



THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
R. C. MERRILL







Salut. et Fraternité
Auguste Comte

DB

MODERN THINKERS

PRINCIPALLY UPON

SOCIAL SCIENCE:

What They Think, and Why.

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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With Eight Portraits.



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THIS BOOK IS
AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
TO THE

Philosophical Society of Chicago

AND
*TO EACH OF ITS MEMBERS, PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE.*

THOUGH SIMPLE IN ORGANIZATION AND INEXPENSIVE IN ITS
MEANS, THE SOCIETY IS DOING AN EMINENT AND
FAR-REACHING WORK, FOR THE PROMOTION
OF INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY AND
HUMAN WELFARE, AND
DESERVES TO BE THE PARENT OF THOUSANDS OF
SIMILAR SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD AND THROUGHOUT
THE AGES.

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PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR.

This book is both a product and a proof of the extent to which in America, the daily Press, owing to its greater wealth, circulation, and enterprise, is performing for the people, as rapidly as the demand arises, the function which in Europe is performed by the Reviews, viz., that of supplying discussions of the more abstract elements of Politics and Sociology, and rendering the reading public familiar to some extent with the philosophic systems of leading thinkers. The articles embraced in this volume were written for THE CHICAGO TIMES, at the request of Mr. Storey, its editor, and published in its Saturday edition, which has a circulation of some sixty thousand copies, before being collected in book form. Most of them attracted very general attention, and letters of criticism, commendation and response came in to them from the most distant and unexpected quarters of the globe, as well as from points near at hand. One request for their publication in book form comes from a German, residing in Egypt, another from a Frenchman, in Quebec. The fact that the most experienced, enterprising and successful daily journalist now living, should open his columns to expositions of current philosophic and sociological systems, requiring so much space, and that they should be widely read and preserved by those who have read them in this form, indicates that there is an increasing demand on the part of the public for thought that is independent of any and all forms of theological bias. The people demand to know, not merely what seers and prophets, oracles and men acting under some

form of mystical infatuation or supernatural frenzy, have taught, for there is always a liability that these may be lunatics, but also what the calm scholars and rigid investigators who were favored with no divine afflatus, have thought concerning man, his origin, duty, and destiny. For while a few of the latter, like Newton and Comte, have suffered from cerebral disease brought on by stress of mental labor, even these differ from seers like Swedenborg and Mahomet, in the fact that we are not indebted to their disease for their revelations. Philosophers as well as prophets may be the subjects of catalepsy or of lunacy. But a marked distinction still reigns, if the latter, like Mahomet, commune with angels only while foaming at the mouth, while the former, like Comte, elaborate their philosophic systems only after all signs of mental distress have disappeared.

No attempt has been made in the following volume to collect the views of merely speculative philosophers or metaphysicians—those who undertake to consider the nature of knowledge, of being, of consciousness, of ideas, or of the sources of any of these. It has designedly nothing to say of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, or any of the German metaphysicians from Spinoza to Hegel. It aims only to present a few of the leading thinkers upon Social Science; upon the great questions arising out of the evils that afflict society and the supposed means of scientifically and philosophically counteracting them. It endeavors, however, to elucidate the systems of each more constructively and sympathetically than is usually done in histories of philosophy.

Swedenborg thought society would derive its greatest salvation from an entire renovation of the accepted creeds of Christianity. Spiritualizing what had become materi-

alized, and converting Hell from a Lake of Flame into a love of self, and Heaven from a Jewelled City into an amiable character, he then adhered to the spiritualized Word, thus obtained or created, as the most potent means of renovating society through the purification of its individual members. Though his means were theological, his end was social.

Adam Smith thought wealth, industry, division of labor, the introduction of money and freedom of exchange, to be the great progressive forces in society, though for eighteen centuries Christianity had been compelled, by the narrow social views which attended its origin, to deery wealth, and the love and pursuit of it as the source of all misery. Dr. Smith founded a school of economists, whose views as to the method of counteracting the evils of society are none the less hostile to those of the Sermon on the Mount, from the fact that economical writers seldom so much as deign to notice the hostility.

Jeremy Bentham discovered that crime was not an impulse of the devil, but a result of imperfect development; and taught mankind that the reform of many of our evils lay in governing men less and teaching them more. Both Smith and Bentham were, as eminently, positive scientific philosophers as if they had sat under the teachings of Auguste Comte.

Thomas Paine was the representative critic, destroyer and revolutionist of his period, but his end at all times was such a reconstruction of society as would prevent the building up of an aristocratic governing class, by keeping the wheel of popular elections in perpetual revolution. His political ideas corresponded more closely with the actual form and structure of the American governments than those of any of his cotemporaries. This entitles him to a front rank as a Social Philosopher.

Charles Fourier and Herbert Spencer have made Sociology their chief end and aim. Ernst Haeckel put in a scientific form the evidences of the spontaneous evolution of man the individual, from the lower forms of life, thus knocking away the last prop that sustained the teleological and supernatural theories of the Evolution of Society. He who writes a scientific genesis for man, begins the true History and Philosophy of Society at its actual beginning. According to Haeckel the child begins in the womb, where Human Society begins in its true Adam, viz.: in a cell clothed in protoplasm. All the subsequent growth arises out of adaptation to its environment, and heredity. The great powers therefore which make up progress are tact and talent. Tact is that which adapts each life to its environment, from the mote that basks in the sunbeam to the millionaire that controls a railway. Talent is the growth which each life underwent in its parent, the original inheritance of calibre, vitality and force, with which offspring are born into the world. All creation, including the Creation of Society, is the evolution, by material forms, of these two innate powers, equally present in a worm and in a Webster; the extent and complexity of the environment upon which they act, growing always with the diversity and complexity of the mechanism through which they act.

August Comte could not have fitly closed the theological and metaphysical periods in his own person, had he not by example boldly taught the world that the business of god-making was a legitimate branch of human industry. It was philosophically impossible for any man to imagine a God that would not be a product of human imagination. But Comte, as an ambitious and scientific manufacturer of Deity could not be content with

taking some fraction, or attribute, or type of humanity, whether Jewish, Greek or Roman, for his idol, but must embrace in one comprehensive act of worship the entire stock, whatever it might inventory. Comte attempted to substitute Sociology for Theology, Sociolatriy for Idolatry, and Socioeracy for Democracy, Plutocracy and Ecclesiocracy.

Although but a century has passed since Swedenborg, Bentham, Adam Smith and Thomas Paine taught, the political ideas of the three last have passed into the creed of the common people, and the theologians of the present day would be extremely glad to compromise on Swedenborg's views of the Word, if they could thereby rescue it from its impending utter extinction as a power over human thought. The tendency of society for half a century past has rapidly been toward a complete realization of many of the social theories, both of Fourier and Comte, unlike as their views are in their details. Spencer and Haeckel expound evolution amidst the applause of the generation that hears them, with the assurance that all theological expositions, having already been banished from scientific minds, cannot long dwell in the popular mind.

To this state of facts the question that comes up from every quarter is, "What are you going to give us in place of the idols and myths you are destroying?" And to this the great thinkers answer, in substance, "We will give you the patience that is content to assume to know only that which human faculties have the capacity to reduce to knowledge. We will give you the knowledge which does all that has ever been done to adorn, bless and ennoble Human Life. If we should discover any fact concerning another life we will give it you as freely as we would give those concerning this life. We will

give you all that the educated and scientific men of the world have ever believed, viz., the accumulated results of all observation, experiment and comparison. We will impose upon you no guesses which nature has endowed us with no faculties for verifying."

"It took two thousand years," says Condorcet, "for Archimedes and Apollonius' investigations in Mathematics and Astronomy to so perfect the science of navigation as to save the sailor from shipwreck." But when the science was perfected, it totally superseded the efforts of the human mind to control, through prayers and sacrifices that divine mind which controlled the seas and the winds, or to secure safety for the ship by exerting a supernatural influence over its environment. So long as prayer strove to adapt the seas to the ship it went down. When science adapted the ship to the seas it sailed on. It cost a like period of study before chemists discovered that the Basilisk which haunted cellars, which was invisible, but which killed all whom it looked upon, was carbonic acid gas. But when this was discovered the Basilisk's dreadful eye was no longer fatal. The world is still filled with invisible Basilisks, invisible save as knowledge makes them visible, but killing their millions. Epidemic diseases, cruel and false social theories, vast social wrongs and oppressions, great theological wastes of wealth relatively to no purpose, compared with the good it might effect, are among these Basilisks. Incantations have been chanted over them, but they still kill. Anathemas and prayers have failed to exterminate them. Slowly but surely the world's great thinkers are exterminating them, for what they think to-day, forms the creed of educated men to-morrow, and of all men on the day after.

INTRODUCTION.

If others who read this book get as much information as I did from the advance sheets, they will feel repaid a hundred times. It is perfectly delightful to take advantage of the conscientious labors of those who go through and through volume after volume, divide with infinite patience the gold from the dross, and present us with the pure and shining coin. Such men may be likened to bees who save us numberless journeys by giving us the fruit of their own.

While this book will greatly add to the information of all who read it, it may not increase the happiness of some to find that Swedenborg was really insane. But when they remember that he was raised by a bishop, and disappointed in love, they will cease to wonder at his mental condition. Certainly an admixture of theology and "disprized love" is often sufficient to compel reason to abdicate the throne of the mightiest soul.

The trouble with Swedenborg was, that he changed realities into dreams, and then, out of the dreams made facts, upon which he built, and with which he constructed his system.

He regarded all realities as shadows cast by ideas. To him the material was the unreal, and things were

definitions of the ideas of God. He seemed to think that he had made a discovery when he found that ideas were back of words, and that language had a subjective as well as an objective origin; that is, that the interior meaning had been clothed upon. Of course, a man capable of drawing the conclusion that natural reason cannot harmonize with spiritual truth because he had seen a beetle, in a dream, that could not use its feet, is capable of any absurdity of which the imagination can conceive. The fact is, that Swedenborg believed the Bible. That was his misfortune. His mind had been overpowered by the bishop, but the woman had not utterly destroyed his heart. He was shocked by the literal interpretation of the Scriptures, and sought to avoid the difficulty by giving new meanings consistent with the decency and goodness of God. He pointed out a way to preserve the old Bible with a new interpretation. In this way infidelity could be avoided; and, in his day, that was almost a necessity. Had Swedenborg taken the ground that the Bible was not inspired, the ears of the world would have been stopped. His readers believed in the dogma of inspiration, and asked not how to destroy the Scriptures, but for some way in which they might be preserved. He and his followers unconsciously rendered immense service to the cause of intellectual enfranchisement by their efforts to show the necessity of giving new meanings to the barbarous laws, and cruel orders of Jehovah. For this purpose they attacked with great fury the literal text, taking the

ground that if the old interpretation was right, the Bible was the work of savage men. They heightened in every way the absurdities, cruelties and contradictions of the Scriptures for the purpose of showing that a new interpretation must be found, and that the way pointed out by Swedenborg was the only one by which the Bible could be saved.

Great men are, after all, the instrumentalities of their time. The heart of the civilized world was beginning to revolt at the cruelties ascribed to God, and was seeking for some interpretation of the Bible that kind and loving people could accept. The method of interpretation found by Swedenborg was suitable for all. Each was permitted to construct his own "science of correspondence" and gather such fruits as he might prefer. In this way the ravings of revenge can instantly be changed to mercy's melting tones, and murder's dagger to a smile of love. In this way and in no other, can we explain the numberless mistakes and crimes ascribed to God. Thousands of most excellent people, afraid to throw away the idea of inspiration, hailed with joy a discovery that allowed them to write a Bible for themselves.

But, whether Swedenborg was right or not, every man who reads a book, necessarily gets from that book all that he is capable of receiving. Every man who walks in the forest, or gathers a flower, or looks at a picture, or stands by the sea, gets all the intellectual wealth he is capable of receiving. What the forest, the

flower, the picture or the sea is to him, depends upon his mind, and upon the stage of development he has reached. So that after all, the Bible must be a different book to each person who reads it, as the revelations of nature depend upon the individual to whom they are revealed, or by whom they are discovered. And the extent of the revelation or discovery depends absolutely upon the intellectual and moral development of the person to whom, or by whom, the revelation or discovery is made. So that the Bible cannot be the same to any two people, but each one must necessarily interpret it for himself. Now, the moment the doctrine is established that we can give to this book such meanings as are consistent with our highest ideals; that we can treat the old words as purses or old stockings in which to put our gold, then, each one will, in effect, make a new inspired Bible for himself, and throw the old away. If his mind is narrow, if he has been raised by ignorance and nursed by fear, he will believe in the literal truth of what he reads. If he has a little courage he will doubt, and the doubt will with new interpretations modify the literal text; but if his soul is free he will with scorn reject it all.

Swedenborg did one thing for which I feel almost grateful. He gave an account of having met John Calvin in hell. Nothing connected with the supernatural could be more perfectly natural than this. The only thing detracting from the value of this report is,

that if there is a hell, we know without visiting the place that John Calvin must be there.

All honest founders of religions have been the dreamers of dreams, the sport of insanity, the prey of visions, the deceivers of others and of themselves. All will admit that Swedenborg was a man of great intellect, of vast acquirements and of honest intentions; and I think it equally clear that upon one subject, at least, his mind was touched, shattered and shaken.

Misled by analogies, imposed upon by the bishop, deceived by the woman, borne to other worlds upon the wings of dreams, living in the twilight of reason and the dawn of insanity, he regarded every fact as a patched and ragged garment with a lining of the costliest silk, and insisted that the wrong side, even of the silk, was far more beautiful than the right.

Herbert Spencer is almost the opposite of Swedenborg. He relies upon evidence, upon demonstration, upon experience, and occupies himself with one world at a time. He perceives that there is a mental horizon that we cannot pierce, and that beyond that is the unknown—possibly the unknowable. He endeavors to examine only that which is capable of being examined, and considers the theological method as not only useless, but hurtful. After all, God is but a guess, throned and established by arrogance and assertion. Turning his attention to those things that have in some way affected the condition of mankind, Spencer leaves the unknowable to priests and to the believers in the “moral

government" of the world. He sees only natural causes and natural results, and seeks to induce man to give up gazing into void and empty space, that he may give his entire attention to the world in which he lives. He sees that right and wrong do not depend upon the arbitrary will of even an infinite being, but upon the nature of things; that they are relations, not entities, and that they cannot exist, so far as we know, apart from human experience.

It may be that men will finally see that selfishness and self-sacrifice are both mistakes; that the first devours itself; that the second is not demanded by the good, and that the bad are unworthy of it. It may be that our race has never been, and never will be, deserving of a martyr. Sometime we may see that justice is the highest possible form of mercy and love, and that all should not only be allowed, but compelled to reap exactly what they sow; that industry should not support idleness, and that they who waste the spring, and summer, and autumn of their lives should bear the winter when it comes. The fortunate should assist the victims of accident; the strong should defend the weak, and the intellectual should lead, with loving hands, the mental poor; but Justice should remove the bandage from her eyes long enough to distinguish between the vicious and the unfortunate.

Mr. Spencer is wise enough to declare that "acts are called good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends;" and he might have added, that ends

are good or bad according as they affect the happiness of mankind.

It would be hard to over-estimate the influence of this great man. From an immense intellectual elevation he has surveyed the world of thought. He has rendered absurd the idea of Special Providence, born of the egotism of savagery. He has shown that the "will of God" is not a rule for human conduct; that morality is not a cold and heartless tyrant; that by the destruction of the individual will a higher life cannot be reached, and that after all, an intelligent love of self extends the hand of help and kindness to all the human race.

But had it not been for such men as Thomas Paine, Herbert Spencer could not have existed for a century to come. Some one had to lead the way, to raise the standard of revolt, and draw the sword of war. Thomas Paine was a natural revolutionist. He was opposed to every government existing in his day. Next to establishing a wise and just republic based upon the equal rights of man, the best thing that can be done is to destroy a monarchy.

Paine had a sense of justice, and had imagination enough to put himself in the place of the oppressed. He had, also, what in these pages is so felicitously expressed, "a haughty intellectual pride, and a willingness to pit his individual thought against the clamor of a world."

I cannot believe that he wrote the letters of "Junius," although the two critiques combined in this volume,

entitled Paine and Junius, make by far, the best argument upon that subject I have ever read. *First*, Paine could have had no personal hatred against the men so bitterly assailed by Junius. *Second*, He knew, at that time, but little of English politicians, and certainly had never associated with men occupying the highest positions, and could not have been personally acquainted with the leading statesmen of England. *Third*, He was not an unjust man. He was neither a coward, a calumniator nor a sneak. All these delightful qualities must have lovingly united in the character of Junius. *Fourth*. Paine could have had no reason for keeping the secret after coming to America.

I have always believed that Junius, after having written his letters, accepted office from the very men he had maligned, and at last became a pensioner of the victims of his slander. "Had he as many mouths as Hydra, such a course must have closed them all." Certainly the author must have kept the secret to prevent the loss of his reputation.

It cannot be denied that the style of Junius is much like that of Paine. Should it be established that Paine wrote the letters of Junius, it would not, in my judgment, add to his reputation as a writer. Regarded as literary efforts they cannot be compared with *Common Sense*, *The Crisis*, or *The Rights of Man*.

The claim that Paine was the real author of the Declaration of Independence is much better founded. I am inclined to think that he actually wrote it; but

whether this is true or not, every idea contained in it had been written by him long before. It is now claimed that the original document is in Paine's handwriting. It certainly is not in Jefferson's. Certain it is that Jefferson could not have written anything so manly, so striking, so comprehensive, so clear, so convincing and so faultless in rhetoric and rhythm as the Declaration of Independence.

Paine was the first man to write these words, "The United States of America." He was the first great champion of absolute separation from England. He was the first to urge the adoption of a federal constitution; and, more clearly than any other man of his time, he perceived the future greatness of this country.

He has been blamed for his attack on Washington. The truth is, he was in prison in France. He had committed the crime of voting against the execution of the king. It was the grandest act of his life, but at that time to be merciful was criminal. Paine being an American citizen, asked Washington, then President, to say a word to Robespierre in his behalf. Washington remained silent. In the calmness of power, the serenity of fortune, Washington the President, read the request of Paine the prisoner, and with the complacency of assured fame, consigned to the waste basket of forgetfulness the patriot's cry for help.

"Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back,
Wherein he puts alms for oblivion,
A great-sized monster of ingratitudes.

Those scraps are good deeds past, which are devour'd
As fast as they are made, forgot as soon
As done."

In this controversy, my sympathies are with the prisoner.

Paine did more to free the mind, to destroy the power of ministers and priests in the New World than any other man. In order to answer his arguments, the churches found it necessary to attack his character. There was a general resort to falsehood. In trying to destroy the reputation of Paine, the churches have demoralized themselves. Nearly every minister has been a willing witness against the truth. Upon the grave of Thomas Paine, the churches of America have sacrificed their honor. The influence of the Hero author increases every day, and there are more copies of the "Age of Reason," sold in the United States, than of any work written in defense of the Christian religion. Hypocrisy, with its forked tongue, its envious and malignant heart, lies coiled upon the memory of Paine, ready to fasten its poisonous fangs in the reputation of any man who dares defend the great and generous dead.

Leaving the dust and glory of revolutions, let us spend a moment of quiet with Adam Smith. I was glad to find that a man's ideas upon the subject of protection and free trade depend almost entirely upon the country in which he lives, or the business in which he happens to be engaged, and that, after all, each man regards the universe as a circumference of which he is the center.

It gratified me to learn that even Adam Smith was no exception to this rule, and that he regarded all "protection as a hurtful and ignorant interference," except when exercised for the good of Great Britain. Owing to the fact that his nationality quarrelled with his philosophy, he succeeded in writing a book that is quoted with equal satisfaction by both parties. The protectionists rely upon the exceptions he made for England, and the free traders upon the doctrines he laid down for other countries.

He seems to have reasoned upon the question of money precisely as we have, of late years, in the United States; and he has argued both sides equally well. Poverty asks for inflation. Wealth is conservative, and always says there is money enough.

Upon the question of money, this volume contains the best thing I have ever read. "The only mode of procuring the service of others, on any large scale, in the absence of money, is by force, which is slavery. Money, by constituting a medium in which the smallest services can be paid for, substitutes wages for the lash, and renders the liberty of the individual consistent with the maintenance and support of society." There is more philosophy in that one paragraph than Adam Smith expresses in his whole work. It may truthfully be said, that without money, liberty is impossible. No one, whatever his views may be, can read the article on Adam Smith, without profit and delight.

The discussion of the money question is in every

respect admirable, and is as candid as able. The world will sooner or later learn that there is nothing miraculous in finance; that money is a real and tangible thing, a product of labor, serving not merely as a medium of exchange but as a basis of credit as well; that it cannot be created by an act of the legislature; that dreams cannot be coined, and that only labor, in some form, can put, upon the hand of want, Alladin's magic ring.

Adam Smith wrote upon the wealth of nations, while Charles Fourier labored for the happiness of mankind. In this country, few seem to understand communism. While, here, it may be regarded as vicious idleness, armed with the assassin's knife and the incendiary's torch, in Europe, it is a different thing. There it is a reaction from Feudalism. Nobility is communism in its worst possible form. Nothing can be worse than for idleness to eat the bread of industry. Communism in Europe is not the "stand and deliver" of the robber, but the protest of the robbed. Centuries ago, kings and priests, that is to say, thieves and hypocrites, divided Europe among themselves. Under this arrangement, the few were masters and the many slaves. Nearly every government in the Old World rests upon simple brute force. It is hard for the many to understand why the few should own the soil. Neither can they clearly see why they should give their brain and blood to those who steal their birthright and their bread. It has occurred to them that they who do the most should not receive the least, and that, after all, an indus-

trious peasant is of far more value to the world than a vain and idle king.

The Communists of France, blinded as they were, made the Republic possible. Had they joined with their countrymen, the invaders would have been repelled, and some Napoleon would still have occupied the throne. Socialism perceives that Germany has been enslaved by victory, while France found liberty in defeat. In Russia the Nihilists prefer chaos to the government of the bayonet, Siberia and the knout, and these intrepid men have kept upon the coast of despotism one beacon fire of hope.

As a matter of fact, every society is a species of communism—a kind of co-operation in which selfishness, in spite of itself, benefits the community. Every industrious man adds to the wealth, not only of his nation, but to that of the world. Every inventor increases human power, and every sculptor, painter and poet adds to the value of human life.

Fourier, touched by the sufferings of the poor as well as by the barren joys of hoarded wealth, and discovering the vast advantages of combined effort, and the immense economy of co-operation, sought to find some way for men to help themselves by helping each other. He endeavored to do away with monopoly and competition, and to ascertain some method by which the sensuous, the moral, and the intellectual passions of man could be gratified.

For my part I can place no confidence in any system

that does away, or tends to do away, with the institution of marriage. I can conceive of no civilization of which the family must not be the unit.

Societies cannot be made; they must grow. Philosophers may predict, but they cannot create. They may point out as many ways as they please; but after all, humanity will travel in paths of its own.

Fourier sustained about the same relation to this world that Swedenborg did to the other. There must be something wrong about the brain of one who solemnly asserts that "the elephant, the ox and the diamond, were created by the sun; the horse, the lily and the ruby, by Saturn; the cow, the jonquil and the topaz by Jupiter; and the dog, the violet and the opal stones by the earth itself.

And yet, forgetting these aberrations of the mind, this lunacy of a great and loving soul, for one, I hold in tenderest regard the memory of Charles Fourier, one of the best and noblest of our race.

While Fourier was in his cradle, Jeremy Bentham, who read history when three years old, played on the violin at five, "and at fifteen detected the fallacies of Blackstone," was demonstrating that the good was the useful; that a thing was right because it paid in the highest and best sense; that utility was the basis of morals; that without allowing interest to be paid upon money commerce could not exist; and that the object of all human governments should be to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He read

Hume and Helvetius, threw away the Thirty-nine Articles, and endeavored to impress upon the English Law the fact that its ancestor was a feudal savage. He held the past in contempt, hated Westminster and despised Oxford. He combated the idea that governments were originally founded on contract. Locke and Blackstone talked as though men originally lived apart, and formed societies by agreement. These writers probably imagined that at one time the trees were separated like telegraph poles, and finally came together and made groves by agreement. I believe that it was Puffendorf who said that slavery was originally founded on contract. To which Voltaire replied:—"If my lord Puffendorf will produce the original contract *signed by the party who was to be the slave*, I will admit the truth of his statement."

A contract back of society is a myth manufactured by those in power to serve as a title to place, and to impress the multitude with the idea that they are, in some mysterious way, bound, fettered, and even benefitted by its terms.

The glory of Bentham is, that he gave the true basis of morals, and furnished statesmen with the star and compass of this sentence:—"The greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Most scientists have deferred to the theologians. They have admitted that some questions could not, at present, be solved. These admissions have been thankfully received by the clergy, who have always begged for

some curtain to be left, behind which their God could still exist. Men calling themselves "scientific" have tried to harmonize the "apparent" discrepancies between the Bible and the *other* works of Jehovah. In this way they have made reputations. They were at once quoted by the ministers as wonderful examples of piety and learning. These men discounted the future that they might enjoy the ignorant praise of the present. Agassiz preferred the applause of Boston, while he lived, to the reverence of a world after he was dead. Small men appear great only when they agree with the multitude.

The last Scientific Congress in America was opened with prayer. Think of a science that depends upon the efficacy of words addressed to the Unknown and Unknowable!

In our country, most of the so-called scientists are professors in sectarian colleges, in which Moses is considered a geologist, and Joshua an astronomer. For the most part their salaries depend upon the ingenuity with which they can explain away facts and dodge demonstration.

The situation is about the same in England. When Mr. Huxley saw fit to attack the Mosaic account of the creation, he did not deem it advisable to say plainly what he meant. He attacked the account of creation as given by Milton, although he knew that the Mosaic and Miltonic were substantially the same. Science has acted like a guest without a wedding garment, and has

continually apologized for existing. In the presence of arrogant absurdity, overawed by the patronizing airs of a successful charlatan, it has played the role of a "poor relation," and accepted, while sitting below the salt, insults as honors.

There can be no more pitiable sight than a scientist in the employ of superstition dishonoring himself without assisting his master. But there are a multitude of brave and tender men who give their honest thoughts, who are true to nature, who give the facts and let consequences shirk for themselves, who know the value and meaning of a truth, and who have bravely tried the creeds by scientific tests.

Among the bravest, side by side with the greatest of the world, in Germany, the land of science, stands Ernst Haeckel, who may be said to have not only demonstrated the theories of Darwin, but the Monistic conception of the world. Rejecting all the puerile ideas of a personal Creator, he has had the courage to adopt the noble words of Bruno:—"A spirit exists in all things, and no body is so small, but it contains a part of the divine substance within itself, by which it is animated." He has endeavored—and I think with complete success—to show that there is not, and never was, and never can be the *Creator* of anything. There is no more a personal Creator than there is a personal destroyer. Matter and force must have existed from eternity, all generation must have been spontaneous,

and the simplest organisms must have been the ancestors of the most perfect and complex.

Haeckel is one of the bitterest enemies of the church, and is, therefore, one of the bravest friends of man.

Catholicism was, at one time, the friend of education—of an education sufficient to make a Catholic out of a barbarian. Protestantism was also in favor of education—of an education sufficient to make a Protestant out of a Catholic. But now, it having been demonstrated that real education will make free-thinkers, Catholics and Protestants both, are the enemies of true learning.

In all countries where human beings are held in bondage, it is a crime to teach a slave to read and write. Masters know that education is an abolitionist, and theologians know that science is the deadly foe of every creed in Christendom.

In the age of Faith, a personal god stood at the head of every department of ignorance, and was supposed to be the King of kings, the rewarder and punisher of individuals, and the governor of nations.

The worshipers of this god have always regarded the men in love with simple facts, as atheists in disguise. And it must be admitted that nothing is more atheistic than a fact. Pure science is necessarily godless. It is incapable of worship. It investigates, and cannot afford to shut its eyes even long enough to pray. There was a time when those who disputed the divine right of kings were denounced as blasphemous; but the time came when liberty demanded that a personal god should be

retired from politics. In our country this was substantially done in 1776, when our fathers declared that all power to govern came from the consent of the governed. The cloud-theory was abandoned, and one government has been established for the benefit of mankind. Our fathers did not keep God out of the Constitution from principle, but from jealousy. Each church, in colonial times, preferred to live in single blessedness rather than see some rival wedded to the State. Mutual hatred planted our tree of religious liberty. A constitution without a god has at last given us a nation without a slave.

A personal god sustains the same relation to religion as to politics. The Deity is a master, and man a serf; and this relation is inconsistent with true progress. The Universe ought to be a pure democracy—an infinite republic without a tyrant and without a chain.

Auguste Comte endeavored to put humanity in the place of Jehovah, and no conceivable change can be more desirable than this. This great man did not, like some of his followers, put a mysterious something called law in the place of God, which is simply giving the old master a new name. Law is this side of phenomena, not the other. It is not the cause, neither is it the result of phenomena. The fact of succession and resemblance, that is to say, the same thing happening under the same conditions, is all we mean by law. No one can conceive of a law existing apart from matter, or controlling matter, any more than he can understand the eternal pro-

cession of the Holy Ghost, or motion apart from substance. We are beginning to see that law does not, and cannot exist as an entity, but that it is only a conception of the mind to express the fact that the same entities, under the same conditions, produce the same results. Law does not produce the entities, the conditions, or the results, or even the sameness of the results. Neither does it affect the relations of entities, nor the result of such relations, but it stands simply for the fact that the same causes under the same conditions, eternally have, and eternally will produce the same results.

The metaphysicians are always giving us explanations of phenomena which are as difficult to understand, as the phenomena they seek to explain; and the believers in God establish their dogmas by miracles, and then substantiate the miracles by assertion.

The Designer of the teleologist, the First Cause of the religious philosopher, the Vital Force of the biologist, and the law of the half orthodox scientist, are all the shadowy children of ignorance and fear.

The Universe is all there is. It is both subject and object; contemplator and contemplated; creator and created; destroyer and destroyed; preserver and preserved; and within itself are all causes, modes, motions and effects.

Unable in some things to rise above the superstitions of his day, Comte adopted not only the machinery, but some of the prejudices, of Catholicism. He made the mistake of Luther. He tried to reform the Church of

Rome. Destruction is the only reformation of which that church is capable. Every religion is based upon a misconception, not only of the cause of phenomena, but of the real object of life; that is to say, upon falsehood; and the moment the truth is known and understood, these religions must fall. In the field of thought, they are briars, thorns, and noxious weeds; on the shores of intellectual discovery, they are sirens, and in the forests that the brave thinkers are now penetrating, they are the wild beasts, fanged and monstrous. You cannot reform these weeds. Sirens cannot be changed into good citizens; and such wild beasts, even when tamed, are of no possible use. Destruction is the only remedy. Reformation is a hospital where the new philosophy exhausts its strength nursing the old religion.

There was, in the brain of the great Frenchman, the dawn of that happy day in which humanity will be the only religion, good the only god, happiness the only object, restitution the only atonement, mistake the only sin, and affection, guided by intelligence, the only savior of mankind. This dawn enriched his poverty, illuminated the darkness of his life, peopled his loneliness with the happy millions yet to be, and filled his eyes with proud and tender tears.

A few years ago I asked the superintendent of Pere La Chaise if he knew where I could find the tomb of Auguste Comte. He had never heard even the name of the author of the Positive Philosophy. I asked him if he had ever heard of Napoleon Bonaparte. In a half-in-

sulted tone, he replied, "Of course I have, why do you ask me such a question?" "Simply," was my answer, "that I might have the opportunity of saying, that when everything connected with Napoleon, except his crimes, shall have been forgotten, Auguste Comte will be lovingly remembered as a benefactor of the human race."

The Jewish God must be dethroned! A personal Deity must go back to the darkness of barbarism from whence he came. The theologians must abdicate and popes, priests, and clergymen labeled as "extinct species," must occupy the mental museums of the future.

In my judgment, this book, filled with original thought, will hasten the coming of that blessed time.

ROBERT G. INGERSOLL.

Washington, D. C., Nov. 29, 1879.



EMANUEL SWEDENBORG.

SWEDENBORG.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Emannel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm, January 29, 1688, and died in London, England, March 29, 1772. He was the son of a bishop, and, both by inheritance and by early education, a strong bias was imparted to his nature in favor of acts of devotion and theological study. Being disappointed in his first love episode he never married, though he seems to have been amorously desirous of women, a desire which he religiously repressed. His life stands divided into three parts or phases. The first phase comprises all his life from birth to his attainment to the age of fifty-five years. This phase was one of physical and mental health, in which Swedenborg's sleep and mode of life were essentially regular, and during all of which he was occupied in extended studies of a material cast, relating largely to mathematics, mechanics, mining, metallurgy, smelting and engineering. He attained copious and minute learning and wrote many diffuse and heavy treatises on these branches, sufficient to give him a prominent place among the men of learning of his time, though it does not appear that any of his scientific works would on their own merits have survived the years in which they were published. He was respected for his learning, advanced in 1719 to the nobility, was introduced to Charles XII., and by him appointed an assessor extraordinary to the college of mines, an associate engineer with the eminent Polhem, and for two years maintained close personal relations with the king, whom he is said to have assisted in his military operations. The nature of his scientific

and practical pursuits during this period, and the degree of credit they drew upon him from his government and nation may be likened to the similar position attained half a century later by Franklin relatively to the rising American nation, as both a scientist and a man of affairs. Where Franklin's nature found vent in philosophy and skepticism, however, that of Swedenborg took refuge in faith and pietism, even during the long half century in which his mind was unquestionably sane and his labors, if not of vast or permanent value, were at least useful and sufficient to confer upon him ordinary social distinction as a gentleman of large scientific and scholarly attainment.

The second period of Swedenborg's life, and, in a physio-psychological point of view, the most important in explaining the exact value of his subsequent revelations as a seer, is the part when that class of abnormal physical manifestations pervaded his body, brain and nervous system, which, in any modern trial, and subjected to the opinions of modern medical experts, would be inevitably characterized, by the verdict of any intelligent jury, as the phenomena of hysteria, catalepsy, trance and lunacy.

The third period is that wherein his religious and theological works were written, all of which are pervaded by the chief characteristic of an insane mind; viz., an inability to distinguish between mere subjective fancies, the airy nothings of the imagination, and objective facts, grasped in true verity by the senses; combined with this disturbed condition of his intellect, there was, however, a facility in detecting the poetic relation between those remotely derived ideas ordinarily called spiritual and physical symbols, which has the effect of rendering even those writings in which confusion of thought and lunacy make themselves painfully apparent to philosophic minds, exceedingly attractive to merely poetic and fanciful natures who have no power of distinguishing mere titillations of the imagination from elucidations of pure truth. Occasionally, also, there are sustained flights of poetic imagery which, by the beauty of

their analogies and symbolism and by their ingenuity of statement, are very imposing to minds predisposed by their constitution to conceive that whatever strikes the fancy as beautiful must be true.

A few extracts from the diary kept by Swedenborg between 1743 and 1744, the period of his nervous lapse into hysterical manifestations, will suffice to show, not only to every physician but to every non-expert of ordinary observation and without religious bias, that Swedenborg was passing through all the physical phases which precede lunacy; viz., irregular sleep, sometimes wholly interrupted, and at others prolonged without regard to intervals of day or night, of labor or rest; night-sweats and intense nightmare, accompanied by nocturnal amorous visions so intense and graphically stated that his biographers are obliged to suppress them to prevent their book from becoming obscene; a cessation of the amorous desire except in these dreams; foaming at the mouth and preternatural energy during these paroxysmal fits, as Swedenborg himself calls them; a fixed belief that the visions he saw must be visible to others as well as himself, and a sense of incredulity in the averments of those around him that they saw nothing; and finally that great and clear evidence of the dethronement of the reasoning faculty, which consists in the inability to draw from any supposed fact the inferences logically associated therewith, but on the contrary a marvelous facility in inferring from every supposed fact, consequences utterly incongruous and disconnected. The diary comprises 64 pages, and is printed nearly in full by Mr. White in his "Life and Writings of Swedenborg," omitting some five or six passages, "only fit for a medical journal, which, set forth at length, would doom this volume, in all judicious households, to existence under lock and key."

Extracts illustrative of mental derangement by manifesting inability to distinguish the related and congruous from the unrelated and incongruous:

"Afterward I came out and saw many black beetles; one was thrown at me. I saw that it could not use its feet. I believe that this means that natural reason cannot harmonize with spiritual." Vol. i, p. 202.

"I wanted medicine for my disease. I got a number of pence to buy it with. I took half of them and selected some from the other half; but gave all back again. The man said that he would buy me something for my cure. This signifies my corporeal thoughts as being coins with which I tried to cure myself, but it was of no use. *Id.*

"Dr. Morsus appeared to be courting a handsome girl, and she allowed him to do with her what he liked. I joked with her because of her easy consent. She was a handsome girl, and grew taller and prettier. *This means* that I should obtain information and meditate about the muscles." Vol. i, p. 211.

"I had horrible dreams; how an executioner roasted the heads which he had struck off, and hid them one after another in an oven which was never filled. It was said to be his food. *He was a big woman* who laughed, and had a little girl with her. P. 212.

"I was the whole night, nearly 11 hours, neither asleep nor awake, in a curious trance. I knew all the while that I dreamed, but my thoughts were kept bound, which made me sweat. * * * (What follows is prudentially omitted.) P. 215.

"A married woman desired to possess me, but I preferred an unmarried. She was angry and chased me but I got hold of the one I liked. I was with her and loved her; perhaps it signifies my thoughts.

"There was a woman with much and beautiful property in which we walked, and she wished to marry me. It is Piety and I think also wisdom who owned the estate. I was with her and showed her my love in my usual way. It appeared to be before marriage." P. 216.

A Mr. Brockmer, with whom Swedenborg boarded while in London, gives a narrative which, if true, leaves no room for doubt that Swedenborg, at this time, was insane. But we refer the reader to Mr. White's work for details, as the extracts above quoted from Swedenborg's diary suffice to the same end.

There can be no doubt that from this time forward until his death Swedenborg believed himself to be in constant companionship with angels, and that he received from them the materials for his subsequent voluminous works. Yet he was aware himself that a suspension of the breath, a purely physical derangement, was essential to these supposed spiritual phenomena. The cataleptic condition of body under which Swedenborg received his supposed revelations corresponds very closely with the foaming fits in which Mahomet interviewed the archangels, and is of essentially the same generic class of phenomena as Paul's prostration before the vision of

Jesus, while on his journey, which in itself was but an exaggeration of the severe fits of melancholy, trance and sweats which marked the temptations, transfigurations and supernatural interviews in which Jesus participated. It would seem from all these instances that the seeing of angels is invariably preceded by hysterical symptoms.

The so-called system of theology propounded by Swedenborg contradicts current Christian theology and the express words of Jesus in many respects, but brings into play no new materials not derived from his Bible reading and scientific knowledge. There is nothing, therefore, in anything that he has written which requires inspiration to arrive at its conception. While Jesus teaches that marriage and sex do not exist in Heaven Swedenborg teaches that they do, but his ideas, as to what a heavenly union of the sexes is, are all derived from his observations of earthly unions of the sexes in marriage. His doctrine that the trinity is a trinity, not of persons but of principles, that the Father is the divine love, the son, the divine wisdom, and the Holy Ghost, the divine operation or energy acting upon the universe, is the natural effect of the change which the word "person" had undergone since its first introduction from the theater into theology, whereby it had ceased to mean the part or character in which an actor appears and had come to mean a human being. If by the statement that there is one God who appears in three persons it had always been understood that no more complex idea was meant than by the statement that on a given night an actor would appear in three personæ; viz., Hamlet, Macbeth and Lear, no necessity for a restatement of the trinity would have occurred to Swedenborg or any other. No mental conception is more simple than that the governing life and force of the world appears or manifests itself in three forms; viz., first, as the universal soul of all nature; secondly, as the incarnated life of humanity in general or of some typical man as its representative; and thirdly, as the joint energy or operation of the two upon the world. But when this primitive conception of the trinity was made impossible

by such a gradual change in the meaning of the word "person" as made it to be not the part acted but the living actor, then Swedenborg rebels against the mathematical crudity of asserting that a God could be at the same time one actor and three actors, whereas he would not have rebelled against the statement that he was one actor appearing in three parts.

But the trinity of Swedenborg is an intellectual crudity. Wisdom and Love are mere relative, limited and human ideas which cannot be applicable to an infinite being, if one exists. Wisdom is the condition of one knowing much relatively to one who knows less. It is like fullness or abundance. It implies two substantial entities, but is itself no more an entity than the condition of fullness or emptiness, which may pertain to a pint cup, is an entity. Wisdom, or the condition of knowing much, implies a being who knows, and facts capable of being known. But the wisdom itself is neither of these, any more than the condition of fullness as to a pint cup is identical either with the cup itself or with the fluid that fills it. It is a mere statement of the ratio that the quantity of the fluid bears to the capacity of the cup. It is not an essence or entity or being, any more than the sign $-|-$ or $-$ in Algebra. Therefore it is not God. So of Love. Love is the degree in which one being is attracted toward another. It is not either being, in essence; it has no identity and therefore can no more be a Son to anybody or to anything than can the adjectives strong, heavy or light, which also express a degree or measure of attraction.

Swedenborg taught also that Jesus did not suffer vicariously the punishment of the sins of mankind, but that his work of redemption consisted in conquering the hells, which, according to Swedenborg, is but another name for the selfish affections. This merges the commercial theory of the atonement into one of moral influence merely expressed in the language of hyperbole. The strong tendency manifested by Swedenborg to deify the Word, is but a form of etherialized fetish worship, the substance of which after all is the worship of a book.

The doctrine giving to the Word its three senses; viz., the material, or external, the spiritual, or internal, and the celestial is open to this objection, that if applied to Mother Goose's melodies it produces the same wonderful results as if applied to the Bible. It is a mere device for pumping into a narrative whatever "sense" or non-sense the interpreter desires to get into or out of it. Thus take the simple stanza from Mother Goose:

Jack and Gill
 Went up the hill
 To fetch a pail of water,
 Jack fell down
 And broke his crown,
 And Gill came tumbling after.

In its material sense it is a mere rhyme got up to please a child's taste for the jingle of words. Now if we say that Jack means the Western Roman Empire, Gill means the Eastern Roman Empire. Their joint ascent of the hill signifies their mutual competition with each other for wealth, territory and power. The object of these competitions; viz., "to fetch a pail of water," was to advance the interests of civilization upon the earth, water being typical of civilization, both as to its purifying qualities and its mobility. Just as they were about perfecting their civilization, "Jack fell down," etc.; *i. e.*, the Western Empire passed under the sway of the Infidel, "and broke his crown;" *i. e.*, he lost his share of the scepter of the world. "And Gill came tumbling after" indicates the fall of the Eastern Empire. We might go on and give to these words a third celestial sense whereby it would refer to the struggle of the soul with its passions, but this suffices to show that this paltering with words in a double and triple sense is mere jugglery and not thought. It cannot be denied that in Swedenborg's view of the marriage relation, and of the nature and effects of the attempted modifications that may be made of it, he was far in advance of the average thought of his period. But so are most of the men of all ages who have lived much in, and learned much of, the world. Swedenborg's view would not greatly differ from Shaks-

peare's or Napoleon's, though the two last named claim no inspiration therefor. But this sketch designed to be merely biographical is already trespassing on the domain of the critique to which it is designed to be introductory.

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG AS A SEER.

HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE TO A MATERIALIZED THEOLOGY ITS SPIRITUAL SENSE; HIS METHOD THAT OF A POETIC INTUITION, AND NOT THAT OF SCIENTIFIC AND HISTORIC RESEARCH; THE PAGAN ORIGIN OF CERTAIN CHRISTIAN MYTHS AND THEORIES; AND A DISCUSSION OF THE SOURCE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN GENERAL; THE RESULTS REACHED BY THE HISTORICAL METHOD FAIL TO AGREE WITH THOSE ATTAINED BY THE EMPIRICAL OR INTUITIVE ROUTE.

Swedenborg combined three rare qualities of genius, which, though not unusual as separate manifestations, are almost unprecedented as a combination in one mind. They were (1) a discrimination sufficiently philosophical to reject most of the idolatrous or matter-worshipping elements of the popular religious faith of his time. In this respect he agrees with that class of minds popularly known as scientific, infidel, or philosophic. (2) A reverence sufficiently religious to prevent such discrimination from causing him, like the skeptics, to denounce or deny the validity or verity of the vehicles of transmission, through which ideas once, perhaps, poetic, philosophic, or attractive, had descended to his own period, and in the descent had become so heavily incrustated with materialistic interpretations, and idolatrous, matter-worshipping accretions, as to darken, if not conceal, the meaning they originally inclosed, thereby giving rise to

a substitution of the material for the spiritual, the finite for the abstract, and the historically false for the poetically true. In this reverence for the vehicle of transmission he was not surpassed by the most simple-minded, the most orthodox, or the most superstitious, and (3) he was so immensely endowed with that mystical and interpretive sense which underlies the poetries, mythologies, prophecies, and in their origin the religions of all races and ages, that he sincerely believed, and has persuaded many highly gifted minds to believe, that, by virtue of this mystical interpretive sense alone, aided by a fair share of the learning of his period, and, as he asserted, by the direct ministrations of angels, he could in all cases distinguish between the literal vehicle of transmission; to wit, the form of words, or the rite or ceremony, or the physical event, and the spiritual idea which, as a passenger, rode in this vehicle, and could furnish the latter with a new and more commodious carriage of his own in which its divinity and truth would no longer be doubted, because its true nature and dignity would cease to be misapprehended. The work which Swedenborg sought to perform for the Christian faith, therefore, was not a new one in the history of religions, though none had so conspicuously attempted it on behalf of Christianity. In the light of the progress that has been made since Swedenborg's time, under the guidance of Grimm, Bopp, Bunsen, and more recently of Max Muller and the modern philologists, in the scientific study of the rise and transitions in religious ideas, there is reason to believe that all religious ideas have one origin, one destiny and one termination; viz., they have their dawn in a poetic truth, by which is meant the struggle to express an unsensual or spiritual fact in sen-

sual imagery; they culminate in an idolatrous faith in the sensual image, which continues after the unsensual or spiritual idea, which it was invented to express, is lost; when it has reached this stage of transition reverent and poetic minds make constant efforts to restore to the sensual image its spiritual idea, these efforts being sometimes scientific—*i. e.*, founded on historical research into the true nature of the original idea intended to be conveyed, and sometimes empirical or presumptuous; viz., founded on the poetic insight of the interpreter. Thus in Hesiod, Homer and the early Greek poets, we can watch the process of manufacturing poetic ideas into religious myths, as intelligently and clearly as in a fish-hatchery, we can observe the transmutation of that which we clearly perceive to be spawn into that which we as clearly perceive to be fish, or as on the top of a barrel of stagnant water we can perceive the crook come up to the surface and change into a mosquito. In Plato, as in Swedenborg, we perceive the effort to restore the original poetic idea, empirically. Plato failed, and the myths he sought to save disappeared. Whether Swedenborg failed, and whether the myths he sought to restore to their original significance will disappear, is the question now under consideration.

Max Müller ("Science of Religion," p. 26.) assures us that the mode in which the Oriental and Greek minds were pleased to express the always beautiful and Celestially artistic mystery of sunrise was by saying that Hephæstus (the unrisen sun) split open with his ax the forehead (the east) of Zens (the bright sky), and caused Athenæ (the dawn) to burst forth full armed from the brain of the most powerful of the gods of Olympus, thereby forever supplying the poets with a physical

image of the birth of wisdom from intelligence. He then asks: "Would the Greeks have had less reverence for their gods, if, instead of believing that Apollo and Artemis murdered the twelve children of Niobe, they had perceived that Niobe was, in a former period of language, a name of snow and winter, and that no more was intended by the ancient poet than that Apollo (the sun) and Artemis, the vernal deities, must slay every year with their darts, the brilliant and beautiful but doomed children of the snow?" Evidently Max Muller agrees with the current opinion of scholars that that which was at first a poetic truth, sensuously expressed, became in time a rude, physical superstition, from which the poetic idea had vanished, and that to the ordinary Greek, Hephæstus was anthropomorphically degenerated from the unrisen sun into a man one hundred and fifty feet, or thereabouts, high, armed with an ax of the length of an ordinary liberty-pole, wherewith he clove the head of Zeus (Latin Jupiter) and brought forth Athenæ (Latin Minerva), a woman of something like the height of Hephæstus, and who was worshiped as the goddess of wisdom. Prof. Muller questions whether the Greeks would have had less reverence for their gods had they been able to resolve them back into the creatures of a poet's fancy. Certainly the reverence would have been of a very different kind, and one which no priest could have utilized or made a source of revenue. Offerings would never be made on the temples of Minerva by those who believed she expressed an idea so intangible as the dawn, and necessarily, therefore, as evanescent as the dew.

There was a constant struggle in the Greek mind between the pure matter-of-fact philosophers who, like

Socrates, believed such imagery simply mischievous and fit only to be forgotten, and that the human attention should be turned from myths to facts and to the true study of man; the priests, who were jealous of any efforts to restore the original poetic significance of these myths, as tending to lessen the reverence in which they themselves were held as the servants of real deities; and those, who, like Plato, sought, without abolishing the image, to recall from the depths of the past or to reinvent out of the fertility of their own fancy, its real or supposed significance. Neander tells us of one Enemerus, of the school of Cyrene, who fancied that he had compassed the long-sought object by resolving the whole doctrine of the gods into a history of nature. There seems also to have been, in the Augustan age of this theological conflict, a peculiar order of *Turveydroptera*, or models of religious deportment, whose habits are the more interesting from the subsequent entire extinction of the species. Strabo, the geographer, and Polybins, the historian, were of the number, as well as most of the statesmen, generals, poets and scholars who did not make a profession of philosophy. They are described as denying utterly the truth, but as recognizing in full the utility of the popular religion. Thus Strabo wisely holds that, "the multitude of women and the entire mass of the common people cannot be led to piety by the doctrines of philosophy. To effect this, therefore, superstition is necessary, which may call in the aid of myths and tales of wonder." Having adduced some examples from Grecian mythology, he adds: "Such things the founders of states employed as bugbears to awe childish people." These myths, as it seemed to him, were required, "not only for children, but also for the ignorant and uneducated,

who are no better than children, and even for those whose education is imperfect; for in their case, too, reason has not as yet acquired sufficient strength to throw off the habit they contracted in the years of childhood."

Public thought at this period seems to have divided, like the river that ran out of Paradise, into four heads: First, the literalists, or idolaters, who looked upon the images, originally employed to convey poetic ideas, as real persons, and who were relied upon by the priests as the only true worshipers; second, the polite hypocrites, or Turveydrops, who were too intellectual to assent to the popular faith in its bald materialism, too unpoetic to comprehend the transcendental interpretations of it, too politic to deny or deride it openly, and who, therefore, were also safely resorted to by the priests for very liberal offerings for the support of absurdities at which they quietly smiled; Third, the Platonists, or poetic philosophers, who sought to restore to idolatry its lost spiritual origin, or, as Swedenborg would express it, to revive that most ancient church, which, without a priesthood, or temples, or language, or sacrifices, had the power of conversing with angels; *i. e.*, with the ministering forces of nature, with the sun and with its light, with the moon and with its chastity, with the air and its fertility, with the subterranean earth and its Plutonic darknesses, with the mysterious principle of life and its mystical generation, with the world that is and the world that is to come, with science and religion, with the divine light and the divine love, all through the doctrine of correspondences; *i. e.*, the doctrine that every spiritual fact may be set forth in sensuous imagery, and that all sensuous phenomena are but the physical vehicles for the expression of supersensuous, but real, and even eter-

nal, ideas; and, fourthly, and lastly, there were the pure philosophers, who despised the idolaters, denounced the hypocrites, marveled at the mystics, and doubted whether that which was not demonstrable, but merely beautiful, could have any of that value which attaches to truth and verity.

Whether the history, forms and doctrines of the Christian church have the same poetic origin, and, in a scientific sense, only the same kind of poetic verity, as its foremost scholars have of late begun to concede to all other religions, may be a question upon which it is still too early in the evolution of the science of religion to speak with certainty. All that can now be said is, that there is a tendency on the part of those engaged in the exploration into the origin of religious ideas, through the history of languages and races, to call attention to the existence of the prototypes, in other and antecedent religions, of most, if not all, of the distinctive supernatural facts and supposed peculiar theological tenets which, even so recently as the period of Swedenborg, were supposed to have been poured into the vehicles of Jewish and Christian narrative only by divine inspiration—their very materials and substance having, it was supposed, had no antecedent existence. The belief that God has imparted a fact is much more readily entertained by one who supposes that the fact itself is such as no man could know or have the means of knowing, than by one who discovers that the supposed fact had been in possession of hundreds of thousands of persons for centuries previously, and that, so far from its requiring a God to impart it, the wonder should be that any human ingenuity could conceal it for so long or from so many; and all reverence for it disappears when the

supposed fact, upon being traced through its protean changes back to its source, exchanges its impress of supernatural majesty for one of mere poetic beauty and finally vanishes like a cloud into one of those "airy nothings," which has been evidently indebted to the "poet's frenzy" for its "local habitation and its name."

That Swedenborg relied more upon revery than on research, and more on introspection than upon historical, scientific or philological retrospection, for his mode of restoring to the vehicles of religious thought their original significance may be made evident by one or two illustrations. Take, for example, those two very important correlated features in Christian theology—hell and Satan. He says, A. E., n. 1,144:

"The love of self and the love of the world constitute hell; but it shall be shown what is the origin of those loves: man was created to love himself and the world, to love his neighbor and heaven, and also to love the Lord. Hence it is that after man is born he first loves himself and the world, and then in proportion as he grows wise he loves his neighbor and heaven, and as he becomes more wise he loves the Lord. When this is the case then he is in divine order and is led of the Lord actually and of himself apparently. But in so far as he is not wise he abides in the first degree, which is to love himself and the world, and if he loves his neighbor, heaven and the Lord it is for the sake of himself before the world. And if he is altogether unwise, then he loves himself alone, and the world and likewise the neighbor for the sake of himself; and as to heaven and the Lord, he either makes light of, or denies, or hates them—if not in words yet in his heart. These are the origins of the love of self and the love of the world, and as these loves are hell it is evident whence hell is."

So far as the above teaching relegates the doctrine of a material hell to the rank of a mere incrustated superstition, which has overgrown the original poetic idea of moral retribution, which underlies the symbolic and sensuous imagery used by Jesus, it is a restoration of the poetic in the place usurped by the superstitious, and of the intellectual in place of the gross. And so far as it makes self-love to be the sum of all sins, and the love of others to be the sum of all virtues, it contains no essentially new teaching by Swedenborg but is borrowed clearly from those of Jesus. Every reader is supplied in the New Testament, and in the history of the Christian church, with the vehicle or bridge over which these two ideas traveled, from Jesus to Swedenborg. Hence, very few will admit that, even if true, their utterance by Swedenborg needs or proves Swedenborg's inspiration. But very few readers are supplied with any bridge connecting the ancient causeways of thought with the ordinary Jewish mind in the period when Jesus lived, whereby they can trace these same ideas in their descent from other human minds to the mind of Jesus. This constitutes the chief argument for the theory that the ideas themselves were imparted to Jesus by supernatural inspiration. To the mind which derives its entire information concerning Jesus from the New Testament, he breaks with a sudden and resplendent light as at once the author of the ethical doctrine that the love of others is the sum of virtue, and the love of self is the essence of sin, and also as the first to announce authoritatively man's immortality, and a future hell and heaven, in the modern sense of punishment and reward. Undoubtedly the literary point, pith and eloquence with which these doctrines are illustrated

in the New Testament are without precedent. But literary versatility is quite distinct from originality, inspiration and divinity, in the theological sense. If it shall be found that the limited information contained in the New Testament inadvertently omits to show the bridges and causeways which connect the antecedent highways of thought with the mind of Jesus, but that contemporaneous history and philology and the progress made in the modern science of religion supply them, so that both the theory of virtue and the theories of immortality, and of retribution, above alluded to, can be traced back through Jesus to antecedent minds as freely and definitely as through the New Testament we trace them back from Swedenborg to Jesus, then it required no more inspiration in Jesus to repeat what previous centuries had learned by heart, than it requires in Swedenborg to repeat from Jesus; and if these same theories in antecedent minds are clearly traceable back to poetic myths and figures of speech, for which when rightly understood no one would claim any verity, then obviously the suppositions of Jesus on these points vanish like the club of Hephæstus and the brow of Zeus before a dawn that neither can withstand, and the poetic interpretations of Swedenborg, while dissolving idolatrous materialisms in a useful way, still lack the merit of having gone back to essential truth.

As to the ethical theories of Jesus, we fail to detect in them any shadow of a shade of thought which, according to Neander's "History of the Christian Church," had not been taught and practiced by the sect of the Essenes throughout Judæa for several centuries prior to the education of Jesus. Abjuration of the world, abnegation of self, submission to others, benevo-

lence to others, abhorrence of wealth and of slavery, abstinence between the sexes, community of goods, non-resistance, in a word every precept contained in the Sermon on the Mount, or illustrated in the early practices of the disciples, had been the cardinal doctrines of a Jewish sect located in his immediate neighborhood two centuries before Jesus was born. His possession of them is accounted for by assuming that he was educated into the views of the Essenes. The passive adoption of ideas already current has only been deemed to require inspiration, when the fact that they were current has ceased to be known. Were all the "facts" contained in the New Testament true, therefore, it is obvious that it might still teach error, by its failure to present antecedent and correlated facts necessary to prevent us from forming an incorrect inference as to the origin of those presented. Had Swedenborg, therefore, been aware of the fact that the theories of virtue propounded by Jesus had not originated with him, but with a sect of very obscure and fallible people, who had no knowledge of political economy and but few ideas concerning the true means of promoting human welfare, he might have reviewed it critically, and found that as much of heaven as of hell was due to self-love; that there was no duty incumbent on man to love his neighbor as himself, but that the very existence of society depended on selfishness as its chief motive force; that the poor, as a rule, are not blessed but accursed, so far as they are poor; that the rich enter into the kingdom of heaven much more easily than the destitute, and that celibacy is no more a virtue than self-mutilation. He might have concluded that only a person ignorant of botany would suppose that no toiling or spinning was essential to the clothing

of the lily, while a person well versed in that science would see the process going on in every fiber of the leaf during every moment of the day and night, and would, therefore, abhor the thought of pointing to it as any illustration of the benefits of idleness. Swedenborg rested in this theory of virtue, probably because he failed to trace it through Jesus to its strictly human source in the Essenes, in the Stoics, in the Buddhists, and, indeed, in those universal principles of human nature which have caused nearly half mankind to infer, from the preponderance of their wants over their possessions, that the only sure road to happiness lay in foregoing its pursuit.

As to the theory of hell, which Swedenborg derives from Jesus, and which bursts forth in his teachings in the New Testament with a vigor that makes it seem like an inspiration, the fact that it was entirely absent from the Jewish religion during all the epochs of the Old Testament, and cuts no figure in the mythologies of the Romans and the Greeks as proclaimed to the common people, invests the doctrine as taught by Jesus with striking freshness and originality. Here, again, however, the appearance of originality is delusive, and arises from the fact that the bridges which connect Jesus with the antecedent course of thought in Judea, and, indeed, wherever the Greek and Roman religions had traversed, have been removed from the sight of the unlettered classes in modern times, and he appears to stand first and alone, whereas for at least five centuries the doctrine of a flaming hell, in which emblems of mental anguish and physical torment combined as fully as they have ever since done, in contrast with a heaven of golden harps and celestial voices, in which all the pleasures of sense and

sound combined, as fully as under the Christian system—all these were taught—taught as positively as Jesus taught them, and that, too, by persons who derived them evidently from poetic myths; so that to trace the teaching to these persons is to trace it to the poetic imagination. During the three centuries preceding Jesus there appear frequent allusions, by philosophers and distinguished men, to the doctrines taught in the Eleusinian mysteries as something that in the form of mysteries ought no longer to be encouraged. Thus we find Dæmonax, of Cyprus, an Athenian philosopher, and Philo, of Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher, concurring in demanding that these mysteries be made public. If they were true, said Philo, they ought to be communicated to the whole people, and if false they ought to be abandoned. We thus learn that, for centuries before Jesus taught, a more or less extended public demand had arisen that the doctrines taught in the Eleusinian mysteries should be either disproved or published to all. Occasional mention appears also of the caution exercised during this period in admitting candidates, and especially philosophers, to the rites of initiation lest the oaths of secrecy might not be sufficient to restrain them from communicating the doctrines to the people. In outlining what these mysteries were, we shall cite, from the encyclopedias and more accessible authorities, the facts which the learned are permitted to verify elaborately in such works as those of Saint Croix on the mysteries of Eleusis, Wilkinson on those of Isis, and many others. Mrs. L. M. Childs in her "History of the Progress of Religious Ideas," includes only a part of the elements constituting the mysteries, and the rest we shall supply from other sources. She says:

“The most solemn of them all were the mysteries of Isis introduced from Egypt, and called by the Greeks the Eleusinian mysteries, sacred to Ceres. The men and women initiated into these mysteries were thought to be peculiarly under the care of the gods in this life and secure of the best places in Elysium. Not to observe them was a reproach to any public man. The enemies of Socrates brought it as a heavy charge against him. No foreigner was admitted, and if any uninitiated person happened to be present by mistake he was put to death. * * * The rights of initiation lasted nine days. On the last day the candidates for initiation, having gone through a probation of fasting, purification, sacrifices and prayers, were admitted for the first time to the mysteries. What these were is unknown, but some of the external circumstances are recorded. At eventide the priests led them to a vast edifice called the mystical temple. At the entrance they washed their hands in consecrated water, being admonished to present themselves with pure minds, without which external cleanness would be of no avail. With a loud voice the priests warned all the profane to retire, and the worshippers remained alone. Thunders rolled around them. Lightning flashed across the thick darkness and revealed startling apparitions as it passed. At last the inner doors were opened. The interior of the temple burst upon them in a blaze of light, and strains of ravishing music floated on the air. The statue of Ceres stood in their midst, splendidly adorned. On her head were the horns of the lunar crescent, and her robe was covered with shining stars. In one hand she held a basket of grain; in the other the Egyptian musical instrument called a *systrum*. One foot rested on the ocean, the

other was stepping on the earth. At the foot of the statue priests crowned the novitiate with garlands of sacred myrtle. Then followed a series of stately pageants, which it is supposed were intended to represent the creation of the world, the progress of society out of barbarism, the passage of the soul through death, frightful pictures of torture in Tartarus and enchanting visions of the Elysian Fields. Whatever might have been the purport of these things, the writers of the ancients indicate that they made a profound and solemn impression on those who witnessed them. The unity of God, the immortal progress and destiny of the soul, and other secret doctrines were taught in the sanctuary to an initiated few, but elsewhere they were veiled in symbols."

