

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Some Problems in Tocqueville Scholarship

I

April 16, of this year will be the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Alexis de Tocqueville. As a new century of Tocqueville scholarship begins there is need to recall some of the work accomplished and to project the desirable direction to be taken by future Tocqueville studies.[1] In 1935 occurred the one hundredth anniversary of Tocqueville's *Democracy*. It occasioned a great deal of discussion of Tocqueville's position in modern thought, much of it profound. Two products of that time now stand out, Professor Pierson's crowning study *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (1938), and Professor Albert Salomon's interpretive essay "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom," (1939) still the best in its field.[2] The latter in particular lent new stature to Tocqueville, presenting him as the author of an image of man, which in our modern plight, we welcome for its grandeur and power.

Three years ago another anniversary occurred, the centenary of Tocqueville's *L'Ancien Régime*. But the picture this time is rather different. Though many historical articles on this scholar-statesman have appeared, they are often lacking in the precision, depth and range which marked those of two decades ago.[3] A

[1] An earlier version of this paper with the title "Tocqueville and the Aristocratic Retrospect" was read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1956.

[2] George W. Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York: Oxford, 1938); Albert Salomon, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom (A Trend Towards Concrete Sociology)," *The Review of Politics*, I (1939), 400–431.

[3] For a list of representative articles and books since 1935 see Appendix *infra* 18.

major exception is the publication in process in France of Tocqueville's work in a definitive edition.[4] This monumental undertaking, under the direction of J. P. Mayer, invites the historical profession, once again, to ask what place it shall assign to Tocqueville in the study of modern society.

This is not an easy question. Opinions differ widely on his role both in history and in the writing of history. The possible choices offered here may be illustrated from an earlier and a more recent judgement on Tocqueville's ultimate place in the tradition of lasting scholarship. In the concluding paragraphs of his book Professor Pierson, after estimating the limitations and "enduring qualities" of the *Democracy,* felt free to write of Tocqueville that his "was a mind that fell short of genius. But he had used it to pioneer. And as a pioneer he would be followed and long honoured. And this would be true despite his foreboding anxiety and his failure to comprehend the whole thought of his time."[5]

This critical assessment, preceded by 776 pages of analysis, may be compared with a recent and very brief indication of one possible turn in the direction of Tocqueville scholarship. In a humble and devoted evaluation Professor J. A. Lukacs in his review of Tocqueville's *Oeuvres complètes,* for the September, 1956, issue of *The Journal of Modern History,* pleaded with his colleagues to regard Tocqueville "as the greatest historical thinker of the past four or five centuries. . . ."[6] The differences implied here are sufficient to suggest that the student of Tocqueville has before him many avenues of investigation before the total character and achievement of the man will be known. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate some of the paths which these studies might take and their possible historical significance.

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[4] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* ed. J. P. Mayer. Édition définitive (4 tomes; Paris: Gallimard, 1951–1958). Tome I, *De la démocratie en Amérique.* Introduction par Harold J. Laski, 2 vols. Tome II, *L'Ancien Régime et la révolution.* Introduction par Georges Lefebvre. *Fragments et notes inédites sur la révolution.* Texte établi et annoté par André Jardin. Tome VI, *Correspondance anglaise.* Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et John Stuart Mill. Texte établi et annoté par J. P Mayer et Gustave Rudler. Introduction par J. P. Mayer. Tome V, *Voyages en Sicile et Aux États-Unis.* Texte établi, annoté et préfacé par J. P. Mayer. *Voyages en Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse et Algérie.* Texte établi et annoté par J. P. Mayer et André Jardin. Avertissement par J. P. Mayer. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958.

[5] Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont, *Tocqueville and Beaumont,* 777.

[6] J. A. Lukacs, reviewing Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* in *The Journal of Modern History,* XXVIII (1956), 284.

II

Future historical studies of Tocqueville might begin with a kind of discourtesy toward this great and gentle historian—with a deliberate decision to curb the enthusiasm provoked by his success as a prophet. His uncanny talent along this line tends to bewitch the historian. It is, in fact, almost impossible to read anything of Tocqueville without coming under the spell of this enchanting quality. Here one may recall not only his famous and cruelly accurate prediction of the totalitarian weakness inherent in mass societies, but also his equally accurate prediction that the shareholders of the Suez Canal were sure to lose their money, to be ruined.[7] Tocqueville was himself not uncritical of his compulsion to prophesy. More than once he comments on the limits of this art. During the crisis of 1848 he was particularly conscious of this danger, and in the midst of his own prophecies he warned that fundamental changes in the course of civilizations can be seen only dimly by the generations approaching these events.[8]

Nevertheless there may be historians who are reluctant to forego the image of Tocqueville as prophet. If so then their path is clear. The relationship of profane prophecy to historical understanding is largely unexplored, and it is into this realm that they are obliged to venture.

III

The historian who neglects Tocqueville the prophet to study his unique creative personality need not be long in seeking problems of sufficient complexity. He may begin with an analysis of the astonishing maturity of Tocqueville's judgements even before he made his voyage to America. This maturity is especially evidenced in a series of letters reflecting his response to the July Revolution.[9] Most men of twenty-five, even men of brillance, would, when presented with a crisis of this dramatic character, have fixed their attention on personalities and the riot of rumor which attends sud-

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[7] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 to 1859,* ed. M.C.M. Simpson, 2 vols., London, 1872, II, 142.

[8] Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* pub. Madame de Tocqueville, ed. G. Beaumont 9 vols., Paris 1864-1875, V, 460–461. (Tocqueville to E. Stoffels, April 28, 1850), cf. also *ibid.,* VI, p. 151, Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850.

[9] *Ibid.,* VI, 19–20 (Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville, April 6, 1830), VI, pp. 5–6; Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville August 9, 1829.

den changes in governments. Not so Tocqueville. He was primarily anxious to fit the Revolution into a wider pattern dominated by the phenomena of class conflict.[10] Beyond this he sought to interpret the events of the spring and summer of 1830 against the background of his already developing views on the fundamental character of modern civilization.[11] Professor Pierson has, of course, traced some of the sources for this breadth of inquiry and conceptualization in his account of Tocqueville's family and environment.[12] There is still room, however, for a further scrutiny of his formative years.

Such a work might seek, among other things, to reconstruct Tocqueville's appreciation of the period of the Restoration. The achievement of this time contributed decisively to Tocqueville's earliest conviction that the aftermath of the French Revolution could continue to be a time of positive and steady growth in political stability and liberty. In an unpublished letter sent from Cincinnati in December of 1831, Tocqueville insisted that those living in an epoch of transition leading to greater freedom or to despotism could yet draw upon the great accomplishments in the time since 1791.[13] It was, he thought, an "incontestable fact" that "immense progress" had been made in the practical intelligence and translation of the ideas of liberty.[14] The Restoration was seen as giving France the fruits of fifteen years of freedom.[15] Identifying the source of his optimism, which was not American, Tocqueville confessed:

> I do not know if we are destined to be free, but that which is certain is that we are infinitely less capable of being so than we were forty years ago. If the Restoration had endured ten more years, I believe that we would have been saved; the habit of lawfulness and of constitutional forms was completely penetrating our manners.[16]

Given this view of France's history, Tocqueville was prepared to welcome and praise in the *Democracy* such habits more perfectly developed in America.

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10 Yale Tocqueville Mss, A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, August 26, 1830. Hereafter this collection will be cited as Y.T. Mss.

11 Y.T. Mss. A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, April 21, 1830.

12 Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont*, 13–25.

13 Y.T. Mss B.I. a. (2), Tocqueville to Hippolyte de Tocqueville (?), December 4, 1831.

14 *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

IV

The relationship of Tocqueville's experience in America to the construction and final format of his *Democracy* has been acutely exhibited by Professor Pierson. We do not yet have, however, a definitive edition of the *Democracy* based on an exhaustive use of all the notebooks, correspondence, drafts and the working manuscript of the *Democracy* in the Yale Tocqueville collection.[17] The significance of this difficult task can not be overestimated.

In imitation of Professor Pierson's book there are many additional aspects of the *Democracy* to be investigated through the use of the numerous manuscripts. Here a most important problem is that of identifying more precisely the sources of Tocqueville's legion of generalizations on the spirit of the modern age, which make up the substance of the enigmatic second part of the *Democracy.* The reader of this concluding volume is often at a loss to account for the scope and boldness of the all-inclusive deductions which enhance Tocqueville's reputation as a seer. One recalls his confident assurance that in France the individual committed to the race for material happiness who breaks down under the pressure of this game will commit suicide whereas in America he will merely go insane.[18] Here it may be inferred that Tocqueville's development of this generous distinction rested in part on statistics which he gathered from the press and journals of his day. I do not know the precise source for this idea, but there are other more well known aspects of Tocqueville's fundamental views which can for illustration be traced to some of their origins.

The notebooks in which Tocqueville wrote and literally scratched out his germinal ideas and the drafts for the second part of the *Democracy* contain innumerable leads to the often prosaic genesis of his grand theories. To begin with a minor example, in the *Democracy,* when treating of the centralization of government, Tocqueville took the occasion to fix a point by noting the centralizing success of the reigning pasha of Egypt.[19] The notebooks indicate that the basis for this comparison was no erudite literature but an article which Tocqueville read in the *Revue des deux Mondes*

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17 G. W. Pierson, "The Manuscript of Tocqueville's De la démocratie en Amérique," *The Yale University Library Gazette,* XXIX (1955), 115–125 (postscript 178).

18 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* Mayer ed., I, pt. 2, p. 145, *De la démocratie en Amérique.*

19 *Ibid.,* 307.

for the first of March, 1838.[20] In Tocqueville's hands this article of passing significance on Mohammed Ali became a "symptom of the times."[21] The drafts further reveal that his fundamental critique of the centralizing compulsion of modern governments rested in large part in his personal dissatisfaction with the day-to-day decisions of the government of Louis Philippe as it tried to come to grips with the issues growing out of the increasing industrialization of France. On the thirtieth of June, 1837, he observed with ironic distaste the language of the journal *Le Siècle,* for the previous month, in which it had encouraged the idea that the government should not only maintain the railroads but also the metallurgical resources of France.[22] Such ideas were, he noted, the natural results of democratic passions, accomodating in an industrial society the aggrandizement of the central power. With this material he projected an image of the states of the future as enormous industrial enterprises dominating the life and capitalization of industry.[23]

On this same subject, on May 27, 1837, while thinking through the theme of centralization, Tocqueville recorded the gist of a conversation with Adolph Thiers. In their talk Thiers told Tocqueville that while serving on a commission to consider a railroad from Lyons to Marseilles, "he had finished by convincing *all* the members of this commission that the great public works ought always in France to be built at the expense of the State and by its agents."[24] To this Tocqueville added "Do not forget that when I come to speak of the ultra-centralizing tendency of our day."[25] The reconstruction of many of Tocqueville's most prescient generalizations is thus open to the historian willing to piece together the fragments of his notebooks. Such a work of reconstruction will not lessen the genius of Tocqueville, but it will make possible significant distinctions between those generalizations issuing from his imaginative logic and those ideas more concretely dependent upon his close observations of the history of France in the first decade of the July Monarchy.

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20 Y.T. Mss C.V. g. "Brouillons des chapitres de la second partie de la Démocratie," Cahier II, p. 136. For the article cf. Augusta Colin, "Lettres sur l'Égypte—Administration territorials du pacha," *Revue des deux Mondes,* XIII (1838), 655-671.

21 Y.T. Mss. C.V. g., 136.

22 *Ibid.,* 123.

23 *Ibid.*

24 Y.T. Mss C.V. d. "Paquet No. 5," 30.

25 *Ibid.*

Tocqueville's correspondence during these years also contributes, as it to be expected, to an understanding of the roots of his compelling generalizations and predictions. Here one of the most impressive aspects of Tocqueville's work is his portrait of the psychological make-up of the average man in a democratic society. Tocqueville, as is well known, was disheartened by the self-centered egotism he saw as a predominant feature of modern man. This is a theme interwoven throughout the final volume of the *Democracy.* Yet it was not the citizens of Syracuse, Philadelphia, or Boston who confirmed Tocqueville in this view, but rather his own neighbors in Normandy. In June of 1838 Tocqueville sent a fretful letter on this subject to Royer-Collard, in which he complained that although he held in sincere and even warm affection his fellow countrymen, their passive egotism oppressed him to the point of despair.[26] Their absorption in their narrow personal concerns, their incapacity for commitments beyond those of self-interest, made them, Tocqueville regretted, "honest men, but poor citizens."[27] To this lament Royer-Collard replied that Tocqueville's ill-humor towards his neighbors was unjust. For "your Normans—they are France, they are the world," and he added that they were dominated by the prudent and intelligent egotism of the men of their age.[28] Do not, the famous Doctrinaire advised, waste any of your time burning incense before this idol, disengage yourself, think and write, go back to your books as if you were alone.[29] Tocqueville took this advice, and in time his ennui in the Normandy countryside was translated into one of the major conceptions of his life. It is certainly a tribute to Tocqueville's genius that this and other similar impressions, which might have remained merely the chronic complaint of a sensitive mind, gave, when developed and incorporated into the *Democracy,* a portrait of the individual citizen in modern society which has become universally accepted.

V

Tocqueville's inability to tolerate mediocrity in his own environment was but one reflection of the enormous demands which he made upon himself. These heroic burdens, before the *Democracy*

26 Léon d'Estresse de Lanzac de Labarie, "L'Amitié de Tocqueville et de Royer-Collard," *Revue des deux Mondes,* LVIII (1930), 899. Tocqueville to Royer-Collard, June 22, 1838.

27 *Ibid.*

28 *Ibid.,* Royer-Collard to Tocqueville, July 31, 1838.

29 *Ibid.*

was finished and in one sense before it was begun, compelled Tocqueville to seek a political career of the first importance. This aspect of Tocqueville's life has likewise been inadequately studied. Yet the necessity for such an analysis can hardly be overstated. Tocqueville brought to this career all of his aspirations to found the new society, which he believed he had assisted in but one vital fashion in his *Democracy*. There is a glimpse of his virtual passion to aid that society in a reminder placed in his notebooks for 1840: "Far from wishing to halt the development of the new society, I strive to bring it forth."[30]

In 1837, the year he first tried and failed to enter the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville freely discussed the scope of his ambition, confessing: "I admit that a great reputation acquired by honest means has always seemed to me the most precious thing in this world, and the only thing worth the sacrifice of one's time, one's fortune, and even the price of one's life."[31] When Tocqueville was finally successful in the campaign of 1839, that victory was prefaced by an appeal to the electors of the arrondissement of Valognes affirming without mitigation the intention of his career:

> There is now in France, and I am not afraid to say, in Europe, another man who has made clearer in the most public manner that the ancient aristocratic society has disappeared forever, and that it only remains for the men of our times to organize progressively and prudently the new democratic society on its ruins.[32]

At the end of his public career Tocqueville had yet to acknowledge the force of that political life. While struggling to begin his history of the French Revolution, he tried to explain to a friend something of the tension involved: "I should like to be able to find a work for my mind far from public affairs," he wrote, "but that is easier to desire than to do. Politics is like certain women who have, so they say, the power to move and trouble one long after they are no longer loved."[33] And again in the next to the last spring of his life, two years after his *L'Ancien Régime* had received a mag-

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30 Y.T. Mss C.V.K. "Paquet No. 17 1er Cahier," 44. Fragments, idées que je ne puis placer dans l'ouvrage(mars 1840)."

31 Léon d'Estresse de Lanzac de Labarie, 893, Tocqueville to Royer-Collard, August 30, 1837.

32 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Beaumont ed., IX, 224, "Circulaire Addressée aux Electeurs de l'Arrondissment de Valognes."

33 *Ibid.*, VI, 173, Tocqueville to the Comtesse de Circourt, February 14, 1851.

nificent reception, Tocqueville still felt obliged to write, "There is no happiness comparable to political success. . . ."[34]

The study and interpretation of Tocqueville's presence in the world of affairs will be greatly aided by the forthcoming publication of his political writings and discourses. To appreciate this coming material fully, we need a day-to-day construction of Tocqueville's political activity, something that has never been done. This demands an accurate account of his circle, and even more important, a close study of his voting record, both under the Monarchy and during the Second Republic.

When we have in detail such a record, it will be possible to penetrate a little further the problem of his lack of success as a parliamentarian. Tocqueville was inclined to trace this disappointment to his unwillingness to be a party man and to the more austere personality he exhibited in public. He was also willing after 1851 to suggest that the intellectual can never permanently affect the course of history in the theatre of action.[35] This later interpretation is a tempting one, but it leaves unresolved why this should be so in every case. The danger here is allowing one's sympathy with Tocqueville to suggest that he was above his time, beyond its spiritual compass.

There is in fact in Tocqueville's writing, outside of the *Democracy,* almost a lacuna with regard to the broader problems of legislative practice. He had, it is true, certain fixed ideas such as a realistic appreciation that this activity involved immersion in petty and unspectacular detail, and a strong distaste for a unicameral legislature. His consideration of the problems of representative government does not, however, match the attention given to these matters by the political thinkers of the Restoration.

The historian conscious of Tocqueville's now classical stature as a great moralist is tempted to subscribe to Tocqueville's belief that the spiritual and moral direction of any government more decisively determines its achievements than does the specific structure and content of its laws. Another task is to measure the effectiveness and strategic pertinence of this emphasis in the critical historical situations in whch Tocqueville participated. In the opening session of the Chamber of Deputies in January of 1848, while the tension

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34 Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations,* II, 207.

35 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* Beaumont ed., IX, 117–119. "Discours à La Séance Publique Annuelle (3 Avril, 1852) de L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques."

leading to the insurrection of February was mounting, Tocqueville considered it has greatest responsibility to exhort his colleagues and the government in the highest moral tones. And even after that Revolution became a reality, he clung to the belief that his moral appeal was what the situation most demanded. His appeal was indeed impressive as Tocqueville concluded:

> Legislative changes are called for. I am very ready to believe that these changes are not only useful but necessary; thus I believe in the usefulness of electoral reform, in the urgency of parliamentary reform; but I am not so senseless, gentlemen, as not to know that it is not laws themselves which determine the destinies of peoples; no, it is not the mechanism of laws that produces the greatest events of this world; it is the very spirit of government. Keep the laws, if you wish, although I think you would be very wrong to keep them; keep even the men, if that pleases you: for my part, I make no objection to this. But in God's name, change the spirit of government, for, I repeat, this present spirit will lead you to the abyss.[36]

It is possible to surmise that those who heard Tocqueville's moving words were touched. It is also possible to surmise that those who had heard Tocqueville give a similar address six years earlier, and had listened to his expressions of the same sentiment many times in the intervening years, were at a loss to know from his remarks how they might act, in the pressing hours that remained, to halt a Revolution.[37] Without lessening the worth of Tocqueville's preoccupation with the moral climate of politics, the historian may find here a partial explanation for the fact that in Tocqueville's entire political commentary it is virtually impossible to find ten men in public life whom he could respect. This conscious superiority helps to explain not only Tocqueville's limited career, but also is of some assistance in explaining why one of the greatest interpreters of the modern age could have only a qualified impact on his contemporaries.

Yet Tocqueville's consuming passion to help found the new age could have been counted on to bring him past the normal irritation which men of rare talent experience when dealing with lesser men. His failure to achieve an impressive political success lies not so much in his lack of skill in the art of politics but rather in his attitude toward the commanding social problems of his age. The author of the *Democracy* could be expected to endorse the movements

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[36] *Ibid.*, IX, 535, "Discours Prononcé à la Chambre des Desputes."

[37] For Tocqueville's earlier discourse in which he admitted that he gave a kind of "sermon" cf. *ibid.*, IX, 374–388.

for political reform proposed during the life of the July Monarchy. Similarly, under the pressure of events creating the Second Republic, he supported, though with reservations, the introduction of such measures as universal suffrage. Tocqueville was not, by the time of the Republic, unique in this posture, and it could earn him no great rewards. He chose, however, during the Republic to adopt an attitude towards the extension of the social obligations of the state which did mark him out. He became one of the bitterest and most vigorous critics of the proposal to interpret the Revolution of 1848 as involving a great social reform to be initiated and implemented by the Republic.

Here it is well known that Tocqueville took this attitude because of his conviction that socialism was inherently totalitarian.[38] During the Republic he therefore contributed in no small measure to a division between moderate Republicans and Social Democrats which made possible the victory of Louis Napoleon over the Republic itself. This event forever terminated Tocqueville's political prospects. At critical moments during this struggle Tocqueville was aware of the implications of this division, and yet he could not in conscience act otherwise.

The evolution by Tocqueville of a stern, inflexible critique of socialism is a problem which invites major historical attention. Such an analysis will involve delineating Tocqueville's precise knowledge of the socialist theories of his age. It will also require attention to the moment of Tocqueville's development when he began to fix his view on socialism as the phenomenon most to be dreaded in his struggle against the Leviathan. This decision is closely related in the structure of Tocqueville's thought to his study of the French Revolution. In 1842, when reviewing a book dealing with a system of parole and assistance for those released from prison, Tocqueville sharply challenged the author's suggestion that the State would be the best agency to administer such a service.[39] On the contrary, he insisted, Charity ought ever to retain its "independent aspect. . . . even in its capriciousness."[40] Moving then to the heart of his criticism, he asked if the author did not make too much of the misery of the poor classes. Had not the Revolution of '89, he queried, made a great contribution to this question. The Revolution

[38] Edward Gargan, *Alexis de Tocqueville: The Critical Years 1848–1851,* Washington, 1955, 121.

[39] Tocqueville, *Oeuvres Complètes,* Beaumont, ed., IX, 52–54. "Discours Fair à L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, le 4 Juin, 1842."

[40] *Ibid.,* 58.

had equalized the tax burden, destroyed privileges favoring the concentration of wealth in single hands, and multiplied "infinitely" the chances which enabled one to move from poverty to a "comfortable position, even to being rich."[41]

Tocqueville was to qualify this praise of the social accomplishment of the Revolution by admitting that all problems were not solved. There is, however, in his writing on this question a preference for seeing the alleviation of want as a provisional matter approachable through charity of the benevolent type. This is consistent despite assertions which would indicate a broader view.[42] His inner position is nowhere better indicated than in discussion in 1851 with Nassau William Senior on the poor laws of England. After hearing Senior's views, Tocqueville declared:

> There is one point, however, on which I have not been able to make up my mind. It is the great question as to the right to relief, whether we should or should not say as a matter of law nobody shall starve. If we give this right, we must, of course, make this relief disagreeable; we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison, and our charity repulsive.[43]

On the social question central to the history of the Second Republic, Tocqueville was thus compelled to occupy the position of a devastating critic rather than that of the architect of positive plans.

An additional reason for this response to socialism is also to be found in another of his basic views concerning the Revolution. He was convinced that the breakup of the Old Regime was possible because its aristocracy had decisively sponsored the *philosophes* in creating a climate directed at their own destruction. Tocqueville, determined not to imitate the conduct and folly of Enlightenment thinkers, refused to support the revolution of his time. From the viewpoint of this historical analogy, his fierce critique of socialism, his unwillingness to be its Montesquieu, offer a considerable explanation for the failure of socialism in the nineteenth century.

VI

The *coup d'état* of December 2 was an unhappy fulfillment of Tocqueville's constant anxiety over the life expectancy of the Second Republic. Louis Napoleon's success now confirmed Tocqueville's old fear, that of the two currents issuing out of the French Revo-

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41 *Ibid.*, 59.
42 *Ibid.*, VI, 151, Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850.
43 Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations*, I, 204–205.

lution, the one directed towards a freer society and the other aimed at creating a new despotism, the darker forces should prevail. Tocqueville was now forced into the political retirement that made possible his return to historical study and writing. Anticipating the defeat of the Republic, Tocqueville had already in 1849 begun to re-examine his conception of the continuing Great Revolution, and to search for the confidence necessary to write its history. He found that trust in part by a practical assessment of his own political accomplishments, concluding that his experience as a man of affairs had prepared him in a unique manner to understand history as one who had shared in its making. He further recovered his sense of dedication to the scholar's vocation by celebrating the idea that when the ultimate play of history is done, the role of the majestic and original thinker far surpasses the place of those who merely "speak the speech" and "saw the air" on history's stage.[44]

The noble discipline which Tocqueville brought to the task of writing his history is reflected in a beautiful letter he wrote in response to a plea for encouragement from his old friend Gustave de Beaumont, whose public career, like Tocqueville's, was ended on December 2. Beaumont had written in March of 1852 describing his efforts to work. Each morning he arose early, went to his desk, picked up his pen, and arranged his writing materials, only to find that his depressive reaction to the political events of the hour paralyzed his intellect and his will to work.[45] Tocqueville, who was now getting well into his subject, nevertheless hastened to assure Beaumont that he too was not unaffected by their situation. He wrote:

> Every day I spend three or four hours in the library on the rue de Richelieu. Despite all this effort to distract myself, I am ceaselessly aware of a bitter sadness which overcomes me, and if I let myself be surprised by it, I am lost for the rest of the day. The life which I am leading would seem to be very pleasant, but the sight of my country, which I glimpse above my books, breaks my heart.[46]

As the months went on, Tocqueville gained increasing insight into

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[44] Gargan, *Alexis de Tocqueville,* 180–195, 235–237.

[45] Y.T. Mss D. II, "Paquet No. 11 5th Cahier, 41, Beaumont to Tocqueville, March 9, 1852.

[46] Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* Beaumont ed., VI, 85., Tocqueville to Beaumont, May 1, 1852.

his grand problem, whereas Beaumont continued to send pitiful letters of admiration and envy.[47]

Unlike Beaumont, Tocqueville was able to continue and complete his masterpiece on the Old Regime, and to penetrate profoundly the development of the Revolution, because he regained in studying the scene something of the optimism toward the destiny of France and Europe which he had nearly surrendered in the last moments of his political career. That optimism is the more remarkable because Tocqueville brought to his study of the Revolution a sharpened and concrete political sense more conducive to skepticism than faith. The events of 1848 march unseen on every page of his history. His exciting analysis of the struggle between the Parliaments and the King, for example, in which he presents the Parliaments as unwittingly preparing their own demise, is an almost exact replica of his reflections on the role of the Opposition to Louis Philippe's Government in blindly inviting the Revolution of 1848.[48] Again, Tocqueville's attention to the moment when the Revolution ceased being a single harmonious passion directed against the old order and became a class struggle is also to be traced to his earlier examination of the class struggle which was intrinsic to the history of the Second Republic.[49]

In the process of constructing his history of the French Revolution, Tocqueville never surrendered his right to cast a glance forward at the folly and even cowardice of his own generation. He was encouraged to do this by the redeeming experience of his discovery that perhaps never in the history of humanity had mankind such pride in itself and in its destiny as in the moment when it approached and commenced that Revolution of 1789.[50] Tocqueville found here the commitment beyond self for which he had searched all his life. This discovery brought a tranquility to Tocqueville's life which he had never experienced. Writing of his work some months before *L'Ancien Régime* was published, Tocqueville described his day to Gobineau in a manner echoing Machiavelli's description of his own habits during the composition of the *Prince:*

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47 Y.T. Mss D. II, 49, (Beaumont to Tocqueville, April 24, 1852), 54, Beaumont to Tocqueville, June 25, 1852.

48 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 53–78. *L'Ancien Régime Fragments et Notes Inédites;* Tocqueville, *Souvenirs,* ed. Luc Monnier, Paris, 1942, 135.

49 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes,* Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 71–72; Tocqueville, *Souvenirs,* 135.

I spend the morning in my study where I work seriously, the afternoon in the fields where I watch over work of another kind. . . . The time passes with prodigious rapidity; I have never had it pass for me in a more agreeable manner. It is foolish not to know well the art of living when life is so advanced.[50]

Tocqueville's happiness in his work and in his evocation of the spirit of the Revolution in turn enabled him a year before his life ended to reject and condemn Gobineau's prediction of the inevitable decline of the West.[52] The study of Tocqueville's historical thought which remains to be done must have as its keystone Tocqueville's reply to Gobineau. For that reply, with its impassioned affirmation in the ability of democratic societies to be free, was written at the moment when Tocqueville was approaching in his history the despotic center of the Revolution. Given this faith, one may, like Beaumont, envy the historian who will provide us with a full portrait of Tocqueville as historian.

In summary, there is great need of a "definitive" biography of Tocqueville.[53] That biography should reflect the spirit characteristic of Tocqueville when he confessed to a friend: "My dominant feeling . . . when I find myself in the presence of another human being no matter how humble his position, is that of the original equality of the species, and from then on I am concerned less perhaps to please or to serve him than to not offend his dignity."[54]

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50 Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 23, 131–134.

51 Tocqueville, *Correspondence entre A. de Tocqueville et Arthur de Gobineau, 1843–1859*, ed. L. S. Schemann, Paris, 1909, 49, Tocqueville to Gobineau, November 13, 1855.

52 *Ibid.*, 305–309, Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 14, 1857, 311–314, Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 24, 1857.

53 The biography of Tocqueville by J. P. Mayer, *Alexis de Tocqueville*, New York, 1940, is an important work. It is not, however, a definitive biography.

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Business and Currency in the Ohio Gubernatorial Campaign of 1875

The specie resumption controversy of the reconstruction period has generally been treated as a battle between a vaguely defined business-creditor interest centered in the East and a western farmer-debtor group. In recent historiography the return to specie payments in January, 1879, has been placed alongside the protective tariff, railroad land grants, and internal improvement legislation in the program of a triumphant postwar industrial capitalism.[1] Historians have often emphasized the moral fervor of the inflation movement and have portrayed the greenback leaders as idealistic and inexperienced crusaders for the rights of the small farmer oppressed by the power of big business.[2]

In reality western agrarianism is only one thread in the tangled skein of greenback politics. There is evidence to show that western businessmen frequently supported soft money policies out of fear of the deflationary consequences of specie resumption. It is also clear that greenback politicians on occasion recognized and attempted to exploit this apprehension for political purposes. In one such instance, moreover—the Ohio gubernatorial campaign of 1875—the leading greenback politicians were themselves businessmen who viewed the return to sound money as a threat to their own vital economic interests.

Local economic conditions played an important role in the 1875 political contest. By the Seventies Ohio had become an important industrial state, third in the nation in the number of its manufac-

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[1] See, for example, Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year,* New York, 1930, 144–145, 236ff.; Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization,* Revised Edition, New York, 1944, II, 105–114, 330–333; Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos,* New York, 1938, 20, 39, 188–193; Paul Studenski and Herman Krooss, *Financial History of the United States,* New York, 1952, 161; Louis M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism,* New York, 1947, 386–387. Among these writers only Professor Beale takes notice of business opposition to resumpton, but he views this as an occasional aberration, concluding that: "manufacturers generally sought contraction of the currency along with an increase of tariff rates." See Beale, 278.

[2] See, for example, Fred Emory Haynes, *James Baird Weaver,* Iowa City, 1919, *passim;* Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Modern America, 1865–1878: A History of American Life,* Vol. VIII, New York, 1928, 166–167; Solon J. Buck, *The Agrarian Crusade: The Chronicles of America,* Vol. XLV, New Haven, 1920, 77–98.

turing establishments, and fourth in the size of its industrial labor force and the total value of its manufactures. The state was especially prominent in heavy industry. In 1872 it was second to Pennsylvania in steel rail and pig iron production, while in the census year 1879-80 Ohio blast furnaces employed 8,900 workers compared with Pennsylvania's 13,000 and New York's third place of 2,500. In the same census period the state's bituminous coal production followed closely behind that of second place Illinois.[3]

But this impressive industrial machine was hard hit by the long depression that followed the financial collapse of September, 1873. Railroad construction in the nation reached a trough for the decade in 1875, and the suppliers of railroad iron in Ohio suffered severely. In the Mahoning Valley of the northeast, the mining areas of the Hocking Valley, and the manufacturing region adjoining the Ohio River, industrial activity fell off rapidly after 1873. Prices for "no. 1 hot-blast charcoal" iron declined almost fifty per cent in the three years following the panic, and scores of Ohio furnaces shut down, throwing thousands out of work. In the mining regions coal lands worth ten million dollars in 1872 had fallen in value to six million by 1877. Cash was so difficult to procure in the coal districts that miners who remained employed were often forced to submit to a "truck" or "scrip" system of wage payment.[4]

The widespread industrial distress had important political consequences. Greenbackism had swept over Ohio in several waves in the Sixties,[5] but had largely abated in the following decade. The depression served once more to make inflation politically attractive, and on the eve of the 1875 gubernatorial campaign it was revived as a political issue by a faction within the Ohio Democracy.

The leaders of this group were largely new to the Democratic party. Recent converts from the ranks of pre-war Whiggery in a number of instances,[6] they had not, in one editor's colorful phrase,

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[3] See the *Railroad Gazette*, VII (October 2, 1875), 408; and United States Bureau of the Census, *Tenth Census, 1880; Census of Manufacturers, passim.*

[4] Rendigs Fels, "American Business Cycles, 1865–1879," *American Economic Review*, XLI, No. 3 (June, 1951), 347–348; Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875*, 35; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 14, 1875; Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, *First Annual Report for 1877*, 116–117.

[5] Reginald C. McGrane, "Ohio in the Greenback Movement," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XI, No. 4 (March, 1925), 526–531; Clifford H. Moore, "Ohio in National Politics, 1865–1896," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Publications*, XXXVII (1928), 244–266.

[6] See the *Cincinnati Commercial*, July 2, 1875.

"been Democrats long enough to let the dirt accumulate under their nails."[7] Men like Thomas Ewing, Jr., Samuel F. Cary, and Robert Schilling, complained Congressman Michael Kerr, were "not democrats at all, in any just sense."[8] Ambitious for leadership, the newcomers hoped to use inflation to seize political power. A successful greenback platform would consolidate their hold on the party in Ohio and would, perhaps, enable them to dictate the Democratic presidential nomination in 1876. If the money issue proved a vote-getter in the fall canvass, the *Cincinnati Commercial* warned conservative Democrats, the inflationists would "occupy and possess" the Democratic political organization. The next step would see "the worse elements . . . loosed," and the 1876 national campaign would be fought on the currency issue.[9]

Business considerations also drove the inflationists. Ewing was deeply involved in mining and railroad promotion. During the early Seventies the former Union general and his brothers, Charles and Hugh, had invested heavily in railroad stock and central Ohio coal and iron properties.[10] Later in the decade the Ewings expanded their interests to include the manufacture of railroad iron and speculation in western silver lands.[11] The panic was a cruel blow to the Ewing fortunes and for the remainder of the decade, General Ewing, hoping to realize something for the family properties, fought every attempt to restore the specie standard. He particularly detested the Republican sponsored Resumption Act of 1875, believing that "if that infernal law were repealed or amended" the family "coal and iron lands would sell at once."[12] Cary too, was a promoter of western mining lands, and during the campaign was accused of fraud in connection with his Colorado silver speculations.[13] The leaders of the Ohio Democracy, the

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7 This was the description of the Democratic *Cleveland Herald,* also quoted in Clifford Moore, "Ohio in National Politics," *loc. cit.,* 295–296, n. 19.

8 Kerr to Manton Marble, Manitou Springs, Colorado, September 1, 1875, in the Marble MSS., Library of Congress.

9 *Cincinnati Commercial,* July 15, 1875. For similar views see also the *Cleveland Leader,* October 7, 1875. During the campaign the *Cincinnati Enquirer,* chief organ of the inflationist Democracy, as if to confirm Republican charges, spoke with anticipation of an inflationist Democratic ticket against Grant in 1876. See the *Enquirer,* September 9, 1875.

10 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Hugh Ewing, Lancaster, O., July 29, 1871 and November 17, 1871, in the Ewing Family MSS., Library of Congress.

11 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Columbus, O., July 14, 1873, *ibid.;* and William Thomas Hutchinson, *Cyrus Hall McCormick,* New York, 1935, II, 195.

12 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Lancaster, August 13, 1877, Ewing Family MSS.

13 *Cincinnati Commercial,* June 17, 1875.

Cincinnati Commercial could charge with considerable justice, "want flush times to gamble in, knowing the wreck must come, but confident of their ability to save themselves."[14]

At the June Democratic convention in Columbus the resolutions committee had proven subservient to Ewing and his followers, and over the protest of the Cleveland Democracy,[15] accepted an inflationist platform. Ewing had apparently been aided by an understanding with Governor William Allen, an old time Jacksonian sound money man who now had presidential ambitions.[16] When the platform was reported to the convention it carried the Governor's endorsement and was adopted without an open floor fight.[17] Immediately after, Allen was renominated and Cary was given second place on the ticket.

The financial plank of the Democratic platform attacked the most vulnerable spot in the Republican record, the 1875 Resumption Act. This measure, which provided for redeeming the wartime greenbacks in gold on January 1, 1879, had been "railroaded" through the Forty-third Congress by the Republican caucus.[18] Its passage had been shortly followed by a sharp currency contraction which had produced widespread alarm among businessmen.[19] This Republican legislation, the Democratic platform charged, had "already brought disaster to the business of the country," and now threatened it with total "bankruptcy and ruin." The contraction

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[14] *Ibid.*, October 1, 1875.

[15] The Cuyahoga County Democratic Convention had, on June 12, adopted a sound money financial plank. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 13, 1875.

[16] Reginald C. McGrane, *William Allen, A Study in Western Democracy*, Columbus, Ohio, 1925, 219, 250ff.

[17] *New York Daily Tribune*, June 21, 1875. The religious question just raised by the Republicans at their state convention was probably an important factor in conservative Democratic acquiesence in the soft money plank. This issue stemmed from the previous legislative session when John J. Geghan, an Irish Democratic member of the lower house, introduced a measure authorizing Catholic chaplains at state hospitals and penal institutions. This measure, passed by the Democratic controlled General Assembly reputedly under Catholic pressure, had done much to stir up the latent nativism of a large segment of the electorate. The Republicans clearly intended to make "no Popery" an important part of their campaign, a fact that did much to reconcile sound money Democrats to the Ewing financial plank. See Harry Barnard, *Rutherford B. Hayes and His America*, New York, 1954, 272–273, for details of this issue.

[18] Concocted in the Republican Senatorial caucus largely to avoid a party breach over the currency issue the bill was passed by a strict party vote. In the House, for example, the majority was composed of 134 Republicans to 2 Democrats. *Congressional Record*, 43 Congress, 2 session, 318–319

[19] *Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1874*, viii; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, XX, No. 522 (June 26, 1875), 604.

policy must be abandoned, and, in a clause which clearly opened the door to unlimited monetary expansion, the platform demanded that the volume of the national currency be adjusted "to the wants of trade."[20]

The gubernatorial campaign which followed the conventions[21] attracted nationwide attention. The *Chicago Tribune* observed that not since the Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial contest in Illinois had the American public been so interested in a local political canvass.[22] Neither Allen nor Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was deemed worthy of such attention, but the public had accepted the Ohio inflationists at their own estimate. If the greenback won in Ohio, the conservative New York financial weekly, the *Financier,* announced, there was a strong likelihood that the inflationists would carry the Democratic national convention in 1876.[23] The results, moreover, would have an important bearing upon the nation's financial future. "Give the inflationists success in Ohio on the 12th of next month," declared one newspaper, "and the inflation feeling will be overwhelming in the next House of Representatives."[24]

Despite this latter prospect the Republicans at first tried to ignore the money issue. National chairman John Binney advised the party leaders in Ohio as late as September that it would be "unwise to make the currency issue a prominent part of the canvass." Prudence demanded that it be kept an "open question on which Democrats and Republicans are divided in opinion."[25] Local Republicans, including candidate Hayes, sought at first to avoid taking a stand on the Resumption Act.[26]

However, evasion became increasingly difficult. While the Republicans waved the rather worn bloody shirt, the Democrats were rapidly making the financial question the leading issue of the campaign. Day after day Democratic speakers played on the

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20 *The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1875,* New York, 1877, 606–607.

21 The Republican state convention had convened in Columbus just a few days before the Democrats.

22 *Chicago Daily Tribune,* September 6, 1875.

23 *The Financier,* VII (September 25, 1875), 212–213. See also the *Terre Haute Express,* quoted in Forrest William Clonts, "The Political Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly,* XXXI (1922), 40.

24 *Cincinnati Commercial,* September 13, 1875.

25 Binney to E. W. Keyes, quoted in Horace Samuel Merrill, *The Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West, 1865–1896,* Baton Rouge, 1953, 107.

26 See John Quincy Smith to John Sherman, Oakland, O., October 8, 1875, in the Sherman MSS., Library of Congress.

anxieties of businessmen and laborers caught in the worst economic slump in two decades. The Republican Resumption Act would mean "general and inevitable bankruptcy and ruin," asserted Ewing. "The threat of forced resumption . . . had paralyzed all enterprise, and checked all adventures," former Senator George Pendleton claimed.[27] "The mines are not worked . . . manufactures have ceased to run, laborers are out of employment, rents have fallen one third." Total industrial stagnation would be the inevitable consequence of the Republican resumption policy.[28]

Out in the hustings, in the industrial towns of Ironton, Shawnee, Lancaster, Galion, Upper Sandusky, Circleville, Wilmington and Tiffin, Ewing told of "shrinking values, reduced manufactures and trade, . . . suffering among laborers, and bankruptcy among producing and trading capitalists."—The Republican contraction had destroyed business and "the cry of want was going up from every industrial center in the land."[29] At Wilmington he pleaded eloquently for the young capitalism of the Mississippi Valley. What manufacturer, he asked, could withstand the jolt of the sixty per cent contraction promised by the Resumption Act? Business could not be conducted without borrowed money, especially in the newer western areas, what businessman could borrow "when he knows that in addition to the interest he pays, seventeen *per cent,* has to be added for the difference between greenbacks now and gold on the first of January 1879?" It was the older men in the East who were lenders of money accumulated over a long business career. The young energetic businessmen who combined the money of the "non-producer" with their skill and talents for the production of goods would be the ones to suffer by the contraction.[30]

It was soon evident that the Democratic line of argument was being favorably received in the industrial regions. George W. Morgan of the inflationist *Cincinnati Enquirer* observed:

A great revolution is going on in . . . the manufacturing and mining districts. . . . Businessmen, generally, are awakening to the fact that the real issue is between dead capital on the one side, and active capital and labor on the other. Our platform is therefore freed from unmeaning phrases,

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[27] *Speeches of Governor William Allen, . . . George H. Pendleton, . . . A. G. Thurman, . . . Thomas Ewing, . . . Samuel F. Cary, . . . Before the Democratic Ratification Meeting . . . June 17, 1875,* Columbus, 1875, 6–10.

[28] *Ibid.,* 6.

[29] *Speech of Gen. Thomas Ewing Delivered at Ironton . . . ,* 4–10.

[30] *Joint Discussion Between Gen. Thomas Ewing of Ohio and Gov. Stewart I. Woodford of New York on the Finance Question,* 9.

and the consequence is that thousands of businessmen are uniting with us on business grounds.

Henry Blanding of Zanesville, one of the leading ironmasters of southeastern Ohio, Morgan reported, was canvassing the state for Allen. The Blanding brothers had always been Republican, and their defection would "bring with them a powerful following of men who think as they do."[31] In Mahoning County, "leading Republicans engaged in the iron business," Judge Rufus P. Ranney predicted, would "pronounce in favor" of the Democrats.[32] By mid-September Cary too was prophesying large Democratic gains among workers and capitalists in the coal and iron districts.[33]

The Republicans knew that Ewing and Cary were not alone among Ohio businessmen in fearing "forced" resumption. The depression and falling prices made easy money appealing to many Ohio industrialists and the Hayes leaders had evidence that they would have a difficult fight to hold the mill owners to their traditional party affiliations. The Republican Congress that passed the Resumption Act, one Ohio manufacturer wrote to Congressman James A. Garfield, "piled another *mountain of distress*" on top of that produced by the panic. His firm's losses in the previous two years, this Cleveland businessman asserted, had "been not less than 50,000$ annually in bad debts and from depreciation in selling power of our products" as a consequence of the measure. Only the bankers, he complained, had profited from the rapid "shrinkage of values" of the last few years.[34] In the East the papers were reporting that the Democrats would win the vote of "manufacturers and businessmen who had incurred risks, had notes to pay, and look[ed] to inflation as their only hope to unload."[35]

The Republicans were deeply disturbed by the prospective loss of the business vote. By late June Hayes was conceding in a letter to Senator John Sherman that the tariff and the national finances would be "controlling subjects" in industrial Ohio.[36] Soon after, Hayes wrote apprehensively of an impending visit of Republican inflationist William "Pig Iron" Kelley to Ironton in

[31] Morgan to Samuel J. Randall, Mt. Vernon, O., August 19, 1875, in the Randall MSS., University of Pennsylvania Library.

[32] Reported in George W. Morgan to William Allen, Cleveland, O., July 4, 1875, William Allen MSS., Library of Congress.

[33] *New York Daily Tribune*, September 14, 1875.

[34] W. C. Andrews to Garfield, Cleveland, O., October 4, 1875, Garfield MSS., Library of Congress.

[35] *New York Daily Tribune*, September 13, 1875.

[36] Hayes to Sherman, Fremont, O., June 29, 1875, the Sherman MSS.

the southern industrial region.[37] "Doubtless there are localities where our position on the currency will be damaging," but on the whole, he asserted with more determination than real conviction, the Republican endorsement of sound money must help. "At any rate," he concluded lamely, "we are right."[38]

Paralyzed at first by the effective Democratic assault, the Republicans soon rallied and set about reinvigorating their campaign. By late summer the implications for national politics and the national finances of a Democratic victory had become abundantly clear, and from outside the state Republican stalwarts and sound money Independents alike hurried to enter the Ohio battle. "The whole power of the Administration was used against us," wrote Congressman Milton I. Southard. Never before, he later recalled, had there been "such a determined effort" to defeat the Democracy in a local election.[39] Senator George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, a former Secretary of the Treasury, came to Ohio and threw his financial prestige behind the Republican platform.[40] Massachusetts' junior Senator, Henry L. Dawes, Senator John Ingalls of Kansas, and Congressman Eugene Hale of Maine stumped the state for the sound money cause.[41] "The Republicans," Ewing reported in mid-September, were "spending money freely" to support this "great effort."[42] Carl Schurz was dragged back from a European visit by the entreaties of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Murat Halstead, and other former Liberal-Republicans who knew Schurz's power to charm the voters among his fellow German-Americans and his influence with the educated independent voter.[43] Ohio

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37 Although a Republican, Kelley favored an easy money policy. At this point his motives were partly personal since he had important iron investments in Ohio which had been hard hit by the slump. More important, however, Kelley had for years been the chief spokesman in Congress of the Pennsylvania ironmasters who, like their Ohio counterparts, were fearful of "forced" resumption. For Kelley's Ohio investments see Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875*, 431. For the currency attitudes of the Pennsylvania iron interests see my unpublished Columbia University doctoral dissertation, "Men, Money, and Politics: the Specie Resumption Issue, 1865–1879," *passim*.

38 Hayes to John Sherman, Fremont, O., July 5, 1875, the Sherman MSS.

39 Southard to Samuel J. Randall, Zanesville, O., November 15, 1875, the Randall MSS.

40 *New York Daily Tribune*, September 18, 1875.

41 *Ibid.*, October 6, 1875.

42 Ewing to Samuel J. Randall, Lancaster, O., September 14, 1875, the Randall MSS.

43 George Hoadly to Carl Schurz, Cincinnati, September 24, 1875, in the Schurz MSS., at the Library of Congress. See also Frederic Bancroft, (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, New York, 1913, III, 157–161.

Republicans rapidly took heart and for the first time prepared to face the currency issue squarely. By early September Hayes, former Governor Edward Noyes, Sherman, Garfield, and Thomas Young, nominee for Lieutenant Governor, were on the stump striking out boldly against the "rag baby."[44]

Until a month before election day, however, Democratic victory still appeared certain. In late September Washington observers were predicting that nothing could stop the Allen forces.[45] But Democratic prospects faded as the contest entered its last weeks and the supreme Republican effort began to tell. In Cincinnati, on September 27, Schurz made his first campaign address to a crowd that overflowed Turner Hall.[46] In quick succession he made six more scheduled speeches, both in English and German, to large and enthusiastic audiences.[47] Republican mass meetings in various parts of the state became increasingly exuberant as election day approached. One at Warren in the Reserve was attended by some twenty-five thousand Ohioans who listened to speeches by Noyes, Garfield and Senator Ben Wade; applauded the fifteen brass bands that blared patriotic music; goggled at maneuvering artillery and fire companies; and marched in procession carrying banners inscribed "In Hayes we Trust, In Allen we Bust," and "Allen and Cary, Not a Vote Nary." The rally was, a visiting Chicago reporter wrote, one of the most colossal affairs in the political history of the state.[48]

The rest of the Republican battery of campaigners, both the imported and domestic varieties, were out in force in the weeks before the October election date.[49] The campaign entered a new phase as the Republicans sought to awaken middle class fears of anarchy and confiscation. "Inflation means the repudiation of all debts public and private, the utter destruction of credit, and a long lapse toward barbarism," pronounced Murat Halstead's *Cincinnati Commercial*.[50] "A vote for the Democratic ticket is encourage-

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[44] *New York Daily Tribune*, September 4, 1875; *ibid.*, October 6, 1875; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 6, 1875.

[45] See the manuscript diary of James A. Garfield, entry for September 22, 1875, in the Garfield MSS.

[46] The full speech was reported in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* of September 28, 1875.

[47] Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, New York, 1908, III, 362–363; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 5, 1875; and the *New York Times*, October 1, 1875.

[48] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 24, 1875.

[49] See the *New York Daily Tribune*, October 6, 1875.

[50] *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 12, 1875.

ment . . . to communist revolution," the *Cincinnati Gazette* shouted.[51] Every man with a home mortgage who voted for Allen and inflation was, it was asserted, voting for foreclosure of that mortgage.[52]

The inflationists were inciting class war. Cary's speeches were "calculated to do the greatest possible mischief in stirring up strife between what he is pleased to call 'classes' of the people."[53] The Democratic campaign reminded the *Gazette* of the period of the French Revolution "when such men as Cary, Ewing, Pendleton, and Kelley rose to the surface . . . appealing to the masses against property and capital."[54] The Hayes papers made much of Kelley's "intemperate" address to the mill operators at Ironton. The Pennsylvania Congressman, resented the more for his Republican affiliations, was accused of wishing "to set up a division of classes, to divide the laboring class from the rest, and to persuade the workingmen that their interests were hostile to the rest."[55] The *Commercial* in its issue of August 9 featured a four-column Nast cartoon depicting Kelley releasing a "rag baby" jack-in-the-box as he brandished a "bullionist heart" on a spear, while above and around his head was inscribed "Vive la Guillotine," "Tremble Tyrants," "the Sans Culottes are coming," and "more greenbacks or death."[56]

The Republicans skillfully played upon all the social prejudices that permeated late nineteenth century mid-western America. The Democrats and their platform were disreputable, dishonest, and immoral. Cary was taken to task by the Republican press for "dirty harangues," in one of which, it was alleged, he had charged the daughters of "rich men" with "curvature of morals,"[57] In an address at Marion in August Hayes asserted that "overtrading and fast living" always accompanied the sort of currency scheme cooked up by the Democracy.[58] The Democrats, Schurz told his Cincinnati audience, were attempting to force the state of Ohio to endorse a financial policy "which, if followed by the National Government . . . would make our political and business life more than ever a hot-bed of gambling and corruption, and plunge the country into all those depths of moral . . . bankruptcy and ruin . . .

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51 *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, October 12, 1875.
52 *Cleveland Leader*, October 5, 1875.
53 *Cincinnati Commercial*, August 4, 1875.
54 *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, August 4, 1875.
55 *Ibid.*, September 7, 1875.
56 *Cincinnati Commercial*, August 9, 1875.
57 *Ibid.*, August 8, 1875.
58 *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, August 2, 1875.

which never fails to follow a course so utterly demented in its wickedness." To entrust to any government the power to increase or decrease the national currency at will, as the inflationists intended, would have disastrous consequences. "The private fortune of every citizen is placed at the mercy of the government's arbitrary pleasure" by such a course. No business venture would be safe, no contract secure: only speculators and promoters would gain. "The rings would thrive and honest men would pay the cost."[59]

By the last days of the campaign the political prospects had drastically altered, and by early October the Democrats had begun to lose confidence.[60] And in the end the Republican effort was successful. First returns on October 13 were indecisive, but by the 16th the victory of Hayes was clearly established. The Republican margin of victory was narrow, however, with Hayes receiving 297,817 votes to Allen's 292,273. Only five thousand votes separated the candidates out of a total of almost six hundred thousand cast.[61]

The defeated Democrats indulged in much post-election soul-searching. The Ohio hard money faction believed the defeat a just punishment for the party's desertion of traditional sound financial principles, and cursed Allen, Ewing, and the rest of the inflationist leaders.[62] The inflationists, on the other hand, blamed the "treachery" of the eastern hard money Democrats. The *New York World,* organ of Samuel Tilden and August Belmont, had attacked Allen violently, and during the campaign had been circulated as a Republican campaign document.[63] These "eastern gentlemen," the *Cincinnati Enquirer* promised, "will not be forgotten. They have built up a good account which will be settled in good time."[64]

Doubtless the most important single factor in the defeat was the successful mobilization of middle-class urban Protestant opinion against the inflationists. The contest brought out the largest vote of any election in the state's hisory, [65] and it was Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati, the centers of "trade and culture," that gave the

59 *Chicago Daily Tribune,* September 28, 1875.
60 See the *New York Daily Tribune,* October 6, 1875.
61 *Ibid.,* October 23, 1875.
62 *Ibid.,* October 14, 1875.
63 *New York Herald,* December 2, 1875, quoting the *Cincinnati Enquirer.* December 2, 1875.
64 *Enquirer,* October 13, 1875.
65 Clonts, "The Political Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," *loc cit.,* 86.

Republicans their majority.[66] The Ohio fight, the *New York Times* remarked, was "won in the cities, the larger towns, and the populous intelligent counties where daily newspapers, good schools, and speakers like Schurz [and] Garfield . . . got in their good work."[67] In particular the urbanized and commercial northern tier of the Western Reserve, a part of the state settled by New Englanders and retaining much of the Yankee ethical approach to political affairs, turned out in force for Hayes.[68] Ashtabula County, "the most Puritanical part" of Ohio, lamented the Democratic *Chicago Times,* carried the Reserve for the Republicans.[69]

The political puritans had also rallied to the cause of "honest" finance. The Liberals, the clean government men and independents who had voted for Horace Greeley in 1872, apparently voted for Hayes three years later. Carl Schurz, observers were certain, had succeeded in getting out the old Liberal vote. "If it had not been for that crout-eating Greeley-ite," wrote one peeved Pennsylvania Democrat, the state would assuredly have gone for Allen.[70] To the Germans and the independents Schurz had made the campaign into a crusade for the middle-class virtues, and they responded at the polls. The margin of victory in Ohio was small, independent Henry Adams wrote an English friend, "but every man of that five thousand was one of us."[71]

Nevertheless the inflation platform had not been a total failure. The soft money slogans were indeed successful in converting hard times into Democratic votes in the industrial districts. As the dispatches reporting the news of Democratic defeat pointed out, the party had made advances over the 1873 gubernatorial race in the coal and iron regions. In the manufacturing towns of Steubenville, Youngstown, Canton, and Wooster substantial gains for Allen were

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66 *New York Daily Tribune*, November 1, 1875.
67 *New York Times*, October 14, 1875.
68 *Cleveland Leader*, November 21, 1875.
69 Quoted in *ibid.*, November 26, 1875.
70 J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21, 1875, in the Jeremiah S. Black MSS. at the Library of Congress.
71 Henry Adams to Charles Milnes Gaskell, Beverly Farms, Mass., October 15, 1875, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., *Letters of Henry Adams, 1858–1891*, Boston, 1930, I, 272. It is difficult to find confirmation for the impressionistic material concerning the independent vote. A comparison of county returns for 1872 and 1875 does indicate, however, that in the two urban centers of Cleveland and Cincinnati large majorities for Liberal-Republican Greeley in 1872 were converted into large majorities for Hayes in 1875. In normally Democratic Columbus the Allen majority was considerably below that of Greeley in 1872. The county returns may be found in Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875.*

scored.[72] Pennsylvania Democrats, scanning the Ohio returns for a forecast of their own state campaign, noted that the inflation platform had carried the Ohio mining districts.[73]

It is impossible to determine conclusively from the available data the voting pattern of the ironmasters and coal operators of Ohio.[74] But it is difficult to believe that some of the very real antagonism to deflation among the state's manufacturers during the fall of 1875 was not transformed into Democratic votes. The voting preferences of the state's industrial leaders are not, however, as interesting as the nature of the contending forces in the 1875 canvass. Far from being spokesmen of agrarian debtors, the Ohio inflationists accepted the dominant business ethic of the Gilded Age and pitched their soft money appeal to western industrial aspirations. Nor were the financial conservatives the minions of industrial capital. In the 1875 contest the sound money forces were compelled to marshal the respectable commercial and professional middle-class to counteract the strong inflationist inclinations of the leaders of Ohio industry.

