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A
MODEST APOLOGY
FOR THE
CONDUCT
OF A
CERTAIN ADMIRAL
IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN.

[Price Six Pence.]

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MODEST APOLOGY

FOR THE

C O N D U C T

O F A

CERTAIN ADMIRAL

I N T H E

MEDITERRANEAN.

B E I N G A N

ESSAY towards Silencing the Clamorous
Tongue of SLANDER, 'till Facts can be
ascertained by substantial and circumstantial
Evidence.

Audi alteram Partem.

L O N D O N :

Printed for M. COOPER, in *Pater-noster-Row* ;
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M DCC LVI.

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P R E F A C E to the P U B L I C K.

TH E following Effay is calculated to display the Folly and Injustice of determining in Matters of Moment by Hearsay, an Error too frequent amongst the *English* — It hath heretofore been thought necessary by Power, occasionally to sacrifice a Victim to State Policy, with Intent to amuse and divert the Populace from diving too deep into Political Mysteries, and tracing Effects up to their Prime Causes: This Finesse

is

is not badly illustrated in the Fable of the Monkey's hugging the Cat, and using her Claw to scratch Chestnuts out of the Fire withal. Far be it from me to suppose this is the Case at present; I would only urge, that every Thing which can be preceded ought to be supposed, while an hitherto innocent Gentleman's Life and Character are at Stake, at least till palpable Demonstration turns all Apology into an Ironical Sarcaſm. I end this with entreating my Readers, if possible, to read the following Effay dispaſſionately.

A Modest



A

Modest Apology, &c.



O stem the Torrent of Popular Prejudice, is like attempting to alter the Course of the Tides, or to silence the outrageous Noise of the tempestuous Ocean, and therefore far exceeds the most sanguine Success expected from the compiling of this small Essay: The Author of which, however credited, deems it necessary previously to declare, in the most solemn Manner, that he is not biaſſed by Ties of Kindred or otherwise, being an utter Stranger to the Gentleman who occasions this Apology; no, he is an unprejudiced Spectator, one who is no Friend to Opposition, nor Partizan

tizan of Power, but a free *Briton*, who humbly insists, as such, he has an indisputable Right to deliver his Sentiments concerning all national Transactions.

He is well aware of the numerous Witticisms, which will be thrown out upon him and his Subject; and tho' he acknowledges himself an Admirer of Wit, wishes the Smarts of the Age would exhaust their seemingly inexhaustible Funds upon Subjects somewhat less serious; as for the Author's Performance, they must use their Pleasure; but he apprehends, a Gentleman's Life, Reputation, with a long &c. are not Topics fit for the Decision of Public, and Coffee-house Frequenters, those Dabblers in Politics: They truly represent the Madman in the Scriptures, who *casteth Firebrands, Arrows and Death, and wantonly saith, am I not in Sport?*

The *English* are generally too premature in their Applause or Condemnation of public Transactions. In the Time of Sir R. W——'s Ministry, the Populace deem'd Admiral *Hofier* to blame, for lying inactive near *Porto Bello*, while Sickness swept away his Forces, till their
Eyes

Eyes at length were open'd, by the clearing up and discovering of certain Circumstances, by which it appeared that brave Officer had Orders *not to engage*. Thus when it was past Remedy, this unfortunate Gentleman obtained Pity; a slight Redress for a broken Heart and once ruined Reputation.

No Man hath as yet endeavoured to controvert, or call in Question, the many Absurdities, palpable Falshoods, and gross Misrepresentations, which public Rumour hath lately vented about Mr. B——, a Gentleman who deserves a Suspension from such malignant Abuse, at least till Proofs can support Malice, not only upon the Score of Justice and common Humanity, but also of that Veneration the *English* ought ever to pay to the Memory of the great Lord *Torrington*. Far be it from my Meaning, that the Father's glorious Deserts should shade the Son's Defects; I would infer from thence only, that there ought to be a Respite from Slander till positive Proofs appear. In the present Case we have seen a Flood of Abuse flowing in Ballads, News-papers, Magazines, and public Prints, all founded upon a Letter, or an Extract from one,

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written

written by Mr. B—, and transmitted to the Public in the *London Gazette*, on *Saturday, June 26*, and dated the 25th of *May*. If this Letter be genuine, I fear the Admiral's Confusion has occasioned his hurrying over what a simple Secretary might have carelessly drawn up.

But allowing this to be the Case, I cannot acknowledge any great Misconduct appears to have been committed by the Admiral. How can we tell what Hurry and Confusion he was in, what Intelligence he might have received relating to the Affairs and Situation of the Enemy, which might to him, at that Time, seem to deserve Credit, and induce him to act in the Manner he has done; or, in short, What can be determin'd, 'till the Officer's Orders, Log-books, and Journals, &c. are inspected? Oh, but say his Enemies, Suppositions prove nothing. I say they do prove every Thing I want to prove, which is, that there ought to be a Suspension of Abuse till Truths can be investigated. Let it also be remembered, that whatever has been alledged against this Gentleman, is also founded on Suppositions.

In Crimes of the highest Nature it has always been held unjust, to calumniate the Criminal before his Trial, lest, by so doing, you should prejudice him in the Eyes of his Jury. A Judge, unless the Offence is flagrant to the clearest Demonstration, tenderly delivers his Charge to the Jury, and lays the greatest Stress upon what seems to make most for the Service of the Delinquent. Then let us use a Fellow Creature like a human Being, and not wantonly oppress the already falling. I am sorry I am obliged to say, this Behaviour in my Countrymen bears not the Stamp of Christianity. Behaviour like this indicates the greatest Ungenerosity, nay Savage Barbarity, and which would far better become the wild *Indians* in *America*, than the more polish'd Sons of *Britannia*.

We are inform'd, that Mr. B—— was intended to perform great Exploits; and, according to the Opinion of the Populace, he was to perform such as *Don Quixote* never aspir'd to; amongst other Things, he was only to require the Winds and Waves to assist him with a quick Passage; then he was to

make it in his Way to meet, fight, and beat the *French Fleet*; and finally, he was to throw Succours into Fort St. *Philip*, maugre all Opposition he might meet with in the Attempt. I believe Mr. B—— may be a very capable Man, and yet he might not be capable of performing all this, without the particular Interposition of Divine Providence, a Favour which from the Degeneracy of this Nation, I fear we have but too small Reason to expect. As I was passing thro' the *Strand* one Day, I observed two or three Journeymen Joiners mending Mr. B——'s Operations: The Place they had chosen for their Debate was at the Corner of *Exeter Exchange*; I listened some Time, till the Dispute began to grow warm, when on a sudden, hearing a hoarse Noise behind me, I turn'd round, and observ'd a naked Head, bolted thro' a Cobler's Stall, from whence issued the following incoherent Expression; "Damn my Blood, if B—— don't deserve to be scragg'd for not beating the *French Fleet* to Mummy, and landing his Forces at *Makou*". Upon which it immediately began to roar, instead of a Ribbon, he shall have a String, &c. I walk'd off, and could not help reflecting how ridiculous it

was,

was, for Men bred Mechanics, to pretend to determine on the Propriety of an Admiral's Motions in naval Affairs. Yet to prove how far this has been done by People in perhaps a somewhat more elevated Sphere in the *Daily Gazetteer*, and other Papers, which most of my Readers may have seen. There are inserted certain Articles of Impeachment, supposed to have been drawn up at a public House in *Wapping*, whereby Mr. B—— is severely censured. Now to shew how the ignorant may be imposed upon, by a specious Pretence to marine Knowledge, I shall take the Trouble to confute, to a Demonstration, perhaps every one of those Articles. But I shall first, for the Benefit of Landsmen, lay down this as a fixed Principle, that no Man breathing, on Shore, can tell how long a Fleet might be going from *Plymouth* to *Gibraltar*, and thence to *Minorca*; for when the wind is easterly off of Cape *Finisterre*, it may be due West near the Isles of *Scilly*. Therefore how some Gentlemen would calculate the Time when Mr. B—— might have arrived at *Malon*, I cannot imagine, unless they had received some Dispatches from *Lapland*.

ARTICLE I.

That he is highly Guilty, for ordering the *Deptford* out of the Line, as he ought to have taken all Advantages to destroy the *French*, and not risqued a Battle on equal Terms, when he could do otherwise,

OBJECTION I.

Not Guilty for ordering the *Deptford* out of the Line; 'twas a prudent Act, either to supply the Place of a disabled Ship, or to protect her from falling into the Hands of our Adversaries; as also that she might be ready to take Advantage of any of the Enemies Ships when distress'd. Further, a Coward would never have lessened his Number, it being the Nature of Cowardice, never to think itself sufficiently secur'd.

Note, It is both usual and necessary, where there is an equal Number of Capital Ships, to throw out the smaller Vessels for the Purposes aforesaid.

ART. 2. Because he did not lead the Van, but gave the Command and his Post of Honour

nour and Danger to his Rear-Chief d'Escadre; whereas he should have led the Van, and by Example spirited-on the other Ships: Which shews he did not intend any Harm to the Enemy.

OBJECT. 2. It is both usual and necessary, to draw a List of the Line, of which every Ship is obliged to have a Copy, wherein it is appointed which Ships are to lead with the Starboard and which with the Larboard Tacks on board; this therefore is determinable by the Wind, which all People know is precarious.

ART. 3. That he might have prevented his Ships from being raked by the Enemy, as he had the Windward Gage, but did not prevent it.

OBJECT. 3. His having the Wind of the Enemy, obliged him to bear down to engage, of Consequence the Enemy laying too to receive him, he could not prevent their Raking him from the Time of coming within Gun-shot, to the Time of closing.

N. B. It is not a Sea Phrase to say he had the Windward Gage, but nothing better can be expected from such Sailors.

ART. 4. That he suffered his own Ship (according to his own Words) to sustain the Fire of the Enemy for some Time before he engaged his Adversary.

OBJECT. 4. 'Tis admitted he did so and insisted upon to be right, as he could fire no more than his Forecastle Guns till he came to a close Engagement, which is far preferable to throwing away a few random Shot.

N. B. This does not deserve to be stiled Cowardice, most brave Commanders chusing to close e're they engage.

ART. 5. That we suspect this 4th Article, because it is impossible for two capital Ships to engage, without having a Man killed or wounded.

OBJECT. 5. I have known an Instance last War, where two capital Ships engaged for some Hours, wherein one Ship lost only two Men killed, and three wounded, yet the other had near Three-score killed and wounded ;
therefore

therefore tho' this may be improbable, it is far from being *impossible*.

ART. 6. That it must be owing to ill Conduct for one single Ship to put the whole Line in disorder, by only losing her Fore-top-mast; whereas it might have been repaired in a few Hours.

N. B. What became of her Bowlings, or had she any to her Sails?

OBJECT. 6. What could she do with her Bowlines—tear the Sails to pieces, or can it be supposed that the Bowlines could support the Fore-top-mast with all its Rigging, &c. lying at the Back of the Fore-sail, when the Braces, Tack, &c. were gone; the best Way must certainly be to cut the Top-mast Rigging quite away, and clear themselves from it as fast as possible; its said it might have been repaired in a few Hours, whereas this Confusion don't appear to have lasted, according to the Letter, more than *some Minutes*. The Confusion was far from being general, or extending thro' the Line, tho' Experience has often shewn, that one Ship may disorder best Part of a Line of Battle.

N. B. The Letter says but a few were disorder'd.

ART. 7. As the Enemy was not to be seen for five Days after, he might have landed his Forces, or at least peeped into *Mabon*; but as he did neither, we think he was afraid of meeting the Enemy off the Mouth of the Harbour.

—But it seems it was not his Fighting Day.

OBJECT. 7. Why he did not land his Forces, must appear from the Proceedings of the Council of War, but the Admiral, far from running away, prudently lay refitting his Ships the whole Night, for a fresh Engagement, so that if *Galiffonniere* had been as ready as he next Morning, I can't help thinking but it would have prov'd his Fighting Day.

N. B: It seems to me that Admiral *West*, who tis allowed proved himself a Man of Courage, would have protested against the Council of War, had there not been some better Reasons than we are acquainted with to induce him to acquiesce, unless it is to be supposed that his *Fighting Day* was past too, which I won't suppose without better Foundation.

ART. 8.

ART. 8. By his ill Conduct, he left the Enemy Masters of the Seas.

OBJECT. 8. This can only be determined by a Council of War.

ART. 9. We look upon his Account that the Enemy failed three to one, to be a Mistake, owing to a Pannic; because, if it had been true, they had it in their Power, in the Attempt they made, to have gained the Windward Gage, by eating us out of the Wind.

OBJECT. 9. One Ship may out-fail another large or right before the Wind, yet may not be able to ply to the Windward so well——there is a great deal in the Building of Shipping which may occasion this Difference; some Ships holding their Wind much better than others; further, the Wind might shift, and be still in our Favour——however, I believe their failing three Feet to our one may be an Oversight in the Admiral's reading the Letter, probably drawn up by a blundering Secretary; and we ought to reflect, that the Admiral had more Things of Consequence to

take Care of there, than most of us, who can criticize coolly upon his Actions here.

ART. 10. That it does not appear, that Mr. *Bung*, intended any Skirmish, if the *French* had not rudely begun firing upon his Ships.

OBJ. 10. The contrary is apparent, because he, being to Windward, might have chose whether he would have engaged or not; instead of which it is expressly said, he made the Signal to bear down upon *Galiffonniere* and engage.

ART. 11. That as the said *Bung* had the Windward Gage, he might have run close on Board the Enemy, and with his Crowd of Sail becalmed them; the Consequence would have been a Victory, as their Ships could not have edged away three Feet in an Hour.

OBJ. 11. As the *French* Ships are said to be the best Sailors, How could he close with and becalm them, when it was in their Power to take or leave at Pleasure; 'tis said, by
the

the *English* Fleet's crowding Sail? — Did the *French* then leave their Sails behind them at *Toulon*? If not, Had they not Power to crowd too? Besides, Can any Mortal ascertain a Victory, where the Adversaries are equal, War being so fortuitous?

ART. 12. As he had 13 Sail of the Line to the Enemy's 12, and 52 Guns more than they, he ought not to have acted as a Fribble, and more especially as *Mabon* was at Stake.

For these and many more Reasons we expect he should be brought immediately to the Gang-way, to receive his Reward for Misdemeanors so malignant.

OBJ. 12. This Article was answer'd before; a Fribble would never have diminished his Force, unless it could be proved, that the Admiral had retired himself into the *Deptford*, so dismissed out of the Line.

For the above, and divers other Reasons, I shall postpone my Opinion, till a legal Enquiry is made. Can it be supposed, a Coward would make Interest to go upon an Expedition, he knew must be attended with imminent

ment Hazard of Life and Character; a Gentleman, according to Report, possessed too of a very plentiful Fortune. As to the pretended Delay of Mr. B—— in setting out, the Nature of his Instructions, &c. not being acquainted with the Arcana's of the Cabinet, I must leave them intwin'd, with other State Mysteries, to be untwisted by Time (perhaps sooner) at least at the final Disclosure of all Things. Thus much I must say, that had repeated Orders, as given out, been sent to Mr. B—— to fail, tis hardly probable, that he would have been *permitted* to have disregarded such Orders. But to proceed,

'Tis a lamentable Circumstance, if the false Reports given out of an Officer Abroad, should occasion his Disgrace among the Populace at Home, when tis possible those very Reports might be rais'd primarily by our profess'd Enemies, the Reason for which might be, their being too sensible of such Officer's Abilities, with respect to the intended Expedition. I say, if this is the Case, 'twould be dreadful, should such Incendiaries gain their Ends; this must deter experienc'd Officers from offering their Service to the Government at any Exigency,

gency, not caring to run so great a Risk of losing their Characters. — May the Means be ever remembered, whereby the *English* were deprived of that great and good Man Sir *Walter Raleigh*; his being too well acquainted with *South America*, made him obnoxious to the *Spanish* Court, which, after repeated Efforts for many Years, work'd his Downfall, by the Assistance of cursed Gold, and the Intrigues of *Gondomor*.

Thus far, in the Pursuance of my Plan, I have endeavoured to divest myself of all Party Prejudices, and to speak like a *Citizen* of the *World*; I shall now close, with declaring, that if Mr. B—— should be found, after a candid Examination, guilty; I shall readily, and doubt not every true *Briton's* joining with me, in wishing he may meet with the most exemplary Punishment, as a Traitor to his native Country, and most gracious Sovereign, whom may God out of his infinite Mercy long protect, &c.

R I N I S.

S O M E

Further Particulars

I N

R E L A T I O N

T O T H E

C A S E

O F

Admiral B Y N G.

F R O M

ORIGINAL PAPERS, &c.

Fiat Justitia!

By a GENTLEMAN of OXFORD.

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. L A C Y, at the Corner of *St. Martin's Court*,
St. Martin's Lane, near *Leicester-Fields*; and are to be
sold at all the Pamphlet Shops and Booksellers in *London*
and *Westminster*. 1756.

[Price One Shilling.]

S O M E

Interesting Particulars

Tending to EXPLAIN

The late Conduct of A—B—.

THE cruel Situation of A——
B——, in being expos'd to the
Resentment of the Nation for not
doing what was not in his Power to do,
and left to the Mercy of those who are
possibly predetermined to shew him none, ap-
pears already in so glaring a Light, that a
bare Mention of the Fact, is sufficient to
introduce all that is here to be said upon
it.

Nor will it be thought, I hope, indecent
or improper for the Friends of a Gentleman,
labouring under such a Variety of Pressures,
to offer a Word or two to the Publick in
his Vindication.

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How heavy a Load has been laid upon him, and with what exemplary Patience he has borne it, is obvious to the whole World: And as an Interval of Candour and Moderation may possibly recur, when it will be asked, by what strange Fatality he was brought into such a Situation, it is a Duty incumbent on a Man, innocent and injur'd like him, to be provided with an Answer.

And, indeed, whoever has at present Composure enough to see Things as they really are, must be struck with no small Degree of Astonishment, in observing, what slight Premisses have produced these extraordinary Consequences.

For as yet all that has been made Public concerning this supposed Criminal, (I mean that is supported by any Degree of Authority) amounts to no more than this; That he sail'd, arriv'd, and fought the Enemy as soon as he could: and that, if he did not obtain a compleat Victory, so neither did he suffer any considerable Loss.

Scraps and Fragments of Intelligence, generally

nerally in the most abusive Language, have it is true been inserted from time to time in the News-Papers, under the Pretence of Letters from on Board his Fleet: But if the Matter they contain could have been rely'd on, even by those who have made so unfair a Use of it, it would, no doubt, have been reserv'd, to be given in Evidence at his Trial: And if they could not rely upon it, any Attempt to impose it on the Public, ought to be resent'd, as it deserves.

For their own sakes it ought to be resent'd; for without the Help of such unfair Practices, from time to time repeated, a People so deservedly famous for their good Nature and Generosity, could not have been induced to act as they have done, in a Manner repugnant to the first Principles of Justice and Humanity, which provide, That the oppressed should be sacred from Insults, and the accus'd from Censure, till a regular Course of Proofs has demonstrated their Guilt: So often as it appears in our Annals, that such an unnatural Ferment has been rais'd, and directed to the Ruin of any particular Man, it appears to have been rais'd and directed by the same

Means: and that within the Compass of a very few Years, we should twice be taken in the same Snare, is not the best Compliment to our Memories.

But I proceed now to the Particulars propounded at the Head of this Paper.

On the 17th of *March* the Admiral receiv'd his Commission, and took the Oaths as Admiral of the Blue: On the 20th he arriv'd at *Portsmouth*, and found Letters from the Board, forbidding him to meddle with any Men belonging to the *Torbay*, *Essex*, *Nassau*, *Prince Frederick*, *Colchester* and *Greyhound* (all which Ships were said to be wanted for the most pressing Service) or, if it was possible to be avoided, with any Men belonging to any other Ship in a serviceable Condition. The same Letters also directed him, to compleat the manning and fitting the *Stirling-Castle*, in Preference to any other Ship, as she also was wanted for the same most pressing Service.

On the 21st at Sun-Rising, he hoisted his Flag on Board the *Ramillies*: Six other Ships of his Squadron, *viz.* The *Buckingham*,
Culloden,

Culloden, *Captain*, *Revenge*, *Kingston*, and *Defiance* were at *Spithead*; two, the *Trident* and *Lancaster* were in the Harbour fitting for Sea; and the *Intrepid* was not as yet sail'd from the *Nore*.

For these nine Ships, seven Hundred and Twenty-three Men were wanting, of which two Hundred and Forty were short of Compliment, two Hundred and Ninety-one lent to Ships at Sea, and one Hundred and Ninety-two sick in the Hospital.

It is observable, that in the Evening of this Day he received a Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, pressing the utmost Diligence in getting his Squadron into sailing Order, marking the Necessity of his so doing from the Necessity of the Service, which requir'd him as soon as possible in the *Mediterranean*, and inclosing the Reason, in an Extract of a Letter from the Earl of *Bristol* at *Turin*, to Mr. *Fox*, dated *March* the 6th, and communicating a Design of the *French* to make a Descent on *Minorca*.

To this Letter the Admiral the next Day return'd the Assurances requir'd, that he was using all possible Dispatch: Specifying, That in seven or eight Days he hoped all the Ships under his Command would be ready in every Respect, excepting Men; and accompanying this with a State of the Ships both in *Portsmouth* Harbour and at *Spithead*, that their Lordships might issue their Orders accordingly.

For, by the said State it appear'd, that over and above the ten Ships assign'd to the Admiral, there lay at *Spithead*, at that Instant, no less than Twelve Men of War of the Line; that is to say, the *Prince* of 90 Guns, the *Prince George* of 80, the *Invincible* and *Torbay* of 74, the *Monmouth*, *Yarmouth*, *Essex*, *Nassau* and *Prince Frederick* of 64, and the *Nottingham* and *Princess Augusta* of 60; to which may be added the *Anson* of 60, which came in three Days after, and the *Fire-Brand*, fire Ship.

All these Ships, it is to be observ'd, were either full mann'd, or nearly so, and four of them were Mann'd above their Compliments. And those in the Harbour were the *Royal*

Ann and *Duke* of 90 Guns, the *Barfleur* of 80, the *Swiftsure*, *Bedford*, and *Elizabeth* of 64, the *Bristol* and *Colchester* of 50, the *Romney* of 40, and the *Greyhound*, *Gibraltar*, *Nightingale* and *Unicorn* of 20; all of which, except the four first were also full mann'd, or nearly so.

But the sending this List did not answer the Admiral's End; no Orders came for supplying the Defect of Men till the 25th, when the Admiral was directed to take them out of the (a) Tenders and Hospitals; and then not till the Compliment of the *Stirling Castle* had been compleated first; which is so much the more remarkable, as he received an Express the Day before to dispatch Mr. *Keppel* in the *Effex* and *Gibraltar* to Sea, as soon as possible, and to supply the said Ships with what Number of Men they wanted out of the *Nassau*.

To shew, however, how well their Lordships understood Business, and how notably

(a) Tenders expected to arrive from *Liverpool* and *Ireland*, two only of which arrived before the Fleet sailed, the greatest Part of the Men from them put on board the *Sterling Castle*; the whole Number 198.

they

they could conduct it; on the 26th at five in the Evening it was the Admiral's Turn to receive an Express, informing him, that the *Ludlow Castle* was order'd to *Spithead* from her Cruise, with the Men borrow'd from the *Ramillies*; and directing him to take from aboard the *Stirling-Castle* the Men by former Orders shipp'd on board her out of the Tenders, together with 100 Men to be discharg'd out of the *Augusta*, towards completing the Compliments of his Squadron. He was also directed by the same Express, to distribute all the Marines he had on board among the several Ships at *Spithead* and in *Portsmouth* Harbour, and to receive Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment of Royal English Fuziliers in their Room. An Operation, which, together with procuring them Bedding, &c. found Employment for the Lieutenants, Boats, &c. till the 30th inclusive: And the next Day was employed in completing the Officers, Stores, Provisions, Water, &c.----

And now *April* the first at ten in the Morning, the Admiral received by an Express a Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, together with his Instructions, dated

March

March the 30th, inclos'd, which the same Secretary had on the 21st of the Month preceding prepar'd him to expect on the 23d following: The Letter required him, in the Name of the Board, to put to Sea with the first fair Wind, and to proceed without Loss of Time to the *Mediterranean*: There was also inclos'd in it, an Order for receiving on Board his Squadron Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment of Royal Fuziliers, for what Service will be explained in the Sequel: And of the said Instructions, it will be sufficient in this Place to say, That of all the Articles they were compos'd of, there is but one (regarding the Operation of the Enemy must be understood) positive; namely; That repeated by the Secretary, which required him to put to Sea as soon as possible, &c. For tho' it is admitted in the introductory Clause, That several Advices had been receiv'd, concerning the *suppos'd Intentions* of the *French* to attack the Island of *Minorca*, the next supposes, that their real Design was to slip through the *Straits of Gibraltar*, and direct their Course to *North America*; and makes a suitable Provision, for separating the Squadron, and sending off such a Part of it under Rear Admiral *West*, together with such a

proportionable Number of the Soldiers on board, as, added to the Ships he was suppos'd to find there, would render him *Superior* to the Enemy (in which Case it is to be noted, the said Soldiers could not have serv'd in the *Mediterranean* at all, and for this, that a Superiority was judged to be a requisite, essential to the Service.) And all the other Articles hingeing in like manner, upon Events, were accordingly, to be observed or not, as Circumstances agreed or otherwise.

In obedience to these Instructions and Orders, therefore, he directed the Captains of his Squadron, to take on board all the Men they had in the Hospitals, fit for Service, and to discharge all the Absent, that he might know exactly the Number wanting to compleat his Compliment; which in the Evening of the same Day were found to be 336; the greatest Part of them lent to the *Ludlow-Castle*, (*a*) *Hampton-Court*, and *Tilbury*, which were still at Sea: of this Defect he sent Information at four the next Morning by Express to the Board, desiring

(*a*) The *Hampton-Court* then at *Lisbon*, the *Tilbury* at *Cork* in *Ireland*.

their Lordships final Orders, in relation thereto, and it may be supposed he was so much the more sensible of it, because the *Torbay*, *Essex* and *Gibraltar* had sail'd Eastward on a Cruise the Evening before.

That Morning, however, about nine o'Clock, the *Ludlow-Castle* came to *Spithead*, and about four in the Afternoon repaid the borrow'd Men: With her also came in the *Intrepid*, Captain *Young*, having 261 Supernumeraries on board, but then 156 of these were wanting to make up the Compliment of that very Ship: So that there was still a Necessity to take 30 from the *Stirling-Castle*, and 70 Supernumeraries from the *Cambridge*, notwithstanding he had taken 43 from the *Colchester* and *Romney* before; which, without an Order from above, was done accordingly.