Brande's "Encyclopedia of Science and Art" contains, among others, the following additional particulars: "Women and children were admissible, and a child, styled the child of holiness, whose innocence, it was believed, of itself endowed him with capacity to fulfill the requirements of the mysteries, was selected to conciliate the deity in the name of the initiated. Of the ceremonies which attended the initiation we know little, since every postulant was required under the most dreadful oaths to conceal whatever he saw or heard beneath the hallowed precincts, and he who violated the oaths was not only put to death, but devoted to the execration of all posterity. Yet the priests of ancient, like the Freemasons of modern, times, could not prevent the disclosure of some facts. Crowned with myrtle and enveloped in robes which from this day were preserved as sacred relics, the novices were conducted beyond the boundary impassible to the rest of men. The hiero-

phant, with his symbols of supreme deity, and his three assistants, representing the three other gods, were carefully visible. Lest any should have been introduced not sufficiently prepared for the rites the herald exclaimed: 'Far from hence the profane, the impious, all who are polluted by sin!' If any such were present and did not instantly depart, death was the never-failing doom. The skins of new-slain victims were now placed under the feet of the novices, the ritual of initiation was read, and hymns were chanted in honor of Ceres. The novices moved on, while a deep sound rose from beneath, as if the earth itself were complaining; the thunder pealed, the lightning flashed, and specters glided through the vast obscurity, moaning, sighing and groaning. Mysterious shades, the messengers of the infernal deities,—Anguish, Madness, Famine, Disease and Death,—flitted around, and the explanations of the hierophant, delivered in a solemn voice, added to the horrors of the scene. This was intended as a representation of the infernal regions, where misery had its seat. As they advanced, amidst the groans which issued from the darkness were distinguished those of the suicides, thus punished for cowardly deserting the posts which the gods had assigned them in this world. But the scenes which the novices had hitherto beheld seemed to be a sort of purgatory, where penal fires and dire anguish and the unutterable horrors of darkness were believed, after countless ages of suffering, to purify from the guilt acquired in this mortal life. Suddenly the bursting open of two vast gates, with a terrific sound, dimly displayed to their sight and faintly bore to their ears *the torments of those whose state was everlasting*—who had passed the bounds beyond which there was no hope. On the horrors of

this abode of anguish and despair a curtain may be dropped; the subject is unutterable. Onward proceeded the novices, and were soon conducted into another region—that of everlasting bliss—the sojourn of the just—of those whose hearts had been purified and whose minds had been enlightened by ‘the holy doctrine.’ This was Elysium, the joys of which were equally unutterable, equally incomprehensible, to mortals not admitted into these mysteries. Here a veil was in like manner drawn over this scene.” (Cabinet Cyclopædia, vol. lxi.)

So completely do such narratives indicate the source whence Jesus and his contemporaries obtained their views concerning hell and heaven, and the necessity of becoming as a little child in order to attain to the one and to escape the other, that the class of text-books prepared by and for theologians dwell only on the outer form and wholly omit or slur over the origin and internal sense of these rites. Thus Smith’s “Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities” says: “The awful and horrible manner in which the initiation is described by later, especially Christian, writers seems partly to proceed from their ignorance of its real character, partly from their horror and aversion to these pagan rites. The more ancient writers always abstained from entering upon any description of the subject.” And again: “Respecting the secret doctrines which were revealed in them to the initiated nothing certain is known. The general belief of the ancients was that they opened to man a comforting prospect of a future state.”

Dr. Anthon, in his “Classical Dictionary,” says: “The ancient writers are full of the praises of the Eleusinian mysteries, of the advantage of being initi-

ated; *i. e.*, admitted to participate in them, and of the favor of the gods in life and the cheerful hopes in death which were the consequence of it. Hence, occasion has been taken to assert that a system of religion little inferior to pure Christianity was taught in them."

The "Encyclopedia Britannica" says: "The whole of this part of the ritual is on its face symbolical of the passage through death to life, first in the case of the fruit-bearing earth, and then of the soul of man. * *

* One great feature in this feast was the dramatic symbolism which described the revivification of the earth after the death of winter. This symbolism opened forms which would explain their meaning, even to the uninitiated. But the revival of nature would be inseparably associated with the thoughts of the life into which the human soul passes through the gateway of death; and in a festival where everything was dramatic, the one truth or fact would be expressed by signs not less than the other. The Eleusinian legend represents Dionysius, or Iachus, as the son of Demeter, and in the great Dionysiac festival at Athens the phallus was solemnly carried in procession, as in like state the veiled ship or boat of Athenæ was borne to the Acropolis. This ship or boat was represented by the mystic cysts or chests carried by the pilgrims to Eleusis, and answers to the Yoni, as the phallus corresponds to the *lingam* of the Hindoo. The methods of initiation based on these signs might be gross or spiritual, coarse or refined, according to the genius of the people by whom they were used. There is no reason for supposing the Eleusinian mysteries involved any more than this symbolical teaching which centers on the two ideas of death and reproduction; there is no valid ground for supposing that it involved less."

Having thus traced through the Greek mysteries, which take their rise in the Egyptian mysteries of Isis, of a much earlier date, a doctrine of future rewards and punishments and of the nature of holiness, identical with that of Jesus, and shown that a desire that these doctrines should be made public had arisen, it remains only to connect these elements of Greek culture with the Jews of the period and neighborhood of Jesus. The open hostility of Jesus to both the Pharisees and Sadducees of his time, when taken in connection with the fact that he still manifests an ardent love for the Jewish nationality and religion as he apprehends it, places him in the only category in which a Jew, who was neither a Pharisee, nor a Sadducee, nor a philosopher or infidel, could be; viz., among the **Essenes**. These are described (*Encycl. Brit.*) as one of the three principal sects of the Jews, appearing for the first time about the second century before Christ; an exclusive society, distinguished from the rest of the Jewish nation by an organization (communistic) peculiar to themselves, and by a theory of life in which a severe asceticism and a rare benevolence to one another and to mankind in general, were the most striking characteristics. Their membership could be recruited only from the outside world, as marriage and all intercourse with women were absolutely renounced. They were the first society in the world to condemn slavery both in theory and practice; they enforced and practiced the most complete community of goods. Though their prevailing tendency was practical and the tenets of the society were kept a profound secret, it is perfectly clear from the concurrent testimony of Philo and Josephus that they cultivated a kind of speculation which not only accounts for their

spiritual asceticism but indicates a great deviation from the normal development of Judaism, *and a profound sympathy with Greek philosophy*, and probably, also with Oriental ideas. In Pliny they are a colony settled over the western shore of the Dead Sea. They renounced marriage, not because they denied its validity or necessity, but because of the artfulness and fickleness of the sex. They adopted young children and reared them on their own principles. They rejected pleasure as evil. They despised riches not less than pleasure; regarded oil as a defilement; did not change their clothes until they were worn out; dressed coarsely, generally in white; said grace before and after meat; gave to the poor without solicitation; forbade oaths; abjured all fighting and war, and would hurt no man voluntarily; rejected logic and philosophy, believed in God, special Providence, the soul and a future state of heaven and hell (their elysium resembling the Eleusinian and that of the Greek mythology in being approached over a river or ocean); they held that the body is mortal and only the soul immortal; they believed in fate. Says the "Encyclopedia Britannica": "In view of such divergencies from the normal development of Judaism and of doctrines on the soul and a future state, which so closely resemble Pythagorean, Platonic, and even Zoroastrian speculations, the question naturally arises, how far Essenism was a native product of the Jewish mind, and how far it had experienced the influence of Greek and Oriental thought. On the one hand it is clear that it must have completely passed the barriers of traditional Judaism, and equally clear on the other that they could not have reached their peculiar point of view in perfect isolation from antecedent and

contemporary speculation. For more than a century before the Essenes appear as a factor in Jewish history, the Jews had come into closest contact with Greek life. * * * Josephus himself says the Essenes live the same kind of life as the Pythagoreans. The Essenes certainly did realize the Pythagorean ideal. In beliefs, institutions and tendencies we are struck by the close resemblance. Greek culture was widely diffused among the Jews; the Greek philosophy was acceptable to their scholars. Jewish thought could not but obey the influence of the dominant civilization, and could not avoid more or less completely moving in parallel directions."

Having thus supplied the bridge over which the peculiar theories of holiness and of hell taught in the Eleusinian mysteries could not have failed to pass to the immediate neighbors of Jesus, and to that sect with which all his doctrines identify him, it still remains to trace these doctrines back to that mythic and poetic origin which when known destroys their claim to historic verity. For as it cannot be conceived that it required inspiration for Jesus to adopt doctrines with which the air in which he was educated was filled, so not even the attribute of divinity in Jesus, if he possessed it, could lend any additional sanction to ideas, then five centuries old, and distinctly traceable to strictly pagan and poetic sources. To perceive why the worship of Ceres, who was the goddess who presided over vegetable germination and harvests, should have involved, more than any other form of heathen worship, the doctrine of immortality and of future rewards and punishments, it is only necessary to analyze the myth around which this worship centers. Every myth is a

fact in nature, expressed in such sensuous imagery that the imagery alone, if taken without the fact, becomes an idolatrous falsehood. For instance, the Greeks regarded bathing in the sea a chief source of female beauty. They expressed the supposed fact by the myth that Venus rose from the foam of the sea. They regarded it as a fact in nature that female beauty prefers masculine ardor to either courage, power, or comeliness. They expressed it by the myth wedding Venus, not to Apollo, (comeliness), Jupiter (power), or Mars (courage), but to the ugly blacksmith, Vulcan, the God of the divine fire, which was hurled out of heaven by the glance of Jove, to wit, the lightning. To them virginity was indicated by the regular return of the virgin's monthly periods. The monthly changes of the moon were sure throughout eternity. Hence the moon, as Diana, was the type of virgin purity, and the planet of Love in its longing and unsatisfied innocence. In their view Time was due to its means of measurement; *i. e.*, to the motions of the heavens and the earth. They expressed it by the myth that Chronos or Saturn (time) was the offspring of Uranus (heaven) and Terra (earth). They thought it a fact in nature that Time is perpetually consuming all it creates. They expressed it by the myth that Saturn was engaged in devouring his own offspring. But they also thought that certain of the offspring of Time were immortal. This they expressed by the myth that certain of the offspring of Saturn led by Jove rebelled against their father and held him bound under chains and darkness. As these myths are all founded on very familiar facts in nature, of which they are the true sensuous expression, so the myth out of which grew the mysteries of Ceres, was a poetic ex-

pression of the physical fact that a grain of corn (wheat) planted in the ground in the fall and coming up in the spring, spends half the year in dying or in the abodes of death, in order that it may wave during the last half of the year in the open heaven and in the abundant harvest. To express this natural fact a myth or impersonation is devised to the effect that Ceres (Latin for corn), known to the Greeks as Demeter, suffered the loss of her only daughter, Persephone (Latin, Proserpine, meaning creeping upward, sprouting or germinating), who was carried off in a chariot by Pluto, the god of the lower world (alluding to the burial of the seed in the earth), from the plains of Enna in Sicily (this was the Roman form of the legend, because Sicily was the country of corn supply to Rome—in Greek tradition the offspring of Demeter was in some places male (Iachus) and in others female (Persephone), and the incident centered at Eleusis). Ceres wandered in anguish up and down the earth searching for her daughter, and refusing food and drink, threatening a famine for mankind (alluding to the deprivation suffered by man in consequence of the necessity of losing so much grain in the form of seed), till Zeus (Jupiter the earth-father), sending Hermes (the sun's rays) as his mediator to Pluto (the under-ground), effected a compromise whereby in consideration that Pluto should have possession of the charms of Persephone for half the year, her mother, Ceres (the harvest), should have her the other half. "To those who were initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis," says "Johnson's Encyclopedia," "the myth taught the principle of a new life after death, founded on the return of Persephone to the upper world, or rather on the process of nature by which the seed sown in the ground

must first die and rot before it can yield new life, a process which the annual coming and going of Persephone was designed to illustrate." Just at this point it is worth noting, first, that the supposed fact on which the myth is founded is not a fact at all, but an error, as the seed does not die and rot before it yields new life but on the contrary, keeps growing in bulk and in life, throughout the process of germination, until it has become a germinated stem; so that, in fact, it does not illustrate death at all, except to a mind that is too careless to find out what becomes of the seed. It no more illustrates death, than an egg, placed under a hen, illustrates death during the process of its transformation from an egg into a chick. Indeed, the two processes are the same, and both are phenomena of mere growth, without any fact of death whatever. Nor is there a solitary instance in universal nature where death produces life, except as the body, once endowed with one form of life, may, as food, contribute to another. Secondly, early Christian teachers, including Paul, indicate the source of this theory and illustrate the point that resurrection follows death by comparing it to the supposed death of the seed in germinating, thus using in behalf of an undemonstrable point a supposed fact which is wholly untrue.

There is evident, throughout the Roman, Greek, Egyptian and Hindoo worship, a grossly physical, and what to modern minds seems a revolting, tendency to worship, as a divine mystery, the principle both of vegetable and animal generation. The latter, known as Phallic worship, appearing in the rites of Apis, of Osiris, of Priapus, and of Bacchus was so marked in the character of its sensuous imagery, and so orgiastic in setting

forth the emotional conditions under which generation proceeds, as to cause the antagonistic forms of worship, founded on the principle of vegetable generation, and which was illustrated by the purer symbols of flowers, wine and music, to revolt in hatred, and to run into celibacy and other forms of anti-sexual asceticism, even to mutilation. The belief in celibacy and in the sinfulness of generation and conception, *per se*, logically leads to the notion that conception, to be absolutely free from sin, must be immaculate or miraculous. Hence, the worship of Ceres was identified with austerity of morals, and a tendency to make happiness in the future life depend on holiness, to regard holiness as identical with dying unto the world, or with self-abnegation, and to regard a return to the condition of the seed or the child; *i. e.*, an extinction of all human experience and knowledge, as the condition of rising into an abundant harvest, both of works and of rewards. In a word, it substitutes the worship which centers in an ideal principle of regeneration, or the new birth, for the Phallic worship, whose principle was the first birth or generation, and in so doing discards the theory of virtue which makes it consist in masculinity, power, fertility, abundance, wealth, intellect, passion and other positive forces, and adopts instead the theory that it consists in meekness, obedience, chastity, sterility, self-denial, poverty, and all negative virtues. This view is exceedingly favorable to the cultivation of that humility and generosity which subjects a people to the easy control of the priest-hood.

Having thus traced the Christian notions of hell and holiness to their strictly Pagan, poetic, and mythical origin, we are enabled to pronounce the work of Sweden-

borg in attempting to restore them from their modern sensual to their original poetic significance, to have been useful in its way, but imperfect in its extent, by reason of his having accepted them as the original teachings of Jesus; whereas, a moderate amount of research would have taught him that Jesus but absorbed them from the atmosphere, in which he was born, as part of the legacy transmitted to it from previous centuries.

Swedenborg again says: "It has hitherto been believed in the world that there is some one devil who presides over the hells, and that he was created an angel of light, but afterward became rebellious and was cast down with his crew into hell. This belief has prevailed because, in the word, mention is made of the devil and Satan, and also of Lucifer, and the word has been understood in those passages according to the sense of the letter. When yet (whereas) by the devil and Satan, hell is there meant, by the devil the hell which is behind and where the worst dwell, who are called evil genii, and by Satan the hell which is in front and where they are not so malignant, and are called evil spirits; by Lucifer they are meant who are of Babel or Babylon, who are those that extend their dominion even unto heaven."

The researches of recent philologists have clearly shown that the names of the devils of one country and religion are the names of the gods of some opposing country and religion. The difficulty with Swedenborg is, that while the extreme simplicity of his ethics limits him to but one good principle, viz., the love of the Lord and of the neighbor, and to but one evil principle, viz., self-love, the variety of demonology furnishes him with more devils than he knows what to do with. He never seems to have suspected that his Lucifer, or lightbearer, was the

sun; that his Satan was the Saturn whom the Romans worshiped, and that the rebellion of Satan against Jehovah was probably only a reiteration in another form of the story of the rebellion of Jove, or Zeus, against Saturn, with the little difference that in the Greek and Roman story Saturn (time) reigned before Jupiter, while in the Jewish form of the myth, wherein its poetic significance is wholly lost, Jehovah reigns both before and after the rebellion. I am aware that this particular myth is so imbedded in the Christian scheme that philologists have handled it charily, and that the origin of the myth concerning Satan is supposed to be Eastern Babylonish and Zoroastrian, while the name Saturn is Roman and Western. One can only entertain a suspicion that the two myths are identical, since scientific philologists have not yet pronounced them so. There are many points of resemblance, however, between the Saturn chronos (time) of the Roman and Greek mythology, the Ahriman of the Persian, the Siva of the Hindoo, and the Satan, or devil, of the Christian mythology. His appearance in the form of a serpent is the natural symbol of duration, since the serpent curved into the form of a circle so as to be engaged in consuming his own tail, is one of the most ancient, universal and expressive symbols of endless duration, and represents Saturn, typically, as the sickle represents him, functionally. His mission as the great destroyer is peculiarly like that of Time, which is perpetually destroying such of his offspring as are not immortal. His mission as the great accuser (*diabolus*) is also fitting, as it is "time" that brings to light all guilt and brings all conduct into judgment. His mission as the foe to all innocence is also appropriate to Saturn, or Time, since infancy alone

is sinless, and, according to the Eleusinian and Jesuist idea of sin, each moment's addition to our worldly knowledge and experience, *i. e.*, each pulsation of time, removes us farther from that child-state or blank state, in which, knowing nothing, we know nothing wrong. Swedenborg's doctrine, that the most ancient church or man in his first estate, had a power of internal respiration or of breathing inside the chest, seems to have been influenced by a peculiar habit in his own organization, whereby he was enabled to suspend the breath for long periods, and thus give rise to sensations of trance and ecstatic visions, not unlike those said to be enjoyed by magi of various orders in Oriental countries. We think it is too early to affirm that extraordinary psychologic powers may not, in certain instances, attend an abnormal condition of the respiration and perhaps of the circulation, even when, as in the case of Mohammed, they amount to catalepsy. But such physical peculiarities can hardly strengthen Swedenborg's claims as a seer, which must rest on the verity and supernaturality of what he saw. It is a great relief, however, to learn from him that the two she-bears who came out of the wood and slew the forty-two children that irreverently requested Elijah to "Go up thou bald head," were not either grizzly, brown, black or polar bears. The forty-two children were not of a kind for whose loss their mothers would weep if they did not return home. Swedenborg says: "By bald head, the word deprived of the natural sense was signified, which is the sense of the letter; and by the bears out of the wood was signified power from the natural or literal sense of the word; and by those children were signified they who blaspheme the word on account of its natural sense, because it is such as it is;

by forty-two blasphemy is signified. Hence, now it is plain that the punishment of blaspheming the word was represented, and, therefore, signified by these things." Our imagination strives to grasp the idea of the natural or literal sense of the word coming out of the wood and going for the scalps of those who can't understand it, because they say its literal sense is destitute of natural sense, and we still feel that our poetic sense, which is capable of almost any flight, knows where it is. But when we deliberately try to think that forty-two means blasphemy upon any doctrine of correspondence to be found in nature we sink back appalled. We are compelled to believe that there was no squirrel whatever up the tree under which Swedenborg was then barking.

There is a doctrine of correspondence between external nature and the most delicate spiritual ideas, which is at the foundation of all sensuous imagery and poetry; a correspondence between the snow-capped mountains and the austere coldness of pure intellect; between the impetuous torrent and the fervid orator; between the deep blue ocean and the meditative soul; between the rocky cliff projecting into the stormy sea and the immovable will unshaken by the current of adversity; between the quick music of birds and the light gayeties of youth; between slow murmurous chords, such as are made by the desolate seas, and the solitary night winds, and the solemn facts of death and mystery. Frequently in Swedenborg we enjoy the presence of this deep poetic sense. Had he been relieved from all fetich worship for a book, and left free as the poets are to find the word and its correspondence in the universe, including all phenomena and all books; had he applied in theology the grand old axiom of mathematics, "The whole is

greater than any of its parts and equal to the sum of all its parts," he would not have tried to force universal truth into the small compass occupied by Bible truth. He would not have been under the necessity of explaining she-bears to mean the Bible, or forty-two little children to mean blasphemy. His life would not have been spoiled in the effort to put meaning into the meaningless, to spiritualize dying superstitions, and to restore to religions myths their true poetic significance. The fact is, that when this poetic significance is truly restored, in the only manner in which it is possible, viz., by historical research, the gods disappear from Olympus, the wail of the lost no longer comes up from Tartarus, the priests abandon the temples, the fires go out on the altars, the heavens stretch out into starry spaces in which there is no promise, save of more stars and wider spaces, and man awakes to the sad consciousness that there is and has been none that can reveal to him anything concerning the great mystery—no not one.

ADAM SMITH.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Adam Smith, the founder of the school of thought known as Political Economy, was born at Kirkealdy, Fifeshire, Scotland, June 5, 1723, and died in Edinburgh, July 8, 1790. His father had been controller of the customs, thus furnishing another illustration of the tenacity with which heredity models the genius of the child in the mold of the parents experience. The revenues of governments are indissolubly associated with the wealth of the nations over which they bear sway. Adam was a posthumous child, his birth occurring a few months after his father's death, but his mother survived until within a few years of the death of her son. He was weak and sickly in infancy, and was reared by his mother with unlimited tenderness and indulgence. At three years of age he was stolen from his home by a band of "Tinkers," or Gypsies, but was almost immediately recovered. After attending the small seminary of David Miller, at Kirkealdy, for a few years, he left home at the age of fourteen for the University of Glasgow, where he studied under the celebrated Dr. Francis Hutcheson. After three years at Glasgow, he entered Baliol College, of the University of Oxford, with the intention that he should study for the Church of England. During his seven years of study at Oxford he abandoned all desire or taste for the ecclesiastical profession, and while not aggressively skeptical, yet his attitude of polite philosophy would render him better fitted for secular and literary than for religious effort. He publishes in the "Wealth of Nations" some strictures upon the course of disci-

pline and study pursued at Oxford which were never relished, and hardly even forgiven by the worshipers of that renowned seat of learning. Smith became a critical Greek scholar with a profound love for the literature and Drama of the Hellenic race. Leaving Oxford he returned to Kirkealdy, but soon removed to Edinburgh, where he formed one of a coterie of illustrious scholars and thinkers, including Hume and Robertson, Blair, Ferguson, Lord Kames, Home, Lord Loughborough, Lord Monboddo, and others. With Hume, the eminent philosopher and historian, his acquaintance was specially intimate and congenial, and continued until the death of the latter, when Dr. Smith took pains to write, in vindication of his friend, from the charge, very fashionable at that day on the part of Christians against philosophers, of having died in great agonies of remorse. The common unlettered crowd were unable to conceive how any gentleman of learning and integrity could die, at peace with himself and all the world, unless he adored a deceased Jew as the author of the universe and the creator of his own mother, however unwilling they would have been to invite a living Jew to dine with them. To them it was a sort of sacrilege that any person should presume to die happily, unless inspired by the selfish belief that he had been individually rescued from those hell-flames which the imagination of each mortal is so proud to hold in reserve as a penalty for the sins of others. In 1751, through the influence of Lord Kames and other friends, Mr. Smith was made Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow, and in the following year he was advanced to the chair of Moral Philosophy in the same institution, which he continued to fill for thirteen years. He became immediately successful and eminent as a teacher, for, though he wrote with labor, he seems to have talked with fertility and fluency. All his works were dictated to an amanuensis, and bear somewhat the earmarks of this mode of composition, which inclines to diffuseness and turgidity. His "Theory of the Moral Sentiments" had a hold at first equal to that of the Wealth of Nations, which was published in the

year so eventful to Americans, of 1776, but with the progress of time the former has become obsolete, and Dr. Adam Smith entered the nineteenth century indebted to the "Wealth of Nations" alone for his continued fame. In 1764 he joined the Duke of Buccleugh in a tour of the continent, where he made the intimate acquaintance of the economists Turgot and Quesnay. Shortly after his return he was appointed one of the commissioners of the customs in Scotland, and fixed his residence at Edinburgh, where he continued to the end of his life. He was never married, but the domestic offices of his household were performed during most of his life by his mother, and for four years after her death by his cousin. The loss of both these relatives preyed severely upon his own health and spirits, and left the closing years of his life somewhat sad and solitary. He was "foppish," as he expressed it, in his taste for an elegant library, and left one of rare value. Numerous of his manuscripts were burned at his death by his peremptory request and without examination; but, from their bulk and form, they were believed to include works upon which their author had expended vast labor, but which, for some reason, he was unable to leave in a condition to render their publication expedient or satisfactory.

ADAM SMITH, THE ECONOMIST.

HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THAT OF PREVIOUS AND SUBSEQUENT WRITERS; THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS, MORE ESPECIALLY UPON FREE TRADE VS. HOME INDUSTRIES, COIN AND PAPER MONEY, LABOR AND POPULATION; POLITICAL ECONOMY NOT A SCIENCE, BUT A SHIFTING COMBAT, OF WHICH ADAM SMITH WAS A SAGACIOUS BUT NOT AN INFALLIBLE OBSERVER; HIS ERRORS FREELY DISCUSSED.

Few writers of the last century displayed a spirit so candid, impartial and judicious as Adam Smith, and few, therefore, have transmitted to the present so much that is still of value or so little that the intervening additions to the world's learning would induce its author, were he now to re-edit his own works, to recant. While later writers have ostentatiously presented fewer materials for thought, under the flattering pretense that they form the science of political economy, or of wealth, or of society, Dr. Smith modestly purports to present only "*an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.*" Strictly confining himself to those pertinent inductive observations which came under his eye, he endeavored, with something of the canny spirit of the Scotch, to sort the legislative policies that seemed to have paid a profit, from those which had netted a loss to the nations adopting them, and to label them much as a merchant would his wares in taking an account of stock.

In writing his great work he begins without any definitions of his terms, proceeds without outline or analysis of what he deems to be his field of observation, occupies the mind of his reader with a synthetic grouping of a wide diversity of perceptions and observations held together by a slender thread of principles; freely qualifies his principles so as to admit those that are antagonistic, and thus leaves behind him a work in which opposing schools of economists will alike claim, during succeeding centuries, to find the fundamental doctrines of their conflicting systems. Opening his work with a discussion of the general truth that the economical progress of society is proportionate to the division of labor, and that the capacity of society for division of labor depends on the nearness and diversity of the market which exists for the products of labor, he necessarily presents the bases of the argument on which the protectionist has built up the theory, that such a diversification of home industries as opens the nearest and most varied market for industrial products forms the shortest road to the most perfect subdivision of occupations, and thereby tends most rapidly to furnish dear markets in which to sell and cheap markets in which to buy, and also to furnish some market for the labor of the very large class of artists, such as singers, painters, orators, literateurs and the like, who in sparse communities could find no market at all. Yet when he comes to treat more fully the subject of commercial restrictions, he not only denounces vigorously all commercial monopolies in favor of privileged individuals or classes, which were then, 1752-'6, so much in vogue, and also all restrictions on trade which aim to protect the people of one province of the same country from free competition with those of an-

other, such as had prevailed in France, but he denies that it is wise for a legislature to make any industry profitable, or to do more than let it alone. He says, p. 345:

“The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention but assume an authority which could safely be trusted to no single person, to no council or senate whatever, and would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.”

Yet, on p. 351, he defends the navigation act, as one which “very properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases by absolute prohibitions, and in others by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries.” Although these acts, he says, “proceeded from national animosity” toward the Dutch, who had previously held the carrying trade, yet, “they are as wise as if they had all been detected by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England.”

Here Dr. Smith comes again over to the help of the protectionists, whose policy in the preceding sentence he had condemned, and after affirming that the power to make navigation profitable could not safely be entrusted to any council or senate, he, in effect, affirms that it was safely exercised by the long parliament of ignorant and

vindictive Puritans presided over by Praise-God Barebones, in the reign of Cromwell. It does not expunge the inconsistency that navigation is an exceptional industry, because essential to a nation's defense, since manufactures are as essential to national defense as ships, and, in the case of an inland nation, infinitely more so.

Adam Smith also distinguished between the feasibility of attempting, by legislative restrictions on importations, to promote the growth of manufactures, which only need coal, breadstuffs and capital for their unlimited expansion, and the impracticability of like attempts to promote the supply of agricultural products by protecting English farmers, whose supply of the chief raw material for that purpose, viz., land, is incapable of being sensibly increased, even by the most industrious reclaiming of marshes, mountains and wastes and the most improved system of fertilizing. He says, page 347: "Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle and of salt provisions, together with high duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of Great Britain as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is chiefly employed. In manufactures a very small advantage will enable foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will require a very great

one to enable them to do so in the rude produce of the soil. If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several of the home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them perhaps go to ruin altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and industry at present employed in them would be forced to find out some other employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the soil could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the country."

Dr. Smith suggests three classes of cases in which a protective policy is preferable to one of free trade; viz., (1) when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defense of the country (a qualification which in its ultimate logic applies to all industries); (2) when some tax is imposed at home, on the domestic product, which competes with the foreign product on which a customs duty is laid. But here Dr. Smith rather illogically insists that the principle applies only when the domestic cost of production is increased by a tax laid directly on the competing domestic product, or the process of manufacture, and not when it is enhanced by taxes laid on other products, the incidence of which, in the form of increased wages and increased cost of living, enhance the cost of the manufacture in question. He founds the objection to a protective customs duty, in the latter case, on the difficulty of ascertaining the exact sum by which the cost of the domestic production is actually enhanced by taxes that fall in their first incidence on other products, and only reach the manufacture in question through their effect on rates of wages, of interest and of cost of living. But if the exception itself is in principle sound, viz., that a domestic manufacturer ought not to be permitted to be undersold by a foreign manufac-

turer by reason of any enhanced cost in the production of his own staple, caused by any taxes imposed by the government itself, then, if the government cannot determine precisely how far the cost of the domestic production is enhanced by the general burden of taxation, its obligation to determine *as nearly as it can* is in no way diminished. The principle involved still requires that protective duties be laid in all cases wherein the foreign manufacture may undersell the domestic, since in all cases the cost of the domestic is enhanced by the general burden of taxation resting on all industries. The third case in which Dr. Smith favors the continuance of the protective policy is, p. 354, when the foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the importation of some of our manufactures into its country. Such an instance is very likely to occur in the case of any nation which levies any duties on imports whatever; for instance, the duties laid by England on highwines under her present free-trade system is clearly protective of the English manufacture of highwines. Thus it will be seen that while the general drift and argument of "The Wealth of Nations" are so far opposed to commercial restrictions for the encouragement of particular industries as to justify in part the claims of the free-trade school of economists, yet his exceptions and qualifications embody all that is essential in the doctrines of the protectionist school, yet not so cordially and heartily expressed as they would have been had not commercial restrictions of a very impolitic and oppressive sort, such as those designed to prevent the building up of a commercial marine in Ireland, and of iron and woollen manufactures in the American colonies, been the distinguishing vice of the statesmanship of the period in which he wrote.

While the capacity to apprehend, and do justice in our statements, to the antagonistic forces of society indicates an ability and practical candor far higher than the blind partisanship which allies itself with one of these forces only, yet the careless statement of both of two antagonistic forces successively, as being the one right and just force which should prevail, betrays want of the logical power of generalization and of statement, which shall either reduce the two forces to one more comprehensive, or shall clearly state the philosophy and grounds of their perpetual antagonism. Adam Smith rises above both the sectarian protectionist and the sectarian free-trader, in both candor and wisdom in being able to apprehend the essential elements of truth in both their doctrines, but he falls short of the philosophic conclusion to which he might easily have been led by entertaining simultaneously these opposing views; viz., that in the social world a conflict of interests is essential to the completest harmony, as in the world of matter a conflict of forces is essential to all eternal motions, and in mind a conflict of those ideal abstractions which we call truths is of the essence of all permanent knowledge.

As comprehensive a statement as occurs to us, of the conflicting views on this point, to be gathered from the various parts of Dr. Smith's work, would be, that, where a nation has natural resources for the production of a given product sufficient to justify the hope that the gain from encouraging its production at home, by imposing a tax on the importation of the foreign article, will more than counterbalance the loss arising from the payment of the tax, and from the diversion of labor and capital from other forms of production which are presently more profitable into that which is presently less

profitable, there arises a conflict of interest in which the free-trader looks at the immediate loss to the consumer as not counterbalanced by the ultimate profit; and the protectionist looks upon the immediate loss as more than counterbalanced by the ultimate profit, and as both immediate loss and ultimate profit exist in most cases, and the amount of either is in no case definitely ascertainable, there is a perpetual utility in the struggle between the two forces or parties, as it tends to narrow legislation to that happy medium in which protective experiments will be confined to instances in which the ultimate profit will exceed the immediate loss.

In dealing with the money and currency question, Dr. Smith betrays an occasional lapse into the same illogical inconsistencies of expression, sometimes, in his zealous opposition to some error of the earlier economists, toppling over into a vehemence of expression which is at war with the just conclusions of later ones. Thus he says, p. 331: "Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital, but it has already been shown that it generally makes but small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it." . . . "If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconvenience. Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their credits with one another once a month or once a year, will supply it with less inconvenience. A well-regulated paper money will supply it, not only without any inconvenience, but in some cases with some advantages. Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was so unnecessarily employed as when directed to

watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country."

It seems incoherent to demand in the same sentence that a paper money shall be "well regulated," and that government, which is the only regulating force contemplated by Dr. Smith, shall let entirely alone the question of the preservation and increase of the quantity of money, which constitutes its regulation. Nor does Adam Smith do justice to money in saying that it always constitutes the most unprofitable part of a nation's capital. As the means by which all values in exchange are measured, it gives to the thing exchanged all that part of its value which is saved to the exchanger by being able, through the intervention of money, to measure its value exactly; whereas, without money he would be compelled, either not to exchange at all, or to exchange almost without regard to value. No ingenuity of barter would enable a newspaper to be published, because it would not admit of the thing bartered for it being divided into small enough parcels for distribution among those whose labor produces the paper. So no ingenuity would enable a concert or a government to be run by barter, nor indeed any form of enterprise requiring the contributing labor of different and distant persons extending over considerable periods of time. The only mode of procuring the services of others on any large scale in the absence of money is by force, which is slavery. Money, by constituting a medium in which the smallest services can be paid for, substitutes wages for the lash, and renders the liberty of the individual consistent with the maintenance and support of society. Nowhere in Adam Smith is the fact recognized that money is the abolisher of slavery, or that freedom is a substitution of induce-

ment by money for compulsion by force. Nor does he fully recognize the fertilizing power of money, the extent to which it causes productions to go on, which, without an accurate means of measuring the value produced and of subdividing its price among the thousands who produce it, could not go on. Adam Smith's statement, that paper money, credit, and money of account, or mutual set-offs, show the extent to which money is unnecessary to commerce is peculiarly faulty, in that, all these are but ideal shadows or intellectual conceptions of money, which could not themselves exist had not money itself previously existed. Credit is a promise to pay money. Paper money is a form of credit. The setting off of accounts is but the setting off of accounts of money due and owing; i. e., of credits. All these are but incidental utilities of money, not proofs of its inutility. All the modes of dispensing with money depend despotically on its pre-existence and are the mental recognition of its potentiality. It was an Irishman who thought it quite unnecessary to put any ball into his rifle as the fall would be sufficient to kill the squirrel. Dr. Smith's supposition that money is not utilized when credit is employed rests on the same foundation. Were there no such previous fact as money it could cast no such present shadow as credit, and it is one of the utilities of actual or value money that it renders credit or ideal money possible. Although Dr. Smith recognizes the economy of the substitution of a paper currency for one of gold and silver, his statements concerning currency are simple and crude compared with the recent discussions of that branch of economic study by Dr. Henry C. Carey; and while they display a higher judgment, they lack the fullness in detail even of

those of Walker and Sumner. The facts that all forms of exchangeable credit are currency in proportion to their ready exchangeability; that growth in finance implies an ever increasing substitution of credit currency for value currency; that all such currencies assume four functions, being at once a debt, an investment, a measure of value and a medium of exchange, and are to be so dealt with as to secure the minimum of dislocation and the maximum of steadiness and certainty to each of these functions; that the highest possible utilization of specie is, when it is the basis of redemption, of a far larger volume of credit currency, thus enabling many exchanges to be made by means of a coin which does not appear in the exchange except by its representative, the paper bill, which it lies in the bank vault ready to redeem; and that the financial circulation is carried on by two forms of circulating medium, of which money, including even paper money, is slower, corresponding to the blood in animal circulation, while bank deposits, discounts and checks are the more rapid, corresponding to that mysterious lightning-like nerve force by which, in the animal economy, the will flashes itself momentarily throughout the body in ten thousand forms of complex action; and finally, that it is to the expansions in the deposit and discount system rather than to expansions in the volume of paper money, to which financial crises are so often due (as in England in 1824-'5, and in America in 1837 and 1857), all these generalizations of a later epoch are a great advance in detail upon the general views of Adam Smith concerning money.

As most branches of intellectual inquiry are the subjects of gradual evolution, a writer, even of the highest value, must generally be content to appear at advantage

when compared with those who have preceded him and with his cotemporaries. Adam Smith followed in the wake of a series of writers, whose attention had been turned to the consideration of the fertilizing power of money by the immense influence felt in Europe from the discoveries of gold and silver in America. Among these in England, Thomas Munn (1664) had written upon "England's Treasure by Foreign Trade;" Andrew Yarranton (1677) had followed upon "England's Improvement by Land and Sea;" John Locke, (1691) had expatiated upon "The Interest and Value of Money." On the Continent numerous writers were crystalizing in their closets the prevailing faith of the period, that an abundance of specie, obtained either by colonial mines or by colonial trade, was the sure road to national wealth. This tendency to magnify the gold supply and the profits of foreign trade and colonial possessions, Adam Smith thought it worth while to counteract. He says, p. 341:

"Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses and consumable goods seem to slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce. The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines, only by the balance of trade or by exporting to a greater value than it imported, it necessa-

rily became the greater object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry." And again, p. 328, "The title of Munn's book, 'England's Treasure in Foreign Trade,' became a fundamental maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all other commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of all, the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue and creates the greatest employment to the people of the country, was considered as subsidiary to foreign trade." Elsewhere, Dr. Smith states that the tonnage of coal alone carried from Newcastle to London, exceeds the entire foreign tonnage of the kingdom, as in this country, in like manner, it was early observed that the tonnage of freight through the Erie canal exceeds the entire tonnage of foreign imports and exports of the United States. While the mercantile school of economists, against whom Dr. Smith chiefly wrote, were endeavoring, by restraints upon importations, and bounties upon exportations, to build up a large foreign trade as a means of insuring an influx of the precious metals, the modern protectionist school, against whom his arguments are sometimes used, direct their discriminative duties entirely to the building up of an active internal trade (which Dr. Smith greatly favored) by bringing about such a diversity of industries that every resource of soil and raw material shall be worked up into the finished product for consumption at home, thus supplying the largest volume, and the widest diversity of employment for labor, and preventing the export of our gold product to pay for articles which our own unemployed labor is as competent to produce as that of any other country.

Adam Smith's prescience in stating so clearly the greater applicability of discriminating duties as a means to insure the introduction of manufactures into a new country having all natural resources therefor, than as a means of maintaining a monopoly of the agricultural supply in an old country in the hands of a class who have no means of meeting the demand for breadstuffs by increasing their acreage of agricultural lands, at once divorces him from the modern English protectionists of the school of Lord George Bentinck, and allies him to the modern English free-traders of the school of Mill and Bright, and to the American protectionists of the school of Carey. On the other hand, the American free-traders attach an importance to the foreign trade relatively to the domestic, though they seek to encourage the former by the removal of discriminations and duties, which allies them rather with the mercantile school of Munn and Locke than with Adam Smith, who thought that a diversification of domestic industries was of much more importance, and that "by means of such regulations a manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a certain time may be made as cheap or cheaper than in the foreign country."

As it is conducive to the proper apprehension of Adam Smith's views concerning money and trade to bear in mind the strained exaggerations he was endeavoring to counteract, so it is necessary, to a correct appreciation of his teachings concerning the productiveness of various kinds of labor, to remember that he had been preceded by a school of Physiocrats, founded by Quesnay (1758), who taught that none but agricultural labor is productive. Turgot and the elder Mirabeau were writers of the school of Quesnay, and Dr. Frank-

lin, who was also the friend of Adam Smith, was one of his disciples. He taught that the productive powers of the soil were the sole source of a nation's wealth; that the raw cotton and wool, as they come from the farmer, are only increased in value when converted into cloth, and thence into garments, by the value of the cost of the food, clothing and shelter furnished indirectly by the farmer to the artisans who spin and weave the wool and make the garment. The garment, therefore, is the product formed by combining the farmer's breadstuffs, meats, vegetables, and timber, for the support and shelter of workmen, with the farmer's raw materials, wool and cotton, with perhaps some metals produced by miners, who are a class of farmers in that the earth supplies their product. To Quesnay, commerce and manufactures were sterile industries, which a nation should do nothing to encourage. Agriculture was the source and keeper of both, and if the trade in grain were kept free, abundant and cheap, commerce and manufactures could not fail to prosper through the cheapness of all they would need to buy, and the prosperity of all to whom they would need to sell.

Adam Smith, following immediately upon these narrow teachings, was influenced by them. He holds agriculture to be the most productive, manufactures less so, and assigns the last and least profitable place to foreign trade, which the mercantile school had placed foremost. Unfortunately, however, he classes as unproductive all other employments, and as this is his greatest error, and clearly limits his authority as an economist, we extract his position at some length. He says, page 253: "There is one sort of labor which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed; there

is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called productive, the latter, unproductive, labor. Thus, the labor of a manufacturer adds generally to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance and of his master's profit. The labor of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the manufacturer (artisan) has his wages advanced to him by his master (employer) he, in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labor is bestowed. But the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of manufacturers (artisans); he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial servants. The labor of the latter, however, has its value, and deserves its reward as well as that of the former. But the labor of the manufacturer (artisan) fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity, which lasts, for some time at least, after that labor is past. It is as it were a certain quantity of labor stocked and stored up to be employed, if necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or, what is the same thing, the price of that subject, can afterward, if necessary, put into motion a quantity of labor equal to that which had originally produced it. The labor of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realize itself in any particular subject or vendible commodity. The services of the menial generally perish in the very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace of value behind them for which an equal quantity of service could afterward be procured.

“The labor of some of the most respectable orders of society is like that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject or vendible commodity which endures after that labor is passed, and for which an equal quantity of labor could afterward be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the officers, both of justice and war, who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive laborers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honorable, how useful, or how necessary soever, produces nothing from which an equal quantity of service can afterward be procured. The protection, security and defense of the commonwealth, the effect of their labor this year, will not purchase its protection, security and defense for the year to come. In the same class must be ranked some both of the gravest and most important and some of the most frivolous professions; churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc. The labor of the meanest of these has a certain value, regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other soil laborer, and that of the noblest and most useful produces nothing which could afterward purchase an equal quantity of labor. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.”

This assumption that labor, to be productive of wealth must result in the creation of some physical commodity which shall have an exchangeable value for an appreciable period of time, is, in effect, constructing a new

definition of wealth; viz., that it consists in physical commodities having an exchangeable value. But our author, p. 23, had already followed Hobbes in defining wealth, not as a physical commodity having exchangeable value, but as a "power" to purchase the necessaries, conveniences and amusements essential to the enjoyment of human life, to which should be added the power to maintain in motion the forces, capital and industry, which should insure the permanency of the previous power to purchase, etc. Now "powers" of whatever kind are abstract attributes, not physical commodities. If wealth is the power to satisfy wants, then, since the only want man knows is that of pleasurable sensations, the sole function of wealth and labor in the last analysis is to produce pleasure, and all pleasure is mental. Thus, so far from it being true that wealth must be a physical commodity, it is true that no physical commodity is wealth except through its convertibility into pleasurable ideas. If power is wealth, then the *prima donna's* song which buys a guinea is as exchangeable a commodity as the merchant's guinea which buys the song. In one sense the song perishes in the singing. In another, to-wit, in the pleasures of memory, it out-lives the guinea; for, years after the merchant has forgotten where he got the guinea, he will remember where he heard the song and perhaps will retain it in his memory. We do not perceive that the fact that a source of pleasure perishes in its production, forms any reason why it is not wealth. All things perish sooner or later in their use. This perishing is called their consumption. A diamond is not consumed by use for a million years. A dwelling may be consumed by use in a hundred years or in twenty. Food must be consumed within an hour after

its preparation. A song, speech or sermon is consumed in the instant of production. Will any one say that the labor which results in a diamond is ten thousand times more productive than that which results in a dwelling? or that the labor which results in producing food is unproductive because the food is so soon consumed, and because the strength and nourishment derived therefrom to-day, will not (except by being itself consumed in procuring more food) exchange for the strength and nourishment needed for to-morrow? What class of menial servants could Dr. Smith have supposed to be unproductive? It passes comprehension that he could have supposed that the cooks, laundry maids, chamber maids, bootblacks and valets, who relieve the producer of wealth or the organizer and controller of labor or capital, from the necessity of cooking his own food, washing his own linen, making his own bed, blacking his own boots, and being distracted by the care of his own toilet, did not thereby enable him to accomplish a larger work of production than if half his time had been occupied by these cares. Menial servants in great number are burdensome to those who have nothing for them to do, but equally so are clerks and artisans, and are, therefore, as a rule, kept only that they may do what their employers would otherwise be obliged to do, or to sacrifice some portion of their time or comfort. They preserve, to the aristocratic class, that freedom from nervous irritation, and that repose of judgment and poise of character, which distinguish an aristocracy wherever it exists, imparting to it calmness and equanimity, grace and politeness, all of which tend toward stability in the guidance of productive industries and freedom from mistakes and rashness in the management of financial investments.

A lawyer's argument concerning a title to land helps, as much as the fences that surround the land to which the argument relates, to enhance the value of the product of the land by rendering secure the tenure by which it is enjoyed. The science of jurisprudence is molded by such arguments, and without it the production of commodities, by losing the certainty of the title to them, would be almost prevented. And here we strike upon the keynote to the inadequacy in scope of Adam Smith's view of political economy, which is essentially the shopkeeper's view, the mere profit-and-loss view, and not the view of the philosopher of society. Instead of regarding men as the subject of political economy, and their development intellectually, physically, morally and socially as the theme of the science, he keeps his eye riveted to the ledger, the shop, the state of trade, the balance of profit over expenditure. Hence, money is to him a physical commodity—not an emancipator of man. He nowhere connects with its potency in subdividing exchangeable values, the substitution of wages for the lash as an inducement to industry; the superseding of tenants by freeholders; the equalization of man; the growth of popular freedom; the increasing humanity of law, coinciding with the diminishing prevalence of crime; the extended education of the people and the myriad-tongued power of the press. Adam Smith is a patient, plodding, always trite and often dull thinker, generally surpassing in scope and correctness the age in which he lived, who had a keen eye for detecting the profitable, and who described, very comprehensively, what classes of the industries and legislations of his time tended to enhance the national wealth of the peoples adopting them. Having set himself to describe

the profitable, he did not get above his task. He left to later writers the task of unfolding and analyzing the principles which govern the evolution of man in society, from poverty to wealth, from barbarism to civilization, from ignorance to knowledge, from slavery and anarchy to freedom and order. Profit is one factor in this science of society, and a very great one. Law, art, association, religion, science, philosophy, are all likewise factors of sacred importance. Adam Smith had done much to found a new system of morals by showing that labor was the sole producer of wealth, that wealth was the sole employer of labor, and that to these two man was immediately indebted for the means of satisfying every want and obtaining every enjoyment. The mere act of directing popular attention to these points did much to overthrow the doctrine which had for seventeen centuries held nominal sway over the Christian world that wealth was a sin to be atoned for, and that the best thing to do with it was to destroy it, by dispersing it.

In the years 1798 to 1826 the Rev. T. R. Malthus, in his work on population, broadened the field of political economy by making man, instead of the ledger, the theme of study. He swept the world for the causes which tend to diminish population, as Adam Smith had done for the causes which tended to facilitate its support. Singularly enough, while Adam Smith had found the productiveness of labor increase in geometrical ratio as the subdivision of trades and the employment of machinery advanced, and that both these causes increased with the increase in the density of the population, wherefrom it might have been inferred, that, as the human race multiplied upon the earth, the means for its subsistence constantly increased in a more rapid ratio than the race

itself, Mr. Malthus, on the contrary, regarded the means of subsistence as a nearly permanent supply, which, owing to the increase of numbers, was constantly becoming more inadequate. The Malthusan assumption, that the ratio of increase of population exceeded the ratio of increase in the means of subsistence, actually required to sustain it, such facts as would show that in sparsely settled countries, like Patagonia and Tartary, the means of subsistence are greater per capita than in Belgium, Great Britain, Japan and China; and that the thinning out of the race, by famine and the diseases incident to want, is more severe amidst compact populations than in sparsely inhabited countries. No such proof was offered. On the contrary, Mr. Malthus' illustrations of failure in the struggle for subsistence are almost exclusively drawn from sparsely settled countries. They are more than met by the more logical, historical and statistical arguments of Dr. Carey, showing the very numerous forces which are at work to cause the ratio of the increase in means of subsistence to far exceed the ratio of increase in population. Among these are the greater extent to which the productive moments of time, and capacity for force, can find profitable employment, where the diversity of industries furnishes each worker with an occupation suited to his taste and powers, than is possible where each must choose between hunting, fishing and digging, or the few other rude occupations of barbarism; also the enormous increase in the bulk and nutritive power of the food producible from land where the variety, vicinage, numbers, and wealth of the consumers of the food are sufficient to call for a system of improved garden tillage, over the scant supply of food derivable from similar land in sparsely settled

countries whose markets of consumption are distant and whose crops are therefore confined to those which are exportable; also the rapid enrichment of the soils which takes place in the vicinity of all compact populations, owing to the improved systems of culture and the rotation of crops which are there profitable, and the waste of soils in countries whose populations are sparse and whose markets are distant; also the fact that as populations increase in density the equilibrium between agriculture, manufactures and commerce becomes more perfect, so that each supplies the other more and more rapidly with raw materials and with the markets for its products, the rapidity of the societary movement becomes greater, the circulation more electric and strong, man becomes more free by reason of the increased demand upon his powers, industry becomes more profitable, great famines disappear from history, fewer hours of labor suffice for support, offspring become less a burden and the means for rearing them are within the reach of all; also, that as society advances in numbers, the cultivation of the soil, which begins among the shepherds on the mountains or on the easily fortified hills, where the soil is poor, but bare of forests and easy of access, gradually extends to the richer soils of the lowlands, to the marshes and deltas where only an improved civilization can remove the rank jungle of vegetation or resist the malarious tendencies of the atmosphere; also, that only as society multiplies do mechanical inventions and the inanimate labor powers of steam, heat, electricity and sunlight accomplish the results of human labor without the expenditure of human force, as so powerfully illustrated in the case of Great Britain, whose machine power exceeds the existing hand-power of the

whole human race. In short, while it is easy to grasp the supposed truth that the propagation of an animal depends only on the momentary indulgence of passion, while its subsistence demands years of industry, and to infer therefrom that the tendency to propagation must outrun the means of subsistence, and must need the checks imposed by starvation, want and war; yet against no deduction which the mind can frame can there be brought a more overwhelming array of inductive evidence. Indeed, so much easier is it to live in society than out of society, and in a dense society than in a sparse one, that the most fascinating romance civilization has produced, "Robinson Crusoe," is but a picture of the difficulties which would beset a civilized man, in undertaking to derive an existence unaided, amidst all the bounties of nature; and the chief argument against the story of the earth having been peopled by a single pair is the absolute economical impossibility that such a pair, fully developed into the form, frailty and weakness of humanity without the knowledge of fire, cooking, clothing, weapons or agriculture, could live long enough to rear a family.

It is in comparison with the gloomy error of Malthus concerning population, and with Ricardo's English theory of rent, and with the one-sided fanaticism of such modern bullionists as Amasa Walker, and such free-traders as Wayland and Perry, that the judiciousness of Adam Smith becomes conspicuous. While less minute in details than some of them, his judgments are wiser and more in harmony with advanced knowledge than any of them. By being too broad to become the founder of a school, he has risen, as nearly as an economist could do, to be the founder of a science. He has at least presented us with a sound method. For, while each little

college professor, who has imparted to the world his inadequate notions upon political economy, has styled them a science, it may well be doubted whether political economy can ever become anything more than Adam Smith denominated it; viz., an "Inquiry." For not only does any doctrine disappear from the domain of political economy the moment that, by its universal adoption, it passes into the domain of jurisprudence, or that, by its universal rejection, it is relegated to the rank of exploded follies or crimes, but any and every doctrine of political economy depends for its place in that department of thought, as much upon the dignity and ability of those who dispute, as of those who advocate, it. No work on political economy discusses the expediency of establishing courts of justice, or of giving some protection to life and property against crime, or the propriety of establishing roads, because all these policies, though immediately essential to the production of wealth, are undisputed and have passed into the domain of jurisprudence. They have emerged from the "whether" into the "how." Neither does any work on political economy argue against a crusade for the recovery of the holy sepulchre, or a revival of the Spanish inquisition, though both these phases of activity were far more injurious in an economical sense than any experiment, however ill-judged, in modern finance has ever been. The sole reason is that these policies have no economical defenders. A proposition, therefore, to deserve a place in political economy, must not only relate to causes which affect the production, distribution and consumption of values, but must be capable of being ably sustained and also of being ably resisted; it must not only be disputable, but it must be disputed. It is, therefore, the

opposite of an exact science; it is an inquiry into the disputable governmental policies concerning the industry of the periods and nations for whose use it is written. In England its chief questions are "upon whom shall the taxes be laid," and the government being in aristocratic hands, taxation is laid upon the consumers. In America, where the government is practically in the hands of the non-taxpayers, the burden of state and local taxation rests on the property-holders, while that of federal taxation rests more largely on consumers. While the two countries deal with the same question in nearly opposite ways, neither country discusses it as a question in political economy, because in each country its policy is, in fact, undisputed, though in theory extremely disputable. Upon the question whether indirect taxation should be made discriminative in favor of domestic industries, volumes of "political economy" have been written, because it is greatly disputed. Let the doubts of the propriety of either course be removed from all able minds, and while the doctrine actually carried out would become fixed in the legislation and jurisprudence of the country adopting it, it would be effectually eliminated from its "science" of political economy. The above are almost the only questions which England and America even seem to have in common, and even in this case the appearance of having them in common is delusive, since in England the cry of free trade is a cry of the manufacturers and artisans for cheap bread, while in America it is the demand of the importers and consumers for cheap manufactured goods. In England, protection, until recently, has been the cry of the farmers for dear corn. In America it is the demand of the manufacturers, primarily, for good prices on their products.

All our other questions are distinct. In England the monopoly of land makes the rent question primary. In America we have no such question, but the monopoly of the means of transportation renders the railroad question primary. In England the communistic trades unions struggle feebly in the grasp of a powerful aristocracy. In America capital of all kinds begs and buys permission to exist at the hands of forty separate communes in which numbers alone are represented. England buys enduring peace through the maintenance, by the wisdom of her capitalists, of a considerable army and navy. America drifts cheaply, without an army, toward another costly civil war, in which the rebelling force will be recruited as rapidly as that which represents the government, and in the meantime has neither the power to hold a fort nor disperse a secession convention. Meanwhile the true economists continue their inquiries into the disputable problems which beset the statesman, tempering the passionate forces of the hour by the calmer, though less experienced, disquisitions which, being matured in the library, may sometimes compensate by their breadth and depth for a frequent lack of that adaptation and fitness which can only be fully acquired in actual legislation. Often the practical legislator feels inclined to say with Napoleon: "If an empire were made of adamant the economists would grind it to powder." Yet ever the true economists, who explore this debatable land with candor, will overturn continual errors of the statesman of this generation, and impart continual instruction to the statesman of the next; and ever will his own errors fall before the sickle of maturer thought, wielded by the economists who will follow him. For it will never be a science, but always a

progressive combat between armies never quite the same, contending on bases which shift with each incident of the battle. Indeed, as a philosophy of the contending forces of society, it could not but be a shifting combat. Yet even the little men, who glean behind the economists, will hold up their scattered blades of wheat, gathered from distant and exceptional corners in the harvest-field of economic history, and, brandishing aloft the straw, which to-day is and to-morrow shall be cast into the oven, will say of these fragments, whose ends are already burning: "Behold the science of wealth."



JEREMY BENTHAM.

JEREMY BENTHAM.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Bentham was born in London, February 15, 1748, and died in Queen Square Place, Westminster, June 6, 1832. The early part of his life was made unhappy by the combined effects of a weakly and puny body, a sensitive and bashful reserve, concealing vast egotism, and a precociously acute mind, exciting brilliant hopes of preferment and place in the breast of his practical and pushing father, united with an utter contempt on his part for those arts of complaisance toward the average dullness of people in power, and with a real lack of that tact in adapting means to ends, which would help him to get on in the world. All these qualities clouded his early life with obscurity, neglect and failure. During the latter part of his career, however, he was sufficiently admired, by eminent and scholarly people of influence, to render his declining years sunny with the hope of a great fame, and warm and bright under the genial rays of numerous and distinguished friendships, and elegant and commanding activities. His ancestors for three generations backward, beginning with a pawnbroker and continuing through two attorneys of moderate practice, had been shrewd money getters and land buyers. A distant branch of the family contained a Bishop, whose relations to Jeremy seem to have been confined to the function of snubbing him, when, in an early part of his career, certain collegiate preferment was sought through "his reverence." It would be a curious problem to solve whether Bentham's early physical weakness had aught to do with inspiring his pessimistic view of every phase of society,

whether relating to government, law, or prevailing moral creeds, which he felt called on to consider. Everything he touched was wrong as it was, but easy to be set right by his remodeling.

Pope, the poet, was even more an invalid, yet thoroughly an optimist. Both illustrate the danger of falling into the purely physical theory of stirpiculture, that none but strong children should be born, since both prove that the very best of human work is sometimes done by invalids.

Bentham's precocity is indicated by many examples. Before he could talk he knew the alphabet; at three years of age, and before he was "breeched," he left a company of gossiping conversers and was found absorbed in reading Rapin's History of England. At five he played the violin, and was so far entered upon Latin and Greek that his father had to resume his studies, in those languages, in order to keep ahead of him as his teacher. At the age of six he began to learn the French language and dancing, though his muscles were so weak that the latter was painful to him, as he could not get on his tiptoes, even for an instant. At the same age, and while able to ascend the stairs only by drawing one leg after the other at every step, he read Pope's Homer with great avidity. In all schools he appeared among his classmates almost as a dwarf. At twelve he entered Oxford, though he felt a strong disgust in being obliged to ratify, without examination, the XXXIX Articles, and at sixteen took his degree of Bachelor of Arts, having formed, however, like Adam Smith, an unfavorable opinion of the institution. At the age of fifteen he became a (law) student in the Court of King's Bench, Westminster Hall, and ate his first commons at Lincoln's Inn. In December of the same year, however, he returned to Oxford to listen to Blackstone's lectures on Law, which have since become so famous as the text book of students. At the age of sixteen he travelled to Scotland and France, and at eighteen took his degree at Oxford as Master of Arts, the youngest graduate that had been known at either of the universities. At twenty

he made a considerable expedition on horseback in England, and at twenty-two a further tour on foot.

Bentham never practiced law, but at the age of twenty-two began to be regarded, in the limited circle of his friends, as a philosopher. His "Fragment on Government," a critique on Blackstone's chapter in laudation of the British constitution, was the first effort which brought him into notice. In the contest between Great Britain and America he took but little interest, that little leaning to the tory side. He did, however, seek an appointment as Secretary of a commission sent out by Lord North to propose terms to the revolted colonies. To his logical mind, the cause of the colonies, if it had merits, was put upon a false ground. "It was," he said, "founded on the assumption of natural rights, claimed without the slightest evidence of their existence, and supported by vague and declamatory generalities." To have won his assent, the colonial demand should have been based on the unlikelihood that the English governing class would comprehend rightly the interests of the American people, both from distance of place and difference of interest.