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72 *New York Daily Tribune*, October 13, 1875.

73 J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21, 1875, in the Black MSS.

74 An analysis of the six leading coal mining counties and the nine leading iron and steel producing counties of the state does, in fact, reveal substantial Democratic percentage gains over the previous state contest. But there is no way of determining the vote of the mine operators or the ironmasters from this data since their numbers could not have been great enough to affect the voting percentage substantially.

The Failure of German Propaganda in the United States, 1914-1917

Since German propaganda was primarily directed toward the American of German descent, the United States, prior to its entry into the European conflict, would seem to have been a fertile field for the operation of an effective propaganda movement. With the aid of Spencerian sociology and Darwinian biology, the Anglo-Saxon dogma, then current in the United States, "became the chief element in American racism in the imperial era."[1] Like other varieties of racism, Anglo-Saxonism was a product of modern nationalism and the romantic movement, rather than an outgrowth of biological science.[2] Many Americans readily agreed with James K. Hosmer, the author of *Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom,* who believed that the primacy of the world lay with the Anglo-Saxon race. "English institutions, English speech, and English thought," said Hosmer, "are to become the main features of the political, social, and intellectual life of mankind."[3] The implications of the Anglo-Saxon cult gave way to a hostile attitude by native Americans toward their immigrant population.

While the patterns of American nativism cannot be dealt with in this paper, it is generally accepted that native Americans greatly resented what they believed to be the non-Americanization of the three most important racial groups of nineteenth-century immigration, namely, the Germans, Italians, and Poles, in that order. This antagonism hindered the process of assimilation because it weakened an old bond of understanding, if not of union. Into the world of American Protestantism millions of non-Protestants were pouring, unprovided with new ways of life by an American society itself perplexed and drifting.[4] The advocates of immigration restriction insisted that the immigrant's nationality and special national loyalties persisted for many generations even when the individual descendents

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[1] Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought,* Boston, 1955, 172.

[2] Stow Persons ed., *Evolutionary Thought in America,* New York, 1956, 439.

[3] Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism,* 174. For a more elaborate treatment: of the Anglo-Saxon cult, see Josiah Strong. *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis,* New York, 1912, 180-222.

[4] D. W. Brogan, *The American Character,* New York, 1944, 102.

of the original immigrants were almost completely assimilated. This nationality, they declared, was contradictory and inconsistent with American nationality.[5] Writers of the American scene were quick to point out that the one thing vainly asked for in New York City "is a distinctly American community."[6] As elements of the so-called "new immigration" streamed into the United States after the Civil War, the various national groups not only conflicted with native Americans, but also with each other, causing periodic crises within the American community.[7] The inevitable reaction on the part of native Americans was the establishment of defense organizations.

The "nationalist nineties" saw the growth of numerous *ad hoc* nativist organizations like The National League for the Protection of American Institutions, The American Protective Association, and the Immigration Restriction League. The nation-wide growth of Anglo-Saxon nativism, whose activities mirrored the history of popular xenophobia, tended to corrode the traditional American confidence in assimilation and homogeneity.[8] Prewar sentiment, surrounded by myth and emotionalism, left the American people psychologically unprepared to achieve national solidarity. The German invasion of Belgium strengthened nativist sentiment and opened wide cleavages along nationalist lines. As Merle Curti has observed, "Hatred of the enemy across the sea was extended to German-Americans at home in the name of loyalty to the nation."[9] The use of the German language was forbidden in the pulpits and schools of Montana. In Iowa, the governor ruled that German could not be used on street cars, over the telephone, or anywhere else in public.[10] Even before America's entry into the war, there had been attacks upon things German. After Wilson's decision to intervene, the cries of hate rose to a crescendo. As two historians have pointed out, "Names of towns and individuals were changed. The lowly hamburger became the liberty sandwich, and sauerkraut was called liberty cabbage. Hymns, symphonies, and operas of German origin

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5 Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Melting-Pot Mistake," in *Immigration; an American dilemma*, ed. Benjamin Munn Ziegler, Boston, 1953, 23–25.

6 Jacob A. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*, New York, 1957, 15.

7 John Tracy Ellis, *American Catholicism*, Chicago, 1955, 101.

8 John Higham, *Strangers in the Land; Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*, New Brunswick, N. J., 1955, 183.

9 Merle Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty*, New York, 1946, 227.

10 H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917–1918*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1957, 195–196.

were looked upon with suspicion. And then, of course, there was hatred of the German language."[11]

From press surveys it appears that of 367 American newspapers, 105 favored the Allies and 20 the German cause. The other 242 were neutral. Community sympathies were given as pro-Ally in 189 cases, pro-German in 38, and 140 divided. In both cases, the Middle West was more favorable toward the German cause than the East or the South.[12] American intervention, itself a product of political, economic, and cultural forces, showed evidence of the weight of ethnic loyalties, not least so in the case of President Wilson himself. Even before 1917, the question of participation had already aligned factions into respective camps who fought to determine the course of national policy. As one eminent American historian has said, "The conflict that ensued brought to the fore questions of the nature of group loyalties that, until then, had largely been taken for granted."[13] This division of group loyalties would seem to have insured the success of German propaganda. But, much to the chagrin of its agents, the American "melting pot" continued to function despite the division in national loyalty.

Since the atmosphere in the United States "made it impossible to risk exacerbating public opinion by any acts of sabotage,"[14] the representatives of Germany in the United States did what they could to organize an information service to present the German point of view to the American public. A propaganda committee was formed with the support of a number of German organizations and of the German language press.[15] A German propaganda mission headed by Dr. Heinrich Albert and Dr. Bernhard Dernburg arrived in the United States shortly after the outbreak of war, and the German government opened an information bureau on Broadway, in New York City. From this office came press releases, interviews, lectures, movies, and other devices to mold public opinion in favor of the Central Powers. "German propagandists," says Carl Wittke, "supported pacifist and antiwar organizations, worked closely with the Irish, bought the New York Daily Mail, and distributed news reports favorable to Germany to the American press."[16]

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11 *Ibid.*, 195.

12 William P. Slosson, *The Great Crusade and After: 1914–1928*, New York, 1930, 10–11.

13 Oscar Handlin, *The American People in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, 1954, 113.

14 Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, London, 1952, 36.

15 *Ibid.*, 32–33.

16 Carl Wittke, *The German-Language Press in the United States*, Lexington, Ky., 1957, 238.

The columns of the German-American press were opened to the consuls of the German government stationed in the United States, "and these officials availed themselves of this vehicle in order to publish not only official communications to German citizens, resident in the United States, but also to communicate on the war."[17] Another instrument of German propaganda was the public lecture platform. Professor Eugen Kühnemann, an exchange professor from the University of Breslau who had lectured at Harvard and Wisconsin, and was still in the United States, "was converted into public lecturer" whose duty it was to travel all over the country making public addresses on the causes and issues of the war.[18]

We must make a distinction here between the German-language press and propagandist instruments subsidized by the German government solely for the use of propaganda purposes. That the German-language press and the German element was "pro-German during the first three years of the war was to be expected, and during the period of American neutrality, "it was just as legal and reasonable to be pro-German as it was to be pro-Ally."[19] That many Germans, in their desire to refute slanderous accusations—especially in view of the tendency to canonize the Allies in the United States—"occasionally overstepped the bounds of discretion and common sense is also quite understandable."[20]

There is also evidence that propagandists from Germany received considerable cooperation from the various branches of the German-American Alliance, a defense organization representing more than a million and a half members.[21] The German-American Alliance was never really understood in Germany. Absurd comments upon its activities in the German press, and extravagant claims as to its political power, "managed to do considerable harm when they found their way (often via London) into the United States."[22] Commenting upon the June 8, 1916 edition of the Chicago *Abendpost* (which openly admitted the activist tendencies of the National German-American Alliance) a critic of the Alliance stated that the propaganda was directed against the prevailing

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17 Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, Columbus, Ohio, 1936, 9.

18 *Ibid.*, 9–10.

19 Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America*, New York, 1939, 259–260.

20 *Ibid.*, 260. See also Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 12.

21 Clifton James Child, *The German-Americans in Politics 1914–1917*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1939, 30.

22 *Ibid.*, 177.

Anglo-Saxon culture; its mission, according to the Baltimore *Deutsche Correspondent,* was that of "preventing the now incipient Anglicizing of the American people, of seeing that the race of men issuing from the melting-pot be no Anglo-Saxon, but a purely American race [Germanoriented, to be sure] having its own history, its own politics, its own culture, its own philosophy of life, its own way of thinking and feeling."[23] At the beginning of 1915 there was talk of establishing a daily newspaper in the English language. However, Charles L. Hexamer, the president of the National German-American Alliance, had already expressed satisfaction (on the part of the Alliance) with George Sylvester Viereck's English weekly, *The Fatherland.*[24] Indeed, Hexamer's position was well taken, for *The Fatherland* was probably the most important and effective instrument for the spread of German propaganda in the United States.

George Sylvester Viereck was a devoted worker in the German propaganda movement.[25] His English weekly *The Fatherland,* "became perhaps the most outspoken German propaganda sheet in America." As one of the few papers which received financial aid from the German Government, it built up a large circulation among the German-American element. Some of the German-language papers frankly admitted that *The Fatherland* was subsidized by the German Government and "saw no reason to apologize for this arrangement."[26] A letter from Alexander Konta to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in March, 1915, is one of the earliest records explaining the purpose of this weekly. The weekly, said Konta, would be "a discreet appeal to every German society in the country for support by its members." A national daily circulation of 500,000 copies would tremendously impress the man in the street. "Politically, the transaction would have to be handled with the utmost delicacy. No suspicion of the influence behind it should be allowed to reach the public."[27] If zeal and devotedness are any criteria, then Viereck and his *Fatherland* were more than equal to the task.

The immediate task of *The Fatherland* was to explain away the German invasion of Belgium. Germany's situation in regard

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[23] Frank Perry Olds," 'Kultur' in American Politics," *Atlantic Monthly* (September, 1916), 383–384.
[24] Child, *German-Americans in Politics,* 29.
[25] Walter Millis, *Road to War,* New York, 1935, 207.
[26] Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War,* 23.
[27] Slosson, *The Great Crusade,* 6–7.

to Belgium, said Viereck, was "that of a young giant surrounded on all sides by an impregnable iron wall and having through the one side an easy means of escape."[28] Before the war there had already existed, without any cause from the German side, a fanatical hatred in Belgium for the Germans. Belgium had already been mobilized. Moreover, continued *The Fatherland,* "the most unbelievable persecutions of Germans had taken place, women and children were killed by the most cruel tortures, in a way only thought possible at the Congo in the darkest of Africa, perhaps, but never in Europe."[29] Today, said the propaganda sheet, we know the cause of it. An agreement existed between England, France, and Belgium to attack Germany by way of Belgium. Hence, Belgium "had to pay for it."[30] Indeed, to support this claim, *The Fatherland* reported the discovery of important documents in the archives of the Belgium General Staff, revealing conclusively that Belgium was a designing party to a preconcerted conspiracy to crush Germany. The plan, of English origin, and sanctioned by Lieutenant-General James Griers, Chief of the British General Staff, set in motion an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to invade Germany. From these official documents, said Viereck, "it requires a peculiarly warped mental attitude to gather the conclusion that Belgium was not hand-in-glove with England and France in a colossal conspiracy to destroy the German Empire."[31]

It is highly significant that *The Fatherland* mitigated this belligerent attitude concerning the Belgium invasion, for it indicates the difficulty that Viereck had in equating the violation of Belgium's neutrality with the traditional American abhorrence of militarism and treaty violation. Germany's position must be understood, pleaded *The Fatherland* in 1917. She had always fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; and, if such a war occured, it would be a matter of life and death. "Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In the face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do."[32] The invasion of Belgium, then, was a matter of defense.[33] Since Germany's

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28 *The Fatherland,* September 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 8, p. 5.
29 *Ibid.,* September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 2.
30 *Ibid.,* August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7; December 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 21, p. 14.
31 *Ibid.,* November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, pp. 10–11.
32 *Ibid.,* January 17, 1917, vol. V, no. 24, p. 395.
33 Hugo Münsterberg, *The War and America,* New York, 1914, 8–9. See also *The Fatherland,* November 29, 1916, vol. V, no. 17, p. 263.

neighbors begrudged the prosperity of *The Fatherland,* which resulted from the development of her agricultural and industrial resources, "Germany had to spend a vast part of its material and mental income in a hard preparation for defense."[34] As a counter to the Belgium atrocity stories, *The Fatherland* told its readers of 1620 murders committed by the Russians in East Prussia simply from "the bestial lust of blood and torture."[35] Such brutality, continued the weekly, was a decided difference from the "restraint" which the Germans always exercised.

Despite this attempt to convince non-Germans that the Belgium invasion was a defensive measure, little or no success was gained in this direction. It offended American sensibilities in areas of thought. Progressivism, the prevailing body of social thought in the formative years of the twentieth century, ran counter to the defensive theme expressed by German propagandists. As a collection of loosely connected and not always consistent ideas, progressivism shared the belief in social legislation, the extension of political democracy, and the restoration of individual rights.[36] Not least important in the philosophy of progressivism was the belief in a fundamental moral law. The invasion of neutral Belgium, with its corollary, the doctrine of a "scrap of paper," violated a sacred obligation. To deny that contracts are sacred was to deny the ruling philosophy of America. Moreover, the invasion of Belgium came at a time when the moral law was being much emphasized in American social ideas. It had provided the background for the Progressive crusaders who were seeking to overcome the evils of capitalism and political corruption. "In such an age, when hope in a new and better day ran high the invasion of Belgium seemed to be denial of morality and a reversion toward some new dark age."[37]

Behind the appeal to the defensive theme stressed by German propagandists lay the assumption that a nation must make its decisions wholly upon the basis of what it considers to be its best interests. If a nation's activities cannot be restrained by a moral law, the nation in fact must be a law unto itself.[38] Secondly, the invasion of Belgium offended, however inconsistent, the traditional

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[34] Münsterberg, *The War and America,* pp. 4–5. See also Hugo Münsterberg, *The Peace and America,* New York, 1915, 181.

[35] *The Fatherland,* August 23, 1916, vol. V, no. 3, p. 36.

[36] Merle Curti *The Growth of American Thought,* 2nd Ed., New York, 1951, 623.

[37] Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought,* New York, 1956, 391–392.

[38] *Ibid.,* 391.

American suspicion of militarism and things military. Such a suspicion was observed as early as the eighteenth century by the French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville.[39] Some indication of the strength of this anti-militarist feeling may be seen by the difficulty which the "preparedness" movement encountered. The two chief champions of the movement, in its early stages, General Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt, won the day only through skillful leadership, ample financial backing, and the glamour of parades.[40] Evidence exists which shows that Viereck was cognizant of this failure, because he hastily revised the Belgium theme and redirected it toward the German-American element.

The die is cast, said *The Fatherland;* the most highly cultured people of all times are engaged in a death struggle with jealous and semi-barbaric foes. The death struggle between the Slav and the Teuton is not merely a struggle for territory or commercial supremacy as many superficial observers seem to believe, but a conflict of principles, "a struggle ultimately of the highest ideals known to the human race against the low and sordid aims of races merely veneered with culture."[41] Europe, then, was not waging a war against German imperialism, but against German culture; and it was perfectly plain to *The Fatherland* that German culture depended upon her military power. "Were it not for German militarism, German civilization would long since have been extirpated. For its protection it arose in a land which for centuries had been plagued by bands of robbers, as no other land had been."[42] The real causes for the war lay in the fact that England, "a nation of shop keepers," worshipped the god of materialism, while Germany steadily adhered to its ancient veneration of the eternal values of life. Consequently, "it should be the sacred duty of all thinking men to do everything possible to prevent the crippling or the downfall of the German Empire . . . in the interest of higher civilization . . . so that a world catastrophe may still be prevented."[43] The destruction of the German people

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[39] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* Oxford ed., London, 1953, 527.

[40] George E. Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement,* Madison, Wisconsin, 1947, 304–316; John M. Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt,* Cambridge, 1954, 155. For contemporary observations on Theodore Roosevelt and "preparedness," see *The Autobiography of William Allen White,* New York, 1946, 507.

[41] *The Fatherland,* August 24, 1941, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7.

[42] *Ibid.,* November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 4.

[43] *Ibid.,* August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 6–7.

would be a return to the Dark Ages—to a civilization that makes material values end in themselves.

> All Europe except Germany has been steadily sinking to a plane of crass materialism, which has been resisted successfully in the Fatherland by the vehement warnings of the best of the nation. In the case of England and France the degeneration has been so thorough-going that certain of their pseudo statesmen has [sic] betrayed Western culture to the Oriental. Germany may finally succumb, for she stands at bay to a yelling pack determined on her destruction. . . . Idealistic Germany, conscious of being the standard bearer of values that might easily be lost forever to civilization, could never tamely submit to become like, effeminate Italy, merely a Niobe of culture. Hence, no true friend of culture can view with approval or indifference the unparalleled crime against civilization involved in this ruthless advance of the Slav on the Teuton. The only ray of hope in the present emergency lies in the complete preparation of the powerful German nations for the struggle.[44]

The corollary to this defense-of-culture theme was usually a critical appraisal of American foreign policy, stressing American intervention in Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. History was used to equate the American seizure of California and Texas with the Belgium invasion. "In this respect," said *The Fatherland,* "the American eagle differs not a whit from the German eagle."[45]

The failure, of course, with this phase of German propaganda, was the fact that it was based upon the cultural forces prevalent in the *older* immigration. Until 1850 the German immigrants had taken the political and economic freedom of the country for granted.[46] To be sure, the early German immigrant had every intention of retaining Old-World customs and traditions.[47] But after 1850, a new type of German immigrant appeared on the American scene. The "forty-eighters" came to the United States after the collapse of the German revolution. They soon became caught up in the absorbent powers of the new land, and quickly began to integrate themselves into the realities of American life. "At no other period did America receive a wave of immigrants with so much political consciousness and idealism."[48] Thus, the

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[44] *Ibid., loc. cit.,* 7.

[45] *Ibid.,* August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 59.

[46] Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration; 1607–1860,* Cambridge, 1951, 148–149.

[47] Albert B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States,* 2 vols., New York, 1909, vol. II, 377–475.

[48] Dieter Cunz, "The German-Americans: Immigration and Integration," *Twenty-eighth Report of the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland,* Baltimore, 1953, 33.

new type of immigrant was more interested in social legislation, prohibition, woman's suffrage, and civil service reform, rather than directing all his energies to the strengthening of cultural bonds with the Fatherland.

The most colossal blunder committed by *The Fatherland,* however, was the condemnation of British materialism and the consequent exaltation of Germany's adherence to the development of the "higher life." The naturalized voter might be without funds or land, he might inhabit a slum tenement, but no matter how miserable his surroundings he was a capitalist at heart. As the foremost historian of American immigration has observed, "The hope that brought him across the Atlantic did not fail him; and the possession by others of wealth and leisure spurred him on to secure the same advantages for himself and his children."[49] The German immigrant never questioned the fundamentals of capitalism. He was a man of enterprise, determined to reap the harvest of a free economy. In short, he was more anxious to emulate American capitalists than to preserve the philosophy of Goethe or the music of Wagner.

Another avenue of attack used by German propagandists was a skillful exploitation of American colonial history and traditional anti-British sentiment. *The Fatherland* was careful to point out that British propaganda emanated from a "Tory" press. Even the new edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was denounced as "a distorted, insular, incomplete and aggressively British reference work, the use of which constituted a fatal intellectual danger to America."[50] Charles J. Hexamer, president of the National German-American Alliance, declared that the American nation should burn the Declaration of Independence as well as the Constitution. What was needed was, "a new Declaration of Independence of the American Press against the yoke of international English news service and against the dictation of England in our editorial sanctums."[51] The readers of *The Fatherland* were reminded that they were more completely under the domination of England than at any time since the Revolution, and practices which led to the War of 1812 were acquiesced in by the State Department.[52] *The Fatherland* stressed repeatedly the fact that America had rebelled

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49 Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History,* Cambridge, 1948, 85.

50 Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War,* 12.

51 *The Fatherland,* November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 7.

52 *Ibid.,* December 9, 1914, vol. I, no. 18, p. 9.

against England and not Germany. It was England who had flirted with the Southern Confederacy and attempted to ignore the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. Even in the Spanish-American War public opinion in England was bitter against the United States.[53] When England barred the International News Service and refused the latter both mail and cable facilities for news dispatches to America, *The Fatherland* exploited the American worship of a free press. This stupidity of the British, it said, "will lead to a new Declaration of Independence from Great Britain."[54] The most extravagant encomiums, of course, were reserved for the Revolutionary leaders.

A recurrent theme was that George Washington fought the same enemy against whom Germany was now fighting—an enemy who wantonly attacked the United States in 1812 and who looted and burned the White House. Washington, continued *The Fatherland,* along with many other patriots of the American Revolution, like Steuben, Muhlenberg, Herkimer, and Count von Wittgenstein, fought against the enemy who is Germany's enemy today. "Would George Washington, would Abraham Lincoln be found on the side of England against Germany, if they were alive today?" concluded the weekly.[55] *The Fatherland* further recalled to its readers that it had been Frederick the Great who had "alone recognized the United States of America as entitled to a place in the family of independent nations."[56] The speech of James Madison, made in June of 1812, in which he condemned Great Britain for interfering with the rights of American commerce and navigation led *The Fatherland* to comment that Great Britain was the same in 1916 as she was in 1812. "It is deplorable," continued the article, "that we do not have more of the Americans with red blood in their veins like President Madison today."[57]

The presidential campaign of 1916 was especially fertile for this exploitation of the Revolutionary War. The real interests and issues of the campaign had been side-stepped, declared *The Fatherland.* How much longer will we permit the British to blacklist our merchants, loot our mails and blockade our commerce with

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53 *Ibid.*, October 28, 1914, vol. I, no. 12, p. 8; November 25, 1915, vol. I, no. 16, p. 11; November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 194; October 25, 1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.

54 *Ibid.*, October 25, 1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.

55 *Ibid.*, December 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 21, p. 11.

56 *Ibid.*, November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, p. 6; August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 10.

57 *Ibid.*, November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 198.

neutral countries? it asked. But for the struggle of Americans of German descent to arouse the "spirit of '76," these issues would seem to have been as "dead as the mummy of Cleopatra." It was the "Minute Men" of 1916, added *The Fatherland,* who were struggling gallantly to uproot the British conspiracy and keep the real issues in the open.[58] Even the British, said the weekly, were beginning to realize that the opposition of the German-Americans "with sterling Americans of other stock in whom the spirit of 1776 still survives blasts her last hope of dragging the United States into the war on the side of the Allies."[59] Along with this latter theme usually went a praise for the famous German-American politician Carl Schurz and his emphasis on neutrality and avoidance of European conflicts.[60] The irony in this line of attack by the German propagandists lay in the fact that it appealed to a heritage in which the first generation had no part, and which was only dimly apparent to the second. Surely, Americanization was well under way, even though language and community customs were slow in disappearing. Clearly, the Revolutionary philosophy and the "spirit of '76" would appeal to a much later group of immigrants' descendents.

A more vigorous theme used by *The Fatherland* was the identification of Wall Street and England with a world-wide conspiracy to subvert American ideals. The war, said Viereck, benefited no one except England and Wall Street.[61] The attack usually centered on J. P. Morgan,[62] Elihu Root, and George H. Putnam. "Let it be remembered," said *The Fatherland,* "that Root and his Allies are seeking to carry out the terms of the secret treaty between this country and England. . . . Root and his Confederates are trying to deliver the United States bound hand in foot into the keeping of England."[63] For *The Fatherland,* the conspiracy motif could serve both in domestic and international politics which happened to be unfavorable to the course advocated by Viereck. Thus, New York City was described as a scene of a terrific war between

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58 *Ibid.,* November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 218; August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 58.
59 *Ibid.,* October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, pp. 170–171.
60 *Ibid.,* September 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 8, p. 118; October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, p. 170.
61 *Ibid.,* February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 26.
62 *Ibid.,* August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 6.
63 *Ibid.,* December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, p. 329; August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 53; August 16, 1916, vol. V, no. 2, p. 21; March 7, 1917, vol. VI, no. 5, p. 73; February 14, 1917, vol. VI no. 2, p. 26.

capital and labor. The Wall Street banking group was portrayed as seeking to crush unionism as it sought to involve the United States into war with Germany.[64] When Woodrow Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, Viereck urged his readers "who refuse to participate in the desperate conspiracy hatched in London" to write to the President and urge neutrality.[65] A German should never forget, explained *The Fatherland,* that the United States was ruled from London.[66]

Again, it is apparent that German propaganda had failed to advance with the growth of American political thought. The conspiracy theme had been much used by the agrarian Populists of the 1890's, many of whom actually believed in a vast conspiracy of a financial group operating between London and Wall Street.[67] But by 1914, the philosophy of Populism was moribund. The advent of Wilson's "New Freedom" meant the rooting out of all evil within finance capitalism—hence, Wilson's trust busting. For the German propagandists to have centered their artillery on such a *réchauffé* of past agrarian contentions as an international economic "conspiracy" betokened their vast ignorance of the fact the Progressivism had done much to re-establish free enterprise.[68]

An even more difficult obstacle for German propaganda to overcome was the common American belief that Germany's political system was undemocratic. *The Fatherland* attempted to obviate this ideological stumbling block by attacking not only the two American political parties,[69]but by criticizing the theoretical foundations of the American political system as well. America's political system was called "the worst and clumsiest system in the world."[70] On the other hand, said Viereck, the war had realtered the internal life of Germany, as expressed in her political parties. The Conservative, Liberal, and Social Democratic parties were described as being in a state of evolution, ushering in progressive forces, so that when peace returned, "a liberal reconstruction of national life" was anticipated for a new democratic, and free Germany.[71] What

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64 *Ibid.*, September 20, 1916, vol. V, no. 7, p. 102.
65 *Ibid.*, February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 19; September 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 8, p. 122.
66 *Ibid.*, August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 4–5.
67 Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform,* New York, 1955, 73–74.
68 Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910–1917,* New York, 1954, chap. IX, *passim.*
69 *The Fatherland,* March 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 6, p. 83.
70 *Ibid.*, December 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 19, p. 293.
71 *Ibid.*, April 25, 1917, vol. VI, no. 12, pp. 196–197.

was the secret of Germany's progress? asked *The Fatherland.* The answer, instinctively known to every true German, was simply that in the Fatherland the will of the people was instantly ascertained and put into action by a single, responsible government. The United States, continued Viereck, had already experimented with the same governmental principle without realizing that it was the very principle making for German progress. This system, continued *The Fatherland,* had no name, but could be called a "polyocracy." Because of its complexity, this system was imperfectly understood even by the German people. Thus, according to *The Fatherland,* the German Empire was not a monarchy but a confederation. The Kaiser was nothing more than "a psychological emperor, and not a real emperor."[72] In reality, the German Empire was a Republic, with its real power located in the will of the people as represented by the Bundesrat. The Kaiser actually had very little power.

> This misapprehension of his real position is the source of much error in judging Germany's relations to the country. Bismarck, too, looms much larger in America than he does in Germany, while the Bundesrat, the true power of the empire, is only known as a legislative term.[73]

The secret, then, of German progress was to be found in the powers of the Bundesrat, in which were united the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. The American government could benefit if it too would establish a Bundesrat. Such a system was vastly superior to the American system because the will of the people was always carried out. "In short, the Bundesrat system may be termed a polyocracy, or a government of the many. Essentially, it is an aristocracy on good behavior, an aristocracy holding its job at the pleasure of a democracy."[74]

This attempt to dispel the charges of an undemocratic government characterized by the autocratic will of the Kaiser had little effect on the German-Americans. There were various causes for Old-World emigration, and, certainly, the political factor cannot be denied. But the freedom sought by the immigrant was primarily economic freedom. The aspiration of the rank and file of immigrants was to take advantage of the opportunities of free enterprise and, in turn, to preserve the fruits of such an economic system. Hence, the political system they found in America (which operated so as to ensure the continuance of the *economic* system) was the

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72 *Ibid.*, January 13, 1915, vol. I, no. 23, pp. 6–9.
73 *Ibid., loc. cit.*, 9.
74 *Ibid.*, January 20, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, pp. 8–9.

one they wished to embrace. As a result, the weight of immigrant political influence had been felt on the side of conservatism. They had little desire to level down the gradations of society. Usually, they were democrats, but only in the sense that "they believed that the American brand of government would facilitate the acquisition of property and position and would protect them in what they had acquired."[75] Thus, the immigrant was quite satisfied with the American political system as he found it and had little desire to change its form.

Various other devices were used by *The Fatherland* to further the German cause. Germany was pointed to as a great humanitarian state, and the work of Dr. Rudoff Veretow in pathology was used again and again to exemplify Germany's altruism.[76] Germany was portrayed as the champion of humanity, a champion who believed in the "ethical justification of a sacred war."[77] To a religious nation, *The Fatherland* declared that next to the United States "the Church in Germany has made the greatest progress in modern times."[78] When an explosion destroyed an estimated $7,000,000 worth of munitions in New York Harbor, *The Fatherland* was disposed to see "the Hand of God" in the affair. It was significant, said the weekly, that the force of the explosion shattered every window in the bombproof office of J. P. Morgan. Nor was it without importance that the schrapnel from the explosion "severely shook the Statue of Liberty to its very foundations."[79] In defense of the German submarine attacks on American commerce, *The Fatherland* revealed that the English had employed Americans to sail on English vessels for $27.50 a month.[80] Moreover, *The Fatherland* recalled, during the War of 1812 the British "hand-sank" American shipping, disregarding international law.[81] Finally, the German submarine was pictured as actually helping American commerce, for it was destroying English commercial supremacy. Thus, the German U-boat was likened to the Southern parasite, "in that slowly and inexorably it has consumed the strength of Britain's economic fabric."[82] However, the most important of all propaganda efforts

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[75] Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, 80–82.

[76] *The Fatherland*, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 6–7; September 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 67.

[77] *Ibid.*, September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 14.

[78] *Ibid.*, November 25, 1914, vol. I, no. 16, p. 8.

[79] *Ibid.*, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 10.

[80] *Ibid.*, November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 216.

[81] *Ibid.*, September 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 71.

[82] *Ibid.*, September 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 83. See also August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 51, and August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 9.

was that of furthering the cleavage between the immigrant groups and native Americans.[83]

The German-American, said *The Fatherland,* looked upon Germany as his mother and America as his bride. Consequently, he was as proud of his mother as he was of his bride. "His attitude toward his bride is not determined by the demands of his mother."[84] German propaganda thus concentrated on exploiting the cultural ties between the German-American and his forefathers in the Old World. "I can assure you," said *The Fatherland,* "that the German cause can be greatly assisted in other countries, especially in America, if one always proudly acknowledges one's German sentiments, supports the German ideal of culture, and especially promotes the preservation of the German language."[85]

On his trip abroad in 1916, Louis Viereck, the staff correspondent, commented on the similarity between Austrians in Europe and the Germans in America. Even the region of the Danube reminded him of the Mississippi basin. His argument seemed to be that, after all, the Germans in Europe and America were members of the same race, and had preserved their language and national traits. Moreover, in addition to the common language and customs, the Lutheran church bound the German-Americans to their mother country. "As good Hungarian citizens, as the Saxons undoubtedly are, they will never let any one rob them of their traditional German traits, as well as German customs *to be found all over the world.*"[86] The implications of this propaganda are obvious. Like the "good Hungarian citizens," the German-American should not have abandoned his nationality, let alone his customs and language.

The duty of the German-American was elaborated by the National German-American Alliance at the Washington conference of January 30, 1915. It was said that evidently it was "the mission of the German-Americans to bring their adopted country, misled and misrepresented by its newspapers, back to authentic Americanism."[87] Consequently, the duty of the German-American was to make himself a factor in the United States.[88] German-American sympathizers were encouraged to organize and to send speakers to every city and town. Local German societies were advised to rent theaters and

[83] von Papen, *Memoirs,* 35.
[84] *The Fatherland,* October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, p. 164.
[85] *Ibid.,* November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, pp. 11–12.
[86] *Ibid.,* December 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 18, pp. 277–278.
[87] *Ibid.,* February 10, 1915, vol. II, no. 1, pp. 10–11; December 2, 1914, vol. I, no. 17, p. 5.
[88] *Ibid.,* November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, p. 14.

hire speakers to "counteract the influence of the English press." The American people should be "educated" to the true causes and meaning of the war. "Organize," warned *The Fatherland,* "before it is too late."[89] Pamphlets should be circulated for distribution. Singlehanded, little could be accomplished, said *The Fatherland;* but, by uniting local associations the sympathizers of Germany could exercise the balance of power and bring the American people to their senses.[90] The national consciousness of the Germans in the United States, said *The Fatherland,* was one of the most significant results of the war. The latest sign was the founding of the German Glee Club at Cornell University. This Glee Club, said the weekly, "has now become the nucleus of an intense German spirit," and it urged the movement to spread to other universities.[91] *The Fatherland,* however, was more interested in the immigrant groups.

For the benefit of the Irish immigrants, *The Fatherland* declared that Germany would not give up Belgium until England relinquished Ireland.[92] Germany's chief aim in the war was the freedom of the seas, and this freedom depended on the deliberation of Ireland. *The Fatherland,* continued the weekly, did not discover the plight of Ireland until 1913; consequently, she could not come to an understanding with England until the fate of Ireland was settled. If the Irish Revolution should ever break out again, Germany would not only recognize Ireland's independence but would also send money and men. But, more important, the Irish struggle was of special significance to the German-Americans because "if Germany were crushed, the hopes of Ireland would be crushed likewise."

> If Ireland remained in fetters, our hopes for Germany would be blighted. We are one with the Irish. The Irish are one with us. . . . *The Fatherland* and its readers feel that the cause of the Central Powers and the cause of Irish freedom are one.[93]

Even the Jewish element was not ignored. *The Fatherland* reminded its Jewish readers that the Russian Czar had taken justice, law, and property away from his Jewish population. On the other hand, in Germany, the Jew had been accorded every privilege and right offered to Christians. One thing was certain, said *The Fatherland,* and that was that "the Jews throughout the world are a unit

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89 *Ibid.,* September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 10.
90 *Ibid.,* January 27, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, p. 3; November 25, 1914, vol. I, no. 16, p. 9.
91 *Ibid.,* December 16, 1914, vol. I, no. 19, p. 7.
92 *Ibid.,* December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, pp. 346–347.
93 *Ibid.,* October 4, 1914, vol. V, no. 9, p. 138; August 16, 1916, vol. V, no. 2, p. 26.

in their opposition to Russia."[94] *The Fatherland* hoped, therefore, that by appealing to the ethnic loyalties of the Irish and the Jews it could create a unified pressure group within the United States, unfavorable to the Allied cause.

The futility of this attempt to solidify the immigrant elements in the United States lay, of course, in the belief held by the German propagandists that the German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants were similar to "the good citizens" of German descent in Hungary. Despite, however, the antagonism between the immigrants and a certain element of native Americans, the "melting pot" continued to function. The American offspring of the older generation turned their once powerful group-consciousness into more nationalistic channels. The sons of the immigrants had no memory of Old-World places, causes, or of village solidarity. The old affiliations of the German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants had no meaning for this second generation, save as a kind of patriotism. Gradually, traditional customs were lost; the lines in the immigrant press concerning village life slowly faded, then disappeared completely, replaced by news of the immigrant's new home. Parents found it more convenient to send their children to public schools. The immigrant theatre also vanished from the American scene, irretrievably supplanted by the new (and national) medium of the motion picture.

Thus, in these, and in numerous other ways the immigrants were adjusting to the American environment as the American environment was, in turn, growing accustomed to their presence. This assimilative process which the immigrants experienced has been well analyzed by Oscar Handlin:

> The old coat disintegrates. Its rugged homespun had come along; its solid virtues had taken the strain of the full way since the old tailor had put his labored stitches into it. The new is one of many, indistinguishable from the rest. Cheaper, it transforms the wearer; coming out the factory gate he is now also one of many, indistinguishable from the rest.[95]

Thus, the ultimate failure of German propaganda was the failure to recognize the influence of the American "melting pot" and its ability to assimilate the one into many.

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[94] *Ibid.*, August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 14; September 6, 1914, vol. I, no. 5, p. 3; September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 11.

[95] Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted*, New York, 1951, 196–197.

Book Reviews

Gabriel Richard, Frontier Ambassador. By Frank B. Woodford and Albert Hyma. Detroit (Wayne State University Press), 1958. Pp. xxviii, 160. Illustrated. $4.50.

This work of two distinguished scholars is certainly refreshing among the biographies of American clerics. In fact the reviewer would like to nominate it for a Pulitzer Prize. Professors Woodford and Hyma summoned their highest gifts to produce a model of the art of historiography. The assembling and marshalling of materials matches a writer craftsmanship of high quality. In the approach, and preceptivity of judgment both as to episode and to overall location of the subject, a discerning reader will discover both a story of moment and an ornament to the most demanding library. Striking are the pains taken for exactness, sharp delineation, absolute fairness, and full appreciation of genuine worth.

Gabriel Richard played a part of no small measure in building our early Northwest. Author opinion has it this way: "Of all the pioneers [of Michigan], he is, perhaps, the best remembered; certainly the most beloved." Born in the Gironde of France in 1767, Richard emerged into manhood and priesthood as the Revolution lit the twin flames of ardor and passion. Not by his choice—for he would gladly have gone down with other heroes—but at the direction of his Sulpician superiors, he took ship at Honfleur on April 9, 1792, to follow his predecessor missioners of the preceding centuries. For the next forty years he would fulfill his title of "Frontier Ambassador."

A scholar himself, self-destined for professional life, he found his first situation in the area recently won by George Rogers Clark. In 1798 Bishop Carroll ordered him to the Detroit region, his headquarters from then onward in the dual apostolate of pastor and maker of a society. In both he served with spotless sacerdotal reputation, though he twice knew what is meant to look out from behind the bars, once as a locked-up enemy of the British in the War of 1812, again as a priest convicted for doing his duty in publicly ousting a member of his congregation for notorious marital infidelity. No short account can do justice to his contribution in the making of America, nor explain his enduring honor among his people.

For long the only clergyman in the entire territory between Lake Huron and the Mississippi, he did his religious duty almost as a matter of course. Every Sunday for years he lectured to large groups of people outside his own faith. Schools were to him the basis for both heaven and earth. There he generated the parochial system and the district public system. He is honored as co-founder and—for years—teacher, and vice-president of the legally organized university of Michigan, at first called by his co-worker, Representative Woodbridge, the "Catholepistemiad." In the fire of 1805 that wiped out the little city, he led the forces that saved the people and restored the municipality. When war came he stoutly refused foreign allegiance. Facing Indian threats, he won over the Redman to friendship by help in trouble and by his schools and priestly dedication. The university story in itself is a saga of understanding and energy.

When in 1823 he broke down his distaste and agreed to run for election as Delegate to Congress, his motive was to unite the French settlers or *Canadiens* with the westward-moving frontier. In that campaign he learned how unfair competitors can be, but he held to his aim and won such benefits as land-distribution and construction of important roads, particularly over the old Sauk trail to Chicago. The Labadie incident caused him great unhappiness, but again he stuck to justice and constitutional principle and preferred jail to paying damages assessed at the instance of a famous name that quit his parish in a pique. Denied the bishopric, though it had been at first awarded by papal decision, he refused to stop his forward motion, and his last service for the cholera-stricken populace brought him to death on September 13, 1832.

The printers have given Richard a highly artistic setting. A large page, seven by ten, set with Linotype Granjon and Bulmer Display faces, and an imposing group of engravings and other illustrative material done in offset, present the reader with a gem of typography. Bibliographical citations will attract a student to go further in this revealing narrative. The index is meticulous, and thorough. And, for one who wants to know where he is as the story moves along, good maps identify each central topic of geography.

W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.

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From Community to Metropolis. A Biography of São Paulo, Brazil. By Richard M. Morse. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1958. Pp. xxiii, 341. Illustrated. $7.50.

This is an elaborated, English version of Professor Morse's study published in Portuguese translation in 1954 for the occasion of the fourth centennial celebration of the founding of São Paulo. The author began his work in Brazil in 1947 and after long research concludes that "the fastest growing city in the world" should not be called "the Chicago of South America" nor even likened to Chicago except in some very superficial aspects. Despite its remarkable growth in population to more than 3,000,000, its dynamic progress in building, and its leadership in industry in all Latin America, São Paulo is different from all other cities from a sociological viewpoint, while in spirit it has emerged as a nucleated metropolis, fundamentally agrarian and patriarchal, with a distinctive culture that can be characterized only as Paulista.

To arrive at his major conclusion Dr. Morse had to reach many minor conclusions, twenty-one, to be exact, which became the subjects of the twenty-one chapters and the reasons why São Paulo is so different. Such individual studies required an enormous amount of reading to gather evidence for his verdict. The evidence is generously quoted in the text and summarized in a selective bibliography of thirty-two pages chiefly of source materials. Besides the written authorities Dr. Morse calls upon his own observations and conversations with the city's leaders in his effort to comprehend their minds and aims. All the research was done according to pattern to discover why such great industrial and cultural progress could

have been made by the metropolis "within a plantation economy, within a Roman Catholic, patriarchal, and tradition-bound culture, and in a country indifferently blessed with the resources for industrial development. . . ." (Introduction, xiii)

The chapters are broken into four parts. Part I describes briefly the colonial community of São Paulo from the time of its founding by the Jesuits in 1554 through the period of national independence under Dom Pedro I. Part II, reveals the escape of São Paulo from community status and self-subsistent economy to cityhood, especially after Dom Pedro II became Emperor. There was a cultural quickening, some material progress, and the rise of the coffee industry in the state of São Paulo with all the premonitions of eventual monoculture status, not only for the city and state but for the whole of Brazil. Part III brings out, chiefly by quotations, the development of the railroads, the era of positivism, the economic and physical expansion of the city and state, the coming of the immigrants, and the middle class life. Part IV, in five chapters, describes "The Metropolitan Temper," "Industrialism," "The Metropolis as Polis," "Modernism," and "The Anatomy of the Metropolis."

The book has value as a pattern of study which can be followed by researchers preparing biographies of other cities. It contains also a wealth of information for the general reader. It will stimulate discussion and interpretations of the data gathered over the years by Professor Morse. Scholars will be happy with the bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter, which give descriptions of author's and materials, and with the long selective bibliography mentioned above. The index and illustrations are quite satisfactory.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

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Efforts of Raymond Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917–1933. By Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1958. Pp. ix, 225. Paper cover, $2.50.

Historians and publicists have already contributed a mass of literature concerning Soviet Russia and its many facets. However, there is still much that can be done to remove the Soviet Union from the category of an enigma. Perhaps it is in the area of American-Russian relations that further research and study can contribute most to a better understanding of the Soviet Union and the current struggle between the West and the Soviet bloc of nations.

This need is partly met by the scholarly work of Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger. The author makes no attempt to write a definitive biography of Raymond Robins, a central figure in American-Russian relations from the administration of Woodrow Wilson to that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On the contrary, she attempts to present "an exposition of Robin's efforts, after World War I, to bring about the United States recognition of Soviet Russia and the outlawry of war by international agreement."

Raymond Robins, social worker, religious enthusiast, and politician, was a self-made man who championed the cause of the poor and down-

trodden. He was an idealist motivated by the highest ideals of human service. In his efforts to serve his fellow man he was not hindered by racial or national barriers. Following his appointment to the American Red Cross Commission sent to Russia by President Woodrow Wilson in July, 1917, he seized the opportunity to be of service to the Russian people, "to help them find their way from Czarism to democracy and a better standard of human living." His unrestrainable idealism accounted for much of his efforts toward the recognition of Russia and the outlawry of war. It was his burning ambition to eliminate social injustice of all kinds from the face of the earth. He was a visionary who believed (rather naively) that Lenin's program advocating the establishment of a new and worldwide, classless society, would ultimately culminate in the establishment of a better standard of living for the Russian masses, a type of utopia.

Robins' efforts toward the United States recognition of Russia included his attempts to influence presidents, congressmen, and the general public. He was tireless and relentless in his campaign to influence the administrations of Presidents Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge to establish American economic relations with the Soviet regime. Such cooperation, he hoped, would be a stepping stone to the complete recognition of Soviet Russia. However, his efforts and pleas did not produce the desired results. Meanwhile, a combination of circumstances caused Robins to lose some of his enthusiasm for United States recognition of Russia after January, 1924, only to be revived in 1933, at the time of his second trip to the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to ascertain to what extent Robins was influential in the recognition of Russia in November, 1933. He did present arguments in favor of recognition to members of President Roosevelt's cabinet and the "brain trust." Furthermore, Roosevelt did grant Robins an interview before the arrival in Washington of the Soviet foreign commissar, Maxim Litvinov. However, the President had made the decision to recognize Soviet Russia prior to conferring with Robins. Thus it would be an exaggeration to conclude that Robins played the decisive role in this change in United States policy toward Russia.

Robins was also one of the foremost peace advocates of the 1920's. He believed that outlawry of war was something to offer the American people in lieu of the League of Nations. However, it is interesting to observe that he had no part in the initiation of the Kellogg-Briant Pact which was regarded as the climax of the movement.

Apparently, there was no direct connection between Robins work toward outlawry on the one hand, and recognition of Russia on the other. The author was unable to uncover evidence to support the suspicion that Robins and the advocates of recognition were using the outlawry of war as a facade behind which to maneuver in order to achieve their real objective—recognition of the Soviet regime.

Sister Meiburger has made an excellent contribution to a better understanding of the various forces at work—pro and con—concerning the belated acceptance of an historical fact, namely, the Soviet regime in Russia.

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Notes and Comments

A call for help comes from Dr. J. Leon Helguera. He has been awarded a grant from the John Boulton Foundation of Caracas, Venezuela, for the purpose of research in the sources of Venezuelan history in the United States and Canada. This Foundation has in project in an advanced stage the compilation and publication of all the extant manuscript correspondence and papers of the leaders of the revolt against Spain in the northern provinces of South America—Francisco de Miranda, Simón Bolivár, Antonio José de Sucre, and José Antonio Páez. Confronted with the enormous task of gathering the manuscripts which are scattered over the hemisphere in the original or in copy, Dr. Helguera asks the cooperation of archivists, librarians, scholars and private collectors, who might know of the location of the desired materials. Communications should be addressed to him at Post Office Box 5243, State College Station, Raleigh, North Carolina.

* * * *

"The French Jesuits and the Idea of the Noble Savage," by George R. Healy of the Bates College faculty, is an interesting study appearing in the April, 1958, *The William and Mary Quarterly.* In their attacks upon the existence of God and upon Christianity the French rationalists of the eighteenth century argued that men in their natural state, primitive men, could get along well enough without the encumbrances of European culture and religion. As proof they pointed to the American Indians, whom they glamorized as brave, noble, and physically perfect, even as was done in the Leather Stocking Series and is done at present in Western novels and in Western television shows. Mr. Healy finds that while the Jesuit missionaries of New France, living amid the squalor of the Indian villages and suffering death and torture at the hands of savages, did not subscribe to the "nobility" of the savage from the natural point of view, they did consider him as a human, with a soul, and therefore noble in the eyes of God. The *philosophes,* however, used parts of the voluminous Jesuit writings on the Indians to establish the myth of the noble Indian.

* * * *

"Edmundo O'Gorman and the Idea of America," by Edwin C. Rozwenc of Amherst College, appeared in *American Quarterly,* Summer, 1958. This is a penetrating article revolving around the question: What is America and What is an American? First Mr. Rozwenc indicates how Frederick Jackson Turner's hypothesis pointed to the significance of the frontier and influenced all historical thinking in this country but failed to answer the question. Herbert E. Bolton in his famous "Epic of Greater America" extended the name to all the lands and islands of North and South America and included all peoples of the continents among Americans. O'Gorman, the Mexican thinker and historian, saw a relation between Bolton's idea of America and Hegel's "humiliating thesis" on America and has taken up cudgels against both Bolton and Hegel in his own inimitable way. The extent of O'Gorman's attack and its validity is well explained in this article beginning with Columbus's idea of the New World, Vespucci's concept and Waldseemüller's christening.

* * * *

The *Journal of the History of Ideas,* June, 1958, carried among other interesting articles two on Charles Darwin. Maurice Mandelbaum's "Darwin's Religious Views" traces the evolution of the scientist's beliefs from the strict orthodoxy of the Anglican Church to a helpless agnostic state of mind, stranded somewhere between the arguments of Theists and Atheists. Alvar Ellegard in "Public Opinion and the Press: Reactions to Darwinism," by a novel approach endeavors to estimate the actual percentage of the reaction of people and press to Darwin's *Origin of the Species* for the twelve years following its publication in 1859. By one method of computation he finds that 46% were against Darwinism, and by another method 58% were against Darwinism.

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Of interest to those investigating the Indian place-names is *Wheeling: A West Virginia Place-Name of Indian Origin,* by Delf Norona. This is a lithoprinted, paper-bound brochure of thirty-eight pages. It is Publication No. 1 of Oglebay Institute, Mansion

Museum, Oglebay Park, Wheeling, West Virginia, and Publication No. 4 of the West Virginia Archeological Society, Moundsville, West Virginia. It may be obtained at either of these addresses. After citing numerous authorities on the early site of Wheeling and on Indian linguistics, Mr. Norona concludes that the name is from the Indian Weel-ink or Weel-unk, meaning "The place where a [human] head is located." The last two pages of the brochure on "Wheeling and Ranonouara," are by M. H. Deardorff, who explains the Huron, Mohawk and Onondaga words for the place.

* * * *

Authors of Liberty, by John Coleman, Illustrated by C. Edward Beach, was published in the late 1958 by Vantage Press. Mr. Coleman as a journalist, a columnist, and most recently on radio programs, has constantly endeavored to bring about "a better understanding of the American way of life." In this book of 244 pages he has brought together in informal papers many of the "national shrines, sanctuaries, monuments, and memorials," each introduced by an eloquent quotation. Among the forty-eight more important illustrations of the American way of life selected by Mr. Coleman we find: "The First Americans," the Indians whose memorial is the chiseled figure of Crazy Horse; Williamsburg, Mt. Vernon, Monticello, and the battlefields from Yorktown to the present; the American immortals in the Hall of Fame; the national parks; the national athletic heros; the leaders of industry and science; the democratic traditions; the underworld; and the circus. Under these general headings practically every phase of American life and all significant sites are mentioned. The list price is $3.75.

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William Hickling Prescott: Authors' Agent

As a centennial tribute to Prescott, this article is an excursion into mid-nineteenth century American intellectual history, wherein the prominent writer, as he aids fellow American authors, contributes to the internationalization of the nascent American literature. Before his death on January 28, 1859, in the years of his literary maturity, while the public was avidly reading his multivolume histories and his publishers impatiently awaited his unfinished manuscripts, ever generous William Hickling Prescott repeatedly assisted friends desirous of marketing their literary wares.

The aid which he extended Madame Calderón de la Barca was but the logical outcome of Prescott's continuing concern about that lady's knowledge of Mexico. They had been friends in Boston before Scotch-born Frances Inglis had married Spanish diplomat Angel Calderón de la Barca, likewise before Prescott had seized upon the conquest of Mexico as his own special historical theme. Hence it was natural for the Boston writer to keep in touch with so charming a female correspondent once she moved over the terrain connected with his historical protagonist Hernando Cortés.

One of many Spaniards overjoyed at Prescott's pursuit of Spanish historical themes, Angel Calderón de la Barca was himself dedicated to furthering the Bostonian's search for manuscripts, illustrations, and scholarly connections.[1] As Angel's wife, Fanny would have assisted Prescott; as the historian's personal friend, she had added reason for identifying herself with his projects.

[1] Roger Wolcott (ed.), *The Correspondence of William Hickling Prescott 1833–1847*, Boston and New York, 1925, 24, 84, 92–93, 111, 113. The diplomat's intended translations of successive works by Prescott never materialized.

With long, warm friendly letters of Prescott and both Calderóns moving as regularly as the mails permitted between Boston and Mexico City, it soon became apparent that Fanny Calderón's range of interests and her colorful and engaging accounts, compounded of history and geography as well as contemporary society, could supplement Prescott's own knowledge of Mexico in such fashion as to enrich his detail-laden writing.

On August 15, 1840, by which time the Calderóns had spent eight months in Mexico and Prescott more than two and a half years on the conquest of Mexico, the author put a series of queries to the diplomat's lady:

> By the bye, will you be good enough to inform me whether there are any descendants of Montezuma or of the Tezcucan line of monarchs now living in Mexico? Should you visit Tezcuco I hope you will give me some account of the appearance of things there. And I wish you would tell me what kind of trees are found on the table land and in the valley. In describing the march of the Spaniards I am desirous to know what was the the appearance of the country through which they passed. . . .

After imaginatively spinning himself onto the Mexican scene, the color-conscious writer from the far northern clime, especially intrigued by the *tierra caliente,* continued, "Is not the road bordered with flowers and the trees bent under a load of parasitical plants of every hue and odour? I should like to get a peep into this paradise."[2]

Invited to do so, as the historian refused to accede to repeated urgings to visit Mexico and see things for himself, Fanny Calderón penned the phrases that gave Prescott the desired peep, along with much else that made Mexico more meaningful to the chair-borne traveler of Boston.

"As for the appearance of the country in the tierra caliente," she replied, "you may boldly dip your pen in the most glowing colours. . . ."[3] In addition to endorsing Prescott's disposition to color, she also supplied him with infinite detail.

"Many thanks to you, my dear Madame Calderón, for . . . the rich description you have given me . . . ," he countered. "It was what I wanted."[4] In certain passages of Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico* one meets Fanny's contributions.[5]

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[2] *Ibid.*, 150.
[3] *Ibid.*, 169-170.
[4] *Ibid.*, 186.
[5] William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico,* 3 vols., New York, 1843, I, 5–9 342; III, 98–99, 332.

In such fashion a well known author became aware of the powers of observation and the literary skill of a friendly correspondent, who in one particularly rambling epistle had declared, "I am afraid you will think I am going to write you a volume, upon the Mexican manners and customs. . . ."[6] Perhaps it was then, possibly earlier, surely not much later, that Prescott came to expect a volume from Fanny's pen.

In addition to those addressed to him, Prescott was aware of Fanny Calderón's letters to her family in the United States. What the letters had meant to him and to them might, it was conjectured, be converted into an interesting and instructive experience for a larger, less intimate audience, the reading public. It required some effort to convert the private letters into public reading material, but such did occur largely because Prescott "strongly recommended that they should be given to the world."[7]

The third logical step for the man who first had partially inspired the letter writing and then had insisted upon publication was that of helping to find a publisher. In Boston this was a routine matter, with an arrangement speedily worked out with Little, Brown and Company, the recently-founded firm that was happily issuing edition after edition of Prescott's *Ferdinand and Isabella.*[8]

While the American edition of the Calderón letters was being readied for the public, the search for an English publisher got underway. In a day in which American authors dedicated special attention to the matter of winning European approbation, such effort was especially to be expected for Madame Calderón's manuscript in consideration of her own British background and Prescott's established reputation abroad. If satisfaction with his American publisher explains the submission of Madame Calderón's manuscript to Little, Brown and Company, it was dissatisfaction with his English publisher that caused him to ignore Richard Bentley at this time.

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[6] Wolcott, *Correspondence,* 133.

[7] Madame Calderón de la Barca (Henry Baerlein, ed.), *Life in Mexico during a Residence of Two Years in that Country,* New York, [1931], xxiv.

[8] Between August, 1838, and late 1842 this Boston publisher had issued seven printings of Prescott's work. For the sequence of Prescott's own publications, see the present writer's *William Hickling Prescott: An Annotated Bibliography of Published Works,* Washington, Library of Congress, 1958; for Prescott's relations with his publishers, see the present writer's *Prescott and His Publishers,* Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1959.

Having met Charles Dickens in Boston early in June, 1842, on which occasion Prescott's suspicions regarding Bentley were enlarged and Dickens' offer of assistance in publishing circles was extended,[9] it was not unnatural for the historian to turn to the novelist. After identifying Fanny Calderón, describing her Mexican experience and evaluating her writing, Prescott wrote, "The favour I have to ask of you is that you will allow me to send her manuscript to you, and that you will offer it to a responsible London publisher to print on the best terms he will offer." Prescott hoped that near simultaneous publication in England and America might come early in 1843.[10]

The complete freedom of action accorded Dickens in the overture of late August was maintained in Prescott's mid-autumn communication. The American would willingly confirm any publishing arrangement that the Englishman might make for the Calderón manuscript.[11] On December 1, 1842, Prescott sent Dickens a prepublication copy of the text of the first volume, with all of the second volume promised by the beginning of 1843.

