetic license. For example, Japan a few days ago in a proclamation opposing a separate state in Siberia asserted "that Japan will not tolerate in any country close to Japan any political organization designed to interfere with world

peace and to defy humanity." Those who invoke our divine mission to "clean up Mexico" doubtless are comforted by the air of self-righteousness embodied in the proposal and easily overlook some of its more sinister implications. Again, no war since 1815, according to the usual statements of historians and statesmen of the respective belligerents, has been anything but a war of defense. Military alliances are always characterized as "defensive."

Secondly, the ability to see ourselves as others see us seems particularly essential. The interpretation by the Senate majority of the Monroe Doctrine, arrogating to ourselves to the exclusion of the League of Nations any privilege of interference in Latin-American disputes has aroused a storm of protest in intellectual circles among our sister republics. Our long delay in liquidating the Colombian obligation and conditioning its discharge upon reciprocal advantage has been generally disapproved throughout the southern continent. Our control over certain Central American and Caribbean countries, not, I believe, fully understood, has done much to impugn our motives in Latin America. Our shifting and unintelligent attitude toward Mexico, sometimes dignified by calling it our Mexican policy, has weakened our prestige in Latin America. Indeed, should the counsels of armed intervention ultimately prevail, we may find a repercussion throughout Latin America which will embody the first consistent challenge to our interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and may involve us in conflict with other powers. It must be remembered that Latin America, while conceding that the Monroe Doctrine properly serves to keep European political control out of America, does not admit any corollary by which United States control is to be substituted. One step in diplomacy leads to the next, and the world is now, more than ever before, a house of cards. Had Austria appreciated this fact, the world war would probably not have occurred in 1914. Moreover, reliance upon permanent friendship among nations is likely to prove most tenuous in times of test, if history has any meaning. While deep-seated hostility unfortunately is a common phenomenon, such as

the eternal feud between France and Germany, the much-vaunted ties of friendship are easily broken when political conditions require. Another phenomenon is the belief, apparently entertained in high quarters, that all peoples can accommodate themselves or mould their institutions to fit our Constitution. It is a manifestation of the passion for uniformity often nurtured by illiberal minds. It has much to do with the misfortunes of Mexico. The Constitution among us has experienced changes which have altered much of its original conception, and properly so, for it could not survive if it could not adjust itself to the genius of each succeeding age and its social demands. But to impose it on other peoples to whose institutions it does not respond, is likely to produce friction and not peace.

Finally, a new factor in foreign policy, of exceptional importance, requires intelligent consideration to avoid misguidance. I refer to the press and organized propaganda. Never before in history has the world been subjected to so much misinformation, carefully prepared to advance a political cause. With the skillful aid of an official censorship which surpassed all military needs in the suppression of facts, the people have been almost helpless in their effort to learn the truth. The sources and channels of the news were polluted. Diplomacy has found the department of propaganda as essential an adjunct as the army and navy, and against its machinations the struggle is difficult. I do not condemn the press too severely, for often they are as much sinned against as sinning. Were I to characterize the position in my own language, I would not be so severe as the expert whom I shall take the liberty to quote, but I believe it well for our people to ponder the words of such an authority as Mr. Charles Grant Miller, lately editor of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. He says in the trade journal, *Editor and Publisher*:

For five years there has been a world-wide famine in facts. Truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, about anything of grave public interest, seems to have disappeared from the face of the earth. The date line is no longer any sign of the real source of news. Assertion is little indication of the truth. The news of Russia, the Balkans, the Bosphorus, and Central Europe

mostly originates in London or is trimmed to London's shifting interests; tidings of conditions in England, France and Italy are carefully strained through the foreign loan centers of Wall Street; and where all the rest of the worldful of interested if not interesting misinformation comes from the Lord only knows.

The only defense against these forces of perversion is the cultivation of intelligent opinion by a critical press and public. Whether that end can be achieved I am not sure, for the task, in face of the prevailing adverse conditions, is very nearly insuperable. In foreign affairs, our public in general is so devoid of any background of information that the professional propagandist has a fairly easy task. The only safeguard lies in education of the people, itself made difficult by the propagandist, and in the development of a body of journalists and editors who will manifest at least as much regard for the interests and good name of their own country as they do for the interests and policies of other countries.

Appreciation of these facts and forces, I believe, is essential to the development of an intelligent foreign policy. Unless the economic foundation of international relations is better understood, there will always be danger of the falsification of issues and the confusion of public opinion by astute or irresponsible politicians and by emotional or uninformed journalists. Such understanding will also serve to give a healthier and more reasoned direction to our collaborative efforts in the building of a more stable international order. Instead of carrying out policies thought out for us in foreign capitals and ostensibly founded on permanent moral or political principles, we shall be able to contribute to the promotion of the general welfare by a sound judgment of the present effect and probable future consequences of our foreign policy. The necessity for enlightenment in this respect was never more apparent than now. I do not believe that in modern times the world has faced a greater crisis than that before which we now stand. A continuation of the unenlightenment from which the present governments of Europe seems unable to escape is almost certain to lead to future wars, an eventuality which would threaten not only present political

systems, but the economic system as well. The intelligent coöperation of the world's economic statesmen seems to me, therefore, imperative, if we are to avert the dangers ahead. Mere political coöperation—at best temporary and fluctuating, and never sufficiently informed, impartial or farsighted—will not solve the immediate problem. I would not oppose collaboration by this Government in any coöperative effort, by common counsel or definite action, calculated to relieve the periodic tensions produced by the present international competitive system, with its absence of all restraint upon unfair competition; and I am even hopeful that some day the world may see a centralized body appointed by the nations with authority to allocate raw materials and capital according to economic needs. Such an institution would, I believe, more nearly solve the problem of war than any now in existence. But now and at all times a foreign policy informed by a major premise of fact and not fancy is essential to the welfare of the nation.

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES¹

By William R. Shepherd, Ph.D., L.H.D., Professor of History, Columbia University

Until a quarter of a century ago the people of this country knew of the great sea that lies to the southward as a neighboring expanse of waters girdled with palm-treed shores and dotted with islands innumerable, glistening in manifold hues under the rays of a tropical sun. It was fabled as a region once productive of rakish buccaneers and later of swaggering revolutionists. In its political firmament each of the various and variable republics that it contained was presumed to occupy a separate star revolving through international space—with as many revolutions per minute as might seem desirable. From its exuberant soil sprang the toothsome sugar-cane, the aromatic coffee and tobacco and the delectable fruits that diversified the tastes of temperate climes: An area where nature did as it pleased and man did likewise, amid scenes both primitive and idyllic, it was a geographical expression that meant little outside of books and palates. Certain of our statesmen of old, to be sure, had cast a wistful glance at an island or two and even bits of mainland, as suitable places of sojourn for evanescent ambitions, but the region continued nevertheless to lie beyond the rim of our public consciousness.

Suddenly in 1895 the Caribbean hove into sight. The Monroe Doctrine awoke startled from its slumbers in the realm of the more or less theoretical, and an insurrection arose to shatter the last vestige of an ancient colonial grandeur in the New World. Out of a dispute over the

¹ In this paper an effort will be made to state the problem and to indicate four policies that might be adopted. Of these policies only the first, as the one that seems to correspond to the actual trend of events, will be discussed at length.

boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana and out of a revolt of Cubans against the dominion of Spain have come forth in the brief period of twenty-five years a series of consequences for the United States, of which even now as a people we have but scant appreciation. What we had fancied peculiar to the expansive tendencies of European nations in the remoter parts of Africa, Asia and the archipelagoes of the Pacific has become a reality in our own career. A region near in space but hitherto isolate in thought has been converted into a sphere of influence for this country. The Caribbean Sea has become an American Mediterranean, if not altogether an American lake.

In and around this great sea to the southward are islands and mainlands amounting in extent to over 1,300,000 square miles, or more than a third that of the United States itself. They may be said to stretch like a giant chain all the way from Bermuda, 580 miles east of North Carolina, down to the northern coast of South America, and thence up to Guatemala, 450 miles south of a point about midway between Texas and Florida. Here under fifteen national flags are four political groups. They consist of American dependencies, what are virtually American protectorates, independent republics and European colonies. To the first group, of course, belong Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The second is divisible into three classes, namely: states like Cuba and Panama, which have a government of their own, subject to certain specified limitations that we have seen fit to impose; states like Haiti and Nicaragua, which also have a government of their own, though subject in the one case to a similarly specified but considerably more stringent control on our part than is true of the class preceding, and in the other case to a supervision looser but quite as effective; and a state called the Dominican Republic, which has no government at all of its own. To be sure we maintain a solemn humbug of an international relationship with it by having a Dominican envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary resident at Washington and an American diplomat of the same rank and title dwelling in the city of Santo Domingo, but the directing

word of an American naval officer is law in that land. Doubtless the arrangement has its advantages, in that the American director and the American diplomat can converse in a language mutually intelligible and entertain views that are fairly identical! The third group is composed of the Central American republics of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, where the influence of the United States has been more or less patent at times, and the two South American republics of Colombia and Venezuela. The fourth is made up of the insular and continental colonies of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.

Out of this Caribbean area, following a plan of events as they emerged, we have assembled on a small scale a political and economic conglomerate that, like its huge British compeer in the world at large, is fearfully and wonderfully made. We appear even to have been living up to the best traditions of our erstwhile motherland, by gathering it all up in spells of absentmindedness. In putting it together our course of action reveals something of the equally British "unity in diversity." We seem also to have grasped and applied the meaning of the famous answer of a British minister who, when asked in the House of Commons what reason Great Britain had for holding Egypt, replied: "that of being in a position to give the khedive authoritative advice!"

Without attempting either a logical or a chronological order of presentation, since neither would bring with it either clarity or consistency in the essential absence of both, a list in outline of the more obvious of the heterogeneous processes at work might be offered. It would include: applications of the Monroe Doctrine, both as it was and as it has grown to be; the determination of boundaries; the prevention of filibustering; the annexation of territory by conquest and by purchase; aid in the establishment of two republics, and the temporary administration of one of them; the acquisition of a canal zone, as well as an option on a second canal route, and an attempt to secure a third, asserting thus a claim to sole ownership of potentially competitive routes in the vicinity; the actual building of

a canal; the acquisition further of islands and harbors to be used as naval stations; the military as well as diplomatic protection of persons and property, both foreign and American; the restoration and maintenance of order, including the reservation of a right to intervene for the purpose; the establishment of a native constabulary under American officers; the placing of limitations on the amount of indebtedness which a republic might incur; a course of financial rehabilitation carried actually to the point of putting republics into the hands of a receiver; mediation between belligerent states; help in the formation of a species of federation of republics under moral supervision; intervention for the purpose of insuring fair elections and the enforcement of rules of sanitation, both physical and moral; a refusal to recognize presidents who had gained their positions by a resort to violence, the diplomatic blocking of grants of economic concessions to Europeans, and the destruction of the government of one republic and the imposition of varying types of restriction upon the governments of others.

To all such activities of an official character must be added the spread and diversification of commercial, industrial and financial enterprises on the part of American citizens and corporations, weaving ever closer and closer the economic network that binds the Caribbean lands to the United States. Not the proximity of these lands alone, but the nature of their climate and soil and the wealth of their resources in general render them of incalculable value to us. They constitute a tropical belt similar to that which European nations have acquired long since in other parts of the world and have found altogether desirable. They are so many natural markets lying upon one of the greatest commercial highways of the present and future—to and from the Panama Canal. From them come raw materials and secondary foodstuffs requisite for our factories and exchangeable for our basic foodstuffs and manufactured articles. They have become localities, also, for the investment of American capital under circumstances that may invite the exercise of political influence to a greater or less degree.

Though all of the Central American countries in particular, except El Salvador, front on both the Pacific and the Caribbean, their economic outlook on the whole is directed toward the Caribbean. Tropical fruit thrives most abundantly in the lowlands on the Caribbean side. Here too the sugar-plantations and the forests of hardwoods and rubber are mainly accessible. With the construction of interoceanic railways and the growing use of agricultural machinery, the commerce that springs from the steady development of the interior tends to flow out of Caribbean ports that serve as feeders for New Orleans, New York and other American seaboard centers. No small percentage of Central American trade, furthermore, has been derived from investments made by American corporations and individuals. All this would show that, quite apart from political influence, the currents of commerce in this area, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, set toward the United States, and by it are controlled.

Back of the entry of American capital, however, which has been comparatively recent, lie a series of financial complications in which many of the republics have been involved with European creditors. As a bulwark against foreign aggression of the sort that was contemplated in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine, of course, has been effective. No overt attempts have been made, or seem likely to be made by any non-American nation at actual colonization or the setting up of a foreign political system or the oppression of any of the republics. More insidious forms of alien influence have appeared to menace the welfare of the lands to the southward and challenge the future efficacy of the great American tenet in its broader implications.

Viewing the history of the smaller Caribbean republics as a whole during the last quarter of a century, it is evident that, with the exception of Cuba, few have displayed financial soundness. Even in the case of the European colonies the balance sheet has been far from favorable. Most of the smaller republics, certainly, like tropical areas elsewhere, have gravitated toward bankruptcy, as one or another has repudiated or scaled down its foreign debt,

found itself unable to pay, or has fallen into dispute with foreign creditors. Whether the fault lay primarily in the misbehavior or incapacity of the rulers of any particular country, or was attributable rather to the rapacity of European financiers who took advantage of helplessness or corruption, is beside the point. The condition called for alleviative action by a strong neighbor, if security and development were to be attained.

On the other hand, apart altogether from phenomena suggestive of force and fraud, and taking legitimate transactions alone into account, it is manifest that, in proportion as weak little tropical countries need outside capital for the utilization of resources that consist of a single or of a very small number of staple products, their dependence upon this financial aid is likely to make them in greater or less degree subject to the political influence of the home government of the investor. Similarly, to the extent that this particular home government supports its nationals and promotes their enterprises accordingly, so does the process of economic imperialism continue until the tropical lands in question become hopelessly subordinate to an alien political control. Such a control would be revealed in three main respects, namely: over the public debt, over concessions granted to foreigners for the exploitation of natural resources, and over forms of purely private investment. The issue that fairly presents itself, therefore, is, whether the inevitable control that proceeds from a necessity of adjusting pecuniary claims of one sort or another should be exercised by a European nation or by the United States.

Unrelated as official courses of action to meet all these conditions and circumstances may seem, they have followed quite consistently nevertheless certain lines of development coincident with the economic tendencies of the Caribbean area and marked out by former American Secretaries of State. One is found in the declaration of Richard Olney in 1895: "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."² Another is visible in state-

² House Documents, 54th Cong., 1st sess., I, No. 1, pt. 1, p. 558.

ments of Elihu Root in 1904: "the Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of our right for our own interest to interfere with the action of every other nation in those parts of this hemisphere where others are sovereign and to say, if you do thus and so, even by the consent of the sovereign, we shall regard it as an unfriendly act because it will affect us injuriously;"³ "we arrogate to ourselves only the right to protect; what we will not permit the great Powers of Europe to do we will not permit any American republic to make it necessary for the great Powers of Europe to do."⁴ A third is to be noted in an assertion of Philander C. Knox in 1912, when, referring also to the Monroe Doctrine, he said: "it has in Providence been given to us of the North to state and interpret it."⁵ "Territorial propinquity," moreover, according to Robert Lansing in 1917, "creates special relations between countries."⁶ Though pronounced in the famous Lansing-Ishii agreement, and hence in quite a separate connection, the implications of this assertion, as between the United States and the Caribbean region, are obvious enough.

When one reviews such highly significant utterances by our former Secretaries of State, the most striking thing about them is the fact that they were delivered by representatives of both of the great political parties. This in itself denotes a continuity of thought under successive administrations and regardless of differences in political platforms. In substance the several dicta appear to mean that the exercise of independent action by American republics is subject to limitations imposed by the United States for its own protection and in the interest of an enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, by obviating in advance any reason for its application. As a political medicine, accordingly, the Monroe Doctrine becomes a preventive instead of a remedy. They would indicate, also, that the proximity of a powerful and progressive country to a feeble or backward one entitles

³ Senate Document No. 471, 63rd Cong., 2d sess., p. 39.

⁴ Elihu Root, *Miscellaneous addresses*, p. 272.

⁵ *American Journal of International Law*, vol. vi, p. 495.

⁶ T. F. Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, p. 152.

the former to a right of determining the kind of relationship that shall exist between them.

Whatever the inferences that may be drawn from these dicta, they are centered in economic and political concerns so closely interwoven as to constitute, when applied to the Caribbean region, something quite akin to a declaration of economic imperialism. If the original foundation upon which the structure rests are the Venezuelan imbroglio and the Cuban insurrection, the keystone to the arch is the Panama Canal. At this interoceanic waterway practically all of our interests roundabout it since 1903 have converged, with the object of defending it and of guarding against the acquisition by oversea nations of adjacent trade routes that might compete with it. The control of the Canal has carried with it dominance over the Caribbean area, and that for strategic, political and economic motives identified with the protection of our own national welfare.

Regardless, then, of their particular status of dependence or independence, the countries lying in and around that area are of vital interest to the United States. Not only are they immediate neighbors in whose well-being we must have the concern that proximity suggests, but their location possesses for us a political and economic, as well as purely human, significance that we cannot fail to heed. They are situated so close to our shores and to the Panama Canal that their fortunes and ours are and must be indissolubly linked. Whether this fact has become an actual part of our national consciousness or not, it is revealed in utterances and in deeds, official and private, sufficiently to make its existence plain. More than that, the trend of international events here in the New World, no less than in the Old, as the economic and political consequences of the war became apparent, would seem to foretell the likelihood of an extension of the influence of the United States on an ever-widening scale over the countries in and around the Caribbean.

In this connection one need cite but a single concrete illustration—the oil problem. Our consumption of this product, so indispensable in an oil-driven age, is increasing and the home supply of it diminishing. This, however,

is not the really serious or alarming phase of the matter. Rather is it to be found in the disposition of European governments to bar foreigners out of the ownership and operation of oil properties, and themselves actually to participate in the ownership and control of the corporations that may be concerned—and this not in their own dominions alone, but in countries where they have no sovereignty. The possible effects of such a plan of action upon the United States are easily conceived. Means of counteraction will have to be sought in the Caribbean region as well as in Mexico. The acquisition by European countries of African and Asiatic territories to be held under the form of mandates from a League of Nations, and having a door ostensibly open while the economic ménage within apparently is kept closed, has thus a meaning to us on this side of the water.

Whatever the characteristics of thought and deed, there has been nothing deliberate and systematic about our course of action in the Caribbean. Neither the government nor the people of the United States has planned it in conscious fashion. Worse than that, utter indifference joined with ignorance has marked only too often the popular attitude toward it. Things said or done have aroused substantially no public attention, met with no organized aid or opposition in Congress and seldom produced either approval or condemnation in the press. Not only is there a lack of interest in what we have done or are doing in the Caribbean, but in why anything has been done. The American people has never expressed an opinion at the polls as to whether it sanctioned or not a variety of our performances there. Even the purchase of insular territory at an enormous price evoked no especial comment one way or the other. Supposedly independent republics have had their independence diminished or destroyed, their affairs taken over and their inhabitants and property made subject to officials acting under the orders of the President of the United States—all without the slightest constitutional warrant—and yet who among us seems noticeably to care?

To our neighbors in the Caribbean, moreover, what may be termed the fourfold relationship of this country to its

sister republics in America appears to have been applied with particular intensesness, and in each of its phases: of territorial expansion, political and economic dominance, invocations of the Monroe Doctrine and pronouncements about Pan-Americanism. The notion, indeed, of an essential community of interests and problems between the United States and its fellow republics, which suggests cooperation for the promotion of the one and the solution of the other, has been iterated on many an occasion, even if the action taken by this country has been rather unilateral than otherwise. So, too, in its protean guises the Monroe Doctrine—if its initial letters and its mode of application at times suggest anything—would seem to have been evolved under successive presidential administrations from a Democratic-Republican “Manifest Destiny” into a Republican “Masterful Domination,” continuing on into a Republican “Money Diplomacy” and thence, according to the opinion of some perhaps, into a Democratic “Much Deception”—if the disparity between benevolent assurances about the equality of nations great and small and the actual manner in which they have been handled since 1913 is taken into account. But when all is said and done, the American public seems to have recked nought of cause or consequence.

There has been some expostulation, to be sure, over a supposedly deliberate imperialism of ours which would seek to create a tropical empire to the southward, as a sort of belt of heat about the temperate waist-line of the United States. Condemnation, also, has been levelled at the treatment by this country of a number of the smaller republics, on the ground that they were so treated because they were weak nations and as such might be imposed upon. To these charges, however, an answer is not difficult.

It has not been a deliberate spirit of imperialism, nor even a solicitous regard for the Monroe Doctrine, but rather a more or less unconscious determination on the part of the United States to maintain its political preponderance, promote its economic advancement, and strengthen throughout the area of the Caribbean a sense of inter-American solidarity of which the United States should be the sponsor

and guarantor, that has led this country to introduce among presumably independent republics a kind of tutelage unknown elsewhere in the world. By so doing it has sought no exclusive commercial privileges. Oversea nations share with it freely the benefits of the stability that it has striven to maintain. Their citizens, capital, trade and property in general are quite as amply protected as our own. Yet it cannot be denied that, in regard to several of the republics immediately to the southward, and carefully as the suggestion of a political protectorate has been avoided, this country has converted itself into a trustee; it has become a self-appointed mandatary for weaker neighbors. Even so it would be hard to prove that the line of action we have taken was based solely upon the superiority of our strength over their feebleness. The real distinction, on the contrary, that we have endeavored to draw rests upon the difference between orderly and progressive self-government and retrogressive disorder. In the latter case government by the consent of the governed may signify merely taking a gun and going into politics; but to the Anglo-Saxon mind at all events it would express something other than consent!

One may admit, nevertheless, the possibility that the substantial difference as an international problem between the plight of Mexico and that of some of the little nations of the Caribbean has been one of size. Were Mexico a small state requiring for the restoration of "law and order" merely the despatch of a squad of American sailors and marines, with or without the formulation in advance of a treaty for the purpose of setting up a virtual protectorate, and minus also the antecedent approval or even knowledge of the American people, the woes of Mexico might have been assuaged long since. Many Americans and other foreigners have been slain and much American and other foreign property has been destroyed or damaged in that country. This has not been true in the Caribbean states. "Cleaning up" Mexico, doubtless, would be a big job; whereas "wiping out" the independence of little Caribbean republics seems to have been part of the day's work!

In view of all the foregoing and in view also of the fact that we have completed a quarter century of practices more or less at variance with platitudes, though not with official dicta, and have emerged furthermore from a war that in directing our energies abroad has obscured more than ever our thought and conduct nearer home, it is about time for us to cease drifting in the Caribbean. The course of the United States toward the republics and European colonies in and around the American Mediterranean ought to be shaped by a definite policy. Just what we intend to do in that region should be rendered clear. Even if such categorical questions as, how long will our actual power and our potentialities for interference remain as they are, how often shall we go back to a political archbishop at Washington for more time—as the earlier evolutionists did with the Ussherian chronology—or whether we shall ever let go, can hardly be answered in a manner that will carry practical conviction, we can differentiate at least among what we imagine we are doing, what we are really doing and what we intend to do. The people of the United States ought to face realities and leave off swallowing honeyed phrases that have a different taste, perhaps, in the Caribbean. A precise declaration of intention is needed—an expression of deliberate national will working on the basis of a knowledge of the facts and an appreciation of the possible consequences. Rather than allow the United States to continue resembling a glacier that in terrifying silence is slipping slowly and surely southward, with scant prospect of melting as it goes, the simile of an avalanche might be preferable. At least it would have the advantage of enabling our Caribbean neighbors to see and hear it coming!

In the formulation of a definite policy on the part of the United States four courses of action are available for consideration. Briefly they may be designated as “regulation,” “annexation,” “neutralization” and “abstention.” In a geographical sense, “regulation” would be applicable to the smaller republics; “annexation,” to the British, French and Dutch colonies; “neutralization,” to the republics and possibly to the colonies also, and “abstention,” to both of them.

Taking up the first of these suggested modes of procedure, "regulation" would mean that the United States, without depriving of its actual independence any nation that is unable to maintain an orderly and progressive existence, should exercise over it such a degree of supervision and control as may be requisite to enable the country concerned to govern itself properly. If we adopt and proclaim this to be our Caribbean policy, however, the motives, methods and consequences which it would involve must be clearly understood. It would not be sufficient simply to hit upon a form of administration for a given locality, with or without training in the art of self-government, or to employ the customary means for an assurance of order or an attainment of relief from the burden of indebtedness. The question would be: whether the purpose of the United States and the action chosen to correspond would be altruistic in nature—one genuinely and sincerely designed to help small nations to help themselves; or whether it would be fixed in the terms merely of our own material interests and possibly theirs. Along with the assumption by this country of a right to determine for itself whether a particular republic is fitted for self-government or not, it would be equally a duty to make indisputably plain the circumstances that would justify interference in the internal or external affairs of that republic. No claim based on proximity or necessity alone, which might involve, as it did in a certain famous example in western Europe at the outbreak of the recent war, the perpetration of a moral wrong, would suffice. The essential rights of small nations on this side of the water are no less an obligation to uphold than they are on the other side.

What, then, are the bases upon which such regulation might rest? In the first place it is obvious that a nation has the duty no less than the right to protect its citizens and their interests abroad, so long as the conduct of such citizens is in accordance with the privileges guaranteed them by treaty and the general principles of international law. Since the United States, moreover, has undertaken in its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to prevent non-American nations from interfering beyond a certain point

in the affairs of an American republic for the protection of their nationals, it is plainly the duty of the United States also to extend such protection beyond the point which the non-American nations in question may not pass. While in this manner it is bound to safeguard legitimate foreign interests, it is none the less obligated, on its own behalf and on that of any particular republic, not only to forestall foreign intervention but to balk foreign intrigue.

In the second place, it is amply recognized at common law that anyone has the right to abate a nuisance. If conditions reach such a pass in any given republic that the lives and property of foreigners and nationals are wholly or even largely at the mercy of armed bands engaged in chronic revolutionary turmoil, or in fomenting in one state an insurrection planned for another state, and the conduct of public affairs in that country becomes an international scandal, the United States would have to restore order. How legitimate the performance of this police duty might be must depend upon the extent to which foreigners, rather than natives, were really to blame for the conditions warranting such action.

Financial rehabilitation is another basis on which a policy of "regulation" should rest. To countries like many of those in the Caribbean loans have been and still are indispensable. If such loans are to have the proper security, they must be backed by liens upon the public revenues, foremost among which are the customs receipts. By their honest and economical administration in the interests of the republic concerned, no less than in those of the foreign creditors, the proceeds from taxation in one form or another would be put beyond the reach of more or less professional trouble-makers, whose chief aim might be to seize the public treasury. The chances are, also, that a goodly number of the evils associated with the grant of lavish concessions to foreigners as an easy way of borrowing money would be obviated. The old situation whereby, if a foreign corporation in receipt of such a concession paid the rental regularly, the government was not likely to intervene on behalf of its nationals who might suffer from a misuse of

the privilege in question, would not so readily occur. It may well happen, nevertheless, that the development of natural resources in some instances could be rendered profitable only through the grant of concessions to corporations which thereby are enabled to control, not land and modes of transportation alone, but native labor as well. If so, the duty of honest supervision to guard against exorbitant demands becomes all the more imperative. American companies, therefore, doing business in Caribbean countries where the local government is unable or unwilling to keep them within proper legal restraints, should be incorporated under the federal laws of the United States and be made subject to regulation and inspection.

This brings up the question as to the ethics of certain pecuniary claims that have been put forward by foreign creditors of Caribbean lands. Fifteen years ago, when the news was flashed across the seas that the government of the United States was about to undertake the work of rehabilitating the finances of the Dominican Republic, the effect upon European banking circles was paradoxical. The quotations of bonds issued by such countries rose forthwith, but some of the bondholders protested against any arrangement of the sort contemplated for ascertaining the actual validity of the debts alleged to have been incurred. It was apparent then that the United States had no sympathy with the European practice, sanctioned by long usage, of demanding the payment of claims at the cannon's mouth, prior to a legal determination of the justice of the amount to be exacted. Whatever the opinion entertained overseas on the matter, this country showed itself unwilling to subscribe to the view that any nation should be at liberty to decide at its pleasure how it might collect from small states sums declared to be due its nationals.

If proper care in the supervision of matters financial is exercised, the results are likely to prove beneficial both to the foreign investor and to the republic concerned. As the one is relieved of anxiety about his money, so the other is protected against oppressive exploitation and the ill effects of its own improvidence. An assurance of stability in these

respects would meet pecuniary obligations, replace a fluctuating and more or less irredeemable paper money by a gold-secured currency, and attract the capital needful to stimulate industry, promote commerce, and foster the improvement of seaports and modes of transportation. In general, it would provide the republic in question with the measure of prosperity which the abundance of its natural resources might suggest. Above all, the United States would be enabled to take due precautions against possible infringements of the Monroe Doctrine under the guise of safeguarding innocent foreign loans and concessions.

So as not to wound unnecessarily, and still less to destroy, the consciousness of nationhood, financial supervision should be entrusted to international commissions and not to Americans alone. The creation of boards composed of representatives both of the republic concerned and of our own country would not imply any disparagement of dignity on either side. If railways and other public works can be built on this joint basis, and if nations interested have assigned to commissions of the sort industrial and commercial tasks of great difficulty which they have performed with entire success, there is no valid reason why the same course of action could not be adopted in reference to matters of finance as between the United States and Caribbean countries whose pecuniary problems seem incapable of solution by local effort alone.

Another basis for the policy of "regulation" would take the form of an imposition of moral restraint upon a government whose conduct might seem hurtful to the welfare of its citizens or that of an assurance of moral support to attempts at social amelioration. On behalf of international fair-dealing, however, the course of action ought never to be inconsistent or gratuitously meddlesome. Such a spectacle as that of the United States refusing to uphold the authority of the Central American Court of Justice for the creation of which it was really the sponsor, and allowing it to lapse after a decision indirectly adverse to our procedure with regard to the financial rehabilitation of Nicaragua had been rendered, ought never to be repeated. Neither should

the performance of refusing to recognize a president who might have secured his power through a resort to violence. While it is all very well for the United States to try to inculcate a love for democracy of an Anglo-Saxon type, by helping Caribbean republics to govern themselves, insuring to them the largest measure of democratic government of which they may be capable, and exercising on its own account such an amount of control over the fundamentals as may seem reasonable and prudent, insistence upon a right of withholding recognition because of a difference in methods of presidential selection is wholly unjustifiable. Unless we are prepared to accept the implication that this procedure entails, namely, that we ourselves guarantee the fairness of elections by superintending them, it is a most insidious form of intervention in the domestic affairs of a friendly neighbor. The same may be said of our practice in several cases of sustaining a particular government in power which is not desired by a majority of the citizens.

Were the policy of "regulation," furthermore, to be not only adopted but rendered systematic, it would suggest the advisability of ascertaining whether the existing forms and processes of administration employed in the Caribbean are well adapted to the needs of the localities affected, and whether some degree of uniformity, instead of the actual heterogeneity, might not be introduced both into that area and into the various bureaus and divisions at Washington which are charged with the conduct of their affairs. It would determine whether the course of action thus far pursued and the theories underlying it really befit the needs of the regions and peoples to which they are applied, and the extent to which a careful discrimination might provide for subserving better their respective interests where conditions might present marked differences for consideration. However satisfactory a kind of administration which distributes powers between central and local authorities under a federal system may seem to the American people, it is not apt to work under circumstances quite unlike those to which we are accustomed. At the earliest possible moment, also, military control, wherever set up, should be superseded

by civil rule. More important still, the American authorities temporarily in charge should provide amply for the advancement of education and never rest content merely with a promotion of material well-being. Industry, commerce and transportation must be stimulated, of course, but the training of the mental and moral senses and the elevation of the standard of living are so many human rights that must be given preference over all other considerations. Instead of having the duties and responsibilities at Washington distributed among several departments of government, moreover, it might be desirable to consolidate them as much as practicable on behalf of a more efficient administration. As matters stand, the failure to coordinate the agencies entrusted with the direction of Caribbean concerns is likely to produce confusion where it does not work injustice. Consolidation, also, might serve more effectively to centre public attention upon this particular phase of our foreign relationships, lest it become excessively bureaucratic.

Every possible safeguard, therefore, must be chosen against arbitrary action. To whatever of importance is done the utmost publicity should be assured. This is all the more imperative in view of the indifference of our people to foreign affairs. The United States is not like Great Britain, where spokesmen for native peoples are numerous in Parliament and advocates of their rights are vocal in the press and on the platform. Here in our country the tendency only too often is to conclude that such a spokesman or advocate is harboring an ulterior motive of self-interest or else a sinister design upon the common welfare. Frank and honest constructive criticism, nevertheless, is needed in the management of our foreign concerns more than in those of domestic import, just because so little public attention is devoted to them.

Manifold as the several advantages of the policy under consideration may appear to be, there is quite another side to the picture. If "regulation" be our motto, it means something other than mere "dollar diplomacy" or the substitution of "dollars for bullets," in the same fashion that the police phase of our course of action would be intended

to replace bullets by ballots. It connotes a tightening of the grip of the American investor whose hand would be upheld by the government of the United States. If this in turn should imply the reduction of the smaller Caribbean republics to the position of debtors, in order to facilitate the exercise of political power over them, or on the plea of suppressing revolution give to Americans a monopolistic grasp upon the resources and wealth of those countries, its ethical merits would be dubious indeed.

Moreover there are certain pleasant terms in international parlance the use of which an honest consistency would have to make us forego. "The twenty-one independent republics of the New World," the "equality of sovereign states in this hemisphere," the "self-determination of small nations," even "Pan-Americanism" and similar expressions, would have to fall somewhat into desuetude, except as ornate trappings for state occasions. And yet, if it be true that several of the Caribbean countries are in fact no longer independent and belong almost, if not quite, in the category of the British crown colonies, so far as their relationship to the United States is concerned, the inconsistency in employing misnomers would seem already obvious.

