
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An Historical Review

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Theodore Roosevelt in American Historical Writing, 1945-1960

During recent years Theodore Roosevelt has acquired a new vogue. The centennial observance of his birth, in 1958, seemed to reveal a new appreciation for the controversial Rough Rider and to disclose what Hermann Hagedorn describes as a deep reservoir of "nostalgic memories of Theodore Roosevelt, and of youthful enthusiasm, undimmed by the passage of time. . . ."[1] Recent historical writing in America has reflected the revival of interest in the nation's twenty-sixth President.[2] Indeed, Roosevelt has become a rival of such heroic figures as Jackson, Wilson, and Franklin

1 For a full account of the work of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission, which Congress created in 1955, and a survey of the centennial activities throughout the country, see Hermann Hagedorn, "Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission to the Congress of the United States" (New York, 1959). A mimeographed copy of this report, as well as various centennial articles, was provided the author through the courtesy of Mr. Leslie C. Stratton, Secretary and Director of the Theodore Roosevelt Association. See also *Interim Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission Relating to a Celebration in 1958 of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Theodore Roosevelt Pursuant to Public Law 183 of the Eighty-fourth Congress*, Washington, 1957.

2 Some of this work was sponsored or inspired by the centennial commission and the Theodore Roosevelt Association. See, for example, Hermann Hagedorn (ed.), *The Free Citizen: A Summons to Service of the Democratic Ideal by Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1956 (paperback ed., 1958); Hagedorn (comp. and ed.), *The Theodore Roosevelt Treasury: A Self-Portrait from His Writings*, New York, 1957; Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission, *A Compilation on the Life and Career of Theodore Roosevelt Relating to the Celebration in 1958 of the Hundreth Anniversary of His Birth*, Senate Document No. 84, 85 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1958; Avery Delano Andrews, "Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, XLII (April, 1958), 117-141; and Carleton Putnam, "Theodore Roosevelt: The Early Pattern," *ibid.*, XLIII (April, 1959), 237-251.

D. Roosevelt in attracting the attention of American historians.[3] During the last decade and a half at least eight biographical studies of Roosevelt have been published and others are in progress.[4] No less than forty articles and essays, ranging from a discussion of his ancestry to an analysis of his rhetoric,[5] have appeared during the same peroid, as well as a superb eight-volume selection from his letters, several unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, and scores of collateral works.

Of course, the irrepressible "Teddy" has long fascinated students of the American past, but this hardly explains the new interest in him. A part of the answer is the peculiar attraction the progressive movement has come to have for historians in this country. Roosevelt was so intimately associated with American progressivism that the subject can scarcely be considered without giving attention to his involvement in it. Another reason historians have focused attention on Roosevelt and the era he dominated is the renewed interest in his foreign policy, which has taken on new meaning when examined in the light of two world wars and recent international developments. No doubt more subtle influences manifested in the nation's dominant mood of late are also involved. It is possible, for instance, that the homogenizing forces so apparent in modern American society, and especially the desire to avoid social conflict, have found confirmation and inspiration in Theodore Roosevelt's basic attitudes.

In one respect recent Rooseveltian historiography has been curiously unproductive. There has been no full-length biography of Roosevelt during the last fifteen years, a circumstance which provides remarkable testimony to the powerful influence and durability

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[3] For three provocative historiographical essays, see Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (*MVHR* hereinafter), XLIV (March, 1958), 615-634; Richard L. Watson, Jr., "Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters, 1947-1957," *ibid.* (September, 1957), 207-236; and Watson, "Franklin D. Roosevelt in Historical Writing, 1950-1957," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LVII (Winter, 1958), 104-126.

[4] At the time this essay was completed, in the fall of 1959, Howard K. Beale, William H. Harbaugh, and Carleton Putnam were engaged in writing biographies of Roosevelt. The untimely death of Professor Beale late in 1959 interrupted a long and thorough preparation for the writing of what promised to be the definitive biography of Theodore Roosevelt. Howard Beale's long quest thus becomes a tragic and unfinished chapter in American historiography.

[5] At least two of these articles proved too esoteric for the author to make anything of: Nora E. Cordingley's "Extreme Rarities in the Published Works of Theodore Roosevelt," *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, XXXIX (1945), 20-50, and Dick Spencer, III, "Teddy Roosevelt's Saddle," *Western Horseman*, January, 1958.

of Henry F. Pringle's brilliantly-written biography.[6] One of the centennial studies, Edward Wagenknecht's *The Seven Worlds of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1958), attempts to distill the essence of Roosevelt's thought and to delineate the character of his leadership.[7] Although it is well-written and assimilates many of the new interpretations, it is lacking in critical judgment and its topical organization allows one to appreciate neither the fascinating story of Roosevelt's over-all growth nor the vital relationship between the man and his times. Another recent volume, Hermann Hagedorn's *The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill* (New York, 1954), is a warm and entertaining account of the Roosevelt family at its Long Island home, but it is not much concerned with politics or Roosevelt's public career.[8] A suggestive unpublished study by David Francis Sadler deals with the images of Roosevelt in the minds of his contemporaries.[9]

The most detailed study yet made of Theodore Roosevelt's youth and early career is the first volume of Carleton Putnam's projected four-volume biography.[10] Putnam's readable and well-documented work limns the first twenty-eight years of the New Yorker's life in rich detail. Putnam emphasizes the influence of Theodore's father in the formation of the future President's character and ideals,[11] describes "Teedie's" youthful enthusiasm for na-

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6 *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography*, New York, 1931. Even at the time of its publication, Pringle's biography had certain obvious limitations. The treatment of the post-presidential years, for which Pringle did not have access to the Roosevelt Papers, was thin and some aspects of the earlier period were inadequately developed. The book's great merit lay in its appraisal of Roosevelt's presidency and in its attempt to explain the man. Pringle could never quite bring himself to regard Roosevelt as anything more than a "violently adolescent person." In a revised version of the biography, published in paperback in 1956, Pringle faithfully adheres to his earlier interpretation.

7 The "seven worlds" Wagenknecht discusses are those of action, thought, human relations, family, spiritual values, public affairs, and war and peace.

8 William Davison Johnston's *TR, Champion of the Strenuous Life: A Photographic Biography of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1958, is notable for its excellent photographs. The commentary is slight. In the same genre is Stefan Lorant's *The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1959. It assembles a large number of pictures, cartoons, diaries, and letters to enliven the "life" and "times."

9 "Theodore Roosevelt: A Symbol to Americans, 1898-1912," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1954. The major aspects of the Roosevelt symbol, according to Sadler, were violence, work, righteousness, and corruption (the unprincipled and tyrannical Roosevelt).

10 *Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years, 1858-1886*, New York, 1958.

11 Putnam provides considerable family background, but the best treatment of Roosevelt's forebears is Howard K. Beale, "Theodore Roosevelt's Ancestry, A Study in Heredity," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record*, LXXXV (October, 1954), 196-205. For some further account of earlier Roosevelts in America, see William T. Cobb, *The Strenu-*

turalism,[12] discusses the physical regimen he prescribed for himself, brings the shadowy Alice Lee to life, does a workmanlike job in covering Roosevelt's legislative career, and deals effectively and at length with his ranching and hunting experiences.[13] He stresses Roosevelt's understanding of politics, his sense of *noblesse oblige*, his passion for law and order, his belief in individual self-responsibility, and the courage and determination he showed in developing his mind and body. But Putnam's portrait of the young Roosevelt is unduly flattering. If Pringle overemphasized the adolescent and foolish in Roosevelt's character, Putnam goes too far in depicting him as a responsible, mature, and purposeful young man. His volume is also open to other criticisms. It is largely descriptive, the space given to some topics to the relative neglect of others is open to question, and the author is not always critical in his use of sources. Nevertheless, *The Formative Years* provides for the first time a fairly complete and reliable factual account of Roosevelt's youth and early career. Nowhere outside of his own papers can one find so comprehensive a reconstruction of his early life.

Several recent articles and essays treat various aspects of Roosevelt's career before his elevation to the presidency in 1901. Elwyn B. Robinson and Robert W. Sellen have written perceptive articles on Roosevelt the historian;[14] Ari Hoogenboom, in an enlightening

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ous Life: The "Oyster Bay" Roosevelts in Business and Finance, New York, 1946.

12 Paul Russell Cutright, *Theodore Roosevelt the Naturalist*, New York, 1956, is an interesting study by a zoologist of Roosevelt's outdoor life. Broadus F. Farrar, "John Burroughs, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Nature Fakers," *Tennessee Studies in Literature*, IV (1959), 121-130, throws light on the nature-faker controversy during Roosevelt's presidency but does not elaborate Roosevelt's contributions.

13 Several recent articles have also illuminated some of the obscure features of Roosevelt's experiences in the Badlands. Significant for the light it throws on his experience in the open-range cattle industry is Ray H. Mattison, "Roosevelt and the Stockmen's Association," *North Dakota History*, XVII (April, 1950), 73-95, and *ibid.* (July, 1950), 177-209. See also Gerry Nelson, "Roosevelt Ranch Life in the Badlands," *ibid.*, XXIV (October, 1957), 171-174; Ray H. Mattison, "Ranching in the Dakota Badlands: A Study of Roosevelt's Contemporaries," *ibid.*, XIX (April, 1952), 93-128, and *ibid.* (July, 1952), 167-206; Olaf T. Hagen and Ray H. Mattison, "Pyramid Park—Where Roosevelt Came to Hunt," *ibid.*, XIX (October, 1952), 215-239; and Chester L. Brooks and Ray H. Mattison, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Dakota Badlands*, Washington, 1958. The last item is a sixty-page illustrated booklet issued by the National Park Service. For an interesting note on Roosevelt's influence on Owen Wister, see Don D. Walker, "Wister, Roosevelt and James: A Note on the Western," *American Quarterly*, XII (Fall, 1960), 358-366.

14 Robinson, "Theodore Roosevelt: Amateur Historian," *North Dakota History*, XXV (January, 1958), 5-13; Sellen, "Theodore Roosevelt: Historian with a Moral," *Mid-America*, XLI (October, 1959), 223-240. Putnam gives an interesting evaluation of *The Naval War of 1812* and of the biography of Thomas Hart Benton in *The Formative Years*, 221-227, 574-579. For two older surveys of Roosevelt's work as a historian, see Har-

analysis of the effect the Pendleton Act had on the civil service, advances convincing proof of the New Yorker's genuine contributions to civil service reform;[15] and Clifford P. Westermeier's book on the cowboy volunteers of 1898 contains an appraisal of the war feats of Roosevelt and the Rough Riders.[16] One of the best unpublished studies of Roosevelt is a dissertation on his governorship by G. Wallace Chessman.[17] This is an informed work that does much to explain the complicated political scene in New York near the end of the century[18] and to illuminate Roosevelt's relations

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rison John Thornton, "Theodore Roosevelt," in William T. Hutchinson (ed.), *The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography,* Chicago, 1937, 227-251, and Raymond C. Miller, "Theodore Roosevelt, Historian." in James Lea Cate and Eugene N. Anderson (eds.), *Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of James Westfall Thompson,* Chicago, 1938, 423-438. George B. Utley, "Theodore Roosevelt's *The Winning of the West*: Some Unpublished Letters," *MVHR,* XXX (March, 1944), 495-506, contains an interesting exchange of letters between Roosevelt and William Frederick Poole with respect to Poole's discerning review of the first two volumes of *The Winning of the West.* Charles Fenton's article on "Theodore Roosevelt as an American Man of Letters," *Western Humanities Review, XIII* (Autumn, 1959), 369-374, is an account of T.R.'s election to the American Academy of Arts and Letters and of his association with its members.

15 "The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service," *American Historical Review* (*AHR* hereinafter), LXIV (January, 1959), 301-318. For an extremely critical estimate of Roosevelt's service as commissioner, see A. Bower Sageser, *The First Two Decades of the Pendleton Act: A Study of Civil Service Reform,* University Studies of the University of Nebraska, XXXIV-XXXV (Lincoln, 1935), especially 141-142.

16 *Who Rush to Glory, the Cowboy Volunteers of 1898: Grigsby's Cowboys, Roosevelt's Rough Riders, Torrey's Rocky Mountain Riders,* Caldwell, Idaho, 1958. For other accounts of the Rough Riders, see Clifford P. Westermeier, "Teddy's Terrors: The New Mexican Volunteers of 1898," *New Mexico Historical Review,* XXVII (April, 1952), 107-136, and Royal A. Prentice, "The Rough Riders," *ibid.,* XXVI (October, 1951), 261-276, and *ibid.,* XXVII (January, 1952), 29-50. Laurin Hall Healy and Luis Kutner give a journalistic account of T.R.'s relations with Admiral Dewey in *The Admiral,* New York, 1944. Frank Freidel, *The Splendid Little War,* Boston, 1958, is a new and magnificently illustrated treatment of the Spanish-American War told mainly in the words of contemporaries.

17 "Theodore Roosevelt, Governor," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950.

18 For an interesting autobiographical account of Roosevelt's relations with the reformers who sought to nominate him on an independent ticket in 1898, see Julius Henry Cohen, *They Builded Better Than They Knew,* New York, 1946. On this episode and its unpleasant consequences, see also "Note on Roosevelt's Nomination for the Governorship," in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,* 8 vols., Cambridge, 1951-1954, II, 1474-1478; these volumes will be cited hereinafter as Morison, *Letters.* In regard to Roosevelt's behavior in 1900, Chessman argues convincingly that the New Yorker did not "set his course" in an effort to end up on the national ticket that year. See Chessman's article on "Theodore Roosevelt's Campaign against the Vice-Presidency," *Historian,* XIV (Spring, 1952), 173-190. Bascom N. Timmons, *Portrait of An American: Charles G. Dawes,* New York, 1953, which is based on Dawes' diaries, contains some interesting material on the Republican convention of 1900 and on Roosevelt's presidency.

with the legislature and with Boss Platt. The author rightly concludes that the years of Roosevelt's governorship were crucial ones for the Rough Rider. It was on the testing ground of the governorship that he clarified and strengthened his fundamental ideas on the role of the state in modern society and the relationship of the political party to government and the people.[19]

As might be expected, Roosevelt's presidency has been one of the principal attractions for modern Roosevelt scholars. Although no one has written an over-all appraisal of Roosevelt's presidential years as comprehensive as Pringle's, the period has been dealt with extensively in monographs, articles, and biographies of other major figures. Three studies are particularly significant: George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900–1912* (New York, 1958), Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956), and John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1954). Mowry's book is the best general account of Roosevelt's administration.[20] It contains an excellent appraisal of Roosevelt. Beale's study, vigorously written and based on exhaustive research,[21] is a comprehensive and critical examination of Roosevelt's policies in the international sphere. Beale clearly demonstrates Roosevelt's skill in handling foreign relations but questions the wisdom of his major policies. Blum, who prepared himself well for undertaking an interpretative study of Roosevelt during his years as associate editor of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*,[22] has written an exciting essay that clarifies "the purposes and methods" of Roosevelt's career. It has probably done more than any other publication since 1945 to re-

19 Chessman stresses Roosevelt's "impartial" approach to the complicated labor world that existed in the Empire State in the 1890's. A more critical appraisal of Roosevelt's labor policies is Howard Lawrence Hurwitz, *Theodore Roosevelt and Labor in New York State, 1880-1900*, New York, 1943.

20 Among general books on the period a good supplement to *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* is Harold U. Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917*, New York, 1951, which concentrates on economic institutions and their development. Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers: The Culture of Politics and Leadership in An Age of Enlightenment, 1896-1919*, New York, 1940, is also useful.

21 The citations and evaluations in Beale's voluminous notes provide an excellent bibliographical guide to the primary and secondary materials for a study of Roosevelt's foreign policy; this volume will be cited hereinafter as *Roosevelt and World Power*.

22 A substantial part of Blum's book first appeared in various appendixes to the edited letters. See "Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Decision," in Morison, *Letters*, II, 1484-1494; "Theodore Roosevelt and the Legislative Process: Tariff Revision and Railroad Regulation, 1904-1906," *ibid.*, IV, 1333-1342; and "Theodore Roosevelt and the Hepburn Act: Toward An Orderly System of Control," *ibid.*, VI, 1558-1571.

habilitate Roosevelt as an important and able leader.[23] Blum pictures Roosevelt as a skillful conservative more concerned with the processes than with the ends of government; but a conservative who accepted change as the only means of preserving his nation's most cherished institutions.

Another interpretative essay is Richard Hofstadter's sketch in *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1948). This piece, which gives evidence of Hofstadter's interest in psychology, reminds one of Pringle in its skeptical approach and caustic characterization. Hofstadter refers to Roosevelt as the "stabilizer of the status quo," the "master therapist of the middle classes." He emphasizes the tension, the penchant for violence, the uneasiness over radicalism, and the tendency to straddle in Roosevelt's life, while minimizing his reform accomplishments as President and suggesting that his militarism and imperialism had much in common with recent authoritarianism.[24] Another critical estimate of Roosevelt appeared in Peter R. Levin, *Seven by Chance: The Accidental Presidents* (New York, 1948). Levin stresses the discrepancy between the faith Roosevelt preached and the works he accomplished.[25]

An indirect but significant contribution to recent Rooseveltian historiography is the increasing number of able biographies of Roosevelt's political associates and contemporaries. The most impressive biographical studies have been those devoted to the lives of leading congressional figures, particularly Senators. The best of these are John A. Garraty's *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York, 1953), which throws light on the thirty-five-year political collaboration between Lodge and Roosevelt and on Massachusetts politics but fails to elaborate Lodge's attitude toward the Square Deal and his role during the troubled years 1910-1912;[26]

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23 On this point see Howard K. Beale's review in *MVHR*, XLI (December, 1954), 539-541.

24 "Theodore Roosevelt: The Conservative as Progressive," *The American Political Tradition*, 203-233. It is interesting to note—and perhaps a commentary on the dominant interpretations in recent Rooseveltian historiography—that in *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.*, New York, 1955, Hofstadter was much less critical of Roosevelt. He still spoke of his using "the rhetoric of progressivism" to win the plaudits of the reformers, but he now viewed Roosevelt as one of the most astute and discerning leaders of the period, and he found much significance in the reforms of his presidency (pp. 13, 232-238, 243-251).

25 *Seven by Chance*, 177-230, 353-354, 357-358. Gerald W. Johnson's *Incredible Tale: The Odyssey of the Average American in the Last Half Century*, New York, 1950, a survey of the American scene since 1900, devotes a pungent chapter to Roosevelt.

26 Karl Schriftgiesser, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge*, Boston, 1944, presents a sharply critical view of Lodge.

Everett Walters' *Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican* (Columbus, Ohio, 1948), a good study of a conservative who differed with the President over railroad regulation, patronage, administration policies in the Caribbean, and the Brownsville affray;[27] Belle Case and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette, June 14, 1855–June 18, 1925* (2 vols., New York, 1953), a detailed and sympathetic account of the Wisconsin progressive's long career which views the latter years of Roosevelt's administration from the perspective of a man whose experiences with the Rough Rider were disillusioning;[28] Oscar Doane Lambert, *Stephen Benton Elkins* (Pittsburgh, 1955); Leland L. Sage, *William Boyd Allison: A Study in Practical Politics* (Iowa City, 1956); and Thomas Richard Ross, *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver: A Study in Political Integrity and Independence* (Iowa City, 1958). The last three volumes are helpful in understanding the railroad regulatory legislation of the Roosevelt period, and the studies of the Iowans are especially valuable because of the way in which they relate Iowa politics to national developments. Although there is still no adequate study of Joseph G. Cannon's public career, Blair Bolles' sprightly-written *Tyrant from Illinois* contributes to an understanding of his speakership and his relations with Roosevelt.[29]

The members of Roosevelt's Cabinet have not attracted recent biographers. Since 1945 only one such study has appeared: Richard W. Leopold's *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston, 1954).[30] Leopold deals incisively with Root's important work in

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27 For two important articles on the Brownsville episode and its political repercussions, see James A. Tinsley, "Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," *Journal of Negro History*, XLI (January, 1956), 43-65, and *Emma Lou Thornbrough*, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote," *MVHR*, XLIV (December, 1957), 469-493.

28 John R. Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, Baton Rouge, 1953, is an able study of a Democratic Senate leader. It is informative on Gorman's efforts to line up Democratic opposition in the Senate to Roosevelt's Panamanian coup.

29 *Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power*, New York, 1951. Bolles has probably exaggerated Cannon's importance in his thesis that the Speaker's obdurate use of his powerful position to oppose reform measures was a major factor in the ultimate triumph of the progressives. William Rea Gwinn, *Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of Insurgency: A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism*, n.p., 1957, is a sympathetic appraisal of Cannon which fails to develop in a systematic and coherent fashion important aspects of Cannonism that it seeks to encompass.

30 Although less interpretative than Leopold's book, Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 2 vols., New York, 1938, is more revealing in the light it throws on domestic issues and on Root's relations with Roosevelt. This biography, which is sympathetic in approach, lavish in detail, and scholarly in execution, remains one of the most valuable studies of a major Roosevelt figure.

the Cabinet and stresses his contribution to the conservative tradition in America. But his book contains few references to politics and fails to do justice to Root's views on the Square Deal.[31] Other recent biographies that should be mentioned are Ira V. Brown's *Lyman Abbott, Christian Evolutionist: A Study in Religious Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1953), which is helpful for its discussion of the relations between Roosevelt and a high-minded reformer whose independent journal consistently supported Rooseveltian policies,[32] and Merlo J. Pusey's *Charles Evans Hughes* (2 vols., New York, 1951), a lengthy but uncritical biography of the inscrutable New York reformer and jurist.[33] Walter Johnson's sparkling biography of William Allen White presents a vivid account of the Emporia editor's long association with Roosevelt and some valuable material on politics in Kansas during the Roosevelt era.[34]

No one has made a more penetrating analysis of Roosevelt's presidential politics than John M. Blum, who graphically demonstrates that the Rough Rider's proficiency in the processes of politics, administration, and legislation stamped him as "professional." By 1900, writes Blum, the New Yorker's party regularity had become "convincingly habitual," his utilization of the mechanics of power

31 Eric F. Goldman, *Charles J. Bonaparte, Patrician Reformer: His Earlier Career*, Baltimore, 1943, is an interesting but incomplete biography of a man who served in several minor national positions during the first years of Roosevelt's presidency and subsequently as Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General. Unfortunately, Goldman's book does not deal with Bonaparte's work as Attorney General. For an appraisal of the Cabinet careers of Roosevelt's Postmasters General—Henry C. Payne, George B. Cortelyou, and George von Lengerke Meyer—see Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, *The Cabinet Politician: The Postmasters General, 1829-1909*, New York, 1943, 262-302.

32 Brown's excellent biography also throws light on Roosevelt's work as a contributing editor of *Outlook*. For Roosevelt's relations with a powerful financier and a wayward Democrat, see Frederick Lewis Allen's *The Great Pierpont Morgan*, New York, 1948, and James McGurrin's *Bourke Cockran: A Free Lance in American Politics*, New York, 1948.

33 The small volume by Dexter Perkins in the Library of American Biography—*Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship*, Boston, 1956—makes out a case for Hughes as a farsighted middle-of-the-road leader, but it does not achieve the interpretative excellence of Leopold's study of Root in the same series. Important for an understanding of Hughes' governorship, Rooseveltian politics in New York, and progressivism in the Republican party of that state, is Herbert Hillel Rosenthal, "The Progressive Movement in New York State, 1906-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1955.

34 *William Allen White's America*, New York, 1947. Two memoirs that are disappointing for the Roosevelt period are *Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris*, New York, 1945, and *American Chronicle: The Autobiography of Ray Stannard Baker*, New York, 1945. Two nostalgic memoirs by members of the Roosevelt family—*A Front Row Seat*, Norman, Okla., 1953, by Nicholas Roosevelt, and *Day Before Yesterday: The Reminiscences of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.*, Garden City, 1959—provide some account of Roosevelt and his home life.

"smoothly effectual," and his standards of executive efficiency "refreshingly rigorous."[35] Blum illuminates the course T.R. followed in transforming the party of Hanna and McKinley into the party of Roosevelt,[36] and shows how Roosevelt, with an intuitive understanding of politics and an "absolute sense of political pitch," captured the loyalty of the people as had no incumbent President since Andrew Jackson.[37] Although Roosevelt sought to control rather than to change the American political system, his vivid performance and his success in persuading the people that he had "a conscience and would be fair" gave a powerful impetus to the reform movements of the early part of the twentieth century and provided "an irrepressible force" for the mandate of 1904.[38]

Theodore Roosevelt's role in the revivification of the presidency has been described by Arthur S. Link as "the most significant political development of the time."[39] Several scholars have shown how Roosevelt's "stewardship theory" of the presidency, his role as a policy determiner in the legislative field, and his assertion of national leadership through control of public opinion contributed to

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35 *The Republican Roosevelt,* 22.

36 *Ibid.,* 37-54. M. R. Merrill, "Theodore Roosevelt and Reed Smoot," *Western Political Quarterly,* IV (September, 1951), 440-453, discusses Roosevelt's support of the conservative Morman Senator, whose faction opposed Hanna, and Smoot's enthusiastic support of Roosevelt in 1904. For Roosevelt's southern policy, see Basil Mathews, *Booker T. Washington: Educator and Interracial Interpreter,* Cambridge, 1948, 229-234; Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life,* Boston, 1955, 133-138, 168-169; John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes,* rev. ed., New York, 1956, 426-428, 434-435, 445; and Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "Dinner at the White House: Theodore Roosevelt, Booker T. Washington, and the South," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly,* XVII (June, 1958), 112-130.

37 For an interesting and thoughtful analysis of Roosevelt's rhetoric, see William A. Behl, "Theodore Roosevelt's Principles of Speech Preparation and Delivery," *Speech Monographs,* XII (1945), 112-122. This article is based on Behl's "The Rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1942.

38 Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt,* 55-72. Two brief surveys of the politics of the Roosevelt administration are contained in Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections,* New York, 1957, and Malcolm Moos, *The Republicans: A History of Their Party,* New York, 1956. Russel B. Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1950,* East Lansing, 1951, is valuable for its treatment of the relationship between Roosevelt and the midwestern progressives. Charles W. Stein, *The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics,* New York, 1943, includes a discussion of Roosevelt and the third-term issue. Three articles that throw some light on the Rough Rider's western political trips are Frederic C. Smith, "Teddy Roosevelt in Iowa," *Palimpsest,* XXIX (October, 1948), 296-302; Robert P. Wilkins, "Theodore Roosevelt and 'Dacotah': A Mutual Disillusionment," *North Dakota Quarterly,* XXVI (Spring, 1958), 53-64; and Agnes Wright Spring, "Theodore Roosevelt in Colorado," *Colorado Magazine,* XXXV (October, 1958), 241-265.

39 *Wilson: The New Freedom,* Princeton, 1956, 146-147.

the strengthening of the American presidency.[40] Blum's *The Republican Roosevelt* provides the best analysis of that contribution. Blum's brilliant dissection of Roosevelt's quest for and use of power, and his treatment of T.R.'s approach to his party and to the people, of the methods he employed in dealing with Congress, and of the concerts of power he worked to establish in the international sphere constitute a series of instructive case studies.

In a superb chapter on the enactment of the Hepburn Act, Blum illustrates Roosevelt's facility in dealing with Congress and the nature of his approach to governmental control over industrial operations.[41] He was given to moral solutions and the dimensions of his morality, Blum says, involved practicality, popularity, and especially preoccupation with process. Having defined the tariff as a matter of expediency and the regulation of railroad rates as a matter of conduct (and morality for him was largely a matter of conduct), Roosevelt used "the specter of tariff agitation" to threaten the Old Guard and create a controlled environment within his party conducive to rate reform.[42] He brought "a new respectability" to demands that went back to Populist days, and by mobilizing the full powers of his office he won an outstanding victory. Blum effectively refutes an interpretation that once had a good deal of currency which held that Nelson W. Aldrich outmaneuvered Roosevelt in the Hepburn fight.[43] Leland L. Sage's *William Boyd*

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40 Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957: History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion.* 4th rev. ed., New York, 1957, 120, 137, 152-153, 265-268; Corwin, "The Presidency in Perspective," *Journal of Politics,* XI (February, 1949), 11; Wilfred E. Binkley, "The President and Congress," *ibid.,* 71; Binkley, *President and Congress,* New York, 1947, 191-198. See also Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency,* New York, 1956, 76-77, and "The President and Labor Disputes," *Journal of Politics,* XI (February, 1949), 95.

41 *The Republican Roosevelt,* 73-105.

42 In effect, says Blum, Roosevelt sacrificed tariff reform, which he never considered worth a fight, in return for co-operation in the enactment of his railroad bill. Since some Republican rate reformers in Congress were also protectionists, Blum may have exaggerated the extent to which Roosevelt's railroad legislation involved a conflict between high-tariff, pro-railroad conservatives and low-tariff, anti-railroad liberals. George E. Mowry says that Roosevelt never gave up entirely on the tariff question and that his occasional use of the issue against the conservatives was more in the nature of "counterpunching than of shadowboxing." *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt,* 200. A critical view of Roosevelt on this issue is Richard Cleveland Baker, *The Tariff under Roosevelt and Taft,* Hastings, Nebr., 1941. Wilfred E. Binkley suggested several years before the appearance of Blum's book that Roosevelt used the tariff in situations like the Hepburn fight "for the sheer purpose of getting bargaining advantages." See Binkley, *President and Congress,* 197.

43 This thesis was most persuasively advanced by Nathaniel Wright Stephenson in his *Nelson W. Aldrich: A Leader in American Politics,* New York, 1930, 280-318. Leon Burr Richardson, *William E. Chandler: Republi-*

Allison and Thomas R. Ross's *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver* support Blum's interpretation and help to clear up the complicated maneuverings in the struggle between Roosevelt and Aldrich that preceded the Senate passage of the Hepburn bill.[44]

Another aspect of Roosevelt's approach to the problem of industrial control—trustbusting—has been the focal point of considerable historical attention since 1945. Richard Hofstadter suggested in *The American Political Tradition* that antitrust action for T.R. was partly a means of satisfying the popular demand to see the government punish big business, but chiefly a threat to hold over business to compel it to accept regulation, which was really Roosevelt's solution for the trust problem.[45] In his volume in the New American Nation Series, George E. Mowry agrees substantially with this interpretation. With the path to effective control blocked by a stubborn, conservative Congress, Roosevelt was forced to bring "the arrogant capitalists to heel" through the judicious use of the antitrust laws.[46] Hans B. Thorelli's comprehensive study of the formative period of antitrust policy, *The Federal Antitrust Policy*:

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can, New York, 1940, provides a good account of Chandler's role as Roosevelt's intermediary in working with the Senate Democrats led by Benjamin R. Tillman. Richardson and Francis Butler Simkins both criticize Roosevelt for a lack of good faith in his dealings with Chandler, Tillman, and the Democrats. For the South Carolinian's part in the railroad rate struggle and his long hostility toward Roosevelt, see Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian*, Baton Rouge, 1944, 400-401, 408-454.

44 Ross emphasizes Dolliver's contribution in getting the Hepburn bill out of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and argues that the Iowa Senator was the "real author" of the Hepburn measure. He contradicts Stephenson's contention that Aldrich's amendment in committee, reserving the right of committee members to amend the bill on the floor of the Senate, represented a victory for Aldrich by pointing out that such an amendment was meaningless in view of the fact that committee members had always possessed this right under procedures of the upper house. It was, says Ross, only "a petty effort to lead the public to believe that the Old Guard was still in control of the committee." *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver*, 193-213, 333-334. Blum apparently made the mistake of following Stephenson on this matter. Lambert's *Stephen Benton Elkins* is valuable for its analysis of the workings of the Elkins Act during the years 1903-1905, but overestimates Elkins' contribution to the formulation of the Hepburn bill. Richard Lowitt, "George W. Norris, James J. Hill, and the Railroad Rate Bill," *Nebraska History*, XL (June, 1959), 137-145, offers evidence that a major reason for support of Roosevelt's railroad legislation in Nebraska was the resentment at the policies James J. Hill and his associates followed in managing the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad.

45 *The American Political Tradition*, 222. In *The Age of Reform* (p. 244), Hofstadter makes the interesting observation that the readiness with which Roosevelt's reputation as a trustbuster grew up around his use of the Sherman Act (despite his candid admissions that he did not believe in the trustbusting philosophy) offers "striking testimony to the public's need to believe in the effectiveness of action in this sphere...."

46 *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 132-134.

Origination of an American Tradition (Baltimore, 1954), while emphasizing the point that Theodore Roosevelt brought "executive initiative and leadership" to this area of public policy-making, insists that there was no well-defined and coherent Roosevelt plan during the early years of his presidency. Before 1903, declares Thorelli, there was nothing in Roosevelt's program *per se* "that is in conflict with the antimonopoly tradition, although it is implied that the antitrust policy might need reinforcement or supplementation."[47]

Intrigued by the possibilities of federal power, Roosevelt moved toward a system of orderly control, first by establishing the Bureau of Corporations in the Department of Commerce and Labor to discipline consolidation. The power thus granted to an agency under the control of the Chief Executive was potentially very great and, though Roosevelt intended to rely upon experts in carrying on the work of the Bureau, John M. Blum has suggested that the open environment provided by the legislative or judicial processes might have been a more equitable approach to the problems of competition, consolidation, and control.[48] An important article by Arthur M. Johnson on Roosevelt's role in the establishment and early work of the Bureau lends support to Blum's reservations about the Rough Rider's solution to this problem.[49] Johnson concludes that the agency proved useful to Roosevelt in publicizing corporate abuses and in helping to prosecute offenders, but that its performance was uneven and its susceptibility to influence by the President constantly invited arbitrary distinctions between "good" and "bad" combinations. Such an arrangement, he says, was "too patently inconsistent with sound public policy to be institutionalized."[50] In another recent article Robert H. Wiebe has shown

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47 *The Federal Antitrust Policy*, 411-431, 528-554, 560-561, 592-593. Thorelli's coverage ends with 1903, but his study contains much valuable material on the administration and enforcement of the Sherman Act, judicial interpretation, and the trust problem in Congress during the first two years of Roosevelt's presidency.

48 *The Republican Roosevelt*, 6, 116-121. "The conclusion imperiously suggests itself," writes Blum, "that Roosevelt did not want to be controlled, that he did not want to be inhibited by a body of law, whether or not it was properly interpreted, nor delayed by the impedance of legislatures."

49 "Theodore Roosevelt and the Bureau of Corporations," *MVHR*, XLV (March, 1959), 571-590. Johnson is inclined to see more coherence in Roosevelt's early presidential policies for the handling of big business than is Thorelli.

50 *Ibid.*, 589-590. For the main points in an interesting paper on "The Antitrust Law, 1901-1909," which Johnson delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in 1958, see C. E. Black, "The Washington Meeting, 1958," *AHR*, LXIV (April, 1959), 794.

how the House of Morgan negotiated "gentlemen's agreements" with the Roosevelt administration and thereby removed the United States Steel Corporation and the International Harvester Company from the scourge of antitrust prosecution.[51]

Several books and articles published since 1945 have clarified other features of Roosevelt's Square Deal. Robert J. Cornell, *The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902* (Washington, 1957), a monograph based on extensive research, provides an excellent account of the strike and of Roosevelt's part in forcing a settlement.[52] *The Health of a Nation: Harvey W. Wiley and the Fight for Pure Food* (Chicago, 1958), a carefully-prepared study by Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., concentrates on Wiley but also deals with Roosevelt's role in the fight for pure-food and drug legislation. Anderson shows Roosevelt to have been a "late convert" to the crusade for pure-food legislation, but his book does not underestimate the President's substantial contribution to the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.[53]

Although there is still no adequate treatment of Roosevelt and the conservation movement, his policies in that field have not been altogether neglected during the last few years. Gifford Pinchot's *Breaking New Ground* (New York, 1947), while particularly concerned with the story of forest conservation in the United States, describes the various elements in Roosevelt's comprehensive conservation program.[54] An article by Whitney R. Cross on "The Conservation Policies of the Two Roosevelts" thoughtfully analyzes the

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51 "The House of Morgan and the Executive, 1905-1913," *AHR*, LXV (October, 1959), 49-60. This article and another by Wiebe on "Business Disunity and the Progressive Movement, 1901-1914," *MVHR*, XLIV (March, 1958), 664-685, are important for their analysis of business ideas, tactics, and conflicts during the progressive era. For a convenient selection of readings on the trust debate as it culminated in the campaign of 1912, see the small volume in the Amherst College Problems in American Civilization edited by Edwin C. Rozwenc on *Roosevelt, Wilson and the Trusts*, Boston, 1950.

52 Marguerite Green, *The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925*, Washington, 1956, describes the mediation efforts of the National Civic Federation in the coal strike and covers Roosevelt's relations with the organization.

53 See also Anderson's article, "The Pure-Food Issue: A Republican Dilemma, 1906-1912," *AHR*, LXI (April, 1956), 550-573, which argues that the controversies over the enforcement of the pure-food regulations and over Wiley's resignation in March, 1912, were politically significant "as one more feature in the combination of circumstances that doomed the Republicans in 1912."

54 See also M. Nelson McGeary, *Gifford Pinchot: Forester-Politician*, Princeton, 1960. David Cushman Coyle, *Conservation: An American Story of Conflict and Accomplishment*, New Brunswick, N.J., is an undocumented account that emphasizes the work of Pinchot and T.R. in the conservation movement.

first Roosevelt's conservation ideas.[55] Cross points out that Theodore Roosevelt's support of conservation was a congenial commitment on his part because it allowed him to stress convictions of honesty and efficiency that were firmly fixed in the American tradition. Cross contends that specific conservation problems "on their own merits" gradually led originally individualistic predispositions to evolve in "the collectivist direction," that through his conservation program Roosevelt came to assume a consistent and pervasive antimonopoly position, and that the inadequacy of simple righteousness in dealing with complicated and highly technical violations promoted the development of a comprehensive theory of resource management. Thus was Roosevelt led along the road to the New Nationalism and an elementary stage of the welfare state, says Cross. A somewhat different view is presented in a survey of Roosevelt's conservation activities by E. C. Blackorby, who emphasizes the western sources of the Rough Rider's conservation ideas and asserts that Roosevelt's policies derived from his interpretation of the powers of the presidency and his conception of the government's function as that of a steward for later generations of Americans.[56]

The most significant work on the conservation movement to appear in recent years is Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920* (Cambridge, 1959), which is based on extensive use of primary materials. Hays challenges those scholars who have emphasized the democratic features and the antimonopoly spirit of the conservation movement and advances the thesis that conservation was primarily a scientific movement, concerned with rational

55 "Ideas in Politics: The Conservation Policies of the Two Roosevelts," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (June, 1953), 421-438. For a general comparison of the two Roosevelts that is critical of T.R., see R. G. Tugwell, "The Two Roosevelts," *Western Political Quarterly*, V (March, 1952), 84-93.

56 "Theodore Roosevelt's Conservation Policies and Their Impact upon America and the American West," *North Dakota History*, XXV (October, 1958), 107-117. For two articles that throw light on the conservation movement in the Far West during the Roosevelt era, see Lawrence Rakestraw, "Uncle Sam's Forest Reserves," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XLIV (October, 1953), 145-151, and "Before McNary: The Northwestern Conservationist, 1889-1913," *ibid.*, LI (April, 1960), 49-56. A brief article that deals with one example of the Roosevelt administration's efforts to protect the public domain is Jerry A. O'Callaghan, "Senator Mitchell and the Oregon Land Frauds, 1905," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXI (August, 1952), 255-261. For an older account that touches on the connection between Roosevelt's conservation policies and his ideas on agriculture, see Earle D. Ross, "Roosevelt and Agriculture," *MVHR*, XIV (December, 1927), 287-310.

planning to promote the efficient development and use of all natural resources.[57] He argues that instead of being a great moral struggle between the virtuous "people" and the evil "interests," the movement was primarily the work of a limited group of people with a particular set of goals. Far from involving a reaction against large-scale corporate business, asserts Hays, conservation in fact shared its views in a mutual revulsion aganist unrestrained competition and undirected economic development.[58] Hays' emphasis on the concept of efficiency in resource management is a significant contribution to a fuller understanding of the conservation movement, and it suggests a side of the progressive movement that needs further investigation. But the interpretation is too monolithic to explain the conservation crusade or the progressive movement entirely.

Hays is more successful in fitting the conservation policies of the Roosevelt administration into his conceptual framework. Stressing the close connection between the various elements in the larger conservation movement, he demonstrates how the Roosevelt administration expanded its public land policies and gradually broadened its early reclamation work into a full-fledged water development program and a single, coherent approach to conservation.[59] But the administration had difficulty in adjusting the conflicts that arose over resource decisions. Encountering increasing opposition from Congress, which could not appreciate the conservationists' passion for efficiency and which sought to protect its own role in the making of resource decisions, Roosevelt and his conservation friends endeavored to overcome legislative restraints by devising new administrative concepts and practices, by expanding the interpretation of resource laws, and finally, by making a bid for popular support. At this point, Hays contends,

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57 A radically different and more traditional interpretation is found in an excellent article by J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 to 1921," *MVHR*, XLIV (June, 1957), 29-57. Bates explores the relationship between conservation and the progressive movement, and argues that the organized conservationists were concerned more with economic justice and democracy in the handling of resources than with mere prevention of waste. For this general theme, see also Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936,* Princeton, 1942, 301-379. E. Louise Peffer, *The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-1950,* Stanford, 1951, contains a careful survey of Roosevelt's public land policies.

58 Hays suggests that the conservation ideology stressed conservation as a theory of resource *ownership* when, in fact, the movement was primarily concerned with resource *use*. *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency,* 1-4, 261-266.

59 *Ibid.,* 5-127.

middle- and upper-class urban dwellers, with little appreciation for rational and comprehensive planning, joined the conservation crusade.[60]

Theodore Roosevelt's extraordinary energy, his passion for stability, his practicality and willingness to compromise, his fascination with processes rather than ends, and his devotion to the gospel of righteousness, all suggest why he should have demonstrated a flair for administration. Leonard D. White has said that as an administrator Roosevelt stood "head and shoulders above his predecessors since the days of James K. Polk."[61] No published work has yet made a careful study of the twenty-sixth President as an administrator, but a Ph.D. dissertation by Joseph Teplin on his administrative thought and behavior suggests the importance of the subject.[62] Although based only on printed materials, this is a critical study of all significant aspects of Roosevelt's administrative ideas and actions. An illuminating case study is Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s essay on "Theodore Roosevelt and the Panama Canal: A Study in Administration," which appeared as an appendix to *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt.*[63] Chandler points out that Roosevelt's administrative abilities lay less in the realm of theory than in the field of practice. As a practical executive his talents were three-fold: first, he made decisions rapidly and on the basis of the best advice available; second, he understood the necessity of choosing capable men for important administrative positions, of supporting them fully, and of convincing them of the value of their work; and finally, he had learned from experience "not only that authority and responsibility must be centralized but that authority to act must be commensurate with the responsibility exacted."[64] Civil service reform, another element in the strenuous President's administrative work, has received extensive coverage in Paul P. Van Riper's history of the civil service.[65] Under Roose-

60 *Ibid.*, 133-145, 275.

61 "The Public Life of 'T.R.,'" *Public Administration Review,* XIV (Autumn, 1954), 281.

62 "Theodore Roosevelt: A Study in Administrative Thought and Behavior," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1949.

63 Morison, *Letters,* VI, 1547-1557. This essay first appeared in *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History,* IV, Cambridge, 1951, 103-111.

64 Part IV of Gerstle Mack's *The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal Projects,* New York, 1944, contains a useful treatment of such aspects of the canal story as medical administration, labor problems, and the role of technology. See also Miles P. DuVal, Jr., *And the Mountains Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal,* Stanford University, 1947.

65 *History of the United States Civil Service,* Evanston, Ill., and White Plains, N. Y., 1958, 176-207, 540-541.

velt's "stimulating guidance," says Van Riper, the public service first began to reflect the influence of the drive for "administrative and organizational reform."

Elting E. Morison has pointed out that Theodore Roosevelt was one of those Americans who first discerned that the country's future lay "within the whole world and not in some insulated corner."[66] His efforts to equip the nation for international maturity was a major part of his leadership and has been recognized as such by American historians. Roosevelt was unusually well-equipped to deal with foreign problems, as Howard K. Beale makes clear in his important study of Roosevelt's diplomacy. His travels abroad, his extensive reading, his friendships at home and abroad, and the sense of security and of *noblesse oblige* that he got from an aristocratic background were all important in his approach to international questions. Beale notes that the Roosevelts, unlike most of their predecessors, accepted living in the White House as "completely natural." They had the aristocrats' concern for good breeding but they blended regard for proprieties with simplicity in taste and freedom from ostentation. This facilitated Roosevelt's man-to-man diplomacy.[67]

In discussing Roosevelt's part in the rise of American imperialism, Beale places emphasis on the Rough Rider's moral rectitude, his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority,[68] and his special brand of national honor; he observes that in his ignorance of modern war Roosevelt romanticized war, and that while he valued the blessings of peace he craved the excitement of war. Beale shows that Roosevelt's desire to have his country act as a great power was intimately related to his concern for the qualities of character he prized and his feeling that expansion would help develop those

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66 *Letters*, V, xviii. A lively synthesis that covers Roosevelt diplomacy while surveying American foreign relations from 1885 to 1910, is Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years*, New York, 1956. See also Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire*, New York, 1950.

67 Beale, *Roosevelt and World Power*, 1-13. An interesting article by Nelson Manfred Blake examines Roosevelt's relations with the more important foreign ambassadors during his presidency and illustrates his flair for personal diplomacy. "Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt," *MVHR*, XLII (September, 1955), 179-206.

68 *Roosevelt and World Power*, 14-80. Beale makes the point that Roosevelt's racism differed from that of many of his contemporaries in that he attributed differences of "race" to acquired characteristics and to the effect of geographic environment, in that he did not limit the possibilities of progress to white men, and in that he had such respect for "the sacredness of individual personality" that he judged each man as an individual human being rather than as a member of a class, a race, or a nation.

qualities in his fellow-citizens. This point is examined in an interesting article by John P. Mallan on "The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," which argues that the "little imperialist elite" composed of such men as Brooks Adams, Homer Lea, and Theodore Roosevelt made the only serious attempt during America's brief history as a world power to develop a genuinely conservative position on foreign policy.[69] In his study of the conflict between ideals and self-interest in the international life of the United States, Robert Endicott Osgood asserts that a group of "American Realists," motivated by "an aggressive national egoism and a romantic attachment to national power," briefly captured popular leadership under the banner of a missionary imperialism.[70] One of these realists, Theodore Roosevelt, found it easy to lead the nation to its most active participation in international affairs since the days of the French alliance; but this was not, according to Osgood, the result of any "sudden burst of realism" in the popular attitude toward world politics. Rather it should be attributed to Roosevelt's political genius, "his consummate skill in tapping the resources of aroused nationalism and directing them into new channels."[71]

To understand Theodore Roosevelt's views on foreign policy, one must comprehend his belief in the oneness of American and British interests and his conviction that together they could dominate the world, to the advantage of civilization. Howard K. Beale's *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* contains an excellent account of Roosevelt's British policies. Beale does not make the mistake of interpreting Roosevelt as "an unqualified Anglophobe," but he shows how T.R. and his friends gradually developed a full-fledged foreign policy based on the belief that the two countries shared common interests. He reviews the conflicts and misunderstandings whose ultimate resolution led to the con-

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69 "Roosevelt, Brooks Adams, and Lea: The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," *American Quarterly*, VIII (Fall, 1956), 216-230. Mallan concludes that despite the antimaterialist or antibusiness sentiments of men like Roosevelt, Lodge, and Alfred T. Mahan, only Adams and Lea clearly saw the possible conflict between a luxury economy and military survival. On Lodge and Mahan in this connection and on their support of imperialism in general, see Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 146-165, 180-219, and William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, Norman, Okla., 1947, 97-137.

70 *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, Chicago, 1953, especially 27-28. A European study, based mainly on secondary sources, which views Roosevelt's diplomacy as a combination of realism and idealism, is Alex Weilenmann, *Theodore Roosevelt und die Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, Zurich, 1953.

71 Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 70-71, 75, 84.

summation of the entente, throws new light on Roosevelt's handling of the Alaskan boundary dispute, and suggests that the President and his associates desired but never quite dared to advocate publicly an Anglo-American alliance.[72] For all Roosevelt's prophetic insights, writes Beale, he failed to foresee the inevitable resentment of the colonial people whose domination was a major objective of the Anglo-American understanding.[73] Beale also criticizes Roosevelt and his colleagues for seeking in combination with Britain to preserve "an unstable balance" among the nations he considered civilized, and for their failure to inform the American people of the commitments they had made.[74]

As John M. Blum's penetrating essay makes clear, Roosevelt's foreign policy was governed (as were his policies at home) by his quest for order and his faith in power.[75] Roosevelt's first objective was the self-interest of the United States and this helps account for his interest in strategic considerations and his determination to develop the American navy.[76] His quest for order and his faith in

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72 *Roosevelt and World Power*, 81-171. An interesting treatment of Roosevelt's British diplomacy is that of H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, London, 1954, 549-626. A careful study, based an extensive research, that parallels Beale's interpretation but is somewhat more critical of Roosevelt is Charles S. Campbell, Jr., *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Baltimore, 1957. For a comprehensive review of the Alaskan boundary question, see Charles Callan Tansill, *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911*, New Haven, 1943.

73 The confusion in Roosevelt's (and many Americans') approach to imperialism, the contradiction in his thinking about liberty and order, and his somewhat idealized conception of imperialism as the great civilizing agency for backward nations were well illustrated in 1910 during the course of several speeches he made in Egypt and England concerning British policy for administering Egypt and the Sudan. Although he urged the necessity of British control in these colonial areas, much that he said, especially in Egypt, was susceptible of favorable interpretation by the Egyptian nationalists. See David H. Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt and Egyptian Nationalism," *Mid-America*, XLI (April, 1959), 88-103.

74 *Roosevelt and World Power*, 151, 153, 159-171, 457-458. In a paper on "Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire," Max Beloff challenges Beale on several of these points. See *The Great Powers: Essays in Twentieth Century Politics*, London, 1959, 215-232.

75 *The Republican Roosevelt*, 126. For a discussion of Roosevelt and the balance of power, see Edward H. Buehrig, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power*, Bloomington, Ind., 1955, 151-167.

76 A concise and competent treatment of Roosevelt's contributions to the building of the modern American navy is Gordon Carpenter O'Gara, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy*, Princeton, 1943. See aso Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy*, Boston, 1942; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, rev. ed., Princeton, 1942; and Arthur M. Johnson, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXXIV (October, 1958), 76-82. For an amusing account of Roosevelt's much-publicized General Order No. 6 on physical fitness, see Rear Admiral Lucius W. Johnson, "When T.R. Streamlined the Officers," *ibid.*, LXXVIII (December, 1952), 1310-1313.

power were perhaps most apparent in his Caribbean policies. But this area has received relatively little attention since World War II, in part perhaps because the subject had earlier been given elaborate treatment.[77] Even Beale slights Roosevelt's Caribbean diplomacy.

Most American diplomatic historians have been highly suspicious of Roosevelt's claim that he used the presence of Admiral Dewey's fleet in the Caribbean and sent a personal ultimatum to the Kaiser to force Germany's acceptance of American arbitration proposals during the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-1903.[78] In an article published in 1946, Seward W. Livermore challenged some of the conventional conclusions with regard to this episode.[79] Livermore concedes that Roosevelt might have embellished his recollection of his activities in the crisis, but the historian's examination of naval records convinced him that there exists "a substantial factual basis" for Roosevelt's statements. He thinks the key to the problem lies in the careful preparation the navy made in 1902 to defend the interests and security of the United States in the Caribbean, and in the way Roosevelt made use of American naval maneuvers in that area during the crisis for diplomatic purposes. In a fascinating exploration of the whole historiographical problem that has developed over this question, Beale goes further than Livermore in defending Roosevelt's claims. He views the affair as a notable example of Roosevelt's personal diplomacy and as important in its bearing on his "reputation for veracity."[80] He takes issue with Dexter Perkins and other historians and introduces considerable evidence to prove that "the substance" of Roosevelt's account is true.[81]

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77 Among the best of the numerous earlier studies are Howard C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, Chicago, 1927; Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907*, Baltimore, 1937; and Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, New York, 1943.

78 See, for example, Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, 106-174; Alfred Vagts, *Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik*, 2 vols., New York, 1935, II, 1525-1635; and Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907*, 319-395.

79 "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903," *AHR*, LI (April, 1946), 452-471.

80 *Roosevelt and World Power*, 395-431. Beale suggests that the "debunking" of one of Roosevelt's proudest accomplishments, "more perhaps than any other one factor," has become the basis for a growing conviction, "professional and popular," that he was something of a fraud.

81 In a review of Foster Rhea Dulles' *The Imperial Years*, Perkins indicated that he still doubts the "Roosevelt legend," and finds it significant "that there is not a word in the German archives to substantiate the story of an ultimatum...." *MVHR*, XLIV (September, 1957), 375.

Mowry's *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* has a good brief account of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policies, but the most comprehensive study of Rooseveltian diplomacy in the Orient is contained in Beale's volume. In his chapter on Roosevelt and China, Beale examines T.R.'s handling of such problems as the dispute over the American China Development Company,[82] shows how he miscalculated in the arrangements he made with Japan for the maintenance of the Open Door in China, and explores the implications of American imperialism with respect to that country. He is critical of Roosevelt for failing to formulate a foreign policy which would help resolve China's basic problems, and expresses the opinion that the United States missed a great opportunity during the Roosevelt era when it failed to become the friend and guide of the "new spirit" in China.[83] In another chapter Beale reviews in great detail Roosevelt's mediation in the Russo-Japanese War and his major policies designed to maintain the balance of power in the Far East.[84] He probably overemphasizes Roosevelt's responsibility for the ultimate failure of the balance of power and Open Door arrangements he worked so hard to perfect in the Far East.[85]

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[82] For a good account of the early years of this company, see William R. Braisted, "The United States and the American China Development Company," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XI (February, 1952), 147-165.

[83] *Roosevelt and World Power*, 172-252. For another critical examination of Roosevelt's policies concerning China, see Charles Vevier, *The United States and China, 1906-1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1955, which analyzes American relations with China as they were affected by "the techniques of cooperation between Washington and Wall Street." See also Vevier, "The Open Door: An Idea in Action, 1906-1913," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXIV (February, 1955), 49-62, and Raymond A. Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910," *MVHR*, XLVI (December, 1959), 435-454. Paul A. Varg, *Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill*, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, XXXIII, No. 4, Urbana, 1952, is also helpful for Roosevelt's Chinese policies.

[84] *Roosevelt and World Power*, 253-334. For American public opinion on the Japanese problem, see Winston B. Thorson, "Pacific Northwest Opinion on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XXXV (October, 1944), 305-322, and "American Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Peace Conference," *AHR*, LIII (April, 1948), 439-464. Outten Jones Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1947, although based almost entirely on printed sources, is enlightening on Roosevelt's response to the upsurge of Japanese power in the Far East. For an elucidation of the American dilemma during the Roosevelt era that resulted from heavy reliance upon sea power to support the nation's Far Eastern diplomacy, in the absence of a clear-cut strategy and an adequate Pacific fleet, see William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," *MVHR*, XLI (June, 1954), 21-40; "The United States Navy's Dilemma in the Pacific, 1906-1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXVI (August, 1957), 235-244; and *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909*, Austin, Texas, 1958.

[85] Beale suggests that some American policies unfriendly to Japan, including the famous naval cruise around the world, encouraged the rise of the militarists in Japan. *Roosevelt and World Power*, 328-334. For

Although Roosevelt's role in European diplomacy was smaller than it was in the Far East, he was vitally interested in preserving the balance of power on that continent. He sought to avoid the outbreak of a war in Europe (which he suspected would become a general war) and in the first Moroccan crisis he played a useful part in avoiding an open conflict.[86] In his lengthy discussion of Roosevelt and the balance of power in Europe, Beale illuminates some of the hidden corners of the twenty-sixth President's notions about war and peace, and provides an especially discerning treatment of his position *vis-à-vis* Germany and the Kaiser.[87] Although Roosevelt generally turned a friendly countenance toward the Prince of Wilhelmstrasse, a recently published article by Seward W. Livermore shows how he made use of a pattern of naval-diplomatic activity to indicate American preference for the Anglo-French Entente and thus tip the balance against Germany in the precarious international situation.[88]

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a different view of the naval cruise, see Thomas A. Bailey, "The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, I (December, 1932), 389-423. Raymond A. Esthus, "The Taft-Katsura Agreement—Reality or Myth?" *Journal of Modern History*, XXXI (March, 1959), 46-51, advances persuasive evidence to prove that the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 was not a "secret pact," as Tyler Dennett and most later historians have interpreted the "agreed memorandum," but rather a helpful and "honest exchange of views." An older work that contributes to an understanding of one aspect of Roosevelt's dealings with the Japanese is Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises: An Account of the International Complications Arising from the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast*, Stanford University, 1934. The following recent studies throw light on American policies in the Far East during the Roosevelt period: Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905*, Madison, 1944; John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, rev. ed., Cambridge, 1958; Edward H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914*, Philadelphia, 1946; Pauline Tompkins, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East*, New York, 1949; Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1950; and Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, rev. ed., Cambridge, 1957.

[86] A colorful account of an earlier Rooseveltian gambit in Morocco is Barbara W. Tuchman, "'Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead,'" *American Heritage*, X (August, 1959), 18-21, 98-101.

[87] *Roosevelt and World Power*, 335-447. The American statesman got along well with the Kaiser and was often successful in his personal diplomacy with him. Privately his comments on the German ruler ranged all the way from "dislike to esteem." See Beale's interesting article, "Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II. und die Deutsch-Amerikanischen Beziehungen," *Die Welt Als Geschichte*, XV (1955), 155-179.

[88] "The American Navy as a Factor in World Politics, 1903-1913," *AHR*, LXIII (July, 1958), 863-879. Livermore points up the American suspicions of German aggression in Central or South America. Thus, while Roosevelt was primarily concerned with maintaining world peace at the Algeciras Conference, the United States had a strategic interest in pre-

Several historians have pointed out the relationship between Roosevelt's domestic reforms and his purposes in the international sphere. For example, George E. Mowry has noted how the nationalist and collectivist impulse that encouraged one wing of progressivism to rely upon the federal state for the solution of internal problems also reflected itself in foreign affairs.[89] In an influential article published in 1952, William E. Leuchtenburg advanced the thesis that the progressives, with few exceptions, ardently supported imperialism or at the very least proved "agreeably acquiescent."[90] Although Leuchtenburg and other recent American specialists have clearly shown the affinity one branch of the progressives had for an imperialistic foreign policy, other historians have insisted that progressivism, especially in the Midwest and the South, was basically hostile to imperialism and the ambitious foreign policies of Theodore Roosevelt.[91]

Much of recent Rooseveltian scholarship has been concerned with Roosevelt and the progressive movement, with major emphasis on the years 1910-1912. The most significant volume on this subject is George E. Mowry's *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* (Madison, 1946), the first important work to be published on Roosevelt following World War II. The result of extensive research in manuscript sources and other records, Mowry's book is a perspicacious and well-written treatment of Roosevelt's influence on the progressive movement and the influence of the movement on the man. Mowry stresses the midwestern origins of the movement[92] and asserts, in his evaluation of T.R.'s presidential contributions to the incipient reform wave, that "Roosevelt was the best publicity man progressivism ever had." He makes a detailed

venting Germany from obtaining control of Casablanca, which would be useful as a naval base for operations against South America. Beale emphasizes Roosevelt's desire to prevent a Franco-German war at Algeciras. He says Germany had no territorial ambitions in Latin America at the time of the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-1903. *Roosevelt and World Power*, 371, 388, 398, 430.

89 *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 144-146.

90 "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *MVHR*, XXXIX (December, 1952), 483-504.

91 See Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954*, New York, 1954, 83-85, and Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917*, New York, 1954, 180-186. Russel B. Nye's *Midwestern Progressive Politics* is disappointing in its failure to deal more adequately with the attitudes of midwestern progressives toward international relations. This is perhaps a commentary on the midwestern progressives' lack of interest in foreign affairs.

92 Mowry presents a more comprehensive explanation of the origins of progressivism in the first five chapters of *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*.

examination of the Taft administration, the various phases of insurgency,[93] and the gathering progressive storm in the West. He is much more critical of William Howard Taft, whom he views as a conservative and as a bungling politician, than was Henry F. Pringle.[94] He follows Roosevelt closely after his return from abroad and does much to clarify his motivations and behavior in the campaign of 1910;[95] he discusses the gradual cleavage between the ex-President and Taft, the evolution of the New Nationalism, the organization of the Progressive party, and the election of 1912. His brief account of the decline of the Progressive party is a masterly treatment. Mowry has probably overemphasized Roosevelt's role in the progressive movement, especially in his thesis that he killed progressivism in the Republican party by leading the progressives out of the party in 1912, only to abandon them in 1916. He concentrates too closely upon domestic politics and is understandably limited in his handling of the relationship between far-flung local and state activities and national developments. But his book is indispensable for an understanding of Roosevelt and the progressive movement.

During the years since 1945 the election of 1912 has continued to be a central attraction for research on progressivism. Few American elections have been studied at the grass-roots level so inten-

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93 Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era*, New York, 1940, remains of some value as a careful account of insurgency in Congress.

94 *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography*, 2 vols., New York, 1939. Pringle emphasizes Taft's constructive accomplishments as President, puts the best light possible on his actions, and fully captures his charm as a human being. He is captious in his attitude toward Roosevelt in the Taft biography. Mowry takes issue with Pringle's interpretation of the Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy and adopts the general position of Alpheus Thomas Mason in *Bureaucracy Convicts Itself: The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy of 1910*, Princeton, 1941. In *Breaking New Ground*, Gifford Pinchot accuses Taft of deserting Roosevelt's conservation program, sharply criticizes Ballinger's policies, and defends his own position at length. Samuel P. Hays has recently provided a new appraisal of the controversy in which he chides his fellow-historians for having been beguiled into surrendering objective analysis by the ideology of democratic protest that accompanied the conservation movement. To picture the controversy as a crusade for the "common people" against the "trusts," he contends, is a gross oversimplification. Nor, according to Hays, was the Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy the result of a lack of public morality; rather, its roots lay in the differences over administrative policies, some of which began to emerge as early as 1907. *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 147-174.

95 Mowry shows clearly that the key to an understanding of Roosevelt's actions in 1910 lies in his desire to reunite the Republican party. For an earlier article by Mowry on this subject, see "Theodore Roosevelt and the Election of 1910," *MVHR*, XXV (March, 1939), 523-534.

sively.[96] One aspect of this interest has been the origins of Roosevelt's New Nationalism. Eric F. Goldman, George E. Mowry, and other historians have stressed the role of Herbert Croly as the theoretician if not the originator of the New Nationalism.[97] Two scholars who have been most critical of Theodore Roosevelt in recent years—Daniel Aaron and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.—have concentrated their fire upon Roosevelt's well-advertised progressive doctrine. In *Men of Good Hope,* Aaron characterizes Roosevelt as a leader of "comic vanity and inveterate opportunism," a late-comer to reform whose progressivism was of the "most dubious sort."[98] He emphasizes the elite strain in the New Yorker's make-up and pictures the real Roosevelt as a militarist and a disciplinarian. According to Aaron, the Croly-Roosevelt program was a kind of "pseudo-progressive makeshift," engendered more from "a fear of social revolution than a dream of fulfillment."[99] It is at this

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[96] See, for example, Howard W. Smith, "The Progressive Party and the Election of 1912 in Alabama," *Alabama Review,* IX (January, 1956), 5-21; William A. Pitkin, "Issues in the Roosevelt-Taft Contest of 1912," *Mid-America,* XXXIV (October, 1952), 219-232; Elmo R. Richardson, "Conservation as a Political Issue: The Western Progressives' Dilemma, 1909-1912," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly,* XLIX (April, 1958), 49-54; Mildred Throne, "Iowa and the Presidential Election of 1912," *Palimpsest,* XXXIII (October, 1952), 289-336; and Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life,* New York, 1946, Chs. XXIII-XXIV. For Roosevelt's abortive effort to win electoral support in the South, see George E. Mowry, "The South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912," *Journal of Southern History,* VI (May, 1940), 237-247; Arthur S. Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," *North Carolina Historical Review,* XXIII (July, 1946), 313-324; and Link (ed.), "Correspondence Relating to the Progressive Party's 'Lily White' Policy in 1912," *Journal of Southern History,* X (November, 1944), 480-490. A slight article that suggests some of the contrasts between Roosevelt and Wilson as progressive leaders is Jack Kenny Williams, "Roosevelt, Wilson, and the Progressive Movement," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* LIV (April, 1955), 207-211.

[97] Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform,* New York, 1952, 188-207; Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement,* 146. In his latest book, where he demonstrates Roosevelt's drift to the left during the last two years of his presidency, Mowry suggests that Croly's influence on Roosevelt has been exaggerated by earlier historians. *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt,* 222. See also Elum, *The Republican Roosevelt,* 107, 143. For a perceptive analysis of Croly's famous book, see Byron Dexter, "Herbert Croly and the Promise of American Life," *Political Science Quarterly,* LXX (June, 1955), 197-218.

[98] "Theodore Roosevelt and Brooks Adams: Pseudo-Progressives," *Men of Good Hope: A Story of American Progressives,* New York, 1951, 245-280.

[99] Although several historians have commented on Roosevelt's almost pathological fear of left-wing radicalism and his revulsion for socialism, there is as yet no thorough analysis of his response to and impact upon the American left. Some mention of Roosevelt in this connection can be found in the following studies of socialism in the United States: Ray Ginger, *The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs,* New Brunswick, N.J., 1949; Daniel Bell, "The Background and Development of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald Drew Egbert and

point in particular that Aaron seeks to show that Brooks Adams greatly influenced Roosevelt's thinking.[100]

Arthur A. Ekirch maintains that the progressive movement, while supporting some liberal causes and opposing many domestic abuses, was not primarily a liberal movement and that it abandoned almost completely the philosophy of natural rights for a kind of political instrumentalism.[101] As President, says Ekirch, Theodore Roosevelt emphasized to a "superlative degree" the nationalistic side of progressivism. Ekirch stresses the Hamiltonian notions of the progressives, the influence of collectivist and statist views from abroad on the evolution of American progressivism, the *rapport* between business and progressive tenets, and the intimate relationship between "the aggressive foreign policy of the progressives and their emphasis on nationalism in home affairs." Ekirch's interpretation is suggestive, but it errs in its emphasis and distorts the meaning of American progressivism by characterizing the movement as a whole largely in terms of the ideas of such eastern exponents of the New Nationalism as Herbert Croly, George W. Perkins, and Theodore Roosevelt. As George E. Mowry has acutely observed of Roosevelt in 1912, "He was supported in the West not because of his New Nationalism but in spite of it."[102] The character of the progressive movement can be accurately determined only when enough studies of its manifestation at the state and local levels have been made to permit authoritative generalizations. Such studies as Russel B. Nye's *Midwestern Progressive Politics* (which emphasizes the midwestern character of progressivism and vividly contrasts the liberalism of Croly and Roosevelt with that of Midwesterners like La Follette),[103] Mowry's *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), and Robert S. Maxwell, *La Follette and Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin* (Madison, 1956)

Stow Persons (eds.), *Socialism and American Life*, 2 vols., Princeton, 1952, I, 215-405; Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912*, New York, 1952; David A. Shannon, "The Socialist Party Before the First World War: An Analysis," *MVHR*, XXXVIII (September, 1951), 279-288; Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America: A History*, New York, 1955; and H. Wayne Morgan, "Eugene Debs and the Socialist Campaign of 1912," *Mid-America*, XXXIX (October, 1957), 210-226.

100 Arthur F. Beringause, *Brooks Adams: A Biography*, New York, 1955, offers additional evidence of the ideological agreement between Adams and Roosevelt, and of Adams' influence on T.R.

101 *The Decline of American Liberalism*, New York, 1955, 171-194.

102 *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 280.

