


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THE MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES

A History of American Land Forces from
Colonial Times until June 1, 1915

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

Author of "Military Studies," etc.; founder of the Army
League of the United States, member of the
Military Service Institution, etc.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, M. H.

FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

Truth is the highest thing that man may keep.
Chaucer, The Frankeleines Tale, 11789.

Sooner or later the truth comes to light.
Dutch Proverb.

New York
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1916

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
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v. c.
To
The Memory of
MY BELOVED MOTHER

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Upon the author's return from Europe at the end of November, 1914, after an absence of two and a half months spent in France, England, Holland and Germany, he was gratified to see an awakening of the interest of the American public in the necessity for adequate national defence, which he had been striving for nearly nine years to arouse. This interest, stimulated by the war which has involved a large part of the civilized world, gave such unmistakable evidences of being more than superficial, and so numerous and earnest were the inquiries which he received from all over the United States during the month of December, 1914, as to the condition of our land forces and what ought to be done to strengthen them, that he resolved, during January, 1915, to set forth the facts concerning the military policy pursued by the United States since Revolutionary times. It had at last become apparent that there existed a need for a military history of the United States which gave the unvarnished truth, doubly so since our historians have painted in glowing colours the successes of our former wars but have suppressed with studied care the blunders which have characterised our military policy throughout the past.

Heretofore, the nearest approach to such a history was *The Military Policy of the United States* by Brevet Major General Emory Upton, United States Army, one of the most masterful works of its sort in any language. General Upton's book only covers the period from 1775 to the end of 1862, is much too technical for the average reader and, moreover, is not available to the general public. The author has taken Upton as his model — exactly as he did in a number of articles on the subject of national defence written during the

past nine years *— and in the present work he has embodied, either in whole or in part, nearly all of the most important paragraphs of that *magnum opus*. He has, on the other hand, corrected a number of errors discovered in Upton and has incorporated much important matter pertaining to the period from 1775 until the close of 1862 which had completely escaped that writer. The data from the first of January, 1863, down to the present day have been collected from a multiplicity of sources and have never before been embodied in a single work. Furthermore, the opposing forces and losses in the principal battles from the beginning of the Revolution to the end of the Philippine War have been compiled with great care from the most authoritative statistics

* Of these articles by the author of the present work the most important were:

(1) *Is the United States Prepared for War?* Part I constituted the leading article in the *North American Review* for February, 1906. Part II appeared in the *North American Review* for March, 1906. The entire article was re-published in pamphlet form by the North American Review Company in May, 1907, accompanied by an introduction by the Honorable William H. Taft, Secretary of War, and by reviews from the *Army and Navy Register* of March 24, 1906, and from the *Infantry Journal* for April, 1906.

(2) *The Truth Concerning the United States Army*, which was published in the newspapers affiliated with the United Press Associations on January 14, 1911, *et seq.* This article formed the subject of debate in the House of Representatives on January 17, 1911 (*vide* the Congressional Record for Tuesday, January 17, 1911, vol. 46, No. 26, Sixty-first Congress, third session, pp. 1047-1050), and also appeared in the Congressional Record for March 3, 1911, vol. 26, No. 70, pp. 4228 and 4229. It was re-published in the *Infantry Journal* for May-June, 1911, pp. 848-863, accompanied by authorities for every statement of fact in the text and by a note by the Editor. It was reprinted in pamphlet form, Washington, June, 1911.

(3) *The Army Unprepared for War*, an article specially prepared for, and published in, *The New York Times* for Sunday, February 19, 1911, and other newspapers affiliated with the Publishers' Press. It was re-published, under the title of *The United States Army and Organized Militia To-day*, in the *Infantry Journal* for July-August, 1911, pp. 43-60, accompanied by authorities for every statement of fact in the text and by a note by the Editor. This article was reprinted in pamphlet form, Washington, August, 1911.

(4) *The Lessons of Our Past Wars*, an article, with illustrations and a map, which was published in *The World's Work* for February, 1915, pp. 392-416.

and have been inserted in the footnotes as a useful reference.

In the present history there is scarcely a statement of material fact in the text for which the authorities are not given in the footnotes. Since nothing is more irksome to the average reader than to be confronted at the bottom of every page by a long array of citations, most of these footnotes have been relegated to appendices at the back of the book and subdivided according to the chapters to which they refer. The authorities thus quoted, although necessarily explanatory and supplemental, contain almost as much information as the text itself. The author therefore ventures to suggest that the reader, who is genuinely interested in the subject, should, upon finishing a chapter, turn to the footnotes under that heading and glance through them, even if he does not care to examine them in detail.

This book has been written under high pressure — only five months having elapsed from the beginning to its completion. The author has, however, personally verified every single reference cited — an amount of labour so herculean that it can scarcely be appreciated by any one who has not attempted a similar work. All italics and capitals have been inserted by the present author, unless otherwise specifically stated. In many instances the narrative has been submitted to officials and officers who have played important rôles in the events described. By this precaution much valuable information was gained which could not be gleaned from official documents, and the side-lights of history have been thrown upon occurrences by those who, having been most intimately connected with them, were best qualified to interpret their true significance. It is a source of gratification to be able to record that in no case was any desire encountered to do more than to illustrate and explain the facts which had previously, although at times somewhat hazily, been set forth in official documents.

The final chapter, which treats of the land forces of the United States as they ought to be organized, was submitted,

by kind permission of the Chief of Staff, to the Army War College, as the author's purpose was to prevent the views therein expressed from being too greatly at variance with the scheme of organization now in the process of formulation by the War Department. Although the number of corrections made in that chapter was gratifyingly few, the author desires to state emphatically that he alone assumes entire responsibility for the suggestions made and that, under no circumstances, must they be taken to represent — save in the most general way possible — the views of the War Department, the Army War College or the General Staff.

If the author's strictures upon the militia appear to be unduly severe, it must be distinctly borne in mind that he has considered that force purely in the light of a military asset and has endeavoured to ascribe the proper value to it as such. He yields to no one in his appreciation of the high motives which have actuated the militia and volunteers in our past history. The sacrifices that they have made of business and family interests for the purpose of serving their country, and the unrivalled personal courage which they have shown, with few exceptions, cannot be too greatly commended. If, therefore, they have fallen short of the requisite standard that the United States has a *right* to demand of the troops to which it entrusts its national destinies, the blame must not be laid at the door of these patriotic men individually. The fault lies in the fact that they have always been, and still are, the victims of a most pernicious system, and it is against that system that the author's comments are directed.

The author desires to express his thanks and appreciation to the following officials and officers who have been extremely kind in rendering him valuable assistance in the preparation of this arduous work, namely, the Honorable Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War; the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, late Secretary of War; Brigadier General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, and his assistant, Captain Powell Clayton; Lieutenant-General Nelson A. Miles,

M. H.,* formerly commanding the Army; Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb, President of the Army War College; Brigadier General Erasmus M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, and his assistant, Colonel Richmond P. Davis; Brigadier General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, and his assistant, Colonel Edwin B. Babbitt; Brigadier General Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General; Brigadier General Albert L. Mills, M. H., Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs; Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Johnston, Major Charles Crawford and Captain William Mitchell of the General Staff; and to Mr. Graham H. Powell of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification.

The author's heartiest thanks are due in particular to Major General Leonard Wood, M. H.,* former Chief of Staff, not only for the introduction to this work, but for his never-failing kindness and assistance in innumerable other ways; to Brigadier General Henry C. McCain, The Adjutant-General of the Army, and his assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Wright, who furnished an immense amount of material from the records of The Adjutant-General's Office, without which this history could not have been accurately written; to Lieutenant-General John C. Bates, retired, former Chief of Staff, and the author's uncle, Major General Henry Shippen Huidekoper, M. H., the ranking retired officer of the National Guard of Pennsylvania, both of whom supplied important suggestions about the campaign of Gettysburg. To Major General Joseph P. Sanger, retired, former Inspector General of the Army, the author is quite unable to express the full measure of his appreciation for the invaluable corrections and suggestions in the narrative of the Spanish-American War and its lessons. To Colonel Henry A. du Pont, M. H., the senior Senator from Delaware and former Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, the author is extremely grateful for important material relating to recent military legisla-

* Medal of Honor — the American Victoria Cross.

tion in Congress. To the Honorable Chandler P. Anderson, Special Counsellor of the Department of State, and to Mr. Julian Kennedy of Pittsburgh, the author is indebted for authoritative information in respect to the manufacture of war *matériel* in case the United States were cut off from certain imports. To Major John R. M. Taylor, retired, the Librarian of the Army War College, and his assistant, Miss Nannie C. Barndollar, the author returns his heartiest thanks for their prompt responses to his frequent requests for important works from that library. To the law firms of Wilson, Huidekoper and Lesh, and Clephane and Clephane, the author is likewise greatly beholden for the use of their law libraries, as well as to Mr. John T. Loomis of W. H. Lowdermilk and Company for the loan of certain rare books treating of American military history. Last, but not least, the author desires to express to his secretary, William O. Davis, his appreciation of the valuable services rendered in the preparation of this difficult manuscript.

If the information contained in this work shall assist to arouse the American people to a realization of the necessity for adequate national defence and shall contribute to bring about the proper strength and organization of the land forces of the United States, the author will consider that he has been amply rewarded for the many arduous hours devoted to this labour of love.

F. L. H.

1614 Eighteenth Street,
Washington, D. C.,
June 9th, 1915.

INTRODUCTION

In 1907 Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War, said in speaking of a work of Mr. Frederic L. Huidekoper, entitled *Is the United States Prepared for War?* — that every American who has the defense of his country at heart ought to read Mr. Huidekoper's article. Every one who has read this condensed and able statement can have but one opinion as to its value.

Mr. Huidekoper has just completed a most admirable work dealing with our military history and policy from the beginning of our national history up to the present day. It follows the general lines of that able presentation of these subjects by General Emory Upton in his great work — *The Military Policy of the United States*. Mr. Huidekoper has endeavored to present these subjects in a rather more condensed form with reference to certain portions of our history, and has greatly amplified them in others through the addition of much new and valuable material. That portion covering the period from the end of the Civil War to the present time is especially valuable, as it embodies a compilation of data not heretofore presented. The references are well arranged, and are in great detail, and the whole work is characterised by good arrangement. This work of Mr. Huidekoper's is one which should be read, and carefully read, by all Americans who are interested in the military history and policy of their country, and who desire to replace our past haphazard policy by one which will be adequate to secure a reasonable degree of preparedness without in any way building up a condition of militarism. Mr. Huidekoper presents with such effectiveness the folly of our past policy and its great and unnecessary expense in life and treasure,

that one who reads with an average degree of intelligence cannot escape the conviction that a continuance of the policy of unpreparedness, blindly trusting to chance, which has characterised and dominated our military policy in the past, and a continuance of the methods employed in raising and maintaining armies, can have but one end — national disaster. Our people have forgotten, in the rush and turmoil incident to the development of the national resources and the industries of our great country, the unnecessary cost both in blood and treasure of our past wars, and remember only that somehow or other we emerged from them successfully. Ignorance concerning our military history is universal and profound. Our school histories, whatever their intent, do not give a correct impression of our military history, and say little or nothing about the methods employed in the building up and maintenance of our armies in peace and war. Our children are taught nothing about the dangers of trusting to voluntary service in war, and are told little about the most pernicious of all systems — the bounty system, with its attendant demoralization, desertions and resulting degradation of the individual sense of responsibility for military service. If there is anything which is brought out with special emphasis in connection with modern war it is the necessity of thorough preparation — of a preparation which in its scope recognizes the necessity for the organization of the resources of the nation, in men, money and material, not with a view to having them always ready as a standing army, but with a view to having them ready so that they may become immediately available in case of war, and prepared so that each element of the fighting machine may be well balanced and ready to discharge its particular function. The organization of the military resources of a nation to-day involves the training of practically the entire male population, through systems of varying intensity and thoroughness, all having as an object the establishment of such a state of training and organization as will render it possible to apply the full mili-

tary strength of the nation in the minimum time. This may be accomplished under the systems employed by Switzerland and Australia, which I believe are best adapted for our purposes and most in accord with our ideals, or under such a system as that employed by France, where in addition to being ready it is necessary to maintain actually in service a very considerable army. However preparedness is to be brought about, it must be done in time of peace. Not only does this apply to the training of men, but it applies with equal force to the preparation of material, for the weapons of to-day are infinitely more complicated than those of our fathers. The time necessary to instruct in their use is much greater, and improvements in transportation have enormously reduced the period of an enemy's approach, so that everything now is in the favor, to an extent never before known, of the prepared nation, and the unprepared, unready, pacific country has less chance of successful resistance than ever before. The words of John Adams in his second message—"An efficient preparation for war can alone secure peace"—may well be heeded by the people of to-day, and those who have their country's safety at heart may take unto themselves with profit the words of Lord Roberts and make the sentiment they express their own—"Strive to stir up, to foster and develop, the manly and patriotic spirit in the nation—the spirit which will induce our youth to realise that they must be not only ready but prepared to guard the heritage handed down to them."

Any one who reads Mr. Huidekoper's book will, I am sure, realize the necessity of following this advice.

Our people must remember that there is nothing in the experience of the past or in the conditions of to-day which in any way justifies the assumption that wars are past. While we should strive for world peace and endeavor to settle our international difficulties by arbitration, we cannot, unless we are unworthy of the trust handed down to us, fail to make adequate preparation to defend our heritage. We must not

forget that there is many a peace which is worse than war. We have never yet waged war single-handed with a first class nation prepared for war. Our people know nothing of what such a struggle means; they have no conception of the effect of the application of well organized and thoroughly prepared military force. A careful perusal of Mr. Huidekoper's work will aid them in reaching sound conclusions as to our needs in the way of military preparedness, and give them many valuable suggestions as to the methods to be adopted to meet them.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be "Woodrow Wilson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "W".

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THE MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL PERIOD

IN *The Seven Seas*, by Rudyard Kipling, there is a poem entitled "An American," which contains the following stanza :

"Enslaved, illogical, elate,
He greets th' embarrassed Gods, nor fears
To shake the iron hand of Fate
Or match with Destiny for beers."

These lines, unconsciously perhaps, describe to perfection the nonchalant attitude of the average American toward the United States Army and anything pertaining to the military service. The fruit of this indifference, which has persisted from the beginning of our national career until to-day — with the exception of a spasmodic interest manifested during threatened or actual war — has been reaped in the most short-sighted, blundering military policy ever pursued in modern times by a great nation of supposedly intelligent people. As a matter of fact, there has existed no real military policy in this country, in the sense of the term as understood elsewhere, and, as a result, the United States was prevented by its weakness from attaining the front rank among the Powers of the world until the autumn of 1898. Even to-day, our international influence is largely due to causes other than our own strength — causes such as the existing alliances between the leading nations which confer upon the United

States an extraordinary position by giving it control of the balance of power, thus investing it with an importance in world politics all out of proportion to the rôle to which it would otherwise be entitled. These facts the ordinary American in nowise realizes, and his ignorance is not in the least surprising. As a child he is taught from school-books, the authors of which have extolled to the skies the prowess of our "citizen-soldiery" and have painted in glowing colours the brilliancy of American military successes, while they have glossed over or suppressed with studied care the blunders and fearful cost in life and money which have characterised our past wars. As a man, his chief sources of information have been the press and the utterances of men in public life and so-called orators, all feeding him to the point of surfeit with intellectual *pabulum* on the subject of American invincibility. It is only natural that he has accepted these statements as absolutely true — or at least as well-founded in view of the fact that our wars have all been brought to a victorious issue — and that he has gone on slumbering under a false security in the belief that a system which has been successful in the past must necessarily prevail in the future.

Only those who have delved deep into the subject of our military history and who have studied the question of a military policy — a question so vital to our very national existence — know the truth; the public as a whole has been grossly misinformed and therefore indifferent all these years to our military needs. Our interest has at last been quickened by the gigantic war which has involved nearly half the world, and no man in his senses would now venture to argue that Great Britain and France with a few thousand Regular troops, supplemented by a force of "citizen-soldiery" however large, could have withstood the onslaught of the mighty German army and driven it back from the very gates of Paris as they have done. Every one realizes that their huge standing armies were taxed to the very utmost and that, had

they depended upon anything except Regular troops trained to the highest possible standard, they would have been hopelessly crushed at the start, so that all their volunteers — who require six months of training to render them fit for service in the field — would have availed them nothing. Yet our military organization since the beginning of the Revolution has been moulded upon just such specious arguments as that of placing but small dependence upon our Regular army and of entrusting our destinies in time of war to an untrained “citizenry.” And, what is more, those arguments still persist.¹

It may, therefore, not be amiss to examine briefly our military history in the past, taking care, as one of the greatest of American military writers, General Upton, has warned us,²

“to bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The latter are responsible for the creation and organization of our resources, and, as in the case of the President, may further be responsible for their management or mismanagement. Soldiers, while they should suggest and be consulted on all the details of organization under our system, can alone be held responsible for the control and direction of our armies in the field.”

In order to have an intelligent understanding of the method employed during the Revolution with respect to the fighting men, it must be recollected that the American Colonies possessed no Regular military force; that was supplied by England. Each colony had a force of militia of distinctly uncertain value as a military asset. It contained, however, an admirable nucleus in the shape of some excellent officers and men who had received a thorough schooling in the French and Indian wars. Many of these had participated in such important Colonial operations as the siege of Louisbourg in 1745, the struggle between the French and English for the valley of the Ohio from 1749 to 1758, and in the fighting along the Canadian border. In spite of their

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repugnance to discipline, they were first-class soldiers, but the majority of the Colonial militia by no means attained such a standard, irrespective of the fact that the frontier conditions of the time developed men who were good shots and unusually self-reliant, for Indian warfare demanded men of special training, exceptional hardiness and extraordinary qualifications.³ The siege of Louisbourg was one of the most astounding feats in the annals of war, excelled perhaps only by Cæsar's capture of Alesia, the more so since one of the mightiest fortifications ever erected capitulated after only six weeks of siege to a motley band of New England farmers and fishermen led by a lumber merchant. The moral effect of this extraordinary achievement on the part of the American colonists was infinitely more far-reaching than at first blush would appear. Of the men who fought at Bunker Hill, many had been at Louisbourg and, when they saw the mud walls that General Gage had erected on Boston Neck and compared them to the mighty ramparts of the French fortress which they had so gallantly captured, they laughed them to scorn. The annihilation of General Braddock's regulars at Fort Duquesne was, in reality, a blessing in disguise for the colonists, inasmuch as it shook the prevalent belief in the invincibility of British troops, bred in them a contempt — by no means wholly warranted — for the European method of fighting in close formation, and compelled them to rely entirely upon their own power of fighting instead of trusting supinely to the protecting *ægis* of England, as they otherwise would unquestionably have done. Indeed, too much stress cannot be laid upon the influence of these factors in strengthening the *morale* of the American colonists and in confirming them in the belief that they could make a successful opposition to the regulars of Great Britain.⁴

These facts and the absence of a permanent force of Regular troops left the revolting colonies no alternative except to have recourse to such militia as they already possessed,


supplemented by whatever recruits presented themselves. The beginning of the Revolutionary War thus inaugurated the system of depending largely upon raw untrained troops, for the very good reason that none others were available, except in paltry numbers.

As early as 1745 there existed in England a suspicion — and in some cases a conviction — that the American colonies were aspiring to independence.⁵ The development of this desire for separation from the mother-country need not be traced here. Suffice to say that, in 1774, several of the colonies began preparations for an armed conflict. The First Continental Congress, proposed the year before by Benjamin Franklin, convened at Philadelphia on September 5th, drew up “The Declaration of Rights,” concluded “The Association,” an agreement to refrain from all trade with England until the various objectionable Royal acts had been repealed,⁶ prepared addresses “to the People of Great Britain” and “to the Inhabitants of Canada,” and ended by issuing “The Petition to the King,” in which it rejected all allegiance to Parliament, but expressed its willingness to accept him as the general head of the British Empire, and implored him to protect them from the usurpations of Parliament and the Ministry. On October 26th, it adjourned after passing a resolution to meet in 1775 if the justice sought had not been granted.⁷ On that same day, the Colonial Assembly of Massachusetts, which had been dissolved by the Governor on September 28th, met, voted themselves a Provincial Congress, adopted a scheme for the militia, appointed several general officers, as well as a Committee of Safety to organize the militia, commission the officers and direct their operations in the field, and a Committee of Supplies to procure arms and ammunition.⁸


In 1775 the Committee of Safety appointed by the Second Provincial Congress was composed of eleven members, with authority to raise and support such a military force as was deemed necessary to resist the executions of the Acts of

6 *Military Unpreparedness of the United States*

Parliament. In compliance with the powers so conferred, the committee proceeded to organize companies and regiments throughout the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and one-third of the militia, classed as "minute men," agreed to hold themselves in readiness to respond at a minute's notice.⁹ These crude preparations were interrupted by the engagements at Concord and Lexington, which ushered in the American Revolution.



THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.



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CHAPTER II

THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

ON April 19, 1775, 800 British, sent to destroy the stores at Concord, Mass., were fired upon by some provincials at Lexington, but succeeded in carrying out their mission. A fight at the bridge at Concord ensued, ending in the retreat of the British which developed into a rout, but at Lexington some semblance of order was restored by Lord Percy, who had hurried up with re-enforcements. The British then fell back twenty miles to Boston, their retreat much hampered by the increasing number of Colonial minute-men. The latter lost but 93 men, whereas their adversaries counted 273 men out of action.¹

Three days later, April 22nd, the initial step was taken to organize a combined defence against England, when the Massachusetts Assembly passed a unanimous resolution that a force of 30,000 men was needed for the defence of that colony, and decided that 13,000 men should be raised at once, trusting that the remainder would be furnished by the other New England colonies.² The organization of these hasty levies was accomplished by giving a captain's commission to any one enrolling a company of fifty-nine men and a colonel's commission for a regiment composed of ten such companies. This system, which made the ability to raise men the sole qualification for command, is emphasized for the reason that it has persisted until recent times, and was invariably employed at the beginning of all our wars down to the War of the Rebellion.³

The engagement at Concord and Lexington was the signal for the assembling near Boston of the militia and minute-men of all the New England colonies, and on June 17th these

half-organized troops under General Artemas Ward fought the battle of Bunker Hill, under a common commander whom they recognized by common courtesy only. Three assaults were made on the breastworks and redoubt held by the colonists,⁴ resulting in a loss to the British of 89 officers and 965 men, a total in killed and wounded nearly 50 per cent. greater than in any subsequent action of the war. The American casualties were confined to 449 in all, and occurred, for the major part, during the retreat across Charlestown Neck after their ammunition had given out.⁵

The gallantry of defence was due to the fact that the entrenchments were constructed under the supervision of, and the American troops commanded by, veteran officers in whom the men had the utmost confidence. It rendered Gage's victory so costly and proved such a surprise that the British were reduced to the defensive for nearly a year.⁶ As General Upton pertinently remarks,

“The lesson to be learned from this remarkable conflict is the value of trained officers in command of raw troops, a lesson which neither our statesmen nor our historians have ever been able to appreciate,”

and he goes on to say that

“without pausing to discover the secret of the defense of Bunker Hill, the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and that patriotism was the sole qualification for a soldier's calling — a fallacy which paralyzed the military legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeopardized our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undisciplined levies.”⁷

Meanwhile, on May 10th, the fort at Ticonderoga had been captured by a force of Colonials under Ethan Allen, and on the same day the Second Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia. The Revolution had then assumed such headway as to force that body to exercise the functions of civil government, and it promptly assumed not only legislative but executive powers. Finding itself not clothed with authority

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to levy taxes or raise revenue, it was obliged to emit bills of credit, the redemption of which was pledged by the twelve "United Colonies." The financial system thus inaugurated, having no other basis than public faith in the eventual success of the American cause, virtually neutralized the power to create and support armies. Local interests, passions, and prejudices soon became paramount and, as a result of the feeble and exhaustive military policy followed, Congress was finally reduced to the helplessness of an advisory body, bereft of power to call out or support a single soldier save with the assistance and concurrence of the colonies — all of which could have been prevented had Congress been clothed with sovereign authority to utilize the entire resources of the country.⁸ Military legislation was thus made from the very start to depend mainly upon the collective wisdom of an assembly of men who, as far as their individual experience was concerned, were wholly devoid of military knowledge — a state of affairs which, in many instances, has prevailed in Congress until the present day.

Shortly after the troops arrived in the vicinity of Boston prior to the battle of Bunker Hill, it became evident that the struggle would not be confined to the New England colonies alone, and that, in order to prevent the disintegration and dispersal of the force already collected, it would have to be adopted as a Continental Army owing allegiance to the United Colonies exclusively.* Accordingly, on June 14, 1775, Congress authorized the raising of ten companies of riflemen

* Early in June, 1775, General Nathanael Greene made certain recommendations respecting this new army, the wisdom of which was fully confirmed by subsequent events. The six conditions which he declared indispensable for immediate success were: (1) there should be one commander-in-chief; (2) the army should be enlisted "during the war"; (3) a system of bounties should be established in order to provide for the families of soldiers in the field; (4) the troops should serve wherever required throughout the colonies; (5) funds for the complete equipment and support of the army according to the demands of the war should be borrowed; and (6) independence should be declared at once and every resource of every colony pledged to its support.—Greene, *The Life of Nathanael Greene*, I, pp. 123, 124, 127-129.

in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, the term of enlistment being fixed at one year. These were the first troops raised under the authority of the United Colonies with the title of The American Continental Army, and they formed the nucleus of the forces which eventually achieved American independence. On the following day, George Washington was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and on July 3rd he assumed command at Cambridge, Mass., of the army investing Boston, numbering 17,000 men, every one of whose enlistments was to expire before the end of the year. On July 18th, Congress recommended

“to the inhabitants of the United English Colonies that all ablebodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia . . . That the officers of each company be chosen by the respective companies,”

and, imitating the action of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, passed the following resolution:

“That one-fourth part of the militia be selected as minutemen of such men as are willing to enter into this necessary service, formed into companies and battalions, and their officers chosen and commissioned as aforesaid, to be ready at shortest notice to march to any place where their assistance may be required for the defense of their own or neighboring colony.”¹⁰

This measure is of special interest in that it was our first scheme of mobilization.¹¹

Three days later, July 21st, Congress authorized Washington to maintain in the vicinity of Boston such a force as he thought necessary, provided it did not exceed 22,000 men, and on July 25th it fixed the number of troops for the Northern Department, New York, at 5,000. In organizing these troops on a Continental basis, commissions signed in blank by the President of Congress were sent to the various colonies to be filled out with the necessary names.¹² During the course of the year Congress gradually increased the size of the Continental Army, but, nourishing hopes for an early peace,

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could not be induced to prolong the term of enlistment beyond 1776.

Notwithstanding the power vested in him, Washington found himself compelled, on account of the slowness with which the recruits presented themselves,¹³ to call for 5,000 militia and minute-men to replace the troops whose enlistments would expire on December first.¹⁴ General Schuyler in New York experienced great difficulty in this respect with the New England troops,¹⁵ while Washington had his patience sorely tried by the Connecticut contingent which decamped the instant its service expired.¹⁶ "Those who are familiar with our military history will not be surprised at the conduct of these Connecticut troops. Each succeeding year of the Revolutionary struggle found American soldiers behaving in like manner; and during the War of the Rebellion a similar course was followed by the regiments whose terms of service expired on the morning of the first battle of Bull Run."¹⁷ The officers too gave Washington an immense deal of unnecessary trouble,¹⁸ and Congress found itself compelled to provide new troops to replace those whose terms would expire before the year was out,¹⁹ as well as to recommend to the various colonial legislatures that punishment be inflicted upon persons harbouring deserters, whose number was rapidly augmenting.²⁰ Desertion is an evil inseparable from the method of bounties which was then beginning to be introduced, and it must be distinctly remembered that "any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits." Recognizing the danger of admitting such a principle, Congress passed a resolution on December 6, 1775, "That the charge of bounty in the account exhibited by Rhode Island against the United Colonies be not allowed." Yet in spite of this disapproval, bounties were paid throughout the Revolution, producing both endless trouble

and discontent just as they did during the War of the Rebellion.²¹

Irrespective of the necessity, however great, of employing untrained troops, history demonstrates that needless extravagance, frequently attended by inaction and disaster, is the inevitable result. This was the case during the Campaign of 1775. The only military operations of the army about Boston that year were confined to the battles of Concord, Lexington and Bunker Hill, all fought before any of the troops were taken into Continental pay. As Upton points out:²²

“When Washington took command his army numbered 17,000 men, but the number fit for duty did not exceed 14,500. The strength of the enemy was estimated by the council of war at 11,500; but after deducting the sick and wounded his real effective strength was not over 6,500. Notwithstanding this disparity in numbers neither Washington nor his generals deemed it prudent to attack, and the year passed away in hopeless inactivity.”

The only important offensive operation was the invasion of Canada by two distinct forces; one, composed of 3,000 troops under Generals Schuyler and Montgomery, assembled at Ticonderoga in August, but the former's ill-health compelled him to relinquish his command, while the latter, after spending weeks in reducing the fort at St. John's, eventually occupied Montreal on November 12th.²³ The other expedition, undertaken at the instigation of a Congressional committee, was composed of 1,100 men under General Benedict Arnold. Leaving Cambridge on September 17th, it embarked at Newport on the 19th, reached Gardner, Maine, on the 20th and started for Quebec three days later. After untold hardships during the march through the Maine wilderness, Arnold arrived at Port Levis, opposite Quebec, on November 9th, with his force reduced to 750 men. A storm lasting three days suspended further operations, but, on the 14th, spurred on by the necessity of action, largely *because*

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of the approaching expiration of the terms of enlistment of nearly all his men,²⁴ Arnold repeated Wolfe's feat in climbing the steep ascent and demanded the surrender of the city. The British garrison had meanwhile been re-enforced to 2,000 and the Americans were compelled on the 19th to retire to Point-aux-Trembles, where they were joined by Montgomery on December first, the combined forces not exceeding 1,000 men. A second demand for surrender (December 6th) and a feeble bombardment proving equally ineffectual, it was resolved on the 16th to assault the place, "but it was not until the night of the thirtieth, when but one day of legal service remained for a large portion of the troops, that the preparations were complete."²⁵ On the last day of the year a desperate attack was made; Montgomery was killed, Arnold badly wounded, 60 men were dead or *hors de combat* and 426 were captured. The invasion of Canada thus ended in a hopeless disaster²⁶ and, except for Bunker Hill, virtually nothing had been achieved by the Americans.

"The total number of troops in Continental pay during the campaign of 1775, as appears from the report of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, submitted to Congress in 1790, was 27,443. In addition to the above, it is estimated that the colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, furnished 10,180 militia, making the whole American Army 37,623. For the most part this force, from want of supplies, organization, and discipline, was maintained at public expense in a state of demoralizing inactivity."²⁷

The events of the year 1775 have been dwelt upon at considerable length for the reason that they, like those of the entire Revolution, are necessary for an intelligent understanding of our subsequent military history. The seeds of the vicious military policy sown in those years have been reaped during every succeeding generation. We shall also have occasion to make frequent quotations from Washington's correspondence because he, as the commander-in-chief and the principal figure of the Revolution, was called upon to

combat every single mistake in the military policy of that time. No other person was in a better position than he to pass judgment upon this all-important subject, and his comments are to-day quite as worthy of legislative consideration as when they were originally written.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1776


Up to January 14, 1776, out of the 20,370 troops authorized by Congress three months before, only 10,500 had been enlisted and many of these had not joined.²⁸ Washington, despairing of raising the army by voluntary enlistments, wrote to the General Court of Massachusetts on January 16th suggesting the employment of "coercive measures" to maintain the regiments at their proper strength. On the same day he proposed to the council of war an attack on the British at Boston before they could be re-enforced and, upon the council of war's agreeing, it was recommended that 13 regiments of militia be called into service until April first.²⁹ On February 9th, he wrote a remarkable letter to Congress on the subject of the evils, dangers and extravagance of short enlistments, in which he said:

"The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those who are eyewitnesses of them to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt, for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued to blockade Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed . . .

"The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration . . .

"To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a





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soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time, but it is a work of great difficulty, and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. TO EXPECT, THEN, THE SAME SERVICE FROM RAW AND UNDISCIPLINED RECRUITS AS FROM VETERAN SOLDIERS IS TO EXPECT WHAT NEVER DID AND PERHAPS NEVER WILL HAPPEN . . .”³⁰

Washington, re-enforced by certain militia, occupied Dorchester Heights on March 4th, threw up two redoubts and took steps which brought about the evacuation of Boston by the British on the 17th.³¹ Appreciating that New York would be the next objective point, he hastened to send five regiments to its defence and on April 13th arrived there himself with nearly all his army. Congress immediately required him to send four, and later six, additional regiments — 3,000 men — to Canada to re-enforce the troops near Quebec. His army, thus scattered and divided, was reduced to 5,300 Continentals,³² leaving him no alternative except to depend upon militia enlisted for short periods only. Such was the force with which he was expected to confront a disciplined British army numbering from 20,000 to 30,000.

Congress at last awoke to the gravity of the situation in June, called out 6,000 militia to re-enforce the troops in Canada,³³ authorized 13,800 to strengthen Washington,³⁴ and created a “flying camp” to be located in New Jersey;³⁵ but in spite of Washington’s reiterated recommendations, the enlistments of all these troops was to expire on December first. As General Upton aptly remarks,³⁶

“The slow increase of the Continental Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual military establishment, one class of troops being Continental or regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our cause. The natural disposition of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the Continental regiments,

and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third to one-half below its prescribed strength."

On July 4th³⁷ the Declaration of Independence was adopted and the time for speedy action in expelling the British had come, but the lesson that raw troops cannot prevail against disciplined regulars had apparently not been learned. On August 27th was fought the battle of Long Island between Lord Howe's force of fully 20,000 men³⁸ and about 8,000 under Washington, all that he could muster out of an army whose paper strength was 27,000.³⁹ The logical result followed; the Americans were badly beaten and on the 30th retreated to New York,⁴⁰ where Washington wrote on September 2nd to the President of Congress that

*"no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences."*⁴¹

On September 15th the British occupied New York, after a spirited engagement ending in the retreat of the Americans to Harlem Heights, the brigades of Parsons and Fellows running away in the most disgraceful fashion.⁴² On the 24th Washington wrote some plain truths to the President of Congress, declaring that

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowl-

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edge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

“ Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodgings, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others.* Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. *To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year. . . . Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 to 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia.† The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause.”⁴³*

The bugbear of militarism which had already taken possession of Congress, Washington dismissed by continuing thus:

“ *The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and, in my judgment, situated as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon*

* On September 5, 1776, General Knox wrote to his wife:

“ It is Misfortune that must raise us to the character of a great people. *We must have a standing army.* The militia get sick, or think themselves so, and run home.”—*The Centennial of the United States Military Academy*, I, pp. 201-202.

† General Greene, next to Washington the most distinguished officer in the army, wrote on October 28, 1776, to a friend:


“ There must be a good army established; men engaged for the war; a proper corps of officers. . . . The Congress goes upon a penurious plan.”—Greene, *Life of Nathanael Greene*, I, p. 221.


to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter. . . . Experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the practice of trusting to militia that no man who regards order, regularity, and economy, or who has any regard for his own honor, character, or peace of mind, will risk them upon this issue.”⁴⁴

Congress had at last begun to realize that there existed a good and sufficient ground for the complaints of the commander-in-chief, and several resolutions passed that year showed that it appreciated the importance of enlisting men “FOR THE WAR,”⁴⁵ but, upon ascertaining that the uncertainty as to its duration was having a detrimental effect, it modified its terms so as to permit enlistments to be “for three years” or “for the war,” at the discretion of the recruit.⁴⁶ In the former case, a bounty of \$20 was given; in the latter \$20 and 100 acres of land — a procedure quite in keeping with other legislative enactments on that score during 1776,⁴⁷ which resulted in the States bidding against Congress for men and ended by creating an enormous and most unnecessary debt.* In the case of the officers, too, this rivalry wrought incalculable harm by depriving the commander-in-chief of anything except a nominal control over them.⁴⁸

The military events subsequent to the occupation of Harlem Heights can be quickly told. On October 12th, General Howe began his operations to cut Washington off from New England and upper New York.⁴⁹ The latter for want of good troops retreated to White Plains, where an action was fought on the 28th to the advantage of the British. Washington then fell back to North Castle Heights, from which he could not be dislodged, and the British returned to New York, capturing Fort Washington and 2,000 prisoners on November 16th, and caused the evacuation of Fort Lee four

* “It is needless to add that short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt.”—*Washington to the President of Congress*, December 20, 1776. Sparks, IV, p. 234.





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days later. Howe then resumed the offensive in New Jersey, and by December 8th not an American soldier remained in the State, Washington, with his army reduced to 3,305,⁵⁰ being "powerless to make even a show of resistance, while the militia and other troops of the flying camp were disbanding."⁵¹ On the 26th he surprised the Hessians at Trenton, captured about 1,000, losing only five men himself,⁵² and two days later occupied the town.

With the exception of the repulse of the British under Clinton at Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina, on June 28th, this brilliant action at Trenton was the only victory of which the Americans could boast during 1776, notwithstanding 46,901 Continental or Regular troops and 42,760 militia, a total of 89,661, were called out during the year⁵³ to oppose a British force which never equalled half that number.⁵⁴ Congress in its alarm over the almost total dissolution of the army, the rapid advance of the British through New Jersey and the capture of the capital, Philadelphia, which was momentarily expected, not only voted an increase of 110 battalions,⁵⁵ but vested in Washington complete power for a period of six months to raise 16 additional battalions of infantry, 3,000 light horse, 3 regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers, as well as certain other extraordinary authority.⁵⁶ That the sovereign body was willing — indeed eager — to pass a resolution so fraught with danger to the future liberties of the States and to clothe even a Washington with the absolute power of a dictator affords ample proof that the blundering policy pursued since the beginning of the Revolution was recognised after nearly two years to be utterly inadequate and worthless under the stress of military crisis.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777

After a victory at Princeton on January 3rd, Washington's army took up its winter quarters at Morristown, its strength on March 14th being "under 3,000,"⁵⁷ while the British

had more than 20,000 veterans in the vicinity of New York. The operations ending in June, when the enemy evacuated New Jersey, were little more than skirmishes, since Washington did not dare to give or receive battle.⁵⁸ The army was in a sorry plight and payments were made in paper money, which rapidly depreciated. Again Congress resorted to raw levies,⁵⁹ found itself greatly embarrassed by the bounty system which it had inaugurated,⁶⁰ was obliged to introduce territorial recruitment⁶¹ and to grant dictatorial powers to Washington for a second time.⁶² So apparent did the insufficiency of Congressional measures⁶³ become that, before the year was out, Virginia and Massachusetts had to set the example of drafting — a method which Washington recommended to the President of Pennsylvania as the only certain way of obtaining Continental troops.⁶⁴

The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, who was commissioned a Major General on July 31st, afforded the struggling colonies some temporary encouragement, but early in that month General Howe transported the British forces at New York⁶⁵ to the Chesapeake and, moving north, reached Elkton, 54 miles from Philadelphia, on August 28th. On September 11th Washington was defeated at the battle of the Brandywine,⁶⁶ and sixteen days later Howe occupied Philadelphia. On October 4th he endeavoured to surprise the camp at Germantown, but without success, and after some minor actions withdrew to winter quarters at Valley Forge.⁶⁷ Meanwhile a splendid success had crowned the American arms at Saratoga, where Burgoyne and his force⁶⁸ surrendered to General Gates⁶⁹ on October 17th,⁷⁰ but the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union creating the United States of America, which had been in force since July but were not definitely agreed upon until November 15th, did not augur well for the future from a military standpoint since

“ instead of resting the war power in a central government, which alone could insure its vigorous exercise, Congress was reduced to a mere consultative body or congress of diplomats, with authority

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to concert only such measures for common defense as might receive the sanction of the allied sovereignties they represented. . . .⁷¹

“Weak as had been our military policy under the government of the Continental Congress, it was to become still more imbecile through the inherent defects of the new system. To the indecision and delays of a single Congress were now superadded the indecisions and delays of at least nine more deliberative bodies.”⁷²

Small wonder that in spite of the employment of 34,820 Continentals and at least 33,900 militia, a total of 68,720,⁷³ the results achieved during 1777 should have been so meagre, and the straits to which Washington and his slender force of half-clad, half-starved men at Valley Forge were reduced were an indelible blot upon American history.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1778

The winter spent at Valley Forge was the acme of human misery and discouragement, received only by the heroic spirit manifested by officers and men alike and by the much-needed reforms in tactics, regulations and discipline introduced by Baron von Steuben, a veteran of the wars of Frederick the Great,⁷⁴ who had been appointed Inspector General. The army numbered less than 10,000, but, as none of the battalions during the preceding year had been recruited to much more than one-third of their proper strength, Congress, in consequence of the report of a committee sent in January to examine into the conditions at Valley Forge,⁷⁵ recommended on February 6th that the States draft men for nine months, with the proviso that they could be replaced as fast as men enlisting for three years were received.⁷⁶ Notwithstanding this drastic measure,⁷⁷ the entire Continental force at the beginning of May numbered only about 15,000,⁷⁸ whereas the British had more than 33,000 effectives.⁷⁹ On May 7th the tattered troops were assembled on parade and the treaty of alliance with France was read amid wild en-

thusiasm.* On the following day the council of war unanimously decided, in view of the slenderness of the force and the expectation of assistance, to remain on the defensive and to let events take their course.

Even before that time the officers had begun to resign their commissions in disgust,⁵⁰ and this state of affairs rapidly progressed to such an alarming extent that Congress was compelled on May 15th to pass a resolution giving to all officers serving to the end of the war half pay for seven years and a gratuity of \$80 to non-commissioned officers and men. The enlistment of deserters, in order to fill the quotas required by the resolution of February 6th, became so prevalent that Congress was obliged to denounce it, but the desire to get men so as to avoid the draft led to another expedient, and in Rhode Island the proposal was made to enlist a battalion of slaves.⁵¹ Another difficulty, almost as grave as the non-enlistment of recruits, militated against the maintenance of a proper army. Since the beginning of the Revolution paper money had been steadily issued, but by 1778 it had so depreciated in value that it had become literally impossible for officers to support themselves and their families on their pay — indeed, as Washington declared, they were “sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want.”⁵² Nations collectively are fully equal to keeping up a protracted struggle,

* “On the seventh of May, at nine o'clock, A. M., the American army was on parade. Drums beat and cannon were fired, as if for some victory. It was a day of jubilee, a rare occurrence for the times and place.

“The brigades were steady, but not brilliant in their formation. Uniforms were scarce. Many feet were bare. Many had no coats. Some wore coats made of the remnants of their winter blankets. The pomp and circumstance of war were wanting. . . .

“There was no review by general officers, with a well appointed staff. Few matrons and few maidens looked on. . . . The Treaty of Alliance was read, and in solemn silence the American army at Valley Forge united in Thanksgiving to Almighty God that He had given them *one friend on earth*. . . .

“Huzzas for the king of France, for Washington and the Republic, with caps tossed high in air, and a rattling fire through the whole line, terminated the humble pageant.”—Carrington, pp. 404-405.

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but individuals often shirk the privations and dangers of war.* The bounties first offered by Congress and the States were tantamount to a confession of this truth, which was only too palpably confirmed by each subsequent campaign. Unable to check this calamity, Congress now endeavoured to conceal it and on September 18th it resolved

“That General Washington be authorized, if he shall judge it for the interest of the United States, to augment the Continental bounty to recruits, enlisting for three years or during the war, to a sum not exceeding ten dollars; and *that he use his discretion in keeping the matter secret as long as he shall deem necessary.*”⁸³

The story of the military operations that year can be told in a few words. Too weak to take the offensive, the American army cooled its heels in inactivity at Valley Forge until General Sir Henry Clinton, learning of the approach toward the Chesapeake of the Comte d'Estaing's fleet with French troops,⁸⁴ evacuated Philadelphia on June 18th and withdrew in the direction of New York. Washington instantly started in pursuit, intercepted his march and, ten days later, at the battle of Monmouth by his skill turned the retreat begun by General Charles Lee into a substantial victory.⁸⁵ Clinton made his escape and reached his destination two days later,⁸⁶ followed to White Plains by Washington,⁸⁷ but active operations between these armies terminated with this engagement, and forces on both sides were transferred east of the Hudson.

Agreeably to Washington's plan to capture Newport⁸⁸


* “*Men may speculate as they will; they may talk of patriotism; they may draw a few examples from ancient story, of great achievements performed by its influence; but whoever builds upon them, as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war, will find himself deceived in the end. . . . I do not mean to exclude altogether the idea of patriotism. I know it exists. . . . But I will venture to assert that a great and lasting war can never be supported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a prospect of interest, or some reward. For a time it may, of itself, push men to action, to bear much, to encounter difficulties; but it will not endure unassisted by interest.*”—*Washington to John Bannister, April 21, 1778. Sparks, V, p. 323.*

while the French fleet remained in American waters, d'Estaing appeared off that place on July 29th and that same day General Sullivan occupied the northern end of Rhode Island,⁸⁹ but it was not until August 15th⁹⁰ that the bulk of his command advanced to the siege.⁹¹ A week earlier Admiral Howe had set sail from New York, but a "tremendous storm"⁹² dispersed both fleets and prevented any general action, the British barely getting back to New York, while the French returned to Newport badly crippled. In conformity with the explicit instructions received before leaving France,⁹³ d'Estaing sailed away to Boston on the 22nd to refit, his departure greatly discouraging Sullivan's troops and causing the militia to desert in large numbers.⁹⁴ The capture of Quaker and Turkey Hills on the 29th was but a momentary success, and the retreat begun next day was hastened by the arrival of 100 British ships bringing Clinton's army to the rescue of the garrison. Howe promptly sailed for Boston,⁹⁵ but, being unable to force d'Estaing into an engagement, returned to New York. A similar attempt by Admiral Byron a month later was frustrated by a severe storm. On November 3rd, d'Estaing set sail for the West Indies and the scene of land operations was transferred to South Carolina, where a British force⁹⁶ under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell captured Savannah on December 29th.⁹⁷

Thus ended a year in which the only tangible success gained by the Americans was at Monmouth, in spite of their having more than 51,000 troops under arms,⁹⁸ opposed to a British force which never exceeded 34,000.⁹⁹

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1779

Not a month had elapsed before Congress, in its anxiety over the diminishing number of recruits, empowered Washington¹⁰⁰ to give a bounty not to exceed \$200 to each able-bodied veteran who would re-enlist and to each new recruit who joined "for the war." Within two months¹⁰¹ it reiterated this resolution and transferred the bounty to the State



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for whose contingent the recruit was enlisted. On March 29th, it fixed the Continental establishment at 88 battalions,¹⁰² recommending that Virginia and North Carolina raise as many battalions of regulars as possible for the defence of the Southern States, with the proviso that their term was to be limited to one year and that they were not to be forced to serve north of Virginia. *On top of these concessions, it granted a bounty of \$200 to these one-year troops.*¹⁰³ The States promptly outbid Congress, New Jersey offering \$250 to each recruit in addition to the \$200, the clothing and land allowed by Congress, while Virginia¹⁰⁴ made the bounty \$750, one suit a year and 100 acres of land, incidentally confiscating the bounty and clothing given by Congress.¹⁰⁵ These enormous bounties to new recruits produced such intense dissatisfaction among the soldiers who had already done considerable service that Washington's suggestion that they be given a gratuity of \$100¹⁰⁶ was promptly complied with by a resolution of Congress.¹⁰⁷

The continued depreciation of the Continental currency wrought increasing distress among the officers¹⁰⁸ and, as the half-pay for seven years to those who served until the end of the war¹⁰⁹ was manifestly insufficient, a recommendation was made to the States to grant half-pay for life to officers remaining in service until the conclusion of hostilities, as well as proper rewards to the soldiers.¹¹⁰ In other words, in order to have sufficient officers to command the troops, Congress found itself forced to advocate that they too be given a bounty in the shape of half-pay for life.¹¹¹ The claim of the officers was ignored by the States,¹¹² but in proportion as the bounties for the soldiers was augmented the character of the recruits obtained became increasingly inferior, until Washington declared in disgust that, in any operation against the enemy's force in New York and Rhode Island, "double the number is the least it could be undertaken with, and this would be far from giving a certainty of success."¹¹³

Abundant proof of the utter futility of the system in which Congress persisted is to be found, not only in his judgment, but in the number of troops under arms that year. They amounted to 26,790 Continentals and 17,485 militia, a total of 44,275,¹¹⁴ as against less than 35,000 British,¹¹⁵ and the results achieved were virtually *nil*. In the North, the Americans were restricted through weakness to a defence almost purely passive. New Haven and other towns in Connecticut were sacked by a force under General Tryon,¹¹⁶ but this loss was recouped by the storming of Stony Point by "Mad Anthony" Wayne ten days later,¹¹⁷ the seizure of valuable stores and the destruction of the fortifications erected there by the enemy, followed by the capture of Paulus Hook in August.¹¹⁸ In the South the fall of Savannah¹¹⁹ was but the precursor of the complete evacuation of Georgia and the restoration of the Royal government.¹²⁰ On March 3rd, General Ashe and his 1,500 North Carolina militia were soundly beaten at Briar Creek, and the next two months were confined to unimportant movements and skirmishes on the part of General Lincoln and the British commander, General Prevost. In May an expedition under General Matthews plundered the coast of Virginia, laid waste both Norfolk and Portsmouth, destroyed 100 vessels and returned within a month with abundant booty.¹²¹ Congress was apparently blind to the desolation entailed by a strong invasion of the Southern States, while Washington was powerless to furnish any assistance so long as Clinton continued to occupy New York. General Greene applied for command in the South, but, in spite of Washington's approval, Congress refused to grant it, and Lafayette, seeing no active service in prospect, returned to France.¹²²

During the latter part of the summer a plan was formulated to re-take Savannah, and Comte d'Estaing, who had meanwhile captured New Grenada and fought a successful action with Admiral Byron, concurred in the scheme and on September 8th appeared off Savannah with a fleet of 33 ships

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and 6,000 troops. Eight days later the British garrison¹²³ was summoned "to surrender to the arms of the King of France" and the place was invested. D'Estaing, in trepidation over the approaching stormy season and the rumours of the coming of the British fleet, urged immediate action and on October 9th a vigorous assault was made, but Prevost had gained sufficient time to strengthen the defences¹²⁴ and the allied forces¹²⁵ suffered a costly repulse. The French Admiral sailed away,¹²⁶ and Lincoln was compelled to abandon the siege. Two months later Sir Henry Clinton retaliated by leaving a small garrison in New York and by sailing¹²⁷ for Charleston with over 7,500 men.¹²⁸ Washington, upon learning that Clinton was embarking a large force of troops and believing that their destination was either South Carolina or Georgia, promptly ordered the Virginia and North Carolina troops of the Continental Army to march south, while he went into winter quarters, for the main part in New Jersey, the headquarters being established at Morristown for the second time.¹²⁹

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1780

As in the previous years, 1780 witnessed a diminution in the number of enlistments¹³⁰ and the increase in the size of the bounties offered, New Jersey paying \$1,000 in excess of the continental allowances. The depreciation in the currency¹³¹ caused the utmost distress among the officers,¹³² but Congress confined itself to reiterating¹³³ its previous resolution¹³⁴ that they be offered half-pay for life to remain in service until the close of the war. Notwithstanding an almost uninterrupted succession of defeats, and the urgent need for more and better troops, Congress resolved on a reduction of the army to take effect the first of January following.¹³⁵ This was quite in keeping with the unwise legislation which made no attempt to check the corruption among Government agents that had arisen as a result of increasing prices and commissions,¹³⁶ which legalized violence and ex-

posed unprotected persons to cruelty and outrage until the summary execution of soldiers without trial — even by order of Washington,— the plundering of citizens and the seizure of their property without payment became matters of frequent occurrence.¹³⁷ The States likewise took a hand in legislation and, toward the close of the war, the seizure of supplies for the army was made a penal offence by more than one of them, quite regardless of national welfare and the detriment to the land forces.¹³⁸

After a bitter experience of five years of war, during which he had had ample opportunity to test fully the military policy pursued by Congress, Washington laid bare its follies and inadequacy in a letter to the President of that body, dated August 20, 1780, in which he declared that

*“ it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistence and solidity to her measures. . . . ”*¹³⁹ Experience has shown that a peremptory draft will be the only effectual one. . . . To one, who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description, and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may be easily shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

“ Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy; destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of

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these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak, as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford; and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.

“Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war, and the paper emissions, have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had, a great part of the time, two sets of men to feed and pay, the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present levies we find there are some who have received a hundred and fifty dollars in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught those men the rudiments of a soldier's duty, their service will have expired, and the work recommence with a new set. The consumption of provision, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind, has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person, who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs, can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments, than it would have done otherwise.

“There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. *Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.*

“If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. It will be an interesting winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. *An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.*”¹⁴⁰

Nearly four weeks later¹⁴¹ the commander-in-chief, in writing to the President of Congress about General Gates' defeat at Camden, summed up the whole question in a nutshell by declaring that

“This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify *the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia.* REGULAR TROOPS ALONE ARE EQUAL TO THE EXIGENCIES OF MODERN WAR, AS WELL FOR DEFENSE AS OFFENCE; AND WHENEVER A SUBSTITUTE IS ATTEMPTED, IT MUST PROVE ILLUSORY AND RUINOUS. NO MILITIA WILL EVER ACQUIRE THE HABITS NECESSARY TO RESIST A REGULAR FORCE. . . . THE FIRMNESS REQUISITE 'FOR THE REAL BUSINESS OF FIGHTING IS ONLY TO BE ATTAINED BY A CONSTANT COURSE OF DISCIPLINE AND SERVICE. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion; and IT IS MOST EARNESTLY TO BE WISHED, THAT THE LIBERTIES OF AMERICA MAY NO LONGER BE TRUSTED, IN ANY MATERIAL DEGREE, TO SO PRECARIOUS A DEPENDENCE.”¹⁴²

The Campaign of 1780 was virtually a repetition of the

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experiences of 1775 and 1776. Clinton's voyage from New York¹⁴³ was beset with storms and it was not until February 11th that his troops were landed on St. John's Island, 30 miles below Charleston. After a delay of six weeks,¹⁴⁴ the city was invested¹⁴⁵ and a siege,¹⁴⁶ ending on May 12th, resulted in the capitulation of General Lincoln, the garrison¹⁴⁷ and all the male inhabitants of Charleston¹⁴⁸ upon honourable terms.¹⁴⁹ Within a month General Clinton returned to New York,¹⁵⁰ leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, and that officer promptly set to work to reduce South Carolina to submission, but encountered considerable resistance in the partisan warfare waged by Colonels Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion,¹⁵¹ seconded by a small force under Baron de Kalb.¹⁵² On July 25th, General Gates¹⁵³ arrived, assumed command¹⁵⁴ and set "the Grand Army"—as he termed it—in motion for Camden, South Carolina, where on August 16th, notwithstanding his superiority in numbers,¹⁵⁵ he was overwhelmingly defeated by Cornwallis.¹⁵⁶ Some of the militia ran away in the most disgraceful manner * while Gates himself covered 180 miles in four days, reaching Hillsborough, North Carolina, on the 20th, "without gathering a sufficient force of the fugitives to form even an escort."¹⁵⁷ Cornwallis promptly followed up his victory, and on the 18th Colonel Tarleton nearly annihilated Sumter's force at Fishing Creek.¹⁵⁸ South Carolina had been completely subjugated and the British commander addressed himself to the invasion of North Carolina but, on October 7th,

* General Henry Lee, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*, I, pp. 178-183; Tarleton, *Campaign in North Carolina*, pp. 106-109.

The culprits were the brigades of Virginia and South Carolina militia. The only regiment out of these two commands which did not behave in this ignominious fashion was composed of North Carolinians under Colonel Dixon and greatly distinguished itself. It was apropos of them that General Henry Lee wrote in his memoirs (I, p. 97) that

"A GOVERNMENT IS THE MURDERER OF ITS CITIZENS WHICH SENDS THEM TO THE FIELD UNINFORMED AND UNTAUGHT, WHERE THEY ARE TO MEET MEN OF THE SAME AGE AND STRENGTH, MECHANIZED BY EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE FOR BATTLE."

one of his detachments under Major Fergusson¹⁵⁹ was surprised at King's Mountain by a force of American volunteers¹⁶⁰ and defeated with heavy loss.¹⁶¹ Marion and Sumter continued to harass the enemy until the latter was disabled by a wound.¹⁶² Cornwallis, realizing that he had not adopted the best method of invasion, went into winter quarters at Winnsborough, North Carolina, and the interest in the southern theatre of war terminates with the arrival on December 3rd of General Greene, who superseded Gates in command of a sorry force of less than 2,400 men.¹⁶³

In the North, the winter of 1779-1780 had been unusually severe and the army at Morristown suffered correspondingly.¹⁶⁴ Washington, harassed beyond endurance by the dearth of supplies, the absence of money to pay the troops¹⁶⁵ — whose disgust and desperation culminated in mutiny¹⁶⁶ — and by the inability to lend assistance in the South so long as a superior force of British,¹⁶⁷ supported by a fleet, remained in occupation of New York, began to despair of the result.¹⁶⁸ A gleam of hope was received upon the arrival of Lafayette¹⁶⁹ with the news that the Comte de Rochambeau was coming with a large army and that the first division was already *en route*; but the month of June witnessed two invasions of New Jersey by the British,¹⁷⁰ merely for the purpose of keeping the Americans occupied. On July 10th, Rochambeau arrived at Newport with 6,000 troops and Washington proposed the capture of New York, but three days later Admiral Graves reached there, thus giving the British fleet a decided superiority, and the enterprise had to be postponed until the arrival of the second French division.¹⁷¹ Clinton retorted by an expedition destined to operate against Rhode Island and 8,000 troops were sent forward to Huntington, Long Island, but Washington's prompt movement and information as to Rochambeau's strength caused him to relinquish his project and to confine himself to blockading Newport with his fleet.¹⁷² This ended the important operations for the year, although mention must be

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made of the capture and execution of Major André,¹⁷³ the attempted betrayal of West Point and the flight of Benedict Arnold,¹⁷⁴ and the declaration of war against Holland by Great Britain on December 2nd. The French second division, reported as blockaded in Brest, did not arrive; the American army rapidly dwindled as the cold weather approached; and on November 28th Washington announced the winter quarters for his troops, selecting New Windsor, New Jersey, for his own¹⁷⁵ and being compelled to discharge the militia for fear the entire army would disband.¹⁷⁶

Thus terminated a campaign during which the United States had over 43,000 men under arms¹⁷⁷ and won only one victory of any consequence.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781

The jealousy against standing armies manifested by Congress since the beginning of the Revolution — a jealousy so studiously fostered as to wring from Washington the reluctant acknowledgment that “it is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of *war*”¹⁷⁸ — bore fruit in the reduction of the Continental forces, which took place on January 1, 1781.¹⁷⁹ The failure to provide pay, clothing and often food — largely attributable to the unwillingness of Congress to comprehend military necessities owing to its fear of “militarism” — took a form that the legislators had not contemplated. The mutiny of the Connecticut regiments in the preceding May¹⁸⁰ was caused by starvation;¹⁸¹ equally well justified were the complaints which culminated in an open mutiny of the Pennsylvania line¹⁸² at Morristown on January first. In spite of the efforts to restore order made by their officers — several of whom were killed or wounded in the attempt — the mutineers,¹⁸³ under the command of their non-commissioned officers, started for Princeton next day, with the avowed determination of marching to Philadelphia to obtain a redress of their grievances, their demands being for clothing, the residue of their bounty and the full arrears

of their pay. Congress, in a panic lest the remainder of the army should become similarly disaffected, despatched a committee to make terms with the malcontents. The conditions proposed¹⁸⁴ were accepted substantially in the form offered¹⁸⁵ and were tantamount to an absolute capitulation of the civil authority, not to the Army, but to a band of mutineers.¹⁸⁶ A similar uprising on the part of the New Jersey troops toward the end of the month¹⁸⁷ was, however, suppressed with a strong hand.¹⁸⁸ These mutinies, regrettable as they were owing to the impairment of discipline and disregard of authority, in nowise affected the loyalty of the troops. Their revolt was against unbearable conditions* and contained many of the elements of lawful revolution to justify it on the ground that the Government had failed totally in its duty to its defenders.¹⁸⁹

The opening of the year did not presage success to the American cause. Washington's army was reduced to about 5,000 effective men, the number of enlistments was woefully small, the French fleet was closely blockaded in Newport, the Indians were becoming very troublesome in western New York and on the Canadian frontier, the American navy had practically disappeared, the British in New York were a constant menace¹⁹⁰ and the scarcity of money prevented full advantage being taken of the presence of the allied forces. The prospect was anything but encouraging.

The principal interest centres in the southern theatre of war¹⁹¹ where Cornwallis,¹⁹² deeming an invasion of North Carolina unwise so long as the Americans threatened both of his flanks, determined to defeat Morgan and Greene in detail. On January 1st he sent Tarleton to pursue Morgan

* On February 2, 1781, Lafayette wrote from New Windsor to the Marquise:

"That only proves that human patience has its limits, and, as no European army would suffer the tenth part of it, that it requires *citizens* to endure nakedness, hunger, toil, and the absolute want of pay which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardest, I believe, and the most patient that there are in the world."—*Mémoires, correspondance et manuscrits du Général Lafayette*, I, p. 408.

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and to drive him across the Broad River. Sixteen days later they met at Cowpens,¹⁹³ where the American, who understood from past experience how to handle his militia,* inflicted a crushing defeat on the British.¹⁹⁴ Tarleton fell back and joined Cornwallis next day but, notwithstanding a re-enforcement,¹⁹⁵ the latter permitted Morgan to escape, whereupon he turned his attention to General Greene's sorry force,¹⁹⁶ and a series of manœuvres and skirmishes ensued, lasting for nearly two months without decisive action.

Meanwhile Benedict Arnold with a force of 1,600 men had sailed from New York¹⁹⁷ and, landing at Westover on the James River on January 4th, marched on Richmond and burned as much of the city as time permitted but, threatened by the troops under Baron von Steuben at Petersburg, beat a hasty retreat to Portsmouth which he proceeded to fortify.¹⁹⁸

On March 12th, General Greene, having been joined by considerable re-enforcements,¹⁹⁹ determined to engage Corn-

* On a slight eminence Morgan posted a battalion of Maryland regulars, their right prolonged by two companies of Virginia militia under Majors Triplett and Tate, the extreme left being formed by 150 Georgia militia under Captain Beatty. One hundred and fifty yards in front were 270 militia in open order under Colonel Pickens, preceded at about the same distance by a picked force of 150 men under Majors Cunningham and McDowell. Within 6 miles, the Broad River ran round Morgan's left and parallel to his rear, so that there was no possibility of escape in the event of defeat.

Morgan's injunction to his militia was: "*Just hold up your heads, boys — three fires and you are free.*" He thus apologises for his choice of position:

"*I would not have a swamp in view of my militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking as Buford's regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one-half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me.*"—Carrington, p. 543.

wallis. On the 15th the battle was joined at Guilford Court House, where the British²⁰⁰ fought superbly²⁰¹ and won a bloody victory.²⁰² Although some of the American militia ran away,* it proved so costly²⁰³ as to nullify Cornwallis' success and to cause Fox to exclaim in the House of Commons that "another such victory would ruin the British army."²⁰⁴ Greene then proceeded to move directly against his adversary's posts in South Carolina but, after capturing one of the most important,²⁰⁵ was attacked by Lord Rawdon at Hobkirk's Hill²¹⁶ on April 25th and again defeated,²⁰⁷ notwithstanding his superiority in numbers.²⁰⁸ This British success was of little avail however,²⁰⁹ for Rawdon was obliged to evacuate Camden, three forts fell in quick succession to the Americans,²¹⁰ and on June 5th Augusta surrendered after a siege of seven weeks.²¹¹ A fortnight later General Greene, who had invested Ninety-Six, was compelled to raise the siege²¹² and to withdraw northward but, learning that Rawdon had abandoned the place and divided his forces so as to cover Charleston, marched his troops to the High Hills of the Santee in order to rest them during the intense heat of the summer. The subsequent operations were little more than partisan skirmishes but were kept up unceasingly and with the utmost bitterness until late in August when Greene, considerably re-enforced,²¹³ resumed the offensive.²¹⁴ On September 8th was fought the battle of Eutaw Springs, where Greene suffered another defeat.²¹⁵ A series of minor engagements ensued, but the armies did not meet again, and the Southern campaign terminated with the British still in possession of Charleston.

* The North Carolina militia under Generals Butler and Eaton, and the 2d Maryland regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Ford.—Greene, III, pp. 196-197; Carington, *ibid.*; Lossing, II, pp. 609-612; Marshall, IV, pp. 370 and 373.

Trevelyan says, I (Part II), p. 183, footnote, that "as soon as Lord Cornwallis sent his people forward, the militia broke and ran, and never stopped retreating until (to use the words of their disgusted General) they had gone home to kiss their wives and sweethearts." Also Greene, III, p. 205.

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Meanwhile, Cornwallis had decided, almost immediately after the battle of Guilford Court House, to join General Phillips²¹⁶ and, by occupying Virginia and controlling the Chesapeake, to intercept all communication with the Allies and thus effectually reduce the South to submission.²¹⁷ On April 25th he started from Wilmington, North Carolina, reaching Petersburg, Virginia, within a month,²¹⁸ but he found himself opposed by a combined force of regulars and militia under the Marquis de Lafayette,²¹⁹ who subsequently assumed command of all the American troops in Virginia.²²⁰ This general, having prevented the capture of Richmond,²²¹ rallied Wayne²²² to him and for three months the respective forces indulged in manœuvring and skirmishing without any notable encounter save at Jamestown.²²³

In the North Washington and Rochambeau had conferred at Wethersfield, Connecticut, on May 22nd and a junction of the allied armies was agreed upon as a preliminary to an attack upon New York,²²⁴ but the operation was not actually undertaken in force until nearly two months later.²²⁵ On July 14th Washington received a letter from the Comte de Grasse announcing his intention to sail from Saint Domingo on August 3rd for the Chesapeake.²²⁶ In view of this information it was decided to abandon the attack on New York,* and on August 21st the allied army was set in motion for Virginia. The following day Cornwallis concentrated his entire command²²⁷ at Yorktown and on the 30th the fleet under de Grasse reached the Chesapeake,²²⁸ 3,200 French troops being landed at Jamestown Island on September 3rd and Williamsburg occupied by the joint forces of the Comte de Saint-Simon and Lafayette two days subsequently.

Meanwhile the British had made desperate efforts to intercept the two French fleets but — luckily for the allies —

* “*The supreme moment of Washington’s military career had come — the moment for realizing a conception which had nothing of a Fabian character about it, for it was a conception of the same order as those in which Cæsar and Napoleon dealt. He decided at once to transfer his army to Virginia and overwhelm Cornwallis.*” — Fiske, II, p. 275.

their plans had miscarried.²²⁹ On September 5th, Admiral Graves entered the Chesapeake, but de Grasse, slipping out, drew him off to the southward and manœvered with such skill that for five days the English were unable to bring on a decisive action. De Grasse then put back into the bay and found the squadron under de Barras safely at anchor.²³⁰ He was followed by Graves but that Admiral, finding himself completely outnumbered, renounced his attempts and set sail for New York.²³¹

On the 14th Washington and Rochambeau reached Lafayette's headquarters at Williamsburg, where the entire Allied armies were concentrated eleven days later,²³² their march in nowise slackened by Clinton's counterstroke in the shape of an invasion of Connecticut conducted by Benedict Arnold,²³³ which accomplished nothing except the destruction of New London.²³⁴ On September 28th the Allied armies advanced to a position within two miles of Yorktown and on the following day began the investment of the place. A week later the siege guns began their work with such effect that on October 17th Cornwallis offered to capitulate, and on the 19th his 8,000 men²³⁵ defiled between the French and American armies to the tune of "*The World Turned Upside Down*,"²³⁶ surrendered their colours and laid down their arms.²³⁷ This crowning success came none too soon, for on that memorable day Clinton sailed from New York with a powerful fleet and 7,000 of his best troops to relieve Cornwallis, arriving at the mouth of the Chesapeake five days later, only to have to turn back from his fruitless mission.²³⁸

Without the timely assistance of Rochambeau, de Grasse and de Barras, it is doubtful that the struggling colonies would ever have achieved their independence. As the war progressed the response to the military necessities diminished,²³⁹ and in 1781 not 30,000 troops were furnished by the States,²⁴⁰ whereas at the most critical moment the British had over 38,000 effective men.²⁴¹ The service thus rendered by France was incalculable.²⁴²

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Although the war was virtually terminated with the surrender of Cornwallis, the cessation of arms did not officially occur until fourteen months later,²⁴³ so that Washington wisely prepared for further operations²⁴⁴ but without the necessary troops being forthcoming.²⁴⁵ On April 19, 1783, Washington, following in the footsteps of Congress,²⁴⁶ proclaimed the cessation of hostilities,²⁴⁷ on September 3rd the definitive treaty of peace was signed at Paris,²⁴⁸ on November 2nd, he delivered his farewell address to the army²⁴⁹ which was disbanded next day,²⁵⁰ and on December 23rd he resigned his commission.²⁵¹

CHAPTER III

LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

AS a result of the blundering military policy pursued, the maximum number of troops raised in any year¹ was 89,661, of whom 42,700 were militia.² Owing to the principal dependence being placed upon untrained men, the largest force that Washington was able to assemble for battle was less than 17,000; at Trenton and Princeton, when the fate of the cause trembled in the balance, his effective strength was less than 4,000.³ A careful study of the conduct of the regular or Continental troops throughout the Revolution will abundantly demonstrate that a standing army is one of the least dangers to which American freedom can be exposed.⁴ The fear of "militarism" caused the wise plan suggested by Greene⁵ and the reiterated recommendations of Washington to go unheeded and, as a logical consequence, our first war was attended by an extravagance in men and money utterly unjustifiable. Of regulars or Continental troops 231,771⁶ and no less than 164,087 militia⁷ saw service, a total of 395,858, whereas the entire British force from first to last was only about 150,605⁸—in other words the Americans used nearly three men to their enemy's one. The war cost the United States \$370,000,000,⁹ and pensions to the amount of \$70,000,000 have been paid in consequence of it.¹⁰

Unflattering though it be to American pride, it is none the less true that, notwithstanding our employment of over 395,000 men, only two military events had a direct bearing upon the ultimate expulsion of the British. The first was the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777, the second the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781—and the

latter was only rendered possible by the timely assistance of a French army and a French fleet.¹¹

From a military standpoint the errors in the policy followed during the Revolution may be summarized under twelve headings, namely:

- (1) The total inability to comprehend that the military resources can only be utilized to best advantage by a central government to which the entire nation owes paramount allegiance, and that any delegation of that power to the States must obviously weaken the national military strength and correspondingly increase the national expenditures;
- (2) the failure to realize that, in a military system which combines the use of regulars and volunteers or militia, men in the absence of compulsion or strong inducement will invariably enlist in the organization most lax in discipline;
- (3) the enlisting of troops for too short periods of service;
- (4) entirely too great dependence placed upon militia, instead of
- (5) maintaining an adequate force of trained officers and soldiers; the substituting for the armies in the field, and the increasing of them by new and untrained organizations in place of keeping the former up to their full strength at all times;
- (6) the pernicious use of bounties, both State and National — the logical result of short enlistments, the dearth of proper provisions for recruiting, and the failure to recruit "for the war" only;
- (7) the depriving of organizations of their officers by detaching them on detached duty, owing to the failure to provide the requisite number of officers for staff duty, recruiting, etc.;
- (8) the neglect to make full use of drafting when all other methods had failed to obtain the men needed;
- (9) the enormously increased expense caused by the unnecessarily large number of troops under pay, the wanton waste resulting from lack of discipline and the heavy losses from sickness which is inevitable among raw troops;

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- (10) the needless protraction of the war owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed;
- (11) the absolute lack of a definite military policy by Congress at any time during the war — the consequent inability of the commander-in-chief to formulate any sound plan of campaign and the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts;
- (12) unnecessary increase in the pension list.”¹²

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE END OF THE REVOLUTION UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF 1812

WASHINGTON'S solicitude for our national military welfare did not terminate with the Revolution, but even before resigning his commission he thus set forth his views as to a proper peace establishment for the defence of the republic,¹ expressing a belief that

“due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. . . . It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed.”

Notwithstanding this sound advice, the moment that independence was an accomplished fact, the States all hastened to arrogate to themselves almost every attribute of sovereignty. In the midst of the most critical period in the history of the United States, when the national credit at home and abroad was completely exhausted and when the country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, Congress saw fit to disband all that remained of the Continental Army except 80 soldiers destined to guard public stores²—its action being tantamount to a declaration that a Regular Army would be dispensed with at the outset of the republic.³ Throwing to the

winds the lessons of the Revolution, it promptly proceeded to raise a mixed regiment of 700 infantry and artillery drawn from the militia of four States to protect the northwestern frontiers and to garrison the posts about to be evacuated by the British.⁴ Within a year, however, the need of a certain amount of regular troops was recognized and a regiment of equal numbers was authorized for the same purpose, the enlistment being for three years.⁵ Eighteen months later⁶ a further increase was made⁷ and the two organizations merged into a "legionary corps"⁸ but, although the States were urged to "use their utmost efforts to raise the quotas of troops respectively assigned them"⁹ with all possible expedition," their response was so meagre that only two companies of artillery were forthcoming.

The pygmy army just created had scarcely got ensconced on the frontiers than Shays' rebellion took place in Massachusetts, and the Government arsenal at Springfield narrowly escaped capture by the malcontents.¹⁰ Eight months later¹¹ another body of 700 men, enlisted for three years, was raised by resolution of Congress "in order to save the great expense of transporting new levies to the distant frontiers," "to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country" and in the hope of persuading the soldiers already in service to re-enlist.¹²

The feeble, ineffective and chaotic administration both of civil and military affairs under the existing system of government had produced a general conviction that a change was imperative, and Congress had recommended a convention of delegates from the States in order to revise the Articles of Confederation.¹³ This convention met at Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, and on September 17th the new constitution was signed and submitted to the States for ratification.¹⁴ The preamble recites that among other reasons it was instituted to "insure domestic tranquillity" and to "provide for the common defense." Several portions have a direct bearing upon military affairs,¹⁵ and a comparison of the

1787-1789]

war powers of Congress under the Confederation with those granted by the Constitution will suffice to show how radical was the change effected in the form of government. As Up-ton very pertinently remarks: ¹⁶

“Up to this time Congress could justly claim that its feeble and exhausting military policy was largely due to the inadequate powers conferred by the Articles of Confederation. Under the Constitution, however, the authority ‘to raise and support armies,’ ‘to provide and maintain a navy,’ ‘to levy and collect taxes,’ and ‘to borrow money on the credit of the United States’ was unqualified and gave every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask.

“Henceforth there could be no division of responsibility between the General Government and the States. If disasters should happen in the future . . . the whole responsibility must lie at the doors of a President and a Congress clothed with unlimited power to meet every emergency.

“Our liberties and independence, our country’s honor and credit were thus all committed to one General Government, IT BEING FULLY EXPECTED by a generous and confiding people THAT EACH REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THIS SACRED TRUST SHOULD REGARD THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AS ‘ONE OF THE CARDINAL DUTIES OF A STATESMAN.’”

In consequence of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the military as well as the civil affairs required an extensive overhauling, and the first act of importance pertaining to the former ¹⁷ created a War Department, presided over by a Secretary of War who was made responsible to the President instead of to Congress.¹⁸ The Act of September 29, 1789, laid the foundations of our present Army by recognizing “the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States,” by requiring all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance and by vesting the power to appoint officers in the President alone.¹⁹ By virtue of the fifth section the President was authorized, whenever it might be necessary to protect the frontiers against Indians, to call into service such militia as he should deem necessary, such militia when in service to have the same pay and subsistence as the

Regulars — a procedure which furnishes the key to our entire policy in respect to subsequent hostilities with the Indians.²⁰

The first general organization of the Army under the Constitution was effected by the Act of April 30, 1790, which fixed the strength of the Regular establishment at one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery,²¹ but no provision was made for a General Staff beyond permitting the President in his discretion to appoint one or two inspectors. General Harmar's expedition against the Miamis again demonstrated the folly of depending upon newly-formed militia²² and forced Congress to add another regiment of regulars to be enlisted for three years.²³ By virtue of the 8th section of this Act, the President was empowered to employ, "for a term not exceeding six months," a corps of 2,000 non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians in addition to, or in place of, the militia and, if such a corps should not be raised in time for active operations, to make good the deficiency by raising additional levies or by calling into service an equal number of militia;²⁴ while the 9th section authorized him "to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper."²⁵ As Upton points out:²⁶

"The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. *Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long civil war. The 'levies,' known later as 'volunteers,'* were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to 'raise and support armies,' and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the 'levies' *were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.*

"The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the governors of the States²⁷ was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution."

The disastrous rout of General St. Clair's expedition²⁸

1791-1812]

furnished another proof that the lessons which ought to have been taught by the Revolution and by Harmar's defeat had been wasted upon the Government, but it had the salutary effect of inducing Congress to complement the artillery and infantry then in service to their maximum strength and to add three new regiments of infantry,²⁹ thus bringing the strength of the Army up to 258 officers and 5,156 men.³⁰ During the succeeding twenty years the legislative enactments, depending largely upon our foreign relations and upon troubles with the Indians, caused the size of the Regular forces to vary greatly, as will be seen from the following table:

STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS³¹

Date	Officers	Men	Total
1792 to 1796	258	5,156	5,414 ³²
1796 to 1798	233	3,126	3,359 ³³
1798	783	13,638	14,421 ³⁴
1799	2,447	49,244	51,691 ³⁵
1800 to 1801	318	4,118	4,436 ³⁶
1802 to 1808	241	3,046	3,287 ³⁷
1808 to 1812	774	9,147	9,921 ³⁸

The various acts of Congress affecting the military and militia establishments are too numerous and complex to require insertion here, but a few of them are of sufficient importance to demand a cursory examination.

The diminutive size and temporary character of the military force created by the early American legislators demonstrate that their intention was to dispense with a standing army entirely; but as time wore on Shays' rebellion, the Whiskey rebellion, the continual trouble with the Indians and the complications with France, Spain and England, engendered a universal belief that national defence must not be disregarded. After considerable discussion, Congress inclined to its usual favourite and sought to appease public opinion by the organic law of May 8, 1792, entitled "An

act more effectually to provide for the national defense, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States." The opening section of this law prescribed that all able-bodied white men between the ages of 18 and 45 shall be enrolled in the militia, with the obligation to provide themselves with certain specified arms and accoutrements, as well as to appear equipped therewith when called out for duty or drill.³⁹ Section 2 exempted certain persons from military duty,⁴⁰ and Section 3 indicated the proper military organization and ventured the suggestion as to the composition of each brigade, "if the same be convenient," to the States,⁴¹ while the fourth section required at least one company of artillery and a troop of horse, exacting that all officers, privates and troops furnish their own arms and equipment as well as all necessary mounts for the cavalry and infantry.⁴² A mere glance at the military edifice erected by this law shows that it was founded upon the sands, and that Congress thus substantially handed over its war powers to the States, placing itself at their mercy as completely as during the darkest days of the Revolution. An admirable analysis of this far-reaching measure is thus given by Upton: ⁴³

"During the Revolution the Government shifted upon the States the responsibility of providing men, arms, and even daily supplies for the troops; but under the provisions of this law the Government and States went one step further, and shifted upon individual citizens the responsibility of providing their own arms, horses and equipments. No penalty was enacted for a failure to procure such supplies, Congress having no power to enforce it, and the States were therefore left to apply such penalties by way of fines as their legislatures might see fit to impose. Even had the citizen been willing to furnish at his own cost that which it was the unmistakable duty of the Government to provide, the further execution of the law depended wholly on the voluntary and concurrent action of the States, without which a 'uniform militia throughout the United States' would be impossible. . . .

"Aside, however, from the military defects of the system, it is only when we examine it from the standpoint of the taxpayer

1792-1799].

that its fundamental errors become fully apparent. For one National Army were substituted thirteen or more State armies. In place of having a small but efficient force of regulars, supported by indirect taxation, the citizens of each State were called upon to pay over their hard-earned dollars to maintain undisciplined bodies of militia, totally ignorant of the first principles of the military art. Even had all the States with patriotic regard for the welfare of the whole country maintained their quotas of militia during the long intervals of peace, they would have been at the expense of a large military force for the benefit of the General Government, and that, too, without compensation except in time of war. If, on the contrary, as has since happened, certain States should fail to keep up a militia, the burden of their shortcomings would be unjustly borne by the remainder.

“View it in whatever light we may, the conversion of the militia into an army of the first line, as designated by the law, was a wild and impracticable scheme.”⁴⁴

In 1798⁴⁵ the serious complications with England and France, especially the latter, caused an increase in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers,⁴⁶ an appropriation of \$1,200,000 was made for fortifications, arms and munitions of war,⁴⁷ and an authorization to the President “in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of our imminent danger of such invasion, . . . to raise a force of 10,000 noncommissioned officers and men, to be enlisted for the period of three years.”⁴⁸ Washington was appointed commander-in-chief with the rank of Lieutenant-General but, although this army was never called into service, it is manifest that the intention was to eliminate the militia, to place all dependence upon regulars and volunteers and, so far as the former were concerned, not to repeat the blunder of short enlistments.⁴⁹

Ten months had not elapsed before Congress, still in dread of war, sanctioned⁵⁰ a large increase in the military establishment,⁵¹ authorized the President to accept the services of 75,000 volunteers, with power to organize them into regiments, brigades and divisions, as well as to appoint all necessary officers. Then having done an excellent piece of

work, Congress proceeded to nullify a large measure of it by inserting a fatal proviso that "the said volunteers shall not be compelled to serve out of the State in which they reside, or for a longer time than three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous." On the other hand, it incorporated a section authorizing the President to make use of these volunteers in all cases where he was empowered to call out the militia.⁵²

"Thus, in addition to the Regular Army, the military legislation of that period, profiting by our Revolutionary experience, had provided a body of national volunteers, officered by the President, to take the place of the State militia troops. *Had this organization come down* to the beginning of our late war,⁵³ or even had the companies only been raised by the State authorities, leaving it to the President to organize them into battalions and regiments with a professional soldier at the head of each,⁵⁴ it is more than probable that in one-half the time 300,000 men would have done the work finally accomplished by little less than 3,000,000."⁵⁵

The complications with France having been adjusted without war, the additional force was disbanded by the Act of May 14, 1800.⁵⁶

During this entire period, by far the most important measure was the Act of March 16, 1802, in which the reiterated urgings of Washington, Hamilton, Knox and Pickering were heeded by the creation of a Military Academy at West Point,⁵⁷ and second in its beneficial effects was that of April 29, 1812, increasing the number of cadets to 250,⁵⁸ thus vitalizing it⁵⁹ and enabling it to furnish most of the officers needed by the Army in time of peace.


From 1802 to 1808, all Congressional measures, whether offensive or defensive, were directed toward the almost exclusive use of the militia and volunteers. The advent of Thomas Jefferson, who was thoroughly imbued with democratic ideas and to whom anything that smacked of a dominant central Government or the augmentation of its existing powers was strongly repugnant,⁶⁰ doubtless exercised its in-

1803-1808]

fluence. Indeed, in his first annual message to Congress,⁶¹ he deprecated the superfluous size of the army⁶² and its maintenance in time of peace as a defence against invasion in war, declaring that the only dependable force is "the body of neighboring citizens as formed into a militia"⁶³ and emphasizing the necessity of rectifying the militia laws "until they are sufficiently perfect."⁶⁴ Throughout his utterances as President is the underlying principle of dependence upon a citizen-soldiery,⁶⁵ which he suggested should be raised to the number of 300,000⁶⁶ and classified.⁶⁷ As the founder and leader of democracy in America, his views are of special significance, doubly so since they have persisted to a greater or less degree until to-day.⁶⁸ It is therefore particularly interesting to see the reversal of opinion on his part in subsequent years when his doctrines as to national defence were put to the test of war.⁶⁹

Within thirteen months of Jefferson's first inauguration the army was further reduced and re-organized,⁷⁰ and one year later, when war was impending with Spain, no attempt was made to increase it, but the President was authorized to require such State governors as he selected "to hold in readiness to march at a moment's notice a detachment of 80,000, officers included."⁷¹ The third section of this law remanded the appointment of volunteer officers to the States and, most unfortunately for our military welfare, became the basis of the system used throughout the Mexican War and the War of the Rebellion.⁷² In 1807 there were unmistakable evidences that a war with England was brewing, but again resort was had to volunteers limited to twelve months' service,⁷³ with the proviso that all militia which volunteered as organizations "shall continue to be commanded by the officers holding commissions in the same"⁷⁴ at the time of such tender." The indications of war becoming stronger in the spring of 1808, an increase was at last made in the Regular Army⁷⁵ to an authorized strength of 9,921, but two years later, when the war was recognized to be unavoidable, Con-

gress remained supine, and it was not until the end of 1811 that further action was taken in the shape of a bounty of \$16 to all new recruits enlisting for five years or former soldiers re-enlisting for the same term.⁷⁶ At the beginning of 1812, on the eve of war, a succession of six acts sought too late to raise the necessary forces⁷⁷ and to effect the organization which can only be done in time of profound peace. Short enlistments were again resorted to, and the distressing fact became apparent that, after twenty-five years of independence, the nation was about to embark upon a war against a great Power with officers scarcely more efficient than those who led the Continental Army at the beginning of the Revolution. The outbreak of hostilities found the entire military establishment in the utmost chaos, and no better evidence of the confusion that is inevitable at the commencement of war, just so long as Congress in time of peace neglects to make suitable provision for national defence, could be adduced than the military legislation of this period.⁷⁸



THE WAR OF 1812



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CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF 1812

THE declaration of war against Great Britain occurred on June 18th, at which time our entire standing army was only 6,744, while the British regulars in Canada numbered less than 4,500 effectives.¹ Before any active operations could be undertaken, the conflicting organizations of our military establishment² had to be rectified,³ and a modification in the law respecting the 30,000 volunteers⁴ was made to permit the President to appoint all the company, field and general officers thereof.⁵ The United States was accordingly deprived of the advantage which ought to have been taken of the enemy's weakness, and military action had to be superseded *ad interim* by military legislation.⁶

The wisdom of the Constitution in vesting in Congress the sole power to raise and support armies was strikingly demonstrated at the opening of hostilities, when the governors both of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to furnish their quotas of militia. The former denied the right of the President or Congress to determine when such exigencies arise as to require the militia to be called out and claimed that "this right is vested in the commanders in chief of the militia of the several States."⁷ The latter used virtually the same contention, and both raised the question as to whether the President had the right, even after the militia was ordered into the United States' service, to assign Army officers to command it.⁸

"As every citizen fit for military duty was incorporated in the militia, it is evident that Congress could not avail itself of

the services of any militia organization, in opposition to the commands of the governor, without forcing its members to disobey orders. Nor could Congress accept the services of individuals, either as volunteers or regulars, without encouraging the crime of desertion, for the law made no exceptions in favor of citizens belonging to the military force of the United States.

"A partial repeal of the act of 1792⁹ was the only way in which Congress could have extricated itself from this dilemma. Such a course, however, would have amounted to a confession of the failure of that elaborate system of national defense, based upon the conversion of our people into a vast array of citizen soldiers. Nevertheless, it is a system under which any State or States not in sympathy with the purposes of the General Government, could successfully thwart the will of the nation.

"Under one particular form of government, and in a country of such vast extent, the possible lukewarmness or opposition of one or more of the States, makes it the more important that the whole war power of the nation should be wielded exclusively by the direct representatives of the States and of the people, in Congress assembled."¹⁰

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812

With the outbreak of war came the cry throughout the country of "On to Canada," and General Hull with a mixed force of regulars and volunteers and militia crossed the Ste. Marie River from Detroit¹¹ in July, but soon withdrew and permitted the British to invest them in Detroit. At the end of eight days the entire American garrison,¹² without so much as firing a shot, surrendered to a force numbering about 320 regulars, 400 militia and 600 Indians.¹³ Within a month the control of the entire Northwest was lost and the initiative passed to the enemy, who was promptly joined by nearly all the Indians in that region.

The ignominious fiasco of Hull served only to stiffen the American determination to expel the British, to invade Canada and to punish the Indian tribes in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. One expedition of 4,000 Kentucky mounted militia under General Hopkins started from Fort Harrison, Indiana, on October 14th, for the Wabash and Illinois Rivers, but five

1812]

days later the troops mutinied, deserted their officers and dispersed to their homes.¹⁴ A similar fate attended the expedition to the rapids of the Maumee River under General William Henry Harrison during the same month.¹⁵

The operations on Niagara frontier were equally unsuccessful. A sorry body of New York militia under General Van Rensselaer¹⁶ was re-enforced by 900 regulars and additional militia, under General Wadsworth,¹⁷ attacked the British at Queenstown on October 13th and got a sound beating,¹⁸ the militia — except one detachment — mutinying and refusing to cross the river to the support of the troops already on the other side who successfully stormed and captured the enemy's batteries.¹⁹ Nearly seven weeks later²⁰ a second attempt was made to invade Canada by a force of 4,500 under General Smyth who, notwithstanding a bombastic proclamation,²¹ lost heart and ordered the troops already embarked back to the American side. A second embarkation²² three days later was likewise recalled and the expedition abandoned, much to the anger of the troops who had at first been opposed to the invasion.²³

Meanwhile a force of 5,737 troops under General Dearborn had been assembled in the vicinity of Lake Champlain for the purpose of invading Canada by way of Montreal. In November the advance began but, upon reaching the frontier, "of the 3,000 militia . . . nearly all refused to cross the line . . . but halted at the very border."²⁴ A reconnaissance to the La Colle River and the capture of a block-house constituted the extent of its exploits which ended in winter quarters.²⁵

Such were the achievements of the American forces, which numbered not less than 65,000 men,²⁶ in the face of an enemy never estimated to exceed 1,450²⁷ and in reality even less.²⁸ The utter worthlessness of the new system inaugurated by the pernicious Act of 1792²⁹ was demonstrated in the succession of failures and disasters which characterized this campaign.³⁰

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813

At the beginning of the year Congress realized that something must be done immediately or the disasters of the previous campaign would be irretrievable. It therefore granted a bounty in the shape of \$24 advanced pay to every soldier enlisting, after February 1st, for five years or during the war,³¹ its object being "to complete the present military establishment to the full number authorized by law, with the greatest possible despatch."³² The sixth section of this act wisely rectified the most glaring defect in the law of 1792³³ by permitting militia to enlist in the United States Army. Nine days later, apprehensive lest the inducements already made would fail to secure sufficient men, Congress reverted to short enlistments, and authorized the President to increase the Regular infantry by twenty regiments, aggregating 57,351 men, who were to be enlisted for one year only.³⁴ The other legislation during the year was principally concerned with the increase of the staff, which was effected in the lower grades by detailing officers from the line. As usual, these measures contained fundamental defects, for the saving in staff officers' pay was more than counterbalanced by depriving many of the companies and battalions of their proper quota of officers.³⁵

In view of the immense number of militia employed in 1812 without commensurate results, the Government limited the army under General Harrison to 7,000 men,³⁶ being driven to the use of regulars by public opinion clamouring for a more vigorous and efficient prosecution of the war. The campaign, like that of the preceding year, began disastrously. The advanced-guard of the army, under General Winchester,³⁷ moved forward into Michigan in response to an appeal from the settlers on the River Raisin but was annihilated by the British General Proctor,³⁸ the Kentucky militia running away ignominiously.³⁹ On February 1st, Winchester with a new force of 2,000 started back to the

1813]

Miami and constructed an entrenched post at Fort Meigs, but was besieged there ⁴⁰ by Proctor,⁴¹ who routed a relieving force of Kentucky militia under General Clay ⁴² but was unable to take the fort. As a matter of fact, so heavy were the American losses ⁴³ that the prestige, if not the actual fruits, of a victory inured to the British.⁴⁴ Again in July Proctor appeared at Fort Meigs, left a force of Indians under Tecumseh to blockade the place and moved against Fort Stephenson on the lower Sandusky River. His summons for surrender being refused by Major Croghan, he assaulted the fort ⁴⁵ but met with a repulse ⁴⁶ and, assembling his troops, retreated to Canada for the third time. Meanwhile additional militia had been called out in Ohio and Kentucky and had joined General Harrison, who crossed Lake Erie ⁴⁷ with more than 7,000 men, landed at Amherstburg on September 27th, pursued Proctor, overtook him and totally defeated him at the battle of the Thames ⁴⁸ on October 5th.⁴⁹ This success prompted the Indians of the Northwest to desert the British cause forthwith and restored to the Americans the territory lost. The usual blunder was then committed. Instead of the victory being followed up, the army was disbanded, the militia and twelve months' volunteers discharged, while General Harrison took his 1,300 Regulars by water from Detroit to Buffalo.

“The cost of dispersing the 800 British regulars, who from the first to last had made prisoners of Hull’s army at Detroit, let loose the Northwestern Indians, defeated and captured Winchester’s command at Frenchtown, besieged the Northwestern army at Fort Meigs, and twice invaded Ohio, having experienced but one rebuff, at the hands of a stripling in command of 160 regulars at Fort Stephenson—teaches a lesson well worth the attention of any statesman or financier.

“Not counting the hastily organized and half-filled regiments of regulars, sent to the West, the records of the Adjutant-General’s Office show that about 50,000 militia were called out in 1812 and 1813, from the States of Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, for service against Proctor’s command.”⁵⁰

“As further evidence that the keys of the Treasury were turned over to the States with no check, save the honesty of the officers who made out the muster-rolls, it need only be stated that up to April 14, 1813, ‘no return of any description’ from General Harrison’s division of the Army had ever been received at the Adjutant-General’s Office.”⁵¹

“The above facts would seem to offer conclusive proof that THE SAME MISTAKE IN STATESMANSHIP WHICH, IN TIME OF PEACE, GIVES US A NONEXPANSIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, IS CERTAIN TO BRING ABOUT, IN TIME OF WAR, USELESS SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIFE, UNLIMITED WASTE OF MONEY, AND NATIONAL HUMILIATION.”⁵²

*Military operations in the centre.*⁵³

On April 27th a successful attack was made on York — now Toronto — followed by the capture of Fort George by General Dearborn just a month later, and subsequently of all the forts on the Niagara frontier.⁵⁴ On May 29th the British under Sir George Prevost⁵⁵ attacked the garrison at Sackett’s Harbor, N. Y.,⁵⁶ but were repulsed with heavy loss⁵⁷ by the Regulars under Colonel Backus, while General Brown’s militia turned tail and ran, despite his efforts.⁵⁸

The retreat of Hampton and Wilkinson from Canada — to which allusion will presently be made — compelled a withdrawal of the regular garrison from Fort George, the defence of which was left to some New York militia under General McClure. Upon the approach of the British, this inexperienced officer evacuated the place on December 10th, burned the village of Newark⁵⁹ and retreated to the American shore, his troops mutinying *en route*.⁶⁰ Although he called out all the militia of the counties of Genesee, Niagara and Chautauqua, the British held these raw levies in such contempt that they determined upon a counter-invasion, crossed the Niagara River to Black Rock on December 19th, captured Fort Niagara “through the criminal negligence of its commander,” and, in revenge for the destruction of Newark, burned Buffalo, Lewistown and several other places,⁶¹ while the militia ran away quite as fast as did the inhabitants.⁶²

Military operations in the North.

Shameful as were the fiascos in the central zone, they were insignificant as compared with the fate of the two columns which undertook to invade Canada from the northern frontier. General Hampton with about 5,000 new-recruited regulars⁶³ started from Lake Champlain, crossed the border, was repulsed at Chateauguay on October 26th by a paltry force of 800 Canadian militia and Indians,⁶⁴ and ignominiously retreated to Plattsburg. General Wilkinson, with 8,000 regulars,⁶⁵ assembled at the foot of Lake Ontario and advanced down the St. Lawrence. On November 11th, his advanced-guard, composed of about 1,700 men, encountered 800 British regulars at Chrystler's Fields, and, after a fight of two hours, being unable to dislodge the enemy and having lost 338 men, it fell back to its boats. A council of war then decided to abandon the attack on Montreal, the troops retreated to the American shore and went into winter quarters.⁶⁶ In a word, two American columns numbering fully 13,000 and composed for the most part of regulars, faltered and recoiled before an enemy of only 2,000!

“Want of cooperation, superannuated and incompetent commanders, newly enlisted and undisciplined men, inexperienced officers — all the fruits of a bad military policy — were the causes of these humiliating defeats.

“The story of Hampton's nerveless campaign affords perhaps the most satisfactory demonstration of THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF, ONCE AND FOR ALL, DOING AWAY WITH A MILITARY SYSTEM WHICH, as under the Confederation, STILL BASED ITSELF UPON THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE STATES.”⁶⁷

That Massachusetts and Connecticut defied the United States Government by refusing to furnish their militia to its service has already been seen.⁶⁸ In Vermont Governor Chittenden, being bitterly opposed to the war, sought to embarrass the Government by a proclamation, dated November 10, 1813, whereby he commanded a brigade of Vermont militia⁶⁹ to return to their homes “within the territorial

limits of their own brigade, there to repel if need be, the enemy's invasion, either in co-operation with troops of the United States or separately, as might be necessary," declaring

"that, in his opinion, the military strength and resources of the State must be reserved for its own defense and protection exclusively."⁷⁰

Some of the officers refused to be parties to any such attempt to produce insubordination and mutiny,⁷¹ but the governor persisted in his stand and in the following year went even to greater lengths.

Military operations on the Chesapeake.

After two declarations by the British Government of a state of blockade embracing the entire Atlantic coast⁷²—with the notable exception of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island⁷³—a fleet under Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake on March 4th and, being joined by Admiral Warren and a force from Bermuda, spent the next two months burning and destroying towns.⁷⁴ The inhabitants, to whom more than 66,000 militia afforded no protection,⁷⁵ sought to defend their property themselves, but this disregard for the rules of civilized warfare entailed reprisals, until the unhappy people were glad to throw themselves on the mercy of their enemies. In June, Admiral Warren, who had gone back to Bermuda, returned with reinforcements amounting to 2,650 infantry and marines, attacked Norfolk⁷⁶ on the 20th and was repulsed, but captured and destroyed Hampton on the 25th.⁷⁷ The remainder of the year the British devoted to maintaining the blockade.

The Creek War.

On August 30th, one thousand Creek warriors surprised Fort Mims in southern Alabama and massacred the garrison. Tennessee promptly authorized the raising of 3,500 volunteers and, on October 11th, 2,500 were concentrated at

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Huntsville under General Andrew Jackson. A fortnight later he began his march, and on November 3rd and 9th at Tallasahatchee and Talladega he inflicted crushing defeats upon the Indians.⁷⁸ The war would doubtless have come to a sudden end but a dearth of supplies — “due in large degree to the failure of the Government to properly organize the staff departments, until hostilities with Great Britain became imminent”⁷⁹ — forced Jackson to withdraw to Fort Strother, where he spent ten days in argument with his hungry and insubordinate troops. This furnished a very amusing incident; first, the militia mutinied but were suppressed by the volunteers, then the volunteers revolted but were brought to order by the militia, with the aid of the guns. Jackson, realizing that no good could be derived from the volunteers, permitted them to return to Nashville, where they were disbanded; but no sooner was this difficulty overcome than his militia, as well as the 2,000 under General Cocke sent to re-enforce him, again became disaffected and deserted him almost to a man.⁸⁰

Troops employed in 1813.

Exclusive of rangers and volunteers,⁸¹ the troops called out in that year amounted to 149,148, only 19,036 being regulars and the rest — 130,112 — militia.⁸² Of the latter 66,376 from Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia and North Carolina spent their time in observing the 2,600 regulars and marines on the British fleets, their assistance to the despoiled inhabitants or their resistance to the enemy being virtually *nil*. As Upton remarks,⁸³

“The only compensation for the employment of so many troops during the campaign, was the destruction of Proctor’s force of 800 regulars, a feat that would have been impossible, but for the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie.”

Far from realizing the cherished dream of a conquest of Canada, the second year of this war witnessed the expulsion of the Americans from the enemy’s territory, followed by a

counter-invasion and the destruction of the towns along the entire Niagara frontier, while farther south the British plundered our coasts at will.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

The urgency for expediting enlistments caused a modification of the law of January 20, 1813,⁸⁴ and offered each man enlisting for five years a bounty of \$124 in lieu of the \$16 and three months' pay previously granted. The amount of cash thus obtained upon enlistment was more than tripled,⁸⁵ much to the detriment of the national exchequer,⁸⁶ but even this increase was rendered nugatory by the sums paid by many of the militia for substitutes.⁸⁷ The Act of February 10th added five regiments of rifles enlisted for five years or "during the war," and the Act of March 30th, re-organized the Army⁸⁸—all of these measures being taken too late, as usual, for the men secured to be of any use during the campaign.⁸⁹

"Although the paper aggregate reached 62,773,⁹⁰ an increase of more than 5,000 over the previous year, despite the actual tripling of the bounty, the strength of the Army in September was but 38,186 men. In December the grant in land, due after the soldier's discharge, was doubled, making it 320 acres; yet, notwithstanding this encouragement, the Army dwindled away until it was only 33,424 strong in February, 1815. This falling off was largely due to desertion, which, as was the case during the Revolution, every increase of the bounty seemed to stimulate.

"The figures just given are but another proof that VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENTS, EVEN WHEN AIDED BY EXTRAVAGANT BOUNTIES, CAN NOT BE DEPENDED UPON IN A WAR OF ANY DURATION. Forced to devise various schemes for raising men, the Government, in this instance, was only able to avoid a draft by the speedy termination of the war."⁹¹

Military operations on the Niagara frontier.

The Regulars at Buffalo spent the winter and spring in drill and instruction, the effect of which was shortly evi-

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dent. On July 3rd the army crossed the Niagara, captured Fort Erie that same day, won the battle of Chippewa on the 5th,⁹² and fought a drawn battle at Lundy's Lane twenty days later.⁹³ General Brown then fell back to Fort Erie, which he proceeded to strengthen immediately, and on August 2nd the enemy under General Drummond appeared and invested the place. Early on the morning of the 15th he endeavoured to carry the fort by storm but met with a bloody repulse. The siege was continued, however, until a successful sortie was made and the fort demolished by the Americans, who crossed to the New York side and went into winter quarters at Buffalo.⁹⁴

Military operations on the northern frontier.

The opening invasion of Canada in 1814 was planned to begin from the northern theatre, and on March 30th General Wilkinson, notwithstanding a grandiloquent exhortation to his troops the day before,⁹⁵ permitted his force of nearly 4,000 regulars to be checked at La Colle Mill⁹⁶ by 180 men in a stone building, and his invasion came to an abrupt end.⁹⁷

Wilkinson was succeeded by General Izard but, just when the Governor-General of Canada, General Sir George Prevost, was preparing to advance up Lake Champlain with 11,000 veterans, mostly from Wellington's Peninsular army, he was ordered to march to Sackett's Harbor with 4,000 troops, thus reducing the American force at Plattsburg to 1,500 effectives under General Macomb.⁹⁸ On September 11th Prevost began his attack,⁹⁹ but the total destruction of his fleet by Commodore Macdonough that day sent him packing back to Canada and saved the American land forces from annihilation.¹⁰⁰ At the beginning of the month Macomb had appealed to Governor Chittenden "for aid, not to invade Canada, but defend Vermont." A second appeal met with equally small success, his answer being "that he had no authority to order the militia to leave the state."¹⁰¹

While the governor skulked in his house at Jericho, many of the Vermont militia, hearing the cannonade at Plattsburg, crossed the lake without orders, joined Macomb in the fight and were rewarded by a share in the booty captured during the British retreat.¹⁰²

The capture of Washington.

In spite of the presence of a British fleet with 3,000 troops on board in the Chesapeake for nearly a year, no attention was paid by President Madison and his cabinet to the danger that threatened the capital. It was not until July first that any steps were taken for defence. A succession of measures followed,¹⁰³ almost childlike in their feebleness and all looking to raw troops, but on August 20th approval was given to a call of the militia *en masse* made by General Winder. On the following day the troops¹⁰⁴ were assembled and the articles of war read to them. On August 22nd this so-called army, which its commander described as "suddenly assembled without organization," devoid of discipline and of officers with any knowledge of service,¹⁰⁵ was reviewed in state by the President and his Cabinet. Two days later, in the presence of the same high officials, it was hopelessly routed at Bladensburg, Maryland, by less than 1,500 British,¹⁰⁶ the militia fleeing ignominiously and so rapidly that the American loss was only 8 killed and 11 wounded.¹⁰⁷ The British occupied Washington that evening, burned many public buildings, decamped next day and on the 29th were safely back on board their warships.¹⁰⁸ The President and his officials fled into Maryland and Virginia; the Secretary of War, General John Armstrong, whose obstinacy and inefficiency were held to be responsible for the disaster,¹⁰⁹ was forced to take refuge in Baltimore where he resigned his portfolio,¹¹⁰ and chaos reigned generally. The British made a combined land and naval attack on Baltimore on September 13th and 14th but were repulsed,¹¹¹ and in October their fleet sailed for Jamaica. The new Secretary

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of War, James Monroe, proposed to raise men by drafting, a measure which would have been inevitable had not a treaty of peace been signed at Ghent on December 24th.¹¹²

*Creek War.*¹¹³

Meanwhile, a levy of three months' militia had been ordered by the governor of Tennessee, thus producing 2,500 men, General Jackson had been joined by the 39th United States Infantry and by the end of February he found himself at the head of nearly 5,000 assembled at Fort Strother. Advancing with 3,000 men, he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Indians at the Horse Shoe Bend of the Tallapoosa River on March 27th, thus terminating a war which would have been ended long before had it not been for the use of raw troops enlisted for too short service.¹¹⁴

Troops employed in 1814.

“The troops called out in this fruitless campaign numbered:

Regulares	38,186
Militia	197,653

“Total 235,839¹¹⁵

“Of the militia 46,469 from the State of New York were employed on the Canadian frontier, while more than 100,000 from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia were called out to repel the incursions of the 3,500 British along the shores of the Chesapeake.

“Notwithstanding these enormous drafts, such were the faults of our organization and recruitments, that the utmost strength we could put forth on the field of battle was represented at Lundy's Lane by less than 3,000 men. Nor was this evidence of national weakness our only cause of reproach. Boasting at the outset of the contest that Canada could be ‘captured without soldiers, that a few volunteers and militia could do the business,’ our statesmen, after nearly three years of war, had the humiliation of seeing their plans of conquest vanish in the smoke of a burning capital.”¹¹⁶

In marked contrast to the continual disasters on land was

the almost unbroken succession of splendid victories achieved at sea,¹¹⁷ thus affording abundant proof of the merit of the system used with respect to the Navy and the folly of the method employed for our land forces. Indeed even Jefferson who, as governor of Virginia in the Revolution, had utterly failed to offer the slightest opposition to the capture and burning of Richmond by Benedict Arnold,¹¹⁸ and who throughout his public career had continually advocated dependence upon a citizen-soldiery,¹¹⁹ became so disgusted with the inefficiency of the militia during the first two years of this war that, fourteen months before the climax was reached in the disgraceful rout at Bladensburg, he wrote to James Monroe that

*“ It proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free state. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. WE MUST TRAIN AND CLASSIFY THE WHOLE OF OUR MALE CITIZENS, AND MAKE MILITARY INSTRUCTION A REGULAR PART OF COLLEGIATE EDUCATION. WE CAN NEVER BE SAFE TILL THIS IS DONE.”*¹²⁰

Drastic as was the measure proposed, his assertion was quite in harmony with a similar outburst on his part thirty-two years previously when he, as governor of Virginia, found himself at his wit's end owing to his inability to procure the necessary militia to check the British inroads, and so harassed by their refusal to respond to his calls, their insubordination, mutinies, desertions and utter worthlessness,¹²¹ that he had vented his spleen in a letter dated March 1, 1781, to Richard Henry Lee, the Speaker of the House of Delegates, in which he said:

*“ Whether it be practicable to raise and maintain a sufficient number of regulars to carry on the war is a question. That it would be burdensome is undoubted yet it is perhaps as certain that no possible mode of carrying it on can be so expensive to the public, so distressing and disgusting to individuals as the militia.”*¹²²

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In view of two such candid statements, both made under the stress of war, it is surprising that in the years which intervened he should have advocated such dependence as he did¹²³ upon the very class of troops that he condemned so unreservedly.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815

The military operations of the last year of the war were short and decisive. The British expedition up the Chesapeake, which ended in the destruction of Washington and the attack on Baltimore in 1814, was originally intended as a feint to draw both attention and the American forces away from Louisiana, which the English purposed to invade preparatory to taking possession of the valley of the Mississippi.¹²⁴ Pursuant to this plan, a force of 7,000 troops¹²⁵ — which had assembled at Jamaica in November, 1814, but whose departure¹²⁶ was delayed for ten days until the arrival of Commodore Lloyd's squadron from Fayal¹²⁷ — reached the mouth of the Mississippi on December 9th, and disembarked at Isle des Pois below New Orleans between the 16th and 20th, but was surprised to find that General Jackson had already begun preparations to meet them.¹²⁸ Some preliminary engagements and two spirited attacks¹²⁹ convinced General Pakenham¹³⁰ that the task was more than had been bargained for, and he resolved, now that additional reinforcements had reached him,¹³¹ to carry the American entrenchments on both sides of the river by storm on January 8th. Meanwhile, through Jackson's indomitable energy and perseverance, the lines had been strengthened to such an extent as to be extremely formidable,¹³² and by the morning of the battle he had succeeded in collecting a force of 5,698 men, only a small fraction being regulars.¹³³ The bulk of his army was stationed on the east bank of the Mississippi in three lines, while on the west side was General Morgan "with only eight hundred men, all militia, and indifferently armed."¹³⁴

At dawn on January 8th, General Pakenham with 8,000 veteran troops — the flower of Wellington's Peninsular army — advanced to the attack, his columns in solid formation notwithstanding the fact that the ground was almost perfectly level and as smooth as a *glacis*. Upon their reaching a point 200 yards from the first line of entrenchments, the American fire rang out. In less than half an hour the battle was over, after frightful carnage among the British who fled in wildest confusion.¹³⁵ On the west bank, however, the scene was reversed. The troops under Colonel Thornton,¹³⁶ after many difficulties and being retarded by the strong current, disembarked with half of their original forces and came into action against Morgan's militia.¹³⁷ Just when the Americans across the river were cheering over a victory still unexampled in our history, just when the advance of a skirmish line might have brought about the capture of the British army, Jackson had the mortification of seeing the Kentuckians "abandon their position and run in headlong flight toward the city."¹³⁸ Driving the Louisianians out of their entrenchments and gaining possession of Morgan's line, Thornton routed Patterson's battery, but the *débâcle* of the British on the other bank and orders to rejoin the main army compelled him to fall back and to re-embark his troops at the close of the day.¹³⁹

On the 19th the British withdrew from the Mississippi and on the 29th returned to their fleet, but it was not until March 6th that news was received of the treaty which had been signed at Ghent fifteen days before the battle had been fought.¹⁴⁰

"While the nation had reason to exult over so signal a victory, the battle in no sense vindicated a dependence on raw troops. It only proved, as at Bunker Hill, that with trained officers to command them, with an effective artillery and regular troops to support and encourage them — above all, when protected by works so formidable that nothing but a regular siege should have dislodged them — advantages of position may compensate for an utter lack of instruction and discipline.

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“Agreeable as it might be to give the entire credit of this battle to raw troops, their heroic commander knew so well the uncertainty of their conduct in the open field that he was obliged to accept the advantages of a mere passive defense.”¹⁴¹

Troops employed during the War of 1812.

The number of troops under arms at various times during this war was:

Regulars (including about 5,000 sailors and marines)	56,032
Volunteers	10,110
Rangers	3,049
Militia	458,463

Total 527,654¹⁴²

Opposed to them was an enemy’s force which, so far as can be estimated, did not exceed 67,000 all told,¹⁴³ yet that war cost the United States \$86,627,009,¹⁴⁴ and no less than \$45,950,546 have already been paid in pensions on its account.¹⁴⁵

The Revolution lasted seven years, the War of 1812 two and a half. In the former more than four times as many regulars, but only about one-third as many militia, were employed as in the latter.¹⁴⁶ In the Revolution, aside from such victories as Trenton, Princeton, Monmouth, Stony Point, and King’s Mountain, Burgoyne’s force of 5,763 was captured in 1777, and four years later, with the aid of the French, Cornwallis was forced to capitulate with nearly 8,000.¹⁴⁷ Yet few of us realize that “*the only decisive victory of the War of 1812 before the conclusion of the treaty of peace was at the battle of the Thames, where the force of British regulars dispersed or captured*¹⁴⁸ *numbered but little more than 800.*”¹⁴⁹ The results speak for themselves.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY POLICY FROM THE CLOSE OF THE WAR OF 1812 TO THE BEGINNING OF THE MEXICAN WAR

HOSTILITIES were no sooner over than the policy of retrenchment was again resorted to and the peace establishment was fixed at 10,000 men,¹ but the organization of the Army was still defective.² The Act of April 24, 1816, imperfect as it was in many respects,³ created the first permanent peace establishment in which both the line and the staff were duly represented.⁴ A vigorous protest from General Jackson in 1817 put an end to the issuance of orders from the War Department directly to officers without being transmitted through the division commanders.⁵

SEMINOLE WAR

In 1817 began this war which originated in a massacre of a detachment⁶ on the Apalachicola River, Florida, on November 30th, followed a fortnight later by an attack by the Indians on Fort Scott, Georgia. In March, 1818, General Jackson advanced into Florida with 1,800 men and, being joined in April by General McIntosh with 1,500 Creeks, destroyed the Mikasuky villages, captured the Spanish garrison at St. Marks, burned a large Indian village, invested the Spanish Fort Barrancas, bombarded it and forced it to surrender after two days, on May 27th.

The management of this war was quite in keeping with the policy followed during the Revolution and the War of 1812. For lack of sufficient regulars, Generals Jackson and Gaines, in defiance of statutory law and orders, undertook to organize volunteers and Indians and mustered them into the

United States' service. Although Jackson finished in three months this war against a "miserable, undisciplined banditti of deluded Indians and fugitive slaves, their whole strength when combined not exceeding 1,000 men,"⁷ no less a force than 6,911 had to be called into service.⁸ As Upton remarks:⁹

"Needless extravagance is not the valuable lesson to be drawn from this war. It lies in the proof, recorded by a committee of the Senate, that the greatest dangers to which our liberties have thus far been exposed have occurred in time of war, not through the presence, but for the want of, a sufficient disciplined army."

REORGANIZATION OF 1821

Pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives on May 11, 1820, instructing the Secretary of War to bring forward at the next session

"a plan for the reduction of the Army to 6,000 noncommissioned officers and privates, and preserving such parts of the Corps of Engineers as, in his opinion, without regard to that number, it may be for the public interest to retain,"

Mr. Calhoun complied with a project worthy of the most careful study even at the present time. It is a very remarkable document, insomuch as he traced the general scheme for an expansive organization such as almost every army in the world has now found it necessary to adopt. In his report to Congress, made in December, 1820, Mr. Calhoun wrote:

"If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascendancy, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge, just as in our physical system a state of the most dangerous excitement and paroxysm follows that of the greatest debility and prostration. To avoid these dangerous consequences, and to prepare the country to meet a state of war, particularly at its commencement, with honor and safety, much must depend on the organization of our military peace establishment, and I have accordingly, in a plan about to be proposed

for the reduction of the Army, directed my attention mainly to that point, believing it to be of the greatest importance.

*"To give such an organization, the leading principles in its formation ought to be, that AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING EITHER TO NEW MODEL OR TO CREATE. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and war formations of the Army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter, and the only change in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary."*¹⁰

*"It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder, and the weakness and danger which otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle: First, the organization of the staff in a peace establishment ought to be such that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and posts occupied may render necessary; and, secondly, that the organization of the line ought, as far as practicable, to be such that in passing from the peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments or battalions, thus raising the war, on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of creating a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war."*¹¹

Irrespective of certain defects,¹² Mr. Calhoun's plan was fundamentally sound¹³ and would have given the Army all the benefits derived from the most modern staff organization; but, as usual, Congress eliminated the most important features and proceeded by the Act of March 2, 1821, to reduce the Army from 12,664 officers and men to 6,183,¹⁴ made the staff efficient to the detriment of the line and prevented the President from adding an enlisted man,¹⁵ although it permitted him in the event of Indian wars to authorize governors and generals to call out militia in unlimited numbers. The Ordnance department¹⁶ was merged into the artillery, but this arrangement proved so unsatisfactory that eleven years later it had to be restored.¹⁷

During 1828 and 1829 the question of abolishing the grade of Major General was much mooted, and out of it

arose a prolonged discussion as to the officer upon whom would devolve the command of the Army in that case. The Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives expressed its opinion that, in the absence of a general-in-chief, "the Army would virtually be commanded by the staff officers who surround the Secretary of War,"¹⁸ and subsequent years amply proved the correctness of its prediction.¹⁹

BLACK HAWK WAR

This war, begun in March, 1832, was marked by two engagements only. The first, fought by Illinois volunteers, took place on the Wisconsin River on July 21st;²⁰ the second at the Bad Ax River near its junction with the Mississippi on August 2nd,²¹ when the Indians under Black Hawk were totally defeated and dispersed.²² The Government acted with more than customary despatch in this instance,²³ but, even so, nearly 6,000 troops²⁴ were required to conquer a force of Indians estimated to be between 800 and 1,000.²⁵

During these operations the defencelessness of the frontiers caused the creation of a battalion of 600 mounted rangers,²⁶ who were enlisted for one year only, required to arm and equip themselves and to furnish their own horses,²⁷ and nine months later a regiment of dragoons was added to the Army.²⁸

FLORIDA OR SECOND SEMINOLE WAR

This struggle, which began in December, 1835, and dragged out until August, 1842, found the Government totally unprepared to meet the situation²⁹ in spite of months of warning.³⁰ The Governor of Florida, finding himself forced to look to his own resources, called out 500 hasty levies,³¹ his action being the signal for the massacre of Major Dade and his command on December 28th.³² Three days after, General Clinch with 200 regulars and about 500 Florida militia crossed the Withlacoochee River, was attacked by the

Seminoles but repulsed them after a lively fight. The war would probably have ended then and there had not the militia mutinied and refused to take part in the action.³³ During January, 1836, the Government authorized the calling out of militia from South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama "to serve for at least three months after arriving at the place of rendezvous," and ordered General Scott to assume command of all the troops.³⁴ The operations began in February by an unauthorized advance of a mixed force under General Gaines which was besieged by the Indians,³⁵ but it was not until March 22nd that General Scott, after many delays in equipping and supplying his militia, took the field.³⁶ The Indians, who did not number 2,000,³⁷ avoided being drawn into a decisive engagement, took refuge in the Everglades and other impenetrable swamps, and continued to harass the country until the following March. The mention in General Scott's report of "3,000 good troops (not volunteers)"³⁸ evoked such a storm of indignation from the State levies that he was superseded by General Clinch and sent to Georgia to take command against the Creek Indians who had risen in open warfare.

In place of expanding the Regular Army as suggested by the Secretary of War,³⁹ Congress on May 23rd authorized the President to accept the services of 10,000 volunteers for six or twelve months,⁴⁰ requiring them to furnish their own clothes and horses — just as was done under the mischievous Act of 1792⁴¹— and, although these troops were to constitute a national force, their organization and the appointment of the officers were vested in the governors.⁴²

In Georgia General Scott was confronted with conditions similar to those in Florida, the militia of Alabama and Georgia being without adequate arms or supplies, and it was not until June 21st that he was ready to move.⁴³ Nine days earlier General Jesup with a force of 2,300 had advanced against the Creeks⁴⁴ in Alabama, who promptly rendered their submission without fighting. Jesup's movement being

contrary to Scott's instructions, a quarrel arose, which resulted early in June in orders to General Scott to proceed to Washington to answer before a Court of Inquiry for "the unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war and the failure of the campaign in Florida."⁴⁵

Such was the fiasco entailed by the Government's policy, notwithstanding the fact that no less than 27,842 troops were put into the field during the year.⁴⁶

During the winter of 1836-1837 the military operations in Florida achieved nothing except to keep the Seminoles on the move, but on March 6th their chiefs agreed to capitulate and to transfer the entire tribe west of the Mississippi. This proved nothing short of a ruse to gain time, and on June 2nd Micanopy and some other chiefs were spirited away from Tampa where they were to embark. The Indians rose again and resorted to the same tactics as in the previous year, with the result that up to October 21st only 30 had been killed and 500 captured. On Christmas day General Zachary Taylor was successful in forcing them into an engagement at Lake Okeechobee and in inflicting a severe defeat upon them,⁴⁷ in spite of the fact that the Missouri volunteers and spies bolted to a nearby swamp and could not be induced to return to the fight.⁴⁸

Before the year was out public opinion was aroused by the extravagance of the war in men and money to such an extent that the Secretary of War felt called upon to make explanations and to urge an increase in the regular establishment, as well as in the staff corps,⁴⁹ but it was not until July 5, 1838, that his recommendations were heeded. By the act of that date the army was considerably increased,⁵⁰ the departments of the Adjutant, Quartermaster and Commissary-Generals, and Ordnance being augmented, the principle of expansion recognized in respect to the pay corps — cadets required upon entrance to bind themselves to eight years' service, three months' extra pay given to each soldier re-enlisting and a bounty of 160 acres of land for ten years' faithful service.

Two days later it was found necessary to make certain modifications and to repeal the land bounty,⁵¹ but these two laws gave the Army an authorized strength of 12,539 officers and men.⁵²

“The ills springing from detached service were but partly cured. In failing to provide supernumeraries in the Quartermaster’s and Commissary’s Departments, two of the most important branches of the staff, as in the past, could only be made efficient at the expense of the line.

“To the prejudice of true economy, the other great defect of the law of 1821, the nonexpansion of the rank and file, was also only remedied in part. Instead of authorizing the President to expand the Army to a given limit, with like power to reduce it by mere Executive order, the moment the public interest would permit, Congress prescribed a war maximum which might continue months after the emergency had ceased and could only be lessened by the slow and uncertain process of legislation.”⁵³

During 1838 and 1839 serious complications occurred on the Northern frontier, which threatened to bring about a third war with England. As the bulk of the Regular Army was occupied in Florida and the Southwest,⁵⁴ the President was authorized

“to resist any attempt on the part of Great Britain to enforce, by arms, her claim to jurisdiction over that part of the State of Maine which is in dispute between the United States and Great Britain.”

Aside from the employment of the Regular military and naval forces and of such militia as he deemed advisable to call into service, the President was empowered to accept volunteers up to the number of 50,000 — who were required to supply their own clothing and horses, and to serve for a period of six to twelve months after reaching the rendezvous — and \$10,000,000 were placed at his disposal.⁵⁵

“A glance at this law, for the passage of which General Scott claimed special credit,⁵⁶ shows that on its face there was no indication that Congress had either appreciated or been able to profit by the losses of the Revolution, the War of 1812, or even

by its own two years' experience with the Florida War. Fortunately for the country, a repetition of the disasters which marked the beginning of the War of 1812 was averted by a peaceful settlement." 57

From 1838 to 1842 the operations in the Florida war were conducted by the successive commanders with small detachments rarely exceeding 100 men. In May, 1839, General Macomb made a treaty with the leading chief of the Seminoles, whereby hostilities were to cease,⁵⁸ but after a lapse of two months another massacre⁵⁹ lighted the conflagration for the third time. The Indians took to their fastnesses in inaccessible swamps,⁶⁰ and it was only the system of summer campaigns instituted by Colonel Worth, which destroyed the crops and other subsistence, that eventually compelled them to sue for peace. On August 14, 1842, official announcement was made that "hostilities with the Indians in Florida have ceased."

During this war the efforts of the Government to economise were defeated by the persistency with which State militia was forced upon it, sometimes without authority of law.⁶¹ Suffice to say that from 1835 to 1842 no less than 48,152 volunteers and militia were in service,⁶² apart from 12,539 regulars,⁶³ thus making a total of 60,091, and the war expenditures during those seven years for the land forces amounted to no less than \$69,751,611.50.⁶⁴


To appreciate properly the excessive cost of short-sighted military legislation, it must be borne in mind that this war teaches some valuable lessons, *viz.*:—

"First. That its expense was tripled, if not quadrupled, by that feature of the law of 1821 which gave the President, in times of emergency, no discretion to increase the enlisted men of the Army.

"Second. That, as in every previous war, after successfully employing for short periods of service militia and volunteers, and exhausting their enthusiasm, Congress found it more humane and economical to continue hostilities with regular troops, enlisted for the period of five years.

“Third. That for want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of 17,000,000 of people contended for seven years with 1,200 warriors and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole cause of the war.”⁶⁵

Nine days after the termination of hostilities the Army was forthwith reduced from 12,539 officers and men to 8,613⁶⁶ without disbanding any of the regiments.⁶⁷ Had Congress applied the same wise method to the expansion of the Army at the beginning of the war which it did to its reduction at the end, the struggle would never have been protracted for seven years and the loss in lives and money would have been many times less.



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CHAPTER VII

MILITARY POLICY DURING THE MEXICAN WAR

A SERIES of continuous victories such as preceded the entry of the American forces into the City of Mexico would ordinarily be indicative of a faultless military policy. In this instance, however,

“paradoxical as it may seem, official documents establish the fact that they were achieved under the very same system of laws and executive orders which in the preceding foreign war had led to a series of disasters culminating in the capture and destruction of our capital.

“The explanation of this paradox is to be found partly in the difference of character of our adversaries, but more especially in the quality of the Regular Army with which we began the two wars. For the Mexican War, as for the War of 1812, the Government had ample time to prepare.”¹

The secession of Texas from the Mexican federation,² the establishment of an independent republic,³ and its overtures for admittance to the American Union ended in President Tyler's submitting a treaty of annexation to the Senate in April, 1844. It was decisively rejected on the ground that public opinion did not relish such clandestine negotiations, but the matter became a leading political issue and, on March 3, 1845, Texas was definitely annexed to the United States, ratification⁴ following on July 4th.⁵ The question of boundary and extent of territory being in dispute, this Government undertook to fix upon the Rio Grande as the legitimate frontier⁶ and during August orders were sent, by direction of President Polk, to General Taylor⁷ to “defend Texas from invasion” which, if it occurred, was to be considered “as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities.” In the event of the latter he was empowered

to muster into the United States service such Texan volunteers as were required, and to "cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling to invade Texas."⁸ Instructions were likewise sent to the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,⁹ Tennessee and Kentucky¹⁰ to furnish such militia for the "army of occupation" as General Taylor might specify.

These orders were extremely significant in that they contemplated, not only an invasion of Mexico, but an aggressive war to be waged by the same sort of troops as were used at the commencement of the War of 1812. Furthermore, despite the Constitutional limitation as to the use of the militia,¹¹ General Taylor's instructions sanctioned his entry into foreign territory with such State troops as had responded to his call. The Government officials were apparently oblivious to the conduct of the Vermont militia in 1813 and 1814¹² and the possibility of such a recurrence.

On October 4th, Taylor suggested that the vexing question as to the boundary would be brought nearer a solution by taking possession of some point on or near the Rio Grande¹³ and, the Administration having concurred, orders were given him accordingly on January 13, 1846. On March 8th he left Corpus Christi, reaching the river at a point opposite Matamoras twenty days later, where he found the Mexicans "decidedly hostile." His own regulars numbered at most 3,554¹⁴ and, finding himself none too strong and very much isolated, he promptly wrote¹⁵ to the Adjutant-General:

"Under this state of things I must again and urgently call your attention to *the necessity of speedily sending recruits to this army.* The militia of Texas are so remote from the border . . . that we can not depend upon their aid. *The strength gained by filling up the regiments here, even to the present feeble establishment, would be of very great importance.*"¹⁶

Taylor's suggestions were in harmony with those contained in the reports of General Scott and the Secretary of War nearly four months previously.¹⁷ These reports were trans-

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mitted to Congress by the President when he sent his annual message on December 2, 1845, but, as usual, that body saw fit to disregard their wise recommendations, and in the four and a half months which elapsed between its convening and the outbreak of hostilities it took no action whatsoever.

On April 25th occurred the first encounter, in which Thornton's dragoons were worsted. Next day General Taylor called upon the governors of Texas and Louisiana for 5,000 volunteers,¹⁸ but obviously it was too late. The Mexicans in large force threatened his line of communications, forcing him to fall back to Point Isabel,¹⁹ but on May 7th he resumed his advance, encountered the enemy²⁰ at Palo Alto, defeated him and repeated his success next day at Resaca de la Palma.²¹ As Upton remarks:²²

“The effect of this brilliant initiative was felt to the end of the war. It gave our troops courage to fight against overwhelming numbers, demoralized the enemy, and afforded a striking proof of the truth of the maxim, ‘That in war, moral force is to physical as three is to one.’²³ In all of the subsequent battles our troops were outnumbered two or three to one, yet they marched steadily forward to victory, and for the first time in our history temporarily convinced our statesmen, if not the people, of the value of professional education and military discipline.”

The news of these two engagements spread rapidly and created such alarm lest Taylor's small force should be overwhelmed that volunteers presented themselves far in excess of the numbers for which he had called. General Gaines, who in almost every disturbance since 1815 had called out troops without sanction of the Government, proceeded on his own initiative to organize and equip an army enlisted for six months, and so energetic was he that more than 8,000 men were sent to Taylor before the Government put a quietus on Gaines by relieving him from his command.²⁴ Two days after the news reached Washington, President Polk sent a message to Congress,²⁵ in which he said:

“I invoke the prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. To this end I recommend that authority should be given to call into the public service a large body of volunteers, to serve for not less than six or twelve months, unless sooner discharged.²⁶ A volunteer force is beyond question more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers; and it is not to be doubted that a number far beyond that required would readily rush to the field upon the call of their country. I further recommend that a liberal provision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies and munitions of war.”²⁷

In this message are to be found the germs to which the subsequent delays and extravagance characteristic of this war are directly traceable. Oblivious to the experience of three wars and without taking into account the length of time required to convey troops to the distant Rio Grande without railways, the President expressed his conviction that raw troops could successfully terminate a foreign war in a year — a thing that never has happened and in all likelihood never will happen under our present system. But Congress fell in with his suggestions with extraordinary promptness, authorized a call for 50,000 volunteers and voted \$10,000,000,²⁸ but it manifested a better grasp of the situation than did the Executive by requiring the volunteers “to serve the twelve months after they shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war.”²⁹ The sequel demonstrated once again the necessity for wise and comprehensive legislation, for the President, instead of exercising his prerogative, issued his call³⁰ in the exact letter of the law and thus left it to the discretion of each volunteer to decide at the expiration of a year whether he should demand his discharge or continue in service “to the end of the war.”³¹

On that same day Congress empowered the President to increase the number of privates in the companies of dragoons, artillery and infantry of the Regular Army to not exceed 100,

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with the proviso that it should be reduced to 64 when the emergency had passed.³²

“It will thus be seen that while *during peace all discretion to increase the Army was withheld from the President through motives of economy, or of jealousy of the Army, the moment war was declared the power of expanding it was freely committed to his trust*, a power that enabled him, without adding an officer to the line, to raise the enlisted strength from 7,580 to 15,540.

“*Had this discretion been granted to the President by the law of 1842,*³³ *the army of occupation need not have been exposed to an attack by an army three times its numbers; neither would there have been any occasion to expose to the ravages of disease the thousands of three months’ men*³⁴ *who rushed to its rescue.*”³⁵

The remaining military legislation during the year³⁶ was devoted to the increase of the staff departments during the war, the exception being the Act of May 19th which added a regiment of riflemen destined for service in Oregon.³⁷

Meanwhile, so prompt had been the response to the President’s call that General Taylor, who had occupied Matamoras, had been joined by so many volunteers³⁸ as to be at his wit’s end how to supply them, but he put them through such a course of drill and instruction that he succeeded in developing a good second line army out of them.³⁹ As not a wagon had reached him,⁴⁰ he was compelled to leave 6,000 volunteers behind when he began his advance from Camargo⁴¹ to Monterey at the end of August.⁴² A march of 180 miles through a dreary desert and under a tropical sun brought the army to the outskirts of Monterey on September 19th. The following day was spent in dispositions for the attack, and on the 21st began the battle of Monterey which raged for three days. A brilliant assault upon Fort Independence by General Worth⁴³ placed the Americans in possession of the dominating heights and the city, with the exception of the citadel, and forced General Ampudia to propose a capitulation on the 24th.⁴⁴ By virtue of the terms granted, the place was to be evacuated within seven days and a cessation of hostilities to continue

for six weeks.⁴⁵ The Mexicans withdrew through Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, 300 miles from Monterey, but it was not until December that Taylor pushed forward to the former and, re-enforced by General Wool's command,⁴⁶ inaugurated the operations which put him in possession of the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas within a few weeks.

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1847

On January 12th Congress, acting on the recommendation of the Secretary of War, passed a measure permitting recruits to join the Regular Army for "five years" or "during the war," and granted a bounty of \$12.⁴⁷ Had this been done nine months earlier the existing difficulty in securing recruits⁴⁸ would have been largely obviated. On February 11th, the Army was increased by ten regiments,⁴⁹ to be enlisted "for the war," a major added to each regiment,⁵⁰ a bounty given to all soldiers, regular or volunteer, upon honourable discharge at the expiration of one year's service,⁵¹ and the Quartermaster and Pay corps augmented.⁵² Like its predecessor, this act was passed too late to secure the results desired, and the new regiments were consequently unable to reach the front until the summer was nearly over. The dearth of officers caused an increase to be made⁵³ to correspond with the number of new regiments, as well as adding some artillery companies.⁵⁴ The endeavour was likewise made to rectify the mistake of short enlistments,⁵⁵ and Congress wisely reverted to the correct principle of having the President commission all volunteer officers.⁵⁶ These three measures completed the military legislation for the year.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1847

Meanwhile General Taylor⁵⁷ had reached Victoria where, much to his astonishment, he received a despatch on January 14th notifying him that he was to be stripped of nearly all his regulars and the best of his volunteers, who were to be sent to Brazos San Iago to participate in the expedition which

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General Scott was about to undertake against the City of Mexico.⁵⁸ These troops⁵⁹ were forthwith set *en route* for Tampico, but with much reluctance on the part of Taylor, who very rightly complained that he was left "with less than a thousand regulars and a volunteer force, partly new levies, to hold a defensive line" in the face of 20,000 Mexicans.⁶⁰ Nevertheless he advanced on February 5th to Agua Nueva,⁶¹ where he effected his junction with General Wool and secured possession of the important passes and the road to San Luis Potosi. Sixteen days later, realizing that he was on the verge of being attacked by the entire Mexican army under General Santa Anna,⁶² he fell back 12 miles to Buena Vista, a position of great defensive strength.⁶³ On February 22nd was fought the celebrated battle,* the most desperate of the war, in which Taylor's troops,⁶⁴—regulars and volunteers alike,⁶⁵—covered themselves with glory. Santa Anna was compelled to beat a hasty retreat, his command so thoroughly demoralised by its defeat and losses⁶⁶ that he was obliged to raise a new force, and the time thus gained proved invaluable to the other American army, which was additionally freed of all danger from the north by General Taylor's complete conquest of those provinces.

During the month of February transports had arrived at Brazos San Iago, and by the 27th the last of General Scott's troops had been embarked and had sailed for Lobos, an island 60 miles south of Tampico, which had been indicated as the rendezvous. On March 2nd the fleet and its convoys started for Anton Lizardo and, after a reconnaissance of Vera Cruz made by Scott and Commodore Conner on the 7th, the troops landed on the 9th and in three days had completed the in-

* At 11 A. M. General Santa Anna sent a flag of truce with a demand for surrender by the Americans. When the interpreter had finished reading it to General Taylor, "the old man with his characteristic readiness and brusqueness, said: 'Tell him to go to hell.'" The formal reply in writing was of course couched in perfectly proper language.—*The Centennial of the U. S. Military Academy*, I, pp. 66-67; *Senate Executive Document, No. 1, Twenty-ninth Congress, First Session*, p. 98.

vestment of the city. On the 10th began the bombardment, which continued until the 26th when General Landero⁶⁷ made overtures for a capitulation,⁶⁸ and three days later the garrison marched out with the honours of war and surrendered their arms, colours and equipments.⁶⁹

The fall of Vera Cruz spread consternation throughout Mexico, but Santa Anna, having gathered a new army,⁷⁰ sought to check the advance of the invaders⁷¹ who had begun their march toward the capital on April 8th. Ten days later the opposing forces met at Cerro Gordo,⁷² where Scott gained such a decisive victory⁷³ that, as he expressed it, "Mexico has no longer an army."⁷⁴ On the 19th Jalapa was captured, and three days after the town and castle of Perote on the summit of the eastern Cordilleras, reputed the strongest fortress in Mexico except Vera Cruz, capitulated without resistance and put the Americans in possession of a large amount of war *matériel*.⁷⁵ The road to the capital lay open and its occupation was synonymous with the collapse of resistance on the part of the enemy. With the goal in sight, Scott's progress came to a sudden halt at Puebla on May 15th, through no fault of his own; and once again was demonstrated one of the fundamental defects in our military policy, at a time and in a manner which might readily have proved disastrous to American arms.

Allusion has already been made to the blunder of Congress in failing to specify absolutely the length of enlistment for the 50,000 volunteers authorized on May 15, 1846, and the neglect of the President to fix the term "to the end of the war," as he was given latitude to do.⁷⁶ The result of these mistakes now became apparent. Months of training had consumed most of the year for which the majority of the volunteers had bound themselves, and General Scott found himself in the unenviable predicament of discovering that nearly every man intended to exercise the alternative offered him upon enlistment and to terminate his service at the end of twelve months.⁷⁷ As many of the enlistments were on the

eve of expiration, General Scott did not wish to expose these men needlessly to the deadly climate, and on May 4th he was forced to part with seven out of his eleven volunteer regiments, amounting to 4,000 men, who were despatched to Vera Cruz, whence they were to be conveyed to New Orleans and discharged. As a result of this loss, coupled with the detachments necessary to guard the line of communications and a large number of sick, his army was reduced to 5,820 effective troops.⁷⁸ *In the midst of a hostile country and only three days' march from the capital, with virtually no enemy to oppose him, Scott found himself unable to budge for more than three months. Had Santa Anna at that juncture possessed any army worthy of the name and had he fallen in force either upon Scott or Taylor, the American Government would have had abundant cause to regret both its defective legislation and a most faulty plan of campaign*⁷⁹— *blunders which could not have been retrieved by many thousand new but raw troops. It was only incredible good fortune which averted a calamity and spared the American people the mortification of seeing their formidable preparations collapse like a house of cards — all because Congress and the President had been oblivious to the lessons of past wars and had been too shortsighted to take advantage of the enthusiasm which invariably marks the outbreak of hostilities, and under its stimulus to obtain enlistments* “FOR THE WAR.”⁸⁰

Although Santa Anna was precluded by circumstances beyond his control from crushing Scott's slender force out of existence, the Mexican guerillas harassed the Americans unceasingly, and prevented detachments from Vera Cruz from joining the army in considerable strength. It was not until July 8th that the first re-enforcement was received in the shape of 4,500 men,⁸¹ followed nearly a month later by 2,249,⁸² which brought the total of Scott's command up to about 13,500 troops, of whom 3,000 were on the sick list.⁸³ On August 7th — after three months of enforced inactivity — the American commander was at last able to resume his ad-

vance with 10,738 troops,⁸⁴ "nearly one-half of whom were new and untried soldiers, fresh from the pursuits of civil life, except for the discipline to which they had for a few months been subjected at Pueblo."⁸⁵ The Mexicans in the meanwhile had gained sufficient time to raise a new army which, according to their own estimates, numbered at least 36,000 men and 100 guns, and, having strongly fortified the capital, had every reason to be confident of the outcome.⁸⁶

On August 10th the leading troops descended from the mountains into the basin where the City of Mexico is situated at the end of long causeways guarded by strong fortifications. After several reconnaissances, General Scott determined to approach the place from the south and accordingly concentrated his divisions near San Augustine on the 18th.⁸⁷ The resumption of his advance was marked by a series of sanguinary encounters. On the afternoon of the 19th and the following morning was fought the battle of Contreras.⁸⁸ The 20th also was memorable for the capture of the important fortification of San Antonio and for another victory gained at Churubusco.⁸⁹ In a single day 8,500 Americans⁹⁰ had overwhelmed 32,000 Mexicans.⁹¹ The enemy's army was completely demoralized and rendered incapable of further resistance, while the inhabitants of the capital were in consternation over the enemy's presence at their very gates. Just at the moment when nothing remained to be done but to crown his brilliant campaign by the immediate occupation of the city, Scott suddenly forgot his military training,⁹² became timid and permitted himself to be wheedled into a truce pending negotiations for peace.⁹³ On August 23rd hostilities ceased *ad interim*, but within a fortnight the American commander awoke to the fact that Santa Anna had made a cats-paw of him in order to gain time.⁹⁴ On September 7th the armistice was declared at an end, and on the following day the American troops attacked the enemy at Molino del Rey. A desperate fight ensued,⁹⁵ with no results commensurate

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with the loss suffered,⁹⁶ and Scott was obliged to transfer his operations to the western side of the city. On September 12th the formidable heights of Chapultepec were subjected to a vigorous bombardment and on the following morning they were stormed, but the Mexicans fought like fiends and it was not until noon that success crowned the American efforts⁹⁷ after heavy losses.⁹⁸ The troops, now thoroughly aroused, determined to capture the city in spite of General Scott, who sought to restrain them,⁹⁹ and by 2 P. M. General Quitman's division had effected a lodgment within the walls, hoisted the American colours over the national palace and sturdily held its ground until nightfall put an end to the fighting. On the morning of September 14th a deputation announced the evacuation of the city by Santa Anna and the American Army made its triumphal entry, but twenty-four hours of desperate house-to-house fighting were still necessary before General Scott was left in undisputed possession of the place.¹⁰⁰

The resourceful Santa Anna made determined efforts to cut the American line of communications with Vera Cruz and to arouse further resistance to the invaders,¹⁰¹ but the re-enforcements sent to Scott,¹⁰² small and tardy as they were,¹⁰³ rendered his attempts abortive. On February 2, 1848, was concluded the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,¹⁰⁴ and on June 12th the last of the American troops evacuated the City of Mexico.¹⁰⁵

TROOPS EMPLOYED DURING THE MEXICAN WAR

The forces in service during this war numbered :

Regulars	31,024
Volunteers and rangers	60,659
Militia	12,601
Total	104,284 ¹⁰⁶

The maximum number of Mexican troops was only about 46,000.¹⁰⁷ The cost of the war to the United States

amounted to \$88,500,208.38,¹⁰⁸ and up to June 30, 1914, no less than \$48,693,102.18 had been paid in pensions on its account.¹⁰⁹

This war is principally notable for the marked change in the military policy as evinced by the abandonment of the militia as the "great bulwark of national defense" and the increased use of regulars and volunteers, especially the latter.¹¹⁰ When it is remembered that the military organization and operations were conducted under laws almost identical with those prevailing in the War of 1812,¹¹¹ it is the more surprising that such remarkable successes should have characterized the later war in contrast to the ignominious failures of the earlier struggle.¹¹² The solution is to be found in the different quality of the troops as a whole, in the better discipline and training, and in the employment of a larger number of professional officers. Indeed General Scott himself attributed the shortness of the war to the last cause.¹¹³

On the other hand, it must be distinctly borne in mind that the failure of Congress and the President to fix the term of enlistment "for the war" narrowly escaped being fatal to Scott's ultimate success,¹¹⁴ and it involved the totally unnecessary death and wounding of nearly 2,000 men,¹¹⁵ for both of which the Government was alone to blame. Moreover, for lack of an organization which could be expanded at the beginning of war, General Taylor was forced to fight his first battles with only 2,300 regular troops, whereas under an expansive system he could have had 8,000. Scott's army at Vera Cruz could have been augmented to 15,000 and, had it not been for the expiring enlistments, he could have entered the enemy's capital immediately after the battle of Cerro Gordo.¹¹⁶ At no time did his maximum strength exceed 13,500¹¹⁷ and, when he did actually fight his way into the city, his army was reduced to about 6,000 men.¹¹⁸ In view of his isolation in the midst of a hostile country, the slowness with which re-enforcements were sent him¹¹⁹ was little short of criminal. Viewed from any angle, the success of the war

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was in nowise attributable to the legislative or executive wisdom of the Government, and what business man would venture to claim that the manager of a company or corporation could, or ought to, be retained, who was unable to keep more than 21,000 men at work at any given time in spite of his having over 91,000 at his disposal? Yet such was the way that our Government managed the Mexican War.¹²⁰

CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY POLICY FROM THE MEXICAN WAR TO THE WAR OF THE REBELLION

THE American troops had scarcely evacuated Mexico before Congress reduced the Regular Army from 30,890 to 10,317,¹ thus removing virtually all influence which the war had exercised over the military establishment²— just as was done after the Florida War — and leaving the organization both defective and unprovided for future emergencies.³ The last imperfection was remedied by the Act of June 17, 1850, in which the principle of expansion was wisely embodied.⁴ It was not until the trouble with the Indians became very grave in 1853 and 1854 that President Pierce availed himself of the power thus vested in him and, by augmenting the 123 companies west of the Mississippi to their full authorized strength, increased the Army to 13,821. However, as this feeble increment of 3,489 men was palpably insufficient to guard the vast extent of territory in which the Indian tribes were none too friendly, a further increase of two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry was made by the Act of March 3, 1855.⁵

In the six ensuing years the only military legislation meriting particular attention was the Act of April 7, 1858, which authorized the President to receive into the United States service a regiment of mounted Texas volunteers for the purpose of defending the frontier of that State, as well as to call out and accept volunteers to the extent of two regiments to be organized, if he saw fit, as mounted infantry and used to quell “disturbances in the Territory of Utah, for the protection of supply and emigrant trains, and the suppression of Indian hostilities on the frontier.”⁶ Eighteen months were

fixed as their term of service, and, reverting to the vicious principle enunciated in 1792,⁷ the men were required to furnish their own horses and equipment, at a compensation of forty cents *per diem*; and the officers to be appointed by their respective States and Territories, with the exception of the commissaries and quartermasters who were to be assigned from the Regular Army. As General Upton pertinently remarks:⁸

“This effort to secure economy was undoubtedly a wise step in the right direction, but *like so much of our hasty and ill-digested military legislation it began at the wrong end*. Had the President been allowed to call for the volunteers by companies, with authority to select the field officers, adjutants, and quartermasters from the Regular Army, not only the economy but the discipline and instruction of the regiments could have been controlled by trusted officers of the Government.”

The military operations between 1848 and 1861 were confined to Indian wars⁹ and the Utah expedition which took place in 1858. The latter, although free from bloodshed, resulted in transferring almost all of the Army to stations west of the Mississippi.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WAR OF THE REBELLION

HOW little heed had been paid by Congress to the lessons of the past was thus admirably summarized by Upton: ¹

“At the close of the year 1860 we presented to the world the spectacle of a great nation nearly destitute of military force. Our territory from ocean to ocean exceeded 3,000,000 square miles; our population numbered 31,000,000 people.

“The Regular Army as organized consisted of 18,093 officers and men,² but according to the returns it numbered only 16,367.³

“The line of the Army was composed of 198 companies, of which 183 were stationed on the frontier or were en route to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The remaining 15 companies were stationed along the Canadian frontier and on the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

“As a guard for the national frontiers, the Army could not furnish two soldiers, per mile; for protecting the settlements in the States and Territories west of the Mississippi but one soldier was available for every 120 square miles; to aid in the enforcement of the laws in the remaining States of the Union we had but one soldier for every 1,300 square miles.

“The militia for a sudden emergency were scarcely more available than the Army. Nominally they numbered more than 3,000,000, but mostly unorganized. So destitute were they of instruction and training that — a few regiments in the large cities excepted — they did not merit the name of a military force.

“Such was the condition of the national defense when, on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina in convention passed the ordinance of secession.”

By February 1, 1861, seven states had seceded,⁴ and on the 4th the delegates of six met at Montgomery, Alabama, formed a union, adopted a provisional constitution, and elected

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a President and Vice-President.⁵ No less daring and forceful were the measures that followed. The inauguration of Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens on the 18th was succeeded ten days later by authorization to their President to assume control of "all military operations between the Confederate States" and to accept for a period not to exceed twelve months as many volunteers as were required. On March 6th he issued a call for 100,000 men, who were to be mustered into service under his sole and supreme command.⁶

These formidable preparations⁷ were in marked contrast to the feeble condition of the United States Army, defective in organization and so disseminated that, on December 15, 1860, the nine fortifications along the southern coast were garrisoned by only five inexpansive companies, and it was not until six weeks later that they were augmented by some 600 recruits. The other regular troops were scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, too remote to participate in the first encounters or even to afford an adequate defence for Washington.

Events progressed faster than the Government had bargained for, and the contemplated assistance to the garrison in Charleston harbour was forestalled by the first overt act of war on the part of the insurgents, who bombarded Fort Sumter on April 12th and compelled it to surrender two days later. Mr. Lincoln, in alarm over the threatening conditions, turned — as so many Presidents had done before him — to the militia, and on April 9th called for ten companies from the District of Columbia; but some refused to be sworn, others to serve outside the District, so that the Government was obliged to accept this militia on its own terms.⁸ By contrast, the Confederacy by the middle of that month had equipped 35,000 men, seized the arsenals within reach and had begun the siege of the forts in the Southern States.⁹

"In every stage of their prosecution the wars of the Revolution and of 1812 gave evidence that a system of national defense,

based on the consent and cooperation of the States, possessed none of the elements of certainty or of strength.

“Nevertheless, for the want of an expansive regular army or a system of national volunteers, the President was again compelled to look to the States, and therefore on the 15th of April, issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 militia for the period of three months.

“The terms of the proclamation show that the President and Cabinet began the war with the same confidence in raw troops as was manifested by their predecessors in 1812.

“The militia was not summoned for the defense of the capital, but to suppress ‘combinations and to cause the laws to be duly executed.’¹⁰

“In explanation of the call, the President further stated:

“‘I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth, will probably be to repossess the forts, places and property which have been seized from the Union.’

“Language so unmistakable, and which had the sanction of our most distinguished statesmen, leads only to the conclusion that with raw troops, it was believed that a formidable rebellion, already covering 560,000 square miles, could be subdued within the brief space of three months.”¹¹

Obviously the governors of the Southern States defied the Government and refused to furnish their militia, their action being taken solely on their own responsibility.¹² Once again was demonstrated the futility of a military system founded upon the theory of a confederation — such as that followed by the United States — whereas the Confederacy rid itself of all such useless shackles, assumed the necessary responsibility and appealed directly to the people.¹³ The spread of the rebellion¹⁴ afforded sufficient strength to the Confederate officials so that on May 27th the capital was transferred to Richmond, and the Confederate troops advanced to Fairfax and even Alexandria, within plain sight of Washington.¹⁵

“*The advantage so far as related to the forces in the field was, at the time, decidedly on the side of the Confederates.* The Government had called for 75,000 militia for the period of three months; the Confederates had called for 100,000 volunteers

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for the period of one year. Both had repeated the blunder of short enlistments. *The President, by a law more than sixty years old, was obliged to limit the service to three months;*¹⁶ the Confederate Congress, with no appreciation of past history, adopted the identical policy which had led to the protraction of all our previous wars. Nevertheless, *in default of further measures, on the part of the President, the Government at the end of three months would see the forces dissolved, while the Confederate army, constantly improving in discipline, would still be available for nine months of field service.*"¹⁷

The outbreak in Baltimore on April 19th, in conjunction with the proximity of the enemy's troops, virtually isolated Washington and its capture appeared imminent. In the face of such a calamity, which threatened the overthrow of the Government, the President promptly assumed and exercised the war powers which under the Constitution belong to Congress alone. On May 3rd he decreed by proclamation that the Regular Army be increased by 22,714 officers and men, the Navy by 18,000 sailors, and additionally called for 42,034 volunteers to serve for three years.¹⁸ No usurpation could have been more absolute, but it was fully justified by the circumstances and, when Congress convened on July 4th for the extra session called by the President, so universal was the approval and gratitude of the people that Mr. Lincoln's course was completely sanctioned.¹⁹

Meanwhile the Secretary of War was so overwhelmed with the work of equipping the 50,000 volunteers called out on May 3rd that their organization and that of the regulars was "tossed over" to the Secretary of the Treasury. Fortunately, three experienced officers²⁰ were detailed to assist him, but the final decision rested with Mr. Chase alone, who eventually agreed to the three-battalion system²¹ for the regulars but rejected it for the volunteers because of their unfamiliarity with it — thus adhering to an organization which had descended from the days of the Revolution. This scheme was embodied in the General Orders²² issued by the War Department on May 4th, was adopted by Congress and formed

the basis upon which all the national forces were organized.²³

“Novel as were the duties imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury, he and his assistants deserved the gratitude of the nation. By simply fixing the term of enlistment at three years, thus giving the volunteers time to become veterans, they insured us against a series of disasters such as under the system of 1812, or that adopted for the volunteers at the beginning of the Mexican war,²⁴ must inevitably have terminated in the dissolution of the Union.”²⁵

Congress lost no time in getting down to business and, by the Act of July 22nd, authorized the President to accept 500,000 volunteers for service “not exceeding three years nor less than six months,” to organize them into regiments, brigades and divisions, their pay and allowances to be similar to that of the Regular Army.²⁶ Again was committed one of the many legislative blunders whose effect might readily have been as far-reaching as a similar mistake in 1846,²⁷ and in at least two other respects this law was most defective.²⁸

The Act of July 25th permitted the President to call out an additional half a million men but wisely required their enlistment to continue “*during the war.*”²⁹

The next law, that of July 29th, provided an increase of the Regular Army,³⁰ on condition that within one year after the termination of “the existing insurrection and rebellion” it might be reduced to 25,000.³¹ The enlistments made during 1861 and 1862 were limited to three years, those after January 1, 1863, to be for five years.³² The last section voiced the desire of Congress that professional officers should be employed with the volunteer regiments “for the purpose of imparting to them military instruction and efficiency”³³ — a very wise provision which most unfortunately was completely nullified by the previous mistake of giving the governors the right to appoint the volunteer officers without permitting the President to designate at least one field officer in every regiment.³⁴

Another act approved the same day, looking to the en-

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forcement of law and the suppression of rebellion, authorized the employment of militia with the wise provision that it was to continue in service until discharged, on condition that such term was not prolonged more than sixty days after the beginning of the next regular session of Congress.