In 1781 Lord Shelburne visited him in his Lincoln's Inn garret, and prevailed upon him to become a visitor at his country seat. He became a favorite of Lady Shelburne and her coterie, largely, it is said, through his ability as a musician, which enabled him to accompany their musical performances on the violin. An introduction among the aristocracy of wealth and culture raised him out of his depths of humiliation, and from this time forth his life assumed a more confident and successful hue. From 1785 to 1788 he spent in a tour to Russia, during which time, instead of observing the world through which he was passing, he was writing a Treatise on Usury, the most popular of his works among Englishmen.

From about this period Bentham began to offer his services to various nations, to Russia, the United States, France, and even to the adventurer and revolutionist, Miranda, who was trying to capture the Republic of

Venezuela, and to the South American republics. In all these cases he pressed upon these governments the superiority in principle of a code framed by one man according to his unique impressions of deductive logic, over the existing codes framed out of human experience and as the aggregate results of volumes of judicial precedents. President Madison received in 1811, an offer from Bentham to frame a code, National and Federal, for the United States collectively, or any number of the states separately. In 1816, after reflecting on the singular offer for five years, Mr. Madison replied that the acceptance of Bentham's offer was not within the scope of his powers.

In 1823 Bentham furnished the money to found the Westminster Review. By this time his prominent pupils in Law Reform were Sir Samuel Romilly, Lord Brougham, Daniel O'Connell and Sir Robert Peel, so far as a trimmer could ape a reformer.

Personally, Mr. Bentham was happy, amiable and youthful in manner, given to hospitable entertainment, and not deficient in a sort of worldly wisdom, notwithstanding the impracticability of many of his schemes. He especially interested the English Government in a proposed means of criminal reform, which was to combine the qualities of a prison, a workshop, and a place of industrial instruction. George III. opposed it effectively, because of a hatred he had conceived for Bentham, founded on the opposition of the latter to a war with Russia, on which the king had set his heart. For the failure of the government to carry out its contract with Bentham, upon which he had made expenditures, the government paid him £32,000.

Mr. Bentham was never married. The following extract, written in 1822, briefly summarizes Bentham's philosophy of human motive:

Now, for some years past, all inconsistencies, all surprises have vanished; everything that has served to make the field of politics a labyrinth has vanished. A clue to the interior of the labyrinth has been found. It is the principle of self preference. Man, from the very constitution of his nature, prefers his own happiness *to that of all other sensitive beings put together*; but for this self preference

the species could not have an existence. Place the chief care of each man in any other breast or breasts than his own (the case of infancy and other cases of intrinsic helplessness excepted); a few years, not to say a few months or weeks, would suffice to sweep the whole species from the earth. By this position neither the tenderest sympathy, nor anything that commonly goes by the name of disinterestedness, improper and deceptive as the appellation is, is denied. Peregrinus Proteus, the man whom Lucian saw burning himself alive, though not altogether without reluctance, in the eyes of an admiring multitude, and without any anticipation of a hereafter, was no exception to it. It was interest, self-regarding interest, that set fire to this so extraordinary a funeral pile. Yes, and interest there is in every human breast for every motive, for every desire, for every pain and pleasure.

JEREMY BENTHAM.

THE PHILOSOPHER OF LAW REFORM.

The modern students of Jeremy Bentham, as of the Roman law, easily divide into two classes; viz., those who hold that every modern lawyer needs much to know a little of him, and those who hold that one has little need to know much of him. Bentham lived the life of a daily editor without any daily newspaper in which to publish his editorial articles, but having plenty of time and a fair share of wealth, he was under no necessity of finding an immediate market for his intellectual crop, and went on storing it up in ponderous manuscripts, as "forehanded" farmers store their corn, waiting for a rise. The phrase "forehanded" gauges Bentham's intellectual attitude favorably. Each ear of corn in his granary of thought was commonplace, some of them mere "nubbins" and cobs, but he had a great many tons of it in store, and when the rise came, as in about fifty years it did, Bentham's intellectual career was converted into a success. If lawyers were divided into three classes; viz., those who have too little knowledge of the details of law, and too little talent for affairs, to make the law as it is, an implement with which to carve out a livelihood; those who have just enough for that purpose, and those who have too much, Bentham, wholly excluded from the second

class, would vibrate between the first and the third. Notwithstanding he has left eleven volumes of closely printed matter, mostly relating to the ethical principles which should govern legislation, government, jurisprudence, the punishment of crime, and the promotion of education, the closest reader will fail to note in any part of these massive volumes any evidences that he had given to the actual structure of jurisprudence then existing any more close research than was necessary to enable him to illustrate his disdain for it by example. He seems to have perused law books as Voltaire and Paine glanced at the Hebrew scriptures, or as Saladin in the desert made his distant circuits around the armor-cased King Richard, hoping to find some cleft in the armor of the knight of the couchant leopard at which he might direct his arrows. His estimate of the English law is expressed in such sentences as the following (the works of Jeremy Bentham, by Bowring, vol. i., p. 185): "The English law is a great part of it of such a nature as to be bad everywhere." Again on the same page he says: "The customary, or, as it is called, the common law, in which accident rather than design has mixed up a few principles which are inestimable, has been made up with scarce any regard for the welfare of any country, even of that which has given it birth." Again on page 167 he says, with admirable sarcasm: "That which is called unwritten law, which consists of rules of jurisprudence, is a law which governs without existing. The learned may exercise their ingenuity in guessing at it; but the unlearned citizen can never know it." And again on the same page: "To promulgate the English laws as they exist at present; to pile the decisions of the judges upon the top of the stat-

utes of parliament, would be chimerical; it would be to present the sea to those that thirst; it would do nothing for the mass of the people who would not be able to comprehend them. A point, say the mathematicians, has no parts; so neither are there any parts in chaos."

Setting out from this lofty standpoint of infidel disdain, it is not surprising that the instances cited in illustration of the iniquitous character of English law are often so rare and exceptional as never to have been made the subject of judicial decision, and at other times arise from supposed reasons which they outlived, and so continued incongruous until the incongruity was remedied by statute. Thus he says on page 186, in illustration of the supposed fallacy that under English law there can be no right without a remedy: "Are you an antiquary? your coin may be stolen from you and you can only recover the value of the copper. Are you a connoisseur? you may lose your Raphael and be paid for the canvas and the color by the yard. Are you a lover? the miniature of your mistress may be snatched from you by a rival, and you only receive for it the price that would be paid by a broker." Stolen Othos, Raphaels and mistress' miniatures are scarce as hen's teeth in the practice of the law. The first two of these instances, however, are clearly false in principle, and we have no hesitation in saying there was never any decision of the English courts—we doubt if there was ever the remotest dictum of an English common-law writer of any authority—to justify either of them. A coin or medal of the period of Otho would have a pecuniary value, provable on the testimony of dealers in antiquarian coins, and a painting by Raphael would

likewise have a pecuniary value proximately provable by testimony. In the third instance, the value a lover might set upon his mistress' miniature, like that which the mistress herself might set to an "Ode to Her Eyebrows," would not be measurable in money, because there would be presumably not a sufficient number of lovers competing for the purchase of the miniature of the same mistress to give it a market value, and outside of that immediate circle her miniature would have only the value a broker would pay for it. The sole foundation we are aware of for Bentham's remark is a dictum in Blackstone (book 2, p. 405), to the effect that if one willfully writes a work of literary merit on the parchment or paper of another, or willfully paints a picture on another's canvas, while the Roman law would have given the picture or manuscript to the writer or painter out of respect for genius, it is doubtful if the common law would.

Another instance cited by Bentham in illustration of the capriciousness of the sense of justice which prevails under the common law is, that if A assault B and injure him, an action lies for damages on behalf of B, and the damages increase in proportion to the injury up to the point at which the injury kills B, at which point the action ceases and the heirs of B are without redress, and the action, if brought in favor of B, dies with his person, and cannot be prosecuted by his executors. This criticism was correct, and subsequent statutes have both caused the action in behalf of B to survive, and have given an action to B's heirs, thus adopting Bentham's views as just.

There is a sufficiently numerous category of instances in which Bentham's views have anticipated the course

of subsequent legislation to prove him a valuable fault-finder as well as a prolific scold. Among these, it is claimed, are the abolition or mitigation of imprisonment for debt, and of arrest of the person in civil suits, a great diminution of the death penalty and tendency to proportionate punishment to offenses, a partial abolition of oaths and of laws against usury, state education so far as introduced, the ballot, universal suffrage, equal election districts, and representation in proportion to population; such a localization of courts as would establish a fountain for justice of every kind in every county; public prosecutors, a cheap postage system, savings banks, post-office money-orders, and freedom of commerce from legislative restrictions.

The contempt of Bentham for the plan of developing a system of jurisprudence through a continual accretion of judicial decisions, supplemented or modified here and there by a statute in the mode in which Roman, English and American law has been developed, the keen acuteness with which he ridicules such a system and the serenity of the egotism with which he assumes his own competency to frame codes and constitutions in a nutshell or on a half-sheet, which will make the entire law known, in its application to all the complicated contingencies of human life, at once so clearly that no litigant need doubt or even litigate, and so briefly that it would form a convenient part of church service to read the entire code, or some considerable sections of it, between the hymns or as part of the litany in the ordinary church service on Sunday—these are the contradictions in Bentham's mind, which no sane practicing lawyer can comprehend; or even apprehend, without involuntarily exclaiming, "What an inspired idiot!"

Thus Bentham says, vol. v., p. 235: "How should plain men know what is law when judges cannot tell what it is themselves? More than a hundred years ago Lord Chief Justice Hale had the honesty to confess he could not so much as tell what theft was; which, however, did not prevent his hanging men for theft. (Hale's Pleas of the Crown, tit. Larceny.) There was then no statute law to tell us what is or what is not theft; no more is there to this day; and so it is with murder and libel and a thousand other things, particularly the things that are of most importance."

"Miserable," says that great Lord Coke, "miserable is the slavery of that people among whom the law is either unsettled or unknown." Which, then, do you think is the sort of law which the host of lawyers, from Coke himself down to Blackstone, have been trumpeting in preference? That very sort of bastard law I have been describing to you, which they themselves call the unwritten law, which is no more *made* than it is *written*—which has not so much as a shape to appear in—not so much as a word which anybody can say belongs to it—which is everywhere and nowhere—which came from nobody and is addressed to nobody—and which, so long as it is what it is, can never by any possibility be either known or settled. How should lawyers be otherwise than fond of this brat of their own begetting? Or how should they bear to part with it? It carries in its hand a rule of wax, which they twist about as they please—a hook to lead the people by the nose and a shears to fleece them with. The French have had enough of this dog law; they are turning it as fast as they can into statute law, that everybody may have a rule to go by."

This habit of mental disdain pervades Bentham's view of society universally, and especially of education and religion. In his "Chrestomathia," or system of practical education, which he sets forth as a substitute for the university system of Oxford and Cambridge, and which system is beginning to be realized in our schools of technology, vol. viii., p. 39, he says: "In its character of a school of technology the Chrestomathic school, though not a place, would thus be a source of general communication—a channel through which the several sorts of artists might receive from one another instruction in relation to points of practice at present peculiar to each. The carpenter, the joiner, the cabinet-maker, the turner in wood, the ship-builder (here enumerating most of the mechanical trades), with their respective tools and other implements, and the operations performed by means of them, will thus be confronted together and a comparative and comprehensive view will be given of their points of resemblance and difference."

In the course of this work, in discussing the subject of logic, he says, p. 120: "As to Plato, when in the vast wilderness of words with which by this spoilt child of Socrates so many shelves and so many brains have been loaded, and in which so many wits, beginning with those of Cicero, have been lost,—when among all these signs, so much as a single thought which is at once clear and instructive shall have been pointed out, it will be time enough to steal from Aristotle's 'Logic' either a word or so much as a thought to bestow upon his master's eloquence." Again, on p. 163 of the same work, he says: "That fluxions and equations should have had their origin in so impure a source as matter is, to an ardent-minded mathematician, an idea no more to be

endured than by certain religionists it is that moral evil should have no other source than physical, or by the sentimental poet, the sentimental orator or the hypocritical politician it is that sympathy (whether for the individual or the particular class of the community-political body he belongs to, the nation at large or the human race) should have so unhonored a parent or so despicable an antagonist as self-regard, either in his own pure bosom or that of any of his friends."

We have placed these citations together, not only because they show the habit of intellectual disdain with which Bentham regarded most existing institutions, but because they exhibit his attitude as the foremost advocate of legislative codes as opposed to systems of jurisprudence built up of judicial decisions; of popular scientific education as opposed to classic university education; of the celebrated utilitarian theory, that all morals consist in an enlightened study and practice of the means of promoting the greatest happiness, as opposed to the theory that morals are an obedience to divinely uttered commands, and of the materialistic theory of crime that it is the failure of the weaker in the struggle for existence, as opposed to the religious theory that it is the instigation of the devil. While hundreds of other issues come in for a large share of attention, on these Bentham leads the march of the philosophic thought of this century.

As to the bulk of the supposed universal code which Bentham thought adequate, he says, vol. i., p. 158: "Why should not the reading of the laws form, as it did among the Jews, a part of divine service? . . . This public reading in places of worship would be, as respects the most ignorant classes, a means of instruction as little

costly as it would be interesting; and the code would be unnecessarily voluminous if it would not be possible to read it through many times in the year." "In this manner, before 16 years of age, without hindrance to any other studies, the pupils in public schools would become more conversant with the laws of their country than lawyers at present are whose hair has grown gray in the contentions of the bar. The change would arise out of the nature of the laws themselves."

One would suppose, from this brevity expected, that Bentham had in mind some such production as the code of Justinian, in which, by eliminating all that pertained to the history and reasons of the law, the statement of many of its first principles is brought within the compass of a book no larger than the gospels and epistles. But instead, Bentham requires that every statement of the law shall be accompanied by its reasons, even down to the reasons why assassination should be punished. He then devotes a space nearly equivalent to the criminal code of Illinois to a fractional "Specimen of a Penal Code," which covers what he styles "simple corporal injuries." In order to see what kind of a practical legislator Bentham would make, and how rapidly a jurisprudence consisting of judicial decisions would grow out of his codes, it is only necessary to scan the first sentence. He says: "Simple corporal injury is either positive or negative. There is positive simple corporal injury when, without lawful cause, an individual has caused or contributed to cause to another a corporal pain, either light or weighty, which is not followed by any ulterior corporal evil." As the element of criminal intent is omitted, the following actions would fall under the designation: (1) criminal assaults of every kind;

(2) rape; (3) an arrest under a supposed warrant of law which proves null or void; (4) violence by a lunatic or other person *non compos mentis*; (5) unintentional malpractice in medicine, and (6) all indirect injuries to the person, which are now sued for in actions on the case, such as negligently leaving open an excavation or turning loose an animal whereby another sustains injury. Here are six classes of injuries, totally unlike in their essential nature, some of them calling for criminal punishment and some for civil damages, and from the statement of which Bentham omits the statement of intent essential to all crime, and the statement of pecuniary injury essential to all damages, and the statement of absence of provocation or contributory negligence on the part of the party injured, which has usually been essential to a cause of action. For all these alike Bentham gravely proposes punishment by fine and imprisonment at the option and discretion of the tribunal (with references to other chapters for rules governing such option), security for good conduct, banishment from the presence of the party injured, and costs.

The very term "without lawful cause" requires judicial interpretation, and the question, What amounts to lawful cause for inflicting a personal injury? is one upon which a hundred thousand judicial decisions would be needed to restore the existing completeness of jurisprudence before Mr. Bentham's terms would be intelligible.

Doubtless the process of attempted codification is one which every system of law must come to when the cumbrousness of judicial decisions becomes an insufferable evil, or rather it is a process continually going on in its only practicable form of condensing judicial decisions,

first into digests and then into treatises, from which the transition is not impossible to a code. But the function of the code when arrived at is not, as Bentham assumed, to supersede further judicial decision, but to so formulate that which by a long course of judicial decisions has become indisputable and rockbedded, that the courts may use it as the solid foundation whereon to erect a still newer system of jurisprudence by following the perpetual differentiation of legal questions which arises by the application of the principles of law and equity to the perpetually novel and shifting movements of society. Bentham, notwithstanding his voluminousness, never got beyond the alphabet of the law. He is always considering legal questions up to the point where an evident right and an evident wrong, as distinguished from a technical right and technical wrong, exist in them. But this element of evident right and wrong—*i. e.*, a right and wrong evident to one having no technical education in the law—only accompanies legal questions in their simplest and most rudimentary stages. Nothing could be found in any of Bentham's codes, nor in any code deductively evolved, as all of Bentham's codes are, out of his own moral consciousness (instead of being condensed, as the codes of Justinian and Napoleon were, from digests, pandects, customary laws and judicial reports, embodying the concrete results of millions of judicial decisions), upon which any of the questions litigated before our supreme court could be decided. The writer of this article has reported, or edited and annotated, during the past two years some fifteen hundred cases decided by the supreme courts of Illinois and Michigan, comprising seven volumes of the former and three of the latter, and undertakes to say that not one of the questions involved in

these litigations could be decided by any rule or principle anywhere to be found in Bentham's proposed codes or plans for codes, nor in any codes that could be written on the deductive principle. The merit of an available code, whether of procedure or of jurisprudence, must consist in the fidelity with which it embodies the statutes and judicial decisions which perish to form it, as the coal measures embody the light, heat, and life of an antecedent vegetation. Bentham's codes disdain to borrow anything from previous systems of jurisprudence, and, relying on but one judgment for their applicability to human affairs, they nowhere fit. Like all results of deductive reasoning, the chief point at which they labor is to make the few facts, of which they take any cognition whatever, square with the logical faculty, or supposed logical faculty, in the mind of the writer, whereas the true difficulty in forming a code of any kind is to so expand and differentiate its provisions as to make it possible to apply its rules to the questions that will actually arise in litigation. Thus Bentham's subdivision of laws into integral or principal, and subsidiary or effectuate, meaning by the former term laws which exist for their own enforcement, and by the latter term laws made to assist in carrying out other laws, is a purely metaphysical and idle abstraction, shedding no light whatever on the interpretation of any law. So his subdivision of contracts into collative, those which confer a title, and ablative, those which divest a title; also into operative, those which impose an obligation, and destitutive, those which take away a right, are an inversion of the mental processes essential to the codification of the laws. These processes consist in reducing complex instances to simple rules, not in complicating simple rules

by enveloping them in complex phraseology. Bentham has much to say of the unutterable jargon of the then existing law. But he invites the bench and bar to learn a new language in which such words as "prehensors," "forthcomingness," "justiciability;" "dyslogistic" and the like are to aid in clarifying the judicial mind.

Had Bentham had the experience of Blackstone or Mansfield as a judge upon the bench, his greatness as a law-reformer and an advocate of codification would have been prevented by the fact that the constant necessity of appealing to past decisions to guide him in elaborating new decisions would have enhanced his respect for the body of actual jurisprudence which he ridicules as "law that governs without existing," and would have paralyzed his confidence in his own powers or in those of any other individual to substitute any practicable code in place of it, unless the code were itself an epitome of the aggregate body of judicial decision. This may seem like holding that Bentham is indebted to his ignorance for his fame, or to his want of balance of mind for his genius, a position which would not be devoid of truth in the case of most prophets, whose comprehension of the future seems accurately proportioned to their ignorance of the historic, the present and the practical. Bentham doubtless illustrates the Hindoo maxim that an absolutely wise being would necessarily be dumb; for if, before speaking, he stopped to consider the objections to what he were going to say, he would say nothing. While, considered as a philosopher for all time, Bentham was an exceedingly one-sided and unbalanced affair; considered as a social force, useful in antagonizing the other social forces of his period, he was as much needed as a law-reformer in England as Voltaire

was as a church-reformer in France, and for much the same reasons. For the century preceding 1768, when Bentham began to write, the religious theory of crime, that it was the direct instigation of the devil, was not only gravely affirmed in every indictment, but it was acted upon by sending the criminal to his instigator as promptly as possible. What Bentham, vol. i, p. 186, calls the "lavish and unnecessary use that is made of the invariable unequable, incommensurable, uncharacteristic, unfrugal, unpopular, uncompensatory, irremissible punishment of death" was applied to one hundred and sixty-four distinct grades of crime, including such offenses as the third offense of girdling a fruit tree, the third offense of exporting raw wool from the kingdom, and stealing above the value of twelve pence. Of course to one who argued so closely as Bentham, that "if for stealing ten shillings no greater penalty is awarded than for stealing five, then the stealing of the second five of the ten shillings is a crime for which there is no punishment whatever," such a criminal code was fit only for scoffing. Bentham thought debtors should be imprisoned in a white jail, unconvicted prisoners and those charged with second-class crimes in a gray prison, and first-class convicted felons in a black one, and that the æsthetic arrangements of a prison should include a judicious assortment of skeletons for the wholesome effect which the study of the human anatomy would have on the conscience, and also that painters should be employed to surround the cells of prisoners with portraiture of the animals whose propensities resembled the crimes they had committed. It is evident that sound principles of prison reform had not become, even to him, a perfected inspiration. Blackstone, at whose lectures Bentham was a listen-

ing pupil, had already suggested those ameliorations of criminal rigor which consisted in allowing the prisoner witnesses in his own behalf, and in permitting his counsel to address the jury, as well as to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. Bentham is reticent on these points, but suggests the use of official prosecutors, and also of official counsel for the prisoner's defense, the latter being a stretch of humanity which no state has yet adopted. Prior to the adoption of these reforms the theory of the English law was that, as the prosecutor represented only the interests of public justice, it would be impugning his motives to assume that he would not summon all the witnesses whose evidence could be of service to the prisoner, and that, as the court was the prisoner's counsel, he needed no other. Having thus tried the prisoner before a tribunal which heard only the witnesses for the prosecution, if he could read, he might in most cases for first offenses plead benefit of clergy, where if he could not read he would be executed. Upon his pleading benefit of clergy he was sent to an ecclesiastical tribunal, which kindly summoned only the witnesses for the defense, and here he was invariably acquitted. Thus, of his two trials the first was invariably a conviction without a sentence, and the second was invariably an acquittal without inquiry.

In the civil courts every act performed in the administration of justice was a fiction. The suitor, summoned in express words to appear in "the court of our lord the king, before the king himself," found no "king himself" sitting, but perhaps Mansfield or some other successor of judges who had, centuries before, scouted the thought that unlearned kings could sit in their own courts. The fees, nominally paid to clerks and

officials for the performance of judicial functions, were really paid to the descendants of the puppets and courtiers, and even mistresses, of earlier reigns, among whom they had been farmed out by a generous sovereign. In chancery the pleadings and evidence pursued the complicated route of written interrogatory and reply, and had become almost as cumbrous, useless and indirect a mode of arriving at the point involved as the printed but never uttered messages and speeches which our executive and legislative branches of government, separated as they are, like the old chancery litigants, alternately, fire off at each other. The cumbrousness which we so greatly relish in legislation, the English subject then enjoyed in litigation. At these abuses Bentham discharged what he called an "equity dispatch court bill," so complicated as a means of relief, and even as a philosophic study, that the English people, if they read it, should have been struck by the humor of the thing, if they were unable to interpret its meaning. The only thing essential to its perfect comprehension would be to remove from the examinant, as Bentham would call him, the head with which nature had endowed him, to place on his shoulders a head constituted like Bentham's, then to supply it with Bentham's capacity for deductive ratiocination and incapacity for practical affairs, and to teach it Bentham's language. So far as this process could be applied it would relieve the court of chancery from the pressure of causes on its calendar.

It is probable that the utmost Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Brougham could have adopted from Bentham, as hints toward law reform, were the impulse and the direction in which it should be exerted. Between his pro-

posed means of effecting such reforms and those actually used we detect nowhere the faintest resemblance. Nor in the celebrated New York code of civil procedure, which has its offspring in more than half the states of the union, do we detect any element of Benthamism, beyond the mere preference of code over custom, which, provided the code be rightly and wisely arrived at, has distinguished some of the most eminent lawyers the world has produced, as well as Bentham, who seems to have been, in the proper sense, no lawyer at all, but a mere hater of jurisprudence and an unsuccessful cogitator for its entire submergence under codes.

The localization of courts, of which Bentham was the first prominent advocate, has seemed to accord with the genius of American institutions, and has been very fully applied here. We have brought justice to every man's door; *i. e.*, established a court for the administration of every branch of jurisprudence in every county, and in this sense have applied Bentham's theory as completely in what are called the common law states as in the code states. Its obvious advantages are offset by great disadvantages. The judges are infinitely more numerous, partly because the business coming before each judge is unassorted, the attorneys who bring it before the courts are unassorted, and consequently the universal complaint of the system is that nine-tenths of the time of the counsel and courts are wasted in litigating questions that have repeatedly been litigated and decided before. Our judges being local are less impartial, and partake more of the quality of jurors. They are, also, much lower paid than the English, yet, owing to the twenty or thirty fold greater number required in proportion to population, the aggregate expense of our

judicial system is doubtless greater, and it will hardly be claimed that the quality of the judicial work done is so good. While the localization of our courts has not arisen directly from any influence of Bentham's theories, it has been the natural outgrowth of that tendency toward local self-government, and disintegration which necessarily accompanies that universal suffrage which Bentham was, perhaps, the first to advocate. For, though of aristocratic family, born into tory associations, and educated at Oxford, Bentham was, in theory, an ultra democrat. His first, and of all his productions the most readable and happiest, is his caustic review of Blackstone's chapters on government, wherein he exhibits the fallacy in logic of Blackstone's theory that limited monarchy can combine the executive strength and promptness, usually attributed to a monarch, with the deliberation and conservative acuteness, usually attributed to an aristocratic legislature, and the popular will and sense of justice to the people usually found in an elective legislature, without also combining the weaknesses of these three forms of government in one. Bentham argued that the negative qualities or weaknesses pertaining to each of the three forms of government would be present as well as the positive elements or excellencies, and hence the result would be as follows:

1. England, in her monarch, is -|- as to strength and — as to wisdom and justice.
2. England, in her house of lords, is -|- as to wisdom and — as to strength and justice.
3. England, in her house of commons, is -|- as to justice and — as to wisdom and strength.

Adding them all together, England is — 6 and -|- 3, or in the net result has a deficiency in wisdom, strength

and justice represented by — 3, relatively to no government at all. This argument, or rather humorous device of Bentham, simply shows the inapplicability of the mathematical formulas used, to express the gain that accrues to society from subdivision of labor and specialization of function. For if we apply it in political economy to the subdivision of trades and of labor, where it is well known that the men in each branch of industry become ignorant of the other branches in the ratio that they become skilled in their own, and yet that the aggregate result is a vast increase in skill and in rapidity of production, the result would be as follows:

1. Division of labor makes 10 blacksmiths — or skilled as to blacksmithing and — or ignorant as to carpentering and as masons.

2. Division of labor makes 10 carpenters — or skilled as to carpentering and — or unskilled as to blacksmithing and masonry.

3. Division of labor makes 10 masons — as to masonry and — as to carpentering and blacksmithing.

Therefore division of labor creates an ignorance represented by— 6, and a skill represented only by — 3, or a net loss of skill to the 30 artisans of — 3; *i. e.*, it brings about a lack of skill in the 30 artisans, represented by — 3, relatively to that possessed by no artisans at all.

Although Bentham's wit punctures Blackstone's incongruities at every point, yet such is the unreliability of wit that in effect it is only as the missiles thrown by a passenger on the thoroughfare may puncture the glass windows of an edifice. There is so much left of the edifice, and what remains is so enduring, that while the throwing of the missiles may distinguish the thrower, it fails to extinguish that at which it is thrown.

Blackstone, though his entire commentaries on the common law of England are of less dimensions than Bentham's single treatise on evidence, and are less by four-fifths in bulk than Bentham's volumes, and though he made no effort to codify, and offered but few suggestions toward reform (all of which, however, were pre-eminently wise, and have, we think, been adopted without exception), yet has not only furnished a book, upon the law of which nearly every litigable question can be decided, but has come nearer the production of an English code than his ultra-sarcastic pupil. Blackstone was an optimist in jurisprudence, seeing in the English constitution and laws the best things possible, and at the close of his wonderful and unequalled course of lectures, elucidating their origin, wisdom and harmony, he sincerely raises aloft his ermined arms to invoke religiously upon them the Roman blessing, "*Esto perpetua.*" Bentham was a pessimist in jurisprudence, seeing in the English constitution and laws only the worst possible, and religiously holding that the only thing worth doing with them was to destroy them. Successful statesmen and jurists are inclined to be optimists; while reformers of the state are generally pessimists. In institutions, as in matter and in force, there perpetually goes on the conflict between the organizer and disorganizer, the architect and the critic, between the Cicero and the Cataline, the Cæsar and the Brutus, between him who successfully wields the world's forces as they are and him who successfully labors to change their trend and current by revolution. The line of actual progress is in the mean between the duality of contending forces. Bentham was a vast disintegrator, but disintegration alone without the constructive organ-

izing faculty will not merely produce death—it is death.


What shall we say of Bentham's theory of morals; viz., that all benevolence is an enlightened selfishness, and that all virtue lies in the intelligent pursuit of the greatest ultimate pleasure. It ascribes to the philanthropist who braves the horrors of the yellow fever to relieve the suffering, the same moral motive as to the incendiary who seeks to spread the pestilence by introducing it into a town where its ravages have never been felt. It says of these, both were animated by the same motive; viz., the promotion of what each deemed to be his highest ultimate pleasure, but one was more intelligent than the other as to the means. They differed only in intellectual caliber and acuteness. Such a view may be necessary as a social force to counteract the tendency to look upon conscience as an infallible guide and upon crime as a demoniac possession. Its effect is to eliminate the element of intent, in crime, and of freedom and responsibility from conduct, for no man can change his intellectual caliber. Perhaps all philosophical systems, and some religious ones, paralyze moral motives in the estimation of their adversaries in a way which affords their friends no difficulty. The theory that virtue consists of a code of moral intuitions shows no disposition to surrender to the Bentham theory that virtue is a series of scientific discoveries, and the result of improved education and environment.

The intuitional theory has possession of all the pulpits and of nearly all the chairs of moral philosophy in the country. The Bentham theory obtains among many men of science and rationalists, though many also repudiate it. It is the peculiar felicity of great thinkers, ancient or modern, that it does not detract from the

greatness of their thought that some other great thinker came to exactly the opposite conclusion on the same point.

Looking at Bentham through American spectacles, we know of no modern worker whom he so much resembles as the late Horace Greeley. Had Bentham lived in the age of great daily newspapers he would certainly have gravitated into the editorial chair of the chief radical and revolutionary daily of his period as Blackstone would have gravitated into the supreme court. His faculty of terse, sparkling, luminous sarcasm would have delighted the reader of the *Daily Slasher*, while his morbid tendency to reduce the affairs of the universe to a system of deductive logic, and to bind and label the airy nothings of his own imagination into their several genera and species as he would the bugs and flies of the outer world, would have been judiciously suppressed by the necessity of actually promoting the "greatest happiness" of his readers instead of merely speculating on how it might be done. Bentham, like Greeley, was an educated and industrious impulse, a jet of intellectual steam on one side only of the social piston, a social force, not in any sense a philosopher. Neither had a judicial mind; neither could stop, or spend the time, to look on both sides of any question. To have done so would have paralyzed most of his zeal. Both went through the world with horns down, intent only on dashing the red rag immediately before them into the air, and both of them did it. Both of them made considerable reputations as reformers, and upon both the world gazed in alternate wonder and compassion, unable to comprehend the queer combination of humanity with severity, of acumen with simplicity, of acuteness in

apprehending the complex with blindness in not discerning the simple. On the whole, we cannot help believing that had Bentham known more law, and had Greeley possessed more statesmanship, the influence of each upon his country would have been more salutary. Greeley would have brought more wisdom and less passionate sentimentalism into politics, thereby aiding in the solution of political controversies through statesmanship rather than through civil war. Bentham would have added fewer peppery expletives to the literature of the law, and still might have accomplished even more than he has toward improving its remedies. But both men worked in the heat and fervor of manly honesty, and with an industry which was itself greatness. The world will always bury the graves of these Vulcans of the intellect in flowers, believing, with the typical mythology of the Greeks, that the heat and fire amidst which they labored were the divine fire, hurled to earth, out of the clouds, from the upper home of the gods.





THOMAS PAINE.

THOMAS PAINE.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Thomas Paine has been made the subject of numerous skeleton biographies, all of which are lacking in the same ingredients and contain the same meager "facts," so that one is involuntarily led to believe that they have all borrowed from some one original sketch, which itself was very imperfect and perhaps erroneous. None of them bear evidence of having been written by any one who knew Paine personally, either in England, America, or France. None evince any intimacy with his social life, with the mode in which he occupied his time. None furnish us with even one of those anecdotes or incidents which admit us to the personal idiosyncrasies of the man as he sat at breakfast, or traveled or labored among his books, or shared in the society of his fellows, whether distinguished or obscure. All save one were written long after his writings concerning religion had made him an object of hatred to millions of persons, and the earlier of the biographies, those of Cheetham and Oldys, seem to have been written simply to gratify the taste of the average Christian public, by filling up a few doubtful dates and salient events concerning his life with righteous comments on his wickedness. In a word, they are anti-Paine tracts of such obvious malice and unfairness of tone that we are at loss to trust them, even as to facts in which they all agree. Paine's chief characteristic seems to have been a confidence in the ultimate justice of popular opinion, and in the ultimate rectitude of history, and in his own convictions, which rendered him careless of his own fame. He left no scrap of auto-

biography to set the world right concerning his private career. He wrote nothing concerning his wife or the reasons of his separation from her, nor concerning his occupations while in England, nor concerning his life at sea nor the mode of his introduction to Franklin, nor the reasons of his dismissal from the excise. He wrote copiously concerning his neglect by Washington, while imprisoned in the Bastille, because here he considered, whether rightly or wrongly, that he stood as the injured representative of a principle; viz., that the American government should intervene in behalf of American citizens who become involved in foreign revolutions, so as to further, and, if possible, secure, humane treatment toward them as political prisoners. It was the fashion of leading men of that day to pronounce the shibboleth, "men are nothing, principles everything." Paine's biography has suffered from too close an adherence to that shibboleth. Indeed, between the neglect of himself and the friends who knew him, and the *post mortem* malice of his enemies, who seemed determined to prove by their calumnies that there is a punishment after death, the true life of Paine has been expunged and it is now too late to restore it.

The bald details usually presented in the sketches thus far compiled are, that he was born at Thetford, in the county of Norfolk, England, Jan. 29, 1737, and died in New York, June 9, 1809. His father was in religion a Quaker, and by trade a stay-maker. The Quaker sect was one in which many heresies found refuge, and in which much sturdy independence of thought and hatred of priests existed, though combined in a large degree with severe devotional habits, and a blending of asceticism and mysticism. One of Paine's biographers assumes that the business of stay-making, in which the Paine or Payne family—for the name was spelled indifferently either way—was engaged, referred to ladies stays, but the others are doubtless correct in making it refer to ship's stays. Such an employment must have thrown Thomas Paine in his youth much among sailors. At eighteen he shipped on a privateer, but neither the

period of his absence, nor the degree of success he found in the employment, nor the place to which his voyages took him is indicated, though most of the privateering of that day bordered very strongly on piracy, and centered in the West Indies.

After Thomas Paine's return he was styled among his acquaintances "Commodore," though whether we are permitted to infer that he ever commanded a vessel is left in complete obscurity. He may or may not have been privateering four years, since the next fact mentioned is that of his first marriage and settlement in Sandwich in 1759. Nothing is known concerning this first wife, but Paine at this period seems to have had no antagonism to religion or to acts of devotion, since he preached and doubtless conducted all the services of public worship as a dissenting minister. The exact nature of his views, however, is not more definitely known. His first wife died within the year of their marriage. At the age of twenty-three he was appointed in the excise at Thetford and is said to have married an exciseman's daughter. Both his father-in-law and himself seem to have combined the excise business with that of tobacconists and sugar grocers. His father-in-law is stated to have been a Mr. Ollive, and Paine's second wife is variously mentioned in the biographical sketches by the names of Olivia, Olive, Elizabeth Olive, Elizabeth Ollive and Frances Ollive. There is an obscurity here which indicates that his biographers did not know whether Olive was her Christian name or her surname. It could hardly have been both, and if it was not both then the fact that her father's surname was Ollive or Olive needs verification. A degree of importance attaches to this fact, which is more fully indicated in the article on Junius, published in this volume. Paine's biographers represent him as having been without children by either wife, but Cheetham and Oldys, with singular malice, picture him as impotent at 24, and as never having intercourse with his second wife, his impotency being even established by medical examination, whereas at upward of fifty years of age

they represent him as the seducer of Madame Bonneville and imply that he was the father of her youngest son. There is something so gratuitously improbable in such a statement, that, though some of Paine's friendly biographers have slurred it over without investigation or contest, we prefer to regard it as mere drivel, on a par with the Rev. Mr. Weem's fables concerning Washington and his little hatchet. There was a very strong tendency, in our revolutionary period, toward writing down enemies and writing up friends by the grossest misrepresentation. The higher class of writers, like Paine and Voltaire, relied on invective and satire wherein bitterness barely fell short of clear falsehood. Their less clever literary antagonists, not being endowed with their faculty for invective, often leaped the barrier between truth and falsehood, and told the direct lie in cases where a point could be made and detection would be slow. The earlier writers concerning Paine, and especially Cheetham and Oldys, are such irresponsible vagabonds that the above charge is a light one to bring against them. At the age of 35 Paine was selected by his fellow-excisemen to write a plea of the officers of excise for an increase of salary. The style betrays fully the tendency so characteristic of Paine and of Junius to adopt the philosophic tone, even in matters the most commonplace. The plea was dedicated to Oliver Goldsmith, a connection which indicates that Paine, if he was not really associating with literary men as one of them, had a most presumptuous estimate of the literary value of this particular performance. After this period Paine is represented as teaching school in London, having failed in his commercial business and been dismissed from the excise. In 1774 he left for America, and accounts are diverse as to the motives with which he left; whether it were to found a ladies' seminary in Philadelphia as some represent, or to become the historian of the American contest as is asserted by others. Franklin gave Paine a letter of introduction to his son in which his estimate of Paine seems to have been very moderate, another to Rush, and still another,

we believe, to Jefferson; but while the contents of these are frequently assumed by biographers to have been laudatory to Paine we can not verify the truth of this assertion, the letters themselves, except that to the younger Franklin, not having come under our view. There is a difference of two years in the accounts of the arrival of Paine in America; Dr. Rush, who knew, but may have forgotten, states that he arrived in 1772, while the concurrent testimony of those who had no personal knowledge of the fact, is, that he arrived in 1774. His first employment was as editor of the "Pennsylvania Magazine." He was probably the first radical abolitionist, of the stripe of Garrison and Phillips, that ever appeared in America. In October, 1775 in an article entitled "Serious Thoughts," in the Pennsylvania journal, he predicted both the separation of the colonies from Great Britain and the ultimate abolition of negro slavery. He never looked at slavery temporizingly or economically or Biblically or patriarchally or historically but always simply as an inhuman crime. He alone of all persons resident in America in 1776 possessed anti-slavery convictions sufficiently vigorous and vituperative to have given vent to the charge against George III. contained in the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, which averred his responsibility, first, for the existence of negro slavery in America, and, secondly, for making it a source of revolt and danger to the white population. The whole statement was mere rhetorical fustian, but it was a kind of fustian that would never have occurred to an American brain. Some of the prose, and all of the poetry, which Paine wrote during this period, is coarse, sophomorical and mediocre. His lines on the death of Wolf, are sufficient to prove that while he could be a rhymester he was no poet. Yet the average poetic taste of the period was so undeveloped that they were thought very clever. The pamphlet "Common Sense," however, contains an order of rhetoric equal to any in "Junius," very much resembling it, and which will compare favorably with the finest English Classics. It advocated separation from Great

Britain and had a wide circulation. It was published anonymously, though no attempt was made to conceal its authorship, and as in the case of "Junius," and the subsequent "Rights of Man," no attempt was made by the author to make money out of it, or even to get the slightest return from it. The legislature of Pennsylvania, however, conferred on Paine a gratuity of £500, and the university of Pennsylvania conferred upon him the degree of M. A.

Independence having been declared, Paine joined the army, and served in Gen. Roberdeau's "flying camp," and as aid to Gen. Greene. During the war he published a series of crisis papers, as the exigencies of victory or defeat might require, to nerve the troops against disaster or to stimulate them to new efforts in the hour of success. Some of these were read by order at the head of every regiment, a sufficient comment on their value. In 1777 he was elected secretary to the committee on foreign affairs, a position of which he seems to have been very proud, as it is the only title he appends to his name in connection with subsequent political publications. Upon the charge of making improper use of official information, derived through his connection with this committee, in certain published letters against Silas Deane, he was censured by congress and obliged to resign the position. In November, 1779, Paine became clerk to the general assembly of Pennsylvania. In the following June a despairing letter was received by the assembly from Washington, saying that unless the distresses of the army were relieved mutiny must ensue. The assembly adjourned in silent despondency and without action. Paine, however, wrote to a merchant in Philadelphia, subscribing his entire salary then due, \$500, as his contribution to the relief fund. A meeting of merchants was called; Paine's letter was read, and immediately £300,000 was subscribed, with which as a capital the Pennsylvania Bank (afterward Bank of North America) was established for the relief of the army. In these "times that tried men's souls" no subscriptions came in from either Cheetham or Oldys, whose mission

it afterward became to rescue the Deity from the imputation of having allowed a deist to be useful, by writing such a life of Paine as would prove that he had no virtues. In 1781 Paine was sent with Col. Laurens to France to assist in negotiating a loan, and succeeded in securing from France and Holland some 16,000,000 livres. The next year he wrote his letter to the Abbe Raynal, correcting some "mistakes," the latter had fallen into in a narrative of the American Revolution. In 1785 he received \$3,000 from congress as a testimonial for his services during the revolution, and the state of New York gave him a house and 300 acres of land at New Rochelle.

In April, 1787, he sailed for France, nominally, says the "Encyclopedia Britannica," to exhibit the model of an iron bridge which he had invented; really, however, to carry the torch of revolution wherever he went. Thence he crossed over to England, nominally, of course, to see his mother, but really as the aforesaid fire-brand. He erected his bridge, however; it won the plaudits of the great engineer Stephenson, and was a success. It still spans the river Wear, at Sunderland. In 1791 appeared his "Rights of Man," a reply to Burke's reflections on the French Revolution. The same year he subscribed £1,000 for revolutionary purposes in England, being probably the total profits of the publication of the "Rights of Man," which had an immense sale. If there ever was a man who did not know the value of money it was Thomas Paine. During the same year he was elected a deputy from the department of Calais in the French National Convention. Here he was on the committee that framed the constitution of 1793. He voted generally with the Girondists, advocated the trial, but not the sentence of Louis XVI., whom he desired to have sent to America. He was imprisoned by Robespierre from January to November, 1794, and was once marked for execution. During this period he wrote the "Age of Reason," in two parts; Part I without the Bible or any commentaries thereon. It is the kind of performance that might have been expected from an acute and vigorous reasoner under the circumstances. Its want of

learning would not have been deemed a serious charge against it, if it had been orthodox. His chief points are, that the books of Moses are a priestly production of the period of King Josiah, 400 years after the death of Moses, and that the finding of them recorded in 2 Chron. ch. 34, vs. 14 to 18, was the period of their first imposition on the Jewish mind; that supernatural phenomena can not be proved by hearsay evidence until we are prepared to assume that miracles are easier than lying; that the prophecies of the Old Testament are such only by perversion of their words—and are fulfilled only by a perversion of events, etc., etc. It assumes that the false can not be useful. It is strong but not kind, wherefore Christians curse it but leave it unanswered. As a sincere Deist he labored to defend the character of God against the aspersions cast upon it by the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. Had he lived a century later, he would have felt no more interest in the character of Jehovah than in that of Jupiter. In April, 1796, he wrote "On the English System of Finance," and in the same year his excoriating "Letter to General Washington," which bears a closer literary resemblance to Junius' letter to Lord Mansfield than any other epistolary phillipic in the language.

In 1802 Paine returned to the United States in the national sloop of war *Maryland*, tendered him for that purpose by President Jefferson, to avoid the possibility of his capture by British cruizers. After fifteen years' absence he arrived at Baltimore, October 30, 1802. His subsequent treatment at the hands of Americans was strictly partisan. Federalists, aristocrats and orthodox Christians, a heavy combined alliance of external respectability, despised, feared and detested him. Radical democrats and freethinkers gave him public dinners and treated him with a good deal of honor. He did little more effective work, however, and died in New York in 1809. He had asked to be buried in a Quaker burial ground but was refused. His remains were taken to his farm at New Rochelle and there buried. In 1819 they were removed by William Cobbett, the English

reformer, to England, where his bones still rest. Between the conflicting representations of the two classes of commentators it is difficult to tell whether Paine in his later days was dissolutely vicious or impotently virtuous; whether he was neat or a sloven; whether he was addicted to the use of spirituous liquors in excess or was only like Tam O'Shanter, fond of the genial presence of

"Reaming swats that drank divinely."

Paine lived in days when Christianity had not passed into its teetotalistic cycle; when an orthodox clergyman could treat his deacons, at the bar of the village tavern, on the way home from church on Sunday, to stout horns of hot brandy, without incurring censure. But woe was unto that man, in the sacred desk, who recreantly permitted any lady in the pews to wear jewels or gold about her person without rebuke. Then Christianity had a stronger horror of expenditure than of intemperance; it was in its economical cycle. It is superfluous to crucify Paine for noncompliance with a standard of requirement as to the use of intoxicating liquors, which, whether the best for health or not, had no existence in public opinion until long after his death. We have felt no more interest in the discussion whether Paine drank to excess in his later days, than we would in a like discussion concerning Silas Wright, Daniel Webster or Stephen A. Douglass. Nor shall we ever feel the slightest care to know whether he was happy in his last moments. Nature has set the irreversible destiny upon us all, that we shall enter the world, and make our exit from it, in pain; that prior to, and after, our period of strength, power and activity, there shall be periods of suffering, feebleness and weakness. Thus our lives at either end dip downward into the somber valley of pain and of tears. It ill becomes those who profess to worship, as the creator of the universe, a historical human being whose death-throes brought out the most despairing of all dying exclamations, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," to gather, like hungry ghouls, around the

death-bed of a philosopher, to see if some sharp note of pain may not be caught up and distorted into a cry of remorse at his philosophical theories. Far be it from all sensible minds to descend to such pitiable controversy. What in Paine's period was damnable heresy is now preached from thousands of Christian pulpits, and is represented in theology by such names as Channing, Parker, Starr King, Emerson, Everitt, Chapin, Bellows, Collyer, Laird Collier, the Martineaus, and hosts of others. We, therefore, of this generation can afford to apply to Paine that homely advice which the early poet so happily recommended for the treatment of a termagant:

"Be to her faults a little blind,
"Be to her virtues very kind."

For, after all, the worst thing about Paine was also his best; viz., his power of saying bitter things where sweet ones would have answered (perhaps) as well.

It is not the aim of the present volume to discuss Paine's religious or philosophic influence, but only to place in a true light his literary work, with the view of recurring, at some future time, more fully to his position and influence as a religious philosopher.

THOMAS PAINE.

HIS POLITICAL CAREER BEGINS IN ENGLAND WITH THE AUTHORSHIP OF "THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS;" CONTINUES IN AMERICA IN THE AUTHORSHIP OF "COMMON SENSE," "THE CRISIS," AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; IS RESUMED IN ENGLAND IN "THE RIGHTS OF MAN;" AND CLOSES BY A NARROW ESCAPE FROM THE GUILLOTINE IN FRANCE. HIS GENIUS FOR RHETORICAL INVECTIVE ANALYZED. A GOSPEL OF CHRONIC REVOLUTION DISTINGUISHED FROM A PHILOSOPHY OF STATESMANSHIP. HIS INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HOW FAR IT IS SOUND.

In the years 1769 to 1772 there shone athwart the political sky of England an intellectual meteor, a prodigy of effulgent sarcasm, who came, none knew whence, dwelt, none knew where, and went, none knew whither. He was gifted as no man ever was before or since, with the fatal and unhappy faculty of suppressing the good, and exaggerating the evil, in the men upon whose conduct he was called to comment, and in the institutions he aimed to overturn. Under his withering touch a Mansfield became ignorant of the law, statesmen shrunk into courtiers, courtiers into pimps; and a compact aristocracy full of learning, courage and experience, shook like aspen leaves in the wind, a very varletry of mean vices and low aims. Burke spoke of the anonymous writer as the mighty boar of the forest, who not

only tossed the king, but the lords and commons on his tusks. Yet Johnson thought Burke himself was the unknown. And, though he attacked Chatham, volumes were written to prove that Chatham was he. Some have given to his writings an intent so broad as that of revolutionizing the English government by subverting all faith in those who conducted it. All that the letters of Junius clearly indicate is that a writer had arisen with all the pride and skepticism of Gibbon, without his loyalty and with less than his candor, but following closely his literary style, in which the ideal mentally demanded by the writer formed the climax, and the act done by his subject formed the collapse of a sarcastic antithesis, which no patience could endure and few reputations could outlive. This genius for sarcastic expression disdained to vent itself on the unpopular or incompetent; it struck always at the most shining marks—the men universally believed to be wise and popularly recognized as successful. The attitude of Junius toward the American contest then impending was peculiar. He at first sustained the doctrine that the taxes for reimbursing to England her cost of military operations in America should be insisted on and collected, and fiercely attacked Chatham. But afterward, in his thirty-ninth letter, he takes the other view, thus:

“In the repeal of those acts which were most offensive to America, the parliament have done everything but remove the offense. They have relinquished the revenue but judiciously taken care to preserve the contention. It is not contended that the continuance of the tea duty is to produce any direct benefit whatever to the mother country. What is it, then, but an odious, unprofitable exertion of a speculative right, and fixing

the badge of slavery upon the Americans without service to their masters? But it has pleased God to give us a ministry and a parliament who are neither to be persuaded by argument nor instructed by experience."

His attitude toward the English king is indicated in the thirty-seventh letter, which concludes as follows:

"His majesty will find, at last, that this is the sense of his people, and that it is not his interest to support either ministry or parliament, at a hazard of a breach *with the collective body of his subjects*. That he is the king of a free people is, indeed, his greatest glory. That he may long continue the king of a free people is the second wish that animates my heart. The first is THAT THE PEOPLE MAY BE FREE."

That any revelation at that time of Junius' real identity would, owing to his personal obscurity or inferior social standing, have lessened or destroyed his influence, is stated by Junius himself in No. 70 of his private letters; viz., to Wilkes. He says:

"Besides every personal consideration, if I were known I could no longer be a useful servant to the public. At present there is something oracular in the delivery of my opinions. I speak from a recess which no human curiosity can penetrate, and darkness, we are told, is one source of the sublime. The mystery of Junius increases his importance."

This last statement dispels the entire arguments of both Lord Brougham and Lord Macaulay, in behalf of Sir Philip Francis as the author of Junius, since the discovery that an aristocrat, of sufficient prominence to be appointed a member of the East India board, and to whom the government designed for a time to transfer the government of India from Warren Hastings, was

the author of a systematic design to undermine the aristocracy, instead of lessening the importance of Junius, would have vastly increased it. Nor is it conceivable that Sir Philip Francis, after sharing in the government of India with Warren Hastings, whom he hated, and who furnished him through a series of years with materials for letters infinitely more pungent and powerful than Junius possessed, should, had he really been Junius, never afterward have written a single line of sarcastic metaphor concerning the gigantic criminal, with whom, for years after the letters of Junius ceased, Francis was in daily but detested contact. Sir Philip Francis himself denounced the story that he had written Junius as a malignant falsehood. Whoever Junius was, he must either have died shortly after 1772, or again shone athwart the firmament, for no human power could have suppressed, if he lived, his magnificent rhetoric, or changed the nature of his scathing fire. That Junius' ideas of government were as radical as those afterward embodied in the Declaration of Independence is easier of proof than that those of Jefferson himself were—to whom the actual composition of that document has been by some attributed. Thus Junius says, in letter 37: "How ever distinguished by rank or property, in the rights of freedom WE ARE ALL EQUAL. *

* * The time is come when the body of the English people must assert their own cause; conscious of their strength and animated by a sense of their duty they will not surrender their birthright to ministers, parliaments or kings." Junius also resembles the writer of the Declaration of Independence in an other egotistical idiosyncrasy; viz., his faith in his powers of foreseeing the future. Compare:

JUNIUS LETTER LIV.

Such artifices cannot long delude the understanding of the people, and without meaning an indecent comparison, *I may venture to foretell* that the Bible and Junius will be read when the commentaries of the Jesuits are forgotten.

ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

Future ages will scarcely believe that the hardness of one man adventured within the short space of twelve years only to lay a foundation so broad and so undisguised for tyranny over a people fostered and fixed in principles of freedom.

A haughty intellectual pride always underlies this willingness of a really reflective mind, to pit his individual thought against the combined clamor of a world, and this pride, being the opposite of vanity, is often willing that the author of the prophecy be veiled, if only its fulfillment be universally acknowledged.

Burke's style is unlike that of Junius, in the fact that Burke is always ponderous and profound, while Junius is always crisp and tart. Burke's sentences are long and involved, Junius' never so; Burke is wise, Junius merely acute; Burke is always reverent toward religion, while Junius' pretended politeness toward it is always thinly sarcastic, as when writing under the second *nom de plume* of Philo Junius, he certifies in letter 55, that Junius himself is "a true and hearty Christian in substance, not in ceremony; though probably he may not agree with my reverend lords, the bishops, or with the head of the church (king), that prayers are morality, or that kneeling is religion." Burke has a lofty appreciation of the sublime and the beautiful, which cannot exist without a capacity for apprehending moral and æsthetic significance, and value, in things mystical and poetic. Junius is a veritable Gradgrind in sticking to what he calls facts; *i. e.*, to a class of unpoetic assertions, which would be facts if they were true. Burke has a profound reverence for the law, and for exalted human dignities

and rank. Junius has no reverence for any thing except those ultimate ideas which stand in his own mind for truth. Besides, Burke prosecuted Woodfall, the publisher of Junius, for libel, and recovered a penalty of £100, a thing the writer of Junius could never have done. The only claimant who asserted that he knew Junius was John Horne Tooke, and those who claim Tooke to be Junius think that in the controversy between Tooke and Junius the letters on both sides were written by the same person. The argument for this paradox is founded in the identity of style. But this argument would still stand if we suppose that the writer of both was Paine. That Paine and Tooke were intimate cannot be doubted, since Tooke's name is signed to one political address which appears in Paine's works as written by Paine. Tooke also professes familiarity with Paine, in the remark for which he is often quoted that "Paine wrote as well as he knew; had he known more he would have written better." It is only when Tooke is answering Junius that he writes like Junius. Paine was probably indebted to Tooke, Franklin, and perhaps indirectly to Burke, Goldsmith, Chatham, and even Francis and Lord George Sackville for hints. Goldsmith, Tooke and Franklin he is known to have been acquainted with. Each of these were capable of supplying Paine with information concerning the chief matters discussed by Junius. The one individual in Great Britain most likely to know Junius personally, because most in sympathy with all his aims and most safely to be trusted with his secret, would have been Franklin, then acting as agent for the colonies, at the British court. The one use to which Franklin would have been certain to have urged Junius to have devoted his masterly rhetorical

powers and his intense revolutionary principles would have been, if he failed in stirring up a revolution in England, to proceed to America and there prepare the minds of the people for separation. Franklin actually sent over, on this mission, in 1874, Thomas Paine, with letters of commendation to Jefferson, though nothing in the known life of Paine justified the expectation that he had the least capacity for a work of this kind. Franklin had even marked him out as the historian of the impending conflict, and was actually collecting materials to aid him in presenting the history of the struggle in its true light to the world. Yet all that Paine had written, over his own signature, to excite an expectation that he would prove to be a great rhetorician, was an argument for an increase of the salaries of excisemen. It was written in as excellent a style as either Junius or "Common Sense," and in the same style. But it is simply incredible that such a master of rhetoric, having such a genius for politics, should have lived in so critical an epoch, possessed of the views, the passion, the compass of thought which he develops in his American writings, and should have been utterly silent, in his native country, concerning a state of mis-government, which so acute a man as Franklin would send him to America on purpose to write up. Paine, therefore, was a great anonymous political writer before coming to America, or he would not have been selected for this peculiarly first-class work. Two reasons for concealing these facts suffice; first, to reveal them would be to betray his more prominent inspirers and associates; secondly, while aiming at the overthrow of the government, he was holding an office under it. It has never been deemed honorable, in a business sense, to accept bread at the hands of

an employer whom one is seeking to ruin. Paine, while certainly in many respects conscientious, was so independent in his moral judgments, and so prone to rate highly what was due to himself and to the people, that he might easily have satisfied his own conscience with the theory that the powers that appointed him did not own the offices, but were the mere agents of the people, and that, so long as he served the people faithfully in the performance of the duties of his office, he was under no obligation either to agree with his employers or to lose his bread if he did not. Yet, while thinking the criticism unsonnd, he would be likely to prefer that it should not be made. While the public letters of Junius ceased in May, 1772, and his last letter to Woodfall was in January, 1773, Paine remained in the excise until 1774, when he came to America and immediately entered on the editing of *The Pennsylvania Magazine*, and the writing of the class of revolutionary papers known as "Common Sense" and "The Crisis," which lasted from 1775 to 1783.

In the very first sentences of "Common Sense" all the polished sarcasm, fine rhetorical antithesis and lofty blending of philosophic calmness, with contemptuous disdain for his adversaries; all the tart, crisp, pugnacious simplicity and hard-headed clearness of statement; in a word, every element of literary force, political depth and range of thought which distinguished Junius, reappear. We have had no writer in America to this day so practiced in the handling of pure and elegant English, or that could have written either of the chapters of "Common Sense." The style of Bancroft, when he had completed his numerous volumes of American history, was sophomorical, "spread-eagleish" and inexpert

compared with "Common Sense," regarded simply as a literary composition. The style of Jefferson was turgid, halting, hesitating, politic and "hitchity-hitch" compared with the rhythmic musical cadence of this flowing rhetorician and apparent philosopher, whose sentences dart down to the rock bed of radical principles, and contain in their very structure a logical form and sequence that makes them authoritative, wholly irrespective of their source. "Common Sense" which, though possessing but the authority of one mind, was read by order at the head of the armies and around the camp fires until it became authoritative by universal assent, opens thus: "Some writers have so confounded society with government as to leave little or no distinction between them, whereas they are not only different but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last is a punisher.

"Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best estate, is but a necessary evil; in its worst estate an intolerable one; for when we suffer or are exposed to the same miseries *by a government*, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built upon the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other law-giver; but that not being the case, he finds it neces-

sary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him, out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to insure it to us with the least expense and greatest benefit is preferable to all others."

We regard most of the above sentences, except the last, as fallacious and misleading, and especially the historical assumption that government is founded on compact. But as a class of half-truths they are admirably calculated to promote revolution, and they have been impressed, through their subsequent utterance in the Declaration of Independence, upon the American people, so that now they are the current creed. Very few in America seem to suspect that all governments have been founded by and on force, notwithstanding history teaches no other lesson. The eloquent fallacies of Paine have superseded history, and such is the universality of our assent to the glittering sophistry that "all just government derives its power from the consent of the governed," that our entire people assume, without hesitation, that in forming our own government the loyalists were driven out of the country and their property confiscated at their own request; that in administering it both the women and the negroes were ignored on their own motion; that, in forming its constitution, capital, as an element in government, was denied representation by its own desire, and that in the execution of the laws each particular criminal has been punished to promote his own happiness. The assumption that there ever

was or could be society without a government, or government without society, or that one originated any more in our wants, or in our wickedness, than the other, or that they have any different origin, is mere rhetoric. Society opens with government already in existence, always established by the strong and bold, by force, over the weak and cowardly, for the promotion, by the former, of their own interests; the consent of the governed is not at first asked, and the ability of the governed to express their assent only arises in the later stages of society by concession of the governors, and it is a boon so easily over-granted that civilization has, at least in one notable instance, that of Rome, been ruined by its premature concession. Instead of being a natural inalienable right it is the latest patented improvement in political mechanics, and one which should be of the most doubtful and cautious application.

Thomas Paine, as a chronic satirist and revolutionist, and the only writer of any distinguished merit as a rhetorician then in America, found ample scope and worked with singular address and tact in the American cause. He passed from one detail to another of the contest with great address and with the same ready capacity to investigate the facts or law required for each article which had been so notable a quality in Junius; especially in the letter to Lord Mansfield. He seemed argus-eyed, and touched with his fingers every spring of information, whether it related to the causes of failure in the recent campaign, or to proper means of obtaining aid from France, or of building up a navy. Knowing the attachment of large masses of the people to religious texts he constructed arguments for a democratic republic out of the scanty materials therefor to be found in

the Old and New Testaments. He handled the peace question to the discomfiture of the Quakers without incurring their enmity. As secretary of the committee of foreign affairs he was at the pivot of real practical influence, and the opportunity it afforded him for constructive work seems to have abated from the rancor of his pen, while the presence of a legitimate though distant mark in the British cabinet, policies, generals and armies, prevented his fierce denunciations being launched for the time at anything American. He coupled ingenious apologies in defeat with stirring bugle-calls to the energy that should avert its repetition. He converted the smallest savings from disaster into grounds of unlimited hope and effort. Wholly occupied with the need of organization, he lost the spirit of a disorganizer. And when at last the country emerged from the straggle, the gratitude of the nation was universally felt to the proud, disdainful democrat who had not yet denounced Jay as a "sycophant," Adams as a "speller after places and offices," and addressed to Washington the peculiarly Junius-like paragraph: "And as to you, sir, treacherous in private friendship (for so you have been to me, and that in the day of danger) and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide whether you are an apostate or an impostor—whether you have abandoned good principles or whether you ever had any."