103 *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, 181-296. Nye contends that while Roosevelt's dramatization of the conflict between progressivism and conservatism brought him the reluctant support of the midwestern progressives, he never touched "the real progressive tradition."

suggest how diversified a lot American progressives were and how untenable a monolithic interpretation of the progressive movement would be.[104]

Three or four recent memoirs are important as sources for an understanding of Theodore Roosevelt and the progressive movement. Of these, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York, 1946) is most notable. White, who was one of those who stood with Roosevelt at Armageddon, has written a graphic account of Republican insurgency and the Progressive party, and his magnificent evocation of the spirit that animated the Roosevelt Progressives helps make his book a classic in recent American history. Henry L. Stimson's *On Active Service in Peace and War* offers a revealing example of how Roosevelt attracted able young men to government service, throws light on New York politics,[105] and provides a case study of a Roosevelt man who stayed with the Taft administration in 1912.[106] Important for its illumination of the conflict within the Progressive party during the years 1912-1916 is Amos Pinchot's *History of the Progressive Party,* which has been skillfully edited by Helene M. Hooker.[107] Pinchot, who was almost from the first a "Cassandra to the Colonel," wrote a highly subjective and selective account, but one that is valuable for the

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104 For other recent accounts of progressivism in different states and regions, see the La Follettes, *Robert M. La Follette,* I, passim; Herbert F. Margulies, "The Background of the La Follette-McGovern Schism," *Wisconsin Magazine of History,* XL (Autumn, 1956), 21-29; Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914," *North Carolina Historical Review,* XXIII (April, 1946), 172-195; C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913,* Baton Rouge, 1951, 369-395; and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Morison, Letters, VIII, 1462-1465.

105 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War,* New York, 1947. See also Elting E. Morison's valuable biography, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson,* Boston, 1960. Herbert H. Rosenthal, "The Cruise of the Tarpon," *New York History,* XXXIX (October, 1958), 303-320, is a revealing analysis of New York politics in 1910, and of Roosevelt's conference with Taft at New Haven in September, 1910.

106 On the organization and later course of the Progressive party, see Donald R. Richberg, *My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life,* New York, 1954, Harold L. Ickes, *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon,* New York, 1943, and John A. Garraty, *Right-Hand Man: The Life of George W. Perkins,* New York, 1960. William T. Hutchinson's first-rate biography, *Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden,* 2 vols., Chicago, 1957, is informative on Illinois politics during the Roosevelt era, on Lowden's work after 1912 to bring the Progressives and the Republicans back together, and on his friendship with Roosevelt.

107 Helene Maxwell Hooker (ed.), *History of the Progressive Party, 1912-1916,* by Amos R. E. Pinchot, Washington Square, N.Y., 1958. The editor has provided a lengthy sketch of Amos Pinchot and an excellent analysis of his basic ideas.

light it throws on the abandonment of La Follette's candidacy by the Pinchots and others early in 1912,[108] the differences between the "radical nucleus" of the party and Roosevelt over the trust question and the role of George W. Perkins in the party's management, and the decline and collapse of the organization.[109]

Roosevelt's activities following his defeat in 1912 have not yet received adequate treatment. In addition to Mowry's account of the Progressive party's decline, two recent works should be mentioned: William Henry Harbaugh's unpublished study of Wilson, Roosevelt, and intervention during the years 1914-1917,[110] and Robert E. Osgood's *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations,* which has been cited in connection with Roosevelt's early twentieth-century ventures in *Realpolitik.* Although Harbaugh's study is most valuable for its analysis of public opinion and pressure groups on the question of intervention, it is important also for its careful examination of Roosevelt's thought and action during this period.[111] Osgood uses Roosevelt as a symbol in the conflict between ideals and self-interest in American foreign relations during the first two decades of the twentieth century. He makes a notable contribution in his brilliant exegesis of Roosevelt's motivations in his fight for American public opinion. The ex-President feared that his country's position in the world would be des-

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108 On this point and the early planning that led to Roosevelt's bid for the nomination, see Robert M. Warner, "Chase S. Osborn and the Presidential Campaign of 1912," *MVHR,* XLVI (June, 1959), 19-45.

109 Pinchot's *bête noire* was George W. Perkins, whom he believed to be part of a conspiracy by big business to mislead Roosevelt and undermine the Progressive party. Another critical view of Perkins is evident in Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" *AHR,* XLVI (January, 1941), 306-337. For the views of a disillusioned Progressive who supported Woodrow Wilson in 1916, see Fred L. Israel, "Bainbridge Colby and the Progressive Party, 1914-1916," *New York History,* XL (January, 1959), 33-46. Excerpts from the telephone conversations between Perkins and Roosevelt during the 1916 Progressive party convention have been edited by John A. Garraty as "T.R. on the Telephone," *American Heritage,* IX (December, 1957), 99-108.

110 "Wilson, Roosevelt, and Intervention, 1914-1917: A Study of Domestic Influences on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954. See also the brilliant chapter on the preparedness controversy in Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,* and Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," *AHR,* XLIII (July, 1938), 775-790. Hermann Hagedorn, *The Bugle that Woke America: The Saga of Theodore Roosevelt's Last Battle for His Country,* New York, 1940, is a highly partisan account of the ex-President's efforts to further the cause of American preparedness before and after the United States entered the war.

111 An excellent reassessment of the domestic and diplomatic factors in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany that led to American intervention in 1917, is Ernest R. May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917,* Cambridge, 1959.

troyed if Germany won the war, but Osgood doubts that considerations of national security had a direct influence upon his desire for intervention. It was the inhumanity and humiliation inflicted by the submarine campaign and not its threat to the Western Hemisphere that aroused his passionate feelings. Wilson's apparent success in winning popular backing for his milk-and-water ideals, for which Roosevelt had the utmost contempt and which he sincerely believed would lead the country down the road to disaster, exacerbated his fears. Osgood uses Nietzche's distinction between the Warrior and the Priest to depict the positions of the two leaders, whose differences, he thinks, were more than personal and partisan, involving also a struggle between contrasting philosophies of international relations.[112] In some respects Roosevelt was a realist in his attitude toward foreign affairs; but Osgood's volume demonstrates that in others he was "a militant idealist and something of an aggressive national egoist as well."

No evaluation of recent Rooseveltian historiography would be complete without special reference to the eight-volume edition of Roosevelt's letters published during the early 1950's.[113] A distinguishd contribution to Roosevelt literature in its own right, this superbly-edited work has proven an extraordinary stimulus to historians and biographers interested in the Roosevelt era.[114] Everyone will not agree with the editors' selection of letters and the specialist will still find it necessary to use the Roosevelt manuscripts. Nevertheless, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* is a magnificently documented record of Roosevelt's life and career.[115]

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112 Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 88-91, 96, 102-103, 112, 135-153, 202-203, 245, 249, 271-273.

113 Morison, *Letters*. For a few other published letters of Roosevelt, see Morison (ed.), *Cowboys and Kings: Three Great Letters by Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, 1954, and John Joseph Gallagher (ed.), "The Theodore Roosevelt Letters to Cardinal Gibbons," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLIV (January, 1959), 440-456.

114 On the Roosevelt Papers and the procedures used in editing the letters, see, in addition to Morison's introductions in Vols. I, III, and V of *The Letters*, Thomas Little, "The Theodore Roosevelt Collection at Harvard," *Harvard Library Bulletin*, V (Autumn, 1951), 376-378; Elting E. Morison, "*The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*," *ibid.*, 378-381; John M. Blum, "Editors' Camera: 'The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,'" *American Documentation*, I (Fall, 1950), 181-184; and Morison, "Some Thoughts on the Roosevelt Papers," *Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*, XV (May, 1958), 101-105.

115 For some discerning evaluations of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, see Howard K. Beale's reviews in the *AHR*, LVII (October, 1951), 184-187; (July, 1952), 998-1002; LIX (October, 1953), 159-163; LX (July, 1955), 918-921; and two review essays by Richard L. Watson, Jr., "Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Preparation, 1868-1900," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LI (April, 1952), 301-315, and "Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover," *ibid.*, LIII (January, 1954), 109-129.

A review of the impressive body of historical literature devoted to Roosevelt and his times prompts a few general observations. For one thing, despite the extensive work accomplished during the last fifteen years, there are striking gaps in the biographical and historical coverage of the Roosevelt era. In the case of Roosevelt himself, there is still no full-scale biography based on a familiarity with all of the Roosevelt manuscripts and other relevant sources. Nor have all phases and aspects of the Rough Rider's career received adequate treatment in monographic studies and articles. As for the Roosevelt period, one might suggest the need for biographies of such men as George B. Cortelyou, Philander C. Knox, and Nicholas Murray Butler, not to mention numerous congressional figures and state and local leaders.[116] There is as yet no good treatment of important features of Roosevelt's presidency, including his conservative program, the Panic of 1907, the Country Life Commission, and his antitrust program.[117] There are exciting possibilities for studies of reform on the local, state, and regional levels; for an investigation of American conservatism during this period; for the impact of technological advances and the organizational revolution upon American social and political life; and for new approaches to American foreign policy.

One of the notable characteristics of Roosveltian historiography since World War II is the change in attitude of historians toward Roosevelt. In a recent reference to new works on Roosevelt, Hermann Hagedorn observed that in none of them was there "a trace of the patronizing, even sneering skepticism of the appraisals that had been accepted by too many of the historical writers of the past thirty years as the proper attitude to take toward Mr. Roosevelt. . . ."[118] In many respects this is a desirable development. The older views of Roosevelt associated with Pringle's interpretation and the 1930's surely went too far in picturing the Rough Rider as a political opportunist, a man lacking in principle, and a pseudo-progressive who failed to comprehend the nature of the fundamental problems of his day, evaded issues, and in many ways actually

116 For two suggestive articles on research needs and possibilities for this period, see John M. Blum, "A Note on Method and Materials," in Morison, *Letters*, VIII, 1495-1505, and Richard L. Watson, Jr., "American Political History, 1900-1920," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LIV (January, 1955), 107-126.

117 Professor Arthur M. Johnson of Harvard University is now engaged in writing a book on federal antitrust policy during the period 1903-1914.

118 "Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission to the Congress of the United States," New York, 1959.

hindered genuine reform.[119] Yet it is a cause for wonder and perhaps concern that, with some important exceptions, most Roosevelt writers since 1945 have not paid proper tribute to the critical side of Clio's craft. Many of these authors have been amateurs, but the lack of critical judgment has also characterized the work on Roosevelt by some professional historians. One need not oppose a proper recognition of Roosevelt's constructive work and prophetic insights to feel that historians and biographers have swung too far away from the skeptical approach of the prewar scholars.

Roosevelt continues to be a controversial figure. His interpreters have not agreed, for example, whether to call him a conservative or a liberal. Although most recent writers have been inclined to accept John M. Blum's characterization of him as an enlightened conservative,[120] two of the leading Roosevelt students—Howard K. Beale and George E. Mowry—have entered dissents and argue that Roosevelt falls within the American liberal tradition. It may well be, as Samuel P. Hays has suggested, that Roosevelt's biographers and historians of the progressive period have been overly concerned with the traditional theme of liberal-conservative conflict. Hays believes that Roosevelt is difficult to characterize because historians have asked the wrong question about him. They have insisted on interpreting the significance of his career as primarily in its role in the social conflict of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between the business community and the farmer-labor groups. Actually, Hays declares, Roosevelt sought to avoid social struggle, refused to become identified with either side, and is chiefly significant for the attempt he made to supplant this conflict with a "scientific" approach to social and economic questions.[121] Whether or not Theodore Roosevelt was a progres-

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119 Louis Filler probably expressed a typical attitude among American historians when he wrote in 1939, "Each year Roosevelt becomes less impressive in retrospect, and it is unlikely that he will ever resume the stature he enjoyed in his days of triumph." *Crusaders for American Liberalism*, new ed., Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1950, 44.

120 In his thoughtful introduction to Vol. V of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Morison suggests that the distinguishing characteristics of the Roosevelt administration, which he says were the intuitive approach to situations, the selection of the individual as the primary object of concern in society, and the unruffled attitude toward power, were part of the conservative temper of the period (p. xxii).

121 Hays thinks that Roosevelt, who viewed the good society as agrarian and pre-industrial, accepted the technical requirements of an increasingly organized industrial society but feared its social consequences. Hays suggests that these contradictory elements in Roosevelt's outlook fused in an almost mystical approach to the political order best described as "social atomism." *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 266-271.

sive, it is difficult to disagree with Henry F. May's conclusion that he was "the greatest spokesman of practical idealism in America" and "a compelling symbol of the country's regeneration."[122]

There is much to be said for the historical writing on Theodore Roosevelt during the years 1945-1960. Far better than was true before 1945, recent scholars, most notably John M. Blum, have illuminated the roots of Roosevelt's career and the sources of his convictions. There is now, after George E. Mowry's excellent work, a new understanding of the impetus the twenty-sixth President gave to progressive politics in the United States, and of his own evolving progressivism. His skill in the game of politics, his contribution to the revivification of the presidency, his awareness of the implications of America's new industrial society and his efforts to work out policies for adjusting to it, his understanding of the fact that the United States was, inexorably, a part of the world and her foreign policy must be shaped with that in mind—all of these things about Roosevelt have become much clearer during the last decade and a half. Meanwhile, scores of historians not directly concerned with Roosevelt have helped to fill in the historical interstices of his period. And, finally, recent Rooseveltian historiography has suggested, even if it has not adequately explained, those defects in Roosevelt's character and those limitations in his policies which prevented him from being an even greater American.

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122 *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917*, New York, 1959, 17, 107.

John Boyle O'Reilly, Social Reform Editor

In the post-Civil War era John Boyle O'Reilly, editor of Boston's Catholic and Irish weekly, the *Pilot*, cast a critical eye over the American social scene.[1] Having witnessed the advent of "big business" with its rich and powerful leaders, he sadly reflected on the retreat of the masses into their foul, overcrowded tenements, which became breeding places for crime and social discontent. And so, by 1870, O'Reilly had inaugurated his own campaign against all forms of encroachment, especially that of the state upon a subjected people and the industrial lords upon the masses.

The Boston editor's sympathy for the workers, the poor and the destitude had been nourished since the days of his youth, for he had been born on the eve of Ireland's great starvation time and, as a young boy in County Meath, had been associated with the misery accompanying the famine of the 1840's. When he arrived on the American scene, therefore, he was already conditioned to reform, and the unrest then prevalent in American society gave added impetus to his crusading spirit.

In the decades before prominent writers like Edward Bellamy (*Looking Backward*), Jacob Riis (*How the Other Half Lives*), Henry Lloyd (*Wealth Against Commonwealth*), and at a time when Henry George was working on his famous *Progress and Poverty,* O'Reilly had already given notice of his keen interest in a reformation of the social order. His chief inspiration was the cry of the toiling masses crowded into the slums of the cities and subjected to numberless indignities. The expensive living of the opulent lords and masters constituted in his eyes a crime against society that demanded redress. His poem, "The City Streets," was

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[1] John Boyle O'Reilly was born on June 28, 1844, in County Meath, Ireland. While an Irish rebel in the British army, he was unmasked, court-martialed and imprisoned in 1866. The young Fenian escaped from the penal colony of Western Australia in 1869, and after an odyssey of nine months he landed in Philadelphia and soon removed to Boston. In July, 1870, he assumed the position of editor of the *Pilot,* and together with the Catholic Archbishop, John J. Williams, become co-proprietor of the journal in April, 1876. He died on August 10, 1890. For a detailed account of O'Reilly's career cf. Francis G. McManamin, S.J., "The American Years of John Boyle O'Reilly, 1870-1890," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, The Catholic University of America, 1959; James J. Roche, *Life of John Boyle O'Reilly,* New York, 1891; William G. Schofield, *Seek for a Hero: The Story of John Boyle O'Reilly,* New York, 1956.

a scathing indictment of the heartless city with its palaces of merchant kings where the "well-bred" reigned, ignoring the cries of the anguished poor in their forbidden districts—"over ten thousand huddled here, where a hundred live of our upper ten."[2] O'Reilly cried for justice and an adherence to divine law in this and other poems like, "From the Earth—a Cry," and "Prometheus Christ." At times his impassioned verses almost seemed aimed at a total disruption of contemporary society. Nevertheless, in spite of his forebodings and unveiled threats he did not countenance violence on the part of the oppressed, for he maintained that social advancement necessitated an adherence to the law of God and that only on this foundation could there be any constructive changes in society. For the pharisaical laws of man, however, he had nothing but contempt.

O'Reilly's poetic flayings of contemporary society lacked any clearly defined program of social reconstruction. His editorials, on the other hand, while stigmatizing the social order in the same vein as his poetry, offered more concrete solutions, for most of his writings for the *Pilot* on social themes dealt with specific conflicts in labor-management relations and flagrant violations of justice and charity toward the workingman and the poor, as well as the consequences resulting from labor's bid for recognition. His solutions to these problems reflect his perception of the root causes of these social disorders.

In the absence of an official stand by the leaders of the Catholic Church in the United States on the abuses current in the industrial system, O'Reilly formulated his own reform program from the age-old teachings of the Church and their adaptions to modern life. He was likewise acquainted with the writings and programs of some of the more progressive European Catholic reformers so that many of the ideas he espoused later received papal sanction in the two famous labor encyclicals, *Rerum novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo anno* (1931).

The rapid rise of an industrial society in the land of O'Reilly's adoption had caught most of the leaders of the Catholic Church in the United States unawares,[3] and without a comprehensive social

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[2] O'Reilly's poems have been published in many places, and they have been gathered together by Roche; for "The City Streets," cf. Roche, *Life of John Boyle O'Reilly*, 513-517.

[3] The Church in these decades was greatly preoccupied with such problems as secret societies, parochial schools, ecclesiastical discipline, and seminary education. Cf. *Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis II, Decreta*, Baltimore, 1868, and *Decreta Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis Tertii*, Baltimore, 1886.

philosophy they vacillated on some paramount questions. As a consequence, some of these problems encountered by both clergy and laity received conflicting solutions.[4] But the precedents had already been established in Europe that proved to be an invaluable guide for the development of a Catholic social philosophy peculiar to Amercian industrial growth.[5]

From the ideas advanced by certain reform writers both at home and abroad—complemented by his personal observations of the social scene—O'Reilly was able to give expression to his own social philosophy. Nor were other American Catholic publicists totally unobservant in this respect, for in the 1870's the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* discussed such topics as the ownership of property, secret societies, the labor question, and socialism in the United States, while the *Catholic World* gave prominence to labor, the Communist International, and kindred topics; and Catholic and Irish newspapers were notable defenders of the workingman and the poor. Still, the American Church did not take up the gauntlet in earnest until the 1880's, when it was brought face to face with the critical situation created by the growing labor movement in which so many of its members were enrolled.[6]

Whereas the American hierarchy had been somewhat tardy with regard to the labor question during the post-Civil War era,

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[4] Henry J. Browne, *The Catholic Church and the Knights of Labor*, Washington, 1949, Chapter I. Archbishop William Henry Elder, of Cincinnati, reflected this confusion in a letter to James Cardinal Gibbons, of Baltimore, saying, "I said however, I believed it would be a great service, if some authoritative declaration should be given, of the doctrines of the Church on some of these questions [Henry George and other matters]. There are some Catholics who do not know what to believe and profess. There are others, who hold sound doctrines, and yet hesitate to pronounce decidedly against false ones: because these have not been distinctly condemned by authority." March 23, 1888, Cincinnati. Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.

[5] An important European Catholic social reformer was Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz. Cf., George Metlake, *Christian Social Reform*, Philadelphia, 1912, and William Edward Hogan, S.V.D., *The Development of Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler's Interpretation of the Social Problem*, Washington, 1946. For a study of Henry Cardinal Manning and the social reform movement in England cf. Edmund S. Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminister*, New York, 1895-1896, II, chap. XXII, and Shane Leslie, *Cardinal Manning, His Life and Labours*, New York, 1954.

[6] Aaron I. Abell, "The Catholic Factor in Urban Welfare: The Early Period, 1850-1880," *Review of Politics*, XIV (July, 1952), 319-321, and Abell, "American Catholic Reaction to the Industrial Conflict: Arbitral Process: 1885-1900," *Catholic Historical Review* XLI (January, 1956), 385-407. Also cf. James E. Roohan, "American Catholics and the Social Question, 1865-1890," *Historical Records and Studies* XLIII (1955), 3-26; John Tracy Ellis, *The Life of James Cardinal Gibbons*, Milwaukee, 1952, I; Browne, *Catholic Church and Knights of Labor*, Ch. I.

the labor movement itself had struck out on a bold course of expansion. The "Noble Order of the Knights of Labor," founded in 1869, provided a common meeting ground for many of the oppressed groups of contemporary society. Because of the policy of secrecy, however, the K. of L. erected a barrier between itself and the Catholic Church. As the years advanced Churchmen felt constrained to seek the removal of this stigma of secrecy from the Knights. Measures had to be undertaken to insure the protection and advancement of the laboring classes in civil society within the safeguards of religion.[7] Ultimately when the Catholic, Terence V. Powderly, became leader of the Knights in 1879, he was prevailed upon to remove this seal of secrecy which deprived them of the Church's approbation.[8]

O'Reilly, meanwhile, had been a critic of all secret societies, an attitude that dated back to the period when he had dissociated himself from the Fenians. He had seen the abuses to which these secret groups had given rise and had been at pains to publicize them. His solution was a firm obedience to the directives of the Catholic Church, since, in his judgment, she was the only physician capable of countering the plague of such organizations.[9] He realized that secret labor societies alienated employer and employees and pitted social classes against one another. However much his poetical anathemas seemed to nourish the idea of a class warfare that would terminate in universal equality, he had never advocated an abolition of classes.[10] Keenly aware as he was that the in-

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7 Richard Gilmour, Bishop of Cleveland, expressed his fear of the possibility of labor's dissatisfaction with the Church's policy in this delicate matter. Referring to George's book, he told Archbishop Elder that it would be a mistake to condemn it and, as he added, "create bitter hostility towards the Church by the workingmen & the poor who are getting edged enough as it is and will soon be looking for a victim to assail...." Cleveland, April 17, 1888. Archives of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati. For the secular aspects of this period cf. Foster Rhea Dulles, *Labor in America*, New York, 1955; John R. Commons et al., *History of Labour in the United States*, (New York, 1918), II. Arthur Mann, *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age*, Cambridge, 1954, is a good study of New England in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and an analysis of the reform programs. His chapter, "Irish Catholic Liberalism," however, must be read with caution, for some of his statements of Catholic doctrine and the social philosophy of John Boyle O'Reilly need clarification.

8 Browne, *Catholic Church and Knights of Labor*, and Ellis, *Life of James Cardinal Gibbons*, I.

9 *Pilot*, May 18, 1872.

10 O'Reilly viewed European society as a constant conflict between two antagonistic classes, the rich and the poor. American society, on the other hand, was epitomized as one of class distinctions with free interchange among the groups. Louis Hartz's distinction between European Liberalism and American Liberalism suggests a definition O'Reilly would have been pleased to make. *Liberal Tradition in America*, New York, 1955.

justices and opprobrium heaped upon the masses were not inherent in society nor in the capitalistic system, he made it clear that these abuses stemmed from the uncontrolled propensity toward individual aggrandizement to which weak human nature was an easy prey. His cry, therefore, was to abolish the injustices and the abuses and in so doing the aristocratic social class in the European sense would be abolished, without detriment to the acceptable class distinctions that existed in American society. "We look at rich and poor," he said, "employer and workman as a necessity, and as true order to go on forever in this world."[11] To O'Reilly it was not a crime to grow rich by honest means; but he insisted that wealth did not bring with it an arbitrary right to its disposal.[12]

Early in his crusade for social betterment O'Reilly was confronted by labor's renewal of its bid for an eight-hour working day, but he did not concede it his immediate endorsement. Although the Boston Eight Hour League, the successor of the Massachusetts Grand Eight Hour League, had been established as late as 1869,[13] it was the intensified agitation in New York that first brought the subject to the attention of the Boston journalist in 1872. In countering labor's demand on this point, O'Reilly relied on stock arguments, remarking that the workmen must first be educated in the proper use of leisure time. He also added that the agitation for an eight-hour day would be unfair to those workmen who were willing and anxious to work longer hours. "Tyranny this seems to be certainly," he declared, for "if a man is not at liberty to work as long and as hard as he pleases, he is a bondman, and the end of a struggle conducted on such grounds may be safely predicted."[14] Moreover, O'Reilly insisted on the prime requisite of the workingman's freedom when deciding his hours and wages, and to his mind trade unions had no authority to interfere. So when he declared that a successful agitation of the eight-hour movement would tend to reduce all men to the same improvident level, it was scarcely very helpful to the class O'Reilly sought most to assist. "It is the workingman's right to sell his labor as high or as low as he pleases," he said, "since laborers must not apply to each other the compulsion they would deem tyranny if applied to themselves by an employer."[15]

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11 *Pilot*, June 1, 1872.

12 *Ibid.*, August 17, 1878; February 19, 1887. Similar ideas were expressed by Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum novarum*, par. 26, and by Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, par. 136. References to the encyclicals are to the edition of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1942.

13 Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 140.

14 *Pilot*, April 12, 1873; June 8, 1872; June 22, 1872.

15 *Ibid.*, June 20, 1874; April 14, 1873.

As conservative as this doctrine may sound, it was a commonly accepted policy in 1874. Richard Gilmour, Bishop of Cleveland, was of a similar mind with O'Reilly and in his lenten pastoral of 1879 remarked that united with a man's right to join a union was his right to sell his labor. Where labor unions sin, he added, was in their attempt to coerce men to affiliate with the unions, or when they tried to force laborers to work for the price fixed by them. A union, he admitted, had the right to adjust wage scales at which its members would work, but no union had the right to force a man to sell his labor for the price determined by it.[16]

O'Reilly, meanwhile, had emphasized the fundamental principle of a subsistence wage. Acknowledging the rights of both employer and employee, he admonished the latter not to demand exorbitant wages. Yet if an employer cared not whether the remunerations supported an employee and his family, then he was acting unlawfully and in an inhuman manner.[17] But in justice to the employer, O'Reilly insisted that due consideration must be given to the value of money and brains, the employer's chief investment, along with a fair determination of the market price of the product, before any wage demand should be proposed. The profit that remained, he concluded, was to be divided between the employer and his employees. A settlement founded on these principles would be fair, he remarked, but all restrictive agreements or combinations of either capital or labor would be, in his mind, unjust.[18]

Industrial society being constituted as it was, O'Reilly's proposals were viewed as entirely too idealistic. Thus, as a counter measure to insure the success of his policy, O'Reilly advocated the establishment of boards of arbitration, either public or private, to determine where the employer's profits should terminate and the workingman's wages commence, and to make a fair adjustment of the profits between the two.[19] In emphasizing the need for arbitration O'Reilly did not distinguish clearly the principles embodied in the modern terms of collective bargaining, arbitration, mediation and investigation. When he used the specialized term, arbitration,

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16 "Lenten Pastoral," March 12, 1879. Archives of the Diocese of Cleveland. James O'Connor (Vicar Apostolic of Nebraska), writing in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, (July, 1883), stated that everyone has a right to hire his labor on any terms satisfactory to himself and no one can deprive him of it. Pope Leo XIII expressed similar views, but insisted that underlying such agreements there must be an element of natural justice; *Rerum novarum*, par. 63.

17 *Pilot*, August 4, 1877; *Rerum novarum*, par. 63; *Quadragesimo* par. 71.

18 *Pilot*, August 18, 1877; *Rerum novarum*, par. 28.

19 *Pilot*, January 16, 1875; June 19, 1875; November 2, 1878.

therefore, he frequently embraced the notions connoted by the other terms also. O'Reilly, of course, was not an exception, for the terms themselves were not clearly defined nor much used in his era.

In the capital-labor disputes over wages O'Reilly declared that labor had a title to a fair profit ensuing from the application of labor to raw materials, not to the mere pittance then awarded the workingman to keep him in bread and shelter.[20]

Whereas the Boston editor's principal emphasis for a remedy to the labor-management problem was arbitration, labor itself preferred a form of unilateral action, the strike. This form of retaliation was emphatically denounced by O'Reilly, and he advised workingmen that if they reflected on their own position they would realize that protecting their interests in such a foolish manner would be suicidal.[21] But O'Reilly's opposition was of little account, since strikes played an increasingly prominent role in the industrial strife of the 1870's and 1880's. In fact, during the latter decade they became a deadly instrument, enhancing the power of the labor movement but also proving to be the rock on which the Knights of Labor were destined to founder.

The leader of the Knights, Terence Powderly, was as opposed to strikes as O'Reilly professed to be, yet during this era of upheaval both men were compelled to retreat from their idealistic positions and to countenance the strike as a method of retaliation at the same time that they expressed hostility to it. Having pleaded with the workingmen to refrain from membership in trade unions which generated strikes, O'Reilly added that strikes could effectuate no permanent settlement since they relied on brute force, while peace could be restored by Christian principles and common sense.[22] This negative approach did not, however, entirely preoccupy the editor of the *Pilot,* for he also propounded a positive doctrine on the question of industrial strife. "Instead of a strike," he once remarked, "let the dissatisfied workmen start a shop or a store of their own, and meet the masters on their own ground by becoming masters themselves."[23] By co-operative shops the united labor force could, he thought, build up valuable stocks, the profits from which could be divided among the men, and thus by co-operative

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[20] *Ibid.*, January 1, 1872.

[21] *Ibid.*, March 15, 1873; June 1, 1872; June 22, 1872; May 10, 1873; November 21, 1874.

[22] *Ibid.*, November 21, 1874; April 11, 1874; May 10, 1873; December 19, 1874; May 29, 1875.

[23] *Ibid.*, May 10, 1873; April 11, 1874.

stores, clothing, provisions, and the like could be purchased and all profits divided among the shareholders.[24]

O'Reilly's ideas on co-operatives were neither new nor radical, since for a decade or more they had found place in American society. However, the stimulus that he gave to the co-operative program was so much in accord with the later action of the Knights of Labor that it deserves consideration. Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Foster's Crossing, Ohio, were only two of the sites demonstrating comparatively successful co-operatives in the years following the Civil War; similar attempts were made by practically all the trades in the following decades.[25] With Powderly's endorsement the Knights established many co-operatives in the early 1880's, but they generally failed, for they were unable to compete with private enterprise, nor could they secure the capital funds necessary for the expansion of their programs or the efficient management to run them.[26] Sensing, as he probably did, these disadvantages, in addition to the more universal obstacles such as the limitless opportunities which bred a spirit of individualism in America, the mixed populations with their varying backgrounds, customs and languages impairing unity,[27] O'Reilly did not press his program in the 1880's, but contented himself with remedies for purifying the social order rather than changing it.

While giving publicity to the co-operative movement, however, O'Reilly retained his enthusiasm for the principle of arbitration as he understood it. As early as January 1875, he had maintained that a straightforward interview between the representatives of the employer and the employees over a disputed wage would be beneficial to both parties. But the employer must first be questioned by the workers' representatives as to whether he could increase wages; if his answer was affirmative, then he was morally obliged to do so. If, on the other hand, he desired to reduce wages, he should be asked whether the move was necessary. Again, said O'Reilly, should the answer be affirmative, the workers had no alternative but to accept the decision.[28] To the Boston editor these proposals were more than expressions of Christian charity and justice; they were the measures designed to counteract the flagrant

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24 *Ibid.*, September 14, 1878.
25 Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 110 ff, and Dulles, *Labor in America* 108 ff.
26 *Ibid.*, 136-137, 109.
27 James P. Warbasse, *Cooperative Democracy*, New York, 1936, 56-58.
28 *Pilot*, June 19, 1875; January 2, 1875. Cf. *Quadragesimo anno*, pars. 71-75.

disregard of labor's rights induced by haughty capitalists' refusal to concede the right of bargaining to the workers and their arbitrary establishment of the working conditions in industry. But O'Reilly inserted the provision that adamant refusals on the part of the employers to arbitrate demonstrated bad will and justified a strike, although it was a decision that he approached only after long consideration. He liked to envision labor, several hundred thousand men of all trades, united in one national organization, exerting their influence on public opinion and demanding arbitration even when management hesitated.[29] He ignored the fact that labor could have been the culprit in refusing this solution.

Since voluntary arbitration was subjected to the whims of human nature, O'Reilly would apply the remedy of compulsory arbitration, whereby the disputants would either submit to this process or take their case to a court of equity, where a binding decision would be rendered. He approved Carl Schurz's program of February, 1884, publicized in the *North American Review,* which advanced the notion of a state-appointed board of arbitration, and he added to the Schurz remarks that any system of arbitration that would tend "to bring about a fair settlement of respective claims of labor and capital to the combined fruits of both" would be a blessing to both. On another occasion he suggested that the boards should be selected by the parties involved in the altercation, each choosing a representative and together agreeing on a third member. Under these circumstances the decision of the tribunal would, he felt, be as impartial as any court might be expected to be. In a final note, however, he declared that he was opposed to permanent, salaried officials as arbitrators, especially if they were politicians.[30] These ideas of the Boston editor were not radical but striking and so his observations on labor marked him as a progressive among social commentators, especially among his Catholic contemporaries.

American Catholic writers in general had paid little heed to the arbitral process until the mid-1880's,[31] even though the labor movement in the United States was vitally interested in such remedies. At the convention of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada held in Pittsburgh in November, 1881, W. H. Foster had spoken in favor of a national law to legalize arbitration, that is, a requirement to sub-

29 *Pilot,* September 25, 1875; October 2, 1875; June 28, 1879.
30 *Ibid.,* October 2, 1875; August 4, 1877; November 2, 1878; February 2, 1884; May 1, 1886.
31 Abell, "*Catholic Factor in Urban Welfare,*" *loc. cit.,* 385 ff.

mit a question to arbitration or to meet on the same level before an impartial tribunal. It was not meant to be a compulsory law but, as Foster said,

> merely compulsory dealing with the union, or compulsory investigation by an impartial body, both parties to remain free to accept the reward, provided, however, 'that once they do agree the agreement shall remain in force for a fixed period.'[32]

O'Reilly, of course, went beyond this provision when he proposed that the decisions of a court of equity should be binding on the disputants. The Pittsburgh declaration, however, was a notable shifting of labor's aspirations from the co-opertaive notion of the 1860's to collective bargaining and arbitration, a shift that has been characterized as denoting "a fundamental change in the aim of the labor movement—from idealistic striving for self employment to opportunistic trade unionism."[33]

Meanwhile O'Reilly's idealism, undermined by the vicissitudes of the industrial order which forced him to retreat from a position of hostility to forbearance of strikes, shifted with the same winds that carried the American labor movement into the hurricane of strikes which beset the 1880's. With Powderly, the Boston editor still protested his fear of and opposition to strikes, even when he came to accept them as a necessary means of the workers' protection and an instrument for good when properly managed. In the face of the current unrest he concluded that the labor question would be settled only when all who worked for wages understood that a variety of trades did not make a variety of interests, and when they remembered that the wage-earning body was one class and one family. Should one segment of labor be oppressed, the other of necessity was obliged to cry out until the trouble was rectified by arbitration.[34] But it was just this failure to combine and to cement the relations of the variety of trades, embracing both skilled and unskilled workers, that spelled doom for the national labor union envisaged by O'Reilly, and paved the way for the American Federation of Labor.

Not content to propose remedial measures solely for the labor-management crisis, the editor of the *Pilot* also concentrated on one

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32 Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 325-326.

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Pilot*, September 7, 1889; June 28, 1879; February 28, 1880. Powderly asked Gibbons to use his influence to abolish or reduce to a minimum the strikes that were paralyzing labor and industry, and he expressed his desire to further the process of arbitration. Baltimore, July 9, 1887. Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.

of the major root causes—the glutted labor market. One of his proposed remedies, which was strongly influenced by his concern for the Irish immigrant and the attention of ecclesiastical authorities to the overcrowded conditions of the cities, was his advocacy of westward migration to relieve the pressure on the labor market in the industrial centers. Years before Frederick Jackson Turner had incorporated the safety valve theory into his study of the American frontier, O'Reilly had, as early as 1878, made this part of his platform, without, of course, using the same terminology. The Boston editor realized that too many were dependent on trade and manufacturing, and he insisted that immediate return to the soil was imperative. "The earth is the true mother of national wealth and popular comfort," he once remarked; and on another occasion he declared "all wealth lies in the *crust of the earth.*" He concluded that wages were low because of the surplus of labor, and prices were high because of underproduction. Building homes in the west, therefore, would alleviate both problems, and would also gain a certain measure of independence for the workingman.[35] O'Reilly's solution was too simple, for there were innumerable other factors which he failed to consider. Still, his proposal merited attention, and within a year the Irish Catholic Colonization Society was established to encourage and support the kind of colonization on the frontier that he and others had advocated.

In all this O'Reilly did not overlook the all-important channel for social advancement—legislation. Sagacious lawmakers, he insisted, could initiate legislation to stifle the growth of social evils and to insure the protection of satisfactory wage scales for the laborer, by determining the market point at which profits should cease and wages begin. But in pursuit of this goal O'Reilly would not endorse labor's incursion into politics by means of a labor party, for such, he held, would be a 'nuisance and an injury," but effective measures could be accomplished by an enlightened public opinion influencing legislation.[36] It was the same attitude that was

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35 *Pilot,* April 27, 1878; August 31, 1878; September 14, 1878. Pope Leo XIII expressed similar views in *Rerum novarum,* par. 66.

36 *Pilot,* January 16, 1875; August 11, 1875; July 16, 1878. In December, 1886, O'Reilly favored labor's supporting Hugh O'Brien for Mayor of Boston on the Democratic ticket. Cf. Dulles, *Labor in America,* p. 147; *Pilot,* August 10, 1878. O'Reilly also suggested a measure to curb chronic unemployment that savored of "pump-priming." He felt that since nearly every city in New England had projects that needed attention, they should hire some of the excess labor. "Labor is cheap and men are plentiful," he said, and "if they are not employed at profitable labor they will have to be supported as paupers." *Pilot,* September 4, 1875; December 18, 1875.

taken by Powderly, and later by Samuel Gompers, both of whom refused to support a labor party, conceiving instead that labor's gains could best be accomplished through the existing parties.

During this era many forms of agitation had taken root, and were nourished by chronic unemployment and industrial strife. Some of these, to be sure, were legitimate enough; others, more radical in tone, like Communism and Socialism, cloaked their tenets in verbiage that frequently deceived the casual reformer or parties interested in social betterment. These two "isms," occupying the center of the stage, had long before been condemned by the Catholic Church, and O'Reilly, too, had inveighed against them. He could not subscribe to the irreligious aspects of Communism and Socialism, nor to their belief in the abolition of private property and their levelling of the various classes of society.

With regard to the class struggle, O'Reilly was quick to admit the existence of the fundamental distinctions in society; distinctions he preferred to term them rather than classes, since, to his mind, the latter implied the European class system, which he emphatically denounced. O'Reilly acknowledged that there had to be the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," as well as leaders and governors, since God had so constituted society and it could not be otherwise. Any other theory, he maintained, was calculated to disturb the existing social order and to introduce discord and confusion where God had intended harmony and peace. He castigated as well any social theory that propagated a system which would ignore the old Christian traditions and aim at establishing a utopian condition of social equality where, as he said, "all shall be proprietors and the degradation of the laborer receiving wages would be abolished."[37] In defense of his position on socialism he wrote a scathing rebuke of the continental radical Johann Joseph Most, calling him a wretch and an apostle of greed and robbery. "It never struck this man," he said, "that bankers and capitalists have at least as much right to exist as workmen." The radical Most had no idea that the thing needed to improve the social system was not brute force, but a sense of "Christian brotherhood, equity, fair play." O'Reilly concluded: "The word 'socialism' which ought to stand for the noblest philosophy, is a hissing and an abomination in the ears of men, because of such moral and intellectual monsters as Herr Most."[38]

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37 *Ibid.*, November 18, 1871.
38 *Ibid.*, January 20, 1883.

That socialism could mean something noble was not an uncommon notion, for under different conditions of time and place, and of social and religious influences, O'Reilly and others freely interchanged the term in expressing several confused ideas.[39] Socialism, favorably understood, meant social legislation by which the state would intervene to protect the workers from the encroachments of relentless and ambitious capitalists. Such intervention in behalf of the common good was strictly in accord with Catholic teaching and had received the endorsement of theologians. It was, in fact, an idea to which Leo XIII gave special emphasis in his famous labor encyclical.[40] O'Reilly had anticipated the papal confirmation on this point when he declared in 1883:

> Socialism is the great problem of the present and future: how to raise humanity to a higher and more equitable civilization. To this world movement there is only one safe guide—the Catholic Church, the spiritual test, for the revolution must be spiritual as well as intellectual. Socialism is the hope of the People. How deep the crime of those who have made the word synonymous with Atheism and disorder. The shallow reasoners of Europe who have dissociated Socialism and Religion have committed an almost unpardonable sin. With the deepest equities underlying the social order, the Catholic Church must always be in the deepest sympathy.[41]

Socialism as the "hope of the People," was interpreted by O'Reilly as a dependence on a law of equity deeply embedded in the divine law and proclaimed by the Catholic Church. This, he felt, would restore Christian brotherhood, by which all men would endeavor to resolve the inequalities and injustices in the social order. To the Boston editor, charity on the part of the rich, the gospel of wealth, as some were to preach, was insufficient to cure the social ills that were yearly growing worse, for disorder could be cured only by a larger equity. The principle of equity had far-reaching results, for by it one could countenance the state's social legislation, and moderate state intervention to curb social disorder.

The type of socialism that O'Reilly refused to endorse was a conglomeration of several hazy notions embracing many of the

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39 John Lancaster Spalding, Bishop of Peoria, noted the confusion concerning the meaning of the term "socialism" when he remarked "the word Socialism . . . stands rather for a tendency than for a definite body of principles and methods, and this tendency is one of which men of very different and even opposite opinions approve: and a Socialist may be a theist or an atheist, a spiritualist or a materialist, a Christian or an agnostic. The general implication is the need of greater equality in the condition of human beings. The aim, therefore, is to bring about a social arrangement in which all will receive a fair share of the good things of life. . . ." *Socialism and Labor*, Chicago, 1902, 6-7.

40 *Rerum novarum*, pars. 52-56.

41 *Pilot*, December 15, 1883.

irreligious aspects of contemporary writers, abolition of the classes, investiture of the government with the means of production, abolition of private property, and similar tenets identified from time to time with socialism. He had no use for Communists and Socialists as such, characterizing them as fools and dreamers, since to his mind they "deliberately cut themselves away from and preach the destruction of all that is stable and respectable in humanity." In his criticism of these "isms" he always returned to Catholic doctrine, which he considered the principal support for the preservation of the social order, and he always insisted that it was the duty of Catholic workers to guard the country from misfortune. "There is no change for the better," he remarked, "which cannot be carried out under the Constitution and sanctioned by our religion."[42]

As much as O'Reilly railed against Marxism, he acknowledged that the author of *Das Kapital* had made some pointed observations regarding the abuses in the capitalistic system. He remarked that in all the theories of reform spreading over 300 years between Sir Thomas More and Marx, "no socialist reasoned closer than this cold and dispassionate, 'man of earthquakes'." Yet to O'Reilly the remedies which the father of modern Communism proposed fell drastically short, because he had appealed solely to "the rational and material part of mankind." Marx had tried to reason out a social life and that "regardless of spiritual influences, making provisions by law for all the improvements that are needed. He ignores the spiritual life in man and communities." He further noted that all the theorists from More to Marx had begun their utopias by abolishing private property as the source of inequality and the deepest error and danger to human society. The editor of the *Pilot,* strongly opposed to any tampering with the rights of private property, concluded that

> So long as misery and poverty exist, so long will man speculate and devise for their removal. It is wiser to listen to the proposals even of dreamers than to try to put them down by brute force. There may be a grain of wheat hidden in the chaff of even the wildest theorists. There is only one thing that can stop them: the satisfaction and contentment of the people.[43]

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[42] *Ibid.*, November 9, 1878; February 19, 1887.

[43] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1883. O'Reilly demanded that the current industrial scene be viewed objectively, showing the advantages of the capitalistic system; if this were done there would be no need for socialism. He admitted, however, that ruthless oppression of the worker, expansive living on the part of the rich in the face of the starving masses, and similar injustices could be seeds for communism. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1870; also July 19, 1879.

While O'Reilly condemned Marxism, he showed a certain tolerance for Marx the reformer. He always regarded social reformers with deference, not for the remedies they proposed, but for their serious consideration of social abuses and for their benevolent interest in alleviating human misery. For this reason he had a deep respect for Henry George when the latter first gained prominence, in 1879, with his *Progress and Poverty,* even though O'Reilly did not accept all of George's principles. Not only did he inveigh against the single tax and the reformer's scheme of nationalization of the land, but when George went to Ireland and endeavored to inaugurate his program there O'Reilly rebuked him fiercely, especially after Michael Davitt's head had been turned toward nationalization and away from the Parnell movement.[44]

The Boston editor wavered in his support of the single taxers when the Reverend Edward McGlynn, pastor of St. Stephen's Church in New York, an apostle of social reform, came out in support of George and his theories, and endorsed his campaign for mayor in the face of the explicit command to the contrary of his superior, Archbishop Michael A. Corrigan. O'Reilly could brook no insubordination among the clergy toward their superiors, and he felt that the George movement had been responsible for McGlynn's disobedience.[45]

O'Reilly's initially responsive attitude toward George was extended, in large measure, to Edward Bellamy, when the latter published *Looking Backward* in 1888. The editor of the *Pilot* acknowledged that it was a fascinating story, and a wonderful attempt at the solution of the great social problem of humanity. But O'Reilly would not commend its political principles which, he felt, embodied the idea of paternalism run mad. He acknowledged, however, that the book represented the idea of cooperation.[46]

The political principles which the editor endorsed and acknowl-

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44 *Ibid.*, February 2, 1884.

45 Prior to the New York election of 1886, O'Reilly declared that George's victory would have advantages for the old parties, by showing them that men and principles were higher and stronger than organization. He also felt that George might not be able to institute any of his equitable social principles; he added, nonetheless, that "his election would be a gain for fair play and true democracy." *Pilot,* October 9, 1886.

46 *Ibid.*, April 7, 1888. On June 8, 1889, O'Reilly welcomed the appearance of the magazine of the Nationalist Society of Boston, an organization which aimed at reformation of the social order along lines indicated by Bellamy. "While the methods of reform advocated by the Nationalists," he said, "may be criticized as savoring too strongly of paternalism, their purpose is deserving of all praise, and if the reformers be able to correct even a few of the many evils of the present social system they will have done well. . . ."

edged publicly time and time again were those of "democracy as formulated by Jefferson." To O'Reilly this meant that every atom of paternal power not needed for what he termed the "safety of the Union and the intercourse of the population" should be removed from the federal government and be carefully guarded by the states. It also meant an inherent dislike for any "sumptuary and impertinent laws," for he declared that law should only be drawn at disorder, and that all affairs manageable without disorder should be managed without law. Finally, it meant watchfulness against federal legislation on such questions "as education, temperance, irrigation and all other questions that may arise and are sure to arise in the future."[47]

Reluctant as he was to invest the federal government with excessive powers when other solutions were at hand, O'Reilly was forced by the unpalatable facts of daily life to retreat from this idealistic position. Monopolies such as those in coal and railroads, and management's indiscriminate use of hired thugs or ruffians, had subverted the peace and tranquility of society and, as might have been suspected, were condemned by the Boston editor. In the absence of forbearance and charity toward the worker, O'Reilly reluctantly sanctioned governmental intervention for the protection of the people. As early as 1879 he had perceived the advantages that might be gained from governmental control of the railroads. A year later he emphasized this again, when he declared that he did not favor an increase in the powers of the general government where the public good did not absolutely demand it. Yet he concluded that "the need of some action to make the railway autocrats understand that they are the servants, not masters, of the people, grows more urgent every day."[48]

Throughout this discussion he adhered to his original principle that it was better for the people to be governed lightly than strongly. Some powers, however, such as that of the postal authority, he felt, should reside in the central government. And the only reason he would consider the concentration of the telegraph in governmental hands was the fact that men would then be liberated from the insolence of the corporations, which were more of a menace to freedom than the government. In the face of the ill treatment of their miners by the Pennsylvania coal operators, O'Reilly, in a

47 *Ibid.*, May 31, 1890.

48 *Ibid.*, January 15, 1880; January 18, 1879; April 17, 1886; October 23, 1886; October 30, 1886; February 5, 1887; January 7, 1888; July 28, 1888.

mood of disgust and disappointment, even entertained the idea of nationalizing the mines, although he knew that critics would say that such a proposal savored of paternalism. "Well, paternalism is better than intolerable and irresponsible tyranny," he declared, "and there seems to be no other alternative." He also castigated the "rapacity of the insolent highway robbers who control the total supply of a prime necessary of life."[49]

O'Reilly, indeed, was in fear of trusts and monopolies, for to him the former was socialism under another name. If a trust could gain control over production, he asked, why could not government? He looked for free and fair competition, a good American doctrine, as he said, but if monopolies continued to nullify this doctrine and could not be circumvented in an amicable manner then the private trust "must give way to private co-operation." Paternalism in government was evil, he admitted, "but a greater evil is government by greedy or corrupt speculators for the benefit of insatiable monopoly."[50]

As editor of the *Pilot* O'Reilly surveyed the current American scene in all its aspects and prodded public officials to counteract social abuses. Most of his proposed remedies were inspired by specific events, chiefly in Boston and its vicinity. Such was his advocacy of a reform program to curb some of the abuses in the city's hospitals; re-organization of the municipal charitable institutions; publicizing the Tewkesbury Almshouse scandal exposed by Ben Butler and others in 1883; his plea for the protection of women workers; and similar manifestations of concern for the interests of the poor, orphans and invalids. He also discussed at length such topics as civil rights, woman's suffrage—of which he was a vigorous opponent—prison reform, alcholism and the universal brotherhood of man.

In retrospect the Boston editor seemed, perhaps, every inch the revolutionary, but at heart he was really a reconstructionist. George Parsons Lathrop once remarked of him, "I have never known anyone who showed such deep and searching and wide interest in the welfare, comfort and progress of the whole human race."[51] According to Lathrop, O'Reilly possessed an almost infinite compassion for the suffering of mankind, and an

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49 *Ibid.*, January 28, 1888; May 15, 1880; September 1, 1883.
50 *Ibid.*, August 11, 1888.
51 Lathrop to Editor of the *Critic*, New London, August 11, 1890. Quoted in the *Critic* XIV (August 16, 1890), 83.

unlimited fund of hope for the alleviation of those sufferings. Sometimes, however, he uttered terrible theories looking toward the destruction of human society as it now exists. These theories were only a sort of rendrock, intended merely to blow up the granite walls of inert prejudices, and make an opening for broader paths of progress and enlightment; but they caused him to be misunderstood.[52]

As he advised others, so O'Reilly himself put his ear to the rich earth, listening, as it were, to the blood stream of humanity, and learning where it was trying to flow, and what and where were its barriers.[53] He developed a deeper understanding of mankind, which enabled him to inculcate principles of charity and justice in the daily lives of his contemporaries.

In many respects, O'Reilly the social commentator was in advance of his time. He never became, however, the center of a social reform movement nor a part of the *avant garde* through vigorous political action. And here his advice to Henry George—that the duty of the reformer is to teach, not to do—was his guiding principle. Furthermore, he insisted that social reformers should never meddle in politics, for, as he said, politics was the service of the social conditions as they were, whereas the reformer had to do with social conditions as they ought to be. To O'Reilly, reform was not achieved by power from above, but rather by pressure from below. When the masses had learned what the reformer had taught, they would act.[54]

For several years prior to his death he had been engaged in writing a work on social philosophy which was to have given expression to his theories, a work said to have resembled in some respect Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* and Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward.*[55] The idealistic overtones of these two works

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52 *Ibid.*

53 O'Reilly to a friend [J.] *Atlantic Monthly* LXVI (October, 1890), 572-574.

54 *Pilot*, September 14, 1889.

55 An unidentified newspaper clipping announced that O'Reilly would soon bring out a book entitled, *The Country With a Roof.* "Somebody who ought to know," the reporter said, "tells me that the book is made-up of epigrams which tersely express some of Mr. O'Reilly's rather radical views on social questions. *The Country With a Roof* is, I am told, the wide world as it wags and is governed today. All the common people who have to struggle and toil for their daily bread are assembled on the roof, and the privileged few are sheltered beneath the roof, feasting on the comfort and luxuries that can only be had with wealth, all unmindful of the sufferings of their fellow beings who are shivering over their heads. But as time goes on and the rich grow richer, and the poor poorer, the crowd of people on the roof become so large that the rafters go down with a crash. Then what become of the privileged few underneath? This is the problem O'Reilly is supposed to solve." Boston College Irish Collection: O'Reilly Scrapbook.

must have appealed to O'Reilly, for as an idealist he firmly believed that

> sometime in the future mankind will have a social order based on justice and not on expediency, in which the spiritual virtues of generosity, mercy, kindness, truth, and sacrifice shall be as publicly respected as the intellectual virtues of shrewdness, selfishness, thrift, ambition, and boldness.[56]

Yet because of the seeming hopelessness of the conflict between a generous idealism for the good of humanity and the selfish indifference which controls so many men, O'Reilly died in many ways a sadly disillusioned man. There was a grain of truth in Lathrop's remark that his end came not from the failure of the heart, but from the failure of society.[57]

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56 O'Reilly to Editor of the *Boston Post*, n.d. Boston College Irish Collection: O'Reilly Scrapbook.

57 *Critic*, XIV (August 16, 1890).

A Note on the Muckrakers

The story of the Muckrakers is familiar to all students of American history and is included in almost all standard American history texts. These accounts discuss the need for reform, the rise of the popular magazines, and mention the more prominent names--Steffens, Tarbell, Baker, Phillips, Lawson, and Hendrick. All accounts generally agree that the movement was short-lived; and that by 1910 muckraking had declined, and by that date most of the magazines which specialized in this literature of exposure had either turned to new subjects or had ceased publication. In discussing the reasons for the rise and the rapid decline of this movement, the authors advance similar explanations and draw similar conclusions.

The writers all lay stress on the care, thoroughness, and documentation that the publishers demanded in order to make each article accurate and trustworthy. One notes that "S. S. McClure, probably the most able and energetic of the publishers, set a good example for the rest by encouraging his writers to do the most pains-taking research before they burst into print." Another declares that "McClure imposed only two standards—accuracy and readability." A third says that "fearing legal reprisals, the Muckraking magazines went to great pains and expense to check their materials—paying as much as $3,000 to verify a single Tarbell article. None of the publishers ever suffered an adverse judgment in a major libel suit." Yet another concluded that "the muckraking followed the method of pitiless exposure supported only by the facts. None of the authors, or publishers for whom they wrote, lost a single important libel suit."[1]

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[1] The general histories, monographs, and texts examined include Thomas A. Bailey, *The American Pageant,* Boston, 1956; Leland D. Baldwin, *The Stream of American History,* Vol. II, New York, 1952; Louis Filler, *Crusaders for American Liberalism,* Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1939; Wesley M. Gewehr and Others, *American Civilization,* New York, 1957; John D. Hicks, *The American Nation,* New York, 1955; Richard Hofstadter and Others, *The United States,* New York, 1957; Arthur S. Link, *American Epoch,* New York, 1955; Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic,* vol. II, New York, 1950; Cornelius Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers,* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1932; Robert E. Riegel and David F. Long, *The American Story,* New York, 1955; T. Harry Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, *A History of the United States Since 1865,* New York, 1959; and George Harmon Knoles, *The United States, A History Since 1896,* New York, 1959.

These conclusions leave a somewhat inaccurate impression. There was at least one libel suit that cost a major muckraking periodical dearly. It involved a leading publisher, S. S. McClure, a leading magazine, *McClure's,* and one of the more prominent journalists, Ray Stannard Baker. The article concerned was one of the most quoted exposés of the entire movement: Baker's "The Railroads on Trial." Evidently many writers have overlooked this case which perhaps had more far-reaching effects than previously thought.[2] Its significant facts are as follows.[3]

In 1905, Baker was pursuing material in the Chicago area for his railroad article, concentrating chiefly on the activities of the great meat packers, the Armour-Swift-Morris combine. In a conversation with Wisconsin Governor Robert M. La Follette, "Fighting Bob" told Baker that a Milwaukee industrialist, one Emanuel L. Philipp, might well serve as an additional example of a rebater in his forthcoming article. La Follette recalled a report given him the previous year by railroad commissioner John W. Thomas which had linked Philipp with a number of rebate payments made by the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad to a refrigerator car company. The governor provided Baker with a copy of the report and commented that he had used some of the material in his campaign speeches in the fall of 1904.

Without consulting Philipp or checking the story at all in Milwaukee, Baker incorporated the charges in his article under the subheading of "Rebates to Milwaukee Brewers," and even included an imaginary conversation to illustrate how Philipp solicited his rebates. The reference to Philipp and his Union Refrigerator Transit Company occupied less than one page of the article and sought to provide, as Baker explained, a "peculiarly effective illustration of the rebating technique."[4]

Unfortunately for McClure and Baker, the journalist had been guilty of carelessness in his investigation and an utter confusion

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[2] Of all the secondary accounts consulted, only Regier gives any indication that he was aware of the Philipp-McClure Case. He quotes John S. Phillips (one of McClure's editors) as saying "So thorough was the work then, that, although we dealt with libelous materials all the time, there was only one suit for libel sustained against the magazine, and this suit was successful simply because a document on which an article was based turned out to be inaccurate." Regier makes no further comment or explanation concerning the case. See Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers,* 211.

[3] For a full account of this case, its background and ramifications, see Robert S. Maxwell, *Emanuel L. Philipp: Wisconsin Stalwart,* Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin Press, 1959.

[4] Ray Stannard Baker, "The Railroads on Trial," *McClure's Magazine,* 26 (January, 1906), 326.

regarding several refrigerator car companies. The vouchers of the C. M. & St. P. R. R. concerned payments not to Philipp's Union Refrigerator Transit Company but to the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company which was almost wholly owned by one of the family who also owned the Schlitz Brewing Company. In fact, the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Wisconsin was not organized until some months after these transactions had taken place. Its predecessor company, the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Kentucky, was in the car leasing business and leased refrigerator cars to a number of companies including the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company. Philipp, a rising entrepreneur with many activities, was the salaried president of the Kentucky company, the manager of a Pabst-Schlitz lumbering enterprise in Mississippi, and an employee of the parent Schlitz company in Milwaukee. He was listed as a vice-president of the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company, but held only one share of stock, was paid no salary, and had no duties except of a routine clerical nature. The profits and rebates, if any, had all gone to the owner. All of this had transpired prior to the passage of the Elkins Act, February, 1903. In August of that year, Philipp had severed all connection with the Schlitz interests, organized his own refrigerator car company, and purchased the cars of the Kentucky company, which became inoperative. Ironically, Philipp had been active during 1904 and 1905 in prodding the United States Attorney-General to take stronger action under the Elkins Act against certain companies whose continuing rebate practices were creating an unfair discrimination against him and his young company.

Upon reading the article, Philipp at once protested to both McClure and Baker, demanding a retraction and an apology. He also discussed the libel laws of New York with his attorneys with a view toward a possible suit should the magazine refuse to make a proper explanation. At Philipp's insistence, Commissioner Thomas rechecked his report of 1904, and, after having the nature and relationship of the several companies made clear to him, revised his report and affirmed that neither Philipp nor the Union Refrigerator Transit Company was involved in rebating.

Baker soon made a return trip to Wisconsin and this time called on Philipp. There the industrialist spent a long day with the reporter going over the history of his refrigerator car company and the nature of its business. He offered to allow Baker to examine the company's books in detail and urged Baker to visit Chicago and go over the C. M. & St. P. R. R. records and to visit St. Louis

where he could see the books of the old Kentucky company. Baker declined all these offers, expressing his satisfaction that he now had the complete story and indicated that a suitable apology would be forthcoming, based on his conversation with Philipp and the revised report of the Wisconsin railroad commissioner.[5]

Evidently Baker was unconvinced. To him, the various refrigerator car companies seemed to have been made deliberately confusing—"veritable wheels within wheels." He was certain that his accusation was substantially true, even though it might be technically inaccurate. In his "explanation" which appeared in the April, 1906, issue of *McClure's,* Baker in effect said that he had been wrong when he said that Philipp had accepted rebates with his right hand. He should have said that he had accepted them with his left hand. He acknowledged that there was no evidence linking the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Wisconsin with rebate payments, but he stressed Philipp's position as vice-president of the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company at the same time he was president of the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Kentucky. In short, Baker deliberately invited a libel suit, certain that his charges could be substantiated. Actually, he was confident that Philipp would not dare to sue.

Philip at once advised his attorneys to proceed with the suit and wrote Baker that he regarded his corrections and explanations "just as libelous as the original article." The case, heard in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York, did not come to trial until March, 1908. Philipp brought with him voluminous records from his refrigerator car company and from the railroads involved. In the testimony, he proved to be an excellent witness, explaining the activities of his companies clearly and reviewing his efforts to prod the Attorney-General into more vigorous enforcement of the Elkins Act. Regarding Baker, Philipp insisted that the reporter had set out to write a sensational article that would aid La Follette. It was deliberately biased and inspired by malice. Baker, Philipp concluded, did not want to learn the truth.[6]

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5 In the course of their conversation, Baker queried Philipp concerning his reaction to these charges when La Follette had first made them during the 1904 campaign. Philipp replied that "he thought" he had denounced and denied them at once in the press, but he was not sure. He had taken no further action because of the heated nature of the campaign and because the governor held no substantial property. Baker went away probably thinking that Philipp had not dared deny them then or sue La Follette. Philipp, however, had issued a denial which appeared in the *Milwaukee Sentinel,* November 6, 1904.

6 From the manuscript copy of the testimony in Philipp vs. S. S. McClure in the Emanuel L. Philipp papers in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

Baker and McClure, despite their best efforts, were unable to find additional evidence to bolster the charges, so they based their defense on Railroad Commissioner Thomas's report and the confusion of names in the several refrigerator car companies. But Baker's refusal to make more than token corrections in his second article evidently militated against him in the minds of the jurors and his scanty knowledge of the refrigerator car industry adversely impressed the court. After some two weeks of testimony and arguments, the jury, following a short deliberation, found for the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000. The case was at once appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals which, in May, 1909, affirmed the judgment with costs. This terminated the case.[7]

The McClure company promptly settled with Philipp's attorneys. The damages and costs totaled more than $18,800. In addition, McClure had to pay the very considerable costs of the unsuccessful defense efforts of his attorneys and the expenses of the last minute search for additional evidence. It is estimated that the case cost the defendants, apart from the costs of the original article and Baker's salary, between $35,000 and $40,000. All of this was paid by McClure.

The effects were devastating on *McClure's Magazine.* The leading specialists, Steffens, Baker, John Phillipps, and Tarbell had already left *McClure's* to publish the *American Magazine,* and McClure had begun to de-emphasize muckraking. After the Philipp case, he abandoned it completely.[8] The magazine encountered financial reverses, advertising dropped off, and shortly the control of *McClure's* passed to other hands. The history of other muckraking periodicals was similar. By 1910, most had turned from muckraking or were out of business.[9]

Yet, this case seems to have been completely ignored. Writers advance various other reasons and theories for the sudden decline of the muckrakers. One scholar is of the opinion that muckraking "turned into yellow journalism around 1906 . . . soon readers tired of the excitement . . . and by 1908, the entire movement was dis-

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7 *Milwaukee Sentinel,* March 28, 1908; *S. S. McClure* (plaintiff in error) vs. *E. L. Philipp* (defendant in error), *170 Fed. 910* (1909); *96 C. C. A. 86* (1909).

8 John M. Whitehead, Wisconsin attorney and politician, said that McClure stated after the trial that "muckraking was ended as far as he was concerned." See Whitehead to Ralph H. Gabriel, April 22, 1914, in the John M. Whitehead Papers, State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

9 Samuel S. McClure, *My Autobiography,* New York, 1914, 245; Filler, *Crusaders for American Liberalism,* 368-370.

credited." Another talks of bank pressures, foreclosure of loans, loss of advertisers, and "poor business methods" as the chief causes of the decline of muckraking. Yet another calls muckraking a sort of "fad." A fourth advances the hypothesis that "perhaps muckraking was stopped—magazines fell into the hands of their creditors." They agree that by 1910 American people were tired of it. None of these writers discusses the Philipp vs. McClure case as a cause for the decline of this literature of exposure. Nowhere is litigation or the threat of litigation advanced as a reason for the sudden loss in interest in muckraking.[10]

Baker in his autobiography, written years later, recalled the Philipp case with obvious lack of enthusiam. Even then, he was certain that he had been right but merely unable to prove his charges. Philipp's subsequent career in which he became a Republican leader, an intimate friend of President Taft, and a three-term governor of Wisconsin during the First World War, did nothing to change Baker's mind. Nowhere did he intimate that he had made a grievous error.[11]

In this particular case at least, one of the most widely publicized and most quoted muckraking articles, by one of the foremost muckrakers, was neither carefully written nor thoroughly documented. Nor was it, in this respect, accurate or trustworthy. The net effect of the article was to embarrass the author and to cause the publisher a serious financial reversal. This short note does not intend to do more than to suggest that this libel case against McClure hastened the decline of enthusiasm for muckraking. Perhaps there were still other cases that had similar results.

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[10] *Ibid.*, 370; Link, *American Epoch*, 76; Gewehr, *American Civilization*, 272-273; Regier, *Era of the Muckrakers*, 194-216.

[11] Ray Stannard Baker, *American Chronicle*, New York, 1945, 207-212. In his autobiography, McClure does not mention the Philipp case.

Documents

Some War Letters of the Bishop of Mobile, 1861-1865

The Catholic Church was the only major religious body in the United States which was not split into Northern and Southern divisions by the causes which led to the Civil War or by the war itself. Even with the outbreak of hostilities there was no official break and hence after the conflict was over there were no ties to be rebound and no apologies were necessary. This is not to say that the war did not disrupt or at least seriously impair the unity that had characterized the Church prior to the conflict.

The blockade of the Confederate ports of entry worked a hardship upon the Church in the South. Supplies of all types necessary for carrying on the services and functions of the church became scarce and some of the rites and ceremonies of the church had to be seriously curtailed. As the Federal forces occupied more and more of the Confederacy, communication between members of the hierarchy became extremely difficult and in some cases impossible. These and other problems raised and accentuated by the war are illustrated in the letters written by John Quinlan, Bishop of Mobile, to John Mary Odin, Archbishop of New Orleans.

John Quinlan, second Bishop of Mobile, was born at Cloyne, County Cork, Ireland, on October 19, 1826, and was educated in private schools near his native place.[1] In 1844 when he was eighteen he came to the United States and studied for the priesthood at Mt. St. Mary's of the West, Cincinnati, Ohio, and at Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland. On August 30, 1852, he was ordained by Archbishop John Purcell of Cincinnati, and assigned to missionary work at Piqua, Ohio. Two years later he became assistant pastor at St. Patrick's Church in Cincinnati and shortly thereafter was made the superior of Mt. St. Mary's of the

[1] This sketch of Quinlan is based upon the following: *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, 37 vols., New York, 1852-1951, XIII, 499-500; Charles G. Herbermann, *et al.*, editors, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 15 vols., New York, 1911, X, 411; Thomas M. Owens, *History of Alabama and Dictionary of Alabama Biography*, 4 vols., Chicago, 1921, IV, 1403; John H. O'Donnell, *The Catholic Hierarchy of the United States, 1790-1922*, Washington, 1922, 56-57.

West. On December 4, 1859, he was consecrated Bishop of Mobile by Archbishop Antoine Blanc of New Orleans in St. Louis Cathedral in that city.

It was a poor diocese indeed which Quinlan had been called to administer. The fourteen schools and twelve churches had only eight diocesan priests. Better to serve his people he soon made a trip to Ireland whence he brought eleven young candidates for the priesthood. He also introduced the Sisters of St. Joseph and the Sisters of Mercy into the Mobile Diocese. Later he invited the Benedictines from St. Vincent's Abbey, Pennsylvania, to settle at Cullman, Alabama.

Shortly after he assumed his new post, the Civil War broke out and added to the burdens which Quinlan already bore. Despite the difficulties of transportation imposed by the hostilities, he continued the annual visitation of his diocese, for only the bishop could administer the rite of confirmation. An ardent Confederate, Quinlan was mindful of the needs of those in military service and furnished chaplains from his small number of priests and supplied nuns for hospital work. Following the Battle of Shiloh, he, himself, hurried to the battleground on a special train and administered to the temporal and spiritual wants of the soldiers of both the North and South.