The Acts of August 3rd and 5th related principally to the staff, although the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War was provided for,³⁵ certain increases authorised, the dragoons and mounted rifles merged into the cavalry,³⁶ and a retiring board to deal with officers "incapacitated for service" prescribed.³⁷

On August 6th four acts were approved. Two of these were concerned with the increase of the Engineer and Topographical Engineer Corps, and heed was paid to the popular clamour against the vicious system of permitting the election of volunteer officers³⁸ by an amendment providing that such vacancies should be filled by the governors of the States, as in the case of original appointments.³⁹ The evil was thus rectified, but not until after 250,000 men had been accepted under this demoralizing scheme. The third act increased the pay of the privates in the Regular Army and volunteers from twelve to thirteen dollars a month and — what was most important — sanctioned all of the actions of President Lincoln.⁴⁰

At the end of the year a bill was introduced in the Senate "to abolish all distinction between the regular and volunteer forces of the United States," but the Committee on Military Affairs very properly killed it then and there.⁴¹

In four weeks and a half Congress had assuredly worked like a Trojan and deserved credit accordingly. In that short space of time it had enacted a military system under which one of the greatest wars of modern times was to be prosecuted, its haste being in marked contrast to the laborious slowness of the Prussians who, after the annihilation of their army by Napoleon at Jena — October 14, 1806 — took years to build up the fabric of a system under which they humiliated Austria in a few weeks in 1866, crushed France in 1870 and are


fighting to-day. "By their fruits ye shall know them," and we shall have occasion to see the consequences of the delusion of Congress that, once it had passed a series of laws — be they good, bad or indifferent — creating a military system however defective, almost over-night, its duty had been discharged and that all future mistakes were none of its concern.⁴² We shall see how its virtual rejection of trained troops — upon which all other nations depend — and the reliance which it placed in untrained volunteers,⁴³ most of whose officers were necessarily devoid of military experience, was destined to prolong for four years a struggle which witnessed the repetition of almost every blunder of our past wars and which caused bloodshed and expenditures nothing short of appalling.


THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861

Although by July first more than 200,000 volunteers had been mustered into service for three years,⁴⁴ the Government could not withstand the temptation to repeat anew the folly of short enlistments. Forgetful of the fact that numbers and military strength are by no means synonymous, that the reputation acquired by the militia at Bunker Hill and New Orleans was gained behind formidable entrenchments, the entire country — Congress, the Cabinet, the press and people — began to clamour that, before the 75,000 men called out for three months⁴⁵ were discharged, they should be led to battle.⁴⁶

The first real encounter of the war took place on June 10th at Big Bethel, a few miles up the Virginia peninsula from Fortress Monroe, when the Northern volunteers under General Pierce were repulsed,⁴⁷ and this fiasco, magnified into a great victory by the South, produced deep mortification on one side of the Potomac and corresponding elation on the other.⁴⁸

The victories of Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, West Virginia, on July 11th and 14th, resulted in the capture and





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dispersal of the Confederate troops in that section, and a week later General Patterson's force near Harper's Ferry had so disintegrated as a result of its repulse at Winchester and the expiring enlistments that, notwithstanding his efforts to retain the men, he was reduced to absolute impotency.⁴⁹

On July 21st the main armies met — "two armed mobs" was the very apt description given them by Count von Moltke. The forces were approximately of equal strength,⁵⁰ but the elements of weakness were, if anything, more apparent in General McDowell's command than in General Beauregard's.⁵¹ The battle of Bull Run⁵² ended in an overwhelming victory for the Confederates,⁵³ the Northern troops being thoroughly routed and — with the exception of the regulars⁵⁴ — ran away in a panic, which could not be checked until they reached the Potomac.⁵⁵

Although the Confederate "army was more disorganized by victory than the United States was by defeat,"⁵⁶ there is no gainsaying the fact that "the North richly deserved its punishment."⁵⁷ Of the causes of this disaster,

"First among them was the popular but mistaken belief that because our citizens individually possess courage, fortitude, and self-reliance, they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. And next to this error was the fatal delusion, that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for battle."⁵⁸

As Swinton aptly declares:⁵⁹

"So far as regards the mere physical fact of *fighting*, which was at the time the all-important question, there was nothing of which the Union soldiers had to be ashamed — they stood up to it with the blood of their race. The fault lay in the inherent vicious organization of the force — in the great number of miserable subordinate officers, which in turn was the natural result of the method of raising regiments. . . .

"When the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there was that [which?] had suffered worse defeat than the army — it was the *system*

under which Bull Run had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted — when campaigns were planned by ignorant politicians, and battles, precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by three months' levies — the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Run experiment taught the country it was a real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles."

The remaining operations of the year ⁶⁰ can scarcely be dignified by any other title than skirmishes — with the possible exception of Wilson's Creek — but popular imagination invested them with all the importance of pitched battles. The sequel of Bull Run is thus admirably described by that gallant and distinguished French officer,⁶¹ the Comte de Paris, long attached to the staff of General McClellan who superseded Scott in command of the Union armies on November first:⁶²

"Its immediate effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates. Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was threatened anew. We shall see the Federal government organize a powerful army within its capital; but its opponents, also taking advantage of the respite which the victory gave them, will increase their forces almost as rapidly, so as to keep those of the enemy constantly in check; and they remained quiet during a period of nine months on the field of battle conquered on the 21st of July.

"But it was chiefly through its moral effect that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence upon the war of which it was only the prelude. . . . In short, this victory inspired the South with unlimited confidence in her own resources and the conviction that she could never be vanquished. At the outset this conviction was a great element of success; it inspired her soldiers, already impressed with a sense of their superiority over their adversaries, with that daring which frequently determined the fate of battles. But at the same time

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it also rendered her improvident, and made her neglect many details the importance of which she felt too late; it prevented her, at this critical hour, from availing herself of all resources, from calling together all able-bodied men, from organizing the interior defence of the States, which she thought could never be invaded; and, in this manner, it prepared the way for the disasters she met with in the West the following year. . . .

“This disaster, which might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a salutary lesson. Far from dividing the States faithful to the Union, as the Confederate leaders had anticipated, it only had the effect of stimulating their patriotism and of rendering them more clear-sighted. At the news of the defeat, they appreciated at last the difficulty of the task they had undertaken, but they never shrank from it. They understood that in order TO OBTAIN SUCCESS IN A GREAT WAR, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HAVE A GREAT NUMBER OF SOLDIERS — IT IS NECESSARY THAT THEY SHOULD BE WELL TRAINED; THAT ARMIES ARE COMPLICATED MACHINES WHICH REQUIRE AS MUCH SCIENCE AS CARE IN THEIR CONSTRUCTION, AND THAT if popular enthusiasm and personal courage supply the materials, IT REQUIRES DISCIPLINE TO COMBINE THEM. From that day the North submitted patiently and with determination of purpose to all that was required to organize her forces and to put them in a condition to undertake long and fatiguing campaigns. Although the soldiers composing the national armies still bear the name of volunteers, the aim of all their efforts will henceforth be to acquire THAT INSTRUCTION AND THAT EXPERIENCE WHICH CAUSE THE SUPERIORITY OF REGULAR TROOPS.

“The improvised generals will give place to those who are brought up in the military career;⁶³ the officers who seriously try to learn their profession will be greatly encouraged by the confidence of the public and of the army. It is not, therefore, to this American democracy, which is essentially practical and profits by experience,⁶⁴ that the partisans of levies *en masse* and improvised armies must look for confirmation of their theories.”

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1861

The false economy which in “piping peace” discountenances preparation for war became manifest before the end of 1861. A few paltry successes and one distinct disaster

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constituted all there was to show, in spite of the fact that there were mustered into service during the year:

Under the President's call of April 15th for 75,000 militia	93,326
Under the call of May 3rd and the Acts of July 22nd and 25th	714,231
Total	807,557

The number of troops in the field on January 1, 1862, was:

Regulars	22,425
Volunteers	553,492

Total	575,917
Adding the militia	93,326

Grand total of troops under pay in 1861	669,243 ⁶⁵
The Confederate forces in January, 1862, did not exceed	232,138 ⁶⁶

Excess of Federal over Confederate troops

437,105

The maintenance of these vast numbers of troops for eight months cost the United States no less than \$238,392,488.77. ⁶⁷

CHAPTER X

MILITARY LEGISLATION AND EVENTS IN 1862

THE first measure dealing with military matters passed in 1862¹ made it manifest that Congress had awakened to the necessity for Government control of telegraph lines and railways,² and it wisely took occasion to exercise to the limit the war powers vested in it by the Constitution. A fortnight later \$150,000 were appropriated for the defences of Washington, and one section of this law of February 13th forbade the acceptance of volunteers or militia "on any terms or conditions confining their services to the limits of any state or territory"³— thus preventing a repetition of the inability to utilize troops outside of their own jurisdiction, such as happened in the preceding year.⁴

On April 16th the Medical Corps of the Army received a much-needed increase,⁵ and a month later a distinctly faulty measure⁶ was passed which permitted any medical inspector to discharge men for disability — actual or alleged — on his own certificate but without the approval of his superiors. The next important law⁷ provided for the appointment of additional medical officers in the volunteer service — part of which was admirable in that it insured the best of medical attention to the sick and wounded, but the other part placed a premium on suffering by failing to set a proper standard for the assistant surgeons to be appointed by the state governors.⁸

On July 2, 1862, an important measure was approved. It was entitled "An Act Donating public lands to the several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts,"* and is generally known as "the Morrill act." It provided in Section 4

* 12 United States Statutes at Large, p. 503.

that the interest on all moneys derived from the sales of land authorized by this act "shall be inviolably appropriated by each State . . . to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." The inclusion of military instruction was rendered necessary by the dearth of officers in the Union armies — a shortage which had already made itself strongly felt and one that West Point was quite inadequate to overcome. The law in question founded the system of military schools, which was given further extension by subsequent Congressional legislation * and which has spread all over the United States.

The Act of July 5th permitted the President to appoint not more than forty Major Generals nor more than two hundred Brigadier Generals, and appropriated \$7,500,000 so as to allow \$25 "to be paid immediately after enlistment to every soldier of the regular and volunteer forces hereafter enlisted, during the continuance of the existing war."⁹ The next act¹⁰ dealt with pensions, and three days later several important measures were approved, of which only three concern us here. One of these was designed "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels."¹¹ The second, which defined the pay and emoluments of certain officers of the Army, provided that the President might retire any officer who had been in service for 45 years or who had reached the age of sixty-two.¹² The third,¹³ as Upton says,¹⁴ "reads like a chapter

* Amendments to the Morrill act were made by two measures, one approved July 23, 1866 (14 Stat. L., 208), the other approved March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 484). Further endowments of agricultural colleges were affected by the second Morrill act, approved August 30, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 417), and by the Nelson amendment, approved March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. L., 1256, 1281). *Vide* also the circular issued by the U. S. Department of Agriculture on October 31, 1914, and entitled "Federal Legislation, Regulations and Rulings affecting agricultural colleges and experiment stations."

from the Journal of the Continental Congress during the darkest days of the Revolution." To analyse this measure in detail would serve no useful purpose; suffice to say that it demonstrated that every lesson of the past had been cast to the winds. The President was empowered to call out militia for service "not exceeding nine months"; this militia was to be organized in the same manner as the volunteers — in other words, the officers to be appointed by the States; 100,000 volunteers, in addition to the 1,000,000 already in service,¹⁵ could be called out for nine months, with a bonus of one month's pay and a bounty of \$25. In order to get men to join the Regular Army, volunteers could be accepted for twelve months and were to be given a bounty of \$50¹⁶— this greater inducement being necessary to offset the very natural inclination of men to join the volunteers, where the term of service was shorter and the discipline less severe. Certain other provisions were made,¹⁷ the most important being for the creation of army corps¹⁸ which, obviously, ought to have been instituted at the outbreak of war.

Aside from the statutory acts, there were three resolutions passed that year worthy of passing notice. One of these wisely provided

"That whenever military operations may require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade in the same field or department, the President may assign the command of the forces in such field or department, without regard to seniority of rank,"¹⁹

thus establishing the principle of selection. Another granted a premium of \$2 to any one producing a recruit accepted for the Regular Army,²⁰ and the last appropriated \$10,000 for the preparation of "medals of honor" to "be presented, in the name of Congress, to such non-commissioned officers and privates as shall most distinguish themselves by gallantry in action, and other soldier-like qualities."²¹ This constituted the creation of the "American Victoria Cross"²²— an


order of which our average citizen is even to-day colossally ignorant.


“ Save the one law authorizing the President to seize the railroads and telegraphs, the military legislation of 1862, as compared with that of 1861, shows little or no increase of wisdom. Congress had not yet discovered the value of military training. It exercised the power to support armies, but the power to raise them it conferred on the governors. To its mind the volunteer and State systems meant one and the same thing. The idea still prevailed that the Union could be saved by the voluntary service of its citizens. Patriotism, notwithstanding the lesson of Bull Run, was esteemed above discipline. There was no need of careful instruction. The war would soon be over; and strong in this delusion the views of Congress, more than a year after the fall of Fort Sumter, found expression in a law which, could the President have executed it, would again have intrusted the destiny of the nation to raw troops raised by the States for the brief period of nine and twelve months.”²³

CALLS FOR TROOPS IN 1862

During the months of May and June special authority was given the States of New York, Indiana and Illinois to furnish men for three months' service, and their response yielded 15,007.²⁴ The numerical losses of the troops at the front had been such that, on June 28th, eighteen governors petitioned the President to call upon the States for sufficient men to fill the armies in the field up to their proper complement, as well as “ to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily crush the rebellion.”²⁵ Mr. Lincoln complied by issuing a call on July 2nd for 300,000 volunteers for three years, and the states generously exceeded their quotas by fully 33 per cent.²⁶

“ The great depletion of the old regiments by the campaigns of 1862 induced special efforts during the summer and fall of that year to secure recruits for them. It was, however, perceived early in August that these efforts would not meet with success, and that the call of July 2, where filled at all, would





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be filled mainly by new organizations. These the governors of the States authorized partly from a misapprehension of the real needs of the service,²⁷ and partly from a more or less well-founded belief that, without the stimulus of commissions in new regiments, individual efforts, heretofore so successful in raising men, would not be made by influential parties in different localities. In view of this failure and the pressing want of troops, a draft for three hundred thousand (300,000) militia, to serve for a term of nine months, was ordered by the President on the 4th of August, 1862. The order directed that if any State failed to furnish its quota of men under the preceding call for volunteers, the deficiency should be made up by a special draft from the militia by the 15th of August. It also announced that steps would be taken for the promotion of officers for meritorious services, for preventing the appointment of incompetent persons as officers in the volunteer and regular forces, and for ridding the service of the unworthy ones already commissioned.

“ This order was the first step taken by the government towards carrying out the maxim upon which the security of the republican governments mainly depends, viz: THAT EVERY CITIZEN OWES HIS COUNTRY MILITARY SERVICE.²⁸ To its adoption, and the subsequent rigorous resort to conscription, the salvation of the Union is due, more than to any other cause.

“ The draft under this order commenced on the 3rd of September, 1862, and was conducted by the State authorities. Of the three hundred thousand (300,000) men called for, about eighty-seven thousand were credited as having been drafted into the service under the call.²⁹ This number was much reduced by desertion before the men could be got out of their respective States, and but a small portion of them actually joined the ranks of the army.

“ This draft constituted the last demand of the general government for men previous to the inauguration of the system of conscription in the following spring.”³⁰

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862³¹

The military operations of 1862 fall naturally into three distinct periods; in the first and third the Union armies acted on the offensive, in the second on the defensive.³²

On February 6th General Grant, who had moved from


Cairo up the Tennessee River, captured Fort Henry with the assistance of the gunboat flotilla under Commodore Foote,³³ and ten days later Fort Donelson capitulated to him in response to his demand for "unconditional surrender."³⁴ In the East General Burnside took Roanoke Island, North Carolina, on the 8th;³⁵ a month later the *Merrimac* sank the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*, but was defeated next day by the *Monitor*.³⁶ On March 11th General McClellan was relieved of command as generalissimo,³⁷ on the 14th New Berne, North Carolina, fell to Burnside,³⁸ and on the 23rd General Shields was victorious at Winchester.³⁹

The battle of Shiloh took place on April 6th and 7th, ending with the retreat of Johnston's army before Grant,⁴⁰ and the following day General Pope and the gunboats captured the important Island No. 10, thus opening the upper part of the Mississippi.⁴¹ On the 24th Rear-Admiral Farragut destroyed the Confederate fleet and ran the gauntlet of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. Anchoring off New Orleans next day, he made a demand for its surrender and on May 1st the city complied. Steaming up the river, he took Baton Rouge and Natchez, and on June 27th his mortar boats bombarded Vicksburg but, being unable to reduce this stronghold, he ran past the batteries and joined Foote's gunboats which had descended from Cairo.⁴²

On March 17th the Army of the Potomac began its embarkation at Alexandria, Virginia, its destination being the peninsula, up which its advance was commenced on April 4th. Yorktown was besieged from the 5th until May 4th, followed in quick succession by the battles of Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House and Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.⁴³ On that day, June first, the Army of the Potomac with a fighting strength of 100,000 was astride of the Chickahominy River within six miles of Richmond.⁴⁴

Second Period.

"During this period the Government and the Confederates



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conducted the war on contrary principles. *The Government sought to save the Union by fighting as a Confederacy; the Confederates sought to destroy it by fighting as a nation. The Government recognized the States, appealed to them for troops, adhered to voluntary enlistments, gave the governors power to appoint all commissioned officers and encouraged them to organize new regiments. The Confederates abandoned State sovereignty, appealed directly to the people, took away from them the power to appoint commissioned officers, vested their appointment in the Confederate President, refused to organize war regiments, abandoned voluntary enlistments, and, adopting the republican principle that every citizen owes his country military service, called into the army every white man between the ages of 18 and 35.*"⁴⁵

On June first General Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia then in the vicinity of Richmond,⁴⁶ but he waited until a series of successes in the Shenandoah Valley⁴⁷ permitted General "Stonewall" Jackson to join him with some 18,500 men⁴⁸ and, in conjunction with other re-enforcements that reached him during the month, enabled him to concentrate about 90,000 troops⁴⁹ behind entrenched lines between the James and Chickahominy rivers, in close proximity to McClellan whose army numbered 105,445.⁵⁰ On June 26th Lee assumed the offensive and the "Seven Days' Campaign" began. A succession of hard-fought battles⁵¹ ended in a bloody repulse of the Confederates at Malvern Hill on July 1st, after which McClellan withdrew his army from Richmond.⁵²

The Federal Government then endeavoured to unite at Aquia Creek⁵³ the scattered armies under McClellan, Burnside and Pope,⁵⁴ but Lee had meanwhile begun his advance toward Washington.⁵⁵ On August 9th, his van under Jackson attacked General Banks at Cedar Mountain,⁵⁶ but a spirited engagement⁵⁷ compelled the former to fall back across the Rapidan and to await re-enforcements. On the 29th and 30th Bull Run witnessed a second victory for the South,⁵⁸ which drove Pope within the fortifications of Wash-

ington.⁵⁹ On September 4th the Confederate army crossed the Potomac near Leesburg,⁶⁰ and four days later General Lee issued at Frederick a proclamation inviting the people of Maryland to join the Southern cause.⁶¹

In the West the Confederates were equally successful. General Bragg's army was increased to 50,000 men by conscription, turned Buell's flank, threatened Nashville, captured the garrison of 2,100 men at Mumfordsville on September 17th, menaced Louisville and marched to Frankfort, Kentucky, where he was joined by the 3rd Corps under General Kirby Smith which had defeated Nelson at Richmond, Ky., on August 29th and had advanced within 50 miles of Cincinnati. On September 13th General Price captured Iuka, Mississippi, and on October 4th General Rosecrans inflicted a severe repulse on a Confederate force of 22,000 under Van Dorn and Price, which attempted to drive him out of his entrenchments at Corinth, Mississippi.⁶²

"With the exception of the victories of Iuka and Corinth an unbroken chain of disasters marked the second period of 1862.⁶³ The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the James River to Washington and Alexandria, the invasion of Maryland, and the retreat of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville,⁶⁴ produced a depression in the public mind nearly as great as that which succeeded the battle of Bull Run."⁶⁵

Third Period.

Upon the retreat of the Northern armies to Washington after the second battle of Bull Run, General Pope was relieved at his own request and ordered to the West.⁶⁶ McClellan, now in command of the forces near Washington,⁶⁷ advanced to Frederick, Maryland, on September 12th, occupied Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap on the 14th after a lively fight,⁶⁸ and three days later the opposing armies⁶⁹ met in one of the bloodiest battles of the war.⁷⁰ Antietam terminated in the retreat of Lee across the Potomac,⁷¹ but McClellan failed to follow up his advantage, and it was not until nearly a week later that the Army of the Potomac again en-

tered Virginia⁷² and marched for Warrenton and Culpeper.⁷³ On November 7th, McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac and superseded by General Burnside.⁷⁴ On November 15th the new commander set his troops in movement *en route* to Richmond,⁷⁵ and on December 13th he launched them against Lee's entrenchments at Fredericksburg, only to suffer a fearful repulse.⁷⁶

In the West, Buell, who had been considerably re-enforced, started from Louisville on October 1st in pursuit of Bragg. The latter accepted the challenge at Perryville, Kentucky, on the 8th but was beaten,⁷⁷ retreated to Chattanooga but again resumed the offensive and advanced to Murfreesborough, some thirty miles south of Nashville. On October 30th Buell was relieved by General Rosecrans and the title of the Army of the Ohio changed to the Army of the Cumberland. After nearly two months spent in schooling the new recruits, Rosecrans began his movement on December 26th and five days later the opposing forces met at Murfreesborough. The attacks were suspended on January 1st; next day Bragg resumed his assaults but was repulsed, and on the 3rd abandoned the battlefield and retreated to Tullahoma.⁷⁸

On November 24th, General Grant — who had been assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee⁷⁹ — ordered all his forces to the Tallahatchee River and began the Vicksburg campaign, with the assistance of Admiral Porter's gunboats and a force of 20,000 under General W. T. Sherman. The latter therefore started from Memphis, rallied to him 12,000 troops at Helena, reached the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou on December 27th, and two days later delivered an assault against General Pemberton's formidable entrenchments on the bluffs at that place, but was driven back with considerable loss.⁸⁰

The year 1862 was characterised by the mismanagement of military legislation by Congress and the mismanagement of the armies in the field by the Union commanders, who suc-

ceeded each other in rapid succession and none of whom had the experience necessary to command large forces.

“The military situation at the close of 1862 was far more favorable for the Southern Confederacy than any one could have predicted at the beginning of the year. Great opportunities had been thrown away by the generals on the Union side.

“Twice during the year might the Confederate army of the West have been attacked under exceptionally favorable circumstances by a much more powerful force, but Grant after Shiloh and Halleck after Corinth threw away their chances. No similar opportunities were offered to Buell or to Rosecrans. Hence, at the close of the year we find the army of Bragg resolutely confronting its antagonist on the field of Murfreesborough.

“In the East, by the interference of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton with McClellan’s plan of uniting the force under McDowell to the army near Richmond, the best chance of success was thrown away; while McClellan by not attacking Lee at Sharpsburg⁸¹ on September 16, failed to improve the most promising opportunity for destroying the Army of Northern Virginia which up to that time had been presented.

“The task of the Army of the Potomac had certainly not been lightened by the battle of Fredericksburg, nor had that of the Army of the Cumberland by the battle of Murfreesborough.”⁸²

The results achieved were in inverse ratio to the strength of the opposing forces, as the Northern armies uniformly outnumbered their adversaries.

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1863

THE Act of January 6th "to improve the organization of the cavalry forces"¹ was followed a month later by authorization to the Governor of Kentucky "to raise and organize into regiments a volunteer force not exceeding twenty thousand, rank and file" "for the term of twelve months." These troops were to be used for the defence of that State and, as usual, Congress vested the appointment of the officers in the governor.² Two days later a "commissary general of subsistence" was created,³ and the following week a measure was passed "to secure to the officers and men actually employed in the western department, or department of Missouri, their pay, bounty, and pension"⁴ which had previously been suspended.⁵ The Act of March 2nd provided for the appointment of thirty Major Generals and seventy-five Brigadier Generals in addition to those already authorized⁶ or in the regular service,⁷ with the very wise stipulation "that the officers to be appointed under this act shall be selected from those who have been conspicuous for gallant or meritorious conduct in the line of duty."⁸

On March 3rd three important measures were approved. The first was framed in order "to promote the efficiency of the corps of engineers and of the ordnance department" and effected some notable changes,⁹ but it likewise contained a serious defect in the bounty given for new enlistments for comparatively short periods.¹⁰ The second law prescribed the organization of the Signal Corps during the war,¹¹ while the third was, by all odds, the most far-reaching military legislation passed during the war.

"During the latter part of 1862 the necessity for a radical change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute the

war to a successful issue became more and more apparent. The demand for reinforcements for the various armies in the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply of men. The old agencies for filling the ranks proved more and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without resort to THE UNPOPULAR, BUT NEVERTHELESS TRULY REPUBLICAN, MEASURE OF CONSCRIPTION. The national authorities, no less than the purest and wisest minds in Congress, and intelligent and patriotic citizens throughout the country, perceived that, besides a more reliable, regular, and abundant supply of men, other substantial benefits would be derived from the adoption and enforcement of THE PRINCIPLE THAT EVERY CITIZEN, NOT INCAPACITATED BY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY, OWES MILITARY SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY IN THE HOUR OF EXTREMITY. It would effectually do away with the unjust and burdensome disproportion in the number of men furnished by different States and localities.

“But it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty, contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of privileges than to the fulfilment of duties under the general government, and hence beheld the prospect of compulsory service in the army with an unreasonable dread. Among the laboring classes especially it produced great uneasiness. Fortunately, the loyal political leaders and press early realized the urgency of conscription, and, by judicious agitation, gradually reconciled the public to it. When the enrolment act was introduced in Congress in the following winter, the patriotic people of the north were willing to see it become a law.

“After a protracted, searching, and animated discussion, extending through nearly the whole of the short session of the thirty-seventh Congress, the enrolment act was passed, and became a law on the 3d of March, 1863. IT WAS THE FIRST LAW ENACTED BY CONGRESS BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES APPEALED DIRECTLY TO THE NATION TO CREATE LARGE ARMIES WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SEVERAL STATES. . . .

“The public safety would have been risked by longer delay in the enactment of this law. A general apathy prevailed throughout the country on the subject of volunteering. Recruiting had subsided, while desertion had greatly increased and

had grown into a formidable and widespread evil. The result of the important military operations during the first months of 1863 had been unfavorable and exercised a depressing effect on the public mind. . . . The rebel army was stronger in numbers than at any other period of the war. And last, not least, a powerful party in the north, encouraged by these events, opposed the raising of the new levies, and especially the enforcement of the new conscription law."¹²

The measure in question was entitled "An Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes," and "the main objects of the law were, in general terms: first, to enroll and hold liable to military duty all citizens capable of bearing arms not exempted therefrom by its provisions; second, to call forth the national forces by draft when required; third, to arrest deserters and return them to their proper commands."¹³

The basis of this legislation was another law which went into effect more than seventy years before,¹⁴ and the opening section enunciated the same cardinal principle, with the single difference that the minimum age was raised from 18 to 20 years.¹⁵ The earlier law required all persons enrolled in the militia to provide themselves with certain equipment which the law of 1863 by inference obliged the Government to furnish, and the execution of the later law was insured by prescribing¹⁶

"That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and empowered, during the present rebellion, to call forth the national forces by draft, in the manner provided for in this act."

In all its military legislation Congress has rarely, or never, produced a rose without the accompaniment of a thorn, and the present instance was no exception to the general rule. Having declared that every male, with certain exceptions, was amenable to military duty, it proceeded to undo part of its excellent work by permitting substitutes or the payment of \$300 in lieu thereof,¹⁷ and on top of that granted large boun-

ties for duty which the law specifically exacted.¹⁸ The evils thus unloosed far exceeded those which emanated from Pandora's notorious box.

The first step in the execution of this law was to enroll all males not exempted. As the report of the Provost Marshal General declared:¹⁹

“Numerous and weighty obstacles were encountered in making this enrolment. The large floating population of the country, and the disposition and right of our people to go from place to place without let or hindrance, rendered it exceedingly difficult to perfect it. Most of the embarrassments resulted, however, from the opposition encountered in almost every house, if not to the act itself, at least to its application of the particular persons whose names were sought for enrolment. The law made it the duty of this bureau to *take*, but did not make it the duty of any one to *give*, the names of those liable to draft. Every imaginable artifice was adopted to deceive and defeat the enrolling officers. Open violence was sometimes met with. Several enrolers lost their lives. Some were crippled. The property of others was destroyed to intimidate them, and prevent the enrolment. In certain mining regions organized bodies of men openly opposed the enrolment, rendering it necessary that the United States authorities should send troops to overcome their opposition. There were secret societies, newspapers, and politicians who fostered and encouraged this widespread opposition.”

The sequel is thus interestingly told by Morse in his biography of Abraham Lincoln:²⁰

“The fact confronted Mr. Lincoln that he must institute enrolment and drafting. The machinery was arranged and the very disagreeable task was entered upon early in the summer of 1863. If it was painful in the first instance for the President to order this, the process was immediately made as hateful as possible for him. Even the loyal and hearty ‘war-governors’ seemed at once to accept as their chief object the protection of the people of their respective States from the operation of the odious law. The mercantile element was instantly and fully accepted by them. The most patriotic did not hesitate to make every effort to have the assigned quotas reduced; they drew

jealous comparisons to show inequalities; and they concocted all sorts of schemes for obtaining credits. Not marshalling recruits in the field, but filling quotas on paper, seemed a legitimate purpose; for the matter had become one of figures, of business, of competition, and all the shrewdness of the Yankee mind was at once aroused to gain for one's self, though at the expense of one's neighbors. Especially the Democratic officials were viciously fertile in creating obstacles. . . .

"In a word Mr. Lincoln was confronted by every difficulty that Republican inventiveness and Democratic disaffection could devise. Yet the draft must go on, or the war must stop. . . . But in the main business he was inflexible; and at last it came to a direct issue between himself and the malcontents, whether the draft should go on or stop. In the middle of July the mob in New York City tested the question. The drafting began there on Saturday morning, July 11. On Monday morning, July 13, the famous riot broke out. It was an appalling storm of rage on the part of the lower classes; during three days terror and barbarism controlled the great city, and in its streets countless bloody and hideous massacres were perpetrated. Negroes especially were hanged and otherwise slain most cruelly. The governor was so inefficient that he was charged, of course extravagantly, with being secretly in league with the ringleaders. A thousand or more lives, as it was roughly estimated, were lost in this mad and brutal fury, before order was again restored. The government gave the populace a short time to cool, and then sent 10,000 troops into the city and proceeded with the business without further interruption. A smaller outbreak took place in Boston, but was promptly suppressed. In other places it was threatened, but did not occur. In spite of it all, the President continued to execute the law. Yet although by this means the armies might be kept full, the new men were very inferior to those who had responded voluntarily to the earlier calls. Every knave in the country adopted the lucrative and tolerably safe occupation of 'bounty-jumping,' and every worthless loafer was sent to the front, whence he escaped at the first opportunity to sell himself anew and to be counted again. The material of the army suffered great depreciation, which was only imperfectly offset by the improvement of the military machine, whereby a more effective discipline, resembling that of European professionalism, was enforced."

The efforts to evade the law came to such a pass that on September 15th President Lincoln found himself obliged to proclaim a suspension of the constitutional privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*,²¹ since the courts had continually overridden the specific provision of the law making the decision of the board of enrolment final.²² The difficulties encountered by the Government in the attempt to secure men were never-ending. On June 15th the President had called for 100,000 militia to serve for six months but only 16,361 were furnished.²³ Such was the opposition to the draft that not more than 35,882 men were secured, and of this number no less than 26,002 were substitutes. Of the 292,441 drafted,²⁴ 52,288 paid their \$300 to escape duty, and the Government was thus enabled to utilize these sums amounting to \$15,686,400 to obtain others.²⁵

“This draft, though not directly fruitful in producing men, served the essential purpose of substituting the reality for the semblance of conscription, and of establishing the power and determination of the government to proceed in the reenforcement of its armies. When it was resorted to, volunteering had stopped, and would not have been again started without the spur of the draft.”²⁶

After applying it and increasing “the bounties to the largest practicable limit,” the paucity of men was still so far from sufficient to complement the armies in the field that, on October 17th, Mr. Lincoln called for 300,000 volunteers for three years, but was compelled to announce in his proclamation that the draft for these troops would be deferred until January 5, 1864, in order to give Congress time to make certain much-needed amendments in the Enrolment Act.²⁷

Early in December Congress assembled for its usual regular session, but the only legislation enacted during that month with respect to the military service²⁸ was an appropriation of \$23,000,000 “for the payment of bounties and advance pay,”²⁹ in which it was specified that commutation money “shall be kept in the treasury as a special deposit, applicable

only to the expenses of draft and for the procurement of substitutes." ³⁰

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1863

On January 25th President Lincoln appointed General Joseph Hooker commander of the Union armies in succession to Burnside,³¹ and "Fighting Joe" addressed himself to a complete re-organization of the army which, it must be confessed, was decidedly needed.³² The winter had been spent in quarters on the north bank of the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg and opposite Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, which was only about half as strong.³³ Each commander had planned to take the initiative in April but, in the case of the Army of the Potomac, the obligation to strike quickly in order to take advantage of superior numbers was the greater inasmuch as the service of the men enlisted for nine months and two years were both on the eve of expiration.³⁴ On April 13th the campaign opened by Hooker's sending his cavalry corps to make a raid in Lee's rear, and on the 27th he set his army in motion. On the night of the 30th Hooker had covered about 45 miles, crossed two rivers and had established some 54,000 infantry and artillery on his adversary's left flank at Chancellorsville.³⁵ He then proceeded to issue one of those bombastic proclamations³⁶ which — with the exception of Napoleon — have nearly always been a precursor of disaster. Although Hooker's position was one of great strength,³⁷ nearly all of his cavalry was absent, his right flank was "in the air" and his army was divided. A retrograde movement was closely followed by Lee who, notwithstanding his inferiority, was bent upon attacking. Thrusting Jackson forward against Hooker's exposed right, the battle was joined on May 3rd and, although Lee suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Jackson,³⁸ Chancellorsville terminated in a bloody victory³⁹ and forced Hooker to retreat northward.⁴⁰

In one aspect this campaign recalls Arnold at Quebec in

1775.⁴¹ In both instances the commanders were impelled to strike lest the expiring enlistments should reduce their forces to inactivity, and each suffered a severe repulse.

A lull of four weeks after Chancellorsville afforded Lee an opportunity to prepare for the counter-stroke in the shape of an invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which he resolved in spite of his unsuccess at Antietam the year before. During May the Army of Northern Virginia was re-organized,⁴² and on June 3rd Lee began the delicate operation of manœuvering Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahannock. A week later Ewell's corps was set in motion for the Shenandoah Valley, followed at intervals by the rest of the army whose withdrawal was masked in a most masterful manner by J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry. Hooker started to interpose himself between Lee's flanks but was held back by Secretary Stanton and General Halleck, who had made up their minds not to permit him to command in another battle. Hooker did however continue to approach Lee and, when the leading Confederate corps crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and Williamsport on June 23rd and 24th,⁴³ he followed them over the river⁴⁴ during the ensuing forty-eight hours and marched for Frederick. On the night of the 27th Stuart's cavalry likewise crossed at Rowser's Ford and, after capturing a Union wagon-train eight miles long at Rockville next day, started on the raid around Hooker's army, which he had suggested and to which Lee had consented. This brilliant feat achieved nothing, as Stuart was impeded by the wagons which he persisted in taking with him, lost all touch with the main army and did not rejoin it until July 2nd.⁴⁵ Lee was thus deprived — largely through his own fault — of "the eyes of the army" which are so essential to successful operations, and found himself tremendously handicapped in consequence.⁴⁶ It was not until midnight on the 28th that he learned through a scout that his adversary was north of the Potomac, with three corps near Frederick and two at the base of South Mountain. That night Lee issued orders for

a concentration of his forces at Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, whence he could threaten Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia equally.⁴⁷

Meanwhile Hooker had penetrated his adversary's design and sought permission to cross the Blue Ridge in Lee's rear, but, being refused, he tendered his resignation on June 27th and Meade, in spite of his protest,⁴⁸ was appointed to succeed him — a procedure which might have entailed disaster considering the time and occasion when it occurred.* The new commander assumed his functions next day and, having selected Parr's Ridge behind Pipe Creek as an advantageous position for a defensive action, issued his orders accordingly. On the 30th his leading troops⁴⁹ reached Gettysburg but, finding that Lee was withdrawing in the direction of Cashtown, a further advance was ordered with the design of securing the position selected and gaining time for the concentration of his corps. Both he and Lee cautioned their lieutenants not to bring on a battle but the Fates saw otherwise, Hill taking the initiative and Reynolds accepting the challenge with alacrity.⁵⁰

At 10 A. M. on July 1st began the battle of Gettysburg⁵¹ which marked the zenith and decline of the Confederate star. Three days of the most desperate fighting, attended by some of the heaviest losses incurred in modern war,† ended in the retreat of Lee on the 4th.⁵² The failure of Meade to follow up his splendid victory alone saved the Confederates from annihilation, and permitted them to fall back to the Potomac, which was swollen by heavy rains, and to remain there until the 13th, when the last troops effected their crossing without

* Although President Lincoln was not one of the active *dramatis personæ* in this plot to force Hooker to resign, he evidently forgot his own motto: "Never swap horses when you are crossing a stream."

† The losses of the Union army were 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded and 5,434 captured or missing, a total of 23,003.

The Confederate casualties were 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing or taken prisoner, making a total of 20,451.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 437 and 439; *Alexander*, pp. 443-446.

"At Balaklava the Light Brigade lost 37 per cent. of its men, and at Inkerman the Guards lost 45 per cent., and both go down in history,

serious opposition, in spite of Meade's arrival on the 11th.⁵³ Irrespective of the incredible sloth of the Union commander when his adversary's fate lay in his hands, it must be confessed that even under the circumstances "Lee's escape was exceedingly narrow."⁵⁴

The Confederate army continued to Culpeper, rested a week and crossed the Rapidan to Orange Court House, followed by Meade, but the remaining operations in Virginia that year were confined to manœuvering unmarked by any action of major importance.⁵⁵

In the West the Union successes were even more notable than in the eastern theatre of war. Allusion has already been made to the beginning of the campaign against Vicksburg by Grant in November, 1862, and to Sherman's defeat at Chickasaw Bluffs at the end of that year.⁵⁶ The winter was unprecedented for the continuous high water in the Mississippi, which rendered ineffectual all attempts to approach the Confederate stronghold,⁵⁷ but in April the receding of the waters made land operations possible.⁵⁸ On

in verse and prose, as having been annihilated. At Gettysburg, on July 1st,

The 16th Maine	lost 84 per cent.
The 2nd Wisconsin	" 77 " "
The 149th Penna.	" 74 " "
The 24th Michigan	" 73 " "
The 151st Penna.	" 71 " "
The 147th N. Y.	" 70 " "
The 107th N. Y.	" 70 " "
The 150th Penna.	" 66 " "
The 107th Penna.	" 65 " "
The 75th Penna.*	" 63 " "
The 142nd Penna.	" 62 " "
The 76th N. Y.	" 62 " "
The 157th N. Y.*	" 61 " "

* In the 11th Corps.

In the 150th Pennsylvania, out of 17 officers who went into action, only one escaped death, wounding or capture."—Henry S. Huidekoper, *A Short Story of the First Day's Fight at Gettysburg*, p. 12. Also *The Military Order of the Congress Medal of Honor Legion of the United States*, p. 264.

the night of April 16th part of Admiral Porter's ironclad fleet and several transports ran past Vicksburg, and thirteen days later performed a similar operation at Grand Gulf. Thus supplied and protected, Grant's troops were ferried across to Bruinsburg, nine miles lower down, on the 30th and that general found himself with only 20,000 men in the midst of an enemy's country, separated from his base by a vast river and a powerful enemy who occupied Haines Bluff, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf and Jackson, fifty miles to the east. His energy was in keeping with the situation. On May 1st the opening engagement took place at Port Gibson, Grand Gulf was occupied next day, Sherman with 13,000 men joined him on the 7th, five days later a Confederate force was driven back from Raymond, and on the 14th Grant compelled Johnston to evacuate Jackson.⁵⁹ Turning toward Vicksburg, he encountered Pemberton at Champion's Hill on the 16th and was again successful, repeating his feat next day at Black River Bridge. On the 18th began the investment of Vicksburg, but two assaults⁶⁰ convinced Grant that the stronghold could not be taken by storm and he therefore sat down to a regular siege. Six weeks exhausted Pemberton's resistance and on July 3rd he made overtures to surrender. The terms were soon arranged and on the 4th Grant marched into the place.⁶¹

This notable achievement,⁶² coupled — to use Grant's own words —

“with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and the loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the *morale* was with the supporters of the Union ever after.”⁶³

The operations which terminated with the capitulation of this important fortress bear marked similarity to those of Napoleon during the campaign of Ulm. Had Grant's

career ended then and there, he would still be entitled to fame,⁶⁴ for none but a great general could have taken the resolution to cut loose from his base of supplies under such circumstances as confronted Grant. Like other Union commanders he was made to feel the sinister influence of defective military legislation, and he candidly confessed that

“The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy’s country.

“With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. It looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.”⁶⁵

The modest victor was promptly rewarded by having the bulk of his army taken away from him by the wiseacre Halleck, who ruled the military councils at Washington, vetoed Grant’s suggestion for a campaign against Mobile and compelled him to detach the bulk of his troops in order to reinforce General Rosecrans and relieve Chattanooga.⁶⁶ Early in October Grant himself was summoned North⁶⁷ to take the general command of the troops drawn from the West,⁶⁸ as

Rosecrans had meanwhile been badly defeated by Bragg at Chickamauga,⁶⁹ "the hardest fought and bloodiest battle of the Rebellion"⁷⁰ considering the number of forces engaged.⁷¹ This victory so crippled the Confederates that no benefits inured to them,⁷² although Rosecrans found himself at Chattanooga practically in a state of siege, hemmed in between his adversary in front and the mountains in his rear.⁷³

On October 16th Grant, having reached Cairo, was invested with command of the newly-created Military Division of the Mississippi.⁷⁴ Arriving at Chattanooga on the 23rd,⁷⁵ he began to concentrate the armies under Sherman⁷⁶ and Thomas, the latter of whom had superseded Rosecrans⁷⁷ and had been re-enforced by Hooker's two corps which had been sent by rail from the East.⁷⁸ On November 24th and 25th Grant fought the battle of Chattanooga which, in reality, consisted of three detached actions at Lookout Mountain, the valley of the Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge, all strongly fortified by Bragg. Hooker assaulted the first⁷⁹ and swept the valley clear, while Sherman after desperate fighting on the left was re-enforced by Thomas and carried the ridge by storm, and a prompt pursuit by Sheridan⁸⁰ completed the success by capturing most of the prisoners taken.⁸¹

Considering the strength of Bragg's position, "the victory of Chattanooga⁸² was won against great odds,"⁸³ although it must be confessed that the blunders of the Confederate commander contributed largely to his adversary's success.⁸⁴ Grant immediately started for Knoxville where Burnside had been blockaded since November 17th, and his approach forced Longstreet, who had attempted to carry the place by assault,⁸⁵ to raise the siege on December 4th.⁸⁶ Shortly afterward the opposing armies went into winter quarters, Grant's headquarters being established at Nashville on the 20th.⁸⁷

CHAPTER XII

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1864

ON January 16th an amendment was made to the resolution of December 23, 1863,¹ with respect to the money paid in by men seeking to escape service under the draft.² Allusion has already been made to the postponement until January 5, 1864, of the draft for the 300,000 men demanded in the President's call of October 17, 1863, in order to permit Congress to make some necessary amendments to the Enrolment Act.³ The plan contemplated was, as the Provost Marshal General pointed out: ⁴

“1st, to offer a large bounty to the man presenting himself as a recruit, this bounty being divided into instalments and distributed through the period of his enlistment; 2nd, to secure the services of active and reliable men as recruiting agents, who, liberally remunerated by the premium allowed for each man they presented, would devote themselves wholly to the business, be under the control of the government, and held responsible for their behavior.

“A dread of the draft on the part of some, and a commendable pride in having their localities escape compulsory service on the part of others, resulted in defeating these two main objects. To fill their respective quotas and avoid the draft, towns, counties, and States offered bounties and premiums so greatly in excess of those offered by the government as to make the latter of inappreciable effect,⁵ especially as the local bounties were generally paid in full at the time of enlistment.

“In the anxiety of towns and States to fill quotas, useful regulations and wholesome restraints upon fraud and abuse were, in some instances, pronounced by the public to be unnecessary and vexatious obstacles to success in recruiting, and were consequently defeated or disregarded. . . .

“The opportunities for fraud and gain, in connection with the increase of local bounties, grew rapidly, and with the bus-

iness open to the bad as well as the good, very soon produced the class of men known as bounty and substitute brokers. The network with which they covered the country was so well contrived and so skilfully managed, that it was difficult for recruits or substitutes to get into the service without passing through their hands. . . .

“THE WRONGS TO INDIVIDUALS, AND THE INJURY TO THE RECRUITING SERVICE AND THE CAUSE OF THE COUNTRY, RESULTING FROM THE OPERATIONS OF THESE SUBSTITUTE AND BOUNTY BROKERS, AND FROM THE LARGE LOCAL BOUNTIES . . . ARE OF SUCH A CHARACTER AND EXTENT AS TO PROVE THE NECESSITY, under similar circumstances, if they should arise hereafter, OF AN ENTIRE SUPPRESSION OF SUBSTITUTE BROKERAGE, as practised during the late war.”

A long discussion in Congress ended in a number of amendments to the Enrolment Act and the new law was approved on February 24th. The first section went straight to the point by declaring

“That the President of the United States shall be authorized, whenever he shall deem it necessary during the present war, to call for such number of men for the military service of the United States as the public exigencies may require.”

That Congress was in earnest this time is manifest from the provisions of this act. The quotas to be furnished by any subdivision⁶ were to be proportioned to the resident males liable to military duty, including those already supplied, and in the event of deficiency repeated drafts were to be made until the entire quota was filled.⁷ In case a substitute were furnished, the immunity of the original was made wholly dependent upon the immunity of the substitute; and if the substitute were, or became, subject to draft, the name of the original was to be restored to the list of those enrolled as liable for service, and even the payment of money was to afford no exemption beyond a year at the outside.⁸ The most drastic provision of all limited the persons exempted from enrolment and draft to

“Such as are rejected as physically and mentally unfit for

service, all persons actually in the military or naval service of the United States at the time of the draft, and all persons who have served in the military or naval service two years during the present war, and been honorably discharged therefrom.”⁹

Resistance to enrolment or to the arrest of any spy or deserter was made punishable by a fine not exceeding \$5,000 or five years' imprisonment.¹⁰ Fines were also imposed for false statements,¹¹ and fines or imprisonment for false reports,¹² fees in excess of those prescribed by law,¹³ and for the procuring of substitutes by enrolling officers, provost marshals or surgeons or any of their employees.¹⁴ All able-bodied male negroes were to be enrolled in, and form part of, the national forces. In the case of a slave drafted into service, his master was to receive the usual bounty of \$100.¹⁵ The power of provost marshals and boards of enrolment was properly enlarged, and certified copies of their records were declared to be valid “evidence in any civil or military court.”¹⁶ The fact that a person of foreign birth had voted was declared “conclusive evidence that he is not entitled to exemption from military service,” and all claims for exemption were to be verified under oath or affirmation.¹⁷ Men who were “conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms” or prohibited from so doing by their religion were to “be considered as non-combatants” and assigned to duty in hospitals or might be exempted on the payment of \$300 “to be applied to the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers,” but any declaration of conscientious scruples was to be supported by evidence showing that the man's “department has been uniformly consistent with such a declaration.”¹⁸

In a word, the former law was recast virtually *in toto* and a genuine effort made to eradicate the existing defects.¹⁹

On May 20th²⁰ an act was approved which organized a regiment of veteran volunteer engineers from men in the Army of the Cumberland. The term of service was fixed “for three years or during the war,” and all officers were to

be appointed and commissioned by the President²¹— both very wise provisions.

The Act of June 15th stipulated that all coloured men mustered into the military service should receive from and after January 1, 1864, the same equipments, emoluments, etc., as other regular or volunteer soldiers; while those who joined after the act went into effect were entitled to bounties to the amount of \$100, the same provision being made for every volunteer, irrespective of colour, who was mustered in under the call of October 17, 1863. Negroes who were free and in the military service on April 19, 1861, were declared to be entitled to pay, bounty and clothing allowed by the laws existing at the time of their enlistment. The 5th and last section provided

“That all enlistments hereafter made in the regular army of the United States, during the continuance of the present rebellion, may be for the term of three years.”²²

The Act of February 24th had not been in operation for four months before it was found to contain certain objections which it was sought to overcome by an amendatory Act of July 4th.²³ That great difficulty had been encountered in securing men even under such a drastic measure as drafting is evident from the opening sections. The first provided

“That the President of the United States may, at his discretion, at any time hereafter, call for any number of men as volunteers, for the respective terms of one, two, and three years, for military service . . . and every volunteer who is accepted and mustered into service for a term of one year, unless sooner discharged, shall receive, and be paid by the United States, a bounty of one hundred dollars; and if for a term of two years, . . . a bounty of two hundred dollars; and if for a term of three years, . . . a bounty of three hundred dollars: one-third of which bounty shall be paid to the soldier at the time of his being mustered into service, one-third at the expiration of one-half of his term of service, and one-third at the expiration of his term of office. . . .”²⁴


The second section, not content with the former mandate that, in the event of a deficiency in any district, drafts were to be continued until the shortage had been made good, went to the length of ordering "a draft for one hundred per centum in addition to the number required to fill quota of any district."²⁵ Surely no force bill could have been harsher, and Congress had apparently awakened to a realization of the truth of Washington's declaration that a long and bloody war cannot be prosecuted on patriotism alone but "must be aided by a prospect of interest or some reward," and that "a peremptory draft" is the only effectual solution.²⁶


CALLS FOR TROOPS DURING 1864

The folly of enlisting troops during hostilities for any period less than "*for the war*" was demonstrated anew and in a most conclusive manner during this year. The expiration of the terms of service of the officers and men called out during 1861 for three years, and during 1863 for six months,²⁷ necessitated the raising of new armies, doubly so since the draft during the latter year had fallen short of producing the number of men required to carry on the war successfully.²⁸

Allusion has already been made to the President's call on October 17, 1863, for 300,000 men.²⁹ This was supplemented by another issued on February 1, 1864, for 200,000, but, although those raised by the draft in 1863 were embraced in these calls,³⁰ the response fell below the requirements, inasmuch as only 63½ per cent. of the 500,000 were furnished.³¹ On March 14th an additional call was made for 200,000 men for three years, but in this case the number who came forward far exceeded the quota fixed.³² Once again recourse was had to militia and, by a call dated April 23rd, 85,000 were summoned for service limited to one hundred days.³³

On July 18th a fourth call was made, the number asked





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for being 500,000, but in view of the excess on previous calls the quotas were considerably reduced,³⁴ and in this instance the 384,882 men furnished surpassed the number required. Notwithstanding the enormous outpouring of men already made in response to the Government's demands, it was found urgent to issue another call on December 19th for 300,000 men, for service ranging from one to three years. Only 70 per cent. were supplied,³⁵ but fortunately without detriment to the cause as the necessity for more troops ceased to exist before the majority of States had furnished their full quotas.³⁶ As it was, the Government had called for no less than 1,585,000 troops in fourteen months and had met with responses to the amount of 1,249,709.

CAMPAIGN OF 1864

On March 2nd the Senate confirmed the nomination of Ulysses S. Grant as Lieutenant-General, and a week later his commission was handed him at Washington by President Lincoln in person. On the 12th he was officially placed in supreme command of all the armies of the United States, and a fortnight afterward he established his headquarters at Culpeper, Virginia.³⁷ The importance of this appointment can scarcely be over-estimated.³⁸ The chaotic mismanagement of armies which had characterised Halleck's *régime* became a thing of the past, and thenceforth a definite military policy was inaugurated and consistently followed.³⁹

Grant's initial step was to concentrate all possible Union forces, which had been greatly disseminated, and to have Sheridan placed in command of the cavalry, which had heretofore accomplished but little by comparison with its capabilities under a really skilful leader.⁴⁰ Before April 9th Grant had matured his plans. Sherman, who had succeeded him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, was to move from Chattanooga directly against Johnston's army⁴¹ and Atlanta, while Meade with the Army of the Potomac — which Grant would accompany — advanced

against Lee and Richmond.⁴² These were the principal objectives, and the operations of the other Union forces⁴³ were necessarily secondary and merely intended to supplement and support the main armies. In a word, Grant purposed to make a united effort with the maximum force against the two Confederate armies, to engage them simultaneously and to subject them to continuous hammering until their resistance was overcome and their destruction achieved.*

Pursuant to this plan Meade crossed the Rapidan on May 4th⁴⁴ and on the 5th came into collision with Ewell's corps near Wilderness Tavern. "The battle raged furiously all day" and throughout the 6th,⁴⁵ but on the morning of the 7th Lee had fallen back within his entrenched lines. That night Grant resumed his advance, and next day General Warren — commanding the 5th Corps which formed the van — was again engaged with Ewell, who sought to delay his movement in order to permit the line at Spottsylvania Court House to be fortified. The ensuing three days were spent in manœuvring and fighting, Sheridan meanwhile starting on the 9th on a raid against Lee's communications with Richmond.⁴⁶ The battle of Spottsylvania terminated on May 18th, and on the night of the 21st Grant began to transfer his army to the North Anna River but found himself again anticipated by Lee. From the 23rd to the night of the 26th⁴⁷ the fighting continued unabated, but the Union commander withdrew to the north bank and set his army in motion to Hanover Court House⁴⁸ in the hope of turning his adversary's right flank. But Lee had fathomed his pur-

* "I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land."— *Grant's Official Report to the Secretary of War*, dated July 22, 1865, and quoted in his *Memoirs*, II, p. 556.

pose, and from the 28th to the 30th the struggle was renewed at that point. On June 1st the battle of Cold Harbor opened with an attack on the Confederate entrenchments; next day there was a lull in the fighting but on the 3rd it was resumed with the utmost fury.⁴⁹ Four days later Sheridan was sent on another raid,⁵⁰ and on the 12th Grant was forced to relinquish his attempts to drive his opponents from their fortified lines, his own tremendous losses being in nowise commensurate with the results achieved.⁵¹ That night, moving again by his left flank and changing his base of operations, he started across the James for Petersburg, where he arrived on the 15th and at once attacked. On the 17th and 18th his assaults were renewed with great vigour "but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged."⁵² Next day he sat down to a regular siege of Beauregard's forces⁵³ "and penned Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia within the intrenchments of Richmond and Petersburg for ten long months⁵⁴ on the pure defensive, to remain almost passive observers of local events,⁵⁵ while Grant's other armies were absolutely annihilating the Southern Confederacy."⁵⁶

The operations of the secondary armies in Virginia had their effect, although they were not attended with conspicuous success, with the possible exception of Hunter, who was however driven back from Lynchburg to the Kanawha Valley by Early.⁵⁷ The latter then continued up the Shenandoah, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on July 5th and 6th, defeated General Lew Wallace at Monocacy⁵⁸ and moved against Washington, in accordance with Lee's plan to force Grant to withdraw from the vicinity of Richmond. On the 12th Early, having — to use his own words — "given the Federal authorities a terrible fright,"⁵⁹ began his retrograde movement to Strasburg, where he arrived ten days later. Learning that Wright's corps had been withdrawn from Washington, Early attacked and defeated Crook at Kernstown, recrossed the Potomac into Maryland, burned

Chambersburg, levied contributions upon other towns and threw the whole country into consternation but, in spite of the efforts to catch him, succeeded in getting back into Virginia, although two of his brigades were badly cut up by Averell at Moorefield on August 7th.⁶⁰

On that same day General Sheridan⁶¹ assumed command of the Middle Military Division,⁶² and on August 10th, having massed his entire command⁶³ near Harper's Ferry, he began his advance against Early, who had concentrated at Martinsburg, West Virginia.⁶⁴ After five weeks⁶⁵ spent largely in manœuvering,⁶⁶ the opposing forces met at Opequon — better known as the battle of Winchester — where Sheridan won a notable victory on September 19th.⁶⁷ Following up his adversary, he inflicted a second defeat upon him at Fisher's Hill three days later,⁶⁸ and on October 19th a rout at Cedar Creek was transformed into a splendid success by Sheridan who had galloped up from Winchester.⁶⁹ Early's army was so demoralised by its defeat that it did not attempt again to take the offensive, and the operations in the Shenandoah Valley ended that year with Sheridan in winter quarters at Kernstown and Early at Staunton.⁷⁰ This campaign had cost the Union forces 16,952 men, "but these losses are no just measure of the results of that victory, which made it impossible to use the Valley of Virginia as a Confederate base of supplies and as an easy route for raids within the Union lines."⁷¹

Meanwhile Sherman had distinguished himself by a campaign which was one of the most important achievements during the war. Starting from Chattanooga on May 4th with 98,707 troops and 254 guns,⁷² he defeated Johnston⁷³ at Resaca on the 13th to 16th, forced him to retreat, worsted him again at New Hope Church on May 25th to 28th, but was repulsed at Kenesaw Mountain on June 27th.⁷⁴ Within three days Johnston abandoned his position and retreated across the Chattahoochee, and the Confederate government, dissatisfied with his Fabian policy, superseded him by Gen-

eral John B. Hood, much to Sherman's content. On July 20th the new commander attacked the Union army but, after desperate fighting, was driven within his entrenchments, his efforts on the 22nd and 28th being equally unsuccessful.⁷⁵ "Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets,"⁷⁶ but Sherman kept "hammering away all the time"⁷⁷ and on August 25th began his advance to Jonesboro—26 miles below the city—which compelled Hood to evacuate Atlanta and permitted its occupation by the Union army on September 2nd.⁷⁸ On the 21st Hood moved to Palmetto Station⁷⁹ and commenced an aggressive movement against Sherman's communications, thus forcing the latter to send General Thomas back to Nashville and Schofield to Knoxville, while he remained in Atlanta and took precautions to frustrate his adversary's plan. Crossing the Chattahoochee on October 1st, Hood advanced to Dallas⁸⁰ and thence by a detour to Resaca, destroying the railway to Dalton and capturing the garrison there. Sherman⁸¹ followed to Resaca and turned west to intercept his retreat by the valley of the Chattanooga, but so rapid was Hood's march that he reached Gadsden without obstacle, while Sherman halted at Gaylesville. Hood then marched in a northwesterly direction across the mountains to Florence on the Tennessee River,⁸² and Sherman, realizing his purpose, promptly despatched General Schofield and two corps by rail to Nashville to re-enforce Thomas in the defence of Tennessee. He then addressed himself to the necessary preparations, with the object of resuming his offensive operations in Georgia, and on November 4th he assembled 60,598 troops in Atlanta.⁸³ Convinced that Thomas would be equal to the task of containing Hood, Sherman, being under the necessity of establishing a new base for future operations, selected the seacoast, with Savannah as the nearest point.⁸⁴ On November 15th his celebrated "march to the sea" began; on December 10th the intervening 300 miles had been covered, but it was not until the 22nd that the city had been captured and

Sherman had made his triumphal entry into Savannah.⁸⁵

Meanwhile Hood, having completely re-organized and supplied his army at Florence,⁸⁶ resumed his advance against Nashville. At Franklin he encountered Schofield on November 30th and sustained a severe check⁸⁷ but, nothing daunted, pushed on and invested Nashville on December 2nd. Thomas coolly bided his time, but on the 15th sallied forth from his entrenchments, attacked Hood in a strongly fortified position and on the following day utterly annihilated his army.⁸⁸

Hood thus ceased to be a factor and "at the end of the year 1864 the conflict at the West was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but Lee's army, held by Grant in Richmond, and the Confederate detachments at Mobile and along the seaboard north of Savannah." *

* Sherman in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 258.

General Wilson gives a most interesting account of a discussion with General Sherman at Gaylesville on October 22nd, and relates (*Under the Old Flag*, II, p. 17) that Sherman "commented freely on the strong as well as the weak points of Grant's character and in the midst of the conversation looked up suddenly, with the glow of the camp fire on his deeply marked features and exclaimed: 'Wilson, I am a damned sight smarter man than Grant; I know a great deal more about war, military history, strategy, and grand tactics than he does; I know more about organization, supply and administration and about everything else than he does; but I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world. He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell!' He added: 'I am more nervous than he is. I am more likely to change my orders or to countermarch my command than he is. He uses such information as he has according to his best judgment; he issues his orders and does his level best to carry them out without much reference to what is going on about him and, so far, experience seems to have fully justified him.'"

CHAPTER XIII

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1865

ASIDE from a comparatively unimportant measure fixing the pay of medical directors,¹ the principal legislation came at the end of the short session of Congress. On March 3rd, four important acts were approved. One of these made it illegal to offer for military or naval service any one charged with a criminal offence within the District of Columbia;² another provided for the appointment of a Chief of Staff to the Lieutenant-General; and a third permitted the Secretary of War to appoint certain commissary officers to each geographical military division, separate army corps, department or principal subsistence depôt.³

The remaining law was by all odds the most important, and its 27 sections were intended to supplement or "to amend the several acts heretofore passed for the enrolling and calling out of the national forces."⁴ The most essential features of this measure were:

(1) The payment of bounties due to a deceased soldier to his widow, children or relatives;⁵

(2) the payment of the full bounty to any soldier disabled in the line of duty;⁶

(3) the organization of six regiments of volunteer engineers and the increase of the existing regiment by two companies;⁷

(4) the stipulation that no officer was to be appointed to a regular regiment if reduced below the legal minimum, "beyond those necessary for the command of such a reduced number";⁸

(5) no brevet officers in the Regular army to receive pay and allowances in excess of "brevet officers of the same grade in the volunteer service";⁹

(6) the exoneration of an officer upon re-trial or the failure of the court-martial to convene within six months after the application of the accused shall quash the original order of dismissal;¹⁰

(7) persons who have been drafted and who have furnished acceptable substitutes for three years shall be exempt during the immunity from service of the substitute;¹¹

(8) the enlistment of those *non compos mentis*, intoxicated or incapacitated, of minors or deserters, by recruiting agents, substitutes, brokers or others, for pay or profit was to be punished by fines ranging from \$200 to \$1,000 or by imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years, or both. In the event the offender was an officer of the Regular army, the penalty was dismissal from the service. In case the culprit were a drafted man, his name was to "be again placed on the list and he shall be subject to draft thereafter as though no such substitute had been furnished by him," and, if the substitute had been mustered into service, the man originally drafted was to be "held to service in the place of such substitute, and he shall stand in the same relation and be subject to the same liability as before the furnishing of such substitute";¹²

(9) "in case any substitute shall desert from the army, and . . . that the party furnishing such substitute shall have, in any way, directly or indirectly, aided or abetted such desertion . . . then such person shall be immediately placed in the army, and shall serve for the period for which he was liable to draft, such service to commence at the date of the desertion of the substitute";¹³

(10) the President was required to issue a proclamation in order "to notify all deserters returning within sixty days . . . that they shall be pardoned on condition of returning to their regiments and companies, or to such organizations as they may be assigned to, until they have served for a period of time equal to their original term of enlistment." Upon failure to comply, they shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship and their rights to become citizens; and "SUCH DESERTERS SHALL BE FOREVER INCAPABLE OF HOLDING ANY OFFICE OF TRUST OR PROFIT UNDER THE UNITED STATES, OR OF EXERCISING ANY RIGHTS OF CITIZENS THEREOF." All deserters and persons enrolled leaving their district or the country "with the intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, duly ordered, shall be liable to the penalties of this section";¹⁴

(11) recruits procured prior to the operation of a draft shall be credited to, and be substitutes for, the persons obtaining them;¹⁵

(12) employés of the War Department were permitted to administer oaths for the settlement of officers' accounts with the same force and effect as if administered by magistrates or justices of the peace but without any expense to the officer;¹⁶ and

(13) "acting assistant surgeons, contract surgeons, and surgeons and commissioners on the enrolling boards, while in the military service of the United States, shall hereafter be exempt from all liability to be drafted."¹⁷

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1865

The winter of 1864-1865 was of unusual severity and its effects were obviously felt more by Lee's famished troops,— who were in dire want of almost everything and who deserted by the hundreds,— than by Grant's better-provided army.¹⁸ On February 1st Sherman started north from Savannah for the purpose of effecting his junction with Grant, and on March 7th entered North Carolina between Cheraw and Fayetteville.¹⁹ By all the rules of strategy Lee should have united with Johnston — who had been restored to his former command²⁰— to crush Sherman before he could unite with the Union army before Richmond, but so deficient were his means of transport that such an operation was out of the question.²¹ He resolved however to make a final effort to overwhelm Grant, notwithstanding the strength of the latter's fortified position in his front. On March 25th Fort Stedman on the Union right was assaulted, but in spite of the most strenuous attempts the attacks failed signally.²² Two days later Sheridan joined the Army of the Potomac, having left Winchester just one month before,²³ destroyed and captured most of Early's force at Waynesboro' on March 2nd, and permanently crippled both the Virginia Central railway and the James River canal.²⁴ Grant then determined upon a counter-stroke²⁵ and concentrated a large force against his adversary's right.²⁶ A forward thrust begun on March 29th had to be suspended during the next two days, owing to the flood of rain which rendered the roads impassable, although it did not prevent Lee from springing like a

cornered tiger upon Warren on the 31st or from attacking Sheridan, who had been sent to threaten his right and rear²⁷ and who had ensconced himself on his flank at Dinwiddie Court House.²⁸ Sheridan was promptly re-enforced as agreed, and on April 1st won the battle of Five Forks, a victory which routed Lee's right, wrenched it from his centre and left him no alternative except to abandon Richmond and Petersburg.²⁹ To prevent his throwing his whole weight against Sheridan, Grant bombarded his adversary's position all night, and at daylight on the 2nd delivered a general assault upon the Confederate entrenchments, which was almost uniformly successful. Petersburg was to be subjected to similar treatment next day but Lee, having but one line of retreat leading anywhere except to destruction, evacuated both places during the night of the 2nd-3rd and took the only road still open to him, which ran westward up the Appomattox River. After occupying both Richmond and Petersburg, Grant immediately started his army in pursuit,³⁰ his object being to anticipate Lee before he could reach Danville.³¹ Next day Sheridan learned at Jetersville that Lee was at Amelia Court House,³² but had to entrench and await Meade's infantry which did not overtake him until the following afternoon. The combined pressure of the Union columns forced the Confederates to abandon some guns and several hundred wagons,³³ and that afternoon Sheridan, supported by the 6th Corps (Wright), isolated Ewell from Longstreet and Gordon, and captured his entire command with the exception of 250 men at Sailor's Creek,³⁴ while the 2nd Corps (Humphreys) indulged in a running fight with Gordon's corps, from which it took 1,700 prisoners.³⁵ On the 7th the pursuit was continued³⁶ with relentless vigour, but, although Humphreys, after preventing the destruction of the important High Bridge, suffered a check at Farmville, he was successful in detaining Lee near that point from midday until night,³⁷ and that too at a critical time when the very minutes were equal to days. That evening

Grant sent a flag of truce with a letter to Lee emphasizing "the hopelessness of further resistance." The latter replied by asking for terms, and additional correspondence took place on the 8th,³⁸ while the wretched Confederates continued their retreat,³⁹ unmolested⁴⁰ except for rear-guard actions.⁴¹ Late that evening Sheridan drove Lee's advanced guard from Appomattox station, capturing 25 guns, a hospital-train and four railway trains loaded with supplies, but he was having a lively fight on the morning of April 9th with Gordon's corps — which was making desperate efforts to cut its way through to escape — when Generals Ord and Griffin appeared on the scene.⁴² The arrival of these two corps caused the Confederates to desist from their attempts, and Sheridan was about to make a counter-attack when he received news that Lee had surrendered.⁴³ The Confederate commander had in fact sent a flag of truce with a request for a suspension of hostilities and an interview with General Grant.⁴⁴ This conference took place that afternoon in the McLean house at Appomattox,⁴⁵ Grant embodying his terms in a letter written by himself⁴⁶ and Lee accepting them in his own handwriting.⁴⁷ By 4 o'clock the interview had terminated⁴⁸ and the Army of Northern Virginia had passed into history. The surrender comprised 28,356 officers and men who were duly paroled,⁴⁹ while 19,132 — in addition to those killed and wounded — had been captured in the twelve preceding days.⁵⁰ In this crowning success is to be found complete vindication of Grant's plan of continuous hammering until his adversary through sheer attrition was reduced to submission,⁵¹ and the surrender of General Lee, who had fought seven campaigns,⁵² "prolonged the struggle for a thousand days, and put out of action, in the meantime, more than three of the enemy for every man of his own army at its maximum strength"⁵³ — a record scarcely paralleled by Napoleon in twenty years of fighting — marked the virtual close of the War of the Rebellion.

Sherman, after his interview with Grant,⁵⁴ rejoined his

army at Goldsboro', North Carolina, and resumed his operations against Johnston, who retreated and permitted the former to occupy Raleigh on April 13th. Having learned of Lee's surrender, Johnston on that same day proposed "a temporary suspension of active operations" with a view to surrender and, after an unfortunate *contretemps*, eventually capitulated on the 26th under substantially the same terms as had been given Lee.⁵⁵ Mobile was occupied by the Federals on April 12th, and on the 20th Cobb surrendered at Macon to General James Harrison Wilson, who had wrought tremendous destruction to the Southern cause by an extraordinary campaign and capped the climax by capturing Jefferson Davis at Irwinsville, Georgia, on May 10th.⁵⁶ Six days earlier Taylor and all that remained of the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi had been taken prisoners by General Canby, who repeated his feat on May 26th on the other side of the river by capturing Kirby Smith and his entire command,⁵⁷ and the curtain descended upon the military operations of the War of the Rebellion.

CHAPTER XIV

LESSONS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION AND ITS COST IN MEN AND MONEY

THE short-sighted military policy pursued by the United States, in failing to maintain in time of peace a Regular Army of sufficient size and expansiveness to furnish an adequate trained force to suppress the rebellion at its inception,¹ had its logical outcome in the prolongation of the war for four years and in a most unnecessary loss of life²—quite apart from that which can justly be charged to the mistakes of the Union generals in the field. Indeed it is highly doubtful whether it could have been brought to a successful conclusion even then had it not been for the iron blockade which the Navy drew about the coasts of the Confederacy. The dependence placed upon untrained volunteers and militia, virtually to the exclusion of trained regulars,³ necessitated the improvising of new armies which were obliged to learn the duties of a soldier from the very beginning in the hardest of all schools — that of actual war. As might be expected, blunder after blunder was committed by these volunteer officers, whose ignorance was only exceeded by their courage, while the lack of discipline among the troops, coupled with their ignorance of how to take care of themselves, produced a degree of sickness out of all proportion to that which prevails among trained soldiers⁴ who have been taught military hygiene.⁵ Inordinate waste and expense were the natural consequences, and these conditions are in nowise surprising considering that they have inevitably existed among raw troops.

The organizations in the field, instead of being maintained at the proper strength, were permitted to waste away until

the officers who had at last learned how to lead, found themselves without troops to command, although hundreds of new and untrained regiments were hurried to the front, only to undergo the same process of learning the trade of a soldier from the beginning, with the obvious result that for months they were useless as a military asset. Indeed, in some cases, they were not available for hard campaigning until their term of service was about to expire.*

The folly of short enlistments was again committed, and all the evils attendant in its train were once more made apparent. Aside from the depletion of the armies in the field,†

* Ropes, II, pp. 219-220, paints the following admirable picture of the military situation in the North in 1862:

"While the Confederate authorities had adopted a system of conscription for filling the gaps in their wasted battalions, *the Northern Government with inexcusable fatuity had in April actually stopped recruiting, and nothing was thought of, at least in the Eastern States, in the summer of 1862, but raising new organizations. Nothing could exceed the infatuation of the people on this subject.* The old regiments, which had acquired military discipline and knowledge of warfare by arduous experiences of the camp, the march, and the battlefield, were actually allowed to waste away; the invaluable schools of the soldier which they furnished for the raw recruits were almost entirely neglected; few were the accessions of fresh men received by their diminished ranks; *popular enthusiasm was mainly directed to the raising and equipment of brand-new regiments, none of which could possibly be of much service until months had been passed in learning the elements of military life and conduct.* In some of the Western States a healthier standard prevailed; in several of them the efforts of the authorities were chiefly directed to the reinforcement of the existing organizations; and the young men who filled the gaps in the lines of the veteran battalions, of Illinois and Wisconsin learned their trade in half the time which was required to make the new regiments of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts of efficient service in the field.

"Nor was this the only mistake made by the Federal Government in the summer of 1862. *Levies of troops engaged to serve only for nine months were accepted; and several of the Eastern States were unwise enough to adopt this shallow scheme, and to send the flower of their fighting men into organizations which from the necessity of the case could hardly be made fit for active service until the day of their disbandment was plainly within sight.*"

† General Sherman devoted the final chapter of his *Memoirs to Military Lessons of the War* and in it he declared (II, pp. 387-388) that

"The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the

— which often handicapped their commanders at crucial periods⁶—the approaching discharge of large numbers of troops forced the Union generals on more than one occasion to act precipitately, and sometimes with disastrous results.⁷

Even before the initial enthusiasm for the war had subsided — as it invariably does — and long before voluntary enlistments had practically ceased,⁸ Congress, pursued by its historical infatuation, sought to stimulate recruiting by offering bounties. Beginning with \$100 in July, 1861,⁹ the increase reached \$300 within sixteen months,¹⁰ while the anxiety to get trained men caused as much as \$400 to be offered to all veterans who enlisted or re-enlisted for three years or “for the war.”¹¹ As has been remarked, the States promptly outbid the Government, paying exorbitant bounties¹² and — what is more important — paying them almost uniformly in advance. As “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” men naturally sought to enlist for a moderate bounty paid in advance in preference to a larger amount paid in instalments. As the officer whose experience made him the most competent authority on the subject declared: ¹³

“A plan of recruitment, based upon the bounty system, will necessarily be more expensive than any other, and, as a rule, produce soldiers of an inferior class; and although bounty is unquestionably calculated to stimulate recruiting, it does not always accomplish that object at the proper time. For when it

bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best non-commissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was left to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. *I believe that five hundred new men added to an old and experienced regiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a new regiment, for the former by association with good, experienced captains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is no good reason why we should not follow it substantially.”*

is visible, as it was during the late war, that in the anxiety to obtain recruits the bounties offered constantly increased, the men who intend to enlist at one time or another are induced to hold back, with the hope at a later day of receiving a higher compensation, and having to serve for a shorter period.

“In time of peace a sufficient number of recruits to meet the requirements of the service can usually be obtained without the aid of bounty: and in time of war the country can least afford the cost, besides needing the services of better men than those who enter the army simply from mercenary motives.” *

Allusion has already been made to the endless chain of evils which, like “bounty-jumping,” sprang from such a vicious system¹⁴ and which ought to be sufficient to prevent Congress from enacting any legislation that would render possible the repetition of such abuses as occurred during the War of the Rebellion.

Bounties not only failed to procure the men desired, but the system possessed another and greater inherent evil — namely, that of stimulating desertion. As the authority just quoted, being charged to arrest these culprits, discovered from bitter experience,

* General Sherman declared (II, pp. 386-387) that “the real difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an adequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every system known to modern nations, all with more or less success — voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes — and I think that all officers of experience will confirm my assertion that *the men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best*, better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute. . . . *Once organized, the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes difficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised by Congress, instead of tempting men by exaggerated bounties.* I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars in the form of bounty. Toward the close of the war, I have often heard the soldiers complain that the ‘stay-at-home’ men got better pay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed to all the dangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front. The feeling of the soldier should be that, in every event, the sympathy and preference of his government is for him who fights, rather than for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear, and, like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay.”

“ In general, those States which gave the highest local bounties are marked by the largest proportion of deserters. The bounty was meant to be an inducement to enlistment; it became, in fact, an inducement to desertion and fraudulent re-enlistment.”¹⁵

Desertion grew to such an extent that it developed into a serious problem, as must necessarily be the case when it involves a number so large as 199,105 men,¹⁶ and in this respect two of the New England States were among the worst offenders.¹⁷

When all the measures devised by Congress had failed to secure the desired result, the draft was resorted to; but even that drastic step fell short of obtaining the necessary recruits, and it was not until the very end of the war and after several amendments that a sufficiently comprehensive law was put into operation¹⁸— too late as usual. The necessity of thorough military legislation and the inadequacy of hasty measures were thus again made manifest.

In the long list of blunders in respect to military laws and organization, one scheme is conspicuous for its merits. At the suggestion of the Provost Marshal General, certain inducements were given for the re-enlistment of officers and men already in service.¹⁹ The “ veteran volunteers ” thus secured bore close analogy to modern reserves called to the colours, and

“ By this expedient over one hundred and thirty-six thousand (136,000) tried soldiers, whose services would otherwise have been lost, were secured, and capable and experienced officers continued in command. The exact value of the services rendered by any particular part of the military forces may not be ascertained, but it may safely be asserted that the veterans thus re-organized and retained performed, in the closely contested campaigns subsequent to their re-enlistment, a part essential to the final success which attended our arms. In his official report of 1864 the Secretary of War says in relation to this subject, ‘ I know of no operation connected with the recruitment of the army which has resulted in more advantage to the service than the one referred to.’ ”²⁰

The value of such a force was incalculable, doubly so since

*“ where the leaders themselves are untrained and where officers and men must alike stumble toward efficiency without intelligent guidance, the formation of an efficient army is a question of years. Indeed, such a force can not become an army at all within the period of duration of modern war. As the American War of 1861-1865 presents the singular phenomenon of two extemporized armies gradually developing while in conflict with each other, it is a most remarkable record of the evolution of such forces. In the conflicts of 1861 both officers and men were untrained for the duties demanded of them. Even the companies were imperfectly organized as units of the regiment, and the lack of cohesion was still more apparent in the higher units. Bull Run disorganized both armies. One was demoralized by defeat and the other by victory. By 1862 effective regiments, brigades, and divisions had come into being, but the conduct and leading of higher units as a rule was still imperfect. It was not until 1863 that the armies confronted each other as complete and effective military teams. But even in the early stages of the war the influence of trained and able leaders was apparent. The time required to make an effective soldier depends very largely on the organization in which the recruit is enrolled. The recruit of 1861 could not become a good private until his captain became a good captain, but the recruit of 1863 was absorbed in a team already trained, and therefore became a trained soldier in a few months of active service.”*²¹

At the end of the War of the Rebellion the volunteers had acquired a training which made them comparable to any armies that have ever existed — veteran regulars in everything but name — but at what an appalling cost! No less than 67,000 regulars²² and 2,606,341 volunteers and militia had had to be employed by the United States²³ to conquer the military forces of the Confederacy which have never been estimated to exceed 1,500,000 and which were probably nearer 1,000,000.²⁴ The four years' struggle cost the United States the enormous amount of \$5,371,079,778.28,²⁵ and on June 30, 1914, \$4,457,974,496.00 had already been paid out in pensions on account of this war,²⁶ with the end not yet in sight.

CHAPTER XV

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE WAR OF THE REBELLION TO THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

WHEN the Confederacy had at last been crushed and the great armies of veteran volunteers disbanded,¹ the disturbed condition of the South² and the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the Allied invasion of Mexico³ compelled Congress to increase the Regular Army from 39,273⁴ to 54,641 by the Act of July 28, 1866,⁵ and the grade of General was revived three days earlier⁶ and bestowed on Lieutenant-General Grant. In 1867 the French forces were withdrawn from Mexico and the Emperor Maximilian, being left in the lurch, was captured and shot, but it was not until March 3, 1869, that the Army was reduced to 37,313.⁷ Seventeen months later the grades of General and Lieutenant-General were both abolished, the number of general officers reduced, the pay of the Army fixed and provision made for a board to select the officers to be mustered out of service.⁸ During 1874, 1875 and 1876 five acts⁹ effected a further reduction in the strength of the Army to 27,472,¹⁰ the maximum of enlisted men being definitely fixed at 25,000¹¹ in conformity with the suggestion contained in the Act of July 29, 1861.¹² For the ensuing twenty-two years¹³ the actual strength of the military establishment never exceeded 28,000¹⁴ until the Act of March 8, 1898,¹⁵ added two regiments of artillery, thus bringing its paper strength up to 28,747.¹⁶

Throughout the period from the close of the War of the Rebellion until April, 1898, the Army was principally occupied with garrison and constabulary duties and with almost uninterrupted campaigns against the Indians.¹⁷

During the seventeen years preceding the outbreak of the war with Spain three most important institutions were inaugurated. The first was the Infantry and Cavalry School, which was established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by General William T. Sherman's General Order, No. 42, dated May 7, 1881, for the purpose of giving special and supplementary training to those arms. Since that time the name has been changed several times and certain other schools amalgamated with it.¹⁸ The consolidated institution now bears the title of the Army School of the Line and furnishes an admirable course for officers in the higher branches of their profession.

The second was the Board on Fortifications and Other Defenses — better known as “the Endicott Board” — created by Act of Congress approved March 3, 1885.¹⁹ The absolute lack of systematic fortification or modern armament rendered such an organization imperative. Its report, submitted to the Hon. William C. Endicott, then Secretary of War, on January 3, 1886, marked the inauguration of the present scheme of coast defence which was further developed by another board appointed twenty years later.²⁰

The third was “a School of instruction for drill and practice for Cavalry and Light Artillery,” which was authorized by the Act of Congress of January 29, 1887, and promulgated by General Order No. 9, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, under date of February 9, 1887. Its establishment at Fort Riley, Kansas, took place in consequence of General Order No. 17 from the same source, dated March 14, 1892. In War Department General Order No. 191, dated September 13, 1907, it received its present title of “the Mounted Service School at Fort Riley, Kansas,” and affords a thorough course of instruction to officers of the Cavalry arm.²¹

CHAPTER XVI

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

IN spite of all the lessons of the past

“The war with Spain, declared from the 21st of April, 1898, found us with the smallest Regular Army, in proportion to population, that we have had at the beginning of any of our wars. It consisted of but 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men,”¹

in other words, of *less than four one-hundredths of one per cent. of our estimated population*;² an army too small and widely scattered to serve as a school of application;³ too small for a nucleus in case of needed expansion, and, with only the militia behind it, too small for serious military consideration by any of the great Powers with which the United States is bound to rank.* It might be supposed that, having insisted for years on a mobile army of pigmy dimensions, with no organized reserve, Congress would have paid some attention to our coast defences, yet so feebly did it respond to the recommendations of the Endicott Board⁴ on that subject that, twelve years after the plans of the board had been adopted, only 151 guns had been placed in position,⁵ out of 2,362 considered as the necessary armament of our fortifications. The militia law had been permitted to stand with the same defects which characterised it nearly one hundred years before.⁶ No provision had been made for national reserves, and the desire of the various staff departments to accumulate an adequate reserve of war supplies had been repeatedly

* In 1898 the Russian army on a peace footing numbered approximately 1,000,000 officers and men; the French army, 602,720; the German army, 580,612; the Austrian army, 349,205; and the British army (the Home army), 173,730. See *Statesman's Year Book for 1898*.

frowned upon. Thirty years of peace had wrought such enervation in the business methods of the War Department that it was sadly afflicted with dry-rot, so much so that the Secretary of War had to confess that "the governmental machinery was altogether inadequate to immediately meet the emergency" of actual war.⁷ As Captain Rhodes pertinently observed:⁸


"If the beginning of the war with Spain — a second-rate military power, . . . found our country without accurate maps and statistical information of our adversary's military resources; * lacking in carefully formulated plans of mobilization, concentration and operation; without magazine rifles,⁹ smokeless powder, and breech-loading cannon for our reserves, and with reserves themselves — the peers of any soldiers on earth in intelligence, bravery and military initiative, but absolutely ignorant of the more serious phases of war; if, we repeat, this comparatively petty war found us more or less unprepared, what must have been our loss in lives, treasure and national prestige had we been pitted against a first-class power."

Not alone in the preposterously small size of its army was the United States unready for war, but, as previously stated, the coast defences were totally insufficient and supplied with only a fraction of the guns, ammunition¹⁰ and troops required. No munitions of war existed to arm and equip any force larger than the liliputian Regular Army. To meet the land forces of Spain with any fair chance of success involved the raising of large numbers of raw troops which had then to be organized, equipped and trained as best they could

* The *Anuario Militar de España* for 1898 gave the strength of the Spanish army, including irregular troops, at 492,067, but these figures are unquestionably much too high. In April, 1898, there were, however, 196,820 Spanish soldiers in Cuba — *viz*: 155,302 regulars and 41,518 volunteers — and about 9,000 regulars in Porto Rico — facts that the American authorities did not even know approximately. On April 12th, General Fitzhugh Lee, then Consul-General in Cuba, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs that there were 97,000 to 98,000 Spanish troops in Cuba. General Miles estimated their strength at 150,000, which, although much nearer the truth, fell far short of the actual numbers.—Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, I, pp. 79-80; III, pp. 164-167.



CUBA.



Reproduced, by kind permission, from Major Herbert H. Sargent's Campaign of Santiago de Cuba.

before being rushed into active campaigning, while work on the coast defences and in the manufacture of munitions of war was too hurried to be scientifically or thoroughly done. Once again — for the nth time in our history — the responsibility for our unpreparedness could be justly laid at the door of that branch of our Government in which the Constitution has vested the power “to provide for the common defense” and to “raise and support armies.”¹¹ In numbers the *personnel* of the great supply corps of the Army was preposterously inadequate. “On April 23rd there were only 22 trained commissary officers in the service. In the Quartermaster Department the number of officers was limited by law to 57. Congress allowed 192 medical officers, but when the war came only 179 were ready for active service. . . . The hospital corps consisted of 723 men — a mere handful.”¹² Such were the consequences entailed by dilatory and grudging legislation; indeed, one might search — and search in vain — for one single instance in our entire history when Congress has done its whole duty to the country with respect to thorough and adequate national defence.

“Coming events cast their shadows before” and the approach of the Spanish-American War was heralded for some time prior to its outbreak. On October 9, 1897, the Spanish Government recalled Captain-General Weyler from Cuba and appointed Ramon Blanco as his successor. The latter promptly proceeded to put the new policy into effect, revoked Weyler’s order for the detention of Cubans in “reconcentration camps” and offered amnesty to all political offenders. These conciliatory measures were instituted too late to restore the faith of the Cubans in the promises of the mother-country.¹³ The offer of autonomy was rejected, and it became evident that nothing short of independence would be acceptable to the islanders. The Spanish resented the interference of the Americans, real or alleged, to such a point that hostile demonstrations broke out in Havana from January 15th to 20th, and Blanco deemed it advisable to place a guard at the

American Consulate-General. On the 25th the battleship *Maine* arrived in the harbour; on February 9th there was published in the American press a letter from Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister at Washington, in which he spoke of President McKinley in very disparaging terms;¹⁴ the following day the Senate discussed intervention in Cuba; and five days later the President was directed to transmit to Congress all information relative to the situation in Cuba. On February 15th the *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbour, with the loss of 264 lives, but, although Spain officially expressed regret for the *Maine* "incident" next day, a naval court of inquiry was appointed by the President on the 17th, and three days later began its investigations at Havana. On March 5th Spain demanded the recall of Consul-General Lee, which the United States absolutely refused to entertain. Although the American public had been clamouring for war since the destruction of the *Maine*, it was not until March 8th that the House of Representatives voted \$50,000,000 for "national defense." The Senate followed suit next day and the bill was promptly signed by the President.¹⁵

Two days later, March 11th, the War Department began the mobilization of the Regular Army which, as has been seen,¹⁶ numbered only 28,183 officers and men, was scattered over vast areas of country and, thanks to the indifference of Congress for years past, was most defective in organization. Regiments supposed to have ten companies possessed only eight, and those companies were reduced to only 60 enlisted men. There were no brigades, no divisions and, worst of all, no plans,¹⁷ nor could any be formulated for the very excellent reason that Congress, with its usual short-sightedness, had restricted its appropriation to national defence and to that one object alone. No money was available for offensive operations — the only kind which could possibly be used against the Spanish possessions in both hemispheres — ; no indication was given of the number of troops eventually to be called

out; and the War Department, which ought to have been ordering and purchasing clothing, tents, supplies, etc., and accumulating the material and equipments needed, was obliged to wait supinely with folded hands until Congress had done its part.¹⁸ Truly, the history of our military legislation from start to finish tempts one to wonder why that body has not long ago adopted the title of the States General of Holland — “*Their High Mightinesses.*”

The failure of Congress to act on the recommendations of the Endicott Board during the twelve years which preceded the appropriation of \$50,000,000 just mentioned, and its usual procrastination until the last moment involved a tremendous amount of labour and energy to accomplish within a few weeks the work on our coast defences which ought to have been spread over a period of years.¹⁹ Although by April 21st a number of emplacements and carriages had been constructed for the heavy guns already made but still unmounted, and although a number of these guns had been placed in position, either permanently or temporarily, the deficiency had to be made up by using many obsolete guns “of multifarious pattern, and mounted on carriages of every variety and age.”²⁰ Within a few days after the declaration of war, 1,535 torpedoes and mines, together with their electrical connections, were installed²¹ in twenty-eight harbours; by June 30th, 114 guns and 71 mortars were mounted in the various forts,²² and permanent defences of a modern type were in the course of construction in twenty-five different localities.²³ Gratifying as were the results achieved under such pressure, no less than 2,026 guns still remained to be provided under the scheme of coast defence formulated in 1886.²⁴ As it was, the Flying Squadron under Commodore Schley had to be retained at Hampton Roads²⁵ in order to afford additional security until the work of strengthening the fortifications on the Atlantic seaboard had made substantial progress.²⁶ This delay — for which Congress was alone to blame in failin^g to

act on the repeated recommendations of qualified officers²⁷—not only weakened us on land but was a distinct handicap in the execution of proper strategical movements by the Navy, insomuch as it prevented that concentrated effort, that unity of purpose which is the fundamental basis of every military and naval success. It was nothing but sheer good fortune and the weakness of the Spanish navy which saved some of our unprotected cities on the Atlantic coast from great damage. Had we been pitted against a strong naval Power, we should have learned by the most bitter experience the necessity of thorough and timely preparation for war.²⁸

Aside from the Regular Army and the coast defences, the principal source from which additional means could be derived for the prosecution of war was the State militia. There was of course a small number of men who had served in the War of the Rebellion, but age necessarily limited their capabilities. Many of the men who had done duty in the Regular Army could be expected to offer their services, but the bulk of volunteers who had any training whatsoever had to be looked for in the militia or, to a lesser degree, in the various military schools where the students were under the age of 18 years. The conditions of our land forces at the time have been thus admirably summarized by Lieutenant-General Miles:²⁹

“The army, of 25,000 men, . . . was not even sufficient to have properly guarded our sea-coasts, in the event of a war with a strong naval power.

“The militia, composed of the national guards of the several States, was, as a rule, inefficient, and, as a body, could be practically disregarded. Its arms and equipment were obsolete and unfit for use by troops fighting an army properly organized and equipped. Never in the history of the country was the necessity so obvious to the people for proper legislation for the reorganization of the regular army, as well as of the national guard. Small arms using smokeless powder had been manufactured for the use of the regular troops, but there was not a sufficient supply of these arms to equip even the small army called into service

at the time of its mobilization.³⁰ Our field artillery, our siege-guns, and all our heavier guns were constructed for, and used, black powder. This in time of action proved to be a great disadvantage; and, in fact, the regiments of volunteers which were present with our army in Cuba had to be withdrawn from the firing-line on account of the obsolete fire-arms with which they were armed, while the field artillery was subject to the same disadvantage. Had our field artillery been of modern type, using smokeless powder, there is no question that its proper employment would have produced much more effective results. . . .

“It is safe to say that, with an army of 75,000 men properly equipped, at the time of the declaration of war, peace could have been secured without requiring a single volunteer to leave the country, and thus the necessity of the enormous volunteer army, and the expense and inconvenience incident to its organization and maintenance, could have been avoided.”

Meanwhile events had crowded thick and fast upon each other. On March 19th³¹ the Court of Inquiry completed its investigation of the destruction of the *Maine*, its report was submitted to the President on the 25th and three days later transmitted by him to Congress. On April 5th the American consuls in Cuba were recalled; on the 9th General Lee and many Americans left Havana; and on the 11th President McKinley sent a message to Congress in which he described the situation, declared that intervention was necessary, advised against the recognition of the Cuban government and requested Congress to take action. Eight days were consumed before that august body finally adopted resolutions declaring Cuba independent and authorizing the President to employ the armed forces of the United States to put an end to Spanish rule in Cuba. Next day these resolutions received the President's signature³² and General Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, was instructed by cable to deliver the ultimatum of this Government. The Spanish Cortes convened that same day, and on April 21st Woodford was handed his passports, which was tantamount to a declaration of war.

MILITARY LEGISLATION AND CALLS FOR TROOPS
DURING 1898

To offer any excuse for the supineness of Congress, which, with the solitary exception of the appropriation made on March 9th,³³ had done absolutely nothing to prepare for war, is little short of ridiculous. The emergency had not suddenly arisen — any school boy could have foreseen the approaching conflict.³⁴ For months prior to the destruction of the *Maine* the indications pointed unmistakably to war with Spain; after that fateful February 15th it was inevitable within a short time.³⁵ After priceless weeks had been wasted by Congress in “masterful inactivity” — the War Department, unable to stomach any further delay, issued orders on April 15th for the concentration of the infantry of the Regular Army at New Orleans, Mobile and Tampa as a preliminary to despatching it to Cuba on the outbreak of war.³⁶ It was not until a week later that Congress at last awoke to the fact that the country was then actually at war and that a paltry force of 28,000 regulars constituted the total number of troops at its disposal. By the Act of April 22, 1898,³⁷ it provided for a temporary increase in the military establishment,³⁸ which was divided into two branches, namely: the Regular Army and the militia, the latter upon being called into service in time of war to be designated “the Volunteer Army of the United States.”³⁹ In many respects this law marked an advance over similar legislation enacted in haste on the eve of war, and the majority of its provisions were, taken all in all, distinctly good.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Congress once again evinced its unwillingness to do its whole duty to the country in the matter of military measures. Instead of fixing the terms of enlistment “FOR THE WAR”⁴¹ or for not less than three years — which the past had so often demonstrated as the only safe course to pursue — it made the mistake of limiting it to two years. On top of that it specified that all volunteers should be discharged “when the purposes for which they were called into service shall

have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities." 42 We have had occasion to comment upon the blunder committed at the beginning of the Mexican War in failing to define the term of enlistment without any "ifs" and "ors," 43 and we shall presently see that this similar laxness in phraseology was destined to be given an interpretation in nowise intended and, as a consequence, to cause the Government no little embarrassment. 44 To cap the climax Congress once more showed that it had not yet shaken off the pernicious influence of the past and, notwithstanding that the volunteer army was a Government force beyond peradventure, it pandered to the States by stipulating that "all the regimental and company officers shall be appointed by the governors of the States in which their respective organizations are raised." 45 As Captain Rhodes very aptly pointed out: 46

"A not unexpected deduction from our experiences in the Mexican and Civil Wars was that the efficiency of American volunteers was to be measured by the previous training, professional zeal, and soldierly discipline of their officers. The enlisted personnel has ever been of splendid natural quality, and has not varied considerably in different regiments. Trained officers have by no means been numerous.

"The Spanish War was no exception in this respect, because the same obsolete system of selection of officers was followed as in former wars, and naturally the same results followed. . . .

"Such a method of selection was justified at the outbreak of the Civil War on the ground that volunteers were militia, and by the Constitution the appointments were reserved to the States. *That volunteers are not militia has now long been held. But in both the Civil and Spanish Wars the main reason for following the old system appears to have been that no better system had ever been carefully thought out, which was acceptable to the States. In such emergencies as ever follow a declaration of war, there is no time for new systems to be prepared;* 47 State patronage demands the appointment of officers regardless of qualifications, and so urgent are the necessity and straits of the national government in such crises, for the rapid mobilization of troops, that all other considerations give way to it. . . .

"Volunteer regiments organized under the Act of April 22,

1898, differed very widely in efficiency and discipline, as was to be expected. Some States had given extraordinary encouragement to the training of their militia along practical lines; others, as we all know, were mostly a paper force without any real value as a national asset. In such regiments as included a regular officer in its personnel—limited by law to one—there was greater progress made, other things being equal, than in regiments officered entirely by volunteers. Some regiments were mustered in well equipped with uniforms, arms and accouterments, and under excellent control by their officers; others reported for muster in such a state of disorganization as to be equally dangerous to friend and foe.⁴⁸ There were many excellent volunteer regiments, but they became so in spite of the system then in operation, and not in any way by reason of it.

“There can be no possible doubt that in due time, with patient labor and unceasing training, such volunteers as were concentrated in the great camps during the year 1898, could, as was the Army of the Potomac under McClellan, have been gradually molded into a dependable force. But bearing in mind the suddenness of modern wars, as well as their comparative shortness of duration, it is very doubtful if thirty per cent. of the volunteer forces mustered in during the war with Spain became entirely dependable for service against the regular army of a foreign power during the entire period of their service.”

On April 23rd President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers,⁴⁹ and two days later Congress officially announced that war had begun on the 21st, as well as authorizing the use of the land and naval forces and the militia for the necessary operations.⁵⁰ On the following day the President approved “An Act for the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States,”⁵¹ by virtue of which the authorized strength of the Regular Army was raised from 28,747 officers and men⁵² to 64,719.⁵³ This increase, admirable as it was, occurred weeks too late to produce the beneficial effect intended and the conclusion of hostilities four months later found the Army considerably below its authorized strength,⁵⁴ the majority of recruits naturally preferring service with the volunteers as they had always done.⁵⁵ The law taken as a whole contained some excellent provisions,

particularly in the organization of the peace establishment⁵⁶ and in the power conferred upon the President in time of war to expand the infantry regiments by adding a third battalion,⁵⁷ as well as to increase the companies of all the arms to war strength.⁵⁸ He was also authorized to add one second lieutenant to each battery of artillery,⁵⁹ which were to be organized as heavy or field artillery according to the exigencies of the service.⁶⁰ Not the least important was the sixth section which provided "that in time of war the pay proper of enlisted men shall be increased twenty per centum over and above the rates of pay as fixed by law."⁶¹ This wise step obviated the use of bounties and was quite in harmony with the suggestion made by General Sherman as a result of his experience in the War of the Rebellion.⁶²

The next Congressional measure was the Act of May 11, 1898,⁶³ which authorized the organization of a volunteer brigade of engineers⁶⁴ and an additional force of 10,000 enlisted men who were immune to tropical diseases.⁶⁵ The officers of both these forces, it is to be noted with satisfaction, were to be appointed by the President.⁶⁶ On the following day the Medical Corps of the Army was increased by fifteen assistant surgeons "to be appointed after examination by an army medical examining board," and provision was made for as many contract surgeons as might be required.⁶⁷

On May 18th two other acts went into effect; one authorizing the organization of a volunteer signal corps for service during the existing war,⁶⁸ the other providing for the appointment of two additional Assistant Adjutants-General, owing to the extra work entailed on that department by the calling out of volunteers and the increase in the Regular Army.⁶⁹

On May 25th President McKinley issued his second call for troops, specifying 75,000 as the number required.⁷⁰ These volunteers, like the 125,000 called out on April 23rd,⁷¹ were "to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged."

On the following day a bill was approved declaring that the pay and allowance of volunteers "shall be deemed to com-

mence from the day on which they joined for duty and are enrolled." The Secretary of War was permitted in his discretion to pay one month's wages in advance to "troops about to embark for service in the Philippine Islands."⁷² The Act of May 28, 1898,⁷³ amended that of April 22nd⁷⁴ so as to make Regular officers eligible for staff appointments in the volunteers without vacating their rank and number in the Army,⁷⁵ and a similar proviso was made in respect to those appointed to the grades of field officers either in the Volunteer Army or "in the regiments possessing special qualifications."⁷⁶

The next military legislation⁷⁷ that requires our attention was the Act of June 18, 1898,⁷⁸ providing for summary courts for the trial of enlisted men for certain offences which were specified. The composition of such courts and their powers were defined, together with such other details as were necessary to insure a better administration of justice in the Army.

After authorizing the appointment of a military storekeeper in the Quartermaster's department⁷⁹ and fixing the organization of the Engineer Corps,⁸⁰ Congress wound up its session by a number of military measures. On July 7th, aside from a deficiency appropriation,⁸¹ it increased both the Inspector-General's department⁸² and the Ordnance department,⁸³ authorized the enlistment of cooks and declared that the pay and allowances of all officers and enlisted men of the volunteers were to commence from the day of enrollment and joining for duty.⁸⁴ On the following day it authorized the appointment of an additional twenty-five post quartermaster-sergeants,⁸⁵ voted "that all chaplains in the volunteer service shall have the pay and allowances of a captain mounted,"⁸⁶ and ended by authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury

"to pay to the governor of any State or Territory, or to his duly authorized agents, the reasonable costs, charges, and expenses that have been incurred by him in aiding the United

States to raise the Volunteer Army in the existing war with Spain, by subsisting, clothing, supplying, equipping, paying, and transporting men of his State or Territory who were afterwards accepted into the Volunteer Army of the United States." 87

The military legislation at the beginning of the Spanish-American War demonstrated an apparent effort on the part of Congress to profit by some of the lessons of the past, although further effort might have been made to the distinct advantage of our military service. The merits of the Congressional enactments were embodied in the following facts:

- (1) A genuine attempt was made to retrieve the former negligence in the appropriations requisite for adequate sea-coast fortifications;
- (2) Militia *per se* was virtually discarded and use made of it only as volunteers mustered into Government service;
- (3) The folly of permitting enlistments for a period shorter than two years was not repeated;
- (4) An unnecessary number of troops was not called out;
- (5) Every effort was made to keep the organizations in service up to their full complement of officers and men in order to insure their ability to fight;
- (6) No bounties were granted;
- (7) The effort was made to have a definite plan of organization and campaign;
- (8) The appointment of Regular officers to the command of volunteer regiments, brigades and divisions.

On the other hand, there were certain marked demerits which may be thus summarized:

- (1) All the military legislation in 1898 was enacted too late to have the full effect contemplated;
- (2) The Regular Army was not sufficiently increased;
- (3) The coast defenses ought to have been finished long before the war began;
- (4) Congress once again failed to realize that, in a military system combining the use of regulars and volunteers, men in the absence of compulsion or strong inducement, will invariably enlist in the organization most lax in discipline — in other words, not in the Regular Army;

- (5) The delegation to the governors of the States and Territories of the power to appoint officers of their militia or National Guard when these organizations were destined to be almost immediately mustered into United States service was nothing more or less than an adherence to the pernicious system which had prevailed since the War of the Revolution.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF CUBA

Allusion has already been made to the order issued to the Regulars to concentrate at New Orleans, Mobile and Tampa preparatory to an invasion of Cuba⁸⁸ but, before this could be effected, it was decided to establish at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, a camp entitled "Camp George H. Thomas," where the American forces were to be mobilized and instructed.⁸⁹ During the latter part of April and the first part of May large numbers of the Regular and volunteer troops were assembled at that point, from which they were hurried forward to Tampa, Jacksonville and Fernandina, Florida, in order to have them in convenient locations for embarking. During the course of the war twelve other camps were also established,⁹⁰ for a like purpose of mobilization and instruction, the most important being Camp Alger, at Falls Church, Virginia,⁹¹ eight miles from Washington.

So prompt was the response to the President's calls for volunteers that, by the end of May, no less than 124,704 officers and men had offered themselves and been mustered into service — indeed two months later the number exceeded those called for.⁹² On April 23rd the few troops assembled at Camp Thomas were constituted a provisional army corps under the command of General John R. Brooke and, on May 7th, in compliance with the President's directions, seven army corps were established, *viz*:

First Corps, Major General John R. Brooke, organized at Camp Thomas.

Third Corps, Major General James F. Wade, organized at Camp Thomas.

Second Corps, Major General William M. Graham, organized at Camp Alger.

Fourth Corps, Major General John J. Coppinger, organized at Mobile, Alabama.

Fifth Corps, Major General William R. Shafter, organized at Tampa, Florida.

Sixth Corps, Major General James H. Wilson (unorganized), at Camp Thomas.

Seventh Corps, Major General Fitzhugh Lee, organized at Tampa, Fla., and later at Jacksonville.⁹³

Some six weeks later, on June 21st, the forces, which were concentrated at San Francisco and forwarded to the Philippines,⁹⁴ were formed into the Eighth Corps under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt.⁹⁵

All offensive operations against Spain were of necessity dependent upon the control of the sea,⁹⁶ but the American Navy acted with utmost promptness. On April 25th Commodore Dewey with the Asiatic squadron sailed from Hongkong and on the morning of May 1st annihilated Admiral Montijo's fleet in the harbour of Manila, without the loss of an American sailor. The day before Admiral Cervera's fleet left the Cape de Verde Islands and on May 11th appeared off Martinique. On the 12th a squadron under Acting Rear Admiral Sampson bombarded San Juan de Porto Rico; two days later the Flying Squadron under Commodore Schley left Hampton Roads; on the 19th Cervera entered the harbour of Santiago de Cuba and was shortly afterward blockaded by Schley, who was re-enforced on May 30th by the entire American fleet.

At the outbreak of war a movement against Havana was contemplated, as it was believed that the city could be stormed and captured before the rainy season began.⁹⁷ As a preliminary thereto two officers were sent to Cuba and Porto Rico to ascertain the existing conditions there,⁹⁸ but all idea of investing Havana had to be relinquished because the volunteers were raw and untrained, there was every indication that the necessary forces would not be forthcoming for at least two

months and, moreover, the dearth of ammunition and proper equipment would have rendered such an attempt suicidal. As the Northern public in June, 1861, clamoured that its troops should be rushed "On to Richmond," so the American people in May, 1898, were impatient to push "On to Havana," but fortunately the military councils were ruled by men who could not be stampeded.⁹⁹ In default of an invasion by the combined land forces, several small expeditions were sent to supply the Cubans with arms and other war *matériel*,¹⁰⁰ and it was decided that 5,000 troops under General Shafter, the senior officer at Tampa, should be despatched to Tuñas on the south coast of Cuba under convoy of the Navy. Its rôle was to be that of a reconnaissance in force for the purpose of obtaining information and of furnishing the Cuban insurgents with arms, ammunition and supplies. After accomplishing its mission it was to re-embark and proceed to the northwest coast for a similar object but, in case the appearance of the Spanish fleet rendered the second movement too hazardous, the expedition was to return to Florida. On April 29th the necessary orders were issued, but next day the news of Cervera's departure from the Cape de Verde Islands made the Navy officials unwilling to detach the necessary ships to convoy the troops, and Shafter's expedition had to be deferred.¹⁰¹ On May 8th the Major General commanding the Army "was directed to take an army of 70,000 men and capture Havana."¹⁰² The sequel is thus related by Lieutenant-General Miles himself:¹⁰³

"I appreciated in the highest degree the command of an army to invade a foreign country in a just cause, yet, my sense of duty, not only to my country, but to the brave men who composed that army, prompted me to sacrifice every personal consideration and explain to the President the real military conditions, as he had evidently been misinformed. I told him that there were within a short distance of Havana 125,000 Spanish troops with over 100 field guns, besides the 125 heavy guns in strong, fortified positions; that the Spanish troops had approximately 1,000 rounds of ammunition per man; that while

I was very anxious to go and while the morale of the army was most excellent, the most serious difficulty was that there was not enough ammunition in the country, outside of the amount then being sent to the Philippine Islands, and a small amount required for coast defense, available for an army of 70,000 men to fight one battle, and that our cartridge factories could not manufacture an adequate amount in eight weeks' time; that placing an army in such condition on a foreign island in mid-summer, with the possibility of the enemy controlling the seas behind it, would be extremely hazardous; that the policy of storming heavily fortified positions had long since become obsolete, and that strategy was far more advisable than the useless sacrifice of life. Upon this information the President suspended the order, and thereby saved many thousands of lives, and possibly a national disaster, by adopting more judicious measures."

On May 9th General Shafter had received orders to embark and proceed to Mariel, on the north coast of Cuba, where he was to establish himself in a solid position and to be re-enforced by other troops as fast as they could be sent him.¹⁰⁴ Next day it was discovered that the Navy could not furnish the requisite convoy for some days and the movement was postponed until the 16th.¹⁰⁵ Orders were given that 12,000 of the troops should be transported to Key West,¹⁰⁶ but this plan had likewise to be abandoned owing to the dearth of water supply at that place.¹⁰⁷ It was not until May 30th that it was definitely known that Cervera's fleet had taken refuge in the harbour of Santiago and was bottled up by the American warships, but the interim had been spent to good purpose in organizing and instructing the troops, and in collecting a fleet of thirty-six transports.¹⁰⁸

THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO

On May 30th General Miles telegraphed Shafter to proceed with all his "force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet," and that same night he left for Tampa to superintend operations.¹⁰⁹ Arriving on June 1st, he reported next day that the working force at Tampa had been divided into three reliefs of eight hours each and

that nine transports were being loaded simultaneously.¹¹⁰ Although every possible effort was bent to embarking the troops and their *matériel* with all despatch,¹¹¹ and although the pressure of public opinion spurred the work to the limit of human endurance,¹¹² the utter absence of anything resembling systematic management afforded a spectacle of military unpreparedness sufficient to make the most boastful American blush for shame. The conditions have been thus admirably described: ¹¹³

“Affairs at Tampa were in such great confusion that many difficulties were encountered in getting the expedition ready to sail. When the regiments of the Fifth Corps, which were to compose the expedition, arrived at Tampa, the lack of an adequate supply of water and other sanitary requirements necessitated their being assigned to camps at a considerable distance from each other, and from Port Tampa, where the embarkation was to take place. Not only was ‘the capacity of the place greatly exceeded,’ but the facilities for embarking the troops were inadequate. Only a single line of railroad connected Tampa with Port Tampa, nine miles away. The switching facilities were entirely too limited, and for miles the line was choked with freight-cars which could not be unloaded near the places where the regiments were encamped and the supplies needed. As the cars had no labels indicating their contents, consignments could not be found when wanted, and as the little local post-office could not properly handle the mail, bills of lading were not promptly distributed. Thus it became impossible for receiving officers to supply and equip the troops expeditiously. The equipment and supplies needed were nearly all there, but to find them was the difficulty. An officer seeking clothing would open a car only to find cannon, or seeking bacon and beans would find shirts and shoes. The docking space, too, was inadequate. There was wharfage for only eight or nine of the thirty-five or more vessels that had to be loaded, and no storage facilities had been provided.¹¹⁴

“Naturally, in the midst of such a chaotic condition of affairs, delays were unavoidable and mistakes frequently made. . . .¹¹⁵

“The delay in the departure of the Fifth Corps from Tampa was of much concern to the people and government of the United States. But under the conditions existing at the time,

this delay was practically unavoidable; not because there was any lack of energy and soldierly qualities on the part of General Shafter and his officers, but because the facilities at Tampa for the embarkation of such a large number of troops were totally inadequate. As Tampa lies on the west coast of Florida only two hundred and seventy miles from the naval base of operations at Key West, and is nearer Cuba than any other gulf port of importance, it was most favourably situated strategically for a base of operations for the invading land forces. And as no other gulf port offered any better facilities for the encampment and embarkation of the Fifth Corps, it is evident that the only way confusion and delay at Tampa could have been avoided would have been for the United States government to have anticipated events and made the necessary preparations beforehand for the proper encampment and speedy embarkation of an army at that place. . . .¹¹⁶

“In this connection it will not be out of place to remark that a government ought to profit by past mistakes, and thereby strengthen itself for future conflicts. The lessons of history should be the lessons of wisdom. Such confusion and delay as occurred at Tampa in the Spring of 1898 should not be allowed to occur again. One of the greatest military needs of this country to-day is a port on the Gulf of Mexico with ample facilities for the speedy embarkation of a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand soldiers; for at any moment the need of troops in Panama, in Central or South America, or in the West Indies, may become a pressing necessity.”

As a result of this seething chaos

“*the vessels were not loaded systematically.* A battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel and its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh, and Seventeenth Regular Infantry were each divided up and portions in each case sent on three different vessels. . . . *Medicines, stores, and hospital furniture were often put in the holds of transports for Cuba . . . under all sorts of freight.*”¹¹⁷

The instances of disorder might be multiplied almost indefinitely and, moreover,

“The great difficulty in the way of a prompt movement was the procurement of the necessary transports for that service, the Government having none of its own. . . .

"Thirty-six transports were gathered at Port Tampa, few of them fitted for such service on account of their lack of sufficient ventilation and space to carry as large a force as was required.

"They were, however, the best and all that could be had; and while the description of them furnished prior to their charter showed that they could transport about 23,000 men, with transportation, artillery, horses, quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies, yet it was found that even the number shipped — about 16,000 — was greater than should have been carried."¹¹⁸

On June 7th the Secretary of War telegraphed General Shafter that "the President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready,"¹¹⁹ but it was not until that morning that the last troops arrived from Camp Thomas and that the final orders were issued for the embarkation.¹²⁰ A fair sample of the experiences undergone by many of the regiments in their effort to obey promptly¹²¹ may be gained from the following graphic account given by Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt of the First Volunteer Cavalry:¹²²

"It was the evening of June 7 when we suddenly received orders that the expedition was to start from Port Tampa, nine miles distant by rail, at daybreak the following morning; and that if we were not aboard our transport by that time we could not go. We had no intention of getting left, and prepared at once for the scramble which was evidently about to take place. As the number and capacity of the transports were known, or ought to have been known, and as the number and size of the regiments to go were also known, the task of allotting each regiment or fraction of a regiment to its proper transport, and arranging that the regiments and the transports should meet in due order on the dock, ought not to have been difficult. However, no arrangements were made in advance; and we were allowed to shove and hustle for ourselves as best we could, on much the same principles that had governed our preparations hitherto.

"We were ordered to be at a certain track with all our baggage at midnight, there to take a train for Port Tampa. At the appointed time we turned up, but the train did not. The men slept heavily, while Wood and I and various other officers wan-

dered about in search of information which no one could give. We now and then came across a Brigadier-General, or even a Major-General; but nobody knew anything. Some regiments got aboard the trains and some did not, but as none of the trains started, this made little difference. At three o'clock we received orders to march to an entirely different track, and away we went. No train appeared on this track either; but at six o'clock some coal-cars came by, and these we seized. By various arguments we persuaded the engineer in charge of the train to back us down the nine miles to Port Tampa, where we arrived covered with coal-dust, but with all our belongings.

"The railway tracks ran out on the quay, and the transports, which had been anchored in mid-stream, were gradually being brought up alongside the quay and loaded. The trains were unloading wherever they happened to be, no attention whatever being paid to the possible position of the transport on which the soldiers were to go. Colonel Wood and I jumped off and started on a hunt, which soon convinced us that we had our work cut out if we were to get a transport at all. From the highest General down, nobody could tell where to go to find out what transport we were to have. At last we were informed that we were to hunt up the depot quartermaster, Colonel Humphrey. We found his office, where his assistant informed us that he didn't know where the Colonel was, but believed him to be asleep upon one of the transports. This seemed odd at such a time; but so many of the methods in vogue were odd, that we were quite prepared to accept it as a fact. However, it proved not to be such; but for an hour Colonel Humphrey might just as well have been asleep, as nobody knew where he was and nobody could find him, and the quay was crammed with some ten thousand men, most of whom were working at cross purposes.

"At last, however, after over an hour's industrious and rapid search through this swarming ant-heap of humanity, Wood and I, who had separated, found Colonel Humphrey at nearly the same time and were allotted a transport — the *Yucatan*. She was out in mid-stream, so Wood seized a stray launch and boarded her. At the same time I happened to find out that she had previously been allotted to two other regiments — the Second Regular Infantry and the Seventy-first New York Volunteers, which latter regiment alone contained more men than could be put aboard her. Accordingly, I ran at full speed to our train; and leaving a strong guard with the baggage, I double-quickened the rest of the regiment up to the boat, just in time to

board her as she came into the quay, and then to hold her against the Second Regulars and the Seventy-first, who had arrived a little too late, being a shade less ready than we were in the matter of individual initiative. There was a good deal of expostulation, but we had possession; and as the ship could not contain half of the men who had been told to go aboard of her, the Seventy-first went away, as did all but four companies of the Second. These latter we took aboard. Meanwhile a General had caused our train to be unloaded at the end of the quay farthest from where the ship was; and the hungry, tired men spent most of the day in the labor of bringing down their baggage and the food and ammunition.

"The officers' horses were on another boat, my own being accompanied by my colored body-servant, Marshall, the most faithful and loyal of men, himself an old soldier of the Ninth Cavalry. . . ."

"By the time that night fell, and our transport pulled off and anchored in midstream, we felt that we had spent thirty-six tolerably active hours. The transport was overloaded, the men being packed like sardines, not only below but upon the decks; so that at night it was only possible to walk about by continually stepping over the bodies of the sleepers. The travel rations which had been issued to the men for the voyage were not sufficient; because the meat was very bad indeed; and when a ration consists of only four or five items, which taken together just meet the requirements of a strong and healthy man, the loss of one item is a serious thing. If we had been given canned corn-beef we would have been all right, but instead of this the soldiers were issued horrible stuff called 'canned fresh beef.' There was no salt in it. At the best it was stringy and tasteless; at the worst it was nauseating. Not one-fourth of it was ever eaten at all, even when the men became very hungry. There were no facilities for the men to cook anything. There was no ice for them; the water was not good; and they had no fresh meat or fresh vegetables.

"However, all these things seemed of small importance compared with the fact that we were really embarked, and were with the first expedition to leave our shores."¹²³

By mid-afternoon of June 8th the transports were all underway¹²⁴ after an embarkation which for chaos and inefficiency has scarcely its counterpart in history. As chasten-

ing is reputed to be good for the soul, American pride might benefit by comparing soberly this opera bouffe with the remarkable system evolved by Napoleon while his "Grand Army," which later so distinguished itself at Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland and Wagram, lay encamped on the heights of Boulogne awaiting a favourable opportunity to invade England. After many trials he found that he could embark an army of 130,000 troops within three hours,¹²⁵ and, even if it be impossible to duplicate his astounding feat, it nevertheless teaches that, with previous preparation and frequent practice, there is no excuse for a fraction of the confusion and delay which attended the American operation at Tampa and which might readily have entailed disastrous consequences had we been pitted against any but a third-rate military Power.

No sooner were the transports *en route* to the Gulf than orders were received to countermand the departure, because it had been reported that a Spanish cruiser and torpedo-boat had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel.¹²⁶ The transports were recalled,¹²⁷ and for five days the impatient troops had to make the best of a situation caused by the consternation at Washington over what was subsequently discovered to be a delusion.¹²⁸ The conditions of the men during this enforced delay are thus depicted by the Lieutenant-Colonel of the Rough Riders:¹²⁹

"Meanwhile the troop-ships, packed tight with their living freight, sweltered in the burning heat of Tampa Harbor. There was nothing whatever for the men to do, space being too cramped for amusement or for more drill than was implied in the manual of arms. In this we drilled them assiduously, and we also continued to hold school for both the officers and non-commissioned officers. Each troop commander was regarded as responsible for his own non-commissioned officers. . . .

"The heat, the steaming discomfort, and the confinement, together with the forced inaction, were very irksome; but every one made the best of it, and there was little or no grumbling even among the men. All, from the highest to the lowest, were

bent upon perfecting themselves according to their slender opportunities. Every book of tactics in the regiment was in use from morning until night, and the officers and non-commissioned officers were always studying the problems presented at the schools. About the only amusement was bathing over the side, in which we indulged both in the morning and evening. . . . So we lay for nearly a week, the vessels swinging around on their anchor chains, while the hot water of the bay flowed to and fro around them and the sun burned overhead."

At last, on June 12th, General Shafter received telegraphic instructions that the warships "forming the convoy will meet transports at Rebecca Shoal and proceed together to destination,"¹³⁰ and next day his fleet¹³¹ sailed from Tampa,¹³² the thirty-two troop-ships crammed to their fullest capacity by the addition of the independent brigade¹³³ which General Bates had brought from Mobile. The total forces numbered 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men,¹³⁴ but some 10,000 troops had to be left behind for lack of sufficient transportation.¹³⁵ The commanding General of the Army had applied to accompany the expedition, but his request was quietly ignored and he had been ordered to organize this latter force for another expedition destined to be sent to Porto Rico.¹³⁶ Although Shafter's command contained but three volunteer organizations — the 71st New York, the Rough Riders and the 2nd Massachusetts — it comprised one half of the Regular Army and was expected to oppose a Spanish force of veterans inured to tropical climate and numbering 196,820, of which 36,582 were in the province of Santiago¹³⁷ where Shafter had been ordered to land and where, after a smooth and uneventful voyage, he put his first troops ashore on June 22nd.¹³⁸ The trip and the operation in question are thus admirably described:¹³⁹

"On the 14th of June, after several false alarms of attack by Spanish torpedo boats, the United States fleet got under way, and crept toward its destination at about eight knots an hour — the limit of speed of many of the old steamers which had been chartered as transports. On arrival at Daiquiri, which had

been selected as a landing-place, it was discovered that the transports were provided with one lighter only for the disembarkation of horses and guns,¹⁴⁰ and no launches. The one available landing-stage was but partially floored, and there were no materials or tools available for its repair or for the construction of other stages.

“Every boat and launch, even from the iron-clads blockading Santiago Harbour, was requisitioned for the service, and by the splendid efforts of the American blue-jackets, greatly aided by a spell of exceptionally fine weather, the infantry were got on shore during the first day of the disembarkation,¹⁴¹ two men, however, being drowned. In the absence of lighters or flats, horses and mules had to swim to shore, being simply hoisted out of the transports and lowered into the ocean; moreover, as there were no ordinary boats available to guide them to land, some fifty animals swam out to sea in the confusion and were drowned. Under the circumstances it is not remarkable that the disembarkation of horses, guns, and stores was not completed for many days. The number of animals was very limited, as owing to the omission to fit up a sufficient number of vessels for their transport, most of the cavalry horses had to be left behind at Tampa. The landing of provisions was effected with such slowness that the troops from the outset had to be placed on reduced rations; and throughout the disembarkation there was great confusion on the landing-place, which was congested with men and stores, as no officer had been detailed to assume control there, or act as base commandant.

“The disembarkation was practically unopposed, as the few Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Daiquiri appear to have fled as soon as the American men-of-war opened fire. German authorities, however, are of the opinion that as the rocks reached close to the sea, and afforded many places screened from the fire of the war-ships, 300 determined men, although they might not have been able to frustrate the landing entirely, could certainly have inflicted very severe loss on the invaders.¹⁴² Great friction appears to have arisen between the military authorities and the officers of the transport steamers. ‘The latter had only their own advantage and that of the ships’ owners in view, and did not pay the least attention to the wishes and plans of the officers of the troops. The greater part of the time they kept at a distance of from 3 to 20 miles from shore . . . and if at times they did assist in unloading their cargoes, they would return to


sea as fast as possible as soon as fire was opened ashore!' Even when the landing had at last been completed, the Army was wanting in mobility through the deficiency of land transport.

"Bearing in mind that the force engaged had been sent forth by one of the most powerful and most enlightened nations in the world, and that the descent took place at the close of the nineteenth century, it would certainly appear that the landing at Daiquiri is a unique illustration of the fact that even the most splendid resources cannot compensate for the absence of a well-established organization carefully prepared and tested in time of peace.


"The miscalculations and errors, which resulted not only from individual incapacity — for all accounts bear testimony to the zeal and enthusiasm of American sailors and soldiers — but from an entire lack of pre-existing and established system, would have brought disaster to the very gates of the Great Republic if its forces had been pitted against an enterprising foe. The forces of the United States have been without the schooling of war for thirty-four (*sic*) years; but it is not too much to say that the state of affairs depicted could not possibly have arisen if the theory and practice of the combined action of fleets and armies had been established before the encounter with Spain as a recognized branch of naval and military arts."

By the night of June 22nd about 6,000 troops had been landed, and General Lawton was sent forward to seize and hold Siboney. During the 23rd another 6,000 men were put ashore, the disembarkation being shifted that afternoon to Siboney,¹⁴³ eight miles nearer Santiago, and continuing throughout the night.¹⁴⁴ It was not until the 25th that the entire command was finally established on Cuban soil,¹⁴⁵ and "it was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for daily consumption."¹⁴⁶

By comparison with the bungling which characterised this operation, the clock-like precision of the disembarkation at Chemulpo in February, 1904, of a Japanese army of 20,000 men, 2,500 horses, several field batteries and fully 100,000 tons of stores, stands out in strong contrast. The reader who is interested to compare the two operations will find a com-



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.



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prehensive account of the Japanese landing in the Appendix to this chapter, on pages 649-651.¹⁴⁷

The orders issued by General Shafter on June 23rd contemplated the assumption of a strong defensive position near Siboney by General Lawton's division which was to be supported by General Bates' brigade, while General Kent's division was to be retained near Siboney and General Wheeler's cavalry to remain in the rear on the road from Siboney to Daiquiri, pending the landing of the entire force and a reasonable amount of the necessary supplies.¹⁴⁸ Wheeler, who had been joined that evening at Siboney by his 2nd brigade under General Young and who thus had 964 troops available,¹⁴⁹ learned that the enemy was entrenched near Sevilla and, being anxious to get to the front, determined to attack, supported by 800 Cubans whose participation General Castillo had promised. At 5.45 A. M., on the 24th, Young's brigade began its advance in two columns, Colonel Wood with the First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders) following a trail west of the main road. Two hours later General Rubin's force of Spanish troops was encountered on the ridge at Las Guasimas¹⁵⁰ and Young's Hotchkiss guns opened against their position, but so hot was their fire that, at 8.30 A. M., Wheeler sent to Lawton for re-enforcements, declaring that he had encountered "a bigger force of the enemy than he had anticipated."¹⁵¹ Meanwhile the Rough Riders had come into action on the left of the Regulars, both columns pressed forward through the dense tropical jungle and, while Young's troops made a frontal attack, Wood struck the right flank and rear of the enemy on the heights, the combined advance driving the Spanish from their entrenchments. The withering heat and the exhaustion of the troops prevented a vigorous pursuit by Wheeler which, had it occurred, must necessarily have been checked four miles beyond, as General Linares had moved out from Santiago to El Pozo with his artillery and retained that position until Rubin had retreated past it. The losses were comparatively trifling,¹⁵² but the action was important in that it

secured to Shafter's forces a well-watered district for their camps, which additionally afforded an unimpaired view of Santiago and the surrounding country. Moreover, this initial success was distinctly encouraging to the Americans while it exercised a dispiriting effect upon the Spanish.¹⁵³

At the conclusion of the fight General Lawton appeared on the scene with his 1st brigade (General Chaffee), and General Shafter ordered a concentration of his troops at Sevilla under General Wheeler, the senior officer at the front,¹⁵⁴ while the commander-in-chief remained at Siboney on board the *Segurança* to superintend the organization of the supply departments which were in a state of chaos.¹⁵⁵ It was not until eight days later that the advance was resumed, and the conditions during a large part of that invaluable time, which had been wasted in inactivity owing to the failure to make adequate preparations beforehand, are thus depicted by Senator Lodge, who declares that the success achieved at Las Guasimas

“also encouraged the mistaken idea which Admiral Sampson had expressed at first, and which General Shafter apparently held to firmly, that the soldiers of the United States had nothing to do but to press forward, drive the Spaniards from them, and take the town in forty-eight hours. If the Americans had gone on at once, there is every reason to believe that they might have gone through successfully to the city itself. But to take the town in forty-eight hours in the first advance was one thing, and to attempt to take it on the forty-eight hours plan after a week's delay was another and widely different business. In a short time it was to be proved that a strong lines of defences, constructed for the most part while the advance begun at Las Guasimas was halted, lay between the Americans and Santiago, and that the Spaniards, after their fashion, would fight hard and stubbornly under cover of entrenchments and block-houses. Nevertheless, it was with such views prevailing that the army finally moved forward. Lawton's and Chaffee's brigades came up to the front the day of the fight at Las Guasimas, and the other troops advanced during the following days to the high ground around Sevilla, which the victory of the cavalry division had brought within American control. During three days there seems to have been great confusion in the movement of troops,

and still more in the transportation of supplies.¹⁵⁶ The narrow trails, bad at the best, were soon torn up by wagons, and were choaked by the advancing regiments, which moved slowly and with difficulty.¹⁵⁷ The army stretched back for three miles from El Pozo, where an outpost was stationed, and whence the Spaniards could be seen hard at work, the line of entrenchments and rifle-pits lengthening continually along the hills of San Juan, and the defences of El Caney constantly growing stronger. Yet during these days of waiting no battery was brought to El Pozo to open on the Spanish works, no effort was made to interfere with the enemy in strengthening his position, which meant the sacrifice of just so many more lives by every hour that it went on unimpeded. There was no attempt during these comparatively unoccupied days to make new roads through the forests and undergrowth, so that the troops could emerge all along the line of woods instead of in dense narrow masses from the two existing trails. There were officers who saw, knew, and suggested all these things, but they were not done."¹⁵⁸

On June 27th part of General Duffield's brigade from Camp Alger joined the army, and next day Shafter learned that 8,000 Spanish regulars under General Pando were advancing from Manzanillo and were expected to reach Santiago within a few days.¹⁵⁹ Despite the deficiency in the equipment of his command and the dearth of provisions at the front, he determined to attack without further delay. On the 29th he established his headquarters ashore about a mile from El Pozo, on the 30th made a reconnaissance and, after a consultation with Lawton and Chaffee, assembled his division commanders and communicated his plan to them.¹⁶⁰

At 6.15 A. M., on July first the artillery opened fire against the Spanish,¹⁶¹ thus ushering in the battle of Santiago, which consisted of two separate and distinct actions. The first was that of El Caney, where General Vara de Rey with only 520 troops¹⁶² occupied a position that "was naturally strong, and was rendered more so by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church."¹⁶³ To Lawton's division — which was re-enforced during the morning by Bates' independent bri-

gade ¹⁶⁴— was assigned the task of taking this position ¹⁶⁵ and about 6.30 its solitary battery opened fire. For nine long hours a desperate struggle raged about the village of El Caney. Never in its history did the Spanish infantry fight more superbly ¹⁶⁶ and never did American troops show greater heroism. It was not until 4.30 that afternoon that success crowned Lawton's efforts, when the place was carried by storm and the garrison driven out of the village after heavy losses on both sides.¹⁶⁷

From a military standpoint the assault at El Caney was most unnecessary. Although the place was of great importance strategically speaking, once it was discovered that it could not be captured without prolonged struggle, a sufficient force should have been left to mask it and to contain the garrison.* Lawton and Bates would thus have been enabled to push on and to join in the main attack upon the San Juan ridge which was by all odds the most important point on the battlefield. Instead of participating in the major operation where every available regiment should have been concentrated in order to gain possession of the position constituting the key to Santiago, † the main army was deprived of their much-needed support, while hours and lives were needlessly wasted in a secondary operation directed against a place which was nothing more or less than an isolated outpost situated three miles away, on the flank of the principal line of advance. It should have been self-evident that a success

* General Shafter seems to have appreciated this fact since about 2 P. M. he wrote to Lawton:

“I would not bother with little blockhouses. They can't harm us. Bates' brigade and your division and Garcia should move on the city and form the right of the line going on the Sevilla road. Line is now hotly engaged.”

The fighting at El Caney had then been in progress since 6:30 A. M. and this note, which ought to have been sent hours before, did not reach Lawton until he was making his final assault.

† Shortly after 2 P. M. General Shafter sent a despatch to Lawton saying, “You must proceed with the remainder of your force and join on immediately upon Sumner's right. If you do not, the battle is lost.” — Bonsal, p. 116, footnote.

gained on the San Juan heights necessarily neutralized any importance possessed by, as well as entailing the fall of, El Caney, and in other respects the conduct of the battle that day was marked by a notable disregard of certain fundamental rules of war as laid down by Napoleon, namely:

- (1) "*The art of war consists in not dividing one's forces*";
- (2) "*It is a fundamental rule in war to know how to sacrifice secondary to primary points*"; and (3) "*Do not attack in front positions which you can obtain by turning them.*"

Senator Lodge, one of the most distinguished of American statesmen and historical writers, makes the following criticism:¹⁶⁸

"To take a strongly fortified town with infantry quickly and without needless loss it is absolutely essential to clear the way by a powerful and destructive artillery fire. For this all-important object the division had only Capron's battery of four guns, so absurdly inadequate to its task that the fact needs only to be stated. This meagre battery opened on the Fort at El Caney with a deliberate fire at half past six, producing little more effect than to very slowly crumble the walls. Moreover, the battery was not grossly inadequate, but it used black powder, and immediately established a flaring target for an enemy concealed and perfectly familiar with the ranges. Why were there no more guns? Why were they left at Tampa or in the transports? The fact requires no committee of investigation to prove it, and somebody was responsible for the scores of men shot at El Caney because there were only four guns to open the way.¹⁶⁹ Why was the powder black, so that a target of smoke hung over the American position after every discharge? Any smokeless powder was better than none. Even poor, broken-down Spain had smokeless powder for her artillery. Why did we not have it? While the War Department had been passing years in trying to find a patent powder just to its liking, our artillery was provided with black powder and went to war with it, and men died needlessly because of it. No need of a committee to establish this fact, either. Who was responsible? One thing is certain — A SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS CAPABLE OF SUCH PROTRACTED INEFFICIENCY IS LITTLE SHORT OF CRIMINAL, AND THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE WHO PERMIT SUCH A SYSTEM TO EXIST, now that it has been

found out, WILL SHARE IN THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY OF A NEGLECT FOR WHICH MEN'S LIVES HAVE DEARLY PAID IF THEY DO NOT PROMPTLY REMEDY IT. . . ."

In speaking of the attack on El Caney he says: ¹⁷⁰

"The force was composed entirely of regulars, with the exception of the Second Massachusetts Regiment, in Ludlow's brigade. These volunteers, never in action before, behaved extremely well, coming up steadily under fire, and taking their place in the firing-line. But the moment they opened with their archaic Springfields and black powder, which they owed to the narrow parsimony of Congress, and to the lack of energy and efficiency in the system of the War Department, they became not only an easy mark for the Spanish Mausers, but made the position of more peril to all other troops. In consequence of this they had to be withdrawn from the firing-line, but not until they had suffered severely and displayed an excellent courage. The lack of artillery and the black powder made the assault on El Caney a work to which infantry should not have been forced. Yet they were forced to it, and supported by only four guns."

Similar handicaps were experienced by the other troops in the main attack upon the San Juan heights. The smoke from Grimes' battery at El Pozo quickly gave the range to the Spanish guns and several Americans were killed and wounded.¹⁷¹ The advance of the Cavalry division — temporarily under Sumner as General Wheeler had been ill ¹⁷²— followed by Kent's division from El Pozo across the San Juan river, preparatory to deploying to the right and left for a general attack, was disclosed to the enemy by a captive war balloon, and a withering fire was concentrated upon the troops while in their densest formation near the branching of the roads, a few hundred yards beyond the fords. For nearly an hour the troops were huddled together without orders from the commander of the army¹⁷³ whose "own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the day before" and who remained in the rear.¹⁷⁴ At last the deployment was effected after tremendous efforts on the part of the officers,¹⁷⁵ though not without heavy losses and one instance of slight panic in a volunteer battalion.¹⁷⁶ But "still

no orders, and at last the division, brigade and regimental commanders acted and ordered for themselves,"¹⁷⁷ having grown sick and tired of waiting for Lawton, who was to assume a position on the extreme right of the line. General Sumner then directed his 1st brigade under Colonel Wood to assault Kettle Hill, which was soon taken. Part of the cavalry division bore to the left and joined Hawkins' attack on San Juan Hill which was crowned by a blockhouse and entrenchments. Sumner's men then crossed the intervening valley and charged up the heights to the north of the road to Santiago, reaching the crest shortly after Hawkins, while on the left Kent's 2nd brigade carried the heights immediately south of San Juan Hill. At 1.30 p. m., this initial success had been achieved, the Spanish driven from their first and strongest line of entrenchments back to their second line, and the Americans began to strengthen their position as best they could. From that time until nightfall the fighting continued at intervals between the opposing forces, at distances varying from 300 to 800 yards only, and the one attempt of the Spanish to take the offensive was vigorously repulsed. General Linares having been wounded at 2 p. m., the command of the garrison devolved upon General José Toral.¹⁷⁸

Although the day had brought a notable success in the capture of San Juan Hill, the situation of the Americans was precarious in the extreme. Out of the 8,412 troops who had participated in this victory, no less than 1,018 were killed, wounded or missing,¹⁷⁹ every one was greatly exhausted by the terrific heat which caused them to throw away all impedimenta except their rifles and ammunition,¹⁸⁰ the line was painfully slim, there were no reserves to fall back upon for support and three ambulances were all there was to carry the wounded to the rear.* At the end of the fight General Wheeler ordered the construction of breastworks¹⁸¹ and the

* "The richest government in the world had only three ambulances there to carry its wounded sons to the dressing-stations."—Bonsal, p. 141.

American positions were considerably strengthened, but it was not until midnight that General Bates' brigade, which had left El Caney at 4.30 P. M., reached the extreme left, after having marched or fought continuously for twenty-one hours out of the preceding twenty-seven and a half.¹⁸² Lawton, who started shortly after Bates, ran into some Spanish pickets in the darkness, had to halt pending instructions from General Shafter and his entire division did not assume position on the right of the line until about noon next day.¹⁸³

"All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury,"¹⁸⁴ but the much-needed re-enforcement of Bates and Lawton¹⁸⁵ enabled the Americans to hold their position without great difficulty.

About 6 P. M., Shafter summoned Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton and Bates to his headquarters and proposed to them to withdraw five miles to the plateau between the San Juan River and Siboney but, meeting with stout opposition on their part, he decided, after a discussion lasting two hours, to retain his position for the next twenty-four hours "and at the end of that time he would again summon the generals for a second conference."¹⁸⁶ At 10 P. M., the Spanish opened "a terrific musketry fire which lasted about an hour," but no actual attempt was made to break through the American lines, although such was thought to be their intention.¹⁸⁷

On the morning of July 3rd General Shafter cabled the Secretary of War that, although Santiago was invested on the north and east, the line was "very thin"; that the defences were too strong to carry by storm with his present forces; and that he was "seriously considering" the withdrawal to which allusion has just been made.¹⁸⁸ He did, however, write a note to the Spanish commander demanding his surrender,* and the desultory firing which began at day-

* HEADQUARTERS UNITED FORCES,
Near San Juan River, July 3, 1898 — 8:30 A. M.
THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SPANISH FORCES,
Santiago de Cuba.

SIR: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de

break was interrupted about 12.30 p. m., by the flag of truce bearing this summons to the city.¹⁸⁹ This marked the termination of the battle of Santiago and the operations were shortly transformed into those of a siege. General Toral refused to entertain any suggestion for capitulation¹⁹⁰ and that night he was joined by Escario's column from Manzanillo,¹⁹¹ which the Cuban army had permitted to slip past them without much opposition.¹⁹² Upon the request of several of the foreign consuls, Shafter agreed to extend the time for the departure of the women and children until noon of the 5th.¹⁹³

Shafter's correspondence with Washington appears to have raised no little consternation there. The Secretary of War had waited at the White House with the President until 4 a. m., but it was not until 11.44 that his cable announcing his intention of withdrawing was received.¹⁹⁴ General Alger thereupon cabled him, at 12.10 p. m.:

"Your first dispatch received. Of course, you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once."

To this Shafter replied, "I shall hold my present position," but, in the meantime, he had telegraphed that

. . . "Cervera's fleet was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton of the *Harvard* just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signaled Cervera had come out and had escaped and that he was in pursuit. . . ." ¹⁹⁵

Small wonder that the Secretary of War declared that
Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM R. SHAFER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

“ Sunday, the 3rd of July, was the darkest day of the war,”¹⁹⁶ and it was not until the following day that the astounding victory of the American fleet was known and the anxiety of the officials dispelled.

An exchange of letters followed between Shafter and Toral,¹⁹⁷ which need not be chronicled here, but at 4 P. M., on the 10th the truce was broken by a bombardment of the city¹⁹⁸ that continued until noon next day.¹⁹⁹ On the 11th General Miles arrived at Siboney with the transports *Yale* and *Columbia*, arranged with Admiral Sampson for the fleet to cover the disembarking of the troops at Cabañas, two and one-half miles west of the entrance to Santiago harbour, reached Shafter's headquarters next morning and assumed charge of the negotiations.²⁰⁰ At 12 o'clock on the 13th he had a conference with General Toral, offered him liberal terms and gave him until noon of the following day to surrender or to submit to an assault.²⁰¹ On the morning of the 14th it was reported to Toral that fifty-seven American ships, part of them loaded with troops, were menacing his lines on the west, and this demonstration produced the desired effect. At noon that day he again met General Miles and forthwith announced his readiness to surrender all the troops in the Province of Santiago, which was accepted “ under the condition that the Spanish troops should be repatriated by the United States.” Shafter was then authorized to appoint commissioners to draw up the articles of capitulation,²⁰² instructions were given him with respect to the precautions to be taken against yellow fever which had then made its appearance,²⁰³ and General Miles returned to Siboney and moved his transports to Guantanamo in order to prevent these troops from becoming infected also.²⁰⁴

The surrender was then a *fait accompli* and, after some haggling over the terms which necessitated several conferences during the ensuing forty-eight hours,²⁰⁵ an agreement for the capitulation of the garrison²⁰⁶ was finally signed by the six commissioners²⁰⁷ on July 16th at 6 P. M.²⁰⁸ On the follow-

ing morning at 9.30 the ceremony of surrendering occurred between the lines,²⁰⁹ at the termination of which Generals Shafter and Toral, accompanied by their staffs and escorts, rode into the city, and punctually at noon the American flag was hoisted over the Governor's palace.²¹⁰

Thus ended the campaign of Santiago,²¹¹ for the successful issue of which Americans had abundant reason to be thankful. Shafter's corps was composed of the flower of the American army²¹² and obviously all that regular soldiers could be taught of military sanitation and hygiene had been learned by them. Notwithstanding this, and in spite of the fact that directly after the capitulation the regiments were moved every few days to new camping grounds and all possible precautions taken, the diseases incident to the tropics²¹³ spread with alarming rapidity until no less than seventy-five per cent. of the troops were on the sick list.²¹⁴ Yet it was absolutely imperative to retain the Fifth Corps at Santiago, not only to guard the prisoners until they had been transported to Spain, but to prevent clashes with the Cubans, between whom and the Spanish intense animosity prevailed.²¹⁵ Moreover, prudence dictated that an army infected with yellow fever ought not to be permitted to return to the United States until the disease was thoroughly under control. On August 1st the epidemic had progressed to such a point that no less than 4,255 men were ill,²¹⁶ and, as Lieutenant Miley states:²¹⁷

"The Commanding General was now directed to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the yellow-fever limit;²¹⁸ but this was a physical impossibility, as the troops were too weak and sick to march, and the work of repairing the bridges on the railroad had not yet been completed. Even after this was done the rolling stock was so insufficient that only a comparatively small number could be transported in a day, and when once San Luis was reached the camps would have been less comfortable than those around Santiago.


"The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in


which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these conditions staring them in the face, that the officers commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation."

As a result of this conference, General Shafter sent a long cable on August 3rd, setting forth the alarming conditions and accompanying it by two so-called "round robins," one signed by the surgeons of the corps, the other by the brigade and division commanders.²¹⁹ On the following day authorization was given to ship the troops to Montauk Point,²²⁰ which had been selected for their reception; ²²¹ on the 7th the first troops were embarked; and on the 25th General Shafter and the last of his command sailed for Montauk Point, arriving at their destination on September 1st.* Major General Lawton was left in command of the Province of Santiago with a force of four "immune" regiments, and Brigadier General Leonard Wood was placed in command of the city.²²² The shipment of the prisoners back to Spain began on August 9th and terminated on September 17th.²²³ Meanwhile, negotiations had been instituted by Spain on July 26th and were conducted through M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Washington. The publication of the "round robin" occurred at the most delicate stage in the *pourparlers*, but most fortunately its detrimental influence was overcome ²²⁴ and the negotiations culminated in a peace protocol for the suspension of hostilities, which was signed at Washington on August 12th.²²⁵

* Report of the Secretary of War, for 1898, p. 5; Miley, p. 228.

The physical condition of the Army brought from Cuba may best be judged from *General Wheeler's report* of September 26th (in *Report of the Major General, commanding, for 1898*, p. 244), which states that between August 13th and September 13, 1898, there arrived at Montauk Point 22,221 troops from Santiago; that 3,252 were sick and that 87 had died on the voyage. General Wheeler moreover declares that "While only 3,252 were reported sick when the ships landed, the great bulk of the troops that were at Santiago were by no means well, and many of them, fully 5,000 to 6,000, developed sickness after their arrival."





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THE CAMPAIGN OF PORTO RICO

Allusion has already been made to the refusal of the military authorities to grant the request of the Major General commanding the Army to accompany Shafter's expedition and to the orders sent him to organize another expedition destined for Porto Rico,²²⁶ which General Miles stated "could be ready in ten days."²²⁷ On June 15th he was ordered back to Washington and, after repeated conferences,²²⁸ was given specific instructions as to the composition and purpose of his force.²²⁹ On July 5th he suggested that in view of the destruction of the Spanish fleet the time had come "for proceeding immediately to Puerto Rico," but Shafter's urgent request for "15,000 troops speedily"²³⁰ brought about a decision on the part of the authorities that he should first proceed to Santiago. On July 9th he sailed from Charleston with the *Yale* and *Columbia* with some 3,400 troops, reaching Siboney on the 11th.²³¹ His participation in the negotiations for the surrender of Santiago and his departure for Guantamo have already been chronicled.²³² As every single regiment in Shafter's command was then infected with yellow fever, none of these troops could be utilized and, on July 21st, General Miles set sail for Porto Rico with nine transports containing only 3,415 infantry and artillery, under convoy of the battleship *Massachusetts* and two smaller vessels.²³³ In spite of the flotilla of tugs, launches and lighters which had been ordered, none put in an appearance and, as it had been ascertained that the Spanish commander in Porto Rico, who had no less than 8,233 regulars and 9,107 volunteers, was concentrating and entrenching his forces at Porto Fajardo near San Juan, where it had been planned to disembark, the landing place was changed to Guanica, only a short distance from Ponce, on the southwest coast. Arriving at daylight on July 25th, a landing was effected under cover of the guns of the *Gloucester* and after a brief skirmish the Spanish were driven off.²³⁴

On the following day General Garretson with seven companies²³⁵ attacked the Spaniards near Yauco, defeated them after a spirited engagement, and gained possession of the railway and highroad leading to Ponce.²³⁶ That night the transports *Obdam*, *La Grande Duchesse* and the *Mobile*, carrying General Ernst's brigade,²³⁷ arrived at the anchorage, and the landing is thus described by Major General James Harrison Wilson, commanding this force:²³⁸

"Early the next morning we entered the harbor and reported to General Miles, whom we found there with one brigade, but the little bay was utterly out of the way and the roads entirely inadequate for effective operations in any direction. Accordingly, Miles changed his plans and decided to disembark sixteen miles farther east at Ponce,²³⁹ the second city of the island, connected with San Juan on the north coast by a broad macadamized highway, said to be at that time the best road in the West Indies.

"The harbor of Guanica which we had entered head on, although sufficiently deep, was almost land-locked and so crowded with transports that our steamer could not turn about in it. This made it necessary for us to back out for over a mile through a narrow crooked channel, but the maneuver, although hitherto unheard of for a long, ocean-going steamer, was successfully managed by the captain, who was a bold and skilful navigator. Had the weather been rough this fortunate result could not have been attained, and our withdrawal as well as our further movements would have been correspondingly delayed. But fortune favored us. We found that Ponce had been abandoned early that morning and was already occupied by a small detachment of marines from our blockading ships. My whole command was at hand, but as the beach, or *playa*, two miles in front of the city, was shallow and shelving for a half mile out, and my requisitions for flats and motor boats had not been filled, the landing of our animals and supplies was a long and tedious operation. Had our movement into the interior depended upon a prompt advance after our first appearance, it would have been seriously endangered by the failure of the War Department to fill my requisitions, and by its perfectly inadequate preparation to meet perfectly well-known conditions.²⁴⁰ With our transports anchored more than half a mile from the shore, with no wharf

or landing facilities, it would have been impossible to disembark the transportation and supplies of the command without the assistance rendered by the navy, and especially by Captain Higginson, of the battleship *Massachusetts*. The troops got ashore that day, but with all we could do our impedimenta were seriously delayed and our preparations to advance were not complete for fully a week longer than would otherwise have been necessary.

“As the enemy had withdrawn toward the interior and made no sort of effort to resist or embarrass us, I had ample time in which to restore order, establish a military administration and reconnoiter the country along the great highway toward Caomo. Notwithstanding the improvements in infantry firearms, my command had been supplied with Springfield rifles and cartridges of black powder on the theory of the Ordnance Department that these would be good enough for fighting the Spaniards, but under my earnest protest the new standard rifle, of which a supply was on hand in the States, was furnished and issued to the command on the third day of August on foreign soil only four days before we began our forward movement. With any men less intelligent than the American soldier this might have been a costly if not a fatal change, but the volunteers readily adapted themselves to the new rifle and used it in their first and only action with great effect.”²⁴¹

Wilson was joined that afternoon at Ponce by Henry,²⁴² but it was not until four days later²⁴³ that Major General Brooke, the commander of the First Army Corps,²⁴⁴ and Brigadier General Schwan arrived,²⁴⁵ the former being instructed to disembark at Arroyo²⁴⁶—forty-three miles east of Ponce—where he was joined three days later by Brigadier General Hains,²⁴⁷ and to march on Cayei. Schwan was directed to land the 11th Infantry at Guanica and to move to Yauco, where he was re-enforced²⁴⁸ and received orders to “drive out or capture all Spanish troops in the western portion of Porto Rico.”²⁴⁹

Upon the arrival of these commands, the total number of American troops in the island amounted to 15,199 and 106 pieces of artillery of various sorts. General Miles' plan of campaign contemplated convergent movements against the

strongholds of Coamo and Aibonito by the columns under Generals Brooke and Wilson, and a concerted advance by Generals Henry and Schwan through the western part of the island and northward to Arecibo, a town on the north coast about thirty-five miles west of San Juan, with which it was connected by a railway. To that end the army was divided into four columns,²⁵⁰ while the necessary troops were retained in the rear to garrison Ponce and other places in that vicinity.²⁵¹

On August 5th General Brooke had a lively fight near Guayama but ended by occupying the town, and three days later a second encounter drove the enemy in the direction of Cayei. This reconnaissance developed the fact that the Spanish were in force in strong positions north of Guayama but, although Brooke determined to turn the position, he deemed it advisable to await the arrival of four light batteries and two troops of cavalry which would be of great use in such an operation.²⁵²

Starting on August 9th, from Yauco, General Schwan advanced rapidly through Sabana Grande and San German, routed the enemy on August 10th near Hormigueros,²⁵³ occupied Mayaguez early on the 11th, and continued his pursuit in a northwestwardly direction toward Lares.²⁵⁴

In the centre General Wilson moved forward from Juana Diaz to within three miles of Coamo and, on the evening of the 8th, divided his forces, sending the 16th Pennsylvania under Colonel Hulings to make a detour to the rear of the enemy, guided by Lieutenant-Colonel Biddle and Captain Gardner. On the morning of the 9th the rest of General Ernst's brigade, supported by his guns and Troop C, New York Volunteer Cavalry, advanced directly against Coamo, while Hulings fell upon their rear, and the Spanish were thoroughly routed, their two commanding officers being killed and 167 captured.²⁵⁵

Although the victory was instantly followed up by a vigorous pursuit, part of the Spanish forces succeeded in taking

refuge in the stronghold of Aibonito, five miles beyond. Perched on the summit of a lofty ridge with craglike slopes and protected by powerful batteries at Asomanta and El Peñon, it defied all attempts to capture it by a frontal attack, and two days were consumed in a cautious approach. At 1.25 p. m. on the 12th Wilson's guns opened on the Spanish position at Asomanta, but the black powder afforded a perfect target for the enemy and seven men were put *hors de combat*. A demand for surrender was curtly refused, and on the morning of the 13th General Ernst's brigade was in movement to turn the position when a courier reached General Wilson's headquarters with the announcement that an armistice had been concluded between the United States and Spain, that all military operations were to cease, and that the troops were to retain their positions until further orders.²⁵⁶

In a similar fashion this news arrested the advance of General Brooke from Guayama, just as he was on the point of turning and attacking the Spanish near Cayei,²⁵⁷ as well as that of the two western columns. General Stone had successfully constructed a road over what was considered to be an impassable trail leading through Adjuntas and Utado, thus enabling General Henry to push on with Garretson's brigade in the hope of intercepting the enemy retreating before Schwan, and his advanced-guard was approaching Arecibo, where he purposed to effect a junction with his confrère, when the news of the armistice ended his movement.²⁵⁸ On the extreme west General Schwan had continued his advance from Mayaguez through Las Marias, had routed the enemy at the Rio Prietoat beyond Las Marias, on the 13th,²⁵⁹ and was on the verge of entering Lares when the information of the signing of the protocol reached him. There was no alternative but to call a halt just at the moment when the country had been beaten up most effectually and when his quarry lay within his grasp; ²⁶⁰ truth to tell, "no troops ever suspended hostilities with worse grace."²⁶¹


As Senator Lodge very pertinently observes: ²⁶²

“There has been an impression that the Puerto-Rican campaign was little more than a parade, and it has even been spoken of contemptuously as a ‘picnic,’ owing probably to the too prevalent notion that military operations must be estimated solely by the losses, or as a British admiral of the last century is said to have put it in somewhat brutal phrase, ‘by the butcher’s bills.’ . . . But a campaign as a whole must be judged, if it is to be judged fairly, by larger and different standards. . . .²⁶³ The success of the American troops was so rapid and complete, and their future was so clearly assured, that a claim to the island had been established of such an undeniable character that, when it came to signing the protocol, there was no possibility of withholding from the United States the cession of Puerto Rico. Thus the object of the campaign was completely achieved, which, after all, will always weigh heavily in making up the final judgment of history . . . and the manner in which it was carried forward through many difficulties reflects the highest credit on the generals who commanded,²⁶⁴ and upon the discipline, quality, and courage of the soldiers, both regulars and volunteers.”