It might happen, also, that the concretion of a heterogeneous series of activities in the Caribbean into a definite and officially announced policy of regulating their affairs would move in the direction of forming an actual Caribbean empire by a constant enlargement of the nature and scope of what was being done. If so, it might create a tendency to widen its bounds far enough to include Mexico. True, our Declaration of Independence had no historical bearing at the time of its pronouncement upon the republics in the Caribbean, but there is at least a semblance of a generality of application about the principles it sets forth. If governments do owe their just powers to the consent of the governed, as much in the great sea to the southward as they do in the United States itself and in other powerful nations, it is rather hard to reconcile either this particular tenet, or its later exposition in regard to making the world safe for democracy, with a regulation of the affairs of sister republics,

unless the mental reservations that may be lurking behind either of them are rendered distinctly geographical and political as well.

It might be argued, furthermore, that in order to befit a new set of circumstances the adoption of such a policy would require still another fundamental alteration in the Monroe Doctrine as originally conceived. As that pronouncement was designed to protect both the republics of America at large and the United States itself against the wiles and perils of European domination, so hereafter it would have to be understood to mean that it supplies the United States with an official dictum for the establishment in the Caribbean of an American sphere of influence. On the principle that what a non-American power is prohibited from doing we may do, and that precisely because our country is not a non-American power, we can build up or tear down as we list—for “we have the ships, we have the men and we have the money too!” The Caribbean republics, accordingly, under such an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, must be kept absolutely independent of Europe, even if in order to attain that desirable situation we have to make them dependent upon the United States.

Of the policies that remain to be dealt with, those of “annexation” and “neutralization” belong to the realm of the conceivable rather than of the actual, and hence do not call for elaboration here. “Annexation,” it may be said, would suggest the acquisition of the British, French and Dutch colonies by purchase from their present European owners.⁷ Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of this procedure, its adoption would be quite compatible with the policy already discussed. Just as “regulation,” if duly safeguarded against abuse, would assure to the republics an independence as effective as that which Cuba now possesses, so “annexation,” if carried out in the spirit that has been displayed in the administration of Porto Rico and the Philippines, would endow the colonies with

⁷W. R. Shepherd, “The attitude of the United States toward the retention by European nations of colonies in and around the Caribbean,” in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* (New York, 1917), pp. 200-13.

a measure of self-government and an opportunity for progress more liberal by far than what they now have.

“Neutralization,” on the other hand, is a course of action from which the ideas of “regulation” and “annexation” would be wholly absent. Moreover it would necessitate a relinquishment of the Monroe Doctrine to the geographical extent that might be required. At all events it would have as its objective an application to the Caribbean of what has been done to states, provinces and other localities in Europe and islands adjacent to it. The republics, and if Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were willing, the colonies also, would be placed under an international guarantee of perpetual immunity from external attack, and prevented in like fashion from making war. To this end the European countries that hold the dependencies in question, the Dominion of Canada and the greater nations at least of South America, as the parties mainly interested, might be invited to join the United States in a common pledge of protection to the Caribbean lands.

Among the three policies thus far proposed, that of “regulation” is at present the most practicable from the American national standpoint. It squares more with precedents and conditions, also, than either of the others. If declared definitely to be the policy of the United States, it might have a beneficial influence through this very declaration upon republics of unrest, which are not soothed by bland assurances from us about equality among sovereign nations, so long as acts indicative of a belief to the contrary are employed against them. In the fullness of time, moreover, acquisition of the European colonies may be combined with it.

But, if the smaller republics in and around the great sea to the southward, along with their fellows of larger dimensions elsewhere in America, are, as on repeated occasions our statesmen and publicists have declared them to be—free and independent sovereign nations, on an equality of rank and dignity with other nations of the world, and hence entitled to the immunity from interference by outsiders which that status would require—and if the

“Pan-Americanism” that we profess really rests upon such a foundation, then “abstention” would be ideally and sentimentally the policy for the United States to adopt. This would mean a discontinuance of the practices that have marked our treatment of many of the Caribbean countries, a withdrawal of so much of the political control over them as now exists, and an abandonment of any thought of acquiring the European colonies as well as of securing the neutralization of either the republics or the colonies. Logically, also, it would appear to connote even a renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Accordingly the little states in question would have to be allowed to work out their own destinies as they might see fit. Any limitation placed upon them in the exercise of their right to freedom in the broad sense would wound, and possibly destroy, their consciousness of nationhood. The sole remedy in justice applicable to them, in case their behavior at any time were not to square with the rules of conduct laid down by civilized nations, would be to subject them to an international boycott until they had mended their ways.

For two reasons, however, a policy of “abstention” is untenable. One of them is unhappily the incontrovertible logic of things as they are. The other is the fact that most of the republics of Latin America, including several of those in the Caribbean area, have joined the League of Nations, and by so doing have formally recognized the validity of the Monroe Doctrine which, in accordance with Article 21, “nothing” in the Covenant “shall be deemed to affect.” Whether the United States becomes a member of the League or not, the result is the same. The cardinal tenet that governs our relations with the republics of Latin America has become through their express recognition of it, and through that of the other signatories of the Covenant, a part of the international law of the world. Instead of protecting them against such a construction as the United States may determine to put upon the Monroe Doctrine, their adoption of the Covenant appears rather to have deprived them of the measure of protection that they already enjoyed.

THE PRESENT AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI

*By Judge Otto Schoenrich, formerly President of the Nicaragua
Mixed Claims Commission; Connected with the Reorgani-
zation of Dominican Finances; Author of
"Santo Domingo"*

As part of the heritage left us by the Spanish War our country is charged with the arduous but honorable task of assisting the countries of the Caribbean Sea in the quest of economic and political well-being. Porto Rico and Cuba early came under our administrative action and our record in both of those Islands has brought honor to the United States. In the last five years new fields have been opened to our activity, and Hispaniola, the favorite island of Columbus, has resounded with the tramp of the American marines. The two republics on that island, the Dominican Republic of Santo Domingo, and the Republic of Haiti, had stumbled on the difficult road of self-government and we have intervened to raise them up and help them on to material prosperity and political stability. It is the purpose of this address to set forth, in brief outline, how these interventions have come about and the manner in which we are fulfilling our mission.

SANTO DOMINGO

Occupation by the United States

Between the Dominican Republic and the United States close relations have existed since 1905. At that time the Dominican custom-houses were placed in charge of an American receiver-general for the purpose of securing a bond issue through which the Dominican Republic redeemed itself from bankruptcy. Under a treaty between the Dominican Republic and the United States both govern-

ments agreed to protect the receiver-general, and the Dominican government promised not to increase its debt without the consent of the American government.

Events progressed satisfactorily in Santo Domingo until November, 1911, when the assassination of President Caceres inaugurated a period of civil commotion, during which the Dominican government violated its treaty pledge to refrain from further debt contraction. As revolution succeeded revolution the American navy repeatedly gave moral support to one side or the other, and officials came from the state department to arrange compromises. In April, 1916, the minister of war endeavored to depose the president, and another revolution threatened, when the American government took drastic action. With the consent of the Dominican president marines were landed and took possession of Santo Domingo and other port towns. In the interior there was some opposition, but occupation of the whole country was eventually accomplished, with a loss of seven Americans killed and fifteen wounded, and probably about three hundred Dominicans killed and wounded. The American forces took over the collection of the Dominican revenues and disarmed the inhabitants, but otherwise the affairs of the Republic were administered in the usual manner.

The Congress of Santo Domingo thereupon elected as temporary president Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, a distinguished physician and highly cultured man, who assembled a cabinet of the most prominent Dominicans. The United States government, however, refused to extend recognition except on condition that a new treaty between the two countries be adopted, similar to the treaty recently negotiated between the United States and Haiti. The principal features of this treaty were the collection of the customs under American auspices, the appointment of an American financial adviser, and the establishment of a constabulary force officered by Americans.

Henriquez and his cabinet refused to accede, pointing out that the proposed arrangement would make the Dominican government a puppet controlled by all-powerful and

not sufficiently responsible American officials. The American authorities exerted pressure by declining to pay over any of the Republic's revenues, and as they controlled practically all, the Henriquez government was left penniless. As a result no salaries were paid, most government services were discontinued, and the whole machinery of government was paralyzed. The entire country rallied about the president, however. Political enmities were forgotten, officials performed their duties as far as possible without pay, and the resistance to the American demands, though passive, was general.

Proclamation of military government

The situation continued for several months until on November 29, 1916, the commander of the American cruiser force in Dominican waters broke the deadlock by declaring the Dominican Republic under the temporary military administration of the United States.

Although the proposed new treaty had met with resistance, I believe the majority of thinking Dominicans found abundant consolation in the turn of events. They remembered the advances in Porto Rico and Cuba under American supervision and hoped that in a few months the road would be opened to similar progress in Santo Domingo.

The United States navy and marine officers took over the entire government of the country, which they still retain. A rear-admiral of the American navy is military governor and exercises full executive and legislative functions, the Dominican congress being suspended. The posts of cabinet ministers are filled by officers of the American navy and marine corps. Although this form of government still continues in Santo Domingo, yet at the same time an American minister is maintained there, under the theory that the country is independent; naturally his duties are nominal.

Accomplishments of military government

The military government has now lasted three and one-half years. In that time it has accomplished a number of results of benefit to the country, of which I shall mention the more important:

1. *Public works.* The military government has shown a commendable interest in road building. Many miles of roads have been constructed in different parts of the country. This in itself is a service greatly to be appreciated, for it would be difficult to find anywhere in the world worse mountain roads than in Santo Domingo. The Dominicans, however, complain that much money has been wasted. Some work has been done also on bridges, port improvements and minor matters.

2. *Finance.* In financial matters the military government has been wise enough to utilize the services of a competent civilian who was formerly assistant receiver-general. Through a claims commission most of the claims outstanding against the Dominican government have been settled, and the awards of the commission have been paid by means of a bond issue. New tax and revenue laws have been enacted.

3. *Police.* The Dominican army and police force were abolished and in their place a new police force, called the national guard, has been created. It is to be observed that whereas in Cuba and Porto Rico nearly all the officers of the newly created police forces were natives and very few Americans, in Santo Domingo the rule is the other way, and practically all the officers are former officers or privates of the marines.

4. *Education.* The marine officer in charge of education is a very intelligent man and many decrees attest his interest in the matter. A set of new school laws prepared by a board of prominent Dominicans has brought considerable improvement over former conditions, though probably the improvement would be still more marked had trained educators been on the board.

5. *General improvements.* Further, a new postal organization has been effected; new sanitary regulations issued; considerable study made of the chaotic land title situation, with a view to introducing the Torrens system; attention has been given to the promotion of agriculture; and a number of other measures are under consideration.

These accomplishments are all of great importance; yet when we compare them with the far-reaching reforms effected in Cuba during the first intervention, which also lasted about three and one-half years, or in Porto Rico during the first three and one-half years of American rule, or even during the shorter second intervention in Cuba, they appear meager. The improvements have not been so varied, nor so thorough, nor so excellent as those in Cuba and Porto Rico.

Moreover the work in Cuba and Porto Rico is all the more remarkable because of the small amount of friction, the measure in which the coöperation of the people was obtained, and the fact that full civil liberties were enjoyed by the native population. In Santo Domingo, on the other hand, the reforms have been accompanied by the complete suppression of popular liberties under a drastic censorship and the oppressive action of arbitrary military courts. And this brings me to the three great defects which in the eyes of the Dominicans have neutralized the good works of the military government, namely, first, the character of the military government; second, the provost courts; and third, the censorship.

Character of the military government

Military officers give excellent results in administrative positions during warfare or in brief emergencies, but as a rule they do not prove good administrators in the long run. They are apt to be autocratic, arbitrary, intolerant and inefficient. There are, of course, exceptions, as is proved by the administration of General Wood in Cuba, but the rule is as stated. Such has been the experience in Santo Domingo.

Among the naval and marine officers in charge in Santo Domingo a number have been conscientious though inexperienced administrators; many have done their work without sympathy; and not a few have been overbearing tyrants. As a chain is judged by its weakest link, so these have made most impression on the Dominicans. Most of the officers have had to depend on interpreters, generally imported from nearby islands, who have been disposed to adopt an aggravating air of superiority.

To the credit of the military government it must be said that it has repeatedly sought the assistance of competent civilians, though it has occasionally made errors of judgment in their selection. It has made the bad mistake of giving the Dominicans little participation in their government and has thus set itself up as a hateful foreign military autocracy. A few months ago, with a flourish of trumpets, it appointed an advisory council of the five foremost Dominicans, but as it ignored the council's recommendations and tried to force the council to endorse an objectionable bond issue, the members of the council resigned and resentment was greater than before.

In the provinces and municipalities the local American military commanders have acted like little kings, to the disgust of Dominicans and foreigners alike. As often happens, the lower the grade of a military official, the more overbearing his conduct is apt to be. There are many stories current of tactless conduct on the part of the local American officials and of the arrogance and petty tyranny of American and Dominican subordinates. There are also unfortunate stories current of torture of prisoners by water cure, by application of red-hot machetes and in other ways. A protest signed by the Archbishop of Santo Domingo which is being circulated throughout Latin America, is, in part, my authority for this statement. Giving prisoners an opportunity to escape and shooting them while escaping is also said to have occurred.

The provost courts

Another source of dissatisfaction is found in the provost courts. They are composed of one or more American officers and were originally established to take cognizance of "offenses against the military government," but this phrase was stretched to cover almost anything. The provost courts have gained the reputation of being unjust, oppressive and cruel, and to delight in excessive sentences. These provost courts, with their arbitrary and overbearing methods, their refusal to permit accused persons to be defended by counsel, and their foreign judges, foreign language and foreign procedure, are galling to the Dominicans, who regard them with aversion and terror.

The censorship

The third source of trouble has been the censorship. When the American authorities took over the administration of Santo Domingo, they immediately instituted a censorship more rigid than any the country had seen in the darkest days of dictatorship. Nothing was too high for the censor: he went so far as to blue-pencil an official address of the chief justice of Santo Domingo; nor was anything too insignificant: not even an advertisement for a servant girl could be published without his approval. Arbitrary and ridiculous rulings of censors elsewhere had their counterpart in Santo Domingo. The use by newspapers of the title "general," as a title for a Dominican, and of certain words such as "national" and "revolution" and of certain phrases such as "freedom of thought," "freedom of speech," was strictly forbidden. Not the slightest criticism of the acts of the government or American officials was tolerated. Censors in different cities had different criteria of severity, and the censor in Santo Domingo has forbidden the reproduction of an article which was lawful in Macoris, thirty miles away. Papers and books from the United States were censored as freely as those from elsewhere. A book of the Porto Rican poet, Jose de Diego, speaker of the house

of delegates of Porto Rico, and which circulated freely in that island, was forbidden in Santo Domingo and its distributor sentenced by a provost court to five years at hard labor, which penalty was generously commuted to banishment from the Republic and confiscation of his stock of books. In September, 1919, the newspaper *El Imparcial* of Macoris was fined \$300 by a provost court for reproducing an inoffensive cablegram which had appeared in a newspaper of San Juan, Porto Rico, and such examples might be multiplied.

Discontent in Santo Domingo

The protest against the censorship at length filtered back through Washington to Santo Domingo and since January of this year there has been a relaxation of the rules. Also the military government is showing a greater consciousness of its responsibilities. Meanwhile, however, a spirit of violent opposition and resentment against everything American has been roused among the inhabitants. A number of men have taken to the woods to resist the American administrators by force of arms. They are called "bandits" by the American authorities, but they evidently have the assistance and sympathy of the country people.

It was formerly the boast of the Dominicans that a stranger could safely visit any part of the country unarmed. Now this condition has changed, properties are menaced, and it is dangerous to ride across the country without an armed guard.

That forcible resistance to the military government is not more widespread is due solely to two circumstances: the fact that the country has continued to enjoy economic prosperity, and the good sense of the Dominicans who realize that armed resistance would be futile.

Happily the military government seems to have profited by its experiences, and its tendencies at the present time are more reassuring, but the record so far cannot be viewed with satisfaction.

HAITI

Occupation by the United States

Turning now to Haiti we find a peculiar and very confusing condition of affairs.

Up to 1915 the relations of the United States with Haiti were as formal as those with the most distant countries. Of late years, however, there had been a rapid political decay in Haiti, the country had not respite from internal warfare, and the danger of international complications became constantly greater. At length, in July, 1915, President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was overthrown and driven to take refuge in the French legation in Port-au-Prince. The next morning the city was aroused at learning that during the night the garrison of the jail, under orders of the district commander, had massacred over 200 political prisoners. After the funeral of the victims several of the mourners proceeded to the Dominican legation, where the district commander had taken refuge, hauled him out and killed him. The others invaded the French legation, dragged out the ex-president and handed him over to the mob, by which he was promptly killed and mutilated.

Two hours after this occurrence, July 28, 1915, the cruiser *Washington* arrived in Port-au-Prince. Marines were disembarked and the military occupation of the country by the United States forces was begun. American marines gradually occupied the whole country. Against the vain protest of the Haitian government they took over the Haitian custom-houses and many public services, including most municipal services; disarmed the Haitian soldiers and police; and seized all weapons they could find. Yet while sorry to lose their independence even temporarily many Haitians were not grieved at the American occupation as they believed it meant the opening of a new era for their country.

Although the American military officials directed as much of the public administration as they chose, the Haitian governmental organization remained intact and continued to function in so far as its workings did not conflict with the actions of the Americans.

The Haitian treaty

The Haitian congress having elected a new president of Haiti, the American legation presented the draft of a permanent treaty between the United States and Haiti, making Haiti to all intents an American protectorate. The treaty raised a storm of protest. Under the strongest pressure the congress eventually adopted it, but with twenty-three "explanations," which in some respects varied the sense of the document and recall the "reservations" to the peace treaty recently discussed in the American senate. The American state department correctly decided that the "explanations" were merely expressions of opinion and did not amount to amendments. The Haitian treaty was accordingly approved by the American senate without modification, and ratifications were exchanged May 3, 1916. Nothing more has since been heard of the Haitian "explanations."

Under this treaty the American government promises to aid Haiti in the development of her resources and the reorganization of her finances. A number of American experts are to be nominated for Haiti by the president of the United States: a general receiver of customs and assistants, a financial adviser, officers to organize and command a Haitian constabulary, and engineers to supervise Haitian public works and sanitation. It is further provided that the United States may intervene for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of an orderly government. The term of the treaty has been fixed at twenty years. The treaty tends to set up two groups of authorities in the same territory, namely, the Haitian government and the American treaty officials, and thus contains the germs of innumerable conflicts.

Dispersal of the Haitian congress

The Haitian government having elected a president and adopted the treaty began to hint that the military occupation should cease, and it actually received a written promise from the American minister carrying that implication. But

American promises in Haiti have been scraps of paper. The occupation still continues, it has charge of all services it cares to hold, and all inquiries with respect to its duration are answered with evasions.

Meanwhile the treaty was put in effect and the American officials for which it provided were appointed and entered upon office.

In 1916 the Haitian congress prepared to meet on the date fixed by the constitution. Their assembling did not suit the American authorities, but instead of avoiding it in a tactful way the executive was induced to issue an entirely illegal decree dissolving the congress. The congressmen having met nevertheless, their meeting place was raided by American officers and marines, who dispersed the congress like so much rabble.

Later the government called the election of a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution and act as legislature. An assembly of high-class men was chosen, which met in June, 1917. It soon became apparent that the assembly labored under the delusion that it was expected to be a coördinate governmental body and not a rubber stamp. Accordingly the Haitian executive, under the pressure of the American authorities, issued a decree dissolving the assembly. The assembly hall was surrounded by constabulary and marines and the members and spectators were locked in for several hours, apparently to make them more amenable to reason. Then, while the chief officers of the constabulary stood about with drawn revolvers, the order of dispersal was given, and the speaker was warned not to answer a word on pain of being shot. Since that time the bothersome system of government through a congress has been dispensed with.

A new constitution was then elaborated in executive circles and submitted to a plebiscite. It was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The result was a foregone conclusion, for no one had been permitted to discuss the new constitution, all voting was oral, and only the boldest dared vote against it. There is nothing remarkable about the new constitution, however, except several provisions

at the end. One of these postpones the next election of congress until January of an even year, which year is to be fixed by decree of the executive. Thus, in a perfectly constitutional manner, the meeting of congress can be indefinitely postponed.

Meanwhile legislative powers are vested in a council of state appointed by the executive. The council of state is agreeably tractable; last year, indeed, two members fought against a measure, but they were promptly removed and their places were taken by more reasonable men.

Governmental disorganization

There are thus in Haiti at the present time three governments: the Haitian government, the American treaty officials and the military occupation. The first is impotent, the second inefficient, the third indifferent to the feelings of the native, but in the accomplishment of results the most efficient of the three. All three must be consulted before it is possible to proceed with any important matter. The situation is chaotic; there is no recognized hand; the functions of the different officials overlap; and there is constant friction between the Haitian government and the treaty officials; between the engineering department and the constabulary; between the navy officers and the marines; between the sanitary department, the marines, the constabulary and the financial adviser. When an agreement is made with one department others refuse to allow it to go through, and no one desiring to take up a matter knows with whom to begin or with how many departments he must treat before it is finally concluded. With such confusion and lack of coöperation it would be impossible even for the most competent men to do constructive work.

Accomplishments under American intervention

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that distressingly little has been accomplished in the period of almost five years since American intervention began. Very

few items merit mention, and several of these require qualification:

1. *Constabulary.* A native constabulary has been organized, as to the expense of which the Haitians complain considerably. Almost all the posts of officers are held by Americans, the higher posts having been given to commissioned officers of the United States marines and the lower posts to non-commissioned officers. Thus sergeants and corporals of marines suddenly found themselves lieutenants of the gendarmerie and virtual monarchs of the districts where they were stationed. (The title of some of these lower officers is "souslieutenant," which is occasionally given the English pronunciation of "souse-lieutenant" by persons who see a peculiar significance in the term.) The amount of tact displayed by such warriors in dealing with the natives can be left to the imagination. The higher officials were men experienced in military affairs, who have proven their valor many times in expeditions in which the marine corps has participated. Their military training inclined them to be autocratic and their tact was unfortunately not always coextensive with their valor.

2. *Road-building.* Many miles of road have been built in different parts of the country. The work has been carried on under the direction of marines, on the theory that a marine can do anything. The Haitians claim the roads are badly built and that much money was wasted on them. The later roads cost less as they were built under the corvee system, authorized by an old law long in disuse, by which the country people could be forced to give a certain amount of labor on the roads. The Haitians complain that the marines enforced this system with harshness and brutality.

3. *Customs service.* The dishonesty which formerly characterized the Haitian customs service has been eliminated. The merchants, native and foreign, complain, however, that the customs laws are being enforced in a spirit which tends to stifle commerce and industry.

4. *Sanitation and prisons.* A number of ditches have been dug around various towns for drainage purposes,

gutters have been cleaned and the prisons are kept in sanitary condition.

That is about the whole record of five years. In spite of the army of American officeholders there is not a trace of the great constructive measures which distinguished the two interventions in Cuba and the first years of American rule in Porto Rico.

Default in public debt

Not only has the action of the American officials been barren of results, but with respect to the public indebtedness of Haiti it has been positively mischievous. No attempt has been made to liquidate or provide for the pending claims against Haiti. On the contrary, the first act of the American occupation was to allow the foreign and internal debt to go into default, and that default continues up to the present day. It mattered not that numerous revenues were specifically pledged to the service of these debts: these moneys have been misapplied to other governmental purposes.

The foreign debt is held mostly in France, and as that country was being financed by the United States, it did not make the outcry which might otherwise have been expected. The internal debt is held mostly in Haiti and the default in its service was a serious matter. As there are no savings banks in Haiti, nor large enterprises in the securities of which money might be invested, it was the custom of the saving Haitian of moderate means to invest his money in government obligations. The bonds of the interior debt were a favorite investment for doctors, lawyers, employees and other people of the middle class. The default brought sadness and want to many families. It is said that most of the bondholders, pressed by want, have sold their papers for insignificant sums to a local bank or to speculators who expect to redeem them from a loan now in contemplation.

Tactlessness of officials

But what exasperates the Haitians even more than the mismanagement of their affairs is the air of superiority adopted by many of the foreign officials and the rudeness and contempt with which the natives are often treated. Unfortunately some officers forget that they are supposed to be in Haiti for the purpose of advancing the happiness of the inhabitants, and they act as though they were in a conquered country, do not attempt to conceal their race prejudice and have no regard for the feelings of the natives. The principal offenders are officers in the lower grades and former non-commissioned officers or privates of the marines. In Haiti also unfortunate stories are current of torture by water-cure and of shooting of prisoners.

The provost courts

The American provost courts have further contributed to the popular discontent. Their rule is said to be that a marine can do no wrong—to a native Haitian. They do justice as they see it, without bothering much whether there is a statute prohibiting the offense. Henri Chauvet, the editor of *Le Nouvelliste*, the principal newspaper of Port-au-Prince, learned that to his sorrow. Having received a tip that Mr. Ruan, the financial adviser, was soon to be recalled, he published it in his paper. He was called before the acting chief of the gendarmerie and invited to tell where he got "that damned lie about Ruan." Chauvet replied that he had printed the item in good faith, believing it to be true, but that he would print a denial if it were not. He refused to give the name of his informant, as he did not wish to get a friend into the trouble he saw coming to himself. Thereupon he was fined \$300 and kept in jail till the fine was paid and his paper suspended for three months. The joke was that the tip was correct and Mr. Ruan was actually recalled shortly after.

Nor do technicalities of procedure disturb the provost courts. Their procedure is the acme of simplicity and

promptness, as Mr. Victor Mangones, of a well-known Haitian family, can testify. Mr. Mangones is a wholesale merchant, and as a sideline to his regular business he owns a little store near the waterfront of Port-au-Prince, which store is conducted by an employee. Now the occupation has made an order that no rum shall be sold to the marines: the order has never been enacted by any duly constituted authority in Haiti nor has it been published according to law, but the provost courts do not consider such details. In November, 1919, several thirsty marines sent a Haitian boy to the store of Mangones for a bottle of rum and the storekeeper sold it to him, never thinking it was for Americans. Somebody told the provost court, which immediately sentenced Mr. Mangones, the owner of the store, to six months' imprisonment at hard labor. It did not take the trouble to summon or hear him. The first thing Mangones knew of the matter was when he was seized, hustled off to jail, put in stripes, and made to work breaking stones on the rock-pile. Fortunately he had influential friends, who with the assistance of the French minister, obtained his release.

Discontent in Haiti

The contemptuous and oppressive conduct of their new rulers has aroused such bitterness among the populace, that groups of malcontents have begun to form in the woods. They are called "cacos," the Haitian term for political bandits. The audacity and following of these "cacos" became such that on the fifteenth day of last January a force of about 2000 dared to attack the capital city, Port-au-Prince. They penetrated far into the city, and it was not until after they had burned a block of buildings and battled for over an hour that they could be scattered by the marines and gendarmerie. This incident goes to show that the Haitians are exasperated to the point of open rebellion. Yet such is the disorganization of government that no improvement in the situation is in sight.

CONCLUSION

Thus a review of developments in Santo Domingo and Haiti in the last five years is not gratifying to our national pride. When we consider the splendid achievements in Cuba and Porto Rico, the record made in Santo Domingo must bring us deep disappointment, while the mess in Haiti must awaken feelings of resentment and shame.

I do not wish to give the impression, however, that the blame for conditions rests entirely upon the local American authorities, for most of them have been earnest workers and have done their duty as they saw it. The chief fault is higher up, in the Washington government, which has permitted these conditions to arise and develop. The complaints to which I have in general terms referred, have been brought to the attention of the state department many times but without avail. The Washington government, in its dealings with Haiti and Santo Domingo, has displayed a disregard of the rights of the inhabitants, an obtuseness with respect to the obligations devolving upon the United States, and an indifference to the opinion of Latin-America and the world, which are simply incomprehensible.

Not only from these countries do we hear complaints, but also from the Virgin Islands, whose inhabitants claim that they had more freedom and received more consideration under Danish rule than at present. It seems that whenever in the last five years the United States have assumed the government of another country, the coming of the American flag has signified the suppression of popular institutions and the setting up of an arbitrary and inefficient militarism.

Our government seems disposed to forget at times that our position in those countries is that of a trustee. We are therefore in honor bound to exercise more vigilance with reference to their affairs than with respect to our own and use extraordinary care in choosing men and enacting measures. Failing to do so we shall prove false to our trust, and when we stoop to use our authority for the purpose of dispensing party patronage, as has unfortunately repeatedly

occurred, we are in the position of a trustee who uses the trust funds for his own ends.

There can be no doubt, however, that the American spirit of common sense and fair dealing will eventually assert itself and that Santo Domingo and Haiti will yet have occasion to praise American administration, generosity and justice. Let us hope that this result may soon be attained, to the benefit of the inhabitants of those countries, to our own satisfaction, and to the glory of the American name.

AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS IN SANTO DOMINGO, HAITI, AND VIRGIN ISLANDS

*By Colonel George C. Thorpe, United States Marine Corps,
Recently Chief of Staff of the Brigade of Marines in
Occupation of the Dominican Republic*

As I have come to this conference with a paper previously prepared, without knowledge of the nature of the disparagements to be heard here today with reference to our government's conduct of affairs in the West Indies, I can reply specifically thereto only by way of remarks interposed here and there.

In advance I will reveal my point of view (my prejudice, you may say) by confessing my complete surprise at the picture painted by an earlier speaker whose representation of conditions in Santo Domingo is so foreign to my understanding of them that I began to wonder if I really had been in that country at all, but had only dreamed of being there, until I learned that the critical speaker has not been there himself for many years, certainly not since the beginning of the American occupation. I am quite certain that I reported at Santo Domingo City as chief of staff of the brigade of marines in occupation of the Dominican Republic in February, 1917. In that capacity as well as by special detail, I visited many parts of the country—even the most remote and unfrequented—and, as in a rather wide experience of travel I always find people the most promising objects of interest, it was natural that wherever I went I made friends with the natives and talked with them on intimate terms. In riding up to a mountain hut with my escort, we would dismount and exchange ceremoniously polite greetings with the family. Whatever is strange and mysterious (as is the foreigner to these ignorant countrymen) is alarming or terrifying. They, in seeing armed Americans for the first time, would regard us with frightened

expectancy. But a seat would be offered, followed soon by a cup of black coffee. By the time I had asked the names and ages of children gaping from every window and corner, and had told them I had little ones at home myself—"one as old as Carmita and another as big as Pedro"—the ice was broken and they saw there was nothing terrible about the foreigner who knew that children liked sweetmeats. Many of such wayside hospitalities ended in the exchange of simple presents. Incidentally, of course, I learned their grievances if they had any and could estimate their attitudes.

During the last seven months of my stay of nearly two years, I was in command of the eastern district composed of two provinces and part of a third, where there was a so-called insurrection which was not a real insurrection because: (1) the participants were mostly criminals (or bandits) who were interested only by the attraction of adventure and license; (2) they had no propaganda or other announcement of any grievances against the government; (3) their activities were directed far more against peaceable Dominicans than against armed forces of the government; (4) their acts were typically criminal, consisting of robbery, murder of Dominicans who would not meet their demands, destruction of Dominican property, and fiendish crimes against very young girls. When the leader, Vicentico, and his followers surrendered to me in July, 1917, he told me they had had no grievance against the government or against Americans. That the vast majority of Dominicans were entirely unsympathetic with these bandits was evidenced by the fact that the archbishop informed the military governor that the provincial parishes had set aside a day of prayer and thanksgiving over the restoration of order following the surrender of Vicentico's bands. Immediately following that event hundreds of new farms were opened by Dominicans in the rural districts of Seibo province.

While conducting operations for suppression of banditry, I lived for months in the rural towns and daily had long talks with representative natives; we used to estimate every conceivable possibility and make plans for future progress—of how we could build roads and bridges, develop indus-

tries, advance agriculture, extend education, and promote coöperation. Whenever I suggested coöperative enterprise they invariably assured me that any such mutual undertakings as were represented by incorporation were impossible because of mutual distrust and because no one would be satisfied with his share. I believe that explains why the Dominicans are not able to sustain self-government: they have no social feeling—no coöperative instincts.

I recall that when I was in that country, I was not insensible to the fact that some young upper class Dominicans felt the humiliation of seeing a foreign people ruling their country, and while I tacitly sympathized, I knew (and they often assured me) that they realized it was a situation for which they could thank themselves, and however much they might regret the suspension of their sovereignty they hoped our government would hold to its task until the Dominican people became fit, through education and otherwise. My intimate acquaintance extended not only to the poor country people but to the most educated classes in the cities in whose homes I was a frequent visitor.

To understand why it was necessary at last for our government to occupy Santo Domingo, I must sketch briefly the cardinal material items of Dominican history, even at the risk of telling you much that you already know, and I believe the later events cited will suggest the reluctance with which our government intervened.

In this view we must take the two republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti together, forming one island of 28,249 square miles (as large as Vermont and New Hampshire combined) situated between Cuba and Porto Rico.

From the time of its discovery by Christopher Columbus to the Peace of Ryswick (1697), the island was under Spanish Governors. Early in the sixteenth century the energetic governor Ovando impressed the Arawaks so severely in agricultural and building enterprises that, unaccustomed to work, they broke under the strain, so that the Spaniards had to import Africans. The more vigorous negro, allied with European diseases, proved a too strong combination against the Indian. It is said that some two million disap-

peared—died or carried off as slaves. Although the Indian, as a race, vanished from the country, present day Dominicans honor Indian traditions, particularly the memory of Princess Anacaona whose friendliness to the Spaniards was most treacherously rewarded.