In spite of the handicaps which marked the early days of his long episcopate, Quinlan accomplished much. He built the portico of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Mobile and founded St. Patrick's and St. Mary's churches in that city. In addition he established churches in nine other towns in Alabama. While on a visit to Rome in 1881, he contracted the Roman fever and a severe cold which completely broke his health. In January, 1883, he reached the United States but passed away on March 9, at New Orleans.

The letters presented here are from the archives of the Archdiocese of New Orleans and are published with the gracious permission of the Reverend Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C., Archivist of the University of Notre Dame where the papers are deposited. Other than the addition of punctuation marks for clarity, the letters are printed as written in the hand of Quinlan.

WILLARD E. WIGHT

Georgia Institute of Technology

Mobile May 22, 1861

Rt Rev & dear Sir

Having just returned from a missionary tour of several weeks, I heard a few days ago of your elevation to the archepiscopal See of New Orleans. You will remember, Monseigneur, that at the last Council when our late lamented Monseigneur Blanc had asked our opinion as to who should be pleasing to us suffragans, as his coajutor & successor, that I proposed your Grace, seconded by Bishop [William Henry] Elder [of Natchez]—you arose & *with tears* besought me to withdraw my recommendation. I am now exceedingly glad that Providence has brought about your appointment.[2] You may rely on the most cordial cooperation of your suffragans,[3] all of whom, I am sure, are rejoiced at your elevation—As one of them, I take the present opportunity to congratulate you & to beg you most earnestly to accept & put an end to the widowhood of our archdioces as soon as possible. By doing so you will advance greatly the plan of religion, & rejoice the heart of one, at least, of those who owe you, as Metropolitan, a sincere & devoted attachment.

I am Most Rev & dear Sir
Yours devotedly in our Lord
John, Bishop of Mobile

Most Rev. J. M. Odin, D.D.
Archbp. Elect of N. Orleans

Same day May 22, 1861

Monseigneur

As I was about to send the above to the Post Office, I recd your note of invitation to New Orleans, along with the pleasing news that you have, God directing, accepted. I will start on Friday morning to assist at your installation, deferring until after this occurence some appointments previously made.

Again yours devotedly in God
John, Bp. Mobile

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[2] The Papal Bulls translating Odin from Galveston to New Orleans were sent to Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore who forwarded them to Galveston. Odin wished to decline because of his age, his lack of knowledge, his inability to cope with the problems, and his unwillingness to leave his people, his priests, and his religious in Texas. He advised Kenrick that "if you do not assure me positively that I would commit a sin by sending back the Bulls, I will return them." Odin to Kenwick April 22, 1861, New Orleans Papers, Archives of the University of Notre Dame. Kenrick told a correspondent that he pronounced Odin's statement rash "but refused to determine its sinfulness." Kenrick to Patrick N. Lynch, Bishop of Charleston, May 12, 1861, Archives of the Diocese of Charleston, Envelope 129.

[3] The Province of New Orleans contained the archdiocese of New Orleans and the suffragan bishoprics of Galveston, Little Rock, Mobile, Natchez and Natchitoches. *Metropolitan Catholic Almanac and Laity's Directory for the United States, Canada, and the British Provinces, 1861,* Baltimore, 1861, 49.

Mobile May 23, 1861

Most Rev & dear Sir

I wrote yesterday stating that I would start on tomorrow for New Orleans to be present at your installation: I wrote under the influence of a great desire to be present. But afterwards reflecting on the number of disappointments that my going over would involve, I today telegraphed my inability to go. I now give the reasons. I administered tonsure & minor orders yesterday to five of my young men at Spring Hill Seminary, intending to confer *Subdeaconship, Deaconship* & *Priesthood* on Friday, Saturday & Sunday morning next. This is *ember* week—the Seminarians are in Retreat, kindly given by one of the Jesuit Fathers. I announced last Sunday the ordination of two young priests, to take place next Sunday morning at the Cathedral; also that I would give Confirmation at St. Vincent's & St. Joseph's Churches next Sunday, forenoon & afternoon. New Monseigneur I am sure you will agree with me in thinking that to put off all these arrangements would be morally impossible. The children are in immediate preparation—in retreat &c for Confirmation: the Seminarians are in retreat; it is moreover the last week of the Pascal time, and all these arrangements are already *published.* I am sure in the circumstances you will not only *not* blame me, but you would, knowing the circumstances attending my absence from home next Sunday, feel annoyed at my going to New Orleans, at the expense of such disappointment. Is it possible to delay your installation? a week? I should like very much to be present. All the Suffragans, I presume to remark, would like to be present; but with so short a notice it is hardly possible that Bishop [Andrew] Byrne [of Little Rock] could be present.[4] If I should be needed in any matter of business connected with the Province, I could go over Monday morning, if telegraphed to in the meantime. Regretting exceedingly, Monseigneur, my inability to be present, for the reasons adduced at your merited installation, in any other way than by my prayers, which I shall offer up most fervently.

I remain

Yours devotedly in God
John, Bishop of Mobile

Mobile, July 15, 1861

Most Rev. & dear Sir

After an absence of about six weeks in the northeastern part of my Diocese, during which time I received almost no news from Mobile, I returned a few days ago. I found your kind letter awaiting me. I regret very much that I had not received it earlier for, I assure you, I would have deferred my visitation in order to meet you & my Episcopal brothers in

[4] In spite of the inability of most of the suffragan bishops to attend, the ceremony of installation for Odin took place on Trinity Sunday, 1861, with only the Bishop of Natchez present. *New Orleans Catholic Standard,* May 26, 1861, quoted in *New York Tablet,* June 8, 1861.

New Orleans. Monseigneur, I know no priest at present, whom I could recommend for Galveston; I have the fullest confidence in your *Knowledge, prudence & discretion.* Therefore I most heartily endorse the choice of candidates you mention viz "V. Rev. Mr. [Claud Marie] Dubuis, Rev. Peter Parizot, O.M.I., and very Rev. [Louis Claud Marie] Chambodut."[5] You will be glad to hear that we are taking measures for the immediate erection of three new churches in several parts of the Diocese of Mobile. Civil commotions may disturb the world, but God's holy Church has her mission and nothing can prevent her in the accomplishment of it. Is not the death of the Apostle of Revolution, Cavour, a manifest evidence of God's interference in behalf of his Vicar, Pius?[6] I hope it may be for the better thinking of some [sic] some many deluded men. Poor Mr. Houlahan[7] left Mobile before I reached here; he had not much hope of being kindly received by me. I certainly, under no circumstances, would receive him to a trial. One scandal does more harm to the church, than a thousand virtuous acts do good. I start again on my visitations, by appointment already made, about the 1st of August, and I shall be absent about two months. When I return I shall take the earliest opportunity to offer you, My dear Monseigneur, my congratulations in person. Best regards to all the Rev^{d} Clergy of the Cathedral, and accept for yourself, the expressions of my warmest regards & sincere devotedness.

Most devotedly in God
Your Obt. Serv^{t} & Brother
John, Bishop of Mobile

Most Rev. J.M. Odin, D.D.
Archbishop of New Orleans

Mobile Monday Oct. 28, 1861

Monseigneur—

Your kind favour of the 23rd inst was handed to me just now. It affords me great pleasure to inform you that I, at present see nothing to hinder me from complying with your kind request, so you may expect me over, God assisting, to take part in your investiture of the Pallium & to preach to the English people, on the 24th of November next.[8] I have

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5 At this time, the bishops of a province in which there was a vacancy submitted to the Holy See the names of three candidates for the office. While it was not mandatory that one of the three be elevated to the episcopacy, it was not infrequent for one of the three to be named. In this instance Dubuis became the Bishop of Galveston.

6 Camillo Benso, Count di Cavour (1810-1861) was a leading figure in the unification of Italy and thus was considered responsible for the loss of the Papal States.

7 Probably the Reverend Dan Houlehan who in 1861 was assistant pastor of St. Theresa's Church, New Orleans. *Metropolitan Directory*, 109. What the scandal was, is unknown.

8 In November, 1861, Odin was invested with the pallium, a band of white wool, worn on the shoulders, with four purple crosses worked on it, as a sign of his office. During the ceremony, Quinlan preached in

just been talking to Mr. St. Cyr, formerly of Galveston & now of Nice, Italy. In his efforts to reach the South, thru the Lincoln lines, he was treated with every indignity. You will hear his narrative from himself; indeed you will get this at his hands, as he has kindly consented to take it.

With all respect, Monseigneur.
Yours devotedly in our Lord
John, Bishop of Mobile.

Most Rev. J. M. Odin, D.D.
Archbp of N. Orleans

Most Rev[d] Archbishop Odin, D.D.
New Orleans
Louisiana

Monseigneur:

Father Ozamia will hand you this. The blockade cutting me off from communication with you; and, at the same, information concerning a few matters of importance being absolutely and speedily needed, I have sent him on, with two sisters of our Visitation Convent, on business of their order, to confer with you and bring me back the desired information. In my appointment to the Diocese of Mobile, the Episcopal Faculties[9] were conveyed to me in a few lines viz. "The Faculties of your Predecessor Monseigneur Portier, are continued to you, whether ordinary or Extraordinary." Now what do these lines mean? Is it that Bishop Portier's Faculties were continued to me, for the *unexpired term only?* or is it that these faculties were given to me for the usual period of ten years commencing with *my* Episcopal appointment? If the *first* be the meaning, then I am now destitute of regular Faculties, as the term of Bishop Portier's Faculties expired on the 1st of Jany 1863! If the second, I have yet these Faculties and can exercise them. In my present state of doubt in the matter, I cannot, with a safe conscience exercise any of the Extraordinary Faculties. Have you got a renewal of the Faculties which expired 1st Jany. 1863, and what are the changes & modifications if any? In regard to the Baptism of Adults, the time allowed for the use of the Formula for Infants in their case, had I believed elapsed. Must we use the long "Form for Adults," or have you obtained from the Holy See an extension, in point of time, of the privilege of still using the "Infant Form," in the Baptism of Adults?

English, Father Napoleon Perché preached in French, and the Bishop of Natchez made the presentation. *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, November 26, 1861.

[9] In Roman Catholic Canon Law a faculty is "the authority, privilege, or permission, to perform an act or function. In a broad sense, a faculty is a certain power, whether based on one's own right, or received as a favour from another, of validly or lawfully doing some action." *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, V, 748-749.

and can the privilege be shared by your suffragans? I am totally ignorant of what may have transpired in Rome, for the last three years concerning Ecclesiastical affairs affecting our Province, and will be thankful to you by sending thru Father Ozamia this and any other Ecclesiastical instructions you have received.

Praying God for a return of peaceful times, and commiting myself and Diocese to your spiritual solicitude

Your obt. Sert & brother in God
I am, Monseigneur—
John Quinlan
Bishop of Mobile

/Endorsed/ Recd Aug. the 23d 1863
Ansd " " 27

Mobile, July 29, 1864

Most Revd & dear Sir

It was only about a week ago since I heard that you had written me *two* letters about Ecclesiastical matters, and that you were very much surprised that I wrote you no answer. I assure you, Monseigneur, I never received those letters: the only ones that came to me from your hand were two or three "letters of Introduction" by parties from New Orleans; which, from their contents, did not seem in any way to demand a reply. The letters which you wrote me early last year, containing answers to certain questions which I proposed for your consideration, I recd and answered in terms of gratitude and thankfullness. You, perhaps did not get these responses; as I sent thru those uncertain channels which lie open [?] to correspondents. By a lady lately come from New Orleans, I have been told that you desired faculties to be given to Priests from New Orleans for Pensacola and other places within the federal lines, within my jurisdiction. Monseigneur, I always looked upon a reciprocal concession of faculties for Priests, *in good standing,* of Mobile and New Orleans, as a fixed arrangement between us. I have always had this impression: where I got it from I can't tell. This arrangement has been entered into between Bishop Elder and Bishop [Augustin] Verot [of Savannah] & myself. And if you have not *hitherto* considered it as existing between yourself and me, I desire very much that you would now accept it, & that it become a rule for our Priests. Father Miller, I hear, has left Pensacola & gone to Philadelphia not to return. He could not get a pass to confer *in person* with me, his Bishop! I did [not] imagine that the Federal authorities carried their measures so far as to Blockade God's Church. F. Miller desired me to go to the Navy yard to administer Confirmation. I wrote him that I desired vehemently to see our poor people there & administer the Holy Sacrament, if I recd from the Federal Commandant at [the] Navy-yard a passport to *go in* and *come out of his lines,* without his exacting of me any condition of a political nature, such as taking the oath. I have yet recd no answer; so I presume the Federal authorities refuse to comply

with my request. I am sorry for this, as it hinders [me] from giving to my catholic children of the Diocese of Mobile, as well as their own Catholic soldiers, the consolations of their holy Faith.

In these circumstances, Monseigneur, I beg your charity to send a priest occasionally to the Navy yard. I am sure Father Chalon[10] would try to find time for an occasional trip there, for the *old memories* of this Diocese. Please give my best thanks to Father Chalon for the two bottles of oil, which he sent us by Father Miller. They came safely and just in time for Holy Thursday; also for some little presents sent lately by a lady from New Orleans. I will not soon forget his kindness. I am told that there are in the hands of some one in Natchez letters from Rome for me, sent by your Grace. I have not yet received them. We have been all pantic [sic] here, through your New Orleans exiled children to hear of your illness. But thank God, the tidings come now that you are convalescent. Hoping to hear from you soon, and of your improved health,

I am, Monseigneur, until we meet in better times,

Your obt. Sevt & bro in God
John Quinlan
Bishop of Mobile

Most Revd Dr. Odin
Archbp of
New Orleans
La

I hope this will reach you, by the very uncertain channel thru which it goes

10 Father Gabriel Chalon, said to have been Quinlan's cousin, was appointed chancellor and secretary of his diocese by Odin at his installation. Jeremiah J. O'Connell, *Catholicity in Georgia and the Carolinas*, New York, 1879, 589; Roger Baudier, *The Catholic Church in Louisiana*, New Orleans, 1939, 412.

Book Reviews

Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. By Robin W. Winks. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. xviii, 430. $6.50.

Yale University's Professor Winks set for himself the difficult task of examining, in one volume, British North American—United States relationships during the tempestuous years of the Civil War. It is quite clear from the outset that Winks does not intend to be misled by the friendly-neighbor, "century-of-peace" formula that so unthinkingly is popularly accepted by United Statians who really know very little about their northern neighbor.

His study of "Canadian-American" problems is mounted on the sandstone base of popular opinion, one of the most hazardous areas an historian can try to re-create. Yet Professor Winks has done remarkably well here, showing popular opinion in all its fickleness and subtlety without resorting to the comfort of generalization, as I shall in the next sentence. During the period of secession, he notes, opinion in British America generally favored the North, after Sumter, the South, and Lincoln's assassination, the Union. That British America feared forceable annexation, and that this spurred its efforts toward the establishment of a federal union of its own, is well demonstrated and elaborately documented.

Nearly every irritant and problem between these two cousins from the crimping of Canadians into the Northern armies, numerous border violations, the *Trent* Affair, second *Chesapeake* Affair, the St. Albans raid, through almost every rumor, is carefully searched out and evaluated. The documentation is copious and accurate, there is no bibliography, but the sixteen page note on sources is valuable.

The rhetoric of the first few chapters is laborious, and Winks tends to repetitiousness, but he warms up after the first fifty pages. No two historians will ever agree on every point, and this reviewer cannot accept all the details of the kidnapping of Sioux chiefs from the Red River settlements. This is, however, a needed, objective, detailed, and up-to-date work. Not only Canadian-American relations, but to a lesser degree imperial relations, and the diplomatic skirmishing between Blue and Gray in Canada are skillfully sketched, primarily from manuscript sources. This is a positive contribution to both diplomatic and Civil War history and is a tribute to Dr. Winks thoroughness.

ROBERT H. JONES

Kent State University

El Patronato Regio de Indias y La Santa Sede, en Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, 1581-1606. By Vicente Rodríguez Valencia. Iglesia Nacional Española, Roma. Distributed by José Porter, Librero, Barcelona. Publicaciones del Inst. Esp. de Est. Esclesiásticos. 1957. Pp. 260.

Santo Toribio was born in 1539 a member of a noble family in the countryside of León. As a layman he pursued an intense education in law at Valladolid and later at Salamanca, where he had done two years of doctoral studies when Philip II in 1578 presented him for the arch-

bishopric of Lima. Gregory XIII confirmed him on March 16, 1579, and dispensed him so that he could receive major orders and consecration immediately. For five years previously he held membership in the Inquisition with his special care, Granada. He took possession of the See of Lima in 1581.

Ever loyal to his sovereign, to whom he sent complete records of all his major moves, he nevertheless came into sharp conflict with the king and the Council of the Indies over their conduct of the Patronato Real. His own revelations to them of his continuous private communication with the popes led to a major expansion in their use of the *Pase Regio* after 1592. His insistence on direct dependence on the papacy and exact fulfilment of its decisions produced friction with the crown on three issues: his right to call provincial councils when so ordered by the Tridentine decrees and the mandate of the pope; his duty to visit the dioceses of his province of Lima; and his immediate obligation to supervise the funds of churches and hospitals. On these three sectors Madrid operated as the delegated vicar of the Holy See. Toribio counterattacked, and remained steadfast in his episcopal conduct—and this despite a too frequent subserviency shown by his theological advisors in favor of the royal patron.

The book is projected against the background of the famous Junta de Madrid held in 1568. In that year the Patronato practice underwent a thorough examination both in Rome and in Madrid, and it was a time of crisis. The pope wanted a nuncio resident in the Indies. Philip countered by proposing a Patriarch who would reside under his eye in Madrid. Neither suggestion was accepted. The crown advanced its employment of patronage into the practical, though unspoken, claim to a full vicariate over the imperial church. The archbishop fought valiantly to stem that dangerous tide. He won in his lifetime by pure determination to do his duty, though the situation was to be repeated in future years.

The merit of Rodríguez lies in presenting irrefragible proof of the crown's attitude. Leturia had preceded him in the position, but he conducted so complete an examination of the case that it should no longer be controverted. An interesting sidelight is his conclusion (pages 30-31) that the religious orders contributed in aid of the royal position. The documentation on his correspondence with the pope is amply displayed, as is indeed all the recent writing on the Patronato. Garcia de Mendoza, recent viceroy in Peru, is shown as a strong protagonist of the crown contention. The Council of the Indies held the same views. Clearly the patronage had subverted the mind, and perhaps the objectivity, of what might be called the ruling class.

W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.

Xavier University, Ohio

"Sunset" Cox Irrepressible Democrat. By David Lindsey. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 313. $5.00.

Samuel Sullivan Cox as a young editor of the Columbus *Ohio Statesman* wrote a glowing account of an 1853 sunset, thereafter affixed to him as an agnomen. Cox, who graduated with honors from Brown Univer-

sity in 1846, was an indifferent attorney, a better journalist, and an avid politician. He was noted for his ability to write, as Lindsey's list of twenty-three items of Cox's in the excellent biography testifies, and to speak, and was famous for his sense of humor.

Cox emerges from Lindsey's pen as a Douglas popular-sovereignty follower in 1856, when Ohioans first elected him to Congress. In the secession crisis Cox stood for compromise but in January, 1861, "denied the right of secession." He blamed the crisis on extremists. As House minority leader he led the wartime "loyal opposition" and supported armed intervention tempered with "moderation and generosity toward the South." Cox opposed the draft, was a critic of the administration's civil liberty policies, and also denounced the Second Confiscation Act. To him, this meant the war was actually being fought to abolish slavery and not only to preserve the Union. He thought it would better serve the cause to "leave to the states their own institutions." He voted against the Thirteenth Amendment at the last moment, although by 1865 he had been advocating that the Democrats strengthen themselves by "throwing off the proslavery odium." In 1864, Cox, a McClellan proponent, was gerrymandered out of his Ohio district and lost his first election in eight years.

He moved to New York City in 1865, and with Tammany's support returned to Congress in 1868. Cox's *bête noir* in post-war politics was the tariff. A free-trader, he worked hard for reduction. He opposed greenbacks and railroad land grants and supported general amnesty, resumption, and in 1877 free silver. A ranking Democrat, he was greatly disappointed to be passed over for Speaker of the House.

Lindsey touches on some interesting problems but does not exploit them. For example, after the Republican Congressional defeat in 1862, were Republican-sponsored repressive measures a conscious effort to maintain control of the government? He notes that it "is impossible to determine" Cox's relationship to Tammany: but certainly the machine was useful? Lindsey offers no concrete explanation why Cox, who behaved like a typical Eastern Democrat, switched to free silver. There are no glaring errors in the book, though customarily pictures are hung and people hanged (p. 153).

Cox, the witty politician comes through well, yet Cox, the man, remains buried, pity that it is, even though Lindsey meant it that way. The book seemed occasionally superficial because Lindsey did not stop to put many events in the perspective of the times. The post-war chapters become a dreary recital of session-by-session activities, but there is enough sparkle in the rest of the book to carry it. All in all this is a careful and useful study, a product of hard work and research (as the end-notes attest), and Lindsey did what he set out to do: he presented the political career of a Nineteenth Century politician, an interesting, though not a key figure, whose public services spanned nearly half a century.

ROBERT HUHN JONES

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Notes and Comments

The Philosophy of Abraham Lincoln in His Own Words, compiled by William E. Barringer, Executive Director of the Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission, was published late last year by Falcon's Wing Press of Indian Hills, Colorado, as one of the Keystone Series of enduring books. The general editor of the Keystone Series, C. A. Muses, has a stirring introduction to the volume, in which he eloquently enlarges upon the principles of Lincoln as opposed to those of Lenin and pleads for an adherance to Lincoln's philosophy in the face of the Communist threat to civilization. Professor Barringer compresses the philosophy of Lincoln into 167 pages, divided into ten chapters: Human Interest, On Politics and Politicians, On Slavery, On Law, On American Institutions, On Liberty, On Religion, On Labor, On Union, Disunion, and War, and On Civil Liberties. The sayings of Lincoln are culled from the Basler-Pratt-Dunlay edition of *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* published in 1903. The book is very handy and its contents are ever inspiring. Its list price is $3.50.

* * * *

Readings in Church History, Volume I, *From Pentecost to the Protestant Revolt,* edited by Coleman J. Barry, O.S.B., was published last year by The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland. This is a collection of primary documents carefully selected and grouped to indicate the major developments, trends, crises, and heresies in the history of the Church from the time of Christ to the early 1500's. Preceding each group is a very helpful compendium of the history of the time covered in the documents. In all there are 103 numbered documents, more than a fourth of which numbers are sub-lettered A, B, C, etc. With the exception of five or six newly translated source materials all of the documents have already been translated and published in English in various books and at different times. Now they are brought together for the convenience of readers in 633 pages of double columns in a pleasing type. To make the volume more available the publisher has listed the cloth bound volume at $7.50 and the paper covered volume at $2.95. Either will make a worthy addition to a library shelf.

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Foss of Massachusetts: Demagogue or Progressive?

From 1911 to 1914 the governor's chair in Massachusetts was occupied by Eugene Noble Foss, the first Democrat to be re-elected to the office since the early 1890's. One of the most stormy and colorful figures in early twentieth century Bay State politics, Foss rose to prominence at the height of the progressive era. But his credentials as a progressive were hotly disputed. He was distrusted by many of the older Democratic reformers, rejected by most insurgent Republicans, and scorned by the Roosevelt Progressives. He was, said one opponent, nothing but an "extraordinary political charlatan," who "has out-Barnumed Barnum, and will go down in history as the great humbug of the 20th century."[1] Foss's enemies were legion. As a result his fame was short-lived, and after 1914 he soon sunk to what his detractors believed was a well-deserved political obscurity. Yet if his personality and methods alienated him from most of the more conventional progressives, Foss achieved more than many of his critics. On the whole his recommendations were farsighted, and he deserves some credit for the numerous reforms enacted during his years as governor and for a few real contributions to the progressive cause.

Foss was a wealthy manufacturer for whom politics was only a temporary side-interest. Born in West Berkshire, Vermont, in 1858, he attended the University of Vermont for two years before beginning a business career as a traveling salesman. In 1882 he settled in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, as manager of the B. F. Sturtevant Company, which manufactured boilers. Assisted by his marriage to his employer's daughter, Foss advanced rapidly. He

[1] *Practical Politics*, Boston, September 16, 1911, 3520.

became president of the Sturtevant Company after his father-in-law's death and later branched into other business activities. By 1910 he had built four cotton mills in Massachusetts, was president of the Becker Milling Machine Company, and was a director of several firms, including a bank, the Union Stock Yards Company of Chicago, the Eastern Steamship Company, and the Brooklyn Transit Company.[2] Foss was politically inexperienced when he began his attack upon the policies of the conservative Republican organization in Massachusetts, but he was sufficiently equipped with money and ambition to make himself heard.

Foss entered the political arena as a champion of tariff reform and reciprocity. The high protective tariff was an article of faith for Bay State Republican leaders. However, Foss argued that it stifled business and unnecessarily increased the cost of living. Reciprocity agreements, he said, would check the hostile tariff legislation set up against the United States and enable Americans to increase their exports of manufactured goods. Furthermore, Foss maintained that reciprocity was quite compatible with Republicanism. Even McKinley had shown interest in it.[3] His critics charged Foss with being selfishly interested in promoting tariff reductions only on his competitors' products, although he strongly denied the accusation and insisted that he could prosper with a drastically lowered tariff on iron and steel products, including items which he manufactured, as long as such reductions applied "to the whole iron and steel industry from the coal and ore up."[4] Quite likely, of course, Foss's motives were not entirely disinterested. But during his stormy political career he remained a consistent advocate of tariff reform, whether standing as a Republican, Democrat or independent.

In September, 1902, Foss began his political career by challenging the Republican organization's choice for candidate from the

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[2] *Boston Herald,* October 23, 1910; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress: 1774–1927,* Washington, 1928, 981; "The Buoyancy of Mr. Foss," *Current Literature,* LI (December, 1911), 615–618; George Perry Morris, "Eugene Noble Foss," *The Independent,* LXIX (November 17, 1910), 1071–1073.

[3] *Reciprocity: A Republican Issue. Addresses Upon This Topic By Henry B. Blackwell and Eugene Noble Foss before the Massachusetts Club, Boston, June 11, 1904,* Pamphlet, Massachusetts State Library; Eugene Noble Foss, "American Manufactures and Foreign Markets," American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, *Annals,* XXIX (May, 1907), 515–521. See also Foss to Edward Atkinson, January 13, 1903, and May 6, 1904, Atkinson Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

[4] *Congressional Record,* 61 Cong., 2d Sess., 1910, Vol. 45, Part 6, p. 6697.

eleventh congressional district. In his campaign he advocated reciprocity with Canada and free coal, iron and hides.[5] To the dismay of the machine, enough Foss delegates were selected at local party caucuses to insure his nomination. Henry Cabot Lodge was appalled. "I have never seen anything like it," he wrote to Roosevelt. "He is mad with pride and vanity. . . . I sometimes think that the 'business man in politics' is too often one who has no business to be there."[6] However, Foss failed to disrupt the state convention, which accepted the usual standpat platform without mention of tariff reform, and in the general election he lost to the Democrat, John A. Sullivan.

Foss made his next effort in the spring of 1904 when he ran for delegate-at-large to the Republican National Convention. Although he received little support at the local caucuses, he carried his fight into the state convention, only to be badly beaten by the organization candidate. Foss's humiliation was made all the worse by Senator Lodge, who denounced him vehemently and virtually read him out of the Republican Party.[7] The machine triumphed, but the consequences of the fight ultimately were serious. Lodge had turned Foss into an implacable enemy who did not rest until he had won a considerable measure of vindication.

In the fall of 1904 Foss again won the Republican nomination for congressman from the eleventh district, thanks in large measure to a 1903 law that provided for a direct primary election to select the candidates from the ninth, tenth and eleventh districts. Again Foss received only tepid support from his party, and lost to Sullivan in the November election.[8] Foss's bitterness against Lodge grew. At a reciprocity convention held at Chicago in August, 1905, Foss accused the Senator of deliberately wrecking the Hay-Bond reciprocity treaty with Newfoundland under the pretense of making its fishing provisions acceptable to Gloucester, Massachusetts.[9] At the state convention in October of that year he branded Lodge's speech in defense of protection as an insult to the majority of voters in Massachusetts. The Republican loss of the governorship

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[5] *Boston Herald,* September 7 and 21, 1902.

[6] Lodge to Roosevelt, September 25, 1902, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., *Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge: 1884–1918,* New York, 1925, I, 530.

[7] *Boston Herald,* April 5, 1904; John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge,* New York, 1953, 239.

[8] *Boston Herald,* September 28 and November 9, 1904.

[9] *Ibid.,* August 17, 1905. For a defense of Lodge's position on the treaty see Garraty, *Lodge,* 236–238.

in 1904, said Foss, "has not taught the senator that there is no profit in a speech that will sweep a machine convention and defeat its nominees."[10]

Foss was not easily discouraged, and in 1906 he sought the nomination for lieutenant-governor. That office was then held by the ultra-conservative, high protectionist Eben S. Draper. But it was clear that Foss's real target was Senator Lodge.

> The machine has made up the slate for all offices twelve years in advance.... No man has any chance of political preferment in Massachusetts who will not wear the collar of the political boss of the State.... If for no other reason than that it is corrupt, the Lodge machine should be annihilated. We have had the "scholar in politics" long enough in Massachusetts. Let us try a few businessmen, who when they say they will stand for a thing, will come somewhere near doing it.[11]

Yet for all Foss's efforts, he was quite unable to attract a large following within the Republican Party at that time. He failed by a wide margin to win the support of enough delegates to the state convention to insure his nomination. As a result, he did not even bother to attend the 1906 convention, which was controlled perfectly by the organization, and which adopted a strictly standpat platform.[12] After several years of battling the machine, Foss was no better off than when he began. Most rank-and-file Republicans in Massachusetts were not yet unduly disturbed by the high protective tariff or by the Lodge-Crane domination of their party. After all, as in the case of the Gloucester fishermen, Lodge was careful to guard the interests of his own constituents. If some groups did not fare as well, they tended, like the shoe manufacturer William L. Douglas, who won the governorship in 1904, to seek relief in the Democratic Party. Foss's efforts in politics from 1902 to 1906 clearly demonstrated that he had little prospects for advancement as a Republican. Obviously his hope lay elsewhere.

Foss's opportunity came a few years later. After a brief period of political inactivity, he shifted his allegiance to the Democrats and in 1909 received the nomination for lieutenant-governor. The Democrats, united for the first time in years, were attracted by Foss's large purse, and by the hope that he would draw the sup-

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10 *Boston Herald,* October 7, 1905.

11 Foss to Channing Smith, July 24, 1906, published in the *Boston Evening Transcript,* July 27, 1906.

12 Lodge to Roosevelt, September 29, 1906, in Lodge, ed., *Selections,* II, 238; *Transcript,* October 5, 1906; *Herald,* October 6, 1906.

port of those discontented voters who could find no adequate means to express their opposition to the Lodge-Crane organization within the Republican Party. Foss picked the right year to change parties, for 1909 marked the beginning of a reversal in the fortunes of the G.O.P. in Massachusetts. While Draper defeated James H. Vahey for the top post, the Governor's plurality of 60,000 in 1908 was reduced to a mere 8,000. Foss showed real strength in coming within 8,000 of Lieutenant-Governor Frothingham, whereas in the previous election the Democratic candidate had lost by over 96,000 votes.

Republican leaders attributed this decline to the popular concern over the rising cost of living.[13] Naturally the Democrats blamed the tariff for the price increases, and in 1909 this approach seemed to be politically effective. Certainly this issue was made to order for Foss, with his long record of agitation for tariff reform. Senator Lodge, apprehensive, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt:

> I feel anything but easy about next year. If the country continues prosperous and the prosperity increases so that wages will rise, I think we shall win; but if wages do not rise and the high prices which we cannot control continue, we are likely to lose.[14]

Lodge's fears proved to be far from groundless.

The events of 1910 demonstrated that the Republican Party had indeed become decidedly vulnerable in Massachusetts. Alarming symptoms of insurgency developed in the state committee and General Court as more and more Republicans became impatient with the standpattism of the old guard. This rising discontent helped to catapult Foss to political prominence. On March 22, a special election was called to fill a vacancy in the fourteenth congressional district, an area that included all of Barnstable County and Cape Cod, most of Plymouth County, and a few adjacent communities in Bristol and Norfolk Counties. The previous incumbent, William C. Lovering, had died on February 4. A member of Congress since 1897, Lovering had gained a reputation as an insurgent because of his association with those congressmen

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[13] G. von L. Meyer to Lodge, November 3, 1909; Draper to Meyer, November 4, 1909; Lodge to Meyer, November 7, 1909, Lodge Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. On the increased living costs see Massachusetts: General Court, *Report of the Commission on the Cost of Living*, House Doc. No. 1750, May, 1910.

[14] Lodge to Roosevelt, November 30, 1909, in Lodge, ed., *Selections*, II, 354.

planning the overthrow of Speaker Joe Cannon.[15] In 1908 the popular congressman had been re-elected by a vote three times that received by his Democratic opponent. Naturally the Republican organization assumed that this district was solidly behind the G.O.P.

Events soon proved that the Republicans were badly mistaken. Pleased by Foss's showing in the 1909 election, the Democrats selected him as their candidate. Foss immediately made it clear that he intended to make insurgency the chief issue. He praised Lovering for his stand on Cannon, and identified his Republican opponent, William A. Buchanan of Brockton, with standpattism. Stressing the high cost of living, Foss called for better trade relations with America's neighbors, the free entry of raw materials, and reciprocity with Canada. He also championed the income tax and conservation measures, while denouncing "Aldrich-Cannonism and all that it implies."[16] Thus, to some extent the contest was a test of changing popular sentiment on such broader national issues as insurgency and tariff policy.

Virtually no one predicted other than a Republican victory, with only the size of the majority in doubt. But the political prophets were badly mistaken. Foss not only won, but he did so by a majority of nearly 6,000. Thousands of Republicans had deserted their party.[17] Some Republicans attempted to explain away this disaster as the product of local issues, and especially as a rejection of Buchanan personally. Certainly Buchanan was not favored by a number of Republicans in the district, particularly those who had promoted the nomination of Judge Robert O. Harris of East Bridgewater.[18] But to write off this dramatic reversal in political fortunes simply in terms of personalities was fatuous. Clearly the election was an emphatic rebuke of existing Republican policies. Within this district, which subsequently became the section of Massachusetts most strongly supporting the Progressive Party, the belief was widespread that Lodge and the Republican

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15 George Henry Payne, *The Birth of the New Party*, n.p., 1912, 116–117; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, February 14, 1910.

16 *Boston Transcript*, March 11, 1910; *Boston Advertiser*, March 15, 1910. For relation of reciprocity issue to this special election see L. Nathan Ellis, *Reciprocity 1911, A Study in Canadian-American Relations*, New Haven, 1939, 15.

17 The vote was Foss: 15,086, Buchanan: 9,469. In 1908 the vote had been Democratic: 6,709, Republican: 20,959.

18 *Boston Transcript, Boston Advertiser, Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 1910; Draper to Lodge, April 20, 1910, Lodge Papers.

Party had not served the area well in regard to the tariff.[19] Possibly the dissatisfaction of the shoe manufacturers over unfavorable duties on hides was one source of the insurgency. But Foss had also carried nearly all of the traditionally Republican small towns as well as the few cities of the district. Distrust of the old guard went beyond the problem of tariff. At the same time probably most of the voters did not want to shift their allegiance permanently to the Democrats. Conveniently enough, the special election did not involve control of the state, and Foss, as a former Republican insurgent, who was not yet associated with the urban Democratic bosses, was an attractive candidate. The situation was ideal for an expression of no confidence by Republicans in their party's leadership.

Foss's service as Congressman was brief and undistinguished. He delivered only one real speech, an effort on behalf of tariff reform, but his interest was in state politics rather than in Congress. As a result of the special election his political stock had risen dramatically. In January, 1911, Senator Lodge had to stand for reelection. If Foss played his cards correctly the possibility existed that he could strike a blow at his old enemy.

In January, 1910, Congressman Butler Ames of Lowell began a campaign to unseat Lodge. Ames did not attract much support, and Lodge felt that he was not in great danger. After the special congressional election, however, the Senator began to take a more serious view of the situation. "The times are troubled," he told Roosevelt, "and a narrow margin in the Legislature might open the door for Foss and his money."[20] To insure his own re-election, Lodge had to prevent the mounting insurgency from actually crystallizing into a solid progressive faction. On the other hand, the success of his opponents depended in large measure on the ability of the Democrats to keep their divergent factions together, while presenting a program and ticket in the November election that was sufficiently progressive to attract the discontented Republicans. Fortified by his recent triumph, Foss appeared to be well suited to lead the Democratic attack.

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[19] A poll of 17 Republican editors in this district disclosed that 16 had expressed disapproval of the tariff. See "The Election of Mr. Foss," *Independent*, LXVIII (March 31, 1910), 709–710. The editor of the *Wareham Courier* maintained that the district was still basically Republican, but that the tariff was exceedingly unpopular and that it was necessary to punish the Republican Party for drifting away from the people. See *La Follette's Weekly Magazine*, II (May 14, 1910), 9.

[20] Lodge to Roosevelt, April 19, 1910, Lodge Papers.

With so many clear indications of Republican decline, interest naturally rose in the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. James H. Vahey, who had led the ticket in 1909, was the first to declare his candidacy. Later both Mayor John F. Fitzgerald of Boston and Charles S. Hamlin announced that they were quite willing to accept the nomination, although they were not actively working for it.[21] Foss remained noncommittal throughout the summer, but he had important supporters. Chairman MacLeod of the state committee began to pressure Vahey to withdraw in favor of Foss, on the grounds that Foss would be more likely to attract Republican votes.[22] Many Democrats were also frankly impressed by his wealth. As former Governor Douglas noted to Hamlin, Foss "would make an enormous contribution" to the campaign.[23] By the time of the convention Foss had the backing of many important Democratic leaders.

Nevertheless, the Foss forces did not control a majority of the delegates at the state convention held at Faneuil Hall in Boston on October 6. The battle between Vahey and Foss resulted in a deadlock. In order to file the notice of nomination by 5:00 p.m., October 7, which was believed to be the deadline, the Vahey and Foss leaders finally agreed to a novel proposal. They selected Frederick W. Mansfield as a comprise candidate, but only for purposes of filing nomination papers. It was understood that Mansfield was only a dummy, who would resign within 72 hours. Another candidate would subsequently be chosen by a committee of four, which was appointed specially for the task of filling the vacancy. In short, this committee was empowered to make the real nomination.[24]

Incredibly, neither the Vahey nor the Foss men had interpreted the election law correctly, for it was subsequently pointed out that certificates of nomination did not have to be filed until October 10. There had been plenty of time to reconvene the convention

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[21] *Boston Herald,* August 23 and September 4, 1910.

[22] See report of discussion between Hamlin and MacLeod in the Diary of Charles S. Hamlin, August 15, 1910, Hamlin Papers, Library of Congress. MacLeod did not declare publicly for Foss until October 2, just prior to the state convention. *Boston Herald,* October 3, 1910.

Martin Lomasney, boss of Boston's Ward 8, was another important Democrat who threw his support to Foss just before the convention. See A. D. Van Nostrand, "The Lomasney Legend," *New England Quarterly,* XXI (December, 1948), 449; Leslie G. Ainley, *Boston Mahatma,* Boston, 1949, 110–112.

[23] Hamlin Diary, August 21, 1910.

[24] *Boston Herald* and *Boston Transcript,* October 7, 1910.

for further balloting. To make matters worse, the special committee of four was quite unable to reach a decision, and Mansfield, who would not be legally compelled to resign, even threatened to remain on the ticket if Foss were selected.[25] Finally the Democratic State Committee agreed to break the deadlock by having the regularly elected delegates to the convention mail in their preferences for governor. The committee of four promised to select a candidate on the basis of the results of this mail-order ballot. On October 17, the committee announced that Foss had beaten Vahey by eleven votes. Two days later Mansfield withdrew, and Foss was duly substituted as the Democratic gubernatorial nominee. Taking no chances, Foss in the meantime had filed independent nomination papers as a "Democratic Progressive." Hence his name ultimately appeared on the ballot under two designations.[26]

Despite the struggles over the gubernatorial nomination, the prospects for a Democratic victory in 1910 seemed better than in years. The Democrats capitalized on the growing interest in reform. Their platform, noted the *Springfield Republican*, was "sharp, ringing and progressive. It places the Republicans badly on the defensive. . . ."[27] Whereas the G.O.P. program was vague and equivocable, the Democratic was unusually clear and specific. It blamed high living costs on the tariff and demanded removal of duties on food-stuffs and necessities. In addition it called for an impressive list of reforms including: the federal income tax amendment, the direct election of United States senators, initiative and referendum, direct primaries, an effective workingmen's compensation law, an eight-hour law for employees on public projects, and several other proposals of this nature.[28] If platforms could be taken seriously, the Democrats presented a real alternative to the Republicans.

As standard-bearer Foss had several advantages, not the least of which was his long record as an opponent of Senator Lodge and a champion of tariff reform. During the campaign he concentrated on these points and led the Democratic Party to its first gubernatorial victory since 1904. Foss received the second largest Democratic vote in Massachusetts history. While the Republicans carried the other state offices, they did so by greatly reduced mar-

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[25] *Boston Herald*, October 8 and 12, 1910.
[26] *Ibid.*, October 13, 16 and 18, 1910; *Boston Transcript*, October 17 and 19, 1910.
[27] *Springfield Republican*, October 7, 1910.
[28] *Boston Herald*, October 7, 1910.

gins. Fortunately for Lodge, the Republicans retained control of the General Court. However, they lost 42 seats in the House and 6 in the Senate. Their margin over the Democrats would be only 17 in the new House and 12 in the Senate, or a total of only 29 on a combined ballot. This was still potentially very dangerous for Lodge, for if the Democrats held firm on a joint ballot, while picking up a minimum of 15 insurgent votes, they could block the Senator's re-election.

Foss and most Democrats interpreted the election as a vote of no confidence in Senator Lodge. Certainly the Senator had become more and more the object of attack, not only by Democrats but by dissatisfied Republicans as well. In all probability Lodge was a liability to his party in the November election. For example, in the third congressional district the Republican incumbent, Charles G. Washburn, was defeated by a virtually unknown Democrat, John A. Thayer. Local sentiment placed the blame for Washburn's and Draper's defeat squarely on Lodge's shoulders. "It was clearly a case," proclaimed the *Worcester Evening Gazette*, "where the voters shot their arrows over the House to hit Lodge. . . . [He] is a millstone on the neck of the party and should be allowed to retire as gracefully as may be. The party cannot carry him longer."[29] Given such hostility within his own party and a new General Court with only a slim Republican majority, it was clear that Lodge faced the fight of his life to retain his seat in the Senate.

The Governor-elect spearheaded the attack against Senator Lodge with the belligerent assertion:

> I shall never sign his credentials except at the end of a campaign which will make the last one look like an afternoon tea party. He must surrender or fight. He must defend his position before the people. The people of Massachusetts will not permit him longer to manipulate the Legislature. I am ready, and if he does not retire, will be on the stump in every section of the state, and we will find out where the people stand.[30]

Foss kept his attack in high gear throughout December and into January, but despite the severity of his language, his campaign was weakened by its excessively negative character. It was not enough to assert that Lodge should not be re-elected; Foss had to promote someone who was better qualified. Yet he did not

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[29] *Worcester Evening Gazette*, November 9, 1910, quoted in George H. Haynes, *The Life of Charles G. Washburn*, Boston, 1931, 112–113.

[30] *Boston Herald*, November 21, 1910,

seriously concern himself with finding a candidate who could win the support of both the Democrats and the insurgent Republicans, even though the joint efforts of both were necessary to defeat Lodge. By December the only Democrats to announce their candidacies were Colonel William A. Gaston and Congressman Joseph F. O'Connell, while Congressman Ames was the only declared Republican. But none of these men had an enthusiastic following.[31] Not until January 16 did the Democrats agree on their candidate, and he proved to have little attraction to the Republican insurgents.

Quite likely Foss's public campaigning backfired. For example, Charles Francis Adams, a man who had displayed little political sympathy for Lodge in the past, wrote that he was so tired and disgusted by "the Gyrations, Pronunciamentoes and Proclamations of our extraordinary Governor-elect . . ." that he would do anything in his power to assist the Senator's re-election.[32] On December 21, Gaston withdrew his candidacy on the ground that Foss's tactics had made his own election impossible.[33] Two weeks later another prominent Democrat, Henry M. Whitney, a gubernatorial candidate in 1907, went even further and declared for Lodge.[34]

As the time for the election drew near, it was clear that Foss had failed to consolidate the opposition. Yet he continued to campaign until nearly the last minute. Thus, in his inaugural address delivered on January 5, Foss repeated his belief that the November election was a popular mandate against Lodge. Still, at that stage it was doubtful that the new governor influenced many legislators. In noting the breach of traditional amenities in the inaugural address, Speaker of the House Joseph Walker observed that "the House has got into a frame of mind where they expect anything from Governor Foss, and they do not take him very seriously."[35]

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31 *Boston Transcript*, November 21 and December 22, 1910; *Herald*, November 23 and December 22, 1910.

32 Charles F. Adams to Lodge, November 25, 1910, Lodge Papers.

33 *Boston Herald*, December 22, 1910. Lodge noted: "Foss has completely queered Gaston's campaign and I do not wonder that he is angry.... If the Democrats are all loose it ought to help us." Lodge to Norman White, December 23, 1910, Lodge Papers. See also Lodge to Allen Treadway, December 24, 1910, and Charles S. Groves to Lodge, December 27, 1910, Lodge Papers.

34 *Boston Herald*, January 3, 1911. On Whitney see Robert L. O'Brien to Lodge, January 1, 1911, Lodge Papers, and Frank B. Tracy to Roosevelt, January 3, 1911, Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. Tracy, the editor of the *Boston Transcript*, insisted that Whitney was primarily motivated by his hatred of Foss.

35 Walker to Lodge, January 9, 1911, Lodge Papers; *Boston Herald*, January 6, 1911.

Lodge owed his ultimate re-election on January 18, 1911, to his own meticulous planning as well as to the reaction against Foss. Thus, the Senator's managers carefully cultivated the support of any doubtful members of the General Court.[36] In addition, his long-term efforts to maintain party unity in the face of increased progressive sentiment paid off. No organized block of Republican insurgents campaigned against Lodge, while such prominent Republicans as Robert Luce, Joseph Walker, and Norman White, all known for their independence and reform inclinations, were his loyal supporters.[37] As for the "progressive Republicans in the rank and file . . ." observed Congressman Gardner, "of course, Mr. Lodge doesn't satisfy them; but, on the other hand, he doesn't disastisfy [sic] them enough to stir them into activity and they seem to feel that they might fare worse after all."[38] Nevertheless, the contest was close. Lodge failed to get a majority, in the House, and he was victorious only after the election was transferred to a joint session in which a simple majority of all votes was required. Had there been an opponent satisfactory to both Republican insurgents and Democrats, the outcome might well have been otherwise.

If Foss had failed to destroy his enemy, at least he had given the Lodge machine a serious scare, and in the process his name had become far better known. Clearly the discontent in 1910 had turned out to be very convenient for Foss's political career. Many of his critics, indeed, assumed that Foss was far more concerned with his own political advancement than with a real desire for reform. At any rate, Foss had become a highly controversial figure. It certainly was questionable whether he could provide the leadership which was necessary to enact a reform program, for success depended upon uniting most Democrats with the liberal Republicans in the General Court.

Few previous governors of Massachusetts were as active as Foss, who for three years kept the politicians and public busy trying to guess his next move. Prior to his governorship his primary interests had been in tariff reform or in attacking Senator Lodge. In his first inaugural message, however, Foss shocked conserva-

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[36] See files "Senate Contest, 1910–1911," in Lodge Papers.

[37] For a more extended analysis of the Lodge Campaign see Richard B. Sherman, "Progressive Politics in Massachusetts; 1908–1916," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University, 79–89, and Garraty, *Lodge*, 273–284.

[38] Gardner to Roosevelt, December 31, 1910, Roosevelt Papers.

tives by calling for one of the most extensive reform programs in state history.

> We have reached a crisis in the affairs of this commonwealth. . . . The dictatorship by political bosses and by representatives of special interests is hotly resented. . . . This usurpation of power can only be ended by the people taking into their own hands the direction and control of their government.
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> The first step is to abolish the boss and all his agencies; the caucus, the nominating convention and all political machinery which intervenes between the people and their government.[39]

Specifically Foss asked for such political reforms as: direct primary nominations for all elective offices, recall of public servants, initiative and referendum, reduction of election expenditures with the state providing meeting halls for parties and publishing election literature, redistribution of legislative districts, and home rule for cities. But he did not stop there. For labor's benefit Foss recommended protection of the right to organize, restriction on unfair injunctions, limitation of hours of labor (especially for women and children), compensation for injuries, and vocational training for the youth of the state. In addition he called for expenditures to improve the Port of Boston, higher judicial salaries, a number of administrative reforms, a state income tax, and the federal income tax amendment.

"Foss would reform all," complained the *Boston Advertiser,* which saw no difference between his ideas and those of the socialists.[40] The businesslike *Boston Herald* predicted that if Foss's proposals were adopted, they "would swamp the state in new expenditures."[41] But reformers took a different view. The progressive weekly, *Boston Common,* concluded that the movement "toward fundamental democracy, toward equality of privileges and opportunities before the law, has received new life and hope. . . ."[42] Regardless of Foss's motives, and hostile critics did question his true interest in many of the proposals, the new governor had aroused the complacent. It was an unusual sight for a governor of Massachusetts to assume the role of progressive leader.

The 1911 session was the longest on record. While the legislators ignored a large part of Foss's program, they could boast of

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[39] *Boston Herald,* January 6, 1911.
[40] January 6, 1911.
[41] January 6, 1911.
[42] January 14, 1911.

a number of significant measures. Thus, after years of agitation and partial measures, a general direct primary law was finally enacted. Most of the other political reforms failed, but a number of labor measures were passed. A commission was created to study the possibility of establishing a mininum wage for women and children. The recommendation of this commission led to the enactment in 1912 of the first minimum wage law in the United States. Massachusetts also became in 1911 one of the first states to enact a workingman's compensation law. Participation in the compensation system was elective, not compulsory, but it provided many workers with far better protection than they had found under the rigors of the modified common law interpretation of employers' liability. Another measure cut the maximum hours from 56 to 54 for women and children under eighteen years employed in manufacturing or mercantile establishments. At first Foss favored a 55-hour law, but under pressure from labor he finally consented to the more liberal measure.

Although the Republicans had a majority in the General Court during all three terms of Foss's governorship, support for most reforms was bipartisan, with the Democrats supplying the largest number of votes. A study of the voting records on eleven progressive political or social measures in 1911 indicated that they were favored by 81 percent of the Democratic legislators, but by only 28 percent of the Republicans.[43] Enthusiasm for reform was limited to a fairly small minority within the G.O.P. Thus the progressive elements in both parties had to cooperate to be successful in the legislature.

Although Foss presented his most extensive proposals in his first inaugural address, he repeated many of these ideas in later messages, and never was he without a cause.[44] In addition to the political and social reforms already noted, Foss had a particular interest in reorganizing and consolidating the large number of boards and commissions that cluttered up the government of Massachusetts. Such boards, he insisted, had been largely used as a source of patronage.[45] In his 1912 and 1913 inaugural messages,

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[43] *Boston Common,* August 12, 1911.

[44] Note, for example, his numerous special messages or his second inaugural address. See also *Workingmen's Compensation. The New Massachusetts Law and the Need of Uniform Legislation on this Subject in Other States.* Address by Eugene Noble Foss at Governors' Conference, Spring Lake, N. J., September 13, 1911, Pamphlet in Massachusetts State Library.

[45] Charles Johnston, "A Talk with Governor Foss," *Harper's Weekly,* LV (September 2, 1911), 7.

Foss devoted more attention to the problem of the New Haven Railroad's attempted monopoly of New England transportation. He recommended dissolution of the Boston Holding Company, the device by which the New Haven controlled the Boston and Maine, and the creation of a powerful public service commission with mandatory regulatory powers over transportation facilities.[46] Prison reform was another interest. In 1912 he demanded the abolition of the archaic Charlestown prison, its replacement by a modern institution, and the payment of prisoners for their work at full value.[47] And, of course, at nearly every opportunity he continued to put in a plea for tariff reform and reciprocity agreements.

In terms of bills enacted, probably more was accomplished in 1911 than in any other year, but the second two years of Foss's governorship did witness some significant new measures. The most important political reform in 1912 was the presidential preference primary law. The driving force behind this bill came from the Roosevelt Republicans, but Foss and a large number of Democrats gave it their support. In 1913 the Progressive Party, through its Legislative Bureau, took the initiative in drafting and introducing political and social reforms. By that time Foss's interest in many progressive measures had decidedly slackened. Nevertheless, some of his earlier recommendations were now enacted. For example, the General Court passed for the required second year a referendum amendment providing that measures could be submitted to the electorate for approval or rejection. This amendment was overwhelmingly accepted by the voters in the November election. An initiative proposal failed, but a public opinion law was enacted to allow voters in senatorial or representative districts to render advisory opinions on duly propounded questions.

Foss's three years as Governor coincided with the height of the progressive movement in Massachusetts. Standing as an opponent of bossism and a champion of reform, Foss had certainly capitalized on the widespread interest in progressivism. Yet if his tactics occasionally suggested political opportunism, he did at least assist the enactment of several notable reforms. None of his more conventional Republican predecessors could claim anywhere near

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[46] *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912 and January 3, 1913.

[47] *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912. See also Eugene N. Foss, "Reform Through Labor," American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*, XLVI (March, 1913), 35–39; Eugene N. Foss, "The Ideal Prison System," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, IV, (January, 1914), 674–686.

as much. Nor was it true in every case that he took up reform only when an election was at hand. His fight for reciprocity was certainly a continuing one, and he kept up an interest in prison reform long after his third election as governor. Granted all this, the fact remains that progressives of all parties did not entirely trust Foss. The *Boston Common* concluded:

> He has been shifty and uncertain. What he says at one time affords little light as to what he may subsequently be expected to do. He is something of a bluffer, a good deal of a politician and always a 'jollier.' He is not a constructive statesman.[48]

Certainly Foss had political ambitions. After his re-election in 1911, his name was frequently mentioned as a vice-presidential or even presidential candidate. Foss did little to discourage such speculation. The fact that he devoted half of his inaugural message on January 4, 1912, to national issues was interpreted as an obvious bid for the White House.[49] In the spring of 1912 Foss planned to enter the presidential preference primary, but finally withdrew when he failed to win the support of the Democratic State Committee. Nearly all of the important organization Democrats in Massachusetts favored Champ Clark.[50] As a result, the Foss boom never got off the ground.

The turnout for the Democratic presidential primary was light, but the trend was clear. Clark received over twice as many preference votes as did Wilson. Twenty-one of the delegates were pledged to Clark, fifteen to Foss and none to Wilson. Foss immediately announced that he was releasing his delegates from their pledges. Yet he had not abandoned all hope, for he remained available as a compromise candidate in the event of a protracted deadlock at Baltimore. At the convention he distributed pamphlets entitled, "Foss, the Only Democrat Who Can Win." But the Democratic leaders received him coldly. Nearly all of the Massachusetts delegates voted consistently for Clark until his chances began to

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[48] *Boston Common*, November 2, 1912. It should be noted that this journal was at the same time highly sympathetic to Wilson.

[49] *Boston Transcript*, January 4, 1912; *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912.

[50] *Boston Transcript*, April 5, 1912; *Boston Advertiser*, March 29, 1912; *Boston Herald*, April 3–5, 1912; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, Princeton, N. J., 1947, 381–382, 419–420 note. Wilson was vulnerable in Massachusetts because of the conservative anti-Populist, anti-union and anti-foreign attitude in his *History of the American People*. George Fred Williams, the old radical Democrat, had called attention to this issue in a letter published in the *New York Times*, February 2, 1912.

fade. Only then did they shift to Foss, for whom they voted fruitlessly until Wilson's nomination was assured.[51]

With his presidential aspirations thwarted, Foss's interest in state politics began to revive. Ordinarily after two successful elections, a governor could readily count on a third nomination, but in 1912 Foss's hesitation aided his enemies. Several times before the Baltimore convention he had been quoted as saying he would not run again. Joseph A. Pelletier, the District Attorney of Suffolk County, rushed into the gap with his own bid for the nomination.[52] In what became a hot battle for control of Boston, Pelletier was supported by James M. Curley, who hoped to destroy the power of the Foss-backers, Mayor Fitzgerald and Martin Lomasney.[53] Another threat developed in mid-July, when David I. Walsh, the successful candidate for lieutenant-governor in 1911, told Foss that he, too, would seek the nomination unless he immediately declared his intention to run. On July 15, Foss finally announced his candidacy, and he soon received the support of Fitzgerald, the Boston Democratic City Committee and Chairman Riley of the State Committee. Not until mid-September, however, did Walsh, who reconciled himself to another try for the second position, endorse Governor Foss.[54]

The battle between the Foss and Pelletier forces was a bitter one, but with the power of the state machine behind Foss, his victory at the September 24 primary was no surprise. By that time, however, Foss's credentials as a progressive spokesman were highly questionable. In 1910 and 1911 he had undoubtedly won the support of some liberal Republican and independent voters, but he had failed to unite Massachusetts progressives. Foss's position in the Democratic Party had become all too obviously dependent upon the aid of such Boston politicians as Fitzgerald and Lomasney, men whose names were anathema to most of the reform element. Furthermore, Foss's political aspirations in 1912 gave some basis to

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[51] Michael E. Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics: 1890–1915*, Boston, 1917, 293–294; Frank Hendrick, *Why Eugene N. Foss Should be Nominated For President and Elected*, n.p., 1912, pamphlet in Roosevelt Memorial Association Collection, Widener Library, Harvard University: *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention*, 1912, 197ff.

[52] *Boston Advertiser*, June 3, 1912; *Boston Herald*, July 5 and 16, 1912.

[53] *Boston Herald*, July 18 and August 27, 1912; *Boston Transcript*, August 27, 1912; Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years*, 303–306; Joseph F. Dinneen, *The Purple Shamrock*, New York, 1949, 93–105; Leslie G. Ainley, *Boston Mahatma*, Boston, 1949, 122–125.

[54] *Boston Transcript*, July 15, 1912; *Boston Herald*, July 18, August 7, September 11 and 16, 1912; *Boston American*, September 17, 1912.

the charge that his main interest was in personal advancement, not progressive legislation. Finally, of course, Foss faced a well organized Bull Moose Party in 1912. Progressive voters could choose between him and Charles Sumner Bird on the gubernatorial level, and between Roosevelt and Wilson on the presidential.

While progressives were politically split in 1912, the presence of the third party did aid the Democrats. Foss's vote was well below his 1910 and 1911 total. Yet thanks to the division in Republican ranks, he was easily returned for a third term, accompanied now by a David I. Walsh as lieutenant-governer and a Democratic secretary of state.

Foss had won the distinction of becoming the first Democrat in Massachusetts history to be elected governor three consecutive times. But during his third term his alliance with the Democratic Party was severely strained and ultimately broken. His political power rapidly evaporated. Foss had been useful to the Democratic leaders. When insurgency had been at its height, he had been a moderately good vote-getter as a champion of progressive causes. Unhappily, Foss had not constructed an organization of his own, either within the Democratic Party or as a broader progressive coalition. In 1910 his outspoken independence was an attractive feature for an opponent of bossism; by 1913 this same characteristic led to his isolation as a political maverick.

Possibly Foss hoped that Wilson would appoint him to some national position. No such reward was forthcoming. His chances for another Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1913 were very slight now that he was serving the traditional maximum of three terms. By mid-1913 it appeared obvious that Foss was losing interest in progressivism and the Democratic Party. He attacked the Wilson administration for proposing a reckless and indiscriminate lowering of the tariff, rather than carefully balanced reciprocity agreements.[55] Increasingly he ignored the suggestions of local Democratic leaders and appointed Republicans to state jobs.[56] In July,

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55 Eugene N. Foss, "Reciprocity, the Solution to our Tariff Problem," *Hearst's Magazine*, XXIV, (September, 1913), 405–407.

In July Foss announced that he planned to remove part of his machinery works from Massachusetts to Canada. He asserted that this removal was necessary because of the tariff action of the Democratic Congress and the local "arbitrary and tyrannical" labor leaders. See, "Retreat of a Foss Industry," *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26, 1913), 122.

56 Thomas P. Riley to James E. Handrahan, February 17, 1914, Walsh Papers, Dinand Library, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass. Riley, Chairman of the Democratic State Committee, said the matter of appointments was the chief reason for his break with Foss.

It should be noted, however, that earlier even Foss's opponents ad-

David I. Walsh, supported by Chairman Riley and the state organization, announced his candidacy for the gubernatorial nomination. Shortly afterwards Foss began negotiations with G.O.P. leaders.[57] He held a number of talks with Republican Chairman Hatfield, and then stated his intention to file nomination papers as a Republican. In August, Foss explained to an incredulous public that he had never left the Republican Party. Rather, he claimed, it had left him, while his own record had been consistent in terms of the policies he had advocated. For all his troubles, however, Foss failed to collect the requisite number of signatures for his name to appear on the Republican primary ballot.[58]

Governor Eugene Noble Foss did not retire gracefully. On the last day for filing nomination papers, he entered the race as an independent candidate for governor. He had no major party support, and no chance of success. Yet he might draw enough votes to influence the outcome. With typical effrontery, Foss called upon the Republican and Progressive Party candidates to withdraw in order to prevent control of the state from being turned over to his former allies, the "Tammany trio, Thomas P. Riley, Martin Lomasney, and John F. Fitzgerald."[59] A skeptical voter might well observe that it was rather late for Foss to become concerned over the influence of these gentlemen.

The 1913 election proved to be Foss's last stand in politics. Walsh was elected governor, despite the fact that Foss drew some 20,000 votes. Foss's political career had reached land's end. Although he returned to the Republican fold, the G.O.P. had no use for his talents. In 1917 the former Governor ran unsuccessfully

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mitted that his appointments had usually been good ones. Although some detractors then argued that this fact in itself proved Foss acted only to advance his political career. See, for example, *Practical Politics*, September 16, 1911, 3520.

Foss also had admirers among the Irish Catholic population in the matter of appointments. William H. Sullivan of Boston, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed in the course of a debate in 1918, that "Foss appointed to the judiciary men of the Catholic faith when it required great courage, physical and moral, to do it. . . ." *Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: 1917–1918*, Boston, 1918–1920, I, 915.

[57] *Boston Herald*, July 16, 20 and 22, 1913. The estrangement between Walsh and Foss was due in part to the Governor's attitude toward labor. Workers at Foss's Hyde Park Sturtevant Company went on strike in July. Foss countered by denouncing the union and upholding the open shop. See Dorothy G. Wayman, *David I. Walsh: Citizen–Patriot*, Milwaukee, 1956, 46. See also, "Retreat of a Foss Industry," *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26, 1913), 122.

[58] *Herald*, August 9, 17, 19 and 20, 1913.

[59] Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years*, 348; *Boston Herald*, October 28, 1913.

for delegate-at-large to the constitutional convention. Thereafter until his death in 1939, he never again sought elective office.

Foss's political career was marred by caustic charges and recriminations. He refused to abide by the conventional rules, and he disdained party loyalty. Consequently, first the Republicans and then the Democrats belittled his intentions and minimized his accomplishments. Clearly Foss enjoyed the applause of the crowd, and he had risen to political prominence by exploiting the popular issues of insurgency and progressivism. Still it does not follow that Foss was merely a demagogue. Any politician must be ambitious and must use the issues at hand. Foss's political collapse was largely due to his failure to develop adequate institutional support for his ambitions. If anything, he was too consistently the insurgent. Despite his shortcomings, Governor Foss, with the support of urban Democratic bosses, was probably a more effective spokesman for reform than most of the insurgent Republicans or Bull Moosers in Massachusetts.

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German-Americans and Neutrality in the 1916 Election

In the period between the outbreak of World War I in August, 1914 and the entry of the United States into the conflict in April, 1917, the major objectives of German propaganda in the United States were: (1) to prevent the shipment of munitions and supplies to the Allies; (2) to keep the United States from entering the war as an ally of France and England; (3) to maintain a solidarity of the German immigrants and pro-German elements in the United States behind the cause of the Central Powers.[1] Ultimately all of these objectives failed. Plots and conspiracies to block munitions and supply shipments involving German representatives violated American laws and neutrality, thus contributing to the ineffectiveness of Berlin's propaganda.[2] This propaganda, combined with German attempts to exercise political influence, failed to keep the United States out of the war and failed to create solidarity among pro-German elements. Instead such activities created a distrust of Germany in the minds of many Americans and, more significantly, in the minds of important members of President Woodrow Wilson's Administration.[3]

One of the best examples of how German political and propagandist efforts among the German-Americans backfired occurred in the election of 1916. While Berlin's representatives in the United States did not actively engage in politics themselves, they did support groups and individuals who were attempting to defeat President Wilson with the hope of electing an administration more favorable to the Central Powers. In some cases the efforts of German-American and Irish-American leaders, with whom the

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[1] Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda,* 66 Cong., 1 sess., *Senate Document* No. 61, Washington, 1919, 7.

[2] The course and effect of the plots and similar activities are traced in Thomas J. Kerr, IV, "German Attempts to Influence American Neutrality 1914–1917: A study of the Role of German Diplomatic Officials in Propaganda, Plots, and Political Activities in the United States." M.A. thesis, University of Buffalo, February 1959, 73–116.

[3] This thesis is summarized more fully in *ibid.,* 160–175. The best analysis of German propaganda and its failure to appeal to German immigrants is found in Felice A. Bonadio, "The Failure of German Propaganda in the United States, 1914–1917," MID-AMERICA, XLI (January, 1959), 40–57. Bonadio contends, "... the ultimate failure of German propaganda was the failure to recognize the influence of the American 'melting pot' and its ability to assimilate the one into many."

Germans had been working, clearly went farther than the German Ambassador, Johann von Bernstorff, desired. The result of these efforts was not the defeat of Wilson, but, indirectly, a blow to Berlin.

Before the Democratic and Republican conventions in June, 1916, the leaders of the Teutonic element were already lining up on the Republican side, hoping to influence the "Grand Old Party's" choice for the presidential nomination. The professional German-Americans, those leading German propaganda and German-American organizations, felt that this represented their best chance to defeat the "pro-British" President whom, with increasing animosity, they had opposed on nearly every international issue for more than a year.[4] In mid-1915 the *Fatherland,* a weekly English language periodical run by George Sylvester Viereck, a paid agent of the German government,[5] conducted a poll among 208 German-American papers. This poll indicated that Wilson had lost 92 percent of the German vote because of his unneutral attitude.[6]

While there had been some preconvention talk among German-Americans of supporting Champ Clark for the Democratic nomination, it was soon a foregone conclusion that opposition to Wilson was futile.[7] In the Republican camp the Germans were particularly anxious to block Theodore Roosevelt's bid for nomination. T. R. had become strongly anti-German soon after the outbreak of European hostilities, and the hyphenate leaders felt that even Wilson was preferable to the vituperative "Rough Rider." Thus, they quickly lined up behind Charles Evans Hughes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the strongest contender for the nomination.[8]

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[4] Clifton J. Child, *The German-Americans in Politics 1914–1917,* Madison, Wisconsin, 1939, 43, 64–65, 70.

[5] Frederic L. Paxson, *American Democracy and the World War,* 3 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936, I, 270. For Viereck's own account of his propaganda activities see George Sylvester Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate,* New York, 1930.

[6] *Fatherland,* II (May 26, 1915), 9.

[7] "Teuton Lobby in Congress," *Literary Digest,* LII (March 18, 1916), 699.

[8] Child, *German-Americans in Politics,* 113–114. For a description of the development of Roosevelt's animosity toward the German-Americans see Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914–1917," *American Historical Review,* XLIII (July, 1938), 775–790. For examples of how the German-Americans reciprocated in this animosity see the *Fatherland,* I (November 11, 1914), 8; II (May 26, 1915), 7; III (December 29, 1915), 370; IV (June 14, 1916), 298. Roosevelt felt the German-Americans supported Hughes because it was the only way to beat him; Roosevelt to Herbert W. Packard, September 2, 1916, quoted in Elting E. Morison, *et. al.,* eds., *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,* 8 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951–1954, VIII, 1111–1112.