By these Shifts and in this precarious Manner, by the 3d of *April*, while the Squadron was getting under Sail in order to repair to *St. Helens*, the Deficiency of Men was supply'd: But then it ought not to be forgot, that Captain *Young*, upon receiving Orders the Day before to put himself under the

Admiral's Command, and to receive on board the only Company of Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment, not yet embark'd, waited upon him, with a Representation, That the *Intrepid* was not fit for a foreign Voyage, having made so much Water in her Passage from the *Nore* to *Spithead*, though her Ports were caulk'd in, that he was forc'd to scuttle the lower Deck, and let the Water down, in order to have it pump'd out: That he had receiv'd no Notice of his being destin'd for any such Voyage, and that he had neither Water, Provisions, or Stores for it.

This was as bad News for the Admiral as for him: However, as there was now no Remedy, on the 4th all the long Boats with an Officer in each, were order'd to repair to *Spithead* with empty Water Casks from the *Intrepid*, there to exchange them with the different Ships, for full ones; and in the mean while, her own Officers and Boats were employed in procuring and taking in the necessary Stores, Provisions, &c.

The next Day, the Admiral having issued out the Line of Battle-Signals, made
 the

the Signal at 11 o'Clock to weigh, and stood to Sea, but was forc'd by the Tide of Ebb, accompany'd with a Calm, to anchor again at three in the Afternoon.

I had almost forgot to specify, that on the 23d of *March* in the Afternoon, the Admiral receiv'd a List from the Admiralty, of thirty Officers, including two Colonels, order'd to their Posts at *Minorca*, together with thirty-two Recruits and eight Deserters; and of sixteen Officers, one Corporal, two private Men, and thirty-eight Recruits for *Gibraltar*; together with Orders to take them on board; which was done accordingly, as fast as they arriv'd; and that was not the Case with some of them till the Fleet was actually under sail.

And to this Recollection, I must also beg Leave to add another; namely, that the Admiral having, *March* 24, apply'd by Letter to the Board for an additional Frigate to repeat Signals, in case of coming to Action with the Enemy in his Passage out, he was never favour'd with any Answer to that Paragraph.

With

With the Squadron already particularis'd, then, on the 6th of *April*, he again put to Sea, palpably as soon as it was possible for him to do so, and after a tedious Voyage, occasion'd as well by *Calms*, as *contrary Winds*, arriv'd at *Gibraltar*, *May* the 2d.

What necessity for being thus circumstantial will be shewn in its Place.

And, as Premisses never to be lost Sight of, it is here to be observ'd, That as the Admiral's Instructions were, in general, founded on a Persuasion, that the *French* Armament at *Toulon*, was destin'd to *North-America*, so it was declar'd with the utmost Confidence, by those who ought to have known better, that, for want of Seamen, six or eight Ships of the Line at most, was the greatest Number the Enemy could possibly put to Sea from that Port.

For hence it is apparent, First, That we had either no true Intelligence at Home of what was really in Agitation at *Toulon*, or that we gave no Credit to it. Secondly, That Instructions unprecise in their Nature, because founded on Mistakes and Uncertainties,

tainties, accompany'd with Orders yet more unprecise and embarrassing, (as having nothing clear in them, but the Negligence or Ignorance of the Writers) could not but be productive of Perplexities and Difficulties in every Question they gave Rise to, consequently of Snares and Dangers in every Resolution taken upon them. Thirdly, That from the very different Aspect of Things on the Admiral's arrival at *Gibraltar*, from that which they had been made to wear in *England*, a Difference of Conduct became absolutely necessary; and thenceforward, he was either to proceed discretionally, or not to proceed at all.

Instead of six or eight Men of War of the Line, he was informed the Enemy had put to Sea on the 13th of *April*; *N. B.* (just a Week after the Admiral set sail from *St. Hellens*) with a Squadron of twelve Ships from sixty to eighty Guns; five Frigates from twenty to fifty; two Xebèques of eighteen, four Gallies, two Galliot, four Bombs, escorting 233 transports, with 18000 soldiers on Board, and 50 vessels freighted with Cattle, Stores, &c. And that instead of steering for *North-America*,

America, they had not only made a Descent on *Minorca*, but were moreover in actual Possession of the Whole Island, *Fort St. Philip* excepted.

I say then with this Difference in the real State, as well as the Aspect of Things, surely the most partial or violent Man in *Britain*, will not take upon him to insist, that the Admiral ought to have gone in immediate Quest of an Enemy so much his Superior in Point of Strength, for the mere Vanity of such a desperate Attempt! Surely the Difference between Brutality and Bravery is better understood amongst us; and none but the very, very Vulgar, are subject to that groundless Notion, That it is a Fundamental in the Navy-Discipline, for every *English* ship to engage two of the same Force of any other Nation!

And let none of these partial or violent Persons exult too hastily, because I have not as yet brought Commodore *Edgecumbe's* little Squadron to account.

So much in the Dark as we manifestly were with regard to the Motions and Designs

signs of the Enemy, and so much astonish'd and surpriz'd as we were known to be, when Day-light unawares broke in upon us; we have no Right to reckon on any one of the Ships that compos'd it. It is, besides, notorious, that they were all in the Enemy's Power; and that they did not actually fall into their Hand, was owing only to want of due Intelligence on their Side, and due Precautions to supply the Defect of it, which also contains a Brief of our own unhappy Case, with respect to *Minorca*.

Some little Reserve of good Fortune, then, is all the Merit we can pretend to on that Account: And when we farther see in what a Condition those Ships fell under the Admiral's Command, we shall find it was more owing to his good Conduct, than to any Foresight any where else, that they were at last render'd serviceable. — Which brings us to the Consideration of what pass'd on the Admiral's arrival at *Gibraltar*.

It was then from Mr. *Edgecumbe* himself, whom he found at *Gibraltar*, with

the *Deptford*, *Princess Louisa*, and *Fortune* Sloop, part of his Squadron, that he receiv'd the Information cited above: And having now, for the first Time, one positive Fact to reason upon, *to wit*, that *Fort St. Philip* was actually besieged, with a great Force compleatly furnished with all Manner of Ammunition and Provision, and the Siege cover'd with a Squadron abundantly stronger and better appointed, than had enter'd into any of the *Supposers* Heads to suppose possible, who dictated his Orders; it must be understood his first Concern was to consider, how he was best to conduct himself in Conformity to those Orders.

The *American* IF stated in the second Clause, as the Point of most *Probability*, with Respect to the *Design* of the *French* Armament, and yet again recurr'd to, and implicated in the third, was now out of the Question; as was also another in the same Clause; IF the *French* were still inactive in Port, in which Case he was to station his Squadron, (still suppos'd all-sufficient) in the best Manner to prevent their getting out: And he was now to *use all possible*

possible Means in his Power (the learned and able Secretary is to be answerable for this Tautology) for the Relief of the Place, taking proper Care, nevertheless, to exert his utmost Vigilance to protect *Gibraltar* from any hostile Attempt; which is not only understood, but expressed in his Orders; as also to protect the Trade of his Majesty's Subjects, and to annoy the Enemy wherever they might be found within the * *Limits of his Command*; with an Exception, however, to the Ports of the *Ottoman* Empire, which was with the utmost Circumspection guarded against.

And now what his Conduct really was, we shall endeavour to shew.

As soon as he had received from Commodore *Edgecumbe* the Information specified above, which was the Day of his Arrival, he issued immediate Orders, for all the Ships of his Squadron to complet their

* It seems his Orders did not impower him to attack the Enemy, even if he met them, without the Limits of his Command, as War was not then declared.

Provisions and Water with the utmost Expedition.

On the third he went on Shore to communicate to the Governor of *Gibraltar* his Orders in relation to a Battallion, to be detach'd from the Garrison, and to be embark'd on Board the Squadron for the Relief of *Fort St. Philip*.

The Governor had also Orders delivered to him from the War Office ; which, it seems, were to have been of the same Tendency, whether in Fact they were so or not : But, waving that Point for a Moment, new Matter in Abundance having arisen, which had not been so much as suppos'd at the Time of Penning them, and such as had been productive of Difficulties, hardly if at all to be surmounted, it was thought proper, in the first Place, to take the Opinion of the Engineers best acquainted with the Works of *Fort St. Philip* (the principal of whom had not only been in Service there, but when at Home, had been promoted to the Post he then held, on the Merit of bringing Home a Model of the Place) concerning the Possibility of
 Pro-

Probability of relieving the same, and they gave it under their Hands the same Day, That all Circumstances considered, it appear'd to them extremely dangerous, if not impracticable, to throw Succour into it.

This Opinion of the Engineers was moreover submitted on the Morrow, to a Council of War, compos'd of the Governor and all the Field Officers of the Garrison assembled, to take into Consideration the several Orders above acceded to.

And by the Way, tho' much has already been said of those from the War Office to General *Fowke*, and more of the Usage they have unhappily expos'd him to, it is hop'd the public will forgive a short Interjection in the Shape of Queries on the same Subject, which may possibly serve to throw some additional Light upon it. *To wit.*

Whether the Land and Sea service, are not distinct from and independent of each other? Whether they are not accordingly under the Direction of distinct Offices and Officers? Whether those employ'd in either of
the

the said Services, are Subject to any Orders, but such as are address'd to them through the proper Office they belong to? Whether for Example, an Order from the Secretary at War, can be understood to be of Authority to the Fleet, and *vice versa* from the Admiralty Board to the Army? Whether when both Offices are to co-operate in the same Service, the Orders given by both, ought not to correspond exactly in every Circumstance? Whether, in case of reciprocal Ignorance in each Office as to what is doing in the other, this necessary Co-operation might not be obtain'd, if the Secretary of State was in the Secret of both, as he ought to be, and was to give his Instructions accordingly? And lastly, When the Orders in relation to the same Service issued from both, instead of corresponding as above required, happen to be irreconcilable, whether the Land-officers are not to be justify'd, in adhering to those of the War Office, and the Sea Officers to those of the Admiralty?

And now having put these Questions which answer themselves, what is to follow is an Abstract of the two Commands, Videlicet. In the first Paragraph of Lord

Bar-

Barrington's first Letter to the General, dated *March 21, 1756*, it is said, The King has order'd the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers to embark immediately for *Gibraltar*, and that upon their *arrival* he is to make a Detachment from the four Regiments then in Garrison to *Minorca*: Which implies surely, That if the Detachment was to go, the Regiment was to stay. But, as if for fear this should not be plain enough, the next Paragraph is exprefs, That together with the Recruits for the Corps in his Garrison, the said Regiment was to be *disembark'd*, and *quarter'd* in the *Garrison* under his Command: Upon which said Disembarkation, he the said General, in obedience to his Majesty's *further* Pleasure, was to cause a Detachment, equal to a Batallion on the present *British* Establishment, to embark for *Minorca*. The next, without the least Reference to or Repeal of any Part of the former, reiterates the Order for causing a Batallion to embark on board his Majesty's Fleet for the Relief of the Island of *Minorca*, in case there should be any *likelihood* of its being attack'd. And the third, of *April 1st*, only directs him to receive such Women and Children belonging to the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers,

as Admiral *Byng* should think fit to land there; such is the War Office Language: And now what it ought to have been, we are to learn it seems, from that made use of by the Lords of the Admiralty in their additional Instructions to Mr. *Byng* of *March* 31. For therein it is not only signified, That the King had been pleas'd to direct, that the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers should serve on Board his Majesty's Ships in the *Mediterranean*, and also be landed at *Minorca* in Case the said Island was attack'd, and upon a Consultation with General *Blakeney*, it should be found necessary; but, moreover, that the Governor of *Gibraltar* had Orders (which we have seen he had not) to make a Detachment equal to a Batallion from his Garrison, in Case of a like Necessity for a further Reinforcement: And this Detachment, together with the said Regiment, the Admiral was required to land at *Minorca* under the Restrictions before specify'd, together with what other Assistance of Gunners and Men his Ships could possibly spare.

On the fourth of *May* the Council of War sat on these several Orders, together with

with the written Opinion of the Engineers, and the Situation of his Majesty's Garrisons and Forces in the *Mediterranean*; on a full Consideration of which, they were humbly of Opinion, that the sending the said Detachment would evidently weaken the Garrison of *Gibraltar*; and be no way effectual for the Relief of *Minorca*: Assigning for the Grounds and Reasons of this Opinion, That of the Engineers already mention'd, touching the Impracticability of introducing any Succours into the Place, the Insufficiency of the Number propos'd, if introduc'd for the Defence and Preservation of the Island in its present Condition, which seem'd to be the Scope and Meaning of the Letters and Orders before them: And the Imprudence of weakening the Garrison of *Gibraltar*, unnecessarily risking the Loss of an additional Number of his Majesty's Troops, without any reasonable Prospect or Hope of being of any Assistance to *Minorca*. To which was added the following Reason; which it will be expedient to give in their own Words. *To wit.*

“ Because the *Toulon* Squadron, by the
 “ best Accounts the Council have receiv'd,
 “ is at least equal in Force, if not Superior
 E “ to

“ to that under Admiral *Byng*: And should
 “ the *British* Fleet be *any way weaken'd* by
 “ any *Engagement*, or any other *Accident*,
 “ the Garrison of *Gibraltar* would be ex-
 “ pos'd to *imminent* Danger; and as the Gar-
 “ rison stands *at present*, it is not more than
 “ sufficient to the *common* Duty of the Gar-
 “ rison.”

But tho' they were induc'd by these Considerations not to go the Lengths indeterminately requir'd, which would have expos'd one Place, without preserving the other, they discover'd a Disposition to do whatever could be prudently done for the Good of the Service. Captain *Edgcumbe*, before his Departure from Fort *St. Philip*; had put on Shore all the Soldiers and Marines he had on Board his Ships, together with a considerable Number of Seamen, to make some small Addition to a Garrison notoriously deficient, and so far at least prolong the Defence of the Place; by which means, however, his Ships were left so thinly mann'd, that in case of an Engagement, no Service could have been expected from them. To remedy this Defect and enable these Ships to proceed to Sea, the Admiral apply'd to General *Fowke* for such

such a Detachment out of his Garrison as he could spare; and with the Approbation of the same Council of War, the General did accordingly furnish him, with one Captain, six Subalterns, nine Serjeants, eleven Corporals, five Drums, and two hundred thirty-five private Men: in all two hundred sixty-seven.

It was not, however, till the 6th, that he receiv'd a List of these from the Governor; and the very next Day also the *Experiment* join'd his Squadron, as the *Portland* and *Dolphin* had done two Days before: And now having dispatch'd two Expresses to *England*; that is to say, one on the 4th by the Way of *Madrid*; and a Duplicate of the same on the 7th by Lieutenant *O'Hara*, in the *Lovel Packet*; and having also done his best to supply all the Wants of his Squadron, on the 8th in the Morning he set sail, tho' the Wind was Easterly, and before his Ships were full water'd, which was owing not to any Neglect imputable either to Officers or Seamen, but the small Quantity of Water supply'd by the Springs themselves.

The Winds proving variable, and often interrupted by Calms, it was the 16th before

the Squadron could get up as far as *Palma*, the Capital of *Majorca*; and here the Admiral thought fit to send the *Experiment* to that Port, with a Letter to the Consul for what Intelligence he could supply him with; about which Time, a Ship close in with the Shore (discover'd afterwards to be the *Gracieuse*, a Frigate of thirty Guns; that, together with another Ship, suppos'd to be the *Amphion* of fifty, which quitted that Station the Day before, had cruiz'd off of that Port, and kept in the *Phœnix* for near three Weeks) was observ'd to stand away to the Eastward, with a fine Breeze, whilst the Squadron in the Offing was in a Manner becalm'd: And the next Day in the Afternoon, the *Experiment* rejoin'd the Squadron, (which was standing to the Eastward) with the *Phœnix* in Company, which last brought the Admiral some Intelligence of the Quantity of Cannon, Ammunition, and Provision, landed at *Minorca* by the Enemy, as also of their Manner of landing, and of treating the Inhabitants.

The Wind still continued Easterly, until the 18th at nine in the Evening, when a fine
Breeze

Breeze sprung up Northerly, and the Fleet failed large all Night.

The 19th at Day break; the Squadron being off the Coast of *Minorca*, about five o'Clock in the Morning, the Admiral sent the *Phœnix*, Captain *Hervey*, with the *Chesterfield* and *Dolphin*, Captain *Lloyd*, and Captain *Marlow*, a Head of the Fleet, to reconnoitre as closely as possible, the Harbour's Mouth, and the Situation both of the Enemy and their Batteries, as also to observe whether it was practicable, and where to throw any Succours into the Castle, to look out for the *French* Squadron, and to pick up if possible any of their small Craft, in order to procure Intelligence; in relation to all which Purposes, proper Signals were appointed for the Admiral's Information.

Captain *Hervey* was also charged with the following Letter from the Admiral to General *Blakeney*.

Ramillies

Ramillies off Minorca, May 19, 1756.

S I R,

“ I Send you this by Captain *Hervey* of his
 “ Majesty’s Ship *Phœnix*, who has my
 “ Orders to convey it to you if possible, to-
 “ gether with the inclosed Packet, which he
 “ received at *Leghorn*.

“ I am extremely concerned to find that
 “ Captain *Edgcumbe* has been obliged to re-
 “ tire to *Gibraltar* with the Ships under his
 “ Command, and that the *French* are land-
 “ ed, and *St. Philip’s Castle* is invested; as
 “ I flatter myself had I fortunately been
 “ more timely in the *Mediterranean*, that I
 “ should have been able to have prevented
 “ the Enemy’s getting a footing on the
 “ Island of *Minorca*.

“ I am to acquaint you that General *Stu-*
 “ *art*, Lord *Effingham* and Colonel *Cornwal-*
 “ *lis*, with about thirty Officers and some
 “ Recruits belonging to the different Regi-
 “ ments now in Garrison with you, are on
 “ board the Ships of the Squadron, and shall
 “ be glad to know by the Return of the Of-
 “ ficer,

“ ficer, what Place you will think proper to
 “ have them landed at.

“ The Royal Regiment of *English* Fuzi-
 “ liers, commanded by Lord *Robert Bertie*,
 “ is likewise on Board the Squadron destin-
 “ ed, agreeable to my Orders, to serve on
 “ Board the Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, un-
 “ less it should be thought necessary upon
 “ Consultation with you to land the Regi-
 “ ment for the Defence of *Minorca*; but I
 “ must also inform you, should the Fuziliers
 “ be landed, as they are Part of the Ships
 “ Compliments; the Marines having been
 “ ordered by the Lords Commissioners of
 “ the Admiralty on Board of other Ships at
 “ *Portsmouth*, to make Room for them, that
 “ it will disable the Squadron from act-
 “ ing against that of the Enemy, which I am
 “ informed is cruising off the Island; however
 “ I shall gladly embrace every Opportunity
 “ of promoting his Majesty’s Service in the
 “ most effectual Manner, and shall assist you
 “ to distress the Enemy, and defeat their
 “ Designs to the utmost of my Power.”

“ Please to favour me with Information
 “ how I can be most effectual of Service to
 “ you

“ you and the Garrison ; and believe me to
 “ be, with great Truth and Esteem,

S I R,

Your most Obedient

Humble Servant,

J. B.

Captain *Hervey's* Orders were to deliver this Letter if possible to the General, and as with a View to some such Service as this, a private Signal had been agreed upon between him and Captain *Scroope* of the *Dolphin*, who was in the Castle, and had kept his Boat, in order to come off upon Occasion, it was understood the said Letter would be delivered accordingly.

The Frigates thus dispatch'd with a fresh Gale Northerly, got round a small Island call'd the *Laire of Mahon*, about half an Hour before nine o'Clock, and when under the Land, fell into light Airs of Wind and Calms, but nevertheless, continued to make the best of their Way for the Harbour's Mouth.

About an Hour after the Squadron also got
 round

found the said Island, with a fresh Gale; and when within two or three Miles of *St. Philip's* Castle, (which was full in fight; with the *French* Colours flying before it at a small Distance, and both Sides at Intervals exchanging Shots as well as Shells) fell in as the Frigates had done before; with light Breezes and Calms.

And now it was that Capt. *Hervey* in the *Phœnix* still standing on for the Harbour's Mouth, made his private signals, but without the desir'd Success: No Answer was made: No Boat came off: And the Enemy's Squadron appearing at the same Time in the S. E. Quarter, the Admiral call'd in his Frigates, bore away for the Enemy, and made the general Signal to chase.

Both Squadrons made Sail towards each other; and about two in the Afternoon, the Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle a Head, which for want of sufficient Wind; could not be form'd so properly as it ought to have been. His next Care was to furnish such of his Ships as were sickly, and ill mann'd (which was the Case of several) with Seamen from the Frigates——

Thus he order'd 30 Men out of the *Phœnix* into the *Revenge*, and 20 into the *Deptford*; 40 out of the *Experiment* into the *Captain*, and 20 into the *Lancaster*, and out of the *Dolphin* 20 to the *Intrepid*, 20 to the *Defiance*, and 17 to the *Portland*.

Upon Captain *Hervey's* Representation, that there were proper Materials on Board the *Phœnix* (long ago reported Home unfit for Service) to convert her into a Fire-Ship, he issued Orders accordingly; under such Restrictions, nevertheless, as should not prejudice the Ship, in case she was not made use of in the Manner intended, to board, and burn any Ship of the Enemy's Squadron, that might happen to be disabled.

These Measures having been thus taken, a fine Breeze sprung up about seven in the Evening, and brought the two Squadrons within about two Leagues of each other; when almost at the same Instant both tack'd, no doubt, for the same Reasons, Namely, To avoid the Confusion of a Night-Engagement; as also, the *English* to gain, and the *French* to keep the Weather-Gage, which the Wind and the Situation
of

of the two Squadrons, had, at that Time, given them Possession of.

Night now came on, and the Wind freshening, the Admiral stood in towards the Shore, till half an hour after eleven, when he made the Signal for Tacking, and then taking advantage of the Wind from the Shore, stood off for the Remainder of the Night.

On the 20th, the Morning proving hazy, the Enemy were not to be seen; and two of their Tartans, falling in with our Rear by Mistake; one of them (having on Board upwards of 100 Soldiers, Part of 600, embarked from the Enemy's Camp the Day before to re-inforce the Fleet) was taken by the *Defiance*.

About seven, however, the Enemy were descry'd to the South-East, and the Admiral made the Signal for calling in his Cruizers; repeating it with several Guns at a small Distance of Time from each other, till it had been seen and observ'd by all of them.

About ten he tack'd, and stood towards

the Enemy; and having by the Dint of Seaman-
 ship, not only kept the Wind against all
 the Efforts of the *French* Commander to
 weather him, but form'd as compleat a Line
 as could be form'd, began the Attack, which
 the Enemy lay to, to receive.——— The
 Particulars of what followed cannot be ex-
 pected here. The Admiral has now more
 dangerous Enemies to combat with, than
 he had then. And for the sake of a com-
 pleat Narrative, must not throw away the
 Materials of his Defence.---- When the pro-
 per Time comes, every Man that is open to
 Conviction, will be convinced, that he acted
 in all Respects suitably to the great Trust
 repos'd in him; that without impairing the
 Honour, he never once lost Sight of the real
 Interest of his Country; --- That in every Or-
 der he gave, he made the best Use that he could
 possibly make of his Understanding; ---- That
 even what seems to be so inexplicable, with
 Regard to his ordering the *Deptford* out of the
 Line, will receive the most clear and satis-
 factory Explanation; ---- That the odious
 Imputations thrown on his personal Behavi-
 our, are as groundless as wicked; --- That
 he had, indeed the *Pleasure* to see the Ene-
 my give Way to the Impressions made upon
 them.---

them; --- And that nothing could equal his Mortification in not being in a Condition to follow them.

What his Condition really was, and what the Condition of the *Mediterranean* Service in general, he was now sadly sensible. "Instead of encountering six or seven Ships at most, he had met with twelve," far superior in Strength, far better mann'd, and far better Sailors than his own. --- These had suffered less in the Engagement, could be supply'd perpetually with fresh Men from the Camp on Shore; as had already been the Case; were near their own Ports; could return to the Charge with these Advantages whenever they pleas'd, and if they pleas'd to retreat could not be overtaken. --- His own Ships, on the contrary, such at least as had borne the Brunt of the Action, had sustained more Damage, than could easily be repair'd. The *Intrepid* from the very beginning, was not fit for the Service she had been allotted to, on the Evidence of her own Commander*; the *Portland* had not been cleaned for upwards of ten Months,

* See the Admiral's first Letter to the Admiralty Board, already publish'd.

nor the *Chesterfield* for twelve: And as to the Careening-wharfs, Store-houses, Pits, &c. at *Gibraltar*, they were entirely decay'd.— The Wounded were now moreover to be added to the Sick; and no Hospital Ship had been appointed for the Reception of either.— And as to the Relief of *Minorca*, he had neither the Battallion on Board; which was to have been sent on that Service; nor could he have spared the Fuziliers, if they had been a Number sufficient for it, which it is notorious they were not, without exposing the Squadron to utter Perdition, either in the Attempt to land them, if it could have been made, or in venturing on a second Engagement without their Assistance.

That however he might not rely on his own Judgment merely, as soon as he had taken the proper Measures to cover the crippled Ships, as also to repair and refit them, as well as it could then be done; he called a Council of War on Board the *Ramillies*; the Result of which is here submitted to the impartial World.

At a Council of War assembled, and held on Board his Majesty's Ship the Ramillies, at Sea, on Monday the 24th of May, 1756.

P R E S E N T,

The Hon. JOHN BYNG, Esq; Admiral of the Blue.

Major General <i>Stuart Temple West</i> , Esq;	rear
Capt. <i>Henry Ward</i>	Ad. of the Red
Hon. <i>Edw. Cornwallis</i>	Capt. <i>Philip Durell</i>
Capt. <i>Cha. Catford</i>	Capt. <i>James Young</i>
Hon. <i>Geo. Edgcumbe</i>	Capt. <i>Fred. Cornwall</i>
Capt. <i>John Amberst</i>	Capt. <i>William Parry</i>
Rt. Hon. Earl of <i>Es-</i>	Capt. <i>Arthur Gardiner</i>
<i>singham</i>	Hon. <i>Augs. Jo. Hervey</i>
	Capt. <i>William Lloyd</i>
	Rt. Hon. Lord <i>Robert Bertie</i> .