On the contrary, Paine proceeding via France to England, there publishes in 1791 a work entitled "The Rights of Man," being a reply to Burke's attack on the French revolution, the dedication of which is to George Washington, president, etc., and reads as follows:

SIR: I present you a small treatise in defense of those principles of freedom which your exemplary virtue hath so eminently contrib-

uted to establish. That the rights of man may become as universal as your benevolence can wish, and that you may enjoy the happiness of seeing the new world regenerate the old, is the prayer of sir, your much beloved and obedient humble servant, THOMAS PAINE.

The period in the president's career, at which Paine, overlooking both Franklin, to whom he was indebted for his introduction to America, and Jefferson, who had first facilitated his literary labors, dedicated this work to Washington, is afterward described in Paine's celebrated letter to Washington as follows:

“Elevated to the chair of the presidency, you assumed the merit of everything to yourself; and the natural ingratitude of your constitution began to appear. You commenced your presidential career by encouraging and swallowing the grossest adulation; and you traveled America from one end to the other to put yourself in the way of receiving it. You have as many addresses in your chest as James the Second.”

His American fame and his work in defense of the French revolution caused Paine to be elected to a seat in the French assembly, from which, after voting for the trial, but not for the execution of the king, Paine was committed to prison by the Robespierre faction, and would probably have been guillotined if the state of his health would have admitted of the ceremony. President Washington neglected utterly to intervene in Paine's behalf. This conduct, which Paine regarded as base, was certainly cold and needless. For, while foreign governments had no international right to prevent an American citizen, who was courting revolutionary violence in France, from suffering its effects, a moral intervention, especially when the violence of the revolutionists had become beastly, would have been humane and might have been effective, even when employed in behalf of

one of themselves. Smarting under the pain of this neglect, Paine wrote that letter to Washington, which, in lofty egotistic pride and fierce invective, blended with a certain mental habit of philosophic generalization, is so identical in style with portions of Junius that we cite parallel passages for comparison, though the unhesitating conviction that Paine wrote Junius will better result from the use of hundreds of passages than of two or three.

JUNIUS' LETTER XXXVII., p. 231.

Instead of an answer to a petition, his majesty very gracefully pronounced his own panegyric.

As for the terms of the remonstrance, I presume it will not be affirmed by any person less polished than a gentleman usher, that this is a season for compliments.

LETTER XLI. TO LORD MANSFIELD.

Believe me, my good lord, you are not admired in the same degree in which you are detested. It is only the partiality of your friends that balances the defects of your heart with the superiority of your understanding. No learned man, even among your own tribe, thinks you qualified to preside in any court of common law.

LETTER XXXIX., ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

No man regards an eruption upon the surface when the noble parts are invaded, and he feels a mortification approaching to his heart. The free election of our representatives in parliament comprehends, because it is, the source and security of every right and privilege of the English nation. The ministry have realized the compendious ideas of Caligula. They know that the lib-

THOMAS PAINE—LETTER TO WASHINGTON.

As to the pompous encomiums he (speaking of Washington) so liberally pays to himself, on the score of the American revolution, the propriety of them may be questioned.

"Mr. Washington, having expended so many fine phrases upon himself. * * * A stranger might be led to suppose from the egotism with which Mr. Washington speaks, that himself and himself only had generated, conducted, completed, established the revolution. In fine, that it was all his own doing."

"By the advantage of a good exterior he attracts respect which his habitual silence tends to preserve; but he has not the talent of inspiring ardor in an army."

LETTER TO WASHINGTON ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.

As to the point of consolidating the states into a federal government, it so happens that the proposition for that purpose came originally from myself. I proposed it in a letter to Chancellor Livingston in the spring of the year 1782, while that gentleman was minister for foreign affairs. * * * It was only to the absolute necessity of establishing some federal authority extending

erty, the laws and property of an Englishman have in truth but one neck, and that to violate freedom of election strikes deeply at them all.

LETTER XV. TO THE DUKE OF GRAFTON.

It was not inconsistent that you should abandon the cause of liberty in another country, which you had persecuted in your own; and in the common arts of domestic corruption we miss no part of Sir Robert Walpole's system except his abilities. * * * Yet for the benefit of the succeeding age I could wish that your retreat might be deferred until your morals shall happily be ripened to that maturity of corruption at which the worst examples cease to be contagious.

JUNIUS' LETTER XXXIX.

The morality of a king is not to be measured by vulgar rules. There are faults which do him honor, and virtues that disgrace him. A faultless, insipid equality in his character is neither capable of vice nor virtue in the extreme, but it secures his submission to those persons whom he had been accustomed to respect, and makes him a dangerous instrument of their ambition. A character of this sort is the soil fittest to produce that obstinate bigotry in politics and religion, which begins with a meritorious sacrifice of the understanding, and finally conducts the monarch and the martyr to the block.

equally over all the states that an instrument so inconsistent as the present constitution is, obtained a suffrage. I should have voted for it myself had I been in America, or even for a worse, rather than have had none, provided it contained the means of remedying its defects by the same appeal to the people by which it was established.

SAME (COMPARING MORRIS AND WASHINGTON).

The chief difference, however, between the two is (for in politics there is none) that the one is profligate enough to profess an indifference about moral principles, and the other is prudent enough to conceal the want of them.

SAME.

Could I have known to what degree of corruption and perfidy the administrative part of the government of America had descended, I could have been at no loss to have understood the reservedness of Mr. Washington toward me during my imprisonment in the Luxembourg.

SAME.

Some vices make their approach with such a splendid appearance, that we scarcely know to what class of moral distinctions they belong. They are rather virtues corrupted than vices originally. But meanness and ingratitude have nothing original in their character. There is not a trait in them that renders them doubtful. They are so originally vice that they are generated in the dung of other vices, and crawl into existence with the filth upon their backs. The fugitives have found protection in you, and the levee room is their place of rendezvous.

LETTER LXVIII.—CONTEMPT FOR
LAW AND LAWYERS (APPLIED TO
LORD MANSFIELD).

As a practical profession, the study of the law requires but a moderate portion of abilities. The learning of a pleader is usually upon a level with his integrity. The indiscriminate defense of right and wrong contracts the understanding, while it corrupts the heart. Subtlety is soon mistaken for wisdom and impunity for virtue. If there be any instances upon record, as some there are, undoubtedly, of genius and morality united in a lawyer, they are distinguished for their singularity, and operate as exceptions.

SAME (CONTEMPT FOR LAW AND
LAWYERS) APPLIED TO JAY.

A man—such as the world calls a sharper—as versed as Jay must be supposed to be in the quibbles of the law, may find a way to enter into engagements and make bargains in such a manner as to cheat some other party, without that party being able, as the phrase is, to take the law of him. This often happens in the cabalistic circle of what is called law. But when this is attempted to be acted on the national scale of treaties, it is too despicable to be defended or to be permitted to exist. Yet this is the trick upon which Jay's treaty is founded, etc.

Before me lie a series of works ascribing the authorship of "Junius" to Lord Chatham (Dowe, 1847); Governor Pownall (Griffin, 1854); to John Horne Tooke (Graham, 1828); James Wilmot, D. D., (by his niece, 1813); Sir Philip Francis (anon, 1818); Isaac Barre, M. P. (Britton, 1848); Lord George Sackville (Coventry, 1825); De Lolme (Busby, 1816); Lord George Sackville (anon, 1828); a work by E. H. Barker on the claims of Sir Philip Francis, Charles Lloyd and Edmund Burke, and finally an anonymous work, published in Washington, D. C., in 1872, attributing the authorship, both of the letters of Junius and of the Declaration of Independence, to Thomas Paine. The latter work is hastily written, but its argument, derived from unity of literary style, mental characteristics, identical beliefs and other internal evidences is conclusive. It is to be regretted that it has not dealt with the question of handwriting for while the handwriting of Sir Philip Francis is singularly like that of Thomas Paine, the disguised hand of Junius occa-

sionally falls into single words which more clearly resemble Paine's hand than that of either Sackville or Francis. As to the round, undisguised hand in which the original draft of the Declaration of Independence is written, it is not claimed to be Jefferson's, and it seems to be very clearly that of Thomas Paine, who, as the most masterly rhetorician of the period, would naturally be called on to write it. The internal evidence, however, that Jefferson could not have written the Declaration and that Paine did, is overwhelming. Had Jefferson written it, he could have quoted its language correctly; whereas, in vol. viii., p. 500, of his works, in attempting to explain certain "unlucky expressions in it which gave offense to some members," he says "the words 'Scotch and other foreign auxiliaries,' excited the ire of a gentleman or two of that country." Now Jefferson, as an American, could have no hatred toward Scotchmen, and had he written the document, there was no mental idiosyncrasy in his mind which would have caused any allusion to Scotchmen to get into it. But the true words were not "Scotch and other foreign auxiliaries," but "Scotch and foreign mercenaries," which involve two quite different ideas; Paine, as an Englishman, would look upon Scotch mercenaries as *not* foreign, and therefore omitted the word "other." To Jefferson, as an American, auxiliaries coming from Scotland would be foreign, as well as those coming from Germany, or, indeed, England itself. Therefore he inserts the word "other." Again, Jefferson, not having any hatred for Scotchmen (on the contrary, he had successively three Scotch tutors, to all of whom he was devotedly attached), and knowing the presence of Scotchmen in the congress, would not have sought to cast any opprobrium on them.

He therefore calls them in polite phrase, "auxiliaries." But the Declaration had called them mercenaries. Why! Junius, in letter 38, sneers at the destructive loyalty of "tories, Jacobites and Scotchmen." In letter 41 he pays what he calls "a just tribute to Scotch sincerity," by saying that "when gentlemen of that country smile he feels an involuntary emotion to guard against mischief." Again, in the same, he sneers at "the little prudential policy of a Scotchman." In letter 44 he declares he will speak tenderly of Wedderburne, "for when treachery is in question we should make allowances for a Scotchman." Junius hated prudence and a Scotchman equally. Paine, in his letter to Washington, sneers at prudence as "a sort of non-describable, chameleon-colored thing," which is, "in many cases, a substitute for principle, and so nearly allied to hypocrisy that it easily slides into it." None but an English Junius writing the Declaration would have logged in an irrelevant and un-American thrust at the Scotch.

Again, Junius, Paine and the writer of the Declaration, all retain one arbitrary date in their minds as that from which English and American troubles begin; viz., 1763. Junius says, in 1769: "Outraged and oppressed as we are, this nation will not bear, *after a six years' peace,*" etc., and in 1770 he says: "At the end of seven years we are loaded," etc. Paine, in 1779, writes to the English people, "a period of sixteen years of misconduct and misfortune," and the Declaration of 1776 says, "within the short compass of twelve years only." Thus the three writers date the entire trouble of English misgovernment to the same date, 1763-'4. This is a mental idiosyncrasy in which Jefferson did not share, but Paine, Junius and the Declaration only.

Moreover, Jefferson, though he became theoretically a mild form of anti-slavery man, yet, being brought up in the midst of slavery, could never have composed that peculiar clause in the original draft of the Declaration, in which the slave-trade is denounced as an "execrable commerce," an "assemblage of horrors," etc. Thomas Paine hated negro slavery with the hatred of one who has never lived in its midst, and no sooner landed on our shores than he began to work for its extinction. Jefferson simply foresaw its political and some of its social evils. Moreover, it is significant to note that Thomas Paine, in his letter to Washington, by capitalizing the words APOSTATE and IMPOSTOR, shows the same chirographic habit of putting important words in large capitals, which forms so conspicuous a feature in this clause of the Declaration, and which is but an expansion for capital occasions, of a habit of capitalizing and underlining which is frequent, both in the published writings, and in the manuscript fragments of Junius. Nothing in Junius' own writings is so fierce an embodiment of his vast and profound genius for carrying vituperation far beyond the limits of libel, as the climacteric clause of the Declaration, which Bancroft is dull enough to attribute to the plain matter-of-fact writer and politic thinker, Thomas Jefferson. It is as follows:

"He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the person of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of INFIDEL powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a

market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce.

And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he has obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes, committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."

The English language possesses no clause more elaborate in its rhetoric, and few so false in fact. George III. had neither prosecuted the slave trade nor negatived any attempt to restrain it. Indeed, no act of parliament whatever had been negatived since the reign of Ann, and we have yet to learn that any colonial act aimed to stop the slave trade. Jefferson states in his autobiography that his incipient attempts at anti-slavery legislation in Virginia, met with no favor. So far from it, America, when free from George III., continued the foreign slave trade by constitutional guards until 1808, and the internal slave trade until 1865. Nothing could be more false than to charge upon George III. any responsibility for slavery or the slave trade. While wholly omitting to mention the fact that the king and parliament had legislated against the erection of furnaces and other manufactures, and the introduction of machinery, it contains such false counts as "abolishing the free system of English laws in Canada," when even Bancroft shows clearly that the permission to the French to be relieved from English laws was granted to them as a boon to secure their loyalty; also, with "withdrawing

his governor," when the only governors withdrawn were those who, like Gov. William Franklin, of New Jersey, were waited upon by mobs and ordered by them to leave the country. It is also noticeable how small a figure the question of taxation cuts in the Declaration, and it will be remembered that Junius at first advocated the justice of taxing America, as Paine, being an exciseman, would naturally have done, for an exciseman naturally adheres to a tax. Moreover, Paine, out of his contempt for money, would have looked upon rebellion against a tax as mean. That Thomas Paine should not have sought to identify himself with the authorship of either Junius or the Declaration is sufficiently accounted for by his pride; for, while Junius involved him in the question of doubtful honor, whether one deriving his bread from an office under a government can consistently labor for its overthrow, the Declaration was authoritatively reported by a committee including Jefferson, Adams and Franklin, who were its responsible and official authors, and it would have been a breach of confidence and honor for him to penetrate behind the doors of that committee room and assert the individual authorship of that of which they were the official authors. Jefferson, in his autobiography, only shows that as between him and his fellow-members of the committee, he stood responsible for its authorship. He says: "The committee requested that I should prepare the Declaration; *it was accordingly done.*" He still avoids saying that he himself wrote it. The act of others in inscribing upon Jefferson's tombstone the legend "Author of the Declaration of Independence," is of a piece with the like acts of numerous parties in England in causing their relatives to be painted as "Authors of Junius."

Never were mental characteristics so identical as in Paine and Junius. Both were officially and personally obscure. Both were secretive, for Paine conceals the causes of his acquaintance with Franklin, and of the reasons which induced the latter to send him to America as a political writer; conceals the causes of his separation from his wife; conceals from her the source of the pecuniary aid he sent her; conceals from Franklin the nature of the work "Common Sense" until it was completed, that he might surprise him with its publication; furtively masks his theological bias under a vein of irony, in "Junius," and of simplicity, in "Common Sense," while in the Declaration he seeks to make a point against Christianity by charging that slavery, which is the opprobrium of infidel powers, is sustained by the Christian king of Great Britain, thus identifying infidelity with humanity, and Christianity with slavery. The battery was masked, but its shot was Paine's.

Moreover, Junius wrote without pay, and pledges himself, in Letter XLIV, not to be seduced from his work by government patronage—a pledge which, if Sir Philip Francis were Junius, would have been broken by his acceptance of the seat in the Indian board, with £10,000 a year. Paine took no pains to secure pay for his political writings, sowing them gratuitously broadcast, and we think it is not claimed that the donations made him by congress, or by Pennsylvania, or New York, were made at his request, though, doubtless, they grew out of the knowledge that he was poor. Junius dedicated his work to the English people, as Paine dedicated "Common Sense" to the American people, and the two dedications are as like in their substance, style and phraseology as any two letters of Junius or any two pages of Paine.

Enough! The Declaration of Independence must hereafter be construed as a fabric whose warp and woof were Thomas Paine's. It was admirably adapted as a revolutionary pronunciamento to fire the colonial heart to a war for separation, which, though placed on utterly inadequate and untenable grounds by that Declaration, yet had good grounds which are not mentioned in it. Those were, simply, that not having any of the materials for an aristocracy in this country, we could not coalesce into one government with Great Britain whose government was aristocratic. If we had been permitted to elect members to her house of commons, what should we have sent to her house of lords? The alleged grievance of taxation, to reimburse the British treasury for expenses incurred in our defense, was in no sense a money grievance. The money having been expended for our benefit it was our duty to pay it. There could surely be no duty resting on Londoners or Yorkshiremen to pay the expenses of Montgomery's march to Quebec, or Braddock's to Pittsburgh. The real difficulty was that we needed a sovereign government, and could not be admitted into the British one, because that was aristocratic and we had no aristocracy. This was not a grievance, but it was a good cause for national separation. The Declaration, like many popular documents, substituted sentiment for sense, passion for wisdom, fiction and rhetoric for history and fact, concealed the double merits of the case, and helped on the war, in the same way that the stupidity of George III. did. The writer whose views of the case loom up before the present generation as the most wise was Adam Smith, who, in "The Wealth of Nations," labored to bring about a representation of the colonies in the British parliament,

an idea which, had it been properly tried, could hardly be regarded as impracticable in an age which professes to sympathize with Tennyson's "parliament of nations—a federation of the world."

We may now fairly estimate Thomas Paine in his two most marked characters, as a master of rhetorical invective and as a revolutionist; for, after attributing to him the authorship both of "Junius" and of the Declaration of Independence, as well as "Common Sense," "The Crisis" and "The Rights of Man," he still subsides into the category of brilliant sensational agitators endowed with a considerable force of prophetic insight, who fell far short of the qualifications essential to a statesman or even of the appreciation of what statesmanship is. There can be no statesmanship without cool-headed candor, judicial calmness, capacity for guarded, just and moderate statement which will bear the test of time, perfect fairness toward adversaries, gratitude toward supporters, and a capacity for harmonizing adverse or conflicting elements by practicing in non-essentials unity, and in essentials charity. Webster, Clay, Calhoun, Hamilton, Madison, Washington and Franklin possessed these qualities, but Paine, the scathing and withering accuser, lacked them all. If it be a galling and unbearable tyranny for a conscientious man, with a tongue that has an infinite capacity for accusation and none for pardon, to go about, like a section of the day of judgment, applying to everyone who stands in his way such exacting and ideal tests and standards of virtue that human nature, which seems very tolerable to those who are looking at it without the blasting motive, is foredoomed by it to certain damnation and infamy, then Paine was a species of moral tyrant, always demanding the impossible of

others, notwithstanding his profession and belief that he was an apostle of freedom. Paine's fundamental belief in politics was that the government was always wrong; that it was inherently an evil; that the less there was of it the better, but that however reduced in dimensions, whatever should be left of it would still be bad by reason of its being government. It was as wrong when vested in Washington as in George III., and he had good reason to know that it was as wrong when wielded by Robespierre as when presided over by Louis XVI. On the contrary, Paine imagined that the aggregated ignorance and incapacity of all the vast, unskilled millions who had been pushed out of the work of government by the superior force and cunning of those in power, were the actual repository of political wisdom and purity. The iceberg only needed turning over. He began with the creed, which he retained to his death, that government was not an affair of skill, but merely of honesty; not a problem of difficulty, but merely of good intentions. Holding these views, it followed that if it could in some way be got out of the hands of the skilled and interested few who were educated to it, and had made a profit out of it, into the hands of the unskilled and disinterested masses, who were not educated to it, and who, he assumed, would not seek to make a profit out of it, then good government would be perfectly secured. The inverted iceberg would bloom into an enchanted island melodeous with the songs of birds and mellifluous with the scent of flowers. It did not occur to him that the hereditary principle in government might supply permanency, nationality and non-partisanship to the executive, while an elected executive would always be the mere chief of a party and never the head of a nation;

or that the bungling charlatanism of the unskilled democracy might result in misgovernment, waste, despotism and passionate folly. So little did he comprehend both sides of the question that, in the "Rights of Man," he predicted that within ten years the monarchical and aristocratic principles would have disappeared from all enlightened governments of Europe. The instant his supposed government of the people had got under way in America, Paine immediately saw in it an oligarchy in power, new in personality, but not materially different in meanness and avarice. The iceberg when turned over was still ice all the way up.

John Adams was to Paine a charlatan ignorant of the general principles of government, as superficial a place-hunter and toady as the Duke of Grafton. Jay was as corrupt a trickster as Mansfield. Morris was a treacherous fool, and Washington an impostor and hypocrite, without brains or force, indebted, like a dancing-master, to his grace of physical form for his factitious prominence. The weak point, therefore, in Thomas Paine's political philosophy was, that he was not a political philosopher at all, for no man is a philosopher who, like the spider, transforms every food into poison. That power of invective which lies as much in the suppression of the whole truth as in the utterance of part, he possessed. But it is not a power on which man rises into his highest greatness. It is, after all, only ornamental slander. It needs to be made kind by charity and just by candor, or it becomes venomous, viperous, diabolic. There is moral force in the philology which derives the name of the devil from the root signifying accusation or invective. It was not without necessity that the severest satirist of the last century should be

the most conspicuously crucified one of this. This was doubtless due in some degree to his religious writings, justly to estimate the effect of which would involve an article at least as extended as the present. But it was also largely due to that censorious harshness and unscrupulous exaggeration which are the gist of all genius for invective, and which in Paine's case became coarser and less literary as he advanced in life. We cannot deem his political views a philosophy of statesmanship, since, in our view, all revolution indicates a failure of statesmanship, while Mr. Paine's theories make all statesmanship consist in successful revolution. Yet, if a set of opinions could be entitled to a place among political philosophers by reason of millions having come to believe in and praise them, then indeed Paine would stand, more than any other, as the founder of the American school of political philosophy, as he certainly is the founder of the creed of American democracy. Millions who abhor his religious opinions constantly assume with Thomas Paine that, in politics, if the "outs" can only supersede the "ins" with sufficient rapidity to prevent the building up of any specialized or skilled class, and if the business of government can be continually remanded from those who have acquired some slight skill to those who have none, society will be greatly blessed and the work of government will proceed with real wisdom. It may be that this is true, and, if it is, Mr. Paine will prove to have been one of the profoundest, as well as most popular, of political thinkers, for his opinions in politics are the standard of American orthodoxy. Had Paine been more comprehensive in his judgments; had he been able to perceive the advantages pertaining to aristocracy as well as those to be anticipated

from democracy; the extent to which good government results from skill as well as the extent to which ignorance promotes honesty, he would have been less applauded, but more just and more instructive. As it resulted, his life was brilliant, but unsuccessful; his character was full of virtues, and yet not attractive, and his political teachings have been at once the most famous and most fallacious of their time. The fallacy that all men are equal is a continual incitement to revolution, since it is only during periods of anarchy, when each man is powerless, that it is true. As order returns and powers become unequally distributed, the equality of men disappears, since, in the exercise of all actual power,

Order is heaven's first law, and this confessed,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest.

So Paine's doctrine, that the hereditary transmission of power is robbery, applies as logically to the hereditary transmission of property as of power, thus merging democracy into socialism. Paine, therefore, is the apostle of chronic revolution. The opposite of revolution is statesmanship, but before this can prevail, a philosophy of statesmanship must supersede, in the popular mind, that gospel of revolution which Paine did so much to implant.



CHARLES FOURIER.

CHARLES FOURIER.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Francois Charles Marie Fourier was born in 1772 at Besancon, in France, and died in Paris, Oct. 10, 1837. In youth he was precocious, and, throughout life, his mind was of that brilliant order, so certain to be misunderstood by the simple and dull, who free all questions from paradoxes by disregarding so much of the facts as renders them paradoxical. At thirteen he took the prizes for French themes and Latin verse in the school of his town. Mathematics, botany, and music were his favorite studies, and all his works are pervaded with illustrations borrowed from these three branches of study, pursued to a degree of abstruseness that renders them obscure to one not familiar with the recondite mysticisms pertaining to numbers, flowers and music. He was also from the first a diligent student of geography, both in its mathematical aspects, as the history of one of the planets, and in its ethnological features, as an exposition of the condition of the human race in all countries, and of the physical causes to which their progress toward, or in, civilization is due. During this period he became an adept in the cultivation of flowers, and invented a system of musical notation, the object of which was to enable all the instruments in an orchestra to call each note by the same name and dispense with the different keys or scales theretofore used by each. Entering a commercial house he was afforded an opportunity to travel throughout western Europe. In 1793 he inherited about 100,000 francs, which he invested in produce at Marseilles, expecting to sell it in

Lyons. Most of this was pillaged by the troops of the convention, and Fourier, engaging in an insurrection to protect his property, narrowly escaped the guillotine, and finally took refuge from imprisonment in the army. During this period his inventive mind was illustrated by important military suggestions to the government, for which he received the thanks of Carnot. A political essay put forth at this time also attracted the attention of Napoleon. Discharged from the army at twenty-three for ill-health, he resumed commercial pursuits at Marseilles, where he had occasion to superintend the destruction of an immense quantity of rice, which had rotted while being held by speculators and monopolists for a rise, at a time when the people were greatly suffering for the want of food. This was one of the impressive lessons which turned the mind of Fourier toward the study of social science, and the in-harmony between the supposed interests which animate the industrial captains of society and the real interests which should become known to them. From the age of twenty-seven to thirty-six he was engaged in elaborating in his own mind certain views which he thought to be discoveries in social and universal science, the keynote of which was, that the laws of attraction which govern matter are symbolic of those which govern mental action, both intellectual and passional, or rather that all mental, moral and social action is passional, and is governed by attractions, the same as matter. There is a passion for sex, and another for justice; another for truth and another for beauty; another for worship and another for intrigue; another for change and another for emulation; and whatever laws govern the attractions of gravitation and chemical affinity, govern also these passional attractions, which are the sole forces that can act upon the human will, and the balance of which must determine all human action. Brutus condemning his child, Regulus returning to Carthage, Archimedes protecting Syracuse, are as purely instances of obedience to a passional attraction as Cleopatra sighing for Antony or Desdemona escaping with the Moor.

Fourier's cardinal points were: 1. Analogy is universal, and, we may add, if rightly drawn, is philosophically accurate as a source of instruction.

2. Attractions are proportional to destinies, which is not essentially different in meaning from Jonathan Edwards' statement, that in all action the will consists in obedience to the strongest inducement.

3. The series distributes the harmonies of the world. The complex ideas ranging under this general law are brought out more fully in our critique.

In 1808 Fourier published his first work, the *Theorie des quatre mouvements et des destinées générales* (theory of the four movements and of universal destiny), which was edited and republished in part in this country by Brisbane, under the title of "The Social Destiny of Man." France, however, was then shaking under the unfolding tragedies of Napoleon, and could give no heed to any philosophy that did not come in stirrups and on horseback. After six years Fourier made his first convert, one Muiron, of Besancon, who assisted him in the publication of his subsequent works. At the age of fifty, Fourier published his "Treatise on Agricultural Home Association," which afterward appeared as a "Treatise on Universal Unity." This work, originally intended to embrace nine volumes, was completed, as to two of the volumes, which have been translated into English under the title of "An Analysis of the Passions." Various journals in the interest of Fourierism were started in France, which soon perished, apparently because there is not that undemonstrability about Fourierism which is essential, in any doctrine, to make it the subject of perpetual advocacy. To Fourierism this scientific test is applicable; viz., "If you believe it, try it." Whether the trial succeeds or fails, in either event its advocacy ends. A cause, in order to admit of perpetual advocacy, must be one that cannot be subjected to the analysis of experiment, *i. e.*, it must relate to that which is both unknown and unknowable. Hence the fitness of doctrines concerning the future life as a basis on which to organize sects in this world. The

tenet can never be proved or disproved, hence it may be advocated eternally. Toward the close of his life Fourier obtained some distinguished disciples, both in Europe and America, all of whom may be said to be disciples only in the general sense, rejecting in detail many of Fourier's ideas. Among the former may be included Considerant, Cantagrel, Hennequin, and among the latter, Hugh Doherty, Albert Brisbane, and at one time Emerson, Ripley, Dana, and other members of the Brook Farm Association. Although Fourier entertained an extreme estimate of the importance of the sexual attraction in its influence over human destiny, and professed an exalted interest in woman's enfranchisement and emancipation from all control, he did not hold that in the far future her best development would stand associated with marriage, although at the present, and for many centuries to come, marriage might prove to be her most fortunate condition. He predicted that an excess of misery over advantage would flow from premature attempts to supersede it, but thought that as the ages progressed and woman obtained a higher freedom and pecuniary independence, a different ideal concerning sexual purity would come to prevail. True to these intellectual standards he never married.

CHARLES FOURIER.

THE PHILOSOPHER OF PASSIONAL HARMONY AND APOSTLE OF CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION AND WOMAN'S RIGHTS; WHO "SET THE PASSIONS TO MUSIC" AND PROVED THE HARMONY BETWEEN HUMAN NATURE AND UNIVERSAL NATURE; THE DOCTRINE THAT VIRTUE CONSISTS IN A BALANCE OF THE PASSIONS AGAINST EACH OTHER, AND THAT ATTRACTIONS ARE PROPORTIONAL TO DESTINIES.

No philosopher of modern times has left so wide or so undefined, and, on the whole, so inadequate an impression on the popular mind as Fourier. His works have ceased to be read. They seldom appear on the shelves, even of our larger libraries, and are absolutely not to be found at all in our book stores. They are difficult to read, and when read are difficult, and, in many parts, impossible, to comprehend. At times he seems more abstruse than Hegel or Kant, and yet he professes unmixed contempt for the speculations of all philosophers. He is more subtle in his appreciation of correspondence and analogy than Swedenborg, yet his searching out after mysterious and often beautiful poetic analogies never seems to color his thought with the warm glow of poetic ardor, but to stand in his own mind for hard scientific facts, which he gathers and classifies into genera and species, as a naturalist would his bugs or a geologist his fossils. He has at least attempted to give the world a scientific analysis of the

passions, and to base thereon a theory of virtue, which are at once subtle, profound, and, in some sense, perhaps, scientific. In view of the universal assumption, that everybody knows what Fourierism is, it is somewhat startling to find that almost nobody has read anything concerning it from original sources, which are confessedly the only fair sources of information concerning any system. Fourier began with the theory that analogy (or what Swedenborg calls correspondence) forms the key to unlock the mysteries of nature. The perception of this fact, in some degree, is probably the universal endowment of poetic minds. Plato and Enemerns perceived it before Swedenborg. In Swedenborg it is oppressed by theological limitations, which are not favorable to its expansion or scientific exercise. He is limited to the two good principles of theology, viz., wisdom, or truth and love, or goodness, and to the one bad theological principle, viz., self-love; and thus cribbed, "cabinéd and confinéd" the universe does plebcian duty by becoming a hewer of wood and a drawer of water in alternately setting forth one or the other of these three supposed principles, all of which explode under the tests of philosophy, which show that wisdom or truth is not, any more than ignorance or error, an essence, but a relative fact, like upper or under, or fullness or emptiness; that the love of others is as often mischievous as beneficial, and that the love of self is infinitely more beneficial than mischievous, indeed, is absolutely essential to existence.

Fourier's system of correspondence is more difficult to follow than Swedenborg's, and bears the stamp of a more profound and complex mind. Physieal nature, he says, consists of the hieroglyphic expressions of ideas,

The universe consists of one active principle, called by him, spirit; called by the theologians, God; and by the scientists, force, or law, or motion, and by Schopenhauer, cosmic will; one passive principle called matter; and one neuter or abstract principle; viz., numbers or mathematics. Sex, therefore, in Fourier's philosophy, as in Hindu theology, is the primary fact in nature. Soul or motion is masculine. Matter and all inertia are feminine. Mathematics alone are destitute of sex.

We cannot better contrast Fourier's method of thought with that of the philosophy of his day than by comparing him with Cousin. Cousin claimed to have interrogated human nature and to have ascertained all its wants, which consisted of a demand for the realization in its outer experience of certain innate ideas, which were: First, the useful; second, the just; third, the beautiful; fourth, the divine; fifth, the true. Industry brought us the first, law the second, art the third, religion the fourth and philosophy the fifth. These he boldly affirmed, p. 28 of "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy," exhausted the capacity of human nature; forgetting, apparently at one fell swoop, that the chief stimulant, to industry, law, art, religion and philosophy are the various social, sexual and sensual attractions, and forgetting also all the vast and diversified antagonistic capacities of human nature for the useless, the unjust, the ugly, the devilish and the false, though the exhibition of these capacities had cut by far the larger figure in history. Moreover, Cousin supposed that men engaged in industry labored because labor was useful to society, whereas the recognition of the utility to society is merely a late deduction of philosophy, as indeed are all the others.

Fourier founded his philosophy on the senses. Every

animal panting in the chase, labored to gratify the luxury of taste, whether it were the royal Bengal tiger springing to its prey, or the epicurian philosopher discussing dialectics for the salary with which to purchase bread; though in the former case the taste gratified is simply physical, while in the latter it is composite; *i. e.*, both physical, social and intellectual. Hence, human motives begin in the five senses, the passion for the gratification of which man shares with the lower animals. These are: Fifth, touch; fourth, smell; third, taste; second, hearing; first, sight. Of these, sight and hearing were the least important, and taste, smell and touch the most important; as upon the latter depended those powerful springs of action essential to the maintenance of the race, while upon the former depended only its instruction. All these Fourier calls the attractions; thus generalizing by means of this significant word, attractions or loves, a continued recognition of the fact that the spirit of him who exercises these qualities of the senses is affected toward the various objects seen, heard, felt, tasted and touched, upon certain principles of attraction, alternation and repulsion, which correspond at once to the vibratory motions of the planets around the suns, from their aphelion to their perihelion, to the law by which a soil to be productive requires a rotation of processes and of crops; the earth a yearly change of seasons, a daily change of weather and an hourly change of cloud; the laborer an alternation between labor, pleasure and repose; and the man of fame and power a far more complex combination of transits, — physical, social and intellectual.

And here Fourier's tendency to the use of formulas derived from music, which, with a like tendency to the use of formulas derived from mathematics, underlies all

his writings, introduces a scale or gamut of the affections in their alternations, so as to show the class of affections which work attraction and those which work repulsion, or a transition to a new attraction. When Fourier wrote, the attention of the scientific world was being drawn by Euler and others to the singular analogy existing between light and sound, as shown by the complete correspondence discovered between the seven colors of the spectrum and the seven notes of what is called the octave in music (the eighth note being, in fact, no part of the first, but the first of the second series, which is in fact only a septave). Physicists were calling attention to the fact that the distinction, between the full tones and the semitones in the octave, corresponds to the spaces occupied by the three primary and four composite colors in the spectrum; and that the third and fourth, and the seventh and eighth spaces, both of the spectrum and the scale, were but half as great as the others, because of a certain mathematical law of undulatory vibration which governs both light and sound. It was quite natural, therefore, that Fourier should have turned to the scale in music as the fittest type or symbol by which to set forth certain features in his theory of the affections and passions, as his theory is itself an undulatory theory, depending upon rapid alternations of attraction and repulsion for its vibrations, and upon the harmonies between the vibrations of different chords, *i. e.*, the simultaneous enjoyment of distinct but concurrent pleasures, for its highest effects. Premising that the name of each note of the octave needs to be comprehensively defined in order that the sources of passional harmony may be understood, and that the numbers of the notes on the scale are the continuation of an ascending series of which

the five senses already mentioned form the first five, Fourier's scale of the passions is as follows, beginning at the bottom and reading upward in the order, *do re mi fa sol la si do*, the distribution into two columns being for the separation of the passions according to their philosophical nature, into the affective or centripetal passions, and the distributive, reactionary, or centrifugal passions:

Do—UNITYISM.

9. *Si*—AMBITION.

<i>Major Chords.</i>	{	8. <i>Sol</i> —FAMILYISM.		<i>Minor Chords.</i>	{	12. <i>La</i> —CUMULATION.
		7. <i>Mi</i> —LOVE.				11. <i>Fa</i> —ALTERNATION.
		6. <i>Do</i> —FRIENDSHIP.				10. <i>Re</i> —EMULATION.

Friendship is placed at the bottom of the scale, as meaning little more than the absence of that enmity or distrust in which society begins, and the willingness to be kind if convenient. Friendship exists between two cattle that stand side by side, and lap each other with their tongues, or, possibly, between two brainless beetles, the one of whom finds the little round ball which he had been moving pinned to the ground by an intruding naturalist, and, flying away for help, brings another beetle to aid him in moving it. This is not the only, though, perhaps, one of the lowest illustrations of the fact that friendship may exist, both without brains and without ability, but it certainly demonstrates in the most satisfactory manner that the love of the neighbor may exist without the presence of a perceptible theology. Friendship, so far as it goes, tends to bring men together, but at every throb it is antagonized, according to Fourier, by emulation; *i. e.*, good will toward the neighbor alternates with the desire to rival, outdo, or outshine the

neighbor. Emulation is as good and useful a quality as friendship, and is a grade higher, and subsequent, following it as *re* follows *do* in the scale, since it is only the neighbors whom we considerably love and esteem that we care to outshine. Emulation exists among all higher animals, especially in the matter of social and sexual selection and pairing, but it also prompts birds to sing in successive competition and rivalry. It inspires the race horse, whose intensity in the race often exceeds that of the rider. It evidently is the leading motive in the flight of migratory birds, as all can perceive who watch the emulative efforts of domestic geese in March and November to imitate their migratory ancestors. It introduces the germs of leadership and government into all flocks and herds in which the wethers fight for the mastery. It underlies the tribal organization, and thus founds the state, and is a continual force in civilization, from the little log school to the senate, and from the competitive contest of Indian boys, with their arrows, to the mortification of Schopenhauer at his lectures on philosophy being less attended than those of Hegel. As the notes *do* and *re* when sounded together produce discord, so friendship and rivalry, when arising between the same persons or classes, destroy each other. Either the friendship ceases, or the rivalry ceases, or there is war. Emulation, therefore, or the desire to outdo one's neighbor, is the distributive or centrifugal passion which rises above the affection of friendship or the love of one's neighbor and ends it, as the note *re*, when sounded, puts an end to the note *do*. By emulation centers of power and force are multiplied, local rights and liberty of action and thought are preserved, individual and state wealth and independence are maintained, and great activity, through competition, is imparted to human industry.

Next above emulation, however, and ready to extinguish it when sounded, is the note love. Love rises in intensity and value, both in the order of the sense that is attracted or delighted, and also accordingly as the delight is simple or composite, *i. e.*, accordingly as it is confined to one class of pleasurable sensations, for instance, the physical, or, as it combines a series of many, for instance, the physical, emulative and ambitious. Thus, to look out alone on a fine landscape which you do not own, gratifies the eye, even of a peasant, but if the eye has been cultivated by travel and the study of geology so that both the æsthetic and scientific tastes are developed, the pleasure, instead of being merely physical, is composite and complex, and the artist or geologist may enjoy the sight by its suggestion of ideas which to the peasant's mind are not suggested or comprehensible. On the other hand, the emulative or critical taste of the artist or geologist may render the landscape repulsive, owing to the features which, to the peasant's eye, may form its chief attraction, as, for instance, the peasant's own hut or drove of hogs in the foreground. In this case the peasant strikes, through the sense of sight, the two notes of love and familyism, as the drove of hogs represent to him the means of supporting his family during the year, and thereby of gratifying all his senses through those two passions, and these notes chord. If, however, the artist associates in his own mind the peasant's hut and the drove of hogs with that penury, vulgarity and economy which are hostile to art, and associates his own ambitious future with castles and wealth, which are favorable to art, then the notes struck in the artist's mind are *ra* and *si*, or emulation (in its critical phase of fault-finding or disgust) and ambition, which do not chord.

If, however, in addition to the physical gratification of the eye by the landscape, made composite by the knowledge of the sciences and arts best calculated to enhance the intellectual enjoyment of the scene, there is added the fact that your most valued friends own the landscape, which you for any reason, neither hope nor desire to own, then the faculty of physical sight strikes *do*, or friendship, the first note on the scale, which gives a clear, strong, monotonous intonation. If the landscape is one which you desired to have and failed in the effort to buy, then *do* and *re*—friendship and rivalry—are struck and there is discord. But if you love the daughter of your more successful rival who did get the estate, and if your love is accepted, then four notes in major accord are struck at once; viz., Friendship, *do*; love, *mi*; familyism, *sol*; and unityism, *do*, and your transport amounts to rapture. You enjoy your friendship in a composite or threefold manner; viz., first, because your friend is your friend; second, because you have a friend who owns so grand an estate; third, because your friend is father of one toward whom you feel the most intense of all attractions, though the attraction itself is as yet gratified only by sight and not by touch; and, fourth, because the concurrence of the preceding unities, in so remarkable a manner, excites in your soul the highest of all passions; viz., the passion for perceiving a unityism, or what philosophers call a divine harmony, and what religion calls a special providence, or the will or spirit of God, in all things.

If, while you are in this state of composite or complex pleasure, you hear sounding along the approaching avenues, beautifully bordered with stately elms, your friend's carriage, and in a moment recognize his voice

inviting you to dine with him, another sense, to wit, that of hearing, reinforces sight, striking the same chords with double energy, and the anticipation of a third, that of taste, which exhilarates your soul at the prospect of an excellent and elegant dinner in the midst of cordial and affectionate friends, causes you, in a ferment of ecstasy, in which you can hardly avoid shouting, to grasp your friend's hand, thus admitting the fifth and closing sense, that of touch, to heighten your still more composite and complex pleasure. You enter the carriage and accost the ladies who are perhaps the sisters of your inamorata, shaking hands with each, and enjoying in succession that family likeness to one more loved, which causes each to seem a separate miracle of loveliness. The delicate fragrances with which the art of the perfumer has surrounded their persons combine with that of the flowers that border the avenue, or of the freshly mown hay on the lawn, or the hedge-row of lilacs, to waft to your soul through your fourth sense, a charm which only seems faint because overcome by a brilliancy of conversation which nimbly traces, up and down, the gamut of the affections; first, talking of friends (*do*); then of rivalries, cliques, intrigues and cabals, but always of those in which you and they are in the same set, (*re*); then of your inamorata, (*mi*), but being careful while striking the rich note of love (*mi*) not to touch at the same time the discordant note (*fa*) of alternation (change, flirtation, inconstancy, new loves), for *mi* and *fa* do not chord; but passing on perhaps to *sol* (familyism) by describing the preparations making for your future welfare in your expected relation. Here the notes struck are *do* and *mi* and *sol*, and they all chord. If at this point they should strike the notes *mi* and *re*, love and emulation simultaneously, by telling

you that a rival was accepted in your stead, or should remind you that you are fifty years old while your inamorata is nineteen, thus suggesting criticism, fault, rivalry, and the like, how horrible would be the discord. If such facts exist, politeness ignores them, and only the accordant notes are struck until you alight at your friend's mansion and are received by your inamorata. Here your pleasure will vary greatly, according to whether you are confined to the mere sense of sight and hearing, and, perhaps, a slight touch of the fingers, as might be the case in aristocratic circles, or if too many persons were present, or whether you would be permitted to combine the more intimate senses of taste, smell and touch, as in kissing. To those who think the sense of smell has nothing to do with kissing it would be sufficient to hint the effect of a dyspeptic, or alcoholized, or onionized, or tobaccoized breath as compared with one fragrant, like new milk, with the sweetly tasteless suggestions of a thousand flowers. Kissing, itself, is a composite pleasure, depending, secondarily, on the perfection with which the sensuous contact is made expressive of physical unity, but, primarily, on the electric and nervous excitement attending the gratification through all the five senses at once (for a kiss is the sole act which exercises all of them), of an affection which combines friendship, (*do*), sexual love (*mi*), familyism (*sol*), and unityism (*do*), or worship, without any admixture of the distributive or centrifugal passions of emulation (*re*), *i. e.* rivalry, which would consist in admitting others to the same privilege; or alternation (*fa*), which would consist in changing and inconstancy; or emulation (*la*), which in this connection would consist in the ability of your inamorata to do many other things, as for instance to

chew gum, eat an apple, play on a piano, or give directions for the dinner at the same time that you are kissing her. All of the latter would have the effect of discord. Yet to sustain the activities which all this time have been ministering to your pleasure, there must be a class of persons, and these are your friends' servants, who are engaged in emulation, alternation and cumulation; *i. e.*, they rival each other in efforts to contribute to your pleasure, they flit by, lightly from one duty to another, and they, especially in waiting on the table, have the cumulative labor of doing many things at once. But all this your difference of rank enables you not to see; for if you saw it, *i. e.*, if it were done by persons of your own rank, it would present a discord, and would mar your feast. Ordinarily, if the dinner is good, both in the viands and in its wines, and even if the feast appeals to the sense of sight by its beauty, of hearing, by the presence of music, and of smell, by the fragrance of flowers, as well as to the gustatory faculties by its substantial elements, it will still lack the highest pleasure-producing power unless it ministers also to ambition. But if you are there to meet twenty of the most famous men and women in the world, of the class or group whose fame the complexion of your own mind would lead you most highly to enjoy, as, for instance, twenty great generals like Grant, Von Moltke, MacMahon, and the like, if you are a military hero, or twenty capitalists like the Rothschilds, Astors and Vanderbilts, if you are a capitalist, or twenty poets, if you are a poet, or philosophers, or physicians, or divines, or merchants, as the case may be, these would, at an ordinary dinner, tend, by making it composite, *i. e.*, by combining the ambitious with the gustatory, to make the occasion so enjoyable

that not only would the company present be greatly more elated by each other's presence than in a company of a different sort, but the press would esteem the act of partaking of a little food by such a company so important as to trumpet it throughout the world, and describe the minutest details of dress, conversation and appearance of every person present. So much does a composite rise above a simple pleasure, especially when the note struck in the scale of the affections is among the higher; though if the passion to which the feast ministers be familyism, *e. g.*, in the case of a silver or golden wedding, or even merely love, as in the case of the first and original wedding of two parties who have numerous friends, society recognizes this as a composite pleasure of rare value and enjoyableness. But in the case first above supposed, you would infinitely prefer, in dining with your innamorata and her friends, that these vastly great personages should be away than that they should be present, unless your own rank in the social world were so high as naturally to draw and attract such a company; otherwise their greatness would, by dwarfing your little love affair, cause everybody to forget that which is to you the spirit of the wine, and which, if omitted or evaporated, turns all to lees, dregs and vinegar. As ambition (*si*) would not chord with (*sol*) familyism or love (*mi*) under these circumstances, the presence of the great would encumber the feast, whereas without these elements the like presence of the great would distinguish it by converting it from a simple, and therefore vulgar, repast into a composite "feast of reason and flow of soul."

Fourier, in his analysis of the passions, names the distributive passions thus:

12. *La* (Cumulation.) Composite—accord, dovetailing, coinciding.

11. *Fa* (Alternation.) Papillion—butterfly, varying, crossing, alternating.

10. *Re* (Emulation.) Cabalist—discord, criticising, intriguing, grasping, dissenting.

Dickens, in *Mrs. Jellyby*, holds up to ridicule a woman who neglects the monotonous duties of getting her husband food, mending her children's clothes, and polishing her knuckles against the washboard, and runs about organizing associations for furnishing warming pans for the naked negroes of Borrioboola Gha. There are *Mrs. Jellybys* in every town, in every Protestant congregational church, indeed, such churches can be run by no others, and in nearly every association to which women are admitted. Fourier defends them all. He holds that the passion for intrigue and cabal is one of the most essential to human progress; that men and women enjoy it, alike, in that savage life which is sometimes called the state of nature; that in barbarism (polygamy), the husband intrigues in war and crime while the wife has still the intrigues and cabals of the harem; but in civilization (monogamy) man retains his field for intrigue and cabals in politics, in Freemasonry, and in (Catholic) church government, while the wife in the solitary household (in Catholic countries) has no field for its real exercise whatever, and only dreams of it through the novel and the theater. To these, therefore, she flies from an ennui which would be otherwise unendurable. In Catholic countries it is chiefly known to the religious orders. This passion for intrigue, which prevails, like most of the passions, among animals, as well as among men, has the general object of enabling the weak to select their protectors from among the strong. By its aid the female withdraws from a protec-

tor whose protection for any reason has become odious, whether it be a father, brother, mother or husband, and betakes herself to one whose protection she prefers; as Desdemona withdrew herself from Brabantio to wed the sooty Moor. It chords with alternation, or the flitting, butterfly faculty, as *re* chords with *fa*, and also with the composite *la*. Never can a woman attend to so many things at once as when she is carrying on a flirtation or effecting an elopement, as both Brabantio and Shylock observe, on the escape of their daughters. Fourier's assumption is, that complex households will prevail on the earth from five to twenty thousand years hence, of a pattern which it would be quite premature to attempt to introduce now. It is no valid criticism, therefore, on any of his predictions to say that human nature is not at present and never has been, adapted to their fulfillment, as Fourier did not contend that it is or soon would be. In these complex households about eighteen hundred persons would form a corporation, of whom one-half, and that an equal half in rights, property and powers, will be women. The various functions pertaining to housekeeping will be so subdivided among cabalistic groups or cliques that not only will each clique be passionately striving to outdo every other, but every man or woman in each would be passionately striving for leadership in his or her clique. At present, says Fourier, "a fearful confusion is made in civilization by charging one woman only, wife or servant, with the whole business. Yet these functions are of an immense variety, and it is not extravagant to estimate their sum collective at ten to twelve genera, containing thirty to forty species, one hundred to one hundred and twenty varieties, and three hundred to four hundred shades. A poor house-

keeper is therefore obliged among us to be loaded with these innumerable details; she is obliged to take care of the kitchens, cellars, barns, stables, gardens, orchards, fruit loft, confectionery, larder, washing, sewing, etc., and of the varieties of these different genera. In the garden alone a housekeeper may have fifty species to look after, and in the kitchen almost as many, in the cellar at least twenty; that is to say, the housekeeper is obliged to mind alone all the household works, that would require the intervention of more than three hundred groups in a phalanx of passional harmony (*i. e.*, of selection of employment according to preference). Accordingly, the lady holds this household work in aversion, whereof the least branch is so much above her means, and presents no fuel for intrigue. Every woman would willingly join in three or four branches of these labors, if she found these cabalistic parties, *i. e.*, cliques, in which she could practice intrigue, emulation, alternation and the faculty of emulation or manipulation (such as is required in piano playing and in politics), and other vehicles; but being obliged to embrace the task of a hundred or two hundred corporations, she is exhausted, disheartened. She cannot fail to have an aversion for household labors or to perform them without intelligence, as happens with our housekeepers, the most renowned of whom are novices and incapable, in comparison with the intelligence of (which will be developed by) the passional series, where every variety, every shade, employs a group violently impassioned, and consequently very intelligent; for you only do well in industry what you do with passion." The following extract presents Fourier's views in illustration of the utility of the passion of emulation, intrigue or cabal.

He says: "Let us suppose four groups occupied in making a certain culture prevail, say four pears called the Bury pear, the blonde, the gray, the brown and the green (bergamot piquete). If these four masses of cultivators carry on intrigues to gain for their fruit the upper hand, make outlays to improve it and secure suffrages, or at least to create a mass of partisans by the excellence of each species, their cabals will have been very laudable, and as useful as those of the elections are injurious and unproductive; and if these same men have each of them thirty industrial cabals, like those of the Bury pear, there will only result from them prodigies of industry, a general frenzy of emulation. People will be convinced that disagreement in industrial series is as useful as accord, that it is requisite that each of the groups of the series should be jealous of the two contiguous ones and should cabal actively to carry off the palm and cause the preference to be given to their own produce. It will be found useful that the group of the white Bury pear should labor to take away partisans from that of the green Bury; and in the same way with the others; for from all these efforts there will result an extreme perfection of each produce. The cabal in this order of things will become a passion as divine as it is now infernal, where its development only leads to injurious consequences, to the intrigues of stock jobbing, to political combinations, etc. I reply to the detractors of the cabalist, you may prove by paralel of ambition and of love, that the cabalistic spirit is only vicious when it has too little aliment, and that the cabals accumulated in great number are a pledge of passional balance. In fact, love is balanced in the case of a young man, handsome and very wide in his nature, like Alcibiades,

each of whose love intrigues is to him a subject of charm; he has always the greater share of success, at least three-fourths of triumph for one-fourth of failure; you might even say nineteen-twentieths for one-twentieth. In this case his love cabals only occupy him slightly; he carries them on with the confidence of a soldier secure of victory; he is not absorbed by love, and can lead abreast other passions, like that of interest or ambition; whereas a philosophical cock turtle dove (meaning a lover educated only according to the current philosophy of the day), entirely absorbed by his lady turtle dove, will lose sight of a host of matters that he ought to have combined with his amours. Such a dove will have no readiness in business; he will not know how to make ambition and love march abreast, like the man who conducts rapidly several love intrigues, and who handles love in accords of the fifth and sixth. In a case of this nature his cabals are not limited. They extend from shepherdesses to queens; they embrace the sum total of society and combine the developments of ambition and of friendship with those of familyism or marriage.

“The man who is able to combine in this way the cabals of the four groups (*i. e.*, Friendship, Love, Familyism and Ambition) is the man who is balanced in affective passions. He who neglects the three others for the sake of one of the four affections, he who neglects the three other affective cabals for the love of country and of fraternity, is a fool, who in time finds out his folly and perceives that he ought to have led abreast the four cabals, and to have thought of interest at the same time that he thought of fraternity. You only arrive at this equilibrium by dint of having many cabals in each of the four

affectives and of the five sensitives. The moment that one of the nine is confined to a single intrigue, it absorbs everything; and a character thus preoccupied is nothing more than an abortion in civilizeé affairs. Social perfection consists, therefore, in giving a full development to the cabals in each of the nine passions, in order to balance the different sorts of cabals one by the other, instead of reducing them to the feeblest development, like that of the civilizeé ambitions, which are deprived of developments; or that of the barbarians, who, by the custom of the harem, are deprived of the cabal of gallantry on the side of the man. Such a development becomes a tomb of love to man, instead of being its throne. It is this privation of cabals that transforms ambition into a gnawing worm to the civilizees. It is a stimulant to the courtiers, who have a hundred intrigues to carry on; it is a sting for the small proprietor, who, with the delights of his rural and moral mediocrity, is maddened at not having influence in elections, nor the means of acquiring the field that would improve his estate, nor chances of marrying his poorly portioned daughters. He maddens cordially at being without influence in the cabals and confined in the paths of morality. He would require, to enjoy the passional balance, thirty cabals, at least, to follow, and illusions for each. Instead of this full and varied career, he has often, as the only aliment of the tenth passion (ambition), a single cabal, a longing for a public office, that he loses after all. What a difference from the societary order, where every one meets with numerous cabals and chances of fortune and glory, in connection with the merest trifles, such as with the care of a flower or fruit,—cares that present to him chances of advancement, as will be seen in synthesis, in the Treatise on the Passional Series.”

Of the Papilion, or Butterfly passion, the passion for passing from one pleasure to another, or for quick transits in all transports, Fourier says:

“Everybody must have seen some of those men who love to carry on at once a crowd of functions, whether of genus or of species; if they are at work in an action at law, they will want to compose four briefs at once for four different causes. This mania of cumulation reigns even in their recreations. If they are reading a book they will not finish it except they have three or four to read at a time—to day one, to morrow another. They have a ricochet or rebounding memory; it is stronger than memories laboriously cultivated * * * Cæsar dictated four letters at once to his secretaries, and with his own hand he wrote a fifth. * * * The Papilionists are beings that must be overloaded with functions; they are commonly more intelligent in cumulating twenty employments than another man would be in cumulating two. A journalist complained lately because a certain member of the institute cumulated twenty-five different functions in his own person. It is possible that he may have performed the twenty-five better than two or three. * * * To bring on the stage a passion so contrary to the oracles of philosophy, let us join hands with nature, who is an authority of some weight, even where she is in discord with philosophy * * * As to the material, have any plants ever been seen to be fond of monotony? No! A particular wheat wants to change soil and a soil wants to change seed; this year, wheat; another year, barley or rye; and even when a soil admits the same produce two or three years following, it does not like to receive the same produce that it has yielded. Accord-

ingly, the science of soils and their varieties is an essential branch of agriculture. Plants, as well as soils, require an alternation in every direction. For instance, in reproduction, such a plant as comes from seed—as the strawberry, the carnation—requires that it should be afterward renewed by slips, by shoots, and that you should vary it as much as possible in plats, localities etc., for want of which the plant degenerates. Nothing is better proved by experience.

“The Animal Kingdom is no less exacting on this point than the vegetable, and if you omit the precaution of crossing the breed, you soon come to complete degeneration. Here then we have nature in material contradiction with morality, which preaches to us the love of monotony, of uniformity, and which, moreover, betrays itself, for it promises us ever renewed pleasures in the moral system, in the practice of virtues, the contempt of riches, the love of boiled turnips and of black broth! But what need is there of so much novelty in spiritual pleasure? If philosophy blames novelty in material pleasure, does it believe in the duplicity of system? No! most undoubtedly; but if it wishes unity, you must admit in the passional as well as material sphere, this taste for variety and butterflyism that is seen to burst forth in the whole of material nature.

“Let us define regularly the eleventh passion or papilion. It is the want of variety, relays and contrast in pleasures, the want of an enjoyment that should come opportunely to make a diversion to another enjoyment that is ready to cease or to lose its edge. Of this nature is the surprise of a man, who, on issuing from a fete, and even before its end, learns unexpectedly his nomination to a great and very lucrative post. This news

becomes to him a second fete, the charm of which is enhanced by the state of contentment into which the first fete had thrown him. The liveliest pleasures become insipid if others do not promptly succeed them. To be happy you must every day experience at least four of these delicious surprises in order that the day estimated at the minimum of twelve sessions of pleasure, may have at least

“A third with the papilion for tonic,

“A third with the cabalist for tonic,

“A third with the composite for tonic.

“The papilion gives happiness impromptu; mediocre enjoyments become marvelous by the apropos, the opportuneness with which it is able to decorate them. It has the property of making much of a little; drawing two pleasures from a single source, and retempering the soul by unforeseen emotions. Thus it is one of the most meager pleasures to walk around your own native town; but to do so, as the Trojans did after a siege of ten years, or after a captivity in the dungeons of Algiers, and a return to your country, is one of the most lively pleasures, and which arises from simple comparison with the foregoing lot. It is an alternation, a development of this papilion, which is able to make something out of nothing by the single charm of relays or of contrasts.”

Fourier regarded the power of sexual conquest as one whose first victory, like any other acquisition of wealth or fortune, should not lead to immediate retirement, but should form the mere entrance on the career of a continuing social force. As courtship is a much more elevating, stimulating and composite enjoyment than marriage, the latter, as a rule, is a relapse from that

composite blending of amusements of the soul with those of the senses which renders courtship the most instructive and energizing period of life, into a condition of simple, solitary, and isolated sensualism, which often destroys by its reaction the affections which had called it into existence, and so leaves sensualism to work, under the supposed consecrations of religion, all the destructive effects of vice. Of course when married persons are trained in the true apprehension of the nature of the passions, they will give the utmost play possible to the distributive or separative as well as to the conjunctive passions. This is done by setting out on a bridal tour simultaneously with the consummation of the nuptials, and spending the ensuing months in every phase of emulation; *i. e.*, of mutual rivalry in performing the tasks and enduring the fatigues essential to successful and delightful travel, and of alternation or rapid transit from place to place and from scene to scene, and of emulation or a diversified attention to the numerous details of a wedding journey. All these distributive passions in exercise prevent the pleasure from sliding back, as it constantly tends to do, from the composite, which produces ecstasy, into the simple or physical, which soon produces reaction and aversion or exhaustion, congestion, paralysis, and death. Those who are much in society pass from love (*mi*) to alternation (*fa*) by means of those rules of etiquette which permit and require the married, when in society, to exchange the attentions of their marital for those of other partners. An ordinary, intelligent, sociable, or club meeting, where everybody passes rapidly to a new partner, illustrates Fourier's idea of the instinct of papilionism, or butterflyism, as a relief to a purely

monotonous attraction. But in large classes of society no such reliefs exist. The only alternations are from labor to meals and from meals to rest, or to marital sensuality. The religious secure some satisfaction to the passion for papilionism, or change, by means of worship. They go to church that their senses may be gratified by the opportunity of rapid transit from the harmonies of the organ to a neighbor's bonnet; from the talk about Mary, who bathed Jesus' feet, to the thought of Agnes' velvet ribbons, and whether the color agrees with that of her feather. The convivial secure the same satisfaction by gaming and drinking. A few obtain the same change through politics or the newspapers. But to thousands of married persons their relation becomes revolting, and they stagger blindly into conflicts, crime and divorce, through the emotional reaction inseparable from simple sexual union without the continuance of those concurring pleasures which, by maintaining the composite character of the pleasure, sustain its dignity. Fourier's remedies for this condition of things, which, however, he did not contend that human nature would permit to be successfully applied on any extended scale in less than three thousand years, were the emancipation of labor from the thralldom of capital through co-operation, and therein the emancipation of woman from that pecuniary dependence upon man which underlies sexual slavery; the emancipation of both sexes, through a wiser theory of the passions than had been taught, either by the religions or the philosophies, from the thralldom of marriage; and the consequent emergence of both into a social atmosphere, wherein courtship and gallantry would be expanded to their maximum, and simple sensualism, *i. e.*, the union

of persons, unaccompanied by the ecstatic influences derivable from the other harmonies, would be reduced to the minimum.