With the author's name concealed and only her initials given, a concession to her husband's insistence upon the demands of diplomatic etiquette, Prescott's signed preface played a more significant role than usual in recommending the work to the public. The presumed power of Prescott's modestly phrased one page endorsement is evident in words which he addressed to Dickens: "The publishers may make use of the Preface in advertising the book. . . . They will do so here."[12]

As he forwarded the remainder of the Calderón manuscript to Dickens later in December, Prescott indicated that "Now that I have read the book through more thoroughly I think it must have success."[13] At the end of January, 1843, Prescott informed Dickens that he would be happy to receive any sums that Chapman & Hall, the English publisher of her work, might have for Madam Calderón. As for the American reception of the travel book, the Bostonian reported: "It has had an excellent sale here. . . ."[14]

London, likewise, could report the favorable reception of the book, by both reviewers and reading public. In early March, as

9 Wolcott, *Correspondence*, 309–310.
10 *Ibid.*, 315–316.
11 Memo dated November 14, 1842, of letter from Prescott to Dickens, William Hickling Prescott Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society (hereinafter cited as P–MHS).
12 Wolcott, *Correspondence*, 323.
13 *Ibid.*, 328.
14 *Ibid.*, 329.

Chapman & Hall paid Madame Calderón, via Prescott, the twenty-five pounds agreed upon for the early copy of the American edition, the London publisher expressed two wishes, neither of which materialized: another work from the Calderón pen and an opportunity to publish Prescott in England.[15]

Meanwhile there was one more assist that Prescott could give Fanny Calderón's literary labor: he could review it in a major publication. Although the tempo of his own labors had increased and his outlook had so changed as to consider review writing an utterly worthless endeavor, Prescott seized the opportunity "to give the work a life here."[16] The Boston-based *North American Review,* foremost literary organ in America and the publication in which virtually all of Prescott's onetime welter of reviews had appeared, was the ideal medium. For the January, 1843, issue, which appeared simultaneously with Fanny's book—just as an earlier issue had perfectly paralleled and extensively reviewed Prescott's first book in January, 1838—Prescott composed a review of more than thirty pages. A treatise on travel literature in general and Calderón's *Life in Mexico* in particular, it was a statement of the prejudices and inabilities of most such authors and praise of the understanding and abilities of the author of *Life in Mexico.* Numerous and lengthy quotations were offered, the better to support the reviewer's enthusiasm, illustrate the book's nature, and whet the reader's appetite. Apologetically concluding his essay with the hope that he had indicated the wealth and variety of the work, Prescott insisted that it contained the best spirited portraiture of Mexican society to be found in a travel book.[17]

From beginning to end, Prescott had done everything he could to assist Madame Calderón de la Barca with the publication of *Life in Mexico.* The verdict of history so heartily endorses the worth of the work[18] that appreciation also is due him without whose efforts it probably might never have materialized.

* * *

Six years later Prescott was at the height of his fame: his *Conquest of Mexico* had appeared in December, 1843, the potpourri

15 Chapman & Hall to Prescott, March 3, 1843, P–MHS.
16 Wolcott, *Correspondence,* 329.
17 [William H. Prescott], "Madame Calderón's Life in Mexico," *North American Review,* LVI (January, 1843), 137–170.
18 Reprinted, abridged, and translated repeatedly in the century since its initial appearance, *Life in Mexico* has known and continues to know an appeal unrivalled by any other travel account of independent Mexico.

of his literary essays and extended review articles had become a book in 1845 and two years later, on June 22, 1847, his *Conquest of Peru* had reached the hands of the reading public. Acclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic, with his works translated into several languages, Prescott took a brief rest from the literary labors that had consumed his attention almost uninterruptedly for two decades and in the course of early 1849 again took occasion to peddle the penned product of one of his friends.

Young Samuel Eliot was a Bostonian with multiple claims upon the attention of William Hickling Prescott. Himself a graduate of Harvard, Eliot was son of William Havard Eliot and nephew of Samuel Atkins Eliot, both of whom were and had been literary and social intimates of Prescott since the days of the founding of Club back in 1818.[19] Possessed of literary interests which included a projected multi-volume history of liberty, young Eliot, in his late twenties, became the object of Prescott's special attention when, in 1849, the first part of his history was ready for publication.

With the passage of years that had included the release in England of four of his own works through the house of Richard Bentley, much of the disgruntlement that had punctuated Prescott's earlier relations with his English publisher had yielded to a mellowing trans-Atlantic friendship increasingly evident in the personal portions of the voluminous correspondence that once had been business-like only in tone. Accordingly Bentley became the final piece in the three-piece mosaic consisting of author, agent, and publisher.

"My friend and townsman Mr. Samuel Eliot," the historian wrote the publisher, " has been enaged for sometime in the composition of an historical work of which he has now completed two volumes. He wishes to have the book brought before the English public at the same time that it appears here and I have mentioned you to him. . . ."

Sensing that Bentley would make his own appraisal and reach his own decision, Prescott wasted few words recommending either the writer or the work. "Mr. Eliot is a young man who has a high reputation among us for his talents and literary acquisitions. The work submitted to you is of a comprehensive nature, and—from

[19] George Ticknor, *Life of William Hickling Prescott*, Philadelphia, 1895, 52.

the glance I have had of it—shows scholarship and careful meditation . . . he sends out the printed proofs. . . ."[20]

Eliot's writing evidently pleased Bentley because Prescott, ever one to keep an eye on the announcements of forthcoming publications in England, soon gave the matter his further attention: "I see you have advertised Mr. Eliot's work, and I hope you will not be the loser by it."[21] Eliot's *History of the Liberty of Rome* emerged from Bentley's hands on July 2, 1849, in two garbs, with the price of the two volumes twenty-eight shillings in octavo and five shillings in quarto.[22]

Early the following year Bentley informed Prescott that the Eliot work had not had any success. Reflecting upon that unfortunate state of affairs, the publisher mused that it might have been otherwise had the book known, along with a more attractive title, some felicitous editing by Prescott's able hand. Suggestive that Bentley sustained no loss was his willingness to publish Eliot's *History of the Early Christians,* part two of his project, on September 26, 1853. Though revised and republished in America, Eliot's work was not the masterpiece in its field that Madame Calderón's swiftly became.[23]

* * *

Two years passed, during which Prescott, for a variety of reasons, continued to remain largely outside the routine of productive scholarship. In the spring of 1850 he mustered sufficient courage to undertake the trip that fulfilled his oft-made promise to visit England. For more than three months, from early June until mid-September, historian Prescott was lionized by British society in a manner unrivalled by any other private American citizen. As he capitalized upon the past achievements that spelled literary fame for him in England and hurriedly cast an eye to the future while speeding through Holland, the land so significant to his promised history of Philip the Second of Spain, it was a momentous season back home, that one in which Clay, Webster, Calhoun and others

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20 Prescott to Richard Bentley, February 9, 1849, Richard Bentley Papers, Harvard University (hereinafter cited as B–HU). Eliot's work was published by G. P. Putnam of New York in 1849.

21 Prescott to Bentley, April 20, 1849, B–HU.

22 [Richard Bentley and Son], *A List of the Principal Publications Issued from New Burlington Street During the Year 1849,* London, 1897, unnumbered p. 29.

23 Bentley to Prescott, February 7, 1850, P–MHS. A representative negative estimate of Eliot's work may be found in "Retrospective Survey of American Literature," *The Westminister Review,* LVII (January, 1852), 159.

heatedly debated the issues contained in successive segments of the Compromise of 1850.

At mid-century, as Prescott paused in his historical production, another Bostonian, Francis Parkman, make his meteoric rise. Though both Parkman and Prescott were physically handicapped, intensely interested in history, and came of wealthy and socially prominent families, the differences between them were also noteworthy. Prescott was old enough to be Parkman's father; their subject matter differed greatly both in time and space; and many of their approaches to historical method as well as their styles of writing showed marked dissimilarity. However, with the breadth of interests that characterized Prescott's intellectual life, it was inevitable that he would know and formulate an estimate of the man who had published *Oregon Trail* in the late 1840's and had his *History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac* ready for the press with the dawning of the next decade.

One of Prescott's intimates, Parkman's old history professor Jared Sparks, read the manuscript in March, 1850, and reported favorably on it. In June the Reverend George E. Ellis, another long-term acquaintance of Prescott, undertook to find an American publisher for Parkman. Garbed in an array of optional and equally clumsy titles, the well-written work on a secondary American historical theme was received coolly at Harpers where the Prescott precedent suggested that an author should have his work stereotyped at his own expense before entering into negotiations with a publisher. After the rebuff in New York, Parkman had his manuscript stereotyped, contracting later for its publication by Little, Brown and Company.[24]

Like many other American authors of his day, Parkman desired simultaneous publication in England and America. To assist his young friend beyond the Atlantic, Prescott wrote Richard Bentley:

> My friend Mr. Parkman, of this city, proposes to send out by this steamer the proofsheet of a new work of his relating to the occupation of this country by the French, and their intercourse with the Indians. His work leads him largely into an account of these sons of the forest, for which, as you are probably aware, he is better qualified than any good writer among us by his residence with them. I have seen some hundred and fifty pages of the book, and it seems to me to be written with much spirit, with many picturesque descriptions and stirring incidents—told in a skilful manner, that I should think would engage the interest of the

[24] Mason Wade, *Francis Parkman, Heroic Historian,* New York, 1942, 306–308.

reader. The rare materials from which the story is drawn gives it still higher value in an historical view. I cannot tell how much curiosity the English reader would feel in this portion of American History, or how far such a work would be a good book in the sense of the *trade.* I believe, from the specimen I have seen, it will prove a good book in every other sense, and as such, if you think it for your interest—of which you are much the best judge—I hope you will be able to make some arrangement with Mr. Parkman for the publication of it.[25]

This was not Bentley's introduction to Parkman. Indeed the London publisher had so enthused over the *Oregon Trail* that he had published an edition of it, only to find that the English reading public did not share his enthusiasm.[26] Now, a few years later, as Prescott brought the two together once more, his was essentially a job of reestablishing Bentley's enthusiasm. Prescott's letter surely helped on that score, for his own enthusiasm was so fulsome as to be contagious.

Thanking Prescott for bringing author and publisher together, Bentley quickly warmed to Parkman's new book. He wrote:

I have looked into it, and am much interested by the picturesque narrative. I judge that others will not fail to be interested in his work, and therefore in my letter to him by this packet I have acquainted him that I accept with pleasure the offer he has been so good as to make me of publishing it in England.[27]

Published in America in September, 1851, and released in England by Bentley somewhat earlier on August 21, the *History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac,* in two volumes, priced at 21 shillings, was no success beyond the water, for Bentley disposed of only 153 copies of a 500-copy edition in a period of twelve months.[28] Nevertheless, and despite the English reaction to Parkman, Prescott had helped to put another historical masterwork before a larger audience.

* * *

In the spring of 1852 Prescott's helping hand was extended in behalf of an author who neither needed nor sought his assistance. Published initially in weekly instalments in the *National Era* between June 5, 1851 and April 1, 1852, the abolitionist novel, *Uncle*

25 Prescott to Bentley, May 20, 1851, B–HU.
26 Wade, *Parkman,* 299.
27 Bentley to Prescott, June 19, 1851, P–MHS.
28 Wade, *Parkman,* 308; and [Richard Bentley and Son], *A List of the Principal Publications Issued from New Burlington Street During the Year 1851,* London, 1902, unnumbered p. 57. However, English reviews supported Bentley's judgment; see "Contemporary Literature in America," *Westminister Review,* LVII (January, 1852), 167–168.

Tom's Cabin, seemingly did not attract Prescott's attention until released in book form in Boston on March 20, 1852, by publisher John P. Jewett.

The "puff" he tried to give it was unnecessary in the whirlwind of acclaim rapidly bestowed on *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* "Three thousand copies were sold the very first day, a second edition was issued the following week, a third on the first of April," wrote the the author's son, "and within a year one hundred and twenty editions, or over three hundred thousand copies of the book, had been issued and sold in this country."[29]

Ten weeks after this auspicious American debut in book form, Prescott penned Richard Bentley:

> . . . my object in writing to you now is to mention a book I have lately been reading, and which has had an immense circulation in this country—"Uncle Tom's Cabin." It is a novel in two volumes written by a lady, the wife of a Calvinistic divine, who lived many years in the Southern States, and has exhibited in this novel the character of our South and the social condition of slavery. It is sketched with great strength and truth of coloring, in scenes very touching—some of them comic—and the whole story written in a very piquant attractive manner. I know nothing of the writer personally; but it has occurred to me more than once that the book could not fail to be popular in England; so that I have already sent two copies to friends there.
>
> If you wish it, I suppose you can get a copy of the American booksellers—Putnam's for instance—in London. Or if you desire it, I will send you one.[30]

Bentley was much interested and Prescott played middleman in the fruitless exchange that developed. When the publisher, hoping for a second book to exploit the popularity of the writer's name, penned an expression of his interest, Prescott forwarded it to Mrs. Stowe, who, in turn, wrote the historian a letter laden with queries about foreign copyright. Relaying Mrs. Stowe's word that she had another work in progress, Prescott quoted her to Bentley, "And as far as I know, I think I would like to engage Mr. Bentley as publisher, although I am not yet prepared to enter into immediate negotiation." The historian informed both the novelist and the publisher that he stood ready to assist, should they prefer to communicate through him.[31]

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[29] Charles Edward Stowe (comp.), *Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe compiled from Her Letters and Journals,* Boston and New York, 1889, 160.

[30] Prescott to Bentley, June 6, 1852, B–HU.

[31] *Id.* to *Id.,* October 11, 1852, B–HU; and Bentley to Prescott, October 26, 1852, P–MHS.

By late November it was evident that Prescott had not brought author and publisher to terms, for he wrote Bentley, "I am sorry that my correspondence with Mrs. Stowe has had no better result, as I see her next work advertised by some publisher—I forget whom —in the English papers." In a parting word about her to Bentley, Prescott offered a succinct single sentence judgment: "Her literary adventure is a miracle, for in a twinkling 'Uncle Tom' has shot up into a celebrity equal to that reached by the best of Scott's novels, while in point of literary execution merely, it is not equal to the worst."[32]

English publishers, seizing the opportunity to accord an American author the treatment so often dealt English writers on this side of the Atlantic, produced a confusion of pirated editions of the famed novel. Within twelve months of its initial appearance in England, which incidentally antedated Prescott's first letter to Bentley about it, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* passed through forty editions at the hands of eighteen different London publishers.[33]

A few years later, by which time both the historian and the novelist were under contract to Phillips, Sampson and Company of Boston, their literary paths casually crossed once more. From his autumn retreat at Pepperell, Prescott, on October 4, 1856, penned Mrs. Stowe a letter of appreciation for the copy of her novel *Dred* which publisher Phillips had forwarded to him. Among his reactions to the book, he insisted, "But Nina, to my mind, is the true *hero* of the book, which I should have named after her instead of "Dred."[34] Prescott was not alone in his opinion and on occasion the book was reprinted under that suggested title.

* * *

In the latter part of 1853 Prescott, calling the attention of both English reader and English publisher to a work by George S. Hillard, repaid numerous kindnesses extended him by another longtime friend. Hillard, reviewing Prescott's first book for the Boston *Courier,* had declared:

The first qualities in an historical work are accuracy and thoroughness, and these it possesses to an extent which leaves nothing to be desired, and puts

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[32] Prescott to Bentley, November 26, 1852, 852, B–HU.

[33] Stowe (comp.), *Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe,* 190. Many of these editions are listed in *The English Catalogue of Books published from January, 1835 to January, 1863,* London, 1864, 740–741. Bentley published a 3s. 6d. edition on September 29, 1852; see [Richard Bentley and Son], *A List of the Principal Publications Issued from New Burlington Street During the Year 1852,* London, 1903, unnumbered p. 61.

[34] Stowe (comp.), *Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe,* 311.

it upon a level with Gibbon's Rome and Hallam's Middle Ages. It is undoubtedly the most learned historical work that has appeared in our country. . . . That it will take a permanent rank, as a classic, in the language, may be predicted with perfect confidence.[35]

Two days later Prescott, reveling in the reception given his *Ferdinand and Isabella,* stamped Hillard's praise "as much to my taste as anything that has appeared."[36] Six years later, in a long and beautifully phrased article for the *North American Review,* Hillard reviewed the *Conquest of Mexico* and in so doing placed additional laurels upon the literary brow of his friend.[37]

With the passage of years, during which he practiced law, travelled widely and maintained his interest in literature, Hillard came to pen his *Six Months in Italy.* Prescott's enthusiasm for the work led him to press for English reception of it on two fronts. In mid-September, 1853, he sent copies of the work, accompanied by a praise-laden letter, to his friend Mrs. H. H. Milman, wife of the English literary critic.[38] Another England-bound copy of Hillard's book went to publisher John Murray. Prompted by the harsh realities that stamped the Italian theme as hackneyed, Murray initially entertained serious doubts. However, his study of the book so convinced him that Prescott's praise of it was justified that he hastened, without further ado, to reprint it in an English edition of 1,000 copies. Writing Prescott of his course of action, which included promise of half profits for the author, the publisher asked the historian to inform Hillard of the conditions on which he had reprinted the work.[39]

Time proved that this product of the author's travels of 1847-1848 was another Prescott-backed winner because in less than three years it knew five American editions. Long accepted as a standard work among travelers' guide books, it eventually appeared in more than twenty editions.

* * *

Within the small class in which Prescott graduated from Harvard in 1814 was modest, gentle Thomas Bulfinch. After a brief teaching career, bachelor Bulfinch turned, in his later adult life, to clerking in the Merchants' Bank of Boston. However, he never turned

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35 Boston *Courier,* January 4, 1838.
36 Ticknor, *Prescott,* 109.
37 *North American Review,* LVIII (January, 1844), 157–210.
38 Ticknor, *Prescott,* 360.
39 John Murray to Prescott, December 8, 1853, P–MHS.

his back on his literary interests. Maturing late as a writer, Bulfinch dotted the 1850's with successive titles which he offered the reading public, with fables, legends, chivalry, and mythology commanding his attention.

With one volume behind him, Bulfinch had another ready for some publisher's consideration when Prescott, on December 28, 1853, addressed Bentley:

> A friend of mine, Mr. Bulfinch, of this town, has now in the press a work relating to Ancient Mythology so explained and illustrated as to adapt it to the use of families—which is rather a delicate task. Mr. B. has already produced a volume which has met with much commendation; and from what I know of his character and abilities I cannot doubt that his forthcoming work will be well adapted to the purposes for which it is designed.
>
> As Mr. Bulfinch is desirous of being put in communication with an English publisher, I have thought I could not do better than by introducing him to you, and I shall be most happy if when you have seen his work, you shall find it so well suited to the English market as to allow of your publication of it.[40]

Less than a week later, while reporting his own progress on the first two volumes of *Philip the Second,* Prescott adverted to Bulfinch in a manner which suggested that qualms of conscience prodded him. He had written the earlier letter at Bulfinch's request and indeed expected his friend to produce a fine book but one thing he plainly wished known was the fact that he had never seen the work.[41]

Bulfinch's book seemingly was not published immediately in England, by Bentley nor anyone else, but *The Age of Fable,* the item concerned, did prove to be Bulfinch's finest work. His effort to widen the audience for mythology knew considerable success, with the work passing through several editions and gaining a reputation that still classes it as a standard reference in its field.[42]

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Between Prescott and Boston-born John Lothrop Motley stretched a slender, yet significant, intellectual relationship. Motley, much the younger, was born the year that Prescott concluded his formal education at Harvard. Like Prescott, Motley traveled abroad, di-

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40 Prescott to Bentley, December 28, 1853, B–HU.
41 *Id.* to *id.*, January 2, 1854, B–HU.
42 A. Johnson *et al* (eds.), *Dictionary of American Biography,* 21 vols., New York, 1928–1944, III, 247–248.

vided his intellectual interests between literature and history, came of a family of means and outlook which permitted his concentration on not overly remunerative intellectual endeavors, and, finally, centered his historical interests upon a theme far removed from the American scene.

The intellectual paths of the two men first came together in the late 1840's. Motley had begun collecting materials about 1846 for a history of the Netherlands, at which time Prescott was concluding his *Conquest of Peru*. Despite the fact that he had neither studied nor written as yet on the period of Philip the Second of Spain, Prescott's long-range intentions already included that subject in his ultimate array of historical studies. For years book dealers, diplomats, and scholars had laboriously been drawing together the materials upon which Prescott would eventually base his study of late sixteenth-century Spain.[43]

Interested in the Dutch sector of Spanish history in that and the following century, Motley found himself in a position similar to that in which Prescott had been in 1838-1839 in reference to Washington Irving and the conquest of Mexico. Then Irving, Prescott's senior in years and reputation, had graciously stepped aside to allow the Bostonian complete freedom of action in his exploitation of the Mexican theme. Indeed Irving had given Prescott some assistance as well as much encouragement.[44]

As Prescott had manfully approached Irving, so Motley came to Prescott. Whereas Prescott had corresponded with Irving, Motley took his case to Prescott in person. In 1847, at which time their personal acquaintance with each other was slight,[45] Prescott and Motley discussed their hopes and plans. Pleased and cooperative, Prescott saw no reason why Motley should not proceed with his project. The generosity of the senior historian was doubly evident as he offered his junior any books which he owned that pertained to Motley's research. For Prescott it was but a small kindness extended; for Motley it was so momentous a gesture that

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[43] Wolcott, *Correspondence, passim* and Clara Louisa Penney (ed.), *Prescott, Unpublished Letters to Gayangos*, New York, Hispanic Society of America, 1927, *passim* illustrate this activity with basic correspondence. See also the present writer's article, "Prescott's Most Indispensable Aide: Pascual de Gayangos," *Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIX* (February, 1959), 81–115.

[44] Ticknor, *Prescott*, 156–163.

[45] With Motley publishing romances in this period, their contacts probably were simply within the whirl of Boston society; see Susan and Herbert St. John Mildmay (eds.), *John Lothrop Motley and His Family*, London and New York, 1910, 28.

it constituted a turning-point in his life.[46] Almost a decade passed before either man published a book related to the theme of their overlapping interest.

Pre-publication problems occupied both Prescott and Motley in the autumn of 1855. Promise of the most lucrative contract that he had ever known had led Prescott to turn from Harpers to Phillips, Sampson and Company of Boston. Nonetheless his parting from the New York house, his publisher for more than a decade, was friendly. When Thomas Motley, Jr., in the absence of his author-brother, John Lothrop, who was still in Europe, decided to peddle that historian's wares in New York, Prescott obligingly addressed a warm letter of introduction on his behalf to the Harpers.

> As he has been living in the midst of the scenes he describes, and with the best materials at his command," Prescott wrote of John Lothrop Motley, "his works cannot fail to be of the most authentic character. Although I have not seen the manuscript, yet I cannot doubt, from his high parts and brilliant and attractive style, that his book will be one of great interest and importance. I hope therefore that you will give it a careful examination, and that he will be able to make an arrangement with you which will be satisfactory to both.[47]

Three months later, on December 10, 1855, Prescott's American publisher issued the first two volumes of his *Philip the Second.* Like other histories by Prescott, this was preceded by a lengthy prefatory statement of his theme, the materials upon which he had based it, and words of appreciation to scholars who had assisted him. Cognizant of his co-worker's forthcoming work, Prescott wrote: "... the Revolution of the Netherlands, although strictly speaking, only an episode to the main body of the narrative, from its importance well deserves to be treated in a separate and independent narrative by itself." Amplifying this point in a footnote, he continued:

> It is gratifying to learn that before long such a history may be expected—if indeed it should not appear before the publication of this work—from the pen of our accomplished countryman Mr. J. Lothrop Motley, who during the last few years, for the better prosecution of his labors, has established his residence in the neighborhood of the scenes of his narrative. No one acquainted with the fine powers of mind possessed by this scholar, and the earnestness with which he has devoted himself

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46 Ticknor, *Prescott,* 259–261.

47 J. Henry Harper, *The House of Harper—A Century of Publishing in Franklin Square,* New York, 1912, 140–141.

to his task, can doubt that he will do full justice to his important but difficult subject.[48]

Sensing a good publishing prospect in the offing, Bentley pounced upon the proffered bait. He hurriedly wrote to Prescott:

> In a note in the preface to your new history, you mention that Mr. Motley is engaged on a history of the Netherlands. Has that gentleman published his Work? If not, may I ask whether he is at Boston? In that case probably he would do me the favor to negotiate with me for it, if you would kindly ask him.[49]

Early in the spring of 1856, less than five months after the appearance of Prescott's latest work, Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* appeared in both America and England. In America the Prescott assistance was all the more meaningful because Motley's work was accepted and published by the Harpers. In England Prescott's role was less noteworthy. There Motley had trouble finding a publisher, as nothing came of Bentley's early enthusiasm. John Murray declined to publish the work; and finally the author was forced to bring it out through Chapman at his own expense.[50]

Prescott also helped Motley to that equally significant literary commodity, the reading public. The phenomenal sale of the *Rise of the Dutch Republic,* 17,000 copies during the first year of its publication in England, derived from many factors, most important of which was the inherent worth of the work.[51] However, one cannot discount entirely, nor assess fully, the significance of Prescott's assistance. The free advertising and boundless praise in his *Philip the Second* certainly helped to ready the reading public for Motley's work. In addition, the latter basked, to some extent, in the reflected interest that the well-known Prescott had established for its theme through his own writing.[52]

As the success of Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico* had underscored the rightness of the decision by which Irving had stepped aside, so Motley's achievement underscored the worth of the decision that had welcomed a co-worker and quasi-competitor to the field which Prescott had staked out for his own historical digging. Motley had his American publisher send a presentation copy to Prescott, who acknowledged it in a heart-warming letter dated

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[48] William H. Prescott, *History of the Reign of Philip the Second, King of Spain,* 2 vols., Boston, Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1855, I, xii.

[49] Bentley to Prescott, November 23, 1855, P–MHS.

[50] Mildmay, *Motley and Family,* 57–58.

[51] George William Curtis (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley,* 2 vols., New York, 1889, I, 190.

[52] For Motley's awareness of this, see Mildmay, *Motley and Family,* 53.

April 28, 1856. Among a succession of friendly sentiments and words of praise, possibly the finest constituted those which read, "... you have more than fulfilled the prediction which I had made respecting your labours to the public. Everywhere you seem to have gone into the subject with a scholarlike thoroughness of research, furnishing me on my own beaten track with a quantity of new facts and views...."[53] In a very real sense Prescott's continuing study of *Philip the Second* probably was enriched by Motley's work. Even in this limited realm of author relationships, all had not been unilateral, for through Prescott surely gave Motley greater assistance than he received from him, it was a relationship possessed of reciprocal advantages.

* * *

In mid-spring 1858, less than a year before his death, Prescott initiated what was probably his last literary assistance to a fellow author. This time the recipient of his attentive support was a friend and neighbor of long standing, John Gorham Palfrey.

Boston-born Palfrey, almost exactly Prescott's age, had graduated from Harvard in the class of 1815, along with their mutual friend Jared Sparks. Palfrey's interests included a range of intellectual endeavors for he was successively clergyman, editor, politician, and historian. Like Prescott, Palfrey had a long-term identification with the *North American Review,* both contributing to it during the editorship of Sparks. In 1835 Palfrey bought the publication and operated it successfully until 1843, when he sold it. During those years Prescott published seven items in the Palfrey-owned organ.[54]

Recovering from his apoplectic stroke of February, 1858, and leisurely putting the third volume of his *Philip the Second* through the press at a moment when national depression tempered any author's enthusiasm for launching his literary product, Prescott, penning a letter to Richard Bentley on a multiplicity of subjects, wrote:

A friend of mine, Dr. Palfrey ... will publish this autumn the first volume of a History of New England Puritans, in a couple of volumes, I believe.

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[53] Curtis, *Correspondence,* I, 191. In the spring of 1857 Prescott was busy inducing his Spanish friend and aide Pascual de Gayangos to assist Motley with his continuing research; see Penney, *Prescott, Unpublished Letters,* 126–127.

[54] *Dictionary of American Biography,* XIV, 169–170; and William Charvat and Michael Kraus, *William Hickling Prescott; Representative Selections,* New York, [1943], cxxxii-cxxxiii.

It will, I doubt not, be an able and learned book. Whether the theme will interest the English reader you can judge better than I.[55]

Six weeks later Prescott's correspondence with Bentley found him returning to Palfrey:

This note will be handed to you by my friend Mr. Bowen, formerly the Editor of the *North American Review* and now a professor in Harvard University, Cambridge. Mr. Bowen wishes to converse with you about a historical work of our mutual friend Mr. Palfrey, of Cambridge, with whose literary reputation you are doubtless acquainted and of whom I wrote to you in my last. I shall be glad if it suits your views to make an arrangement with Mr. Palfrey for the publication of his book. It cannot fail to be an important one, as the writer has explored the best sources of information to which he has had free access, in England as well as here, and his ability and thorough scholarship eminently fit him for the task. Mr. Bowen, however, can give you many more particulars about Mr. Palfrey's work and the progress made in it than I can; and I will only add that we have no critic among us whose opinion on a subject of this nature is entitled to greater weight than that of Mr. Bowen.[56]

In mid-August, at which moment Prescott initiated negotiations looking forward to the sale and publication of the third volume of his *Philip the Second,* the gentleman-scholar of Boston could still preface a letter dealing with such compelling personal interests with expressions of concern about his friend's manuscript.[57]

Failing to effect an arrangement between Palfrey and Bentley, Prescott turned in his friend's behalf, just as he had several years earlier in pursuit of his own interests, from Bentley to Routledge. On December 9, 1858, within seven weeks of his death, Prescott wrote a laudatory covering note to accompany the synopsis of the history of New England which Palfrey sent for Routledge's consideration.[58] Prescott could do no more; he lay in his grave before Palfrey's work finally found a London publisher.[59]

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Between the early 1840's and the closing weeks of his life, Prescott extended, for a variety of reasons, special assistance to these

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55 Prescott to Bentley, May 3, 1858, B–HU.

56 *Id.* to *id.*, June 18, 1858, B–HU. Bowen had reviewed Prescott's *Conquest of Peru* in the *North American Review,* LXV (October, 1847), 366–400.

57 Prescott to Bentley, August 13, 1858, B–HU.

58 Prescott to Routledge, December 9, 1858, P–MHS.

59 Published in London in 1859, the first two volumes of Palfrey's masterwork were issued by Low; see *The English Catalogue of Books... 1835–1863,* 580.

eight: Madame Calderón de la Barca, Samuel Eliot, Francis Parkman, Harriet Beecher Stowe, George S. Hillard, Thomas Bulfinch, John Lothrop Motley, and John Gorham Palfrey. What opened this facet of the historian's intellectual life?

Did Prescott try to facilitate the publication of their works because of penetrating appraisals he had made? Admittedly he knew and was much interested in the Calderón de la Barca theme and, after reading her work thoroughly, endorsed it in superlative terms. But for the fuller array of works, it can be said he neither knew the themes nor the specific works in minute detail. He freely admitted that he had but glanced at Eliot's writing on Roman liberty. Aside from the demands of his own work schedule, one suspects that Prescott's unfamiliarity with the theme constituted a basic reason for his not giving the work more attention. Parkman's subject, despite its parallels to his own Mexican and Peruvian studies thematically and stylistically, was unfamiliar to him. Prescott based his very enthusiastic endorsement of Parkman on a reading of a minor part of the book. Of Stowe's subject Prescott, never known to have traveled south of the Potomac, knew little, but had thought much. Once he had read *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* it was kinship of spirit that drew from the historian the unsolicited urge to aid the already successful novelist. The Whig historian, who counted anti-slavery spokesmen like Daniel Webster and Charles Sumner among his warm personal friends and long-term correspondents, was a stanch adherent to the abolitionist philosophy of his age.[60] Love of Italy, rather than knowledge of Hillard's manuscript, probably prompted the historian's support of that work. Never did Prescott's request that Bentley consider Bulfinch's work on mythology include any assurance that he had seen, much less read and approved, the work. With Motley working on a theme close to his heart and doing so in the workman-like fashion that further endorsed the eventual product of his labors, Prescott, without laying eyes on the work, paid Motley's history an unusual compliment as he praised it in anticipation. Of Palfrey's work on the history of their mutually beloved home area of New England, Prescott said nothing suggestive of real acquaintance with the penned product of his friend. In the analysis of subjects involved

60 Illustrative of this aspect of Prescott's nature is Fulmer Mood and Granville Hicks (eds), "Letters to Dr. Channing on Slavery and the Annexation of Texas, 1837," *New England Quarterly,* V (July, 1932), 587–601.

and Prescott's knowledge of them in general and of the specific writings in particular, no common denominator of concern emerges.

Apparently the historian's endorsements derived more basically from personal friendship than from scholarly evaluation. With a single exception all the authors were New Englanders by birth, most of them Bostonians. And the lone non-New Englander, Madame Calderón de la Barca, was a Bostonian by adoption. Though the ingredients of which the various friendships were compounded varied somewhat, some similarities and patterns do appear. Bulfinch and Palfrey, writing on themes vastly removed from Prescott's own interests, were fellow-Bostonians and fellow-Harvard graduates of the same age as the historian. Motley, Eliot, and Parkman, all Bostonians and Harvardmen, were of another generation, the oldest of the trio born the year Prescott left Harvard and the youngest twenty-seven years his junior. Hillard, another Harvard man, fell between these groups in point of age. Plainly the friendships, derived in part from social and economic circles, transcended narrow age categories because of the common element of intellectual endeavor related to creative writing.

Prescott's letters calling the attention of publishers to the works of his friends invariably identified them clearly as such. Quite probably, even as he did everything humanly possible to win initial consideration for the labors of his friends, Prescott said as little as he did about the works concerned because he might have felt that his judgment would be discounted by the publisher. In the name of friendship Prescott went the limit; on the score of literary worth he often refrained from offering any comment, much less judgment. Loyal to his friends, Prescott seemed intent upon helping them breach the barrier of publisher indifference. Interestingly and logically related is the fact that Prescott never bothered to assist any person a second time.

Charged, in the choice of his own historical themes, with being out of step with the surging nationalism of his day,[61] Prescott, in his interest in the contemporary literary products of numerous fellow Americans, exhibited his peculiarly patrician pattern of nationalistic sentiment.

For other writers in other periods and other American communities such widespread, almost indiscriminate, endorsement of

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[61] Vernon Louis Parrington, *The Romantic Revolution in America 1800–1860*, New York, 1927, 438–439.

one's friends would undoubtedly include a considerable number of literary second-raters and duds. For Prescott, ensconced in the wealth of mid-nineteenth century literary life of Boston, it was otherwise, because he, in his casual, rather than consciously pursued role of authors' agent related himself to the emergence of some of the most noteworthy titles of the period. With the exception of the work by Eliot the literary products of all the authors that Prescott assisted rose to such levels of eminence that they are invariably classified as standard authorities, if not masterworks.

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Theodore Roosevelt and Egyptian Nationalism

On March 14, 1910, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, fresh from the African game-trails, arrived at Khartoum in the Sudan; by the end of the month he and his party had cleared Egyptian waters for Naples and the next leg of the famous "Teddyssey." During this fortnight sojourn in Egypt and the Sudan Roosevelt found himself in searing contact with the developing problems of imperialism and nationalism in the Middle East. These were problems which, not unnaturally, he was confident he had sure and useful knowledge of, and thus he was prompted to deliver a number of speeches in the nature of both impromptu remarks and formal addresses concerning British policy for administering these colonial areas.[1] An examination of these Egyptian speeches[2] reveals in a singular fashion that Roosevelt was unable to appreciate the large implications of the tensions steadily mounting between the imperialist powers and colonial peoples.[3] His contradictory attitude was based on a conflict between the best interests of the imperialists and the nationalists as he understood Egypt and its future. Long a student of Egyptian affairs[4] Roosevelt's first-hand observations of the people of the Nile exposed him to young nationalism in the

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1 Roosevelt's principal biographers have devoted attention, in varying detail, to the Egyptian episode. See e.g., Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1956, 360–362; William R. Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt, An Intimate Biography*, Boston, 1919, 320; Joseph R. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Times*, 2 vols. New York, 1920, II, 184, ff. wherein is reprinted the extensive account Roosevelt wrote of his African-European tour in the form of a letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan.

2 Roosevelt made three formal speeches on the Egyptian question: "Peace and Order in the Sudan" (Khartoum, March 16, 1910); "Law and Order in Egypt" (Cairo, March 28, 1910); "British Rule in Africa" (London, May 31, 1910). These addresses are reprinted in full in Theodore Roosevelt, *African and European Speeches*, New York, 1910, hereafter cited as *Speeches*. In addition to the foregoing Roosevelt also made a number of shorter talks to various groups in the Sudan and Egypt. The texts of these talks in so far as they are extant have been gathered from various sources.

3 See in particular Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America as a World Power*, Baltimore, 1956. For example, Beale comments: "He seems never to have comprehended that the more successfully Britain, America and the other powers 'civilized' their colonial peoples, the more certain became the overthrow of the world power he joined Britain in seeking to impose." *Ibid*, 170.

4 *Ibid.*, 164.

raw. The experience was confusing for him. And the result was that his public pronouncements became exhortations to the native population to be better and more useful citizens of their country (not better subjects or wards of the British Crown), and admonitions to the British "to govern or to go" from Egypt.

The interplay of this contradiction is worth examination for several reasons. It demonstrates clearly that Roosevelt had no well thought-out concept of the relationship of imperialism to nationalism as he applied his judgment to a particular case with which he was for a time in contact. This was doubly unfortunate in view of his role as one of the American empire builders and because of the moral authority which as an ex-president he wielded on the popular and official mind at home and abroad. Isolation of the imperialist dilemma of liberty and order is also valuable because it exemplifies the confusion sown in the receptive minds of a would-be national people. Charges of hypocrisy and of democratic cant easily could have been levelled at Roosevelt by any Egyptian leader acquainted with a fair proportion of what he said concerning Egypt and the Sudan. The depth of Western confusion over the nature of imperialism and its ultimate fruits may be measured by the good intentions of Roosevelt in speaking; he sincerely believed in what he said about liberty and order, whatever contradiction might be implicit therein. It is helpful to bear this consideration in mind because it dramatizes one of the sources of distrust between the Powers and colonial peoples.

The Egypt of 1910 like other areas of the colonial world was experiencing the birth pangs of modern nationalism.[5] It was a nationalism its advocates sought to fructify in a national self-government. When so cautious a critic as Lord Cromer[6] could write seriously of rendering "the native Egyptians capable of eventually taking over their share in the government of a really autonomous community,"[7] nationalist opinion, not surprizingly, was demanding independence from the control of Europeans forthwith.

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5 For the Egyptian background see: George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, New York, 1938; Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 volumes, New York, 1908; John Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1953*, London, 1954; E. W. P. Newman, *Great Britain in Egypt*, London, 1928; George Young, *Egypt*, London, 1927.

6 Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer (1841-1917), Agent General in Egypt, 1883–1907.

7 Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, II, 569; Cromer in his concluding chapter entitled "The Future of Egypt," emphasized the necessarily gradual assumption of self-government by the Egyptians and the need to prepare the native populations to assume power, II, 563–571, *passim*.

It was a nationalism that in a large sense was expressed in terms of "Egypt for the Moslems." It was a nationalism whose extremist elements did not scruple at political murder.[8] On February 10, 1910, Boutros Ghali Pasha, the Prime Minister and a Copt who had a long record of amicable relations with the British Agency, was assassinated by a young Moslem fanatic.[9] Nationalist agitation for a time threatened to disrupt the political balance among Khedive, middle class, and British officialdom which ruled in Egypt. In the backwash of this smoldering unrest aggravated by assassination Theodore Roosevelt arrived in the Sudan.

To the task of pronouncing policy for a restive Egypt Roosevelt brought a firm preconception of the beneficence of European imperialism, and particularly that of Great Britain.[10] His was a somewhat idealized conception of imperialism as the great civilizing agency for the backward peoples of the world. He termed it "Democratic Nationalism," while some like-minded Britishers spoke of it as "Democratic Imperialism."[11] It was something he could believe in, he wrote to Sir Percy Girouard, the governor of Nigeria, with whom he discussed it while stopping at Nairobi,[12] though he

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8 The nationalists included moderate and extremist elements. Extremist opinion was expressed through various secret terrorist groups as well as through newspapers like *El Lewa*. The Constitutional Reform League of Egypt was typical of the moderate factions.

9 By name Ibrahim Nassif al Wardani, a member of the secret terrorist group "The Mutual Brotherhood." He was apprehended, brought to trial April 21, 1910, found guilty of the assassination and executed June 28, 1910.

10 This same idea is evident in the following excerpts from his public addresses. "I doubt whether in any other region of the earth there is to be seen more progress, the genuine progress, made by the substitution of civilization for savagery than what we have seen in the Sudan in the past twelve years." "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," *Speeches*, 3. "I have just spent nearly a year in Africa. While there I saw four British protectorates. I grew heartily to respect the men whom I there met, settlers and military and civilian officials.... Your men in Africa are doing a great work for your empire, and they are also doing a great work for civilization." "British Rule in Africa," *ibid*, 159. See also *The New York Times*, March 16, 1910, 1.

11 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.* Roosevelt took his role as witness to events very seriously. "As Sir Edward Grey (whom I greatly like and who thoroughly understands matters) wrote me that I am in the position of an actor who is right in the front of the stage in the full glare of the footlights, but who has no assigned part to play." Roosevelt to Lady Delamere, September 22, 1910, *ibid.* See also Sir George Otto Trevelyan to Roosevelt, October 21, 1911, Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt*, II, 184.

12 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.* See also Roosevelt to Arthur Lee, August 16, 1910, *ibid.*

was not always convinced of what the outcome would be.[13] Such doubts did not, however, cause him to feel that the attempt to impart the blessings of Western progress to the backward areas should not be made. A striking insight into Roosevelt's attitude in this regard is evident from an address he delivered to a Methodist Conference in Washington, just before he left office in 1909. In these remarks he pointed out:

> There is one feature in the expansion of the peoples of the white or European blood during the past four centuries which should never be lost sight of by those who denounce such expansion on moral grounds. On the whole, the movement has been fraught with lasting benefit to most of the people already dwelling in the lands over which the expansion took place. . . . Occasionally although not very frequently, a mild and kindly race has been treated with wanton, brutal and ruthless inhumanity by the white intruders. . . .
>
> There have been very dark spots on the European conquests and control of Africa; but on the whole the African regions which during the past century have seen the greatest cruelty, degradation and suffering, the greatest diminution of population, are those where native control has been unchecked. The advance has been made in the regions under European control or influence. . . .[14]

In short, Roosevelt's mind was cast in the imperialist mold. But it was an imperialism that aimed ultimately at lifting up the non-white races, improving their living conditions, enabling them to have a fuller life. In this great work of human improvement the role of responsible self-government was a crucial one. Roosevelt's domestic political career had been devoted to raising the standards of American life through responsible government, and it is not unexpected that very often in Africa he found himself uttering the same preachments that he had made in America to emphasize this vital need, though the social circumstances of the two peoples were strikingly dissimilar. Many Africans, perhaps

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13 Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, *ibid.*

14 *The Washington Post,* January 19, 1909, 1–2. Lawrence F. Abbot relates the following curious anecdote that throws added light on Roosevelt's understanding of the fruits of civilization and the progress of mankind. The ex-president was inspecting some Egyptian ruins when it took place. "One series of carvings presented the picture of a law court in which a witness was being horribly tortured in the presence of the judge to extort a confession. 'I wish,' said Colonel Roosevelt, 'that those pessimists who believe that civilization is not making steady progress could see this carving. Here is a king portraying as one of the virtues of his reign a state of vicious cruelty which would not have been tolerated by Tammany Hall in its worst days of corruption.'" "Mr. Roosevelt in Egypt," *Outlook,* XCIV (April 30, 1910), 979–982, especially 981.

likewise oblivious to these differences, welcomed the ex-president as an apostle of constitutional government.[15]

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For the enthusiastic young Egyptian who heard Theodore Roosevelt as the voice of one of the great nations, it would have been impossible not to have glimpsed a vision of the new Egypt, the new nation, of which the ex-President spoke and which in truth he exhorted his listeners to help create. Basic to the new Egypt was a new, westernized Egyptian, an individual who was capable of helping himself and thereby performing the work of a good citizen. Roosevelt wanted to see the graduate of Egyptian schools

> prepared to do his work in some capacity in civil life, without regard to any aid whatever received from or any salary drawn from the Government. If a man is a good engineer, a good mechanic, a good agriculturist, if he is trained so that he becomes a really good merchant, he is, in his place, the best type of citizen.[16]

This was the way of Europe and America and it must be the way of Africa.[17] One hears distinct echoes of Roosevelt's classic American plainsman as he encourages the youth of the Nile to become "men who will be able to shift for themselves, to help themselves and to help others, fully independent of all matters connected with the Government."[18] " 'There is only one way a man can permanently be helped, and that is by helping him to help himself' ", he warned the young people of Africa.[19] The active life of con-

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15 "We Egyptians anticipated the arrival of the ex-President of the United States with great pleasure and impatience, for all Egyptians believed him the best representative of the great American nation, and they still consider that the Americans are the greatest nation in civilzation of the present time and that they are the best friends of liberty in as much as in that country constitutional principles have received their widest development." Sheikh Ali Youssef, "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roosevelt," *The North American Review*, CXCI (June, 1910), 729.

16 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," *Speeches*, 5. Even in Lord Cromer's time the educated Egyptian relied heavily upon governmental employment. Thereby evolved a considerable pressure group for expanded subsidies to the very people who were among the most vocal nationalists. At the Luxor Mission *The New York Times* quoted Roosevelt as saying that he wanted education "directed at making a man able to care for himself and for those dependent on him." *The New York Times*, March 24, 1910, 4.

17 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," *Speeches*, 6.

18 *Ibid*, 5–6.

19 Roosevelt at the Luxor Mission, *The New York Times*, March 22, 1910, 5.

stant growth and increasing knowledge, the stock-in-trade of shibboleth of "T.R." at home, was readily declared to a people yearning to assert itself. He asked the members of one audience at Khartoum, for example, not to close their minds or books once school had been left behind, but to keep training, keep educating themselves so that instead of standing still, great progress, "good work, better work" could be accomplished.[20] This was a familiar Western creed which as practiced in Europe and the United States had contributed much to the making of the nation-state.

One of the truly decisive means available to the Egyptians for bringing about a new nation was education. Roosevelt's views of the worth of training people sufficiently so that they might help themselves have already been indicated. But he also took occasion to remind the Egyptians of the function of education in the larger sense, and the place of the University as the best means of expressing a country's ideals. For one thing they must not simply imitate Western universities; rather, Roosevelt entreated, you must "copy what is good in them but test in a critical spirit whatever you take, so as to be sure that you take only what is wisest and best for yourselves."[21] A critical spirit of inquiry, however, was not calculated to enhance British popularity in many quarters of the Egypt of 1910; but Roosevelt failed to relate theory and facts as a first step toward a logical and coherent attitude on the Egyptian question. That he had in mind a University whose impact should be felt in many phases of the peoples' lives is amply borne out by the following words of the Cairo address at the National University:

> This university should have a profound influence on all things educational, social, economic and industrial throughout this whole region, because the very fact of Egypt's present position is such that this university will enjoy a freedom hitherto unparalleled in the investigation and testing out of all problems vital to the future of the people of the Orient.[22]

It was to be a University "fraught with literally untold possibilities" for the good of the country.[23]

Closely tied to the free National University advocated by Theodore Roosevelt was the privileged status of the country's press. Western struggles for liberty very often had revolved around freedom of the newspapers to criticize the government. Roosevelt, good

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20 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," *Speeches*, 9.
21 "Law and Order in Egypt," *ibid*, 19.
22 *Ibid.*, 17.
23 *Ibid.*, 16.

democrat that he was, would not insist upon a free press for Europeans and Americans and a muzzled press for native peoples.[24] At Shepheard's Hotel where he stayed while in Cairo he held a press interview to which were invited representatives of the local newspapers. Some fourteen native editors attended; suitably enough the group reflected various shadings of nationalist political opinion. In discussing their responsibility as editors Roosevelt addressed them very much as he would have spoken to a similar gathering of newspapermen in the American midwest:

> I always tell the newspaper men in my own country that they are using one of the most formidable weapons of modern life, and that it is vital to see that they use it for good purposes and not for bad purposes.
>
> The correspondent or editor of a newspaper is in reality a public servant.[25]

Yet a free press in Egypt would have certainly included elements agitating for the withdrawal of British forces from the country and the establishment of a national government. Many Egyptian editors would have felt remiss in their duty as public servants to have written otherwise. According to a first-hand account furnished by Ali Youssef, editor of *El Garida,* one of the moderate nationalist organs, Roosevelt quite expected that any rebuke he should choose to give the nationalists over the death of Boutros Pasha would receive some adverse comment from the press.[26] Yet, as an American nutured on the tradition of an uncontrolled press this did not disturb him. On the contrary, it was natural to him. In Africa as in America! His vision of the modern Egypt included as a matter of course a responsible press free to criticize.[27]

The kind of society in which the modern Egyptian should expect to find himself was a Western one in many of its aspects. Before the

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[24] The Press Law of 1881 enabled the Government to suppress newspapers for criticism unfavorable to government policy. This law was put into effect after the death of Boutros Pasha.

[25] *The New York Times,* March 28, 1910, 1. *The Daily Mail* (London), March 28, 1910, 5, carried a glamorized account of the same interview.

[26] Ali Youssef has quoted Roosevelt at the press interview as remarking: "'I do not want newspaper men to dictate to me. I am going to speak tomorrow in the Egyptian University. Wait till you hear what I shall say and then say what you wish to say.'" "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roosevelt," *loc. cit.,* 732.

[27] Professor Nathaniel Schmidt, Chairman of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature at Cornell University and himself a long time resident of Egypt remarked in criticism of Roosevelt's Cairo address: "'As for freedom of speech, they have got to have it. It is in the blood.'" *The New York Times,* March 31, 1910, 5.

National University Roosevelt insisted on the practical, technical, industrial foundation of a healthy country. "The base, the foundation of healthy life in any country, in any society, is necessarily composed of men who do the actual productive work of the country, whether in tilling the soil, in handicrafts, or in business. . . ."[28] The economic objective of the modern Egyptian should be, in other words, the development of a nation of productive workers who could by their own efforts add to the security and welfare of their country. In this regard he reiterated that his doctrine for Americans and for Africans was one and the same.[29]

Still other attributes of a great community modeled on Western lines Roosevelt urged on his Egyptian audiences. One of these was a Christian respect for womanhood. Stopping at the Luxor Mission on his way to Cairo he commented favorably on the training given the native girls at the Mission school. The women as well as the men must be elevated to a new status based on respect for the individual. This could be achieved in part by instructing the girls in the domestic arts to be sure, but neither should their literary education be neglected.[30] Another Western idea discussed briefly by Roosevelt was premised on what he considered sound American experience. This was a mutual respect for the religious beliefs of all Egyptians. Moslems, Copts, and Jews were mingled with native converts to Protestant and Catholic Christianity. Learn to live together regardless of religious differences was the practical advice he offered to overcome the dangers inherent in this situation.[31] Nor must the Egyptians allow their government to become dominated by the military. "Woe to the people whose army tries to play a part in politics," Colonel Roosevelt admonished the new Egypt.[32] Control by a military junto would preclude the erection of the very kind of society that he wished for his listeners; generals too frequently had been the death of freedom and criticism. Ali Youssef for one was in agreement.[33]

It was an easy matter for the Egyptians to accept Roosevelt's encouragement of their nationalistic ambitions. Americans were the exemplars of freedom and prosperity from whom they had

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[28] "Law and Order in Egypt," *Speeches*, 23.
[29] *Ibid*, 23–24.
[30] *The Times* (London), March 24, 1910, 5; *The New York Times*, March 24, 1910, 4; "Mr. Roosevelt in Egypt," *loc. cit.*, 981.
[31] "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," *Speeches*, 6.
[32] *The Times* (London), March 18, 1910, 5.
[33] "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roosevelt," *loc cit.*, 730.

learned much, without paying tribute of suffering and humiliation.[34] A remarkable example of the nature of the feelings of the Middle East peoples for Americans is to be seen in a testimonial presented to the former president by a Committee representing the Syrian community of the city of Khartoum. The document is eloquent of the aspirations which motivated the inhabitants of their part of the world, whether in Syria, Turkey, the Sudan or Egypt. In part it read:

> The chief reasons which the Syrians have to be grateful to America are the introduction of a system of free education or of education on terms within the means of the masses, and the broad and liberal lines of American policy in welcoming immigration. . . .
>
> Schools were opened in almost all important centres of Syria, a printing press was established at Beirut, and a genuine yearning for the acquirement of knowledge animated the whole population . . . instilling into the minds of the rising generation the true principles of liberty, and inspiring them with American, English and French ideals of life.[35]

Roosevelt without doubt proudly accepted this accolade from a grateful people. After all these were the ideals of life he cherished as civilized man's highest expression. There were no better models to guide native peoples in reconstructing their societies for the future.

As for the present Roosevelt concerned himself with the fact and as he saw it with the necessity of British control in Egypt and Sudan. In turning to examine in detail this defense of the British occupation it is well to remember that the ex-president visited the area at a time when feelings of political unrest were rife with violence. To match the murder of Boutros Pasha there was Denshawai, of terrible memory.[36] At the time it might well have seemed that the final crisis in Anglo-Egyptian affairs was at hand.

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[34] "Moreover, Egyptians have a greater liking for Americans than for Europeans because they consider that they have not been harmed by Americans, while at the same time they are getting the same benefits from the American civilization that they gain from Europe. . . . The Americans are, in fact, the only real teachers who taught the Egyptians honestly and did not interfere in politics." *Ibid*, 729.

[35] "Address Presented to Colonel the Honorable Theodore Roosevelt by the Syrian Committee of Khartoum," March 17, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.*

[36] In 1906 at Denshawai a British officer was killed by villagers during a misunderstanding over hunting privileges in the area. Three death sentences and several floggings were ordered by a Special Court and subsequently were carried out. Popular reaction among the Egyptians was violent in denouncing this judgment and penalty. Boutros Pasha had served as president of the Special Court.

The incumbent Agent General, Sir Eldon Gorst,[37] was not made of the stern stuff of Lord Cromer, and the Liberal ministry at London was divided as to its policy for Egypt between imperialists and little Englanders. Very probably these circumstances worked to intensify Roosevelt's antagonism to the nationalist political factions and make more pronounced the contradictions discernible in "Democratic Nationalism."

There were two major reasons in Roosevelt's thinking why Great Britain must not be disturbed in her occupation of the Nile provinces. Britain was a vessel of civilization, carrying Western ideas across the world. In each of his major speeches on the Egyptian question,[38] in extemporaneous remarks delivered to informal groups,[39] and in his private correspondence,[40] Roosevelt tirelessly insisted upon Britain's historic role as the agent of Western culture. Equally important was his conviction that the Egyptians were themselves incapable of self-government at the time, and the continuance of British power was its logical complement. According to Rooseveltian criteria it would be years, generations perhaps, before this deficiency would be overcome. Writing to Sir George O. Trevelyan he characterized nationalist agitation as centering in two groups: "... Levantine Moslems ... of the ordinary Levantine type, noisy, emotional, rather decadent, *quite hopeless material on which to build,* but also not really dangerous as foes"; and second "the real strength of the nationalist movement ... the mass of practically unchanged bigoted Moslems to whom the movement meant driving out the foreigner, plundering and slaying the local Christian, and a return to all the violence and corruption which festered under

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37 Sir Eldon Gorst (1861–1911), Consul General for Egypt, 1907–1910.

38 *Speeches,* 3, 26–27, 159.

39 "He gave two little addresses, one to the boys in the Government school, and the other to the principal merchants. Upon each he urged the necessity of doing everything in their power to perpetuate the present rule of peace and justice in the Sudan. To the merchants he said: 'Uphold the government which has given you prosperity and upon which your further prosperity depends.'" *The Times* (London), March 17, 1910, 5. In commenting upon the Gordon College as an example of a great civilization institution Roosevelt exclaimed: "'Think of it! The sons of the Khalifa El Mahdi are studying in a college which perpetuates the name of the man originally responsible for the destruction of their father's power.'" *The New York Times,* March 16, 1910, 4. See also *The Times* (London), March 18, 1910, 5, for an account of Roosevelt's address at the Egyptian Officers' Club.