Many of the organizations infiltrated with Berlin's hirelings attempted to influence the conventions. The American Embargo Conference, a group formed in 1915 with branches in many states, had direct connections with members of the German Embassy and was receiving financial support from it. Some of its funds were to be used to influence the selection of delegates to the national conventions in 1916.[9] Just before the election the Embargo Conference merged with another German-backed group, The American Independence Conference, in an effort to secure the election of Hughes.[10]

While the national charter of the German-American Alliance, the most powerful German-American organization in the country since its formation in 1901, prohibited political participation, state and local branches faced no such obstacle.[11] The Wisconsin Alliance had conceived a plan to dominate the Republican convention, but this proved impractical. Instead, a conference attended by representatives of twenty-five state alliances and sixty agents of the German-American press was held in Chicago in May, 1916, to consider how best to influence the Republican choice. Little action was taken, but local and state alliances did send petitions to the convention opposing the nomination of T. R. and the confirmed Anglophile, Elihu Root, who had been Roosevelt's Secretary of State.[12]

When Hughes was chosen by the Republicans there was rejoicing in hyphenate circles, and, whether the bewhiskered Justice liked it or not, he became the candidate of the professional German-Americans.[13] Interestingly, in 1908 the German-Americans in New York had opposed Hughes' bid for two more years in the governor's mansion because of his strict enforcement of blue laws.[14]

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[9] Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Senate Document* No. 61, 18–20; and Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda*, 66 Cong., 1 sess., *Senate Document* No. 62, 3 vols., Washington, 1919, II, 1495.

[10] *New York Times*, October 11, 1917.

[11] For a description of the formation and composition of the Alliance see Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 2–5; and Albert B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States with Special Reference to Its Political, Moral, Social, and Educational Influence*, 2 vols., Boston and New York, 1909, II, 198–199. For the article of the Alliance's constitution prohibiting participation in party politics and for its program see Rudolph Cronau, *German Achievements in America*, New York, 1916, 218–221.

[12] Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 122–126; Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, Columbus, Ohio, 1936, 90–91.

[13] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917*, New York, 1954, 232.

[14] Editorial in the *Buffalo Courier*, October 29, 1908.

The fact that these people now gave him their unqualified support demonstrates that foreign policy issues, rather than domestic issues, clearly dominated their thinking in 1916.

In any case, the German-Americans could find no consolation in Democratic ranks. While the Republicans had made an appeal to the hyphenates, Wilson moved to turn their already outspoken opposition to him into a political asset. The President insisted that the keynote of his party's convention be Americanism and that a strong anti-hyphenate plank be adopted which, at least by inference, condemned the German-American Alliance and other such groups.[15]

Because Roosevelt was an active and bombastic campaigner for Hughes, he hurt the candidate's stature among the German element, even though it continued to support him. The German-American press almost unanimously backed Hughes, although it really was more enthusiastic in its desire to lessen the influence of T. R., who was referred to as the "Wild Man of Oyster Bay."[16]

State and local branches of the German-American Alliance flocked to the support of Hughes and in some areas played an active role in his campaign. Dr. Charles J. Hexamer, President of the National Alliance, threw his support to Hughes. Although Hexamer gave this endorsement as a private citizen rather than as an official of the Alliance, because of his position it had the effect of circumventing the Alliance's restriction on political activity.[17]

Irish and German organizations, which had been working together formally since 1907, achieved a zenith of cooperation in the political arena that far exceeded their earlier collaborations.[18] This led Viereck to boast in his *Fatherland* that, "We and our Irish comrades have put the Anglomen of both parties on the defensive."[19]

Some of these efforts were of great concern to Ambassador Bernstorff, despite the many connections his staff had with the German-American leaders who were responsible for them. Bern-

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15 Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 233; Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 144–146; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 93.

16 Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 131–135; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 88, 94, 97, 107.

17 Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 121, 134–135.

18 Carl F. Wittke, *The Irish in America*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1956, 275–278; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 89–90.

19 *Fatherland*, V (November 8, 1916), 218.

storff was not strongly opposed to the re-election of the President, as were most of the professional German-Americans, and he found it difficult to control the anti-Wilson sentiment that his agents had aroused.[20] He told the President's confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, that, " . . . it was utterly impossible to influence in any way the rabid German-American vote; . . . they had conceived the idea that the President had branded them as disloyal, and they would take their revenge by voting for Hughes."[21] Probably the Ambassador was referring to such German-Americans as his paid propagandist, Viereck, whose *Fatherland* had been strongly anti-Wilson from an early date and remained so during most of the campaign.[22] Realizing that if Wilson won, the German-Americans, because of their opposition to him, would under no circumstances be able to exert any pressure on the Administration, Bernstorff and other members of the German Embassy attempted to persuade Viereck to tone down his opposition. The editor obliged to some degree.[23]

How much did the members of the Wilson Adminstration fear the attacks of the hyphenates? Colonel House felt that nearly all the Germans were Republicans anyway and their vote would have little effect on the election.[24] Secretary of State Robert Lansing, however, showed more concern. He complained that the ". . . attacks on the Administration reeked with vituperation, slander and falsehood."[25] As early as December, 1914, when he was Counselor to the State Department he had noted in a memorandum to the then Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, that, "Thousands of former friends of the Administration are being converted into bitter adversaries, . . . by reason of the propaganda which is being carried on in an apparent effort to force the Government to adopt a policy favorable to Germany regardless of the fact that to do so would be a breach of neutrality."[26] Some Dem-

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[20] Johann von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, New York, 1920, 256.

[21] Notes of House on his conference with Bernstorff, October 3, 1916, quoted in Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols., Boston and New York, 1926–1928, II, 372.

[22] For example see *Fatherland*, IV (June 28, 1916), 330.

[23] Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 75. See *Fatherland*, V (November 1, 1916), 202–203.

[24] Notes of House on conference with Ambassador Bernstorff, October 3, 1916, quoted in Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 372.

[25] Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing: Secretary of State*, Indianapolis and New York, 1935, 76.

[26] Quoted in U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, 2 vols., Washington, 1939–1940, I, 184.

ocrats close to the President were so concerned that they offered to buy one million copies of the *Fatherland* on behalf of the Democratic National Committee if Viereck would print an article which asked Hughes certain leading questions. They also attempted to convince the Germanophile editor that Wilson had "kept the nation out of war."[27]

There was no doubt where the President stood. He held steadfast in his opposition to the hyphenates, expressing contempt and distrust for a group which he was convinced was dominated by foreign governments. In a Flag Day address just prior to his renomination, he proclaimed:

> "There is disloyalty active in the United States, and it must be absolutely crushed . . . there are those at this moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying, "Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will wreck our vengeance at the polls."[28]

In his formal acceptance speech at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, September 2 the scholarly Chief Executive continued to make political capital out of German- and Irish-American opposition to his re-election. He spoke of active foreign-born groups and combinations, declaring, "I neither seek the favour nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element amongst us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States."[29]

In campaigning for Hughes, Roosevelt was even more abusive of the hyphenates than the President, in spite of the fact that the Republicans were generally attempting to curry the favor of this element. In a typical speech at Lewiston, Maine, on August 31 the Colonel outspokenly declared, "The citizen who endeavors to shape America's policy in the interest of the country from which he or his ancestors have sprung is no true American and has no moral right to citizenship in this country . . . ." He then expressed his scorn for those who had organized in the interest of a foreign power and accused them of being guilty of "moral treason to the Republic." Emphasizing this same theme he continued, "I

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[27] George Sylvester Viereck, *The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, New York, 1932, 159. Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 241–242. Postmaster-General Albert S. Burleson was one of those who approached Viereck, see Wittke, *German-Americans in the World War*, 101–102.

[28] Quoted in Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy*, 2 vols., New York, 1926, II, 207–209.

[29] Quoted in *ibid.*, 282–283.

condemn those professional German-Americans who in our politics act as servants and allies of Germany. . . ."[30]

Naturally the German-Americans bitterly resented Roosevelt's attacks. The *Fatherland* was particularly vocal in expressing this resentment. The German-backed weekly countered that Roosevelt wished to see Hughes defeated in order to further his own ambitions in the Republican Party and that he was trying to do this by alienating those who were demanding "fair play" for the Central Powers. A cartoon pictured T. R. following in the footsteps of Hughes with a long knife and a tank full of poison gas speeches.[31] Viereck lamented that every time T. R. ". . . opens his mouth Mr. Hughes loses 10,000 votes," and warned the candidate to repudiate the former "Rough Rider" or many of those who had been ashamed of Wilson's foreign policies might be more willing to endure them than risk an administration in which Roosevelt had influence.[32] There seems to be little doubt that T. R.'s support of Hughes cost the latter some support among leading German-Americans.[33]

Hughes' campaign was full of blunders and dissension as the candidate attempted to reconcile the support of two bitterly hostile groups. His refusal to take a stand on "hyphenism" enabled the Democrats to portray him as a dupe of the Kaiser in pro-British areas and as a Roosevelt-dominated jingo spoiling for war with Germany in areas with a large Teutonic population.[34]

Before his Lewiston speech, Roosevelt had written Hughes asking for an endorsement of his vociferous denials that the Republican candidate had made any deals with the German-Americans.[35] Hughes replied in a telegram which was released to the press, "I heartily congratulate you on your speech at Lewiston, and

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30 These quotations are found in Roosevelt's speech printed in the *New York Times*, September 1, 1916. In this address Roosevelt wanted to use the phrase "members of the German-American Alliance" but was induced to substitute "professional German-Americans" by his advisers; Roosevelt to Hughes, August 28, 1916, quoted in Morison, *et. al., Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1108–1110.

31 *Fatherland*, V (October 4, 1916), 154–155.

32 *Ibid.*, V (November 1, 1916), 202–203.

33 "The Hughes-Roosevelt Alliance," *Literary Digest*, LIII (July 8, 1916), 56.

34 Wittke, *German-Americans in the World War*, 101–102; Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 150; *New York Times*, November 4, 1916; "Progressive Leaven in the Republican Lump," *Literary Digest*, LIII (September 30, 1916), 818–819.

35 Roosevelt to Hughes, August 28, 1916, quoted in Morison, *et. al., Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1108–1110.

warmly appreciate your effective support."[36] At the same time Hughes was secretly negotiating with German and Irish groups. One such group, the American Independence Conference, was a confederation which included German-backed organizations. To the leaders of the conference Hughes minimized the significance of his endorsement of the Lewiston speech.[37]

Hughes' strongest public statement containing an appeal to these elements was made in Philadelphia on October 9. At that time he made reference to recent British activities, which had not drawn the type of strong protest from the Administration desired by the German-Americans, when he declared:

> "We do not propose to tolerate any improper interference with American property, with American mails, or with legitimate commercial intercourse. No American who is exercising only American rights shall be on any blacklist by any foreign nation."[38]

This statement received praise from the *Fatherland*.[39] But, it was later to cause Hughes considerable embarrassment because it was revealed that it was made as a concession to the leaders of the Independence Conference.[40]

As far as the hyphenate issue was concerned, the master strokes of the campaign were engineered by the Democrats. The President was able to exploit German- and Irish-American opposition to his fullest advantage. Late in September the German-tainted Jeremiah O'Leary, who was one of the leaders of the American Independence Conference and who received funds for some of his activities from the Germans,[41] sent Wilson an abusive telegram denouncing his attacks and his "pro-British" attitude. Shrewdly, Wilson released this message to the press along with the following reply: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or any body like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal

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[36] Quoted in "The Republican Side of the Campaign," *Outlook*, CXIV (September 13, 1916), 63.

[37] Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 136; *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

[38] Quoted in *New York Times*, October 10, 1916.

[39] *Fatherland*, V (October 18, 1916), 171.

[40] *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

[41] For evidence of some of O'Leary's connections with the Germans and for a description of his activities see Senate Committee on Judiciary, *Senate Document* No. 61, 21–22; Mixed Claims Commission, *United States and Germany, Opinions and Decisions in the Sabotage Claims Handed Down June 15, 1939 and October 30, 1939*, Washington, 1939, 22–23.

Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."[42]

This final denunciation of the hyphenates was made even more effective by the dramatic publication of the executive committee minutes of the American Independence Conferences. These had fallen into the hands of the Democratic National Committee and revealed the nature of Hughes' secret conference with representatives of the group.[43] Hughes was forced to admit that the conference had occurred and to make a futile effort to repudiate such support.[44] But, the damage had already been done.

Like most elections, the one in 1916 was far too complex to claim that it was decided by any single issue. Many issues were probably equally as significant as hyphenation. Wilson's appeal as the President who "kept us out of war" may have had more impact among rank and file German-Americans, especially in the Mid-West and Far West, than any of the propaganda against the President that had long appeared in the German-American press.[45]

Certainly the results of the election do not bear out the contention that there was a Teutonic vote mobilized behind Hughes in the interest of a foreign power. Wilson was elected by a combination of Southern and Western support. In states like Illinois, Iowa, and New York where the Republican-Progressive breach had been closed, Hughes was successful, but in the Far West where the "old guard" Republicans controlled party machinery the erstwhile Progressives supported Wilson. In the East, Irish opposition and unenthusiastic Democratic machines in the cities hurt Wilson and enabled Hughes to win all the states but New Hampshire, where Republicans and Progressives were feuding.

States with heavy German populations, like Wisconsin, went for Hughes by a narrow margin. But, Wilson carried such German strongholds as Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Hoboken. In a few places, such as Cincinnati, the German-Americans did follow their leaders. Possibly Minnesota, which went for Hughes by only several hundred votes, would not have been in his column had not several normally Democratic counties which were heavily German voted for him. In Ohio Roosevelt's campaign may have caused

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42 Quoted in *New York Times*, September 30, 1916.

43 Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 245–246; *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

44 *Ibid.*, October 24, 25, 1916.

45 Paul M. Buck, "Pacifism in the Middle West," *Nation*, CIV (May 17, 1917), 595; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 111.

the German-Americans of Columbus and Cleveland to vote for Wilson and thus cost Hughes the state. But, in such states as Washington and Idaho where German minorities voted as a group for the Republican candidate, their action had no effect on the election.[46]

In the long run, the election was very damaging to Berlin's goals of keeping the United States out of the war and mobilizing the German-American element as a political force in favor of the Central Powers. The German-American element, and especially its leadership, emerged from the campaign discredited. The defeat of Hughes was in a sense a defeat for the German-American Alliance which thereafter fell into rapid decline.[47] Thus, the group which was most favorable to the *Reich* was rendered impotent as a political force.

More important than the discrediting of this pro-German element was the fact that many Americans were resentful of what they considered as German interference in American politics. As early as a year before the campaign the *New York World* had claimed, "The German propaganda in the United States has become a political conspiracy against the government and people of the United States."[48] Other papers throughout the country expressed similar resentment at the attempts of German propagandists to influence political currents in the United States.[49] The election reinforced this reaction to such an extent that one authority has described the campaign of 1916 as "the European war in America."[50]

Even more disastrous for Berlin was the effect of the election on the Wilson Administration. Because many of the professional German-Americans and Irish-Americans with whom German diplomats has been known to work were actively engaged in a campaign against the President and his foreign policy, it was only natural that the Administration's distrust of the *Reich* deepened. This was reflected by the President in his campaign references to a small alien minority working in the interest of a

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46 This analysis of the election is based on Buck, "Pacifism in the Middle West," 595; *New York Times*, November 12, 1916; Link, Woodrow *Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 249–251; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 110.

47 Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 154.

48 Quoted in "Light on German Propaganda," *Literary Digest*, LI (August 28, 1915), 388.

49 *Ibid.*

50 Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 153.

foreign power. Perhaps Secretary of State Lansing best expressed this distrust. Looking back on the German activities, he felt that they represented interference by the German Government and its agents in the political situation in the United States—a grievous violation of diplomatic custom. He wrote:

> A government has always resented and rightly, any attempt by a foreign government to influence its people in regard to questions of a domestic nature, and especially those which relate to party politics. No government with a due sense of dignity will allow to pass unnoticed so flagrant a breach of international propriety.[51]

Thus, the German efforts to use the German element in the United States as a political club produced exactly the opposite effect than the one desired. It discredited the German minority and increased the already growing distrust of German motives in the Wilson Administration; a distrust which eventually moved the United States from a policy of neutrality to one of intervention on the side of the Allies.

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[51] Lansing, *War Memoirs*, 76.

Gompers and Racism: Strategy of Limited Objectives

Samuel Gompers was a man of the pre-World War I era who survived into another era without adapting to it. His reputation has suffered from the antagonism he created after 1917. One of the areas in which he has been severely criticized is his racism.[1] A careful study of his attitude toward Negroes has been made by Bernard Mandel in "Samuel Gompers and the Negro Worker 1886–1914."[2] Professor Mandel has traced the policies of the A. F. of L. and Gompers toward Negroes with care. There can be no disputing the accuracy of his scholarship. There can be dispute, however, about what meaning should be attached to Professor Mandel's findings. Mandel's interpretation was that Gompers was a man who

> compromised his principles and fell in line with the narrow policy of the labor officials on whom he depended for his job. The evolution of Gompers' view on the Negro question provides one of the most striking illustrations of his transformation from a militant and radical labor agitator to a conservative, stand-pat bureaucrat.[3]

Professor Mandel's method has been to gather together all of Gompers' statements and actions relating to Negroes and to develop a history of these attitudes. By thus removing Gompers

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[1] Arthur Mann, "Samuel Gompers and the Irony of Racism," *Antioch Review*, XIII (June, 1953), 203–214.

[2] *Journal of Negro History*, XL (January, 1955), 34–61.

[3] *Ibid.*, 34. In other relevent quotations Mandel believes that Gompers' surrender of principles to the "practical" led to successive surrenders, (pp. 51, 54). In a summary opinion Mandel states:

"Gompers had begun with a relatively advanced attitude toward Negro workers. But this attitude was based on a narrow trade union desire to keep the Negroes from competing with white labor, and neglected the broader vision of labor solidarity which marked the policy of the Knights of Labor. Furthermore, the positive aspects of his policy were mixed with a considerable amount of racial prejudice and lack of concern for the special problem of the Negroes. So it was easy for him to retreat to a policy of jim–crowism when his principles were attacked by the trade union leaders who desired to solve the problem by excluding the Negroes from industrial life altogether. In his typically pragmatic way, Gompers could justify the surrender of principle as 'theoretically bad but practically necessary' and finally arrive at the conclusion that it was not even theoretically wrong. He kept the Negroes out of the labor movement and then declared that they deserved no better because they had not made common cause with the white workingman. Thus he sacrificed both his principles and the Negro workingman, as well as the broader interests of the whole labor movement, to the short–sighted and selfish demands of the aristocratic officialdom of the craft unions whose spokesmen he had agreed to be." (p. 61)

racial attitude from its surrounding nexus he has arrived at findings which are accurate, but whose meaning and import seem to have been distorted. Samuel Gompers did not compromise his basic principles, or pander to the prejudices of others. His failing, in fact, was in the other direction. He often held so rigidly to principles that he could not adapt to new situations. In assessing whether or not he abandoned principle, however, it is important always to be sure to make the judgement in relation to *his* principles, *his* basic goals and not those of the investigator or of a period or group to which Gompers did not belong.

In fact Gompers' principles had nothing whatever to do with Negroes. To evaluate correctly any of Gompers' attitudes one must keep in mind two beliefs which underlay every major idea he held, and every important policy he followed. The first of these was his class consciousness, the second his analysis of the function of power in society.

In perhaps the most perceptive interpretation of Gompers ever written, John R. Commons pointed out that Gompers' class consciousness was more compelling than even that of Karl Marx. Marx, when he turned his ideas into action, was glad to accept aid from any quarter. For Gompers, however, anyone not strictly from the working class was an object of suspicion and scorn.[4] He considered class consciousness something to be proud of, and boasted that only trade unions embodied true class consciousness.[5] Moreover he knew exactly what he meant by the term: "those who belong to the class are conscious of the fact, and are conscious, too, of the fact that their interests as a class are separate and distinct from any other class."[6] To Gompers there were quite simply two classes: we and they. Between the workers and the capitalists was a bottomless and unbridgeable gulf. This gulf was caused by the natural and unavoidable conflict of interest derived from the economic fact that the buyers and sellers of any commodity, even labor, were inevitably antagonistic.[7] He saw one eighth

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[4] John R. Commons, "Karl Marx and Samuel Gompers," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLI (June, 1926), 281–286.

[5] *American Federationist*, IV (July, 1897), 99. Unless otherwise indicated all references to this periodical are to the editorials which Gompers wrote.

[6] *Ibid.*, IV (August, 1897), 114.

[7] Gompers to John Elliot, Canton, Ohio, November 1, 1892. Unless otherwise indicated, Gompers' letters are from the letterbooks in the A.F.L.–C.I.O. headquarters, Washington, D.C. Gompers to Frank M. Notton, Ashland, Wisconsin, December 2, 1893; Gompers to P. J. McGuire, Philadelphia, Pa., November 4, 1892; *American Federationist*, VIII (June, 1901), 215; VIII (November, 1901), 479; I (July, 1894), 99.

of society living by exploiting the other seven eighths who actually produced the wealth.[8]

Gompers saw the warfare between these groups in rather simple Darwinian terms. He regarded economic enterprise in general as a species of warfare, in which his side had to defeat the other side.[9] His terminology was insistently military: invade, march, column, enemies, skirmish. He apparently regarded himself not so much as a reform leader, but as a military commander.[10] He regarded labor as a nation within a nation, threatened on all sides by its enemies.[11]

The victory which Gompers sought was not to be gained merely by being right. His troops had to go into battle and wrench their demands from the capitalists.[12] "Liberty has never been conceded to people," he insisted, "Liberty comes from power, and conscious power, and that conscious power intelligently and humanely wielded."[13] Here we come to the question of Gompers' views on the uses of power in effecting social change.

Gompers of course thought that labor's power should be used to its fullest extent. In answering a query as to whether a union might fine a non-member for scabbing he replied: "It is a matter of power, where the union has the power it should punish the crime of scabbing."[14] However just as important as using power to its utmost extent was not using it beyond that extent. Frequently he cautioned unions, especially newly formed unions in which zeal and enthusiasm often outran resources, not to rush into a strike. "Justification does not always lead to successful strikes," Gompers said, "You must not only be right, and be able to justify your position, but you must possess the might and be able to support your right."[15] Gompers, unlike some reformers, recognized clearly the limits of his power.

The problem was that Gompers' power was rather limited indeed. He had to determine how best to apply his slender power

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[8] *Ibid.*, I (July, 1894), 98.
[9] *Ibid.*, VII (June, 1900), 165.
[10] *Ibid.*, VII (May, 1900), 134; VII (June, 1900), 165; VII (October, 1900), 314; VIII (September, 1901), 358.
[11] *Ibid.*, IX (February, 1902), 71.
[12] *Ibid.*, IX (April, 1902), 183; XII (July, 1905), 449; XIX (February, 1912), 101–114; XIX (July, 1912), 553.
[13] *Ibid.*, XII (February, 1905), 74.
[14] Gompers to John B. Lennon, Journeyman Tailors Union of America, August 11, 1890.
[15] Gompers to F. W. Gilwreath, Secretary of Lathers Union 5112, August 19, 1891; Gompers to George S. Burelson, Secretary of Federal Labor Union 5478, August 22, 1891.

against the large might of his enemies the capitalists. Gompers' solution had two parts: first to develop a highly unified body of hard core troops and second to apply his force in a strictly circumscribed area.

To carry the ramparts of its enemies most effectively Gompers thought that a union should be made

> protective in its character. In other words members of the Union should be required to pay higher dues into the Union and to receive a considerable benefit from it and thus to inlist [sic] the material interests of the members in the Union; not so much for the sake of the material interests but for the sake of keeping them in the Union. When that is once secured, progress can be made in any direction. . . .[16]

Gompers simply did not believe that the trade union movement could afford to worry about those who were either unwilling or unable to pay high dues. A closely knit group was for him far more important than a large one. A well known outgrowth of this way of thinking was Gompers' insistence that only true wage earners had a place in the labor movement. "It is essential for us to maintain the purity of our movement, unsullied from partisan or other corrupting influences", he said.[17] At one point Gompers even refused to attend an anti-injunction meeting because he was afraid non-union forces would dominate the meeting.[18]

In the interest of creating a hard core, conflict within the trade union movement had to be strictly avoided. Jurisdictional disputes, expulsion of union men and the like were dangerous, and should be averted.[19] However this by no means meant that union organization and membership should be maintained at all cost. Gompers was willing to have some members drift out of the unions, or even have some locals collapse if the members or locals were weak, ill prepared or not militant enough.[20]

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[16] Gompers to Mrs. T. J. Morgan, September 10, 1891; *American Federationist*, VI (December, 1899), 248.

[17] Gompers to John M. Callahan, General Organizer, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 31, 1892; Gompers to E. H. Cherry, Owasso, Michigan, January 11, 1892; Gompers to S. P. Holmes, Findlay, Ohio, October 8, 1890; *American Federationist*, IV (August, 1897), 115–116.

[18] *Ibid.*, IV (October, 1897), 191.

[19] *Ibid.*, XII (January, 1905), 18; Gompers to Hiram J. Bell, Secretary of Street Car Employes Union 6005, Hamilton, Ohio, May 31, 1893. This desire to avoid internecine fights, plus the A.F. of L. policy of trade union autonomy made it difficult for Gompers to enforce an unpopular policy.

[20] Gompers to Henry Demerst Lloyd, April 18, 1892, Lloyd Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

The very existence of class warfare provided both an imperative reason for a tough united labor movement and also a whetstone against which this economic weapon could be sharpened. Gompers had as one of his principle aims an increase in "the recognition by the workers of the imperative necessity of this twofold unity of trade and class."[21] He was pleased whenever he saw a "growing spirit of solidarity" or a determination on the part of the workers to "work out their own salvation."[22] Indeed, this spirit of solidarity was not only a basis on which trade union organization could be built, but was itself an aim toward which trade union organization tended. Organization cemented "the bonds of friendship and solidarity between organized workers."[23] Unions "led men toward the upper heights of working class unity."[24] A strike, especially a sympathetic strike, could sometimes therefore bring great benefits even if the immediate ends of the strike were not won. "Loyalty, self-sacrifice, fellowship" could be engendered purely by the act of striking.[25] Gompers therefore was willing to strike and risk loosing if unity could thereby be increased in adversity.[26]

This was the weapon which Gompers created in his fight with the capitalists, a hand picked body of thoroughly convinced loyal troops. He also had definite ideas on the best way these troops should be employed against a superior enemy. Rather than steady pressure against a broad front, he was convinced that trade unions should exert sharp pressure in a narrow area.

One manifestation of this strategy of limited objectives was Gompers' original emphasis on purely bread and butter goals: hours, wages and working conditions. Even more specifically, of these three Gompers concentrated first on hours alone. In the spring of 1897 he wrote a series of articles in the *American Federationist* urging the importance of "The Eight-Hour Work Day." The eight hour movement, he thought, should be the first order of business. Union efforts, in the 1890's at least, should be concentrated behind this single effort.[27]

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[21] *American Federationist,* VII (August, 1900), 246; *Ibid., IX* (March, 1902), 112.

[22] Gompers to Emil Applehagen, General Organizer, Duluth, Minnesota, September 11, 1890.

[23] *American Federationist,* IX (January, 1902), 22.

[24] *Ibid.,* VII (October, 1900), 314.

[25] *Ibid.,* IX (October, 1904), 911.

[26] *Ibid.,* VIII (April, 1901), 122–123.

[27] March, April, May, 1897; Gompers to Aaron King, Secretary of Hod Carriers Union, January 12, 1892; Philip Taft, *The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers,* New York, 1957, 142–146.

A well known outgrowth of the strategy of limited objectives was Gompers' gradualism. Recognizing that the union movement could not achieve complete justice immediately, he counseled taking what it could get. He thought pressure should be applied at the weakest point and partial victory accepted.[28]

Gompers' opposition to partisan political activity was another manifestation of this strategy. He had seen trade unions hurt and even destroyed by trying to be both a union and a political organization. He therefore felt that unions should stay out of the "miasmatic atmosphere of political party corruption."[29] He counseled a policy of "masterful inactivity" on the political front, and excoriated both the Knights of Labor and the socialists for trying to bring pressure on both the political and economic fronts.[30] He only abandoned the principle of applying purely economic pressure when he was forced to do so. He was driven from his position by the Danbury Hatters' case. Gompers was dismayed and outraged by this decision which, he felt, took away labor's economic power. The A. F. of L. therefore had to turn to political action for redress.[31] The fact that the Democratic party was receptive to labor's demands while the Republicans were not forced the A. F. of L. to become partisan.[32]

Gompers' theory of the uses of limited power, then, was that a hard core of tough troops should be used against limited objectives. The battle he was fighting was, of course, that of class warfare. In practice this meant he wanted to create a sturdy trade union organization which would not dissipate its strength in a variety of schemes, but would concentrate on first things first. This was the principle upon which Gompers acted. It was this principle to which he held unwaveringly and before which all other goals faded into insignificance. Before this principle the organization of the mass industries, effective political action

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[28] Gompers to George S. Burleson, Secretary of Federal Labor Union 5478, August 22, 1891; Gompers to Aaron King, January 12, 1892; *American Federationist,* V (June, 1895), 70; XVII (February, 1910), 146; XVII (June, 1910), 489.

[29] Gompers to Dennis J. Bulkly, Superior, Wisconsin, September 13, 1900; *Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor,* Washington, D. C., 1891, 15; Louis S. Reed, *The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers,* New York, 1930, 97–103.

[30] Samuel Gompers, "Organized labor in the Campaign of 1892," *North American Review,* CLV (July, 1892), 91–96; *American Federationist,* V (May, 1898), 54; V (August, 1898), 115.

[31] *Ibid.,* XV (March, 1908), 180–192; XV (April, 1908), 276–279; XV (June, 1908), 457.

[32] *Ibid.,* XV (August, 1908), 603; XIX (November, 1912), 889–894.

and racial equality became mere detail. It is in this context that Gompers' racism must be understood.

Within this context he was certainly a racist. His diatribes against the Chinese were as vicious as they are well known. He thought that orientals were completely unassimilable into American culture, and he warned that all of modern civilization would come crashing down if the oriental hordes were allowed into the United States.[33] However Gompers' ultimate appeal was always on the basis of class welfare. Orientals, he insisted were cheap workers who drove Caucasians out of any trade they entered. Only selfish interests and perhaps a few "dilettante sentimentalists" wanted orientals in this country.[34] These Asiatics, he agreed with Kipling, were "a nation with a devil-born capacity for doing more work than they ought."[35] It was on these grounds rather than racist grounds that Gompers concluded "Chinese exclusion is the desire of the toiling masses and must be maintained."[36]

Similarly Gompers was always willing, even in the 1890's, to subordinate Negro equality to trade union strength. He did make statements, both public and private, in favor of equal treatment regardless of race.[37] However right from the beginning he was unwilling to sacrifice the union movement to equal treatment. This is well illustrated by an incident involving two union organizers in New Orleans, John M. Callahan, white and George L. Norton, Negro. Callahan was something less than co-operative with Norton who himself was resented by any white workers he tried to organize. Gompers wrote to both men pleading for harmony between them. To Callahan he said that Negroes too must be organized or they would underbid organized workers. To Norton he insisted that he never made distinctions between white and black, but that effective organization was more important than racial parity. He advised Norton to avoid contact with men who would resent him, to concentrate on organizing Negroes and leave the whites to others.[38] To this point of view Gompers held steadfastly. In 1900 he declared that although discrimination

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[33] *Ibid.*, I (May, 1894), 50;VIII (September, 1901), 362; IX (March, 1902), 125; XII (November, 1905), 833.

[34] *Ibid.*, VIII (August, 1901), 305–306.

[35] *Ibid.*, IX (February, 1902), 70.

[36] *Ibid.*, I (May, 1894), 50–51.

[37] Mandel, "Gompers and the Negro Worker," *loc. cit.*, 34–36 and *passim.*

[38] Gompers to Callahan, May 17, 1892; to Norton, May 16 and 17, 1892.

based on race, sex or nationality was bad, non-discrimination must give way before trade union organization.[39] He repeated this argument on other occasions.[40]

It is wrong therefore to accuse Gompers of being either a hypocrite or a backslider. He had a clear and consistent value system to which he remained true. Was his value system right? In his own terms it was, for Samuel Gompers created a viable labor movement where none had existed before. Out of the shambles after the Haymarket Affair he forged a movement which survived the depression of the 1890's and the violence of the Pullman strike. Gompers did not take upon himself the task of ending all injustice in the world. To others he left the task of achieving justice for Negroes. Moreover these others have been most effective when they have followed his strategy.

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[39] *Report of the Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor,* Washington, D. C., 1900, 23.

[40] *American Federationist,* VIII (April, 1901), 118–120; XII (September, 1905), 131–132. For other examples see Mandel, "Gompers and the Negro Worker," *loc. cit.,* 46–61.

Charles Francis Adams, Antimasonry, and the Presidential Election of 1836

Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy, and not yet thirty years of age, became involved in the Presidential maneuvers of 1835–1836 almost accidentally. Early in, May, 1835, Benjamin F. Hallett, editor of an Antimasonic paper, the *Advocate,* disclosed to him in a chance meeting that the paper was on the verge of failure. The decreasing strength of Antimasonry as a distinct party movement had left the *Advocate* without sufficient financial support, and Hallett told Adams that if the paper was to survive at all, he would soon be forced to accept overtures from one of the two major parties, theWhigs or the Democrats. Hallett confessed that at the moment he preferred the Presidential candidacy of Martin Van Buren, the Democrat, to any other.[1] Adams thoroughly disliked the principles of the Democratic party, but he was angry with the Webster Whigs of Massachusetts for a recent "deal" whereby, for "selfish reasons," they had by-passed his father and elected instead Governor John Davis to the national Senate. Burning with resentment at what he considered a glaring injustice, Adams, who had until recently been active in the Antimasonic movement, decided to encourage Hallett's inclination to support Van Buren, and in fact to join actively in the effect to swing independent Antimasonic support to him.[2] It was an opportunity, Adams felt, "to pay off some scores besides doing what I believe the only advisable thing."[3] Adams and Hallett were soon joined by Alexander Everett, brother of Edward, and late editor of the *North American Review.* The three men decided to cooperate in writing for the *Advocate*, although Alexander Everett at first preferred the idea of starting a new paper. Adams, however, refused any arrangement "built upon the ruins of the *Advocate,*" and Everett finally agreed to make the older paper their organ.[4]

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[1] CFA Diary, May 4, 1835, Microfilm Edition of the Adams Papers. Unless otherwise specified, all quotes from Adams' diary and letters come from this source.

[2] CFA Diary, May 14, 1835.

[3] CFA Diary, May 22, 1835.

[4] CFA Diary, May 14, 1835.

Adams launched a series of articles for the *Advocate*, in which he warned that the Whigs were at least in part the party of Southern nullification. For New Englanders to unite with such men and such doctrines was neither natural nor consistent, he argued, and would necessarily lead to concessions on such fundamental questions as the tariff and internal improvements. Van Buren, on the other hand, he somewhat disingenuously wrote, represented "too many States deeply interested in the liberal construction to be otherwise than liberal himself. . . ."[5]

In June John Quincy Adams returned to Massachusetts from Washington. In the Congressional session just completed he had supported Andrew Jackson's stand on executive power of removal from office, and he now stimulated his son into writing a series of articles defending Jackson and taking issue with Webster, who had called Jackson's removals an invasion of the rights of the Senate. The articles which resulted were printed simultaneously in the *Advocate* and the *Centinel* under the title, "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, by a Whig of the Old School." In the series Charles Francis invoked the opinions of Oliver Ellsworth, James Madison and John Marshall to prove that the Constitution intended to give the power of removal from office to the President alone, and not to subject it, like the power of appointment, to the consent of the Senate. If the fathers of the Constitution had intended to give such power to the Senate, they would have expressly mentioned it, Adams argued, for this was their practice in all cases where they conferred a power of one branch upon any other. The Senate, he wrote,

> is claiming for itself more than its' due share of power. It is endeavouring to reduce the President to a state of dependence upon it for his Officers which will subvert in the end the whole principle of the balance of the three powers so studiously introduced into the Constitution by its framers.[6]

It was a well-reasoned, forcefully presented argument; probably the best piece of political writing Charles Francis Adams ever did. He was conscious of the power of the series, and felt he had succeeded in frightening the Whigs into silence. "I have now the right end of the whip," he wrote, "and mean to apply the lash."[7] Yet he soon began to wonder whether the silence of the

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5 CFA, "Political Speculation," No. 7, "Miscellany" [part of Microfilm Edition of the Adams Papers].

6 CFA, "An Appeal . . . ," "Miscellany."

7 CFA Diary, Aug. 3, 1835.

opposition press was due to fear or to simple indifference. In late August, therefore, he decided to publish "The Appeal" in pamphlet form at his own expense in order to give it a new chance of being read. At first the response was disappointing; the pamphlet sold badly and elicited almost no comment. The fault, Adams decided, lay with the public; they had no taste for constitutional controversies, and moreover, they discouraged "talent when connected with [a] great name."[8] By October, however, "The Appeal" had begun to excite at least some newspaper comment, and sales on it slowly picked up.

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Adams hoped to rally Antimasonic support for Van Buren, but at the same time to maintain a position independent of both major parties. He was fighting Webster and the Whigs, it was true, but this did not mean to him that he must therefore put on "the collar of Jacksonism." "My natural feelings," he wrote, "are in themselves too moderate for any party, and consequently I am regularly walking the path between one side and the other, now and then touching and rebounding immediately."[9] He became indignant with Alexander Everett when the latter suggested taking up "a miserable radical [Democratic] paper" to help affect the fall elections in Massachusetts. To do so, Adams thought, would be a sign of either "degradation or desperation."

> "I must either be expected to bend to a tone which would please the reformers, a tone which I despise, or to raise them to me which is a vain and absurd hope."[10]

Adams was attempting to tread a fine line—to be neither a Jacksonian nor a Whig at a time when the country was grouping into one or the other of these divisions. Moreover, he was attempting to single out serious issues for discussion—such as the President's constitutional power of removal from office—while the community was responding to personalities and the emotional appeal of party politics. Further, he was attempting to throw Antimasonic support to Van Buren, the leader of a party whose policies he did not generally adhere to, and to combat the Whig party

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[8] CFA Diary, Oct. 2, 1835; it was reprinted in the Washington *Globe*, however, and Madison sent Adams a complimentary note on it. (CFA Diary, Nov. 27, 1865.)

[9] CFA Diary, April 14, 1836.

[10] CFA Diary, Aug. 24, 1835.

which, in its New England branch at least, most closely represented his own beliefs.

Yet it was difficult to support the leader of a party without adopting that party's principles. At one time, for example, the *Advocate* printed several standard Democratic attacks on the Bank of the United States, and John Quincy Adams warned Charles Francis that his fight in Congress in favor of the Bank was embarrassed by his son's connection with the paper. Charles Francis objected to the assumption that the opinions of father and son were inseparably united in the eyes of the world, but since he agreed with his father's stand on the Bank issue, he spoke to Hallett about the difficulty.[11] Hallett admitted that he himself was opposed to the national Bank, but claimed that the pieces had been inserted during his absence, and he promised that in future no attacks upon the Bank would be allowed in the paper.[12] Yet the fact that a public stand on such a basic question as the Bank fight had to be suppressed, is indicative of the tenuity of the alliance that bound Charles Francis Adams to the Van Buren group.

On the state level there were even more difficulties in becoming too closely associated with the Democrats, for in Massachusetts two factions of the Democracy were warring against each other. The "Custom House" or "Post" party, headed by David Henshaw, was allied with the Calhoun faction of the national party, and included the Masonic and more conservative elements. The second group, led by Marcus Morton, were strong Van Buren partisans and contained the reform or "loco-foco" Democrats. They had more sympathy with the Antimasons, but welcomed their alliance chiefly for the aid it would give them in overwhelming the "Post" clique.[13] Adams, therefore, had reason to dislike both factions; one for being pro-Masonic and pro-Southern, the other for being too "radical." He thus determined to remain aloof from the internal disputes of his allies and even from specific identification with them.[14] His aim was to convince the Anti-

[11] CFA Diary, Sept. 10, 1835.

[12] CFA Diary, Sept. 11, 1835. Both Hallett and Everett were too uncomfortably "loco–foco" in their inclinations for Adams' taste. Eg. CFA Diary, Dec. 21, 1835: "In truth I am perfectly aware of the fundamental differences of opinion which exist between Mr. Hallett and myself."

[13] Arthur B. Darling, *Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824–1848*, New Haven, 1925, 192, 195.

[14] Thus he refused to make a speech at a Faneuil Hall meeting of all parties uniting on Van Buren. It had been gotten up, he felt, by the Locofocos, who "were working to appear *the* genuine party to the ex-

masons to support Van Buren independently, through their own distinctive organization.

The state election results in 1835 proved better than the *Advocate* group had anticipated. Edward Everett, the Whig candidate, was elected Governor—with Antimasonic endorsement —but the Whig vote was considerably off the previous years' tally in such strongholds as Boston. Moreover, because the Antimasons had supported the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, the Whigs barely squeezed their man into that office.[15] Even more encouraging was the large accession of Antimasonic and Democratic strength in both branches of the state legislature, especially in the Senate. Adams felt that a heavy blow had been struck at Whig prestige in Massachusetts, and that the *Advocate* had emerged as the head "of a very formidable party" in the state.[16]

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Daniel Webster's hope of becoming the Presidential candidate of a united Whig party was blasted in December, 1835, when the Pennsylvania Antimasonic convention chose William Henry Harrison instead, and the Whigs of that state concurred in the choice a few days later. Actually, Webster had never had much chance of becoming the national Whig leader. The stigma of the old Federalist party was too much on him for the taste of the West or South. Charles Francis Adams had recognized the futility of the Massachusetts nomination of Webster as long ago as the previous year, when he had written that the nomination "will not be sustained . . . as a party measure . . . every division of the Whigs will consider this as a signal for making that nomination most agreeable to each."[17]

And this in fact is precisely what happened. Instead of nominating one candidate to oppose Van Buren, the Whigs soon had three regional candidates in the field: Webster from New England, William Henry Harrison from the West, and Judge Hugh Lawson White, a recently estranged Jacksonian, from the South. It

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clusion of . . . the Custom House party against whom they entertain a feud growing out of a division of spoils—To this effect they pounce upon the new acquisition of Antimasons . . . and get up a meeting exclusive enough to drive away all but themselves. . . ." (CFA Diary, Feb. 11, 1836).

15 *American Traveller* [Boston], Nov. 10, 17, 1835.

16 CFA Diary, Nov. 10, 1835.

17 CFA, "Political Speculation," No. 1, Jan. 20, 1835, *Boston Advocate*, "Miscellany."

was hoped that Van Buren would thereby be prevented from getting a majority of the electoral vote, and that the contest would be thrown into the House, where the Whigs felt they had a good chance of electing one of their number. The *Advocate* strongly denounced this strategy and piously objected to any attempt to defeat a choice by the people.[18]

For a short while after the Pennsylvania defeat, the maneuvers of Webster's supporters helped further to complicate the political situation in Massachusetts. Edward Everett, a leader of the Webster Whigs, told Hallett that as it was rumored Webster would withdraw altogether from the race, many of his friends, rather than support any other Whig, desired to join the Anti-masons in a national convention in favor of Van Buren.[19] Further confirmation that some such scheme was brewing came from a Mr. Ward, member of the National Antimasonic Committee, who wrote Hallett asking him to suspend all attacks upon Webster in the *Advocate.* Ward forwarded the information that ten Pennsylvania Antimasons, who had been friendly to Webster, had seceded from the Harrisburg Antimasonic Convention which had nominated Harrison, and now proposed taking up Van Buren. To that end they had nominated thirty-two delegates to meet in a National Antimasonic Convention in May.[20]

Adams, however, had no wish for such allies. He feared that this adherence of the Webster Whigs to the Antimasonic-Van Buren alliance would simply result in "re-establishing the tyrannical and treacherous domination" which the recent election had shaken.[21] Moreover, Adams doubted if the Websterites, once in control of a National Antimasonic Convention, would be able to resist the temptation to nominate Webster (or even Harrison) rather than Van Buren.[22] In any case, it would mean union with some of the Massachusetts Whigs, and Adams felt that "no peace with such allies *can* be lasting."[23] It seems clear that he was more interested in handing a defeat to Massachusetts Whiggery than in gaining allies to help elect Van Buren. Both Hallett and Alexander Everett agreed with Adams that they would at once withdraw from active participation if the union with Webster came to pass.[24]

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18 *Boston Advocate*, July 15, 1835.
19 CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.
20 CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.
21 CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.
22 CFA to JQA, Dec. 28, 1835.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.

In the meantime, they worked hard to prevent it. First they refused to recognize the Pennsylvania seceders as the true representatives of the Antimasonic Party of that state:

> . . . the idea that ten seceders from a Convention of 140 and more . . . six of them from a single burrough of Pittsburgh, assuming the ground that the body exceeded their powers in nominating a candidate for the Presidency, when the six had been instructed to support Mr. Webster, can represent the Antimasons to the exclusion of the Governor and all the men of official influence of the State together with a formal vote of the full Convention declining to be represented, is the height of absurdity.[25]

Secondly, the *Advocate* group decided that the proposed National Convention should be discouraged:

> Even in a single State [Penn.] antimasons could not agree to nominate a distinct candidate . . . how idle to attempt to do it in a Convention of half a dozen States? The argument is conclusive against going into a National Convention, merely to quarrel upon matters not connected with the principles of Antimasonry. In those principles we all agree, but on the Presidency the Antimasons of the different States must act for themselves, separate from a National Convention, according to local circumstances. The next Presidency is not a question of Antimasonry, and cannot be made such. We must act upon it not as distinct Antimasons but as good citizens. . . .[26]

Thus, in effect, the *Advocate* group admitted that their decision to support Van Buren did not rest primarily on a desire to foster Antimasonic principles. Van Buren, it should be remembered, was not even an avowed Antimason. Indeed, when the proposed National Antimasonic Convention did actually meet,[27] the *Advocate* published a stern rebuke to that gathering for requesting statements from both Van Buren and Harrison regarding their attitude towards Masonry. When Van Buren answered the query in a characteristically non-commital way, the *Advocate* praised it as

> . . . the most antimasonic of the two. He [Van Buren] says distinctly that Masonry would be no ground of *objection* . . . Masons have heretofore been *preferred* as applicants for office. . . . It was not our object to break down the Masonic monopoly . . . and then build up an Antimasonic monopoly. . . . Mr. Van Buren . . . has never professed to

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25 CFA Diary, Dec. 26 1835.

26 *Boston Advocate,* January 1, 1836.

27 It was very thinly attended and included only the Pennsylvania seceders, one delegate from R.I., 4 or 5 from Ohio, 2 from New York. (*Boston Advocate,* Aug. 24, 1836.) No nomination was made by the convention.

be an Antimason, nor did the Antimasons of Massachusetts nominate him as an Antimason.[28]

It soon became apparent that many of the Massachusetts Whigs were no more eager to embrace the Antimasonic-Van Buren cause than the *Advocate* group was to have them do so. The *Atlas,* a leading Whig paper in Boston, declared that it had no desire to support Van Buren, but, on the contrary, was determined to stick with Webster until the time should come when the election would go to the House, at which point Harrison or any person might be selected in preference to Mr. Van Buren. The *Globe,* edited by Blair, a Mason, likewise refused to consider an alliance with an Antimasonic group.[29] Whig opposition to union, therefore, tended to take two grounds—some would not support the heir of Jackson, others would not link themselves in any nomination with Antimasons.

Webster himself soon settled the matter by announcing that he would not withdraw as a candidate. The *Advocate* group breathed easier, especially since they had been receiving letters which seemed to point clearly to a plot to nominate Webster at the National Antimasonic Convention which had been proposed ostensibly to support Van Buren. Adams rejoiced that this "union which more than anything was to be dreaded by us" had not been consummated.[30]

With this threat over, Adams threw himself into a heavy writing schedule in an attempt to convince Antimasons to support Van Buren. Many Antimasons were unsympathetic, however, as witnessed by the fact that a meeting of those Antimasons who opposed Van Buren was held in March,[31] and the Websterites in particular had some strong talking points in their bid for Antimasonic support. Webster himself had gone far towards adopting Antimasonic principles and Edward Everett, then the Whig Governor, was known to have similar sympathies.[32] The *Advocate* tried hard to discredit Everett, and stressed the fact that though he had been elected with Antimasonic support, he had used the Governor's office to appoint four Masons to high positions.[33] But Van Buren was hardly an

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[28] *Boston Advocate,* Aug. 24, 1836.
[29] CFA Diary, Dec. 29, 1835.
[30] CFA Diary, Dec. 31, 1835.
[31] As reported in the *Boston Advocate,* March 3, 1836.
[32] C. M. Fuess, *Daniel Webster,* Boston, 1930, 2 vols., II, 41–42.
[33] *Boston Advocate,* May 13, Oct. 14, Oct. 18, 1836.

outspoken Antimason, and tenuous analogies had to be made to convince Antimasons that their principles were any safer in his hands:

> . . . the Whigs . . . are the natural opponents of Antimasonry, the aristocratic and false clamor party of the country, while . . . the Antimonopoly doctrine of Mr. Van Buren and the Democracy, is a kindred principle to Antimasonry . . . taking in not only secret societies, but all combinations of the few against the many.[34]

In a number of articles Adams tried to discourage support of Webster. He stressed the failure of the Massachusetts Whigs to incorporate Antimasonic principles into their program,[35] and declared that their real reason in running Webster was to allow the "Boston Regency" to maintain its hold on state offices.[36] Adams further argued that since Webster could not win anyway, a vote for him really amounted to a vote for White, who would have the best chance of election if the contest were thrown into the house, since the free states would probably divide between Van Buren, Harrison, and Webster. Yet White, Adams reminded his readers, represented "the bitterest, rooted prejudices which exist in the Southern States against us in this quarter."[37]

In two other series of articles Adams took issue with those Antimasons who counselled support of Harrison.[38] First of all, he argued, Harrison was a General, which was a major objection the Whigs had levelled against Jackson. And, like Jackson, Adams felt, Harrison would be "entirely at the mercy of the merest breath of popular opinion . . . without head to devise or hands to execute any plan either for bad or for good."[39] Secondly, Harrison had no more chance of election than Webster, and a vote for him would simply serve to destroy any choice by the people. Finally, Harrison, like White, was unreliable on the slavery question. Both had declared that Congress could not legislate on the subject in the District of Columbia, while Van Buren, though denying the expediency, had at least admitted the right.[40] Van Buren, Adams

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[34] *Boston Advocate,* May 12, 1836.
[35] CFA, "The Presidency," 1836, "Miscellany."
[36] CFA "Plain Thoughts for Plain People," #1, May 10, 1836, *Boston Advocate.*
[37] CFA, "The Presidency," 1836, "Miscellany,"; CFA, "Plain Thoughts for Plain People," #2, May 13, 1836, *Boston Advocate.*
[38] *Boston Advocate,* Jan.–March, 1836.
[39] CFA to JQA, May 18, 1836.
[40] CFA, "To the Unpledged Voter," No. 4, 1836, *Boston Advocate,* "Miscellany."

claimed, represented the antislavery sentiment of the North, though evidence adduced for this conclusion was again unsubstantial:

> A majority of that portion of the democratic party which supports Mr. Van Buren . . . is to be found in the free states . . . and is aloof from the impulses which are carrying the country to Mexico. On the contrary, a majority of the parties which support Judge White and General Harrison, each or both, are directly in the current of popular enthusiasm running in that direction.[41]

In his various articles Adams stressed arguments against voting for the Whig candidates, but he rarely gave positive reasons for supporting Van Buren—for in fact this could not easily be done. On Masonry, slavery, or banking, Van Buren's views were ill-defined and certainly no more agreeable to men like Adams than those of Webster. In truth, Adams' main motive for supporting Van Buren had been to get revenge on the Massachusetts Whig leaders—and this was the one reason which could not be discussed in print.

* * * *

In order to achieve union upon an electoral ticket, a committee of thirteen was organized by the Antimasonic and Democratic members of the state legislature. Adams, though not holding an elective office, was asked to serve on it.[42]

In the conferences of this committee, the differences of opinion between the various factions soon came to a head.[43] In the first place, the Antimasons objected to supporting Van Buren's running mate, Colonel R. Johnson, who was an avowed Mason. On the other hand, the Masons in the Democratic party, the "Post" clique, insisted upon a pledge to Johnson. They also demanded that the nomination of electors take place in the several districts, where Masonry would be stronger, rather than by legislative caucus. The "loco-foco" wing of the Democracy, on its part, wished to have all nominations decided upon by a convention in September. Motion after motion was made until Adams "despaired of a result," but the "steady determination of the Majority [of the Democratic party] to act in good faith" with the Antimasons effectively countered the pressures of the extremists. A joint electoral ticket was

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[41] CFA "To the Unpledged Voter," No. 2, *Boston Advocate,* 1836, "Miscellany."

[42] CFA to JQA, Feb. 21, 1836.

[43] CFA to A. H. Everett, March 9, 1836.

pushed through in which the electors were left unpledged to Johnson, with an understanding that "the Antimasons will not, if elected, vote for him, unless he is explicit with them" as to his Masonic commitments.[44]

Agreement over the electoral ticket, however, did not end the three-cornered feuding between the "Post" clique, the Antimasons, and the "loco-focos." Adams feared that the lack of harmony among the Van Buren men would adversely affect their chance of defeating the Whigs in the fall election. Therefore, when Henshaw, the leader of the "Post" group lost control of the State Democratic Committee and resigned the Collectorship, Adams welcomed the news, for he felt that Henshaw's rumored successor, Mr. Simpson, though also a member of the "Post" party, would be "of far more conciliatory disposition towards the Antimasons."[45] Adams also hoped that there would now be a change in the policy of the *Morning Post,* the organ of the "Post" group, which had previously "tried exceedingly hard to make a quarrel with the *Advocate* for the sake of splitting the party."[46] But increased harmony did not result from Henshaw's loss of power. On the contrary, his attempt to turn the collectorship over to Simpson caused an open breach in the Democratic party.[47] Though he disapproved of this continuous bickering, Adams saw some compensation in the open warfare of his allies in that it would give pause to those Antimasons anxious to absorb their party into the Democracy.[48] Adams, moreover, was by this time not unduly upset over the possibility of Van Buren's defeat, even though he thought it would probably mean the end of his own political career.[49]

Van Buren's most serious drawback in Adams' eyes had always been his disposition "to fawn" upon the Southern States,[50] (despite Adams' public newspaper testimony to the contrary). Events in Congress in the spring of 1836 confirmed this fear, and did much to complete Adams' disenchantment. A bill to exclude "incendiary" literature on the slavery question from the mails was introduced in the Senate, where, although it failed of adoption, it received Van Buren's vote. This news put Hallett "in great

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44 CFA to A. H. Everett, March 9, 1836.
45 CFA to JQA, April 26, 1836.
46 CFA to JQA, April 26, 1836.
47 Darling, *Political Changes,* 196–197; CFA Diary, May 5, 1836.
48 CFA to JQA, May 28 1836.
49 CFA Diary, May 3, 1836.
50 CFA to JQA, May 18, 1836.

agony"; this vote, he claimed, destroyed Van Buren's chances in Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Ohio. Adams was equally horrified; he reflected on "what a miserable thing it was to depend upon a man without settled principles."[51] Still, they would have to continue their support of him, for their course had been marked out, and the alternative candidates continued to seem even less attractive.

John Quincy Adams in the House, had been greatly exercised by a similar attempt there to restrict all resolutions, petitions and discussions pertaining to the slavery question. Unfortunately, his opposition to that effort had re-allied him with the very Webster Whigs whom his son was fighting in Massachusetts.[52] This development slackened Charles Francis' interest in the outcome of the election still further. He had pursued an active political course "mainly with a view to aid . . . [my father], and now that he does not need it, I go on only because I have got into the track."[53]

* * * *

The November election resulted in Van Buren's elevation to the Presidency, though the loss of New York, or Pennsylvania or Virginia, would have thrown the election into the House. Apparently most Antimasons in Massachusetts voted for him,[54] but the state was carried by Webster and remained under Whig control.[55] Adams was "not able positively" to say he was sorry for it,[56] but he did congratulate himself on the part he had played in Van Buren's election:

> I could not help thinking that perhaps my course had saved him his election. When Mr. Hallett's mind was balancing I acted upon it—he in turn acted upon the Antimasonic party here, the party refused to go into a National Convention and thus chilled the action in Pennsylvania. Had a National Convention nominated Harrison, he would have carried Pennsylvania and that would have settled the question—Thus it is that

51 CFA Diary, June 6, 1836.

52 CFA Diary, May 28, 1836; "I was fearful that the slavery question would bring my father up in aid of Mr. Webster again and that thus the State would be swept out of our hands just at the moment we were likely to seize it."

53 CFA Diary, Aug. 27, 1836.

54 Eg. See CFA to B. F. Hallett, Nov. 22, 1836.

55 Fuess, *Webster*, II, 51 gives these figures: Webster—41,287, Van Buren—33,542.

56 CFA Diary, Nov. 15, 1836.

great events spring from little causes. I do not at all repent of what I have done.[57]

The time had come, he felt, to retire temporarily from active politics. He did not look forward with any confidence to Van Buren's administration and this set him off from Hallett and Alexander Everett, his former associates.[58] The parting, however, was amicable. Adams wrote a valedictory piece for the *Advocate* as well as a private note to Hallett in which he proposed "to rest for a time in peace," and recounted with satisfaction his work in trying "to rescue Massachusetts from the Whig grasp." But future support of Van Buren, he added, would "depend . . . upon his acts." "To them," Adams concluded, "I shall look with considerable anxiety."[59]

MARTIN B. DUBERMAN

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[57] CFA Diary, Nov. 23, 1836.
[58] CFA Diary, Nov. 26, 1836.
[59] CFA to B. F. Hallett, Nov. 22, 1836.

Book Reviews

Erastus Corning, Merchant and Financier, 1794-1872. By Irene D. Neu. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1960. Pp. 212. $4.00

Refining an interest in the "American Industrial Elite" which was evident in her 1952 research, Professor Irene D. Neu has moved from group study to individual case history with a skillful treatment of Erastus Corning, creator of the New York Central Railroad. And, incidentally, Professor Neu has successfully moved from an earlier position of co-author (with George Rogers Taylor in 1956) to complete monopoly of her own manuscript in 1960 when dealing with problems of the American railroad network.

Corning, an eastern business man who could believe not only in Jeffersonian Republicanism but also in Jacksonian Democracy, preceded the era of the giant corporation and nationalization of business. As merchant and financier, his business interests ranged from iron manufacturing, to banking, to land speculation, to railroading. These interests were, of course, inter-related and one business enterprise did not terminate when another began. Rather did Corning become involved in all these business pursuits early in his career, and continue to be engaged in each one of them until his death in 1872.

Almost every Corning financial interest, handled in a topical chapter organization by the author, has within its account a tie-in with major American historical incidents. Corning, as an iron manufacturer, was involved in the building and financing of the *Monitor* and other ironclads in the Civil War. This association, in addition to other profitable government war contracts, could be accomplished without hesitation even though Corning was politically opposed to war and to the Lincoln administration. Corning, the banker, could politically approve of the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States on the grounds that the Bank was an example of federal encroachment on states' rights. Realistically, he could view the Bank of the United States as thwarting New York financial interests in behalf of the interests of Philadelphia, and later, grudgingly but again pragmatically, permit his state bank to become a national bank at the proper time period.

Professor Neu wisely emphasizes that Corning, in his role as railroad president, profitably tied his position to Corning, iron manufacturer and dealer. Investigations brought censure, but did not prevent collaboration. Further emphasis made by the author is that in the creation of the New York Central, Corning, for all his organizational genius, had his blind spots. Although he forged a twenty-three million dollar, three hundred mile railroad network from a four and a half million dollar, seventy-eight mile short line railroad, he never grasped the importance of a dependable rail connection with New York City. Corning relied too heavily on the Hudson River as proper access, and thus strategy perfection was bequeathed

to Vanderbilt. These two, in interesting fashion, seemed not to disapprove of one another, and were somewhat sympathetically kin in the business world of mid-nineteenth century.

Corning's extensive land speculation in both eastern and western states, his involvements with western merchants as well as eastern financiers, plus the fact that "Corning's railroad investments were so widespread that it would have been possible for a traveler at the end of the 1860's to span the continent riding exclusively on lines in which the Albany capitalist had a large interest," made Corning "an important figure in America's economic growth." Students of economic history will be pleased that Professor Neu has added another detailed account to the growing list of studies on American capitalists; students in other areas will be pleased with the readability of a business biography.

WILLIAM T. DOHERTY, JR.

University of Mississippi

The Trumpet Soundeth: William Jennings Bryan and His Democracy, 1896–1912. By Paul W. Glad. University of Nebraska Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 242. Illustrated. $4.75.

For most Americans who have grown up since World War I the image of William Jennings Bryan is a rather blurred and not very flattering montage composed of Bryan Delivering the Cross of Gold Speech; Bryan, the Three-Time Loser of Presidential Campaigns; Bryan, the Grape Juice Diplomat; and, very prominently, Henry Mencken's Bryan at the Scopes Trial, "... a charlatan, a mountebank, a zany without shame or dignity." In *The Trumpet Soundeth* Professor Paul Glad of Coe College has attempted to rescue the Commoner from his bad historical press by focusing diligent research and a sympathetic approach upon Bryan's role as leader of the opposition party from 1896 to 1912.

To Professor Glad, Bryan represented the peculiar intellectual product of the Middle Border in the last half of the nineteenth century, a product conditioned by the frontier, by the morality of "evangelical, revealed Protestantism," by the ethics of the McGuffey Readers, and by the cultural impact of the Chautauqua movement. To readers interested in intellectual and social history the early chapters of *The Trumpet Soundeth,* those dealing with Bryan's formative years and with his "environment determinants," are likely to be especially rewarding.

As a presidential candidate Bryan was never able to secure the American voters' endorsement of his brand of Populism-Progressivism, but in the twenty years between the Battle of the Standards and America's entry into World War I he had the satisfaction of seeing an impressive list of policies and programs, which made up "Bryanism," enacted into state and national law and embodied in constitutional amendments.

Professor Glad does not, of course, assign exclusively to Bryan the credit for tariff reform, the increasing regulation of business, a graduated

income tax, women's suffrage, or a host of other reforms of this era, but he does clarify Bryan's role in these various movements, and, in the process, makes an effective argument for the thesis that Bryan was "remarkably consistent" in his devotion "to the idea that the people must rule. . . ." Bryan's "consistency and fidelity" to the principle of majority rule, in Glad's mind, account for the apparent (but not real) contradictions involved in the Commoner's positions in respect to such issues as academic freedom and Oriental immigration.

The research, style, and interpretation of *The Trumpet Soundeth* makes it a significant addition to the literature of the Progressive era and mark the author as a most promising member of the new generation of American historians.

J. Robert Constantine

Indiana State Teachers College
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The Constant Captain, Gonzalo de Sandoval. By C. Harvey Gardiner. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1961. Pp. x, 224. $4.50.

In this work Professor Gardiner draws on his ready knowledge of the conquest of Mexico to put bones and sinews on the shape of the gifted chieftain Gonzalo de Sandoval. In ten tempestuous years 1518–1528 Spain took firm hold of the new world. Those were the years when Sandoval served Cortés as his right arm, in battle and in the more difficult task of ruling over the conquerors and the conquered. He deserves to be remembered, for he was completely trusted by the great captain and he took part in most every siynificant move of that epochal triumph. His last act of devotion was to accompany his leader back to Spain in 1528. At the end of the voyage he fell sick and died within sight of La Rábida whence Columbus had drawn his great inspiration.

The book is rather a vignette than a full biography, and as such its appeal will be to the general reader. In a way it had to be such a book. For little written record survived the auburn-headed youth and his notable career. Aside from the extended notice given him (later) by Bernal Díaz there are only a few signatures and incidental data in memorial accounts to offer more than a clear outline of his part in the campaign. Accordingly the chief merit of the composition would appear to be a singularly definite sketch of military action and political organizing in that important decade. Here Gardiner is at home with his study of the horses in the conquest and his close acquaintance with its personnel.

The style is interesting though somewhat hurried in spots with repetitious phrases and frequently inverted sentences. The bibliography, almost all in Spanish, limits its entries to works cited in the text. The publisher met his responsibilities with distinction.

W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.

Xaxier University, Ohio

The Mexican Revolution, 1914–1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes. By Robert E. Quirk. University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1960. Pp. 325. $6.25.

This is not just a good book, it is a very good book, clearly, capably and authoritatively written. It is a day by day account of the clash of militarists who for two long years pillaged, murdered, and raped in the cities of Mexico in a fanatical scramble for control of the nation after the passing of Porfirio Díaz. It is the tragic story of the subjugation of 15,000,000 kindly people to the caprices of some 160,000 caudillos, politicians, and soldiers. It is a narrative of armed revolt as opposed to the democratic process of election, a narrative that could have been written of any one of a hundred similar revolutions that plagued Latin America from Bolívar to Fidel Castro. This revolution, fortunately, found a biographer competent to expose for the instruction of students and statesmen the dictator mentality of *politicos* who have dominated in the nations south for a century and a half.

Professor Quirk is brief in setting the scene for his detailed study. Porfirio Díaz, whose benevolent dictatorship had raised Mexico from bankruptcy to prosperity during his role of twenty-six years to 1910, was then eighty years old and was seeking a successor. He failed to find one, but word got abroad and soon the caudillo governors of states and sundry "generals" armed their cohorts to capture the presidency, each wedded to the opinion that his was the only plan for running the government, particularly the ample treasury and profitable oil wells. Madero and Carranza were already in revolt in the northeast, Pancho Villa was in the north, Obregón and Calles were in the northwest, Zapata was in his southern stronghold, and the Porforistas, among them Victoriano Huerta, were holding out in Mexico City. In 1911 Díaz went into exile. Madero succeeded but was completely unwanted, except by interests in the United States, and after the bloody days of February 1913, was assassinated. Huerta held the capital until President Woodrow Wilson joined the chorus of Mexican revolutionaries and decreed: "Huerta must go!" From this point Professor Quirk enlarges on events, carving his fascinating record chiefly from virginal sources.

The central theme is the Convention of Aguascalientes and the three main sources are the personal archive of General Roque Gónzalez Garza, president of the Convention, the papers in the State Department archives in Washington, and the newspaper collections in both countries. The Convention was called by Carranza, who arrived in Mexico City on August 18, 1914, after General Obregón had made things safe for the First Chief. The description of First Chief Carranza occupying the best home in Mexico, the ousting of civilians from homes, the shooting of "enemies," and the looting is memorable. Only Carrancistas were admitted to the Convention, and Obregón soon ousted all civilians. Thus, the vast bulk of Mexicans was unrepresented, a pattern that was to be followed through the years of the one party system. This was The Revolution. The Convention then went to Aguascalientas where Zapatista and Villista representatives joined

in the chaos. "Citizen" Carranza holed up in Vera Cruz until Obregón had routed Villa and had driven Zapata into his mountain hideaway.

One is appalled at the prevalent inhumanity, the murders, injustices, wanton destructions, eliminations of neutrals and opponents and all who had ability to administer locally and nationally. The most concrete illustration of the mind of The Revolution is the vivid description of "A Meeting of Titans," Zapata and Villa, plotting the destruction of Carranza and casually exchanging men for execution. (Pp. 135–141.) And no less interesting is the chapter on "The Hapless City," which depicts the tragic invasions of the capital. A source of wonderment is the utterly unrealistic attitude of Wilson, Bryan and Lansing, even though American agents, news correspondents, and the foreign diplomatic corps were sending accurate reports on events, indicating the abiding hatred of the United States and its democratic principles on the part of Carranza and the militarists and the hopefulness on the part of the millions in Mexico that the United States would intervene.

A singular omission is noticable. Only once does Professor Quirk refer to the all-important oil interests, and that in passing. As one who lived through later revolutions in Mexico, this reviewer notes that our West Coast oilmen, especially Edward L. Doheny, were backed by Díaz and that prior to his passing the Eastern oilmen were bent upon obtaining concessions. Díaz had granted rights to Doheny on the condition that West Coast interests should never sell out to the East. Huerta, too, favored the condition. Perhaps Professor Quirk intends to cover this subject in his forthcoming study on Wilson's policy.