On August 30th General Miles turned over the command to General Brooke and sailed for the United States. On October 18th Porto Rico was evacuated by the last of the Spanish troops and the American forces officially took possession.²⁶⁵

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PHILIPPINES

The general plan of campaign for the war contemplated the occupation of the Philippines, and the receipt on May 7th of the news of the destruction of the Spanish squadron at Manila on the first by Commodore Dewey hastened the preparations to that end.²⁶⁶ To follow up the advantage gained by the Navy by the capture of the capital of the archipelago, seven expeditions were organized, the combined strength of which amounted to 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men. The first, under Brigadier General T. M. Anderson, sailed from San Francisco on May 25th, reaching Manila on June 30th; the second, under Brigadier General Francis V. Greene, followed on June 15th; and the third



THE PHILIPPINES



under Generals Wesley Merritt and MacArthur — the former having on May 28th received command of all the forces destined for the Philippines²⁶⁷ which were constituted into the Eighth Army Corps on June 21st²⁶⁸— departed on June 27th and 29th. These three expeditions, numbering 470 officers and 10,464 men, alone participated in the operations prior to the cessation of hostilities, the other four arriving after August 13th.²⁶⁹

Upon reaching Cavite on July 25th, General Merritt found that place occupied by Anderson's command, Admiral Dewey's ships anchored off the town and Greene's brigade near the village of Paranaque, his left or north flank resting on the *Calle Real*, less than two miles from the outer line of defences of Manila. Between the Americans and the Spaniards were the Philippine insurgents, some 14,000 strong, under General Emilio Aguinaldo, who had proclaimed an independent republic with himself as president,²⁷⁰ but who neither visited General Merritt nor offered the assistance of his forces. Preparations were promptly made to attack the city and, by the exercise of tact, General Greene persuaded the commander of the insurgent brigade adjacent to him to vacate his position so as to give the former an unimpeded advance. A strong line of outposts was thrown forward along the *Calle Real* and the shore of the bay, and a trench constructed in which some of the Utah guns were placed.²⁷¹

These preparations did not escape the Spanish, and on the night of July 31st a vicious attack was made upon the American positions by their infantry and guns, but was successfully repulsed after some hard fighting in a howling storm of wind and rain. A new line of trenches was opened, the position extended and strengthened, and less difficulty experienced in beating off the constant night attacks, the heaviest of which occurred on August 5th.²⁷²

Greene's situation being none too secure, he was re-enforced by MacArthur's brigade which had arrived on July 31st and was disembarked, after infinite difficulty, in native

lighters and small steamboats, which were landed through a raging surf to the accompaniment of squalls and incessant deluges of rain.²⁷³ The American forces now numbered over 8,500²⁷⁴ and, being in readiness to attack, an official notification was sent to the Spanish commander that land and naval operations²⁷⁵ might begin at any time within forty-eight hours and that he was "to remove all noncombatants from the city." * General Jaudenes promptly replied that he was "without places of refuge for the increased number of wounded, sick, women and children who are now lodged within the walls." Two days later a joint demand, signed by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, was made for the surrender of Manila, to which he responded by asking for time to communicate *via* Hongkong with his Government, a request that they declined to grant.²⁷⁶

On August 12th General Merritt issued his orders for an attack upon the city next day to be made in conjunction with the warships, and early on the morning of the 13th the troops were in the positions assigned them. At 9 A. M. Admiral Dewey steamed forward from Cavite and within an hour had opened fire against the sea flank of the Spanish entrenchments at the powder magazine fort, † the Utah batteries join-

* HEADQUARTERS U. S. LAND AND NAVAL FORCES,
Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, August 7, 1898.
The General in Chief Commanding Spanish forces in Manila.

SIR: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.


This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all noncombatants from the city.

Very respectfully,


WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General, United States Army,
Commanding land forces of the United States.

GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding United States naval force on Asiatic station.

† Lodge relates, pp. 215-216, that as the ships "got under way and the *Olympia* moved off, the English band on the *Immortalité* struck up



THE OPERATIONS IN LUZON 1898-1901



ing in from the trenches near the *Calle Real*. At 10.25, upon a pre-arranged signal, the ships withheld their fire and the 1st Colorado charged, captured the fort and pushed on through Malate to Binondo and San Miguel. On Greene's right, MacArthur advanced by the Pasay road, encountered considerable resistance from the enemy in the block-houses, trenches and woods but, notwithstanding their heavy fire and the handicap of marshy ground and thick undergrowth, carried these positions, seized and occupied the bridges and the town of Malate.

Manila was then in possession of the Americans, with the exception of the walled portion of the city, but shortly after the troops entered Malate a white flag was displayed by the Spanish.²⁷⁷ Preceded by two officers, General Merritt betook himself to the palace of the Governor-General, where a preliminary agreement for surrender was signed by the opposing commanders, the final capitulation being arranged by a commission²⁷⁸ and concluded the following day.²⁷⁹ The walled town was immediately occupied and no opposition was experienced in disarming the troops comprised in the surrender.²⁸⁰

Remarkable indeed were the results achieved by this combined attack which put an end to Spanish domination in the Philippines.²⁸¹ The assault upon the city cost the lives of only five Americans and the wounding of forty-three,²⁸² while the entire operations beginning on July 30th and cul-

'See, the Conquering Hero Comes,' and then, as the battle-flags broke out on the fighting fleet, the English band played the 'Star Spangled Banner,' and the cheers of the American seamen rang strong and clear across the water. As the American ships drew away, the English followed them a little further out, and when they came to their old anchorage near the Pasig river, the French and Germans got under way, too. The German flag-ship steamed down behind the *Concord*, so that a high shot from Manila aimed at the latter might easily have struck her, and thereupon the *Immortalité* came in between the German and the American, and stopped. The hint was not lost. The Germans and French remained near Manila, while the English and Japanese were grouped on the American side; and with this arrangement the closing act of the drama went forward."

minating in the capture of Manila were accomplished with the loss of no more than seventeen men killed, and ten officers and ninety-six men wounded.²⁸³ The Spanish had some 14,000 good troops,²⁸⁴ nearly all regulars, and their losses, although impossible to determine accurately, were much heavier.²⁸⁵ The trophies of this victory were "nearly \$900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms."²⁸⁶

"In not a few features the siege and capture of Manila is comparable to the Santiago campaign. The landing of 10,000 troops was made under great natural difficulties, resulting from a high and dangerous surf, which, as we have seen, actually prevented for eight days the disembarkation of the troops accompanying General MacArthur, and numbering nearly 5,000. Part of General Merritt's army was in the trenches from July 20th to August 13th — fourteen days — practically as long as General Shafter's army occupied the trenches before Santiago. In Manila, however, the heat was greater and the rains heavier than in Cuba, and at times the trenches had no less than two feet of water in them. Here, under the constant strain of four night attacks and many other threatened assaults, the American regulars and volunteers endured the trying hardships without shelter or protection and without complaint. The nervous tension during this period was certainly as great as, if not greater than, at Santiago, where the trenches were occupied for much of the time of the siege under flag of truce. The Spanish army of regular veterans exceeded our own in numbers. A third of the circumference of the globe separated our little army from its base of supplies. Moreover, the attitude of the native forces during this period was so uncertain and at times so hostile that it was even feared that the Filipinos might be included among our enemies. Our landing was made during the season of the highest temperature, but, for the same reasons that applied to the Santiago campaign, all the troops in the Philippines could not be furnished with khaki uniforms before leaving the United States. And, for these same reasons that applied to the Santiago campaign, only the simplest components of the army ration could be placed on shore or furnished the army before Manila fell. Although the full allowance of every component of the ration was on the ships, only sugar and coffee, bacon and hardtack could be landed, and once, when the

surf was unusually heavy, the troops ashore were twenty-four hours without food. The watchful vigil in the flooded trenches resulted in the destruction of many pairs of shoes, and 300 men of General Merritt's army marched into Manila barefooted. Conceive the remarks of the yellow press had this incident, so common in war, occurred at Santiago instead of at Manila!

"Yet there were no complaints from those sturdy heroes. Every general officer who has written of the battle and the trying period preceding has highly commended their fortitude, their cheerfulness, and their patience under all conditions."²⁸⁷

On August 16th the news of the signing of the peace protocol reached Manila, and on the 28th General Merritt received orders to relinquish his command to General Otis²⁸⁸ and to proceed to Paris to confer with the American Commissioners.²⁸⁹ On December 10th there was signed in the French capital the definitive Treaty of Peace, whereby Spain withdrew from Cuba and ceded to the United States Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, receiving \$20,000,000 for her Asiatic colonies²⁹⁰—which were already in the possession of the Americans by right of conquest.

Thus ended the Spanish-American War, in which the United States had employed 58,688 regular troops,²⁹¹ and 223,235 volunteers,²⁹² to oppose Spanish forces numbering about 228,160,²⁹³ at a cost of \$321,833,254.76,²⁹⁴ and the pensions for this war, taken in conjunction with those paid out for the Philippine insurrection, have already amounted to no less than \$46,092,740.47.²⁹⁵

CHAPTER XVII

LESSONS OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

HOW short and decisive a modern war can be is demonstrated by this struggle which lasted only 109 days from the official declaration of hostilities to the signing of the peace protocol.¹ In certain aspects it was well-nigh unique, and the commander of the American land forces had abundant reason to declare² that

“It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun or rifle has been captured by the enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps, unparalleled. . . .

“While but a small portion of the available forces of the United States — approximately 52,000 men — has been on foreign soil and engaged in fighting a foreign foe, those that have been in the presence of the enemy have fairly demonstrated the character and fortitude of the military forces of the United States.”

That a mighty empire in both hemispheres should have been wrested from Spain after four centuries of domination with a loss so infinitesimal on the part of the victorious nation³ is almost incredible. This was mainly due to the employment by the United States of such a large percentage of Regular troops,⁴ to the failure of the Spanish commander at Santiago to concentrate his army, and to the sudden collapse of the war in consequence of the destruction of the Spanish fleets. Credit should also be given to General Garcia and the Cubans who rendered important services.

The principal resistance to our land forces was encountered in Cuba, where the success was achieved by the flower of the American Regular Army. That such a mere handful

of trained soldiers was able within twenty-four days and during the worst season of the year to win three actions,⁵ to force Admiral Cervera out of the harbour and into certain destruction, to capture Santiago and some 23,000 Spanish troops — a number considerably in excess of their own⁶ — and thus in so short a time to end the war, is little less than miraculous. None but an army of highly trained regulars could have accomplished such a result, and the credit belongs rightfully and almost exclusively to them.⁷

History is replete with inaccuracies and omissions, and the campaign of Santiago affords another instance of this fact. Although the rôle played by General Garcia and the Cuban forces after the landing of the American army scarcely redounded to their credit, the fact none the less remains that, prior to General Shafter's arrival, they rendered invaluable assistance by virtually isolating the Spanish in the vicinity of Santiago from those in the rest of the province. With the suggestions made by General Miles on June 2nd⁸ Garcia complied to such an extent that, out of 36,582 Spanish troops in the province of Santiago,⁹ General Linares was reduced to 12,096 soldiers and 1,000 sailors¹⁰ with which to oppose Shafter.¹¹ That he failed to utilize them as a good general would have done was extremely lucky for the Americans. Thus far historians, almost without exception, have neglected to give to Garcia and his Cubans the proper recognition due for the important services which they rendered in the initial stages of the campaign in Cuba.

The Spanish-American War is notable, not only for the greater percentage of regulars in proportion to the number of troops actually used in active operations than in most of our wars, but for the large number of Regular Army officers employed in the volunteers, no less than 387 serving in the various grades of this force.¹² With the exception of Miles, Wilson and Merritt, none of the general officers had commanded army corps or independent armies during the War of the Rebellion. The first two of these generals were sent

to Porto Rico, the last to Manila. General Shafter, while not a brilliant soldier, was by no means devoid of ability — an incompetent commander could not have concentrated 83 per cent. of his available forces for the decisive battles as he did on July 1st ¹³— but he was physically unfitted for campaigning in the tropics and therefore incapable of giving that personal supervision to the operations of his troops which is indispensable to efficient control.¹⁴

Congress, having neglected to carry out the recommendations of the Endicott Board,¹⁵ found itself in the usual dilemma and sought by an appropriation of \$50,000,000 to make reparation, but neither money nor the most strenuous efforts could place our fortifications in an effective state during the short time available. Yet, owing to an absurd construction of the law, the money appropriated could be used for very little else, and preparations indispensable to the efficiency of the several supply departments were much delayed. Once the legal difficulty was overcome and expenditures by the various departments began, one of the most glaring evils of our supply system was carried to its utmost limit, and the duplication of purchases resulted in an enormous surplus of supplies for which there existed no demand and which were disposed of for a trifle by condemnation shortly after the close of the war.

Since we have no general supply department for the Army, and as the supplies of the Engineer, Ordnance, Medical and Signal corps are bought by each one independently of the others and of the Quartermaster Department, and, moreover, as many of the supplies are of the same kind in all the departments, this sort of extravagance will no doubt occur again should the United States be suddenly plunged into war. The consolidation of the Quartermaster, Commissary and Pay departments¹⁶ has to some extent mitigated the evil, but it will not be wholly eradicated until all manufactured articles and raw materials in common use in the Army are provided by a general supply department, fully conversant with the

needs of all the branches of the service and how far they can be met by the stores on hand. Until such a change in administration is made, waste and extravagance will inevitably continue to disgrace our absurdly administered Army.

What the supply departments were subjected to as a result of the dilatory action of Congress, waiting as usual until the eleventh hour, and what they achieved in spite of their handicap is admirably set forth in that part of Captain Rhodes' Gold Medal Prize Essay which will be found in the appendix to this chapter on pages 668-671.¹⁷

In the Spanish-American War the same piecemeal and hand-to-mouth policy which has marked the military legislation from the beginning of our national career was again apparent. No expansive organization had been instituted in the long years of peace following the close of the War of the Rebellion and, as usual, the increase of the Regular Army occurred after the outbreak of war, with the result that the maximum authorized strength was not attained even at the cessation of hostilities. As this increase came after the creation of the Volunteer Army, the recruits naturally preferred service with the volunteers, just as they have always done¹⁸ and always will do. Moreover, as the governors of the States were empowered to appoint the company and regimental officers, many commissions were obtained in the volunteers by men who were in no respect qualified to lead troops, and the authorities were well-nigh swamped by the applications which poured in upon them.¹⁹ The lack of adequate training on the part of the volunteers rendered them of comparatively small value from the standpoint of a military asset, doubly so since Congress expressly forbade that more than one regular officer should be appointed in any one volunteer regiment.²⁰ Even so, nearly one-fifth of the regular officers were given volunteer commissions, in spite of the fact that the Regular Army had been more than doubled in size and that many of these officers were needed for recruiting service.²¹

The dearth of trained officers, arising out of the neglect of

Congress to make provision beforehand for such an emergency, proved a tremendous handicap. At the battle of Waterloo Marshal Ney appealed to Napoleon for more infantry, which caused the Emperor to retort to Colonel Heymès, who brought the request: "Where does he want me to get them from? Does he expect me to make them?"²² Congress evidently laboured under the delusion that a sufficiency of trained officers would spring up overnight, but the military authorities knew differently and therefore

"The War Department requested of Congress authority to issue commissions for active service to retired army officers. This authority Congress denied. From the regular army was taken the maximum number of officers consistent with its efficiency—an efficiency that is the rock upon which this country must build its hope for effective operations during the first few months of any war in which it may be engaged."²³

As was to be expected, the dearth of trained officers forced the employment of volunteer officers with little or no experience, and the confusion and mismanagement during the course of this war were directly attributable to this cause.²⁴

Once again Congress neglected to take full advantage of the national enthusiasm which invariably accompanies the outbreak of hostilities. Instead of requiring all enlistments to be "FOR THE WAR," it indulged its customary habit of making them too short and limited them to two years. Unless all signs fail, there were unmistakable indications during the summer that, had the war been prolonged until the following year, great difficulty would have been experienced in obtaining the necessary recruits. As Captain Rhodes very trenchantly declares:

"The duration of the Spanish War was so short as to afford little data on which to base a system of recruiting suitable for our form of government, and designated to keep the ranks of both regulars and volunteers filled to the maximum *in a long, severe, or unpopular war*. But taken in connection with some of the serious mistakes of the Civil War, and with certain ex-

periments in recruiting for the Philippine insurrection . . . it must be very evident to all who have seriously considered the conditions prevailing in the month of September, 1898, that in the matter of army depletion and recruitment we were on the high road to the same grave state of affairs that virtually prolonged the War of the Rebellion."

To cap the climax Congress expressly stipulated that all volunteers "shall be discharged from the service of the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities."²⁶ This was tantamount to leaving the question to the adjudication of the volunteers, and scarcely had the Peace Protocol been signed on August 12th than they proceeded to avail themselves of what they deemed to be their privilege. On the 18th of that month an order was issued by the War Department for the mustering out of 100,000 volunteers²⁷ but, as this embraced less than half of that force, any number of officers and men began to clamour for their discharge, using every possible influence to procure it, quite regardless of the fact that the Government was in nowise obligated to grant it until the Treaty of Peace had been definitely signed and ratified.²⁸ In many cases their demands were complied with in order to reduce military expenditures but, when the regulars were withdrawn from Cuba and Porto Rico, the Government found itself greatly embarrassed by the demands of the volunteers who had to be sent to replace them in order to hold those islands. By the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, the volunteers had in turn been superseded by other regulars, had been brought home and mustered out, so that the terms of the enlistment contracts had been complied with. The exigencies in the Philippines rendered such a course impossible. Allusion has already been made to the declaration of independence by the Filipinos, who were not permitted to participate in the operations culminating in the capture of Manila.²⁹ Having formed a government, they demanded recognition of it, but

this was refused, although no steps were taken to prevent their acquiring control over substantially the rest of the archipelago, partly owing to the paucity of our troops and partly owing to the policy laid down by our Government.³⁰ This attitude, coupled with a fear that the United States was about to seize the islands, engendered such distrust and enmity that in October the Filipinos began to concentrate their forces, to the number of some 40,000, around Manila³¹ and virtually shut up the American army under General Otis in the city, where, apart from guarding 13,000 Spanish prisoners, it was compelled to maintain order among the 300,000 hostile inhabitants.³² By January, 1899, Otis received a paltry re-enforcement of 6,500 men,³³ thus bringing his command up to 20,481,³⁴ the regulars armed with the Krag-Jørgensen rifle being only 5,372 strong, while the other 15,400 were State volunteers supplied with the obsolete Springfield.³⁵ On February 4, 1899, began the Philippine insurrection,³⁶ which was not finally quelled until more than three years later. Congress had not only committed an egregious blunder in the wording of the law of April 22, 1898, instituting the Volunteer Army,³⁷ but it neglected until March 2, 1899, to create other forces to replace it. In consequence of this failure, not until June 14, 1899 — ten months after the necessity had ceased for the use of volunteers called out under the act of 1898 — did a sufficiency of regulars reach the Philippines to permit Otis to send home any of his volunteer troops,³⁸ and not until October 11th did the first of the newly-created force join him.³⁹ As a matter of fact, the last of these regiments — the 48th Volunteer Infantry — did not arrive at Manila until January 25, 1900.⁴⁰ Owing to the lack of a Regular Army large enough to respond to the increased demands in the two hemispheres, the Government was confronted by two alternatives, *namely*: either to abandon the Philippines entirely or to endeavour to hold them by retaining in service such troops as were available. Having determined upon the latter course, it was compelled

to break its contract and to hold the men, who had volunteered for the war with Spain only,⁴¹ through a succession of active operations lasting for six months after the period when their term of enlistment had legally expired.⁴² A fresh instance was thus afforded of the folly of short enlistments to which the United States has persistently adhered since the beginning of the Revolutionary War.

The causes which brought about these conditions were twofold: first, as we have seen, a conditional enlistment contract — *one of the worst blunders from a military standpoint which can be committed* — and, second, the failure to provide for adequate trained reserves — a defect that has prolonged every one of our wars. Illustrative of the latter are two facts worthy of careful attention. In the haste to get the regular regiments to the front at the outbreak of war, sufficient time was not given to recruit them up to war strength and, moreover, the new material was so raw and untrained that many regimental commanders preferred to leave the new recruits behind.⁴³ As a result, the returns show that the infantry regiments participating in the attack on San Juan on July first averaged only 556 enlisted men each, whereas their strength should have been 1,272. When it is recollected that the Spanish troops in the province of Santiago numbered over 36,000, the hazardous nature of such a course needs no other commentary. Furthermore, aside from the killed and wounded, the loss by disease in the regulars was such that many of the regiments were reduced to about 300 enlisted men. It thus became necessary to recruit them up to 1,500 and to equip each one anew. “No consideration was given to training, for there was no time for this, only to send the raw material forward as soon as possible, thanking God for the character of our foe.”⁴⁴ What such a harum-scarum proceeding would have entailed had we been pitted against a great military Power the reader can judge for himself.

The Spanish-American War demonstrated, perhaps as much as in any other respect, the necessity for a General

Staff. Had the first plan contemplating an attack upon Havana — which was favoured by the Administration — been carried out, the result could not have failed to end in overwhelming disaster. As a matter of fact, the Spanish fondly hoped that such an attempt would be made.⁴⁵ The plan actually executed — which originated with General Miles — was sound in that it was based upon the well-known principle of strategy prescribing that the enemy's force should be broken asunder and the weaker part first overpowered. Cuba, being nearly 800 miles long and from 30 to 120 miles in width, lent itself in an unusually favourable manner to just such an operation. Cervera's entrance into the harbour of Santiago definitely fixed the exact point at which the first stroke should be made, and the fact that it accomplished the desired result is ample proof that in overseas expeditions in time of war the combined efforts of naval and land forces can alone insure decisive success. The method by which Shafter's army eventually achieved victory was haphazard in the extreme, and we have had occasion to glean from the comments on pages 176-178 how readily the lack of proper organization, thoroughly prepared and tested in time of peace, and the absence of a pre-arranged and comprehensive plan for such an expedition might have ended in irretrievable disaster had we been opposed by an enterprising and powerful foe. Such organization and plans as would obviate the chaos and blunders that characterised Shafter's expedition are the function of a General Staff,⁴⁶ which this great country did not possess in 1898.

As has been seen, the Spanish troops in Cuba numbered 198,820 and those in the Province of Santiago 36,582, while Havana was one of the most strongly fortified places in the western hemisphere. Under ordinary circumstances, the chances were not one in a hundred that an army of 17,000, even though its quality were superb, could bring to a successful conclusion all the fighting that might reasonably be expected before the Spanish — who outnumbered it nearly

twelve to one — were overcome. Indeed, that so paltry a force was sent on such a mission seems like “flying in the face of Providence.” Thanks to the inefficiency of the Spanish commanders in Cuba, the only re-enforcement which reached Santiago was a meagre column of 3,660 under Escario from Manzanillo, and at the crucial moment of the campaign the heights which formed the key to the city were held by a few thousand men upon whom fell the brunt of the American attacks.⁴⁷ The apathy and incapacity of Linares, let alone Blanco, were simply incredible. Although the Cubans had isolated the 12,096 troops in the immediate vicinity of Santiago⁴⁸ from those in the rest of the province, Garcia’s force about the city numbered only some 5,000⁴⁹ and could easily have been brushed aside. The destination of Shafter’s expedition was published all over the world for weeks before it reached Siboney and, irrespective of the distances and difficulties of transport, an abler commander would have had ample time to concentrate the bulk of his forces within striking distance. Had Linares attacked with half his troops during the American disembarkation, Shafter would have been driven into the sea. Had he assembled 18,000 on the heights of Santiago at any time within nine days after the Americans landed, the outcome — in the light of the difficulty experienced by our army against only part of that number — can readily be imagined. Napoleon declared that “*In war men are nothing — it is a man who is everything.*”⁵⁰ Luckily for us, the Spanish did not possess a man in Cuba, but we must carefully refrain from blinding ourselves to the fact that rare indeed in history are the instances in which enormous superiority in numbers have availed a nation so little as was the case in Cuba in 1898. We have already seen that yellow fever made its appearance on July 4th; by August first the usefulness of the American army as a fighting force had been greatly impaired by the ravages of that fearful disease, and there was, consequently, grave apprehension among our generals lest Toral would not capitulate promptly.⁵¹

Had the negotiations been prolonged until the Spanish commander learned of the conditions in our army, he would unquestionably have refused to surrender and thereby forced an assault which, it was realized, would necessarily have cost more men than General Shafter dared to lose.⁵² Under such circumstances, there is every indication that the Americans would have been compelled to relinquish their position and to abandon Cuba, for the time being at least.

Even after Toral did capitulate, there were more than 163,000 Spanish troops in Cuba, and Havana still defied capture. Notwithstanding the destruction of Cervera's fleet cut off all possibility of re-enforcements, a competent general would have experienced little difficulty in keeping the Americans at bay for months, but difficulties which to a really able commander would have been comparative trifles proved insurmountable to such incapables as Blanco and Linares. And back of them was the weakness, internally as well as externally, of Spain, whose resistance collapsed like a house of cards. Her feebleness is the more incredible if it be compared with another nation, the situation of which is in many respects analogous to that of Spain in 1898. What would have happened had the United States found itself opposed in Cuba by generals and troops in anywise like those of Germany at the present time, the reader can deduce for himself.

One of the most important lessons to be derived from the Spanish-American War is the necessity of such a system as will minimize the length of stay in permanent or semi-permanent camps and will get the troops to the front in the shortest possible space of time. This was fully demonstrated by the fact that out of 223,235 volunteers enlisted during the war, only 289 were killed or died of wounds received in action, whereas no less than 3,848 died of disease;⁵³ and it must be distinctly remembered that the majority of these volunteers never got into action at all. On April 26th General Miles suggested to the Secretary of War that it was

“ of the highest importance that the troops called into service by the President’s proclamation be thoroughly equipped, organized, and disciplined for field service. In order that this may be done with the least delay, they ought to be in camp approximately sixty days in their States, as so many of the States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service. After being assembled, organized, and sworn into service of the United States, they will require uniforms, tentage, complete camp equipage, arms, and ammunition, and a full supply of stationery, including blank books and reports for the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, Medical, and Ordnance Departments. They will also require complete equipment of ordnance, quartermaster’s, commissary, and medical supplies, hospital appliances, transportation, including ambulances, stretchers, etc. The officers and non-commissioned officers will have to be appointed and properly instructed in their duties and responsibilities, and have some instruction in tactical exercises, guard duties, etc., all of which is of the highest importance to the efficiency and health of the command. While this is being done, the general officers and staff officers can be appointed and properly instructed, large camps of instruction can be judiciously selected, ground rented, and stores collected. At the end of sixty days the regiments, batteries, and troops can be brigaded and formed into divisions and corps, and proper commanding generals assigned, and this great force may be properly equipped, molded, and organized into an effective army with the least possible delay.”⁵⁴

However, as the Commission appointed by President McKinley to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain found, “ the War Department had not the officers to send to each State to organize, muster, feed, and equip them, nor had it officers of sufficient rank to command, drill, and discipline the troops while in State camps.”⁵⁵

This insufficiency of officers — for which Congress was responsible — resulted, *faute de mieux*, in the militia and volunteers being concentrated in various camps to which allusion has already been made.⁵⁶ During seven and a half months the Quartermaster department was called upon to transport by rail no less than “ 17,863 officers and 435,569 enlisted

men,"⁵⁷ a good deal of a tax considering that this particular

"department consisted of fifty-seven officers. It was provided with all necessary clothing, camp and garrison equipage, for the Regular Army of 25,000 men; it was prepared to equip and move an army at least double that size under peace conditions, but was suddenly called upon to furnish within a short period all that was required to fit out an army of 275,000 men for probable operations in an enemy's country."

Moreover, there existed certain statutes,⁵⁸—the legality of which could not be questioned—prohibiting it from making any contract "in excess of the appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year," and that sovereign body saw fit to defer until the beginning of hostilities any appropriation which would permit the approaching situation to be met with any degree of preparedness. Small wonder that the commission reported "that the declaration of war threw upon the Quartermaster's Department an amount of labor and responsibility for which it was neither physically nor financially prepared."⁵⁹

Substantially the same criticism was applied to the Subsistence⁶⁰ and Medical departments, the capacities of which were stretched beyond all reason. In the case of the latter, the short-sightedness of Congress resulted in

"the almost absolute lack of any supplies in store when the war broke out. Medicines could be purchased in any quantity and without delay, as could bedding and certain articles of hospital furniture, but other articles of adopted pattern, as surgical instruments or cots of special design, could not. Time was lost in having manufactured standard chests of various kinds to contain drugs, stores, dressings, furniture, etc., and the making of these articles never kept up with the demand for them."⁶¹

It is therefore not surprising that the Commission found "that at the outbreak of the War the Medical Department was, in men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the necessities of the army called out," and "that the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be attributed,

in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no preparations in advance had been or could be made because of existing rules and regulations.”⁶² In the light of what occurred there was abundant justification for the recommendation of the Commission that this department needed “a larger force of commissioned medical officers” and, even more so,

“a year’s supply for an army of at least four times the actual strength of all such medicines, hospital furniture, and stores as are not materially damaged by keeping, to be held constantly on hand in the medical supply depots.”⁶³

Whatever difficulties were experienced by the Regular troops in the field in consequence of the shortcomings and the deficiency in the matter of supply on the part of these administrative departments, they were obviously felt to a much greater degree by the volunteers, who had none of the training which would have rendered them sufficiently resourceful to overcome some of these disadvantages. As the largest number of troops in any command throughout the war was concentrated in certain camps — notably in Camp Thomas at Chickamauga, which was not suitable to “accommodate more than 20,000 troops at once for any great length of time” but where 7,283 regulars and 69,459 volunteers were nevertheless sent, and in Camp Alger, which “was very undesirable” but where 31,195 troops were lodged⁶⁴ — these conditions ran rampant to a degree that gave rise to a distinctly justifiable scandal. Congress was apparently oblivious to the fact that, although it had set the example by permitting the outbreak of war to find “the country unprepared with any large stock of arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies and equipments,”⁶⁵ the States would undoubtedly follow in its lead. As a matter of fact, the State legislatures had been even more remiss — as was to be expected — and many of the volunteer regiments reported in a condition positively ludicrous from a military

standpoint, being without proper arms, ammunition, uniforms or equipment.⁶⁶ "Many sets of such equipments had been issued to the National Guard of the several States. These were reported as serviceable, and when the National Guard was called out as volunteers it was presumed that they would be properly equipped from the stores in the hands of the State authorities. It was found, however, that a large proportion of these stores were not in fit condition for field service, and they had to be replaced."⁶⁷

The instances could be multiplied *ad infinitum* and certainly *ad nauseam*, as is always the case with raw troops. Sickness, culminating in typhoid fever, soon prevailed, especially at Camp Thomas, where the sanitary conditions were "very imperfect and at times decidedly bad."⁶⁸ The unvarnished truth is that

"Large bodies of men who are not soldiers, under officers who have had little or no military training, can not be brought together and held for many weeks in camp and remain healthy. If the water supply is not abundant or is not good; if the thoroughly well-established rules of sanitation are not observed; if the discipline of the camp puts little restriction on drunkenness and immorality; if the soldier does not know how to live and his officers do not watch him and teach him; if his food is poorly cared for and badly cooked, and he is permitted to eat and drink anything and everything he can find, sickness will certainly prevail. If, as at Camp Thomas, a regiment can go for ten days without digging sinks; if the sinks dug are not used or they quickly overflow and pollute the ground; if practically no protection is afforded against the liquor sellers and prostitutes of neighboring places; if commands are crowded together and tents seldom struck, or even never during the occupation of the camp; if no one is called to account for repeated violation of sanitary orders, it can not be but that typhoid fever once introduced will spread, rapidly, widely.

"How much may be accomplished by intelligent and watchful supervision on the part of surgeons and regimental officers and the observance of the well-established rules of camp sanitation is shown by the record of the Eighth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry at Camp Thomas. This regiment was for many weeks

very healthy,⁶⁹ while much sickness was occurring in regiments near by, though the conditions of camp site, of water, and of drill were practically the same. . . .”⁷⁰

“In conclusion it may be said that it is impossible to bring together a regiment of 1,300 men whose lives and habits have all been different and place them in camp, subject them to its discipline, diet, and duties, without much complaint. They must become acclimated and accustomed to camp life before sickness can be prevented; and until the individual soldier appreciates the necessity of complying fully with the regulations and confines himself to the regular food — and this the soldier never does until experience teaches him the necessity — he will drink polluted water, eat noxious food that disturbs his digestive organs, and will not take care of himself, and no discipline or watching will prevent it. The imprudent acts of the soldiers are the first and greatest cause of sickness in camps.

“Another great cause of complaint was the inexperience of officers and surgeons as to proper sanitation, necessity of daily exercises, the camping too long in one place, lack of exercise by marches and other methods to take up the soldier’s thoughts. This occurs to all volunteers.”⁷¹

As one war correspondent aptly put the case,

“What the country needs to know now is that in actual warfare the volunteer is a nuisance, that it always takes one regular to offset his mistakes, to help him cook his rations, and to teach him to shelter himself and to keep himself clean.”⁷²

By far the most important lesson to be learned from the Spanish-American War is the necessity for a larger Regular Army than we then possessed. The dearth of trained soldiers prevented a force proportioned to the task that it was expected to accomplish from being sent to Cuba; the same reason caused the retention in the Philippines of the volunteers long after their term of service had legally expired; and a similar cause resulted in our fortifications being most inadequately manned. The strength of the Regular establishment must indispensably be determined by the rôle which it may be called upon to play in the defence of the country or to insure the success of such overseas expeditions as the Gov-

ernment may deem it expedient to undertake. Under any circumstances, it ought to be of sufficient size that the odds that it can accomplish its mission may be on the side of the United States and not overwhelmingly in favour of its enemy, as was the case in 1898. Notwithstanding that General Shafter's command comprised "the finest body of men the country had ever assembled,"⁷³ his expedition to Cuba is almost a by-word among military men. The plain truth is that

"THE ARMY WAS SIMPLY DISORGANIZED BY THE WORKING OF A SYSTEM WHICH THE VERY OFFICERS WHO WERE NOW CALLED UPON TO ENFORCE IT HAD TIME AND AGAIN ENDEAVORED TO MODERNIZE AND BRING ABBREAST OF THE TIMES. AND THE ARMY BILLS, WHICH THE PAPERS AND THE POLITICAL DEMAGOGUES HAD COMBATED AND DEFEATED, HAD BEEN DRAWN UP WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH A DISGRACEFUL SPECTACLE, WHICH THESE SAME PAPERS AND DEMAGOGUES NOW DESCRIBED IN SUCH GRAPHIC TERMS AND WITH SUCH INDIGNATION, BUT, OF COURSE, WITHOUT ASSIGNING THE BLAME WHERE IT BELONGED — AT THEIR OWN DOORS."⁷⁴

As the Commission appointed to investigate the conduct of the War Department declared:⁷⁵

"One of the lessons taught by the war is that the country should hereafter be in a better state of preparation for war. Testimony has been taken on this subject, and suggestions have been made that large supplies of all the material not liable to deterioration should be kept on hand, to be continuously issued and renewed, so that in any emergency they might be available. Especially should this be the case with such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not in general use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in open market."

The fundamental responsibility for the majority of these defects rested with that legislative body in which alone is vested the power "to raise and support armies." The demoralization, disorders and incapacity which attended the opening operations were nothing more than the logical outcome of the unwillingness of Congress to prepare for war

*until the last possible moment. Once again was demonstrated the vicious system to which our legislators have persistently bound us from the beginning of our national career, by neglecting to provide a force of thoroughly trained soldiers either large enough or elastic enough to meet the requirements of war as well as of peace, supported by a militia which has PREVIOUSLY had sufficient training to make it, when called out as volunteers, fairly dependable against the regular forces of other nations.*⁷⁶

The whole subject was admirably summed up in the testimony given before the Investigating Commission by one very distinguished general who declared that

“CONGRESS IS CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BAD ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY AND ITS ORGANIZATION. THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN APPEALED TO TO RECONSTRUCT THE ARMY ON MODERN PRINCIPLES, AND THEY HAVE FAILED TO DO SO, AND UNTIL THIS IS DONE THE EVILS WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED WILL RECUR AGAIN, AND WE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO TAKE OUR PLACE BESIDE OTHER MILITARY NATIONS UNTIL WE DO THAT.”⁷⁷

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PHILIPPINE WAR

ON December 21, 1898, President McKinley issued a proclamation in which he announced that the mission of the United States in the Philippines would be one of "benevolent assimilation."¹ This pronouncement is of unusual importance "because it precipitated the war in the Philippines and is the key to all our subsequent dealings with them."² On January 4, 1899, it was officially published at Manila in amended form by General Otis as Military Governor, but within a few days it was recognised to be a mistake, the American attitude being construed by the natives as indicative of weakness and the desire to avoid a conflict.³ On the night of February 4th our troops were attacked by the Tagalogs who sought to capture Manila. A series of lively engagements continuing through that night, the 5th,⁴ 6th and 10th of February ensued, but the assaults of the natives proved ineffectual, while the American lines, on the other hand, were extended and established at a considerable distance from the city. A concerted uprising of the Tagalogs in Manila — of whom there were some 200,000 — took place on February 22nd, incited by an order issued by the Malolos government exhorting the extermination of the American army of occupation and of "all other individuals, of whatever race they may be," with the sole exception of Filipinos.⁵ Luckily this attempted massacre was forestalled and the entire city was guarded with a strong hand.

The Eighth Army Corps was then composed of 20,870 officers and men — 5,372 being regulars.⁶ As Secretary Root said in his report for 1899: ⁷

"All of the volunteers and 1,650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to their discharge, and their

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right was perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on the 11th of April.

“The total force to which Major-General Otis was thus entitled to command for any considerable period consisted of only 171 officers and 3,551 enlisted men. . . . The effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these 3,000 constituted a provost guard necessary to preserve order within Manila and prevent the known intention of the secret hostile organizations in that city to burn and sack the city when our troops were engaged on the lines of defense. Including, therefore, all the troops who were entitled to be discharged, there were not more than 11,000 officers and men available to engage the insurgent army, which was two or three times that number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army, and to occupy and hold positions in a comparatively unknown country, densely populated by inhabitants speaking, in the main, an unknown language. The months of the most intense heat, followed by the severe rainy season of that climate, were immediately approaching, and for any effective occupation of the country it was necessary to await both the close of the rainy season and the supply of new troops to take the place of those about to be discharged. Practically all the volunteers who were then in the Philippines consented to forego the just expectation of an immediate return to their homes, and to remain in the field until their places could be supplied by new troops. They voluntarily subjected themselves to the dangers and casualties of numerous engagements, and to the very great hardships of the climate. They exhibited fortitude and courage, and are entitled to high commendation for their patriotic spirit and soldierly conduct.”

Such was the predicament into which the United States was thrust by the mistaken theory of “benevolent assimilation” of the Filipinos which pervaded the minds of certain high officials. The sequel,—as a writer who served in the Philippines for two years as a volunteer officer and for four years as a United States District Judge declared—⁸

“is a requiem over those brave men of the Eighth Army Corps from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States that bore the brunt of the early fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed in 1899 as the result of an unpreparedness for war due

to anxiety not to embarrass Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the Senate, an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in order to conceal from the people of the United States the unanimity of the desire of the Filipinos for Independence."

Had Congress exercised any perspicacity no requiem need have been necessary but, as usual, a rude jolt was required to awake it from its habitual slumber when military needs are at stake. The outbreak of the Philippine insurrection on February 4th afforded the requisite shock, and on March 2, 1899,⁹ "An Act For increasing the efficiency of the Army of the United States, and for other purposes" was approved by the President and became a law.¹⁰ This measure was one of the most notable military enactments up to that date, particularly in respect to the new force created thereby. The first nine sections related to the composition and organization of the Regular Army, the method by which vacancies were to be filled, promotions and retirements made, and examinations held for certain appointments to the staff from civil life.¹¹ Section 10 enlarged the Military Academy at West Point by providing

"that the corps of cadets shall consist of one from each Congressional district, one from each territory, one from the District of Columbia, and twenty from the United States at large. They shall be appointed by the President, and shall, with the exception of the twenty cadets appointed at large, be actual residents of the Congressional or Territorial districts, or of the District of Columbia, or of the States, respectively, from which they purport to be appointed."¹²

The most important part of this law read as follows:

"SEC. 12. That to meet the present exigencies of the military service the President is hereby authorized to maintain the Regular Army at a strength of not exceeding sixty-five thousand enlisted men, to be distributed amongst the several branches of the service, including the Signal Corps, according to the needs of each, and raise a force of not more than thirty-five thousand volunteers to be recruited as he may determine from the country

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at large, or from the localities where their services are needed, and to organize the same into not more than twenty-seven regiments organized as are infantry regiments of war strength in the Regular Army, and three regiments to be composed of men of special qualifications in horsemanship and marksmanship, to be organized as cavalry for service mounted or dismounted: *Provided*, That each regiment shall have one surgeon, with the rank of major; two assistant surgeons, one of whom shall have the rank of captain and one that of first lieutenant, and three hospital stewards: *Provided further*, That such increased regular and volunteer force shall continue in service only during the necessity therefor, and not later than July first, nineteen hundred and one.

“All enlistments for the volunteer force herein authorized shall be for the term of two years and four months, unless sooner discharged.”

Section 13 empowered the President to continue in service or to appoint Major Generals and Brigadier Generals of volunteers on condition that such officers, including those of the Regular Army, should not exceed one to every 12,000 enlisted men in the case of the first grade or one to every 4,000 men in the latter case. Regular officers appointed to the volunteers were not thereby to “vacate their Regular Army commissions,” but their term of service in the volunteers was to expire on July 1, 1901. It was also stipulated

“That any officer now in the Army, who was graduated at the head of his class at the United States Military Academy and who is not now in the Corps of Engineers, may be appointed to the Corps of Engineers with the same grade and date of commission that he would have if he had been appointed to the Corps of Engineers on graduation; but said commission shall not entitle an officer to any back pay or allowance.”

Section 14 authorized the continuance in service or the appointment of certain volunteer staff officers, whose number was prescribed, and who were to be “honorably discharged on July first, nineteen hundred and one, or sooner if their services are no longer required” and, wisest of all, it “*Provided further*, That the officers herein authorized shall be appointed

by the President — by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

Section 15 prescribed that the volunteer army was to be mustered out of service in the manner set forth in the Act of April 22, 1898, and that if any enlisted men thereof desired to remain in service, either in the Regular Army or in the present volunteer force, they might be transferred to such organizations as were below the maximum authorized strength, and, under such circumstances, their previous service was to be credited on their new enlistment as volunteers. Congress, having failed to take adequate measures to provide for a sufficient force to meet such emergencies as were almost certain to arise in a war against a Power like Spain with colonial possessions in both hemispheres, was now obliged to resort to a makeshift by providing further

“That the President is authorized to enlist temporarily in service for absolutely necessary purposes in the Philippine Islands volunteers, officers and men, individually or by organization, now in those islands and about to be discharged, provided their retention shall not extend beyond the time necessary to replace them by troops authorized to be maintained under the provisions of this Act and not beyond a period of six months.”

Each and every provision of this law was to continue in force until July 1, 1901, when all officers appointed thereunder were to be discharged, the former numbers in each grade restored, and the enlisted line of the Regular Army reduced to the basis established by the Act of March 8, 1898, except insofar as the increase in the artillery and corps of cadets was concerned. The three final paragraphs read thus:

“SEC. 16. That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized to permit enlisted men of the United States Army to make allotments of their pay, under such regulations as he may prescribe, for the support of their families or relatives, for their own savings, or for other purposes, during such time as they may be absent on distant duty, or under other circumstances warranting such action.

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“SEC. 17. That no officer or private soldier shall be detailed to sell intoxicating drinks, as a bartender or otherwise, in any post exchange or canteen, nor shall any other person be required or allowed to sell such liquors in any encampment or fort or on any premises used for military purposes by the United States; and the Secretary of War is hereby directed to issue such general order as may be necessary to carry the provisions of this section into full force and effect.”¹³

“SEC. 18. That all laws or parts of laws which conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.”

Having provided for an increase of pay for the volunteers,¹⁴ Congress proceeded to do likewise for the military establishment, and the Appropriation Act of March 3rd for the support of the Regular and Volunteer Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, contained the following:

“That all enlisted men of the Regular Army who enlisted subsequent to the declaration of war for the war only and mustered out of the service who have served honestly and faithfully beyond the limits of the United States shall be paid two months’ extra pay on muster out and discharge from the service, and all enlisted men in the Regular Army who enlisted subsequent to the declaration of war for the war only and mustered out of the service who have served honestly and faithfully within the limits of the United States shall be paid one month’s extra pay on muster out and discharge from the service from any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, said moneys to be immediately available.

“That the Act of January twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, be, and it is hereby, amended so as to authorize the payment to the legal heirs or representatives of the officers and enlisted men who died or were killed or who may die in the service, and extra pay provided for in that Act for officers and enlisted men who have been or are to be mustered out.”¹⁵

That Congress had profited, *mirabile dictu*, by the consequences of limiting the appropriation of \$50,000,000 made on March 9, 1898, to “national defense” only¹⁶ is evident from another act that became a law on March 3, 1899, which suspended certain acts passed in the previous year and speci-

fied that "materials required by the War Department may, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, be purchased abroad, and shall be admitted free of duty"; and, to make amends for its former neglect, it provided by

"SEC. 3. That during the same time the Bureau of Ordnance of the War Department is authorized to purchase without advertisement such ordnance and ordnance stores as are needed for immediate use; and when such ordnance and ordnance stores are to be manufactured, then to make contracts without advertisement for such stores, to be delivered as rapidly as manufactured." ¹⁷

The last military legislation of the year which concerns us was another act approved on March 3, 1899, which amended the law of July 8, 1898,¹⁸ so as to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to settle the claims of the governors of States and Territories for expenses incurred by them in assisting to raise, organize, equip and supply the Volunteer Army for the war with Spain ¹⁹ by reimbursing them for "expenses incurred after, as well as before, July eighth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight"—thus confessing the inadequacy of the previous measure. The amount of compensation was specifically fixed, transportation expenses for men who actually presented themselves as well as for the subsistence of the organized militia, National Guard or naval reserves called out on or after April 25, 1898, were allowed, with the express proviso "that such organizations shall afterwards have been accepted into the Volunteer Army of the United States." Unsettled accounts were not to be set off, but the presentation of vouchers for equipment purchased and subsequently used by the Regular Army was to constitute a valid claim for reimbursement. Accounts for transportation properly authorized were to be paid, but not "in excess of the rates charged for transporting troops of the United States under like circumstances"; all claims therefor were to be filed with the Auditor of the War Department, "supported by proper vouchers or other conclusive evidence of interest." Demands for reim-

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bursement under this act or that of July 8, 1898, were to be presented in itemized form to the Treasury Department on or before January 1, 1902, "or be forever barred." ²⁰

As is evident, the Act of March 2nd ²¹ was by all odds the most important military legislation passed during the year 1899.²² The organization of the army thereunder was a distinct improvement over the previous laws, and its increase to an authorized strength of 67,585 officers and enlisted men,²³ although none too great, was a *sine qua non*. In rendering available for positions in the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments such captains as had shown marked aptitude for command, as well as in requiring examinations for civilians to be appointed to the positions of paymaster, judge-advocate and chaplain, and in enlarging the number of cadets at West Point, this law performed a meritorious service. Greatest of all were the provisions for the new volunteer force, but, on the other hand, the limitation of its existence to July 1, 1901, and the restriction of the term of enlistment to two years and four months were unwise and short-sighted in the extreme. Had these qualifying conditions been omitted and had the section terminated with the proviso "that such increased regular and volunteer force shall continue in service only during the necessity therefor," all possible eventualities would have been prepared against. In spite of these defects this measure achieved a notable success in the quality of the troops raised under its operation. There is no exaggeration in Captain Rhodes' declaration ²⁴ that

"As volunteer regiments, it has been the almost unanimous verdict that they have never been surpassed. Certainly never, in such a short space of time, have such excellent troops been organized, trained and put in the field.

"If the cause of this efficiency be analyzed, it will be found to have resulted from four factors:

"1. *In most cases the field officers of the regiments were selected from experienced officers of the regular service.*

"2. *The company officers were principally selected by the War*

Department, from officers who had served creditably in State organizations during the war with Spain.

“3. *The fact that from this method of selection the officers were in no way under obligations to the men under them.*”

“4. *From careful selection of the enlisted personnel, accepting only the physically perfect, and after enlistment summarily discharging those deficient in the qualifications of a good soldier.*”

“Under this Act of Congress, 1524 officers and 33,050 men were enlisted, organized, equipped, and instructed, and were on their way to their destination in less than six months from the date of passage of the law. They proved themselves a thoroughly reliable force in the Philippines, and it was largely through their aid, that the Philippine insurrection was checked, and relapsed into guerilla warfare.”

Admirable as was the law which brought this volunteer force into existence, it partook of the invariable defect of most of our military measures in being passed months after it ought to have been. We have already adverted to the fact that it was not until June 14, 1899, that General Otis dared to begin to send home the volunteers raised in 1898,²⁵ as the only re-enforcements which reached him during the first five months of 1899 were confined to 347 officers and 13,281 men, all Regulars, the first of whom did not arrive until March 10th. Other regular troops followed in rapid succession, and by October 9th his forces had been swelled by an additional 330 officers and 15,656 men, many of whom were recruits; but it was not until October 11th that the first part of the 34th Volunteer Infantry, which formed the van of this newly-created force, appeared at Manila, their approaching arrival permitting him to send home three days earlier the last of his State volunteers.²⁶ During the rest of the year General Otis received constant accretions in the shape of the new volunteers to the amount of 433 officers and 11,583 enlisted men²⁷—the grand total of troops, regular and volunteers, which joined him during 1899 being 1,110 officers and 40,520 men.²⁸

The Philippine War embraced no less than 2,811 contacts

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with the natives,²⁹ ranging from insignificant skirmishes to actions of considerable importance. To chronicle them in detail would serve no useful purpose here, nor is it within the scope of this work. No attempt will therefore be made beyond sketching in baldest outline certain of the most important operations.

The opening fighting of the insurrection, which took place on February 4th, 5th and 6th, was followed on the 10th by the battle of Caloocan, ending with the occupation of that town by General MacArthur.³⁰ These successes inaugurated the operations, the object of which was to strengthen the American positions, to extend the lines and to restore safety and confidence in Manila. Although it is probable that any resistance on the part of the insurgents could have been overcome,

“there were not the troops necessary to garrison the towns, or to maintain any far extended lines of communication. No attempt was accordingly made to occupy the country, except in the vicinity of Manila, and at such points as were important for the protection of our lines. Such movements as passed beyond this territory were designed primarily to break up threatening concentrations of insurgent troops, and to prevent undue annoyance to the positions which we occupied.”³¹

On February 11th Iloilo, on the island of Panay, the second port in size and importance in the Philippines, was occupied by General Miller, and on the 26th a battalion of the 23rd Infantry was installed at Cebu, which had been taken possession of by the warships. General Smith seized the island of Negros and the city of Bacolod,³² while Mindanao and other small islands were occupied subsequently. On March 10th General Wheaton captured Pasig and by the 17th had occupied Taguig — notwithstanding a counter-attack upon him — driven the insurgents fifteen miles down the lake and secured that line, thus intercepting all communication between the Filipino forces on the north and south.³³ On the 24th General MacArthur began his advance northward against

Malalos, the insurgent capital, where a large quantity of ammunition had been stored, and, after some spirited fighting, occupied that place on the 31st.³⁴ On the 20th the Philippine Commission, consisting of Dr. J. G. Schurman, Professor Dean Worcester, Colonel Charles Denby, Admiral Dewey and General Otis began its labours at Manila, and on April 4th issued a proclamation promising the Filipinos

“the most ample liberty of self-government . . . which is . . . compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States.”

The advance of the dry season permitted military operations on a larger scale than heretofore,³⁵ and on April 9th General Lawton with a force of 1,509 troops crossed the Laguna de Bay, captured Santa Cruz on the following day and returned on the 17th. As any further advance beyond Malalos by General MacArthur was unwise so long as the enemy threatened his flanks and line of communications, on the 22nd Lawton with some 4,000 men began a movement which carried him through Norzagaray, Baliuag and San Miguel to San Isidro, the third insurgent capital, which he entered on May 17th, too late to capture Aguinaldo and his cabinet who had withdrawn to Cabanatuan, 14 miles farther north. Meanwhile, on April 24th, General MacArthur resumed his advance, crossed the Angat River four days later in the face of 4,000 Filipinos, took Calumpit and occupied San Fernando, the second insurgent capital, on May 5th.³⁶ These operations gave the Americans possession of the country north of Manila which it was urgent to hold, doubly so since the enemy had at least 10,000 men opposed to them on the north, while fully 5,000 were advancing against Manila from the south. MacArthur's troops were exhausted by three months of marching and fighting, and their condition gave no little concern.³⁷ The withdrawal of the Spanish troops in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago — where they had to be replaced by American forces — the detachment of others to Cebu and the neces-

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sity to increase those in Negros, capped by orders from Washington to send the volunteer regiments home without delay, placed the army in a critical situation.³⁸ General Otis persuaded the volunteers to remain but, by the end of May, the rainy season set in, "the volunteers had again become very restless and desired to depart,"³⁹ and General MacArthur reported of his command⁴⁰ that

"the four regiments now present have an enlisted strength of 3,701. Of these 1,003 are sick and wounded, leaving an effective of 2,698, which, after deducting necessary details for special duty, yields only 2,307 for the firing line, many of whom could not march 5 miles. . . ."

To meet the insurgent force advancing against Manila⁴¹ from the south, which had entrenched in a strong position near Paranaque, General Lawton was ordered to concentrate about 4,000 troops under Generals Wheaton and Ovenshine, to disperse the enemy and to take up a position on the American flanks. On June 10th his advance was begun, three days later he attacked the Filipino entrenchments at the Zapote River, carried them in spite of desperate resistance and, continuing his movement, received the surrender of Imus on the 15th, and at once took possession of the place.⁴² The enemy having divided his forces and retreated to Das Marinas and Malabon, Wheaton followed up the former column and effectually routed it, but it was not until July 26th that Calamba, on the southeastern part of the Laguna de Bay, was captured by General Hall.⁴³

On the north, the insurgents attacked MacArthur at San Fernando on June 16th but were repulsed by Generals Funston and Hale, a similar attempt made on the night of July 1st being equally ineffectual.

The situation during the months of June, July and August, 1899,⁴⁴ is thus summed up by General Otis in his report:⁴⁵

"We were now busily engaged in discharging over 60 per cent. of the enlisted men of the artillery and infantry regiments of

the regular establishment, which had joined us previous to February, and in bringing into Manila and preparing for departure the volunteer organizations. We had still in the Visayas 6,200 men and in Luzon 26,000, of whom more than 20,000 were [present?] for duty, but most of the volunteers were not considered available, except possibly to meet some unexpected emergency, and before the end of July more than 8,000 of them had been discharged or sailed for the United States, their places being in part taken by new arrivals.

“The end of the month found us with 29,427 enlisted men, of whom 23,279 were reported for duty, and of whom 18,000 were in the island of Luzon. Active hostilities were maintained by a continued series of minor affairs, notwithstanding the unparalleled heavy rainfall of forty-six inches in a single month, with an accompaniment of a number of severe typhoons. These affairs occurred mostly on our railway line of communication and at the north, and attended our endeavors to open the Laguna de Bay country for traffic with Manila, for which the inhabitants were particularly desirous. . . .

“Our returns for August 31 showed a total Army force present in the Philippines of 30,963 officers and enlisted men, of whom more than 3,500 were volunteers awaiting shipment and men of the regular regiments about to be discharged, and hence could not be reckoned among the available. Of this total, twelve and a fraction per cent. were sick, leaving 27,189 officers and men for duty. . . . The force of active combatants outside of the city was therefore between 13,000 and 14,000, of whom 5,000 were required to hold the long line encircling the same. . . .

“The casualties in killed and wounded among all United States troops in the Philippines . . . for the period from February 4th, when the insurgents declared war against the United States, to August 31, 1899, [were] 19 officers and 342 enlisted men killed or who died of wounds received in battle and 87 officers and 1,325 enlisted men wounded.”

By October 10th the changes in the army and the approach of the dry season had progressed sufficiently to justify a forward movement looking to a general occupation of the country. The American lines then stretched south from the Bay of Manila to the Laguna de Bay, and embraced parts of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna and Morong, virtually all that of

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Manila and the southern portions of Bulacan and Pampanga, thus dividing the Filipino forces into two parts widely separated from each other. Numerous bodies of insurgents concentrated from time to time south and east of the American lines in Cavite and Morong, but their attacks were uniformly repulsed, their forces dispersed and driven back toward the mountains. North of Manila for the distance of about 120 miles stretched the great plain of central Luzon, which is bounded on the east and west by lofty mountain ranges barring it from the seacoasts, on the north by the Gulf of Lingayen and other mountains, and on the south by the Bay of Manila. In this region Aguinaldo wielded a military dictatorship, his headquarters being at Tarlac, which he styled his capital and where he and his cabinet set up the semblance of a civil government.⁴⁶

The first operations in this northern territory were an advance by troops under Generals MacArthur and Wheeler, which resulted in the occupation of Porac, a small town eight miles from Bacolor, on September 28th. The following month witnessed a combined movement by three separate columns with the object of ridding this region of the enemy. On October 12th⁴⁷ a force of 3,500 under General Lawton, with General Young in command of the advanced-guard, began its movement to Arayat, driving the insurgents toward the north and west. Six days later Cabiao was occupied, on the 19th San Isidro was captured, on the 27th the Rio Grande was reached at Cabanatuan where a permanent garrison was installed, and on November first Aliaga and Talavera were occupied.⁴⁸ Meanwhile Young's cavalry had swept the country west of the line-of advance clear of the enemy, driving his isolated detachments toward the railway. Pushing on to the north, the principal towns as far as San Nicolas were in the American possession by November 13th, when the column turned west, occupying Asingan and Rosales five days later and moving against Pozorrubio, an insurgent stronghold lying between San Nicolas and San Fabian, on the Gulf

of Lingayen.⁴⁹ As a result of Lawton's advance, a cordon of posts had been established along the eastern and northern edges of the plain of central Luzon to within a few miles of the Gulf of Lingayen, where a force of 2,500 under General Wheaton, which had been transported by sea from Manila, had landed at San Fabian on the 7th and five days later drove the 1,200 insurgents out of their entrenchments at San Jacinto, inflicting on them a loss of three hundred.⁵⁰

Meanwhile General MacArthur had been no less successful. Starting on November 5th from Angeles, he advanced up the line of the railway, capturing Magalang, Bamban, Capas and Concepcion, his right covered by Colonel J. Franklin Bell with the 36th Volunteers, who cleared the country as far east as Lawton's left. On the 12th MacArthur entered Tarlac from which Aguinaldo, his so-called government and his forces had precipitately fled. On the 17th⁵¹ he occupied Gerona and Panique, and on the 20th reached Dagupan, close to the Gulf of Lingayen, where Wheaton had arrived the day before.⁵² The junction of the three columns was thus effected after a series of operations conducted with energy, celerity and gratifying success. Great difficulties had been encountered and overcome, as the entire country was well-nigh impassable owing to the extraordinarily unfavourable weather and the deluges of rain which handicapped the progress of the troops and rendered the transportation of supplies unusually hard. In the course of these operations

“large quantities of insurgent supplies of all descriptions were captured, including stores of food, clothing, arms, munitions of war, quick-firing and Krupp guns, powder factory and arsenal, engineering tools, money, war department records, personal effects of officers, and numerous private despatches.”⁵⁵

Meanwhile General Young, with a small force of 80 picked troopers of the 3rd Cavalry and the Macabebe scouts, was in hot pursuit of Aguinaldo. Starting from Pozorrubio on November 18th and following the road along the west coast,

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he occupied San Fernando de Union on the 20th after a brief engagement, and reached Namacpacan, 30 miles beyond, on the 23rd.⁵⁴ On the following day a force of marines from the *Oregon* landed and occupied Vigan, the chief port on the northwest coast, and General Otis was able to telegraph to Washington that the insurgents could no longer set up any claim to government inasmuch as two of their cabinet and the president of their congress had been captured, Aguinaldo and other officials were in hiding, their forces had been dispersed into small bands and were reduced either to guerilla warfare or to "playing the rôle of 'Amigos,' with arms concealed."⁵⁵

In response to Young's request,⁵⁶ re-enforcements were sent him and with them he continued a most unrelenting pursuit of Aguinaldo through the northern provinces. Following up the coast, he released the American and Spanish prisoners held in various places, meanwhile sending Major March with a battalion of the 33rd Infantry eastward in pursuit of the insurgent leader. At the Tila Pass, a wild spot in the mountains overlooking the China Sea and some 4,441 feet above it, March encountered Aguinaldo's rear-guard under General del Pilar, one of the ablest of the Filipino commanders, in an almost impregnable stronghold. A gallant attack was crowned with success and del Pilar was killed along with fifty-one others, March's loss being confined to two killed and nine wounded.⁵⁷ On the 4th General Young took the enemy's trenches at Tangandan mountain, and Lieutenant-Colonel James Parker performed an extraordinary feat in repelling Tinio at Vigan.⁵⁸ The rest of the month was spent in pursuing the insurgent forces in the most determined fashion⁵⁹— a difficult task in view of the wild and broken country — but one in which Colonels Hare and Howze among others were notable for the results they achieved.⁶⁰ It was no fault of General Young and his subordinates that Aguinaldo remained at large — as a matter of fact it was not until fifteen months later that he was at last captured.

South of Manila the attacks of the insurgents upon the American communications caused General Otis to send a force of 1,774 troops and 63 scouts under General Schwan to put a stop to their activity. Leaving Bacoor in the province of Cavite on October 7th, Schwan drove them southward beyond Perez das Marinas, killed not less than one hundred, destroyed whatever organization they possessed and on the 13th returned to Bacoor.⁶¹

The enemy was, however, by no means *hors de combat* and continued his incessant harassing to such an extent that in December General Lawton was recalled from the north and placed in command of a punitive expedition consisting of nine troops of cavalry, two guns and two battalions of infantry. Starting on the evening of December 18th for San Mateo and Montalban, its progress was hampered by a heavy downpour which caused the Mariquina to rise considerably, and on the following morning, while superintending the crossing at San Mateo, General Lawton was killed.⁶² While part of the troops fell back with his body, Colonel Lockett drove the enemy into the mountains beyond Montalban but, upon his withdrawal, the insurgents again resumed the offensive and advanced as far as San Mateo. The 26th was marked by an attack upon the American garrison at Subig by a Filipino force under General Santa Anna which was successfully repulsed, and by a second advance on the part of Lockett, who had been re-enforced by a considerable number of infantry and who now had some 2,500 troops under his command. Reaching Montalban on the 27th, he inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy and by the 29th he had successfully routed them, killing at least 80 and capturing 24, besides large amounts of war *matériel*, his own loss being confined to one drowned and seven wounded.⁶³

This terminated the operations for the year 1899, at the close of which the American army in the Philippines numbered — exclusive of the sick — 51,167 officers and enlisted men.⁶⁴

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1900

The Army measures passed by the Fifty-sixth Congress during this year present but little of interest. The Act of February 24th⁶⁵ merely continued until June 30, 1901, the suspension provided for in the law of March 3, 1899.⁶⁶ A military post was established at Des Moines, Iowa, by the Act of April 4th,⁶⁷ and on May 25th appropriations were made to continue the work and armament of fortifications.⁶⁸ The Act of May 26th, which made the usual annual appropriation for the support of the Regular and Volunteer Army,⁶⁹ extended the law of January 12, 1899,⁷⁰ so as to embrace "all volunteer officers of the general staff who have not received waiting orders pay prior to discharge," and officers and men of volunteer organizations "honorably discharged without furlough, or by reason of their services being no longer required, or at any time by reason of wounds received, or disability contracted in the service and in the line of duty, and who have not received the extra pay" already granted. This extension was "to apply to officers of volunteers who resigned and enlisted men of volunteers who were discharged upon their own applications subsequent to the issue of orders for the muster out of their organizations and prior to the dates of muster out."⁷¹ On June 6th, aside from two appropriation bills which also concerned the Army,⁷² riders were attached to the appropriation for the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901,⁷³ which were thus phrased:

"SEC. 2. That the senior major-general of the line commanding the Army shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a lieutenant-general, and his personal staff shall have the rank, pay, and allowances authorized for the staff of a lieutenant-general.

"SEC. 3. That the Adjutant-General of the Army shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a major-general in the Army of the United States, and on his retirement shall receive the

retired pay of that rank: *Provided*, That whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of Adjutant-General on the expiration of the service of the present incumbent the Adjutant-General shall thereafter have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general." 74

The distinction drawn in the last paragraph and the effect of personal influence on the good of the service need no comment.

The fourth measure approved that day wisely provided

"That the President of the United States may detail as adjutant-general of the District of Columbia any retired officer of the Army who may be nominated to the President by the brigadier-general commanding the District of Columbia militia, said retired officer while so detailed to have the active service pay and allowances of his rank in the Regular Army." 75

The last measure, approved on June 7, 1900, specified that the order of the Secretary of War should be sufficient authority for the payment of travelling allowances to soldiers legally entitled thereto, but it restricted the application of the law in question to cases arising in the period embraced between April 21, 1898, and the passage of the present act, and required that the order directing the discharge must set forth "that the soldier was entitled to travel pay." 76

Two joint resolutions also concerned the Army, the first of which authorized the Secretary of War to use \$60,000 out of the annual appropriation for the construction of "a modern military post hospital" at Fort Leavenworth, 77 while the other empowered the President "to appoint ten first lieutenants of volunteers in the Signal Corps of the Army, whose commissions shall expire June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and one." 78

In his annual report for 1899 the Secretary of War had recommended the establishment of an Army War College, and on February 19, 1900, by virtue of Special Order No. 42, a board of three officers was directed to convene at the War Department on February 26th, to consider regulations

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looking to the founding of such an institution.⁷⁹ Congress took kindly to the idea and, acting with unusual promptitude, inserted in the Army Appropriation Act of May 26, 1900, the sum of \$20,000

“For hire of clerks, purchase of stationery, furniture, and for contingent expenses incident to the establishment of the Army War College, having for its object the direction and coordination of the instruction in the various service schools, extension of the opportunities for investigation and study in the Army and militia of the United States, and the collection and dissemination of military information.”⁸⁰

The scope and organization of the War College Board was further enlarged during the years 1901 and 1903, and culminated in the establishment of the present Army War College which has exercised a highly-important influence on the military service.

THE PHILIPPINE WAR — (*Continued*)

The operations of the American forces in the Philippines during 1900 were similar in purpose to those of the preceding year — namely, to crush the insurrection by attacking and dispersing all assemblies of troops wherever found. In Northern Luzon the principal task was that of hunting down the fugitive Aguinaldo in the mountain fastnesses, but although his capture was not effected — for *dis aliter visum* — yet, as one well-known writer on the American occupation declared:⁸¹

“Many were the combats, great and small, of General Young’s brigade, in compassing the task of crushing the resistance in that part of Luzon into which he led the first American troops in the winter of 1899-1900. The resistance was obstinate, desperate, and long drawn out, but when he finally reported the territory under his command ‘pacified,’ it *was* pacified. The work had been thoroughly done; General Young gave the Ilocano country a lesson it never forgot, before politics had time to interfere. We have never had any trouble in that region from that day to this.”

Of these operations the most important was the expedition under Major March and Colonel Hare which left Candon and Bangued on May 10th and 16th, scoured the northern provinces and returned in June. March just failed to capture Aguinaldo at Sagad on May 19th, while Captain Rucker and Lieutenant Lipop of Hare's column surprised and killed Tinio near Malibcong that same day.⁸²

In Southern Luzon the campaign was inaugurated at the very beginning of the year, the plan being to hold the enemy's principal force in check near Imus and west of Bacoor by means of the troops under General Wheaton, while General Schwan advanced down the western side of the Laguna de Bay, seizing the roads leading to the enemy's supply depôts at Siling and Indang, and placing himself in position to intercept the insurgent retreat to the mountains of southern Cavite and Batangas. On January 4th — the day on which General John C. Bates succeeded to the command of the 1st division of the Eighth Corps made vacant by the death of General Lawton — Wheaton assembled his column at San Pedro Macati, from which General Schwan began his march next day. While the former delivered a series of attacks commencing near Bacoor, the latter moved rapidly along the Laguna de Bay, covered more than 600 miles, during which he fought incessantly, captured one entrenched position after another, occupied and garrisoned the towns along his line of march, and swept the entire country clean. In consequence of these combined operations the insurgent forces in that region were completely annihilated and dispersed by February 8th, a large number had been killed or captured, and the others stole back to their homes in the guise of unarmed citizens, or escaped to the south. Some 600 Spanish prisoners were liberated, and the country was so thoroughly "pacified" that no attempt to rise against the Americans was ever made again.⁸³

Meanwhile an expedition consisting of the 43rd and 47th Volunteer Infantry and light battery G of the 3rd Artillery,

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under Brigadier General Kobbé, was sent from Manila on January 18th to occupy the important ports situated in the Province of Albay and in the islands of Samar, Leyte and Catanduanes. Landing at Sorsogan on the 20th, Kobbé performed his mission thoroughly, in spite of the resistance encountered at Legaspi on the 23rd. The Chinese general Paua, not content with the defeat suffered on that occasion, returned to the attack but, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the native cause, surrendered himself and his staff to Colonel Howe.⁸⁴

Another expedition, composed of some 2,300 troops under Brigadier General J. M. Bell, the whole under Major General Bates, sailed from Manila on February 15th, occupied the provinces of North and South Camarines and Western Albay, where the insurgents who had been driven from the north had taken refuge, defeated them in a lively fight near the mouth of the Bicol River on April 4th, routed and dispersed them, and captured large quantities of war *matériel*.⁸⁵ On March 20th General Bell was appointed military governor of these provinces and General Kobbé of "the district of Mindanao and Jolo Archipelago."⁸⁶

On that same day a third expedition, consisting of the 40th Volunteer Infantry, under General Bates, was despatched to establish garrisons in Mindanao. Upon reaching Surigaoon on the 27th, the commander received the surrender of the insurrecto General Garcia and such ordnance as he possessed, but the resistance expected at Gagayan did not materialize, doubtless owing to the appearance of American gunboats and the promptness with which General Bates disembarked his command.⁸⁷ A week later the insurgents, who had taken to the hills, reappeared and made a night attack upon the American garrison, but after a hand-to-hand fight were driven back in disorder, having killed two Americans and wounded eleven.⁸⁸

During the year other expeditions of a similar character were sent to various Visayan islands, and the numerous par-

ties of bandits and insurgents infesting them were summarily handled and dispersed.⁸⁹ As a result of these different operations and the establishment of over 400 posts throughout the Philippine Islands, all organized and open resistance to the American authority ceased forthwith; but, on the other hand, there sprang up a species of guerilla warfare closely akin to brigandage, which proved infinitely more vexatious to cope with and which continued to be waged almost uninterruptedly until the summer of 1901. The measures taken to suppress it need not be chronicled here.⁹⁰ Suffice to say that every effort to that end was made by General MacArthur in the department of Northern Luzon, by General Bates in Southern Luzon, by General Hughes in the Visayas and by General Kobbé in Mindanao and Jolo, to which districts these officers had been assigned on April 7, 1900, by the order of the War Department creating those departments and supplanting the Department of the Pacific by the Military Division of the Philippines.⁹¹ On May 5, 1900, General MacArthur superseded General Otis both in command of the division and as Governor-General,⁹² his total forces numbering, on June 30th, 2,225 officers and 61,059 enlisted men,⁹³ which were increased to 2,367 officers and 71,727 men by November 30th.⁹⁴

THE PEKING RELIEF EXPEDITION

The precarious situation of the American Legation at Peking and the complete isolation of the Minister and his staff in the midst of the uprising led by the Boxers in the spring of 1900, coupled with the realisation that American interests in China would require a larger land force for their protection than could be supplied by our warships on the Asiatic station, caused instructions to be sent on June 16, 1900, to General MacArthur at Manila to despatch a regiment of infantry, with the requisite transportation, surgeons and rapid-fire guns, to Taku on the Gulf of Pechili, where its commanding officer was to confer with Rear Admiral Kempff and sub-

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sequently report to the American Minister for the protection of American lives and property in China.⁹⁵

On June 10th, in response to an urgent telegram from the various foreign Ministers in Peking, a relieving force under Admiral Seymour set out by train in the effort to reach the Chinese capital, but at Tang Ts'u the destruction of the railway obliged it to stop in order to effect the necessary repairs. At that point it was joined by re-enforcements which brought its strength up to 2,066 troops,⁹⁶ and the column pushed slowly forward, in the face of a constantly increasing enemy.

On June 17th the Chinese forts on the Pei-Ho River at Taku opened fire against the European warships, which immediately returned the bombardment and captured the forts by means of a landing force.⁹⁷ On the 20th Baron von Ketteler, the German Minister, was assassinated on the way from his Legation at Peking to the Tsung-Li-Yamen (Foreign Office), and that day Admiral Kempff cabled the Secretary of the Navy that in his opinion one brigade was necessary to represent the United States suitably in China. On the 22nd Major General Chaffee was assigned to the command of the American troops destined to participate in the joint expedition to Peking,⁹⁸ but it was not until a month later that General James H. Wilson, who was thoroughly familiar with China, was relieved from the Department of Matanzas in Cuba and ordered to report as the second in command.⁹⁹ On June 26th Admiral Seymour's relieving force returned to Tientsin, having been unable to get within twenty-five miles of the Chinese capital and barely escaping annihilation.¹⁰⁰ On the 27th the Allied forces attacked Tientsin and captured the east arsenal, and that same day the 9th Infantry under Colonel E. H. Liscum, after being delayed by a typhoon, sailed from Manila, *en route* for Taku. On July 3rd General Chaffee, together with his headquarters and eight troops of the 6th Cavalry, sailed from San Francisco in the transport *Grant*,¹⁰¹ while Rear Admiral Kempff was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to confer with the foreign command-

ers of Taku and to report the proportional number of American troops required for a second expeditionary force to Peking. On the 8th the Admiral replied by cable

“that a meeting had been held; that about 20,000 troops were ashore, which were necessary to hold the position from Taku to Tientsin, and that 60,000 troops in addition were required to march upon Peking; that our proportion of the entire allied army should be about 10,000; that re-enforcements were expected within a month which would make the entire active force of other powers by the middle of August 40,800.”

Anticipating this response, the War Department had the day before directed that the 14th Infantry (Colonel Daggett) and light battery F of the 5th Artillery (Captain Reilly's) be despatched from the Philippines to Taku, and followed them by various other troops¹⁰² to the number of 435 officers and 15,018 enlisted men, to which the Navy Department purposed to add some 2,000 marines. Of this force between 5,000 and 6,000 reached China before the capture of Peking.¹⁰³

Some of the difficulties encountered in supplying the American expeditionary forces at such a distance were indicated by the Secretary of War who stated¹⁰⁴ that

“While the climate of the province of Chili is extremely hot in summer, it is extremely cold in winter, and the river Pei-Ho and that part of the Gulf of Chili upon which Taku is situated are closed to navigation about the 1st of December and remain closed until late in the succeeding spring, so that it was necessary to provide not only for the landing of the troops with their horses, transportation, ordnance, and current supplies, but for the delivery in China, not later than the middle of November, of six months' supply of food, ammunition, heavy winter clothing, fuel, stoves, lumber for quarters, medical stores, and supplies of all kinds. Adequate provisions were made to meet this requirement.

“The supply problem was somewhat complicated by the fact that it was impossible to discontinue the regular supply service for the army in the Philippines, in which our fleet of transports

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were engaged; it was impossible to withdraw from that service a sufficient number of vessels for a separate service to China, and there was not time to secure new transports. The problem was solved, however, through the courtesy of the Japanese Government, which, upon our application through the State Department, in the most friendly spirit, permitted us to use the port of Nagasaki, where the lines from the United States to Manila on the south and to Taku on the north diverged, for the transshipment of supplies and material without passing through their custom-house and for the transfer of men (not carrying arms).

“This enabled us to establish a subsidiary service, which, in connection with the main service to and from this country, distributed both men and materials between Nagasaki and Manila and between Nagasaki and Taku, practically using both our Pacific ports and Manila as main bases and Nagasaki as a secondary base of supply. This arrangement was also very convenient and, as it ultimately proved, very valuable, in enabling us to direct each organization as it left this country to look for orders at Nagasaki, so that if at any time it should become apparent, as of course we always regarded it possible, that their services were not needed in China they could be diverted from Nagasaki to the Philippines, to take the place of an equal number of volunteers. . . .

“The gulf at Taku is too shallow for large vessels to approach within 10 miles of the shore, and all of the men, animals, ordnance, and supplies had to be transported for that distance by lighters or small boats. They were much delayed at times by stormy weather, which particularly interfered with the landing of horses and mules. Besides the small boats used in this service 32 large steamships were employed in the ocean transportation required.”

On July 3rd General Chaffee sailed from San Francisco, reaching Taku on the 29th.¹⁰⁵ In the meantime the 9th Infantry from Manila had landed at Taku on the 6th, and five days later two of its battalions arrived at Tientsin where, on the 13th, they participated in the battle between the Allied forces — composed of British, French and Japanese troops — and the Chinese. The continual shelling of the foreign quarters outside the walls by the Imperial troops within the city

caused an assault to be made upon the southwestern part of the walled city, in which the two battalions of the 9th Infantry was assigned to the brigade under the British General Dorward and posted on the flank of the Allied forces. For fifteen hours the American troops, being in the front line, were exposed to a severe fire which resulted in heavy loss, Colonel Liscum and seventeen men being killed, while five officers and seventeen men were wounded.¹⁰⁶ During the night they were withdrawn from their position, but on the following morning Tientsin was captured and the American forces were assigned to the duty of guarding and policing the southeastern quarter.

The decision of the Allied commanders that 80,000 troops would be needed before a definite advance could safely be undertaken — that is, 20,000 to hold the intervening district between Taku and Tientsin, and 60,000 to comprise the relief force — denoted an abandonment of any expectation of rescuing the Diplomatic corps in Peking, especially since it was not anticipated that more than 40,800 troops would arrive before the middle of August, and since it had been determined to postpone any advance until the entire 80,000 were on hand. Through the kind offices of Wu Ting Fang, the Chinese Minister at Washington, a cipher despatch was forwarded on July 11th to Mr. Conger, the American Minister at Peking, and on the 20th the following response was received from him:

“For one month we have been besieged in British Legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can prevent general massacre.”

This reply was the first despatch from a diplomatic representative in Peking received by any of the western Powers for nearly a month; but, although considerable doubt at first was cast in Europe upon its authenticity, the American Government persisted in the belief as to its trustworthiness, and made it the basis for urgent pressure upon the other Powers,

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with a view to an immediate advance to Peking without awaiting the assembly of the 80,000 troops contemplated.¹⁰⁷ In consequence of the representations from Washington, a conference of the Allied generals¹⁰⁸ was held in Tientsin on August 3rd, and, after a discussion lasting for five hours, it was decided to push forward and give battle next day,¹⁰⁹ despite the rainy season when the question of transport presented difficulties well-nigh insuperable, and regardless of the heterogeneous troops composing the Allied forces, the insufficiency of their strength and the variety of their equipment.¹¹⁰

On the afternoon of August 4th the British and Americans moved off in the direction of Hsiku, thus forming the van of the expeditionary force which comprised — according to the numbers reported at the conference the day before — 8,000 Japanese, 4,800 Russians, 3,000 British, 2,100 Americans and 800 French, aggregating about 18,700. By the time the advance was begun the Americans had been re-enforced to 2,500, and on August 9th were joined by one troop of the 6th Cavalry which had been delayed by storms in the Gulf of Pechili, while the rest of the regiment and detachments from others were left behind to do guard duty at Tientsin and along the line of communications.¹¹¹ The American column was formed of Troop M and a detachment from Troop L of the 6th Cavalry, light battery F (Captain Reilly) of the 5th Artillery, the 9th and 14th Infantry, and comprised ninety-six officers and 1,954 enlisted men,¹¹² in addition to whom there was a battalion of marines containing twenty-nine officers and 453 men,¹¹³ thus making a total strength of 125 officers and 2,407 enlisted men. As a matter of fact, the forces of the other Powers turned out to be somewhat less than the numbers reported on August third.¹¹⁴

On the 5th the Chinese¹¹⁵ were encountered in a strongly entrenched position intersecting the Pei-Ho. The attack on the right bank was made by the Japanese on the right, the British in the centre and the Americans on the left, while the

Russians and French moved by the left bank. By 9 A. M. the position had been carried, but the Chinese failed to hold in another strong position at Pei-Ts'ang and the Allies occupied the town, where they spent the night. On the following day an engagement lasting four hours took place at the railway station of Yang Ts'un, where the Americans sustained a loss of seven killed and sixty-five wounded.¹¹⁶ So exhausted were the troops by their marches and fighting in the excessive heat that a day of rest was given them at Yang Ts'un, and an opportunity was afforded to get up some much-needed supplies.¹¹⁷

On August 8th the advance was resumed, the entire force moving by the right bank — the Japanese in the van, followed by the Russians and Americans, the British bringing up the rear, while the French remained at Yang Ts'un.¹¹⁸

“The Japanese were quick marchers and the Russians slow, slouching along with frequent halts at a pace hardly exceeding a mile an hour, which greatly embarrassed the Americans in their rear, who were often compelled to halt on the sandy plains in the hot sun, while the Russians were resting in the umbrageous villages in front. This fact was of importance as accounting for the large number of casualties which they suffered from the heat, the Americans and the British being obliged to do the heaviest marching in the hottest hours of the day.¹¹⁹

“The superior organization and equipment of the Japanese were everywhere conspicuous, and their position in the front of the column gave the enemy no time to rally, so that their retreat was in reality a long and rapid flight before the agile men from the Land of the Rising Sun, who gave them no respite and no pause. Gen. Fukushima, the moving spirit of the pursuit, was asked if his troops were not very tired, and replied: ‘Yes, but so are the enemy.’

“His plan was to keep them on the run at all costs, and it was carried through perfectly and with great success. His cavalry and mounted infantry were usually pushed ahead about three miles in advance of the main body of infantry. Whenever they got into touch with the enemy they dropped back upon the infantry, which was then extended and sent forward to go thoroughly through all the villages to the right and left of the

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line of march. While the infantry rested after this, the cavalry pushed on again, and the process, to the consternation of the pursued, was repeated."¹²⁰

On the morning of the 9th the Japanese shelled Ho Hsi Wu, where they had a slight skirmish and routed the Chinese; and during the day their mounted infantry and the Bengal Lancers dispersed some 200 of the Imperial cavalry, capturing four banners. Next day the bulk of the expeditionary forces reached Ma T'ou and on the 11th occupied Chang Chia Wan, while the Japanese shelled the enemy out of his position south of T'ung Chou, to which he retired. Early next morning they advanced to assault the south entrance and blew up the outer gate of the *enceinte*, but the Chinese had evacuated the place and the Allies entered without opposition.¹²¹ On the 13th began the march destined to cover the remaining 12 miles to Peking — the Japanese on the north moving by the road leading to the Ch'i Hua gate, the Russians and Americans and British on their left in the order named. It had been agreed that the day should be devoted to reconnaissance and that on the 14th the various columns were to concentrate on the advance line held by the Japanese, while the plan for the final attack was to be determined at a conference that evening.¹²² Instead of halting in accordance with this arrangement, the Russians pressed on and attacked the Tung Pien Men gate, one of the eastern entrances to the city,¹²³ but were met by a hot fire and suffered considerable loss, including their Chief of Staff, General Vasilewski. They did force their way in, but were thrown into confusion just inside the gate, and, in spite of a heavy fire from their guns and small-arms, which continued throughout the night, were unable to make any progress.¹²⁴

On the morning of August 14th the Japanese advanced to the attack of the Ch'i Hua gate, but were frustrated by the rifle fire from the wall. A bombardment begun at 10 A. M. and lasting all day achieved little except to pave the way for blowing up the gate, which was effected under cover of the

darkness and thus permitted them to penetrate into the city.

The Russians were still in disorder at the Tung Pien Men gate when General Chaffee arrived there and found some of the 14th Infantry and the American guns at the gate.¹²⁵ Under his direction an entrance was effected, the Tartar wall was swept clear of Chinese troops by the use of shrapnel and, during the early part of the afternoon all opposition having been overcome, the advance was resumed toward the British compound.¹²⁶

South of this gate some of the other American troops had achieved a notable success. "At 11 A. M. two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the immediate command of Colonel Daggett, had scaled the wall of the Chinese city at the northeast corner, and the flag of that regiment was the first foreign colors unfurled upon the walls surrounding Peking."¹²⁷ These companies, supported by those facing the wall, then drove the Chinese southward to the Sha Kno Men gate, where the British entered later in the day without any considerable opposition and, guided by the information given by Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister, penetrated through the water-gate¹²⁸ in spite of the fire of the Chinese riflemen, and quickly reached the British Legation, where all the foreigners had taken refuge during the siege.¹²⁹ It was somewhat later when the American troops arrived, as they had encountered more opposition, were unfamiliar with the way to the water-gate and the advance companies of the 14th Infantry had, moreover, been delayed for two hours by running short of ammunition.¹³⁰

The relief of the legations in Peking was thus successfully effected with a comparatively small loss of 177 officers and men on the part of the American forces.¹³¹ The conditions which greeted them are thus described by General Chaffee in his report:¹³²

"Upon entering the legations the appearance of the people and their surroundings, buildings, walls, streets, alleys, en-

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trances, etc., showed every evidence of a confining siege. Barricades were built everywhere and of every sort of material, native brick being largely used for their construction, topped with sandbags made from every conceivable sort of cloth, from sheets and pillowcases to dress materials and brocaded curtains. Many of the legations were in ruins, and the English, Russian, and American, though standing and occupied, were filled with bullet holes from small arms, and often having larger apertures made by shell.

“The children presented a pitiable sight, white and wan for lack of proper food, but the adults, as a rule, seemed cheerful and little the worse for their trying experience, except from anxiety and constant care. They were living on short rations, a portion of which consisted of a very small piece of horse or mule meat daily. The Christian Chinese were being fed upon whatever could be secured, and were often reduced to killing dogs for meat.

“All the surroundings indicated that the people had been closely besieged, confined to a small area without any comforts, no conveniences and barely existing from day to day in hope of succor.”

On the following day, having been informed by Mr. Conger, the American Minister, that the Chinese had utilized that portion of the Imperial city in front of the Ch'i Hua Men gate to fire upon the legations, General Chaffee determined to force the Chinese troops from this position. On the morning of the 15th four guns opened fire from the Tartar wall at that gate, to which the Chinese replied with some spirit, but their fire was soon silenced and two of the outer gates were blown over by Captain Riley's pieces, although that officer was killed by General Chaffee's side. A vigorous pursuit drove the Chinese from four gates in rapid succession, but the advance was suspended at the last, which is hardly the grounds of the Imperial palace. That afternoon a conference of the Allied commanders was held and, in accordance with their decision not to occupy the Imperial city, the American troops were withdrawn from their advanced positions, although they continued to hold the Ch'i Hua Men

gate.¹³³ Next day the various Ministers assembled and strongly urged the occupation of the Imperial city. Their action caused the generals to reverse their former decision and to divide the Chinese and Tartar cities into several districts to be guarded by the different Allied contingents, the Americans being assigned to the west half of the Chinese city and to that section of the Tartar city situated between the Ch'i Hua Men and Shun Chin gates, and bounded by the wall of the inner or Forbidden city on the east and on the north by the principal east and west street of the Tartar city. Agreeably to this decision, General Chaffee re-occupied the line he had gained the day before and stationed the 9th Infantry inside the fourth gate, where his pursuit had been relinquished.¹³⁴ Troops were also posted along the Pei-Ho River as far as Tientsin, to safeguard the transport of sick, wounded and supplies; ¹³⁵ but it was not until August 28th that contingents from the Allied forces formally entered the grounds of the Imperial palace and took possession of the Forbidden City.¹³⁶

On August 22nd ¹³⁷ General Chaffee's cable announcing the relief of Peking was received at Washington, and next day he was instructed to take no further aggressive action unless compelled for defensive reasons. Orders were also cabled to Nagasaki diverting to Manila all troops then *en route* for China, and on the 25th Chaffee was directed to hold his forces in readiness to withdraw from Peking; but it was not until a month later that he was instructed to despatch to Manila all the American troops in China, with the exception of a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and one light battery, which were to be left in Peking as a guard for the American Legation.¹³⁸ The intervening time ¹³⁹ was spent mainly in punitive expeditions destined to break up the predatory bands of Boxers which infested the territory about the Chinese capital.¹⁴⁰ On October 3rd began the withdrawal of the American troops which were sent to the Philippines.

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1901

By far the most important of the laws enacted by the second session of the Fifty-sixth Congress during the year was that of February 2nd entitled "An Act to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the United States."¹⁴¹ This fixed the force of the Army at fifteen regiments of cavalry, a corps of artillery and thirty regiments of infantry, with the senior officer ranked as a Lieutenant General,¹⁴² thus giving it a strength of 3,820 officers and 96,799 enlisted men, a total of 100,619.¹⁴³ This law contained forty-two sections, of which twenty-four dealt with organization,¹⁴⁴ and in this category the two which marked a radical innovation in one branch of the service were as follows:

"SEC. 3. That the regimental organization of the artillery arm of the United States Army is hereby discontinued, and that arm is constituted and designated as the Artillery Corps. It shall be organized as hereinafter specified and shall belong to the line of the Army.

"SEC. 4. That the Artillery Corps shall comprise two branches — the coast artillery and the field artillery. The coast artillery is defined as that portion charged with the care and use of the fixed and movable elements of land and coast fortifications, including the submarine mine and torpedo defenses; and the field artillery as that portion accompanying an army in the field, and including field and light artillery proper, horse artillery, siege artillery, mountain artillery, and also machine-gun batteries: *Provided*, That this shall not be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of War to order coast artillery to any duty which the public service demands or to prevent the use of machine or other field guns by any other arm of the service under the direction of the Secretary of War."

Section 6 prescribed that the ranking officer of the Artillery Corps should be "a Chief of Artillery who shall be selected and detailed by the President from the colonels of artillery, to serve on the staff of the general officer commanding the Army, and whose duties shall be prescribed by

the Secretary of War." Section 7 stipulated "that each company of coast artillery shall be organized as is now prescribed by law for a battery of artillery"; Section 8 merely reiterated "that each battery of field artillery shall be organized as is now prescribed by law"; and Section 9 provided

"That the increase herein provided shall be made as follows: Not less than twenty per centum before July first, nineteen hundred and one, and not less than twenty per centum each succeeding twelve months until the total number provided for shall have been attained. . . ."

The question of vacancies and promotions was dealt with in several sections,¹⁴⁵ and one of the most important features of this measure was the following:

"SEC. 26. That so long as there remain any officers holding permanent appointments in the Adjutant-General's Department, the Inspector-General's Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department, the Pay Department, the Ordnance Department, and the Signal Corps, including those appointed to original vacancies in the grades of captain and first lieutenant under the provisions of sections sixteen, seventeen, twenty-one, and twenty-four of this Act, they shall be promoted according to seniority in the several grades, as now provided by law, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to apply to vacancies which can be filled by such promotions or to the periods for which the officers so promoted shall hold their appointments, and *when any vacancy, except that of the chief of the department or corps, shall occur, which cannot be filled by promotion as provided in this section, it shall be filled by detail from the line of the Army, and no more permanent appointments shall be made in those departments or corps after the original vacancies created by this Act shall have been filled.* Such details shall be made from the grade in which the vacancies exist, under such system of examination as the President may from time to time prescribe.

"All officers so detailed shall serve for a period of four years, at the expiration of which time they shall return to duty with the line, and officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel shall

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not again be eligible for selection in any staff department until they have served two years with the line.

“That when vacancies shall occur in the position of chief of any staff corps or department the President may appoint to such vacancies, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, officers of the Army at large not below the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and who shall hold office for terms of four years. . . . *Provided*, That so long as there remain in service officers of any staff corps or department holding permanent appointments, the chief of such staff corps or department shall be selected from the officers so remaining therein.”

The changed conditions resulting from the inauguration of this excellent detail system were thus provided for:

“SEC. 27. That each position vacated by officers of the line, transferred to any department of the staff for tours of service under this Act, shall be filled by promotion in the line until the total number detailed equals the number authorized for duty in each staff department. Thereafter vacancies caused by details from the line to the staff shall be filled by officers returning from tours of staff duty. If under the operation of this Act the number of officers returned to any particular arm of the service at any time exceeds the number authorized by law in any grade, promotions to that grade shall cease until the number has been reduced to that authorized.”

Persons not more than forty years of age were permitted to be appointed to the grades of first or second lieutenant in the Regular Army, on condition that their fitness were favourably passed upon by examining boards and that they should take rank “according to seniority as determined by length of prior commissioned service.” Enlisted men might likewise be appointed second lieutenants in the Regular Army, “provided that they shall have served one year, under the same conditions now authorized by law for enlisted men of the Regular Army.”¹⁴⁶

In order to insure that vacancies in organizations serving outside the United States should be kept filled with trained men, the President was empowered “to enlist recruits in

numbers equal to four per centum in excess of the total strength authorized for such organizations,"¹⁴⁷ and he was explicitly instructed "to maintain the enlisted force of the several organizations of the Army at their maximum strength as fixed by this Act during the present exigencies of the service, or until such time as Congress may hereafter otherwise direct."¹⁴⁸ The Secretary of War was permitted to detach such enlisted men as were needed for recruiting duty,¹⁴⁹ while the President was to select two Brigadier Generals of volunteers, who were to be appointed to the same grade in the Army and retired. He was also to select a Brigadier General from the retired list of the Regular Army "who may have distinguished himself during the war with Spain, in command of a separate army" and to appoint him a Major General retired.¹⁵⁰

Permission was also given for officers, regular or volunteer, who have been honourably discharged, to bear the title and wear on occasions of ceremony the uniform of the highest commission held by them;¹⁵¹ and officers and men of the Army and Navy were allowed to wear the distinctive badges of military societies composed of men "who served in the armies and navies of the United States during the Spanish-American war and the incident insurrection in the Philippines."¹⁵²

An important feature of this law was contained in Section 35, which directed the Secretary of War to have preliminary examinations and surveys made of four sites, "with a view to the establishment of permanent camp grounds for instruction of troops of the Regular Army and National Guard," and appropriated \$10,000 for that purpose. Not less essential was the authority given to the President to enlist not exceeding 12,000 Philippine natives as scouts, to be organized in the usual military fashion, but with all majors and captains selected from officers of the Regular Army.¹⁵³ He was similarly empowered to organize and maintain in Porto Rico a provisional regiment, the enlisted *personnel* to be

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composed of natives of that island enlisted for three years,¹⁵⁴ and to prescribe the components of the army ration.¹⁵⁵ Once again was reiterated the prohibition of "the sale of or dealing in beer, wine or any intoxicating liquors by any person in any post exchange or canteen or army transport or upon the premises used for military purposes by the United States"¹⁵⁶—*a restriction the good intentions of which have only been excelled by the evil effects produced in fostering the very vices that it was designed to suppress.**

Aside from the usual annual and deficiency appropriations for the Regular establishment, as well as for fortifications and other works of defence,¹⁵⁷ the remaining military legislation enacted during the year 1901 was confined to two measures of importance. The Act of February 26th¹⁵⁸ empowered the President to detail

"such retired officers of the Army and Navy of the United States as in his judgment may be required for that purpose, to act as instructors in military drill and tactics in schools in the United States, where such instruction shall have been authorized by the educational authorities thereof, and where the services of such instructors shall have been applied for by said authorities."

The Act of March 2nd¹⁵⁹ dealt with military justice and, by direct mandate or the amendment of existing statutes, fixed the penalties for persons duly subpoenaed but refusing to qualify as witnesses before a court-martial, and required the United States District Attorney to prosecute such persons "on the certification of the facts to him by the general

* The Secretary of War, Mr. Root, in his report for 1902, p. 52, said: "Referring to the operation of section 38 of the act of February 2, 1901, . . . I am convinced that the general effect of prohibiting the use of beer and light wines within the limited area of the army post is to lead the enlisted men to go out of the post, to frequent vile resorts which cluster in the neighborhood, to drink bad whisky to excess, and to associate intimately with abandoned men and more abandoned women; and that the operation of the law is to increase drunkenness, disease of the most loathsome kind, insubordination and desertion, and moral and physical degeneration."

court-martial." In case of conviction the punishment was to be \$500 or six months' imprisonment, or both.¹⁶⁰ Penalties were also fixed for frauds against the United States,¹⁶¹ Army officers were permitted to administer oaths,¹⁶² and certain courts-martial were prohibited from trying "capital cases or commissioned officers."¹⁶³ By the repeal¹⁶⁴ of Article 94, Section 1342 of the Revised Statutes,¹⁶⁵ the United States was the last of the great nations to suspend the restriction that courts-martial should not sit after 3 P. M. This regulation — which had persisted for centuries in the British army at least — was based on the unwritten law that any officer who was a gentleman would, by the dictates of custom, be too much intoxicated at that hour to render impartial justice.

Allusion has already been made on pages 238–239 to the order of the Secretary of War on February 19, 1900, creating a War College Board. This was supplemented on November 27, 1901, by General Order No. 155, which prescribed that

"A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study for army officers, to be known as the Army War College. Such buildings and grounds as may be available and necessary will be assigned to its use on the reservation at Washington Barracks, D. C.

"The executive head of the college will be an officer of the Army, not below the grade of field officer, who will be known as the president of the Army War College, and who will preside over the War College board. A course of instruction embracing the higher branches of professional study will be arranged by the board, and this board will also prepare and submit for the approval of the Secretary of War such regulations as it shall deem necessary.

"The officers to be detailed to pursue the course at the War College will be of two classes:

"(a) Those who have been recommended as distinguished graduates of the General Service and Staff College.

"(b) Such field officers and captains as may be specially designated by the War Department for instruction.

"It is intended that the officers who have uniformly shown

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the greatest interest and most proficiency in the theoretical and practical courses prescribed for the officers' schools at posts, the General Service and Staff College, and the War College shall have high consideration of the War Department, with a view to the utilization of their abilities as military attachés or on special missions abroad and for the higher duties of general staff work." ¹⁶⁶

Elsewhere in this same order the various special service schools ¹⁶⁷ were mentioned, and it was announced that

"The War College shall be under the immediate direction of a board of five members detailed from the Army at large and the following ex-officio members:

"The Chief of Engineers.

"The Chief of Artillery.

"The superintendent of the Military Academy.

"The commanding officer of the General Service and Staff College.

"The War College Board shall exercise general supervision and inspection of all the different schools above enumerated, and shall be charged with the duty of maintaining through them a complete system of military education, in which each separate school shall perform its proper part. Such officers as shall be requisite to assist the board in performing its duties will be detailed from time to time for that purpose. It should be kept constantly in mind that the object and ultimate aim of all this preparatory work is to train officers to command men in war. Theory must not, therefore, be allowed to displace practical application." ¹⁶⁸

This scheme of such an institution evidently commended itself to Congress inasmuch as the Appropriation Act of March 2, 1901, "for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and two" set apart \$10,000 "for the continuance of the Army War College, having for its object the direction and co-ordination of the instruction in the various service schools, extension of the opportunities for investigation and study in the Army and militia of the United States, and the collection and dissemination of military information." ¹⁶⁹

THE PHILIPPINE WAR (*Continued*)

It has already been remarked that the year 1900 witnessed a complete cessation of open resistance to American authority on the part of the insurgents, but that organized opposition was superseded by a most annoying guerilla warfare, difficult in the extreme to repress.¹⁷⁰ The four hundred posts established in that year were augmented in 1901 to 502 stations located at all the important towns and strategic points in the archipelago.¹⁷¹ Obviously such funds and supplies as were procured by the banditti emanated from the towns and the districts in the vicinity of their operations. A mistaken policy dictated that the persons assisting to support these roving bands should be subjected to no interference, and prisoners taken in battle were merely disarmed and forthwith liberated. Far from having the desired effect, this policy served merely to increase the distrust of the natives — who regarded it as an evidence of weakness on the part of the Americans — and it was accordingly found imperative to apply with considerably more rigour to the Filipinos the laws relating to the government and control of occupied territory.¹⁷² Due notice of this purpose was given by a proclamation issued on December 20, 1900, by General MacArthur as the Military Governor of the Philippines,¹⁷³ and instructions were sent to the commanding officers of the various departments to distribute this proclamation “as expeditiously and extensively as possible.”¹⁷⁴ That the error of employing consideration in a warfare waged against a barbaric or semi-civilized people had been realized, and that the military authorities had at last learned the proper method of dealing with such a situation is attested by the declaration of the division commander to his subordinates, stating that

“whenever action is necessary the more drastic the application the better, provided only that unnecessary hardships and personal indignities shall not be imposed upon persons arrested and that the laws of war are not violated in any respect touching the treatment of prisoners.”¹⁷⁵

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The inauguration of this new policy was accompanied by decidedly more vigorous military operations, and orders were issued that all prisoners of war captured in the field or arrested in towns were to be held in custody until the close of hostilities, whereas all men who surrendered themselves were immediately to be disarmed and released.¹⁷⁶ These steps were followed during the month of January, 1901, by the deportation to the island of Guam of some fifty prominent Filipinos, insurgent army officers, agents, sympathisers, agitators and civil officials.¹⁷⁷

The operations in the field were conducted with commendable energy throughout the entire archipelago,¹⁷⁸ and the value of the 502 stations established was manifest from the advantage derived from them as secondary or advanced bases. It is probable that each department commander could have said with as much truth as did Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell of the First District of Northern Luzon:

“I have worked the troops as hard as possible — they have penetrated the mountains, over almost impassable trails to places Spanish troops never went, and everything has been accomplished that could be done with the means at my disposal.”¹⁷⁹

Of the military events of the year the most important was the capture of Aguinaldo, who had baffled every effort until he was taken prisoner as the result of a plan devised and masterfully executed by the commander of the Fourth District of the Department of Northern Luzon. This notable exploit is thus briefly described in the “Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1900, to June 30, 1901,” under the date of March 25th:¹⁸⁰

“Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, U. S. V., with Capt. T. Hazzard, Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. V., Capt. Harry W. Newton, Thirty-fourth Infantry, U. S. V., Lieut. O. P. M. Hazzard, Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. V., Lieut. B. J. Mitchell, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. V., and 78 Macabebe scouts, having landed near

Baler, on the east coast of Luzon, March 14, 1901, and marched inland northeast nearly 600 miles to Palanan, province of Isabela, Luzon, P. I., surprises and captures the insurgent commander in chief, Emilio Aguinaldo, most of his staff and escort of 40 men. After a time the command with its prisoners marches to Palanan Bay, where the U. S. S. *Vicksburg* is met, and, going aboard, sails for Manila, where it arrived this date."

A full report of this feat was made by General Funston on May 6, 1901,¹⁸¹ but even more interesting to the layman is the graphic description given in his article entitled "The Capture of Aguinaldo," which appeared in *Scribner's Magazine* for November, 1911.

The capture of Aguinaldo was the signal for the complete collapse of the Filipino resistance, particularly since he issued a proclamation of his own accord, on April 19th, calling upon his fellow-countrymen to desist from their struggle since "the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines."¹⁸² As Dr. Worcester declares, this announcement doubtless hastened the end of the war but it did not lead to immediate surrender.¹⁸³ Within a short time, however, such prominent insurgent leaders as Tinio, Aglipay, Trias and Cailles had been taken prisoners,¹⁸⁴ although Malvar in Batangas (Southern Luzon) and Lukban in Samar managed to hold out until the following year, in spite of the vigorous campaign conducted against the former by General J. Franklin Bell and against the latter by General Frederick D. Grant.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless so effectually had the insurrection being suppressed elsewhere that, on June 21, 1901, President McKinley issued an order directing that on and after July 4th "the president of the Philippine Commission will exercise the executive authority in all civil affairs in the government of the Philippine Islands heretofore exercised by the military governor of the Philippines," and appointed Hon. William H. Taft the Civil Governor. Inasmuch as the military was to give away to a civil régime,—

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“The military governor of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the performance, on and after the fourth day of July, of the civil duties hereinbefore described, but his authority will continue to be exercised as heretofore in those districts in which insurrection against the authority of the United States continues to exist or in which public order is not sufficiently restored to enable provincial civil government to be established under the instructions to the Commission, dated April 7, 1900.”¹⁸⁶

July 4, 1901, accordingly marked the official termination of hostilities in the Philippine War. On that same day Judge Taft was inaugurated as Civil Governor, and General Chaffee succeeded General MacArthur in command of the Military Division and as Military Governor.¹⁸⁷

How efficient the latter had been in the conduct of affairs during the preceding year is attested by the fact that

“The operations of the field forces were so vigorous and unrelenting that more than 1,000 contacts occurred between our troops and the insurgents from May, 1900, to June 30, 1901, in which the insurgent casualties were: Killed, 3,854; wounded, 1,193; captured, 6,572; surrendered, 23,095; with a total of 15,693 rifles and nearly 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition captured and surrendered. Our casualties during the same period were: Killed, 245; wounded, 490; captured, 118; missing, 20.”¹⁸⁸

As Secretary Root pertinently stated:¹⁸⁹

“These field operations were prosecuted notwithstanding the withdrawal from the Philippines and return to the United States of the volunteer army, comprising 1 regiment of cavalry and 25 regiments of infantry, a total of nearly 1,400 officers and 29,000 enlisted men, whose transfer across 8,000 miles of sea to San Francisco, where they were mustered out of service as required by law, was accomplished without loss.”

As a matter of fact, the volunteer force sent home between January 28¹⁹⁰ and June 5, 1901, numbered 1,356 officers and 28,797 men. They were replaced by regulars to the amount of only 89 officers and 8,146 men,¹⁹¹ so that on June

30th the actual strength of the American troops in the Philippines was only 47,742 officers and men,¹⁹² as against 74,094 in the preceding November,¹⁹³ and by the end of November, 1901, it was further reduced to 43,239.¹⁹⁴

The suppression of the Philippine insurrection was achieved with a loss among the American forces during the period from February 4, 1899, to June 30, 1901, amounting to 330 officers and 6,746 enlisted men, killed, wounded or died.¹⁹⁵

In the Philippine War the United States was compelled to use 76,416 Regular troops¹⁹⁶ and 50,052 volunteers¹⁹⁷ against native insurgents whose numbers cannot be estimated even approximately. This war cost \$170,326,586.11,¹⁹⁸ and the pensions, taken in conjunction with those paid for the Spanish-American War, amounted on June 30, 1914, to no less than \$46,092,740.47.¹⁹⁹

CHAPTER XIX

THE LESSONS OF THE PHILIPPINE WAR

CONSIDERING the magnitude of the task involved in the suppression of an insurrection in an archipelago like that of the Philippines, the inhabitants of which numbered some 7,000,000 persons,¹ the Secretary of War had abundant reason to declare that he could not

“speak too highly of the work of the army in the Philippines. The officers and men have been equal to the best requirements, not only of military service, but of civil administration with which they were charged in all its details from the date of our occupancy in August, 1898, until the inauguration of a civil governor on the 4th of July, 1901.”²

The reason for the efficiency of the American forces is not far to seek. *In this war the United States employed a larger percentage of Regular troops than in any other war in its history.* Apart from this important fact, the Volunteer force created by the Act of March 2, 1899, was by all odds the best of its sort ever raised. The factors which made it so extraordinarily effective have already been set forth on pages 227-228, and need not, accordingly, be reiterated here. In no sense was it composed of raw troops — as a matter of fact it was mainly officered by regulars or those who had acquitted themselves with credit during the Spanish-American War; the enlisted *personnel* was as near physically perfect as elimination could make it, and the majority of the men had had exceptional training previously. This force may therefore be taken as a model of its kind, and can under no circumstances be put in the category with the class of raw troops who usually comprise the volunteers.

Sufficient allusion has already been made to the dearth of

trained soldiers at the outbreak of the insurrection, resulting from the customary procrastination of Congress until the eleventh hour; and it has been seen that, in consequence, the first of the newly-created volunteer regiments did not reach the Philippines until more than eight months after the war began,³ and the last did not arrive until January 25, 1900 — almost one year after the commencement of the insurrection.⁴ War, properly conducted, is the most drastic and brutal of human undertakings, but so obsessed was our Government with the idea of “benevolent assimilation” and so loath to use the “mailed fist” that it was not until December 20, 1900, that really drastic measures were inaugurated. As a result of the relentless operations of the American forces in the field, “by April 1, 1901, it became apparent that the insurrection was rapidly approaching complete collapse,”⁵ and it is undoubtedly fortunate that this *desideratum* was on the eve of accomplishment since the War Department, as early as December 11, 1900, ordered General MacArthur to “start home volunteer regiments,”⁶ and sixteen days later cabled him, “We must push this movement, otherwise [there] will be trouble getting volunteers home.”⁷ It is not difficult to read between the lines that the War Department, influenced possibly by having been compelled, *nolens volens*, to retain the volunteers raised in 1898 in service long after their terms of enlistment had legally expired, was resolved that there should be no repetition of such a course with respect to the Philippine volunteers, who were to be mustered out on July 1, 1901, according to the express provision of the Act of March 2, 1899, creating them. In conformity with his instructions, General MacArthur sent off the 37th Volunteer Infantry in the transport *Sheridan* on January 10th, the 36th Volunteers in the *Pennsylvania* on January 28th, and the 11th Volunteer Cavalry in the *Meade* on February 1, 1901.⁸ About every fortnight thereafter a volunteer regiment was despatched to San Francisco,⁹ so that

the last regiment left Manila on May 5th.¹⁰ As early as January 9th General MacArthur warned the War Department that after May 1st it would only be safe to send away the volunteers if replaced by Regulars,¹¹ and the straits to which the military authorities were put to find the necessary number of Regulars is attested by the following cable sent by Adjutant-General Corbin on January 29, 1901, to General Leonard Wood at Havana:

“Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can give your consent to the immediate withdrawal of the Tenth Infantry from Cuba. *The long delay in passage of the army bill makes it imperative that we have immediate use of every available company we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines.* Secretary [of] War very much desires if possible that you can see your way clear to recommend the withdrawal of this regiment at once.”¹²

Thus was afforded a fresh instance of Congressional folly in limiting the term of enlistment instead of making it “*for the war.*” Had the Philippine insurrection in the bulk of the archipelago not been crushed at the time when it was, and had it been prolonged until 1902, as was the resistance in Batangas and Samar, the Government would have found itself in the same unenviable predicament as in 1899, and very hard put to find an adequate number of trained soldiers to respond to the demands, not only in the Philippines, but in Cuba and various insular possessions. The inadequacy of our Army was again made manifest, and such was the difficulty of obtaining a sufficiency of recruits for the Regulars in the Philippines that General MacArthur recommended a bounty of \$250 as an inducement to volunteers to join the Army in those islands.¹³

The conduct of the Philippine War was marked by more than one mistake on the part of the War Department. Among them was the failure to notify the commanding officers far enough ahead of the departure of their troops — with

the result that a most unnecessary amount of supplies was accumulated at certain points, deteriorated rapidly in the tropical climate, and either had to be shipped back to the United States or condemned and sold for a mere song.¹⁴

CHAPTER XX

THE LESSONS OF OUR PAST WARS

THE various wars waged by the United States from the Revolution down to, and including, the Philippine War have been characterised by certain conspicuous blunders from a military standpoint. At the outbreak of hostilities the Government has found itself seriously embarrassed for the ensuing reasons:

First: The Regular Army has invariably been too small to cope with the situation in such a manner as to give a reasonable assurance of success.

Second: Never once has the Army been properly organized, nor has it been so constituted that, when war was recognized to be inevitable, it could be automatically expanded to the requisite strength.

Third: No proper reserves have ever existed from which could be drawn the trained men necessary to raise the Regular Army to war strength.

Fourth: In consequence of a total lack of such reserves, the Army has almost invariably been compelled to accept such recruits as offered themselves. These recruits have, as a rule, been deficient in training and therefore below the standard of the soldiers already in the Regular service. Not only has the requisite number been rarely obtained but, in proportion as they have been incorporated into the Army, their inferiority has necessarily diminished in value of the Army as a fighting force until sufficient training could be given them to bring them up to the standard of the professional soldier.

Fifth: *The policy of the United States with respect to*

the length of enlistments has uniformly been the very incarnation of folly. Rare indeed have been the occasions when they have not been for too short a term of service, and so seldom has Congress displayed the wisdom of taking advantage of the enthusiasm at the beginning of hostilities to prescribe that all enlistments shall be FOR THE WAR that the instances are conspicuously unique. As a result of this failure, troops, which after long periods of training have developed into dependable forces, have had to be discharged; generals in the field have been forced to act in opposition to military sense or been greatly embarrassed in their operations; the War Department has had to resort to innumerable shifts to extricate itself from the difficulties into which it was plunged by approaching or actual expiration of enlistments; and more than once our national destinies have been imperilled by the depletion of armies from this cause at the very time when troops were most imperatively needed. The whole question was admirably summarized by Washington in a letter — hitherto unpublished — addressed to Fielding Lewis, Esq., and dated “Peaks-kill, 28th June, 1781,” in which he said:

“I lament most sincerely the system of policy which has been but too generally adopted in all the States, to wit, that of *temporary expedients*; which like *quack medicines* are so far from removing the causes of complaint that they only serve to increase the disorder. This has in a most remarkable manner, been the case with respect to short enlistments; which has been the primary cause of all our misfortunes — all our expenses (which may, through a thousand different channels, be traced up to this source) — and of the calamities which Virginia, the two Carolinas & Georgia now groan under.”¹

And the United States has groaned under this system of too short enlistments in war from that day to the close of the Philippine insurrection.

Sixth: Invariable failure to increase the Regular Army until the eve, and frequently after the beginning, of hostili-

ties, with the result that it has rarely attained its full authorized strength during the war.

Seventh: Persistent neglect, until the Spanish-American War, to keep the organizations at the front up to their full war strength, while new and untrained regiments were either substituted for, or used to increase, the armies in the field.

Eighth: Incessant use of bounties, both State and national, down to the close of the War of the Rebellion — the logical result of short enlistments, the dearth of proper methods of recruiting, and the failure to enlist FOR THE WAR only.

Ninth: Too great a dependence placed upon raw troops and neglect to set a proper standard for them until the Philippine War. This was the case with respect to the militia used even in the War of the Rebellion and the volunteers accepted during the Spanish-American War. In the Philippine War, however, the volunteer army created under the Act of 1899 was so closely akin to Regulars in many respects that it proved immeasurably superior to any similar force we have ever organized.

Tenth: The needless protraction of all our great wars down to 1898, owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed.

Eleventh: The appalling expense caused by the unnecessarily large number of troops under pay until the Spanish-American War, the wanton waste resulting from lack of discipline, and the heavy losses from sickness which are inevitable among raw troops. These last two facts were abundantly demonstrated in the various camps established during our "toy war" with Spain.

Twelfth: The persistent failure of Congress to realize that, in a military system combining the use of Regulars and volunteers or militia, men, in the absence of compulsion or strong inducement, will invariably enlist in the organization most lax in discipline.

Thirteenth: Uniform neglect to provide *beforehand* for the requisite equipment of the number of troops likely to be called into service during the war.

Fourteenth: Lack of a General Staff, which can alone formulate a definite military policy and proper plans of campaign to be inaugurated at the beginning of war, and thus prevent the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts often imperilling the chances of success.

Fifteenth: The total inability of Congress and the American people to comprehend that military resources can only be utilized to best advantage by the central Government to which the entire nation owes paramount allegiance; that war cannot be conducted with that degree of efficiency which the people have a right to demand in return for their sacrifices unless the Government wields its power despotically; and that any delegation of that power to the States must obviously weaken the national military strength and correspondingly increase the national expenditures beyond all justification.

CHAPTER XXI

CITIZEN-SOLDIERY

WE Americans are prone to boast that whatever we possess is the "finest in the world," and we gloat with a pride often offensive over the marvellous achievements of our national career. Superficiality — which is a dominant American trait — has caused us to slumber under a fictitious security and to flatter ourselves that, because we have fortunately been victorious in our past wars, we may dismiss any apprehension as to the future. The Monroe Doctrine, with its policy of non-interference in European politics and its dogma that European Powers shall not meddle in the affairs of this hemisphere, has contributed to imbue us with a provincial standpoint from which even the Spanish-American War and our sudden development into a "World Power" have as yet been unable to divest us entirely. Animated by the deeply-rooted Anglo-Saxon repugnance to a large standing army and to anything which smacks of militarism in the remotest degree, we as a people cling with incredible tenacity to the preposterous fallacy that an American with a rifle in his hand and a uniform on his back is fully equal, if not vastly superior, to the trained soldier of other nations both in courage and efficiency. That we have thus far weathered the storms to which the American Ship of State has been exposed seems to us to afford ample reason why we should content ourselves with the same course that we have steered in the past, utterly oblivious to the fact that the world is constantly progressing in military matters and that we have apparently tried to forget every lesson which we ought to have learned by our own experience in former wars.

Through the parsimony and short-sightedness of Congress, our Regular Army has invariably been much too small to meet our requirements in time of war — and, indeed, often in time of peace — so that it has always been necessary to depend largely upon the militia and volunteers. “Why not?” the opinionated American will reply with characteristic superficiality. “Have we not always had plenty of them at our disposal? And, surely, no one could ask for better soldiers than these same militia and volunteers were at the close of the War of the Rebellion.” Granting that it would be impossible to find more efficient troops than those which the United States possessed in 1865, we must not forget that they were then militia and volunteers in name only. Four years of desperate fighting had transformed them from extremely raw recruits into seasoned veterans of the very highest type. We must, furthermore, distinctly remember that the opposing forces developed at about the same rate; that *we have never yet been pitted against the land forces of a first-class military Power*; and that it is highly improbable that any great nation in the future will ever oppose us with an army which is not trained to the highest degree.

We Americans have achieved our phenomenal successes by the application of sound business foresight and judgment, joined with progressive business methods, to the various problems which we have undertaken to solve, and it is consequently surprising that our people have not, through their Senators and Representatives in Congress, made use of the same methods in dealing with their land forces. By tabulating the figures, the majority of which have already been given, it can be seen by a glance at the table on the next page what our wars have entailed in men and money.

Probably not one American in a hundred thousand has any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterised almost every war in which we have engaged. From a purely business standpoint, the

War	Regulars	Militia, Volunteers, etc.	Opponents	Cost	Pensions
Revolution	231,771	164,087	About 150,605	\$ 350,000,000.00	\$ 70,000,000.00 ¹
1812	56,032	471,622	" 67,000	86,627,009.14	45,950,546.86 ²
Creek	600 ³	43,921 ⁴	" 2,000 ⁵	Unestimated	
Seminole	{ About 1,000 ⁶	5,911 ⁶	" 1,000 ⁷	8,004,236.53 ⁸	} See footnote ¹⁴
Black Hawk	1,341 ⁹	4,638 ⁹	{ Between 800 and 1,000 ¹⁰	5,446,034.88 ¹¹	
Florida	12,539 ¹²	48,152 ¹²	{ Between 1,200 and 2,000 ¹³	69,751,611.50 ¹²	} 48,693,102.18 ¹⁵
Mexican	31,024	73,532	About 46,000	88,500,208.33	
Of the Rebellion	67,000	2,606,341	" 1,000,000	5,371,079,778.28	} 4,457,974,496.00 ¹⁶
Spanish	58,688	223,235	" 223,160	321,833,254.76 ¹⁷	
Philippine	76,416	50,052	Unestimated	170,326,536.11 ¹⁸	} 46,092,740.47 ¹⁷

1 See page 40, and authorities on page 574, footnotes 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

2 See page 69, and page 590, footnotes 142, 143, 144 and 145.

3 39th U. S. Infantry.

4 According to the Records of The Adjutant-General's Office, Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi furnished 25,779, and North and South Carolina 18,142 militia. Of these only 15,000 were actually put into the field.

5 Upton, p. 119.

6 In a letter to the author of this book, dated April 22, 1915, The Adjutant-General cited the detailed statement compiled from the muster rolls and published in the *American State Papers*, Military Affairs, vol. II, p. 104, showing a force of 5,911 volunteers, militia and Indians engaged in the Seminole War of 1817-1818. The Adjutant-General also stated that "The exact number of regulars engaged in that war can not be determined, as the records covering that period are incomplete, but from the best data obtainable it appears that there were about 1,000 regulars engaged, making a total of approximately 6,911 regulars, volunteers, militia and Indians in the service of the United States in that war."

7 Report of the Senate Investigating Committee. *American State Papers*, I, pp. 739-741.

8 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1914, p. 236.

9 See page 73, and page 592, footnote 24.

10 Report of Major General Macomb, commanding the Army. *American State Papers*, V, pp. 29-30.

11 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1914, p. 237.

12 See page 77, and page 594, footnotes 62, 63 and 64.

13 See pages 74 and 78, and page 593, footnote 37.

14 The Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, p. 9, and June 30, 1914, p. 33, gives the total pensions paid out for Indian wars up to June 30, 1914, as amounting to \$12,801,521.01.

15 See pages 89 and 90, and page 602, footnotes 106, 107, 108, and 109. To the 73,260 volunteers and militia must be added a General Staff numbering 472, thus making a total of 73,532.

16 See page 150, and pages 632-633, footnotes 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26.

17 See page 201, and page 666, footnotes 291, 292, 293, 294 and 295.

18 See page 264, and page 686, footnotes 196, 197, 198 and 199.

above figures are indicative of puerile short-sightedness and criminal blundering such as would not be tolerated for a

moment in any properly managed company or corporation in the United States. The lamentable policy of retrenchment in time of peace, to which our legislators have persistently adhered, is nothing more or less than the "penny wise, pound foolish" policy which every sane business man heartily condemns. The results entailed by this false economy furnish a further corroboration of the fact that our military policy has always been unsound from a financial as well as a numerical standpoint, as will appear from the following table:

COST OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT BY PERIODS

Period	Condition	Cost
1791-1811 ¹	Peace	\$5,669,930.65
1812-1816	Including the War of 1812	82,627,009.14
1817-1835	Minor Indian Wars. Army averaging under 6,000 officers and men..	90,411,068.59
1836-1843	Florida War	69,751,611.11
1843-1845	Peace. The Army reduced	13,873,146.89
1846-1849	Including the Mexican War	88,500,208.38
1850-1860	Peace. The Army reduced	168,079,707.57
1861-1865	Including the War of the Rebellion.	2,736,570,923.50
1866-1869	Forces large on account of French occupation of Mexico	583,749,510.99 ²
1870-1897	Peace. The Army reduced	1,211,321,300.94
1898-1899	Including the Spanish-American War	321,833,254.76
1900-1902	Including the Philippine War	391,662,681.06
1902-1914	Peace. The Army reduced	1,693,920,509.96
	Total cost since 1790	\$7,457,970,863.54 ³
	Total cost of pensions since 1790	\$4,729,957,370.94 ⁴

What do American taxpayers who have had to foot some of these bills think of such figures? How long do they suppose that the shareholders in any bank or railway would tolerate any such mismanagement? How long would the officials or directors be permitted to remain in power if they could produce no better results in return for such colossal

¹ Throughout this table the dates given are "both inclusive" in each instance.

² Including outstanding warrants amounting to \$3,621,780.07.

³ Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1914, pp. 236-238.

⁴ Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, pp. 9-10, and June 30, 1914, p. 33.

expenditures? The mere expense of maintaining armaments, however costly, is by no means the only item to be considered in war; the outpouring of men to meet the call to arms, the disturbance of all business, economic and political conditions, are additional factors which must not be disregarded. When one considers that sacrifices involving pecuniary loss to almost every individual have always been willingly met, and that our military forces have nearly always been disgracefully beaten at the beginning of every war, save two, it is indeed a veritable enigma that the nation has not long ago awakened to the mismanagement of its military affairs and risen in anger against the indignities to which it has been subjected by its own servants.

When the progressive American business man, firm, company or corporation desires to have affairs properly conducted, one cardinal rule is invariably observed, namely, that men specially trained for that particular business are employed in numbers proportioned to its requirements under any and all circumstances that can be foreseen. We all sympathize with the Israelites who were compelled to make bricks without straw, but, in some respects, Pharaoh was no harder taskmaster than Congress has been, insomuch as the Army is supposed to cope with every possible emergency, notwithstanding that the requisite strength has yet to be given it. *Never at the beginning of any decade in our national history, save one, have our people had as much as one trained soldier to every one thousand of population to protect them, as will appear from the table on page 278.*

When any individual or combination of individuals strives for the acquisition or control of a valuable business advantage, or has any important negotiation to transact, the most experienced and best trained of its officials or agents are invariably selected for the work. *Per contra*, Congress has persistently neglected its best trained forces in favour of comparatively raw and inexperienced soldiers; and, what is more, down to 1899 it never failed in time of crisis to place its

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Year	Population of the United States	Actual strength of the Regular Army	Number of soldiers per 1,000 of population
1790	3,929,214	1,273	0.324
1800	5,308,483	4,436	0.833
1810	7,239,881	9,921	1.378
1820	9,633,822	8,942	0.927
1830	12,866,020	5,951	0.462
1840	17,069,453	10,570	0.602
1850	23,191,876	10,763	0.421
1860	31,443,321	16,367	0.520
1870	38,558,371	37,075	0.963
1880	50,155,783	26,509	0.527
1890	62,947,714	27,095	0.430
1900	76,303,387	68,155	0.895
1910	93,402,151	77,035	0.825

main dependence in the latter. Since war is the severest test to which human beings can be subjected, the folly of this procedure has naturally been reiterated *ad nauseam*. That the militia and volunteers have never failed after two years of war — which afford ample time to transform them into well-trained soldiers — to acquit themselves with credit in nowise alters the fact that, until they have undergone some similar schooling, they have never been, and never will be, anything but comparatively raw, undisciplined organizations. Although it would be manifestly unjust to blame the militia for their ignorance — particularly since our laws have never provided them with the necessary military training — and although we must not withhold the praise which they have always merited whenever, as volunteers, they have at last received sufficient schooling in actual warfare, yet it must be confessed that, viewed as a purely military asset, their value has fallen far short of what it ought to have been, and that their history has fully justified Washington's estimate that "to place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff,"* as the ensuing exhibits will demonstrate.

* Washington to the President of Congress, September 24, 1776. See page 16.

THE MILITIA RAN AWAY OR DESERTED

Battle	Date	Organization or expedition
Long Island. Evacuation of New York.	August 27, 1776 September 15, 1776.	Parsons' Brigade. ¹ Brigades of Parsons and Fellows. ²
Brandywine. Guilford Court House, North Carolina.	September 11, 1777. March 15, 1781.	Sullivan's division. ³ North Carolina militia and 2nd Maryland regi- ment. ⁴
Burwell's Ferry, Vir- ginia.	April 19, 1781.	Virginia militia. ⁵
Williamsburg, Virginia.	April 20, 1781.	Virginia militia. ⁵
Indian village near Fort Wayne, Indiana.	October 22, 1790.	Gen. Harmar's Miami ex- pedition. ⁶
Darke County, Ohio.	November 4, 1791.	Gen. St. Clair's expedi- tion. ⁷
Frenchtown and Raisin River, Michigan.	January 18-22, 1813.	Gen. Winchester's col- umn. ⁸
Sackett's Harbor, New York.	May 29, 1813.	Gen. Brown's New York militia. ⁹
French Creek, New York.	November 1 to 2, 1813.	Gen. Hampton's column. ¹⁰
Chrysler's Fields, Can- ada.	November 11, 1813.	Gen. Wilkinson's col- umn. ¹¹
Burning of Buffalo, Lew- istown and other towns in northern New York.	December 30, 1813.	Gen. McClure's New York militia. ¹²
New Orleans, Louisiana.	January 8, 1815.	800 militia, under Gen. Morgan, posted on the west bank of the Mis- sissippi. ¹³
Lake Okeechobee, Flor- ida.	December 25, 1837.	Missouri volunteers and spies under Gen. Za- chary Taylor. ¹⁴
Bull Run, Virginia.	July 21, 1861.	The entire force of militia under Gen. McDow- ell. ¹⁵

1 Carrington, p. 209. See also page 560, footnote 40.

2 See page 16, and page 560, footnote 42.

3 Gen. Greene's report; Gen. Sullivan's letter to Congress, quoted by Sparks, V, Appendix No. II, pp. 462-463.

4 See page 36.

5 See page 572, footnote 221.

6 See page 46, and page 576, footnote 22.

7 See page 46, and pages 577-578, footnote 28.

8 See page 56, and page 585, footnote 39.

9 See page 58, and page 586, footnote 58.

10 Report of Col. Purdy, 4th New York Militia. *American State Papers*, I, pp. 479-480.

11 Upton, p. 113.

12 See page 58, and page 586, footnote 62.

13 See page 68, and page 590, footnote 138.

14 See page 75, and page 593, footnote 48.

15 See page 101, and page 608, footnote 55.

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THE MILITIA MUTINIED

Place	Date	Mutineers
Morristown, New Jersey.	January 1, 1781.	Six regiments of the Pennsylvania Line, 1,300 men. ¹
Pompton, New Jersey.	Jan. 24-28, 1781.	New Jersey Line. ²
Lancaster, Pennsylvania.	June, 1783.	Eighty recruits, joined by 200 other malcontents, marched to Philadelphia, demanded their pay and held Congress prisoner for several hours on June 21, 1783. ³
On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, Michigan.	June, 1812.	Part of the militia under Gen. Hull. ⁴
Detroit, Michigan.	July, 1812.	180 Ohio militia of Gen. Hull's command. ⁴
On the march from Fort Harrison, Indiana, to the Wabash and Illinois Rivers.	October 19, 1812.	4,000 Kentucky mounted militia under Gen. Hopkins. ⁵
<i>En route</i> to the rapids of the Maumee River.	October, 1812.	Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia militia under Gen. William H. Harrison. ⁶
Battle of Queenstown, Ontario.	October 13, 1812.	New York militia under Generals Van Rensselaer and Wadsworth. ⁷
<i>En route</i> from Plattsburg, New York, to Canada.	November, 1812.	Nearly all the 3,000 militia under Gen. Dearborn. ⁸
Fort Strother, Florida.	November, 1813.	Tennessee militia and volunteers under Gen. Andrew Jackson. ⁹
Retreat to Buffalo, New York, after the evacuation of Fort George.	December, 1813.	The New York militia under Gen. McClure. ¹⁰
Withlacochee River, Florida.	December 31, 1835.	About 500 Florida militia and volunteers under Gen. Clinch. ¹¹
Charlestown, West Virginia.	July 16-18, 1861.	Militia of the Army of the Shenandoah under Gen. Patterson. ¹²

¹ See pages 33-34, and page 570, footnotes 182-186.

² See page 34, and page 570, footnotes 187-189.

³ *The Madison Papers*, I, pp. 551-553; Sparks, *Writings of Washington*, VIII, pp. 454-456; Fiske, *Critical Period of American History*, pp. 117-118.

⁴ See page 54, and page 583, footnote 11.

⁵ See pages 54-55, and page 583, footnote 14.

⁶ See page 55, and page 583, footnote 15.

⁷ See page 55, and page 584, footnote 19.

⁸ See page 55, and page 584, footnote 24.

⁹ See page 61, and page 587, footnote 80.

¹⁰ See page 58, and page 586, footnote 60.

¹¹ See pages 73-74, and page 593, footnote 33.

¹² Gen. Patterson's reports to the Adjutant-General; Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, pp. 126-127, 132, 138-139.

THE STATES DEFY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BY
REFUSING TO FURNISH THEIR MILITIA TO ITS SERVICE

State	Governor	Date	Cause and Reason for Refusal
Massachusetts.	Strong.	April, 1812.	Denied the right of the President or Congress to determine when such exigencies arise as to require the militia to be called out, and claimed that "this right is vested in the commanders in chief of the militia of the several States." ¹
Connecticut.	Griswold.	April, 1812.	Substantially the same contention as the above. ¹
Vermont.	Chittenden.	November 10, 1813.	Declared that "the military strength and resources of the State must be reserved for its own defense and protection exclusively." ²
Vermont.	Chittenden.	September, 1814.	Refused to permit the militia to support Gen. Macomb in repelling 11,000 British veterans, under Gen. Sir George Prevost, who had then invaded northern New York. ³
Virginia.	Letcher.	April 16, 1861.	} Rebellion. ⁴
North Carolina.	Ellis.	April 15, 1861.	
Kentucky.	Magoffin.	April 15, 1861.	
Tennessee.	Harris.	April 17, 1861.	
Missouri.	Jackson.	April 22, 1861.	
Arkansas.	Rector.	April 22, 1861.	

¹ See page 53, and page 582, footnotes 7 and 8.

² See pages 59-60, and pages 586-587, footnotes 70 and 71.

³ See pages 63-64, and page 588, footnotes 101 and 102.

⁴ Report of the Provost Marshal General, II, p. 130; Upton, pp. 227-228.

Is not the above a glorious record for Americans to contemplate? — we who are so prone to boasting of the prowess of our citizen-soldiers. Yet these results are by no means surprising, in view of the utter lack of a definite military policy which has always characterised the measures of the legislators who frame our military laws and mould our military organization. In every walk of life the value of skilled labour is recognized, and specially trained men are selected in preference to unskilled. Yet Congress has invariably placed its main dependence upon the unskilled citizen-soldier. Every schoolboy knows that no enthusiasm, however great, will win athletic victories without long weeks, and even months, of training. Our sages in the Capitol have repeatedly shown that they believe that, because our people individually possess courage, fortitude and self-reliance in a high degree, they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. At certain periods — as, for example, that just prior to the first battle of Bull Run — the measures passed by Congress demonstrated that it actually believed that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for war. How utterly unfounded is such a belief is abundantly proved by the table on page 275, which shows that DOWN TO 1898 THE UNITED STATES NEVER ENGAGED IN A SINGLE WAR IN WHICH IT DID NOT HAVE TO EMPLOY AT LEAST TWO MEN TO EVERY ONE USED BY ITS ADVERSARY.

It is a well-known maxim in business that the efficiency of the management of every organization depends upon the capabilities of its officials. Insomuch as the bulk of the troops which the United States has employed in time of war has always — except during less than two years in the Philippines — consisted of militia or volunteers, the officers of which, being drawn from professional and mercantile pursuits, have of necessity had but little time or opportunity to master the multifarious details which ought to be familiar to every one whose duty it is to lead troops, is

it surprising that their operations in war have been attended with mistakes at a cost often appalling? Actuated by the highest motives, sacrificing their business and personal interests for the purpose of serving their country, excelled by none in courage, these officers cannot be justly blamed for their ignorance. They are in nowise responsible for the fact that they have never been provided by Congress with the education and training necessary to fit them to cope with the many difficult problems of war. No sound business corporation would dream for an instant of entrusting the management of its affairs to officials so comparatively inexperienced, and consequently so inferior, as are the officers of the militia and volunteers.

It is for this very reason that the record of our land forces suffers sadly when compared with that of the Navy, which has achieved an almost unbroken succession of victories from the days of John Paul Jones down to the present time. The education, training and *personnel* of the officers and men of the Navy being substantially on the same plane with those of their *confrères* in the Regular Army, the fundamental reason lies deeper. It rests in the fact that Congress has been wise enough to hold jealously to its right "to provide and maintain a navy," instead of delegating any part thereof to the various States and thus giving them the power to interfere in naval as they can, and do, in military affairs. Furthermore, the appointment of all naval officers is vested in the President alone, and not surrendered to the governors of the States, as in every case of the militia and volunteers down to the Spanish-American War. The consequence is that the honour of our country and the protection of our people and their property have been entrusted to disciplined sailors, commanded by officers thoroughly trained and experienced. The merits of this system over that pursued in respect to the major part of our land forces needs no commentary; the results speak for themselves.

The *crux* of the entire question lies in the efficiency of our

militia and volunteers, which can only be gauged by their training. One of the best National Guards in the country is that of Pennsylvania, yet its actual training is confined to one week in camp and about seventy hours of drill *per annum*.* At the beginning of hostilities this militia would furnish as good volunteers as the United States could hope to obtain, and *how long does any reasonable man suppose that these troops would stand against the regulars of France, Germany or Japan? How much faith would the officials of any corporation place in an agent or employé whose training is limited to one week and seventy hours of work a year?* Yet our national legislature has persevered these many years in the delusion that an untrained citizen-soldiery could not possibly jeopardize the destinies of the nation.

Throughout its history Congress has shown a conspicuous absence of appreciation of its duty with respect, not only to the country in time of war, but to the people who support the struggle. When men make the greatest of sacrifices, including the willingness to give their lives for the welfare of their country, surely they have a right to demand that the national legislature shall do its duty toward them. Yet how often has the American people been treated as a sacrifice on the altar of the God of War, in atonement for the sins of omission and commission of Congress. General Henry Lee, a distinguished officer during the Revolution, epitomized the matter admirably when he asserted that "A GOVERNMENT IS THE MURDERER OF ITS CITIZENS WHICH SENDS THEM TO THE FIELD UNINFORMED AND UNTAUGHT, WHERE THEY ARE TO MEET MEN OF THE SAME AGE AND STRENGTH, MECHANIZED BY EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE FOR BATTLE." †

No truer words were ever uttered than those of the greatest of all Americans and no more fundamental military wis-

* Information contained in a letter from Gen. Thomas J. Stewart, the Adjutant-General of Pennsylvania, dated January 28, 1911, to the author of this book.

† *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*, I, p. 97.

dom was ever embodied in a maxim than in Washington's declaration that "TO EXPECT, then, THE SAME SERVICE FROM RAW AND UNDISCIPLINED RECRUITS AS FROM VETERAN SOLDIERS IS TO EXPECT WHAT NEVER DID AND PERHAPS NEVER WILL HAPPEN." * Yet Congress has persisted from the very beginning in believing that untrained troops are a sufficient bulwark for national defence on land, and even President Wilson in his annual message to Congress on December 8, 1914, announced that "We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms." Earnestly as it is to be hoped that in the near future the majority of American men may be given sufficient military training to make them a dependable force in time of war, the fact none the less remains that *never once, from the beginning of our national career until the present day, have we possessed "a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms."* And President Wilson has written more than one work treating of American history.

* *Washington to the President of Congress*, February 9, 1776. Sparks, III, p. 279.

CHAPTER XXII

MILITARY POLICY, LEGISLATION AND EVENTS FROM 1902 TO JUNE 1, 1915 *

ASIDE from the usual annual appropriations for the support of the Army, for fortifications and for the Military Academy, the appropriations to meet deficiencies and the sundry civil expenses, the military legislation enacted during 1902 was confined to three important measures. The Act of June 28th allotted \$2,000,000 "for the enlargement of buildings" at West Point "and for other necessary works of improvement in connection therewith."¹ The Army Appropriation Act of June 30th set apart \$15,000 "for the continuance of the Army War College, having for its object the direction and coordination of the instruction in the various service schools, extension of the opportunities for investigation and study in the Army and militia of the United States," and also authorized the Secretary of War to expend \$400,000 "for the erection of the necessary buildings for the Army War College, established at Washington Barracks, District of Columbia."² The third and last measure — the Act of July 1st — required the Secretary of War to furnish "indelibly marked" certificates "in lieu of a lost or destroyed discharge" to any officer or enlisted man "honorably discharged from the military service of the United States or to his widow," but with the proviso "that such a certificate shall not be accepted as a voucher for the payment of any claim against the United States for pay, bounty, or other allowance, or as evidence in any other case."³

* The author ventures to suggest that the reader who is not interested in the intricate details of military legislation — which of necessity comprise a large part of this chapter — should either omit or glance hurriedly through them, and should devote his attention to the parts dealing with military events.

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1902

In the Philippines the remnants of insurrection were still kept up in the provinces of Batangas and Tayabas under the leadership of Malvar, and in the island of Samar by the guerillas under Lukban. The active operations of the troops in Luzon under General J. Franklin Bell culminated in the surrender of Malvar on April 16th, while Lukban was captured and his successor Guevara surrendered to the forces under General Frederick D. Grant on April 27th. These events put an end to the warfare which had been waged by the natives with such ruthlessness since the dispersal of Aguinaldo's government in 1899. On July 4th President Roosevelt issued a proclamation announcing the termination of the insurrection and granting "complete pardon and amnesty" to the natives. The office of Military Governor was discontinued, and the Secretary of War in a General Order conveyed to the Army the thanks of the President for the services rendered to the country by its conduct "in the great and difficult undertakings" in Cuba and the Philippines.⁴ The Moros of the Sulu archipelago and Palawan were still defiant, but expeditions under Colonel Frank Baldwin and Captain John Pershing effected a distinctly summary pacification which put an end to their resistance for the time being.⁵

On February 24, 1902, the Electoral College of Cuba, chosen at a general election on December 31, 1901, convened and elected a President, Vice-President, Senate and House of Representatives. On May 20th T. Estrada Palma was inaugurated as the first President of the Cuban Republic, and during the afternoon of that same day the American forces under the command of Brigadier General Leonard Wood, Military Governor, were withdrawn from the island.

On June 11th the Military Academy at West Point celebrated with appropriate ceremonies, attended by a notable assemblage of distinguished alumni, the completion of a century of honourable and useful existence.

During the month of September joint manœuvres, suggested by Brigadier General Wallace F. Randolph, Chief of Artillery, took place on the New England coast. Simulated attacks were made by a fleet of warships against the fortifications at the eastern end of Long Island Sound, situated at New London, the entrance to Narragansett Bay and at New Bedford. A force of Regular troops and a small number of militia participated in the defence, and much profit was derived from the admirable spirit in which these manœuvres were carried out.⁶

As has been seen on page 255, Section 28 of the law of February 2, 1901, permitted the appointment of men not over forty years of age to the grades of first or second lieutenant in the Regular Army when their fitness had been favourably passed upon by examining boards, as well as allowing enlisted men who had served one year in the Army to be appointed second lieutenants. Many proceeded to avail themselves of this opportunity and, in connection with this innovation, Secretary Root made the following pertinent comments in his annual report for 1902: ⁷

“An examination of the sources from which are drawn the officers of the Army, as now constituted under the Act of February 2, 1901, shows how important it is to go on with the military education of officers in some such general and systematic way as was outlined in my last report. Of the 2,900 officers of the line of the Army, 1,818 have been appointed since the beginning of the war with Spain. Of these 1,818 but 276 were supplied by the West Point Academy; the remaining 1,542 have come—414 from the ranks, 512 from civil life, and 616 from the volunteers of the war with Spain and in the Philippines.

“The volunteers and the enlisted men have of course acquired useful experience, and they were all selected on the ground of their military conduct and intelligence. Yet it is generally true of the whole 1,542, constituting more than one-half of all the officers of the line, that they have had no systematic military education. They constitute nearly the entire body of first and second lieutenants. After some years, when their seniors

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have passed off the stage, they will have to supply our generals and colonels and chief staff officers charged with the instruction, discipline, and command of our forces. Unless the theory of military education under which we have maintained the Academy at West Point for a century is all a mistake, it is very important to give to this class of young officers, now that they are in the Army, some degree of the educational advantages which the West Point men get before they are commissioned. The same will be true of future accessions to the force of officers, for the West Point Academy, even with the recent enlargements, can not be expected to fill more than about two-thirds of the annual vacancies which will occur in the ordinary course of life."

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1903

The second session of the Fifty-seventh Congress was signaled by two measures of far-reaching importance to the military service. The first of these was entitled "An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,"⁸ which was approved on January 21, 1903, and was generally known as "the Dick bill," having been introduced in the Senate by the junior Senator from Ohio. As originally framed, it contained a number of admirable provisions; but, as in the case of past measures, it ended in a compromise containing some glaring defects which substantially defeated the very purpose for which the measure was intended. The merits of the law may be thus summarized:

(1) It separated the militia into two classes, namely, "the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States and Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia."⁹

(2) It announced that "the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen . . . and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age."⁹

(3) It defined what citizens are liable to, and exempted from, military duty.¹⁰

(4) It stipulated that within five years after the approval of this Act, "the organization, armament, and discipline of the organized militia . . . shall be the same as that which is now or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular and Volunteer Armies of the United States."¹¹

(5) It specified the manner of calling out the militia, their pay and the regulations to govern them while in service.¹²

(6) It provided for the issuance of arms, ammunition and other military supplies to the militia by the United States Government.¹³

(7) It directed that regular inspections of the militia be made by officers specially detailed by the Secretary of War.¹⁴

(8) It provided for the participation of the militia in joint manœuvres with the Regular Army, which manœuvres were to be under the command of a Regular Army officer, irrespective of the rank of any militia officer present.¹⁵

(9) It fixed the pay and allowances of militia participating in encampments, and the allowances of militia officers attending "a regular course of study at any military school or college."¹⁶

(10) It specifically required all organized militia, unless excused by the governor, "to participate in practice marches or go into camp of instruction at least five consecutive days, and to assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or regimental armories or rendezvous or for target practice not less than twenty-four times," and "during such year an inspection of each such company, troop, and battery to be made by an officer of such militia or an officer of the Regular Army."¹⁷

(11) It provided that Regular Army officers might be detailed "to attend any encampment of the organized militia, and to give such instruction and information to the officers and men assembled in such camp as may be requested by the governor"; and that Regular officers might, upon application of a governor, be assigned "for duty in connection with the organized militia," such assignments to be revocable at the request of the governor or the pleasure of the Secretary of War.¹⁸

The second part of the law beginning with Section 23¹⁹ dealt with the subject of future volunteers and

(12) provided for securing a list of persons specially qualified for commissions in any volunteer force other than the organized militia, who were to be examined by boards composed of those

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who have had previous experience in the Regular Army, volunteers, organized militia or who have pursued regular courses of military instruction in some school or college. The ages above which no commission was to issue were fixed as follows: for a second lieutenant, 30; for a first lieutenant, 35; for a captain, 40; for a major, 45; for a lieutenant-colonel, 50; and for a colonel, 55.²⁰

On the other hand, the Dick Bill presented certain defects which were as follows:

(1) The Act of May 8, 1792 — which wisely prescribed compulsory service in time of peace on the part of every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 45 — was repealed.²¹

(2) The United States must call the militia into its service through the governors of the States. A governor can refuse to obey — as did the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont in 1812, 1813 and 1814 — and the law specified no method to coerce him. The militia may refuse to respond to a call not transmitted through their governor. In that event it is subject to trial by court-martial, but no court was granted jurisdiction over such cases and no punishment was prescribed.²²

(3) *Notwithstanding the lessons of the past as to the folly of short enlistments, the law forbade the militia from being called out for a longer period than nine months.* Moreover, it permitted the States to retain the right to impose such terms and conditions of enlistment as they saw fit. Under this act militia, when offered for the service of the United States, must be accepted but could not be retained beyond the term of enlistment. As a consequence the Federal Government might have large numbers of short-term troops forced upon it, instead of being able to depend upon men enlisted "FOR THE WAR."²³

(4) The Dick bill required that the organization, armament and discipline of the militia shall be the same as that of the Regular Army. On the other hand, the acceptance of the militia was in nowise dependent upon their complying with this obligation, and no penalty was imposed for failure to reach the required standard.²⁴

(5) It was expressly stipulated that appointments of officers from the list of persons examined and found qualified to hold volunteer commissions shall not include appointments to organizations of the organized militia "which volunteer as a body,

or the officers of which are appointed by the governor of a State or Territory.”²⁵

(6) Future volunteer forces were to be organized according to the Act of April 22, 1898, thus again giving to the governors of the various States the power to appoint the officers, notwithstanding that they were to be mustered into the service of, and receive their pay from, the United States Government.²⁶

(7) The original provision for the creation of a Volunteer Reserve of 100,000 men in time of peace — to which militia officers possessing the necessary qualifications could be appointed, and for which the power of the governors to make appointments had wisely been limited — was stricken out, and no provision was made for such a volunteer reserve, or even to keep alive the ridiculously inadequate force of 3,000 men authorized by the former Act of April 22, 1898.²⁷

The Act of January 30th permitted Army officers to be detailed for service as chief and assistant chiefs — the latter not to exceed four in number — of the Philippine Constabulary, the former to have the rank, pay and allowances of a Brigadier General and the latter those of a colonel. It also permitted companies of Philippine scouts to assist in the maintenance of order in those islands and to be placed under the command of the chief or assistant chiefs of the Philippine Constabulary.²⁸

The most notable military legislation enacted in many years was the measure in which the recommendations made by Secretary Root in 1899 and 1901²⁹ were carried into effect by a radical innovation in the shape of the creation of a General Staff. This much-needed institution was inaugurated by “An Act To increase the efficiency of the Army,”³⁰ and was sufficiently important to warrant its being quoted *in extenso*. The phraseology of the law ran as follows:

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established a General Staff Corps, to be composed of officers detailed from the Army at large, under such rules as may be prescribed by the President.

SEC. 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be

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to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this Act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.

SEC. 3. That the General Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of Staff and two general officers, all to be detailed by the President from officers of the Army at large not below the grade of brigadier-general; four colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, and twelve majors, to be detailed from the corresponding grades in the Army at large, under such rules for selection as the President may prescribe; twenty captains, to be detailed from officers of the Army at large of the grades of captain or first lieutenant, who while so serving shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of captain mounted. All officers detailed in the General Staff Corps shall be detailed therein for periods of four years, unless sooner relieved. While serving in the General Staff Corps, officers may be temporarily assigned to duty with any branch of the Army. Upon being relieved from duty in the General Staff Corps, officers shall return to the branch of the Army in which they hold permanent commission, and no officer shall be eligible to a further detail in the General Staff Corps until he shall have served two years with the branch of the Army in which commissioned, except in case of emergency or in time of war.

SEC. 4. That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line and of the Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Judge-Advocate's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and Ordnance departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President. Duties now prescribed by statute for the Commanding General of the Army as a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home

shall be performed by the Chief of Staff or other officer designated by the President. Acts and parts of Acts authorizing aides-de-camp and military secretaries shall not apply to general officers of the General Staff Corps.

SEC. 5. That the Chief of Artillery shall hereafter serve as an additional member of the General Staff and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general and when the next vacancy occurs in the office of brigadier-general of the line, it shall not be filled, and thereafter the number of brigadier-generals of the line, exclusive of the Chief of Artillery, shall not exceed fourteen; and the provisions of the foregoing sections of this Act shall take effect August fifteenth, nineteen hundred and three.

Approved, February 14, 1903."

As Captain Rhodes pertinently remarks in his Gold Medal Prize Essay: ³¹

"Besides prescribing in a general way the duties of the new body and of the Chief of Staff, the act provided for changing the designation of the commanding-general, for the obvious reason that under the Constitution the President alone is Commander-in-Chief, and in past years bestowal of the title without the legal right to command had led to endless friction and ill-feeling.

"Under existing law, the Chief of Staff is simply military adviser to the President, aided in his deliberations and conclusions by the General Staff, and the law very wisely places under his direct supervision not only all troops of the line, but also the various staff corps — hitherto independent of any military control except that of the President or Secretary of War.

"In practice, the General Staff has been classified as the War Department General Staff, and the General Staff serving with troops.³²

"The former has been organized for convenience into three divisions, with appropriate duties pertaining to each: the first, generally speaking, dealing with army administration, the second with the collection and distribution of military information, and the third with questions affecting the technical services, military education and plans of campaign.

"Since its organization the General Staff has studied and passed upon a multitude of important military questions, with

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credit to itself, and with unquestioned benefit to the army. Being an advisory body, its work is and will continue to be largely confidential in character, aside from those military matters which, from their nature, are properly kept secret. Hence the tangible results of its efforts will rarely convey to the public an adequate comprehension of the full extent of its labors."

Broadly speaking, the functions of a General Staff are threefold: first, to prepare all plans for war; second, to devise the proper co-ordination between the various branches of the military service; and third, to superintend the execution of the plans, organization and co-ordination determined upon. In greater detail, its rôle was thus comprehensively portrayed by Secretary Root in his annual report for 1902: ³³

"The most intelligent way to describe such a body of men, however selected and organized, is by calling it a general staff, because its duties are staff duties and are general in their character.

"The duties of such a body can be illustrated by taking for example an invasion of Cuba, such as we were all thinking about a few years ago. It is easy for a President, or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided among the different arms of the service, and how they shall be armed, and equipped, and to do that he must get all information possible about the defenses of the place to be captured and the strength and character and armament of the forces to be met. He must determine at what points and by what routes the place shall be approached, and at what points his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must be informed about the various harbors of the island and the depth of their channels; what classes of vessels can enter them; what the facilities for landing are; how they are defended; the character of the roads leading from them to the place to be attacked; the character of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed movement; the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants; the quantity and kind of supplies that can be obtained from the country: the

extent to which transportation can be obtained, and a great variety of other things which will go to determine whether it is better to make the approach from one point or from another, and to determine what will be necessary for the Army to carry with it in order to succeed in moving and living and fighting.

“All this information it is the business of a general staff to procure and present. It is probable that there would be in such case a number of alternative plans, each having certain advantages and disadvantages, and these should be worked out each by itself, with the reasons for and against it, and presented to the President or general for his determination. This the general staff should do. This can not be done in an hour. It requires that the staff shall have been at work for a long time collecting the information and arranging it and getting it in form to present. Then at home, where the preparation for the expedition is to be made, the order must be based upon a knowledge of the men and material available for its execution; how many men there are who can be devoted to that purpose, from what points they are to be drawn, what bodies of troops ought to be left or sent elsewhere, and what bodies may be included in the proposed expedition; whether there are ships enough to transport them; where they are to be obtained; whether they are properly fitted up; what more should be done to them; what are the available stocks of clothing, arms and ammunition, and engineers' material, and horses and wagons, and all the innumerable supplies and munitions necessary for a large expedition; how are the things to be supplied which are not ready, but which are necessary, and how long time will be required to supply them.

“All this and much more necessary information it is the business of a general staff to supply. When that has been done the order is made with all available knowledge of all the circumstances upon which the movement depends for its success. It is then the business of a general staff to see that every separate officer upon whose action the success of the movement depends understands his share in it and does not lag behind in the performance of that share; to see that troops and ships and animals and supplies of arms and ammunition and clothing and food, etc., from hundreds of sources, come together at the right times and places. It is a laborious, complicated, and difficult work, which requires a considerable number of men whose special business it is and who are charged with no other duties.

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“It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa and elsewhere was the necessary result of having a large number of men, each of them doing his own special work the best he could, but without any adequate force of officers engaged in seeing that they pulled together according to the detailed plans made beforehand. Such a body of men doing general staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an army properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and rearranging information and working out plans in detail, and it makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme.”

Mr. Root advocated the abolition of the title of Commanding General of the Army and the substitution of that of Chief of Staff on the ground that in the former case the officer, by virtue of his rank, would naturally expect great latitude in following his own ideas in preference to those of others, and would justly regard attempts to control his action or to restrict his power as unwarranted interference. In this connection he went on to say ³⁴ that

“The title of Chief of Staff, on the other hand, denotes a duty to advise, inform, and assist a superior officer who has command, and to represent him, acting in his name and by his authority in carrying out his policies and securing the execution of his commands. “The officer who accepts the position assumes the highest obligation to be perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all personal interest from his advice and representation, and to try, in the most whole-hearted way, to help him to right conclusions, and to successful execution of his policies even though his conclusions may not agree with the advice given. For the successful performance of his duties the chief of staff must have the entire confidence of his commander. In proportion as he merits that confidence, the chief of staff gradually comes to find his advice usually accepted, and to really exercise the authority of his commander, subject only to the most general

directions, just as Von Moltke exercised the authority of King William of Prussia as his chief of staff."