40 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.* Roosevelt to Lady Delamere, September 22, 1910, *ibid.* Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, *ibid.*

the old style Moslem rule, whether Asiatic or African."[41] Under such circumstances the Egyptians, however keen they might be for self-government at once, could not be trusted with it. Years of further political apprenticeship under British direction would have to intervene.[42] The fullest expression of Roosevelt's doubts about immediate Egyptian self-rule is contained in the speech before the National University, the same address with so much encouragement to the spirit of nationalism. In part, the audience was advised:

> . . . the training of a nation to fit it successfully to fulfill the duties of self-government is a matter, not of a decade or two, but of generations. There are foolish empiricists who believe that the granting of a paper constitution, prefaced by some high sounding declaration, of itself confers the power of self-government upon a people. This is never so. Nobody can 'give' an individual 'self-help'. . . . With any people the essential quality is to show, not the haste of grasping after a power which it is only too easy to misuse, but a slow, steady, resolute development of those substantial qualities such as love of justice, love of fair-play, the spirit of self-reliance, of moderation, which alone enable a people to govern themselves.[43]

In the light of the foregoing analysis it is not unexpected that during the course of his journeying along the Nile Roosevelt frequently was heard to insist upon the wisdom of maintaining British power there, and that in his final address on the future of Egypt delivered in London he called for a strong arm to rule. In these passages of his speeches he assumed the attitude of a hard-fisted soldier intent on keeping order, rather than that of a patient colonial administrator concerned with demonstrating the reality of British justice. The "thing, not the form" was vital; it was England's "first duty to keep order."[44]

On the evening of his arrival in Khartoum Colonel Roosevelt was entertained at the palace of the Governor-General. His host

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[41] Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, *ibid.* (Italics added)

[42] An extreme version of Roosevelt's estimate of the level of Egyptian political maturity is included in the following news story: "At Tantah Colonel Roosevelt was reminded that it was the spot where in 1882 the Moslems pulled the Christians out of the trains and massacred them. 'Yes,' said Colonel Roosevelt, 'and that is just what should happen again if they had self-rule in Egypt.'" *New York Evening Journal,* March 31, 1910, 21. Although one may hesitate to give credence to this report in that its chief source is the somewhat sensational *Evening Journal* the ex-president would in effect say the same thing in his London address; it is also necessary to point out that whether authentic or nor, the story circulated among the Egyptians. See "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roosevelt," *loc. .cit.,* 736.

[43] "Law and Order in Egypt," *Speeches,* 24–25.

[44] "British Rule in Africa," *ibid,* 171.

was Slatin Pasha,[45] the Sirdar, the senior British military officer in the Sudan, and his fellow diners were British military and civil officials. Roosevelt was not to speak formally, but in the course of the dinner conversation the subject of the assassination of Boutros Pasha was brought up. He was asked what he would have done had he been the Agent General. The reply forthcoming is a forceful example of Roosevelt's "tough" policy as a reaction against extreme nationalist pressure to achieve self-government.

> It is very simple. I would try the murderer at drumhead court-martial. As there is no question about the facts, for his own faction do not deny the assassination, he would be taken out and shot; and then if the home government cabled me, in one of their moments of vacillation to wait a little while, I would cable in reply: 'Can't wait the assassin has been tried and shot.' The home government might recall me or impeach me if they wanted to, but *that* assassin would have received his just deserts.[46]

This conversational remark largely sets the tone for all of Roosevelt's more formal addresses when his theme gravitated to the rights of the Egyptians for immediate self-rule. Many of the British audience were pleased to have this "tough" answer and he was urged to speak out for law and order whenever possible.[47] Two days later in a formal address before British officialdom at the Sudan Club Roosevelt paid tribute to the work of the British and insisted that any attempt to dislodge them from their Nile occupation would be criminal.[48] As he was to remark later in London, self-government in the hands of the Sudanese had been the self-government of the wolf-pack,[49] a situation no civilized power could permit to continue unchecked. Native press reaction to these opinions concerning the political future of Egypt and her people was high-lighted by repeated demands for local autonomy and even a warning to Roosevelt that he should not dare to speak out again in a pro-British vein.[50] Nothing daunted, next day upon invita-

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[45] Rudolph Carl, Baron Slatin, (1857–1932), Austrian-born Inspector-General of the Sudan, 1900–1915.

[46] Lawrence F. Abbott, *Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1919, 154–155. Italics in original.

[47] *Ibid.*, 155.

[48] *The Times* (London), March 18, 1910, 5.

[49] "British Rule In Africa," *Speeches*, 165.

[50] For a personal reflection concerning the political stir that "Peace and Justice in the Sudan" created and threats made against Roosevelt see R. S. McClernahan to J. C. O'Laughlin, March 27, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.* McClernahan was with the American Presbyterian Mission, Assuit, Egypt; O'Laughlin was a *Chicago Tribune* correspondent assigned to the Roosevelt tour of Africa and Europe.

tion he addressed the Egyptian Officers club where nationalist feeling was understandably strong. Slatin Pasha had asked in advance that the native officers be urged to maintain "their absolute and unflinching loyalty to English rule" and Roosevelt "very gladly" consented to do so.[51] In the speech that followed the officers were warned of the dangers of involvement in politics.

> The soldier who mixes politics with soldiering becomes a bad politician and a poor soldier. In the Spanish War, most of the men in my regiment differed from me in politics. I didn't care a particle. I knew they felt so long as they were in uniform, that their duty and pride bade them to be soldiers and nothing else, and that they devote all their thoughts, will and energy to working for the greatness of the flag under which they fought.[52]

This loyalty to British rule at the expense of national aspirations, with the curious analogy of the Spanish war only adding a note of obscurity, must have seemed ill-founded to many of the native officers. It tends to emphasize once more that Roosevelt frequently did not relate theory to the facts at hand. That he was inclined to persist in his illogical attitudes is illustrated by events shortly after his Officers' Club talk, when two days later at Assuan he repeated his warnings about the dangers of mixing politics and soldiering to a group of native officers informally gathered to greet him.[53]

The unsettling effect that Roosevelt's widely circulating opinions were having upon the Egyptians may be judged from Sir Eldon Gorst's initial desire that he say nothing of the assassination of Boutros Pasha in his scheduled speech to the National University. This Roosevelt refused to do and his outspoken opposition apparently convinced Gorst that some good could come of an admonition to the Egyptians to forego violence in their feud with Great Britain.[54] Thus, while the greater portion of this address was devoted to praise and encouragement of the University with the nationalistic appeal already discussed, it also included a stinging rebuke to the assassins:

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[51] Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, Roosevelt *Mss.*

[52] *The Times* (London), March 18, 1910, 5.

[53] *Ibid.*, March 21, 1910, 5.

[54] Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, *Roosevelt Mss.*, Gorst wrote: "how glad I am that you consented to speak to these people. If anything can bring them into a more reasonable frame of mind your words should have that effect." Gorst to Roosevelt, March 26, 1910, *ibid.*

All good men, all men of every nation whose respect is worth having, have been inexpressibly shocked. . . .

The type of man which turns out the assassin is a type possessing all the qualities most alien to good citizenship. . . . Such a man stands on a pinnacle of evil infamy.[55]

Perhaps this publicly administered reprimand was the most striking phase of the address, given the circumstances of tension and bad feeling. British approval certainly was not lacking, Roosevelt's words having been edited and approved in advance by both Gorst and Wingate.[56] But *Almo,* one of the organs of the Constitutional Nationalists, seemed to think that Roosevelt had also come out for more self-government for the Egyptians.

Some criticism is due to the bad translation [it told its readers] made in reference to the strategic position of Europe, which seemed to indicate that he [Roosevelt] desired England always to remain in Egypt. [But] he has insisted that the Egyptians are as fit for a Constitution as the people of Turkey, which movement Mr. Roosevelt has approved.[57]

It depended upon which part of the speech was studied, and by whom. The Cairo address is of critical significance in this examination of the nature of Roosevelt's "Democratic Nationalism" in that the logical clevage in his thinking is so unmistakable within the passages of a single speech. This factor helps to rule out the interpretation that he may have arrived at Khartoum with a false impression of the civilizational level of the Nile peoples, only to be convinced shortly of the position that continued British occupation was both blessing and necessity. Nor is there evidence from other sources that Roosevelt's estimate of the Egyptian potentiality for self-rule was altered by his personal experiences with the peoples there. Both these considerations re-emphasize a confusion of theory and reality that is part of this Egyptian particularization of the *Weltanschauung* of "Democratic Nationalism."

Perhaps the most widely known of Theodore Roosevelt's speeches on the Egyptian question is "British Rule in Africa," de-

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55 "Law and Order in Egypt," *Speeches,* 26.

56 Sir Reginald Wingate to Roosevelt, March 30, 1910, Roosevelt *Mss.* Sir Reginald Wingate to Roosevelt, June 8, 1910, *ibid.* (Wingate was British Governor-General in the Sudan.) *The Times* correspondent reported that Roosevelt's speech was "heartily welcomed here [Cairo] by the British, French and those natives who have large interests which would be affected by a change in the system of government. It is hoped that it may help to convince the United States and the continent that British occupation is the only guarantee of order and financial stability." *The Times* (London), March 31, 1910, 9.

57 *The New York Times,* March 30, 1910, 3.

livered at the Guildhall in London on May 31, 1910, on the occasion of granting the freedom of the City of London to the former president. There is little in it susceptible of favorable interpretation by the nationalists. It has been termed the "govern or go" address which is an apt summation of its most forceful passage:

> Now either you have the right to be in Egypt or you have not; either it is or it is not your duty to establish and keep order. If you feel that you have not the right to be in Egypt, if you do not wish to establish and keep order there, why then, by all means get out of Egypt. If, as I hope, you feel that your duty to civilized mankind and your fealty to your own great tradition alike bid you stay, then make the fact and the name agree and show that you are ready to meet in very deed the responsibility which is yours.[58]

The dangers of self-government for a people such as the Egyptians had been demonstrated amply in the Sudan, Roosevelt pointed out. Under Sudanese rule "great crimes were committed . . . crimes so dark that their very hideousness protects them from exposure. . . . Then the English came in; put an end to independence and self-government which wrought this hideous evil, restored order, kept the peace and gave to each individual . . . liberty. . . ."[59] And so must it be in Egypt. For Roosevelt the murder of Boutros Pasha was conclusive of this. " . . . The attitude of the so-called Egyptian Nationalist Party in connection with this foul murder has shown that they neither were desirous nor capable of guaranteeing even that primary justice, the failure to supply which makes self-government not merely empty but a noxious farce."[60]

As has been pointed out, "British Rule in Africa" was consistent in its appeal for an indefinite continuation of the British occupation. May it be argued in consequence that this speech represented the matured convictions of Theodore Roosevelt on the question of Egypt, and as such marks the high plateau of a consistent policy pronouncement by him after confusion among the foothills of conflict and unrest in Egypt itself? Two conditions tend to discourage this conclusion. One is the rather brief period of time elapsing between the date of the Cairo address (March 28) and that of the London talk (May 31). This interim, it should be kept in mind, was taken up with an almost constant round of public appearances, formal receptions and social functions from the draw-

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58 "British Rule In Africa," *Speeches*, 171.
59 *Ibid.*, 165.
60 *Ibid.*, 170.

ing rooms of Vienna to the common rooms of Oxford. Roosevelt probably had little opportunity for the kind of serious reflection by means of which political attitudes of the most significant sort are refined and crystallized. A second consideration is the all British audience that was his in London; successful politicians are by instinct sensitive to the moods and prejudices of their listeners.

The Guildhall address had firmly placed Roosevelt in the camp of the imperialists in the popular mind—the popular Anglo-American mind. But there was that "new Egypt" of which he had spoken and his native audiences quite understandably might have been most influenced by those phases of his talks that emphasized the national potential of their country. The total meaning of Roosevelt's words was such as to indicate that his own attitude was confused and inconsistent. He had brought to his task of pronouncing a British policy for Egypt a profound faith in the great worth of self-government and a perplexing belief that nationalism by definition was a monopoly of the West. It is clear from his speeches that he was no friend of Egyptian self-rule; yet he had preached eloquently to the people of their country and what each might do to strengthen it. A productive economy, a self-reliant population, a spirit of free and critical inquiry—all these things he had wished for Egypt. Modern nations have been built on no less. Even as he was excoriating the Levantine Moslems—"noisy, emotional, rather decadent"—he was in search of a people on which to build. With disarming clarity had Roosevelt himself, as though by accident, revealed the nature of the dilemna of Western imperialism, and the conflict in his own "Democratic Nationalism" that was a microcosm of it.

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The Midwestern Immigrant and Politics: A Case Study

Historians have long neglected to study the role of the Midwestern immigrant groups in politics. General statements concerning the political allegiances and voting behavior of the various foreign-born groups have been made by both careful scholars and casual observers. Yet, there have been few, if any, "grass roots" investigations to support these conclusions. This study attempts to answer three questions: (1) Did the politicians view the immigrant group as a force in politics? (2) Was there a pattern to immigrant voting? (3) To what extent did ethnic group identity influence the immigrant vote?

North Dakota serves well as an area for this study because of the high percentage of foreign-born in its population and because the immigrant population was divided into three distinct geographical sections. The election of 1900 was chosen because at that time the foreign-born population was at its greatest strength. Also, in 1900 the issue of imperialism was raised—in part to sway certain ethnic group votes.

Historical Background

In 1890 North Dakota's population had been 182,000, while ten years later there were 319,000 people in the state.[1] North Dakota showed the greatest percentage increase of the Great Plains states for the ten year period, a notable increase caused by the great influx of immigrant groups.[2] Of the total population in 1900, 133,091 were of foreign origins with the Norwegians, Germans, and Canadians making up the three largest groups.

The Norwegians, numbering 30,206 in 1900, comprised 9.5 per cent of the state's population.[3] This national group found its principal area of settlement in the eastern counties of the state. Norwegians started migrating to the United States as early as 1825, but the main flow began after the Civil War when more than

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[1] *Census Reports*, I, *Twelfth Census of the United States*, "Population," Part I, Washington, 1901, 33. Hereafter cited as *Twelfth Census*.

[2] C. F. Kraenzel, *The Great Plains in Transition*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1953, 138.

[3] *Twelfth Census*, 732–734.

100,000 came between 1866-1873. A second great movement of Norwegians to America took place between 1879 and 1889 when over a quarter of a million arrived.[4] Although there were many reasons for this exodus from the Old Country, Einar Haugen best sums them up as "the hope for *social betterment.*"[5]

It was not long until the Norwegians within the United States began to move westward as the tide of immigration increased. By the 1870's they had pushed across Minnesota into the Red River Valley. A decade later these people were dominant in the eastern part of North Dakota.[6]

The Germans made up another ethnic group of importance in North Dakota at this time. There were two distinct national groups of Germanic origin—the "Reich" Germans and the "Ruzlaends" or German-Russians. At the close of the nineteenth century, there were 14,179 German-Russians and 11,546 Germans in the state; together they comprised over eight per cent of the population.[7] The "Reich" Germans were those Germans who migrated to the United States from Germany. The primary cause of their migration was "undoubtedly economic"; however, the disturbed political conditions in western Europe provided another motive.[8] The first Germans to move into the Midwest settled in Wisconsin and southern Minnesota. As more and more Germans came into the area, their ethnic frontier was extended into parts of North Dakota. The "Reich" Germans were scattered over the whole state, but their greatest concentration was in Morton, Oliver, and Mercer counties located in the Missouri Valley area.[9]

The German-Russians were not Russian in origin, but Germanic. These people left Germany for the area around the Black Sea during the years of unrest in Europe between the Seven Years War and the fall of Napoleon. Catherine II and Alexander II

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[4] Ingrid Semmingsen, "Norwegian Emigration to America During the Nineteenth Century," *Norwegian-American Studies and Records,* XI (1940), 68–70.

[5] Einar Haugen, "Norwegian Migration to America," *Norwegian-American Studies and Records,* XVIII (1954), 2; For general discussions about motives for immigration see: Carlton Qualey, "Pioneer Norwegian Settlement in North Dakota," *North Dakota History,* V (October, 1930), 21–22; Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America, The Saga of the Immigrant,* New York, 1939, 264–265.

[6] Carlton Qualey, "Pioneer Norwegian Settlement in North Dakota," *North Dakota History,* V (October, 1930), 16.

[7] *Twelfth Census,* 734–736.

[8] Wittke, *We Who Built America,* 188.

[9] Jesse A. Tanner, "Foreign Migration into North Dakota," *"Collections of the State Historical Society of North Dakota,* I, (1906), 131–135.

of Russia offered them religious freedom, tariff-free trade, self-government, military exemption, loans and other rights if they would make Russia their home. The immediate cause of their movement to the United States was the cancellation of many of these rights including military exemption. It was not long until thousands of eligible men and their families left the Black Sea region for America where they found new homes in the agricultural Midwest.[10] In North Dakota the German-Russians settled in the central and southern areas of the state.

Before the Europeans began finding homes in North Dakota, French and English Canadians had crossed the international boundary to settle in northern North Dakota. The Canadian-born population reached its peak in 1900 with 25,004 people, or nine per cent of the state population. This ethnic group dominated those counties bordering Canada—Bottineau, Rollette, Towner, Cavalier, Pembina, and Walsh.[11]

The Immigrant and the Campaign

The immigrant was the center of attention in the North Dakota campaign of 1900. Since the ethnic groups were a potential political power, both parties attempted to win their votes. Two editorials, one in the Republican *Lakota Herald* and the other in the Democratic *Devils Lake Free Press,* keynoted the state campaign when they implied that the aim of both political parties was to capture the votes of the immigrant population. The *Lakota Herald* believed "it was plainly evident . . . that the so-called German vote will occupy a good share of the attention of Bryan Democrats,"[12] while the *Devils Lake Free Press* contended that "the Republicans will endeavor to hold the normally Republican Norwegians and at the same time work on the Germans."[13]

The Democrats, as the *Lakota Herald* suggested, placed their main emphasis upon convincing the Germans that their party was "the party which stood for the high ideals of liberty and peace that the Germans did."[14] In attempting to bring the German voters into the Democratic column the Democrats advanced the argument that the Republican party was the party of "imperialism."

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10 *Ibid.*, 199; Wittke, *We Who Built America*, 311.
11 Leon H. Truesdell, *The Canadian Born in the United States*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 29; *Twelfth Census*, 732–734.
12 *Lakota Herald*, July 6, 1900.
13 *Devils Lake Free Press*, July 13, 1900.
14 *Ibid.*

The *Bathgate Pink Paper,* one of the two Democratic daily newspapers in the state, illustrated this when it declared: "The Republican party's stand on imperialism and ultimate militarism is against all in which the German of today believes."[15] The Democrats also argued that the Republicans' friendship toward England had "entangled us in an unwritten alliance with Great Briatin, Germany's rising rival"; they further reasoned that "no loyal citizen of the United States of German birth can longer support the Republicans."[16] Bryan's party felt that the German had come to this country to escape "what the Republicans now push down his throat—militarism concealed in imperialism."[17]

The Democrats also tried to secure German votes by nominating a German, Max Wipperman, for the governorship. The importance of selecting a candidate for governor who would appeal to the ethnic population was illustrated by National Democratic Committeeman I. P. Baker who wrote: "While at our state convention we could not find a good strong Scandinavian, we did find a good strong German to run . . . , and as the German vote is quite numerous . . . I think we can elect him."[18]

Wipperman's role in the campaign was to "make flying trips to speak at German gatherings," to "organize Germans into Democratic clubs," and to "overcome Republican charges" in order to "bring the German and German-Russian population under Democratic control."[19] The Democrats believed that they could win the governorship by using a German candidate to lure the German vote.

The Republicans did not concentrate as much effort on winning the German vote as did the Democrats. Yet to counteract the influence of Wipperman in German areas, they established a German-language newspaper, *Die Wacht am Missouri,* which carried Republican views throughout the German counties.[20] Recognizing the advantage of having this important ethnic group represented on the

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15 *Bathgate Pink Paper,* as quoted in *Church's Ferry Sun,* July 20, 1900.

16 *Yankton Press and Dakotan,* July 18, 1900. This paper, printed in South Dakota, was widely circulated throughout the German areas in southern North Dakota.

17 *Wahpeton Times,* July 13, 1900.

18 I. P. Baker to Richard Pettigrew, July 28, 1900. I. P. Baker Papers, North Dakota Historical Society Library, Bismarck, North Dakota. Hereafter cited as Baker Papers.

19 I. P. Baker to Max Wipperman, November 2, 1900; I. P. Baker to Thomas Kleinogl, August 15, 1900; I. P. Baker to William F. Foye, October 22, 1900; Baker Papers.

20 *Dickinson Press,* July 15, 1900.

party ticket, they nominated a German, Ferdinand Leutz, for the position of Commissioner of Insurance.[21] It was also alleged that the Republicans had "taken ten to twelve kegs and a number of cases of beer into a German community to make a drastic effort to capture the German vote there."[22]

On the other hand, although the state Republicans were "of the opinion that the Norse and other Scandinavians were always and would always be Republicans,"[23] they attempted to secure the votes of this important ethnic group for their party. This plan to center the campaign upon the Norwegians and other Scandinavians rested upon Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota, who was described as the "most popular man in the United States with the Scandinavian population."[24] Nelson was especially popular in the Red River Valley for he had supported legislation which was or would have been beneficial to that region. The Republicans, therefore, wished to have Nelson come into North Dakota to plead the Republican cause with his fellow Scandinavians.[25]

While Nelson was visiting the Red River Valley area, a delegation of North Dakota Republicans asked him to come into North Dakota to address a rally to be held in Grand Forks. In a spectacular incident Nelson vowed he would never speak for the Republicans of his sister state while it was dominated by political bossism.[26] Republican hopes to use Nelson were crushed. Knowing that this incident could cost them Scandinavian votes, the Republicans tried to keep the matter out of the press.[27]

On the other hand, the Democrats took full advantage of the Republican blunder. The *Bathgate Pink Paper* warned the Scandinavian voters that they should follow Nelson's advice and not support the Republican machine.[28] In order to capitalize upon this

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[21] *Mandan Pioneer,* July 13, 1900.

[22] I. P. Baker to Max Wipperman, November 2, 1900. Baker Papers.

[23] *Devils Lake Free Press,* August 18, 1900.

[24] W. Jewell to Solomon Comstock, October 1, 1900. Solomon Comstock Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society Library, St. Paul, Minnesota.

[25] R. W. Farrar to Knute Nelson, October 10, 1900; G. S. Norgaard to Knute Nelson, September 22, 1900; Porter J. McCumber to Knute Nelson, August 28, 1900. Knute Nelson Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society Library, St. Paul, Minnesota. Hereafter cited as Nelson Papers.

[26] "Why Not Speak in North Dakota?"—clipping dated October 22, 1900. Nelson Papers.

[27] Of the Republican newspapers surveyed for this study not one reported the Nelson incident.

[28] *Bathgate Pink Paper* as quoted in the *Grand Forks Plaindealer,* October 26, 1900. Other Democratic papers that emphasized the Nelson incident were: *Grafton News and Times,* October 19, 1900; *Grand Forks Plaindealer,* October 25, 1900.

situation, the Democratic campaign headquarters had "several thousand of Nelson's anti-Republican remarks printed in Norwegian and Swedish and circulated in Scandinavian areas of the state."[29]

From this evidence it is clearly seen that the political parties believed that the ethnic group could become a powerful weapon in the winning of an election. It was felt that control of one or more of the major immigrant groups was essential to victory at the polls. The only major ethnic group not strongly concentrated upon was the Canadian. It may have been that the Republicans believed that these people were a lost cause because they had previously supported Democratic candidates with few exceptions.

Voting Behavior of the Immigrant

The election of 1900 retained Republican William McKinley in the White House. In polling the largest plurality in Republican history, he received 7,218,491 votes or 51.7 per cent—a slight increase over 1896. The defeated William Jennings Bryan got 6,358,071 or 45.5 per cent of the vote.[30] In North Dakota there was a greater Republican landslide than in the United States as a whole; McKinley's 35,898 votes represented 62 per cent of the votes cast, while Bryan polled 20,531 or 35.5 per cent of the state's ballots—10 per cent less than on the national level. Also, McKinley's 1900 total in North Dakota was 7 per cent greater than it had been in 1896, while Bryan's was 7.2 per cent below his previous showing.[31]

The Republicans swept every state office with the candidate for governor, Frank White, capturing 59 per cent of the votes as compared to Democrat Wipperman's 38 per cent. White carried all but three counties in recording the greatest Republican state victory since statehood.[32] The immigrant groups, as well as the native population, seemed to support the Republicans in 1900.

Of the three major ethnic groups the Canadians comprised one-fourth of the total foreign-born population. This group was dominant in the counties adjacent to Canada—30 per cent in Pembina, 29 per cent in Cavalier, 21 per cent in Bottineau, 19 per cent

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29 I. P. Baker to Thomas Kleinogl, October 22, 1900. Baker Papers.

30 Edgar E. Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, 1896–1932*, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1934, 7–9.

31 *Legislative Manual, 1897*, (Bismarck: Tribune Printers, 1897), 104; *Legislative Manual 1901*, (Bismarck: Tribune Printers, 1901), 126.

32 *Legislative Manual, 1901*, 128.

in Rollette, 15 per cent in Walsh, and 9 per cent in Towner.[33] In 1896 this section of the state gave the Democrats and Bryan a sizable margin of victory, but in 1900 these Canadian counties repudiated the Democratic party and gave McKinley the majority of the votes with a great percentage increase over the previous election.[34] It certainly appeared that the Canadians cast their ballots as a mass protest against the Democrats.

This abrupt reversal of political allegiance was probably caused by two factors. First, in their attempt to win German votes, the Democrats had pursued an anti-English attitude. They attacked the Republicans because they had formed an "unwritten alliance with Great Britain."[35] This action lost the Democrats many of the Canadian immigrant voters who maintained close ties with Canada and the English tradition. Secondly, many Canadians would not support a party that sympathized with the Boers in South Africa. While Bryan was campaigning in the Canadian countries of North Dakota, he seriously blundered when he attacked England's imperialistic policy in South Africa.[36] This incident undoubtedly drove Canadian voters into the Republican ranks.

It was the German immigrant population that during the campaign received the most attention from the political parties. While both parties sought to woo this ethnic group into their columns, it was the Democratic party which most vigorously tried to win German immigrant support by raising the issue of imperialism and by nominating a German for the governorship. The election results proved that the Democratic belief that a German running for the position of governor would carry the German counties was mistaken. Although Wipperman ran 3 per cent ahead of Bryan, he was able to win only three counties—Richland, Oliver, and Walsh. No doubt he was able to win Richland because it was his home county. Although he did carry the German county of Oliver, there were thirteen other heavily German counties that he did not carry. In McIntosh county (46 per cent German) White defeated Wipperman 602-181, while Wipperman was beaten in Mercer county (37 per cent German) by a vote of 221-83.[37]

Although it was believed that Wipperman would be able to aid the national Democratic ticket in German regions, Bryan was unable

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33 *Twelfth Census,* 732–734.
34 *Legislative Manual, 1901,* 126–128.
35 *Yankton Press and Dakotan,* July 18, 1900.
36 *Grafton News and Times,* October 3, 1900.
37 *Legislative Manual, 1901,* 128.

to win a single county. He did, however, improve his 1896 average in the German counties of Emmons (34 per cent German), Stark (21 per cent German), and Pierce (14 per cent German). The only areas where Bryan gained strength over his 1896 performance were German counties. He lost no more than 5 per cent of 1896 percentage in the counties of Morton (37 per cent German), Mercer (37 per cent German), Stutsman (13 per cent German), and McIntosh (46 per cent German).[38] Perhaps Bryan was able to maintain his strength because Wipperman was the gubernatorial candidate. Also, undoubtedly some Germans feared the "unwritten alliance with Great Britain" and Republican imperialism. The important factor is that the Democrats were able to maintain their power in many German areas while all other ethnic groups turned to the Republicans.

The largest ethnic group was the Norwegian. Since first coming to the United States they had been a strong element of the Republican party.[39] In the election of 1900 in North Dakota this immigrant group remained solidly in the Republican party. Such strongly Norwegian counties as Traill (26 per cent Norwegian), Griggs (22 per cent Norwegian), Nelson (19 per cent Norwegian), and Grand Forks (14 per cent Norwegian) gave McKinley a greater percentage of their votes in 1900 than in 1896.[40] This trend was also illustrated on the precinct level. In Norway precinct of Traill county McKinley defeated Bryan 43-16, while Norway precinct of Nelson county supported McKinley, 67-10.[41] The Knute Nelson incident caused few Norwegians to bolt their traditional party.

Although one writer has contended that these Norwegian immigrants "brought with them from Norway a tradition of rural socialism, a political heritage which they found little reason to discard in their new homeland,"[42] there is little evidence to support such a conclusion. Traill county (26 per cent Norwegian), the most heavily dominated by the Norwegian ethnic group, cast only .8 per cent of its ballots for Debs on the Socialist ticket, while Griggs and Steele counties (each 22 per cent Norwegian) gave

38 *Ibid.*, 126.

39 George Stephenson, "The Mind of the Scandinavian Immigrant," *Norwegian-American Studies and Records*, IV (1929), 72–73.

40 *Legislative Manual, 1901*, 126.

41 *Ibid.*, 161, 170.

42 Jackson K. Putnam, "The Role of the NDSP in North Dakota History," *North Dakota Quarterly*, XXIV (Fall, 1956), 116. Note: NDSP means North Dakota Socialist Party.

the Socialist only .2 per cent of their vote.[43] McHenry and Ward counties in the north-central part of the state were the centers of Socialist strength. In neither were the Norwegians the dominant group. The Norwegians in 1900 remained faithful to the Republican party.

Conclusion

From this study of immigrant groups and their part in an election, two main points may be drawn. First, politicians of the day believed that there was political strength in the ethnic group. Secondly, there was an evident pattern to immigrant voting. This second conclusion might suggest that ethnic group identity was a factor that influenced the immigrant vote.

The contention that politicians thought the ethnic group to be politically important needs no further elaboration. The efforts of the major political parties to capture the immigrant vote serves as sufficient evidence; the immigrant vote was the main concern of the campaigners. The observation that there was a voting pattern to the foreign-born vote that followed ethnic lines has been amply documented. However, the conclusion that group identity might have been a factor determining the vote needs clarification.

Although some writers have suggested that ethnic group identity was the sole factor influencing the vote in areas of large foreign population, this can be seriously challenged. Certainly economic conditions played a key role in molding the voting mind. The year 1900 was prosperous in North Dakota. Wheat prices reached fifty-eight cents a bushel as contrasted to thirty-eight in 1896 when McKinley was first elected. Corn, oats, barley, as well as wool prices made similar advances. Rising land prices coupled with a decline in mortgage indebtedness made it evident that better times had arrived under the Republicans.[44] Prosperity swayed many votes into the Republican column.

The role of group identity, however, can not be completely disregarded; it was *a* factor, although not *the* factor. The complete reversal of Canadian political allegiance illustrates the immigrant in mass protest as a group—be it against Democratic anti-English attitudes or Democratic depression. The fact that Bryan was able to maintain his strength in traditionally German areas indicates that

[43] *Legislative Manual, 1901,* 126.

[44] *Fargo Record,* VII (January, February, March, 1901), 4; *Larimore Pioneer,* June 15, 1900; *LaMoure Chronicle,* December 29, 1900.

group identity could have been an influencing force. No doubt there were those Norwegians who cast a Republican ballot because their fathers had done so before, or because the candidate was a Johnson or an Olson.

Thus, it appears that group identity did play a role in the voting of the immigrant. But it was only one force among many that influenced not only the immigrant vote, but also that of the native American.

D. Jerome Tweton

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The Waning Prestige of Lewis Cass

Milo Quaife said that "the memory of Cass has been allowed to sink into obscurity and neglect. Considering the role he played, few Americans have received less attention at the hands of writers of history."[1] Many historians would agree that Cass has been largely forgotten—even in Michigan. The following appeared in the *Detroit Collegian:*

> While he achieved a creditable record as governor, as a national figure, Lewis Cass was the conventional politician and achieved little which entitles him to renown.
>
> Perhaps the most authentic and reliable estimate of Lewis Cass is that of the late Professor Channing of Harvard who wrote that he "had a great reputation in his day, although the reason for it is somewhat indistinct at the present time."[2]

What influence did Cass wield during his long political career? When was his power greatest? When did it decline?

Cass, of course, enjoyed a great deal of prestige because of the important political offices which he held.[3] He was highly respected within the Party. Andrew Jackson wrote to Cass in 1843: "Having full confidence in your abilities and republican principles I invited you to my cabinet, and I never can forget with what discretion and talents you met those great and delicate questions which were brought before you whilst you Presided [*sic*] over the Department of War. . . ."[4]

Polk, too, had respect for Cass, who had been gracious in the loss of the Democratic nomination to him in 1844. Cass had even campaigned enthusiastically for Polk in Michigan. Hewlett stated that "on May 6 [1846], on the basis of dispatches from General Taylor, Polk called a meeting of his top advisers: Vice-President

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[1] Milo M. Quaife, "Some Reflections Concerning the Papers of Lewis Cass," 1; Manuscript in the Lewis Cass Papers. Burton Historical collection, Detroit Public Library.

[2] E. R. Skinner and Bryan Rust, "Question the Greatness of Lewis Cass," *Detroit Collegian,* January 17, 1934.

[3] He was governor of Michigan Territory, 1813–1831; Secretary of War, 1831–1836; Minister to France, 1836–1842; Democratic presidential candidate, 1848; United States Senator, 1845–1857; Secretary of State, 1857–1861.

[4] Letter from Andrew Jackson to Lewis Cass, July 8, 1843, as quoted in *General Lewis Cass, 1782-1866,* Norwood, Mass.: Plimpton Press, 1916, 24.

Dallas, Secretary of War Marcy, Secretary of State Buchanan, and Senator Cass."[5] Two years later Polk wrote to the Michigan Senator: "I need not assure you, that I shall be most happy if at the close of my term I can surrender the Government into your hands."[6] When Cass failed to win the presidency in 1848, Polk informed him:

> I am glad to learn from you, that it is possible that you may accept a re-election to the Senate and be in Washington this winter. My opinion is that under the circumstances of your position you ought not to hesitate to accept an election to the Senate. The whole Democratic party, I am sure, would be highly gratified to see you again a member of that body, where you would have the opportunity as you have heretofore so ably done, to reindicate and maintain the course of the Democratic policy.[7]

The *Detroit Advertiser,* vehemently anti-Democratic, stated: "It cannot be denied that in point of talent, influence, and distinguished reputation Gen. Cass is immensely above all other Loco Focos who are talked about for that office [Senate seat from Michigan]."[8] *The National Whig,* a pro-Taylor paper in Washington, said that although "opposed to many of Governor Cass' political doctrines, we have regarded him as one of the ablest statesmen of the country, and we are rejoiced that he will have a seat on the floor of the Senate during President Taylor's term. . . ."[9]

Perhaps the prestige of the Michigan Senator was never higher than when he returned to the Senate in 1849:

> In 1849 Cass came to Washington not only well-known but as a man of great prestige and dignity. It was no longer necessary for him to carry his opinions to others; younger men would now come to him for the benefit of his judgment and experience. His political career had reached its climax just one year before in the Presidential race. Now with ambition mellowed and spirit tempered by many political conflicts, Cass virtually 'retired' to the Senate. He had made his mark; he was willing to leave

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[5] Richard G. Hewlett, "Lewis Cass in National Politics, 1842–1861." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1952, 84. "I desire to see you for a few minutes this morning if it shall be convenient for you to call." Letter from James K. Polk to Cass, March 30, 1846. Lewis Cass Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

[6] Letter from James K. Polk to Cass, August 24, 1848. Lewis Cass Papers. "To see General Cass in the White House is and has been for years the chief political desire of my heart." Letter from James K. Polk to Lucius Lyon, November 4, 1848. *Ibid.*

[7] Letter from James K. Polk to Cass, November 26, 1848. *Ibid.*

[8] *Detroit Advertiser* as quoted by the *Hillsdale Gazette,* February 1, 1849.

[9] *Washington National Whig* as quoted by the *Hillsdale Gazette,* February 1, 1849.

the petty strivings for position to younger men. He refused appointment to any of the standing committees of the Senate. Leaving the preparation and presentation of bills to others, Cass was content with a pointed question on routine problems; with a few words to clear the air and soothe the nerves in times of crisis; with a voluminous, learned, set speech on great issues before the Senate. By remaining aloof from work-a-day functions of the Senate, Cass was able to achieve something of the role of the elder statesman, one who could be called on when the problems of state became too big for ordinary men. If he was not of this calibre, at least he was able to convey that impression to many people in 1850.[10]

For several years previous to and subsequent to the apogee of his political career in 1848, Cass enjoyed great respect and prestige. The *Ann Arbor Signal of Liberty* stated that "as an individual we have respect for the General."[11] *The Baltimore Sun,* alluding to Cass, remarked in 1852: "There is an inate dignity in some men, which cannot be eclipsed even by what would appear as grotesque in other persons."[12] *The Hillsdale Gazette* affirmed: "No one, it is believed, has the strong hold on the nation's affections that Gen. Cass has. His whole career is public and without reproach."[13] The owner of the *Detroit Free Press* in 1853 was W. F. Storey. Charles Perry said of him:

> In the conduct of his paper he gathered an able staff around him and ruled them with an iron discipline. He respected no man's opinions with the possible exception of those of Lewis Cass. He declared that he wanted no friends, as having friends would hamper his freedom in printing the news.[14]

Harper's Weekly referred to Cass as a "monumental figure. No man has filled so large a place in American history. Many presidents will rank, in after times, beneath Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Marcy, and Cass."[15] From another quarter Cass was honored:

> . . . the Indians who as late as the last council in Detroit, of the Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomies July 25, 1855, testified their respect for and confidence in him by abandoning their discussion, flocking about him,

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[10] Hewlett, "Lewis Cass," 166–167. "During his second term in the Senate, 1851–1857, Cass dominated if he did not completely control the foreign policy of the Democratic Party." *Ibid.* A ball was given in honor of Cass on February 22, 1851, at Tammany Hall.

[11] *Ann Arbor Signal of Liberty,* July 15, 1844.

[12] *Baltimore Sun* as quoted by the *Detroit Free Press,* September 15, 1852.

[13] *Hillsdale Gazette,* January 8, 1852.

[14] Charles M. Perry, "The Newspaper Attack on Dr. Tappan," *Michigan History Magazine,* X (1926), 499.

[15] *Harper's Weekly,* April 11, 1857.

grasping his hand and saluting him as an old and valued friend when he unexpectedly entered the council room.[16]

Apparently there was a rapid decline in the influence of the Michigan statesman when he was forced to leave the Senate. Even the friendly *Detroit Free Press* admitted: "More than any great statesman alive does he [Cass] occupy the position of a disinherited patriot."[17] Between 1844 and 1855, the *Free Press* had anticipated the stump engagements of Cass by announcing his itinerary as well as naming the other Democratic speakers appearing on the program with the Michigan Senator. During these years, the name of Cass invariably led the list: "Gen. Cass, Gov. Felch, and Gov. McClelland. . . ."[18] Beginning in 1856, however, the same journal began to report: "Speeches by Breckinridge, Dickinson, Preston, Cass and Felch. . . ."[19] "No longer to be reckoned with as a power in the West, Cass was virtually forgotten in the Democratic strategy which preceded the Cincinnati Convention of 1856."[20]

> The historian has looked in vain for any expression of Cass' opinion on the momentous issues of 1858, 1859, and 1860. . . . As a cabinet officer [Secretary of State], he was forgotten to a degree that hardly seems possible. Even the Michigan Democracy disowned him. In the state convention which met in Detroit in June, 1860, a delegate moved that Cass, who was in the city, be invited to attend the convention as a guest; but after a brief discussion the motion was tabled and forgotten.[21]

The active political career of Cass came to an end when he resigned the position of Secretary of State. Stripped of the respect and prestige which for years had been his as head of the Democratic party, his return to Michigan was a sad affair. Cass was, in effect, going home to die after a long political life which had been marked with misfortune. He had been defeated for the presidency in 1848; the nation had condemned his popular sovereignty thesis after its ignominious failure in Kansas in 1856; he had been repudiated by his own state and forced out of the Senate during the same year; and he found himself in 1861 in a position which left him no alternative but resignation. Moreover, "he now saw simul-

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16 Thomas W. Palmer, *Congressional Record*, 50th Congress, 2nd session, 2002.
17 *Detroit Free Press*, January 11, 1856.
18 *Ibid.*, October 19, 1852.
19 *Ibid.*, September 7, 1856.
20 Hewlett, "Lewis Cass," 279.
21 *Ibid.*, 291.

taneously with the defeat of his party which he loved, the country which he had served, going rapidly, he believed, to inevitable dissolution and destruction."[22]

In 1889, W. F. Poole suggested to the Houghton-Mifflin Company,[23] which was publishing a series of biographies dealing with great American statesmen, that Andrew C. McLaughlin[24] be asked to do the life of Lewis Cass. John T. Morse, editor of the Statesmen Series, replied that the series was closed.[25] Later Morse changed his mind. His letter to McLaughlin casts some light upon the subject of the prestige of Cass at the time, twenty-three years after his death:

> Several months ago it was suggested to me that you might like to write a life of Cass for the American Statesmen Series. It did not, at the time, fall in with my plan to include Cass in the Series, but upon further consideration I am inclined to revise this decision. The political growth and characteristics of the Northwest are not depicted in any volume as yet, and I think that this leaves a hiatus which I ought to fill. It is rather for this purpose than because Cass himself seems to me, as an individual, to deserve to be included, that I have made up my mind [to] add his biography. . . . I say this only in order to show you the *motive* which I should like to have you bear in mind in writing the book, if you undertake it. I do not conceive that Cass did much in the way of shaping the policy, or controlling the fortunes of the country, or in creating public opinion; therefore his personality should not be the dominating interest of the book, as in the case of Jefferson and Hamilton.[26]

A granddaughter of Cass informed McLaughlin that her mother was pleased about the fact that an historian was going to write

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[22] William E. Chandler, *Congressional Record*, 50th Congress, 2nd session, 2007.

[23] "I have just written a letter to Houghton-Mifflin and Co., warmly commending the paper you read at Washington, and advising them to ask you to prepare a life of Gov. Cass for the series of 'American Statesmen.'" Letter from W. F. Poole to A. C. McLaughlin, January 14, 1889. Andrew C. McLaughlin Papers. Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan.

[24] McLaughlin was a professor of history at the University of Michigan. He had read a paper in Washington entitled "The Influence of Governor Cass on the Development of the Northwest," which had considerably impressed W. F. Poole. Although McLaughlin was a Republican, his subsequent book presented Cass as a truly great statesman. This is the only biography of Cass that has been done by a professional historian.

[25] Letter from John T. Morse to James J. Angell, January 15, 1889. Andrew C. McLaughlin Papers.

[26] Letter from John T. Morse to Andrew C. McLaughlin, April 16, 1889. *Ibid.*

a biography of her father. Heretofore, said Elizabeth Cass Goddard, "everything relating to him that has been published has been for some political purpose, and therefore most unsatisfactory."[27]

The political career of Lewis Cass spanned fifty-five years, one of the longest on record. Perhaps Cass deserves no more recognition than he is receiving. There are some, however, who disagree. Quaife said that Cass was "the peer in character, patriotism, and ability of any of his contemporaries. . . ."[28] Dwight L. Dumond declared categorically: "He was the greatest statesman that Michigan ever produced."[29]

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27 Letter from Elizabeth Cass Goddard to Andrew C. McLaughlin, August 29 (no year provided). *Ibid.*

28 Quaife, "Some Reflections," 1.

29 Statement from a lecture by Dwight L. Dumond, January 1957, at the University of Michigan.

Book Reviews

Illinois Internal Improvements, 1818–1848. By John H. Krenkel. Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1958. Pp. 252. $4.00.

This book represents a thorough treatment of Illinois's participation in the internal improvement craze which swept the country in the late 1820's and 1830's. Dr. Krenkel deals expertly with all phases of the extravagant program including a detailed analysis of the beginnings of the system, the feeble and unsuccessful efforts of private enterprise to construct the improvements, the law of 1837 committing the state to build the projects, the administration, construction, and financing of the system, the ensuing financial disaster, and the eventual liquidation of the state debt.

Dr. Krenkel writes sympathetically of his subject, and with a complete knowledge of it gained through extensive research in newspapers, government documents, collection of letters, and other archival material. The book is carefully footnoted, well indexed, contains a series of helpful appendices and a folding map showing the proposed system in 1838. This study, originally a doctoral dissertation, is not intended for the layman. The author's straightforward and concise style, however, makes a difficult and complex subject easy to read and understand. Certainly the topic will never need to be rewritten, and the monograph serves as a valuable and basic study for a more extensive treatment of the internal improvement "extravaganza" during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

The shortcomings are minor ones and those which are likely to appear in most books. Mentioning those detected in no way lessens the importance of the work. The fact that there is only one item listed in the bibliography published in the last twenty years is not so much the fault of the author as the neglect of historians to do research in this fruitful area. Dr. Krenkel obviously drew a bit too heavily on certain chapters in the *Frontier State* written by Theodore Calvin Pease. Some repitition was noted such as occurs on pages 49-50 repeated to some extent on pages 75-76, and on page 197 repeated on page 213. In summary it can be said, however, that the book is a useful addition to the history of Illinois during the Jacksonian era.

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Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. By John Lynch. University of London, The Athlone Press, London, and Essential Books, Fair Lawn, New Jersey, 1958. Pp. xi, 335. 42s.

The impact of the intendant system from the time it was superimposed on the Spanish colonies has been a subject of continuing interest to historians. Professor Lynch, of the University of Liverpool, previously demon-

strated his research and ability in this area in his article "Intendants and Cabildos in the Viceroyalty of La Plata, 1782-1810," (*HAHR,* XXXV, August 1955). In the present volume he expands the theme set forth in that article and analyzes the effect of the intendant system on the viceroy, the exchequer, public administration, the Indian, and the audiencia, concluding with an analysis of the intendant and the revolution.

The early chapters are concerned with the general changes in administrative structure in the colonial system from Philip V through Charles III, and with the "stepchild" province of the Río de la Plata from its foundation until the establishment of the viceroyalty in 1776. Indicating that the interest of the crown in creating a new viceroyalty arose essentially from Charles III's fear of Britain and Portugal, Professor Lynch sees the intendants introduced as an additional aid to assure internal order and security. Geographic and personnel problems were thorny, the latter especially so, as the time-worn prejudice against the Creoles still remained, ". . . for they lacked the mode of thinking . . . prevalent in Spain . . . ," and the difficulty of obtaining competent Spaniards proved so enormous that from time to time they had no alternative but to engage a "native."

When he considers the relationship of the intendants to the viceroy, Professor Lynch writes a most interesting chapter. How could the division of power implicit in the intendant system harmonize with the stature and prestige of the viceroy? His narrative of the struggle between Viceroy Loreto and Superintendent Sanz might seem to indicate that harmony was not to be expected because of intrinsic differences in the systems. However, Professor Lynch is careful to point out that this and other conflicts which existed were primarily conflicts of personalities and not of institutions. The newness of the viceroyalty in this area should have insured the compatible growth of the two systems and, with certain modifications of jurisdiction, there seemed no intrinsic reason why harmonious and efficient administration could not have been obtained.

In the attempted financial reorganization, high hopes were held for increased revenue from mines and taxes as well as for increased efficiency. However, patronage, sale of offices, and personnel problems mired down these hopes. The lethargy in mining techniques could not be surmounted even for a foreign mission, one of whose members described the methods of Potosí miners as steeped in ". . . incredible barbarism and ignorance. . . ."

The unhappy lot of the Indian was not improved by the intendant system. Perhaps the kindest words the author has on the subject are that the intendants were not indifferent toward the natives but that they had the very "disconcerting" habit of indulging in theoretical discussions while practical problems of the *encomiendas* and *mita* went unsolved. His words are sharp for the administrators of the former Jesuit reductions. Disinterest, inefficiency and desire for profit are pointed out as characteristics of the new secular administration. While generally critical, Professor Lynch does not fail to point out those voices crying for justice, such as that of Viedma in the Cochabamba area who tried to get a fair land distribution for the Indian, and González in Puno who refused to send the *mita* quota to Potosí, and Villava of the audiencia of Charcas who strove unsuccessfully to gain condemnation of the *mita.* His conclusion

is that Spain lacked a clear policy and that advances, if any, were made only by virtue of the quality of the individual.

An interesting phenomenon is presented in the case of the *cabildos* and in particular the *cabildo* of Buenos Aires. Weak and impoverished before the establishment of the new system, the enhanced commerce, interest in public works, and civic responsibilities, appear to have given them a new life and a sense of power they had known only rarely in times past. This advent of strength in the face of a system designed to strengthen centralization rather than localize authority is explained in part by the hands-off policy pursued toward *cabildo* elections, as well as by the increase in their funds due to the activity of the intendants. Demands made on the *cabildos* for statements of accounts as well as for estimates of tax requirements seemed to have stimulated the old institutions to new and vigorous activity. The conclusions are that this reinvigoration at the hands of the new system prepared the *cabildo* for its role in the days of revolution. The author points out that not only did this maturing of the *cabildos* set the stage for revolution, but that the whole structure of the intendant system worked as a divisive force, weakening the colonial administrative structure prior to the days of Ferdinand VII.

For the most part this study is original, from unpublished documents of Seville. It is fine history and an eminently worthwhile contribution. The appendix, glossary, bibliography, and index are excellently done.

MARTIN J. LOWERY

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The Making of an American Community. By Merle Curti. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1959. Pp. vii, 483. $8.50.

"This place [remarked the Reverend Mr. D. O. Van Slyke] used to be noted for . . . good society, pleasant surroundings, and well defined moral influences. Has the reverse come to be true? Have we no civil laws and civil forces? Has Galesville ceased to be America? Have all or most all the better classes moved away?" This complaint sounds like many voiced in 1959 but it appeared in the *Galesville* [Wisconsin] *Independent* on October 3, 1878, nearly eighty-one years ago. The words seem to assure us that although social conditions may not be ideal at present, they are at least as good as they were eighty-one years ago. Hence, things are perhaps not getting worse; they are simply remaining as bad as they already were.

The above quotation and scores equally pertinent are found in *The Making of an American Community,* a microscopic study made of an "area that experienced transition from wilderness to settled community with the purpose of determining how much democracy, in Turner's sense, existed initially in the first phase of settlement, during the process itself, and in the period that immediately followed." The area studied was

Trempeleau County, in the central part of western Wisconsin. This county was not studied because it was considered "typical" of frontiers in general. It was simply a frontier, and one blessed with good records. Ten newspapers were available, as were three important collections of private papers, plus unusually well preserved county records. At least one good history of the county had already been published. The period studied extended from the 1850's to the 1880's.

In addition to employing historical research in the ordinary meaning of the term, Dr. Merle Curti and his four main assistants used quantitative methods whenever these seemed appropriate and feasible. Using codes, the members of this research team recorded on cards all householders and gainfully employed individuals listed in the unpublished federal censuses of 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880. Generalizations were then based on comprehensive data, rather than on samples or on impressions based on incomplete records.

Chapter titles such as "Social and Economic Structure," "Making a Living on the Farm," and "Choosing Officials" are indicative of the results of the research. The one entitled "The Social Creed" seems particularly illustrative of the community. Samuel Luce, editor of the *Galesville Independent,* often argued in his editorials that the West, or, the frontier, contributed in a very real sense to the development of "fine human beings, people with confidence in themselves." In the issue of August 1, 1862, he maintained in an editorial that the Westerners were by no means the incompetent and stupid people that the Easterners considered them to be. Each individual in the West, Luce maintained, tended to become an important factor in multiplying " 'the facilities of civilization.' " Convinced of his own importance and realizing that he could not be spared, "the pioneer found life more living than his fellows who stayed in the East and lived their lives under less taxing conditions." However, crimes did occur in this latter day Eden. The newspapers reported that some shops had been robbed. One man rightfully complained because someone had stolen his heifer, killed it and made off with the meat. Lawsuits involving ownership of land were common, giving employment to many lawyers. Fights and brawls were frequent but it seems that few murders took place. Gun fights were not common in this part of the West.

Many helpful tables presenting detailed statistical data concerning such matters as the farms of the settlers, family income, school attendance, occupational changes, receipts and disbursements of the county treasurer's office and the cost of schools are given. For factual information concerning the growth of a community, this study leaves nothing to be desired. It is strongly recommended to anyone interested in the history of the American frontier.

PAUL KINIERY

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Notes and Comments

Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics, by William S. Hoffmann, was published late last year as Volume 40 of The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science by The University of North Carolina Press at Chapel Hill. Hoffmann's theme is North Carolina politics from 1824 to 1837 in the setting of defamation and character assassination of the Jacksonian era. His purpose is to examine the North Carolina segment of the national political picture, North Carolina's place in the vital development of the two party system, and Andrew Jackson's influence in the formation of North Carolina's political character. Granting that historians have covered the dramatic clashes between "Old Hickory" and Biddle, Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, Hoffmann goes quickly to his study in North Carolina. His work is thoroughly documented and compressed into 134 pages. In an exceptional summary, Chapter XII, "Evaluation and Conclusions," Hoffmann finds that during his first term as President, Jackson satisfied North Carolina by holding to Jefferson's state rights doctrine. Needing a low tariff the state turned away from Clay and Webster. Jackson's dismissal of John Branch, former governor of North Carolina, from his cabinet helped vastly in gathering together all anti-Jacksonists into state extremists, who in turn became part of the Whig party. In general: "The story of North Carolina politics from 1824 to 1837 is the story of politicians maneuvering to gain or maintain political power. . . . The majority of the people of North Carolina loved Jackson." (P. 117)

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There should be more books written in the clear, concise, and penetrating manner of *Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914–1917,* by Daniel M. Smith. This is Volume 59 of the University of California Publications in History, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958. Such a study could not have been written if a new documentary source had not been opened recently, that is, the Confidential Memoranda of Robert Lansing. These materials lead Mr. Smith to the positive conclusion "that not only was Lansing's role of supreme importance but that his tenure in the Department of State has earned for him a place among the leading American secretaries of state." Eight

chapters amply substantiate this general conclusion, while the ninth chapter is a summary of Lansing's enormous part in the fashioning of American war diplomacy. A new Lansing emerges. The paper-covered volume is of 241 pages, including an excellent bibliography and index.

In this same series of Publications in History, Volume 62 is *Bondsmen and Bishops, Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codrington Plantations of Bardados, 1710–1838,* by J. Harry Bennett, Jr. This is an interesting and important study based upon a complete body of documents newly discovered by Frank J. Klingberg in the London archives of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts of the Anglican Church. By an odd will Christopher Codrington in 1710 bequeathed his two sugar plantations to the Society with the stipulation that the Society was to man a college on the island with professors under the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, who were to operate the plantations and take care of the bodies and souls of 300 slaves. How the committee of Church of England bishops got around the will and managed the estates for over a century is Mr. Bennett's interesting contribution.

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Saint Anthony's Century, 1858–1958, by Hilda Engbring Feldhake, was published by St. Anthony of Padua Church, Effingham, Illinois, in commemoration of the foundation and the hundred years of service of the Church. This is a remarkable example of local and parochial history and may well serve as a model of data gathering for local historical societies. By painstaking research and thorough collecting of evidence Mrs. Feldhake amassed enough historical material to fill a pictorial museum. A great number of the pictures of individuals and groups are handsomely printed in the volume. Part One, traces the history of the town of Effingham and its surroundings from the original settlement to the present, with the story of the growth of the parish interwoven. Genealogies of families, biographical sketches of townsmen and pastors, charts of land ownership, and origins of civic and rural institutions are incorporated and suitably illustrated. No name of a contributor to the growth of Effingham and its Catholic parish is omitted. Parish statistics and a chronological table of events complete the first part. Part Two has to do with the parish and its many services in the community. The contributions of man power of this German-American town during the Civil War,

the Spanish-American War, and the World Wars were notable. The primary and secondary schools have long satisfied the educational needs under the direction of the religious and lay instructors. Besides carrying out its religious functions the church became the center of many social, cultural, and civic activities, each of which has its place in the well-arranged volume. The list price is a very reasonable five dollars.

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Scholars are again indebted to The Newberry Library, this time for the publication of *A Catalogue of Printed Materials Relating to the Philippine Islands, 1519–1900, in the Newberry Library,* as compiled by Doris Varner Welsh. This checklist completes the catalogue of printed materials in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry and adds many items on linguistics to those listed in Mrs. Welch's *Checklist of Philippine Linguistics,* published by the Library in 1950. Of over 3,000 items in the Philippine collection the *Checklist* named more than a thousand, while the present *Catalogue* lists nearly 1,900, classified under the headings of political, religious, social, economic, and local history. The manuscripts in the Ayer Collection were well taken care of by Paul S. Lietz in his *Calendar of Philippine Documents in the Ayer Collection,* published in 1956. Thus, the scholar has the bibliographic tools for investigating in a rich collection of Filipiniana. The materials listed cover Philippine history and ethnology only, and are second in this country in volume to those in the Library of Congress which cover all phases of Philippine life.

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Seventy-five Years of Latin American Research at the University of Texas, is Latin American Studies XVIII of the publications of The Institute of Latin American Studies of the University of Texas, Austin. Here is a complete and imposing list of 670 doctoral and master's dissertations on Latin American subjects written between 1893 and 1958, and a second list of publications between 1941 and 1958. This is definitely a help to libraries and to professors directing research in Latin American and Texas history. It is hoped that the 67 page booklet will be an inspiration to other universities to publish similar lists of their scholarly productions.