Having read to the Council of War the Opinion of the Engineers, in Regard to throwing in Succours in the Castle of *St. Philips*, the Result of a Council of War held by General *Fowke* at *Gibraltar*, with Regard to embarking a Detachment on Board the Fleet; likewise Admiral *Byng's* Instructions for his Proceedings in the *Mediterranean*; likewise the Order with Regard

gard to the Disposal of the Regiment of Fusiliers, commanded by the Right Honourable Lord *Robert Bertie*, and the Defects of the Ships which received Damage in the Action with the *French* Squadron, the 20th Instant; as also having laid before the Council the State of the Sick, and wounded Men on Board the Ships of the Fleet, propos'd to the Council the following Questions, *viz.*

1. Whether an Attack upon the *French* Fleet, gives any Prospect of relieving *Minorca*?

Unanimously resolved that it would not.

2. Whether, if there was no *French* Fleet cruising off *Minorca*, the *English* Fleet could raise the Siege?

Unanimously of Opinion that the Fleet could not.

3. Whether *Gibraltar* would not be in Danger, by any Accident that might befall this Fleet?

Unanimously agreed that it would be in Danger.

4. Whe:

4. Whether an Attack with our Fleet in the present State of it upon that of the *French*, will not endanger the Safety of *Gibraltar*, and expose the Trade of the *Mediterranean* to great Hazard?

Unanimously agreed that it would.

5. Whether it is not most for his Majesty's Service that the Fleet should immediately proceed for *Gibraltar*?

We are unanimously of Opinion, that the Fleet should immediately proceed for Gibraltar.

J. Byng

Ja. Stuart

Temple West

Henry Ward

Phil. Durell

Edward Cornwallis

Ja. Young

Cha. Catford

Fred. Cornewall

Geo. Edgcumbe

William Parry

John Amberst

Arthur Gardiner

Effingham

A. Hervey

Mich. Everitt

William Lloyd

Robert Bertie.

G

Here

Here then we have Authority as well as Reason, to justify the Admiral's Conduct in every Particular; and at any other Period but this, the unanimous Suffrages of so many Persons of distinguish'd Worth and Honour, would have commanded an universal Acquiescence. But so graceless and shameless are the Times we live in, that Endeavours have been used, even to blast this very Authority, by the Means of a wicked Insinuation, that it was more owing to the ill Opinion entertain'd of the Admiral, than their Conviction of the ill-State of our Affairs: As if it was possible for any such Number of Men to concur in a Prevarication of so infamous a Nature: Namely, to set their Hands to a Paper of such Importance, avowing one Motive, and guided by another.

But to proceed. Agreeable to the last Resolution of the Council of War, the Fleet stood to the Westward in the Afternoon, and after a tedious Passage, (occasion'd partly by contrary Winds, and partly by the Tardiness of the crippled Ships, one of which, the *Intrepid*, was sometimes forc'd to be taken in tow) arriv'd at *Gibraltar* on the 19th.

Here

Here the Admiral found Commodore *Broderick*, who had arriv'd four Days before with five Line of Battle Ships from *England*; (which by the way shew'd, that even the very Cabinet was at last convinc'd of the Nécessity of such a Re-inforcement; as a Means to transfer that Superiority to us, which till then had been on the Enemy's Side;) and it is to be observ'd, notwithstanding what has been given out, that the necessity of re-inforcing Admiral *Byng*, was known soon after his sailing from *England*, if not before, as may be seen by the Secretary of the Admiralty's Letter to him by Mr. *Broderick* *; and it is

* *Admiralty Office, May 21, 1756.*

S I R,

“ MY Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having received certain Intelligence, that the *French* are fitting out more Ships at *Toulon*, they have thought proper to re-inforce the Squadron under your Command with the Ships named in the Margin †, by whom this is sent to you.

“ These Ships carry out a Regiment of Soldiers, and will probably take more on Board at *Gibraltar* if they can be spared.

I am, S I R,

Your most humble Servant,

J. C——D.

Hon. Admiral *Byng*,
Mediterranean,

Receiv'd by Captain *Broderick* on the Arrival of the Fleet at *Gibraltar*, the 19th June, 1756.

† *Prince George* of 80 Guns, *Hampton-Court*, *Ipswich*, and *Nassau* of 64 Guns each, and the *Isis* of 50 Guns.

indubitable, that Mr. *Broderick* received his Orders*, and failed before there was a possibility of receiving any Letters from Admiral *Byng*, or any authentic Intelligence relating to his Squadron; though too late to enable the Admiral to answer the supposed Design of the Expedition; and it is likewise absolutely certain, that those very five Ships sailing with the Squadron under his Command, instead of following him too late, would have rendered the Superiority in those Seas indisputable. The *French* Admiral, who knew exactly his Force, would not then have dared to keep the Sea and wait for him.

The Admiral mindful of the Promise he had made to the Board, in one of the *suppress'd* Passages of his Letter, after the Action, “not to lose a Moment’s Time in case he found Stores to refit with, and a Re-inforcement at *Gibraltar*, before he fought the Enemy again, and once more gave them Battle;” his first Care was to order the Sick Men of the Fleet, amounting to near 1000, into the Hospital; after which he issued the following Orders. *To wit.*

* His Orders dated the 17th of *May*,

To all the Captains to refit their Ships for the Sea, with all possible Expedition.

To compleat their Water, having sent some Ships to *Tetuan* for the sake of Dispatch.

To send a-shore as many Carpenters and Sail-Makers, as they could possibly spare from every Ship, to assist the Master Ship-Wright and Store-keeper in carrying on the Service of the Fleet.

To the Captains of Mr. *Broderick's* Squadron, as they were ready for Sea, to send a-shore from each Ship, one Officer, and two petty Officers, with 50 Men, every Morning at Day-light, to assist in surveying the Stores, and selecting such as were fit for Service; as also to make a Report of their Progress every Evening.

To the Master Ship-Wright of *Gibraltar*, together with some Carpenters of the Fleet, to survey the Ships which had received Damage, and to make Report of their Defects.

To the Carpenter of the *Ramillies* to act as Assistant to the Master Ship-Wright in re-
fitting

fitting the Ships which had been damaged in the late Action.

And lastly, to the Agent Victualler, to compleat all the Ships to 70 Days Wine, three Months dry Provisions, four Months Beef and Pork, and to procure fresh Beef for the Seamen while in Port.

All these several Duties and Services were prosecuted with the utmost Diligence, till *July* the first, when the Fleet being nearly ready for the Sea, excepting the *Portland*, reported on a Survey unfit for Service, till careen'd, and the *Intrepid*, still in the *New Mole*, and in no great likelihood of being rendered fit for Service, Time enough to sail with the Fleet, the Admiral came to a Resolution to put to Sea on the 6th following, in quest of the Enemy, and to attempt the Relief of Fort *St. Philip*, which according to the Intelligence he had receiv'd, still continued to hold out: And whereas most of the Sick-seamen were still in the Hospital, incapable of Service; he propos'd to supply that Defect as well as he could, out of the Companies of the *Portland* and *Intrepid*, and by unmanning several of the Frigates, which
were

were to have been left behind: As also to apply to the Governor of *Gibraltar* for two Detachments of Soldiers, each equal to a Battallion, as specify'd in Mr. *Broderick's* Orders, which now could have been spar'd; seeing the Garrison had already been re-inforc'd with one Regiment brought on Board his Squadron, and two more were daily expected from *England*.

But these Resolutions of his, he was not permitted to have the Honour of carrying into Execution: For on the 2d of *July* arriv'd Sir *Edward Hawke* in the *Antelope*, with the Orders to supersede him, which were executed the same Day in the Manner already communicated to the Public.

And now having given a Sketch of the Admiral's Conduct, from the Day his Commission was bestow'd on him, to the Day he was depriv'd of it; with an Excéption to one very short Interval; another Sketch of the Returns he has met with at Home would make the most proper Companion for it: But as something of this Nature has already been done from sufficient Authorities in a late Pamphlet, call'd, *A Letter to a Member of Par-*

Parliament in the Country, relative to the Case of Admiral Byng, certain supplemental Touches will serve the Purpose as well; and even these need only be thrown in, partly to fortify the Opinion which is gaining Ground every Hour, That both the Admiral and his Fellow-sufferer *G*——— *F*——— have been thus severely dealt with, not so much for any Miscarriage of their own, as to throw a Mist over the Miscarriages of others, and partly to throw a little farther Light on the Origin of the whole Procedure.

And first, as to the Origin; we ought to take shame to ourselves, for having been so long hunting for it, in the *Actions* of the two Parties, and to the no small Entertainment, no doubt, of those in the Cabal; when the Truth is, that it can be found only in their *Words*.

In the Council of War, for Example, held at *Gibraltar*, *May 4*, a Mischief-making Paragraph was inserted, importing, That tho' the Detachment under Consideration, to be sent by Way of Succour to the Besieged at *Minorca*, was not likely at *that Time* to produce *any Effect*, yet it *might* have been

of *great Service*, had it been landed there *before* the Island was actually *attack'd*; and if a Squadron of his Majesty's Ships had been there, to co-operate with the Troops in its Defence and Preservation: And again, the Admiral in his Dispatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty of the same Date from the same Place, is also unguarded enough to say, " If I had been so happy to have arriv'd at *Mahon* before the *French* had landed, I flatter myself I should have been able to have prevented their setting a foot on that Island: But as it has so unfortunately turn'd out, &c.

In both these Paragraphs, those in the first Digestion of Business are by Inference made answerable for all Miscarriages and Misfortunes; and from the Moment their Penetration had made a Shift to keep them to this Discovery, they apparently resolv'd to make use of all the Arts of Recrimination, accompany'd with all the Weight of their Power and Influence.

Then as to the Proofs of such a Procedure, this opening is no sooner made, than like Water they flow in of themselves.

It is not usual to take the Enemy's Word for their own Feats and Performances; because notorious that the Bias of the Story will ever be in their own Favour. And it is certain there is not a Precedent in History to be found of any Process of any Kind, founded upon such Evidence. — But in this Case the Confederates, (not to give them a more severe Appellation,) no sooner receive an *Extract* of the Enemy's Account, pass'd thro' the Hands of one frenchified foreign Minister abroad, to another frenchified foreign Minister at home, un-authenticated in any Manner whatsoever, than, without waiting for the Advices they could not but expect from their own Commander in chief, they not only take the whole upon content, in the *worst Construction* the Words would bear, but also by grafting the superceding Orders upon it, ratify as far as in them lay, the Insult therein offer'd to the Glory of the Nation; to say nothing of the atrocious Injury done to the Officers so superseded.

A Fact incapable of Aggravation; and what will put to the Stretch, the Faith of Posterity to believe; and yet so it is, that *June* the 8th, but nineteen Days after the

Action, one Mr. *Cleveland*, Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in the Name of a good and gracious King, and by Order of their Lordships, thus writes to the Admiral; “ I am commanded by my
 “ Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to
 “ send you herewith, an *Extract* of M. *Ga-*
 “ *liffoniere*’s Letter to his Court, giving an
 “ Account of the Action, and to acquaint
 “ you, that his Majesty is so much dissatisfi-
 “ ed with your Conduct, that he has or-
 “ der’d their Lordships to recall yourself
 “ and Mr *West*, and to send out Sir *Edward*
 “ *Hawke*, and Rear Admiral *Saunders*, to
 “ command the Squadron.”

It is to be observed, that the *Extract* thus inclos’d was not in the Original *French*, but an Office Translation; and yet these are the most material Articles of it. “ The Engage-
 ment lasted about three Hours and a Half, or four Hours; but was not general during *all* that Time; the *English* Ships that had suffered most from our Broad-sides, having got to the Windward out of the Reach of the Cannon.

“ They have always preserv’d this Ad-

vantage not to engage, and after having made their *greatest Efforts* against our Rear, which they found so close, and from which they receiv'd so great a Fire, as not to be able to *break* it; they resolv'd to retire, and appear'd no more on the 21st."

The Amount of which is plainly this; That the *French* kept on the Defensive only; That in owning their Rear was expos'd to the Efforts of the *English*, they own they retreated before them, and that if the *English* did not break them, it was for want of sufficient Strength, not of Courage; which, with an Exception to one Circumstance, That they out-fail'd us, corresponds in the Main with our Admiral's own Account, and actually justifies his Conduct without impeaching his Bravery.

But indeed if the Credit of *France* had ever obtained such a Sanction from her Enemies before, neither this or any other Nation would have had one Victory to boast of against her; or a Commander for such a Service to reward: It is a Rule of theirs to be ever victorious; and a Variety of Proofs may
be

be produced of annual *Te Deums* fung for annual Defeats.

In the Case of the great Battle fought off of *Malaga*, in the Year 1704, between the confederate Fleet under Sir *George Rooke*, and that of *France*, under the Count de *Toulouse*, *Louis XIV.* in his Royal Capacity, ascribes the Victory, notwithstanding a great *Superiority* in *Number*, and the *Advantage* of the *Wind* on the Enemy's Side, to his own Fleet, and enjoins a *Te Deum* to be fung accordingly; and yet so little Regard was paid to his *Ipsè dixit* here at home, that instead of superceding, disgracing, imprisoning and making a public Victim of *Rooke*, he was complimented by the House of Commons, in their Address to the Queen, as deserving almost as much of his Country for that Year's Service, as the great Duke of *Marlborough*, who had just won the Battle of *Blenheim*.

There is no need of adding any Thing more on this Topic; every *Englishman's* Indignation will supply the rest.

It has been observ'd, That this unprecedented Order sent by one Admiral to blacken

en and ruin another, was dated *June* the 8th, and it follows of Course, that having once ventur'd to strike so bold a Stroke, the Confederates were under a Necessity of taking every Measure possible, to keep themselves in Countenance for having done so: when therefore, the Admiral's Account came to Hand, which set Matters in so very different a Light, it was incumbent on them to expunge every Passage, which could either help to undeceive the Public in Respect to the Conduct of the Admiral, or to expose (though innocently on his Part) their own: And as those Passages are now in Print, and can and will be prov'd to be genuine, it must be self-evident to every Man, who reads them, that they could be expung'd for no other Reason.

Having already proceeded against him as a beaten Coward, they could not bear he should ever so modestly claim a Victory; much less produce the Proofs; his lying to, to refit, for three Days together, often in Sight of *Minorca*, and of the Enemy's Fleet. Fore-seeing when too late, that the Island would be lost, they resolv'd to place the Loss to his Account,-----knowing *Gibraltar* had
had

had been taken no * better Care of. They would not suffer him to derive any Merit from covering it.---- Willing to allow a Council of War had been held upon the present Situation, they would by no means have it understood, that it was the present Situation of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, about which not the least Doubt or Contention arose.— And sensible of what Importance it was to themselves, that our Squadron should be thought superior to that of the Enemy, they falsify'd the Evidence in their Hands, which prov'd it to be otherwise.

Add to this that, not satisfy'd with having, in this perfidious Manner prostituted the *Gazette*, and the sacred Name of *Authority* placed at the Head of it, they caus'd the following Paragraph (for it could come from no other Quarter) to be inserted the *same* Evening, in a Paper known to be under their Influence, if not their Direction.

* See the weak State of the Garrison, as prov'd by General *Fowke* at his Trial; and compare it with the Advice from our Consul at *Carthage*, dated *April 21*, signifying, That twelve Men of War had been order'd thither, from *Cadix* and *Ferrol*; on what Account he could not explain.

“ We have received the following Circumstances, relating to the Conduct of a Sea-officer in great command, which, we are told, may be depended upon.

“ Though he solicited the Command, he *deferred* sailing from *England*, till very *pressing* Letters were sent him from Authority; many *strange* Delays happened in the Course of the Voyage; he *lost* seven Days at *Gibraltar*, when the utmost Expedition was necessary for the public Service; he was *twelve* Days upon his Passage from *Gibraltar* to the Distance of twelve Leagues off *Minorca*, where the *French* Fleet *happened* to find him; he called a Council as to the *Prudence* of venturing an Engagement; the bad Condition of the Enemy's Fleet occasioned their only maintaining a running Fight; Night, and the *Cautiousness* of our Admiral, put an entire End to the Skirmish; after staying *four* Days, without *seeing* or *seeking* for the Enemy, a Council was called to determine upon the *Expediency* of relieving Fort *St. Philip's*—the *Errand* they were sent out upon; when off *Mahon* Harbour another Council was called, in which it was *resolved*, that the endeavouring to throw in the designed Reinforcements

was too dangerous, and that the Preservation of the Fort was *impossible*; [against this Lord *Effingham Howard* of the Land Forces nobly protested;] another Point determined was, that the Non-appearance of the Enemy's Fleet made it probable they were fail'd against *Gibraltar*, and therefore, that it was *prudent* to get thither as fast as possible: — Where the *British* Admiral has since remained in perfect *security* and freedom from them."

To every Word of this the Reader has now a sufficient and satisfactory Answer in his Hand; and that he may be further convinc'd, that no Body in the Service, not as yet practic'd upon by the Confederates, either did or could harbour a Thought, similar to the odious Misrepresentations thus artfully and wickedly made of it, an Extract of a Letter to him from Sir *Benjamin Keen*, dated *June* the 14th, is here laid before him.

"As I *hope* this will *meet* you at *Gibraltar*, I lay hold of the earliest Opportunity to return Thanks likewise, for your Favour of the 25th off *Mabon*, which enabled me to contradict the *French* Accounts of the Action on the 20th; what they were I presume General *Fowke* will have communicated to you out of my Letters on that

Subject; and, in spite of their ARTIFICES, your remaining Master of the Field of Battle, decides the Advantage to have been on your Side, to the SATISFACTION of all IMPARTIAL PEOPLE.”

There is also another Paragraph in the same Letter, which the present critical Situation of the Admiral makes it also necessary to publish: It is true it will involve the Embassador in the original Sin, which has been visited with so much Rigour, not on him only, but also on General *Fowke*, and in some Degree, on almost all the Parties concerned in the Opinions given at the two Councils of War: But as no Pretence can be found for making an Example of him, nor Turn can be serv'd by it, he can apprehend nothing from it.

“ I most heartily join with you, Sir, in your Concern, That the *inevitable Obstacles* you had met with in your Navigation, retarded your Presence in the *Mediterranean* so long; and am fully persuaded, that if, EVEN with the Force you then brought, you had been in those Seas, BEFORE the *French* had engag'd themselves in the Enterprize, they would not have undertaken it: But as soon as they KNEW both the NUMBER of
I your

your Ships and their QUALITIES, and had COMPARED them with *their own*, they persisted in their Attempt, and would risk a Battle, though not an entire Defeat."

Whether Sir *Benjamin* made use of the same Language in his Letters to the Confederates, can be only known to themselves; but if he did, they paid it no Regard; and contrarywise went on as they had began, in exciting the Populace against the Admiral, by every wicked Device in their Power, and making their own Court to them at his Expence.

Thus a Merit was made in the *Gazette* and other News Papers, of an Order sent to all the Ports to put him under an Arrest, as soon as he arriv'd; which was done accordingly at *Portsmouth* on the 26th of *July*.

Whether these Orders were regular or not, it is certain they were as unusual as severe. Messrs. *Matthews* and *Lestock* were to the full as obnoxious to the Justice of their Country, as Mr. *B*— had been represented to be, and yet they were left at full Liberty, as if no Charge could be maintain'd against them, or no Consequence was to be expected from it.

And though Admiral *B* -- and Rear Admiral *West* had been equally involved in, and

disgrac'd by the superceding Orders, (which the Former in his animated Letter to Mr. *Cleveland* thereon, on Mr. *West's* Behalf in the most gallant Manner resent'd) special Care was now taken to funder them by the most invidious Distinctions. For while one was kept a close Prisoner on Board the *Antelope*, the other was not only permitted to repair to *London*, but was caress'd in the most extraordinary Manner.

Particulars recollected at this Time, not for the Sake of insinuating ever so remotely, that these Favours were unworthly bestow'd on a Man whom the Admiral still continues to esteem as highly as he deserves; but of reminding the Public of the inhumane use that was made of them, in the following Article of News, dated *July 28!* at the Drawing-Room at *Kensington*, where there was the greatest Levee that has been known for many Months, Admiral *West* was distinguish'd by his Majesty in a very particular Manner, who was pleas'd to say, "Admiral *West*, I
 " am glad to see you; I return you my
 " thanks for your gallant Behaviour; and
 " wish every Admiral had follow'd your Ex-
 " ample."

It was obvious, this was meant to give the
 Coup-

Coup-de-Grace to the Admiral and his Cause.—For if the Public could be persuaded, that the King had already pre-judg'd and pre-condemn'd, who should presume to absolve him? And with such an Air of Confidence deliver'd to the Public as this Article was, who but those of the first-Rate understandings, would have been able to discover the Forgery, by reflecting on the utter Impossibility, that the sovereign-Judge should thus openly declare himself a Party, or that the Current of Justice should run polluted from its very Source?

After this Piece of Practice then (which was sufficient to humble the stoutest Heart) we are not to wonder at the Load of Indignities, Hardships, and Outrages, since heap'd upon him.

His Letter to Mr. *Cleveland*, giving Notice of his Arrival, and inclosing a Duplicate of his former upon his being superseded, serv'd only to produce an Order from the Admiralty, directing the Marshal to take him into his Custody, and continue him, for the Present, on Board the *Antelope*, though it might be suppos'd his Health, and it was manifest his Situation, requir'd all the Helps and Consolations that the Shore and his Friends and Relations could give him.

And

And after he had been accordingly continued there some Time, the Head of a certain Board, was graciously pleas'd to intimate, That when he was weary of his Birth he would apply for a Removal----which, however, did not happen, till the melancholy Incident of his Brother's Death, (which had also the most barbarous Constructions put upon it) oblig'd him----and then he was only remov'd from one Ship to another.

When order'd up to *London August* the 5th, he was surrounded with a Guard of Soldiers, though an Admiralty-Prisoner, and when remanded upon the Road (because those who had sent for him were not as yet agreed how to dispose of him) he was remanded on Ship-board again.

On his second Removal on the 9th following, guarded as before, he was not appriz'd, till he came as far as *Kingston*, whither he was to be convey'd; and when brought to *Greenwich* after Midnight, found no Provision of any kind made for his Reception.

Though still an Admiral, the Son of a Peer, and a Member of Parliament, he was hoisted up to the Top of the Hospital, into an Apartment where People were yet a-bed,
and

and where he was told, he was to accommodate himself as well as he could; which for the Remainder of the Night he did accordingly, by making choice of the Floor and his Portmanteau:

In this Situation, obliged to furnish his own Prison with every Convenience it wanted, he thought it high Time, to put their Lordships of the Admiralty in Mind, that no Body in the like Case had ever been used with such Rigour before: But their Lordships were not condescending enough to honour him with any Reply.

On the contrary, Centinels were placed at his Door, the Marshal was order'd to keep him as closely confined as possible, the Governor play'd the Part of Goaler in Chief, pleading sometimes Lord *A*—'s Orders, and sometimes Orders of Council for it; so that every Hour made it more and more dubious, whether he was the Governor's Prisoner, or the Marshal's Prisoner, consequently whether he was to be try'd by a Court-Martial, or as an Offender against the State.

And during this whole Interval, his Character was deliver'd over to the Populace, to gratify upon it the worst Passions, that the worst Artifices and Instruments could raise; in

in so much, that there is not a Species of Libelling in Prints, in Verse, or in Prose, that has not been exhausted to render him odious: The very Ghost of his reverend Father has been raised, advising him to lay violent Hands on himself—Last dying Speeches and Confessions have been prepared for him.—Mock Executions have been spirited up to make the Way easy for a real one; and Epitaphs fit only for the Devil himself to inspire, have consigned him over to everlasting Infamy: Forgetting, that the worse the Case, the less Need there is of Aggravation, and that an over Charge implies a Defect of real Matter.

But whatever Effect these wretched Devices have had on the Rabble they were address'd to, they have had none on him—unconscious of having done any Thing inconsistent with his Duty, or even his Instructions—or unbecoming his Station in the severest Sense considered, he has all along regarded them with the Disdain, the Contempt and the Derision they so justly deserve: Nor is it to be understood, that any one Complaint herein letter'd, concerning his past or present Sufferings, ever rose from him—His Resentments, if he may be allow'd to have
any,

any, arising from much higher Considerations.

It will not be deny'd, however, that, after his Adversaries had in this Way beggar'd both their Wit and their Malice, they did hit upon an Expedient, which not only ruffled the Composure he had till then preserv'd, but rais'd his Indignation.—This was the shameless Forgery, of his attempting to make his Escape in his Sisters Cloaths; of which he had so much the quicker Sense, because the only Concern he had at Heart was the Vindication of his Honour; and that he well knew could only be done effectually by a Trial as public as the Injury it had sustain'd. Had therefore the Prison-Doors been thrown open for him, he would not have purchased Liberty and Life at so dear a Rate: And were his Trial to be dropt on the Side of his Prosecutors, they would find he himself would insist upon it, according to a Resolution he had taken from the Moment his Flag was struck.

Whether it will or can be a fair one, after what has been said and done to set the whole World against him, and the Precedent already set in the Case of G—— F——, let the Reader judge for himself when he comes to the End of this Narrative.

The bare Hint of an Escape, though start-

ed only by themselves, and never so much as dreamt of by the Prisoner, was now to be countenanced by new Precautions, such as additional Bolts and Bars, additional Guards of Soldiers, and as if all were not sufficient, a Boatswain and twelve Men of the Hospital by way of Supplement, to watch in the Court below.

Nor was it long before this new Officer was made, to see four Men at his Window in the Middle of the Night; upon which the Alarm was given, strict Search was made, the Officer upon Duty leading the Way,--- and though these Men in *Buckram* were not to be found, nor any Trace that they had ever been there (the Marshal himself sleeping in the outer Room, and his Prisoner in the Inner,) yet this Figment was also to have an Air of Truth thrown upon it, by a further Parade of new Fortifications----No less than eleven Smiths being the next Day set to work, by the officious Governor, assisted by a proportionable Number of Bricklayers, to wall up suspected Doors, (indeed to leave but one open, for the Use of a Water Closet only, two Stairs down was now forbid) and not only to bar up all the Windows, but (as if they had thought him capable of performing the famous Bottle Miracle) even the very

Chimneys too*.

For what Purposes these wise Measures were taken, and this extraordinary Vigilance was shewn, is not worth Enquiry. But if it was to shew, the Prisoner was to expect no Favour, the Trouble might have been spar'd, for that had been already proclaim'd by every M——and every one of their Echoes; who were known to talk of his Destiny, on all Occasions, with as much Confidence, as if it was hardly in the Power of Providence itself, to rescue him out of their Hands.

As therefore, they had, in the most public Manner, before declar'd, if not bespoke the Royal Displeasure against him, so these sanguinary Discourses serv'd as a proper Lesson to all their Dependents and Followers--- Admiral B---- was the stricken Deer, which all were to unite in goring out of the Herd. And it was to be understood of Course, that to entertain a Doubt concerning him, much more to drop any Expression in his Behalf, or shew him Countenance by any personal Advance or Civility, was an Offence unpardonable both against King and Country.