A tremendous stride was taken in the right direction when the General Staff came into being on August 15, 1903, by virtue of the law of February 14th of that year. As has been seen, it was composed entirely of line officers whose period of service with the General Staff was limited to four years. In other words, this body was composed of officers whose duties were primarily with the line, their duties on the General Staff being merely supplemental thereto. While this new scheme possessed great merit in that it permitted a supervision and co-ordination heretofore inadequate or impossible, the system was in diametrical opposition to that of the German General Staff, in which the officers are specialists and are only detailed to troops at certain periods in order to prevent their losing touch with the conditions in the line. The German General Staff is a model of its sort and, insomuch as the American General Staff differs widely from it, it is not surprising that the latter does not accomplish as much or work as smoothly as the former.

✓ The remaining military legislation of the year, apart from the usual annual appropriations, was decidedly brief. The Army Appropriation Act of March 2nd³⁵ wisely provided, under the heading of Retired Officers,

"That in addition to the detail of retired officers now authorized by law, it shall hereafter be lawful for the Secretary of War to detail, whenever in his judgment the public interest requires it, not exceeding twenty retired officers for service in connection with the organized militia in the States and Territories, upon the request of the governor thereof, and such retired officers shall be entitled, while so employed, to receive the full pay and allowances of their respective grades."³⁶

Under the title of Retired Enlisted Men, it was stipulated

"That hereafter, in computing the length of service for retirement, credit shall be given soldiers for double the time of

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their actual service in China, the same as is now given in Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands.”³⁷

Two decidedly important features were also embodied in this law; the first — a capital innovation — was an appropriation of \$2,500 to be continued yearly

“for the purpose of furnishing a national trophy and medals and other prizes to be provided and contested for annually, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War, said contest to be open to the Army, and the National Guard or organized militia of the several States, Territories, and of the District of Columbia.”³⁸

The other feature was the allotment of \$2,000,000

“for the purpose of furnishing the necessary articles requisite to fully arm, equip, and supply each regiment, battalion, squadron, company, troop, battery, signal, engineer, and hospital corps and medical department of the organized militia of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia with the same armament and equipment as are now prescribed for corresponding branches of the line or staff in the Regular Army, without cost to said States, Territories, or the District of Columbia, but to remain the property of the United States, and to be accounted for in the manner now prescribed by law, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized, under such regulations as he may prescribe, on the requisitions of the governors of the several States and Territories, or the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, to issue the said armament and equipment to the organized militia.”³⁹

The Act of March 3, 1903, making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904,⁴⁰ contained a rider amending Section 5 of the Act of February 14, 1902, which created the General Staff.⁴¹ It read as follows:

“That the Chief of Artillery shall hereafter serve as an additional member of the General Staff, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general, and when the next vacancy occurs in the office of colonel of artillery it shall not be filled,

and thereafter the number of colonels of artillery shall not exceed thirteen; and the provisions of the foregoing sections of this Act shall take effect on August fifteenth, nineteen hundred and three.”⁴²

The Act of March 3, 1903, making appropriations for fortifications and works of defense⁴³ embodied the wise restriction

“That all material purchased under the foregoing provisions of this Act shall be of American manufacture, except in cases when, in the judgment of the Secretary of War, it is to the manifest interest of the United States to make purchases in limited quantities abroad, which material shall be admitted free of duty.”⁴⁴

The only joint Resolution touching upon military matters was passed on January 12, 1903, and permitted

“That the distinctive badges adopted by military societies of men who served in the armies and navies of the United States during the Chinese relief expedition of nineteen hundred may be worn upon all occasions of ceremony by officers and men of the Army and Navy of the United States who are members of said organizations in their own right.”⁴⁵

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1903

In the Philippines, the Moros in the region of Lake Lanao still continued to manifest hostility to the Americans and during the month of April, 1903, attacked a detachment of troops under Captain John J. Pershing, who retaliated by destroying the fort belonging to the Sultan of Baccalod. In the following month a force under the same officer, which was engaged in exploration on the eastern shore of that lake, was fired upon by the Taraca Moros; in punishment their forts were stormed and captured, and the rest of the year passed without further opposition. The American troops in the archipelago had been reduced to such an extent that on October 15th they numbered only 843 officers and 14,667 enlisted men.⁴⁶

The first national rifle contest authorized by Congress was

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held at Seagirt, New Jersey, on September 8 and 9, 1903, and was eminently successful. Six prizes were awarded, the first being won by a team from the New York National Guard. The Army rifle team was fifth and the Marine Corps sixth, but the latter was debarred from the cash prizes owing to the oversight of Congress in failing to include the Navy and Marines among the contestants.⁴⁷

On July 20th, in pursuance of the policy which had led to the institution of the General Staff, the Secretaries of War and the Navy agreed upon "the formation of a joint board to be composed of four officers of the Army and four officers of the Navy,⁴⁸ to hold stated sessions and such extraordinary sessions as shall appear advisable for the purpose of conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services."⁴⁹ This step was indeed admirable, but there still remains much to be done before such plans have been evolved as will insure that combination of military and naval forces which is requisite for properly-conducted operations alike in overseas expeditions as in national defence.

According to the law of February 14, 1903, the General Staff came into existence on August 15th, Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young being selected as the first Chief of Staff. The creation of this body necessarily relieved the War College Board of a multiplicity of duties pertaining, strictly speaking, to a General Staff, but which had had to be imposed upon the former in the absence of the latter. The division of duties between the two permitted a simpler organization for the Army War College, which was made an adjunct to the General Staff,⁵⁰ and, as all *raison d'être* for the continuance of the War College Board as then constituted had vanished, it was permanently disbanded on August 15th.⁵¹

In view of the great radical changes made in the policy and organization of the military establishment in the preceding six years, Secretary Root recommended the discon-

tinuance of important legislation affecting the Army "for some time to come," and he thus summarized the reasons for his standpoint:

"The three-battalion organization of infantry, the corps organization of artillery, the authority vested in the President to vary the numbers of the Army between minimum and maximum limits, the system of details to the Staff, with compulsory returns to line service at fixed intervals in place of permanent staff organizations, the system of general staff supervision and control, the new militia system providing for cooperation with the Regular Army, the enlarged system of military education culminating in the Army War College as an adjunct to the General Staff, all appear to be working well and are enlisting the best efforts of the officers of the Army. They should be let alone until some reason for interfering with them appears as the result of trial."⁵²

The concluding sentences of his annual report for 1903 were noteworthy for the following statements with respect to the chiefs of bureau and their assistants, civil and military, the civil assistants of the Secretary of War, and the officers of the Army in general:

"I do not think that any government ever had a body of public servants presenting a better standard of personal character, a higher average of competency, or a more completely controlling sense of public duty. A country is fortunate which has such officers to rely upon in time of need."⁵³

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1904

The first important military legislation of the year was the Act of April 21, 1904,⁵⁴ which provided that the President might select chaplains from those having the grade of captain, who had served not less than ten years and who had been commended "for exceptional efficiency," and promote them to the grade of major, but that not more than fifteen chaplains in active service should be so promoted. A proviso was also inserted to the effect that chaplains newly-appointed to the Army "shall have the grade, pay, and allowances of

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first lieutenant mounted, until they shall have completed seven years of service."

Another measure, also approved on April 21st,⁵⁵ made appropriations for fortifications, and Congress, having procrastinated for five years after the United States had acquired and occupied numerous colonies in both hemispheres, at last awoke to the fact that our insular possessions were in dire need of defence and therefore appropriated \$1,318,920 for their fortification.⁵⁶

The Army Appropriation Act of April 23rd,⁵⁷ under the heading of Retired Officers, prescribed

"That any officer of the Army below the grade of brigadier-general who served with credit as an officer or as an enlisted man in the regular or volunteer forces during the civil war prior to April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, otherwise than as a cadet, and whose name is borne on the official register of the Army, and who has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, retired on account of wounds or disability incident to the service, or on account of age or after forty years' service, may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be placed on the retired list of the Army with the rank and retired pay of one grade above that actually held by him at the time of retirement: *Provided*, That this Act shall not apply to any officer who received an advance of grade since the date of his retirement or who has been restored to the Army and placed on the retired list by virtue of the provisions of a special Act of Congress; and the Secretary of War may assign retired officers of the Army, with their consent, to active duty in recruiting, for service in connection with the organized militia in the several States and Territories upon the request of the governor thereof, as military attachés, upon courts-martial, courts of inquiry and boards, and to staff duties not involving service with troops; and such officers while so assigned shall receive the full pay and allowances of their respective grades."⁵⁸

This same measure likewise appropriated \$12,000

"For three thousand medals of honor to be prepared, with suitable emblematic devices, upon the design of the medal of honor heretofore issued, or upon an improved design, together

with appropriate rosettes and other insignia to be worn in lieu of the medal, and to be presented by direction of the President, and in the name of Congress, to such officers, noncommissioned officers and privates as have most distinguished, or may hereafter most distinguish, themselves by their gallantry in action.”⁵⁹

The Act of April 27th⁶⁰ amended Section 6 of the Act of March 3, 1899⁶¹ by extending from January 1, 1902, to January 1, 1906, the time within which claims for reimbursement had to be filed by governors who had assisted the United States in raising, organizing, supplying and equipping the Volunteer Army in the war with Spain. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to settle such items or parts of claims as had been disallowed “for the reason that they appear to have been for stores furnished or expenses incurred or transportation furnished after the troops raised had been mustered into the service of the United States”; and the certificate of the governor to the effect “that such expenses were incurred in good faith” was declared “to be sufficient to authorize the final settlement and payment in full of such claims for reimbursement.”

The Sundry Civil bill, approved April 28, 1904, contained an appropriation of \$105,000 for the construction of a double barracks for four troops of cavalry at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming⁶²—a location utterly unsuited from the standpoint of strategic, geographical or commercial advantage for a garrison of any considerable size. Another measure, likewise approved on April 28th,⁶³ continued the appropriation of \$2,500 for trophies for the annual rifle contest which had been inaugurated in 1903.

The last military legislation enacted in 1904 was the Act of December 20th “to fix the rank of certain officers in the Army,”⁶⁴ which stated

“That any second lieutenant of the United States Marine Corps who may have been appointed second lieutenant of artillery since the second day of February, nineteen hundred and one, and prior to the passage of this Act, shall, in determining

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his lineal and relative rank, be entitled to the same credit for prior commissioned service as a lieutenant of volunteers appointed under the Act entitled 'An Act to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the United States,' approved February second, nineteen hundred and one."

Two joint resolutions require passing notice. The first, approved April 15, 1904, authorized the President, in case of the loss or destruction of a medal presented by Congress to any officer or person "on account of distinguished or meritorious services," to cause a duplicate medal to be made.⁶⁵ The second resolution, dated April 28th, provided

"That the military rolls and records of the Indian wars or any other wars prior to the Civil War, now preserved in the Interior or other Departments, be transferred to the War Department, to be preserved in the Record and Pension Office of that Department, and that they shall be properly indexed and arranged for use."⁶⁶

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1904

A few encounters took place during the year in the Philippines as a result of the persistent defiance of the Moros in Mindanao and Jolo. In the former, Datu Ali with some 3,000 followers proved especially troublesome in the Catabato district and kept the troops there busy pursuing him constantly from March until October, when he agreed to surrender but soon broke his promise and resumed his depredations in the country about Liguasan and Buluan.⁶⁷ With these exceptions, the principal operations of the Regular troops were confined to joint Army and Militia manœuvres. In July a force of 1,687 regulars and 2,324 militia from the States of Washington, Oregon and Idaho assembled at American Lake, Washington, under the command of Brigadier General Funston. In August similar manœuvres occurred at Atascadero, California, in which 2,247 regulars and 2,181 California militia participated under the command of Major General MacArthur. The manœuvres in the vicinity of Manassas, Virginia, during September were conducted under



Major General Corbin on a larger scale than anything of the sort heretofore attempted in the United States. No less than 26,296 troops, composed of 5,062 regulars and 21,234 militia,⁶⁸ were mobilized and were organized into two divisions, one under the command of Brigadier General Frederick D. Grant encamped near Manassas, the other under Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell at Thoroughfare. Two problems involving movements on a large scale were presented for solution, and two days were devoted to each, arrangements being made to reproduce to a measure the situations which confronted Pope and Lee at the second battle of Bull Run on August 29 and 30, 1862. These manœuvres were highly successful, particularly in the training given to the militia,⁶⁹ and it is much to be regretted that Congressional apathy has made it impossible to continue them at all in 1906 or in subsequent years on the same scale.

The second National Rifle contest was held at Fort Riley, Kansas, in the latter part of August and was again won by a team from the National Guard of New York.⁷⁰

Although progress was made in the construction of the new building authorized for the Army War College, so cramped were the temporary quarters available that a class of only nine officers could be assembled. An important step was taken in prescribing the following course, *viz*:

“ (a) A critical study of an approved plan of operations, with a view to its confirmation or modification.

“ (b) The assumption of the original conditions on which an approved plan was based and the preparation of an independent plan, the two to be subsequently prepared and discussed.

“ (c) In each case a minute or detailed study of a certain number of days' operations at an important period of the plan, involving the preparation of every daily order of importance to be issued during the period, directing the position and movements of wagon trains of every kind, the tactical arrangement of marches (assignment of roads to columns, arrangement of columns on the roads, etc.), length of marches, tactical arrangement of camps and bivouacs, etc.

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“ (d) In connection with the above, the discussion of special problems encountered by the technical troops of the tactical use of the three arms, under the given conditions, the supply of ammunition, of disposition of the wounded, etc.

“ (e) A war game in which an actual campaign (of the civil war, for instance) will be taken, all the initial conditions of the campaign being assumed to exist now as they actually did, except that the organization, armament, equipment, and tactical methods are those of the present day, the probable result being worked out on the map.

“ (f) Informal lectures and general discussions of current military events and developments.”⁷¹

As Secretary Taft went on to point out,⁷²

“ It will thus be seen that the study pursued at this institution is of the highest character that can be exacted of officers of the Army. It consists in the application to practical problems of the knowledge previously gained by these officers at one or more of the technical schools, which constitute our excellent but inexpensive system of military education. The work of the Army War College is intended to be conducted in cooperation with that of the Naval War College, thus guaranteeing harmony of action between the two services, which can not fail to be of great advantage to the Government.”

The creation of the General Staff and the assignment to it of 45 officers, coupled with the fact that 481 other officers were on detached service, reduced the number of officers available for duty with troops below the point of proper efficiency — a condition which, as has already been seen, has often recurred in the history of our Army. The Secretary of War therefore recommended that the detail to the General Staff of line officers under the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel should create a vacancy in the line and thus add at least 25 officers available for service with troops. Similar recommendations were likewise made for additional officers in the Medical and Ordnance departments.⁷³

During the course of the year and by virtue of the regulations issued in 1903, part of the newly-created General Staff was assigned to duty with the various commanders of geo-

graphical divisions and departments, while the other portion, entitled War Department General Staff, was retained at Washington, where

“besides aiding the Secretary of War as contemplated by law in the administration of current business, [it] has made important revisions during the year of existing regulations, orders, and manuals governing the instruction and administration of the Army. In consultation with the chiefs of staff bureaus in the War Department it has completed a revision of the Articles of War, to be submitted to Congress for adoption, and of the General Regulations of the Army. It has also revised the drill regulations for infantry and the orders governing military education in the Army and at military colleges, and has now in course of preparation field service regulations for the government of troops in the field and at peace maneuvers.

“It has further systematized and developed the Military Information Division, to which has been transferred the War Department library and the distribution of War Department publications. In addition it has made some progress in advance of the establishment of the War College in the important duty imposed by statute on the General Staff of preparing plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces of the country in time of war. The volume of work done has been very great, and substantially all of the subjects placed by statute or the regulations of the President under the supervision of the General Staff have been considered during the year.”⁷⁴

Twelve months sufficed to demonstrate its unquestioned utility. Whatever its defects, there was abundant reason for Secretary Taft's declaration that “no one at all familiar with its advantages will ever think of recommending its abolition.”⁷⁵

The year 1904 witnessed the completion of more than half of the scheme of seacoast fortification advocated by the Endicott Board in its report of January 16, 1886, but considerable difficulty was experienced in getting recruits in order to maintain at full strength the coast artillery companies which, even then, were insufficient to man one half of the guns already mounted. A marked disinclination on the part of

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the men to re-enlist and the fact that nearly three years are required to train such men to a good degree of proficiency, led to a recommendation for more troops in this arm of the service, as well as in the field artillery, which "has not a proper organization, nor sufficient officers in the different grades even for the present force."⁷⁶

In compliance with the appropriation of \$1,318,920 made on April 21, 1904, for the defenses of insular possessions, the actual construction of fortifications and their armament was begun in the Philippines, in Manila and Subig bays. Plans were also prepared and approved for defensive works at San Juan, Porto Rico, Pearl Harbour and Honolulu harbour, Hawaii, San Luis d'Apra and Guam.⁷⁷

Three other points only need to be touched upon. One of these was the general re-arrangement of military commands made on January 15, 1904, whereby the geographical territory of the United States was organized into five grand military divisions, under the command of Major Generals, and each was in turn subdivided into one or more military departments under a Brigadier General. The second — which was the most important occurrence of the year from the standpoint of administration and business — was the creation of the Military Secretary's Office, effected by amalgamating the offices of the Adjutant-General and the Record and Pension, which had been authorized by Congress for the purpose of simplifying the business methods and expediting the work of the War Department.

The third was the satisfactory progress made in bringing the armament and equipment of the Organized Militia up to the standard of the Regular Army. No less than 116,544 rifles and carbines were issued to the State troops, new ammunition was gratuitously exchanged for obsolete cartridges, steps were taken looking to a re-arming of the artillery, and special inspections were made. These measures met with a ready response on the part of the militia, resulting in a distinct improvement in its discipline, attendance and efficiency.⁷⁸

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1905

Congress assuredly took heed of Mr. Root's injunction in 1903 that no further measures in respect to the Army would be necessary "for some time to time,"⁷⁹ as the military legislation enacted during 1905, aside from the usual appropriations for the Army, fortifications and the Military Academy, was extraordinarily brief. Allusion has already been made on page 304 to the first act passed at the third session of the Fifty-eighth Congress and approved on December 20, 1904. The next measure of importance was contained in the Army Appropriation bill of March 2, 1905, and provided

"That any vacancy that shall occur in the office of the Assistant Chief of the Record and Pension Office previous to July first, nineteen hundred and five, shall be filled by the appointment of a captain of the line of the Army, and vacancies hereafter occurring shall not be filled, and the offices now designated by the title of Assistant Chief of the Record and Pension Office and by the title of Assistant Adjutant-General shall hereafter be designated by the title of Military Secretary."⁸¹

This same law likewise specified

"That retired officers of the Army above the grade of major, heretofore or hereafter assigned to active duty, shall hereafter receive their full retired pay and shall receive no further pay or allowances from the United States: *Provided further*, That a colonel or lieutenant-colonel so assigned shall receive the full pay and allowances of a major on the active list."⁸²

Under the heading of Ordnance Department, \$516,000 was appropriated

"For the purpose of procuring field-artillery material for the organized militia of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, but to remain the property of the United States and to be accounted for in the manner now prescribed by law, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized, under such regulations as he may prescribe, on the requisitions of the governors of the several States and Territories or the commanding

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general of the militia of the District of Columbia, to issue said artillery material to the organized militia.”⁸³

The Appropriation bill for fortifications, approved March 3, 1905,⁸⁴ allotted the sum of \$700,000 “for construction of seacoast batteries in the insular possessions” but stipulated that

“Hereafter all estimates for fortifications for insular possessions of the United States shall be made and submitted to Congress showing amounts proposed to be expended at each harbor in each insular possession.”⁸⁵

There was also approved that day “An Act To promote the efficiency of the reserve militia and to encourage rifle practice among the members thereof,”⁸⁶ which read as follows:

“That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to sell, at the prices at which they are listed for the Army, upon the request of the governors of the several States and Territories, such magazine rifles belonging to the United States as are not necessary for the equipment of the Army and the organized militia, for the use of rifle clubs formed under regulations prepared by the national board for the promotion of rifle practice and approved by the Secretary of War.

“SEC. 2. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized in his discretion to sell to the several States and Territories, as prescribed in section seventeen of the Act approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, for the use of said clubs, ammunition, ordnance stores, and equipments of the Government standard at the prices at which they are listed for the Army. The practice of the rifle clubs herein provided shall be carried on in conformity to regulations prescribed by the national board for the promotion of rifle practice, approved by the Secretary of War, and the results thereof shall be filed in the office of the Military Secretary of the Army.”

The Sundry Civil Bill, approved March 3, 1905,⁸⁷ appropriated \$25,000

“To enable the Secretary of War, in his discretion, to cause to be transported to their homes the remains of officers and soldiers who die at military camps or who are killed in action, or who die in the field or hospital in Alaska, and at places outside the

limits of the United States, or who die while on voyage at sea," and \$2,500 were set apart for the same purpose in the case of civilian employ es of the Army.⁸⁸

The only Joint Resolution that year which is of interest was approved on February 28th and provided

"That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized to deliver to the proper authorities of the respective States in which the regiments which bore these colors were organized certain Union and Confederate battle flags now in the custody of the War Department, for such final disposition as the afore-said proper authorities may determine."⁸⁹

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1905

The only operations of the Army during the year occurred in the Philippines and on a minor scale. Mention of the depredations committed in Mindanao during 1904 by Datu Ali has already been made on page 305. Repeated attempts to induce him by peaceful means to surrender having proved abortive, and his incessant terrorizing of the Cotabato valley and of the Moros who were friendly to the Americans having become insupportable, an expedition composed of three officers and 100 picked men from the 22nd Infantry, together with a detachment of one officer and ten Philippine Scouts, the whole under the command of Captain Frank R. McCoy, one of General Wood's aides-de-camp, was despatched against him by Brigadier General Buchanan, temporarily commanding the Department of Mindanao. Leaving Digos on October 16th, a rapid march attended with great hardship brought the column — which was composed of 77 men stripped of all impedimenta except cooked rations for one day and reserve ammunition — to the Malala River on October 22nd, where Datu Ali was surprised in his hiding place and killed.⁹⁰ This success resulted in the seizure or surrender of all the arms in the hands of the hostile Moros and in the complete pacification of the Cotabato valley.⁹¹ This exploit, planned with great cunning and executed in a masterful manner,⁹²

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while less well known, was characterised by an ability not one whit inferior to Funston's capture of Aguinaldo two and a half years previously.

Aside from the operations in the Philippines, the Army — which numbered on October 15, 1905, 3,750 officers and 56,064 enlisted men ⁹³— spent a year of the usual routine duties in its various garrisons, without even such manœuvres as were held in 1902, 1903 and 1904 to enliven the monotony, because Congress had been too parsimonious to make the necessary appropriations for them.

In his annual report the Secretary of War laid great stress upon the impaired efficiency of the service resulting from the fact that about 25 per cent. of the line officers and 11 per cent. of the staff officers were absent on detached duty, pointing out “that at the date of the last annual inspection of the Army about 40 per cent. of the captains of the line were absent from their commands and that 10 per cent. of our cavalry, artillery, and infantry companies were commanded by second lieutenants.” Emphasis was very properly laid on the fact that

“these conditions can not continue without great detriment to the service.

“With a full complement of trained officers it takes a long period of unremitting effort to make a good cavalryman out of a raw recruit, and this remark applies with even greater force to our artillery service, which has now — particularly in the coast branch — become of a highly technical and specialized character; and when we consider that our small army is maintained chiefly as a nucleus of the army that would be required in the event of a national crisis, and must therefore always be kept in the highest state of efficiency, the conditions disclosed by these figures are so startling as to call for prompt remedial action.” ⁹⁵

To that end he recommended an increase in the Artillery Corps and in the number of officers of the Army, particularly in the Medical and Ordnance departments — indeed the urgency of a larger force in these last two corps was sufficient

to prompt President Roosevelt to send a special message to Congress on January 9th advocating their increase.⁹⁶

✓ So great was the progress made in the re-organization of the militia begun in 1903 that Secretary Taft was able to report that "with few exceptions the militia now conforms to the organization of the Regular Army as far as practicable," and that "a strong disposition is manifested on the part of the State authorities to bring their militia to a state of discipline and efficiency approximating as closely as possible that of the Regular Army." He also pointed out that "while much remains to be accomplished as to organization, supply, discipline, and training of the militia before there will be anything like uniformity or a high average of efficiency, a general improvement was shown over conditions prevailing the year before, and continued improvement is confidently expected in consequence of the interest and pride in the matter exhibited generally by the State authorities concerned."⁹⁷

The work of fortification, not only of the seacoast of continental United States but of Manila and Subig Bays, was continued and the installation of batteries for the defence of the important naval station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was begun.⁹⁸

By all odds the most important event of the year from a military standpoint was the appointment made on January 31, 1905, by President Roosevelt of a board to revise the report of the Endicott Board with respect to fortifications. In the Executive order creating this new body, Mr. Roosevelt very aptly stated that

"The report of the Endicott Board, submitted nineteen years ago, was very carefully considered by its distinguished members. It enunciated sound military principles and recommended the best application of these principles with the conditions then existing. It fully deserved the generous support it has received from Congress. Nearly two-thirds of the land armament recommended by the Board has been installed or provided for; but since the date of the report so many conditions then existing

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have been materially modified, and the engines or implements of war have been so greatly improved, and others, untried or unknown, of undoubted value developed, giving a greater advantage to the defense, that it is confidently believed our harbor defense can be completed effectively and satisfactorily with a much less expenditure of money than has been heretofore estimated. With this object in view, the Board will recommend the armament fixed and floating, mobile torpedoes, submarine mines, and all other defensive appliances that may be necessary to complete the harbor defense with the most economical and advantageous expenditure of money.

“The Board will also recommend the order in which the proposed defense shall be completed, so that all the elements of harbor defense may be properly and effectively coordinated.”

The following were appointed to constitute this new board :

Hon. William H. Taft, Secretary of War, president of the Board; Lieutenant General Adna R. Chaffee, Chief of Staff; Major General George L. Gillespie, Assistant Chief of Staff; Brigadier General Adolphus W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer; Brigadier General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance; Brigadier General John P. Story, Chief of Artillery, General Staff; Brigadier General Alexander Mackenzie, Chief of Engineers; Captain Charles M. Thomas, U. S. Navy; Captain Charles S. Sperry, U. S. Navy; Major George W. Goethals, General Staff, secretary of the Board.

Upon convening, the National Coast Defense Board — or “The Taft Board” as it is generally known — subdivided its preliminary work into three parts, *viz.*: (1) charge and supervision of matters relating to fortifications and armament in general; (2) torpedoes and similar accessories in the work of defence and communication; and (3) those matters in which the Navy was more especially concerned. Each subdivision was allotted to a separate committee, and a careful study of the conditions was made by a personal inspection of the various harbours along the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts, at Guantanamo and on the Isthmus of Panama. The committee whose functions were enumerated under the first heading adopted the ensuing important resolution:

"The committee is of the opinion that in the present state of the coast defenses it is highly important that measures be taken to render the armament already installed fully effective, and that, to this end, ample appropriations should be made to complete, in the harbors of the United States already fortified, those accessory works and installations, such as a system of fire control and direction, power plants and searchlights, and the submarine and torpedo defense, which are necessary to realize the full value of what has already been provided."⁹⁹

The full report of the Taft Board was not rendered until February 1, 1906, and we shall have occasion to comment upon it in considering the events of that year. It is to be noted that this board took pains to differentiate between coast defence and harbour defence — a distinction which is of importance insomuch as *the United States has never had, and does not to-day possess, anything beyond harbour defence, except insofar as the mobile army can be depended upon for the protection of our coasts.*

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1906

The first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress was marked by the enactment of certain military legislation of considerable importance. The Army Appropriation Act, approved on June 12, 1906, provided, under the heading of Retired Officers,

"That hereafter no officer holding a rank above that of colonel shall be retired except for disability or on account of having reached the age of sixty-four years until he shall have served at least one year in such rank."¹⁰⁰

Congress apparently realized that the valuable training afforded by such joint manœuvres as had occurred in 1902, 1903 and 1904, ought not to be permitted to lapse as they did in 1905 owing to its own negligence, and it therefore appropriated \$700,000 for the expenses of the militia participating "in such brigade or division encampments,"¹⁰¹ and further allotted \$550,000 "for the purpose of procuring field-artillery material for the organized militia."¹⁰²

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On June twenty-second there was approved "An Act To increase the efficiency of the militia and promote rifle practice,"¹⁰³ which was of more than ordinary importance. The amendment to Section 1661 of the Revised Statutes was further amended so as to read

"That the sum of two million dollars is hereby annually appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of providing arms, ordnance stores, quartermaster stores, and camp equipage for issue to the militia, such appropriation to remain available until expended."

Section two of the Act of February 12, 1887, was also changed to read thus:

"SEC. 2. That said appropriation shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories, under the direction of the Secretary of War, according to the number of Senators and Representatives to which each State respectively is entitled in the Congress of the United States and to the Territories and District of Columbia such proportion and under such regulations as the President may prescribe: *Provided, however,* That no State shall be entitled to the benefits of the appropriation apportioned to it unless the number of its regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia shall be at least one hundred men for each Senator and Representative to which such State is entitled in the Congress of the United States. And the amount of said appropriation which is thus determined not to be available shall be covered back into the Treasury: *Provided also,* That the sums so apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia shall be available for the purposes named in section fourteen of the Act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, for the actual expenses of travel in making the inspections therein provided for over the allowances made for same by law; for the promotion of rifle practice, including the acquisition, construction, maintenance, and equipment of shooting galleries and suitable target ranges; for the hiring of horses and draft animals for the use of mounted troops, batteries, and wagons; for forage for the same and for such other incidental expenses in connection with encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction provided for in sections fourteen and fifteen of the said Act of

January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, as the Secretary of War may deem necessary.”

Section three of the same act was amended and re-enacted as follows:

“SEC. 3. That the purchase or manufacture of arms, ordnance stores, quartermaster stores, and camp equipage for the militia under the provisions of this Act shall be made under the direction of the Secretary of War, as such arms, ordnance and quartermaster stores, and camp equipage are now manufactured or otherwise provided for the use of the Regular Army, and they shall be receipted for and shall remain the property of the United States, and be annually accounted for by the governors of the States and Territories and by the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, for which purpose the Secretary of War shall prescribe and supply the necessary blanks and make such regulations as he may deem necessary to protect the interests of the United States.”

Section four of the Act of February 12, 1887, was thus amended:

“SEC. 4. That whenever any property furnished to any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, as hereinbefore provided, has been lost or destroyed, or has become unserviceable or unsuitable from use in service, or from any other cause, it shall be examined by a disinterested surveying officer of the organized militia, to be appointed by the governor of the State or Territory, or the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, to whom the property has been issued, and his report shall be forwarded by said governor or commanding general direct to the Secretary of War, and if it shall appear to the Secretary of War from the record of survey that the property has been lost or destroyed through unavoidable causes, he is hereby authorized to relieve the State from further accountability therefor; if it shall appear that the loss or destruction of property was due to carelessness or neglect or that its loss could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, the money value thereof shall be charged against the allotment to the States under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended. If the articles so surveyed are found to be unserviceable or unsuitable, the Secretary of War shall direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be

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made of them, except unserviceable clothing which shall be destroyed, and if sold the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States."

On June 25, 1906, was approved "An Act To increase the efficiency of the Ordnance Department of the United States Army,"¹⁰⁴ in which the repeated recommendations of the Secretary of War for more officers were heeded by the provision

"That the Ordnance Department shall consist of one chief of ordnance with the rank of brigadier-general; six colonels, nine lieutenant-colonels, nineteen majors, twenty-five captains, twenty-five first lieutenants, and the enlisted men, including ordnance-sergeants, as now authorized by law.

"SEC. 2. That details to the Ordnance Department under the provisions of the Act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, may be made from the Army at large from the grade in which the vacancy exists, or from the grade below: *Provided*, That no officer shall be so detailed except upon the recommendation of a board of ordnance officers, and after at least one examination, which shall be open to competition: *And provided further*, That officers so detailed in grades below that of major shall not be again eligible for such detail until after they have served for at least one year out of that department."

The Act of June 25th stipulated that the chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs should be appointed by the President for four years "and while holding that office he shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general";¹⁰⁵ while a third act, approved that same day, appropriated \$250,000 for the purchase of two tracts of land, on Deer Island, in Boston Harbour, "for fortification purposes";¹⁰⁶ and Congress, forgetting that national defence and the necessary training for it are, or ought to be, paramount to any consideration of local interests, inserted the ensuing proviso:

"SEC. 2. That the United States shall be liable for any damage to the property of the city of Boston or to the works of the North Metropolitan Sewerage System located on said island that may be caused by the firing of guns in time of peace from batteries erected within the area that may be acquired as afore-

said; and the Secretary of War is authorized and directed, whenever any such damage occurs, to ascertain and determine what would be a reasonable and proper compensation to pay the city of Boston and shall certify the same to Congress for consideration.”¹⁰⁷

The fourth act, approved on June 25th, made appropriations “for fortifications and other works of defense” and allotted \$165,000

“for the erection and equipment of a powder factory, with its necessary communications and accessory structures, upon such reservation now or that may hereafter be under the control of the War Department as may be selected by the Secretary of War.”¹⁰⁸

A most important step was thus taken in empowering the military service to embark upon the manufacture of powder — the object being to render it more or less independent of private producers — and the new factory was located at the Picatinny Arsenal at Dover, New Jersey. The same act set apart \$310,000 for the purchase of sites and the erection of seacoast batteries in the Hawaiian Islands,¹⁰⁸ and three days later an additional appropriation of \$1,700,000 was made “for completing the necessary improvements at the United States Military Academy at West Point.”¹⁰⁹

On June 30th a law¹¹⁰ went into operation specifying

“That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to issue, at his discretion and under proper regulations to be prescribed by him, without cost of transportation to the United States, such obsolete ordnance and ordnance stores as may be available to State and Territorial educational institutions and to State soldiers and sailors orphans’ homes, for purposes of drill and instruction.

“And the Secretary of War shall require from such institutions or homes a bond in each case in double the value of the property issued for the care and safe-keeping thereof and for the return of the same to the United States when required: *Provided*, That the issue herein provided for shall be made only to institutions upon recommendation of the governors of States and Territories and shall not be made in any case to any educational institution to

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which issues of such stores are allowed to be made under provisions of existing law."

Five Joint Resolutions relating to the military service were passed during the year ¹¹¹ but they are not of sufficient importance to require chronicling here.

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1906

During the year it became necessary to use certain of the troops stationed in the Philippines to assist the Philippine constabulary and scouts in quelling disorders which they were unable to cope with. In the island of Jolo the depredations of a band of fanatical Moros, several hundred strong, led, after peaceful measures had been exhausted, to the despatching in March of an expedition under Colonel Joseph W. Duncan of the 6th Infantry against their stronghold at Bud-Dajo. The engagement, which lasted from the 5th to the 8th of that month, was characterised by some desperate fighting on both sides and the attempts of the American troops to carry the place — which was one of extraordinary natural strength — threatened to end in failure when an escalade led by Lieutenant Gordon Johnston, who had volunteered to accompany the expedition, effected an entrance over the stockade, and the fight culminated in the killing of many of the Moros and in the dispersal of the rest.¹¹²

From the 18th of April until the first of July the Regular troops rendered signal service in supplying the destitute and maintaining order in San Francisco after the earthquake and conflagration which had destroyed a large part of that city.

During the summer an insurrection against the Cuban government assumed such proportions that the President of that republic requested the United States Government to intervene, basing its action on the authority emanating from the so-called "Platt amendment." In compliance therewith and as a preliminary to the establishment of a provisional government looking to the pacification of the island, an ex-

peditionary force composed of 5,396 Regular troops was despatched to Cuba under the command of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the Chief of Staff. The value of a General Staff was evinced by the precision and utter absence of friction and confusion which characterized the organization, equipping, supplying and transportation of this expedition.¹¹³

Disaffection over the allotment of lands in the Uintah reservation caused a band of some 300 Ute Indians to break out across Wyoming. In response to the call of the governor of that State, troops were sent to intercept them, and the entire body was conducted to Fort Meade, South Dakota.

A serious breach of military discipline occurred during the night of August 13th-14th, when certain soldiers of the 25th Infantry (coloured) stationed at Fort Brown "shot up" the town of Brownsville, killing and wounding several persons. An investigation conducted by Inspector-General Garlington was promptly made and the culprits punished. As a matter of fact, the report of the Judge-Advocate showed that the number of cases tried by summary courts during 1906 "was but slightly less than during the preceding year, when there were 51,329."

The excellent innovations in the matter of schooling of the troops, which were put into operation during the year 1906, are comprehensively described in the report of the Secretary of War who stated,¹¹⁴ under the heading of Encampments of the Regular Army and the Militia, that

"The past year has been one of great activity for the Army in the earnest and persistent training that has been had in the different exercises calculated to instruct and prepare the soldier in time of peace for his actual duties in war. There have been weekly practise marches of not less than 12 miles for foot troops and 18 miles for mounted troops, and during the open season a monthly march of instruction covering three consecutive days and requiring two camps.

"The principal difference between the old system of training and the new system inaugurated during the past year consists in

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the frequency of practise marches with full equipment and the conduct of skirmish fire at target practise in field kit; and in addition to the valuable practical knowledge that was to be acquired, one of the main objects was to keep both men and animals in fit condition for active service at any time. There has been some difference of opinion regarding the efficacy of the new system, particularly with reference to the marching and skirmish fire in full equipment, but, upon the whole, it has met with approval.

“Some of the requirements of this new system of practical training were fulfilled in connection with the joint encampments of the Army and the Militia during August and September in the seven camps of instruction that were established at Mount Gretna, Pa.; American Lake, Washington; Fort Riley, Kans.; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.; State Maneuver Camp, near Austin, Tex.; Target and Maneuver Reservation, near Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., and Chickamauga Park, Ga. ✓

“Each camp was commanded by a general officer, and practically all the cavalry, infantry, and field artillery stationed in the United States were assembled in these seven camps of instruction. In the concentration of the troops and their dispersion at the conclusion of the camp period, the infantry were required to march approximately 200 miles and the field artillery and cavalry 250 miles each way, and both on the march and in camp the conditions of field service in time of war were approximated as nearly as possible. The flooring of tents and similar semi-permanent arrangements were forbidden, and the maximum of drills, exercises, and problems calculated to harden the troops and perfect their field training were enjoined, ‘together with the minimum of formal ceremonies and a total absence of merely spectacular exhibitions.’

“All the work incident to the formation, maintenance, and discontinuance of the camps was done by officers and enlisted men, each officer doing, so far as practicable, the duties of the staff corps or arm of service to which he belonged.”

The resumption of these joint manœuvres, which had been discontinued during 1906 for want of an appropriation, was welcomed by the military authorities, Federal and State alike, as is attested by the fact that no less than 49,717 troops participated in them, the Regular officers and men numbering 20,478 and the Militia 29,239.¹¹⁵

As a further step to increased efficiency of the Army, the Secretary of War recommended the abolition of a large number of the small posts scattered all over the country — a necessity during the Indian wars, but one whose *raison d'être* had long since vanished — and the concentration of the troops in regimental and brigade posts, in order that officers and men might be afforded the opportunity for training such bodies as they would necessarily serve with in time of war. He again called attention to the need of an increase in the Artillery Corps, and advocated its separation into Field Artillery and Coast Artillery on the ground that the existing system was “illogical and wasteful and altogether unsatisfactory,” and that “modern experience teaches the wisdom of a regimental organization for field artillery, and the necessity for a corps organization for the coast artillery is founded in the very nature of things.” An increase had been made by the Act of June 26, 1906, in the Ordnance department but, as the Medical Corps had been overlooked, emphasis was laid on the need for more officers in that department, and it was pointed out that the Act of February 2, 1901, had left it defective in three important particulars, namely:

“I. A commissioned personnel entirely adequate to perform the medical service of the Army in time of peace.

“II. Insufficient enducement in the way of pay and promotion to attract the most desirable class of young physicians to enter and remain in the corps.

“III. No satisfactory means of expansion to meet war conditions and special needs in time of peace.”¹¹⁶

✓ Particular stress was placed upon the urgent advisability of amendment of the laws of April 22, 1898, and January 21, 1903 (the Dick Bill) — governing the use in time of war of forces other than the Regular establishment. The whole matter was thus admirably summed up by Secretary Taft: —

“There seems to be lack of clearness, as to the distinction between calling the militia (i. e., all citizens liable to military duty) into the service of the United States and the raising of volun-

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teers, these two operations being seemingly taken as practically identical procedures and the two forces as identical, whereas they are wholly distinct forces and should be kept so. The organized militia is primarily under the control of the State authorities, at the disposal, however, of the National Government for a limited period and for certain purposes, as set forth in section 4 of the act of January 21, 1903. VOLUNTEER FORCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONSTITUTE A FEDERAL AGENCY, CREATED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR NATIONAL PURPOSES, AND THIS DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MORE CLEARLY MAINTAINED IN THE LAWS.

“The general practise heretofore of calling out volunteers has been to address a call to the governors of the various States for so many organizations, complete, the officers being appointed by the governors. The last portion of Section 6 of the act of April 22, 1898, however, authorizes the raising from the nation at large of not to exceed 3,000 men, and provided for the appointment by the President of the officers of this force. Similar provision was later made for volunteer regiments for service in the Philippine Islands. These experiments were so entirely successful as to force the conclusion that this is the proper method of raising and training volunteers. This of course is not an infringement of the constitutional provision reserving to the States the appointment of the officers of the *militia*. This latter vests in the State authorities, even after the organized militia is ordered into the service of the United States, but for volunteer forces the President should be free to exercise his constitutional power to ‘nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,’ to appoint the commissioned officers of the Army.”¹¹⁷

By all odds the most important event of the year from a military standpoint was the report of the National Coast-Defense Board rendered to the President on February 1, 1906.¹¹⁸ The principal consideration upon which its recommendations were based was contained in the postulate with respect to any given fortification and its guns that,

“If the armament will compel the enemy to land in order to effect its capture, it has fulfilled its function, and any increase in armament thereafter is an unwarrantable expense in material and personnel.”¹¹⁹

In other words, it admitted tacitly that THE UNITED STATES

POSSESSES NO COAST DEFENCES, ONLY HARBOUR DEFENCES, and that THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION OF OUR COASTS, AND INDEED OF ANY FORTIFICATION GUARDING A HARBOUR, MUST NECESSARILY DEVOLVE UPON A MOBILE ARMY — facts which cannot be too strongly emphasized.

Under the plan advocated by the Endicott Board in 1886, permanent harbour defences had, by the beginning of 1906, been installed at the following places in continental United States:

1. Kennebec River, Maine.
2. Portland, Maine.
3. Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
4. Boston, Massachusetts.
5. New Bedford, Massachusetts.
6. Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island.
7. Eastern entrance to Long Island Sound.
8. New York.
9. Delaware River.
10. Baltimore, Maryland.
11. Washington, District of Columbia.
12. Hampton Roads, Virginia.
13. Cape Fear River, North Carolina.
14. Charleston, South Carolina.
15. Port Royal, South Carolina.
16. Savannah, Georgia.
17. Key West, Florida.
18. Tampa Bay, Florida.
19. Pensacola, Florida.
20. Mobile, Alabama.
21. New Orleans, Louisiana.
22. Galveston, Texas.
23. San Diego, California.
24. San Francisco, California.
25. Columbia River, Oregon and Washington.
26. Puget Sound, Washington.¹²⁰

To the above, the Taft Board added the ensuing:

1. Eastern entrance to New York.
2. Southern entrance to New York.
3. Entrance to Chesapeake Bay.
4. Lake ports.
5. Kiska Island, Bering Sea.

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In the insular possessions, fortifications were advocated at

1. Guantanamo, Cuba.
2. San Juan, Porto Rico.
3. Guam, in the Pacific.
4. Subig Bay, Philippines.
5. Manila Bay, Philippines.
6. Pearl Harbour and Honolulu.

On the Isthmus of Panama defences were to be placed at

1. Colon.
2. Panama.

Attention was invited to the fact that

“Commercially and strategically Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it always has been, of the very first importance. With the entrance as it is now, unfortified, a hostile fleet, should it gain control of the sea, can establish, without coming under the fire of a single gun, a base on its shores, pass in and out at pleasure, have access to large quantities of valuable supplies of all kinds, and paralyze the great trunk railway lines crossing the head of the bay.

“The completion of the fortifications at the entrance to Long Island Sound is placed second to Chesapeake Bay only because there are some guns already mounted at the former, while there are none to defend the channel between Cape Charles and Cape Henry. The importance of the fortifications at the entrance to Long Island Sound is due to the fact that they constitute the first and chief line of defense of New York City against naval attack from that direction; they will prevent the occupation by a hostile fleet of Gardiner’s Bay or other interior water as a naval base, and will also protect various manufacturing towns established along the Sound, including New London, Bridgeport, New Haven, and others.”

Next in importance were placed Puget Sound, Subig Bay, Guantanamo and the entrance to Manila Bay, in the order named.¹²¹

The above is of interest in that it affords another example of Congressional procrastination and unwillingness to do its whole duty in respect to national defence. Though no less than twenty years had elapsed since the report of the Endi-

cott Board, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, one of the most important inland arteries of trade in the country, was still defenceless. One wonders if Job had dealings with a body like Congress and for that reason uttered the complaint, "How long, O Lord, how long?"

The report of the National Coast-Defense Board showed that the

1. The total cost of the existing system of coast defenses of continental United States, up to February, 1906, amounted to \$72,750,583.98.

2. The cost to complete the defenses of the United States, including sites and ammunition, was estimated at \$50,879,339.00.

3. The estimated cost of the defenses for insular harbors, including ammunition, was placed at \$19,873,895.00.

4. The expenditures necessary for the fortifications at the two entrances to the Panama Canal were calculated at \$4,827,682.00.

5. The cost of completing the submarine equipment, installation of the system of range and position finding, and the necessary search-lights for harbor defense at night was estimated at \$14,513,084.

6. The requisite power plants and electrical installation for use in connection with both guns and mines was calculated to involve an expenditure of \$3,062,664.¹²²

During the course of the year work was continued on the fortifications of continental United States, at Manila Bay and at Subig Bay in the Philippines. Careful study was also made of the proper sites for batteries at Pearl Harbour and Honolulu, but the construction of batteries at those points could not be begun until the following year.¹²³

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1907

The military legislation passed during the year 1907 presented only a few notable features, the most important by all odds being "An Act To reorganize and to increase the efficiency of the artillery of the United States Army," approved on January 25th.¹²⁴ The separation of this corps into two parts, as advocated by the Secretary of War in his report for 1906, was made by the first section which provided

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“That the artillery of the United States Army shall consist of the Chief of Artillery, the coast artillery and the field artillery. The coast artillery and the field artillery shall be organized as hereinafter specified, and the artillery shall belong to the line of the Army: *Provided*, That on and after July first, nineteen hundred and eight, the Chief of Artillery shall cease to exercise supervision over the field artillery and shall hereafter be designated as the Chief of Coast Artillery.”

It seems incredible that these two branches of the artillery should have been retained so long together, instead of being kept distinct and apart as almost every other military Power has found it expedient to do. Indeed, in Germany the coast artillery is designated as “Marine Artillery” and is placed under the supervision of the Minister of the Marine.

Section 2 specified “That the Chief of Artillery or Chief of Coast Artillery shall be an additional member of the General Staff Corps, and his other duties shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War.” It also provided that he should be selected from the Coast Artillery; that when retired should have “the rank, pay and allowances authorized by law for a brigadier-general on the retired list”; and that he should either continue in the same lineal position as he would have held under ordinary circumstances or be an additional number either in the grade to which, or that from which, he was appointed.

The next two sections ran as follows:

“SEC. 3. That the coast artillery is the artillery charged with the care and use of fixed and movable elements of land and coast fortifications, including the submarine mine and torpedo defenses.

“SEC. 4. That the field artillery is the artillery which accompanies an army in the field, and includes light artillery, horse artillery siege artillery, and mountain artillery.”

Section 5 stipulated “That the coast artillery shall constitute a corps, and shall consist of one Chief of Coast Artillery with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general,” certain commissioned and non-commissioned officers

duly enumerated and numbering respectively 700 and 399, "one hundred and seventy companies, and fourteen bands."

Section 6 prescribed the strength of each company of Coast Artillery, and inserted the proviso that the number of sergeants should be in excess of 1,362 or the corporals 2,040, "and that the total enlisted strength of the coast artillery as provided under this Act, shall not exceed nineteen thousand one hundred and forty-seven, exclusive of master electricians, electrician-sergeants, first class, and electrician-sergeants, second class."

Section 7 fixed the organization of the Field Artillery, which was to consist of six regiments, each having "six batteries organized into two battalions of three batteries each," while Section 8 established the composition of the field batteries which, exclusive of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers, were to contain 102 privates. An expansive organization was wisely arranged for by permitting the President to increase in any battery of Field Artillery the number of sergeants from six to eight, the corporals from twelve to sixteen, the mechanics from four to seven, the musicians from two to three, "and the number of privates to one hundred and forty-nine"; but it was expressly stipulated that the total number of enlisted men in the line of the Army, together with native scouts, was not to be increased beyond that fixed by Section 36 of the Act of February 2, 1901, which — as has been seen — was limited to 96,799.

The severance of the two branches of the artillery was thus provided for:

"SEC. 9. That on and after the approval of this Act the coast artillery and the field artillery shall be permanently separated, the separation to be effected as follows:

"All officers in the present Artillery Corps shall remain on one list as regards promotion until sufficient promotions shall have been made, as far as the present number of officers permit, to provide in each grade, together with the officers remaining therein, the total number of officers of the grade provided for in this Act for the coast and field artillery combined. After

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such promotion they shall, in each grade, be assigned by the President to the coast artillery or to the field artillery, according to special aptitude and qualifications and agreeably to individual preference, so far as may be practicable and for the good of the service, such assignments to be permanent; and all officers promoted or appointed in the artillery thereafter shall be commissioned as officers of the coast artillery or the field artillery, as the case may be, and shall be promoted by seniority in their own branch, subject to the provisions of the laws governing promotion in the Army at large."

Section 10 prescribed that vacancies should be filled in the usual method of promotion but, in case of an insufficiency of officers in the Artillery Corps,

"one-fifth in each branch shall be filled in each fiscal year until the total number of officers herein provided for shall have been attained. The vacancies remaining in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by appointment in the following order: First, of graduates of the United States Military Academy; second, of enlisted men whose fitness for advancement shall have been determined by competitive examination; third, of candidates from civil life; and all such appointments shall be made in accordance with the provisions of existing law."

The next section established the pay and allowances of non-commissioned staff officers, as well as additional pay for certain of them such as casemate electricians, plotters, etc., and fixed their number, with the proviso that no enlisted man should receive "more than one addition to his pay." Section 12 permitted the appointment of "one chaplain for each regiment of field artillery and two for the coast artillery," while the final section repealed "all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."

The Act making appropriations for fortifications, approved March 2, 1907, repealed Section 2 of the law of May 19, 1882, which permitted two guns and four mortars to be loaned to any State bordering on the sea or Gulf coast where the militia thereof held an annual encampment of not less than six days, as well as the appropriation of \$5,000 to each

State "for the construction of a suitable battery for the cannon so issued." ¹²⁵

The Army Appropriation Act of the same day contained four items of more than passing interest. The first put an end to the short-lived existence of exactly two years of the office of Military Secretary by providing

"That hereafter the Military Secretary's Department of the Army shall be known as the Adjutant-General's Department, the senior in rank of the officers of said department shall be designated by the title of The Adjutant-General, the other officers of the Department shall be designated by the title of Adjutant-General, and The Military Secretary's Office of the War Department shall be known as the Adjutant-General's Office." ¹²⁶

Under the heading of Pay of Officers of the Line and as a logical consequence of the creation of the office of the Chief of Staff, it was announced

"That when the office of Lieutenant-General shall become vacant it shall not thereafter be filled, but said office shall cease and determine," ¹²⁷

and, under the caption of Bureau of Insular Affairs, it was provided

"That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail an officer of the Army, whom he may consider especially well qualified to act as principal assistant to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, and said principal assistant while acting under said detail shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a major: *And provided further*, That the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, with reference to the transfer of officers of the line to the departments of the staff for tours of service, shall apply to the vacancy created by this Act and to the return of the officer so detailed to the line of the Army." ¹²⁸

Although the United States military prison at Fort Leavenworth had been re-established early in the preceding year and thus relieved the overcrowding of the guard-houses at various posts and garrisons, it had become filled to its fullest

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capacity by the end of June, 1906,¹²⁹ and this same act sought to alleviate the existing conditions by prescribing

“That hereafter any military prison that the Secretary of War may designate for the confinement of general prisoners for whom there is no room at the United States Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or whom it is impracticable to send there, shall be regarded as a branch of the said United States Military Prison and equally with it shall be subject to the laws relating thereto, including chapter six, title fourteen, of the Revised Statutes.”¹³⁰

A third act, likewise approved on March 2, 1907,¹³¹ stipulated

“That when an enlisted man shall have served thirty years either in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, or in all, he shall, upon making application to the President, be placed upon the retired list, with seventy-five per centum of the pay and allowances he may then be in receipt of, and that said allowances shall be as follows: Nine dollars and fifty cents per month in lieu of rations and clothing and six dollars and twenty-five cents per month in lieu of quarters, fuel, and light: *Provided*, That in computing the necessary thirty years' time all service in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps shall be credited.

“SEC. 2. That all Acts and parts of Acts, so far as they conflict with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.”

The next measure¹³² of importance requiring attention was contained in the Deficiency Appropriation Act of March 4, 1907, and specified under the caption of Military Establishment that

“The President is hereby authorized to receive from the treasury of the Cuban Republic and pay into the Treasury of the United States from time to time such amounts to reimburse the United States for the expenditures from the United States Treasury made necessary on account of the present intervention as he may consider the Cuban Treasury then able to pay without serious embarrassment.”¹³³

Ten thousand dollars were also appropriated

“for expenses incident to stay of United States troops at the

Jamestown Tercentennial Exposition and of visiting foreign military organizations in attendance upon such Exposition at the invitation of the United States Government, including preparation and sanitation of a camp site for such troops.”¹³⁴

Of the Joint Resolutions of Congress passed that year, only one — numbered 17 and approved February 27th — needs to be recorded here. It read thus:

“That the holders of medals of honor under the Act approved July twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and section six of the Act approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall not be required to surrender such medals in case such medals are replaced, in pursuance of the provisions of the Act of Congress approved April twenty-third, nineteen hundred and four; and that whenever the holders of such medals of honor have surrendered them, in order to receive medals provided for by said Act approved April twenty-third, nineteen hundred and four, such medals shall be returned to them: *Provided*, That no recipient of both medals shall wear both medals at the same time.”¹³⁵

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1907

The military operations during 1907 can be told in a few words. In the Philippines order and quiet reigned except in the islands of Samar and Leyte, where the assistance of Regular troops was needed to aid the Philippine Constabulary to suppress the disturbances caused by the Pulajanes, but by June 24th General Wood, commanding that division, reported that the disturbed conditions were apparently at an end. In Cuba the Army of Pacification under Brigadier General Barry performed its task effectively but without ostentation, and no necessity for resorting to forcible measures occurred during the year. The Ute Indians, whose outbreak in 1906 was mentioned on page 322, were removed to the number of 393 from Fort Meade, South Dakota, to the Cheyenne River Reservation, as the latter tribe had agreed in a general council held on April 15th, to lease part of their lands to the Utes.¹³⁶

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On October 15, 1907, the Regular Army was stationed and composed as follows:

Geographical distribution	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
In the United States	2,625	31,637	34,262
In Alaska	52	970	1,022
In the Philippines	688	12,091	12,779
In Porto Rico	3	6	9
In Cuba	276	4,182	4,458
In Hawaii	12	196	208
Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations.....	94	1,108	1,202
Total	3,750	50,190	53,940 ¹³⁷

In addition to the above there were in service

Geographical distribution	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
In the Philippine Scouts	116	4,346	4,462
In the Porto Rico Regiment.....	24	572	596
In the Hospital Corps, excluded by the Act of March 1, 1887 (24 Stat. L., 435) from being counted as part of the enlisted strength of the Army	3,400
Making a grand total of	3,890	55,108	62,398

This was a decrease of 4,855 from the preceding year, and considerably below the authorized maximum strength of 3,997 officers and 69,861 enlisted men fixed by the Act of January 25, 1907.¹³⁸ At the bottom of the trouble lay the difficulty in obtaining recruits, and the Secretary of War pointed out that ¹³⁹

“ although the Department, by the most strenuous efforts, has succeeded in raising the average monthly number of enlistments and reenlistments beyond the monthly average of the preceding year, this increased average, even if kept up, will not be sufficient to maintain the Army at its present enlisted strength, which, as

shown above, is less than 72 per cent. of the maximum authorized strength.

“While many reasons have been advanced for the difficulty experienced in recruiting, I think a sufficient reason is to be found in the inadequacy of the pay.

“While there is always more or less difficulty in securing the enlistment of soldiers in time of peace, this difficulty is of course much augmented in periods of great and widespread prosperity. When the supply of mere laborers is not equal to the demand for them, although the wages offered range from \$1.75 to \$2.50 or more a day, it is not strange that men do not care to enlist in the Army at \$13 a month. Although their real compensation is much more than this, because they are well housed and fed and clothed and receive medical and dental services in addition, still the life is full of hard work with the drills and practice marches and fatigue duty that are essential to the proper training of a soldier and inseparable from the maintenance of an army post in good condition; and there is of course a far greater degree of discipline required than is usually found in civil employment. At small and isolated posts the monotony of the routine becomes accentuated and the soldier's life correspondingly less attractive.

“With the present rates of pay it is especially difficult to keep the ranks of the Coast Artillery full. This service requires for its proper performance a high degree of mechanical skill, and the training necessary to develop the men leads to their acquisition of a considerable knowledge of electricity and a skill in assembling and manipulating various kinds of electrical apparatus in general use in the commercial world. The result is that by the time these men have served one enlistment they have attained a proficiency which commands a very much higher remuneration in civil employment than it does in the army, and they do not reenlist. I think it is quite probable that an increase in the pay of enlisted men, including considerable additional inducement for men to reenlist and such reasonable increase in the pay of noncommissioned officers would stimulate men to remain in the service and to qualify themselves for these higher positions, would have a markedly beneficial effect upon the recruitment of the Army.

“I earnestly recommend that the same system be made to apply to the fixing of the pay of enlisted men and of the noncommissioned officer that now obtains in respect to the Navy, so

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that the President may fix the rates of pay within defined limits. This would enable the President to classify enlisted men according to length of service and meritorious service and vary their pay accordingly, and also to make a large proportionate advance in the pay of noncommissioned officers, which would secure them as permanent members of the Army. Such results would make much for better discipline and higher efficiency."

Elsewhere in his report Secretary Taft invited attention to the urgent need of more medical officers and of a General Service Corps for the Army, as well as to the failure of men to re-enlist, to the large number who purchase their discharge from the service before the expiration of their term of enlistment, and to the fact that, notwithstanding the employment of officers in the capacities where they were of most use, no less than "13.45 per cent. of the general and staff officers and 27.14 per cent. of the line officers were absent from their regular duties."¹⁴⁰ For the benefit of the reader who may be ignorant of the functions of a General Service Corps, the following recommendations of the Secretary of War with respect to such a body are inserted here:

"Another measure that would undoubtedly secure greater contentment in the line of the Army and reduce desertions is the establishment of a general service corps, for duty as wagon masters, engineers, firemen, overseers, teamsters, packers, carpenters, blacksmiths, laborers, clerks, etc. This class of work is now performed in part by civilian employees and in part by soldiers detailed on extra and special duty. Under present conditions there must always be a large number of soldiers detached from their companies for work of this kind. If they are given extra pay for it, it encourages them to seek duty other than that for which they were primarily enlisted. If they are not paid extra for this class of work, they are dissatisfied at being employed upon work for which they did not enlist and at wages which are much less than like services would command in civil employment; and in either event the organizations to which they belong are depleted of their proper strength and the soldiers deprived of the military training which was the main purpose of their enlistment. Under present conditions, it is possible that a private with only a few months' service to his credit may secure

a detail for extra duty which will give him more pay than his first sergeant, although the latter may be a trained soldier of many years' service. The veteran first sergeant is an invaluable factor in securing and maintaining the discipline of a company organization, and as a noncommissioned officer has a unique and peculiar status among enlisted men. The conditions that have been described do not conduce to the perpetuation of his kind, nor do they make for the best interests of either noncommissioned officer or private."¹⁴¹

The failure of men to re-enlist and the frequency with which they purchased their discharge was declared to be largely attributable to the neglect to offer

“suitable rewards for proficiency when attained, a greater increase of pay for length of service, and by the establishment of conditions that will elevate and sustain the self-respect of the enlisted man by making the duties of his daily life more those of a soldier — for which object he entered the Army — and less those of a laborer, for service at which he could get much more pay in civil life.”¹⁴²

In respect to the absence of line and staff officers from the commands or departments to which they strictly belonged, Secretary Taft asserted with much truth that

“these detached officers are all usefully employed. Generally their work is of a military character, and in the very few cases where it is not so there can be no doubt that the duty performed is of the utmost importance and could not well be dispensed with. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the absence of such a large number of officers from their commands is not without its bad effect upon the discipline and efficiency of the Army. . . .

“The seriousness of this situation is such that a majority of the commanding generals of military departments comment upon this undesirable condition of affairs in their annual reports for 1907. In a general way the remedies suggested by them are broadly in the direction of an increase in the total number of officers for the service, rather than a reduction in the number of places that must necessarily be filled by detaching officers from their commands for a longer or shorter period.

“It is apparent . . . that the great bulk of absenteeism of offi-

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cers from their usual military duties with their commands results from detailing officers for recruiting duty and for duty in connection with the extensive system of military education that is being carried on both in the Army and in the several States at institutions of learning and with the militia forces. It goes without saying that many officers must always be needed for recruiting service; it is equally certain that the number of officers engaged in work of an educational character, either as students or instructors, can never be materially reduced without serious impairment of the efficiency of the Army and the militia.

“These facts are incontrovertible and the statements made are but repetitions in substance of what has been said in annual reports for several years past. In my judgment it will be the wisest sort of economy for the nation to recognize the situation and to provide additional officers to meet a condition which is fast becoming a menace, for I can not but feel that it has a very decided, if not direct, bearing upon the failure of men to reenlist in the Army and upon desertions. There can be no reasonable doubt that the more constant presence of company officers with the organizations to which they belong, and whose military training, discipline, and general welfare it is their legitimate function to maintain, would, next to increased pay, prove one of the most potent factors for promoting contentment among the enlisted men of their commands.”¹⁴³

The needs of our military establishment at that time were thus pithily summarized:¹⁴⁴

“Our Army is relatively a small one compared with the armies of other nations and in proportion to our area, population, and resources. The traditional policy of the United States has always been against the maintenance of a large standing army and probably always will be; but our interests and our necessities demand that the Army shall always be of the highest standard and of the greatest effectiveness possible for its size. We can afford to have this so; we can not afford to have it otherwise. To that end the Army now needs more officers, both in the line and in the staff, and it needs more enlisted men; and it is imperative that both officers and enlisted men should be a carefully selected force, and that they should be at all times in prime condition, mentally and physically, for active service. To accomplish this and constantly to keep the best class of men in the Army re-

quires adequate pay, a steady flow of promotion for efficiency, and a fair degree of elimination by retirement or otherwise as the circumstances may call for. Individual cases of enthusiasm, intelligent effort, and hard work without sufficient compensation or other adequate recognition are to be found in every vocation, and fortunately are not rare in our Army; but to secure these *en masse* requires, as inducements to preparation and performance, the just rewards of labor of a character similar to those which I have indicated above."

On June 30, 1907, the former system, whereby the United States territory was subdivided into geographical divisions and departments for the purpose of military administration, was discontinued, by abolishing the geographical divisions within continental United States. The nine existing military departments remained unaltered, except that the State of Missouri was transferred from the Department of Texas to the Department of the Missouri, but no change was made in the Philippines Division. The motive which prompted the introduction of this new classification was the desire to simplify military administration by bringing the generals in command of territorial subdivisions into closer touch with the War Department at Washington.¹⁴⁵

Although Congress had made the necessary appropriations and although the War Department had contemplated continuing the summer encampments, the absence of troops in Cuba and at the Jamestown Exposition, coupled with the preparations for despatching a large portion of the mobile army to the Philippines in order to relieve the regiments stationed in those islands, so greatly diminished the number of troops available that no joint manœuvres were held. As a substitute, joint Army and Militia coast-defence exercises under the supervision of the Coast Artillery took place at various forts. These lasted about ten days at each fortification, commencing on June 8th and continuing during July, August and October, the last being held in the Florida district from October 18th to November 1st. Of

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the militia organizations of the seaboard States, 860 officers and 12,660 men participated,¹⁴⁶ and the exercise proved so successful that Brigadier General Murray, the Chief of the Coast Artillery, was encouraged to hope that the impetus thus given might

“in course of time, develop an adequate and efficient Coast Artillery reserve among the militia to reenforce the Regular Coast Artillery in time of war and an equally adequate and efficient body of Coast Artillery supports to defend the coast batteries against land attacks from the rear.”¹⁴⁷

A change was made in the schedule of studies at the Military Academy at West Point, and the Army War College building at the Washington Barracks, D. C., was completed. The policy of having Navy officers attend the course of instruction at the Army War College, and Army officers attend that at the Naval War College at Newport — which policy had been in operation for three years — was continued to the manifest advantage of both services.¹⁴⁸

The work of harbour defence continued as usual, but with some handicap, as Congress had failed since April 21, 1904, to make appropriation for the construction of gun and mortar batteries. For the insular possessions, however, \$2,360,000 had been allotted during the years 1904–1907, and the work at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Honolulu and Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, and at Manila and Subig Bay in the Philippines made corresponding progress during the year. The suitability of sites for fortifications was carefully studied by the National Coast-Defense Board, and each place recommended was visited by one or more members thereof.¹⁴⁹

The most notable innovation of the year was introduced with a view to keeping all Army officers up to the proper standard in respect to physical fitness, and it was promulgated in the following communication:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 4, 1907.

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 240.

The following is published to the army for the information of all concerned :

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 2, 1907.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR :

I desire due notice given to all officers concerned that hereafter suitable physical tests to determine their fitness for active operations will annually be made of all field officers of the army, under such regulations as you may prescribe. A sufficient number of the practice marches of cavalry, occurring in the fall of each year, might be taken advantage of to test the ability of all field officers, except those of seacoast artillery, to make a daily march of not less than 30 miles, for three days in succession, under conditions suitable to the making of forced marches in active field operations. Tests suitable to the character of service required of them should also be prescribed for field officers of seacoast artillery.

Annual reports should also be required, under such conditions as will insure accuracy and thoroughness, upon every junior officer of the army, setting forth whether physically qualified for active operations.

Except when excused by higher authority, all officers should accompany their commands on the monthly practice marches, and reports should be required, naming in every case any who are unable or fail to do so or fall out on the march.

Appropriate action should be taken in the cases of all officers found not qualified physically for active service.

It is just as much the duty of all officers of the army to adopt such measures and pursue such habits as will maintain a physical condition fit for active service as to cultivate their minds in fitting themselves for the intellectual duties of their profession.

I should also like as much encouragement given to the cultivation of horsemanship in the army as may be practicable under the law, and likewise to have as many facilities for riding horseback as possible afforded to infantry captains on government

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horses, until they have been made mounted officers as in foreign armies.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

By order of the Acting Secretary of War:

J. FRANKLIN BELL,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.

Official:

HENRY P. McCAIN,
*Adjutant-General.*¹⁵⁰

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1908

The first session of the Sixtieth Congress was marked by a number of important legislative enactments in respect to the military service, beginning with "An Act To increase the efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army," which was approved on April 23, 1908,¹⁵¹ and in which the repeated recommendations of the Secretary of War were at last heeded. The opening section declared

"That from and after the approval of this Act the Medical Department of the United States Army shall consist of a Medical Corps and a Medical Reserve Corps, as hereinafter provided; and the Hospital Corps, the nurse corps, and dental surgeons, as now authorized by law."

Section 2 provided

"That the Medical Corps shall consist of one Surgeon-General, with rank of brigadier-general, who shall be chief of the Medical Department; fourteen colonels, twenty-four lieutenant-colonels, one hundred and five majors, and three hundred captains or first lieutenants, who shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of officers of corresponding grades in the cavalry arm of the service."

It further specified that all medical officers on the active list, other than the Surgeon-General, were to be re-commissioned, and it fixed their grades and ranks, as well as stipulating that "hereafter first lieutenants shall be pro-

moted to the grade of captain after three years' service in the Medical Corps."

Section 3 provided that promotions should "be made according to seniority," fixed the maximum yearly increase in the various grades, and stated that assistant surgeons from the volunteers were to take rank among the captains according to the date of their entrance into the Medical Department "as commissioned officers." Section 4 contained the following wise restriction:

"That no person shall receive an appointment as first lieutenant in the Medical Corps unless he shall have been examined and approved by an army medical board consisting of not less than three officers of the Medical Corps designated by the Secretary of War."

Section 5 prescribed that medical officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel must pass a successful examination in order to be promoted, and, in the event of "physical disability contracted in the line of duty," were to be retired unless a reviewing board disapproved the finding of the original examining board. On the other hand, it forbade a second examination for any other cause than that above mentioned. Section 6 expressly stated that the rank and service of present medical officers were not to be effected by this act.

An important feature was contained in

"SEC. 7. That for the purpose of securing a reserve corps of medical officers available for military service, the President of the United States is authorized to issue commissions as first lieutenant therein to such graduates of reputable schools of medicine, citizens of the United States, as shall from time to time, upon examination to be prescribed by the Secretary of War, be found physically, mentally, and morally qualified to hold such commissions, the persons so commissioned to constitute and be known as the Medical Reserve Corps. The commissions so given shall confer upon the holders all the authority, rights, and privileges of commissioned officers of the like grade in the Medical Corps of the United States Army, except promotions, but only

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when called into active duty, as hereinafter provided, and during the period of such active duty. Officers of the Medical Reserve Corps shall have rank in said corps according to date of their commissions therein, and when employed on active duty, as hereinafter provided, shall rank next below all other officers of like grade in the United States Army: *Provided*, That contract surgeons now in the military service who receive the favorable recommendation of the Surgeon-General of the Army shall be eligible for appointment in said reserve corps without further examination: *Provided further*, That any contract surgeon not over twenty-seven years of age at date of his appointment as contract surgeon shall be eligible to appointment in the regular corps."

Section 8 prescribed

"That in emergencies the Secretary of War may order officers of the Medical Reserve Corps to active duty in the service of the United States in such numbers as the public interests may require, and may relieve them from such duty when their services are no longer necessary,"

but it permitted such officers to decline "to accept such service" or to serve with the militia. It also authorized the President "to honorably discharge" any officer no longer needed, allowed the Secretary of War to place on the active list and order "to the Army Medical School for instruction and further examination to determine their fitness for commission" all applicants for admission to the Medical Corps, and finally provided

"That any officer of the Medical Reserve Corps who is subject to call and who shall be ordered upon active duty as herein provided and who shall be unwilling and refuse to accept such service shall forfeit his commission."

The final part of this important law ran as follows:—

"SEC. 9. That all officers of the Medical Reserve Corps when called upon active duty in the service of the United States, as provided in section eight of this Act, shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders for the government of the Regular Army, and during the period of such service shall be entitled

to the pay and allowances of first lieutenants of the Medical Corps with increase for length of service now allowed by law, said increase to be computed only for time of active duty: *Provided*, That no officer of the Medical Reserve Corps shall be entitled to retirement or retirement pay, nor shall he be entitled to pension except for physical disability incurred in the line of duty while in active duty: *And provided further*, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent appointments in time of war of medical officers of volunteers in such numbers and with such rank and pay as may be provided by law.

“SEC. 10. That all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.”

The next measure of importance pertaining to the military establishment was contained in the annual Army Appropriation Act, approved May 11, 1908, which, under the caption of Pay of Enlisted Men, increased that of the commissioned officers by providing¹⁵²

“That hereafter the annual pay of officers of the Army of the several grades herein mentioned shall be as follows: Major-general, eight thousand dollars; brigadier-general, six thousand dollars; colonel, four thousand dollars; lieutenant-colonel, three thousand five hundred dollars; major, three thousand dollars; captain, two thousand four hundred dollars; first lieutenant, two thousand dollars; second lieutenant, one thousand seven hundred dollars. And the pay of cadets at the Military Academy shall hereafter be six hundred dollars a year. That hereafter the United States shall furnish mounts and horse equipments for all officers of the Army below the grade of major required to be mounted, but in case any officer below the grade of major required to be mounted provides himself with suitable mounts at his own expense, he shall receive an addition to his pay of one hundred and fifty dollars per annum if he provides one mount, and two hundred dollars per annum if he provides two mounts. Section twelve hundred and sixty-seven of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended to read as follows: “In no case shall the pay of a colonel exceed five thousand dollars a year; the pay of a lieutenant-colonel exceed four thousand five hundred dollars a year, or the pay of a major exceed four thousand dollars a year.”

The law went on to stipulate that, upon official notifica-

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tion of the death of any officer or enlisted man from wounds or disease contracted in the line of duty, the Paymaster-General shall pay to the widow or to any person designated by the deceased six months' pay, less \$75 in the case of an officer and \$35 in the case of an enlisted man, which amount was to cover the expenses of interment.¹⁵³ The recommendations made by Secretary Taft were next heeded in a general increase of pay for the enlisted men of the Army, and certain bonuses were likewise given for re-enlistment.¹⁵⁴ Under the heading of Miscellaneous, the act provided

“That men hereafter enlisted in the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry shall be enlisted for a period of three years and may be reenlisted, such enlistments and reenlistments to be subject to the regulations governing the Army at large, with such modifications as to physical requirements as the President may prescribe.”¹⁵⁵

On May 16th there was approved an act which specified

“That the office of captain in the Philippine Scouts is hereby created as a grade in the military establishment. Such captains shall be selected from officers of the grade of first lieutenants in said scouts, and shall be given provisional appointments for periods of four years each, and no such appointments shall be continued for a second or subsequent period unless the officers' conduct shall have been satisfactory in every respect: *Provided*, That the number of officers provisionally appointed under the terms of this Act shall not at any time exceed the number of companies of said native troops which may be formed by the President from time to time for service in the Philippine Islands.”¹⁵⁶

On May 27, 1908, three important laws affecting the military service went into operation. The first, “An Act Fixing the status of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry,”¹⁵⁷ changed its title on and after June 30, 1908, to “the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United States Army,” specified its field officers and the method to

be followed in respect to the appointment of the captains and lieutenants, as well as to promotions and retirement.¹⁵⁸ The second law was "An Act Making appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense," and Congress made amends for its omission of the past four years by allotting \$300,000 "for construction of gun and mortar batteries."¹⁵⁹ The third was most important, particularly since attention was paid to the recommendations contained in Secretary Taft's report of 1906 — which have been enumerated on pages 324–325 — and since amendments were made to no less than eleven sections of the Act of January 21, 1903, better known as "the Dick Bill," which has been considered at length on pages 289–292. So vital and far-reaching were the alterations made by this Act of May 27, 1908,¹⁶⁰ that, especially since it constitutes the last measure dealing with the organization of the militia now standing on the statute books, it is deemed advisable to recite it *in extenso* in the footnotes to this chapter on pages 694–698, its great length precluding its insertion here.¹⁶¹

In many respects the amendments made by the law of May 27, 1908, were a marked improvement over the provisions of the Dick bill but, on the other hand, they were a distinct retrogression from the measure as drafted by the General Staff. The merits of the amendments may thus be briefly summarized:

(1) Declaration that all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 45 were amenable to service in the militia;

(2) Requirement that the regularly enlisted, organized and active militia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation fixed by law shall constitute the organized militia;

(3) Obligation of the organized militia to conform to the standard of the Regular Army on and after January 21, 1910;¹⁶²

(4) Power granted to the President to fix the minimum number of troops in each unit of the organized militia;

(5) Punishment by court-martial of any officer or enlisted man of the organized militia for failure to answer a call by the President;

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(6) The militia was not to receive any pay when called into Government service until they had actually reached the rendezvous;

(7) Arms, equipments and other war *matériel* issued to the organized militia were to be free of cost to the States, but were not to exceed \$2,000,000 *per annum* and to remain the property of the United States;

(8) Upon request of a governor, the Secretary of War was to make provision for the participation of the organized militia of that State in joint manœuvres, encampments or coast-defense training with the Regular troops;

(9) Militia so participating was to be under the orders of the Regular officer in command of the post "without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or its vicinity";

(10) Militia officers and enlisted men attending military schools were to receive the same allowances as are granted by law to Regular officers and men "while in actual attendance upon a course of instruction";

(11) Provision was made for the assignment of Army officers or enlisted men for duty with the militia;

(12) Authorization to the Secretary of War to appoint a representative board of five officers on the active list of the organized militia for a term of four years, to be summoned to Washington from time to time "for consultation with the Secretary of War respecting the condition, status, and needs of the whole body of the organized militia."¹⁶³

On the other hand, the benefits conferred by this law were to a measure neutralized by its defects, the most conspicuous being

(1) No compulsory service on the part of every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 45 was exacted in time of peace, such as had been required by the Act of May 8, 1792;

(2) So hazy was the definition given to militia that incompetent officers of high rank and troops who are not up to the requisite standard could be forced upon the Federal Government;

(3) Accustomed privileges of militia organizations in existence since 1792 were virtually made *hors la loi*, in spite of the fact that such immunity might readily have proved detrimental to the good of the military service under many circumstances;

(4) The militia could only be called into the service of the United States through the medium of the governors;

* (5) A radical step was taken by prescribing that "*the militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the President.*" Such a mandate was admirable in that it was intended to prevent a repetition of the many refusals in the past on the part of the militia to serve outside the country. On the other hand, it demonstrated anew how ill-digested are many of the enactments of Congress in respect to the military service, and on February 17, 1912, was declared by Attorney-General Wickersham to be unconstitutional ¹⁶⁴—a fact which ought to have been apparent on the face of it;

(6) Although the President was permitted to specify the period for which the militia was to be called out, this was largely nullified by the proviso "that no commissioned officer or enlisted man of the organized militia shall be held to service beyond the term of his existing commission or enlistment." In this case the lesson in respect to the State volunteers retained in the Philippines in 1899 had been taken to heart;

(7) *The most flagrant defect of all, and one which placed an utterly unnecessary handicap on the Government in the effort which it would obviously make at the outbreak of war to obtain the best troops possible,* was contained in the proviso "*That when the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, cannot be met by the regular forces,* THE ORGANIZED MILITIA SHALL BE CALLED INTO THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ADVANCE OF ANY VOLUNTEER FORCE WHICH IT MAY BE DETERMINED TO RAISE."

(8) The law specified that, where any State has adopted the medical standard of the Army, its militia shall be mustered into United States' service without further medical examination. The mere fact that a physical standard has been adopted does not insure its enforcement, nor was there anything in the law to compel such enforcement;

(9) In the event of a trial by court-martial "of officers or men of the militia when in the service of the United States," it was expressly stated that the majority of the members constituting such courts-martial "shall be composed of militia officers." In other words, the Government voluntarily pandered to the States

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by relinquishing its right to control courts-martial destined to try offenses committed by troops in the employ of the United States;

(10) In the call to arms priority was given to the States, and governors could effectually prevent the raising of volunteers within their jurisdiction by the United States merely by summoning into active service all the militia of their States;¹⁶⁵

(11) The law left it wholly within the discretion of the governors to obey a call made by the President or to refuse as did the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont in 1812 and 1813. Furthermore, the militia may decline to respond to a call not transmitted through the governor of its State, and in that event the United States would be powerless to coerce it;

(12) Although it was prescribed that on and after January 21, 1910, "the organization, armament, and discipline of the organized militia" must conform to those of the Regular Army, no penalty was attached to their failure to reach this requisite standard.

The Act of May 28th making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy provided, among other things, that the Secretary of War should designate four Filipinos "to receive instruction at West Point and to be eligible on graduation 'only to commissions in the Philippine Scouts,' in which they were required to bind themselves to serve for eight years."¹⁶⁶ Another act, approved that same day, authorized the donation of certain condemned ordnance to various institutions, and the last section specified

"That the Chief of Ordnance is hereby authorized to sell without advertisement to patriotic organizations for military purposes surplus obsolete small arms and their equipments and ammunition at such prices as he may deem reasonable and just: *Provided*, That hereafter obsolete small arms and their equipment and ammunition shall not be disposed of to such organizations except as provided for in this Act."¹⁶⁷

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1908

During the course of 1908 there was a considerable increase in the strength of the Regular Army which, exclusive

of the 3,521 men in the Hospital Corps, numbered on October 15th, 4,116 officers and 68,512 enlisted men, a total of 72,628, which was still considerably below the authorized maximum strength of 4,307 officers and 77,743 men, although it must be borne in mind that that maximum had been increased 7,308.¹⁶⁸

Beyond a few trivial cases of lawlessness committed in Mindanao by roving bands of outlaws against other Moros, there were no disturbances in the Philippines, and quiet likewise reigned in Cuba, where Regular troops to the number of 268 officers and 4,853 men were retained in the work of pacification. Camps of instruction lasting for a month were held during the summer at Pine Plains, N. Y.; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Chickamauga Park, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming; American Lake, Washington; Atascadero Ranch, California, and Leon Springs, Texas. These were attended by about 45,000 of the organized militia, and by some 1,099 officers and 19,164 men of the Regular Army, the mounted troops of the latter marching 250 miles one way or 150 miles in going and returning, while the infantry covered 200 or 150 miles in a like manner. The joint Army and Militia coast defence exercises inaugurated the year before were repeated to excellent advantage in the eleven artillery districts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts during May and June, and approximately 10,000 troops took part in them. The entire Army and National Guard, with the exception of that of Florida and Nevada, were re-armed with the new United States magazine rifle, model of 1903, chambered for 1906 ammunition, which, being much more powerful, accurate and rapid, superseded the Krag-Jørgensen rifle. Considerable progress was also made at the new factory at the Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, in the manufacture of smokeless powder, about 500 lbs. being turned out *per diem*. Another notable incident were the successful tests for military purposes made during the summer of a biplane

Joint
Maneuvers

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invented by Messrs. Orville and Wilbur Wright, but in the absence of appropriation, the War Department was precluded from purchasing even one aeroplane.¹⁶⁹

Considerable progress was made in the work on the seacoast defences, so that 85 per cent. of the heavy guns and 72 per cent. of the rapid-fire guns contemplated for these fortifications were mounted by the close of 1908. The results of the target-practice were especially gratifying in the number of hits scored. On the other hand, the Coast Artillery Corps was still 370 officers and 7,071 men short of the number required "to furnish one-half of the personnel required for one complete manning detail of the guns now provided in the United States, the full number for the mines, and the full number for guns and mines now provided for the insular possessions." Moreover, so parsimonious had been the appropriations made by Congress that the auxiliaries — which had become a *sine qua non* in modern fortifications — such as fire control, searchlights, submarine mines and power plants, were still in a lamentable state of backwardness.¹⁷⁰

The detrimental effect of the detachment of officers for services which could not be avoided — among them being the extensive system of military education not only in the Army but at State institutions and in the militia, recruiting service, and the river and harbour improvement conducted under the supervision of Engineer officers — made itself strongly felt as in past years.¹⁷¹ Like his predecessors, Secretary Wright was impelled to recommend an increase in the number of officers, to which he added an enlargement of the Quartermaster's Department and the advisability of a system to hasten the flow of promotion, as well as proper appropriation for such joint Army and Militia manœuvres as would teach the higher officers to handle the bodies of troops that they would be expected to command in time of war.¹⁷²

The year 1908 witnessed the introduction of two notable

innovations in the military service. The first was the creation a "Division of Militia Affairs" effected by virtue of the executive order of the Secretary of War on February 12th. It was charged with the superintendence of, and the transaction of business relating to, the organized and unorganized militia except when in the service of the United States, and its principal functions are the co-ordination of the militia with the Army and the assignment of Regular officers as instructors and inspectors of the various National Guards. By virtue of the War Department orders of June 10, 1908, all records pertaining to the militia were transferred to it from the office of the Adjutant-General, and three days later it was definitely organized as part of the General Staff. The other innovation consisted in putting into effect the physical tests directed by President Roosevelt on December 2, 1907, and the conditions, promulgated in War Department General Orders No. 79, under date of May 14, 1908, were, in brief, as follows:

(1) An annual physical examination by two or more medical officers was to be made of all field officers of the Army stationed in the United States and Alaska during the three months beginning about August first, and of those stationed in Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines during a similar period commencing about December first.

(2) As soon as possible thereafter the riding test prescribed was to begin. It was to consist of three marches of 30 miles each, made on three consecutive days. Two of these marches were required to be made within $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours of the time of starting and the third within 6 hours. The gaits were limited to the walk and trot.

(3) Within three hours of concluding the third day's march, a second medical examination of each officer was to be held.

(4) For the field officers of the Coast Artillery a walking test was prescribed to "consist of a march of 50 miles, to be made in three consecutive days and in a total of twenty hours, including rests, the march on any one day to be during consecutive hours."

(5) Field officers holding permanent appointments in the various staff corps—the departments of the Adjutant-General

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and Inspector-General, the Engineer and Signal Corps excepted — were permitted to elect which test they preferred to take.

(6) Field officers whose health would be seriously endangered thereby, and so certified to by medical officers, were forbidden to take the test. In that case they were required to retire under the 30 years' service clause or to appear before a retiring board.

(7) Field officers of the permanent staff corps engaged upon civil work of a technical character and who have reached an age and rank such as to make it improbable that they will ever participate in active operations, were excused from the physical test but not from the examination.

(8) All officers below the grade of major were to be subjected to a physical examination once each year.¹⁷³

The work of the War Department General Staff was re-cast,¹⁷⁴ and the first National Militia Board, authorized by the Act of May 27, 1908, met in Washington on June 15th to 17th, and submitted a number of recommendations which were duly approved by the War Department and transmitted to the Adjutant-General of each National Guard for their information and guidance.¹⁷⁵

Apropos of the above-mentioned law, the Secretary of War in his annual report for 1908 made the following interesting comments: ¹⁷⁶

“The conditions established by this new legislation make it possible for the first time in the history of the United States to prepare in time of peace a scheme of organization of all organized land forces with a view to immediate mobilization of such forces on the outbreak of war. The working out of the plans of mobilization will make it possible to avoid the confused and congested conditions which have in the past characterized the initial periods of some wars. It is expected that the new conditions will lead to the establishment of mobilization plans so complete that, on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary simply to open reserve depots of supplies and to call the troops to their respective colors.

“These new conditions suggest that the time is opportune to consider the relations of the organized militia to the first line of defense of the nation in case of war. A careful study has been

made of this question, and the conclusions reached are worthy of the serious consideration of the Congress.

“There are at present approximately 111,000 officers and men in the organized militia. It is considered that about 75 per cent. of this number would respond to a call to arms and of the number responding a small percentage would be eliminated probably by physical disqualification. It is estimated that little more than 60 per cent.—that is, about 67,000—would be available at present in case of an emergency.

“The Chief of Coast Artillery has indicated that about 20,000 of the organized militia will be required for the coast artillery reserves and approximately the same number for coast artillery supports. These troops would be required for service in the immediate vicinity of the fortifications, and would not be available for use with the mobile army until all question of sea power along the coast had been settled favorably.

“The result of careful study in the War Department shows that in the event of war with any first-class power we ought to have a first line of defense of at least 350,000 combatants. As the Regular Army is limited to 100,000, it follows that in order to be at all ready for war it would be necessary to draw 250,000 men from the organized militia. It would be fortunate if the several States of the Union appreciated the importance of increasing their organized militia to the extent indicated, and in order to bring about this result the General Government might well, in furtherance of the act of May 27, 1908, still further increase the appropriations for the equipment of the militia and for general maneuvers of the militia with the regular forces.”

Secretary Wright also laid particular emphasis upon the fact that

“The two most pressing needs in the way of fighting material are now an increase of reserve supply of artillery for the mobile army, both light and heavy field artillery, and reserve ammunition of both kinds. It is hoped that it may be possible to appropriate the full amounts which are estimated for these important purposes.”¹⁷⁷

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1909

Aside from six acts of Congress and two joint resolutions authorizing the donation of condemned ordnance to certain

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States, towns, institutions or organizations,¹⁷⁸ and apart from the usual annual appropriations for the support of the Army and the Military Academy and for the fortifications at home and in the insular possessions,¹⁷⁹ the military legislation of 1909 presents remarkably little of interest. The most important measure was "An Act For the organization of the militia in the District of Columbia," approved on February 18th,¹⁸⁰ which so amended and revised the Act of March 1st, 1899, as to make it over *de novo*. The alterations were effected for the purpose of making this organization — which was henceforth to be styled "the National Guard of the District of Columbia" — conform to the new standard required for organized militia but, as this measure was only of local concern, its details need not arrest us here.

The Act of March 3, 1909, "making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and ten," made a slight change in one part of the law of May 11, 1908,¹⁸¹ as well as in that of November 3, 1893,¹⁸² and provided that any major in the Medical Corps found disqualified for promotion to the grade of lieutenant-colonel, for any reason other than physical disability, should be suspended; if upon re-examination at the end of a year, he were then found qualified for promotion, he was to be advanced, but if the finding were adverse, he was to be retired.¹⁸³ Under the caption of Ordnance Department, this law wisely specified that

"Hereafter whenever pressing obligations are required to be paid by a disbursing officer of the Ordnance Department and there is an insufficient balance to his official credit under the proper appropriation or appropriations for that purpose, he is authorized to make payment from the total available balance to his official credit, provided sufficient funds under the proper appropriation or appropriations have been allotted by the Chief of Ordnance for the expenditure."¹⁸⁴

The serious infraction of discipline resulting from the shooting affray alluded to on page 322 had been a burning

question for three years and formed the subject of "An Act To correct the records and authorize the re-enlistment of certain noncommissioned officers and enlisted men belonging to Companies B, C, and D of the twenty-fifth United States Infantry who were discharged without honor under Special Orders, Numbered Two Hundred and Sixty-six, War Department, November ninth, nineteen hundred and six, and the restoration to them of all rights of which they have been deprived on account thereof."¹⁸⁵ This measure, approved March 3, 1909, provided

"That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to appoint a court of inquiry, to consist of five officers of the United States Army, not below the rank of colonel, which court shall be authorized to hear and report upon all charges and testimony relating to the shooting affray which took place at Brownsville, Texas, on the night of August thirteenth-fourteenth, nineteen hundred and six. Said court shall, within one year from the date of its appointment, make a final report, and from time to time shall make partial reports, to the Secretary of War of the results of such inquiry, and such soldiers and noncommissioned officers of Companies B, C, and D, of the Twenty-fifth Regiment United States Infantry, who were discharged from the military service as members of said regiment, under the provisions of Special Orders, numbered two hundred and sixty-six, dated at the War Department the ninth day of November, nineteen hundred and six, as said court shall find and report as qualified for reenlistment in the Army of the United States shall thereby become eligible for reenlistment.

"SEC. 2. That any noncommissioned officer or private who shall be made eligible for reenlistment under the provisions of the preceding section shall, if reenlisted, be considered to have reenlisted immediately after his discharge under the provisions of the special order hereinbefore cited, and to be entitled, from the date of his discharge under said special order, to the pay, allowances, and other rights and benefits that he would have been entitled to receive according to his rank from said date of discharge as if he had been honorably discharged under the provisions of said special order and had reenlisted immediately."

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1909

Beyond certain isolated cases in which the Regular troops were called upon to assist the civil authorities in the Philippines to punish occasional acts of lawlessness committed by the Moros, there were no active operations during the year worthy of mention. Between January 1st and April 1st, the Army of Cuban Pacification was withdrawn from that island, having performed its mission in an admirable manner. Joint combined manœuvres of the organized militia of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and the District of Columbia were held in southeastern Massachusetts simultaneously with the Regular forces in the Department of the East.¹⁸⁶ As Secretary Dickinson declared,¹⁸⁷

“Some defects and irregularities developed in connection with these maneuvers, but the object of such maneuvers, like all other drills and practical instruction, is to develop defects and to profit thereby. It is important that defects of material and shortcomings of methods should be known, and they can only be known by such practical tests. If effects of mobilization and shortcomings in delivering supplies are to be avoided at the outbreak of war, it is of first importance that they be ascertained in peace maneuvers, and ways found to avoid them when mobilization for war becomes necessary.

“It is urged that Congress make a suitable appropriation to carry out the policy of the department to have joint maneuvers between the state forces and the regular forces during the ensuing year.”

A gratifying improvement was made during the year in the target practice of the infantry, field and coast artillery. So effectively had the interest in rifle practice been fostered that in December, 1909, 78 civilian rifle clubs, with a membership of some 3,300, and 44 school boy rifle clubs had been organized.¹⁸⁸

While the recruiting for the Army progressed so satisfactorily during the early part of the year that it was suspended for several months, the 15th of October found the Regular establishment numbering 4,366 officers and 77,412

enlisted men, a total of 81,778, which was 7,350 short of the maximum strength authorized by law.¹⁸⁹ Notwithstanding the severe measures taken to deter desertions, there was a slight increase over 1908, and the Adjutant-General pointed out in his report for 1909, "that there should have been nearly five thousand desertions from the army of the United States during the last fiscal year is simply a disgrace to the army and a reproach to American citizenship."¹⁹⁰ There was a considerable increase in the number of courts-martial, although the trials were mainly for minor offences. In obedience to the Act of March 3, 1909, a court of inquiry was appointed to determine which non-commissioned officers and soldiers of Companies B, C, and D of the 25th Infantry (coloured), who had been discharged as a result of the shooting affray at Brownsville, Texas, on the night of August 13-14, 1906, were entitled to re-enlist. The members of this court were Lieutenant-General S. B. M. Young, Major General Joseph P. Sanger, Brigadier General John M. Wilson, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, Brigadier General Butler D. Price — all retired Army officers — and Captain Charles R. Howland of the 21st Infantry as the recorder, but so thorough was its investigation that its labours were not finished until 1910.¹⁹¹

A systematic effort was made for the first time to secure a proper equipment for the infantry, and to that end a board of six officers was convened at the Rock Island Arsenal on April 28th. Samples of the field equipment used by the infantry of other armies, all available information and the shops of the arsenal were placed at its disposal in order to enable the board to reach a practical conclusion.¹⁹²

Progress was made in respect to the seacoast fortifications, so that at the close of the year 85 per cent. of the heavy guns and 75 per cent. of the rapid-fire guns contemplated under the plan of the National Coast-Defense Board had been mounted. Seventy per cent. of the work required at Manila Bay, Honolulu and Pearl Harbour had been appropriated for, but

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\$11,685,789 were still needed to complete the fortifications in the insular possessions, and no money had been allotted by Congress for the important positions of Caballo Island in Manila Bay nor for the island of Oahu in Hawaii.¹⁹³

Secretary Dickinson pointed out that the evil of detached service was still present to the detriment of the Army, as no less than "12.51 per cent. of the general and staff officers and 27.38 per cent. of the line officers were absent from their commands," and he laid emphasis on the report of the Inspector-General "that there can be no doubt that the discipline and efficiency of troops were lowered by the continued absence of so many company officers and the resulting frequent changes of commanders." He therefore reiterated the recommendation so often made by his predecessors as to the absolute necessity of more officers for the Army, and the need of additional officers in the Quartermaster's department, in which a new system of decentralization introduced on July 1, 1908, had proved of marked benefit to its business methods. He likewise urged the passage of a law inaugurating a system of selection founded upon merit, in order to hasten promotion in the Army, as most officers became superannuated before they reached field rank; as well as of a measure providing for the raising of a volunteer army in time of actual or threatened war, which had been before the Military Committee of the House of Representatives for two sessions without any action having been taken thereon.¹⁹⁴ In addition to these, the Secretary of War advocated a modification of the annual physical test prescribed for officers, insomuch as "it required officers to be fit only once in a year, whereas they should be required to keep themselves continuously fit"; the advisability of an appropriation of \$500,000 for military aeroplanes; regulations governing the control of wireless telegraphy both national and international; and the appointment of candidates for West Point every three years instead of every four, since "during the past ten years the number of cadets graduated

from the Military Academy has averaged 51 a year less than vacancies caused by casualties alone, without considering the increases in the army" ¹⁹⁵— a state of affairs which needed prompt rectification.

✓ The strength of the Organized Militia, as reported after the annual spring inspections, was 118,926 officers and enlisted men, an increase of 7,985 over the preceding year.¹⁹⁶ There was also a distinct improvement in its military efficiency but, as Secretary Dickinson remarked,¹⁹⁷

“ Much remains to be done in the way of instruction. While the Constitution provides that discipline shall be the same as that of the Regular Army, it reserves to the States the authority of training the militia. It thus appears that while the War Department can fix standards it has no authority to take direct charge of the training and cause the organized militia thereby to attain such standards. The War Department may provide ways for training, make suggestions as to methods, and fix the standards that must be attained, but it cannot directly conduct the training. With a view to meeting the full obligation of the department in regard to instruction, there has been organized in the Division of Militia Affairs an instruction branch, with the object of placing at the disposal of the States every facility that can properly be extended under the law to assist the military authorities thereof in imparting both theoretical and practical instruction to the state forces. In addition it is desired, so far as possible, to coordinate the work of instruction between the States, and do what can be done in establishing uniformity of instruction throughout the States. Along these lines the department has encouraged the formation of correspondence schools for officers and enlisted men, and in connection with state encampments and special assemblages for field instruction has furnished commissioned officers and enlisted men, to assist in giving practical instruction. In establishing these correspondence schools it is the desire of the department to have the subjects and methods of treatment conform, as far as possible, to those practised at the regular service schools. As to the mobile state forces, it is specially desired to have them conform to the course at the Army School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Correspondence schools have been established, or are pending organization, in the following States:

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Colorado.	Massachusetts.	Tennessee.
Florida.	Michigan.	Texas.
Georgia.	District of Columbia.	Vermont.
Iowa.	New York.	Virginia.
Kansas.	Ohio.	West Virginia.
Maine.	Pennsylvania.	Wisconsin.

“ Aside from the theoretical instruction imparted by correspondence lectures by commissioned officers and special literature prepared and issued to officers of the organized militia, the question of practical instruction is being closely observed by the department. This divides itself into two classes, viz, the practical instruction that can be given in armories, and that which can be given only in the field,”

and stress was laid upon the fact that in many of the States the armouries were totally inadequate for the proper drills.

During the summer a successful experiment was made in the shape of a school of instruction for field artillery, held for ten days on the Government reservation at Sparta, Wisconsin, in which the field batteries of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa and Indiana participated in conjunction with a battalion of Regular field artillery. Field schools for the instruction of medical officers were also held at Sparta, Antietam and the Presidio of San Francisco.¹⁹⁸

Most encouraging was the progress made in the policy of developing an adequate force of militia coast artillery to supplement that of the Regular Army, no less than 138 companies being organized, or in the process of organization, by the end of 1909. Field exercises of coast artillery troops were conducted with the usual success in seventeen artillery districts.

The interest in rifle practice showed no signs of flagging during the year, and forty-three militia teams attended the national match at Camp Perry, Ohio. The improvement in firing was particularly noticeable and the scores in the national matches reflected accurately the amount of encouragement given to individual range practice.¹⁹⁹

The Secretary of War laid strong emphasis upon three

features of our military organization which were in sad need of rectification. Apropos of one of these he stated²⁰⁰ that

“It is particularly important that the field artillery be provided for, if practicable. Recent wars have enhanced its importance immensely. Foreign governments are increasing the proportion of guns in their armies. The General Staff has considered that the proportion of guns which should be provided in the American Army should be 3.35 per thousand bayonets. It is estimated, further, that there should be about 2.5 guns per thousand sabres, to act with cavalry in time of war. This is less than in most foreign armies. Accepting the proportion of 3.35 guns per thousand bayonets, however, IT WOULD REQUIRE 228 BATTERIES OF FIELD ARTILLERY FOR THE PRESENT FORCE OF INFANTRY OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA. THERE ARE IN EXISTENCE BUT 48 BATTERIES. THE REGULAR FIELD ARTILLERY IS ONLY ONE-HALF OF WHAT IS NECESSARY TO SUPPLY THE LARGER PROPORTION OF GUNS FOR THE PRESENT AUTHORIZED REGULAR INFANTRY AND CAVALRY. The bare statement of these numbers indicates the very unsatisfactory state of the field artillery question.”

Under the caption of “Military Policy for defense of the United States,” Secretary Dickinson asserted²⁰¹ that

“The military system of the United States contemplates a correlation of the Regular Army with the National Guard. It necessarily follows that the organization of the Regular Army and the militia in combination should be such as to permit them to cooperate and practice together in time of peace under conditions similar to those which would obtain in time of war. . . .

“Joint camps of instruction and maneuvers in which the army and national guard have taken part have been held biennially since 1903 in different parts of the country, which have been of pronounced benefit to all the troops engaged. The participation of the national guard in these maneuvers has given to the Regular Army the inestimable advantage not otherwise obtainable of experience in the maneuvering of large masses of men under conditions of service assimilated so far as practicable to the actual conditions that may be expected when war is on. The national guard, in addition, had the opportunity to acquire military experience in association with professional soldiers.

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The number of men, Regular Army and National Guard combined, participating in these different maneuvers has ranged from 30,000 to 50,000. Recognizing the fact that Congress was not likely to authorize in time of peace so large an increase in the seacoast artillery as is necessary for the complete manning details for all the guns of the coast defense of the United States, the plan has been inaugurated and put in successful operation of relying on the militia of the seacoast States to furnish a part of the remainder. The time has now arrived when a rational plan should be devised for a similar cooperation of the army and the militia with respect to the mobile army.

"In order to put such a plan into operation and permit of practice under war conditions in time of peace by the Regular Army and the militia in combination *the United States should be divided into a number of territorial and tactical districts, so that the organized militia of the States comprising such districts may be conveniently combined with the Regular Army stationed therein into permanent brigades, divisions, and corps for instruction and tactical organization.* It will probably be found desirable to have in each State in such district at least one military post, the said posts to be occupied by troops of the different arms of the service in such numbers that when the troops from all the posts included in the district are assembled that they would constitute a division, including the proper proportion of all arms and branches of the regular service. This regular organization should be the special educator and assistant of the militia forces of those States and should be the center from which general instruction could be given. *No post smaller than a regimental one is of real value from a military standpoint, so far as education, discipline, and drill are concerned.*

"The present system of departmental military government should give way to an organization tactically correct for war purposes; that is, these various troops, both regular and militia, gathered together, should be permanently designated in name and organization, with all the attendant system which would be in existence in time of war, so that when the troops retire to their proper stations they will not lose their brigade or division organization and will be controlled by their proper commanding officers, stationed within the district.

"In each tactical corps or division district a central point for a camp site should be selected, with a view to the convenience

and economy of easy concentration of both the regular and militia forces of such district. The regular and militia troops should be concentrated for instruction at these points. Such camps will answer the purpose of permanent brigade posts, so far as instruction is concerned, and the marching to and from the regimental stations to such points will bring the army before the people and more or less in contact with them.

“Should such plan be carried out it would be possible to concentrate about 8 army corps — possibly somewhat imperfect and incomplete. . . .

“In time, at the points of concentration in each corps district, there should be established supply depots, so planned that upon the assemblage of the corps or divisions there would be available such equipment as might possibly be lacking in the various States for the equipment of their organizations. . . .

“What is greatly needed is a decentralization of the powers of supply and initiative. The present centralization always breaks down the moment it is put to the test, and THE PEACE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AS IT STANDS TO-DAY IS INCOMPLETE AND IMPROPER FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

“It is proposed to submit such plan of organization to the governors of the States, asking their assent thereto, as all this system, so far as the national guard is concerned, must be voluntary. Upon receiving such assent from the governors, the War Department should designate in each district the exact organizations, assigning the various branches of the service to their proper brigades or divisions. While this will necessarily result in an incomplete organization, as there will be lacking in all branches certain organizations both in the Regular Army and in the militia, still it will be the first step toward carrying out this proposed creation.

“There is a shortage of various militia organizations to complete the proposed corps. In order to obtain these necessary organizations the various States should be urged to add to their national guard such organizations as would be required in each district.”

Intimately co-related with this policy was the question of the distribution and shelter of the Mobile Army — that is, the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers and other auxiliary troops which can be moved from place to place and are not permanently fixed to certain spots as is the coast artillery.

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Appropos of it, the Secretary of War made the following pertinent comments: ²⁰²

“THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION AND SHELTER OF THE MOBILE FORCES OF THE ARMY, . . . ARE NOT BASED UPON ANY CONSISTENT POLICY OR PLAN, AND ARE NOT SUCH AS TO MAKE THE ARMY AS EFFECTIVELY RESPONSIVE AS IT SHOULD BE TO THE PROPER DEMANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE MOBILE ARMY, UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, CAN NOT BE ECONOMICALLY ADMINISTERED. IT IS NOT IN PROPER STRATEGIC POSITIONS FOR MOST EFFECTIVE USE, AND IS NOT SO DISPOSED AS TO BE OF GREATEST VALUE IN TRAINING THE MILITIA FOR SERVICE IN THE FIELD. The present distribution of our mobile army appears to be a consequence of conditions of army service incident to the development of the West and Indian warfare, rather than the result of a plan founded upon modern ideas and necessities.

“Prior to the civil war and afterwards until the early eighties, the Regular Army was mainly employed in affording protection to the settlers on our Indian frontiers. In the prosecution of this work it necessarily happened that the army was in constant movement. Many of the posts or cantonments established were of temporary character, built by soldier labor from local material and at a minimum cost to the Government. As the Indian problem approached settlement and wars with the tribes became less frequent these stations took on a more permanent character. The rude structures erected by the soldiers were replaced by more commodious barracks built by civilian labor of superior material and equipped with modern appliances, and water and sewerage systems were established, involving heavy expense.

“While the necessity for maintaining the army in the West for the protection of settlers against Indians practically disappeared years ago, as a consequence of such service *our mobile army is now in large part located at points far distant from sources of supply and in places not at all suited to modern requirements; but the elaborate and costly improvements to which I have referred, with their conveniences and comforts, and the strong desire of the communities in which posts are located to have them continued,* have naturally had a tendency to prevent the adop-*

* The desire of any community to prevent the abolition of a post in its vicinity is obviously founded upon the fact that the troops are a decided source of revenue.

As the Chief of Staff, General Leonard Wood, stated in 1910 to

tion of any plan changing the distribution of troops which included the abandonment for military purposes of property of such value. The ever increasing cost of material and labor had made the expense of construction and maintenance of our army posts a very important one and necessitates serious consideration of the question of the distribution and shelter of the army.

“ . . . I am satisfied that THERE SHOULD BE, both for economy and usefulness, A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE DISTRIBUTION AND SHELTER OF THE ARMY, AND THAT A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS A CHANGE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS AND A CORRELATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD. A large part of our military expenditures is for the upkeep of our expensive system of quartering troops. . . .

“ In any plan for distributing the mobile army throughout the country three prime considerations should be kept in mind:

“ First. *The forces should be so located as to permit of their being maintained and administered in the most economical manner.*

“ Second. *They should be stationed in positions from which they can be moved most expeditiously and economically to points of concentration against foreign or domestic enemies.*

Third. *They should be so distributed as to be of the greatest value in educating and training the militia and carrying out plans for raising volunteers in case of necessity.*

“ Under the first the natural conclusion would be that the troops should be stationed near great centers of production and supply. Under the second they should be stationed at great centers of transportation, and under the third they should be distributed in the several States in proportion to their population and organized militia. Each State has one or more centers of supply at which troops could be economically maintained. These centers of supply are, as a rule, centers of transportation, and are usually large and important cities. The proportion of militia organized in the cities of the several States is far greater than the proportion organized in small towns and country districts. Hence THE THREE REQUIREMENTS — ECONOMY, POSSIBILITY OF RAPID MOVEMENT, AND TRAINING OF THE MILITIA — WOULD ALL BE MET IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IF THE the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, “there is a great uproar always made when we withdraw troops.”— See *Hearing on the Army Appropriation Bill for the Fiscal Year 1911-1912*, p. 360.

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TROOPS WERE STATIONED IN OR NEAR THE PRINCIPAL CITIES ; and this is the course which the General Staff believes should be pursued."

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1910

The military legislation enacted by the second session of the Sixty-first Congress during 1910 contained, aside from the usual appropriation acts and certain measures of minor importance,²⁰³ only six measures of sufficient interest to the general reader to warrant mention. The first was the Act approved March 8th,²⁰⁴ which ran thus:

"That the one hundred and twenty-second and one hundred and twenty-fourth articles of war be, and hereby are, modified to read as follows:

"ART. 122. If, upon marches, guards, or in quarters, different corps of the army happen to join or do duty together, the officer highest in rank of the line of the Army, Marine Corps, organized militia, or volunteers, by commission, there on duty or in quarters, shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful in the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President, according to the nature of the case.

"ART. 124. Officers of the organized militia of the several States, when called into the service of the United States, shall on all detachments, courts-martial, and other duty, wherein they may be employed in conjunction with the regular or volunteer forces of the United States, take rank next after all officers of the like grade in said regular forces, and shall take precedence of all officers of volunteers of equal or inferior rank, notwithstanding the commissions of such militia officers may be older than the commissions of the said officers of the regular forces of the United States.

"SEC. 2. That the one hundred and twenty-third article of war be, and hereby is, repealed."²⁰⁵

The Act of April 12th making appropriations for the Military Academy embodied the recommendation of the Secretary of War by providing that

"Hereafter, for six years from July first anno Domini, nineteen hundred and ten, whenever any cadet shall have finished

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three years of his course at the United States Military Academy, his successor may be admitted to the Academy; and the corps of cadets is hereby increased to meet this provision." 206

✓ The next measure of importance was approved on April 21st and further amended Section 15 of the "Dick Bill" of January 21, 1903, which had been amended by Section 9 of the Act of May 27, 1908, as will be seen by reference to pages 348 and 697. The law in question 207 provided

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"That section fifteen of the Act entitled 'An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,' approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, as amended by "An Act entitled "An Act to further amend the Act entitled 'An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,' approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eight," be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 15. That the Secretary of War is authorized to provide for participation by any part of the organized militia of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, on the request of the governor of a State or Territory, or the commanding-general of the militia of the District of Columbia, in the encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular Army, at or near any military post or camp or lake or sea-coast defenses of the United States. In such case the organized militia so participating shall receive the same pay, subsistence, and transportation as is provided by law for the officers and men of the Regular Army, and no part of the sums appropriated for the support of the Regular Army shall be used to pay any part of the expenses of the organized militia of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, while engaged in joint encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction of the Regular Army and militia: *Provided*, That the Secretary of War is authorized, under requisition of the governor of a State or Territory or the commanding-general of the militia of the District of Columbia, to pay to the quartermaster-general, or such other officer of the militia as may be duly designated and appointed for the purpose, so much of its allotment, under the annual appropriation authorized by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, as shall be necessary for the payment, subsistence, transportation, and other expenses of such portion of the organized militia as may engage in en-

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campments, maneuvers, and field instruction with any part of the Regular Army at or near any military post or camp or lake or sea-coast defenses of the United States, and the Secretary of War shall forward to Congress, at each session next after said encampments, a detailed statement of the expense of such encampments and maneuvers: *Provided*, That the command of such military post or camp and the officers and troops of the United States there stationed shall remain with the regular commander of the post without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity: *Provided further*, That except as herein specified the right to command during such joint encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction shall be governed by the rules set out in Articles One hundred and twenty-two and One hundred and twenty-four of the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States."

The third military measure of importance was "An Act To authorize commissions to issue in the cases of officers of the army retired with increased rank," approved on May 6, 1910,²⁰⁸ and provided

"That officers of the army on the retired list whose rank has been, or shall hereafter be, advanced by operation of or in accordance with law shall be entitled to and shall receive commissions in accordance with such advanced rank."

The fourth was "An Act Providing for the retirement of certain medical officers of the army," approved on June twenty-second,²⁰⁹ and specified

"That any officer of the Medical Reserve Corps who shall have reached the age of seventy years, and whose total active service in the Army of the United States, regular or volunteer, as such officer, and as contract or acting assistant surgeon, and as an enlisted man in the war of the rebellion, shall equal forty years, may thereupon, in the discretion of the President, be placed upon the retired list of the army with the rank, pay, and allowances of a first lieutenant."

The last item of interest was contained in the Sundry Civil Bill of June 25, 1910, which allotted \$50,000 for military posts but explicitly

"*Provided*, That hereafter no money appropriated for military posts shall be expended for the construction of quarters for officers of the army, or for barracks and quarters for the artillery, the total cost of which, including the heating and plumbing apparatus, wiring and fixtures, shall exceed, in the case of quarters of a general officer, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, of a colonel or an officer above the rank of captain, twelve thousand dollars, and of an officer of and below the rank of captain, nine thousand dollars."²¹⁰

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1910

On October 15, 1910, the actual strength of the Regular Army was 4,310 officers and 67,459 enlisted men, exclusive of the Hospital Corps of 3,486 men. If the Philippine Scouts numbering 166 officers and 5,100 men be added to the above, the total Regular force amounted to 77,035 officers and enlisted men, which was 10,084 short of the maximum strength authorized by law. At the close of the fiscal year "121 general and staff officers (10.37 per cent.) and 800 line officers (25.76 per cent.) were absent from their commands," and the number of desertions which had occurred during the preceding twelve months amounted to 3,464 — 30.6 per cent. less than the year before. The principal activities of the Army were devoted to fighting forest fires during August and September in Montana, Idaho, Washington and Oregon; and the camp of instruction at American Lake, Washington, had to be discontinued on account of the withdrawal of nearly all the troops for that purpose. Certain Regular forces did, however, participate in military tournaments at Toledo, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Des Moines, Iowa; Albany, N. Y.; Nashville, Tennessee; Chicago; and at Tacoma, Washington. The first tournament at Des Moines from September 20 to 30, 1909, proved so successful that a second was held there from September 26 to October 5, 1910; the tournament at Albany was an adjunct to the Hudson-Fulton celebration, and the one at Chicago was attended by over a million people. These exhibitions comprised, among other

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things, reviews of troops, competitive drills, tests in scaling walls, building and demolishing bridges, and packing. They were of service in that they not only afforded capital schooling to the troops, but enabled the people at large to gain some understanding of the variety, extent and character of modern military training.²¹¹

During the year more than 13,000 of the Regulars were inoculated against typhoid fever; the physical tests for officers were modified by General Orders No. 148, under date of July 10, 1910, which prescribed that all officers on the active list were to keep themselves at all times in condition to perform duty with troops under war conditions; the infantry equipment recommended on April 5th by the board of six officers convened in 1909 was approved with slight modifications; and a similar board was appointed during April, 1910, to consider the subject of equipments for the cavalry.²¹²

In the seacoast fortifications three 10-inch guns and 46 rapid-fire guns were added during the year, and the first three of the more powerful 14-inch guns were completed. Owing to the neglect of Congress, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, one of the most important strategic points on our Atlantic coast, remained wholly unfortified and without so much as one gun to defend the channel between Capes Charles and Henry. There was also dire need for more guns at the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, but nothing could be done to rectify this condition without the proper appropriation. Progress was made in the matter of installing searchlights and fire-control, but both were a long way from completed.²¹³

In the insular possessions, the heavy gun batteries for the defence of Subig Bay were finished, but the work in Manila Bay, Corregidor and Carabao islands was handicapped, and that at Caballo island could not be begun, owing to the insufficiency of money. In the defences of Honolulu and Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, as well as those guarding the Panama

Canal, the same cause prevented their completion in the manner contemplated by the National Coast Defense Board.²¹⁴

✓ According to the returns made in consequence of the annual inspections, the Organized Militia numbered 9,155 officers and 110,505 enlisted men, an increase of 734 over 1909. The law of May 27, 1908, had fixed January 21, 1910, as the date when the militia was to conform to the standard of the Regular Army in organization, equipment and discipline, but, in default of a clause enforcing this standard, the State authorities complied or not as they saw fit, and as a result it was found that the efficiency of their respective National Guards varied "from a high to a low degree." Every effort was made by the War Department to stimulate instruction through the encampments and schools of correspondence to which allusion has been made, but the limit in this direction was reached during 1910, and no further development could be expected until Congress had authorized the assignment of Regular officers on the active list to duty with the organized militia.²¹⁵ In his annual report Secretary Dickinson stated²¹⁶ that

✓ "The year has been notable, in so far as the Organized Militia is concerned, by the publication of a War Department order which, with the approval of the authorities of certain States, established a paper organization of combined regular and militia troops, organized into three military divisions, constituting a field army. This is an initial movement which looks ultimately toward providing a similar combination of regular and militia troops for the whole country suitable for mobilization for field operations in case of war. It is hoped during the ensuing year to extend this organization scheme to include all of the States and Territories. It is further planned to accomplish the actual mobilization of one of the three divisions of the first field army if appropriations are granted by Congress for this purpose. Such a mobilization is considered of much importance in the tentative working out of the general defensive scheme and an adequate appropriation therefor is urged."

During the year all the coast States, except New Jersey, Delaware and Louisiana, made provision for militia coast

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artillery reserves in conformity with the policy of the War Department of having one-half of the *personnel* necessary to man the seacoast fortifications furnished by the militia. The State troops participating in the joint coast defence exercises continued to make fair progress, although obviously hampered by the lack of dummy guns and other apparatus which would permit much valuable instruction to be given them in their armouries.²¹⁷

The restricted demand for the type of horses required for the military service had resulted in such a scarcity of remounts throughout the country that the Secretary of War appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture for assistance and co-operation. Each department designated a representative and the outcome of their joint endeavours to devise the means to remedy the situation was a project to encourage the breeding of horses for military purposes.²¹⁸

"In brief, the plan was drawn so as to provide in time for a sufficient number of remounts annually for the mounted service of the Army on the present peace footing. The country is to be divided into four breeding districts and 100 stallions purchased to stand for service free of charge for approved sound mares, the mare owner to give in return an option on the resulting foal during the year it is 3 years of age. The localities suggested for breeding districts are those where conditions are especially suited for horse raising, where the prevailing type of mares is most likely to approach that desired for the Army, where a light type of horse will always in the long run be the most profitable to the farmer and draft horses least likely to obtain a firm foothold, and where the mares are sufficiently numerous to give the stallions maximum service."²¹⁹

The cost of this plan was estimated to be \$250,000 for the first year and \$100,000 annually thereafter.²²⁰

Secretary Dickinson again laid strong emphasis upon the necessity for Congressional action for the following purposes:

- (1) The elimination of inefficient officers from active service in the Army in order to expedite the flow of promotion for capable officers.
- (2) An increase in the number of officers, which was urgently

needed if the Army was to perform the duties required of it by law.

(3) The creation of a General Service corps.

(4) Sufficient appropriations to purchase aircraft, to complete the fortifications in the United States and insular possessions, and to secure the necessary supply of field-artillery guns, carriages and ammunition of which there was a woeful shortage.

(5) To make some much-needed amendments in the existing law governing the militia, which still contained certain material defects.

(6) To enact a comprehensive law for the organization of a volunteer army to be raised in the event of war.²²¹

In further explanation of the last, he declared that ²²²

“Such a measure can best be formulated in time of peace and tranquillity, when the opportunity is afforded to proceed with deliberation and care in the preparation of laws adequate and indispensable for our possible war needs. The passage of such legislation will permit of the preparation of all the necessary plans for the organization, equipment, and supply of the volunteer army and the selection of places for mobilization. Without the necessary legislation all such matters must be deferred. A bill for this purpose (S. 4003, 61st Cong., 2d sess.) is now before Congress, and it is hoped that it will receive favorable consideration at the present session. *Some new legislative enactment of this kind is an essential part of our national military system, and will enable the General Staff and the War College to discharge one of the most important duties for which Congress created them, and which they are now prevented from doing because of the absence of such a law.* The measure in question has been very carefully considered by the department, and it is believed to be adequate for the purpose. It does not call for any appropriation, nor would it cause any expenditure of public money during the years of peace.”

Under the caption of National Military Policy, the Secretary of War laid down these most important principles: ²²³

“*In order to avoid the waste inseparable from going to war without full preparation, WE MUST BE READY WITH A COMPLETE SYSTEM FOR PASSING FROM A PEACE TO A WAR ESTABLISHMENT. WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLIFYING AND PERFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND OR-*

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GANIZATION OF THE ARMY TO THE END THAT THE NEW ARMY OF REGULARS, ORGANIZED MILITIA, AND VOLUNTEERS MAY PASS AUTOMATICALLY FROM A PEACE TO A WAR BASIS. *We have vast military resources, and IF WE BUT ORGANIZE THEM IN TIME OF PEACE IT WILL NOT ONLY HAVE A TENDENCY TO PREVENT WAR, BUT should war come IT WILL ENABLE THE NATION TO CONDUCT ITS CAMPAIGNS WITH A GREATER REGARD FOR ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY THAN HAS BEEN HITHERTO POSSIBLE. IT IS FUTILE TO ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNTRY UPON A PROPER BASIS, having due regard for economy and efficiency, BY THE PASSAGE OF DETACHED LEGISLATION. In my opinion THE TIME HAS COME WHEN CONGRESS SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO DETERMINE AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR THE ORGANIZATION, MOBILIZATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY, THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, AND THE VOLUNTEER FORCES IN THE EVENT OF WAR."*

Insomuch as the year 1910 marked the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, it may be of interest to examine in somewhat greater detail the condition of our land forces and our readiness for war at that epoch. It will thus be possible to gauge how far Congress had profited by the lessons of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars, and how much it had achieved in the fulfilment of its duty to provide the country with adequate national defence.

As has been seen, the Regular Army — including the Philippine Scouts — numbered on October 15, 1910, 77,035 officers and enlisted men, distributed as follows:

In the United States	56,961
In Alaska	1,128
In Hawaii	1,371
In the Philippines:	
Regular Army	10,962
Philippine Scouts	<u>5,266</u> 16,228
In Porto Rico	604
Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations	743
Total	<u>77,035</u> ²²⁴

In other words, *there was only one Regular officer and soldier to defend every 10,000 inhabitants in continental United*

States. As the enlisted men in the entire Army numbered 72,559, in order to raise the military establishment to the maximum war strength authorized by the law of February 2, 1901, 27,441 additional men would be required. *The Army would then contain about thirty per cent. of recruits and, obviously, be far below the fighting efficiency it ought to possess.**

In one respect Congress had been generous, since appropriations had been made for 675,000 Springfield rifles of the latest model, but the Ordnance Department declared that a reserve of 1,000,000 rifles ought to be kept on hand for an emergency.

The sources of supply for small-arms ammunition were the Frankford Arsenal and certain private manufacturers. During the fiscal year 1909-1910 the former produced 80,000,000 rounds and the latter 8,000,000, but from this amount must be deducted the 40,000,000 rounds consumed each year in target practice by the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, and in the supplies furnished to the Navy and Marine Corps. In other words, the actual increase in the reserve *per annum* was only about 48,000,000 rounds. In the Russo-Japanese War the average expenditure of small-arms ammunition in a one-day's battle was fully 300 rounds per man engaged, according to General Kuropatkin's own account; ²²⁵ and in the present European War, so far as the author was able to ascertain from French, English and German officers and men, ²²⁶ the amount is even larger. An army of 500,000 men would therefore use in a single day's fighting the entire 152,000,000 rounds which the Chief of Ordnance stated constituted the American reserve on June 30, 1911.

* The following account of our military condition at the close of 1911 is based upon the author's articles, "The Truth Concerning the United States Army" and "The United States Army and Organized Militia To-day" as published in the *Infantry Journal* for May-June and July-August, 1911, and re-published in pamphlet form in July and August of that year respectively. In these articles the authorities for every statement of fact in the text are given in copious footnotes.

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Our field artillery was hopelessly inadequate for war. In almost every large army there are four guns to each 1,000 infantrymen, while France had nearly five and Germany six guns per thousand. The available infantry of the Regular Army and Organized Militia in the United States in 1910 recruited up to its full war strength would have numbered approximately 212,520 rifles. According to our Field Service Regulations at that time, such a force would require at least 850 guns, but General Leonard Wood, the Chief of Staff, testified before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 14, 1910, that we possessed only 432 three-inch field pieces. The German army then had 2,800 rounds per gun, while our own Field Service Regulations required only 1,856 rounds for each 3-inch piece, yet, according to General Wood's testimony, *we possessed less than one-third of the amount prescribed and, what was more, that was all we had.* The Chief of Staff in his annual report laid special emphasis upon the fact that, at the existing rate of appropriation, IT WILL BE MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS BEFORE AN ADEQUATE RESERVE SUPPLY OF FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION CAN BE ACCUMULATED. "The existing want of field-artillery guns, carriages, and ammunition," he declared, "constitutes a grave menace to the public safety in case of war," and he pointed out that

"once a state of war exists with a first-class power there will be no opportunity to buy this material abroad or time to manufacture it at home, even if all available plants were running at the maximum capacity, without such delay as would be fatal to our hopes of success. This shortage of field-artillery material is the most serious feature of the present military situation, and one which should be immediately corrected."

Our seacoast defences were fortunately in a decidedly better condition and, so far as concerned the installation of armament, were well advanced toward completion; but in certain posts the number of guns was insufficient and certain ports were conspicuous for the absence of needed fortifica-

tions. In the matter of ammunition, searchlights and apparatus for fire control, there was, on the other hand, a notable deficiency. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911, Congress had appropriated only \$140,000 for reserve ammunition for the ports within the confines of the United States, while the allotment for the preceding years had been only \$325,000 *per annum*. Even were the appropriations continued at the latter rate, no less than thirteen years would elapse before the full supply of reserve ammunition could be accumulated for our home ports, and twenty-one years would pass before this supply would be completed for the existing batteries and for those to be constructed within the country.

The installation of searchlights for the fortifications in the United States was slightly more than half finished but, to judge by the average rate of appropriation, nearly ten years will be necessary to complete it. About one-half of the apparatus for fire-control had been put into the fortifications, but this work would be prolonged for eight years unless Congressional appropriations were made in larger amounts than during the previous five years. Without the proper searchlights, fire-control apparatus, and, above all, without reserve ammunition, the expenditures already incurred for fortifications — amounting in round numbers to \$70,000,000 — would have been virtually wasted.

A decided dearth existed in the matter of large reserve supply depôts located with reference to supply centres or at such points as to be utilized to the best advantage during the mobilization and concentration of the Regular Army, Volunteers and Militia. Nearly every European army has for years possessed a system of such depôts containing sufficient supplies of all sorts — except perishable stores like food — to equip fully all troops that may be recruited or mobilized within its sphere. Without such depôts, no army can be put into the field with the speed and precision demanded by modern war.

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Inferior as was the condition of our military forces in respect to *matériel*, the *personnel* conditions were worse. Although the backbone of an army is the infantry upon which falls the brunt of fighting, the United States possessed in 1910 only thirty regiments of Regular infantry — eight in the Philippines, one in Honolulu and Alaska, and twenty-one in continental United States. The War Department, having planned a joint force of Regulars and militia for national defence, constituted them into the first field army by General Orders No. 35; but, as a matter of fact, this was a field army in name only, so deficient was its organization and equipment. As for the other proposed field armies, they would of necessity be little more than mere skeletons, and would consequently cut a sorry figure if opposed to a properly organized army such as other great nations possess.

Both in the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, the field artillery fell far short of its correct proportion to the number of infantry and cavalry. Had they been recruited up to their full war strength at that time, there would have been a shortage of more than 50 per cent. in the number of guns required to arm them properly. Such a force would have amounted approximately to over 300,000 men, and in war this number would unquestionably have to be doubled. The dearth of guns, not to mention ammunition, was therefore all the more striking. The report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs for 1910 showed that the light batteries in the militia were deficient in organization, *personnel* and instruction, and that they were very deficient in the numbers needed to make their existing infantry effective as fighting units.

The Coast Artillery was likewise short of its requisite strength. The number needed to provide one manning detail for the fortifications already constructed within the United States was 42,065, whereas there were available only 18,079 Regular coast artillery troops, and 6,864 militia, a total of 24,943. The deficit was therefore 17,122 troops, ir-

respective of the 13,045 who would be required to man the fortifications at the Panama Canal and in the insular possessions. Furthermore, the protection of these fortifications against attacks from the rear would demand some 45,000 field troops in time of war.

The retention of many of the Army posts was utterly unwarranted from a military standpoint, but Congressional indifference and local influence prevented their abandonment. As a result mountain batteries were stationed several days' march from any mountains where they could be properly trained, and cavalry found itself located in the north where it was snowed up for half the year. Economy and better administration dictated an improvement in the business methods of the War Department, the concentration of troops in large garrisons, and the creation of a supply corps and a general service corps, such as the French and German armies possess, but Congress persisted in ignoring every recommendation in respect to them.

Greatest of all the defects in our military system in 1910 was the absence of a reserve for the Regular Army. Notwithstanding that three years of excellent schooling were given to regular soldiers and in spite of the fact that expiring enlistments graduated some 30,000 men annually from the military establishment, all control of these trained men was lost the moment their term of service was ended. Congress, with its customary proclivity for undue waste and shortsightedness, had not shown the slightest inclination to utilize them in the event of war, and the bills introduced to create them into a reserve — such as the smallest nations with any pretensions to a modern military force possessed — had been persistently ignored, along with other measures imperatively needed by our land forces. It is therefore scarcely surprising that the close of 1910 witnessed our land forces utterly unprepared for war against any first-class Power, and that there was abundant reason for apprehension concerning our defencelessness.

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1911

The third session of the Sixty-first Congress enacted certain military legislation of decided importance, in that the recommendations of the Secretary of War were at last put into effect, in part if not *in toto*. The first act was approved on January 19, 1911, and provided

“That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to drop from the rolls of the army any officer who is absent from duty for three months without leave, or who has been absent in confinement in a prison or penitentiary for more than three months after final conviction by a civil court of competent jurisdiction; and no officer so dropped shall be eligible for reappointment.”²²⁷

The act of February twenty-seventh²²⁸ making appropriations for rivers and harbours contained the following stipulation:

“SEC. 5. That the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army is hereby increased by five colonels, six lieutenant colonels, nineteen majors, seventeen captains, and thirteen first lieutenants. The increase in each grade hereby provided for shall be extended over a period of five years as nearly as practicable, and the original vacancies hereby created in each grade shall be filled by promotion from the next lower grade in accordance with existing law: *Provided*, That officers of the Corps of Engineers when on duty under the Chief of Engineers, connected solely with the work of river and harbor improvements may, while so employed, be paid their pay and commutation of quarters from appropriations for the work or works upon which they are employed: *Provided further*, That whenever it shall be necessary in order to properly prosecute works of river and harbor improvement, the Chief of Engineers is authorized to detail for duty in charge of river and harbor districts or as members of boards of engineers any assistant engineers in the employ of the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. Vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers shall hereafter be filled, as far as may be consistent with the interests of the military service, by promotions from the Corps of Cadets at the United States Military Academy: *Provided*, That vacancies remaining in any fiscal year after the assignment of cadets of the class graduating in that fiscal year may be filled from civil

life as hereinafter provided: *And provided further, . . .* To become eligible for examination and appointment, a civilian candidate for the appointment as second lieutenant must be an unmarried citizen of the United States between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-nine, who holds a diploma showing graduation in an engineering course from an approved technical school, and is eligible for appointment as a junior engineer under the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. Selection of eligible civilians for appointment, including term of probation, shall be made as the result of such competitive examination into the mental, moral, and physical qualifications, and under such rules and regulations as shall be recommended by the Chief of Engineers and approved by the Secretary of War.”²²⁹

On March 1st there was approved “An Act To protect the dignity and honor of the uniform of the United States”²³⁰ which provided

“That hereafter no proprietor, manager, or employee of a theater or other public place of entertainment or amusement in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory, the District of Alaska or Insular possession of the United States, shall make, or cause to be made, any discrimination against any person lawfully wearing the uniform of the Army, Navy, Revenue Cutter Service or Marine Corps of the United States because of that uniform, and any person making or causing to be made, such discrimination shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.”

On March 3rd three acts were approved. The first, making appropriations for the Military Academy, contained a proviso relating to acting first sergeants of engineers,²³¹ while the second, which made appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1912, embodied several features of importance. The Secretary of War was “authorized to detail an officer of the Medical Corps to take charge of the first-aid department of the American Red Cross,”²³² and veterinarians were to be retired “under the laws governing the retirement of second lieutenants.”²³³ Under the caption of “Equipment of Coast Artillery, Armories, Organized Militia,” the reiterated recommendations of

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Secretaries of War were at last heeded by permitting 200 Regular officers on the active list to be assigned to duty with the militia, by arranging for filling vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant, and by a much-needed increase in the Quartermaster's department. This important part of the law ran as follows: —

“Upon the request of the governors of the several States and Territories concerned, the President may detach officers of the active list of the Army from their proper commands for duty as inspectors and instructors of the Organized Militia, as follows, namely: Not to exceed one officer for each regiment and separate battalion of infantry, or its equivalent of other troops: *Provided*, That line officers detached for duty with the Organized Militia under the provisions hereof, together with those detached from their proper commands, under the provisions of law, for other duty the usual period of which exceeds one year, shall be subject to the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, with reference to details to the staff corps, but the total number of detached officers hereby made subject to these provisions shall not exceed two hundred: *And provided further*, That the number of such officers detached from each of the several branches of the line of the Army shall be in proportion to the authorized commissioned strength of that branch; they shall be of the grades of first lieutenant to colonel, inclusive, and the number detached from each grade shall be in proportion to the number in that grade now provided by law for the whole Army. The vacancies hereby caused or created in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled in accordance with existing law, one-half in each fiscal year until the total number of vacancies shall have been filled: *Provided*, That hereafter vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant occurring in any fiscal year shall be filled by appointment in the following order, namely: First, of cadets graduated from the United States Military Academy during that fiscal year; second, of enlisted men whose fitness for promotion shall have been determined by competitive examination; third, of candidates from civil life between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years. The President is authorized to make rules and regulations to carry these provisions into effect: *Provided*, That the Quartermaster's Department is hereby increased by two colonels, three lieutenant colonels, seven majors, and eighteen

captains, the vacancies thus created to be filled by promotion and detail in accordance with section twenty-six of the Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one.”²³⁴

Under the caption of Quartermaster's Department, an appropriation was made for horses for cavalry, artillery and engineers, with the condition attached “that no part of this appropriation shall be used for breeding purposes,” and it was

“*Provided further*, That hereafter from the enlisted force of the Army now provided by law the President may authorize the organization of remount detachments at each of the remount depots, and may authorize the appointment therein of such non-commissioned officers, mechanics, artificers, farriers, horse-shoers, and cooks as may be necessary for the administration of such remount depots.”²³⁵

Under the heading of Army Medical Museum and Library, it was provided that

“Hereafter there shall be attached to the Medical Department a dental corps, which shall be composed of dental surgeons and acting dental surgeons, the total number of which shall not exceed the proportion of one to each thousand of actual enlisted strength of the Army; the number of dental surgeons shall not exceed sixty, and the number of acting dental surgeons shall be such as may, from time to time, be authorized by law. All original appointments to the dental corps shall be as acting dental surgeons, who shall have the same official status, pay, and allowances as the contract dental surgeons now authorized by law. . . .”²³⁶

The closing paragraph of this act was as follows:

“On and after the passage of this Act, every line officer on the active list below the grade of colonel who has lost in lineal rank through the system of regimental promotion in force prior to October first, eighteen hundred and ninety, may, in the discretion of the President, and subject to examination for promotion as prescribed by law, be advanced to higher grades in his arm up to and including the grade of colonel, in accordance with the rank he would have been entitled to hold had promotion been lineal throughout his arm or corps since the date of his entry into the arm or corps to which he permanently belongs: *Pro-*

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vided, That officers advanced to higher grades under the provisions of this Act shall be additional officers in those grades: *Provided further*, That nothing in this Act shall operate to interfere with or retard the promotion to which any officer would be entitled under existing law: *And provided further*, That the officers advanced to higher grades under this Act shall be junior to the officers who now rank them under existing law, when these officers have reached the same grade.”²³⁷

The third measure, which became a law on March 3, 1911, was of major importance. It was entitled “An Act To prevent the disclosure of national defense secrets”²³⁸ and provided

“That whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, to which he is not lawfully entitled, goes upon any vessel, or enters any navy-yard, naval station, fort, battery, torpedo station, arsenal, camp, factory, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed or in process of construction by the United States, or in the possession or under the control of the United States or any of its authorities or agents, and whether situated within the United States or in any place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof; or whoever, when lawfully or unlawfully upon any vessel, or in or near any such place, without proper authority, obtains, takes, or makes, or attempts to obtain, take, or make, any document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge of anything connected with the national defense to which he is not entitled; or whoever, without proper authority, receives or obtains, or undertakes or agrees to receive or obtain, from any person, any such document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge, knowing the same to have been so obtained, taken, or made; or whoever, having possession of or control over any such document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge, willfully and without proper authority, communicates or attempts to communicate the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or to whom the same ought not, in the interest of the national defense, to be communicated at that time; or whoever, being lawfully intrusted with any such document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge, willfully and in breach of his trust, so communicates or attempts to

communicate the same, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

"SEC. 2. That whoever, having committed any offense defined in the preceding section, communicates or attempts to communicate to any foreign government, or to any agent or employee thereof, any document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge so obtained, taken, or made, or so intrusted to him, shall be imprisoned not more than ten years.

"SEC. 3. That offenses against the provisions of this Act committed upon the high seas or elsewhere outside of a judicial district shall be cognizable in the district where the offender is found or into which he is first brought; but offenses hereunder committed within the Philippine Islands shall be cognizable in any court of said islands having original jurisdiction of criminal cases, with the same right of appeal as is given in other criminal cases where imprisonment exceeding one year forms a part of the penalty; and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such courts for such purpose."

The next military legislation of interest was contained in the act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture, approved March 4, 1911, and, in furtherance of the plan to encourage the breeding of horses for military purposes — to which allusion has been made on page 375, allotted \$50,000

"For experiments in animal feeding and breeding, including cooperation with the State agricultural experiment stations, including the repairs and additions to and erection of buildings absolutely necessary to carry on the experiments, including rent, and the employment of labor in the city of Washington and elsewhere, and all other necessary expenses." ²³⁹

On March fourth, aside from the Appropriation Acts for General and Deficiency Expenses and for Fortifications,²⁴⁰ the law of June 22, 1910, relative to the retirement of certain medical officers was amended so as to read:

"That any officer of the Medical Reserve Corps who shall have reached the age of seventy years, and whose total active service in the Army of the United States, Regular or Volunteer, as such officer, and as contract or acting assistant surgeon, and as an enlisted man, shall equal forty years, may thereupon, in the discretion of the President, be placed upon the retired

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list of the Army with the rank, pay, and allowances of a first lieutenant.”²⁴¹

The Sundry Civil Bill, approved on the same date, wisely appropriated \$2,000,000 for the construction of seacoast batteries in the Panama Canal Zone, and \$1,966,000 “for the purchase, manufacture and test of seacoast cannon for coast defense.”²⁴²

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1911

On October 15, 1911, the actual strength of the Regular Army was 4,388 officers and 70,250 enlisted men, a total of 74,638 and an increase of 78 officers and 2,791 men over the preceding year, but about nine per cent. below its maximum strength as authorized by law. Although Congress had at last created an additional force of officers — 12 engineers, 60 dental surgeons and 200 to meet the drain caused by detached duty and instruction of the militia — the graduating class at West Point and the officers raised from the ranks were insufficient to supply the necessary quota and, as it had become evident that many would have to be appointed from civil life, great care was taken in prescribing the requirements and a high standard was wisely set. Similar care was taken in recruiting for the Army and no less than 72 per cent. of the applicants were rejected. The desertions, which had numbered 4,993 in 1909 and 3,464 in 1910, fell to 2,504, or 2.28 per cent. of the total number of enlisted men in service during the year. This diminution was particularly gratifying in that it was the lowest, with one solitary exception, that had occurred in the American Army in ninety years.²⁴³

The military operations of 1911 were of considerably more importance than in the years immediately preceding. The depredations of the Moros in the Sarangani peninsula, District of Davao, in Mindanao, reached such a point that a punitive expedition was sent against them under the command of Major E. R. Heiberg of the Philippine Scouts and other columns were sent in pursuit of the bandits. As a result of

the thoroughness with which the work was performed, all opposition was crushed and the country restored to a peaceful condition. As in the past a considerable amount of extremely arduous police duty had to be done by the Regular troops in assisting the civil authorities in the Lake Lanao district in Mindanao.

By all odds the most noteworthy military event of recent years occurred during the month of March, 1911. So serious were the unrest and the intrigues prevailing on both sides of the frontier separating Texas from Mexico that, in November, 1910, two troops of cavalry were despatched to assist the civil authorities to enforce the laws of neutrality. As the conditions became worse rather than better, additional troops were sent, until the entire border from the mouth of the Rio Grande River in Texas to San Diego, California, was more or less effectually patrolled by Regulars. As the indications pointed to the salutary effect which would unquestionably be exercised by the presence of a large force of troops, orders were issued by the War Department on March 6, 1911, for the concentration of certain troops destined to be organized into a "manœuvre division" composed of three brigades of infantry, a field artillery brigade, an independent cavalry brigade, and the necessary auxiliary troops, the whole under the command of Major General William H. Carter. On the same day instructions were also issued for the mobilization of thirty-six companies of Coast Artillery, to be organized into three provisional regiments of twelve companies each and designated as the First Separate Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Albert L. Mills.²⁴⁴ As General Wood, the Chief of Staff, stated in his annual report,²⁴⁵

"The mobilization of the maneuver division in Texas was attended with the delay incident to assembling this number of troops from many widely scattered stations, which was increased by the time necessary to assemble railroad transportation, it not having been practicable to give the railroads any advance information of the movement."

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The troops from Fort D. A. Russell, near Cheyenne, Wyoming — the largest garrison in the United States — did not reach San Antonio until March 13th to 16th, and the manœuvre division — the aggregate strength of which was 613 officers and 15,056 enlisted men — actually numbered on March 31, 1911, only 11,254; on April 30th, 12,598; on May 31st, 12,809; and on June 30th, 11,882. In other words, its maximum strength was not attained until nearly three months after it had been ordered to assemble. The First Separate Brigade, on the other hand, reached its maximum of 4,045 officers and men at the end of March.²⁴⁶ The commander of the "manœuvre division" was taken from Washington, his chief of staff from New York, and the other staff officers from all over the country. They had never worked together, but were immediately called upon to improvise a division administration and supply system. This division never approximated anywhere near the 19,200 troops it ought to have numbered, and on August 7, 1911, it was disbanded, the provisional brigade having been discontinued on June 15th.²⁴⁷

As the Chief of Staff observed,²⁴⁸

"The mobilization brought out the necessity for the concentration of our troops into larger garrisons on lines of communication better suited for rapid mobilization. The troops themselves were ready to move promptly and no delay whatever was incident to lack of preparedness on the part of organizations. As the regiments were at peace strength when first assembled, the division was only a little over half the strength of a war division. Recruits were rapidly added to the different regiments until they were brought up to an average per regiment as follows: Infantry, 1,036; cavalry, 957, and Field Artillery, 847. To have brought this division up to war strength would have required the addition to the regiments of an excessive number of recruits and unless a considerable period had been available to instruct and discipline this new personnel the result would have been disastrous to the efficiency of the Regular organizations. THE MOBILIZATION HAS EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT OUR REGIMENTS IN PEACE SHOULD BE KEPT AT

GREATER STRENGTH, AND IT HAS ALSO BROUGHT OUT VERY FORCIBLY THE NECESSITY FOR A RESERVE WITH WHICH TO BRING THE REGIMENTS FROM THEIR PEACE STRENGTH TO FULL WAR STRENGTH. THE EXPERIENCE IN THE MOBILIZATION IN TEXAS HAS ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR ACCUMULATING A SUFFICIENT QUANTITY OF RESERVE SUPPLIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROPER DEPOTS; IN SHORT, THE NECESSITY FOR PROPER MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR."²⁴⁹

The *Infantry Journal* for May-June, 1911, told the plain unvarnished truth when it declared ²⁵⁰ that

"It is a pitiable thing to rejoice at a display of our own weakness, but the concentration in Texas has been such a pitiable display of that weakness that we must all either rejoice or slink away in shame, and it is to the credit of our manhood and the one sign of military regeneration discoverable that far from slinking away in shame the great mass of the line officers of the Army have faced the facts unshrinkingly and declared our whole military organization inefficient and our whole military system extravagant and useless. The concentration in Texas — we do not say mobilization, because the force in Texas even now, months after the original order, is not mobilized — has proved conclusively several things. Primarily it has proved that in individual efficiency of personnel, enlisted and commissioned, we are the peer of any military force in the world. Undeniably there are unfortunate exceptions that go to reduce the average, but these, while much to be regretted and obviously to be got rid of as soon as possible, are counterbalanced by others of equally exceptional enthusiasm, energy, and ability. The average is high. Again, *it has proved that just so far as we have any tactical organization in the Army, just so far, and not one bit farther, is our Army efficient.* In the company, the battalion, and the regiment, within the limits of their authorized strength — no farther — efficiency has been shown. . . . And, finally, the concentration has shown that AT THIS POINT IN OUR MILITARY SYSTEM EVERY SIGN OF EFFICIENCY DISAPPEARS, AND THAT NO MATTER HOW HIGH A DEGREE IS OTHERWISE MAINTAINED, IT IS INSUFFICIENT, and in consequence that OUR WHOLE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ON ITS PRESENT LINES IS USELESS FOR ANY REAL MILITARY PURPOSE. It is altogether useless and foolish to attempt to gloss over the

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matter. There were not lacking those, certainly within the line, to understand long ago that no other result could be expected once an attempt was made to concentrate any part of the Army into a tactical organization larger than a regiment. There were not lacking critics outside the Army, even in Congress itself, to suggest the limitations of our system. But these were all counted as alarmists, yet NOT ONE OF US DARED TO THINK, NOR ANY CRITIC DARED TO GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST, THAT OUR WEAKNESS WAS SO GREAT, OUR SYSTEM SO PITIABLY FUTILE, AS THIS ATTEMPT HAS PROVED TO BE THE CASE. But we have exposed our shame unhesitatingly. Foreign military attachés were invited to witness it, and they came and saw and laughed; national guard officers from all over the country were welcomed, and they came and saw and, we hope, understood; for WHATEVER HAS BEEN DISPLAYED OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE ARMY IS WEAKNESS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN STILL GREATER MEASURE, AND WHATEVER THERE IS IN THIS COMBINED WEAKNESS IS ALL THERE IS TO THE MILITARY SYSTEM THAT SUPPORTS THIS NATION IN ITS CLAIM AS A WORLD POWER."

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911, four 10-inch guns and 23 rapid-fire guns were added to those in the sea-coast defences, thus making a total of 1,182.

The Organized Militia, according to the last reports, was composed of 117,988 officers and men, a decrease of 1,672 over the previous year. Aside from the usual camps of instruction for officers of the infantry, cavalry and field artillery, more than 1,000 officers of the militia served for periods of fourteen days with the manœuvre division at San Antonio. Twelve batteries of field artillery participated in the instruction given the Regular batteries at Sparta, Wisconsin, and the reserves of the militia coast artillery received their customary annual training at various fortifications. During July the National Guard of Massachusetts held manœuvres lasting for seven days, in which war conditions were reproduced in so far as possible, and a marked improvement in efficiency over that of two years previously was manifested. In compliance with the Act of Congress of March 3, 1911, one Regular infantry officer was assigned to duty with

each State and Territory, while Regular cavalry, field artillery and coast officers were detailed to districts of contiguous States possessing these respective arms.²⁵¹

On February 20, 1911, a board of officers — of which Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. John Greble, General Staff, was the president and Captain William D. Connor, General Staff, the recorder — was appointed by the Secretary of War “to consider questions concerning the types of field guns and ammunition supply therefor.” The report of this board stated that

“On February 4, 1911, the Chief of Staff approved a memorandum to the effect that in case of war with a first-class power, it would be necessary for the United States to raise at once a mobile force of approximately 450,000 men within the continental limits of the United States,”

and it therefore recommended that a total of 323 batteries, numbering 1,292 guns, be procured. It also stated that the amount of artillery ammunition which should be provided in time of peace is 1,713,240 rounds, but added that

“It is to be noted that the ammunition here provided for is simply that which should be on hand at the outbreak of war, and is in no sense a complete supply for war.”

On June 23, 1911, the Secretary of War approved this report and directed that the “policy outlined in this report be adopted by the General Staff.” This action was followed on July 14th by directions from the same official “that the accompanying report of the board of officers on types of field guns and ammunition therefor be referred to the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster General, and the Chief Signal Officer, and then filed in the Adjutant General’s Office.”²⁵²

By virtue of War Department General Orders No. 72, dated June 3, 1911, a School of Fire for Field Artillery was established at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, with the object of giving a thorough instruction, both practical and theoretical, in the principles and methods of target practice and fire by field

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pieces.²⁵³ On July 1st the United States was divided, for administrative purposes, into three territorial divisions, to which were entrusted the administrative functions formerly performed by the seven departments, thus eliminating a very large amount of paper work and overhead expense, and effecting a saving estimated at \$245,000 a year. Apropos of this innovation, the Secretary of War stated ²⁵⁴ that

“The department commanders, having been freed from the administrative work formerly performed by them, are now able to devote their time to the personal inspection, training, and supervision of the troops within their departments. The result has been a complete change in the relations sustained between the department commander and the troops within his department. He now goes into the field with them and has a personal acquaintance with the officers and men which he was never able to have before.”

The so-called mobilization in Texas afforded an opportunity to transfer many of the cavalry regiments from northern to southern stations where conditions were infinitely more favourable for training at all seasons. A new policy was therefore inaugurated for that purpose and the mounted troops were replaced at the northern stations by infantry. Steps were likewise taken to recruit regiments intended for service in the Philippines up to full war strength and to retain them there permanently, thus augmenting the number of combatants and effecting a notable saving in pay, construction of barracks, transportation, etc. As a result of the co-operation of the Economy and Efficiency Commission and a specially appointed board, many and important economies were effected during the year, one of the most notable being the continuation of experiments by the Ordnance department of the “Taylor system” of scientific management in the Watertown Arsenal, whereby waste was prevented, more efficient production obtained and skilled workmen received an increased wage.²⁵⁵

In his annual report to the President, Secretary Stimson

recommended the enacting of legislation for the following needs of the military service:

(1) A fair merit system governing both the promotion and elimination of officers.

(2) The abolition of many of the useless posts scattered throughout the country, the maintenance of which entailed expenditures in nowise justified.

Mr. Stimson pointed out that the result was "to make the maintenance of the Army extraordinarily expensive" and that "it is a conservative estimate that *we pay per effective riflemen between two and five times as much as any first-class power on the continent of Europe*; and this comparison is made after excluding from the comparison the higher pay and subsistence which our soldiers receive."

(3) A proper organization of the Army stationed within the United States.

(4) A shortening of the existing term of enlistment of three years, on the ground that "the theory of the modern state is that *it is the duty of the citizen to train himself as promptly as possible to perform his function as a soldier in case of possible war and to return as quickly as possible to his normal civil life.*"

(5) The creation of a reserve composed of soldiers who have received training in the Regular Army, which reserve would be utilized in time of war to maintain the first line of defense at its full fighting strength.

(6) A radical revision and reform of the existing laws in respect to military crimes and offenses. Particular stress was laid upon the excellent results obtained in the punishment of deserters under the system used in the detention barracks of the British Army.

(7) The consolidation of the supply departments, whereby a great saving would be made and increased efficiency obtained.

(8) The creation of a General Service corps.

(9) The imperative need for additional reserve supplies of field artillery guns, carriages and ammunition.

Mr. Stimson emphasized the fact that "*We are less adequately supplied with field artillery material than with any other class of fighting equipment. There is not enough field artillery ammunition for the guns we now have for a single engagement such as were frequent in the Manchurian War.*"

(10) To keep the corps of cadets at West Point filled to its maximum by permitting vacancies to the extent of 30 per cent

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to be filled from the whole list of applicants selected in the order of merit established at the entrance examinations, such appointments to be credited to the United States at large and without prejudice to other appointments authorized by law.²⁵⁶

The Secretary of War also laid great stress upon his hope that Congress would take favourable action in respect to the bill establishing a Council of National Defense, and to another bill providing for a force of national volunteers to be created without delay in the event of actual or threatened war,²⁵⁷ which had been introduced in the Senate on May 25, 1911, by Colonel Henry A. du Pont, the senior Senator from Delaware and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.²⁵⁸

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1912

The most important military legislation enacted by the second session of the Sixty-second Congress occurred during the months of July and August, 1912, although measures relating to the Female Nurse corps, the Mississippi floods, the use of the American Red Cross with the land and naval forces in time of actual or threatened war, and the usual annual appropriation for fortifications became laws previously.²⁵⁹ Allusion has already been made to the experiments made of the "Taylor system" of scientific management in the Watertown Arsenal, and permission was given for its introduction by "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of War to pay a cash reward for suggestions submitted by employees of certain establishments of the Ordnance Department for improvement or economy in manufacturing processes or plant," which was approved on July 17th.²⁶⁰ On August 9th the necessary appropriations were made for the Military Academy for the ensuing fiscal year and some features of slight moment only embodied therein,²⁶¹ while next day there was approved a similar act relating to the Department of Agriculture, which doubled the previous allotment by setting aside \$100,000 "for experiments in animal feed-

ing and breeding, . . . and the experiments in the breeding of horses for military purposes.”²⁶² After creating Fort McHenry a Government reservation “in the control of the War Department,”²⁶³ Congress passed an act which was approved on August 22, 1912, and which amended certain sections of the Revised Statutes and authorized “the President, in certain cases, to mitigate or remit the loss of rights of citizenship imposed by law upon deserters from the military or naval service, and to authorize certain reenlistments in the Army and Naval service.” The reader who is interested to examine this law in detail will find it set forth *in extenso* in footnote on pages 705-706.²⁶⁴

On August 24, 1912, three measures were approved by the President. The first of these — the Sundry Civil Bill — contained nothing of importance from a military point of view except the appropriations to the extent of \$2,806,950 for fortifications and armament for the Panama Canal;²⁶⁵ the second authorized the Secretary of War “to deliver to certain cities and towns condemned bronze or brass cannon, with their carriages and outfit of cannon balls, and so forth;”²⁶⁶ while the third — the Army Appropriation Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913²⁶⁷ — embraced some of the most important military legislation in recent years and embodied in various provisions many of the reiterated recommendations of several Secretaries of War.