It was not only against the Indians that the Spanish colonists had to fight, but during the first two hundred years of European occupation they were troubled with numerous uprisings of the blacks and were attacked from without by the French, Dutch and English.

In 1585, Sir Francis Drake initiated England's strategy against Spain by his piratical thrust at the Spanish Main through Santo Domingo City, then a most important point on the strategic map of the world. He utilized disloyal natives to secure a foothold on the island.

The Peace of Ryswick settled the sovereignty by giving France the western third (now Haiti), and Spain the remainder. Haiti prospered for a time and Santo Domingo declined under the yoke of slavery and through isolation until 1740 when the opening of its ports to foreign commerce brought about improvement.

During the French Revolution the two colonies took sides and carried on a border warfare.

The Treaty of Basle, 1795, ceded the whole island to France and the French administration in Haiti became supreme. Spanish colonists quit the country in a body, going to Cuba, Porto Rico and Venezuela. It is said that 40,000 thus left their homes.

By 1804 the strength of the Haitians had become so formidable that a Haitian Republic was proclaimed over the entire island. After much fighting, the French reëstablished their authority over the Haitians.

In 1808, a revolution broke out in Seibo (the incubator of insurrection ever since), and with the help of the English the Spanish flag was hoisted the next year. Spanish dominion was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, 1814. A long period of seven years' comparative peace was followed by a revolution against the Spanish which succeeded so far as to establish an independent sovereign state called Spanish

Haiti which lasted a few weeks when the Haitians invaded and established themselves so firmly that they were able to hold on for twenty-two years until, in 1844, inhabitants of Spanish descent succeeded in a revolution that established the Dominican Republic with Gen. Pedro Santana as first president. He lasted for nearly four years when a revolution resulted in elevating Gen. Manuel Jimenez to the Presidency.

Another revolution the next year, displaced Jimenez by Col. Buenaventura Baez who served out his term and was succeeded by the reelection of Santana.

Revolutions and wars with Haiti filled the next twelve years when the Dominican president called for Spanish aid to pacify the country. Spain effected a military occupation, but a revolution broke out two years later which lasted until 1865 when Spain withdrew.

Revolutions were now a regular institution and an enormous debt was piled up. During President Grant's administration there was strong Dominican demand for annexation to the United States endorsed by Grant which, however, failed through opposition in our Congress.

New governments were formed, through revolution, in 1865, 1866, 1867, 1873, 1876 (two), 1878 (two), 1879.

In 1882 General Heureaux (of Haitian descent and known by the nick-name of Lili) became president and by the exercise of strong-armed government held his office for the legal two-year term. After a bitter struggle his candidate, General Billini, succeeded to the presidency, but, unable to support the demands of his supporters for preferment, resigned in a few months and was succeeded by the vice-president, Gil, which brought about a revolution and re-established Heureaux in the presidency who held office, by murder, tyranny and graft, until 1899 when he was assassinated. Dominican annals are full of stories of this monster's presidential adventures, according to which it appears that as soon as Lili suspected anyone, even a blood relative, of ambition, he contrived and effected his murder. He was ingenious in diabolical methods.

The vice-president, succeeding Lili, was soon overthrown by a revolution headed by General Horacio Vasquez who held office less than three months. By a controlled election Gen. J. I. Jimenez was made president and Vasquez vice-president. Vasquez headed a revolution against his confrère and displaced him in 1902.

Vasquez was soon forced out and was succeeded by Gil in March, 1903. In October of the same year General Morales headed a revolution and marched on the capital. He was elected president in the following June, with Caceras as vice-president.

The heavy expense of revolutions and the inefficient (not to say corrupt) collection of revenues, had entailed a constant increase of public debt, and by 1904 the interest was entirely in default. Foreign governments began pressure for payments due their citizens. Arrangements were made to liquidate the debts by pledging customs receipts and an American agent was placed in charge of the Puerta Plata custom house. Other foreign nations demanded similar rights. In the face of imminent danger of foreign intervention, the Dominican Republic applied to the United States for assistance. In 1905 an agreement with the United States went into effect whereby the Dominican customs receipts were to be collected by the United States, and provision made for the payment of the debt.

In spite of the fact that revolutionists could no longer count upon capturing customs houses, revolutions continued. President Morales fled and resigned. Caceras succeeded him. A bond issue of \$20,000,000 was made for conversion of old debts, the principal creditors reducing their claims by about one-half.

In 1907, a new fiscal treaty was confirmed by the United States Senate and Dominican Congress which provided for a general receiver of Dominican customs appointed by the President of the United States.

Conditions improved; funds were set aside for the debt and for public improvements. Caceras was reelected.

In 1911 Caceras was assassinated. The election of his successor brought on a revolution which lasted for several

months and as the Dominican government could not restore order it called in the good offices of the United States which sent a commission to Santo Domingo. The various factions were brought together in the choice of the Archbishop Noel as president. The latter was soon in despair and fled. Then the Dominican Congress elected Bordas Valdez who served a year. Revolutions broke out again and the United States again came to the rescue by sending a commission which brought the parties together to choose a provisional president (Ramon Baez, son of late President Buenaventura Baez) and conducted a popular election which chose ex-president J. J. Jimenez. Matters seemed settled for a time, and conditions improved. But in less than a year and half the secretary of war, Desiderio Arias, executed a coup while the president was at his country home, and through command of the military forces, seized the government and imprisoned the loyal officers. At the request of President Jimenez marines landed from American ships and restored order in the capital. Jimenez resigned and the Dominican Congress elected Dr. Carvajal. The United States refused recognition of the new government unless it would give assurance of maintenance of order and honest control of finances, to which end a new treaty would be required, providing for collection of customs under American supervision, appointment of a financial adviser, and establishment of a constabulary officered by Americans. Carvajal refused consent to these terms. Matters drifted for more than a year, when in view of the hopelessness of the situation, marines were landed some miles west of the city (as Sir Francis Drake's troops had done in 1585) and marched upon the capital which was promptly evacuated by Dominican forces under Arias.

Arias marched across the island and secured his position in the mountains at Santiago and thereabouts.

In June, 1916, the Fourth Regiment of Marines, proceeding from San Diego, Cal., landed at Monte Cristi, under command of Col. J. H. Pendleton (now Brigadier-general) who was placed in command of all forces operating on shore in the Republic.

There were two principal routes from the coast to Santiago: one by way of a muddy trail for about 80 miles climbing up grade flanked by heavy underbrush; the other from Puerta Plata, a much shorter and steeper route served by a dilapidated cog railway. The advance upon Santiago was made by a column from each of these ports, and after about ten days' marching and several engagements against vastly superior numbers of insurgents hidden behind concealed intrenchments, Colonel Pendleton's force reached the vicinity of Santiago and was met by peace commissioners. All the insurgents surrendered or dispersed and Arias submitted to American control which was at once established militarily throughout the country under the administration of Rear-Admiral Caperton.

Endeavors to reestablish government under Dominican administration having proved fruitless, the military government of the United States in the Dominican Republic was set up November 29, 1916, with Capt. (now rear-admiral) H. S. Knapp as military governor. His first proclamation required the disarmament of the population. Mountains of weapons of all epochs since the fifteenth century and a great deal of ammunition and explosives were surrendered or captured during the following year. And still enough was held back to support the prosecution of a formidable amount of banditry for two years more. During the present occupation there have been 116 distinct fights or skirmishes between marines and Dominican bandits, resulting in the killing of 5 marine officers and 9 enlisted men, and wounding of 7 officers and 34 enlisted men, i.e., 55 battle casualties on our side. Dominican casualties are not known but certainly are many times our aggregate.

That brings us historically up to the present.

As to the form of governmental administration in Santo Domingo:

The military governor (Real-Admiral Snowden at present) "administers" the Dominican Republic. He is assisted by cabinet ministers whose functions are practically the same as under Dominican presidency, incumbents being Americans. The entire Dominican judiciary has been left in office.

There are twelve provinces, each with a native governor who, if he is the right kind of man, may do a great deal in leading his people into peaceful pursuits and industry, and in developing public works as did, especially, Governor Elpidio Morales of Seibo in 1917.

The country is further subdivided into 60 communes which are governed by communal councils composed of the best citizens, appointed by the military governor. Cities and the larger towns are governed by councils called *ayuntamientos*.

From a personal knowledge of the happenings in Santo Domingo, I can say that the American administration of that government has been actuated by a high sense of its responsibilities and with a most earnest desire, at every step, to build soundly for the present and future good of the Dominican people. Nothing could be finer than the way our officers, from lieutenant up (with rare exceptions) have estimated particular Dominican situations and provided therefor.

During the World War, we had to get along with few troops in Santo Domingo, and small detachments were widely scattered. I recall that a second lieutenant with a few marines was sent up into a troubled province to do his best toward restoring order. It was a remote region and possibly never had enjoyed the blessing of good government. The better class of natives were impressed by this young man's earnestness and under his guidance all sorts of items of elementary progress were initiated: sanitation, police, road building, suppression of brigandage, enforcement of court decrees, collection of taxes, etc. A letter came to the capital, signed by hundreds of natives, asking that the young officer be made a permanent governor to guide them forever. In the other end of the island, a young American captain of constabulary (a sergeant of marines) had similarly interested the people in progress and when he was murdered by a bandit he was universally mourned as a Dominican martyr: everyone wore a special commemorative badge in his honor.

Everywhere in the island the troops make friends with the people and are unpopular only with the criminal or the flippant agitator with unworthy political aims.

From the first, the military government has truly estimated its mission to be: (1) To promote education, primary and vocational; (2) to build roads; (3) to create an effective police force; (4) to cultivate a regard for law and order; (5) to place property rights on a firmer basis, particularly as to land titles; (6) to stabilize the finances of the country; (7) and at the same time, to respect Dominican institutions and sentiments as far as may be.

As to the realization of these aims: Under Dominican régime there was no real school administration. Primary education was mostly confined to schools with one or two teachers in most important towns; no rural schools. Not over 18,000 pupils in all schools, average attendance 40 per cent. Teachers were very poorly paid and often their salaries were corruptly withheld. The military government's reform was based upon a report of a Dominican commission. There is now a school system with the country divided into 50 school districts of 6 departments, acting under a minister of education. There were (January 1, 1920) 1468 teachers, free of political influence, whose salaries are at least four times the supposed salaries of the teachers under the Dominican régime. There are 195 primary schools, 7 secondary and normal, 6 completely developed industrials for girls and others under formation, 2 schools of fine arts, 2 correctional schools, central university. As against 18,000 pupils there are now more than 100,000 and the average attendance is 85 per cent. There used to be almost no school equipment and even in the cities there were no distinctive school buildings—only miserable dirty places rented. During the past two years more than \$200,000 worth of school equipment has been distributed. Schools benefit by modern methods; physical, moral and vocational training. As there is more than 90 per cent illiteracy in Santo Domingo the Department of Education estimates its mission to be to extend rudimentary education until illiteracy is banished, to satisfy the basic mission of the

military government to lay the foundation of a self-supporting democracy.

The agricultural college maintains an experimental station near the capital, and thirty instructors are placed throughout the country to give local instruction to farmers. The government sells modern agricultural machinery at cost to promote their use.

A national highway over the Cordilleras, from the capital to Monte Cristi, connecting the northern and southern coasts, estimated to cost \$3,000,000 is 60 per cent complete. Various other highways have been finished or are in course of construction. In the absence of common carrier railways in the southern provinces, these automobile roads are of first importance to promote husbandry because without them there is no reasonably available transportation for marketing produce. Road building would have been advanced much more if war conditions had not impeded the importation of materials.

The government owned railway from Puerta Plata has been improved and its earnings trebled.

A native constabulary called Guardia Nacional Dominicana of a strength of about 2000 officers and men has been brought to a high state of efficiency. Since its organization in February, 1918, there has been no case of a native Guardia's defection or desertion to insurgents or bandits. These troops are scattered in small detachments all over the country, and supported by American marines concentrated at important points, maintain order, perform police duties, and serve the courts (in capacities analogous to that of sheriff or bailiff), furnish prison guards, etc. Effort to utilize native officers has not met with success. We were very anxious to avoid using American officers therefor, especially during the World War, but in nearly every case the native officer failed to hold his men together and, without proper control, the native soldiery was inclined to impose upon the civilians.

The land ownership question is probably the most difficult one to reform as the state of land titles is one of hopeless confusion, due to the involved usages of land tenure—espe-

cially as to communal lands (tracts owned in common by several persons with no division upon descent). The military government is proceeding conservatively with this problem so as to safeguard the rights of real owners: a wise precaution especially in view of the ignorance of the masses as to means of defending their titles. The government has in project a law, about to be promulgated, providing for the division of undivided lands, with guaranteed titles. The land is not of sufficient area to satisfy the claims of all, and an honest adjudication will result in loss to many people. A political government could never hope to solve this problem because it could not withstand the pressure of dissatisfied claimants. Under the military government, the practice of law has been placed on a higher plane. The profession has even been thrown open to women and one Dominican woman is now prominent at the legal bar in the capital.

The reform of the Dominican judiciary is in progress. Penal proceedings have been simplified and trials correspondingly expedited. Formerly many cases avoided trial by prescription of time before their cases could be reached on the docket. Now the criminal dockets are being cleared.

The military government has accomplished a great deal in prison reform. Nothing could have been worse than the conditions of prisons and prisoners as we found them. All this is being placed on a modern basis, as to sanitation, segregation, probation, training, etc.

Civil service is being gradually extended to all departments of the government.

As to finances: When the United States took over the administration of Dominican finances, the account of the government was overdrawn in the sum of \$14,234.63, and payment of salaries and various claims were greatly in arrears. The military government paid all 1916 indebtedness, has met all accruing expenses of government and on October 1, 1919, had nearly \$4,000,000 in the treasury.

The military government has reorganized the internal revenue department and without increase of rates the collections have almost trebled.

A claims commission created by the military government, in session now for about three years, will complete its hearings and reports about March, 1920. Then the entire floating debt of the Dominican Republic will have been refunded. The government is issuing bonds (about \$5,000,000) in payment.

As a résumé of the public debt, it may be said that as against the \$20,000,000 bond issue there are assets in the sinking fund (Sept. 30, 1919) of \$8,210,738.83, leaving a balance of liabilities to be liquidated, amounting to \$11,789,-261.17. If the Dominicans criticize this management of their finances, as an earlier speaker claims, what can they say of their own management which failed even to pay interest.

The Dominican people are grateful to the military government for shipping aid rendered during the World War. Had the United States not been in occupation of Santo Domingo, the latter's products could not have been marketed, with the exception of sugar which was needed by the belligerents. The military government was very active in securing shipping for the Dominican products and even carried them on naval transports, not only thus saving the people from distress, but placing millions of dollars in the pockets of their citizens by the continuance of normal trade or better.

HAITI

It is well known to you that the European governments that colonized Haiti, finding it rich in resources, exploited it with the fierceness characteristic of buccaneering times. Hosts of African slaves were brought there directly from the jungle, were worked unmercifully and were treated worse than beasts. These slaves remained savages and did not even learn their master's languages. Some of the strongest and most intelligent summoned spirit to escape from the plantations and mines, taking refuge in the mountains; they were called *cacos* (probably an African term). Then in the time of the French Revolution and during the teachings of the equality of man, French agitators came to Haiti and told the slaves that they were as good as their

masters and that in France the oppressed had risen and killed off their oppressors. So the blacks rose in Haiti and gradually exterminated the whites; this movement went so far as finally to result in the murder of every inhabitant with any white blood (even the mulattoes). Napoleon sent an army of 10,000 soldiers to subdue Haiti. Its base was in the north at Cape Haitian. At the same time England sent a force into the south which took Port au Prince by storm. The yellow fever defeated both forces, but the English escaped fairly well by being supported by their fleet. The French, not so served, perished almost to a man. Visitors at Cape Haitian may now see the graves of the French general, Napoleon's kinsman.

The outstanding result of the greater success of native arms against the foreigner in Haiti, over those of the native against the foreigner in Santo Domingo, is that Haiti, now known as the *Black Republic*, is far less civilized than Santo Domingo, known as the *Mulatto Republic*. While there is a high percentage of ignorance in both countries, the Dominican is far more amenable to educating processes than is the Haitian *caco*. During my two years' stay in Santo Domingo, the doors and windows of my house were always open and my personal effects often unguarded but the only time I ever was robbed, the thief was a Haitian. In fact, a large part of the so-called insurgents or bandits in Santo Domingo are Haitians.

I understand that Haitian government employees never were paid in cash, but in due bills. If, for instance, an employee earned say 50 gourds (the Haitian monetary unit), he received a chit or due bill for that amount. A broker would give him 5 gourds for his piece of paper. The broker would then pass it on to a higher broker who would give him 10 gourds; and so on up through a series of grafters until it finally reached the head of the government department upon which the bill was drawn, he would pay possibly half its face value and pass it to the government as a voucher for full value.

Without dwelling upon the innumerable revolutions that make the history of Haiti, we may come to the last which took place in July, 1915.

It seems that the presidential palace was next to the French legation and that there was an easily accessible back way between the two which Haitian presidents often availed themselves of to escape assassination. President Sam traveled this familiar route in that July of 1915, and gained the diplomatic refuge, but, quite contrary to Haitian precedent, the revolutionaries invaded theoretical French territory and murdered Mr. Sam in the presence of the French minister's family, and cut their victim's body into pieces which they carried on spear heads in a grand parade through the streets. The capital, Port au Prince, was filled with federal troops as well as by the *cacos* (insurgents) from north Haiti. Hundreds of people were slaughtered—especially scores of political prisoners.

Admiral Caperton, then in command of the American naval forces in West Indian waters came into the harbor and was asked to land troops to protect foreigners against the rioting of this blood-thirsty mob. He complied by sending a small force of marines and sailors which accomplished the delicate operation of entering a fairly large city, with which they were entirely unfamiliar, and into the midst of frenzied masses that, though factional among themselves, were united as against the invader. The landing party occupied important points, checked destruction and bloodshed, and possibly saved the city with the loss of a few sailors killed.

The whole country was in a state of chaos and bankruptcy and savagery. A considerable force of reënforcements soon arrived under Col. (now major-general) L. W. T. Waller and set about subduing the *cacos* and pacifying the country. After some delay the American commanders prevailed upon the remnant of Haitian government to reorganize and select a provisional president; a treaty was concluded with the United States, providing for the latter's supervision of Haitian finances, for the organization of a constabulary, and for the prosecution of public works and sanitation as necessary features of progress.

American officers took charge of Haitian finances and organized an efficient gendarmerie with an authorized strength of about 2600 officers and men which was disposed

in various districts to cover the republic, preserving order, promoting public works, and initiating extensive sanitation improvements. Possibly the best achievement of this organization was the completion of an automobile road from Port au Prince to Cape Haitian on December 18, 1917. They have built some 600 miles of road. A force of marines is maintained in Haiti to support the gendarmerie.

From time to time there have been disturbances on the part of the *cacos*, particularly during the present year. But during a period of nearly four years, from December 6, 1915, to November 1, 1919, there were only eighteen casualties among American troops.

There was almost no postal or telegraph service at the beginning of the occupation; now those services are general and mail deliveries are regular.

The revenues are collected efficiently and honestly, provision is made therefrom for liquidation of the large public debt as well as for a progressive scheme of public improvements. A certain sum is turned over to the Haitian government for its other expenses. There is absolutely no graft or extravagance.

The present president has held office for some three years and recently toured the country, being received enthusiastically everywhere; surely an absolute guaranty that the Haitian majority approves of the present arrangement of American occupation, for it was President Dartignave who, on behalf of Haiti, participated in initiating American intervention. Under Haitian government a president would have needed an army to guard him on such a trip.

As the schools are under the Haitian government, they are not, as in Santo Domingo, under the direction of an American minister; at the same time the forces of occupation have aided the Haitian government in educational directions by establishing model schools and by having gendarmerie officers report as to school sessions as, without such precautions, teachers have been known to draw their salaries without attending school sessions for several months at a time. Progress in education in Haiti, it is safe to say, will be infinitely slower than in Santo Domingo if the present plans in both places continue.

As to sanitation, Haiti was a terrible place scarcely inhabitable where the death rate at times was appalling. Systematic sanitation has been effected by sanitary engineers. The work of the Americans has changed sanitary conditions so that Haiti is now most healthful and, with Santo Domingo, should be the most popular winter resort for tourists in the western hemisphere.

VIRGIN ISLANDS

The Virgin Islands present an entirely different problem from that of the Haitian-Dominican island, for in the former there has been no resistance to American occupation. We are there by right of purchase and practically by unanimous consent expressed in a plebiscite. The vast majority of the inhabitants had been eager for the transfer of flags for a long time.

In 1901 I was mounting guns on Culebra Island, and to give some of the men a holiday after hard work, manned a sailing launch and sailed over to St. Thomas—about an eighteen hours' trip with unfavorable winds. When my little 30-foot boat came into St. Thomas harbor, with the Stars and Stripes at the peak, thousands of people crowded the water front to give us welcome. As the question of sale of the islands was then acute in American-Danish diplomacy, it seems the natives thought I had brought a message announcing the transfer as an accomplished fact. My men were received very hospitably at every turn and even the Danish soldiers wanted to exchange their allegiance.

It is well known that the sole value of the Virgin Islands to the United States is strategic; otherwise they are a liability instead of an asset. They were not self-supporting under the Danes. Strategically they are well worth the price paid and the small cost their maintenance will involve, and possibly they may be turned to good commercial account. At present they produce yearly about a million dollars worth of sugar, and little else.

The population of about 35,000, on the three principal islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. John, nearly all

blacks, maintained itself largely through the revenues incidental to shipping, and that principally in furnishing the labor for fueling ships, though there was a considerable trade in ships' supplies, especially when St. Thomas was a free port.

The United States came into possession of the Virgin Islands during the World War, when shipping was abnormal and while our country was possibly too busy with the great efforts it was making to win the war, to be able to give intensive attention to these new possessions. Recently a congressional committee has visited the islands and gathered the fullest information, highly commended the military government, and recommended its continuance.

As the islands are not self-supporting administratively and as the natives themselves fail to make both ends meet, the government not only has been without funds for public improvements, but it has been called upon to provide subsistence for indigents.

Very little ever had been done for the natives before the American occupation: almost no educational facilities, although a compulsory education for the very young made every child able to read and write which arts they forget by maturity; little road development except in the island of St. Croix; almost no public service of sanitation and health; practically every native deceased; no sewage in the cities or elsewhere; not even a proper or sufficient water supply.

With almost no funds available, the military government has utilized to the fullest its own naval organization and has given the people an efficient and free hospital and medical service under naval medical officers, which has been an important service to the people.

The government has been able to do little in the matter of education on account of lack of funds. I visited Charlotte Amelia, the capital, in January, 1919, and was particularly impressed by the earnestness of the officers as well as of their wives. They all were doing what they could to better the conditions of the natives, and earlier, when I was in Santo Domingo, I received the personal check of one

officer of the Virgin Islands government to be expended for a certain kind of fiber which he was providing for St. Thomas natives to start them in hat making.

But good intentions without money are not sufficient. However some school buildings have been erected and a good start has been made in a school system, under the capable Superintendent Blair. An Agricultural Experimental Station, under the United States Department of Agriculture, has extended its activities over the three principal islands. Roads have been built in a small way and the telephone service has been extended. A great deal has been done for the poor.

SUMMARY

1. As to the Virgin Islands, it is safe to assume that our government will do whatever is necessary to afford the people an opportunity to make a living and gain an education and that the islands will be a creditable colony. The natives as a whole are proud of American citizenship.

2. In Santo Domingo, the achievements of the military government have been highly creditable. In less than four years it has accomplished more progress than had been realized in ages of European colonization and native government, for it has in full swing a system of education that will develop good citizens. A mental attribute, heretofore unknown in the island, i.e. social feeling, is being surely realized. By example the Americans are showing the Dominicans that public service is not principally self service. Critics who assume that the Dominican masses are opposed to American control are misinformed. If they have visited the country at all, they have gained their information only at sea port cafes where they have been indoctrinated by idlers or politicians or special interests that are disappointed in the military government because it is not favorable to reward without labor. If the critic will go into the country and talk with the industrious native and small property owners, or with self respecting intelligent persons anywhere, he will find an overwhelming verdict in our favor.

Some persons appear to assume that the American occupation was designed and is maintained principally in American interests—to protect American settlers. Nothing could be more erroneous, for as a matter of fact, there are very few real American settlers, aside from Porto Ricans, in the island. There are a very few Americans on some of the sugar estates and a very *very* few in the cities, but one never sees one in the rural districts, outside of the government service. I can't recall seeing in two years as many as a dozen American civilians resident in Santo Domingo outside of government service.

American interest in Santo Domingo is an humane interest—a desire to see peace and good order and progress and an equal opportunity available to all classes of a people. No special favors accrue to Americans from the military government.

It is not surprising that the work of the American occupation has not yet created a perfect social order, as the thoughtless and misinformed critic would seem to demand, in less than four years' trial. Every such problem is a new one. It is not the same in Santo Domingo as in Haiti, and it is far different from that of the Philippines where American control has been the finest achievement of its kind in the history of colonization. You have sent remarkably fine governors to Santo Domingo and the Virgin Islands, wise men of culture, gentle and considerate, and as fine men to Haiti. Nothing could be finer than their devotion to their temporarily adopted country. Speaking only of those I know personally (and of whose administrations I have personal knowledge) I am sure there are no finer men than Rear Admiral Oliver, the first governor of the United States Virgin Islands; Rear Admiral Knapp, the first military governor of Santo Domingo; Brigadier-Generals Pendleton and Fuller, acting governors and commanding land forces in Santo Domingo; and Colonel Russell in Haiti. The American people need have no concern in giving such men an opportunity to work out their tasks without nagging them.

There is, however, one criticism of military government in Santo Domingo and Haiti that I have heard advanced

by friendly natives. They ask why it is necessary to continue military courts for the trial of civilians who commit offenses against the military forces or in violation of a few decrees of the military governor. The last time I heard this complaint was from a Haitian. He cited an example of the hardship in saying that a Haitian had been fined heavily (\$50) for selling liquor illegally to a soldier. He said that as the offense was only a trifling misdemeanor, the fine was far too heavy.

That example is one illustration of the necessity of the continuance of the military court with its present very limited jurisdiction; the great chasm of difference in standards of right and wrong, as viewed by these natives and ourselves, necessitates the retention of military courts for the protection of the means of accomplishing our mission. Murder is a very ordinary crime in that island, and without any extenuating circumstances a native court will award a punishment of one year's imprisonment therefor. From the point of view of the forces of occupation, firearms in the hands of Dominicans very generally have made sources of much of their trouble; but Dominicans, having been brought up with firearms from infancy, find it difficult to see the seriousness of a violation of the military government's order against firearms. The effectiveness of the prohibition would be *nil* without the aid of military courts.

It should not be forgotten that military (or provost) courts have very limited jurisdiction; that their findings and sentences are reviewed by the highest authorities; and that they have no opportunity to be oppressive. They never deny the right of accused to be represented by counsel, as has been stated by a speaker here today; to the contrary they urge such representation. If there are those who would prefer to be tried by civil courts, many people appeared at my headquarters to appeal for military jurisdiction for their cases. Everywhere one finds persons who think their chances of escaping justice might be better in some other jurisdiction than that prescribed by law. Our military courts are bound by the same rules of evidence that are applied in United States courts and convictions are

had only on due process. That military process is not unduly severe is attested by the fact that although many bandits have been convicted of numerous murders, no native has paid the price of capital punishment under the military government of Haiti, Santo Domingo or Virgin Islands.

As to the censorship, for which the military government is criticized, it was not imposed at the beginning of the occupation, as has been stated here today. It was not applied for a long time during which the freedom of the press was grossly abused by the publication of wholly false and abusive material intended to impede the restoration of order for the benefit of the people. Furthermore, the censorship was an incident of the World War. Santo Domingo was a haven for many Germans who, with the idea of aiding their own country, tried to embarrass the military government by aiding banditry. Obviously a censorship was necessary to curtail all such efforts as well as to obstruct the importation of arms and ammunition.

3. The problem in Haiti is the most discouraging of all for it is the most difficult. It will take a much longer time in the solution, for the Haitians are so much farther removed from social competence. The inhabitants being as yet unable to appreciate mental and moral control must, obviously, be governed through the exercise or show of force until education in a generation or two has established a supremacy of reason. Our guidance and protection to material development in the country and protection to the Haitian government is the only means through which the objective can be obtained. The savage *cacos* will be disorderly for sometime to come, no doubt, but they will not seriously affect the march of progress desired by the good Haitians who will lead Haitian thought. The American Marines in Haiti have accomplished more good in four years than was brought about in all previous centuries of Haitian history. Give them a chance for a few years more and see what the Haitians themselves, under American guidance, will make of themselves.

If there is any criticism due our administration in the West Indies, according to my own views, it is that there is

no announced policy and no definition of mission that is generally understood. Uncertainty is painful. But if the American government could announce and widely and frankly publish, its intentions in well defined terms, saying that it proposes to remain in occupation until a certain state of affairs is created and at least until a certain date stated, it would be so much better for all persons concerned, even for ourselves who could then allot our tasks in reference to time. It would give the native politicians an assurance through which they would reconcile themselves to other employment than political intrigue, and it would give the masses who are pro-Americans a new confidence upon which they could securely rest a scheme of life and employment. Uncertainty is particularly a hardship for people of tropical temperament who naturally are procrastinators; they delay action until they may know what the *de facto* government is going to do.

Definition of a mission, placed in the hands of American officials in the West Indies, would be helpful because it would afford a basis for indoctrinating all agencies of the government.

As to the propriety of American occupation—there is the same necessity to protect a whole population of helpless people against a few exploiters and criminals that there would be for you to stop a murder if you saw it about to be committed in your neighbor's back yard, or to step between a villain and a helpless little girl about to be ravished. And it is just as pusillanimous for a government to hesitate in such a duty as it is for an individual. It would be just as gallant for the United States to leave the Dominicans and Haitians to the fate that would await them if the old order were restored, as it would be for you to stand by as an indifferent witness to the worst of crimes. Regardless of whether there is any political theory that will cover such a case of loss of self government by a people unfit to govern, I am sure that no generous American could visit Santo Domingo and Haiti and, learning the true conditions, wish an end to the occupation.

I hope I may be pardoned a word as to the effect of public criticism of our government's efforts in the West Indies. There is no denying the value of criticism if based upon accurate knowledge of facts and conditions. However painful it may be to the criticized agent it may bring to him the benefits of wide scientific knowledge and sound judgments suggesting shorter routes to the end in view. But criticism not founded on accurate knowledge of the case is only harmful; it suggests no remedies to those in authority and only serves to encourage the government's unworthy enemies. The thoughtless critic thus allies himself with Dominican bandits and Haitian *cacos* or with a few misguided politicians who, failing to estimate the weight of the critic, see in it new encouragement to intrigue. The *politico* sends a copy of the American critic's speech to his friend, the bandit chief, who, on the strength of this American encouragement, kills a few more loyal natives and maybe an American marine, and rapes a town or two. If anyone really has knowledge of any abuse of authority in Haiti or Santo Domingo, it is his duty to report the facts to our government in Washington; justice would follow speedily. So also if anyone can give valuable suggestions for the improvement of our governments in the West Indies they would be most gladly received, I believe, by the government's agents either in the Navy Department at Washington or in the military governments.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN

*By Samuel Guy Inman, Executive Secretary of the Committee
on Cooperation in Latin America*

It may be that I am the only one present at the Conference who has visited during the last year all of the countries of the Caribbean where the United States maintains a force of soldiers. I will therefore speak informally of political conditions as I found them in some of the most interesting of those countries, rather than trace the historical facts, already amply described, which led up to the present influence of the United States Government in the life of these countries.

The outstanding impressions of a trip through the countries of the American Mediterranean are, first, the marked backwardness of most of them in matters of educational and moral progress, and, second, the overwhelming influence of the United States in their economic and political life. It makes no difference how much one may have read about the situation, it is impossible to realize until he has made a visit to them one after another just how true it is that the United States holds these countries absolutely in the hollow of her hand.

Ordinarily when one is to have an audience with a Latin American president he practices up his best Spanish phrases and etiquette. But I recently found in Santo Domingo that this was all unnecessary. The president of the Dominican Republic when I was presented spoke to me in charming English. For he was none other than a rear-admiral of the United States navy. On being presented to the minister of foreign affairs, I found that he was an officer in the United States Marine Corps, as was the minister of war, minister of public works and the rest of the cabinet in this *Republic*. There is a certain advantage in this for the American visitor, commercial man and even for the

American minister, who, curiously enough, is still accredited and maintained before the government of the Dominican Republic. Here at least is one Latin American government which appreciates the English language and the North American view-point enough to adopt them, which seems to be what the average American thinks the whole world should do.

One is deeply impressed with the fine spirit in which the admiral and his cabinet are carrying on their work, which they seem to regard as a real missionary job. The admiral said that when he first received the request from Admiral Benson in Paris to go to Santo Domingo, he said abruptly, "I won't go." Benson's cable back to the department was, "Disappointed in Snowden." The department again put it up to Snowden, telling him he was holding up the whole navy program. So he decided to go. Now that he is down there he has become so interested in helping these people that he would like to spend the rest of his official life working out the problems now before him. This represents the spirit of many of our men, in spite of the criticism one often hears on the military authorities.

The chief trouble with Santo Domingo is the utter absence of all the facilities and forces that we associate with modern civilization. The capital has no street cars, no sewers, water or telephone systems, only a few private electric light plants and no building ever erected entirely for school purposes. Illiteracy on the Island is calculated at 90 to 95 per cent of persons over ten years of age. Many country people have no sense of numbers above five. There are practically no roads, and the northern and southern parts of the island are like two different countries. Venereal diseases, hookworm, malaria and tuberculosis run riot without anyone knowing how to treat them.