* The worthy *Governor or Goaler* was so jealous that his Care and Diligence was not sufficiently conspicuous, that he reprimanded the Workmen for not having made the Bars across the Chimney Tops to project, so that all Persons passing might see them.

Out of some Mouths a Hint is a Warning, and a Caution a Menace: And to the Disgrace of human Nature, they have had their full Effect, wherever they have been communicated: These in Possession, and those in Expectancy of Preferment, have been intimidated alike: And what is worst of all, the rendering him unpopular, has render'd those who bid for Popularity, almost as fearful of appearing for him, as those in the Service, not to take a Part against him.

Let it be imagined then what Difficulties he has to struggle with, even in prosecuting the common Forms of his Defence; and what he has further to apprehend from a Continuance of the same indirect Practices, which have hitherto been made to operate so notoriously to his Prejudice.

Instead of sinking, however, under such a Variety of Pressures, as it is probable his Enemies hop'd he would, and meant he should, he has never yet betray'd the least Sign of Dejection or Dismay, much less of Distrust in his Cause; but, on the contrary, has manifested the same uniform Composure, except in the single Instance of the forged Escape, through the whole Series of his Persecutions. — This is a Truth his said Enemies are well appriz'd of, would fain suppress
if

if it were in their Power, and endeavour to falsify as much as they can. ——— But tho' they may pronounce him guilty, they cannot make him so; and till condemn'd by his own Conscience, he will to the last Gasp assert and maintain his Innocence:

The Events of War are uncertain----so it is said in his Majesty's most gracious Answer to the *London Address*; and so it has always been said ever since Mankind recorded their Miseries. But, according to the Procedure now carrying on against Admiral B—, the Commander that cannot convert Uncertainties into Certainties, must run his Country or forfeit his Head,—Ministers are but Men, and Men are all fallible — such has been the Voice of the World till now—but now the World is to learn a new Creed—That more or less Power bestows more or less Infallibility; and consequently, that he who has the most, must always be most in the Right.

It has hitherto been esteem'd a national Duty to assert national Honour, and more especially against the open Attacks of an open Enemy——But now it seems the Reverse is to be the Practice; and those who have the Lead amongst us, are not only become so complaisant as to give up the Point of Honour on the first Challenge, but their Cham-
pion

pion too, or as the Vulgar would express it; whatever M. de la *Galiffoniere* SAYS, they are ready to SWEAR.

And upon the whole; let every thinking Man in *Britain* ask himself a few such Questions as these: Whether the putting such a Change as this upon him is not one of the highest Affronts that could be put upon his Understandings? Whether in the Case of Admiral *B*—— it has not been put upon the whole Community? Whether any Pretence of Delusion, Rashness, Prejudice, Wantonness, or even Connection and Influence can excuse any Man for suffering himself to be made an Accessary to it? And whether it has not a direct Tendency to ruin the Service both by Sea and Land, by discouraging Men of Parts and Character from engaging in it, and thereby throwing it wholly into the Hands of Fools and Madmen; since none but such will accept a Commission on the ignominious Terms of serving with a Halter about their Necks, that a Knot of domineering Grandees may be exempt not only from Punishment but Imputation?

E R R A T A.

Pag. 7. l. 17. after the Word in, add, *the Torbay with*
 P. 11. l. 8. for *repaid*, read, *returned*.

F I N I S.

A N
A P P E A L
T O T H E
P E O P L E :

C O N T A I N I N G,
The Genuine and Entire LETTER of
Admiral *Byng* to the Secr. of the Ad—y :

O B S E R V A T I O N S on those PARTS of it
which were omitted by the Writers of the *Gazette* :

A N D
What might be the REASONS for such
O M I S S I O N S.

—————Nec lex est æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.

OVID.

P A R T the First.

L O N D O N :

Printed for *J. Morgan*, in *Pater-Noster-Row*.

1756.

A N
A P P E A L
T O T H E
P E O P L E, &c.

IN all States of whatever Plan the Constitution may be formed, general Prejudices are extremely apt to take too strong Possession of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the People so open to the Influence of that Impulse as in Governments; where, from the Nature of the Establishment, they make a Part of the legislative Power.

FROM this Cause at present in this Kingdom; constituted on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable, that as well as anciently in *Athens* and *Rome*, popular Condemnation and Applause are more particularly visible in the Actions of all Ranks of Men, than in monarchic or despotic States: Hence it is, that those who become the favourite Objects of this People, are for the most

B Part

Part preserved inviolate from the Malevolence of the M——rs, and those who become Objects of their Resentment or Contempt, are abandoned to the full Force of m——l Attacks. No Man can be safely punished, or safely permitted to escape Punishment, when the Nation is in great Ferment, contrary to the general Opinion of his Deserts, however well inclined the M——rs may be to save or destroy.

THIS Consent or Disapprobation of the Public, frequently proves to be the just Counterpoise which weighs against the ministerial Inclinations, when unreasonably intended to reward or punish those who become the Objects of the national Consideration, and a necessary Sanction to all their Proceedings of a public Nature; for these Reasons, whenever, by m——l Measures long misconducted, some sinister Event becomes the Consequence of their Administration; those in the Cabinet who have little Honesty and less Understanding to direct a Nation either in Peace or War, to appoint proper Means for attacking their Enemies, and protecting their own Country by Land or Sea; in short, those who are unequal to every Duty of a M——r, are still cunning enough to think it indispensibly necessary, to throw the whole Blame and Disgrace of the ill Success, on the visible Object who presided in the Scene of Action, to fascinate the Understandings of the Multitude by delusive and partial Representations,

tions, and sculk from their Indignation behind the Resentment, which their Adherents and Abettors have craftily raised against the Commander in the Day of Battle.

To quote Instances of this Kind, would be to mention almost all the past Facts in History, in which Military Affairs have proved unsuccessful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or Incapacity, of the M——rs, and the Chief in Command has been called to public Justification : and indeed as the Dependants of M——rs must be more numerous than those of a suspected Commander, and as the Love of Money and their own Interest is more particularly prevalent, in such Men, than the Love of Honesty of Truth, and of their Country, it has too generally happened, that by means of m——l Faction, the innocent Commanders have been condemned by the People, and the guilty Administration not attended to or acquitted. It has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the People has generally pronounced righteous Sentences, when all the Circumstances of the Affair have been brought before it ; and even where the Decisions have been either defective or unjust, that it has been chiefly owing to partial and unfair Representations of the Subject ; for these Reasons, it necessarily becomes the Interest of all Ministers, who intend to transfer the Guilt of an Action from themselves to the Commanders in any unfortunate undertaking, to

conceal and misrepresent every Circumstance, which can possibly offer any favourable Idea, for the Justification and Defence of those who have unhappily miscarried in their Endeavours, under their wrong Directions and ill-concerted Measures, and to destine them the public Sacrifice and Atonement for their Inability or Iniquity.

To effect this, and their own Preservation, Ten Thousand idle and groundless Reports, which may tend to countenance and support that Part of the Affair only which they think necessary to be offered to the Public, are daily spread by their Emissaries; hence it arises, that from partial Views of the whole Circumstances, from limited Considerations of the Subject, Things appear to be just, which are the rankest Injustice, the Guiltless die, and the Guilty escape from condign Punishment.

THIS has frequently been the Consequence of Craft in M——rs, and many an innocent Man has suffered from this cruel Cunning of Men in Power; by these Arts the Passions of the People, greatly incensed and knavishly seduced, have been misled to condemn Men as Destroyers of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who are only made to appear in that Light, by the Wickedness and Wiles of those very M——s who ruined the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of the Sovereign; it is during this Tumult in the
Minds

Minds of Men, too turbulent at first to be appeas'd by, or listen to, the Voice of Reason, that M——rs have taken Occasion to sacrifice a Commander in Chief, to appease the Wrath of the People and save themselves.

THIS having been already the Event in numberless Instances, must naturally prevail again, and be attempted, whenever an iniquitous, weak, or inattentive M——r entertains the Design of screening himself from Punishment, by the Death of another Man less criminal; without this Precaution, the first Impetuosity in the Multitude subsiding, and more Truth being let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that which was condemned under a partial View, becomes approved of under a general one, the M——r receives that Fate which he had allotted for the Commander, and Justice takes Place where Heaven always designed it should, on the nefarious.

· It may perhaps by this Time be suspected, that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a Justification of the late Behaviour of Admiral B—g, and that I, his Advocate, am endeavouring to screen him from the public Resentment. Nothing is less true; my Intent is only to lay the whole Affair candidly before you, assuring you at the same Time, that no Man can be more irritated against his Conduct than I was in the beginning, 'till what I am going to offer to
your

your Opinions became the prevailing Power over mine.

I AM fully convinced that the People of this Country have the Love of Justice so strongly implanted in their Bosoms, that nothing can efface or over-rule it by direct and open Force ; but I know also, that by Concealment of Truth and Misrepresentation of Circumstances, the Minds of Multitudes, as well as of the wisest Individuals, may be warped from Equity, and induced to determine diametrically opposite to right Reason, however ardently they seek the Truth.

INDEED, I freely own my Sentiments are much altered, by being indulged with authentic Evidence of Admiral B—g's Behaviour in the *Mediterranean* ; and appealing to you as Judges of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when what I have to say is laid before you, even in granting the most unfavourable Opinions you can entertain of him to be just, you will allow that he has been most unjustifiably dealt with by those who sent him on the Expedition.

BETWEEN perfect Innocence and perfect Guilt there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of Offence ; and as no Man can say he is without Fault, so none can be pronounced all Guiltiness ; the Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees as those who commit them ; and the Nature of Justice is such, that unless it be truly adapted to
the

the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injustice ; and that which is the due Punishment for one Crime is converted to Cruelty, when inflicted for the Commission of a less ; though it be just to condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too severe to deprive those of Life, who steal Bread to satisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of perishing by Hunger ?

IN Cases of Disloyalty, the Officers who are most active in recruiting Troops against their King, and bravest in the Day of Battle, are always considered as less culpable in the Breach of their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators of the Rebellion, though they never appear in Arms ; the most obvious Objects of Resentment are frequently the least guilty of all who are concerned.

In like Manner, when M——rs have heretofore been determined to sell the Interest of their K—g and Country, those whom they employed to execute their Purposes, however guilty, have been considered as less criminal, whilst their Leaders, like *Satan*, first tempted to sin, continue tempting others to their own and the Nation's Ruin ; not that I say this to intimate that this Kingdom has been sold on a late Occasion, much less that Mr B—g is conscious of the Sale. I know he is not ; but to show only that in such aggravating Instances even, there must be Men more notoriously guilty than
the

the most obvious Offender, and that it therefore becomes necessary to point out who they are, that the foremost in Offence may be first in Punishment, and not by removing the subordinate, preserve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more Mischief to their Country's Ruin.

To fix the Degree of every Crime in the Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an Act of Justice, as to protect the Innocent or condemn the Guilty; and to lay the Case of Mr *B—g* fairly before you, must appear a laudable Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and just Men, because every *Englishman* has a Right to a fair Plea and candid Judgment; and without being acquainted with all the Circumstances, no Decision can be made but what must be partial and defective. If it shall appear then, at the End of this Enquiry, that Misrepresentation, Calumny, Concealment of Truth; and Tales of Falshood, propagated and committed by those who pursue Mr *B—g*, and their Confederates; have induced you to pronounce those severe Censures which have been passed against him; when Things come to be placed in their true Light, and the Mist of Craft removed from your Eyes; when, if it be apparent that your Judgment has been misled by erroneous and partial Representations, shall not then the Love of Justice move ye to reverse those Decrees which ye have already made, and the Love of Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of
your

your former Decision, with the same Zeal with which you embraced it, you will then think it as much the Duty of an *English* Subject, and of a Man, to remit your Resentment against Mr *B—g*, as it will be to direct it on the great Promoters of your Ruin and Disgrace.

WITHOUT manifesting this Candour, Men obstinately confess, that they prefer following an Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth which may have been long hidden from their Perceptions, by the most malignant Artifices of the most pernicious Men: This Reflection, I hope, shall never be imputed to the Behaviour of *Englishmen*.

IN this View and to this Intent I stand forth, not as the Friend or Advocate of Mr *B—g*, but as the Friend and Advocate of Justice, my King, and Country; to make apparent to all Eyes, how the first has been violated, and the latter abused and ruined; to explain how it becomes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr *B—g* be ever so enormous, to provide that it be fairly examined, and the Ad——l impartially treated; to show you in what Manner those Evidences, which favour the Justification of him, have been cruelly with-held from the public Eye, basely misrepresented, and others added to insinuate their coming from his Hands; and in his Place permit me to speak to the Hearts and Understandings of all *Englishmen*,

C

uncorrupted

uncorrupted and uninfluenced by m——l Bribes, Places, and Pensions. Let me suppose that any one indifferent Man amongst you had been employed in a military Action of Consequence, and had written to either of the others an Account of his Behaviour, and of the Transaction on which not only his Honour but his very Life depended, is there a Man amongst you who would have concealed or misrepresented any Part of this Account, with Design to accomplish the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you would not have committed such Baseness. What then is the just Due of such Men, if such there are, who have dared to commit an Action of that Nature, not improbably, duping their R——l Master to this iniquitous Intent, without his Knowledge of the real Circumstances, and making you, the honest Subjects of this Realm, Abettors of all this horrid Injustice? What then must be the State of that Man's Bosom, who may have seen his own Letter stripped of every Part which can make most effectually in his Favour, imperfectly given to the public Examination, and the People enraged against his Conduct by this partial Representation of his own Account, concealing the most material Circumstances which determined him to behave as he did.

WHAT profligate and abandoned Hearts must such Men possess, who, by Omissions of whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Letter,

ter,

ter, and Additions of others, can lessen the Force of his Justification in an Affair of Life and Death, change the Account of his Proceedings, and almost efface the whole Meaning of the Letter, to make his own Words condemn him to the Multitude, by speaking half what they express, and extorting, by this new Way of putting Letters to the Torture, so contradictory to the Spirit of the *English* Laws, a Meaning so different from what they truly import, a Confession of Guilt which is not to be found in the whole uncastrated Original. If this appear to be a true Representation, you will not withhold a just Resentment on this Occasion; and that it is, I dare to make appear from such Proofs, that even the greatest Enemy against Mr B—g shall be obliged to confess his Conviction of the Truth of what shall be said; and that, however guilty he may appear to be, in Comparison with his Oppressors, he is as innocent as the Person who treads on a Worm compared with *Cain* who slew his Brother, or he who burns his own Hovel, to him that set Fire to the shattered Ruins of *Lisbon* amidst the Calamities of the Earthquake.

IN Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven, if what I shall offer to your Consideration appears to be Fact, How are such barbarous Proceedings reconcilable with Humanity, or essentially different from a Forgery? to add what can undo a Man, or erase what can preserve him,

how do they vary in the Nature and Consequence of the Design? And to aggravate the Heinousness of the Offence, it is not like the despicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his Money, but like that of depriving him of his Life; it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it may be to murder.

Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery, when men, by leaving out the most material Circumstances of a Man's Defence, lessen the Force, or change the Import of the whole, rendering him to the People the detested Object of their Indignation and Desire of Punishment? Is it not by such cruel Means that he may become unjustly condemned? Added to this, if it shall appear that this Iniquity is purposely committed to screen themselves from their just Rewards, what is it but an execrable Endeavour to take away the Life of a less guilty, perhaps innocent, Man, to save their own destructive Heads from condign Punishment.

ANY Attempt of this Nature appears the most inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evidence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts which justify, and retaining those which seem to condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Witnesses? Is it not obliging the very person to give Testimony contrary to the Truth of the Fact, and repugnant to his own Preservation?

IF this should appear to be the Case with Respect to the Man whose Conduct I am going to lay before you ; if M——rs shall be found to have dealt with him in this inhuman Manner, I doubt not but the Tide of Resentment, which has so long and so violently ran against him, will be turned in his Favour, and set as strongly against those that may be discovered to have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to preserve themselves.

THIS Attempt of faithfully placing before your Eyes the real State of an injured Fellow-Subject, will I hope be forgiven ; injured he must appear to be, however Guilty, because no Man's Guilt can justify the concealing or altering the Nature of his Evidence, or representing him to his Countrymen more criminal than he is, with Design to see him over-borne by the Torrent of Popular Prejudice.

IN my Endeavours to do this, I shall only lay before you the genuine Letter which was sent to the S——y of the A——y by Admiral B—g, dated on board the *Ramillies* off *Minorca*, May the 25th, 1756, in it's intire State, unmangled by the Writers of the *Gazette* ; endeavour to investigate the true Motives which induced the publishing of it in this imperfect State, on *June* the 26th, and impartially explain

plain the Mischief it was probably designed to do Mr B—g.

THIS I presume is justifiable in the Eyes of Heaven and Earth, to devellope and characterise the Designs of Men in such Proceedings against the A——l, and to examine if Self-Preservation, attempted by Cruelty and Injustice, might not have been the chief Motives to this inhuman Conduct.

ALL I request, is a calm and dispassionate Examination of the whole Affair, and what there is to be said upon it; and then, though Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly erased, more especially those which are received against the imagined Enemies of their Country. I entertain not the least Suspicion, but to prove the Person against whom this Tempest of Injuries has been let loose, who has been drawn, hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town, is the least Guilty of all concerned in the Conduct of the Affair in the *Mediterranean*, the least meriting such opprobrious Treatment, and the most worthy your Protection; and that all those injurious Proceedings will be found to have taken Birth from conscious Guilt, the Fear of your Resentment, and public Justice, and to with-hold your Eyes from discerning the just Objects of your Indignation: By this, I mean not to soothe your Hearts to disproportioned Mercy; all I desire is, that you may be alike

alike just in your Decisions to every Man proved a Delinquent ; let not the great, when proved Offenders, screen themselves by the Sacrifice of the less criminal ; distinguish their Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your Opinions freely of the Punishment which is due to each, for without your Approbation, they will not presume to condemn him unmeriting it ; and if you are still deluded to believe amiss by partial and unjust Representations, will they not screen themselves and complete his Destruction however Innocent ?

ALL I mean by what has been already urged, is to appeal to your Tribunal, in Justice to you who have been so flagrantly abused by deceitful Representations, and made Accomplices in Abetting the wicked Purposes of bad Men, in Justice to my own Convictions, and the Sensations of a humane Heart, which has been deeply touched with Resentment of this Barbarity towards Mr *Byng* ; in Justice to, and Compassion for one, who by injurious and unmerited Ill-Usage from their Hands, has been rendered so obnoxious to the Public, that scarce a Man dares openly appear to be his Friend.

PERMIT me now, to lay the true Copy of the Letter as it left the Hands of Admiral *Byng*, before you, uncurtailed or altered.

A Genuine Copy of Admiral *Byng's*
Letter to the Secretary of the Ad-
miralty.

The Parts printed in *Italics* and Comma's, mark
the Parts omitted in the G A Z E T T E.

Ramillies, off Minorca,
25 May, 1756.

S I R,

I HAVE the Pleasure to desire you will ac-
quaint their Lordships, that having sailed
from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the
19th, having been joined by His Majesty's Ship
Phœnix, off Majorca, two Days before, ,, by
,, *whom I had confirmed the Intelligence I re-*
,, *ceived at Gibraltar, of the Strength of the*
,, *French Fleet, and of their being off Mahon.*
,, *His Majesty's Colours were still flying at the*
,, *Castle of St Philip's, and I could perceive*
,, *several Bomb Batteries playing upon it from*
,, *different Parts; French Colours we saw fly-*
,, *ing on the West Part of St Philip's. I dis-*
,, *patched the Phœnix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin*
,, *a Head, to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth,*
,, *and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to land a*
,, *Letter for General Blakeny, to let him know*
,, *the Fleet was here to his Assistance, though*
,, *every one was of Opinion, we could be of no*
,, *use to him, as by all Accounts, no Place was*
,, *secured*

„ secured for covering a Landing, could we have
 „ spared any People. The Phœnix was also to
 „ make the private Signal between Captain
 „ Harvey and Captain Scrope, as this latter
 „ would undoubtedly come off, if it were prac-
 „ table, having kept the Dolphin's Barge with
 „ him; but the Enemy's Fleet appearing to the
 „ South-East, and the Wind at the same Time
 „ coming strong off the Land, obliged me to call
 „ those Ships in, before they could get quite so
 „ near the Entrance of the Harbour, as to make
 „ sure what Batteries or Guns might be placed
 „ to prevent our having any Communication with
 „ the Castle." Falling little Wind, it was Five
 before I could form my Line, or distinguish any
 of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all to judge
 of their Force more than by their Numbers,
 which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared
 large. They at first stood towards us in a re-
 gular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I
 judged was to endeavour to gain the Wind of
 us in the Night; so that being late, I tacked,
 in order to keep the Weather-Gage of them, as
 well as to make sure of the Land Wind, in the
 Morning, being very hazy and not above five
 Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards
 the Enemy at Eleven; and at Day-light had no
 sight of them. But two Tartans with the
 French private Signal being close in with the
 Rear of our Fleet, I sent the Princess Louisa to
 chase one, and made the Signal for the Rear-
 Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send

Ships to chase her; the Princess Louisa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a great Distance, but the Defiance took her's, which had two Captains, two Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two private Soldiers, who were sent out the Day before with Six Hundred Men on board Tartans to reinforce the French Fleet, on our then appearing off the Place. The Phœnix, on Captain Hervey's offer, prepared to serve as a Fire-Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate, 'till the Signal was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her Decks, every thing else being prepared, as the Time and Place allowed of. The Enemy now began to appear from the Mast-head; I called in the Cruisers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the Enemy, and formed the Line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to Leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me: They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and five Frigates. As soon as I judged the Rear of our Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours might become equal in Number with theirs. At Two I made the Signal to engage, as I found it was the surest Method of ordering every Ship to close down on the one that fell to their Lot. And here I must express my great Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which the Rear-Admiral set the Van the Example, by
instantly

instantly bearing down on the Ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the French Ships to begin the Engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down ; I bore down on the Ship that lay opposite me, and began to engage him, after having received the Fire for some Time in going down. The Intrepid, „*unfortunately*” (in the very beginning had his Fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on his Fore-sail and backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut at the same Time, so that he drove on the next Ship to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head of me to throw all aback ; this obliged me to do so also for some Minutes to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our Adversary out of the Line, who put before the Wind, and had several Shot fired at him from his own Admiral. This not only caused the Enemy’s Center to be unattacked, but left the Rear-Admiral’s Division rather uncovered for some little Time. I sent and called to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid’s Place. I found the Enemy edged away constantly, and as they went three Feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the Advantage of destroying our Rigging ; for though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found I could

not again close the Enemy, whose Van were fairly drove from their Line; but their Admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this Time 'twas past Six, and the Enemies Van and ours were at too great a Distance to engage; I perceived some of their Ships stretching to the Northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new Line; I made the Signal for the headmost Ships to tack, and those that led before with Larboard Tacks, to lead with the Starboard, that I might by the first, keep (if possible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the second, be between the Rear-Admiral's Division and the Enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad Condition, and whose loss would very greatly give the Ballance against us, if they had attacked us the next Morning as I expected. I brought to about Eight that Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships as fast as possible, and continued so all Night. The next Morning we saw nothing of the Enemy, though we were still lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. I sent Cruisers out to look for the Intrepid and Chesterfield, who joined me the next Day; and having, from a State and Condition of the Squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has lost her Captain) were much damaged in their Masts, *„ so that they were endangered of not „ being able to secure their Masts properly at „ Sea;*

„ Sea; and also, that the Squadron in general
 „ were very sickly, many killed and wounded,
 „ and no where to put a Third of their Num-
 „ ber, if I made an Hospital even of the Forty
 „ Gun Ship, which was not easy at Sea.” I
 thought it proper in this Situation, to call a
 Council of War before I went again to look for
 the Enemy. I desired the Attendance of Gene-
 ral Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert
 Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might
 collect their Opinions upon the present Situa-
 tion „ of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make
 „ sure of protecting the latter, since it was found
 „ impracticable to either succour or relieve the
 „ former with the Force we had; for though we
 „ may justly claim the Victory, yet we are much
 „ inferior to the Weight of their Ships, though
 „ the Numbers are equal, and they have the
 „ Advantage of sending to Minorca their
 „ wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Sea-
 „ men from their Transports, and Soldiers from
 „ their Camp; all which, undoubtedly has been
 „ done in this Time that we have been laying
 „ to to refit, and often in Sight of Minorca;
 „ and their Ships have more than once appeared
 „ in a Line from our Mast-heads. I send their
 „ Lordships the Resolution of the Council of
 „ War,” in which there was not the least Con-
 tention or Doubt arose. „ I hope indeed we
 „ shall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and
 „ if I have any Reinforcement, will not lose a
 „ Moment's Time to seek the Enemy again, and
 „ once

„ more give them Battle, though they have a
 „ great Advantage in being clean Ships, that
 „ go three Feet to our one, and therefore
 „ have the Choice how they will engage us,
 „ or if they will at all, and will never let
 „ us close them, as their sole View is the dis-
 „ abling our Ships, in which they have but
 „ too well succeeded, though we obliged them to
 „ bear up.” I do not send their Lordships the
 Particulars of our Losses and Damages by this,
 as it would take me much Time, and that I am
 willing none should be lost in letting them know
 an Event of such Consequence. „ I cannot help
 „ urging their Lordships for a Reinforcement,
 „ if none are yet sailed, on their Knowledge of
 „ the Enemy's Strength in these Seas, and which,
 „ by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days
 „ be strengthened by four more large Ships from
 „ Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now sailed
 „ to join these.” I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin
 Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making
 the best of my way to „ cover,, Gibraltar ;
 from which Place I propose sending their Lord-
 ships a more particular Account.

I am,

S I R,

Your most humble Servant,

Hon. John Cleveland, Esq;

J. B.
P. S. I must

P. S. I must desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that I have appointed Captain Hervey to the Command of the *Defiance*, in the room of Captain Andrews slain in the Action.

I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out, whilst I was closing my Letter."

BEFORE I proceed to examine what may have been the probable Reasons for omitting the above Paragraphs printed in *Italics* and Comma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic Lists of the Fleets which engaged in the *Mediterranean* under the Commands of Admiral Byng and Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*, as they were in Number of Ships, Number of Men, Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal; and from a fair Comparison in these Particulars, show you on which Side, and to what Degree the Advantage lay.