The first feature of this law deserving of attention was the allotment of \$100,000 “for the purchase, maintenance, operation and repair of airships and other aerial machines,”²⁶⁸ in which our Army was far behind those of other great nations. The second occurred in the proviso under the caption of “Pay of officers of the line” and stipulated

“That hereafter * in time of peace whenever any officer holding

* Joint Resolution No. 53, approved August 24, 1914, amended the Army Appropriation bill by providing “That in the Act making appropriation for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and for other purposes,” there be substituted for the word “hereafter” where it first occurs

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a permanent commission in the line of the Army with rank below that of major shall not have been actually present for duty for at least two of the last preceding six years with a troop, battery, or company, of that branch of the Army in which he shall hold said commission, such officer shall not be detached nor permitted to remain detached from such troop, battery, or company, for duty of any kind; and all pay and allowances shall be forfeited by any superior for any period during which, by his order, or his permission, or by reason of his failure or neglect to issue or cause to be issued the proper order or instructions at the proper time, any officer shall be detached or permitted to remain detached in violation of any of the terms of this proviso; but nothing in this proviso shall be held to apply in the case of any officer for such period as shall be actually necessary for him, after having been relieved from detached service, to join the troop, battery, or company, to which he shall belong in that branch in which he shall hold a permanent commission, nor shall anything in this proviso be held to apply to the detachment or detail of officers for duty in the Judge Advocate General's Department or in the Ordnance Department, or in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal until after such canal shall have been formally opened, or in the Philippine Constabulary until the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, or to any officer detailed, or who may be hereafter detailed, for aviation duty. And hereafter no officer holding a permanent commission in the Army with rank below that of major shall be detailed as assistant to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs with rank of colonel, or as commanding officer of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, or as chief or assistant chief (Director or Assistant Director) of the Philippine Constabulary, and no other officers of the Army shall hereafter be detailed for duty with the said Constabulary except as specifically provided by law."²⁶⁹

Having dealt a knock-out blow to the evils of detached service and absenteeism by the above proviso — which is generally known in the Army under the nickname of "the Manchu law" — the act went on to declare, under the heading of "Pay of Enlisted Men,"

in the first proviso under the heading "Pay of Officers of the Line," the words: "on and after December fifteenth, nineteen hundred and twelve."— *37 Stat. L.*, p. 645.

“That no officer or enlisted man in active service, who shall be absent from duty on account of disease resulting from his own intemperate use of drugs, or alcoholic liquors, or other misconduct, shall receive pay for the period of such absence from any part of the appropriation in this Act for the pay of officers or enlisted men, the time so absent and the cause thereof to be ascertained under such procedure and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.”²⁷⁰

Some modifications were made in former laws pertaining to the Subsistence Department;²⁷¹ retired enlisted men were to be given “credit for double time for foreign service,” but no such privilege was to inure “to those who hereafter enlist”; and accounting officials of the Treasury were directed to remove any suspensions and disallowances in the accounts of quartermasters for 1910, 1911 and 1912 for certain “expenditures in connection with the raising of forage at remount depots.” In allotting \$1,700,000 for the construction of barracks and quarters, the law wisely stipulated

“That no part of the appropriations contained in this Act shall be expended for permanent improvements at any Army post which has been abandoned or which may be ordered abandoned by the President of the United States.”

It was also

“*Provided*, That hereafter the Secretary of War is authorized to consider, ascertain, adjust, and determine the amounts due on all claims for damages to and loss of private property when the amount of the claim does not exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, occasioned by heavy gun fire and target practice of troops and for damages to vessels, wharves, and other private property, found to be due to maneuvers or other military operations for which the Government is responsible. . . .”,

and it was expressly specified that none of the appropriation for Ordnance stores and ammunition “shall be paid for small-arms powder at a price exceeding seventy-one cents a pound.”²⁷²

The really important part of the Army Appropriation Act

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of August 24, 1912, was embodied in Sections 2, 3 and 4. By virtue of Section 2 there was created for the first time in our history a reserve for the Regular Army similar to that possessed for years by every other nation in the world with any pretensions to a modern military force, and for the lack of which our past wars have been so needlessly prolonged and our expenditures so appalling. Section 3 instituted a consolidation of the supply departments into a single body to be known as the Quartermaster Corps; and Section 4 organized its logical adjunct, the oft-recommended General Service corps.²⁷³ Only a *résumé* of these three important innovations will be made here, insomuch as their great length precludes their insertion in the text, but the reader who is interested to examine them in detail will find those portions of the law dealing with them given *in extenso* in footnote 274 on pages 706-711.²⁷⁴

The purpose of a reserve for the Regular Army, as well as the merits and defects of Section two, were completely summarized in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, for 1912, which stated²⁷⁵ that

“It has been our historical policy in the past to keep the regiments of the Regular Army in time of peace at only about half the strength in enlisted men requisite for its complement of officers. At the same time there is no provision made by law for filling the ranks of these regiments in case of war. When the Spanish War broke out the efficiency of many regiments was greatly injured by the necessity of throwing into them a large number of perfectly raw recruits, and in order to fill the ranks of other regiments it was necessary to consolidate two regiments into one. Such a system postulates the development of a reserve force of trained soldiers which, on the outbreak of war, can be called back from their civil occupations to bring our Army up to its full strength and to keep its ranks full during the inevitable losses of the first engagements. A reserve system is in effect in the armies of practically all nations of the civilized world except our own. It has also been shown by experience to be the most economical and effective way of creating a citizen army, the men of which in time of peace will be free to perform

the activities of civil life and be no drain upon the treasury of their country.

“I am very glad to report that Congress enacted as a part of the Army appropriation Act last summer legislation looking to the creation of such a reserve for our Regular Army. The former term of enlistment for three years, all of which was spent with the colors, has been changed to an enlistment for seven years, four of which are to be spent with the colors and three as a reserve. There is also a provision which permits a soldier to apply voluntarily for transfer to the reserve at any time after three years with the colors. Provision is also made for voluntary enlistment of veterans in the reserve for a period of three years. No provision is made for any payment to reservists, except in case of war, when they will receive \$5 per month for the time which they have hitherto served in the reserve. While the reserve created by this bill is far from perfect, it is in my opinion a long step in the right direction, and I believe that it can be made the beginning of a permanent reserve system. The most serious defect in my opinion is that it creates too long a period of service with the colors. I believe, as I indicated in my last report, that our own experience, and the experience of nations in Europe, have shown that the soldier can be adequately trained for his duties in considerably less than three years. Thereafter economy demands that he should be transferred to the reserve as promptly as possible, except for the number of trained men in the shape of noncommissioned officers and special privates who are retained as a nucleus for the training of future recruits. I think our experience will gradually lead to a shortening of the period of training with the colors, and that by so doing we will greatly improve the character of the young men who will come into the Army, while in no way diminishing the effectiveness of their training. Nevertheless, I believe that a reserve can be initiated under the present law, and every effort is being made to insure that this result will be accomplished.”

The author, who was afforded an opportunity to be thoroughly conversant at that time with the opposing standpoints of the War Department on one hand and Congress on the other, can testify that the feature of the bill creating an Army Reserve ended, as so often in the past, in a compromise which virtually defeated the very purpose for which it

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was framed; and in support of this contention it is only necessary to repeat the statement made in the annual report of the Secretary of War on November 15, 1914, that

“We have a reserve — that is, men who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in time of war — consisting of 16 men.”²⁷⁶

In other words, *so faulty were the provisions of this act in question that at the end of two years it had produced a reserve limited to the preposterously small number of sixteen soldiers.* The results speak for themselves and the necessity of immediate amendment of the law needs no commentary.

Section three consolidated the Quartermaster's, Subsistence and Pay departments into a new organization to be known as the Quartermaster Corps, under “a Chief of the Quartermaster Corps” with the rank of Major General. It provided for a reduction of the officers in the grades of captain to colonel, both inclusive, until the total number had reached 180; stipulated

“That the Quartermaster Corps shall be subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff to the extent the departments hereby consolidated into said corps have heretofore been subject to such supervision under the terms of existing law”;

and required the President to appoint immediately the Chief of the new corps, who was “to put into effect the provisions of this section not less than sixty days after the passage of this Act.”

Section four created a General Service corps “of not to exceed six thousand men, who shall be permanently attached to the Quartermaster Corps and who shall not be counted as a part of the enlisted force provided by law.” They were destined to supersede 4,000 civilian employes and 2,000 soldiers detailed on extra duty in performing such work as that of clerks, engineers, firemen, overseers, carpenters, blacksmiths, packers, teamsters, and labourers. Such a body

is to be found in all great armies, and the saving and increased efficiency resulting therefrom have been abundantly demonstrated through many years.

The Act of February 14, 1903, creating the General Staff, had specified that it should consist of a Chief of Staff, two general officers, four colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors and twenty captains detailed from the grade of captain or first lieutenant, a total of 45 officers, as has been seen on page 293. This body was subsequently divided into two parts, the War Department General Staff and the General Staff serving with troops. In case of the latter, these officers were attached to various commands, with the ultimate object of having them become chiefs of staff and in order to maintain a closer touch between the different commanders and the plans of the War Department, as worked out by the General Staff, than had previously been possible. However, as the dispersion of the Army into small forces scattered throughout the country had rendered impossible the formation of any units larger than a regiment — such as brigades, divisions or corps — the General Staff officer thus serving with troops found himself either in the position of a supernumerary or tempted to usurp the functions of the adjutant-general of that command, with which his own conflicted. Congress, having ascertained the facts, jumped at the conclusion that the General Staff was larger than there was any necessity for its being, that its powers needed to be scrutinized and its numbers reduced. This it proceeded to carry out by means of the following provision in the law we have been discussing:

“SEC. 5. That hereafter the General Staff Corps shall consist of two general officers, one of whom shall be the Chief of Staff, four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, twelve majors, and twelve captains or first lieutenants, all of whom shall be detailed from the Army at large in the manner and for the periods prescribed by law: *Provided*, That hereafter, except as otherwise provided herein, when any officer shall under the provisions of

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section twenty-six of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, be appointed to an office above that of colonel, his appointment to said office and his acceptance of the appointment shall create a vacancy in the arm, staff corps, or staff department from which he shall be appointed, and said vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed by existing law, but he shall retain in said arm, staff corps, or staff department, the same relative position that he would have held if he had not been appointed to said office, and he shall return to said relative position upon the expiration of his appointment to said office unless he shall be reappointed thereto; and if under the operation of this proviso the number of officers of any particular grade in any arm, staff corps, or staff department, shall at any time exceed the number authorized by law, no vacancy occurring in said grades shall be filled until after the total number of officers therein shall have been reduced below the number authorized by law; but nothing in this proviso shall be held to apply in the case of any officer who now holds a four-year appointment to an office with rank above that of colonel, and whose return to the relative position that he would have held if he had not been appointed to said office is not possible under existing law.”²⁷⁷

There were other causes which brought about the passage of this law — causes which cannot be so charitably construed as those above mentioned. Be that as it may, this was a retrogressive piece of legislation and ought to be repealed at once, on account of the handicap that it placed on one of the most important branches of our military service.

The law concluded with the following provisions:

“SEC. 6. That hereafter the service of a cadet who may hereafter be appointed to the United States Military Academy or to the Naval Academy shall not be counted in computing for any purpose the length of service of any officer of the Army.

“SEC. 7. That the appropriations herein provided for the several departments consolidated under this Act shall be available for the consolidated corps herein created.

“SEC. 8. That nothing in this Act shall be held or construed so as to separate any officer from the Army or to diminish the rank now held by him, and that all laws and parts of laws, so

far as they are inconsistent with the terms of this Act, be, and they are hereby, repealed.”²⁷⁸

The Joint Resolutions passed and approved during 1912 present few features of interest from a military point of view except the one forbidding the export of arms or munitions of war subsequent to a proclamation by the President prohibiting the same, and the resolution appropriating \$1,350,000 for the participation of the Organized Militia in joint encampments and manœuvres with the Regular Army.²⁷⁹

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1912

On June 30, 1912, the actual strength of the Regular Army was 4,470 officers and 77,835 enlisted men, a total of 82,305 and an increase of 8,023 over the preceding year, but still 3,916 below the maximum authorized by law. How successful had been the effort to maintain a high standard among the soldiers is evinced by the fact that out of 158,917 applicants for enlistment and re-enlistment, only about 25 per cent. were accepted. The percentage of desertions was about three per cent.—slightly higher than the year before but still extraordinarily low. During the period from June 30, 1911, to October 15, 1912, 395 second lieutenants were appointed to the Army—177 from graduates of West Point, 29 from the ranks and 189 from civil life—but 134 vacancies still remained unfilled. Great care was taken to maintain the highest possible standard in the selection of candidates.²⁸⁰

The Secretary of War declared in his annual report for 1912,²⁸¹ that, notwithstanding the vigorous efforts made by the Medical Corps and the commanders of troops to check the evil,²⁸²

“The high percentage of venereal disease continues to be the reproach of the American Army, and the daily average number of those sick from that cause during the past calendar year was larger than the daily average of those sick from all other of the more important diseases combined. . . . In my last annual report I recommended the stoppage of pay of officers and men

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during periods of disability caused by such misconduct, and I am glad to report that legislation to the effect was adopted at the past session of Congress and is now being vigorously enforced. It is hoped that these steps will result in reduction of the evil.

“Nevertheless, I believe that the ultimate causes which make the record of our Army in this respect shameful beyond that of the army of any other civilized nation are inherent in our own shortcomings as a nation in dealing with this matter. So long as in our civil communities, and particularly our larger cities, we continue to close our eyes to the magnitude and extent of the evil and refrain from attacking it with all of the weapons which modern scientific knowledge places in our hands, it can not but be expected that the younger men in our Army, leading the abnormal life of the soldier, will show the effect of the evil to a marked degree. In this respect I believe that THE SO-CALLED ANTICANTEEN LEGISLATION HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH VICE. DURING THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF I HAVE VISITED PERSONALLY AND INSPECTED NEARLY HALF OF THE 49 MOBILE ARMY POSTS IN THE UNITED STATES. IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE I HAVE FOUND THE MILITARY RESERVATIONS ADJOINED BY DIVES AND ILL RESORTS OF THE VILEST CHARACTER. THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY IS ALMOST UNANIMOUS TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE ARISEN OR GREATLY INCREASED IN NUMBER SINCE THE SALE OF LIGHT WINES OR BEER AT THE POST EXCHANGES HAS BEEN ABOLISHED. BY THAT LEGISLATION THE SOLDIER IS IN EFFECT DEPRIVED OF THE GARRISON CLUB, WHERE FORMERLY IT WAS COMPARATIVELY EASY TO KEEP HIM FOR HIS AMUSEMENTS, AND HE NOW RESORTS FOR HIS LIQUOR TO PLACES WHERE EVERY KIND OF TEMPTATION SURROUNDS HIM. There may have been and probably were abuses in the methods of some of the so-called canteens as managed under the system now abolished by law: but the abuses were not necessary or inherent in the system, and I am very confident, from my personal investigation, that most of the post exchanges under that system constituted effective and practical instruments toward Army temperance and cleanliness of living, and that a very considerable percentage of the evils from which the Army is now suffering is directly attributable to their abolition.”

The military operations in the Philippines were insignificant except for the attack against a force of two troops

of cavalry and two companies of Philippine Scouts under Captain E. G. Peyton made by a band of Moro outlaws in the island of Jolo on January 14, 1912, which resulted in the killing of 20 Moros and the wounding of one American officer and one man. Upon the disbanding of the manœuvre division and the first separate brigade during the summer of 1911, the revolutions instituted against the Madero government rendered it obligatory to patrol the Mexican frontier in order to enforce the laws of neutrality, and this task was entrusted to the 2nd and 14th Cavalry. The border raids made by certain Mexicans formerly of Orozco's rebel force compelled the War Department to send the 9th Cavalry to Douglas, Arizona, and the 13th Cavalry to El Paso, Texas. These troops were decidedly effective in the work of suppressing the attempt made in Texas by General Reyes to instigate an insurrection against Madero; in enforcing the export of arms and ammunition prohibited by the President's proclamation, which resulted in the collapse of the uprising in Chihuahua led by Orozco; and in the active patrolling that prevented raids being made upon American ranches in Texas and Arizona.²⁸³ Apropos of these events, Secretary Stimson stated in his report ²⁸⁴ that

“In the light of the recent proposals to reduce by one-third the force of the Regular Cavalry belonging to the United States Army, I deem it proper to call attention to the fact that the brunt of this entire work fell upon and was performed by Cavalry, and that during any continuance of unsettled conditions on that long and sparsely settled frontier, such patrol work must be continued by that arm of the service. There are now on duty in connection with the patrol of the Mexican border six regiments of Cavalry, a regiment and a half of Infantry, a battery of Field Artillery, two companies of Coast Artillery, and one company of Signal Corps troops. The approximate total strength of these troops is 6,754 officers and enlisted men. There are thus at the present time engaged in this special duty a larger number of Cavalry regiments than the five which it was proposed last winter to cut out of the Army.”

✓ During the summer 67,280 of the Organized Militia par-

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ticipated with the Regular troops in five joint manœuvres, in which the conditions of a campaign were reproduced by placing the opposing forces several days' march apart and by having them approach and locate each other. Out of a strength of 121,852 officers and men who constituted the Organized Militia during 1912, no less than 103,453 took part in field service or encampments; more than 3,000 officers attended the usual camps of instruction; 24 of the field artillery officers took a course of a month at the newly-established School of Fire at Fort Sill; seven medical officers were present at the initial course in the Field Service Medical School; and the garrison or service schools of the Regular Army were attended by 45 militia officers, of whom 22 were found proficient in every subject. There was thus a gratifying improvement made in the efficiency of the organized militia.²⁸⁵

Several events of importance occurred during 1912. In March and April the Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments performed a signal service in relieving the distress caused by the tremendous floods of the Mississippi, but so quietly and efficiently was their work done that it attracted little of the public attention which it merited. The former garrison in the Philippines, composed of twelve regiments of infantry and cavalry at a reduced strength of 7,536 effective combatants, was replaced by six regiments — four of infantry and two of cavalry — at full strength, which comprised 8,592 combatants. A greater effectiveness was thus given, and it was estimated that the cost of maintenance would be reduced by fully \$1,000,000 *per annum*, as the regimental units were destined to remain continuously in the islands instead of being transferred back and forth as heretofore. The officers and men composing them were to serve the regular tropical detail as usual. Steps were also taken to constitute the mobile army — which was scattered in some 49 posts in 24 different States, the average strength being less than 700 men and no unit higher than a regiment existing — into a tactical organization of three infantry divisions, com-

posed of two or three brigades with a proper quota of divisional cavalry and artillery, apart from separate brigades of cavalry. Although in default of Congressional action and the necessary appropriations, this organization was obviously merely skeleton, it none the less furnished a basis for the future formation in peace as well as war.²⁸⁶

Considerable reforms were effected in the paper work both of the Army and the War Department, and in the system of military prison administration. In the latter case a system of "detention barracks" similar to that used by Great Britain was introduced, whereby men convicted of purely military offences were upon release sent back to the colours, instead of being converted into hardened and degraded characters and regarded as outlaws.

Progress was also made on the fortifications for the insular possessions. Those at Subig Bay were finished and those at Manila Bay about three-fourths completed. The defences of Pearl Harbour and Honolulu were well advanced, while in the Panama Canal Zone about half of the excavations, foundations and concrete foundations was accomplished. The defences of Guantanamo, Cuba, were held in abeyance pending the appropriation made during the summer, but no work was authorized by Congress at San Juan, Porto Rico, at Kiska Island, Alaska, or at Guam.²⁸⁷

By all odds the most important event of the year from a military standpoint was the scheme of a complete re-organization of the Army worked out by the War College Division of the General Staff and culminating in a series of conferences held at the War Department during July, 1912, at which the Secretary of War, the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, presided in person.* The object of this scheme was to rectify the utter absence of the tactical organization which an army ought to possess and which had resulted, in the case of

* Through the kind invitation of Secretary Stimson, the author had the honour of being the only civilian, except certain members of Congress, present at these conferences. He therefore speaks from his own personal knowledge and experience.

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the American army, from the dispersion of the troops throughout the country into groups, the duties and formation of which were much more akin to those of a constabulary than of a properly constituted army. Broadly-speaking, these conferences discussed (1) the principles of military organization; (2) what the United States possessed in the way of land forces; (3) how far and in what manner the desired organization could be effected with the means at hand; and (4) what would then remain to be done to achieve a modern military force of such strength and organization as the United States ought to have. The War Department, as Secretary Stimson stated,²⁸⁸

“proceeded upon the theory that before asking Congress for legislative help, we should advance as far as possible in the direction of reform by administrative action. By doing this, not only can many evils be remedied without legislation, but the very effort at reorganization, and the study which that involves, as well as the practice under the new methods, all tend to shed a clearer light upon the ultimate problem and to make much more definite and clear the character of the legislation which will be eventually needed.”

Out of these conferences was evolved a plan which

“does not aim to go into too specific details, but is a study of the broad principles which must govern any successful military policy of this country. It constitutes a broad chart for present guidance and for future progress. . . . In general scope and purpose, the plan is a constructive application to modern American conditions of the principles of military policy carefully worked out by General Upton in his exhaustive studies of military policy soon after the Civil War.”²⁸⁹

For the first time in our history a sound and definite policy in respect to the military branch of our service was formulated, and the importance of this step cannot be over-estimated. The plan was promptly published under the title of “Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States,” and contained a short introductory note dated August 10, 1912, and signed by Secretary Stimson. It was

distributed to members of Congress, as well as throughout the Army and the National Guard, and to institutions of learning all over the country. Its length precludes its insertion here, but the reader who is interested to examine this masterful document will find it in Appendix A of the report of the Secretary of War for 1912, and attention is particularly called to the "Estimate of the land forces needed in the United States," in which it was stated that

"Our requirements in the way of land forces are certain to change as the years go on; in the light of present-day conditions it is estimated that AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH A FIRST-CLASS POWER WE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING AT ONCE IN THE UNITED STATES AN EFFECTIVE FORCE OF 460,000 MOBILE TROOPS AND 42,000 COAST ARTILLERY; THAT THIS IS THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF FIRST-LINE TROOPS NECESSARY; AND THAT TO AUGMENT THIS FORCE AND REPLACE ITS LOSSES WE SHOULD HAVE PLANS MADE FOR RAISING IMMEDIATELY AN ADDITIONAL FORCE OF 300,000 MEN.

"To meet requirements less vital than a great national war—as for example, the sending of expeditionary forces to protect certain foreign interests—it may be presumed that we would draw upon the forces thus enumerated; and as in the light of our recent experiences we can not possibly foretell to what places expeditions may have to be sent nor what numbers will be required, all of these forces should be available for service anywhere."²⁹⁰

The Secretary of War strongly recommended action by Congress looking to

- (1) The abolition of many useless posts.
- ✓ (2) Proper Federal control over the National Guard in order that adequate training may be given it, to the end that it will attain the standard prescribed by the War Department and thus meet "*one of the greatest military needs of our Government, namely, the creation of a trained and definitely organized nucleus for a citizen army.*"
- (3) An adequate law governing the raising of a National Volunteer force in time of war.²⁹¹
- (4) The creation of a Council of National Defense.

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(5) The maintenance of the Military Academy at its full capacity in the number of cadets allowed by law.

(6) An increase in the supply of field artillery material.

Secretary Stimson emphasized the fact that "*Such material can not be extemporised. It requires months and even years to manufacture it, and in time of war it can not be purchased abroad. The amount which we have been permitted to accumulate would not be sufficient for a single engagement of the character of the engagements in either the Russo-Japanese or the present Balkan War.*"²⁹²

On March 21, 1912, the Washington Branch of the National Cavalry and Artillery Remount Association of the United States was organized on the lines of a similar body tentatively formed in New York several months previously, the purpose of both being to encourage the breeding of horses for military purposes.²⁹³ On May 28th, a "Service Test" for officers was held under the auspices of the Washington Branch, in conjunction with the race meeting of the Washington Riding and Hunt Club at Benning, D. C. The distance was about fifteen miles. Starting from the Benning race track, the course was nine miles along roads, then six miles across country, with obstacles during the last part — the first two being ditches, followed by a steep embankment, an "in-and-out" and eight jumps, the last four in the steeplechase course. There were seventeen entries and all officers, including one of the Navy, rode in uniform.²⁹⁴ The trophy, a handsome silver cup, was won by Major Henry T. Allen, Captain D. L. Rockwell being second and Colonel St. John Greble third. This Service Test, the first of its kind ever held in the United States, excited an immense amount of interest, and the movement thus inaugurated bore fruit almost immediately, since the War Department prescribed in General Orders, No. 19, issued on June 24, 1912, that

"Commanders of Cavalry and Field Artillery detachments or regiments at all posts and stations where such mounted troops are serving will annually (this calendar year included) conduct the officers of their command over a course three miles in length,

and over rolling country when practicable, with an average of three obstacles to the mile uniformly distributed throughout the course within a period of 11 minutes. The six over-ground obstacles will consist of fences, logs, brush, and stone walls not less than three feet high and of such stiffness that they will not break when struck by the horses' feet. The three ditches will be six feet wide and two and one-half deep. Post commanders will fix the date of this ride and the commanders of detachments or regiments will make report thereof through channels to The Adjutant General of the Army. Officers failing to finish within 15 seconds of the prescribed time will be mentioned by name in the reports."²⁹⁵

A further outcome of this Service Test was a second test held at Middleburg, Virginia, on November 16, 1912, and opened to civilians as well as officers.²⁹⁶

On April 3, 1912, at a meeting called by the author and held at his house in Washington, the Army League of the United States was founded for the purpose of making known to the public the exact condition of the land forces of the United States, and of awakening interest and co-operation in all matters tending to aid, improve or develop their efficiency.

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1913

The important military legislation enacted during the third session of the Sixty-second Congress was confined, with the exception of three measures, to the various appropriation acts. The allotments made by the Act of February 13, 1913, for fortifications in the United States and insular possessions²⁹⁷ are chiefly remarkable for the absence of any appropriation for the defences of Chesapeake Bay and Guantana-
namo, and for the parsimonious sums assigned for the installation of searchlights, fire-control and other most important auxiliaries. The bill carrying appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, approved March 2nd,²⁹⁸ contained a number of important provisions which may be summarized as follows:

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(1) An assignment of a small amount of money for the various service schools, including the new School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

(2) An appropriation of \$125,000 "for the purchase, maintenance, operation and repair of airships and other aerial machines."

(3) An increase of 35 per cent. in pay and allowances to officers detailed to aviation duty, with the provisos that they shall be "actual flyers of heavier than air craft"; that not more than thirty officers shall be assigned to the aviation service; and that the Act of February 2, 1901, "shall not limit the tour of detail to aviation duty of officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel."

(4) "That hereafter, in determining the eligibility, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved August twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve, of troop, battery, or company officers for detail as officers of the various staff corps and departments of the Army, except the General Staff Corps, service actually performed by any such officer with troops prior to December fifteenth, nineteen hundred and twelve, as regimental, battalion, or squadron staff officer, shall be deemed to have been duty with a battery, company, or troop: *Provided further*, That regimental, battalion, and squadron quartermasters and commissaries shall hereafter be required to perform the duties of officers of the Quartermaster Corps, including the receipting for any money or property pertaining to said corps, when no officer of the Quartermaster Corps is present for such duties, and nothing contained in the Army appropriation Act approved August twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve, shall hereafter be held or construed so as to prevent competent authority from requiring any officers of the Army to act temporarily as quartermasters wherever there shall be no officers of the Quartermaster Corps and no regimental, battalion, or squadron quartermasters or commissaries present for such duty."

(5) The number of majors in the Judge Advocate General's department was fixed at seven.

(6) \$350,000 were appropriated for the organized militia for joint encampments and manœuvres, of which \$50,000 were to be expended for land "for a suitable range for Field Artillery target practice."

(7) \$185,000 were allotted for the equipment of the Coast Artillery armories of the organized militia with "dummy guns

and mortars, mounts for dummy guns and mortars, dummy ammunition, loading appliances, range and position finding equipment, aiming and laying devices, subcaliber tubes and mountings," etc.

(8) \$325,240 were appropriated for horses for the cavalry, artillery, engineers, etc., with the express proviso "That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for polo ponies except for West Point Military Academy, and such ponies shall not be used at any other place."

(9) \$150,000 were set apart "for the construction of the necessary officers' quarters and other buildings required at the remount depot, Front Royal, Virginia."

(10) The cost of construction for officers' quarters, as fixed by the Sundry Civil Act of June 25, 1910, was cut virtually in half and restricted to \$8,000 for the quarters of a general officer, \$6,000 for those of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel or major, and \$4,000 for those of a captain or lieutenant.

(11) In the allotment made for Ordnance stores and ammunition, it was distinctly "*Provided*, That no part of any sum in this Act appropriated shall be expended in the purchase of ordnance powder at a price in excess of 53 cents per pound or for small-arms powder at a price in excess of 65 cents per pound."

(12) \$1,000,000 was set apart for the procuring of field artillery material for the organized militia; and

(13) Courts-martial were divided into three sorts, *viz*: general, special and summary, and the composition, duties and jurisdiction of each defined.²⁹⁹ The law covering them is set forth in detail in footnote 300, on pages 712-714.

On March 2, 1913, the following measure was approved:

"That within the limits of the appropriation herein made, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and directed to collect or copy and classify, with a view to publication, the scattered military records of the Revolutionary War, including all troops acting under State authority, and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized and directed to collect or copy and classify, with a view to publication, the scattered naval records of the Revolutionary War.

"SEC. 2. That all such records in the possession or custody of any official of the United States shall be transferred, the military records to the War Department and the naval records to the Navy Department.

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“SEC. 3. That there is hereby appropriated for the purposes of this Act, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, twenty-five thousand dollars for the War Department and seven thousand dollars for the Navy Department: *Provided*, That the aforesaid sums of money shall be expended, respectively, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and that they shall make to Congress each year detailed statements showing how the money herein appropriated has been expended and to whom: *Provided further*, That no part of the sum hereby appropriated shall be used in the purchase of any such records that may be discovered either in the hands of private owners or in public depositories.”³⁰¹

On March 4th the President affixed his signature to four bills containing provisions in respect to the military service,³⁰² but the only ones deserving of notice here were the Agricultural Appropriation act, which carried with it an allotment of \$100,000 to be devoted in part to “the breeding of horses for military purposes,” and the appropriation for the Military Academy for the ensuing fiscal year which directed the retrial of four cadets who had been dismissed from the service.³⁰³

The military legislation passed during the first session of the Sixty-third Congress — which convened on April 7th and adjourned on December 1, 1913 — was embodied in the Sunday Civil and Urgent Deficiencies acts approved on June 23 and October 22, 1913, respectively. Aside from the fact that Congress had at last awakened to the repeated warnings as to the dearth of field guns, carriages and ammunition and therefore appropriated \$250,000 “for increasing the capacity of the plant at the Rock Island Arsenal for the production of field artillery *matériel*,” it contains no features of special interest beyond the appropriation of \$2,506,000 for guns for the armament of the Panama Canal; the authorization to the Chief of Ordnance to equip those defences with one 16-inch gun and carriage; and the sums allotted to replace the military stores, supplies and equipments lost by the National Guard of Ohio, and to reimburse the War Department

for the expenditures made during the year in the work of relief to sufferers from floods, tornadoes and fires.³⁰⁴

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1913

On June 30, 1913, the actual strength of the Regular Army was 4,665 officers and 75,321 enlisted men, a total of 79,986, which was an increase of 195 officers and a decrease of 2,514 men over the preceding year, and, moreover, fell below the maximum strength authorized by law to the extent of 98 officers and 9,489 men. Although the lower grades of officers were almost completely filled by the appointments made between June 30, 1912, and December 11, 1913, of 327 second lieutenants — 187 from West Point, 28 from the ranks and 112 from civil life — in the higher grades the pernicious effect of detached duty continued to make itself felt, as 162 general and staff officers — 13.20 per cent. — and 821 line officers — 23.88 per cent. — were absent from their commands. Out of 127,827 applicants for enlistment, only about 20 per cent. were accepted, thus indicating the care taken to maintain a high standard among the men but, on the other hand, the number of desertions amounted to 4,451, an increase over the three preceding years.³⁰⁵

The only military operations of any consequence occurred in the vicinity of the Mexican frontier, which continued to be patrolled by some 6,700 troops throughout its extent of 1,600 miles from the Gulf of Mexico to Sasabe, which is situated 30 miles west of Nogales, Arizona. During February, 1913, the overthrow of the Madero government and the accession to power of General Victoriano Huerta was the signal for the inauguration of hostilities against the latter by the so-called constitutionalists led by Carranza, Villa and Zapata. The possession of the border towns being coveted by both factions, considerable fighting took place along the boundary line, and many Mexican wounded or refugees betook themselves to American territory. Although our troops conducted themselves in a most commendable manner, their task

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was anything but easy, and it soon became manifest that nothing short of the presence of a large force would put an end to the disturbances on our southern frontier. On February 21st and 24th orders were issued for the concentration at Texas City and Galveston of the 2nd Division under the command of Major General William H. Carter, amounting to 11,450 officers and men. The transportation of this force was effected with greater precision and celerity than in the case of the "manœuvre division" of 1911, and on March 3rd all the troops had reached their destinations. This so-called division — which ought to have numbered 22,565 — did not attain its maximum strength of 517 officers and 10,770 men present for duty until June 30, 1913; and, moreover, 220 men deserted and 160 were discharged by sentence of court-martial or "without honor," while only 940 recruits were received between March 1st and June 30th.³⁰⁶ As General Carter himself stated³⁰⁷

"The only available source of reservists is from men discharged by expiration of service. Of the 464 so discharged 207 reenlisted, leaving the maximum number of men who could pass to the reserve 257 out of a total of 941 separated from the service during the period under discussion.

"The number of deserters at large, together with those apprehended and discharged by sentence of court-martial or without honor greatly exceeds the number of possible reservists. These are unpalatable facts, and are cited only that those engaged in the problem of creating a reserve may have the benefit of the experience of this Division."

The British and German military attachés personally assured the author that they had never seen a finer body of troops, superior discipline, less intoxication or such perfect sanitary arrangements in camps, but when questioned as to the subject of supply they were discreetly silent. The truth was that this alleged division was short one full regiment of field artillery, not to mention ambulance companies, field hospitals, field signal company and three companies of engineers.³⁰⁸ Generally speaking, there existed no proper

supply columns or ammunition trains, no adequate transport, and the regiments were scarcely more than half their requisite war strength. In a word, these troops were at no time ready to take the field owing to a lack of adjuncts absolutely necessary for active operations. The editor of the *Infantry Journal* pointed out at the time that

“If the infantry in the 2d Division now concentrated on the southern frontier was needed for active service, it would be necessary to raise to war strength the companies of sixty-five men. As a result the efficiency of these companies would be spoiled and the division would not be able to move, but would be compelled to remain where it is to train the recruits. On the other hand if these companies had now one hundred men each, although not even then at war strength, they would not only be of a strength which would allow training for war, but would be strong enough to allow the division to move promptly and thus become an effective agent in a military policy.”³⁰⁹

At the close of his report General Carter made the ensuing observations:³¹⁰

“The value of the experience obtained by the concentration of brigades and divisions, their tactical employment and their administration and supply in the field is very great. The moment we enter upon the employment of the division to the front, in retreat or in the attack or defense of a position the importance of individual instruction and discipline becomes evident. The ease with which ammunition can be wasted by untrained men and the difficulty of refilling the belts under fire become at once apparent. . . . Control of fire under excitement will not come by intuition but only through persistent training. In this connection it may be remarked that the methods for maintaining the supply of ammunition on the firing line do not seem to have kept pace with our progress in other matters.”

The attempts made in 1911 and 1913 to assemble one paltry division of Regular troops thoroughly prepared for war afforded to the world the edifying spectacle of a great nation composed of one hundred million people virtually destitute of real military strength or the means to make the

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few soldiers whom it could muster efficient as a fighting force.

A camp of instruction for Regular Cavalry was assembled at Winchester, Va., about July 18th, and continued until September 30, 1913. The troops composing this camp were the Tenth Cavalry, Eleventh Cavalry, and the First and Third Squadrons of the Fifteenth Cavalry. Camps of instruction for the Field Artillery were held during the summer at Tobyhanna, Pa., Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma.³¹¹

The Army rendered signal service in the relief of sufferers from the floods occurring in March in the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi — Majors J. E. Normoyle and James A. Logan, Jr., handling the situation with the same skill and success that they had shown the year before; after the tornadoes which devastated Omaha, Nebraska, and Lower Peach Tree, Alabama, during the spring; and in fighting forest fires in California during July and in the Adirondacks during September.³¹²

Among the most notable events of the year from a military standpoint was the assembling in Washington of most of the generals who would be charged with the execution of the scheme for the organization of the land forces determined upon in July and August, 1912, to which allusion has been made on pages 410-411. A series of conferences, beginning on January 13th and presided over by Secretary Stimson, discussed the plan in question in all its aspects,* and on February 6, 1913, by virtue of General Orders No. 9, the mobile army within the United States was given a tactical organization into brigades and divisions, and for purposes of military administration the territory of the United States and its possessions was re-organized into six "geographical departments," four within the country — designated as the Eastern, Central, Western and Southern De-

* To the kindness of Secretary Stimson the author was indebted for the honour of being the only civilian invited to attend these conferences.

partments — and two in the insular possessions — the Philippine Department and the Hawaiian Department.³¹³

Second only in importance to the foregoing was the inauguration of two camps for the military instruction of college undergraduates of seventeen years of age or over, who were physically qualified and properly recommended. These were established during the month of July at Gettysburg, Pa., and at the Presidio of Monterey, Cal., and lasted for six weeks, the purpose being to foster a patriotic spirit, to make known the true military history of the United States and its needs, and to train young men, as the report of the Chief of Staff for 1913 said,³¹⁴

“in military maneuvers, tactics, care of troops, camp sanitation, and rifle practice, resulting in their better preparation to discharge their military duty to their country should it ever have to call upon them in time of need, thereby saving the great waste in valuable lives and money which has always occurred at the beginning of previous wars due to the ignorance in such matters of the newly created officers and men.”

The instruction and military exercises, conducted by Regular officers, were restricted to the forenoon, with occasional lectures during the afternoon, and the students were required to pay for their transportation as well as for their subsistence and clothing, the two latter items averaging about \$15. The camp at Gettysburg was attended by 159 young men drawn from 63 universities and colleges; the camp at Monterey was comprised of 85 students from 27 educational institutions.³¹⁵ The Chief of Staff very properly declared³¹⁶ that

“The instruction given at these camps has been of the greatest value to the young men participating, and will tend not only to give them some ideas of our military situation and policy, but it will also tend to establish nuclei of information in the student bodies of the various universities represented.”

The students attending these camps * formed an association

* The author had an opportunity to see something of the work done in the camp at Gettysburg and the honour of delivering an address to

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with the title of "The Society of the National Reserve Corps of the United States," and secured for their advisory committee such men as the presidents of Harvard, Yale, the College of the City of New York, Lehigh, Michigan, California, Alabama and the Virginia Military Institute.³¹⁷

Another important innovation was the establishment of a "School of Musketry" at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, by virtue of War Department Bulletin No. 19, dated June 9, 1913. It was created for the purpose of giving "instruction in small-arms firing" and was to form "part of the command of Fort Sill." There had formerly existed a similar institution at Monterey, California, but it was merely extemporized and was never formally established either by executive order or operation of law. The career of the School of Musketry at Fort Sill has been distinctly spasmodic, since no regular course could be given owing to the absence of the necessary instructors with the troops stationed on the Mexican border. It was, however, utilized during the summer of 1913 for joint Regular and militia training.

In February, 1913, the aviation school at Augusta, Georgia, was transferred to Texas City in order to participate in the field operations of the Second Division and to afford an opportunity to study and perfect the employment of the aeroplane under actual field conditions. Two flights of 240 miles without a stop were made, and the sketch maps drawn by the reconnoitering officer were quite complete in the details shown. In 1913 the fifteen aeroplanes constituted the equipment of the Army aviation corps, and contracts were made for six more, but there were no dirigibles of any sort; while the \$125,000 appropriated by Congress for military aeronautics was ludicrously small as compared with the \$7,400,000 spent during the year by France, \$5,000,000 by

them on July 26, 1913, on the subject of the unpreparedness of the United States for war. He was greatly impressed with the splendid types of young men who composed that camp and with the zeal and interest which they showed in their work.

Germany and Russia, \$3,000,000 by England, and indeed less than the \$400,000 expended by Mexico.

The introduction of scientific management in the various arsenals effected considerable saving to the Government in the cost of production, as well as inuring to the advantage of the workmen in the shape of increased pay, the bonus during August, 1913, at the Watertown Arsenal amounting to an average of \$9 to \$10 per man. Indeed, the premiums over and above the regular wages paid out at that arsenal during the seventeen months from January 1, 1912, to May 31, 1913, were no less than \$22,000.³¹⁸

The policy of the War Department to separate, insofar as practicable, general prisoners convicted of offences punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary from those convicted of offences of a purely military character was promulgated by General Orders No. 56 under date of September 17, 1913.³¹⁹ On each working day, which under the former *régime* would have been given over entirely to hard labour, one-half of the time was to be devoted to a special course of rigid military training, with the object of making the men efficient soldiers and expert in some one feature. The prisoners were to be enrolled in disciplinary companies under the command of specially selected officers, were designated by name instead of by number, and were given an appropriate uniform in lieu of the usual prison garb. The design of this new system — which was founded upon that employed in the “detention barracks” of the British army — was that

“such prisoners as are restored to the colors will go back, not stigmatized as men who have worn stripes and numbers or as convicts who have done penal servitude, but as men who have been subjected to a special and rigid regimen of military instruction and training, the purpose of which is to supply them with new standards of conduct and to enable them to render efficient service from the moment of rejoining.”³²⁰

The gun batteries for the home ports of the United States were practically all installed with the exception of those for

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the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and San Pedro, California, the latter of which had recently been added to the list by the National Coast-Defense Board. The defences at Oahu in Hawaii were likewise nearly completed, and satisfactory progress was made on the works at the entrance to Manila Bay and at El Fraile and Caballo islands, as well as in the Panama Canal Zone, but in the case of the last the guns had not yet been shipped. At Oahu and Panama no barracks for the troops had been provided by Congress, and the Secretary of War accordingly submitted estimates involving expenditures of \$1,753,600 for the Hawaiian Islands and \$1,268,580 for the Canal Zone.³²¹

The strength of the Organized Militia numbered, according to the returns made during the first five months of 1913, 9,110 officers and 111,162 enlisted men, a decrease of 32 officers and 1,048 men over 1912, caused in many instances by the elimination, in compliance with law, of organizations and *personnel* below the moderate standard set by the War Department. Officers' camps of instruction were held in many States and continued to demonstrate their value as adjuncts to theoretical training. Camps of instruction were also held by most of the States, save in the case of the militia cavalry and field artillery which participated in joint camps for those arms with the Regular troops. In a few States there were divisional or brigade camps or manœuvres, and in a number of cases — notably New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Massachusetts — considerable attention was paid to fire problems. The target practice of the militia showed but slight improvement during the year — a fact largely attributable to the mistaken tendency of developing rifle teams composed in the main of commissioned officers, instead of encouraging the target practice of the enlisted men in accordance with the policy of the War Department. Although the law of March 3, 1911, had authorized an increase of 200 in the number of officers of the Regular Army, so widespread and incessant was the demand by the States for inspector-in-

structors that it was impossible to comply with them, and thus, once again, was demonstrated the detrimental effect of the habitual course pursued by Congress in providing only 200 officers, notwithstanding 612 had been asked for and the Senate Committee on Military Affairs had recommended the latter number as necessary for the needs of the service. The excessive cost of the attendance of militia officers and men at garrison schools, coupled with the inadequate results obtained, compelled a discontinuance of this permission. A system of accountability was also introduced regulating the supplies in the possession of the militia by the demands for them, and thus enabling the Federal Government to know at any moment the amount on hand in each State.³²² Secretary Garrison stated in his annual report that ³²³

✓ "Reluctance on the part of many States to provide sanitary organizations in their Organized Militia is regretted. Properly organized sanitary units are so important in field service and so difficult to provide within the limited time available after the need for their existence arrives that every effort should be made to provide, equip, and train these organizations in time of peace.

"The national importance of a reserve system for the Organized Militia can not be questioned. The minimum strength at which militia organizations are maintained in time of peace will render necessary a great and immediate increase in a national emergency, and this fact demands the presence of a system of reserves from which trained men may be secured for this increase. Without some such system, not only will such increase be rendered exceedingly difficult, but even when accomplished the efficiency of the organizations will have been reduced to a minimum by the introduction of an untrained element double in number the trained personnel.

"The cooperation of the governors of the several States having been secured, a plan for the organization of the entire Organized Militia into military divisions has been initiated. It remains now for the Organized Militia to complete their organizations, both in number and in strength, so as to render these divisions such in fact as well as in name.

"The War Department has issued, during the year, instructions calling for compliance with the militia law in the matter

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of organization. Proper organization as required by law is absolutely necessary if the Organized Militia is to be counted on as a dependable military Federal asset in time of national need, and the organizations existing as such in name only will be required to complete their component elements or lose Federal recognition of their character as such organizations." ³²⁴

The Secretary of War recommended

(1) That every effort be made to popularize the military service, to arouse enthusiasm in a definite national military policy, to spread military knowledge among the people at large and to create a reserve force "to the end that there shall be in all walks of civil life an increasingly large number of men with sufficient military training to make them better prepared for the service of their country should the call ever need to be made."

(2) A continuance of the Students' Military Instruction camps.

(3) A revision of that part of the Army Appropriation Act of August 24, 1912, which created a reserve for the Regular Army, the regulations for which had been promulgated by General Orders No. 11, dated February 11, 1913, and by General Orders No. 26 on April 15, 1913.

Apropos of this Army reserve Mr. Garrison pointed out that about 21,000 men had enlisted in the Regular establishment between November 1, 1912, and August 31, 1913, of whom 61 applied to be furloughed to the reserve at the expiration of their three years' service, and that on August 31, 1913, the reserve "consisted of 8 men."

He stated that he had interviewed many officers and men at most of the Army posts and had discovered "that the men were dissatisfied with the present enlistment contract" and that "one trouble with the present law undoubtedly is that it does not offer as great financial inducement to the man who enlists so as to pass into the reserve as it does to the one who does not so enlist, particularly during the first six years of his service."

(4) The necessity for legislative action in order to maintain the Military Academy at West Point at its maximum capacity authorized by law, instead of having 80 vacancies such as existed on September 1, 1913.

Mr. Garrison asserted that "This matter has been repeatedly brought to the attention of Congress, but so far without any effective legislation."

- (5) Appropriations for more field artillery and ammunition.
- (6) Provision for sufficient horses for the cavalry and field artillery of the organized militia.
- (7) An increase in the number of Regular officers in order to supply the demands of the States for inspector-instructors for their militia.³²⁵

On May 26, 1913, The National Remount Association³²⁶ held a second "Army Service Test" for officers at Benning, D. C., under conditions somewhat more severe than those in 1912. The cup was won by Lieutenant St. John Greble.

In the autumn occurred two distinctly important events so far as the Organized Militia was concerned. They were thus described in the report of the chief of the Division of Militia Affairs for 1914:³²⁷

"In October of 1913 the annual convention of the National Guard Association was held at Chicago, and by invitation was attended by the commissioned personnel of the Division of Militia Affairs. The principal subjects of discussion before this convention were:

✓ "A. The proposed militia pay bill.

"B. Circular No. 8, Division of Militia Affairs, 1913, governing the organization of the Organized Militia in conformity with Regular Army organization.

"C. Circular No. 2, Division of Militia Affairs, 1913, defining what constitutes field or camp service for instruction in the Organized Militia.

"D. The substitution of State for Federal personnel in the Division of Militia Affairs.

"In the early proceedings of the convention many addresses voicing the disagreement of the speakers with the Federal policy in its relation to the Organized Militia were made at length, and in the heat of argument several unwarranted and unjust charges against the War Department were made. These statements placed the representatives of the War Department in an embarrassing position.

"It should not be inferred that the militia officers attacking the War Department represent the true spirit or opinion of the National Guard, or even of the National Guard Association, for such, it is believed, is not the case.

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“ It is noted with satisfaction that this opposition to the War Department was lacking at the recent convention held at Boston, Mass., September 14, 1914, in which the delegates passed a resolution to cooperate with the War Department. It is believed that with cordial cooperation existing between the representatives of the Organized Militia and the War Department more satisfactory results can be obtained than in the past.”

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING 1914

The military legislation passed during the second session of the Sixty-third Congress — which convened on December 1, 1913, and adjourned *sine die* on October 24, 1914 — was somewhat voluminous and in part distinctly important. The appropriations for urgent deficiencies, approved on April 6, 1914, contained nothing out of the ordinary in respect to the military establishment, although it allotted \$55,000 for submarine-mine structures and \$194,350 “ for the construction of field fortifications ” for the Panama Canal ³²⁸— both items scarcely what might be termed generous. The usual annual appropriations for the Military Academy ³²⁹ were approved on April 15th and were followed by one of the most important legislative enactments in our military history, in which the reiterated recommendations of several Secretaries of War were at last embodied into law after the measure had undergone considerable vicissitudes. ³³⁰ It was entitled “ An Act To provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war,” was approved by the President on April 25, 1914, ³³¹ and is so extremely important as to warrant its insertion here in full, notwithstanding its length. It ran as follows:

“ *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the land forces of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the organized land militia while in the service of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize.

“ SEC. 2. That the volunteer forces shall be raised, organized, and maintained, as in this Act provided, only during the exist-

ence of war, or while war is imminent, and only after Congress shall have authorized the President to raise such a force: *Provided*, That the term of enlistment in the volunteer forces shall be the same as that for the Regular Army, exclusive of reserve periods, and all officers and enlisted men composing such volunteer forces shall be mustered out of the service of the United States as soon as practicable after the President shall have issued a proclamation announcing the termination of the war or the passing of the imminence thereof.

“SEC. 3. That when volunteer forces are to be raised the President shall issue his proclamation, stating the number of men desired for each arm, corps, and department, within such limits as may be fixed by law, and he shall prescribe such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of this Act, as may be necessary for the purpose of examining, organizing, and receiving into the service the men called for: *Provided*, That the power to organize volunteer forces shall include the power to provide, within such limits as are or may be prescribed by law, the officers and enlisted men of all grades and classes, and the trained nurses, male and female, that may be necessary in the various arms, corps, and departments: *Provided further*, That when three-fourths of the prescribed minimum enlisted strength of any company, troop, or battery, or when three-fourths of the prescribed minimum enlisted strength of each company, troop, or battery comprised in any battalion or regiment of the organized land militia of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, organized as prescribed by law and War Department regulations, shall volunteer and be accepted for service in the Volunteer Army as such company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment, such organization may be received into the volunteer forces in advance of other organizations of the same arm or class from the same State, Territory, or District, and the officers in the organized land militia service with such organization may then, within the limits prescribed by law, be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as officers of corresponding grades in the Volunteer Army and be assigned to the same grades in the said organization or elsewhere as the President may direct: *Provided further*, That all enlisted men received into the service of the volunteer forces shall, as far as practicable, be taken from the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia in proportion to the respective populations thereof: *Provided*

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further, That when the raising of a volunteer force shall have been authorized by Congress, and after the organized land militia of any arm or class shall have been called into the military service of the United States, volunteers of that particular arm or class may be raised and accepted into said service in accordance with the terms of this Act regardless of the extent to which other arms or classes of said militia shall have been called into said service.

“SEC. 4. That the volunteer forces shall be subject to the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army in so far as such laws, orders, and regulations are applicable to officers or enlisted men whose permanent retention in the military service, either on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated by existing law; and no distinction shall be made between the Regular Army, the organized militia while in the military service of the United States, and the volunteer forces in respect to promotion or to the conferring upon officers or enlisted men of brevet rank, medals of honor, certificates of merit, or other rewards for distinguished service, nor in respect to the eligibility of any officer of said Army, militia, or volunteer forces for service upon any court-martial, court of inquiry, or military commission: *Provided*, That the organization of all units of the line and of the signal troops of the volunteer forces shall be the same as that prescribed by law and regulations for the corresponding units of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That when military conditions so require the President may organize the land forces of the United States into brigades and divisions and such higher units as he may deem necessary, and the composition of units higher than the regiment shall be as he may prescribe: *Provided further*, That to each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and to each battalion of Engineers and Signal Corps troops organized under this Act, there shall be attached the same personnel of the Medical Department as are attached to like organizations of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That the organization of the coast defenses, of machine-gun detachments, establishments of the Medical Department, remount depots, military trains, secret-service agencies, military prisons, lines of communication, including their supply depots, and of other adjuncts that may be necessary in the prosecution of war, and the organization of which is not otherwise provided for by law, shall be as the President may from time to time direct.

“SEC. 5. That except as otherwise provided herein the President is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all volunteer officers required by this Act, but the number and grade of such officers shall not exceed the number and grade of like officers provided for a like force of the Regular Army: *Provided*, That all appointments below the grade of brigadier general in the line of the volunteer forces shall be by commission in an arm of the service and not by commission in any particular regiment; and officers in each arm of the service shall be assigned to organizations of that arm, and transferred from one organization to another in that arm, as the interests of the service may require, by orders from the Secretary of War: *Provided further*, That no officer above the grade of colonel shall be appointed under the provisions of this Act.

“SEC. 6. That to provide the staff officers that will be necessary in the various staff corps and departments in time of war or while war is imminent, and that are not otherwise provided for in this Act, the President is authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, such number of volunteer staff officers of grades authorized by law for the Regular Army as he may find necessary for such corps and departments: *Provided*, That the total number of such staff officers so appointed, including all such officers of the organized militia called into the military service of the United States, shall not exceed the ratio of one officer to two hundred enlisted men for all militia and volunteer forces called into the military service of the United States: *Provided further*, That the number of volunteer staff officers appointed in any grade in the various staff corps and departments shall not exceed in any staff corps or department the proportionate strength of regular officers of the corresponding grade as established by law for the corresponding staff corps or department of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That the President may appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, volunteer chaplains at the rate of one for each regiment of Volunteer Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery, and one for every twelve companies of Volunteer Coast Artillery raised, with rank corresponding to that established by law for chaplains in the Regular Army.

“SEC. 7. That in appointing the volunteer officers authorized by this Act the President may select them from the Regular Army, from those duly qualified and registered pursuant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress approved January

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twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, from the country at large, from the organized land militia of the District of Columbia, and, upon the recommendation of the various governors, from the organized land militia of the several States and Territories in proportion, as far as practicable, to their respective populations, and as far as compatible with the interests of the military service, from the localities from which the troops with which the officers appointed upon said recommendation are to serve shall have been recruited: *Provided*, That in appointments from the country at large preference shall be given those who shall have had honorable service in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the volunteer forces, or who shall have been graduated from educational institutions in which military instruction is compulsory: *Provided further*, That at the same time, not to exceed one Regular Army officer shall hold a volunteer commission in any one battalion of volunteer engineers or signal troops, or in any one battalion of Volunteer Field Artillery; and not to exceed four Regular Army officers shall, at the same time, hold commissions in any one regiment of Volunteer Cavalry, Field Artillery, or Infantry, or in any twelve companies of Coast Artillery, including their field and staff: *And provided further*, That Regular Army officers appointed as officers of Volunteers under this Act shall not thereby vacate their Regular Army commissions nor shall they be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein by reason of their service under their volunteer commissions.

“SEC. 8. That the temporary vacancies created in any grade not above that of colonel among the commissioned personnel of any arm, staff corps, or department of the Regular Army, through appointments of officers thereof to higher volunteer rank, shall be filled by temporary promotions, according to seniority in rank of officers holding commissions in the next lower grade in said arm, staff corps, or department; and all temporary vacancies created in any grade by temporary promotions shall in like manner be filled from, and thus create temporary vacancies in, the next lower grade; and the vacancies that remain thereafter in said arm, staff corps, or department, that can not be filled by temporary promotions, as prescribed in this section, may be filled by the temporary appointment of officers of such number and grade or grades as shall maintain said arm, corps, or department at the full commissioned strength authorized by law: *Provided*, That in the Staff Corps and departments subject to the pro-

visions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, and Acts amendatory thereof, temporary vacancies that can not be filled by temporary promotions, as hereinbefore prescribed, shall be filled by temporary details made in the manner prescribed in said sections twenty-six and twenty-seven and Acts amendatory thereof, and the resulting temporary vacancies in the branches of the Army from which the details are so made shall be filled as hereinbefore in this section prescribed: *Provided*, That officers temporarily promoted or appointed under the terms of this section shall be so promoted or appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms that shall not extend beyond the termination of the war or, if war shall not occur, beyond the passing of the imminence thereof, as defined by the President's proclamation, and upon the expiration of said terms said officers shall be discharged from the positions held by them under their temporary promotions or appointments: *Provided further*, That officers temporarily promoted under the provisions of this section shall not vacate their permanent commissions, nor shall they be prejudiced in their lineal or relative standing in the Regular Army under permanent commissions, by reason of their services under temporary commissions authorized by this section.

"SEC. 9. That all returns and muster rolls of organizations of the volunteer forces and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States shall be rendered to The Adjutant General of the Army, and upon the muster out of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be transferred to and filed in The Adjutant General's Office. And regimental and all other medical officers serving with volunteer troops, or with militia organizations in the service of the United States in the field or elsewhere, shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick or wounded, as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such reports, with other reports provided for in this section, in The Adjutant General's Office, as provided for herein for other reports, returns, and muster rolls.

"SEC. 10. That in time of war or while war is imminent all organizations of the land forces in the military service of the United States shall be recruited and maintained as near their prescribed strength as practicable. For this purpose the necessary rendezvous and depots shall be established by the Secretary of War for the enlistment and training of all recruits, and in

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order that officers may be available for recruiting duty the President is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint officers of Volunteers of the proper arm of the service, additional to those elsewhere herein authorized, in numbers not to exceed at the rate of one major, four captains, five first lieutenants, and five second lieutenants for each organized regiment of Cavalry, Field Artillery, or Infantry, each three battalions of Engineers, or each twelve companies of Coast Artillery; that for purposes of instruction and discipline the troops at recruit depots herein authorized may be organized into companies and battalions, at the discretion of the Secretary of War, with noncommissioned officers and privates of such grades and numbers as may be prescribed by the President. The recruit rendezvous and recruit depots herein prescribed shall be under the direct control of the Secretary of War, and shall render their reports and returns to The Adjutant General of the Army: *Provided*, That to maintain the organized land militia organizations in the military service of the United States at their maximum strength the recruiting rendezvous and depots in any State or Territory may, at the request of the governor thereof, enlist and train recruits for the organized land militia organizations in the service of the United States from said State or Territory.

“SEC. 11. That in the organization of a recruiting system, after Congress shall have authorized the raising of volunteer forces, the President is authorized to employ retired officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the Regular Army, either with their rank on the retired list or, in the case of enlisted men, with increased noncommissioned rank; or he may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint and employ retired officers below the grade of colonel, with increased volunteer commissioned rank not to exceed in the case of any officer one grade above that held by him upon the retired list, or retired enlisted men with volunteer commissioned rank not above the grade of first lieutenant: *Provided*, That retired officers and enlisted men while thus employed shall not be eligible for transfer to the field units, but shall receive the full pay and allowances of the respective grades in which they are serving, whether volunteer or regular, in lieu of their retired pay and allowances: *Provided further*, That upon the termination of the duty or, in case of those given volunteer rank, upon muster out as volunteers said retired officers and enlisted men shall revert to their retired status.

“SEC. 12. That, except as otherwise specifically prescribed by law, all officers provided for in this Act shall be subject to such assignments of duty and such transfers as the President may direct: *Provided*, That medical officers of Volunteers when detailed as consulting surgeons shall not exercise command over the hospitals to which they may be assigned for duty, except that by virtue of their commissions they may command all enlisted men: *Provided further*, That medical inspectors shall be detailed for duty with each army, field army, or army corps, and division, and for the base and lines of communications, and that no officer shall be detailed for duty as a medical inspector except he be experienced in military sanitation.

“SEC. 13. That all officers and enlisted men of the volunteer forces shall be in all respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army.

“SEC. 14. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act be, and the same are hereby, repealed.”

Rarely, if ever, in its history has Congress shown such a sincere desire to profit by the lessons of our former wars and to avoid the mistakes made in military legislation in the past. The law just quoted was replete with excellent provisions which, had they been in force in April, 1898, would have prevented most of the disorders and blunders committed during the Spanish-American War, including the confusion so prevalent in many of the large camps where the medical officers not infrequently acted in defiance of the commanding officers. The two apparent defects were in reality wise precautions. The limitation of the term of enlistment of volunteers to that of the Regular Army “exclusive of reserve periods” was founded upon the intent to make both strictly uniform, leaving to subsequent legislation to determine the proper length of service according to circumstances. The interdiction against the appointment by the President of any volunteer officer above the grade of colonel was made for the express purpose of preventing a repetition of the wholesale nomination of incompetent generals such as occurred during

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the initial stages of the War of the Rebellion, as well as to insure that the high commands at the beginning of hostilities should be entrusted to Regular officers alone. As a rule, the services of volunteer general officers are not required when volunteers are first called out, since, as is obvious, the preliminary instruction is almost wholly regimental and can be more effectually superintended by a retired colonel of the Regular Army than by a newly-appointed volunteer Brigadier-General. It is only when the regimental organizations have been filled and sufficiently instructed to be formed into brigades and divisions that the services of volunteer generals are needed.

The next Congressional measure of importance was the Army Appropriation Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, approved April 27, 1914,³³² which contained the following items of interest:

(1) An allotment of \$250,000 for airships and other aerial craft.

(2) The restriction "That hereafter no officer or enlisted man in active service who shall be absent from duty on account of disease resulting from his own intemperate use of drugs or alcoholic liquors or other misconduct shall receive pay for the period of such absence, the time so absent and the cause thereof to be ascertained under such procedure and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War: *Provided further*, That an enlistment shall not be regarded as complete until the soldier shall have made good any time in excess of one day lost by unauthorized absences, or on account of disease resulting from his own intemperate use of drugs or alcoholic liquors or other misconduct, or while in confinement awaiting trial or disposition of his case if the trial results in conviction, or while in confinement under sentence: *Provided further*, That the reviewing authority may suspend the execution of a sentence of dishonorable discharge until the soldier's release from confinement; but the order of suspension may be vacated at any time and the execution of the dishonorable discharge directed by the officer having general court-martial jurisdiction over the command in which the soldier is held, or by the Secretary of War: *And provided further*, That the authorized enlisted strength of the

Army and of organizations thereof shall be exclusive of soldiers under sentences which include confinement and dishonorable discharge."

(3) The proviso "That the enlisted force of the Quartermaster Corps shall consist of not to exceed fifteen master electricians, six hundred sergeants (first class), nine hundred and seventy-five sergeants, six hundred and twenty-five corporals, two thousand five hundred privates (first class), one thousand one hundred and ninety privates, and ninety-five cooks, all of whom shall receive the same pay and allowances as enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Signal Corps of the Army, and shall be assigned to such duties pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps as the Secretary of War may prescribe."

(4) Important modifications in respect to the detail of line officers contained in the proviso which read as follows:

"*Provided*, That hereafter whenever the number of officers holding permanent appointments in any staff corps or staff department of the Army, except the Quartermaster Corps, shall have been reduced below four and a vacancy shall occur in an office above the grade of colonel in said corps or department, any officer of the Army with rank above that of major who shall have served creditably for not less than four years by detail in said corps or department under the provisions of section twenty-six of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, shall, in addition to officers otherwise eligible, be eligible for appointment to fill said vacancy: *Provided further*, That hereafter whenever the President shall deem it inadvisable to reappoint, at the end of a four-year term, any officer who, under the provisions of section twenty-six of the Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, or Acts amendatory thereof, has been appointed for such a term, in any staff corps or staff department, to an office with rank above that of colonel, but whose commission in the lower grade held by him in said staff corps or staff department at the time of his appointment under said Act to an office of higher grade has been vacated, the President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint said officer to be an officer of the grade that he would have held, and to occupy the relative position that he would have occupied, in said staff corps or staff department if he had not been appointed to said office with rank above that of colonel; and if under the operation of this proviso the number of officers of any particular grade in any staff corps or staff

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department shall at any time exceed the number authorized by law other than this Act, no vacancy occurring in said grade shall be filled until after the total number of officers therein shall have been reduced below the number so authorized: *And provided further*, That after September first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, in time of peace, whenever any officer holding a permanent commission in the line of the Army, with rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major, shall not have been actually present for duty for at least two years of the last preceding six years with a command composed of not less than two troops, batteries, or companies of that branch of the Army in which he shall hold said commission, such officer shall not be detached nor permitted to remain detached from such command for duty of any kind except as hereinafter specifically provided; and all pay and allowances shall be forfeited by any superior for any period during which, by his order or his permission, or by reason of his failure or neglect to issue or cause to be issued the proper order or instructions at the proper time, any officer shall be detached or permitted to remain detached in violation of any of the terms of this Act; but nothing in this Act shall be held to apply in the case of any officer for such period as shall be actually necessary for him, after having been relieved from detached service, to join the organization or command to which he shall belong in that branch in which he shall hold a permanent commission; nor shall anything in this Act be held to apply to the detachment or detail of officers for duty in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal until after such canal shall have been formally opened, or in connection with the Alaska Road Commission or the Alaska Railroad or the Bureau of Insular Affairs; and nothing in this Act shall prevent the redetail of officers above the grade of major to fill vacancies in the various staff corps and departments as provided for by section twenty-six of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one: *Provided further*, That whenever the service record of any field officer is to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, all duty actually performed by him during the last preceding six years, in a grade below that of major, in connection with any statutory organization of that branch of the Army in which he shall hold a permanent commission, or as a staff officer in any coast-defense or coast-artillery district, shall be credited to him as actual presence for duty with a command composed as hereinbefore prescribed: *And provided further*,

That temporary duty of any kind hereafter performed with United States troops in the field for a period or periods the aggregate of which shall not exceed sixty days in any one calendar year, and duty hereafter performed in command of United States Army mine planter by an officer assigned to a company from which this detachment is drawn, and duty hereafter performed in command of a machine-gun platoon or a machine-gun unit, by any officer who, before assignment to such duty, shall have been regularly assigned to, and shall have entered upon duty with, an organization or a command the detachment of certain officers from which is prohibited by the Act of Congress approved August twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve, or by this Act, shall, for the purposes of said Acts, hereafter be counted as actual presence for duty with such organization or command."

This lengthy provision sought to unravel the tangle caused by too hasty and ill-digested legislation contained in the law of August 24, 1912.

(5) An appropriation of \$1,250,000 for the participation of the organized militia in joint encampments and manœuvres with Regular troops.

(6) Authorization to the Secretary of War to acquire a tract of land, either near Tullahoma, Tennessee, or near Anniston, Alabama, "for the purpose of establishing a permanent maneuver camp for the troops of the United States Army, and to establish and maintain thereon camps of instruction for rifle and artillery ranges and for the mobilization and assembling of troops from such States as may be designated by the Secretary of War."

(7) In the allotment for horses for cavalry, artillery, engineers, etc., it was specifically provided "That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for polo ponies except for West Point Military Academy, and such ponies shall not be used at other place;" and "That hereafter no part of this or any other appropriation shall be expended for defraying expenses of officers, enlisted men, or horses in attending or taking part in horse shows or horse races; but nothing in this proviso shall be held to apply to the officers, enlisted men, and horses of any troop, battery, or company which shall, by order or permission of the Secretary of War, and within the limits of the United States, attend any horse show or any State, county, or municipal fair, celebration, or exhibition."

(8) The Secretary of War was "authorized to issue, without expense to the United States, for use in target practice, United

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States magazine rifles and appendages therefor not of the existing service model and not necessary for the maintenance of a proper reserve supply, together with forty rounds of ball cartridges suitable to said arm, for each range at which target practice is had, not to exceed a total of one hundred and twenty rounds per year per man participating in target practice, to rifle clubs organized under the rules of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and to schools having a uniformed corps of cadets and carrying on military training, in sufficient number for the conduct of proper target practice."

(9) Appropriations were made of \$2,100,000 for field artillery and of \$3,000,000 for ammunition for the organized militia.

The act of June 27, 1914, carrying appropriations for fortifications, contained some paltry amounts for the insular possessions and stipulated that no expenditure should be made "for powder other than small-arms powder at a price in excess of 53 cents a pound,"³³³ while the Agricultural Appropriation act, approved June 30th, set apart only \$30,000 "for experiments in the breeding and maintenance of horses for military purposes."³³⁴ On July 17th there was approved "An Act To permit sales by the supply departments of the Army to certain military schools and colleges,"³³⁵ and on the following day there became a law "An Act To increase the efficiency of the aviation service of the Army, and for other purposes,"³³⁶ the opening section of which provided

"That there shall hereafter be, and there is hereby created, an aviation section, which shall be a part of the Signal Corps of the Army, and which shall be, and is hereby, charged with the duty of operating or supervising the operation of all military air craft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation."

The remaining part of this law may thus be summarized:

Section 2. (a) The aviation section shall consist of not more than 60 officers and 260 enlisted men, apart from those assigned from the Signal Corps, and the

1 250
2 100
3 000
5 350

said corps shall be augmented by those in the aviation section.

- (b) The tour of service for line officers below the rank of captain shall be four years; the proviso of the law of February 2, 1901, respecting details shall apply to them; and proficient aviators may be re-detailed.
- (c) Aviation students sufficient in number to maintain the section at full strength. Such aviation students "shall be selected on the recommendation of the chief signal officer from among unmarried lieutenants of the line of the Army not over thirty years of age" for duty not to exceed one year, and if proved inefficient they are not to be re-assigned.
- (d) It was expressly "*Provided*, that no person, except in time of war, shall be assigned or detailed against his will to duty as an aviation student or aviation officer."

- Section 3. (a) Aviation officers were to be divided into two classes, *viz.*: junior military aviators and military aviators; and the Secretary of War was empowered within 60 days to rate as junior military aviators officers below rank of captain who have shown special qualifications.
- (b) Each aviation student while on active duty was to receive "an increase of 25 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his line commission."
 - (c) Each duly qualified junior military aviator was to have the rank, pay and allowances of one grade higher, provided it was not higher than that of first lieutenant. "While on duty, requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in addition an increase of 50 per centum."
 - (d) Not more than fifteen officers shall at any time be rated as military aviators.
 - (e) Each military aviator while so serving was to have the rank, pay and allowances of one grade higher than his own — provided not higher than first lieutenant — and to receive an increase of

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75 per centum in his pay while making regular and frequent flights.

- (f) The aviation enlisted men were to consist of 12 master signal electricians, 12 first-class sergeants, 24 sergeants, 78 corporals, 8 cooks, 82 first-class privates and 44 privates.
- (g) Not more than forty of the above were to be rated as aviation mechanics.
- (h) Twelve enlisted men shall be instructed in the art of flying at the same time, and shall receive an increase in pay amounting to 50 per cent.
- (i) Examination and qualification certificates to be issued by The Adjutant-General were required in case of aviation officers, junior military aviators, military aviators and aviation mechanics.
- (j) Except in the case of officers then on aviation duty and rated as junior military aviators, no person who had not served as an aviation student for a period to be fixed by the Secretary of War was to be detailed for service as an aviation officer, "and no person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall have served creditably for at least three years as an aviation officer with the rating of junior military aviator."
- (k) An amount equal to one year's pay was to be paid to the widow of any officer or enlisted men killed as a result of an aviation accident not arising from his own misconduct, or to any other person designated by him in writing.
- (l) Such payment was to be in lieu of, and a bar to, any other allowance for death in service.

Those who are interested in examining the details of this law will find it set forth in full in footnote 337 on pages 715-718.³³⁸

The Deficiencies Appropriation Act, approved July 29, 1914, ratified the action of the Secretary of War in transferring submarine mines to the value of \$17,075.78 from the United States to the Philippines for the protection of

the harbours in those islands; ³³⁸ and the Sundry Civil act, approved on August 1st, allotted \$1,124,475 "for fortifications and the armament thereof for the Panama Canal." ³³⁹

One of the two Joint Resolutions which concern us was approved on April 22nd ³⁴⁰ and recited that

"In view of the facts presented by the President of the United States in his address delivered to the Congress in joint session on the twentieth day of April, nineteen hundred and fourteen, with regard to certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States in Mexico: Be it

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is justified in the employment of the armed force of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States.

"Be it further resolved, That the United States disclaims any hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."

In contrast to this ridiculous document — which, by failing to set forth the facts justifying the employment of armed force, placed the United States in a distinctly unfavourable light in its subsequent action — was the joint resolution approved on August 5, 1914, ³⁴¹ which appropriated \$2,500,000 to bring home the Americans stranded in Europe as a result of the outbreak of war on the continent, and which provided that

"In the execution of the provisions hereof, the President is authorized to employ any officers, employees, and vessels of the United States and use any supplies of the Naval and Military Establishments and to charter and employ any vessels that may be required."

MILITARY EVENTS DURING 1914

According to the latest returns made in 1914 the actual strength of the Regular Army was 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. It was noteworthy during the fiscal year, as the report of the Secretary of War pointed out, ³⁴²

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“That the health of the Army has been exceptionally good. The last year has afforded the lowest recorded noneffective rate in the history of the Army; a reduction of nearly 20 per cent. in nonefficiency from sickness and injury has resulted. There were only four cases of typhoid fever in the Army, including the Philippines’ Scouts. Two of these were cases of recruits of four and five days’ service, respectively, who had not been immunized. Venereal diseases have decreased about 25 per cent. The rate for alcoholism is the lowest since 1873. The health of troops in camps over a long period of time has been extraordinarily good on account of the high efficiency of camp sanitation.”

As the actual condition of the land forces, both Regular and Militia, will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter, only such events and features as do not fall within that category will be mentioned here.

The military operations in the Philippines during the year were confined to a few encounters with hostile Moros in the island of Jolo, the principal one occurring at Bud Tandu on March 1st.³⁴³ The thankless task of patrolling the Mexican frontier for 1,703 miles from Brownsville, Texas, to the vicinity of San Diego, California, was performed by 359 officers and 8,260 enlisted men, assigned from the Southern and Western Departments under the command of Generals Bliss and Murray respectively. On April 9, 1914, the Mexicans seized and held as prisoners an American paymaster and several sailors who had landed in a Navy launch at the Iturbide bridge at Tampico. Rear Admiral Mayo, commanding the squadron off that port, immediately demanded their release and a salute of twenty-one guns to the American flag by way of apology. The prisoners were liberated, but President Huerta absolutely refused to permit a salute to be fired. The affair precipitated a message to Congress delivered by President Wilson in person on April 20th and resulted in the joint resolution mentioned on page 444 authorizing him to employ the armed forces of the United States to compel proper amends for the affront. The entire Atlantic fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher had mean-

while been despatched to the east coast of Mexico, and on April 22nd that officer disembarked a force of marines and sailors at Vera Cruz in order to forestall the landing by the German ship *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* of a large consignment of arms destined for Huerta. A spirited fight ensued, resulting in the killing of four Americans and the wounding of twenty. For several days and until a house-to-house search had confiscated all arms, there was desultory fighting which further increased the American casualties. As it was manifest from the start that the Navy could not cope with the situation single-handed, tentative orders were issued by the War Department for the 5th Brigade of the 2nd Division and its re-enforcements to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Vera Cruz. On April 23rd, in compliance with the President's directions, Brigadier General Funston was instructed to sail at once from Galveston with four regiments of infantry and as much of the cavalry and field artillery re-enforcements as could be embarked on four Army transports. Next day he started with 182 officers and 3,047 men,³⁴⁴ followed on the 26th by the first battalion of the 4th Field Artillery from Texas City. On the latter date orders were issued to him to relieve the naval forces occupying Vera Cruz and he was informed that the first brigade of the U. S. Marine Corps would be placed under his command. On April 28th, General Funston reached Vera Cruz, disembarked, took over the command of the city at noon on the 30th, and was shortly joined by the rest of his troops.³⁴⁵ Upon their arrival his force consisted of 225 officers and 3,832 men, to which were added 113 officers and 3,333 men from the Marines of the fleet, thus making a total of 7,503 officers and men. He promptly occupied the immediate suburbs of Vera Cruz and extended his lines so as to include El Tejar, some 9 miles distant, whence the supply of fresh water for the city was derived.³⁴⁶

The fall of Zacatecas on June 24th robbed General Huerta of all power of resistance, and on July 15th he and General

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Blanquet resigned and went into exile, Francisco Carbajal acting in his stead in the interim between Huerta's departure for Europe and the surrender of the government on August 12th to General Obregon as the representative of Carranza. The peace which followed was soon interrupted by a revival of the former rivalry between Carranza and Villa, but a convention of all the revolutionary chiefs early in November proclaimed General Gutierrez as provisional president, with the approval of Villa. Opposition by Carranza led to a renewal of hostilities, but the stronghold of Querataro surrendered to Villa without a fight and Carranza's forces fell back toward Vera Cruz. On November 23rd the American forces were withdrawn and brought back to Texas, although part of the fleet remained in the port in order to protect American and foreign interests. Thus ended an occupation which, from a military standpoint, was little short of a farce and, from the point of view of international comity, wholly unwarranted. The conduct of General Funston and his troops was marked by great tact in the difficult position in which they were placed, but their situation was at no time enviable. By the end of the occupation the enlisted men of his combined forces numbered only 3,434 soldiers and 2,500 marines, a total of 5,934. A large portion of his original command had had to be left at Galveston in April for want of sufficient transports to carry it to Vera Cruz. Certain elements which properly belonged to it—such as parts of its field artillery, cavalry and transportation—could not be sent with it;³⁴⁷ and, moreover, the four infantry regiments, which at war strength should have had 51 officers and 1,863 enlisted men each, a total of 204 officers and 7,452 men, “had approximately 140 officers and 2,790 men”—“in other words, only one-third as many men as they should have had if the regiments had been full.”³⁴⁸ Had circumstances required a prompt movement into the interior directly, or indeed at any time, after his arrival at Vera Cruz, General Funston would have found himself

obliged to improvise such means as could be obtained on the spot, and the sequel might readily have ended disastrously had the Mexican factions combined against him, as they would unquestionably have done. *For the third time in three years was presented the spectacle of one of the greatest Powers in the world unable to assemble even a paltry force of Regulars thoroughly equipped for war or for such overseas expeditions as the United States may at any moment be called upon to undertake.*

Late in April, 1914, the disturbances in the coal regions of Colorado required the sending of Regular troops, which remained there throughout the year but effectually put an end to the disorders. Similar conditions in Butte, Montana, early in September, and in the coal regions of Arkansas early in November, necessitated the presence of Regulars. The dearth of troops within the United States compelled a withdrawal of all those formerly stationed in various national parks which had to be left to the control of the Interior Department.³⁴⁹ As a matter of fact, a mistaken idea has insisted upon the retention of Regular troops in such places, where they do not belong and where the duty is such as is properly performed by constabulary under the supervision of the Interior Department.

So successful were the results that attended the establishment of the Students' Military Instruction camps at Gettysburg and Monterey in 1913 that steps were promptly taken, not only to repeat them, but to add two additional camps to be held at various periods during the months of June, July and August.³⁵⁰ The increased interest evoked by this splendid movement may be gauged by the fact that the number of students attending them in 1913 was 244, while in 1914 there were 677, divided as follows:

Camp at Burlington, Vermont, July 6th to August 7th, inclusive	348
Camp at Asheville, North Carolina, same dates	120
Camp at Ludington, Michigan, same dates	114

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Camp at Monterey, California, June 26th to July 31st,
inclusive 85 ³⁵¹

On November 4, 1914, the War Department announced that four such camps would be held during the summer of 1915, viz.: from July 5th to August 8th, inclusive, at or near Chickamauga Park, Georgia, Plattsburg Barracks, New York, and Ludington, Michigan; and from June 25th to August 1st, inclusive, at or near the Presidio of San Francisco. ³⁵²

The War Department had contemplated combined Regular and Militia manœuvres to be held in the vicinity of Washington and San Francisco, but the demand for troops in Mexico, on the southern frontier and in various coal regions compelled their abandonment, as well as that of a cavalry camp of instruction at Winchester, Virginia, similar to that of the preceding year. For the same reason the camps for medical officers and non-commissioned officers and the schools of instruction for field artillery officers at Fort Sill and Fort Riley had to be cancelled. A joint camp of instruction for field artillery was however held at Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, a number of State encampments took place, and the usual joint exercises for coast defence occurred in the seaboard States during June, July, August and September. ³⁵³

The fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, was marked by great activity, and better and sounder progress toward the creation of a really efficient field force was undoubtedly made than in any other. Most notable of all was the introduction of a divisional system to conform to the plan of the War Department in respect to a correct tactical formation of the land forces which had been inaugurated by Secretary Stimson early in 1913 and which, as has been remarked, constituted the greatest stride in the direction of proper military organization ever made in our history. Of lesser importance only were the simultaneous meetings in January, 1914, of the National Militia Board and the Association of Adjutants-General of the Organized Militia, at which various features relating to that body were discussed and definite con-

clusions reached; and it is gratifying to record that most of the recommendations of the National Militia Board met with the approval of the Division of Militia Affairs of the War Department. It is to be regretted, however, that the action of Congress in limiting to two hundred the increase in the number of officers of the Regular Army made by the Act of March 3, 1911 — notwithstanding that 612 had been asked for and were imperatively needed — was manifested in the dearth of officers who could be assigned to duty with the Organized Militia as inspector-instructors. As the detached-service law had been extended to include the field officers and troops on the Mexican border, the difficulty of finding the number of officers and enlisted men for whom the State organizations clamoured and to whom they were justly entitled in their sincere efforts to improve their training was even greater than in the preceding year.³⁵⁴ Other features relating to the condition of the Organized Militia will be treated of in detail in the ensuing chapter.

On February 25, 1914, the Tables of Organization prepared by the General Staff were approved and published for the information and government of the Regular Army and National Guards. These tables were based on the new and revised Field Service Regulations issued on March 19, 1914, and particularly notable for the vastly improved provisions in respect to administration and supply which were prepared in the main by Major James A. Logan, Jr., who, having spent two years in the French *École de l'Intendance*, was thus able to introduce many of the features which have made the French system the acknowledged superior of all others. The introductory notice to the new Field Service Regulations, signed by Major General Leonard Wood as Chief of Staff, contains the following important observations:

“Officers and men of all ranks are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the

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highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of the means."

A memorable mission was that of the Assistant Secretary of War, Henry S. Breckinridge, who sailed early in August in the U. S. cruiser *Tennessee*, accompanied by a large staff of officers, to carry aid to the many thousands of Americans who had been marooned in Europe by the outbreak of war and were experiencing great difficulty in returning to the United States.³⁵⁵

By virtue of War Department General Orders No. 21, dated December 16, 1914, instructions were given for the convening on the following day at Washington of a board composed of the Assistant Secretary of War, Major-General Leonard Wood, commanding the Eastern Department; Brigadier General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance; Brigadier General E. M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery; Brigadier General D. C. Kingman, Chief of Engineers, and Captain Frank S. Cocheu, General Staff Corps. The instructions ran as follows:

"The board is directed in view of the increased size, caliber, and offensive power of guns now on or contemplated to be placed on naval vessels and the caliber, mounting, range, and offensive power of our coast-defense guns, either now in such defenses or contemplated to be placed therein, to consider whether or not we should make any change in our coast defenses and their armament; and if so, what changes are recommended?"

After sitting only three days, so expeditiously was the business transacted that on December 19, 1914, the board rendered a unanimous report, which contained the ensuing important findings and recommendations:

"That the old type 12-inch guns and mortars are not equal in range and power to the major-caliber guns afloat;

"That by such minor changes in the carriages of the old type 12-inch gun at present emplaced as will permit an elevation of 15 degrees, and by the provision of a certain proportion

of lighter projectiles of approximately 700 pounds weight, an effective range of about 20,000 yards can be given these guns; that these changes should be made;

“That the great majority of our 14-inch guns, with certain slight changes which have already been ordered and by the supply of a portion of the projectiles of lighter weight than the heaviest now furnished, are suitable in power and range to meet any that may now be brought against them;

“That the present emplacements are, as a whole, satisfactory, with the possible exception of some of the older magazines, which should be more thoroughly protected against plunging fire; that this protection should be furnished.

“That a policy should be adopted of providing, through annual appropriations, for such modernizing of fortifications as will result in keeping pace with the improvement in armament afloat.

“That in the case of those works where modernizing involves very extensive changes in emplacements, gun carriages, etc., it will be policy to construct new works and provide new armaments adequate for the demands of the situation.

“That the old works should be held, when practicable and desirable, as a secondary line of defense.

“That wherever it may be necessary to construct new works, especially at important points, such as the entrances of our principal harbors, naval bases, etc., the major-caliber gun should be at least a 16-inch 45-caliber gun, mounted so as to have the greatest possible protection and an all-around fire where it may be necessary to have such fire.

“That the mortars to be installed in future should be of not less than 12-inch caliber, with a range of at least 21,000 yards.

“That this weapon should be the numerically preponderant type in our coast defenses, as it is cheap, has a long life, can be easily protected, is very effective against ships, and can be used as a valuable adjunct for the land defense. It must not, however, at any important point be adopted to the exclusion of high-power direct-fire guns.

“The general policy with reference to seacoast defense should be to have the armament there emplaced of greater range and power than any which can be brought against it.”³⁵⁶

On December 1, 1914, a meeting was held in New York for the purpose of organizing The National Security League,

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the object of which was to make known to the people at large the lamentable condition in respect to the defencelessness of the United States both on land and sea. This organization, which comprises some of the most distinguished men in the United States, has already shown extraordinary activity and made its influence felt in a widespread manner.

MILITARY LEGISLATION AND EVENTS UNTIL
JUNE 1, 1915

The military legislation passed at the third session of the Sixty-third Congress — which convened on December 1, 1914, and came to a close on March 3, 1915 — fell within the latter year and embodied quite a number of important features. The first measure deserving of particular attention ³⁵⁷ was “An Act To regulate details of majors in the Ordnance Department,” which was approved on February 24, 1915, and provided

“That majors may be detailed in the Ordnance Department, under section twenty-six of the Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, and Acts amendatory thereof, without a compulsory period of service out of that department.” ³⁵⁸

The next, the Sundry Civil Expenses, approved March 3, 1915, contained various appropriations under the caption of War Department; allotted \$50,000 to be expended “for the erection of a building at the Watertown Arsenal for the installation of machinery to be used in the manufacture of projectiles,” provided the Secretary of War deemed such a step to “be to the best interests of the United States”; and applied \$2,639,048.30 “for fortifications and armament thereof for the Panama Canal.” ³⁵⁹ On the same day was approved the usual annual appropriation act for fortifications, which is chiefly notable for the niggardly sums set apart for the installation of search-lights, fire-control and submarine mines both in the United States and the insular possessions, and the limitation of the price to be paid for

powder "other than small-arms powder" to 53 cents a pound.³⁶⁰

On March 4, 1915, the President affixed his signature to seven bills which contained provisions relating to the military branch of the service. The first, the Appropriation Act for the legislative, executive and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, contained nothing out of the ordinary,³⁶¹ whereas the Army Appropriation Act covering the same period³⁶² was replete with important features which were, in substance, as follows:³⁶³

(1) An allotment of \$15,000 "for the actual and necessary expenses of officers of the Army on duty abroad for the purpose of observing operations of armies of foreign States at war, to be paid upon certificates of the Secretary of War that the expenditures were necessary for obtaining military information."

(2) An appropriation of \$300,000 for airships and other aerial craft and for "motor-propelled, passenger-carrying vehicles, which may be necessary for the aviation section," with the proviso "That not more than \$500 of the foregoing shall be used for the cost of special technical instruction of officers of said section."

(3) Directions to the Secretary of War to appoint a commission of three Army officers to report on the advisability of the acquisition by the Government of land for an aviation school and training ground.

(4) Authorization to the President "to detail officers of the Army, active or retired, for duty with the Panama-Pacific International Exposition without extra compensation."³⁶⁴

(5) The proviso, under the heading Pay of Enlisted Men, "That hereafter pay and allowances shall not accrue to a soldier under sentence of dishonorable discharge, during such period as the execution of the sentence of discharge may be suspended under authority of the Act of Congress approved April twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and fourteen. . . ."

(6) The stipulation, under the caption of Quartermaster Corps, "That hereafter the Secretary of War is authorized to appoint such number of quartermaster sergeants, Quartermaster Corps, not to exceed the number provided for by law, as

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he may deem necessary for the interest of the service, said quartermaster sergeants to be selected from the most competent noncommissioned officers of the Army, who shall have served therein at least five years, three of such service having been rendered as noncommissioned officers, and whose character and education shall fit them to take charge of public property and to act as clerks and assistants to the proper officers of the Army in charge of public property."

(7) A modification of, and an increase in, the aforesaid corps made by the proviso "That the enlisted force of the Quartermaster Corps shall consist of not to exceed fifteen master electricians, three hundred and eighty sergeants (first class), one thousand two hundred and forty sergeants, six hundred corporals, two thousand nine hundred and twenty privates (first class), seven hundred and fifty privates, and ninety-five cooks, all of whom shall receive the same pay and allowances as enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Signal Corps of the Army, and shall be assigned to such duties pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps as the Secretary of War may prescribe."

(8) Apropos of Retired Officers it was "*Provided*, That hereafter the President be, and he is hereby, authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to transfer to the active list of the Army any officer under fifty years of age and with rank not above that of captain who may have been transferred heretofore or who may be transferred hereafter for physical disability from the active to the retired list of the Army by the action of any retiring board: *Provided*, That such officer shall stand a satisfactory medical and professional examination for promotion as now provided for by law: *Provided further*, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized within two years of the approval of this Act, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to transfer to the active list of the Army any officer who may have been transferred heretofore for physical disability from the active to the retired list of the Army by the action of any retiring board: *Provided*, That such officer shall be transferred to the place on the active list which he would have had if he had not been retired, and shall be carried as an additional number in the grade to which he may be transferred or at any time thereafter promoted: *Provided further*, That such officer shall stand a satisfactory medical and professional examination for promotion as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War: *Provided further*, That any officer who may have al-

ready been transferred from the retired to the active list, shall receive the benefits of this Act."

(9) Under the heading of Miscellaneous, it was "*Provided*, That hereafter, at places where there are no public quarters available, commutation for the authorized allowance therefor shall be paid to commissioned officers, acting dental surgeons, veterinarians, members of the Nurse Corps, and pay clerks at the rate of \$12 per room per month; and, when specifically authorized by the Secretary of War, to enlisted men at the rate of 15 per month, or in lieu thereof he may, in his discretion, rent quarters for the use of said enlisted men when so on duty.

"*Provided further*, That hereafter the Secretary of War may determine where and when there are no public quarters available within the meaning of this or any other Act."

(10) The status of certain officers in one of the colonial organizations was fixed by the proviso "That the permanent captains of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry now holding commissions as such in said regiment shall be recommissioned as captains of Infantry of the United States Army, to take rank on the lineal list of officers of Infantry immediately after the junior officers of the same grade whose total commissioned service equals or exceeds theirs: *Provided further*, That those officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, recommissioned as captains of Infantry, whose total commissioned service is less than that of any officer of Infantry of the next lower grade, shall not advance on the lineal list of captains of Infantry, nor on the relative list of officers of the United States Army, until such time as there no longer remains on the lineal list of officers of Infantry any officer of the next lower grade of equal or greater length of total commissioned service and shall take rank in the grade of captain on the lineal list of officers of Infantry and on the relative list of officers of the United States Army immediately after the juniors in rank of such officers of Infantry of equal or greater total commissioned service: *Provided*, That for the purpose of this Act total commissioned service shall include commissioned service in the Regular Army, in the Volunteers, in the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry, and in the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, and that the commissioned service of those officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry who were officers of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry, shall be counted as continuous and uninterrupted between the twenty-ninth day

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of June, nineteen hundred and eight, and the thirty-first day of December, nineteen hundred and eight."

(11) \$200,000 were appropriated for the care of horses and *matériel* for Field Artillery of the Organized Militia, and it was " *Provided*, That for the purpose of this section the total number of horses shall not exceed thirty-two to any one battery or four to each battalion or regimental headquarters, and that such horses shall be used exclusively for Field Artillery purposes: *And provided further*, That the men to be so compensated, not to exceed five for each battery, shall be duly enlisted therein and shall be detailed by the battery commander under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and shall be paid by the United States disbursing officer in each State provided for in the Act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, entitled, 'An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,' as amended: *And provided further*, That the funds appropriated by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, and by the Act entitled 'An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,' approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eight, as amended, shall be available for the purchase, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, of horses conforming to the Regular Army standards, said horses to remain the property of the United States and to be for the sole continuous use of the Field Artillery of the Organized Militia: *And provided further*, That the Secretary of War may, under the provisions of this Act, issue to the Field Artillery organizations hereinbefore mentioned and without cost to the State condemned Army horses which are no longer fit for service but may still be suitable for purposes of instruction, the same to be sold as now provided by law when the latter purpose has been served."

(12) To give authority of law to the newly-established system of punishment for purely military offenses it was " *Provided*, That the United States military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, shall hereafter be known as the United States disciplinary barracks and the branches of said prison as branches of such barracks: *Provided further*, That the authority now vested in the Secretary of War to give honorable restoration to duty, in case the same is merited, to general prisoners confined in the United States disciplinary barracks and its branches shall be extended so that such restoration may be given to general prisoners confined elsewhere, and the Secretary of War shall be, and

he is hereby, authorized to establish a system of parole for prisoners confined in said barracks and its branches, the terms and conditions of such parole to be such as the Secretary of War may prescribe."

(13) In making appropriations for horses, the law expressly stipulated that their number "shall be limited to the actual needs of the mounted service" and that no polo ponies were to be bought for, or used elsewhere than at, the Military Academy. Additional impetus was given to the breeding of horses for military purposes by providing "That the Secretary of War is authorized to expend \$2,110.32, or so much thereof as may be necessary, of the amount appropriated herein, for the completion of the purchase of certain lands included in the reservation of the Front Royal (Virginia) Remount Depot, which was acquired under authority of the Act of Congress approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, namely tracts twenty-two, twenty-five, and twenty-eight, aggregating one hundred and ninety-three and seven-eighths acres, more or less, and for the release of all claims against the United States for the use and occupation thereof, the said sum being the amount necessary to complete the purchase of the said tracts under the proposed compromise of the suit now pending for the condemnation of the same."

(14) Under the caption of Barracks and Quarters, Philippine Islands, it was "*Provided further*, That on and after October first, nineteen hundred and fifteen, no officer or enlisted man of the Army shall, except upon his own request, be required to serve in a single tour of duty for more than two years in the Philippine Islands, nor more than three years in the Panama Canal Zone, except in case of insurrection or of actual or threatened hostilities: *Provided further*, That the foregoing provision shall not apply to the organization known as the Philippine Scouts."

(15) \$2,090,000 were appropriated for field artillery for the organized militia and \$2,900,000 for the manufacture of reserve ammunition for the same, but with the proviso that not more than \$100,000 could be utilized for purchasing.

(16) In spite of the excellent results in the shape of increased production and diminution of cost obtained by the Ordnance Department through the introduction of the "Taylor system" of scientific management in certain arsenals, the opposition of the Labor Unions secured the insertion of the following proviso:

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“That no part of the appropriations made in this bill shall be available for the salary or pay of any officer, manager, superintendent, foreman, or other person having charge of the work of any employee of the United States Government while making or causing to be made, with a stop watch or other time-measuring device, a time study of any job of any such employee between the starting and completion thereof or of the movements of any such employee while engaged upon such work; nor shall any part of the appropriations made in this bill be available to pay any premium or bonus or cash reward to any employee in addition to his regular wages, except for suggestions resulting in improvements or economy in the operation of any Government plant; and no claim for services performed by any person while violating this proviso shall be allowed.”

(17) A meritorious, although somewhat tardy, rewarding of former service was brought about by the stipulation

“That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, any brigadier general of the Army on the retired list who has held the rank and command of major general of Volunteers and performed the duties incident to that grade in time of actual warfare, and has been honorably discharged, and who served with credit in the Regular or Volunteer forces during the Civil War prior to April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, to the grade of major general in the United States Army and place him on the retired list with the pay of brigadier general on the retired list; and any officer now on the retired list of the Army who served with credit for more than two years as a commissioned officer of Volunteers during the Civil War prior to April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, and who subsequently served with credit for more than forty years as a commissioned officer of the Regular Army, including service in command of troops in five Indian campaigns, the War with Spain, and the Philippine insurrection, and to whom the Congressional medal of honor for most distinguished conduct in action has been twice awarded, and who has also been brevetted for conspicuous gallantry in action, and place him on the retired list of the Army with the rank and retired pay of one grade above that actually held by him at the time of his retirement from active service in the Regular Army.”

(18) After a long period of striving to improve the military

laws of the Army, the Judge Advocate General's office succeeded in getting the ensuing law enacted:

"SEC. 2. That chapter six, Title XIV, of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"2. Persons sentenced to confinement upon conviction by courts-martial or other military tribunals of crimes or offenses which, under some statute of the United States or under some law of the State, Territory, District, or other jurisdiction in which the crime or offense may be committed, are punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, including persons sentenced to confinement upon conviction by courts-martial or other military tribunals of two or more acts or omissions, any one of which, under the statute or other law hereinbefore mentioned, constitutes or includes a crime or offense punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, may be confined at hard labor, during the entire period of confinement so adjudged, in any United States, State, Territorial, or District penitentiary, or in any other penitentiary directly or indirectly under the jurisdiction of the United States; and all persons sentenced to confinement upon conviction by courts-martial or other military tribunals who are not confined in a penitentiary may be confined and detained in the United States Disciplinary Barracks.

"3. The government and control of the United States Disciplinary Barracks and of all offenders sent thereto for confinement and detention therein shall be vested in the Adjutant General of the Army under the direction of the Secretary of War, who shall from time to time make such regulations respecting the same as may be deemed necessary, and who shall submit annually to Congress a full statement of the financial and other affairs of said institution for the preceding fiscal year.

"4. The officers of the United States Disciplinary Barracks shall consist of a commandant and such subordinate officers as may be necessary, who shall be detailed by the Secretary of War from the commissioned officers of the Army at large. In addition to detailing for duty at said disciplinary barracks such number of enlisted men of the Staff Corps and departments as he may deem necessary, the Secretary of War shall assign a sufficient number of enlisted men of the line of the Army for duty as guards at said disciplinary barracks and as noncommissioned officers of the disciplinary organizations hereinafter authorized. Said guards, and also the enlisted men assigned for duty as non-

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commissioned officers of disciplinary organizations, shall be detached from the line of the Army, or enlisted for the purpose; and said guards shall be organized as infantry, with noncommissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and cooks of the number and grades allowed by law for infantry organizations of like strength: *Provided*, That at least one of said guards shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a battalion sergeant major.

“5. The commandant of the United States Disciplinary Barracks shall have command thereof and charge and custody of all offenders sent thereto for confinement and detention therein; shall govern such offenders and cause them to be employed at such labor and in such trades and to perform such duties as may be deemed best for their health and reformation and with a view to their honorable restoration to duty or their reenlistment as hereinafter authorized; shall cause note to be taken and a record to be made of the conduct of such offenders; and may shorten the daily time of hard labor of those who by their obedience, honesty, industry, and general good conduct earn such favors — all under such regulations as the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe.

“6. The Secretary of War shall provide for placing under military training those offenders sent to the United States Disciplinary Barracks for confinement and detention therein whose record and conduct are such as to warrant the belief that upon the completion of a course of military training they may be worthy of an honorable restoration to duty or of being permitted to reenlist; may provide for the organization of offenders so placed under military training into disciplinary companies and higher units, organized as infantry, with noncommissioned officers, except color sergeants, selected or appointed from the enlisted men assigned to duty for that purpose pursuant to the provisions of paragraph four hereof; and may provide for uniforming, arming, and equipping such organizations.

“7. Whenever he shall deem such action merited the Secretary of War may remit the unexecuted portions of the sentences of offenders sent to the United States Disciplinary Barracks for confinement and detention therein, and in addition to such remission may grant those who have not been discharged from the Army an honorable restoration to duty, and may authorize the reenlistment of those who have been discharged or upon their written application to that end order their restoration to the Army to complete their respective terms of enlistment, and such

application and order of restoration shall be effective to revive the enlistment contract for a period equal to the one not served under said contract.

"8. The Secretary of War may, from time to time, designate any building or structure or any part thereof under the control of the Secretary of War and pertaining to the military establishment as a branch disciplinary barracks for the confinement and detention of offenders whom it is impracticable to send to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and all branch disciplinary barracks and all offenders sent thereto for confinement and detention therein shall be subject to the laws respecting the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the offenders sent thereto for confinement and detention therein."

The act making appropriations for the Agriculture Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, allotted only \$25,000 "for experiments in the breeding and maintenance of horses for military purposes,"³⁶⁵ while a similar measure for the Military Academy³⁶⁶ and the Deficiencies Appropriation Act³⁶⁷ contained nothing worthy of particular mention.

The fifth measure, entitled "An Act To provide for recognizing the services of certain officers of the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service for their services in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal, to extend to certain of such officers the thanks of Congress, and for other purposes"³⁶⁸ provided

"That the thanks of Congress are hereby extended to the following officers of the Army and Navy of the United States who, as members of the late Isthmian Canal Commission, have rendered distinguished service in constructing the Panama Canal, to wit: Colonel George W. Goethals, chairman and chief engineer; Brigadier General William C. Gorgas, sanitary expert; Colonel H. F. Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel William L. Sibert, and Commander H. H. Rousseau.

"SEC. 2. That the President is hereby authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to advance in rank Colonel George W. Goethals to the grade of major general of the line, United States Army; Brigadier General William C. Gorgas

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to the rank of major general in the Medical Department, United States Army; Colonel H. F. Hodges and Lieutenant Colonel William L. Sibert to the grade of brigadier general of the line, United States Army; and Commander H. H. Rousseau to the grade of rear admiral of the lower Nine, United States Navy.

"SEC. 3. That such officers of the Army and Navy as were detailed for duty with the Isthmian Canal Commission on the Isthmus of Panama for more than three years, and who shall not have been advanced in rank by any other provision of this bill, shall be advanced one grade in rank upon retirement: *Provided*, That any officer of the Army or Navy now on the retired list with similar service shall be immediately advanced one grade in rank on the retired list of the Army or Navy.

"SEC. 4. That the President is further authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint such officers of the Public Health Service as were detailed for duty with the Isthmian Canal Commission on the Isthmus of Panama for more than three years to the grade next above that at present held by such officers.

"SEC. 5. That the numbers in such grades provided for in sections two and four of this Act, except where vacancies occurring in any grade by the provisions of this Act can be filled by such officers in a lower grade as are entitled to the benefits of this Act, shall be temporarily increased during the time such offices may be held: *Provided*, That the officer who may be advanced and appointed major general in the Medical Department, United States Army, shall thereupon become the head of such department, and the operation of so much of section twenty-six of the Act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, as limits the term of office of the head of the Medical Department, United States Army, shall be suspended during the incumbency of the head of the department who may be appointed under this Act: *Provided*, That whenever the head of the Medical Department appointed under the provisions of this Act shall become separated from the active list of the Army, by retirement or otherwise, the extra office or grade to which he shall have been so advanced or appointed shall cease and determine, and thereafter the rank of the head of the Medical Department, United States Army, shall be that of a brigadier general: *Provided further*, That nothing in this Act shall operate to interfere with or retard the promotion to which any officer would be entitled under existing law: *And provided further*, That the officers ad-

vanced to higher grades under this Act shall be junior to the officers who now rank them under existing law when these officers have reached the same grade.

“SEC. 6. That at any time after the passage of this Act any officer of the Army or Navy to be benefited by the provisions of this Act may, on his own application, be retired by the President at seventy-five per centum of the pay of the rank upon which he is retired.”

The last was “An Act Authorizing the Secretary of War to make certain donations of condemned cannon and cannon balls” to a long list of organizations and institutions, civic and otherwise, cities, towns and villages, and it wisely

“*Provided*, That no expense shall be incurred by the United States through the delivery of any of the foregoing condemned military equipment: *And provided further*, That each and every article of condemned military equipment covered by this Act shall be subject at all times to the order of the Secretary of War.”³⁶⁹

Such were the achievements of the Sixty-third Congress at its third session. On the other hand, it failed almost wholly to respond to the growing demand of the country for better national defence, which had been awakened by the object-lessons given by the gigantic war that had embroiled half of the civilised world. A fair example of its failure was the action of the House of Representatives on January 22, 1915, when the following amendments to the Army Appropriation Bill offered by Hon. Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts were either defeated by an overwhelming vote or rejected on a point of order:

- (1) An appropriation of \$1,300,000 for the Aviation Corps.
- (2) An increase in the Coast Artillery Corps.
- (3) An increase in the allotment for small-arms ammunition from \$100,000 to \$30,000,000.
- (4) An increase in the appropriation for Field Artillery from \$2,090,000 to \$4,000,000.
- (5) An increase of the allotment for Field Artillery ammunition from \$2,900,000 to \$5,000,000.³⁷⁰

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And every one of these increases was imperatively needed by the Army.

In addition to the Students' Military Instruction Camps already alluded to, steps are at present being taken by Major General Leonard Wood, commanding the Department of the East, to establish a Military Instruction Camp for business and professional men to be held at Plattsburg, New York, from August 10 to September 6, 1915.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CONDITION OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF 1915

ACCORDING to the latest statistics obtainable, dated April 20, 1915, the authorized strength of the Regular Army — exclusive of the 6,000 men allowed for the Quartermaster Corps and the 4,012 for the Hospital Corps — was 4,833 officers and 87,877 enlisted men, while that of the Philippine Scouts was 182 officers and 5,733 men, thus making a total of 5,015 officers and 93,610 men.¹ The actual strength on May 26, 1914, according to the latest returns in the office of The Adjutant-General of the Army was as follows:²

	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
MOBILE ARMY			
In the United States	1,989	34,798	36,787
In Alaska	15	424	439
In Porto Rico	34	595	629
In the Panama Canal Zone	132	4,458	4,590
In Hawaii	245	7,298	7,543
In the Philippines	303	9,294	9,597
In China	30	1,195	1,225
Total	2,748	58,062	60,810
COAST ARTILLERY CORPS			
In the United States	588	15,647	16,235
In the Panama Canal Zone	34	1,038	1,072
In Hawaii	34	952	986
In the Philippines	37	1,664	1,701
Total	693	19,301	19,994
Grand total	3,441	77,363	80,804

¹ Army List and Directory, April 20, 1915, p. 7.

² Letter of The Adjutant-General of the Army to the author, dated May 26, 1914.

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Combining the movable and fixed troops according to their geographical distribution, the forces of the Regular Army were stationed thus:

	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
In the United States	2,577	50,445	53,022
In Alaska	15	424	439
In Porto Rico	34	595	629
In the Panama Canal Zone	166	5,496	5,662
In Hawaii	279	8,250	8,529
In the Philippines	340	10,958	11,298
In China	30	1,195	1,225
Total	3,441	77,363	80,804

The mobile troops are supposedly stationed in fifty-seven posts scattered all over the United States;³ but, as a matter of fact, the statement issued by The Adjutant General's office on April 30, 1915, shows that *in all the vast extent of territory from Buffalo and Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, on the east to Seattle on the west, and from the Canadian boundary on the north to the vicinity of the Mexican frontier on the south, there were no Regular troops in their permanent barracks except four troops of cavalry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois; four troops and one Signal company at Fort Leavenworth, and one troop at Fort Riley, Kansas; two troops at Fort Robison, Nebraska; one regiment of field artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; four troops of cavalry at Fort Meade, South Dakota; and two troops at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming.*

For the purposes of command the United States and its possessions are divided into the following departments:

THE EASTERN DEPARTMENT, embracing the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, the post of Fort Logan H. Roots in Arkansas, the coast defences of New Orleans

³ Statement issued by The Adjutant-General's office, April 30, 1915.

A complete list of all the garrisoned posts is given in the Army List and Directory, published every month.

and Galveston, the Panama Canal Zone, Porto Rico and the islands and keys in its vicinity. Headquarters at Governor's Island, N. Y.

THE CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, including the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming (except the Yellowstone Park) and the post at Fort Missoula, Montana. Headquarters at Chicago.

THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT, comprising the States of Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas — except the coast defenses of Galveston and New Orleans and Fort Logan H. Roots — Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizona. Headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT, embracing the States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana — except Fort Missoula — Wyoming — except the Yellowstone Park — California, Nevada, Utah and Alaska. Headquarters at San Francisco.

THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, including the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies. Headquarters at Honolulu.

THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT, comprising all the islands of the Philippine archipelago. Headquarters at Manila.⁴

With the exception of the troops in the overseas garrisons in the last two departments and on the Panama Canal Zone, virtually all the organisations in the United States are maintained on a peace footing which is much below war strength. In other words,

	Now has on a Peace footing	Should have at War strength
A company of infantry	65	150
A troop of cavalry	71	100
A battery of artillery	133	190
A company of coast artillery	104	104 ⁵

On April 20, 1915, the Regular Army consisted of three battalions of engineers and a detachment at West Point; twelve companies of Signal Corps troops, seven field hospitals, eight ambulance companies and one evacuation hospital; fifteen regiments of cavalry; six regiments of field artillery; 170 companies of coast artillery; thirty regiments of infan-

⁴ Army List and Directory, April 20, 1915, pp. 3-4.

⁵ Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, p. 7.

try and the Porto Rico regiment of infantry, as well as the Philippine Scouts.⁶ On April 20, 1915, according to the statement issued by The Adjutant-General there were stationed,

In the United States: Eight companies of engineers, 7 companies of Signal Corps troops, 12 regiments of cavalry, 4 regiments of field artillery, 20 regiments of infantry, composing the Mobile Army, and 141 companies of coast artillery.

In Porto Rico: The Porto Rico regiment of infantry.

In the Panama Canal Zone: One company of engineers, 3 regiments of infantry and 9 companies of coast artillery.

In Alaska: Two companies of infantry.

In Hawaii: One company of engineers, 1 company of Signal troops, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 regiment of field artillery, 3 regiments of infantry, and 9 companies of coast artillery.

In the Philippines: Two companies of engineers, 2 companies of the Signal Corps, 2 regiments of cavalry, 1 regiment of field artillery, 3 regiments and 1 battalion of infantry, and 11 companies of coast artillery.

At Tientsin, China: Two battalions of infantry.

Notwithstanding the small size of the Regular forces in continental United States, the policy of the War Department to maintain the overseas garrisons at full war strength — a very sound policy since it will be almost impossible to re-enforce them for some time after the outbreak of war and then only under the most favourable circumstances — must require a further reduction in them. As the Secretary of War very pertinently pointed out in his report for 1914,⁷

“it will be necessary in the very near future to take from the United States and put into the Philippines 13 companies of Coast Artillery, 1,950 men; in the Hawaiian Islands, 3 regiments of Infantry, 1 battalion of Field Artillery, and 2 companies of Coast Artillery, 6,380 men; and in the Panama Canal Zone, 1 regiment of Infantry, 1 squadron of Cavalry, 1 battalion of Field Artillery, 1 company of Engineers, and 12 companies of Coast Artillery, 4,774 men. . . . This will leave in the United States

⁶ Army List and Directory, April 20, 1915, pp. 15-48.

⁷ Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, p. 10.

proper 12,610. Coast Artillery troops and 24,602 of the mobile arm, the latter being then not much more than twice the size of the police force of the city of New York.”

As the Coast Artillery must of necessity remain stationary in the fortifications which it is their duty to man, the only force that can be transferred from place to place to repel attacks by an enemy seeking to land or penetrate within our borders is the Mobile Army, which will shortly be reduced to 24,602, as Mr. Garrison has stated. IT IS AN ASTOUNDING PROOF OF OUR UNPREPAREDNESS AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THAT SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE SMALLER THAN THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AT ANY TIME SINCE THE CLOSE OF 1861 — save in April, 1865, when it numbered only 22,310,⁸ but when we had more than a million volunteers who were Regulars in everything but name — NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IN THOSE 53 YEARS OUR POPULATION HAS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 31,000,000 TO 100,000,000.

OFFICERS

The importance of a sufficient number of officers to train and lead troops is too well known to need dwelling upon here, and, furthermore, has been demonstrated on every hand in the present European war in which the casualties among the officers has been little short of appalling. The Army is compelled by law to detach many officers from the troops with which they properly belong, in order to perform certain duties imposed by law, such as river and harbour work, training the organized militia, giving instruction at universities, colleges and other schools, recruiting, etc. In his report as Chief of Staff, dated November 15, 1914, General Wotherspoon pointed out⁹ that

“There are in the line of the United States Regular Army

⁸ The actual strength of the Regular Army each year down to June, 1902, is given by Heitman, II, p. 626.

⁹ Report of the Chief of Staff (Major General W. W. Wotherspoon) for 1914, pp. 3-4.

(including Coast Artillery), not including the two battalions of the Porto Rico regiment, 65 regimental and 758 troop, battery, and company organizations. Of these officers, according to latest returns, 93 field and 675 company officers are at present absent from their commands on detached service, on leave, or sick. This important branch of the Army is therefore at the present time 28.656 per cent. short of the officers who are deemed necessary under existing laws for its instruction, training, and discipline. As the department draws mainly upon the units of the forces in the United States proper for officers for detached service, maintaining as far as possible the full complement of officers with the organizations on foreign service, the percentage of regimental and company officers absent from their organizations is far higher for those organizations in the United States than the above percentage would indicate.”

For years each Secretary of War has done everything in his power to impress upon Congress the detrimental effect which this shortage of officers is bound to exercise upon the military service in time of peace, quite irrespective of the disastrous results in time of war, but our national legislature salved its own conscience by throwing a sop to the Army in the shape of an increase of two hundred officers made by the Act of March 3, 1911, in spite of the imperative necessity for several times that number.

ENGINEER CORPS

Three battalions of engineers and a small detachment on duty at West Point make up the quota of that arm, which is virtually deprived of the services of sixty officers detached to the work of improving rivers and harbours. On February 27, 1915, the Engineer Corps attained the full strength of officers authorized by the law of February 27, 1911.¹⁰

CAVALRY

Next are the two arms which constitute “the eyes of an army” in warfare. Fifteen regiments of cavalry, numbering only about 15,000 officers and men, may appear superfluous

¹⁰ Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, p. 63.

in view of the present composition of the military establishment; but it must be borne in mind that if the Regular Army and the Organized Militia were raised to full war strength and formed into the divisions necessary to constitute the seven field armies that we should have to have in time of war, and if the organization were made on the basis of 75 cavalymen to every 1,000 infantry as required by our Field Service Regulations,¹¹ the cavalry would still be many thousands short of what it ought to number.¹²

AEROPLANES AND DIRIGIBLES

The equipment of our aviation service is little short of ridiculous. Brigadier General Scriven, the Chief Signal officer of the Army, and his assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Reber, testified before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 8, 1914, that the United States then possessed only 119 aviators and 21 aeroplanes; that an aeroplane costs from \$2,000 to \$2,400 to build, exclusive of the motor "which has a standard price of about \$2,500"; that it requires fully a year to construct one; that European nations possess and spent in their budgets for 1914 for aircraft:

	Aeroplanes	Dirigibles	Expenditures
France	500	11	\$12,800,000
Russia	500	4	22,500,000
Great Britain	250	8	1,080,000
Germany	500	20	45,000,000
Austria	100	3	3,000,000
Italy	150	2	800,000

The United States has 21 aeroplanes, no dirigibles and spent \$250,000.¹³

¹¹ Tables of Organization (based on Field Service Regulations, 1914), United States Army, 1914, p. 3.

¹² See Huidekoper, *The United States Army and Organized Militia To-day*, footnote 4 on pp. 8-9.

¹³ Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on the bill making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year 1916, pp. 643, 646, 648-649, 653-654.

FIELD ARTILLERY

In all wars, since the invention of cannon, the value of artillery as a *sine qua non* to success has been admitted, and the present European war has additionally corroborated this fact. According to the latest authoritative statistics obtainable, in 1913 Russia had 6,000 field guns, Germany about 5,000 and France 4,800;¹⁴ and in nearly all the European armies the number of guns per 1,000 infantrymen is at least five and often six or more.¹⁵ On December 8, 1914, according to the testimony of Brigadier General Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, the United States possessed only 658 three-inch field pieces, and, even when the guns under construction and those provided for by the present appropriation have been finished, the number of guns of all calibres will not be more than 912.¹⁶ The minimum estimate of what would be needed has been placed at 323 batteries of four guns each, a total of 1,292 guns,¹⁷ while the maximum estimate, made by the late Chief of Staff, was 2,834,¹⁸ which is undoubtedly what would be required in a war against a great Power. On December 23, 1914, the Secretary of War acknowledged that *we had only 634 completed modern field guns and howitzers altogether*.¹⁹ The United States has nothing larger in calibre than the 6-inch howitzer, and only forty of those either in existence or appropriated for;²⁰ yet every one knows that in the present European war

¹⁴ Testimony of Major General Wood, Chief of Staff, on December 9, 1913.—*Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on the Fortifications Appropriation bill for 1915*, p. 13.

¹⁵ Huidekoper, *The United States Army and Organized Militia Today*, p. 4.

¹⁶ Testimony of Brigadier General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, on December 8, 1914.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 678-679 and 685.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 678-679.

¹⁸ Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1914, p. 12.

¹⁹ Letter of the Secretary of War to Representative Gardner, December 23, 1914.—*Extension of Remarks of Hon. Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts in the House of Representatives, January 14, 1915*, p. 12.

²⁰ General Crozier's testimony.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, p. 686.

great use is being made of heavier guns than these. The Chief of Ordnance also testified that, even when the design has been decided upon and the forgings delivered, the actual construction of a gun requires about four months; that a battery costs about \$85,000; that if \$2,100,000 were appropriated annually it would still require eight years before the United States would have 1,292 guns; that the Ordnance Department, which manufactures the harness for artillery, is behind on this item; and that, moreover, it has only two or three range-finders and is not in a position as yet to make any.²¹ The reader must distinctly bear in mind that the manufacture of artillery is at best a slow process, necessitating months and years to acquire any large amount, and, according to General Wood's statement, the Government arsenals cannot turn out more than 500 guns *per annum* even working three shifts a day.²²

FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

In no other respects is the military unpreparedness of the United States so apparent as in the matter of reserve artillery ammunition. The minimum number of rounds per gun required in the German army is 2,800,²³ while our own Field Service Regulations for 1914 prescribe 1,856 rounds.²⁴ Disregarding the other field pieces possessed by the American Army and assuming that the 568 three-inch guns were alone supplied with 1,856 rounds each, the number required would be no less than 1,054,208; yet the Chief of Ordnance confessed on December 8, 1914, that ALL THE UNITED STATES THEN HAD " WAS ABOUT 580,000 ROUNDS FOR THE FIELD AR-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 677, 685, 679, 669 and 659.

²² Testimony of Major General Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff, on December 4, 1913.—*Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on the Army Appropriation bill for 1915*, p. 93.

²³ Huidekoper, *The United States Army and Organized Militia Today*, p. 5.

²⁴ Tables of Organization (based on Field Service Regulations, 1914) United States Army, 1914, p. 7.

TILLERY, FOR THE GUNS OF ALL DIFFERENT CALIBERS." He also acknowledged that he had received trustworthy information of one battery in the present European war which had fired "2,400 rounds for each gun in four days," but stated that "those were exceptional circumstances."²⁵ The author, however, knows of a case in which two German guns fired 227 times within two hours,—a fact attested by counting the empty shells when the position was abandoned—and the official reports of various commanders bear witness to the enormous expenditure of artillery ammunition made imperative by the conditions of modern warfare.²⁶ *If the 634 field guns of all calibres which the United States possessed in December, 1914, fired only 915 times each, they would more than exhaust the present reserve supply of field artillery ammunition amounting to 580,000 rounds, and it is a conservative estimate that two days of such firing as is a common oc-*

²⁵ Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, p. 689.

²⁶ The author of this book, in his article "*The Truth concerning the United States Army*," gave (footnote, pp. 6-7) the following data respecting the Russo-Japanese War:

"General Röhne, in the *Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine*, for January-June, 1906, pages 2 and 3, stated that 'in the battle of Taschichao, July 11-24, one battery of 8 guns fired 4,178 rounds, that is 522 rounds per gun. . . . At Liao-yang the artillery of the 1st and 3d Siberian Corps fired 108,000 rounds on two days, that is at the rate of 6,750 rounds for each battery, 840 rounds for each gun and 420 rounds for each gun for each day of the battle . . .'

"Lieutenant Ulrich, of the German Army, who was with the Russian Army, gives on page 187 of the *Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine*, for January-June, 1906, his data for the four days' action at the Shaho, September 29th to October 2nd, both inclusive, showing that the minimum number of rounds fired by the Russian guns was 100 rounds per day and the maximum 364 $\frac{2}{3}$ per day.

"In the *Sweigersche Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie*, for June, 1910, is a table showing that the Russians used the following field artillery ammunition:

"At the battle of Taschichao on July 24, 1904, the 2d Battery of the 9th East Siberian Artillery Brigade fired 4,178 rounds, which is at the rate of 522 rounds per gun per day.

"At the battle of Liao-yang on August 30, 1904, 16 batteries of the 1st and 3d East Siberian Corps fired 100,000 rounds or 422 rounds per gun per day.

"At Mukden on March 3, 1905, the 1st Battery of the 9th Artillery Brigade fired 4,034 rounds or 504 rounds per gun per day."

currence in the battles of the present time would suffice to consume the entire amount now on hand. When it is considered that the total supply possessed by the United States would go no farther than two days at the most for the existing field guns, and that no account is taken of the quantity which would be needed if any troops in addition to the present Regular Army were called into service, the conditions need no further commentary. But on top of that it must be distinctly remembered that, as the Chief of Ordnance stated, even if every source of supply were utilized, only "about 400,000 rounds" could be manufactured in the first six months; that only 130,000 rounds could be turned out each month thereafter; that a million rounds might be made in a year; that we need about a million and a quarter; and that "it takes over a year to get that much if we were to go at it with unlimited appropriations." As a matter of fact, General Crozier had to confess that "no permanent ammunition trains have been provided," and that *at the present rate of appropriation by Congress it would require eight years to complete 1,292 guns and their ammunition trains, and about four years to supply 1,800 rounds to the field guns of various calibres* — with the exception of the 6-inch howitzers to which it was contemplated to give only 1,000 rounds — *and then only on condition that the various plants throughout the country were kept "going night and day" in manufacturing artillery ammunition.*²⁷ In view of these facts it is scarcely to be wondered that the former Chief of Staff, General Wotherspoon, stated²⁸ that

"It should also be remembered that large numbers of guns and large masses of ammunition are, in active war, liable to capture and destruction, and that *to start into field operations with the expectation that the proportions given will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious. As the*

²⁷ Hearings, pp. 679, 689-690. The statement that "No permanent ammunition trains have been provided" will be found in the Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914, p. 22.

²⁸ Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1914, p. 12.

factories and works in this country which can produce munitions of war of the above character are exceedingly limited, *it is evident that a full supply of this type of matériel must be stored and ready for use before war is undertaken.*"

Nor is it less surprising that Secretary Garrison should have declared²⁹ that

"We have nothing like sufficient artillery and artillery ammunition. This has been urgently presented in all of the recent reports of the head of this Department and the Chiefs of Staff, and Congress has from time to time recently increased the appropriations for these purposes. There is universal agreement among all who know, that artillery is an essential feature of modern warfare, and that a proper proportion thereof to any army is indispensable if success is to be even hoped for. It is imperative that the manufacture of artillery and artillery ammunition should progress as rapidly as is possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained."

MACHINE-GUNS AND SMALL-ARMS.

After considerable experimentation the Ordnance Department has found it advisable to discontinue the manufacture of the service model of machine-gun and has adopted the gun made by the Vickers Company of London as the better weapon. Of the old model — Gatling and Colt automatic guns — there were 1,380 in December, 1914, but many were obsolete and only 1,000 could be counted upon as serviceable. Moreover, they are liable to over-heating because they are not surrounded by a water-jacket as is the Vickers gun. The former estimate of 1,801 machine-guns required by the Army has within the past year been cut down to 1,361, on the basis of four per regiment.³⁰ This is manifestly far too low, as the French among others have increased the number of machine-guns per regiment to more than forty during the present war, owing to their great power of destruction. Only 125 machine-guns were manufactured for the Ameri-

²⁹ Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, pp. 8-9.

³⁰ Testimony of General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 674-675.

can army during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914,³¹ and the supply of ammunition for them is fixed at 21,400 rounds per gun.

A more satisfactory condition is found in respect to infantry rifles, of which the United States possessed on June 30, 1914, slightly less than 700,000 of the most modern Springfield pattern, as well as between 300,000 and 400,000 of the old Krag-Jørgensen rifles.³² During the preceding year, 25,545 United States rifles, calibre .30, model of 1903, (or Springfield) were manufactured,³³ which is at the rate of about 82 per working day, whereas that one small-arms factory has a capacity of 500 rifles *per diem*.³⁴ The Chief of Ordnance declared that a reserve of 800,000 small-arms was desired,³⁵ which would be sufficient to arm any force such as the country would be likely to need for the first months of war. It will, however, be necessary to increase the last appropriation — which was only \$250,000 — if the remaining 100,000 rifles are to be secured within several years.

SMALL-ARMS AMMUNITION

*The reserve supply of small-arms ammunition in December 1914 was only 195,000,000 rounds.*³⁶ Our Field Service Regulations prescribe 1,360 rounds for each infantryman — that is, 100 in his belt, 120 in the combat train which goes with the troops, 120 in the ammunition train which follows behind the supply trains, 340 rounds in the advance depôt from which it can be sent forward to the troops, and 680 in the depôt at the base of supplies.³⁷ In other words, *195,000,000 would not be sufficient to supply an army of*

³¹ Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914, p. 46.

³² General Crozier's testimony.— *Hearings*, p. 666.

³³ Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914, p. 45.

³⁴ General Crozier's testimony.— *Hearings*, p. 667.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 666.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 660.

³⁷ Tables of Organization (based on Field Service Regulations, 1914), United States Army, 1914, p. 7.

145,522 infantrymen with 1,360 rounds each. In modern warfare the consumption of rifle ammunition is something colossal, and the average expenditure of 350 rounds per man by the Russians at the battles of Mukden and Liao-yang, as given by General Kuropatkin,³⁸ has often been exceeded, so far as can be ascertained, in the hard-fought actions of the present European war. *The 1,360 rounds prescribed for American infantrymen would, in all probability, be exhausted in four days' fighting*, and, just in proportion as our forces are engaged in larger numbers than 145,522, the insufficiency of rifle ammunition will necessarily make itself felt. Moreover, no allowance whatsoever is made for the machine-guns, which are supposed to have 21,400 rounds each. Assuming that the United States put into the field a force of about 450,000 — the number contemplated by the General Staff as a minimum required in a great war, to which allusion has been made on page 412, this force properly organized would number 450,615 rifles and 982 machine-guns,³⁹ and would require 612,836,400 rounds for the infantry and 21,014,800 for the machine-guns, a total of 633,851,200 rounds of small-arms ammunition. When it is realized that the present sources of supply are the Frankford Arsenal and certain private manufacturers; that all of them combined could not make more than 15,000,000 rounds for the first two months, or more than double that amount in subsequent months; that 30,000,000 rounds “ would be the limit of the powder-making capacity of the country ”; that even at that rate it would require “ between six and seven months to duplicate ” the present reserve supply of 195,000,000 rounds; and it would require “ about a year and a half ” to build a new Government factory to make ammunition at the rate of 15,000,000 rounds a month — all of which was stated by the Chief of Ordnance to the Military Affairs Committee of the House

³⁸ Kuropatkin, *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, II, pp. 149, 150, and 229; Huidekoper, *The United States Army and Organized Militia To-day*, pp. 3-4.

³⁹ General Crozier's testimony.—*Hearings*, p. 661.

of Representatives on December 8, 1914 ⁴⁰— one may arrive at a fairly just estimate of American preparedness for war in the matter of small-arms ammunition.

PISTOLS

As all officers — every one in the cavalry and certain non-commissioned officers of infantry — are required to carry pistols, they form an item to be considered. On June 30, 1914, the Ordnance Department had 1,300 in store; 34,000 were in the hands of the Regular troops; and 28,000 either in the possession of, or about to be issued to, the militia. Thirty-one thousand were under manufacture at the Springfield arsenal, of which it was expected that the Navy and Marine Corps would purchase 3,500 during the year, so that including everything there would be a supply of about 93,000 in December, 1915.⁴¹

COAST ARTILLERY

The Coast Artillery Corps is composed, as has been seen, of 693 officers and 19,301 enlisted men, a total of 19,994, and is organized into 170 companies of 104 men each, always maintained at war strength. The maximum strength authorized by law is 748 officers and 19,321 men,⁴² so that this corps is actually 55 officers and 20 men short of what it ought to be. This shortage appears at the first glance quite insignificant, but as a matter of fact it is of great import. The policy adopted by the War Department prescribes that the Coast Artillery Corps of the Regular Army shall furnish sufficient force to man completely all of the guns, mortars, mines and accessory *matériel* of the insular possessions and in the Panama Canal Zone, as well as all of the mines in

⁴⁰ Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on the bill making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year 1916, pp. 661-662.

⁴¹ Testimony of General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance.—*Hearings*, pp. 667-668.

⁴² Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, United States Army, for 1914, p. 14.

continental United States, whereas the troops required to man the guns and mortars in the United States are to be supplied, half by the Regular Coast Artillery — which is, moreover, to have exclusive control of their accessory equipment — and half by the Coast Artillery of the Organized Militia. To carry out this thoroughly-sound policy, the defenses now constructed or appropriated for will require the following troops:

In the United States	Officers	Men
Regular Coast Artillery for one-half of the gun defenses	740	18,531
Regular Coast Artillery for all mines, power and light plants	309	5,544
In the insular possessions and the Panama Canal Zone		
Regular Coast Artillery for all gun defenses	220	5,040
Regular Coast Artillery for all mines, power and light plants	43	1,194
Total Regular Coast Artillery	1,312	30,309
Total Militia Coast Artillery to man one-half the guns and mortars in the United States	740	18,531
Total force of Regulars and Militia required	2,052	48,840 ⁴³

Apropos of this table, the Chief of Coast Artillery says in his report for 1914: ⁴⁴

“From the foregoing it will be seen that *the present authorized strength of the regular Coast Artillery Corps is short 564 officers and 10,988 enlisted men of the strength required to man our coast defenses* under the adopted plan outlined above.

“The defenses outside the continental United States are practically ready for their garrisons, and *when these are provided there will remain for home gun defenses 176 officers, and 7,543 enlisted men, which is about one-third of one relief.*

“In order to provide for our primary home defenses, to wit, Coast Defenses of Portland, Boston, Narragansett Bay, Long

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Island Sound, Eastern New York, Southern New York, Chesapeake Bay, Pensacola, San Francisco, and Puget Sound, there are required 662 officers and 16,251 enlisted men.

"It will thus be seen that *there are now provided about one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose*. Unless provision be made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker detachments at some of the defenses of lesser importance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charleston, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac, Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear, and Mobile."

It is quite worth while to bear in mind what General Weaver has emphasized, *viz*: that *when the troops necessary for the fortifications in our overseas possessions have been sent to those stations, there will remain only about one-third of the number required for the defences of the United States*; and that means that, apart from being an utterly inadequate force, these troops must remain continually on duty, day and night, in time of war, without any men to relieve them. It is the consensus of opinion among the best informed coast artillery officers than we ought to have at least one full relief, in addition to extra skilled soldiers needed to man the mines and searchlights.⁴⁵ Further comment is superfluous, since the facts just given tell the entire story as to whether American defences are properly manned or not, and whether the nation is getting a *quid pro quo* for the money paid for the construction of costly fortifications.

For the purpose of command, continental United States is divided into three Coast Artillery districts, constituted as follows:

⁴⁵ Compare the statement prepared by the author of this book on December 22, 1914, in answer to the assertion of Representative Swagar Shirley of Kentucky that "The continental United States is not only well fortified, but is perhaps better fortified than any country in the world." The author's refutation of this assertion will be found in the *Hearings before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 3-5.

*North Atlantic Coast Artillery District,
Headquarters at Fort Totten, N. Y.*

Coast defenses of	Companies.
Portland	12
Portsmouth	1
Boston	12
New Bedford	1
Narragansett Bay	8
Long Island Sound	12
Eastern New York	6
Southern New York	14
—	
Total	66 of 104 men

each and, including enlisted specialists, numbering about 7,300 men.

*South Atlantic Coast Artillery District,
Headquarters at Charleston, S. C.*

Coast defenses of	Companies.
The Delaware	4
Baltimore	3
The Potomac	2
Chesapeake Bay	10
Cape Fear	3
Charleston	3
Savannah	4
Key West	1
Tampa	2
Pensacola	5
Mobile	2
New Orleans	2
Galveston	2
—	
Total	43 companies

numbering, including enlisted specialists, virtually 4,700 men.

*Pacific Coast Artillery District,
Headquarters at Fort Miley, Cal.*

Coast defenses of	Companies.
San Diego	2
San Francisco	17

The Columbia	4
Puget Sound	13
Total	36 companies

numbering, inclusive of enlisted specialists, approximately 4,000 men.⁴⁶

In our overseas possessions there are

In the Panama Canal Zone, Hdqrs. at Cristobal	9 companies
In Hawaii, Hdqrs. at Fort Ruger	9 "
In the Philippines, defenses of Manila and Subig Bays, Hdqrs. at Fort Mills	11 "

Total 29 companies,
numbering, as has been seen on page 466, 3,654 enlisted men.⁴⁷

There are, moreover, 29 coast-defence commands which comprise 55 garrisoned forts and 39 ungarrisoned forts,⁴⁸ the latter being guarded by "caretaker detachments" detailed from the nearest garrisoned fort, for the very good reason that there do not exist sufficient troops to occupy them.

THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN FORTIFICATIONS

The Chief of Coast Artillery stated in his report for 1914 that "all of the defensive projects for the coasts of the United

⁴⁶ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷ Statement issued by The Adjutant-General's office on April 30, 1914.

⁴⁸ *Forts garrisoned by the Coast Artillery* (55).

Preble, Williams, McKinley, Levett, Constitution, Banks, Warren, Strong, Revere, Andrews, Rodman, Adams, Greble, H. G. Wright, Terry, Totten, Hamilton, Wadsworth, Hancock, Mott, Du Pont, Howard, Washington, Hunt, Monroe, Caswell, Moultrie, Scriven, Dade, Key West Barracks, Barrancas, Pickens, Morgan, Jackson Barracks, Crockett, Rosecrans, Baker, Miley, Barry, Winfield Scott, Worden, Ward, Casey, Flager, Columbia, Stevens, Wint, Ruger, De Russy, Kamehameha, Armstrong, Amador, Sherman and De Lesseps.

Ungarrisoned forts (39)

Baldwin, Lyon, Stark, Foster, Heath, Standish, Wetherill, Getty, Kearney Michie, Mansfield, Schuyler, Slocum, Delaware, Carroll, Smallwood, Armistead, Wool, Sumter, Fremont, De Soto, Taylor, McRee, Gaines, Jackson, St. Philip, San Jacinto, Travis, Pio Pico, McDowell, Whitman, Canby, Frank, Hughes, Drum, Randolph, Grant, Guantanamo and San Pedro.

Testimony of the Chief of Coast Artillery.—Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, pp. 612-613.

States and its over-sea possessions which have heretofore been approved have been carried to completion, with a few exceptions,"⁴⁹ and in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 5, 1914, he asserted that 1,299 guns had already been mounted and that 51 were appropriated for.⁵⁰ On the other hand, he called attention to the fact

"That most of the guns that are mounted in our coast fortifications — that is, those of 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch caliber — date back to a design that was made in the early nineties and late eighties. The guns designed then and mounted in the latter part of the nineties are not what are to-day considered full-powered guns."⁵¹

The range of guns being one of the most important factors in war, the House of Representatives, by Resolution No. 698, adopted on January 14, 1915, called upon the Secretary of War for information in respect to our seacoast cannon. On the following day Mr. Garrison replied in a communication to the Speaker of the House, in which he stated⁵²

(1) That there were no guns mounted in the fortifications of the United States proper of a calibre larger than 12 inches.

(2) That the range of the 12-inch guns mounted on the standard disappearing carriage was not more than 13,000 yards, but that the range of the 12-inch guns mounted on barbette carriages was approximately 18,000 yards.

(3) That the British dreadnaughts of the *Queen Elizabeth* type were equipped with 15-inch 45-calibre guns, and that their range was approximately 21,000 yards.

(4) That "It is true that the range of the guns just mentioned exceeds by over 4 miles the range of the guns as mounted in the defense of the United States proper, either on the Atlantic or Pacific coast; but it is not true that the range of those guns need remain thus restricted, since by a slight change in the mounting their range will be practically equal to that of the 15-inch 45-calibre guns above referred to."

⁴⁹ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, p. 16.

⁵⁰ Hearings, p. 612.

⁵¹ General Weaver's testimony.— *Hearings*, p. 615.

⁵² House of Representatives, Document No. 1492, 63d Congress, third session.

That the range of the American 12-inch barbette guns can be thus increased by modifying their mounting is unquestioned, but one must not lose sight of the fact that it was admitted by our leading ordnance experts and military officials that such an augmented range could only be obtained at the expense of diminishing the weight of the projectile and hence its penetrating power.⁵³ The net result is therefore in favour of the heavier British guns.

A table prepared by the Chief of Coast Artillery on December 8, 1914, and submitted to the House Committee on Military Affairs⁵⁴ showed that on that date 1,299 guns had been mounted and 51 were in the process of construction — only one of the latter being of 16-inch calibre; that three 14-inch guns had been mounted — that is, outside of the United States — and 21 appropriated for; that 433 modern 12-inch guns were in position and 11 under construction; while the remaining 863 already mounted and 18 appropriated for were old-fashioned 12-inch or calibres ranging down to 3-inch. Since high-powered guns have a life of only 240 rounds — or, if used at the maximum, 100 rounds⁵⁵ — it is therefore self-evident that *the armament of our fortifications is sadly in need of being modernized.*

Apart from the utter insufficiency of officers and troops needed to man the seacoast fortifications properly, General Weaver declared that, owing to different conditions, it would be impossible to transfer even trained Coast Artillery troops to a new station and expect efficient service until they had been given time to adapt themselves to the new circumstances; that “it would be just as reasonable to suggest putting Infantry soldiers aboard a cruiser or battleship to serve the guns, as it would be to suggest putting them in a fort for that purpose”; that some of the batteries are exposed in the

⁵³ Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914, p. 33; Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill for 1916, pp. 6-9, 61-65.

⁵⁴ Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, p. 612.

⁵⁵ General Crozier's testimony.—*Hearings*, p. 688.

rear; and that *the principle upon which our fortifications are constructed is based upon the assumption "that there shall be assigned to every coast-defense fortification a certain number of mobile troops," known as "artillery supports," in order to protect it against land attack.*⁵⁶

SEARCHLIGHTS, FIRE-CONTROL AND SUBMARINE MINES

The auxiliaries — without which fortifications are little more than useless — are in a state of deficiency scarcely less conspicuous than the *personnel*. According to the last report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the installation of search-lights was then "approximately 50 per cent. completed"; yet Congress appropriated only \$150,000 for the year ending June 30, 1916, and prescribed that it was to be "for the defenses of our most important harbors." The installation of the equipment for generating and distributing power in the sea-coast fortifications is about 25 per cent. finished, and the munificent sum of \$50,000 was the extent of Congressional generosity on this score. There are twenty-nine coast defence commands, and General Weaver reported in September, 1914, that "seven . . . have received a standard fire control installation"; that "the standard installation for Fort Monroe, Va., is about 95 per cent. completed"; and that "the fire-control features of the coast defense system may be said to be approximately 60 per cent. completed." Congress apparently thought that ample progress was being made in this respect since it allotted only \$130,000 for this accessory during the ensuing year. The submarine mine structures were reported by the Chief of the Coast Artillery as "83 per cent. completed," so Congress voted \$26,000 "for the purchase, manufacture, and test of submarine-mine *matériel*."⁵⁷ The

⁵⁶ Testimony of the Chief of Coast Artillery.—*Hearings*, pp. 620-622.

⁵⁷ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, p. 16. The appropriations mentioned in this paragraph were contained in the Fortifications Act, approved March 3, 1915.—Public — No. 264 — 63d Congress (H. R. 21491), pp. 1-3.

report of the late Chief of Staff, General Wotherspoon, made as recently as November 15, 1914, discloses that not more than

*"the amount of explosive necessary to load and operate the mines now provided at our various coast defenses for one charge is complete. The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defense areas, the remainder of the fire-control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised."*⁵⁸

COAST ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

The conditions in respect to the ammunition to be kept in reserve for emergencies are not one whit more reassuring. On December 8, 1915, the Chief of Coast Artillery confessed to the House Committee on Military Affairs that

*"Of ammunition for continental United States we have now on hand and under manufacture 73 per cent. of the allowance fixed by the National Coast Defense Board. That allowance for continental United States is the number of rounds that any given gun would fire at the maximum rate of firing in one hour."*⁵⁹

Let the reader realize fully what this astounding revelation means. It means that THE GUNS OF THE FORTIFICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES FIRING AT THE LIMIT OF THEIR CAPACITY WOULD EXPEND EVERY BIT OF AMMUNITION THAT THEY POSSESS WITHIN 45 MINUTES. And the present Chief of Staff, General Scott, submitted to the same committee a statement showing that IF THE MORTARS WERE SIMILARLY FIRED THEY WOULD EXHAUST THE LAST ROUND OF AMMUNITION IN 30 MINUTES.⁶⁰ One shudders to contemplate what would happen if our fortifications were subjected to such a gruelling bombardment for weeks as those in the Dardanelles have recently

⁵⁸ Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1914, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, p. 617.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 700.

undergone. And a further proof of the blindness of Congress to the utter inadequacy of our seacoast ammunition is to be found in General Scott's announcement to the House Committee on Military Affairs that, at the present rate of appropriation — which is only \$400,000 — the necessary amount will not be obtained until "in about four years."⁶¹

FORTIFICATIONS NEEDED

General Weaver stated in his report for 1914 that the construction of the seacoast batteries at Fort MacArthur, San Pedro, California, was progressing, but that San Diego needed further defences, and he strongly emphasized the fact that "the fortification of the entrance to Chesapeake Bay is of primary importance."⁶² Nine years ago the National Coast-Defense Board — the "Taft Board" — declared in its report that

"Commercially and strategically Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it always has been, of the very first importance. With the entrance as it is now, unfortified, a hostile fleet, should it gain control of the sea, can establish, without coming under the fire of a single gun, a base on its shores, pass in and out at pleasure, have access to large quantities of valuable supplies of all kinds, and paralyze the great trunk railway lines crossing the head of the bay."⁶³

Today — May, 1915 — that statement is exactly as true as when it was penned, and the defencelessness of the entrance to the Chesapeake at the present time is one of the marvels of the age on the subject of our unpreparedness. Although the land has been purchased at Cape Henry,⁶⁴ none has been acquired at Cape Charles, *no fortifications have been begun,*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 700.

⁶² Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, p. 16.

⁶³ Report of the National Coast-Defense Board, dated February 1, 1906, p. 11.

⁶⁴ Testimony of the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, February 3, 1915.—*Hearings before subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill, 1916*, pp. 35-36.

not a gun is in position, not an emplacement is in the course of construction, nor has one solitary cent been appropriated for any defences there. The reiterated warnings of the Taft Board, of Secretaries of War, of Chiefs of Artillery and Coast Artillery, have fallen upon deaf ears for these nine years, and to-day the entrance to the Chesapeake — one of the most important inland waterways in the United States — lies absolutely at the mercy of a hostile fleet. Yet Representative Swagar Shirley of Kentucky, the chairman of the House committee in charge of fortifications, publicly announced on November 28, 1914, that "the continental United States is not only well fortified, but is perhaps better fortified than any country in the world."⁶⁵

FORTIFICATIONS OF THE INSULAR POSSESSIONS

The Chief of Coast Artillery stated in his annual report for 1914 that in the Panama Canal Zone the

"*Battery construction* at both ends of the canal is rapidly being carried to completion. Much of the armament has been delivered to the Governor, Panama Canal, and its installation is progressing at a satisfactory rate.

"*Power plants.*— The generating equipment is now being delivered and its installation is being rapidly accomplished.

"*Fire control.*— If the remainder of the funds needed for this purpose are appropriated at the next session of Congress, the fire-control system for all the armament included in the project should be completed during the fiscal year 1915.

"*Searchlights.*— Funds have been appropriated for the purchase of all the searchlights required for the defense of the canal, and the supply of those now on hand has been the subject of recent action, which should produce the desired result.

"*Ammunition.*— Ammunition for the armament now made for service has been shipped to the Canal Zone."⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Representative Shirley's statement was published in the *Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., on November 28, 1914. He was confronted with this statement by Representative Augustus P. Gardner at a hearing before the House subcommittee in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill on February 3, 1915, but made no disclaimer. This statement was published in the *Hearings* on that bill, p. 3.

⁶⁶ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, pp. 16-17.

The one 16-inch gun thus far manufactured and intended for the Panama Canal is still *en route*, and the shipment of the 4.7 howitzers was not expected to begin until the spring of 1915.⁶⁷ On January 5, 1915, Colonel Winslow testified before the House committee that 43 of the projected power plants had been shipped, leaving seven still to be sent for the Atlantic end of the canal, and that the stages of installation varied from 10 to 90 per cent., but that they would be finished by June 30, 1915.⁶⁸ The total amount needed for fire-control was estimated at \$633,301.30, and Colonel Goethals stated to the committee that such an appropriation would permit this work to be finished by September 1, 1915,⁶⁹ whereupon Congress generously voted the entire amount.⁷⁰ Colonel Goethals also announced that the searchlights would be installed and "everything in connection with the fortifications" completed "by the first of September."⁷¹

The National Coast-Defense Board allotted to the guns in the fortifications overseas the amount of ammunition which would be consumed in firing at the maximum rate for two hours⁷²—in other words, an allowance double that prescribed for continental United States and also exclusive of the amount given for target practice.⁷³ The testimony of the Chief of Ordnance on January 5, 1915,⁷⁴ showed that the status of the seacoast ammunition for the Panama Canal fortifications was as follows:

⁶⁷ General Crozier's testimony.—*Hearings concerning Estimates for construction and fortification of the Panama Canal for the fiscal year 1916*, p. 247.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁷⁰ In the Sundry Civil bill, approved March 3, 1915, p. 72.

⁷¹ Hearings on the fortification of the Panama Canal for 1916, p. 227.

⁷² General Weaver's testimony.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, p. 617.

⁷³ The target-practice allowance is: for the 16-inch guns, 14 rounds; for the 14-inch guns, 20 rounds; for the 6-inch guns, 20 rounds; and for the mortars, 12½ rounds.—*Testimony of the Chief of Ordnance*. Hearings on the fortification of the Panama Canal for 1916, p. 237.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

	Rounds already shipped	Rounds under manufacture	Rounds to be ap- propriated for
16-inch guns	none	35	35
14-inch guns	250	350	195
4.7 howitzers	none	over 3,100	7,600
12-inch mortars . . .	2,500	the remainder	none

On February 3, 1915, the Secretary of War declared to the House Subcommittee in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill that

“Approximately 78 per cent. of the ammunition supply needed for all the contemplated armament of the Panama Canal is on hand or under manufacture. The current estimates under the sundry civil bill provided funds for bringing the supply up to about 89 per cent. of that required. The ammunition supply to date for the foreign possessions has, in general, kept pace with the armament as installed.”⁷⁵

The conditions in respect to fortifications and war *matériel* in the Panama Canal Zone are therefore distinctly superior to those in the United States. But, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that AN HOUR AND FORTY-SIX MINUTES WOULD SUFFICE TO EXHAUST THE LAST ROUND OF AMMUNITION IF THE GUNS WERE FIRED AT THEIR MAXIMUM RATE, and that *there exist no defences against a land attack by a hostile force disembarking on the Pacific side at a point about 60 miles south of Panama and advancing along the plateau.*

Oahu, Hawaii

The Chief of Coast Artillery in his report for 1914 thus summed up the conditions in the Hawaiian Islands:⁷⁶

“*Battery construction.*—All the seacoast batteries included in the original project have been completed. In accordance with the scheme recommended by a board of officers of which Brig.-Gen. M. M. Macomb was president, these defenses have been strengthened during the last year by the addition of a mortar

⁷⁵ Testimony of the Secretary of War, February 3, 1915.—*Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill for 1916*, p. 26.

⁷⁶ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, p. 17.

battery, the completion of which will require an additional appropriation.

Searchlights.—The searchlights for these coast defenses have been supplied, and their installation is progressing at a satisfactory rate.

Power plants.—Completed.

Ammunition.—The full allowance of ammunition for these defenses is now on hand or will be provided from available funds.

Fire control.—The fire-control system can be completed with funds on hand, except as to coincidence range finders for emergency stations.

Submarine-mine structures.—All work under this heading has been completed.”

General Weaver also gave the following satisfactory account of the conditions in the

Philippine Islands.

Battery construction.—All the seacoast batteries for the defenses in the Philippine Islands are practically completed, except one mortar battery and the supply and mounting of the armament at Fort Drum, El Fraile. Satisfactory progress is being made on the completion of these batteries.

Searchlights.—Four searchlights now being supplied will complete the searchlight project for these coast defenses.

Power plants.—Practically all the power generating and distributing equipment for these coast defenses has been installed, with the exception of that for Fort Drum, El Fraile, which is now being purchased.

Fire control.—The fire-control installation will be completed during the coming year, except as to coincidence range-finders for emergency stations.”¹⁷

He likewise gave the ensuing *résumé* under the heading of

Submarine-mine defense.

Experiment.—Experiments with satisfactory results have been continued in certain important harbors with a view to improving the matériel.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

"*Cable*.—It is being supplied as rapidly as funds permit, and is the only important item of equipment short.

"*Mine planters*.—The work of these has been more satisfactory than in preceding years, but there are not enough of them. Additional ones are needed for the Panama Canal Zone and the Hawaiian Islands.

"*Distribution box boats*.—Future boats of this class should be larger than the present ones.

"*Torpedo depot*.—This depot has performed its function satisfactorily during the past year."⁷⁸

On February 3, 1915, the Secretary of War, in testifying before the House subcommittee in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill, put the status of the ammunition in our Pacific possessions in a nutshell by declaring that "approximately 71 per cent. of the prescribed allowance has been supplied for the Hawaiian and Philippine armament."⁷⁹

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

On November 27, 1914, the actual strength of the Medical Department was

Medical Corps (exclusive of 20 vacancies)	424	
Dental Corps	67	
Medical Reserve Corps, active	97	
" " " inactive	1,249	1,346
Contract surgeons		15
Total		1,852

The Dodge Commission which investigated the conduct of the War Department during the war with Spain wisely recommended that sufficient medical supplies be kept on hand to equip a force four times that of the standing Army. Although the present authorized strength of the Regular establishment is 100,000, General Gorgas, the Surgeon General, testified on December 5, 1914, before the House Committee on Military Affairs that "our reserve at present would

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

⁷⁹ Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill for 1916, p. 26.

equip 200,000 men ” but that these supplies had been considerably reduced by the needs of the forces in the field, on the Mexican border and at Vera Cruz. He also stated that there were only 19 motor-ambulances; that in time of war it would take “ perhaps six or eight months ” to accumulate the medical supplies needed; and that, owing to their being in units, as well as prepared and specially adapted for field service, they cannot be bought in open market “ but must of necessity be manufactured.” He likewise called attention to the fact that none of the States have a full equipment in the medical corps.⁵⁰

EQUIPMENT AND RESERVE SUPPLY DEPOTS

Within the past five years new equipment had been adopted both for the infantry and cavalry — the former especially being perhaps the most satisfactory yet devised in any army. Experiments are also being made with a view to improving the outfits for the pack trains. As a part of wisdom the Ordnance Department has sought to use up all old equipment before issuing the new, but of the former some \$150,000 worth still remains on hand, in addition to what has been supplied to the militia, which has none of the new equipment. The Army has at present no armoured car nor does there exist any law permitting the Government to commandeer automobiles in time of war as is universally done in Europe.⁵¹ In December, 1914, Secretary Garrison approved a policy whereby reserve supplies of every sort sufficient to equip the National Guard at war strength will be placed with such States as have suitable storage space in their armouries. These supplies are to be under lock and key, accessible only to Regular officers, and not to be served out to the States until the beginning of war. In the case of States lacking in proper

⁵⁰ Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916, pp. 71, 629, 631-633.

⁵¹ General Crozier's testimony.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 669-673 — and *Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914*, p. 32.

armouries, these stores will be deposited in the nearest Regular Army dépôt.⁸² The adoption of this policy — which is universal throughout the great armies of the world — marks a great stride in the right direction, but it will still be necessary for Congress to make much larger appropriations than heretofore if the desired amount of supplies is to be procured. A fair instance of the deficiencies in the matter of war *matériel* is to be found in tabulated statement prepared by the Chief of Ordnance on January 20, 1915, and transmitted to the President six days later by the Secretary of War.⁸³ It is based upon the conservative estimate of the Greble board — which was appointed on February 20, 1911, “to consider questions concerning the types of field guns and ammunition supply therefor” — and, summarized, is as follows:

	To be on hand at the outbreak of war, as estimated by the Tables of Organization and by the Greble Board	Actually on hand or under manufacture, January 1, 1915	Shortage
Rounds of rifle ball cartridges, model 1906	513,130,640	231,186,596	282,244,044
Number of Field Artillery guns and howitzers	1,292	743	549
Rounds of Field Artillery ammunition	1,713,240	224,097	1,489,143
Sets of Artillery harness	21,104	9,808	11,296

Not less startling is the contrast between the number of batteries of field artillery of four guns each which the United States ought to have and what it actually possesses, as the ensuing table shows:

⁸² Testimony of the Assistant Secretary of War, December 5, 1914.—*Hearings*, p. 633.

⁸³ Equipment requisite for Army in time of war. *Senate Document No. 718, 63d Congress, 3d Session*, pp. 4-5.