Jerome V. Jacobsen

Loyola University, Chicago

Nationalism: A Religion. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1960. Pp. vii, 187. $5.

Just what can a reviewer say about a volume written by a dean of historians, whose influence as a teacher by word and book reaches back into the generations and whose writings have merited numerous medals, honors awards? Professor Emeritus Hayes for forty years has been a keen observer of the origins, manifestations, and effects of nationalism, as his books testify. Now he protests that this present study is not an exhaustive book. "It is simply a précis, a brief summing up, of what one person, through a lifetime of study, has conceived and learned about nationalism, with special regard to its story in Europe and with tentative reflections on its present course on other continents." (P. vi.) It is indeed an admirable summary. It has the familiar Hayes' readability, understandable to general readers, orderly, logical, and gracefully written. It will prove a guidebook in seminars of the future. Scholars will appreciate the broad vision of the veteran scholar.

Hayes brings the customary definition of nationalism into focus with our contemporary world, then surveys the religious sense of man as it survives in Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and extends it to the religions of communism and nationalism. In tracing nationalism from primitive social units through its rise to modern political nationalism he finds no continuity of the religious sense in medieval times. However, the roots of modern nationalism were in European Christianity, and its seat was England.

How nationalism became a religion in France during the French Revolution and its advance there and in Europe from 1800 to 1870 is the theme of chapters five and six. The following two chapters reveal the "blatant" nationalism of industrialized society from 1864 to 1914 and the flare-up of nationalist imperialism from 1874 to 1914. Nationalism was the cause of World War I, and its effects were evident in the rise of national groups. Totalitarian nationalism, a newer religion, brought about World War II. The final two chapters are highly thought-provoking: "The Contemporary World and Nationalism," in the cold war, and "Reflections on the Religion of Nationalism." Hayes' final words are a plea to hold fast to the traditions of Christianity in the explosions of the religion of nationalism around the world.

JOSEPH ROUBIK

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Notes and Comments

Well Mary: Civil War Letters of a Wisconsin Volunteer, edited by Margaret Brobst Roth and published last year by The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, does real credit to the earnestness of university presses in preserving the details of Americana. The editor, granddaughter of both the writer and the recipient of these letters, has left the original form intact, even down to homely and ungrammatical expressions, and has included helpful maps and illustrations, a bibliography and necessary annotations. The letters cover the second half of the Civil War, from March, 1863, when John Brobst, a raw western Wisconsin volunteer from the farmland joins the Union Army, through his experiences in various Southern campaigns, to the time when he is mustered out in June, 1865. The psychology of a soldier appears repeatedly throughout the letters—the boredom, the dissatisfaction with conditions, the need of sustaining morale through letters, the boost to the feelings of a floundering young man through actively promoting a cause. The recipient of the letters, Mary Englesby, orginally had only a tenuous friendship with Brobst, but through the medium of this correspondence a romance developed, which obviously proved to be Brobst's chief morale-preserver in recurrent periods of low spirits. The University of Wisconsin Press is to be congratulated for the handsome manner in which it has published this book. The list price is $4.00.—W.R.T.

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A Career Diplomat. The Third Chapter: the Third Reich, by Hugh R. Wilson, Jr., was published by the Vantage Press, in January of this year. Hugh R. Wilson, father of the author, as a career diplomat had produced two books of memoirs, *Education of a Diplomat* and *Diplomat Between Wars.* He had promised a third but owing to his untimely death left the promise unfulfilled. Now his son has presented not a biography or an account of the many diplomatic posts held over the world by Wilson but a collection of his correspondence as Ambassador to Germany from March 3 to October 26, 1938, his Berlin Diary from February 16 to November 15, 1938, and his confidential correspondence from 1938 to September 1939, when he resigned as the last pre-War II

Ambassador to Berlin. Wilson then became a member of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Affairs under Cordell Hull. The book is short, 112 pages, but gives many interesting details of the problem Hitler had created and interesting observations on the possible outcome of the Nazi moves. The list price is $2.75.

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A Change and a Parting, My Story of Amana, by Barbara S. Yambura in collaboration with Eunice Willis Bodine, illustrated by Dale Ballantyne, was published last year by the Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. It is a series of vignettes of Amana, a group of seven villages southwest of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, which came to be built in 1855 by German immigrants who had founded the True Inspirationist religion and had arrived in Iowa to live a communal life. It was typical of many such socio-religious enterprises that had sprouted in this country, isolated, utopian, and apart from any higher control than their church elders. Coming to mind immediately are the other like communities: the Quakers, Shakers, Holy Rollers, Zionists, Amish, Mormons, Dunkers, and Dukhobors. Rarely, however, is there a book written by one who had been inside the community. In this case Barbara Yambura did so live and left Amana at the time the economic isolation was failing. As an "outsider" she recalls the people and their way of life in "old Amana." Now the Amanas have adopted the capitalistic system and are widely known for their diversified manufactures, though they maintain the Amana religion. The volume of 361 pages is listed at $3.50.

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The first volume of *Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers of Luther Hartwell Hodges, Governor of North Carolina,* covering the years 1954-1956, edited by James W. Patton, was published last year by the Council of State of North Carolina at Raleigh. The custom for this set of publications has been to wait until the retirement of a governor before bringing out his writings, and then only in a single volume. Governor Hodges, however, finished the term of the late Governor Umstead from 1954 to 1956, when he was returned to the office for four years, hence a second volume will be needed to cover that period. The present volume is well edited and printed with suitable illustrations and a good index in 691 pages.

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The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, has performed a noteworthy service to students and teachers plagued by the cost of books by publishing in paper cover *La Follette's Autobiography,* first copyrighted in 1911 as *A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences* by Robert M. La Follette. Allan Nevins in a Foreword indicates the great significance of the work in the battle of the reformers and the Progressives against bossism and the crusading belligerence of Senator Bob of Wisconsin. The book runs to 339 pages in very readable type and is listed at $1.95. The cloth bound volume is $6.00.

* * * *

The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702, by Charles W. Arnade, is vivid and detailed narrative of the British attack on the venerable Spanish town and fortress of San Agustín in Florida at the beginning of Queen Anne's War. The monograph is only sixty-seven pages in length, but it has been prepared carefully from original documents, maps and charts. Besides facsimiles of contemporary illustrations of the town and fort the pages include excellent maps portraying each naval and infantry movement including the time and numbers involved. While the book is a product of research it is also of interest to general readers. Originally published as No. 3 of the University of Florida Social Science Monography Series, listed at $2, it is republished now by the St. Augustine Historical Society for $1, and may be obtained from the University of Florida Press, Gainsville.

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Francisco de Miranda, by Philip John Sheridan, was published last year by The Naylor Company of San Antonio, Texas. The author had no intention of superseding the great works of William Spence Robertson on the "precursor" of the revolution in Latin America nor of re-evaluating the doings of Miranda, but rather he wished to make available a readable and accurate account of the man for the average student. In this he has succeeded. His book is well printed, contains a suitable bibliography and index within its eighty-three pages, and is illustrated. The list price is $3.

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The Latin Americas, edited by D. L. B. Hamlin, is a collection of papers read in August 1960 during the 29th Couchiching

Conference, sponsored by The Canadian Institute of Public Affairs, with the cooperation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The papers were presented with the purpose of making the Latin Americans better understood in Canada. They are twelve in number, delivered and commented upon by scholars from the nations to our south. They are marked by friendliness and informality, as also are the discussions, and are well worth reading. The paper-bound book of 126 pages is listed at $1.50 and may be obtained from University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada.

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An Historical Review

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MID-AMERICA

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Grangerism in Champaign County, Illinois, 1873-1877

The last thirty years of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of regional and national farmers' organizations designed to improve the social, intellectual, and economic status of their members through cooperation. The Patrons of Husbandry or the Grange as it was more commonly known was the first national association to attempt to rouse the farmers from their apathy. During a brief period of less than a decade it sponsored a broad program which left a clear imprint on subsequent agricultural development. Besides securing notable victories over the farmers' foremost opponent, the railroads, the Grange contributed toward the education of the rural community, began a breakdown of agrarian isolation, and planted the seeds of cooperation among a class noted for the independence and self-reliance of its members.[1]

To an amazing degree, the establishment of the Patrons of Husbandry was the work of one man. In 1866, Isaac Newton, United States Commissioner of Agriculture, directed Oliver Hudson Kelley, a department clerk who had farmed near Itasca, Minnesota, for fifteen years, to make a survey of agriculture in the former Confederate states. Discovering that economic conditions were

[1] For a summary view of agrarianism and its results, see William B. Bizzell, *The Green Rising: An Historical Survey of Agrarianism*, New York, 1926. Agricultural organizations existed in the United States for a century before the appearance of the Grange. Such groups, however, consisted of groups of gentlemen farmers devoting their attention to problems of practical agriculture and they were manifestly unsuited, both in organization and objectives, to fill the need of farmers caught in the rush to the "great barbecue." See Solon J. Buck, "Agricultural Organizations in Illinois, 1870–1880," Illinois State Historical Society, *Journal*, III, No. 1 (April, 1910), 10; "History of Our Rural Organizations," United States Commissioner of Agriculture, *Report*, 1875, Washington, 1876, 437–468.

distressing but that the spirit and attitude of the farmers equalled or excelled their economic status in degradation, Kelley concluded that an organization designed to improve their social and intellectual situation was needed. Consequently, Kelley explained his hopes and plans to friends and in December, 1867, he and five government clerks held a formal meeting, declared themselves to be the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, and officially launched the organization. As constructed by Kelley and his associates, the society was comprised of organizations on the local, state, and national levels. Local bodies, when organized, included a minimum of nine and a maximum of thirty persons "interested in agriculture," with minimum ages of eighteen and sixteen for men and women respectively. An official, elected annually and known as the master, headed each subordinate grange. State groups were composed of masters and past masters of local bodies, and the National Grange included similar officials representing the state organizations. Individual members received degrees upon their initiation into the order and upon evidence of their proficiency in the work. In all there were seven degrees, the first four conferred by the subordinate granges, the fifth by the state groups, and the sixth and seventh by the National Grange. A separate classification, differing only in the titles of the degrees, was established for women. The founders also formulated a secret ritual, based largely on that of the Masonic fraternal order, developed a regalia for members and a set of ceremonial tools, and drew up procedures to be followed at the meetings.[2]

Having supervised the launching of the order, Kelley early in 1868 set out on an organizing trip through the Middle West. Little success greeted his first efforts, however; the farmers were yet to feel the pinch of hard times and they displayed slight interest in an association promising little in concrete rewards. In addition, Kelley's mistaken belief that granges could be organized in cities handicapped the work. By the end of 1868 only ten locals existed, and six of these were in Minnesota. The great period of expansion did not commence until 1872 when farmers, reacting to deteriorating economic conditions, seized upon the Grange as a protective device. At the same time, the decision of leaders

[2] Solon J. Buck, *The Granger Movement*, Cambridge, 1913, 40–44; Oliver H. Kelley, *Origin and Progress of the Order of the Patrons of Husbandry*, Philadelphia, 1875, 11–90, 175, 252, 325, 365; Thomas C. Atkeson, *Semi-Centennial History of the Patrons of Husbandry*, New York, 1916, 11–22.

to emphasize opposition to railroad extortions and support of cooperative enterprises stimulated farmer interest. Consequently, 1,105 locals appeared in 1872, 8,400 the following year, and by January 1, 1875, 21,697 subordinate granges existed in the United States.[3]

Since the Middle West proved to be the most fertile ground for the new society, Illinois received early attention from the leaders. The first grange in the Prairie State was formed by Kelley in Chicago, April 23, 1868. Having corresponded for several months with Henry D. Emory of the *Prairie Farmer,* Kelley in the course of his first organizing trip visited the journalist, who succeeded in recruiting a group of ten persons willing to become members. Although their relationship to the realities of agriculture was vague, Kelley familiarized them with the ritual and secret work of the organization, granted a dispensation,—the fourth since the establishment of the order—collected the required $15 fee, and named the club the Garden City Grange. The embryonic group promptly failed, thereby illustrating the failure of Kelley's early policy of establishing granges in urban areas, and it was not until November 27, 1869, that the Patrons of Husbandry was permanently established in Illinois with the organization of Eureka Grange at Nunda in Henry County. A second working grange appeared in the same area a month later, but during the next two years growth continued to be distressingly slow.[4] The objectives of intellectual and social improvement proved to be no more attractive to Illinois farmers than to those elsewhere, and not until the leaders became cognizant of the limitations of such goals did the Illinois rural community turn to the Grange in appreciable strength.

The first effort by Kelley to shift the emphasis of the Grange to economic cooperation and resistance to railroad excesses was made in Illinois, where even before the Civil War farmers had not been hesitant in voicing their demands. As early as September, 1858, a rural convention which met in Centralia produced a comprehensive statement of farmers' grievances and rights, but the eruption of the slavery controversy into open conflict post-

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[3] Fred A. Shannon, *The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860–1897* (Vol. V of *The Economic History of the United States,* Henry David and others, eds., New York, 1945), 329–330; Buck, *Granger Movement,* chart following p. 58.

[4] Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry,* 97, 212–213, 217; Jonathan Periam, *The Groundswell: A History of the Origins, Aims, and Progress of the Farmers' Movement,* Cincinnati, 1874, 138.

poned the rural uprising for more than a decade.[5] By 1870, however, agrarian discontent reappeared and led to a "Producer's Meeting" at Bloomington, April 20, 1870, where delegates adopted resolutions calling for railroad regulation and appointed a committee charged with the responsibility of organizing town and county transportation leagues. Kelley attempted to capture this movement for the Grange by sponsoring the organization in June, 1870, of a temporary state grange, although the number of locals in the state did not justify such action, and by naming Henry C. Wheeler of Du Page County, a leading member of the Bloomington convention, as secretary of the state group. The failure of the conclave to provide workable machinery[6] doomed the transportation leagues and made Kelley's move abortive, but it indicated a growing awareness among granger leaders of those problems considered most pressing by farmers.

Undaunted by temporary reverses, Kelley and local leaders, aided by the journalistic support of the *Prairie Farmer,* continued indoctrination work with Illinois farmers. Late in 1870 the National Grange adopted the policy of appointing organizing deputies, and in June, 1871, one of these officials appeared in northern Illinois where he succeeded in establishing five new locals by the end of the year. Thereafter, growth was rapid. In August, 1872, Illinois contained forty-five granges, twenty-one of them in Henry County alone, and by the end of the year the total reached sixty-five.[7] To stimulate the work further, officials strengthened the organizing corps until by August, 1873, there were at least sixty-two agents laboring in Illinois. These men, aided by growing economic distress, sowed and harvested so well that by November 15, 1873, Illinois boasted 712 local granges and on January 1, 1875, when the movement reached its height, a total of 1,533 subordinate bodies existed, giving a ratio of one local to each 130 farms in the state. Officials claimed a total membership of 115,000 persons.[8] The rapid growth after 1871 necessitated the reestablishment of the state grange which had been totally dormant since its premature formation in 1870. On March 5, 1872, Kelley and delegates from twenty locals gathered at Dixon, formed the perma-

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5 *Ibid.,* 204–206.

6 *Ibid.,* 225–230; Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry,* 245–246, 269–271.

7 *Ibid.,* 289, 333, 339; *Prairie Farmer,* XLIII, No. 35 (August 31, 1872), 272; *ibid.,* XLIV, No. 1 (January 4, 1873), 3.

8 Periam, *Groundswell,* 142; Buck, *Granger Movement,* chart following p. 58; *Chicago Tribune,* December 30, 1872, 2, January 14, 1875, 7; U. S. *Ninth Census: The Statistics of Wealth and Industry,* 340.

nent state body, and selected as master Alonzo Golder of Rock Falls, thereby placing the association in Illinois on a firm basis after almost four years of effort.[9]

The Grange appeared in Champaign County in 1872, but the order counted only two locals there by the end of the year. The distance from northwestern Illinois, the early center of granger strength in the state, hampered the work. But from a total of two late in 1872 the number of locals increased to nine by March, 1873, and to thirty-one by the end of that year. Three months later a total of thirty-eight subordinate granges was operating. No membership figures for the county are available, but it is clear that the percentage of organized farmers was higher than in the state as a whole. In 1870 Champaign County included 4,182 farms; consequently in March, 1874, there was one grange for each 110 farms,[10] and it is safe to state that at the height of the movement fully thirty per cent of the Champaign County farmers was connected with the society.

The rapid expansion of 1873, coupled with the desire to form a group capable of more comprehensive cooperative efforts, led to the establishment of a county grange, although such intermediate bodies were not authorized by the National Grange until February, 1874. On September 19, 1873, sixty-four delegates representing twenty-four granges met in Tolono, organized the Champaign County Association of the Patrons of Husbandry, and adopted by-laws similar to those used in a comparable body in Polk County, Iowa. Under these rules the county grange was composed of masters and past masters of subordinate granges and their wives, who had achieved fourth degree status in the order. One additional delegate was granted to each local for every twenty members. The county grange met quarterly in regular session, in January, April, July, and October. Officers were elected at the first meeting of the year. The organization supported itself financially by levying a fee of fifty cents on each delegate, who was reimbursed by the local he represented.[11]

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[9] Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry*, 374; *Prairie Farmer*, XLIII, No. 11 (March 16, 1872), 81; C. C. Buell, "Patrons of Husbandry," Illinois State Department of Agriculture, *Transactions*, 1872, Springfield, 1873, 202.

[10] *Prairie Farmer*, XLIV, No. 14 (April 5, 1873), 108; *Champaign County Gazette*, March 25, 1874, 4, October 8, 1873, 4; U. S. *Ninth Census: The Statistics of Wealth and Industry*, 349.

[11] *Champaign County Gazette*, September 3, 1873, 4, September 24, 1873, 4; Champaign County Grange, MSS By-Laws, Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, September 19, 1873, October 17, 1873, located in Illinois Historical Survey, Urbana.

Economic factors, the desire for a social medium, and farmer enchantment with the idea of rural resistance to urban extortions and with the novelties of granger secrecy and ritual explain the rise of the Patrons of Husbandry in Champaign County. The first element, economic hardship, was clearly the catalyst in the reaction. Rural spokesmen complained incessantly of low prices for farm produce, high rail rates, and the inequalities between town and country life. While the urban areas prospered, the farmer "generally lives poor and dresses poor," able to procure only the bare necessities for his family and often failing in that limited goal. "Scattered like sheep without a shepherd, and a prey for every wolf or fox that takes a fancy to our mutton,"[12] the farmers of Champaign County were more than willing to flock into an organization promising protection from those considered to be their oppressors.

At first glance an observer might have been inclined to dismiss the comments of rural leaders as mere tirades by fanatics. Located on the fertile, black land of the Illinois prairies which never failed to inspire visitors to almost poetic praise, blessed by abundant rainfall and by gently rolling and easily tilled fields, the Champaign County farmer appeared to be endowed generously by nature.[13] In fact, certain figures support this thesis. In 1870, for example, the average Champaign County farm, reflecting its better soil and higher percentage of improved land, produced greater yields and earned for its owner-operator $50 more a year in gross returns than did the average farm in the state as a whole, although it was ten acres smaller.[14] A major urban market only 100 miles distant and adequate transportation facilities were other obvious advantages.

These favorable conditions were counterbalanced by others which indicated that a valid basis existed for the complaints of farmers. As late as the 1860's Champaign County was in a transitional stage in its evolution. The last portion of the state to be settled, east-central Illinois was the domain of the great cattle raiser until the

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[12] *Chicago Tribune*, December 16, 1873, 2, December 30, 1872, 2; *Illinois State Register*, Springield, December 12, 1870, 1; Richard Bardolph, "Illinois Agriculture in Transition, 1820-1870," Illinois State Historical Society, *Journal*, XLI, No. 4 (December, 1948), 434–436.

[13] R. C. Ross and H. C. M. Case, "Types of Farming in Illinois," University of Illinois, Agricultural Experiment Station, *Bulletin* 610, Urbana, April 1956, 8–14. For comments of early visitors in the area see *Illinois in 1837: A Sketch*, Philadelphia, 1837, 75; Frederick Gerhard, *Illinois As It Is*, Chicago, 1857, 271–288.

[14] U. S. *Ninth Census: The Statistics of Wealth and Industry*, 130-131, 341, 347.

1850's, and as late as the Civil War decade great estates based on livestock and grain production existed.[15] Ordinary farmers in appreciable numbers did not flow into the area until the 1850's, stimulated in part by the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad which reached the hamlet of West Urbana in 1854.[16] In 1835, two years after its organization, Champaign County boasted a population of only 1,045, and fifteen years later a mere 2,649 people were counted. But between 1850 and 1860 the population increased by almost 600 per cent, and by 1870 the county contained 32,737 persons.[17] Consequently, adjustments common to any region emerging from frontier conditions plagued many Champaign County farmers in the early 1870's.

The existence of several large estates combined with the land disposal methods of the Illinois Central produced a large number of absentee owners and share or cash tenants. Although data for 1870 is not available, information gathered for the 1880 federal census indicates that fully one third of the farmers in Champaign County were non-owners during the granger period.[18] Moreover, a large number of the farms in the county were small. While in 1870 the average Champaign County farm included 118 acres, 2,982 of the 4,182 holdings contained less than 100 acres and there were 1,644 units of less than 50 acres.[19]

Nor did the prevailing type of farming guarantee agricultural stability. Corn and oats were the major crops, but livestock numbers were too small to consume the total production. As a result Champaign County had a grain-producing and shipping economy which was particularly susceptible to the extortions of grain dealers and the abuses of railroads.[20] Furthermore, although the average Champaign County farmer enjoyed the benefits of a generous nature, he was particularly affected by the pattern in the collapse of farm commodity prices. The average value per bushel of his major

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15 Paul Wallace Gates, "Frontier Landlords and Pioneer Tenants," Illinois State Historical Society, *Journal*, XXXVIII, No. 2 (June, 1945), 154, 157, 165; Mrs. Frank V. Harris, "The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin Harris," Illinois State Historical Society, *Transactions*, 1923, Springfield, 1923, 84–85, 94.

16 C. A. Harper, "The Railroad and the Prairie," Illinois State Historical Society, *Transactions*, 1923, Springfield, 1923, 105; Harris, "Benjamin Franklin Harris," 96.

17 *Illinois in 1837*, 75; U. S. *Ninth Census*: *Population*, 23.

18 Ross and Case, "Types of Farming," 19; Charles L. Stewart, *Land Tenure in the United States with Special Reference to Illinois* (Vol. V, No. 3 in the *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Urbana, 1916), 44, 49–50.

19 U. S. *Ninth Census*: *The Statistics of Wealth and Industry*, 349.

20 *Ibid.*, 130–131.

crops, corn and oats, fell to 24 and 19 cents respectively in 1872, declines of more than 50 per cent since 1867. Livestock prices, by comparison, reached peak levels in 1872 while wheat prices were on an upward trend during the early 1870's after having fallen to 74 cents a bushel in 1869.[21] Characteristically, Champaign County farms carried a heavy indebtedness in the form of land mortgages. In 1870 no other county in the state had more land encumbered and, excluding Cook County, only one carried more mortgages and only two had a greater mortgage indebtedness. In all, 344,541 of the 494,650 acres of farm land in Champaign County in 1870 carried a total of 2,844 mortgages worth $4,458,350. Less than a fourth of the mortgage indebtedness on lands represented loans for deferred payments, but the existence of debts averaging more than $9 an acre was serious, especially in light of falling prices for the leading agricultural commodities.[22]

Such weaknesses in the agrarian economy could only sharpen farmers' grievances arising from the practices of railroads, bankers, politicians, and others deemed oppressors. Rail rates affecting Illinois farmers actually rose in the late 1860's and the early 1870's, while a decade later even conservatives admitted that the "rapacity of railroad corporations is past all endurances."[23] Local bankers charged hard pressed Champaign County farmers interest rates of from 12 to 16 per cent, plus heavy commissions for renewals and other services.[24] A study of the state revenue system, which showed that during the 1870's property taxes contributed 87 per cent of the state's revenue,[25] gave credence to the agrarian contention that state legislators represented the interests rather that the voters who elected them.

Among the granges which sprang into existence during the boom period of 1873 was Champaign Grange No. 621, established September 5, 1873, by a deputy representing the state body. Pursuant to an informal announcement, a group of nineteen farmers and nine wives assembled at a rural schoolhouse, listened to a

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21 "Illinois Agricultural Statistics," Illinois Co-operative Crop Reporting Service, *Circular* 445 (Springfield, July, 1949), 15, 19, 24, 81. 86. Figures cited are for January 1 and December 1 of each year; consequently, they are only indicative of prices actually received by farmers.

22 Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Fifth Biennial Report*, Springfield, 1888, xciv–xcvii.

23 United States Department of Agriculture, *Yearbook*, 1898, Washington, 1898, 726, 728; *Chicago Tribune*, October 25, 1879, 4.

24 Harris, "Benjamin Franklin Harris," 100.

25 I. M. Labovitz, "The Illinois Revenue System, 1818–1936," Illinois Tax Commission, *Special Report* No. 4, Springfield, 1936, 10.

lecture by the organizer, and formed the association. The members elected the master, secretary, and treasurer immediately, but the ten other officers were not selected until the next meeting, when formal organization was completed. In accordance with the bylaws of the national and state granges, the new members paid initiation fees of $3 and 50 cents for men and women respectively. Of the total raised in this fashion $15 went to the National Grange for the dispensation and other papers, the organizing deputy received $5, and the balance remained in the treasury of the new group.[26]

A majority of the charter members were farmers whose economic status was considerably above the average for the county. Of the nineteen heads of families, fifteen were landowners, three were tenants, and one was a farm laborer. Among the landowners, sizes of farms varied greatly, but the average was 45 acres larger than the average unit in Champaign County. Moreover, the charter members tended to be more economically stable than the average Champaign farmer. The members raised more livestock, and their improved land produced bigger yields so that average gross income was a third greater than for all farmers.[27]

For the highest office in the club, members chose men who by their earlier careers indicated that they possessed certain qualities of leadership. During the life of the organization two men served as master. John S. Busey was the first to fill the post, serving from the formation of the association to January, 1877. He was succeeded by Jefferson Trotter, who had been secretary since September, 1873.[28] Neither of these men were among the most prosperous of the group, although Trotter's 200-acre property was more valuable than the average. However, Trotter, a Virginian

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[26] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, September 5, 1873, located in the Illinois Historical Survey, Urbana; *Champaign County Gazette*, March 25, 1874, 4; *Prairie Farmer*, XLIV, No. 4 (October 4, 1873), 314; *ibid.*, XLIV, No. 1 (January 4, 1873), 3; Illinois State Grange, *By-Laws*, Sterling, Illinois, 1874, 4–5. Members who joined after the society was established paid initiation fees of $5 for men and $2 for women. All participants paid monthly dues of 10 cents. From the amounts collected, the treasurer of the local grange paid the state body $1 and 50 cents for each man and woman initiated and a quarterly dues of 6 cents a member. In turn, the state grange paid annual dues of 10 cents a member to the national organization. [James D. McCabe] Edward W. Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, Chicago, 1874, 424–425.

[27] U. S. *Ninth Census*: *The Statistics of Wealth and Industry*, 130–131, 340–341, 349; U. S. Agricultural Census, Champaign County, Illinois, 1870, MSS., located in Illinois State Archives, Springfield.

[28] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, September 5, 1873, January 29, 1877.

who appeared in Champaign County in 1859, had attended Wabash College and taught school before turning to agriculture. John S. Busey owned and operated an unproductive, 147-acre farm which in 1869 produced agricultural commodities valued at only $450. But Busey was a member of a prominent pioneer family which had migrated to Champaign County in 1829 and which by the Civil War period was involved in extensive farming, banking, and politics. Busey himself had served in the state legislature.[29]

In the course of its life, Champaign Grange No. 621 added 35 members, making a total of 63 persons who at various times were affiliated with the group. There were 21 female members, including 19 who participated with their husbands, one single woman, and one widow. Twenty-three male members were either bachelors or were not accompanied by their wives. The group included three sons over eighteen years of age who affiliated soon after their parents, but unwed daughters apparently shunned active participation in the organization. An overwhelming majority of those who joined the grange after its formation entered during its first year. Although one application for membership was received as late as October, 1876, 31 of the 35 new members joined prior to July, 1874. Meanwhile, members began dropping from the organization as early as November, 1873,[30] and maximum membership was reached in the late summer of 1874 when approximately 55 persons were carried on the roll.

Since plans to construct a hall did not materialize, Champaign Grange No. 621 held its meetings in rural school houses or in private homes. By the terms of the constitution of the National Grange, regular sessions were held monthly, but during the flourishing period of growth and widespread enthusiasm, the local met weekly or biweekly.[31] Regular meetings were ritual-laden affairs, guided by a manual issued by the National Grange. The central body formulated and distributed to locals detailed instructions covering such aspects of sessions as the duties of officers and their

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[29] U. S. Agricultural Census, Champaign County, Illinois, 1870, MSS.; *Portrait and Biographical Album of Champaign County, Illinois,* Chicago, 1887, 256–259, 314–315; *History of Champaign County, Illinois,* Philadelphia, 1878, 83; J. S. Lothrop, comp., *Champaign County Directory,* 1870–71, Chicago, 1871, 233, 250.

[30] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, list of members following entry for September 5, 1873, June 8, 1874, October 9, 1876; U. S. Census, Champaign County, Illinois, 1870, MSS., in Illinois State Archives, Springfield.

[31] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, December 15, 1873; Martin, *History of the Grange Movement,* 423.

positions in the room where the meeting was in progress, the order of business, and other details of the secret work. A password was issued annually. A special ceremony was provided for the installation of officers and the conferring of the different degrees. In the course of a meeting, members addressed each other as "brother" or "sister" while officers' titles were prefixed by "worthy."[32] Members in session wore a prescribed regalia which had been developed by the North Star Grange, St. Paul, Minnesota, and later adopted by the national body. For women it included a wreath of real or artificial flowers, a white apron, and a colorful sash. These accoutrements were purchased from the National Grange or made by the ladies from material acquired locally.[33] Symbolism played an important role in the Grange and in the individual meetings. The symbol of organization, which was bestowed upon masters when they took office and was prominently displayed while a local was in session, was a pouch bearing the emblem of a plow and containing a memorandum book, a knife, and a pencil. Each item had a certain significance. For example, the plow, the traditional symbol of agriculture, reminded members to keep the "plowshare of your mind bright by deep thinking and active use" and to follow a course as straight as the furrow. In addition it symbolized the desire of the Grange for members to break the "heavy clods of ignorance" and thus prepare the mind for the "seeds of knowledge." Each degree was symbolized by specific "instruments." Those of the laborer, for instance, were the axe, the plow, the harrow, and the spade. Finally, each officer, while performing his duties, wore a sash adorned by distinctive "jewels" symbolizing the responsibilities of his position.[34]

Music had a prominent place at all regular meetings and most social gatherings as well. The ritual specified that each regular session be opened and closed by a song, and many locals organized choirs from among their members in order that musical presentations could be enjoyed at all meetings.[35] The Champaign Grange used a songbook entitled *The Triumph of Reform*, but as early as 1872, Carrie A. Hall, Oliver H. Kelley's niece, compiled a

[32] *Ibid.*, 433–434; National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Manual for Subordinate Granges*, Philadelphia, 1874, 2–68.

[33] Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry*, 143, 175; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, October 13, November 13, 1873, April 13, May 25, 1874.

[34] National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Manual*, 11–14; Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry*, 252, 365.

[35] Periam, *Groundswell*, 147; National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Manual*, 3–5; *Songs of the Grange*, Philadelphia, 1874, 3–4, 8; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, February 15, 1875.

volume of tunes for all occasions which gradually came to be used uniformly. The songs rendered by granger choirs tended to be spiritual or inspirational in tone and, in many cases, reflected clearly the philosophical basis of the Order. Many of the tunes idolized rural life and expressed the agrarian fundamentalism so basic to granger thought. Others proclaimed the moral and physical value of manual labor.[36]

During the first few months that Champaign Grange No. 621 was in operation, the conduct of the meetings followed the instructions from the national body closely. Members spent a great deal of time in considering the qualifications of applicants, initiating the acceptable ones, and participating in the ceremonies by which grangers were advanced from one degree to the next. Such matters as organizational finance, the formulation of bylaws for the group, and the acquisition of supplies, including lamps and fuel, provoked extended discussion.[37] But from the very outset and increasingly as the ritualistic aspects of meetings became routine, members were acutely interested in the social, educational, and cooperative opportunities which participation in the society afforded.

To many members and especially to the farm wives, the social function of the Grange was of primary importance. While few would have been as eloquent as the commentator who observed that "frequent and refined intercourse is absolutely essential for formulating higher degrees of attainment and culture," they did recognize clearly that the farmer who visited the nearby village once a month and the farm wife whose social contacts were limited to weddings and funerals were victims of rural isolation.[38] Consequently, dinners and picnics sponsored by the local grange or by the county body and held in private homes, grange halls, or convenient groves were frequent events. At such functions, farm wives prepared basket lunches and members "partook of bounteous feasts in which all present did ample justice." Musical or educational programs often followed the meals although these activities were occasionally limited by a "sense of heaviness" in the stomachs of the participants. Larger social gatherings were sponsored by the county grange. Typical of such affairs was a Fourth

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[36] *Ibid.*, September 21, 1874; Kelley, *Patrons of Husbandry*, 405; Atkeson, *Patrons of Husbandry*, 47; *Songs of the Grange*, 40–45, 48, 74–75, 94.

[37] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, September 30, October 13, November 3, 1873, January 12, March 2, 1874.

[38] *Prairie Farmer*, XLIV, No. 11 (March 15, 1873), 83; Periam, *Groundswell*, 146–147; Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 450–453.

of July celebration held in 1874 in a grove near Rantoul. An abundance of dust failed to discourage the crowd which numbered almost 8,000 and included the entire membership of fourteen locals. Some members wore the regalia of the order and arrived carrying banners. After dinner, music by a fireman's band and a speech by an agricultural journalist provided entertainment.[39]

In addition to social gatherings, various other activities promoted a friendly neighborhood spirit. The local endeavored to prevent the outbreak of quarrels between members, recognizing that such disturbances exposed the participants to exhorbitant charges by lawyers. When a disagreement arose, the grange appointed an arbitration committee which attempted to settle the matter quietly. The local sent representatives to offer assistance to members in distress and occasionally made a small financial contribution to flood or fire victims. In 1875 one lady, having lost most of her wardrobe in a fire, received $10, and a farmer who suffered a similar loss was granted $18. The same year the Champaign Grange donated $10 to a general fund being raised to assist needy Kansas and Nebraska residents.[40] The use of a special ceremony at funerals and the establishment of a special day to decorate the graves of former members[41] also promoted community solidarity.

Existing as an integral part of all regular meetings and of many of the social gatherings was the educational aspect of the Grange. The national organization consistently supported expansion and proper maintenance of the public school system; equally important, the central body attempted to teach the farmer that education was as important for him as for any other member of society. On the local level, subordinate bodies encouraged members to read appropriate books and periodicals, and some locals created small libraries which the leaders hoped would become "moral and intellectual" club rooms where all participants could improve themselves.[42] More important, because they were the most common type of educational activities, were lectures, speeches, and group discussions within ordinary meetings. In regular meetings of Champaign Grange No. 621, the lecturer or another officer normally presented topics for discussion or spoke on a pertinent subject. The range of topics

[39] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, December 29, 1873, April 20, 1874; *Prairie Farmer*, XLV, No. 28 (June 11, 1874), 217.

[40] *Ibid.*, XLIV, No. 11 (March 15, 1873), 83; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, March 16, December 14, 1874, January 11, 18, February 8, April 5, 1875; Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 435.

[41] National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Manual*, 68–72.

[42] Periam, *Groundswell*, 147–148.

covered was wide indeed. At one meeting, the lecturer urged members to beautify their homes by planting trees and flowers; two months later, he belabored his audience on the need for currency inflation. Discussions or even formal debates among members were common. With a seriousness which indicated the presence of real problems, farmers and their wives explored the complexities of interest rates, tariff levels, railroad regulation and taxation, and similar matters of national importance.[43] To urban sophisticates the ideas expressed in such discussions may have been naive, but the farmers and their wives were learning how to think and how to express themselves.

In spite of the obvious benefits arising from social and educational activities, Champaign County grangers believed that economic cooperation was "the chief aim of the order." No other feature received greater attention and none promised so much in immediate rewards. The prospects of banding together to reduce operating and living costs so enchanted farmers that they often launched a cooperative buying project immediately after organization. In the most simple type of economic cooperation, a method which enjoyed wide popularity throughout the Middle West, local granges appointed representatives to bargain with community businessmen, offering them the patronage of the entire group in return for a fixed discount in prices. A month after formation, Champaign Grange No. 621 made contracts with a clothing merchant and a grocer, both of whom agreed to sell commodities to grangers at five per cent above cost. Other businessmen applied for permission to address the members so that they could make propositions to the group.[44] Within a few months, the local had saved its members considerable amounts on a wide variety of goods.

The desire for greater bargaining power and greater savings tended to force local granges into closer cooperation with each other. This factor was a prime motive in the formation of the Champaign County Grange and that organization, soon after its establishment, appointed a committee to deal with local grocers, dry goods merchants, and others. The committee quickly succeeded in making contracts with a number of concerns, including a clothing merchant who granted drastically reduced prices, and

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[43] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, January 26, March 2, May 10, June 14, August 30, 1874; *Champaign County Gazette,* July 1, 1874, 4.

[44] Periam, *Groundswell,* 148, Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, October 7, November 10, 1873; *Champaign County Gazette,* September 17, 1873.

a local grocer willing to provide members with flour at $7 a barrel, the current wholesale price.[45]

The contract system, however, contained basic weaknesses which practically destroyed its usefulness within a few months. The operation of the system required confidence among the farmers in the honesty of the merchant with whom they were dealing. In most cases, grangers were unable to examine the merchant's books, and the suspicion that he was charging more than the contract allowed quickly destroyed the agreement. Unscrupulous merchants, jealous of a competitor's success in dealing with farmers, occasionally spread false rumors to arouse the grangers' suspicions. In other cases, non-cooperating merchants cut prices on a few commodities and when the grangers, thinking only of the short run gain, flocked to take advantage of the bargains, contracts with other businessmen fell by the wayside.[46] By the early months of 1874, the attitude of many Champaign County merchants was stiffening, and as early as January, the bargaining committees reported that no grocer in the neighborhood was willing to grant reductions. Similar was the reaction of corn planter dealers. In that instance, the grangers resolved to buy none of the machines, but such a negative response merely indicated the failure of the bargaining technique as a cooperative buying scheme.[47]

The failure of the contract or bargaining system caused grangers to turn to the use of purchasing agents. As early as January, 1874, the Illinois State Grange appointed an official charged with the responsibility of negotiating with manufacturers of farm machinery and household appliances and reporting their lowest figures to subordinate groups.[48] County clubs, in turn, appointed purchasing agents who in theory acted as middlemen between the state official and local granges or individual members. In many cases, however, it is apparent that county agents dealt directly with manufacturers, bypassing the state official completely. Such was the case in Champaign County where an agent was located at a central point and given full responsibility to bargain with manufacturers. The information secured was distributed to local grangers by means

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45 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, November 21, 1873, January 16, 1874; *Prairie Farmer*, XLV, No. 2 (January 10, 1874), 11.

46 Albert Shaw, *Cooperation in the Northwest* (Vol. VI, Nos. 4–6 in *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Baltimore, 1888), 336–337.

47 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, January 16, 1874.

48 *Chicago Tribune*, January 30, 1874, 4; Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 478.

of circulars. Individual members of a local desiring particular items pooled their orders and placed them through the county agent, including with the orders sufficient cash to cover the entire cost of the goods. To facilitate the operation of this system, the grangers of Champaign County erected a "sample depot" where manufacturers selling to farmers might display their wares.[49]

By eliminating the local retail agents, by purchasing in lots of five, ten, or more, and by paying cash, the grangers were convinced manufacturers would compete vigorously to do business with them. The farmers' hopes were only partially realized. Informed of the new buying technique, some manufacturing concerns rushed to send circulars describing their goods and offering substantial reductions in prices. One concern offered one-row cultivators at fifteen per cent less than list price, two manufacturers were willing to sell sewing machines at one third less than retail price, and other companies agreed to sell wagons, plows, fence posts, and Osage Orange hedge plants at comparable reductions. However, the concerns willing to cooperate with the grangers were in the main small, local manufacturers without an established retail outlet system.[50] The great farm implement concerns, those companies which produced the most popular brands of machinery, flatly refused to grant preferential prices. The basic objective of such cooperative buying schemes was the elimination of the middleman, in the machinery trade, the retail agent. But the great concerns recognized that their local agents performed indispensable functions in setting up and servicing machines, handling relations with the majority of farmers who required credit, and serving as the general company representative. To grant price reductions to members of organized farm groups would destroy the local agents and, since many businessmen were convinced that the granger movement would be of short duration, the leading manufacturers concluded that cooperation with the farmers was dangerous and in the long run unprofitable.[51]

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[49] *Prairie Farmer*, XLV, No. 12 (March 21, 1874), 91; Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, March 20, October 16, 1874; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, February 9, 1874.

[50] Shaw, *Cooperation in the Northwest*, 475; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, February 9, 1874; Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, January 16, 1874.

[51] Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 475; Arthur H. Hirsch, "Efforts of the Grange in the Middle West to control the Price of Farm Machinery, 1870–1880," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XV, No. 4 (March, 1929), 490–491.

Although the purchasing agent system, by facilitating direct buying from secondary manufacturers, produced considerable saving for farmers, growing granger strength and increasing enthusiasm for economic cooperation induced leaders in Champaign County to venture into the field of farmer-owned enterprises. As early as March, 1874, a local in the southeastern part of the county reported the successful operation of a cooperative store, and two months later, the grangers in the Tolono area established a cooperative grain-shipping association with a capital stock of $10,000.[52] Encouraged by these apparent successes, the Champaign County Grange, in November, 1874, appointed a committee to secure the necessary legal authorization and to open books for stock subscription to a cooperative association which would serve as a county purchasing agency. As established, the concern had a capital stock of $3,000, consisting of 300 shares valued at $10 each. Only Grange members in good standing were allowed to purchase the stock in the concern, but by March, 1875, practically all the shares had been taken.[53] In a series of organizational meetings, beginning April 1, 1875, the shareholders labeled the new enterprise "The Farmers' Cooperative Association of Champaign County," selected officers, including a business agent with a monthly salary of $70, rented a warehouse in Urbana for $25 a month, and adopted bylaws to govern the business. For funds to launch the enterprise, the officers were authorized to collect 35 per cent of the amount subscribed for shares. Officers of the Association announced that all purchases and sales by the concern would be conducted on a strictly cash basis. The store, which opened April 19, 1875, proposed to deal only with grangers and planned to sell goods at cost plus an amount sufficient to cover necessary operating expenses.[54]

Cooperative buying schemes were most popular among Champaign County grangers, but the members experimented with cooper-

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52 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, March 20, 1874; *Prairie Farmer*, XLV, No. 18 (May 2, 1874), 139. Although many members objected to the establishment of such enterprises, considering them dangerous to the Order, they ultimately existed in half of the counties in Illinois. Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 479; Amos G. Warner, *Three Phases of Cooperation in the West* (Vol. VI, No. 7–8 in *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Baltimore, 1888), 384.

53 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, November 27, 1874, February 17, March 29, 1875; Farmers' Cooperative Association, MSS Proceedings, April 17, 1875, in Illinois Historical Survey, Urbana.

54 *Ibid.*, April 9, 13, 1875; Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, April 19, 1875.

ative selling, discussed the formation of mutual insurance companies, and joined together in a number of other efforts to protect themselves as well. In the fall of 1875, the county grange arranged with Chicago commission firms to sell members' corn crops directly through the city concerns, thereby eliminating the country buyers. Under this system, the farmers had the privilege of storing their grain in Chicago without charge for as long as twenty days and of drawing $100 when the shipment was made, the balance when the grain was sold.[55] Cooperative insurance was another form of joint action considered but, although state legislation in 1872 and 1874 provided for the establishment of township mutuals, there were no immediate results in Champaign County. More successful was the decision, accepted by the grangers of the county, to refuse to patronize the itinerant peddlers who plagued the countryside, and the establishment in 1875 of a county-wide detective committee for returning estrayed or stolen horses.[56]

The Grange in Champaign County, like the parent organization, was officially nonpolitical. The installation oath taken by masters of local granges pledged these officers to exclude politics from their organizations, and leaders regularly expressed their willingness to comply with this injunction.[57] Such a position, however, was totally unrealistic and naive, given the conditions existing in the early 1870's. Farmers were convinced that they suffered from class legislation, that politicians accepted their votes but represented the interests, and that only by using their organized strength could they correct existing evils. When they met together, within or outside granger halls, it was only natural that they would discuss politics and consider steps necessary for the improvement of their position. Consequently, the Grange as an organization was non-partisan, but an articulate portion of its membership was openly political, willing to work through the existing parties or, if necessary, to launch an independent movement.

Political independency in Illinois originated not in the Grange but in the unaffiliated farmers' clubs which flourished throughout the state. Originally established for such diverse purposes as resisting horse thieves and providing opportunities for discussing

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55 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, January 16, June 26, 1874, December 21, 1875, January 11, 1876; *Champaign County Gazette*, January 20, 1875, 1; *Prairie Farmer*, XLVI, No. 24 (June 12, 1875), 188.

56 Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, July 17, 1874, December 21, 1875.

57 National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Manual*, 59; Periam, *Groundswell*, 562; Martin, *History of the Grange Movement*, 436.

improved agriculture, the local clubs increased rapidly in number as agrarian discontent mounted in the early 1870's. A total of 820 clubs with a membership of 46,473 was reported in December, 1873, and Champaign County alone had forty-two independent locals.[58] Although there was a certain amount of rivalry between the clubs and neighboring granges, the two groups shared basic ideals, general objectives, and, in many cases, members; in fact, a large number of prominent Champaign County farmers who were affiliated with the Grange also participated in the club movement.[59] But while the Grange proclaimed its nonpartisan nature, the independent clubs soon adopted open and aggressive political methods. The clubs were united in a loose manner by the formation early in 1873 of the Illinois State Farmers' Association, which promptly assumed the task of creating a third party. Operating in the county and judicial district contests, the organization in 1873 won a number of local victories and elected a judge to the state's supreme court. A year later, it held a state convention, adopted a platform, and nominated candidates for two state offices, thereby placing itself, in the form of the Independent Reform Party, squarely in the arena of state politics.[60]

From the first appearance of the Grange in Champaign County, locals and the county group adopted resolutions and drafted petitions expressing views of the membership on current issues, but by the middle of 1873, aggressive leaders were prepared to take more vigorous action.[61] Calling for a break with old party loyalties and the development of a spirit of independence which would allow farmers to support any candidate in sympathy with their ideas, the Champaign County grangers in July, 1873, resolved that "we are not a political party, but we will support for office only such persons as we have reason to believe are honest men and who will work for the interests of the whole people and not for selfish aggrandizement."[62] Consequently, when independent

[58] Illinois State Board of Agriculture, *Transactions*, 1872, 232, 238; *ibid.*, 1873, 198; Illinois State Farmers' Association, *Proceedings, December 16–18, 1873*, Chicago, 1874, 136; *Prairie Farmer*, XLIII, No. 14 (April 6, 1872), 105.

[59] Periam, *Groundswell*, 81, 240; *Champaign County Gazette*, October 8, 1873, 4; Illinois State Board of Agriculture, *Transactions*, 1872, 293.

[60] *Ibid.*, 1873, 197–198; Alfred W. Newcombe, "Alson J. Streeter—An Agrarian Liberal," Illinois State Historical Society, *Journal*, XXXVIII, No. 4 (December, 1945), 425–427; Periam, *Groundswell*, 312–314, 561–562.

[61] Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, August 21, 1873; *Champaign County Gazette*, December 24, 1873, 4, October 1, 1873, 1, October 8, 1873, 4.

[62] *Prairie Farmer*, XLIV, No. 28 (July 12, 1873), 218.

farmers throughout Illinois began nominating county tickets for the 1873 fall elections, Champaign County farmers were not far behind. At a convention in Urbana, August 14, 1873, independents named candidates for local offices and called for the support of all grangers. The Republicans, pleased with the choices and being unwilling to divide the usual GOP majority, threw their support to the agrarian nominees in an effort to defeat their traditional opponents. In fact, so many old party wheelhorses found that "granger hats are now the prevailing style" that victory was assured.[63] A few months later, when farmers' township tickets were blossoming throughout the state, neighborhood farmers met in a rural school house and nominated a ticket for Champaign township composed of prominent grangers. The Republicans, finding that a majority of these candidates were former Democrats, countered by naming other leading members of the Grange to their slate, thereby illustrating the dangers of political activity by agrarian groups, but the farmers were pleased by the respectful attention shown them.[64]

Such victories only whetted the appetite of farmers for greater victories. In Champaign County, the grangers resolved that "we as farmers feel it our duty to do all in our power to control"[65] state candidates and platforms, thereby indicating that they were ready to participate actively in the 1874 campaign. When the Illinois State Farmers' Association issued the call for a convention to meet in Springfield, June 10, 1874, to nominate farmer candidates for state treasurer and state superintendent of public instruction, the farmers of Champaign County responded eagerly. At a county convention in Urbana, June 4, 1874, ninety delegates representing twenty-five grangers and nine independent clubs selected seven members to represent the county. A few days later, the Champaign County men participated in the convention which chose the name "Independent Reform" for the group, adopted a platform drafted by the State Farmers' Association six months earlier, and nominated third party candidates.[66] In addition, Cham-

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[63] *Ibid.*, XLIV, No. 32 (August 9, 1873), 251; Buck, *Granger Movement*, 85–88; *Illinois State Register*, August 7, 1873, 1; *Champaign County Gazette*, October 8, 1873, 1, 6, October 15, 1873, 6, October 22, 1873, 4.

[64] *Ibid.*, April 1, 1874, 1, April 8, 1874, 1; *Illinois State Register*, March 27, 1874, 2.

[65] Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, June 26, 1874.

[66] Illinois State Farmers' Association, *Proceedings, December 16–18, 1873*, 98–109; *Chicago Tribune*, May 6, 1874, 1, May 11, 1874, 2; *Champaign County Gazette*, May 27, 1874, 6, June 10, 1874, 1; Buck, *Granger Movement*, 94–95.

paign County farmers resolved to repeat their local victories of 1873. A convention which included a number of prominent grangers met in Urbana, August 8, 1874, and selected a slate of candidates for county offices, and appointed delegates to a congressional convention, scheduled later in the month. Finally, the farmers selected two candidates to seek election to the lower house of the state legislature.[67]

The farmers scored notable successes in the campaign of 1874, electing with Democratic support the independent candidate for superintendent of public instruction, gaining a balance of power in the state legislature, and making heavy inroads in the Republican delegation at Washington.[68] But the contest opened cleavages within granger ranks in Champaign County which could not be closed. When farmers entered politics on state and congressional levels, partisan passions rose to heights unknown in the local contests of 1873. The Democrats of Champaign County, being in the minority and seeing the rise of independency as an ally against the Republicans, embraced the farmers. Spokesmen for the GOP, on the other hand, were violent in their attacks on the new group. Maintaining that the Independents were simply Democrats in disguise and that their sole objective was the destruction of their traditional opponents, Republican leaders waved the bloody shirt, sneered at the "pseudo" farmers as "hayseed copperheads," and maintained such a drumfire of attacks against the Independents that partisan passions soon reached the boiling point.

Many grangers in Champaign County did not agree with one outraged Republican spokesman who described the election of 1874 as an effort in which "the Democracy, the grangers, the flesh and the devil, solidly flung themselves against the ramparts of the true and tried party of freedom, the union, and equal rights."[69] But at the same time, a majority were confirmed Republicans and they were distressed to see their grange officers, including such men as John S. Busey and Jefferson Trotter, actively working against a party which, to them, represented the memory of Lincoln and victory in a struggle less than ten years in the past. Other members, less concerned over the attacks upon the Republican Party, recognized clearly that once in politics farm groups attracted in large droves

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[67] *Champaign County Gazette,* August 12, 1874, 4, August 19, 1874, 2, August 26, 1874, 1

[68] Buck, *Granger Movement,* 95–96.

[69] *Illinois State Register,* June 9, 1874, 2; *Champaign County Gazette,* June 10, 1874, 8, July 1, 1874, 4, November 4, 1874, 1.

discredited politicians who hoped to use the enthusiasm of the moment for their own advancement. Consequently, political action in 1874 proved to be a divisive factor which could only act adversely to continued granger organization. In less than six months, locals began to disband as farmers, considering themselves betrayed by their own leaders, lost enthusiasm for the order.[70]

Disgust with politics alone does not explain the rapid decline of the Grange in Champaign County which began early in 1875 and by the end of 1877 had totally destroyed the organization. Failure of cooperative enterprises, so hopefully begun, contributed to the debacle. During the early months of 1875, Grange stores in the area began to fail in appalling numbers, due to cutthroat competition by ordinary retail concerns and the failure of farmers to adjust completely to the cooperative method. At the outset, granger leaders naively underestimated the problems of cooperation, and led farmers to expect material benefits with little effort. In reality, farmer-owned enterprises in the 1870's were severely handicapped by a lack of managerial ability and knowledge of business principles. Moreover, farmers were so inherently conservative that they hesitated to break normal trade patterns and at least latently distrusted their own concerns. They displayed a readiness to desert cooperative stores when regular outlets offered tempting bargains and, at the first sign of weakness, farmer shareholders rushed to dispose of stock, leaving the concern in the hands of a few faithful but unfortunate investors. Finally, the inability of farmer-owned businesses to extend credit to hard pressed customers reduced the volume of business and forced those members to patronize the regular merchants.[71]

The Farmers' Cooperative Association of Champaign County suffered from all of these ills, besides having been established after local granger strength began to decline. The business agent proved to be incompetent, the location of the store inconvenient, and the volume of business much less than had been anticipated. An additional assessment of $3.50 on each share of stock failed to place the concern on solid footing, although it operated until 1877 before collapsing, badly in debt.[72] Nor were other types of

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[70] Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, June 26, 1874; *Champaign County Gazette*, January 20, 1875, 1; April 21, 1875, 3.

[71] *Ibid.*, January 6, 1875, 6; Warner, *Cooperation in the West*, 369–370, 387–390.

[72] Farmers' Cooperative Association, MSS Proceedings, July 6, August 21, October 21, 1875, February 20, 1877.

economic cooperation more lasting. The local merchants, sensing correctly that granger strength was evaporating, lost any remaining enthusiasm for contractual agreements with local groups. Similarly, the agency system faded as the society weakened, while at least one Chicago wholesaler, who had been selling to farmers through grange agents, absconded, leaving goods undelivered and grangers discouraged.[73]

Moreover, farmers soon lost interest in the ritual and mechanics of grange meetings. Even a member of the national body admitted that "during the first months of the existence of a new grange, the novelty, preparation of regalia, and the initiation of new members secures a full and interested attendance. After this, there is often a want of amusing and interesting exercises, the interest flags, the attendance falls off, and the grange seems to lack vitality."[74] Ordinary members became even more specific in expressing their views on the ritual and secret work. One farmer demanded that pass words and symbolic implements be eliminated while another wished to abolish all degrees and the remainder of the "juvenile ceremony" so that members could devote their time in meetings to matters of genuine value.[75] Other members considered the complex hierarchy of the Grange useless or even dangerous to the ordinary patron and claimed that it served only to perpetuate the control of the organization by a few prominent leaders. A few members even questioned the honesty of high grange officers and intimated that a considerable portion of the funds raised through dispensations, fees, and dues had found its way into their pockets.

While the exact role of the diverse factors in the decline—politics, failure of economic cooperation, and growing apathy toward grange meetings—can never be ascertained with absolute certainty, the evaporation of granger strength in Champaign County was apparent to all observers. Near the end of 1875, one reporter stated, "There is a spirit of dissatisfaction in the granges . . . Interest is on the wane, the meetings are irregular and infrequent, and many granges have not met for many months; there has not been for a long time any additions to the membership. . . . They are

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73 *Champaign County Gazette,* January 13, 1875, 6.

74 National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Proceedings,* 1874, Philadelphia, 1874, 12.

75 *Champaign County Gazette,* August 5, 1874, 7; *Prairie Farmer,* XLVI, No. 27 (July 3, 1875), 211.

paralyzed. . . ."[76] As a matter of fact, the problem of retaining members developed early in the granger movement and by 1875, it was rapidly destroying the locals. Only three months after Champaign Grange No. 621 had been launched, officers appointed the first of many committees charged with the responsibility of calling on nonattending members and before the end of 1873, two of the charter members had resigned from the organization. Even men selected as officers were remarkably negligent in attending. After the lecturer had failed to appear at several consecutive sessions, one disgusted member suggested that "we buy a cast iron talking machine and grind out a lecture whenever needed."[77] A committee appointed in 1874 to investigate delinquent members failed to report because the committeemen themselves were absent.[78] By the middle of 1875, nonpayment of the ten cent monthly dues was a serious matter, reflecting the growing apathy among grangers, and at one meeting in May, 1876, six members were expelled. Since some participants claimed that they were unable to pay the necessary dues, the local in October, 1876, altered the bylaws to exclude women from paying them, although no authorization for such action had been received from the state or national bodies. Three months later, the master suggested that all dues for 1876 be cancelled so that members might begin the new year in good standing.[79] Such expedients, however, could not compensate for the overwhelming lack of interest, so Champaign Grange No. 621 discontinued meetings early in 1877.

Nor was the course of the organization in the county or in the state any more encouraging. By the middle of 1875, the Champaign County Grange had collapsed, suffering from general apathy among its members and lack of leadership. In October, 1875, delegates from locals met and reorganized the body, hoping that new blood would instill life into the organization. The association continued to meet quarterly but interest dwindled steadily throughout 1876. Numbers attending became so small that no quorum could be collected, so in March, 1877, the bylaws were altered to allow seven members to conduct business. When not even this number appeared in April, 1877, the body, after one more unsuccessful

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[76] *Champaign County Gazette*, November 24, 1875, 1.

[77] Champaign Grange, MSS Proceedings, October 7, December 22, 29, 1873, August 10, 1874, March 8, 1875.

[78] *Ibid.*, January 5, 1874.

[79] *Ibid.*, September 20, 1875, May 8, October 9, 1876, January 29, June 19, 1877.

meeting, disappeared.[80] In the state as a whole, numbers of locals fell from 1,533 in January, 1875, to 646 in July, 1876. The decline continued unabated until 1885 when the state master could claim only 100 granges with a total membership of 3,200 farmers,[81] a mere shadow of the once great organization. But while the Grange faded and practically disappeared, its accomplishments, well-known to all students of American history, remained to improve the status and life of farmers in the nation, in Illinois, and in Champaign County.

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[80] Farmers' Cooperative Association, MSS Proceedings, August 2, 1875; Champaign County Grange, MSS Proceedings, October 4, 26, 1875, March 7, 1876, March 13, June 12, 1877.

[81] Buck, *Granger Movement*, Chart following p. 58; National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, *Proceedings*, 1885, 46–47.

When the Czar and Grant Were Friends

Throughout the Civil War the grim business of conducting diplomatic relations with pro-South European states was relentlessly pressed with the skill of master chess players by President Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward, but after the bloody battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg it was apparent the End Game moves were close at hand.[1]

The United States and Imperial Russia had been on good terms throughout the war. Czar Alexander II, Chancellor Gorchakov, and the Russian minister, Baron Stoeckl, assured Lincoln of their friendship and their desire to see the Union restored.[2] Stoeckl, however, undoubtedly voiced the sentiment of most Russian aristocrats when he expressed little faith in democracy: "The sole fruit of the republican institutions has been demagogy, venality, party intrigue, and the struggle among themselves of greedy and ambitious politicians. This war was not inevitable, but a direct result of democratic structure. . . . After the war is over . . . there will surely develop reorganization along aristocratic lines."[3]

The Russians suddenly faced a revolution in Poland in 1863, and there was another ignited powder keg nearby which exploded into a short war among Prussia, Austria and Denmark the following year for control of the strategic twin-duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The threat of war hung menacingly in Europe in 1863 as Britain and France threatened to intervene in the Polish insurrection against Russia, when suddenly on September 11 a Russian frigate entered New York harbor. The Russians were given a rousing welcome both in New York and San Francisco where other naval units suddenly materialized. Some Americans felt that Russia was about to give assistance against the South, while others suggested that the visits were merely intended to under-

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[1] In addition to the material cited in the footnotes, this article is based on a large mass of undated and unidentified clippings and notes in the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.

[2] Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov was the Czar's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Civil War. Edouard de Stoeckl took charge of the Russian Ministry in Washington after the death of Minister Alexander Bodisco in 1854. Although he was not a member of the aristocracy, Stoeckl was usually referred to as "Baron."

[3] Alexandre Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, New York, 1958, 187.

score the friendship she felt for the North. After all, these ships represented the Czar who had been likened to Lincoln. Shortly before Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Alexander II had issued a ukase freeing the Russian serfs.[4] Even the *Richmond Examiner* saw a parallel in the lives of the two men: "The Czar emancipates the serfs from their bondage of centuries and puts forth the whole strength of his Empire to enslave the Poles. Lincoln proclaims freedom to the Africans and strives at the same time to subjugate freeborn Americans."[5]

While contemporaries hailed the visit as a token of friendship or possible aid, historians later showed that Russia had a different motive. Faced with the threat of war with Britain and France, she wished to get her warships into friendly ports where they would not fall prey to her stronger adversaries.[6] The fact remains,however, that the American people felt a close bond with Russia; a bond which deepened when Seward purchased Alaska. Even more delightful was the news in 1871 that the Czar planned to send a second fleet to America. It would be accompanied by His Imperial Highness, Grand Duke Alexis, one of the Czar's younger sons, who was serving as a lieutenant in the imperial navy.[7] A popular song of the period proclaimed sentiments of good will, which seem incredible today: "Ho! for Russia and the Union, for the Czar and Grant Are Friends." There was no reason for it to be otherwise.

The only issues concerned personalities. Since 1856 both countries had been arguing over the claims made by Captain

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[4] Russian-American relations during the Civil War are treated in Albert Woldman's *Lincoln and the Russians*, Cleveland, 1952. This volume is based to a large extent on Baron Stoeckl's reports to his government.

[5] Quoted in Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, 194. See Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians*, 25, 26, 27, 31, 124, 130, 134, for similar sentiments.

[6] The visit of the Russian fleet during the Civil War has been the subject of much study, but the salient points have recently been outlined in Marshall B. Davidson, "A Royal Welcome for the Russian Navy," *American Heritage* XI (June, 1960), 38–43, 107. The Russian visit was first shown to be more than one of good will by Frank A. Golder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," *American Historical Review* XX (July, 1915), 801–812.

[7] Czar Alexander II had six children. The eldest, Alexander, succeeded to the throne in 1881. He was born in 1845. A second son, Vladimir, was born in 1847, and the third son, Alexis Alexandrovich, was born at St. Petersburg on January 2 O.S./14 N.S., 1850. The other children were Maria, Sergius, and Paul, born respectively in 1853, 1857, and 1860. The careers of each of these persons may be followed in the annual volumes of the *Almanach de Gotha*, and the family geneology may be conveniently traced in Ottokar Lorenz, *Genealogisches Handbuch der Europäischen Staatengeschichte*, Berlin, 1895, Tafel 28, Neueste Geschichte, no. 21.

Benjamin Perkins for payment for alleged delivery of arms to Russia. The burden of dealing with this vexatious problem devolved, in time, upon President Grant's very capable Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, and the Russian Minister, Constantine Catacazy.[8] The latter had gotten off to a bad start with the Grant administration (not noted for its high moral character) when he brought as his wife the former-wife of the ruler of Brazil, whom he had seduced while a member of the Russian legation in Rio. Catacazy added to his unpopularity by issuing statements accusing Grant and Fish of being criminals. By the time the Duke was due to arrive, the Russian Minister was persona non grata in Washington.

The squadron was very late in arriving, and the public was forced to wait impatiently for the Duke's company. He was scheduled to make an extensive tour of the country, presumably as a good will ambassador. Actually the young man was probably sent abroad to disrupt his passionate courtship of Alexandra Zhukovskaya, a girl at the court who was his social inferior.[9]

The Russians arrived about midnight, Saturday November 18, 1871, outside New York harbor. The American fleet was apprised of this fact early the next morning by a passing steamer. The mist had cleared sufficiently by afternoon so that the two fleets were visible. The American sloops *Congress* and *Severn* and the steamers *Iroquois* and *Kansas* under Vice-Admiral Stephen Rowan exchanged salutes with the frigate *Svetland* and the corvettes *Bogatire* and *Abreck*. The Russians astounded their hosts with their seamanship in anchoring their vessels. After another salute, the American commander boarded the frigate for an exchange of greetings. These ceremonies were intended as a tribute to the Russian admiral, so the Duke was not present.[10]

The Americans had no sooner left the frigate when a party of reporters was admitted aboard. Captain-lieutenant Leonide Michiloff explained the delay. The fleet had left the Madeira Islands on October 10, but its progress was delayed by unseasonable gales. It had been impossible to make a reckoning since November 14. All of this was very interesting, but the reporters

[8] The Perkins affair is ably treated in Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish, The Inner History of the Grant Administration*, New York, 1936, 503–511. A brief reference is also contained in Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians*, 286, 287, 289.

[9] Alexis' love life is described in Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, 273, 281.

[10] *New York Times*, November 20, 1871.

had not braved the windswept harbor for a weather report. Several of them inspected the grizzled officers who were on deck with Admiral Poisset and Captain Oscar Kremer, hoping that one of them was the Duke, but no one so identified himself. The honored-guest suddenly caught the press by surprise as he materialized on deck through a companionway leading down to the wardroom. He was brimming with excitement as he saluted the press. Alexis spoke English, although it would seem that his command of the language was not impressive. He proved to be a handsome youth of a well-proportioned six feet, with broad shoulders, light complexion, brown hair, mustache, and side whiskers. He had the alert eye and firm step of a man of twenty-one. He wore a fatigue uniform of the naval service. Although Alexis sprang from an ancient line of kings, he was only a lieutenant aboard ship. The lionization could not begin until he reached shore. The Duke had no sooner begun his interview when Catacazy and the Russian consul came aboard from the health boat, whose doctors fumigated the young Romanov and certified that he was free of cholera and smallpox.[11]

The official reception was set for Monday, November 20, but an incredibly severe rainstorm delayed Alexis' landing. Nevertheless, the executive committee of two-hundred met him informally as it braved the wildly-tossing harbor to approach the frigate in the steamer *Mary Powell*. Since early morning a large crowd had assembled at the wharf to welcome the Duke despite the rain. The flags and bunting wilted, while many of the "watered-down" spectators sought "artificial reinvigoration" at dockside grogshops. Some reporters, who had elbowed their way through the crowd to the edge of the pier, were tumbled into the swirling water by the unhappy spectators.[12]

Three Russian officers made it ashore in a small boat. A rumor swept through the crowd that the admiral had come ashore with his aides. Hundreds of eyes fastened upon the biggest of the three, a hirsute man of gigantic proportions, who seemed to be bearded to the eyelids. He wore a profuse tangle of gold braid and ribbons on his tunic and carried a small valise. The Russians reported that the reception had been postponed for twenty-four hours, but many in the crowd were unconvinced. Voices were raised on all sides; if the bearded brute was not the

11 *Ibid.*, November 20, 21, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 21, 1871.
12 *New York Times*, November 21, 1871.

admiral, he might be the Duke trying to slip ashore without notice. Many in the front ranks of the crowd were the hardened denizens of the local saloons, and duke or not, they left no doubt as to how they felt about aristocrats. As the comments grew saltier, one of them offered an explanation of the ribboned Russian. "He ain't no Grand Duke," he exclaimed, "He's a Russian carpet-bagger." This cry swept back through the doubting-ranks. During this repartee, which dealt with a most popular subject, the *Mary Powell* returned to dock with the disappointed committee, leaving the Duke, as one reporter commented, "with nothing to do but smoke cigarettes in the wardroom until tomorrow."[13]

The furious rains subsided on Tuesday, and at the appointed hour more than three-hundred gentlemen and ladies, resplendant in their silks, satins, velvet, and furs, boarded the *Mary Powell* for another attempt to get the Duke ashore. The Russian minister and Admiral Rowan went along. When they approached the *Svetland*, Admiral Poisset sent his sixteen-oared barge to transfer Catacazy aboard the frigate. He picked up the Duke and escorted him to the *Mary Powell* for Major-General John A. Dix's brief address of welcome. The Duke was then introduced to all the guests, who had drawn up in two parallel lines along the deck. This was only the first of many similar occasions when Alexis ran the gauntlet between rows of well-wishers, eager to shake the hand of royalty. When the steamer returned to dock, the Russians were taken by carriage amid tumultuous crowds along Broadway to their lodgings at the Clarendon Hotel.[14]

The next morning, November 22, the Duke and his retinue left for Washington with little fanfare. A private train—the first of many similar conveniences—had been placed at his disposal. The journey had been planned as a quasi-secret movement, but railroad employees in Philadelphia, who learned of the special run, gawked at the Duke through the coach windows as he passed through. The demonstration in Baltimore was of sufficient size to warrant the Duke making a personal appearance on the platform. By the time the train rolled into Washington at seven in the evening, there were few Americans who did not know of his whereabouts. It was difficult to extricate him from the throngs on the concourse, but he was finally spirited away in a closed car-

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[13] *Ibid.*, November 21, 22, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 21, 22, 1871.