The primary object of my visit was to survey the country and suggest a united program of service which could be undertaken to help in the Island's development. Practically every person I asked as to what the people were in particular need of replied, "Everything." If I suggested this or that or the other institution or activity, the reply

was, "Yes, anything you can do for these people will be worth while. Don't be afraid of duplicating or doing too much. That would be impossible."

After a week in the capital, I drew up a tentative program and invited ten gentlemen to meet me at luncheon to discuss it. There were present the admiral and his staff, the president and his cabinet, as you choose to call them, the chaplain of the marines, the archdeacon of the Episcopal church and others. Admiral Snowden expressed himself later in a letter as follows:

I beg to thank you for your hospitality of yesterday at the Enlisted Men's Club, which was a most enjoyable meeting. I was very much interested in the program you presented and which we discussed, and most cordially endorse the program and hope that we can arrange coöperation so that the many beneficial institutions there outlined can be materialized for the benefit of the Dominican people. These people are in the greatest need of the institutions therein specified. They are to a great extent a backward people who need an object lesson in modern ideas and ideals. They would be willing to help themselves later on, at which time they can be taught the value of these moral and industrial activities.

Here is the difficulty with the present situation. A military government is not designed to educate a people and develop them in self-expression and government. In the first place, there is too much government. Martial law always means regulation of every detail of life. People cannot meet in public gatherings to discuss their problems. The newspapers cannot discuss political questions, and criticisms are not to be thought of. Individuals talk mostly in whispers if they answer adversely your inquiries as to how they like the present order.

In the second place, a foreign military government conducted largely by officials who cannot speak the language of the people and who have no idea of their history or national psychology must necessarily be an unjust government. Some of the American officials do their work in as fine a spirit as any missionary who went to serve in a foreign mission station. But this does not keep them from making great mistakes when they arbitrarily determine great prob-

lems of taxation, education and economic and social life. The United States navy has not had sufficient experience in colonization to have built up a body of experts in such matters. Officers are changed too often to build up a body of experience and enlisted men are too anxious to get home to take any interest in the people.

Two illustrations occur to me. With perfectly good intentions the government was planning a landtax and was about to require the properties to be registered. But if it works out as it did a few years ago in Mexico it will mean that the ignorant natives, who have enjoyed the use of lands without question from generation to generation, will find that their properties are registered in the name of slick politicians who will thus build up great landed estates by robbing the common people.

In the matter of education a wonderful showing has been made in the primary schools, which have grown from an enrollment of some 30,000 three years ago up to 90,000 at present, due to the herculean efforts of Colonel Lane, the Minister of Education. But Colonel Lane has now left. His efforts were centered on combating illiteracy. There are no permanent foundations laid for building up either of two indispensable educational forces, an adequate teaching staff or universal training of children along industrial lines. Higher education is almost wholly lacking and the provision of former governments to send a number of students to foreign countries has been discontinued by the military government because of these students interesting themselves in political problems.

In the third place the governors and the governed live entirely apart from one another and there is practically no means of intercourse. While a few Dominicans have been employed to assist the Americans, they have thus largely cut themselves off from their own people. The Americans generally remain to themselves and the Dominicans do likewise, if for no other reason than the simple one that 99 per cent of each party is unfamiliar with the language of the other.

This was brought home to me by a visit to Señor Federico Garcia Godoy, one of the most noted literary men in Latin America. American army men in La Vega, his home, did not even know there was such a man. When he found out that I was not, as he supposed, a commercial traveler, and that I had read his books and knew some of his friends in the literary world of Latin America, he was overjoyed. To meet an American who could talk of history, literature, international politics and other things belonging to his world seemed to give him the surprise of his life. So I was all the time meeting choice spirits among the Dominicans and the Americans, but who knew nothing of one another. The situation which shuts out entirely from the moulding of national life some of these splendid Dominicans that are well known for their ability in other parts of the world, is an impossible situation.

The Dominicans recognize that they have made a mess of governing themselves during the hundred years they tried it. They are not unmindful of the benefits that have come from peace and increased prosperity enjoyed under American rule. Few ever expect to be entirely out from under American influence. Strange to say, I found most of them preferring their present situation to that of Haiti, they reasoning as follows: The present military government is essentially temporary, though it may last many years. Public opinion of the world will not allow it to continue indefinitely so long as we refuse to accept it. If we should sign a treaty like that signed by Haiti, then we ourselves would be to blame for our loss of sovereignty. Give us a treaty along the lines of the arrangement with Cuba. Then you can protect your commercial interests and help us restore order if we return to political turmoil. But if we are good, then we can direct our own affairs.

If there were time, it would be interesting to point out some of the splendid things that the American authorities have done in the way of building roads and port works, improving sanitary conditions, paying foreign bond holders, providing stable conditions for business, etc. Frankness would compel me to say, however, that even in these mate-

rial matters I was disappointed in the results, especially in the two important matters of providing overland communication between the northern and southern halves of the island and the suppression of the terrible disorder in the interior of the country which still renders it unsafe for travelers. There seems to be no letting up whatever in the banditry, and an American probably runs greater risks in traveling through certain districts than at any other time in the history of the country.

One of the greatest difficulties with the present situation, however, is that the people are not being prepared for government. The Dominicans have no responsibility placed on them. They have no incentive toward progress except material prosperity. More of their children may be taught to read and write, more may secure advanced wages from foreign corporations and more may enjoy automobile rides on good roads, but the present military government by its very nature cannot give itself to the development of the nobler things of life. For this reason and for the other that, whatever exigencies of war may have compelled us to take over Santo Domingo, the American people cannot permanently consent to robbing a people of their sovereignty. The present situation is an impossible one. I feel sure that no one more fully recognizes this than the responsible American officials concerned and that they will soon bring about the needed change.

The situation in Haiti is very similar in many ways to that of Santo Domingo. But our authority in Haiti is secured by treaty. In each country the military force is the dominating one.

The first thing for a visitor to do, either in Santo Domingo or Haiti is to report to the local American officer in command. The arrangements between our military forces in the two countries is different, however, at least in theory. In Santo Domingo there is no pretense of federal government except by the American military forces. In Haiti there is a president, cabinet and sometimes a congress, with governors and local officials, which function in certain matters as long as they are willing to cooperate with the American military authorities.

There is, then, a dual government in Haiti, one the native government and the other the American Marines, headed by the general in command. If the native gendarmerie is counted, and it has large authority, there may be said to be three governments.

The man of most power is the Financial Adviser, an American, who has final authority over the various items of expenditure by the national treasury. In matters like sanitation, the United States government details an officer from the navy or the marine corps to serve under the Haitian government. The gendarmerie, like the *Guardia Nacional* of Santo Domingo, is composed of native soldiers officered by American marines, privates or non-commissioned officers, who have been detailed by the marine corps for this work after they have stood examination in elementary French and in Haitian law. Marines are only stationed permanently in the larger towns, but the gendarmes are found scattered all over the country as well as in all the cities. Where both forces are found their barracks are in different parts of the town. As the officers of the gendarmes are only enlisted men in the Marine Corps and the private gendarmes are Haitians, there is naturally little relation between the personnel of the two organizations.

The marine who becomes an officer in the gendarmerie finds himself clothed with almost unlimited power in the district where he serves. He is the judge of practically all civil and criminal cases, settling everything from a family fight to a murder. He is the paymaster of all funds expended by the national government, he is ex-officio director of the schools, inasmuch as he pays the teachers. He controls the mayor and city council, since they can spend no funds without his O.K. As collector of taxes he exercises a strong influence on all individuals of the community. It is no wonder that an ordinary private in the marine corps, with a few months residence in a foreign country, where people are at a very low stage of civilization, and he himself with little or no preparation for such varied responsibilities as are thrust upon him, is often accused of many abuses and mistakes. When one sees the awful conditions

under which these gendarme officers are called to live, he wonders if he himself would do any better under the same circumstances. But the fact remains that it is impossible to get anywhere in reforming a people who see nothing to admire in the reformer, who too seldom tempers justice with mercy but often inflicts a punishment more severe than the crime.

The fight being waged by the force of marines and the gendarmerie for the extermination of the *cacos*, or bandits, is growing more serious constantly. While we were not molested on the main road, it was evident everywhere that we were in a country where there was real war. Most of the big posts were stripped of men except barely enough to do necessary guard duty, the rest of them being out in the hills after the bandits. These outlaws go about in bands numbering from twenty-five to two hundred. Not more than 20 or 30 per cent are armed and these are very poor shots, so that there are few casualties among our men. They are now making a systematic drive and closing in on the bandits and in some battles from twenty-five to sixty are killed. It is the hardest sort of military work.

The bandits may be sighted on top of a hill, and by the time our men hike to the spot their quarry will have crossed over to the next hill-top and will holloa across making fun of the slow *Americanos*. There is nothing to be done but to keep on chasing them until through strategy or forced marches they are within gun shot. The range needs to be close, as the *cacos* are little affected by a wound that will put an ordinary man out of business. I saw one man who had been accidentally shot and brought into the fort where a gendarme was probing for the bullet with what looked to me like a needle used to sew up potato sacks. The blood was flowing profusely as the probe went here and there, but the man lay as still as though absolutely nothing was going on. After seeing that I was more ready to believe the stories of how they kept coming after they had been shot in a way that would be fatal immediately to most men.

One's heart goes out toward our boys who are engaged in this terrible business. Often their forced marches without

food last for many long hours and even days. Months are spent in the wild country without seeing any civilized life whatever, without any amusements, without even a newspaper or magazine. Even in the smaller towns on the main road of travel we found posts where the men had not seen a newspaper for four months, and had no means of recreation whatever. The few chaplains are working hard on this matter, and one has just succeeded in getting a motion picture machine sent way up into the hills in the interior where the fighting is worst and where living conditions are almost unbearable. For we must remember that interior Haiti is like interior Africa, where natives live the most degraded lives.

The men out on the field agree that the situation is getting worse rather than better. They only see an end to it when all the *cacos* shall have been exterminated. But when will this be accomplished? In the killing of the present crop others are grown. While Haiti has always had its professional revolutionists and country bands who lived by robbery, there seems to be a general agreement that the present acute trouble was developed by the American officers of the gendarmerie enforcing too rigidly an old law requiring men to work the roads four days a month. This has now been abandoned, and all road workers are paid a *gourde* (twenty cents gold) per day for their work. But the opposition to government has been augmented to such an extent that the American authorities see no way of settling it except by the sword. In the short time I was in the country I was not able to form a proper judgment as to whether there was any particular political purpose behind this opposition to the Americans on the part of the *cacos*, or whether they were simply a lot of bandits who preferred to live by pillage rather than by work. One hears, of course, both opinions expressed.

It is with great hesitancy that one even seemingly passes criticism upon our American marines. No man knows but that he might act in the same way under similar conditions. It is the machine, not the man, that is to blame. From the military standpoint, it is natural to regard all life as cheap;

especially when stationed in a country where people are little above the animal, where you are hated and your life is sought, if not by all, at least by organized bands who compel you to sleep with your hands on your arms, and where, if ever caught, you know you will be subject to unmentionable torture before you meet a horrible death. Under such conditions it is easy to live up to the rule of "take no prisoners" and to have small respect for the rights and property of those who have no respect for you and little for themselves.

Military life, moreover, does not lend itself to civil reforms, for it is based on caste. Discipline is only maintained by obeying without question your superior. The private is subject to the ire of the sergeant, the sergeant to the lieutenant, the lieutenant to the captain, and so on. And very likely the ire of all is visited on the civilian. As a young editor, who had to take his paper to the military authorities for their censorship before it was published, said, "We want a civil government so we can approach them. You go to see one of the military authorities. You know he is a very fine man. But he has a guard at the door who unceremoniously tells you to 'get out, and do it quick!'" Is it any wonder that the bandit situation doesn't get better under such treatment or that the American soldier acts as he does under the conditions described, when he has never had any training for administrative or democratizing work? My duties have carried me into many of the out of the way places of the world, where moral restraint was largely removed. But in no place have I ever seen American men descend so low in orgies with native rum and native women as in interior Haiti. But they were not typical of our soldiers, many of whom are putting up a heroic fight for character against awful odds.

The same thing applies to moral life. Who will throw the first stone at the man who is compelled to live away from all that is pure and ennobling, without religious or moral influences of any kind, without books or recreation often, without even a baseball or a victrola, in the midst of the vilest native life where men have little virtue and women

small sense of shame? The whole thing is absolutely unnatural. If necessary for a few months under extraordinary conditions, it should certainly not be allowed to exist through the years that men do not get into a pure atmosphere or see good women of their own race or hear a moral exhortation for two or three years, as happens with some of our men here. Such men too often have their whole moral makeup changed.

The best of the officers in Haiti realize that the situation is not satisfactory and are doing what they can to correct it. "So far we have done little for Haiti except stop the graft—and that has not made the people like us! It is time we were doing some constructive service for these people." Thus spoke the commander of the American marines in Haiti. Of course he did not mean that literally because already much has been accomplished in the building of roads, sanitation of cities, improvement of the postal service and other public activities. The national debt, which constantly threatened the independent life of the nation, is being gradually liquidated.

If our government is to go forward satisfactorily with the tremendous job it has begun there must be in every case the most careful selection of the men who are sent to deal with these people. When we began our work in the Philippines we sent a man like Mr. Taft to begin the development of the people into a democracy. He found much the same conditions as now exist in Haiti. When he began to talk about "our little brown brother" it took strong measures to stop the sarcasm of the soldiers who sang, "He may be a brother of William H. T., but he ain't no kin to me." But the new spirit prevailed and today the development of the Filipino toward democracy is the pride of every American. The job in Haiti is a harder one, but it can be accomplished by a combination of the highest type of administrative and moral leadership.

The following extracts from the letter of a naval officer emphasize the duty of the United States to render an unselfish service to the backward people of this island:

In 1914 while I was on duty in Haiti and Santo Domingo the thought occurred to me how the natives of these islands had been neglected by the various philanthropic and religious societies of the United States.

Again, after five years in Europe, I have once more returned to Santo Domingo. Meanwhile we have actually taken over the government of this Island and our moral responsibility for the improvement and progress of the natives has been greatly increased, while I note the same indifference on the part of the various philanthropic and welfare organizations of the United States toward this work.

The citizens of the United States, out of private funds, have spent millions of dollars in helping and assisting the peoples of war-stricken Europe. The peoples of war-stricken Haiti, our own particular wards, the responsibility for whose betterment we cannot now escape in view of the occupation, have received practically nothing.

Europe has suffered from the devastation of wars for five years; Haiti and Santo Domingo for over a hundred. At least 50 per cent of the population are practically reduced to savagery; a certain proportion are in the same condition as their ancestors were when they were brought in slavery from the African jungles.

I do not believe that the various charitable and philanthropic institutions, which after all represent the public—the people of the United States—wish to shirk their moral responsibilities towards these unfortunate people. Their neglect up until now, their bending all their energies towards Europe at the expense of their foster-child is attributable only to ignorance and lack of knowledge of conditions.

But now the United States has occupied the Island, the American people should no longer remain in ignorance of the true conditions. As soon as they realize and can visualize the state of affairs, knowing that now we are legally and morally responsible, have got to see the thing through, I'm sure they will respond as they have always done to stricken and unfortunate branches of the human race.

In Central America I found a different attitude toward the United States than in any other part of the Southland. There seems to be a rather general feeling that there is no use of longer kicking against the pricks. The North American influence must remain predominant and the best thing to do now is to work toward making it a just influence. While there is plenty of the kind of prejudice that Ugarte and his school stand for in other parts of Latin America and there is much resentment at direct interference with the internal affairs of the various countries especially in regard

to the presence of the marines and the Bryan-Chamorro treaty in Nicaragua, the reasoning of the average man seems to run something like this: "Our economic life must necessarily depend very closely on the United States. We need the help of the United States in stabilizing our political life. We do not object to receiving such helpful influence. But what does keep us continually resentful is the use of marines to protect foreign investors and keep in power an administration that is despotic, while doing nothing toward helping the people in general to better their condition. Let your influence be toward a positive program of improving our political, economic, educational and social life, not in suppressing self-expression and just nationalism. If you assume the authority to say we cannot have revolutions, then you must also assume the authority to compel our rulers, whom you protect, to give us political and economic justice. We are independent nations and we would like to run our own affairs. But we admit that economically we are bound inseparably to you; politically we need your steadying influence to bring all Central America into harmonious co-operative relations; and morally we need your stimulating example. But do not force this on us. Help us to keep our self-respect and our national honor while you help us to rid ourselves of the tyranny of our *caudillos*, of our individualism, our graft and our inertia. Please, Mr. Great Big Yankee Man, we know we need your capital and your powerful influence and we do admire you for many things, but please, fewer marines, fewer one-sided treaties, fewer demands for economic exploitation, and more help in developing the things that have made your own fine nation great."

In Nicaragua the outstanding influence is the hundred United States marines who live up on the hill dominating the city. A hundred marines are not many, but as one gentleman expressed it, "When we see that hundred up there, we see a hundred thousand behind them and then behind them a hundred million. So we know we must not displease *Tio Samuel*."

The American bank that owns the railroad and dictates the financial policies of the country and the American customs collectors are the predominant forces that persuade the Nicaraguans to court the favor of the United States or curse their luck, as the case may be.

As soon as I arrived at Managua, I had a perfect avalanche of callers and requests for engagements. For maybe this American could have some influence in getting his government to better their conditions. Soon my days were divided up, one with the editors, one with the educators, one with the literati, one with the cabinet, one with the supreme court, and so on.

The presidential elections were very close (August, 1920) and the big question with the Conservative party was, "Will our big Uncle stand by us as before and keep the opposition from armed rebellion, so we may continue in power?" The Liberals are no less insistently asking, "Will the United States force the Conservatives to let us vote at these elections so we may put in a man who represents the majority of the people?" It has often been said, and it seemed to me true, that the Conservative government in power could not stand for any time unless it was supported by the United States, for a large majority of the people were Liberals. As Senator Root said in discussing the Bryan-Chamorro treaty,

I am told that if the marines were withdrawn, the present president would be obliged to leave the country immediately or he would be expelled by a revolution. This situation raises a very serious question, not about the desirableness of the treaty, but about the way in which the treaty should be made. Can we afford to make a treaty with Nicaragua, granting us perpetual rights in that country, with a president who we have reason to believe does not represent more than a quarter of the people of the country, and who is maintained in office by our military force, and to whom we would, as a result of the treaty, pay a large sum of money to be disposed of by him as president? I should be sorry to see the United States get into that position. We don't want to maintain a government in Nicaragua by military force perpetually, and it is highly probable that if we were to withdraw our force after making such a treaty there would be a revolution and the treaty would be repudiated, leaving us in a position where our legitimate moral influence would be destroyed and nothing

but brute force left. There is a good deal of evidence that the other people of Central America look at the subject in this way. I should be very sorry to see the Central Americans convinced that we wish to rule them by force, for it would be the end of all our attempts to benefit them and help them along as we have been trying to do.

The Liberals now claim that, since the United States has interfered once with their internal affairs, the only just thing for it to do in the present instance is to compel fair elections—that if it simply keeps its hands off it will mean the continuance of the Conservatives in power, since they will count themselves in, however the election may swing.

The Liberals have been the opponents of intervention and of course have not been popular with Americans. In the early days of intervention, their leaders like Dr. Leonardo Arguillo, whose tract against intervention was used as a text in the University of Madrid, were very bitter in their denunciations of the situation. Under no circumstances then would our government allow them to attain power, for they would, it was thought, immediately break faith with American bondholders. These leaders now say that they fully recognize the obligations they have contracted with United States financial concerns and would hold rigidly to their agreements if they were elected. They claim that they are not anti-American nor desirous of cutting off relations with the United States and that it is not fair to hold them responsible for the sins of Zelaya, who was in no wise a representative Liberal, though he claimed to be of that party.

The beneficial results of the American intervention in Nicaragua seem to be three: peace, freedom of speech and the protection of foreign investors. For a country that has been the victim of unprincipled *caudillos* for many decades, where political opponents have been subject to torture and robbery, where property was unsafe and foreign interference continuous, these are indeed great benefits. The Nicaraguans put over against these benefits the following evils: The practical loss of self-determination; actual decrease in the number of schools and the weakening of the educational

system by turning it over largely to the church; excessive taxes which work against the poor and favor the rich; lack of any responsible body working for a constructive policy for improving the Nicaraguan people politically, economically, educationally or socially.

If the Chileans are the Yankees of South America, the Salvadoreans are the Chileans of Central America. A hard working population (comparatively), a lack of revolutions, numerous small industries, a well-organized army, emphasis on secondary education (always comparatively, remember), a strongly developed nationalism with a converse questioning concerning North American imperialism, and a pride of leadership among sister states—these and other characteristics remind one familiar with South American states of vigorous little Chile.

The most democratic president I met in all Latin America is Don Jorge Melendez, who talked with me nearly an hour recently in the most informal way about the people of Salvador, the difficulties of avoiding revolutions in Central America, financial and political relations with the United States, and other questions. He was greatly delighted to have North American visitors come to Salvador, he said, because he recognized the necessity of closer relations between his country and the United States and thought that such visits would add greatly to these relations. It is hard for the North American to understand the difficulties with which Central American governments have to cope. If the president attempts to introduce reforms too rapidly he has a revolution on hand. When Señor Melendez came into office he found an internal debt of three millions, principally back salaries, due to the loss of export and import duties during the war. This debt was paid off the first year, principally by a strict collection of the internal revenues on liquor, which unfortunately is one of the largest sources of income.

The interest on the national debt, held largely in England, has been so promptly met that additional credit, not yet used, had been extended. He is now working to get a small change in the banking laws to meet the conditions of

a large American bank which is desirous of opening a branch here.

As for internal improvements, the president said he had just returned from the celebration in connection with the opening of the railway from the south to Cajutapeque so that one may travel by rail from the southernmost port, La Union, to within twenty miles of the capital, covering the rest by auto at present but very soon by rail. He has just signed a contract with the International Railway of Central America, a North American company, to build the railroad from Santa Ana, near the Guatemalan border, to join the railroad at Zacapa, Guatemala, which runs to Puerto Barrios. Thus Salvador will have not only a railroad running the entire length of the country, but will be brought within six days of New Orleans.

How much this will mean may be judged from the fact that it now requires at least five or six weeks to get second class mail, to say nothing of freight, which comes from the United States via Panama, then up the west coast. Only first class mail is brought by mule across from the Atlantic port, Puerto Barrios. The contract calls for the completion of this new road before February 15, 1923.

The president spoke of the problem of education as being one of the most difficult, since the nation had been tied to old systems which it was hard to change. But here he has recently appointed a special commission to study the subject and he expects them to completely modernize the public school curriculum.

In the president's inaugural address, March 19, 1919, he proposed the institution of a national campaign against illiteracy. This has recently been started. At that time he said,

I call the attention of thinking men and especially of the Department of Public Instruction to the necessity of wiping out the worst of our defects, illiteracy. How is it possible to conceive of effective progress and definite implanting of a republic when 70 per cent of the people cannot read and write? It is humiliating to announce such a sad condition, but it is necessary to leave aside sweet sounding phrases and face frankly our situation, understanding that we are building on the sand if we do not teach those

who form the greatest majority of the nation how to read and write. Public instruction must receive new impulses. Our public schools are still influenced by chaotic systems and it is necessary to popularize our instruction, having it penetrate to the very lowest social strata.

If, at the conclusion of my term of office, this disturbing percentage of illiteracy has been considerably reduced, I will have a legitimate pride, for by such diminution we shall have rendered our nation the greatest service in preparing the present generation to realize and carry forward the highest ideals of a democracy.

On inquiring of the president concerning a map showing the military posts of the country, he explained that while they did not want any more war yet it was necessary to be prepared. In twenty-four hours, by communicating his commands to three brigadier-generals, he could mobilize an army of one hundred and sixty thousand men. One year military service is obligatory for all men. The soldiers are given a thorough instruction in common school branches and in English, so that when they leave the army they are much better prepared for fighting life's battles than before.

Because Salvador was the only Central American republic that did not join the allies in the war against Germany and because she has recently asked the United States for a definition of the Monroe Doctrine, it was particularly interesting to hear the president declare his desire for close relations with the United States. Because his ideas seem to be so well represented by the words of his brother, whom he has just succeeded in the presidency, I give them to you here:

If American diplomacy, in its relations with the Central American peoples, maintains unimpaired the principles of equity and justice laid down by President Wilson, principles of cordiality, confraternity and respect for the sovereignty of these peoples, such a policy of mutual consideration and good understanding will be the foundation for closer commercial relations between the United States and Salvador, as well as among the other republics of the American continent.

The best means of rapprochement for two peoples is an intimate reciprocal knowledge of their peculiar moods, their psychology, their ideals and initiative in the path of civilization. North Americans have made very little systematic and methodical effort to comprehend the characteristics of the political and social evolution of our small nationalities. As a general rule, with but

very few exceptions, North Americans know very little about our peoples because of false representations prompted by impulsive meddling with these young states. We have been dubbed restless peoples, ungovernable hordes, uneducated masses incapable of civilization. But in spite of all this, for twenty-four years not one single internal revolution or political commotion of any importance has taken place in this republic, which has lived in perfect peace, devoted to its work during a long period of progressive reconstruction.

False and biased report spread by some writers in North America, and the little importance given to our markets, have contributed to the neglect by Americans of the study of these peoples to such an extent that they have but very scant knowledge of their commercial geography.

The breaking out of the European war was necessary in order that some serious thought should be given to Central and South America, for prominent men in the United States to undertake the task of bringing about the intellectual rapprochement of our respective countries, and for these nations to be deemed worthy of study and encouragement.

We desire to know more intimately North America's cultural status, its scholastic and municipal institutions, its methods of cultivation of the land, its financial organization, its literature, and above all its political institutions since our system of government is analogous to that of the American people.

The interchange of university professors and students would be an effective means of promoting mutual acquaintance. And if it were possible and an agreement could be reached between the United States and other countries of Central and South America, nothing could contribute more to the strengthening of our intellectual bonds than the foundation of a Pan American University in the United States.

The men of the two Americas, educated side by side in the same school, would work together to strengthen mutual bonds of everlasting confraternity, and Spanish America, through an army of its men thoroughly imbued with the practical methods of American education, would benefit by a new standard of culture more in harmony with the requirements of modern life.

The sending of lecturers to our universities, the establishment of good daily papers and magazines in the Spanish language, having a wide circulation in these countries, will contribute to the spread of information about the resources and characteristics of the North Americans in our midst.

It behooves the statesmen, bankers and manufacturers of the United States to make effective the most important part in the relations between the United States and Salvador. There are no prejudices among us against the United States. We admire the strength and fearlessness of the people of the United States in their financial struggles, in their republican traditions and in the doctrines of their publicists; we study closely the solutions reached

in their political evolution and their great administrative progress, and in their pedagogical progress we find an inspiration for the improvement and reform of our methods of teaching.

Conditions are propitious for bringing closer together the ties that bind us to the democracy of the North, founded by Washington and made greater by Franklin, Jefferson and many other great statesmen.

Behind those words of Don Carlos Melendez is the fact that during the war, when he was president, Salvador had much pro-German sentiment, which kept the country from entering the war on the side of the Allies, although it declared a benevolent neutrality toward them. For many years there has been a more marked tendency in Salvador than in other Central American countries to question the intentions of the United States with reference to Latin America.

Her protest against the Bryan-Chamorro treaty by which Nicaragua gave the United States the right to build a canal through that country and establish a naval base in the Bay of Fonseca was most vigorous. She claimed that the bay is the common property of the three countries which it touches and that the establishment of a naval base there and the fortification of some of the islands would give the United States, with long range guns, absolute command of Salvadorean territory and in case of war make her neutrality impossible.

It may be said in parenthesis that when one sees the bay it is easy to understand the truth of this statement. The fact that this protest, although sustained by a majority of the Central American court of justice, was unheeded by the United States did not serve to lessen suspicion of America's imperialistic motives.

During the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress in Washington in 1915 the Salvadorean delegate, Dr. Alonso Reyes Guerra, bearded the eagle in its nest and said plainly that before there could be any real Pan-Americanism four things were necessary: first, a declaration that the prohibition against the conquest of American territory contained in the Monroe doctrine applies to the United States as well as to European countries; second, the adoption of the Drago

doctrine, which makes the collection of debts exclusively an internal question to be handled within each nation itself; third, elimination of all exceptions to the doctrine of non-intervention; fourth, the institution of obligatory arbitration of all international disputes.

When President Wilson made his address to the Mexican editors, which was the most satisfactory statement of a decade concerning the North American attitude toward Latin America, President Carlos Melendez of Salvador immediately wrote to President Wilson saying that

As the ruler of the Salvadorean people, as a citizen of Latin America, I wish to express to you my firm adhesion to the ideas of justice and sentiments of fraternity with which your speech to the Mexican journalists is replete. In expounding the Monroe Doctrine you have dispelled prejudgments and unfavorable conjectures that have for many years hampered the full blossoming and propagation of principles of true cordiality which must for the common good exist between the United States and the other republics of the American continent.

When the United States saw fit to have a special clause placed in the League of Nations pact, reserving the rights involved in the Monroe doctrine without defining them, Salvador spoke for the rest of Latin America and asked the United States to define the meaning of the doctrine, since other American nations entering the League would, with the new clause, themselves recognize as binding this same doctrine. Without a definition of the Monroe doctrine these nations would be in the position of a man signing a note without knowing its amount.

As will be recalled, our state department simply quoted in reply a part of President Wilson's address to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress. This has not satisfied many, who say that an address of a president cannot be taken as the official declaration of a nation. But the government of Salvador, which under the young Melendez is sympathetic to the United States and is backed by a public sentiment of no little strength since the victory of the Allies, has outwardly accepted the reply as satisfactory.

Indications are that the endeavors of Salvador to find out if there is a colored gentleman in the Pan American wood-

pile will cease temporarily at least, and that the growing commercial and financial relations with the United States will cause, at least apparently, a more sympathetic attitude toward us. That this friendship shall be real as well as official, there should be a close study of Salvador and other Central American countries by the government and the people of the United States. We should be represented in those countries by diplomats who have a background of history, language and culture that will enable them to penetrate beneath surface appearance and politeness to a real understanding of the underlying feelings and motives of Central American life.

The outstanding event in Guatemala recently is, of course, the fall of Cabrera, the last of the old order of dictators in Latin America except one—Gomez of Venezuela.

I was in Guatemala both immediately before and immediately after the revolution. Having talked with Cabrera about his policies during my first visit, I desired to compare him with the new president on my second visit, which resulted in an experience illustrative of the difficulty of keeping straight on Central American politics.

Asking a friend whether he thought I could see the president to find about his proposed program, he replied that he thought I could and told me where to find him. Following the directions I came to a private house which had a few soldiers in front of the door and, on explaining that I wished to see the president, my card was taken in where I saw a *patio* full of ragged soldiers. Pretty soon a gentleman in military uniform came out and asked me what I wanted. I told him that I was anxious to see the president and talk with him about his new program. The gentleman seemed to be a little confused and I again explained that I was now going back to the United States and wished to carry a message from the new president to the American people. But still he did not seem to understand and I began to wonder if my Spanish was at fault. After I had made the third attempt to explain to him how important it was for me to see the chief magistrate and find out his attitude toward things American, he looked at me in a queer way and said,

“You must want to see the new president. It is the old one that we have here in jail.” As I had seen the old president a few weeks before, I had no desire to see him again and hurried on up to the house of President Herrera, to which I was directed, where I had a long interview with him. When I finally found him, Don Carlos Herrera, the new president, said:

Tell the people of the United States that you met in Guatemala a friend of the Americans. As to my program, in two words, it is to follow as closely as possible the development of democracy as it has taken place in the United States. In Guatemala we have everything to do and I know of no better way of doing it than studying carefully what has been done in the United States. I have for a long time been a great admirer of that country. My two boys were educated there. (Indeed these two boys are American citizens.) I have visited the country myself; have for a long time had business connections with many of its large commercial organizations and believe thoroughly that the best thing for our country's development is to maintain cordial relations with the United States.

President Herrera is a new type of ruler for Guatemala. He is not a military man or even a politician. During the long despotic reign of Cabrera, who had the most complete spy system ever developed and who persecuted his critics wherever they might be found in any part of the world, who kept his prisons filled with political offenders and who allowed no open opposition, the dictator had never been quite able to lay hands on Herrera, one of the richest men in the country. For Don Carlos is not only a splendid business man but has also proved himself to be careful and diplomatic. He is one of the few men who maintained his independence and yet has not been openly persecuted by Cabrera. His large fortune is invested in sugar and coffee plantations. He is probably the largest exporter of both commodities in Guatemala and maintains financial relations with many of the big banks of England and the United States, in which countries he is by no means a stranger.

His administration will no doubt be mainly a business administration, devoted to the development of Guatemala's wonderful economic resources. Already business men, both

native and American, are planning for great increases in commercial development. Under the Cabrera régime merchants did not dare order more than they needed for immediate delivery, for they never knew what tomorrow might bring forth. But now merchants are placing large orders with every confidence that they are entering a new régime. Already American Commercial travelers are feeling this optimism as reflected in increased orders.

President Herrerra was anxious to have me see his minister of foreign affairs, Señor Aguirre, in order to talk with him more in detail concerning the lines along which the administration would like the help of the United States. Señor Aguirre is a cultured gentleman who has traveled widely, speaks several languages and is in every way a cosmopolite. He had charge of Guatemala's exhibit at the San Francisco Exposition and has been active in many of the international expositions of the world. While he is a farmer in the sense that he owns a big plantation and gets his income from it, yet he is especially interested in the matter of international relations and has made a deep study of the question from the standpoint of economics. Señor Aguirre said:

We must have the help of the United States, along three lines particularly. First, we need your moral help. In the past *Guatemaltecos* have had to hang their heads because of the utter backwardness of their country and the lack of liberty we have enjoyed. All of this must be changed. We must come out into modern life. We realize that fundamentally our problem is a moral one and we are not strong enough to cope with this problem alone. We earnestly hope for the help of the United States in the development of our moral life. Second, we need financial help. Guatemala is one of the richest countries in the world. There is practically nothing that we cannot produce. We have not only the finest coffee in the world but wonderful sugar and all kinds of tropical fruits. There is an opportunity to further develop our agriculture and also for building factories. With all of our fruit, canning factories would give splendid results. Our water power furnishes great opportunities for the development of electricity. We ought to have several North American banks immediately.