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	Recommended by the Greble Board	Actually on hand Janu- ary 1, 1915
2.95-inch mountain guns (obsolete) ..	None	20
3-inch mountain howitzers	27	1
3-inch guns	195	126
3.8-inch howitzers	36	2
4.7-inch guns	15	9½
4.7-inch howitzers	35	9¼
6-inch howitzers	15	8 ⁸⁴

According to the report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914,⁸⁵ the small arms and personal equipments required for the recruits needed to bring the Regular Army up to war strength as prescribed by the Field Service Regulations have been stored at the various recruit depôts, thus permitting their being armed and equipped before joining their commands. The requisite horse equipments are also on hand at the various supply arsenals. On October 1, 1914, the major part of the small-arms, personal and horse equipments necessary for the Organized Militia at war strength were packed, marked and ready for shipment to the State mobilization camps. However, since orders had been received to furnish the new infantry equipment of the 1910 model to all infantry organizations and to all Coast Artillery companies of the militia destined to be formed into provisional regiments for active service, it was found necessary to break up some of the sets intended for future militia in order to make this issue, and to replace them by old equipment. Most of the small-arms and equipments for this purpose for the States in the Eastern Department east of Kentucky and north of North Carolina had then been stored at the Army Field Supply Depot No. 1 at Philadelphia, while those for the remaining States within the Eastern Department and for each one of the other departments in the United States had been placed at the respective supply arsenals.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸⁵ Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1914, pp. 20-21.

General Crozier's report showed a decidedly bad state in respect to

“*Volunteers.*—The small arms, personal and horse equipments essentially required for the volunteer branch of the Army are on hand, under manufacture or covered by current funds available for their manufacture, except a considerable number of horse equipments which are still required to complete the equipments of the volunteer Field Artillery. In addition to the shortage of horse equipment for Field Artillery troops, there is a complete deficiency of horse equipment required for other branches of the volunteer service in case of emergency, such as staff departments, mounted detachments, mounted engineers, mounted Signal Corps troops, and Hospital Corps troops accompanying mounted detachments.”

On December 4, 1914, the Quartermaster General stated to the House Committee on Military Affairs that in the principal Army depôts located at Philadelphia, St. Louis and San Francisco there existed a sufficient supply of clothing and shoes to “equip more than 100,000 men and maintain this equipment for from four to six months”; that, on the assumption that the clothing, shoes, etc., were of the correct sizes, 150,000 to 175,000 men could be fitted out; that the plant at Philadelphia was capable of manufacturing a thousand garments *per diem*; and that the reserve supply of these items was better than he had ever known them to be. On the other hand, General Aleshire's testimony developed certain conspicuous deficiencies, insomuch as he showed that the Army has only 13 pack trains of 65 animals each in the United States and nine in the Philippines; that there were only 2,720 escort or army wagons in the United States and 617 in the Philippines, while the number of motor trucks in both was only 76 — the whole forming a totally inadequate amount to supply an army in time of war —; and that of the fleet of eleven Army transports, the *Meade* was forty years old and the *Crook* thirty-two.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Testimony of the Quartermaster General, December 4, 1914.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 529-531, 437, 440, 447-448, 466 and 452.

REMOUNT DEPOTS

The breeding of horses for military purposes — conducted jointly by the War and Agriculture Departments since 1910 — has been marked by decided success, hampered mainly by the limited appropriations for this purpose. A distinct improvement in the type of remount has been made as a result of careful selection and breeding, but the military service cannot derive the full benefit of this admirable institution until it is given additional assistance by Congress. The value of such breeding establishments has been too well demonstrated in Europe to permit of any question as to their efficacy. The number of remount depôts now possessed by the United States is limited to three, which are situated at Front Royal, Virginia, Fort Reno, Oklahoma, and Fort Keogh, Montana, and the number of animals received through them during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, was 1,838 horses and 231 mules.⁸⁷

ORGANIZED MILITIA.

According to the latest returns made in 1914 the Organized Militia or National Guards of the various States numbered 8,323 officers and 119,087 enlisted men, a total of 127,410,⁸⁸ divided as follows:

	Officers	Men
Mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery and Infantry)	7,018	106,911
Staff and non-combatant branches	855	5,026
Coast Artillery	450	7,150
Total	8,323	119,087

Of the Organized Militia there were present at the annual inspection in 1914,

Mobile forces	6,553	85,541
Staff corps	692	4,090
Coast Artillery	439	5,989
Total	7,684	95,620

⁸⁷ Report of the Quartermaster General for 1914, pp. 59-60.

⁸⁸ Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon), November 15, 1914, p. 6.

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in other words, only 81.07 per cent. of the total strength, the number absent being 639 officers and 23,467 men.

The number who attended camps of instruction was,

Mobile force	5,904	77,353
Staff corps	568	3,744
Coast Artillery	423	6,135
Total	6,895	87,232

or 73.87 per cent., 1,428 officers and 31,855 men being absent.

	Officers and men	Percent- age
In organizations armed with rifles	111,140	
Participating in rifle-practice (season of 1913)	66,974	52.56
Qualified as second-class marksmen or better	42,599	33.43

The regulations of the War Department are that organizations of the National Guard shall take part in at least 24 drills *per annum*, but, although the reports show that in the bulk of the States the units met these requirements, in the major part of the organizations a considerable number of men failed to comply. Indeed the total of those who neglected to attend the 24 drills amounted to no less than 37,874 out of the 119,087 enlisted men. The Chief of Staff also asserted that it was "a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of ten miles fully equipped and armed." When it is additionally remembered that in the Organized Militia the number of companies, troops, batteries, etc., amounts to 2,000 and that 1,120 of them are below the prescribed minimum strength, a fair estimate can be made of the value of the National Guard as a military asset and of how much dependence could be put upon it if pitted against trained regulars.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

Organization of the Militia.

The report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, embodying the broad principles of a correct military policy and tactical organization, and put into effect by Secretary Stimson's order on February 6, 1913 — as has been seen on pages 421 and 426 — contemplated the formation of 16 divisions at war strength — of which the Regular Army was to furnish four and the Organized Militia twelve — as well as the field army troops and cavalry suitable for four normal field armies into which the twelve tactical divisions of militia might be organized in time of war. This number was assigned to the militia, since it gave a fair strength of first-line troops and because every indication pointed to the improbability of any marked increase in the *personnel* of the various National Guards. The governors agreed to the scheme, but up to the present time little has been achieved in carrying out this correct divisional organization. There are, however, two notable exceptions: the 6th division (New York) is practically complete and the 7th division (Pennsylvania), although lacking in auxiliary troops, is well on the way to the desired organization. All the others are sadly deficient in at least one of the auxiliary arms, and all but the 16th (Montana, Idaho, Washington, California, Nevada and Utah) have a decided excess of infantry. The present status of these 12 militia divisions taken collectively is as follows:

	Deficiency	Excess
Batteries of field artillery	78	0
Troops of cavalry	61	7
Companies of infantry	0	316
Companies of engineers	25	11
Companies of Signal troops	3	9
Number of field hospitals	12	0
Number of ambulance companies	34	0

For a field army the only cavalry available consisted of two troops in the 5th division (New England) and one squadron

in the 6th (New York), but this is offset by a shortage of 61 troops elsewhere; the only engineers are 2 battalions in the 6th division and 2 companies in the 11th (Ohio and Michigan), counterbalanced by a deficiency of 25 companies in the others. The reason is not far to seek. When a divisional district is comprised of a single State, the military authorities have an interest in, and are responsible for, a proper co-ordination of the various elements; but when such a district is composed of two or more States, the authorities of each follow their own dictates. Infantry is much cheaper to maintain than the other arms; the Federal Government neither prescribes the proportion of auxiliary units required nor can it compel the States to spend the money allotted to them in a manner which would insure a properly balanced force; and many of the States made no effort in the eleven years which elapsed between January 21, 1903, and January 1, 1914, to repeal such laws as conflicted with the standards set by the Government. Indeed so lax were they that on December 31, 1913, the shortage of troops as compared with the Federal requirements reached the serious number of nearly 16,000 men — approximately the amount which would form an infantry division at war strength — and the War Department had no alternative than to reduce the minimum of enlisted strength,⁹⁰ since the shortage was such that the organizations

⁹⁰ Minimum of enlisted strength for the Organized Militia as revised and published by the War Department in 1914:

Infantry, company	65 men
Field Artillery, battery	133
Cavalry, troop	65
Engineers, company	65
Signal Corps:	
Type A, company	75
Type B, company	74
Type C, company	40
Type C, company	67
Sanitary troops:	
Ambulance company	43
Field hospital	33
Coast Artillery, company	65

were "of no value as a military asset to the Federal Government," 60 per cent. of the engineer and infantry companies, 70 per cent. of the cavalry, 80 per cent. of the coast artillery and practically all of the field artillery being below the existing minimum.⁹¹ As General Mills stated in his report for 1914 as the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs,⁹²

"Many States have solved the problem of disposing of officers made supernumerary through the operation of Circular No. 8 which prescribed the tactical organization for the militia and which went into effect on January 1, 1914, by maintaining a military organization separate from and additional to the Organized Militia. Such forces are maintained for purely State purposes, and are made up generally of officers formerly belonging to the Organized Militia, and of officers of the Organized Militia carrying additional State rank. It is believed that the legal standing of these State troops is doubtful, that they do not contribute to the efficiency of the Organized Militia, and that they represent a useless expense to the State. Nevertheless, the War Department has interposed no objection to their maintenance, which, it is hoped, is only a temporary expedient."

In consequence of the standard prescribed by the Federal Government, a considerable change has taken place in the organization of the infantry of the National Guards, resulting in a reduction of the higher and an increase in the lower units. The infantry of the Organized Militia was composed, according to the last returns in 1914, of 2 divisions, 25 separate brigades, 37 separate regiments, 19 separate battalions and 22 separate companies, all virtually complete and organized in pursuance with law, the total strength being 6,328 officers and 95,109 enlisted men. The actual number of militia infantry regiments to be utilized in the scheme embodied in the Organization of the Land Forces is 108 and, as there exist 130, the excess amounts to 22 regiments. This excess exercises a distinctly detrimental effect, since many States persist in main-

⁹¹ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, pp. 199-208.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

taining more regiments of infantry than they can fill to the proper strength, and the *personnel* of most of the organizations naturally falls below the requisite strength which they ought to possess. Another result is that the officers are deprived of the opportunity of handling men in the numbers which they would be called upon to lead in war. This defect could easily be remedied if the States would reduce the number of regiments to the quota required of the divisional district to which they belong and would maintain the residue at full strength.⁹³

On October 1, 1914, the cavalry organizations of the National Guards consisted of 3 regiments, 8 squadrons, 2 bands, 1 machine-gun detachment and 91 troops, aggregating 4,940 officers and men — a distinct shortage in proportion to the number they ought to possess. The greater expense of maintenance had deterred many of the States from organizing units of the mounted arm, and the allotment of funds has not been made in proportion to the expense that would be incurred in bringing it up to the proper standard. The result is that many of the officers and troops, whose zeal is most commendable, are obliged to maintain their own mounts at private expense. As a matter of fact, the latest available statistics show that the States own only 211 mounts, whereas the organizations and troopers own 1,376, and 146 are available from various other sources. The injustice of this system is manifest, although the States do provide mounts for their cavalry at the annual encampments and a few supply mounts for several additional assemblies every year. In many instances the armoury facilities are wholly inadequate or lacking altogether, and the cavalry drill regulations, issued in 1896, are sadly out of date and in need of revision.⁹⁴

The field artillery of the Organized Militia had taken on a new lease of life since 1913, ten new batteries having been organized, one disbanded and the War Department withdrew

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-228; Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wother spoon) for 1914, p. 7.

its recognition from one. The new batteries and two regiments in New York and one in Minnesota have been fully organized and equipped, and the battalion organizations in Georgia and Alabama completed. This arm of the service now consists of 3 regiments, 10 battalions and 19 separate batteries, a total of 65 batteries, of which 46 are combined into tactical groups, thus greatly increasing their value as a military asset, owing to the ease with which they may be mobilized, concentrated and utilized. Of the remaining 19 batteries, Pennsylvania has three and is about to complete a battalion organization; New Jersey and Missouri have two apiece; while the other twelve are scattered all over the country in such a way as to render difficult the organization which alone would make them efficient. The present distribution is shown in the table at the top of the next page.

This table shows the regrettable fact that the 6th division (New York) alone had its full quota of field artillery, without which infantry in modern warfare stands as little chance as sheep in shambles; the other divisions have percentages ranging from seventeen in the case of the 10th division to sixty-six in the 13th. The Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs declared in his report for 1914 that "there are batteries in the Organized Militia to-day which for two years have had no field service, practice marches, service practice, or the use of horses except for an occasional street parade"; that "the strength of many of the batteries continues to be far below the required number of enlisted men"; that "29 organizations had no horses except at camp"; and that 30 "failed to have mounted drills of any kind except at camp" during the preceding fiscal year — nearly all of which was attributable to a lack of support on the part of the States.⁹⁵ Apropos of this last, General Mills very pertinently remarks ⁹⁶ that

⁹⁵ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, pp. 229-238.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 221.-222.

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Division	States comprising division district	Organized	Shortage
Fifth	Maine, New Hampshire (1 battery), Vermont, Massachusetts (1 battalion), Rhode Island (1 battery), Connecticut (1 battery).....	6	6
Sixth	New York	12	none
Seventh	Pennsylvania (3 batteries)	3	9
Eighth	New Jersey (2 batteries), Delaware, Maryland, Virginia (1 battalion), West Virginia, District of Columbia (1 battery)	6	6
Ninth	North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia (1 battalion), Florida...	3	9
Tenth	Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama (1 battalion, 2 batteries)	2	10
Eleventh	Michigan (1 battalion, 2 batteries), Ohio (1 battalion)	5	7
Twelfth	Illinois (1 battalion), Indiana (1 battalion)	6	6
Thirteenth	North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota (1 regiment), Wisconsin (1 battery), Iowa (1 battery)	8	4
Fourteenth	Wyoming, Colorado (1 battery), Nebraska, Kansas (1 battery), Missouri (2 batteries)	4	8
Fifteenth	New Mexico (1 battery), Oklahoma, Texas (1 battery), Arkansas, Louisiana (1 battalion)	5	7
Sixteenth	Montana, Washington, Oregon (1 battery), Idaho, California (1 battalion), Nevada, Utah (1 battery), Arizona	5	7
	Total	65	79

“Without going into all the details of what constitutes the support which every battery has a right to expect of the military authorities of its State it will perhaps be sufficient to point out that matériel which is not adequately housed and cared for will deteriorate, that a mounted organization unprovided with horses and facilities for mounted drill is a mounted organization in name only, and that the Artillery organization which has not had facilities for learning how to shoot and opportunities for demonstrating its ability to shoot is an Artillery organization in name only. No matter how interested and capable the militia Field Artillery officers may be, adequate results can not be accomplished unless adequate support is given.”

In view of the all-important rôle played by artillery in the

present European war, the condition of this arm of the militia is scarcely pleasant to contemplate.

The number of militia companies of engineers last reported was twenty-two, with a strength of 78 officers and 1,246 enlisted men. The lack of proper distribution, territorially considered, prevails as in former years; "seven divisions have no Engineer troops, two have more than the required quota, and three have one or more organizations, but less than the proper quota."

There are also twenty-two companies of Signal Corps troops, eight more than are required for the twelve militia divisions, but their distribution is quite as faulty as in the case of the engineers, although the number approximating to the Regular Army type — which is designated by the letter A — is sufficient for the needs of 12 divisions.⁹⁷

The sanitary troops of the Organized Militia are organized into 26 field hospitals, 14 ambulance companies and 156 detachments, and number 869 Medical Corps officers and 3,554 Hospital Corps men, a gain of 90 officers and 450 men over the previous year, but confined to 37 States while the other 14 showed a decrease. Twelve tactical divisions properly organized will require 36 field hospitals and 48 ambulance companies, but there exist only 26 of the former and 14 of the latter, and besides "the efficiency of the sanitary troops in regard to organization, training and equipment . . . is far from having reached that standard which is necessary if its immediate use in war be considered." A fair example of the dependence to be placed on these troops — upon whom will devolve the care of the sick and wounded in time of war — may be gauged by the fact that, at the annual inspection in 1914, out of 869 commissioned medical officers, only 615 were present and 254 — or more than one-third — were absent, while of the 3,554 enlisted men, 624 or one-sixth absented themselves. So incomplete are the company and detachment rosters, that it is impossible to ascertain the

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-246.

number of drills, practice marches or other instruction given during the year. Of the 12 militia divisions, only one (the 11th, Ohio and Michigan), has a full quota of field hospitals and ambulance companies; the others are lacking in many of these important units. West of the Mississippi there are but seven field hospitals and two ambulance companies, while the 7th (Pennsylvania), 8th, 13th and 15th divisions — to their shame be it said — have no ambulance companies at all. As a matter of fact, exclusive of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, “*there are but 307 ambulances in the entire Organized Militia, which is 269 short of the minimum number that would be required in case these troops were ordered for active duty in the field.*” In some States the units are fairly well equipped, in others not so; many are without overcoats and shoes, and even more are short of the proper medical supplies. The blame is easily placed, for General Mills declares that “*There appears to be reluctance on the part of many of the States to requisition for a proper supply to meet the requirements of their organizations for field service.*”⁹⁸

Instruction and training of the mobile forces of the Organized Militia.

After a careful study of the needs of the Organized Militia, the Division of Militia Affairs arrived at the conclusion that, in a general system of practical field instruction covering three years,

“the first year should be given to regimental encampments wherein the instruction should be principally for companies and battalions, ending with that of the regiment.

“The second year should be given to regimental or brigade encampments, the instruction to be principally for battalions and regiments, ending with that of the brigade where such an organization exists.

“The third year should be given to a joint maneuver, the troops in each divisional district being assembled and instruction

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-252.

given to the division first in marches, combined with the problems of supply and of security and information, and culminating in the contact and battle operations of two divisions where practicable.”

In the hope of standardizing the methods of instruction in the Organized Militia, it expressed its views in Circular No. 3, Division of Militia Affairs, 1914, emphasizing the fact that “the ideas set forth are advisory only,” but as yet there exists no data to show how far the States have fallen in with these recommendations.

Theoretical and practical instruction indoors has been given for some years, but considerable handicap has been experienced in the inadequacy of the militia armouries. The reports for 1914 show that there were 2,000 militia organizations and that the state of their armouries was as follows:

	Number
Drill hall inadequate for indoor drills	602
Use as an armoury interfered with by use for non-military purposes	146
Armouries not affording proper protection for U. S. Government property	303
Not equipped with indoor shooting ranges	331
Neither equipped for indoor gallery practice and without room therefor	118
Location, construction or equipment such as to discourage enlistment or re-enlistment	1,460

State encampments were held as usual in 1914 but, as has been seen in the preceding chapter, joint Regular Army and Militia manœuvres had to be abandoned owing to the withdrawal of so many Regular organizations for service along the Mexican border and at Vera Cruz. There was also a notable falling off in the number of camps of instruction for infantry officers of the militia as compared with the two previous years. In this last instance was afforded a fresh example of how the failure to do justice to others may work harm to ourselves and our friends. The neglect of Con-

gress to provide a sufficient amount of officers for the Regular Army made it impossible to furnish the number of inspector-instructors demanded by the National Guards in their effort to improve their training, and the extension of the law respecting detached service to the field officers and troops on the southern frontier rendered the situation worse than before. On top of that Congress failed to appropriate funds to meet the travelling expenses of these officers, with the result that only such States as paid their expenses got any officers.⁹⁹ The Army List and Directory for April 20, 1915, shows only 117 officers on the active list of the Army on duty with the militia, and the number of retired officers so detailed under the provisions of the Act of April 23, 1904, was not more than eighteen.¹⁰⁰ The target practice was "far from satisfactory"; in many instances the firing was conducted without proper instruction and only 38.3 per cent. of the militia "have reached that stage of proficiency which marks them as suitable for battle purposes." If there is one thing an infantryman ought to be able to do properly it is to shoot, and these conditions need no further commentary. In the past the trouble has been due to the desire of each State to win the rifle trophy, and too much time has been devoted to a small number of special marksmen rather than to the development of the privates in the regiments as a whole. Of the field artillery, twelve batteries had no practice at firing at all during 1913 and 1914, only 155 men qualified as first-class gunners and a paltry thirty men as second-class gunners.¹⁰¹

Shortage of the mobile forces of the Organized Militia in troops and matériel.

In his report as Chief of Staff for the period between April

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 211-215, 220-221, 10.

¹⁰⁰ Army List and Directory, April 20, 1915, pp. 70-73.

¹⁰¹ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, pp. 9, 256-257, 301, 238.

22 and November 15, 1914, General Wotherspoon declared ¹⁰² that

“As organized the militia is deficient in the following units to make it a properly balanced and efficient field force:

Cavalry, number of troops	54
Field artillery, number of batteries	79
Engineers, number of companies	14
Ambulance companies	34
Field hospitals	12”

and he went on to unfold the following unpalatable truths:

“As to the matériel necessary to put this force into the field and maintain it there for a period of six months, there is a very decided deficiency in many important respects. For instance, there are but 550 horses available for the use in drill and instruction of the cavalry, which aggregates 4,940 officers and enlisted men. The deficiency in horses for the field artillery is even greater than that of the cavalry. There are no animals for the signal or sanitary troops. As regards wagon transportation, the militia as now organized is deficient 1,934 wagons. Should the militia be assembled into divisions and separate brigades, the deficit would be 5,836 wagons. There are no draft animals available. These deficiencies in matériel are very important, inasmuch as they must be supplied before the Organized Militia forces can be made available for field operations.

“As regards field artillery matériel for the Organized Militia, should this force be called into service with its present number of batteries, the total amount of ammunition necessary therefor would be 1,300,000 rounds of 3-inch ammunition, based on an average of 5,000 rounds per gun, which is equivalent to the best standards of supply of this character of ammunition in foreign armies. TO COMPLETELY EQUIP THE PROPER NUMBER OF BATTERIES FOR THE 12 MILITIA DIVISIONS, INCLUDING THE AUXILIARY DIVISIONS, THERE WOULD BE REQUIRED, IN ADDITION TO MATÉRIEL NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, 316 FIELD GUNS AND 1,322,384 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION.”

¹⁰² Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1914, pp. 7-8.

Militia Coast Artillery.

The militia Coast Artillery force is composed of 123 companies numbering 441 officers and 7,122 enlisted men, divided as follows:

	Companies	Officers	Men
Maine	11	42	652
New Hampshire	4	16	214
Massachusetts	12	47	718
Rhode Island	17	65	988
Connecticut	13	44	697
New York	32	104	1,839
North Carolina	6	20	354
Georgia	4	14	143
California	12	41	713
Oregon	8	33	521
Washington	4	15	283
Total	123	441	7,122

The following States have no militia Coast Artillery troops, in spite of the fact that they border on the sea and have fortifications constructed for the defence of their coasts and of the approaches to their principal cities and harbours, *viz*: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas. Of these States the first three have never organized militia Coast Artillery; the last seven did formerly possess companies of this branch of the service, but for reasons best known to themselves saw fit to disband them.¹⁰³

As has been seen on page 481, the policy of the War Department is that the militia shall furnish sufficient Coast Artillery troops to man one-half of the guns and mortars of the fortifications in continental United States. As the number required would be 740 officers and 18,531 men, it follows

¹⁰³ Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1914, p. 15. Also General Weaver's testimony before the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, December 5, 1914.—*Hearings on the Army Appropriation bill for 1916*, pp. 618-619.

that the militia is no less than 299 officers and 11,409 men short of being able to furnish the quota which could be properly exacted of it. The returns for 1914 show that the average enlisted strength of the militia Coast Artillery companies was only 58 men — which is seven below the prescribed minimum strength — but, even were these companies raised to a war strength of 104 men, the total militia force would still be 5,739 short of their proper quota for the defences of the United States. The Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs reported ¹⁰⁴ that

“Repeated efforts to induce the delinquent States to meet their obligation to supply Coast Artillery troops have met with no satisfactory response. This condition is aggravated by the fact that the States can give no good reason for their failure. In view of the great national importance of this question the facts are emphasized in order that the War Department may be informed of the deficiency which can not be corrected without recourse to measures which have not heretofore been considered advisable. If the War Department can dictate to the States concerning the character of the militia organized in the several States, then, and then only can the coast States be induced to furnish their quota of Coast Artillery. If the several States are to control this national question rather than the General Government, the War Department must then look to some source other than the Organized Militia for any additional Coast Artillery.”

General Weaver expressed to the House Committee on Military Affairs his opinion that

“the difficulty is due chiefly to the fact that the adjutant generals of the States are not always kindly disposed toward the Coast Artillery organizations. They do not like to expend the funds appropriated by the States and by the United States for the support of the militia for Coast Artillery troops.” ¹⁰⁵

The very nature of their duties demands that a high degree of technical training be given to Coast Artillery troops.

¹⁰⁴ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, p. 277.

¹⁰⁵ Hearings, p. 618.

It is therefore disappointing to be compelled to record that during the fiscal year ending in 1914 "the attendance at target practice averaged only slightly more than forty-one enlisted men per company"—just a sufficient number to bring the companies up to the minimum strength which would entitle them to pay from the Federal Government—and that the attendance at armoury drills was even smaller. Adequate instruction and combined work are thus rendered well-nigh impossible and individual instruction extremely difficult. The Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs frankly asserted that

"To secure the minimum attendance at exercises some States have resorted to the expedient of disbanding certain companies and distributing their personnel among the remaining companies. This was simply a means of evading regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

Many of the organizations have conducted target practice with safety and a fair degree of accuracy—indeed some of the results were quite creditable to the troops concerned. Camps of instruction were attended by 195 officers and 173 men, and 459 officers and 6,287 men participated in joint coast defence exercises with the Regular troops during 1914; but, on the other hand, so slender was the attendance and to such a limited extent was the dummy armament installed in the armouries used that it is a moot question whether the Government would be justified in further expenditure on this score until circumstances change for the better. The conditions now prevailing in the militia Coast Artillery are thus comprehensively summed up by General Mills:

"The efficiency of organizations by no means measures up to that of individuals. Small enlisted strength, the still smaller and irregular attendance at drills, together with from 30 to 50 per cent. new enlisted men each year, keeps the companies inefficient as organizations. Militia Coast Artillery companies as they normally exist are not qualified to serve their guns against an enemy. They must have time to fill the ranks, organize, and drill. In this respect the militia Coast Artillery fails to meet

expectations. It should be stated, however, in justice to many earnest and well-qualified officers and enlisted men who carry on their work in the face of adverse and at times very discouraging conditions, that the low strength results from causes which appear to be beyond the immediate control of those most concerned." ¹⁰⁶

RESERVE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA

The reserve of the Regular Army, inaugurated by Section two of the Army Appropriation Act, approved August 24, 1912, amounted on June 1, 1915, to exactly seventeen men.¹⁰⁷ The Organized Militia has no reserve whatsoever and never has had. Apropos of the necessity for the latter, the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs very pertinently observes in his report for 1914 ¹⁰⁸ that

"A reserve system is essential for the war efficiency of an army whose organizations in time of peace are maintained at a specified minimum, and in time of war raised to a prescribed maximum strength. Without a reserve of trained men from which organizations can be promptly placed on a war footing, it is evident that rapid mobilization and immediate action will be impossible, due to the delay in enlisting, training, and equipping recruits for war. Such period of delay can not be less than three months and, judging by the past experience, is more likely to be six; and even then the men will not have been properly trained. It is therefore evident that a trained reserve of men is necessary for the Organized Militia if its immediate and effective use in war is contemplated."

LEGISLATIVE MEASURES SUGGESTED TO OR INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS, BUT NOT AS YET ENACTED INTO LAW.

(1) The establishment of a Council of National Defense.

A bill for this purpose was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 7, 1913 (H. R. 1833, 63rd Congress, first

¹⁰⁶ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, pp. 277-281.

¹⁰⁷ Records of The Adjutant-General's office.

¹⁰⁸ Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for 1914, p. 339.

session) by Representative Richard Pearson Hobson, but no definite action was taken to put it into operation.

(2) An increase of one thousand in the number of officers of the Regular Army.

A bill to that effect (Senate No. 6966) was introduced on December 16, 1914, by Senator Chamberlain, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, but it died a natural death with the close of the third session of the 63rd Congress on March 3, 1915.

Another bill (Senate 6978) providing for an increase of 1,000 officers was introduced by Senator Lodge on December 17, 1914, but suffered a similar fate.

(3) An increase in the enlisted strength of the Regular Army.

Such a step was provided for in Senate bill No. 6966 just mentioned, which was also framed "to authorize the maintenance of organizations of the mobile army at their maximum strength." The method proposed was to increase the Regular Army by 25,000 men, but, although this increase is imperatively needed, the bill contained a fundamental defect in that it completely failed to provide for an expansive organization such as every other great Power has found to be the only proper system for organizing armies, which are to be maintained on a reduced footing in time of peace, but raised to their maximum strength in time of war.

The bill introduced by Senator Lodge on December 17, 1914 (Senate No. 6978), also authorized the President "to fill up to their full strength the existing organizations which compose the aggregate mobile army force."

(4) A modification of the existing law in respect to a Reserve for the Regular Army, in order to produce such a force of reserves as ought readily to be obtained under a properly formulated measure.

A bill for that purpose (Senate No. 6965) was introduced during the 63rd Congress, but it contained such defects that the effort was made to eradicate them by a new measure which was transmitted by the Secretary of War to Senator Chamberlain on January 4, 1915.

Senator Lodge's bill (Senate 6978), mentioned above, authorized the President to discharge at the end of 18 months enlisted men who were proficient in the duties of a soldier, and prescribed that such men "shall constitute a reserve and shall be subject to be called back to military service in time of war."

(5) The creation of a reserve for the Organized Militia.

Provision for such a reserve is contained in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the so-called Militia Pay bill (Senate No. 6217, 63rd Congress, third session) introduced by Senator Chamberlain on August 6, 1914.

A bill (H. R. 20327) was also introduced in the House of Representatives on December 23, 1914, by Representative Britten. It authorized the addition of "one hundred thousand men to the existing personnel of the Army by the organizing of regiments of able-bodied male citizens of the United States and able-bodied males who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States for a special enlistment term not to exceed four months." It also prescribed "That the men enlisted . . . shall, upon discharge, constitute a citizen soldiery to be held in reserve for a period of ten years subject to call for military duty in time of war."

(6) The creation of a reserve of officers for the Regular Army.

A bill for that purpose was introduced during the last session of the 63rd Congress (Senate No. 6968) but, like the others, was not passed.

More comprehensive was the bill (Senate No. 6936) introduced by Senator Weeks, "to provide for commissioned officers, for the reserve and volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war," but it likewise suffered the same fate.

(7) An increase in the authorized strength of the Coast Artillery Corps of the Regular Army.

A bill to that end (Senate No. 6967) was introduced by Senator Chamberlain on December 16, 1914, but never became a law. Much as this increase is needed, it ought not to be made until a general enlargement of the Regular Army takes place, otherwise the military establishment will be worse balanced than it is at present.

(8) A modification of the existing Militia law, in order to correct certain radical defects contained therein.

Such changes are embodied in the so-called Militia Pay bill (Senate No. 6217, 63rd Congress, third session) introduced by Senator Chamberlain on August 6, 1914.

Even this bill needs certain amendments in order that the Federal Government may exercise the control over the Organized Militia necessary to bring about that efficiency which the Government has an unquestioned right to demand of troops that are

to be utilized in time of war in the service of the United States.

(9) An increase in the number of officers of the Signal Corps.

This augmentation was embodied in a bill (Senate No. 6964) introduced by Senator Chamberlain on December 16, 1914.

(10) The creation of a Transportation Reserve Corps composed of volunteers — engineers, chauffeurs, etc.— such as Austria possesses.

(11) Authority of law for the establishment and continuance of the Students' Military Instruction Camps, and proper appropriation therefor.

(12) Sufficient appropriations in order that the shortage in guns, ammunition, supplies of every sort, transport, etc. of all branches of the military establishment, as well as of the Organized Militia, may be rectified, and that the United States may possess everything needed in the event of war.

(13) The abolition of many of the posts scattered all over the country and the concentration of the Regular Army in large garrisons, thus putting an end to the present absurd method of administration, which entails a great deal of unnecessary expense as well as making impossible a rapid and effective concentration of the troops in case of emergency.¹⁰⁹

EXCESSIVE COST OF MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

According to the latest statistics available, the peace strength and cost of maintenance of the principal European armies was: —

	Officers and Men	Cost of Maintenance 1913-1914
Russia	1,284,000	\$377,233,000
Germany	799,999	167,990,240
France	869,403	287,298,310
Austria-Hungary	472,716	121,211,200
Great Britain	267,664	139,918,250
Italy	250,860 ¹¹⁰	66,976,700 ¹¹¹
In 1914 the figures for the United States Army were	92,482 ¹¹²	97,013,965.87 ¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ The Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session, on National Defense

In the case of our Regular forces, the figures given are for the support of the Army alone and are even exclusive of the expenditures for the Military Academy. It will thus be seen that the American army is far more expensive in proportion to its size than any of the others, and that each man costs more than \$1,000 *per annum*. As a matter of fact, our Regulars — which are in reality a national police — are more expensive than the police forces of the leading cities of the United States as the following table will demonstrate:

City	Population	Size of police force, officers and men	Cost of maintenance
New York	5,250,000	12,222	\$17,996,038.90
Chicago	2,500,000	4,443	6,622,654.90
Philadelphia	1,650,000	3,967	4,371,180.07
St. Louis	800,000	1,940	2,064,750.00
Cleveland	775,000	859	967,564.44
Boston	686,092	1,590	2,449,612.33
Detroit	614,486	1,293	1,475,235.00
Baltimore	595,528	1,073	1,260,543.71
San Francisco	450,000	929	1,527,620.00
Buffalo	423,417	838	1,074,165.89
Cincinnati	401,000	705	818,778.31
Washington	353,297	715	935,171.14
Jersey City	300,000	544	824,133.61
Total	14,798,820	31,118	\$42,387,448.30 ¹¹⁴

Bills contains many of the above suggestions and sets forth some of the bills in full.

¹¹⁰ The author's article entitled *The Armies of Europe in The World's Work* for September, 1914, pp. 23, 41, 44, 45 and 46. The statistics relative to the peace strength of the various European armies were the latest and most authentic then obtainable.

¹¹¹ Statesman's Year Book for 1914, pp. 1244, 903, 828, 641, 56 and 1030.

¹¹² Including the Quartermaster Corps, 3,809, and the Hospital Corps, 4,055.— *Report of the Secretary of War for 1914*, p. 7.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

¹¹⁴ The statistics in the above table were obtained from the Directory of Police and Prisons, compiled by Major Richard Sylvester, president of the International Police Association, and issued on June, 1914, supplemented by information furnished to the author of this book by the chiefs of police of these thirteen cities.

In other words, approximately one-sixth of the population of the United States maintains for its protection a regular force sixty per cent. of the size of the total number of the Regular Army now in the United States and within 7,000 men of the present mobile army. In order to supply the overseas garrisons with their proper quota the mobile army will shortly be reduced to 24,602 — as has been seen on page 470 — and the policemen of thirteen cities will then outnumber it more than 7,000. Moreover, the cost of maintaining those police forces is only 43.3 per cent. of what was spent during the fiscal year 1913-1914 for the Regular Army. A fresh proof is thus afforded of the truth of the declaration of the Comte de Guibert, one of the greatest military organizers in France during the eighteenth century, that “*what costs dearly, at the present as well as in the future, is a mediocre army.*”¹¹⁵

THE MANUFACTURE OF CERTAIN WAR MATÉRIEL

We Americans are prone to boasting that, regardless of what might happen in the shape of a coalition against us, the United States could not be materially affected. It may, therefore, afford something of a shock to our pride to discover that the manufacture of war *matériel* and powder would be decidedly hampered if it should become impossible to import certain ingredients, such as ferro-manganese, ferro-nickel, the optical glass for field-glasses and telescopes, nickel, nitrate of sodium, tungsten and wolfram ore — the bulk, if not the total supply, of which is imported from abroad. As a matter of fact, so serious were the conditions deemed in November and December, 1914, when Great Britain established an embargo against the importation of certain ingredients of steel produced in British colonial possessions, that the steel manufacturers of the United States were very urgent that this embargo should be lifted for their benefit.

¹¹⁵ Comte de Guibert, *Défense du système de guerre moderne*, IV, p. 276.

It is understood that their representations resulted in private arrangements being made between them and the British Government, whereby their requirements were supplied, on condition that they would not export to countries at war with Great Britain either the ingredients in raw form or the manufactured products. In the making of steel the alloy upon which our steel manufacturers are most dependent is ferro-manganese, which has heretofore been largely imported from India. At the present time this source of supply has been supplanted by Brazil, but the mines of this latter country are as yet comparatively undeveloped. Should this source be shut off, our manufacturers would be reduced to making ferro-manganese out of American ore, with the result that the manganese content would be lower than in the case of Indian or Brazilian ore, and the steel could only be produced with distinct trouble and inconvenience, to say nothing of the increased cost.

In the matter of powder the situation would be much more serious. From Chile is derived almost all our supply of sodium nitrate, from which nitric acid is made, and the latter is an essential in the manufacture of gun-cotton, which in turn is the principal ingredient of smokeless powder. The extraction of nitrates from the atmosphere is not only scientifically but commercially practicable, and is in general operation in Germany. In the United States not more than one such plant exists. From abroad has hitherto come the bulk of our carbolic acid, out of which is made picric acid, one of our most powerful explosives. Toluol and nitric-toluol, by-products of petroleum, have been almost wholly imported, but since the beginning of the present European war their manufacture has been commenced to a moderate degree in this country.

Allusion to the fact that the American army possesses extraordinarily few range-finders has already been made on page 474. Not only in this item, but in field-glasses and telescopes, the Ordnance Department is at present labouring

under a serious handicap, since the American manufacturers are dependent for their supply of glass for lenses upon Germany, from which it cannot be imported under existing circumstances.¹¹⁶

In every walk of American life the value of specially trained men is recognized, save in the matter of public office, the diplomatic service and our land forces. Unlimited as our military resources unquestionably are, Congress has thus far failed utterly to foster and develop them, so that they may actually be a source of weakness insomuch as they invite attack by a stronger Power than we. By contrast with our military resources, undeveloped though they be, our actual military strength is the feeblest of all the great nations with which we consider ourselves entitled to rank, as the following table will show:¹¹⁷

Country	Area in square miles	Population	Size of land forces	
			Peace strength	Total war strength of trained men
Russia	8,647,657	160,095,200	1,284,000	5,962,306
Germany	208,830	64,903,423	799,999	4,000,000
France	207,054	38,961,945	869,403	3,878,000
Great Britain and colonies..	11,467,294	396,294,752	269,464	961,330*
Austria-Hungary	261,035	49,418,596	472,716	4,320,000
Italy	110,550	32,475,253	250,860	1,200,000
Japan	147,655	53,875,390	250,000	1,200,000
Turkey	1,186,874	35,764,876	420,000	1,200,000
Switzerland ...	15,976	3,741,971	140,000	275,000
United States .	3,026,789	98,781,324	97,760†	225,170‡

* Including 160,000 Indian troops.

† Including 5,278 Philippine Scouts.

‡ Including 127,410 Organized Militia.

¹¹⁶ The above facts were kindly furnished to the author by the Hon. Chandler Anderson, Special Counsellor of the State Department; by General Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, and his assistant, Colonel Babbitt; and by Mr. Julian Kennedy, the former general superintendent for Carnegie, Phipps and Company, who has been connected with nearly every important steel plant in the United States and Europe.

¹¹⁷ The statistics given in the table showing the area, population, peace and war strengths of eight European nations, Japan and the United States are a combination of those given in the table on page

The above estimate of the war strength of the United States is based upon the assumption that every one of the 8,323 officers and 119,087 enlisted men of the Organized Militia would respond to a call to arms — in other words, upon a miracle. If war were declared in the near future, the number of troops now in the United States upon whom the defence of this country would devolve would be limited to

	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
Mobile Army	1,989	34,798	36,787
Coast Artillery	588	15,647	16,235
Organized Militia	8,323	119,087	127,410
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Grand Total	10,900	169,532	180,432

And that is absolutely all. The only recourse left would be to call out volunteers, and to organize, train, equip, and prepare them to take the field would require, at the lowest possible estimate, six months. Sufficient facts have been set forth in this chapter to afford a fair comprehension of the value of the Organized Militia as a military asset. It has also been conclusively shown that the United States does not possess sufficient ammunition for an army of 145,522 infantrymen for four days' fighting nor enough artillery ammunition to last our 634 field guns for two days — not to mention innumerable other items in which we are lamentably deficient. The reader is left to draw his own conclusions.

10 of the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1914*, and of those contained in the author's article, *The Armies of Europe in The World's Work for September, 1914.*

CHAPTER XXIV

THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AS THEY OUGHT TO BE ORGANIZED

THE term, "a fool's paradise," describes to perfection the dreamland in which Americans have slumbered for years in their complacent indifference to national defence. We as a people have not yet learned to think *nationally*, being much too engrossed in our own individual, local or State interests; and rarely in our career have we demonstrated from a military standpoint that we understood the true meaning of our national motto, *E pluribus unum*. It is scarcely flattering to one's pride to confess that the latter part of the proverb, "One for all and all for one," is seemingly beyond the comprehension of our people, whose everyday actions belie wholly their loud but spasmodic outbursts of what is termed patriotism — a principle which we apparently do not understand as it is known in many another country. True patriotism is not the sort which is proclaimed from the housetops to the accompaniment of waving flags and boisterous cheers, but the unobtrusive kind which realizes that "Drudgery is the gray angel of Success" and therefore labours unremittingly for long years in order to be prepared when the emergency arises.

There is reason to be grateful that the present European war, which has involved half the world, has at last aroused the American people to a partial realization that our means of national defence are lamentably inadequate. We now stand at the parting of the ways. On one hand, the road which we have been following for years stretches toward national calamity and possible loss of national existence; the other road leads to increased national strength, prosperity, prestige

and continued success. The time has come for Americans to decide which road they shall take, and to remember that the Scriptural parable anent the five wise and five foolish virgins is peculiarly applicable to our nation.

The average American who has had no military training or who has not studied military history thoroughly is obsessed by the conviction that the principles governing the organization of armies are extraordinarily complex — so intricate and difficult as to be beyond the grasp of the ordinary person. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The fundamental principles which underlie all proper military organization are quite as simple as A B C. To fit them to a multiplicity of conditions and requirements does assuredly demand profound knowledge of a purely technical character, and diversity of opinion is bound to exist in respect to the best method; but the subject is one which can be grasped — in the main essentials at least — by any one of average intelligence. In this chapter no attempt will be made to enter into minute details, but only to indicate in broad outline the basic principles upon which American land forces ought to be organized.

The first essential transcends the mere question of military organization in that it is a fundamental principle of law, *viz*: that every citizen has a right to the protection of life, liberty and property. Since this protection is indissolubly bound up in the maintenance of proper legal authority, which is in turn dependent upon uninterrupted national existence, it follows that it is the bounden duty of high Government officials, and to an equal degree of the members of the national legislature, to safeguard the destinies of the nation. From the latter flows another duty which, although inseparable from high office, has rarely, as our history shows, been fulfilled by Congress, to wit: that ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCE IS ONE OF THE CARDINAL DUTIES OF EVERY STATESMAN, and that there is an obligation to perform such a duty absolutely irrespective of party politics or factional differences.

Much clamour is made in these days about "our rights," but complete mystification seems to reign as to the basis from which all rights spring. The true principle has rarely been better enunciated than in the declaration of Giuseppe Mazzini, one of the liberators of modern Italy, that "*The origin of every right is in a duty fulfilled.*" If, therefore, we are to be entitled to the right to demand that our Government protect our lives, liberties and property in time of war, we must fulfil our duty toward that Government; and no principle is more in keeping with a republican form of government, no doctrine is more truly democratic, than the second essential, which asserts that EVERY ABLE-BODIED MALE CITIZEN OWES MILITARY SERVICE TO HIS COUNTRY. Indeed, the principle of compulsory service is no more a violation of the policy and traditions of the American people than is the payment of taxes under compulsion.

The third is contained in the question, "Do the people want adequate national defence?" In all ages this question has had to be met and answered by the ruling power, be it tribal chief, prince, sovereign or people. Under the form of government of a constitutional monarchy, republic or democracy, the dictum of the people prevails, and the representatives in authority reflect, generally speaking, the dominant public opinion. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the historical fact that no nation has ever possessed a great army and navy or has wielded great influence unless the people wished it so.

The fourth of the great underlying principles is that of undivided responsibility of the Government for the public weal. Since the days of primeval man, national disaster has invariably resulted in the blame being laid — and very properly — at the door of the ruling power. As war represents the limit of stress to which human beings and human institutions can be subjected, it follows that the responsibility of the Government is even greater than under ordinary cir-

cumstances. The motto, "United we stand, divided we fall," has been exemplified countless times throughout history, which further teaches that war can only be conducted with a reasonable assurance of success if the Government be unhampered and if it receive the united support of the people. *The more despotically the combined power and resources of a nation are wielded in time of war, the greater the chances of victory*—a stern fact too often demonstrated by history to admit of any well-founded doubt as to its truth. *Per contra*, how seriously the destinies of a nation may be imperilled by interference with the unrestricted exercise of power by the Government during the war has been repeatedly shown in this book. In this respect there has been a striking contrast in the relations between the States and the United States with regard to the land forces on one hand and the naval service on the other. Thus far Congress has been wise enough to hold jealously to its constitutional prerogative "to provide and maintain a navy," instead of delegating any part of its right to the various States and thus giving them the power to interfere in naval as they can, and do, in military affairs. For that reason the record of American land forces suffers sadly when compared with the splendid annals of the Navy. No one has yet had the temerity to advocate that a naval militiaman is competent to command a battleship, a squadron or a fleet. To cite a better example of that efficiency which can only be attained when the Government wields despotic power in time of war than is being given at this very moment by Germany would be impossible. By contrast, the Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States points out the undeniable fact that

"Our traditional theory of a small Regular Army and a great war army of citizen soldiers is not yet embodied as a definite institution. THE MOBILIZATION OF OUR CITIZEN SOLDIERY TO-DAY WOULD NOT RESULT IN A WELL-KNIT NATIONAL ARMY. IT

WOULD BE AN UNCOORDINATED ARMY OF 50 ALLIES, WITH ALL OF THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF ALLIED FORCES, EMPHASIZED BY THE UNUSUAL NUMBER OF THE ALLIES.”¹

The difference between German efficiency and American inefficiency in this respect needs no commentary.

The fifth great principle is that World-Power, with its accompanying rank, prestige and possessions, necessarily entails great responsibilities. The American people have danced too long without paying the piper, but they must now decide whether or not they are ready to assume the responsibilities inseparable from their present status among the nations of the world. If so, they must be prepared to make sacrifices and expenditures accordingly, or to relinquish a great part of what has been acquired since the Spanish-American War and the sudden development of the United States into a World-Power.

In entering upon the subject of military organization, it should clearly be borne in mind that any plan for the organization of the land forces of the United States has to be based upon a recognition of the fact that these forces are, and must necessarily be, divided into two distinct parts, namely: (1) The Army stationed in the overseas possessions, and (2) the Army within the territorial limits of continental United States. In the case of troops comprising the overseas garrisons, the problem is comparatively simple and the principles to be followed are obvious. Each one has a distinct strategic and tactical mission to perform, each is destined to operate within a restricted field, but all of them are liable to be isolated for considerable periods, particularly in the critical stages at the beginning of war. It is therefore evident that in each case Regular troops, thoroughly equipped and provided with an abundance of war *matériel* and supplies of every sort, should be maintained in sufficient force to defend such possessions as are of vital impor-

¹ Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, p. 19.

tance against an enemy likely to attack any one of them until the American Navy has secured command of the sea in its vicinity. These garrisons must accordingly be self-supporting and in nowise dependent upon assistance from outside for a number of weeks at the very least. These facts should be taken into account in organizing them and in providing them with an abundance of such supplies as will enable them to perform their rôle efficiently. The present conditions with respect to the troops in the first category were thus admirably set forth in the report of the late Chief of Staff, General Wotherspoon: ²

“ In looking over the strength of our garrisons in foreign possessions it becomes at once manifest that the garrisons we are maintaining there or propose to maintain there under the scheme of our Army as it exists at present are entirely inadequate to the needs of those possessions. That an effective defense against an enterprising enemy in the Philippines could be made with a deficiency of 33 per cent. of the manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay and with a mobile force of a little over 7,000 American troops, supplemented by less than 6,000 Philippine Scouts, is manifestly impossible; that the great waterway of the Panama Canal can not be protected against the operations of a first-class military power by the present or proposed garrison we contemplate placing there without the power and ability to reenforce it rapidly by troops from the United States is equally manifest; that we can retain our valuable Territory of Alaska in its isolated position against an enemy with any military power by placing there a garrison of less than 500 men verges on the ridiculous unless we have ample forces at home to occupy that Territory in the very earliest stages of an impending conflict. As regards the Hawaiian Islands, all military persons will recognize that the proposed garrison in this possession is far below what it should be to meet a serious attack unless, in this case, again, we have an adequate force on the Pacific coast ready to despatch to these islands when trouble is impending. It must therefore be frankly admitted that the present garrisons of these outlying

² Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1914, pp. 8-9.

possessions are entirely inadequate for the purpose for which they have been sent there, and that without a material change in conditions at home we have no available resources from which to reenforce them, even should time be given us to do so. As the Philippines are too distant from the United States to be reenforced when war is impending, it would seem necessary that the garrison of those islands should be at least a full manning detail for the Coast Artillery defenses and one complete division at full war strength plus the necessary administrative staff. As to our other outlying possessions, it may be said that the garrisons proposed for those possessions, with the exception of Alaska, may be considered adequate only under the contingency that we have available in the United States sufficient thoroughly trained troops in excess of our home needs to warrant us in heavily reenforcing the peace garrisons."

The unvarnished truth is that, instead of a paltry force of 11,298 officers and men at present in the Philippines, we ought to have a division at full war strength — 22,665 — and 24 companies of Coast Artillery — 2,496 — making a total of 25,161. In the Hawaiian Islands the existing strength of 8,529 ought to be replaced by at least 14,389 mobile troops and ten companies of Coast Artillery — 1,400 — a total of 15,789. In the Panama Canal Zone the present force of 5,662 should be strengthened to the number of 7,890 mobile troops and 18 companies of Coast Artillery — 1,994 — a total of 9,834 at the very lowest estimate possible.³ As a matter of fact, about 16,000 officers and men

³ "The minimum garrisons required for the maintenance of national interests beyond the limits of the United States are as follows:

"The Philippines.—4 regiments of Infantry at maximum statutory strength (150 men per company), 2 regiments of Cavalry at maximum statutory strength (100 men per troop), 2 battalions of Field and Mountain Artillery (6 batteries), 2 companies of Engineers, 2 companies of Signal troops (one of these a field company), 24 companies of Coast Artillery, 52 companies of Philippine Scouts, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital, with detachments pertaining to the Ordnance Department and enlisted men of the Hospital Corps on duty with organizations. . . .

"Oahu.— . . . 6 regiments of Infantry at maximum statutory strength (150 men per company), 1 regiment of Cavalry at maximum statutory strength (100 men per troop), 3 battalions of Field Artillery

would be nearer the requirements for that most important possession. Guantanamo will also need a proper garrison in due time.

Our principal concern is with the second category, *viz*: the land forces within the territorial limits of continental United States. Since the days of the Revolution the policy of the United States has been that the military establishment in time of peace shall consist of a small Regular Army, and that the ultimate war force of the nation is to be a great army of citizen soldiers. The fundamental theory of this military organization is sound both economically and politically, but, as has been seen throughout our history, the instances when it has been put into effect in the proper manner have been extremely few and far between. The maintenance of armies in time of peace imposes heavy financial burdens, and wisdom dictates that expenditures for this purpose should be kept as low as is consistent with effectiveness for war. Unfortunately, the mistake has nearly always been made in such a cheese-paring policy during the periods of peace that efficiency at the outbreak of war — when it is most essential — has been sacrificed in a wholesale manner. Reliance on citizen-soldiery is seriously handicapped by one great limitation, namely, that this force is virtually a negligible quantity as a military asset until it has undergone a long period of training sufficient to meet trained soldiers. Our history is replete with the achievements of the volunteer soldier after he has received the training necessary for war, but it contains no instance when raw levies have been suc-

(9 batteries), 1 company of Engineers, 1 field company of Signal troops, 10 companies of Coast Artillery, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital. . . .

“Panama.— . . . The minimum peace garrison necessary for the defense of the canal is as follows: 3 regiments of Infantry at the maximum strength in Chapter VI of this report, 1 battalion of Field Artillery (3 batteries), 1 squadron of cavalry, 1 signal company, 1 engineer company, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital, 18 companies of Coast Artillery.”—*Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*, pp. 8-9.

The figures are taken from the Tables of Organization, 1914.

cessfully employed in general military operations. *The American people have apparently not as yet realized that a man with a uniform on his back and a musket in his hand is not a dependable soldier, nor have they awakened to the understanding that none of the great European or Asiatic Powers would attempt to combat us with an improvised army, but would employ only troops trained to the highest possible degree.* For years the German military authorities have claimed that they can embark an army corps in three days and, assuming that they control the sea and allowing sixteen days to cross the Atlantic, could land fully 250,000 regulars within the territorial limits of the United States within five weeks. It is also well known that, should we be unfortunate enough to come to blows with Great Britain, she could put approximately the same number of trained troops on our northern frontier in thirty days.

The first problem to be considered is the size of the force likely to attack us — a factor that would determine the size of our own — and what method would most speedily produce the forces necessary to insure our safety by repelling such an attack effectively. The consensus of opinion among military men abroad as well as here is that no other nation would make such an attempt with less than from 400,000 to 500,000 of its best troops. The United States must therefore have at least an equal number similarly trained and ready for service at the outset of hostilities. Insomuch as all other great military Powers possess reserves of men who have done service with the colours and are to all intents and purposes as well trained as the first-line troops, they would experience little difficulty in maintaining their force at its initial full strength and in replacing the losses, which the experience of modern war has demonstrated beyond peradventure amounts in the first six months of war to fifty per cent. of the strength of any given unit.

How then shall the United States acquire a force of thor-

oughly trained troops sufficient to meet such a situation — and one which may arise at any moment? In the first place, this country will be obliged to maintain a Regular Army which, on a peace footing, numbers at least 250,000 enlisted men. The term of enlistment should be definitely fixed at seven years — not more than two years to be spent in active service with the colours and not less than five with the reserve, except in the case of the non-commissioned officers who form the most invaluable asset and nucleus in any army. Although no soldier should be furloughed to the reserve until he has completed one year of active training, at any time between the expiration of his first year and the termination of his second year, if he has proved himself thoroughly proficient in the duties of a soldier of the branch of the service in which he enlisted, he should at once, upon certification of that fact by the proper officers and under proper restrictions, be transferred to the reserve of the Regular Army. A military establishment of 250,000 enlisted men would, under the conditions outlined above, graduate 125,000 *per annum*. Deducting approximately one-third of that number for deaths, re-enlistments, discharge for disability, courts-martial and other causes, would give, at a conservative estimate, 84,000 in round numbers passing to the reserve each year. Obviously the law would not operate until the end of the second year of enlistment, but at the beginning of the third year the available trained soldiers would amount to 250,000 in the Regular Army and 84,000 in the reserve, a total of 334,000; at the beginning of the fourth year to 418,000; at the commencement of the fifth year to 502,000; the sixth year to 586,000, and at the beginning of the seventh year to 670,000 men, at which figure the active Regular Army and its reserves would be maintained. If present indications be any criterion, such a force ought to be amply sufficient for many years to come. The crux of the whole question lies in “the principle that *a nation's military power is to be meas-*

*ured not by the total number of its male citizens capable of bearing arms, but by the number of trained soldiers with which it can meet a given emergency."*⁴

The reason why such stress is laid upon a reserve for the Regular Army is because it is the only method yet devised to perform certain imperative functions. In the first place, a reserve of soldiers who have had training in active service with the colours permits the first-line army to be maintained in time of peace on a reduced footing and at the minimum cost, without impairing its efficiency in war. At the outbreak or impending of hostilities, such trained reserves are utilized by European nations to expand their active armies to full war strength. The United States has never possessed a proper reserve and the shifts to which it has been put in consequence have been abundantly rehearsed in this book. Great Britain, whose military system is similar to ours, did not adopt the policy of reserves until for lack of them her army broke down in the Crimean War. Her highly-trained, long-service army melted away almost at the outset of hostilities; no method existed to renew its strength save with untrained men, and she discovered by bitter experience that without reserves her army was by no means fitted to meet the requirements of war.⁵

In the second place, it is the only scheme extant for making good the losses in war and for maintaining the troops at the front at their full fighting strength. This is most important insomuch as

*"It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses at least 50 per cent. of its strength in the first six months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is 50 per cent. deterioration in the power of the unit; and if it is replaced by raw men, the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed."*⁶

⁴ Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, p. 14.

⁵ Compare *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

There is in the United States a law forbidding the adulteration of food and no one questions the soundness of the principle upon which it is based. Yet at the beginning of every single one of our wars, the want of trained reserves has caused the quality and efficiency of our Regular Army to be adulterated by increasing its number by raw recruits. It is obvious that just in proportion as untrained men are poured into a trained organization, its strength is weakened, but, in spite of the folly of such a procedure, we have persisted in following it on every possible occasion. The merit of a reserve of trained soldiers lies in the fact that, aside from the two principal functions just enumerated, it in nowise deteriorates the strength of the troops of the first-line but, as a matter of fact, maintains them at their existing standard. A reserve for the Regular Army is a purely business proposition, the economic value of which consists in reducing the *per capita* cost of the Army and in increasing its efficiency. Moreover, it insures the maximum efficiency with the minimum amount of cost and labour, and every business man knows that experience has proved that the nearer men and machines are run to their full capacity the lower the proportionate cost. There is accordingly every reason — military, economic and financial — to justify the enlargement of a reserve for the Regular Army to a point where it will fulfil its mission in keeping with the needs of our national defence.

As a matter of fact, at least six divisions ought to be maintained at war strength in continental United States — exactly as the French keep their corps stationed along the Rhine frontier in time of peace at full strength and as we do with the troops in the overseas garrisons. These 135,990 officers and men⁷ would therefore be instantly available at the outbreak of war or for overseas expeditions, as is the British Home army. Indeed, wisdom would dictate that all

⁷ An American division at war strength numbers 22,665 officers and enlisted men.

units of the Regular Army ought to be maintained at war strength. The reserves could then be utilized for the dual purpose of keeping the troops in time of war up to their full fighting strength and of forming additional organizations, together with depôt troops destined to make good the wastage which invariably occurs in actual hostilities.

The question as to whether the soldiers in the reserve should be paid or not has been much discussed, but can be dismissed in a few words. The household proverb that "You cannot get something for nothing" applies with particular force in this case. In a military system like that of the United States and Great Britain men enlist in the Army because they prefer the career of a soldier to other vocations; the service is purely voluntary and not compulsory as in the case of European armies. One might as well expect men dependent upon their wage or salary to work *gratis* as to expect soldiers to give their service, even a reserve, without some remuneration. They are paid in the Regular Army in order that the country may avail itself of them, and they should assuredly be paid when they pass into the reserve, if service can be exacted of them in time of war. Although the pay will necessarily be only a part of what they receive in active service, justice, equity and the plain fact that in no other way will an adequate reserve of trained soldiers be secured, all demand that reservists must be properly recompensed.

The increase of the Regular Army to 250,000 men should be made with due regard to the respective function to be discharged by each arm of the service. The infantry, which is the backbone of an army, will then be sufficiently strong for all purposes, and the cavalry and artillery will not be hopelessly deficient when volunteers and Organized Militia are employed. Another great shortage will thereby be rectified, inasmuch as the Coast Artillery Corps will be increased from its present force of 19,994 to a sufficient number to permit all the guns and mortars, as well as all the accessories

such as mines, searchlights and fire-control apparatus, not only in the overseas possessions but in continental United States, to be manned, as they ought to be, by trained Regular troops. The comparatively paltry force of Militia Coast Artillery — amounting, as has been seen on page 512 to only 7,563 officers and men — can then be utilized to great advantage by distributing them as additional details among the fortifications most likely to be attacked. Aside from correcting the defect just mentioned, such an increase in the Regular Coast Artillery would permit all the batteries to be manned, instead of having thirty-nine forts ungarrisoned, as is now the case owing to lack of sufficient troops. This is not the only instance in which the United States has hitched the cart in front of the horse in military matters. The folly of spending vast amounts for the construction of fortifications and at the same time failing to provide the necessary troops to man them is too evident to require further comment. In addition to a sufficient number of troops to man all forts and batteries, it will be necessary to provide coast artillery and mobile troops in order to protect the fortifications against raids by small forces landed from an enemy's warships or transports. Without protection by adequate mobile forces harbour defences can readily be taken from the rear, where they are decidedly vulnerable.

In increasing the Regular establishment our legislators must not lose sight of the necessity for extra officers. It is an absolute impossibility to bring troops up to the requisite standard of efficiency unless they have the proper quota of officers present at all times with the commands. The handicap under which our Army has laboured for years for want of sufficient officers on duty always with troops has been too often emphasized to need repetition here. Furthermore, the needs of such detached service as engineer officers doing improvement work on rivers and harbours, as inspector-instructors with the Organized Militia, as instruc-

tors in various educational institutions, etc., must be considered and due account taken of the number required for such duty — especially since it is specifically exacted by law and cannot be legally escaped. Aside from these is the necessity for the creation of a reserve corps of officers in order to provide beforehand the requisite number which will be needed when the volunteer or reserve forces are called into the service of the United States.

In connection with the subject of officers, it is highly imperative that some system of elimination and selection should be immediately introduced into the Regular Army. At present there exists no relation between efficiency and promotion, the latter being based on seniority alone. Indeed one is almost tempted to declare that in the Army the system is one of promotion by senility. While experience is one of the most valuable weapons in the hands of a general officer, there is no gainsaying the fact that in the American Army officers reach the rank of major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general long after they ought to, with the result that the service suffers from superannuation and consequent lack of initiative which, with the rarest of exceptions, is only to be found in younger men. Moreover, much deadwood is permitted to remain in active service to the decided detriment of the Army and the discouragement of the more zealous and efficient officers.

One of the most important reforms to be made in respect to the mobile army within continental United States is to put a definite end to the present dispersion of the troops all over the country, as a result of which the American Army is absurdly administered from almost every conceivable standpoint except that of the communities in which the various posts are situated. The time has come when the interests of the United States must be made paramount to those of petty localities, and the present system of wholesale and totally unnecessary expense terminated. *It is an absolute impossibility that the Army can be economically*

administered or attain that efficiency which it ought to possess unless fully four-fifths of the garrisons and posts in the country are abolished. Obviously a howl will be set up by every community which will be deprived of the revenue emanating from the expenditures of the troops stationed in its midst, but the question must now be squarely faced, and our legislators must determine whether the country is to continue to be milked for the sole benefit of certain local interests. The War College, after a careful study, has estimated that a saving of about \$5,500,000 *per annum* would be effected if the present mobile force were concentrated in eight posts. Broadly-speaking, the Army should be so distributed as to insure

(1) Proper tactical training of the infantry, cavalry and field artillery combined.

(2) Rapidity of concentration of the Army upon the northern or southern frontier or upon the Atlantic or Pacific coasts.

(3) The best use of the Regular Army as a model for the general military training of the National Guard.

(4) The most advantageous employment of the Regular Army as a nucleus for the war organization of the Organized Militia and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize.

(5) An economical administration giving the maximum return for the money expended.

(6) A peace organization in keeping with effectiveness in war — in other words, one which will permit the Army as a whole to be instantaneously available for active operations either within or without the United States.

The troops should be stationed only at strategic points which are additionally centres favourable for transportation, administration and supply, and in general terms their location should be as follows:

(1) Two or perhaps three groups covering the Atlantic seaboard and situated on a line between the St. Lawrence and Atlanta.

(2) Two or three groups covering the Pacific coast and stationed on a line between Puget Sound and Los Angeles.

(3) Two groups as a minimum between the Great Lakes and the Mexican border, which would serve as a fire reserve for the groups on the Atlantic or Pacific coast as well as nuclei for the development of the Organized Militia and volunteers to be organized in the interior of the country where they would be immune from attack.⁸

Unless some such scheme is put into effect, the full benefit cannot be derived from the tactical organization introduced by Secretary Stimson in 1913 — the merit of which, as has been repeatedly stated, cannot be overestimated — the American people will never get a *quid pro quo* for their money, and the Army will never reach that efficiency which the nation has a right to expect from its military establishment. Moreover, not until the Regular troops are concentrated in groups not smaller than brigades will our Army officers be afforded an opportunity to perfect themselves in leading forces of such size as they would necessarily be called upon to command in time of war. At the present they are deprived of such practice, and, if the United States were now suddenly plunged into war against a powerful adversary, there is every indication that reverses, serious if not fatal, would be bound to occur until our officers had been taught by bitter experience the lessons which they ought to have mastered in time of peace. In such an event, the Secretary of War and every unsuccessful general would be made the scapegoats of public wrath, even though they were in nowise responsible for the pernicious system bequeathed to them and even though they might have moved heaven and earth to abolish it; while the American people would as usual be blind to the fact that the real responsibility lay at their own doors for permitting the continuance of a system under which a Napoleon himself would be powerless to achieve success.

So little has been done by Congress in the matter of ap-

⁸ Compare Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, p. 21.

appropriations for guns, ammunition, supplies and war *matériel* of almost every sort and description such as would be needed in time of war, that it may be safely said that the surface has scarcely been scratched. If the reader has any doubts on this score, let him examine the facts set forth in Chapter XXIII and soberly compare what our national legislature has done for national defence with the preparations for the present European war made by Germany. That country has demonstrated by its achievements, not only the imperative necessity for such measures, but that overwhelming superiority of numbers and resources can, to a large measure, be offset and nullified when pitted against thorough preparation for war. With such an object lesson staring us in the face, it is pertinent to ask how long the American people are going to remain supine and blind to what the consequences of inadequate preparation for war may readily entail?

Passing from the Regular military establishment, consideration must next be given to the land forces constituting the second, and indeed principal, line of defence. Heretofore this has been the Organised Militia, either *per se* or as the principal source from which officers and men of any military training could be drawn, save the isolated instances of former Regular soldiers offering their services in time of emergency. The Act of May 27, 1908, specifically prescribed that "the Organized Militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise." *This was one of the most flagrant pieces of folly ever injected into the military legislation of this country.* So long as it remains on the statute books there need be no hope of our possessing a sound military organization suitable to the stress of war. Indeed, there is grave reason to doubt whether a really efficient citizen-soldiery can be created under the militia provisions of the Constitution, especially if the National Guard is to unite the dual function of a national reserve and of

State constabulary. Be that as it may, the fact none the less remains that as a military asset the Organized Militia is today woefully deficient — as has been seen in the previous chapter — and, moreover, as Major Palmer strikingly pointed out in his admirable article on The Militia Pay Bill in the *Infantry Journal* for November-December, 1914, suffers markedly by comparison with analogous military forces of other English-speaking nations.

“The United States with a population of about 92,000,000 has a force of about 122,000 organized militia, or 1,324 citizen soldiers to each million of population.

“The United Kingdom with a population of about 41,000,000 has in its well organized territorial army 317,000 citizen soldiers none of whom are paid. This means 7,770 citizen soldiers to each million of population. If the young men of the United States would enlist in the same relative numbers as the young men of Great Britain we could have a citizen soldiery of 714,622 men. . . .

“The Dominion of Canada with a population of a little more than 7,000,000 has a national citizen soldiery of about 64,000 men, none of whom are paid. If our young men should enlist in the same relative numbers we would have a force of about 826,000 men. . . .

“The Federation of Australia with a population of about 4,455,000 has a partially trained citizen soldiery of about 88,000,⁹ none of whom are paid. If our young men should enlist in the same relative numbers, we should have 1,802,651 citizen soldiers. . . .

“Why is it that where one young American enters the organized militia, more than five young Englishmen enter the territorial army, more than six young Canadians enter the Dominion militia, and more than fifteen young Australians enter their national citizen soldiery? It cannot be solely because our men are not paid, because neither the Englishman, the Canadian nor the Australian is paid for the time he gives for military training. Can it be because the young American is less patriotic than his

⁹“This was the number before compulsory service became effective. Under compulsory military service it is expected that the force will attain a strength of 250,000.”—*Palmer*, p. 348.

fellows of the English speaking race, that we must pay him to perform a duty as a free and voluntary patriotic service?"

The answer is to be sought at the foundations upon which the National Guard is built and organized. It lies in the fact that it is primarily a State force which can be employed in quelling local disturbances; that it has a long enlistment and a period of training spread over three years, confined largely to armoury drills instead of brief intensive training such as is given to the Swiss or Australian soldiery. Not less fundamental is the objection to the Organized Militia on the ground that it cannot legally be employed outside the confines of the United States; and, worst of all, the Constitutional limitations respecting its use are in conflict with the basic principle that in time of war the Government of a nation shall be clothed with despotic power to wield the entire national resources for the benefit of public welfare, without let or hindrance by any part of that nation. As Major Palmer pertinently observes: ¹⁰

"The immense mass of modern military forces and the speed of modern military operations require a coöperation or team work that can be secured only by permeating the entire force with a unified military doctrine in time of peace and this is possible only when the war making power is also the war preparing power. This cannot be secured by the Federal Government *requesting* each of the forty-eight sovereigns to adopt its military doctrine. Each of these forty-eight sovereigns has a prior claim on the employment of the militia, maintains it for its own uses, and has its own doctrine as to its employment and training in peace."

There are two solutions in respect to the Organized Militia as at present constituted. Either it must be taken wholly out of the hands of the several States and placed under the absolute control of the Federal Government, or, if it is to remain in State control, it must be appraised at its true

¹⁰ *Infantry Journal* for November-December, 1914, p. 244.

value as a military asset and relegated to the third line of defence. In the latter event a force of United States Volunteers must be created, and it will be difficult to improve upon the features of the law of March 2, 1899, that brought into being the volunteer regiments, the worth of which was so conclusively demonstrated during the Philippine insurrection. It is highly probable that many of the best officers and men of the Organized Militia would enlist in such a Federal force, and, if the provisions of the above-mentioned law were closely followed, the rejection of candidates not up to the requisite standard would be simple. Such a force could be made to conform to any requirements that the Government deemed best to exact, and, by the time that six months of hostilities had elapsed, it could take its place in the fighting line side by side with the Regular Army without there being any grounds for misgivings as to its efficiency.

The officers and men enrolled in this force of United States Volunteers or Second-Line Army should receive an intensive training similar to that given to the Swiss, whose governmental system is closely akin to our own but whose militia system is vastly superior to ours. A proof of the merit of their method lies in the fact that in 24 hours they can mobilize an efficient army of 220,000 soldiers fully trained and equipped, most of whom are fair shots and all of whom are accustomed to using the army rifle. Behind this first line is a reserve composed of 270,000 men, of whom 70,000 are thoroughly armed, and the entire force cost only \$8,594,200 for the year 1913-1914¹¹—something of a contrast to the \$97,013,965.87 spent by the United States for the maintenance of a Regular Army of only 92,482.¹² The initial instruction of the Swiss militia soldiers is given in the recruits' schools, and is followed by periods of training amounting to 65 days for the infantry, engineers and foot

¹¹ Statesman's Year Book for 1914, p. 1338.

¹² Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, pp. 10, 16-18.

artillery, 75 days for the field artillery, and 90 days for the cavalry. The subsequent trainings, known as "repetition courses," are confined to eleven days annually, but all soldiers under the rank of sergeant are excused from further schooling after having attended seven courses — or eight in the case of the cavalry. One of the notable features of the Swiss system is the requirement that every man exempted for any reason from military service shall pay a special tax for national defence, the amount being proportioned to his income or wealth. This principle was enforced by the United States in resorting to the draft during the War of the Rebellion, and might well be adopted again, particularly since its application is quite as just in time of peace as in war.

There is little question that the organization of such a Federal force, with an intensive training similar to that just outlined, would appeal to the best officers and men of the Organized Militia, as well as to the young men who have attended the Students' Military Instruction Camps during the past two years. The fact that such a force was *national* and therefore not liable to be called out for police duty in strikes and riots — a task which is necessarily irksome; that the training is intensive and not dragged out for three years; that such a Federal force is *organized for war*, and that the man who enrolls himself in it will learn in a comparatively short time to be a soldier, removes nearly all of the objections which now deter men from entering the National Guards of the various States. The existence of such a force would go a long way to postpone conscription, which inevitably overtakes every nation that embarks upon war without an adequate military force.

The Organized Militia should constitute the third line of defence so long as it retains its present status as a State force. It is high time that an end were put to the present preposterous conditions which have been permitted to continue entirely too long, and that the American people real-

ized the facts about the National Guard. How woefully deficient it now is, in spite of all that has been done to improve it, has been chronicled in detail in Chapter XXIII. It must be remembered that *the Federal Government virtually supports the militia of the forty-eight States but it does not, and under the Constitution cannot, control them.* Since 1903 Congress has spent in round numbers \$60,000,000 for their support, yet it is powerless to enforce regulations for the proper care of arms and property belonging to the United States and entrusted to the care of the militia, or to prevent their loss and destruction through negligence. Except on sufferance, the Government has no real control over the training of the militia, and no control whatsoever over their organization. In the event of war, it can exercise nothing more than a divided control and, under no circumstances, can the militia be ordered outside of continental United States. In every war in our history the State militia as such has been a dismal failure. It would be impossible to cite a better proof that the system is at fault than the fact that these same men, when organized into national volunteers and given proper training, have almost always become efficient troops, with a record often glorious. All the more reason why the Federal Government should at once cease to support troops which it cannot control and which are not at its disposal until their status is changed at the beginning of war or when hostilities are imminent. What their employment has entailed in the way of waste, confusion, political generals and crass inefficiency has been sufficiently rehearsed in former pages, and the time has come to realize that the appointment of inexperienced and unqualified officers to command men in time of war is a crime akin to treason as well as to murder. To continue the present system is to prolong what is nothing short of a farce. The United States should certainly withdraw all financial support from the Organized Militia as at present constituted, and permit the States to support and control such forces as

they deem best. It is not unlikely that, under such circumstances, they would find that small forces will suffice for their needs, especially if their character be analogous to that of the Pennsylvania constabulary which, although considerably smaller than it ought to be, has thus far proved itself fully able to cope with any internal situation.

If, on the other hand, the States should voluntarily agree to permit their Organized Militia to pass under the absolute control of the Federal Government and should allow its status to be changed to complete allegiance to the United States, there is little doubt that its efficiency could soon be increased at least two-fold. Better yet would be a Constitutional amendment placing all troops intended to be used in war under the control of the Federal Government. The plain truth is that *there is no more ground for the States to maintain land forces which are destined to be employed in national service in time of war than for them to maintain navies independently of the United States.* The Federal Government could then raise the troops to the proper standard, instead of being obliged to lower the standard to suit the troops, as it did in the case of the Organized Militia during January, 1914. In that event, the necessity for a Federal Volunteer Army such as outlined in the preceding pages would be immeasurably lessened, particularly if a law were passed permitting the drafting of the necessary men in each Congressional district where the number of men who volunteered for military service fell short of the quota allotted to that district. Such a measure would possess all the merits of the system which now prevails in Australia — where compulsory service is exacted of all males not physically unfit, beginning at the age of 12 years and lasting until twenty-five — but without the objections which would infallibly be raised against it. The term of enlistment in such a Federal Militia should be for seven years, with a period of intensive training amounting to about six weeks in the first year and at least a fortnight in each of the remaining six. Local pride

in such a force and the identification of the organizations with the communities in which they are raised could be perpetuated by adding to the designation of the number and arm that of the locality to which the troops belong, as for example the 100th Infantry (Pennsylvania.)

Emphasis has already been laid on the undeniable fact that "A nation's military power is to be measured not by the total number of its male citizens capable of bearing arms, but by the number of trained soldiers with which it can meet a given emergency." The author ventures to suggest that, if it be desired to ascertain how much of a military asset the United States now possesses in the Organized Militia as at present constituted, the *modus operandi* is simple. Let the President call out the militia by proclamation and, when they have assembled at the rendezvous in their respective States, let each officer and man announce whether or not he will volunteer for war service. That done, a thorough inspection can be made by carefully selected Regular officers, for the purpose of ascertaining how many officers and men are up to the standard of dependable troops who have received sufficient training to enable them to take the field at once. Such a procedure would scarcely exceed the cost of a joint summer manœuvre, and the American people would then know exactly what could be counted upon from the Organized Militia.

If the land forces are organized as has been indicated above, they would consist of

- (1) A Regular Army of 250,000 men.
- (2) A reserve of the Regular Army amounting eventually to 420,000 men.
- (3) United States Volunteers.
- (4) The Organized Militia or National Guard.

It is probable that, if the proper precautions be taken in the creation of these four lines of defence, the yield would be at least 1,200,000 men, of whom 670,000 would have

had training in the Regular Army, and the rest a foundation of schooling which, if supplemented by six months of training at the beginning of hostilities, would transform them into excellent troops fully fit for war.

One of the great reforms needed in our military service is in the present system of recruiting, which is based upon a shifting army, and is both wasteful and expensive when compared with that which most military nations have found necessary to adopt. The principal justification for the existing system is in the fact that it does its work well considering the handicaps due to a shifting and widely dispersed Army. It must be admitted that the desired reform will be difficult to effect until the Regular troops are concentrated in large forces in a few garrisons or posts. Once that has been accomplished, all recruiting for organizations should be done in the locality or area in which they are stationed, thus eliminating a large measure of the expense now arising from the necessity of transporting recruits long distances from the place where they are accepted. Moreover, all terms of enlistment should begin and end at certain fixed dates, instead of occurring at any time during the year as under the present system. If all men who have finished their legal service with the colours were transferred to the reserve about the first of November, and if all recruits were sent to join their organizations at the same time, much confusion would be avoided, the winter could be devoted to training the recruits, and the following summer and autumn to higher military training, without the interruption caused by a continual influx of recruits. An added advantage would lie in the opportunity thereby given to officers and non-commissioned officers to handle large numbers of men in the same stage of training, thus insuring better results than are possible under the existing system. The indications are that it would be impracticable to confine to one date the period when recruits join the colours; but, even if such periods occurred every

three or four months, the labour would be greatly simplified and the resultant efficiency much higher than can now be attained.

The Adjutant General of the Army has officially declared that, even if the entire population of the United States were utilized as a recruiting field, the indications are that the Regular Army cannot be recruited by *voluntary* enlistment beyond 140,000 men. This is a serious condition, but there exist two solutions. Either the military service must be made more attractive to the average man than it now is, or else drafting or compulsory service must be exacted. The first is obviously the simpler solution, but it is bound to entail greater expense and the public will have to be brought to a realization that the men who are the bulwark of national defence are entitled to far greater recognition than they now receive. The labour market is full of men who would doubtless be glad to follow the career of the soldier provided they received compensation commensurate with that which they can earn in civil pursuits. The whole question can be put in a nutshell by declaring that a nation which needs a large military force for its defence is confronted by two alternatives, namely, an expense necessarily heavy if it depends upon voluntary enlistment for the soldiers required, or the exaction of compulsory service on the part of the able-bodied males.

It is impossible to lay too much stress upon the absolute necessity from a military standpoint of an organization the basic principles of which have never been more comprehensively enunciated than by Secretary of War Calhoun in 1820, when he declared "that, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES, THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING EITHER TO NEW MODEL OR TO CREATE." For this fundamental reason all organization which is to be sound must take place in time of peace, otherwise it cannot be in working order when war arises. In this connection emphasis is again placed upon the imperative necessity for a reserve force of trained officers, in order that

they may be available the instant the new and augmented forces are called into service. The difficulty which Great Britain has encountered in obtaining trained and experienced officers for her volunteers in the present European war ought to be a lesson by which Americans should profit.

The crux of the whole question is in the matter of training. Without trained reserves it is utterly impossible to mobilize an army for war with any degree of promptness. Without trained officers long periods of schooling are necessary to bring soldiers up to even a moderate degree of efficiency. Without training men are worse than useless in war. From a military point of view the problem of obtaining men in time of war would be tremendously simplified if military drill, military hygiene and the elements of rifle shooting were made compulsory in every public and private school, as well as in every college and university in the United States. Properly conducted, such training might readily be made as little irksome as is the work of the Boy Scouts or of the young men who have attended the Students' Military Instruction camps; and the youngsters in these two categories have taken to the work with genuine avidity. In the author's opinion the school, college or university which is the first to require every male student, not physically or mentally incapacitated, to take a course in military training before a diploma is given him will perform a great public service and set an example which many of our educational institutions will be glad to follow. The author appreciates that his advocacy of such an innovation is open to attack by a host of carping critics who will indulge in the hackneyed clamour against "militarism," but it is too much to ask such people to realize that, great as may be the advantage of such training to the country in time of crisis, greater far will be the benefit conferred upon the individual in his everyday life. If sound bodies, well-developed physiques, knowledge of hygiene, the lessons of self-control, and the inculcation of obedience and of that patriotism which actuates the individ-

ual to make sacrifices for his country are of no benefit to a nation, then the scheme has no justification. If, on the other hand, such a course of training produces better men physically and better citizens, merely by curbing the spirit of disobedience which has made the American deservedly a by-word for lawlessness and lack of true patriotism, and if it can accomplish for the boys a part of what it does for the men in our Regular Army to whom we point with pride, no really valid objection can be raised against it. One of the ablest of American political economists has openly declared that "the efficiency of factory labor in Germany has been greatly increased through this military education, and that the young men who have been through this military training become much more efficient in the field of production in later years than they would have been had they not been obliged to undergo this training at all."¹³ "The proof of the pudding is in the eating," and in certain ways we Americans can derive no little profit from the example of German efficiency and the comparative inefficiency of British land forces thus far in the present European war.

Part and parcel of the system of military education of which the United States stands in dire need are the Students' Military Instruction camps inaugurated in 1913. This innovation — which was one of the best measures of recent years — requires nothing more than additional development to make it an institution which will exercise a beneficial influence far beyond present expectations. The intensive training given has already laid the foundations for a small number of good soldiers, and the most proficient can, if given additional training, be utilized as lieutenants or even as captains in any volunteer force which might be raised in time of war.

One of the most important steps which must be taken in the near future is the creation of a Council of National

¹³ *Some Economic Aspects of War*, by Henry C. Emery, professor of Economics at Yale, pp. 20-21.

Defense. Obviously most of its meetings ought to be held in Washington, and its work would be greatly assisted if the Naval War College, now at Newport, Rhode Island, were also transferred to the seat of the Government and thus permit constant joint conferences with the Army War College. In this manner comprehensive plans for the co-ordination of the land and naval forces could be formulated and the chances of defeat owing to lack of concerted action vastly diminished. In this connection it is not amiss to point out that a suitable fleet of submarines would go far to deter an enemy from attempting to land a large force of troops at any of the many points along our coasts where it is out of question to erect fortifications.

To those who have studied the existing conditions the necessity for a complete re-organization of the War Department is apparent. The military branch of the Government is at present saddled with burdens which do not properly belong to it. Secretaries of War are driven to distraction by duties which have nothing to do with the military. There ought to be one, if not two additional Assistant Secretaries of War, whose functions are divided according to the requirements of the service, and certainly one of these ought to be a permanent official. The Keep Commission found ten years ago that many of the methods of the War Department might be improved¹⁴ but, although great progress has been made in this respect, much still remains to be done in the matter of increasing the efficiency and diminishing the expense. All river and harbour work ought to be placed where it belongs, *i. e.*, under the Department of the Interior, to which engineer officers can be loaned while engaged in internal improvements. National Parks and reservations should likewise be transferred to the Interior Department, and the work of policing them done by a constabulary instead

¹⁴ Letter from John C. Scofield, Chief Clerk of the War Department, to the Secretary of War, dated October 9, 1905, and relating to the questions propounded by the Keep Commission.

of by Regular troops. The United States ought to have a Colonial Department, with a Cabinet officer at its head, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs should be put under it, in place of being administered, as at present, by the War Department. In a dozen other ways, reforms might be instituted that would vastly improve that branch of the Government which is charged with the conduct of military affairs.

Too much stress cannot be laid upon the following, *viz*:

(1) The absolute necessity of organizing all American national resources so thoroughly as to render them instantly available upon the outbreak of war.

(2) The enlargement of the Military Academy at West Point to its maximum capacity.

(3) The advisability of giving to the young men at the various military schools additional training in order to render them fit to become officers. Such training ought, obviously, to take place at the non-productive period of their lives—in other words, before they embark in business, professions or other vocations.

(4) The extension of the system of Military Instruction Camps so as to embrace a large number of men up to the age of 45 years.

(5) The names and addresses of all men who have received intensive military training such as would fit them to become officers or dependable soldiers ought to be registered at the War Department.

(6) All military finance ought to be placed on the budget system.

It is impossible to emphasize too strongly the fact that all the improvements so imperatively needed by our land forces require TIME. American indifference to national defence has permitted many a golden moment to escape, and we as a people have apparently no appreciation of the Scriptural warning that peace can only be enjoyed so long as one is armed and prepared to defend one's possessions, and that when one encounters a stronger force, destruction is the in-

evitable consequence.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the arguments of pacifists are absolutely controverted by the Bible, which lays great stress upon adequate defence and upon the disaster which is bound to overtake those who refuse to heed the warnings to be prepared against war.¹⁶ The reason is not far to seek. The fundamental law of life is the law of strife, and in the supreme test might nearly always prevails. The American people have but two alternatives — either to profit by the lessons taught every day by the present European struggle and thus to avert the horrors inseparable from war, or to learn these lessons by the bitterest experiences which human beings can undergo. *Adequate preparation for war has never yet in history been made after the beginning of hostilities without unnecessary slaughter, unjustifiable expense and national peril.* IT IS ONLY IN THE YEARS OF PEACE THAT A NATION CAN BE MADE READY TO FIGHT. Germany has been the last to demonstrate this truth, whereas England has afforded a convincing proof of the well-nigh insuperable difficulties that confront any nation which fails to realize this

¹⁵ "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace:

But when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils."—*Luke*, xi, 21 and 22.

¹⁶ "Then said he unto them, But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip: and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one."—*Luke*, xxii, 36.

"Again the word of the Lord came unto me, saying,

"Son of man, speak to the children of thy people, and say unto them, When I bring the sword upon a land, if the people of the land take a man of their coasts, and set him for their watchman:

"If when he seeth the sword come upon the land, he blow the trumpet, and warn the people;

"Then whosoever heareth the sound of the trumpet, and taketh not warning; if the sword come, and take him away, his blood shall be upon his own head.

"He heard the sound of the trumpet, and took not warning; his blood shall be upon him. But he that taketh warning shall deliver his soul.

"But if the watchman see the sword come, and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned; if the sword come, and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at the watchman's hand."—*Ezekiel*, xxxiii, 1-6.

fact. In the present juncture the very minutes are precious, and Americans would do well to bear in mind Napoleon's exhortation to Colonel Colbert whom he sent on March 11, 1803, on a mission to the Emperor of Russia: "Go, sir, gallop, and don't forget that the world was made in six days. YOU CAN ASK ME FOR ANYTHING YOU LIKE EXCEPT TIME."

Under the American system of government reforms and improvements in our military organization and in our land forces must be effected by Congress. Senators and representatives but reflect the will of their constituents, and, if the American people genuinely desire adequate national defence, they need only to make known their wishes in no uncertain terms. In 1806, Prince Adam Czartoryski, the great Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that "Bonaparte is the only man in Europe who knows the value of time." It behooves us Americans to take that saying to heart and to remember that few truths have ever been uttered greater than that contained in Lord Brougham's splendid motto:

"Lose not the opportunity; by the forelock take
That subtle power of never-halting Time,
Lest the mere moment's putting off should make
Mischance almost as grave as Crime."

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. President Wilson, in his annual message to Congress on December 8, 1914, declared that, "We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms."

2. Brevet Major General Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 305. This was published by the War Department in 1904, thanks to the interest and efforts of Secretary Root, the editing being done by Major General Joseph P. Sanger, assisted by Major William D. Beach and Captain Charles D. Rhodes. General Upton's book is one of the most masterful works of the sort ever written in any language.

3. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*, I (part II), pp. 182-194; Bradley, *The Fight with France for North America*, pp. 8-15, 25-26, 113, 149-151, 233; Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, I (chapter on The Volunteers of the Eighteenth Century), pp. 3-8; Sparks, *The Writings of Washington*, vols. I and II abound in references to the Colonial militia, especially II, pp. 123-124, 149-151, 158-160, 172-177, 194-196, 207, 219, 223-226 and 250; Brady, *Colonial Fights and Fighters*, pp. 170, 172, 185-186, 198, 212, 230 and 245.

4. Huidekoper, *Some Important Colonial Military Operations* (Historical Papers of the Society of Colonial Wars in the District of Columbia, No. 8, 1914), p. 36. Compare Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution*, p. 6.

5. Parkman, *A Half a Century of Conflict*, II, p. 159. Also Sydney George Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence*, I, pp. 16 and 206-207.

6. This "was intended to be the most complete non-importation, non-exportation and non-consumption agreement that had yet been attempted."—Fisher, I, p. 234.

7. Fisher, I, pp. 217-239; Fiske, *The American Revolution*, I, pp. 110-111; Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution*, I, p. 157.

8. Fisher, I, pp. 230 and 293; Fiske, I, p. 109; Lossing, I, pp. 515-516; Upton, p. 1.

9. Upton, p. 1; Carrington, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER II

1. Carrington, p. 11; Fiske, pp. 121-126; Upton, p. 1.

2. Upton, p. 1; Carrington, p. 84.

3. Upton, p. 1.

4. The British force numbered about 3,000; the Americans, 1,500.—*Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754 to 1900*, p. 226. This work was compiled from official sources by Newton A. Strait.

5. Upton, p. 2; Carrington, pp. 92-111; Lossing, I, pp. 540-547; Fiske, I, pp. 138-144.

6. Upton, p. 2; Carrington, p. 116; Fiske, I, p. 146. Owing to the dis-

satisfaction of the British Ministry, Gage was superseded by General Howe.

7. Upton, p. 2.

8. "Fear of a standing army and corresponding jealousy of military dictation, were additional reasons for making the Continental Congress rely upon its own judgment in legislation pertaining to army matters."—Upton, p. 4.

9. These companies were "to consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, and 58 privates." They "were to be formed into regiments and battalions, each with 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 1 adjutant, and 1 quartermaster, all officers above the rank of captain being appointed by the provincial assemblies or conventions, or if in recess by the committees of safety. The militia could only be called out with the consent of the State legislatures. They were specially intended for home defense and to make head against forays of the enemy in the absence of the Regular or Continental Army."—Upton, p. 8.

10. "Such of the minute men as desired it were to be relieved by drafts from the whole body of the militia once in four months."—Upton, p. 8.

11. Upton, p. 8.

12. Four hundred commissions were sent to General Schuyler for the Northern District alone.

13. The returns show that up to November 19th only 966 men had enlisted.

14. The militia were to report in camp by December 10th and to remain in service until January 15, 1776.—Upton, p. 6.

15. "*Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides.* Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, a discharge, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be detained a few days to cross Lake George, they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity. . . . *Our army requires to be put on a different footing.*"—General Schuyler to Washington, date not given but probably the end of November or beginning of December, 1775. Sparks, *The Writings of George Washington*, III, footnote on p. 191.

16. "The reason of my giving you the trouble of this, is the late extraordinary and reprehensible conduct of some of the Connecticut troops. Some time ago, apprehending that some of them might incline to go home, when the time of their enlistment should be up, I applied to the officers of the several regiments to know whether it would be agreeable to the men to continue until the 1st of January, or until a sufficient number of other forces could be raised to supply their place, who informed me, that they believed the whole of them would readily stay till that could be effected. Having discovered last week, that they were very uneasy to leave the service, and determined upon it, I thought it expedient to summon the general officers at headquarters, and invite a delegation of the general court to be present, that suitable measures might be adopted for the defense and support of our lines. The result was that 3,000 of the minute men and militia of this province, and 2,000 men from New Hampshire, should be called in by the 10th inst.

for that purpose. With this determination the Connecticut troops were made acquainted, and requested and ordered to remain here, as the time of most of them would not be out before the 10th, when they would be relieved. Notwithstanding this, yesterday morning most of them resolved to leave the camp. Many went off, and the utmost vigilance and industry were used to apprehend them. Several got away with their arms and ammunition."—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, December 2, 1775. Sparks, III, pp. 182-183.

17. Upton, p. 7.

18. "I had like to have forgotten what sits heaviest upon my mind, the new arrangement of officers.

"Although we have now enough to constitute the new corps, it has employed the general officers and myself ever since Thursday last, and we are nearly as we began. Connecticut wants no Massachusetts men in her corps, Massachusetts thinks there is no necessity for a Rhode Islander to be introduced into hers, and New Hampshire says it is very hard that her valuable and experienced officers, who are willing to serve, should be discarded, because her own regiments under the new establishment, can not provide for them. In short, after a few days' labour, I expect that numbers of officers who have given in their names to serve, must be discarded from the Massachusetts corps, where the regiments have been numerous, and the number in them small, and that of Connecticut will be completed with a fresh recruit of officers from her own government."—*Washington to Joseph Reed*, November 8, 1775. Sparks, III, p. 150-151.

19. A committee was appointed to consult with Washington and the colonies of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. It met at Cambridge on October 18, 1775, conferred with delegates from the four Colonies and, after a consultation with Washington and his council of war, reported "that the army around Boston ought not to be less than 20,370 men, organized into 26 regiments of 8 companies each, exclusive of the artillery and riflemen." Congress apportioned these 26 regiments as follows: Sixteen to Massachusetts, 5 to Connecticut, 2 to Rhode Island, and 3 to New Hampshire. It was hoped that the regiments might be largely recruited from the troops then around Boston, the vacancies being filled by new levies."—Upton, p. 4.

20. On November 4, 1775, Congress recommended the enactment of laws prescribing "a punishment of not less than \$30 nor more than \$50 upon such as knowingly harbor deserters" and if unable to pay the fine "to be punished with whipping, not exceeding 30 lashes for each offense."—Upton, p. 7.

21. See below, pp. 147-149.

22. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 9.

23. Carrington, pp. 127-129.

24. "At this juncture three of Arnold's captains refused to serve under him any longer. Their time of service would expire at the end of the month, and there was every indication that open mutiny would replace the harmony which had thus far prevailed. An earnest appeal from Montgomery restored them to duty."—Carrington, p. 134.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

26. Carrington, pp. 121-125, 130-137; Lossing, I, pp. 190-200; Fiske, I, pp. 165-168; Upton, p. 9.

27. Upton, p. 9.
28. Upton, p. 10.
29. Sparks, III, pp. 246-247, and footnote, pp. 253-254.
30. Sparks, III, pp. 278-279.
31. "During these operations the militia of the neighborhood were called in for the short space of three days."—Upton, p. 12.
32. "During the first half of 1776 the Continental Army was increased piecemeal. January 4, 10, and 16, an additional battalion was authorized from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina, respectively; January 14, 4 battalions were called for from New York; March 25, 2 battalions were authorized in South Carolina; May 16, 2 battalions were called for from Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively, with a term of enlistment for two years, *provided the men would consent*; May 18, a regiment of rifles was authorized from Virginia; July 24, the regiment of South Carolina Rangers was taken into the Continental establishment; June 27, a regiment of rifles was created, partly composed of independent companies to be enlisted for three years."—Upton, pp. 12-13.
33. This step, being taken too late, proved futile since the Americans had to evacuate Canada on June 18th.
34. Of these New Jersey was to furnish 3,300, New York 3,000, Connecticut 5,500, and Massachusetts 2,000.
35. This camp was destined for the protection of the middle colonies and was to consist of 10,000 militia, Pennsylvania supplying 6,000, Maryland 3,400, and Delaware 600.
36. "On the 19th of July the flying camp was further increased by 4 battalions of militia from Pennsylvania, 3 from New Jersey, and 2 battalions of Continentals from Virginia."—Upton, p. 12.
37. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 13.
38. On June 12th, Congress formally appointed a permanent committee, entitled the Board of War and Ordnance, to which all military questions were to be referred and whose functions were similar to those of a Secretary of War.
39. Admiral Howe reported that he landed 15,000 men on August 22nd and a corps of Hessians on the 25th—a total of "upward of twenty thousand" according to Sir George Collier. The total British force amounted to 31,625—24,464 being "effectives fit for duty" as stated by General Clinton in the House of Commons.—Carrington, pp. 199-200.
40. The official returns of the American army on August 3rd gave a total of 17,225, but only 10,514 present for duty. On August 26th, its total nominal strength, "including the sick, non-effectives of all kinds, and those without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men." "The force on Long Island at the time of the battle, was not quite eight thousand men, inclusive of Stirling's brigade, which crossed the river in the morning."—Carrington, pp. 196, 197 and 204.
41. Carrington, pp. 207-219; Upton, p. 13.
42. Sparks, IV, p. 73; Upton, pp. 13-14.
43. Carrington, 220-228; Upton, p. 14.
44. Sparks, IV, pp. 113-115.
45. *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 115-116.
46. The resolution of September 16th directed "that 88 battalions be

enlisted as soon as possible to serve during the present war." A bounty of \$20 was offered to every non-commissioned officer and man so enlisting and land, ranging from 500 acres for a colonel down to 100 acres for non-commissioned officers and soldiers, was promised to all who served until the conclusion of the war. The States were to make original appointments of officers or those to fill vacancies, the actual commissions being issued by Congress. The jealousy and discontent aroused in the Continental troops during the previous year by the same system were thus perpetuated."—Upton, p. 17.

46. On November 21st, Congress authorized the States to enlist men "for three years," but timidly volunteered the opinion that it would be to the advantage of the service if the enlistments were for the period "during the war."

47. No less than seven resolutions were devoted to bounties, viz: those of January 19th, June 26th, July 16th, September 16th, October 8th, October 30th, and November 12th. The bounties were doubled between January and July, and again doubled on September 16th.

48. "If, in the days of the Revolution, an officer's promotion could not be urged even by a Washington, it is worthy of remark that with certain State governors, during the War of the Rebellion, the combined recommendations of division, corps, and army commanders were powerless to influence the advancement of officers of known skill and ability."—Upton, p. 18.

49. The American force, which had evacuated Montreal on June 18th, (footnote 33) had been followed by a British force under Carleton to Crown Point from which it fell back to Canada on November 2nd. One of Howe's objects was to prevent this body from re-enforcing Washington at New York.

50. The general returns made at Trenton on December 1st showed that Washington's "command consisted of four brigades, including sixteen regiments, and numbered with officers and staff, four thousand three hundred and thirty-four, of whom one thousand and twenty-nine were sick, and two-thirds of the sick absent."—Carrington, p. 256.

51. Upton, p. 19.

52. Washington's report of December 28, 1776.

53. *American State Papers*, XIII, p. 15, and Upton, p. 20.

54. Upton, p. 20. C. Stedman, who served on the British General Staff under Howe, Clinton, and Cornwallis, in his *History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of the American War*, I, p. 317, gives the maximum British force during 1776 as 27,700.

55. Recommended by Washington in his letter of December 20, 1776, to the President of Congress (Sparks, IV, pp. 234-235). The 88 battalions voted on September 16th (page 560, footnote 45) were thus augmented by twenty-two.

56. "This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis, and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigor, and uprightedness of General Washington, do hereby

"Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of in-

fantry; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light-horse, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American Army; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the Army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the Continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and to return to the States, of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offenses, together with the witnesses to prove them. That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington, for and during the term of six months from the date hereof, unless sooner determined by Congress."

57. Washington's report of that date emphasized the fact that only 981 were regulars and that the terms of service of the militia would expire on March 31st.

58. By May 24th, his force had been increased to 7,500.

59. On July 28th, Congress recommended to the Executive Council of Pennsylvania "to call out 4,000 militia in addition to those already called forth," and on August 24th it "urgently recommended to the State of Maryland to immediately call out not less than 2,000 select militia to repel the invasion of the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware." It likewise requested Pennsylvania to furnish the army with 4,000 and Delaware with 1,000 militia, and eight counties in Virginia near Chesapeake Bay were asked to contribute one-third of their forces. These urgent calls produced exactly one small brigade of militia for the army at the Brandywine.

60. "Early in the year delegates from the New England States, which met for consultation in regard to their joint interests at Providence, recommended that the States represented should add a bounty of thirty-three and one-third dollars to the Continental bounty of \$20 already authorized for the 88 battalions created in 1776. Massachusetts and New Hampshire doubled this extra bounty, making a total of eighty-six and two-thirds dollars for each recruit. *Thus within a year the bounty had become more than twenty-fold greater.*

"*This increase at once put a stop to re-enlistments in the old regiments, as the men naturally went home to secure the State bounty, and would not take the smaller sum offered by Congress. Further than this, the large State bounties shook the allegiance of the soldier to his colors.*" Desertions became so numerous that on April 6th, Washington had to issue a proclamation "offering free pardon to all . . . who shall voluntarily surrender themselves to any officer of the Continental Army or join their respective corps before the 15th day of May next."—Upton, p. 28.

61. On July 31st, Congress recommended "the executive authorities of the United States to divide their respective States into districts and to appoint a proper person in each district to fill up the regiments . . ."

"It also recommended that the legislative authorities should desig-

nate in their respective States convenient places of rendezvous for recruits and deserters. . . .”

“This division of States into districts and establishments of rendezvous or depots, had some analogy to the territorial distribution and recruitment of troops now adopted by every European nation.”—Upton, p. 28.

62. September 17, 1777.

63. “To stimulate recruiting, Congress on the 14th of April recommended that each State legislature ‘enact laws exempting from actual service any two of the militia who should, within the time limited by such laws, furnish one able-bodied recruit to serve in any battalion of the Continental Army for three years or during the war; said exemption to continue during the term of enlistment, the recruit to have the Continental bounty and other allowances.’

“It is also recommended ‘that State legislatures enact laws compelling all such persons as are by laws exempted from bearing arms or performing military duties, other than such as are specified in the foregoing resolution, to furnish such number of able-bodied soldiers as said legislature shall deem a proper equivalent for such exemption; such soldiers to be entitled to the Continental bounty and *other allowances over and above such gratuities as they may receive* from those who procure them to enlist.’”

In other words, the Government, although not ready to recommend a draft, took a step in that direction by obligating certain individuals—not States—to furnish a certain number of troops.—Upton, pp. 27-28.

64. *Washington to Thomas Wharton*, October 17, 1777. Sparks, V, pp. 95-97.

65. Approximately 18,000 men.—Carrington, p. 366; Fiske, I, p. 309.

66. “The nominal strength of the American army . . . was fourteen thousand men, but the effective force did not exceed eleven thousand.”—Carrington, p. 366.

67. On December 19th. On the 23rd Washington reported that “only 8,200 men were present fit for duty.”

68. 5,763 officers and men.

69. According to Gates’ report of October 16th, his army numbered 9,093 regulars and 4,123 militia, a total of 13,216 present for duty. The value of trained troops was demonstrated anew by the success achieved.

More than to any other officer present—Gates included—was the credit for this notable victory due to the gallant Benedict Arnold, then the hero of the American troops.

70. Notwithstanding the attempt to relieve him made by Clinton from New York.—Fiske, I, pp. 334-335; Carrington, pp. 356-361.

An extremely interesting account of the battle of Saratoga is given by Sir Edward Creasy in his *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, pp. 297-324.

71. Each State could, with the assent of Congress, maintain its own army and navy in time of peace, while the power to carry on war was made to depend upon the concurrence of at least nine States. The power “to raise men, and clothe, arm and equip them at the expense of the United States” being relinquished to the several States, the

national Treasury was thus placed at the mercy of every State agent. Moreover, since Congress was prohibited from enlisting a soldier, levying a tax or enforcing a requisition for men or money, any legislature could neutralize the power of any other State, "if not defeat the chief object of the Confederation."—Upton, p. 32.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *American State Papers*, XII, p. 15; Upton, p. 27.

74. He arrived at Valley Forge on February 27th, 1778.

75. Carrington, p. 403.

76. Upton, p. 33.

77. The character of the men thus obtained was markedly inferior to the previous recruits—many of them being deserters.

78. At Valley Forge, 11,800—including the sick and those subject to call upon emergency; at Wilmington, 1,400; on the North River, 1,800.—Sparks, V, p. 360, footnote.

79. Washington estimated the total strength of the enemy at 16,000 (Sparks, *ibid.*) but, according to the *original returns in the British Record Office*, the effective British forces on March 26, 1778, were 33,576, divided as follows: at Philadelphia, 19,530; at New York, 10,456; in Rhode Island, 3,770.

80. *Vide* Washington's letter to John Barrister, April 21, 1778. Sparks, V, pp. 321-322.

81. Free negroes had been accepted for service since the beginning of the Revolution. The enlistment of slaves was practised both by the North and the South during the War of the Rebellion.

82. *Washington to Benjamin Harrison*, December 30, 1778. Sparks, VI, p. 152.

83. In conformity with a further resolution, \$80,000 were placed in the hands of William Palfrey, Paymaster-General of the Army, to disburse these bounties.

84. This fleet, which carried 4,000 troops, sailed from Toulon on April 13th, but owing to contrary winds it did not pass Gibraltar until May 15th, reaching the Delaware Capes on July 8th, just too late to prevent Admiral Howe's escape.

85. The opposing forces were about equal. The British lost in killed, wounded and missing, 365; the Americans 362.

86. 800 Hessians deserted during this retreat. Clinton's losses from various causes from the time he evacuated Philadelphia until he reached New York "were little less than two thousand men."—Carrington, p. 458.

87. Arriving on July 22nd.

88. The British garrison consisted of 6,000 men under General Pigott, supported by seven frigates.

89. Sullivan unwisely detained the French fleet in the offing and neglected the proper military courtesies to his ally while he was maturing his plan for the land operations. Moreover, he had notified the French Admiral that he would not attack until August 10th. The precipitate landing of the Americans thus disconcerted the plans already agreed upon.

90. On August 5th, part of the French fleet entered Newport harbour.

91. According to the circular issued by Sullivan on July 23rd, his

command consisted of 8,974 officers and men. The French troops numbered 4,000.

92. Stedman, II, p. 32.

93. D'Estaing's letter to Sullivan, August 20th, and his report to the President of Congress.

94. Carrington, p. 453. D'Estaing's course gave rise to much indignation on the part of the American public and to the charge that he had basely deserted Sullivan—a charge utterly unjustified in view of his orders to make the port of Boston in case of severe injury by storm or in action.

95. Arriving on September first.

96. Numbering 3,500 men who left New York on November 27th under convoy of Commodore Hyde Parker, later the British commander at the battle of Copenhagen.

97. Upton, p. 34; Carrington, pp. 459-460.

98. 32,893 Continentals and 18,153 militia, a total of 51,046.—*American State Papers*, I (Military Affairs) and XII, p. 16; Upton, p. 34.

99. Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by Carrington, footnotes on pp. 411 and 462.

100. On January 23rd, 1779.

101. March 9th.

102. The apportionment of these 88 battalions among the States is given by Upton, p. 39.

103. The resolution ran thus:

“That a bounty of two hundred dollars out of the Continental Treasury shall be granted to each recruit who after January 23d hath enlisted or shall enlist during the war, or in case the State shall have granted as great or greater bounty the said two hundred dollars for each recruit shall be passed to the credit of the State for whose quota he shall be raised.”

104. On May 3rd.

105. Virginia reserved to herself the bounty and clothing given by Congress, which was tantamount to confiscating them.

106. Contained in his letter of June 9, 1779, to the Board of War.—Sparks, VI, footnote pp. 198-199.

107. On June 22nd.

108. See above, p. 22. In January, 1779, paper currency advanced from seven to one as compared with specie to nine to one; by the end of the year it stood at forty-five to one.

109. Recommended by the resolution of May 15, 1778. See above, p. 22.

110. Resolution of August 17th, which further instituted the payment of pensions to widows of officers and men killed in service.

111. Upton, p. 43.

112. So much so that, on October 21, 1780, Congress deemed it urgent to repeat its resolution.

113. *Washington to the Committee of Congress*, January 15, 1779.—Sparks, VI, p. 160.

114. *American State Papers*, XII, p. 17; Report of General Knox, Secretary of War, *American State Papers*, Military Affairs, vol. I; Upton, p. 40.

The quotas required amounted to 38,624. Only two-thirds were furnished to the Continental Army, the strength of which was 10,000 men less than the preceding year.

115. The maximum of the British effective strength that year was reached on December 1st. In New York and its dependencies were 28,756 troops; in Georgia, 3,930; in west Florida, 1,787, a total of 34,473.—*Original returns in the British Record Office.*

116. It numbered 2,600 men, who were convoyed from New York by Sir George Collier's fleet. It landed at New Haven on July 5th, spent four days in destruction, crossed to Huntington, Long Island, for stores, returned on the 11th, destroyed Norwalk and was back in New York on the 13th.

117. July 16th.

118. On August 19th, by a force of 400 under Major Henry Lee. Paulus Hook is situated opposite New York where Jersey City now stands.

119. On December 29, 1778. See above, p. 24.

120. July 20, 1779.

121. This expedition consisted of 2,000 troops and 500 marines. It sailed from New York late in April and reached Hampton Roads on May 9th.—Carrington, p. 466.

122. Carrington, p. 465.

123. "The whole British force in Savannah, including a few militia, some Indians and three hundred negroes, was two thousand eight hundred and fifty."—Lossing, II, p. 739, footnote 1.

124. Memoirs of Generals Lee and Moultrie.

125. 2,823 French and 2,127 Americans, a total of 4,950.

126. On October 29th.

127. December 26th.

128. 7,500 was the number reported in London and given by Carrington, pp. 483, 494-495. The convoy consisted of 14 ships under Admiral Arbuthnot.

129. Upton, p. 39; Carrington, pp. 476-483; Lossing, II, pp. 734-739.

130. The States were required to furnish 80 battalions amounting to 41,760 men; the number enlisted was only 26,826.—*American State Papers*, and Upton, p. 47.

131. In April, May, June, and July, 1780, paper currency stood at sixty as compared with specie; in November it reached one hundred. In May, 1781, it ceased to circulate entirely. "When this fatal result could no longer be averted, Congress, in March, 1780, tried to set on foot a new scheme of finance, and with five millions of specie sought to redeem, at the rate of forty to one, the two hundred millions of currency which represented the labor and privations of a patriotic people during five years of war."—Upton, p. 50.

132. "*In 1780 the cost of a hat was \$400, a suit of clothes \$1,600, while the year's pay of a captain would not buy a pair of shoes.*"—Upton, p. 51.

133. October 21st.

134. Passed August 17, 1779. See above, p. 25.

135. On the reduced footing contemplated, the Army was to consist of 49 regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, 4 of artillery, and one of

artificers. The quotas assigned to the various States need not be set forth here; they will be found in Upton, p. 48.

136. The plundering of the national Treasury — alluded to in footnote 71 — progressed to such an extent that Congress authorized, in July, 1779, the States to scrutinize and in case of misbehavior to discharge persons in the departments of the Quartermaster or Commissary General. This step was one of those leading to the reorganization of the Quartermaster's department in July, 1780. "The new system was adopted in opposition to the report of a Congressional committee which had perfected a plan after full consultation with Washington and Greene. It established no check to corruption, but rather increased it by recognizing the paramount authority of the States, under the Confederation, in every matter pertaining to the supply of men and means for the prosecution of the war."—Upton, p. 51.

137. Congress, seeing that its credit was diminishing owing to the extent to which paper currency had been emitted, endeavoured to replenish the Treasury through the medium of taxes levied by the States, but, when these failed to produce the desired result, it had no other alternative than to requisition from the States the supplies actually needed. The responsibility was thus shifted to the States and their credit with the people was but little stronger than that of Congress. Within a short time public faith both in Continental and State currencies had vanished, and people refused to part with their property for valueless money. It then became necessary to resort to forcible impressment, which was sanctioned by Congressional resolution and State laws.

When dictatorial powers were first conferred upon Washington in 1776 (see footnote 56) he was authorized "to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the Army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same," and he was additionally empowered to arrest and confine any person refusing to accept Continental money or disaffected toward the American cause. In the second grant of dictatorial powers in 1777 (see page 20) he was authorized within a distance of 70 miles from his headquarters "to take, wherever he may be, all such provisions and other articles as may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of the army under his command, paying or giving certificates for the same."

Aside from the manifest injustice of these impressment laws, they exercised a pernicious influence upon the discipline of the troops who often yielded to the temptation to plunder in the most outrageous fashion. To protect the lives and property of the inhabitants, the officers had no alternative except to inflict illegal and summary punishment — a course which Washington was obliged to sanction in order to put an effectual check to the licentiousness indulged in by the soldiers.

Vide Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, II, pp. 207-208, and Upton, pp. 52-53.

138. Upton, p. 53.

139. A statement as true to-day as it was then.

140. Sparks, VII, pp. 162-165.

141. On September 15th.

142. Sparks, VII, pp. 205-206.

143. See above, p. 27.
144. It was not until March 12th that the British established themselves across the narrow neck between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, but Clinton deferred action until he had been joined by General Paterson and 1,400 men from Savannah.
145. On the night of April first.
146. On April 18th, Lord Cornwallis arrived from New York with 3,000 troops to re-enforce Clinton.
147. 2,200 regulars and 1,000 militia are the figures quoted by Carrington, p. 404. Lossing does not give its strength.
148. The schedule made by Deputy Adjutant-General John André enumerates 5,618 prisoners.
149. Carrington, pp. 493-497; Lossing, II, pp. 762-767.
150. On June 5th.
151. Carrington, pp. 506-509.
152. This force, numbering 1,400, had left Morristown, N. J., on April 16th, going by water to Petersburg, Va., and reaching Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N. C., on July 6th.
153. The victor of Saratoga. See above, p. 20.
154. "On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consulting Washington, appointed General Gates to the command of the Southern Department. He had spent the winter at his home in Virginia, but eagerly accepted this high command. His old confidant and companion in arms, Charles Lee, sententiously forewarned him on his departure: 'Take care that you do not exchange northern laurels for southern willows.'" — Carrington, p. 492.
155. The British numbered 2,239 men, according to Cornwallis' report, while the American returns made the night before the battle showed a force of only 3,052 — a fact of which General Gates was in total ignorance until that moment.
156. Cornwallis reported his losses as 324 killed, wounded and missing. The exact loss of the Americans was never ascertained but, so far as can be estimated, it consisted of 736 officers and men, 1,000 prisoners, 8 field pieces, 2,000 muskets and the entire baggage train. Generals de Kalb, Gregory, and Rutherford were killed.—Carrington, pp. 517-518; Lossing, II, p. 673, and footnote 2 on p. 674.
157. Carrington, p. 517.
158. Out of 400 men, Sumter had 50 killed and 300 captured.—Carrington, pp. 511, 512 and 518; Lossing, II, p. 660.
159. Composed of 1,125 men.—Lossing, II, p. 634.
160. Numbering about 1,600 men.
161. Carrington, pp. 520-521; Lossing, II, pp. 631-635.
162. At Blackstock's plantation, on the Tiger River, November 20th.
163. "The remnants of General Gates' army were being re-organized as rapidly as possible, and before the departure of that officer to answer before a Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, as to the disaster of Camden, he had collected a nominal force of two thousand three hundred and seven men, more than half of whom were militia, and as afterwards stated by General Greene, 'but eight hundred in the whole force were properly clothed and equipped.'" — Carrington, p. 522.
164. Carrington, pp. 486-488.
165. "The soldiers had not been paid for five months; their families

were suffering; recruiting was almost suspended."—Carrington, p. 488.

166. "On the twenty-fifth of May two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they would march home, 'or at least gain subsistence by the point of the bayonet.'"—*Ibid.*, p. 491.

167. According to the original returns in the British Record Office, the English had 17,324 effective troops in New York on May 1, 1780. At the beginning of April, Washington's force amounted "to only 10,400 rank and file," of which about 2,800 had but four weeks longer to serve.—*Washington to the President of Congress*, April 2, 1780. Sparks, VI, p. 6.

168. In a letter to Joseph Jones, dated Morristown, 31 May, 1780, Washington set forth some plain truths about the prevailing conditions:

"Certain I am, unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone, unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the States respectively act with more energy than they hitherto have done, that our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill timing the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and, while such a system as the present one or rather want of one prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.

"... I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which, instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are considering themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect, which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and I am fearful of the consequences."—Sparks, VII, pp. 67-68.

169. On May 12th.

170. On June 6th by General Knyphausen, and on the 21st by Clinton.

171. Carrington, p. 504.

172. Carrington, p. 523.

173. On September 23rd, and October 2nd, respectively.

174. September 25th.

175. *Washington to the President of Congress*, November 28, 1780.—Sparks, VII, pp. 313-315.

176. *Washington to General Greene*, December 13.—Sparks, VII, p. 321.

177. 21,015 Continentals and 22,061 militia, a total of 42,076.—*American State Papers*, Military Affairs, vol. I; Upton, pp. 47-48.

As has already been seen (footnote 130) the men furnished to the Continental Army were only about half the quotas required. It is also noteworthy that the militia—the majority of which was used in the South—outnumbered the regulars, and that the total of the troops under arms was slightly over 1,000 more than the number furnished during 1779.

178. Washington, in writing to John Banister on April 21, 1778, said: "There are one or two points more, upon which I will add an observation or two. The first is, the indecision of Congress and the delay used in coming to determinations on matters referred to them. . . . The other point is, the *jealousy* which Congress unhappily entertains of the army, and which, if reports are right, some members labor to establish. You may be assured, there is nothing more injurious, or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a State. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of *peace*, and these from their not having in general cases any of the ties, the concerns, or interests of citizens, or any other dependence, than what flowed from their military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of *war*; though they are citizens, having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most cases property totally unconnected with the military line.—Sparks, V, p. 328.

179. In conformity with the Congressional resolution of October 3, 1780. See above, p. 27 and footnote 135.

189. See p. 33.

181. "The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed, without proper clothing, to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.

"This situation was common to the whole army, whether in the northern or southern service; and had been of such long continuance, that scarcely the hope of a change could be indulged."—John Marshall, *Life of George Washington*, IV, p. 392.

182. Six regiments.

183. 1,300 men and six guns.

184. "1. To discharge all those, who had enlisted indefinitely for three years, or during the war; the fact to be inquired into by three commissioners to be appointed by the executive, and to be ascertained, where the original enlistment could not be produced, by the oath of the soldier. 2. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation of their pay, and to settle arrearages as soon as circumstances would admit. 3. To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles of clothing, which were greatly wanted."—Sparks, VII, p. 359, footnote.

185. The mutineers stipulated that they should appoint three additional commissioners to determine, in conjunction with the others, what soldiers were to be discharged.

186. In punishment, Congress disbanded the Pennsylvania troops, and the six regiments which that State was required to furnish were not assembled before March, 1781.

Accounts of this mutiny are given by Sparks, VII, pp. 359-387; Fiske, II, pp. 240-242; Carrington, pp. 537-538; Upton, pp. 55-56.

187. January 24th to 28th, 1781.

188. Sparks, VII, pp. 380-382, 385-388, 560-566; Fiske, II, pp. 242-243; Upton, p. 56.

189. Carrington, p. 538.

190. On December 1, 1780, Clinton had 17,729 effective troops in

New York according to the original returns in the British Record Office.

191. The slenderness of Washington's force, the blockade of the French at Newport and the non-arrival of their second division compelled the allies to remain on the defensive in the north. On the other hand, as Carrington points out (p. 535), "the French army in America sustained an important relation to this period. It prevented General Clinton from risking the offensive, and to the same extent lessened the zeal of the New England people in the preparation for troops for the new campaign, because the urgency of their employment did not appear immediate and absolute."

192. Who had wintered at Winstanborough (see above, p. 32). According to official returns, his force on January 15, 1781, numbered 3,224.

193. "Tarleton's entire force consisted of about eleven hundred well-disciplined men, and in every particular he had the advantage of Morgan."—Lossing, II, p. 638.

194. Cornwallis reported a loss of 100 killed and 529 captured, but omits mention of his wounded. In addition Tarleton lost 2 colors, 2 guns, 35 wagons, 100 horses, and 800 muskets. The American casualties were confined to 12 killed and 60 wounded.—Carrington, p. 545; Lossing, II, p. 642.

195. General Leslie with 1,100 men from Charleston joined him on January 18th and 19th.

196. Including Morgan's command, it numbered 1,703 men. In a letter to Sumter, dated January 15, 1781, General Greene remarked that "More than half our members are in a manner naked; so much so that we can not put them on the least kind of duty. Indeed there is a great number that have not a rag of clothes on them except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, around their waists."

197. On December 19, 1780, Lieutenant-Colonels Simcoe and Dundas were attached to the expedition, as Clinton did not place any too much reliance on Arnold.

198. Carrington, pp. 548-549; Lossing, II, pp. 433-436.

199. His army then consisted of 4,004 men, of which 1,490 were regular infantry and 161 regular cavalry.—Carrington, p. 556.

200. Numbering "twenty-four hundred men, chiefly veterans."—Lossing, II, p. 606.

201. The consensus of opinion among writers is that the British never fought more splendidly than at Guilford Court House. Compare Stedman, II, pp. 385-386; Marshall, IV, p. 379.

202. Greene, III, pp. 196-205; Stedman, II, 375-385; Carrington, pp. 556-564; Lossing, II, pp. 606-612.

203. The British loss was 544 killed and wounded, Cornwallis and Leslie being the only general officers not wounded. The total American casualties were 1,311. The 921 missing in Greene's force were generally accounted for as having fled to their homes.—Carrington, pp. 562-564; Lossing, II, pp. 609-612. Greene, III, p. 205, places the total casualties at 1,255.

204. Carrington, p. 564.

205. Fort Watson, on the Santee River, capitulated to Lee and Marion on April 23rd.

206. Near Camden, South Carolina.

207. Carrington, pp. 570-574; Lossing, II, pp. 678-680.

208. Lossing estimated Greene's forces as "about fifteen hundred men"; Carrington gives it as 1,446. Both agree in placing Rawdon's command at "about 900 men." The American casualties were 271, the British, 258.

209. Stedman, II, p. 401.

210. Sumter occupied Orangeburg on May 11th; Fort Mott surrendered to Lee and Marion on the 12th; and Lee reduced Granby on the 15th.

211. Carrington, p. 574.

212. On June 21st.

213. To about 2,600 men.

214. On August 22nd.

215. Lossing, II, pp. 700-704; Carrington, pp. 578-582. The latter says that "the American army was superior in numbers, and was well-officered." According to Strait, p. 227, Greene had 2,000 men, and lost 555 in killed, wounded and missing.

The casualties of the British — then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, who had succeeded Lord Rawdon — were "85 killed, 70 wounded, and 538 made prisoners."

216. This officer had arrived in the Chesapeake on March 26th with 2,000 troops from New York and instructions from Clinton to report to Cornwallis.

217. Carrington, p. 565.

218. On May 20th. There he made his junction with Phillips' force which had arrived on the 8th but, as this general had died on the 13th, the command of his troops had been assumed for the interim by Arnold. Cornwallis brought 1,435 men with him, Arnold had 1,553 of his own, and 2,116 formerly under Phillips, and on May 26 Leslie joined him with 2,278 from Portsmouth and Norfolk, thus making the total force under Cornwallis 7,382.

219. 1,200 Pennsylvania Continentals and 1,000 militia under Baron von Steuben and General Muhlenberg.—Muhlenberg, *Life of Major General Peter Muhlenberg*, pp. 246 and 407.

220. On February 20th Lafayette was sent from the Hudson with part of the Pennsylvania line which had mutinied (see page 33) to capture Benedict Arnold. On April 29th he reached Richmond, and on May 18th he received orders to assume command in Virginia.

221. On April 19th, Lieut.-Colonel Simcoe with the Queen's Rangers landed at Burwell's Ferry and on the 20th attacked Williamsburg. The Virginia militia posted at both places fled ignominiously.—Carrington, p. 589; Lossing, II, p. 543; Simcoe's *Journal*, pp. 189-192; Tower, *The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, II, p. 291.

222. Whose command consisted of about 800 Pennsylvania Continentals and some militia.

223. On July 6th.

224. Washington's diary and memorandum on the conference.—Sparks, VIII, pp. 54, 517-519.

225. July 21st to 23rd. On July 2nd and 3rd a demonstration had been made against New York by General Lincoln, supported by Washington. On the 6th Rochambeau's army effected its junction with the Americans.

226. Washington's diary.—Sparks, VIII, p. 134.

227. On August 1st, Cornwallis had 9,433 troops in Virginia; on September 1st, 8,885, according to the original returns in the British Record Office.

228. His fleet consisted of 28 ships of the line, besides frigates and transports.

229. When Admiral Rodney, who commanded the British naval forces in the West Indies, heard of de Grasse's proposed movement, he promptly sent Admiral Sir Samuel Hood with 14 ships of the line to intercept him. Hood outsailed the French, reached the Chesapeake three days before de Grasse's arrival, looked into Delaware Bay and reached New York on August 28th. Admiral Graves, his superior, had only 5 ships fit for service, but, assuming command of the combined fleet, sailed from New York on August 31st, hoping to intercept Admiral Comte de Barras, who, he had been informed, had started from Newport for the Chesapeake on the 27th.

230. This Admiral had 7 ships of the line and 14 transports carrying 800 marines under General de Choisy, as well as siege guns and stores of utmost importance to the Allies. De Barras only arrived on September 10th.

231. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, pp. 388-392. Mahan pertinently remarks (p. 392) that "On the French side De Grasse must be credited with a degree of energy, foresight, and determination surprising in view of his failures at other times."

232. The first troops arrived on the 18th. The total force was 12,000 regulars and militia in excess of 4,000.

233. About 2,000 men. It left New York on September 4th.

234. September 6th.

235. Officers and men, 7,073, to which were added 900 officers and sailors, a total of 7,973, according to the statement of the commissary of prisoners based on the original muster rolls.

Cornwallis, being ill, was not present at the surrender.

236. Fiske, II, p. 283.

237. Among the trophies were 75 brass guns, 69 iron guns, 18 German and 6 British regimental standards, a military chest containing £2,113, 4 ships, 30 transports, 15 galleys and many smaller vessels.

238. Just as he did when he endeavoured to relieve Bourgoyne in 1777. See above, footnote 70.

239. See above, pages 19, 21-25, 27, 34.

240. The quotas required of the States for 1781 amounted to 33,408 men. Of these only 13,292 Continentals and 7,298 militia, a total of 20,590, were furnished. In addition to the above, 8,750 militia were employed, making a grand total of 29,340.—*American State Papers*, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p. 57.

241. Original returns in the British Record Office.

242. Fiske, II, p. 284.

243. January 20, 1783, when the preliminaries of peace between Great Britain, France, and Spain were signed at Versailles, and between Great Britain and the United States at Paris.

Preliminary articles between England and the United States had previously been signed at Paris on November 30th.

244. King George vowed that he would not give up Georgia or the cities of Charleston and New York. Lord Rockingham, however,

brought such pressure to bear that Savannah was evacuated on July 11, 1782, and Charleston on December 14th, New York, on the other hand, was retained by the British until November 25, 1783.

245. In 1782, 33,408 troops were required of the States and 18,006 furnished; in 1783 out of 33,808 only 13,477 were supplied.—*American State Papers*, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p. 58.

246. Which had officially announced a cessation of arms on April 11th.
247. Sparks, VIII, Appendix XIII.

248. Lodge, *Story of the Revolution*, Appendix II, pp. 583-588.

249. Sparks, VIII, pp. 491-496.

250. Upton, p. 64; Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 53.

251. Fiske, p. 53; Sparks, VIII, pp. 504-505.

CHAPTER III

1. 1776.

2. See above, page 19.

3. Page 19.

4. Upton, p. 61. Compare Washington's declarations, pp. 17 and 570, footnote 178.

5. See above, page 9, footnote.

6. Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; *American State Papers*, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p. 58.

The number of soldiers recruited to the Continental Army during the Revolution was as follows:

Massachusetts	67,907	New Jersey	10,726
Connecticut	31,939	North Carolina	7,263
Virginia	26,678	South Carolina	6,417
Pennsylvania	25,678	Rhode Island	5,908
New York	17,781	Georgia	2,679
Maryland	13,912	Delaware	2,386
New Hampshire	12,497		
		Total	231,771

In the figures given by Carrington, p. 653, Massachusetts is stated as having furnished 69,907, so that his total is 233,771.

7. *American State Papers*, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p. 58.

8. Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by Carrington, pp. 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646.

9. Upton, p. 66; Ingersoll, *The Second War*, I, p. 14. The cost per capita was \$123 as against \$96 for the War of the Rebellion.

10. Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1913, p. 9. His report for 1914 does not mention this item.

11. Upton, p. 59.

12. Upton, pp. 66-67; Carrington, pp. 647-656; Huidekoper, *Is the United States Prepared for War?* p. 21, *North American Review* for February and March, 1906, and republished, in May, 1907, in pamphlet form, with an introduction by Hon. William H. Taft.

CHAPTER IV

1. Circular letter addressed to the Governors of all the States on disbanding the army, dated Newburg, 8 June, 1783.—Sparks, VIII, p. 450.

2. On June 2, 1784, Congress resolved

"That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates to guard the stores at Fort Pitt and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point, and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms: *Provided*: That Congress before its recess shall not take other measures respecting the disposition of those troops."

3. Upton, p. 69.

4. On the following day, June 3, 1784, Congress passed this preamble and resolution:

"Whereas a body of troops to consist of 700 noncommissioned officers and privates, properly officered, are immediately and indispensably necessary for securing and protecting the northwestern frontiers of the United States, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty:

"*Resolved*, That it be and it is hereby recommended to the States hereafter named, and as most conveniently situated, to furnish forthwith from their militia, 700 men, to serve for twelve months, unless sooner discharged, in the following proportions: Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; Pennsylvania, 260; making in the whole 700.

"*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War take order for forming the said troops when assembled into one regiment to consist of eight companies of infantry and two of cavalry, arming and equipping them in a soldier-like manner."

5. On April 1, 1785, Congress resolved

"That it is necessary that a body of troops consisting of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years unless sooner discharged, for the protection of the Northwestern frontiers, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians and to prevent unwarranted intrusion thereon, and for guarding the public stores."

On April 7th and 12th, further legislation designated the States to furnish the recruits and defined the organization of this new regular regiment which eventually became the Third United States Infantry.

6. October 20, 1786.

7. 1,340 non-commissioned officers and privates, enlisted for three years.

8. "To consist of 2,040." This scheme of a Legion was suggested by General Anthony Wayne.

9. Of infantry and artillery, New Hampshire was required to furnish 260 men, Massachusetts 660, Rhode Island 120, and Connecticut 180, while Maryland and Virginia were each to supply 60 cavalry.

10. An attempt to overawe the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was made at Springfield in September, 1786, by a body of 600 men led by Daniel Shays, many of them veterans and all of them clamouring for the cancellation of debts, being determined to resist taxation under the State laws. After drilling for two months at Worcester and committing innumerable depredations, this force, swelled to 2,000, marched on Springfield, hoping to seize from the Federal arsenal the necessary arms

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to enforce their demands. On January 25, 1787, an attack was made, but a hot artillery fire from 1,200 militia under General Shepherd produced a panic in their ranks, and a vigorous pursuit by 4,400 militia under General Lincoln — which had been called out by Governor Bowdoin but had to be equipped by private subscription — resulted in the capture and dispersal of the rebels.— Fiske, *Critical Period of American History*, pp. 195-198.

Upton fittingly remarks (p. 71) that “the present exposed condition of all our great arsenals finds its condemnation in the history of this brief rebellion.”

It was apropos of this outbreak that John Adams declared that “NATIONAL DEFENSE IS ONE OF THE CARDINAL DUTIES OF A STATESMAN.”

11. October 3, 1787.

12. These troops, together with the 2 companies of artillery previously raised, were organized into a regiment of infantry and a battalion of artillery.

13. Fiske, pp. 203-238.

14. On July 26, 1788, eleven States had ratified the Constitution and it thus became the supreme and organic law of the land. North Carolina did not ratify it until November 21, 1789, nor Rhode Island until May 29, 1790.— Fiske, p. 385.

15. Namely, Article I, Sections 1, 4, 7, 8, and 10; Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3; Article IV, Section 4; and Article VI.

16. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 74.

17. The Act approved August 7, 1789.

18. John F. Callan, *The Military Laws of the United States*, pp. 85-86.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

20. “As the Continental troops during the Revolution were never maintained in sufficient strength, it was necessary to fall back on the militia to meet current emergencies, and when Indian wars had to be dealt with after the Revolution the same system was continued as involving the least expense. Thus, as events soon proved, a shortsighted and mistaken economy was to jeopardize the lives and property of our hardy settlers on the frontier.”— Upton, p. 75.

21. Numbering respectively 962 and 321 officers and men.

22. His force was composed of 320 regulars and 1,133 militia. On October 22, 1790, he attacked the Miami village near Fort Wayne, Indiana, using only 60 regulars and 340 militia. The Court of Inquiry exonerated Harmar but found that the militia misbehaved, disobeyed orders and left the Regulars to be sacrificed. The evidence also showed that many of the militia were “old, infirm men and young boys” or “substitutes.”

Upton trenchantly observes (pp. 77-78) that “The story of this expedition must convince us that the characteristic features of our Revolutionary military policy were in no wise dependent upon the magnitude of the operations involved. Whether from indifference or inability to appreciate the value of discipline and instruction, WE HAVE NEVER YET BEEN ABLE TO UTILIZE THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPANSION NOW SO SUCCESSFULLY APPLIED IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION BY OTHER CIVILIZED NATIONS.

“Under the law of April, 1790, the President could not add a single

soldier to the Regular Army, while his authority to call our raw troops perhaps largely composed of "old, infirm men, and young boys," with officers to match, was solely limited by his discretion. At this very time, by increasing the enlisted strength of each company from 76 to 200, the three-battalion regiment of infantry and the battalion of artillery were capable of expansion to more than 3,200 men. Instead of being able to adopt this simple and economical expedient, the President had no other alternative than to call out militia, the records of the Court of Inquiry bearing eloquent testimony as to the result."

23. Act of March 3, 1791. The enlisted men were limited to 912.

24. "Sec. 8. That if the President should be of opinion that it will be conducive to the public service to employ troops enlisted under the denomination of levies, in addition to, or in place of, the militia which, in virtue of the powers vested in him by law, he is authorized to call into the service of the United States, it shall be lawful for him to raise, for a term not exceeding six months (to be discharged sooner if the public service will permit), a corps not exceeding two thousand noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians, with a suitable number of commissioned officers. And in case it shall appear probable to the President that the regiment directed to be raised by the aforesaid act, and by this act, will not be completed in time to prosecute such military operations as exigencies may require, it shall be lawful for the President to make a substitute for the deficiency by raising such farther number of levies or by calling into the service of the United States such a body of militia as shall be equal thereto."

"Section 12 gave \$3 bounty to each enlisted man of the 'levies,' and section 14 gave recruiting officers \$2 for each man enlisted in the regulars."—Upton, p. 79; Callan, pp. 90-91.

25. "During the Revolution the regular troops or Continentals were largely supplemented by militia, and it will be remembered that the latter, having little or no respect for officers of their own choosing, would not submit to the restraints of discipline and never could be depended upon.

"This fact was distinctly recognized in the law just quoted, which took the radical step, far in advance of our Revolutionary war policy, of creating an entirely new class of troops to support the regular army in case of emergency."—*Ibid.*

26. The Military Policy of the United States, p. 79.

27. By the Act of May 8, 1792.

28. On November 4, 1791, St. Clair's mixed force of regulars and militia, numbering only 1,400 effectives, was attacked in Darke County, Ohio, by a force of Indians of nearly equal strength and routed with a loss of 632 killed and 264 wounded. The Investigating Committee appointed by the House of Representatives reported that "the militia appear to have been composed principally of *substitutes* and totally ungovernable and regardless of military duty and subordination"; that "the attack was unexpected. . . . It commenced upon the militia who were in advance of the main army, and who fled through the main army without firing a gun. This circumstance threw the troops into some disorder, from which it appears they never recovered during the action." The committee also found that "the want of discipline and experience of the troops" was one of the principal causes of the

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defeat for which General St. Clair was in no respect to blame.—Upton, p. 79.

29. By the Act of March 5, 1792, of which Sections 2 and 3 created the "Legion of the United States," to which the organization of the militia was to conform. The legional organization was adopted on December 27, 1792, divided the militia into the "advanced corps"—comprising all youths of 18, 19 and 20 years—the "main corps"—all men between the ages of 21 and 45—and the "reserve corps," which embraced those from 46 to 60, all corps to receive certain specified annual instruction.—Callan, pp. 92-94.

30. F. B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, II, p. 562.

31. Heitman, II, pp. 562-571. No complete returns are given of the actual strength of the army until December, 1816.

32. Act of March 5, 1792.

33. Act of May 30, 1796.

34. Act of July 16, 1798.

35. Act of March 3, 1799. This sudden increase was caused by the imminence of war with France.

36. Act. of May 14, 1800.

37. Act of March 16, 1802.

38. Act of April 12, 1808.

39. "Sec. 1. That each and every free, able-bodied, white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as hereinafter excepted) shall, severally and respectively, be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act. And it shall at all times hereafter, be the duty of every such captain or commanding officer of a company, to enroll every such citizen, as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or, being the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years (except as before excepted), shall come to reside within his bounds; and shall, without delay, notify such citizen of the said enrollment, by a proper noncommissioned officer of the company, by whom such notice may be proved. That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or, with a good rifle, knapsack, shot pouch, and powderhorn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear so armed, accoutered, and provided, when called out to exercise or into service; except, that when called out on company days' exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack. That the commissioned officers shall, severally, be armed with a sword or hanger and spontoon; and that from and after five years from the passing of this act all muskets for arming the militia, as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound, and every citizen so enrolled and providing himself with the arms, ammunition, and accouterments

required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, distress, executions, or sales for debt or for the payment of taxes."—Callan, pp. 95-96.

40. *I.e.*, certain officers of the Federal Government, pilots, ferry-men and others, in addition to those whom the States might exempt.

41. "Sec. 3. That within one year after the passing of this act the militia of the respective States shall be arranged into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, as the legislature of such States shall direct; and each division, brigade, and regiment shall be numbered at the formation thereof and a record made of such numbers in the adjutant-general's office in the State; and when in the field, or in service in the State, each division, brigade, and regiment shall, respectively, take rank according to their numbers, reckoning the first or lowest highest in rank. That, if the same be convenient, each brigade shall consist of four regiments, each regiment of two battalions, each battalion of five companies, each company of 64 privates. That the said militia shall be officered by the respective States as follows:

"To each division, one major-general and two aids-de-camp, with the rank of major; to each brigade, one brigadier-general, with one brigade inspector, to serve also as brigade major, with the rank of a major; to each regiment, one lieutenant-colonel commandant; and to each battalion, one major; to each company, one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer, and one fifer or bugler. That there shall be a regimental staff, to consist of one adjutant and one quartermaster, to rank as lieutenants; one paymaster, one surgeon, and one surgeon's mate, one sergeant-major, one drum major, and one fife major."

42. Callan, pp. 95-100.

43. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 85.

44. The fruits of this pernicious law were reaped in the War of 1812, when further criticism of this measure will be made.

45. The Act of February 28, 1795, "to provide for calling forth the militia" prescribed in Section 4, "that *no officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, of the militia, shall be compelled to serve more than three months after his arrival at the place of rendezvous, in any one year.*"—Callan, p. 109.

This law was still in operation in 1861 when its inconveniences were seriously felt.

46. By the Act of April 27, 1798.

47. Acts of May 3 and 4, 1798.

48. Act of May 28, 1798.

49. Upton, pp. 87-88.

50. By the Act of March 2, 1799. These five laws are given by Callan, pp. 119-125 and 131-133.

51. Twenty-four regiments of infantry, 1 regiment and 1 battalion of riflemen, 1 battalion of artillerymen and engineers, and 3 regiments of cavalry. The enlistment of these troops was for a term not to exceed 3 years, and no officer, with the exception of captains and lieutenants on recruiting duty, was to receive pay until actually called into service.

Had these troops been raised, the Regular Army would have been augmented to a strength of about 40,000 men.

52. Jefferson relates in his diary, under date of January 14, 1799, that "Logan, observing, that notwithstanding the pacific declarations of France, it might still be well to keep up the military ardor of our citizens, and to have the militia in good order; 'the militia,' said Pickering, 'the militia never did any good to this country, except in the single affair of Bunker Hill; that we must have a standing army of fifty thousand men, which being stationed in different parts of the continent, might serve as rallying points for the militia, and so render them of some service.'"—*The Anas, The Works of Thomas Jefferson* (edited by Paul Leicester Ford), I, p. 347.

53. The War of the Rebellion.

54. As was done in the Spanish-American War.

55. Upton, p. 88.

56. On December 19, 1801, the actual strength of the army was 248 officers, 9 cadets and 3,794 enlisted men, a total of only 4,051.

57. By Section 27.—Callan, p. 148; *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy*, I, pp. 2, 211, 222-223. It was formally opened on July 4, 1802, with ten cadets.

58. *Ibid*, I, pp. 2 and 226; Callan, pp. 224-225.

59. Up to March, 1812, only 88 cadets had been graduated.

60. Letter to Elbridge Gerry, January 26, 1799, in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal edition (collected and edited by Paul Leicester Ford) IX, pp. 17-18. Also Morse, *Thomas Jefferson* (American Statesmen Series), pp. 88-92, 114-117, 124-131, 168-169; Curtis, *The True Thomas Jefferson*, pp. 164, 302-303, 305-306; Foley, *The Jeffersonian Cyclopaedia*, pp. 130-133, 252, 833-834.

61. On December 8, 1801.

62. This was quite in harmony with one of his "two favorite ideas," namely, that of "never keeping an unnecessary souldier."—*The Anas*, June 4, 1792. *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, I, p. 227.

The authorized strength of the army during 1801 was 4,436; its actual strength at the end of the year was only 4,051. See above, footnote 56.

63. Two years earlier he had announced: "I am relying, for internal defence, on our militia solely, till actual invasion . . . and not for a standing army in time of peace."—*Letter to Elbridge Gerry*, January 26, 1799. *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, IX, p. 18.

64. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I, p. 329; *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, IX, pp. 336-337.

65. For example, in his fifth, sixth and eighth annual messages. In the last he maintained that "For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed militia is their best security."—Richardson, I, p. 455; *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, XI, pp. 68-69.

Jefferson's written statements concerning his views on the militia and his opposition to a standing army are given by Foley, Nos. 522-546, 558, and 5177 to 5233, pp. 54-55, 56, and 550-554.

66. Fifth annual message, December 3, 1805. Richardson I, pp. 382-383.

67. In order to utilize first those between the ages of 18 and 26. See his fifth annual message; his draft for "An Act for classing the militia and assigning to each class its particular duties," dated December, 1805; and his letter to John Armstrong, Minister to France, dated May 2, 1808.

Jefferson's scheme was that "a militia of young men will hold on until regulars can be raised, and will be the nursery which will furnish them."—*Letter to William A. Burwell*, January 15, 1806.

Similarly his letter to John Armstrong just alluded to, in which he said: "We are raising some regulars in addition to our present force for garrisoning our seaports, and forming a nucleus for a militia to gather to."

The above will be found in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal edition, X, pp. 191-192, 213-217, 223, and XI, pp. 30-31.

68. For example, in President Wilson's second annual message to Congress, December 8, 1914. See Chapter I, footnote 1.

69. See page 66.

70. By the Act of March 16, 1802, which limited its strength to 241 officers and 3,046 enlisted men.—Callan, pp. 141-142.

Yet it was less than three weeks before that Jefferson had declared that "*None but an armed nation can dispense with a standing army.*" To keep ours armed and disciplined, is therefore at all times important."—*Letter to* (name omitted), February 25, 1803. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (edited by H. A. Washington), IV, p. 469. Ford evidently considered this unaddressed letter not sufficiently well-authenticated and did not insert it in his edition.

71. Act of March 3, 1803. This force was to be enlisted for a year only. This law was substantially re-enacted on April 18, 1806, with the proviso that it was to continue in force for two years but that the service of the troops so called out was to be restricted to six months.—Callan, pp. 151-168, and 198.

72. Upton, p. 91.

73. By the Act of February 24, 1807, which authorized the acceptance of 30,000. On August 9, 1807, Jefferson wrote to the Secretary of War, General Dearborn: "I received yesterday yours of the 7th, with the proposition for substituting 32,000 twelve-month volunteers instead of 15,000 regulars as a disposable force, and I like the idea very much. . . . I repeat that I like it greatly."—*The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, X, footnote on p. 475.

74. From their respective States.

75. Act of April 12, 1808.

76. Act of December 24, 1811.

77. (1) The Act of January 2, 1812, empowered the President to accept 6 companies of volunteers or rangers, to be enlisted for a year for the protection of the frontiers.

(2) The Act of January 11th increased the Regular Army by 10 regiments of infantry, 2 of artillery and one of light dragoons, the term of service being five years. The army, when augmented by this force, was supposed to number 35,603, but, notwithstanding the inducements in the shape of bounties, so slow was the recruiting that its actual strength in July, 1812, was only 6,686.

(3) The Act of February 6th authorized the President to accept companies of volunteers, not to exceed 30,000, and to organize them into battalions, regiments and brigades.

(4) The Act of February 24th empowered him to mount the regiment of light artillery recruited in 1808.

(5) The Act of April 8th directed the President to reduce to 18 months the period of enlistment fixed at five years by the Act of 1811, provided the number of men thus enlisted did not exceed 15,000.

The bitter lessons of the Revolution as to the folly of short enlistments were thus cast to the winds.

(6) The Act of April 10th substantially reiterated that of March 3, 1803. See above, p. 51 and footnote 71, page 581.

The above laws are given by Callan, pp. 211-222.

78. Upton, pp. 92 and 94.

CHAPTER V

1. James, *Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States*, I, p. 56.

2. Resulting from the laws of 1802, 1808 and 1811.

3. By the Act of June 26, 1812, which remodeled the regiments on the basis of ten companies each.—Callan, p. 230.

4. Acts of February 24, 1807, and February 6, 1812.

5. Act of July 6, 1812. This force, although called "volunteers," would have been equivalent to a second Regular Army except for the limitation in the enlistment to one year. The measure failed and its only effect was to deter enlistments in the sole organization that would have been effective.

6. *Had Congress at the beginning of the year declared that all men owed their country military service and raised the Army to 35,000 by volunteering or by drafting for service "during the war," such a force after six months' training could easily have occupied Canada and terminated the war in one campaign.* Compare Upton, p. 96.

7. Opinion delivered by Theophilus Parsons, Samuel Sewell, and Isaac Parker, the three judges of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to whom the Governor referred the matter.—*American State Papers*, I, p. 324.

8. Upton, p. 97.

Hart, *Formation of the Union*, p. 215, says that "The general government had no means of enforcing its construction of the Constitution. It did, however, withdraw garrisons from the New England forts, leaving those States to defend themselves; and refused to send them their quota of the arms which were distributed among the States. This attitude was so well understood, that during the first few months of the war, English cruisers had orders not to capture vessels owned in New England. As the war advanced, these orders were withdrawn, and the territory of Massachusetts in the District of Maine was invaded by British troops. An urgent call for protection was then made upon the general government; but, even in this crisis, Massachusetts would not permit her militia to pass under the control of national military officers."

9. Pages 47-48.

10. Upton, pp. 97-98.

11. On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, part of Hull's militia mutinied and the 4th United States Infantry had to be employed to bring them to order. Upon reaching Detroit, 180 Ohio militia mutinied and refused to cross the river, "alleging as a reason that they were not obliged to serve outside of the United States."—Hull's *Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812*, pp. 34-35.

12. About 300 regulars and 1,500 volunteers and militia.

13. Upton, p. 98. How much value the enemy placed upon the militia is evinced by the fact that they were allowed to return home, whereas the 320 regulars were sent to Montreal as prisoners.

14. "As illustrating the reckless extravagance with which hostilities were carried on, one of the expeditions, set on foot for this purpose, deserves special mention. It was commanded by General Hopkins and consisted of 4,000 Kentucky mounted militia, who reached Fort Harrison [*Note.* About 2 miles from the present city of Terre Haute, Ind.] on the 10th of October, whence four days later they set out for the Indian villages on the Wabash and Illinois Rivers. Once on the march the ardor of these troops began to cool and insubordination quickly followed; on the fourth day a fire on the prairie was mistaken for a ruse of the enemy; on the fifth day, totally ignoring the authority of their officers, the disorderly mass abandoned their general, and, retracing their steps, dispersed to their homes."—Upton, p. 99.

15. "While these movements against the Indians were going on, preparations were made for collecting another army under General William Henry Harrison for the special purpose of effacing the stain of Hull's surrender. To this end volunteers, and more especially militia, came forward with the greatest enthusiasm and offered themselves in such numbers that it became necessary to decline the services of the larger part, who returned to their homes grievously disappointed.

"The militia of Kentucky and Tennessee assembled at Louisville and at Newport; those from Virginia, at Urbana; those of Pennsylvania, at Erie. From these several points the troops were organized into three columns with a supposed total of not less than 10,000 men. Their first destination was the Rapids of the Maumee, a point that was not reached in this year's campaign, for no sooner had the several columns moved, than hunger, nakedness, and mutiny began the work of dissolution. The left column from Kentucky, when a few days out, was only prevailed upon to remain by the personal entreaties of the general and other officers. The middle column from Urbana, after a slight engagement with the Indians, refused to obey orders for a further pursuit, and deliberately returned to their camp. This ended the autumn campaign, though Harrison was not willing to acknowledge its failure, and proposed to continue operations by means of a winter expedition which led soon after to a painful defeat."—*Ibid.*

16. 691 men according to the returns of September 1st, "many of them without shoes and all clamorous for pay."—Van Rensselaer, *Affair of Queenstown*, p. 10.

17. The force in the vicinity of Lewistown and Fort Niagara numbered on October 12th, 900 regulars and 2,270 militia.—Returns quoted

in Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, I, p. 580. Even the regulars were comparatively raw troops.

18. 160 regulars and 90 militia killed and wounded, and 700 captured.—*Records of the Adjutant-General's Office*.

The British, who numbered 600 regulars and 500 militia and Indians, lost only 69 killed and 69 wounded.—James, I, p. 97.

19. Van Rensselaer, p. 10, and Appendix, p. 62; Armstrong, *Notices of the War of 1812*, II, pp. 100-107, and Appendix No. 12, pp. 207-219.

20. November 28th, 1812.

21. James, I, pp. 391-392; Thompson, *Late War*, p. 82.

22. From Black Rock, N. Y.

23. Upton, pp. 103-104; Thompson, p. 87.

24. Ingersoll, *The Second War*, I, p. 101.

25. Upton, pp. 104-105.

26. The militia numbered 49,187, Massachusetts furnishing 208 and Connecticut none. The regulars amounted to 15,000.—*Records of the Adjutant-General's Office*, and Upton, p. 105.

27. James, I, p. 56.

28. General Brown, subsequently the British commander-in-chief, in a letter dated July 20, 1813, estimated the British regulars at less than 1,200 men and asserted that "at no time did the command of this distinguished chief (General Brock) consist of less than one-third of old men and boys, fit only for garrison duty."—Armstrong, I, p. 224.

29. Pages 48-49.

30. "Instead of relying upon a small but well-disciplined regular establishment, this law entrusted the safety and honor of a nation to armies of militia supported by the several States during the long intervals of peace. These armies, though elaborately organized on paper into battalions, brigades, and divisions, were only to receive such drill and instruction as the various States might think proper. . . .

"Led to a certain extent by those who had gained actual military experience during the Revolution or on the Indian frontier, endowed with perhaps more average intelligence and education than the regulars; supplied with the same food, clothing, and equipments as they were, the marked inferiority of the militia troops was largely due to the brief period of their service, to the conviction that their time would soon be 'out,' and that others must take their places and bear the burdens and dangers of the contest.

"While their pay was no greater than that of other troops, when we deduct the time lost in coming and going, as well as that consumed in partial and unavailing instruction, their real cost to the country was infinitely greater."—Upton, pp. 105-106.

31. This advance did not include the three months' pay, a bounty of \$16 and 160 acres of land which were to be given to the soldier upon his discharge.

32. Act of January 20, 1813. It illustrates admirably the proverb, "the more haste, the less speed," for at the end of February the total strength of the Army was only 19,036.

33. See pages 47-49, 53-54.

34. Act of January 29, 1813.—Callan, pp. 238-240.

35. Upton, p. 107.

36. Harrison, in a letter to the Secretary of War, dated March 17, 1813, protested that, in view of the shortness of time allowed for training, his regulars "would be very little superior to militia," thus giving him "no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline."—*American State Papers*, I, p. 452.

37. A sequel of Harrison's expedition of the previous autumn. See footnote 15. Winchester's force consisted of a few companies of regulars, a battalion of rifles and the 1st and 5th Kentucky militia, a total of less than 1,000.

38. His force, composed of British regulars, militia and Indians, was numbered 1,000. Winchester lost 397 killed, 27 wounded, and 522 captured, a total of 946.

39. Upton, p. 109.

40. From April 28th to May 9th, 1813.

41. With a force of 983 regulars and militia and 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh.—James, I, p. 195.

42. 1,200 strong. A detachment of 800 surprised Proctor's guns but, in disobedience of orders, attacked the British camp and were routed with a loss of 45 killed and 605 taken prisoners, only 150 escaping.—*General Clay's official Report*, quoted by Fay, *American War*, p. 93.

43. 875, of whom 605 were captured, as against a British loss of only 101.—Thompson, p. 114; James, I, p. 200.

44. Upton, p. 110.

45. On August 2nd.

46. Losing 96 out of 391 regulars, while the American casualties were confined to one killed and 7 wounded.

47. On September 10th the brilliant victory of Commodore Perry's improvised fleet rid Lake Erie of the British ships and made direct access to the enemy's stronghold possible by water.

48. Harrison estimated his force at slightly more than 3,000; Proctor had 834 regulars and about 1,200 Indians.

49. Proctor lost 34 in killed and wounded, and 600 prisoners; 33 Indians were killed, among them the famous chief Tecumseh. Harrison's casualties were only 29.

Accounts of this action are given in *General Harrison's Official Report*, quoted by Fay, p. 138; by James, I, p. 279; and by Upton, p. 111.

50. Upton, p. 111.

51. Letter of the Secretary of War to General Harrison, dated April 14, 1813.—*American State Papers*, I, p. 453.

52. Upton, p. 111.

53. Comprising the theatre from Prescott on the St. Lawrence River to Lake Erie. The British force in this region early in February, 1813, was estimated by the Secretary of War to be 2,100 men, against whom, he asserted, it would be necessary to use not "less than 6,000 effective regular troops, because in the first enterprise of a second campaign, nothing must, if possible, be left to chance."—*American State Papers*, I, p. 439.