Fourier makes the most exalted of the passions to consist in unityism, a passion whose manifestations are so varied that it is difficult to reduce them by language to a sufficient resemblance to each other to reveal the common principle in them all. Unityism is the passion for perceiving unity of design amid diversity of manifestation, and hence is the interior impulse in religious worship; wherefore, Fourier, while denominating it a human passion, also denominates it the spirit of God; it is the passion for reducing to law, and, therefore, to unity, the myriad diversities of facts and phenomena by which the universe assails, storms and subdues the human mind, and herein it is the central passion in all philosophies. It is that determined faith, which underlies all logic, that there is an inherent impossibility that any one truth can contradict any other truth, and this renders it the inspiring passion which perceives beauty in dialectics or pure reason. It is the consciousness ever present to the poetic mind of the unity between physics and ideas; that external nature is made up of hieroglyphics for the sensuous expression of thought and emotion; that the bectling tempest of winds, lightning and rains is the natural symbol of human fury, indignation and grief, while the calm, warm, sunny breath of noon is the like symbol of mature prosperity and happy good fortune; that the glowing stars are types of mental brilliancy, while earthly fires are sensuous shadows of those passions which consume while embracing; that the flowers portray the esthetics and art culture, while the rocks represent the relative sterility and solidity of facts; that

history is a flowing stream, revolution a foaming cataract, and war an ocean tempest—in short, unityism is also the poetic passion which, throughout universal nature, perceives one mode of movement producing all effects, one universal attraction operating to impel all phenomena, and boldly applies, therefore, the principle of poetic analogy, or the correspondence between the sensuous and the spiritual, to unlock nature's secrets and unveil all mysteries. Unityism is the passion that enjoys the co-operative and converging elements of a dramatic plot to produce the catastrophe which accords with the dramatist's sense of justice; which is in no respect different from the theologian's pleasure in contemplating such a dramatic scheme of divine government of the world as seems to him to vindicate the ways of God to man. Unityism, also, is the interior passion in all music, in sculpture and in architecture, as well as in literature and history. Finally, it is the passion that chiefly glows when man is at one with his environment and destiny, when all the elements of his character and life accord with each other and with his neighbors, and with his views of the future and the unseen,—it is the peace that passeth understanding, the perfect atonement between man and God, and between knowledge and mysteries.

Fourier's analysis of the passions is more than ingenious, therefore; it is profound. Like nature itself, it extends from details that elude us by their minuteness out into the infinite, where its vastness mocks us. It brings the throbbings of the human heart into harmony at once with the melody of the seasons, the twinkling of the stars, the ripple of the brooks, the fiery pulses of the sun and the calm music of the spheres. What we

have called vice and virtue in man subsides in the light of his philosophy into the rhythmic movement of a harp, responding to the breathings of æolian winds, sometimes in the major chords, that are clear and full of joy, and anon in minor chords, sad and plaintive, and again in discords that still again seem resolved into a more complex harmony, as their dissonance is lost in time or sweetened by distance. He alone enables us to see how the religious soul, looking at evil and touching it on every hand passionately, should say, with Calvin and Schopenhauer, everything is wrong; while the philosophic soul, dwelling on evil in its distant clearness, should say, with Pope and Paul, all is well. Of all philosophers, he alone recognizes the passions as springs of the beautiful, the useful, and the good in human conduct, and proceeds to set them to music. On the very soil where the theologians had for centuries been kindling their pretended eternal fires and feeding their undying worms, he plows deep for grains and grasses, sets out groves, plants flowers, and causes them to bloom, turns the Gehenna of a crude superstition into an enchanted park, the Grecian Tartarus into a garden of flowers sweet with billows on billows of roses, carnations and camelias, and bids mankind to simply cease defaming their Creator, in order to make out a case against themselves.

It remains to indicate the bold and fanciful, but not wholly unprophetic, flight of half-poetic half-scientific prevision by which Fourier, in his "Theory of the Four Movements" attempted to outline the future history of our globe and of the human race for eighty thousand years. Beginning with the fundamental proposition that in the laws of nature there is perfect unity, and that what is observed to be true of one species as to its

origin and extinction must be true of every other, he concluded that as every form of force goes through the same four movements of (1) sexual gestation and birth, (2) growth, adolescence and education, (3) maturity, freedom, activity and reproduction, and (4) decline, decay and dissolution, and that as man, the individual, passes through these, and as such of the races and genera of plants, animals and men as have become extinct have passed through the same four movements as a race as it passed through as an individual, it is an obvious scientific deduction that the human race as a whole will pass through them all in regular series, beginning with infancy and ending with gradual but total extinction from the planet. Moreover, if there are any scientific criteria or tests by which to distinguish these periods from each other in any species, the same criterion applied to another species will determine whether it is in its infancy, maturity, decay or decline. The decay of nations compares with the final extinction of the race much as the decay and disappearance of tissue in the human system from labor or exhaustion compare with the final dissolution of the body. Both proceed according to a law, as stated by Spencer, that when the demands of the environment on the particle for motive force exceed its capacity to manifest motive force, it is removed. Its maintenance in place depends on its supply of nutrition.

There are two reasons for believing that the human race is in its infancy; viz., the physical and the intellectual. The physical consists in the fact that the capacities of the earth to afford nutrition to a population are capable of all the increase which the utmost industry of man could avail itself of, throughout a period seven

or eight times as long as man has already existed on the planet, or say sixty thousand years, even assuming, as we must, that the population will become as many billions as there now are millions. In discussing this question Fourier, who wrote thirty years before the steam locomotive was invented, and fifty years before the reaper, predicts that the societary movement will be greatly quickened and fertilized by the introduction of rapid means of locomotion and of tillage. These means he calls anti-lions and anti-camels, and his graphic, sensuous and positive style of writing is such that his translators credit him with saying that new species of animals bearing these names would be specially created by the intervention of certain planetary and stellar agencies, to which he, in some form of either poetic rhapsody or scientific hyperbole, attributed the introduction of new species, that "missing link" in the phenomena of evolution which Darwin and the naturalists are still hunting for. It seems probable that Fourier attributed the creation of species to stellar agency, since he quite plainly affirms that planets and suns have life and reproductive powers; and yet it is unsafe to conclude that his language is anything more than the sensuous mode of speaking of the forces of nature whose attractions and repulsions he constantly speaks of as sexual and as the sources of all creation, production and reproduction. Fourier's poetic mind felt actively and truly the vast increase in rapidity of locomotion and cultivation which would attend the progress of society during this century. His mode of describing it was either too figurative to be understood, or it was less accurate as to details than it was sound in its general impulse.

The intellectual fact which indicates that the human race is still in its infancy, is the present infantile condition of the human life and mind. In comparing mankind with its latent possibilities, Fourier concluded that the race had passed through gestation and was still in its infancy. An infant finds its chief instruction up to the age of ten in fables and fictions. Nothing that is really true interests or can be taught to it. It gets very red in the face at anybody who assures it that Santa Claus is only its natural father, or that its own life is the product of coition between its parents. Having been judiciously taught that it came into the world on wings, it blushes to look mankind in the face on learning that its conception was not immaculate. It has neither instinct nor knowledge to guide it in the selection of foods, and except for the bad taste would as soon swallow poison as sugar. Its chief quality of character is its preference of the fantastic over the useful or beautiful, of the amusing and deceptive over the true, and of the teacher who pretends to know what he does not over the teacher who admits how little he knows. The chief function he can perform is to feed his body until he gets old enough to begin to think. These infantile qualities are still the universal and striking characteristics of the race. For seven thousand years it has been learning how to feed its body, and does not yet know. It has no science of disease nor of its cure, of crime nor its reform, of morals nor its source, of life nor its object. It is amused with fables. It organizes table-telling into bishoprics and archbishoprics, and promotes the teachers of myths into crowns and salaries because they feed it—taffy. A few philosophers have learned a little, but these the infantile

mind hates. Hence mankind is still in its infancy. But if seven thousand years have left the world still an infant, and if the rate of progress heretofore made will keep it in a condition not very different for three thousand years longer, then ten thousand years may be set down as the period of the infancy of the race. In all such generalization Fourier thinks an allowance of one-eighth sufficient for error. It will then be ready to enter on its education; *i. e.*, to learn facts. In its infancy it was learning only words and fables. This will last ten thousand years longer; this will be a period of intellectual expansion and mental freedom. The world in this period will have become a university. The generals, bishops, and social robbers, who in the infancy of the race fed it on force and fables, will have disappeared like the caliphs from Bagdad. Philosophers and scientists will teach mankind how to converse with the inhabitants of other planets, by means of interstellar signals, whose responsive signals exhibited in other planets the improved and cultivated visual senses of the residents on this planet will enable them clearly to discern. Labor and poverty will be abolished, and there will be no wealth save that of years, of honors and of intellect, but cultivation will be carried outward over the deserts, upward into the mountains, and onward even to the poles by a system of harmonial association as far freer, less gross and more enlightened than civilization, as civilization stands removed from savagery. All work will be performed passionately and lovingly, as the artist paints, as the prima donna sings, as the orator speaks, or as the fond mother nurses her babe. All will enjoy that highest freedom of doing only the work which is most pleasing to the esthetic

sense. Crime and its punishments will long since have been forgotten, and justice will sit only to award between contending competitors those labors and pleasures which are identical, and their rewards and dividends.

The next ten thousand years, corresponding to the years from twenty to thirty in the individual, will witness the results of the previous periods of education. The power of achievement in both men and women will now be approaching its maximum. The whole earth will bloom with fertility and a beauty now unknown; the seasons will soften and both their grandeur and mildness increase; the air and the deep seas will be traversed, the interior of the earth explored, and the entire history of past and future will become scientifically known. Human life will be greatly lengthened, its pleasures will become more composite, and the relation of the sexes, which is at all times the pivotal axis on which the social and spiritual world revolves, will have emerged into that degree of perfect freedom in which every conjugal embrace shall form the crowning ecstasy to a separate and distinct period of courtship; the courtship addressing itself, not mainly, as now, to the frivolous fancies of the woman, but to her understanding and her poetic and æsthetic nature; and being of a character to render her condescension, not like the frightened plucking of a distracted bird, but like flowers bending passionately to the sun, there will be no waste of sexual power in transits which are not allied with social, moral and intellectual victory. Still less will there be any obligation holding any to submit to a transport less perfect than the highest and most composite. The education and nurture of the young will be committed to those to whom it brings the most passionate ecstasy, and not, as in existing civiliza-

tion, often to the drunken and the haggard, the despotic and the heartless, who, disappointed in the murderous effort to avoid offspring, make up by soothing syrups what they lack in lullabys, and welcome the reluctant visitor with incompetency, until he is old enough to exchange it for a blow on the ears.

We need not further follow Fourier's prophecy to that gloomy period when the human race, like a decaying oak, shall feel its inadequate and diminishing life receding toward its center, leaving its limbs to rot and die and finally its vast trunk to fall and return to the elements that gave it life. At this period, according to Fourier, the globe will slowly lose its fertility, human stature will diminish, art and science will be forgotten language will return to the mumbling chatter of savages and from thence to the guttural moan of beasts and the chirp of sparrows. Humanity will totter blindly toward the great abyss that swallows all.

Fourier's prophecies seem to develop the germ of a scientific principle into an outgrowth of startling dimensions, through the fructifying and realizing power of a brilliant and exceedingly French imagination. We have presented a few of his most intelligible theories. We could not undertake to follow Fourier's discussion of the analogy between the passions of the soul and arithmetical numbers, or between the passions and the colors of flowers and vegetable forms, or between the same and planetary and stellar motion. We must even leave wholly untouched those theories of co-operation in industry and association in labor to which his works have given so great an impetus. Having omitted so much in our summary of his system, we shall be correspondingly brief in our estimate of his philosophy.

In making sex the controlling force in nature Fourier revived a subtle principle which was acknowledged of old in Buddhism and in the Egyptian and Greek religions. His scale of the passions is exceedingly suggestive, if not exhaustive and satisfactory. His skepticism as to the divine sanctions, the eternal sanctity and the necessary beneficence of the marriage institution, is slowly gaining ground as against antagonistic theories. His theories concerning marriage do not seem to be adapted to the existing state of human nature, but this criticism fails when we consider that Fourier did not assert that they were. He only asserted that the germs of adaptation are implanted in our natures, which, in due time, will develop into a state of human nature to which his theories will be adapted. To solve this problem is very much like looking into the brain of the Bushman of Africa for the germs of republicanism and Christianity. No authoritative mode of solving the problem exists. In a general way most men believe that the man, the creed, the church, the state and all the institutions of the future are to be greatly unlike what they now are. To outline the character of the changes that are to ensue is a task that few have undertaken, with a compass and range of vision that is even creditable to the imagination; to say nothing of the judgment. Of these few Fourier is certainly one—perhaps the chief.



HERBERT SPENCER.

HERBERT SPENCER.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

This greatest of living English philosophers was born in Derby, April 27, 1820. His earliest years were spent in minute observations of nature; the drawing and preserving of insects, caterpillars, and in the study of mathematics and the physical sciences. At the age of sixteen he invented a new and ingenious theorem in descriptive geometry, which was published in an engineering journal. At seventeen he engaged under Sir Charles Fox as a civil engineer on the London and Birmingham Railway. He was fond of drawing and modeling, and of the collection of plants and animals. During this period he was intent on mechanical inventions, his mind tending specially toward improvements in watchmaking, in the manufacture of type, of a new printing press, and of a plan for engraving by the electrolyte. At the age of twenty-three he sought literary employment in London, but was not successful, and resumed engineering. He had already, however, at twenty-two, begun the publication, in the "Non-Conformist," of a series of papers on the "Proper Sphere of Government," which were issued in a pamphlet. In the years 1848 to 1852 he began the writing, for the "Economist" and other reviews, of papers, unfolding the doctrine of evolution as the fundamental law of cosmogony, of life, of society, and of mind. His philosophical works, already some twenty in number, include "Social Statics; or, the conditions essential to human happiness specified, and the first of them developed" (1850—1865); "Principles of Psychology" (1855—1870-'72); "Rail-

way *Morals and Railway Policy*" (1855); "*Essays, Scientific, Political and Speculative*" (1857—1863); "*Illustrations of Universal Progress*" (1864); "*Essays, Moral, Political and Æsthetic*" (1865, 1874); "*Education, Moral, Intellectual and Physical*" (1860); "*First Principles of a System of Philosophy*" (1862, 1864); "*Classification of the Sciences; with Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of Auguste Comte*" (1864—1871); "*Principles of Biology.*" 2 vols. (1864—1867); "*Spontaneous Generation and the Hypothesis of Physiological Units*" (1870); "*Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy and Morals*" (1871—1873); "*The Study of Sociology*" (1873); "*Descriptive Sociology; Facts classified and arranged.*" 3 vols. folio, (1873-'4); "*The Principles of Sociology.*" &c., &c. In some of his more compendious works, such as "*Descriptive Sociology.*" of which three folio volumes had been published in 1876, he employed for several years the aid of three assistants in collecting and classifying facts pertaining to "all types and classes of society, savage tribes, decayed races and existing civilizations." Amidst all this voluminousness in the accumulation of details, Mr. Spencer's mind adheres, quite rigidly and unalterably, to the principles with which he first set out; his later works being the elaborate application of these principles to new and widely diversified collections of facts, without essential change or expansion in the principles themselves. Mr. Spencer has never married, mingles but little in society, lives very plainly and modestly, has not much respect for the average public opinion, and privately animadvert on those phases of social life which displease him with much more vigor than would be inferred from the coldness of his philosophic style. Partly through the vigorous advocacy of Prof. Yonmans, of New York, and partly through the wider prevalence of liberal or philosophic ideas in America than in England, Mr. Spencer's writings have met with a wider and more appreciative reception in the United States than at home. Several of the leading reviews, and the two Universities, unite hitherto in ignoring his work. But while the writer is

compelled, in the following critique, to dissent from many of Spencer's leading positions, it is no less evident to him than to others that it is a vast stride forward in the march of philosophic thought to have these positions as clearly stated as Spencer has done, and that, whether they be finally conclusive in their logic or not, they possess a rising and increasing momentum which will compel all persons, who make any pretense of giving attention to philosophic utterance, to weigh them, and will leave none at liberty to ignore them.

It is not a quality of philosophic thought that one must agree with either its methods or its conclusions in order to be an admirer of both. So far as philosophy resolves itself into an art of dialectics or right reasoning, it still concedes that except in the mathematics there is great incertitude in all reasoning, and a liability that either of several modes of reasoning, and either of several conclusions concerning the same question, may possess an equal amount of truth. The human reason is approached through as many avenues as there are capacities and powers in human nature, from the power to eliminate a faulty premise in a syllogism to the power to digest an aldermanic dinner. One man's reason is more largely ratiocinative, another's perceptive; one is deductive, another inductive; one is impressed by a synthesis of widely diverse but allied illustrations; another by a cold analysis without illustration. A philosophic system of reasoning, also, has one quality in common with a new poem or opera, or with a child's doll; viz, a large share of its interest will consist in its novelty. It is only when this has worn off that we can rightly distinguish between the real merit it has, in being true, and the factitious merit it seems to have, in being new. It is probable that when a comprehensive system of philosophy shall be arrived at, if such an event ever happens, it will be too composite and heterogeneous to bear the stamp of any one thinker in any special degree of predominance over all others. It will be sufficient fame for one to have brought one or two of the bricks which take their place in the temple. And

however clearly some of its central pillars, porticoes, and architraves may be visible, it will still be but the outline of a moderate portion that will appear. Below, its foundations will sink into the unseen and unknown; above, its spires and minarets, with no tolerance of the incongruous, the unhistoric and the absurd, will still shoot upward until their outlines are lost in the celestial star-dust of the finally unresolvable and perpetually mysterious. No philosophy, therefore, is complete which does not embrace a philosophy of the great mysteries of the universe; or of the elements of the human mind which lead to a systematic and persistent up-reaching toward those mysteries. It is no answer to this demand to say that these mysterious themes, by their very nature and essence, defy philosophic analysis. The supposed answer only adds another and final remove to the previous statement, resulting in the supreme conclusion—no philosophic system can be complete or satisfactory. As, on the other hand, no religious system, however useful as a means of organizing society or promoting unity of action and feeling, is true, the choice is presented to every human mind either of confessing that the gates of all ultimate and satisfactory knowledge are closed against it forever, or of accepting the religious rattlebox, amusing itself by making a noise, until it is far enough advanced to make inquiries after ultimate truth, with the sad certainty that the whole pleasure of these inquiries will consist in the chase, and that the game will prove worthless.

HERBERT SPENCER.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

There are not a few, especially in America, who think that Herbert Spencer has reached the end of philosophic thought, has achieved a final and conclusive system and a logical and harmonious statement of the one all-embracing law into which can be ranged and classified all the phenomena of matter and of force, of life and of mind, of society and of science, of art and of religion; in short, a philosophy of the universe which fails to be accepted by any, only because they fail to comprehend it. The fact that numerous thinkers, of much repute in their respective circles, so believe, indicates both that Mr. Spencer's work is of the most ambitious type, and that if it has not resulted in a complete system of truth, it must at least have embodied an immense plurality of truths. But, on the other hand, the generalization arrived at by Mr. Lewes, as the result of tracing the history of philosophy from Thales to Schopenhauer; viz., that a philosophic creed is impossible; that each philosopher begins to build by critically demolishing the partial superstructure left by his predecessor, and, therefore, that the true function of philosophy is to educate us in the principles of reasoning, and not to put an end to further reasoning by the introduction of fixed conclusions; in short, that the end of philosophy is not a faith

but merely dialectic skill; all this, if true, and Mr. Lewes certainly illustrates it with great candor by the example of every philosophic thinker, except the more recent ones, whose systems are still under consideration, and presumptively awaiting evanescence, must predispose us to doubt that the coining of new philosophies has been brought to a close by the work of Herbert Spencer. Without attempting to trace the relation which Mr. Spencer sustains to other thinkers, or how far the previous tendencies of thought, especially on the part of Cousin, may have led up to his own system, we shall endeavor to group together the illustrations essential to a fair presentation of his system, and then apply to them, so far as we may, the tests of analysis and "cross-examination" under which previous schemes have subsided from intended *credos* into mere speculations. If, at the end of the process, the so-called "system" remains a satisfactory finality in thought, it is possible that the result may still be due in part to the weakness of the tests to which we shall subject it.

The inquiry is not whether Mr. Spencer is not a brilliant, versatile, and learned dialectician, but only whether he has founded a final and satisfactory philosophic system; furnished a clue to the explanation and comprehension of the phenomena of the universe; reversed the creedlessness of philosophy, which had previously prolonged its sterile reign through thirty centuries. Voluminous as have been Mr. Spencer's works in illustration of his system, they are all the mere application to the varied phenomena of cosmology (creation), biology (life), sociology (society), and psychology (mind) of the one supposed principle or law that all the phenomena of the universe consist of an evolution, both in matter and in

force, from the simpler forms and modes of action to the more complex; or from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; which evolution is brought about through an ever-increasing differentiation of the parts or organs, and specialization of functions, which differentiation and specialization are invited and compelled by the attractions of the environment, *i. e.*, by the conditions which surround the organism or mode of action in question, and which constantly tend, by adapting the organism or mode of action to its environment, to educe higher and more diverse capabilities of action, and, by perpetually widening and complicating the environment, to develop or evolve a higher and more complex organism. This evolution is accompanied by a dissipation of motion and integration of matter, which continues until the organism or mode of action has parted with its excess of motive power. Then the environment reacts on the organism, overcomes the equilibrium previously existing between its capacity for motion and the demands thereon, and inflicts upon its parts such excess of motion as causes disintegration and dissolution. The entire operation is deduced from the persistence of force. Drawing somewhat of its inspiration, if this strictly poetic and mythic word is admissible in philosophic discussion, from Fourier's statement that "attractions" (which in Spencerian phrase would be the fitness of the individual for his environment) "are proportional to destinies" (*i. e.*, to the power of evolving multiform and diversified activities), the Spencerian formula is the just complement of Darwin's theory that the multiplication of species results from natural selection (*i. e.*, the fitness of the individual for his environment), and that in the struggle for existence the survival, and therein the propagation,

of the species is the work of "the fittest." The theory which Darwin applies in zoology and Fourier in sociology, Spencer applies to universology. Adam Smith had previously applied it in political economy in enunciating the fact that rapidity and diversity of production were proportionate to the division of labor, and to the freedom of the producer to adapt himself to his environment; *i. e.*, to select his own markets and to produce according to the demand.

Such are Mr. Spencer's wealth of illustration, and, where he does not become too recondite and—

wi' reverence be it spoken—

too prolix to be followed by the average reader, his charming eloquence of diction, that any outline, in a few pages, of illustrations on which he has expended volumes, must be imperfect, and may not escape being presumptuous. It is the peril of all systems of thought, however, that unless reduced to a nut-shell, they must remain unknown except to a very limited few, and if reduced to a nut-shell, for communication to the great world, the thing communicated may differ essentially from the conception of the founder of the system. To offset this peril, however, there is this consolation, that any system which will stand being reduced to a nut-shell, which is often the happiest form of *reductio ad absurdum*, and especially that will endure being stated in the language and weighed in the terminology of its adversaries, and which does not even perish under the panegyric of its admirers, is at least much stronger than one which will not, and Mr. Spencer's system has been frequently subjected to all these tests, without any marked diminution in the respect which it commands.

In the gray dawn of the evolution of the cosmos out

of the chaos, Mr. Spencer perceives a time when nebular matter brooded in homogeneous darkness and death, a darkness pregnant with the possibilities of the existing suns, and a death in which lay nascent the dormant forces of the existing life and progress. Back of this Mr. Spencer does not go. He does not inform us whether (1) *space* and (2) the *matter* that filled it, and (3) the *force* required to evolve it out of its then, into its present condition, and (4) the *time* required for that purpose, and (5) the law according to which the evolution occurred were or were not results of a differentiation of some one antecedent unity into these heterogeneous elements. He does not point us back to the thought of space, matter, force and time being one. He does indeed show elaborately that the measurement of time depended upon the subsequently evolved planetary motions, and that without this measurement there could be no such fact as time; *i. e.*, limited duration conceivable to the human mind; but he does not show that the fact of duration itself is dependent for its existence on the means of its limitation or measurement, to-wit, the planetary motions, nor that duration itself, as distinguished from the means of measuring it, was in any way evolved by the differentiation or splitting in two of any antecedent fact, such as space or matter or force. On the contrary, in "First Principles," chapter 3, he asserts that space, time, matter, motion and force are all ultimate scientific ideas, utterly inderivable, unsolvable, and even unthinkable in any philosophic sense, and as purely unknowable as are all first causes.

If there is a tendency among Herbert Spencer's disciples, as we have sometimes thought, to claim his sanction for any theory that force is the offspring of matter

we fail to find any justification therefor in his writings. On the contrary, distinctly beginning by classing both matter and force as ultimate and equally unknowable ideas, his illustrations begin at the strictly scientific stage, when matter under the operation of force begins to differentiate from the more homogeneous into the more complex forms, and when force, acting in conjunction with or upon matter, begins in like manner to differentiate into motions, attractions, pressure, cohesion, heat, light, electricity, life, mind, society, government, science, art, etc.

There are, to begin with, five primordial or antecedent facts, for the independent existence and distinct identity of which Mr. Spencer's system of evolution from the homogeneous into the heterogeneous does not profess to account, but the independent existence and separate identity of each and all of which are assumed as the necessary conditions precedent, without which his evolutionary machine can not be wound up and set running. These five antecedent facts are space, matter, force, time and motion or law, including the very law of evolution, which seems to him adequate to account for the subsequent succession of phenomena.

But these facts are the elder gods which formed the basis of the mythology of the Greeks and filled the Pantheon of Rome. The Greeks held that time (Saturn) married to motion (Rhea) brought forth matter; *i e.*, earth (Jupiter), sea (Neptune), the atmosphere (Juno), etc. As Mr. Spencer's theory therefore begins with a variety of unresolved elements, and assumes the independent existence of numbers of the same powers or entities which have, at various times and under various names, constituted the stock in trade of theologic and

mythologic assumption, his philosophy retires from the entire domain of first causes, which are not within its sphere or contemplated by its scope, and must deal with secondary causes only. This he concedes by assigning all first causes and ultimate ideas, including human consciousness, to the unknowable. Instead of being a philosophy of the universe, therefore, his system is a philosophy of those elements of the universe which may be made the subject of scientific knowledge and analysis. If, instead of the word *force*, the antecedent existence of which his philosophy implies, we employ the word *Zeus*, we restore the Greek mythology; if the word *Jehovah*, we call up the Jewish cosmogony. In either case we supplement our philosophy by a theology. A philosophy which assumes certain unresolved agents, named *force* and *matter*, as its actors, is truly a theology, or, rather, is incomplete as an explanation of universal phenomena, without assuming an unknowable first cause as its actor; for *force* and *matter* etherealized become good and evil, and further sublimated they are God and devil, which in turn are only theologic names for Schopenhauer's "Cosmic Will" and "Phenomenal Manifestation."

Hence, no disciple of Herbert Spencer should ask that his formulæ of thought shall supersede theologic formulæ, except as a minute scientific study of the relation of secondary causes to their effects, may, owing to the limitations of the human intellect, give rise to a distaste or incapacity for entrance upon the mystic realm of theologic thought—*i. e.*, of the study of first causes. Herbert Spencer's "Cosmos," being scientific, ends exactly where Humboldt's does; *viz.*, by a recognition of the fact that first causes, not being susceptible of scientific

investigation, are something with which it has nothing to do. Whether, if they cannot be made the subject of scientific knowledge, first causes can, with any profit, be made the subject of human thought, and whether all human thought concerning first causes has not been interested, empirical, presumptuous and misleading is a question upon which Herbert Spencer seems to entertain a divided opinion. As a philosopher in his volume on sociology, he argues from the universality of religious beliefs that all of them must have had, to begin with, a germ of observed truth, but so slight are his sympathies with the outgrowth that he will not admit that religious ideas so general as those of sacrifice and propitiation are any part of this germ.

Let us now consider whether, merely as a generalization of scientific phenomena, Mr. Spencer's law of progress is comprehensively satisfactory.

Given space, matter, force, motion and time as the factors, would all progress be found to consist in an evolution of forms, organisms, motions and activities from the homogeneous or simple into the heterogeneous or complex? It must be conceded that the array of instances in which this is true dazzles and almost bewilders the imagination by its variety and beauty. Like the wand of a wizard, Spencer applies his magic formula to a universe of nebulous cloud sleeping unconscious in the gray abyss of a boundless and voiceless twilight, where hitherto no star has shone and no life hath moved, and forthwith the universal cloud differentiates into vacant space and opaque substance; the opaque moving substance differentiates into concentric revolving rings, leaving intermediate spaces; some of these revolving rings again differentiate into planetary

orbs, which by pressure become incandescient and luminous for a time, and into moons whose heat and light soon go out. Each of these orbs further differentiates into solid, liquid and fluid, while solid, liquid and fluid differentiate into the phenomena of combustion, crystallization, attraction, organization, life, animation, sensation, will, intellect, worship, reason. Along the pathway upward from this viewless void of primeval chaos, over the countless centuries that mingle like pebbles and dried leaves under our feet, Mr. Spencer's facile pen conducts us, in thoughts that glow and words that shine, into a rhythmic universe, wherein the beauty is vast, the diversity infinite, but wherein every beauty seems to illustrate the sacred law of evolution and dissolution, which runs also through every diversity from a solar system to a protoplasm, like the one thread whereon nature has strung all her beads. The cooling of the earth's crust, whereby depressions and elevations ensue thereon, is a differentiation of structure due to differences of environment, some parts cooling more rapidly than others. The conjoint action of fires within the earth and the elements of water, ice and snow without, to blend the igneous with the stratified rocks in the beginning of the geologic process is a further evolution of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, which is both induced by and adapted to the environment. But the law by which the earth's crust, originally a simple molten mass, differentiated into granite, gneiss, hornblende, quartz, mica, feldspar, slate, sandstones, limestones, coal, alluvial deposits and soil, is the same as that by which society differentiates into monarchial, aristocratic and democratic ranks, into executive, legislative and judicial functions, into the army, the navy and the civil state,

into political, clerical and lay professions, into producers, distributors and consumers, into devotees of industry, of science, of philosophy and of art. The embryo in the womb, the seed germinating in the soil, the bird singing on the bough, and the babe seeking sustenance at the mother's breast are all examples of organisms impelled by an excess of inward capacity for emitting motion to reach out toward their environment for the materials from whence to derive an increased diversity of structure, and with it an increased specialization of function, causing an increased adaptation to their environment and capacity of exhibiting a more diversified activity. Music, beginning with the chance note on a hollow reed, passes on to the discovery that the note varies with the length of the reed, that one reed with finger-holes answers the purpose of as many reeds as there are holes, and the differentiation goes on until it becomes the many-fluted organ or the cornet orchestra. The twang of a tightened bow-string differentiates into the harp, violin and piano. The melody differentiates into contralto, alto, basso and tenor, thus giving rise to the deeper science of harmony; and harmony evolves a new world of lyric, anthem and oratorio, and, uniting with histrionic passion, dramatic action and scenic effects, culminates in the opera.

So war, at first the predatory movement of an unorganized and undisciplined band of shepherds seeking to avenge an injury, in which the chief is only the tallest and most muscular private, differentiates into a distinct occupation, having a hundred ranks and each rank marked by different insignia and duties; thus giving rise, on the restoration of an armed peace, to an aristocratic division of society into kings, dukes, marquises,

counts, viscounts, knights, squires, constables and other titles, all now civil, but originally military.

Law, which was originally the simple dragging of the debtor or wrong-doer by the injured party before the magistrate as a substitute for the wreaking of his own will upon him, has differentiated into a complex system of process, pleading, trial, judgment and execution, according to distinct systems of law and equity judicature, the apprehension of which forms a life study for the acutest minds, so manifold are the complications with which it has evolved out of the simplest homogeneity the most complex heterogeneity. Religion, the drama, mechanics, chemistry, considered as a science, and every art, has the same history. Literature began as the ballad, celebrating the valor of some mythical fighting giant, some Hercules or Centaur. It was neither history, nor epic, nor song, nor romance, nor political economy, nor biography, nor hymn, nor drama, nor worship, but it contained the germs of all, and from this rude seed have sprung the world's great libraries, the church and the stage, by a law of differentiation from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Oppressed by the vast and ceaseless descent of Mr. Spencer's Niagara of illustrations, we submit for the time to the theory that these "falling thunders" of evolution are the sole phenomena of the universe, and that no counter process of involution is required to sustain these continued processes of evolution, as the silent evaporations upon distant seas sustain the smoking thunders of Niagara. Undoubtedly Mr. Spencer has seized upon and eloquently elaborated one of the most comprehensive and brilliant generalizations of which the phenomena of physical, social and intellectual science are capable.

But if it shall appear that each instance he adduces as an illustration of differentiation of the simple into the complex also illustrates a unification of previously differentiated and diverse elements into one simple and homogeneous entity or substance, is it quite clear that we have made any advance in our knowledge of the principles of universal science? Evidently with reference to the one quality of homogeneity and heterogeneity there can be but two changes possible. The first is the change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Of this Mr. Spencer makes all action, save dissolution, to consist. The second is the change from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, or the involving of previously differentiated and separate elements in the formation of some new and simple and homogeneous entity, which, if it occurs, should be called involution. It is the opposite of evolution, as evaporation is the opposite of precipitation. It antagonizes evolution as a mode of action in a more complete sense than does the dissolution which Mr. Spencer recognizes, because it is simultaneous in its action with evolution, instead of being successive and subsequent. Take the more prominent of Mr. Spencer's illustrations; for instance, the bean seed germinating first throws upward into the air the two halves of the germinated bean, in the form of temporary leaves, while the roots sustain it in the ground. Then it still further differentiates into vine, leaf, blossom and ultimately the new fruit. There is a differentiation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, as to outward form. But why should Mr. Spencer's cognition of the phenomenon not extend to the simultaneous coition of the previously heterogeneous elements, speaking in agricultural phrase of soil, moisture, sunlight and warmth, or, speaking in

chemical phrase of nitrogen, carbon, water, light and heat, to produce the homogeneous entity called a bean plant? Are not the three elements of soil, sunlight and the carbonic acid gas as it exists in the atmosphere sufficiently heterogeneous? And does not a bean plant, when considered as a living individual in nature, possess a sufficient homogeneity in its substance, so that when the former are united to form the latter there is a blending of the heterogeneous into the homogeneous? Is not some element of persistence of force required to attract and "integrate" or deposit the atoms of diverse and heterogeneous substances which go to make up the bean plant, and does not force work persistently, and do not manifold causes tend toward one effect conspicuously, and that effect the reverse of that described in every illustration to be found in Mr. Spencer's volumes?

It is true the two changes do not relate to the same qualities. While Mr. Spencer is depicting a change in form from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, he is ignoring an equally striking change in mechanical substance from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, and the production out of marvelously unlike elements of a new individual which is certainly as unique in structure and function, as single as an organism, as it is diversified in form and details. The combined involution of heterogeneous substances into one new and, at least, mechanically homogeneous substance seems essential to the evolution of that substance from its homogeneous form when a seed into its heterogeneous form when a plant. Nor is it just to speak of this as a mere integration of matter, for that phrase does not indicate the heterogeneity of the elements which are "integrated," nor the homogeneity

of the result, but covers merely the idea of accretion or increase in quantity.

Is there not also a reduction of heterogeneous elements to a homogeneous entity, when a mob of one million of men, each having independent wills, purposes and tendencies to action, is uniformed and unified into an organized army, having one will and moving as one man? Wherein is the unification of the heterogeneous wills into one homogeneous will, which constitutes intellectually the essence of an army, less important than the differentiation in functions and structure which marks the evolution of the mob (which is a thing homogeneous only in the exterior form of its units, not in their interior wills), into a graded army, with its several subdivisions of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and its several ranks from general to private; all of which heterogeneity of function is introduced in order to bring about perfect homogeneity of action? Is the subdivision of a country into states, counties and towns any higher exposition of transition from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous than the confederating of towns, counties and states into one nation, presents of the transition of many into one?

In music is it not true that each differentiation of structure in the instruments, and each new diversification and specialization of function in the orchestra, is intended to subdue some hitherto untamed note and bring it into harmony with others with which it had previously been at discord; and that the highest triumph of music consists in bringing the widest heterogeneity of sound into a perfectly melodious and harmonious "oneness" for the purpose of setting forth a succession of emotions and events, between all of which there shall exist that

homogeneity of dramatic unity which pervades an oratorio or an opera? In the religious organization of society are the differentiations whereby a simple and homogeneous congregation is specialized into a vast and complicated organism like that of Rome, with pope, cardinals, nuncios, arch-bishops, bishops, deans, priests and lay members, with monastic orders, male and female, and litanies, robes, processions, systems of canon law, festivals, confessionals, and what not; are all these, as illustrations of differentiation of structure and specialization of function, more important in a system of philosophy than the unification of heterogeneous wills into one colossal papal will, which is the very object and outcome of the whole?

So the greater the subdivision of functions, in the law, between attorney, barrister, serjeant, solicitor, proctor and advocate, and between chancellor and judge, and sheriff and master, and between process and pleadings, and court and jury, and between trial and execution, and between judgment and decree, and between inferior and appellate courts, and between the several courts adapted for the trial of various classes of cases, the greater would be the unity and harmony of the law as it would ultimately be pronounced by the courts and developed into a system. In short, here again the greater the differentiation and subdivision in form and structure, the more homogeneous would be the law as a science, because the higher would be the human reason available for its utterance in each of its departments.

Now we imagine that if Mr. Spencer had begun by saying that he had discovered a philosophic clue to all phenomena, and had announced it to be that all

progress consisted either in change from the more simple to the more complex, or in the reverse, or in both concurrently, it would hardly have been necessary for him to add "or in neither of them," to have provoked a broad smile. We should have looked upon Mr. Spencer as the prince of humorists. The situation is relieved of its humorous characteristics only by Mr. Spencer's persistent and, one would almost suppose, deliberate inattention or silence concerning aspects which stand related to those he so skillfully elucidates, as the transverse side of the same leaf or the opposite pole of the same magnet.

When Fourier said, "Destinies are proportionate to attractions," it would have taken away all the novelty of his saying to have added the two short words, "and repulsions." The world would not have recognized as a new system of philosophy the bald statement that a man's living depended upon a man's loving and hating. They would have felt a vague suspicion that they had been equal to the conception of that truth without the help of Fourier. But by clipping the truth of half its value certain men feel a zeal in the utterance of the remaining half, perhaps not unlike the interest which a sweater of coin feels in the utterance of the diminished coin from which he has abstracted a portion of the substance. Had Jesus said, "Blessed are both the poor and the rich, for both will enter the next world on the same terms," the remark would have been one which nobody would have had an interest in propagating. But, by withdrawing the benediction from the rich, the poor, who are by far the majority, acquired an interest in propagating the implied censure on wealth and its possessors.

So, probably, had Mr. Spencer laid down, as his funda-

mental postulate, that all progress consists of the two concurrent processes: of the involution of the heterogeneous into the homogeneous, and the evolution of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous; and that every phenomenon which illustrates the one in form illustrates the other in substance, it is possible that his disciples would have begged to know what other modes of change than these two could by any possibility be predicated relative to the one attribute of heterogeneity.

Mr. Spencer has sought to strengthen his leading postulate by certain minor postulates, such as that in nature "every cause produces more than one effect," and that there is "an inherent instability in the homogeneous." Doubtless these propositions are broad enough to be capable of diversified and magnificent illustration. But who will say that any of the complex unities we have been considering, such as a plant, an army, a state, an opera, a planet or a literature, is not one effect produced by many causes? Or that the heterogeneous entity called a flock of sheep, or of birds in flight, has any quality of stability (unless the capacity for reproduction be regarded as an element of stability) which is not shared, in at least an equal degree, by the homogeneous milestone, coral reef or sponge.

Have the terms homogeneous (alike in kind) and heterogeneous (unlike in kind) any philosophic accuracy whatever? Is not every object in nature or mode of action both homogeneous and heterogeneous according to the aspect in which it is contemplated? A marble, a bullet, and a round grape may be perfectly homogeneous as to form and color, and heterogeneous as to substance. When the words homogeneous and heterogeneous are used do we not need to give definiteness to the idea, to

state in what aspects the heterogeneity and homogeneity consist, whether it is of form and structure, of substance and chemical composition, of will and purpose, or the like? Mr. Spencer, for instance, makes no effort to prove that the heterogeneity, which increases with the complexity of structure, applies to the element of color. There is great diversity of color in vegetation and among lizards, serpents and birds, and somewhat, but less, in quadrupeds, and none whatever in the individual man. In the aspect of color heterogeneity is largest in the lower organizations and least in the higher. Mr. Spencer's observation that increase of motive power is proportionate to complexity of nerve structure may be true; but we would not know how to apply it to the case of a flea, which, without brain, and necessarily, therefore, with a very subordinate nerve structure, will leap so many thousand times its length that one would hardly know what act of human agility would equal it, unless it were a leap from France, over the Alps, into Italy. Again, while Mr. Spencer finds rapid increase of heterogeneity of structure in the individual as the type of life ascends, we fail to observe that he alludes to the diminishing heterogeneity of species which attends the same progress. The persistency of force works out a vast variety of heterogeneity of species among the lower types of life, and the lower the type the vaster the heterogeneity in this respect, while as the type ascends the fertility of nature in the production of varied species and genera diminishes, and man, as a genus, stands more completely isolated, homogeneous within itself, and unlike its fellows, than any other.

But no defect in Mr. Spencer's theory of evolution is so illogical as its necessary implication of a beginning

without the designation of any supernatural factor capable of beginning it, for the process of evolution is only thinkable as a process occupying a definite period of time. Assign any desired period, say a billion of years, as the time required to evolve out of chaos the present cosmos. Of course we have only to double the period to demonstrate that the cosmos should have reached its present condition of order one billion of years ago, and should now have attained a billion of years more progress than it has, and so on. In other words, we cannot expend an infinitude of time on a finite result, and the evolution of a cosmos from chaos into its present condition is a result as purely finite as to the time occupied as the manufacture of a chair or table, since it must, according to the Spencerian theory, have had a beginning, though the theory contains no materials out of which to construct an explanation of the inaction which preceded this beginning, nor any hypothesis on which to base a beginning of the exercise of this necessary force.

As to whether there are any actual tendencies toward a transmutation of species among plants and animals such as the evolution theory implies or whether on the contrary such supposed tendencies are not delusive or held in equilibrium by the principle of heredity which maintains the constancy of species, we prefer to cite the opinion of the popular German philosopher Von Hartman, as we find it translated in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* for April, 1879. Von Hartman says: "It would be a very appropriate task for a theory of natural science to strengthen its assumption of the descent of all organic bodies by means of gradual transmutation, since such assumption transcends experience, from the

analogy of some processes, however few, of transition, experimentally established, of one species into another. Darwinism must, however, admit that it has not yet been able to fulfill this condition, and that it continually requires us to regard the transition shown by artificial grouping as a genetic transition. Even in artificial breeding it has not yet succeeded in procuring a pigeon which, with every external variation, does not retain the decisive specific characteristics of the pigeon. Now, the more efficient the means at the command of the breeder, compared to those of nature, the less favorable would the contrary result of artificial breeding be as evidence of natural processes in the origin of species; therefore, the above-mentioned negative result must present the transmutation theory in a rather suspicious light. But as we cannot have recourse to any direct observation of the origin of a new species, nothing remains but, in order to secure a ground for wider analogies, to select such varieties as at first view seem to lead, through a gradual intensifying of their variations, from the original form to a new species."

The transmutation theory is in no way aided by the immensity of the periods of time through which it operates unless the tendency toward transmutation is proven, and it is just this fact of whether such a tendency exists that now needs to be established. Haeckel has met this question with ampler scientific resources than Spencer, and after all it is a question upon which the physical scientists and not the philosophers as such must decide.

If Mr. Spencer's system becomes such merely by a negation of the class of facts which it ignores, and which antagonize it, it follows that the permanent service which he will have rendered to philosophy when the

facts which he ignores are supplied will be that of having aided in bringing out more clearly, under new and more scientific formulæ, the evidences that nature never acts wholly under the influence of one force or law only, but always in a line determined by the concurrent antagonism of two or more opposing, and in some sense contradictory, forces, laws or principles. Of these he has elaborated the one. Others will elaborate the antagonistic one. And the statement, concurrently, of both, will still not amount to a comprehensive system of philosophy, since both still confine the governing principle of phenomena to the forces that produce change, of one sort or the other. But over against all forces tending toward change are the balancing forces that compel repose and rest and restoration. Of these no philosophy of mere transition can take adequate account. In Mr. Spencer's philosophy the sun is a fire going out; the earth and moon are fires gone out. Very likely these assumptions may be true. We think they are, but possibly they are not. Very likely the forces of heredity in propagation may be continually yielding to the forces of education or differentiation so as to evolve new types of being, adapting the individual to its shifting environment. Just as likely the force of heredity may be strong enough to hold every genus and even species in its orbit. Very likely, in an age in which mankind are ambitious or aspiring, it may be easy to grasp, as a faith, that humanity began in the ascidian. But were we living in an age when the means of support on the earth were diminishing, when the incursions of barbarians were destroying civilization and each generation was falling behind its predecessors in learning and in skill in the arts, we would as certainly

infer that the little we know was revealed to us by the gods, and that the utmost we could do would be to hand down unquenched the burning brand which our ancestors had bequeathed to us. It is too early in research to conclude that the forces which consume are greater than those which replenish, or that the forces which tend toward change obtain more than an illusive and temporary mastery over those which preserve from destruction. It is the old, old war between Saturn and his off-spring, the contest of Brahma, the creator, Vishnu, the preserver, and Siva, the destroyer, told over again, under scientific formulæ, with many a charming philosophic induction and with much graceful tracery of scientific detail. But the fundamental assumptions are still religious—that the power working under all, the origin whence all come, and the destiny to which all are going, are alike Unknown and Unknowable.

THE THEORY OF MORALS.

Since the foregoing was written Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" has appeared. It is in its author's best style. There is no descent from the sustained height at which he looks down on the universe of phenomena, nor any abatement in the keenness and scope of his eagle vision as a collector of widely diverse facts and phenomena. It is a great work for any thinker to have written, indispensable to every other thinker to read; but it is like all philosophical speculation, transitional and not final, useful for what it overthrows, but doomed to be overthrown by that irreversible law whereby the functions of philosophy are reduced to the work of developing powers of analysis, without hoping ever to supply the mind with a creed or a code. Philosophic speculation can disintegrate and destroy moral systems but can-

not frame one, for the reason that when philosophy has founded a rule or system of wise living, it will be found, on analysis, to be a philosophic and not a moral one. A studious perusal of the "Data of Ethics" impresses us with the belief that Spencer himself feels a reluctant sense of failure inherent in the task. The proposition to be established is, that a system of conduct can be scientifically, logically and philosophically deduced from the facts of the universe, which shall be a trustworthy guide to the human conscience in its search for light concerning human duty; or, at least, if it be not satisfactory, it will be preferable to any heretofore in use. Mr. Spencer holds the affirmative of this proposition.

He defines moral conduct as being that line of action which best promotes the preservation, and present, and future welfare and happiness of the actor, without hindering others from pursuing such a line of action as best promotes their own future welfare and happiness. Both the conclusion of the pessimist, that life is not worth living, and the conclusion of the optimist, that it is the best life possible, imply that the value of life consists in its ultimate excess of pleasure over pain. Spencer is very happy in the clearness with which he dissolves the logical proposition that duty consists in obedience to a divine command. For if an act is wrong only because divinely forbidden, then in itself it involves no excess of pain over pleasure, but may involve an excess of pleasure over pain. But if these are its effects the mind refuses to believe that it is divinely forbidden. If, therefore, the mind will not believe that an act is divinely forbidden, unless it involves an ultimate excess of pain over pleasure, then it will not believe it wrong solely because forbidden, but because of the unhappiness it immedi-

ately or ultimately involves. He disposes with equal facility of those who make wrong conduct to be the result of state enactment; for if legislation requires acts which have inherently injurious effects, it is immoral legislation; but if it requires acts, whose inherent effects are beneficial, then the acts acquire their ethical character from their inherently beneficial effects, and not from the legislative enactment.

So the pure intuitionists, who hold that acts are right when they conform to the divinely given monitor within us, known as conscience, and wrong only because they violate these intuitive perceptions, must either affirm that we do not, otherwise than through this intuitive monitor, know right from wrong, which is tacitly to deny any natural relations between acts and results, or, if they concede that right actions produce beneficial results, and *vice versa*, then it follows that we may, both by induction and deduction, learn, wholly irrespective of conscientious intuitions, what actions are beneficial and what injurious—which in turn admits there is a scientific standard, wholly outside of conscience, whereby we may detect the right from the wrong.

There are two defects in Spencer's definition of morality, viz.:

1. So far as life is a competitive struggle between antagonistic and opposing interests, every act which promotes one's own interest must, relatively to some other conceivable act which could take its place, hinder others from pursuing the line of action which will promote their interests and happiness.

2. These very acts which hinder others from promoting their interest, or which fail to promote the interest

of the actor, are often those which are moral par excellence.

For instance, a working man, who, by superior industry, energy and frugality, accumulates capital, makes a more active drain upon his nerve-force and muscular force, as a means to get ahead of his fellows, than they are making. He does so in order to get a larger share of the wage fund or product of production than either he or they would get for the ordinary expenditure of nerve and muscle. In order that they may keep up with him and get the same ratio of the aggregate product of production as before, they must expend more nerve force and more muscle. This first and immediate effect may be offset by the successful laborer making such a use of his capital as ultimately to afford larger demand for labor, and by the fact that the aggregate product of labor which constitutes the wage fund may in some cases and within certain limits increase. Subject to these modifying facts, what has the superior industry, energy and frugality of the working man done? It has compelled each of his fellows to expend more nerve and muscle in order to get the same ratio of the aggregate product of industry on which to live. The thief who enters the hen-roost of each of these laborers at night, and steals a chicken, does the same thing in the net result. He requires them to expend so much more of nerve and muscular force, than they need otherwise have done, as will repossess each of the value of the chicken. It is true the thief may make such a use of the chicken he steals as may render both eggs and chickens more abundant in the future to all from whom he stole them. He may even enter into the production of eggs and chickens so extensively as ultimately to

afford employment to every person from whom he stole them, at higher wages than he would otherwise have received. In such case both the immediate and the ultimate effect upon himself and his fellowmen of the conduct of the man who increases his capital by industry, energy and frugality, is the same, except as to the before mentioned increase in the aggregate product of labor, and of the wage fund, as that of the man who increases his working capital by stealing chickens. Yet no one supposes that industry, energy and frugality are thereby shown to be immoral, or stealing chickens to be moral; nor that the continued morality of industry and immorality of chicken stealing depend upon any calculation that may be made of the ratio of probabilities against, to that in favor of, such a use of the chickens by the chicken stealer as will render the theft a source either of plenty and employment or of scarcity to those from whom he stole. No one doubts the morality of investing large capitals in manufactures or farming, though they hinder or destroy the success of competitors possessing small capitals; nor, except among certain Orientals, the morality of eating animal food, though it involves a sudden termination of the happiness of the animal we eat; nor the morality of the invention of improved processes of industry, though they promote the happiness of the inventor and the consumer at the cost of those who have been producing by the old processes; nor the morality of underselling all competitors in trade, though it may build up one great capitalist at the expense of numerous small ones; nor the morality of education, though it inflicts serious relative disadvantage on the non-educated; nor the morality of free education at the cost of the state, though it destroys or tends to

destroy private paid education at the cost of the students. In short, throughout the strife and competition of life each upward step which promotes the happiness of one must be taken at the cost of others. It can not therefore be a rule of ethics, that in order that conduct shall be moral it shall not "hinder any others from pursuing such a line of conduct as best promotes their own happiness." It is moral that the judge convicts and sentences the offender, but the offender could easily pursue a line of conduct better calculated to promote his own happiness than the endurance of the sentence.

So far as the net utilities to the parties and to the world at large are concerned, apart from motives, the result of the deduction of £5 from the wealth of an aristocratic lord who perhaps does not even know of its possession or of its loss, and the addition of the same sum to the finances of an indigent widow, are the same whether the transfer is effected by an act of voluntary charity or by an act of robbery. Yet the act of charity entitles the donor to the plaudits of the world, while the act of robbery entitles the perpetrator, legally and morally, to the penitentiary; charity is voluntary robbery, and robbery is enforced charity. Evidently, however, the voluntariness of that transfer of capital from the rich to the poor, which is, in the utilitarian sense, the essence of both acts, forms no criterion of the good or bad consequences to flow from the diminution of the capital of the rich or from an accession of capital to the poor. The effects to be derived from the transfer will depend almost entirely on the use that may be made of the capital transferred, by the transferee compared with the use it would have been put to by the former holder, a consideration which stands wholly aside from the morality of the

transfer. We are compelled to find, therefore, that the beneficence or maleficence of the effects of an act on ourselves or others is not the actual basis of its moral quality. But the objection that Mr. Spencer's definition of morality comprehends many acts that are immoral and fails to comprehend all that are moral is not perhaps the strongest that may be made to it. It might be pardoned for being inaccurate as a definition, if it still contained a considerable plurality of truth as a generalization. But the word moral has, by centuries of use, acquired a meaning from which it can not be diverted to suit the necessities of philosophers of any school. In the light of this meaning it is clear that no act which is performed with a clear prescience of the advantages and profits, or of the disadvantage or loss, which will accrue to self or to others, possesses any moral qualities. A speculator buys land or grain with a clear prescience that in a week it will net him ten thousand dollars profit. If he did not buy it it would in a week net some one else the same amount. It is a good business transaction, a keen act of self-interest, but usage has never imparted to such an act a moral quality of any kind any more than a chemical, or astronomical or literary or artistic quality. This is because morality and business have been conceived of as distinct fields of action so long that acts of the one kind can not be measured in terms of the other.

As we cannot call a successful purchase and sale of grain, when rightly conducted, either an alkali or a salt, either a solar or nebular phenomenon, either prose or poetry, or beautiful or ugly, so we cannot in any sense in which moral terms have been heretofore used, regard it as moral or immoral. It is simply non-moral, or

wholly aside from all questions of morals. To admire a landscape, and to travel that we may see many of them; to ride a horse skillfully; to play on the violin; to scan the stars with a telescope, or to steer a ship, are acts neither moral nor immoral, but simply non-moral; yet they all fall within Spencer's definition of moral conduct, which, by the way, is but a transcript of the definition given by the Roman law of legal conduct; viz., *sic utere tuo ut alicui non laedas*. But legal conduct and moral conduct will by no means admit of one definition.

To sell all one has and give to the poor is neither moral nor immoral, but extra moral, as is all pure benevolence. It may be very foolish, as it may subject the vendor to beggary in a day, but mere imprudence as such is not immoral. Goldsmith, giving his only guinea to a beggar, and even giving away the money loaned to him expressly to pay his debts, was guilty of gross and reckless imprudence, but not of immorality, unless the immoral quality attached to a breach of trust, or of promise, or something apart from the mere excessive benevolence. As the most acute consultation of self-interest falls short of involving a moral quality, so any consultation of good to others goes beyond it, for mere morality is complete without entering upon the broader sphere of benevolence. The young man to whom Jesus spoke had kept the whole moral law from his youth up. The unlimited generosity which Jesus commanded was no part of it, any more than heroism, or any other suicidal eccentricity, is called for by moral standards.

We regard moral action as such a line of action as is believed to be right, in spite of the inability, or wholly

irrespective of the ability, of the doer, to see whether it will promote or injure his interests or that of others. The moment the veil is so far lifted from the future that the doer can clearly see the act to be for his own interest, moral qualities cease to attach to it because the element popularly known as "resistance to temptation," which is of the essence of a moral act, no longer operates. If it is clearly foreseen to be an act of self-sacrifice or pure benevolence to others, moral codes cease to command it; it becomes extra as to mere morality, and is deemed religious, generous, benevolent, heroic or suicidal, according to its degree. But so long as the consequences which will attach to its performance are unknown, and the actor is called on to choose between it and some competing course of conduct, whose consequences also he cannot foresee, and so long as he determines the choice, not by some blind arbitrament of chance, but according to a prescribed and accepted rule, in which he believes with a faith that is in some degree blind compared with scientific knowledge, so long the act possesses the quality called moral, and no longer.

I For instance, ~~it~~ is generally believed to be moral to tell the truth, and immoral to lie. And yet it would be difficult to prove that nature prefers the true to the false. Everywhere she makes the false impression first, and only after years, or thousands of years, do we become able to detect her in her lies. *colours* The laws of perspective make the near object, that is small, appear much larger than the distant object that is large, so that no two objects in nature appear to us according to their true relative size. Nature makes the sun appear to revolve around the earth by the visible story she tells to our senses. Nature endows the chameleon, which is

the representative liar of the universe, with the power to take its color from that of the object on which it depends, as an attorney takes his facts from his client, a politician learns his principles from his party, and a theologian takes his creed from his congregation. Nature gives to mere fluid masses of cloud vapor the apparent solidity of molten silver and gold, and to the concussion of columns of air when parted by lightning, a sound like that of the chariots of God riding on crystal pavements through the skies. So deceived were God's elect, the Hebrews, by this fact that they had but one word in their language to express the, to us, distinct ideas of thunder and voice of God. Nature endows almost every animal with the faculty of deceit in order to aid it in escaping from the brute force of its superiors. Why, then, should not man be endowed with the faculty of lying when it is to his interest to appear wise concerning matters of which he is ignorant. Lying is often a refuge to the weak, a stepping stone to power, a ground of reverence toward those who live by getting credit for knowing what they do not know. No one doubts that it is right for the maternal partridge to feign lameness, a broken wing or leg, in order to conceal her young in flight, by causing the pursuer to suppose he can more easily catch her than her offspring. From whence, then, in nature, do we derive the fact that a human being may not properly tell an untruth with the same motive? Our early histories, sciences, poetries and theologies are all false, yet they comprehend by far the major part of human thought. Priesthoods have ruled the world by deceiving our tender souls, and yet they command our most enduring reverence. Where, then, do we discover that any law of universal nature

prefers truth to falsehood any more than oxygen to nitrogen, or alkalis to salts. So habituated have we become to assume that truth telling is a virtue, that nothing is more difficult than to tell how we came to assume it, nor is it easy of proof that it is a virtue in an unrestricted sense. What would be thought of the military strategist who made no feints, of the advertisement that contained no lie, of the business man whose polite suavity covered no falsehood?

Inasmuch as all moral rules are in the first instance impressed by the strong, the dominant, the matured and the successful upon the weak, the crouching, the infantile, and the servile, it would not be strange if a close analysis and a minute historical research should concur in proving that all moral rules are doctrines established by the strong for the government of the weak. It is invariably the strong who require the weak to tell the truth, and always to promote some interest of the strong.

A schoolmaster desires to hold his power intact over a crowd of insurrectionary pupils. If he can make them informers against each other, under the pretense of inculcating a profound reverence for truth, he can divide them against each other, and so rule them. So of a magistrate, trying to detect and punish a criminal. So, of a priest, trying to run the consciences of a world into subjection to a church through a confessional; and so of parents who are constantly feeding the minds of childhood on fables. But who is there to enforce truth-telling on governments, priests, parents and schoolmasters? Nobody! Therefore, the moral law, "Tell the truth," is the weapon whereby the strong rule the weak. It represents but one of the divided and antagonistic forces

of society; viz., the powerful. The opposing maxim, "Tell a lie," is the weapon of the weak and helpless against brute force. The hare obeys it every time he doubles on the hound. The mud wasp obeys it, when he professes to be caught in the outer filaments of the spider's web, in order that he may draw the spider forth from those interior and stronger parts of the web in which the wasp would be effectually caught, if he should venture there for the death grapple with his prey. The priest obeys it when he is importuned concerning the creation of the world and the life beyond the grave, about which he knows nothing; but invents the best story he can think of, and so doubles on the scientific hounds, from whose terrific scent and untiring pursuit he is forever fleeing.