[14] *New York Times*, November 22, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 22, 1871.

riage. Many people at the station trailed off after a stout, heavily-bearded man with a valise and an escort of police. This spurious duke did not prove to be even the Russian carpetbagger, who had decoyed the crowds in New York, but only a German salesman.[15]

The Duke's retinue was safely deposited at the Arlington House, while Alexis was taken to Catacazy's residence. Many eager spectators had guessed his destination, and the ministry was surrounded by a large crowd when he arrived. A few over-anxious spectators had even broken into the building through a partially open window. Later in the evening when the shouting outside had died down only to a din, the Duke was able to retire. Secretary of State Fish paid a late visit to the ministry to discuss with Catacazy when it would be convenient for the Duke to wait upon the president. The minister was concerned about his own status, but Fish assured him that although he was "both officially and personally" unacceptable as minister, the United States would honor a recent request from the Czar to allow him to accompany the Duke in a private capacity. There was no reason why he could not introduce the Duke to the President.[16]

Shortly after noon the next day, several select-members of the cabinet assembled in the Blue Parlor to give a rousing cheer for the Duke as he entered. Grant, Fish, and the president's closest advisers, Postmaster-general John A. J. Creswell, and generals Orville Babcock, Horace Porter, and Frederick Dent, the president's brother-in-law, entered the parlor from the upstairs executive offices. The exchange of greetings was courteous, simple, and conventional. After diplomatic protocol had been fulfilled, Grant escorted Alexis to the Red Parlor for presentation to Mrs. Grant, her daughter Nellie, and father, Frederick Dent, who was a resident of the White House, and the wives of the cabinet officers. During the brief reception, the Duke singled out Julia and Nellie Grant for special attention. It was at this type of work that the young Romanov was best. At the termination of the brief reception, the Duke and his party returned to the ministry and the Arlington House respectively amid the resounding cheers and best-wishes of the crowd.[17]

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15 *New York Times*, November 3, 1871.

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*, November 24, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 24, 1871. Creswell had served as a Representative and Senator from Maryland before his appointment to the cabinet on March 5, 1869. It was said of Grant that he was: "First in War, First in Peace, and First in the hearts of his postmasters." Porter had first met General Grant while

Early the next morning the Duke departed Washington for Annapolis with Catacazy, Admiral Poisset, and Secretary of the Navy George Robeson. The rain, which had welcomed him to New York, overtook him in Maryland, and the inspection of the Academy and the review of the midshipmen left the Russians drenched. Superintendent John Worden, who had commanded the *Monitor* in its epoch-making battle with the *Virginia*, provided a reception and luncheon. A magnificent bout of toast-drinking ended with Catacazy's to the beauty of American women, a subject on which he was an authority. Admiral Poisset proposed: "To the prosperity of the remarkable institution we have just inspected; may it continue its great usefulness and produce more men like Farragut, Porter, and Worden to adorn their country's history."[18]

By Friday evening the Russians were again installed in the Clarendon Hotel. It had rained most of the way back from Washington after the Annapolis excursion, but this did not deter the crowds. By this time there was a growing belief—fanned by inventive journalists—that the Duke was on a secret mission. There was talk of a defensive alliance, and some papers even spoke of an offensive and defensive alliance, thereby ignoring the diplomatic rules that nations may ally for self-preservation but not for aggression. The Duke was described as the most brilliant negotiator in the Czar's kingdom. Wiser heads warned that the Duke, Grant, and Fish could hardly have made any kind of alliance in the few minutes they were face-to-face in the White House. All rumors of secret missions vanished soon after the return to New York. It was announced that Alexis would not visit Washington again, and that he would soon rejoin the fleet for a cruise to Japan and

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he was still a captain, but Grant instantly asked that he be given a brigadier-general's star and assigned to command one of Grant's brigades. He was associated with Grant for the duration of the war, and after 1865 he gradually assumed the role of Grant's spokesman because of his remarkable skill as a public speaker. Babcock, like Porter, was also a West Pointer and had served as Grant's aide-de-camp during the war. When Grant became President, Babcock served as his private secretary, although he was later implicated in much of the dishonesty that surrounded the administration. Young Fred Dent was also an aide-de-camp to Grant. The General's father-in-law, Colonel Frederick Dent, according to one of Grant's biographers, "lived at the White House for weeks and months at a time, reading newspapers, smoking cigars and mixing mint juleps. Grant's friends found the Colonel's discourses on damned Yankees and upstart 'niggahs' rather amusing." W. E. Woodward, *Meet General Grant*, New York, 1928, 403.

[18] *New York Times*, November 25, 1871.

China. On November 24 Catacazy relinquished his diplomatic post to Major-General Gorloff.[19]

On Saturday, November 25, Alexis donned his naval uniform and accompanied General Irvin McDowell on a tour of the harbor and attended a small reception and dance at Governor's Island. Sunday was a quiet day of reflection. The Duke attended, for the second Sunday in New York, services at the Greek Orthodox Chapel, and in the afternoon he met the leaders of the reception committee. He explained that he had been favorably impressed by both New York and Washington but felt the commercial capital had greater appeal than the political. Before supper he and another member of his staff accompanied General Gorloff on a brief window shopping expedition. It was an act of bravery for the Duke to venture into the streets with a small party, for grave concern had been expressed over the growing army of "lion hunters" which held the Clarendon under close seige. All of the hunters were Dianas, but, to the dismay of the press, most of them were middle-aged. Some of the hunters were satisfied with an occasional glimpse of the Duke or some of his younger retainers, but there were others who found that womankind does not live by glances alone. The hotel employees were pestered for confidential information on the Duke's habits and movements, and a lively business developed in the sale of items said to be his. There was a brisk trade in hotel linen, silver, and other properties.[20]

On Monday, November 27, New York got down to the serious business of entertaining its royal guest. The day's activities included photos at Matthew Brady's famous studio, and an inspection, dinner, and dance at the naval yard. In a touching scene the young Romanov was taken to the ways and given a lecture and demonstration on American naval architecture, in which he briefly joined. It was an attempt to show that the Duke was a worthy successor to his illustrious ancestor, Peter the Great, who had worked as a ship's carpenter at the ways in Amsterdam. The day's festivities ended with a performance of *Faust* at the Academy of Music.[21]

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[19] Press correspondents in Washington announced "It could hardly be possible even for so accomplished a diplomat as the Prince is presented to be, to finish negotiations of an important and delicate character, like an offensive and defensive alliance in the few minutes he spent with the officers of our government today." *New York Times*, November 24, 1871. Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, 273.

[20] *New York Times*, November 26, 27, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 26, 27, 1871.

[21] *New York Times*, November 27, 28, 1871.

The next day, the reporters said, was cold enough to make the Duke feel at home. In the afternoon the Russians were taken to Tompkins' Square where Alexis reviewed the fire brigade. The horse-drawn apparatus went by the reviewing stand three times: at the walk, trot, and gallop. The Duke went straight to his hotel but came out in a few moments and went with the fire commissioner to the nearest box. The crowd gasped in amazement when the box was opened and he telegraphed "Fire in Union Square." He had barely taken his position on the Clarendon balcony when several fire companies and the insurance patrol arrived to extinguish a mock-blaze on the Everett House. The day's activities ended with a gala ball at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.[22]

On Wednesday the Russians attended the grand ball at the Academy of Music. Most of the guests were on hand by ten, and they fretted nervously awaiting the Duke's appearance. The academy was decked with the flags and colors of both countries, a huge portrait of the Duke's parents, as well as pictures of Lincoln and Emperor Alexander II signing the Emancipation Proclamation and the ukase. When the Russians finally arrived, the music and dancing commenced, although the latter was constantly interrupted. Most of the couples preferred to promenade the floor to get a better look at Alexis. It became evident that Alexis either disliked dancing or found the mild exertion too exhausting. Many of the young ladies soon wearied of his apparent indifference and concentrated their attention on one of his suite, a brilliantly uniformed young Hussar, who embarrassed them by making it evident that he understood their subtle whispering.[23]

The Duke celebrated Thanksgiving Day by attending the English and Russian services at the Greek Orthodox Chapel on Second Avenue. He spent the afternoon in solitude; perhaps the pretty young things at the Academy of Music the previous evening had made him think of his own beloved. By evening his mood had changed to one of pleasure, and he slipped out incognito with a few intimates to see, for the first time in his life, an American minstrel show.[24]

On Friday the Duke was taken aboard the *Mary Powell* for an inspection of West Point. After watching the cadets parade, he toured the barracks, library, public offices, and hospital. After

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[22] *Ibid.*, November 29, 1871.
[23] *Ibid.*, November 30, 1871; *New York Herald*, November 30, 1871.
[24] *New York Times*, December 1, 1871.

dining in the superintendent's quarters, Alexis returned to the city to attend a performance of *Mignon* at the Academy of Music.[25]

Nearly four hundred guests assembled Saturday morning at the Academy of Design for the presentation of a painting of Admiral David Farragut in the shrouds of the *Hartford* at the battle of Mobile Bay, which had been painted by the now-forgotten artist William Page. General Gorloff accepted the gift: "I receive with grateful thanks the portrait of one of your most distinguished naval heroes, by one of your most honored artists. It will have its place among the choice collections of the Imperial Government." Alexis added a brief expression of hope and good will:

> I trust that there will never be any occasion for disturbing the peace and good will of the United States and Russia. I am proud to belong to that naval profession in which your Admiral Farragut won so much respect and honor, and I trust that the navies of the two countries will never meet except as friends.

This spirit of co-operation was underscored when Admiral Poisset entertained some American naval officers aboard the *Svetland* in the afternoon. In keeping with the nautical spirit, which had been created for the Duke's last day in New York, he was entertained that evening at Delmonico's by the New York Yacht Club.[26]

The following morning the Duke attended religious services again and was later photographed with his staff. The four-pose portraits, which had been taken earlier, had attracted more than three thousand ladies to Brady's galleries. They gazed upon their hero and bought copies of their favorite pose as a treasured memento. After dinner, eight carriages transported the thirty-two

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25 *Ibid.*, December 2, 1871; *New York Herald*, December 2, 1871.

26 *New York Times*, December 3, 1871; *New York Herald*, December 3, 1871. William Page was born in Albany, New York, in 1811. As a young man he became a student of the American painter-inventor, Samuel F. B. Morse. He became noted as a portrait painter during the early phases of his career, and during this period he painted a portrait of Governor Marcy for the New York City Hall and one of John Quincy Adams for Faneuil Hall. He opened a Boston studio in 1840 and soon became acquainted with most of the prominent figures in Massachusetts. In 1843 James Russell Lowell dedicated the first complete edition of his poems to Page: "I have never seen the works of the great masters of your art, but I have studied their lives, and sure I am that no nobler gentler or purer spirit than yours was ever anointed by the eternal beauty to bear that part of the divine message which it belongs to the great painter to reveal." Page returned to New York in 1860. His painting of Admiral Farragut was widely criticized as inaccurate, but the admiral, who personally posed on a model of the rigging, attested to its complete authenticity. Page was President of the Academy of Design from 1871 to 1874. He died in 1885 after paralysis had virtually put an end to his career in 1877.

members of the Russian retinue to the special train which awaited in Jersey City to carry them to Philadelphia.[27]

Alexis arrived at the Continental Hotel late Sunday evening. The following morning he made a tour of the city in an open carriage with General George Meade. The enthusiasm of the crowds was no less than that of those in New York. The one-day visit to Philadelphia terminated with a grand ball at the Academy of Music, at which the "Alexis March" was featured. By Tuesday, December 5, the Russians were again installed in their home base at the Clarendon Hotel. The Duke spent a quiet day in his chambers. He did not visit the *Svetland*, as it had been first announced he would do, but Admiral Poisset returned to his ship to issue some orders. When he returned to the Clarendon, he brought Admiral Rowan and other officers who joined the Duke and Generals Dix and McDowell for dinner. At this moment the State Department released many papers on the Catacazy affair. Secretary Fish submitted the correspondence to the Senate. Fortunately this did not disrupt the spirit of good will which permeated the air.[28]

On Thursday morning the Russians left New York for the last time aboard another private train for Boston. The Duke stopped for five hours in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts, to check on the status of Russian arms contracts which were being filled at the Union Metallic Cartridge Company and the Smith and Wesson Arms Company. It was after ten at night before the Duke arrived in Boston and was escorted to the Revere House amid the same cheering crowds.[29]

After a restful evening, the Duke left the hotel at 10 next morning in full naval uniform. He boarded the "Lincoln Landau" (the carriage ridden by the martyred President in Boston) and was taken to the city hall and state house to meet the local and state officials. There could scarcely have been even a slight drop in the decibel rating of the crowd's roar during these movements.

Some cavalry led the prince to Cambridge to see Harvard. He was escorted to the venerable Gore Library building where he was received by President Charles Eliot and members of the faculty. The ever-present crowd of adoring females beamed down from the

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[27] *New York Times*, December 4, 1871.

[28] *Ibid.*, December 5–8, 1871; *New York Herald*, December 5, 6, 1871; *Philadelphia Ledger*, December 3–7, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*, December 3, 4, 5, 1871.

[29] Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, 274.

balcony. With President Eliot the Duke explored the shelves and met John Sibley, the librarian, who took pride in showing him a rare copy of the *Bibliorum Codex Synaticus Petropolitanus* (a gift of Alexander II). The library also boasted more than one hundred volumes of the *Memoirs and Collections of the Imperial Academy at St. Petersburg*, which were shown to Alexis with great pride.

After this bow to knowledge, the young Muscovite was whisked off to Eliot's home for lunch. In the meantime, the undergraduates had been having fun. Some of them had 140 quarts of ice cream shipped out from Boston to a building that was locked. The students had some refreshments. Others had engaged forty hacks in Boston which wandered idly up and down the streets of Cambridge all afternoon. Earlier in the day the hacks had been kept busy driving up to Eliot's house to announce the arrival of the Duke. From Harvard the Duke was driven out to see Breed's Hill, where the battle of Bunker Hill had been fought, and he was then taken to the navy yard. By this time he had seen so many navy yards that it was becoming boring. Even a torpedo-firing demonstration added to the ennui when it failed. Alexis returned to his hotel to prepare for the evening's festivities—a ball. The only excitement occurred on the way to Harvard when Catacazy's coach got out of control and ran into a lamp post. He was catapulted into the street with a Boston alderman, but neither of them was hurt. The ball was staged at the Boston Theatre. There were the customary flags, colors, and portraits. Alexis arrived late and departed early, leaving the managers lamenting a ten thousand dollar loss.[30]

On Saturday, December 9, the Duke went by train to Lowell where he visited his friend, the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox. The private train brought him back to Boston in time for the climax of the reception—a gigantic music festival featuring 1,200 school children. The Duke had begun to grow weary of hearing the Russian national hymn sung on the slightest provocation, as it had been so often on his journey, but the children's performance touched him deeply. Oliver Wendell Holmes had written special lyrics for the occasion:

> Shadowed so long by the storm-clouds of danger.
> Thus whom the prayers of an Empire defend—
> Welcome, thrice welcome! but not as a stranger;
> Come to the nation that calls thee its friend.

30 *New York Times*, December 7, 8, 9, 1871; *New York Herald*, December 7, 8, 9, 1871; *Boston Advertiser*, December 4–10, 1871.

Bleak are our shores with the blasts of December,
Fettered and chill is the rivulet's flow;
Throbbing and warm are the hearts that remember
Where was our friend when the world was our foe.

Look on the lips that are smiling to greet thee,
See the fresh flowers that a people has strawn;
Count them thy sisters and brothers that meet thee
Guest of the nation, her heart is thine own.

Fires of the North, in eternal communion
Blend your broad flashes with evening's bright star!
God bless the Empire that loves the great Union;
Strength to her people! Long life to the Czar.[31]

That evening Alexis and the celebrated figures of the commonwealth's economic, political, social, and artistic life sat down to a banquet in the Revere House. No efforts were spared to make it a memorable occasion in which the Duke would receive an indelible impression of the state's greatness. The Boston scribes had criticized the receptions in New York and Philadelphia where the absence of great men had given the banquets an aura of "flunkyism." They complained that too many guests had been served without tickets. In Boston, the reporters explained, it was different, and they borrowed an old railroading term; except for the Russians the only other "dead heads" at the banquet were the governor, the mayor, and the members of the city government. Alexis paid tribute to the city, "The cradle of the American nation. The child or the infant, which lay in that cradle has very soon, in a very short time, become the giant which all the nations are regarding, and which every nation desires to have for its friend." Holmes had composed another poem for the occasion. The final stanza read:

You must leave him, they say, till the Summer is green
Both shores are his home th'ough the waves roll between.
And then we'll return him with thanks for the same
As fresh and as smiling and tall as he came.

James Russell Lowell introduced a humorous note when he suggested that by selling Alaska to the United States, the Czar had made us his "Keeper of the Seals."[32]

The Duke spent Sunday recuperating from the dinner, but in the evening he ventured out to hear a concert of Theodore Thomas'

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[31] *New York Times*, December 10, 1871.
[32] *Ibid.*, December 11, 1871.

orchestra and the Boston Handel and Haydn Society. After seeking his own pleasures in Boston for a few more days, the Duke visited Montreal and Ottawa, where he paid his respects to the Governor-General. On Friday, December 22, the imperial party reached the Canadian side of Niagara Falls. Later that day the Russians crossed to the American side. During his brief stay at the Falls, the Duke and his friends visited Colonel Barnett's Museum, where they "donned the grotesque looking costumes needed in their proposed trip under the cataract." The Russians followed the cold, wet path which led them down and under the falls. It was an exciting and pleasurable experience. They came up "jabbering their native jargon with foreign volubility." Alexis left Niagara Falls on Saturday and proceeded to Buffalo where he was introduced to former-president Millard Fillmore. Catacazy left the entourage in Buffalo and returned to Washington to collect his family before returning to Europe and oblivion. Alexis spent a joyful Christmas visiting several private homes. From Buffalo he moved on to Cleveland and Detroit for brief receptions.[33]

The imperial party reached the Tremont House in Chicago on Saturday evening, December 30, where he was given a small reception and accepted the freedom of the city "à La Grant"—brief and to the point. New Year's Day was still not recognized as a general holiday except for editors, bankers, and businessmen, but the Duke was introduced to one American custom for that day, which he heartily endorsed. It was customary for young men to visit the homes of young girls and leave their cards. The reception committee also took him for a tour of the stock yards where he was thrilled by the faultless-techniques of butchering. He visited the Board of Trade and toured the sections of the city which had so recently been devastated by the great fire on October 8 and 9.

After a brief diversionary visit to Milwaukee, the Duke was back in Chicago on January 4 to hold a public reception. He announced that he had reconsidered an invitation to join a buffalo hunt on the plains. On the next day he left for St. Louis where he was accorded the same extravagant reception that he had received on a dozen previous occasions. His itinerary carried him next to Kansas City, Leavenworth, and Omaha where he joined General Philip Sheridan, the western commander, for the hunt. Every possible effort was going into making it a success.[34]

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[33] *Ibid.*, December 17, 18, 23, 25, 1871.
[34] *Ibid.*, January 3, 4, 1872.

The army assembled an impressive cast for the show.[35] "Buffalo Bill" Cody had been acquiring a reputation as a hunter and scout, thanks largely to the efforts of such novelists as "Ned Buntline" (Edward Zana Carroll Judson), and he had recently conducted a party of millionaires on a hunt.[36] He visited the Sioux leader Spotted Tail and invited him to join both Sheridan and himself at Red Willow creek "in five sleeps" to meet another great chieftain from across the sea.[37] The famous cavalry officer George A. Custer, who was destined soon to lead his men to disaster against the Sioux, was also invited, as were several other prominent military commanders in the West. On January 13, 1872, the Russian party reached North Platte, Nebraska, where a caravan of five ambulances, a baggage wagon, and a carriage had been provided. The army barracks at Omaha had forwarded champagne and all other delicacies needed to bring a touch of old world cuisine to the marrow-chilling, windy plains of the West. A main base, "Camp Alexis," had been established on Red Willow creek, about fifty miles away. In a few hours the caravan reached camp under the protective-eye of two companies of the Second Cavalry. Spotted Tail had kept his word. His band was on hand but so were those of Whistler, War Bonnet, and Black Hat. An estimated crowd

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[35] *Ibid.*, January 14, 1872. The buffalo hunt phase of the Duke's visit has attracted much attention from students of the Old West, but many of their accounts show considerable variation in details.

[36] General Sheridan had prevailed upon Cody to take out a hunting party in 1871 composed of some young gentlemen of "New York's fastest society." Commodore James Gordon Bennett, son and heir of one of New York's greatest editors and proud holder of a naval title won in combat at the New York Yacht Club, was the most prominent among the group. While on the way to the prairies the party paused long enough in Chicago to inspect some specimens of the prospective target at the zoo. The "New Yorkers on the Warpath" reached Fort McPherson on September 22, and a "Dude Wigwam" was established nearby. For the next few days the young sportsmen ate, drank, shot buffalo and listened to Cody's stories. Cody taught them the proper way for a he-man to brush his teeth in the morning—roll a shot of whiskey around the mouth vigorously before swallowing. The hunt disbanded at Fort Hays, Kansas, on October 2. One of the dudes, Henry Eugene Davies, promptly published a pamphlet, *Ten Days on the Plains*, in which he related the experiences of the hunt. The episode may be followed in the *New York Herald* (Bennett's paper), September 30, October 3, 6, 1871, and in the recent studies: Don Russell, *The Lives and Legends of Buffalo Bill*, Norman, 1960, 170–173; Henry Blackman Sell and Victor Weybright, *Buffalo Bill and the Wild West*, New York, 1955, 79–83; Richard O'Connor, *Sheridan the Inevitable*, Indianapolis, 1953, 321.

[37] George Hyde, *Spotted Tail's Folk*, Norman, 1961, 179–180. Spotted Tail's people, the Brulé Sioux, were sent twenty-five wagons of provisions from Fort McPherson to assure their cooperation. Several other Sioux bands were angered by what they considered to be a case of discrimination.

of 1,300 Americans, Russians, and Indians were in the hunting area. Alexis was fascinated by the Indians, who shrieked, yelled, and staged sham-battles. He marveled at their marksmanship. One brave, Two Lance, shot an arrow completely through a buffalo and gave the gory instrument to Alexis as a gift. It was Cody, however, whom Alexis admired most. The Don Cossacks, he said, were equal to the Indians in their skill as riders and marksmen, but there was no one in the world to compete with "Buffalo Bill."

The Duke had demonstrated his skill at pigeon shooting in the East, but this was a new kind of hunting. He shot poorly. On his first try, Alexis emptied two revolvers without a hit. Cody, who had already loaned him his favorite horse, Buckskin Joe, offered Alexis his pet fire iron, Lucretia Borgia, and he scored his first kill. After burning powder for three days, Alexis had a total of eight kills, while the entire Russian shooting-party (Admiral Poisset, Counsellor of State W. T. Machin, Consul-General Bodisco, Counts Olsenfieff and Shonveloff, Lieutenants Tudor and Stordengaff, and Dr. Vladimir Kadrin) had added eighteen more. The herd had escaped with minor casualties, but the five ambulances filled with wine and viands had suffered annihilation. There was nothing to do but head for Denver to revictual.

A trader in Denver, Don Miguel Otero, arranged a second hunt near Kit Carson, Colorado. The Duke was entertained in Denver at a ball. There was a later story that during the ball a telegram arrived that buffalo had been sighted. Alexis was supposed to have left the territorial governor's ball to battle with the bison, just as allied officers had been summoned from a ball in Brussels many years before to do battle with Napoleon at Waterloo. The Kit Carson hunt was led by famous guide James P. McCoy, who astonished Alexis by killing an antelope at two-thirds of a mile with a single bullet between the eyes. The feat was repeated later in the day at a greater range. While the Duke gesticulated and poured out his praise in a profuse mixture of Russian and English, Sheridan calmly assured him that it was a fair shot, but that virtually every private in the American army could do as well. There was a delightful story—undoubtedly associated with this phase of the hunt—in which one of the violinists at the ball followed the hunters. He took a position atop a knoll with Sheridan, when a wounded calf came along. Sheridan's marksmanship was substandard. The fiddler grasped the calf by the tail and held it stationary until Sheridan could deliver the coup de grace. The

Duke had a narrow escape during the hunt when a wounded animal charged while his pistol was empty. Custer rode alongside and passed a loaded weapon to Alexis, who promptly brought down the game.[38]

The special train, which carried the visitors eastward, stopped in Topeka and Jefferson City where the Duke was feted by the state officials of Kansas and Missouri.[39] The Russians were given another rousing ovation in St. Louis, and by the end of January they had moved along to Louisville, Kentucky. On February 1 the visitors went to Mammoth Cave, where they spent four hours. The Duke was much impressed, since he had never seen a cave. On the same day the Russian government named Baron von Offenburg to replace Catacazy.[40]

On Friday, February 2, there was a ball at Overton Hall in Memphis, Tennessee. On Monday the Russians dispatched some private letters to St. Petersburg by special courier, while on the same day the Duke was presented with a bale of cotton which had been beautifully encased in Russian and American flags. The next day he attended a dance at the Peabody Hotel. He was quoted as saying that he had never seen such beautiful women since entering the South. On February 7 the Russians boarded the steamer *James Howard* for New Orleans. George Custer accompanied the Duke on the last lap of the journey. The Duke's visit corresponded with the Mardi Gras season, and he had a most delightful reception. On February 19 he left by special train for Mobile and Pensacola. The Russian squadron awaited him at the latter place, and on February 23 he boarded the *Svetland* to resume the cruise to the Orient.[41]

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[38] Of those who have written about the hunt only Tarsaïdzé, *Czars and Presidents*, 279–280, has indicated that there were actually two hunts in Nebraska and Colorado Territory. For other accounts of the hunt see: Russell, *Lives and Legends of Buffalo Bill*, 174–180, 267–268; Sell and Weybright, *Buffalo Bill and the Wild West*, 84–88; O'Connor, *Sheridan the Inevitable*, 322–323; Richard J. Walsh (In collaboration with Milton S. Salsburg), *The Making of Buffalo Bill*, Indianapolis, 1928, 165–166; Elizabeth Jane Leonard and Julia Cody Goodman, edited by James Williams Hoffman, *Buffalo Bill: King of the Old West*, New York, 1955, 208–210; Frederick S. Dellenbaugh, *George Armstrong Custer*, New York, 1917, 147–148; Carl Coke Rister, *Border Command: General Phil Sheridan in the West*, Norman, 1944, 167–170; *New York Times*, January 18, 1872.

[39] The typical extravagance that was shown to the Grand Duke even in the most remote areas is attested by the tantalizing menu of 104 items that was offered to him at the reception in Topeka, Kansas. William F. Zornow, "Topeka Fetes Royalty," *Bulletin of the Shawnee County* (Kansas) *Historical Society*, XIII, (March, 1951), 21–26, *New York Times*, January 23, 25, 1872.

[40] *New York Times*, January 22, 26, February 1, 1872.

[41] *Ibid.*, January 28, February 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 17, 19, 1872.

It is difficult to say what impressions the young Duke carried away with him. He had been given a resounding, sincere welcome wherever he went, and he carried away the best wishes and good will of the American people. Unfortunately, he had been in America at a time when she could not show herself to the best advantage. He came while Reconstruction was going through some of its meaner phases. He visited the capital when it was presided over by one of the weakest and most corrupt administrations in history. In New York, where he spent most of his time, he arrived in the midst of the scandals over the corrupt administration of Boss William Tweed. His visit corresponded to a period when American foreign affairs were in a delicate state, for Fish was engaged in serious negotiations with the British over the settlement of the *Alabama* Claims.

The young Duke left no great name for himself in Russian history. His elder brother, Alexander, succeeded to the throne in 1881 when their father was assassinated. Alexis resumed his amours with the beautiful Alexandra, and finally in 1884 their son was legitimatized as Count Alexis Belevsky.[42]

William F. Zornow

Kent State University, Ohio

[42] Alexis' position was not the result of achievement but of family ties. In addition to commanding several regiments and the corps of guards in Moscow he also commanded the naval cadets. He was supreme admiral and aide-de-camp for many years before his death in Paris on November 14, N.S., 1908.

The Friendship of Woodrow Wilson and Cleveland H. Dodge

The biographers of Woodrow Wilson generally have portrayed him as a man who stirred masses of people through his eloquence and idealism but who at the same time was cold in personal relationships, a person who seemed to "love men at a distance."[1] Certainly many of those thrown into intimate association with him later broke off: George Harvey, James Smith, Jr., William McCombs, William Jennings Bryan, Colonel E. M. House, and Robert Lansing. Wilson himself remarked "how few friends I have" and concluded that this was partly because he was "reserved and shy" and partly because he had a "narrow uncatholic taste in friends."[2] Reputedly he had an "instinctive aversion" to businessmen.[3] Yet, ironically, among the warm, enduring friendships enjoyed by Woodrow Wilson was his relationship with the New York millionaire businessman, Cleveland Hoadley Dodge.

The existence of the friendship has been long recognized, but Dodge's influence on Wilson has never been explored.[4] This is understandable in terms of the character of Dodge. A modest man, he did not exploit his friendship with Wilson and ride the presidential coattails into public office. He left no diary and saved but a handful of his personal correspondence, some 125 letters from Wilson.[5] Though never essaying the role of Colonel House, Dodge had an important influence on Wilson's career. Aside from being a close friend for a third of a century, he promoted Wilson's advancement at Princeton, financed his entry into

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[1] Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers, 1896–1919*, New York, 1940, 346.

[2] Wilson quoted in Herbert C. F. Bell, *Woodrow Wilson and the People*, Garden City, 1945, 105.

[3] Arthur D. Howden Smith, *Mr. House of Texas*, New York, 1940, 87.

[4] Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era Years of Peace, 1910–1917*, Chapel Hill, 1944, 106. See also James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson*, New York, 1926, 473; Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, *The Woodrow Wilson's*, New York, 1937, 133; Joseph P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him*, Garden City, 1921, 82.

[5] The Dodge Papers consist of some 125 letters at the Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey. Most of the letters are from Wilson to Dodge. Carbons of these letters are also to be found scattered through the Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. Letters from Dodge to Wilson are, for the most part, found only in the Wilson Papers.

politics, and advised him on several important appointments and foreign policy issues.

Although Wilson made his mark as a college president turned politician and Dodge as a businessman and philanthropist, they shared much in common. Author of a brilliant study of the role of congressional government, a competent history of the Civil War and Reconstruction, and a pedestrian multi-volume history of the Republic, Wilson's principal forte was as lecturer and essayist. His reading tastes ran to Charles Dickens and Walter Bagehot.[6] Never a writer, Dodge was a "great reader" even as a youth.[7] At college he, like Wilson, developed a taste for the political essays of Bagehot and the works of Charles Lamb. Later in life he read the essays of Wilson appreciatively. These shared literary interests formed one strand of the correspondence that passed between Wilson and Dodge, particularly in the 1920's when both men were in semi-retirement.[8]

The world of business which absorbed Dodge's energies was somewhat foreign and distasteful to Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister. When he abandoned his law practice in Atlanta to enter the academic life, Wilson observed that in Atlanta the chief end of man was certainly to make money and "money cannot be made except by the most vulgar methods."[9] That Dodge's money did not repel Wilson was owing, no doubt, to two factors. Cleveland Dodge escaped the onus of the nouveau riche by inheriting an interest in Phelps Dodge, a mining and metal firm that was notable for its model, if paternalistic, labor policies.[10] Likewise significant was the public spirited tradition of the Dodge family. In the age of vulgar parvenus the Dodges were distinguished for their public benefactions. David Low Dodge, a great grandfather, was a founder of the New York Peace Society, while successive generations served as officers of the Y.M.C.A. Of greatest moment was the family interest in American missionary and educational institutions in the Near East. His grandfather, William Earl Dodge, Sr. had been one of five incorporators of the Syrian Prot-

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6 Bell, *Woodrow Wilson,* 376.

7 Corrinne Roosevelt Robinson to Editor, *New York Times,* June 30, 1926.

8 Dodge to Ray S. Baker, November 10, 1922, Ray Stannard Baker Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey; Dodge to Wilson, February 21, 1922, Wilson Papers, File 9, Box 8.

9 Wilson to R. H. Dabney, May 11, 1883, cited in Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House,* Princeton, 1947, 11.

10 Robert Glass Cleland, *History of Phelps Dodge, 1834–1950,* New York, 1952, 166–167, 177.

estant College at Beirut; later his father, William Earl Dodge, Jr. and an uncle, David Stuart Dodge, became leading patrons of the institution.[11]

At the time Wilson and Dodge became well acquainted in the 1890's Dodge was already establishing his own reputation as a philanthropist. His wealth permitted him to give generously, often munificently, to various causes as when he gave $1,000,000 in a single gift to the Red Cross during World War I. Dodge invariably gave his time as well as money to the organizations he served. He was, for example, a vice-president of the Museum of Natural History and treasurer of both the American Red Cross and the National War Fund. He served these organizations not in an attitude of a man perfunctorily fulfilling his duty but with relish and zeal. He nurtured the family philanthropy in the Near East by organizing the Near East College Association to assure the American colleges at Constantinople and Beirut adequate financial support and the Near East Relief to aid impoverished refugees in Turkey, Persia, the Levant, and Greece during and after World War I.[12] Wilson could not match Dodge's gifts, but he shared his friend's interest, and as President of the United States and later as a private citizen he contributed modestly to the Near East Relief.[13]

Indeed, it was in the role of philanthropist that Dodge, an alumni trustee of Princeton, became aware of Wilson, a new member of the Princeton faculty. Although both men were members of the class of 1879, they had not been well-acquainted as students. However, the similar experiences and influences of their undergraduate life furnished an important bond between the two in subsequent years. Wilson's reputation as a popular lecturer brought him to the attention of the Princeton trustees who in 1896 asked him to deliver the important Sesquicentennial Address. The lecture won wide acclaim and brought offers of the Presidency of several colleges. Already regarding Wilson as a protege, Dodge joined other trustees in raising a private fund to supplement Wilson's

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11 See sketches of David Low Dodge, William Earl Dodge, Sr., William Earl Dodge, Jr., and David Stuart Dodge in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., *Dictionary of American Biography,* 21 vols., New York, 1928–1937.

12 *New York Times,* June 25, 1926. This obituary is the best brief summary of Dodge's activities.

13 As President Wilson proclaimed Near East Relief Days to assist the fund raising drives of that organization beginning in 1916. As a citizen he made modest contributions. See Dodge to Wilson, November 9, 1923, Wilson Papers, File 9, Box 8.

salary and secured a commitment from him to remain at Princeton for at least five years.[14] In 1902 Dodge joined fellow trustees in shattering precedent by electing Woodrow Wilson the first lay president of Princeton. Dodge and two other members of the class of 1879 notified the President-elect of his appointment. In what is probably the first personal note between them, Wilson told Dodge of his "delight" to have "such support and endorsement from you and the other '79 men who stand so close to me."[15]

The years of Wilson's presidency of Princeton saw the friendship grow and repeatedly put to the test with Dodge revealed as a dependable ally. Evidence of the deepening friendship is seen in the gift of a fine set of golf clubs that Dodge brought from Scotland and again in a note solicitous of Wilson's health.[16] It was in disputes over Wilson's educational plans that the friendship was tried and proved. Desiring to strengthen the undergraduate program, Wilson proposed a preceptorial system which would give each student far more personal instruction than hitherto. The plan meant adding fifty men to the faculty at once, thus requiring a major increase in the University budget. Dodge voted for the plan and enthusiastically accepted the job of raising the requisite funds from the alumni and friends of the University. Proud of Wilson's educational statesmanship, Dodge termed Wilson "Princeton's most valuable asset."[17]

Having succeeded in introducing the preceptorial system, Wilson in 1907 proposed to reorganize the social life of the student body by placing students in residence quadrangles. This new plan which was presented to the trustees with little or no prior consultation with the faculty outraged many senior faculty and alumni. Dodge approved Wilson's general plan, but recognizing that it lacked general support, he urged Wilson to settle for reform of the eating clubs as preferable to total defeat. Although Wilson declined to accept any compromise, his relationship with Dodge remained unchanged.[18]

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[14] Ray Stannard Baker, ed., *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, 8 vols., Garden City, 1927–1939, II, 39.

[15] Wilson to Dodge, June 17, 1902, cited in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, II, 134.

[16] McAdoo, *The Woodrow Wilson's*, 133; Dodge to Wilson, June 14, 1904, cited in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, II, 203.

[17] *Ibid.*, 157; Dodge to Wilson, October 15, 1906, cited in Link, *Wilson*, 44; Dodge to Wilson, December 18, 1907, cited in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, II, 267.

[18] Dodge to Wilson, September 28, 1907, cited in Link, *Wilson*, 52.

Before the sting of defeat had passed the graduate school controversy began. Wilson had long been committed to the creation of a first-rate graduate school at Princeton, but he felt that the school envisaged by Dean West would compete with, if not overshadow, the University. Throughout the debate, Dodge cautioned Wilson to proceed by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. Yet on the crucial votes Dodge stood by Wilson and expressed approval of Wilson's policy in taking "the bull by the horns." He told Wilson: "I knew it must come and don't see how you could have done anything else."[19] Dodge, McCormick, and other pro-Wilson men on the board of trustees came within an ace of winning the battle. Wilson was checkmated, however, by the gifts of William Cooper Procter and Isaac C. Wyman in support of Dean West's plan.

Just as Wilson found his leadership at Princeton thwarted, boss James Smith, Jr. began sounding him out on his availability as the Democratic party candidate for governor of New Jersey. Before entering politics Wilson consulted with Dodge on the propriety and advisability of leaving Princeton. By this time the Wilson-Dodge friendship was solidly formed. Wilson could look back over a decade and a half in which Dodge had promoted his teaching career, had helped elevate him to the Presidency of the University, and had consistently supported his educational policies. Dodge, impressed with Wilson's idealism and sentiments on public service, had, as he later phrased it, hitched his wagon to Wilson's star.[20]

The blessings of Cleveland Dodge went with Wilson's "star" as it rose in the political arena. Although the Smith machine had intended to employ him as a facade for its continued reign, Wilson emerged his own master. He identified himself with proponents of long overdue reform and achieved such admirable success that he was soon a major contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912.

The aid that Dodge could give Wilson at this point was limited but all-important. Dodge had been a "Cleveland Democrat" by conviction but was active in politics only sporadically and then only locally. On the other hand he was willing to use his money generously in behalf of Wilson's candidacy, and of money Wilson had

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[19] Dodge to Wilson, July 2, 1907, cited in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, II, 240; Dodge to Wilson, December 28, 1909, cited in *ibid.*, 319.

[20] Dodge's long-hand draft containing these sentiments is enclosed with the letter from Wilson to Dodge, February 6, 1917, Dodge Papers.

great need. As a "Johnny-come-lately" to politics, Wilson had no great following among the professional politicians. His appeal was to a growing mass of middle class voters who were ready to "swap" the professional politician for a man of courage and ideals. To organize "grass-roots" support for Wilson, Dodge put up $51,300 to publicize Wilson prior to the Democratic National Convention of 1912 and raised nearly $35,000 more from other sources. He also helped line up the Trenton *True-American's* editorial endorsement of Wilson's candidacy. After the convention nominated Wilson, Dodge gave an additional $35,000 to help finance the election. His pre-nomination contributions were the largest single sum received by the Wilson forces and constituted over half of all the pre-nomination money received. In the 1916 election Dodge contributed $108,000 to the Wilson campaign fund, by far the largest sum given by an individual. Dodge's financial aid was, in William Gibbs McAdoo's words, a "Godsend."[21]

As the greatest financial contributor to the presidential campaign one might well have expected Dodge to capitalize on his ties with the President by seeking some political plum. On the contrary Henry L. Stoddard's comments are typical of the judgements expressed by most journalists and acquaintances of Dodge: "I never heard of his wanting anything for himself; he was interested in the success of Wilson's Administration."[22] Dodge continued to offer his friendship and on occasion found opportunity to influence important policy decisions of the President without himself becoming a political figure.

Dodge's continuing friendship offered Wilson an avenue of escape by which he could retain a connection with the life he had known prior to 1910. On Dodge's yacht he found asylum to write his acceptance speech of 1912.[23] At Dodge's Riverdale home,

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[21] For Dodge's local political activity see *New York Times,* October 9, 1882, and May 29, 1917. For Dodge's campaign contributions see Wilson to Dodge, October 11, 1910, Dodge Papers; U. S. Senate, *Campaign Contributions. Testimony before a Sub Committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections,* 62 Cong., 3d Sess., 2 vols., Washington, 1913, I, 875–877; *New York Times,* November 4, 1916; William Gibbs McAdoo, *Crowded Years The Reminiscences of William G. McAdoo,* Boston, 1931, 117.

[22] Henry L. Stoddard, *As I Knew Them: Presidents and Politics from Grant to Coolidge,* New York, 1927, 23.

[23] On coming ashore Wilson delighted reporters with a bit of verse:

"I wish my room had a floor;
I don't care so much for a door;
But this walking around
Without touching the ground
Is getting to be a damned bore."

Kerney, *Political Education of Wilson,* 239.

which the President invariably visited whenever he was in New York City, he could enjoy a luncheon among old friends with a chance to reminisce about less strenuous days.[24] Even Dodge's letters, with their "breath of affection and unselfish loyalty" gave Wilson a lift.[25]

In the making of several appointments Dodge had a decisive influence. Wilson had hoped to appoint distinguished Americans, rather than party hacks, to ambassadorial posts, and accordingly he discussed with Dodge the suitability of a number of mutual acquaintances. Dodge was asked in one instance to use his influence to get a prospective nominee to accept the appointment.[26] In other instances Dodge took the initiative in proposing suitable appointees.[27] His most important influence on ambassadorial appointments was in connection with the tenure of Walter Hines Page as ambassador to the Court of St. James. Page had soon found out that his expenses exceeded his salary and was on the point of resigning. Wilson took the liberty of asking Dodge to subsidize Page to the extent of $25,000 a year over and above his regular salary so that he could stay on in London. Dodge immediately complied.[28] Later, in 1916, when Page was again restless and Wilson was increasingly dissatisfied with Page's work, Colonel House recommended that Wilson replace Page with Dodge: "He is loyal and has good sense, and that is all you want in an ambassador."[29] The President held off nearly a year before broaching the subject to Dodge. The latter replied to his "dear friend and President" that he was "flabbergasted" and "touched deeply" but pleaded that his health would not permit any such strenuous activity. He further predicated an "insuperable objection" on the grounds of friendship. Avowing that he would not "ask for anything or accept anything from you except your friendship," Dodge, unaware of Wilson's dissatisfaction with Page, offered to increase Page's allowance if that would keep him on the job.[30]

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[24] *New York Times*, November 6, 1915; May 20, 1918; October 14, 1918.

[25] *Wilson to Dodge*, January 27, 1911, Dodge Papers.

[26] Dodge was to help induce John R. Mott to accept the ambassadorship to China. Wilson to Dodge, March 30, 1913, Dodge Papers; Edward C. Jenkins to Wilson, March 14, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series VI, File 203.

[27] Wilson to Dodge, January 6, 1913, and April 10, 1913, Dodge Papers.

[28] Wilson to Dodge, July 12, 1914, cited in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, IV, 33.

[29] House to Wilson, May 14, 1916, cited in U. S. Senate. Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, *Hearings* . . . , 74 Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, 1937, Part 28, 8490.

[30] Wilson to Dodge, February 6, 1917, Dodge Papers.

In the controversy over Wilson's proposal to appoint Louis Brandeis to a cabinet post Dodge again exerted an influence. Politically Brandeis was unacceptable to many New England Democrats because he had been actively identified with Robert M. LaFollette's candidacy early in 1912 and had only recently become a Democrat. As soon as his name was mentioned as a possible Attorney General a smear campaign began impugning his motives, integrity and professional ethics. Officials of the New Haven Railroad, the United Shoe Machinery Company, Kidder-Peabody, Lee-Higginson, and Old Dominion Copper and Smelting Company opposed the Brandeis appointment. Their complaints were funneled to Dodge through Henry L. Higginson, a close friend. Dodge apparently was unaware that Higginson was acting as spokesman for numerous business groups, but he was convinced that the appointment would be a political blunder. He cautioned Wilson against adding Brandeis to the cabinet. Although other advisors, especially Governor Eugene N. Foss of Massachusetts and William McCombs strongly counselled Wilson to drop Brandeis in the interest of party harmony, the "personal affection existing between Dodge and Wilson" was "an influential factor" in making Wilson receptive to the pressure to abandon Brandeis.[31]

On other occasions Dodge was asked by business acquaintances to solicit favors from Wilson, but only rarely did he yield and then half-heartedly. When the Owen-Glass bill proposing a Federal Reserve banking system was being threshed out by the President and administration leaders in Congress, Paul Warburg and Jacob Schiff prevailed upon Dodge to secure a hearing for them with the President. Dodge took them to the White House, but he sought out Colonel House and disavowed support of either Warburg or Schiff saying that he felt the President knew what he was doing and did not need any more advice.[32]

In foreign affairs, also, Dodge influenced the course of events. At the moment Wilson became President American relations with Mexico were troubled by the continuing Mexican Revolution. Porfirio Díaz, the Mexican dictator, had been advised to resign or had been driven from office in 1911. His successor, Francisco Madero, a champion of constitutional government, was overthrown

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31 Alfred Lief, *Brandeis: The Personal History of an American Ideal*, New York, 1936, 260; Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Brandeis, A Free Man's Life*, New York, 1946, 385–393. See also Kerney, *Political Education of Wilson*, 284–286.

32 Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols., Boston, 1926, I, 165–166.

and assassinated in February, 1913. As the Phelps, Dodge Company owned mining properties in northern Mexico, Cleveland Dodge was well informed on conditions in Mexico. During the first three months of his Administration, Wilson seems to have relied upon Dodge for advice. Almost from the time Wilson was inaugurated Dodge forwarded to the President reports on the Mexican situation from Judge Haff, an attorney for the Southern Pacific Railroad and a spokesman for Phelps, Dodge as well.[33] Largely on Dodge's recommendation Wilson in May, 1913, agreed to recognize the Huerta regime on condition that it call for free elections by the fall of 1913. Within a month it was apparent to both Dodge and Wilson that Huerta was not likely to create a constitutional regime, and both Dodge and Wilson turned to support Carranza. By the summer of 1913 Wilson had his own independent sources of information on Mexican affairs and while he and Dodge continued to exchange letters on the subject, Dodge could no longer be described as a source of policy. As Mexico regained a semblance of political stability in 1916, Dodge pronounced his satisfaction with American-Mexican policy, but it was one of Wilson's making.[34]

Along with the question as to which revolutionary regime in Mexico the United States should recognize was the matter of ascertaining whether any Americans were "fomenting, inciting, encouraging or financing" the rebellion in Mexico. A Senate subcommittee held hearings in September, 1912, which produced rumors of gunrunning, but first hand testimony disclosed that the only aid given the revolutionaries by American firms had been under duress and that it was inconsequential.[35] Allegations of a "close financial relationship" between Mexican revolutionaries and mining interests in this country continued to be made in the fall and winter of 1912, but the culpable parties remained unnamed.[36] Finally in 1913 the Phelps, Dodge officials were accused of making two shipments of ammunition to Mexico in violation of an arms embargo. Both charges were dropped when the United States

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[33] Dodge to Wilson, August 25, 1913; Wilson to Dodge, July 21, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series VI, File 307.

[34] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917*, New York, 1954, 111 ff: Dodge to Wilson, January 14, 1916, Wilson Papers, Series VI, File 307.

[35] U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Revolutions in Mexico*, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, 1913, testimony of E. C. Houghton, 10; George H. Laird, 22; and George Young, 86–92.

[36] *New York Times*, December 20, 1912; December 22, 1912.

attorney failed to prove that any ammunition had crossed the Mexican border.[37]

For his connection with Mexican affairs Dodge was subjected to considerable abuse in the 1916 election campaign. Frank H. Bleighton authored a scurrilous pamphlet, "Woodrow Wilson & Company," which made Dodge the evil genius of Mexican policy; an anonymous pamphlet by the "League for Protection of Religious Orders," was sent to Irish voters just prior to election day in New York City; also William A. Rodenberg, an Illinois Congressman dissatisfied with Wilson's Mexican policy, labelled Dodge the architect of that policy and accused Dodge of using his friendship with Wilson to secure permission to ship ammunition to Carranza.[38]

At most it could be said that the Phelps, Dodge Company did nothing overt to oppose Carranza and nothing improper to aid him. A million rounds of ammunition were sold to the Carranza regime by a subsidiary of Phelps, Dodge Company after the State Department lifted its arms embargo on the shipment of arms to Mexico. On the whole the international intrigue in Mexican politics involved the rivalry of British and American firms for oil concessions, not mining rights. The unwillingness or incapacity of rival factions within Mexico to hold free elections and abide by the results added to the confusion. Wilson's general preference for Carranza over Huerta was premised on Carranza's presumed leadership of the Constitutional party rather than his acceptability to any particular American business firm.[39]

Far more consequential was the influence Dodge had on the course of American policy in the Near East. In 1914 Turkish nationalists induced the Ottoman government to repudiate unilaterally the capitulatory regime which formed the heart of American-Turkish treaty relations. Shortly thereafter Ottoman Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers and began a vigorous persecution of the Armenian Christians of Turkey. At the suggestion of the American Ambassador in Con-

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[37] *Federal Reporter*, Vol. 209 (1913), 910–914.

[38] Bleighton, "Woodrow Wilson & Company," New York, 1916; Francis C. Kelley, *The Book of the Red and Yellow, Being a Story of Blood and a Yellow Streak*, Chicago, 1915, damning Dodge and Wilson was cited in an anonymous pamphlet circulated by the League for Protection of Religious Orders; see *New York Times*, November 5, 1916; William A. Rodenberg, *Congressional Record*, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12118–12119, August 4, 1916; *Ibid.*, 13935, September 6, 1916. Both Dodge and Robert Lansing hotly denied Rodenberg's charges. *New York Times*, August 6, 1916, and September 7, 1916.

[39] Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, Baltimore, 1937, 228, 282–283, 288–289.

stantinople, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., Dodge took the lead in organizing a relief fund for the Armenians.[40] Dodge served as treasurer of the organization and as a link between the committee and the Wilson Administration. Through Dodge, for instance, the relief committee secured permission to use State Department files for documentary evidence of the atrocities. He also induced the President to issue a proclamation requesting public support of the relief committee.[41] In the course of its fund-raising activities the committee whipped up widespread pro-Armenian and anti-Turkish sentiment which affected American-Turkish relations until late in the 1920's.

American entry into World War I posed a serious problem for the relief committee as well as for American missionary and educational institutions in the Near East. Serbian and Greek groups in the United States demanded that the aims of the United States include the liberation of their countrymen. The governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy, as well as the Supreme War Council, urged the Wilson Administration to wage war on all of the Central Powers.[42] The President confessed such an action was logical, and the United States might well have gone to war with Turkey and Bulgaria had Dodge not interceded with the President.[43]

In February, 1917, Dodge confided his concern over affairs in the Near East to Wilson who replied that he hoped to "manage things so prudently that there will be no real danger to the lives of our people abroad."[44] As American entry into the war became more certain the Bulgarian Minister to the United States assured Dodge that his government would grant Robert College, of which Dodge was an officer, access to supplies if the United States did not declare war on Bulgaria. With this information Dodge went to Wilson and secured a pledge that he would not ask Congress

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[40] Morgenthau to Lansing, September 3, 1915, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1915, Supplement,* Washington, 1928, 988.

[41] Dodge to A. A. Adee, September 13, 1915, State Department Records, National Archives, File 867.4016/133; Dodge to Wilson, November 19, 1918, Wilson Papers, Series VI, File 2554.

[42] Lansing to Wilson, May 8, 1918, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914–1920,* 2 vols., Washington, 1939–1940, II, 124–126; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918, Supplement I,* 2 vols., Washington, 1933, I, 225, 227.

[43] *Congressional Record,* 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 104, April 2, 1917.

[44] Wilson to Dodge, February 6, 1917, Dodge Papers.

to declare war on either Bulgaria or Turkey.[45] Accordingly, in his war message of April, 1917, Wilson asked only for a declaration of war against Germany.[46]

During the next year Dodge and the relief committee sought to forestall any demand to broaden the war. Solicitors for the relief committee were told that militarily war with Turkey would only serve to weaken the war effort against Germany, halt the relief work in Turkey, and subject the American churches, hospitals, and schools in the Near East to destruction or expropriation.[47] As he was about to ask Congress to declare war on Austria-Hungary, Wilson wrote to Dodge that he was "trying to hold Congress back from following its natural inclination to include all the allies of Germany in a declaration of a state of war. . . .I hope with all my heart that I can succeed."[48] He sent Secretary of State Lansing to tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there were controlling reasons for not going to war with either Bulgaria or Turkey, and in the war message itself Wilson explained that both nations were relatively blameless for their belligerency and were unable to pose a serious threat to the United States. Congress accepted the President's analysis, and peace with Bulgaria and Turkey prevailed.[49]

The issue was revived in April, May, and June of 1918. Again the Secretary of State explained to a Senate Committee why the United States should keep the peace with Bulgaria and Turkey.[50] Dodge was moved to warn publicly that a declaration of war on Turkey would only enable the Turks to "gobble up everything we

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45 Stephen B. L. Penrose, *That They May Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut 1866–1941*, New York, 1941, 162–163; Cleveland E. Dodge to author, September 9, 1959, confirms that his father spoke several times of this incident as one of the few favors he ever asked of President Wilson. Neither Penrose nor Dodge give a date for the meeting; the Wilson-Dodge correspondence makes no reference to it.

46 *Congressional Record*, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 104, April 2, 1917.

47 American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, "Worker's Bulletin 11," ca. January, 1918.

48 Wilson to Dodge, December 5, 1917, Dodge Papers. It was important that the Ottoman Government avoided giving offense to the United States and that Congress was unwilling to challenge Presidential leadership on this issue. There was no organized war party in the United States seeking war with Bulgaria and Turkey. See Robert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914–1927," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (September, 1959), 258–259.

49 Lansing to Sen. Stone, December 6, 1917, cited in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1917 Supplement*, 2 vols., Washington, 1932, II, 448–454; *Congressional Record*, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 23, December 4, 1917.

50 *New York Times*, May 3, 1918.

have in the Empire."[51] Once more Congress bowed to the wishes of the President.

Before the war's end President Wilson had tentatively outlined the shape of the post-war world with his Fourteen Points. Dodge was in sympathy with the League of Nations concept and was a heavy contributor to the League to Enforce Peace.[52] He joined others in signing a petition favoring acceptance of the League Covenant with reservations if that was all that could be secured, but there was little he could do further to influence the Senate in the debate over ratification of the League Covenant. A number of prominent citizens including Dodge joined in charging Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes and others of the Committee of Thirty-one with misrepresentation of Senator Harding's views on the League of Nations in an effort to win pro-League voters to the support of Harding.[53]

With the post-war settlement came the discussion of the acceptance of a mandate for Armenia which was favored by Dodge though he seems not to have been identified with any specific plan for such a mandate. In August, 1919, the President told Dodge that it is "manifestly impossible" to send American troops to the Caucasus, "much as I should like to do so. . . ."[54] By the spring of 1920 when the subject of a Turkish peace treaty arose conditions were far different than they had been at the end of the war. The American Congress had become hypercritical of the League Covenant and the Versailles Pact; the de facto Armenian Republic organized in the Caucasus in 1917 was disintegrating; Wilson with his "heart set" on American acceptance of a mandate for Armenia inquired of Dodge whether the relief committee might not know the "most effective channels of public opinion." He was convinced that "some kind of legitimate propaganda" which would have "the proper effect upon our Congress" was needed.[55] Dodge was amenable to the suggestion and sounded out the relief committee on the "advisability of our organization attempting some form of propaganda."[56] Nothing was done as other leaders

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51 *Ibid.*, June 29, 1918.

52 Dodge contributed $7,000 to the League of which he was a member of the finance committee. Ferdinand Lundberg, *America's 60 Families*, New York, 1946, 265.

53 *New York Times*, October 28, 1920.

54 Wilson to Dodge, August 14, 1919, Dodge Papers.

55 Wilson to Dodge, April 19, 1920, Dodge Papers.

56 Dodge to Wilson, April 29, 1920, Dodge Papers.

in the relief work were loath to involve the committee in propagandizing Congress.[57]

The last measure which Dodge urged on Wilson was the proposal of a loan to the Armenian Republic,[58] a futile proposition, for by the time it was made in December, 1920, the Armenian Republic was on the verge of extinction. Although Wilson realized the difficulty entailed in aiding the Armenians, he urged Congress to loan $25,000,000 to the Armenian Republic.[59]

After Wilson left the White House in March, 1921, he and Dodge continued a sporadic correspondence of two old friends who spend much time reliving the past. Dodge reminisced about the days the President had come to Riverdale, the Dodge estate on the Hudson; they exchanged regrets that Wilson's peace plans had not been accepted and "what our abstention from the League of Nations means." Dodge, no doubt, pleased Wilson with his unrestrained denunciations of "Cabot Lodge." The ex-president, appalled at Harding's conduct of the presidency, confided that "it is heart-breaking to be so near as we are to a fool of a President for, though he is often ridiculous, there is nothing in his conduct that the country can laugh at with the slightest degree of enjoyment. . . ."[60]

Dodge expressed his deep friendship and respect for the former President in several ways. He was active in organizing the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and took the lead in raising a $1,000,000 fund to establish annual awards for meritorius public service. In appealing for funds Dodge made reference to the example of "international cooperation," "high idealism" and "public service" rendered by Wilson.[61] On the President's sixty-eighth birthday Dodge and Jesse H. Jones presented Wilson a custom built Rolls Royce with interchangeable touring and limousine bodies both painted the Princeton colors, black with a

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57 James L. Barton to the Reverend H. G. Benneyan, October 29, 1919, American Board Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, File 3.2, Vol. 344, 446; Dodge to Joseph Tumulty, May 19, 1920, Wilson Papers, Series VI, File 307.

58 Wilson to Dodge, December 2, 1920, Dodge Papers. This proposal was less extreme than that urged on the President by James Gerard who wanted a loan of $75,000,000 to the Armenians; Gerard to Secretary of State, May 21, 1920, quoted in *Cong. Record*, 66 Cong., 2 Sess., 7876, May 29, 1920.

59 *Ibid.*, 3d Sess., 26, December 7, 1920.

60 Dodge to Wilson, August 18, 1921, November 15, 1922, and December 10, 1923, Wilson Papers, File 9, Box 8; Wilson to Dodge, August 15, 1922, *ibid.*

61 *New York Times*, April 2, 1922.

narrow orange trim and the monogram "W.W." on the doors. About the same time Dodge and other former Princeton men, Jesse H. Jones, Thomas D. Jones and Cyrus McCormick, established a fund which relieved Wilson of financial anxiety in the last days of his life.[62]

The Wilson-Dodge friendship lasted until death separated the two. Dodge summed up his appreciation for the late President in a letter to Wilson's biographer, Ray Stannard Baker. He was impressed, he said, by the "great epic nature" of Wilson's life, "his intense love of democracy which pervaded his life in college and during his struggles for a more democratic social life in Princeton, and of course throughout his whole political career."[63] Wilson reciprocated in what was his last letter, one dictated to his wife, two weeks before he died. Thanking Dodge for his help, Wilson declared that he had been blessed with the "knowledge that I have won the affection and loyalty of the finest and most ideal body of friends that ever gave a man reason to believe himself worthwhile."[64]

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[62] Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir*, New York, 1939, 357–358.
[63] Dodge to Baker, November 24, 1925, Baker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, File B, Box 12.
[64] Wilson to Dodge, June 21, 1924, Dodge Papers.

Milwaukee's First Socialist Administration, 1910-1912: A Political Evaluation

Three Socialist mayors have guided Milwaukee's city administration for thirty-eight out of the last fifty years. The best-known was Daniel Webster Hoan, whose seven terms and twenty-four consecutive years beginning in 1916 made him the dean of American mayors and a figure of national prominence. His unexpected defeat in 1940 at the hands of a political novice may properly be attributed to understandable overconfidence in Milwaukee's voting habits. Frank P. Zeidler, still a comparatively young forty-eight, voluntarily retired as mayor in the Spring of 1960 after serving three four-year terms. Widely respected throughout the nation for his thoughtful approach to the multiplying urban problems of the 1950's, Zeidler might well have won another term; significantly, the two Democrats nominated in Milwaukee's non-partisan primary had refrained from announcing their candidacy until Zeidler had removed himself from the race.

The first and the least-known Socialist mayor of Milwaukee was 46-year old Emil Seidel, who served a single two-year term from 1910 to 1912. A Pennsylvania-born woodcarver and patternmaker of German antecedents, Seidel failed of reelection in 1912, lost again in 1914, and stood aside for what proved to be the successful Socialist candidacy of Hoan two years later. By the harsh but pragmatic test of the electoral results, Seidel and his administration were political failures. Superficial contemporary judgment concurred in this evaluation. Now that his two illustrious successors have made their records and the Socialist party has disappeared as a local political power, a more sophisticated and fairer judgment of the pioneer Seidel years seems possible.

Seidel and the Socialists entered Milwaukee's City Hall on April 19, 1910, with the broadest political victory the party was ever to achieve. Safely Socialist was the mayor, the city attorney, the city comptroller, the city treasurer and twenty-one of the thirty-five aldermanic seats. Between them the mayor and the Socialist

Editor's note. This paper was read in the December 1960 meeting of the American Historical Association in New York.

aldermen named the council president, the city clerk, and the major department heads. The sixteen-member county board also had a Socialist majority of ten and thus elected a party member as chairman, but then as well as later the party perceived little opportunity in county affairs. Three holdover Socialists sat on the city school board. In the Autumn elections the party captured all seven county administrative offices and sent a fourteen-man delegation to the state legislature.[1]

Why had Seidel and his associates won so substantial a victory in the Spring and Fall elections of 1910? We may attribute a measure of their success to their own wisdom and efforts. Themselves predominantly German, they found among Milwaukee's large German population an electorate familiar with and not unreceptive to Socialist appeals. Under the guidance of Victor L. Berger they developed an almost ideal working relationship with the local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. The Socialist-union alliance was advantageous politically and financially to both sides, without destroying the identity or confusing the interests of either. But Berger's political acumen had by 1906 begun to guide the party away from too narrow a dependence on a class-conscious labor and Socialist appeal. By moderating its rigid opposition to any public utility franchise, the party had opened the way to increasing support among middle-class reform elements. As the 1910 election approached the Socialists had also extended their efforts among the city's large Polish population, hitherto seemingly impervious because of their ethnic isolation and a deep-seated suspicion of Socialist designs on their religious faith. Underpinning this broadening of their electoral appeal was a superb campaign organization and an idealism rarely found among politicians.

Since 1903 repeated grand jury exposures of corruption among local Democratic and Republican officeholders had enhanced the attractiveness of the Socialists. Moreover, beginning in 1904 Socialists had held city, county, and state legislative office and therein had impressed even their partisan opponents with the integrity and high seriousness of their actions. Their nominees in 1910 included many veteran party and public officeholders, who were thus familiar to and often were trusted by the voters. Opposing them were the disorganized Republicans and Democrats,

[1] Marvin Wachman, *History of the Social-Democratic Party of Milwaukee, 1897–1910* (*Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, XXVIII, No. 1), Urbana, 1945, 70–72.

unwilling to defend their guilty associates but hardly in a position to repudiate them.[2]

The 1910 platform of the Socialists demonstrated conclusively how far the party had combined earlier doctrinaire views tinged by Marxian thought with a program of practical measures possible of immediate adoption. What socialism remained was almost exclusively found in a long preamble. The high cost of living and old-party graft and corruption were vigorously denounced. The specific Socialist municipal program was compounded of expanded welfare services, broader public ownership, and reforms intended to ensure public justice and fairness. City beautification, popular enlightenment, public health and convenience, consumer protection, and unemployment relief were primary objections. Municipal ownership and operation of a wide range of public-service enterprises was also advocated, to be achieved as soon as obstructing city bond limits could be lifted and state enabling acts adopted. Political reforms conducive to honest and democratic local government, the suppression of vice, and the setting of local labor standards through the exemplary treatment of city employees, completed a long-winded platform.[3]

Nominally the first important Socialist victory in the country, the election of Seidel and company might more accurately be viewed as the late arrival of a Milwaukee variant on progressive reform. By 1910 the nationwide wave of municipal housecleaning was well advanced if it had not indeed spent itself. Low in New York, Johnson in Cleveland, Jones in Toledo, and Pingree in Detroit had already passed from the scene. But Milwaukee was as yet untouched. In the early 1880's it had experienced a tax revolt and a labor bid for power, and in 1898 the Populists had joined the local Democracy to elect David S. Rose mayor on a public ownership platform. But Rose, during a decade in the city hall, had shown little zeal for reform or public ownership, and a Republican interlude from 1906 to 1908 frightened few boodlers and achieved nothing constructive.[4]

Party politics and the LaFollette movement may explain why

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[2] *Ibid.*, 75–76; Bayrd Still, *Milwaukee: The History of a City*, Madison, Wis., 1948, 316–320; Frederick I. Olson, "The Milwaukee Socialists, 1897–1941," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1952), 185–188; Duane Mowry, "The Reign of Graft in Milwaukee," *Arena*, XXXIV (December 1905), 589–593.

[3] For a convenient reprinting of the platform from the party's campaign paper, *Voice of the People*, for March 19, 1910, see Wachman, *History*, 77–81.

[4] Still, *Milwaukee*, chapter 7.

progressivism had made so little impact on Milwaukee before 1910. On balance Democratic in its sympathies, the city of Milwaukee had not embraced Republican insurgent LaFollette and his program. It may be doubted that Governor LaFollette's proposals between 1901 and 1906 had as much meaning for urbanized Milwaukee as they did for rural and small-town Wisconsin. The leading LaFollette Republican in the city was District Attorney Francis E. McGovern, who aggressively prosecuted boodlers under grand jury indictments from 1905 to 1909. However, McGovern's ambitions were state and national, and between him and LaFollette there was no love lost, then or later. To the two Republican factions, stalwart and progressive, and even within the latter, as well as to the Democrats, Milwaukee was less a challenge to accomplishment than it was a battleground for partisan or factional advantage.

Moreover, Milwaukee, unlike the other municipal reform targets, had no local boss or machine to serve as a focus for discontent. LaFollette had dramatized his state-wide crusade by personalizing the enemy—Philetus Sawyer, John C. Spooner, and Henry Clay Payne. Yet even the most severe condemnation of Milwaukee Republican leaders like Payne and Charley Pfister and of Democrat Rose did not prove that they were bosses on the Steffens model—like Butler, Ames, and Magee. Corruption and vice existed, but not a systematic machine operation.[5]

Widespread Socialist office-holding in 1910, amounting to control of the local governmental machinery, would seem sufficient to overcome the ordinary obstacles to political achievement. Add to this the Socialist tradition of party discipline, their acceptance of caucus rule, and their recognition and acceptance of the leadership of "Boss Berger" as some called him, and one might forecast a most remarkable record of accomplishment for the Seidel administration before it had to face the voters in two years. Such hardly proved to be the case.