There is also an opening for wholesale and retail stores handling exclusively American goods.

In the third place we need your help in education. Here almost everything is to be done. While the previous administration

pretended to be a friend of education and erected a certain number of showy buildings, they have been little more than shells. The education of the more than a million Indians in our population is in itself a tremendous problem. We must make our education modern and to whom can we look for help so much as to the United States which has advanced so rapidly along educational lines?

My idea also is to make Guatemala a modern Mecca for American tourists. We have one of the finest climates in the world, some of the most beautiful scenery, with mountains and lakes more wonderful than those of Switzerland and we are within three days of New Orleans. Of course we must first prepare for these tourists by building automobile roads and hotels. This we expect to begin very soon. If we can have a stream of American tourists coming to Guatemala the development of our country will be assured. Heretofore we have lived to ourselves. The former government discouraged visitors to the country, as it did not care for the outside world to know of its abuses. But our policy is to throw open the gates to all friends of progress. We want the world to come and see us.

The greatest criticism that the Guatemalan people had of the United States government during the exciting days of the revolution, was the publication in the Guatemalan press of a note from the state department which indicated that our government was very much opposed to the revolution. The revolutionary forces had conducted themselves in a most remarkable way. In fact nothing like it has ever been known in Latin America. For four months they carried on a campaign against Cabrera by means of the press and through public addresses, continually stating that they did not intend to resort to arms but were determined to make this a peaceful revolution. They stuck to this determination even when they were fired upon by Cabrera's soldiers during one of their peaceful parades. The reform or "unionist" movement represented at least 90 per cent of the nation. It did not therefore seem consistent with the history of the United States or with the ideals of liberty for which we stand that our government should publish the statement which seemed to command the Guatemalans not to revolt against one of the worst tyrannies that any people have been subjected to, and who Americans ought to know never kept a promise for reform.

The following is the American note which caused such unfavorable comment:

Mr. Benton McMillin, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Guatemala, after the issuance of the president's proclamation, issued, with the authority of his government, the following for publication:

"The steady policy of the government of the United States is to encourage constitutional government and free elections in Central America. Having the greatest interest therefore in the constitutional progress of Guatemala, the government of the United States has learned with great pleasure of the proclamation of President Estrada Cabrera regarding constitutional guarantees and has confidence in view of the statements just made to this government by President Estrada Cabrera, that he will faithfully carry out the reforms proclaimed.

The government of the United States is opposed to revolutionary measures and firmly believes in view of President Cabrera's proclamation there is no excuse for starting a revolutionary movement in Guatemala and that therefore in the eyes of the civilized world the gravest responsibility would rest with any man or group of men who should start such a movement. The government of the United States particularly desires to see peaceful constitutional progress in Guatemala and would regard with horror any actions which should cause a needless and inexcusable revolution to be commenced in that country." (From *Diario de Centro-America*, Guatemala, April 5, 1920.)

It ought to be said that this note was published by Minister McMillin not because of his approval of its contents but by order of his superior authority.

The final fall of Cabrera came when the National Assembly declared him insane and unfit for office and elected Don Carlos Herrera to replace him. A few days before this action Cabrera's assistant minister of war, his faithful friend and servant for a decade, reported to his master that some of his troops had deserted. This so enraged Cabrera that he knocked the man down with the butt of his pistol and kicked him around. The man finally escaped and took refuge in the English legation and afterwards revealed to the National Assembly that Cabrera was living a life in his palace outside of the city which showed him to be insane. He kept in his house some old Indian witches and herb-doctors whose advice he continually accepted, and his suspicions of his closest friends and his cruelty to everyone

showed that he was not in his right mind. After the Assembly had declared him insane he began to bombard the city and for eight days there were the most frightful conditions in the capital.

The American legation was besieged by a large number of people who were afraid of their lives and for a week Minister and Mrs. McMillin had 181 refugees in the legation. Most of these were women and children. There were fourteen members of President Herrera's family there; some forty Americans, and the rest represented all grades of *Guatemaltecos*. It is easy to imagine the confusion that existed at that time. American marines were brought up from the *Tacoma* on the Pacific shore and from the *Niagara* on the Atlantic side. Machine guns were stationed on both sides of the legation and marines stood guard in order to protect the legation, which was several times threatened by mobs who were infuriated against two Americans who had been in league with President Cabrera in exploiting the people.

One of the most remarkable things about it all was the heroism and unselfish service of Mrs. McMillin, who was everything to everyone during those eight days, giving up her own room to three of the women who were about to give birth to children and going from one part of the house to the other ministering to the sick and quieting the nervous. The fourth day of the siege the house was put under military rule. The cook of the *Niagara* was brought up to take charge of the rationing, which was the only thing that saved Mrs. McMillin from a complete breakdown, her own servants being so excited that they could not even make the coffee.

Things in Guatemala are rapidly becoming reorganized and there are evidences everywhere of the new day. The ordinary revolution in Central America is an opera bouffe affair, but this upheaval in Guatemala has been justified if any revolution in the world was ever justified. It has been carried out in the quietest possible way. When the city was fired upon the Unionist party did not have any arms whatever with which to protect themselves. They had maintained, up to the very last, their determination not

to resort to arms. They were able to defend the city when it was attacked by Cabrera only because the government troops themselves turned to the new régime. Many of the men who are now in power have suffered terrible tortures for long years for the sake of liberty. They have learned by these sufferings the cost of liberty and it is the judgment of people who know Guatemala best that they will work for a really democratic government in one of the richest countries of all the Americas.

The countries mentioned presented to me the most interesting situations and there is not time to describe the others. Cuba, by means of the Platt amendment and the predominant economic influence of American capital which owns most of the great sugar and tobacco estates, can have no political or economic policies not approved by the United States. Our protection of the Conservative government there has brought immense prosperity to certain classes.

But if we do not want Cuba to become an American Ireland we must study with her some necessary constructive policies.

Honduras means "the depths" and that unfortunate country has almost reached them in many regards. She does whatever we suggest for her to do. But our suggestions so far are purely political and not educational.

The revolutionary government of Costa Rica has learned the impossibility of standing without the recognition of the United States, and a constitutional government, grateful to us for our stand, is now reëstablishing itself as it looks to us for support.

Panamá seldom challenges the American influence, but the presence of our soldiers in the interior of the country and the shirt-sleeve diplomacy used in demanding the Island of Taboga, caused the most regrettable insult to General Pershing and shows we will get much more by adopting some fine Spanish phrases than by shouting "hands up!"

Summing up, my first-hand observations in the Caribbean lead me to the following conclusions:

1. The United States really has here at the present time a colonial proposition.

2. The lack of a frank recognition of the situation and lack of colonial experience have led us into mistakes that have made our intervention more resented than is necessary.

3. Failure to mark out a definite policy, and leaving matters largely to the military, has led to a policy of suppression rather than of constructive helpfulness.

4. Intervention being principally to conserve order, protect American investors and ward off European interference, the reactionary parties in the various countries are too often sustained and help is too often confined to material matters with no consideration for building up education.

I would respectfully suggest the following as helpful steps in dealing with the all important question of our relations with the Caribbean countries:

1. A strong department with recognized responsibility in the United States government to study conditions and advise the executive and legislative powers concerning relations between this country and smaller countries specially dependent upon us. This department could well have an advisory committee made up of some outstanding private citizens who are in a position to aid in such work. Immediate economic, educational and social surveys should be made to determine the exact situation and needs of the various countries.

2. Signing of treaties with certain Caribbean countries that recognize their sovereignty but secure the aid of the United States in developing stable government, fair elections, improved educational facilities, needed financial accommodation, etc.

3. Withdrawal of United States marines from countries where now stationed.

4. Special effort to help in the broad education of the people of these countries through both government and private agencies.

5. Cultivation of appreciation of the history, literature, social life and problems of these countries on the part of Americans.

6. Turn on the light and let the peoples interested publicly determine and frankly avow the policy for their servants to follow in forming relations.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS AND THEIR PROBLEMS

By Webster E. Browning, Ph.D., Educational Secretary, Committee on Coöperation in Latin America; formerly President of the American College in Chile

It is a peculiar and interesting fact that those twenty states which lie to the south of us and form the geographical division generally known as Latin America, are less known to the average citizens of the United States than are other lands that lie much more distant, even on the other side of the earth. It would be safe to say that through the crucible of the World War the resurrected nationalities, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, the Ukraine and Esthonia, in Europe, or Kurdistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, in Asia, have a more distinct personality in our minds than have Nicaragua, Honduras or Venezuela, our near neighbors to the south and members of the family of American nations for a hundred years. The Asian Mesopotamia is probably a clearer concept in the average American mind than is the South American Mesopotamia formed by the republic of Paraguay and the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, although their population is about the same and the area of the latter is almost double the former. One of the reasons for this lack of exact knowledge in regard to the countries of Latin America is found in the fact that it lies far off to one side from the usual line of travel. Our American tourists visit those portions of the world which lie east or west, but few of them seldom turn to the South to the lands that lie under the gleam of the southern cross.

Another explanation is the fact that we have had but comparatively few diplomatic questions of any great importance with the countries that lie to the south. They themselves have had local questions which sometimes involved the United States, but, on the whole, we have been

able to keep apart from any responsibility in the solution of their problems. And it must also be confessed and somewhat shamefacedly, that when we have been compelled to participate in Latin American diplomacy our diplomats and statesmen have not always taken the trouble to study local conditions, to ascertain all the facts in the case, and thus render a decision which left us higher in the estimation of the peoples with whom we were dealing.

It is even more strange that the Latin nations which lie nearest to us, contrary to the usual rule, are those which are less known and on which our own supposedly superior civilization has had a less evident effect. The Central American republics are less often in our thoughts and in our estimates than are Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil, which lie to the far south in the temperate zone and pour their bounteous products into our markets and receive in turn our exports in an ever-increasing ratio. In other words our interest in Latin America has been largely commercial and utilitarian, largely limited to those regions which have promised the highest and quickest returns on a financial investment.

GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

This paper is to deal with "The Central American Republics and their Problems," but, in view of the somewhat vague understanding of the region to be described, which prevails in most quarters, it may be well to set up at the beginning a geographical and historical perspective in order that our study may be the more clearly understood.

To locate the six republics of Central America on the map, they border on the Pacific Ocean on the west and south, and their shores are washed by the waters of the Caribbean Sea on the east, while, through the territory of one of them, runs that marvel of engineering skill, the Panama Canal, which Viscount Bryce has so aptly termed "the greatest liberty ever taken with nature." To the northwest lies the territory of Mexico, our own troubled and too little appreciated neighbor, and in the south Panama

clings, as if in filial love, to the skirts of its mother, the justly discontented republic of Colombia. Lying entirely within the tropics, between the parallels seven and eighteen north latitude, their longitude would fall, roughly speaking, between that of Des Moines or Little Rock, on the west, and Washington on the east. Thus their general trend is from northwest to southeast, producing the easting of the southern half of the American continent which throws its east shores nearer to Europe and brings the west directly south of the great ports on our east coast.

HISTORICAL SETTING

As to their historical setting, the five original republics—Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador and Costa Rica—under Spanish rule, which ended in 1821, formed the Kingdom of Guatemala. This kingdom was ruled by a captain-general who was directly responsible to the throne, but who did not assume the title of viceroy, as did the rulers of Peru, farther south. Due principally to the efforts of Francisco Morazán, of Honduras, a leader of the Liberals, independence from Spain was secured in 1821 and a federal republic was established which lasted until 1842. At that time, because of mutual jealousies, this federation broke up into its component parts and each state, at least in name and theory, became an independent republic. In but few cases, however, and for no great length of time, has republicanism existed in more than name and the President has too often relied on the army to place and maintain him in power, rather than on the votes of his fellow citizens. International jealousies have persisted and because of this and other handicaps, no one of the five republics has kept proper pace with the progress of the Anglo-Saxon nations to the north or with the Latin states in the far south of the continent.

ATTEMPTS AT UNION

Repeated efforts have been made to reunite these weak and often warring political units into one strong state; but many of the people seem to partake of the turbulent char-

acter of their volcanic territory, and all such well-intentioned efforts have failed. A Central American "Hague Tribunal" was set up a few years ago, all the republics except Costa Rica signed the *modus vivendi* then drawn up, and occasional meetings have been held for the purpose of adjusting differences; yet but little has been gained in the way of a permanent cementing of international friendships. On the contrary, Central America has been notorious among the nations of the world because of its constant revolutionary outbreaks and the amazing facility with which some of its peoples have repudiated or failed to cancel foreign debts. The soil has been drenched with the blood of the inhabitants, and never have so-called Christian nations so given themselves up to mutual slaughter and despoilment. Civil wars have frequently reduced the male population to almost the vanishing point, and the territory has been impoverished and laid waste with a ferocity which has been seldom equalled in history.

During the rule of Spain the governors were but official exploiters and assassins on a large scale. Under the republican form of government, these exploiters have too often given way to dictators, or presidents in name, whose mutual jealousies have often plunged their peoples into war and caused the wholesale slaughter of many thousands of citizens whose energies should have been used in the establishing of stable economic conditions. Progress has been impossible and the prosperity of these peoples is constantly hampered by enormous debts, when they have not been cancelled by the simple process of repudiation.

A REGION OF VOLCANIC DISTURBANCES

The unusual frequency of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions has also been a hindrance to the prosperity and economic stability of Central America. This section seems to form a species of joint in the crust of the earth, a weak point especially susceptible to disturbances from within, and its volcanoes are among the most destructive on earth. Six of these are located in Guatemala, two in Salvador, four in Nicaragua, and four in Costa Rica.

The havoc wrought by the play of these terrific forces had full illustration in the destruction of the second city of Guatemala, now known as Antigua, in 1773, by a combination of seismic and volcanic movements; in the eruption of Santa Maria, in the same republic in 1912, which covered many square leagues with lava and ashes and blotted out thousands of lives; and, more recently, in the destruction of the present capital of Guatemala in December, 1917.

PANAMÁ AND THE UNITED STATES

Panamá, not yet named in the above lines, is the sixth member of the Central American group and the one which has most recently become an independent nationality. In 1903, Panamá, then a province or state in the republic of Colombia, seceded from that country, and under the aegis of the United States of America, quickly constituted itself as a republic. Its existence has been very closely allied with the interests of the United States and it is probable that its independence could not have been achieved without the not altogether disinterested advice and help of its powerful friend to the north, and the echoes of "I took Panamá" have been a very real detriment to the Progress of Pan-Americanism, or the cultivation of intimate friendly relations between the United States of America and the remaining nations of the continent.

The area of the Panamanian republic is about equal to that of the the state of Maine, or a little less than that of Ireland, and a strip of land 10 miles in width and running from ocean to ocean has been ceded to the United States for the uses of the Canal. As a matter of interest, the cities of Colon and Panamá, which lie outside the Zone, are generally policed by the United States and this latest-born of American republics does little that is not approved by Washington.

COMPARATIVE AREA AND POPULATION

The following table will show the comparative area and population of the six republics of Central America, although statisticians differ in their figures and unsettled boundary disputes often make an exact statement impossible:

	<i>Square miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
Nicaragua.....	49,200	600,000
Guatemala.....	48,300	2,000,000
Honduras.....	46,250	555,000
Panama.....	31,520	350,000
Costa Rica.....	18,400	420,000
Salvador.....	7,225	1,200,000
Total.....	200,895	5,125,000

As regards the composition of the population of Central America, the native Indian races are largely represented. Sixty per cent of the population of Guatemala, for example, is estimated as pure Indians, divided into thirty-six tribes, each with its own language, or dialect, customs, dress and religious beliefs. Of pure foreigners there are only some 15,000. The other republics have a smaller percentage of pure Indians, but in all of them these "native sons" form the background of the population and constitute a serious problem.

COMPOSITE CHARACTER OF THE POPULATION

The unusually composite character of the population may be judged from the following table of crosses which, although prepared for the republic of Salvador, will apply with certain restrictions, to the entire six republics. It forms an interesting study in ethnology and will alone explain many facts in the history and character of the peoples of Central America. It is as follows:

<i>Crosses</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Mother</i>
Ladino (mestizo).....	Spaniard	Indian
Castiso.....	Spaniard	Ladina
Españo.....	Castiso	Spanish
Mulato.....	Negro	Spanish
Morisco.....	Spaniard	Mulata
Albino.....	Morisco	Spanish
Tornatos.....	Albino	Spanish
Lobo (wolf).....	Negro	Indian
Caribujo.....	Lobo	Indian
Grifo.....	Lobo	Negress
Barsino.....	Coyote (Indian)	Mulata
Albarazado.....	Coyote	Indian
Chaniso.....	Coyote	Ladina
Mechino.....	Coyote	Loba

In addition to these native crosses, every nation of the world has contributed to the formation of the modern peoples of Central America. Buccaneers, sea-rovers, tourists, exiles from all lands—Teutons, Anglo-Saxons, Scandinavians, Greeks, Latins, Turks, Dutch, Asiatics, the sable African—many of them honest tradesmen who have made permanent homes in these lands, have generously mingled their blood with that of the natives. It is probable that few, if any, other centers of population offer to the world such an amazing mixture of the races as do the six republics of Central America.

ORIGIN OF THE PEOPLES

Although no conclusive proof may be adduced, there is good reason to believe that the Indians of Central America had an Asiatic origin, and the general trend of the tribes seems to have been northward. Copan, in Honduras, supposedly marks the oldest civilization in this part of the world, of which there is a record, and this was followed by the Mayan civilization whose ruins exist near the little village of Quiriguá, in Guatemala, and these in turn were followed by the tribes that invaded what is now Mexico and left as monuments their magnificent temples and cities in Yucatan, Chiapas and Oaxaca. These monuments preceded the formation of the Aztec empire and are even pre-Toltec in their origin, antedating the pyramids of Egypt, in the estimate of some archeologists, by thousands of years. The glyphs of Quiriguá are as yet undeciphered, although the great stone calendar has been squared with the Gregorian, and the origin of these people will probably never be known. The fabled Atlantis which afforded a passage across what is now a wide waste of waters, where there are but a few scattered islands—the tops of what must have been the high mountains of this now submerged continent—may be more than a mere hypothesis, and its counterpart in the Pacific may give the real explanation of the origin of all these Indian hordes that in some dim age of the past, swept up from the south and west and left

in the various stages of their journey the monoliths and temples which are today the mute evidences of their engineering skill and of their social organization. All through South America, among the native tribes there persists a tradition of some great Antarctic movement in which the tribes gradually trekked northward, and the pre-Incan ruins of Tiahuanacu, on the shores of Lake Titicaca, and those of Machu-Pichu, in the interior of Perú, may be accredited to these succeeding waves of immigration, the outward edges of which reached over into what are now Colombia and Venezuela and thus extended on to the north and west in the order we have seen.

The existence of an advanced civilization in the regions noted, all of which is or has been tropical, and the absence of proofs of an equal development to the north or south, would seem to indicate that the "curse of the tropics" was not so potent in bygone ages as it is supposed to be today. No Indian nation has left such monuments in colder regions, and those who lived on the fringes of this advanced civilization seem to have been, at least in a measure, subservient or inferior tribes who have left no record of their impact on world life.

Today the descendants of these same Indians constitute one of the most serious problems of the Central American statesman who goes below the surface and faces the future of his race. This native population is the great, seemingly inexhaustible, reservoir on which continuous drafts are being drawn to replenish and strengthen the mixed or creole population. It is the healthy, vigorous strain of the tribes of the hinterland that must strengthen the worn-out and often diseased blood of the dweller in the city, and thicken that of the coast dweller which has been thinned by tropical heat and debilitated by constant sieges of paludic and other even more destructive fevers. Unless the sources are kept pure and clean the whole stream will necessarily become polluted and the doom of the Central American races will be sealed.

CLIMATE

Central America, like Mexico, has for the most part, the advantages that arise from a climate that, in a given region, is practically stable. Along the coast, on either side, runs the *tierra caliente* where every known tropical fruit may be produced. The land is fertile and requires but little cultivation. Banana plantations have reached a high degree of development, under the fostering care of the United Fruit Company and similar corporations, along the coast, and the coffee berry which grows on the slopes of the interior plateaus, is rarely excelled in quality and flavor. Cane plantations and cattle ranches stud the coast line and the latter extend up into the higher regions of the interior, while fine woods, among them mahogany and rosewood, abound in the forests and form an as yet almost virgin treasure of these lands.

The bulk of the European population has naturally sought the high cool plateaus of the interior, in the *tierra templada*, and the city of Panamá is the only Central American capital situated on the coast. Guatemala City is almost 5000 feet above the sea, thus resembling Bogotá and the City of Mexico in climate and general conditions of life, though both these capitals are higher. The different countries are divided into what might be called cantons by mountain ranges and pestiferous swamps, and this has no doubt influenced the ethnological development of the native populations, dividing them into small tribes, each with its own dialect or language, customs and religion.

SOCIAL CASTES AND CONDITIONS

The population of Central America naturally divides itself, as in all Latin American countries, into three great social castes or classes. First of all there is the Indian of the hinterland, to whom reference has already been made. Slightly above him in social standing is the *ladino*, or creole, of mixed blood, who occupies an intermediary position between the pure white or European population and the mass of Indian laborers who are the hewers of wood and the

drawers of water. Though for the most part artisans, and generally of a humble social category, some have reached positions of influence, have become prominent in political life, or even occupied the seat of the President and made their voices heard in the legislative halls. The pure white population is often a negligible quantity numerically and tends to disappear through absorption by the lower classes. The women of this class, in particular, are the stay of the Church, while the men, openly non-religious, if not even anti-church in their sentiment, generally turn to political interests or give themselves to literary pursuits which are seldom remunerative but are supposed to insure high standing in the community. In Central America to a degree unknown in some of the states further south, the fact of humble origin is not necessarily a bar to political preference, nor to admission to the exclusive social circles of the high-born. This social chasm which yawns between the classes is more often crossed on a bridge of gold, yet talent and industry are coming to be recognized for their own worth and national life thereby deepened and strengthened.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Aside from what has been done by foreign capital, it may be said that but little economic progress has been made in Latin America. Panamá in particular depends on the United States not only for its political independence but also for its economic life. The tremendous business carried on by the administration of the Canal Zone in the immediate vicinity of the two principal cities of the republic, with its thousands of employees, insures a constant and altogether lucrative return on funds invested by the commercial community; but the natural resources of the country have been but very slightly exploited, and in the few cases that form an exception, by foreigners. In the other republics the landed proprietors belong, generally, to the old aristocracy, many of whose families received their grant of land from the crown itself, and have held it through successive changes of government, since its possession consti-

tutes not only potential wealth but also social standing and prerogatives. But the development of these fiefs depends very largely on foreign capital, particularly the construction of railways to the coast and the transportation by sea to foreign markets. The Central American governments have given but little attention to the increase in the ways of communication except in the granting of concessions to foreign capitalists. Yet few centers in the world have greater natural resources and the time cannot be far distant when these republics under stable governments will come into their own.

With the passing of dictators, who are an anachronism in modern life, and the exercise of the unobstructed right of suffrage by the peoples, Central America cannot fail to take a position of large economic importance among the nations.

In spite of the physical handicaps of a tropical climate; a heterogeneous and often nondescript population, in which the very dregs of humanity seem to have left an indelible mark, especially in the coast regions; the earthquakes which frequently wreck the cities, and the volcanoes which hurl cinders and lava over the surrounding country—often covering it to a depth of many feet and blotting out thousands of lives and destroying valuable property—the people of Central America have most attractive qualities, in common with the other Latin American nations, have shown a high standard of intellectual and executive ability, and, under good governments, ought to forge rapidly ahead and fulfill their real destiny. The United States through the investment of capital, especially in the opening up of interstate and international communication both by land and by sea could do real service to Central America and at the same time reap enormous returns on the investment.

An interesting illustration of the difficulties inherent in communication with the various Central American states, is found in the route usually preferred by those who would go from Guatemala, the northernmost republic, to Panamá at the extreme south of the Isthmus. Instead of simply going down to the Pacific port of San Jose and thence shipping direct to Balboa, the quickest as well as the most

comfortable route is that which leads down to Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic coast. There the traveler takes the United Fruit Company's boat to New Orleans and then transships to a steamer of the same line for Cristobal. Or, to give another illustration; if a letter is mailed in Denver or even San Francisco, addressed to a resident of Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, it is not sent directly down the west coast, but, instead, by rail to New Orleans, thence by boat to Panamá and, finally, up the west coast to Corinto, the port of the capital. In the usual course of events a letter could be sent from San Francisco to Hong Kong or Tokyo, or from New York to Cairo or Constantinople, in less time, and with considerably more certainty of its safe delivery, than to Managua or to Tegucigalpa.

The prompt completion of the Panamá railway from the frontiers of Mexico to Panamá, with the corresponding national lines running down to the ports in the various countries, would be one of the most helpful contributions to the solution of the economic and social problems of Central America. Intercommunications would thus be made easy, the rich and abundant products of the various countries would quickly and economically find an outlet to the sea, and, what is of even greater importance, especially in view of the proposed Federal union, the people of the different nationalities would come to know each other better, jealousy and intrigue would tend to disappear and the dream of Central American statesmen of a single strong political entity lying between Mexico and South America would be much nearer its realization.

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

Statistics in the Department of Public Instruction are on the whole incomplete and unsatisfactory, yet show, even in the best of cases, the need of prodigious endeavor on the part of the Central American peoples if they are to put this exceedingly important function of the governments on a proper basis.

Nicaragua, for example, where instruction is almost entirely in the hands of the church, and a country which has never erected a building for school purposes in all its history, is cited as having a total of 366 public and private schools, including all those of primary and secondary grade. The state offers no secondary instruction, but has three universities and a number of normal schools. The annual budget is \$310,000. Counting the population at one-half million, this means an annual per capita tax of about sixty cents for all departments of instruction, or a total about equal to the budget of one of our smaller colleges—such as Berea, in Kentucky—or one-tenth the annual income of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.¹ And this for an entire nation!

Costa Rica reports 419 elementary and 2 high schools, with a total attendance of 32,576 pupils. There is also a normal school and a university with four faculties.

Honduras has 584 primary public schools, a national institute, a University with four faculties, and the educational budget in 1918 amounted to \$385,000.

Salvador in 1916 reported 989 primary schools with 1476 teachers and 57,555 enrolled pupils; 27 higher schools, including 3 technical and 3 normal schools, with a total of 2345 pupils, and a national university with five faculties.

Panamá in 1917 maintained 398 public schools, throughout the 8 provinces, with a total attendance of 22,000 pupils under 315 teachers.²

The average illiteracy for all Central America, although exact statistics are silent on this point, cannot be less than 75 per cent of the entire population, as compared with 7.7 in the United States, and the combined educational budget for all Central America, with its population of over 5,000,000, cannot exceed one half that of Harvard or Yale University for a single year.

The statistics for Guatemala are more complete and for the school year of 1918 are as follows. There are reported

¹ Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1917, p. 47.

² (The above statistics are taken from *The Statesman's Year Book*, for 1919.)

1642 primary schools, with a total matriculation of 41,162 pupils; two normal schools, one for each of the sexes, with 226 students enrolled; schools of commerce and of a similar character, 212; and in the university, 57 students in pharmacy and natural sciences; 158 in medicine and surgery; and 110 in the faculty of law and political and social sciences. At the close of the year 11 were graduated in law, 12 in medicine and surgery, 3 as dentists, 3 as midwives, 3 as nurses, and 4 as pharmacists. Counting the population at 2,000,000 the above figures would give roughly speaking, one primary school for every 1200 persons, and one pupil for every 50 inhabitants. In the secondary or high school there is but one pupil for every 8500 inhabitants, and but one university graduate for every 87,000 inhabitants. Moreover in the estimation of eminent Guatemalans who were not in sympathy with the government of the now overthrown dictator, Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera, there is much that might be said as to optimism of the above statistics, as also of the equipment and methods of teaching. The "college" as understood in the United States, is unknown in Central America, as in all Latin America, and the university receives its students direct from the secondary schools, supplying in its lengthened program the courses they could not receive before entering. The "university," too, it must be remembered, is a different concept in the mind of the Latin American and generally centers around some one building in the heart of the city, *sans* campus, *sans* student life and activities, and *sans* most of the other component parts of our somewhat complex university organization.

RECENT POPULAR UPRISINGS

While Central America has always been a prolific center of political uprisings, these movements have, in the main, been military and fomented by pretenders to executive authority who, in some way or another, had been able to secure a following and overturn the one in power. An indication of a salutary change in methods of administration is the evidently increasing power of the people and their

influence on the choice of the nation's executive. This may be evidenced by recent developments in Costa Rica, and more particularly by the recent overthrow of Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera, in Guatemala, after 22 years of autocratic rule of that country. This occurred during the writer's visit to that country and evidently was the result of a great popular uprising rather than of the machinations of another aspirant to power. The streets of the capital, for many days before the declaration by the Assembly, that resulted in the resignation of Estrada Cabrera, were filled with throngs of determined citizens, who, in an orderly but energetic manner, manifested their hatred of the old order of government and their desire for a more democratic régime. Unbiased observers declared that at least 90 per cent of the thinking people of Guatemala were behind the movement that finally resulted in the overthrow of the so-called constitutional president, but who was in practice a Dictator, and the appointment of his successor.

The steps by which this was brought about were interesting and deserve perpetuation in the records of history, as showing a distinct advance in revolutionary methods. Urged on by the people, through its representatives, the Assembly, on April 8, made public the following decree:

LEGISLATIVE POWER

DECREE NUMBER 1022

The National Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Guatemala,

WHEREAS: The documents which in our possession duly establish the mental alteration of Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera, President of the Republic, by which he is rendered incompetent to continue as the Executive, and in order that he may attend to the re-establishment of his health, in conformity with Article 52, paragraphs VII and VIII, and 68 of the Constitutional Law,

THEREFORE:

IT IS DECREED:

Article I. Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera is separated from his position as President of the Republic and is given permission to absent himself from the territory of Central America.

Article II. The supreme power shall be given over into the hands of the citizen who is named for this purpose by the Assembly.

Article III. While Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera is in the country he will be given the honors corresponding to the high position which he had held and he is guaranteed by the people full exercise of all his rights.

The same number of *El Guatemalteco*, the "official daily bulletin of the Republic of Guatemala," published the decree by which his successor in the presidential office was named, and runs as follows:

DECREE NUMBER 1023

The National Assembly of the Republic of Guatemala,

WHEREAS: On this date Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera has been separated from the exercise of the Executive Power,

AND WHEREAS, the person should be named who must succeed him in that high position,

THEREFORE, in conformity with that which is decreed in Article 52, paragraph VIII, of the Constitution,

IT IS DECREED:

That citizen Carlos Herrera is named Constitutional President of the Republic in substitution for Dr. Manuel Estrada Cabrera.

It may be added here that these decrees did not bring the desired result without the spilling of blood, although the people were hoping that the revolution might be bloodless. The dictator, from his forts on the hills above the city, bombarded the defenseless population, for six days, with interruptions, and many lives were lost. But the movement, inasmuch as it was of the people and by the people, did not waver and on April 14 an armistice was signed by the terms of which Estrada Cabrera became a prisoner and the new government came into power.

REVIVAL OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARD UNION

An interesting phase in the recent revolution in Guatemala is the attempt by the "Unionist Party," now in power, to revive interest in the federation of the Central American States under one flag and one government. As illustrating the sentiment of this party, which now represents the

people in its executive capacity, the Preamble to a decree which the National Legislative Assembly was asked to promulgate, will be of interest. Translated from the somewhat florid original into our colder and less tropical tongue, it reads as follows:

The historic moment is definite and should be taken advantage of. A century of shameful separation, internal revolts, calamities and mistakes, have not been sufficient to quench the flame of union among the Central Americans. Far otherwise, the people rise above the sorrowful reality to a higher ideal of Justice and Right, of aggrandizement and progress, does not bend under the weight of misfortune, refuses to accept the dictates of adversity, lifts up its countenance and demands union because it does not wish to be consumed by impotence.

It is necessary that the sorrowful spectacle of our political disintegration disappear, that we direct our gaze toward the greatest and highest ends of existence, and fulfilling the ideals bequeathed us by past generations, bring it about that Central America be reborn, free, sovereign, independent and worthy of taking its place by the side of the great nations of the earth.

The unity of the old Central American territory is a necessity that is felt by all and desired by all. The political clubs, whether they are Unionist or Liberal in affiliation, and the inhabitants of the country, with no distinction whatever, desire it and hope that the centenary of our independence be acclaimed in the five republics by the flag of 1821. By the fathers of the Independence, by those who fought for the noble idea of a united country, by the blood spilled to bring about this desire of all Central America, by our love to the races from which we have sprung, by our marvelous geographic position, and taking advantage of the national sentiment, now profoundly stirred and vibrant, we beg you to give life to this ideal of a Union and that you promulgate the following decree:

"The National Legislative Assembly of Guatemala proclaims the Union of Central America; protects and sustains all endeavor directed toward securing it in a peaceful manner.

"To that end, it convokes the other States in a Constituent Central American Assembly, to be formed by fifteen individuals from each State, elected by the people under conditions of the most ample liberty and independence of action, who shall meet in the City of Guatemala, on the first day of April, 1920, for the purpose of choosing the city which shall serve as the seat of their deliberations, decree the Political Constitution of the Republic of Central America, and designate its Capital and the seat of its legislative and executive power.

"Anyone who may declare himself as against this Union or who may oppose its work or embarrass it in any way whatever, shall be held to be a traitor to the ideals of the country and both

unworthy and incapable of holding any public office or employment.