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Just born: *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* Volume I, Number 1, January, 1959. Published by the School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida, Gainsville, under a grant from the Pan-American Foundation, Inc., the *Journal* is under the General Editor, Robert E. McNicholl, Associate Editor, A. Curtis Wilgus, five contributing editors, and three consultants. The *Journal* publishes studies on all aspects of the Americas in any of the official languages of the American countries and offers itself as a new means for the interchange of scholarly ideas especially in the humanities and social sciences. The initial number in 102 pages has stimulating articles by Dantès Bellegarde, C. Harvey Gardiner, Elena Vérez de Peraza, Harold E. Davis, José J. Arrom, J. Fred Rippy, and Aurelio de la Vega. We advise you to obtain it at two dollars for the annual subscription at the address of the *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* Box 3625, University Station, Gainesville, Florida.

* * * *

On January 10, 1612, James I, "By the Grace of Almighty God, who created Heaven and Earth, Kinge of great Brittaine, France, and Ireland, Defendor of the Christian Faith, &ct.," wrote a letter "To the High and Mightie, the Emperor of Japan, &ct.," asking for a treaty of trade and commerce. This letter is in the James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota. It has now been reproduced and put in the latest publication of the Collection, a beautifully printed brochure of twenty-four pages entitled *A Royal Request for Trade.* The brochure has a Foreword by John Parker, Curator, and the letter is placed in its historical setting by David Harris Willison. The brochure is a fine addition to the growing list of similar publications by the James Ford Bell Collection.

* * * *

The King Can Do No Wrong, by William L. Reuter, is a recent addition to the Lincolniana in 1958. The little volume of sixty-two pages tells of the capture of John Wilkes Booth by Colonel Everton J. Conger and of Booth's death at the hands of Sergeant Corbett. Fifty-one years after the assassination of Lincoln, Colonel Conger was asked to dictate the story of his search for the assassin. Conger did so, but his narrative never found its way into print until Professor Reuter decided to preserve it in this book. Conger's own words remain as he dictated them, and Reuter has interspersed

passages descriptive of the times and persons, adding as an "Aftermath" the trial of the other conspirators and the attempts to save Mrs. Surratt. The whole is a highly dramatic presentation. It is published by Pageant Press and its list price is $2.50.

* * * *

With the peoples of the world insecure in the cold war and in unsettled domestic conditions two men have come forth with plans for world peace. The plans begin at opposite points, one with the renovation of the individual human being and the other with a super-governmental force capable of enforcing world peace. *Permanent Peace, a Check and Balance Plan,* by Tom Slick, published by Prentice Hall in 1958, offers a step by step program whereby the machinery for collective security may be established. The author is widely known for his vast activities in businesses, philanthropies and research. The other plan, *Toward a New World,* by the Italian Jesuit, Richard Lombardi, translated into English and published by Philosophical Library, Inc., in 1958, has been widely announced to vast audiences in Europe for over ten years. If society is to be renovated and peace established the individual member of society must renovate himself according to the principles of the Gospel. The individual is given practical advice on establishing peace and security in his own home, with his neighbor, in his community, and his local institutions of government, politics, business, education, and labor. The local renovation when multiplied becomes a state, then national renovation and then world-wide, until a family of nations appears following the great principles of the love of God and neighbor.

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The Northwestern Frontier and the Impact of the Sioux War, 1862

Minne-ha-ha, laughing water
Cease thy laughing now for aye,
Savage hands are red with slaughter
Of the innocent today.

Ill accords thy sportive humor
With their last despairing wail;
While thou'rt dancing in the sunbeam
Mangled corpses strew the vale.

Change thy note, gay Minne-ha-ha;
Let some sadder strain prevail. . . .[1]

Perhaps even Captain Richard Chittenden, reputed composer of this gruesome parody, was not aware of the extent of the Sioux outbreak. As swiftly as the sun-kissed falls of his poem, the native warriors were tumbling across prairie and forest of Minnesota, Dakota, and Iowa. John G. Nicolay, one of Lincoln's secretaries,

Note: After this paper had been submitted for publication in these pages, C. M. Oehler's *The Great Sioux Uprising* was published by Oxford University Press. The paper remains different from the book in its approach and perspective, and amplifies Mr. Oehler's work with respect to causes and effects of the uprising. Professor Jones kindly consented to write a review of Oehler, which may be found in the book review section of this number. Editor.

[1] The poem is attributed to Captain Richard H. Chittenden, on leave from Campany E, First Wisconsin Volunteer Cavalry, and was composed while riding with a group of Minnesota cavalry to the relief of Fort Ridgely. Quoted from Nathaniel West, *The Ancestry, Life, and Times on Hon. Henry Hastings Sibley, LL.D.*, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1889, 250.

urgently telegraphed an on-the-spot report to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton:

> The Sioux, mustering perhaps 200 warriors, are striking along a line of scattered frontier settlements of 200 miles, having already massacred several hundred whites, and the settlers of the whole border are in panic and in flight, leaving their harvest to waste in the fields as I myself have seen even in neighborhoods where there is no danger. The Chippewa are . . . turbulent . . . and the Winnebagos are suspected of hostile intent. . . . As against the Sioux it must be a war of extermination.[2]

This full-scale war broke out in Minnesota on August 17, 1862, a time as unfortunate for the Union as it was propitious for the Indians. In spite of the savage hands red with slaughter and the mangled corpses in the vale of the Minnesota River, the war-whoops and tom-toms and shotguns on the northwestern frontier were scarcely heard above the rebel yells and drums and din of cannon fire in the South.

None the less, the noise in the north had an ominous overtone. The Sioux scarcely were an obscure tribe known just by the French traders, for they had been allies of the English in the War of 1812, had helped the United States track down and destroy the remnants of Blackhawk's tribe, had terrorized the California trail in the 1850's, and as late as 1857 a renegade group had massacred thirty-two settlers at Spirit Lake, Iowa. The 1862 uprising was on the largest scale yet, however, and, taking advantage of hindsight, one may note this proud and untamed people was not to be finally quieted until after the battle of Wounded Knee, two weeks after the death of Sitting Bull, in 1890. Individual murders and petty riots continued for some time even after that. The names of General George Crook and Colonel George A. Custer have become almost legendary; but the names of John Pope and Henry H. Sibley, men who first handled the Sioux problem, have been all but forgotten.

A number of factors combined to precipitate the savage explosion in the northwest in August, 1862. Originally, the Mdewakanton, Wahpeton, and Sisseton tribes of the Sioux nation roamed the extensive, beautiful, and fertile regions of northwestern Iowa, western Wisconsin, southwestern Minnesota, and adjoining Dakota

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[2] *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* Series I-IV, Index and Atlas, 74 vols. in 132, Washington, 1895–1901 (1), Ser. I, vol. XIII, 620; hereafter cited as *Official Records.* Nicolay was in the Northwest on an assignment to the Chippewa Indians.

Territory. Herds of buffalo grazed over rolling plains that were scattered with wooded groves, countless lakes, streams, and rivers; a vast area with an abundance of wild-fowl and fur-bearing animals such as otter, mink, beaver, and deer.[3] The attraction of this country was as strong for white settlers as it was for the native Sioux, and the advance of the white settlers into it was an inevitable as the expulsion from it was for the Indian. By a series of treaties over a period of sixty years the Sioux were compressed into an ever-dwindling reserve that by 1858[4] had been reduced to a ribbon of land ten miles wide, located along the south bank of the Minnesota River and spanning the 150 miles between Lake Traverse and a point just below Fort Ridgely.[5]

The Mdewakanton and Wahpekuta[6] occupied the lands below the Yellow Medicine River, called the Lower Reservation, while the Sisseton and Wahpeton inhabited the area above the Yellow Medicine, which was termed the Upper Reservation.[7] The Indian agent, whose job included the administration of the treaties, resided among them and established two places for the transaction of his business; the Lower or Redwood Agency, located fourteen miles above Fort Ridgely, and the Upper or Yellow Medicine Agency, situated at the mouth of the Yellow Medicine River. Around these agencies were small villages of residences, stores, warehouses, schools, and churches.[8] The missionaries Stephen Return Riggs and Thomas Smith Williamson had schools and churches a few miles above the Yellow Medicine; at Lac qui Parle were the house and school of another missionary, Amos W. Huggins, along with a government storehouse and blacksmith shop; and at the Lower Agency was the mission of Samuel W. Hinman. At Big Stone Lake and at other points on the reservation, trading posts had been established.[9]

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[3] Isaac V. D. Heard, *History of the Sioux War and Massacres of 1862 and 1863*, New York, 1864, [13], 14.

[4] Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, Senate Document* No. 452, 57 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial 4254, Washington, 1903), vol. II, 177, 586, 590, 594. Other treaties were: 1830, 218; 1836, 347, 355, 357; 1837, 366, 439; 1851, 437, 438, 440.

[5] Heard, *Sioux War*, 18.

[6] The spelling of Indian names varies from writer to writer. Where questionable the spellings used are those in Appendix I, "Revised Spelling of Names of Indian Tribes and Bands," in Kappler, *Indian Affairs*, vol. I, 1021.

[7] Heard, *Sioux War*, 18.

[8] *Ibid.*, 21, 22.

[9] *Ibid.* Also, Stephen R. Riggs, *Tah-Koo Wah-Kań, or the Gospel Among the Dakotas*, Boston, c. 1869, 107, 312; cited hereafter as Riggs, *Gospel Among the Dakotas*. Henry Benjamin Whipple, *Lights and Shadows of a Long Episcopate*, New York, 1912, 61–62.

Living in scattered groups mostly along the Minnesota River, there were some 6,600 Minnesota Sioux of the several tribes, and another 3,000 or 4,000 Yanktonai Sioux roaming in nearby Dakota Territory.[10] The treaties meant to bind the Sioux were not much different from those the government made with other tribes. The Sioux did not wholly understand them or, with reason, trust those who administered them. These treaties had a two-fold purpose: to civilize and to educate the Indians. But the treaties of 1858 with the Sioux on the Minnesota Reservation differed primarily from those of 1851[11] in reducing the area of the reservation by one half. This divested the ten-mile-wide band on the north bank of the river from the reservation. This land was sold publicly, and its proceeds up to $70,000 were paid to the chiefs and headmen. The remainder was surveyed, eighty-acre tracts were alloted to heads of families "as soon as practicable," and the rest of the land held in common. The usual treaty stipulations were included: the right of the United States to maintain military posts, roads, and the like, on the reservation; assurances of friendly relations among the bands of Indians and between them collectively and the United States; agreements to surrender to justice criminals and offenders; an article for the enforcing of prohibition, and another giving the Secretary of the Interior discretionary power over disbursement of annuities.[12] The amounts agreed to in the 1851 treaties were not changed. Annual interest payments at five per cent drawn from trust funds totaling over $3,000,000 continued for purposes of agricultural and educational improvement and for "goods and provisions." The treaties and the annuity allotments were the result of cession by the Sioux of "all their lands in the State of Iowa; and all their lands in the Territory of Minnesota. . . ."[13]

Another section of the treaty, an attempt to convert the Sioux to a stationary, agricultural people, caused dissatisfaction. The stipulation allocating eighty acres to a family and disbursing annuities for purposes of education and agriculture was particularly annoying. Sioux Agent Thomas J. Galbraith states the policy of refining the Indians in very bold terms:

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10 *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1863, *House Executive Document* No. 1, 38 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial 1182, Washington, 1864), 410: report of Thomas J. Galbraith, Sioux Agent, dated St. Paul, January 27, 1863. See also *House Executive Document* No. 68, 37 Cong., 3 Sess. (Serial 1163, Washington, 1863), 38: included in this document is another copy of Galbraith's report plus other papers pertaining to the same subject.

11 Kappler, *Indian Affairs*, vol. II, 437, 438, 440.

12 *Ibid.*, 590–597.

13 *Ibid.*, 437, 438, 439.

By my predecessor a new and radical system was inaugurated practically, and in its inauguration he was aided by the Christian missionaries and by the government. The treaties of 1858 were ostensibly made to carry this new system into effect.

The theory, in substance, was to break up the community system among the Sioux; weaken and destroy their tribal relations; individualize them by giving each a separate home, and having them subsist by industry—the sweat of their brows; till the soil; make labor honorable and idleness dishonorable; or, as it was expressed in short, *"make white men of them."*[14]

This program proved abortive. About 175 "annuity Sioux" became farmers, but the great majority had not and they manifested considerable hostility toward those who had. The farmers were known as "Cut-hair and breeches" Indians (because they adopted the white men's dress) or "Dutchmen," a name of opprobrium, while the others were known as "Scalp-lock" or "Blanket" Indians.

The few who were farmers had made considerable progress, in spite of harassment by the others. They had put almost 3,000 acres under cultivation, two thirds in corn, in the spring of 1862. They expected a harvest of about 53,000 bushels of turnips, including rutabagas, some other vegetables, and a small amount of wheat. The estimated total value of these crops was about $119,400.[15] The white men conceded this to be a good beginning.

A second facet of the civilizing of the Sioux was the activity of the missionaries, though it was even less successful than the attempt to make farmers of them. "Indeed, with quite a large majority of that people the settled purpose not to change their religion and the customs of their fathers was manifest. . . ."[16] The lure of getting a feather as the decoration of a warrior and their reluctance to do such squaw's work as farming, showed the hold of tribal customs, on occasion even upon Indians who were supposed to be civilized. The tribal affiliation was so strong among many that they participated in the Sioux outbreak of 1862, although they realized the futility of such an action.[17]

The proud nature of the Sioux was a powerful factor in their

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[14] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 25–26; "Chief Big Eagle's Story of the Sioux Outbreak of 1862," *Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society*, vol. 6, St. Paul, 1894, 384.

[15] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 15–16, 26, 34.

[16] Riggs, *Gospel Among the Dakotas*, 391; Whipple, *Lights and Shadows*, 62. In the nine months after the opening of the first mission at the Lower Agency, Rev. Hinman was able to confirm only seven of the several thousand that lived nearby.

[17] "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387, 390.

arrogance toward the whites. This certainly stood behind the mosaic of causes that influenced the outbreak of warfare on the northwestern frontier. Chief Big Eagle, thirty-two years after his participation in the uprising, gave reasons for the war similar to those noted by Galbraith, substituting for his dim view of the Indian an equally dim view of the white man. Big Eagle spoke disparagingly of the presence of traders at the annuity payment (which they attended to collect their debts, just or unjust) and also told of the Indian distrust of them. The Sioux were also irritated by the superior attitude of the white man (because "the Dakotas did not believe there were better men in the world then they") and by the white man's abuse of Indian women. He blamed the "Blanket"-versus-"Farmer" controversy on the whites. When Galbraith enlisted a volunteer company of half-breeds at the agencies the Sioux were convinced the North was desperate in its struggle with the South. Big Eagle also criticized the change in administration in 1861, and the appointment of new agents and a new Superintendent of the Northern District, Clark Thompson, and their innovations in the management of Sioux affairs. He spoke of the weakened condition of the frontier, which seemed to present the redmen with a good opportunity to recover their lands. Many Sioux hoped a war might once again unify them. They believed the Chippewa, as well as the Winnebago, would assist them.[18]

Apparently there was much discussion of these matters among the Sioux, who substituted temper and pride for reason and became belligerent that summer. On June 25, as the payment of annuities usually took place about then, they made a demonstration about the Upper Agency, and inquired about their money. Galbraith told them he did not expect the payment to arrive before July 20, issued them some provisions, and sent them home.[19] On July 14, about 4,000 annuity Sioux and 1,000 Yanktonai (who were not included in the payments, but who claimed a share) came down to the Yellow Medicine to collect their money. Galbraith was puzzled as to how to deal with them since the money still had not arrived, but he managed to put them off and keep them fed until August 1, when his supplies were nearly used up.[20] On August 4 the Sioux surprised the agency and the troops on guard and forcibly

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[18] *Ibid.*, 384–387.

[19] *Ibid.*, 388; Heard, *Sioux War*, 44–46; *House Executive Document* No. 68, 16; *House Executive Document* No. 58, 38 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial 1189, Washington, 1864), 11–12.

[20] Heard, *Sioux War*, 47; *House Executive Document* No. 68, 17.

broke into the government warehouse.[21] The troops succeeded in restoring order, and Galbraith, in the presence of Captain John F. Marsh, of Company B, Fifth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, and of the missionary, Riggs, issued the "annuity goods and a fixed amount of provisions, provided the Indians would go home and watch their corn, and wait for payment until they were sent for."[22] The Indians withdrew, and for the time being a serious incident was avoided.

Even so, it was clearly evident that the Sioux were aggressively inclined. Accounts other than Chief Big Eagle's agree that the major causes of discontent were the treaty and the annuity delay, in combination with the opportunity the Indians thought they had found to retake the land they had bartered away.[23] The previous fall, Galbraith and Thompson had unjudiciously attempted to substitute goods for money in the annual payments, and Thompson foolishly encouraged the Sioux to expect "a further bounty" without telling them this would be a part of their 1862 allowance. In order to come in and get this "great gift" the Indians skipped their annual hunt, which would have brought them more benefits than the goods did. When the Sioux finally learned that this bonus was an advance on the next year's annuity, they became "greatly exasperated."[24]

Stories of the Civil War seemed to have a psychological effect on them also. One observer reflected that the effect of war stories

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[21] *Ibid.;* also, the Board of Commissioners, *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars 1861–1864,* 2 edn., St. Paul, 1891, 246–247. Agent Galbraith claims that the Indians broke into the warehouse at gunpoint. His statement agrees with that made by Lt. Thomas B. Gere in the work above, but Stephen R. Riggs, in *Mary and I, Forty Years with the Sioux,* Chicago, c. 1880, 151–152, claims that the Sioux were unarmed. These volumes are cited hereafter as *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,* and Riggs, *Forty Years.*

[22] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 17; *Executive Documents of the State of Minnesota for the Year 1862,* St. Paul, 1863, [415]–416. Hereafter cited as Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862.*

[23] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 16–17, 28, 29; *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,* 728; Heard, *Sioux War,* 41–42; Riggs, *Gospel Among the Dakotas,* 328–329, 329–331; Adrian J. Ebell, "Indian Massacres and War of 1862," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine,* vol. XXVII, June, 1863, 7; Samuel J. Brown, "In Captivity: the Experience, Privations, and Dangers of Samuel J. Brown and Others while Prisoners of the . . . Sioux During the . . . War of 1862. . . ." *Senate Miscellaneous Document* No. 28, 56 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 4029, Washington, 1900), 2 (hereafter cited as "In Captivity"). According to Riggs, the annuity payment was delayed because the Sioux would not accept the fact that the payment the previous fall was deductable from 1862 annuity, causing the delay. The money was on the way to St. Paul by August 13 and reached Fort Ridgely on August 18, the day after the outbreak began.

[24] Riggs, *Forty Years,* 147–148.

"operates very powerfully upon the warlike Indians,"[25] while another remarked that "the war for the Union, has been a fruitful source for trouble among the Sioux, exciting inquiry, restlessness, and uneasiness. . . .The effect . . . upon the savage and superstitious minds of the Indians can be easily imagined."[26] Perhaps "If there had been no Southern war, there would have been no Dakota uprising and no Minnesota massacres!"[27]

There were rumors that Confederate agents fomented the trouble but, though this was given some credence, it was never proved. Also the English in Canada were thought to have implicated themselves to some extent in the outbreak.[28] This too was never satisfactorily demonstrated, although the Indians in the following years did receive supplies from north of the border.[29] Certainly, the Sioux seem to have had sufficient provocation for war without urging from the Confederates or the English.

There were also rumors rumbling along the frontiers that the Sioux were not alone in their intent to evict or kill the white man. A simultaneous uprising of the Chippewa was narrowly averted, and the Winnebago were virtually forced into the affair. The Winnebago had been relatively quiet, since they were in no position to be otherwise. Their reservation was in the heart of very good land, and as a result they were hard pressed by the settlers, who coveted this land and who scarcely needed the excuse of a war to take it. The Winnebago lived in double jeopardy after the outbreak, fearing the Sioux, who threatened to exterminate them unless they joined in, and apprehensive of the whites, who bore them more animosity than ever, just because they were Indians, and because it was rumored that some of them had joined the uprising. Their agent, St. A. D. Balcombe, swore to their loyalty, and had two companies of troops stationed "in their midst, which . . . allayed their fears" apparently. Balcombe admitted the presence of Winnebago at the massacre of the Lower Agency, however, and was not sure that some did not take part.[30] Little Priest and a few of his

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[25] Riggs, *Gospel Among the Dakotas*, 330.
[26] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 29.
[27] Riggs, *Gospel Among the Dakotas*, 331.
[28] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 2, 8, 29; *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 729; *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 8, 9, 232; John G. Nicholay, "The Sioux War," *The Continental Monthly*, vol. III, January, 1862, 197.
[29] Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, *Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, Washington, 1866, "Report of Major General John Pope," vol. II, 198.
[30] *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 174–176, 177, 227–231, 236–237.

warriors of that tribe were said to have actively participated in the outbreak[31] and probably did so. But in the main, the Winnebago were at peace.

The Secretary of the Interior saw an even larger pattern, involving nearly all the Indians west of the Mississippi, with some evidence seemingly supporting it.[32] The Indian agent in Utah had written on August 5 that the Shoshone were attempting to organize "the Cum-um-bahs, the Gros Utes, and the Shoegars, or Bannack Diggers" in a war against the whites and were in fact already committing depredations; an agent of the overland mail company informed the Postmaster General that "a general war with nearly all the tribes east of the Missouri river is close at hand;" the acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs on September 19 in a public advertisement warned of the danger of crossing the plains; and a missionary, Peter J. DeSmet, warned of the excited attitude of the Gros Ventre, the Ariccaree, the Mandan, the Assinaboine, and the Blackfoot, and strongly suspected that traders from north of the border were exciting them. He also had heard that the Missouri Sioux were agitated.[33] Captain James L. Fisk, who took an expedition to the mines in the northern Rockies, reported that the Assinaboine were saucy, and that "their conduct convinced me that they were knowing to the raid of the Sioux Indians."[34] While this seemed to the Secretary of the Interior to indicate a general conspiracy in the West, its existence in more than coincidence is doubtful.

There is, however, some tenuous evidence to sustain a belief in a premeditated plan in the case of the Sioux, Chippewa, and Winnebago of Wisconsin. As mentioned previously, some Winnebago almost certainly took active part, even though most of them did not. Of Hole-in-the-day, an influential Chippewa chief, Thompson said that, "He [Hole-in-the-day] also carried on a correspondence with Little Crow, leader of the Sioux raid,"[35] although evidence against

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31 *House Executive Document* No. 68, 8; Riggs, *Forty Years*, 153; "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 392.

32 *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 8–9, 171.

33 *Ibid.*, 357, 358, 359; *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 590, 592, 645.

34 *House Executive Document* No. 80, 37 Cong., 3 Sess. (Serial 1164, Washington, 1863), 2.

35 *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 201; Official Records, Series I, vol. XLI, pt. III, 127; George W. Sweet, "Incidents of the Threatened Outbreak of Hole-in-the-Day and Other Ojibways at the Time of the Sioux Massacre of 1862," *Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society*, vol. 6, St. Paul, 1894, 401; hereafter cited as Sweet, "Incidents"; Brown, "In Captivity," 11. Ojibway and Chippewa were used synonomously.

this is strong. Both Big Eagle and Galbraith admit that the tribes were enemies; and, for this reason, the general belief seems to be with coincidence rather than collusion.[36]

Coincidence or collusion, general or local, the Indian situation in the whole West was incendiary. On the part of the Minnesota Sioux, the "spark of fire, upon a mass of discontent" was "one of those accidental outrages at any time to be anticipated on the remote frontier."[37] On August 17, 1862, a small hunting party murdered several settlers at Acton, Minnesota, after a quarrel among themselves over some hen's eggs. Accounts vary as to whether or not they were drunk, but it is almost certain that the slaying of the whites was not premeditated.[38] Since the Indians expected trouble over the homicides anyway, they apparently decided to wage a preventive war.[39] This so-called "accidental outrage" began one of the worst massacres in the history of the United States.

In this same section of the frontier the United States Army maintained four garrisons: Fort Abercrombie, Dakota Territory, on the Red River of the North, roughly fifty miles above Lake Traverse; Fort Ridgely, Minnesota, about twelve miles northwest of New Ulm on the north bank of the Minnesota River; Fort Ripley, Minnesota, on the Mississippi River about forty miles above St. Cloud; and Fort Randall, Dakota Territory, on the southwest side of the Missouri River about forty-five miles west of Yankton. The military Department of the West, which then embraced this area, reported to the Adjutant General's Office, January 1, 1861, that fourteen companies of the regular army with a total of 879 men were on duty at those posts.[40]

With the secession of the Southern states beginning in December, 1860, and continuing on through the winter and spring of 1861, along with the raising of an army in those states, it seems hardly inconceivable today that professional troops of the regular army were not replaced by local militia sooner than they were. Lincoln's government acted within a month of the inauguration to

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[36] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 24; Sweet, "Incidents," 401; "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387.

[37] *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 204–305, report of Lieutenant Governor Donnelly of Minnesota.

[38] Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862*, 4; *House Executive Document* No. 68, 31; Heard, *Sioux War*, 54–56; Riggs, *Forty Years*, 152–153; *Senate Report* No. 1362, 54 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 3475, no publication note), 10–11.

[39] *House Executive Document* No. 68, 31; Heard, *Sioux War*, 58–61; Riggs, *Forty Years*, 153; "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 389–390.

[40] *Official Records*, Series III, vol. I, 23.

concentrate these forces, however, and the regulars began to withdraw eastward on April 13. With the exception of one group, they had departed by the following August. The last unit went east in January, 1862.

The void created by the removal of regulars from the frontier posts was filled by the local volunteer troops. Those of the Minnesota volunteers who were assigned to the frontier, even though these assignments were at first brief, were disappointed to draw such unglamorous duty. Only nine companies were now deemed necessary. Forts Ripley and Ridgely were garrisoned by Companies A, B, and G of the First Minnesota Volunteer Infantry on May 28 and 29, 1861, and their compatriots in Company E joined them on June 6. Companies C and D of the same organization reached Fort Abercrombie June 10, 1861, but they were ordered south along with the rest of the regiment eleven days later. For a few days Abercrombie and Ripley apparently were unmanned until the arrival of companies from the Second Minnesota Volunteer Infantry in July. Fort Randall was garrisoned by Companies A, B, and C of the Fourteenth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, which was mustered into service in September and October of 1861. Fort Randall was occupied only by Co. H, Fourth Artillery, from August 1861 until the Iowa troops arrived later in October that year.

Six companies of the Second Minnesota were stationed at Abercrombie, Ridgely, and Ripley until October 14. Garrison duty on these posts over the winter fell to detachments of the Fourth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, who were relieved in the spring of 1862 by detachments of the Fifth Minnesota. That spring only seven companies were used to hold the frontier; of the Fifth Minnesota, Co. B garrisoned Ridgely, C Ripley, and D Abercrombie; the same three companies of the Fourteenth Iowa remained at Randall; and Co. A, Dakota Cavalry was mustered into United States service on April 29, 1862, and was stationed in detachments at various posts along the Missouri River in Dakota Territory. Also at Ridgely in United States service was an ordinance sergeant to look after the six pieces of artillery left there by elements of the Second, Third, and Fourth Artillery Regiments that departed in the preceding spring, and also an Indian interpreter, a sutler, and a post surgeon.[41]

41 *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 5, 79, 198, 243, 244; Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862*, 206; *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 376; *Report of the Adjutant General and Acting Quartermaster General of Iowa 1862*, Des Moines, 1863, vol. I, xiii, vol. II, 323–324; *Senate Miscellaneous Document* No. 241, 58 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 4591, Washington 1904), 10.

On June 18, 1862, Captain Francis Hall, Commanding Officer at Fort Ripley, sent Lieutenant Timothy J. Sheehan and fifty men of Co. C to Fort Ridgely.[42] On June 30, Sheehan

> with detachment of fifty men of Company C and one Lieutenant [Thomas P. Gere] and fifty men of Company B . . . [proceeded] forthworth . . . to the Sioux Agency on the Yellow Medicine River, and . . . [reported] to Major Thomas Galbraith, Sioux Agent at that place, for the purpose of preserving order and protecting United States property during the time of the annuity payment for the present year.

In addition, Sheehan's command of fifty men included a twelve-pounder mountain howitzer and rations for fifteen days. They arrived at the Upper Sioux Agency on the Yellow Medicine on July 2.[43] Since the annuity payment failed to arrive after the expiration of about two weeks, Sheehan sent a detail to Fort Ridgely for another fifteen days' rations. Since there were about 779 lodges of Indians encamped about the Agency, including Yanktonai and Cut-Heads, not entitled to annuities, Sheehan also sent back to Fort Ridgely for a second mountain howitzer, which arrived on July 21.

Following the altercation at the warehouse, and after the Indians were sent back to their homes to await the payment, Sheehan was ordered to return to Fort Ripley with his detachment, since Captain Marsh did not anticipate any further danger. On August 17 Sheehan and his men left for Fort Ripley. On the same day, Lieutenant Norman K. Culver and six men of Co. B were detached to St. Peter to provide transportation to Fort Snelling for the company of fifty recruits Galbraith enlisted at the agencies. Remaining at Ridgely were Captain Marsh, Lieutenant Gere, and seventy-six men.[44]

On August 17, the day of the murders at Acton, the troops on frontier duty were disposed in the following manner: Co. B, Fifth Minnesota, at Fort Ridgely (minus one officer and six men en route to St. Peter); Co. C, Fifth Minnesota, garrisoned at Fort Ripley with about thirty soldiers, as the other fifty men with Sheehan were en route back from Fort Ridgely. At Fort Abercrombie was Co. D of the same regiment, with nearly eighty men; at Fort Randall were Companies A, B, and C of the Fourteenth Iowa with 295 on the

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[42] *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 245 (Special Order No. 30, Fort Ripley, June 18, 1862); Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862*, 267 (Special Orders No. 6, Adjutant General's Office, June 14, 1862).

[43] *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 245 (Special Order No. 57, Fort Ridgely, June 29, 1862).

[44] *Ibid.*, 245–248.

roll. Nearby in Dakota Territory was Co. A, Dakota Cavalry, that mustered ninety-two men. At Fort Snelling, the recruiting and muster of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Minnesota Volunteer Infantry regiments was in progress, with about seven companies of the Sixth at full strength, or approximately 550 recruits, and other regiments at various stages of completion.[45] But Fort Snelling was nearly ninety miles from the scene of the outbreak. Fort Randall was even more distant, nearly 200 miles from Ridgely.

In 1860-1861 the War Department had required nearly 900 regular troops to secure the area. However, in the summer of 1862, there were on duty at the same frontier posts almost 300 fewer troops in half the number of organizations previously thought necessary, and these were relatively green recruits. Fort Randall, the most remote, was garrisoned by more than half the number of men on duty in this region. In the central Minnesota area, less than half the number of soldiers occupied the frontier posts as had been the previous policy. Here, from a military point of view, was a very weak link in the chain of frontier defense. The raw, unarmed troops, mustering at Fort Snelling, constituted a remote and shaky reserve corps, with any utilization in the frontier district of questionable value or, in view of the military situation in the South, of equally questionable assignment there.

News of the disturbance reached the Governor of Minnesota on August 19, and almost immediately the whole northwestern frontier was aflame. The Secretary of the Interior, in his annual report dated November 20, 1862, almost matter-of-factly mentioned that

> In the month of August last the Sioux Indians in Minnesota most unexpectedly commenced hostilities . . . with a degree of cruelty and barbarity scarcely paralleled by any acts of Indian warfare since the first settlement of this country. . . . A large extent of country, in an advanced stage of improvement, was rendered utterly desolate. It is estimated that the number of lives destroyed by the savages is not less than 800. This outbreak was so sudden and unexpected that the settlers were taken by surprise, and were found without the means of resistance or defence. . . . The Sioux Indians are connected with kindred tribes, extending . . . to the Rocky mountains. The various tribes, united, can bring into the field ten thousand warriors. They are supplied with arms and ammunition to a considerable extent. They have it in their power to inflict great injury . . . throughout the whole region.[46]

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[45] *Ibid.*, 255, 258, 301–302; Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862*, 228, 236, 256–257.

[46] *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 7–8.

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in his report of November 26 to the Secretary of the Interior, reported

> It is estimated that from eight hundred to one thousand . . . unarmed settlers fell victim to the savage fury ere the bloody work of death was stayed. The thriving town of New Ulm, containing from 1,500 to 2,000 inhabitants was almost destroyed. . . . Meantime the utmost consternation and alarm prevailed throughout the entire community. Thousands of happy homes were abandoned, the whole frontier was given up to be plundered and burned . . . and every avenue . . . was crowded with the now homeless and impoverished fugitives.[47]

Superintendent Thompson placed the massacre figure at 600 to 800 lives, "the destruction of an immense amount of property," and "barbarities . . . horrible beyond description."[48] Lieutenant-Governor Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota found the territory between Fort Ridgely and St. Peter "completely abandoned by the inhabitants; the houses, in many cases, left with the doors open, the furniture undisturbed," but went on to say, "I do not think that, when all the facts are ascertained, the number actually killed will much exceed *two hundred.*"[49]

In Dakota Territory, the frontiersmen abandoned the inland settlements, such as Sioux Falls, to retreat to the safety of the fortified installations along the Missouri River, Fort Randall and the Yankton Agency. The Indians burned Sioux Falls after it was abandoned.[50] Governor William Jayne of Dakota Territory, formerly a physician in Springfield, Illinois (later mayor of that city), and a close friend of Lincoln, wrote General James G. Blunt, commander of the military Department of Kansas, that as a result of the situation in Minnesota

> and that attack upon our settlement at Sioux Falls and . . . each day's news of additional butcheries of families . . . a general alarm pervades all our settlements. Family after family are leaving our territory and whole settlements are about to be broken up. We must have immediate aid . . . or else our territory will be depopulated. I have ordered . . . all the militia [to active duty] . . . but we are to a great extent without arms and ammunition—a few thousand people at the mercy of 50,000 Indians should they . . . fall upon us.[51]

Schuyler R. Ingham, acting as agent for Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood of Iowa, in a report to the governor concerning his visit

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47 *Ibid.*, 171.
48 *Ibid.*, 199.
49 *Ibid.*, 202–210.
50 *Ibid.*, 320; *Official Records,* Series I, vol. XIII, 613.
51 *Official Records,* Series I, vol. XIII, 613.

to the northern border of Iowa, said that he "found many of the inhabitants in a high state of excitement, and laboring under constant fear of an attack by Indians. . . . [Many] families were leaving their homes and moving to more thickly settled portions of the state."[52] Kirkwood appraised Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton that he had information that the Yanktonai were joining the Minnesota Sioux "and threaten our whole northwestern frontier. The settlers are flying by hundreds. We lack arms. . . . Something must be done at once."[53]

Algernon Sidney Paddock, Secretary of Nebraska Territory and at that time acting Governor (later, in 1868, Governor of Wyoming), notified Stanton that there were "Powerful bands of Indians returning from Minnesota into northern settlements. Nebraska settlers by hundreds fleeing. Instant action demanded. . . . Territory without credit or cent of money."[54]

Charles Robinson, Governor of Kansas, informed Stanton that Indians threatened the border, and he requested arms for the state militia. Robinson further mobilized what organized militia remained after national calls, and also all able-bodied men.[55] The whole northwestern frontier feared a general Sioux war.

While telegraph wires hummed the alarm and panic-stricken settlers fled, the Sioux ravaged the Minnesota valley. Presumed to have 1,500 warriors, but never employing more than half that number at any one time, they were earnestly attempting to exterminate the white settlers from the Dakota border to the Mississippi River.[56] The Indians were divided into two parties; one, the lower party, attacked major points, such as Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, with other raids and engagements as those at Redwood Ferry and Birch Coulie. The upper party raided in the northern counties and attacked Fort Abercrombie. There were also many sorties by individual Indians all along the frontier.

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52 *Adjutant General's Report, Iowa, 1862*, vol. II, 861; *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 638.

53 *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 620.

54 *Ibid.*, 621.

55 *Ibid.*, 628.

56 Estimates of the number of warriors vary with each account. See *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1863, 394: Galbraith estimates a total of 1,700 (or 850 in each group); *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 210: Lt. Gov. Donnelly estimates 800–1,000 in the lower group; Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862*, 10: Ramsey estimates 1,200 warriors total, 350–500 in lower group; *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 254: Lt. Gere estimates 1,200–1,500 in the lower group; Heard, *Sioux War*, 83, puts 450 in the lower group.

The Sioux had no planned campaign in mind, only the general desire to reduce Fort Ridgely and New Ulm and to move swiftly toward the Mississippi, and in the process to bring the whole of the Winnebago into the war.[57] Stubborn resistance at Fort Ridgely, New Ulm (even though it had been temporarily abandoned), and Birch Coulie ended any such hope. The organization of the Indians, although under the over-all command of Little Crow, was in no way perfected; each band was semi-independent, and many braves preferred to plunder on their own. This imperfect deployment, coupled with brave defense by volunteer troops in the beleaguered area, insured their ultimate defeat. The hope that a war on the whites would close the breach among them was chimerical, since some of the farmer Indians helped warn the settlements and protected individuals from the scalping knives of their brethren. Also, many chiefs took part half-heartedly, realizing the ultimate futility of the campaign.[58]

The extent of the panic occasioned by the descent of the Sioux warriors down the Minnesota valley can be seen reflected in the dispatches of the authorities in Minnesota, Iowa, Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska quoted above. Preparations went along at a furious pace to arm in order to ward off any attack, but the frontier settlers fled for safer ground anyway. The evacuation of the Minnesota valley and the abandonment of Sioux Falls has already been alluded to; Bon Homme, Dakota Territory, also was deserted and Yankton, Vermillion, Elk Point, and Richland were partially depopulated. A large group of settlers fled from eastern and southern Dakota to Sioux City, Iowa, in such haste that they left their stock and crops in the fields. Also many Iowans from Woodbury, Ida, and Sac counties fled to Sioux City.[59] In Nebraska Territory there was a report of the Brulé and Yanktonai grouping to assail the Pawnee Indians as well as white settlers of that region. Families moved out of danger areas to the village of Columbus, Nebraska, in anticipation of such an attack.[60] The conspiracy rumor, the terrible toll, and stories of the Minnesota valley massacre added to the panic.

Relatively fresh in the minds of Iowans was the Spirit Lake massacre by Inkpaduta and his band of outlaw Sioux in 1857, who

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57 *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 253.

58 "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387.

59 *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 638; State Department of History, *South Dakota Historical Collections*, vol. 8, Pierre, S. D., 1917, 104, note 3.

60 *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 644–645. The Brulé, as the Yanktonai, were a Sioux tribe.

had killed about forty persons. The possibility of a reoccurrence of this on a larger scale was indicated by the carnage in Minnesota, and particularly by the fifteen settlers (more or less) slaughtered near Jackson, Minnesota, about twenty miles north of the Iowa border, and the same number massacred at Lake Shetek only forty miles north of the line. In Iowa itself, within three miles of Sioux City, two frontier defenders were ambushed before the Northern Border Brigade was organized, and bands of Sioux were reported in the Little Sioux valley. Horses and cattle were also reported stolen.[61]

Iowa reacted by commissioning Lieutenant Colonel James A. Sawyer to command the Northern Border Brigade, five volunteer companies raised to defend the northwestern border.[62] These units were mustered at Fort Dodge, Webster City, Denison, Sioux City, and Chain Lakes, and held a continuous line of blockhouses from Chain Lakes to Sioux City. While some of them had signed for nine months' duty, most of them served until December 1863. Divided between Spirit Lake and Sioux City was Captain Andrew J. Millard's company of Sioux City Cavalry in the United States service.[63] Also in Sioux City for a while were "a squad of artillery from Council Bluffs and three companies of infantry from Council Bluffs and Harrison County," which troops, as was the case in Minnesota, had volunteered for federal service but had not yet been sworn in. All told, there were apparently about 350 troops in Sioux City that September.[64]

In Dakota Territory, the governor ordered "every male citizen in the Territory between the ages of eighteen and fifty" to "enroll himself in a company to be formed for home defense in his respective county, with such arms as he may have in his possession." In response to this proclamation five companies, totaling 266 men, were raised. The ninety-two troopers of Captain Nelson Minor's Company A, Dakota Cavalry, which had been taken into federal

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61 Riggs, *Forty Years*, 139; Heard, *Sioux War*, 99; Benamin F. Gue, *History of Iowa*, New York, c. 1903, Vol. II, 68–69.

62 *Adjutant General's Report, Iowa, 1862*, vol. II, 869–870. The companies, their positions, and their captains were: Co. A, Estherville, William H. Ingham; Co. B, Iowa Lake, William Williams; Co. C, Peterson, Harvey W. Crapper; Co. D, Cherokee, James M. Butler; Co. E, Correctionville, Jerome W. White. Companies C, D, and E also had detachments at Ocheyedan, Ida, Sac City, West Fork, Little Sioux, and Melbourne.

63 *Ibid.*, 862–866; Captain William H. Ingham, "The Northern Border Brigade of 1862–1863," *Annuals of Iowa*, 3rd Series, Vol. 5, October, 1902, 481–523.

64 Dan Elbert Clark, "Frontier Defense in Iowa 1850–1865," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, Vol. XVI, July, 1918, 376.

service on April 29, 1862, were already in frontier service. They were stationed in Dakota Territory at Yankton, Vermillion, and Sioux Falls; and, according to some accounts, the company, or part of it, was driven from Sioux Falls before the city was burned.[65] Other depredations in Dakota, combined with the Minnesota Massacre, lent much justification to the arming there. Two farmers were murdered within a mile of Sioux Falls, a mailcarrier was shot down between Yankton and Sioux Falls, a stage driver on the Fort Randall road was shot, and two unarmed citizens were killed in a wagon at a ferry within three miles of Yankton. In addition, in Yankton County, "farmers were driven from their fields and shot at in their doorways, until forced to retreat to the town [Yankton] for safety."[66]

In contrast to Minnesota, or Iowa and Wisconsin, Nebraska Territory's pressing problem was a nearly defenseless frontier. A string of settlements on the Dakota side and Fort Randall protected her northeastern frontier along the Missouri; but west of the Missouri there was little cover. A thin line of troops guarded the central mail route and the Oregon trail from Fort Kearney west. Brigadier General James Craig, whose duty it was to protect the routes, wrote Stanton on August 23 from Fort Laramie:

> Indians from Minnesota to Pike's Peak, and from Salt Lake to near Fort Kearney, committing many depredations. I have only about 500 troops scattered on the telegraph and overland mail lines. Horses worn by patrolling both roads. . . .[67]

Too many Indians and too few troops had been Craig's problem since the preceding April when he had been put in charge of the mail route from its eastern terminus to the continental divide.[68] But the Indian problem was important in another way also. Benjamin F. Lushbaugh, agent for the Pawnee, reported on September 13 that

> Before leaving Nebraska much apprehension prevailed among the settlers

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65 *Senate Executive Document* No. 241, 58 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 4591, Washington 1904), 9–10, 12, 24, 81; Doane Robinson, "A History of the Dakotas or Sioux Indians," *South Dakota Historical Collections,* vol. 2, Aberdeen, S. D., 1904, 301. The Dakota troops, their captains and numbers were: A, under the command of Capt. F. M. Ziebach, 79 men; B, under the command of Capt. Daniel Gifford, 32 men; C, under Capt. A. W. Puett, 83 men; E, under Capt. Mahlon Gore, 50 men; F, a company of mounted rangers under Capt. A. G. Fuller, 22 men. Capt. A. J. Bell headed a phantom Company D, which existed only on paper.

66 *Senate Executive Document* No. 241, 81, 82.

67 *Official Records,* Series I, vol. XIII, 592.

68 *Ibid.,* 362, 451, 459, 466, 468.

there that the existing Indian troubles in Minnesota might extend to the former Territory. . . . I have received information from my agency that an attack of a serious character had been made upon it by the Brulé and Yankton Sioux.[69]

The Secretary of the Interior then reported to Stanton:

. . . . it will be seen that the Sioux Indians, now in open hostility to the United States have commenced hostilities upon the Pawnees of Nebraska as well as upon the white settlers in that Territory. . . . There is danger that great sacrifice of life, as well as of property, will be incurred . . . in Nebraska.[70]

Because the "frontier people" were "much alarmed," the governor asked for, and was denied, authority to raise a regiment for the defense of the Nebraska border. As of the preceding April, Nebraska had no active home guards and no volunteer troops in United States service except two regiments in the east. Until Nebraska Territory was transferred to another department in November, apparently there was no change in this status.[71]

Edward Salomon, Governor of Wisconsin, wrote Stanton on September 2:

There is very great apprehension in the northwestern and central portions of the state on account of the Indians. . . . Families are leaving their homes for fear of the wandering bands. . . . The people must be protected . . . more arms must be forwarded immediately. . . . Our Lake Superior settlements, surrounded by large numbers of Indians, are entirely defenseless.

Salomon received no arms, but after a sharp verbal duel with Stanton, did get some ammunition.[72] As Wisconsin had no adequate law sanctioning militia or military organization, Salomon had to entrust the arms he sent to the frontier "to some reliable men in different localities." Apparently this was enough.[73]

The Sioux caught the frontier at a time when they knew it was weak, suddenly creating for the local agencies the problem of finding troops and arms to secure themselves. The people of Minnesota felt this problem most urgently, since the attack began before the

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69 *Ibid.*, 645; *Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862*, 267.
70 *Official Records*, Series I, vol. XIII, 644.
71 *Ibid.*, Series III, vol. II, 26, 457, 510, 521.
72 *Ibid.*, Series I, vol. XIII, 508, 511, 515, 518, 522–523.
73 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Civil War Messages and Proclamations of Wisconsin War Governors*, Wisconsin History Commission, 1912, 138–139.

state could prepare. Ramsey acted quickly upon notice of the uprising. The news reached him August 19, and after stopping at Fort Snelling to see what troops were available, he hastened to Mendota to put his old political foe, Colonel Henry Hastings Sibley, in command of an expedition against the Sioux. Along with the commission, Ramsey gave Sibley a free hand in the conduct of the campaign. Sibley knew the Sioux, having lived among them and traded with them for twenty-eight years. Sibley and four companies of the Sixth Minnesota, not yet mustered into United States service, began to move up the Minnesota and on August 22 reached St. Peter. There Sibley waited for supplies and equipment to catch up with him. On August 24 some 200 mounted men called the Cullen Guard under William J. Cullen, a former superintendent of Indian affairs, arrived, and on that day six more companies of the Sixth Minnesota appeared, along with several squads of mounted men and volunteer militia. Colonel Samuel McPhail commanded the irregular cavalry, and Colonel William Crooks succeeded regular army Captain Anderson D. Nelson in charge of the Sixth Minnesota. Sibley's force now numbered nearly 1,400.[74] Sizeable as this was, it was utterly inexperienced, from the green infantrymen of the Sixth to the horses of the mounted men. However, there were men of experience among the leaders, such as Sibley the frontiersman, and Crooks, who had spent two years at West Point.

On August 23, Sibley moved to the relief of New Ulm, and on the 26th toward Fort Ridgely, where the main force arrived on August 28. A reconnaissance and burial party sent to the Lower Agency on August 31 was ambushed at dawn of September 2 in their camp at Birch Coulie. It took the whole of Sibley's force to lift the siege, and cost the reconnoitering group twenty-two dead and sixty wounded. The appearance of Sibley's army frightened off the Sioux before they could be engaged, and Sibley waited another two weeks before resuming operations up the Minnesota.

Charles E. Flandrau, an associate justice of the State Supreme Court and militia Colonel, hero of the defense of New Ulm, was given command of the Blue Earth country of Minnesota, from the Iowa border north to New Ulm. He headed a force of volunteer citizens, militia, and elements of troops from Fort Snelling, originally intended for federal service.

Above the Minnesota River Captain Richard Strout's Co. B, Ninth Minnesota, held Forest City, and Companies F and H of the

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[74] *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,* 735; West, *Sibley,* 254.

Ninth Minnesota, under Lieutenant O. P. Stearns and Captain W. R. Baxter respectively, remained at Glencoe along with a company of citizens under Captain A. H. Rouse.[75]

On August 21, J. H. Baker, Secretary of State in Minnesota, wrote C. P. Wolcott, the Assistant Secretary of War, that "a most frightful insurrection of Indians" had broken out and that the Governor had ordered out infantry, which Baker knew was of little use in chasing Indians. He wanted authority to raise 1,000 mounted men. The same day Ramsey telegraphed Stanton that "The Sioux . . . have risen," and reported that he had ordered up the Sixth Minnesota and made Sibley a colonel. Henry W. Halleck, the General-in-Chief, wrote Ramsey that as soon as the Third Minnesota Volunteer Infantry was paroled it would be sent to him. On August 25 Ramsey wired Stanton and tried to get the draft postponed, but Stanton did not accede. Ramsey then telegraphed President Lincoln:

> With the concurrence of Commissioner Dole I have telegraphed the Secretary of War for an extension of one month of drafting, etc. The Indian outbreak has come upon us suddenly. Half the population of the state are fugitives. It is absolutely impossible that we should proceed. The Secretary of War denies our request. I appeal to you, and ask for an immediate answer. No one not here can conceive the panic in the state.[76]

Lincoln replied on the following day: "Yours received. Attend to the Indians. If the draft cannot proceed of course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law. The Government cannot extend the time."[77] There were no further references to the draft. Even though the government would not extend the time, the draft did not proceed. For one thing, Ramsey needed the Minnesota troops mustering at Snelling, and for another, with some fleeing and others fighting on the frontier, volunteers or draftees would be hard to come by.

Ramsey continued to look for federal military assistance. The same day he wired to Lincoln, he also asked Halleck: "Could not Minnesota and Dakota be organized into a military department and General W. S. Harney be sent to chastise the Sioux?" On August 29, three days later, Halleck replied: "The War Department is not prepared at present to create a new military department in the

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[75] *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,* 739–803; Minnesota, *Executive Documents, 1862,* 370–374.

[76] *Official Records,* Series I, vol. XIII, 590, 595, 596, 597.

[77] *Ibid.,* 599.

west."[78] Halleck doubtless was much more interested in the operations of the Army of Virginia at that date.

Despite the desperate struggle before Washington, the frantic appeals from the frontier along with the news of the atrocities and the extent of the Sioux uprising apparently caused Stanton to see differently from Halleck the necessity of federal military intervention in the Northwest. And then, after the first few days of September, Stanton had a general without a command who could most conveniently be used in the Northwest.

The United States officially recognized the seriousness of the problem by creating the military Department of the Northwest on September 6, 1862. Major General John Pope was ordered to take command of this area, which embraced at first the states of Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Territories of Nebraska and Dakota.[79] By the time Pope was able to set up his headquarters at St. Paul, Minnesota, on September 16, Sibley had the situation in hand. By September 23, Sibley defeated the Sioux at the battle of Wood Lake, Minnesota,[80] and except for annoying raids along the frontier from Dakota to Minnesota by small groups, the major campaigning was over for the 1862 season.

Fortunately, the volunteer response and the availability of numbers of men in some stage of organization was enough to blunt the edge of the Sioux drive and wrest the initiative from them. The Department of the Northwest conducted campaigns into Dakota Territory in 1863, 1864, and 1865, with varying degrees of success. The Sioux continued to be a formidable opponent throughout the Civil War years and beyond.

The massacre of 1862 has received its share of superlatives, including the rather ambitious statement that it was "the most serious Indian massacre the frontier had yet seen."[81] It does indeed rank with blood-lettings such as Opechancanough's of 1644 in the James River (Virginia) area, and the infamous Fort Mims affair that began the Creek War just forty-nine years before. Actual casualties are difficult to determine, with contemporary estimates such as 382 killed and missing, 737 dead, 800 dead, and later studies vaguely

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[78] *Ibid.*, 597, 605.
[79] *Ibid.*, Series I, vol. III, 617.
[80] *Ibid.*, 278–279; *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars*, 159–160, 311–312, 351–352, 743-744.
[81] Frederick Logan Paxson, *The Last American Frontier*, New York, 1922, 235.

noting between 477 and 800. Sibley's biographer claims that 1,000 people perished, 2,000 more were maimed sufferers, an additional 8,000 became paupers, and 30,000 became fugitives.[82] Regardless of the veracity of these statements, the fact remains that the alarm and the reaction to it was not a local affair. The entire northwestern frontier was vitally concerned, and the disturbance was serious enough to trouble the federal government for years to come. Yet compared to the awesome slaughter in the war to the south, the dead in the first campaign of the Sioux War seemed few enough. In the light of greater pain throughout the country, it is easy to see how the country at large, other than the frontier, paid little heed to the troubled Northwest.

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[82] *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1862, 210; *Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1863, 408; Heard, *Sioux War*, 243; Whipple, *Lights and Shadows*, 105; Minnesota, *Executive Documents*, 1862, 9–10; West, *Sibley*, 249; William Watts Folwell, *A History of Minnesota*, St. Paul, 1911, vol. II, 391–393.

Political Weaknesses in Wisconsin Progressivism, 1905-1908

Students of the history of American reform must look to the local and state level. For the Progressive era, study of Wisconsin politics should be of more than ordinary interest. The reform impulse in turn-of-the-century America was probably nowhere so well expressed as in Wisconsin.[1] From 1900 through 1914 Wisconsin reformers introduced effective regulation of railroads, insurance companies and other public service corporations, modernized the tax structure, assisted farmers and laborers, launched a conservation movement in the state, and enacted civil service and the direct primary. Their leader, Robert M. La Follette, served as governor and senator from 1901 until his death in 1925. Later, his sons, Philip and Robert, served as governor and senator, the latter defeated only in 1946, by Joseph R. McCarthy.

Even in Wisconsin, however, progressivism had its tribulations. The Wisconsin Progressives experienced their most resounding and momentous defeat in the election of 1914. That defeat and the factors contributing to it have been discussed elsewhere.[2] But this was not the first setback they had suffered. With the primary election of 1906, in fact, they began to sustain a series of discouragements that did not end until the spectacular Progressive resurgence of 1910. Study of Wisconsin politics in the period from 1905 through 1909 reveals at least three major political limitations which must be considered if an oversimplified picture of the Progressive rationale is to be avoided.

Beginning in 1901, when Robert M. La Follette became governor, after a decade of struggle, the Progressives scored a series of legislative and political victories. By the end of 1905, a direct primary, *ad valorem* railroad taxation, railroad regulation, civil service and other reforms had been enacted. Passage of these measures had required both bare knuckled political fighting and astute compromising. On one question, however, neither method could be wholly successful. A vacancy in the Senate of the United

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[1] See, especially, Robert S. Maxwell, *La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin*, Madison, 1956, 40–173.

[2] Herbert F. Margulies, "The Decline of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1911–1914," MID-AMERICA, XXXXIX (July, 1957), 131–155.

States had to be filled in 1905. Among the influential supporters of La Follette, more than one aspired to the honor. The politically ambitious could be defeated, but at a price; they could be placated, but only in part, and again at a price.

The two leading contenders for the coveted Senate seat were William D. Connor and Isaac Stephenson. Connor was a capable and vigorous lumberman. Though a late-comer to politics and the Progressive ranks, by dint of energy, skill, and business position, he became Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in 1904. He did not conceal his senatorial ambitions. Though a very much older man, seventy-six in 1905, Isaac Stephenson had several things in common with Connor. He too was a lumberman, though much wealthier. He too came late to the Progressive cause. Like Connor, his assistance, chiefly in the form of cash, was vital. Like Connor also, he was unashamedly covetous of the Senate seat. In fact, he broke with the Old Guard leaders of the party and threw his support to La Follette on this very question, after the party leaders failed to reward him for long service in 1899.[3]

La Follette later claimed that his decision to accept the Senate post himself was made in order to compromise the differences between Connor and Stephenson.[4] If so, the effort failed. Neither was placated. Connor immediately broke with La Follette and, in so doing, weakened the Progressive coalition greatly. Stephenson moved away more warily, but his resentment was nevertheless evidenced in important ways in 1905 and 1906.

Connor's declaration of war came in December, 1905. La Follette had called the legislature into special session to act on a bill to permit a second choice vote in primary elections, such votes to be counted when the recipient of the first choice vote was eliminated. The purpose of the bill was to overcome the danger of a Stalwart being nominated because of division in Progressive votes. Connor, however, wielded his full influence against the bill and was generally credited with causing its defeat.[5] Mean-

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[3] Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette*, New York, 1953, I, 130-131.

[4] *Ibid.*, 187–189.

[5] Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, December 16, 1905; Elisha Keyes Letterbooks; Robert M. La Follette to Isaac Stephenson, June 23, 1906, Robert M. La Follette Papers; Herman Ekern to Nicolai Grevstad, December 17, 1905, Herman L. Ekern Papers. All manuscripts cited in this article are on deposit at the Wisconsin Historical Society Library, Madison, Wisconsin.

while, he planned to abandon La Follette and pursue his political fortune independently in the 1906 primaries.