Practically, the Socialist mandate was much more limited than it seemed. Seidel had triumphed with a 46.4% plurality in a three-party race, a status he shared with all of his colleagues elected on city- or county-wide ballots. Party strength, concentrated in a few north side wards, gave only a few Socialist aldermen and county supervisors a majority vote. Nominally far apart, the local Democrats and Republicans had already closed ranks in a few con-

[5] For sketches of the Wisconsin politicians mentioned, see *Dictionary of Wisconsin Biography*, Madison, Wis., 1960.

tests in 1910 in order to give the voter a clear choice between Socialist and anti-Socialist. The Socialists professed to be delighted by the prospect of an electoral division based on their own issues, but when general fusion of the two old parties took place in the election of 1912, it was disastrous to Socialist hopes of reelection.[6]

Probably as important as the practical threat of fusion in 1912 was the inhibiting influence of a plurality victory in 1910. To begin with the Socialists had only a two-year term to work with. Quick results seemed necessary, the more so since the necessities of a Spring campaign in 1912 would further reduce by several months their working time. The objective of the usual alternation between Republican and Democrat, limited primarily to throwing out the rascals, seemed better suited to a two-year period than did the ambitious Socialist program. Moreover, Milwaukee's voters as recently as 1906 had exhibited impatience with a Republican mayor who had not worked miracles of reform overnight.

The peculiar political psychology of the Socialists added to the dilemma posed by their limited mandate. Since their first successes at the ballot box in 1904, the Milwaukee Socialists had clearly placed increasing importance on the winning of office. Whereas they had once viewed their mission as primarily educational, a preparation of the masses for the inevitable arrival of the Marxian vision, they had now all but adopted the values of their opponents, that is, of the paramount importance of the quest for office. Ultimately they may have rated a continuation in office too highly. Whereas Democratic or Republican leadership could accept defeat with reasonable assurance of being restored to office, the Socialists had envisioned a steady rise to power, from which the logic of their vision of history decreed they would never be toppled. Yet in 1910 they had gained power without winning a majority of the votes, let alone converting the mass of Milwaukeeans to socialism. They seemed likely to lose in 1912 and thus to retrogress for the first time in their local political history.

Unfortunately the Socialists seem to have begun to believe their own prophecies.[7] It is noteworthy that 1910, the year of their own greatest voting triumph, was also the high water mark of Socialist strength in the nation. Among Socialists throughout the

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[6] Olson, "Milwaukee Socialists," 162–163, 184–185, 219, 238.

[7] My conclusion that the Socialists foresaw a steady political march to power and placed greater and greater weight on capture of public office is based on a wide reading of their literature. See, for Berger's attitude, his *Broadsides,* 3rd edition, Milwaukee, 1913, esp. 166–173 and 263–266.

country, watching closely the trial their party was offered in Milwaukee, Berger's cohorts had already begun to earn the title "sewer Socialists," that is, more interested in holding office through good municipal housekeeping than in advancing Marxian doctrines.

Other peculiar weaknesses beset the Socialists in power. Very few possessed political or governmental experience outside their own party, and most of these few had been Populists or Socialist Laborites. Preferment within the party was neither easy nor rapid, and opportunists from the old parties attracted by Socialist success would scarcely be welcomed. The party had finally developed a comparatively large membership organization, but its size and efficiency concealed this weakness—it was better equipped to gain votes than to capture voter loyalty of the sort its program demanded. It meant to be a party of principles, but American voters were attracted to "good men." Yet Milwaukee Socialists who had held legislative office since 1904 had borne no responsibility for the actual conduct of government. Like so many critics they underestimated the difficulties of administration, and even of finding competent administrators. Highly idealistic while in opposition, they failed to foresee the scramble for jobs, the temptation of expediency, the pressure for favors, the resort to sectarianism that power induced.

The Milwaukee Socialists professed to be both a local progressive reform party and a manifestation of a world-wide revolutionary movement. They found it difficult to have it both ways. For example, to hold the progressive and reform vote they had to support that tinkering with the political machinery so typical of the progressives—the referendum, the recall, and so on. But many of them really didn't believe in such capitalist measures, for, in Berger's words, these reforms did not put another sandwich in a worker's dinner pail. Where the progressives favored popular election of Senators, Berger demanded abolition of the Senate. Where the progressives advocated woman suffrage, many Socialists like Berger wondered what good it would do to enfranchise workers' wives who were so impervious to Socialist propaganda and so attuned to clerical control. Toward the benefits of nonpartisan elections the Socialists were bound to display some skepticism.[8] The Socialists demanded government or public ownership but the people seemed satisfied with a progressive adaptation of Granger

[8] For a discussion of the Socialist attitude toward contemporary political reform proposals, see Olson, "Milwaukee Socialists," 114–116, 219–220; see also Berger, *Broadsides*, 187–192, 273–277.

methods of regulation. Hoan perceived the lesson in all of this—he wrote a powerful socialistic assault on utility regulation which the national party published, but he himself used the city attorney's office to launch repeated attacks on public service corporations through the regulatory commissions and the courts.[9] The basic dilemma of the Socialist remained—political reform or social revolution?

Serious as these limitations on their freedom of action were, the Socialists did not give undivided attention to their big job of running the city. Their year-around interest in advancing the movement constantly intruded. They had launched a movement in 1909 to build a labor temple, named Brisbane Hall, to house their party, union, and publishing offices. This excursion into high finance and capitalist enterprise continued to divert them from immediate political concerns. In December 1911 Berger's publishing company launched a Socialist daily from this new plant in Brisbane Hall. Berger and his lieutenants again were distracted, and once more discovered how time consuming and frustrating was business management. In the long run the *Milwaukee Leader* may have served the party cause admirably, but for the moment it was simply an added burden. And Berger himself, the heart and head of the local movement, won a Congressional seat in November 1910 and thereafter found himself a national figure, second only to Debs in the party. Enjoying to the full his national position, Berger inevitably neglected some local interests. Even more, he had to use his new prestige as an asset on the lyceum circuit, raising money to keep the party and its allied interests solvent.[10]

No one, not even the most rabid Socialist, would therefore have expected the Seidel administration in two short years to bring about the collective ownership of the means of production and distribution. Even their platform admitted that the 1910 victory would be but a step toward that goal, "a milestone on the way

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[9] Daniel W. Hoan, *The Failure of Regulation,* Chicago, 1914; Olson, "Milwaukee Socialists," 214–216.

[10] Promotion Committee, *Prospectus People's Realty Company of Milwaukee, Wis.,* Milwaukee, n.d., *passim,* and People's Realty Company of Milwaukee, Wis., *Annual Statement for 1913,* unpaged; Milwaukee Social-Democratic Publishing Co., *Annual Report for the Year 1912,* Milwaukee, 1913; *Milwaukee Leader,* December 7, 1911. The Berger papers in the Milwaukee County Historical Museum contain extensive correspondence relating to Berger's role as his party's only congressman and to his lyceum activities. On his *Leader* troubles, see Berger to W. J. Ghent, November 15, 1911.

of human progress."[11] The state constitution and state laws, including municipal debt limitations, as well as the Milwaukee charter and conservative judicial construction of municipal powers, precluded action on many of the party's proposals. Councilmanic minorities proved resourceful. From conviction the Seidel administration sought generally to expand public activities, but these necessarily cost money and hence meant higher taxes. Short-run political considerations, with only a two-year term available to them, dictated discretion if it did not enforce cowardice in the spending of more money. Berger himself winced when a high price tag was placed on the land acquisition costs for their proposed Milwaukee River parkway.[12] Subsequently, the Socialists showed greater courage and determination in facing the financial facts of urban government and boldly demanded higher taxes.

Administration of city affairs under Seidel and the Socialists, however, was acknowledged to be good. Berger, determined to justify the confidence of non-Socialist voters, invited the University of Wisconsin's John R. Commons to undertake a comprehensive survey of municipal affairs.[13] The Commons agency, called the Bureau of Economy and Efficiency, sought to improve the quality and lower the cost of routine government operations. Cost-accounting and budgeting was introduced, a property inventory was developed, and substantial, though debatable, economies, in purchasing and street-paving, were carried out. Public health, housing needs, building ordinances, and harbor development were promoted. An honest effort was made to support the principle of merit in government employment, although many party faithfuls were thus disappointed by such seeming ingratitude. For supervisory and policy-making positions the Socialists usually sought qualified appointees, whether party members or not, and from outside the city if necessary. They were partly thwarted by their own inexperience in such matters, by the pressure of time, and by occasional unwillingness to accept office from a probably short-lived Socialist administration.

Three less tangible achievements of the Seidel administration, however unimpressive to the contemporary observer, are also worth

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11 Wachman, *History*, 81.

12 Berger to C. B. Whitnall, July 25, 1911, Berger papers.

13 John R. Commons, *Myself*, New York, 1934, 151, and "Eighteen Months' Work," *Bulletin No. 19 of the Milwaukee Bureau of Economy and Efficiency*, Milwaukee, 1912, 3–7, 19, 21, 31–34; J. E. Treleven, "The Milwaukee Bureau of Economy and Efficiency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, XLI (May 1912), 270-278.

noting. One was a dedication to fact-gathering as a prelude to public action. More conscious than most politicians of the complexity of urban life and more aware of the possibilities of the social sciences, the Socialists used Commons and others to study the city and its problems as a prelude to reaching a political solution. Secondly, the Socialists naturally embraced long-range planning as a public necessity for the industrialized and urbanized twentieth century. Their city treasurer, C. B. Whitnall, became the father of land-use planning in Milwaukee. Finally, they perceived the necessity of winning the public on the need for new and expanded city services. To this end they instituted public lectures and exhibits which explained municipal programs. After 1916 Mayor Hoan carried out this policy to a high degree by such devices as a Mayor's Advisory Council.[14]

Given all of the foregoing qualifications, no balance sheet for the Seidel term of office would be fair. If the standard of judgment is the literal terms of their 1910 platform, Seidel and company failed, for very little of it was, or could have been, carried out under the circumstances. Perhaps the Socialists were therefore guilty of irresponsibly promising far more than they could achieve. Unfortunately for them, some of their measurable accomplishments were either not completed within their two-year tenure, or became evident successes only after more time had elapsed. Such was the case with City Attorney Hoan's legal attacks on public service corporations in order to enforce franchise provisions. Luckily for Hoan, his term alone among city officials ran for four years, and by 1914 he had won enough court jousts with the steam railroads and the street railways to gain reelection. Unhappily the efficiency and economy of the city comptroller, the city treasurer, and the city clerk were less spectacular in voters' eyes by 1912.

What judgment emerges from this evaluation? The voters' verdict was failure, and perhaps properly so. In 1912 Seidel polled 40.6% of a larger vote, a relative loss but an absolute vote increase;

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[14] Still, *Milwaukee*, 515–522. Among contemporary evaluations, see John Collier, "The Experiment in Milwaukee: What Socialism Has Accomplished and Where It has Failed after a Year's Trial in Wisconsin's Chief City," *Harper's Weekly*, August 12, 1911; George A. England, "Milwaukee's Socialist Government," *American Review of Reviews*, XLII (October 1910), 445–455; Frederic C. Howe, "Milwaukee, a Socialist City," *Outlook*, June 25, 1910; Albert Jay Nock, "Socialism in Milwaukee," *Outlook*, July 11, 1914; and G. R. Taylor, "The Socialists in Milwaukee," *Survey*, March 30, 1912. The party version is found in Carl D. Thompson, *et al.*, *Milwaukee Municipal Campaign Book 1912: Social-Democratic Party*, Milwaukee, 1912.

his colleagues as treasurer and comptroller lost too; and the Socialist representation in the Common Council fell to a vocal but impotent eleven. The expected effect of Democratic-Republican fusion and an often hysterical anti-Socialist campaign cannot disguise the fact that the Socialists failed to convince the majority of Milwaukee's voters that they deserved an extension of their mandate. Of the substantial increase of over 15,000 in the total vote for mayor, Seidel was able to add less than 18% to his 1910 count. With no single issue working against them as incumbents, with a superb grass roots campaign organization, and with their long-hoped-for daily a reality, the Milwaukee Socialists nevertheless failed to hold office.[15] Only a portion of the blame for this may be attributed to the petty political mistakes they had made.

Especially detrimental was the attitude of those voters who had become their erstwhile supporters but ordinarily were their opponents. Apparently many Milwaukeeans had voted the Socialists into power as a lesson to the two old parties; they were quite prepared to return to their old voting habits by 1912. Not only were their memories of Democratic and Republican chicanery exceedingly short—in fact, they correctly judged that the old party leaders would be chastened by their rout. Old party fusion in 1912 facilitated if it did not ensure a Socialist defeat, and a nonpartisan election law inaugurated in 1914 perpetuated an anti-Socialist coalition which a large number of Milwaukeeans were quite prepared to support. What was significant, however, was that the Socialists henceforth provided a convenient alternative to any revival of Democratic-Republican knavery, but not one which independent voters had to accept regularly or adopt consistently.[16] Politicians and academic observers may concur in deploring the baleful effects of nonpartisan election laws on party responsibility; yet in Milwaukee the result, as long as the Socialists held together—certainly until 1936 and probably through 1940—was to provide true political responsibility by pitting Socialist against Non-partisan and thus keeping both sides vigilant. To a degree nonpartisan elections were never allowed to be truly nonpartisan until the Socialist demise.

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15 Olson, "Milwaukee Socialists," 243–244.

16 Ovid Blix, "Milwaukee Voters' League, Resumé of Its Activities during Its Existence, 1904–1925," (typescript in Municipal Reference Library, Milwaukee) reveals this attitude as it developed in one nonpartisan organization.

What appears most clearly is that the Socialists had deluded themselves and perhaps the voters when they sought office between 1898 and 1910. They were not engaged in a steady march to total power, and they could not really produce what they had promised immediately, let alone bring about a socialist state. But given a few more years to gauge the true potential of a Socialist administration, its limitations as well as its solid virtues, the Milwaukee voters would be quite content to support Hoan and to repose considerable confidence in the political equilibrium which he and a strong Socialist party had brought into being. They would elect "good" Socialists to office, while declining to give them complete control over the machinery of government. The voters would be most skeptical of the party in the sensitive areas of the courts, the school board, and the fire and police commission, but the Socialist label would be no insuperable obstacle to public office.

For 50 years after Seidel's election, Milwaukee maintained a reputation for honest and efficient administration of government. For 38 of these years a Socialist was mayor, but Milwaukee, far from being socialized, remained inherently conservative.[17] If Seidel and his associates were rebuffed in 1912, they at least had the satisfaction of creating the terms under which Milwaukee politics would be conducted for half a century.

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[17] J. E. Harris, "Is Milwaukee a Socialist Town?," *Milwaukee Journal*, May 20, 1932; Lindsay Hoben, "Dan Hoan, Mayor of Milwaukee," in J. T. Salter, ed., *The American Politician*, Chapel Hill, 1938, 261–281; and Richard S. Davis, "Milwaukee's New Socialist Mayor," *Progressive*, XII (June 1948), 24–26. All of these accounts emanate from the *Milwaukee Journal*, an independent critic of the Milwaukee Socialists and the three Socialist mayors.

Notes and Comments

Early this year The Minnesota Historical Society published the second volume of the new and revised *A History of Minnesota* by William Watts Folwell. The original edition in four volumes came out in 1924 but has long been out of print. The Minnesota Historical Society, long known for its vigorous efforts to foster a spirit of love of the traditions of Minnesota and to spread knowledge of Minnesota's history, is to be congratulated upon making Folwell more available. The first volume, as is known, put together the story of the State from its discovery to the end of its days as a Territory. This second traces the growth of Minnesota from its admission into the Union through its trying infancy when the nation was torn by civil strife and the Northwest was engaged with Indian wars. The beginnings of statehood, the Civil War, the Sioux War, and the railroads, are the larger areas, but details of the history are numerous and graphic. The book in 477 pages is well illustrated and indexed and its list price is $7.75.

* * * *

The publication of historical works in reasonably priced, paperback form is becoming more widespread in the States. Some of the paperbacks are unfortunately misleading in that they are republications under a changed title, or are truncated, or what is worse, digests. However, in Canada a series of historical accounts is in the process of publication in illustrated paperback covers, composed accurately in simpler French and designed to make the average Canadian acquainted with historical figures. The first four of these are: *Cavelier de la Salle*, by Roger Viau; *Les fougueux Bâtisseurs de la Nouvelle France*, by Serge Fleury, (short sketches of ten builders); *Maisonneuve*, by Pierre Benoit; and *Laurier, artisan de l' unité Canadienne*, by Raymond Tanghe. These Figures Canadiennes are each listed at $1.50, by Société Fomac, Limitée, Montreal 1, P.Q.

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Anti-Monopoly League of 1866

V.

La Crosse Packet Company *Et Al.*

The transportation companies in the upper Mississippi Valley during the Civil War operated in a rapidly changing economic climate. Inflation, rising costs, and increasing production, especially of wheat, influenced the freight rates charged by the steamboat and railroad lines. Before the war, at least, it was natural for these companies to charge high rates on the small and variable tonnage of freight. Just when the volume increased through growth of population and expanded production of wheat, the war came along, and with it inflation. At the same time, during three of the war years, the water was so low in the rivers for long periods that not even logs could be sent downstream with regularity, much less steamboats. Such difficulties, accompanied by small shipments and high risks, tended to keep rates up and profits down. After the war, the main difficulty was that the transportation companies refused to lower rates until forced to do so, since the officers had in mind all the tribulations of the war years. Then public opinion, organized by the "anti-monopolists," forced the issue. This anti-monopoly movement formed part of an agitation which extended not only over Minnesota and Wisconsin, but also over Illinois and Iowa; in fact, over all the region which ten years later was the seat of the Granger uprising.[1]

[1] The most detailed earlier accounts of the anti-monopoly movement in Minnesota and western Wisconsin during the 1860's were by Frederick Merk, *Economic History of Wisconsin during the Civil War Decade*, Madison, 1916, 308, and Lester B. Shippee in "Steamboating on the Upper Mississippi after the Civil War," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, VI (March, 1920), 470-502. Since then the Minnesota Historical Society has acquired the William F. Davidson Papers, which include the business records of the La Cross and Minnesota Steam Packet Company.

Three major steamboat companies operated on the upper Mississippi to St. Paul during the latter part of the Civil War, two of them in connection with railroads running between the river and Lake Michigan. The La Crosse and Minnesota Steam Packet Company, which purchased its first steamers in 1861,[2] worked closely with the La Crosse and Milwaukee Rail Road at La Crosse, Wisconsin. The North Western Packet Company, organized in 1863 as the successor to the old Galena, Dubuque, Dunleith and Minnesota Packet Company, had arrangements with the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railway at Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, and with the Illinois Central Railroad at Dunleith, now East Dubuque, Illinois. Finally, the Northern Line, formed in 1857 to operate between St. Louis and St. Paul, had encountered a series of difficulties during the war years from which it did not begin to recover until after the war.[3]

The increase in freight rates from the upper Mississippi Valley to Lake Michigan during the war somewhat exceeded the rise of wheat prices in the region and the general increase in wholesale prices in the nation. For instance, the freight charges on a bushel of wheat shipped from Minnesota's major wheat port, Winona, to Milwaukee climbed from about 13.5 cents in May, 1861, to 35 cents in May, 1865, an increase of around 159 per cent. The average price of number one wheat at Winona during approximately the same period rose from 60 cents per bushel in May-July, 1861, to $1.376 during September-November, 1864, an advance of 129 per cent.[4] Nationally, wholesale prices in general from 1861 to 1865 climbed just a little over 100 per cent.[5]

Public protest against the increasingly high freight rates began even before the end of the war. The transportation lines had raised the charge for shipping a bushel of wheat, for example, from St. Paul or Winona to Milwaukee or Chicago to 25 cents during 1863, almost double the rate of just two seasons before.[6] Shippers and other businessmen of Hastings, Minnesota, then a port of some prominence on the upper Mississippi, met early in the following year to consider the rate problem. They agreed

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2 Minute Book, 18, Davidson Papers.

3 Merk, *Economic History of Wisconsin*, 353; *St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat*, May 2, June 1, 1861, May 3, 1862; *St. Paul Pioneer*, November 25, 1863, March 1, 1864, November 30, 1865.

4 Henrietta M. Larson, *The Wheat Market and the Farmer in Minnesota*, New York, 1926, 29, 52.

5 Harold F. Williamson, ed., *The Growth of the American Economy*, 2d ed., New York, 1951, 326.

6 Larson, *Wheat Market*, 52.

that "Certain transportation companies have entered into a combination, and have established an exorbitant rate of freight from all points on the Mississippi above La Crosse, to Milwaukee and Chicago." The Hastings shippers recommended the combined action of the businessmen of all towns affected, to make some arrangement by which freight charges would be reduced to "reasonable" rates. As the first step, the Hastings merchants invited the businessmen of every town above Dubuque, Iowa, to send delegates to a convention at Red Wing, Minnesota, a short distance down the river from Hastings.[7]

The Red Wing convention met in March, 1864, and elected a committee to go to Chicago and Milwaukee to seek relief from the high freight rates. The Chicago Board of Trade agreed that rates were too high, while the *Chicago Tribune* proclaimed in no uncertain terms that the freight charge on wheat constituted "unmitigated extortion."[8] Nevertheless, the railroad and steamboat lines not only failed to lower the rates, but soon raised them considerably. The transportation companies increased the charge on a bushel of wheat shipped from Winona to Milwaukee or Chicago to 28 cents, 3 cents above the previous rate, and jumped the charge from St. Paul to 36 cents, an advance of 11 cents per bushel. The railroad and steamboat organizations justified these increases partly as being the result of the increased difficulties of navigation on the Mississippi that season caused by the very low stage of water.

Protests against the high rates broke out again in the spring of 1865. The railroad and steamboat companies had announced in March a rate of 35 cents per bushel of wheat from St. Paul to Lake Michigan, only a penny less than in the previous low-water season. The *St. Paul Press* then predicted that the "transportation monopolies," in order to obtain freight at all, would be obliged to reduce their rates so as to encourage, or at least not to discourage, production. As predicted, the companies soon lowered the rate on wheat to 28 cents;[9] but complaints continued, since wheat prices also were falling. From the wartime high average of $1.38 per bushel in September-November, 1864, the average price of number one wheat at Winona dropped to $1.06 during January-March, 1865, and to $0.87 in May-July. After recovering

[7] *St. Paul Press*, February 20, 1864.
[8] Larson, *Wheat Market*, 46, 47.
[9] *St. Paul Press*, June 29, 1864, March 29, May 16, 1865.

to $1.13 in September-November, the average price fell again to $0.95 during January-March, 1866.[10]

In December, 1865, the *St. Paul Press*, already interested in the anti-monopoly movement, began an all-out crusade. When President Andrew Johnson remarked that "Monopolies, perpetuities and class legislation are contrary to the genius of free government, and ought not to be allowed," the *Press* foresaw an "Impending Conflict of Monopolies and the People." This newspaper calculated that it cost farmers living along the Mississippi nearly a third of their crop to get it to the Milwaukee market. The journal accused William F. Davidson of using his position as president of the La Crosse Packet Company to further his own ends as a wheat buyer, at the expense of the other buyers and of the farmers. Furthermore, the paper stated flatly that the "combination" excluded any competition by compelling shippers using independent steamboats to pay six cents per bushel more freight charges on the railroads than if the shippers had used the "Davidson" or "Wellington" (North Western Packet Company) lines, which was "infamous discrimination."[11]

Led by the *Press*, the anti-monopoly movement gained increasing momentum as 1865 drew to a close. A Minnesota farmer wrote a "caustic exposition" to a Hastings newspaper, attaching the combination of "Commodore Davidson and Lord Wellington's Company" with the La Crosse and Milwaukee, the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien, the Chicago and Northwestern and the Illinois Central railroads.[12] Another correspondent urged the calling of a new convention of merchants and shippers to organize for opposing the "combination monopoly" by diverting as much trade as possible to St. Louis. The *Press* took up the call for a convention, but added that the preliminary step should be taken by the farmers, the chief sufferers from this "iniquitous monopoly."[13] At the beginning of the new year, the *Press* also attacked "Commodore Davidson's paper," the *St. Paul Pioneer*, for attempting "a feebly-desperate diversion in favor of the Steamboat Monopoly by chaotically tumbling the banks, dry goods' merchants, the lumber manufacturers, the grain dealers" and even the *Press* itself into "the same offensive category."

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10 Larson, *Wheat Market*, 29.
11 December 12, 1865.
12 Quoted in the *St. Paul Press*, December 14, 1865.
13 December 21, 1865.

The demand for a new anti-monopoly convention developed rapidly early in 1866. The *Press* claimed that in the previous year alone the people of Minnesota had been "forced against their will to pay the prodigious sum of about $2,500,000 in freights. . . ."[14] This journal reprinted a letter from a Hastings newspaper calling for a state convention of farmers and merchants to consider how to get rid of the "Freight Monopoly," which was proposing an extension all over the state of the "crushing monopoly of the wheat trade which Commodore Davidson has organized throughout the Minnesota Valley."[15]

A call for a state convention was soon being circulated and "very generally signed" by members of the Minnesota legislature and by businessmen of St. Paul.[16] The *Press* published an invitation, signed by a hundred and twenty-seven "Merchants, Shippers and other Business Men of St. Paul," members of the legislature, and others, to a meeting to "adopt measures to combine the influence of the Northwest against all counter combinations, designed to extort from us unreasonable and oppressive freights."[17]

Anti-monopoly leaders soon met in St. Paul to consider the best plan of securing lower rates of transportation. The meeting adopted resolutions calling for a major anti-monopoly convention a month later at St. Paul. Next the St. Paul Board of Trade announced that it "cordially" sympathized with the farming interests in their efforts to break up the "monopoly combinations." Preparations for the anti-monopoly convention soon were under way. The St. Paul Board of Trade elected delegates, while a citizens' meeting in the same city chose representatives of the "mechanics and working men." Other towns all over Minnesota and parts of western Wisconsin selected delegates for the anti-monopoly convention, which met in St. Paul in February, 1866.[18]

One possible solution to the rate problem was for shippers to patronize steamers which operated independently from the dominant packet companies. A new Savanna (Illinois) and St. Paul Steamboat Line had advertised in 1865 that it would carry freight from Chicago, Milwaukee, or Racine via the Chicago and Milwaukee and the Chicago and North Western Railways to all points on the upper Mississippi at "the Lowest Tariff Rates."[19] Shippers

14 January 2, 1866.
15 January 3, 1866.
16 *St. Paul Press*, January 5, 1866.
17 January 6, 1866.
18 *St. Paul Pioneer*, January 10, 13, February 4, 8, 1866.
19 *Ibid.*, August 17, 1865.

on the upper river soon purchased a "magnificent" gold watch to present to the "pioneer captain" of this line. The St. Paul businessman-politician presenting the watch maintained that for more than two years the people of Minnesota had been at the mercy of "a powerful monopoly embracing in its interests nearly all of the steamboats upon the upper Mississippi, and Minnesota rivers, and the lines of railroads running from the great river to the great lakes. . . ." The introduction of the Savanna Line, he claimed, had "already done much to break up the tyranny of this monopoly and relieve our people of its exactions."[20]

Early in 1866 rivermen proposed additional independent lines. The chairman of the preliminary anti-monopoly meeting in St. Paul read a letter from a Chicago representative of the European Express Freight Line and the National Steam Navigation Company who offered to furnish as many as six steamboats to run between St. Paul and St. Louis or any other point, if the merchants and citizens of St. Paul would pledge $20,000 or $25,000 in support of a new company. The meeting then invited the proposed anti-monopoly convention to consider establishing a single steamboat line from St. Paul to New Orleans. Just before the convention met, the press reported that arrangements had been completed for a new line of packets between La Crosse and St. Paul, which would make a total of four daily lines in that trade.[21]

Representatives of various existing or projected steamboat companies appeared at St. Paul when the day of the convention dawned to propose the establishment of still other new lines. A "well-known steamboatman of the lower Mississippi" offered to organize a daily line from St. Louis to St. Paul, to be called the Merchants' Line. The "pioneer captain" of the Savanna Line presented a plan to establish a new line from St. Paul to Savanna to connect with the Western Union and the Racine and Mississippi Railroads, which were prepared to act independently from all other roads and to operate with any line of boats established by the convention. An experienced upper Mississippi riverman, Captain John B. Davis, representing Archer and Hart of Memphis and Louisville, arrived to propose another new line to the convention.[22] Davis and Captain James R. Hatcher, a former director of the La Crosse Packet Company and until recently one of William F. Davidson's right-hand men,[23] told a convention committee that the Hart Line

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20 *Ibid.*, August 20, 1865.
21 *Ibid.*, January 10, February 7, 1866.
22 *Ibid.*, February 8, 1866.
23 Minute Book, 12, Davidson Papers: *St. Paul Pioneer*, June 30, 1865.

proposed a new company with a capital stock of $300,000, half or a majority to be taken by the merchants, shippers and farmers.

The convention developed its own plan for forming a new steamboat company, however. A committee on this subject recommended the organization of a corporation with a capital stock of $500,000, to be taken in shares of $25 each with no person or company owning more than two-fifths of the paid-up stock. The convention approved the recommendations and authorized the appointment of a committee of one in each of thirty-eight towns to collect subscriptions. Next the convention chairman appointed a committee to prepare articles of incorporation. When Captain Davis asked if the Hart Line could take half the stock, a convention official replied that "when the money is raised, we can see," adding that the new company's officers would need between $100,000 and $200,000 reserve capital "to fight their way through."[24]

The new steamboat line seemed to be well launched. The committees appointed by the convention began at once to take necessary steps to form a new company, and the articles of incorporation of the Minnesota Transportation Company, as the anti-monopolists named the line, soon were drafted and signed by the incorporators. The St. Paul Board of Trade subscribed $50,000, while the Hart Line promised to put up $200,000 toward the $500,000 to be raised. In March the newspapers reported that Captains Hatcher and Davis of the Hart Line were on their way to St. Paul again, since the stockholders and incorporators planned to meet soon to organize. At this meeting the stockholders elected temporary officers.

The Minnesota Transportation Company never left the levee, however. The incorporators decided that the sentiment of the people seemed to be that it was unnecessary to purchase any boats at that time, perhaps because rates already had been reduced, but that the company should contiue the subscription of stock until all of it was taken, thus continuing to be useful as a club over the heads of the railroads and steamboat companies. In the meantime the new company should just make contracts for shipping freight by any line of boats and railways which would give the organization the best rates. The incorporators therefore empowered the officers to communicate with railroad and packet companies to make contracts upon the most advantageous terms. If the officers failed to get low rates from any existing lines, the incorporators

[24] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1866.

then favored purchasing boats of their own.[25] The president soon visited Chicago and other cities to contract for shipping all Minnesota freight with the "mark" of the Minnesota Transportation Company through to the seaboard.[26] But the existing transportation lines apparently would not agree to this arrangement, for the new company then faded into oblivion.

Other competitors of the La Crosse and the North Western Packet Companies had more success. The Northern Line announced even before the convention met that the company would provide daily service between St. Paul and St. Louis in 1866, doubling the tri-weekly schedule of the previous season. Also, Captain Hatcher organized the Hatcher Steamboat Line in the spring to operate three boats between St. Paul and St. Louis, and soon purchased a tow boat to add to his little fleet. Finally, the Savanna Line scheduled three boats to operate on the upper Mississippi and St. Croix Rivers, plus another on the Minnesota.[27]

In November, 1865, when the anti-monopoly movement was just gaining momentum, the "monopoly" transportation companies had acquired a public defender of their own. A relative of President Davidson of the La Crosse Packet Company purchased a large interest in the *St. Paul Pioneer*, and, to the surprise of no one, this newspaper soon began to present the "monopoly" packet companies' side of the argument. The journal reported in detail their claim that they had not raised their prices anything like the increase in their expenses, including wages, provisions, material, fuel, taxes, license fees, and other expenditures. Taxes on steamboats had greatly increased since the war, the *Pioneer* reported. One of the main items was the city, or warfage, tax, which at St. Paul amounted to 7 cents per rated ton on every trip, regardless of the load. Others included annual inspection fees of $25 for hulls and $10 for boilers; hospital dues of 20 cents per month for each man employed on a boat; an annual federal tonnage tax of 30 cents per ton on each boat and barge; passenger boat licenses of $25 dollars each; and bar licenses of the same amount. These, added to the usual operating expenses of a first class packet, amounted to about $550 to $600 per day, while at every port agents and receiving clerks also had to be paid.[28]

The transportation companies also took steps to weaken the

25 *Ibid.*, February 25, March 10, 23, 1865.
26 *St. Paul Press*, April 13, 1866.
27 *St. Paul Pioneer*, January 21, April 24, May 11, 15, 25, 1866.
28 *Ibid.*, November 8, 30, 1865.

anti-monopoly spirit by granting some of the demands before the convention met. First, the La Crosse and Milwaukee Rail Road reduced freight rates, and the steamboats decided to do the same. Far from placated, the *St. Paul Press* denounced the reductions for which it had clamoured as "The New Conspiracy of the Monopolists."[29] The companies soon lowered the charge on wheat to Milawukee or Chicago to 19 cents per bushel from St. Paul and to 18 cents from Winona.[30]

Next the railroad and steamboat lines moved to eliminate the basis for the charge of discrimination. The *Press*, however, headlined that the "Freight Monopoly" was "Playing Possum," since the La Crosse and the North Western Packet Companies were about to announce "the dissolution of their combination with the Wisconsin Railroads, in the faint hope that . . . they can prevent the consumation of the anti-monopoly league."[31] Davidson's "individual enterprise" for 1864 and 1865, the newspaper claimed, consisted of a "combination" whereby the railroads agreed to discriminate against any independent steamboat lines, in return for a large amount of stock in the two packet companies.[32] The general manager of the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, as the La Crosse and Milwaukee now was named, announced just before the convention opened that his company had adopted as its future policy the principle of an "open river," so far as its freight business was concerned. Thereafter the railway would receive from and deliver to all steamboats doing business on the upper Mississippi and its tributaries on equal terms, receiving "each and all alike" in the order in which they arrived.[33]

Not to be outdone, Davidson himself reported that he had a proposition to make to the convention. When he was "loudly called for," he took the floor to announce that the La Crosse Packet Company had twenty steamboats and forty barges that it was willing to dispose of on reasonable terms, if the people were determined to have a line of their own, which he thought was "a good idea." The company had authorized him to say that if the merchants of St. Paul wished to run the line, they could lease all the company's boats and barges for $156,000 per season, which would be about $32.50 per day for each boat and no charge for

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29 *St. Paul Press*, January 14, 1866.
30 Larson, *Wheat Market*, 52; *St. Paul Press*, October 21, 1866.
31 January 27, 1866.
32 January 30, 1866.
33 *St. Paul Pioneer*, February 7, 1866.

the barges. Or he was ready to sell La Crosse Packet Company stock as low as anyone would and to let disinterested parties appraise it. If the people wanted him to do the freight business himself, however, he would contract to carry all the wheat or other freight offered as cheaply as anyone. The convention declined to accept any of Davidson's proposals.[34]

The anti-monopoly league not only failed to lease Davidson's boats or to organize its own steamboat company, but soon saw the formation of an even greater "monopoly" than before. The La Crosse and the North Western Lines merged in April, 1866, to form the North Western Union Packet Company. Its incorporators included the presidents of the La Crosse and the North Western Packet Companies, plus the general superintendent and the assistant general superintendent of the Chicago and North Western Railroad. These four officials and the secretary-treasurer of the La Crosse Line constituted the first board of directors. The state of Iowa authorized the new corporation to raise a capital stock of $1,000,000, which might be increased up to $5,000,000.[35] The Savanna Line also was asked to join the merger, according to the press, but refused.[36] Then the new directors named six officers, including three officials from the La Crosse Line and three from the North Western Line, with William F. Davidson as president.[37]

At the same time as the packet companies merged, the Milwaukee and St. Paul and the Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien Railways completed an arrangement to consolidate, or prorate, their earnings.[38] Soon the Prairie du Chien merged with the Milwaukee and St. Paul, now the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad.[39] The *St. Paul Press* naturally denounced the new steamboat and railway arrangements as "The Mammoth Monopoly," proclaiming that "The Upper Mississippi and all the routes of transit to Lake Michigan have thus passed completely under the control of a Transportation Monopoly far more gigantic in its proportions and immensely more powerful than that which last

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34 *Ibid.*, February 8, 1866.

35 Articles of Incorporation, 3-5; John Lawler to William F. Davidson, April 20, 1865, Davidson Papers; *Biographical Encyclopedia of Illinois*, Philadelphia, 1875, 401; Newton Bateman and Paul Selby, eds., *Illinois Historical*, Chicago, 1909, 184.

36 *St. Paul Press*, May 11, 1866.

37 William E. Wellington to William F. Davidson, September 14, 1866, Davidson Papers.

38 *St. Paul Press*, May 4, 1866.

39 August Derleth, *The Milwaukee Road*, New York, 1948, 90.

year and the year previous, ruled the waters and railroads. . . ."[40] The new North Western Union Packet Company, the *Railroad Gazette* added, was "one of the most powerful and wealthy corporations ever organized for the Mississippi Valley trade."[41]

After apparently accomplishing some of its objectives and failing to achieve others, the anti-monopoly movement in Minnesota and western Wisconsin quickly faded away. The leaders may have felt as did the editor of the *Stillwater Messenger* (Minnesota), who exclaimed despairingly that "We shall never oppose another monopoly—unless paid for it! It is no use to butt against Capt. Davidson."[42] More important, probably, was the fact that wheat prices began to rise. The average price at Winona climbed to $1.60 per bushel in May-July of 1866; to $1.79 during January-March, 1867; and to $1.99 in May-July.[43] With wheat prices even higher than during the war, and freight rates lower during much of 1866, farmers and shippers were too busy making money to get excited about "monopolies."

In many ways the anti-monopoly league was a failure. The transportation companies did reduce the rate on wheat, but by the fall of 1866 had returned the charge from Minnesota to Lake Michigan to 36 cents a bushel.[44] An open river policy was announced, only to be followed by mergers forming even larger transportation systems. Rivermen, perhaps encouraged by the rumors of high profits, established two new, independent steamboat lines; but the North Western Union Packet Company dominated the upper Mississippi in 1866 and for several years thereafter. In the St. Paul trade, for example, the Union Line owned twenty-nine of the total of sixty-three boats in 1866 and made about 79 per cent of the total of 1015 trips to that city.[45] Nevertheless, the anti-monopoly movement, led by businessmen but supported by farmers, established a precedent for the larger scale and more effective attack on the transportation "monopolies" by the Grangers just a few years later.

Clearly, some of the anti-monopoly charges were considerably exaggerated, if not completely false. For instance, it was not true that any railroad owned a large amount of stock in the La Crosse

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40 May 4, 1866.
41 Quoted in the *St. Paul Pioneer*, May 19, 1866.
42 June 20, 1866.
43 Larson, *Wheat Market*, 29.
44 *St. Paul Press*, October 21, 1866.
45 *St. Paul Pioneer*, December 13, 1866.

Packet Company. The original stockholders in 1861 consisted of the Galena Packet Company, William F. Davidson and his younger brother, and two La Crosse merchants. The only one of these who could reasonably be considered a railroad representative was the merchant who acted as the local commission agent for the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad, and he was one of the smallest stockholders.[46] At the beginning of 1866, just before the anti-monopoly convention, the La Crosse Line's stock was owned by the Davidsons and one of their associates, by two former Galena Line officials, and by three officers of the North Western Packet Company. All of them were steamboatmen or merchants, although again some of the latter, all minority owners, acted as local commission agents for railroads.[47] The only stockholder in the La Crosse Line up to 1866 who was actually an official of one of the Wisconsin or Illinois railroads at the time was the general superintendent of the La Crosse road, who received one $2,000 share in 1863 in payment for two barges, but soon transferred it to one of the La Crosse merchants.[48]

Equally false were the anti-monopolists' charges that the packet companies made gigantic profits. Before the convention met, the *Press* had published a long list of "Facts for Public Consideration," many of them about the La Crosse Packet Company. The company's "cheap freight boats" made $4,225 "nett profit" on single round trips between Hastings and La Crosse in 1865, the newspaper claimed, while some of the packets, or regularly scheduled passenger and freight boats, realized $10,000 net profit on round trips. The *Press* also reported that "those conversant with the steamboat business" stated that the company's eight packets realized from $75,000 to $100,000 each in net profits during that year, and estimated that the company made nearly or quite as much from its freight boats, making total net profits of at least $1,200,000. However, the *Press* itself estimated that the company's net profits in 1865 amounted to not less than $1,400,000.[49]

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[46] Minute Book, 18; Stock Certificates Nos. 1-7, Davidson Papers; F. A. Ketchum, ed., *La Crosse City Business Directory for 1868-69*, La Crosse, 1868, 121, 135; Russell Blakely, "History of the... Advent of Commerce in Minnesota," *Minnesota Historical Collections*, VIII, St. Paul, 1898, 408.

[47] Account Book, n. p.; Stock Certificates Nos. 20-33, Davidson Papers; *Minnesota Pioneer* (St. Paul), April 13, 1854; *St. Paul Press*, July 2, 1861; *History of Dubuque County, Iowa*, Chicago, 1880, 801, 894.

[48] Minute Book, 26; Stock Certificates Nos. 11, 18, Davidson Papers.

[49] January 9, 1866.

At the convention, Davidson claimed that the profits of his company had been "greatly misrepresented" by the press. The statement by "a certain journal" that the La Crosse Packet Company had made $1,400,000 in the past year was "a slight mistake"—a million dollars, at least, too much. Even the gross earnings of the company had not reached such an amount as that, he explained, adding that the gross earnings actually totaled less than half a million, out of which all expenses had to be paid. People talked as though there were no other boats on the river except his, Davidson continued. There was the North Western Line and the Northern Line, and he "certainly did not own all of them."[50] The *Press* replied in rebuttal after the convention that the La Crosse and the North Western Packet Companies virtually formed one consolidated company during the past year, paying their gross earnings into a common fund and dividing them equally at the end of the season. The newspaper did retreat somewhat, however, from its first estimate of the La Crosse Line's net profit in 1865, now claiming that the company's total down-river freight charges must have amounted to at least $550,000, leaving the up-river freight charges to pay the expense of running the line.[51]

Davidson's statements about his company's profits came much closer to the truth than did the claims of the anti-monopolists. The earlier assertion in the *Press* itself that the people of Minnesota had paid about $2,500,000 in freight charges in 1865 made the accusation that a single steamboat company had made a net profit of $1,400,000 obviously ridiculous. Actually, the La Crosse Packet Company's net profit that season amounted to only $160,000,[52] so that it was no accident that Davidson offered to lease all of the line's boats and barges to the St. Paul merchants for $156,000. As a matter of fact, the company's net profits for all five seasons from 1861 to 1865 totaled just $419,000, which scarcely seems "gigantic" for an important packet line during the Civil War. Furthermore, because of the agreements between the La Crosse Line and the North Western Line to divide their gross earnings equally in 1864 and 1865, the latter company's profits could have been little if any larger than the former's.

The basic error made by the anti-monopoly press was its estimate of the "nett profits" of the individual steamboats. The

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50 *St. Paul Pioneer*, February 8, 1866.
51 February 9, 1866.
52 Ledger, 20, Davidson Papers.

St. Paul Press even rejected as too low the statement by "those conversant with the steamboat business" that the La Crosse Line's packets realized from $75,000 to $100,000 each in net profits during 1865, and that its freight boats earned nearly or quite as much. Actually, the highest "earnings" (not net profits) made by any La Crosse boat in one season amounted to $65,000 in 1865, while the company's steamboats that year averaged about $18,000. Furthermore, the company then had to deduct from the total earnings of its boats, plus the relatively small income from mail contracts, interest, and exchange, the large general expenses, such as officers' and office expenses, agents' commissions, new barges, major repairs, and several other items. The steamboatmen's claim that they had not raised their rates anything like the increase in their expenses is supported by the rise in daily expenses of one of the La Crosse Line's larger packets from $155 in 1861 to $411 in 1864. This increase of 165 per cent in just three years was almost twice as large as the rise in rates of about 85 per cent during the same period.[53]

On the other hand, there undoubtedly was considerable truth to several of the charges which the anti-monopoly leaders and press hurled at the transportation companies. Whatever the reasons, they had increased freight rates greatly since the beginning of the Civil War, and had made little attempt to hide the fact that some of the railroad and steamboat lines worked in close agreement. The charge that these railroads discriminated against merchants shipping by independent steamers seems to be borne out by the announcement by the general manager of the Milwaukee and St. Paul that his company's "future" policy would be the principle of an open river. Also, it not only was true that the La Crosse and the North Western Packet Companies had an unannounced agreement to divide their gross earnings equally in 1865, but they had had a similar arrangement for the season before that.[54]

The basic charge that the La Crosse and the North Western Lines had a "monopoly" of the steamboat business on the upper Mississippi in 1864 and 1865 is harder to evaluate. The two companies did not have exclusive control of steamboat service in the region, but they and their connecting railroads had a control that made possible the manipulation of rates. Some indication of the

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[53] Journal, 8, 21, 28, 41, 115; Ledger, 20; Account Book, n. p., Davidson Papers.

[54] Contracts, February 4, 1864, February 17, 1865, Davidson Papers.

two packet lines' proportion of the total traffic can be found in the annual steamboat statistics for the important port of St. Paul. The two companies owned sixteen boats in 1864, almost a third of the forty-nine steamers in the St. Paul trade. Furthermore, Davidson personally owned several of the remaining boats, while the two companies chartered still others. The steamboats owned or chartered by the two lines made 48 per cent of the total of 630 trips to St. Paul that year. These companies owned twenty-eight steamers, or 57 per cent of the forty-nine boats in this trade during the following season, while their boats made 84 per cent of the total of 779 trips, certainly a dominating proportion of the business.[55] The La Cross Packet Company alone transported 2,793,000 bushels of wheat to La Crosse in 1865.[56] Since the total production of wheat in Minnesota that year was 9,475,000, not all of which was "exported," the La Crosse Line carried over 29 per cent of this major crop.[57]

Looking back, it is easy enough to see why each side in the controversy thought the other grossly unfair. The anti-monopolists based some of their charges upon false information, estimates, or rumors stimulated by crusading zeal, postwar disillusionment over declining wheat prices, and perhaps a bit of frontier exaggeration. Nevertheless, the anti-monopolists were correct in claiming that several of the policies and practices of the dominant transportation companies were burdensome, discriminatory, and the results of covert agreements.

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55 *St. Paul Pioneer*, November 13, 1864, November 30, 1865.
56 William Rhodes to Ignatius Donnelly, January 27, 1866, Donnelly Papers, Minnesota Historical Society.
57 Assistant Secretary of State of Minnesota, *Statistics of Minnesota ... for 1869*, St. Paul, 1870, 12.

Ledesma Ramos and the Origins of Spanish Fascism

The fascist intellectual was a symptomatic feature of European cultural and political life between the two World Wars.[1] He made his appearance in each of the four principal countries of the western half of the continent, but was also to be found in Portugal, Austria, the Low Countries and many of the east European nations. In Germany and especially in Italy, the fascistic intellectual helped provide the ideological *rationale* for a political movement with definite vigor and support.

In France and Spain, however, fascistic parties were virtually non-existent until the early nineteen-thirties. Here the theorists of corporative authoritarian nationalism expostulated in a physical vacuum, elaborating doctrine or tactics for groups which had no significant following, exhorting their few hearers to the creation of a force as yet unseen. *Action Française,* for many years the base of the authoritarian French Right, was no more than an intellectual organ, with a few snobbish street gangs attached.[2] Colonel De la Rocque's "Croix de Feu," which became the only serious Right nationalist movement in France, did not reach noteworthy proportions until 1933. While France never experienced fascist government, save for the ambiguities of Marshal Pétain's occupation regime, her southern neighbor, Spain, has undergone the longest siege of fascistoid government known to any major European country.

More than in any other area, the original ideological current of authoritarian nationalist statism in Spain began as the individual vision of an obscure and passionate ideologue. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, the founder of the national syndicalist norms of Spanish *falangismo* and the subject of this essay in cultural despair, was born in the Castillian province of Zamora. Since his father was a village schoolmaster who died before the boy was grown, Ramiro

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1 The term "fascist" and words therefrom derivative are used in this essay with reference to persons or groups advocating some form of corporative-directed, authoritarian, anti-parliamentary, nationalist statism.

2 An adequate study of *Action Française* has never been made. On Charles Maurras, there is William C. Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France,* New York, 1939; Michael Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès and Maurras,* Princeton 1959; and Robert Havard de la Montagne, *Histoire de l'Action Française,* Paris 1950.

Ledesma early became accustomed to a meager existence. At the age of fifteen he set off for Madrid with considerable energy and no financial resources. There Ledesma won a poorly paid position as a postal clerk and, during the next six or seven years, succeeded in obtaining a degree at the University.[3]

Ledesma's first love was philosophical study and, especially, German philosophy. He also began very early to write. During his early twenties, he clung to his position at the Madrid post office and published essays on modern German philosophy in a number of intellectual reviews, including Ortega y Gasset's *Revista de Occidente*.[4] These were hard and lonely years for Ledesma, submerged in the isolated existence of a solitary member of Madrid's intellectual proletariat. His life consisted of sorting mail and reading metaphysics.

By the time Ledesma reached his twenty-fifth birthday, in 1930, his country was coming to a parting of the ways. The frustrated development of Spain's economy, her very serious social problem, the breakdown of constitutional monarchy followed by the bankruptcy of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, were all bringing the old order to its knees. Inexorably, the Bourbon Monarchy was being driven onto the rocks.

In one sense, Ramiro Ledesma felt very closely identified with his nation's fate. He, too, was reaching a break with his previous manner of life. As he grew older, formal philosophy meant less and less to him. The technical distinctions of ontology began to look like artificial trivia, and discussion of epistemology came to resemble a smoke screen which masked real life. He hoped to break out of his narrow round of existence onto a more vital, active plane, to work with applied thought instead of abstract, theoretical reckoning. As the attraction of philosophy diminished, the appeal of political ideology increased sharply. The urge was to transcend his circumscribed intellectuality and create a new style of life for himself. "If reality is dull and petty, let us forge another with the material offered us by our dreams, and with the prodigious variety given us by our imagination."[5]

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[3] Ledesma's early life is dealt with in Juan Aparicio, *Ramiro Ledesma, Fundador de las J. O. N. S.*, Madrid, 1942, 13–18; Juan Aparicio, ed., *La Conquista del Estado*, Barcelona, 1939, vii–ix; Joaquín Arrarás, ed., *Historia de la Cruzada española*, Madrid, 1940, I, 385.

[4] This material was later collected in *Los escritos filosóficos de Ramiro Ledesma*, Madrid, 1941.

[5] Quoted by Emiliano Aguado, *Ramiro Ledesma en la crisis de España*, Madrid 1943, 23.

Ledesma later admitted that he had been much impressed by the sociological writings of José Ortega y Gasset[6] at about the same time that he had been introduced to the rhetoric of hypernationalism through his association with Ernesto Giménez Caballero, a bizarre writer who directed one of the country's leading literary reviews.[7] However, he soon rejected the aristocratic liberalism of Ortega, just as he found the extremist esthetics of Giménez Caballero inadequate. What was needed was to create a new national political ideology out of whole cloth. Once more Ledesma found his point of departure in German culture, but his new inspiration was Hitler, rather than Kant.

It was an easy step from metaphysics to abstract political ideology, for in the latter realm, too, Ledesma quickly discovered a way to deal with entire categories of existence. He wanted to transform his environment, the Spanish environment, with sweeping, radical changes. To do this he placed emphasis on emotion rather than reason, on warmth rather than light, on ideology rather than science, on politics rather than philosophy. He understood sufficiently the nature of the tradition-oriented society of Old Castile from which he had sprung to realize that his new values had certain roots in Spanish custom. It seemed clear to him that the emotional temper of the Spanish people was incompatible with orthodox liberalism or scientific socialism, and for his own part, Ledesma equally abhorred the atomistic individualism of the liberal creed and the fatalistic impersonality of Marxism. Thus he felt sure that he was in trend with the spirit of his time and, in the long run, with the feeling of most of his fellow countrymen.

If the basis of his new intellectual life were to be valid, however, Ledesma was convinced that it must be wholly modern and support a broad plane of physical reference. Two revolutionary creeds were in the political air of Europe in 1930: radical Leftist socialism and integral nationalism. Combined in one doctrine they could be a source of enormous power. The political philosopher of the post office craved emotional identification with a movement of this sort, which could release the pent-up vigor of the nation. He dreamed of a social revolution, indigenous to Spain, combining nationalism and socialism in the achievement of its goal. The

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[6] Ramiro Ledesma Ramos (Roberto Lanzas, pseud.), *¿Fascismo en España?* Madrid, 1935, 35.

[7] Giménez Caballero's most representative writings are *Genio de España*, Madrid, 1932, and *La nueva catolicidad*, Madrid, 1933. There is a succinct summary in Alfred Mendizábal, *The Martyrdom of Spain: Origins of a Civil War*, New York, 1938, 178ff.

idea was novel in the Iberian peninsula, but it reflected the mood of the era: Soviet Russia was in the throes of its first Five Year Plan; the world depression threatened the foundations of the liberal democracies, while the Nazi Party revived with great *éclat* and the hour of vindication for Mussolini's system seemed about to arrive.

To ride the crest of the future, Ledesma belived that he had only to shake off the atmosphere and methodology of precise philosophical thought and get into the midst of the stream of activity leading to the "new world." From that point, the horizon was boundless. Ledesma could even hope to make himself a leader of some sort of Spanish fascism. His personal characteristics, however, seemed ill cut out for the role; even his friends admitted that Ledesma had "a cold personality and an ill-kempt appearance."[8] He was lacking in personal magnetism and had no individual style, save for a rhetorical emphasis on audacity. Thus it was only natural that he borrow mannerisms from the style designers of authoritarian nationalism in Italy and Germany. Soon Ledesma even began to comb his hair over the side of his forehead, *Führer*-fashion.[9]

At the same time, he refused to copy slavishly the political doctrine of central European national revolutionary groups. Quite to the contrary, Ledesma decried "mimicry" and made a fetish of ideological originality, indicating that if Spanish nationalist revolutionist ideology were to be unique, it could be called neither corporatism nor national socialism. In reality, the only truly Spanish revolutionary movement was Anarcho-syndicalism. Thus if he were to be true to his designs, Ledesma decided that the neo-Leftist quality of the national revolution and the nationalist quality of the neo-Leftist revolution could be properly synthesized only in "national syndicalism." This notion was not necessarily prompted by the concrete possibilities of the Spanish political world in 1931, but sprang largely from the mind of Ramiro Ledesma.

During the last year of the Monarchy (1930-1931), proposals for a national *ralliement* were common among Spain's intellectual leaders. The most perceptive and influential of this elite, José Ortega y Gasset, made repeated calls for a great national party,

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[8] Aguado, *Ramiro Ledesma*, 13. They pictured him as "a man of harsh temperament, steel-like intolerance...."; Emmett Hughes, *Report from Spain*, New York, 1947, 23–24.

[9] Francisco Guillén Salaya, *Anecdotario de las J. O. N. S.*, San Sebastián, 1938, 12. There are photographs in Arrarás, *Historia de la Cruzada*, I.

an all-inclusive national front, a party of parties which would represent all Spaniards almost as a corporate entity.[10] To Ledesma, this was sad, dismal stuff. Liberal nationalism meant nothing to him, but he had difficulty finding companions with whom to offer an alternative. The last vestiges of the old political regime were collapsing while he watched, and somewhere there must be other young enthusiasts for a radical new order. Searching for collaborators, Ledesma found an even ten, all young men from the universities, like himself.[11] Initially, they showed a good deal of enthusiasm for the preparation of a new nationalist weekly review, but there was no money to support it. After several vexations, they managed to get their organ started on a small donation from the pro-monarchist propaganda fund of the last government organized under the aegis of Alfonso XIII.[12] It seems that political informants of the last prime minister, Admiral Aznar, saw some value in using Ramiro's group as a device to create division among liberal intellectuals. As it turned out, such hopes were vain.

The little band of would-be nationalist revolutionaries signed their first manifesto by candle-light in an office consisting of four bare rooms which even lacked electricity. Their proclamation, a vague blue-print for a new state, appeared in the first issue of the paper, *La Conquista del Estado*, emphasizing the following points:

> The new state will be constructive, creative. It will supplant individuals and groups, and the ultimate sovereignty will reside in it and only in it. . . . We defend, therefore, Panstatism. . . .
>
> . . . Exaltation of the Universities . . ., the supreme creative organ of scientific and cultural values. . . .
>
> Articulation of the varied districts of Spain. The basic reality of Spain is not Madrid, but the provinces. Our most radical impulse must consist, then, in connecting and encouraging the vital force of the provinces. . . .
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> . . . . .
>
> Syndication of economic forces will be obligatory and in each instance bound to the highest ends of the State. The State will discipline and will guarantee production at all times. . . . Expropriated land, once nationalized, must not be divided, since this would be equivalent to the dismal and archaic liberal solution, but ceded to the peasants themselves, so that they

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10 For example, *El Sol* (the Ortega tribune), Dec, 6, 1930. Cf. *El Socialista*, Jan. 6, 1930.

11 Aparicio, *La Conquista del Estado*, xi. Aparicio served as Ledesma's secretary during these months.

12 According to Emiliano Aguado, who was an occasional participant in the group's activities. Conversation in Madrid, Dec. 6, 1958.

themselves may cultivate the land, under the supervision of autonomous municipal entities, and tending to communal and cooperative exploitation.

. . . . .

Our primary goal is revolutionary efficiency. Therefore we do not seek votes, but audacious and valiant minorities. . . . We favor the politician with a military sense of responsibility and combativeness. Our organization will be founded on the basis of syndical cells and political cells.[13]

During these early months, Ledesma's propaganda was very confused. He applauded many aspects of Carlism,[14] then eulogized the Anarchists at the opposite end of the political spectrum.[15] His rhetoric often amounted to little more than "up with the new" and "down with the old":

Long live the new world of the twentieth century!
Long live Fascist Italy!
Long live Soviet Russia!
Long live Hitlerian Germany!
Long live the Spain we will make!
Down with the bourgeois parliamentary democracies![16]

Indirectly, Ledesma explained the metaphysic of his new political creed when he wrote that though the intellectual "constitutes a magnificent human type, and is of all the social strata the most indispensable,"[17] pure ideas have no reality. Only physical extension lent significance. Hence the national aspirations of the people could be very real, but intellectual activity was fully valid only when identified with such feelings. "Pay no attention to words," ran one headline. "Require deeds. Only deeds."[18] *La Conquista del Estado*, of course, was strictly a talking-association; no segment of the "people" identified their "aspirations" with it.

Ledesma, however, always remained an intellectual. No matter how passionate and fascistic, or how violent and materialistic his talk became, it was always based on purely abstract calculation. He was never concerned with practical alternatives. Instead of an Absolute Idea, Ledesma was impelled to the confection of an Absolute Passion, nationalism. His emotion sprang from his

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13 *La Conquista del Estado*, no. 1, Mar. 14, 1931.
14 *Ibid.*, no. 2, Mar. 23, 1931.
15 *Ibid.*, no. 11, May 23, 1931. This contradiction may be reconciled if one bears in mind that these were the two Spanish political groups which most thoroughly opposed the legacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
16 *Ibid.*, no. 13, June 6, 1931.
17 *Ibid.*, no. 15, Apr. 11, 1931.
18 *Ibid.*, no. 4, Apr. 4, 1931.

mental contortions, and even his irrationality was very often calculated. He none the less strove desperately to appear tough and revolutionary. Bizarre costumery—a lion's claw with lightning rays emblazoned on a sort of Faustian garb minus the cloak—was selected for the clique. Only Ledesma was ever photographed wearing it.[19]

In one sense, he was more honest than other anti-Leftists, since Ledesma made no effort to justify his brand of national revolution by the threat from the Left. He personally admitted that no such Leftist threat existed in Spain in 1931, for the Socialists were collaborating with the government and the Anarchists largely abstained from political activity, while Spanish communism scarcely counted adherents.[20] According to Ledesma, the immediate danger came from the bourgeois Right.[21] Therefore, he tried to appeal to all revolutionary forces in Spain that were not Marxist in orientation. For example, he commended the Anarcho-Syndicalists for being the first people in Spain "to untie themselves from the bourgeois love of [individual] liberty."[22] He condemned them for refusing to base their goals on a national plane, but recognized in the Anarcho-Syndicalist "the most efficient subversive lever"[23] of 1931-32, because their revolutionary ardor was unsullied by connection with any branch of international Socialism.

These political attitudes were based on pure conceptualization and were not related to immediate reality. In 1931 Spain's basic problem was to make parliamentary democracy take root in a land hitherto dominated by an intransigent Right, now challenged by a Left unable and unwilling to accustom itself to the slow give-and-take of democratic government. Ledesma's proposals offered no solution to this dilemma, but simply ignored the problem in favor of a violent new vision. Ledesma planned a number of provocative demonstrations with his handful of supporters, but none of these efforts made any impression. No one was awed by his nationalistic fulminations or his cries that "the individual has

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19 *Ibid.*, no. 6, Apr. 18, 1931.

20 Ledesma usually interpreted Russian Communism as the belated nationalist revolutionary movement of the Russian people. Within the Russian context, he deemed it a praiseworthy enterprize, considering Communism dangerous only when manipulated by Russians to aggrandize Russian nationalism. These points were later elaborated in *Discurso a las juventudes españolas,* Madrid, 1935.

21 *La Conquista del Estado,* no. 9, May 9, 1931. He reiterated this opinion four years later in *¿Fascismo en España?*, 48.

22 Quoted by Francisco Guillén Salaya, *Historia del sindicalismo español,* Madrid, 1943, 141, 145.

23 Quoted by Aparicio, *La Conquista des Estado,* xviii.

died."[24] Though he was eager to win the approbation of leading intellectuals, Ledesma could impress neither Ortega, who had ignored free copies of *La Conquista del Estado,* nor the more emotional Miguel de Unamuno, who received Ledesma's citations with equal disdain.

Life was difficult for Ledesma in 1931. He saw some of the more constructive notions entertained by his clique, such as the establishment of agrarian syndicates of small peasant holders in Galicia, collapse for want of finances,[25] and the authorities frequently made things even more discouraging by banning his sheet. On two occasions, he even was arrested for provocative and abusive language, and after six months sources of financial support dried up altogether. Earlier, Ledesma appears to have received a meager subsidy from the world of high finance, especially from the Bilbao bankers, but the latter naturally were not interested in investing any significant sum in a radical intellectual utterly lacking political adherents. *La Conquista del Estado* came to an end on October 16, 1931, and it seemed that Ramiro Ledesma Ramos would never be the *caudillo* of Spanish fascism.[26]

Now forced to search for new collaborators in his self-created movement of "national syndicalism," he found an associate in the person of a young rural lawyer from Valladolid, Onésimo Redondo Ortega. Redondo came from the independent peasantry of Old Castille, very much like Ledesma himself. He had been educated by the Jesuits and had studied in Germany, where he had been impressed by the dynamism of National Socialism. He was a clerical and a Rightist, but he also believed passionately in economic justice and in direct action. Hence he advocated a nationalist lower class revolution to combat materialism, vice and the class struggle. He was especially concerned with saving the economic position of the solid, conservative peasantry of northern Spain.[27]

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[24] *La Conquista del Estado,* no. 11, May 23, 1931.

[25] According to Manuel Souto Vilas, Ledesma's chief deputy in this enterprise. Conversation in Bilbao, Dec. 8, 1958.

[26] Ledesma's original ten apostles had already begun to split up. One joined the Azaña liberals, another the Lerroux Radicals, and a third the clerical CEDA. A fourth went back to the Left, while a fifth, it would seem, later entered a mental institution. According to *¿Fascismo en España?,* 54–57, and Charles Foltz, *The Masquerade in Spain,* Boston, 1948, 63.

[27] The background of Onésimo Redondo is dealt with in Narciso Sánchez, "Onésimo Redondo," *Temas españoles,* Madrid, 1953, no. 39, 5–6, and in "Onésimo Redondo y el Sindicato Remolachero," *SP,* Mar. 8, 1959, 10. All Redondo's propaganda articles are available in his *Obras completas,* Madrid, 1952.

Redondo had begun a weekly in Valladolid during the summer of 1931. Soon afterward, he and Ledesma made contact and began to discuss the possibility of forming a new nationalist political movement. During October of that year they founded the "Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista" (J. O. N. S.), the first political group in Spain to bear the national syndicalist label. The membership was largely composed of two nuclei centered around Redondo in Valladolid and Ledesma in Madrid. To demonstrate their radical aims, the formation adopted as its colors the red-black-red banner of the Anarchists.

During the next eighteen months, the J. O. N. S. movement scarcely got off the ground. Ledesma was silenced throughout 1932 for lack of any resources with which to carry on propaganda work. The only audible voice in the movement was that of Redondo at Valladolid. It was not until after the latter had become implicated in the abortive military rebellion of 1932 and had had to flee to Portugal that Ledesma could regain his personal pre-eminence, though on a rather insecure basis.[28]

In 1933, the national political situation began for the first time to work in favor of the radical Right. The first two years of liberal Republican rule in Spain were a failure, and the unrest which gained volume during 1933 aided all elements of the Right, and any other group which opposed the liberal regime. After serving a two-month prison term for abusive language in the winter of 1932-1933, Ledesma saw his movement attract followers. In Spain, as in France, those most susceptible to the emotional rhetoric of nationalist re-integration were half-educated young people from the universities. An effort to form a student syndicate at the University of Madrid in March, 1933, was immediately rewarded with several hundred affiliates.[29] A syndicate of taxi drivers was also set up,[30] and one hundred young activists were organized into squads of four to do battle in the streets.[31] Fur-

[28] The events of this period are dealt with in *¿Fascismo en España?*, 75–78, and in Guillén Salaya, *Anecdotario*, 112–114.

[29] *¿Fascismo en España?*, 91; David Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*, Madrid, 1953, 54–55.

[30] Guillén Salaya, *Historia del sindicalismo español*, 55.

[31] This was the second not the first, street gang of the radical Right in Republican Spain. The first had been organized during the winter of 1930-31 by a neurologist from Valencia, Dr. José María Albiñana. This group, the "Partido Nacionalista Español," was composed of tiny nuclei in Madrid and Burgos. Its proclaimed program was the defense of all existing institutions save the Republican government. Its militia group, the "Legionarios de Albiñana," was forced to cover with the advent of the Republic, and the Doctor himself was placed under arrest. He has re-

thermore, the moneyed Right was ready to subsidize Ledesma's radical agitation once more, and gave him the backing to begin publication of a new monthly review of J. O. N. S. propaganda.[32] The "Juntas" gained adherents, and by mid-1933 national syndicalist units had been set up in six other cities of Spain. Though each group numbered but a few dozen members, two of them (Valencia and Zaragoza) began to publish weekly reviews. Given such encouragement Ledesma could face the future with renewed confidence.

The idea of some sort of national corporatist or syndicalist movement had become attractive to other sectors of the Spanish Right besides the lunatic fringe, but practical-minded financiers did not wish to leave the major effort for "Spanish fascism" in the hands of a cold, passionate, unpredictable intellectual like Ramiro Ledesma. A variety of candidates were suggested or presented themselves for the leadership of a new nationalist movement.[33] By the summer of 1933, direction of this new initiative had come into the hands of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, eldest son of the late dictator, and Julio Rúiz de Alda, an aviator who had taken part in the first trans-Atlantic flight to Buenos Aires.[34] Young José Antonio was a very different type from his genial, anti-intellectual father. He was scholarly and erudite on occasion, but above all a lyricist whose self-professed desire was to establish a "poetic" new national revolutionary movement.[35] By contrast, Rúiz de Alda was simple, hearty and direct. A man of action and a good organizer, he was non-intellectual and personally inarticulate, and was clearly overshadowed by the eloquent José Antonio.