54. In one night attack Generals Winder and Chandler were captured.

"In another, Colonel Boerstler, believing himself to be surrounded by a superior force, surrendered with 542 men, of whom nearly 500 were regulars."—Upton, p. 112.

55. Less than 1,200 strong.

56. An important depot of naval stores where a new ship, the *General Pike*, was in the course of construction.

57. 50 killed and 211 wounded; the American casualties were 157.

58. "My orders were that the troops should lie close and reserve their fire until the enemy had approached so near that every shot might hit its object. It is, however, impossible to execute such orders with raw troops, unaccustomed to subordination. My orders were, in this case, disobeyed; the whole line fired, and not without effect; but in the moment while I was contemplating this, to my utter astonishment, *they rose from their cover and fled*. Colonel Mills fell gallantly, in brave but vain endeavors to stop his men. I was, personally, more fortunate. . . ."—*General Brown's report to the Secretary of War*, quoted by Fay, p. 102.

59. With the object, as he alleged, that the enemy might be "shut out from any hopes or means of wintering in the vicinity of Fort George."—*American State Papers*, I, p. 468.

60. "The best and most subordinate militia that have yet been on this frontier, finding that their wages were not ready for them, became, with some meritorious exceptions, a disaffected and ungovernable multitude."—*General McClure's report to the Secretary of War. American State Papers*, I, p. 486.

61. Upton, p. 115.

62. "Not more than 650 men, of regulars, militia and Indians landed at Black Rock. To oppose these we had from 2,500 to 3,000 militia. All, except very few of them, behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket."—*General Cass to the Secretary of War*, January 12, 1814. *American State Papers*, I, p. 487.

63. "Who had been but a short time in service and had not been exercised with that rigid discipline so essential to constitute the soldier. They had indeed been taught various evolutions, but a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views."—*Official report of Colonel Purdy, 4th New York. American State Papers*, I, pp. 479-480.

64. Only half of this force came into action at all.

65. Official returns, quoted in Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, III, Appendix VII.

66. Upton, p. 113.

67. Upton, p. 113.

68. Page 53.

69. This brigade had been duly mustered into the service of the United States and was stationed at Plattsburg as the reserve of Hampton's force then in Canada.

70. Ingersoll, II, p. 26.

71. On November 15, 1813, certain Vermont officers replied to Chittenden that

"When ordered into the service of the United States it becomes our duty to march to any section of the Union, not confined to the narrow limits of the town or State in which we reside. We are under a paramount obligation to our common country and the great

Confederacy of States; and while in actual service, your Excellency's power over us, as governor of Vermont, is suspended. If legally ordered into service of the United States, your Excellency has no power to order us out of it. An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country will never be obeyed by us, although it proceeds from the captain-general and governor of Vermont."—Ingersoll, II, p. 26.

72. December 26, 1812, and March 20, 1813. The former was limited to the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays.

73. See page 582, footnote 8.

74. Frenchtown, Havre-de-Grace, Georgetown, and Fredericktown.

75. See below, p. 61.

76. With only 1,500 men.—James, II, pp. 57-58.

77. Losing 81 men.—*Official reports of Admiral Warren and Sir Sidney Beckwith, Quartermaster-General.*—James, II, p. 114, Appendix XIII.

The American force, consisting of 480 militia and 150 sailors and marines, came out unscathed. According to Thompson (p. 213) no less than 10,000 militia hastened to the assistance of Norfolk.

78. Upton, pp. 116-117; Lossing, pp. 667-683.

79. Upton, p. 118.

80. Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, I, pp. 459-462; Lossing, pp. 767, 768 and 773; Upton, pp. 118-119.

81. No accurate data concerning the number of these troops is obtainable.

82. Records of the Adjutant-General's office; Upton, p. 120.

83. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 120.

84. Page 62.

85. The pay of a private for three months was only \$24.

86. Under this Act of January 27, 1814, \$2,012,439.33 was paid out in bounties between January 27th and October 26, 1814. The number of recruits available on April 1st was only 3,337; the number obtained between February 1st and October 1st being 13,898.—*American State Papers*, I, p. 519.

87. On October 26th, the Secretary of War reported to the Senate Military Committee that "many of the militia detached for six months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war."—*American State Papers*, I, p. 519.

88. Callan, pp. 251-255.

89. "The failure of this scheme of recruitment was more especially due to that feature of our system which, by tolerating two kinds of troops, encourages citizens and townships to offer greater bounties to the militia than the Government is willing or able to pay to recruits for the Regular Army."—Upton, p. 122.

90. According to Heitman, II, pp. 576-577, the authorized strength of the Army under the Act of March 30, 1814, was 62,674.

91. Upton, p. 123.

92. The American casualties were 335, the British 604.—Lossing, p. 810.

93. Out of about 3,000 men, the Americans lost 748 in killed and wounded; the British, who had 3,300 regulars, 1,200 militia and 500 Indians, lost 878.

94. Upton, p. 124; Lossing, pp. 804-840.
95. Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, III, Appendix XI.
96. About 4 miles below Rouse's Point, N. Y.
97. Upton, p. 124; Lossing, pp. 790-791.
98. *General Macomb's Official Report*, quoted by Fay, p. 241.
99. In which he lost 242 men and 800 captured.—*Prevost's Official Report*, quoted by James, II, p. 446.
100. James, II, pp. 206, 223 and 463; Upton, pp. 124-125.
101. Ingersoll, II, p. 133.
102. It was not until 1827 that the question as to the control of militia in the event of a Presidential call was finally adjudicated in the case of *Martin vs. Mott*, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided that it was reserved to the President alone to determine when the exigency arises in which he has the constitutional right to call out the militia, and that his decision is binding. See Kent's *Commentaries*, I, p. 279.
103. July 2nd, 4th, 9th, 12th, and 17th. The details are given by Upton, pp. 126-127.
104. Numbering 5,401, including 400 regulars, 600 marines, and 20 sailors, the rest being militia or volunteers.—*Records of the Adjutant-General's Office*, and *American State Papers*, I, p. 526.
105. Armstrong, II, p. 152.
106. *Admiral Cockburn's report*, quoted by James, II, p. 493. The total of General Ross' force was 3,500, but only the above number was engaged.
107. Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.
108. Lossing, pp. 926-927; Upton, pp. 127-128. On August 29th a detachment of seven British ships captured Alexandria, Virginia.
109. E.g., *Jefferson to J. W. Eppes*, September 9, 1814. *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, XI, p. 275.
- Upton, pp. 129-133, comments very adversely upon his exercise of command as Secretary of War throughout 1813 and 1814, which proved distinctly detrimental to the welfare of the service, but, as he explains, "the failure to create the grade of General in Chief, tempted, if it did not compel, the Secretary to assume, in the Cabinet and in the field, the position of generalissimo of our forces."
110. September 27th. See Ingersoll, II, p. 113.
111. Lossing, pp. 949-959; Upton, p. 129. The British lost 319 killed and wounded, among the former being General Ross.
112. Upton, p. 123.
113. Continued from pages 60 and 61.
114. Lossing, pp. 776-781; Upton, pp. 119-120.
115. Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.
116. Upton, p. 133.
117. Had it not been for our naval successes, peace upon such favorable terms could never have been obtained.
118. See page 35.
119. Pages 51, and 580-581, footnotes 62-67.
120. *Letter to James Monroe*, dated Monticello, June 19, 1813. The above was copied from the *original in the Library of Congress*. It is also quoted in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington edition), VI, p. 131, but not in the Ford edition.

On September 9, 1814, he wrote in a similar tenor to John Wayles Eppes, and on the following day he explained to John Cooper that

“In the beginning of our government we were willing to introduce the least coercion possible on the will of the citizen. Hence a system of military duty was established too indulgent to his indolence. This is the first opportunity we have had of trying it, and it has completely failed.”

On January 1, 1815, he wrote to Monroe: “But you have two more causes of uneasiness; the want of men and money. For the former, nothing more wise or efficient could have been imagined than what you proposed. It would have filled our ranks with regulars, and . . . it would have rendered our militia, like those of the Greeks and Romans, a nation of warriors.”

Similarly his letter to William H. Cranford, Minister to France, dated February 11, 1815.

The letters to Eppes, Monroe, and Cranford (1815) will be found in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, XI, pp. 426, 443, and 451-452. The letter of September 10, 1814, to Cooper, was not included in the Ford edition but is given in the *Washington edition*, VI, p. 379.

121. See his letters from January 2nd to May 31, 1781.—*The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, III, pp. 111-290.

122. *Ibid*, III, p. 192.

123. See above, pp. 50-51.

124. Lossing, p. 936.

125. 3,000 who had participated in the operations in the Chesapeake and 4,000 under the command of General Keane who had sailed from Plymouth in September.

126. From Negril Bay on November 26, 1814.

127. This squadron had made three desperate attacks upon the American privateer, *General Armstrong*, under the command of Captain Reid, in the harbor of Fayal, on the night of September 26-27, but had been repulsed and so crippled that it did not reach Jamaica until ten days after the appointed rendezvous. This delay is considered to have saved New Orleans. See *American State Papers*, XIV, p. 493, and Coggeshall, *History of American Privateers*, p. 370.

128. Jackson had reached New Orleans on December 2nd, 1814.

129. December 14th, 23rd, 27th, 28th, and 31st, and January 1st.

130. The hero of Salamanca, who had arrived on December 23rd and superseded General Keane.

131. According to *Captain Gleig's British Campaigns*, p. 419, the British forces which landed below New Orleans in December, 1814, and January, 1815, numbered 14,250, including 2,000 sailors and 1,500 marines.

132. “The main body was posted on the east bank behind a line of intrenchments from 5 to 8 feet high, and extending from the river on the right to an impenetrable cypress swamp on the left. Those works were little more than 1,000 yards long, and were thrown up on the edge of a canal, which served as a wet ditch, the water of which varied in depth from 1 to 5 feet. Along the front of this short line fifteen guns were posted in nine different batteries containing from one to three guns each. Of these batteries four were served by the regular artillery and infantry, two by the former marines and sailors

of the U. S. S. *Carolina*, and one by trained privateersmen. In support of these batteries there were two regiments of regular infantry and detachment of marines."—Upton, p. 134.

133. 884, including 66 marines. Moreover, most of the regulars were new recruits commanded by young officers. The militia were distinctly indifferent. Of the Kentucky brigade, 2,250 men, who arrived shortly before the battle, "not one man in ten was well armed, and only one man in three had any arms at all."—Parton, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, II, p. 168.

134. Lossing, p. 1043.

135. 700 were killed, 1,400 wounded, and 500 made prisoners. Among the killed was General Gibbs; Generals Pakenham and Keane were wounded, the former mortally. The regimental casualties were tremendous, the 93d Highlanders losing 786 out of 1,100 officers and men.

The Americans, on the other hand, came out almost unscathed, their losses being confined to 8 killed and 13 wounded.—Lossing, pp. 1046 and 1049; Upton, p. 135.

136. About 4,900 men.

137. Some time after the fighting had begun on the plain of Chalmette on the eastern side of the river.

138. Parton, II, p. 213. Jackson subsequently told the fugitives that "the want of discipline, the want of order, the total disregard to obedience, and a spirit of insubordination, not less destructive than cowardice itself, are the causes which led to the disaster, and they must be eradicated, or I must cease to command."—Goodwin, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, p. 153.

139. Lossing, pp. 1042, 1043, 1045 and 1049.

140. *Ibid.*, pp. 1051 and 1053.

141. Upton, pp. 135-136.

142. Records of the Adjutant-General's Office; Upton, p. 137.

The terms of enlistment were as follows:

One year or more, including sailors and marines.....	63,179
Six months or more.....	66,325
Three months or more.....	125,643
One month or more.....	125,307
Less than one month.....	147,200
Total	527,654

143. About 55,000 British regulars, 1,810 militia, and 9,825 Indians, a total of 66,635.—*Brannan's Letters and Gleig's British Campaigns*, quoted by Upton, p. 138.

Our largest force was 235,839 in 1814 (see page 65), whereas the British maximum, attained in the same year, was only 16,500.—Armstrong, I, p. 220.

144. Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1914, p. 236.

145. The annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, p. 9, shows that \$45,923,014.46 had been paid out in pensions for the War of 1812; his report for 1914, p. 33, adds \$27,532.40, making a total of \$45,950,546.86.

	<i>Regulars.</i>	<i>Militia and Volunteers.</i>
146. Revolution.....	231,771	164,087
War of 1812.....	56,032	471,622
(See page 40.)		
147. See pages 20 and 38.		
148. Page 57 and page 585, footnotes 48 and 49.		
149. Upton, p. 139.		

CHAPTER VI

1. By the Act of March 3, 1815.—Callan, pp. 266-267.
2. The Topographical department and those of the Adjutant-General, Inspector-General and Quartermaster-General were abolished, some very inefficient substitutes replacing them.
3. Such as failure to recognize the value of special training in the staff departments and prescribing that the staff could be filled up by men from private life.
4. Washington had recommended this thirty years earlier.
5. The correspondence, which need not be quoted here, is given by Parton, II, pp. 373-374, and Upton, pp. 146-147.
6. Forty officers and men of the 4th and 7th U. S. Infantry, under Lieut. Scott, and seven women.
7. Report of the Senate Investigating Committee.—*American State Papers*, II, pp. 739-741. Additional information respecting the organization of troops without the sanction of Congress will be found in the Report of the House Committee, *American State Papers*, II, p. 99.
8. The regulars—4th and 7th Infantry, and the 4th battalion of artillery—numbered about 1,000; the volunteers, militia and Indians amounted to 5,911, making a total of 6,911.—*Letter of the Adjutant-General to the author, dated April 22, 1915, and American State Papers, Military Affairs*, II, p. 104.
The figures given by Upton, p. 149, are incorrect.
9. Page 149.
10. The mobilization of modern armies conforms strictly to this principle.
11. *American State Papers*, II, p. 189.
12. (1) Neglect to furnish sufficient officers in the grades of colonel, lieutenant-colonel and major to insure uniform operation in each department; (2) failure to replace by supernumeraries the captains and lieutenants detailed from the line; and (3) no requirement in peace time that line officers detailed to the staff should return to their commands periodically.
13. Among other things, it provided for permanent chiefs for the departments of the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, and Commissary-General, the minor grades being filled from the line.
The essence of Calhoun's scheme was that the Army could be increased to 11,558 "without adding an additional officer or a single company," or to 19,035 by adding only 288 officers.—*American State Papers*, II, pp. 190-193.
14. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 194 and 452; Callan, 306-309.
15. "Had Congress given him the authority to increase each company of artillery and infantry to 100 enlisted men, the reduction of

the Army by one-half would still have enabled him in time of war to augment it to more than 11,000 men."—Upton, p. 152.

16. Created by the Act of May 14, 1812.—Callan, pp. 226-227.

17. By the Act of April 5, 1832.—*Ibid.*, pp. 322-323.

18. *American State Papers*, III, pp. 820-822, and IV, p. 91.

19. Until the organization of the General Staff on February 14, 1903 (see page 292), the chiefs of bureau grew more and more to regard the Secretary of War rather than the commanding general as their sole and legitimate military superior. There thus arose a system peculiarly American which more than once worked to the detriment of the military service. Compare Upton, pp. 158-159.

20. The Indians lost 68 killed and wounded; the volunteers 1 killed and 8 wounded.

21. Heitman, II, p. 394.

22. The Indians lost 150; the casualties of the American force—which consisted of 400 regulars and 900 Illinois volunteers under General Atkinson—were only 24.—*Report of Major General Macomb*, commanding the army. *American State Papers*, V, pp. 29-30.

23. On June 16th the Government, in order to avoid calling out unnecessary volunteers and militia, ordered all the regulars on the Atlantic coast, the Great Lakes and the Mississippi to concentrate at the scene of action under General Scott. Five of the six companies of artillery from Fort Monroe reached Chicago, "a distance of 1,800 miles, in the short space of eighteen days, a rapidity which is believed to be unprecedented in military movements. The loss by cholera in that detachment alone was equal to one out of every three men."—*American State Papers*, V, p. 18.

The ravages of this disease precluded General Scott and the troops from the east from participating in the campaign.

24. Regulars, 1,341; volunteers, 4,638, a total of 5,979.—*Records of The Adjutant-General's Office*.

25. General Macomb's report.

26. By the Act of June 15, 1832.—Callan, pp. 325-326.

27. Again Congress reverted to the principle of militia, a mistaken policy which has already been discussed.

28. Act of March 2, 1833, which fixed the authorized strength of the Army at 7,194 officers and men.—Heitman, II, pp. 584-585.

29. On November 30, 1835, the Army numbered 7,198 officers and men, but only 3,888 men were present for duty. In the Eastern Department, comprising the Atlantic coast and almost all the territory east of the Mississippi, were only 1,534 under General Scott.

Notwithstanding our population was in excess of 15,000,000, the entire seacoast, the Canadian frontier and all the outlying settlements were protected by less than 4,000 troops. The 52,000 square miles of Florida were guarded by 536 regulars.—*American State Papers*, V, p. 633-639, and VI, p. 57.

30. *Letter of Governor Eaton of Florida to the Secretary of War*, March 8, 1835.—*American State Papers*, VI, p. 493.

31. *Governor Call to the President*, December 22, 1835.—*Ibid.*, VI, p. 1026.

32. Of the 110 officers and men from the 2nd and 3rd Artillery and the 4th Infantry, only three escaped alive.

33. *Official Report of Major General Macomb*, commanding the Army, and *Governor Call's Report*, January 9, 1836.—*American State Papers*, VI, p. 817, and VII, p. 218.

34. On January 21, 1836. His instructions are given in the *American State Papers*, VII, p. 216.

35. This officer, who commanded the Western Department, had not waited for orders from Washington, but called on the governor of Louisiana for militia, sailed for Tampa on February 3rd with 1,140 regulars and volunteers, pushed on to Fort King unknown to General Scott and thence to the Withlacoochee where he was besieged from the 27th until March 6th.—*American State Papers*, VI, p. 244.

36. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 225.

37. They were estimated to number "from 1,200 to 2,000 warriors."—*Ibid.*, VII, pp. 218 and 278.

38. *To the Adjutant-General*, April 30, 1836.—*Ibid.*, VII, pp. 278-279.

39. See Upton, p. 168.

40. Callan, pp. 336-337.

41. See page 48.

42. The 6th section of this act also provided a regiment of regular dragoons to be disbanded whenever the public service permitted. The Act of July 4, 1836, increased the Medical and Pay departments. As a result of these acts, the authorized strength of the Army became 7,957. Its actual strength in November, 1836, was only 6,283.—Upton, p. 168; Heitman, II, pp. 586, 587 and 626.

43. *Scott to the Adjutant-General*, June 12th, 14th and 21st.—*American State Papers*, 326, 328 and 333.

44. Estimated by Scott to number from 3,000 to 5,000.—*Ibid.*, VII, p. 951.

45. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 337.

46. Regulars, 1,757; militia and volunteers, 23,541; Creek Indians, organized and mustered as volunteers during the summer, 2,544, a total of 27,842.—*Ibid.*, VI, pp. 1053, 1060 and 1061; Upton, pp. 171-172.

47. Upton, p. 173.

48. *General Taylor's Official Report*, January 4, 1838.—*American State Papers*, VII, pp. 987-988.

The Missouri legislature appointed a committee to investigate Taylor's charges and, upon receiving its report, passed a series of joint resolutions taking direct issue with Taylor.—Barnes, *Commonwealth of Missouri*, p. 237.

49. In his annual report for 1837, in which he pointed out that 15,000 were scarcely sufficient to guard a frontier of 8,500 miles and to afford adequate protection against 45,000 Indian warriors, emphasizing the fact that if danger were apprehended from such a regular force "it is effectually to be guarded against by a proper organization of the militia."

His argument in favour of an increase in the staff was due to the evils of detached service inaugurated by the law of 1821. See page 72 and footnote 12, page 591.

50. By one regiment of infantry, a company to each artillery regiment and by raising the enlisted strength of the companies in both these arms.—Callan, pp. 341-351.

51. Act of July 7, 1838.—Callan, pp. 351-352.

- An analysis of these two acts is given by Upton, pp. 181-182.
52. Heitman, II, pp. 588-589.
53. Upton, p. 184.
54. Nine regiments and the entire artillery of the army was stationed in Florida; the other four were distributed along the western frontier.
55. Act of March 3, 1839.—Callan, pp. 353-354.
56. *Autobiography of General Winfield Scott*, II, p. 333.
57. Upton, p. 185.
58. This treaty was promulgated in his General Order of May 18, 1839.
59. On the Caloosahatchee River on July 23rd, the victims being 18 of the 40 men under Colonel Harney, who sought to establish a trading post.
60. For a graphic description of them, see Sprague, *History of the Florida War*, p. 283.
61. For example, by Governor McDonald of Georgia.
- 62.
- | | <i>Officers.</i> | <i>Men.</i> | <i>Total.</i> |
|---------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Florida War, 1835 to 1842..... | 1,504 | 26,803 | 28,307 |
| Creek War, 1836 to 1838..... | 734 | 9,617 | 10,351 |
| Cherokee War, 1836 to 1838..... | 542 | 8,952 | 9,494 |
| Total | 2,780 | 45,372 | 48,152 |
- Note.*—There were no active hostilities in the Cherokee War, but troops had to be called out to enforce the emigration of this tribe west of the Mississippi.
63. The maximum force of the Regular Army at any time during the war.
64. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1914, p. 237.
65. Upton, p. 192.
66. By the Act of August 23, 1842.
67. This was accomplished in the line by converting one regiment of dragoons into riflemen and by reducing the number of privates in each company. The Commissary-General of purchases was abolished and his functions merged with those of the Quartermaster-General. The inspectors-general, surgeons and assistant surgeons were also reduced.

CHAPTER VII

1. Upton, p. 195.
2. On March 2, 1836.
3. As a result of the victory won by General Sam Houston with 800 Texans over General Santa Anna with 5,000 Mexicans at the battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836.
- The independence of Texas was recognized in 1837 by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium.
4. By Texas.
5. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, VI, pp. 256-257, VII, pp. 325, 356-369, 391-396 and 406; Ladd, *The War with Mexico*, pp. 22, 26-35.
6. This was in accordance with the treaty between Mexico and Texas in 1836.
7. This officer, who commanded the First Military Division at New

Orleans, had been ordered on June 15th to proceed to the mouth of the Sabine River or some other place suitable for an advance to the Rio Grande. During July he sailed with 1,500 troops, arriving early in August and establishing his headquarters near Corpus Cristi.

8. Orders dated August 6th, 23rd, and 30th, 1845.—*House of Representatives, Executive Document, No. 60, 30th Congress, first session*, pp. 83-85, 88-89.

In the last order the Secretary of War said:

“You have been advised that the assembling of a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the Executive here as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities. . . .

“In case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts, your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas. Mexico having thus commenced hostilities you may, in your discretion, should you have sufficient forces and be in a condition to do so, cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling to invade Texas, defeat the junction of troops uniting for that purpose, drive them from their positions on either side of the river, and, if deemed practicable and expedient, take and hold possession of Matamoras and other places in the country.”

9. On August 26th, 1845.

10. On August 28th.

11. “To execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”—*Article I, Section 8, paragraph 14*.

12. Pages 59-60, 63-64.

13. *House Executive Document, No. 60*, pp. 91-92.

14. *H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 24, 31st Congress, 1st session*, p. 8-a, table.

15. On March 29th, 1846.

16. *H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 60*, pp. 132-133.

17. General Scott in his annual report in November, 1845, recommended the expansion of the companies to 100 privates. Had this been adopted, Taylor's 73 companies could have been raised to 7,300 men or 8,000 with the full quota of officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., thus giving it an effective strength of about 6,000.

The Secretary of War's report urged “that authority to increase the number of privates in a company, to any number not exceeding eighty should be vested in the President, to be exercised at his discretion, with special reference to what the public interest might suddenly require.

“THIS MODE OF ENLARGING THE ARMY, BY ADDING TO THE RANK AND FILE OF THE PRESENT COMPANIES, WILL NOT, it is believed, IMPAIR, BUT, on the contrary, GREATLY IMPROVE THEIR COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY, AND on that account as well as on the score of economy, IS DEEMED PREFERABLE TO THAT OF EFFECTING THE SAME OBJECT BY RAISING NEW REGIMENTS at this time.

“It is only in view of a probability that a force considerably larger than a permanent peace establishment might soon be required that I should prefer the mode of increasing the Army by raising new regiments, organized on our present reduced scale. This scale is undoubtedly too low for actual service and has nothing to recommend it to a preference under any circumstances but THE FACILITY IT AFFORDS OF

EXPANDING AN ARMY SO ORGANIZED BY INCREASING THE RANK AND FILE, AND OF RENDERING IT EFFECTIVE FOR SERVICE IN A SHORTER PERIOD THAN NEW REGIMENTS COULD BE RAISED, ORGANIZED AND DISCIPLINED."—*Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session*, pp. 195-196.

18. Four regiments from each State.—McMaster, VII, pp. 441-442.

On the same day, in reporting Thornton's skirmish, General Taylor declared that

"If a law could be passed authorizing the President to raise volunteers for twelve months, it would be of the greatest importance for a service so remote from support as this."—*H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 60*, p. 141.

19. Where he had established a base of supplies.

20. 6,000 strong.

21. At this battle Taylor's forces numbered 2,222 officers and men, but only 1,700 were engaged. His losses in the two actions were only 170 killed and wounded, whereas the Mexican casualties were 1,000.—*General Taylor's Official Report; H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 24*, table B.

Taylor concluded his report by stating that "The causes of victory are doubtless to be found in the superior quality of our officers and men."—Montgomery, *Life of General Taylor*, p. 162.

22. The Military Policy of the United States, p. 200.

23. Napier, *Peninsular War*, II, p. 113.

The maxim as given by Napoleon is: "In war three-fourths are moral affairs; the balance of the actual forces is only the other fourth."—*Observations on Spanish Affairs*, August 27, 1808. *Corresp.*, No. 14,276.

24. Upton, p. 201.

The troops who responded to the call of Generals Taylor and Gaines numbered 12,601, *viz*: men enlisted for three months, 1,390; men illegally enlisted for six months and held for three, 11,211.

25. On May 11, 1846.

26. He evidently took his cue from Taylor's own suggestion. See page 80.

27. *H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 196, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session*, p. 6.

28. Act of May 13, 1846.—Callan, pp. 367-368.

29. "Unless sooner discharged, according to the time for which they shall have been mustered into service."

Section 2 prolonged to 6 months the term of militia mustered into United States service; Section 3 required the volunteers to furnish their own clothing, horses and equipment, the Government supplying the arms; Section 4 gave \$42 in lieu of clothing allowed to regular troops; Section 5 authorized the appointment of officers in conformity with the laws of their respective States, Congress evidently forgetting that these troops were not militia but a Government force; and Section 9 granted the same allowances as to regulars, the volunteer cavalrmen receiving 40 cents *per diem* as a compensation for their horses.

30. On the governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas for 26 regiments.

31. Nine regiments and one battalion of volunteers had already been called for "to serve to the end of the war," thus demonstrating that the longer enlistment would in nowise have discouraged those who offered themselves for service.

32. Act of May 13, 1846.—Callan, p. 369.

33. See above, p. 78.

34. The 12,601 volunteers who responded to the calls of Taylor and Gaines (footnote 24) had neither equipment nor means of transport. They were therefore obliged to remain idly near their supply depots for three months, never fired a shot and lost 145 by death, only 25 less than the casualties at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.

35. Upton, pp. 204-205.

36. Acts of May 15 and 19, and June 18 and 26, 1846.—Callan, pp. 369-375.

37. The authorized strength of the Army under the five acts of 1846 was fixed at 17,812.—Heitman, II, pp. 590-591.

Section 2 of the law increasing the staff departments empowered the President "to call into service, under the act approved May 13, 1846, each of the general officers of the militia as the service, in his opinion, may require, and to organize into brigades and divisions the forces authorized by said act, according to his direction."—Callan, p. 373.

"This section would apparently denote that Congress regarded the volunteers under the Constitution as substantially the same as the militia, and that conformably with the law of 1792 the Governors of States had an equitable right to the appointment of all the officers, from the highest to the lowest grades. *This partial adhesion to the State system was the means, in many instances, of placing the fortunes of the country, as well as the lives of our soldiers, in the hands of generals utterly ignorant of the military art at a time when the Government had at its disposal numbers of competent officers who had devoted their lives to the theory and practice of their profession.*"—Upton, p. 205.

38. The first arrived in June.

39. "Never was the value of disciplined men more triumphantly demonstrated than on these glorious occasions; and since we have learned that General Taylor compels the volunteers with him to receive six hours' drilling per day and relieves them from all other duties, to make soldiers of them, we venture to predict that they too, when they meet the enemy, will add to the reputation of our arms. 'Rough and Ready' will first make them soldiers and then win victories with them."—Quoted by Upton, p. 208.

40. "While some 20,000 volunteers were sent to the theater of war, not a wagon reached the advance of General Taylor till after the capture of Monterey."—Stevens, *Campaigns of the Rio Grande and of Mexico*, p. 21.

41. Order No. 108, dated Camargo, August 28, 1846.

42. With about 6,000 troops.

43. Early on the morning of September 22, 1846.

44. The Mexicans at this battle numbered 7,000 regulars and 3,000 militia, and their loss is unknown.

Taylor's force was only 6,645. The regulars lost 205 in killed and wounded; the volunteers, 282, a total of 487.—Ripley, *War with Mexico*, I, pp. 198-199; *H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session*, pp. 10 and 28.

The training received by the volunteers was evident from the admirable way they fought.

45. Except for the major part of the artillery, the Mexicans were permitted to retain their arms. Such favourable terms raised a storm of indignation in the United States.

46. 2,829 troops, composed of volunteers from Illinois, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Texas, together with a few regulars. Leaving their camp of instruction at San Antonio de Bexar on September 26th, they proceeded *via* Presidio, the Rio Grande, and Santa Rosa to Monclova, where Wool reported his arrival to Taylor and was ordered to advance in Parras.

47. \$6 to be paid upon enlistment and \$6 upon their joining their regiment.

48. The authorized strength of the Army had been fixed at 17,812 (see above, footnote 37), but on December 5, 1846, it actually numbered only 10,690. The deficiency of 6,958 was thus explained in the *report of the Secretary of War*:

“The volunteer service is regarded generally by our citizens as preferable to that in the Regular Army, and as long as volunteers are expected to be called for it will be difficult to fill the ranks of the regular regiments.”

49. One of dragoons and nine of infantry.—Callan, p. 379.

50. No law for retirement then existed and many officers were disqualified by age, wounds, etc., from service in the field.

51. 160 acres of land or \$100 in Treasury scrip bearing 6 per cent. interest. To soldiers of less than twelve months' service was granted a bounty of 40 acres or \$25 in scrip.

52. A step made necessary by the increase in the line.

53. By the Act of March 3, 1847. Of the staff corps the departments of the Adjutant-General, Pay and Ordnance were alone augmented.

54. Two to each regiment of artillery. Authorization was also given to equip two light batteries in each regiment.

55. Section 3 empowered the President to organize into companies, battalions and regiments as many of the volunteers in Mexico as would re-enlist for the war, and Section 4 granted such men a bounty of \$12. Section 5 authorized him to accept the services of individuals volunteering in order to fill up the existing vacancies in the volunteer regiments, and Section 21 empowered the President, in case any regiments, regular or volunteer, could not be so filled to war strength, to consolidate them and discharge all supernumerary officers.

These provisions made manifest the difficulty in obtaining volunteers—a difficulty which past experience had proved would increase with the prolonging of the war.

56. Section 3. This act is given in full by Callan, pp. 383-387.

57. See page 84.

58. General Scott sailed from New York on November 30th, touched at New Orleans, from which he sent Taylor the order alluded to, dated December 20th, and reached Brazos San Iago on January 12th, 1847.

59. 1,465 regular officers and men, and 3,268 volunteers, a total of 4,733.—*Return accompanying General Taylor's first report to General Scott*, January 15, 1847. *H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session*, p. 862, footnote.

60. Taylor's second report of January 15th.—*Ibid.*, p. 863.

61. In conformity with Scott's suggestion.

62. An intercepted despatch from Scott to Taylor had apprized the Mexican commander of the detachment of troops to Scott.—McMaster, VII, p. 455.

63. Taylor's reports of February 4th, 7th, and 24th.—*H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 60*, pp. 1109-1111, and *Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1, Thirtieth Congress, first session*, p. 97.

64. Numbering 4,759, of whom only 517 were regulars.—*Taylor's Report of March 6, 1847. Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, p. 142.

The Mexican army amounted to 20,000.—*Ibid.*, p. 138.

65. The volunteers had then had a field training of eight months, "a period twice as long as the time considered necessary to transform a recruit into a regular soldier."—Upton, p. 209.

66. 500 killed and from 1,000 to 1,500 wounded, in addition to a large number of desertions estimated at more than 3,000.

The American losses were 267 killed, 456 wounded and 23 missing, a total of only 746.—*Taylor's Report of March 6th. Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, pp. 138, 142 and 143; Ripley, I, pp. 424 and 427.

67. General Morales, to whom the idea of surrender was repugnant, had feigned illness and turned the command of the place over to Landero.

68. Which was agreed upon at 9 P. M. on March 27th. The Mexican officers were permitted to retain their swords, horses and equipment, and the entire army liberated on parole not to "serve again until duly exchanged."

69. 5,000 strong, with 400 guns, small arms, stores, etc.—*General Orders, No. 80*, dated March 30, 1847; *Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, pp. 239-240.

70. 13,000 and 42 guns.—Ladd, p. 219.

71. Numbering about 12,000.—*General Scott's Autobiography*, II, p. 240; Ripley, II, pp. 17-18; Mansfield, *Life of General Winfield Scott*, p. 367.

72. 60 miles from Vera Cruz.

73. According to General Scott's report of April 23, 1847, the Mexicans numbered "12,000 or more," and lost 3,000 prisoners, 4 or 5,000 stands of arms and 43 pieces of artillery, in addition to "1,000 to 1,200" casualties. The American "force present, in action and in reserve, was 8,500," the losses being 63 killed and 367 wounded.—*Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, pp. 264-274.

74. *Scott to General Taylor, Jalapa, April 24, 1847. H. R., Ex. Doc., No. 60*, p. 948.

75. "Fifty-four guns and mortars, iron and bronze, of various calibres in good service condition, eleven thousand and sixty-five cannon balls, fourteen thousand three hundred bombs and hand grenades, and five hundred muskets."—*General Scott's Report of April 22, 1847. Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, p. 300.

76. See page 82.

77. "The general-in-chief regrets to learn, through a great number of undoubted channels, that, in all probability, not one man in ten of those regiments will be inclined to volunteer for the war."—*General Orders, No. 135*, dated Jalapa, May 4, 1847.

78. General Scott's reports to the Secretary of War, April 28th, May 6th, and June 4th.

79. "There must be only one army, for *unity of command is the first necessity in war.*"—Napoleon, *Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre*, Corresp., XXXI, p. 418.

80. Upton, pp. 211-212.

81. Six companies of infantry and 3 of dragoons—nearly all recruits—left Vera Cruz on June 4th under Colonel McIntosh, but were attacked and had to await General Cadwalader and 500 men who joined them two days later, and rallied to the garrison at Jalapa. Reaching Perote on the 21st, the combined force was further delayed until they were joined by General Pillow, but on July 1st they resumed their march, reaching Puebla on the 8th. With this reinforcement the Army then numbered 8,061 present and 2,302 sick.—*Scott's Report of July 25, 1847.*

82. All that remained of General Franklin Pierce's command of 3,000—composed of new regiments and recruits for the old army—which left Vera Cruz on July 19th, and arrived at Puebla on August 6th.

83. Upton, p. 213. *Scott's Autobiography*, II, p. 420.

84. General Scott's report of September 18, 1847. *Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, p. 384.

85. Ladd, p. 229.

86. Ripley, II, pp. 161, 169-184.

87. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 187 and 210.

88. Scott's force "did not number over 4,500"; his losses were confined to 60 killed and wounded. The Mexicans "had actually engaged on the spot 7,000 men, with at least 12,000 more hovering within sight, and striking distance." They lost 700 killed, 813 prisoners—including 4 generals and 88 officers—and an immense amount of *matériel*.—*General Scott's report of August 28, 1847. Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, p. 308.

89. As a result of these three battles—which in reality consisted of five distinct successes—the Mexican army lost 4,000 in killed and wounded, 3,000 captured, including 8 generals and 205 other officers, 37 pieces of artillery and a large amount of small arms, stores, etc.—*General Scott's report of August 28, 1847.*

The American losses on August 19th and 20th were: "Killed, 137, including 14 officers. Wounded, 665, including 49 officers. Missing (probably killed), 38 rank and file. Total, 1,052."—*Scott's report of September 18, 1847. Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1*, pp. 313-314 and 384.

90. On the morning of the 20th the American army numbered all told, 11,052, but owing to the sick, detachments for garrisons, etc., there were "but 8,497 men engaged."—*Scott's reports of September 18th.*

91. *Scott's report of August 28, 1847.*

92. "*In war nothing has been done when anything still remains to be done.*"—Marshal Berthier to Marshal Soult, transmitting Napoleon's orders the day after Austerlitz.

93. In which one Nicholas P. Trist, President Polk's special emissary with Scott's headquarters, concurred.

94. *Report of the Secretary of War*, December 2, 1847.

95. *Scott's report of September 11, 1847.*

96. The entire American force engaged was only 3,251, while its casualties amounted to no less than 789.—*Scott's report of September 18, 1847.*

97. *Ibid.*

98. The entire American force available for these operations was only 8,180, whereas the Mexicans opposed them with "thirty-odd thousand men."—*Scott's report of September 18th.*

99. "General Worth's division had been turning some minor works north of Chapultepec and was now advancing along the San Cosme causeway. This formed a double roadway on each side of a massive aqueduct of masonry with open arches and pillars. Quitman was pursuing the enemy along the similar causeway of Belen.

"As Shields was charging along this causeway with his volunteers, who, flushed with victory, could not be satisfied with any less honor than the capture of the city, he was overtaken by an aide sent by General Scott to detain him until Worth had forced an entrance through the San Cosme gate. Riding up, the aide saluted the impetuous general—'General Scott presents his compliments'—Shields comprehended at once his message, and interrupted him:

"'I have no time for compliments just now,' and spurred on out of reach of the orders of the commander-in-chief."—Ladd, pp. 252-253.

100. *General Scott's report of September 18th* in which he gives his losses for September 12th, 13th and 14th as 862 killed, wounded and missing. For the operations ending in the capture of the city, his total losses were "2,703, including 383 officers."

On the other hand, the Americans killed or wounded "more than 7,000 officers and men" of the Mexican army, captured 3,730 prisoners, "including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been presidents" of Mexico, "more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shots, shells, powder, &c., &c."

101. On September 18th the Mexican General Rea besieged the American garrison left at Puebla, 500 strong with 1,800 sick. On October 22nd he was joined by Santa Anna, thus bringing the Mexican forces up to 8,000. On October 1st Santa Anna with 4,000 sought to crush General Lane, who was coming up from Vera Cruz with 3,300 men, but was defeated at Huamantla, and on the 12th Rea retreated from Puebla, pursued by Lane who captured his entire force at Atlixco on the 19th.—*General Lane's report of October 22, 1847.*

102. On December 4th General Scott had only 6,000 fit for duty, while his sick numbered 2,041, according to his report of that date.

103. On October 18th Lane with 3,300 reached Puebla, and on December 14th was joined by General Patterson with 2,600, the combined forces reaching Mexico City on the 17th. These, together with other reinforcements, brought the army in the capital up to "9,000 men, or 8,000" fit for duty.—*Scott's report of December 14, 1847.*

104. This treaty stipulated that Mexico was to be evacuated within three months: that the United States was to pay \$3,000,000 in hand and \$12,000,000 divided into four annual instalments, for the provinces of New Mexico and California which had become American territory by right of conquest. The United States was also to assume certain Mexican debts to American citizens, amounting to \$3,500,000. The Rio Grande was fixed as the boundary, Mexico relinquished all claim to Texas, and the United States gained territory aggregating 522,955 square miles.

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105. Ripley, II, p. 640.

106. Upton, pp. 215-216 and 221.

107. *Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900*, pp. 236-237. This work was compiled from official records by Newton A. Strait.

108. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1914, p. 237.

109. Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, p. 10, and June 30, 1914, p. 33.

	War of 1812	Mexican War	Percentage of total number of troops employed	
			War of 1812	Mexican War
Regular	56,032	31,024	9.3	30
Militia	458,463	12,601	88.7	12
Volunteers and rangers..	13,159	60,659	2	58
Total	527,654	104,284		

The above figures differ somewhat from those given by Upton, p. 221. Incidentally it may be remarked that a larger percentage of regulars was used in the Mexican War than in any other, the Philippine War alone excepted.

111. Upton, p. 195.

112. "In the first war, relying upon the States instead of appealing directly to the people as intended by the Constitution, Congress became a witness of disasters like those which occurred in the Revolution; in the second, the national troops, organized and supported by Congress, achieved a series of victories unmarred by a single defeat.

"In one war, an army of more than 6,000 raw troops, posted in the defense of our own capital, fled with a loss of but 19 killed and wounded; in the other a force of less than 5,000 trained volunteers, supported by a few regular troops, overthrew a Mexican army of four times its number.

"In one war, an enemy numbering less than 5,000 men baffled all of our efforts at invasion; in the other our army, with less than 6,000 combatants, entered in triumph the enemy's capital."—Upton, p. 222.

113. "I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish."—Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy*, I, p. 11.

114. See above, pp. 86-87.

115. The total losses of the American army in the battles of August and September which ended in the capture of the City of Mexico were 2,703 (page 601, footnote 100). If the actions of September 12th, 13th and 14th, in which the casualties were 862, be charged up to Scott's consent to the armistice, the net result is still 1,841.

116. See pages 86-87.

117. *Scott's Autobiography*, II, p. 420.

118. Page 601, footnote 102.

119. Page 601, footnote 103.

120. Taylor reached his maximum force — 6,645 — at Monterey (page

597, footnote 44); Scott attained his — 13,500 — at Vera Cruz, making a total of 20,145.

The regulars in service during the war numbered.....	31,024
Volunteers (exclusive of men enlisted for three or six months)	60,659

Total	91,683
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The number of regulars was thus nearly five times that of Taylor's greatest strength. The total number of regulars and volunteers who were enlisted for twelve months or for the war was nine times as large as the effective force with which Scott began his operations against the enemy's capital on August 7, 1846. See pages 87-88.

A mass of statistics relating to this war and some enlightening deductions therefrom are given by Upton, pp. 215-222.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Act of August 14, 1848, which fixed the number of privates in the dragoon companies at 50, in the mounted rifles at 64 and in the artillery and infantry at 42.— Callan, p. 397.

2. A regiment of mounted rifles, two companies in each artillery regiment, an extra major to the old regiments of infantry and a small increase to some of the staff corps were the only additions to the army as organized before the Mexican War.

3. The 15 regiments remaining varied in strength from 558 to 800 men each.

4. Section 2 empowered the President "by voluntary enlistment to increase the number of privates in each or any of the companies of the existing regiments of the army, at present serving or which may hereafter serve at the several military posts on the western frontier, and at remote and distant stations, to any number not exceeding 74."— Callan, p. 408.

5. Callan, pp. 435-436.

This law fixed the strength of the army at 12,698.— Heitman, II, p. 597.

Had the 108 companies on the frontiers been raised to their full strength as authorized by this and previous laws, they would have numbered 17,861. If the entire army — 198 companies — had been similarly increased, its force would have been 18,349. As a matter of fact, its actual strength in November, 1855, was 15,752.— Upton, pp. 223-224; Heitman, II, p. 626.

6. Callan, pp. 451-452.

7. Page 48.

8. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 224.

9. Texas and New Mexico Indian War, 1849-1855; California Indian disturbances, 1851-1852; Utah Indian disturbances, 1850-1853; Rogue River Indian War in Oregon, June 17 to July 3, 1851, August 8 to September, 1853; March to June, 1856; Oregon Indian War, August and September, 1854; Yakima Indian War, October and November, 1855; Klamath and Salmon River Indian War in Oregon and Idaho, January to March, 1855; Florida Indian War, December 15, 1855, to May, 1858.— Strait, pp. 222-223.

A most interesting account of "the American Army among the Indians," is given in Chapter V of the Comte de Paris' *History of the Civil War in America*, I, pp. 59-75.

CHAPTER IX

1. *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 225.
2. Army Register for 1860, p. 42.
3. *Ex. Doc., No. 23, Forty-fifth Congress, Third Session*; Heitman, II, p. 626.
4. Florida on January 7, 1861; Mississippi on the 9th, Alabama on the 11th, Georgia on the 20th, Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on February 1st.
5. On that same day, February 4th, a Peace Congress met in Washington.—Nicolay, *The Outbreak of Rebellion (Campaigns of the Civil War series)*, p. 39.
6. Pollard, *Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History of the Confederacy*, p. 91; Nicolay, pp. 1-16, 39-42.
7. On April 8th the Confederate President issued a call for 20,000 volunteers and on April 16th for 34,000.—Nicolay, p. 79.
8. During April, 1861, all the militia companies from the District of Columbia, save three, had to be mustered into service with the express agreement that they were "to serve within the District and not go beyond it."—*Final Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War covering the period from March 17, 1863, to March 17, 1866*, Part I, p. 7.
9. On April 23rd the first of the South Carolina regiments started for the Potomac.
10. *Report of Provost Marshal General*, Part II, pp. 205-206. The President's authority was based on Section 24 of the Act of March 3, 1802.
11. Upton, p. 227. General Barnard, *The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run*, p. 42, declared that "it was a favorite notion with a large class of northern politicians (and the people too) that nothing but an imposing display of force was necessary to crush the rebellion."
12. *Report of the Provost Marshal-General*, Part II, p. 130; Moore, *Rebellion Records*, I, p. 155.
13. On April 24th, the Virginia Convention decreed that, pending a popular vote respecting secession, "military operations, offensive and defensive, in Virginia, should be under the chief control and direction of the President of the Confederate States."—Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 26.
14. Virginia seceded on April 17th, Tennessee and Arkansas on May 6th, and North Carolina on May 20th.
15. Comte de Paris, I, p. 161; Swinton, p. 30; Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, I, p. 121.
16. Act of February 28, 1795. See footnote 45, Chapter IV.
17. Upton, p. 229.
18. Ropes, I, p. 111; *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I, p. 171. *Report of the Provost Marshal General*, I, pp. 7-8.
19. By the Act of August 6, 1861. See p. 99.
20. Colonel Thomas, the Adjutant-General; Major McDowell, As-

sistant Adjutant-General; and Captain Franklin of the Topographical Engineers.

21. The organization of regiments into three battalions, two being kept in the field and the third retained at the regimental depot for drilling and recruiting.

22. Nos. 15 and 16.

23. Upton, pp. 232-235.

24. See pp. 55-69, 83, 87, 90-91.

25. Upton, p. 235.

26. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 5.—Callan, pp. 466-469.

27. Whether the troops were to serve for only six months or more was left absolutely to the discretion of the President.

28. Section 4 empowered the President to appoint 6 Major Generals and 18 Brigadier Generals who might be selected from the line of the army. Except in case a State failed to supply its quota of volunteers, "the governors of the States furnishing volunteers under this act shall commission the field, staff and company officers requisite for the said volunteers."

Section 6 stipulated that any volunteer wounded or otherwise disabled in service should be entitled to all benefits accruing to those disabled in the Regular service. In the event of the death of a volunteer in service, his widow or legal heirs "in addition to all arrears of pay and allowances, shall receive the sum of one hundred dollars."

Section 10 provided that in the case of vacancies "the men of each company shall vote in their respective companies for all officers as high as captain, and vacancies above captain shall be filled by the votes of the commissioned officers of the regiment."

According to Sections 1 and 2 the President might have called out 500,000 men for six months, if he saw fit to do so, and under Section 4 he and the governors could have sent vast armies into the field without one single officer of military education and experience to command them. The laws of no despotism in the world vest in the ruler such unlimited power to work evil.

Moreover, *Section 4 was based on the theory of a Confederation and the troops regarded as State, not national forces, so that their commissions were to issue from a governor and not from the President.*

The election of officers as provided in Section 10 embodied all that was most subversive of military discipline and efficiency.

29. "Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and is hereby authorized to accept the services of volunteers, either as cavalry, infantry, or artillery, in such numbers as the exigencies of the public service may, in his opinion, demand, to be organized, as authorized by the act of the 22nd of July, 1861; *Provided*: That the number of troops hereby authorized shall not exceed five hundred thousand.

"SEC. 2. That the volunteers authorized by this act shall be armed as the President may direct; they shall be subject to the rules and articles of war, and shall be upon the footing, in all respects, with similar corps of the United States Army, and shall be mustered into the service for 'during the war.'

"SEC. 3. That the President shall be authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the command of the volunteer forces, such number of major-generals and of brigadier-gen-

erals as may, in his judgment, be required for their organization."—Callan, pp. 471-472.

30. Nine regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery.

31. Section 6.

32. Section 5.

33. "SEC. 8. That the enlistments for the regiments authorized by this act shall be in charge of the officers detailed for that purpose who are appointed to said regiments from civil life, and officers of the Regular Army shall be detailed by the commanding general to such service in the volunteer regiments now in the field as will in his judgment give them the greatest military efficiency; and that the commanding general may, in his discretion, employ said officers with any part of the regular forces now in the field, until the regiments authorized by this act have been fully recruited, and detail any of the officers now in the regular army to service with the volunteer regiments now in the field, or which may hereafter be called out, with such rank as may be offered them in said volunteer regiments, for the purpose of imparting to them military instruction and efficiency."—Callan, p. 476.

34. See above, footnote 28, page 605.

35. Act of August 3, 1861, Section 1.

36. By virtue of the Acts of July 29 and August 3, 1861, the authorized strength of the Regular Army was fixed at 39,273 officers and men.—Heitman, II, pp. 598-601.

No increase in its strength was made throughout the war or until July 28, 1866.

37. Callan, pp. 480-487.

38. See above, footnote 28. On August 1st the property holders of New York memorialized the President, complaining against a system so "fatal to military discipline."—Swinton, p. 63.

39. "Resolved, That vacancies hereafter occurring among the commissioned officers of the volunteer regiments shall be filled by the governors of the States, respectively, in the same manner as original appointments, and so much of the tenth section of the act approved July 22, 1861, as is inconsistent herewith, be, and the same is, hereby repealed."—Callan, pp. 488-489.

40. "That all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting the Army and Navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in all respects legalized and made valid, to the same extent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States."—Callan, p. 490.

41. Moore, *Rebellion Record*, II, p. 119.

42. Upton, p. 257.

43. "In 1792 Congress organized the militia and declared in favor of obligatory military service, on the theory that the militia were the bulwark of the nation. Subsequently Indian difficulties and armed conflicts with two foreign nations compelled it to raise and support a regular army. Both of these organizations in 1861 it summarily rejected. Instead of expanding the Regular Army, and making it the chief instrument in executing the national will, it violated the prac-

tice of every civilized nation by calling into existence an army of a million untrained officers and men. But it may be replied that far from rejecting the army, Congress, on the contrary, tripled its strength by increasing its organization from 13,024 to 39,273.

"This increase was mere expansion on paper. *Give men a choice between regulars, volunteers, and militia, and they will invariably select the organization whose laxity of discipline is greatest.* The Rebellion gave another proof of this truth. *By January 1, 1863, the Army attained a maximum of only 25,436, which was less than 3 per cent. of the total force then in the field.*

"Yet this feeble proportion gives an exaggerated idea of the part the Army was to play in the great struggle. We shall find on further investigation that the total number of men recruited for the Army, even after a resort to conscription, was less than three-thousandths, one-third of 1 per cent. of the millions who poured forth in new and untried organizations.

"This disappearance of the Regular Army as a factor was due to the *mistaken confidence of Congress in the system of voluntary enlistments. The Revolution and the War of 1812 had made it evident that being the chief cause of national weakness they could not be relied upon in a long war.* Two wars further conclusively proved that the patriotism of the people should not be judged by the sole test of their willingness to serve in the ranks. . . .

"It should not, therefore, surprise us that under a system so improvident, voluntary enlistments finally proved a failure."—Upton, pp. 257-258.

44. By virtue of the President's call of May 3rd and the Congressional acts of July 22nd and 25th, the North furnished 700,680 volunteers.—Phisterer, *Statistical Records of the Armies of the United States* (Campaigns of the Civil War Series), p. 4.

45. Mr. Lincoln's call of April 15th produced no less than 91,816 men for three months' service.—*Ibid*, p. 3.

46. Upton, p. 243; Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, p. 15.

47. This expedition, devised by General Benjamin Butler for the purpose of capturing the Confederate posts at Bethel, was composed of six volunteer regiments and a battalion. General Pierce was never mustered into the United States service and had no right to any command. The Confederate force, composed of North Carolina and Virginia troops about 1,100 strong, was commanded by Colonel D. H. Hill.—Swinton, pp. 31-33.

48. *Ibid*, p. 33.

49. Swinton, pp. 38, 39 and 46; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 222-226; *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, III; pp. 196-197; Ropes, I, pp. 129-131.

50. Confederates 29,949, Union 28,568.—*Report of the Joint Committee*, II, p. 249; Upton, p. 246.

51. McDowell had only 800 regulars. On the day of the battle some of the volunteers had been in service less than a month; the terms of all the militia were on the eve of expiring. The force was an unknown quantity, and discipline and cohesion were notable for their absence.—

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, pp. 175-194; *Report of the Joint Committee*, III, p. 38; Swinton, pp. 42-44; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 227-228.

52. The Union forces engaged consisted of 896 officers, 17,676 men and 24 guns. Beauregard, having been joined by Johnston from the Shenandoah, had 18,053.—*Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 194-195.

53. The Union army lost 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 captured or missing, a total of 2,896. The Confederates had 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 captured or missing, a total of 1,982.—*Ibid.* Alexander, pp. 50-51, gives the Confederate losses as 2,708.

It was at this battle that General Thomas J. Jackson won his appellation of "Stonewall Jackson."—Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, p. 108.

Interesting accounts of this action are also given by Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 42-57, and by Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, pp. 37-46.

54. Official report of Major Sykes. Moore, II, pp. 24-25.

55. Official reports of General McDowell and General Heintzelman, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 2-7 and 25-27.

56. General Joseph E. Johnston's Statement. *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 252.

57. Ropes, I, p. 157.

58. Upton, p. 243.

59. *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 58 and 60.

60. Defeat of the Union forces and death of General Lyon at Wilson's Creek, August 10th; surrender of Lexington, Missouri, September 20th; disastrous repulse at Ball's Bluff, October 21st; indecisive action at Belmont, November 7th; and victory of Drainesville, December 20th, 1861.

61. Comte de Paris, I, pp. 254-256.

62. *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 200.

63. Of the five Major Generals appointed up to September 18, 1861, four were selected from civil life; of 71 Brigadier Generals, 24 were civilians.

At the commencement of hostilities there were 1,054 graduates of West Point, 168 of whom joined the Rebellion. Although there were more than 600 captains and lieutenants in the Regular Army who might advantageously have been utilized in the highest grades of the volunteer regiments, Congress, by the Act of July 22, 1861, prevented any use being made of them in that capacity if the governor of a State choose to make his own appointments (pages 98 and 605). This policy, which resulted in keeping professional officers in the lower grades of the Army, was undoubtedly one of the greatest blunders committed during the war.

Compare Upton, pp. 236, 237, 261 and 263; Cullum, I, pp. 12-14.

64. *Quaere?* Certainly not from a military standpoint.

65. Report of the Provost-Marshal-General, I, pp. 102 and 160.

66. Jones, *War Statistics*; Draper, II, p. 165.

67. Aside from the appropriation for the Regular Army for 1861, it was necessary to make an additional appropriation of \$203,392,488.77 on February 25, 1862, supplemented by \$30,000,000 on May 14th for further pay for the volunteers.—Upton, p. 267.

CHAPTER X

1. Act approved January 31, 1862.
 2. "That the President of the United States, when in his judgment the public safety may require it, be, and he is hereby authorized to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the United States, their offices and appurtenances; to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the United States, their offices, shops, buildings, and all their appendages and appurtenances; to prescribe rules and regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the aforesaid telegraph and railroad lines . . . to place under military control all the officers, agents, and employes . . . so that they shall be considered as a post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States, subject to all the restrictions imposed by the rules and articles of war. . . ."— Callan, p. 492.
 3. "SEC. 3. That no volunteers or militia from any state or territory shall be mustered into the service of the United States on any terms or conditions confining their service to the limits of said state or territory, or their vicinities, beyond the number of ten thousand in the state of Missouri, and four thousand five hundred in the state of Maryland, heretofore authorized by the President of the United States, or secretary of war, to be raised in said states."— Callan, p. 495.
 4. See above, page 95.
 5. Act of April 16, 1862.— Callan, pp. 501-503.
 6. Act of May 14, 1862.— *Ibid*, pp. 503-504.
 7. Act of July 2, 1862.— See Callan, p. 509.
 8. Section one authorized the appointment by the President of 40 surgeons and 120 assistant surgeons of volunteers, who were to be examined by a medical board convened by the Secretary of War. It further forbade the filling of vacancies in those grades except "on the ground of merit only." Section 2 abolished brigade surgeons and placed all surgeons of volunteers under the supervision of the Surgeon-General.
 - Section 3 permitted the appointment of an additional assistant surgeon in each volunteer regiment, but specified no examination for proper qualification. The list was thus opened to every incompetent, and it was not until they had been weeded out that this evil was checked.
 9. Callan, pp. 509-510.
 10. Approved July 14, 1862.
 11. Callan, pp. 519-523.
 12. Section 12. *Ibid*, p. 528.
 13. "An act to amend the Act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, approved February twenty-eighth, seventeen hundred and ninety-five, and the Act amendatory thereof, and for other purposes."— Callan, pp. 531-535.
 14. The Military Policy of the United States, p. 434.
 15. See above, pages 98 and 605.
 16. Sections one, two, three, and four.
 17. For the appointment of a Judge-Advocate-General and a similar officer for each field army, for the trial for minor offenses by a field-officer, etc. Sections 5, 6 and 7.
- A new organization was also given to the cavalry by Section 11.

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18. Section 9.
19. Resolution 25, approved April 4, 1862.— Callan, p. 539.
20. Resolution 37, approved June 21, 1862.— *Ibid.*
21. Resolution 52, approved July 12, 1862.— Callan, p. 540.
22. Compare Mulholland, *The Military Order of the Congress Medal of Honor Legion of the United States*, pp. 50-51.
The Victoria Cross was created by Royal edict on January 29, 1856.
23. Upton, p. 436.
24. Phisterer, p. 4.
25. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 10; Part II, pp. 102 and 103.
26. The quotas amounted to 334,835; the number of men actually furnished was 431,958.— *Ibid.*, p. 160; Phisterer, pp. 4-5.
27. Which could readily have been prevented had there existed a General Staff to tell them the proper measures to take under such circumstances.
28. A principle laid down by the Act of May 8, 1792. See p. 43.
29. Actually 87,588 out of quotas amounting to 334,835.— Phisterer, p. 5.
30. Report of the Provost Marshal General, I, pp. 10-11.
31. No attempt will be made in this campaign or in those of the three ensuing years to do more than sketch in briefest outline the most important operations.
32. Upton, p. 269.
33. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 368-372; *Personal Recollections of General U. S. Grant*, I, pp. 284-293.
34. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 398-428; Grant, I, pp. 294-315; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*, pp. 56-85; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 471-498; Ropes, II, pp. 18-35.
The casualties of the Union forces, army and navy — the former of which numbered about 27,000 — were 2,886; those of the Confederates under General Pillow, 231 killed, 1,007 wounded and 13,829 captured.— *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 429; Upton, p. 270.
35. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 640-645; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 562-590.
36. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 692-711; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 591-608; Ropes, I, pp. 243-245.
37. Morse, *Abraham Lincoln* (American Statesmen Series), I, p. 343; Comte de Paris, I, p. 616; *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 225.
38. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 647-652.
39. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 92; *Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 284; Alexander, p. 62.
40. *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 465-593; Grant, I, pp. 338-370; Ropes, II, pp. 68-69; Swinton, *Decisive Battles*, pp. 86-138; Comte de Paris, I, pp. 515-561.
The Union army numbered about 59,000, its casualties being 13,047; the Confederate army amounted to about 40,335 and its losses were 10,699.— *Battles and Leaders*, I, pp. 538-539; Upton, pp. 272-273; *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*, I, p. 247; Ropes, II, 89.
41. *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 445.
42. Comte de Paris, II, pp. 153-175; *Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 22-99; III, pp. 551-555.

43. May 5th, May 7th, May 27th and June 1st, 1862, respectively.
 44. Upton, p. 269; Comte de Paris, II, pp. 1-72; *Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 160-263; Alexander, pp. 63-108; *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 252-410; Longstreet, pp. 72-102; Gordon, pp. 47-59.

45. Upton, p. 275.

46. Alexander, p. 109; Long, p. 160.

47. At McDowell on May 8th; Front Royal, May 23rd; Winchester, May 25th; Charlestown and Harper's Ferry, May 28th; Cross Keys, June 8th; ending with Port Republic on the 9th.—Alexander, pp. 94-108; *Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 282-298.

48. Alexander, p. 112.

49. *Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 317; Ropes, p. 164.

50. *Official Records*, XI, Part II, p. 238; *Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 315; Ropes, p. 159.

51. Mechanicsville on June 26th; Gaines' Mills, June 27th; Savage Station, June 29th; White Oaks Swamp and Charles City Cross Roads, June 30th.

52. *Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 180-187, 319-427; Comte de Paris, II, pp. 73-148; Swinton, pp. 140-165; Ropes, II, pp. 170-212; Alexander, pp. 107-174; *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 410-440; Long, pp. 170-177; Longstreet, pp. 120-152; Gordon, pp. 70-79.

The Union losses were 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded and 6,053 captured or missing, a total of 15,849.

The Confederates had 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded and 949 missing or captured, the total being 20,135.—*Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 315 and 317; Alexander, p. 171.

McClellan, p. 440, agrees with the above estimate of the Union losses, but gives those of the Confederates at 19,749.

53. Near Alexandria, Virginia.

54. On August 4th Burnside with 8,000 men—who had been withdrawn from North Carolina (p. 110) to Fort Monroe—reached Aquia Creek, and on the 14th McClellan started his movement from Harrison's Landing.

On June 26th General Pope (p. 110) was appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia composed of the forces under Fremont, Banks and McDowell, and next day fixed his headquarters at Washington, but it was not until August 1st that he started to concentrate his army in the direction of Gordonsville.

On July 11th the command of the Union armies was given to General H. W. Halleck as General-in-Chief, but he did not reach Washington from the West until the 22nd.

55. On July 27th.—Alexander, p. 180.

56. Jackson had about 24,000 troops; Banks about 17,900.—*Ibid*, p. 180; *Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 496.

57. The Union losses were 2,381; the Confederate, 1,365.—*Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 496.

58. Pope's army was so scattered that he went into action with only 35,000 (Ropes, II, p. 282), but he subsequently concentrated his forces to the number of from 63 to 65,000. The total Confederate strength was in the neighbourhood of 54,000.—*Ibid*, II, pp. 497-500; Alexander, pp. 204, 211; Ropes, II, pp. 275, 282.

The losses in this battle have never been separately reported.

59. Alexander, p. 218; Long, pp. 182-200; Longstreet, pp. 153-198.

60. Ropes, II, p. 329.

61. Upton, p. 276; Long, pp. 207-209. The Union losses in this campaign from the Rappahannock to the Potomac were 14,462, the Confederate 9,474.—*Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 499-500. Alexander, p. 219, gives Lee's losses as 9,112.

62. The Army of the Mississippi numbered 23,077 and its casualties amounted to 2,520; the Army of West Tennessee under Van Dorn was "about 22,000 men" and its losses 4,838.—*Official Records*, XVII, Part I, pp. 246 and 378; *Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 760.

63. Accounts of this campaign are given by the Comte de Paris, II, pp. 360-417; *Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 717-759; Grant, *Memoirs*, I, pp. 394-421; Greene, *The Mississippi* (*Campaigns of the Civil War series*), pp. 29-54; Upton, pp. 276-277.

64. This was due to the dispersion by Halleck's orders of the army of 120,000 which had entered Corinth on May 30th, coupled with the bold offensive of Bragg. These two factors reduced the Union armies in the West to a passive defensive.—Grant, I, pp. 383, 394-395; Greene, p. 35; Ropes, II, pp. 95, 218 and 384.

65. Upton, p. 277.

66. Ropes, II, p. 325.

67. By virtue of the order dated September 2, 1862.—McClellan, p. 536.

68. There were also actions at Fox's Gap and South Mountain that same day.

69. According to McClellan's own report, his command numbered 87,164. Lee's force was in the neighbourhood of 35,255.—*Battles and Leaders*, II, p. 603; Taylor, *Four Years with Lee*, quoted by Alexander, pp. 244-245.

Ropes, II, pp. 382-383, estimates Lee's strength at 58,000.

70. The Union losses were 12,410; the Confederates' 11,172.—*Battles and Leaders*, II, pp. 600 and 603.

71. On September 19th.—Alexander, pp. 269-270.

72. October 26th to November 2nd.—Ropes, II, p. 440.

73. Arriving on November 9th.—Comte de Paris, II, p. 559.

The Union losses in this campaign of Antietam were 27,767 (including 12,564 captured at Harper's Ferry on September 15th); that of the Confederates, 13,609.—Alexander, pp. 273-275.

McClellan's Own Story, pp. 548-617, gives his version of this campaign. See also Longstreet, pp. 199-291; Gordon, pp. 80-91.

74. By General Orders, No. 182.—Swinton, p. 227; *Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 104; *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 648, 651 and 652.

This ended McClellan's career, about which there has been much controversy. That he was an able organizer is generally admitted. Perhaps had he not had so many raw troops to train and organize, he might have shone more brilliantly as a general in the field.

75. Swinton, p. 233.

76. *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 70-147; Comte de Paris, II, pp. 559-605; Ropes, II, pp. 447-472; Alexander, pp. 285-313; Long, pp. 233-239; Longstreet, pp. 297-317.

According to General Burnside's return for December 10th, his army

numbered 116,683; a return of the same date gives Lee's forces as consisting of 78,513.

The Union losses were 12,653, the Confederate 5,337.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 145-147; Alexander, pp. 284, 285, and 313.

77. The Army of the Ohio under General Buell was fully "54,000 strong"; the Confederates under Bragg about 17,000.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 30; *Bragg's report*, quoted by Ropes, II, p. 408.

Buell's losses were 4,211; Bragg's, 3,396.—*Battles and Leaders*, *ibid.*

78. Comte de Paris, II, pp. 498-534; Ropes, II, pp. 424-433; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles of the War*, pp. 178-225.

Rosecrans' army consisted of about 47,000 men, Bragg had nearly 38,000.—*War of the Rebellion Records*, XXIX, pp. 663 and 674; Ropes, II, pp. 424-425.

The former's losses were about 9,500 killed and wounded and 3,700 captured; Bragg's casualties were about 9,000 and 900 prisoners.—*War of the Rebellion Records*, XXIX, p. 681; Ropes, II, p. 433.

79. On October 25th.—*Grant's Memoirs*, I, p. 421.

80. Grant, I, pp. 422-438; Sherman, I, pp. 279-293; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles of the War*, pp. 262-279; *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 462-470, 551-560. Sherman had about 33,000 men and lost 1,776; Pemberton's effective strength was "about 25,000" and his casualties confined to 207.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 471.

81. Antietam.

82. Ropes, II, pp. 473-474.

CHAPTER XI

1. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter each regiment of cavalry organized in the United States service may have two assistant surgeons, and each company or troop of cavalry shall have from sixty to seventy-eight privates." Approved January 6, 1863.—*Report of the Provost Marshal General*, Part II, p. 178.

2. Act approved February 7, 1863.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 179.

3. Act of February 9, 1863.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 179.

4. Act of February 16, 1863.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 180.

5. By the resolution of July 12, 1862.

6. By the Act of July 5, 1862. See page 106.

7. Four Major Generals and nine Brigadier Generals.

8. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part II, p. 180.

9. Section one abolished the topographical engineers as a distinct branch and merged them into the Corps of Engineers.

Section 3 provided that no officer below field rank should be promoted until he had passed a satisfactory examination before a board of three officers senior in rank.

Section 4 made an increase of 19 officers in the Ordnance Department, with similar stipulations as to promotion.

Section 6 provided that all payments for advance bounties to men discharged before the expiration of their legal service shall be charged to the individuals unless provided with a surgeon's certificate.

10. "Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That upon any requisition

hereafter being made by the President of the United States for militia, any person who shall have volunteered or been drafted for the service of the United States for the term of nine months, or a shorter period, may enlist into a regiment from the same State to serve for a term of one year; and any person so enlisting shall be entitled to and receive a bounty of fifty dollars, to be paid in time and manner provided by the act of July twenty-second, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, for the payment of the bounty provided for by that act."—*Report of the Provost Marshal General*, II, p. 181.

11. *Ibid.*, II, p. 182.

12. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 12-13.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Under the first category are included Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 17; in the second, Sections 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 33 and 34; in the third category were Sections 7, 21 to 31 both inclusive, and 38.

The question of substitutes was dealt with by Sections 13 and 17; that of re-enlistment by Section 18; while sundry other provisions fell under Sections 19, 20, 32, 35, 36 and 37.—*Ibid.*, Part II, pp. 182-188.

14. The Act of May 8, 1792. See page 48.

15. "That all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, except as hereinafter excepted, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called out by the President for that purpose."

16. By Section 33.

17. "SEC. 13. *And be it further enacted*, That any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft; or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive it, such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the Secretary may determine, for the procurement of such substitute, which sum shall be fixed at a uniform rate by a general order made at the time of ordering a draft for any State or Territory, and thereupon such person so furnishing the substitute, or paying the money, shall be discharged from further liability under that draft. And any person failing to report after due service of notice as herein prescribed, without furnishing a substitute, or paying the required sum therefor, shall be deemed a deserter, and shall be arrested by the provost marshal, and sent to the nearest military post for trial by court-martial, unless, upon proper showing that he is not liable to do military duty, the board of enrolment shall relieve him from the draft."

"SEC. 17. *And be it further enacted*, That any person enrolled and drafted according to the provisions of this act, who shall furnish an acceptable substitute, shall thereupon receive from the board of enrolment a certificate of discharge from such draft, which shall exempt him from military duty during the time for which he was drafted; and such substitute shall be entitled to the same pay and allowances provided by law as if he had been originally drafted into the service of the United States."

18. "SEC. 18. *And be it further enacted*, That such of the volunteers and militia now in the service of the United States as may re-enlist to serve one year, unless sooner discharged, after the expiration of their present term of service, shall be entitled to a bounty of fifty dollars, one-half of which is to be paid upon such re-enlistment, and the balance at the expiration of the term of re-enlistment. And such as may re-enlist to serve for two years unless sooner discharged, after the expiration of their present term of enlistment, shall receive upon such re-enlistment, twenty-five dollars of the one hundred dollars bounty for re-enlistment provided by the fifth section of the act approved twenty-second of July, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, entitled 'An act to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property.'"

19. Part I, p. 19.

20. *American Statesmen* series, II, pp. 196-199.

21. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 32-34, Part II, pp. 224-225.

Authorization to suspend this writ had been given by Congress by an act approved March 3, 1863.

22. Section 14 of the Enrolment Act prescribed that "all persons drafted and claiming exemption from military duty on account of disability, or any other cause, shall present their claims to be exempted to the board, whose decision shall be final."

23. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, p. 160, and Part II, p. 223; Phisterer, p. 5.

24. Of this number 252,564 were examined.

25. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 28, 29 and 174.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

27. *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 29-40, Part II, p. 227-228.

28. Joint resolution approved December 23, 1863.

29. On the express condition "that no bounties except such as are now provided by law shall be paid to any persons enlisted after the fifth day of January next."

30. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part II, pp. 188-189.

31. Comte de Paris, III, p. 2.

32. The numerous desertions due to the discouragement of the men were summarily punished and some of the culprits shot; regular furloughs were instituted; the grand divisions—a cumbersome system invented by Burnside—were abolished and the army organized into six army corps each with a distinctive badge; the three divisions of cavalry were consolidated into a corps under General Stoneman and at last were given an opportunity to show that it was in nowise inferior to its adversaries.—*Ibid.*, III, pp. 3-6; Swinton, pp. 267-268; Alexander, pp. 319-320.

33. According to the official returns for April 30, 1863, the Army of the Potomac numbered "about 130,000" with 404 guns; the Confederate returns for March 31st gave an effective total of 57,112. Adding the increase received during April, Lee's army was "not less than 60,000."—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 237 and 239; Alexander, pp. 320-322.

34. "Unfortunately, there were in its ranks nearly twenty-three thousand men whose term of service expired in May. These consisted of thirty-three New York regiments and two from Maine, which . . . had

enlisted for two years at the breaking out of hostilities in April, 1861; also eight regiments of Pennsylvania, mustered into service for nine months only by the call for troops which followed Pope's disaster in August, 1862. . . . The soldiers appertaining to the first category, trained up to the hardships of war by two years' campaigning, were about to leave a great void in the Army of the Potomac, but the law was explicit; they were to be set free *on the 1st of May, 1863*, and if the Federal general desired to make use of them, he had to fight before that time. A large number of these soldiers were undoubtedly disposed to re-enlist, but they wanted to avail themselves of the expiration of their term of service in order, first of all, to enjoy a little vacation, and then to obtain the bounties by re-enlistment which were offered by the States and the government to the newly-enlisted recruits."—*Comte de Paris*, III, p. 6. The italics are his.

35. Alexander, p. 323.

36. "The enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences, and give battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."

37. *Lee's Official Report*, quoted by Alexander, p. 328.

38. His wounded arm had to be amputated, but pneumonia set in and on May 10th he died.—Alexander, p. 341.

39. The Union losses during the campaign of Chancellorsville were 17,287; the Confederate, 12,463.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 237-238; Alexander, pp. 360-362.

40. *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 152-233; *Comte de Paris*, III, pp. 14-123; Swinton, pp. 267-307; Ropes (finished by Livermore), III, pp. 149-204; Long, pp. 246-265; Longstreet, pp. 328-330; Alexander, pp. 315-360; Gordon, pp. 92-104.

41. See above, pages 12-13.

42. Into three corps, each of three divisions of infantry of four brigades each, and five battalions of artillery with 16 guns each. Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of the 2nd Corps and A. P. Hill received the new 3rd Corps.—Alexander, p. 367; Longstreet, pp. 334-335.

43. Ewell and Longstreet. Part of the former's command, after capturing Winchester on the 15th, crossed the river that same day and occupied Hagerstown and Sharpsburg.—Longstreet, pp. 339-340.

44. At Edward's Ferry near Leesburg.

45. Military blunders are usually punished by defeat and, incidentally, Stuart got a good beating at the hands of Kilpatrick's cavalry at Hanover on June 30th.

46. As General Alexander aptly declares, p. 374, "Hooker's Chancellorsville campaign had been lost by the absence of his cavalry, and Lee's Gettysburg campaign was similarly compromised."

47. So rapid had been the advance of the Confederates that on June 29th Ewell had got beyond Carlisle and was on the point of capturing Harrisburg when he was recalled; Hill was at Fayetteville and Longstreet at Chambersburg.—Longstreet, pp. 348-349.

48. Meade's preference was for General Reynolds, commanding the 1st Corps.

49. Buford's cavalry.

50. In the above narrative we have followed closely the admirable summary given by Alexander, pp. 363-383.

51. So far as can be estimated Meade's force at the battle numbered about 93,500, and Lee's something over 70,000.— *Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 440; Alexander, pp. 368-370.

52. The following authorities were also consulted: *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 239-433; Comte de Paris, III, pp. 610-696; Swinton, pp. 308-372; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles*, pp. 311-355; Alexander, pp. 363-446; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War series)*, pp. 87-210; Ropes, III, Book II, pp. 415-498; Long, pp. 275-297; Longstreet, pp. 351-428; Gordon, pp. 135-176.

53. Alexander, pp. 435-442; Longstreet, pp. 426-430; Gordon, p. 172.

54. Alexander, p. 440.

Both General Longstreet and General Alexander — the latter of whom acted as Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps and under Lee's direction gave the order for the ill-fated charge of Pickett's division on the third day of the battle — personally assured the author that, had Meade organized a vigorous pursuit after Gettysburg, the Southern army would have been annihilated or captured *in toto* before it got over the Potomac.

55. Swinton, pp. 373-401.

56. Page 113.

57. Vicksburg was of the utmost strategic importance because it occupied the first heights adjacent to the river below Memphis and was the only point then connecting the Confederacy on both sides of the Mississippi. So long as it was held, the Federals could not control the river.

58. On January 29th, 1863, Grant arrived at Young's Point, opposite Vicksburg, and assumed command of all the troops next day.— Grant, *Memoirs*, I, p. 441.

59. General Joseph E. Johnston had, according to his own report, about 20,000 troops. His defeat at Jackson prevented the relief of Vicksburg.

60. Delivered on May 19th and 22nd.

61. Grant's army ranged from 33,000 at the start of the campaign to 75,000 at the close, and his losses amounted to 9,362. Pemberton's maximum force was "over 40,000." The number comprised in the capitulation — including non-combatants — was 29,491.— *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 549-550. Grant says (*Memoirs*, I, p. 572), that "At Vicksburg, 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition."

62. The above narrative follows the accounts as given by Grant in his *Memoirs*, I, pp. 437-574; in *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 493-537, which also contains some other interesting articles on this campaign; Sherman, I, pp. 304-334; James Harrison Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, I, pp. 173-222; Gordon, pp. 177, 185-187.

63. Grant, *Memoirs*, I, pp. 567-568.

64. Compare Sherman, I, p. 334.

65. Grant, *Memoirs*, I, pp. 574-575.

66. During August and the first half of September, 1863.

67. By a telegram from Halleck, dated October 3rd, which reached Grant at New Orleans on the 10th. He left that day for Cairo.

68. Grant, I, pp. 578-584.

69. On September 19th and 20th. See Longstreet, pp. 438-460.

70. Gist, *The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War series)*, p. 227.

71. Rosecrans's forces were about 56,965 and his losses in killed, wounded and captured, 16,179. Bragg's army is estimated at 71,551, and his casualties amounted to 17,804.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 673 and 675. The figures given by Gist, p. 228, vary only slightly from the above, except that Bragg's losses are placed at 20,950. On the other hand, Alexander, p. 464, gives the Confederate casualties as 16,199.

Longstreet, p. 458, gives Rosecrans's army at 60,867 and Bragg's at 59,242, their respective losses being 16,550 and 17,800.

72. *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan*, I, p. 289.

73. Gist, pp. 23-242.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 234; Grant, II, pp. 17-18.

75. Sheridan, I, p. 302.

76. Sherman had advanced from Vicksburg, starting on September 22nd and 23rd.

77. On October 16th. Rosecrans was given command of the Army of the Ohio.

78. In September. Hooker's force consisted of the 11th and 12th Corps amounting to some 15,000.

79. His assault has been poetically called "the battle above the clouds."

80. Then commanding the 2nd division, Fourth Corps (Gen. Granger), of the Army of the Cumberland.

81. Grant, II, pp. 19-88; *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 679-727; Sheridan, I, pp. 302-324; Gist, pp. 242-262; Alexander, pp. 473-480; Comte de Paris, IV, pp. 246-315; Sherman, I, pp. 347-379; Wilson, I, pp. 263-303.

82. Grant's effective strength at this battle was 60,000; his losses, 5,815.

Bragg's forces were somewhere between 30,000 and 41,000, while his casualties amounted to 6,687.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 729-730; Grant, II, p. 95; Alexander, p. 480.

83. Grant, II, p. 85.

84. "First, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. . . . It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. . . . Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle."—Grant, II, pp. 85, 95 and 96.

85. On November 29th.

86. Grant, II, pp. 92-98; *Battles and Leaders*, III, pp. 731-751; Alexander, pp. 480-491; Comte de Paris, IV, pp. 223-245; Gist, pp. 256-257; Sherman, I, pp. 364-367, 379-382; Longstreet, pp. 490-511; Wilson, I, pp. 307-314.

"Longstreet's command probably numbered 20,000," while Burnside had "about 12,000 effective men." The former's losses were 1,392, the latter's, only 693.—*Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 752; Alexander, pp. 491-492.

87. Grant, II, p. 99.

CHAPTER XII

1. See pages 120-121, and 615.
2. "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the money paid by drafted persons under the act for calling out the national forces, and for other purposes, approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or that may be paid under any act for like purposes, shall be paid into the treasury of the United States, and shall be drawn out on requisitions, as are other public moneys, for the expenses of the draft and for the procurement of substitutes; for which purposes the money so paid is hereby appropriated.
"Approved January 16, 1864."
3. Page 117.
4. *Final Report*, Part II, pp. 40-41.
5. Just as had happened during the Revolution.
6. "Ward of a city, town, township, precinct, or election district, or of a county, where the county is not divided into wards, towns, townships, precincts, or election districts."
7. Sections 2 and 3.
8. Sections 4 and 5.
9. Section 10. Section 6 dealt with enrolment, Sections 7, 8 and 9 with seamen and marines, and Section 11 prescribed that the classes of men between the ages of 20 and 35 and between 35 and 45 should be enrolled simultaneously.
10. Section 12. Section 13 provided for additional surgeons, and Section 14 for examinations of drafted men at various places within the enrolment districts.
11. Section 15.
12. Sections 20, 21 and 25.
13. Section 22 The fees of agents and attorneys for making out claims for exemption from the draft were fixed at \$5. Surgeons and physicians were not allowed any compensation for furnishing certificates of disability.
14. Section 23. The fine ranged between \$300 and \$10,000, with the question of imprisonment left to the discretion of the court.
15. Section 24.
16. Sections 15 and 16.
17. Sections 18 and 19.
18. Section 17.
19. The full text of the Act of February 24, 1864, is given in the *Final Report of the Provost Marshal General*, Part II, pp. 189-195.
20. The Act of February 26, 1864, revived the grade of Lieutenant-General.
21. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part II, p. 195.
22. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 195-196.
23. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 197-198.
24. As the States had outbid the Government in the matter of bounties, as has been seen (pages 128-129), the latter was evidently resolved to go them one better. One of the principal blunders of the Revolution was thus about to be repeated *ad nauseam*.
25. Section 6.

Section 3 permitted recruiting agents to be sent into any of the rebellious States except Arkansas, Tennessee and Louisiana. Section 4 allowed drafted men, substitutes and volunteers to select such organizations of their own States as were not filled to the maximum. Section 5 required the discharge of minors under 18 years and the dismissal from service of any officer knowingly enlisting any one under sixteen. Section 7 abolished travelling pay but allowed transportation to and from the place of rendezvous. Section 8 credited those in the naval service enlisted prior to February 24, 1864, to the quota of their district. Section 9 permitted an absent person a reasonable notice upon his return of his having been drawn by draft, and Sections 10 and 11 specified that the present act should in nowise alter Section 17 of the Act of February 24, 1864, or existing laws relative to substitutes.

26. In his letter of April 21, 1778, to John Bannister, and his despatch of August 20, 1780, to the President of Congress. See page 23, footnote, and pages 28-30.

27. See pages 95-98, 104 and 120.

28. Pages 120, 131 and 149.

29. Page 120.

30. Final Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 42 and 160.

31. The quotas assigned to the States amounted to 467,434, but only 317,092 were actually furnished, although commutation was paid by 52,288 additionally.—*Ibid.*, I, p. 160; Phisterer, p. 6.

32. The State quotas totalled 186,981, but, as a matter of fact, 259,515 men were actually furnished, exclusive of the 32,678 by whom commutation was paid.—*Ibid.*, I, p. 160; Phisterer, pp. 6-7.

33. Out of quotas amounting to 113,000, 83,652 were furnished.—*Ibid.*, I, p. 160; Phisterer, p. 7, gives 83,612.

During July, 1864, other calls were made on New York and Pennsylvania for 4,000 troops for 100 days' service.

34. To 346,746. The terms of service were one, two or three years.

35. Two hundred and four thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight out of quotas amounting to 290,000.

36. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, pp. 43-47, Part II, pp. 240-241, 243-244; Phisterer, pp. 8-9.

37. Grant, II, pp. 114-121.

38. Morse states, II, p. 278, that "It is said that Grant, before accepting the new rank and taking Virginia as his special province, stipulated that he was to be absolutely free from all interference, especially on the part of Stanton. Whether this agreement was formulated or not, it was put into practical effect. No man hereafter interfered with General Grant. Mr. Lincoln occasionally made suggestions, but strictly and merely as suggestions. He distinctly and pointedly said that he did not know, and did not wish to know, the general's plans of campaign."

39. Sheridan, II, pp. 202-204.

40. Grant, II, pp. 129-133; Sheridan, I, pp. 339-342.

41. Then at Dalton, Georgia. Sherman's effective strength on May 1, 1864, was 98,797; Johnston's on April 30th, 52,992.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 289 and 281; Sherman, II, pp. 23-24.

42. Meade's army numbered "102,869 present for duty with 242

guns," "Lee's total force was about 64,000, and he had about 274 guns."—Alexander, pp. 496-497.

43. Butler, with a maximum force of about 36,000, was to move from Fort Monroe up the James River toward Richmond and Petersburg; Sigel with some 15,000 men in the Shenandoah Valley was to move on Staunton, and, upon being joined by Crook with 9,000 from West Virginia and by Averell, was to threaten Lynchburg which was of vital importance to Lee at Richmond.

In the West, Banks with about 25,000 men was to advance from New Orleans against Mobile.

44. At Germanna Ford and Ely's Ford.

45. Grant's report. In his *Memoirs*, II, p. 204, he asserts that "More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May."

46. Grant's report and *Memoirs*, II, p. 227; Sheridan, I, p. 372.

47. "On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on the way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Leadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains."—*Grant's report*. Also Sheridan, I, pp. 372-393; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 188-193.

48. About 34 miles.

49. *Grant's report of July 22, 1865*, which says: "On the 3rd of June we again assaulted the enemy's works in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light."

50. To Charlottesville in order to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and the canal on the James River by which Lee was receiving large supplies. Sheridan was to rally to him the force under Hunter—who had succeeded Sigel—and, after accomplishing his mission, was to rejoin the Army of the Potomac.—*Grant's report*; Grant, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 282-283; Sheridan, I, pp. 414-416.

51. "On the 1st of June the Army of the Potomac, at and about Cold Harbor, numbered 103,875 'present for duty,' and General W. F. Smith brought from the Army of the James about 10,000." Grant's losses from June 1st to 12th were 1,844 killed, 9,077 wounded, and 1,816 captured or missing, a total of 12,737.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 187.

"The Confederate Medical and Surgical History of the War gives 1,200 wounded and 500 missing from June 1st to 12th."—Alexander, p. 542. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65* (Campaigns of the Civil War series), p. 192, says that "the actual number was probably much greater." Phisterer, p. 216, gives the Confederate losses for those twelve days at 1,700.

General Grant evidently forgot *Napoleon's injunction*, "Do not attack

in front positions which you obtain by turning them."—Précis des Guerres du Maréchal Turenne, 18th observation, Corresp. XXXII, p. 133.

In his report of July 22nd, Grant acknowledged that "It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses."

52. Grant's report.

53. During these forty-three days terminating on June 19, 1864, generally known as "the Wilderness campaign," Grant's maximum strength was about 118,000 of all arms. His losses from May 5th to June 15th, both inclusive, were no less than 54,929, and those from June 15th to 19th, 10,586, making a grand total of 65,515.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 182; Phisterer, p. 217; Humphreys, p. 224. According to Alexander, p. 559, they were 62,750. On the other hand, Grant gives (II, p. 290) a statement of losses from May 5th to June 12th, inclusive, compiled in the Adjutant-General's office, which sets forth his casualties in detail and placed the total killed, wounded and missing at 39,259.

Lee had about 95,000—including 24,000 under Beauregard, who was charged to oppose Butler and was subsequently reinforced to about 30,000. Owing to incomplete returns, it is impossible to calculate accurately the Confederate losses, but they were undoubtedly in excess of 20,000.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 184; Alexander, pp. 529, 532, 542 and 559; Phisterer, pp. 216-217; Swinton, p. 492; Humphreys, p. 225; Long, p. 348.

In other words, Grant's losses were nearly three times as great as Lee's.

54. Until April 3, 1865.

55. During the rest of the year Grant's army varied in strength from 77,321—on July 31st—to 110,364 on December 31st; while Lee's minimum was 34,677 (August 31st) and his maximum 66,533 (December 20th).

That there was a good deal of hard fighting is evinced by the fact that Grant's losses from June to December, both inclusive, were no less than 47,554.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 593-594. The Confederate casualties during the same period were between 12 and 14,000.—Alexander, p. 575.

56. Sherman, in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 249. Other interesting accounts of the operations in Virginia during 1864 will be found in *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 97-246, 533-589; Grant, II, pp. 176-343; Sheridan, I, pp. 357-500; Alexander, pp. 493-581; Humphreys, pp. 1-307; Swinton, pp. 402-553; Long, pp. 322-351, 369-404; Longstreet, pp. 551-581; Gordon, pp. 234-286; Wilson, I, pp. 405-532.

57. On May 4th Butler began his advance from Fort Monroe up the James, occupying City Point and Bermuda Hundred next day and destroying part of the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad on the 7th. On the 13th and 14th he captured a portion of the Confederate defences at Drewry's Bluff, but on the 16th he was attacked and "drew back into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers. . . . His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked."—*Grant's report of July 22, 1865*.

Crook gave his cavalry column to Averell, who destroyed part of the

Tennessee and Virginia Railroad and joined his chief at Union on May 15th. Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, was defeated with heavy loss at New Market on June 15th and retreated behind Cedar Creek.

Hunter — who succeeded him by Grant's demand — was victorious at Piedmont on June 5th, united with Crook and Averell at Staunton on the 8th and invested Lynchburg on the 16th. After some skirmishing during the next two days, the lack of ammunition forced him to retreat. — *Grant's report*. Also *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 480-492.

58. Near Frederick, Maryland.

Early had about 10,000, Wallace 6,050.— *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 499.

59. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 498; Sheridan, I, p. 459, quite agrees with this statement.

60. Sheridan, I, pp. 460-461; Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864* (*Campaigns of the Civil War* series), pp. 94-110.

61. On July 2nd Sheridan had finished his second raid (footnote 50) "after marching and fighting for fifty consecutive days." A third expedition begun on July 26th was discontinued owing to the impossibility of "carrying Petersburg by assault." On July 31st he was selected by Grant to command in the Shenandoah Valley which "at this time was of vast importance to Lee's army."— Sheridan, I, pp. 414-461. Also Grant, II, pp. 316-322.

62. Sheridan, I, p. 467; Pond, p. 120.

63. The return for August, 1864, showed 56,618 officers and men present for duty.— Pond, p. 265.

64. On August 15th Early's maximum force was about 20,000.— *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 352; Sheridan, I, p. 471.

65. On August 17th Sheridan was joined by General James H. Wilson with the 3rd Cavalry Division.— Wilson, I, pp. 533 and 539.

66. Sheridan, I, pp. 475-499.

67. On September 10th Sheridan had about 43,000 officers and men in the field, exclusive of garrisons amounting to some 7,000. His losses at Winchester were 5,018, Early's 3,611.— *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 531-532.

68. The Union casualties were only 528, the Confederate, 1,235.— *Ibid.*

69. Sheridan's losses in this battle were 5,665. Early had 1,860 killed and wounded, in addition to 1,200 captured.— *Ibid.*; Pond, p. 239.

70. This successful campaign cost the Union forces 16,952 in casualties.

Some of the authorities consulted are Sheridan, I, pp. 462-500, II, pp. 1-104; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 500-530; Pond, pp. 1-273; Grant, II, pp. 316-321, 327-340; Wilson, I, pp. 548-563; Gordon, pp. 314-372.

71. Sherman on *The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War*.— *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 250.

72. According to the returns of May 1, 1864, the Army of the Cumberland (Major General Thomas) had 60,773 present for duty and 130 guns; the Army of the Tennessee (Major General McPherson) 24,465 and 96 guns; and the Army of the Ohio (Major General Schofield) 13,559 and 28 guns.— Sherman, II, pp. 23-24. On June 1st his effective

strength was 112,819, and on the 8th the 17th Corps joined him.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 289.

73. On April 30th Johnston's army, "present for duty," numbered 52,992 and 144 guns; on June 10th its strength was 70,878.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 281-282.

74. These were only the major actions. During the month of June, "not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire."—Sherman in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 252.

75. General McPherson was killed on July 22nd. General O. O. Howard succeeded him in command of the Army of the Tennessee.

76. Sherman in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 254.

77. *Sherman to Halleck*, August 7, 1864.—Sherman, II, p. 101.

78. Sherman's losses during the Atlanta campaign were 31,687; the Confederate casualties—including 12,983 prisoners—amounted to 34,979.—Sherman, II, pp. 133-134; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 289 and 292.

79. 25 miles southwest of Atlanta.

80. From Dallas a force was sent to destroy the railway above Marietta and French's division to capture Allatoona, but the latter was repulsed by Corse (4th division, 15th Corps) on October 5th.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 254, 322-323; Sherman, II, pp. 144-150.

81. "The army had undergone many changes since the capture of Atlanta. . . . These five corps were very much reduced in strength, by detachments and by discharges, so that for the purpose of fighting Hood I had only about sixty thousand infantry and artillery, with two small divisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and Garrard's)."—Sherman, II, pp. 145-146.

82. 217 miles from Atlanta and 105 south-southwest from Nashville.

83. The official returns for November 10th show an aggregate strength of 59,545.—Sherman, II, pp. 172-173.

84. "According to the great Napoleon, the fundamental maxim for successful war is to 'converge a superior force on the critical point at the critical time.' In 1864 the main 'objectives' were Lee's and Johnston's armies, and the critical point was thought to be Richmond or Atlanta, whichever should be longer held. Had General Grant overwhelmed and scattered Lee's army and occupied Richmond he would have come to Atlanta; but as I happened to occupy Atlanta first, and had driven Hood off to a divergent line of operations far to the west, it was good strategy to leave him to a subordinate force, and with my main army to join Grant at Richmond. The most practicable route to Richmond was nearly a thousand miles in distance, too long for a single march; hence the necessity to reach the sea-coast for a new base. Savannah, distant three hundred miles, was the nearest point."—Sherman in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 255.

85. The above narrative follows closely the admirable article by General Sherman just alluded to, supplemented Sherman's *Memoirs*, II, pp. 5-232; the various accounts given in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, pp. 260-344 and 663-683; Cox, *Atlanta* (Campaigns of the Civil War series), pp. 1-239; Cox, *The March to the Sea—Franklin and Nashville* (Campaigns of the Civil War series), pp. 1-61; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles of the War*, pp. 385-425; Wilson, II, pp. 3-20.

86. The arrival of Forrest's cavalry on November 15th gave an ag-

gregate strength to Hood's Army of Tennessee of 53,938.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 474; Cox, pp. 11-12.

87. Schofield had about 28,000 troops. His losses were only 2,326, whereas Hood's casualties were 6,252, including two generals.—*Ibid.*, IV, pp. 257, 444 and 473; Cox, pp. 96-97; Phisterer, p. 218.

88. The available Union force in and about Nashville on December 15, 1864, was at least 55,000; Thomas had about 43,260 engaged in the battle. His losses were only 3,057, while Hood's were at least 15,000, the majority being taken prisoners.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 258, 473 and 474; Cox, p. 127; Phisterer, p. 218.

Some of the authorities consulted for this campaign are *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 425-471; Cox, pp. 81-136; Grant, II, pp. 377-386; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles*, pp. 426-477; Wilson, II, pp. 23-157.

CHAPTER XIII

1. Medical directors of armies in the field consisting of two or more army corps, and of military departments with hospitals containing 4,000 beds or upwards were to have the rank, pay and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry; medical directors of army corps or of departments with less than 4,000 beds, those of a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry. "But this increased rank and pay shall only continue to medical officers while discharging such special duties; and the assignments from time to time to such duty shall be at least two thirds of them made from the surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers." Approved February 25, 1865.—*Final Report of the Provost Marshal General*, Part II, p. 198.

2. Section 2 inflicted a fine of from \$250 to \$1,000 for demanding or receiving a reward for information respecting a prisoner in the jail of the District of Columbia.

3. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part II, pp. 203-205.

4. Acts of March 3, 1863, of February 24, 1864, and of July 4, 1864. See above, pages 115-118, 129-130, 131-132.

5. Sections 3 and 11.

Section one fixed the pay of soldiers acting as officers' servants and forbade non-commissioned officers to act in such capacity. Section 2 provided that soldiers in the volunteer service should receive the same clothing as those in the Regular Army.

6. Section 4.

Section 5 prescribed that colored men mustered into service in South Carolina by Generals Hunter and Saxton should have the same pay and rations as other volunteers.

7. Sections 6 and 7.

8. Section 8.

9. Section 9.

Section 10 provided that only generals commanding separate armies in the field, geographical divisions or departments were entitled to the double rations allowed by the Act of August 23, 1842.

10. Section 12.

Sections 13, 14 and 15 dealt with credits for quotas furnished.

11. Section 16.

12. Sections 17, 18 and 19.

13. Section 20.

14. Section 21. Congress had at last determined to tolerate no nonsense and had learned that war involves drastic measures.

Section 22 repealed the 3rd Section of the Act of July 4, 1864.

15. Section 23.

Section 24 made a slight amendment in Section 15 of the Act of February 24, 1864.

16. Section 25.

17. Section 26.

Section 27 was the enacting clause. This act, which was approved March 3, 1865, is given in *extenso* in the *Final Report of the Provost Marshal General*, Part II, pp. 199-203.

18. Humphreys, p. 311; Alexander, pp. 585-586; Gordon, pp. 378-382.

19. Sherman, II, pp. 272, 292-293. On February 1st his army numbered 60,079, on March 1st 57,676.—*Ibid.*, II, pp. 269-270; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 698.

20. See pp. 136-137. Johnston's command consisted of the remnants of Hood's army which had been hurriedly brought from Tupelo, Mississippi, the forces under Hardee, Wheeler and Hampton, and such troops as could be drawn from various scattered garrisons. At its maximum it numbered 31,243.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 768.

21. Alexander, pp. 588 and 590; Long, pp. 404-406; Longstreet, p. 592.

Grant's "effective force, by his latest returns, was 101,000 infantry, 9000 artillery, 14,700 cavalry, total 124,700, with 369 guns. Lee's forces by his latest return, Feb. 28, were 46,000 infantry, 5000 artillery, and 6000 cavalry, total 57,000, from which 3000 should be deducted for desertions in March."—Alexander, p. 590. Also *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 751 and 753.

22. Alexander, pp. 588-589; Gordon, pp. 394-413; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 579-589; Longstreet, pp. 594-595.

23. With about 10,000 troops.—Sheridan, II, p. 112.

24. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 112-125.

Sixteen hundred officers and men, 11 guns, 17 battle flags, etc., were captured from Early on March 2nd.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 116; *Grant's report of July 22, 1865*.

25. Sherman arrived in person at City Point on March 27th and had a conference with Grant that night, at part of which Sheridan was present.—*Grant's report*; Sherman, II, pp. 324-325; Sheridan, II, pp. 131-133.

26. "Grant, on this occasion, concentrated practically his entire force in the attack upon our right, whereas, in the fall, he had never attacked upon one flank without some demonstration, at least, upon the other."—Alexander, p. 590.

27. "It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible."—*Grant to Sheridan*, March 28, 1865.

28. Grant's report; Sheridan, II, pp. 149-154; Humphreys, pp. 330-342.

29. Grant's report; Grant, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 443-446; Sheridan, II, pp. 156-165; Humphreys, pp. 342-356; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 708-714; Long, pp. 407-411; Longstreet, pp. 597-609; Gordon, p. 414-

428; Alexander, p. 591; Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 596-601; Swinton, *Twelve Decisive Battles*, pp. 488-506.

So far as can be ascertained the Union loss was confined to 884, whereas the Confederates had upward of 5,000 *hors de combat*, aside from the loss of 6 guns and 13 colors.—Phisterer, p. 218; Sheridan, II, p. 165; Humphreys, pp. 353-354; Alexander, p. 591.

At the close of the battle Sheridan relieved Warren and placed General Griffin in command of the 5th Corps.

30. "On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the 2d and 6th Corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along the South Side of the Road; the 9th Corps stretched along that road behind him."—Grant's report.

31. Grant, II, pp. 455-456.

32. Lee had ordered a large store of supplies to be sent to this point from Danville, but the officer in charge of the train misunderstood his instructions and failed to unload them at Amelia. As a result they were carried on to Richmond where they were burned in some of the numerous conflagrations when the city was bombarded and evacuated. To Lee's famished army the loss of these provisions was irreparable.—Alexander, p. 594; Long, p. 412.

33. Grant's report.

34. *Ibid.*; Sheridan, II, pp. 179-184; Humphreys, pp. 380-384.

35. Humphreys, pp. 380-381.

36. Sheridan's cavalry — except one division — and the 5th Corps *via* Prince Edward's Court House; the Army of the James (Ord) and the 6th Corps (Wright) and one cavalry division by Farmville; and the 2nd Corps (Humphreys) by the High Bridge Road.—Grant's report.

37. Humphreys, pp. 388-391.

38. Grant's report; Grant, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 478-480.

39. "The Confederates began the retreat from Richmond with but one ration, and when no supplies were met at Amelia Courthouse, they were reduced to such scant store as could be collected from the poor and almost exhausted region through which they passed. . . . The misery of the famished troops during the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th of April passes all experience of military anguish since the retreat from the banks of the Beresina. 'Toward evening of the 5th,' says one eye-witness, 'and all day long upon the 6th, hundreds of men dropped from exhaustion, and thousands let fall their muskets from inability to carry them any further. The scenes of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th were of a nature which can be apprehended in its vivid reality only by men who are thoroughly familiar with the harrowing details of war.'"—Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 613.

Humphreys says, p. 386, that on the 7th "At Farmville rations were distributed to Lee's army, 80,000 having been placed there to await its arrival."

40. "The next day, the 8th, was the first quiet day of our retreat. The 2nd corps followed us up closely, but there was no collision."—Alexander, p. 600.

41. Grant's report.

42. Long, pp. 420-422; Longstreet, pp. 623-626; Gordon, pp. 436-437.

43. Sheridan, II, pp. 190-200.

44. Grant's report; Grant, II, pp. 485-486.

45. At which Generals Grant, Lee, Sheridan, Ord, Ingalls, Rawlins, Williams and Barnard, Colonels Porter, Marshall—Lee's Chief of Staff—Babcock, Parker, Bowers, Dent and Badeau, and other members of Grant's staff were present.

46.

"Appomattox C. H., Va.,
Apl. 9th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE,
Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all officers and men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,
Lt. Gen."

47.

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:—I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

48. Grant, II, pp. 486-495; Sheridan, II, pp. 200-202; Lee's *Memoirs*, pp. 422-423; Gen. Horace Porter in *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 729-744.

49. Grant, II, p. 500; Longstreet, p. 631.

They were divided as follows: infantry, 22,349; cavalry, 1,559; artillery, 2,576; general headquarters and miscellaneous troops, 1,747.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 753.

50. Grant, II, p. 500.

The Union losses during this campaign were 10,515.—*Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 751.

51. See above, p. 134, footnote.

52. First against McClellan before Richmond; second against Pope in front of Washington; third against McClellan in Maryland; fourth against Burnside before Fredericksburg; fifth against Hooker on the

Rappahannock; sixth against Meade in Pennsylvania; and seventh against Grant in Virginia.

53. Alexander, p. 619, who gives the following interesting summary (pp. 618-619):

"This last campaign endured for eleven months, during which the guns were scarcely silent a single day. Lee's army at its greatest numbered less than 85,000 men (*sic*). It put *hors de combat* more than 262,000 Federals within the period mentioned.

"The following figures are from the official archives, in the War Record Office in Washington, showing the Federal numbers killed, wounded and missing in each campaign, with a deduction of 2,000 from the first for the casualties occurring before June 1, 1862.

<i>Campaigns</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Aggregate Loss</i>
McClellan	June 1, 1862, to Aug. 8, 1862	22,448
Pope	June 26, 1862, to Sept. 2, 1862	16,955
McClellan	Sept. 3, 1862, to Nov. 14, 1862	28,577
Burnside	Nov. 15, 1862, to Jan. 25, 1863	13,214
Hooker	Jan. 26, 1863, to Jan. 27, 1863	25,027
Meade	June 28, 1863, to May 4, 1864	31,530
Grant	May 4, 1864, to April 9, 1865	124,390
Aggregate		262,141

"These figures include nothing for Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga and Knoxville, it having been detached from Lee from September 1, 1863, to April 30, 1864. They would add many thousands to this list of casualties could they be included."

General Alexander errs in stating that Lee's maximum force was "less than 85,000 men." In June, 1862, Lee had about 90,000 troops, and two years later his force, combined with that of Beauregard, numbered close to 95,000 (see pages 111, 135 and 622, footnote 53).

54. Page 141 and footnote 25 on page 626.

55. Sherman replied to Johnston's proposal on April 14th and on the 18th an agreement was reached for a suspension of hostilities and as a basis for peace. The new President, Johnson — Lincoln having been assassinated on April 15th — and Secretary Stanton very unjustly denounced Sherman for terms which were only conditional. Their disapproval was communicated to Sherman by Grant in person on the 24th, but two days later a satisfactory arrangement was made.— Sherman, II, pp. 346-363; Grant's report and *Memoirs*, II, pp. 514-517; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 755-757.

According to the report of the Secretary of War, November 22, 1865, the number of troops under Johnston surrendered and paroled was 31,243.— *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 768. *Ibid.*, p. 700, gives the number as 37,047 — including non-combatants; Sherman, II, p. 370, says that there were 36,817, and Phisterer, p. 219, gives 29,924.

56. Grant's report; Grant, II, pp. 518-522; Wilson, II, pp. 189-334; *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 759-761.

Wilson, in addition to taking "five fortified cities and towns," "marched 825 miles and captured 10,052 prisoners, 35 colors and 320 guns in the open field and behind fortifications." His losses from the

time he left Nashville until he captured Cobb were only 1,667.—Wilson, pp. 293-294.

57. Grant's report; Grant, II, pp. 521-522.

CHAPTER XIV

1. See above, pages 94 and 96.

2. The Union loss during the war in killed, and deaths from wounds, disease or other cause in the field was 349,944, and 30,156 died while prisoners, making a total of 380,100 died.

Two hundred and twelve thousand, six hundred and eight were captured and 16,431 paroled on the field, while no less than 199,105 deserted. The grand total is thus 808,244.

No authoritative statistics exist of the number of Confederates killed, but more than 133,821 died of wounds or disease in the field and 30,152 while prisoners. Those captured numbered 476,169, 248,599 were paroled and at least 104,428 deserted. The total of this incomplete list is 993,169.—*Figures compiled by the Adjutant-General's office and quoted by Strait*, p. 145. These statistics are of a later date than those given by *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 767-768.

3. See page 100 and footnote 43 on pp. 606-607.

4. Allusion has just been made to the Union losses by death, of which 239,874 died from disease or causes other than wounds or being killed in battle.

"It is authoritatively stated that at least three-quarters died from disease incident to a soldier's life, what we call preventable diseases. In this connection a curious fact appears, *i.e.*, that those regiments which suffered the greatest battle loss suffered least from disease. This seems to indicate that for those who were longest in permanent or semi-permanent camps there was more danger than for those on the battle-field, hence that the delay incident to drilling raw men in camp is one of the prime causes of mortality from disease. From this may be deduced the argument that if we have reserves of trained men, and are thus enabled to push our troops rapidly into the field, and into contact with the enemy, a very material saving in life will be made."—Evan M. Johnson, Jr., *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 9.

5. *The Final Report of the Provost Marshal General*, Part I, p. 77, emphasizes this fact and states that during the War of the Rebellion, "Under the head of deaths by disease the influence of superior discipline in securing cleanliness and other conditions of health is apparent. The loss of the regulars is only 42.27, while that of the volunteers is 59.22" per thousand.

6. According to the return made by General Grant for the Department of the Tennessee for the month of July, 1863, the average strength of his divisions present for duty was only 4,031, whereas the minimum number of enlisted infantrymen in a division—exclusive of those of the other arms—ought to have been 13,500.—Johnson, p. 9.

Grant mentions (II, p. 322) the embarrassment to which he as commander-in-chief was put in August, 1864, because "Sherman, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements."

7. For example, McDowell at the first battle of Bull Run and Hooker at Chancellorsville. See pages 100-101 and 121.

Fortunately Grant at Vicksburg and Sherman at Atlanta were more fortunate, although both experienced similar pressure from a like cause.

8. As they did in 1863. See pages 116, 120 and 126.

9. As provided by Section 6 of the Act of July 22, 1861. Page 605.

10. On October 24, 1863, a circular issued by the Provost Marshal General announced that \$300 would be paid to all new recruits enlisting for 3 years in old organizations.

11. As announced by *General Orders, No. 191*, dated June 23, 1863, and *No. 305* on September 11, 1863.

"From December 24, 1863, to April 1, 1864, . . . a bounty of three hundred dollars (\$300) was paid to recruits enlisting for three years in any three-years organization in service or in process of completion. . . . From July 19, 1864, to end of war, authorized by Act of July 4, 1864, bounty was paid as follows:

To recruits enlisting for one year	\$100 00
To recruits enlisting for two years	200 00
To recruits enlisting for three years	300 00..

"From November 28, 1864, to the end of the war, in accordance with *General Orders No. 287*, of November 28, 1864, a special bounty of three hundred dollars (\$300) from the draft and substitute fund was paid to men enlisting in the first army corps upon being mustered into service.

"This bounty was in addition to that authorized by the Act of July 4, 1864."—*Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I*, pp. 84-85.

12. See pages 128 and 619. In 1864 the State and county bounties in New York City aggregated \$677.—*Bassett, A Short History of the United States*, p. 573.

13. Report of the Provost Marshal, Part I, p. 87.

14. Pages 117-119, 128-129.

15. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, p. 76.

16. See page 630, footnote 2.

17. The desertion among the troops from Connecticut reached 117.23 per thousand and 112.22 for New Hampshire. The maximum—117.54—was attained by Kansas but "more than half the male population" of that State enlisted and the number of families dependent upon men in service was much larger proportionately than in the case of the States just mentioned.—*Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I*, pp. 75-76.

18. See pages 129-132, 139-141.

19. (1) A furlough of at least 30 days granted by General Order of November 21, 1863, to officers and men re-enlisting for 3 years; (2) a bounty of \$400 payable in instalments; and (3) a distinctive badge in the shape of "service chevrons" and the title of VETERAN VOLUNTEERS.

20. Report of the Provost Marshal General, Part I, p. 58.

21. Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, 1912, p. 13.

Grant, in relating the events during August, 1864, says (II, pp. 322-323) that "Sherman, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the northwest, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction."

22. Phisterer, p. 11; Fox, *Regimental Lists of the American Civil War*, p. 49.

23. *Official Records in the Office of The Adjutant-General; Memorandum Relative to the Probable Number and Ages of Army and Navy Survivors of the Civil War*, p. 4 (published by the Military Secretary's Office, May 15, 1905); *Reply of General F. C. Ainsworth, The Military Secretary*, dated August 28, 1905, to the author's letter of inquiry, in which he stated that the "Memorandum Relative to the Probable Number and Ages of the Army and Navy Survivors of the Civil War," referred to within, contains the latest and most complete statistical information now obtainable from the official records relative to the number of men in service in the Union Army during that war."

According to the *Memorandum*, "As shown by the latest official statistics, the number of men furnished by the different States and Territories during the Civil War, under calls from the President, was 2,778,304. Deducting from this the number of seamen and marines, 105,963, leaves a total of 2,673,341 credited to the Army."

24. The maximum, 1,500,000, is given by A. B. Casselman of the Pension Office in the *Century* for March, 1892, p. 792. The minimum estimate of 600,000 is made by Southern writers like Early, Stephens and Jones, while Wright gives from 600,000 to 700,000, but, as General James Harrison Wilson, I, p. 557, and General Charles Francis Adams, *Studies; Military and Diplomatic*, p. 282 *et seq.*, both competent authorities, declare, the Southern figures given after the war were "habitually understated."

Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, pp. 40 and 63, reckons the numbers between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These calculations are at best conjectural since, as the *Military Secretary* wrote, on August 28, 1905, to the author: "No compilation has ever been prepared by this [the War] Department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate Army and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because of the incompleteness of the collection of the Confederate records in possession of the Department." General Ainsworth further alluded to a letter, dated December 2, 1894, addressed to Colonel Livermore by Major George B. Davis, then in charge of the War Records Office, in which the latter said that "No attempt has ever been made by this office to fix the total numbers of the Confederate Army, because of the incomplete and fragmentary character of the data in our possession." Moreover, as the *Military Secretary* wrote: "He referred Colonel Livermore to an article in the *Century War Papers (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume IV, page 768)* estimating the Confederate forces at one million, and this reference appears to have been accepted as an estimate of the War Records Office."

25. *Senate Executive Document, No. 206, Forty-sixth Congress, Second Session*, containing a letter to John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. William A. Wheeler, President of the Senate, dated June 10, 1880, transmitting a "Statement showing the expenditures, as far as ascertained, necessarily growing out of the War of the Rebellion from July 1, 1861, to June 30, 1879, inclusive."

The total expenditures were not less than \$6,189,929,908.58, of which

\$411,420,937.50 were charged to the Navy, and \$407,192.80 to Army pensions.

26. *Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions*, June 30, 1913, p. 10, and June 30, 1914, p. 33.

CHAPTER XV

1. The Army of the Potomac was reviewed in Washington by the President on May 23, 1865, and Sherman's army on the following day.

2. On May 17, 1865, General Sheridan was assigned to command west of the Mississippi, his force consisting of the troops under Generals Canby and Reynolds, the 4th and 25th Army Corps, with orders to suppress all resistance in Louisiana and Texas. Kirby Smith's surrender (page 144) occurred before he reached New Orleans, but he promptly sent his cavalry columns under Merritt and Custer to San Antonio and Houston to prevent Confederate soldiers from joining Maximilian. Sheridan then concentrated his entire force on the Mexican frontier, but this show of force was largely neutralized by the policy of the State Department, although it was eventually instrumental in causing Napoleon III to evacuate Mexico.—Sheridan, II, pp. 208-228.

3. On October 31, 1861, France, Great Britain and Spain concluded the Treaty of London providing for concerted action to compel Mexico to fulfil certain obligations to them. In December, 1861, and January, 1862, a joint expedition landed at Vera Cruz. England and Spain shortly withdrew their forces, but Napoleon III, determined to check the Anglo-Germanic preponderancy and to exalt the Latin race, resolved to take advantage of the expected breaking up of the United States and to establish a monarchy in Mexico. Re-enforcing his troops by 25,000, General Forey, after a year's fighting, captured Puebla and entered Mexico City. The Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, was inveigled into accepting the crown and arrived in June, 1862, but the new Empire had a desperate struggle against the republican forces, financial difficulties and party feuds. With the termination of the War of the Rebellion and the demand of the United States Government for the withdrawal of the French troops, Napoleon Third's scheme collapsed. Early in 1867 Mexico was evacuated but Maximilian refused to leave his post. After a heroic resistance he was surrounded in Queretaro, captured, tried by court-martial at the command of President Juarez and shot on June 19, 1867.

4. The strength authorised by the Acts of July 29 and August 3, 1861. See above, page 606, footnote 36.

5. This act (14 United States Statutes at Large, p. 333) fixed the military establishment at 10 regiments of cavalry, 5 of artillery and 45 of infantry. See Heitman, II, pp. 602-605.

6. By the Act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 223).

7. 15 Stat., 318. A reduction in the number of infantry regiments from 45 to 25, as well as in the staff departments, was made by this law.

8. Act of July 15, 1870 (16 Stat., 318) which fixed the authorized strength at 35,353 officers and men.

Section 2 provided that the number of enlisted men should be re-

duced to 30,000 on or before July 1, 1871. Sections 7 and 8 stipulated that the number of Major Generals was to be reduced to three and the Brigadier-Generals to six.—Heitman, II, pp. 610-611.

9. The Acts of June 16 and 23, 1874, March 2 and 3, 1875, and June 26, 1876.

The Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 419, 478) fixed the strength and re-organization of the Adjutant-General's department, as well as the organization of the band at the Military Academy.

The Act of June 26, 1876 (19 Stat., 61) increased the number of Indian scouts authorized for the Army but reduced the medical corps.

10. Heitman, II, pp. 612-613.

11. By the Act of June 16, 1874.

12. See page 98.

13. The Act of July 5, 1884, forbade the appointment of paymasters until the number had been reduced below 29 majors, and thereafter the officers in the pay departments were not to exceed 35.

The Act of May 17, 1886, empowered the President to promote and commission graduates of West Point as additional second lieutenants when no vacancies exist in that grade.

14. Heitman, II, p. 626.

15. 30 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 261.

16. Heitman, II, pp. 616-617.

17.

" 1862-1869. War against the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa and Comanche Indians in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado and Indian Territory.

1865-1868. Indian War in southern Oregon and Idaho, and northern California and Nevada.

1865-1866. Fenian Raid, New York and Canada border disturbances.

1867-1881. Campaign against Lipan, Kiowa, Kickapoo and Comanche Indians, and Mexican border disturbances.

1868-1869. Canadian River expedition, New Mexico, November 5, 1868, to February 13, 1869.

1871. Yellowstone expedition, August 28 to October 25, 1871.

1871. Fenian troubles, Dakota and Manitoba frontier, September and October, 1871.

1872. Yellowstone expedition, Dakota, July 26 to October 15, 1872.

1872-1873. Modoc campaign, November 28, 1872, to June 1, 1873.

1873. Yellowstone expedition, Dakota, June 4 to October 4, 1873.

1874-1875. Campaign against Kiowa, Cheyenne and Comanche Indians in Indian Territory, August 1, 1874, to February 16, 1875.

1874. Sioux expedition, Wyoming and Nebraska, February 13 to August 19, 1874.

1874. Black Hills expedition, Dakota, June 20 to August 30, 1874.

1874. Big Horn expedition, Wyoming, August 13 to October 10, 1874.

1875. Expedition against Indians in eastern Nevada, September 7 to 27, 1875.

1876. Sioux expedition, Dakota, May 17 to September 26, 1876.
1876. Powder River expedition, Wyoming, November 1 to December 31, 1876.
- 1876-1877. Big Horn and Yellowstone expeditions, Wyoming and Montana, February 17, 1876, to June 13, 1877.
- 1876-1879. War with Northern Cheyenne and Sioux Indians in Indian Territory, Kansas, Wyoming, Dakota, Nebraska and Montana.
1877. Labor strikes in Pennsylvania and Maryland, July to October, 1877.
1877. Nez Perce campaign, June 14 to October 5, 1877.
1878. Bannock and Piute campaign, May 30 to September 4, 1878.
1878. Ute expedition, Colorado, April 3 to September 9, 1878.
1879. Snake or Sheepeater Indian troubles, Idaho, August to October, 1879.
- 1879-1894. Disturbances of settlers in Indian and Oklahoma Territories, "Oklahoma Boomers," and the Cherokee Strip disturbances.
- 1879-1880. Ute Indian campaign in Colorado and Utah, September 21, 1879, to November 8, 1880.
1885. Chinese miner and labor troubles in Wyoming, September and October, 1885.
- 1890-1891. Sioux Indian disturbances in South Dakota, November, 1890, to January, 1891.
- 1891-1893. Garza troubles, Texas and Mexican border disturbances, "Tin Horn War."
1892. Miner disturbances in Idaho, July to November, 1892.
- 1892-1896. Troubles with renegade Apache Indians, under Kidd and Massai in Arizona and Mexican border.
1894. "Industrial Army," "Commonwealers," "Coxey-ites," and labor disturbances.
1894. Railroad, Pullman, and labor strikes, extending from Illinois to Pacific coast, June to August, 1894.
1895. Bannock Indian troubles, July and August, 1895.—*Heitman*, II, pp. 299-300.

The general reader who is interested in these struggles with the red-skin is recommended to a most interesting book by Cyrus Townsend Brady, entitled *Indian Fights and Indian Fighters*, and to Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles' *Serving the Republic*.

18. *Viz*: the Army Staff College, the Army Signal School, the Army School of the Line, the Army Field Engineer School, and the Army Field Service and Correspondence School for Medical Officers.

19. The suggestion for the creation of such a board originated in a letter written by Captain Eugene Griffith of the Engineer Corps—a son-in-law of General Hancock and subsequently vice-president of the General Electric Company—which was published in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*.

It was further advocated in a letter of Samuel J. Tilden to James G. Carlisle, Speaker of the House of Representatives, proposing that the Government surplus of \$150,000,000 be used for seacoast defenses.

20. See below, pages 314-315.

21. Records of The Adjutant-General's Office, transmitted to the author in a letter from The Adjutant-General, dated March 27, 1915.

CHAPTER XVI

1. Gold Medal Prize Essay, entitled "The Experiences of our Army since the outbreak of the War with Spain: What practical use has been made of them and how may they be further utilized to improve its fighting efficiency."—By Captain Charles D. Rhodes, General Staff, *Journal of the Military Service Institution for March-April, 1905*, p. 180.

The above strength of the Army on April 1, 1898, is given in the *Annual Report of the Adjutant General*, November 1, 1898, in the *Report of the Secretary of War*, dated November 29, 1898, p. 253.

2. 73,000,000 persons.

3. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the enlisted *personnel* had ever been so well trained and disciplined. Compare Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, *Serving the Republic*, p. 270.

4. See page 152. *Per contra*, the appropriations for target practice had been unusually generous, and the result was demonstrated in the superior marksmanship of the Americans, both soldiers and sailors.

5. "The plan required an expenditure of \$100,000,000 for the construction and emplacement of the following guns: 8-inch, 98; 10-inch, 194; 12-inch, 204; 12-inch mortars, 1,037; rapid-fire, 829; making a total of 2,362 guns and mortars. On the 1st of April, 1898, only these had been emplaced; 8-inch, 9; 10-inch, 44; 12-inch, 10; 12-inch mortars, 88; rapid-fire, none.

"Thus out of 2,362 pieces of ordnance contemplated in the project of 1885, only 151 were in position April 1, 1898. In thirteen years Congress had appropriated for this great national work less than one-fourth of the sum required for its completion."—R. A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, p. 10.

6. See above, pages 47-49.

7. Alger, p. 7.

8. *Journal of the Military Service Institution for March-April, 1905*, p. 188.

9. Secretary Alger states, p. 13, that "In one respect alone was the War Department able to make immediate response to at least a part of the sudden demands made upon it. Including those already in the hands of the regular soldiers, there were 53,508 .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifles, and 14,895 .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen carbines. This supply, however, was barely sufficient to meet the requirements of the increased regular army. Nothing was left for the volunteers except .45-calibre Springfield rifles, of which there were 265,895. For these weapons, and for the 7,893 Springfield carbines, also in our arsenal, there was no smokeless-powder ammunition, nor was any immediately obtainable."

10. "For the 8-inch guns there were only twelve rounds each; for the 10-inch, twenty rounds; for the 12-inch, fifteen rounds, and for the mortars, ten."—Alger, p. 11.

11. Rhodes, p. 188

12. Alger, pp. 11-12.
13. Henry Cabot Lodge, *The War with Spain*, pp. 26-27.
14. This letter, "dated December 25, 1897, and addressed to a friend, Señor Canalejas, had been stolen in Havana by some one in the Cuban interest, and sent to the Cuban Junta in New York, which gave it to the press on February 9, 1898."—Lodge, p. 28.
15. The final paragraph of the Act approved March 9, 1898 (30 Statutes at Large, pp. 273-274), appropriated
"For the national defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President and to remain available until January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, fifty million dollars."
16. Page 153.
17. Major E. M. Johnson, Jr., *The Military Policy of the United States*, p. 10.
18. "On March 9th Congress appropriated 'for national defence' the sum of \$50,000,000. No part of this sum was available for offensive purposes—even for offensive preparation. The fund, though placed at the President's disposal, remained only an appropriation 'for national defence,' and he confined the employment of it literally within that limitation. Under this interpretation of the act, it was, of course, permissible to hasten the work upon our coast fortifications, the plans for which had been formulated by the Endicott Board of 1885 and duly sanctioned by Congress at that time. Allotments were made, therefore, out of the \$50,000,000 fund to the Ordnance, Engineer, Quartermaster Medical and Signal corps, as follows: Ordnance (about), \$10,000,000; Engineer, \$5,500,000; Quartermaster, \$500,000; Medical, \$20,000; Signal, \$226,400.
"All of this was for purposes of coast defence—guns, mountings, emplacements, transportation, etc.—not a cent was used outside of the limits fixed by Congress. There was no disturbance of the status of peace before the declaration of war.
"Meanwhile, the War Department had been able to do nothing in the way of accumulating material for offensive war—for the emergency which, after the destruction of the *Maine*, was regarded by the country at large as inevitable. Every arsenal in the country, and every private establishment capable of turning out guns, carriages, powder, ammunition, etc., was working to its full capacity, day and night, for coast defence; but the War Department could not purchase or even contract for any of the material so soon to be needed for the new army. None of the bureaus had on hand reserve supplies. Being unable to increase its stock, each had produced only enough for the immediate, every-day needs of the regular establishment on a peace basis."—Alger, pp. 8-9.
19. "When the diplomatic relations with Spain began to assume a threatening character, orders were given to push work with all possible energy and to mount every available gun as fast as delivered. Operations were carried on with double, and in some cases three shifts of workmen, and were pushed regardless of weather and climate."—Report of Brigadier General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, to the Secretary of War, dated September 29, 1898, in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 197.
20. Sargent, I, p. 89.

21. Alger, p. 9.

22. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President*, dated November 29, 1898, pp. 4 and 197.

23. *Report of the Chief of Engineers for 1898*, p. 196, who goes on to say: "In consequence of the war with Spain and the possibility of hostile attacks upon our coasts, urgent and pressing demands were made by Senators and Representatives, and local business interests for the immediate erection of sea coast batteries at numerous points not contemplated in the general scheme of national defense."

24. The Endicott board recommended the installation of 2,362 modern seacoast guns. At the beginning of 1898 only 151 had been placed in position (see page 153) but were supplemented by 185 by the end of June.

25. Schley hoisted his pennant on March 25th but did not sail until May 13th, 1898.

Cervera had meanwhile left Cadiz on March 14th, reached the Cape de Verde Islands on April 2nd, left there on the 30th and arrived off Martinique on May 11th.

26. Sargent, I, pp. 61 and 97.

27. "The experience of the last few months, I trust, will be valuable to the people and Government of the United States. The value of proper defenses for our ports, harbors, and seaport cities, of inestimable wealth, had been demonstrated; and I trust that the system already adopted for coast defenses, the completion of which has been so long delayed, may be carried out without unnecessary delay. I have urged the importance of this in my annual reports for the last thirteen years."—*Annual Report of Major General Miles, commanding the Army*, dated November 5, 1898, p. 37.

28. Compare Sargent, I, pp. 97-98.

29. Article entitled "War with Spain" by Lieutenant-General Miles in *Harper's Encyclopædia of United States History*, VIII, p. 294.

30. "At the close of the great Civil War the Government had a million veterans in arms, well equipped for war for that time. The great amount of war material then in the possession of the Government was sold or gradually used up by issue either to the militia of the States or to the regular forces that have been engaged in military operations on the frontier for the last thirty years. The supplies and materials that were not sold, but stored, were gradually reduced to the minimum, and the war with Spain found this country with a very small army—25,000 men—with war material sufficient only to equip that force and furnish it with a small amount of ammunition; but the tentage, transportation, and camp equipage was insufficient for any important military operations; in fact, quite an amount of valuable transportation, including ambulances, had been disposed of within the last few years."—*Annual Report for 1898 of General Miles, commanding the Army*, p. 4.

31. On March 14th Senator Proctor published his observations on the results of Spanish rule in Cuba. This report exercised a profound influence upon American public opinion.

32. Joint Resolution, No. 24, Fifty-fifth Congress, Second Session.—30 Statutes at Large, pp. 738-739.

These resolutions are also given in full by Lodge, pp. 237-238.

33. See page 156.

34. Even in the heat of the bitterly-contested national election of 1896 the Cuban question, like Banquo's ghost, would "not down." From that time forward it became a burning question in American politics.

35. Lodge, pp. 32-33; Sargent, I, p. 102; Alger, p. 9.

36. *Reports of the Secretary of War and the Major General commanding the Army for 1898*, pp. 4 and 9.

This order for concentration was, however, somewhat modified and part of the regular infantry, together with the cavalry and artillery, were sent to the camp established at Chickamauga Park, Georgia.

37. 30 Statutes at Large, p. 361, Chapter 187.

38. Section one provided "that all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and, with such exceptions and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States."

39. "SEC. 2. That the organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the service of the United States: *Provided*, That in time of war the Army shall consist of two branches which shall be designated, respectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States."

40. Section 3 declared the Regular Army to be the permanent military establishment maintained both in peace and war.

Section 4 will presently be examined in detail elsewhere.

Section 5 prescribed the conditions of the President's proclamation and the rules and regulations for the examination, organization and mustering in of the men called for, the quotas to be proportioned to the population of the States and Territories.

Section 6 subjected the Volunteer Army and militia to the same laws, orders and regulations as the Regular Army, and wisely stipulated that each regiment was to have one surgeon, two assistant surgeons and one chaplain. Other parts of this section are considered below.

A model of its sort was Section 7, *viz*: That all organizations of the Volunteer Army shall be so recruited from time to time to maintain them as near to their maximum strength as the President may deem necessary, and no new organization shall be accepted into service from any State unless the organizations already in service are as near to their maximum strength of officers and enlisted men as the President may deem necessary.

Section 8 provided that all records were to be rendered to the Adjutant General and upon disbandment to be filed in the Record and Pension Office of the War Department. All regimental and medical officers were required to keep complete records of the sick and wounded.

Section 9 prescribed the organization of divisions of three brigades, each composed of three regiments. Army corps to consist of not more than three divisions were to be organized by the President when three or more divisions were assembled in the same army.

Section 10 specified the organization of the staffs of army corps, divisions and brigades, and wisely permitted these staff officers to be

appointed by the President from the Regular Army, volunteers or militia, according to his discretion.

Section 11 was most admirable in that it allowed the President to appoint one Major General for each army corps and division, and one Brigadier General who might be selected from the Regular Army.

Section 12 placed all volunteers on the same footing in respect to pay, allowance and pensions as troops of corresponding grades in the Regular Army.

Section 13 permitted the governors to select field officers from the Regular service.

Section 14 prescribed the convening of military boards composed of three to six volunteer officers to examine into the qualifications, conduct and efficiency of any commissioned officer in that department or army. Upon adverse report, approved by the President, such officer was to be discharged with one month's pay and allowances.

Section 15 was the enabling clause.

41. At the beginning of the Mexican War no difficulty was encountered in raising nine regiments and one battalion of volunteers "to serve to the end of the war." This fact demonstrated that the longest term of enlistment in nowise deterred men when acting under the influence of the enthusiasm which invariably prevails at the outbreak of hostilities. See above, footnote 31, Chapter VII, page 596.

42. "SEC. 4. That the Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in this Act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President to raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States: *Provided*, That all enlistments for the Volunteer Army shall be for a term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all officers and men composing said army shall be discharged from the service of the United States when the purpose for which they were called into service shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities."

43. Pages 82, 86-87 and 90.

44. See below, pages 207-209.

45. "SEC. 6. That the Volunteer Army and the militia of the States when called into the service of the United States shall be organized under, and shall be subject to, the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army: *Provided*, That each regiment of the Volunteer Army shall have one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, and one chaplain, and that all the regimental and company officers shall be appointed by the governors of the States in which their respective organizations are raised: *Provided further*, That when the members of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia of any State shall enlist in the Volunteer Army in a body, as such company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment, the regimental, company, troop, battery and battalion officers in service with the militia organization thus enlisting may be appointed by the governors of the States and Territories, and shall when so appointed be officers of corresponding grades in the same organization when it shall have been received into the service of the United States as a part of the Volunteer Army: *Provided further*, That the President may authorize the Secretary of

War to organize companies, troops, battalions, or regiments, possessing special qualifications, from the nation at large not to exceed three thousand men, under such rules and regulations, including the appointment of the officers thereof, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War."

Under the provisions of this section, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd United States Volunteer Cavalry—the first better known as "the Rough Riders"—were organized.

46. Gold Medal Prize Essay. *Journal of the Military Service Institution for March-April, 1905*, pp. 190-191.

47. This is a stubborn fact which Congress has apparently never learned from the beginning of its career until the present moment.

48. On June 5, 1898, General Miles announced by telegraph from Tampa to the Secretary of War that the 14 regiments of volunteers there assembled "have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent. are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men had never fired a gun."—*Report for 1898 of the Major General commanding the Army*, p. 12.

49. 30 Statutes at Large, p. 1770.

50. "CHAP. 189.—An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First, That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including the said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

"Second, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this Act into effect.

"Approved, April 25, 1898."—30 Statutes at Large, p. 364.

51. 30 Stat., p. 364.

52. As prescribed by the Act of March 8, 1898. See page 151.

53. Heitman, II, pp. 618-619.

54. According to the report of the Adjutant-General for 1898, p. 257,
 In May, June July August
 1898

Number of enlistments in Regular Army...	9,569	9,311	6,586	3,400
The strength of the Regular Army (exclusive of the Hospital corps of 5,365 men) was	38,760	46,346	50,893	53,323

The 2nd U. S. Infantry received some 200 recruits but many of the commanders of the regiments sent to Santiago preferred not to take the new recruits owing to their lack of instruction and the dearth of equipment for them.—Sargent, I, p. 107, footnote.

55. See, for example, pp. 15, 41, 165, 205 and 271.

56. Section one fixed the number of officers in each regiment of infantry which was to consist of "two battalions of four companies each, and two skeleton or unmanned companies; the organized companies to be constituted as now authorized by law."

57. "SEC. 2. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration by Congress that war exists the President, in his discretion, may establish a third battalion for each infantry regiment, consisting of four companies, to be supplied by manning the two skeleton companies and by organizing two additional companies . . ."

The remainder of this section prescribed the method of filling the vacancies of commissioned officers in the additional companies as well as in the cavalry, artillery and infantry above the grade of second lieutenant.

58. By Section 3 the enlisted strength of a company of infantry, including the non-commissioned officers, was fixed at 106; that of a troop of cavalry at 100; each battery of heavy artillery at 200; and of field artillery at 173; and each company of engineers at 150. In time of war the Signal corps was to be increased by ten corporals and 140 privates.

59. Section 4. According to the report of the Adjutant-General for 1898, p. 254, the President was thus enabled to appoint 84 second lieutenants over and above those authorized by the Act of March 8, 1898.

60. Section 5.

61. Section 6, which additionally provided that no increased compensation should be given for "extra or special duty" and "that any soldier who deserts shall, besides incurring the penalties now attaching to the crime of desertion, forfeit all right to pension which he might otherwise have acquired."

Section 7 prescribed that every officer exercising a command above that pertaining to his grade should receive pay and allowances accordingly but not "exceeding that of a brigadier general." Upon the termination of war, the Army was to be reduced to a peace footing and the measures to be taken to effect this reduction were briefly indicated.

62. Page 148, footnote.

63. 30 Statutes at Large, p. 405.

64. "To consist of not more than three regiments and not more than three thousand five hundred men, possessing the special qualifications necessary for engineer troops."

65. "SEC. 2. And the President is further empowered, during the present war under the Act of April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, to authorize the Secretary of War to organize an additional volunteer force of not exceeding ten thousand enlisted men possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates; the officers thereof to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

66. "SEC. 3. The provisions of the Act of April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, which provide that volunteers called out by proclamation of the President shall be apportioned to the several States and the provisions of said Act which provide that the Governors of the States shall appoint officers shall not apply to this Act."

67. "That the number of medical officers of the Army be increased by the addition of fifteen assistant surgeons with the rank of first lieutenant, to be appointed after examination by an army medical examining board, in accordance with existing regulations.

"SEC. 2. That in emergencies the Surgeon-General of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may appoint as many con-

tract surgeons as may be necessary, at a compensation not to exceed one hundred and fifty dollars per month.

"Approved, May 12, 1898."—30 Statutes, p. 406.

68. "That the President is hereby authorized to organize a volunteer signal corps, for service during the existing war, which corps shall receive the same pay and allowances as are authorized by law for the Signal Corps of the Army."—30 Stat. L., p. 417.

69. 30 Stat., p. 419.

70. 30 Stat., pp. 1772-1773.

71. See page 162.

72. 30 Stat., p. 420.

73. 30 Stat., p. 421.

74. See page 160.

75. Section one amended Section 10 of the Act of April 22, 1898, by adding the following:

"*And provided*, That officers of the Regular Army shall be eligible for such staff appointments, and shall not be held to vacate their offices in the Regular Army by accepting the same, but shall be entitled to receive only the pay and allowances of their staff rank: *Provided further*, That officers of the Regular Army receiving commissions in regiments of engineers, or any other commissions in the Volunteer Army, shall not be held to vacate their offices in the Regular Army by accepting the same, but shall be entitled to receive only the pay and allowances of such volunteer rank while serving as such."

76. "SEC. 2. That section thirteen of said Act is amended so as to read as follows:

"That a governor of any State or Territory may, with the consent of the President, appoint officers of the Regular Army in the grades of field officers in organizations of the Volunteer Army, and the President may appoint officers of the Regular Army in the grade of field officers in organizations of the Volunteer Army raised in the District of Columbia and the Indian Territory, and in the regiments possessing special qualifications, provided for in section six of an Act of Congress approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and in section two of the Act of Congress approved May eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; and officers thus appointed shall be entitled to retain their rank in the Regular Army: *Provided*, That not more than one officer of the Regular Army shall hold a commission in any one regiment of the Volunteer Army at the same time: *And provided further*, That officers so appointed shall be entitled to receive only the pay and allowances of their rank in the volunteer organization."

77. The Act of June 7th (30 Stat., p. 433) limited the number of draft horses for the Army to 5,000. The Act of June 9th (30 Stat., p. 437) carried deficiency appropriations for the military and naval establishments.

78. 30 Stat., p. 483.

79. 30 Stat., p. 571.

80. 30 Stat., p. 652. The corps was to consist of one Chief of Engineers, 126 officers of various ranks and a battalion of engineers.

81. 30 Stat., pp. 666-668, 696-705.

82. By three Inspectors-General.—30 Stat., p. 720.

83. So as to "consist of one Chief of Ordnance, with the rank, pay

and emoluments of a brigadier-general; four colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, twenty-four captains, twenty first lieutenants."—30 Stat., p. 720.

84. 30 Stat., p. 721.

85. 30 Stat., p. 728.

86. 30 Stat., p. 729.

87. 30 Stat., p. 730.

88. Page 160.

89. On April 26th General Miles suggested to the Secretary of War that the militia called out as volunteers be kept in camp for 60 days in their respective States in order to equip them suitably "as so many States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service." He also recommended that "while this is being done, the general officers and staff officers can be appointed and properly instructed, large camps of instruction can be judiciously selected, ground rented, and stores collected. At the end of sixty days the regiments, batteries, and troops can be brigaded and formed into divisions and corps, and proper commanding generals assigned, and this great force may be properly equipped, molded, and organized into an effective army with the least possible delay."—*Report of the Major General commanding the Army, for 1898*, pp. 7-8.

90. "During the war camps were established for military purposes at Tampa, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Camp George H. Thomas, Ga.; Camp Alger, Va.; Camp Poland, Knoxville, Tenn.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Miami, Fla.; Fernandina, Fla.; Camp Wikoff, N. Y.; Camp Hamilton, near Lexington, Ky.; Camp George G. Meade, Pa.; Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala.; and Camp Shipp, Anniston, Ala."—*Report of the Quartermaster General in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, pp. 164, 397-398.

91. Sargent, I, pp. 110-111.

92.		Officers	Men	Total
Volunteer Army	on May 30, 1898.....	6,224	118,580	124,804
"	" on June 30th	7,169	153,355	160,524
"	" on July 31st	8,633	203,461	212,094
"	" on August 31st	8,785	207,244	216,029

—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898*, p. 260.

93. The Sixth and Seventh Army Corps were composed of U. S. Volunteers. No attempt was ever made by the military authorities to organize the Sixth Corps, and General Wilson and his staff ordered their services to General Brooke "for the command and instruction of his First Division." The latter accepted and Wilson ended by being assigned to the command of the 1st division of the First Corps.—See also Wilson, II, pp. 418, 422-423.

94. Seven expeditions were sent to Manila between May 25th and July 29th, inclusive. Their total forces numbered 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men.

95. Report of the Adjutant-General, pp. 266-269.

"In addition to these eight corps, about twelve thousand volunteers were distributed along the seacoast from New Jersey to Maine; five

regiments of United States volunteers were stationed at different points in the South; and one regiment of regular infantry, three of cavalry, and the greater part of the artillery, were left at the various army posts and seacoast forts of the United States."—Sargent, I, p. 112.

96. Report of the Major General, commanding the Army, 1898, p. 6.

97. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 82.

98. Lieut. A. S. Rowan left the United States on April 9th, landed at El Portillo—about 70 miles west of Santiago de Cuba—on the 24th, joined General Garcia of the Cuban army, continued to Manati, embarked in an open boat for Nassau on May 4th and returned to the United States on the 13th.

Lieut. H. H. Whitney left Key West on May 5th, reached Porto Rico on the 15th, explored the southern part of the island and returned on June 9th.

"Both of these officers penetrated the enemy's country and obtained most accurate and valuable information regarding the position of the military and naval forces, the defenses, and the topographical and climatic features of the country, all of which was of great value in subsequent military operations."—*Report of the Major General commanding the Army*, p. 10.

99. *Ibid.*, Miles, p. 272, and his article in *Harper's Encyclopædia of American History*, VIII, p. 299.

100. Under Colonel R. H. Hall, Lieut.-Col. J. H. Dorst, Lieut. C. P. Johnson and others. Dorst landed at Banes on the north coast of Cuba and delivered 7,500 rifles, 1,000,000 cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and other supplies much needed by the 10,000 Cubans under General Garcia.—General Miles' report, pp. 10-11.

101. General Miles' report, pp. 10 and 11, and his article in *Harper's Encyclopædia*; Sargent, I, pp. 114-115.

102. Miles, *Serving the Republic*, p. 272.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

104. The Adjutant-General to General Wade, commanding troops at Tampa, telegram dated May 9, 1898, 6.7 P.M.—*Report of the Secretary of War*, p. 83.

105. Stephen Bonsal, *The Fight for Santiago*, introduction, p. xv, declares that "Whether well founded or not, it was the opinion in the best informed army circles in Tampa, as well as elsewhere at this time, that the Administration had preferred not to admit openly the unfitness of the army for the work it was called upon to perform, but had decided to plan and then postpone execution from time to time, and so conceal from the public the real causes of inaction until some later and, as it was hoped, some far-distant day."

106. The Adjutant-General, by command of General Miles, to General Wade, telegram dated May 10, 1898, 6.35 P.M.—*Correspondence relating to the War with Spain*, vol. I, p. 11.

107. See despatches in report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pp. 83-84.

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87; Sargent, I, p. 116.

109. General Miles' report, p. 11; General Shafter's report, September 13, 1898, in Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 57. This despatch is given *in extenso* by Sargent, I, p. 120.

110. Report of the Secretary of War, p. 87.

In his book, pp. 275-276, General Miles says that "The reports of affairs at Tampa, Florida, became such that I determined to take the field in person.

"On arriving at Tampa, I found great confusion and the place crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and war materials. The confusion was occasioned partly by the want of rail facilities and partly by the system of loading and invoicing war material. The sidetracks of the railroads from the port of Tampa to Columbia, South Carolina, were blocked with cars and trains, and this caused great difficulty in properly equipping an expedition for effective war service."

111. Reports of Generals Miles and Shafter, pp. 12 and 58; Shafter to the Adjutant-General, June 4th-5th, p. 88.

On May 31st the Adjutant-General wired General Shafter asking when he would sail. On June 4th the Secretary of War telegraphed that Sampson "urged immediate aid"; and on June 7th he wired Shafter that "the President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready."—*Report of the Secretary of War*, pp. 87-89.

113. Sargent, I, pp. 122-123, 145-146.

114. "The imperfect facilities at Port Tampa made the task most difficult. While the wharf is a good one, the railroad facilities were inadequate, and the failure to label each car with its contents, and the congested state of the post-office where bills of lading were sent, added to the embarrassment of the situation."—*Report of the Secretary of War*, p. 86.

115. "Great complaint was made of the railroad congestion at Tampa and the absolute lack of ability to bring order out of chaos at that place during the early part of the period of its occupancy by troops. The Major-General Commanding has stated that supplies for 70,000 men for 90 days were ordered there, and the confusion on the railroad when he reached Tampa was very great, 1,000 cars being sidetracked, some of them as far back as Columbia, S. C.

"It is stated that in the hurry and rush attending the commencement of this work the contents of cars were unknown at Tampa; that bills of lading were not forwarded, and that it seemed impossible for a time to determine where absolutely necessary articles were located.

"Colonel Birdfi, of the Quartermaster's Department, testifies that this was corrected later on, when the contents of cars were clearly marked upon them and bills of lading promptly forwarded.

"The condition of the railroad congestion during the early portion of the time Tampa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, showing an almost inexcusable lack of executive ability on the part of those charged with the loading, unloading and handling of the trains.

"Colonel Birdfi and General Humphrey testify that there were very poor facilities for transferring troops and supplies arriving at Tampa via the Florida Central Railroad to the Plant System leading direct to Port Tampa.

"Order was finally brought out of chaos, the cars unloaded, the congestion overcome, and a vast amount of supplies of every character delivered at this immense encampment."—*Report of the Commission*

appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. Senate Document No. 221, 56th Congress, First Session, vol. I, pp. 132-133.

116. To improvise such an operation expeditiously is humanly impossible. The only way yet discovered to insure orderly management and prompt movement under such circumstances is to have a comprehensive plan worked out in time of peace by a General Staff such as the American army did not then possess.

117. Report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, I, pp. 13 and 174.

118. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 86.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

120. General Miles to the President, telegram dated June 7, 1898, 9.34 P. M. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

121. As a matter of fact, the siege pieces were not assembled until late on the 4th.—General Shafter to the Adjutant-General, telegram dated June 4-5, 1898, 6.32 A. M.—*Ibid.*, p. 88.

122. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, pp. 66-71.

123. Other accounts of the confusion which marked Shafter's embarkation are given by Alger, pp. 65-75; Bonsal, pp. 44-54; John D. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, pp. 9-29.

124. Telegrams to the Secretary of War sent on June 8, 1898, by General Shafter at 4.06 P. M. and by General Miles at 5.03 P. M.—*Report of the Secretary of War*, pp. 90-91.

125. Compare Sargent, I, p. 147. The author of this book who has been at work on a history of *The Campaign of Austerlitz* for more than seventeen years can bear witness to the truth of this statement.

126. The Secretary of War's telegrams to Generals Shafter and Miles, June 8, 1898, in his Report for 1898, p. 90.

127. Miles to the Secretary of War, June 9, 1898, 6.50 P. M.; Shafter's report, p. 58.

128. The *Eagle* and the *Nashville* had mistaken American ships in the darkness for enemy's vessels.

129. Roosevelt, pp. 72-73.

130. The Adjutant-General to General Shafter, telegram dated June 12, 1898.—*Correspondence relating to the War with Spain*, I, p. 40.

131. Composed of 32 transports, 2 water tenders and 3 lighters.

132. Shafter's report, p. 58.

133. Comprising the 3rd Infantry, 20th Infantry and one squadron of the 2nd Cavalry.

134. Shafter's report, p. 58.

135. General Miles' report, p. 12. This force was a division of volunteers under Brigadier General Snyder.—Shafter's report, p. 58.

136. General Miles' report, p. 12. In his book, p. 276, he says: "Finding that General Shafter was seriously affected by the intense heat, I telegraphed for authority to go with the expedition, but the request was unanswered."

137. See above, page 154.

138. General Shafter's report, p. 59.

139. Henry G. Sharpe, *The Provisioning of the Modern Army in the*

Field, pp. 87-89. This account was "compiled from *The War with Spain*, by H. C. Lodge; and *Main Features of the Spanish-American War*, by Rear-Admiral Pluddermann, Imperial German Navy."

140. General Shafter explains in his report, p. 58, that "while passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army."

141. Lodge relates, p. 112, that "at last the transports, on June 14, made their way down the bay, pushed on the next day, were joined near Key West by some dozen ships of war as convoy, and then on the 16th were fairly on their way to Santiago. Far pleasanter this than broiling in Tampa Harbor, and the spirits of the troops improved. Yet the movement, so infinitely better than the hot, still waiting, was deliberate enough. Some of the transports were very old and very slow, and as they set the speed, the fleet crept along about eight knots an hour over a sapphire sea, with beautiful star-lit nights, and glimpses by day of the picturesque shores and distant mountains of Cuba. On Sunday, June 19, they were off Cape Maisi, and at daybreak the next morning they came in sight of the waiting war-ships and of Santiago Harbor. Then came consultations between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson and the Cuban generals Garcia and Castillo. The plan of capturing the Morro and other entrance batteries, as the admiral desired, so that the mine-field could be cleared, the fleet go in, destroy the Spanish cruisers, and compel the surrender of Santiago, was abandoned. General Shafter decided to move directly upon the city, and orders were given to make the landing at Daiquiri. The army had neither lighters nor launches. They had been omitted, forgotten, or lost, like an umbrella, no one knew exactly where; so the work of disembarking the troops fell upon the navy. Under cover of a heavy fire from the ships, the landing began, and was effected without any resistance from the enemy."

142. Roosevelt fully agrees with this statement, declaring (pp. 84-85) that "The country would have offered very great difficulties to an attacking force had there been resistance. It was little but a mass of rugged and precipitous hills, covered for the most part by dense jungle. Five hundred resolute men could have prevented the disembarkation at very little cost to themselves. There had been about that number of Spaniards at Daiquiri that morning, but they had fled even before the ships began shelling."

143. General Shafter says in his report, p. 70, that "At Daiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made at a small wooden wharf, which the Spanish tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on the beach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers.

"I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent wharves."

144. Interesting accounts of this disembarkation are given by Miley, pp. 52-79; Bonsal, pp. 77-84; Richard Harding Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, pp. 112-113.

145. Miley, p. 77.

146. General Shafter's report, p. 61.

147. "WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA, 1904.

(Compiled from the Official Despatches and from the Letters of the Newspaper War Correspondents.)

"One of the most detailed descriptions which has been published, on the authority of eye-witnesses of reliability, is that of the first disembarkation of the war carried out at Chemulpo by a Japanese Army, consisting of 20,000 men, with 2,500 horses, several batteries of field-guns, together with an enormous mass of stores estimated at 100,000 tons.

"On the night of 8th February, an advanced guard of 2,500 infantry was disembarked at a small existing jetty. On the 13th February, the Russian war-vessels *Variag* and *Koriets*, having been destroyed at Chemulpo by Admiral Uriu's squadron in the intervening time, two Japanese transports arrived carrying no troops, but filled with supplies, and having Army Medical Corps details, and about 1,000 coolies for the land transport service. With the coolies came a carpenter corps of 100 men, each carrying his box of tools, and also an equal number of army blacksmiths. These were detailed to put up a blacksmith's shop close to the head of the landing jetty, and some of the carpenters proceeded to lay a cleated wooden roadway up the rough stone landing, to facilitate the disembarkation of horses and artillery.

"The Medical Corps of 300 men, came ashore in charge of the supplies for their own department; small trunks, weighing about 100 pounds each, containing necessaries for 'first aid' to the wounded, etc. The coolies were engaged in landing a vast bulk of military material, and nothing seems to have been forgotten. The Army authorities appear to have trusted in no way to local supplies. The advanced transports also brought four steam launches, a hundred flat-bottomed boats, and six tank water-boats, rigged with hand-pumps. During the next few days, under the direction of the Japanese Military Engineers, temporary landing piers were erected, adjoining the permanent stone jetty.

"Wooden floats, which had arrived in sections in the transports, were put together, and cleated gangways were placed across and between them, forming a continuous floor with railings from the channel to land. Korean junks were also to some extent utilized in a similar manner. Whilst these stages were in progress, supplies were coming ashore continuously. Some of the difficulties attending the landing at Chemulpo can be appreciated when it is understood that the mean rise and fall of the tide is 30 feet, and that for a considerable portion of each 24 hours mud flats, in many cases miles in extent, lie on either side of the narrow channel available for lighters and launches. The currents run like a mill race. (All that can be said in favor of Chemulpo Harbor is, that it was better as a landing place than the neighboring coasts.) On the 16th February, seven transports anchored in the harbor, and immediately proceeded to land men and horses. The flat-bottomed boats were taken alongside, the horses raised in slings, and lowered into them, each boat carrying five animals and bearing a transport department flag, giving its number and the number of the landing float to which it was to go. On arrival at the float, each horse-boat was brought up broadside on; the troopers, holding the

horses' heads, leaped up on the floats, and the horses made the 3 feet or 4 feet jump from the bottom of the boat to the floor of the temporary landing-stage, without hesitation or accident. A correspondent counted 20 animals landed in 10 minutes, and one a minute would be a fair average, which was kept up for hours without cessation. Rice mats were thrown down to deaden the noise. At the same time, two streams of men, fully accoutred, were pouring over two other temporary landing piers, and the disembarkation of supplies was steadily maintained at the permanent stone jetty. Men and horses were rapidly marched to the adjacent railway station, where long lines of cars were in readiness to take them to Seoul. In spite of all difficulties, the whole force, together with an immense mass of stores, was thrown on shore in a space of barely a week without confusion or accident. At no time were the approaches to the landing-stages in the slightest degree congested, and all eye-witnesses affirm that men, horses, guns, and above all, the immense bulk of 100,000 tons of baggage, were cleared away as if by magic."

“ COMMENTS

“ I have dwelt somewhat at length on the foregoing, because the details set forth an almost ideal illustration of the perfection in the execution of naval-military operations, which results on active service from methodical peace training.

“ The descent was completed within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, and hence owed none of its success to the costly teaching of immediately preceding failures in the same campaign.

“ In the years preceding the struggle, the Japanese had, as a part of their unostentatious preparations, carefully organized and practised a thoroughly efficient system of disembarkation, and when the day of trial at last arrived, this difficult and complicated operation was carried out with the absolute precision which is usually associated with the carefully rehearsed pageants of the Military Tournament at Islington.

“ Everything was in its place, and every man knew what was required of him.

“ Ample appliances and labor were at hand for the construction of new stages and the repair of those in existence, and it was thus possible to mitigate confusion by appropriating special and separate landing-places for the disembarkation of men, horses, and stores respectively. A sufficient supply of boats was also available; and although the resources of even Japanese ingenuity have not as yet apparently been able to hit upon any more expeditious method of getting horses out of transports than by slinging them, yet the precision and method which have prevailed have rendered it possible for this and the subsequent debarkations, which have been a feature of the war, to be effected with a speed and freedom from untoward events hitherto unsurpassed. . . .