"To you, the members of Congress, corresponds the glory of proclaiming that which for many years has been our fervent desire, the sentiment of our race, the highest of our ideals, and we hope that, not one or two, but all of you may favor this motion."

This decree was presented to the National Legislative Assembly on March 1, 1920, but has not, as yet, been acted upon. Inasmuch as this party is now in power, it will be interesting to see how far they will be able to carry out this very laudable project of a great federated Central American republic. It would be a great triumph for modern democracy, a long step forward in the progress of the nations, of the western hemisphere, could these five republics lay aside private and personal jealousies and ambitions and, interested only in making of Central America a place "safe for democracy," unite their interests and purposes through the formation of one strong state whose influence would weigh heavily in the Councils of the modern world.

That some of their own eminent statesmen are thinking of the formation of one or more strong Latin American nations, through the union or federation of some of the smaller and sometimes defenseless peoples, is evidenced by the recent words of a Mexican jurist.³ He said, in part:

The Latin American countries have developed without fixed purpose, essaying all kinds of government without finding any form that satisfies them. They have passed alternately from tyranny to something very near anarchy, before arriving at democracy. An immense self-love has made each one of these small nations believe themselves entitled to figure as a power of the first order. Each one of them believes that its artists, its scientists, its army and navy are not surpassed by any other nation. They have confounded love of country with love of power.

What is the future of these countries? Will it be possible for any of them to become truly great powers? While they live as they are living? No.

Already out of the tropic of Capricorn have issued two nationalities which, including Brazil, are those of greatest vitality, the greatest vigor and the greatest future—the Argentine Republic

³ The Future of the Latin American Republics, by R. de Zayas Enríquez, in *La Nueva Democracia*, quoted in *New York Times*, May 10, 1920.

and Chile. They are two rival countries today; the lofty wall of the Andes divides them, but the railroad, the viaduct and the tunnel overcome the obstacles raised by nature. Law will overcome the obstacle created by the character of both countries. Chile, essentially a mining country; Argentina, essentially agricultural, both with great industrial possibilities, are complete in themselves. Merged into a single nationality they could become great.

These expansions (resulting from the merging of these countries) appear rational, and it is almost certain that they will be realized, either by means of treaties formed through foresight or else by wars, imposed by necessity, unless the threatened nations, which would be absorbed in the expansion, Mexico included, should change their tactics.

Within a very few years there will be no reason for the small nations to exist; the present century will see them disappear completely, at all events in Europe and America, because they serve only as a hindrance to the progress of humanity.

If in Europe certain small powers have survived, it is due to the fact that the great nations have protected and maintained them, under the pretext of preserving Continental equilibrium.

The nation that sleeps, trusting in right, in agreements and altruism, will have a tragic awakening, finding itself chained to the chariot wheels of the conqueror.

History shows that countries, in order to be self-respecting must be strong and prudent, but above all strong. Thus it is that the Spanish American nations must succeed in making themselves strong at any cost and this they will not be able to do, except by means of democracy, which unites all the inhabitants in a common aspiration and a community of interests. To say, for example, "Mexico for the Mexicans," "Cuba for the Cubans," shows lack of practical sense. The modern doctrine is "The World for Humanity."

The above words, spoken by a Latin American, apply with special cogency to the small and now disunited nations of Central America, and might well be pondered by their statesmen.

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The future happiness and prosperity of the peoples of Central America is very largely in the hands of the government of the United States. This is admittedly so, both because the United States is the strongest nation in the western hemisphere and because of the geographical situa-

tion. And it must be confessed that our diplomatic attitude in the past, as regards all Latin America, leads some of us to suspect that there may be misapprehension and misunderstanding in the future. We do not seem to have learned, as yet, that our duty is not limited to taking all we can out of Latin America, but that we have also an obligation to put something into it. Not entirely without reason have many Latin Americans labored under a misapprehension as to the real contents of the "Monroe Doctrine," and it would seem that the time has come when we should either admit that it is an "obsolete shibboleth," or, giving it the proper interpretation, make it a real "American Doctrine," to whose defense every Latin American nation, from giant Brazil to the comparatively pigmy Panamá, would instantly rally.

On this point it may be well to quote and ponder the words of another Latin American statesman, uttered within the last few weeks, as showing how the chief magistrate of one of the most advanced nations to the south of us considers the formation of such a league. Dr. Brum, President of Uruguay, in an address before the university students in the capital of his country said, referring to this League which he had proposed:

Owing to the state in which European countries remain after the struggle, it may be said that fear of invasion by them in America has been removed for many years. But is that sufficient reason for us to take no interest in the future and turn away from the Monroe Doctrine with the pretext it is now unnecessary? I believe that today, more than ever, we should use foresight in searching for formulas that may assure forever the peace and full independence of American countries.

The principle of American solidarity, based on the constitution of a continental league, is more ample than the Monroe Doctrine, because it will not only defend the countries of America against foreign invaders but also against imperialistic tendencies which might arise among themselves.

The formation of this league, in my opinion, would be a logical consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, which, in recognizing and expressly accepting the Monroe Doctrine, seems to be desirous of limiting its field of action, so far as American affairs are concerned. On the other hand, the Supreme Council of the League of Nations is composed principally of the delegates of the Great Powers, nearly all the American countries having been excluded.

These countries need, therefore, to create a powerful organization to look after their interests in the decisions arrived at by the League of Nations. Harmonious and joint action by the "American League" would avoid European intervention in our affairs.

The policy of the United States in Latin America in the past has been largely opportunist when, on the contrary, it should have been well-defined, well-understood and energetically enforced. With not little reason have the statesmen of these countries considered our methods as vacillating and calculated to favor this or that party or individual which might be expected to do the most in return. A recent writer, referring to the overthrow of Estrada Cabrera in Guatemala has voiced this feeling. He said:

The whole Cabrera episode probably will go down in history as a rather unsavory interlude in our diplomacy in Latin America. Cabrera stood for everything which President Taft and President Wilson professed not to stand for; he represented iron force as much as the Kaiser; he laughed at the doctrine of self-determination; he exploited his country; it has been changed to his advantage; he believed in stark militarism. Yet President Taft's administration tolerated him and Mr. Wilson's gave him eager regard in return for his gesture in declaring war on Germany and his truckling to our policy in Mexico and Central America. His fall is a distinct feather in the cap of President Carranza of Mexico, whose inveterate foe he was.⁴

And another, speaking of the intervention of the United States in Nicaragua, and writing while still in that country and with the actual conditions fresh in his mind, says:

In spite of all the abuses of the Zelaya administration, which the United States threw out, much attention was paid by it to public instruction. But as soon as the Conservative Party, protected by the United States, was put into power, they began to bring into the country the Jesuits, Christian Brothers, Capuchinos and other religious orders, and to give them charge of the schools. At present practically the whole of public instruction is in the hands of the Church. They cannot understand why the United States government is working against itself, by protecting the Conservatives in office while they encourage the Church in every way and the Church, in turn, is giving itself to a constant campaign of prejudicing the people against Americans as heretics whom all good Catholics should oppose.⁵

⁴ The *New York Globe*, quoted in *The Literary Digest*, May 1, 1920.

⁵ Travel letter, S. G. Inman, from Managua, April 12, 1920.

The day has passed when the diplomacy of force can be advantageously applied south of the Rio Grande. It has sometimes given more immediate results than might otherwise have been secured, but it has never been moral or Christian, and consequently has failed in the end. No better policy could be adopted by the United States in its relations with the Latin American nations, and particularly with those of Central America, which are our near neighbors, and largely dependent on our good will, than the principle enunciated centuries ago by one of the world's greatest thinkers, "whosoever would become great among you, let him become your minister, and whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant."

A PROGRAM OF SERVICE

That a very large portion of the people of the United States are thinking of Central America in terms of service is evidenced by the recent celebration in Guatemala City of a Conference between representatives of the various boards which have mission work in Central America, and the setting up by them of a cooperative program, which when carried out, cannot fail to intensify friendly relations between these nations. In no sectarian spirit, but with altogether disinterested and altruistic intentions, it is proposed to aid the various governments through the extension of primary and secondary instruction; the establishing of a model Normal school, industrial schools, especially among the now neglected Indian population, and a training school for nurses, all of which will converge in a Union College to be located in Panamá and which will serve the intellectual interests not only of Central America but also of the nearby South American republics. Other institutions are also planned, as a union Press which will be able to aid in the supply of helpful literature; a hospital in each of the countries; help in combating the social evil; care of the insane; a thorough survey of the Indian population and a comprehensive program for work among these neglected people.

The work that is being done by the Carnegie Foundation and the Rockefeller Institute is also thoroughly appreciated by the people and is accepted as evidence of the desire on the part of the United States to aid in the solution of Central American problems. An editorial which recently appeared in the leading daily paper of one of the Central American capitals, an organ which reflected the opinion of the government, has admirably expressed the gratitude of the people of that and neighboring countries for benefits received from the institutions mentioned, and at the same time has enunciated an admirable philosophy of diplomacy. The writer said:

Rising above the suspicions which "Dollar Diplomacy" and the "Big Stick" have aroused in Latin America, the interest of the United States in Spanish America has been shown in other important ways and in each of these there are sufficient noble and altruistic ideals to erase jealousies and hatreds.

More important than political treaties, than solemn promises of friendship and love, than Congresses and Conferences, the great cultural endeavors of the United States have contributed to the drawing together of the Americas. That what we have stated is true is proved by the great work done in all parts of the continent by the Rockefeller Institute.

It is not necessary to refer to the discretion with which this work has been carried on. No one is ignorant of the positive benefit which this Institute has brought to the country. Its work has not been one-sided. In combating the hookworm, to do which it has penetrated to the remotest parts of the tropics, it has propagated the truth concerning public hygiene, everywhere. It has endeavored to teach cleanliness to the Indians, the necessity of the bath, of sanitation, and of eating only healthful foods. This Institute has gone from farm to farm, from house to house—and at the same time its offices in the cities and most important towns have lost no opportunity to examine the sick and to distribute medicines—and has interested a great circle of people in its work. The results could not be more satisfactory, as proved by the statistics published by the Institute.

If the fight against hookworm provokes our gratitude, of how much greater benefit to the tropical countries has been the crusade against yellow fever. The work of Gorgas and others has no precedent in history. In the saving of humanity from this plague no obstacle has been allowed to stand in the way. Money has been poured out in torrents. The sacrifices have been multiplied and the representatives of the Institute have gone from one extreme of the country to the other—today in Mexico, tomorrow in Guatemala and Salvador, and then on to Ecuador, and they are in all places at the same time.

The recompense of their sacrifices and struggles is to be found in their success, as in the discovery of the manner in which yellow fever may be prevented.

This is the spirit that will bind the two Americas together with bonds that cannot be severed—the spirit of service rendered by the strong to those who are weak. And in this spirit of neighborliness, in this attitude of mental and spiritual hospitality, there is to be found the true solution of our common economic problems, the root of all true diplomacy.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN

*By Jacinto Lopez, Editor of "La Reforma Social;" author
"The War on the Pacific" and many essays on
American and International Questions*

The subject matter assigned to me easily lends itself to an extensive and elaborate discourse on the geographical, historical and political aspects of the relation of the United States to the Caribbean Sea. But this would not meet my purpose. In coming to this conference, I have a more impersonal and far reaching interest. I have come here to make a faithful exposition of facts and to state a few plain truths in connection with a question which is of the utmost importance for the destinies of the American Continent. I have come here with the purpose of rendering, if it is in my power, a service to those ideals of right, justice, and international good faith and good will which should control, as principles of action, the policy of the great and the small powers.

The policy of the United States in the Latin American Continent is carried out without the knowledge of the American people whose interest in these matters has not as yet been aroused. The American people are too busy with domestic questions at home and with European questions abroad. The public pays no attention to affairs in Central and South America. The government is thus free to act without any check and without any sense of responsibility. The government carries forward its policies in Latin America even against the expressed disapproval of Congress. The situation thus created is one of force, pure and simple. It is the dictatorial use of overwhelming might in countries too weak and distressed to think even of resistance. In this arbitrary way, the President of the United States, whoever he may be, disposes of the fortunes and shapes the

destinies of the small countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea, according to his own and exclusive personal will; without a consistent and deliberate policy, without any knowledge or any comprehension of the peoples of those countries, their problems, their needs, their woes, their aspirations; without any regard for international law; sometimes violating even the very elements of Christian civilization. His sole inspiration is that of the old Roman patriotism.

The unbridled and unaccountable freedom of action of the President of the United States in the countries of the Caribbean, the supreme dictatorship which he exerts over those lands, through both the great moral authority as well as the naval power of the United States, fearless of the ultimate sanction of public opinion at home—because the American people are entirely unaware of and entirely indifferent to the events in a region which is, however, so intimately connected with the most vital interests of the United States—this is one of the things that impress and surprise us Latin Americans. We are more deeply and painfully impressed because we admire and love this country and fervently believe that it has a civilizing mission to fulfill in the world at large, but especially and particularly in Latin America.

The century old struggle with Great Britain for the control of the Isthmian routes; the unflinching policy of the United States throughout the nineteenth century with regard to the Island of Cuba; the war of 1898 for the expulsion of Spain from the remaining strongholds of her American empire, testify to the paramount concern and interest of the United States in the Caribbean waters and lands. This interest is manifold. It is commercial, political and strategic. It is inseparable from the national security of the United States. This wide area of waters is the natural outlet for the foreign trade of the United States with the West Indies and with the South American countries. In the policy of the government of the United States, the Panama Canal is considered as a part of the coast line of the United States. We can, therefore, imagine with all its imponderable significance, a continuous coast line ex-

tending from the northwestern frontier of the United States down to and through the Panama Canal, and therefrom up to the northeastern frontier embracing within it the whole of Central America, the Danish Islands, Cuba, Haiti or Santo Domingo and Porto Rico. The continental shore line of South America, from the mouth of the Orinoco River to the Yucatan Channel, completes the land boundaries of the Caribbean Sea on the South and West. The Platt amendment; the Panama Canal and its history since the government of the United States decided on an American Canal under American control; the events of November, 1903, which resulted in the secession of Panama from Colombia and the treaty of 1904 with the new republic by which the United States became the sovereign of the Canal; the policy of the United States government in Central America since 1910, taking the Republic of Nicaragua as a starting point or an entering wedge; the purchase of the Danish Islands, made possible by the Great War and its economic consequences in the mother country; and finally the policy of the United States government in Haiti and Santo Domingo in 1915 and 1916, likewise favored by the Great War, are but manifestations of the supremely controlling interest of the United States in the Caribbean.

The imperialistic expansion of the United States since 1898 is altogether in this magnificent area. Look at the long line of islands stretching down from Key West to Port of Spain. The United States has a footing everywhere. From Guantánamo, the United States can control the windward passage between Cuba and the Dominican Republic. From Porto Rico the United States can control the Mona Passage. Haiti and Santo Domingo are under the direct control of the United States since 1915 and 1916 and each has a harbor of first class importance for a naval station, Mole St. Nicholas and Samana Bay; the former commanding the eastern side of the Windward passage, and the latter commanding the Mona passage from the west. The treaty with Nicaragua gives the United States possession of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands off the east coast of this republic together with the right to build a naval base

on the Gulf of Fonseca. St. Thomas has a splendid harbor for a naval station too. Colon and the fortifications of the Canal, the Canal itself, which has become the center of the naval power of the United States, complete the picture of the southward progress of the United States in its march of expansion in the Mediterranean of the New World, which has thus become an American domain, the Mare Nostrum of the United States. Add to this the United States navy, and we can have an idea of the amount of independence of the sovereign nations bordering on the Caribbean. In this way we can at the same time have an idea, in a general sense, of the actual situation in the Caribbean world. The United States is today the supreme lord of the Caribbean and the whole question is what use does it make or is it going to make of its power and how is it going to improve its opportunities?

We all know the story of Panama. We all know how the present position of the United States in that most important spot in the world was attained. We all know that the American people did not approve the Roosevelt policy in this matter; but what is not so well known is that the nature of the procedure of the United States government in Nicaragua and San Domingo is similar to that which was followed in Panama. It was by force that the United States government prevented Colombia from maintaining its integrity. It was by force that the United States government established in San Domingo in 1916 an American military government. It was by force that the United States government obtained in Nicaragua in 1914 rights and privileges that practically destroyed the political existence of that country as a sovereign nation and impaired the independence of each and all the remaining four Central American republics. It is by force that the conditions and the situation thus created in those countries are maintained.

In San Domingo, a regularly constituted government, headed by an unimpeachable man, was overthrown by the American marines, simply because that man, true to his duty, to his oath, to his conscience, to his country, stubbornly refused to affix his signature to a treaty handing over to the United States the sovereignty of the republic.

In Nicaragua, the United States government gave its support to an armed uprising against the central government. The revolution was entirely justified and deserved the sympathy of liberty-loving men everywhere. But after the war was over it was seen that its leaders were willing to pay a prohibitive price for the help received from the United States government and without which they would not have succeeded. Soon after the organization of the new régime the chief of the Latin American division of the department of state, Mr. Dawson, made his appearance at Managua, Nicaragua, and served notice upon President Estrada that his government would not be recognized by the United States government except upon the acceptance by him of the following conditions: the negotiation of a fifty million dollar loan through the intervention of the United States government, and the control of the custom houses of the republic by the United States as security for the loan. Everything was granted, but the American Congress denied its approval to this pact.

The note in which the revolutionary government of Nicaragua asked the United States to render it the service of entering with it into a contract for the management of the custom houses and the placing of the loan, was written by Mr. Dawson himself, and he opposed even the slightest alteration suggested by the Nicaraguan minister of foreign affairs. Notwithstanding the refusal of Congress, the American government persisted in its Nicaraguan policy and a new arrangement was made by which a New York banking concern made to the government of Nicaragua a loan amounting to \$1,500,000 and later a further amount of \$755,000. Since then the custom houses have been in the hands of these New York bankers. Meanwhile, the principal leaders of the successful revolution, five in number, made an agreement with Mr. Dawson providing that the nomination for president of the republic should fall exclusively upon one of their group of five. There was a violent reaction against this trend of events. The minister of war, General Mena, rebelled. The provisional president lost no time in asking the intervention of the United States govern-

ment to put down the rebellion. He wanted the United States to protect with its forces all the inhabitants of the republic including the protection of his own government, which for all practical purposes from that moment had ceased to exist. American troops were landed and for the first time in the history of the continent the government of the United States took sides with its military forces in the civil strife of an American country in favor of a government which had declared its impotency to rule. Later on this same government, thus saved and backed by the United States government, made a treaty with the government to which it owed its existence, establishing an American protectorate over the republic. This treaty failed in the Senate of the United States and a new treaty was submitted in 1914, which was approved in 1916, this time without the provision of the protectorate plan. By this convention the United States paid to the government of Nicaragua three million dollars in return for the following concessions: the right to construct a trans-isthmian canal by the Nicaraguan route or any other route in the territory of Nicaragua; and the control by lease for ninety-nine years of Great Corn and Little Corn Islands and of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca. The United States has the option to renew the lease for a similar further period.

Costa Rica, Honduras and Salvador protested to the United States against this treaty on the ground that it was destructive of their independence as sovereign states and contrary to their most vital interests. A canal through the Nicaraguan route cannot be built without the consent of Costa Rica which possesses proprietary rights over part of the territory in the region of the San Juan River: and moreover Nicaragua was forbidden by treaty to enter into any agreement whatsoever for the opening of the canal without Costa Rica concurring in the compact. Costa Rica and Salvador, each acting separately, brought suit against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice, established under the Washington Convention for the judicial settlement of all disputes between the five republics. The government of Costa Rica in March, 1916, asked the court

to declare that under the Canas-Jerez Treaty, the Cleveland Laudo and the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1907, the government of Nicaragua had no right to enter with the United States or any other power into an agreement such as the Bryan-Chamorro treaty; and that, therefore, this treaty was null and of no value. On its part the government of Salvador, on August, 1916, petitioned the court to issue a writ ordering the government of Nicaragua to abstain from executing the Bryan-Chamorro treaty.

The government of Salvador alleged that the Bryan-Chamorro treaty violated the rights of Salvador in the Gulf of Fonseca and imperilled its independence and national existence; that said treaty infringed, moreover, the rights of Salvador under Articles III and IX of the Washington Convention of 1907. In December, 1916, the court decided in favor of Costa Rica, supporting in every point the position taken by her as complainant against Nicaragua; and in March, 1919, the court passed judgment equally favorable in the case of Salvador versus Nicaragua, and declared that the Nicaraguan government was under obligations to reestablish the status quo which existed between the three republics prior to the Bryan-Chamorro treaty.

Did Nicaragua obey the sentence of the International Judicial Court of Central America established under the Washington Convention to which Nicaragua was a party in common with the other Central American republics? The practical result was that Nicaragua withdrew her representative in the court; and that the court, the first institution of its kind in the world, the greatest achievement of civilization in our day in America as an agency of peace and justice, passed away and exists no longer. The Bryan-Chamorro treaty has no standing in international law. It is inimical to the most vital interests of the Central American republics. It is in conflict with previous treaties already in force. It was made with a government set up and kept up by the United States government, a government that has no power or authority to make a treaty of such a nature. The people of Nicaragua have not been consulted, notwithstanding the fact that that treaty makes renuncia-

tion of sovereign rights that no nation can make without committing suicide. Elihu Root publicly stated that the treaty should not be made with the existing government of Nicaragua but with a representative government. But a representative government would never make such a treaty. This treaty has disturbed the good relations of peace and friendship and mutual confidence between the five Central American republics. The government of Nicaragua is by them considered as playing the rôle of Judas. And if there has not been a coalition of the other four republics to remove it and bring Nicaragua back into the Central American family of sister republics it is only because that government is under the protection of the United States which supports it against the will of the Nicaraguan people. It was in fear of a Central American crusade to liberate Nicaragua from that government that the protectorate idea was put into the treaty of 1914 with the United States.

The people of the Dominican Republic, the government of which was by force supplanted in November, 1916, by an American military government, has ever since that fateful day been under martial law. Justice even in civil matters is administered there by the provost marshal. There is a censorship of the press compared to which the methods of the Russian czar were an ideal example of liberalism and wisdom. There is a system of repression by the application of corporal punishments so cruel and so inhuman that you would feel inclined, I am sure, to think it unbelievable. They imprison the people without any process of law. They chase the people in the country as if they were savage beasts. Torments or tortures of various forms, that of the water and that of the rope, for instance, are practiced. Now the people of that republic are a civilized Christian people. It can be said that San Domingo is the cradle of Christian civilization in America. What is their crime? What have they done? These people have always been most friendly to the United States. The treaty of 1907 with the United States government was made to preserve their independence and sovereignty. By this

treaty the Dominican people occupy a singular position in relation to the United States which was to act and is acting as a trustee for them before the creditor nations. The reason alleged for invading their country and subjugating them is that there was at the time a civil war. There is so far as I know no reason put forth for treating them as the Germans themselves have not been treated. After all that how can they believe in civilization? It is in the name of civilization that they have been crushed as a nation and oppressed and terrorized as if we were not living in the twentieth century but three or four centuries ago.

I was in Cuba in 1916. I witnessed the presidential elections of November of that year. There was a landslide for the candidate of the Liberal Party. The defeated candidate was the president himself who had run for reelection, a word that has a sinister significance in Latin American politics and Latin American history. Reëlection means there usurpation and usurpation means revolution or civil war. This is invariably the rule in those countries and it did not fail this time in Cuba. History repeated itself in 1916 in the Pearl of the Antilles. The man in the presidential chair was most unwilling to submit to the verdict of the people and through the most scandalous expedients carried on his determination to keep himself in office for another four years. There was of course a revolution. Revolution in Cuba means intervention by the United States. Washington intervened in effect but did it to put down the revolution and uphold the usurpation. Revolution is an unpardonable crime in the eyes of Washington which has no eyes for usurpation.

From November when the elections were held, to February, when the coup d'état took place, there was plenty of time and opportunity for the United States government to exert its moral influence and prevent a catastrophe. Had the least effort been made to do so, the sad events of February, 1917, in Cuba could have been easily averted. The experience of 1905 had shown a defect in the Platt amendment. It was not preventive. It did not come into action until after the consummation of the facts. This most val-

uable lesson was disregarded in 1916-1917. Measures could have been taken and should have been taken then and there to avoid the revolution of 1917. The way to avoid the revolution was to make the usurpation impossible. And with a single word whispered by the American minister at Havana, in the ear of President Menocal, the people of Cuba would have been spared the bloodshed, the destruction of property, the disorder and the discredit incident to the coup d'état. It is our opinion that the Platt amendment was conceived with the purpose, in part, to save Cuba from the cancer that has eaten into the Latin American republics, despotic government. By article III of the Platt amendment, the United States has the right to intervene to maintain a government which will protest liberty. Liberty was killed in Cuba in 1917 and a despotic government arose from the official conspiracy to defeat the will of the people as expressed in the elections of November, 1916. Why did Washington permit this thing to happen? And it would not have been possible but for the line of action taken by Washington. The revolution would have deposed the usurper, had it not been for the protection of Washington and the decidedly hostile attitude assumed by it toward the revolution. Evidently Washington failed in its duty. It should have prevented the conflict. It should have by all means seen to it that a representative government was maintained in Cuba in that emergency. As it was, democracy was destroyed in Cuba in 1917 and Washington was primarily responsible for it. There is no popular government in Cuba today and the outlook is very dark. How is representative government to be reestablished in Cuba?

The revolutions in Latin America are movements of freedom. They are consistently made against despotic governments. The aspiration to liberty thus expressed is seldom realized but failure never kills the will to be free, and so long as despotism exists, so long the aspiration to liberty will fight for its extermination. This is the secret of the endless civil wars in those countries. It is this state of things which creates the opportunity and affords the pretext for action by the United States of the sort we have seen in

reviewing the situation in Central America, San Domingo and Cuba.

Notice that intervention never happens when despotism is in peaceful control. It commences to threaten the very moment there is an uprising against it. Revolutions are the explanation and the justification of the presence of an American military government in San Domingo. A revolution is the explanation of the Panama treaty. A revolution is the explanation of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty. The conclusion is that the struggle for liberty, for good and representative government, in short, for democracy, leads to foreign servitude and that those people in order to preserve their nationalities should keep quiet and get along the best they can under despotism, no matter how cruel and destructive it may be.

Nearly every Latin American nation has passed through the dark age of despotism and revolution. Argentina is the most striking example. Chili had presidential dictators until 1892. And many of them, the great majority, have succeeded in the struggle for freedom and have established stable and strong governments. The policy observed by the United States in Nicaragua, for instance, would have made this process impossible and civilization would have been the loser.

Those countries have a right to live, deserve to live and must live. Because they have not as yet achieved stability, they should not be absorbed and submerged. Nations very much older and larger than they are still solving the problem of self-government and internal peace. No great European power would even think of taking advantage of the conditions in which Russia and Germany find themselves today in order to exact from them concessions that would forever undermine their status of sovereign and independent nations. The greatest of all wars in all the centuries was fought by the greatest of all powers in order to preserve the independence and sovereign existence of the small nations of Europe.

It is our belief that in the existing situation in the Caribbean, the United States has a noble and superior mission

to fulfill. It consists in helping the nations of the Caribbean to enter definitely into the path of political development. This should be done in a friendly, generous way, with no selfish aims. The fundamental principle of action of this mission should be the preservation of the territorial integrity, and the independence and the sovereignty of those nations. Here is an opportunity for the United States to render civilization a service of first magnitude. How it should or could be done is not for me to discuss on this occasion. I know it can be done. I know it should be done. The United States already is the overlord in the Caribbean. There is no fear of any international political rivalry in this region. The future of the world is not to lie in warfare but in peace. Disarmament will become more and more imperative every day. The hunt for naval bases and positions of commercial advantage should not be carried so far as to trespass moral and political boundaries which are really inviolable if we are to live in a civilized world. Naval bases and new fields for commercial expansion should not be acquired at the price of the integrity, the independence and the sovereignty of small and defenseless nations which love their individuality and are loath to part with it. All those people of the Caribbean Seas have the sentiment of nationality. They believe in their own destiny. They hate foreign domination. In this very month of May several thousand Panamanians, the very people of the so-called revolution of November, 1903, marched through the streets of their city in a torch light parade as a protest against the acquisition by the United States of the major portion of Taboga Island for fortification as a part of the Pacific defense scheme of the Panama Canal. An automobile in which General Pershing was driving to a ball in his honor, was halted by the procession and forced to return to his hotel.

These countries are immensely rich. They have enormous possibilities. The extraordinary increase of their commerce in recent years, which is mainly carried on with the United States, shows their importance. They constitute in themselves an empire. They deserve to live. They have the will to live.

The power of the United States is in itself so great that all the other nations of the Caribbean are powerless against it. In this sense their independence is already inevitably restricted. There is no possibility that any one of them or all of them combined would be able to act contrary to the interests of the United States, but their rights as nations should be strictly recognized and respected and their internal problems should be viewed sympathetically and with a spirit of intelligence and disinterested coöperation.

AMERICA'S "MARE NOSTRUM"

By Kirby Thomas, Consulting Mining Engineer, New York

The Caribbean region is usually considered to include the countries, colonies and dependencies bordering on the irregular ellipse formed by the Islands of Cuba, Porto Rico and Haiti on the north; the Yucatan Peninsula, the Central American countries and part of Colombia on the west; Colombia and Venezuela on the south, and the Lesser Antilles on the east. The three colonial Guianas, although without these physical limits should be included to form part of the same economic group, likewise the outlying islands of the Indies, and for general consideration, the Bahamas and also the, geographically separate, Bermuda Islands.

The Gulf of Mexico region, part of which is bordered by important Mexican states, is geographically an extension of the Caribbean region, but for the purposes of this discussion and, generally, is considered separately.

HISTORY AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS

The Caribbean region, as a geographical unit, is well defined, but its communal members vary greatly in their political status and relations and in social and economic development. Geographically, and by reason of sea transportation conditions, the region, as a whole, is one of our "nearest neighbors" and therefore presents the inevitable political, social and business problems arising from the proximity and contact of communities and of nations. The variety of conditions prevailing in the Caribbean area, and the continual, and often unexpected, political and economic changes affecting the individual Caribbean government or geographic members, has given a complexity to this "neighborly" contact with the United States which has puzzled

American statesmen, befogged American public opinion, and disconcerted the commercial and political programs of other nations.

The historical development of the Caribbean people has had a most important bearing on the conditions which prevail today, socially, politically and economically. The first civilization in the Americas was in the Caribbean and for several centuries this region was the source of great commercial activity and an important factor in the world's political affairs and in the development of the world's commerce and commercial politics. These conditions were at their zenith, and largely were developed before the United States came into national existence, and before the North American colonies had become a factor either as a market for the products of this region, or as a source of supply.

Prior to the Spanish-American war, the most important trade activities of the Caribbean region were controlled by Spain and Great Britain, and American participation was limited and generally unsatisfactory. The American people did not have the need of greater commercial exchange with the Caribbean communities nor did they realize the important trade possibilities in that direction. Although the United States gained important territorial extensions and commercial advantages as a result of the war with Spain, it certainly cannot be said that the deliberate motives of the war, on the part of the United States were either political or economic. The results, as we now know, were of much greater importance to the United States economically, than they were politically. And these results have greatly influenced our Caribbean relations and interests.

The post-Spanish-war boom in American trade and investments in Cuba and Porto Rico was followed by an awakened American interest in the whole Caribbean region and a greater interest and activity in Latin American trade and developments generally. Notwithstanding the coincident diversion of American interest and capital to Mexico, the trade and investments in the Caribbean region had attained to a substantial total by the end of the first decade of this century. Investments, outside of Cuba and Porto

Rico, where they were assured of protection and fair treatment by the American political participation, were restricted and limited, except in a few special instances, and American-Caribbean trade at all times had to overcome the low prices and politically organized, or supported, competition of German and British commercial interests.

The undertaking of the Panama Canal by the United States and the establishment of American political influence on the Isthmus, was the next forward step affecting American commercial interests in the Caribbean. The whole world realized that the canal meant a great stimulus to Caribbean trade and business. The nature, circumstances and magnitude of the Panama task appealed to the American imagination and turned attention to consideration of the new commercial conditions expected to result from the completion of the canal. From these considerations, and also because of the unconscious stimulation of national pride, arose many ambitious commercial plans on the part of American business interests. These were influenced also largely by the growing realization of the need of foreign trade expansion to relieve recurrent conditions of over production in basic manufacturing industries and to afford a market for the agricultural, mining and other products which, in some instances, far exceeded the domestic requirements.

Many of these plans, particularly concerning the American Tropical region, were weird and ill advised and never came to serious endeavor. Others were deferred, or frustrated, by reason of the uncertainties in the finances of the world which, as we now know, anticipated the European war by several years. There was, however, a notable increase in the exchange of merchandise and products between the United States and the principal Caribbean countries.

The American capitalist, with his often almost unlimited following of investors, sent his effective engineers and trained executives afield in all the Caribbean region to find things worth doing. In all these countries there were railroads to be built, mines and plantations to be worked, opportunities for manufacturing establishments, for public utility and hydro-electric installations, and generally, great need of

development, undertakings such as really delight certain American "captains of industry," and which appeal, perhaps often unduly, to American investors. But the tangible results were disappointing. The Panama Canal had not changed Caribbean human nature nor reformed political practices or conditions, which had prevailed since politics began in the American Tropics. On close contact and after examination, chronic and unrestrained political graft, constant revolution and over night changes of government did not appeal to, nor were they understood, by the responsible representatives of American capital. In consequence, the "industrial conquest of the American Tropics," of which so much was heard in the beginning of our Panama enterprise, was hindered and deferred, at least, as far as most of the independent countries were concerned.