THE Honourable Admiral Byng's Squadron,
when he engaged Monsieur *De La Gallisson-
nière's* off Cape *Mola*, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the			Men.
		Lower Deck.	Middle Deck.	Upper Deck.	
		lb.	lb.	lb.	
Ramillies - -	90	32	18	12	780
Culloden - -	74	32		18	600
Buckingham - -	68	32		18	535
Lancaster - -	66	32		18	520
Trident - -	64	24		12	500
Intrepid - -	64	32		18	480
Captain - -	64	24		12	480
Revenge - -	64	24		12	480
Kingston - -	60	24		9	400
Defiance - -	60	24		12	400
Princess Louisa -	56	24		12	400
Portland - -	48	24		12	300
	778				5875
Frigates.					
Deptford - -	48				280
Chesterfield - -	40				250
Phoenix - -	22				160
Dolphin - -	22				160
Experiment - -	22				160
Total - - -	932				6885

MONSIEUR *De La Gallissonniere's* Squadron, when he landed the Troops at *Minorca* 18 *April*, and at the Engagement with Admiral *Byng's* Squadron off *Cape Mola*, 20 *May*, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the		Number of		Total Men on board each Ship.
		Lower Deck.	Upper Deck.	Sea-men.	Soldi-ers.	
		lb.	lb.			
Foudroyant -	84	52	24	700	250	950
La Couronne -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Guerrier -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	150	800
L'Hipopothame	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Fier - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Triton -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Lion - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Contant -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Sage - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
L'Orphée - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
	328			6800	1550	8350
Frigates.						
La Juno - -	46			300		300
La Roze - -	30			250		250
La Gracieuse	30			250		250
La Topaze -	24			250		250
La Nymphé -	24			200		200
Total - -	982			8050	1550	9600

IN the first Place, the Number of Ships was equal on each Side ; from this then no Advantage was to be drawn by one Party above another. As the Frigates on either Side did not engage, notwithstanding the *French* exceeded the *English* greatly in Number of Men and Weight of Metal, I shall not attempt to derive from that Circumstance any Argument of the Superiority of the *French* Fleet to that of the *English*, but consider those Ships which were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remarking the Weakness of that Objection to the Conduct of the Admiral, in leaving the *Deptford* out of the Line ; when the same Thing was done by Monsieur *La Gallissonniere* in not taking the *Junon* into his Line ; the first being of Forty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-six.

THE Number of Ships being equal, the next Consideration is the Number of Guns ; and in this Article, according to this List, which was received from a Person the best enabled to give a just Account, and the least to be suspected of doing the contrary, the *French* Fleet exceeded the *English* by Fifty Cannon, the Number of the first being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight, and of the second Seven Hundred Seventy-eight, which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of the *French* ; but as it may be objected, that, according to other Lists printed by Authority, the *Hipopothame* and *Fier* are given as Fifty Gun Ships

Ships only, we will suppose that to be the right; and then the Number of *French* Cannon exceeds the *English* by Twenty-two Guns only.

THE next Article which comes under Consideration is the Weight of Metal; and in this Place it seems necessary to remark, that it is the usual Custom to denominate the Weight of Metal by the Guns which are on the whole Decks only; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes are only mentioned in the List of the *Ramillies*, and two in that of the *Foudroyant*, that there were ten of the Number on board the *Ramillies* on the Quarter Deck and Forecastle, which carried six Pounds only, and on board the *Foudroyant* Twenty-four, which placed in the same Parts mentioned in the *Ramillies*, carried only Shot of Twelve Pounds.

THE *Foudroyant* and *Ramillies* then may be thus considered with Respect to the Cannon which each carried.

Foudroyant.		Ramillies	
Guns.	Weight of Shot.	Guns.	Weight of Shot.
30	of 52 Pounds.	25	of 32 Pounds.
30	24	26	18
24	12	28	12
—	—	10	6
84	2268 lb. each Charge.	—	—
—	—	90	1696 lb. each Charge.
—	—	—	—

DEDUCTING then the lesser from the greater Number, the Weight of the Shot fired by the *Foudroyant* in a Discharge of all the Cannon, exceeds that of the *Ramillies* by Five Hundred Seventy-two Pounds, almost a third of the whole Quantity. The Number of Men on board the *English* Ship, was Seven Hundred and Thirty: on board the *French*, Nine Hundred and Fifty: which gives a Majority of Two Hundred and Twenty Men to the *French* Ship. Now, on a Medium, we may allow Eight Men to a Gun on board the *Foudroyant*, as her Metal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the *Ramillies*; this will make Six Hundred Seventy-two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and Seventy-eight at the small Arms, on board the *French* Ship; and Five Hundred and Forty at the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety at the small Arms, on board the *Ramillies*, which gives a Majority of Eighty-eight small Arms Men to the *Foudroyant*, almost a third superior to the *Ramillies*. In this Account we have computed, the Officers and others employed in various Duties, amongst the small Arms; and as each Ship has probably an equal Number engaged in these Services, whatever is allowed, being allowed alike on board each Ship, it leaves the same Proportion amongst the small Arms Men; this then effects nothing on the Validity of the Reasoning.

LET me then imagine them all engaged on board each Ship, the *Foudroyant* discharging from the small Arms, two hundred and seventy-eight Balls, and the *Ramillies* one hundred and ninety, the *French* Ship's Fire in this Respect exceeds the *English* by eighty-eight Ball in each generally Volley ; let me suppose also, that a Number of Cannon equal to the whole Sum in each Ship, be discharged in a Minute, which seems no improbable Supposition, since Cannon are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land-Service ; the Excess of Weight of Metal in the *Foudroyant*, compared with that fired by the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be thirty-four thousand three hundred and twenty Pounds, a most amazing Superiority. If we allow at the same Time, four Discharges of the Small-Arms in each Minute, then the Number of small Shot fired from the *Foudroyant*, more than from the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be twenty-one Thousand one Hundred and Twenty, which increases the Chance of the Men being killed on the upper Decks on board the *English* Ship equal to that Number. The Advantage drawn from the small Arms, is then exactly in Proportion to the Number in which one Ship exceeds another, and the Advantage of the heavier Shot discharged from the Cannon, is as the Diameter of each exceeds the other ; let me suppose a thirty-two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Diameter, such a Shot can pass between two Objects eleven

eleven Inches distant from each other, and touch neither of them; whereas, allowing a Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches diameter, and to pass in the same Direction with the former, this last Ball *may* destroy, but *must* inevitably wound both Objects: Again, if you suppose a Ball of ten Inches diameter, to pass within half an Inch of any single Object, that of twelve passing in the same Line by the increased Diameter, must destroy or injure it: In like Manner as the Diameter in Shot increases, the Holes which are made in the Sides will be increased also; thus two Men may be killed by the biggest Ball, and not touched by the lesser; two Ropes cut by the biggest, and not touched by the lesser; and Masts and Yards carried away by the increased Diameter of the heavy Ball, which will be untouched or less affected by the lighter; besides this, Holes between Wind and Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being proportioned to the Diameter also, the Danger of sinking is increased, as the Water which flows through the great Aperture, is more than that through the lesser; every Broadside then fired from the *Foudroyant*, carries a Probability of doing more Mischief than that from the *Ramillies*, as the Diameters of all the Balls taken together, fired from the *French* Ship, exceeds that of the *English*; and for this Reason it is in a great Measure, that the Masts, Yards, and Rigging, are more damaged on board *English* Ships in Battle than on board *French*.

HENCE

HENCE in every View, except Number of Cannon, which are only six small Guns of six Pounds, the *Foudroyant* is superior to the *Ramillies*, almost as three to two; in this Manner of computing the Superiority, which appears to me to be just, if for three to two in Force, we put three to two in Ships, which amounts to the same Thing, on which Side ought a prudent Man to expect the Victory.

I do not by this Manner of computing each Force, propose to reduce the different Degrees in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and demonstrative Exactness, but only to show nearly, how much the Superiority of the *French* Ship was greater than that of the *English*; as to the Size of the Ships, the *Foudroyant* is the largest.

IT may be objected, probably, that the Charge and Discharge of a Cannon, instead of taking up one Minute, may take up five or perhaps ten, and each Man at the small Arms employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fufee; even then this will create no Difference, the same Time being allowed alike to each Ship, the Superiority of Powers on board the *Foudroyant* to those on board the *Ramillies* will be still preserved the same; and the sole Alteration arising from this is, that by less firings; the Superiority

periority is not so often exerted, and the Proportion of four to three still remain.

IN this Manner of comparing the different Strengths of the two Fleets, I have pitched upon the two Ships which were the nearest a Match for each other, and here the odds were as four to three. Between the *Couronne* and *Culloden*, it is still greater, and when you descend lower, and compare the seventy-four and sixty-four Gun *French* Ships, against the sixty-eight, sixty-six, sixty-four, and sixty Gun Ships of *England*, it is three to two; so that the Proportion of four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for the Superiority of the *French* Fleet over the *English* as they met in the *Mediterranean*.

HENCE it evidently appears, that if this third Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve *French* Ships, leaving each an equal to the *English*, there would remain a sufficient Force to equip four Ships more, then the Number would be sixteen *French* Ships to twelve *English*, a Superiority not to be attacked by a prudent Man, scarce at any Time, and in this particularly wrong, as we shall show in the following Pages.

THE inexpressible Ignorance of those who appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Expedition, if the succouring *Minorca* was the Design of it, must appear absurd beyond all Expression,

Exprefſion, not to give it a worſe Appella-
tion.

HAVING in this Manner endeavoured to aſcertain the Superiority of the *French* to the *English* Squadron, let me now aſſign the Reaſons for the *French* Cannon being ſo much heavier than the *English*. Firſt, the Pounds of *France* being heavier than thoſe of *England*, a Shot which they call a thirty-fix Pounder, is almoſt equal to a forty-two Pound Shot *English*; and in the above Liſts, the Weights are reduced to the *English* Standard; another Reaſon was, that to increaſe the Force on board each Ship at *Toulon*, Cannon were put much heavier than uſual on board Ships of ſuch Rates, to make them as much ſuperior as poſſible to the *English* in the Day of Battle, apprehending no Danger from this increaſed Weight, as the Navigation was ſhort, in Summer Seas, and ſmooth Water. And that it may not appear extraordinary, that Ships ſhould carry Cannon of twenty-four Pounds on the Upper-Deck; the *Invincible* in our Service, taken from the *French*, carries ſuch Guns at preſent.

THE Liſts of each Fleet were placed in the Beginning, to give a juſt Idea of the Strength of them, and to place the whole in a clearer View, which may be ſaid in the following Sheets, where we ſhall mention that given to the Public in the *Gazette*, with

Mr *Byug's* Letter, to show how fallaciously it was inserted to insinuate it's coming from his Hands.

HAVING transcribed the Letter, given the Lists of the Fleet and their different Force, let me now enquire what may be the Nature of the Paragraphs omitted in the *Gazette*, and from thence attempt, if it is not possible to deduce the true Reasons for the Omissions of them.

THE first Article omitted, refers to a Letter sent from *Gibraltar* by the Admiral, on his Arrival at that Place in his Voyage to *Minorca*, and addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. This Letter contains an Account of the Number of the *French* Fleet which escorted the Embarkation from *Toulon*; the landing of fifteen thousand Men at *Minorca*, from about a hundred and sixty or two hundred Transports, a concern for the Admiral's not being sent time enough to prevent this Descent, which he imagines he could have effected, had he been sent sooner; Reasons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place unless a sufficient Number of Soldiers could be sent to dislodge the *French*, considering the immense Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and Provisions of all Kinds which they brought with them, adding, immediately " I am determin-
" ed to sail up to *Minorca* with the Squadron,
" where I shall be a better Judge of the Situa-
" tion

“ tion of Affairs there, and will give General
 “ *Blakeney* all the Assistance he shall require.”
 He then expresses *his* Opinion, that of the
 Chief Engineers at *Gibraltar*, who had served
 at *St Philips*, and of the other Officers of the
 Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situa-
 tion of the Harbour, of what might be the Suc-
 cess of his going to it's Relief, and his and their
 Reasons for those Opinions. He then mentions
 an enclosed List of the Strength of the *French*
 Ships at *Toulon*, and a Copy of a Letter of In-
 telligence to General *Blakeney*, giving an Ac-
 count of the Equipment on that Occasion ; and
 thence infers an Apprehension of the *French* at-
 tacking *Gibraltar*, adding, that if *Mabon* could
 not be relieved, that he should look upon secur-
 ing *Gibraltar* as his next Object.

HE then goes on to express his great Con-
 cern, in finding at *Gibraltar*, few or no Stores in
 the Magazines to supply the Squadron ; and that
 the careening Wharf, Sore-houses, Pits, &c.
 were entirely decayed ; with the great difficulty
 of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at
 that Place, and no Carpenters could be spared
 from the Fleet which was proceeding to *Mi-
 norca* ; he then mentions his having appointed
 a proper Person to transact every Thing towards
 preparing what was necessary, with all possible
 Speed, adding something relating to the Coun-
 cil of War held by General *Fowke*, and the
 Result of it.

THIS Letter was never given to the Public, for Reasons too evident to be named; yet this is the Letter from which those wise Heads inferred that the Admiral would not Fight; which in the Opinion of every honest Man, will convey Ideas very different from founding the Presumption of branding him with Cowardice; and which, though without Design, affords very just Reasons to blame the Conduct of the great Head of the A——y.

THIS Letter, if the Publick have any desire to see, accompanied with some others, may probably be laid before them.

Is not then the omitting the first Article of the Letter in the *Gazette*, designed to prevent all Knowledge or Enquiry about the different Force of the two Fleets, to keep your belief of Superiority on the *English* side, and delude you to conclude from the Equality of the Number, that Mr *Byng* was extremely delinquent in not vanquishing the *French* Squadron.

THE next Article seems omitted with intent to suggest, that the Admiral's Squadron was never in Sight of *Port-Mahon*, and that he avoided meeting the *French* Fleet, or proceeding directly to Mr *Blakeney's* Assistance; whereas by the Objects which he saw, and indeed it will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that
after

after getting round the small Island, called the *Laire of Mabon*, at Ten in the Morning he was within a League of the Port; but on seeing the Enemy's Fleet, he thought it more immediately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to meet them. This obliged him to recall, with Reason, the three Frigates which he had sent a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, to land a Letter for the Commander of the Garrison, to acquaint him the Fleet was arrived to his Assistance, and to know in what Manner it could be of the most effectual Service.

THIS Behaviour will now I imagine, appear to be suggested by the utmost Prudence, all that could have been attempted in the Space of an Hour, and the most advantageous Step which could have been taken on that Occasion: It proves that the Admiral depended not on the hear-say Evidence which he had received, even from the best Authorities at *Gibraltar*, nor on the united Opinion of every Officer at that Place: But that he was determined to be certified of the true State of the Harbour and Citadel from General *Blakeney* himself, as he knew that Captain *Scrope*, who, together with all the Soldiers and Marines of Mr *Edgecomb's* Ships, and one hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the Garrison, would come off in his Barge, and bring him a just Relation of every Circumstance necessary to be known; and though he adds the

Opinions

Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, that
 ‘ they could render no Service to the Garrison,
 ‘ as no Place was covered for the landing of any
 ‘ Men, *could they have spared any.*’ In this he
 only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the
 other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence
 on his Conduct, and was only meant to signify
 what might have been the Event, supposing
 the *French* Fleet had not appeared at that Time.

So far then neither Knowledge of his Profes-
 sion, Prudence in conducting the Expedition,
 or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be
 deficient in him.

HIS Letter to Mr *Blakeney*, sent by Mr *Her-
 vey*, though never delivered, for Reasons imme-
 diately to follow, will evince this Truth, and
 the Public may be satisfied by seeing it also if
 they please.

THE first Care of the Admiral, after coming
 in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State
 of the Harbour and Garrison, to encourage the
 General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him
 that he was arrived to his Succour, and desiring
 to know how it might most effectually be put
 in Execution.

ARE not now the Reasons which induced
 the publishing this Letter, mangled in that
 Manner, sufficiently convincing? Was it not
 from

from a Perswasion, that those Passages would convey to your Understandings the most undeniable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Conduct, and Duty, in the Commander of the Fleet, the Man whom they seem too determined to destroy? Did not they know that those Words would create a Suspicion, that an Admiral, so provident in every other Respect, could not be guilty of what they chuse to lay to his Charge? And the last Words, *Could we have spared any People*; Do not these plainly pronounce Negligence, Ignorance, Inability, or something worse, in Men whose Duty it is to preside and direct in the equipping a Fleet? Does it not naturally create this Question, Why a Fleet, sent with Intent to relieve *St Philip's*, and assist the Garrison against a Siege from a very powerful Enemy, was unsupplied with Troops for that Purpose? This would probably have condemned the Equippers of the Fleet, and exculpated the Admiral. This was a too dangerous Hint to be trusted with the Public; they felt in their own Hearts that this Neglect or Design could not be imputed to him as a Crime; he neither fitted out the Fleet or planned the Expedition; they also knew that it must fall on them in your Opinion, and therefore it was necessary to be concealed from your View.

LET these Men, whose Duty it was to prepare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, answer

swer me, when I ask them in the Name of you, the People of *England*, who have a just Right to know, by what Means and from what Manner of Reasoning it came to pass, that a Fleet so unequal to the Enemy's as this has been proved to have been, and without Troops, was sent to relieve *St Philip's*? Nay, even supposing a Falshood, that the Force of the Two Fleets had been equal, and even that the *English* had carried Troops with that Intent, Why was the Success, of such Consequence to the Nation, left to the precarious Event of an Equality in Strength, which might have been easily prevented by sending more Ships, uselessly riding at Spithead? No Man, however prejudiced, will presume to utter, that either of these Neglects or Oversights, to say no worse, are to be imputed as Crimes to Admiral *Byng*. Nay, permit me to assert, if the Admiral had not been induced to believe that the *French* Fleet could consist only of Seven Ships, and this from Men who ought to have known the contrary, he never would have undertaken the Command without a proper Force; his principal Fault was believing them to speak Truth, and his Force of Course sufficient.

AND though it has been assiduously reported by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men, that he requested the Command, they will not openly assert, he sought it any otherwise, than by the general Offer of his Service to his King and
Country,

Country, which becomes the Duty of every Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War.

THUS then all Things appear to be well conducted to the Time of the *French* Fleet's appearing in View; when on seeing the Enemy, Considerations of another Nature took Place, and it became necessary to defer the Execution of all Resolutions which he had taken since he saw *Mabon*, and to recal the Men of War which he had dispatched to reconnoitre the Harbour, and procure Intelligence from General *Blakeney*. It was now to no Purpose to know the State of the Citadel and Harbour before he had engaged the *French* Fleet; he had no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the Complements of his Ships, and served as Marines; and if he had been provided with them, it would have been absolutely imprudent to have landed them before the Engagement with his Enemy, and thereby render that Force less, which was already too little for the Intent it ought to have been sent upon. Landing the Troops would have rendered the Fleet unfit for Action, and obliged it to flee before the Enemy. Had the Admiral behaved in that Manner, such a preposterous Act could not have failed rendering him justly delinquent, and unequal to the Command he presided in.

HE knew that if Success was the Consequence of engaging the *French*, that he should have it

more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far as landing the Troops, which served as Marines, could effect it. But he suspected also, and with Reason, that he might probably be rendered unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the Victory, and therefore prevented from effectually succouring the Citadel.

So far all appears to have been conducted with the greatest Knowledge and Prudence, and the most partial Advocate for his Opponents can draw no reasonable Objections to his Proceedings.

THIS Passage of his Letter, omitted in the *Gazette*, cannot well proceed from Clemency to the Admiral, nor from Tendernefs of not irritating the Multitude more vehemently, by giving them all the Letter, as it hath been reported with such Diligence.

I PRESUME it will rather appear this Tendernefs began from other Motives, and nearer Home; since it seems too evidently to prove, that those who planned the Expedition, prepared and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all Measure either ignorant or wicked.

THEIR Precisenefs in omitting an individual Word is no small Argument of their Attention and Care; the miserable Epithet *unfortunately*, in describing the Loss of the *Intrepid's* Fore-
Top-Mast,

Top-Mast, was omitted, lest such a palliating Expression, imputing it to Chance, might alleviate the Odium, which seems by all possible Means designed to be thrown on the Admiral.

THE next Omission is yet a greater Manifestation of the true Design of those Gentlemen, who like Deer, beat *him* from the Herd which the Hounds begin to pursue. For after having castrated all that could prove his Prudence, and vindicate his Conduct before the Engagement, they now conceal what can most effectually justify his not engaging a second Time, and not attempting to land a Reinforcement after the Battle.

WITH this View was not all that Part omitted, which mentions the Ships that were wounded in their Masts, and endangered of not being secured at Sea, the great Sickliness of the Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded, no Hospital-Ships sent out to receive these unhappy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship converted to that Purpose would be unequal to the receiving one third of the Number, and which could not be well done at Sea; Circumstances which entirely change the Face and Reason of Things, and throw the Blame which they intend for the Admiral, on the Planners of the Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet.

Now let the most strenuous Advocate for the Ad——ty, the most prejudiced Pursuer of Mr *Byng*, tell you why this Paragraph was omitted, without confessing that this Omission could not be made in his Favour. Will he say that Tenderness and Humanity distinguish this Action? Or will he not rather declare that the contrary is manifested beyond all Power of Denial.

IT is evident from the Dates of the Time of Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter, that Four Days had passed in refitting the disabled Ships, and yet that the Masts of Three of them could not be secured fit for a second Engagement; that if this could have been obtained, that the Ships Crews were too sickly to undertake the Fatigue of a second Combat, with not a Ship to put the sick and wounded on board during an Action, which being left on board, must have disheartened and interrupted those who were able to perform their Duty.

THE Neglect of not providing Hospital-Ships, as well as Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Contempt of Money in the Person who must be imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not so distinguished, and did not forbid entertaining such a Thought, would you not be inclined to think, that some sinister Intent had determined him

him to prevent Success in this Undertaking? Or that he designed the Fleet should come too late to save *Minorca* and not engage; and therefore the Idea of providing Hospital-Ships, Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Vessels never omitted 'till now on such Expeditions, never entered into his Imagination; for though I am willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the most ignorant of all Men who have ever sat at that Board; yet I am afraid the Indulgence of the most consummate Ignorance, will scarce preserve him from the Taxation of something more criminal, though not more fatal to your, your Sovereign's, and the Nation's Welfare.

BEFORE what Tribunal can Admiral *Byng* be justly condemned, for not seeking the Enemy in this disabled Condition; not before that of the People of *England*, who, Lovers of strict Justice in all Things, never decide contrary to her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is impartially laid before them, nothing concealed, nor any Thing added, to disguise the Truth.

LET me ask his Accusers, To what Purpose would this second Engagement have been attempted, with a Fleet originally so greatly inferior to the *French*, and now rendered much more so by the Damages received in the late Battle? A total Defeat, in all Probability, is the Answer of Reason; and if Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*

Gallifonniere had sought it, which providentially he did not, it is a reasonable Presumption that the whole *English* Squadron would have perished, or fallen a Prey to the *French*, since there was no Port to shelter them. Whereas, had Mr *Byng* been in the *Mediterranean* before the Arrival of the *French* at *Minorca*, a Defeat on his Side even might have saved the Island; he could have then saved his shattered Remains in *Mahon*, and though conquered at Sea, by Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preserved *St Philip's*, and probably the Island. Thus a Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely sent out, would have done more Service than a Victory after *St Philip's* was invested.

THOSE who reason otherwise than in this Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongst the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a Talent of much more Use in the Day of Battle than tilting against Stone Walls, or engaging Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm against a superior Force; and indeed I am more afraid that Mr *Byng*, after every Thing has been fairly urged in his Vindication, and maturely considered, will be found rather culpable in seeking the Enemy at first, than not seeking them after the Engagement.

IT has been the settled Rule of all great Generals, and of those who have written best on the Subject of Armies, and the Manner of a
General's

General's conducting them, as may be seen in most ancient Authors, and those of more modern Date, particularly the Marquis *De Feuquiere*, and the Marquis *De Santa Cruz*, whose Words I shall quote, to consider what Advantage can result from the Action before an Engagement be resolved upon.

FIRST then let me quote the *Spaniard* on this Subject, which permit me to translate.

“ IF nothing is more uncertain than the Success of a Battle, as I have just established it to be, this Consequence is fairly drawn from it, That no Commander should ever risque an Engagement, but when there is greater Expectations to gain by a Victory, than to lose by a Defeat.”

AND *Feuquiere* on the same Subject, lays it down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be deviated from.

“ I HAVE already said in my Maxims on the Subject of Battles, that a General never ought to attack an Enemy, or to subject himself to receive one from them, but when there is a greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince by a Victory, than Disadvantage to be feared from a Defeat.”

ACCORDING

ACCORDING to these Maxims of the most approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr *Byng* seems not a little culpable, in first seeking the *French*, and justifiable only in declining the second Engagement; that the Circumstances in which he was placed before the Battle, correspond exactly with the Directions and Maxims just laid down, is utterly undeniable; First, because it was romantic to expect that he could defeat the *French* Fleet against such Superiority as has been already proved, it had over him; next, there was much to apprehend from a Defeat, and nothing to expect from a Victory, *St Philip's* being already invested and irretrievably gone, with Respect to what Mr *Byng* could have assisted in the Defence of it, when so great a Number of *French* Troops, with Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and every Thing necessary were landed.

WHEN then, from the Inferiority of the *English*, nothing could be reasonably expected but Misfortune and Disgrace; or if by the greatest Efforts of good Fortune, Victory should declare for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be drawn from it; when the Risque of losing the whole Fleet was the Result of an unanimous Council of War; and the Nation, considering the real State of the *English* and *French* Navies, so little able to sustain a Loss of that Kind; when *Gibraltar* would have been left defenceless,

less, and fallen of Course to the Enemy. Could the seeking the *French* Admiral, by a Commander who foresaw these probable Consequences, with not only an inferior, but a shattered Fleet, and no other Ships in the *Mediterranean* to reinforce him, have been justified in the Judgment of Men who have studied the Nature of Military Atchievements, or according to the Rules and Observations of ancient and modern Writers on this Head?

THE utmost Advantage could have been but a Prolongation of the Siege, without the least Probability of raising it; because the Fleet unable to keep the Seas must have retreated to *Gibraltar*, the Port of *Mahon* being still commanded by the Enemies Batteries; from this View of Things it seems apparent, that the only wrong Step was leaving *Gibraltar* to give Battle to the *French*, and his Retreat to that Place the discreetest Act of Prudence and of a General, and in this Opinion the whole Council of War was unanimous: They did not imagine that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate Force was to engage at all Adventures, like *Moor* of *Moor-Hall*, who, with nothing at all, slew the Dragon of *Wantley*; indeed the Admiral was not a little surprized when he arrived at *Gibraltar* in going up to *Minorca*, and knew the Force of the Enemy, that Dispatches had not come over-land to stop him 'till he received farther Reinforcement; Men of Sense and Pru-

dence, who intended the Nation's Honour and Advantage, could not have omitted so necessary a Step; for though it is barely possible that they knew not the Strength of the *French* Fleet before it left *Toulon*, and the Admiral left *England*; they knew it well before he arrived at *Gibraltar*, and had sufficient Time to have acquainted him of it, to stop his Proceeding to *Minorca*, to have reinforced the Fleet, and to have defeated the *French* before the Place was taken; this he thought necessary, and though his Orders would not permit him to tarry at *Gibraltar*, he could not avoid requesting a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect that Place, as he foresaw, that upon any Misfortune of great Consequence to the Fleet which he commanded, this Fortrefs would be open to hourly Invasions.