Thou shalt not steal, is a moral precept invented by the strong, the matured, the successful, and by them impressed upon the weak, the infantile and the failures in life's struggle, as all criminals are. For nowhere in the world has the sign ever been blazoned on the shop doors of a successful business man, "closed because the proprietor prefers crime to industry." Universal society might be pictured, for the illustration of this feature of the moral code, as consisting of two sets of swine, one of which is in the clover, and the other is out. The swine that are in the clover, grunt, "Thou shalt not steal, put up the bars." The swine that are out of the clover grunt, "Did you make the clover? let down the bars." Thou shalt not steal is a maxim impressed by property holders upon non-property holders. It is not only conceivable, but it is absolute verity, that a sufficient deprivation of property, and force, and delicacy of temptation, would compel every one who utters it, to steal,

if he could get an opportunity. In a philosophic sense, therefore, it is not a universal, but a class, law; its prevalence and obedience indicate that the property holders rule society, which is itself an index of advance toward civilization. No one would say that if a lion lay gorged with his excessive feast amidst the scattered carcass of a deer, and a jaguar or a hiena stealthily bore away a haunch thereof, the act of the hiena was less virtuous than that of the lion. How does the case of two bushmen, between whom the same incident occurs, differ from that of the two quadrupeds? Each is doing that which tends in the highest degree to his own preservation, and it may be assumed that the party against whom the spoliation is committed is not injured at all by it. Among many savage tribes theft is taught as a virtue, and detection is punished as a crime. This is essentially true in civilized countries. We never punish the thefts of the strong, that are accomplished by the ruling classes by legislation, by conquest, by "wheedling" wealth out of the masses through the medium of generally accepted falsehoods, through chicane and combinations in trade which are founded on deceit and treachery. No person has ever been punished for the making, by President Grant, of an order stopping the sales of gold just before Black Friday, though it was induced by the placing to the account of the President's sister of \$5,000,000 in gold by Gould and Fisk, on which her profits in four days were equal to six years of the President's salary. The act consisted in taking from the holders of the government's currency, \$75,000,000 of its value without their consent, and appropriating it by Executive fiat. Everywhere we see, therefore, that the law, "Thou shalt not steal," is a rule framed and impressed by the

strong to enable them to rule the weak. Having control of the forces of society, the strong can always legislate or order, or wheedle, or preach, or assume other people's money and land out of their possession into their own, by methods which are not known as stealing, since instead of violating the law they inspire and create the law. But if the under dog in the social fight runs away with a bone in violation of superior force, the top dog runs after him bellowing, "Thou shalt not steal," and all the other top dogs unite in bellowing, "This is divine law and not dog law;" the verdict of the top dog so far as law, religion, and other forms of brute force are concerned, settles the question. But philosophy will see in this contest of antagonistic forces, a mere play of opposing elements, in which larceny is an incident of social weakness and unfitness to survive, just as debility and leprosy are; and would as soon assume a divine command, "Thou shalt not break out in boils and sores" to the weakling or leper, as one of, "Thou shalt not steal" to the failing struggler for subsistence. So far as the irresistible promptings of nature may be said to constitute a divine law, there are really two laws. The law to him who will be injured by stealing, is, "Thou shalt not steal," meaning thereby thou shalt not suffer another to steal from you. The law to him who cannot survive without stealing, is simply, "Thou shalt, in stealing, avoid being detected."

So the laws forbidding unchastity were framed by those who, in the earlier periods of civilization, could afford to own women, for the protection of their property rights in them, against the poor who could not. It will be observed that in the Jewish Decalogue the rule, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," is introductory to

the kindred rule, "Nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's." The will or preference of the wife in question is no more regarded or assumed to exist than that of the ox, nor does the decalogue forbid a woman to covet her neighbor's husband. The fitness of the existing union is not considered. Chastity begins, therefore, as an element in the law of the strong, for the government of the weak, concerning property.

Of course the phrases, in the decalogue, which required the Jewish people to have no other Gods than Jehovah, meant that they were to obey no other priests than those then in power, and were another feature of a moral code for the government of the weak by the strong, and of the dull by the cunning. We do not mean, by this course of reasoning, to imply that the strong in society can, or ought to be governed by the weak; that is neither possible, nor if possible would it be any improvement. We only assert that moral precepts are largely the selfish maxims expressive of the will of the ruling forces in society, those who have health, wealth, knowledge and power, and are designed wholly for their own protection and the maintenance of their power. They represent the view of the winning side, in the struggle for subsistence, while the true interior law of nature would represent a varying combat in which two laws would appear; viz., that known as the moral or majority law, and that known as the immoral or minority law, which commands a violation of the other.

Jesus placed himself among the immoral, or violators of the majority law of the Jews, when he violated the Jewish Sabbath, when he taught that tribute should be paid to Cæsar or Rome, when he taught that force should be met with non-resistance, when he allowed a Magda-

len to associate familiarly with him and those around him, when he rebuked the stoning an adulteress, when he commended poverty, condemned wealth and discouraged marriage. So Luther placed himself among the immoral, or violators of the majority code of the period, when, as a priest, he married, when he attacked the sale of indulgences, the infallibility of a visible church and the like, until, by bringing into the fight the reserved forces of human passion and irreligious common sense, he was enabled to bring about that reversal, in the moral code of his period on these points, which is known as the Protestant Reformation in Germany. *beg*

The unphilosophical element in Herbert Spencer's scheme is its dogmatical assumption that there is a moral law, philosophically deducible by argument from the facts of nature; that this moral law is unique and single, not dual, though all the forces of nature whose study is to lead up to the knowledge of this law are dual and not single; that while at some points it may not yet be clearly definable, yet all the facts indicate both its existence and its philosophical deducibility from nature. On this point he says, p. 282: "For reasons already pointed out a code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite. Many forms of life, diverging from one another in considerable degrees, may be so carried on in society as entirely to fulfill the conditions to harmonious co-operation. And if various types of men, adapted to various types of activities, may thus lead lives that are severally complete after their kinds, no specific statement of the activities universally required for personal well being is possible. But though the particular requirements to be fulfilled for perfect individual well being, must vary, along with variations in the material

conditions of each society, certain general requirements have to be fulfilled by the individuals of all societies. * * * Perfection of individual life hence implies certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all cases, and which therefore become part of the subject matter of ethics. That it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to scientific definiteness, can scarcely be said. But ethical requirements can here be to such extent affiliated upon physical necessities as to give them a partially scientific character. * * * That it will ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct in conformity with such requirements, may be doubted. But the function of absolute ethics in relation to private conduct will have been discharged, when it has produced the warrant for its requirements as generally expressed (*i. e.*, that the individual should so promote his own pleasure as not to mar the pleasure of others. Reviewer); when it has shown the imperativeness of obedience to them; and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately considering whether the conduct fulfills them as well as may be."

While Spencer gives away reluctantly nearly his whole position here (for of what value is an ethical system which can shed no light on the path of private duty) yet the small portion he retains is retained unjustly, and must be surrendered. An ethical system which boils down into an exhortation to all men to promote their own interests has no ethical quality left in it; for, as we have seen, the mere doing of that which is clearly essential to self-preservation pertains to business and not to morals; since, to have a moral quality, an act must raise the question, Is it right? which mere attention to busi-

ness does not raise, any more than the flight of birds the falling of water, or the explosion of gases. End

We will not dwell upon Spencer's argument, that moral conduct is the more evolved, *i. e.*, that mode of conduct in which there is the greatest differentiation of activity and specialization of function, and that immoral conduct is the less evolved; that moral conduct produces a permanent or moving equilibrium which immoral conduct destroys, etc. For if the ethical philosopher must go to the ethical religionist, or to any source outside the speculations of philosophy and the facts of science, to determine what is moral and what is immoral it matters little what tricks of words may be arrived at by a play upon the cloudy terms homogeneity and heterogeneity, generalization and specialization of function, the deceptive nature of which were sufficiently shown in the previous article.

We confess some surprise that Spencer should have been so far impressed and molded in his thought by the theological atmosphere of modern Christianity as to have assumed throughout the entire latter half of his work that all human action divides itself relatively to its moral qualities, into egoistic and altruistic, or that which benefits self, and that which benefits others. Whether the division of conduct into egoistic and altruistic be attempted to be based on motive or on results, and whether the former be defined as that which benefits or aims to benefit self more than others, and the latter that which benefits or aims to benefit others more than self, they are alike obscure and unavailable terms which can never be made more than fog-banks in philosophic discussion. As to motive, not one action in a hundred has any definable motive of benefit to self exclusively

of others, nor can the ratio of selfish and of altruistic motive be made the subject of comparison.

If a man labors to gather wealth, is it not to enable him to marry a wife, provide for children, enrich his own mind by study or by travel or to fit him to fill a wider sphere in business or a higher place in society? In all these motives altruism runs into egoism and *vice versa* at every turn, like the walks in a labyrinth. The vast mass of our lives is spent in actions neither altruistic nor egoistic, but partaking so equally of both that they cannot be separated. Besides, the terms altruistic and egoistic take in only the affections; they do not recognize animosities, rivalries or hatreds, which are the transverse side of all affections.

A farmer expends great care in sowing a field with corn. What are his motives? So far as he has an intellectual curiosity to see what grade of corn the field will produce his motive is neither altruistic nor egoistic. It is a simple pursuit of truth or knowledge, which is essentially a scientific or philosophic spirit, and involves only a love of knowledge in itself utterly irrespective of whether it injures or benefits self or others. So far as it aims to promote his health, by the labor involved, it is mixed of altruism and egoism, since the good health of each member of society benefits every other member as well as himself. So far as the farmer aims to outstrip his neighbors, by producing a variety or excellence which they have never produced, there is a feeling of emulation or rivalry, or a desire to outdo one's neighbor, which is distinct from mere altruism or egoism, yet is flavored by both, since it is only to the extent that we feel pride in our neighbors as well as ourselves, that we desire to outdo them. So far as the farmer aims to reap

the price for his crop and apply it to the support of his family, altruistic and egoistic aims are indistinguishably blended, as his family are too essential to his own happiness to make anything he does for them altruistic, and he is too essential to them to make his acts selfish. They are not the result of altruism or egoism but of familyism. So far as the farmer, in the exact adaptation of means to ends, practices and enjoys agriculture as an art in like manner as a mechanic enjoys inventing or running a beautiful machine, or as an artist enjoys painting a lovely picture, he is working for his love of art or beauty which is a profound force in all minds. The transverse side of the same passion is the hatred the farmer feels in looking upon insufficient fences, thistles, weeds, untillable fields, and all other signs of agricultural unthrif. Of course we need not argue that the love of art or beauty for its own sake is neither a love of self nor a love of others, but a love of certain abstract principles of harmony, which have no more to do with either self or others than has the arithmetical beauty of the Decimal System, the geometrical beauty of Kepler's Law, the artistic beauty of the Greek Slave, the mythological beauty of *Venus Aphrodite*, or the floral beauty of a tuber rose. The love of beauty is nowhere more passionately manifested than in the philosopher's determination to group and express all the phenomena of the universe under a single law, for the philosophic passion consists in seeing the one in the many, unity of design or of force amidst diversity of manifestation or phenomena. That this passion for beauty or harmony is a distinct force, wholly unlike the love either of self or others, has always been recognized by the poets, in whom it is *par excellence* the divine Flame. One of them says:

“Some souls lose all things but their love of beauty,
And by that love they are redeemable;
For in that beauty they acknowledge good,
And good is God.”

But to return to our prosaic farmer. If his motive be that the field has lain some time in grass and needs a change of crops, this recognizes, in the soil and seeds with which he is working, the same need of change, or love of alternation, which, throughout nature, and in all life, is the most frequently influential and dominant of all the passions.

This is a passion of which the religious philosophers, who have mainly contributed to warp the world into this perpetual harping upon egoism and altruism (because the priests, being mendicants, lived upon the altruism of the people and consequently saw no virtue so evident as that of giving, provided the gift were made to them), have taken no account. They have invented a heaven in which there is no alternation, but in which worship, through prayer and singing, is to continue without intermission for ever, though the human being has never yet been constructed who could endure either worship or singing twenty-four hours at a stretch without becoming demented. The birds vary their songs with work, and as they sing flit from bough to bough; the bees, in their work, pass from flower to flower; the lion, in his meal, roams from fragment to fragment of the dis severed corse, and would die if he could not alternate from eating to slumber and then to hunting and the like until each of his passions has been fed, but especially his passion for change. An active man, whose life is filled out with the various functions pertaining to his business, his family, his study of affairs, his participation in politics or intrigues of various kind-, his social life and

the like, will feel the passion for something new gratified a hundred times a day. This, too, is the scientific, philosophic, investigating passion, which animated the Athenians in their perpetual pursuit of "some new thing." It is not a love of self or of others, but a love of novelty; a passion that requires no other value or charm in anything, in order to afford us the most exquisite satisfaction, than that we should never have known it before. This element of novelty makes a new singer, a new politician, a new idea, a new form of leaf, a new style of hat, bonnet or gown, a new bug or butterfly, a new phase in theology, a new acquaintance having new qualities, a new opera, a new book, a new view of life or a new philosophy, but especially a new mode of action, all intensely enjoyable for the moment, and for the moment only.

Mr. Spencer can never construct a satisfactory theory of morals so long as he confines himself to this essentially Christian and theological jingle on the terms egoism and altruism as comprehending the sum of human motive. It is true he is led into this line of discussion, in the course of what he conceives to be a necessary effort to counteract the prevailing Christian dogma that all virtue consists in the love for others and that the love of self is the essence of sin, or as Swedenborg phrases it, the "substance of the hells." With the average class of Christian minds this kind of reasoning may be necessary. And Mr. Spencer, in his second volume, after having fired off all his theological crackers in front of our temples of joss in this his first volume, may proceed to give us a theory of morals founded on philosophic induction and deduction, which shall at least include a comprehensive analysis of human passion and motive, if it does not shed a full light on the pathway of human duty.

To do so he must get away from the narrow standard which divides action into altruistic and egoistic, which is no more worthy of a philosophic mind than one which would divide faith into faith in ones-self and faith in Jesus, or thought into holy and secular, or creeds into orthodox and heterodox. Such essentially theological conceptions were devised as the necessary implements and furniture of a theological destiny in which a part of the human family were to wail in endless torment and another to rejoice in impossible and unlimited bliss. Philosophy has nothing to do with any such quiddities which go far to impeach the general sanity of mankind.

Both the phrenologists and Fourier have come nearer, than Spencer has done in this volume, to an adequate analysis of the complexity of human passion, without which no theory of morals can be framed. The former localize, in about one thirtieth of the human brain, the function of benevolence, and in another thirtieth the function of self love, or, as they phrase it, self esteem, and then go on to endow man, in addition to these passions, with a love of the other sex, of children, of friends, of home, or family, of praise, of country, of travel, with a passion also for destruction and for construction, for concealment and for caution, for the pleasures of the table and for the accumulation of wealth, for conscientiousness and for firmness, or the exercise of the will power, for the sublime and the ideal, for mystery and for worship, for investigation and for reflection, for wit and music, for form, color, and all physical perception, for comparison, reason and all philosophic generalization.

Fourier's analysis of the passions is more poetic and perhaps not less satisfactory. Both relegate al-
tro-

ism and egoism to their proper tenth rate position as forces in human character. Both bring out with equal force the principle of alternation as the most persistently recurrent thread on which all the other passions as successive beads are strung. Both lead to the conclusion that harmony of character and virtue of life lie in a symmetrical succession of all the passionate enjoyments, including therein the intellectual and religious, as distinguished from an ascetic or stoic denial of any of them. Both alike resolve all the motives under which the mind acts into passions, whether it be a passion for amatory pleasure, or for geometrical demonstration, or for the worship of mysteries. All this breadth and scope of analysis of human passion Spencer ignores. The service rendered by his work to the world consists in a demonstration of the truth, that the extent to which the Christian religion lauds the love of others and condemns self-love is philosophically erroneous. For this he has our thanks. But this is merely a sweeping away of certain rubbish which impedes any sound theory of ethics. We look forward to the second volume, either for something more constructive, or for a more complete admission that the construction upon philosophic bases of any theory of ethics is impossible. In fact, we expect the latter, and this result is implied in our very definition of morals. Regarding moral rules, as we do, as consisting of certain principles of choice impressed upon the weaker elements in society by the stronger and more successful, all of which have their exceptions or antagonistic rules, and none of which are in any sense universal or infallible, and regarding it as of the essence of a moral rule that it shall determine the choice or conduct of the party on whom it is impressed without any

analysis or comprehension on his part of the complexity of reasons for and against a given action, or of the totality of pleasure or of pain which is to ensue from it, it follows that every advance in intelligence and in a complete knowledge of the consequences of human action will tend, while enabling men to live more wisely and happily, to obliterate moral rules of every kind, and hence that the complete triumph of philosophy would consist, not in the establishment, but in the abolishment, of ethics. For since a moral action is an action pursuant to a rule, the reason of which is not apprehended, every step in the progress toward an apprehension of the reasons of the rule must abolish the moral quality in the actions by resolving all actions into two classes; viz., those whose effects can be foreseen to be beneficial to self, or others, or ultimately pleasurable, in which case they become either interested or benevolent actions, neither of which are moral; and those whose effects can be foreseen to be injurious or painful in the aggregate, to commit which would therefore amount to insanity. In other words, were the full consequences of all action understood, no action could be moral, since, if its effects were known to be pleasurable, it would have no more moral quality than the eating of a delicious peach; and if its effects, immediate and ultimate, were known to be painful, it would not be performed by a sane person. Hence, as men advance in the comprehension of the true consequences of human action they cease to act by moral rules, just as skilled accountants, with their increase in their knowledge of numbers, cease to remember or act by the rules of arithmetic; or as skilled farmers have long since forgotten all rules for cultivating their farms.



ERNST HAECKEL.

ERNST HAECKEL.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Ernst Heinrich Haeckel was born in Potsdam, Prussia, Feb. 16, 1834, and is still living. Since 1865 he has filled the chair of Professor of Zoology in the University of Jena, conferring, by his lectures, with those of Gegenbaur, an unrivalled reputation on that University as a school for zoology and comparative anatomy. From the early age of twelve years, as Haeckel tells in the preface to his work on the "*Generelle Morphologie der Organismen*," he began the collection of two herbariums, into one of which, called by him the "official," he put all typical forms which could be accurately labeled as separate and distinct species, and into the other, a secret herbarium, he put all the "bad kinds," or individuals representing transitions from one perfect species to another. Thus almost in his infancy his studies were directed to that great problem of the transmutation or origin of species, his contributions toward the solution of which are more exact, if not more copious, than that of any other naturalist, and are only rivaled by those of Darwin himself.

Haeckel, in his work on the calcareous sponges, demonstrates by close scientific analysis, that every *bona-species*, when followed up to its birth, originates always in a *malu-species*. With the publication of this work the doctrine of Evolution passed from the merely speculative to the demonstrable phase and became scientific. In 1866 he delivered a series of popular lectures on the doctrine of Evolution, and particularly on the views of Kant, Lamarck, Goethe and Darwin, which, under the

title *Naturliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, were widely published and translated. Darwin says of it, in the introduction to his "Descent of Man," "If this work had appeared before my essay had been written, I should probably never have completed it. Almost all the conclusions at which I have arrived I find confirmed by this naturalist, whose knowledge on many points is much fuller than mine."

Haeckel's fundamental postulate is, that in nature there are really no divisions into genera and species whatever; that the ideas suggested by these words indicate only that, to the human apprehension, the differences which result from divergent development are more sharply defined than the connecting links which bridge over these differences. Supply, however, the connecting transitions and links, and immediately the supposed fact of division into genera and species dissolves into an airy myth, and every form of life claims relationship with every other, and with all forms of non-life. What Darwin essayed to establish synthetically, by a multiplicity of suggestions, all looking toward a given law, Haeckel aimed to establish analytically, by showing that all subdivisions into species are empirical and not scientific or natural, and that every good species has its origin in a bad or imperfect one. He is an enthusiastic admirer of his co-laborers, Darwin and Huxley, who in return express their profound gratitude and respect for the advances made toward establishing their theories on a scientific basis, by this leading German naturalist. His works best known in America are his "History of Creation; or, The Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the action of Natural Causes; a popular exposition of the doctrine of evolution in general, and of that of Darwin, Goethe and Lamarck in particular," in 2 vols., Appletons, 1876, and his later work on Evolution, which is reviewed in the following essay. His untranslated German works are numerous, but in the main so technical as to be accessible only to those who make scientific pursuits their profession.

ERNST HAECKEL.

THE "MISSING LINKS" IN THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION ARE EVERYWHERE; NO "SPECIAL CREATIONS" HAVE EVER BEEN OBSERVED, AND NO SPECIES OR GENERA EXIST AS FACTS IN NATURE, BUT ONLY AS ARBITRARY HUMAN CONCEPTIONS; ARISTOTLE, WOLFF, LAMARCK, GOETHE AND DARWIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE, THAT MAN HAS NO OTHER CREATOR THAN THE INHERENT PROPERTIES OF MATTER. FROM UNICELLED PROTOZOA, THE STREAM OF HUMAN LIFE TAKES ITS RISE, BOTH IN THE RACE AND IN EACH INDIVIDUAL, AND THENCE FLOWS THROUGH TWENTY-TWO DISTINCT GRADES OF BEING, UNTIL THAT WHICH BEGINS BY SPONTANEOUS GENERATION IN THE *Monera*, *Amoebae*, AND OTHER FORMS OF GERM LIFE, ENDS IN MAN. THE THEORY OF GERM LAYERS, AND OF PROMOTION BY ADAPTATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT, TRACED AS THE ONLY "GENESIS OF MAN" THAT CAN HARMONIZE WITH SCIENCE.

Until the publication five years ago of the most important scientific and philosophic work of this century, viz., Haeckel's "Evolution of Man," the advocates of the supernatural or teleological theories of the creation of the world and of the genesis of man were vociferously calling for the "missing links" in the Darwinian argument; for the instances of transmutation of species occurring under human observation. A logical set-off to the "call" of the supernaturalists might perhaps have been found in the counter call upon them, by the naturalists, for an instance of the special creation of a species by

divine fiat within the period, and under the range of human observation. For the appearances and disappearances of species, which form so familiar a fact in paleontology, indicate that even upon the theory that all species are created by a divine fiat, still these divine fiats must be successive and numerous. No one fiat could suffice for the creation of all species. Hence, presumptively, special creations of new species ought to have occurred under human observation, or, at least, if new species have arisen during the period of human observation, without which their actual evolution could not have been observed, the call upon the miraculist for the proofs that they were created by divine fiat is as logical as the call upon the evolutionist for proofs that they were evolved by the operation of natural causes. The publication of Haeckel's great work puts an end to these mutual calls for "missing links" by supplying them with a minuteness of scientific accuracy and a vastness of research which effectually relegate all doctrines of special creation, and of teleological or supernatural interventions in the work of creation, to the owl-dens and bat caves where dwell or molder the superstitions of sorcery and witchcraft and the mistakes of the astrologers and alchemists, thither soon to be followed by the sensuous heavens and hells of the mythological and unscientific tramps who have founded the world's various religions. Since the publication in 1871 of Charles Darwin's work "On the Origin of Species," the thinking world have daily grown toward the conclusion that Darwin's method, as against the theological mode of accounting for the universe, was that of science against ne-science, that of learning against impudence, that of observation against imposture. But there was a feeling

in laying down Darwin's works that they were suggestive rather than satisfactory; their method and their caution were scientific, but they must be the forerunners of some clearer light yet to come. In Haeckel's great work, "The Evolution of Man," a flood of scientific demonstration is shed upon the question of man's origin, such as conclusively shows that the next generation of children must be taught, along with the other indisputable conclusions of science, the law of the descent or evolution of man from the lowest perceptible phases of vegetable and animal life, from a consinship not merely with monkeys but with worms and sponges, aye, with the mere flakes of gelatinous sperm that puzzle the naturalist to distinguish their doubtful life from that of the liquid waters in which they float. The work of Haeckel changes the very nomenclature of the discussion. The Darwinian theory is no longer a theory but a discovery. The late theory of special creation, as assumed by "Moses" and retained by Linnæus, Cuvier, Agassiz, is as definitely disproved, exploded and ended, except as a historic landmark or acknowledged myth, as the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. This being true, as we think may be conclusively shown, even in this brief review, it is not without reason that we designate the recent work of Ernst Haeckel on "The Evolution of Man," the English translation of which has just been published by Appletons, the greatest scientific work of the century. Throughout this work Haeckel evinces a bold and manly scientific recognition of the fact that, as its discoveries come to be accepted and digested, Christian and all other teleological theologies are brought to an end. If the creation of man can be accounted for scientifically without the intervention of that conglomeration of mysteries

and humanities known to the mythologies and theologies as a "god" or "creator," the redemption of man is very likely to be intrusted to the same forces and laws as have worked out his creation.

In attempting to condense Haeckel's demonstration of the evolution of man by natural forces, we find ourselves embarrassed at once by the simplicity of the method of evolution in which the demonstration results, and by the remoteness from ordinary currents of unscientific thought of many of the illustrations essential to an intelligent presentation of the method. Among Haeckel's fundamental propositions may be said to be:

1. The evolution of each individual animal or plant in the foetus, the egg, or the seed, from a single cell into an organized living creature, is a condensed repetition of the process whereby the tribe, class, or species to which that animal or plant belongs has been evolved from a primitive tribe, class, or species of one-celled existence into its present complex structure; in short, ontogeny, or the growth of the individual from the uni-celled state, is a condensed repetition of phylogeny, or the development of the existing species from some primitive species of one-celled life.

2. This evolution is attained in systematic accordance with the law of the evolution from the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, as stated by Herbert Spencer; *i. e.*, by an ever increasing differentiation in form and specialization in function, which result from the joint working of the two forces of heredity and adaptation, and which, of course, are accompanied by an integration of matter.

3. In all animals and plants that have sex (for there are some that have not, and Haeckel seems to prove

that sexual reproduction is one of the differentiations to which life attains in a comparatively advanced stage of its evolution) there are three factors present at the beginning of life; viz., (1) The unfertilized egg, or life-cell of the female, which, in some few cases, as *e. g.*, in that of the bees, is capable of reproducing within certain limits. This unfertilized egg, or female egg-cell, is not to be confounded with the large mass of yelk and albumen, or other germ food surrounding it in concentric layers, called in the case of the human egg, the Graafian follicles, which are consumed or organized into its mass, in the process of hatching or of embryo formation. The egg itself, even of the largest animals, is a point barely visible to the naked eye. It consists of a single genuine cell. Haeckel defines a cell as "nucleus and protoplasm, or the inner cell-kernal and the outer cell-slime, but having its own independent life, the power to grow and feed itself by absorbing and assimilating juices from the surrounding fluid and reproducing itself by simple cleavage or division." (Vol. 1, p. 127-31.) (2.) The sperm or male vesicle, which is a living cell of much the same character as the egg-cell, but more active, indeed full of motion. The method of union of the male cell with the female, and whether the identity of the former is merged in that of the latter, is not yet known. (3.) The "cytode," or parent cell, which results from the the union of the two former, and contains all the potentialities of growth by nutrition and according to heredity, and of reproduction. Both these classes of cells are independent lives, or citizens, whose aggregate forms the organism, as citizens form the State, and only differ from lymph cells, brain cells, or blood corpuscles, in the fact that their function has become

specialized to the single work of reproduction. They are represented in nature by the monera, amœbæ and other forms of infusoria and protozoa, which retain for life their distinct identity, instead of performing for some larger organism the function of reproduction.

4. The cytode, or fertilized egg cell, develops into the foetus, first, by cleavage or fission, into a disk or film of cells having a leaf form, and then, by a further cleavage of this leaf form, into four germ layers or leaf forms, each of which curls in and closes upon itself by a more rapid formation of cells on its outer than on its inner edge, as does the leaf in vegetation to form the bud, flower, fruit, etc. The outer of these four layers forms the skin and brain; the second forms the muscular system and bone; the third the heart, vascular system and blood; the fourth the intestinal canal, stomach, liver, etc.

A faint presentment of this theory of evolution appears in Aristotle's "Perizoon Geneseos" on the generation of animals. But from Aristotle to the year 1600 no progress was made in the study of the true genesis of man, the dissection of the body being forbidden as sacrilege by the most holy church. In 1600 to 1657 the anatomists Aquapendente, Spigelius, Needham, Harvey, Swammerdam and Malpighi investigated the development of the embryo in the egg of various mammals and birds, so far as to show that all life proceeds from an egg, or cell, and that a surprising resemblance, amounting in the earlier stages to identity, exists between the mode of development of the three higher classes of vertebrates; viz., mammals, birds and reptiles. "It has long been known," says Haeckel, vol. 1, p. 32, "that the accurate study of the evolution of the embryo of the bird, which is most readily obtained as the subject of

research, is all that is necessary in order to learn the essentially similar mode of evolution of mammals, therefore also of man. Even as early as the middle and the end of the seventeenth century, when human embryos, as well as those of all other mammals, began to be examined in their earlier stages, this most important fact was soon recognized. * * * Conclusions of the highest importance to the theory of evolution may be drawn from the similarity of structure of the embryos of widely differing animals. This similarity is invaluable in practical ontogenetic research, because the ontogeny of birds, which is accurately known, most completely supplements and explains the embryology of mammals, which has been but imperfectly studied. Hen's eggs can be obtained at all times and in any quantity, and by hatching them artificially the evolution of the embryo may be traced step by step. On the other hand it is much more difficult to study the evolution of mammals, because the embryo of these does not develop in a large egg that has been laid, or, in other words, in an independent and isolated body, but in a small egg, which, until maturity, remains inclosed and concealed in the body of the mother."

Haeckel regards the scientific theory of the creation of man, or epigenesis, as having been first correctly stated by Caspar Friedrich Wolff, in a brief essay published in 1759. The same Wolff was the first to show that all the various parts of plants may be traced back to the leaf as their common rudiment, or "fundamental organ." Flower and fruit, with all their parts, consist only of modified leaves. This generalization, which was almost immediately accepted in botany, awaited the demonstrations of Pander (1817) and Baer (1828) before it became

the basis of the "germ-layer" theory in embryology, which Haeckel makes an important element in the evolution of man. "Wolff," says Haeckel, p 44, in his scholarly treatise on the formation of the intestinal canal (1768) "supplied detailed proof of his theory of epigenesis. In its complete condition the intestinal canal of the chick is a very complex long tube to which the lungs, the liver, the salivary and many smaller glands are attached. Wolff showed that there is no trace of this complex tube, with all its various parts, in the embryo chick during the first period of incubation, but that in its place there is a flat, leaf-shaped body, and that the whole embryo body in the earliest period is also of a flat, oblong, leaf-like form. Considering the difficulty of accurately examining conditions so extremely minute and delicate as the first leaf-shaped beginnings of the body of the bird with the indifferent microscopes of the last century, we can not but admire the rare talent for observation possessed by Wolff, who actually proved the most important facts known in this the darkest portion of embryology. From this very difficult investigation he even drew the correct conclusion that the entire embryonic body of all higher animals, as well as of birds, is for a while a flat, thin, leaf-shaped plate, which at first appears simple, but subsequently as if composed of several layers. The lowest of all these layers or leaves is the intestinal canal, the development of which Wolff examined thoroughly from its beginning to its completion. He showed that the leaf-like rudiment first forms a groove, the edges of which curve toward each other, thus growing into a closed tube, and that finally at the ends of this tube the two openings, mouth and anus, arise. Nor did Wolff overlook the fact that the other

organic systems of the body originate in an entirely similiar way from leaf-shaped rudiments, which afterward assume the form of tubes. Like the intestinal canal, the nerve, muscle, and vascular systems, with all the various organs belonging to the last, develop from a simple layer-like or leaf-like rudiment."

Wolff was followed in this field of research by Karl Ernst Baer (1792 to 1834), who, says Haeekel, p. 53, "perfected the fundamental theory of germ-layers, as a whole, as well as in detail, so clearly and completely that his idea of it yet forms the safest basis of our knowledge of ontogeny. He showed that in man and the other mammals, as in the chick—in short, as in all vertebrates—first two, and then four, germ-layers are formed, always in the same manner, and that the modification of these into tubes gives rise to the first fundamental organs of the body. According to Baer, the first rudiment of the body of a vertebrate, as it appears on the globular yolk of the fertilized egg, is an oblong disc, which first separates into two leaves or layers. From the upper or animal layer evolve all the organs which produce the phenomena of animal life; the functions of sensation, of motion, and the covering of the body. From the lower or vegetative layer proceed all the organs which bring about the growth of the body; the vital functions of nutrition, digestion, blood-making, breathing, secretion, reproduction, and the like. Each of these two original germ-layers separates again into two thinner layers, or lamellæ, one lying above the other. First the animal layer separates into two, which Baer calls the skin or dermal layer, and the flesh or muscular layer. From the uppermost of these two lamellæ, the skin-layer, are formed the outer skin, the covering

of the body and the central nervous system, the spinal cord, the brain, and the organs of sensation. From the lower, or flesh-layer, the muscles or fleshy parts, the internal or bony skeleton—in short, the organs of motion—arise. Secondly, the lower or vegetative germ-layer parts in the same way into two lamellæ, which Baer distinguishes as the vascular and the mucous layer. From the outer of the two—the vascular layer—proceed the heart and the blood-vessels, the spleen and the other so-called blood-vessel glands, the kidneys and the sexual glands. Finally, from the lowest and fourth, or mucous layer, arises the inner alimentary membrane of the intestinal canal, with all its appendages—liver, lungs, salivary glands. Baer traced the transformation of these four secondary germ-layers into tube-shaped, fundamental organs, as ingeniously as he had successfully determined their import and their formation in pairs by the segmentation of the two primary germ-layers. He was the first to solve the difficult problem as to the process by which the entirely different body of the vertebrate develops from this flat, leaf-shaped, four-layered original germ. The process was the transformation of the layers into tubes. In accordance with certain laws of growth the flat layers bend and become arched, the edges grow toward each other so that the distance between them is continually decreased; finally, they unite at the point of contact. By this process the flat intestinal layer changes into a hollow intestinal tube, the flat spinal layer becomes a hollow spinal tube, the skin layer becomes a skin tube," etc. Lamarck followed with the doctrine, which seems to have been subscribed to by Goethe, that there is no essential difference between animate and inanimate nature; that what is called law

in the latter is identical in origin and principle with what is called life in the former; that both are determined by natural causes (*causæ efficientes*), without the addition of purposive causes (*causæ finales*); that species can by no possibility result either from one original act of creation, as implied by "Moses," nor by repeated new creations, as implied by Cuvier's doctrine of catastrophes, but only by a natural, uninterrupted and necessary evolution. The most ancient ancestral forms must have been very simple organisms of the lowest grade, and must have originated from inorganic matter by means of spontaneous generation. Adaptation, through practice and habit, to the changing external conditions of life, has ever been the cause of changes in the nature of organic species, and heredity caused the transmission of these modifications to their descendants.

Lamarck, therefore, preceded Darwin in the scientific elucidation of the doctrine of descent, but failed to grasp the chief factor in the achievement of the result; viz., the principle of natural selection in the struggle for existence. For some cause, however, perhaps because the world was not yet ready for them, the researches of Lamarck fell dead, though nearly the same observations and theories, when put forth by Darwin, in 1859, in his work on the origin of species, created the most profound sensation of any scientific work of the century.

At this point Haeckel himself appears upon the stage as a naturalist, and in his "Monograph on the Chalk Sponges" (1872) established the fact that no scientific or definite line of distinction exists between species and variety on the one side, or between species and genus on the other. He showed that, accordingly as the system-

atizer takes the ideas of genus, species and variety "in a wider or narrower sense, he distinguishes in the little group of chalk sponges either only a single genus with 3 species, or 3 genera with 21 species, or 21 genera with 111 species, or 39 genera with 289 species, or, even 113 genera with 591 species. But all these diverse forms are so intimately connected by numerous transitions and intermediate forms that the common descent of all the chalk sponges from a single ancestral form, the olynthus, can be proved with certainty." Haeckel asserts that this work presents conclusive evidence to every naturalist that "in the chalk sponges the various species can be traced step by step through the course of their evolution *in statu nascenti*. But if this is really the case, if, in a single class or family, the derivation of all the species from a common ancestral form can be shown, then the problem of the descent of man has been definitely solved, and we are able to demonstrate the derivation of man also from the lower animals." In short, Haeckel's conclusion is, that if in any one instance diverse species have arisen by the transmutation, through natural law, of one species into another, then the origin of all species may be ascribed to the transmutations arising through natural and "non-purposive" causes.

Having thus outlined the general plan of the evolution of the species in a mode which is epitomized in the evolution of the embryo from the cytode or fertilized cell, Haeckel proceeds to cast about in the realms of zoology and comparative anatomy for the various classes and species in which may be recognized the most perfect verisimilitude to the developing human fœtus from the cell stage to its birth. This search results in a pedigree which begins in the one-celled organism

known as the amœba, and rises through twenty-two distinct transmutations of species, until it culminates in and produces man. It will be gratifying to those who are choice of their ancestry to know that from this line of lineal descent very considerable classes of animals are excluded, and are merely collateral relatives of man through certain common ancestors of both, known as the gastræadæ, or "not to put too fine a point upon it," worms. Thus, we are not descended from the star animals (echinoderma—star-fishes, sea-urchins, sea-lilies, sea-encumbers), nor from the articulated animals (arthropoda—crabs, spiders, centipedes, insects), nor from the soft bodied animals (molluska—lamp-shells, mussels, snails, etc). The busy bee and the toiling ant—as if their own civilization were sufficient unto them—have formed no link in the chain of the evolution of the human race. The human pedigree is reducible to three stages—the protozoa, the worms, and the vertebrates.

Beginning at the lowest stage of the protozoa, viz., the amœba, Hæckel introduces our primeval ancestor, the Adam of science, to us thus p. 141, vol. i.:

“Naturally, the first question arising is, whether there exist at the present day any one-celled organisms, from the form of which we may draw an approximately correct conclusion as to the one-celled ancestors of many-celled organisms. The answer to this is undoubtedly affirmative. There are most certainly one-celled organisms now in existence, the whole organization of which is but that of a permanent egg cell. There are independent one-celled organisms which never undergo any further development, which pass their whole lives as simple cells, and as such reproduce themselves without attaining to any higher development. We now know a great number

of such one-celled organisms; for example, the gregarina, flagellata, acineba, infusoria, etc. But one among them is especially interesting to us because it affords the most complete answer to our question, and must be regarded as the one-celled primary organism which most nearly approaches the type form of the race. This organism is the amœba.

“The name amœbæ has long been applied to a number of microscopic one-celled organisms, which are by no means rare, and are indeed widely distributed, principally in fresh water, but also in the ocean; lately they have been found inhabiting moist earth. When one of these living amœbæ is placed in a drop of water under a microscope and greatly magnified, it appears to be a roundish body of very irregular and varying form. Inclosed in the soft, slimy, half-fluid body, which consists of protoplasm, we can see only a small, solid or vesicular substance which is the nucleus. This unicellular body now begins to move, and crawls about in various directions on the glass on which we are observing it. The shapeless body accomplishes these movements by extending finger-like processes from various points of its surface, which are moved in slow but constant alternations and draw the rest of the body after them.

“If the amœba is touched with a needle, or a drop of acid is added to the water, it draws in its processes and assumes a spherical form. These processes are called false feet, *pseudopodia*, being in no proper sense organs, but only variable, wave-like extensions of the semi-fluid, homogeneous and structureless substance of the body. If finely pulverized coloring matter, such as carmine or indigo, is placed in the water in very small quantities, the soft body of the amœba can be seen to assimilate

these particles of coloring matter, over which the soft substance of the cell flows together. It can take food in this way at any point of the surface of its body, although it possesses no special organs for taking in and digesting nutritive matter, no true mouth or stomach. By means of this assimilation of nutriment and dissolving the particles in its protoplasm it grows. When it begins to exceed its normal size, it propagates itself by division or cleavage, precisely as do the fertilized cells in the ovaria of the larger animals. The inclosed nucleus first separates into two pieces. Then the protoplasm distributes itself between the two new nuclei, and the whole cell parts into similar cells, in consequence of the growth of the protoplasm round the two nuclei. In many lower animals the egg cell remains in its original naked condition until it is fertilized. It acquires no covering, and is indistinguishable from an amœba. Like the latter, these naked egg cells can extend processes and move about. In the sponges these active egg cells creep freely about as though they were independent amœbæ, and when first observed by naturalists were mistaken for such. In the medusæ, or bell-shaped plant animals, the eggs are naked uncovered cells, which stretch out amœboid processes, feed themselves, and, after fertilization, propagate by sub-division. Similar amœboid cells occur as the so-called white blood corpuscles among the red blood cells (corpuscles) in human blood and in that of all other vertebrates, and in many invertebrates, as, for instance, in the blood of the snail. The capacity of these naked cells to move, eat, and reproduce arises from the contractility or automatic movableness of the protoplasm, which seems to be a universal property of all young cells. This is true, not only of uncovered egg cells, but of lymph cells, cells, etc.”

The development of these amœbæ into the next higher form, gastrœadæ, or animals having a primitive intestine, which class includes the primitive worms, soft worms, gliding worms, chorda animal and sea-squirts (ascidiæ) is traced by Haeckel with great minuteness and nicety. The process consists, first, of the multiplication, fission or cleavage of amœbæ cells, which remain together until they form two leaf-like layers, of which the outer or skin layer continues to develop cells more rapidly than the inner or intestinal layer, and thus surrounds and envelops it, forming a tubular body or gastrula.

While the gastrœa are descended from the primitive amœbæ, in the line of descent that ends in man, here several collateral lines branch off, all of which are equally the descendants of the amœba, but not in the line of descent toward man. Among these are the plant animals (zoophytes or cœlenterata), comprehending on the one side sponges, and on the other sea-nettles and corals. These are marked by a predominant radiate or pyramidal form which adapts them to a stationary life, while the worms have a bilateral (right and left side) outline which adapts them to a free forward locomotion, the first point in which animal life clearly differentiates from vegetation. The worm form first differentiates into the bloodless worms (acœlomi), which have no true body cavity, blood-vessels, heart or blood, and the blood worms which develop these rudiments of a vascular system. The latter again differentiate into mere soft worms and chorda animals, or worms having the germ of a spinal column. This germ Haeckel finds in the ascidia appendicularia concerning which he says, vol. ii., p. 88: "If we ask ourselves what conditions of adaptation could possibly have had

so remarkable a result as the development of the notochord, and the modification of a branch of the soft worms into the parent form of the chorda animals, we may with great probability answer, that this result was effected by the habituation of the creeping soft worm to a swimming mode of life. By energetic and continued swimming movements the muscles of the trunk would be greatly developed, and a strong internal point of attachment would be very favorable to this internal activity. A support of this kind might arise by enlargement and concrescence of the germ-layers along the longitudinal axis of the body; and the differentiation of an independent bony chord from this axial chord gave rise to the notochord. In correlation to the formation of this central notochord, the simple nerve ganglia, lying over the throat in the soft worms, lengthened into a long nerve chord reaching from front to rear, above the notochord; in this way the medullary tube (spinal column) originated from the upper throat ganglia." "We must by no means regard the ascidian as the direct parent form of the amphioxus and of the other vertebrates. On the contrary," Haeckel asserts, vol. ii., p. 89, "on the one hand the ascidians, and on the other the vertebrates, have both descended from one unknown worm form which has long been extinct. The nearest relatives of this among existing animals are the ascidian larvæ and appendicularia. This unknown common parent-form must have belonged to the group of chorda animals which we point out as the eighth ancestral stage in the human pedigree." (P. 98.) "The ascidian, the most nearly allied invertebrate form, and the amphioxus, the lowest vertebrate form, constitute the bridge over which invertebrates pass into vertebrates, and both are descended

from a single extinct worm possessing the essential structure of the chorda species." Thus, by eight closely reasoned steps, Haeckel ascends from a stage of protozoic life, which might have arisen by spontaneous generation to the vertebrate animal having a spine, and the rudiments of that nerve system which has its highest expansion, after fourteen additional ascending steps, in the human brain.

The amphioxus, since it fills the gap between the invertebrates and vertebrates, deserves a minute description. Haeckel says, vol. i., p. 253:

"The amphioxus lives buried in sea-sand; it attains a length of five to seven centimetres, and in its adult condition is shaped exactly like a long, lanceolate leaf. It is, therefore, called the lancelet. The narrow body is compressed on both sides, is similarly pointed in front and at the back without any trace of external appendages, without any division of the body into head, neck, breast, abdomen, etc. Its whole form is so simple that its first discoverer declared it to be a naked snail. Not until much later (about forty years ago) was the remarkable little being more closely examined, and it then became evident that it is a true vertebrate." Again, vol. i., p. 98, we learn that both the amphioxus (vertebrate) and the ascidian (invertebrate) develop from the egg or simple parent cell by primordial cleavage. The larvæ of both develop a medullary tube on the dorsal side of the intestinal tube, and between the two a noto chord (spine). In both, the intestinal tube differentiates into an anterior gill intestine, and a posterior stomach intestine. These facts prove their common descent. Still, the amphioxus seems very unlike the developed man or the higher vertebrates. It, vol. ii, p. 99, has no specialized head, no

brain, no skull, no jaws, no limbs; it is without a centralized heart, a developed liver and kidneys, a joint vertebral column; every organ appears in a simpler and more primitive form than in the higher vertebrates and in man. And yet in spite of all of these various deviations from the structure of other vertebrates, the amphioxus is a genuine, unmistakable vertebrate; and if, instead of the developed man, the human embryo at an early period of its ontogeny (unfolding) is compared with the amphioxus we shall find perfect parallelism between the two in all essential points. This parallelism justifies the conclusion that all the skulled animals (craniota) have descended from a common primeval parent form, the structure of which was essentially that of the amphioxus. * * * which forms the ninth stage of the ancestral chain, the first among vertebrate ancestors. From this skullless group was developed the amphioxus on the one side, and on the other the parent form of the skulled animals (craniota).

The first stage of the skulled animals, constituting the tenth stage in the human pedigree, is found in the monorhina, or single-nostril class, whose organization is much higher than that of the skullless, much lower than that of the double nostriled class. They are called round-mouths, having a round, sucking mouth, and some of them a toothed tongue. They embrace lampreys, and hags, which Linnæus included among worms, and are far below the structural stage of a genuine fish. They are without limbs, scales or bony skeleton. The inner skeleton axis is an inarticulate noto chord like that of the amphioxus. In the lamprey alone there is a rudimentary articulation and partly cartilaginous skull inclosing a brain, which is but an insignificant swelling of the spinal cord.

Long prior to the recent researches in human ontogeny it was well known that the human fœtus passed through the several stages of cell, leaf, worm, reptile, fish including gills, quadruped including tail, and that in the earlier stages there was positively not the least perceptible difference between the development of the human fœtus and that of the higher mammals, including especially the ape, dog, or rabbit. A very minute knowledge of comparative and human anatomy is required to follow the intimate and marvelous closeness of detail with which Haeckel summons up from the various genera and species of the animal kingdom the forms, structures, functions and metamorphoses which will establish his leading postulate; viz., that the development of the fœtus in the human womb from the condition of a simple cell to that of a human being, is an exact condensed epitome of the process by which, through the long ages, every form, structure, function and metamorphosis existing in any and every part of the animal kingdom has come into existence by the operation of natural and not purposive laws; ontogeny, or the evolution of the individual furnishing the clue to phylogeny, or the evolution of the race.

By these means the evolution of man as an individual is traced through the skulless animals, and the jawless animals, where our ancestors leave the amphioxus on the one hand and the myxine and petro-myzvon on the other, into the primitive fishes, selachii and dipneusti or mud fishes; and thence to the amphibia, where our ancestors diverged from the reptiles, lizards, snakes, crocodiles, tortoises and birds on the one hand, and from the osseous fishes on the other; thence from the amphibia into the primitive mammals, thence into the pouched

animals (marsupials—kangaroos, etc.), where our ancestors again diverged from the sloths, whales and hoofed animals on the one hand and from the beaked animals, rodents and beasts of prey on the other. Finally, by steps that are as complete as the progress thus far made in scientific observation permits, the argument is carried upward through the semi-apes or lemuroidea, thence to the apes, to the ape-like men, and finally to man. Concerning man's derivation from the ape family, Haeckel regards Huxley's work on the "Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature" as affording the most irresistible argument and the standard authority. Haeckel says, vol. ii, p. 177. "If the skull or the vertebral column, together with the rib system, or the anterior or posterior members, are compared, or if the comparison is extended to the muscular system, the circulatory system, the brain, etc., a candid and unprejudiced examination always results in the same conclusion, that man does not differ more from the higher catarrhines than the extreme forms of the latter (for example, the gorilla and baboon) differ from each other. We can therefore complete the important proposition already quoted from Huxley. We may take whatever system of organs we will, the comparison of their modifications, within the ranks of the catarrhinæ leads to one and the same conclusion; that the anatomical differences which distinguish man from the most highly developed catarrhinæ (the orang, gorilla, chimpanzee) are not so great as those which separate the latter from the lowest catarrhinæ (sea-cat, macaque, baboon). We must therefore consider the proof complete that man is descended from the narrow-nosed apes (catarrhinæ). Although future researches into the comparative anatomy and ontogeny of the existing catarrhines, as well as of

their fossil relatives, promise us various new details, yet no future discovery can ever overthrow that important proposition. Our catarrhine ancestors must, of course, have passed through a long series of varied forms before man finally developed as the most perfect form.

“The following must be considered as the most important advances by which this ‘creation of man,’ his differentiation from the most nearly allied catarrhine apes, was effected. Habituation to upright carriage, and, in connection with this, the greater differentiation of the anterior and posterior limbs; also, the development of articulate speech and its organ, the larynx; and lastly, and especially, the more perfect development of the brain and its function, the soul; sexual selection must have exerted an extraordinarily important influence, as Darwin has conclusively proved in his celebrated work on sexual selection. * * * As the twentieth stage in the human pedigree, next to these tailed apes, we must rank the tailless, man-like apes (anthropoides), under which name the most highly developed catarrhines, those most nearly related to man, have been grouped. They originated in the tailed catarrhines by the loss of the tail, the partial loss of their hairy covering, and the further development of the brain, the latter being indicated in the preponderating development of the brain skull over the facial skull. At the present time but few forms of this remarkable family are in existence; they are distributed into two different groups, an African and Asiatic group.” The African group include the gorilla and the chimpanzee, whose color and features resemble the negro. The Asiatic group include the orang and gibbon, whose color and features resemble the Malays and Mongols. “Neither

of these living anthropoids can be indicated as the ape absolutely most like man. The gorilla approaches nearest to man in the structure of the hand and foot, the chimpanzee in important structural details in the skull, the orang in the development of the brain, and the gibbon in that of the thorax. It is evident that no single one of these existing man-like apes is among the direct ancestors of the human race. They are all the last scattered remnants of an old catarrhine branch, once numerous, from which the human race has developed as a special branch, and in a special direction.

“Although man (*homo*) ranks immediately next to this anthropoid family, from which he doubtless directly originated, yet the ape-men (*pithecanthropoi*) may be inserted here as an important intermediate form between the two, and as the twenty-first stage in our ancestral series. In the ‘Natural History of Creation’ I have applied this name to the speechless primitive men (*alali*) who made their appearance in what is usually called the human form, that is, having the general structure of men (especially in the differentiation of the limbs), but yet being destitute of one of the most important qualities of man; viz., articulate speech, as well as of the higher mental development connected with speech. The higher differentiation of the larynx and of the brain occasioned by the latter first gave rise to the true ‘man.’ Lastly, the genuine, or speaking, human being, must be considered as the twenty-second and final stage in our animal pedigree. Man originated from the preceding stage in consequence of the gradual improvement of inarticulate animal sounds into true human articulate speech. It is probable that primeval man originated during the diluvial epoch, in the torrid zone of the old

world, either on the continent of tropical Asia or Africa, or on an earlier continent, which has now sunk below the surface of the Indian Ocean, and which extended from eastern Africa (Madagascar and Abyssinia) to eastern Asia (the Sunda Islands and India)."

Having thus traced synthetically the evolution of man as an individual, Haeckel concludes his great work by a series of chapters on the evolution of each organ and function separately; viz., on the evolution of the epidermis, nervous system and brain; of the sense organs, the tongue, the nose, the eye and the ear; of the skeleton, the motor organs, the limbs, bones and muscles; of the intestinal canal, the gills, the mouth, the stomach and lungs; of the vascular system, the kidneys, heart, blood and tissues, and finally of the reproductive organs.

Haeckel designates the system of physical philosophy to which the doctrines of evolution lead by the name monism, or oneness, as distinguished from the dualistic system which makes all life phenomena to be the result of two forces, spirit and matter. He contends that there is but one force; viz., matter *as constituted*, or matter acting in accord with certain all-sufficient, but non-purposive, causes, which causes we can no more separate from matter than we can its form, color, weight, density, inertia or any other attribute. Indeed, the tendency of matter to evolve motion, growth, nutrition, reproduction and other phenomena is as inseparably its attribute as its tendency to attract. The system of thought, to which Haeckel's work is the most important contribution, admits no such teleological or supernatural agency in the work of creation as is ordinarily implied in the idea of a personal God. As opposed to such a system it may be deemed either atheistic or pantheistic.

It is useless to speculate on the supposed moral consequences which are to result from the scientific elimination from the universe of the anthropomorphic ideas of a God, a future life, of worship, and of human responsibility to the divine. Certain it is that the advanced claims of the doctrine of evolution now are, that all these supposed facts are mythical dreams, the mere results of human vanity and fears. Certain it is that the scientific method of investigation leads to these conclusions, and that the scientific method has the confidence of a very large and intelligent class of minds, in preference to the dogmatic.

As compared with Herbert Spencer, Haeckel is richer in resources, more realistic and less abstract in his illustrations, walks nearer to nature and observation, and is more convincing. As compared with Darwin, Haeckel is almost as minute and picturesque in the presentation of scientific data in detail, is more comprehensive in the range of the sciences from which he draws, more bold in philosophic statement and generalization, and somewhat more conscious of the presence of certain teleological adversaries whom he is annihilating. But his "Evolution of Man" is a very great and masterful work. It secures to its author the very front rank among naturalists and materialistic philosophers. It will be read with avidity by millions, and its effect upon human thought cannot be predicted—except to say that it will be lasting and profound.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

FOUNDER OF THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND PONTIFF OF THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY; HIS CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES ACCORDING TO THE DEPENDENCE OF THEIR PHENOMENA; HIS DOCTRINE OF HUMAN PROGRESS THROUGH THE THEOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL TO THE POSITIVE OR SCIENTIFIC STATE, AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE LIKE PROGRESS FROM THE MILITARY THROUGH THE DEFENSIVE TO THE INDUSTRIAL STATE; KNOWING OF NO "OBJECTIVE UNITY" OR PERSONAL GOD, HE SEEKS TO ATTRACT MANKIND TO THE WORSHIP OF A "SUBJECTIVE" DEITY, *viz.*, "HUMANITY;" HE WOULD LEAD THEM FROM THE WORSHIP OF AN ANTHROPOMORPHIC TO THAT OF A PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPTION, BUT RETAIN A "CONTEMPLATIVE CLASS;" THE RESULT IS CATHOLICISM MINUS CHRISTIANITY, AND PLUS SCIENCE; COMTE'S VIEWS OF THE STATE, WEALTH, CRIME, WOMAN'S SPHERE. MARRIAGE, ETC.; HIS MARITAL RELATIONS; HIS INSANITY. CLOTILDE DE VAUX, ETC. HIS INFLUENCE ON MODERN THOUGHT. WILL THE WORSHIP OF HUMANITY YET PREVAIL?

Auguste Comte is distinguished, in the scientific world, for his original, logical, and profound analysis of the sciences; and, in the philosophic world, for that brilliant generalization whereby he attributes to every branch of knowledge, *i. e.*, to each conception of phenomena, a theological or fictitious, a metaphysical or abstract, and a scientific or positive stage; which three stages of progress in the theoretic mode of accounting for phenomena

sympathize, respectively: the theological stage with the epoch of military conquest, the metaphysical or critical stage with the epoch of revolution and of armed defense, and the positive stage with the industrial and commercial epoch of the race. He was one of the first among philosophers to assume and justify the ascendency of the passionate, or as he styles it the affectional, nature over the intellect, and therefore, to dignify worship above pure thought. And finally, he is the only atheist, who, while denying the existence of a personal God, and regarding all the gods as figments of the human imagination, or projections of certain elements in human nature into the supposed Infinite, has still sought to establish a religion by substituting, as he conceived, the whole for a part, a philosophic conception for a personal being, and by frankly calling upon mankind to praise and adore that Universal Humanity, which, under the names of Buddha, Hercules, Jupiter, Juno, Thor, Woden, Jehovah, Cæsar, Jesus and Mary, they had heretofore been worshipping by piece-meal.

The influence of Comte over modern thought has been so profound that most of the thinkers who have followed him have been obliged to define wherein, and why, they differed from him. Mill, Spencer and Lewes have done this most elaborately, at the same time exceeding their great indebtedness to him. The most difficult objection made to Comte's claims as a philosopher is, that philosophy had until his period been supposed to consist in a discovery of the unity of law amidst the diversity of phenomena, and by this law was usually meant the self-acting agent that produced the phenomena.

Comte, instead of attempting such a discovery, denied

that it was feasible; he began with man, and his environment the world, as the two data or starting points of philosophy, and asserted that outside of these there could be no Objective Unity, or, what was the same thing, we had no means of discovering its existence; that the search after first causes and ultimate laws was therefore fruitless; that the human mind should confine itself to the relation or interdependence of phenomena upon each other, and he then proceeded to state a doctrine or universal law of the dependence of phenomena, governing all the phenomena of all the sciences. It is upon the validity of this statement, or doctrine, of the laws of the interdependence of the phenomena of nature, resulting in a complete classification of the sciences, that Comte's position as the founder of a new and distinct philosophy rests. Out of this philosophy he claimed to deduce a social polity and a religion, which neither Mill, Spencer nor Lewes regards as having any logical coherency with, or deducibility from, the philosophy. While they follow him in great part in his positive philosophy, they do not follow him in his religion or worship of Humanity, otherwise than to commend it as an ingenious and plausible utopia. They regret that Comte did not put it forward as an utopia merely. But it is certain that Comte was as sincere in his religion as in his philosophy. He lived and died in the confident belief that he had instituted among men a system of religion which would restore unity to faith, as his system of positive philosophy had imparted unity to science. He believed all men would yet unite in the worship of that aggregate Humanity, most of whose units they despise; that they would rarify the idea of universal humanity until all its imperfections were eliminated, and only its worshipful

elements were left, and that this process of distillation would produce a deity whose immensity and diversity would be sufficiently mysterious for worship, while its existence and attributes would be sufficiently demonstrable for science. Other men have set to work at god-making unconsciously, and in a sort of mental craze; and usually the generation that made the gods did not worship them. Comte set about it consciously, because he thought mankind had need of worship, and had heretofore blundered in god-making by taking too small a supply of the raw material, viz., humanity, to make their gods from. He therefore took the whole, presented to the world for its worship that Universal Humanity which Jesus had already called upon it to love, worshiped it himself, and believed that in the near future all men would perform the same duty.

The study of Comte naturally subdivides itself into five heads, viz.:

First. His Doctrine of the Scientific Unity of all Phenomena.

Secondly. His Theory of Animal, Intellectual and Social Progress.

Thirdly. His Plan for the Reconstruction of Society.

Fourthly. His Religion, the Worship of Humanity; and

Fifthly. His Biographic Idiosyncrasies, and the influence they exercised over his Philosophic Views. For, as Emerson truly remarks, before passing a final judgment on the views or arguments of any person concerning any question, we should put the previous question, How came he to be on that side? We shall first present Comte's views, as some of them are of a kind to be in no

manner affected by bias, and then his causes of personal bias as gathered from his life and idiosyncrasies.

1.

The Doctrine of the Scientific Unity and Dependence of Phenomena.

Comte holds that in the study of the sciences there are two methods, the historic, adapted to their infantile period, and the dogmatic, adapted to their perfected or more matured period. The historic method leads you, step by step, through the history of the discoveries, experiments or processes whereby the facts that now constitute the science became known. The dogmatic method takes the whole body of facts now known and presents them to you in their logical relations of interdependent causation, or correspondence, or classification, without going back to the processes by which they become known. Mathematics being a perfected science, the student takes up a compendious modern treatise which gives the existing body of knowledge, and perhaps contains no reference to Archimedes, Apollonius, or even Euclid, through whose speculations and investigations the science was perfected. This is studied dogmatically. Political Economy and the Medical Art, being not yet in a condition to be studied dogmatically, are still subject to the historical method, which requires each supposed principle to be enforced by a citation of the experiments or processes by which it was first conceived, or by which it received its latest and most convincing attestations.

This classification applies, however, only to the methods of inculcating science, not to the sciences themselves.

A true classification of the sciences, Comte holds, must be based on the phenomena or facts of nature, to

be first arrived at by observation, experiment and comparison, and must be such that it will constantly advance from qualities that are the more simple, general and abstract, to those that are more special, particular and concrete; and so that each science, when they are all named in their logical and natural order, will contain the principles and facts essential to a right apprehension of every one of the succeeding sciences, but not any principles or facts essential to a right apprehension of any of the preceding sciences.

We prefer Mr. Lewes admirable statement of this point to any we find in the language of Comte himself. Mr. Lewes says:

“The first luminous conception which enabled Comte to discover this order, was the fundamental distribution of all sciences into Abstract and Concrete. The abstract sciences are those which treat of the elementary laws, or general facts, on which all the particular facts depend; they are called abstract, because in them the mind, fixing itself solely on some elementary fact which it discovers under a great variety of phenomena, or complicated with other elementary facts, abstracts this from all its surroundings, purifies it from its variations and considers it in itself. Thus all bodies whatever present the elementary facts, of Number, Form and Movement. They present other facts besides these, but these can be considered apart, and from them arise Algebra, Geometry and Mechanics. Besides Number, Form and Movement, bodies present facts of Weight, Temperature, Luminousness, etc., which likewise can be considered apart, and Physies is the abstract science of these facts. Further we find bodies present facts of (molecular) combination and decomposition, and

Chemistry results. Finally we find certain bodies presenting facts of growth, reproduction and sensation, and these facts we abstract in Biology." To this list of sciences, which Comte merely classified according to the nature of their phenomena, he added a final science, Sociology, which gathers into a body of abstract principles the natural laws which govern the construction and evolution of society. Lewes continues: "Not only do these groups comprise the whole of the elementary cosmical facts, but implicitly, in these facts, are comprised all the multiple and complex phenomena ranged under the concrete sciences, which treat of objects as actually presented to us under the conditions of time and space. Geology is a concrete science; so is Mineralogy; so is Botany. Each deals with objects, not with abstract relations. Each considers existence as determined by complex conditions. The rock, the mineral or the flower is considered as an object involving more or less of the elementary facts of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Biology; and only through the knowledge of these elementary facts can the objects be known except empirically. Abstract science, then, is the knowledge of the elementary facts or laws of phenomena. Concrete science is the knowledge of objects as the actual combinations of these elements. The one investigates existence, the other individuals." Mr. Mill objects to this classification as not including Logic and Psychology as independent abstract sciences, while Mr. Lewes conclusively shows that, from the positive standpoint, Psychology is a department of Biology, and Logic is the mere formulation of the rules for investigating phenomena. Logic is therefore included in Comte's method of investigation, viz., by observation, comparison, and experiment, as

it is the mere grammar or manual of the rules for conducting observation, comparison and experiment. Spencer objects to Comte's classification, on grounds which both Mill and Lewes regard as not well taken. Says Lewes, "The principle adopted is that which permeates the Positive Philosophy, viz., the principle of dependence. The concrete sciences are separated from the abstract sciences because they exhibit particular cases of the general laws and depend upon them. In like manner the abstract sciences themselves are ranged in a serial order, constituted by their gradations of dependence; one succeeds the other according to the principle of decreasing generality and increasing complexity, that which has phenomena the most general and least complex (Mathematics) standing first, and that which has phenomena the least general and most complex (Sociology) standing last. Between these terms the sciences are so distributed that each serves as a necessary introduction to the comprehension of its successors, and each becomes an instrument of exploration taken up by the mind in traversing the field of philosophic investigation."