A strong factor in the failure of American capital and enterprise to engage adequately in these needed development undertakings was the result and example of the course of events in Mexico; in that country in 1911 began a political upheaval which resulted, first and last, in the destruction, or effective confiscation, of over a billion of dollars of American investments and the killing of hundreds of American citizens and the expulsion of nearly one hundred thousand Americans from Mexico. The failure of the American government to protect the property or lives of its nationals in Mexico, followed by the surprising announcement of President Wilson of a policy of non-interference and the public and official criticism and denouncement of the business activities of Americans in Mexico and abroad, by the administration, naturally influenced the plans of American capital, and of Americans, in respect to engagements in other Latin American countries which did not have a reasonably long record of stability and responsibility in their governments.

The European war had a mixed result on American commercial interests in the Caribbean. It removed practically all European competition, but the limitations on transportation facilities and the necessary restrictions on trade and business at home prevented any expansion, except in special lines.

The same favorable conditions as to European competition have prevailed, in part, during the year and a half which has elapsed since the Armistice, and the transportation facilities, especially the Caribbean commerce trade, have been largely restored. The direct effect has been an enormous increase in American trade with all the Caribbean countries. As a result of this increase in the exports of the Caribbean countries and also because of the high prices paid for the products, an unprecedented prosperity has followed, notably in Colombia and Venezuela, which has brought about increased purchases of all commodities, including luxuries, from the United States, the only market practically available up to the present.

To again take up the historical incidents of the Caribbean story: As early as 1905, President Roosevelt, to prevent action on the part of European creditors against Santo Domingo, in variance with the spirit, if not the letter, of our Monroe Doctrine, took control of the financial affairs of Santo Domingo, an independent country of the Caribbean group. Congress approved this action, indirectly. There was some discussion of this departure in American international policy, but no effective protest on the part of the general public nor any political group was made. In 1915, President Wilson directed a like proceeding in Haiti, Congress again approving tacitly as it did very recently in connection with similar incidents involving the self governing countries of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In none of these instances has American control yet been removed, nor has any European or South American nation officially protested. These policies have been denounced, as aggressive and "imperialistic" in some of the countries south of us. There is now in New York, a Latin American "junta" devoted to agitation against these acts and policies, ostensibly on high grounds of political right and justice.

Whatever may be the abstract right in the policy which has been installed on foreign soil in the Caribbean region in four separate instances, agents of the American government, backed effectively by American soldiers, the fact remains that this form of modified political control has survived

consistently, in the only cases, in which it has ever been applied in this manner, through the administration of three presidents representing both of the major political parties.

A result, which may be determinative later, has directly followed from the establishing of these quasi-protectorates. There has been an increased local prosperity in each case and considerable American investments have been made in these, heretofore shunned, communities. The current of trade of the countries concerned, both export and import, for many years has been preponderantly with this country, so we are concerned commercially only with the consequent increase in the volume of business, which is considerable.

In 1918 the United States acquired by purchase the Danish West Indies, thus increasing our definite national interest in the Caribbean region and securing a naval base, important to control from possible acquirement by some other nation.

It is not advisable nor necessary here to discuss future changes in the Caribbean political map. Certainly some other of the "O. Henry" republics of Central America would be greatly benefited in matters of trade and development if they came under the aegis of the unexpressed American policy in the Caribbean. It will be an affront to the national feelings of Colombia and Venezuela to mention them in this connection, but Colombia has for a time been more or less under the spell of the doctrines of Cabrera, the Latin American fire brand, associated with the late Mr. Carranza in Mexico. Besides Colombia is still nursing a memory of the incidents of Panama and is grieved over the long delay in the \$25,000,000 salve to her hurt which has been promised at Washington. In Venezuela, President Gomez is now apparently well established and he has done important things for the material welfare and prosperity of his country, but after Diaz in Mexico came the "avalanche," and Venezuela may yet, and soon be another case of history repeating itself. The British Islands in the Caribbean would like freer and closer commercial relations with the United States, their best market, and in fact the only market for their major products. The French colonies are

yearly in "red" on that nation's budget—and Britain and France owe very large sums to the United States for War loans! The Dutch colonies are a continual source of financial concern to the mother country.

What do the other South American countries think about the continued increase of American ownership and political control and financial and trade participation in the Caribbean? There is no public record of any official protest. Some of the publicists and extremists from the South have been feebly heard from and they foresee dire things in the future for all Latin America. But the obvious answer is, if answer need be made now, that the Caribbean, by reason of its political, social and economic relations is our immediate and important problem, and only remotely the concern of the distant South American countries, which are only slightly interested in its economic or political affairs or its commercial developments.

NAVAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATION

The experiences of the war have caused a realization on the part of the United States of the necessity of preparation and anticipation, in the matter of protection for its extensive coast lines and its numerous and enormously important ports, and of the vital gateway, the Panama Canal.

In addition to the several good harbors on the Gulf of Mexico and the naval base at Key West, Florida, in its own territory, the United States has an established and important naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and controls the Porto Rican harbors, and the more recently acquired Port of St. Thomas, in the Danish Islands, which has been called the "Gibraltar of the West Indies." Naval bases in Haiti and San Domingo are available. Panama is well fortified and protected. Recent negotiations have given us important naval advantages in Nicaragua. Other Central American ports are likely, sooner or later, to be included in the American naval control program.

The policy of the United States is, therefore, not determined by the necessity of acquiring more naval bases in the Caribbean region, but rather by a national prudence to prevent the development of any threatening or preponderant interests on the part of any other first rank nation. Great Britain is already an important factor in the West Indies situation by reason of its control of Jamaica and the Barbadoes and the far outlying Bermudas which constitute a naval base of strategic value. The Caribbean interests of France and Holland are practically negligible and are not likely to be of serious concern to us, except as they offer a starting point—for national expansion or a temptation for some other strong and aggressive European power.

The necessity of establishing such conditions and relations as will prevent the use of the available ports of the Caribbean by any outside nation, or a nation at war with the United States, was emphasized by the fears and experiences of the recent war. The rumored plans for German submarine bases in Yucatan, on the Colombia coast and on the Island of Margarita, part of Venezuela, though more or less groundless, caused alarm and trouble. The facility for establishing wireless telegraph or airplane bases by an enemy in time of war in the territories surrounding the Caribbean is now fully realized.

The promptness and effectiveness with which Cuba came to our aid in 1917 and the advantage of the control of Panama and Porto Rico will be remembered.

From these considerations it is obvious that the diplomatic policy of the United States should be directed towards establishing such relations with the independent Caribbean countries as will assure at least, a complete and friendly neutrality, in case of another war.

HEALTH AND SANITATION RELATIONS

Under present day conditions the health and sanitation of any part of the world is not limited by national boundaries. The coöperation of all the civilized countries in stamping out contagious and other diseases is well established in

principle and in practice. Particularly are all countries concerned in the general sanitary conditions of their neighbors, for travel and commerce must exist, more or less, between neighboring countries and with it are the possibilities of the transmission of diseases. This protective idea has been carried farther in regulating the exchange of commodities to exclude various plant and animal pests.

The Caribbean region has made much progress in public and private sanitation and in the advancement of health conditions. Particularly Venezuela is active in this respect. However, much yet remains to be done, especially in some of the smaller countries and communities.

The United States has an obligation and a duty in respect to the plans and policies which may advance the general sanitation of the Caribbean communities.

MUTUAL ECONOMIC NEEDS

It is unnecessary to establish the advantage or the necessity for foreign markets for American products. Several years ago it was calculated that in a number of the basic industries, the American capacity for production, at maximum and under stimulation, was equal to eight times the normal home consumption. In agriculture and with some mining products, a similar necessity for an outside market exists.

On the other hand, the expanding and varying needs of the American people and the requirements of nearly every line of industry depend on products and materials which must be secured beyond our borders. For much of the raw materials required by the United States, and for certain staple products, the Latin American countries are geographically, and by reason of their natural resources and industries, and the advantage of sea transportation, the logical sources of supply.

The increased demand for distinctively tropical products, such as coffee, sugar, rubber, cocoanuts, tropical fruits, including the ubiquitous banana, requires a trade control of a large tropical area. Practically no part of the United

States is really tropical and the available and developed tropical area of the Western hemisphere is small compared to that which is controlled by the countries of Europe.

A consideration of the large demands for these special tropical products and the limited area to supply them, the most important part of which is included within the Caribbean region, indicates the necessity for encouraging the development of production in the Caribbean countries and the establishing of effective transportation and business facilities to meet the growing requirements of the United States markets.

The Caribbean countries are relatively small consumers of manufactured products on account of the backward and limited social development of the great proportion of the people, but they require increasing quantities of railroad and construction materials, and of machinery of all kinds, and also merchandise and manufactured products of kinds which the United States is well adapted to supply.

Many special natural resource products can best be obtained from the Caribbean region—as platinum from Colombia, chrome and manganese from Cuba and Costa Rica, magnesite and bauxite from Venezuela and Guiana, iron from Cuba, and tobacco from Cuba and Porto Rico. There is a mutual advantage in encouraging the development of these nearer-by sources of supply for our essential raw materials.

LEGISLATION AND TRADE

Owing to the, more or less, complete dependency of most of the Caribbean countries on the American markets, it is plain that commercial legislation on the part of the American government is often of vital concern to them. This was exemplified in numerous instances during the period of the American high-tariff policy. The subsequent inauguration of a preferential tariff for Cuba and the free schedule for Porto Rico seriously injured some of the other Caribbean communities commercially.

This necessary condition of inter-relation and trade reaction suggests the practicability of the adoption, on the part

of this country, of a policy of tariffs and trade regulations to create a basis for bargaining with the independent countries and the colonies to insure advantages for American interests. The, now almost forgotten, policy of reciprocity, so eloquently presented by Mr. Blaine, appealed to the imagination of the Latin Americans more than any other distinctly American doctrine. This idea, modified to meet our present lower tariff policies, and amplified to cover other regulations than those directly involved in tariff restrictions, should be formally and systematically adopted as a policy for the development, encouragement and control of trade relations with the Caribbean countries.

In this connection it is of interest to recall the proposed reciprocal trade treaty between Canada and the British Caribbean colonies which was under negotiation a few years ago. This treaty had for its purpose the support of the trade necessities of the British colonies and the diversion of their trade to Canada.

BANKS AS TRADE PIONEERS

The American banking institutions have very recently recognized the need of increased and closer trade relations with all of the South American countries by organizing foreign connections and by the inauguration of very elaborate plans for branch or affiliated banks. This new American banking policy has been extended to most of the Caribbean countries. These American banking developments are a material aid to trade and investment. However, it appears that the banks are really engaged in pioneering, in expectation of the ability of American producers to compete in outside markets, and in anticipation of a continuation of satisfactory political conditions south of us, or the more favorable trend of the policies of the American government towards the protection and fostering of American trade and investments abroad.

AMERICANS AND DEVELOPMENT WORK

The American abroad, especially in the partly developed countries in all parts of the world, is essentially a developer and a creator, and it is in this relation that he is particularly effective and successful. Already Americans have successfully built railroads, installed water power projects, public utilities, irrigation undertakings and equipped and operated mining and oil properties in all of the Latin American countries. American capital investing in these enterprises usually requires that the business and technical managements shall be in the hands of Americans.

These undertakings, directly or indirectly effect trade. The American engineer and manager specifies American materials for construction and American tools. He and his associates and assistants demand a certain amount of American goods for the business and for personal consumption. The local merchants are influenced to introduce American goods. The result is the establishment of a growing trade and one which is not easily displaced by competition from other countries. These items, in the aggregate, are considerable, as exemplified in the development of trade in Mexico prior to the last, and recent, era of Mexican revolutions.

OIL, BUSINESS AND POLITICS

The recent realization that some of the Caribbean countries have very important possibilities for oil and the critical national need for a continued and increased oil supply, has resulted in developments and undertakings which may divert, control or overshadow the normal factors in commercial progress and which may influence, through absolute economic necessity or enlightened national self interest, our government attitude and policies toward extra territorial business and investments. This economic urge has already influenced enormous American investments and operations in oil in Mexico, a condition likely to be very soon duplicated in Colombia and Venezuela.

AMERICAN COLONIZATION

There have been numerous attempts to establish American colonies in the tropical regions. In the main, these have not been successful, partly because the type of American interested is ordinarily not sufficiently adaptable and the colonies are usually not well organized nor financed. These American colonies, where essayed, have been, more or less, out of harmony with local, political and social conditions, and they have not affiliated with the native institutions sufficiently to insure them the proper participation in and support from the local governments.

The American, as a rule, outside the United States, is most successful as an executive or in charge of engineering and constructive work. In connection with mining and similar undertakings, a considerable number of Americans have found it satisfactory and advantageous to make their homes abroad.

The fact that no large number of Americans have undertaken to colonize in the Philippines, Porto Rico or Cuba, where favorable governmental conditions are assured, is an indication of the futility of advocating American colonization in the independent countries or the foreign dependencies of the Caribbean.

THE STORY OF THE BANANA

No discussion of tropical business is complete without a consideration of the development of the banana trade. This industry is distinctively American, having been largely created by Americans and under control of Americans. Banana raising utilizes heretofore worthless lands in the islands and countries of the Caribbean and the growing and marketing of this specialized crop employs a large amount of local labor. On the other hand, the product affords a very important contribution to our national food variety and supply.

The influence of the banana trade and the allied activities is likely to be more and more important in inter-trade between the United States and the Caribbean for the busi-

ness is based on a mutual situation which makes its development unusually advantageous.

The American market will take an enormously greater amount of tropical fruits if facilities for the harvesting, transportation and marketing are organized so that the cost to the ultimate consumer is reasonable and the supply regular.

Thus the humble banana is playing an international rôle in the Caribbean.

AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY

The enormous and successful development of the American packing industry and its influence on the character and supply of essential food products, at home and throughout the world, is a recognized commercial fact. Within recent years several of the large American companies, engaged in this business, have undertaken to establish packing plants, following the American methods of organization and operation, in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. These operations have been successful and promise to become of increasing importance as a supplemental source of supply to our own food needs and the world's requirements. There has been no large undertaking of this kind in the northern countries of South America. In Venezuela, the vast pampas area offers favorable conditions for an enormous development of stock raising. Efforts are being made to establish stock raising and packing industries in both Venezuela and Colombia. The essential preliminary is the introduction and the acclimatization of suitable breeds of live stock to replace the inferior native breeds. This will take some years and can only be done with the support and cooperation of local interests and local authorities.

The conditions in general are especially ready for the development of important stock raising business in some of the Caribbean countries and the opportunity is offered for the establishment and development of this modern "big business," in control of Americans, and necessarily financed, at the beginning, by American capital.

FACTORS IN BETTER UNDERSTANDING

A large number of the citizens of the Caribbean countries were diverted to the United States during the war for their business and social purposes. The result has been mutually beneficial. Recently the South American countries have followed a policy of sending officials and commercial delegates to the United States for business negotiations and for general investigations and the effect of this personal contact is particularly satisfactory. Our own governmental organizations and various trade and social societies, formed for the purpose of encouraging better understandings, have been effective in entertaining these commissions and visitors and in assisting them in their purpose. Various public and business organizations have been engaged in suitable publicity with reference to the Latin American countries. Some of these countries have placed their claims and advantages before the American people by means of lectures, publications and other educational activities. All these things are factors in a better understanding and, particularly, have they been beneficial to the American public which was woefully ignorant of the actual conditions in the countries to the south of us and was, more or less, indifferent to them for various reasons.

During the past twenty years, a large number of Americans have learned Spanish, either in schools or through their activities in Mexico and in other Spanish countries. Their children, living abroad have, too, acquired facility in Spanish. This has made available a large number of Americans, for undertaking responsible representations in Latin American countries for American business, especially in engineering and constructive lines.

PAN-AMERICAN RAILROAD AND INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION

The program for a Pan-American railroad from Hudson bay to Cape Horn dates back nearly forty years: This ambitious plan has been rather an abstract idea than an actual policy on the part of the several countries concerned or the financial interests engaged in railroad development.

However, considerable actual progress toward its realization has been made, incidental to independent and internal railroad construction on both continents.

The actual completion of an overland rail line between the United States and the northern countries of South America is not of special importance in connection with the development of mutual trade relations. It is likely that the inauguration of such facilities would increase travel materially, particularly when the service can be brought up to present day standards of comfort and convenience. It will appeal to the travel lust of an increasing number of people to take an international train in New York for remote political, social and economic centers on another continent. Such a railroad would form one "leg" of various touring plans.

This Pan-American railroad project is over-shadowed by the greater conveniences and cheapness of sea transportation which is available for practically all of the trade developments between the Caribbean region and the United States.

The great need of the Central American and continental countries of the region is internal transportation. This condition has been notably relieved in the Central American countries in the last decade, largely by American enterprises, supported by the local governments.

In Colombia and Venezuela, the Magdalena and the Orinoco river systems and other rivers afford conditions for internal navigation facilities. These have been utilized greatly, but there is need of extensive improvement of these water ways and of increased and better equipment. Venezuela is particularly desirous of removing the obstruction at the mouth of the Orinoco so as to be able to use this river for access to its largely undeveloped "hinterland."

In both these countries, notably in Venezuela, a great deal of work has been done recently in road building. With the automobile, this improvement affords a means of social and business intercourse which is a fair substitute for railroads, especially for moderate distances or where the traffic is small in bulk or volume.

Many of the island communities also are in need of internal transportation and there are many projects in abeyance,

for short, but very important railroad extensions which must come to realization as soon as capital is available and local political conditions assuring.

In the development of these railroads and in furnishing financial, engineering and organization aid for them and for the larger transport projects the American business interests have a great opportunity.

The rapid establishment of telegraph lines and wireless stations throughout the remoter parts of these countries has been a great factor in breaking down barriers and in putting them in touch with the world's thought and doings. It is likely that the aerial transport for passengers and freight will be established between the sea ports and the interior in the near future. This already is in process of development in Peru and Brazil. The effect of this development in transportation and communication is to unify and mobilize the resources of these countries and to stimulate them commercially, and to bring them into closer social, political and trade relations with their "nearest neighbor," the United States.

IN GENERAL AND IN CONCLUSION

The United States has a preponderant and direct interest, politically and economically, in the Caribbean region, which interest has been greatly increased by the trade and political relations due to the Panama canal and by the new trade conditions during and subsequent to the war.

The continued adhesion to our Monroe Doctrine involves direct obligations on our part in certain cases. This fact, and our increased self interest, may be accepted as the justification for an actual, but not specifically announced, American policy towards the disturbed and disturbing members of the Caribbean political group, which policy has prevailed continuously and consistently, through the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson.

This actual Caribbean policy is in apparent contrast to our national program in the case of Mexico during nearly a decade, notwithstanding the similarity of issues involved.

This contradictory situation, however, may be taken as the personal interpretation of President Wilson, for neither congress nor any political party has endorsed our Mexican policy, while congress has by enactments approved of our Caribbean political undertakings.

The development of inter-trade relations between the United States and the independent Caribbean countries has been greatly retarded in the past by lack of governmental stability and the incidental frequent disturbances to personal and property rights, both of natives and of foreigners. The remarkable commercial progress of Cuba and Porto Rico since the advent of American participation in their governmental affairs is a measure of the economic loss which has resulted from misgovernment in some of the other Caribbean countries. The two larger countries, Colombia and Venezuela, have made considerable progress and economic gain, but not nearly as much as they would have made had there been full confidence in their political institutions. Most of the Central American countries, and notably Santo Domingo and Haiti, have, indeed, paid a heavy economic price for political misbehavior with no corresponding gain in social or political progress or ideals.

There has been a great increase in trade between the United States and all the Caribbean countries and colonies since 1914. Colombia and Venezuela have been particularly prosperous during the last two years, measured by the standards of export and import statistics. Most of this trade has been with the United States since the War began, for patent reasons, but the return of normal world competition seriously threatens the temporary advantages of this country in the Caribbean, and in fact in all Latin American trade.

The American banking interests have cooperated effectively with American commercial interests to develop and hold this trade. American capital, as far as available from extraordinary domestic demands, is being increasingly employed in development undertakings in these countries, a fact which will result in controlling trade effectively in important lines. However, investments cannot continue on

any substantial scale without assurances of security and fair treatment and such assurances under the conditions, can only come from the establishment of a change of policy on the part of our own government toward trade and investments in foreign lands, particularly in those countries which have a consistently bad political record.

Our relations with our southern neighbors, Mexico and Caribbean countries, constitute one of the most urgent, difficult and important of our foreign problems of today, a problem which must be met and solved by this generation and one which requires wise, courageous and far sighted statesmanship backed by intelligent and comprehending public opinion.

An American writer has referred to the Caribbean as the "American Mediterranean," an apt enough geographical designation, but in view of the increasing interest and concern in Caribbean affairs, political, social and commercial, on our part, this designation may well be changed to "America's 'Mare Nostrum'"—Our Sea.

PORTO RICO AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM

By Pedro Capó Rodríguez, Spanish Editor of the American Journal of International Law; Member of the Bar of Porto Rico

I

To refer to Porto Rico as a national problem demanding attention as something of important national concern may seem perhaps rather strange. How can Porto Rico be a national problem at all for the United States? The answer to this question will seem perhaps rather difficult to the average person, but that is probably because after the acquisition of that Island from Spain nearly twenty-two years ago, the people in this country have busied themselves with so many important and pressing national and international problems which demanded attention, that nearly everyone almost have forgotten our existence. So to the average person it will be a matter of speculation to determine what are the elements which enter into this extraordinary and never heard of problem.

As a matter of history, the American people have given very little attention to Porto Rico or its inhabitants. I do not say this as a reproach, I simply state it as a fact. The general inference in this country is that the government of the United States is doing for them what is right. It is generally surmised that our present condition, politically, economically and even socially, is by far superior to the condition we ever enjoyed under the rule of Spain. All these things undoubtedly are true. I could enlarge upon them and show with quite reliable data, statistics and documents that our present government, our finances, our agriculture, our industry, our commerce are all immensely better. Our external trade has increased so much that it seems almost an exaggeration to mention it. From

\$17,000,000 in 1901, it has jumped to the almost incredible amount of \$142,000,000 in 1919, which is nearly one thousand per cent. It may be well to mention that of this large trade the United States absorbs over 80 per cent, namely, \$129,000,000 which exceeds the normal trade of this country with Russia, Spain, the Philippines, or any Latin American country except Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba or Mexico. It is almost as large as the trade of this country with China, or the combined trade of Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Bolivia with the United States. This of course shows the commercial importance of Porto Rico to the United States.

In educational matters, the present level of Porto Rico is by far above the one it held under Spain. At that time our educational establishment was poor and largely inefficient; today we have a modern, democratic school system offering free education to the children of the Island and providing at public expense, out of the Porto Rican treasury, teachers, buildings, equipment, books, etc., and although this system of public education is not, as the Governor of Porto Rico says in his latest annual report for 1918-1919, as yet adequate to the great needs of the Island, it constitutes as it stands such an immense advance over what existed at the earlier date that the comparison would be really instructive and inspiring. I will not, however, enter into details. Suffice it to say in this respect that, as stated in the said report, "the number of schools, of children attending school, of school buildings, of teachers and of expenditures for school purposes, have all been multiplied tremendously, and that the overwhelming illiteracy of about 80 per cent of the adult inhabitants has been reduced to probably less than 60 per cent," or, to be more exact, to 54 per cent. "Above all, the variety and character of the education, the spirit and quality of the work done in the schools have been broadened, modernized and liberalized in accordance with the standards and ideals of the twentieth century."

In sanitation, health, police, public works and other branches of the public administration, we certainly have

accomplished a great deal. As to roads, says the governor of Porto Rico in his already mentioned report,

We started in 1899 with 267.4 kilometers of completed insular roads—now we have 1,189.4 kilometers of completed roads. . . . In the twenty years prior to 1899, there were built in Porto Rico 9 kilometers per year. In the past twenty years there have been built 922 kilometers, or an average of 46 kilometers per year. And this same acceleration of progress can be seen in every other detail connected with communications, both internal and external, railroads, trolley lines, telegraph and telephone lines, the cables that land on our shores, the ships that visit our harbors. The ox-carts and coaches of the earlier day have been replaced by trucks and automobiles. In everything that enters into or indicates the life of a people there is to be seen this marvelous change and progress. In the architecture of their homes and hotels, in the number and character of the crowded shops and stores, in the traffic that throngs the busy streets and fine roads, in the voluntary organizations formed for pleasure and for social welfare, and especially in the number and quality of the newspapers that make up the press—in fact in everything one sees, there is written the record and the proof of twenty years of most remarkable progress.

As to sanitation and guarding the public health, it may be said that our record is equally creditable to the change. The whole health service of the Island has been organized and built up. On this particular subject of so much interest to the people of the United States, says the so often quoted report of the governor of Porto Rico:

The modern methods and agencies of guarding the public health have been introduced, such as quarantine, hospital, scientific study of causes, symptoms, treatment, and prevention of disease and the whole medical profession mobilized so as to cooperate in safeguarding the health of the people. Some dreadful diseases such as yellow fever and perhaps smallpox have apparently been permanently banished from the Island, and many others seem to have been brought under definite control.

The death rate has been reduced so that last year, if we set aside the 10,888 victims due to the great epidemic of influenza and its complications, it was only 23.1 per thousand.

In legislative matters, in the enforcement of law and order, and in the administration of justice, we have also made very substantial progress. In municipal administration the showing is simply astonishing. Let me quote once more from the aforesaid report of the governor of Porto Rico. He says on this point:

In 1899, immediately after the change of sovereignty, the credit of the municipalities was so bad that the military governor, Gen. George W. Davis, made the following statement in his report on civil affairs for that year:

"Until municipal government and administration is reformed and elevated to a very much higher plane than now, I see no hope of greatly improved social, domestic, or economic conditions."

The progress made by the municipalities during the twenty years has completely destroyed the distrust expressed in this rather pessimistic statement. The large floating municipal debt, which in 1901 amounted to \$501,128, has completely disappeared, and now all the municipalities close their financial operations each year with cash surpluses on hand, while during the earlier period only debts remained. In further proof of this progress we may mention the extraordinary development of public-service enterprises that have been built, nearly all of them, during this period. In the 75 municipalities of the Island there are now 37 water systems, 8 sewers, 22 markets, 77 slaughterhouses and 52 hospitals.

The present public debt of the Island is a little over \$10,000,000, but for every dollar of this public debt, all created during the last twenty years, as the governor says in his report, Porto Rico has more than one dollar and a half invested in permanent public improvements to show for it. "To be sure," he says, "the surplus of \$5,000,000 had to be invested out of the annual revenues, but a tax system has been created and efficiently administered in order to produce these revenues. Many larger countries not a thousand miles away have four times the public debt and not half as much to show for the money."

We have also developed physically, morally and intellectually. Our standards of living have been greatly improved. Many of the worst vices, such as gambling and the use of alcoholic beverages, which in the earlier period, as the governor says, were openly practised and recognized by law, have now been prohibited by statutes enacted by representatives of the people. Our working classes have been raised a good many degrees from their former level of practical ignorance and neglect: today we have labor legislation which promotes and stimulates a healthy development of labor conditions which affect the entire fabric of our social and economical life as a people. Our professional classes have been enlarged and increased in numbers and in effi-

ciency and usefulness to the community. Even our own politicians seem to be doing quite well. On the whole it may be said that we have improved in every possible sense; in the home, in the church, and in the community at large. We certainly are better off today than we were under the rule of Spain; we are better men; we are better Christians; we are better citizens.

And yet, may I not quote a few further sentences from the official report of the governor of Porto Rico, to which I have made so much reference above, in order to show a condition which seems to me to be quite important for the proper presentation of my subject? In that report of the governor of Porto Rico, who is a native of Old Kentucky, and who, therefore, may be supposed to be quite truthful in the matter, it is said:

In short and in fine, these two decades of progress made by Porto Rico under the American flag taken all together, constitute a record which I believe can not be equaled by any people anywhere in the world in the same length of time. It is a record creditable alike to the Porto Ricans themselves, and to the great free Republic to which they owe allegiance. Much of it is due to the liberality and generous aid of the great American Government and people, but most of the credit is due to the splendid coöperation of the Porto Ricans themselves. Without their coöperation little of this progress could have been made. But the people of the Island have eagerly availed themselves of every opportunity offered them for improvement. With patriotic devotion to their Island and with a real aspiration for progress; they have made quick response to all the changes that were necessary for development. In politics and government, in education, in commerce and industry, in social and moral improvement, they have offered their coöperation and aid to the forces that have made for betterment. This is the simple truth as to the past, and this is the best augury for the future.

Now, the point which I wish to emphasize at this time is this, that in twenty years of American administration in the Island, in twenty years of continuous schooling, in twenty years of earnest endeavor, and in twenty years of bitter experience and hard work, we have made such strides in the direction of our own development and the practice of self government, that the very thing which at first every one thought to be a matter of fifty, seventy-five or perhaps

one hundred years has been practically accomplished already in the course of two mere decades, in a score of years. No one could claim today with any degree of impartiality and truthfulness that we are not fully prepared to take upon our own shoulders the serious responsibilities of a completely self governing people. By the guidance, and help, and example of the American people, we have already attained that condition of social, economical and political development, which entitles us to manage at least our own internal affairs. We feel therefore that we have already attained our political majority; and just as any normal boy, upon becoming of age, wishes to go out into the world to face and solve by himself his own problems of life without parental dictation, interference or caprice; we too, as a normal people, strongly feel that we ought to be permitted to face and solve our own Porto Rican problems in our own Port Rican way without governmental dictation or interference from the United States. And this is clearly a very natural feeling. It is not that we be ungrateful or rebellious any more than a son who wishes to live his own life and asks to be permitted to do so. He does not wish to alienate his parents' affection; he does not mean to love them any the less. It is that he hears the call of his own nature, of his own Maker, urging him to work out by himself his own destiny, his own salvation.

I should not like to give the impression that we are rebels, for we are not. Our devotion to this great republic has been already shown during the last twenty years, and especially during the great emergency of the world war. Our record during that terrible conflict ought to convince the most sceptical and cynical of our loyalty to the United States. In that emergency readily and gladly we put all our resources and man power to the service of the United States. We actually contributed over 16,000 soldiers who were about to leave for Europe when the armistice was signed, and if the war had continued a little longer we probably would have contributed nearly 30,000 or 40,000 more; our contribution in this respect was nearly as large as the contributions of all the territories and the District of

Columbia combined; we actually contributed nearly \$13,000,000 as our subscription to the liberty loan bonds, which was greatly in excess of our quota fixed by the treasury department; we engaged in and generously donated large sums of money for all sorts of war activities, and actually made a better showing than the territories and a good many of the states. We certainly are very proud of our record in this, as in other respects.¹

The thought which I really wish to convey is that we have already acquired that high degree of development when no moral reason exists for subjecting us any longer to the present state of governmental control by the United States. We have undoubtedly reached a point beyond any possible expectation; we have already acquired the clear consciousness of being a distinct and characteristic Porto Rican people, capable, intelligent, patriotic and able to assume and discharge the obligations and duties of our own government. We wish to be masters of our own affairs, insofar as it may be consistent with the circumstances and the equities of the situation. In this, I am sure, no one will find anything reprehensible, nor deserving of reproach. That we should wish to live our own mode of life and seek the welfare and happiness of our people in conformity with our natural inclinations, education and temperament, can not surprise anybody at all; for that is a natural aspiration which consciously or unconsciously rules the conduct of all men as well as of all peoples, everywhere. It has been said that this natural aspiration of men and peoples everywhere to choose their own way of living constitutes a right and a principle which can not be transgressed without a clear violation of the laws of nature and the dictates of justice. It may be doubted, however, in the present state of the world, if this right and this principle can always be invoked to settle the relations which must exist between neighboring peoples. Experience is showing us constantly that the contrary is

¹ For a more detailed account of Porto Rico's actual contributions to the world war, and the attitude of its inhabitants towards the United States in this great emergency, see the Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, the Honorable Arthur Yager, for 1917, 1918 and 1919.

the truth. So far as Porto Rico is concerned, I believe that it would be better and more profitable to examine the facts, since the principle, or the aspiration as I should prefer to call it, will be readily conceded by any one as deserving the most solicitous consideration in any intelligent study of the matter.

II

Porto Rico, as it is well known, is one of the so-called Greater Antilles, the smallest of the three; the other two being Cuba and Santo Domingo. It lies between Saint Thomas, which is the most important of the Virgin Islands recently acquired by the United States from Denmark, on the east, and Santo Domingo on the west. The distance of Porto Rico from Saint Thomas is only about 80 miles; in very clear days the mountains of either island can be seen from the other. From the main coast of the United States it is only about 1000 miles. Her position in respect to this country is 1380 miles southeast of New York, which is her principal port of communication with the United States. The distance between Porto Rico and Panama is only 1000 miles. In shape and contour, Porto Rico resembles an irregular parallelogram, and its total area is 3606 square miles. According to the last census, the present population of Porto Rico is over 1,225,000 inhabitants, or an average of 340 per square mile. More than 62 per cent of this population are whites, and less than 38 per cent are colored. The capital of the Island is San Juan, with a population of over 75,000 inhabitants.

In point of discovery, Porto Rico is older than the United States. It was discovered by Columbus on his second voyage in 1493. Its conquest, however, was not begun by the Spaniards until early in the sixteenth century, under the leadership of Don Juan Ponce de Leon, of whom it has been written as an epitaph upon his tomb:

*Nole sub hac fortis requiescunt ossa Leonis
Qui vicit factis nomina magna suis.*

Which freely translated into English means "This narrow grave contains the remains of a man who was a lion by name, and much more so by his deeds."