HAD the Prudence of those who destine and prepare Fleets been equal to that of this Commander whom they seek to condemn, *Minorca* had been safe, the Honour of the Crown, and the Commerce of the Nation preserved, and this Gentleman the Darling, whom they wish to be the Detestation of the People.

LET those who omitted this Precaution answer you, why it was thus ignorantly or iniquitously omitted? can that be the Fault of Mr *Byng*; and when he expresses his Apprehensions of being inferior to the Fleet under *La Gallissonniere*,

niere, from the Intelligence he had received, what does it arise from, but a thorough Acquaintance with the Nature of his Profession, rendering Justice to the Arms of one Nation as well as another, from a conscious Deficiency in many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight of Metal, Number of Cannon and of Men, from a Suspicion perhaps of some delusive Proceedings in those who had seduced him to Command so inferior a Fleet, by positively asserting, that the *French* could not consist of more than *Seven Ships*, and would probably be but *Five*, as well as from some beginning Convictions, that it was not impossible, but that he, his brave Companions, the Honour and Interest of the King and Country, might be doomed a Sacrifice to sate the Appetite of some sinister ruling Passion.

To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt not it will to you, whence it can arise that a good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a superior at Land, should be considered as one of the most distinguishing, difficult, and meritorious Exploits of a General ; and yet, that a Retreat equally well conducted at Sea under the same Circumstances, should be deemed a disgraceful Action and worthy Punishment, more especially as the whole Council of War, Land and Sea Officers, who must from their Situation and Professions, naturally be the properest Judges of what was best to be done on such Occasions,

were unanimous, and thought *Gibraltar* in Danger.

ARE Commanders then at all Events to show no other Token of Generalship, but what is to be learned from Brutes? An Excess of Courage only? And are all who use the superior Attributes of the human Understanding, to be considered as Delinquents in their Duty to their King and Country? What Commander of common Sense will serve his Country under such discouraging Conditions; where, unless he fights against all Kinds of Disadvantage, he is to be stigmatised with the eternal Infamy of Cowardice; and if he does engage his Enemy, and does not succeed against this great Superiority of Force, he is to be deemed a Coward also, and given up to the Rage of the Multitude; his Letters published, and deprived of all that can vindicate him, with Additions intended to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, especially when it is known, that all private Letters which can justify the Admiral have been suppressed, or made to speak a different Sense, by interlining, before they were produced; and all those which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however absurd, have been given to the Public.

CAN the Design of omitting the Paragraph which I have been just examining, take it's Origin from Tenderness in exposing the Admiral to the People's Contempt; whoever can
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give Credit to such Assertions, can never be deemed an Infidel.

DOES not this Behaviour proceed from a very contrary Motive; what is it but depriving him of his just Defence, and giving him to an enraged People, by injurious Misrepresentations, Falshoods, and Concealments; is it not like lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding him to defend himself against his Adversary? Is it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and then ordering him to plead in his own Defence? Is it not even inhuman? And since, to sink the Truth, or to add a Falshood, are equally considered as Perjury in the Law; why should it be conceived otherwise in this Instance, and in those Men, if this shall be proved to be the real State of the Case, especially as the Event may prove equally fatal to the Person against whom these Things may be attempted.

THE next Omission begins with the Words, *of Minorca and Gibraltar*, which you will observe immediately follow the Word *Situation*; this Omission determines the Reader to fix the Situation of the Fleet, as the Object on which the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the Officers; which real Condition of the Ships being concealed also, this Consideration of it's Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it too evidently seems designed it should be: Whereas the Situations of *Minorca and Gibraltar* became
reasonable

reasonable Objects of their Consideration ; it appeared impracticable to relieve *Mahon*, and probable that *Gibraltar* would be attacked, and therefore the Determination of proceeding thither, was become the most prudent Decision which could have been made, the most likely to conduce to the Nation's Service, and a just Resolution of the Council of War.

As to the Victory, it signifies not much who claims it, but it was a Matter of Consequence to consider, that though two Fleets may be of equal Number, they may yet be of unequal Force, as we have already proved it happened in this Instance : and a sickly Squadron, without Means of providing for the diseased and wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Soldiers, of which, more than a Thousand Sick, which at their return to *Gibraltar*, were sent to the Hospital, was a Consideration that ought greatly to influence at that Moment, especially when it was evident beyond all Contradiction, that the Enemy possessed every Advantage which the *English* Admiral was in want of, having a Power of procuring Recruits of Seamen from the Two Hundred Transports, and Soldiers from the Camp of the Besiegers, and which every prudent Commander must have done, and was therefore highly reasonable to be concluded, would be done, by the Admiral, Council of War, and by all who understand the Profession of Arms.

DURING

DURING the four Days which Mr Byng's Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, *La Gallifsonniere's* Fleet was several Times seen from their Mast-head, as undoubtedly was that of Mr Byng by the *French* Admiral, a Circumstance as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the whole, because it is a dangerous Thing to permit a Question, so liable to Construction against any Mens Advantage, to come before the People of *England*, who, in search of Truth, might not unlikely demand, why *La Gallifsonniere* with such apparent Superiority did not attack the *English* Fleet once more, and then perhaps a satisfactory Answer might have been difficultly returned by those who chuse to conceal that Circumstance: indeed this single Circumstance, in all Men who may be unacquainted with the upright Intentions of those who planned the Expedition, may probably create a Suspicion, that the *French* Admiral could not have conducted Matters in this absurd Manner from Ignorance alone: nor the Planners of the Expedition have prepared a Fleet so unequal to what it ought to have been from that Cause: in what Manner, on the Principles of Reason and Knowledge in his Profession, which he is allowed to possess, can it be accounted for, that *La Gallifsonniere* desisted from pursuing an Advantage which he had so apparently obtained, by disabling five Ships of our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit for Service again without going into some Port.

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The next Day, and the three following, though he saw our Fleet, and might know it's Condition by a Cruiser sent for that Purpose, and probably did know it? why was the *French* Admiral so deficient in Duty to his King and Country, not to attempt destroying the *English* Fleet, by renewing the Combat on such advantageous Terms, and complete the Victory which he had partly atchieved; was *La Gallissonniere* a Coward too? Many are the Suggestions which are and may be formed on this Occasion; I insinuate none, but leave all Men to decide, for what Reason the *French* Admiral could be so complaisant to the *English*, unless it was by Way of Return to those of the Ad——y, who sent out a Fleet so unable to disturb him in covering the Siege of *St Philips*. One Thing I will assert, and produce my Reasons for saying it if required, that Admiral *Byng* was intirely ignorant of any Consideration which could have created this mutual Politeness, in the *English* Planners of the Expedition, of not disturbing the Siege of *St Philips*; and of not destroying the *English* Squadron in those of the *French*.

THINGS and Appearances being in this Situation, what could the most prudent and most courageous Man have done more than he performed? he relied on no Man's Word: Mr *Byng* proceeded immediately from *Gibraltar* to discover the Truth of Things; and having suffered from

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La Gallifsonniere's Squadron was disabled from putting in Execution what he had intended before the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View.

AFTER this last Omission, a few Words of the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral proceeds with expressing his *Hopes* that he should find Stores to refit the Fleet at *Gibraltar*, and a Resolution of not losing a Minute in seeking the Enemy again, *if he had any Reinforcement*, and once more giving them Battle.

YOU will easily discern the Reason of expressing himself by *Hopes* of finding Stores, if you recall, that in going up to *Minorca*, in his Letter from *Gibraltar*, he tells the Secretary of the Ad——y, that there were neither Stores nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This Word was only used as a gentle Rebuke for this Neglect, and the most polite Hint, that if he should tarry at *Gibraltar* longer than you, the People of *England*, unacquainted with the Cause, should think requisite, that some palliating Report for this Delay might be spread, to prevent Murmurs against him, who was only delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Neglect of those whose Duty it is to provide Stores, and to keep careening Wharfs, Store-Houses, and Pits, in due repair. How undeservedly then was he calumniated? How industriously was the Slander of Delay spread by those Men who were only culpable in this Part, from an

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Expression

Expression in his second Letter from *Gibraltar*, published in the *Gazette*, “ That watering was “ tedious at that Place,” omitting in this also the most favourable Circumstances, as they did in the former.

AT the same Time, his Resolution of returning to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Argument of his Timidity; and when he adds, that the *French* had a great Advantage in being clean Ships, and *going three Feet* to one with his; What was there in this Expression, so much carped at and ridiculed, but a Phrase of all Seamen, who, to express one Ship’s sailing much faster than another, almost constantly use it? Was not the Reason for mentioning their sailing faster, then, prudent in all Respects? It was to guard against any unwarrantable Expectations, which Men, unacquainted with naval Affairs, might entertain from a Reinforcement; because, though one Fleet is vastly superior to another, yet the inferior Fleet being better sailers, may easily escape by running before the Wind, if the superior Squadron has the Wind of them; and by turning to Windward, if they have the Wind of the superior Force. And though the Admiral assigns no other Reason for this sailing better than the *English*, but their being *clean* Ships, he might have justly added their being *better* Ships also; which reflects not a little on the Supervisors of naval Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improve-

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ments at home, and only slowly copied the *French* in their Manner of building.

BESIDES this, Mr *Byng* concluded, from the Behaviour of Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*, that he would neglect no Way of conducting his Fleet with Judgment, and consequently chuse, from this Advantage of better sailing, in what Manner the Combat should be carried on; and which, by preventing the coming to a close Engagement, with a View of disabling the *English* Ships, he had already too successfully put in Execution.

THIS Part then became absolutely necessary to be omitted, against a Man determined to be overwhelmed, because it takes the Fault of tarrying at *Gibraltar* from him, and places it on their Neglect of that Place. It shows, by his Resolution of engaging again, that he could not be justly taxed with Cowardice; it proves his Knowledge of what is to be expected from a superior Fleet, which is out-failed by an inferior; and his Politeness, in not mentioning with Acrimony the Neglect of sending a Reinforcement sooner, and of keeping *Gibraltar* in Repair: Examine one Minute in how different a Manner his and your Enemies have observed a reciprocal Behaviour towards him and you.

As to the *Three Feet to One*, it meant no more than that the *French* sailed faster than the

English; which, if they had failed only as Thirteen to Twelve, would as effectually have answered all their Purposes, and all that the Admiral intended to be conveyed by the Expression, *sailing faster than his Fleet*.

WHAT Truth is there then in the prevailing Report given out by his Accusers, that Tenderness for his Character, and not designing to aggravate his Faults, were the true Cause of omitting these Passages in the *Gazette*.

ARE not these Particulars so many Justifications of Mr *Byng*'s not renewing the Engagement against a Fleet, which had already disabled him, and which had the Power of chusing their Manner of fighting? Ought not these Considerations alone, without inferring the Consequence of ill Success, to have determined him against engaging the Enemy once more, and risking a total Defeat.

THE next Paragraph which is omitted, is the urging the Ad——y to a speedy Reinforcement, if none was already sent, a Request which he had before made; at the same Time acquainting them with the increasing Strength of the Enemy at *Toulon*, by four large Ships; which Circumstance, though it tends not to justify the Admiral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his Zeal for Success, and a contemptible one of those, who, presiding at the Head of Affairs, had

had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at *Toulon*, and negligent *at best* of what happened to *Minorca*: unless you may possibly by this Time be apprehensive, that some other Motives conduced to this Behaviour in them.

THE last Paragraph has but one Word omitted, which, instead of “making the best of my Way to *Gibraltar*,” is to *cover Gibraltar*; a very material Alteration; the going to *cover* a Place being very different from going *to* a Place, the one signifying an Act of Prudence, and of a Soldier; the other, in such Instances, of Flight, and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monosyllable premeditatedly left out, to prevent you from asking what Danger *Gibraltar* was in, and to what Part of the Letter this referred? Does it not seem to be the present Employment of the *Gazette* to misrepresent, and of the Writers or Directors of it, to keep the People of *England* as ignorant as possible of the real Situation of any Place, which may be designed to be given up to your declared Enemies, by those who are your concealed, if Men can be denominated concealed, who are thus open in pursuing a Nation’s Ruin?

EVERY Man amongst you, who can distinguish Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not, behold this perfidious Action of omitting the Parts of a Letter, which can most effectually plead the Justification of the Writer, with all
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due Abhorrence ; notwithstanding which criminal Proceeding, permit me to say, there remains something which is yet a stronger Indication of more blameable Design in those who have been guilty of the former Misbehaviour ; to omit with Design to injure, is surely a criminal Proceeding ; and to add, with Design to create a farther Accusation of Offence, must be yet a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all Men of Probity.

IN Continuation of this Intent to accumulate the Guilt of Mr *Byng*, is it not extremely probable, that the Lists of the Two Fleets were printed at the End of his Letter in the *Gazette*, taking perhaps the Hint of that Design, from Part of the Postscript, in which he says, “ I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out whilst I was closing my Letter.” Then adding what the Admiral never sent, and concealing what he did. The Defects of the Ships are very considerable, as hath been already said, five of them receiving much Damage ; three of which could not, in the Opinion of the best Judges, be repaired at Sea for a second Action ; the List of this Damage may be hereafter printed. At the same Time, under Favour of the above Sentence, Occasion was taken to add the Lists of the Ships, a spurious one, even with Respect to our Fleet ; which methinks those who inserted it ought to be better acquainted with, whatever it might be

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be their Duty to know of the *French*; leaving out the Weight of Metal and Number of Hands on board, and putting in the Number of killed and wounded, that is, preserving all, in which a seeming Equality consisted, and castrating all, in which the *French* were eminently superior. Nor was this the only Variation from Truth, for some considerable Addition was made to the Number of the *English* Cannon, and a Diminution of the *French*, with a View probably to bring the two Numbers nearer each other, and to create the Idea of Equality in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncharitable Suggestion to say, That this spurious and partial List of each Fleet, was inserted to aggravate your Resentment against the Admiral, and to gain a Belief, that the Defects of the Ships which accompanied this Letter, was no more than a List of the killed and wounded, an Artifice favouring of much despicable Cunning, seen through by every Man who had Sense enough to reflect, that though Mr *Byng* had sent the Number of his own killed and wounded, he could not well come at that of Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*. Can these Lists have been added with an honest Intent? Was it not designed to create the Idea of his being a Coward? And to strengthen, by this Addition, what they had begun to insinuate by the former Omissions.

LET me now appeal to the Hearts of Men conspicuous for the Love of Justice and Humanity

nity amongst all Nations; is it not perfidious Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Justification of a Man's own Words, but as it were to suborn false Evidence, and add it to the Account which was transmitted by the Admiral, with a View of depreciating him in the Eyes of his Fellow-Subjects, and letting loose the popular Clamour against him.

INDEED when we review these Artifices, and reconsider the Reports which were spread among the People during the Preparations at *Toulon*, after their arriving at *Minorca*, whilst our Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure, will there not arise certain Suspicions which Prudence would rather conceal than hint at, in any Case but that of preserving one's Country from future Misfortunes of a similar Nature, and preserving the Life of a Fellow-Subject? We shall endeavour to recollect some of them, and let those who chuse to examine them, draw that Conclusion which seems the most probable.

FIRST, then, how came the *French* to form the Idea of taking *St Philips*, when the Fleet of *England*, known to be so superior, might have prevented the Embarkation; if not that, their Descent on *Minorca*; if that could not have been done, reinforced *St Philips*, beat the *French* Fleet, and taken the whole Embarkation Prisoners. Is the Duke of *Richlieu* so Military mad, that he would have undertaken

to command in an Expedition which had been preparing for five Months, known to all *Europe*, and open to be disconcerted in all the above different Manners? Would not this have rather proved him fitter for *Bedlam*, than a Command in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what *Feuquiere* and *Santa Cruz* have positively enjoined? And if the Duke would have been hardy enough to undertake it, would the *French* Ministry have permitted him? Would the Directors of our Marine Preparations, had they been in earnest to preserve *St Philips*, have sent out an inferior Squadron? Delayed it at *Spithead* during so many Months? And given the Admiral absolute Orders to expedite other Services, by not taking Men from particular Ships, nor from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders with pressed Men from *Liverpole* and other Ports? And before the Arrival of more than two, he was obliged to sail.

HAD the Planners of the Expedition been truly animated with the Interest of their Country, why, during this Preparation at *Toulon*, when all *England*, and all *Europe*, was exclaiming against their Delay, did they continually give out to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at *Toulon*? That the *French* had no Sailors nor military Stores; was not this to be the palliating Speech to the People to countenance their Proceedings? Was it not to give the *Air of* relieving

St Philips only that the *English* Fleet set sail a few Days before the *French*, and before a certain Intelligence of it was given to the Public? Though the Day for leaving *Toulon* by the latter must, beyond all Doubt, be known by those who prevented it's Relief, in sending a Fleet from hence so inferior to the Undertaking.

WHEN the popular Clamour now began to be very loud against this shameful Behaviour, were not ten thousand Stories invented to draw off the public Attention from the Planners of the Expedition, and to throw it on him who commanded, and who they concluded would miscarry? Was it not owing to a Design of ill Success in them that the Fleet was sent out so small, and that he was assured the *French* Armament could not possibly exceed seven Ships, and probably would not be more than five? Was it not constantly asserted, that no Fleet was ever so well manned, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as this *English* Fleet? And that the *French* consisted of old Ships not fit for Service, ill-manned, and worse provided; whereas one Moment's Thought would have told them, that a Fleet, however ill-furnished with Men, when it left *Toulon*, must be abundantly provided with Hands from Two Hundred Transports, which after landing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor, could very well spare two thirds of their Crews; as to the Ships being feeble or ill-fitted out, the

Falshood

Falshood of that Assertion is now perfectly well known. Was not this Story, of great Deficiency in the *French* Fleet, propagated to create a Belief in you, that *La Galliffonniere* was inferior to Mr *Byng*; as the extolling the Strength of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear superior? To those spurious Accounts of the different Strength of the two Fleets, was it not constantly added, that Mr *Byng* could blow the *French* out of the Water? With what Intent could this be propagated, but to aggravate the Miscarriage of the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his superior Force, and to animate your Expectations with Views of Success, the more effectually to inflame your Resentment against him, when the the ill News of his not prevailing should arrive, and which they must foresee?

THE Citadel of *Mabon* being attacked, it now became the common Conversation amongst the Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification could not hold out a Week, with a Design to lessen the Surprize of it's being taken; or if it was defended any considerable Time, to give an Idea of it's being well provided; does it not therefore seem evident, from the Fleet of *England* being appointed so inferior, so long delayed after it was ready, sent so late, without a Soldier but those who acted as Marines, without an Hospital-Ship, Fireship, Transports, or Tenders; that no Battle was intended to be fought, nor *St Philips* relieved? But by this

delay, to give Time to Marshal *Richlieu* to take the Fortification, return with his Fleet, and leave Mr *Byng* to cruise ineffectually round *Minorca*; indeed the brave *Irishmen* disappointed the Expectations of those who had thus designed the whole Transaction, by defending the Place becoming the Duty of *British* Subjects, and not according to sinister Intention.

By this contemptible Cunning, a Quality often connected with Ignorance in little Minds, it seems contrived, that if General *Blakeney* gave up the Citadel before Mr *Byng's* Arrival, then *he* was to be exclaimed against, and charged with Cowardice; and if he held out, as the Admiral was insufficient, then that Imputation was to fall on the latter.

Was it not therefore owing to the daily Disappointment of hearing that the Citadel had surrendered, that no Fleet was sent to reinforce Mr *Byng*; apprehending, that with a Reinforcement he would raise the Siege, which seems so contrary to the Intent of sending him? Was it not on this Account that they did not stop him by Express at *Gibraltar*, to wait for more Ships of War? And at last, was not the Reinforcement sent when it could not possibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had succeeded or miscarried.

AT length comes a Letter from Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*, of the *English* Fleet having retired before the *French*, when immediately a Report prevailed, that from a Letter sent by Admiral *Byng* from *Gibraltar*, it was foreseen that he would not fight; with what Intent was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments in his being a Coward, according to the Resolution which had been taken of throwing the whole Blame of the Miscarriage on him, before his own Account could come to set Matters right in the People's Opinion. After some Time a Letter from Admiral *Byng* arrives, printed in the *Gazette*, where the most material Passages in Vindication of his Conduct are cut out; why were these omitted, but to preserve the former Impressions of his having behaved like a Coward, at the same Time condemning the Resolutions of the whole Council of War unheard, a most flagrant Affront on Men of superior Birth, by one who has undeservedly started into Nobility.

IT was now necessary to continue inventing more Tales to support your Resentment against Mr *Byng*; one Day it was given out, that he had sold out of the Stocks, forty-four thousand Pounds before he sailed, which was to insinuate, that he left *England* with a Design never to return: The Falshood of this Report may be seen in the Stock Books. Then it was reported, that this
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was the Man who cruised before *Genoa* last War, and took Money to let Vessels with Provisions and Men pass to the Relief of the Town; a known Falshood, and were not the Ashes of the Dead sacred, I would tell you his Name: Was not this to hint the Idea of Venality?

THEN it seems it was discovered, that a Ship with Provisions had gotten into *Mabon* the very Day before the Action, which Ship arrived at the Port a Month before the investing the Citadel; was not this to insinuate that he might have landed his Soldiers also?

THESE Rumours being grown a little cool, Ballads were made to keep up your Resentment, and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at the national Expencc, by the Clerks and Officers of Public Offices, amongst whom one Mr *Glover*, belonging to the *Viçtualling-Office*, burning him in *White-Chapel* Road, was rewarded with a broken Leg by the *Barking* Stage-Coach.

IT was now thought necessary to assert, that Mr *Byng* was attempting to escape in Women's Cloaths, to impart the Idea of conscious Guiltiness, which is likewise an Invention of Falshood; and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a Man from escaping, whom they wish to be well rid of,
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and who would not leave the Place if they would permit him.

AT one Time he is represented as mad, and then as killing himself with drinking: then, that it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Believe me, he has not lost his Senses, as his Accusers will find, nor will he destroy himself with *his own Hands*; and it is your Duty to preserve his Life, for the Sake of more perfectly knowing what influenced his Pursuers to contrive and conduct the Expedition in so preposterous a Manner. Then the Author of the *Evening Advertiser* is engaged to keep alive the Idea of Mr *Byng's* being a Coward; a proper Employment for a Man who has risen to Dignities by the infamous Practice of an Informer.

AND lastly, these contemptible Artifices are followed by a Letter to Ad——l B—g, published at the Expence of his and your Enemies, and hawked through the Streets for the Sake of universal Publication. This single Circumstance, in the Minds of all Men of Sense, so inhumanly contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice *against* the Admiral and *from* themselves, amounts to an Acknowledgment of *their* Guilt and of *his* Innocence; otherwise, some one Proof of what is there charged would certainly have been brought against him. But the whole is an entire Declamation, intended to inflame your Minds, founded on no one *Argument*, and concludes

judges with a *Confession*, which his Adversaries would do extremely well to learn by Heart, against that Day when public *Justice* will demand them to their *Tryals*.

DOES not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr *Byng* was not the great culpable Person? There must be some other Source of his and your Misfortunes; otherwise the *French* must have been Madmen or Fools to have attacked *Minorca* in that Manner, and some of this Nation Madmen or Fools to attempt preserving it with so unequal a Force.

AFTER all, Are not such despicable Proceedings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of the meanest Beggar? What an Insult on your Understandings, to conceive the absurd Idea of screening themselves from your Enquiry, and seeking Preservation, by drawing, hanging, and burning, a Man in Effigy, who, however culpable in this Action, must be white as Snow compared with them, whose Sins are red as Scarlet.

FROM what Origin can such Proceedings spring, but from conscious Delinquency and Apprehension of Danger? had they believed themselves innocent, why did they conceal those material Passages in his Letter, and add a spurious and malicious List of the Two Fleets? Was it not with Design to depreciate the Commander's
Plea,

Plea, as much as possible, before his Fellow-Subjects? Had they been conscious of performing their Duty, why was he not left to the true Recital of his Conduct? His Misbehaviour could not have affected them; the World would have been satisfied with a true Narration of the Circumstances; *they had been cleared, and Mr Byng stood unprejudiced, by injurious Calumnies in your Opinion*; justly condemned if delinquent, or justly discharged if innocent. Was it not their internal Guilt which prohibited them from behaving with Integrity, and I presume by this Time, as in Cases of Murder, too great Desire to conceal the Crime, has shewn you who were the Capital Offenders.

IT becomes now the essential Duty of every *Englishman*, to divest himself of all those Prejudices which have been so artfully propagated against Mr *Byng*, to resent, with becoming Spirit, the insulting Design of duping you, by Misrepresentation of the Truth, to become Accomplices in pursuing, even to Death, a Man who must be unjustly treated, because hitherto his Story has never been known, and his Justification concealed.

HEAVEN forbid that the Integrity of *Englishmen* should be deceived by the Wiles of Men, who do not possess one Praise-worthy Qualification; or their Judgments perverted by crafty Representations, to become Auxiliaries in completing

pleting the Ruin of him *they* intend to destroy. I know you have hitherto determined equitably according to what has been laid before you ; I blame not the Decision, because it flows from the Love of Justice and your Country. All I request is, that you would now consider the Case of Mr *Byng* with the same Zeal which his Adversaries are pursuing him ; receive the Truth as you did the Delusion ; resent the Imposition, and see Justice done to him whom they wish to ruin. Without your Approbation they will not dare to make him suffer unjustly, and with it I tremble for him, however innocent he may be. Consider the Situation of that Man, whose Death may be necessary to preserve the Lives of others. Consider what the Dispositions of Men, who have almost undone the Nation, must be against a Fellow-Subject, whom it may be convenient to destroy. If he suffer, you will repent too late the not having listened to the Admonitions of these Sheets. Let your Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to him and to yourselves ; it is become an indispensable Act of Justice to support him, who has been injured, against Men who by every Art have insinuated his being guilty. By his Death you may save the Destroyers of your Country. Urge then that the greatest Criminals be first brought to Justice, and that such exist, can need no farther or more convincing Proof, than the Insufficiency of the *English* Fleet, the long Delay in sending it, the Want of Stores
and

and Artificers at *Gibraltar*, the ordering the Marines out of Mr *Byng's* Squadron at *Portsmouth*, sending no Troops to *Mahon*, no Hospital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the sending him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned and old, the Concealment of his Vindication, and adding to his Destruction by Ten Thousand calumniating Inventions.