At first Connor set his sights on the governorship. It soon became apparent to him, however, that another rebel against the La Follette forces had the stronger chance. Perhaps disappointed, but seeing some long-range advantages in any successful anti-La Follette candidacy, Connor joined forces with James O. Davidson. With Davidson running for the Republican nomination for governor, Connor sought the nomination for lieutenant governor. In all parts of the state, Connor organized Davidson-Connor clubs. On the surface, both men appealed for Progressive votes, calling themselves true Progressives. Undercover, however, Connor bargained effectively with the die-hard anti-La Follette Stalwarts and, as it turned out, secured their support.[6] The enmity of W. D. Connor, then, was no small thing.

Connor's ally, James O. Davidson, had come to Wisconsin in 1872, a poor Norwegian immigrant of eighteen. He worked as a farm laborer, tailor, clerk, and finally proprietor of his own general store in Soldiers Grove, a small town in southwestern Wisconsin. Davidson had little formal education, but he won many friends, especially among his fellow Norwegians, and was respected for his shrewdness and honesty. In 1892 Davidson was elected to the state legislature. As an assemblyman, he joined in the fight against the railroad pass and sponsored legislation to regulate sleeping car, telephone, and telegraph corporations. Davidson emerged as a representative of the increasingly potent Norwegian element within the Progressive wing of the Republican party. In 1898 he was nominated and elected state treasurer, which office he held through 1902. In that year, he was shifted to lieutenant governor. Davidson was reelected in 1904 and, after La Follette went to Washington, filled the unexpired portion of his term as governor.[7]

As the incumbent, and a tried and true Progressive, Davidson was the logical choice of the La Follette men for the governorship in 1906. He felt that the nomination was his due, and many

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[6] Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, December 16, 1905; Keyes to H. C. Adams, December 16, 1905; Keyes to Henry Casson, February 17, 1906; Keyes to H. A. Taylor, May 29, 1906, Elisha Keyes Letterbooks; David Atwood to James O. Davidson, January 24, 1906; W. A. Jones to Davidson, March 9, 1906; D. C. Owen to Davidson, May 5, 1906, James O. Davidson Papers; Robert M. La Follette to Perry Wilder, June 25, 1906; W. H. Dick to La Follette, June 18, 1906; Edward E. Browne to La Follette, July 16, 1906, Robert M. La Follette Papers.

[7] *Wisconsin State Journal*, February 17, 1920.

other Progressives agreed. La Follette and his closest intimates had other ideas; they felt that the mild-mannered Davidson was too little qualified by temperament, ability or education for the office.[8] Their support went instead to the dynamic young Speaker of the Assembly, Irvine Lenroot. Despite tremendous pressure to drive him from the field, however, Davidson persisted in his candidacy, though it meant breaking with La Follette.

The role of Isaac Stephenson in assisting the Davidson rebellion was less evident than that of W. D. Connor, but no less important. The old lumber baron was very disgruntled at the way he had been treated in 1905. First, he had been passed over for the Senate. Later, he had not been consulted in the decision to bring out Lenroot against Davidson. Was this his reward for founding and sustaining the chief La Follette organ in the state, the *Milwaukee Free Press?* Stephenson was not in a position to break openly with La Follette in 1906, for he still hoped to get the next Senate vacancy. But he did go so far as to impose a policy of neutrality on the *Free Press* despite the pro-Lenroot feelings of the editor.[9] Moreover, he provided no financial support for the Lenroot campaign. In this policy he was doubtless encouraged by Davidson's flattering personal and political attentions, which he increasingly reciprocated.[10]

The money problem was always a difficult one for La Follette. According to Stephenson's calculations, denied by La Follette, half a million dollars was spent by the lumberman in the Progressive cause, through the years. Regardless of the exact sum, it is clear that money was vital to campaigning and, without Stephenson, La Follette's supply was inadequate. This became very evident during the primary campaign of 1906. La Follette could find only two weeks for Lenroot, for he had to spend the rest of the time from July through November on the Chautauqua circuit. Late in June he wrote an old friend:

> I am almost desperate . . . You see my lecturing begins June 30th out in Iowa. Al and Belle write me ev[er]y day that I must spend some day or so with the party work[e]rs in Milwaukee & as much more in Madison . . .

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[8] *Milwaukee Free Press*, July 21, 1906; Printed letter by A. T. Rogers, n.d., Herman L. Ekern Papers; La Follette to John J. Blaine, May 30, 1906, La Follette Papers.

[9] H. C. Myrick to La Follette, July 11, 1906; La Follette Papers.

[10] J. A. Van Cleve to James O. Davidson, February 5, 1906; J. H. Stout to Davidson, March 16, 1906; F. H. Magdeburg to Davidson, March 27, 1906, Davidson Papers; Davidson to Elmer Grimmer, May 26, 1906, James O. Davidson Letterbooks.

That I must open headquarters in Madison and prepare a circular address to the Republicans &c. They are nearly wild at thought of my leaving the state. But the only way a dollar can be raised for Lenroot's campaign is for me to go out on the lecture platform & earn it. We are in hard times for money.[11]

But money was by no means La Follette's only problem. For James O. Davidson was more than a figurehead for disgruntled politicians. He was a political power in his own right. Otherwise Connor and the Stalwarts would certainly have gone their own way, instead of subordinating their ambitions to his candidacy. In any consideration of the limitations of Wisconsin progressivism Davidson is, from many points of view, the key figure.

The factor that made Davidson an independent political force in the state was this: He was the chief representative of the Norwegian-Americans in Wisconsin politics. Though not the most numerous nationality group in the state, since they were surpassed by the Germans, the Scandinavian element, especially the Norwegians, had been vital to La Follette since 1894.[12] In the midst of the 1906 primary fight against Davidson, Alfred T. Rogers, La Follette's law partner and political lieutenant, warned "Bob": "It has always been your mainstay to line up the solid Scandinavian elements and it's like having a broken arm to fight without them. . . ."[13]

Despite prodigious efforts by the pro-Lenroot leaders of Norwegian descent,[14] Davidson retained the loyalty of his countrymen.[15] It was this ability that made possible his candidacy.

Davidson's success in winning Norwegian votes did not demonstrate that the Norwegians of Wisconsin were never true Progressives. On the contrary, Stalwart candidates of Norwegian descent almost invariably failed to win nominations and elections. Davidson understood this very well, and made a great point of his Pro-

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11 Belle Case and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette*, I, 211.

12 *Twelfth Census of the United States*, Washington, 1901, I:clxxxii, xviii.

13 A. T. Rogers to La Follette, January 11, 1906, La Follette Papers.

14 F. A. Walby to La Follette, November 14, 1905; Henry Johnson to La Follette, November 20, 1905; August Lehnhoff to La Follette, November 13, 1905, La Follette Papers; Herman Ekern to Nicolai Grevstad, December 17, 1906, Ekern Papers.

15 Henry Pitusa to James O. Davidson, June 26, 1905; P. Oscar Thompson to Davidson, August 30, 1905; Ed Emerson to Davidson, October 29, 1905; James Thompson to Davidson, December 1, 1905; C. L. Nelson to Davidson, December 21, 1905, Davidson Papers; Andrew Dahl to Herman Ekern, November 3, 1905, Ekern Papers; James A. Stone to Irvine Lenroot, May 22, 1906, James A. Stone Papers.

gressive ties throughout the 1906 campaign and after. The Norwegians, after all, had strong national traditions of veneration for liberty and self government. They were predisposed to sympathize with La Follette's campaign against "machines," "bosses," "trusts," and "interests." Largely farmers, mainly from the hilly and relatively less fertile western part of the state, their Progressive traditions were reinforced by economic circumstances.

Within the general context of progressivism, however, strong national pride motivated Norwegian-American voters. Like all recently arrived immigrant groups, they sought recognition through political office. La Follette understood this well. When he launched his reform drive by backing congressman Nils P. Haugen for governor, in 1894, he was counting on the "national pride" of Haugen's fellow Norwegians to give him "very strong support."[16] Davidson, in seeking the nomination for treasurer in 1898, very frankly appraised the nationality question in a letter to another Norwegian Progressive:

> While I do not believe in making nationality a point, that question does and will enter in the making up of the state ticket, and if our people are given the usual representation I shall be proud of being their choice. I became a candidate for the office of state treasurer because it seemed to me that our people ought to hold the high position they have attained.[17]

The events of 1906 demonstrated that while Norwegians remained firmly "Progressive," they were not so devoted either to the person or the viewpoint of La Follette as to desert a Progressive leader who was one of their own.

The defection of Davidson, Connor and Stephenson from the La Follette ranks was a serious blow to Wisconsin progressivism, as events were to show. But the underlying roots of these rebellions, the factors that made them politically possible, were even more serious, in the long run. So long as these underlying weaknesses were present, there would surely be similar rebellions till there remained nothing against which to rebel. The actions of these three men apparently had diverse roots. Yet in one respect they were similar: Their defection was the result of divided loyalty. Even when they were part of the La Follette coalition, Davidson, Connor and Stephenson were loyal to their own ambitions as well.

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[16] Robert M. La Follette, *La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences*, Madison, 1913, 288.

[17] James O. Davidson to Andrew Dahl, March 29, 1898, Davidson Letterbooks.

But personal ambition, even selfishness is not unusual. The divided loyalty of these three was rendered dangerous to La Follette only because of a second factor that these men had in common: independent strength. Doubtless few of La Follette's partisans were completely selfless, but how many were strong enough to oppose their leader and survive politically, in 1905? Even Stephenson, a millionaire with statewide political and business connections, had to move cautiously. But with his assets, he had some bargaining power. He had, in other words, not only the inclination to wander from the reservation, something not unusual, but also the ability to do so. The same is true of Connor and Davidson. They too had the independent political power needed to convert an inclination into an actuality. The significant weakness in Wisconsin progressivism that their successful rebellion illustrates is the degree to which it depended upon independent forces such as these. The remarkable political abilities of La Follette, together with certain other factors, such as the unique role of the University of Wisconsin, favorably influenced the character of Progressive legislation in the state and obscured this point. Actually, however, even at its height, progressivism depended to a high degree on extraneous sources of strength, on the money and effort of men whose motives were primarily personal ambition, on voters who were interested in nationality recognition.

The general factor discussed above is closely related to a second major element of weakness in the Progressive political situation, a weakness that also became apparent in 1905 and 1906. The Progressives were not in agreement among themselves as to the meaning of the term "progressivism." Hence the coalition was easily divided, in elections and on matters of legislation. This dangerous weakness partly explains the excessive dependence on extraneous sources of support that has been noted. For La Follette could not always count on full backing from even the sincerest and most devoted "Progressives."

Many, probably most Progressives took a far more conservative view of the needs of their time and the meaning of progressivism than did La Follette and his closest associates. La Follette himself, it might be noted, was far from being a radical when he launched his battles against the Stalwarts in 1894. Awakened to the need for reform by what he considered to have been an attempt by Senator Philetus Sawyer to bribe him, he rallied young alumni of the University of Wisconsin and others to his cause with the quite

reasonable and moderate demand for honesty in politics and government.[18] As the movement developed, equitable taxation, favorable treatment for dairy farmers, and greater popular control in government emerged as powerful reform issues. Progressives loyally followed La Follette in gaining these ends. But by the end of La Follette's third administration, after the early goals had been reached, many of his followers wondered whether there was need for a continuation of the reform movement at the same fast pace, marked as it was by intensely bitter factionalism within each party.

La Follette parted company with the doubters at this point. His answer was distinctly in the affirmative. It was well stated in a letter that he wrote to a young political lieutenant early in 1906, with the Davidson question in mind:

> We have accomplished much in Wisconsin toward the restoration of representative government. That is just what we have accomplished. We have not been fighting all these years for this or that particular legislation, as some are wont to believe. It is wrong to say that the contest is ended because we have been successful in this respect. The reforms which have been written into the laws of our state indicate merely that we are going back to the clean form of government established for us in the beginning. The enemies of good government must also be active. No backward step must be taken. The ground we have gained must be held.[19]

In his *Autobiography,* La Follette wrote that the supreme issue, involving all others,

> is the encroachment of the powerful few upon the rights of the many. It is my settled belief, that this great power over government legislation can only be overthrown by resisting at every step, seizing upon every occasion which offers opportunity to uncover the methods of the system.[20]

Not content with achieving any single reform or group of reforms, La Follette had come to focus his efforts and thought on the single fundamental idea of keeping the predatory interests out of public office. To achieve this purpose it seemed necessary that the one weapon in the hands of the people, their numbers, be fully utilized. Complacency was the menace to be feared above all. The role of the Progressive leader, then, was to keep people vigilant, mobilized. The great reform leader would raise ever new issues, that would dramatize the existence of the fundamental con-

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[18] The best account of the years of La Follette's emergence as a Progressive are Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *La Follette,* I, 1–135, and Robert M. La Follette, *Autobiography.*

[19] Robert M. La Follette to Otto Bosshard, January 6, 1906.

[20] La Follette, *Autobiography,* 21.

flict between people and special interests; he would simplify issues, to make them readily comprehensible; he would publicize them, by speeches and articles; he would personalize them, for most people think in personal terms.

Issues, for La Follette, were weapons; they were means more than ends in themselves. Handling of one of the early Progressive measures, the railroad commission bill, illustrates this. The idea of a strong commission had been popularized during the nineties, and La Follette and his friends heartily backed it. Yet La Follette persuaded A. R. Hall, veteran crusader for railroad reform, not to raise the issue in 1900 or 1901. He preferred not to scatter his fire too widely, as A. O. Barton put it.[21] In the 1903 legislative session, the La Follette men did raise the commission issue, but as a political tool. "The regulation bill did not pass at that session, nor did we expect it to pass," La Follette later wrote. However the main purpose was accomplished; Stalwart rejection of it "stirred the people of the state as they had never been stirred before."[22] According to George Hudnall, a State Senator allied with the Progressives in 1905, a similar strategy was unsuccessfully attempted by Andrew Dahl, one of La Follette's "inner circle," in connection with a bill to tax street railways. Dahl's hope was to block the bill in order to blame Stalwarts for its defeat during the 1906 campaign, when a new issue would be badly needed.[23]

La Follette always contended that he was concerned with principle, not personalities. Yet his recitation of the voting record of candidates in their own districts, his crusading manner of campaigning, his bitterness and irony, his interference in contests for office high and low, his undisguised factionalism, all combined to make the political strife of his time intensely personal.[24] His opponents responded in full measure to La Follette's techniques, setting as their highest goal his political obliteration. In so doing, they actually helped La Follette in his effort to keep the battle simple and dramatic, intensely warm and with just two sides.

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[21] Albert O. Barton, *La Follette's Winning of Wisconsin*, Des Moines, 1924, 178.

[22] La Follette, *Autobiography*, 70.

[23] George B. Hudnall to John J. Esch, August 6, 1912, John J. Esch Papers.

[24] See particularly Carroll P. Lahman, "Robert M. La Follette as Public Speaker and Political Leader," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1939 and Wallace Sayre, "Robert M. La Follette: A Study in Political Methods," unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1930.

Obscured and unheard beneath the sound and fury of the Progressive and Stalwart big guns, many men of both sides grew restive over the constant turmoil and looked to the day of renewed peace in the Grand Old Party. James O. Davidson was such a man. Isaac Stephenson was another. And they represented thousands of nameless voters and leaders of lesser prominence. More than any other factor, the viewpoint of such men was a brake for the Progressive express. Stephenson expressed the widely shared view when he wrote:

> In Wisconsin the old railroad-corporation crowd, the inner ring which controlled party affairs to the exclusion of all others, had been fairly routed and some good laws were placed on the statute books. There the task ended for me.[25]

James O. Davidson was the rallying symbol for Progressive dissidents during these years. Though a leading Progressive, he saw no need for perpetuating the bitter factionalism of Republican politics. He regarded division among Republicans as undesirable, not as a useful and necessary adjunct to reform. Furthermore, he believed in 1905 that after the previous years of turmoil and change, the time had come for consolidation of gains and "a business administration." A naturally friendly man, Davidson prided himself on the amiable relations that he had always maintained with persons of all factions. Under the "business administration" that he planned, there seemed no reason why these relations could not be continued, he wrote a Stalwart early in 1906.[26] Later that year he wrote optimistically to his ally Connor: "If I may judge of the situation, a very good proportion at least of the people, are willing to have a rest from the turbulence that has been with us in the past, but none are willing to sacrifice a single principle that we have contended for."[27]

Most Stalwarts appreciated the difference in thinking between La Follette and Davidson. They would have supported any formidable opponent of La Follette in 1906, but they were especially pleased over the Davidson candidacy, for they saw in the amiable Norwegian a man of peace. Old Elisha Keyes, once party boss and still influential, wrote confidently to Senator Spooner that Davidson was "a peaceable man, . . . not belligerent or aggressive.

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[25] Issac Stephenson, *Recollections of a Long Life*, Chicago, 1915, 239.

[26] James O. Davidson to John Gaveney, January 19, 1906, Davidson Letterbooks.

[27] James O. Davidson to W. D. Connor, June 22, 1906, Davidson Letterbooks.

He is the kind of man the party needs in this state. . . ."[28] Henry Casson, former Secretary of State of Wisconsin and in 1906 Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, was equally confident of Davidson's intention to bring peace. Casson had known Davidson for thirty years.[29] A number of Stalwarts wrote with the same confidence directly to Davidson.[30]

Probably a majority of the Progressives took the less subtle approach espoused by Davidson. Ex-Governor William D. Hoard, for example, sided with him. Always a "good Republican," Hoard wrote bitterly in 1911 "Never in all the fifty-three years of my experience in Wisconsin politics have I seen developed so malign and selfish a spirit as La Follette has infused his present day followers with."[31] An equally prominent Progressive, Nils Haugen, the man La Follette enlisted as candidate for Governor in 1894 when he launched his reform campaign, and later the guiding spirit behind vital tax reforms, came to share some of Hoard's views. In his later years he regarded La Follette as surly, contentious and vituperative.[32]

A great many Progressives supported Davidson on other grounds. But in so doing, they tacitly rejected La Follette's dynamic approach. Davidson's pacific views were well known, and those who backed him themselves endorsed the return to party unity. For these, political custom dictated Davidson's retention of the office La Follette's resignation had given him.[33]

Some Progressives in the Davidson camp went further. State Senator McGillvray, for example, took sharp exception to La Follette's idea that a lawyer like Lenroot was needed for governorship. Foreshadowing an argument that became increasingly embarrassing to Progressives in later years, McGillvray said that the state needed a businessman to effect economies, not a theorist.[34] More

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[28] Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, January 10, 1906, Keyes Letterbooks.

[29] Henry Casson to Keyes, February 5, 1906, Keyes Papers.

[30] E. E. Sherwood to James O. Davidson, December 4, 1905; A. H. Strange to Davidson, December 21, 1905; Walter J. Benedict to Davidson, January 3, 1906; O. W. Arnquist to Davidson, May 9, 1906; A. H. Reid to Davidson, May 17, 1906, Davidson Papers.

[31] William D. Hoard to Lucien Hanks, February 1, 1911, Lucien Hanks Papers.

[32] Nils P. Haugen, *Political and Pioneer Reminiscences,* Madison, 1930, 113–114.

[33] *Milwaukee Free Press,* July 24, 1906, August 30, 1906; *Oshkosh Northwestern,* August 25, 1906; George Cooper to James O. Davidson, May 12, 1906, Davidson Papers.

[34] *Milwaukee Free Press,* July 25, 1906.

graphically, a correspondent to the *Milwaukee Free Press* wrote: "It is said the Governor of Wisconsin should be a lawyer. Buckle up your coat when they tell you a lawyer will make the best governor. Your pocketbook is in danger."[35]

The moderation, even conservatism, of so many of the "Progressives" in the 1906 campaign and later, was probably related in part to economic circumstances. The state was not beset with the kind of distress that might have brought to La Follette devoted majority support for his dynamic political approach. The reform movement in the state had never been based on extreme economic discontent.[36] Wisconsin agriculture was making a successful adjustment from wheat to dairying at the turn of the century. The dairyman, because his product was light and his production conditions stable, had fewer complaints about freight rates and credit than did the wheat growers. Thus, the typical Wisconsin farmer had proved impervious to the appeal of Populism. The dairyman had more limited demands, for low taxes, protection against substitutes and research help.[37]

While doctors, lawyers, merchants, journalists, and bankers were prominent in the Progressive movement in the state, laboring men or their leaders were not. Labor, organized and unorganized, was beginning to catch up with agriculture at the turn of the century, in terms of numbers.[38] However, industry, and the labor force, was highly decentralized during the first decade of the new century. Lumber manufacturing, flour milling and paper milling were chiefly located outside the populous and industrial lake shore region. Much of the labor in small enterprises scattered around the state was not firmly rooted in the class called "labor," for men of this class retained strong agricultural connections, shifting, typically, from farm to city and back again.[39] Another segment of labor, employed in the growing machine tool industry, malting, leather and dairy products, and working in Milwaukee, mainly, or

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35 Thomas J. Ford to the editor, *Milwaukee Free Press*, August 27, 1906.

36 Herbert F. Margulies, "Issues and Politics of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1906–1920," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1955, 1–62.

37 Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, *Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900–1939*, Madison, 1951, 12.

38 See especially J. H. H. Alexander, "A Short Industrial History of Wisconsin," *Wisconsin Blue Book*, 1929, Madison, 1930, 39, and Gertrude Schmidt, "History of Labor Legislation in Wisconsin," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1933, 16.

39 Schmidt, "Labor Legislation in Wisconsin," 13–14.

in Racine or Kenosha, was reform-conscious, but inaccessible to the Progressives. The Social Democratic party had achieved remarkable success in winning the allegiance of organized labor in Milwaukee, under the astute direction of Victor Berger. Following the political approach that was congenial to the German workers who provided a bulwark for the socialist party, a tight party discipline prevented the socialist workers from participating in the factional affairs of the Republicans or Democrats.[40] Thus, La Follette had no mass support from labor for his anti-corporation, anti-Stalwart appeal.

The Progressives that remained to La Follette were a disparate group, many of whose views of progressivism were far more conservative than his. Whether their views or his were sounder is of course an open question. Clearly, though, quite apart from the merits of the two views, the simple fact of ideological disunity was a major source of weakness to the movement.

A third serious limitation to progressivism exhibited in this period was the democratic ideology to which the La Follette forces had committed themselves. La Follette and his allies had fought stoutly against "bosses," and "machines." Government must be restored to the people, they urged. From 1897, major attention had been focussed on the primary, which La Follette finally helped to secure over strong Stalwart opposition.

The campaign against bossism had some obvious advantages, of course. Votes were won with the popular Jeffersonian theme; and in party primaries, progressive Republicans might get help from "fair minded" Democrats.[41] Still, there were some grave disadvantages, too. Leadership proved essential. If the Progressives steered faithfully on their anti-boss, direct democracy course, they would be wrecked on the rocks of disunity. Concensus on candidates and programs would not occur automatically. But if the Progressives tried to achieve unity through caucuses, conventions or the dictation of La Follette they would become targets for the democratic shafts they themselves had forged. Aggravating the situation for Progressives was the fact that the law recognized neither factions nor devises for achieving factional unity. Organi-

[40] See Frederick I. Olson, "The Milwaukee Socialists, 1897–1941," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1941, for a full discussion of this.

[41] Interview with Craig Ralston, January 11, 1953. Mr. Ralston had been political reporter for the *Milwaukee Journal.*

[42] *Milwaukee Sentinel,* August 2, 25, 1906.

zational efforts would have to be extra-legal and therefore doubly difficult and suspect. In practice, the Progressives vacillated between both unsatisfactory approaches. They were hurt by each.

Davidson took full advantage of this weakness in the 1906 campaign. La Follette contradicted the spirit of democracy and of the primary and was engaging in the same kind of boss-rule that he had once campaigned against, the rebel charged.[42] A host of prominent Progressives broke with La Follette and backed Davidson on the basis of this argument. The well respected attorney Robert M. Bashford attacked La Follette for bossism and violation of the spirit of the primary, as he announced support for Davidson.[43] Many lesser lights echoed the view. "I feel that I have just as good a right to dictate who should be Governor, as Bob La Follette or any other man," a Davidson supporter wrote. "And I find nearly every one feels about the same way. He taught us how to do up the bosses and we did it, and he need not now expect that he can act as our boss."[44]

Davidson's preemption of the democracy issue, combined with his other advantages, led to La Follette's first major defeat since his faction took power in 1900. Davidson trounced Irvine Lenroot by a vote of 109,583 to 61,178. Connor won the nomination for Lieutenant Governor at the same time.

The primary election results confirmed the importance of three major political limitations in the Wisconsin Progressive movement. First, the Progressives had depended strongly on men and groups whose loyalties were divided and who were powers in their own right, independent of La Follette. Wealth and nationality appeal chiefly underlay their independence. Second, the Progressives were deeply divided ideologically. The faction included a large number of Republicans who did not share La Follette's belief that constant factional warfare was desirable, but instead wanted peace in the party after certain reforms had been won. The economic circumstances of the state probably contributed to this ideological division. Finally, the Progressives were seriously embarrassed by their commitment to an anti-boss ideology, which made it difficult and costly for them to achieve organization and unity.

In the years that followed the election of Davidson as governor, these same factors continued to work against the La Follette men. For a time, indeed, many astute politicians foresaw an end to La

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43 *Ibid.*, August 29, 1906.
44 J. D. Stuart to Davidson, November 14, 1905, Davidson Papers.

Follette's senatorial career and to the Progressive movement in the state in the election of 1910.

In 1907, the payoff to Isaac Stephenson at last came due. Senator Spooner resigned two years before the expiration of his term and a united Progressive bloc in the legislature had the power to at last reward "Uncle Ike" for his services. The wisdom of placating the old gentleman was not lost on La Follette and chief legislature lieutenants, especially Speaker of the Assembly Herman Ekern. Unfortunately for them, instead of patching up old wounds, the event served only to worsen them.

La Follette expressed a preference for Stephenson early in the legislative session, but he did not or could not prevent three other Progressives entering the contest. Seven weeks later, the legislature was still deadlocked and La Follette wired Ekern, "Stephenson must win. Fight hard."[45] Stephenson did win, but he emerged an embittered victor. The crusty old lumber baron later recalled:

> The La Follette influence . . . appeared to be very ineffective at this time, for it brought about no appreciable change in the situation. To what extent it was exercized others may surmise for themselves. Senator La Follette himself said that he could do no more than he had, because the men generally recognized as his followers or supporters were his friends. A sudden delicacy of feeling, I suppose, forbade any zealous attempt to influence the action or mold convictions of these men whom the outer world had erroneously regarded as parts of a well organized political machine.[46]

And the editor of Stephenson's newspaper, the organ of the Progressives until that time, confided to Elisha Keyes that he was bitter over the treatment that La Follette had accorded his employer. He saw little hope for Progressive harmony in the future.[47]

Again in 1908, La Follette had to choose between dictation and disunity. Stephenson was hopelessly lost to the Progressives by this time, so the problem was to find a single Progressive candidate to oppose him in the preferential primaries. Apparently still fearing the boss-rule charge and another major schism, La Follette refused to commit himself publicly. The result was that two Progressives, William Hatton and Francis E. McGovern, divided Progressive support. Important La Follette men did meet in Madison early in the summer. They decided to give Hatton quiet backing,

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45 Robert La Follette to Herman Ekern, May 15, 1907, Ekern Papers.
46 Stephenson, *Recollections*, 101.
47 H. P. Myrick to Keyes, May 21, 1907, Keyes Papers.

but feared to go further.[48] Thousands awaited the word from La Follette, but it never came. Nor was his law partner, Alfred T. Rogers, forthright on the subject, even in private conversation.[49] La Follette, Lenroot, Ekern, James Stone and others of the "inner circle" distrusted McGovern, the ambitious young Milwaukee District Attorney, but they lacked the organization and the ideology to oppose him successfully. There was no legal mechanism by which they could formally choose Hatton as their candidate. Informal organization against McGovern would open the door once again to the boss-rule charge. With strong support in the Milwaukee area, McGovern was in a good position to duplicate Davidson's successful revolt, if provoked. Perhaps caution was the wiser course in 1908. But the result was that McGovern and Hatton divided over seventy-eight thousand votes while Stephenson won out with 59,839. The support of the *Milwaukee Free Press* and use of over a hundred thousand dollars, incidentally, helped Stephenson win those votes.[50]

Such experiences led a number of sincere and thoughtful Progressives to acknowledge the weaknesses of the primary system and seek some modification of it. State Senator A. W. Sanborn and Herman Ekern favored a Progressive organization within the primary system in 1908.[51] The plan received support from other Progressives from time to time, but was long delayed. Opposition came from such men as McGovern, who had stronger support outside the ranks of the leadership than in it. Equally important, though, was the continuing fear of the boss-rule charge.[52] In 1909 La Follette himself gave some support to the idea of an organization, but as the 1910 election campaign developed, he squashed plans for an organization or even a factional meeting

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48 R. Ainsworth to Herman Ekern, July 23, 1906, Ekern Papers.

49 W. J. McElroy to Herman Ekern, July 25, 1908; W. W. Powell to W. H. Dick, July 31, 1908; W. H. Dick to Ekern, August 14, 1908, Ekern Papers.

50 Herbert F. Margulies, "The background of the La Follette-McGovern Schism," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Autumn, 1956, 21–29.

51 Herman Ekern to A. W. Sanborn, October 27, 1908, Ekern Papers; A. W. Sanborn to James Stone, October 8, 1909; Stone to Sanborn, October 13, 1909, Stone Papers.

52 A. W. Sanborn to Ekern, October 24, 1908; Minutes of the Progressive Organization Meeting in Madison, June 3, 1909, Ekern Papers; James Stone to Edward F. and Julius T. Dithmar, June 4, 1909; Stone to Sanborn, October 13, 1909; Sanborn to Stone, October 16, 1909, Stone Papers; Theodore Kronshage to Tom Morris, May 21, 1910, La Follette Papers.

that might resemble a convention.[53] Finally, after division had contributed to the defeat of the Progressives in the gubernatorial contest of 1914, an organization was formed. Even then, however, it was unable to mobilize complete Progressive support.[54]

The embarrassments associated with the direct democracy commitment, along with the other elements of weakness exhibited earlier, combined to produce further difficulty for La Follette following the 1908 primaries. The La Follette men did not dare contest the popular Davidson's renomination in 1908. Even so, they sustained another defeat at his hands at the Republican platform convention that met in Madison shortly after the primaries. Senator La Follette had battled William Howard Taft for the Republican presidential nomination. At the national convention, Wisconsin had backed its own draft platform to the last. The La Follette forces now asked the state platform convention to endorse their proposals rather than the more conservative planks of the national party platform. In this they were opposed by the Governor. Davidson had walked a tightrope up to this time, hoping to patch up relations with La Follette as much as possible, without, however, surrendering ouright to him. The sharply drawn issue of the platform convention forced him to take a stand, however, and showing vigor and ability that surprised many, he spoke and worked forthrightly for the national Republican platform and against La Follette's.[55] Davidson and his forces won again. The convention rejected the second choice primary and a tariff plank more liberal than the one in the national platform, by votes of seventy to fifty-one and seventy-nine to forty-three. Then it chose Stephenson's campaign manager Chairman of the State Central Committee and adjourned.[56] "The La Follette crowd was cleaned out, horse, foot and dragoon, with Edmonds as Chairman and the platform just as the conservatives wanted it," veteran Stalwart leader Elisha Keyes exulted.[57]

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53 John Hannan to James Stone, October 8, 1909; Charles Crownhart to A. W. Sanborn, May 26, 1910, La Follette Papers.

54 By 1920, such prominent Progressives as former State Senator A. W. Sanborn, Legislative Reference Librarian Charles R. McCarthy and Professor John R. Commons felt that the primary system had done much harm. See Sanborn to McCarthy, August 5, 1920 and McCarthy to Sanborn, August 10, 1920, Charles R. McCarthy Papers.

55 Elisha Keyes to John Gaveney, September 23, 1908, Kayes Letterbooks.

56 *Milwaukee Free Press*, September 24, 1908.

57 Elisha Keyes to John Gaveney, September 23, 1908, Keyes Letterbooks.

In the general election contest that followed, La Follette and Davidson again crossed swords. During the primaries young Herman Ekern met defeat in his bid for renomination to the Assembly. Charging corruption, Ekern entered the general election as an independent. La Follette came into rural and heavily Norwegian Trempealeau county to stump for his loyal and able protege. Davidson, standing on the principle of party regularity and the sanctity of the primary, toured the littler Trempealeau towns for Albert Twesme. In this highly publicized clash of titans, Davidson again won.[58]

A final political reverse in the 1906 through 1909 series was inflicted on the La Follette men during the 1909 legislative session. Despite Stephenson's victory in the primaries, the Progressives, led by State Senator John J. Blaine, hoped to deny him the legislature's designation on the grounds that he had corrupted the primary election. A joint committee investigated the charges, but the more conservative assembly members predominated over the Progressive senators and, after much delay, Stephenson was returned to the United States Senate.

The deterioration of Progressive fortunes in the period 1905 through 1909 had real consequences. For one thing, the 1909 Assembly was conservatively inclined and, for the first time since 1901, failed to pass a single major reform proposal. Secondly, the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Isaac Stephenson, increasingly divorced himself from the lead of La Follette and the Midwestern Republican "Insurgents," voting instead with Nelson W. Aldrich and the "Standpatters." Again, some of Governor Davidson's appointments, especially to the University Board of Regents, materially lessened Progressive influence in state administration.

In 1910, the erosion of Progressive fortunes dramatically ended and a new wave of reform in the state was launched. La Follette was reelected to the Senate; McGovern, representing an advanced, urban oriented version of Progressivism won the governorship; Progressives dominated the elections for congress and legislature. New factors, especially the backwash from the swelling national Progressive tide, were at work. Midwestern Insurgents, including La Follette, had led a well publicized and immensely popular fight against the conservatives on such issues as the Payne-Aldrich tariff, the Ballinger-Pinchot conservation controversy, and the rule of

58 *Milwaukee Journal,* October 28, 30, 31, 1908.

Speaker Joe Cannon in the House. These issues, easily related in the oratory of Progressives to Wisconsin's own earlier struggles against "the interests" and bosses, gave new vitality to the movement in the state.

To the historian, the Progressive resurgence in 1910 has been a confusing and complicating event. For it gave rise to the myth that the Progrossives ruled in Wisconsin from 1901 through 1914 without interruption. It perhaps caused exaggeration of the strengths of the Wisconsin Progressives and obscured the weaknesses. Since Wisconsin was a showcase for Progressivism in its time, misunderstanding about Wisconsin may have contributed to misinterpretations of Progressivism as a national phenomenon. The fact is that very serious weaknesses were present, even in the heyday of Progressivism. Some of them were revealed clearly in the period 1905 through 1909. Others did not show themselves that soon. Taken in combination, these limitations proved potent enough to cripple and finally destroy the movement in the state. To ignore or misconstrue them is to misunderstand a vital phase in the history of American reform.

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The Forty-Fifth Congress and Army Reform

In January of 1878 the *Washington Post* noted the need for "the general purification of the service from the blights of favoritism, flunkyism and extravagance."[1] This was a fitting remark in the beginning of a year which was to see Congress make a major attempt to rid the Army of these and other abuses. In that year the Forty-fifth Congress attempted unsuccessfully to reorganize and reform the service. Because the effort was abortive, most standard treatments of the post-Civil War era seldom mention this episode; yet it was a matter which occupied the attention of a special joint committee of Congress and aroused the champions and opponents of the Army in the last weeks of 1878 and in the early months of the following year. If the proposed changes had been carried out the Army would have undergone a major reorganization which would have affected virtually every branch of the service.

Had Congress been able to undertake this matter in a quiet, dispassionate fashion without such things as partisan and sectional opposition, considerable external pressure by interested parties, and a backlog of attempts to redefine the size and purpose of the Army from the end of the Civil War to 1878, the problem might have been solved in a satisfactory manner. But this was not the case and the efforts of Congress were understandably a continuation of frustrations that dated back to 1865. To appreciate more fully the efforts of the lawmakers of the Forty-fifth Congress it is necessary to summarize briefly the ubiquitous Army problem from Appomattox to 1878.

It should be noted that the size of the Army was seldom constant from the end of the war, and it tended to decrease or increase depending on the whims of Congress and the Indian situation.[2] Congress had shown no inclination to maintain the Army by adequate

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[1] *Washington Post,* January 8, 1878.

[2] It has been estimated that in April, 1865, there were more than one million Northern men in the field. By 1870 the Army had been reduced to 32,788 officers and men, and in 1874 to 25,000. An increase of 2,500 was allowed during the Sioux War, 1875–76. In the spring of 1878 a bill was being considered which would have reduced the Army to 20,000 officers and men. Charles Francis Atkinson, "Army," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1910), II, 623.

appropriations, and in 1876 the Democratic controlled House of Representatives attached a rider to the Army appropriation bill which provided that no federal troops be used to uphold the Republican government in Louisiana.[3] In July, 1876, Congress created a commission of two Senators, two Representatives and two Army officers and the Secretary of War as member ex-officio. This commission failed to submit a report because the term of its service expired before it completed its work.[4] In the next session the House attached a rider to the Army appropriation bill forbidding the use of federal troops at the polls of any federal election. When the Republican-controlled Senate refused to accept the House rider, the Forty-fourth Congress adjourned without appropriating any money for the Army.[5]

In the spring of 1878, Congress was still undecided as to what to do about the bill, though it did not lack proposals. Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, for example, offered to insert twenty-six new sections into the bill, replacing sections 2 through 27. His proposals covered a range of subjects in the bill, but the Senate was no more interested in this amendment than in others that had been offered earlier, and the amendments failed in the Senate.[6] Another proposal was made by Representative Abram S. Hewitt of the House Appropriations Committee who offered his own version which included reducing enlisted personnel from 25,000 to 20,500 with a corresponding decrease in the number of officers.[7] The House accepted the reduction of enlisted personnel to 20,500,[8] but the Senate rejected the bill because of the unpopularity of the reduced figure and in part because of the rule that no legislation could be attached to appropriation bills.[9]

In spite of the Senate's action Hewitt believed that the question of Army reform and reorganization should be raised on the basis

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[3] Edwin E. Sparks, *National Development,* New York, 1907, 125. *Congressional Record,* 45th Cong. 2d sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 902.

[4] James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," *North American Review,* March-April, 1878, 196.

[5] William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army,* New York, 1942, 348–349.

[6] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 2d sess. Senate. vol. 7, pt. 5 (June 6, 1878), 4180. Benjamin Poore, *The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside.* Providence, R. I., 1882, 335.

[7] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 897.

[8] *New York Times,* May 28, 1878.

[9] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 1, (February 1, 1879), 897–898.

of economy. Fearful that the Army might again be used for political reasons as in the election of 1876, he obtained from the chairman of the Judiciary Committee the *Posse Comitatus* amendment, which resulted in one of the more lengthy debates of that congressional session. The Army appropriation bill was subjected to extremely rough handling by its foes, and during the spring of 1878 was sent back to the House no fewer than four times.[10]

The impasse created by the Democratic House and the Republican Senate was temporarily broken on May 15 with the introduction of a Joint Resolution creating a Joint Commission to explore the question of reform and reorganization of the Army.[11] The Commission was to meet as soon as possible and to proceed to the consideration of the matter with which it was charged. After a second reading the Resolution was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. This resolution was modified in the Committee and when it emerged as S.R. 30, it provided for a membership of two Senators and five Representatives. No Army personnel were specifically included but one or more officers were to be assigned to the Committee as secretaries. The committee, with Burnside as chairman, was formed on June 18 and was to have its business completed by January, 1879. Five thousand dollars was appropriated to defray expenses.[12]

The effect of creating the Commission was temporarily to take the vexatious problem of Army reform from the halls of Congress and to allow the matter to be considered by a less partisan and more professional group. Until the Commission's findings were made public, Congress could turn its attention to other business at hand. The Committee requested that heads of various Army departments as well as other officers submit recommendations,[13] and on June 22 the members met with Secretary of War, George W. McCrary, and General Sherman for an exchange of views on Army reorganization.[14]

The attention of the Committee was concentrated upon four

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10 *New York Times*, April 9, 1878, 4.

11 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 2d sess. Senate. vol, 7, pt. iv (May 15, 1878), 3485. All appointments above the grade of captain were to be suspended pending the outcome of the Commission's findings.

12 *Senate Reports*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Rpt. No. 555. The members of the Committee included, Senators Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island and Preston Plumb, Ohio; Representatives included Horace Strait, Minnesota, Henry Banning, Ohio, George Dibrell, Tennessee, Matthew Butler, South Carolina.

13 *Senate Reports*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. rpt. No. 555.

14 *New York Tribune*, June 22, 1878.

areas: staff, line, pay, and stations. Members availed themselves of materials from earlier committees and military boards, and having solicited information in writing from responsible Army personnel they hoped it would not be necessary to call many persons to appear before them for additional information.[15] The Committee moved to White Sulphur Springs on July 22 to August 31 and held its sessions behind closed doors.[16] The members adjourned until late November and then resumed work in New York City. In the interim the chairman was instructed to prepare the details of the bill. The Committee worked in New York about a week and because of the absence of two members adjourned on November 26. It did not resume until December 7.[17]

Up to this time the Committee had considered opinions from various officers and had received a response almost unanimously opposed to any reduction in the size of the Army, but on the question of interchangeability of line and staff the responses were sharply divided. Indeed, this was the most controversial matter of the reforms recommended and with few exceptions, the staff corps were opposed to any change in the existing organization. Many appointments were arranged by a Senator or a Representative and were regarded by recipients as permanent.

Once assigned to Washington these staff officers could look forward to a comfortable life free from the thought of having to spend a portion of their military career in any of the more remote posts in the country. Officers less fortunate, who were assigned to posts in the West, had little chance to be transferred to Washington and were understandably resentful of what they regarded as an unfair system. Most of the men on the staff were satisfied that the existing system was adequate and they were not willing to argue for interchangeability of line and staff. Many of the staff

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15 Ltr., Secretary of War to Commission on Army Reorganization (December 10, 1878), 83/974, George W. McCrary, MSS, National Archives. *New York Tribune*, June 22, 1878.

16 *New York Times*, July 30, 1878. Senator Plumb refused to join the committee when it went to Virginia. He believed that the committee should have gone to the Far West to observe the Army against the Indians and in this way gain better understanding of the problem of reorganization.

17 *Sen. Reports*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. rpt. No. 555. *The New York Times*, July 14, 1878. The latter erroneously reported in July that the Committee was planning to hold its meetings not only in White Sulphur Springs, but at West Point, Saratoga, and Niagara, and the *Times* pointed out, "The unusual opportunities which will be offered the Commission for thought and observation on Army matters at the several fashionable resorts named will doubtless enable them to prepare an elaborate report about the last week of the next session of Congress."

officers who wrote to the Committee were emphatic in their belief in the existing system. Inspector General R. B. Marcy wrote the Committee, "... the existing organization of the Staff Corps, with some slight modifications, is well adapted to the requirements of our service.... Hence I would not recommend any changes from the existing staff organization...."[18] Brigadier General S. V. Benet wrote Burnside, "In my opinion the organization of both line and staff should remain undisturbed."[19] The Adjutant General, General E. D. Townsend, informed the chairman that "... a very large number of disinterested officers would concur in the opinion that the present system is good enough...."[20] Brigadier General A. H. Terry informed the Committee that, "the present division of duties among the several staff departments should remain unchanged. The present staff system has been severely tried, and has endured every test to which it has been submitted."[21]

An exception to the preceding opinions came from Major General J. M. Schofield, Headquarters Department of West Point, who wrote on December 20, 1878, "... I believe the bill merits the cordial support of the Army."[22]

Pleas for reform from line officers desiring staff duty in Washington were made known to the Committee, also, but for obvious reasons the authors were for the most part anonymous. Nonetheless the convictions expressed were as definite as those of their fellow officers in the Capitol.

"The present seems the most favorable time," one line officer wrote, "that has, or may soon occur, to attack the staff incubus, which has fattened upon us till it has grown to be such a monstrous monopoly."[23] Another petition stated,

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[18] Draft of a Bill by Gen. R. B. Marcy to Joint Committee on Army Reorganization (no date, 1878), documents to accompany *Senate Report* No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Original of printed copy, National Archives.

[19] Ltr., Brig. Gen. S. V. Benet, Chief of Ordnance, to Gen. A. E. Burnside (July 20, 1878), documents to accompany *Senate Report* No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd. sess. Original of the printed copy, National Archives.

[20] Draft of a bill by Gen. E. D. Townsend, Adjutant General, to Joint Committee on Army Reorganization (No date, 1878), documents to accompany Senate Report No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Original of the printed copy, National Archives.

[21] Ltr., Brig. Gen. A. H. Terry to Senator Burnside (November 11, 1878), documents to accompany *Senate Report* No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Original of the printed copy, National Archives.

[22] *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 905.

[23] Petitions to the Committee of Army Reorganization in *Senate Reports*, 45th Cong., 3rd sess. No. 555, vol. I, 488.

All of the General Staff are provided at considerable expense with far greater assistance and office, as well as personal conveniences and comforts, than line officers, who perform similar duties. This because they have control of the money appropriated, and they naturally provide first for themselves.[24]

Another anonymous officer wrote the Committee, "We believe that all staff duties, except the medical and chaplains; should be performed by officers temporarily detached from the lines, and that no officer should remain on staff duty in time of peace over two years."[25]

The task of reconciling, if possible, these divergent views as well as devoting time to other matters on its agenda was aided by the secrecy which prevailed during the Committee's period of study, a secrecy imposed so that pressure from interested individuals and groups could be avoided.

On December 12 the Burnside Committee submitted its report to the Senate. The findings as reported to the Upper House contained over seven hundred sections, the bulk of which dealt with Army code and regulations.[26] The Committee reported out the following list of reforms:

1. A codification of all laws relating to the Army in one act.
2. Reorganization and disposition of the Army in time of peace as a frontier and Indian police, and its disposition as a nucleus of offensive and defensive force for foreign war.
3. The reduction of enlisted personnel to 20,000, exclusive of the Signals Corps.
4. Consolidation of the Artillery branch with the Ordnance Corps and reorganization of the Artillery from regimental formation to batteries or companies.
5. Consolidation of the Quartermaster General's and Commissary-General's staffs.
6. Abolishment of the Staff Corps as a distinct group.
7. Introduction of interchangeability of line and staff.[27]

On the question of the future size of the Army there was some difference of opinion. Some favored reduction to 20,000; others advocated a figure above the existing 25,000. The Committee had

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[24] *Ibid.* 493.
[25] *Ibid.*, 495.
[26] *New York Tribune,* December 13, 1878.
[27] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (December 19, 1878), 297–299.

no warrant to change the size of the Army, for that had been fixed by the last session of Congress.[28]

Turning to the more controversial question of the staff, the report stated, ". . . the staff as it now exists is a relic of the rebellion, and has outlived its usefulness."[29] The Committee recommended that interchangeability of line and staff be established by making all officers of the staff below the rank of major detailable from the line of the Army. It also recommended that the number of field officers in staff departments be reduced to a figure consistent with the needs of the staff.[30] This recommendation was, of course, directly contrary to the general tenor of the letters and drafts which the Committee had received from most of the staff officers, and it was expecting too much to believe that the latter would not make great effort to defeat these proposed changes. On December 19, the Senate unanimously consented to reconsider the Committee's report. After reviewing some of the major portions of the bill in broad terms, Burnside declared, speaking of the need to revise the rules and regulations of the Army,

> Nearly all of the troubles between the staff and the line—and they have been numerous, have arisen from uncertainty as to the meaning and authority of regulations and customs of the services. For this reason many of the regulations and customs of the service have been ingrafted upon this bill, and if it meets with favorable action from Congress they will become law, and cease to be subjects of discussion and discord.[31]

At the conclusion of his remarks, Burnside answered questions raised by the Senators and the Vice-President ordered the bill returned to its place on the calendar.[32] Once the bill had been presented to the Senate, those groups interestd in changing the portions unfavorable to their own interests lost little time in using various devices and practices to achieve their ends.

Indications of the staff's attitude were reflected by the Commanding General of the Army, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, who wrote to the Committee,

> As to the reorganization of the army under the bill, I cannot give it my cordial support. I think the present organization is good and well suited

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28 *New York Tribune,* December 13, 1878.
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Poore, Burnside,* 342.
31 *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (December 19, 1878), 297.
32 *Ibid.,* 300.

to our western frontier, and I am not willing to give my consent to any new and untried organization.[33]

On January 6, 1879, the *New York Tribune* reported from Washington that "A number of prominent Army officers in this city have published in pamphlet form their objections to the radical changes proposed by the Burnside Bill in regard to the staff department."[34] According to the *Tribune,* the pamphlet cited authorities on army reorganization to show that inefficiency would result if the proposed changes were made and that the Burnside Bill would not only reduce greatly the number of line and staff officers, but stop promotions of line officers for a number of years.[35] Nor were interested staff officers content with merely a printed statement of their opposition to the bill. The battle was carried to the solons through social gatherings where it was hoped this more pleasant form of campaigning would aid the attacked officers and carry the day on their behalf.[36]

On January 9, the Army Reorganization Bill was scheduled for special consideration in the Senate, but the death of a Senator caused the bill to be placed with others without a fixed place on the calendar. When Senator Burnside attempted to regain a place for it and failed, he notified the Senate that he would bring it up soon for consideration.[37] On January 22 Burnside presented a tabular statement comparing the existing Army with the Committee's proposed changes. This was to accompany the Committee's report on the bill (SB 1491). It was then ordered to be printed.[38] Late in January, the *New York Times* reported that the Commission for the reform and reorganization of the Army had met with the President and exchanged views with him.[39]

The degree of opposition to which the committee was exposed and the press of time to adjourn forced the Burnside Committee to change its plans. On instructions from the Committee, Burnside

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[33] Misc. Docs. of the Senate of the U.S., 46th Cong. 1st sess. No. 14 (January 4, 1879). Papers relating to the reorganization of the Army.

[34] *New York Tribune,* January 6, 1879.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 909.

[37] *New York Times,* January 10, 1879.

[38] *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 1 (January 22, 1879), 621. (A Bill to Reduce and Reorganize the Army of the United States.)

[39] *New York Times,* January 28, 1879.

asked the President of the Senate to allow him to submit a change in the bill. The amendments stripped the original bill of all its parts except the first eighteen pages which dealt with reorganization and reduction of the Army. The deleted portion of the bill dealt with the revised code of regulations and articles of war.[40] Late in the day, on a point of order, it was agreed that the Senate would permit Burnside to withdraw part of the bill. There was no objection and the Senate ended the day's session.[41]

The debate in the House on February 1, was the most lengthy and candid which the bill's supporters offered in its behalf. They summed up the merits of the bill and bitterly assailed those who opposed it. The attack was led by Representative Henry Banning, who told of old captains and lieutenants reporting for duty in command of one non-commissioned officer and no private soldiers, of companies that did not contain a corporal's guard or a regimental band. Speaking of the staff, he declared:

> ... our large and expensive staff, that feeds, clothes, and transports our little Army, has grown to such huge proportions that it takes more money to pay them and the commissioned officers of the line than it takes to pay the entire Army of enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers!

Banning added pointedly: ...

> our military organization is not only (as shown by our best military critics) a weak and ridiculous one, but according to its size the most expensive one upon the face of the earth.[42]
>
> This reform is, of course, warmly opposed by the fortunate gentlemen now filling what the General of the Army calls 'the soft places.' These gentlemen have many friends upon this floor; they are courteous, attentive, and generous hosts, as many of you can testify; no doubt they have warned you of the dire consequences that will follow the adoption of this measure.[43]

Banning insisted that the reforms as proposed in the bill met with support from men of the line, but declared that the bill was opposed by "the staff who have lobbied long and hard and earnestly to prevent its passage—not in the interests of the Army, nor the country—but for the sole and only purpose of preserving and sav-

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40 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 1 (January 30, 1879), 714. *Ibid.*, (February 1, 1879), 849–850.

41 *Ibid.*

42 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879,) 902.

43 *Ibid.*, 903.

ing for themselves the fat, comfortable, useless, extravagant, and expensive positions they now fill.[44]

Representative George Dibrell of Tennessee, also on the Committee, told his colleagues, "No proposition is ever made in Congress to reorganize or modify the military establishment in any way without encountering the charge of premeditated injustice and unfairness to a large class of individuals." He declared that nearly ninety per cent of the amount of almost a million dollars annually appropriated for commutation in the Army was absorbed by the General Staff, whose officers were usually assigned to duty in the populous centers of the country.[45]

Dibrell insisted that the deliberations of the Joint Committee were free of politics and selfishness and that the individual members looked alone, ". . . to the good of the service and the efficiency and economy in the administration of the Army." Speaking of the opposition which the bill had encountered, he candidly declared:

> That there is an organized opposition to the bill none will deny. This organization is strong and will bring to bear a powerful influence upon Congress to defeat the bill; and why? Is it because they propose a better bill? Is it because it is against the interests of the taxpayer of the country who pay the money to support the Army? I answer, emphatically, No. It is not because they propose a better plan, not because they want to lessen the expenses of the Army below that proposed in this bill. No, sir: all of this organized opposition comes from interested parties with selfish motives.[46]

Impassioned as was the defense of the bill, the probability of Congress passing it was not apparently greater than before the debate on February 1, but at least the proponents had exposed on the floors of both houses the degree of opposition the bill encountered.

On the 4th of February the House discussed the Army Appropriation Bill and considered the amendments which would have reduced the Army to 15,000, 17,000, and 20,000, but these proposals were defeated.[47]

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[44] *Ibid.*, 904–905. For a denunciation of the existing line and staff arrangement, see Letter to the Editor, *New York Times*, February 3, 1879. The original House Bill for the reform of the Army (HR 5499) contained 724 sections and comprised largely a rewriting of the Army regulations. The Joint Committee had agreed on a shortened version which Burnside introduced in the Senate. Banning offered this latter version to the House as the Banning-White Bill. See also *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 909.

[45] *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 909.

[46] *Ibid.*, 914.

[47] *Harper's Weekly*, vol. XXIII (February 22, 1879), 143.

Just before the crucial vote in the House on February 5, Banning declared:

> I know, Mr. Chairman, that to stand here and fight for this organization which line asks and which the staff opposes, is to fight against all that society has to offer a member of Congress. But while I know that, I know what it is to stand up in behalf of the people and endeavor to make their Army what General Hancock says in his evidence before a committee of this House, it should be—a small, complete, compact, vigorous organization. . . .[48]

That same day, by a vote of 96-90 the reorganization bill in its entirety was defeated by the House.[49] Yet, there was perhaps, something that could be saved.

The following day, Mr. Thomas Ewing, in debate, forced out of the reform bill such items as code of regulations, the question of power between the Secretary of War and the General of the Army, and provisions relating to the manufacture of arms. With these parts deleted the House was asked to vote only on that part of the bill relating to reorganization. Again the vote was against the bill.[50]

Mr. Banning came to the defense of the bill and asked the House to consider only the first eighteen pages of the original report (the same version which Burnside had introduced in the Senate). The key section of this modified bill which Banning now offered to the House was the proposal for interchangeability of line and staff.[51] By a vote of 101 to 91 this Banning-White amendment was added to the Army Appropriation Bill. In spite of the House action many believed the Senate would strike the amendment.[52] On February 8, the House version of the Army Appropriation Bill was passed with the Banning-White amendment by a vote of 116 to 92.[53]

The Senate was notified that the bill had succeeded in the House and on the following day the measure was sent to the Senate Committee on Appropriations.[54] This committee reported out its own

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48 *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 5, 1879), 1041.

49 *Ibid.*

50 *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 6, 1879), 1061.

51 *New York Times,* February 7, 1879.

52 *Ibid.*

53 *New York Times,* February 9, 1879.

54 *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 10, 1879), 1151.

version of the Army Appropriation Bill and omitted all parts of the House version pertaining to Army reorganization except the portion giving the Secretary of War authority to modify Army regulations. This action was taken because the Senate would not allow the Banning-White amendment included in an appropriation bill.[55]

Senator James Blaine, speaking for the Committee on Appropriations, explained the bill to the Senate, including why the committee decided to strike out the reorganization sections since there was not time to review adequately various sections of the bill.[56] When Burnside attempted to have the Senate consider the portion which the committee had deleted, he was overruled on the grounds that the idea was improper and that time did not allow for such a discussion.[57]

Senator William Windom of the Appropriations Committee explained that the House Appropriation Bill came to the Senate committee at a time when it was overwhelmed with work and did not have time to explore all aspects of the bill in order to judge its merits. He told his colleagues that the committee considered the question of the expediency of attempting to reorganize the Army under existing conditions, but did not report out the House version favorably.[58]

Burnside bitterly replied:

> There has been a hue and a cry against this bill from the very moment it was reported. Where has that cry come from? Much of it from the staff bureaus of the Army. I surely have no disposition to injure the staff officers; on the contrary, I have a great desire to benefit them, as well as other officers of the Army. I know of no officer to whom I would not rather do a personal service than to do harm; but I must say that some of these officers have gone beyond the line of duty, particularly in one of the staff bureaus in Washington, which has almost turned itself into a bureau of newspaper correspondence. Articles instigated by them go all over this country. Not satisfied with attacking the bill, these articles make personal attacks upon me as the originator of the bill. I received papers containing these attacks in great numbers.[59]

In spite of this impassioned confession, the key vote taken on the motion to strike out sections dealing with Army reorganization

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55 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 21, 1879), 1708. *New York Times*, February 21, 1879.