Since that time until the cession of the Island by Spain to the United States, Porto Rico was a Spanish colony, although for a number of years prior to the cession, it had enjoyed the political status of a Spanish province. Its constitutional unity with the mother country was not attained until 1897, when the so-called "autonomía" or a Spanish system of self-government was extended by royal decree to the Island.²

There is no doubt that the geographical position of Porto Rico is of great military and strategical importance to the United States. We know that it would be useless and absurd to deny this proposition. The importance of Porto Rico has, of course, been, in a sense, reduced by the acquisition of the Virgin Islands by the United States, which offer greater advantages than Porto Rico as a base for military operations from the port of New York to the mouth of the Orinoco. The strategical and military importance of Porto Rico to the United States is not, however, to be measured only by the use which this country may see fit to make of the Island as a naval base for military operations; there is also to be considered, I presume, the possible use which a hostile nation might make of it in case that she could in one way or another gain a foothold thereon. Porto Rico, on the other hand, is included within the region of the Caribbean, which the United States already regard as a sort of national preserve over which they must exercise entire control; and therefore, as a measure of self-defense, and for the purpose of protecting its own military, political and even commercial interests within the Caribbean Sea, which is,

² The basis of this famous decree was a law of reforms passed by the Spanish *Cortes* in 1895, upon the outbreak of the Cuban uprising. A complete translation of this decree will be found in *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1898, pp. 636-644. For an account of the government of Porto Rico under Spain as well as a detailed consideration of this decree, see an article which I contributed to *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, for November, 1919, entitled "Some Historical and Political Aspects of the Government of Porto Rico."

so to speak, the Mediterranean of America, must always, whatever the political condition of Porto Rico may be now, in the past or in the future, regard with deep concern and solicitude everything which may in any way affect the destinies of that Island.

Before the acquisition of Porto Rico by the United States as a direct cession by Spain stipulated in Article II, of the Treaty of Paris, there is no doubt that it had always been the policy of the United States to maintain the status quo in the Island so far as questions of sovereignty were concerned; that is to say, the United States always had preferred that Spain should continue to exercise her rights of sovereignty and proprietorship over Porto Rico. This was so, perhaps, because from that nation they apprehended the least danger to their own interests, and because they did not feel quite well disposed to complicate their own national and international problems with the acquisition of a territory and a people totally foreign to their own. But let that be as it may; the historical fact which we must bear in mind is that the policy of the United States in respect to Porto Rico was never, prior to the Spanish American war, a policy founded on the desire of acquiring that Island for their own national aggrandizement. For obvious reasons they could not have viewed with either indifference or equanimity the transfer of Porto Rico to any other power; nor would they have the Island and its people established under an independent government of their own, for the reason that it was considered at the time that the native inhabitants of the Island, as well as the Cubans, were not then sufficiently prepared to assume and discharge the duties and responsibilities pertaining to a self-governing people. The United States therefore were compelled to adopt the policy of the Status quo as the best course to be followed in the matter, and thus whether willingly or unwillingly they always maintained that policy and permitted for nearly a century that Spain should continue to exercise her sovereignty and control over the Island.

It would be really interesting and quite pertinent to the subject of this paper to enter into a detailed examination of

the historical origin of the present relations of Porto Rico and the United States previous to the Spanish American War, and then coming down to the causes which brought about that extraordinary conflict, enter into the consideration of the reasons which the United States had for changing their traditional policy in respect to that Island and demand the cession thereof from Spain as a condition *sine qua non* of peace, in order to show that the cession was not really demanded for the purpose of national aggrandizement; nor as a mere compensation for or an equivalent to the expenses, losses and sacrifices borne by the United States in the successful prosecution of that war; nor even as part consideration for the sum of twenty million dollars paid by the United States to the old mother country to allay her pain for the loss of the Philippines; but rather for the purpose of putting an effective end to the Spanish domination in our continent in order to prevent an almost certain recrudescence of the old Spanish methods of government, which might culminate in another war of liberation in behalf of the Porto Rican people. But however interesting or pertinent this study may be in the consideration of my subject, I must leave it for some other occasion in order not to make this paper inordinately too long.

So far as the purpose of the United States in demanding the cession of Porto Rico is concerned, it would seem that some other means could have been found which would not have lent itself so easily to misinterpretation and doubt, since it really appears rather anomalous and paradoxical that, as a result of a war undertaken in the name of humanity, civilization, liberty and right, Porto Rico and its people should have been handled like mere chattels from one sovereignty to another without a proper regard for their real wishes in the matter. It would have been enough, perhaps, that Porto Rico should have followed the same fate as Cuba, and for this purpose it would have been sufficient to demand that Spain should only relinquish, instead of ceding to the United States, her claims of sovereignty and government in the Island, as it was done in respect to Cuba. This stipulation would have accomplished the purpose of

expelling Spain entirely from America, and at the same time would have given to the United States freedom of action to deal with Porto Rico, free from the constitutional entanglements which gave rise to the doctrine of non-incorporation elaborated by the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. White, in the famous *Insular Cases*.³

But no one seems to have thought of this practical solution at the time. The explanation is to be found, perhaps, in the fact that Porto Ricans were not then in arms against Spain; nor were they exteriorizing at that juncture any collective desires of acquiring their independence as a people, probably because our principal leaders realized the practical impossibility of the thing, and because, perhaps, the brand new "autonomia" which Spain had just implanted in the Island had had the effect of quieting down the unrest among the people and smothering their political aspirations to an independent life and government. On the other hand, it is to be taken into account that Spain had cleverly fomented, through all sorts of intrigues, since the emancipation of her former colonies in the Western Hemisphere, the preposterous proposition that the native inhabitants of the Island were neither capable or prepared for self-government, and the American people, who had always rejected, as a matter of national policy, the possibility of our independence, fearful of a repetition of the afflicting scenes which had taken place at different periods in the history of a neighboring Island, easily believed what Spain had so repeatedly asserted in that respect, and figured that the only reasonable way out of the complicated dilemma was to demand an absolute cession of the Island in order to prevent embarrassing situations and avoid complications of an international nature.

To this might be added that the native inhabitants of Porto Rico had received the American forces of invasion with such real and sincere demonstrations of approval and

³ These cases, as well as the doctrine of non-incorporation have been extensively examined by the present writer in a series of articles in the *American Journal of International Law*; see especially the July number for 1919, pp. 483-525.

rejoicing—because they did not come to Porto Rico as conquerors but as fellow Americans and liberators—that the good American people, logically and naturally reasoned—because this was so pleasing and flattering to their national pride—that Porto Ricans would welcome American rule in the Island with the same alacrity, with the same satisfaction, enthusiasm and joy as they had welcomed the American troops. And that, in a sense, was true. But should it not be mentioned, at the same time, that the Porto Rican people, regardless of party affiliations or distinctions of any kind, were then under the impression, and firmly believed it as well, because of the study they had made of American history and institutions, and because also of the declarations of the American commanders, that Porto Rico would be instantly considered and held to be a regular territory of the United States, and eventually admitted into the Union as a full-fledged state thereof, upon an equal footing with the other states, as had been the custom in this country until then? To this solution of our political status no intelligent and honest Porto Rican would have made then any real opposition; nor do I believe that any one with common sense and having at heart the prestige, welfare and happiness of our people would oppose it even now, if the United States should conclude to adopt this one as the best solution of the Porto Rican problem. The proof that at that time at least such was the mental attitude of Porto Rico is that immediately after the cession formally stipulated in the protocol of Washington of August 12, 1898, the newspaper *El Liberal*, which used to be the organ of the most important Porto Rican party of that time, changed its name for *El Territorio* which means "The Territory," and shows conclusively that the leaders of even that party, which was genuinely Porto Rican, took it for granted and accepted it, that the solution of statehood was the only logical and possible solution of our status.

And it could not be otherwise; because, leaving aside the constitutional history of this country in that respect until then, which perfectly warranted such an impression and belief, what greater honor, what greater glory, what greater

happiness and blessings could befall us than to be considered an integral part of the Union, as a state thereof? It would be as if the American people had called to the Porto Rican people and said to them: "Come and share with us the great responsibilities of our government; come and share with us the serious duties of working out the destinies of this great nation, the greatest and most powerful nation of the universe; come and share with us the noble and beautiful task of upholding and maintaining everywhere the government of the people by the people and for the people; come and be one of us!"

Ah, that would have been, that was in reality our great political aspiration; that was our golden dream; that was our childish expectation of that remote epoch!

The United States, however, were very intent upon some other things which were then demanding their earnest attention. In acquiring Porto Rico they only had the immediate purpose of liberating it from Spain, but in reality they did not know then, nor do they know now, what they were going to do with the Island and its inhabitants. To be sure, the acquisition of Porto Rico was a very desirable thing from both a military and a commercial point of view; but no one seems, in point of fact, to have had any definite idea as to the precise political relations which were to exist in the future between the newly acquired territory and the United States. And it was perfectly rational that those who were at that time in charge of the government of this nation should feel greatly concerned as to the manner in which they were to deal with the new acquisitions. As to the Philippines there was a more or less manifested popular sentiment against their permanent incorporation into the United States, it being preferred that they should be kept outside the constitutional unity of the nation. It was apparent, however, that as a constitutional proposition, any rule that should be adopted as to the Philippines must necessarily be applied also to Porto Rico and thus, finally, our Island become a sort of an experimental station where the constitutionality of the exclusion of the Philippines should be tried out and tested.

On the other hand, our leaders impressed and astounded with the entirely unforeseen developments which had taken place in the Island, had not judged the occasion propitious or desirable at that tragical moment in our history, at the time of the cession, to put forth any claims to this or that particular solution of our future political status, whether within or without the United States, which might hinder the American people in their wonderful work of liberation; and although we were not consulted as to our real and legitimate desires or self-determination in the matter, we had full confidence in the honesty of purpose of this country, and firmly believed that the cession would not be for the aggrandizement of the United States, but for our mutual benefit, and that it would not only put an end to the obnoxious rule of Spain in the Island, but also open to our people a new political horizon, a new era of honor and progress and happiness; a new collective life, not as a mere colony which we had been under Spain in spite of our political status as a province, but as a sovereign state of the Union, some time in the near or the distant future, as a people masters of our own internal affairs and indissolubly united to the American people with the honorable bands of a common constitution and a common government and purpose in everything national.

A few months later, however, after the acquisition, and when the ink on the Treaty of Paris, by which the cession had been accomplished, was scarcely dried on the paper, the Supreme Court of the United States, hopelessly divided in opinion, established, for the first time in the constitutional history of this country, a terrible distinction between those territories which were held to have been incorporated into the United States by the will or consent of Congress, and those other territories newly acquired by the treaty making power or otherwise which had not yet been incorporated into the United States. The former were held to be integral parts of the United States, while the latter were said to be mere territorial possessions, or, more accurately, in the words of the Court, territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States. And in this manner

Porto Rico was held to be included within the last classification, that is to say, that the Island is no part of the United States but a mere subject of property, something which the United States owns to do with as it shall see fit, and thus, substantially, that Porto Rico is beyond the pale of the Constitution in the sense that it is not operative in the Island, except insofar as it may deprive Congress of power to do some specific thing—a political status theoretically inferior to the one we had under Spain.

This decision, it is needless to say, was not at all satisfactory and had a very distressing effect upon our people. It was really disappointing, and did cause among us a feeling of hurt to our pride, and to our national “amour propre” as a people. But the most lamentable thing about this decision is that it brought to our people a complete disorientation as to our political aspirations, placing us in a situation of uncertainty as to the real intentions of the American people in respect to our future relations. Thus we have divided in opinion, and can only wonder what the ultimate decision may be upon this matter.

There is no question that the new constitutional doctrine of incorporation, or non-incorporation, formulated by Mr. Justice White in the Insular Cases was clearly advisable and even necessary as a constitutional asset for the ready solution of a multitude of problems which soon became apparent in the proper management of the Philippine Islands and even perhaps in Porto Rico; there is no question that such a doctrine is very desirable and even commendable as providing, very wisely and properly, for the contingencies of the future in the development of what another great American jurist had been pleased to call a good many years earlier the “American Empire.” Furthermore, that doctrine was in reality the handmaid of a wise and judicious solution of the problem involved in the future disposition to be made of the Island and its inhabitants. But that decision was not well understood in Porto Rico as it was not well understood outside of the Island, and it has caused a great deal of harm to our people. We feel just like a man lost in the woods, at the mercy of his guide. We do not

know what path to take; we do not know what to do, and we must constantly depend upon your advice, upon your words of counsel, whether you really mean what you say or not.

If the Supreme Court had declared twenty years ago that Porto Rico was a regular territory of the United States instead of establishing, as it did, a distinction of so-called incorporation between Porto Rico and the other territories of the United States, with all its constitutional results, our position would have been made very definite and clear, and then we would have striven during these same twenty years to attain as soon as possible the complete status of statehood within this great union of sovereign States. As the situation is today, we do not know in what direction to strive; for the United States may ultimately decide for one thing or for another. Congress, on the other hand, has procrastinated and made this uncertainty more acute and intense, not only by deliberately abstaining from making any positive declaration as to the present or future status of Porto Rico, but also by establishing in Porto Rico a mixture of a territorial and colonial form of government, and extending to Porto Ricans the privilege of American citizenship. And in this way no one in the Island or the United States can tell with any degree of certainty what the permanent relations of Porto Rico and the United States will be in the future.

The general inference in this country in respect to this point is, insofar as I have been able to ascertain, that Porto Rico will sooner or later follow the same course as has been followed by all the other territories acquired by the United States in the past. To this seems to lend color the granting of American citizenship to Porto Ricans as the first step in that direction. But this is only a mere inference founded, as a rule, on no definite process of reasoning which would necessarily lead to that result. American citizenship is a thing entirely independent from the political status of the Island, as has been clearly shown in two Porto Rican cases recently decided by the Supreme Court.⁴

⁴ The People of Porto Rico, et al, vs. Tapia, and the People of Porto Rico vs. Muratti, 245 U. S. 639, decided per curiam.

Even as American citizens we continue to occupy today the same indefinite position as before. Our Island is no part of the United States, and there is no reason to suppose that it will ever be.

Occasionally one hears the opinion expressed that the American flag will never come down in the Island, and that Porto Rico will always be held as a colony or possession of the United States; and that in this sense our political status is right now perfectly well defined. In the same connection it is contended that such a political status is perfectly constitutional and well known and accepted in international law and practice; so that juridically as well as politically it might be said that the problem is already solved, and that the only thing which now remains is to extend to Porto Rico complete self government in an administrative sense without the interference of the federal government.

There is also the opinion that Porto Rico will be ultimately established as a free and independent sovereign state. It is said that the idea of perpetual colonialism is entirely repulsive to the American mind, that it cannot be conceived that a people who only yesterday shook off that form of government should today so easily adopt in respect to Porto Rico a policy involving a principle which they would not have applied to themselves.

But all these opinions have practically the same foundation as the solution of statehood. In my estimation, and so far as I can make out the situation, none of these opinions, whether in one direction or another can claim more real authority than the personal prestige of those who are bold enough to assume the rôle of prophets at this time, and therefore can not be given too much importance either way, for the reason that, as a rule, as already suggested, they are merely founded on personal impressions of the moment and, in consequence, lack that careful consideration and study which is in reality the thing that gives personal opinions their greatest value. In so far as the American people is concerned, I should say that save for a small group of men, mostly composed of prejudiced bureaucrats and officials or ex-officials of the American administration in Porto

Rico, who would like to see perpetuated the present order of things in the Island, and perhaps some rather impulsive members of Congress who do not hesitate to suggest the solution of independence as the logical one, and some other members of Congress connected with the committees in charge of Porto Rican affairs in both Houses of Congress who certainly are, as a rule, quite remiss in expressing any positive views as to the future for publication, probably because they they do not wish to commit themselves to any particular policy at this time, there is no intelligent public opinion in this country upon such an important and urgent national problem as the determination of the future relations which ought to exist between Porto Rico and the United States. The matter has been neglected so long that the people of this country have come to look upon Porto Rico as some sort of a little ward of the United States, receiving its protection and enjoying everything which American bounty and generosity can give away, without worrying about anything else.

But that very attitude of the American people is very harmful to us in more than one way. It hurts us collectively as a people, and in our individual life as men, as Porto Ricans, as American citizens. It hurts us in our conceptions of right; it hurts us in our pride, it hurts us in our interests. In twenty years of constant activity under the American flag, we have developed, as I said before, a long way beyond all expectations. We have done great credit to ourselves and to the United States. Without our collaboration, without our efforts, American rule in the Island might have been perhaps very successful, owing to the great capacity of the American people in matters of government; but the record would not have been so brilliant, and they would not feel so proud of it as they naturally do. There are, however, those who persist in believing that we are mere children, that we still need over our heads the rule of a school master who shall constantly tell us what to do in our local affairs; that somehow we are not as yet prepared to take upon our own shoulders the serious responsibilities of our own government, when as a matter of fact our record shows that the opposite is the truth.

If the true test of preparation of a people for self government is the attitude of that people towards law and order and the estabilization of governmental things, we certainly are better prepared than a good many so-called independent nations and even some of the states. In Porto Rico we do not have, we do not know, those organized subversions of the public peace, which are so characteristic in Central American countries in the form of armed revolutions and insurrections against their governments, and so peculiar in some of the states of the Union in the form of public lynchings, which are manifestations of popular disrespect towards the normal processes of law and order. In Porto Rico we do not approve of these things. In the practical exercise of self-government, in the measure which so far has been granted to us, we have learned a great deal in self-restraint; our officials, our political parties, our leaders and our people in general, have learned the lessons of tolerance, patience and mutual respect. And yet you still procrastinate, until the good work would seem to begin to spoil. The attitude of the American people on this important problem of what to do with Porto Rico can lead nowhere but to deep misunderstanding, ill feeling and unrest.

I should not like to appear as giving expression to sentiments of antagonism and resentment, nor to foster the impression that we have lost the least faith in the American people. My purpose is merely to show that there is a serious problem to deal with in Porto Rico; a problem which is really of deep national interest, more so, perhaps, than many others which engage their attention at this time. That problem ought to be solved as soon as possible. The people of Porto Rico are entitled to know and they ought to be told, as soon as possible, what it is that they must expect, so that they may adjust their life to that expectation. For this purpose, the people in this country should make up their mind and study seriously the different solutions of this problem and choose that one which seems to them more in harmony with their interests and the equities of the situation. There is no doubt in my mind that the acquisition of Porto Rico from Spain was entirely justified from a

historical and moral point of view. But the maintenance of the present state of things in the Island is indeed something which cannot in any way be even excused, and must eventually hurt the cause of the United States in this hemisphere.

III

In so far as our political parties in the Island are concerned, they have formulated several solutions which, in a large measure, show how hopelessly divided public opinion is in the Island upon this important question, although, as already suggested, their division arises out of the uncertainty of the American people upon the matter. Thus there is a political party which has in its platform the solution of statehood for Porto Rico. This party, which is the so-called Republican Party, affiliated with the Republican Party of the United States, has consistently maintained for nearly twenty years that statehood is the only possible solution of the problem consistent with American principles and traditions, and with the best interests of the Island. As a matter of principle, it would accept independence rather than perpetual colonialism. Another political party, which is the Independentist Party, while not professedly anti-American, claims that the real aspiration of the Porto Rican people is to be constituted into a free and independent republic of their own, under a sort of a virtual protectorate after the fashion of Cuba, with such concessions by the Island in favor of the United States as may be deemed necessary by the two peoples in mutual accord, and such guarantees of independence and protection from the United States in favor of Porto Rico as may also be deemed necessary or advisable. There is lastly another party claiming to be the party of the majority in the Island, the so-called Unionist Party, which, while professing to stand for the ultimate independence of Porto Rico, would prefer to make haste slowly, and, for the time being, accept a solution of complete self government in an administrative sense, as a means of doing away with the present state of things.

I will not undertake to examine at this time the multitude of reasons which may be advanced in favor and against each one of these several solutions proposed by the Porto Rican parties from both a Porto Rican and an American point of view, for although that would be perfectly within the scope of this paper, yet as a practical proposition it would be impossible to do so for lack of space. I will say, however, that the acquisition of Porto Rico by the United States as a direct result of the Spanish American War, has given to that Island such a tremendous political importance in the Western Hemisphere that Congress would not be discharging its duty to the nation if it did not take advantage of the opportunity which Providence has thus placed in its hands to greatly improve the relations of this country with Latin America. It should be realized, as soon as possible, that the acquisition of Porto Rico is not, like the acquisition of the Virgin Islands, of little political concern to the Latin-American Republics. The Virgin Islands are more or less a series of little islands and keys with a population of about 35,000, only 3 per cent of which are whites, the rest being negroes, with a historical background foreign to that of the Latin-American republics. The population of those islands scarcely could be called a people. They are, besides, in an inferior state of civilization. Porto Rico is different. As I have already suggested, Porto Rico has a population of over a million and a quarter inhabitants, more than 62 per cent of which are whites. We are one of the peoples of Latin America. In fact, we have national aspirations as a people distinctly Porto Rican. It must follow, therefore, that however indifferent those republics may appear to our lot, their peoples and governments are surely watching with profound interest the gradual development of our relations with the United States. In Porto Rico then, there is for this country a golden opportunity to destroy prejudices and suspicions which have become historical, and to promote mutual confidence and friendship, and consequently, better relations between those republics and the United States.

The solutions offered by the political parties of Porto Rico may well be taken, in my opinion, as the starting point in the consideration of the problem, bearing however in mind that, in so far as the Porto Rican people are concerned, regardless of party politics, and save isolated cases of personal likes and dislikes for this or that solution, they all would, generally speaking, accept any one of those solutions which, aside from material advantages or benefits to be derived from each of them separately, would, no doubt, bring us assurance of future repose and contentment, as well as prestige and honor to the Island and its inhabitants. For this reason I believe that solution of the problem rests entirely with the United States. Of course a plebiscite to ascertain the will of the Porto Rican people might not be entirely amiss. I doubt, however, whether the political parties might not try to make capital out of it, with the result that even if the plebiscite was carried out in good faith and without fraud, violence or intimidation, nothing materially substantial might be gained by this extraordinary and unreliable process, since it would only show what everybody knows already, namely, that we are hopelessly divided as to these things. I think, on the contrary, that a better way would be to consult learned public opinion in the Island, in so far as the self determination of the Porto Rican people is concerned.

Personally, I believe that Porto Rico, as a whole and as a people, is entirely fit and prepared, socially, politically and economically, to assume and discharge the obligations and responsibilities of a self-governing people, whether as a state of this Union, an independent republic, or a completely autonomous commonwealth under the sovereignty of the United States, after the fashion of the British Dominions but more in harmony with the republican institutions of the United States. To my mind, the question is not therefore of preparation and fitness of the Porto Rican people for the task of governing themselves under any of those forms of government, and for this reason I would like to see that element entirely dropped from all intelligent discussion of the subject. To continue harping on this cord is

merely to imitate the old and discredited methods of Spain. That Spain should try to make us appear as a people wholly unprepared and incapable to manage our own affairs, is something which can surprise no one; for such was always the moral pretext advanced by colonizing nations for holding foreign territories and peoples under their domination and rule, and, besides, her very sovereignty and government in Porto Rico was really dependent on this assumption of a lack of preparation and incapacity on the part of the Porto Rican people. This is amply shown to be so by an examination of the diplomatic history of the relations of the United States with Spain in respect to Cuba as well as Porto Rico. But with the record made by Porto Rico during the last twenty years before our eyes, it would be idle and rank nonsense to talk of those things.

Some say that this record made by Porto Rico in this short period of time is not really creditable to Porto Ricans, but to the American officials who have been sent to the Island to occupy the highest and most lucrative positions in our government; but that is not so. The truth is that some of those officials have been really inspiring to Porto Ricans in their fervent desire to help our people in their titanic struggle to lift themselves to their present state of development. Those, no doubt, we honor and hold dear in our hearts. But others, fortunately few, of those same officials, who have been sent to occupy the highest and most lucrative positions in our government, have been an obnoxious hindrance and great obstacles to our development. It is in spite of those officials that we have made the honorable record of which we feel so proud during this last twenty years. For them, however, we have no resentment, but rather gratitude, for in their strange ways and behavior they have taught us their lesson which, undoubtedly, has made us wiser and will do us much good in the future.

IV

To approach the consideration of our subject from a proper angle, it seems to me that we must, in the first place, discard unjustifiable prejudices, and then examine the facts

in as cool and dispassionate a fashion as may be possible, from the standpoint of right and the situations of fact as well as of convenience for both Porto Rico and the United States, bearing in mind that the policy that may be eventually adopted in respect to Porto Rico will be not only a precedent which shall govern the action of the government in the future, in the gradual development of this nation, but will also be taken as an index by the South and Central American Republics of the real attitude of the United States towards them.

If the policy of the United States is of complete absorption of our people, which I seriously doubt very much, their suspicions of continental absorption by you will be in a way corroborated by your attitude. If, on the contrary, the policy of this country has an undoubted tendency to recognize, and to deal with us upon the recognition, that we are a people, with a God given right to pursue our own way of life, according to our own racial conceptions of culture and civilization; happy, contented, unafraid, in the management of our own government, the friends of the United States will always point out with pride to Porto Rico as the best proof of the real sentiments and aspirations of the American people in our Continent. It will then be corroborated by actual experience the American ideal which was expounded at different times and under different forms by Monroe, Lincoln, Roosevelt and Wilson, and which might be expressed by saying that: "*Every people ought to be permitted to govern themselves free from foreign interference, provided they live up to the standards established by the law of nations and the dictates of civilization.*"

Now, if I may be permitted to say so, in my opinion, the solution of statehood is not a practical solution either from a Porto Rican or a purely American point of view. Historically, and as a matter of policy, the United States has always been opposed to the incorporation into the Union of noncontiguous territories upon an equal footing with the States. There are those who contend that politically it would be a mistake to incorporate a people historically and ethnologically, as well as geographically, entirely different

and separate from the people of the United States; a people having their own character, idiosyncrasies, racial temperament, mental processes and ideals, with practically no point of contact whatever with the character, idiosyncrasies, racial temperament, mental processes and ideals of the American people; a people who, leaving aside the mutual bonds of friendship and affection, is bound to the American people by no other ties than political and commercial ones; a people who could never be assimilated in the sense of casting aside, as a useless garment, their own make-up, and assume a new one identical to the American people's. There is no question that we are of a different constitution than the American people, and so we cannot think and feel as they do. But all this is perhaps a mooted question, and may turn out to be nothing but a mere prejudice, without any real foundation. On the other hand, the power of adaptation of our people may have a substantial bearing upon the matter.

It is true, however, that it would not be an easy task to crush in them all their heritage, aspirations and ideals by a process of forced Americanization and thus make them break entirely loose from their past, from their traditions, from the promptings of their very nature. There is no question that the complete Americanization of other Spanish territories has been possible in the past only because those territories were contiguous and practically unpeopled at the time of their acquisition. Porto Rico is overpopulated; it has a population of over one million and a quarter, or nearly an average of 340 inhabitants to the square mile. The American inhabitants of the Island do not exceed 3000 or 4000, and their number is constantly decreasing; so that their influence could not bring about a complete change in the character of the people as in some of the former Spanish territories. But all this when rightly viewed, is not an unsurmountable obstacle for the solution of statehood, because in New Mexico and Arizona, although there may be found entire communities where the people still speak nothing but the Spanish language, and live in the traditions and customs of their race, surrounded by everything Span-

ish, there are no signs there that should point out to a mistake in the incorporation of those territories as States of the Union.

And yet, I seriously doubt that the solution of statehood is at all practical or desirable for Porto Rico, above all because it seems to me that such a solution is not at heart desired by the people of the United States, at least for the time being, as an immediate solution of the problem to be applied now. It would be probably expected that Porto Rico should first pass through a probationary period of territorial condition, and that we should keep, for an indefinite length of time, three or four generations perhaps, knocking at the door to be permitted to enter the Union on an equal footing with the other states, as has been usually the practice in the past. But this would not be really a solution of the problem at all. Porto Rico is already prepared to be a state of the Union, and if such should be the solution given to the problem, it would have to be adopted in a very short time, so that it could benefit the present generations who are most deserving because of their successful efforts to bring Porto Rico to its present condition of development and capacity for self-government. On the other hand, the solution of statehood means a permanent and indissoluble relation which cannot be abandoned once it has been established between us; and therefore, if later on, for one cause or another, likely to arise in the resulting process of the complete absorption of our people in the national life of the United States, this solution should turn out to be injurious and even ruinous to us from the point of view of our own regional life as a Porto Rican people, there would be absolutely no means of remedying such a situation, unless there should come about some unconceivable change in the political structure of the nation. If such a situation should arrive, it seems to me, the union between Porto Rico and the United States would not mean greater strength or benefit for the nation, but it would rather be productive of weakness and detriment.

My doubts in reality do not arise from any fear whatsoever as to the good sense or absolute loyalty of the Porto

Rican people to the United States; nor that they may not love the American flag and institutions as their own. No; my doubts arise from the conviction I have that the spirit of race is sure to react sooner or later against any thing which may seem injurious or obnoxious to their self-determination in their progressive development as a people. I am sure in my mind of that reaction, and fear that it might show up when there is no effective remedy against it, after the condition of Statehood should bring into real conflict our regional interests with the general interests of the United States. I do not fear anything for the present, but I do fear for the future when our people should feel themselves tied forever, not merely to the great destiny of this great nation which eventually must be unavoidably ours, but tied to all American institutions, to all American laws, to all American practices of government, to all American turns in the political, economical and social life of the United States as a nation.

I am, therefore, of the opinion—and by it I do not intend to convince nor to support or attack anybody—that all attempts made along this line must necessarily result in failure. To endeavor, for instance, to change the language of Porto Ricans, to suppress what is Spanish in them, to make them thoroughly American, in disregard of their history, temperament and peculiarities of race, in disregard of the experience of humanity, seems to me must be condemned as unwise and unnecessary. I do not believe that any practical results could be attained by this solution of the problem. To be sure, Porto Ricans are fast learning the English language, but that is not the language of the home, of the community at large. That is the language of convenience, the language people are learning as a profitable accomplishment in their general education, and because that language—why should I not say it?—is being largely forced upon the people as a policy of rapid Americanization, which I consider rather premature until the American people shall determine what is ultimately to be done with Porto Rico. In my opinion, the most which can be obtained in reality is that the Porto Rican people shall become Ameri-

canized in the sense of having a profound love and veneration for the American flag and institutions and adopt the American point of view on questions of a national nature, and above all that the United States can always count on their complete loyalty, coöperation and friendship.

That is my opinion, and I express it with candor, not only as a Porto Rican, with the authority which the study which I have made of these things gives me to speak, but also as an American citizen and with all the love and loyalty which I owe to this great nation, not only because of my citizenship, but also because I have here many things which are very near to my heart, and because I wish to see this problem of what to do with Porto Rico solved in a just and satisfactory manner both to my own people and to this country where my wife and children were born.

I firmly believe that in attempting a solution to this problem we must take into consideration many questions of a national and international nature, which must alter or modify not only our impressions of the moment, but also our most cherished ideals and aspirations, if we are to regard as paramount the highest interests of both Porto Rico and the United States.

It is a well known fact that in dealing with human nature, it is better to let the processes of self-determination shape the course of human conduct. The American people can very well harmonize their own interests with ours, without destroying our personality, without destroying us as a people. We are more than willing, we are eager, to collaborate with the United States; we will serve the American people better if they follow this course than otherwise. We may be the point of contact of the two great races which populate our great continent; we may be the index of a greater and true Pan-American solidarity; we may be, as it were, the interpreter which puts into communication and carries intelligence between two different peoples, destroying misunderstandings and unfounded prejudices and animosities and causes of suspicion and distrust among them.

But if, in spite of these warnings of moderation and good sense, it should be considered wise or necessary that we

should enter the Union as a full fledged state thereof, the Porto Rican people are entitled to know it as soon as possible, so that they may adjust their collective and individual life to that finality; and above all, no fear should be entertained that we might reject such a decision. On the contrary, we shall rejoice at and feel very proud of it, because in that manner the American people shall have bestowed upon us a very great honor which we shall appreciate, and then we shall try to do our best not to disappoint them in their expectations.

On the other hand, if it should be determined not to make us a state of the Union, nor to establish our people as an independent government, at least for the time being, but preferred that the American flag shall continue to wave in Porto Rico as the symbol of the sovereignty of the United States over the Island, leaving to future generations the complete solution of the problem, the people of Porto Rico should be told of it as soon as possible; and in the meantime we should be given the right to govern ourselves fully and with as little interference from the United States in our local affairs as possible. We should be given the right to choose our own government officials, so that they may be directly responsible to our people; and in national matters which must affect our collective life as a people, the United States should not impose the laws of this country upon us as a burden; we should be given the opportunity to pass upon those laws in their application to our Island; we should be given a voice in the initiation and acceptance of such of the treaties of this country as must affect us; we should be given freedom of action, we should be given liberty, and the opportunity to make good and grow to be a prosperous, respected, happy and contented people, not by dictation, but by generosity, by a noble guidance, by the sense of a square deal, by the recognition of the self evident proposition that we are a people fully prepared to assume the full responsibilities of our own government.

In this manner the Porto Rican people shall be able to await confidently and contented the final determination of the political status of their Island, with the complete assur-

ance that whatever that solution may be, it shall not be inspired in selfish motives of national self aggrandizement of the United States, in disregard of the legitimate aspirations of the Porto Ricans. If this is done, the great destiny of this great nation in our continent will be fulfilled perhaps a century earlier.

I will not finish these remarks without stating that I firmly believe in the great sense of justice and fairness of the American people, and although public opinion has not as yet crystallized in this country into any possible form of solution of the Porto Rican problem, I have an inborn conviction, which I have seen corroborated in my general intercourse with the people here, that Americans, as a rule take a good deal of interest in Porto Rico, and wish it nothing but happiness, prosperity and progressive development. In this sense, I am sure Porto Ricans reciprocate with the United States, and just let me say this: As a dependency, as a piece of territorial property, as an unincorporated territory, Porto Rico has always done honor to the United States, and whatever the ultimate solution of the Porto Rican problem may be, the American people may rest assured that Porto Rico will always love and do honor to the United States.