Comte held that there would be a general but not exact or minute correspondence between this order and the order in which the sciences will be brought to maturity; but subject to some perturbation and fluctuations in practice.

With these preliminaries Comte informs us that the logical order of the sciences is Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Sociology. The knowledge of no previous science is in any way essential to the most profound knowledge of Mathematics. Mathematics has for its object the indirect measurement of

magnitudes, *i. e.*, the application of magnitudes that are known to those that are unknown in a manner to ascertain the latter. The application of a foot rule to a log is therefore the simplest type of the same class of operations to which the most complex mathematical investigations belong; whether they be measurements of lines, surfaces, volumes, velocities, times, forces, etc., and whether they be measurements that may be made by the juxtaposition of lines with each other, or whether they depend on numerous mathematical principles which have been from time to time deduced by the juxtaposition of lines upon each other by the theoretical mathematicians, and whether they be expressed by geometrical, arithmetical or algebraic figures. The idea of quantity precedes that of number, for every number is a number of quantities.

That Mathematics precedes Astronomy is evident when we consider that Astronomy, until very recently, consisted solely in ascertaining the number, relative location, magnitudes, orbits, velocities, periods of revolution, distances, densities, attractions, perturbations and other mathematical qualities of the heavenly bodies. Recently by the spectroscope there has been, what Comte thought there never could be, a study of the chemical composition of some of the heavenly bodies, thus making Chemistry a means of perfecting our knowledge of Astronomy. This would be an inversion, so far as it goes, of Comte's method, did not the method itself admit casual exceptions. Astronomy, for instance, must have added something to our knowledge of Mathematics, if only by furnishing the mathematicians with most of their most difficult, yet soluble, problems; though this aid merely would not negative Comte's position. And

surely the phenomena of eclipses in Astronomy could hardly have been understood but for our previous knowledge of that branch of physics known as Optics, which teaches the effects of the interreception of light by occult bodies. Still it may positively be affirmed that no mathematical problem owes its solution to either Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Social Physics, and probably no mathematical problem owes its solution to Astronomy, though many doubtless owe their presentation for solution to that science.

After dividing all natural phenomena into two classes, inorganic and organic, a distinction dependent on the presence or absence of life, Comte then divides the inorganic phenomena into Astronomy and Terrestrial Physics, and the latter into Physics properly so called, which treats of all mechanical motions, or motions of bodies as wholes, and Chemistry, which treats of changes in the arrangements of their particles or atoms. He then divides organic phenomena into Physiology, or those which relate to the individual, whether vegetable, animal or man, and Social Physics (more lately called Sociology) or those which relate to the species. This method of grouping, or rather this terminology, is open to the *bizarreism* that it considers vegetable species as members of society, and the questions relating to their appearance and disappearance as problems in Sociology, along with those relating to animals and man.

The principles of Mathematics, Comte holds, underlie all these sciences, as every motion, operation and phenomenon of which they treat involves for its true consideration, in the last analysis, a measurement of relative magnitudes. He says, p. 58, "In a logical view, mathematical science is necessarily and rigorously uni-

versal. There is no inquiry which is not finally reducible to a question of numbers; for there is none which may not be conceived of as consisting in the determination of quantities by each other, according to certain relations. The fact is, we are always endeavoring to arrive at numbers, at fixed quantities, whatever may be our subject however uncertain our methods and however rough our results. Nothing can appear less like a mathematical inquiry than the study of living bodies in a state of disease; yet in studying the cure of disease, we are endeavoring to ascertain the quantities of the different agents which are to modify the organism in order to bring it to its natural state, admitting, as geometers do, for some of these quantities in certain cases, values which are equal to zero, negative or even contradictory. It is not meant that such a method can be actually followed in the case of complicated phenomena, but the logical extension of the science comprehends such instances as this. * * Every phenomenon is as logically capable of being represented by an equation, as a curve or a motion, if only we were always capable (which we are very far from being) of first discovering and then resolving it."

This deduction of Comte's may throw some light on the meaning of such of the Greek philosophers as declared that the essence of all things was numbers. Comte in his learned and critical analysis of the sciences arrives at no one law, like Mr. Spencer's law of the change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, which is sufficiently comprehensive to include all phenomena. He even doubts the existence of any law more general than gravitation. On this ground some have affirmed his work to be that of a critic or dogmatist merely, and not a

philosophy. On this point Mr. Lewes eloquently sustains Comte. He says : " It constrnets a series which makes all the separate sciences organic parts of one science; and it enables the several philosophies to yield a doctrine, which is what no other doctrine has ever been, co-extensive with human knowledge, and homogeneous throughout its whole extent. * * This then is the Positive Philosophy; the extension to *all* investigations of those methods which have been proved successful in the physical sciences—the transformation of Science into Philosophy—the condensation of all knowledge into a homogeneous body of doctrine, capable of supplying a faith and consequently a polity. * * * * The limitations of human knowledge may be irksome to some impatient spirits, and are usually so to those who have not had patience enough to master much of what *is* known; but Philosophy, pretending to no wider sweep than that of human faculty, and contented with the certainties of experience, declares the search after first and final causes to be a profitless pursuit."

II.

Comte's theory, or as he styles it " great fundamental law of human intelligence," is, that " each of our leading conceptions, each branch of our knowledge—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the theological or fictitious; the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive. In the theological stage men suppose all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings, and the perfection of this stage is reached when all these supposed beings are merged into one, *i. e.*, in monotheism. In the metaphysical stage the mind substitutes for personal

beings abstract forces or laws which are part of the entity or nature of matter, and this stage is matured when mankind have substituted one final entity (nature) for the various minor entities at first supposed.

“In the final, the positive, state,” says Comte, “the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general (unreduced) facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science. The ultimate perfection of the positive system would be (if such perfection could be hoped for) to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—such as gravitation for instance.”

To this it has been objected that a great fundamental law must be something capable of perpetual operation. This comment, for such it is, upon the results of human progress merely traces it to a fixed point; viz, a state of despair as to the ultimate causes and final destination of all things, and of content with the study of their classifications and relations; and this point gained, the law is at an end. It has no perpetuity. It is a mere criticism, or observation of phenomena, complete in three stages—a sort of act of dissection which reveals, first, the muscles, then the viscera, then the bones—and nothing more. A law of the human mind must have perpetual youth. It

cannot consist of a mere affirmation, negation and despair.

Whether it be called a criticism, a doctrine or a law, it created a marked impression on the mind of Europe, because it purported to consign to speedy oblivion the class, both of theological and metaphysical ideas, upon which nine-tenths of the minor class of intellectual minds were expending all their force. It created a consternation akin to that of the handwriting on the wall at Belshazzar's feast, for it said to theologians and metaphysicians alike—*Mene, mene, tekél upharsin*. It said to all priesthoods and spiritual ministries, your occupation was necessary for a time, as was slavery; but the time will come when it will be equally necessary to abolish it, or so to modify it that instead of retailing myths, marvels and fables, you shall preach to the people, Science the true Messiah, Knowledge the only Savior, Humanity the Supreme and Absolute God.

The clergy were better prepared for argument than for outlawry. They did not relish being told that to account for things supernaturally was an inseparable attribute of the infantile stage of the human mind, and therein that all theologies, like all fetich-worships, of which they are in fact a part, like all mythologies, like all scandals, and indeed like all dogs, must have their day and perish. They had pretty nearly made man a product of theology. They were startled to find theology a parasite creeping precariously upon the outer skull of man. They had placed God in the center of the intellectual system, and bid all souls derive from it their light. Comte asserted that no light emanated from this so-called God, except by reflection from the larger luminary, Humanity. Why worship the light

which we ourselves impart? Why adore the less in presence of the greater? Hercules, the typical Greek, Jove, the representative Roman; Jehovah, that abstract man of whom the Jew was the concrete; Mercury, Mars, Jesus, Mary, Buddha, and Mahomet were all, to Comte, but parts; Humanity is the great whole, the *Grand Etre*, from which all these anthropomorphic conceptions are derived, as the light of the planets and the moon emanates from the sun. Jesus and Buddha were in advance of their time, in the fact that they taught that Humanity was to be loved, but in teaching that some sort of emanation from the human mind known as a God was to be worshiped, they were not in advance of their time. For love and worship are identical and inseparable, and the teacher who says love humanity but worship God, in effect neutralizes and paralyzes the first teaching by the second; for he tells the soul to fix its lesser and repealable love on Humanity, and its stronger and irrepeatable affection or worship on some figment of priestly craft and ignorance called God, that may be inhuman and diabolic. Calvin loved his God when he burned Servetus. Queen Mary loved her God when she burned Latimer and Ridley. Had Jesus taught them to worship Humanity as well as to love it, he would have left no veiled Mokanna on its dark mysterious throne, in the very heart of his religion, whose priestly oracles would sanction and command the horrors of the Inquisition, the degrading beastliness of the Crusades, the devilish fiendishness of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's day, or the cold and heartless inhumanity with which Christians of all ages have trodden, under the same oppressive and iron heel, the

heterodox, whether their heterodoxy arose in their intellectual creed, or in their moral standards.

The chief object of the metaphysical stage was, that it enabled man to retain the drapery of worship, which it had put on during the theological stage, until it could be worn in its true and final use, the worship of Humanity. And by worship we must always understand Comte to mean, not merely kneeling or incense, though these may accompany it. Comte, being a man of profound intellect, at least in the apprehension of the significance of words, meant by worship, the deliberate exercise of the qualities of mind and heart, which see and feel the worth, value, beauty or excellence of anything. The worship of humanity is eulogy and praise heightened into a pleasure. It is the opposite of slander, and the very condition of love.

Comte expends no words on theories of creation. He nowhere uses his vast array of facts derived from a minute survey of the natural sciences, to set forth a doctrine of cosmogony, or of human destiny. He regards all this field of thought as at least not yet reduced to the realms of science. Yet he enrolls in the calendar of saints in his Positive religion, Bichat, who first taught that life is a product of organization, as flame is of combustion, or as light and sound are products of vibrations; Lamarek, who originated the theory that the human body is evolved, without supernatural intervention, from the minutest and simplest forms of life, capable of being produced by spontaneous generation, and whose theory has of late been enriched with synthetic illustrations by Darwin, and reduced to analytic demonstration by Haeckel; and, finally, Gall, the founder of the still unpopular and imperfect science

of Phrenology. Gall first taught that intellectual, moral and passional action are the products of the relative activity and physical health of the various parts of the cerebral structure, thus making worship the product of a disintegration of tissue in one portion of the brain, while theft is the product of the same process in another. Saint and sinner having the same cerebral mechanism, but with its different parts differently developed, the theological bearing of this physical basis of moral action was, that any division of mankind into saints and sinners, based on cerebral structure, would have cut every man in two, if not in the middle, at least so centrally that it would have been no vindication of the divine justice worth naming, to have sent one fraction to heaven and the other to hell. To this trio Comte awards a degree of honor which was rare in the period in which he lived, and which, as to Lamarek and Gall, is hardly yet beginning to be awarded except by materialistic evolutionists. In his reconstructed year of thirteen months, the thirteenth month is named Bichat, the other twelve being named respectively Moses, Homer, Aristotle, Archimedes, Cæsar, St. Paul, Charlemagne, Dante, Gutemberg, Shakespeare, Descartes, and Frederick II. The 28th day of the month Bichat is dedicated to Gall, and Lamarek, the true founder of Darwinism, though unrecognized by scientists generally, is also hailed in the immaturity of the doctrine of evolution, or of creation without supernaturalism, as a saint.

These facts indicate that the intellectual method in which Comte expected to see the search for creative first causes end, was in such an elaboration of our knowledge of what we call secondary causes as would

render them adequate to account for all those phenomena, including creation, and the originating of life and species, which the human mind, in its theological and metaphysical stages, has attributed to supernatural special creations. He looked to scientific exploration, to the labors of those who would come after Bichat, Lamarek and Gall, for a genesis which would annihilate Moses, obliterate the recollection of Jehovah, and make the scientific history of creation not only as fascinating, but as evident and natural as the unfolding of a century flower; not less beautiful nor fragrant, because it unfolds without supernatural aid. Comte says, p. 515 (Pos.Phil., by Martineau), "Our social evolution is only the final term of a progression, which has continued from the simplest vegetables and most insignificant animals, up through the higher reptiles, to the birds and the mammifers, and still on to the carnivorous animals and monkeys, the organic (nutritive) characteristics retiring, and the animal (passionate) prevailing more and more, till the intellectual and moral tend toward the ascendency which can never be fully obtained, even in the highest state of human perfection that we can conceive of. This comparative estimate affords us the scientific view of human progression, connected, as we see it is, with the whole course of animal advancement, of which it is itself the highest degree. The analysis of our social progress proves indeed, that while the radical dispositions of our nature are necessarily invariable, the highest of them are in a continous state of more rapid development than the lower, by which they rise to be preponderent powers of human existence, though the inversion of the primitive economy can never be absolutely complete."

Still, Comte argues sometimes in favor of, and sometimes against, Lamarck's theory of evolution, contending that while Lamarck had got the better of Cuvier and the orthodox naturalists in some respects, still the theory was deemed fanciful by most naturalists, and therefore must be rejected. At such times, Comte sinks into the mere critic, when a little more courage would have kept him a philosopher; for no philosopher permits a question of scientific, or indeed of any other, truth, to be decided by taking the ayes and noes, either in his influence upon others, or in the secret deliberations of his own mind.

The critics have objected to Comte's law of the three stages, that some of the sciences have never had a theological stage, and very few of them a metaphysical. Alchemy is assumed to be the theological stage of Chemistry, and Astrology the theological stage of Astronomy. But what, it is asked, constituted the metaphysical or critical period in the evolution of either Chemistry or Astronomy. We know of no better solution than to assume that Comte regarded all who attacked Alchemy and Astrology on logical grounds, because of their inherent contradictions and absurdities, without, however, being supplied with the facts constituting the respective positive sciences of Chemistry and Astronomy, as being in the critical or metaphysical period. Comte uses the words critical, metaphysical, transitional, destructive, and revolutionary interchangeably when speaking of the second stage. It covers the labors of that very useful class who tear down falsehoods without regard to whether they yet have the materials for substituting truth.

Sydney Smith's witticism, that there never was a god of weight, is quoted by Dr. Whewell, as proof that there

has never been a theological stage to physical science. But what are the Mosaic account of creation and the similar accounts in the Hindoo and other religions, but the theological stage of the sciences of Astronomy, Geology, Paleontology, Ethnology, and Physiology, and so forth, all in one? Voltaire, Thomas Paine, and Ingersoll, when they attack the Mosaic account of creation are in the critical, or revolutionary, or metaphysical stage, so far as they seek to tear it down because of its contradictions and incoherences. Lamarck, Lyell, Darwin, Herschell, Laplace, Newton, Huxley and Haeckel, so far as they combine to substitute the scientific theory of creation, are in Comte's third stage, the scientific or positive.

Comte's law of the three stages is at least an acute criticism on the mode of evolution of human thought, and as such will be treated with respect by every candid critic. Whatever the progress of science, there will always be an outer domain of phenomena not yet reduced to positive knowledge. So long as there is such a domain of the unknowable there would probably be in the human mind a tendency, first, to ascribe this outer domain to theological causes, then to criticise and attack this ascription on metaphysical grounds, and finally to confine the mind to the observation of phenomena with the view of reducing such domain to the empire of positive science. While Comte's law is thus expanded from a criticism into a perpetually operative force, it is so at the cost of leaving theologies always in existence, and superstitions in power. This again negatives the promise of Comtism, which is the universal supercedure of superstition. Whether it is, therefore, a criticism or a law depends on the evolutions of a history not yet written.

There is a difference among Comte's critics, as to the question of his theism. Ueberweg, in his *History of Philosophy*, asserts that consistently with the logic of the positive philosophy, Comte could be neither a theist nor an atheist. To be either would be to take theological ground. For he that denies that there is a God is, from the positive point of view, a theologian. Gryzanowski, in an able article in the *North American Review*, styles Comte an atheist. As Comte's ideas are well known, the difference seems to be one of mere taste in the use of the word atheism, not of doubt or obscurity in the views of Comte. He thought the world contained no evidence of the existence of a God, for all actual evidence is scientific; it embraced no phenomena which could be explained by it, for all that explains is scientific; had no phenomena for him to produce, for all phenomena must be scientific, and that his assumed existence, if true, would be a case of surplusage, an organization or being without functions, and an anomaly without an object. Whether this type of positivism shall be called atheism is merely one of taste in the use of words. But whether Comte were classed as atheist or theist, he differs from many philosophers, and from all religionists so far as they have occasion to consider adverse religions, in regarding religions of every kind as the necessary aids to the organization of society, and essential to the preparation of mankind for the metaphysical and positive or scientific epochs. What if it were a delusion of the theological period, that the Roman generals could discover whether the gods would favor military movements by watching the flights of birds or dissecting the entrails of beasts; or that basilisks dwelt in cellars, and whomever they looked upon died;

still the theological theory led to dissection, and dissection to science. In the anatomy of birds and beasts lay hidden the story of the evolution of man, and in the myth of the basilisks lay hidden beautiful chapters in Chemistry which treat of carbonic acid gas and the other heavy gases that render mining dangerous; and out of these chapters come the safety lamp and security to miners.

Most scientific progress has grown out of similarly weak and puerile theories. Instead of hating a religionist of any class, therefore, the positivist looks upon his state as merely marking a certain type of advancement toward the scientific. As he would not quarrel with the tadpole because it had accomplished so few of the steps in the chain of ascent toward man, so he would not quarrel with the fetich worshiper because he was not a positivist.

Moreover, the positive philosophy recognizes in each past stage or condition of the human race certain excellences which are liable to be lost or diminished as it develops into science and civilization. The perfect savage is a higher being in certain respects than the perfect scientific man. He has a culture which relates to the chase, to war, to swimming, climbing, leaping, fasting; to an enjoyment of a high average health consistently with extreme simplicity of diet and clothing; to the use of the bow, the lance, and the boomrang; to the senses of smell, sight and touch; to the knowledge of the habits of animals, of fishes and of birds, much of which in civilization is lost. Comte thought the highest or positive civilization would revive and save all that was valuable in past religions and in lower forms of social life. He was quite of the belief that in history the priesthood had corresponded to the contemplative or

thinking class. This can only become true by including in the priesthood the world's great thinkers, historians, scientists, poets, inventors, explorers and scholars, whereas we know of no body of men which contains so few of any of these classes as the technical priesthood. No priest ever wrote a poem, or invented a machine, if we except the Chinese machine for praying, or wrote a history worthy of the name, or made a discovery in Chemistry, or found a continent, or shed new light on any problem of science. While thinking cannot be done without a certain degree of leisure, it is still a variety of hard work, and the best of it is done, not by priests, for they are so taken up with worship that they have no time for work, but by the working classes themselves, whose active and aggressive thinking has compelled the priesthoods to do what little thinking they have done, in self-defense. In saying that the least inventive, original and progressive class of men have always been the priests, we only charge them with fidelity to their calling. They have lived by imposing certain views on the human mind, concerning that of which nobody could, by any possibility, know anything. Every other class of men have lived by handling weapons which could be met, by dealing in substances which could be measured, or in facts, capable of being verified. The priest has no right to be inventive. He is defending the old, not propounding the new. He cannot be original when it is not he, but the Lord, that speaks; nor scientific, when science, sweeping the void with her telescope, clears it of that theological heaven which it is his vocation to promise, leaving only open space and silent stars. Science finds no point of time when a fiat was ever needed from a theological God to make the world what it is. To the

priest therefore, science is atheistical and abhorrent. It traces the myth of hell to the dreams of pagan priests and the hyperboles of pagan poets, and emancipates man from every intellectual imposture the priest is paid for imposing. The service which priesthoods have rendered to mankind has not consisted in doing their thinking, even upon religion, but in supplying the infant man with pap enough to keep him from crying until he has cut his teeth and can eat meat. They have been the wet-nurses of social progress, not its pioneers or generals.

While the name priest has not been a fortunate one for the contemplative class in which Comte sought to repose so much honor and power, yet, when we examine the duties it was to perform, we acknowledge that a priesthood actively performing such duties would deserve all the honor with which society could invest it.

III.

Comte's theory of the reconstruction of society, was to be brought about through the joint ascendancy of the positive philosophy and the positive religion. The social order was to be brought into harmony with human nature, with which it is now assumed to be at discord. To do this, society must be considered as developing by scientific laws, which it is essentially beyond human power to override, or to do more than pre-empt and obey. The greatest social philosopher will be he who points out this trend and drift of society, and the greatest statesman will be he who adapts himself to it and floats with its tide, securing a uniform consensus between the whole which governs and the portion which obeys. The two concurrent ends of social organization are order

and progress. Its means are love, science, action. Science should be based upon observation, experiment and comparison. The law of social progress is irreversible. Anatomically, says Comte, the effect of this law of progress or tendency toward civilization (p. 517) is "to give an influence, by exercise, to the organs of the cerebral system, increasing in proportion to their distance from the vertebral column, and their nearness to the frontal region," or speaking in ethical terms, "its end is to subordinate the satisfaction of the personal instincts to the habitual exercise of the social faculties, subjecting at the same time all our passions to rules imposed by an ever strengthening intelligence, with the view of identifying the individual more and more with the species."

So far as the latter definition is concerned, it is strongly tinged with the Christian doctrine of egoism and altruism, and seems to overlook the fact that the power and tendency to gratify the appetites and passions, and the facility, frequency, regularity and extent to which they are actually gratified, increases with civilization as certainly and definitely as the power and tendency to cultivate our religious and intellectual natures. Nor is there the least ground for thinking that civilization lessens the ratio which selfishness bears to benevolence. It disarms selfishness from its rudeness and brutality, while leaving the passion itself in as full vigor as in savage life, as, indeed it must be for the maintenance of industry and economy, which are essential to promote progress. Above all it multiplies the number of objects upon which affections and tastes which are neither technically egoistic nor altruistic, may be lavished, such as the love of truth, of order, of beauty, of so-

ciety, of harmony, of unity, of the incongruous or mirthful, of art in all its varieties and details, of music, of the infantile, of the weak, helpless or suffering, of power, of duty, etc.

A leading social maxim of Comte bears a close analogy to the fundamental principle discovered by Lamarck and Haeckel in evolution, and may almost be said to be convertible into it. Comte phrases it, "The future is born out of the past, and the microcosm of the individual exhibits to us, in little, the macrocosm of society." Haeckel's correlated statement is, that the individual in his several periods of gestation in the womb, passing through the condition of cell, egg, protozoon, worm, fish, serpent, quadruped, man, epitomizes the history of the evolution of the race. Comte looks forward, and from the man interprets the social destiny of the race. He, however, still remains a critic and not a prophet. He denounces with vigor, and analyzes with acuteness, but his originality as a reconstructor of society ranks far below that of Fourier, though his eccentricity is perhaps no less.

He is fond of reducing the elements of social progress to trilogies and categories. Thus History consists, dynamically, of the past, the present, and the future, and statically, of the family, the city, and society. Man consists, dynamically, of the father, the mother, and the child, which correspond to the past, the present, and the future, and statically of the woman, the man, and the priest, which he says correspond to the domestic, civic, and social life. The French and Catholic element shines through Comte's social views, when he says in speaking of the sexes that "the priest partakes of both and is the concurrence of men's synthesis with woman's

sympathy." The state, or governments now existing, Comte believes to be more pernicious than serviceable, more creative of disorder than of order, and more retrograde than progressive. Physical force, whether in the form of war, the punishment of crime, or the enforcement of law, are relics of the past which might linger but could promote neither progress nor order. Other means of influence implying mutual consent would supersede them. Europe, to achieve the highest progress and order, must divide into about seventy Republics no larger than Belgium, and each Republic would consist of about thirty communes of 1,000 families each. The individual and social order both proceed from our faculties. Feeling, thinking and willing in metaphysics correspond to impulse, counsel and action in social converse, to principle, means and end in practical life, to woman, priest, and man in the family, and to the priesthood, the patriciate, or capitalist, and the proletariat, or working class in the Commune. For the priesthood supplies to society its feeling or loving principle as woman does to the family. Yet in the family, while the woman feels and the man acts, the priest, according to Comte, comes between them and thinks for both of them. Had Comte possessed a trace of humor he would have gravely taught that the human race had three genders and that the priests are of the neuter. However probable it may be that on some other planet this arrangement exists, those who, on this planet, have assumed it have found the assumption delusive.

The priest's thinking and the man's acting should both be ruled by woman's feeling; but woman herself should be excluded from all public, professional and industrial life, except the industries of the home and the politics

of the *salon* and parlor. The heart should rule the intellect; woman as the affective motor should rule man, and the priest, the state, but only persuasively and through man's consciousness of their purity and the fitness of such a rule.

His objection to the admission of women to business and public life was, that it would render them hard-souled instead of tender, and that a universal experience would mar woman's purity. "In a woman without tenderness," says Comte, "there is something even more monstrous than in a man without courage." Marriage was to be exclusive and indissoluble even by death. Although Comte had no faith in the soul surviving the body, he held that each married person should enjoy a "subjective immortality" in the memory of the other. Hence the widow should not marry again, nor, we suppose, the widower.

Act, he said, from affection, and think in order to act. Let your actions be guided by affection and your affections by resignation. Intellects must not be specially trained; all specialization of function is weakening and dangerous. All education whether of woman, the priest, the patriciate, or the workingman, must be of encyclopædic breadth. The woman must have a sufficient smattering of all knowledge to be a source of inspiration in all. The priest, who is to be the philosopher, physician, and artist, is to do the deep thinking in all the sciences and for all classes of minds; and the workingman is to have an equal facility at every craft. For encyclopædic knowledge, working under the influence of universal love, insures perfect action, or as Comte expresses it, order (in which term he implies the knowledge of all scientific, moral, social and æsthetic laws)

acting in the service of love insures progress. Woman, in her three relations of mother, wife, and daughter, should be the subject of strictly private adoration and worship, but in public only Humanity or The Great Being should be worshiped. In the family and in the Commune, all saints and patrons of either sex, who are highly esteemed may be worshiped.

The three central functions of thinking, feeling and acting are represented in Comte's society, by the priesthood, the patriciate, and the proletary class. The patriciate are subdivided into merchants, industrials and agriculturists, a subdivision which takes away the aristocratic meaning from the word patriciate. The bulk of mankind, the proletary class or non-capitalists, must be ruled as to their work by such merchants and bankers as have accumulated the most wealth, for wealth is at once the power to induce labor and to protect the laborer; and as to their creeds and morals, they must be ruled by the priesthood. The temporal power will arise out of wealth, and at the beginning it will be administered by thirty bankers and capitalists specially appointed. After the first set of officers, each one will appoint his own successor. It will use wages, money and employment, as its chief sources of influence and reform. If a man commits crime it is because he has failed in some element of the struggle for subsistence, which the temporal power, instead of strangling or imprisoning him can, consistently with its own profit, furnish to him and thereupon instead of a criminal he becomes an industrial, and the temporal power is enriched by his labors. The Board of Bankers, Merchants and Capitalists who will wield the temporal power will pay salaries to the priests, for the contemplative class should be sustained by the

active class. The priesthood, comprehending the philosophic, artistic and scientific classes, will be to the Board of Temporal Rulers, or to the Administrators of Wealth what the woman is to the man in the family, a sort of official vexation; viz., in a position to scold, reprove, coax and persuade, but not to command. Indeed, wealth itself will not command, it will only induce. Wages are to take the place of force in matters of government, as with the abolition of slavery, they have done in society. If the societary rulers want an individual or a foreign state to do what he or it does not wish to do, they will make it his or its interest to do it by buying up, either with wealth, or place, or power, or other means of happiness, all hostility and winning off all insurrection and disobedience. If the price demanded is too high they will wait. There are to be in the temporal state no parliaments, standing armies, policemen, hangmen, penitentiaries, jails, laws, courts, codes, statutes or judicial decisions. I find it stated by others, but have not yet met with it in Comte's writings, that the priesthood, however, may inflict, in extreme cases, the penalties of confiscation and death. The vesting of this power in the priesthood doubtless went along with an impression in Comte's mind that a priesthood composed of philosophers, scientists, and artists never would inflict it, for in Philosophy, Science and Art there is no recognition of such a fact as crime. All action is, philosophically, superinduced by causes, and admits of no inherent distinction as to its quality that is not derived from its causes, over which the actor has no control.

In the Comtean state the rich were trustees of their wealth and might name their successors. But all wealth being the product of the labor of all, and of the aggre-

gate societary movement, every possessor of wealth was not only bound to render his public services for nothing, but to employ and protect from thirty-five to seventy proletarians or wages workers. Yet Positivism diverges from Fourierism in regarding the distinction between capitalists and the proletariat as healthy, desirable and necessary. It holds the inheritance of wealth and the development of a capitalist class as essential to the highest welfare of society. It rejects as unsound the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, and holds that the "choice of rulers by judges who are obviously incompetent" is mischievous. "Election," says Comte, "was a protest against the tyranny of caste, but it is absurd that inferiors should elect their superiors." It holds also that philosophers, like women, are excluded from actual participation in government; even that class whose generalizations and studies relate specially to politics. But under the positive polity women will influence government through their conversations and *salons*; philosophers will influence government through their discussions in the clubs, where their lectures and dissertations will be heard by the women, the workmen, and the practical politicians, so far as it may be assumed that politicians can exist under the positive polity. Indeed, philosophers would be the organs and spokesmen of the workmen, and the influential power in society, instead of the newspapers, which he thought too superficial to be useful.

Comte looked to the women and the workmen to carry the positive philosophy and religion into effect. Some of the compliments he addressed to both classes are pleasing, delicate, tender, and doubtless sincere, but the result has shown that they were thrown away. Thus

far both the women and the working classes of Europe stick closely to Catholicism, and Positivism is almost unknown to them.

The object of marriage was to be mutual improvement rather than personal enjoyment. It should be indissoluble, except where by crime, separation is constrained. If either of the parties, by ill health, is unfitted to breed healthy offspring, the marriage should be spiritual merely.

It is undeniable that the progress of modern, and indeed of all society, has consisted largely in the substitution of wealth for force, of wages for the lash, of bribery for revolution, of payment in coin for compulsion by the bayonet, of inducement for coercion; so that the point at which force will end, and consent be co-extensive with authority, is one which, however utopian it may seem, we are constantly approaching. In this Comte showed himself a keen and prophetic critic. In projecting a Church of Humanity in which Philosophy, Science and Art should sit in the seats now occupied, in most religions, by superstition, imposition and craft, he made a great stride forward. But in considering his system of Social Reconstruction we have been led necessarily to anticipate much that as properly belongs to his Positive Religion.

IV.

In presenting the views of Comte concerning the worship of the *Grand Être* or Supreme Being, we prefer to quote his own words. He says (general view of positivism p. 353), "The object of positivist worship is not like that of theological believers, an absolute isolated incomprehensible Being, whose existence admits

of no demonstration or comparison with anything real. The evidence of the Being here set forward is spontaneous, and is shrouded in no mystery. Before we can praise, love, and serve Humanity as we ought, we must know something of the laws which govern her existence, an existence more complicated than any other of which we are cognizant."

"And by virtue of this complexity, Humanity possesses the attributes of vitality in a higher degree than any other organization; that is to say, there is at once more intimate harmony of the component elements, and more complete subordination to the external world. Immense as is the magnitude of this organism, measured both in time and space, yet each of its parts carefully examined will show the general consensus of the whole. At the same time it is more dependent than any other upon the conditions of the outer world; in other words, upon the sum of the laws that regulate interior phenomena. Like other vital organisms it submits to mathematical, astronomical, physical, chemical and biological conditions; and in addition to these, is subject to special laws of Sociology, with which lower organisms are not concerned. But as a further result of its higher complexity, it reacts upon the world more powerfully and is in a true sense its chief. Scientifically defined then, it is truly the Supreme Being; the Being, who manifests to the fullest extent all the highest attributes of life. * * * The Great Being whom we worship is not immutable any more than it is absolute. Its nature is relative, and as such is eminently capable of growth. In a word, it is the most vital of all living beings known to us. It extends and becomes more complete by the continuous successions of generations. But

in its progressive changes, as well as in its prominent functions, it is subject to invariable laws, and these laws considered, as we may now consider them, as a whole, form a more sublime object of contemplation than the solemn inaction of the Old Supreme Being, whose existence was passive except when interrupted by acts of arbitrary and unintelligible volition. Thus it is only by positive science that we can appreciate this highest of all destinies to which all the fatalities of individual life are subordinate. * * * Science, poetry, and morality will be devoted to the study, the praise, and the love of Humanity, in order that under their combined influence, our political action may be more unremittingly given to her service.

“With such a mission, science acquires a position of unparalleled importance, as the sole means through which we come to know the nature and conditions of this Great Being, the worship of whom should be the distinctive feature of our whole life. For this all-important knowledge, the study of Sociology would seem to suffice; but Sociology itself depends upon preliminary study, first of the outer world, in which the actions of Humanity take place, and secondly, of man the individual agent.”

Again, he says, “A deeper study of the great Universal Order reveals to us at length the ruling power within it of the true Great Being, whose destiny it is to bring that order continually to perfection by constantly conforming to its laws, and which thus best represent to us that system as a whole. This undeniable Providence, the supreme dispenser of our destinies, becomes in the natural course the common center of our affections, our

thoughts, and our actions. Although this Great Being evidently exceeds the utmost strength of any, even of any collective human force, its necessary constitution and its peculiar function endow it with the truest sympathy toward all its servants. The least amongst us can, and ought constantly to aspire to maintain and ever to improve this Being. This natural object of all our activity, both public and private, determines the true general character of the rest of our existence, whether in feeling or in thought, which must be devoted to love and to know, in order rightly to serve our Providence, by a wise use of all the means which it furnishes to us. Reciprocally, this continued science, whilst strengthening our true unity, renders us at once both happier and better."

There is no obscurity about these definitions. They mean that Comte designs that the individual man should worship the aggregate of mankind, the Human Race, in all its corporate and conglomerate diversity of quality and conditions. It is narrower than Pantheism, in that man is not called by it to worship the universe, the stars, laws that are exterior to man, like gravitation and the like. It is broader, but less eclectic, than Buddhism and Christianity, in that no typical or ideally perfect man is selected for worship; but the aggregated race, including its worst with its best, is to be worshiped. It is true that Comte assumes by his selection of saints, that the wise and good are to have precedence over the degraded, yet the *Grand Etre* must include the latter among its ingredients. Out of this worship was to come the perfect trilogy, love, order, progress. It would subordinate politics to morals, society to philosophy and superstition to science.

The Positive Religion was to be kept running by a numerous hierarchy, consisting of a High Priest, forty-nine cardinals, and the local priests of the various temples, of which there were to be five hundred in France. The High Priest, who, during Comte's life, was Comte himself, appointed his own successor, appointed and deposed all cardinals and priests, and blessed the thirty rulers who were to form the temporal government. Colleges, which were very like monasteries and convents, were to be established, one for each temple. The axis of each temple should pass through Paris, and the principal temple should be surrounded by fourteen chapels, of which thirteen should be dedicated to the thirteen leading saints from whom Comte named the months, and the fourteenth to the holy women, to whom the additional day in leap year was consecrated. Instead of a cross, or other emblems, the positive church was to have a flag, showing on one side on a white ground, the figure of a woman holding her child, which is symbolical of order (or law) sustaining Humanity. On the other side, on a green ground, was the motto, *Amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base, et le Progres pour but.*

Nine sacraments marked the nine necessary epochs of human life. *Presentation* takes the place of baptism, and is the act of the parents in dedicating the new-born child to the worship, love, and service of Humanity. *Initiation*, at fourteen takes him from his mother's hand and places his education under the control of the priesthood of philosophy, art and progress.

Admission, which may come at twenty-one or may be altogether refused if he is unfit, marks his entrance into public life, not as we would say, into the enjoyment of political rights, because, Comte insists, men have no rights,

but only duties. The sacrament of *Destination* sanctions the choice of a career which should be made at about twenty-eight, or afterward, but if the career is changed this sacrament may be repeated. The fifth sacrament is *Marriage*, which among women must occur between twenty-one and twenty-eight years of age, and among men between twenty-eight and thirty-five.

The sacrament of *Maturity* was performed at forty-two, and marks the period, beyond which the faults we commit, either against ourselves or others, become almost wholly irreparable. *Retirement*, at sixty-three, was the sacrament at which the citizen laid down his wealth, his offices, his duties and his cares, and named his successor to all these trusts. The eighth sacrament, *Transformation*, is a substitute for the Catholic *viaticum* and appears to have been a kind of solemn preparation for the final parting, in which society united with the family, in regrets and tears, errors were atoned for by acknowledgment and forgiveness, and the hope was indicated, in proper cases, of the bestowment of the final sacrament of all, which could not occur until seven years after death. This, the ninth sacrament, was called *Incorporation*. It admitted the deceased into the only paradise which the Positive Religion recognized; viz., the subjective paradise, or that species of immortality which consisted in living on in the loving memory of one's friends. This corresponds as nearly to beatification or canonization in the Catholic Church, as is possible, after excluding an objective immortality.

The devotions and prayers of the Positive Religion are either public, in the family or in private. Public worship, prayer and praise should be addressed either to Humanity, or to its image. Communal and family

worship might be addressed to all canonized and incorporated saints, and to all great living benefactors, including the High Priest and his guardian angel (who in the case of Comte was Madame Clotilde de Vaux), or to the memory of deceased loved ones, including mother or father, wife or husband, sister or brother. There should be also a private worship, by the son, of his mother; by the husband, of his wife, and by the father, of his daughter. Whether the object worshiped is to be present during the worship and what exactly is the mode of worship is not clear, nor does it appear that this form of worship is to be reciprocal, or that it extends to brother and sister. But the three forms of woman worship Comte taught were more important than public worship. They supply every man who has a mother, wife, and daughter with three guardian angels to whom, whether living or dead, he can daily address his prayers.

Although Comte's married life for seventeen years was a very uncomfortable one he never seems to see in woman the diversified actual, but always the unified ideal. It is recorded of Comte that after the death of his own guardian angel, Clotilde de Vaux, he visited her grave regularly every Wednesday, and offered to her memory daily a species of ecstatic meditation which might be called praise, worship, or prayer. It is stated, also, that these seasons of prayer greatly cheered and brightened his life. This view sufficiently summarizes Comte's ideal religion. It was a religion without a mystery, unless it be a mystery that a philosopher should desire a religion of any kind. It had no objective Deity, no objective immortality, no heaven beyond the grave, no hell, no sacrifice for sin, no recognition of sin except as immaturity in develop-

ment, no system of punishment or of escape from punishment for sin, no Savior, no pearly-gates or golden streets or harps, no angels save on earth, no heterodoxy, and no worship save as we praise the worth of those we know. The right apprehension of the genesis of Comte's religion will be aided by the study of his life.

V.

Isidore Auguste Marie Francois Xavier Comte, was born at Montpellier, in France, on the 10th day of January, 1798. His parents were Catholics and Royalists, his father being Treasurer of Taxes for the department of Herault, and necessarily strongly in sympathy with monarchy and religion. Comte was both precocious in study and rebellious against discipline, though highly reverent of intellectual superiority wherever he could discern signs of it among his teachers. Beginning the study of Mathematics at twelve, he had attained, at the age of sixteen, one year before by law he was admissible to the Ecole Polytechnique, a first place at that institution, taking the place of his professor, and giving courses of mathematical instruction to some who had been his comrades and teachers.

At the age of fourteen he had become a republican in politics and an atheist in theology, and was occupied with the writings of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. Hardly had his eminent talents become known at the Polytechnique when he was expelled for signing a protest against the alleged ill-manners of one of the professors toward the younger students. Returning home, he soon tired of the narrow field presented to him in a provincial town, and after pursuing his studies there for a short time with great

avidity he set out, against the remonstrances of his parents, for Paris. Here he earned a scanty living by teaching Mathematics.

In 1816 he seems to have formed some acquaintance with our American sage, who was then one of the lions of Parisian society. He writes of Franklin, "I seek to imitate the modern Socrates, not in talents, but in way of living. You know that at five and twenty he formed the design of becoming perfectly wise and that he fulfilled his design. I have dared to undertake the same thing though I am not yet twenty."

In 1818 he became acquainted with the then celebrated Henry, Count of St. Simon, who was then gaining a temporary but sensational notoriety as a socialist, the founder of a "new Christianity," a Savior of the poor, etc. For six years Comte was intimate with St. Simon, and, though they parted on bitter terms, Comte's biographers unite in the belief that the apostolic element, in Comte's mission, *i. e.*, the impulse to found a new religion as well as philosophy, was to a great extent matured in his mind while he was under the influence of St. Simon, who, though superficial and unscientific, was of noble birth, possessed of personal magnetism and some means, and some thirty years more of worldly experience than had Comte. At the age of twenty-four, Comte published, by the aid of St. Simon, a "Plan of the works necessary for the re-organization of society," and two years after "Philosophic Considerations upon the Sciences and the Sages."

These two works, or essays, embody essentially, the entire philosophy and religion, of which all of Comte's subsequent volumes are but the elaboration and repetition. Lewes sums up their points thus, (1) "that all

phenomena, even those of politics, are subject to invariable laws; (2) that the human mind passes from initial theological conceptions to final positive conceptions through the transition of metaphysical conceptions; (3) that human activity in like manner passes through three phases, from the conquering military regime to the pacific industrial regime, through the transitional state of a defensive military regime; (4) that everywhere and at all times, the state of opinions and manners determines the institutions, and that the nature of the general belief determines a corresponding political regime; (5) that philosophy (or general beliefs), in passing from the theological to the positive stage, must bring about the substitution of the industrial for the military regime; and finally that the spiritual re-organization, which is the necessary condition of all social re-organization, must repose upon the authority of demonstration, it must be based upon science, with a priesthood properly constituted out of the regenerated scientific classes. In other words, the spiritual authority must issue from a philosophy which can be demonstrated, not from a philosophy which is imagined."

In the next year, at the age of twenty-seven, he married Caroline Massin, bookseller, then not yet twenty-four. With her he lived seventeen years, in poverty, in great unhappiness, in continual uncongeniality and quarrelling, until they finally separated by her act. It seems probable that she was thrifty, mercantile, serviceable and prudent and used her best efforts, as she thought, to turn Comte's acknowledged talents and increasing fame to some profitable account; but after years of faithful, though unsympathetic toil, she found she could make nothing of him, but that he would be a seedy and

dependent philosopher, insisting peremptorily and peevishly on the obligation of the "Active Class," to support him, as being the High Priest of the Contemplative Class. She therefore gave him up in despair. From a wife's standpoint she was right, for as a husband Comte was more than a failure; he was, during a great part of their married life, a nuisance. He refused at the outset to be married by any ceremony that should recognize Christianity, and they were married only before a civic magistrate. At their marriage he had but one pupil who soon left for want of companions. Madame Comte spent her little store of money in fitting up lodgings which they were soon obliged to abandon for meaner ones. Comte then began to sustain himself precariously by writing occasional articles on philosophy for the reviews.

In the midst of this pecuniary straightness he had so far matured his philosophy as to announce a course of seventy-two lectures, at his private rooms. Still his fame had so gone abroad that Humboldt, Carnot, De Blainville, Poincot, Montebello and others of the most eminent men of thought in Europe were among his auditors. It is probable that he had entered upon this undertaking with too small a proportion of his matter reduced to form, for at the end of three or four lectures he was plunged into a very acute and dangerous insanity. For weeks previously his malignity, as the irritability due to his disease seemed to his wife, had alarmed her, but she courageously set about taking care of him, as a good woman should, instead of running away from the danger, to friends who could make her personally comfortable. Her husband having fled in his insanity from Paris, wrote one letter to her,

dated at St. Denis. Thither she hastened but could not find him. An acquaintance with his tastes and habits enabled her to trace him to Montmorency where she found him in as pitiable a condition as the "possessed" ever get into. Almost immediately he proposed a walk. On approaching the lake d'Enghien he was seized with the phantasy that, like Jesus, he could walk upon the water without drowning, and tried to drag his wife with him. She was buxom and vigorous, and in spite of his maniac strength, seized him, caught hold of a tree and saved both of their lives. With the assistance of some *gens d'armes*, for the peasantry were too superstitious to assist her, she got him removed to the asylum. His father and mother desired to have him removed to Montpellier, but his wife would not part with the care of him even to them. Their theory of his insanity was, that it was the judgment of God against him for being married without the religious ceremony. And even in this monstrous superstition there was a shade of truth. For the same intense cerebral activity, the same brilliancy and power of thought which compelled him at fourteen to throw all theologies overboard as false, had induced him at twenty-seven to decline the religious ceremony of marriage, and at twenty-eight, to attempt to reconstruct philosophy, society and religion in seventy-two lectures. Had he been a dullard he might have taken orders as a clergyman and at twenty-eight have risen to a bishopric. Thus the old Jehovistic deity of Dullness had his revenge on Comte for thinking too fast and too much, very much as Joss would have had if Comte had lived in China, or Baal if he had dwelt in Babylon. Comte had, like every practical man, to learn that a certain degree of respect must be paid to conser-

vative stupidity in this world if we would succeed even in intellectual matters. A traveler in China, though alone, is safe if he will but burn a few fire crackers in front of the Temples of Joss. So a philosopher, surrounded by Christians, must bow politely as often as either their Deity or their devil is mentioned, if he would not incur the personal and social penalties of failing to adapt himself to his environment. In deference to his parents, the marriage ceremony was performed while Comte was in a low stage of mental aberration, and too weak to oppose an offensive resistance. The maniac is said to have responded to the priest's exhortations with contemptuous denunciations of him and his proceedings, but signed his name to the marriage contract as Auguste Comte Brutus Bonaparte. The Jewish God and the Catholic tax collector were both appeased, and what was more important, Comte was soon after withdrawn from the irritations of an asylum, and permitted to recover. His convalescence at first plunged him into a state of profound melancholy, for he thought his intellectual strength had been finally shattered and that he must give up all further thought of carrying out the great work to which he had dedicated his life.

Luckily at this period, he escaped long enough from his wife's watchcare to slip out, hurry down to the Seine, and throw himself into the river. A soldier rescued him but not until the shock and chill of his bath had acted in a timely manner on his circulation, and from this period he rapidly returned to health. After eighteen months of illness, he was fully restored. A year later he wrote a review of his friend Broussais' work on insanity, which is deemed complete evidence of his own restoration to health. At thirty, he recommenced the

lectures whose delivery had been interrupted by disease, and was listened to, in the first instance, by a few dozen persons, but ultimately by the entire world. Thus the name of Comte is added to the long list of illustrious workers who at some time in their lives have suffered from cerebral disease. Lucretius, Mahomet, Loyola, Peter the Great, Haller, Newton, Tasso, Swift, Cowper, Donizetti, Swedenborg, and probably Fourier and even Napoleon. It would be folly to regard Newton's *Principia* as dimmed by his intellectual eclipse. But it is our right to apprehend correctly the pathology of genius. If some of the best of intellectual work is done by men of imperfect or uncertain intellectual health, let that singular fact be noted with the rest. If it be an incident of sociological science, that in its infancy, not a few sociologists should be insane, then may we know how infantile its condition is, by the fact that in our present stage, our High Priests bear a strong resemblance, at least in the state of their health, to the prophets and seers of most religions.

The twelve years from 1830 to 1842 formed the great epoch in Comte's life. He remained poor, but he became great. His course of positive philosophy swept over Europe and America like a revolution. In these years he read nothing upon philosophy, science, literature or the news of the day, but relied wholly upon the treasures he had accumulated in his youth. He avoided reading as something that would mar his productivity.

During his early years of teaching and lecturing, he is described as a short, stout, smooth-shaven, almost nobby gentleman in a neat black suit, with faultless white neckcloth, who went through his lectures with frigid punctuality, indulged in no human familiarities with students

or others, but was absorbed, sensitive, proud and reserved, on the whole, crabbed and unsocial, yet with an under-vein of tenderness.

In the year 1845, three years after Madame Comte had separated from him, and when he had arrived at the mature age of forty seven, Comte became acquainted with Madame Clotilde de Vaux, the lady whom he ever afterward very frankly spoke of, among all his acquaintances and friends, as standing toward himself in the relation of a Platonic or spiritual wife, guardian angel and personal divinity. He was undivorced from his own wife, and was therefore legally restrained from marriage. Madame de Vaux was undivorced from her husband, who had for some reason been condemned to imprisonment for life. She also was legally restrained, though probably morally free. She seems to have been attractive and accomplished, though the special idolatry paid her by Comte was hardly more comprehensible to others than the like reverence felt by Stuart Mill to a wife in whom others saw an intelligent, sensible woman, but by no means a "George Sand" or "George Eliot."

Comte's pure and imaginative passion for Madame de Vaux imparted to his theological and social system that tender and worshipful spirit toward woman which so largely pervades it. At the end of a year's acquaintance she died. The remarkable feature in this phase of his life is, that when seventeen years of his career had been embittered by the ties of an unhappy marriage, and only one year blest by the intense and passionate affection which he entertained for a woman without marriage, he should have revered the marriage tie instead of sexual congeniality, as the source of happiness; that he should have grasped the theological shadow and missed the

essential fact, even after every experience of life taught him the contrary.

In 1857 Comte died of cancer. He left an imperishable fame. It is no disparagement to others to say that his impress upon philosophic and scientific thought exceeds that of any other mind of this century. Mr. Lewes very justly assigns to him this precedence in the following encomium: "This Philosophy will undergo many and important modifications. The whole tendency of Molecular Physics as now cultivated, is one which must finally introduce such modifications. Mr. Spencer may impress on its details important changes, but he will nevertheless no more disturb the integrity of the Positive Philosophy than Schwann by his cell-theory, or DuBois-Raymond by his discovery of the molecular currents, disturbed the integrity of Biology. Comte was the first to create that philosophy, as Pichat created Biology; successors may gradually displace many of the provisional ideas out of which these creations were formed, but the method and the general structure will remain unalterable.

"Mr. Spencer is unequivocally a positive philosopher, however he may repudiate being considered a disciple of Comte. His object is that of the Positive Philosophy—namely, the organization into a harmonious doctrine of all the highest generalities of science, by the application of the positive method, and the complete displacement of theology and metaphysics. The peculiar character he impresses on it by his thorough working out in detail of the law of evolution gives a special value to his system; but the Positive Philosophy will absorb all his discoveries, as it will absorb all future discoveries made on its method and in its spirit, rejecting certain *a priori* and

teleological tendencies which he sometimes manifests, and disregarding his failures as it disregards the failures of Comte and every other seeker."

The complete work on Positive Philosophy is in six volumes, of which the first three contain an exposition of the philosophies of the five sciences of Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry and Biology. The learning displayed in these volumes is not always satisfactory to the specialists in the various sciences treated. Nor is Comte able to weave his diversity of facts into so brilliant a web of connected argument as Spencer is able to do by virtue of his law of the change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Two of the volumes are devoted to the elaboration of his theory of Human Progress, as illustrated by the history of the most advanced races of men. These form the most successful and vigorous parts of the work, and are more eternal, be ause less liable than the scientific chapters to suffer by the progress of exploration and discovery. All critics regard them as one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect.

The Positive Polity, in two volumes, contains an exposition of that reconstruction of society, gradually being produced by the substitution of scientific and industrial, for theological and military methods. Besides these, are "The Positivist Catechism, a Summary Exposition of the Universal Religion in twelve dialogues, between a woman and a Priest of Humanity," and "The Subjective Synthesis." Miss Martineau condenses the six volumes of the Positive Philosophy into two, but without preserving that profundity of illustration and of argument which have given so great a fame to the original, though her English is pure, and

the work was highly acceptable in a literary sense to Comte himself. Congreve and other admirers have translated his other writings.

Comte's religious system has been best defined as Catholicism minus Christianity and plus Science. There is great force as well as admirable wit in this definition. If the Catholic Church organization could be divested of its Christianity and retain its priesthood, if this priesthood could be instantaneously transformed from mendicant monks, nuns, and priests, to salaried Tyndals, Huxleys, Darwins, Spencers, Haeckels, Lyells, Davy's, Faradays, and the like, in a word into active scientists, artists, and philosophers; if at the head of this intellectual hierarchy there could be a High Priest of Scientific Philosophy and pontiff of demonstrable worship such as Comte himself would have made; if the homage of all mankind instead of being wasted upon a vacuum, could be concentrated on the highest and most worthy elements the human race has ever exhibited, thereby withdrawing it from the popes, priests, and generals who represent only the reign of superstition and force; if wealth could be converted from a monopoly into a trust, and government be changed from a club into a course of instruction, and prisons be superseded by employment, and beggars be furnished with capitalist protectors and guides; if sermons could become expositions of scientific truth, and women could in the *salons* and receptions, impart to society its highest inspiration and most intellectual pleasure; if the reign of force could thus gradually but rapidly pass away before a reign of knowledge and reason, then all for which Comte labored would have come.

Comte was, like Fourier, prophetic in the main, but

inaccurate in the details by which the substance of his prophecies would be realized. The Protestant pulpit is advancing toward the kind of teaching Comte desired, far more rapidly than the Catholic, and a new pulpit, the lecture rostrum, is striding toward Comtism more magnificently than either. A press, differing widely from the press which Comte despised, is even more powerful than the rostrum, the bar, or the senate, and is rising steadily in dignity and utility.

Phrase it as we may, Humanity is becoming more and more the real object of worship, and scientists and philosophers are each day more and more the priesthood of Humanity. The pulpit moves with the advance of science, though always at a timid distance rearward. Orthodox preachers talk Geology with a freedom that crucifies Moses daily, and the leading pulpits are filled by men who are themselves worshiped for their genius instead of attracting the worship of their hearers toward the remarkable Jew in whose name they preach. The drapery is the drapery of Jesus, but the voice is that of Beecher, Talmage, Spurgeon, Chapin, Swing, and Thomas. Whether Jesus or they are the worshiped, it is still the worship of Humanity. Whether it is called Christism or Comtism, it is superstition that is waning and science that is advancing. Whether they are called philosophers or priests, the control of human thought is passing—nay is past to those who “reason but from what they know.”

JUNIUS.

A SEQUEL TO THE CRITIQUE ON THOMAS PAINE.

THE ENIGMA OF TWO CENTURIES; THE TESTIMONY POINTING TO SIR PHILIP FRANCIS, LORD CHATHAM, LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE, AND OTHERS, AS THE AUTHORS OF THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS; SOME CURIOUS CLUES CONNECTED WITH A "SAILOR" WHO WROTE SECRETLY FOR LORD CHATHAM; AND A CERTAIN MARITIME "CAPTAIN" PAYNE WHOSE AMERICAN FRIENDS, MIDDLETON AND "FRETLEY," WERE THE MESSENGERS OF THE JUNIUS LETTERS, AND WHOSE WIFE WAS NAMED "OLIVIA," AS WAS ALSO THE WIFE OF THOMAS PAINE, EX-PRIVATEER AND SAILOR.

The shadow came! a tall, thin, gray-haired figure
 That looked as it had been a shade on earth;
 Quick in its motions, with an air of vigor;
 But naught to mark its breeding or its birth.
 Now it waxed little, then again grew bigger,
 With now an air of gloom or savage mirth;
 But as you gazed upon its features, they
 Changed every minute—to *what* none can say.

—Byron.

Kings, lords and commons are but the sport of his fury.

—Burke.

As early as 1848 upward of thirty volumes and pamphlets had been published to establish the authorship of "Junius," and a number have since been added. After a somewhat careful examination of most of these volumes and the more elaborate essays, we find ourselves

more dissatisfied with the lack of judicial candor than even with the lack of conclusive evidence which distinguishes the investigation thus far of this remarkable enigma. Not one of these works is written in a judicial spirit, but all of them with the evident partiality of an advocate, and several of them exhibit ostentatiously the bias, whether of relationship, special admiration or affection, which induced the author to fling down the glove in behalf of his favorite. In no case does an impartial sifting of the arguments for and against each of the other candidates precede or introduce the advocacy of those of the favorite.

The assumption that Junius was Mr., afterward Sir, Philip Francis, though not announced until half a century after "Junius" appeared, has taken the lead of all others in the extent of its acceptance, and should be founded upon the strongest evidence of any. The facts which bear in favor of Mr. Francis' claims are: (1) an alleged resemblance between his handwriting and the hand in which Junius' letters were written; (2) an apparently minute coincidence between the periods when the letters were written and those of Mr. Francis' presence in London, also between the intervals in which no letters appeared and those in which he was out of town or on the continent, and between the final cessation of the letters and Mr. Francis' departure for India; (3) the fact that Mr. Francis, as first an amanuensis of Lord Chatham and afterward a clerk in the war department, had access to the means of information which so abundantly mark the letters, was also a party to the admiration for Lords Chatham and Holland which characterizes the letters, and shared in so many of the sentiments expressed by the letters, that those in which he did not share may

rationally be ascribed to an intent to conceal his identity; (4) the fact that certain letters of Junius contain extracts from speeches made by Lord Chatham, verbatim in the form in which Mr. Francis reported those same speeches, and containing, therefore, the reporter's earmarks of Mr. Francis' work; it being assumed that Francis' report had not been published or copied at the time the letters in question were written in such manner as to place Francis' report in possession of any other person than himself, who could have written "Junius?" (5) the fact that the king declared that "the author of 'Junius' was known and would write no more," at or shortly after the time when Francis was appointed a member of the Calcutta board or council for the government of India; (6) the fact that Francis, when charged with the authorship of "Junius," denied it, evasively, by informing the author of a work advocating his claims to the authorship that "whether" said author "will assist in giving currency to a silly, malignant falsehood, is a question for your" (his) "own discretion;" To Francis "it was a matter of perfect indifference;" (7) the fact that Francis assumed an air of mystery, even toward his wife, concerning his alleged authorship of "Junius," neither affirming nor denying it; (8) the fact that on his return from India he was received and had an audience with the king and Lord North, though not in favor elsewhere, it being assumed that there was some mysterious association in their minds not known to the public; to-wit, Francis' authorship of "Junius," which caused the king and Lord North to notice him thus favorably, and that the fact that Francis was the steady opponent in India of Warren Hastings, who was then being brought under impeachment, does not sufficiently

account for the "audience" and degree of courtesy or recognition then extended to Francis; (9) finally there are a few very small and slight evidences of resemblances in literary style, of spelling, grammar and handwriting, between Francis and Junius, offset by many unlikenesses and by fundamental differences of tone, aim and character which bespeak two individuals quite unlike. The indorsement which was given to the work of John Taylor, published in 1815-'18, entitled "The identity of Junius with a distinguished living character established," advocating the claims of Sir Philip Francis, by the review of that work in *The Edinburgh Review* (1878) by Lord Brougham; the alleged conviction in favor of Francis produced in the mind of Mr. Hallam, and the decided opinion expressed in favor of Francis' claims by Lord Macaulay in his essay on Warren Hastings, all combine to make Francis' position formidable. Sir Philip's widow has written a letter in advocacy of his claims, which is inserted in Lord Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors," vol. vi, p. 344. Her letter indicates that Sir Philip was willing, and indeed desirous, that without asserting himself to be Junius, his wife and immediate friends should so regard him. It is difficult to explain why he should continue to a period subsequent to "Junius Identified" (1818) to conceal from his wife a fact which, according to that work, was known to the king, Lord North and Lord Grenville in 1772, forty-six years earlier, and constituted their reasons for promoting Francis from a clerkship in the war office at £400 a year to the position of one of the Sovereigns of India at £10,000 a year. According to Lady Francis, Sir Philip's first present to her after their marriage was a copy of "Junius," and his posthumous present to his

son was a copy of "Junius Identified," sealed up and directed to her. It is also difficult to conceive that a man reputed to be upright and conscientious in a marked degree could have gone through two such acts of dumb-show, one to deceive his wife at his marriage, and the other to mislead his son after his death.