“ CONCLUSION

“ It is possible that the prosperity which has attended the combined efforts of the fleets and armies of the Mikado may blind the general public in this country to the careful preparation and sustained effort to which the remarkable success achieved has been entirely due; and

may lead to the impression that operations which have been carried through with such apparent ease cannot be difficult in themselves, that time and money need not, therefore, be devoted to the peace rehearsal of such feats by our own forces, and that in the future, as in the past, we should fall back, in such matters, on the antiquated, dangerous and costly policy of trusting to luck, when an emergency arises. Now there is no point which has made itself more clearly apparent than this, that up to the outbreak of hostilities the diplomacy of Russia had been very much in advance of her warlike preparations; whilst as regards Japan, the state of affairs was exactly opposite, her rulers having been wise enough to let the work of preparation keep pace with the words of diplomacy. The whole campaign, therefore, has been a splendid example of the triumph in combined naval and military operations of method and peace organization over illimitable resources.

“But the lesson can be given in an even more concrete form than is afforded by the events of the present war standing by itself. If any man is inclined to doubt the correctness of the inferences drawn, let him carefully study the details of the Japanese disembarkation at Chemulpo in February, 1904, and compare its features, one by one, with the similar operation which was carried through by the forces of the United States at Daiquiri, in June, 1898. The former episode was purposely selected for quotation in the first part of this essay, because it is an example of a descent executed with admirable precision, within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, and consequently, too soon for it to have been possible for any lessons learned during the existing war to have been applied. The disembarkation at Chemulpo, therefore, was a product of peace preparation, and of peace preparation alone.

“To fully realize the tremendous influence which national foresight may exercise as compared with numbers and wealth, it should be borne in mind that the forces employed at Daiquiri were engaged in executing the mandate of a great state, whose resources exceed those of Japan by many millions, alike in population and money. Yet, as we have seen, whilst the most essential appliances, such as horse boats, were denied to the brave men of the United States Forces at Daiquiri, at Chemulpo, in spite of the comparative slenderness of the national resources, every detail, down to signboards for the Japanese troop-boats and landing-stages, and rice mats for the horses' feet, were at hand and constantly available. The disposition of the British nation, like that of the Americans before 1898, and of the Russians up to 1904, has ever erred on the side of procrastination, where expenditure and preparation for national safety are concerned, and as a result in almost every campaign, from the expedition to Carthage in 1741, down to the present day, British sailors and soldiers, when called upon to uphold the national honor, have been placed more or less at a disadvantage, owing to the lack of previous peace preparation. Luck, sheer fighting power, the like unpreparedness of our opponents have hitherto averted a catastrophe; but as years roll by, the appliances for war become more complicated, and success is gradually tending to depend rather on scientific and systematic training than on personal courage. The immunity from disaster, therefore, which has hitherto attended our arms, may and probably will, fail us at a critical moment, if the object-lesson of Japanese foresight and Russian supineness be not taken to heart.”—Henry G.

Sharpe, *The Provisioning of the Modern Army in the Field*, pp. 90-94.

148. Shafter's report, p. 61; Miley, p. 82; Bonsal, p. 88.

149. General Wheeler's report to Shafter, dated June 26, 1898, and quoted in *Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 73, and in Wheeler, p. 18.

These 964 troops comprised nearly all of his command who had then been disembarked.

150. The forces in the three Spanish lines numbered about 2,078 officers and men, but only 1,500 took part in the action.—*Statement of the Spanish Government*, and Sargent, II, p. 62, and Appendices A and S, III, pp. 159-160 and 218.

On the other hand, Miley says, p. 84, "In the Spanish official reports the strength of the Spanish forces is given as about five hundred men," and Bonsal, p. 99, estimates them as "between five and six hundred men, all told"; while Roosevelt declares, p. 112, that there were "over twelve hundred men in all, together with two guns."

151. Bonsal, p. 88; Miley, p. 83.

152. The American casualties were 16 killed and 52 wounded; the Spanish had only 10 killed and 18 wounded.—Shafter's report, p. 61; Wheeler's report; Spanish official statement, quoted by Sargent, II, p. 63, and III, p. 159; Roosevelt, pp. 112-114; Miley, p. 84.

According to Shafter's statement, *ibid.*, "the reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded."

153. The authorities consulted for the engagement at Las Guasimas are General Shafter's report; General Wheeler's report; Wheeler, pp. 16-38, who includes General Young's report of June 29, 1898, and Colonel Leonard Wood's report of June 25th; Roosevelt, pp. 91-115; Sargent, II, pp. 58-63 and 84; Miley, pp. 83-84; Bonsal, pp. 87-100; Lodge, pp. 113-117; Davis, pp. 132-172.

154. Wheeler, pp. 40-41.

155. General Shafter states in his report, p. 70, that "In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1,000 men continuously at work on the roads, they were at times impassable for wagons.

"The San Juan and Aguadores Rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualling of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not, in the interests of humanity, be left to starve while we had rations.

"Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains. . . .

"The supply of quartermaster and commissary stores during the campaign was abundant, and, notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting the rations, the troops on the firing line were at all times supplied with its coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, sugar, and coffee.

"There was no lack of transportation, for at not a time up to the surrender could all the wagons I had be used."

An interesting account of the difficulties experienced in the matter of supply is given by Miley, pp. 84-89.

156. On June 25th the pack trains were put in service, but next day this method was found to be inadequate to furnish the necessary supplies to the army six miles away. Although more than 66 wagons were then landed, loaded and hurried to the front, the lack of mules,

the illness of the teamsters and the dearth of men to fill their places resulted in many wagons remaining in the holds of the transports until the army occupied Santiago. The assignment of wagons to the various commands proved unsatisfactory, the horses and mules fell sick, and indeed almost every conceivable difficulty was encountered.

157. No systematic effort was made to repair the roads and to open up new roads until the 27th, when this work was entrusted to Captain Burr and the Engineer battalion.

158. General Wheeler asserts, pp. 41-42, that on the 26th he "again received instructions not to advance" but that he "reconnoitered close up to El Caney, and learned that there were not more than five hundred Spaniards at that place." Upon describing the defenses to General Shafter and urging that he be permitted to attack the place with his guns, the commander-in-chief "admitted the feasibility of this plan, but after two interviews and some correspondence informed me that he had determined to entrust this work to General Lawton."

Bonsal declares, p. 112, that, although the country on the right and left was reconnoitered, "the centre, the Spanish front, where the heavy fighting subsequently occurred, remained unexplored, and was almost completely unknown to us until after the battle of San Juan."

159. Shafter's report, p. 62. As a matter of fact the force in question was a column under General Escario and was composed of 3,660 officers and men. It was reported to be advancing at the rate of 12 miles *per diem*, to be only 54 miles from Santiago, and to have with it an abundance of beef cattle and other supplies.

160. "The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy, as holding the Guantanamo road as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating against San Juan Hill. . . .

"During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders, and explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road toward Santiago, and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Pozo, toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed that he had become well engaged."—*Shafter's report*, pp. 61-62.

161. The Spanish forces in the immediate vicinity of Santiago numbered, so far as can be ascertained, about 10,429.—Sargent, II, pp. 99-100.

162. Three companies of the Constitucion regiment and one of guerrillas, a total of about 520 officers and men. There were also about 100 inhabitants who took a hand in the fighting. The Spaniards had neither artillery nor machine guns.

163. Shafter's report, p. 62.

164. With the arrival of Bates, the force under Lawton numbered 6,653.

165. Miley declares, p. 105, that "In General Lawton's report to General Shafter the day before, he had stated that, in his opinion, El Caney would fall in about two or three hours."

166. The assailants outnumbered the garrison more than twelve to one.

167. The American losses were 81 killed and 360 wounded, a total of 441.—*Records of the Adjutant-General's office.*

The Spanish casualties were about 235 killed and wounded, 120 taken prisoners and 65 missing. General Vara de Rey was first wounded, then killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Puñet, who succeeded to the command, was only able to escape with about 100 men.—Sargent, II, pp. 107-108, and III, pp. 223-225.

The authorities consulted are Shafter's report; Lawton's report of July 3rd and Bates' report of July 8th, in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, I, pp. 80-82; Sargent, II, pp. 101-107; Lodge, pp. 119-124; Miley, pp. 105 and 112; Bonsal, pp. 114-116, 139-141.

168. *The War with Spain*, pp. 120-121.

169. On June 28th General Shafter had cabled the Secretary of War that he had not unloaded the siege guns and did not intend to take them to the front until the army had been checked or needed them; that he had "four light batteries at the front, and they are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have."—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 99.

170. Lodge, p. 123.

171. Shafter's report; Roosevelt, pp. 129-130; Miley, p. 107.

172. Wheeler, however, returned to duty during the day and rendered conspicuous service throughout the fight.

173. Sumner's leading brigade reached the ford about 10 A. M. "Then a captive observation-balloon was brought along and anchored at the ford where the troops were crossing and were massed in the road. As one reads the official statement of this fact, comment and criticism alike fail. That such a thing should have been done seems incredible. The balloon simply served to give the Spaniards a perfect mark and draw all the rifle and artillery fire to the precise point where our men were densely crowded in the narrow road. Fortunately the balloon was quickly destroyed by the enemy's fire, but it had given the place and the range, and there the troops remained for nearly an hour, exposed to heavy fire from the forts and block-house. . . . There the men staid, dropping under the shots of the Spaniards, able to do nothing, waiting orders. No orders from headquarters came; the situation was intolerable; retreat meant not only defeat, but useless and continual exposure to a slaughtering fire."—Lodge, pp. 124-125. Compare Bonsal, pp. 117-122; Roosevelt, pp. 130-137; Davis, pp. 200-214.

174. Shafter's report, p. 64.

175. Among others Brigadier General Hawkins, who greatly distinguished himself throughout the action, especially in the manner in which he rallied his troops and urged them forward to the attack. Compare Shafter's report, p. 64.

176. "Soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment, of Hawkins'

Brigade, came up. I turned them into the bypath indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of the brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to again go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the Second and Third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road toward the ford."—*General Kent's report of July 7th in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 77. See also Bonsal, pp. 128-129, footnote, and 500; Davis, pp. 238-239; Sargent, II, pp. 114-115; Lodge, p. 127.

177. Lodge, p. 125.

178. The authorities consulted for the above narrative are General Shafter's report, pp. 63-65; General Wheeler's report; General Kent's report; Colonel Wood's report; Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt's report; Wheeler, pp. 42-48 and 110; Roosevelt, pp. 128-161; Sargent, II, pp. 108-122; Lodge, pp. 124-132; Bonsal, pp. 112-142; Miley, pp. 106-118.

During the day General Duffield with the 33rd Michigan attacked Aguadores and thus prevented the Spaniards at that point from reinforcing Linares at Santiago.

179. The losses of the 1st division of the Fifth Corps on July first were 93 killed, 492 wounded and 58 missing, a total of 643, according to General Kent's report of July 7th (*Report of the War Department for 1898*, p. 78). The 1st Cavalry brigade lost 11 killed and 126 wounded; the 2nd brigade 35 killed and 203 wounded, a total of 375 for the Cavalry division. (Wheeler, p. 55, and *report of Colonel Wood, commanding the 2nd brigade in the illness of General Young*, quoted in Wheeler, p. 75.)

According to these returns, the total American losses in the battle of San Juan on July first were 1,018, while Roosevelt, p. 171, gives them as 1,071.

Lodge, p. 130, gives these casualties at 1,614, but his figures are manifestly incorrect since they exceed the grand total of 1,156 for the days of July 1st to 3rd, both inclusive, given in the statement of the "*Casualties in the Fifth Corps in the Operations against Santiago, June 22 to July 17, 1898*," issued by the Adjutant-General's Office on April 23, 1900.

The Spanish forces actually engaged in this battle and their losses are difficult to calculate accurately. There were—as has been seen above (footnote 161)—10,429 troops in the immediate vicinity of Santiago and the harbor. So far as can be ascertained only 1,197 troops took part in the actual fighting on the San Juan heights and their losses were something under 360 men. The authorities for these figures are given by Sargent, II, pp. 129-130, and III, pp. 159-160, 223-225.

Miley asserts, p. 117, that "The intrenchments of San Juan were defended by two companies of Spanish infantry, numbering about two hundred and fifty to three hundred men. About eleven o'clock in the morning reinforcements were sent them, bringing the number up to

about seven hundred and fifty men." Roosevelt claims, p. 170, that there were "about 4,500 Spaniards."

180. Miley, p. 115.

181. Wheeler's report of July 7th, p. 75; Wheeler, pp. 53 and 118.

182. Reports of Generals Shafter and Bates, pp. 65 and 82.

183. Shafter's report, p. 65; Miley, p. 122.

184. Shafter's report, p. 65.

185. After deducting the losses suffered at El Caney, Bates' brigade numbered 1,078 and Lawton's division, 4,987, a total of 6,065, according to the statement issued by the Adjutant-General's Office on April 23, 1900 (see above, footnote 179).

As 1,018 were put *hors de combat* at San Juan on July first out of 8,412, the troops at the front after midday on the 2nd, having been re-enforced by Bates and Lawton, numbered about 13,459.

186. Miley, p. 124; Bonsal, pp. 253-257. Compare Sargent, II, pp. 128-129; Lodge, p. 133.

187. Miley, p. 124. Also Shafter's report, p. 65; Wheeler, p. 67, who gives the hour as 9 P. M.

188. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 102.

189. Shafter's report, p. 66.

190. *Ibid.* According to Miley, p. 130, Toral's reply "was received at 6.30 P. M. that day."

191. 3,660 troops. See page 653, footnote 159.

192. Shafter's report, p. 67.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 66; Miley, pp. 130-131.

194. Report of the Secretary of War, pp. 102-104.

195. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pp. 103-104. This last despatch was received at Washington on July 3rd at 7 P. M. and 31 minutes later the ensuing cable came from Shafter:

"Early this morning I sent in a demand for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. Perfect quiet on lines for one hour. From news just received of escape of fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered.

196. Alger, p. 172.

197. Shafter's report, pp. 67-68; Report of the Secretary of War; Sargent, III, pp. 3-7, 13-19, 22-23, 28-31; Miley, pp. 134-147, 155-159.

198. On the 9th Brigadier General Wallace F. Randolph reached Siboney with 6 batteries of artillery from Tampa, but so shocking was the condition of the roads that he was unable to get more than two batteries into position before July 14th.

199. The American warships also took a hand in this bombardment.

200. General Miles' report, p. 19, which goes on to say: "Before leaving Washington I was aware of the fact that yellow fever had developed among our troops and by this time learned that it had spread so much that there were over a hundred cases, and the medical officers were undecided as to the extent it might cripple the command. This was the most serious feature of the situation, and impressed me with the importance of the fact that prompt action should be taken, and I so informed the authorities by cable, suggesting that it was a case where discretionary authority should be granted."

This assumption of the conduct of negotiations was based upon the President's specific instructions to proceed to Santiago and to give such

general directions as he deemed best. The discretionary authority which he requested was given him by the Secretary of War's cable of July 13th, which left him free to accept surrender or to deliver an assault according as he judged advisable. See Miles, pp. 282, 286-288, 294-295.

201. "At the appointed time, accompanied by Brig. Gen. J. C. Gilmore and Lieut. Col. Marion P. Maus, of my staff, Major-General Shafter, two of his staff officers, and Major-General Wheeler, and Lieutenant Wheeler, aid-de-camp, I met the Spanish general, Toral, with two of his staff officers and an interpreter. After some conversation between General Toral and General Shafter, I informed General Toral distinctly that I had left Washington six days before; that it was then the determination of the Government that this portion of the Spanish forces must either be destroyed or captured; that I was there with sufficient reinforcements to accomplish that object, and that if this was not the case any number of troops would be brought there as fast as steamers could bring them, if it took 50,000 men. I told him that we offered him liberal terms, namely, to return his troops to Spain; and I also pointed out the fact that this was the only way in which his forces could return, they being on an island 3,000 miles away from their own country with no means of succor. He said that under the Spanish law he was not permitted to surrender as long as he had ammunition and food, and that he must maintain the honor of the Spanish arms. My reply was that he had already accomplished that; that he must now surrender or take the consequences, and that I would give him until daylight the next morning to decide. He appealed for longer time, saying it was impossible for him to communicate with his superiors, and upon his request I granted him until 12 o'clock noon."—*General Miles' report*, p. 20.

That afternoon a cable was received from the Secretary of War leaving the question of accepting a surrender or of making an assault to the discretion of General Miles.

202. General Miles "informed General Shafter that the commissioners could be appointed in his name. I directed him to name Generals Lawton and Wheeler, and informed him that he could also be one of the number, but he appointed his staff officer instead, Lieutenant Miley, a very able and gallant officer."—*Miles*, p. 292.

203. "After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1 and 2; the malarial and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout the command, and on July 4 the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were made to keep this fact from the army, it soon became known."—*General Shafter's report*, p. 70.

204. General Miles' report, pp. 21-25; Miles, pp. 290-293.

205. Shafter's report, p. 69; Miley, pp. 162-182.

206. After no less than five demands for surrender had been made upon it.

207. Generals Wheeler and Lawton, and Lieutenant J. D. Miley for the American forces, and General Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Ventura Fontan, and Robert Mason, the British Vice-Consul who acted as interpreter, on behalf of the Spanish.

208. This document is given *in extenso* in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, pp. 122-123

209. Miley states, p. 214, that "In round numbers, 23,500 Spanish troops in the Division of Santiago de Cuba laid down their arms, and of these, 13,000 were in garrisons outside of Santiago."

Some of the prisoners preferred to stay in Cuba. The total number shipped to Spain between August 9th and September 17th was 22,864, of whom 22,137 were troops and the remainder wives and children of officers, priests and sisters of mercy.—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 5, and *Report of the Adjutant-General in ibid.*, p. 274.

According to Miley, p. 227, "The captured ordnance, arms, and ammunition included 100 cannon, 6,800 projectiles of all calibres, 15,000 pounds of powder, 25,114 small arms, made up of Remington, Spanish Mauser, and Argentina Mauser rifles; and 5,279,000 rounds of small arms ammunition for these three kinds of rifles. Of the 100 cannon, seven were modern breech-loading 8-inch rifles, and four similar guns with a calibre of 6 inches. These guns were all mounted at the mouth of the harbor. There were also eighteen rapid-fire and machine guns distributed among the forts at the entrance to the harbor and the defences immediately around the city. The rest of the cannon were obsolete bronze and cast-iron pieces. The rifle with which the Spanish troops were armed was the Spanish Mauser, and for this particular rifle there were only 1,500,000 rounds among the captured ammunition."

210. Shafter's report, p. 69; Miley, pp. 185-186.

211. The total American losses throughout this campaign were 21 officers and 222 enlisted men killed, 101 officers and 1,344 men wounded, an aggregate of 1,688.—*Casualties in the Fifth Corps in the Operations against Santiago, June 22 to July 17, 1898*," issued by the Adjutant-General's Office on April 23, 1900.

212. In his report General Shafter stated, p. 70, "The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish to invite attention to the fact that not an officer was brought to trial by court-martial, and, as far as I know, no enlisted man. This speaks volumes for an army of this size, and in a campaign of such duration."

General James Harrison Wilson says, II, p. 429, that "Shafter's expedition . . . was composed mostly of well-trained regulars, according to all accounts the finest body of men the country had ever assembled."

213. As has been seen (page 188 and page 657, footnote 203) yellow fever had made its appearance on July 4th.

214. Miley, pp. 215-217. The removal of the troops to new camps was done in compliance with the orders of the Secretary of War telegraphed to General Shafter on July 13th and 14th. These despatches are given by Alger, pp. 256-257.

215. Shafter to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898.

216. "Total sick, 4,255; total fever cases, 3,164; new cases of fever, 653; cases of fever returned to duty, 722."—*Shafter's report of August first, quoted by Alger*, p. 264.

217. *With Shafter in Cuba*; pp. 217-218.

218. The Secretary of War to Shafter, August 2nd.—Alger, p. 262.

219. These despatches are given in full by Alger, pp. 262-266 and 268; Miley, pp. 218-222; Sargent, III, pp. 44-49.

The letter signed by the general officers was unwisely given out to the Associated Press and was published in the United States on August 4th, thereby causing much unnecessary apprehension on the part of the

families of the officers and troops then in Cuba. This leak caused a reprimand to be administered to General Shafter on the same day, but the culprit was never discovered.

220. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 5.

221. Contrary to the prevalent opinion, the "round robin" was not the motive which prompted the withdrawal of Shafter's army from Cuba, although it doubtless somewhat expedited that step. On July 23rd Secretary Alger cabled Shafter that "As soon as it can be done with safety, it is the intention to bring the entire 5th Corps North for rest and recuperation." On the 26th the Surgeon-General was ordered to proceed to Montauk Point and to report on its suitability, and on the 28th Shafter was notified that it had been selected for his "command when it can be moved." On August first, in response to Shafter's recommendation of the 26th, he was ordered "to send some of Wheeler's dismounted cavalry on the *Louisiana* to New York"; on the same day orders were given for the necessary contracts to prepare Montauk Point, and on August 2nd the contracts were approved and let.—See Alger, pp. 259-261, 269-273.

222. Report of the Secretary of War, p. 129; Sargent, III, p. 50.

223. Report of the Secretary of War, p. 5.

224. Alger, p. 270.

225. 30 Statutes at Large, pp. 1742-1743.

226. Page 176.

227. General Miles' report for 1898, p. 12.

228. His plan of campaign was submitted to the Secretary of War on June 24th.

229. On June 26th the Secretary of War informed him that "By direction of the President an expedition will be organized with the least possible delay, under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke, United States Army, consisting of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the First and Third Army Corps and two divisions from the Fourth Army Corps, for movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. The command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition, and you will command the forces thus united in person. . . ."

230. Shafter to the Adjutant-General, July 4, 1898.—Miles' report, p. 18.

231. Miles' report, pp. 18-19 and 25.

232. Page 188.

233. On July 21st General Miles telegraphed the Secretary of War: "The following troops are with me aboard transports Guantanamo harbor en route to Puerto Rico; four light batteries, 3d and 4th, Lomias battery B, 5th Artillery, 6th Illinois, 6th Massachusetts, 275 recruits for regiments 5th Corps, 6th Signal Corps, 7th Hospital Corps—3,415 all told; others expected daily."—Alger, p. 303.

General Miles says in his report, p. 29, that sickness had reduced his "effective force to about 3,300 men."

234. General Miles' report, pp. 29-31.

235. Garretson's brigade formed part of the provisional division under Brigadier General Guy V. Henry, the other brigade being commanded by General Schwan.

236. General Miles' report, p. 31; General Henry's report of August 21, 1898, p. 248, in which he says: "The march from Guanica to Ponce demonstrated a lax state of discipline in the troops of General Garretson's brigade, so at Tallaboa while en route I called upon him for a report of officers who had demonstrated their inefficiency. This action resulted in the resignation at Ponce of several officers of the Sixth Massachusetts who had been ordered before a board to inquire into their efficiency. Since then the state of discipline in this particular regiment has much improved."

237. This 1st Brigade of the 1st Division sailed from Charleston on July 21st and was composed of the 16th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, the 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, companies D and M of the 6th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, under Brigadier General Oswald H. Ernst. According to General Wilson's telegraphic report of July 20th, it numbered 3,571 officers and men.—Report of the Adjutant-General in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, p. 270, and Alger, p. 308, footnote.

238. *Under the Old Flag*, II, pp. 440-442.

General Wilson's command had had to wait for a fortnight at Charleston until transports arrived and had sailed for Porto Rico "entirely without naval escort or protection of any kind."—*Ibid.*, II, p. 439.

239. This change was due to the fact that the *Dixie* had entered the harbor of Ponce and that Commander Davis had reported "that it was neither fortified nor mined."—Miles' report, p. 31.

240. General Wilson asserts elsewhere (II, p. 419) that "when charged with the transfer of a part of the First Division by ship to Porto Rico, I made requisition for the proper flat-bottomed scows and motor boats to disembark my command promptly and expeditiously, but my requisitions were quietly ignored, and the expedition was sent to an unknown coast with nothing but the ship's yawls or row boats to land the troops. It is needless to add that the landing would have been greatly delayed if not rendered impossible had the enemy been strong and determined enough to make a stand at Ponce."

241. Compare General Wilson's report of August 23rd, in General Miles' annual report for 1898, pp. 226-228.

242. General Henry's report of August 21, 1898, p. 248.

243. On July 28th, General Miles issued a proclamation "to the inhabitants of Porto Rico," in which he declared that "the chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation." This announcement exercised a tremendous effect in allaying the fears of the Porto Ricans and in establishing the most amicable relations.

244. "July 23 the Philadelphia City Troop, Pennsylvania Cavalry; A and C New York Cavalry; B, Pennsylvania Artillery; Twenty-seventh Indiana Light Battery; A, Illinois Artillery; A, Missouri Artillery; Troop H, Sixth United States Cavalry; Company F, Eighth United States Infantry, under command of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, United States Army, sailed from Newport News, arriving at Guayama July 31."—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898*, p. 270. According to Gen. Brooke's despatch of July 28th, this force numbered 1,272.

245. "July 23 the Eleventh and Nineteenth United States Infantry;

Batteries C and M, Seventh United States Artillery; Troop B, Second Cavalry and Battery B, Fifth Artillery, making a total of 80 officers and 2,831 enlisted men, under command of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, United States Volunteers, sailed from Tampa, Fla., arriving at Ponce July 31."—*Ibid.*

This brigade numbered 1,447 according to General Schwan's report of August 21, 1898, in the *Annual Report of the Major General commanding*, p. 249.

246. General Brooke relates in his report of September 3, 1898, *Ibid.*, p. 139, that "On disembarking at Arroyo (which point was indicated by the Major-General commanding the Army as the point he wished me to disembark the troops then with me), I found another very serious difficulty. No provision had been made for lighters and for means of towing these lighters to the beach from the ships, necessarily anchored in water sufficiently deep for their draft, and the large ships were a long distance from the shore. Had it not been for the presence of the navy the landing would have been impracticable, and but for the circumstances that a number of local lighters were available, which, had the Spaniards been active, might have been destroyed, the assistance of the navy would have been of no avail in landing our artillery and horses, mules and wagons. The engineers succeeded in constructing a small dock by the sinking of two lighters, and by utilizing some inch boards we were able to land artillery and other material with greater facility than was possible when the lighters were practically beached at other points. All these matters should lead to the adoption of practical means to accomplish this purpose, and particularly should every expedition be supplied with the material and necessary implements to build a reasonable dock at which ships might be unloaded. This could have been done at Arroyo and at Ponce had the material and labor been at hand, and would greatly have facilitated the use of troops and supplies in furthering the purpose of their being sent here, and it may be, and possibly will be, necessary in the future."

247. "July 28 the Third Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Fourth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, making total of 145 officers and 3,581 enlisted men, under command of Brig. Gen. Peter C. Hains, United States Volunteers, sailed from Newport News, Va., arriving at Arroyo August 3."—*Report of the Adjutant-General*, p. 270.

248. By Troop A of the 5th Cavalry, two batteries of light artillery and two companies of the 19th Infantry.

249. General Miles' report, pp. 42-43; General Schwan's report, p. 249.

250. Major General John R. Brooke, commanding the First Army Corps, had the first column composed of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division under Brigadier General P. C. Hains. It was composed of the 4th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; the 3rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry; the 4th Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Troop H of the 6th Cavalry; the Philadelphia City Troop; Battery B, Pennsylvania Artillery; Battery A, Missouri Artillery; Battery A, Illinois Artillery; 27th Indiana Artillery; a battalion of the Signal Corps, and two dynamite guns.—General Brooke's report of August 18, 1898, p. 140.

The second column under General James Harrison Wilson, command-

ing the 1st Division of the First Corps, was composed of the 1st Brigade of that division (Brigadier General Oswald H. Ernest) and included the 16th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; the 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry; a battalion of light artillery under Major James M. Lancaster, consisting of Battery F of the 3rd Artillery, and Battery B of the 4th Artillery; Captain B. T. Clayton's Troop C of New York Volunteer Cavalry; and Captain William H. Lamar's Volunteer Signal company.—General Wilson's report, p. 228.

Brigadier General Guy V. Henry had part of the "Provisional Division" composed of the 1st Brigade under Brigadier General G. A. Garretson, which included one battalion of the 19th Infantry; the 6th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; the 6th Illinois Volunteer Infantry; and Troop B of the 2nd U. S. Cavalry.

The other part of this division was the "Independent Brigade" under Brigadier General Theodore Schwan and consisted of the 11th Infantry; Troop A of the 5th Cavalry; Battery C of the 3rd Artillery; and Battery D of the 5th Artillery.—General Schwan's report, p. 249.

251. Two battalions of the 19th Infantry; 1st Illinois Volunteers; Batteries B and G of the 5th Artillery; Batteries B and M of the 7th Artillery; detachments of the provisional battalion of Engineers; battalion of the Signal Corps and U. S. Engineers.—Alger, pp. 310-311.

252. General Miles' report, p. 34; General Brooke's report of September 3, 1898, pp. 139-140; Lodge, pp. 181-182.

253. Schwan's loss was only one man killed and 16 wounded. The Spanish, who numbered 1,362, had fully 15 killed and 35 wounded.—General Schwan's report, pp. 249 and 253; Strait, p. 176.

254. General Miles' report, p. 35; Miles, p. 302; General Schwan's report, pp. 249-253.

255. General Miles' report, p. 35; Miles, p. 302; General Wilson's report, pp. 228-230 and 234; Wilson, II, pp. 444 and 446; General Ernst's report of August 17, 1898, pp. 241 and 242; Colonel Hulings' report, 242-243; Lieutenant-Colonel Biddle's report, pp. 237-239.

None of Wilson's command were killed and only six wounded.—Strait, p. 175.

256. General Miles' report, p. 36; Wilson's report, pp. 230-232; Wilson, II, pp. 445-449; Lodge, pp. 179-180.

257. General Brooke's report of August 18, 1898, pp. 140-141; General Hains' report, p. 141.

258. General Henry's report of August 19, 1898, pp. 246-247.

259. Schwan had only 6 men wounded. Of the Spanish, who numbered 1,200, at least 17 were killed, 14 wounded, a number drowned, 53 were taken prisoners, and 200 rifles as well as a considerable amount of ammunition captured.—General Schwan's report of August 22nd, p. 257; Lieut.-Col. Burke's report, p. 260.

260. General Schwan's report, pp. 254-257; General Miles' report, p. 235, which goes on to say "From August 7-15 General Schwan's troops marched 92 miles, occupied nine towns, made prisoners of war of 162 regulars (including the commander of the military department of Mayaguez), captured and paroled 200 volunteers, captured much valuable material, and cleared the western part of the island of the enemy.

"Great credit is due to the troops who composed and the general

who commanded the expedition for well-sustained and vigorous action in the face of most trying conditions.”

261. Lodge, pp. 185-187.

262. *The War with Spain*, pp. 187-190.

263. Richard Harding Davis very trenchantly remarks, pp. 299-300, that “Porto Rico was a picnic because the commanding generals would not permit the enemy to make it otherwise. The Spaniards were willing to make it another nightmare—they were just as ready to kill in Porto Rico as in Cuba—but our commanding General in Porto Rico was able to prevent their doing so. A performance of any sort always appears the most easy when we see it well done by an expert. . . . A general who can make an affair of letting blood so amusing to his men that they regard it as a picnic is an excellent general.”

264. General Miles declares in his report, p. 36, that “The success of the enterprise was largely due to the skill and good generalship of the officers in command of the different divisions and brigades. Strategy and skillful tactics accomplish what might have occasioned serious loss to achieve in any other way. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and captured was nearly ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded.”

General Wilson says, II, pp. 449-450, that “The Porto Rico campaign had been made by experienced regular officers, with but few newspaper men at hand to spread exaggerated reports about it for the glorification of popular favorites. As far as Miles and his subordinates were concerned they had managed every detail methodically and efficiently. The country was naturally quite as difficult as Cuba and just as sickly, but it is proper to say that, with the exception of a typhoid infection brought from the States and slight digestive disturbances, due more to the native fruits than to climate, the troops were free from epidemics and any unusual sickness. The records showed but few deaths and at no time over twenty-three per cent. from all causes unfit for duty, the larger part of which were light cases, mostly developed after the campaign had ended, and the friendly people, with pardonable anxiety to please our soldiers and satisfy their curiosity, had supplied them too freely with oranges, pineapples, and bananas and with the rarer and less wholesome varieties of tropical fruits. Withal, there was no lack of hospitals, medicines, Red Cross nurses, or supplies, and no cause for alarm at any time. Although our occupation continued for over two months, there was no round robin and no necessity for withdrawing the troops to Montauk Point. The simple fact is that the campaign and occupation of Porto Rico in July and August were managed so well that the officers and men, as well as the people of the island, regarded it as a continuous picnic or gala *fiesta*, while the campaign and capture of Santiago at practically the same time of year were characterized by sickness, disorder, and general mismanagement, which came uncomfortably near to national disaster and disgrace.”

265. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 7.

A graphic account of the Porto Rican campaign is given by Richard Harding Davis, pp. 296-360.

266. Alger, p. 326; Miles, p. 271.

267. Report of Major General Merritt, dated August 31, 1898, in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 46.

President McKinley's instructions to General Merritt, dated May 18, 1898, are given in part by James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, pp. 51-52.

268. Report of the Adjutant-General, p. 266.

269. "The first expedition for Manila, under command of General T. M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, sailed May 25, consisting of the First California Infantry, Second Oregon Infantry, five companies Fourteenth United States Infantry, and a detachment of California Artillery—115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men—arriving off Manila June 30.

"The second expedition, under the command of Gen. F. V. Greene, United States Volunteers, sailed June 15, and consisted of the First Colorado, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, four companies Eighteenth and four companies Twenty-third United States Infantry, two batteries Utah Artillery, and detachment of United States Engineers—a total of 158 officers and 3,428 enlisted men—arriving at their destination July 17.

"The third expedition, under the command of Generals Merritt, United States Army, commanding corps, and MacArthur, United States Volunteers, sailed June 27 and 29, and consisted of four companies of Eighteenth and four companies of Twenty-third United States Infantry, four batteries of Third United States Artillery, one company United States Engineers, First Idaho, First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota, and First North Dakota Infantry, the Astor Battery, and detachments of Hospital and Signal Corps, a total of 197 officers and 4,650 enlisted men, which arrived at their destination July 25 and 31.

"The fourth expedition, under command of Gen. E. S. Otis, United States Volunteers, sailed July 15, and consisted of six troops Fourth United States Cavalry, two batteries Sixth United States Artillery, five companies Fourteenth United States Infantry, and detachments of recruits, a total of 42 officers and 1,640 enlisted men, and arrived at its destination August 21.

"The fifth expedition, under command of Col. H. C. Kessler, of the First Montana Infantry, sailed July 19, and consisted of the First Montana Infantry and detachment of recruits, a total of 54 officers and 1,294 enlisted men, arriving at destination August 24.

"The sixth expedition, under command of Gen. H. G. Otis, United States Volunteers, sailed July 23, and consisted of eight companies of the First South Dakota and detachments, a total of 50 officers and 846 enlisted men, arriving at destination August 24.

"The seventh expedition, under command of Lieut. Col. Lee Stover, First South Dakota Infantry, sailed July 29, and consisted of four companies of First South Dakota and detachment of recruits, a total of 25 officers and 814 enlisted men, arriving at destination August 31.

"The total forces of the seven expeditions made a grand total of 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men. Since then, on October 19, 27, 28, and 30, 1898, the Twentieth Kansas, First Tennessee, and First Washington Infantry Volunteers, and a battalion of California Artillery were sent to the Philippines, numbering 99 officers and 2,565 enlisted men."—Report of the Adjutant-General, November 1, 1898, in *Report of the War Department for 1898*, pp. 268-269.

270. Compare Blount, pp. 32, 38-40.

271. General Merritt's report, pp. 47-49; General Anderson's report (in the *Annual Report of the Major General commanding, for 1898*), dated August 29, 1898, pp. 54-55; General Greene's report of August 23, 1898, *ibid.*, pp. 62-63; Lodge, pp. 208-310.

272. General Merritt's report, p. 49; General Anderson's report, p. 55; General Greene's report, pp. 63-65; Lodge, pp. 209-212.

The losses of the 2nd brigade from July 30th to August 5th, both inclusive, were 15 killed and 59 wounded according to Greene's report, p. 71, which states that the Spanish losses "from August 1 to 13 were at least 40 killed and 100 wounded."

273. General Merritt's report, p. 49.

274. On August 1st, by General Orders No. 2, the forces were organized as the 1st Division of the 8th Corps under Brigadier General Anderson, composed of the 1st brigade under MacArthur and the 2nd brigade under Greene.

According to the reports of the two brigade commanders, pp. 71 and 84, their forces numbered:

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men</i>	<i>Total</i>
1st Brigade (MacArthur).....	139	3,961	3,830
2nd Brigade (Greene).....	196	4,904	5,100
Total	335	8,595	8,930

275. The monitor *Monterey* joined Admiral Dewey on August 4th.

276. General Merritt's report, pp. 54-55.

This officer also says (Report, p. 50) that "This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season."

277. Alger relates, pp. 338-339, that "General Merritt had planned and conducted his fight irrespective of the presence or attitude of the Filipinos, and, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future, he had even gone so far on the night of August 12th as to request Aguinaldo 'to prevent his soldiers from joining in the attack and entering the city.' In spite of this request, however, when General Greene's advance-guard reached the walls of Manila, they were followed there by a considerable force of the natives, who, by their superior knowledge of the roads, rushed ahead of our troops and opened fire at once upon the five or six thousand Spanish soldiers on the walls of the city, regardless of the fact that at that time the Spaniards had ceased firing, and the white flag was flying from the fortifications. This unprovoked attack precipitated a renewal of the firing upon our troops on the part of the enemy, resulting in the death of one and wounding of two other soldiers of the 1st California Volunteers. After quieting the hostile and excited Filipinos, and assuring himself that there was little likelihood of further trouble, General Greene moved his brigade across the Pasig, in accordance with the original plan, and so disposed his troops as to fully protect the people and property of New Manila. His losses were one enlisted man killed and five wounded."

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See also General Greene's report, pp. 69-71.

278. Composed of General Greene, Captain B. P. Lamberton, U. S. N., and Lieutenant-Colonels Whittier and Crowder for the Americans, and Auditor-General de la Petra and Colonels Carlos and José for the Spanish.

279. This final capitulation is given in General Merritt's report, pp. 55-56.

280. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

281. The authorities for the attack on Manila are the report of General Merritt, pp. 50-52; Report of General Anderson, pp. 57-59; Report of General Greene, pp. 67-72; Report of General MacArthur, pp. 79-82; Lodge, pp. 215-221.

282. General Anderson's report, p. 58; General Greene's report, p. 71; General MacArthur's report, pp. 81 and 84.

283. Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898, p. 273; Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 6.

284. General Anderson's report, p. 54.

285. General Greene asserts (report, p. 71) that "It is impossible to give any accurate figures of the losses of the Spaniards. Deserters reported that the day after the first attack carts containing over 30 dead passed through the streets of Malate coming from the trenches. The Manila papers of the same day gave the names of 37 wounded and brought to the hospitals. On the 13th we found 5 dead in the trenches; how many were removed is not known. The Manila newspapers gave the names of 43 wounded brought to the hospitals. It is probably safe to say that their losses from August 1 to 13 were at least 40 killed and 100 wounded."

286. General Merritt's report, p. 52.

287. Alger, pp. 340-341.

288. General Otis had arrived on August 21st with the fourth expedition of 1,682 officers and men. See above, footnote 269.

289. General Merritt's report, p. 52.

290. This treaty of peace is given *in extenso* in 30 Statutes at Large, pp. 1754-1762, and in Lodge, pp. 267-276.

291. Report of the Adjutant-General in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, pp. 145, 147 and 260.

292. Statistical Exhibit of the Strength of the Volunteer Forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant-General on December 13, 1899. Also Strait, pp. 208-209.

293. In Cuba, 155,302 regulars and 41,518 volunteers, a total of 196,820; in Porto Rico, 8,233 regulars and 9,107 volunteers; in the Philippines, 14,000. See pages 154, 191 and 200.

294. Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1914, p. 238.

295. Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, p. 10, and June 30, 1914, p. 33.

CHAPTER XVII

1. From April 25 to August 12, 1898.
2. General Miles' report for 1898, p. 37.

3.	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
Killed	23	257	280
Wounded	113	1,464	1,577
Total	136	1,721	1,857

The number of deaths from all causes, between May 1st and September 30th, inclusive, as reported to the Adjutant-General's Office up to October 3rd, were: "Killed, 23 officers and 257 enlisted men; died of wounds, 4 officers and 61 enlisted men; died of disease, 80 officers and 2,485 enlisted men. Total, 107 officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of 1 $\frac{59}{1000}$."—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898*, p. 273.

4. See page 201 and table on page 275.

5. Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan.

6. On June 30, 1898, General Shafter's army "present for duty equipped" numbered 869 officers and 17,349 enlisted men, a total of 18,218, according to the statement issued by the Adjutant-General on April 23, 1900.

7. Out of the 26 regiments and one squadron composing the Fifth Corps, only three regiments were volunteers, *viz*: the 71st New York, the 2nd Massachusetts and the Rough Riders.

General Wheeler declares, p. 84, that "the 71st New York was composed of most magnificent material" but confesses that General Francis Greene told him "that more than three hundred of that regiment had never fired a shot." Allusion has already been made to the withdrawal of the 2nd Massachusetts from the firing-line at El Caney—not through any fault of its own but owing to its having been equipped with an obsolete small-arm and black powder—as well as to the temporary panic which seized the 1st battalion of the 71st New York on the way to the foot of San Juan hill. (See p. 184, footnote 176.) The Rough Riders on July 1st, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt's report of July 4, 1898, "went into the fight about 490 strong."

Without the slightest wish to deprecate from the merits of these volunteer regiments, there is no gainsaying the fact that their contribution to the fighting which culminated in the success of the Santiago campaign was by no means so great as their henchmen would have one believe.

8. General Miles' report, pp. 15-16.

9. See page 176.

10. Sargent, II, p. 49, and III, pp. 179-189.

11. In his Annual Report for 1898, pp. 16-17, General Miles says:

"It will be observed that General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards stationed at Holguin. A portion of this latter force started to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under General Feria. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantamano, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under General Rios, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this

garrison, 3,500 started to reenforce the garrison at Santiago, and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago, and would have been stopped had General Garcia's request of June 27 been granted. With an additional force of 5,000 men General Garcia besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops."

12. Fifteen Major Generals, 46 Brigadier Generals, 58 Assistant Adjutants-General, 16 Inspectors-General, 3 Judge Advocates, 43 quartermasters, 21 commissaries of subsistence, 44 surgeons, one paymaster, 22 engineers, 21 ordnance officers, 12 signal officers, and 86 officers of volunteer regiments.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898*, p. 257.

13. Out of 18,218 officers and men "present for duty equipped June 30th," according to the statement issued by the Adjutant-General on April 23, 1900, General Shafter concentrated 15,065 at El Caney and San Juan on July first.—Sargent, II, p. 134, and III, p. 217.

14. General Miles relates, p. 276, that, upon his arrival at Tampa on June first, he found "that General Shafter was seriously affected by the intense heat."

On July 3rd Shafter telegraphed the Secretary of War, "I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command." On the following day he wired the Adjutant-General: "I am still very much exhausted. Eating a little this p. m. for the first time in four days." On July 6th he announced: "I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for last two months. I am also suffering from an attack of gout which prevents me from moving about."—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, pp. 102, 104 and 107.

15. See page 153.

16. Effected by the Act of August 24, 1912. See pages 400-401.

17. "THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS

"If the military emergency following the outbreak of the war with Spain was a severe test of the troops of the line, it was even more so of the staff.

"Most staff corps and departments were at the outset badly weakened by drains on their personnel for service with volunteer troops, and again, in expanding to war strength, the extra officers were quite generally supplied from volunteers of little or no experience. The crying need of the hour was *more trained officers*.

"The Ordnance Department was confronted with the gigantic task of arming and equipping an army of over 250,000 men, and with making good the deficiency in seacoast ordnance and ammunition. Reserve supplies were at a minimum. As is well known, there were only enough small calibre rifles to equip the Regular Army, and in many cases the States' arms and equipments were in such lamentably poor condition, that they must needs be replaced. This latter drawback was so much in evidence that the Chief of Ordnance of that period has stated that the volunteer forces would probably have been ready for service quite as quickly, had they been newly equipped by the national

government, rather than have relied on the defective arms and equipments of their respective States. There was no smokeless powder for the Springfield rifles, and of powder and projectiles for the fortifications, only one-fifth of the required supply was on hand.

"Such unpreparedness for the ever possible contingency of war required most strenuous effort by this department, and it may be said that it rose to the occasion with most commendable results.*"

"The Engineer Corps, with a large percentage of its officers in charge of civil improvements, hurried the completion of many seacoast works, and began the installation of a system of submarine mines.† Its commissioned strength was increased from 109 to 127 officers.

"The Signal Corps was suddenly increased from a peace strength of ten officers and fifty enlisted men, to an aggregate of 1300 officers and men, and in spite of the handicap of such an unforeseen increase, performed creditable service in the Santiago, Porto Rico and Philippine campaigns, as well as in the maintenance of submarine cables. Its personnel was shown to have been far too small on a peace footing, but it had the advantage, as it will ever have, of being able to draw largely for its recruitment on civilian telegraphers, electricians and mechanics. Of all the staff corps its increase was perhaps most easily acquired at the outbreak of hostilities.

"The Quartermaster's Department had possibly the most herculean task before it. Without reserve supplies, it was called upon to furnish, within three and one-half months, clothing, equipage and field transportation for practically 275,000 men; to transport thousands upon thousands of soldiers to the concentration camps, and afterward to their homes; and to organize and maintain on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard a transport service which ultimately extended to the West Indies, China and the Philippines.

"From April 1, 1898, until the breaking up of Camp Wykoff, no less than 17,863 officers and 435,569 men had been transported by rail, and up to September 15th of the same year, 92,836 had been transported by ships. Up to August 31st, 5130 field ovens, 36,800 horses and mules, and 5179 wagons had been purchased by the department. These figures will serve to show the immense responsibilities the officers of this staff department had to face.

"At the beginning of hostilities its commissioned personnel was limited by law to but fifty-seven officers, and its necessary expansion had to be made either by the detail of much needed officers of the line, or by the appointment of inexperienced quartermasters from civil life. Both methods were resorted to.

"That the nation which postpones preparations for war until the actual declaration of war rarely economizes, is to be inferred from the vast appropriations for this department. During the year 1898 this mounted up to \$130,461,367.75, a large part of which could doubtless

* By August 31, 1898, the Ordnance Department had increased its daily output of magazine rifles to 370, and of small arms ammunition to 180,000 rounds. It had procured 250,000 sets of infantry, and 26,000 sets of cavalry equipments; had purchased and had under contract, or under manufacture, 336 rapid-fire guns; and had procured a total of 486 seacoast guns or mortars.

† Duties since transferred to the Artillery Corps.

have been saved to the government by previous wise legislation, having in view a prudent accumulation of reserve supplies at peace prices, and, as will be discussed later, the organization of an army service corps to handle the stores which this immense sum represents.

"The Subsistence Department had, at the beginning of the war, but twenty-two officers, and by the act of April 22 and July 7, 1898, about 120 additional officers were added to the establishment. Its work in the large camps of concentration, and in the succeeding campaigns was highly satisfactory, and demonstrated its efficiency. Most complaints of insufficient food could be traced to ignorance of the handling of the government ration, and criticisms of the quality of the latter were either founded on misinformation or were due to the deterioration inseparable from every period of field-service.

"No army of its size was ever more judiciously and abundantly provided with food. Special foods were selected for troops in the tropics, and an extra sum provided for the purchase of delicacies for the sick in hospitals.

"The need of an army service was also felt in this department, and it is safe to say that the government would have been saved many thousands of dollars through the more efficient handling of perishable stores.

"The Medical Department had but 192 officers to begin the war, and this totally inadequate number was supplemented by the make-shift policy of appointing over 650 contract surgeons, and by adding 118 volunteer surgeons — forty-one of whom were officers of the regular establishment. The President also appointed three surgeons for each of the regiments of United States Volunteers.

"The enlisted personnel was so insufficient that approximately 6000 men were enlisted or transferred to the corps during the war with Spain. This force was augmented by the employment of over 1700 female nurses.

"The mobilization of volunteer troops found most of the regiments with defective medical equipment or without it altogether, necessitating the immediate purchase of six months' medical supplies for 100,000 men.

"Except during the Santiago campaign and the Philippine insurrection, the duties of the medical corps were confined principally to camp sanitation and camp diseases. The large percentage of sickness during the Spanish War and Philippine insurrection must not be taken as an indication of inefficiency by the medical corps, except perhaps, in exceptional cases where laxity in sanitary inspections or failure to anticipate requisitions for supplies by inexperienced surgeons, gave legitimate cause for criticism.

"The war demonstrated the absurdly inadequate strength of the medical corps on a peace footing, and the need of a highly organized field-hospital and ambulance corps for field-service. In no staff department, perhaps, does a state of war cause such a revolution in organization as in the Medical Department, and on no other does the weight of censure fall so heavily for mistakes of omission and commission.

"The Inspector-General's Department, which, of all others, must needs be kept filled with its complete quota of highly trained and experienced officers, was most depleted by details to the line. Its strength, already insufficient for holding a large army of volunteers up to normal sanitary and tactical standard was supplemented by the appointment of

twenty-five officers with volunteer commissions, some of whom had had absolutely no experience with troops prior to the war, and who, moreover, had no especially natural gift for such service.

"The Adjutant-General's Department at the outbreak of war was the only staff department resembling in any particular the General Staff Corps of highly organized armies. For nine years preceding 1898, a division of military information had been maintained as an adjunct of this department, but, through no fault of its officers, had been so dwarfed and subordinated to the routine work of the department, that the outbreak of war with Spain found it without accurate maps of the enemy's territory, and with but meagre information of his defenses and military resources.*

"In addition to handling the immense correspondence incident to the organization, mobilization, muster-in, and concentration of a vast volunteer army, the adjutant-general's office at Washington was called upon to assist in the preparation of plans of campaign, and subsequently to prepare the necessary orders for carrying these plans into effect. Again, the large amount of sickness in the volunteer camps entailed in itself a vast correspondence, while the personal importunities of politicians, friends and relatives of officers or men, strained the system to the breaking point. Finally, came the muster-out of the volunteer forces, and the reduction of the army to a peace footing.

"Too little credit has ever been given this department for its work during the Spanish War — and even later, during the Philippine insurrection and China Relief Expedition. The fact has frequently been lost sight of that the mistakes of omission and commission were rather due to the system in vogue than to any neglect or inefficiency of the department itself. Practically half a dozen officers performed duties which in most foreign armies would have been developed and executed by half a hundred trained officers of the General Staff.

"Looking back on the successes and failures of the various staff departments of the army, an impartial mind must conclude that the clogging of the wheels of administration was principally due to the accumulations of rust during many years of peace. Generally speaking, the methods of requisition, supply and accountability were excellent ones for a small army engaged in nothing more serious than an Indian campaign or a labor riot; but for the needs of a quarter to half a million men, with dependence on untried and inexperienced staff officers, it was inadequate."—Gold Medal-Prize Essay, entitled "*The experiences of our Army since the outbreak of the War with Spain: What practical use has been made of them and how may they be further utilized to improve its fighting efficiency,*" by Captain Charles D. Rhodes, General Staff. *Journal of the Military Service Institution for March-April, 1905*, pp. 196-200.

18. See pages 15, 41, 165, 205 and 271.

19. Ex-Secretary Alger relates, pp. 30 and 33, that "Great and constant was the pressure for appointments. Applicants, by mail and in person, would beg, appeal, and demand commissions. Before breakfast, and even after midnight, they besieged the Secretary's residence with a

* Due credit should be given Lieuts. Andrew S. Rowan and Henry H. Whitney, who went to Cuba and Porto Rico, respectively, to obtain military information.

determination superb in its inflexibility. . . . The officers of the volunteer army appointed by the President numbered, all told, 1,032. Of these 441 were taken from the regular army. . . .

"For a little over a thousand appointments made by the President, as above stated, the number of applicants exceeded 25,000."

20. See pages 161-162.

21. Alger, p. 33.

22. Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, tome XX, p. 234.

23. Alger, p. 33.

24. Rhodes, p. 200.

25. Gold Medal Prize Essay, *Journal of the Military Service Institution for March-April, 1905*, pp. 210-211. The italics are his.

26. Section 4 of the Act of April 22, 1898. Pages 160-161.

27. Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, p. 7.

28. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 5.

29. Page 197.

30. Report of Major General E. S. Otis, U. S. V., dated August 31, 1899, pp. 4-12, 54-55; Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 7; W. B. Wilcox, *Through Luzon on Highways and By-ways*, preface; Blount, pp. 107-108.

31. Major J. Franklin Bell's report to General Merritt, August 29, 1898 (Senate Document No. 62, 1898, p. 379); Blount, pp. 71, 140-142.

32. General Otis' report for 1899, pp. 15-21 and 93; General Anderson's article in the *North American Review*, February, 1900; Blount, p. 79.

33. According to the Report of the Adjutant-General for 1899, p. 27, detachments numbering 232 officers and 6,339 men reached Manila between November 21 and December 6, 1898. The next troops did not arrive until February 23, 1899.

34. The returns for January 31, 1899, gave the strength of the army in the Philippines at 819 officers and 20,032 enlisted men. "The effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these, 3,000 belonged to the provost guard."—Otis' report, pp. 92-93.

35. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 5; Blount, p. 141.

36. Aguinaldo's General Order to his army on February 4, 1899, and his proclamation "to the Philippine People" next day are given in General Otis' report on pp. 95-96.

37. See above, pages 160-161.

38. The 2nd Oregon on June 14, 1899, although by special dispensation the Astor battery and part of the 1st Nebraska were sent home on December 13 and 16, 1898.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1898*, p. 29, and *General Otis' report for 1899*, pp. 43-44 and 83.

39. On October 11, 1899, five companies of the 34th Volunteer Infantry reached Manila. Other detachments and regiments followed.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1899*, p. 28.

40. Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900, p. 8.

41. General Otis, in alluding to the events during December, 1898, says in his report, p. 43, that "The volunteers, however, had grown weary of their service and many applied for their discharge on the plea that the Spanish war had terminated. They were firmly impressed with the belief that the future occupation of the United States Army in the islands would be confined to garrison duty, a belief that was

shared by the older European residents and the abler natives of Manila, and they considered that such duty should be performed by regulars."

42. Compare Johnson, *The Military Policy of the United States*, pp. 11-12.

43. See footnote 54, page 641.

44. Johnson, *The Military Policy of the United States*, pp. 11-13.

45. Miles, p. 274.

46. Compare Rhodes, pp. 200-201.

47. Page 655, footnote 179.

48. See page 667, footnote 11.

49. Miles' report, p. 17; Lieut. Miley's *Notes on Conference between General Shafter and General Garcia*, June 20, 1898, quoted by Alger, pp. 90-91.

50. *Notes on Spanish Affairs*, August 30, 1898. *Correspondence de Napoléon*, No. 14,283, tome XVII, p. 480.

51. See pages 188-189.

52. Shafter to the Adjutant-General, July 7 and 17, 1898; Miles to the Secretary of War, July 13th.—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, pp. 110, 124 and 118.

53.

	<i>Volunteer Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men of Volunteers</i>
Killed in action	18	190
Died of wounds	3	78
	—	—
Total	21	268
Died of disease	119	3,729

Statistical Exhibit of the Strength of the Volunteer Forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant-General on December 13, 1899. Also Strait, pp. 208-209.

54. Annual Report of the Major-General commanding the Army, 1898, pp. 7-8.

55. Report. Senate Document No. 221, 56th Congress, first session, vol. I, p. 119.

56. See page 166.

57. Report of the Commission to investigate the conduct of the War Department during the War with Spain, I, p. 132.

58. Revised Statutes, Sections 3679, 3732 and 3709.

59. Report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, I, p. 126.

60. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 148-149.

61. *Ibid.*, I, p. 173.

62. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 188-189.

63. *Ibid.*, I, p. 189.

64. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 209, 204, 211 and 210.

65. *Ibid.*, I, p. 113.

66. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 128-131, 147, 197-200, 275-277, 281-282, 297-311.

67. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 198-199.

68. *Ibid.*, I, p. 207.

69. Compare Harry E. Webber, *Twelve Months with the Eighth Mas-*

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sachusetts Infantry in the service of the United States, pp. 17-19, 21-26, 79-93.

70. Report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, I, p. 178.

71. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 221-222.

72. Richard Harding Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, p. 241.

73. General James Harrison Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, II, p. 429.

74. Bonsal, *The Fight for Santiago*, p. 63.

75. Report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, I, p. 114.

76. Huidekoper, *Is the United States Prepared for War?* p. 30.

77. Testimony of General Joseph P. Sanger, November 2, 1898. Report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, IV, p. 1115.

CHAPTER XVIII

1. Report of the War Department for 1899, Part IV, pp. 355-356; Senate Document No. 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session (1900), pp. 82-83; Blount, pp. 147-150.

2. Blount, p. 147.

3. General Otis' report for 1899, pp. 68-92; Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, I, p. 267.

4. This first battle of the Philippine War began on February 4, 1899, about 8.30 P. M. and lasted until about 5 P. M. next day. The American loss in killed and wounded was some 250; that of the insurgents was estimated at 3,000, in addition to a lot of prisoners and two Krupp guns.—*General Otis' report*, pp. 99-100.

5. This order is quoted in General Otis' report for 1899, p. 109.

6. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

8. Blount, pp. 187-188.

9. The Act of January 12, 1899, provided "That in lieu of granting leaves of absence and furloughs to officers and enlisted men belonging to companies and regiments of the United States Volunteers prior to muster out of the service, all officers and enlisted men belonging to volunteer organizations hereafter mustered out of the service who have served honestly and faithfully beyond the limits of the United States shall be paid two months' extra pay on muster out and discharge from the service, and all officers and enlisted men belonging to organizations hereafter mustered out of the service who have served honestly and faithfully within the limits of the United States shall be paid one month's extra pay on muster out and discharge from the service, from any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated. . . ."—*30 United States Statutes at Large*, p. 784.

The Act of February 25, 1899, stipulated "That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized to permit volunteer regiments, on being mustered out of service of the United States, to retain all of their regimental colors. . . ."—*30 Stat.*, p. 890.

10. *30 Stat.*, pp. 977-981.

11 Section one provided that "the Army of the United States shall consist of three major generals, six brigadier generals, ten regiments of cavalry, seven regiments of artillery, twenty-five regiments of infantry, an Adjutant-General's Department," etc., etc. It also stipulated that the offices of store-keeper in the Quartermaster's and Ordnance departments were to cease with the present incumbents.

Section two prescribed the organization of the cavalry; Section 3 that of the artillery; and Section 4 that of the infantry, as well as providing "That the limits of age for original enlistments in the Army shall be eighteen and thirty-five years."

Section 5 directed "that all vacancies above the grade of second lieutenant in the line of the Army shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in the several arms, subject to the examinations now prescribed by law," but that "no person shall be appointed from civil life before he shall have reached the age of twenty-one years nor after he shall have reached the age of twenty-seven years, nor until he shall have passed a satisfactory examination as to his moral, physical, and educational qualifications."

Section 6 retained the existing organization of the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments, but entitled captains "who have evinced marked aptitude in the command of troops" to compete for vacancies in the grade of major in those departments, subject to examination.

Section 7 made no change in the other staff departments, but incorporated the battalion of engineers into the line, permitted retired Army officers to "be employed on active duty, other than in the command of troops," required examinations of all persons appointed from civil life to the positions of judge-advocate, paymaster or chaplain, and restricted their age to forty-four years, but exempted from such examination all officers who had served in the Spanish War in such capacity and who had demonstrated their qualifications therefor.

Section 8 gave the Chief of the Record and Pension Office of the War Department the rank, pay and allowances of a Brigadier General, and Section 9 prescribed "that the cooks authorized by this Act shall have the pay and allowances of sergeants of infantry."

12. Section 11 repealed those parts of the Acts of July 7, 1898, which authorized "the assignment of certain officers of the Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments with increased rank, and the continuance in service of certain volunteer officers of those departments for a period of one year after the close of the present war."

13. This section gave further extension to that part of the Act of June 13, 1890, which provided "That no alcoholic liquors, beer or wine shall be sold or supplied to the enlisted men in any canteen or post-trader's store or in any room or building at any garrison or military post in any State or Territory in which the sale of alcoholic liquors, beer, or wine is prohibited by law."

14. See above, footnote 9.

15. *30 Stat.*, pp. 1073-1074.

16. See page 156.

17. *30 Stat.*, pp. 1350-1351.

18. See pages 164-165.

19. See *ibid.*
20. *30 Stat.*, pp. 1356-1358.
21. See page 222.
22. The Act of December 20, 1899 (*31 Stat.*, p. 1), merely extended for one year thereafter the time for examining the monthly accounts of the War Department prescribed by Section 12 of the Act of July 31, 1894.
23. Heitman, II, 620-621.
24. *Journal of the Military Service Institution* for March-April, 1905, p. 192.
25. See page 208. This force was the 2nd Oregon under Colonel Owen Summers.
26. The 1st Tennessee under Colonel Gracey Childers.
27. Including the 34th Volunteer Infantry.
28. Report of the Adjutant-General in the *Report of the War Department for 1899*, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 27-29.
29. Heitman, II, p. 294.
30. General Otis' report, pp. 96-103.
31. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, pp. 6-7.
32. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 7.
33. General Otis' report for 1899, p. 111.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.
35. At this time the available fighting force in the island of Luzon, with the exception of the troops at Cavite, numbered "about 16,500 men."—*Ibid.*, p. 114.
36. Report of General Otis for 1899, pp. 114-116.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 122-134. On February 26th orders were issued to the 23rd Infantry to proceed to Cebu; on March 2nd General Smith and the 3rd battalion of the 1st California started for Bacolod, island of Negros, and was re-enforced on the 22nd by another battalion of the same regiment; and on May 19th Jolo was occupied by 755 officers and men of the 23rd Infantry.
- On April 16th, Lieut.-Colonel Harmer, commanding at Cebu, requested re-enforcements but, as General Otis declared (p. 129), "there were no troops available, for Luzon demanded every armed man. We permitted Cebu to drift and foment opposition, careful to hold securely its principal city, an important trading point and one of the open ports of the Philippines. The insurgent leaders organized their forces as best they could, without much interruption on our part. . . ."
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-121.
40. On May 22nd and June 5th, 1899.—*Ibid.*, p. 121.
41. The insurgents had concentrated about 6,000 troops to the south and 2,500 under Pilar to the east of Manila.—*Ibid.*, pp. 134 and 136.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138; General Lawton's report of October 9, 1899, in the report of the Lieutenant General commanding, 1900, Part 3, pp. 274-283.
43. General Otis' report for 1899, pp. 139-142; General Lawton's report, p. 284.
44. On August 12, 1899, a force of 530 troops under the command

of Brigadier General S. B. M. Young occupied San Mateo after a spirited engagement in which four Americans were killed and fourteen wounded. — *Report of General Young*, August 14, 1899, in the report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901, Part 3, pp. 220-223; Strait, p. 179.

On August 16th, the Americans also captured Angeles, which is about ten miles north of San Fernando.

45. For 1899, pp. 141-142.

46. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, pp. 8-9.

47. On October 1st the insurgents had planned to attack the arsenal at Manila with 700 men, to burn it and to destroy such other property and American lives as they could, but their plot was frustrated by the vigilance of the provost guard, police and troops.— *Otis' report for 1899-1900*, p. 16.

48. "Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands. September 1, 1899, to August 31, 1900." Part 3 of the report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, 1900, pp. 7-11.

49. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 9; Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 21-42, 66-70; Report of Major J. M. Lee for the operations of General Lawton's command, dated April 5, 1900, in the Report of the Lieutenant-General commanding the army, 1900, Part 4, pp. 8-13; Report of Brigadier General S. B. M. Young, January 6, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 262-279.

On November 17, 1899, General Young telegraphed from Pozorrubio to General Otis that "Aguinaldo is now a fugitive and an outlaw, seeking security in escape to the mountains or by sea." As a matter of fact, "Aguinaldo was seventy-two hours in the lead" of Young's troops.

50. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 10; General Otis' report for 1899-1900, p. 64; Report of Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton, dated November 30, 1899, in the Report of the Lieutenant-General for 1900, Part 4, pp. 528-530.

General Wheaton says (p. 530) that the enemy's loss in killed was 134, and his own casualties were "Officers killed 1, wounded 1; men killed 6, wounded 14.

"The officer killed was Maj. John A. Logan, Thirty-third Infantry, U. S. V. . . . The conduct of Major Logan was most gallant and greatly worthy of his name."

51. On November 16, 1899, the 1st battalion of the 33rd Volunteer Infantry under Major M. D. Cronin captured in the vicinity of San Fabian, Luzon, Buencamino, one of the principal leaders in the insurrection, an adjutant, Aguinaldo's mother, son and one of his secretaries, \$1,998 in gold and \$1,191.10 in silver.— *Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands*, p. 14.

52. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 10; report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 43-65; report of General Wheaton in the report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 4, p. 531; Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands, *ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 12-14.

53. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, pp. 9 and 11.

54. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 10; Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 68-74, 115-116; Report of General Young, January 6, 1900, pp. 279-281 and 346.

55. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 10.

56. General Young to General Lawton, telegram dated Aringay, November 19, 1899, 10.30 P. M., quoted in *Otis' report* for 1899-1900, p. 73.

57. Major Peyton C. March's report, dated December 8, 1899, in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 330-332.

58. Reports of General Young, December 6, 1899, and Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, December 7th, and congratulatory telegram to Parker, dated December 8th, in Report of the Lieutenant General commanding, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 229-230, 239 and 240.

Lieut.-Colonel Parker's force consisted of 84 men and 153 sick — the enemy's of 800. The fighting, which began at 3.45 A. M., lasted for four hours, the American loss being 8 killed and 3 wounded. The insurgents lost 40 men and 86 guns. Richly merited was the Medal of Honor conferred on Lieut.-Colonel Parker for his gallantry.

59. The majority of these movements are chronicled in the "Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands. September 1, 1899, to August 31, 1900," in the Report of the Lieutenant General for 1900, Part 3, pp. 16-18.

60. General Otis' report for 1899-1900, pp. 120-128, 138-139; General Young's report, January 6, 1900, pp. 281-288; Reports of Colonel L. R. Hare and Lieut.-Colonel Robert L. Howze in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 322-325, 326-328 and 341; Blount, pp. 237, 246-249.

61. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 8; General Otis' report of May 14, 1900, pp. 17-19; General Schwan's report, November 1, 1899, in Report of the Lieutenant General commanding, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 465-479.

62. His death was made known by General Orders No. 209, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, dated December 21, 1899, which was published in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 7-8.

63. General Otis' report for 1899-1900, pp. 170-172.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 14. The sick amounted to 8.7 per cent. of the total forces.

65. 31 United States Statutes at Large, p. 32.

66. See page 225.

67. 31 Stat., p. 59.

68. 31 Stat., p. 183.

69. 31 Stat., p. 205.

70. See page 674, footnote 9.

71. 31 Stat., p. 217.

72. 31 Stat., pp. 280 and 588.

73. 31 Stat., p. 645.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 655-656.

75. 31 Stat., p. 671.

76. 31 Stat., p. 708.

77. 31 Stat., p. 710.

78. 31 Stat., p. 719.

79.
SPECIAL ORDER }
No. 42. }

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, February 19, 1900.

"31. By direction of the Secretary of War, a board of officers to consist of Brig. Gen. William Ludlow, United States Army; Col. Henry C. Hasbrouck, Seventh United States Artillery; Lieut. Col. William H. Carter, Assistant Adjutant General, United States Army, is appointed to meet at the War Department, in this city, on Monday, February 26, 1900, at 10 o'clock a. m., for the purpose of considering regulations with a view to the establishment of a War College for the Army. The travel enjoined is necessary for the public service.

"By command of Major General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

"Lieut. Col. Jos. P. Sanger, Inspector General, was subsequently detailed as a member of the board."—*General Staff Corps. Laws, Regulations, Orders and Memoranda relating to the organization and duties of the General Staff Corps*, issued by the Chief of Staff on January 1, 1912, p. 3.

80. 31 Statutes at Large, p. 209.

81. Blount, pp. 250-251.

82. Reports of Colonel Hare, June 6, 1900, Major March, and Captain Rucker, in Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 706-707, 710, 718-720.

83. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 8-9; Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 173-199; Report of General Bates, March 19, 1900, in Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 640-659; Report of General Wheaton, January 31, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 625-628.

84. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 9; Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 199-204.

85. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 9-10; Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 204-206; Report of General Bates, March 1, 1899, in Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 660-665.

86. By General Orders Nos. 22 and 36, dated Manila, March 20, 1900, and quoted in General Otis' report for 1899-1900, pp. 206-207.

87. Report of General Bates, dated April 2, 1900, in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 4, pp. 691-697.

88. Report of General Otis for 1899-1900, pp. 224-225.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-224.

90. The details of these operations will be found in the *Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands. September 1, 1899, to August 31, 1900*, which is contained in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 3, pp. 27-43; and in a *similar summary covering the period from September 1, 1900, to June 30, 1901*, in the Report of the Lieutenant General for 1901, Part 2, pp. 5-41.

91. General Otis' report for 1899-1900, pp. 246-248.

92. Report of General MacArthur, dated October 1, 1900, in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 3, p. 59.

93. Report of Assistant Adjutant-General Barber, June 30, 1900, in *ibid.*, Part 3, p. 82.

94. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 4.

95. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 11.

96. "The force which left on the morning of the 10th was composed of 30 British, 112 Americans, 40 Italians, and 25 Austrians. The train proceeded to Yang Ts'un where it had to stop for repairs. There it remained for the night, and there two more trains joined the expedition, making a total number of 112 Americans, 25 Austrians, 915 British, 100 French, 40 Italians, 54 Japanese, and 112 Russians. This was increased the next day by the addition of 200 Russians and 58 French, to a total of 2,066 men."—Arthur H. Smith, *China in Convulsion*, II, p. 439.

97. In this engagement over 100 Europeans were killed or wounded, while the Chinese are estimated to have lost 700 men.

98. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 11 and 14.

99. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, II, 517-521.

100. Smith, II, pp. 439-443.

101. Report of General Chaffee, commanding China Relief Expedition, dated September 1, 1900, in Appendix A of the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 61; Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900, p. 12.

102. "By all or portions of the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Fifteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry; First, Third, and Ninth Cavalry; Third and Seventh Artillery, withdrawn from various stations in the United States, together with portions of the Engineer Battalion, Signal Corps, Medical and Hospital Corps, and officers and men of the staff and supply departments."—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1900*, p. 12.

103. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 11-12.

The following schedule of the departure of American troops from the United States or the Philippines and their arrival in China is taken from the *Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900*, pp. 12-13:

"July 3.—Headquarters and eight troops of the Sixth Cavalry sailed from San Francisco on the *Grant* for China.

"July 6.—Ninth Infantry landed at Taku.

"July 15.—Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and two battalions Fourteenth Infantry sailed from Manila for China.

"July 17.—Headquarters and four companies, Fifteenth Infantry, sailed from San Francisco on the *Sumner* for China.

"July 27.—Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, on the *Flintshire*, arrived at Taku.

"July 28.—General Chaffee, with headquarters and eight troops Sixth Cavalry, arrived at Taku.

"July 29.—Four batteries Third Artillery sailed from San Francisco on the *Hancock* for China.

"August 16.—Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry, U. S. Volunteers, and four companies Fifteenth Infantry arrived at Taku.

"August 21.—Four batteries, Third Artillery, on the *Hancock*, arrived at Taku."

104. Annual report, dated November 30, 1900, pp. 12-13.

105. General Chaffee's report, p. 61. The orders regulating his conduct of the American forces, issued on June 30th and July 19th, are set forth in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 14-16.

The orders of July 19th informed him that the President had that day appointed him Major General of volunteers.

106. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 16; Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900, p. 12.

General Dorward, in writing on July 15, 1900, to the ranking officer of the American forces, said:

"I desire to express the high appreciation of the British troops of the honor done them in serving alongside their comrades of the American Army during the long and hard fighting of the 13th instant and the subsequent capture of Tientsin city, and of my own appreciation of the high honor accorded to me by having them under my command."

"The American troops formed part of the front line of the British attacks and so had more than their share of the fighting that took place. The ready and willing spirit of the officers and men will always make their command easy and pleasant, and when one adds to that the steady gallantry and power of holding on to exposed positions which they displayed on the 13th instant, the result is soldiers of the highest class."—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1900*, pp. 16-17.

107. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 18-19.

108. Lieutenant General Linievitch and his Chief of Staff, Major General Vasilewski, of the Russian forces; Lieutenant General Yamaguchi and the Chief of Staff, Major General Fukushima, of the Japanese; Lieutenant General Gaselee and the Chief of Staff, Major General Barrow, of the British; General Frey of the French; Major-General Chaffee, accompanied by Major Jesse M. Lee of the 9th Infantry and Lieut. Louis M. Little of the Marines, representing the Americans; and a German naval officer.

General Chaffee "arrived at Tientsin at 11.40 o'clock a. m., July 30, 1900. At Tientsin at this time were the Ninth Infantry (Lieut. Col. Charles A. Coolidge commanding), which had a sick list of something like 200 men, and the physical condition of the regiment generally bad, and six companies of the Fourteenth Infantry (Col. A. S. Daggett commanding). The latter regiment was in good condition, with a small sick list."—*General Chaffee's report*, p. 62.

109. General Chaffee to the Adjutant-General, cable dated Tientsin, August 3, 1900, quoted in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 19.

In his report, p. 62, Chaffee erroneously gives the date of this conference as August 1, 1900.

110. Smith, II, p. 453.

111. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 19; General Chaffee's report, p. 63.

	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
112.			
General Officer and Staff	17	..	17
Troop M, 6th Cavalry	2	66	68
Detachment from Troop L, 6th Cavalry	8	8

		<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>
Battery F, 5th Field Artillery.....	4	154	158
9th Infantry (12 companies)	21	694	715
14th Infantry (8 companies).....	22	918	940
Staff departments	30	114	144
	—	—	—
Total	96	1,954	2,050

Records of the Adjutant-General's Office, transmitted to the author of this book on April 21, 1915.

113. Report of Major W. P. Biddle, commanding the marines, dated August 20, 1900, in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 7, pp. 80-81.

114. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, p. 19.

115. Who were variously estimated, from Chinese reports, to number from 10,000 to 12,000.—General Chaffee's report, p. 63.

116. General Chaffee's report, pp. 63-66; Reports of Colonel Daggett, Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge and other American officers in the Report of the Lieutenant General for 1900, Part 7, pp. 43-59.

117. General Chaffee's report, p. 66.

118. General Chaffee's report, p. 66.

119. General Chaffee says, p. 66, that "The time of starting of the Japanese forces, 4 o'clock in the morning, followed by the Russians, threw the hour of marching of the American troops back to about 7 a. m., and the march being slow and the heat very great many of our troops were prostrated and left by the roadside to usually regain camp during the night. During the five days' marching from Pei-tsang to Tong-Chow our forces were woefully distressed physically."

120. Arthur H. Smith, *China in Convulsion*, II, pp. 457-458.

121. General Chaffee's report, p. 66, which relates that "that day being cloudy and cool enabled the troops to march without much distress the early part of the forenoon."

122. "The Japanese when taking possession of Tong-Chow in the morning [of the 12th] advanced troops toward Peking for a distance of 6½ miles. It was finally agreed that the next day, the 13th, should be devoted to reconnaissance; the Japanese should reconnoiter on the two roads to the right or north of the paved road which is just north of the canal; the Russians on the paved road, if at all; the Americans to reconnoiter on the road just south of the canal; the British a parallel road 1½ miles to the left of the road occupied by the Americans. On the 14th the armies should be concentrated on the advance line held by the Japanese, and that that evening a conference should be held to determine what the method of attack on Peking should be."—*General Chaffee's report*, p. 67.

123. Near a point where the wall enclosing the Chinese city joins the wall guarding the Tartar city.

124. General Chaffee's report, p. 67.

125. General Chaffee states, p. 68, that "About noon it was reported to me that the Russians had battered open "Tung-pien-men gate" during the night and had effected an entrance there. I arrived at the gate shortly afterwards and found in the gate some of the Fourteenth Infantry, followed by Reilly's battery. The Russian artillery and troops were in great confusion in the passage, their artillery facing in both

directions, and I could see no effort being made to extricate themselves and give passage into the city."

126. General Chaffee's report, p. 68.

127. *Ibid.*

128. Situated in the southern wall of the Tartar city midway between the Ha Ta Men and Ch'ien Men gates.

129. A census taken during the siege showed 473 foreigners in Peking, of whom 414 were in the compound of the British Legation.—*Smith*, I, p. 298.

Of those who volunteered for the defense, 12 were killed and 23 wounded, while the various Legation guards suffered a loss of 4 officers and 49 men killed, and 9 officers and 136 men wounded. Two men also died from disease.—Table No. 69 in the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900*, Part 7, p. 86.

130. Accounts of the operations of the United States troops on August 14, 1900—the day on which the Legations were relieved—are given in the Report of General Chaffee, pp. 67-68, and in those of other American officers on pages 59 to 79 of Part 7 of the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900*.

The reports of Major W. P. Biddle and other Marine officers will be found in *ibid.*, pp. 79-86.

131. Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900, pp. 12-13.

The American losses on August 14th were one officer and 11 men wounded.

132. General Chaffee's report of September 1, 1900, pp. 68-69.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

The American losses that day were one officer and five men killed, and 19 men wounded.—*Ibid.*

134. General Chaffee's report, pp. 69-70.

135. "At Pei-tsang about 400 men, of which the American forces supplied one company (G) from the Ninth Infantry; at Yang-tsun 800 men, all the French force; at Ho-shi-wu 100 Japanese, 50 English, 50 Americans. Company C, Ninth Infantry, was left at this point, the station being commanded by an English officer. At Matow the strength of the post was fixed at 100 men—50 Americans and 50 English—to be commanded by an American officer. I had 150 men in the command who were reported as being physically unable to continue the march to Peking. These men were left, and Capt. Alfred Hasbrouck, Fourteenth Infantry, detailed to the command of the post. At Tong-Chow one battalion Japanese (800), half battalion Russian (400), 50 English, and 50 American troops were left. For this service I detailed 50 marines. I also detailed 50 marines as guard for depot at the river in conjunction with 100 English troops detailed for like service."—*General Chaffee's report*, p. 70.

136. "Aug. 28, 1900.—The allied forces, including as a representation of the United States, a detachment of 350 men, made up of the representatives of each United States organization present, formally enter the palace grounds (Forbidden City) at Peking."—*Summary of leading events connected with military operations in China in which the United States took part*.—Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, for 1900, Part 7, p. 16.

137. On August 19th an action took place near Tientsin in which the

6th Cavalry had six men wounded.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900*, p. 13.

138. Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, pp. 21-22.

139. On August 10th Field Marshal Count Walderssee was selected as the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, but he did not reach Shanghai until September 21st.

140. The most important of these took place on September 17th and 18th under the command of Brigadier General James H. Wilson who had reached Peking on the 6th of that month. See his *report of September 20, 1900*, in the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1900*, Part 7, pp. 120-123. Also *Under the Old Flag*, II, pp. 521-531.

141. 30 United States Statutes at Large, p. 748.

142. Section one.

143. Heitman, II, pp. 622-623.

144. Section two prescribed the organization of the Cavalry; Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 that of the Artillery. Section 10 fixed the composition of each regiment of infantry; Section 11 the organization of the enlisted *personnel* of the Corps of Engineers. Section 12 stipulated that the President could appoint one chaplain for each regiment of cavalry and infantry and twelve for the corps of artillery. Section 13 fixed the organization of the Adjutant-General's department; Section 14 that of the Inspector-General's department; Section 15 that of the Judge Advocate's department; Section 16 dealt with the Quartermaster's department; Section 17 with the Subsistence department; Section 18 with the Medical department; Section 19 organized the Nurse Corps (female); Section 20 abolished the grade of veterinarian of the second class and substituted two veterinarians in each cavalry and one in each artillery regiment; Section 22 prescribed the number and rank of the officers in the Engineer Corps; Section 23 the same in the Ordnance department; Section 24 those in the Signal Corps, and Section 25 the composition of the Record and Pension Office of the War Department.

145. By Section 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 32.

146. Section 28.

147. Section 29.

148. Section 30.

149. Section 31.

150. Section 33.

151. Section 34.

152. Section 41.

153. Section 36.

154. Section 37.

155. Section 40.

156. Section 38.

Section 39 provided "That nothing in this Act shall be held or construed so as to discharge any officer from the Regular Army or to deprive him of the commission which he now holds therein."

157. Acts of March first, second and third. *31 Statutes at Large*, pp. 873, 895, 910, 1010 and 1133.

158. *31 Stat.*, p. 810.

159. 31 Stat., p. 950.

The Act of March 1, 1901 (31 Stat., p. 847) permitted certain deduction in service from the time required to perfect title to homestead lands in case the entryman had served in the Army, Navy or Marine Corps during the Spanish-American War or in the Philippine insurrection.

160. Section one.

161. Section 5 amending Article 60, Section 1342 of the Revised Statutes.

162. Section 3 amending Section 183 of the Revised Statutes.

163. Section 4 amending Article 83, Section 1342 of the Revised Statutes.

164. Effected by Section three.

165. Article 94 of Section 1342 of the Revised Statutes provided that "Proceedings of trials shall be carried on only between the hours of eight in the morning and three in the afternoon, excepting in cases which, in the opinion of the officer appointing the court, require immediate example."

166. General Orders and Circulars, Adjutant General's Office, 1901. General Orders No. 155, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, November 27, 1901, pp. 5-6.

167. (1) The Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia; (2) the Engineer School of Application at the Washington Barracks, D. C.; (3) the School of Submarine Defense at Fort Totten, N. Y.; (4) the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, Kansas; and (5) the Army Medical School at Washington, D. C.

168. A memorandum of this General Order is contained in Appendix A of the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1901*, pp. 93-98.

169. 31 Statutes at Large, p. 903.

170. Page 242.

171. The maximum number of stations—502—was reached on March 1, 1901.—*Report of General MacArthur, July 4, 1901*, in the Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901, Part 2, p. 97.

172. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 31; Report of General MacArthur, July 4, 1901, pp. 88-91.

173. General MacArthur's report for 1901, pp. 91-92.

174. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

175. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

177. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-96; Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 31.

178. A complete list of these operations terminating with June 29, 1901, is given in the "Summary of the principal events connected with military operations in the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1900, to June 30, 1901," contained in the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901*, Part 2, pp. 41-72.

The various reports of General MacArthur, the department commanders and other American officers will be found in Parts 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the *Report of the Lieutenant General for 1901*.

179. Report of Brigadier General J. F. Bell, commanding the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon, dated April 30, 1901, in *ibid.*, Part 3, p. 31.

180. Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901, Part 2, pp. 59-60.

181. *Ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 122-130.

182. This proclamation is given *in extenso* by Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, I, pp. 287-288.

183. *Ibid.*, I, p. 288.

184. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 32.

185. Malvar surrendered on April 19, 1902, and Lukban was captured on April 27th of that year.—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1902*, p. 11.

186. Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, II, p. 1286.

187. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 63.

188. *Ibid.*, p. 32; Report of General MacArthur for 1901, in the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901*, Part 2, pp. 98-99.

Blount declares, p. 241, that the ratio of insurgent "casualties to ours was about 16 to 1," "a statistical fact, figured out from one of the War Department Reports."

189. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, pp. 31-32.

190. Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, II, p. 1249.

191. Report of Brigadier General Barry, Chief of Staff and Adjutant-General, June 30, 1901, in *Report of Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901*, Part 2, p. 131.

192. Exhibit A in *ibid.*, p. 134. This was exclusive of 5,572 scouts, 1,282 native police and 696 metropolitan police.

193. See page 242.

194. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 33.

195. Letter of The Adjutant-General, dated April 21, 1915, to the author of this book, in which reference was made to Heitman, II, table on page 293 as containing the latest data on the subject of the American losses in the Philippine War. In the above numbers the necessary deductions have been made from Heitman's table for the officers and men killed, wounded or died between August 13, 1898, and February 4, 1899.

According to The Adjutant-General's letter just mentioned, the Philippine insurgents had 15,365 officers and men killed, and 3,401 officers and men wounded during the insurrection.

196. Records of The Adjutant-General's office; Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, II, p. 293.

197. *Ibid.*

198. From May 1, 1898, to June 19, 1902, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War on June 19, 1902. See *Senate Document No. 416, 57th Congress, first session*, p. 2.

199. Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1913, p. 10, and June 30, 1914, p. 33.

CHAPTER XIX

1. The Philippine census taken in 1903 gave the number of inhabitants of the archipelago as 7,635,426.

2. Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, p. 32.

3. See pages 207-208. The headquarters, band, and companies

E, F, G, H and L of the 34th Volunteer Infantry did not arrive at Manila until October 11, 1899.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1899*, p. 28.

4. Fifty-one officers and 1,314 men of the 48th Volunteer Infantry and Hospital corps.—*Report of the Adjutant-General for 1900*, p. 32. Also House of Representatives Document No. 2, 56th Congress, second session, p. 32.

5. General MacArthur's report, July 4, 1901, p. 104.

6. Adjutant-General Corbin to General MacArthur, December 11, 1900.—*Correspondence relating to the War with Spain*, II, p. 1234.

7. Corbin to MacArthur, December 27, 1900.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 1239.

8. General MacArthur's cables to the Adjutant-General received at Washington on January 11, 1901, January 29th and February 2nd.—*Ibid.*, II, pp. 1244, 1249 and 1250.

9. MacArthur to the Adjutant-General, received January 9, 1901.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 1244.

10. Report of Brigadier General Barry, Chief of Staff and Adjutant-General, dated June 30, 1901, in the *Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army, for 1901*, Part 2, p. 131.

11. Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, II, p. 1244.

12. *Ibid.*, II, p. 1249.

13. MacArthur to the Adjutant-General, received December 21, 1900.—*Ibid.*, II, p. 1237.

14. Compare extracts from the report of Colonel Joseph H. Sanger, quoted in the Report of the Inspector-General for 1902. *Annual Report of the War Department for 1902*, vol. I, pp. 431-432. Also pp. 426 and 429.

CHAPTER XX

1. Original letter in the possession of W. H. Whyte of West Chester, Pa., by whose kind permission it is here published for the first time.

CHAPTER XXII

1. 32 United States Statutes at Large, p. 419.

2. 32 Stat., p. 512.

3. 32 Stat., p. 629.

4. Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, pp. 11-16, 137-138.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

6. Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, pp. 40-42.

7. Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, pp. 29-30.

8. 32 Statutes at Large, p. 775.

9. Section one.

10. Sections, one two and three.

11. Section three.

12. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14.

13. Sections 13, 14, 17 and 21.

14. Section 14.

15. Section 15.

16. Sections 15 and 16.

17. Section 18.

18. Sections 19 and 20.

19. Section 22 provided that any militiaman disabled by wounds received in the United States service or dying as a result of such wounds or disability shall have the benefit of the pension laws either for himself or in behalf of his widow and children.

20. Section 23.

21. Section 3.

22. Sections 7 and 8.

23. Sections 4, 5 and 7.

24. Section 3.

25. Section 23.

26. Section 24.

27. The above summaries of the merits and defects of the Dick bill may be compared with those given in the *Report of the Chief of Staff for 1910*, pp. 23-24; Rhodes, Gold Medal Prize Essay in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* for March-April, 1905, pp. 192-195; Huidekoper, *Is the United States Prepared for War?* pp. 39-40; Huidekoper, *The United States Army and Organized Militia To-day*, pp. 11-12.

28. 32 Statutes at Large, p. 783.

29. Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, pp. 44-54, and for 1901, pp. 42-49.

30. 32 Stat., p. 830.

31. *Journal of the Military Service Institution* for March-April, 1905, pp. 201-202.

32. The organization of the General Staff is discussed at some length in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1903*, pp. 3-8, 10, Appendix B, pp. 61-62, Appendix C, pp. 63-68, and Appendix D containing a table showing the organization of the General Corps, opposite p. 68.

33. Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, pp. 44-46.

34. Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, p. 47.

35. 32 Statutes at Large, p. 927.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 932.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 933.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 941-942. This is contained under the heading of Ordnance Department.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 942.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 1011.

41. See page 294.

42. 32 Statutes at Large, pp. 1021-1022.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 1024.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 1027.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 1229.

46. Report of the Secretary of War for 1903, pp. 32-34.

47. Report of the Secretary of War for 1904, p. 34: *Report of the President, National Rifle Association of America*, covering period from 1871 to 1906, p. 59.

48. The Army officers selected to serve on the Joint Army and Navy Board were Major General S. B. M. Young, Major General Henry C. Corbin, Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss and Brigadier General Wallace F. Randolph.

The Navy officers were The Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, Rear

Admiral Henry C. Taylor, Captain John E. Pillsbury and Commander William J. Barnette.

49. This agreement was promulgated by General Orders No. 107, dated Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 20, 1903, and is given in full in the *Report of the Secretary of War for 1903*, p. 9.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

51. GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 15, 1903.

The War College Board appointed by paragraph 2 of General Orders, No. 64, Adjutant General's Office, 1902, is hereby dissolved, and hereafter the duties assigned to said board by paragraph 4 of General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant General's Office, 1901, will be performed by such section of the War Department General Staff as may be designated for the purpose by the Chief of Staff.

By order of the Secretary of War.

S. B. M. YOUNG,

Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff.

52. Report of the Secretary of War for 1903, p. 36.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

54. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 226.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

58. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 264.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

60. 33 Stat., p. 312.

61. See page 226.

62. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 496.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 580.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 595.

65. 33 Stat., p. 588.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

67. Report of Major General Leonard Wood, commanding the Philippines Division, dated November 14, 1905.

68. The militia participating in the manœuvres at Manassas in September, 1904, comprised troops of the three arms of the service from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Tennessee and Texas.

69. Report of the Secretary of War for 1904, pp. 36-37.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 3, 25 and 26.

74. Report of the Secretary of War for 1904, p. 18.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

76. Report of the Secretary of War for 1904, pp. 8, 14-16.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, 28-34, and 38.

79. See pages 301-302.

80. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 827.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 830.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 831.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 840.

84. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 845.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 847.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 986-987.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 1156.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 1197.

89. 33 Statutes at Large, p. 1284.

90. Report of Captain Frank R. McCoy, 3rd Cavalry, A. D. C., commanding expedition, dated October 31, 1905.—*Records of The Adjutant-General's Office.*

91. "From Camp Keithley, Provisional Company, Twenty-second Infantry, October 11, 1905, Lieut. S. B. West, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding; sailed from Camp Overton, October 13; touched at Zamboango, October 14, for Capt. F. R. McCoy, aid-de-camp, who assumed command by direction of the department commander. Chartered ship *Borneo*, left Zamboango October 14, for Digos, via Margosatubig, with cargadores, and picked up Lieut. Henry Rodgers and a detachment of Philippine Scouts at Margosatubig. Expedition left Digos October 16 and marched to the Malala River, arriving October 22, 1905, encountering and killing Datu Ali at his rancheria on the Malala River. American casualties, 2 killed, 1 wounded. Command resumed March October 22, reaching Buluan October 23, 1905. Provisional Company returned to Camp Keithley November 3, 1905. As a result of this expedition all the American arms and many others in the possession of hostile Moros were either captured or surrendered, and the Cotabato Valley was pacified."—*Report of Major-General Leonard Wood, commanding the Department of Mindanao, dated April 12, 1906, in the Report of the War Department for 1906, vol. III, p. 296.*

92. Report of Brigadier General James A. Buchanan, temporarily commanding the Department of Mindanao, dated November 2, 1905, and the endorsement thereon by Major General Leonard Wood, dated November 14, 1905.—*Record of The Adjutant-General's Office.*

Also report of General Wood, dated April 12, 1906, in the *Annual Reports of the War Department for 1906, vol. III, p. 277.*

93. Exclusive of 3,167 men of the Hospital Corps, who are prohibited by the Act of March 1, 1887, from being included in the enlisted force of the Army.

94. Report of the Secretary of War for 1905, pp. 1, 7 and 32.

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25, 28-30.

97. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, 26-27.

99. Report of the Secretary of War for 1905, pp. 21-23.

100. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 245.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

103. 34 Stat., p. 449.

104. 34 Stat., p. 455.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 456.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 457.

107. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 458.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 531. Act of June 28, 1906.

110. 34 Stat., p. 817.

111. Joint Resolution No. 3, approved January 25, 1906, authorized the use of the Army transport *Sumner* to convey the Santiago Battlefield Commission and the representatives of the President and of the State and War Departments from New York to Santiago de Cuba "to enable them to attend the ceremonies to be held at the dedication of the battle monuments at El Caney, Fort San Juan, San Juan Ridge and San Juan de Mayaras Hill."

Joint Resolutions Nos. 16, 17 and 19, approved respectively on April 19th, 21st and 24th, directed the Secretary of War to utilize or purchase the necessary supplies and to co-operate with the State and local authorities in assisting persons rendered destitute by the earthquake on April eighteenth and the conflagration at San Francisco and elsewhere in California.

Joint Resolution No 34, approved June 25th, instructed the Secretary of War to donate to Vincennes University, Indiana, "such obsolete arms and other military equipments now in possession of said university, to be used for military instruction."

Joint Resolution No. 43, approved June 29th, authorized the Secretary of War "to deliver to the Confederate Memorial Literary Society of Richmond, Virginia, all of the Confederate battle flags now in the custody of the War Department which it has been found impossible, after thorough investigation, to trace to the former ownership or custody of the troops of any particular State."

See 34 *Statutes at Large*, pp. 821, 827, 828, 834 and 837.

112. Report of Colonel Joseph W. Duncan, commanding the expeditionary forces, dated March 10, 1906, and report of Major General Wood, commanding the Philippines Division, April 22, 1906.—*Records of The Adjutant-General's Office*.

Both of these officers recommended Lieutenant Gordon Johnston for the Medal of Honor "for most distinguished gallantry in leading assault on the main defence of the crater," and this coveted decoration was conferred upon him by President Taft in person in 1913.

113. Report of the Secretary of War for 1906, pp. 18-29, and 34.

114. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

115. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34, 42-45.

117. Report of the Secretary of War for 1906, p. 55.

118. The Report of the National Coast-Defense Board, dated February first, 1906, was published in Senate Document No. 248, Fifty-ninth Congress, first session.

119. Report of the National Coast-Defense Board, p. 15.

120. Report of the Secretary of War for 1906, p. 35.

121. Report of the National Coast-Defense Board, pp. 11, 12 and 25.

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 23 and 24. Also Report of the Secretary of War for 1906, pp. 36-37.

123. Report of the Secretary of War for 1906, p. 39.

124. 34 United States Statutes at Large, p. 861.

125. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 1060.

126. 34 Stat., p. 1158.

127. 34 Stat., p. 1160.

128. 34 Stat., p. 1162.

129. Report of the Secretary of War for 1907, p. 24.

130. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 1169.

"Pursuant to this provision of law the military prison at Alcatraz Island, Cal., the maximum capacity of which is 319 prisoners, was thus designated on March 21, 1907, and a prison guard was established in the same manner as the guard at the Leavenworth military prison; the military reservation of Alcatraz Island and the prison being designated as the 'Pacific Branch of the United States military prison.'

"On June 30, 1907, there were 1,668 military convicts in custody. Of this number 611 were in confinement at military posts; 38 at the United States penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kans.; 700 at the United States military prison, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; 285 at the Pacific branch of the United States military prison at Alcatraz Island, California; 16 at the Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C.; 1 at the General Hospital, Fort Bayard, N. Mex., and 17 in transit from one place of confinement to another."—*Report of the Secretary of War for 1907*, pp. 24-25.

131. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 1217.

132. An act approved March 2, 1907, authorized the Secretary of War to donate certain condemned ordnance to the Monument Association of Athens, Ohio; two acts approved March 4th directed the loan of brass field pieces to Petoskey, Michigan, and to the Valley Forge Park Commission. Another act approved March 4, 1907, appropriated \$25,000 for the completion of a monument to be erected at Chalmette, Louisiana, to the memory of the American soldiers who fell at the battle of New Orleans. See 34 *Stat.*, pp. 1233, 1293, 1415 and 1411.

133. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 1381.

134. *Ibid.*

135. 34 Statutes at Large, p. 1422.

Joint Resolution No. 8, approved January 25, 1907, authorized the awarding of a Medal of Honor to J. Monroe Reisinger, corporal in Company H of the 150th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry "for specially brave and meritorious conduct in the face of the enemy at the battle of Gettysburg, July first, eighteen hundred and sixty-three."—*Ibid.*, p. 1420.

136. Report of the Secretary of War for 1907, pp. 26-27.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

139. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

140. Report of the Secretary of War for 1907, pp. 27-29, 17, 9-11.

141. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

143. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

145. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

146. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

147. Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1907, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 33.

148. Report of the Secretary of War for 1907, pp. 34-35.

149. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31.

150. Report of the Secretary of War for 1908, p. 75.

151. 35 United States Statutes at Large, p. 66.

This law was preceded by the Urgency Deficiency Appropriation Act of February 15, 1908 (35 Stat., pp. 8 and 14); the Act of February 26th authorizing the deeding of one acre of the military reservation at Fort Riley to the State of Kansas; the Act of March 28th directing the Secretary of War to donate 50 obsolete Springfield rifles to the Albert Sidney Camp, Confederate Veterans, of San Antonio, Texas; the Act of April 2nd authorizing the furnishing of condemned brass cannon and cannon balls to the Confederate Monument Association at Franklin, Tennessee; the Additional Urgent Deficiency Act of April 7th (35 Stat., p. 59); the Act of April 10th, directing the Secretary of War to furnish two condemned cannon to Winchester, Virginia; and the Act of April 11th directing him to donate 100 obsolete Springfield rifles, bayonets and bayonet scabbards to "The Old Guard, an independent military organization of Columbus, Ohio, whose membership is composed entirely of Union soldiers of the war of the rebellion."

152. 35 Statutes at Large, p. 108.

153. *Ibid.*

154. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

156. 35 Statutes at Large, p. 163.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 392.

158. "*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That on and after the thirtieth day of June, nineteen hundred and eight, the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry shall be designated the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United States Army. It shall be composed of the two existing battalions of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry.

"SEC. 2. That the field officers of said regiment shall be one lieutenant-colonel and two majors, who shall be detailed for four years by the President from officers not below the rank of captain of the Army.

"SEC. 3. That the present captains and lieutenants of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry appointed or who were reappointed after a mental, physical, and professional examination, may be re-commissioned as officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.

"SEC. 4. That vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant may be filled by the President in his discretion by the appointment of citizens of Porto Rico whose qualifications for commissions shall be established by examination.

"SEC. 5. That promotions to the grade of first lieutenant and captain shall be according to seniority within the regiment, subject to the examination provided by law. All appointments and promotions herein provided for shall be made with the advice and consent

of the Senate. Officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry shall have the same rank, pay, rights, and allowances provided by law for officers of similar rank in the Army of the United States, except as herein provided with regard to promotion. Any of the officers provided for by section three who may have become incapacitated for active service by reason of disability incident to the service shall be placed upon the retired list with the rank to which they would otherwise be entitled.

“SEC. 6. That all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.”

159. 35 Statutes at Large, p. 392.

160. 35 United States Statutes at Large, p. 399.

161. “An Act To further amend the Act entitled ‘An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes,’ approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three.

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section one of said Act be, and is hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows:

“SECTION 1. That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States and Territories and the District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes: The organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of their respective States or Territories; the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia: *Provided*, That the provisions of this Act and of section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force.”

“SEC. 2. That section three of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

“SEC. 3. That the regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia in the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia who have heretofore participated or shall hereafter participate in the apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended, whether known and designated as National Guard, militia, or otherwise, shall constitute the organized militia. On and after January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and ten, the organization, armament, and discipline of the organized militia in the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia shall be the same as that which is now and may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular Army of the United States, subject in time of peace to such general exceptions as may be authorized by the Secretary of War: *Provided*, That in peace and war each organized division of militia may have one inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of lieutenant-colonel; each organized brigade of militia one inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of major; each regiment of infantry or cavalry of organized militia, one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of captain, and each separate or unassigned battalion of infantry or engineer’s or squadron of cavalry of organized militia, one assis-

tant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of first-lieutenant: *Provided also*, That the President of the United States in time of peace may, by order, fix the minimum number of enlisted men in each company, troop, battery, signal corps, engineer corps, and hospital corps: *And provided further*, That any corps of artillery, cavalry, and infantry existing in any of the States at the passage of the Act of May eighth, seventeen hundred and ninety-two, which, by the laws, customs, or usages of the said States, have been in continuous existence since the passage of said Act, under its provisions and under the provisions of section two hundred and thirty-two and sections sixteen hundred and twenty-five to sixteen hundred and sixty—both inclusive, of title sixteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to the militia, shall be allowed to retain their accustomed privileges, subject, nevertheless, to all other duties required by law, in like manner as the other militia.'

"SEC. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper.'

"SEC. 4. That section five of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 5. That whenever the President calls forth the organized militia of any State, Territory, or of the District of Columbia, to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is required, and the militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the President: *Provided*, That no commissioned officer or enlisted man of the organized militia shall be held to service beyond the term of his existing commission or enlistment: *Provided further*, That when the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, can not be met by the regular forces, the organized militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise.'

"SEC. 5. That section seven of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. That every officer and enlisted man of the militia who shall be called forth in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, shall be mustered for service without further enlistment, and without further medical examination previous to such muster, except for those States

and Territories which have not adopted the standard of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army: *Provided, however,* That any officer or enlisted man of the militia who shall refuse or neglect to present himself for such muster, upon being called forth as herein prescribed, shall be subject to trial by court-martial and shall be punished as such court-martial may direct.'

"SEC. 6. That section eight of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. That the majority membership of courts-martial for the trial of officers or men of the militia when in the service of the United States shall be composed of militia officers.'

"SEC. 7. That section eleven of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 11. That when the militia is called into the actual service of the United States, or any portion of the militia is called forth under the provisions of this Act, their pay shall commence from the day of their appearing at the place of company rendezvous, but this provision shall not be construed to authorize any species of expenditure previous to arriving at such places of rendezvous which is provided by existing laws to be paid after their arrival at such places of rendezvous.'

"SEC. 8. That section thirteen of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 13. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to procure by purchase or manufacture, and issue from time to time to the organized militia, under such regulations as he may prescribe, such number of the United States service arms, together with all accessories and such other accouterments, equipments, uniforms, clothing, equipage, and military stores of all kinds required for the Army of the United States as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia in the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, in accordance with the requirements of this Act, without charging the cost or value thereof, or any expense connected therewith, against the allotment of said State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, out of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended, or requiring payment therefor, and to exchange, without receiving any money credit therefor, ammunition or parts thereof suitable for the new arms, round for round, for corresponding ammunition suitable to the old arms heretofore issued to said State, Territory, or the District of Columbia by the United States: *Provided,* That said property shall remain the property of the United States, except as hereinafter provided, and be annually accounted for by the governors of the States and Territories as required by law, and that each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall, on receipt of new arms or equipments, turn in to the War Department, or otherwise dispose of in accordance with the directions of the Secretary of War, without receiving any money credit therefor and without expense for transportation, all United States property so replaced or condemned. When the organized militia is uniformed as above required, the Secretary of War is authorized to fix an annual clothing allowance to each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia for each enlisted man of the organized militia thereof, and thereafter issues of clothing to such States, Territories, and the

District of Columbia shall be in accordance with such allowance, and the governors of the States and Territories and the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia shall be authorized to drop from their returns each year as expended clothing corresponding in value to such allowance. The Secretary of War is hereby further authorized to issue from time to time to the organized militia, under such regulations as he may prescribe, small arms and artillery ammunition upon the requisition of the governor, in the proportion of fifty per centum of the corresponding Regular Army allowance, without charge to the State's allotment from the appropriation under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended. To provide means to carry into effect the provisions of this section, the necessary money to cover the cost of procuring, exchanging, or issuing of arms, accouterments, equipments, uniforms, clothing, equipage, ammunition, and military stores to be exchanged or issued hereunder is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated: *Provided*, That the sum expended in the execution of the purchases and issued provided for in this section shall not exceed the sum of two million dollars in any fiscal year: *Provided also*, That the Secretary of War shall annually submit to Congress a report of expenditures made by him in the execution of the requirements of this section.

"SEC 9. That section fifteen of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 15. That the Secretary of War is authorized to provide for participation by any part of the organized militia of any State or Territory on the request of the governor thereof in the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular Army at or near any military post or camp or lake or seacoast defenses of the United States. In such case the organized militia so participating shall receive the same pay, subsistence, and transportation as is provided by law for the officers and men of the Regular Army, and no part of the sums appropriated for the support of the Regular Army shall be used to pay any part of the expenses of the organized militia of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, while engaged in joint encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction of the Regular Army and militia, but all payments to the militia under the provisions of this section and all allowances for mileage shall be made solely from the sums appropriated for such purposes: *Provided*, That the command of such military post or camp and the officers and troops of the United States there stationed shall remain with the regular commander of the post without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity: *Provided further*, That except as herein specified the right to command during such joint encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction shall be governed by the rules set out in articles one hundred and twenty-two and one hundred and twenty-four of the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States. The sums appropriated for the organized militia for such joint encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction shall be disbursed as, and for that purpose shall constitute, one fund; and the Secretary of War shall forward to Congress, at each session next after said encampment,

a detailed statement of the expenses of such encampments and manœuvres.'

"SEC. 10. That section sixteen of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 16. That whenever any officer or enlisted man of the organized militia shall upon the recommendation of the governor of any State, Territory, or the commanding general of the District of Columbia militia, and when authorized by the President, attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school or college of the United States, such officer or enlisted man shall receive from the annual appropriation for the support of the Army, the same travel allowances and quarters or commutation of quarters to which an officer or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be entitled for attending such school or college under orders from proper military authority; such officer shall also receive commutation and subsistence at the rate of one dollar per day and each enlisted man such subsistence as is furnished to an enlisted man of the Regular Army while in actual attendance upon a course of instruction.'

"SEC. 11. That section twenty of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby, amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 20. That upon the application of the governor of any State or Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this Act, or former laws of Congress, the Secretary of War may, in his discretion, detail one or more officers or enlisted men of the Army to report to the governor of such State or Territory for duty in connection with the organized militia. All such assignments may be revoked at the request of the governor of such State or Territory or at the pleasure of the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to appoint a board of five officers on the active list of the organized militia so selected as to secure, as far as practicable, equitable representation to all sections of the United States, and which shall from time to time, as the Secretary of War may direct, proceed to Washington, District of Columbia, for consultation with the Secretary of War respecting the condition, status, and needs of the whole body of the organized militia. Such officers shall be appointed for the term of four years unless sooner relieved by the Secretary of War.

"The actual and necessary travelling expenses of the members of the board, together with a per diem to be established by the Secretary of War, shall be paid to the members of the board. The expenses herein authorized, together with the necessary clerical and office expenses of the division of militia affairs in the office of the Secretary of War, shall constitute a charge against the whole sum annually appropriated under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, and shall be paid therefrom, and not from the allotment duly apportioned to any particular State, Territory, or the District of Columbia; and a list of such expenses shall be submitted to Congress annually by the Secretary of War in connection with his annual report.'"

Approved, May 27, 1908.

35 *United States Statutes at Large*, pp. 399-403.

162. The time limit within which the organized militia was required to conform to the standard of the Regular Army was extended from

January 21, 1908, to January 21, 1910, by a Joint Resolution of Congress approved on January 16, 1908.—See *35 Stat. L.*, p. 566.

163. Compare the Report of the Secretary of War for 1908, pp. 33-35.

164. Opinion of the Attorney-General, Hon. George W. Wickersham, contained in a letter to the Secretary of War, Hon. Henry L. Stimson, dated February 17, 1912, and quoted in the *Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*, pp. 83-86.

165. Compare the Report of the Chief of Staff for 1910, pp. 23-24.

166. *35 Stat. L.*, p. 441.

167. *35 United States Statutes at Large*, p. 443.

168. Report of the Secretary of War for 1908, pp. 5, 6, 7 and 18.

169. *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 36, 37, 42, 43 and 45.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-33.

171.

	Officers absent on detached duty	Officers absent from duty on account of sickness or leave
1905	517	317
1906	627	266
1907	682	186
1908	691	157

172. Report of the Secretary of War for 1908, pp. 12-17, 38-41, 45-46.

173. *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 75-77.

“WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, June 27, 1908.

MEMORANDUM

I. The following organization and distribution of business of the War Department General Staff is announced and will be in force until further orders:

FIRST SECTION

Organization, administration, and distribution of the militia forces; details and assignments; examinations for the appointment and promotion of officers; administrative matters pertaining to field maneuvers and to combined exercises of the Army and Navy; discipline and training; drill and firing regulations of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery, mobile armament and equipment; subsistence and clothing; location, design, and construction of posts, camps, hospitals, and quarters; water supply; sanitation, and all related matters; special military rewards; estimates for support of the Army.

SECOND SECTION

Military information; collection, arrangement, and publication of historical, statistical, and geographic information; War Department library; system of war maps, American and foreign; general information regarding foreign armies and fortresses; preparation from official records of analytical and critical histories of important campaigns.

Military attachés.

Photographic gallery.

Preparation of nontechnical manuals.

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Issue of military publications, maps, and documents.

Collation and discussion of all obtainable data relating to strategical, tactical, and logistic features of future military operations, and formation of complete working plans for passing from a state of peace to a state of war under such conditions as can be foreseen or may be assumed.

Direction and coordination of military education in the Army, the Militia, and in civil schools and colleges at which officers of the Army are detailed.

Plans for field maneuvers.

Permanent fortifications.

Submarine defense.

Field engineering.

Signaling, technical manuals, and logistics.

Military resources of the country.

II. Business of the following classes to be referred to the section having jurisdiction of the subject matter, in conference with the Chief of Artillery, in all matters pertaining to Seacoast Artillery:

Combined exercises of the Army and Navy.

Allowances of all items of equipment, armament, and supplies for the military service.

Determination of types, designs, and specifications for such as are required to be standardized.

Regulations and orders.

Proposed legislation to be presented to Congress or legislation pending in Congress referred to War Department for report.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

FRED W. SLADEN,
Captain, General Staff Corps, Secretary."

175. Report of the Secretary of War for 1908, p. 35.

176. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

177. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

178. Acts of February 11th, 17th and 23rd, and March 3rd and 4th, and the Joint Resolutions of February 18th, 23rd and 26th, 1909.— 35 *United States Statutes at Large*, pp. 618, 625, 643, 845, 1062, 1069, 1165, and 1166.

179. Acts of February 9th, March 3rd and 4th.— 35 *Stat. L.*, pp. 615, 728, 732, 877, 919, 993 and 1028.

180. 35 *Stat. L.*, p. 629.

181. "Provided further, That the Act approved May eleventh, nineteen hundred and eight, for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nine, in so far as it relates to the payment of six months' pay to the widow of an officer or enlisted man, and so forth, be amended as follows:

"Strike out the words 'contracted in the line of duty' and insert in lieu thereof the words, 'not the result of his own misconduct.'"— 35 *Stat. L.*, p. 735.

182. "Provided, That the Act approved November third, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, authorizing the detail of officers of the army and navy to educational institutions, be amended so as to provide that retired officers, when so detailed, shall receive the full pay

and allowance of their rank, except that the limitations on the pay of officers of the Army above the grade of major as provided in the Acts of March second, nineteen hundred and five, and June twelfth, nineteen hundred and six, shall remain in force."—*35 Stat. L.*, p. 738.

183. *35 Stat. L.*, p. 737.

184. *Ibid.*, pp. 750-751.

185. *35 United States Statutes at Large*, p. 836.

186. Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, pp. 21-22, 54-57, 62-63.

187. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

188. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-48.

189. Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, pp. 16, 9 and 17.

190. Report of the Adjutant-General, October 30, 1909, in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, p. 246.

191. Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, pp. 57-58.

192. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

193. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

194. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13, 21, 25-27, 49-50, 22-25, 36-38.

The bill covering the organization of the volunteer forces in time of war afforded another instance of Congressional lethargy. It had been introduced by the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs during the second session of the 59th Congress as *House of Representatives bill No. 25712*; was again introduced in the second session of the 60th Congress as *House bill 23862*; and was published during the same session in *House Document No. 1105*, together with a letter from President Roosevelt, dated December 8, 1908, explaining the salient points of the bill.—*Ibid.*, p. 37.

195. Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, pp. 27-28, 50-54.

196. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

197. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

198. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

199. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-67.

200. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

201. Report of the Secretary of War for 1909, pp. 28-31.

202. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34.

203. The Act of February 24, 1910 (*36 United States Statutes at Large*, p. 202) corrected the lineal and relative rank of certain Army officers.

The Army Appropriation Act of March 23rd changed the titles and fixed the pay of the blacksmiths and farriers in the cavalry and the mechanics in the field artillery (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 245). It also authorized the detail of one additional Army officer "as assistant to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs" with "the rank, pay and allowances of colonel."

The Act of April 8th (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 293) amended that of August 19, 1899, relative to the establishment of a National Military Park at the battlefield of Chickamauga.

The Act of April 15th (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 311) provided for the erection of a monument at Fort Recovery, Ohio, in memory of the officers and men killed by the Indians in 1791 and 1794.

The Act of April 19th (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 312) made appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911.

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The Act of June 23rd (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 596) made appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense.

The Act of June 25th (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 703) made appropriations for sundry civil expenses and allotted \$43,000 to the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park (p. 724).

The Deficiency Appropriation Bill, approved June 25, 1910, also made certain allotments for the War Department (p. 788).

204. 36 United Statutes at Large, p. 234.

205. This article of war No. 123 related to limited service rank.

206. 36 Statutes at Large, p. 323.

This same act also directed the Superintendent of the Military Academy to make appropriate regulations for the punishment of hazing, and specified that no cadet dismissed for hazing could be appointed "as a commissioned officer in the Army or Navy or Marine Corps until two years after the graduation of the class of which he was a member."—*Ibid.*, pp. 323-324.

207. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

208. *Ibid.*, p. 347.

209. *Ibid.*, p. 580.

210. 36 United Statutes at Large, p. 721.

211. Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, pp. 7-10, 15, 21-23.

212. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 26-29.

213. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

214. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-35.

215. Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, pp. 48-49.

216. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

217. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

218. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

219. *The Army Remount Problem*, by George M. Rommel, Chief of the Animal Husbandry Division, p. 119. This valuable pamphlet was reprinted from the 27th annual report of the Bureau of Animal Industry, 1910, and issued by the Department of Agriculture on December 15, 1911, as Circular No 186 of that bureau.

220. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, Circular No. 178 (issued April 19, 1911), p. 13.

221. Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, pp. 23-26, 30-35, 51-52.

222. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

223. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

224. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

225. *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, by General Kuropatkin — translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay and edited by Major E. D. Swinton, D. S. O., Vol. II, pp. 149-150.

226. During September, October and November, 1914.

227. 36 United States Statutes at Large, p. 894.

228. The Act of February 13, 1911 (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 898), amended Section 183 of the Revised Statutes so as to permit officials or clerks of any department, officers of the Army, Navy, Marine and Revenue-Cutter Service, and the recorder or president of boards composed of such officers, when detailed to investigate frauds against the Government, irregularity or misconduct, to administer oaths to witnesses in such investigations.

The Act of February 15, 1911 (*36 Stat. L.*, p. 906), directed the Secretary of War to transfer the military reservation at Fort Trumbull, New London, Conn., to the Treasury Department.

229. *36 Statutes at Large*, p. 957.

230. *Ibid.*, p. 963.

231. "That hereafter the pay and allowances of the acting first sergeant of the United States Military Academy detachment of engineers shall be the same as the pay and allowances of a first sergeant of a company of engineers: *And provided further*, That when an acting first sergeant of the detachment of engineers may hereafter be retired, his retired pay and allowances shall be the same as the pay and allowances of a retired first sergeant of a company of engineers."—*36 Stat. L.*, p. 1019.

232. *36 Statutes at Large*, p. 1041.

233. "*Porvided* [*sic*], That hereafter so much of section twenty of the Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, as provides that veterinarians shall receive the pay and allowances of second lieutenants, mounted, shall be interpreted to authorize their retirement under the laws governing the retirement of second lieutenants."—*36 Stat. L.*, p. 1042.

234. *36 Stat. L.*, p. 1045.

235. *Ibid.*, p. 1049.

236. *Ibid.*, p. 1054.

237. *Ibid.*, p. 1058.

238. *36 Statutes at Large*, p. 1084.

239. *36 Stat. L.*, p. 1240.

240. *Ibid.*, pp. 1170, 1289 and 1341.

241. *Ibid.*, p. 1348.

242. *Ibid.*, p. 1451.

243. Report of the Secretary of War in the War Department Annual Reports for 1911, pp. 7-9.

244. Report of the Secretary of War for 1911, pp. 12-13; Report of The Adjutant-General, October 25, 1911, in the War Department Annual Reports for 1911, p. 239.

245. Report of the Chief of Staff, December 2, 1911, in the War Department Annual Reports for 1911, p. 156.

246. Report of The Adjutant-General for 1911, pp. 239-242.

247. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

248. Report of the Chief of Staff for 1911, pp. 156-157.

249. An extremely interesting article entitled "Some Lessons of the Concentration" will be found in the *Infantry Journal* for May-June, 1911, pp. 932-936.

250. *Infantry Journal* for May-June, 1911, pp. 918-919.

251. Report of the Secretary of War for 1911, pp. 24-25, 32-33.

252. Equipment requisite for Army in time of War. *Senate Document No. 718, 63d Congress, third session*, p. 3.

253. General Orders, War Department, 1911, index p. 38.

254. Report of the Secretary of War for 1911, p. 16.

255. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-20, 28-29, 30-31.

256. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9, 13-15, 20-24, 26-29, 31-32.

257. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26, 61-69.

258. On May 25, 1911, Colonel du Pont introduced in the Senate "A Bill To provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war" (Senate No. 2518, 62d Congress, first session), which was referred to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.

On July 6, 1911, Colonel du Pont, as Chairman of that committee, reported the bill back to the Senate favorably with amendments.

On August 25, 1911, upon motion of Senator du Pont, the bill was re-committed to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.

259. The Act of March 4, 1912, provided "That the superintendent and members of the Female Nurse Corps when serving in Alaska or at places without the limits of the United States may be allowed the same privileges in regard to cumulative leaves of absence and method of computation of same as are now allowed to Army officers so serving."—*37 United States Statutes at Large*, p. 72.

The Act of April 3, 1912, appropriated \$300,000 to maintain and protect, under direction of the Secretary of War, the levees on the Mississippi River against impending floods.—*37 Stat. L.*, p. 78.

The Act of April 18, 1912, authorized the Secretary of War to donate three pieces of ordnance to the city of Jackson, Miss.—*37 Stat. L.*, p. 86.

The Act of April 24, 1912, provided "That whenever in time of war, or when war is imminent, the President may deem the cooperation and use of the American Red Cross with the sanitary services of the land and naval forces to be necessary, he is authorized to accept the assistance tendered by the said Red Cross and to employ the same under the sanitary services of the Army and Navy in conformity with such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.

"SEC. 2. That when the Red Cross cooperation and assistance with the land and naval forces in time of war or threatened hostilities shall have been accepted by the President, the personnel entering upon the duty specified in section one of this Act shall, while proceeding to their place of duty, while serving thereat, and while returning therefrom, be transported and subsisted at the cost and charge of the United States as civilian employees employed with the said forces, and the Red Cross supplies that may be tendered as a gift and accepted for use in the sanitary service shall be transported at the cost and charge of the United States."—*37 Stat. L.*, pp. 90-91.

An Act of June 6, 1912, made appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense.—*37 Stat. L.*, p. 125.

260. An Act approved July 17, 1912, provided "That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to offer periodically at such of the establishments of the Ordnance Department as he may select a cash reward for the suggestion, or series of suggestions, for an improvement of economy in manufacturing processes or plant, submitted within the period by one or more employees of the establishment which shall be deemed the most valuable of those submitted and adopted for use: *Provided*, That to obtain this reward the winning suggestion must be one that will clearly effect a material economy in production or increase efficiency or enhance the quality of the product in comparison with its cost and in the opinion of the Secretary shall be so worthy as to entitle the employee making the same to receive the reward: *Provided further*,

That the sums awarded to employees in accordance with this Act shall be paid them in addition to their usual compensation and shall constitute part of the general or shop expense of the establishment: *Provided further*, That the total amount paid under the provisions of this Act shall not exceed one thousand dollars for any one month: *And provided further*, That no employee shall be paid a reward under this Act until he has properly executed an agreement to the effect that the use by the United States of the suggestion, or series of suggestions, made by him shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature upon the United States by him, his heirs, or assigns, and that application for patent has not been made for the invention."—37 Stat. L., p. 193.

261. The Act of August 9, 1912, provided that enlisted men of the engineer detachment of the U. S. Military Academy should have the same pay and allowances as those in "corresponding grades in the battalions of engineers" (37 Stat. L., p. 254); and "That any officer of the United States Army now holding the position of permanent professor at the United States Military Academy who on July first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, should have served not less than thirty-three years in the Army, one-third of which service shall have been as professor and instructor at the Military Academy, shall on that date have the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel in the Army."—37 Stat. L., p. 264.

262. 37 Stat. L., p. 274.

263. 37 Stat. L., p. 311.

264. An Act approved on August 22, 1912 (37 Stat. L., p. 356), provided

"That section nineteen hundred and ninety-eight of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 1998. That every person who hereafter deserts the military or naval service of the United States, or who, being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdiction of the district in which he is enrolled, or goes beyond the limits of the United States, with intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, lawfully ordered, shall be liable to all the penalties and forfeitures of section nineteen hundred and ninety-six of the Revised Statutes of the United States: *Provided*, That the provisions of this section and said section nineteen hundred and ninety-six shall not apply to any person hereafter deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of peace: *And provided further*, That the loss of rights of citizenship heretofore imposed by law upon deserters from the military or naval service may be mitigated or remitted by the President where the offense was committed in time of peace and where the exercise of such clemency will not be prejudicial to the public interests: *And provided further*, That the provisions of section eleven hundred and eighteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States that no deserter from the military service of the United States shall be enlisted or mustered into the military service, and the provisions of section two of the Act of Congress approved August first, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to regulate enlistments in the Army of the United States,' shall not be construed to preclude the reenlistment or muster into the Army of

any person who has deserted, or may hereafter desert, from the military service of the United States in time of peace, or of any soldier whose service during his last preceding term of enlistment has not been honest and faithful, whenever the reenlistment or muster into the military service of such person or soldier shall, in view of the good conduct of such person or soldier subsequent to such desertion or service, be authorized by the Secretary of War.'

"SEC. 2. That section fourteen hundred and twenty of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Acts of Congress approved May twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, and February twenty-third, eighteen hundred and eighty-one, be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1420. No minor under the age of fourteen years, no insane or intoxicated person, and no person who has deserted in time of war from the naval or military service of the United States, shall be enlisted in the naval service.'

"That section sixteen hundred and twenty-four, article nineteen of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Act of Congress approved May twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1624. Article 19. Any officer who knowingly enlists into the naval service any person who has deserted in time of war from the naval or military service of the United States, or any insane or intoxicated person, or any minor between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, without the consent of his parents or guardian, or any minor under the age of fourteen years, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.'"

265. 37 Statutes at Large, p. 486.

266. *Ibid.*, p. 508.

267. *Ibid.*, p. 569.

268. *Ibid.*, p. 571.

269. 37 Statutes at Large, pp. 571-572.

270. *Ibid.*, p. 572.

271. "That so much of section twelve hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as pertains to additional pay for acting commissaries be, and the same is hereby, repealed."—37 *Stat. L.*, p. 574.

"That hereafter the provisions of section five of the Act of June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and six (Thirty-four Statutes, page seven hundred and sixty-three), shall not be construed to apply to the Subsistence Department."—37 *Stat. L.*, p. 579.

272. 37 Statutes at Large, pp. 575, 581, 582, 586 and 588.

273. 37 United States Statutes at Large, pp. 590-594.

274. "An Act Making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and for other purposes," approved August 24, 1912.

"SEC. 2. That, for the purpose of utilizing as an auxiliary to the Army Reserve hereinafter provided for the services of men who have had experience and training in the Regular Army, in time of war or when war is imminent, and after the President shall, by proclamation, have called upon honorably discharged soldiers of the Regular Army to present themselves for reenlistment therein within a specified period, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed in said proc-

lamation, any person who shall have been discharged honorably from said Army, with character reported as at least good, and who having been found physically qualified for the duties of a soldier, if not over forty-five years of age, shall reenlist in the line of said Army or in the Signal or Hospital Corps thereof within the period that shall be specified in said proclamation, shall receive on so reenlisting a bounty which shall be computed at the rate of eight dollars for each month for the first year of the period that shall have elapsed since his last discharge from the Regular Army and the date of his reenlistment therein under the terms of said proclamation; at the rate of six dollars per month for the second year of such period; at the rate of four dollars per month for the third year of such period; and at the rate of two dollars per month for any subsequent year of such period, but no bounty in excess of three hundred dollars shall be paid to any person under the terms of this Act.

“ And that on and after November first, nineteen hundred and twelve, all enlistments in the Regular Army shall be for the term of seven years, the first four years in the service with the organizations of which those enlisting shall form a part, and, except as otherwise provided herein, the last three years on furlough and attached to the Army Reserve hereinafter provided for: *Provided*, That at the expiration of four years' continuous service with such organizations, either under a first or any subsequent enlistment, any soldier may be reenlisted for another period of seven years, as above provided for, in which event he shall receive his final discharge from his prior enlistment: *Provided further*, That any enlisted men, at the expiration of three years' continuous service with such organizations, either under a first or any subsequent enlistment, upon his written application, may be furloughed and transferred to the Army Reserve, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, in which event he shall not be entitled to reenlist in the service until the expiration of his term of seven years: *Provided further*, That for all enlistments hereafter accomplished under the provisions of this Act, four years shall be counted as an enlistment period in computing continuous-service pay: *Provided further*, That hereafter the Army Reserve shall consist of all enlisted men who, after having served not less than four years with the organizations of which they form a part, shall receive furloughs without pay or allowances until the expiration of their terms of enlistment, together with transportation in kind and subsistence as provided for by this Act in the case of discharged soldiers; but when any soldier is furloughed to the Reserve his accounts shall be closed and he shall be paid in full to the date such furlough becomes effective: *Provided further*, That any enlisted man, subject to good conduct and physical fitness for duty, upon his written application to that effect, shall have the right of remaining with the organization to which he belongs until the completion of his whole enlistment, without passing into the Reserve: *Provided further*, That except upon reenlistment after four years' service or as now otherwise provided for by law, no enlisted man shall receive a final discharge until the expiration of his seven-year term of enlistment, including his term of service in the Army Reserve, but any such enlisted man may be reenlisted for a further term of seven years under the same conditions in the Army at large, or, in the discretion of the Secretary

of War, for a term of three years in the Army Reserve; and any person who may have been discharged honorably from the Regular Army, with character reported as at least good, and who has been found physically qualified for the duties of a soldier, if not over forty-five years of age, may be enlisted in the Army Reserve for a similar term of three years: *And provided further*, That in the event of actual or threatened hostilities the President, when so authorized by Congress, may summon all furloughed soldiers who belong to the Army Reserve to rejoin their respective organizations, and during the continuance of their service with such organizations they shall receive the pay and allowances authorized by law for soldiers serving therein, and any enlisted man who shall have reenlisted in the Army Reserve shall receive during such service the additional pay now provided by law for the soldiers of his arm of the service in their second enlistment period. Upon reporting for duty, and being found physically fit for service, they shall receive a sum equal to five dollars per month for each month during which they shall have belonged to the Reserve, as well as the actual cost of transportation and subsistence from their homes to the places at which they may be ordered to report for duty under such summons.

"SEC. 3. That the office establishments of the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General, and the Paymaster General of the Army are hereby consolidated and shall hereafter constitute a single bureau of the War Department, which shall be known as the Quartermaster Corps, and of which the Chief of the Quartermaster Corps created by this Act shall be the head. The Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay Departments of the Army are hereby consolidated into and shall hereafter be known as the Quartermaster Corps of the Army. The officers of said departments shall hereafter be known as officers of said corps and by the titles of the rank held by them therein, and, except as hereinafter specifically provided to the contrary, the provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, entitled "An Act to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the United States," are hereby extended so as to apply to the Quartermaster Corps in the manner and to the extent to which they now apply to the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay Departments, and the provision of said sections of said Act relative to chiefs of staff corps and departments shall, so far as they are applicable, apply to all offices and officers of the Quartermaster Corps with rank above that of colonel. The officers now holding commissions as officers of the said departments shall hereafter have the same tenure of commission in the Quartermaster Corps, and as officers of said corps shall have rank of the same grades and dates as that now held by them, and, for the purpose of filling vacancies among them, shall constitute one list, on which they shall be arranged according to rank. So long as any officers shall remain on said list any vacancy occurring therein shall be filled, if possible, from among such officers, by selection if the vacancy occurs in a grade above that of colonel, and, if the vacancy occurs in a grade not above that of colonel, by the promotion of an officer who would have been entitled to promotion to that particular vacancy if the consolidation of departments hereby prescribed had never occurred: *Provided*, That on and

after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and seventeen, any vacancies occurring among officers of the Quartermaster Corps with rank above that of colonel may, in the discretion of the President, be filled by selection from among officers who shall have served by detail in said corps for not less than four years: *Provided further*, That not to exceed six officers holding commissions with the rank of captain in the Quartermaster Corps and who have lost in relative rank through irregularities of promotion and the operation of separate promotion within the three departments hereby consolidated, may, in the discretion of the President and subject to examination for promotion as prescribed by law, be advanced to the grade of major in the Quartermaster Corps, and any officer who shall be advanced to said grade under the terms of this proviso shall be temporarily an additional officer of said grade but only until a vacancy shall occur for him on the list of officers of said grades as hereafter limited; and no officer shall be detailed to fill any vacancy on the list of majors of the Quartermaster Corps until after all additional officers authorized by the proviso shall have been absorbed. The noncommissioned officers now known as post quartermaster sergeants and post commissary sergeants shall hereafter be known as quartermaster sergeants; the Army paymaster's clerks shall be known as pay clerks, and each of said noncommissioned officers and pay clerks shall continue to have the pay, allowances, rights, and privileges now allowed him by law: *Provided further*, That no details to fill vacancies in the grade of colonel in the Quartermaster's Corps shall be made until the number of officers of that grade shall have been reduced by three, and thereafter the number of officers in that grade shall not exceed twelve; and no details to fill vacancies in the grade of lieutenant-colonel in the Quartermaster Corps shall be made until the number of officers of that grade shall have been reduced by three, and thereafter the number of officers in that grade shall not exceed eighteen; and no details to fill vacancies in the grade of major in the Quartermaster Corps shall be made until the number of officers of that grade shall have been reduced by nine, and thereafter the number of officers in said grade shall not exceed forty-eight; and no details to fill vacancies in the grade of captain in the Quartermaster Corps shall be made until after the number of officers of that grade shall be reduced by twenty-nine, and thereafter the number of officers of said grade shall not exceed one hundred and two; and whenever the separation of a line officer of any grade and arm from the Quartermaster Corps shall create therein a vacancy that, under the terms of this proviso, can not be filled by detail such separation shall operate to make a permanent reduction of one in the total number of officers of said grade and arm in the line of the Army as soon as such reduction can be made without depriving any officer of his commission: *Provided further*, That whenever the Secretary of War shall decide that it is necessary and practicable, regimental, battalion, and squadron quartermasters and commissaries shall be required to perform any duties that junior officers of the Quartermaster Corps may properly be required to perform, and regimental and battalion quartermaster and commissary sergeants shall be required to perform any duties that noncommissioned officers or pay clerks of the Quartermaster Corps may properly be required to perform, but such regimental, battalion and squadron quartermaster

masters and commissaries shall not be required to receipt for any money or property which does not pertain to their respective regiments, battalions, or squadrons, and they shall not be separated from the organization to which they belong: *Provided further*, That such duty or duties as are now required by law to be performed by any officer or officers of the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, or Pay Departments shall hereafter be performed by such officer or officers of the Quartermaster Corps as the Secretary of War may designate for the purpose: *Provided further*, That there shall be a Chief of the Quartermaster Corps, who shall have the rank of major general while so serving, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of said corps and in accordance with the requirements of section twenty-six of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, hereinbefore cited: *Provided further*, That when the first vacancy in the grade of brigadier general in the Quartermaster Corps, except a vacancy caused by the expiration of a limited term of appointment, shall hereafter occur that vacancy shall not be filled, but the office in which the vacancy occurs shall immediately cease and determine: *Provided further*, That the Quartermaster Corps shall be subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff to the extent the departments hereby consolidated into said corps have heretofore been subject to such supervision under the terms of the existing law: *And provided further*, That for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this section the President is hereby authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief of the Quartermaster Corps herein provided for immediately upon the passage of this Act, and it shall be the duty of the said chief, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of War, to put into effect the provisions of this section not less than sixty days after the passage of this Act.

"SEC. 4. That as soon as practicable after the creation of a Quartermaster Corps in the Army not to exceed four thousand civilian employees of that corps, receiving a monthly compensation of not less than thirty dollars nor more than one hundred and seventy-five dollars each, not including civil engineers, superintendents of construction, inspectors of clothing, clothing examiners, inspectors of supplies, inspectors of animals, chemists, veterinarians, freight and passenger rate clerks, civil service employees, and employees of the classified service, employees of the Army transport service and harbor-boat service, and such other employees as may be required for technical work, shall be replaced permanently by not to exceed an equal number of enlisted men of said corps, and all enlisted men of the line of the Army detailed on extra duty in the Quartermaster Corps or as bakers or assistant bakers shall be replaced permanently by not to exceed two thousand enlisted men of said corps; and for the purposes of this Act the enlistment in the military service of not to exceed six thousand men, who shall be attached permanently to the Quartermaster Corps and who shall not be counted as a part of the enlisted force provided by law, is hereby authorized: *Provided*, That the enlisted force of the Quartermaster Corps shall consist of not to exceed fifteen master electricians, six hundred sergeants (first class), one thousand and five sergeants, six hundred and fifty corporals, two

thousand five hundred privates (first class), one thousand one hundred and ninety privates, and forty-five cooks, all of whom shall receive the same pay and allowances as enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Signal Corps of the Army, and shall be assigned to such duties pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps as the Secretary of War may prescribe: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of War may fix the limits of age within which civilian employees who are actually employed by the Government when this Act takes effect and who are to be replaced by enlisted men under the terms of this Act may enlist in the Quartermaster Corps: *Provided further*, That nothing in this section shall be held or construed so as to prevent the employment of the class of civilian employees excepted from the provisions of this Act or continued employment of civilians included in the Act until such latter employees have been replaced by enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps."

275. Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, pp. 16-17.

276. Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, p. 8.

277. 37 United States Statutes at Large, p. 594.

278. *Ibid.*, p. 594.

279. *Ibid.*, pp. 630 and 639.

Joint Resolution No. 40, approved August 9, 1912, directed the Secretary of War to investigate the claims of Americans for damages suffered within American territory and growing out of the late insurrection in Mexico.

Joint Resolution No. 52, approved August 24, 1912, authorized the erection of a joint memorial to Major Archibald W. Butt, U. S. A., aide-de-camp to President Taft, and Mr. Francis D. Millet, both of whom were lost in the sinking of the *Titanic*.—37 *Stat. L.*, pp. 641 and 644.

280. Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, pp. 3-5.

281. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

282. In accordance with War Department General Orders No. 17, dated May 31, 1912.—*General Orders and Bulletins, War Department, 1912*. See index p. 44.

283. Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, pp. 8-9.

284. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

285. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

286. *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 12-15.

287. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

288. Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, p. 11.

289. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

290. Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, pp. 62-63; and *ibid.*, in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, pp. 122-123.

291. Such a bill (Senate No. 2518, 62nd Congress, first session) had been introduced in the Senate by Colonel du Pont, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, on May 25, 1911 (see footnote 258, p. 704). On July 16, 1912, it was again favorably reported to the Senate with further amendments by that committee, went to the Senate calendar and was debated on various occasions. Owing to the persistent opposition of the late Senator Bacon of Georgia, it failed to pass the Senate and died a natural death with the close of the 62nd Congress.

It was, however, re-introduced in the Senate on April 9, 1913, by Colonel du Pont as Senate bill No. 542, 63rd Congress, first session.

292. Report of the Secretary of War for 1912, pp. 15, 20-25.

293. The first officers of the Washington Branch of the National Cavalry and Artillery Remount Association of the United States were: President, Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young, retired; Treasurer, Colonel Alexander Rodgers, retired; Secretary, Mr. Frederic L. Huidekoper.

294. The patrol judges, who accompanied the contestants in the first "Service Test," were Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War; Captain John R. Lindsey; Mr. Redmond Stewart. M. F. H. of the Green Spring Valley Hunt; and Mr. Frederic L. Huidekoper.

295. General Orders and Bulletins, War Department, 1912.

296. Report of the President of the Washington Branch of the National Cavalry and Artillery Remount Association of the United States, dated January 23, 1913, pp. 2-3.

297. 37 United States Statutes at Large, p. 671.

298. *Ibid.*, p. 704.

299. 37 Stat. L., pp. 704-706, 708, 710-711, 714-715, 717, 720-723.

300. The concluding part of Army Appropriation Act approved March 2, 1913, provided (*37 United States Statutes at Large*, pp. 721-723) that

"On and after July first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, courts-martial shall be of three kinds, namely: First, general courts-martial; second, special courts-martial; and third, summary courts-martial.

"General courts-martial may consist of any number of officers from five to thirteen, inclusive.

"Special courts-martial may consist of any number of officers from three to five, inclusive.

"A summary court-martial shall consist of one officer.

"The President of the United States, the commanding officer of a territorial division or department, the Superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of an army, a field army, an army corps, a division, or a separate brigade, and when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of any district or of any force or body of troops, may appoint general courts-martial whenever necessary; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority, and no officer shall be eligible to sit as a member of such court when he is the accuser, or a witness for the prosecution.

"The commanding officer of a district, garrison, fort, camp or other place where troops are on duty, and the commanding officer of a brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command, may appoint special courts-martial for his command; but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable, and no officer shall be eligible to sit as a member of such court when he is the accuser or a witness for the prosecution.

"The commanding officer of a district garrison, fort, camp, or other place where troops are on duty, and the commanding officer of a brigade, regiment, detached battalion, detached company, or other detachment may appoint summary courts-martial for his command; but such sum-

mary courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable: *Provided*, That when but one officer is present with a command he shall be the summary court-martial of that command and shall hear and determine cases brought before him.

“General courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law for any crime or offense made punishable by the Articles of War and any other person who by statute or by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals: *Provided*, That no officer shall be brought to trial before a general court-martial appointed by the Superintendent of the Military Academy.

“Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except an officer, for any crime or offense not capital made punishable by the Articles of War: *Provided*, That the President may by regulations, which he may modify from time to time, except from the jurisdiction of special courts-martial any class or classes of persons subject to military law.

“Special courts-martial shall have power to adjudge punishment not to exceed confinement at hard labor for six months or forfeiture of six months’ pay, or both, and in addition thereto reduction to the ranks in the cases of noncommissioned officers, and reduction in classification in the cases of first-class privates.

“Summary courts-martial shall have power to try any soldier, except one who is holding the privileges of a certificate of eligibility to promotion, for any crime or offense not capital made punishable by the Articles of War: *Provided*, That noncommissioned officers shall not, if they object thereto, be brought to trial before a summary court-martial without the authority of the officer competent to bring them to trial before a general court-martial.

“Summary courts-martial shall have power to adjudge punishment not to exceed confinement at hard labor for three months or forfeiture of three months’ pay, or both, and in addition thereto reduction to the ranks in the case of noncommissioned officers and reduction in classification in the cases of first-class privates: *Provided*, That when the summary court officer is also the commanding officer no sentence of such summary court-martial adjudging confinement at hard labor or forfeiture of pay, or both, for a period in excess of one month shall be carried into execution until the same shall have been approved by superior authority.

“Articles seventy-two, seventy-three, seventy-five, eighty-one, eighty-two, and eighty-three of section thirteen hundred and forty-two of the Revised Statutes; the first section of an Act entitled “An Act to promote the administration of justice in the Army,” approved October first, eighteen hundred and ninety, as amended by the first section of an Act approved June eighteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight (Thirtieth Statutes, four hundred and eighty-three, four hundred and eighty-four), are hereby repealed, but courts-martial regularly convened in orders issued prior to the date when this Act takes effect and in existence on that date, under Articles of War hereby repealed, may continue as legal courts for the trial of cases referred to them prior to that date with the same effect as if this Act has not been passed: *Provided*, That prior to July first, nineteen hundred and

thirteen, the President may, when deemed by him necessary, empower any officer competent under the terms of this Act to appoint the general courts-martial which it authorizes, to appoint general courts-martial authorized by existing law."

301. 37 Stat. L., p. 723.

Another act approved on March 2, 1913, authorized the granting of two condemned cannon to the Wallkill Valley Cemetery Association of Orange County, N. Y.—37 Stat. L., p. 725.

302. The General appropriation act, the Agricultural appropriation act, the Military Academy appropriation act and an act authorizing the Secretary of War to make certain donations of condemned cannon and cannon balls, all approved March 4, 1913.—37 Stat. L., pp. 739, 828, 856 and 1009.

303. 37 United States Statutes at Large, pp. 834 and 856.

304. Statutes of the United States of America passed at the first session of the Sixty-Third Congress, 1913, pp. 29, 74, 215-216.

305. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 3-7.

306. Report of Major General William H. Carter, commanding the Second Division, dated June 30, 1913, in the *War Department Annual Reports for 1913*, Vol. 3, pp. 115-116.

307. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

308. The list of the organizations comprising the Second Division is given in *ibid.*, p. 116.

309. Major Evan M. Johnson, Jr., in the *Infantry Journal* for May-June, 1913, p. 862.

The *Infantry Journal* for July-August, 1913, contained several interesting articles devoted to the 2nd division on the Mexican border.

310. General Carter's report, pp. 119-120.

311. Report of The Adjutant General of the Army for 1913, p. 41.

312. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 14-19.

313. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, p. 27; *General Orders and Bulletins*, War Department, 1913, index p. 29.

314. Report of the Chief of Staff for 1913, pp. 54-55.

315. Records of The Adjutant-General's Office.

316. Report of the Chief of Staff for 1913, p. 55.

317. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 20-21.

318. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26, 28.

319. *General Orders and Bulletins*, War Department, 1913.

320. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, p. 8.

321. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

322. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 30-31; Report of the Chief of Staff for 1913, pp. 30-31.

323. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 31-32.

324. Bulletin No. 18, June 7, 1913, p. 12.—*General Orders and Bulletins*, War Department, 1913.

325. Report of the Secretary of War for 1913, pp. 12-14, 20-24, 27, 30-31.

326. On January 23, 1913, the name of the Washington Branch of the National Cavalry and Artillery Remount Association of the United States was changed to The Washington Branch of the National Remount Association, in order to conform to the new name of the parent association, and on April 23, 1913, the two organizations were merged and the title of The National Remount Association taken.

327. Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs for 1914, pp. 12-13.

328. Statutes of the United States of America passed at the second session of the Sixty-second Congress, 1913-1914, Part I, p. 329.

329. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

330. The history of this measure for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war, down to the time when Colonel du Pont, the senior Senator from Delaware, re-introduced it in the Senate on April 9, 1913, has already been traced on footnotes 258 and 291 of this chapter. It was thereupon referred to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs but no further action was taken. On July 28, 1913, Mr. James Hay, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a similar bill (H. R. 7138) which was referred to that committee, was amended and passed the House on December 3, 1913. On February 20, 1914, Senator Chamberlain, the new Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, reported the bill favorably from that committee with amendments; on April 20, 1914, it passed the Senate; and on April 23rd it was reported out of conference between the two houses, after slight modifications. The difference between the Senate and House bills in their original form was largely one of phraseology, and the measure as finally passed more closely resembled the du Pont bill than the one introduced by Mr. Hay. The term "the Hay bill," so frequently applied to this measure, conveys an impression totally unwarranted by the facts. Whatever credit is deserved by any single individual for this notable law belongs entirely to Colonel du Pont.

331. Statutes of the United States of America, passed at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, 1913-1914, p. 347.

332. Statutes of the United States of America, passed at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, 1913-1914, p. 351.

333. *Ibid.*, pp. 390-392.

334. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

335. "That, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, educational institutions to which an officer of the Army is detailed as professor of military science and tactics may purchase from the War Department for cash, for the use of their military students, such stores, supplies, material of war, and military publications as are furnished to the Army, such sales to be at the price listed to the Army with the cost of transportation added: *Provided*, That all moneys received from the sale of stores, supplies, material of war, and military publications to educational institutions to which an officer of the Army is detailed as professor of military science and tactics shall respectively revert to that appropriation out of which they were originally expended and shall be applied to the purpose for which they were appropriated by law."—*Ibid.*, p. 512.

336. Statutes of the United States of America, passed at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, 1913-1914, p. 514.

337. "An Act To increase the efficiency of the aviation service of the Army, and for other purposes." Approved, July 18, 1914. (*Statutes of the United States of America, passed at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, 1913-1914*, p. 514.)

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That there shall hereafter be, and there is hereby created, an aviation section, which shall be a part of the Signal Corps of the Army, and which shall be, and is hereby, charged with the duty of operating or supervising the operation of all military air craft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation.

"SEC. 2. That, in addition to such officers and enlisted men as shall be assigned from the Signal Corps at large to executive, administrative, scientific, or other duty in or for the aviation section, there shall be in said section aviation officers not to exceed sixty in number, and two hundred and sixty aviation enlisted men of all grades; and said aviation officers and aviation enlisted men, all of whom shall be engaged on duties pertaining to said aviation section, shall be additional to the officers and enlisted men now allotted by law to the Signal Corps, the commissioned and enlisted strengths of which are hereby increased accordingly.

The aviation officers provided for in this section shall, except as hereinafter prescribed specifically to the contrary, be selected from among officers holding commissions in the line of the Army with rank below that of captain, and shall be detailed to serve as such aviation officers for periods of four years, unless sooner relieved, and the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first Statutes, page seven hundred and fifty-five) are hereby extended so as to apply to said aviation officers and to the vacancies created in the line of the Army by the detail of said officers therefrom, but nothing in said Act or in any other law now in force shall be held to prevent the detail or redetail at any time to fill a vacancy among the aviation officers authorized by this Act, of any officer holding a commission in the line of the Army with rank below that of captain, and who, during prior service as an aviation officer in the aviation section, shall have become especially proficient in military aviation.

"There shall also be constantly attached to the aviation section a sufficient number of aviation students to make, with the aviation officers actually detailed in said section under the provisions of this Act, a total number of sixty aviation officers and aviation students constantly under assignment to, or detail in, said section. Said aviation students, all of whom shall be selected on the recommendation of the chief signal officer from among unmarried lieutenants of the line of the Army not over thirty years of age, shall remain attached to the aviation section for a sufficient time, but in no case to exceed one year, to determine their fitness or unfitness for detail as aviation officers in said section, and their detachment from their respective arms of service which under assignment to said section shall not be held to create in said arms vacancies that may be filled by promotions or original appointments: *Provided*, That no person, except in time of war, shall be assigned or detailed against his will to duty as an aviation student or an aviation officer: *Provided further*, That whenever, under such regulations as the Secretary of War shall prescribe and publish to the Army, an officer assigned or detailed to duty of any kind in or with the aviation sec-

tion shall have been found to be inattentive to his duties, inefficient, or incapacitated from any cause whatever for the full and efficient discharge of all duties that might properly be imposed upon him if he should be continued on duty in or with said section, said officer shall be returned forthwith to the branch of the service in which he shall hold a commission.

"SEC. 3. That the aviation officers hereinbefore provided for shall be rated in two classes, to wit, as junior military aviators and as military aviators. Within sixty days after this Act shall take effect the Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, rate as junior military aviators any officers with rank below that of captain, who are now on aviation duty and who have, or shall have before the date of rating so authorized, shown by practical tests, including aerial flights, that they are especially well qualified for military aviation service; and after said rating shall have been made the rating of junior military aviator shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided.

"Each aviation student authorized by this Act shall, while on duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receive an increase of 25 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his line commission. Each duly qualified junior military aviator shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than that held by him under his line commission, provided that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant, and, while on duty, requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in addition an increase of 50 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his line commission. The rating of military aviator shall not be hereafter conferred upon or held by any person except as hereinafter provided, and the number of officers with that rating shall at no time exceed fifteen. Each military aviator who shall hereafter have duly qualified as such under the provisions of this Act shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than that held by him under his line commission, provided that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant, and, while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in addition an increase of 75 per centum of the pay of his grade and length of service under his line commission.

"The aviation enlisted men hereinbefore provided for shall consist of twelve master signal electricians, twelve first-class sergeants, twenty-four sergeants, seventy-eight corporals, eight cooks, eighty-two first-class privates, and forty-four privates. Not to exceed forty of said enlisted men shall at any one time have the rating of aviation mechanic, which rating is hereby established, and said rating shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided: *Provided*, That twelve enlisted men at a time shall, in the discretion of the officer in command of the aviation section, be instructed in the art of flying, and no enlisted man shall be assigned to duty as an aerial flyer against his will except in time of war. Each aviation enlisted man, while on duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, or while holding the rating of aviation mechanic, shall re-

ceive an increase of fifty per centum in his pay: *Provided further*, That, except as hereinafter provided in the cases of officers now on aviation duty, no person shall be detailed as an aviation officer, or rated as a junior military aviator, or as a military aviator, or as an aviation mechanic, until there shall have been issued to him a certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the detail or rating, or for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case, and no such certificate shall be issued to any person until an aviation examining board, which shall be composed of three officers of experience in the aviation service and two medical officers, shall have examined him, under general regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and published to the Army by the War Department, and shall have reported him to be qualified for the detail or rating, or for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of War shall cause appropriate certificates of qualification to be issued by the Adjutant General of the Army to all officers and enlisted men who shall have been found and reported by aviation examining boards in accordance with the terms of this Act, to be qualified for the details and ratings for which said officers and enlisted men shall have been examined: *Provided further*, That except as hereinbefore provided in the cases of officers who are now on aviation duty and who shall be rated as junior military aviators as hereinbefore authorized, no person shall be detailed for service as an aviation officer in the aviation section until he shall have served creditably as an aviation student for a period to be fixed by the Secretary of War; and no person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall have served creditably for at least three years as an aviation officer with the rating of junior military aviator: *Provided further*, That there shall be paid to the widow of any officer or enlisted man who shall die as the result of an aviation accident, not the result of his own misconduct, or to any other person designated by him in writing, an amount equal to one year's pay at the rate to which such officer or enlisted man was entitled at the time of the accident resulting in his death, but any payment made in accordance with the terms of this proviso on account of the death of any officer or enlisted man shall be in lieu of and a bar to any payment under the Acts of Congress approved May eleventh, nineteen hundred and eight, and March third, nineteen hundred and nine (Thirty-fifth Statutes, pages one hundred and eight and seven hundred and fifty-five), on account of death of said officer or enlisted man."

338. Statutes of the United States of America, passed at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, 1913-1914, p. 568.

339. *Ibid.*, pp. 677-678.

340. *Ibid.*, p. 770.

341. *Ibid.*, p. 776.

342. Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, p. 1.

343. Report of The Adjutant General of the Army for 1914, p. 44.

344. Composed of four regiments of infantry, of the 5th Brigade, Company E of 2nd battalion of Engineers and field hospital No. 3, which sailed in the transports *Sumner*, *McClellan*, *Kilpatrick*, and *Meade*.—Report of The Adjutant General of the Army for 1914, p. 43.

345. On April 29, 1914, the headquarters, band, a detachment of the

1st battalion of the 4th Field Artillery, and Troops I and K of the 6th Cavalry sailed from Galveston in the chartered transport *San Marcos*, followed next day by Company D of the Signal Corps in the naval transport *Esperanza*.—*Ibid.*, p. 43.

346. Reports for 1914 of the Secretary of War, pp. 1-2; of the Chief of Staff (Major General W. W. Wotherspoon), p. 13; and of The Adjutant General of the Army, p. 43.

347. Report of the Chief of Staff (General Wotherspoon) for 1913, p. 13.

348. Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session, on National Defense Bills, p. 22.

349. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

350. Regulations and information relating to Students' Military Instruction Camps were published by the War Department in Bulletin No. 1, dated October 17, 1913, and in Bulletin No. 1, dated March 25, 1914.

351. Records of The Adjutant-General's Office transmitted to the author on January 4, 1915.

352. War Department Bulletin No. 48, dated November 4, 1914.

353. Report of The Adjutant-General of the Army for 1914, pp. 40-41.

354. Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs for 1914, pp. 7, 8 and 10.

355. Report of the Secretary of War for 1914, p. 2.

356. Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation Bill for 1916, pp. 28-29.

357. The first measure embodying appropriations for the transportation of the Army and its supplies was the Urgent Deficiencies Act, approved January 25, 1915.—*Public—No. 236—63d Congress* (H. R. 20241), p. 2.

358. *Public—No. 251—63d Congress* (H. R. 17765).

359. *Public—No. 263—63d Congress* (H. R. 21318), pp. 22-36, 72-73.

360. *Public—No. 264—63d Congress* (H. R. 21491), pp. 1-6.

361. *Public—No. 290—63d Congress* (H. R. 19909), pp. 28-31.

362. *Public—No. 292—63d Congress* (H. R. 20347).

363. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24-27.

364. Under this heading the President was authorized to retain Major General Arthur Murray on the active list and as commander of the Western Department from April 29, 1915, to the close of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition on December 4, 1915, when he was to be retired. Moreover, the number of Major Generals of the line of the Army was increased by one for that period "and for that period only."—*Public—No. 292—63d Congress* (H. R. 20347), p. 4.

365. *Public—No. 293—63d Congress* (H. R. 20415), p. 5.


366. *Public—No. 295—63d Congress* (H. R. 21328).

367. *Public—No. 296—63d Congress* (H. R. 21546), pp. 7-8.


368. *Public—No. 316—63d Congress* (H. R. 16510), pp. 1-2.

369. *Public—No. 327—63d Congress* (S. 5495), p. 16.

370. Congressional Record for Friday, January 22, 1915, vol. 52, No. 37, pp. 2248-2282.



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
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
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
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
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












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