56 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 21, 1879), 1708.

57 *Ibid.*, 1709.

58 *Cong. Record*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 22, 1879), 1757.

59 *Ibid.*, 1758.

was 45 to 18 and with it the work of the Committee and the hopes of its members were defeated.[60]

The Senate then sent its version to the House only to have it rejected and a joint committee was formed to attempt to formulate a compromise. This committee could not agree on a solution and two other joint committees were formed, but these, too, reached an impasse.[61] Thus the Forty-fifth Congress adjourned without appropriating funds for the Army.[62] President Hayes called a special session of Congress and persuaded it to provide him with funds for the operation of the Executive branch of the government.[63]

Though the story of the Burnside Committee's efforts ends in failure, reasons for this are not difficult to ascertain. The recent election of 1876 was still fresh in the minds of many Congressmen and the role the Army had played in that controversial election resulted in strong suspicions of the service by Democrats who were eager to challenge its position by reducing its power and or reorganizing it.

Among the more immediate causes for the failure of the bill was the less than skillful way in which Burnside, particularly, represented it in the Senate and the hostility shown by members of the Appropriations Committee. The GAR and the GOP had much to benefit by maintaining the close association they had known since the days after the Civil War. With powerful friends in the halls of Congress the entrenched interests of the staff would understandably be reluctant to give up their more privileged positions for assignments in less appealing posts throughout the country. The fact that the Union Army had emerged victorious was reason enough for many in Congress who honestly believed the present organization was adequate for the tasks before it. Outside of the Capitol

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60 *Ibid.*, 1759–1760. Burnside and Plumb voted for the Bill; 15 Democrats voted against it; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men,* New York, 1956, 140–141.

61 *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 20, 1879), 1622.

62 *Harper's Weekly,* vol. XXVII (March 22, 1879), 223. *Cong. Record,* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate. vol. 8, pt. 3 (March 3, 1879), 2339. Among the difficulties which confounded the task of agreeing on an appropriation bill was the Democratic action of the House to make it unlawful to use Federal troops at polling places, carrying with it a fine of $5,000 and imprisonment of three to five years. The attempt to amend the revised statutes was defeated in the Senate by a straight party vote of 35 to 30. *New York Times,* February 23, 1879.

63 James E. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* 1789–1897, vol. VII, 520–521. *Harper's Weekly,* March 22, 1879.

the business groups such as the Commercial Exchange of Philadelphia and the Boards of Trade in Cincinnati and Chicago opposed Army reduction.[64]

In addition, the railroad strike of 1877 had made the business community uneasy about any decrease in the size of the Army. Nor were many Congressmen in any mood to reduce the size of the Army for any reason: those Senators and Representatives whose states would suffer the loss of military establishments could hardly be expected to treat lightly or indifferently the question of Army reduction, though reorganization would be settled on other bases.[65]

The question of the Army Appropriation Bill, even stripped of the problems of reorganization and reform, was one which taxed the patience and temper of the lawmakers because of the various attempts to attach unacceptable riders to the bill. With the question of reform added to the already charged atmosphere surrounding the Army Appropriation Bill, chances for the Burnside reforms being passed were already reduced.[66] The final vote taken to strip the Appropriations Bill of the reorganization sections illustrate the partisan feeling toward the issue.

With the defeat of the measure proposed by the Burnside Committee the question of major Army reform was set aside until after the turn of the century when the reforms of Elihu Root introduced changes in the Army which far exceeded those proposed in 1878.

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64 *New York Times*, June 8, 1878.
65 *New York Times*, March 26, 1878.
66 *Appleton's Cyclopedia*, 1879, 231.

Book Reviews

The Wisconsin Business Corporation, By George J. Kuehnl. University of Wisconsin Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 284. $6.50.

In 1840 the population of Wisconsin Territory was 31,000. By 1870 it had passed a million and was still growing rapidly. During these years of rapid growth Wisconsin, and indeed all America, underwent a social transformation that was little short of revolutionary. In that change the modern business corporation played a key role. Prior to 1800 there had been but 335 private business incorporations in the whole of American history. The Wisconsin legislature alone ground out three times that many special charters in the period from 1848 to 1871. Indeed, in one busy year, 1866, it turned out 177 special charters. The evolution of the business corporation during that period is complicated, and no one investigator can tell more than a small portion of it. Added to the similar work of Dodd, Davis, Handlin, Hartz and others, this illuminating essay helps to provide insight into the relations between the law and the economy in the formative years of our industrial society. But the surface has only been scratched, as yet. An enormous amount and variety of work remains to be done before the full story can be told.

This kind of historical research is in its infancy. Some is being done by lawyers, like Kuehnl, who may lack expertise in historiography, but have their own special contribution to make to the understanding of the institutional arrangements of the past. The most significant work of this kind now being done is incorporated in the Wisconsin legal history project conceived and supervised by Williard Hurst. The present book is one of at least four to be published from that project within little more than a year. These four, supplemented by other books yet to come out of the project and capped by Professor Hurst's own work on Wisconsin law, will provide an incomplete but many-dimensioned and impressive picture of the way in which the law has implemented the social needs in the history of one interesting state.

Kuehnl has told part of his story in a chronological and descriptive way. He deals first with the fumbling beginnings of the territorial period, then with the special concern for corporate problems in the constitutional conventions of 1846 and 1848. In 1846 a controversy over banking policy dominated the convention, and an extreme hard-money constitutional provision adopted by the convention on the vehement urging of future Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan was fatal to the final adoption of the constitution by the people. In 1848 the redoubtable Mr. Ryan was not in the convention, and the more moderate resulting document became the basic law of the state. After the constitutional conventions, Kuehnl shifts to a rather loosely conceived analytical organization. He discusses first the promotion of economic development, and then the growth of regulatory activity. In both he is especially interested in the roles of the various legal agencies.

In the former he also treats at length one of the interesting problems of this period: why was there for so long a dual system of incorporation, partly by general act and partly by special charter? Even more striking, why did corporations continue to be formed almost exclusively by special chartering, even when fairly adequate general laws were available? In the second part of his analytical survey, Kuehnl talks of the regulation of the economy; he notes especially a shift from regulation by the legislature to control by the courts. The administrative agency as a means of public control over the economy came later.

Kuehnl's organization exhibits many provocative relationships and much information that will be useful to those who seek to understand the growth of American law or of the American economy. However, it is a striking characteristic of this kind of investigation that the facts are numerous and complex, and have many stories to tell. Another investigator, working with the same materials, could organize them differently and provide many different and equally valuable insights. This is not to assert that another organization would be better, but rather that much still remains to be said about the rise of the corporation, even in Wisconsin. For one illustration, Kuehnl, mentions in at least fifteen brief passages the pervasive limitation on the acquisition of land by corporations. Thus the general incorporation law of 1798 (for the Northwest Territory), limited corporations to acquisition of land the income of which did not exceed $1500 annually. Later, banks and insurance companies were severely restricted to land necessary for the operation of the business, plus land acquired in the bona fide enforcement of rights against debtors. The latter had to be disposed of within five or six years after acquisition. One special insurance charter even enforced the disposal requirement by providing for escheat to the territory of any land acquired in the enforcement of rights against debtors and not disposed of after six years. Other charters and general incorporation acts contained similar restrictions. Nor was this pattern limited to Wisconsin. In Massachusetts, insurance company charters customarily limited real estate acquisitions to a fixed sum. In Pennsylvania it was more common to limit real estate by the annual income it produced. In New York the limit was the land "necessary" to the business. In one Virginia charter real estate acquisitions were limited to two acres. The ubiquity of the limitation on real estate acquisitions, geographically, temporally, and as to the kind of corporation involved, and the variety of techniques for setting the limit, suggest pervasive policy reasons that are independent of the kind of corporation and of the relative scarcity of land. One suggestion that has never been explored adequately is that this limitation represents the persistence of the ancient mortmain policy of English law, of keeping real property out of the "dead hand" of the medieval corporation. Kuehnl's organization tends to mask the very existence of a persistent policy, and certainly fails to seek an explanation for it. A more analytical approach to his material would have thrown such problems into sharper relief.

A defect that is not necessarily inherent in his organization, but which may bear some relationship to it, is the fact that Kuehnl has never felt it necessary to make quite clear what a corporation is and why it is so

useful. We are so accustomed to thinking of limited liability as the reason for incorporation, if not as the defining characteristic of the corporate form, that it may come as a shock to some to learn that many corporations did not have limited liability in earlier days. Moreover, the limited partnership was already available as a way to limit liability. The sharp modern distinction between the corporation and the partnership misleads us; we forget the intermediate forms that were tried and found wanting. The corporation is, in a sense, the end product of an evolutionary process—it was the survivor! Why? Kuehnl makes some suggestions but never adequately answers the question why incorporation caught on—why it had advantage enough to achieve its present level of development. The answer would not be simple. One reason for its capacity to survive in the formative era may have been the stock note technique for semi-compulsory mobilization of scarce capital. Capital stock was sold for a cash down payment plus an assessable stock note. If additional capital was needed there was an assessment by the officers. An examination of insurance company charters and general acts in Wisconsin leads one to suspect that this technique for capital mobilization played a significant role, not only in encouraging the use of the corporation itself, but also in continuing the use of the special charter long after a suitable general act was available. Though there was such a general insurance incorporation act in Wisconsin from 1850 on, by 1871 only two companies had been organized under it, while the legislature had ground out ninety special insurance charters. One apparent reason for continuance of special chartering and for failure of the dual system of incorporation in insurance, was the scarcity of capital in early Wisconsin. The general act required paid in capital of $100,000, while the special charters were satisfied by a limited payment in cash, coupled with the assessable stock note.

The critical paragraphs above are intended to suggest ways in which Kuehnl might have done some things he did not do with his material—not to suggest that he *should* have done them. This is such a complex story that it needs to be worked on by people with varying approaches. This book makes real and valuable contributions to our knowledge. Among its many contributions, it will help to bury the hydra-headed myth of the laissez faire nineteenth century. No one can hold this false belief who spends some time in plowing through the state materials and sees the extent of government intervention in the economy at the state and local level. What needs more exploration now is the varying pattern of government intervention. For example, this book provides a nice contrast to Hartz' excellent book, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860.* Hartz documents, among other things, the substantial public investment in enterprise, especially transportation, in Pennsylvania. Kuehnl tells of the reluctance to engage in the same kind of activity, which was even embedded in the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848. The two stories are related, for Wisconsin reluctance in the 1840's was in part a product of bad Pennsylvania (and other eastern) experience in earlier decades. Thus it becomes especially interesting to learn from Kuehnl of the legal techniques for evasion of the constitutional prohibition. The practical

demands of the social life were difficult to oppose in the name of abstract principle, as any thoughful practicing politician can tell you.

In short, though there are ways in which Kuehnl might have done different things, and perhaps some very important different things, through a different organization of his material, this may be merely to say that another person could have thrown the light of his own special insights on the material. In any case, this book seems to the reviewer to be a real contribution to the small but growing body of literature which seeks to understand in some depth the legal institutions of the past and their place in the making of modern America.

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The Great Sioux Uprising, By C. M. Oehler. New York, Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. xvi, 272. $5.00.

It has been no simple job for Mr. Oehler to uncover a facet of history, virtually forgotten, neglected except in local folk lore and state histories, for over ninety years. The Sioux outbreak of 1862 did not result in the bloodiest massacre committed by Indians in North America, but it ranks well among the worst, and certainly it was more fearsome than any that followed. Yet the slaughter in Minnesota remained obscure, because, as the author rightly observes, it was "dwarfed by even grimmer events of the Civil War's second year."

In language almost terse, the author deftly chronicles the immediate causes of the uprising, the madness of the massacre, and Minnesota's quick reaction. Frequent quotations are skilfully woven into the text and serve to spice the narrative, while short paragraphs, often no more than a sentence long, underscore the excitement. Little Crow, the Sioux chieftan, is given considerable and sympathetic attention, and Henry Hastings Sibley emerges as an Indian fighter who should rank with the more pretentious Custer. One of the fine contributions of the book is the expert handling of the politics of the Indian tribes.

The occasional minor error is usually one of judgement and not of fact, but William Winthrop in *Military Law and Precedent* could have explained a military commission for Mr. Oehler, although Oehler's treatment of the trial of over 400 Sioux, especially his analysis of the crimes of the thirty-nine unfortunate Indians Lincoln did not spare, is smoothly done. The author's associates at the Chicago office of Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborne, as well as the reading public, might do well to note the diligence Mr. Oehler displayed in sifting numerous memoirs, reminiscences, and secondary material. He carefully notes that "Newspapers, magazines, Army, Indian Bureau, or Congressional publications . . . are generally fully identified in the notes," when in fact he refers to only three government documents (a Secretary of the Interior *Report,* a *House Report,* and a

Minnesota *Executive Document*). It would have been profitable for the author to have used the *Official Records,* various *House Executive Documents,* and to have made more use of the Reports of the Secretaries of Interior and War, Minnesota's *Executive Documents,* and other pertinent material such as the *Collections* of the Historical Societies of the Dakotas and Wisconsin. The chapter notes are the greatest deficiency. No citation is made to specific page, and in the case of the *Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society,* not even to volume or year. Quite justly, Oehler relied heavily on *Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,* which contains source material unobtainable elsewhere.

This compact account is a needed footnote to general history, as well as to the history of Minnesota, appropriately celebrating its centennial this year. One could wish to know more about the amount, kind, and effectiveness of the federal government's assistance in 1862 and subsequent years, in view of its other military obligations, and more detail concerning the effect of the uprising on the rest of the northwestern frontier, but perhaps such additional consideration would have robbed the volume of its conciseness and effectiveness.

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Prescott and his Publishers. By C. Harvey Gardiner. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1959. Pp. x, 342. Illustrated. $5.95.

The commemorations of the centenary of the death of William Hickling Prescott began fittingly with a symposium during the Washington meeting of the American Historical Association at the end of 1958. Prescott died on January 28, 1859, at the age of sixty-three, and during 1959 suitable tributes are being published in various historical reviews. Professor Gardiner has been prominent as a contributor to the centennial anniversary celebrations finding place for his articles on phases of Prescott's life in, among others, this quarterly (April, 1959). Last year he prepared his *William Hickling Prescott: An Annotated Bibliography of Published Works* for publication by the Library of Congress, and this year he has brought to light the present volume. He is now off to Europe on a research project to complete his studies on the blind historian.

This volume does not have the purpose of describing Prescott as a stylist or literary historian, nor is it a critique of Prescott's historical objectivity or interpretive writing. Its aim is to reveal the historian's business acumen in his relations with his publishers here and abroad. The result is a new and lively portrait of the author of three best sellers, acting in practically all of the capacities known to the modern book trade—book designing, publicity, sales promotion, distribution, copyright protection, financing, and legalities. His agreements and contracts were made with four American and two British book firms, and his dealings were

many in view of the numerous reprints, chiefly of his *Ferdinand and Isabella, Conquest of Mexico,* and *Conquest of Peru.* However, Professor Gardiner points out, Prescott was no common haggler. He was ever "a scholarly gentleman of aristocratic temperament" in contrast with "money-grubbing booksellers and publishers of a different social world," and he found "the most agreeable part" of his correspondence to be that with his publishers. (p. 15).

Hewing to the line of author-publisher relations Professor Gardiner writes his interesting story in eight chapters. The first of these is a survey of "Prescott and the Slippery Trade," and the last is "The Personal Side" of Prescott's relations with the individual publishers, as gathered from exchanges of letters. The intervening chapters describe Prescott's adoption and use of stereotype plates, his publishing agreements, the problem of book pirates and copyrights, the author's role in book designing, promotion and distribution, and the financial sheet showing the author's income. There are thirty pages of appendices containing Prescott's publishing contracts and agreements, followed by a bibliography and suitable index. The illustrations are chiefly pictures of the publishers and happily a contemporary portrait of Prescott at his noctograph. All in all, this is a book worth reading and a credit to the printer.

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The Twentieth Century City: The Progressive as Municipal Reformer

John Adams once warned that "none but an idiot or madman ever built a government upon a disinterested principle." The Progressives were neither idiots nor madmen, certainly, but they did expect to build an "organic city" based upon a disinterested principle. Historians have not always recognized the importance of the organic concept as a factor in Progressive thought. Speaking of Progressivism in Memphis, William D. Miller has written:

> The movement in Memphis—and this was true of progressivism generally—had been largely a reorganization of externals, a pragmatic social patching. In keeping with its pragmatic character, it possessed no unifying philosophy. Progressivism never bothered much with defining the basic values out of which the reform movement developed, and it is this fact that accounts for its lack of penetration and its inconsistencies.[1]

The assertion that Memphis Progressivism lacked a "unifying philosophy" may be correct, but this does not justify the generalization that Progressives elsewhere ignored the quest for "basic values." On the contrary, Progressivism was often distinguished by its vision of the city as an organism which, if properly directed, would enable men to attain the good life.

I

Lincoln Steffens, whose influential book *The Shame of the Cities* was published in 1904, did not suddenly reveal to Americans that civic virtue was absent from New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis and other cities. He simply documented what they had known for

[1] William D. Miller, *Memphis During the Progressive Era, 1900–1917*, Madison, 1957, 190-191.

many years—that the people ruled in name only, while the political machine ruled in fact. *Après-moi, le déluge,* Steffens might have cried after *The Shame of the Cities.* In countless magazine articles and books, his successors muckraked the American city, searching for evidence of "invisible government."

The reformers discovered, much to their horror, that the worst enemy of reform was the "respectable businessman":

> Now, the typical American citizen [Steffens had written] is the businessman. The typical businessman is a bad citizen; he is busy. If he is a 'big businessman' and very busy, he does not neglect, he is busy with politics, oh, very busy and very businesslike. I found him buying boodlers in St. Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pittsburgh, sharing with bosses in Philadelphia, deploring reform in Chicago, and beating good government with corruption funds in New York. He is a self-righteous fraud, this big businessman. He is the chief source of corruption, and it were a boon if he would neglect politics.[2]

The big businessman opposed reform because good government might prove incompatible with "good" business. He needed special privileges, such as a fifty-year street car franchise or a monopoly over the city's construction projects. The "boss," who controlled the political machine, could provide such bonanzas at terms more favorable to the privilege-seeker than to the city. Fred Howe's indictment of Boss Cox is a typical Progressive broadside describing the alliance between politics and privilege:

> Today, Boss Cox rules the servile city of Cincinnati as a medieval baron did his serfs. He rose to this eminence by binding together and to himself the rich and powerful members of the community, for whom he secured and protects the franchises of the street-railway, gas and electric lighting companies. They in turn, became his friends and protectors, and through him, and for him, controlled the press and organized public opinion.[3]

Privilege governed the American city in the name of the people. What could be done? The Progressives rejected the Mugwump solution for corrupt politics. It was not enough to "turn the rascals out" and elect "good" men in their place. The Progressives knew that spasms of civic virtue since the 1870's had indeed "turned the rascals out" in different cities. Unfortunately, the "rascals" did not stay out long, nor could the reformers accomplish much while in office. The Progressives, however, who denounced "invisible

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[2] Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities*, Sagamore Press: New York, 1957, 3.

[3] Frederic C. Howe, *The City, The Hope of Democracy*, New York, 1905, 80.

government" in the name of the people, could hardly conclude that the people did not want good government. They concluded, instead, that the people wanted it but could not get it.[4] The people must be taught how to become free.

The Shame of the Cities symbolized for a generation of reformers the corrupt alliance between politics and privilege. Progressives, deeply conscious of the poverty and the class divisions which belied the American dream of a classless, prosperous society, had a second symbol in Jacob Riis's *How the Other Half Lives.* Riis described the life of the urban poor and warned his contemporaries of a coming day of judgement:

> The sea of a mighty population, held in galling fetters, heaves uneasily in the tenements. Once already our city, to which have come the duties and responsibilities of metropolitan greatness before it was able to fairly measure its task, has felt the swell of its resistless flood. If it rise once more, no human power may avail to check it. The gap between the classes in which it surges, unseen, unsuspected by the thoughtless, is widening day by day.[5]

The Progressives warned their generation that the problem of urban poverty must be solved. If not, blood would wash the streets of the city. The poor were sure to rise one day in their righteous wrath and destroy their exploiters. "We are standing at the turning of the ways," Walter Rauschenbusch proclaimed:

> We are actors in a great historical drama. It rests upon us to decide if a new era is to dawn in the transformation of the world into the kingdom of God, or if Western civilization is to descend to the graveyard of dead civilizations and God will have to try once more.[6]

It is not surprising, given such apocalyptic visions, that Progressive urban reformers rejected the traditional American response to poverty. Poverty was too extensive to be ignored in the expectation that "progress" would automatically dispose of the problem. Similarly, urban poverty had become too ubiquitous for private charity to handle. Americans of the Progressive period had finally caught up to Henry George. They realized that poverty was not an occasional and temporary by-product of industrial capitalism. In

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4 For municipal reform in the 1890's see William H. Tolman, *Municipal Reform Movements in the United States,* New York, 1895.

5 Jacob A. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York,* Sagamore Press: New York, 1957, 226.

6 Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis,* New York, 1909, 210.

order to achieve social justice they insisted that it was necessary for the community to regulate industrial activity.

The Progressives argued that the war against poverty was immeasurably complicated by the close relationship between poverty and immigration. Economic reform and "Americanization" of the immigrant were inseparable. Immigrants, particularly newcomers from southern and eastern Europe, had to become Americanized before they could begin to lift their economic status. Conversely, something had to be done about their poverty before they could be successfully Americanized.

Poverty and immigration, political corruption and privilege—these were the evils which Progressives thought were bringing ruin upon the American city. In order to meet the challenge of the city, Progressive urban reformers were forced to reject much of the nineteenth century liberal tradition. In place of this tradition, with its emphasis on property rights, individualism and economic *laissez-faire,* many Progressives substituted a new urban ethic which I shall define as the concept of the organic city.

II

Despite the prevalent political corruption and social injustice, the Progressives responded optimistically to "the challenge of the city." In the words of Richard Ely:

> . . . if we look back upon past history, and ask ourselves whence the sources of the highest achievements in the way of culture and civilization, we shall find much to give us hope in the prospect of the domination of the city in the twentieth century. . . . The city is destined to become a well-ordered household, a work of art, and a religious institution in the truest sense of the word 'religious.'

Josiah Strong agreed that America's rapid urban expansion marked the beginning of a new era:

> The sudden expansion of the city marks a profound change in civilization, the results of which will grow more and more obvious; and nowhere probably will this change be so significant as in our own country, where the twentieth century city will be decisive of national destiny.

The ultimate significance of the twentieth century city, as Fred Howe suggested, was that "never before has society been able to better its own conditions so easily through the agency of government." "The ready responsiveness of democracy," Howe claimed, "under the

close association which the city involves, forecasts a movement for the improvement of human society more hopeful than anything the world has known."[7]

Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Populists had all looked upon the city with suspicion, if not hatred. For Bryan the city was an evil and unnatural excresence—simply a place where the grass would grow in the absence of vigorous farm and village life. "Virtue," Jefferson had earlier warned, would exist in America only "so long as agriculture is our principal object." "When we get piled upon one another in large cities as in Europe," Jefferson admonished, "we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there."[8]

The Progressives, on the contrary, were the first group in the American liberal tradition to embrace the city lovingly. They accepted the city as the potential "torch-bearer of civilization, the priestess of culture, the herald of democracy."[9] The problem of the city," the Progressives insisted, was "the problem of civilization."[10] If the disruptive forces of urban life such as poverty and class division could be eradicated, twentieth century man could achieve a civilization superior to any in the past.

Why was the rise of the city so profound a crisis in American life? Why were the Progressives so certain of chaos and catastrophe if we failed to meet the challenge of the city? In large measure the answer lies in the fact that the Progressives straddled two worlds. One was in the process of disintegration. The other had not yet emerged in the form which they desired. The Progressives would insure a safe and orderly transition from the old order to the new—from rural, agrarian America to urban, industrial America:

> One of the keys to the American mind at the end of the old century and the beginning of the new [Richard Hofstadter has written] was that American cities were filling up in very considerable part with small town or rural people. . . . To the rural migrant, raised in the respectable quietude and the high-toned moral imperatives of evangelical Protestantism, the city seemed

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7 Richard Ely, *The Coming City,* New York, 1902, 71-72; Josiah Strong, *The Twentieth City,* New York, 1898, 32; Howe, *The City,* 301.

8 Saul K. Padover (ed.), *The Complete Jefferson,* New York, 1943, 123.

9 Delos F. Wilcox, "The Inadequacy of Present City Government," in Edward A. Fitzpatrick (ed.) *Experts In City Government,* New York, 1919, 33.

10 In the words of Delos F. Wilcox: "... if democracy fails here [in the city], the story of America will be a closed chapter in the annals of freedom." *The American City, A Problem in Democracy,* New York, 1904, 416.

not merely a new social form or way of life but a strange threat to civilization itself.[11]

Our choice, the Progressives argued, lay between further disintegration and ultimate chaos, or the creation of a socially integrated and physically beautiful city.

In defining a new urban ethic compatible with their vision of the role of the city, the Progressives were forced to re-examine traditional theories concerning the relationship between the individual and society. Nineteenth century liberalism had relied upon the hand of Providence to insure social order. Americans had often assumed that unrestricted pursuit of economic self-interest would result in optimum individual happiness and social harmony. The promise of American life was automatic. Communal regulation of the divine mechanism would upset the guaranteed equilibrium.

The Progressives, however, had lost faith in the liberal creed. They challenged the assumption that "progress" was a necessary accompaniment to the unregulated pursuit of private profit. Confronted by what they thought was the disintegration of the American way of life, they could hardly embrace the doctrine of automatic equilibrium. The divine mechanism was not only upset, it was shattered. A new instrument of control was needed to replace beneficent Providence. This could only be the community.

Rejecting liberal individualism, the Progressives forged an ethic more appropriate to an industrial-urban society. They first attempted to define the nature of the city which for them was both the hope and possible nemesis of democracy. Basic to an understanding of the nature of city life, the Progressives argued, is the fact of "specialization." The city lived by the division of labor. Men developed special skills and used them to satisfy the needs of other men. No one, in urban life, was self-sufficient. The Progressives often contrasted the relatively self sufficient and independent life of the farmer against the highly specialized and dependent existence of the city dweller. Because of the inter-dependent character of city life, mutual aid and cooperation were imperative. "The very nature of city life," Delos Wilcox wrote, "compels manifold cooperations." "The individual cannot 'go it alone';

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11 Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* New York, 1955, 175. Fred Howe, Jane Addams and Richard Ely, to name just three of the most prominent Progressives, emerge from the rural-Protestant background. Most important, all three are highly conscious of the fact.

he cannot do as he pleases; he must conform his acts in an ever increasing degree to the will and welfare of the community in which he lives."[12] Fred Howe, surveying *The Modern City and Its Problems,* concluded that:

> The city can only live by cooperation; by cooperation in a million unseen ways. Without cooperation for a single day a great city would stand still. Without cooperation for a week it would be brought to the verge of starvation and be decimated by disease.
>
> The city has destroyed individualism. It is constantly narrowing its field. And in all probability, cooperation, either voluntary or compulsory, will continue to appropriate an increasing share of the activities of society.[13]

The modern industrial city, built upon a foundation of specialization and cooperation, could survive only by carefully regulating the economic activities of the individual. The amassing of population and industry in the city meant that a single individual held magnified potentialities for good and evil. The slum landlord, for example, who refused to meet minimum health standards in his tenements, caused untold misery. Under such circumstances, the Progressives concluded that "we must combine more and more and compete less and less; life is not possible to us on any other terms."[14]

The Progressives sanctioned communal control over the property and profits of the individual, not only because men were inter-dependent, but also because the city fostered irresponsibility. Men were remote from one another; they did not always calculate the consequences of their actions. When a man bought a coat made in a sweatshop, he unwittingly supported a barbaric system of economic exploitation. The food manufacturer who adulterated his product felt no guilt because he did not see the consequences of his handiwork. The widows and orphans who owned stock in a corporation were interested only in dividends. They did not concern themselves with the possibility that their dividends were created through the exploitation of other widows and orphans.

Adherents of the liberal creed had regarded government as a necessary evil at best, fit only for the role of policeman. The Pro-

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12 Delos F. Wilcox, *Great Cities in America: Their Problems and Their Government,* New York, 1910, 12; also Charles Zueblin: "The characteristic note of the new era is social. Individual effort is sanctioned because it promotes social welfare." "The New Civic Spirit," The *Chautauquan,* 38 (1903-04), 56.

13 Frederic C. Howe, *The Modern City and Its Problems,* New York, 1915, 4.

14 Washington Gladden, *Social Facts and Forces,* New York, 1897, 165.

gressives swung to the opposite extreme and embraced government as a positive good. They emphasized the beneficent possibilities of government to a degree unprecedented in American history. Government was the community's major instrument of control. It would protect the community against individual or group exploitation. It would actively promote the interests of all the people.

Many Progressives enthusiastically favored municipal ownership of public utilities. They justified municipal ownership on the grounds that a conflict of interest existed between the community and monopolistic capitalism. The directors of a street railway, for example, were interested in profits, not service. The right of the people to cheap and safe transportation was subordinated, under private ownership, to the right of the stockholders to maximum profits. Furthermore, private ownership of public utilities was the offspring of privilege. In order to operate a sewerage or gas plant, a special franchise had to be acquired from the city council. The efforts of businessmen to win these franchises and keep them secure from regulation was regarded by Progressives as the root of corruption in municipal government. Thus the struggle for municipal ownership was closely connected to the broader Progressive campaign against monopolistic capitalism based on privilege and political corruption.

Many of the municipal reformers, such as Tom Johnson and Fred Howe, were single-taxers. The single-taxers agreed that private ownership of utilities created a conflict of interest between the public and stockholders. They agreed that municipal ownership was necessary in order to clean up municipal government. The single-taxer also insisted, however, that the community had a right to the "unearned increment" which private monopoly gobbled up. The "unearned increment," springing from the mere growth of the community, ought to return to its source; it should enrich the community rather than a few private individuals.

The revolt against liberalism, the revised theory of the individual's relationship to society and government which I have been discussing, is the intellectual basis for the Progressive ideal of the organic city. Every community, of course, is organic in the sense that all the parts are related in some fashion. Few communities, however, are organic in the sense that all the parts work together to achieve a common goal, as the organs of the human body cooperate to maintain life. The latter concept of organic, which implies purposive cooperation and not merely random relationship,

was what the Progressives had in mind. In the organic city, men would define common goals and cooperate to realize them. Individual and group activity would be judged in relation to their contribution to the common good. "But always the people remain," Brand Whitlock once wrote, "pressing onward in a great stream up the slopes, and always somehow toward the light. For the great dream beckons, leads them on, the dream of social harmony always prefigured in human thought as the city."[15]

In the organic city, the community was to be consciously and deliberately "organized for the higher and more comprehensive purpose of promoting the convenience, the comfort, the safety, the happiness, the welfare, of the whole people."[16] America had blindly stumbled into urban life. This urban civilization held great promise for good if controlled and directed. It threatened destruction if left to itself. In short, the organic community was the essence of the new urban ethic. Government, transformed from "an agency of property" into an "agency of humanity," would translate the desire for an organic city into action:

> The life of the individual must be brought into organic and vital touch with the life of the community. The citizen must think of the city as far more than a protector of person and property. In his mind, the city must be associated with a large group of services upon the efficiency of which the maintenance of his standard of life depends.
>
> All this involves a wide extension of municipal functions: the creation of a new city environment.[17]

The organic city, devoted to the service of all the people, would restore the social harmony once guaranteed by the invisible hand of Providence.

III

The American Institute of Social Service published, in 1906, the results of a survey concerning the church affiliations of social reformers. Questionnaires were sent to 1,012 individuals. Of this number, 401 were connected with charity work, 339 with settlements, 272 were connected with various national reform organizations. Eight hundred and seventy-eight of the 1012 reported on religious affiliation. Significantly, only fifteen per cent of these were non-Protestant.[18] In order to understand more fully the Progressive

15 Brand Whitlock, *Forty Years of It*, New York, 1914, 374.
16 Gladden, Social Facts, 163.
17 L. S. Rowe, *Problems of City Government*, New York, 1908, 93, 94.
18 W. D. P. Bliss, "The Church and Social Reform Workers," *Outlook*, 82 (1906), 122-125.

vision of the organic city, it is necessary to examine in detail the religious ethos which inspired it.

Fred Howe, in his *Confessions,* tried to explain the moral impulse which guided the conscience of his generation. "Physical escape from the embraces of evangelical religion," Howe wrote, "did not mean moral escape."

> From that religion my reason was never emancipated. By it I was conformed to my generation and made to share its moral standards and ideals. It was with difficulty, that realism got lodgment in my mind; early assumptions as to virtue and vice, goodness and evil remained in my mind long after I had tried to discard them. This is, I think, the most characteristic influence of my generation.[19]

Although the agrarian, Protestant world of the Progressives was dissolving, it is important to understand that the Progressives did not reject the agrarian, Protestant values. Their object was to adapt those values to urban life—to insure the safe transition of these values from one environment to another.

Progressive municipal reformers complained that an exaggerated "materialism" had betrayed Americans into neglecting their higher responsibilities and endangering their secular souls. They had worshipped Mammon and had forgotten their obligations to their fellow men. A necessary prelude to the creation of the organic city was a *renaissance* of moral instinct. Men's latent moral idealism would effect an inner transformation, a transvaluation of values. The spirit of service and sacrifice would replace the will-to-power and the will-to-profits. The fundamental brotherhood of man would be revealed as men subordinated superficial differences and proved their essential unity by cooperating to substitute order for chaos in the city. In the words of Josiah Strong:

> Society is beginning to arrive at self consciousness; that is, it is beginning to recognize itself as an organism whose life is one and whose interests are one. . . .
>
> There are two laws fundamental to every living organism, which must be perfectly obeyed before society can be perfected; one is the law of service, the other that of sacrifice.[20]

There was a third law still more important—the law of love. The law of love "vitalizes the other two." "To him who loves,"

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[19] Frederic C. Howe, *The Confessions of a Reformer,* New York, 1925, 16-17.

[20] Josiah Strong, *The Twentieth Century,* 117, 123.

Strong announced, "service is its own reward, and sacrifice is privilege."[21]

In striving to create a "union of all the people, seeking in conscious ways the betterment of human conditions,"[22] the Progressives exemplified the Protestant "moral athlete." Teach men

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21 *Ibid.*, 127; Progressive literature is replete with appeals for service, sacrifice and love. I will quote just a few such appeals in order to capture the spirit of Progressive municipal reform:

1. Delos Wilcox: "The real character of our national mission is inconsistent with mere self seeking. Freedom, democracy, equality of rights, all speak of brotherhood and cooperation and prophesy that human nature, so cruel and selfish in its ancient and primitive manifestations, is being changed to something benevolent and social." *The American City: A Problem in Democracy*, 3.

2. Brand Whitlock: "He [Mayor Jones of Toledo] saw that the law on which the Golden Rule is founded, the law of moral action and reaction, is the one most generally ignored. Its principle he felt to be always at work, so that men lived by it whether they wished to or not, whether they knew it or not. According to his law hate breeds hate and love produces love in return; and all force begets resistance, and the result is the general disorder and anarchy in which we live so much of the time." *Forty Years of It*, 149.

3. Richard Ely: "And this development of human powers in the individual is not to be entirely for self, but it is to be for the sake of their beneficent use in the service of one's fellows in a Christian civilization. It is for self and for others; it is the realization of the ethical aim expressed in that command which contains the secret of all true progress, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself...." "It is in this duty to love and serve our fellows that I find the most convincing proof of the divinity of Christ." *Ground Under Our Feet: An Autobiography*, New York, 1938, 67, 74.

4. Washington Gladden: "This battle for good government in our cities will not be won without a great deal of heroic, costly, consecrated service. It is because you and I have been so busy with our mills and our mines and our merchandise, with our selfish schemes and our trivial enjoyments and our narrow professionalism... and have left our one main business of ruling the city in the fear of God to those who feared not God nor regarded man, that such a great hour of darkness rests now upon our cities. *Social Facts and Forces*, 190.

5. Frank Parsons: "There is no quarrel between true individualism and the cooperative philosophy. The savage individualist of the primeval forest has of course no use for government or cooperation of any sort. But the developed individualist of a highly civilized society is naturally cooperative to a large degree in his conduct and thought, no matter what sort of nonsense he may talk. Primitive individualism expressed itself in absolute independence; ennobled individualism just as naturally expresses itself in cooperation and mutual help; and the noblest individualism would necessarily express itself in complete mutualism or universal cooperation." *The City for the People*, Philadelphia, 1899, 237.

22 Howe, *Hope of Democracy*, 312.

the truth about politics, poverty and other urban evils, the Progressives preached. Once the truth was known and conscience aroused, then man's instinctive moral idealism would rouse his will to action. By sheer force of will, he could generate the internal reformation so basic to the creation of the organic city.

The Progressives did not believe that social disorder and misunderstanding developed from limitations in man's nature. Conflict and chaos could not be ascribed to "inherent defects" in man. Indeed, social disequilibrium was a departure from the "wisdom of God's plan." "Is there not truth," Howe asked, "in the suggestion that society itself is responsible for the wreckage which industry has cast upon our shores? Are not poverty and the attendant evils of ignorance, disease, vice, and crime the children of our own flesh and blood."[23] If there was tumult in the city, then we alone were the "architects of our own misfortunes." We had worshipped Mammon, and thus sanctified a sordid commercialism oblivious of human rights and needs. It was not surprising that our cities grew unplanned and impervious to the comfort and happiness of the people. The philosophy of entrepreneurial "individualism" had protected the "rights" of the tenement landlord, but not those of his poverty striken tenants. "Individualism" insured to the directors of a street railway the right to exploit their employees and the public, while the city looked on helplessly. We had, in short, permitted an irresponsible commercial ethos to govern our activity and shape the institutions which now exploited us. By force of will, we could alter both the ethos and the institutions.

The Progressive organic city, characterized by the spirit of service, sacrifice and love, was nothing less than God's Kingdom-on-Earth. Just as ante-bellum Protestant reformers had called for the eradication of evil in order to hasten the millennium, so also the Progressives preached a millennial gospel. The evils which the Progressives faced were often different, but the apocalyptic spirit was the same. Urban reform, like abolition, was a great moral drama. In Act I the participants must become conscious of their personal guilt for the evils which surrounded them. In Act II this sense of guilt must merge with a conviction of personal responsibility for the eradication of evil. Act III would witness the transvaluation of values—consumation and salvation.

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[23] Frederic C. Howe, *Privilege and Democracy in America*, New York, 1910, x.

IV

Protestant moral idealism is a most important explanation for the millennial aura which envelops the organic city. Also very significant in explaining the aspirations of municipal reformers was the influence of the European municipality. Most Progressive municipal reformers were conscious of the efforts of European, and especially German and English cities to meet the problems created by rapid population growth and industrialization.

Progressive reformers like Fred Howe and Albert Shaw were greatly impressed by the European municipality. They were inspired by what they thought was the spectacle of cities dedicated to the "service of humanity." Albert Shaw's description of the German city is typical:

> The practical management of German cities proceeds in harmony with the German conception of the municipality as a social organism. . . . It is enough for us to understand that in Germany the community, organized centrally and officially, is a far more positive factor in the life of the family or the individual than in America. The German municipal government is not a thing apart, but is vitally identified with every concern of the municipality; and the municipality is the aggregation of human beings and human interests included within the territorial boundaries that fix the community's area and jurisdiction. There are, in the German conception of city government, no limits whatever to municipal functions. It is the business of the municipality to promote in every feasible way its own welfare and the welfare of its citizens.[24]

Shaw was correct in saying that the German city was a "far more positive factor" in the individual's life than in America. More debatable was his assumption that such interference developed primarily out of a tender concern for the happiness of all the people. Given their desire for order and harmony in place of ruthless economic individualism, I suspect that the Progressives confused German administrative control with the organic city. In fact, Progressive studies of the European city reveal more about the Progressives than about the European city. For this very reason, however, such works are valuable to the student of Progressive municipal reform.

The Progressives assumed that the European city illustrated the organic city in action, not only because it was ostensibly an "agency

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[24] Albert Shaw, *Municipal Government in Continental Europe*, New York, 1895, 323.

of humanity," but also because it relied so much on administrative expertise and science. Fred Howe admiringly reported that:

> The German city is a cross section of the nation. It is Germany at her best. Here, as in the army, in the navy, and the civil service, one finds the most highly organized efficiency and honesty. . . . The higher municipal offices are filled with men prepared for the profession of administration by education, long experience and achievement.[25]

Clearly, if Protestant idealism was the heart and nervous system of the organic city, then science was its brain. Talent and intelligence would rule, they were the instruments by which the municipality would serve the people. Howe revealed:

> I cared about beauty and order in cities—cities that chose for their rulers university men, trained as I was being trained. Possibly because I was disorderly myself, I wanted order. And I hated waste. That I had been taught to esteem a cardinal sin, and American cities, I was told, were wasteful because they were ruled by politicians, whose only interest was in jobs.[26]

Sometimes, as with E. A. Ross, this Progressive faith in expertise emerged as an anti-democratic élitism:

> Politically, democracy means the sovereignty, not of the average man—who is a rather narrow, shortsighted, muddle-headed creature—but of a matured public opinion, a very different thing. 'One man, one vote,' does not make Sambo equal to Socrates in the state, for the balloting but registers a public opinion. In the forming of this opinion the sage has a million times the weight of the field hand. With modern facilities for influencing mind, democracy, at its best, substitutes the direction of the recognized moral and intellectual élite for the rule of the strong, the rich, or the privileged. . . . Let the people harken a little less to commercial magnates and a little more to geologists, economists, physicians, teachers and social workers.[27]

There are two important explanations for the Progressive infatuation with the expert. First, only trained intelligence could successfully cope with the complexity of an urban-industrial civilization. Science alone could transform the idealism of the new urban ethic into reality. The day of the well-rounded Jacksonian democrat was over. He was an anachronism, in government and elsewhere. The future belonged to the specialist.

In the second place, the expert was "disinterested." Remote from the mart of commerce, and the stench of the all-mighty dollar, he was devoted to his work alone. He would not promote only

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25 Frederic C. Howe, *Socialized Germany*, New York, 1915, 265.
26 Howe, *Confessions*, 6.
27 Edward A. Ross, *Changing America*, New York, 1912, 4-5, 106.

his interests or those of his class, but the general interest. The expert, in his selfless dedication to his work and to the commonweal, was a key figure in the organic city. The Progressive believed that this reign of "disinterested" talent typified the European city. As Shaw explained:

> The conditions and circumstances that surround the lives of the masses of people in modern cities can be so adjusted to their needs as to result in the highest development of the race, in body, in mind, and in moral character. The so-called problems of the modern city are but the various phases of the one main question, How can environment be most perfectly adapted to the welfare of urban populations. And science can meet and answer every one of these problems.
>
> [This reliance upon the services of the expert] would seem to rest so palpably at the bottom of all that is encouraging and inspiring in the recent progress of municipal life in Europe that a discussion from any more restricted point of view would be well-nigh useless.[28]

The European city, supposedly devoted to the service of all the people and drawing upon the skill of the expert, offered visible proof to the Progressives that their millennial hopes were not in vain.

In summary, then, the Progressive period witnessed the growth of a new urban ethic which interpreted the city as an organism and which redefined the relationship between the individual and society. The Progressives demanded politics which were moral and disinterested, and politicians who were "social engineers." They demanded a moral consensus which stressed the spirit of service, sacrifice and love. Once such a consensus was achieved, the city would become an "agency of humanity" instead of the nemisis of democracy. In the organic city men would transcend class and ethnic differences. They would perceive and fulfill all human needs—biological, cultural, social, economic. Progressive municipal reform failed, not so much because it lacked a philosophy, but because it wove a reform program around the fragile possibility that men could transcend their "superficial" differences and cooperate in the building of the organic city, the city devoted to the deliberate "culture of life."

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[28] Albert Shaw, *Municipal Government in Great Britain,* New York, 1898, 3, 4.

A Professor in Farm Politics

George Peek—businessman, farm leader, political administrator —looked out at a strange Washington scene in the grim yet hopeful year 1933. What appeared to him to be an "entirely new species" had moved into "high places." The "species" included college professors who were "wholly without experience" in what this politically active businessman regarded as "larger affairs."[1] Peek was not the only man who felt uneasy. Other farm leaders insisted that "the job of getting agriculture back on its feet calls not for well meaning theorists, but for double fisted practical men who still have faith in our institutions."[2] Other businessmen urged the President to replace the professors with "men who have hustled up pay rolls."[3]

Such rhetoric enlivened the political debate of the 'thirties and convinced many observers that the political experiences of the professors testified to a strong anti-intellectual strain in American culture. Those experiences, however, actually testified even more strongly to the accommodation that had taken place between intellectuals and their culture. Large numbers of them had fitted themselves into their culture and were accepted by many of America's economic and political leaders. Not the intellectuals as such but only certain of their values disturbed these other men. The values

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Author's Note. For a more thoroughly developed and documented treatment of this subject see the author's "The New Deal Professors and the Politics of Agriculture" (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1958), especially chapters 1, 3, 4 and 6. As the thesis reveals this study has benefitted greatly from the impressive work that has been done by a number of historians of farm politics. The study rests largely upon a number of manuscript collections, especially the papers of M. L. Wilson, George Peek, George Warren, Franklin Roosevelt, and the office of the Secretary of Agriculture. Also helpful have been the publications of the major farm organizations and the *Journal of Farm Economics*. The latter is a rich source for the student of farm policy. The *Journal* contains many articles by participants in policy making and by outstanding students of the politics of agriculture, such as Charles M. Hardin. I am grateful for the critical attention that this study has received from a number of scholars, especially Professor Merle Curti of the University of Wisconsin and Professors Carl E. Schorske, Joseph C. Palamountain and Loren Baritz of Wesleyan University.

[1] George N. Peek (with Samuel Crowther), *Why Quit Our Own*, New York, 1936, 112.

[2] William Hirth to George N. Peek, August 25, 1936; Peek Papers—MSS in Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

[3] Sibley Everitt to Franklin Roosevelt, April 15, 1935; Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1-Misc. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

of the intellectuals determined their relations with these leaders. Anti-intellectual rhetoric usually only obscured a basic conflict, a conflict between business and democracy, for example.

Professor M. L. Wilson's experiences in farm politics provided evidence on these themes. Though he was an intellectual he enjoyed strong support from many business and farm leaders. And why not? He sympathized with their business values. This professor's outlook, to be sure, ranged well beyond business values. Wilson held democratic values as well. It was this particular combination in his world view that made his political experiences so meaningful to the historian of intellectuals in New Deal politics. The successful opposition to Wilson's policies did not grow out of distrust of intellectuals. Success came to Wilson when he pushed a business program for agriculture. Failure came when he moved beyond to democratic programs that threatened the business orientation of farm politics and the power of that orientation's most militant representative.

Wilson represented a special type of intellectual, a type that can be called a "service intellectual." The service intellectual is quite unlike the "ivory tower" and "alienated" intellectuals who figure so prominently in the popular magazines and literary histories. He fits into major concerns of the culture and identifies with one or more of its major sets of values. He devotes the life of the mind to problems of pressing practical importance and often works on them in cooperation with leaders of economic and political affairs. American universities had been producing an abundant supply of such people since the late nineteenth century. Franklin Roosevelt recognized their utility and encouraged their political activity.

Many of the major contributors to the development of the service intellectual had shaped Wilson's growth. Agricultural colleges had provided most of his formal education and teaching opportunities. Leading exponents of the "Wisconsin Idea," such as John R. Commons, had guided the Montana professor's graduate studies. Further graduate work had been taken with James H. Tufts, a philosopher who, as Wilson has described him, "was as much concerned in how he applied ethics in labor industrial relations as he was in the theoretical side of ethics."[4] Tufts had enjoyed close association with *the* philosopher of the service intellectual—John Dewey. Dewey had advised intellectuals to break down the barriers

[4] Louis Finkelstein, ed., *American Spiritual Autobiographies,* New York, 1948, 16.

that divided them from other people. Wilson developed institutions, especially the farmer committee system, that brought intellectuals and other people into close contact in the shaping of policy.

Where were the origins of the production control program with which Wilson was most closely associated? The program did not originate with the farm organizations that one expects to shape farm policy. Those organizations had their own price raising schemes in 1932, ranging from export "dumping" to simple price-fixing. Wilson worked hard to get "hooked up with the National Farm Bureau and the National Grange."[5] Some of their leaders, however, resented the fact that he had introduced a competing program. All of them tried to get Franklin Roosevelt to accept one of their own programs.

Roosevelt listened to the farm leaders, but at the same time he listened to the alternative proposal that Wilson and other social scientists had been developing. Wilson did more than anyone else to develop the alternative, but his close associates, especially W. J. Spillman, Beardsley Ruml, and John D. Black, had also made important contributions. The idea that agricultural production should be controlled had been around for a long time. These men attempted to devise ways to make it possible for the farmers actually to control their production.

These social scientists believed that a business practice must form the basis of the farm program. Farmers should imitate a practice that urban businessmen had long been using for their own purposes. With help from the government the commercial farmer should behave more like these other businessmen and control his production in order to realize the business goal of profitable prices.

With intellectuals offering the businessman as the model for the farmer, it can hardly astonish us that Wilson gained more helpful support from business than from farm leaders in 1932. Men such as Henry Harriman, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, and R. R. Rogers, a top official of the Prudential Life Insurance Company, provided some of the most important support that Wilson received in that crisis year. "You would be surprised," he informed a friend, "how much the business interests are now het up over so-called farm relief."[6] The professor used their financial support to wage a vigorous propaganda and lobbying campaign.

Both economic and political factors had drawn these businessmen into farm politics. Better farm prices would help those businesses

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[5] Wilson to Beardsley Ruml, May 18, 1932; Wilson Papers—MSS in Montana State College Archives, Bozeman, Montana.

[6] Wilson to Joseph Davis, November 20, 1932; Wilson Papers.

that were "vitally dependent upon the farmer's income."[7] The many millions that the life insurance companies had invested in farm loans, Wilson pointed out, had given the companies "some little interest in what is prosaically called the agricultural situation."[8] And improvement in the farmer's economic situation would make him a conservative political force. Wilson warned business leaders "that we must have elevation in prices or else we are going to have debt repudiation on a scale which will ruin the moral fiber of millions of people and terribly disrupt if not ruin the financial structure."[9] Many business leaders agreed that farm relief could help both to preserve the business system and to restore it to prosperity.

This farm program, then, revealed that an intellectual could hold business values. Wilson's program drew upon more than one set of values, however. Democratic values found a place in the program, especially in the farmer committee system. Farmers were to elect some of their fellows to serve on community and county committees. These committees would function like the corporation functioned in industry to keep production in line with demand. Wilson believed strongly in this feature for above all he saw it as a democratic system of administration. The agrarian democratic tradition, as well as business practices, thus lay behind this professor's program.

It was Roosevelt who got the farm leaders to accept the professor's farm scheme. Not that F.D.R. clearly told the farmers that this was the program they should accept. He merely let it be known in a rather vague way during the campaign that he liked the plan. Though Professor Tugwell brought Wilson to Roosevelt and urged him to force the farm leaders to line up behind the plan and though Wilson played the leading role in drafting the key speech on farm policy, F.D.R.'s commitment remained rather vague. He did not want to antagonize any of the farm groups. The farm leaders got the point, however, and agreed to include production control in the farm bill.

The bill, though, contained the farm organizations' proposals as well and thus forced the administrators to decide how much emphasis should be given to Wilson's plan. The professor and his associates moved into jobs that could help to shape that decision. He, Tugwell, Mordecai Ezekiel, Howard Tolley and other intellectuals who

7 Wilson to C. R. Hope, July 22, 1932; Wilson Papers.
8 Wilson to Joseph Davis, May 18, 1932; Wilson Papers.
9 Wilson to R. R. Rogers, July 22, 1932; Wilson Papers.

favored production control took important administrative posts. And the man in the top post—Henry A. Wallace—had been working with Wilson for several years.

Only one major enemy remained in the way—the agricultural processors and distributors and a businessman in farm politics who shared their point of view. Roosevelt and Wallace chose George Peek as the administrator of the AAA because of his good relations with farm and business leaders. (He later complained that he had been mere "window dressing."[10]) Peek was a former farm machinery manufacturer who had led the McNary-Haugen fight of the 'twenties. He and the "middlemen" fought the efforts to make production control the chief feature of the New Deal farm program. Programs that would sell the surpluses, by dumping if necessary, struck these men as better ways to make farming profitable. Production control was not a form of farm relief that would enlarge the profits of businessmen whose profits depended upon full-scale agricultural operations.

By late 1933, however, Wilson and his colleagues had gained the support they needed to make production control the chief feature of the New Deal farm program. The Farm Bureau had become an especially strong supporter when the AAA started to raise income to commercial farmers and to help that farm organization to increase its power. Thus when the conflict between Peek and the intellectuals reached a crisis, Wallace and Roosevelt stood behind production control. When the processors in 1936 persuaded the Supreme Court to invalidate this program, the professors worked with the farm leaders to seek new ways to control production.

In the late 'thirties, however, the Farm Bureau began to turn against Wilson's program and to join the other business-minded groups that had become New Deal critics. The recession of 1937 strengthened old doubts about production control and strengthened old interests in marketing devices as ways to get higher prices. Better means seemed needed to achieve business goals. More than that, means were needed that did not threaten the political power of the Farm Bureau. The institutional expression of Wilson's democratic values had begun to worry this organization. The committees seemed capable of becoming a new farm organization that could replace the Farm Bureau as the leading representative of the commercial farmer in the development of policy.

Farm Bureau criticism troubled the professors for they hoped

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10 Peek, *Why Quit Our Own*, 155.

that production control would accomplish more than business purposes. Wilson hoped that the program might "stimulate a great lot of discussion and talk about planning and agricultural readjustment."[11] It was not enough to make farming more profitable for commercial farmers. Farm policy must consider broader interests, such as the interests of consumers, of low-income groups in agriculture, and of future generations of Americans. In short, the planning program that was developed reflected doubts that the general welfare could be realized if business considerations alone dictated land use.

An institutional development showed how the professors used the business program as a stepping stone to programs with broader goals. In 1934, a Program Planning Division was established within the AAA. A professor who was one of Wilson's closest associates, Howard Tolley of the University of California, headed up the new Division. It devoted itself to the development of an impressive list of plans.

Then in 1938 the intellectuals made their strongest bid to realize their long-run social goals, a bid that soon led to conflict between democratic and business values. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics with Professor Tolley as its chief was the chosen instrument. The Bureau became the general planning agency for the Department of Agriculture in hopes that all of the activities of the Department would be coordinated and directed toward the fulfillment of the bold purposes.

The BAE planning venture rested in part upon the professors' democratic values. The most conspicuous expression of those values came in the role that was opened up for farmers. Wilson's farmer committee idea was applied to the planning field so that intellectuals and farmers could work together to plan ways to improve the use of the land. The hope was that large numbers of farmers would actively participate. Wilson dreamed of "economic democracy in action . . . farmers, experts and administrators cooperating in the different phases of policy formation. . . ."[12] He and his associates thus not only moved beyond business goals. These intellectuals also rejected elitist conceptions of planning. It was not to be the function solely of a specially trained group of men.

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11 Wilson to E. A. Duddy, March 11, 1932; Wilson Papers.

12 Wilson, "The Place of the Department of Agriculture in the Evolution of Agricultural Policy;" MS in National Archives, Records Group 83, General Correspondence, Division of Statistical and Historical Research.

The democratic planning program barely got off the ground before the Farm Bureau shot it down. Anti-intellectualism did not explain this action for the Farm Bureau got along very well with many service intellectuals. It, unlike some other organizations, had not distrusted production control because intellectuals had developed it. After all, the major political support for the nation's agricultural colleges came from this representative of the commercial farmer.

The attack grew out of Farm Bureau concern about the implications of the democratic values of these particular intellectuals. The organization feared that the committees might possibly free the policy-makers from political dependence upon the Bureau. Such freedom might put farm policy-making into the hands of men whose outlook was not limited to the business perspective of the Farm Bureau. The plans of Tolley's BAE frequently showed a distressing concern for the interests of consumers and lower income groups in agriculture as well as the interests of the rural businessman. The Farm Bureau had the power needed to do the job. The attack began in 1940. By 1946 little remained of the planning program.