As late as May, 1873, the discussion of the authorship of "Junius" was revived by a letter from Thurlow Weed, in *The Galaxy*, in response to a previous article in *The Independent* by J. Grant Wilson, in which Mr. Wilson had affirmed that Mr. Weed had recently obtained access to infallible sources of information that Sir Philip Francis was the man. Mr. Weed receded from the statement that his sources of information were infallible, and even added that were Francis put on trial for libeling the Duke of Grafton, through the letters of Junius, a jury would be obliged to find, both that the libel was the most excoriating in history, and that Francis was "not proven" to have been its author. Mr. Merivale, "a gentleman of high literary reputation," into whose hands all the manuscript materials for identifying Francis with "Junius" were placed on the death of a Mr. Parkes, who had devoted his life to the completion of the argument in favor of Francis, which was begun by Taylor, "represents the manuscripts referred to as disconnected and incomplete, and of less service to him than was supposed by Mr. Parkes." The only item of "evidence" Mr. Weed remembers was that among the papers which Mr. Parkes received from the family of Sir Philip was a proof-sheet of a Junius letter, in which a certain paragraph was marked "out" and a proposed change in matter, form and punctuation, in Sir Philip's own handwriting, was written on the margin.

But the letter was published by Junius as originally written, thus indicating that the change proposed by Francis was either abandoned by himself or was not adopted by Junius. Such a relic is, of course, consistent with the theory that Sir Philip had access to the literary circle in which, or to the individual with whom, the letters of Junius originated, and that his suggestions in aid thereof, without being presumptuous, would still not be decisive.

The difficulties in the way of regarding Francis as the author of "Junius" are moral and intellectual, while the evidences that he was of the circle in which "Junius" originated, and may even have had some hand in transcribing or writing the letters, are purely physical. It is not that Francis' abilities and character are not sufficiently considerable, for both must have been in some respects superior to those of Junius, but neither is of the right kind or quality. Especially was Francis utterly lacking in that philosophic pretense and profound contemptuousness toward all the world, and especially toward ranks and dignities, which are the first characteristics of Junius.

Mr. Francis was, from his extreme youth, a successful place-hunter, and therefore was a respecter of dignities and of persons in power. He was a polite, graceful, adroit, cool, deliberate, patient courtier, just the kind of a creature for whom Junius professes greatest contempt. Francis could never have acquired or felt that spirit of contempt for those above him, and democratic sympathy for those who are out of power, which constitutes one of the main clews to Junius' radical and revolutionary spirit. Imagine Junius, the mighty "boar of the forest," as Burke styled him, before whom king, lords, and

commons alike trembled, accounting for his appointment in India, as Sir Philip did in a speech in the House of Commons, by saying that he "had been bred up in the secretary of state's office, where he had the happiness to possess the favor of the late Earl of Egremont, then secretary of state. * * * He had therefore obtained a seat in the council at Calcutta, not through any private interest or intrigue, but he was taken up upon recommendation, and that the recommendation of persons of high rank, those who best knew his character and qualifications, and who certainly would not have so far disgraced themselves as to have recommended an improper person, knowing him to be such," etc. It is impossible to conceive, without converting Junius into the prince of hypocrites, that, having won his own way up by the arts of a courtier alone, as Francis did, he could speak of them in the person of Lord Hillsborough, and in numerous other cases, with the contempt of which the following is a sample: "That you are a civil, polite person, is true. Few men understand the little morals better, or observe the great ones less, than your lordship. You can bow and smile in an honest man's face while you pick his pocket. These are the virtues of a court in which your education has not been neglected. In any other school you might have learned that simplicity and integrity are worth them all. Sir Jeffrey Amherst was fighting the battles of his country, while you, my lord, the darling child of prudence and urbanity, were practicing the generous arts of a courtier, and securing an honorable interest in the antechamber of a favorite." Moreover, Burke, in describing Francis and his career in India, says: "The book of his life is open before you. Has a single blot been found? Is there one page which has not been

traced by virtue and by wisdom? Virtue, sir, not of the cold and neutral quality, which is contented to avoid reproach by shrinking from action and is the best ally of vice—but virtue fervent, full of ardor, of energy, of effect. Wisdom, sir, not the mere flash of genius and of talents, but wisdom informed, deliberate, profound. * * * His heart is warm, his judgment is cool, and the latter of these features none will deny, except those who have not examined, or wish to disbelieve it.”

Junius' excellences were not wisdom, but vituperation, not coolness of judgment, but its opposite, bitterness of invective; not skill in administration, which requires a good deal of adroit charity toward shortcomings, but the kind of malicious magnifying power which discovers failure where others see success, ignorance where there is reputed wisdom, and mean and sordid vices where the ordinary judgment of mankind has discovered only exalted virtue. In short, neither the caliber, the aims, the motives, the virtues or the vices of Sir Philip Francis are interchangeable with those of Junius. Sir Philip is prudent and diplomatic. Junius hates prudence and diplomacy. Sir Philip is successful as a place-hunter, and so insensitive to moral obliquity that he zealously seeks to have it believed that he is the author of letters which attack Lord Egremont, Welbore Ellis, Lord Barrington, Calcraft, Chatham and every other of the persons through whom Francis obtained a promotion, which, were he Junius, would be blackmail levied to stop slander. Junius was an expert rhetorician, of deep philosophic insight, though unjudicial, one-sided and unfair. Francis was a “hard and meager” writer, without imagination, beauty, grace, variety, or even fluency, without philosophy or rhetoric, but discreet,

fair and judicially prudent and truthful. Junius, in his closing letter of Jan. 19, 1773, gives as reasons for not writing again: "*I meant the cause and the public*: both are given up. I feel for the honor of this country when I see that there are not ten men in it who will unite and stand together upon any one question. But it is all alike vile and contemptible." This is the language of a disappointed revolutionist who has sought to stir the people of England to some grand endeavor and failed, and he frankly confesses his failure. It is in the same spirit as Thomas Paine's disgusted statement in his letter concerning the conduct of Washington and Monroe toward him in France. "Everything was of a piece—everything was mean!" Could a mind meager and superficial enough to regard the post in the Calcutta board as the highest thing worth striving for, be also so profound as to feign disappointment in the moment of success, and to pretend that nothing but a revolution of all England could satisfy its high ambition?

Junius was no hypocrite; and these few words satisfy us that, while, as a man for the time, he was very likely of far inferior talents to Francis, as a man for all time he was somebody infinitely his superior. To conclude that Francis was Junius is to seriously stultify both characters. It is to make Francis an ingrate, while no writer is so fierce and furious as Junius in denouncing ingratitude. And, in fact, it does not appear that Francis was ungrateful to his friends, or that his affecting to regard the theory that Junius was himself, as a silly and malignant falsehood, was anything less than the just indignation an ordinary gentleman would feel on being charged with libeling, personally, each and all of his political patrons. It is to destroy Junius' moral integ-

rity, without which we cannot read his severity of denunciation with respect or even with toleration. It is to lower him from a possibly impracticable, but certainly a sincere political theorist, endowed with all the integrity of the day of judgment, and wielding the thunders of the divine Jove, into a mere politician who was libeling his betters in order to win a bribe, and who, having got it in the form of a front seat in the dress-circle of the abuses he had been denouncing, he was forever after silenced! No, not silenced; for Francis was always combating and denouncing somebody—but without displaying any of Junius' talents. While a bribe to silence might take away the right to speak at all, we cannot conceive how it can convert one, who keeps on speaking and writing, from a genius into a mediocre, or from a man who is always severe and never judicial into one who is always judicial and never severe.

The theory that Lord Chatham was Junius, though sustained by not a few points in common, is completely demolished by the discovery that Junius was the author of the letters of Poplicola and Anti Sejanus, Jr. In those letters Junius declares that Chatham in accepting his title "betrayed his friends, his country, and, in every honorable sense, himself," and "ought to have had the Tarpeian rock or a gibbet for his reward," and that he "deserved nothing but detestation and contempt." We have carefully perused William Dowe's work entitled "Junius, the Mask of Lord Chatham," and while it successfully deals with the claims of Francis, it presents nothing which is consistent with the denunciations of Chatham contained in the letters of Poplicola and Anti Sejanus Jr., which Woodfall publishes among the miscellaneous letters of Junius. Dowe, page 129, calls

attention to the fact that Francis had said in 1791 that "Lord Chatham's was a name he could never recollect without admiration and reverence. To suppose that such a youngster (as Francis) should, as Poplicola, Anti Sejanus and so forth, call that venerable man (Chatham) a blackhearted villain who should be hanged on a gibbet, is ridiculously absurd." But, alas! is the absurdity removed by supposing that Lord Chatham, who also was no hypocrite, applied these epithets to himself! Imagination, if allowed to take the lead of judgment, might permit us to conceive of the great Chatham as soiling his own senatorial dignity so far as to criticise anonymously his own public conduct. But what critic in his senses can conceive of Chatham as writing of himself thus:

"It was then his (Lord Bute's) good fortune to corrupt one man (Chatham), from whom we least of all expected so base an apostasy. Who, indeed, could have suspected that it should ever consist with the spirit or understanding of that person to accept of a share of power under a pernicious court minion whom he himself had affected to detest or despise as much as he knew he was detested and despised by the whole nation. I will not censure him for the avarice of a pension nor the melancholy ambition of a title. These were objects which he, perhaps, looked up to, though the rest of the world thought them far beneath his acceptance. But to become the stalking-horse of a stallion; to shake hands with a Scotchman at the hazard of catching all his infamy; to fight under his auspices against the constitution, and to receive the word from him prerogative and a thistle (by the once respected name of Pitt!), it is even below contempt. But it seems that this unhappy country had long

enough been distracted by their divisions, and in the last instance was to be oppressed by their union. May that union, honorable as it is, subsist forever! May they continue to smell at one thistle, and not be separated, even in death!"

There was then living in England an intense and powerful rhetorician, thirty years of age, who is ordinarily supposed never to have discovered that he possessed the faculty of writing until he reached the advanced age of thirty-eight. To this writer accusations of treachery and hypocrisy against prominent men were almost inseparable from his habits of thinking. They grew there as naturally as stramonium from a dunghill, and, to a candid and impartial mind, while they seemed to draw their bloom and verdure from the pure light of heaven, their odor certainly partook of that of the soil beneath them. Thirty years after, that writer, alluding to Washington, said: "Errors or caprices of the temper can be pardoned or forgotten, but a cold and deliberate crime of the heart, such as Mr. Washington is capable of acting, is not to be washed away." Of Minister Morris, Paine also writes: "His prating, insignificant pomposity rendered him at once offensive, suspected and ridiculous, and his total neglect of all business had so disgusted the Americans that they proposed drawing up a protest against him. He carried this neglect to such an extreme that it was necessary to inform him of it; and I asked him one day if he did not feel ashamed to take the money of his country, and do nothing for it. But Morris is so fond of profit and voluptuousness that he cares nothing about character." The letter concludes by denouncing Washington as "treacherous in private friendship and a hypocrite in public life; the world will be puzzled

to decide whether you are an apostate or an impostor—whether you have abandoned good principles or whether you ever had any.” The faculty for expressing vigorous malice in proud and sensitive rhetoric—which Francis lacked—was evidently possessed by one writer in England, whose name was then wholly unknown. Was this writer, then, intimate with Chatham, and with Francis his amanuensis, protégé and reporter? Alas! Paine was at this period only an ex-sailor just returned from several years’ privateering to the West Indies and—the Lord knows where. Singularly enough, however, Dowe, on the authority of Lady Hester Stanhope’s memoirs, says that “Lord Chatham employed many spies and secret writers, and talks of one who, in the dress of a sailor, gave him much information on American and West Indian events.” It would be interesting to know whether this spy and secret writer, who, in the dress of a sailor, gave Chatham much information on American and West Indian events, was the ex-privateersman, Thomas Paine, whose principles and talents were so much more competent to commend him to Lord Chatham than those of any other “sailor” living, and would be so much more likely to bring the two together. Or, is it supposable that Thomas Paine spent several years privateering on the Atlantic, in the neighborhood of the West Indies and America, and learned nothing which it would be of interest to Chatham to know? If Paine were the sailor and secret writer referred to by Lady Stanhope, his faculty in turning from the warmest encomiums to the bitterest denunciation of Washington may serve to explain how he could, as Poplicola, first (1767) bitterly denounce and afterward, as Junius (1769), warmly praise Lord Chatham. It is somewhat singular

that to no other person except Thomas Paine would the shrewd prediction made by *The British Quarterly* in 1851 (December) apply, viz: "That these compositions, over a period of five years from first to last, should have been the only effort of the alert and energetic intellect which produced them, is most unlikely. When Junius is really discovered, we shall probably see him disappearing like a storm-cloud, from one point of the political horizon to burst with thunder and lightning in another." If Paine were Junius, his successive "burstings forth" were felt alternately in three nations, and in the domains of literature, politics and theology; his was the animating spirit of two successful revolutions, as well as of the failure to revolutionize England.

But the personal traces which connect Paine with Junius being extremely faint, we will now turn to the two aspirants to the honors of Junius, in whose behalf alone there are personal traces of connection with that marvelous shadow. These seem to be Lord George Sackville and Rev. Dr. Wilmot. Neither of them could have been the author of "Junius," for Sackville was a chagrined and disappointed nobleman, all attempts to liken whose style to Junius' are palpably ridiculous; while Junius was too radically a democrat, and a hater of all men in authority, ever to have been a nobleman and cabinet minister. Sackville could never have written concerning his own class: "I should be glad to mortify those contemptible creatures who call themselves noblemen." (Junius' private letter to Wilkes, Sept. 7, 1877.) Nor would we look to him for Junius' doctrines of the original equality of all men, their natural equality, their equality of rights, etc. Noblemen do not harp on these strings. Nor could he, being so well

known, have referred to a conspicuous West-end coffee-house as a place where Woodfall might safely leave any replies intended for Junius, as it would be a place "where it is absolutely impossible I should be known." On the contrary, Sackville could not enter such a coffee-house without being well known. Nor would Sackville, who had graduated at Trinity college, Dublin, "where he had a high reputation for his literary attainments," have written of himself as "a plain, unlettered man," unfamiliar with latin. Sackville introduced latin copiously into his speeches; Junius never into his letters. As in the case of Francis, so in that of Sackville, the very terms in which their abilities are praised by their admirers do not fit Junius. Sackville is described by Bissett as an "acute reasoner and a respectable speaker, distinguished for closeness of argument, precision and neatness of language;" he "acted with the nicest feelings, the strictest honor, the most unimpeachable integrity," was "negligent in his style, which was that of a gentleman and man of the world, unstudied, and frequently careless, even in his official dispatches." None of these characteristics apply to Junius. We would as soon think of speaking of the "precision and neatness" of lightning as of Junius. Nor was there any honor or integrity, but only the vindictive pretense of honor, covering actual malice, in many of his diatribes. Yet Sackville had many of the animosities which inspired Junius, particularly the hatred toward the Duke of Grafton and toward Lord Mansfield, who had failed, as his counsel, on his military trial. He had also that very considerable familiarity with war matters which Junius displays, having been an active commander of the British forces in Germany, whence he was dismissed, after trial by court-

martial, for disobedience of the orders of Prince Ferdinand. There are also letters of Junius which indicate that its author assumed to be a "gentleman" in the technical sense, and to be above compensation for his writings as well as above the possibility of even a political bribe. The fact that Lord Sackville, late in life, sought the forgiveness of Lord Mansfield under circumstances of dramatic solemnity which seemed to imply more than the public knew, seems to indicate that Sackville might have had a hand in inspiring "Junius," though he would have been unequal to the rhetorical effort of writing it. Junius' habit of speaking of his "long experience of the world," "long habit," and particularly his remark that "in figure" he would not be a fit partner for Miss Wilkes in "the minnet," all are more appropriate if regarded as inspired by Lord George Sackville at the age of fifty-six than by Sir Philip Francis at the age of thirty-one. Sackville is also one of the few claimants of the honors of Junius, who could have been present, as Junius says he was, at the burning of Busebaum, Snarez, Molena and a score of other Jesuitical books in Paris at the hands of the common hangman in 1714. It is not claimed that Sir Philip Francis could then have been in Paris.

Sackville was the party chiefly suspected by Woodfall and other contemporaries of writing "Junius," no suggestion of Francis in this connection appearing until forty-six years later. "Sir William Draper," says Mr. Butler, "first divided his suspicions of the authorship of "Junius" between Burke and Lord George Sackville, but on Burke's unequivocal denial of it, he transferred them wholly to his lordship." Sir William Draper, being one of the disputants in the arena with Junius,

would have felt a strong interest in finding out the author, and would have had many materials, now lost, for forming a correct judgement. To Sackville, also, applies the solitary description of the mysterious figure of him, whom Junius styles the "gentleman who does the conveyancing part of our business;" viz., the transmission of Junius' letters to Woodfall. Mr. Jackson once saw a tall gentleman, dressed in a light coat, with bag and sword, throw into the office door, opening in Ivy lane, a letter of Junius', which he picked up and immediately followed the bearer of it into St. Paul's churchyard, where he got a hackney coach and drove off. It is not probable that Mr. Philip Francis, as a clerk in the war office at £400 a year, not then knighted, would have been spoken of in the technical English sense as a "gentleman," nor that he then wore a sword.

In approaching the "conveyancing part of the business," we feel bound to say that just here the mystery deepens. All attempts to trace a resemblance between the handwriting of Junius and that of Sir Philip Francis or John Horne Tooke, or any other of the reputed authors, are total failures. The hand bears no resemblance even to Sackville's, though less unlike his than any other which has been brought into the comparison.

At this point we come upon a singular coincidence, which, while not free from contradiction, seems to raise a hope that more definite proof of the identity of Junius than has heretofore been revealed may yet be made public. In Coventry's book on Sackville, as the author of Junius, we find mentioned as among the circle of his immediate friends a Mr. or Sir Robert Wilmot. In Mrs. Olivia Wilmot Serres' work, advocating the claims of her uncle, Rev. Dr. David Wilmot, to the authorship

of "Junius," we learn that the Robert Wilmot above referred to and Dr. Wilmot were brothers, and that both were very intimate with Lord Shelburne and Lord George Sackville, who were equally intimate with each other. Mrs. Serres, when an infant fourteen years of age, took, without leave from her uncle's library, in order to scribble in its blank pages, a manuscript book containing certain entries. Her uncle, afterward, and before his death, ordered all his manuscripts destroyed, in order to conceal some important secret. This was done, but the book abstracted by the niece remained in her possession. Among those entries were found three erased but still legible entries, in the handwriting of Dr. Wilmot, which, removing the erasures, read as follows:

J—us 5th letter sent to C. F. L—d * * * answered March 17.

Mem. 6th letter of Ju—s completed * * * taken to L—d S—ne.

I have this day completed my last letter of Ju—s, and sent the same to L—d S—ne.

March 17, '67.

J. W.

On taking the book containing these entries to Mr. Woodfall, he informed her that the paper on which they were written was of the same manufacture, and contained the same watermarks as that on which the original manuscript letters of Junius were written, and also that Woodfall believed the letters were written by a clergyman. These facts caused Miss Wilmot to write in advocacy of her uncle's claims as Junius. The marked dissimilarity in mind between Miss Wilmot's good and pious uncle and Junius needs no argument to any one who reads her book. In the course of this book Miss Wilmot, however, says:

"In the year 1769 Dr. Wilmot frequently resided at

the house of his brother-in-law, Capt. Payne (*sic*), with whom a gentleman of the name of Fretland was on terms of intimacy. The doctor was consequently much in his company, and in a short time they became exceedingly friendly to each other. Mr. Fretland was a native of America, and had concerns in the West Indies, from whence he frequently sent to his friend, Dr. Wilmot, various productions of that climate." Dr. Wilmot, she goes on to state, also had a servant in his employ named Middleton. These two remarkable names, Middleton and Fretland, she naturally thinks are identical with the "Mr. William Middleton" and the "Mr. John Fretley," in whose care Junius writes to Woodfall that letters intended for Junius and left at the bar of the New Exchange coffee-house should be directed. This is a singular coincidence, and the only identification that exists in the Junian literature of these two remarkable names, Middleton and Fretley. But just here the coincidences begin to multiply. It is only during Wilmot's stay at the house of this Capt. Payne, whose wife is spoken of indifferently by the names of Olivia and Olive, that he is a Londoner, or is brought into contact with Fretland, who, after all, is Capt. Payne's friend, and not the doctor's. Capt. Payne is spoken of as "a native of Virginia," and as having by this wife several children. Due allowance may be made for the fact that Mrs. Serres writes, in 1813, relative to the condition of matters in 1768 to 1773, concerning which she personally knew nothing, as the facts themselves are forty years old, and date far previous to her recollection. Now who was Capt. Payne? For it will be remembered that Thomas Paine's second wife was named Olive; that Thomas Paine seems to have spent several years at sea

as a privateersman, and was subsequently known to his associates as Commodore or Captain; indeed, in one of the meager current lives of Paine the fact leaks out that he was familiarly styled among his friends "commodore," in honor of his maritime career, whatever it was; and while Capt. Payne is spoken of (forty years afterward) as possessed of some sugar plantations in the West Indies, as well as property in America, Thomas Paine appears to have been not only an exciseman, but a grocer, sugar dealer, and tobacco manufacturer, and an importer and smuggler of West India goods, for he was twice dismissed from the excise for smuggling. The meagerness of the biographies of Paine at this period is such as to indicate that the earlier of them were compiled by men, hostile to his reputation, and strangers to him personally, and who wrote long after the facts. The gaps are more important than the facts. The filling up of those might materially change the whole current of the biography. Some of the sketches wholly omit to mention that he was ever a preacher; none of them state what his denomination or creed was while preaching. Others omit all allusion to his grocery and tobacco manufacturing, or his smuggling operations, and leave the impression that he worked as a staymaker and an exciseman only, down to the period of his introduction to Franklin. One biographer is so ignorant as to assume that Payne's "staymaking" referred to ladies' stays, and not ship-stays. None of the narratives state how long he was at sea, or where his voyages took him, or whether he acquired any property through them, or how he came to know Dr. Franklin. It is doubtless true that Thomas Paine's personal experiences, unaided by others, would never have produced the letters of "Junius." But it is equally certain that Thomas Paine's

rhetorical powers, united to Lord George Sackville's spleens, hatreds, chagrins, and knowledge of court and state secrets, would be ample to produce the letters. If the Capt. Payne referred to by the author of "Dr. Wilmot the Author of Junius," could be identified with Thomas Paine, then several important links would be supplied; viz., the names Middleton and Fretley, in whose care letters from Woodfall to Junius were sent, are discovered to be those of servants in the household of a master of rhetorical invective, not inferior to, but intensely resembling, Junius. This rhetorician is also proved to have been a smuggler, and that, too, of a very successful type, for though twice dismissed from the service for smuggling, he was never prosecuted nor punished for it. Certainly it requires the qualities of a first-class smuggler to conceal the authorship of "Junius." The occupation and probable dress of Thomas Paine as a sailor goes far to identify him with the "sailor" who, according to Lady Stanhope, was Lord Chatham's "secret writer" and chief informant upon American and West Indian affairs. It is true that Mrs. Serres, the author of the work in which these hints (for they are no more) appear, represents Capt. Payne as having by his wife Olive several children, while current biography represents Thomas Paine—*mirabile dictu!*—as never having cohabited with his wife Olivia at all. Such a story coming in a very doubtful biography, for the same work which charges him with impotency toward his own wife, charges him with seducing Mrs. Bonneville, and being the sire of her youngest child! only reinforces the otherwise sufficiently obvious need of revising and amplifying the existing so-called lives of Thomas Paine, since a correct knowledge of Thomas

Paine's life in England may be found to contain the materials which would prove most useful in a further investigation into the authorship of "Junius."

Four reasonable objections occur to the theory that Paine was Junius; viz., that Paine's early education was not adequate to the creation of so fine a rhetorician as Junius; that Paine's means of knowing the state and court secrets were inadequate to the demands of Junius; that Paine's subsequent writings are inferior, even in invective and philosophic style, to Junius; and that Paine's other occupations would have forbidden the leisure essential to the composition of Junius. The first objection, we think, is not well taken, as Paine had a grammar-school education, which was all that Junius professes to have or exhibits any evidence of having. Junius could not style himself "a plain, unlettered man" relatively to one who could merely read Latin, if he had enjoyed either a classical education or its equivalent. The second point is well taken, and we cannot think any complete argument can be constructed in behalf of Paine, however great the resemblance may be between his style and that of Junius, until it shall be shown that Paine lived in close communication with Chatham, Francis, Horne Tooke, Wilkes, Lord Shelburne, Dr. Wilmot, Burke or Lord George Sackville, or with some of them. When this is done, "Junius," we predict, will be found to be inspired by certain of these minds, and not, in every letter, by the same minds, but written always by the same rhetorician, so that virtually, "Junius," in its inspirations would be impersonal, though executed by a single brain and hand. This theory may perhaps account for the mysterious manner in which Francis, Sackville, John Horne Tooke and Dr. Wilmot all claimed its authorship,

as those who thought themselves capable of inspiring it would naturally claim a superior merit to that of him who, as they would say, merely indited it. We think the third point, that Paine's subsequent writings are inferior to those of Junius, not well taken. Junius was not always superior. He was sometimes gross, coarse and scurrilous, as Paine was. But if the theory be true that the inconsistencies of "Junius" show it to be a composite work, then the joint criticisms of all its inspirers would naturally impart to it a higher literary finish than the writings of either of its authors individually would display. Where in "Junius" is a happier turn than the following from "The Crisis," No. VII.?

"The talents of Lord Mansfield can be estimated at best no higher than those of a sophist. He understands the subtleties, but not the elegance of nature; and by continually viewing mankind through the cold medium of the law, never thinks of penetrating into the warmer region of the mind. As for Lord North, it is his happiness to have in him more philosophy than sentiment, for he bears flogging like a top, and sleeps the better for it. His punishment becomes his support, for, while he suffers the lash for his sins, he keeps himself up by twirling about."

Nor is there in all "Junius" any finer piece of writing than the following from the same number of "The Crisis" papers. It is addressed to the people of England:

"You were known and dreaded abroad; and it would have been wise in you to have suffered the world to have slept undisturbed under that idea. It was to you a force existing without expense. It produced to you all the advantages of real power, and you were stronger through the universality of that charm than any future

fleets and armies may probably make you. Your greatness was so secured and interwoven with your silence that you ought never to have awakened mankind, and had nothing to do but to be quiet. Had you been true politicians, you would have seen all this, and continued to draw from the magic of a name the force and authority of a nation. Unwise as you were, in breaking the charm, you were still more unwise in your manner of doing it. Samson only told the secret, but you have performed the operation; you have shaven your own head and wantonly thrown away the locks. America was the hair from which the charm was drawn that infatuated the world. You ought to have quarreled with no power; but with her upon no account. You had nothing to fear from any condescension you might make. You might have humored her, even if there had been no justice in her claims, without any risk to your reputation; for Europe, fascinated by your fame, would have ascribed it to your benevolence, and America, intoxicated by the grant, would have slumbered in her fetters."

No paragraph so classically Junian in its style is to be found in Francis' or Sackville's writings. It is invested with all that philosophic insight, whereby Junius dignified every ascription of praise or blame to an individual, by coupling the individual statement with the general law under which it was ranged, or with the cause from which he assumed the specific fact to arise. It is quite in vain to say that Paine could have learned from the study of "Junius," an element of style whose essence is originality, since, whatever other quality of style may be derived from study, originality is inimitable.

The scurrilousness and blackguardism of "Junius" as closely resembles that of Paine as his philosophic acumen.

Thus, in the above-quoted letter of Anti Sejanus, he says of Lord Chatham:

JUNIUS.

But to become the stalking-horse of a stallion; to shake hands with a Scotchman at the hazard of catching all his infamy.

Miscellaneous Letter V. (Vol. 2, Wade 122.)

And out of his decent lips *a la* Tilbury, hell and d—n blast you all. * * * A little more of the devil, my lord, if you please, about the eyebrows. * * * Scotch clerks and Scotch secretaries, who may be itched out to the life with one hand and grasping a pen, the other riveted in their respective * * * Your southern writers are apt to rub their foreheads in an agony of composition; but with Scotchmen the seat of inspiration lies in a lower place, which, while the furore is upon them, they lacerate without mercy. By this delectable friction their imaginations become as prurient as their * * * and the latter are relieved from one sort of matter while their brains are supplied with another.

PAINE.

(In the letter to Washington:)

The ignorant impertinence of some of the federal papers who are pushing Mr. Washington forward as *their* stalking-horse.

In the Declaration of Independence, "Scotch and foreign mercenaries."

Age of Reason, p. 124.

The writer of the book of Matthew should have told us who the Saints were that came to life again, * * * whether they came out naked and all in natural buff, he saints and she saints, * * * whether they reclaimed their wives * * * or brought actions of *crime con* against the rival interlopers. *Same*, p. 125. Luke says it was Mary Magdalene and Joanna, * * * that came to the sepulchre. John states that Mary Magdalene came alone. They all, however, appear to have known most about Mary Magdalene; she was a woman of large acquaintance—it was not an ill conjecture that she might be upon the stroll.

On one occasion Woodfall published a letter, signed Junia, apparently from a lady, from which, for the purpose of comparing its lady-like spirit with the lowness of Junius' reply, we present an extract:

JUNIA.

Heaven preserve the characters of all my tribe from Junius. In the art of exaggeration he has no equal. Molehills he magnifies into mountains, and views your smallest pécadillo through a double microscope. * * * In short, Junius is chief japper or calumniator general to the opposition. He is employed to be-

JUNIUS' REPLY TO JUNIA.

I find myself unexpect'edly married in the newspapers without my knowledge or consent. Since I am fated to be a husband, I hope, at least, the lady will perform the principal duty of a wife. Marriages, they say, are made in heaven, but they are consummated upon earth, and, since Junia has adopted my name, she cannot, in

smear the ministry with his very best liquid blacking, and when he has written them out of office he will no doubt change his color, take a different brush and white-wash his successors. I wish he may make as distinguished a figure in the sweet work of panegyric as he has done in the painful task of calumny and detraction.

But of all kinds of abuse private scandal seems to be his favorite morsel. Junius lays hold of a scandalous anecdote with as much keenness as a spider seizes an unfortunate fly. * * * He wheels it round and round with his cobweb rhetoric, and sucks the very heart's blood of family peace.

common matrimonial decency, refuse to make me a tender of her person. Politics are too barren a subject for a new married couple. I should be glad to furnish her with one more fit for a lady to handle, and better suited to the natural dexterity of her sex. In short, if Junia be young and handsome, she shall have no reason to complain of my method of conducting an argument. I abominate all tergiversation in discourse, and she may be assured that whatever I advance, whether it be weak or forcible, shall be directly in point. It is true I am a strenuous advocate for liberty and property, but when these rights are invaded by a pretty woman, I am neither able to defend my money or my freedom. The divine right of beauty is the only one an Englishman ought to acknowledge, and a pretty woman the only tyrant he is not authorized to resist.

Chatham and Burke, Francis and Sackville, would all have had too much self-respect to send this letter, which conclusively indicates that Junius lacked the requirement of a gentleman toward the female sex. Many of the statements made concerning Thomas Paine indicate that he was not fortunate in his relations toward women, and one not a friend and admirer to the sex easily descends into that kind of scurrility to which a lady can return no answer.

Mr. Jaques, in his "History of Junius" refers to the theory of an ingenious reviewer, to the effect that Junius was the hand, moved, instructed and guided by three heads. The three heads were supposed to be Lord Shelburne, Dunning and Barre; the hand, this reviewer thought was the Rev. Dr. Wilmot, the brother-in-law of that mysterious Capt. Paine in whose household were

the Middleton and Fretley, or Fretland, to whom letters destined for "Junius" were intrusted.

The arguments in favor of Barree, De Lolme, Burke, Horne Tooke, Dunning and others, so far as we have examined them, seem to be wholly destitute of substance. In conclusion, therefore, we discard Francis as involving a complete stultification of both Francis and Junius, and discarding the theory that "Junius" is wholly the work of one person, we think it probable that Lords Sackville, Chatham and Shelburne were in the secret of "Junius," and supplied in part its information and its bias; that some much more obscure person supplied the literary pungency and talent, and that the obscure person possessed a singular resemblance in mental and social combinations to Thomas Paine.

We know of nothing in the career of Paine which indicates that intense hatred toward the Scotch which is manifested in at least a score of bitter instances by Junius, unless it is conceded that Paine wrote the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, in which case the thrust at the Scotch in that instrument is accounted for, so far as to show that Paine did not like the Scotch, without showing why. But if we suppose Paine to be the "ready writer" merely of Junius, and Lord George Sackville the inspirer and tutor, then we are supplied with the basis for a hatred of the Scotch, on the part of Sackville, in the fact that more than half the officers of the court-martial which convicted Sackville were Scotchmen, and that his counsel, Lord Mansfield, and who he thought botched his case, was also Scotch. Sackville could hardly have been the inspirer and tutor of Paine in the composition of Junius for so long without instilling into his pupil his prejudices.

Lord Sackville, prior to his trial, believed himself to be specially popular with Scotchmen, and having been disappointed at the result of that trial, it was quite natural that he should accuse the Scotch of treachery.

The fact that Junius held back his first letter, though it was ready by the 6th of January, and would not permit it to be published until the 21st of January, 1769, and that the last letter of Junius was dated just three years afterward, viz., on the 21st of January, 1772, has been commented upon as a singular coincidence. The ordinary biographies of Paine represent his birthday as occurring on the 29th of January, 1737. He dates his introduction to the first number of the Pennsylvania magazine on Jan. 24, 1775, and his dedication of the "Age of Reason" on Jan. 27, O. S., 1794, while the "Rights of Man" is dated Feb. 9, 1792, which in N. S. is identical, we believe, with Jan. 29, O. S., his birthday. There is at present no exact coincidence in these dates, and therefore no argument is derivable from them. But the appearance of the first and last letter of Junius on the same day of the year is doubtless a designed coincidence which meant something on the part of that mysterious shadow which still remains the sole depositary of its own secret; *stat nominis umbra.*

WEALTH.

A SEQUEL TO THE CRITIQUE ON ADAM SMITH.

THE ECONOMIC VIEW AS OPPOSED TO THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ITS INFLUENCE; LARGE FORTUNES AND HOW THEY AFFECT SOCIETY, AND ESPECIALLY THE LABORING CLASSES; THE REPRODUCTIVE WEALTH OF THE RICH IS THE INVOLUNTARY SERVANT OF THE POOR; AND THE GREATER THE WEALTH THE MORE CHEAPLY IT RENDERS ITS SERVICES. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SCHEMES OF UNIVERSAL GIVING ARE THE DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRY AND THE RETROGRESSION OF MANKIND TO BARBARISM BY THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF BEGGARY, CRAFT AND WAR.

What are the function and effect, in political economy, of the concentration of great wealth into single hands; in short, of large fortunes? There is a predisposition in society, even among those who are themselves the possessors of large fortunes, to assume that cupidity is the sole cause of their acquisition; that no essential want or need of society is satisfied by their existence; that greed and selfishness are the sole justifications of their retention, and that without dispute, the man of wealth who would deliberately dissipate his fortune in gifts to the poor, and the capitalist who would distribute his capital indiscriminately among all who lack capital, would be

the purest paragons of virtue, and the greatest benefactors of society.

If this fundamental theory of the inutility and banefulness of large fortunes be true, then the spirit of communism, even when it aims radically at a legislative distribution of all wealth among its non-possessors, is sound also. For if the existence of large fortunes be an economical and social evil, then the cutting down of large fortunes must be a social and economical blessing. Not only communism, but highway robbery, may justify itself on this basis. For the Dick Turpins, Robin Hoods, "Paul Cliffords" and "Artful Dodgers" of the criminal calendar have simply been enforcing on the capitalists of society the performance of the duty of distributing their wealth gratuitously among the poor, which, had these capitalists not been deaf to the voice of conscience, they would have performed without force. And inasmuch as there is a vein of this communistic notion concerning the effect of large fortunes, if not of all wealth, running through the teachings of the Founder of Christianity, and from thence instilled through millions of Sunday-school teachers into the minds of youth throughout Christendom, it would not be strange if a permanent habit of what might be called "thoughtless thought" had grown up in millions of minds, to the effect that all large accumulations of wealth are robberies of society; a postulate which, so far as it may be entertained, not only affords a fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of communism, but a weak basis on which to resist the class of crimes which, like forgery, robbery, larceny and burglary, and certain phases of social vice, take from the rich to give to the poor. It may have escaped the observation of some, that all the theories ordi-

narily propounded from the pulpit concerning wealth, at least so far as they borrow their inspiration from the New Testament, if summed up into the one doctrine, that the most useful act a man can perform with wealth is to give it away, are flatly contradicted by all the cardinal doctrines of the political economists, the fundamental assumption of whose science is, that all wealth is useful in the degree that it is made reproductive of wealth—that its capacity to facilitate the reproduction of wealth increases in the ratio of the surplus which the producer of wealth may withdraw from consumption to devote to reproductive purposes; that society is advanced in the ratio of the accumulation and not of the dispersion of wealth, and that so far as wealth undergoes distribution, the one all-controlling principle which should govern its distribution, should be freedom and equality in exchange—not a giving of something for nothing. In political economy wealth is sometimes defined, as for instance by Carey, as the measure of man's power over nature. As nature is a part of man and man is a part of nature, it appears that a certain obscurity arises in this form of definition, and that what is really meant is, that wealth is the measure of man's power to purchase the services and efforts of his fellow-man. As the purchase is made, a *quid* for a *quo*, and to the mutual advantage both of him whose labor is purchased and of him who purchases it, it follows that wealth is the power to attract, educate (from *e* and *duce* to lead out) and bring into existence the labor of those whose time would otherwise lack employment; for the man who is able to employ his own time productively, in conjunction with his own capital, does not hire it out to others. Now if surplus wealth, i. e., wealth which its owner does not

need to consume for his own support and that of his family, is the employer of surplus labor, i. e., of labor which lacks the capital essential to its own employment, then the larger and more numerous the surplus capitals, the fewer and less excusable will be the unemployed laborers; and, *vice versa*, any extended conversion of surplus capitals, i. e., capitals available for reproduction, into non-surplus capitals, i. e., capitals available for immediate consumption, such as would immediately result from the putting in practice of the sell-all-thou-hast-and-give-to-the-poor theory, would, by utterly destroying the capitals which now employ the non-capitalists, amount to a destruction of industry and a return to economical and social barbarism.

In the case of fortunes so small that the mind, uneducated in economics, easily follows their use in industry and readily traces out the entire effects of that use, the theory that it is their owners' religious duty to disperse them among the poor is not entertained. No one would think of assuming that the owner of a yoke of oxen and a cart, which he employs in hauling goods for the support of his family, would really benefit society by cutting up his cart into kindling-wood for distribution among the poor, and by killing and cutting up his yoke of oxen to make soup for hungry paupers; although at all times people exist so poor that free kindling-wood and soup would confer on them a temporary favor. The most unskilled mind is able to see in such an illustration of the diversion of capital from industry into charities that, while only a temporary want is relieved, and that, too, in a way most likely to encourage idleness, a previously productive branch of industry is permanently extinguished for lack of the capital with which it was

conducted; its proprietor is reduced to idleness along with those whom he sought to relieve, and his beggared family, instead of diminishing the demand for the withdrawal of capital from industrious investments to charitable dispersions of capital, as they were previously enabled to do by the use of the team, actually increases the demand for the disintegration of still other profitably employed capital, and for its dispersion in charities whose secondary effect is to increase the need for more charities; and yet the only difference in effect between this act on the part of an owner of small capital, and a similar act performed by a Vanderbilt, Astor or Stewart, by the late E. B. Ward, by Field & Leiter, the Farwells, or by Pullman, would be that a more acute grasp of economic science and a minuter knowledge of the nature and ultimate effects of the investments and industries in which the wealth of each of these persons is employed, are necessary to enable us to trace the ratio of the individual discomfort and misery, to the actual good which would arise from the dispersions of the available surplus capitals, i. e., the capitals over and above those needed for consumption by themselves and families, which would result from any practical or sweeping obedience by them of the supposed duty of universal giving.

The first point arrived at in investigating the nature of the investments of all these men of wealth is, that not only is there no vast aggregate of wealth withdrawn by the cupidity of each from the uses of society, no strong chest in which countless treasures are remorselessly locked up from the starving poor, no stone tower in which gold, or grain, or cloth, or iron, in immeasurable quantities, is kept from the greedy clutch of the imploring and shelterless millions, but, on the contrary, that

The actual fund withdrawn by every such man from purposes of production and devoted to purposes of consumption is, as a rule, less than that withdrawn by a common farmer or drayman, and that the net values consumed each year by a millionaire are less than those consumed by a working mechanic, in about the proportion that the fabrics used by the former are more durable and therefore less perishing, while the appetite of the latter, invigorated by healthy labor, is capable of a more diversified, free and costly gratification. If a communistic mob should ever rise and sack the dwellings of the wealthy in any city, the fact which would chiefly surprise them would be to find how people of wealth could possibly live without anything visible or tangible or present in their dwellings on which to live. Their surprise at the total absence of plunder would be like that of the troops who broke open the vaults of the Bank of Venice and found that its reputed vast treasures had been "invested" three hundred years earlier. The money of the wealthy is in bank almost invariably. Instead of being, like the money of the middle and poorer classes in many countries, withdrawn from circulation by being hoarded in some strong chest, or carefully packed between the mattresses of the family bed, it has all been loaned out by the bank, and all that the millionaire has to show for it is his bank book, which is the bank's due bill. The millionaire's interior strength and greater knowledge relative to institutions of credit, enables him to confide in them for his supply of currency with entire safety, while the less instructed and more distrustful class who have but few exchanges and no means of judging wisely concerning banks, hoard their money somewhere in their own custody. Of late

years valuable plate and jewelry are also made the subjects of special deposit. But in respect to plate and jewelry, it must be noted that the consumption of wealth in articles which retain their full value for centuries is much less than in articles of crockery, glass and porcelain which chip and break with every use that is made of them, and in cheap imitations which lose all available resemblance to gold or diamonds after the first year of wear. In the recent royal wedding of the Duke of Connaught to the Princess of Prussia, among the cheapest things worn, in an economical sense, were the Queen's diamonds, because the wear of them on every similar occasion, while the Empire of Great Britain shall last, will not diminish their value by so much as the cost of the blacking on the shoes of the milkboy who, from a distant street corner, strains his neck to get a glimpse of her majesty's outriders, as her carriage sweeps by in the procession.

Nor does the original cost of these diamonds, when its incidence and effect are fully understood, form a tax upon industry which it should be unwilling to sustain, or which, indeed, it could well afford to dispense with. The same general principle or law applies to all luxuries, that being products with which mankind can dispense, and the production of which is exceptional and precarious, fixed capitals will not seek employment in producing them, but only in exchanging them when produced. Hence, as the finest laces are produced by the poorest needlewomen of Paris, and the richest furs are caught by the trappers of the thinly-inhabited frozen zones, where life is a perpetual struggle with winter; as the pearls attract the poor divers to the depths of the seas of Ceylon and Cathay, while for the finest wools barbarian

mountaineers scale the cliffs of Cashmere and Astrachan; as the raw silk is the product of the almond-eyed Chinese who work at a penny a day and carry every economy to that terrible extreme where every meal is seasoned with starvation; as gems of every kind are delved for by the impoverished children of the sun in Peru and by the wasting descendants of the Aztecs in Mexico; as the finer perfumes, so far as they are not fraudulent adulterations, are wafted to us from the billows of roses that sweeten the tainted air of Bulgaria and Albania, where an industrious peasantry find all their efforts to beautify the earth stamped into the blood and dirt of a real hell in this world by the conflict of two contending systems of saving the soul from an imaginary hell in the next; as even comparatively necessary articles of luxury, such as gold and silver, are in the main mined for by adventurers whom lack of skill and lack of capital have shut out from success, while the universally necessary articles of coal and iron are mined by wealthy corporations that last for centuries—so diamonds and gems of every kind perform a four-fold function in economy and art. They carry pecuniary relief from the highest ranks of industrial civilization to the lowest; they cost almost no labor, as their production is almost exclusively by accidental finding, and yet they form a mode of investment in which wealth may be enduringly expressed without any real waste of wealth, and they furnish affection with its most beautiful and grateful tributes, because they are the physical types of the beautiful in life and the permanent in character. Pictures, statuary, music, and, indeed, art in all its forms, are the appointed channels through which wealth may lay its substantial offering on the shrine of genius, and thus evoke the genius itself,

which would not otherwise exist. Even the use of wines and champagnes forms the only mode in which an American capitalist could aid, without insulting, the grape-raising peasantry who skirt the borders of the Alps and Pyrenees, or watch the desolate ocean from the heights of Minorca or Madeira.

If we pass from the luxuries to the investments of the wealthy, we find them all to consist of capital loaned to others, with a shrewd eye to the class of investments which will combine security with income, but all regulated by the economical law that the investment for which men will pay the highest interest is generally that in which they can earn the highest profit, which in turn is generally that for which there is most demand on the part of their fellow-men. The bloated bondholder, who holds a nation's bonds, has made a loan to the nation's taxpayers. If he bought, at their issue, the bonds of a railway, his capital has built the road; if he bought them after their issue, his capital runs the road; he is the employer of every officer, from the president to the brakeman.

If, like the Astors, his estate consists of land and buildings, every building he erects is a loan of shelter to the homeless, than which certainly capital admits of no use more beneficial. The larger the estate invested in lands, the greater the ability and interest of its owner to improve and build, rather than to hold for a rise, and consequently we find in New York City the largest landlords maintain the smallest ratio of unimproved property, and, having the smallest relative ratio of time in which to look for tenants, their only means of keeping their property continuously productive is to combine the maximum of desirableness in their houses with the minimum of rent. Any disposal of the ownership in these

estates, as, for instance, their subdivision occasionally among numerous heirs, is always a calamity to the tenantry, as the heir succeeding to a smaller property immediately sets about getting a higher ratio of rent for a less one of accommodation.

The peculiar use made by A. T. Stewart in so expanding his capital as to embrace new fields and a larger volume of merchandizing had the effect to cheapen the price and multiply the consumption of goods throughout the entire civilized world; for not only did he continually undersell all competitors, but he compelled all competitors to sell both at lower prices and more honestly. It is doubtful if all the sermons and books against lying ever written have been as potent in curing the vice of deception in trade as the fact that the most successful merchant in Christendom had forbidden his clerks absolutely to commend or praise by the faintest word the goods they were selling. His was the only store in Christendom where one not versed in goods could be truly informed whether they would wash. Having no occasion to pay for skill in lying he could hire clerks for \$700 a year who would sell as many goods behind his counters as clerks in other establishments would be paid \$5,000 for selling. Selling seven times as many goods at one-seventh the cost per yard for selling, he could easily give his customers three-fourths of the profit per yard made by merchants handling a smaller capital, and still retain a profit on his time and income many times greater than his competitors. And for this service to society, which was felt by every man, woman and child in Christendom, and by millions in heathendom, what was his personal charge—what the cost of his personal maintenance? Three or four Grahams gems or some oat-

meal and milk, a raw egg and a cup of coffee at breakfast, a dinner hardly more tempting, with a glass of wine, and a supper which would have left a vigorous coal-heaver famished, were all the dyspeptic financier could consume of this world's wealth as his compensation for regulating and aiding the production, distribution and consumption of millions.

It is the universal law of political economy that the smaller one's capital the larger the percentage at which he can afford to part with its use to others, while the larger the concentration of capital in a single hand, as a rule, the smaller the ratio or percentage of profit at which he is compelled to lend its use to society. The newsboy whose whole capital is a dollar expects to make a dollar out of it in a day by buying a hundred dailies at one cent each and selling them for two. The drayman whose whole capital is two hundred dollars, invested in a cart and team, expects to make a hundred per cent. a month. The grocer with two thousand dollars is content with a hundred per cent. a year. The wholesale merchant with twenty per cent., and the owner of many millions with four or five per cent. per annum. Thus as the capital increases the ratio of income or of charge for its use lessens. In the concentration of railways in this country there has been a continual apprehension that the competition of rival lines would not keep pace with the development of monopoly in the control of each line respectively. As the work of concentration went on, the cry has continually gone forth that the particular act of concentration then being consummated would create a monopoly so gigantic that the people would be prostrated at the feet of the railroad king. This was the cry twenty years ago, at the consolidation of the Harlem with the

New York Central; again at the union of both with the Hudson River; again at the purchase of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern; and again at the purchase of the Michigan Central. Yet the Vanderbilt roads carry twice the tonnage for the same income to-day that they did before they became Vanderbilt's. The same cry has followed the expansion of the Pennsylvania company through every step of its absorption of the railways and canals of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and in the purchase of its western connections. But it has been seen that with each increase of power to raise or reduce fares, there has come an increase in that power of competition which, if it did not reduce freights and fares, at least kept them stationary. As the giants have grown into Titans, the conflict has become Titanic. But with each expansion of the consolidation the management has grown in that conservatism and skill which comes of long and trained management of capital. It is not only in the power of a railroad capitalist to reduce the net profits of his entire capital to the cost of the support of his one family, but such a reduction, under a sufficient stress of competition, would become inevitable. Even amidst the complexities of railway management we doubt if there is any suspension of the economic law that the larger the surplus capital concentrated in a single control the lower the rate of interest it will be able to command for its use by society. Of course they think differently in Turkey, where capitalists and financiers are officially assassinated in the name of charity. But Turkish finance, notwithstanding its genius and ferocity, lacks the merit of success.

An attentive consideration of the secondary effects of the great economic industries, monopolies of capital and

expenditures of wealth upon luxuries, such as diamonds, jewelry, paintings, art, and costly apparel, transforms them all into involuntary charities, which carry relief from the most wealthy to the most necessitous by a law as unerring as that by which the evaporations from the ocean, itself a vast monopoly and waste of wealth, when attracted through the air by the mountain ranges, which are also vast monopolies and wastes of wealth, are made to water the continents and fertilize the world. This is Nature's system of universal irrigation, by which, under the just workings of the laws of economic science, such a distribution of wealth to all, arises from the healthy and vigorous pursuit of wealth by each, that as regularly as the days revolve, all the inhabitants of the world partake in nearly the same degree of food, clothing, shelter and social affection.

Upon this system of natural irrigation, religious and communistic enthusiasm has sought to improve by denouncing all the accumulations of capital, which are necessary to produce the exchanges of industry, as at war with man's best interests; by holding that charity is a better distributor than commerce, and that the dispersion, promiscuous, general and universal, of all capital, is a better friend of the poor than the reproductive industry in which existing capital employs labor.

It would seem that such a proposition needs only to be stated to be scouted as absurd. And I will do the masses of modern Christians, indeed, all whom I have met or whose writings I have read, the justice to say that they fully embrace the economic view of wealth, and reject utterly the mendicant view of it, which was propounded by Jesus himself in his Sermon on the Mount, and was taught and practiced by the primitive

Christians, and by the mendicant orders, and largely instilled by them into the Church of Rome. The inconsistency on the part of the Protestant world consists in believing that they regard as inspired all the teachings of Jesus when they in fact utterly reject his teachings, so far as they are at war with their common sense as bread-winners and with modern economic science. They reassert their consistency by stout denials that the teachings of Jesus, either disparage industry, condemn wealth, command poverty, exalt and honor beggary or land communism. But it is impossible and uncandid thus to ignore his flat and unmistakable precepts, directing his disciples to "take no thought of the morrow," for the Heavenly Father who clothes the lilies of the field, will much more clothe his disciples; to regard the poor as blessed, and the rich as inadmissible into the Kingdom of Heaven; to take no scrip in their purse, but into whatsoever town they come to impose themselves on whomsoever they could, and be fed and sheltered by them; to sell all they have and give to the poor, and if any man ask a coat give him a cloak also; and if they want a mountain removed and cast into the sea, to pray for it, instead of digging and blasting, all of which resulted in the practice on the part of the early disciples of sharing their goods in common, and in the practice on the part of the religious orders of both the Greek and Roman Churches, of dedicating their lives to personal poverty as one of the forms of Christian holiness, of producing nothing in an economical sense, and of living absolutely by beggary, a dead tax on producers and on productive industry.

The original precepts of Jesus are too plain to be glossed or garbled, or made true or moderate by inter-

polations. They have wrought out their natural and logical effects upon history. A commentary, eighteen centuries long, has been written in penury and meanness, in self-deception and in idle and squalid retrogression toward savagery.

So far as these economic errors prevailed over the intuitive common sense of men, they led to a long, sad, priest-led waste of human energy, in the intended service of mankind, but in their real oppression, by generation after generation of hooded and cowed lunatics, who intended to do to mankind, or God, or themselves some good, but did not know how. They did not know how, mainly because Jesus, whom they followed, did not know how. But their long career of beggary in the name of Jesus plainly points to the conclusion that Jesus meant exactly what he said in all its bald absurdity. He was ignorant of the complex economies whereby the propelling passions and desires of each man help to work out the universal happiness of all men through an interdependent chain of industries that binds the universal humanity into a single great being among all whose members flows, by exchange of service for service, the blood of a common life. He actually meant what he taught; viz., that happiness consists in foregoing all satisfactions, in poverty, celibacy, submission to suffering and the avoidance of labor, production and wealth. The doctrine was old. The stoics had taught it for a thousand years. But Jesus, by harnessing this fatal chariot of economic error behind the fiery steeds of hell's undying flames, placed in the hands of the ignorant priesthoods who rode in this juggernaut and fattened on its sacrifices a power to grind mankind into poverty, and scourge them into vast wastes of wealth,

not upon industry and production, but upon worship and war. Had Jesus been a modern economist like Adam Smith, Mill or Carey, he would have stated the whole instead of the half truth. When the human energies have done their best to conquer, possess, enjoy, and produce, and have failed, then the stoicism which can forego the desire for that for which ambition strove in vain becomes a virtue. But till then, it is a mere paralysis, a vice, and to teach the duty of nonproduction when production is possible is to scourge the race with famine and send it back toward barbarism. There are conditions of debasement, of the general overthrow of private rights by despotic power, of the epidemic decline of all industries throughout continents, when stoicism commends itself to the popular mind, as the small pox and yellow fever run among the filthy and the famishing by contagion. If men feel desperate, they enjoy a gospel of despair. Jesus lived in such a period. The nation of which he was an humble peasant groaned under an unlimited yoke. Bitterly as the Roman power rested on the uppermost Jews, both the Roman and the Jewish power ground down the undermost, and one of the lowest of the latter in social station was the son of a carpenter, in a land where carpenters were usually slaves, and where the building of houses had stopped.

As the absence from the mind of Jesus of all that faculty of criticism which comes only with enlarged scholarship and a comprehensive history of the various myths which have imposed on the human mind, made it easy for him to believe in, and preach a hell, "where the fire is not quenched and the worm dieth not;" so a complete ignorance of the benign nature of industry made it possible for him to commend idleness. An

unfortunate and monstrous, but in that age of plunder, natural error concerning the mission of wealth caused him to decri it as an evil and deny its possessors admission into his kingdom. As much kindness as ignorance underlay this severity. He saw wealth nearly always associated with brute force and military conquest. The Romans of the period esteemed it honorable only to obtain wealth in that way. It was never associated with agriculture, unless the agriculture were polluted by slavery. It was never connected with commerce or navigation, unless the two were made vile by piracy and rapine. It owned no kin with manufactures, for the weavers were as poor as the carpenters, and it protected and nourished not the "family," but a polygamous harem. Jesus had never seen an industrial civilization, but only a military and theological one. He lived under a cringing and hypocritical theocracy in which Pharisaism robbed the poor and fawned and truckled to the rich and to Cæsar. He could not comprehend what the reign of industry would be like. All he saw of scholarship lay in the superior and shrewder rapacity of the trained oppressor. To his mind a tax collector was but two removes from the devil, leaving barely room for the praying and canting Pharisee to get between. What wonder that he knew nothing of the advantages of knowledge, and supposed the return of the mind to the blank innocence and ignorance of childhood to be essential to the dawn of blessedness and the restoration of virtue in the human character. "Except ye become as little children," therefore, was his gospel. But in our more favored period, nobody supposes the moral condition of a puling infant upon whom no perception of right or wrong, truth or falsehood, wisdom or ignorance, has yet dawned, to be

higher than that of a matured, educated, and well-balanced mind, whether of a lady or of a gentleman.

Jesus, among men, was as beset by limitations, both as to the extent of his knowledge and the quality of his judgment, as Joan of Arc was among women. Both thought themselves to be the immediate agents of the Highest. So indeed they were. And so, in a sense, are the pebble and the dewdrop, the criminal and the conqueror. Jesus was crucified and Joan was burned, as millions of others have been, because the fools and brutes around them were trying to serve a God whom they could not know, instead of the men and women whom they knew. Jesus probably thought himself to be as nearly an incarnation of God as the undeveloped state of thought in his time permitted such an idea to be formulated. Joan thought herself to be an incarnation of the mother of God. A more generous scholarship, not to say a comprehensive scientific knowledge, would have revealed to the Jews that Jesus was harmless, and would have revealed to Jesus that many of the notions which seemed to him manifestly true were either wholly false or only temporarily true under particular and very limited conditions. The like influence would have revealed to Joan that while she might become a mother of men, the constitution of the universe hardly admitted of her being the mother of its God, if it had any; and to the insane throngs that burned her, it would have revealed the astounding fact, that, though hundreds of thousands of persons had been burned as witches, no witch had ever existed. But neither Jesus nor Joan nor the crowds that burned or crucified them, knew very well how to redeem the world. It was not necessary that they should. For irreversible as fate, and irresistible as

progress, the world moved forward toward its own redemption, not wholly unaided perhaps by the blood of the martyrs that died at the stake or on the cross, but by no means so powerfully aided by them as by the toilers among the metals and over the looms, who, far away from stake and priest and prayer-book, brought forth iron, cloth and gold, agriculture, manufactures and commerce, industry and wealth, science and peace. The grotesque attempt to maintain against all progress the worship of a Jewish peasant as the Creator of the universe stands directly in the way of a clear apprehension of the laws and principles of economic, moral, and social science, of right modes of education and a wise treatment of crime, as the not less grotesque attempt to learn the history of the genesis of man, from Moses, stood in the way of a comprehension of man's true genesis. So long as men thought that most failures of crops, diseases, misfortunes, storms, shipwrecks and contagions were proofs of witchcraft, they could but burn the witches. And certainly the church held them to that belief till every strand in the bridle with which the priesthood guided a duped and misled world was broken, and every pointed spur with which they urged men to be demons was dulled with the coagulated blood it had torn from the galled flanks of faith. And so long as men think that crime is either the inspiration of a personal devil or which is the same thing, the deliberate preference of a wicked heart, †invested with every opportunity to be virtuous, but deliberately preferring vice, and differing in its essential springs and motives from that of the judge and jury who punish it, so long we shall never have a just or reformatory treatment of crime. Not many centuries of scientific investigation

into the causes and nature of crime can transpire before it will be as universally known that crime, in the sense in which that word is ordinarily conceived, has never been committed, as it is now known that witchcraft was never committed. Failures indeed have arisen in men's moral lives, as in their physical lives, but it will ultimately be found that the theological element of wickedness is as absent from all crime, as the theological attribute of supernaturality has always been from sorcery and witchcraft. And finally, so long as men are mistaught in millions of pulpits that there is no economic science, they will continue to suppose that the dispersion of wealth, instead of the employment of labor, is the primary duty of the capitalist; the logical sequel to which assumption is, that the robbery of the capitalist is the first duty of the laborer. These false economic and social theories have once plunged the civilization of Europe into barbarism. There is no cause adequate to account for the midnight darkness of the middle ages except the implicitness with which the false dogmas of Jesus concerning wealth were believed in and obeyed. All other causes pale into insignificance compared with this. It is this that converted what remained of the brave, brutal, and always superstitious Roman race into a nation consisting of four castes, all of which were celibates, and none of which were useful, viz., priests, soldiers, robbers and beggars. It is this that left the propagation of that race to the violators of chastity, and relegated the performance of the first and most tender of human duties to the fugitive loathsomeness of vice. It is this that passed the lands of Europe at the death of their owners into the dead hands of the priesthoods, and solemnly dedicated them, acre by acre, to sterility and

despair, until the wild excesses of the French revolution were needed to strike the palsying hand of the church from its manacled grasp upon the chief implement of human industry—the soil. It is this that even to this day causes the loathsome and filthy saints of the mendicant orders of the Greek Church in Russia to wander from Moscow to Novgorod, proud to exchange their vermin-creeping garments for meaner ones in which the parasites are larger and more active, and thrilling with a sense of holiness derived from the fact they have always lived like the lilies of the field, unwashed, since their baptismal immersion, save by the rains of heaven, unfed save by the votive offerings of superstition, unsoiled by labor and guiltless of ever contributing to the growth of a blade of grass, save as their unburied carrion may do so, after their death, unless the canonizing decree of the Czar may arrest even this small utility by requiring their worthless but worshiped relics to be encased in stone, for the perpetual healing of the diseases of tomb-kissing pilgrims.

It is the fashion of the Christian world to veil the form and features of the Jewish enthusiast, through whom these economic errors have descended to it from the mistaken schools of thought established by pagan philosophers thirty centuries ago, under a cloud of sentimental adulation that shall ward off all criticism of a scientific or philosophic character. So long as this veil can be kept unrent, the Jewish peasant, while politely ignored by scientists and scholars, may still receive worship from the vulgar, as a God. But science knows no veils. Upon whatever other points the economic school of investigators may differ, they are agreed in recognizing wealth, and the labor which produces it, as the chief

motive forces in human progress. This point stands established. And with its establishment there is thrown across the mental heaven of every reflective mind in letters of clear white light the irresistible corollary, "Alas! even Jesus erred. Lovely as was his mind in many things, even He was fallible." Nothing is scientifically true but science.









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THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON
FROM 1630 TO 1880



By SAMUEL JOHNSON
Author of "The History of the City of Boston"

1880