ARE not these the strongest Proofs of Delinquency? Do they not amount to almost a Demonstration, that the Blame lies not greatly against Mr *Byng*, and that what has happened, has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of his Pursuers? Did they ever design that *Minorca* should find Relief from the Fleets and Armies of *Great-Britain*?

NOTWITHSTANDING this favourable Appearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs, I ask not Mercy, but Justice to Mr *Byng*, his Pursuers, and your Country; all I request is a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and an unprejudiced People, which I wish also to those who have thus inhumanly treated him. If they have all erred alike, give them up to the same condign Punishment. If their Guilt is unequal, you will not add Cruelty to Injustice, but let their Punishments be proportioned to it. If he is proved guiltless, you will preserve him. But at all Events remember, that those, in whose Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and Iniquity

Iniquity reside, who have brought this once flourishing Country to so ruinous a State, escape not, by the Sufferings of Mr *Byng*, the Rewards which are due to them. To you I appeal; be *Englishmen*, and I fear no Injustice to him who is thus unjustifiably pursued; him whom you have already been deceived to condemn, you will now be resolved to see treated according to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fellow-Subject and free *Briton*.

F I N I S.

Part the Second



A
L E T T E R
T O A
M E M B E R O F P A R L I A M E N T
I n t h e C O U N T R Y,
F R O M
H I S F R I E N D I N L O N D O N,
R e l a t i v e t o t h e C A S E o f
A D M I R A L B Y N G.

W I T H
S o m e O r i g i n a l P A P E R S a n d L E T T E R S w h i c h
p a s s e d d u r i n g t h e E x p e d i t i o n.



A
L E T T E R

T O A

MEMBER of PARLIAMENT

In the COUNTRY,

F R O M

HIS FRIEND in LONDON,

Relative to the CASE of

ADMIRAL BYNG:

W I T H

Some original PAPERS and LETTERS

Which passed during the Expedition.

Audi alteram Partem.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. COOKE, at the *King's-Arms*, in *Great-Turnstile, Holborn.*

MDCCLVI.

[Price SIX-PENCE.]

THE LIFE OF

JOHN RUSKIN

BY JOHN RUSKIN

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

1848

LONDON

PRINTED BY...

...



A
L E T T E R
T O A
M E M B E R O F P A R L I A M E N T
I n t h e C O U N T R Y ,
F R O M H I S
F R I E N D I n L O N D O N , & c .

Dear S I R,



I N Obedience to your Request,
I take this Opportunity of
communicating to you, what
I have been able to collect
concerning the Affair of Mr.
BYNG, since your Departure
from *London*; and which I do the more
chearfully, as I perceive by your Letter, you
are one of those, who think, no *Englishman*

ought to be convicted, unheard; or executed, unconvicted; and that every Attempt to spirit up popular Prejudice against the Accused, previous to a legal Determination, is not only a Breach of common Humanity, but a Violation of the Law of the Land, which supposes every Man innocent, till by a judicial Enquiry he is found to be otherwise. Had our Countrymen been more generally actuated by these just and humane Sentiments, what Reams of Paper had remained unpoluted!—what Piles of Fuel unconsumed, and been much more usefully applied, than in the premature Disgrace of a Man, who, for ought we yet know to the contrary, may be destined rather a *Martyr* to *private Policy*, than a *Victim* to *public Justice*!

Upon the Effects of any fatal Mismanagement, you are sensible, it is no unusual *State-Trick*, for those in Power, to devote some Sacrifice (however innocent) to the popular Resentment, and thus, by a Sort of political *Legerdemain*, divert the public Attention from a *real* to an *ideal* Offender: How successfully this ministerial *Hocus-Pocus* has in former Days been played off, History abundantly evinces; nor is it impossible but our future Annals may afford an Instance of a FLEET's being doomed to expiate the Errors
of

of a * * * ; and an ADMIRAL made a *Scape-Goat*, to bear away the Offences of a * * * .

Tho' aware of this Artifice, I will frankly confess, that at first I partook of the general Delusion, and from a Zeal for the Glory of my Country, became a Dupe to the Designs of its most dangerous Enemies.—No one was more clamorous in their Exclamations against the Cowardice of the Admiral—No one exulted more in the Flames of his Effigy—But when I reflected; that Execution should rather *follow* than *precede* Conviction, that Clamour was far from being an unerring Proof of Guilt, and found these Measures were encouraged by those very Persons, whose Duty it was to discountenance them; I began to suspect, they might possibly have something more than Truth for their Object, and somewhat less than Honesty for their Motive: Every Day's Practice still more and more confirmed my Suspicions; till at length the Farce became so extravagantly *outré*, that the very Mob discovered the Name of BYNG to be bandied round the Kingdom, only as a *Bubble* to their *proper* Indignation.—The libellous Forgeries, published under the specious Title of *Letters from on Board the Fleet*, were too glaring not to be detected, and the *ridiculous Alarms* of intended Escapes, with all the preventive Engines of Guards,

Locks, Bolts, and Bars, only furnished Matter of Contempt and Laughter, as being plainly perceived to mean *something more* than the Security of the Prisoner.—But in proportion as the enthusiastic Rage of the People against the Admiral abated, it was observable, that, of a *certain Junto* increased: They saw their own Security concerned, and, perhaps, for the first time, joined in a Cry for Vengeance upon a *Failure of Duty in public Employment*. A novel Instance, it must be confessed, of *these Gentlemens* Patriotism, and certainly has no other Object but *Love of Country* for its Foundation.

But the Treatment I found, Mr. BYNG's Letter met with, sufficiently manifested what Ingenuity he had to expect from his Opposers, who, not being able (as they pretend) to understand it themselves, seem determined that no other Person should; else, why were several Passages in it refused the Benefit of the Press? And then, that Obscurity imputed to the Author, which those very Castrations had created? Might not, by the same critical Chymistry, *David* be made to chaunt Blasphemy, and *Solomon* utter Foolishness?—But as I am persuaded it will gratify your Curiosity, I shall here insert such Parts of the original Letter, as were not thought proper for the unhallow'd Eye of the Public, and
by

by that means rescue Mr. BYNG's Understanding at least, from any unfavourable Impressions you may have received of it, on account of a Piece so *partially* published in the *impartial* Gazette.

After mention of being joined by his Majesty's Ship *Phœnix*, off *Majorca*, two days before; the following Passage is omitted—

“ by whom I had confirm'd, the Intelligence
 “ I received at *Gibraltar*, of the Strength
 “ of the *French* Fleet, and of their being
 “ off *Mabon*. His Majesty's Colours were
 “ still flying at the Castle of *St. Philip's*;
 “ and I could perceive several Bomb-Batteries playing upon it from different Parts.
 “ *French* Colours we saw flying on the West
 “ Part of *St. Philip's*. I dispatched the
 “ *Phœnix*, *Chesterfield*, and *Dolphin* a-head,
 “ to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, and
 “ Capt. *Hervey* to endeavour to land a Letter for General *Blakeney*, to let him know the Fleet was here to his Assistance, tho' every one was of Opinion we could be of no Use to him, as by all Accounts no Place was secured for covering a Landing, could we have spared any People. The *Phœnix* was also to make the private Signal between Capt. *Hervey* and Capt. *Scrope*, as this latter would undoubtedly come off, if it were practicable, having kept the *Dolphin's*

“ *phin's* Barge with him: But the Enemy's
 “ Fleet appearing to the S. E. and the Wind
 “ coming at the same time strong off the
 “ Land, obliged me to call those Ships in,
 “ before they could get quite so near the En-
 “ trance of the Harbour, as to make sure
 “ what Batteries or Guns might be placed, to
 “ prevent our having any Communication
 “ with the Castle.”

Again, after giving an Account that the
Captain, Intrepid and *Defiance* were much
 damag'd in their Masts, these Words should
 have been added; — “ so that they were
 “ endanger'd of not being able to secure their
 “ Masts properly at Sea, and also, that the
 “ Squadron in general were very sickly, ma-
 “ ny kill'd and wounded, and no where to
 “ put a third of their Number, if I made an
 “ Hospital even of the 40 Gun Ship which
 “ was not easy at Sea.”

Though the *Gazette* indeed informs us,
 that Mr. *Byng* call'd a Council of War, and
 collected the Opinions of the Land-Officers
 upon the present Situation — it forbears to
 add — “ of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, and
 “ make sure of protecting the latter; since it
 “ was found impracticable to either succour
 “ or relieve the former, with the Force we
 “ had; for though we may justly claim the
 “ Victory,

“ Victory ; yet we are much inferior to the
 “ Weight of their Ships, though the Num-
 “ bers are equal ; and they have the Advan-
 “ tage of sending to *Minorca* their wound-
 “ ed, and getting Reinforcements of Seamen
 “ from their Transports, and Soldiers from
 “ their Camp ; all which undoubtedly has
 “ been done in this Time that we have been
 “ laying too to refit, and often in Sight of
 “ *Minorca*, and their Ships have more than
 “ once appeared in a Line from our Mast-
 “ Heads. I send their Lordships, the Reso-
 “ lution of the Council of War.” Imme-
 diately after the following Passage is wholly
 omitted — “ I hope indeed we shall find
 “ Stores to refit us at *Gibraltar*, and if I have
 “ any Reinforcement, I will not lose a Mo-
 “ ment’s Time to seek the Enemy again, and
 “ once more give them Battle, though they
 “ have a great Advantage in being clean Ships,
 “ that go three Feet to our one, and there-
 “ fore have the Choice how they will en-
 “ gage us, or if they will at all, and will
 “ never let us close them, as their sole View
 “ is the disabling our Ships, in which they
 “ have but too well succeeded, though we
 “ obliged them to bear up.”

Nor was the following Article thought
 proper to be inserted — “ I cannot help
 “ urging their Lordships for a Reinforce-
 “ ment,

“ ment, if none are yet fail’d on their Know-
 “ ledge of the Enemy’s Strength in these
 “ Seas, and which, by very good Intelligence,
 “ will in a few Days be strengthened by four
 “ more large Ships from *Toulon*, almost ready
 “ to fail, if not now failed to join them.”

The *Gazette*, in another Part, inserts these Words, “ *making the best of my Way to Gibraltar*,” instead of *to COVER Gibraltar*; and here, by the way, let me observe, that there is a deeper Design in the Omission of this *single Word*, than perhaps you may at first be aware of: It was doubtless thought, this significant *Word* might chance to furnish too great an Insight into the *real Orders* of the Admiral; and it was much more for the Interest of some particular Persons, that the People should rather believe Mr. *Byng* went of *his own Accord to screen himself at Gibraltar*, than that he went thither, in Consequence of *his Orders to COVER it*.

These, Sir, are the *mortifying Members* of the Admiral’s Letter, which some State-Surgeons deemed necessary for Amputation, — These the *unintelligible Passages*, which, out of mere Mercy to his Intellects, they so humanely concealed from public Derision; yet I must confess myself so uncourtly a Critic, as to imagine that I have seen much greater Violence

lence committed both on Sense, and Language, in a much *shorter Epistle* under the authoritative Pen, of a modern State Secretary — But you, Sir, will readily perceive, that however *Form* may be the Pretence, *Matter* was the real Cause of this unprecedented Abridgment; since there appears hardly an Article in these *proscrib'd Passages*, which does not reflect more Dishonour upon Councils than Arms, and shews, what little Advantage we are to expect over our Enemies from the *latter*, unless assisted by Wisdom and Integrity in the *former*.

Though the People were graciously suffered to share some Morfels of the above-mentioned Intelligence, and like, *Lazarus*, were fed with the Crumbs which fell from the Rich Man's Table; yet, it seems, they were not always to be permitted the same Indulgence; since another Letter from the Admiral was thought of too delicate a Nature even to pass the Confines of a C—b—t.

“ Ra-

“ *Ramillies, in Gibraltar Bay, May 4, 1756.*

“ *S I R,*

“ **T**HIS comes to you by Express from
 “ hence by the Way of *Madrid*,
 “ recommended to Sir *Benjamin Keene*, his
 “ Majesty’s Minister at that Place, to be for-
 “ warded with the utmost Expedition.

“ I arrived here with the Squadron under
 “ my Command, the 2d Instant in the Af-
 “ ternoon, after a tedious Passage of twenty-
 “ seven Days, occasioned by contrary Winds
 “ and Calms, and was extremely concerned
 “ to hear from Capt. *Edgcumbe* (who I found
 “ here with the Princess *Louisa* and *Fortune*
 “ Sloop) that he was obliged to retire from
 “ *Minorca*, the *French* having landed on that
 “ Island by all Accounts from thirteen to fif-
 “ teen thousand Men.

“ They sailed from *Toulon* the 10th of last
 “ Month, with about one hundred and sixty,
 “ or two hundred Sail of Transports, escor-
 “ ted by thirteen Sail of Men of War; how
 “ many of the Line I have not been able to
 “ learn with any Certainty.

“ I

“ If I had been so happy to have arrived
 “ at *Mahon*, before the *French* had landed,
 “ I flatter myself, I should have been able to
 “ have prevented their getting a footing on
 “ that Island ; but as it has so unfortunately
 “ turned out, I am firmly of Opinion, from
 “ the great Force they have landed, and the
 “ Quantity of Provisions, Stores and Am-
 “ munition of all Kinds they brought with
 “ them, that the throwing Men into the
 “ Castle, will only enable it to hold out but
 “ a little Time longer, and add to the Num-
 “ bers that must fall into the Enemy’s Hands;
 “ for the Garrison in time will be obliged
 “ to surrender, unless a sufficient Number of
 “ Men could be landed to dislodge the *French*,
 “ or raise the Siege; however, I am determined
 “ to sail up to *Minorca* with the Squadron,
 “ where I shall be a better Judge of the Si-
 “ tuation of Affairs there, and will give Ge-
 “ neral *Blakeney* all the Assistance he shall
 “ require ; though I am afraid all Commu-
 “ nication will be cut off between us, as is
 “ the Opinion of the Chief Engineers of this
 “ Garrison (who have serv’d in the Island)
 “ and that of the other Officers of the Ar-
 “ tillery, who are acquainted with the Situa-
 “ tion of the Harbour ; for if the Enemy
 “ have erected Batteries on the two Shores
 “ near the Entrance of the Harbour (an Ad-
 vantage

“ vantage scarce to be supposed they have neg-
 “ lected) it will render it impossible for our
 “ Boats to have a Passage to the *Sallee* Port
 “ of the Garrison.

“ By the inclosed List, delivered to me by
 “ Capt. *Edgcumbe*, their Lordships will ob-
 “ serve the Strength of the *French* Ships in
 “ *Toulon*, and by the Copy of a Letter from
 “ *Marseilles*, to General *Blakeney*, which I
 “ herewith transmit to you, their Lordships
 “ will perceive the Equipment the *French*
 “ have made on this Occasion. It is to be
 “ apprehended, when they have got all the
 “ Ships they possibly can ready for Ser-
 “ vice, they may think of turning their
 “ Thoughts this Way.

“ If I should fail in the Relief of Port *Ma-*
 “ *bon*, I shall look upon the Security and
 “ Protection of *Gibraltar* as my next Object,
 “ and shall repair down here with the Squa-
 “ dron.

“ I am sorry to find, upon enquiring of
 “ the Naval Officer here, that there are few
 “ or no Stores in the Magazines to supply any
 “ of the Squadron that may be in Want of
 “ them; and it appears by a Letter I have
 “ received from the Store-keeper and Master
 “ Ship-

“ Shipwright, that the careening Wharfs,
 “ Store-houses, Pits, &c. are entirely de-
 “ cay’d, and I am afraid we shall find great
 “ Difficulty in getting them repair’d, there
 “ being no Artificers to be got here, and at
 “ present he can have no Assistance from the
 “ Carpenters of the Fleet on Account of our
 “ Sailing.

“ It requiring a proper Person to inspect
 “ into and manage those Affairs, I have ta-
 “ ken upon me to give Mr. *Milbourne Marfsh*
 “ (His Majesty’s Naval Officer that was at
 “ *Mahon*, and who came down with Capt.
 “ *Edgcumbe*) an Order to act as Master Ship-
 “ wright, which, I hope, their Lordships
 “ will approve, and have given him Orders to
 “ use his best Endeavours to put the Wharf,
 “ &c. in the best Condition he can, for very
 “ soon they will be wanted; as I apprehend,
 “ this is the only Place the Ships of the Squa-
 “ dron can come to refit, and many of them
 “ are in Want of Repairs and Careening;
 “ particularly the *Portland*, who has not been
 “ cleaned these twelve Months, nor the *Che-*
 “ *sterfield*, ten; besides many of the Ships
 “ that came out with me are foul: I fear
 “ from the Inconveniencies we shall meet with
 “ here, there will be great Difficulty in keep-
 “ B ing

“ ing the Ships clean, as there is but one Wharf
 “ for them to prepare and careen at.

“ By a Council of War, held by General
 “ *Fowke*, a Copy of which is herewith trans-
 “ mitted, it was not thought proper to send
 “ a Dêtachment equal to a Battallion for the
 “ Relief of *Minorca*, as it would evidently
 “ weaken the Garrison of *Gibraltar*, and be
 “ no way effectual to the Relief of that Island
 “ for the Reasons therein given; but, as I had
 “ represented that there was a Deficiency of
 “ Men on board the Ships late under the
 “ Command of Capt. *Edgcumbe*, on account
 “ of his having left a Number of Sailors and
 “ Marines at *Minorca* to assist in the Defence
 “ of that Place, and that it was necessary to send
 “ a Detachment on board those Ships to help
 “ to man them, this the General complied
 “ with, and I shall distribute some Seamen
 “ from the Ships that came out with me to
 “ compleat their Complement.

“ The *Chesterfield*, *Portland* and *Dolphin*
 “ are on their Passage from *Mabon* for this
 “ Place. The *Phœnix* is gone to *Leghorn*
 “ by Order of Capt. *Edgcumbe* for Letters
 “ and Intelligence; and the *Experiment* is
 “ cruizing off Cape *Pallas*, who I expect
 “ in every Hour.

“ By

“ By a Letter from Mr. *Banks*, our Con-
“ sul at *Cartbagena*, to General *Fowke*, da-
“ ted the 21st of *April*, it appears, that
“ twelve Sail of *Spanish* Men of War are or-
“ dered for *Cadiz* and *Ferrol*, which are ex-
“ pected at that Port, but on what Account
“ he could not tell the Governor.

“ We are employed in taking in Wine and
“ compleating our Water with the utmost
“ Dispatch, and shall let no Opportunity slip
“ of failing from hence.

“ Herewith I send you enclosed a Copy of
“ such Papers as have been delivered me,
“ which I thought necessary for their Lord-
“ ship's Inspection.

“ *I am,*

“ *S I R,*

“ *Your most humble Servant,*

“ *J. B.*

Hon. J—n C—d, Esq;

The Receipt of this Letter may be fixed as the Æra of Mr. BYNG's destined Disgrace:— Some discerning Politicians at Home, were, it seems, so eminently indued with the Gift of *Second-sight*, as to foresee, in the Contents of it, that the Admiral — *would not fight*,— and what they so miraculously *foresaw*, they made no scruple to *foretel*; while every Hireling-Tongue was employed to propagate the *Oracle* throughout the Kingdom. — I know not, Sir, what you may be able to do, but for my part, I have not Skill enough in the Art of Divination, to discover the *pusillanimous Prognostics* in this Letter; and am not ashamed, to acknowledge myself so little read in the Rudiments of Court-Logic, as not to be able to see the necessary Connection between Mr. Byng's preparing (as he says) with the utmost Dispatch to *meet* the Enemy, and his Design to *run away* from them:— This, indeed, I can perceive, and without any supernatural Degree of Inspiration, that there are several Articles in the Admiral's Letter of too uncourtly a Strain, to recommend him to some Persons Favour, and therefore it may be possible, those invidious Forebodings of his *future* Cowardice might proceed rather from a Spirit of Persecution, than that of Prophecy.

How must those, entrusted with the Management of public Affairs, relish Mr. BYNG's confirming that general and indelible Re-proach of his being sent *too late*, and that a timely Dispatch might have prevented even a single *Frenchman* setting his Foot upon the devoted Island?——How must his formidable Account of the Enemy's Force and Preparations, falsify the Predictions of those, who represented them as the mere Phantoms of our Imagination?——May not the Complaint of the ruinous Condition of the Wharfs, Pits, and Store-houses at *Gibraltar*, together with the almost total Want of *necessary Stores* for the Security of the Fleet; prejudice in his Disfavour those, to whose Province, the Care of these Affairs more particularly belong?——May not the *Foulness* of his Ships be deemed a Secret improper to be divulged, after the so much boasted Excellency of his Equipment?——In short, does not the whole Piece, rather unluckily contain an actual Proof of some *other* Person's Failure in Duty, than afford any prophetic Tokens of his *own*?

I believe, by this time, you are at no loss to account for the Motives, which induced the Concealment of this Letter; the vindictive Effects it must have produced, and con-

requently, the present unpopular Situation of its Author, who seems to labour under the Calumny of having *done those Things which he ought not to have done*; only to screen others from the Imputation of having *left undone those Things which they ought to have done*.

The Disingenuity of Mr. BYNG's Adversaries is particularly remarkable, in the constant Anticipation of their Vengeance; for, as it was thought convenient to implant in the Minds of the People, a Suspicion of his Cowardice, before it could possibly be known, *whether he would fight*; so it was deemed equally expedient, to supercede him, before it could be fairly known, *whether he had fought*; for, previous to any authentic Account of the Engagement to the Admiralty, the following Dismission was very expeditiously dispatched from it.

“ S I R,

“ **H**IS Majesty having received an Ac-
 “ count that the Squadron under your
 “ Command, and that of the *French* under
 “ the Command of Monsieur *Galissonniere*,
 “ came to Action off of the Harbour of
 “ *Mabon*,

“ *Mahon*, the 20th of last Month, and that
 “ the *French* (tho’ inferior to you in Force)
 “ kept before the Harbour, and obliged you
 “ to retreat; I am commanded by my Lords
 “ Commissioners of the Admiralty, to send
 “ you herewith an Extract of Monsieur *Ga-*
 “ *liffoniere’s* Letter to his Court, giving an
 “ Account of the Action, and to acquaint
 “ you, that his Majesty is so much dissatisfi-
 “ ed with your Conduct, that he has or-
 “ dered their Lordships to recal yourself and
 “ Mr. *West*, and to send out Sir *Edward*
 “ *Hawke*, and Rear-Admiral *Saunders*, to
 “ command the Squadron.

“ I am extremely sorry to be obliged to
 “ inform you of such a disagreeable Event,
 “ being with great Regard,

“ S I R,

“ *Your most obedient humble Servant,*

* * *

Admiralty-Office, June 8, 1756.

Now, Sir, is it to be credited, that this *Death-Warrant* to the Reputation, as well as Power of an Admiral, should have no o-

ther Foundation, than the *mistaken Supposition* of his retreating from an inferior Force, † and the *Authority* of a Letter, from his Competitor for Victory?—Have the partial Accounts, generally given by the *French* of their military

† Hon. Admiral BYNG's Squadron when he engaged Monsieur de la Galiffonniere's off Cape Mola, the 20th of May 1756.

Ship's Names.	Guns.	Weight of Metal on the			Men.
		Lower Deck.	Middle Deck.	Upper Deck.	
		lb.	lb.	lb.	
Ramilies	90	32	18	12	780
Culloden	74	32		18	600
Buckingham	68	32		18	535
Lancaster	66	32		18	520
Trident	64	24		12	500
Intrepid	64	32		18	480
Captain	64	24		12	480
Revenge	64	24		12	480
Kingston	60	24		9	400
Defiance	60	24		12	400
Princess Louisa	56	24		12	400
Portland	48	24		12	300
Frigates.	778				5875
Deptford	48	24			280
Chetterfield	40				250
Phoenix	22				160
Dolphin	22				160
Experiment	22				160
Total	932				6885

military Exploits, been usually adopted here as Articles of Faith, or what new Confidence have they now acquired, to hallow their Orthodoxy?

Monfieur *De la Galiffoniere's* Squadron when he landed the Troops at *Minorca* the 18th of *April*, and at the Engagement with Admiral *Byng's* Squadron off *Cape Mola*, the 20th of *May*, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns.	Weight of Metal on the		Seamen.	Soldiers.	Total Men on Board each Ship
		Lower Deck.	Upper Deck.			
		lb.	lb.			
Foudroyant	84	52	24	700	250	950
La Couronne	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Guerrier	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Hipopothame	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Fier	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Triton	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Lion	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Contant	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Sage	64	36	24	500	100	600
L'Orphée	64	36	24	500	100	600
Frigates.	828			6800	1550	8350
La Juno	46		18	300		300
La Rose	30		18	250		250
La Gracieufe	30		18	250		250
La Topaze	24		18	250		250
La Nympe	24		18	200		200
Total	982			8050	1550	9600

This List of the *French* Ships, as given by a *French* Officer made a Prisoner in a Tartan, the Morning of the Day of Action.

thodoxy?—Might not Mr. *Galissonniere* partake too much of the Frailty of his Nation, to give a disadvantageous Testimony of the Success of its Arms, and of his own Conduct and Valour? But, I believe, this is the first Instance of a *British Admiral* being sacrificed, unheard, to the Romance of a *French One*.—I shall not trouble you with any further Remarks of my own, on this Letter from the Admiralty, since Mr. BYNG'S Answer will afford you a much better Comment than I am able to make upon it.

“ *Gibraltar-Bay, July 4, 1756.*

“ *S I R,*

“ **B**Y Sir *Edward Hawke* I have received
 “ their Lordships Orders, and your
 “ Letter of the 8th of *June*, which I have
 “ immediately complied with, and have on-
 “ ly to express my Surprize at being so ig-
 “ nominiously dismissed from my Employ-
 “ ment, in the Sight of the Fleet I had com-
 “ manded, in Sight of the Garrison, and in
 “ Sight of *Spain*, at such a Time, in such a
 “ Manner, and after such Conduct, as I hope
 “ shall

“ shall shortly appear to the whole World.
 “ ’Tis not now for me to expostulate; I
 “ flatter myself, that Mr. *West* and I shall
 “ make evident the Injury done to our Cha-
 “ racters, which I know of nothing in the
 “ Power of any Being whatever that can
 “ atone for; so high an Opinion I have of
 “ that, which was ever unfullied before,
 “ and which I hope to make appear has been
 “ most injuriously and wrongfully attacked
 “ now, on the Grounds of a false *Gasconade*
 “ of an open Enemy to our King and Coun-
 “ try, and which would have evidently ap-
 “ peared, had the possible time been allow-
 “ ed for my own Express’s Arrival, in which
 “ there was nothing false, nothing vaunting,
 “ nothing shameful, nor any Thing which
 “ could have prevented our receiving his Ma-
 “ jesty’s royal Approbation, for having, with
 “ a much inferior Force, fought, met, at-
 “ tacked, and beat the Enemy: Of this, it
 “ is needless for me to say more at present,
 “ than that I am sorry to find Mr. *West*, with
 “ the Captains, Lieutenants, and Officers of
 “ the Ships we had our Flags on Board of,
 “ are to be Sufferers for what I alone, as
 “ Commander in Chief, am answerable:
 “ But it is so much of a Piece with the whole
 “ unheard of Treatment I have met with,
 “ that neither They, the Fleet, or Myself
 “ can

“ can be more astonished at that particular
“ than at the whole.