The war contributed to Farm Bureau success. During the depression President Roosevelt and especially Secretary Wallace had been the most vigorous supporters of the intellectuals' interest in planning. But when the attack got under way, Roosevelt had already turned his attention to other matters. Wallace, now the Vice President, had left the Department in the hands of Claude Wickard, whose concentration on the war needs for expanded production and close ties with the AAA left Tolley's BAE with no real support. Thus, the Farm Bureau and its spokesmen in Congress had little trouble in destroying the democratic planning program.

Obviously intellectuals in politics needed more than ideas. The professors needed power that ideas alone could not provide. The committees thus had potential importance as means as well as ends. The professors valued broad participation in politics for its own sake and also as a way to get support for planning. Events proved that planning could only live if it had a new farm organization behind it. The established farm organizations provided almost no support against Farm Bureau attacks. Only a new mass-based organization could have competed effectively against the Farm Bureau.

Here, however, the professors' ties with business-oriented power groups played a crucial role. Those groups had enabled the planners to get their programs under way. In establishing the committees, the planners worked with an ally of those groups, the county agents.

With those agents playing such a large role, the inevitable happened. The lower income groups in the communities had little representation on the committees. With the kind of farmer that the Farm Bureau represented dominating the committees, it is not surprising that they did not come to the defense of the program.

The established power structure in farm politics created large difficulties for the intellectuals who hoped to move beyond business programs. Perhaps nothing Wilson and his associates could have done would have produced a genuine democratic social movement that would support planning. But perhaps more could have been accomplished if the intellectuals had been more militant in their efforts to promote broad and active political participation. However, militant efforts would have involved a direct challenge to the very business-minded groups that had brought the professors their early successes. An effort to build new programs slowly and in cooperation with established groups failed because a leading group scented danger in the air. A more vigorous effort to democratize policy-making in the farm field might only have aroused the opposition even more quickly.

Thus, intellectuals such as Wilson failed in their efforts to serve democratic as well as business values in farm politics. Obviously the two sets of values were not in perfect harmony with one another. Obviously business values had greater power. The depression situation had helped the professors to move forward along democratic as well as along business lines. But the war situation, with its emphasis upon the immediate expansion of output, favored business values. Under the aegis of war, a militant representative of those values in farm politics destroyed the democratic planning program and taught the New Deal professors a lesson about the nature of the politics of agriculture. "... the sweep of the business spirit and of the machine," Max Lerner has written, "has caught up the whole enterprise of farming and transformed it in the image of industrial enterprise."[13] The professors had contributed to the transformation, thus showing that intellectuals could fit into business America. But the change also contributed to their political frustration. Intellectuals with democratic values did not fit so easily.

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[13] *America as a Civilization; Life and Thought in the United States Today*, New York, 1957, 140. Compare John H. Davis and Kenneth Hinshaw, *Farmer in a Business Suit*, New York, 1957.

The First Missouri Editors' Convention, 1859

During its first decades Missouri journalism struggled against the hardships of such intense political and economic rivalry, that its fraternity of editors had neither the respect of the citizens, nor, for that matter, regard for each other. So many editors entered the arena ready for combat, that abuse and billingsgate, and even street fighting and pistoling, marred the relationships of the editorial brethren. Newspapers were so numerous and competition so great that subscription rates tended to decline in frontier Missouri while costs of publication went up, all of which made journalism a precarious enterprise. Failure to band together in the interest of dignity and profits cost them so much public esteem, that the editor, aware of his lack of status, lamented his beleaguered condition. Pioneer journalism, in short, wanted an *esprit de corps* to bind it together into harmonious community, and it was to this task of professionalization that a number of editors devoted a great deal of earnest consideration.

The first signs of true professionalization came exactly one hundred years ago with the meeting of the first editors' convention in Missouri in 1859, later to be known as the Missouri Press Association. Calls for such a convention had been made at a very early date. Abel Rathbone Corbin of the *Missouri Argus* was not the first to propose a meeting when, in 1837, he suggested that editors and publishers of papers and masters of job offices from Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin meet in St. Louis to restore harmony among the group, for, as he put it, "we have been clawing each other's eyes out quite long enough."[1] Again in 1839, the *Argus* proposed a convention of proprietors in St. Louis to adopt regulations and secure their enforcement against delinquent subscribers.[2] This meeting, however, did not come off, and the *Argus,* convinced that a convention of printers and publishers of the state was impossible, determined to go it "solitary and alone" to eliminate the credit system. The press of the whole country was kept poor, dependent and contemptible because publishers were too liberal and accommodating to their friends.[3]

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1 *Missouri Argus*, St. Louis, April 14, 28, 1837.
2 *Ibid.*, August 29, 1839; *The Western Emigrant,* Boonville, September 5, 1839.
3 *Missouri Argus*, St. Louis, December 12, 1840.

Throughout the 1840's, futile efforts to bring together a statewide convention continued. William F. Switzler of the *Missouri Statesman* pointed to the benefits of a uniform tariff established among the St. Louis press. He and F. M. Caldwell of the *Boonville Observer* especially desired agreements on advertising rates, which, though they appeared equable throughout the state, varied with every office because the printer took any copy he could get. A recognized tariff of prices would be of great benefit to the craft, and would raise the editor—"emaciated from incessant toil . . . out at elbows and out of money!"—from his low status in society.[4]

In 1853 a regional meeting of editors did take place in Savannah. Lucian J. Eastin of the *St. Joseph Gazette* was made chairman, and James A. Millan of the *St. Joseph Cycle* was appointed secretary. William Ridenbaugh, also of the *Gazette,* made an address in which he spoke of the "Profession of Printing" as the "noblest profession," but one that was left like the "weed cast from the rock, on ocean's foam to float where e're the waves might roll or the winds prevail." The solution to the problem of competitive prices, as in the other professions, was to unite to protect themselves from ruinous competition. A date—the second Monday in October—and a place —St. Louis—was chosen for an editor's convention to fix rates for printing.[5]

Nothing came of this, but the next year, 1854, new proposals were made for a state editors' convention, which like all other attempts, proved abortive. The *Hannibal Journal* made suggestions for a meeting place, Hannibal, Boonville, Glasgow, or some other point of easy access, but A. W. Simpson of the *Boonville Observer,* recognizing the wisdom of the adoption of uniform measures by the "craft," thought the only place where general attendance was possible was St. Louis.[6] He noted that in the newspaper business the overweening idea had been to get a circulation, and, consequently, subscriptions had been reduced to as low as one dollar a year, while costs had advanced ten to twenty per cent. Under this type of enterprise no publisher could make a living, no matter how large the circulation. Whatever was circulated, was circulated for glory.

Switzler also believed that all that the publishers had to do was band together to raise their status, and, like Simpson, saw a con-

4 *Boonville Observer,* February 17, March 31, 1846.
5 *Jefferson Inquirer,* Jefferson City, August 13, 1853.
6 *Boonville Observer,* April 29, 1854.

vention as a means of improving camaraderie. Serious efforts had been made to meet during the State Fairs in Boonville in 1853 and 1854, and in the latter year a few editors made their appearance, but the convention of 1854 failed because attendance was too small. While valuable suggestions were interchanged, the editors had no hope of adopting any resolutions which would win general acceptance. Those loudest in advocating a convention, complained Switzler, remained at home, and so discouraged was he that he regarded the subject as dead and buried for years to come.[7]

But it was not so. His discouragement was premature. A successful convention finally met in Jefferson City in 1859 under the aegis of Switzler. We have seen how editors stressed the dignity of the profession, a uniform tariff of rates, and fellowship as desirable objects for a conclave of editors. The editor of the *Louisiana Herald* announced he would be there, and urged other editors to attend by asking them how long they intended to be slaves of quack doctors, one-horse politicians, and non-paying subscribers. The country printers, he asserted, knew they were doing wrong in publishing long columns of quack nostrums at starvation prices, or too frequently for no price at all, and lawyer-editors too often made their columns pack-horses of the shallow-pated orator. In a vein of humor he drew up an agenda in the form of an interrogatory.

> Fellow countrymen, did you ever know
>
> 1. a prompt-paying patent pill peddlar?
> 2. an honest Eastern advertising agent?
> 3. a menagerie man without multilated money?
> 4. an office seeker that wouldn't lie?[8]

A sufficient number of editors in the state met on June 8, 1859, elected Switzler their first president, and drew up an effectual code of publishing ethics and business operations.[9] The Convention, in drafting its code, had two objects in mind: the elimination of abuse and billingsgate among its members, and the establishment of a workable set of business regulations to be observed by all in the interest of good profits.

Moderation, fairness, dignity, courtesy—these were the virtues which would bring honor to the profession and restore the public esteem of the press. And the punishment for the transgressor who disregarded these virtues? Censure by the other members of the

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7 *Ibid.*, April 29, July 29, September 2, 1854; *Boonville Weekly Observer*, November 4, 1854.

8 *Liberty Weekly Tribune*, May 27, 1859.

9 *Ibid.*, June 24, 1859.

profession, and for the repeated violator, forfeiture of the usual courtesies of the pen.

Twenty years earlier such a code postulating moderation and courtesy would have been impossible, for then the virtues were firmness, manliness, independence, an obligation to speak out bluntly on all issues. An editor regarded his fellow editor with no particular courtesy, indeed any wrongheaded ideas of one editor must be combatted with impunity, for how else could truth be established against error of opinion. Now, in 1859, members of the press were mellowing. Manliness was giving way to moderation. *Esprit de corps* was replacing ruthless competition, the craft was giving way to the profession. The Missouri press fraternity now wanted status, and to get status they needed respectability, and to be respectable they must be courteous.

To rise up from the "degradation of the press," the editors needed an agreement whereby they would not undercut one another's prices. So their code contained a set of business regulations which struck at the competition, the ruthless competition which had caused poverty for most and profits for only a few. To have an adequate subscription list and a good number of advertisers was the great desideratum of all editors. Without the sources of income which the subscriber and advertiser provided the newspaper would perish, as many of them did.

The pioneer editor so ardently desired the patronage of these men that he continually lowered his prices over the years until a newspaper was a precarious enterprise indeed. Sam Clemens reports that his brother Orion, when he took over the *Hannibal Journal,* lowered the price to one dollar a year, two dollars below the price asked by Joseph Charless, the pioneer editor. And, of course, Orion became bankrupt, and never even paid Sam his wages.[10] Editors also agreed to accept other media than money. In the hope of getting something for their labor, the editors agreed to accept produce—flour, pork, vegetables, also Spanish dollars, wood, and one of them, Joseph Charless, accepted old brass and copper at the rate of one bit per pound.[11]

But editors were so eager to maintain subscribers and provide services for advertisers that they gave much of their labor free, by the overextension of the credit system. This was the bane of all

10 Mark Twain, *Mark Twain's Autobiography,* New York, 1924, II, 285-286.

11 *Missouri Gazette,* St. Louis, April 19, December 19, 1810, January 9, 1811, January 2, 1813; *The Weekly Tribune,* Liberty, December 17, 1847.

the editors. Rather than eliminate delinquent subscribers, rather than refuse job work unless paid for on delivery, rather than require payment from the advertiser on first encounter, rather than be hard-fisted about the matter, the editor kept extending the credit, and charged no interest, and most of the time his hope that his debtors would pay were vain. He kept on *"working for glory and printing on trust."*[12] Collections, of course, were most difficult from out-of-town subscribers and transient advertisers, such as the slippery patent medicine advertiser.

No wonder pioneer journalism was studded with the failures of frontier editors, editors who failed to make a living in one establishment after another. No wonder editors were known for their itinerancy, their rootlessness, their wanderlust. Somehow the Convention of 1859 must attempt to promote stability in the profession.

After addressing itself rather briefly to courtesy and moderation, the Convention devoted the largest part of its statement to the matter of profits. Out-of-county subscribers and transient advertisers must pay in advance; book and job work must be paid for on delivery; yearly advertisers must settle their accounts periodically; patent medicine and lottery advertisements must be paid for in advance or guaranteed by a responsible local agent. The square, the unit of measurement for paid insertions in the newspaper, was defined so that it would contain no more nor no less than in any newspaper in the state. Furthermore, legal advertisements, a very lucrative form of advertisement, were to be paid for by the square. Further to discourage credit, a ten per cent interest would be charged on all accounts after they became due.

Thus the Missouri Editors' Convention of 1859 pulled at the strings of pioneer journalism, seeking to end the time of roughness and crudeness, and of loose financial methods and meager returns, and to bring professional status to a beleaguered occupation. But it was the fate of this organization to suffer from the depredations of the Civil War, and regular meetings could not be held again until after the conflagration was over. The War brought great tribulation to the Missouri press—censorship, suspension, suppression, confiscation—and it was not until normal times returned that progress toward professionalization could continue.

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12 *Boonville Observer*, March 17, 1846.

Theodore Roosevelt: Historian with a Moral

One day in January, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt composed a vigorous letter to Sir George Trevelyan, denouncing the "noxious belief that research is all . . ., that accumulation of facts is everything, and that the ideal history of the future will consist not even of the work of one huge pedant but of a multitude of articles by a multitude of small pedants." Roosevelt vented considerable wrath in colorful language on "a preposterous little organization" known as the American Historical Association,[1] being a man not given to timidity. Not only did he face Spaniards, lions, and the Pope with fortitude and self-assurance, but he had no qualms whatever about expressing plainly, or even bluntly, his candid opinion on any subject under the sun. Whether he made an impassioned political speech (of course, nearly everything he did was impassioned) or wrote a magazine article or a biography of Oliver Cromwell, his innermost thoughts were certain to appear.

Probably the chief characteristic of Roosevelt, the writer, is making a point. In attempting to stimulate the martial spirit during the first World War by claiming that ancient Egypt fell because the Egyptians did not raise their boys to be soldiers[2] or in telling the National and International Good Roads Convention that the "great difference between the semi-barbarism of the Middle Ages and the civilization which succeeded it" was the difference between poor and good means of communication,[3] he was constantly drawing lessons from history. Let it be granted that in magazine articles and speeches he was deliberately trying to make a particular point; yet, history was his natural weapon in argument.

"A nation's greatness," he wrote in 1895, "lies in its possibility of achievement in the present, and nothing helps it more than the consciousness of achievement in the past."[4] It was not only Roosevelt the polemicist but also Roosevelt the historian, though the two are often difficult to separate, who believed in the use of history

1 Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 vols., Cambridge, 1951-1954, III, 707-708.
2 Theodore Roosevelt, *Literary Essays*, New York, 1926, 167.
3 Theodore Roosevelt, *American Problems*, New York, 1926, 445.
4 Theodore Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, New York, 1910, 30.

to teach lessons. He uttered a cry of pain and rage when, during the first World War, some public school teachers in Chicago proposed to forbid in the teaching of history any mention of war and battles.[5] He also used his biographies of Thomas Hart Benton and Oliver Cromwell as platforms to advocate that the United States be better prepared for war.[6]

Roosevelt was a man of his time. He shared the general optimism of the western world at the end of the nineteenth century,[7] saw himself as a moralist.[8] His favorite word was "righteous" and the derivations thereof, and he had so far digested a version of Darwinism as to believe in the superiority of Europeans and their culture over "barbarism."[10] He reflected in his writings not only his basic ideas but also his problems and passions of the moment. In 1884, though disgusted by the Republican Party's nomination of Blaine, he stuck with the party[11] and two years later in writing the life of Benton turned loose his hatred of the Mugwumps.

> The men who took a great and effective part in the fight against slavery were the men who remained within their respective parties. . . . When a new party with more clearly defined principles was formed, they, for the most part, went into it; but like all other men who have ever had a really great influence, whether for good or bad, on American politics, they did not act independently of parties, but on the contrary kept within party lines. . . .[12]

His description of the forces which elected Polk in 1844 sounds suspiciously like an embittered Republican taunt at Cleveland in 1884. These forces included: "rabid southern fire eaters," "the almost solid foreign vote, still unfit for the duties of American citizenship," the "vicious and criminal classes in all the great cities of the North," the "corrupt politicians, who found ignorance and viciousness tools

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5 Theodore Roosevelt, *America and the World War*, New York, 1917, 91-92.

6 Theodore Roosevelt, *Life of Thomas Hart Benton*, Boston, 1887, 37-38; Theodore Roosevelt, *Oliver Cromwell*, New York, 1900, 64-65, 91.

7 Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, 291.

8 Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition*, New York, 1954, 229.

9 Theodore Roosevelt, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers and European Addresses*, New York, 1910, 2302-2304; Roosevelt, *American Problems*, 310-311, 343; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life*, New York, 1910, 28-29, 38.

10 Theodore Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, 4 vols., New York, 1910, III, 264-265; Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, 254, 333; Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life*, 28-31.

11 Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1931, 85-91.

12 Roosevelt, *Life of Benton*, 295-296.

ready forged to their hands, wherewith to perpetrate the gigantic frauds without which the election would have been lost. . . ."[13]

In the same book he turned on the Jacksonian Democrats for having originated the "spoils system"[14] which naturally outraged any zealous reformer of the 1880's. On another tack, he later pointed the way to American overseas expansion by asserting that nations which expanded and nations which did not might both ultimately fall, but the former left behind "heirs and a glorious memory" while the latter left nothing.[15] One may assume that Roosevelt expected the American legacy to be grander than that of either Rome or England.

Foremost among the lessons which Roosevelt tried to teach was that "alike for the nation and the individual, the one indispensable requisite is character. . . ."[16] He constantly preached that the ancient empires fell because of their moral corruption,[17] and warned this country not to "lose the virile, manly qualities, and sink into a nation of mere hucksters. . . ."[18] A readiness to fight for the national honor was evidently the pathway to salvation, for Roosevelt described the peace enjoyed by England during the first forty years of the seventeenth century as "an ignoble and therefore an evil peace" with its result "a gradual rotting of the national fibre which rendered it necessary for her to pass through the fiery ordeal of the Civil War in order that she might be saved."[19] To take advantage of this somewhat stiff cure for dry rot in the national character one had to be armed, and Roosevelt continually preached preparedness, whether inspired by writing of a surplus in the federal treasury under Jackson, campaigns against the Indians, or his traditional whipping-boy, the War of 1812.[20]

It might be supposed that a man of Roosevelt's personality held interesting ideas on great men in history and their effect upon events, but the result of investigation is disappointing on this score. The one outstanding figure about whom he wrote at length was Oliver Cromwell, and though he did say that some strong man was bound to emerge from a welter of factions to save them from des-

13 *Ibid.*, 290-291.
14 *Ibid.*, 79, 219, 231.
15 Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life*, 34-35.
16 *Ibid.*, 106.
17 *Ibid.*; Theodore Roosevelt, *Social Justice and Popular Rule*, New York, 1926, 106.
18 Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, 371.
19 Roosevelt, *Oliver Cromwell*, 19-20.
20 Roosevelt, *Life of Benton*, 145; *Winning of the West*, IV, 122-124.

troying one another by "laying his iron hand on all," he saw the masterful Cromwell as pushed along by events, "whether he would or not," and ended by moralizing about the overturning of established governments and about Cromwell's inability to rise to "the Washington level" of statesmanship.[21] His chief opinion of the great men of the past appears to have been the importance of their example for future generations, "the immense but indefinable moral influence produced by their deeds and words."[22]

Roosevelt was primarily concerned with his own country and it was in the history of the United States that his ideas were drawn most clearly and systematically. In the late 1880's he saw the nation's tasks as: taming the wilderness, defying outside foes, and solving the problem of self-government.[23] A few years later he had expanded these three facets to seven "really great matters of American history," which were: the conquest of the continent by the white race, which branch of the white race should win the right to make this conquest, the struggle between Britain and France in America, the establishment of national independence, the building of the national government, the long contest over slavery, and the war to preserve the union.[24] Apparently he was too close to events after the Civil War to find significance in the growth of cities and industry.

To Roosevelt the most dramatic, and hence the most interesting, of these matters was the conquest of the continent. This peopling of North America, he stoutly maintained, dwarfed all the European wars of the past two hundred years and was "the most striking feature in the world's history."[25] He noted as the most significant aspect of the expansion of the United States its admission of its western colonies into the union on an equal footing with the old states, avoiding both the disunity of the Greek cities and the overcentralization of the Roman Empire.[26] It might be added that Roosevelt felt sorry for the people of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, who had missed becoming part of the glorious enterprise.[27]

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21 Roosevelt, *Oliver Cromwell*, 54, 99, 118-119, 132, 190.
22 Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, 17-18.
23 Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, I, 221.
24 Roosevelt, *Literary Essays*, 247.
25 Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, I, 15, 28; Roosevelt, *Life of Benton*, 263; Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, 298-299.
26 Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders and Men of Action*, New York, 1926, 317-318, 320.
27 Roosevelt, *Life of Benton*, 266.

In evaluating Roosevelt as an historian one must look at two sides of the question: first, his ideas about the writing of history and how it should be done; second, how well he lived up to those ideas, or how good his own work really was.

As to the first, he wrote in the *Outlook* in 1912 that "scholarship is of worth chiefly when it is productive, when the scholar not merely receives or acquires, but gives."[28] What form should this giving take? He noted in his address at Oxford in 1910 the influence of science on history, the demands having been made that history be treated as a science and that the history of man be considered in connection with the knowledge of biologists. Roosevelt was willing that history be treated as a branch of science, but only on the condition that it remained a branch of literature also. Furthermore, he asserted, literature should encroach upon science, to make the latter more readable.[29]

This interest in readable, literary, history had led Roosevelt to comment on the works of an earlier historian that "Parkman would have been quite unequal to his task if he had not appreciated its romance as well as its importance."[30] It led Roosevelt in 1912, when president of the American Historical Association, to entitle his presidential address "History as Literature." This was almost a manifesto of revolt against Von Ranke-ism and the supposedly detailed, scholarly, but also presumably dull monograph. Roosevelt granted that history must be based on patient, laborious research if one were not to produce merely a "splendid bit of serious romance writing," but objected that many hardworking historians had grown to feel that complete truthfulness was incompatible with any color whatever, and that "the dryness and the grayness" were themselves meritorious. To this he took vigorous exception. He refused to accept the severance of literature from history merely because both had become specialized. Literature he defined as that writing which has permanent interest because of its substance and its form, and the first element in any great work of literature was imaginative power. Such imaginative power he found not only compatible with minute accuracy but indeed necessary to a real and vivid presentation of the past. The historical work of real literary quality might be "a permanent contribution to the sum of man's wisdom, enjoy-

28 Roosevelt, *Literary Essays*, 85.
29 Roosevelt, *Presidential... and European Addresses*, 2259-2260.
30 Roosevelt, *Literary Essays*, 247.

ment, and inspiration." History must be didactic but only, as great poetry, unconsciously so, possessing

> that highest form of usefulness, the power to thrill the souls of men with stories of strength and craft and daring, and to lift them out of their common selves to the heights of high endeavor. The greatest historian should also be a great moralist.[31]

History must make a point.

Roosevelt's works of history as such comprise a history of the naval side of the War of 1812, a history of New York City, *The Winning of the West,* and biographies of Thomas Hart Benton, Gouverneur Morris, and Oliver Cromwell. To these can be added two historical lectures in Europe in 1910.

Roosevelt began work on *The Naval War of 1812* while a senior at Harvard, having decided that no adequate history of that war's naval battles existed and that he could remedy this difficulty. The work appeared in 1882, was favorably reviewed in the New York press, and was in a third edition within a year.[32] Roosevelt's list of secondary sources was longer than that of primary sources, but the latter included, for example, the American naval captains' logs and reports, of which he made good use. He apparently used every decent source he could find and showed a keen awareness of the faults and values of the various materials,[33] making every effort to be fair. For instance, he was willing to admit that though the United States warred for "the right" it was not because it *was* the right but because it agreed with our self interest, and even granted that the American victories at sea "attracted an amount of attention altogether disproportionate to their material effects."[34] For all that, Roosevelt rejoiced in the American successes[35] and may have limited his book to the war at sea in part because it was much more likely to "thrill the souls of men with stories of strength and craft and daring" than was the rather miserable fighting on land.

Apropos of the feebleness of the American war effort, this book contained the first public flogging which Roosevelt administered to Jefferson and Madison, the former being called "perhaps the most

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31 Theodore Roosevelt, "History as Literature," *The American Historical Review,* XVIII (January, 1913), 473-489.

32 Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt,* 36, 46-47, 62; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812,* 2 vols., New York, 1910, I, 5, 22.

33 *Ibid.,* I, iii-iv, 39-40, 44-45.

34 *Ibid.,* I, 32, 53.

35 *Ibid.,* I, 131-136, 149-150, 174-175, II, 195-197.

incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential chair. . . ."[36] Roosevelt also found room for his first public plea that the United States rebuild its navy into a first class fighting force.[37] Andrew Jackson he saw as the avenger of American honor, and though Old Hickory later "did to his country some good and more evil" no true American could think of the battle of New Orleans without "profound and unmixed thankfulness."[38] Roosevelt was willing to admit that the war left matters in "almost precisely the state" in which it had found them, yet "morally the result was of inestimable value to the United States." There could be no question that his country had emerged from the struggle with the greatest credit in warships taken or sunk, and consequently it had gained much honor.[39] Roosevelt held an interesting view of the War of 1812, regarding it as the last Anglo-Indian attempt to stop the march of American civilization across the continent.[40]

Some of the author's belief in nordic superiority crept out in a passage praising the fighting qualities of the American and British sailors as contrasted with those of the Portuguese and Italians, who were accused of being "treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely to lose either their wits or their courage when in a tight place."[41] On the whole, however, it was not a bad book, if one wanted a detailed though occasionally dramatic account of the single ship duels and the fighting on the Great Lakes between the American and British navies.

Roosevelt's next work was his biography of Benton, written in three or four months while he was at his ranch in the Dakotas. At the end of March, 1886, he had finished the first chapter, but complained that writing was "horribly hard work" and that progress was slow.[42] Yet, by early June, he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge:

I have pretty nearly finished Benton, mainly evolving him from my inner consciousness; but when he leaves the Senate in 1850 I have nothing whatever to go by; and, being by nature both a timid, and, on occasions, by choice a truthful man, I would prefer to have some foundation, no matter how slender, on which to build the airy and arabesque superstructure of my fancy-especially as I am writing a history. Now I hesitate to give him a wholly fictitious date of death and to invent all of the work of his later

36 *Ibid.*, II, 210-211.
37 *Ibid.*, I, 175-176.
38 *Ibid.*, II, 216-217.
39 *Ibid.*, I, 34, II, 194-197.
40 *Ibid.*, II, 212-213.
41 *Ibid.*, I, 64-65.
42 Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 95.

years. Would it be too infernal a nuisance for you to hire some one . . . to look up, in a biographical dictionary or somewhere, his life after he left the Senate in 1850? . . . I hate to trouble you; don't do it if it is any bother. . . .[43]

Toward the end of June Roosevelt believed that a week's work in a library, "with authorities to consult," would allow him to finish the book, but in August he sent it directly from his ranch to John T. Morse, Jr., editor of the American Statesmen Series.[44] Roosevelt said in his book that Benton prepared an abridgment of the debates in Congress from 1787 to 1850 and also wrote *Thirty Years' View,* a history of the working of the federal government between 1820 and 1850.[45] When one looks closely at the story told in the *Life of Benton* the suspicion becomes inescapable that Roosevelt used as sources only these two works by Benton and a general history of the United States.

A work written in such a way was not likely to be a definitive biography or to present a challenging new thesis. The two chief trends in the work were national expansion and the struggles over nullification and slavery, certainly obvious choices. Roosevelt's personality unavoidably colored his treatment of those matters. He was fairer in the first than in the second. Typically, he announced the monumental importance of the job of conquering the North American continent, and seized the chance to lecture his readers on the evils of pacifism.[46] He justified the frontiersmen's conquest of Texas on the ground of their racial superiority to the weaker Mexicans, comparing them to the Norsemen of old, and even claimed that Sam Houston himself, "who drank hard and fought hard, who was mighty in battle and crafty in council, with his reckless, boastful courage and his thirst for changes and risks of all kinds, his propensity for private brawling . . . might . . . stand as the type of an old-world Viking. . . ."[47] This somewhat strained analogy was probably due less to a search for American roots in the Germanic past than to the future Rough Rider's innate romanticism.

Believing that the Oregon dispute was certain to be settled by strength alone, Roosevelt was sorry that the United States had not fought England for possession of the entire territory. He went so

43 *Ibid.*, I, 102.
44 *Ibid.*, I, 104, 108.
45 Roosevelt, *Life of Benton*, 356-358.
46 *Ibid.*, 34, 37-38, 263.
47 *Ibid.*, 175-179.

far in the *Life of Benton* as to compare American with British generals and decided that we would have won, concluding his treatment of the topic with a typical phrase: "Wars are, of course, as a rule to be avoided; but they are far better than certain kinds of peace."[48] He did, however, understand the westerners and was well aware that they "felt themselves created heirs of the earth, or anyway North America." "This . . . piratical way of looking at neighboring territory," said Roosevelt in one of his sounder passages, "was very characteristic of the West, and was at the root of the doctrine of 'manifest destiny.' "[49]

In his treatment of slavery Roosevelt displayed the attitude one might expect of a northern Republican in the 1880's. He traced the intellectual background of secession to Jefferson's part in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, "an unscrupulous party move," launched a blow against slavery as the real cause of the South's lagging in the race for prosperity, and labelled Calhoun's views on slavery in the territories "monstrous." In Roosevelt's judgement the slaveholding interests caused the annexation of a part of Mexico along with Texas, and hence the War with Mexico which was thus the only unrighteous war the United States had ever fought. Slavery was chiefly responsible for "the streak of coarse and brutal barbarism which ran through the Southern character," and it was "ambitious and unscrupulous" southern politicians who used the slavery issue for their own gain and precipitated the secession crisis of 1860. Jefferson Davis was worthy of comparison only with Benedict Arnold.[50]

Immediately after his return from Europe (and his second marriage's honeymoon) in the spring of 1887, Roosevelt agreed to write a biography of Gouverneur Morris, also for the American Statesmen series. He had not yet begun work in mid-May when he learned that the Morris family would not allow him to use Morris' papers "at any price." But he wrote the book anyway. It was one fourth done by the end of June and he sent the manuscript to the publisher at the first of September. While he worked on the life of Morris the restless Roosevelt was also involved in various other literary ventures and in organizing a polo club on Long Island.[51]

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48 *Ibid.*, 261-262, 267-269, 289.
49 *Ibid.*, 17, 41.
50 *Ibid.*, 90-91, 95, 161-163, 289, 306-314, 326-327, 352-353.
51 Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 128-129, 131; Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 116-117.

Again he must have used almost nothing but secondary sources, for nothing emerged of Morris the man beyond quotations from his speeches and some of his letters. The book was filled with what passed for the history of the times. One learned that the American colonies stood toward England

> as the Protestant peoples stood towards the Catholic powers in the sixteenth century, as the Parliamentarians stood towards the Stuarts in the seventeenth, or as the upholders of the American Union stood towards the Confederate slave holders in the nineteenth; that is, they warred victoriously for the right in a struggle whose outcome vitally affected the welfare of the whole human race.[52]

The patriots were not only right but the superior men, while the loyalist side included "the large class of timid and prosperous people; the many who feared above all things disorder, also the very lowest sections of the community, the lazy, thriftless, and vicious, who hated their progressive neighbors," and, almost an afterthought, "the men who were really principled in favor of a kingly government." Naturally there was no hope of compromise when such scoundrels were involved. Roosevelt was indignant not only at the existence of opposition to the patriot cause, but also at the suggestion that independence might have been achieved with help given by allies from abroad, for our own strength had brought the final triumph and we were then not even as good at fighting as we were to be in the American Civil War![53]

The life of Gouverneur Morris contained a paean to Washington: "not only the greatest American; he was also one of the greatest men the world has ever known. Few centuries and few countries have ever seen his like." In it also were an indictment of French "fickle ferocity," and the customary condemnation of Jefferson and Madison because of American unpreparedness for war in 1812.[54] However, there was an almost equally strong condemnation of the Federalist Party for distrusting the people's management of their own affairs, "for . . . in the long run the bulk of the people have always hitherto shown themselves true to the cause of the right."[55] Unfortunately, there was not a notable amount of information about Gouverneur Morris.

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52 Theodore Roosevelt, *Gouverneur Morris*, Boston, 1898, 5.
53 *Ibid.*, 25-26, 28, 42-43, 102-103.
54 *Ibid.*, 44, 210, 302-303.
55 *Ibid.*, 280, 309.

Shortly after publishing the biography of Morris, Roosevelt produced a history of New York City, a volume slender both in size and merit. Stating in his preface that limited space precluded the use of the vast mass of manuscripts available, Roosevelt set forth as his object to draw from the store of facts already collected and trace the causes which gradually changed a little Dutch trading town into a huge American city. The tome which emerged bore no resemblance to twentieth century urban history and carried a suitably Rooseveltian moral: "the necessity for a feeling of broad, radical, and intense Americanism, if good work is to be done in any direction."[56]

Weighting his story heavily toward the earlier years, for only seventy-seven of the 216 small pages dealt with the period after 1800, Roosevelt was concerned more with revelling in the deeds of sailor heroes of Hudson's day, with condemning James II of England or the loyalists of the American Revolution, and with telling the tale of the march of liberty against oppression than he was interested in the commercial development of the city.[57] While he did find it possible to mention the transportation factors (the Erie Canal and railroads) which helped to make New York great, and noted the change in the city with the increased and different immigration of the nineteenth century, Roosevelt emphasized the growth of machine politics, "a perfect witches' sabbath of political corruption," from the time of Aaron Burr to the 1880's. The book ended as a moral-political tract urging the citizens of the city to take an active part in government.[58]

In January, 1888, Roosevelt wrote to a friend, "I should like to write some book that would really rank as in the very first class, but I suppose this is a mere dream." Four years later he wrote that his chance of making a permanent literary reputation depended on how well he did with *The Winning of the West,* which he was working on at the time. However grand the author's scheme, the work was not to be a startling new interpretation. As Roosevelt wrote to Frederick Jackson Turner in 1895, he ignored almost completely the two points which Turner was studying, the reaction of the West upon the East and the history of institutions, for his aim was "to show who the frontiersmen were and what they did, as

56 Theodore Roosevelt, *New York,* London, 1891, vii-ix.
57 *Ibid.,* 1-2, 38, 44, 56, 104-109, 137-138.
58 *Ibid.,* 173, 176-178, 201, 206-207, 210.

they gradually conquered the West."[59] With this aim in mind Roosevelt produced what is in essence a history of the Indian wars from the 1760's to about 1800. Of the forty chapters in the four volumes only ten were not concerned directly with either the Indian wars or the war for independence (and in the latter the emphasis was on fighting against the Indians), and half of the ten dealt with western intrigues with France and Spain.[60]

Roosevelt spent more effort and care on *The Winning of the West* than on all the rest of his historical works put together. He sought all the original sources he could find, in Washington, D.C., Nashville, Louisville, and even Ottawa, Canada. He used the papers, among others, of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Robertson, the Campbell family, Sevier, Jackson, and George Rogers Clark, ransacked the national archives, and looked up what newspapers had existed at the end of the eighteenth century.[61] The result was a first rate account of the Indian wars and the separatist intrigues of the westerners.

Turner, reviewing the fourth volume, found four strong features: the use of widely scattered sources, the advance of the pioneers portrayed with "graphic vigor," the question of the Indians handled in a "courageous and virile way," and a good account of the intrigues of the western leaders with France and Spain. But Turner noted that Roosevelt was interested only in the dramatic and picturesque aspects of the story, that he impressed his own views on the reader, was far too hard on Jefferson and, finally, that "the special student must regret that Mr. Roosevelt does not find it possible to regard history as a more jealous mistress, and to give more time, greater thoroughness of investigation, . . . and more sobriety of judgement to his work."[62] The comment was eminently fair. Roosevelt wrote to Turner, agreeing that he should find history worthy of more time and explaining his duties as Civil Service Commissioner and Police Commissioner.[63] Since much of *The Winning of the West* was written while he held those jobs one would expect to find greater defects than did in fact appear.

Several Roosevelt characteristics could be found. One was, of course, the use of history to point out a moral. If Americans com-

59 Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 136, 211, 367, 440.
60 Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, I, 3, II, iii, III, iii, IV, iii.
61 *Ibid.*, I, 5-11.
62 *American Historical Review*, II, 171-176.
63 Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 571.

pared what they had done with what they might have done, "it may make us try in the future to raise our ambitions to the level of our opportunities." One lesson to be learned was that it is power that counts in national life, and another was that Americans had "erred far more often in not being willing to fight than in being too willing."[64] Jefferson and Madison were pilloried once again for their part in American unpreparedness in 1812, and Roosevelt admitted to Turner that his attitude was not a wise one but found the cause for it. "I meet so many understudies of Jefferson in politics," he wrote, "and suffer so much from them that I am apt to let my feelings find vent in words!"[65] Perhaps this was where Turner had seen the need for "more sobriety of judgement."

Though Roosevelt saw the importance of the new states' being admitted to the union on an equal footing with the old, he asserted that the most important feature of the Norhwest Ordinance of 1787 was its anti-slavery clause and found an occasion in writing of the frontier to damn the southerners for maintaining slavery, "the one evil which has ever warped their development."[66] He showed his interest in natural life by devoting some ten pages to that found by Lewis and Clark on the Missouri River,[67] and possibly reflected his own experiences in the West in a description of western character. He wrote:

> All qualities, good and bad, are intensified and accentuated in the life of the wilderness. The man who in civilization is merely sullen and bad-tempered becomes a murderous, treacherous ruffian when transplanted to the wilds; while . . . his cheery, quiet neighbor develops into a hero, ready uncomplainingly to lay down his life for his friend.[68]

Roosevelt regarded British colonial policy in the eighteenth century as an attempt to keep the interior of North America a wilderness for the benefit of fur traders and English merchants. Consequently, the war of the American Revolution had a two-fold character, a struggle for independence in the East and in the West a war to establish "the right of entry into the fertile and vacant regions beyond the Alleghenies." Success in this paved the way for the conquest of the continent, not only the greatest feature in the

64 Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, I, 220-221, III, 61, 1V, 122.
65 *Ibid.*, IV, 123-124, 229-230; Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 571.
66 Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, III, 11, 354-355.
67 *Ibid.*, IV, 349-358.
68 *Ibid.*, I, 153-154.

nation's history but also one which "utterly" dwarfed all European wars of the preceding two centuries.[69]

This acquisition of western lands brought the pioneers into conflict with hostile Indians. To Roosevelt "every such armed settlement or conquest by a superior race . . . meant the infliction and suffering of hideous woe and misery," "a sad and dreadul thing." The wrongs done could not be ignored, yet they must not be allowed to obscure the results achieved for the benefit of mankind. Civilization's march had to continue, for "the most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages. . . ."[70] After all, the Indians had no ownership of land as civilization knows it. "Every good hunting ground was claimed by many nations" and where one tribe had an uncontested title "it rested not on actual occupancy and cultivation, but on the recent butchery of weaker rivals."[71] Roosevelt did not add that the frontiersmen's claim was nothing more than this butchery of weaker rivals.

For all Roosevelt's seeing the Indian as an ignoble savage, "filthy, cruel, lecherous, and faithless," and his assertion that the red man was treated with abundant generosity, being over-paid for his shadowy claim to the soil, he recognized the hardness of the backwoodsmen. In an interesting passage he stated that those frontiersmen who were religiously inclined were believers in an Old Testament creed, laying slight stress on mercy. "They looked at their foes as the Hebrew prophets looked at the enemies of Israel" and "had read in The Book that he was accursed who . . . kept his sword back from blood." Roosevelt saw that neither side could restrain its extremists, and that war was inevitable since the desires of the two parties could not be reconciled. Treaties and truces could never be permanent remedies when the whites were bent on seizing the land which the Indians were determined at all costs to keep free from settlements.[72] Roosevelt seems harsh toward the Indians, but if one wishes to contend that the present size and strength of the United States are good rather than evil his viewpoint is inescapable.

While Roosevelt was not greatly concerned with the development of insitutions, he did write some passages which are interesting in the light of Frederick Jackson Turner's attitude toward the search

69 *Ibid.*, I, 28, 52-53, III, 53-54, 83, 138.
70 *Ibid.*, III, 130, 264-265.
71 *Ibid.*, I, 109.
72 *Ibid.*, II, 195-197, III, 117, 126-127.

for American origins in the Germanic past. Roosevelt wrote in the first volume of *The Winning of the West,* which appeared in 1889, that the settlers of Watauga elected a "small parliament or 'witan-agemot.' " This remark drew a mild jeer from a reviewer said to be Turner, and five years later Roosevelt wrote to Turner that the latter's ideas were "first class" and would be used in the third volume.[73] In that volume Roosevelt quoted Professor Alexander Johnson of Princeton as inclined to regard frontier governments "as reproductions of a very primitive type of government indeed," but he could not agree with Johnson. Roosevelt then regarded frontier government as copied by the "eminently practical" frontiersmen from that under which they had grown up and applied to their new conditions of life.[74]

Interesting in the light of Roosevelt's later realism in foreign affairs is his prideful account of the Louisiana Purchase. Louisiana, he wrote, was obtained "by a purchase, of which we frankly announced that the alternative would be war." In a later volume this was modified to France's having been unable to hold its colony in the face of the peopling of the western wilderness. Fortunately, the author was willing to admit that Napoleon's disappointment in his attempt to reconquer Haiti and his fear of a British descent upon New Orleans had something to do with the matter.[75]

The Winning of the West may be summed up as a good, even thrilling, account of Indian wars, of western separatism, and of some western explorations. Beyond this it did not go.

Roosevelt's last major historical work was a biography of Oliver Cromwell. Apparently a political career proved to be expensive, for while governor of New York he contracted with Charles Scribner's Sons to write a sketch of Cromwell to appear first in six issues of *Scribner's Magazine* and then as a book. The author was to be paid $5,000 and to receive fifteen per cent on the book's sales.[76] The work appeared in 1900, hastily done by a busy governor. It was ill-treated in the *American Historical Review,* the reviewer finding Roosevelt guilty of ignoring the recent work of Gardiner and Firth and of viewing the seventeenth century in terms of religious and

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73 *Ibid.*, I, 212; *The Saturday Review*, LXVIII (1889), 466-467; Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 363.

74 Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, III, 25, 63, 65n.

75 *Ibid.*, I, 34, IV, 130, 309-311.

76 Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, 2 vols., New York, 1925, I, 418.

political liberty, contrasting Cromwell and his contemporaries with Washington or even Lincoln.[77]

As a matter of fact, Washington's name appears on more pages than does that of Ireton, and Roosevelt made it clear that Cromwell was not the man Washington was.[78]. The book was a tale of good men against bad, for the Stuart kings "clung to absolute power for the sake of . . . carrying out policies that were hostile to the honor and interest of England," and Laud was but "a small and narrow man." At one point Roosevelt asserted, more truthfully than usual, that the Puritans though warring in the name of religious liberty meant it only for themselves. His real feelings must have been what appeared much more often, that the English Civil War was fought for the same principles which motivated the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution of 1776, and the American Civil War, to wit, "political, intellectual, and religious liberty."[79]

The biography of Cromwell contained most of Roosevelt's characteristics as an historian. He was obviously more interested in the military aspects of the English Civil War than any other side,[80] lectured his readers on the necessity of preparedness for war and on war as a good thing for the "national fibre,"[81] and was completely without mercy for Charles I or understanding of what was involved in killing the anointed king.[82] Yet he could point out the folly (his own in this case) of judging men of the seventeenth century by the canons of the twentieth,[83] just as he saw the danger in Puritanism, however well-meaning it might be, of its adherents' treating "not only their own principles, but their own passions, prejudices, vanities, and jealousies, as representing the will . . . of Heaven."[84] This was probably not his own idea but at least he recognized its validity.

Most of Roosevelt's writings and speeches were for the sake of political argument, and they tended to become increasingly violent as the years passed, especially the years of the first World War. In 1910 he delivered two addresses in Europe which marked the end of his career as any sort of historian. The first, at the Uni-

77 *American Historical Review*, VI, 564-565.
78 Roosevelt, *Oliver Cromwell*, 53-54, 190-191, 251, 260.
79 *Ibid.*, 6, 11, 53, 211, 234.
80 *Ibid.*, 58-60, 64-73, 79, 81-83, 86-91, 95-98, 124-128, 130-131, 152-155, 166-172, 174-176.
81 *Ibid.*, 19-20, 64-65, 91.
82 *Ibid.*, 136-137, 139.
83 *Ibid.*, 129.
84 *Ibid.*, 46-47.

versity of Berlin in May, 1910, was entitled "The World Movement" and turned out to be a tedious statement of the fact that whereas formerly civilization had been local, specialized, and hence easily destroyed, it had become worldwide in range, more varied in its activities, and hence was less likely to collapse. Roosevelt's presumed friend, the Kaiser, was said to have been disappointed.[85]

To Roosevelt the most important of his European speeches was the Romanes Lecture at Oxford in June, 1910, and he put much time and thought into "Biological Analogies in History." Fortunately, he had sent a draft of the manuscript to his friend, Henry Fairfield Osborn of the Museum of Natural History, and Osborn prevented embarassment if hardly a war by deleting passages wherein Roosevelt had compared reactionary European states to extinct animals.[86]

The idea of the lecture was that

> we see strange analogies in the phenomena of life and death, of birth, growth, and change, between those physical groups of animal life which we designate as species, forms, races, and the highly complex and composite entities which rise before our minds when we speak of nations and civilizations.

Roosevelt developed this idea in pointing out that as species died, so did nations. Some nations, like some animals, vanished without a trace; others, like Rome, left a culture and bloodline, changed but recognizable. Why, asked Roosevelt, did great empires show periods of extraordinary growth and then decay? A spirit of particularism might make government impossible, as in Poland. Or, the population might have lost its fighting edge, as in Rome. Some, like Holland, achieved a brief prominence beyond their capacity. Roosevelt asked himself if modern western civilization, too, was doomed, and saw certain ominous signs in the growth of luxury, the love of ease and frivolous excitement, and, worst of all, the declining birth rate. Still, all civilization had not crashed with the revolutions early in the nineteenth century Malthus' fears had proved groundless, and there was still hope.[87]

What, then, is the verdict on Roosevelt, historian with a moral? Obviously, it was his name which made the biographies sell, and

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85 Roosevelt, *Presidential... and European Addresses,* 2227-2255; Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt,* 519.

86 *Ibid.*

87 Roosevelt, *Presidential... and European Addresses,* 2257-2258, 2264-2296.

his vigorous personality contributed what interest there is in them. He was not an original thinker. He was capable of an enormous amount of work, but usually did not put it into his historical writings. As a result, only *The Naval War of 1812* and *The Winning of the West* are of any real merit, and their merit is highly specialized. Roosevelt could tell a good story well, and he enjoyed telling stories about fighting and intrigue. The rest of history, one feels, was simply in the way

As the Archbishop of York recalled years after 1910, "In the way of grading which we have at Oxford, we agreed to mark the lecture 'Beta Minus' but the lecturer 'Alpha Plus.' While we felt that the lecture was not a very great contribution to science, we were sure that the lecturer was a very great man."[88] That in itself is a fair judgement of Roosevelt the historian.

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[88] Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 520.

Book Reviews

Republicans Face the Southern Question. By Vincent P. DeSantis. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959. Pp. 283. $4 paper, $5 cloth.

This is a scholarly work for scholars, prepared in the best tradition of scientific, historical research. It contains volumnious documentation drawn principally from contemporary newspapers, magazines, diaries, and personal papers. The Southern Question is defined as being those Reconstruction controversies related to the Negro, the Civil War, and the military occupation of the South, and as the subsequent efforts of the Republican Party to reestablish itself in the states of the ex-Confederacy. In order to accomplish the latter, the Republicans practically abandoned the Negro and shifted their appeal to the southern white. The study concentrates upon the period called by DeSantis the new departure years, 1877-1897. In spite of repeated efforts and frequently changed tactics, the party met with no success in solving its southern problem. Even though the Republicans broke the Solid South in 1928, 1952, and 1956, they are still a sectional party and still have a southern question, so the author concludes.

Necessary to an understanding of the task which faced the Republican Party, beginning in 1877, is a brief review of what had taken place theretofore. In 1867, abolitionists, business interests, and partisan politicians of the North had joined together to Republicanize the South through the enfranchisement of the freedom and the disfranchisement of the native whites. The height of their power was reached in 1872 when they captured eight southern states. Meantime, a reaction had set in. Conservative, upland, and lower class whites of the South, hostile to the Republican Party and fearful of Negro supremacy, became united in a consolidated whole. Northern Democrats were openly sympathetic towards them. When, as early as 1870, numerous other northerners and Republicans began to desert the Radicals and to embrace Liberal Republicanism, the Carpetbag governments were doomed. The last of these were over thrown in 1877, the Solid South emerged, and the Republican Party faced the necessity of finding other means if the South was to be Republicanized. Between 1877 and 1897, Republican leaders were especially confident that they could find the proper solution.

The first of these leaders was President Hayes, who made the decision to abandon the Negroes and Carpetbaggers. However, he tried to let them down gradually, and placate them by giving a few of them federal appointments. This practice of individual appointments, followed by succeeding Republican presidents, was largely responsible for keeping the southern Negro loyal to the Republican Party until the time of the New Deal.

The white southern element which Hayes wished to attract into Republican ranks was that of the regular Democratic conservatives. He would have nothing to do with Independents, such as William Malone, the Virginia Readjuster, for he considered them economic radicals. The President's first move to ingratiate himself and the party with the southern conservatives was to remove the last of the occupation troops from South

Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana. In this respect, DeSantis departs from the traditional interpretation which is to the effect that the removal of the troops was part of a bargain struck with the Democrats whereby they, in turn, yielded the presidency to the Republicans. Hayes' second move was to appoint southern Democrats to numerous federal offices, one to a Cabinet post. And finally, in order to divide the southern people along economic rather than the existing racial lines, he proposed a program of internal improvements for the South at federal expense. This proposal, however, came to nothing.

The testing of Hayes' policy was the elections of 1878 and 1880. The South emerged more Democratic than ever, and Hayes' high hopes were dashed to the ground. However, he had committed his party to a policy of the repudiation of Radical Reconstruction and to the strategy of redeeming the South. His successors used other methods, but kept the same goal unalterably in mind. In spite of the outcries of former abolitionists, Stalwarts, Carpetbaggers, and southern Republicans, a majority of Republican Party members, especially the business interests, favored the new southern policy and gave it their support.

Garfield was intimately familiar with his predecessor's southern program. He continued the policy of attempting to divide the southern whites and convert a majority of them to Republicanism. However, his method was different. In the South, numerous Democrats were rebelling against entrenched Bourbonism and were organizing as Independents who might be persuaded to cooperate with or become Republicans. It was this situation which Garfield decided to exploit. The test case was that of William Malone and the Virginia Readjusters, or the Repudiationists, as they were called by the regular Democrats. Obviously, Garfield had to move carefully, for he was embarrassed by the fact that his party enjoyed the support of the conservative financial interests of the Northeast, and to ally himself with a movement tainted with repudiation might alienate their support. However, when Garfield's untimely death occurred, limited cooperation came to an end.

Arthur entered the White House with the reputation of a spoilsman and a Stalwart. The Reconstructionists were overjoyed, for they expected a return to Grantism. Their consternation was complete when it became clear that Arthur intended to reestablish the Republican Party in the South through a policy of complete cooperation with Independent movements. Where Hayes cultivated the conservative white, Arthur cultivated the Independent white; where Garfield embraced limited cooperation, Arthur embraced complete cooperation. In order to bring about the political regeneration of the South and overthrow southern Democracy, Arthur strove to unite Republicans, Readjusters, Greenbackers, Independents, and Liberals. The opposition to his program, led by Blaine, was widespread and bitter. Nevertheless, his policies prevailed. The factor of the necessity of white supremacy in the South was his undoing. Whereas there were Independent gains in 1882, election results in 1884 reveal that Arthur came no nearer than Hayes in his attempt to find a formula for the breakup of the Solid South.

Republican hopes to rejuvenate the South reached their lowest point in

the mid-eighties. A dramatic change came, however, with the elections of 1888, when they captured the White House and both houses of Congress for the first time since 1872. They could now reach their desired goal through the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which southern Democrats had successfully negated. In order to effect this, with Harrison's blessing Henry Cabot Lodge introduced the Force Bill of 1890 into the House. This bill fared well and was approved by the House. However, in the Senate, it collided with the silver interests of the West, the tariff interests of the Northeast, and the determination of big business to let nothing interfere with the improving happy relationship between North and South. Northern opinion turned against the bill, so, once again for the third time, the Republican Party abandoned the Negro and returned to the search for a two-party South through the winning of native white converts.

The agrarian resurgence which took place in the South during the 1890's, paralleling a similar movement in the West, gave to the Republicans, so they thought, the opportunity for which they had been seeking. Southern Populists attempted to win control of the Democratic Party, state by state, by working from within. Many of these and the Republicans immediately saw the advantage of fusion, even though it was nothing more than a matter of expediency. In the elections of 1892, 1894, and 1896, the fusionists entered combined tickets in the southern states. Only in North Carolina in 1894 did they succeed. Memories of the Force Bill, the economic and social pressure which southern Democrats brought to bear upon southern Populists, and Harrison's lukewarm attitude account for their failure.

And so a twenty year period ended. The Republican Party, in spite of all of its efforts and methods used, was weaker in the South in 1897 than it had been in 1877. They had not let the South become Democratic by default, they had fought for it. But they had failed.

The story of and reasons for this failure is the theme of *Republicans Face the Southern Question.* The author has marshalled a tremendous amount of detailed research material, has organized it well, and apparently drawn the correct conclusions. Occasionally, however, he confuses the reader, and seems to beome confused himself, by the wealth of minutiae. The forest is often lost sight of because of the trees. The continuous use of quotations often makes reading difficult. Typographical errors occur too frequently. Some terms are not clearly defined and their use is open to question. The one basic explanation for the southern question which is not made completely clear and which is known to those who have lived for long periods of time in the South is that it is a matter of bitterness left by the Civil War and the excesses of Reconstruction, and of the unchanging determination of southern whites never again to permit Negro supremacy.

The work fills a very great need and void which have existed too long in the area of historical literature. It is hoped that Professor DeSantis, or some other equally well-prepared specialist, will carry the study into the twentieth century and down to the present.

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Third Parties in American History. By Howard P. Nash, Jr. Public Affairs Press, 1959. Pp. ix, 326. Illustrated. $6.00.

About twenty American minor political parties move in and out of this chronicle. The study is limited, for all practical purposes, to those Presidential elections in which, in the author's judgement, minor parties played a significant role. The term "third" parties, incidentally, is somewhat misleading because in some Presidential elections more than three parties have been of some significance.

Minor parties have influenced American Presidential and even Congressional elections in two ways. They have sometimes affected the results. In 1844, for example, Polk, a Democrat, won New York's thirty-six electoral votes and the Presidency because, it seems, the Liberty party drew enough votes away from Henry Clay to leave him a little over 5,000 votes shy. If one assumes, as does Mr. Nash, that nearly all of Van Buren's 120,000 votes in New York as the Free-Soiler nominee in 1848 were at the expense of Lewis Cass, the Democratic nominee, it was the Free-Soilers who enabled Taylor, a Whig, to win that election. Everybody knows that "Teddy" Roosevelt's bolt from the G.O.P. in 1912 cleared the way for Wilson's victory. The biggest upset in American Presidential elections, on the other hand, was Truman's victory in 1948 despite the "Dixiecrat" and Wallace Progressive defections from the Democrats.

The sound effect of minor parties, as Mr. Nash points out, has been the way in which they have forced major parties to adopt their programs and perhaps even their nominees in order to head them off. A striking example, of course, was the Populist effect on the Democrats from 1896 on.

Although this history is interesting, partly because of the copious reproductions of political cartoons and handbills, and fairly adequate, one senses a lack of clear-cut purpose in the assembling of data. This impression is re-enforced by the way the author lets his study trail off at the end without drawing any conclusions. One wishes, too, that he had adopted a consistent practice in reporting each candidate's popular and electoral vote in the Presidential elections selected for analysis. The State-wide "winner-take-all" method we use in choosing Presidential electors and the influence of woman's suffrage after the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted in 1920 might have been analyzed in connection with third-party votes. An occasional slip in proof-reading appears such as Henry Clay's being identified in a caption on p. 29 as the winner in 1844. The bibliography, without pretending to be exhaustive, is ample, though the absence of Edward A. Stanwood's two-volume *History of the Presidency,* which is really a history of Presidential nominations, campaigns and elections, is somewhat surprising.

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INDEXER'S NOTE

Names of the contributors are in small capitals; titles of articles in this volume are in quotation marks; titles of books and periodicals reviewed or mentioned are in italics. Book reviews are entered under author and title of book, and under the name of the reviewer; no entries are made for subject of the book except in the case of biographies. The following abbreviations are used: tr., translator; ed., editor; revs., reviews; revd., reviewed.