The two collaborators wanted to build their nationalist move-

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counted his experiences in *Después de la dictadura: Los cuervos sobre la tumba*, Madrid, 1930; *España bajo la dictadura republicana*, Madrid, 1932; *Prisionero de la República*, Madrid, 1932; and *Confinado en las Hurdes*, Madrid, 1933.

Albiñana had been hesitantly financed by members of the *latifundista* class, and Ramiro Ledesma spoke bitterly of his "reactionary" activities. *¿Fascismo en España?*, 52.

[32] *¿Fascismo en España?*, 110, 117; Francisco Guillén Salaya, *Los que nacimos con el siglo*, Madrid, 1954, 127.

[33] One aspect of this is treated by Indalecio Prieto in *El Socialista*, May 19, 1949.

[34] Rúiz de Alda's political career is summarized in the Prologue to his *Obras completas*, Barcelona, 1939.

[35] The brief ideological trajectory of José Antonio is available in the *Obras completas de José Antonio Primo de Rivera*, Madrid, 1952, and the *Textos inéditos y epistolario de José Antonio Primo de Rivera*, Madrid, 1956.

ment on the broadest possible platform. Realizing full well that Ledesma had originated national syndicalist ideology in Spain, they met with him in August, 1933, to determine if it were possible to unite their efforts. Ledesma sneered at Primo de Rivera's estheticism, and derided what he called his "mimicry." He later claimed that José Antonio had wanted to call the proposed movement "Spanish Fascism," but admitted he had been "perhaps too intransigent" in rejecting these overtures.[36] When he refused to cooperate, Primo de Rivera and Rúiz de Alda went ahead by themselves, relying on many members of the old conservative and military circles close to General Primo de Rivera. Their movement, called "Falange Española" ("Spanish Phalanx"), was founded in Madrid on October 29, 1933. It overshadowed the J. O. N. S. from the very beginning.

Ledesma later admitted, "The entry of new militants and the upward course of the J. O. N. S. slackened most noticeably from the very beginning of F. E."[37] Financial support dried up once more, since all the safe money was going to the more reliable and conservative Falange. The J. O. N. S. were able to advance only one candidate (Redondo) in the elections of 1933, but even he withdrew after strong entreaties from the Right. On the morrow of the balloting, the situation was even more gloomy, for the electoral victory of the moderate parliamentary conservatives made the prospects of the radical Right look extremely meager. The middle classes did not need to resort to extremism in repulsing the Left, and fascism seemed superfluous. Two national syndicalist movements in Spain were clearly one too many.

During the winter of 1933-34 there was considerable pressure on Ledesma to agree to a fusion of the J. O. N. S. and the Falange.[38] On February 11, 1934, he called a meeting of the J. O. N. S. National Council to consider the problem. He believed a union practicable because

> . . . the enormous defects that were noticed in F. E. were, perhaps, of [entering the Falange], it lacked vigor and a unified historical consciousness, so that it should not have been difficult to displace it from the areas of control. On the other hand, the J. O. N. S., utilizing the resonant

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36 *¿Fascismo en España?*, 111.

37 *Ibid.*, 145.

38 There is an interesting letter in this regard written to Ledesma by his Salamanca lieutenant, Francisco Bravo Martínez, in Bravo's *José Antonio: El hombre, el jefe, el camarada*, Madrid, 1939, 63–64.

platform of F. E., could secure the popularization of their ideas with relative facility.[39]

He counted on the more direct, radical nature of the Jonsista membership to change the predominantly conservative character of the original Falange. The fusion was effected immediately and the new unified movement was entitled "Falange Española de las J. O. N. S." Ramiro Ledesma joined José Antonio de Rivera and Julio Rúiz de Alda to form the executive triumvirate of the party.[40]

It was not so easy to influence the policy of the new movement as Ledesma had calculated. The diffusion of power within the party hierarchy was considerable, with three or four groups pulling in different directions.[41] Though he had always been a verbal proponent of violence and direct action, Ledesma did not figure significantly in the struggle for power between terrorist activists and the literary-minded leadership of José Antonio which wracked the party in mid-1934. After José Antonio gained the upper hand in this contest, Ledesma was left with even less influence than before. When he could not persuade José Antonio to adopt his plan for holding great party rallies in the major cities of Spain, he became morose and withdrew from the other leaders, shutting himself up within his own office cubicle.[42]

A rebellion by the Spanish Left threatened to break out in the autumn of 1934, and the political situation grew very tense. The supporters of José Antonio Primo de Rivera feared that the national syndicalist party would break up in confusion unless a strong, centralized command were provided. Ledesma was not particularly popular with Falange militants, and could never have competed in a popularity contest with the vigorous and inspiring José Antonio. At the National Council meeting of the Falange held on October 4, 1934, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was elected *Jefe Nacional* of the national syndicalist movement.[43] Ramiro Ledesma acquiesced as best he could.

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[39] *¿Fascismo en España?*, 145–146.

[40] These details are dealt with in Francisco Bravo Martínez, *Historia de Falange Española de las J. O. N. S.*, Madrid, 1943, 23; Felipe Ximénez de Sandoval, *José Antonio. Biografía*, Madrid, 1949, 222–229; and Arrarás, *Historialde la Cruzada*, II, 19–23.

[41] Much of this is revealed in Juan Antonio Ansaldo, *¿Paraqué...? (De Alfonso XIII a Juan III)*, Buenos Aires, 1953, 81–87. Ansaldo was the leader of one of the dissident factions.

[42] Ximénez de Sandoval, *José Antonio*, 372.

[43] The most accurate account is in Marqués de Zayas, *Historia de la vieja guardia de Baleares*, Madrid, 1955, 38.

To salve Ledesma's wounds, José Antonio appointed him President of the "Junta Política" of the party. The first task of the founder of national syndicalist ideology was to edit the official program of the movement. Ledesma's resulting draft of Twenty-Seven Points emphasized the same goals which had been noised about in *La Conquista del Estado* three years previously. Refined and softened in style by José Antonio, the Twenty-Seven Points were adopted as the party's official creed.[44]

A precise definition of the party's position had become necessary because of the dissatisfaction which the far Right now felt with the a-clerical, increasingly radical-sounding Falange. The monarchists and wealthy corporatists who had first financed the party finally decided to begin a truly conservative corporatist movement of their own, called the "Bloque Nacional." At the end of 1934, the same thing happened to the Falange that had befallen the J.O.N.S. at the end of 1933: its sources of finance and support were drained by another nationalist movement less radical than itself.[45]

The Falange therefore made a great effort to define the essentially revolutionary nature of its aims and broaden its appeal to the working classes. In the process, Ramiro became more and more dissatisfied with José Antonio's direction, which he considered too timid and literary. The movement was slow to win support, and Ledesma claimed that much more could be done to bolster the Falange's prestige and propaganda potential. This argument grew for several months, until it became clear that the national syndicalist movement was not large enough for both José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. Deciding to break out of the predicament into which he had been forced, Ledesma attempted to split the party wide open, but most of his former cohorts, such as Onésimo Redondo, soon got cold feet. When José Antonio learned of Ledesma's plans, he called an impromptu meeting of the "Junta Política" in mid-January, 1935, and expelled Ramiro Ledesma from the national syndicalist movement. Ledesma then attempted to win the approval of the meager membership of the Falange syndicates, but here too the flashing eye and command-

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[44] *¿Fascismo en España?*, 213.

[45] The doctrines of the "Bloque Nacional" and its leader, José Calvo Sotelo, are dealt with in Eugenio Vegas Latapié, *El pensamiento político de Calvo Sotelo*, Madrid, 1941, and Eduardo Aunós, *Calvo Sotelo y la política de su tiempo*, Madrid, 1943.

ing personal presence of José Antonio Primo de Rivera won the day.[46]

Four years of political agitation had returned Ramiro Ledesma to his point of departure—obscurity. During the next few months he managed to wheedle enough money from the monarchist treasury to permit the publication of a few numbers of a sheet entitled *Patria Sindicalista.*[47] He threatened to sue the Falange for continued use of the initials J.O.N.S., but no more than a handful of former Jonsistas followed him into his new venture, which soon folded. Ledesma then retired from direct agitation, and monarchist sources provided funds for the publication of two short books whose composition occupied the next few months of his life.[48] The first, *Discurso a las juventudes españolas,* was an emotional exordium to Spanish youth, and had little concrete content. The second, *¿Fascismo en España?,* offered Ledesma's critique of the national syndicalist movement he had founded and had then seen pass into other hands. Ledesma intimated that he preferred to be remembered as a nationalist and a revolutionary rather than as a fascist, which he had always denied being, saying "in conclusion, that the red shirt of Garibaldi fits Ramiro Ledesma and his comrades better than the black shirt of Mussolini."[49] Following this, Ledesma announced his temporary retirement from politics and went back to work in the post office. José Antonio Primo de Rivera would not let eager Falange gunmen touch him, saying, "With all his defects, he is very intelligent."[50]

Ledesma returned to the political wars in the spring of 1936 with a new weekly sheet called *Nuestra Revolución.* According to documents later found in the German consulate at Barcelona, this was financed by the Nazi propaganda fund for Spain.[51] It made little difference one way or the other, for the paper only survived a few numbers, and its editor was arrested in the general round-up of figures of the radical Right which marked the hectic months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. On the day

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46 Ledesma's account of his last days in the party is in *¿Fascismo en España?*, 218–221. The other side is given in Sandoval, *José Antonio,* 373–376.

47 There are extracts in Sandoval, 382–394.

48 According to Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, former treasurer of the monarchist front, "Renovación Española". Conversation in Lisbon, May 1, 1959.

49 *¿Fascismo en España?*, 226.

50 Bravo, *José Antonio,* 56.

51 These materials are summarized in Emile Burns, ed., *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain,* London, 1937.

when the conflict exploded, Ledesma was still imprisoned in Madrid. After that, only a miracle could have saved his life. A man with his political background was as good as dead in Republican Spain during the first weeks of the Civil War. He survived the general slaughter of prisoners at Madrid's Cárcel Modelo on August 22, but was eventually executed in October, 1936. He and José Antonio Primo de Rivera died within a month of each other, both at the hands of Republican firing squads. Neither of them was to witness, much less to participate, in the final resolution of political forces among the Spanish Right.

The interplay of parliamentary Right, reactionary Right and radical Right was resolved in the spring of 1937 by General Francisco Franco, who emerged as Chief of State for the new regime in rebellion against the Republic. The Generalísimo solved the problems of political form and ideology for the "new Spain" by exalting the formerly insignificant Falange, now swollen by a mass wartime enrollment, into the Party of the State.

Perhaps it was just as well that Ledesma did not live to see the national syndicalist regime of General Franco, for the latter's "new Spain" was not exactly the sort of thing he had in mind. On the other hand, the pan-activism of Ramiro never had any precise direction. He had merely wanted to overturn the old bourgeois order in Spain, but, like most modern radicals, he was always extremely vague with regard to the precise nature of the "new world" which he envisaged.

Ramiro Ledesma was another product of the cultural despair of the inter-war years. When he gave up metaphysics in 1930, he gave up an entire prior order of existence. The anti-bourgeois, national revolutionary posture which he adopted was an intellectualized emotional creed designed to fill an existential vacuum rather than a calculated response to a practical problem. That Franco's brand of national syndicalism has tended to protect those middle classes whom the philosopher-turned-demagogue Ledesma affected to despise is not altogether a paradox, for the national syndicalist program lacked any real syndical theory or content prior to 1939.

> It is difficult to find in the work of Ramiro, so tied to the concrete, a concrete norm about anything in ordinary life. When he talks of social affairs he loses himself in vague rhetoric which would never satisfy anyone who is in open struggle with life, and when he speaks to us on his own account of the economic order of the State the same thing happens.

The worst occurs when, perhaps taking note of this vagueness, he endeavors to tell us something concrete about things he has not studied, for then one sees only too clearly that he has wanted to convince us with an artificial argument.[52]

Ledesma and his companions never really bothered with practical matters. The kind of pressure they felt upon them was of a different nature. As his friend Emiliano Aguado wrote,

> ... The work of Ramiro ... did not propound anything concrete; it was rather the expression of a human lack we shall continue to feel so long as the present spiritual state of Europe endures.[53]

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[52] Aguado, *Ramiro Ledesma*, 114.
[53] *Ibid.*, 115.

French Language Press in the Upper Mississippi and Great Lakes Areas

Even a quick glance at a map of the North Central section of the United States is sufficient to remind one of the part played by France in the discovery, mapping and clearing of the Upper Mississippi and the Great Lakes areas. Yet, if the many French names sprinkled throughout the area are unmistakable proofs of the French appearance and settlement on the Mid-American continent, so, the names of more than sixty French-language newspapers published in the same area throughout the nineteenth century are unmistakable proofs of the persisting French influence and vindicate Telesphore St. Pierre's assertion that after 1763, though "le drapeau français ne flottait plus sur le sol du Michigan"—and we might insert here North Midwest instead of Michigan—"la race française n'y avait pas dit son dernier mot."[1]

A few words on the French and French-Canadian population might help to understand better the history of the press they originated. Though the years which followed the French defeat witnessed no significant migration from France to the Middle West or to the United States, yet, French culture found its way to America through the medium of the large numbers of French Canadians who in the Nineteenth century left Canada for the United States. In fact, the westward march of the French Canadians began even before the War of Independence, as many Canadian fur traders and trail blazers were naturally led to the Great Lakes which, in turn, became a secondary basis of operation for further progress westward and southward. Following the explorers, who could not resist the attraction of the Great River and the salty waters still further west, settlers cleared and occupied the land, clustering in and around the forts which marked the westward march.

The Nineteenth century, with its two rebellions in Canada, and the American War of Secession, witnessed a considerable increase in the number of French Canadian immigrants. Two areas were particularly affected by this immigration: New England, because

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[1] Telesphore St. Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan,* Montreal, 1895, 220.

of its proximity and of its fast-developing textile industry, and the Middle West, the natural outlet of the Saint Lawrence waterway, which for many still had the appeal of the 'West'. Thus in 1849, a traveler to St. Paul found that "the Catholics are the only denomination who has a church, [and that] the services there are held in the French language."[2] Likewise in Chicago,

> . . . a considerable accession of French and French Canadians was made during the fifties. The sons and daughters of 'la belle France' increased so rapidly in Chicago that just when the influence of the Old Regime had about disappeared, they became numerous enough to erect a church of their own where services were performed in French.[3]

Nearby, Kankakee was another French-Canadian settlement where, in 1857, a French paper *Le Journal de l'Illinois* started publication with a subscription list of 1,200 persons. As for Michigan, we are told that there were about 20,000 persons of French origin in 1840, the number increasing to 36,000 in the next decade.[4]

The American Civil War further accelerated the current of immigrant from Canada, as the North's developing industry was in dire need of manpower. It is estimated, of the French Canadian immigration to the United States, "three-fourths took place between 1865 and 1890."[5] In Michigan alone, the French-Canadian population reached 70,000 by 1870. In Chicago, a 30,000-strong French speaking group had the added support of the many French-Canadian elements scattered within a fifty mile radius of Chicago. Further north, in Minnesota, the French column published in the State's first newspapers for those who could not read English, was now replaced by regular all-French newspapers in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth.

Thus, in 1895, following the heavy immigration of the post Civil War years, the French-speaking group in the area stood as follows:

> Au sud, il y a sur le lac Erié les colonies canadiennes du nord de l'Ohio, qui comptent bien 20,000 habitants . . ., et, sur le lac Michigan celles de l'Illinois qui forment une population de pas moins de 50,000 âmes. A l'ouest, les groupes du lac Supérieur s'appuient sur ceux du nord du Wisconsin et du Minnesota qui peuvent avoir une population franco-canadienne de 60,000 à 70,000 âmes. Enfin, par le Comté d'Essex et le Sault Sainte

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[2] Quoted in "Impressions of Minnesota in 1849," *Minnesota Historical Bulletin*, V, 287.

[3] Arthur Charles Cole, *Centennial History of Illinois*, Chicago, 1919, III, 145.

[4] St. Pierre, *Histoire*, 221.

[5] *Catholic Encyclopedia*, New York, 1909, VI, 272.

Marie à l'est, les Canadiens du Michigan tendent la main à leurs frères de la vallée de l'Ottawa et de la baie Georgienne qui s'avancent en rangs serrés pour former une chaine ininterrompue de postes français qui s'appuieront sur la Province de Québec même.[6]

It is clear that today this French Canadian element has been assimilated in the American melting pot, while the area still boasts strong and culturally-distinct Scandinavian and German groups. Altogether, French and French-Canadian influence seems to have been smaller than one could have expected.

An examination of the files of the newspapers they published leaves no doubt that the French and French-Canadians themselves are to be blamed for their failure to leave a deeper mark in the American cultural tradition. Editors and contributors alike agree that the Canadians' lack of interest in political matters and their reluctance to organize account for their subsequent failure to maintain and preserve an original French cultural tradition. Alexandre Belisle, the historian of the Franco-American Press in the United States, wrote in 1911:

. . . notre presse aux États-Unis a un terrible ennemi, contre lequel elle doit lutter sans cesse pour maintenir ses positions au prix d'efforts incroyables et de sacrifices sans fin, et cet ennemi c'est l'indifférence ou l'apathie d'un trop grand nombre de nos compatriotes à l'égard du journal français local . . .[7]

Not very optimistic about the future of this press, Belisle added in the same page: "La disparition éventuelle de notre presse franco-américaine est dans le domaine des choses possibles." Though there still exists an active French-Canadian press in New England, the fight seems to have ended in this area.[8] It is true, nevertheless, that it was not easily won as many were those who attempted to preserve the national tongue—and with it the traditional French heritage—through the medium of a periodical press.

Alexandre Belisle held this French-Canadian press in high esteem:

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[6] St. Pierre, *Histoire, op. cit.,* 310.

[7] Alexandre Belisle, *Histoire de la Presse Franco-Canadienne aux États-Unis,* Worcester, 1911, Introduction.

[8] Edward B. Ham in an article entitled "Journalism and French Survival in New England," does not show much enthusiasm as to the future of the French-language press in New England either: "A footnote suffices to record the writer's expectation that the French language will survive on a greatly reduced scale in Maine and in New Hampshire with only scattered traces elsewhere." *New England Quarterly,* XI (March, 1938), 90.

Si l'on pouvait juger du degré de culture littéraire d'un peuple par ses journaux, on devrait convenir que les Canadiens des États-Unis se sont montrés un des plus intellectuels, car ils ont été légion les journaux de langue française qui ont germé et poussé en sol américain pendant une période de 25 à 30 ans et sont morts d'inanition après une carrière plus ou moins accidentée. . . .[9]

A similarly favorable estimate was given by the *Catholic Encyclopedia* in an article devoted to the French Catholics in America: "In fifty years, the French Canadian immigrants have built a press that is not surpassed, from the Catholic point of view, by that of any other group of immigrants in the United States."[10]

It should be said, however, that Belisle's main concern was the French-Canadian press, and in his pioneering study he emphasized the New England States at the expense of the Mississippi Valley, the Great Lakes and other areas of French or French-Canadian population. Pointing out at the difference between the French and French-Canadian publications in this country, he declared:

Il faut distinguer entre les deux presses; l'esprit et les tendances générales ne sont pas les mêmes: la presse française se donnait pour mission de rappeler aux Français expatriés le souvenir de la patrie, la belle France; et les journaux canadiens entretenaient dans le coeur de leurs lecteurs le culte et l'amour du pays natal, le Canada.[11]

This difference is already quite noticeable when one compares French and French-Canadian papers published within one area. It is far more considerable, however, when one compares the newspapers published in an area predominatly settled by French-Canadians, with those published in an area where the French element was the stronger. Thus, in his study of "Louis Richard Cortambert and the First French Newspapers in St. Louis,"[12] Professor John McDermott underlines the differences between the French-language newspapers of the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes—where the immigration was mostly from French Canada—and those of the Lower Mississippi Valley, where the native French element was predominant.

On the whole one might say that the French Canadian press in the area was too much a means to an end, that end being the preservation of the French language, and through it of the culturally-

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9 Belisle, *Histoire de la Presse,* Introduction.
10 *Catholic Encyclopedia,* VI, 275.
11 Belisle, *Histoire de la Presse,* 317.
12 The Papers of the Bibliography Society of America, XXXII (1940), 221–253.

distinct French Canadian heritage. It did not respond to a clearly defined need of the settlers themselves, but was more or less imposed upon them. The French press, on the other hand, was more an end in itself. To the French-Canadian patriots who published them, their papers were, above all, protective, defensive measures against the denationalization of their forces, and therefore essentially aimed at the French-Canadian public. The French editors, on the other hand, were more inclined to consider their papers as outlet for intellectual and cultural discussions, and extended their reading public to all those who had any desire or ability to read French. However, and quite naturally, they were not without hope that these papers would help to bind the French-speaking elements together.

Of the sixty papers which have been found so far, published in the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes area the majority of them, 33, were published in Michigan, mostly in lake-shore towns, 15 in Illinois, in or around Chicago, and the rest in Minnesota.[13]

Before discussing some of them more in detail, let us see what can be learned from the figures themselves, and make some general remarks concerning these papers. As might be expected, by reason of the considerable French-Canadian immigration during the seventies and eighties, these publications are chiefly concentrated in these two decades. While 7 only appeared before the Civil War,

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[13] For a list of the French-language newspapers published in Michigan, see Georges J. Joyaux, "French Press in Michigan: A Bibliography;" *Michigan History*, XXXVI (September, 1952), 260–278. For a list of the French-language newspapers published in Illinois, see Louis-Philippe Cormier, "La presse française de l'Illinois;" *Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique française* (Décembre, 1957), 380–392. In this well documented and excellent article, Professor Cormier focuses his attention on the first phase of the history of the French-language press in Illinois (till the 1890's), pointing out that this first period was "la belle époque" of the French press in this state. Mention should be made of a more recent publication, Eugene P. Willging and Herta Hatzfeld, *Catholic Serials of the Nineteenth Century in the United States*, Second Series, Part three, Washington, 1961, which has some pages on the Catholic press in Illinois during the XIXth century. In the section devoted to the French-language Catholic press, the authors list only eight different French newspapers although their selection includes, besides those papers which are "Catholic by purpose," others which are "Catholic by attitude," and "Catholic by national traditions." The breadth of these definitions would, it seems, justify the inclusion of almost all French-language newspapers, whether they be French-Canadian or French. Yet, the list of French-language papers given in the *Catholic Serials* falls short of the fifteen to seventeen newspapers listed in Professor Cormier's article and in this study. It should be pointed out, however, that in a few cases we have no "concrete" evidence of the existence of these newspapers.

and 20 after 1890, the bulk of these papers, 33 in all, appeared during the 25 years following the great upheaval.

Looking through the files of these newsheets, the reader is struck by one characteristic they all seem to share: in practically no case were they founded as long-range projects associated with the French-Canadian elements, or intended to serve as outlet for literary, cultural or social thought. Generally, they were founded by deeply patriotic Canadians who witnessed with great concern the slow disintegration of the French-Canadian heritage and saw in the newspaper the best means of checking Americanization—or *assimilation*, as it was then called.

It is interesting to note also that though there were some sixty papers published in all, the number of persons, owners and editors, associated with these papers is much smaller, as quite often the same man, not discouraged by a first failure, started on a new venture in the same or in a different town. Actually, only a few names stand out. Edouard N. Lacroix, for instance, started the first two successful papers in Detroit in the 1840's. The journalistic ventures of the Grandpré brothers, Alexandre and Michel, dominated the last decades of the Nineteenth century, in and around Chicago. Jean-Baptiste Paradis, after editing the paper resulting from the first Canadian Convention in New York (1865), came West and was associated with practically all the French newspapers published in Illinois and in Minnesota. The Desmeules, father and son, whose activities were chiefly centered in the twin cities, and whose last venture, *L'Echo de l'Ouest*, lasted almost half a century (1883–1929). Bachand-Vertefeuille, finally, who, at the end of the Nineteenth century integrated most of the French-language papers published in the area into a single newsheet *Le Courrier Franco-Américain*, which dominated the scene in the first decades of the Twentieth century.

The last and not least important characteristic which strikes the reader is the deep note of Canadianism running through the various issues of these papers: "The credo of the Société l'Assomption, 'Conserver notre langue, nos moeurs, et notre religion,' epitomizes the aims and characters of the French press in North America."[14] Except for a few cases where the editor was of French origin, in most cases the papers are deeply marked with strong religious feelings so characteristic of the Province of Quebec and

[14] Edward B. Ham, "Journalism and French Survival in New England," *New England Quarterly*, XI (March, 1938), 89.

so unlike the broader, more complacent attitude exhibited in French circles.

Naturally, it is not my intention to discuss all of these newspapers. First, such a task would require much more exhaustive evidence than I have at my disposal. In many cases I have been unable to locate the newspapers and when they were located, only a few issues were found to have been preserved. Second, many of these papers went through parallel adventures, and in many cases the material and intent of one of them is reproduced in many others. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to some of the most important, with the hope that our remarks concerning their scope, distribution, circulation and contents will be significant enough to warrant further studies along these lines.

The first important French-language paper in Illinois was *Le Journal de l'Illinois* (1857–1864) published by Alexandre Grandpré and Claude Petit, in Kankakee. Grandpré, born in the Province of Quebec, immigrated to Illinois in 1856, thereafter devoting his life to journalism. However, if Grandpré was the owner, Claude Petit, a Frenchman, was the editor, and *Le Journal* reflects far more his personality than that of Grandpré. As a result, the paper strikes a note quite different from the other French-Canadian papers, which explains Belisle's comment that the patriotic tone of *Le Journal* was not accentuated enough. Though the paper displayed for motto "indépendant en tout, neutre en rien," it was deeply republican and the editor did not conceal his pleasure at the results of the municipal elections in Chicago in 1858, for "la démocratie irlando-jésuitico-nègre-esclave n'avait jamais été aussi complètement battue."[15] Naturally, the paper also stood firmly against the absolutism of Napoleon III in France, and Orsini (who had just attempted to murder the French Emperor) found in the journal a staunch defender, since, as Petit pointed out, "crime calls for crime." The paper widely publicized his trial, and no doubt was left as to the editor's judgement:

> Quel est l'homme qu'on a voulu assassiner le 14 Janvier? Cet homme est lui-même l'assassin de plusieurs milliers d'hommes . . .; l'action des assassins est criminelle, mais il faut les plaindre et non les maudire. Celui qu'il faut maudire, c'est le tyran qu'ils ont voulu assassiner.[16]

Anti-clericalism, the unavoidable collateral of republicanism, was not absent from the pages of *Le Journal*. Hardly an issue was

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[15] *Le Journal de l'Illinois*, Kankakee, March 5, 1858.
[16] *Ibid.*, February 12, 1858.

published without an attack against the Jesuits: "Ils ont le diable au corps; il n'y a pas d'inventions qu'ils ne trouvent pour gagner de l'argent."[17] And the two topics, Orsini "noble vengeur de Rome égorgée," and the Jesuits, were tied up in this bitter and ferocious remarks: "Certains journaux disent qu'Orsini est jésuite; nous ne le croyons pas. Les hommes aussi braves qu'Orsini ne sont pas jésuites."[18] Another interesting item is a short discussion of the Chicago papers. We are told that out of the 9 dailies (three in German) and 10 weeklies published in the city, *Le Journal* (a weekly) has the widest circulation. Though started in Kankakee, the paper later was moved to Chicago, with agents in Kankakee and Peoria. Belles lettres were given an unusual space in the pages of *Le Journal*. Besides a regular serial from the pen of such writers as Ponson du Terrail, Albert Maurin and Pierre l'Ermite, occasionally the paper published poems by Gautièr and de Banville and literary articles reproduced from Paris newspapers.

After another journalistic venture in Watertown (Le Phare des Lacs, 1868), Grandpré returned to Illinois, and with his brother Michel launched *Le Courrier de l'Illinois* in 1868. This paper, which under different names lasted till the beginning of the Twentieth century, clearly dominates the journalistic scene of the last decades of the Nineteenth century in Illinois, particularly after 1880, when moved back to Chicago it became associated with the large French-speaking group of the great metropolis. Also this second venture was more like the other publications of the French-Canadian element in the Middle West. Its motto, "notre nationalité avant tout," well characterized the new slant given the paper by its editor Jean-Baptiste Paradis. Paradis, who had gained experience as the editor of *Le Public Canadien* (New York, 1867), was quite aware of the slow denationalization of the Canadian group, and unlike his predecessor Petit, gave free rein to his deep patriotism. He urged his readers to become American citizens as the first necessary step if they were to take part in the life of the country, and as a means of maintaining their own culture. Comparing the French Canadians to the German, he wrote:

> Amis lecteurs, pourquoi nos populations sont à la remorque des autres nationalités mêmes moins nombreuses que les notres, j'entends pour le patronage de l'administration. Vous n'êtes représentés mulle part. Pourquoi?
>
> La première chose que fait un Allemand en arrivant, c'est de prendre son premier certificat de naturalisation.

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[17] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1858.
[18] *Ibid.*, March 12, 1858.

Vous retardez le plus possible pour le faire.

Un Allemand va-t-il à la poste . . ., il veut y retrouver un des siens, et pour cela, malgré qu'il sache l'anglais, il s'y adresse toujours en allemand. Conséquence: Les chefs de bureau sont forcés d'avoir des officiers allemands.

. . . et vous, vous vous depéchez de toujours faire comprendre que vous n'avez pas besoin d'interprète.

Dans les temps d'élection, l'Allemand forme des clubs, joint ceux de son quartier et nomme les délégués aux Conventions qui nomment les candidats qui sont élus.

Que faites-vous? Rien! Ces Clubs, ces Conventions, ces élections ne vous occupent pas. Vous n'avez donc pas le droit de vous plaindre.

Ce qui est vrai pour l'Allemand est vrai pour tous. . . .[19]

This kind of statement deserves special notice as it occurs time and time again in the pages of the newspapers we examined, and, according to other students of the subject, in the pages of all the French-Canadian papers published in the United States. Still, the paper is republican, stressing more particularly the Republican stand against slavery. It should be said, in fact, that in most cases the papers published in Chicago were strongly tinted with republicanism and did not hesitate at election times to campaign actively for the candidates of the Republican Party.

Two more Chicago papers deserve special mention: *L'Amérique* (1869–1870) and *Le Figaro Illustré* (1886). With the first, published by Th. Guéroult and Samuel E. Pinta, is associated with name of Louis Fréchette, the well-known Canadian poet. Only one issue of this paper has been found; it contains an editorial favoring the XVth Amendment, a feuilleton by Elie Berthet—a French novelist unknown today but somewhat very popular in his time—and local news. According to Belisle, the paper came to an end when anti-French articles were published at the time of the Franco-Prussian war.

Samuel Pinta was no apprentice either. Coming to Chicago from New Orleans in 1858, he worked for several newspapers before launching his own French language paper, *L'Observateur* (Chicago, 1861) on its very short career. As we have been unable, thus far, to find a copy of this paper, we have to rely on Belisle who refers to it as "un journal bien rédigé et d'un haut caractère littéraire."[20]

The second paper, *Le Figaro Illustré*, was a French paper resulting, no doubt from the enthusiasm aroused by the gift of

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19 *Ibid.*, August 31, 1858.

20 Belisle, *Histoire de la Presse*, 57.

Bartholdi's Statue to America in 1886. It was a well printed and attractive publication edited by a L. R. de Sainte Foy, from Paris. The contents, varied enough and quite literary were apt to please a large range of readers and to hold their interest. Instead of the blunt statement usually prefacing other similar enterprises, the program of *Le Figaro* was explained in these words:

> It will not be a political paper properly speaking . . ., but will limit itself to relate the most important facts of European and American politics. . . .
>
> It will have no other aim than propagating the French language, to make it liked by all those who speak it, to remind it to those of our countrymen or of their descendents who are inclined to forget it, finally, to be a bridge between the French-speaking and English-speaking population, and to increase the bonds of friendship which already exist.
>
> Each issue will include: a poem; a review of current events; a Parisian chronique, especially written by a distinguished writer (Louis Mainard); a theatrical chronique; varieties, reproduced from leading Parisian newspapers; and a serial, from the pen of a Parisian novelist in fashion. Finally, to please the ladies, the paper will publish a monthly review of the latest fashions.[21]

In the few issues we have been able to locate we found poems by Victor Hugo and François Coppée, a serial by the novelist 'à la mode' Georges Pradel, and, most surprising, two full pages of illustrations in each issue. No doubt, the ambitious program along with the weekly illustrations may explain the paper's failure to last more than a month.

Just as the last quarter of the Nineteenth century had witnessed the domination of Alexandre Grandpré in the field of French journalism in Illinois, the following years were dominated by Louis Bachand-Vertefeuille, whose journalistic ventures spread over twenty years and over Illinois, Minnesota and Michigan. In view of the importance of Bachand-Vertefeuille in the history of the French-American press in this section of the country, we should devote a few pages to his journalistic career and, for a while, forget both boundaries and dates.

After a few years in New England where he had migrated from Canada, Bachand-Vertefeuille came to Chicago in 1893. Two years later he launched, on a very short career, *Le Bulletin Officiel,* about which nothing can be said as we have not been able to locate a single copy of it. Soon after, Bachand-Vertefeuille joined the

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[21] *Le Figaro Illustré*, Chicago, October 30, 1886.

staff of *Le Courrier de l'Ouest*, Grandpré's former paper, now in the hands of a private company and edited by a Philippe Masson. His next move took him to St. Paul where he became the associate of T.F.X. Beaudet, editor of *Le Canadien*.[22] The eventual acquisition of this paper by Bachand-Vertefeuille was the first step toward the realization of his life-long project, the absorption of all the French papers published in the West, and their integration into a single newsheet, published under his direction, to carry out his program:

> Maintenir et faire prévaloir aux États-Unis, et plus particulièrement dans les États du centre et de l'ouest, par l'union de toutes les bonnes volontés, sans exception, le culte de l'idéal français et catholique avec tous les glorieux souvenirs et les espérances légitimes qui s'y rattachent. . . .[23]

The next step was the acquisition of *Le Courrier de l'Ouest*, in 1903, and the fusion of these two papers into *Le Courrier-Canadien* in 1904. In 1905, this paper became *Le Courrier Franco-Américain*. Bachand-Vertefeuille also attempted to publish a daily, *Le Petit Journal de Chicago*, which he hoped, would revolutionize "notre système de communications entre nos groupes de langue française dans l'Ouest," and be "le pas de géant dans la voie d'organisation des forces vives de la nationalité canadienne française, et le plus utile engin de guerre contre les assimilateurs." This daily, however, which he felt was a necessity, was very short-lived as it did not find among the French speaking population the support it needed for so expensive an undertaking.[24]

For the next twenty years, at the helm of *Le Courrier*, Bachand-Vertefeuille fought a losing battle: The preservation of a homogenous, distinct, catholic, French-Canadian culture alongside the ceaselessly growing protestant, anglo-saxon society, and amidst the

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[22] This was not Beaudet's first journalistic venture. After leaving Canada, he first came to Michigan, settling for a while in Houghton County, in the Upper Peninsula. This area was heavily populated by French Canadians attracted by the fast-developing mine and lumber industries. In 1879 he settled definitively in Minneapolis where he was soon associated with several French papers in this town: *Le Canadien*, *Le Progres*, *l'Echo de l'Ouest*. In 1892 he began the publication of *L'Oeil*, Minneapolis, 1892–1895. Later the same year he acquired *La Voix du Lac*, Duluth, and integrated it to *L'Oeil*. In 1896, he took over *Le Canadien* (begun in 1877 by Paradis) but was soon forced to sell it to Bachand-Vertefeuille, and retire from journalism.

[23] *Le Petit Journal de Chicago*, June 22, 1903.

[24] *Le Canadien*, St. Paul, May 22, 1903. In fact, Bachand-Vertefeuille was quite enthusiastic about this new project, and he offered to duplicate his daily paper in St. Paul and in Minneapolis "si le public des villes-soeurs le désire."

general apathy of his own countrymen. From the various issues of Bachand-Vertefeuille's papers which we have been able to consult, it is possible to get an idea of some of his objectives and of the way through which he tried to carry them out. There can be very little doubt that his motives were good and that he was genuinely disturbed by the disappearance of the Canadian element as such; but it is equally clear that Bachand-Vertefeuille was not exactly qualified for the task at hand. Too engrossed with his one idea, the preservation of the French language, and all it stood for, he failed in the essential task of the journalist, namely to give his readers good and interesting reading material. To no small extent, finally, he lacked the necessary requirements for a public leader, understanding and tact.

The pages of his papers are filled with attacks, quite bitter at times, against the French-Canadians, for their refusal to join national societies, though "ils se hâtent de faire partie de sociétés américaines sous prétexte qu'elles sont bien meilleures."[25] Summing up French-Canadian strength in the great metropolis, he declared:

> Ce que nous déplorons, c'est qu'à Chicago, au beau milieu d'une population canadienne de 40,000 âmes, nous n'avons rien à montrer qu'un journal qui a toujours végété, un club demi-anglais, deux ou trois petites sociétés d'une vingtaine de membres, quelques projects dans l'air, et des églises où l'anglais est la note dominante. Ceci constitue tout notre bagage, et toutes nos richesse nationales. C'est peu . . . bien peu![26]

These figures, it is true, were challenged by a correspondent from Kankakee. Pointing out that the four Chicago parishes listed no more than 10,000 souls, he asked the editor:

> Doit-on supposer que 25 à 30,000 Canadiens sont à Chicago n'appartenant à aucune Eglise? et ne faisant aucune religion? Ce n'est pas croyable! Ne serait-il pas plus près de la vérité de dire qu'il y a chez vous de 10 à 15,000 Canadien Français? Je crois que ce serait plus honorable de dire la franche vérité et de ne pas laisser croire qu'il peut se trouver à Chicago une majorité, et une forte majorité de compatriotes qui aurait abandonné leur religion.[27]

There were no words harsh enough for the French-Canadian immigrants who, over-zealous in their attempts at assimilation, anglicized their names:

> Les trâitres! Voici des hommes auxquels Dieu a fait la grâce de les faire descendre d'une nation qui marche à la tête du monde civilisé depuis

[25] *Ibid.*, January 9, 1903.
[26] *Ibid.*, March 20, 1903.
[27] *Ibid.*, June 12, 1903.

le début de l'ère chrétienne, d'une nation qui a combattu durant tous ces siècles pour répandre dans le monde la lumière, la liberté, la justice; une nation qui est classée, même par ses ennemis, parmi les plus chevaleresques et les plus nobles, et loin de remercier Dieu, ils semblent le blâmer en rougissant de leur origine. . . .

Par une faveur plus particulière encore, ils sont nés dans le sein du peuple canadien français . . .; ils pourraient s'enorgeuillir d'être né de ce peuple . . ., mais ils veulent plutôt appartenir à cette race de charlatans, de négociants et de spéculateurs qui produit des Tweeds, des Vanderbilts et des Barnums. . . .[28]

In a later issue, carrying the picture to the extreme, the *Courrier* made this picture of John Miller, *l'assimilé*:

Le connaissez-vous? Non, tant mieux; ce n'est pas un ami à aimer, ni un camarade à fréquenter. Son historie pourtant doit être racontée, elle illustre si bien la nature du rénégat qu'est l'assimilé . . .

Son père arrive aux États-Unis vers l'âge de vingt ans . . . Il gagne de gros salaires comme menuisier et se marie avec une Canadienne qui n'a qu'un défaut, elle parle anglais du matin au soir. Alors John commence à s'assimiler.

Il envoie son fils à l'école publique ou l'on apprend l'anglais et surtout l'arithmétique, cette science qui enfante le génie. Grande honte de ce garçon qui le premier jour voit qu'il n'a pas un nom américain. Comment réparer cette injustice de la nature. Il suffit de traduire. Fallait-il entendre alors les termes de mépris dont il se servait pour désigner les Canadiens. Ame basse et ignoble, il reniait sa nationalité.

Fort de son ignorance, ayant appris l'histoire du monde dans un de ces manuels qui ne disent rien, il crut facilement qu'il n'y a jamais eu, qu'il n'y a pas et qu'il n'y aura jamais de nation aussi glorieuse que la nation américaine. Il eut la sottise, plus tard, de croire avec beaucoup d'Américains, que Dewey remporta dans la baie de Manille la plus grande victoire navale dont l'histoire fasse mention, que la guerre de Cuba fut remplie de prodiges inouis de valeur et de science militaire.

Enfin le fils renie le père qui parle un anglais pénible, et se marie avec une Américaine sous l'oeil bienveillant d'un ministre protestant quelconque. Le reniement de la nationalité entrainait le reniement de la foi.

Un jour il voit un moyen de doubler sa fortune. Il fait assurer ses marchandises arriérrées pour le double de la valeur et y met le feu. Le reniement de la foi devait entrainer le reniement de l'honnêteté. Apostat, voleur, incendiaire, John Miller va-t-il toujours être heureux?

Non, il est pincé et mis en prison!

J'aurais pu enjoliver cette histoire, j'ai voulu la raconter tout uniment, sans littérature, pour que tous suivent bien l'enchainement des reniements, pour que tous voient ou conduit naturellement l'assimilation.[29]

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[28] *Le Petit Journal de Chicago*, June 23, 1903.
[29] *Le Courrier-Canadien*, St. Paul, March 18, 1903.

These and many other similar items account for the charges of meanness hurled at Bachand-Vertefeuille from various corners of the French-speaking element in the Midwest. It is only fair to add, however, that he always took time and space to answer these charges personally. Not only was he unaware of the hopelessness of the fight he was waging, but again he did not realize the lack of tact he displayed in his handling of the problem. He even angered Paradis, whose name is synonymous with French Canadian press in this country: "Quand vous aurez fait autant de sacrifices que moi pour la cause du journalisme canadien français dans ce pays," Paradis wrote to Bachand-Vertefeuille, "vous aurez meilleure grâce à me trâiter d'apathie à cet égard."[30]

Relentlessly, Bachand-Vertefeuille castigated his readers, attacking indifferently national societies because they were too numerous; their officials for their lack of efforts and their selfishness; "les mauvais Français de France," because their behavior discredited the larger French-Canadian community; fathers and mothers alike for their failure to teach French to their children, and the latter for their departure from the closely-knit family; priests, for not using French in church; and teachers, for neglecting Canadian history and failing to awaken their charges to the greatness of Canada's glorious past. In fact, very little was left untouched and unharmed. Other French-language newspapers were not forgotten either. Thus, *La Voix du Peuple* (Minneapolis, 1900–1903) was attacked because the editors excused and justified the French parish priests' use of English in church as the only means of communication:

> Mr. Fortin, le rédacteur est anglais jusqu'au fond de l'âme, et—tout le monde le sait—canadien de nom seulement . . . Les Canadiens de Minneapolis continueront, omme par le passé, à entretenir dans leur milieu un agent de destruction au point de vue national et français. Fortin est anglais, Sulte est anglais, Desneules est imprimeur, rien de plus. . . .[31]

So was *Le Patriote* (Bay City, 1880–1904) the butt of Bachand-Vertefeuille's attacks. Commenting on the attempt to revive the paper in 1903 under the editorship of a Adelard Masson, Bachand-Vertefeuille warned that the paper was only a political sheet directed by a new Hearst, M. Washington, owner of the *Bay City Democrat Herald*. After reading the first issue of the new series, he declared:

> Nous voyons que nous n'avions pas fait fausse route; pas de programme, mais un but: sacrifier les intérêts des Canadiens de la vallée de Saguenay

30 *Ibid.*, June 17, 1904.
31 *Le Canadien*, April 21, 1903.

pour l'avancement des intérêts politiques de Washington ou quelques-uns de ses protégés.[32]

At the same time, he mocked Masson's poor French, though it should be said that Bachand-Vertefeuille's own papers were not exempt from mistakes.

On the French scene, and in keeping with the traditional Canadian suspicion of French complacent attitude toward religion, *Le Courrier,* alarmed by Emile Combes' efforts to de-christianize the country, warned France that "la politique de l'anti-cléricalisme . . . est une politique de suicide national."[33]

As Bachand-Vertefeuille became more and more disturbed by the apathy of his countrymen, his paper became more and more a collection of news items from local societies, clubs and organizations, giving, if anything, a false impression of the activities of the French-speaking element throughout the three states. The rest of the paper usually included a large amount of advertisement, no less than half of the paper, some poetry, with special emphasis on the Canadian poets, Chapman, Fréchette, Crémazie, a regular serial and among others, we found Longfellow's "Evangeline." In the later years of his life, probably tired of the hopeless struggle, Bachand-Vertefeuille seems to have withdrawn from the actual management of *Le Courrier.* The proselytizing campaign somewhat slackened, and the space given to local news was considerably reduced.

Many of Bachand-Vertefeuille's associates, both editors and regular contributors deserve more attention. Thus Georges Vekeman, under the name of Jean des Erables, contributed many an interesting article to *Le Courrier-Canadien*; among other items, his controversy over Fourierism and Socialism originated some well-written and well-documented articles. Another frequent contributor was A.E.R. a die-hard French-Canadian mainly concerned with the preservation of the French-language and of the French-Canadian cultural background. He wrote:

> Elever les enfants canadiens de manière à ce qu'ils ne parlent qu'anglais . . ., n'est-ce pas mettre le fruit sain du catholique canadien français en contact avec le fruit contaminé du rationalisme orgeuilleux, du naturalisme goguenard qu'est le vrai Américain? N'est-ce pas travailler ainsi à détruire la foi même des enfants franco-américains, en même temps que leur langue?[34]

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[32] *Le Courrier-Canadien,* February 5, 1904.
[33] *Le Canadien,* April 17, 1903.
[34] *Le Courrier-Canadien,* September 4, 1903.

And later, as a means to check the disappearance of French, he suggested: "S'il y a des ligues contre l'intempérance dans le boire, ne peut-il y en avoir contre l'intempérance à parler anglais?"[35]

Many more deserve to be mentioned, but most of all, Bachand-Vertefeuille deserves special tribute. A more detailed and complete study of his publications and of his many other undertakings, (such as the Institut Franco-Americain founded in 1905), would help to explain him better and throw some light on his life-long fight. Though for a while his papers had editions in Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul and Bay City, and though its circulation reached 2,000, it was never what Bachand-Vertefeuille meant it to be:

> . . . l'organe des diverses colonies de langue française dans l'Illinois, l'Indiana, l'Iowa, le Minnesota, le Wisconsin, le Michigan, l'Ohio, la Pennsylvanie, le Kentucky, le Missouri, L'Arkansas, le Kansas, le Colorado, Les Dakotas, le Montana, l'Oregon, le Washington et la Californie. . . .[36]

As I mentioned earlier, this paper is not and could not be exhaustive. The history of the French language press in the Midwest has been neglected too long to be summed up now in a few pages. More should be said about the other papers published in Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth (The Desmeules' domain) and about the thirty-three papers published in Michigan. I hope enough has been said, however, to show the scope of the problem and to attract other students of Franco-American relationships. If the thought that "21 French newspapers and four monthly publications are now (1938) published in New England, comes as a surprise to most New Englanders outside of Franco-American communities,"[37] the midwesterner would be equally surprised to find out that sixty French-language newspapers have been published in the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes area during the Nineteenth century, some lasting as long as thirty years, and as late as the 1920's. Belisle's pioneer work, mainly concerned as it was with the French-Canadian press and the New England states, should be completed, particularly now as the task would be made easier with the use of the microfilm.

As a conclusion, it might be interesting to hint at some of the reasons explaining the failure of the French and French-Canadians to maintain a tradition of separate culture in this area, while the

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[35] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1903.
[36] *Le Courrier Franco-Américain*, Chicago, January 6, 1905.
[37] Ham, "Journalism and French Survival in New England," *loc. cit.*, 93.

Germans and Scandinavians seem to have been more successful in preserving theirs. Commenting on this situation, Judge Frank A. Picard, of the United States District Court in Detroit, and a regular contributor to *Le Courrier du Michigan* declared:

> We have not of course been as tenacious as the Germans in holding to our language, or in teaching it in the schools, but when we look at it from the angle of patriotism and duty, I think you can draw the conclusion that the French people who have come here have realized the significance of the oath of allegiance they took. . . .[38]

It is doubtful whether such an explanation accounts for the failure of the French element to preserve its tradition and language. Other reasons must be taken into consideration. Edward B. Ham, in his study of the French survival in New England declared:

> The obstacles to the survival are fairly well-known: precedent elsewhere is lacking; reinforcing immigration from Canada has declined; the French communities are widely separated, and their leaders fail to stress the utility of knowing two languages; with their growing prosperity the French are becoming more and more apathetic to the appeal of racial pride; discussions within the French groups are many and marriages outside their own race are increasingly frequent; about all, the English language is making constant inroads on French speech habits.[39]

Not only had the direct migration from French Canada declined, but again the direct immigration from France was never significant, particularly when compared to the direct migrations from Germany and Scandinavia. The task of preserving and propagating French culture was left to the French Canadians alone, and despite their strong resistance to complete Americanization, they were eventually absorbed. As a French Canadian from North Dakota answered to Bachand-Vertefeuille's attacks on those who neglected the native tongue:

> Comment conserver la langue quand on est 12 ou 15 Canadiens noyés dans 2,500 ou 3,000 âmes? Malgré tous les efforts pour le parler en famille, je crains beaucoup qu'avec les années notre langue, dans un centre tel que le nôtre, soit englobée. . . .[40]

Equally important it seems to me is the attitude of the French immigrant. He usually came to America as an individual, a single

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[38] October 21, 1948.

[39] Ham, "Journalism and French Survival in New England," *loc. cit.*, 93.

[40] *Le Courrier Franco-Américain*, August 25, 1905.

person, or at most a family, in contrast to the mass migration of the Germans or the Scandinavians for example. Once in the newly-adopted country, the Germans tended to join in organized German settlements, or if there were none, created some of their own, each complete with a school house, a newspaper, a church and trunverein. The French immigrant, on the other hand, tended to accept his new way of life and his new neighbors, and melt into it. Ralph Leslie Rusk, explaining the failure of the early French settlers "to exert a perceptible influence on the growth of the European culture in the West," declared: "The Frenchman, always more quick to adopt himself to his environment, succombed to the charm of savage life,"[41] and was soon absorbed by it.

A third reason might be the general lack of organization characteristic of the French people as a whole, and apparently characteristic to a certain extent of the French-Canadians as well. Without the Teutonic sense of organization, the transplanted French or French-Canadian moving in different circles and in diferent milieux usually managed to disappear into the mass. The failure of the papers to create a bond among the many French elements scattered throughout the area gave the death blow to the hope, held by a few, that they might preserve and develop a unified and progressive Franco-American heritage.

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[41] Ralph Leslie Rusk, *Literature of the Middle Western Frontier*, New York, 1926, 6–7.

Book Reviews

The Liberty Line, The Legend of the Underground Railroad. By Larry Gara. University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1961. Pp. ix, 194. $5.

Professor Gara of Grove City College, Pennsylvania, writes on the second page of his work: "The legend of the underground railroad tells of the intrepid abolitionists sending multitudes of passengers over a well-organized transportation system to the Promised Land of freedom. The fugitives often were hotly pursued by cruel slave hunters, and nearly always they eluded capture because of the ingenuity and daring of the conductors. All was carried on with the utmost secrecy." The remainder of the book is almost wholly devoted to a refutation of these statements.

The legend of the underground railroad, as accepted by most Americans today, is based upon fiction and romance more than upon fact, according to Gara. It had its origins in the pre-Civil War period and was nurtured by both abolitionists and slave holders; by the abolitionists as a propaganda device directed against the South, and by slave holders as a convenient explanation for the flight of slaves. The legend, however, enjoyed its greatest growth in the decades following the War Between the States. The war brought about the freeing of the slaves. Former abolitionists, once having suffered the general disapproval of their neighbors, subsequently rushed forward to claim credit for a development which thereafter enjoyed popular sanction. In their memoirs, aging abolitionists with dimming memories and even their descendents gradually transformed isolated incidents of a small group in a given locality into an organized institution common to a whole geographic area. The evolved legend was finally best set forth in the historic works of the young Wilbur H. Siebert of Ohio State University, who first became interested in the subject in 1893. Most subsequent writings on the subject, newspaper items, magazine articles, novels, encyclopedia accounts, and historic references have been based on his "research." It is interesting to note that Professor Gara cites Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and Thomas A. Bailey as three contemporary historians who have unwittingly followed the Siebert line. This legend the author attempts to disprove.

Basing his account on scientifically provable facts alone, Doctor Gara relates quite a different story of the underground railway. According to him, only a few abolitionists assisted fugitive slaves, and these were not in agreement as to method or objectives. As a matter of fact, the fugitives relied chiefly upon their own recourses or were assisted more often by free Negroes or individual humanitarians, both northern and southern, than they were by the supposedly sectionally organized abolitionists, mostly Quakers.

The author, depending primarily on census figures, disagrees with the commonly held belief that multitudes of fugitives crossed over the line dividing the slave from the free labor states. According to him, more slaves bought their own freedom or were manumitted by their owners than fled to the North. Of those who successfully left the plantations, more remained in hiding in the South than attempted to find their way to

other sections. Gara does not accept the claims that the underground railroad was a well-organized transportation system covering the entire North and even reaching into the deep South and into Canada. He asserts that it flourished in specific localities, due primarily to the activities of certain forceful individuals, for example, Levi Coffin of Indiana and Thomas Garrett of Delaware. Many a fugitive slave made his way into the North, or across the North into Canada, without receiving any assistance from railway agents or the so-called conductors.

There were occasional instances of slave hunters, some cruel, pursuing and successfully recapturing the runaways. These occurences were frequently quite dramatic, and were colorfully reported in the northern press, both public and abolitionist. The abolitionist version has come to be generally accepted as typical and as occurring with frequency throughout all the free labor states. The author concludes that the average southern slave holder found it too costly to pursue fugitives, and that there were few actual pursuits and fewer recaptures.

The element of secrecy, which is so basically a part of the legend, is quite impressively attacked by the author. He shows that in those localities in which there was actually organized assistance given fugitive slaves, such activity was more frequently open than secret. He discounts the general impression that there were numerous clandestine way-stations, hiding places, and a system of secret signs and signals throughout the North.

It is doubtful whether Professor Gara's work, which will be of interest to historians alone, will accomplish much towards undoing a well-established legend. Like so many legends of American history, it has become a part of our folklore. In their traditional way, the people will continue to believe what they wished had happened, rather than what actually happened. It is this actuality which frequently makes the dedicated historian's work discouraging.

As an example of scientific research, *The Liberty Line* is superb. It is volumniously footnoted from such a wealth of sources that the serious reader is extremely pleased. However, one receives the impression that the writer has rushed into print and has not completely assimilated and digested his material. He has gathered a multitude of apparently substantiated facts, but they are not woven together into an easily understood whole. His continuous use of quotations, both short and long, makes reading difficult. The introductory chapter is excellent. After such an appetizer, the reader prepares himself for a full meal of equally delightful courses. However, the chapters which follow contain material which is not always clear, is repetitious, and cannot readily be related to the main theme of the book. There is, in effect, no concluding chapter or section, and the reader is left hanging in air.

This is an important subject, and the author is blazing a new trail. It is hoped that the work is a beginning and not an end. With continued research, reflection, and clearer writing it is believed that he has an excellent opportunity of helping replace a willfully created legend with true and proved historic facts.

KENNETH M. JACKSON

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Making an Inter-American Mind. By Harry Bernstein. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1961. Pp. vi, 190. $5.50.

Dr. Bernstein, who has long been writing on this subject of cultural relations between North and South Americans, considers that the scholarly and scientific minds of the hemisphere transcended such ephemeral things as wars, national and language barriers, racism, and international pressure and were interested only in the absorbing study of the phenomena of the Americas, whether the phenomena be those of anthropology, ethnology, geography, geology, biology, history, sociology, or religion. In each of these areas he points to men who fostered inter-American harmony prior to 1900. He concludes that there was developed an admirable tradition of cultural and scientific communion by individuals quite apart from governments, learned societies and other organized promotors. Thus, before the inter-American movements, an inter-American mind, "a way of mental life," was made. While the idea of the existance of such a mind seems far-fetched, it affords a convenient frame for all the findings of Dr. Bernstein on the men who shared curiosity about and mutually rejoiced in research findings about this hemisphere.

The volume is divided into five chapters. In Chapter I, "The First Steps" in making the inter-American mind were to get rid of the "Black Legend" of Spanish cruelties and anti-Spanish myths and to establish an appreciation of Spain and her culture. Next step was to appreciate Latin America, to which antipathy to Spain had been transferred. The first moves in rediscovering Spanish culture were made in New York, New England and Pennsylvania, and the movement grew apace from 1700. Cotton Mather wanted to spread Puritanism to the Catholic colonies of the south and Puritan Samuel Sewall yearned to establish a New Jerusalem in Mexico, obviously attempts at Puritanizing the mind of the hemisphere. Then libraries began to gather books on Spain and Spanish America, and personal ties between men and societies of Spain, North America and Latin America were made. All these are described. The second chapter is about the book trade, the publishers and publications in Spanish for South Americans, and in English for North Americans, all in detailed treatment. The following chapter on "American Earth Sciences" tells of the development of scientific thought, scientist by scientist and book by book. The fourth chapter takes up men, institutions and societies engaged in "The Study of Man" in America, and the last chapter is on the historians whose efforts aroused interest in Latin America and revealed fields of research to North Americans. Throughout the book the author points to the values of the cultural exchanges between individuals and learned societies and presents several imposing lists of the same.

The book is in attractive format and has a rather brief index. It will be handy for students of inter-American relations and will be helpful to researchers. There are a few flaws which may be noted by anybody, and there is one strange omission, that of a word on Dom Pedro II, "The Emperor Scientist" of Brasil.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

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Historia de la Provincia de la Compañía de Jesús de Nueva España. Por Francisco Javier Alegre, S.J., Nueva edición por Ernest J. Burrus, S.J., y Félix Zubillaga, S.J., Tomo I, 1956, Tomo II, 1958, Tomo III, 1959, Tomo IV, 1960. Institutum Historicum Societatis Jesu, Via dei Penitenzieri, 20, Roma. $24.

The appearance of the last volume of this new edition of Alegre's work marks the completion of an enormous task undertaken by the Jesuit historians, Fathers Burrus and Zubillaga. With this definitive edition a long felt need is satisfied. Alegre was probably the most accurate and objective historian of New Spain and has been cited as an authority for over a hundred years. Though primarily a chronicler of the deeds of the Jesuits he brought in secular and ecclesiastical persons and events, using primary sources and often eyewitness accounts of the land and the people. The general introduction in the first volume describes Alegre, his high rank as an historian, his manuscript *Historia,* and the earlier published edition. Alegre was American born, in Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1729. He was among the hundreds of Jesuits imprisoned and exiled from Mexico in 1767. In Bologna, his place of exile, he completed his *Historia* by 1771, and during this time and after the papal suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 he enjoyed great prestige there in educational and literary work until his death in 1788.

The only known manuscript of the *Historia* is in the Icazbalceta Collection in the library of the University of Texas, Austin. This was used by Bustamente for the edition published in Mexico from 1842 to 1844, and is now used for the new edition. Happily all the deficiences and errors of the Bustamente edition are removed and the poor printing is supplanted by an excellent format. Not only is the text of the manuscript presented accurately but it is elaborated in footnotes which amplify the text and direct the reader to documents and to pertinent scholarly articles and books that have appeared since the earlier edition. Moreover, numerous documents pertaining to the *Historia* are published in the appendices, which add great value to the volumes, while throughout the more than 2,700 pages are scattered suitable maps, charts, lists, illustrations and facsimiles, all of great help. By painstaking research and checking in the archives the editors have made their edition truly a treasury for historians. Most noteworthy fringe benefits are the analytical indexes to each volume and the bibliographies. All in all the edition is an exceptional and highly praiseworthy achievement and will be a solid addition to any library shelf.

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Notes and Comments

The History of Modern Culture, by Maurice Parmelee, Ph.D., published by Philosophical Library, New York, 1960, in no less than 1295 pages, and selling for $10, is a subversive book, subversive of all American ideals and traditions. Dr. Parmelee, born in Constantinople in 1882, educated finally at Yale and Columbia, held teaching posts in various universities and positions in our government. He retired in 1952, but now brings forth in a volume a summary of his writings, theories, preachments, illogical fixations, and absurdities, all propounded with supreme egotistical assurance. The book seems to reveal the anti-American mind of a man who has thrived unto and old age in this land of the free. Since we have wasted time reading the dull, repetitious pages, we note the book in the hope of sparing somebody the similar ordeal. We recommend it to nobody—except, heartily to the Committee on un-American Activities.

Briefly, Parmelee calls for the elimination of capitalism, of all organized religions and religious beliefs, of nationalism and imperialism, of all racial barriers, and of all subdivisions of the same, as money, ethics, corporations, etc. He advocates collectivism, communism, atheism, a world-wide classless society, "the universal acceptance of man as one animal species," a world federation with a congress of representatives from over the globe, free and unhampered love and sex relations, gymnosophy, and "amatoriums."

Russia and Red China are to Parmelee "great countries" but not communistic enough—they still use money and have leaders (p. 1244). Earlier, (p. 704) for similar criticism he apologizes: "The preceding criticisms of Soviet planning are in no sense intended as disparagement of the genuine and very great achievements of the bolshevists." These are samples of the numerous pages that indicate Parmelee's liking for the communist system and his hatred of the capitalistic system. The United States gets little but criticism. Samples: "The two principal parties—the Republican and the Democrat—form one monolithic capitalist party, quite as dominant as the communist party in the Soviet Union . . . there is a capitalist party dictatorship in the United States. . . ." (etc. p. 607). The United States is made out to be a capitalist "slavocracy" wherein a "slave morality is imposed upon the servile class by any and every means at the disposal of the masters. . . . Under capi-

talism the cardinal virtues of the slave morality are to work hard and long, to be punctual, and to be thrifty. It is not surprising that Benjamin Franklin has become a paragon of virtue. Some of his adages were. 'Time is money;' 'Credit is money;' 'Money begets money.' Similar utterances in praise of thrift by other American worthies reflect the pecuniary idiology of capitalism." The "worthies" are quoted in a footnote, thus: "Economy makes happy homes and sound nations. Instill it deep." (George Washington.) "Save and teach all you are interested in to save; thus pave the way for moral and material success." (Thomas Jefferson.) Save your money and thrive, or pay the price in poverty and disgrace." (Andrew Jackson.) "Teach economy. That is one of the first and highest virtues. It begins with saving money." (Abraham Lincoln.)

Besides these "worthies" there are six other Americans mentioned in the whole book: Calvin Coolidge on the subject of advertising; Grant as a general who became president; Admiral A. T. Mahan as a chauvinist; Woodrow Wilson for his pronouncement on self-determination; Harry S. Truman first as a falsifier (p. 586), and next coupled with Eisenhower as follows: Truman "recognized the misery which is widespread in the world.... But he failed to recognize that this misery is due mainly to the predatory economic system which he represented and to the destructive and murderous warfare which he and his complotters incite and instigate. The same is even more true of his successor, General Dwight D. Eisenhower." (p. 936).

For his authorities Parmelee cites a few authors of note, a number of those who agree with him, and a sufficient number of communists with whom he agrees. But his most important authority is himself. In the index there are 156 page references under Parmelee, M.

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The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America, by Charles O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, was published in March, 1961, by The Macmillan Co., New York. This general survey by two prominent observers is stimulating, in the sense that one may quarrel with many of the statements of Congressman Porter and Professor Alexander and may take issue with the general conclusion that Latin America is ready for political democracy, namely, free elections and constitutional guarantees of civil rights for all. Although Latin America is prepared for popular rule there are

forces working against democracy in its North American meaning, hence the struggle between democracy and tyranny continues. The co-authors consider the forces that have ripened democratic thought: vast social and economic changes over the past fifty years, the rise of an urban, agricultural and commercial middle class, the development of political parties, progressivism, the growth of trade unions, the intellectuals, and even the aid of the Church in social, educational and economic betterment. However adversaries of democratic progress still exist: rural landlords, urban commercial interests, militarists, ambitious politicians, totalitarian parties, communists, fascists, widespread illiteracy, and ignorance of democracy's benefits. Six chapters are devoted to concrete examples of democratic advances under the general heading, "Some Recent Democratic Victories." The final chapter answers the question: What has the United States done in the struggle for Latin American democracy and what it should do in this time of great hemispheric crisis. The book in 215 pages is without footnotes or bibliography but has a suitable index. The list price is $4.50.

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The People of Ecuador, A Demographic Analysis, by J. V. D. Saunders, is Number 14 of the Latin American Monograph Series sponsored by the School of Inter-American Studies of the University of Florida and published this year by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. This is a very helpful analysis of the available vital statistics concerning the people of Ecuador. It is paper covered and its 61 pages contain numerous maps, charts, tables and graphs. Mr. Saunders uses the first and only census taken in Ecuador during the century and a quarter of its national existence, that of 1950, as a basis for his study of the population status, the residential, age, race, and sex data, the marital and educational status, and the birth and death rates. He handles his statistics cautiously, with commendable distinctions and with an awareness of the absence of complete data and comparative tables.

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The Virgin's Children, Life in an Aztec Village Today, by William Madsen, was published in 1960 by the University of Texas Press and listed at $4.50. It is an anthropological study of the 800 people in the village of San Francisco Tecospa not

far south of Mexico City. Dr. Madsen chose the place because the Nahuatl tongue is still used by natives who have escaped the trappings of modern civilization. There in primitive surroundings he made his observations and now reports on the habits of the people, their customs, religious beliefs, witchery, superstitions, diseases, medications, games, processions, fiestas, legends, and everything interesting to anthropologists. He writes sympathetically as a friend of the people and in an entertaining style completing his work in fourteen illuminating chapters. There are over eighty fine photographs and sketches illustrating the 246 pages of the book and the pencil sketches by a ten year old boy give his interpretation of Aztec activities. Since the Indians are baptized though poorly instructed Roman Catholics and now have pagan beliefs and rites, they have developed according to Dr. Madsen (p. 33) a new culture. The conclusion, however, may be disputed along theological lines, and it seems that the Catholic reader is again confronted with the ancient question of missionaries in many lands from St. Paul to date (and the question of many modern tourists): When are native rites contrary to Catholic dogma and when are they harmless tribal customs?

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Frequently enough authors of historical books regret that they have overlooked research articles in periodicals, though they feel excused because of the large output of local and regional history and the unavailability of a suitable bibliography. To fill the need Oscar Osburn Winther has produced *A Classified Bibliography of the Periodical Literature of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1811–1957,* and Indiana University Press, Bloomington, published it this past September 15. As was intended it will prove a very helpful guide for students, teachers, and researchers interested in the vast West. including Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. The previous *Guide* to the literature of the West published in 1942 listed 3,501 items from 1811 to 1937. The present work includes those items and adds 5,723 published from 1938 through 1957. The articles are classified according to States, regions, major topics and sub-topics, and catagories, and there are cross-references. A list of authors and the entry number of their articles completes the 626 pages of the volume. Professor Winther and his associates have done themselves proud and deserve the gratitude of many who will use the bibliography. The book in attractive paper cover is listed at a reasonable $6.

Puerto Rican Politics and The New Deal, by Thomas Mathews, was published toward the end of last year by the University of Florida Press. It has been some years since a book on insular affairs has come to hand as heavily weighted with authority as this one on Puerto Rico. Dr. Mathews has spent many years in Puerto Rico as an instructor and director in social sciences in the University and has long been a student and observer in countries of the Caribbean. Familiar though he is with the political affairs he employs an enormous amount of documentation for his story, manuscripts, printed sources, scholarly studies, newspapers, and magazines. Footnotes in one chapter run to 269 and in another to 229. Yet the story of the great political changes in Puerto Rico beginning with 1932 is engagingly told and well organized. It is certainly difficult to unravel the skein of politics in the New Deal era and more so to ferret out what went on underground and aboveground in the complex Puerto Rican political scene, but in doing so and in correlating the two Dr. Mathews must be credited with a more than ordinary achievement. The history and economy of the island, its sociological and religious aspects are interwoven in the narrative. The book will prove an asset. It is in 245 pages, including the bibliography and index, and is listed at $8.00.

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INDEXER'S NOTE

Names of the contributors are in small capitals; titles of articles in this volume are in quotation marks; titles of books and periodicals reviewed or mentioned are in italics. Book reviews are entered under author and title of book, and under the name of the reviewer; no entries are made for subject of the book except in the case of biographies. The following abbreviations are used: tr., translator; ed., editor; revs., reviews; revd., reviewed.