“ *I am,*

“ *S I R,*

“ *Your very humble Servant;*

“ *J. B.*

To

The Hon. J—n C—d, Esq;

You, Sir, who are so discerning a Judge of human Nature, will find no Difficulty to discover whether this is an unaffected, unstudied Remonstrance, or a disguised Artifice in the Author: The Time, the Occasion, and the Circumstances under which it was wrote, must manifest them to be the Expostulations of a Man, rather conscious of *Injury* than *Guilt*; the Dictates of a Heart jealous of Honour, not of a Head studious of Security; and though it does not amount to a *positive* Exculpation of Guilt, must afford every unprejudiced Person a *presumptive* Evidence of Innocence;—yet by a peculiar Fatality attending the Admiral, this very Letter was to draw on him an Accumulation of Vengeance;
its

its *Smartness* (to use the Phrase of his Adversaries) was deemed a Kind of Treason against their Dignity; and a modest Vindication of his own Conduct was construed into an insolent Impeachment of theirs; nor, indeed, do they seem to be much out in this Construction; since such is the Alternative, that what tends to exculpate the One, will be no very favourable Article towards the Justification of the Other; and to this CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE, I fear, it is, we may impute the *whole unheard of Treatment* Mr. BYNG complains to have met with.

Though the Length of this Letter may already prove, how much I am inclined to satisfy your Curiosity, I should still proceed to communicate some farther *Anecdotes* of this important Affair, and convince you, that Disingenuity is the least Injury that has been offered the Admiral on this Occasion; but as this must necessarily include Facts, essential to his future Defence, Honour and Justice forbid a present Discovery of them; and as they have been intrusted to me under the Seal of Secrecy, I am persuaded I shall not forfeit your Esteem, for not suffering even our Friendship to extort them from me; yet, thus far I may venture to hint, That, when you shall view this exploded SEA-PIECE in
its

its original Purity, you will find it very different from those fallacious Copies, which have been palmed upon the Public, by some prostitute Pencils, as genuine.—You will find there no dastardly Timidity in the Commander, no Dissatisfaction among the Officers at his Conduct; you will see the different Divisions mutually assisting each other to the utmost of their Power;—a Fleet, bravely repulsing an Enemy of much greater Force, and obliging them to seek for Safety, in the Advantage of a superior Speed; in short, you will see the *British* Flag (under the most disadvantageous Circumstances, even from its first setting out) performing all that Conduct and Courage could effect, and then, obliged in Prudence, to wait for those Reinforcements, which alone could insure its Security, and render its future Opposition of any Avail.—This, I presume, would afford you a very sensible Pleasure, not from any private or partial Respect to Mr. BYNG, but from the Satisfaction to find, that whatever Loss or Dishonour the Nation may have sustained from this unfortunate Affair, it is not owing at least to any Deficiency of *Naval Spirit*, on which the Wealth and Glory of this Kingdom so essentially depend.—But to conclude.

Not-

Notwithstanding the present Din of Defamation, and sanguinary Calls for Vengeance; I need not warn a Person of your Ingenuity, to suspend your Sentence till, upon a fair and candid Trial, the Admiral shall be found (what at present I have great Reason to believe him very invidiously misrepresented to be) a *Son*, unworthy of his *Father*,— A *Native* unworthy of his *Country*,—and an *Officer* unworthy of his *Command*.

I am,

S I R,

Yours, &c.



T H E
I M P O R T A N C E
O F T H E
I s l a n d o f M I N O R C A

A N D

H a r b o u r o f P O R T - M A H O N ,
F u l l y a n d i m p a r t i a l l y c o n s i d e r e d .

W I T H A

H I S T O R Y a n d D E S C R I P T I O N o f b o t h ,

I N A

L E T T E R f r o m a M E R C H A N T t o a
N o b l e L O R D .

L O N D O N :

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IMPORTANCE

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T H E
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I s l a n d o f M I N O R C A

A N D

H a r b o u r o f *Port-Mahon*, &c.

M Y L O R D,

AS your Lordship, I know, has a due Regard for the Glory, the Trade, and the Navigation of your Country, and can attend impartially to what is said against the Conduct even of those who by vulgar Minds are called their Friends, or their Party; and as by our present Conduct, especially with regard to our Possessions in the *Mediterranean*, our Glory, our Trade, and our Navigation, seem all to be *in some Danger*, permit me to lay before you, the Importance of those Possessions, which is not perhaps so well understood by our *Peers* or our *Admirals*, as it is by the *Merchants*, who

are daily trading to that Part of the World. The Island of *Minorca*, and Harbour of *Port-Mabon*, seem now to be in the *most imminent Danger*, therefore, I shall begin with that valuable Possession, and that your Lordship may not be obliged to have Recourse to any other, I shall premise a short History and Description of that Island and Harbour.

The Island of *Minorca*, is the least of the two Islands, called *Balcares* by the Antients, which Name was first given to them by the *Grecians*, as some say from *Baleus*, one of *Hercules's* Companions, who was left there; or as others, with better reason, say, from the *Greek* Word ΒΑΛΛΩ, I throw, because the Inhabitants made great use of the Sling, and were very dextrous at hitting a Mark with it at a great Distance, it being a Custom among them, to place their Children's Breakfast upon a Tree, or some Eminence, every Morning, and not to allow them to touch it, 'till after they had knocked it down with their Sling. They were likewise called *Gymnēsæ* by the *Grecians*, from the *Greek* Word ΓΥΜΝΟΣ, naked, because in the Summer-Time they always went naked*. But none

* See *Tit. Liv.* History, Epitome of Book lx. and *Florus's* History, Book iii. Chap. 8.

of the *Grecian* States ever thought it worth their while to subdue, or to establish a Colony in either of these Islands, nor is it probable, indeed, that they were ever subdued until after the *Carthaginians* had conquered some Part of *Spain*; and even then it is probable, that the *Carthaginians* were at the Pains to subdue them, rather on Account of the Use they could make of their Men in their Armies, than for any Thing they could get in their Islands; for it appears, that *Hannibal* had a Body of them in his Army*, and that the *Carthaginian* General and Admiral, *Mago*, after being repulsed from *Majorca*, the largest *Balearic* Island, was received without Opposition into *Minorca*, where he raised 2000 Men, whom he sent to *Carthage* †, and who were probably present in those *Carthaginian* Armies overcome by *P. Cornelius Scipio*, before he put an End to the second *Punick* War.

The Reasons why the *Majorcans* refused Entrance into their Island to the *Carthaginians*, was because they and their Brethren of *Minorca*, had before submitted to the *Romans*, they having been among the first

* *Tit. Liv.* Book xxii. Chap. 4, 48. Book xxvii. Chap. 2. Book xxx. Chap. 33. † Ditto Book xxviii. Chap. 37.

of the *Spanish* Nations who had sent Ambassadors to *Cn. Scipio*, after the naval Victory he obtained over the *Carthaginian* Fleet under *Asdrubal*, at the Mouth of the *Ebro**; and the *Minorcans* would probably have likewise opposed the landing of the *Carthaginians* in their Island, if they had thought themselves able to resist; but they had not, it seems, Men enough at home, to make a Resistance, as their Island was much smaller, and as the *Carthaginians* always drew Numbers of Men from both, to serve in their Armies both in *Italy* and *Spain* †.

After the End of the second *Punic* War, the *Balearick* Islands continued subject to the *Romans*, though not without some short Intervals of Rebellion, until the Western Empire was over-run by the *Goths* and *Vandals*, to the latter of whom the *Baleares* became subject about the Year 421, and continued in their Possession until near the End of the 8th Century, when they were made an absolute Conquest of by the *Saracens*, who had for many Years before been making continual Inroads upon them. Under their Dominion these Islands continued, except for a few

* *Tit. Liv.* Book xxii. Chap. 20.

† Ditto Book

xxviii. Chap. 15.

Years that they were under the Power of *Charles the Great*, until after the *Saracens*, now called the *Maur*s, had their Power in *Spain* very much curtailed by their Loss at the Battle of *Losa*, in 1210, where 200,000 of them were killed ; for as they were not, after that Defeat, able to assist their Countrymen in the *Balearick* Islands, *James* King of *Arragon* invaded *Majorca*, with a powerful Army, in 1229, and after defeating the *Maur*s of that Island in several Skirmishes, and taking their chief Town *Palma*, he reduced the Island to his Obedience, which so frightened those of *Minorca*, that in 1232, they submitted to hold the Island of him, and to pay him an annual Tribute ; so that they continued to have a Sort of Jurisdiction in the Island ; but being encouraged by their Countrymen in *Africa*, they neglected paying their Tribute, and began again their usual Pyracies, therefore in 1286, *Alphonso* King of *Arragon* invaded *Minorca* with a numerous Army, and after giving the *Maur*s two notable Defeats, though they had been re-inforced by great Numbers of their Countrymen from *Africa*, he obliged them to shut themselves up in their strong Fortrefs of *Mount Agatha*, which being
pre-

presently invested by the Conqueror, was at last, on the 17th of *January*, 1287, through *Famine*, forced to surrender, on the lamentable Conditions, that such of them as could pay a certain Sum, by Way of Ransom, should be transported to *Africa*, but that all the rest of the *Maur*s, either there or in the Island, should be made Slaves. Accordingly about 100 of them were shipt on board for *Africa*, but either perished by a Tempest, or were thrown overboard by the Seamen, in their Passage; and the remaining more unfortunate Multitude, to the Number of 20,000, were reduced into a Slavery of the most wretched Sort, as we must suppose, when we consider, that they were enthusiastick *Mahometans*, and their Masters bigotted *Papists*.

As the *Maur*s had thus been in full Possession of *Minorca* near 500 Years, we may suppose, that none of the original Natives were now remaining in the Island, or, if any of them did, that they were become *Mahometans*, and could not be distinguished from the *Maur*s, and consequently, that the Island was by this Conquest quite dispeopled; therefore *Alphonso* divided, and granted, the Island to such of the Officers and Soldiers of his Army

Army as were willing to stay there, and of these Grantees the present Natives are descended, who, tho' they have laid aside the Use of the Sling, and the old Custom of training their Children up to it from their Infancy, are still reputed very good Marksmen with the Musket, or Firelock.

From this Time the *Baleares* remained subject to the Kings of *Arragon*, and so became annexed to the Crown of *Spain*, to which Crown they both continued annexed until the Year 1708, when Major General, afterwards the Earl of *Stanhope*, was sent with a Squadron and some Transports, having about 2000 Land-Forces and Marines on board, to reduce *Minorca*, as being the most convenient and safe Station for our Navy in the *Mediterranean*. He landed in the Island *September* 14, N. S. and upon his Landing all the *French* and *Spanish* Troops that were in the Island, retired into Fort *St. Philips* at *Port-Mahon*, amounting in the Whole to about 1000 Men, besides one Company of 50 Men who kept Garrison in the Fort at *Port Fornelles*, and two Companies of 50 Men each who kept Garrison at *Ciudadella*.

As soon as the Troops were landed, two of our men of War were sent to reduce the

Fort *Fornelles*, which they did in a very few Days, having obliged the Garrison to surrender themselves Prisoners of War ; but as it was found very difficult to land our Artillery, which consisted of 42 Guns and 15 Mortars, and still more difficult to convey it in so rocky a Country, without a sufficient Number of Cattle of any Kind, to the Attack of *Fort St. Philips*, it was the 28th before a Battery of nine Guns only could be got to play upon the Outline of the Fort, in which however a Breach was made before Night, and an Assault resolved on for the next Day ; but that very Night some of the Grenadiers of two Battalions under Brigadier, afterwards Marshal General *Wade*, finding an Opportunity, entered the Line without Orders, and they being immediately supported, first by the Brigadier at the Head of these two Battalions, and then by the whole Army, the Besieged all retired precipitately into the Fort itself, which furnished the Besiegers with an Opportunity to lodge themselves, and to begin before Morning to trace out a Battery, on the Glacis of the Fort. This being perceived by the Besieged as soon as it was Day-light, they began to consider, that as they could expect no Relief, a very
 few

few Days would put it out of their Power to obtain any honourable Terms, therefore they beat a Parley that Morning, capitulated in the Afternoon, to be sent Part to *France*, and the rest to *Spain*, and General *Stanhope* took Possession of the Place on the 30th; presently after which a Detachment was sent to *Ciudadella*, which being no way fortified, the Garrison, upon the first Summons, surrendered themselves Prisoners of War; and thus in three Weeks after our Landing we made ourselves Masters of this whole Island.

As it was reduced chiefly by the *British* Arms, by the Consent of all our Allies, it continued in our sole Possession during the War; and the Advantages of it became by Experience so conspicuous, that, at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, an absolute Surrender of the Island to this Nation was peremptorily insisted on by our *Tory* Ministers: I say, our *Tory* Ministers; because no such Article was so much as mentioned by our *Whig* Ministers in the Preliminaries proposed by them at the Treaty of *Guertruydenburg*. And tho' the Death of the Emperor *Joseph*, and the Election of his Brother *Charles*, then called King of *Spain*, had soon after rendered the

Pursuit of the Grand Confederacy impracticable, yet these our *Tory* Ministers obtained the following Article, inserted in our Treaty of Peace with *Spain*, concluded at *Utrecht*, July the 2d—13th, 1713, viz.

“ Moreover, the Catholick King doth in
 “ like Manner *, for himself, his Heirs and
 “ Successors, yield to the Crown of *Great-*
 “ *Britain* the whole Island of *Minorca*, and
 “ doth transfer thereunto for ever all Right,
 “ and the most absolute Dominion over the
 “ said Island, and in particular over the
 “ Town, Castle, Harbour, and Fortifica-
 “ tions of the Bay of *Minorca*, commonly
 “ called *Port-Mahon*, together with the other
 “ Ports, Places, and Towns, situated in the
 “ aforesaid Island. But it is provided, as in
 “ the above-written Article, that no Refuge
 “ or Shelter shall be open to any Ships of
 “ War of the *Maur*s in *Port-Mahon*, or in
 “ any other Port of the said Island of *Minor-*
 “ *ca*, whereby the *Spanish* Coasts may be in-
 “ fested by their Excursions: And the *Maur*s
 “ and their Ships shall only be allowed to
 “ enter the Island aforesaid on Account of
 “ Traffick, according to the Agreement of

* The preceding Article contains a like Cession of *Gibraltar*,

“ Treaties. The Queen of *Great-Britain*
 “ promises also on her Part, that if at any
 “ Time it shall happen, that the Island of
 “ *Minorca*, and the Ports, Towns, and
 “ Places therein situated, be by any Means
 “ hereafter alienated from the Crown of her
 “ Kingdoms, the Preference shall be given
 “ to the Crown of *Spain* before any other
 “ Nation whatever, of redeeming the Pos-
 “ session and Propriety of the aforesaid Island.
 “ Her Royal Majesty of *Great-Britain* more-
 “ over engages, that she will take Care, that
 “ all the Inhabitants of the said Island, both
 “ Ecclesiastical and Secular, shall safely and
 “ peaceably enjoy all their Estates and Ho-
 “ nours, and the free Use of the *Roman Ca-*
 “ *tholick* Religion shall be permitted : And
 “ Measures shall be taken for preserving the
 “ aforesaid Religion in that Island, provided
 “ the same be consistent with the Civil Go-
 “ vernment and Laws of *Great-Britain*. Those
 “ likewise who are now in the Service of his
 “ Catholick Majesty shall enjoy their Ho-
 “ nours and Estates, tho’ they continue in the
 “ said Service ; and it shall be lawful for any
 “ Person who is desirous to leave the said
 “ Island, to sell his Estate, and pass freely
 “ with the Value thereof into *Spain*.”

Thus

Thus, my Lord, the Island of *Minorca* has now been very near 48 Years in our Possession, either as a Deposite, or as our absolute Property ; and our publick Accounts will shew, what infinite Sums it has cost us, both for maintaining a Garrison there, and for improving the Fortifications. This' Expence, indeed, we ought not to grudge, had it been properly and frugally laid out, even tho' it had been double what it is, because of the great Advantage it has been, and always must be of, to our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*. But, before I have done, I shall shew, that if we had taken proper Measures, as soon as the Island was yielded to us, the publick Revenue arising from it, might long since have been sufficient for defraying the whole Charge of fortifying and keeping it ; and my Reason for attempting this is, because such Measures may still be taken, as soon as it is resolved, that our Foreign Possessions shall not be made *Ministerial Jobs*, for enriching some Favourite sent out by them as Governor, or quartered upon the Governor they appoint. And, in order to do this, it will be necessary to give a short Description of the Island, and the Fortifications

tions belonging to it, which I shall now beg Leave to lay before your Lordship.


As to the Situation of the Island, it deserves a particular Description, because from thence flows a great deal of its Importance. I must therefore observe, that it lies in the *Mediterranean* Sea, and exactly under the 40th northern Parallel, which passes through the Middle of it; and it is of an oval Form, lying South East and North West, it being upwards of 33 Miles long, and from 10 to 13 Miles in Breadth; but its Coast, especially on the North and North East Side, is very much indented with long Bays and Promontories, occasioned, as is supposed, by the Winds called *Levanders*, which blow from the North or North East, and are often so furious, as to be dangerous to Navigation, but in the Summer Time serve to cool and refresh the Island, which, at that Time of the Year, would otherwise be rather too warm for a *British* Constitution. As it lies 200 Miles directly South from *Montpelier*, on the Southern Coast of *France*, about 170 Miles directly East from *Villa-real*, on the Eastern Coast of *Spain*, about 200 Miles directly North from *Algiers*, on the Northern Coast of *Africa*, and about the same Distance from the Western Coast of *Sar-*

Sardinia, it is excellently situated either for protecting or incommoding the Trade of all Nations in the *Mediterranean*, and for saving those Ships that happen to be unluckily caught in a tempestuous *Levanter*; and as *Port-Mahon* lies at the East End of the Island, there is not a safe Harbour for Ships of War in the *Mediterranean*, so conveniently situated for bridling the Pirates of *Africa*.

The Island is reckoned to contain at least 151,040 Acres; but as it is very mountainous, and the Sides of these Mountains consisting in many Places of nothing but Precipices and bare Rock, there are many of those Acres quite barren; and in general the whole Island may be called a Rock covered with a thin Mould, except in some of the Vallies, and in those Places they call their Baranco's, which seem to be Places gained from the Sea, at the Head of some Bay or Cove, by the Washing-down of the Earth from the adjacent Mountains; therefore there are no large Timber-Trees in the Island, for where there is Depth of Earth enough for their taking Root, they make a better Use of it, by turning it into arable Land, or Garden-Ground. But wherever there is any Earth, as it consists of a rich Mould, tho' it be but thin, it is very fruitful, and might be made

M E A N

C. de ^o



C. de Partine

Boval

a de Sclera

Ne de Genovasa

Punta de Pons

Cala Pons

Port de Adlaya

Cala Morria

es Pou don Caldas

es Fontelas

C. de Tuurike

C. de Mosenia vivas

C. de

Monjofira

Catrina

I. de Colom

S. Buffera

S. Galera

S. Pauuc

Palafanque

Bini Araga

R M I N O

Et Gendaret

S. Masquida

Royal Colom

S. Antonio

C. Negra

Mahon

El S. Graciu

Bini Athp

oude Bini Paulat

C. de la Mola

Signal house

A Guarnet

ca Vell

S. Philips

Governor of the

Castles house

Mahon Harb.

S. Stephens Cove

Martborough Ratonbt

I S A H O N

Atalaya Grossa

Signal house

Cala de Regalet

Cala de Aleja

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By T. A. Colat

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Long: E. from London

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much more so, if the Inhabitants had Wealth and Industry enough to make Reservoirs in their Mountains for watering it as often as there was Occasion ; and even their Rock in many Places might be turned to good Account, as it has been lately found to be Marble of a great Beauty and Variety ; therefore I am surprized, that great Quantities of it have not been brought home for publick Use, in such of our Men of War as were to return from that Island in Time of Peace, or in the Transports that brought our Troops from thence after being relieved by others.

After this general Account of the Island, I shall now come to Particulars, and observe, That it was formerly divided into five Termino's or Counties ; but two of them having been united into one, it is now divided into four only, the Northwesternmost of which is that called *Ciudadella*, from its principal City, which was formerly the Metropolis of the Island, as the *Spanish* Governor resided, and the chief Courts were kept in it. The Length of this Termino, from South to North, is about ten Miles, and its Breadth, from East to West, is from five to eight Miles, containing about 7000 Inhabitants. The City stands at the Head

of a little Bay or Cove, which has not Depth of Water enough for Vessels of great Burthen, but small Vessels have sufficient to carry them quite up to the Walls of the Town, where there is a Key for loading and unloading them. This City, which was formerly much more populous, contains still about 600 Houses, and is surrounded with an high Stone Wall, with Curtains and Bastions, without which a Ditch has been begun, and cut to a considerable Depth in the solid Rock, in some Places, but has been quite neglected since we got Possession, so that it may now be properly called an open City, and served us only as Quarters, in Time of Peace, for one of our Regiments, who had Orders, upon the Approach of an Enemy to the Island, to retire to *Port-Mahon*, and if they could spare Time, without Danger of being pursued or intercepted, to demolish the Road as they marched ; for Governor *Kane* had made a Road, during the Time of his Government, quite through the Island, from *Fort St. Philip's* to *Ciudadella*, and had made it as passable as it was possible in such a rocky mountainous Country.

The next Termino towards the South-East is *Fercrias*, which runs quite cross the
Island

Island, and consequently is in Length, from South to North, more than ten Miles, but in Breadth from East to West, it is scarcely any where more than four; and its chief Town of the same Name is so poor a Place, that it is seldom visited by any Travellers, tho' it does not lie above a Musket-Shot to the South of Mr. *Kane's* Road, nor is there any other remarkable Place in the Termino, so that it does not contain above 1126 Inhabitants. Therefore I shall proceed to the next Termino called *Mercadal*, to which this of *Fererias* is now united.

Mercadal Termino lies in the North-East Corner of the Island, and is in Length, from East to West, above 12 Miles, and in Breadth, from South to North, above 10; but tho' it be the largest, it is far from being the most populous, as it is not reckoned to contain above 1700 Inhabitants. Its chief Town is *Mercadal*, which, although it lies in the Center of the Island, and is the common Stage, or Lodging-Place, in travelling from *Mahon* to *Ciudadella*, is nevertheless but a poor Place; nor is there any good Inn, or publick Place of Entertainment, in the Town, which must have some extraordinary Cause, as we have been so long in Possession of this

Island. The Town stands near the Foot of the famous *Mount-Toro*, the highest Mountain in the Island, which rises in the Form of a Sugar-Loaf, and has on the Top of it a Convent of *Augustin* Monks, who entertain you with the miraculous Deeds of a Bull, from whom, they say, the Mountain got its Name, and whose fabulous History is painted round their Chapel, no Circumstance of which is ever in the least doubted by a good Catholick; but Protestants think their Labour ill bestowed in going up to hear such Legends, the Ascent being by a winding Road, which is very narrow, and even dangerous in some Places, tho' when arrived at Top they meet with some Comfort, in the Summer Time, from the refreshing Breezes which render the Convent extremely delightful at that Season. About six Miles to the North of *Mount-Toro*, lies the natural Harbour of *Fornelles*, which is a narrow Bay that runs a great Way within Land, and has Depth of Water sufficient for large Ships, but has many Shoals and hidden Rocks, so that it is dangerous for any Ship to go in without a good Pilot at present, tho' by fixing proper Buoys it might have been made a good Harbour; and upon the West Side of this Harbour there is a
small

small square Fort faced with hewn Stone, consisting of four Curtains and four Bastions, with something like a Ditch or Fossy, but without any Out-works; and as we have added none since we took it, as before-mentioned, tho' a Company of one of our Regiments always kept Garrison there, it could not hold out for any Time. And lastly, about four Miles to the North-West of *Mercadal* is the remarkable Mountain called *St. Agatha*, which, in the Time of the *Maur*s, was the strongest Fortrefs in the Island, and might still be made almost impregnable, by any Method but Famine; for there is a plain Area on the Top of five or six Acres, which is inaccessible every Way but by a Sort of Stairs hewn out of the Rock, and these might soon be demolished upon the Approach of an Enemy; but now there is nothing upon the Top of it except a few Sheep, with a Shepherd and his Family, and a little Chapel dedicated to *St. Agatha*, who here works many miraculous Cures, for the Benefit of the Priests, who send one of their Number, from Time to Time, to celebrate Mass in this Chapel.

To the South of the Termino of *Mercadal* lies the Termino of *Alaior*, whose greatest
Length

Length, from East to West, is about eight Miles, and its greatest Breadth, from South to North, about seven; and it is reckoned to contain about 5000 Inhabitants. The only remarkable Place in this Termino is its chief Town called *Alaior*, which lies about half a Mile to the South of Mr. *Kane's* Road. It stands high and airy, is tolerably well built, and next to *Ciudadella* and *Mabon*, is by much the best Town in the Island, therefore one of our Regiments is always quartered here, except one Company, which keeps Garrison at Fort *Fornelles*; but as it is an open Town, like all the other Towns of the Island, the Troops quartered here retire to *St. Philips* when the Island is in Danger of being invaded.

To the East of *Alaior* and *Mercadal*, that is to say, in the South-East Corner of the Island, lies the Termino of *Mabon*, which is in Length, from South to North, 14 Miles, and in Breadth, from East to West, about eight, but grows much narrower at the North End. However, it is reckoned to contain above 13,000 Inhabitants, and its chief Town is *Mabon*, which is now the capital Town of the Island, as the Residence of the Governor, and the chief Courts of Justice, were removed

to this Town, on Account of the Excellency of the Harbour, and the Neighbourhood of *Fort St. Philip's*, soon after we got Possession of the Island.

The Town is situated on the South Side of the Harbour, upon an elevated Ground, so that the Ascent from the Harbour is steep and difficult, but this renders it more pleasant and healthful. It was formerly surrounded with a Wall, which is still entire in most Places; but as the Trade of this Town has been vastly increased since our getting Possession of the Island, many Streets have been built without and close adjoining to the Wall, which do not yield in Elegance and Regularity, to any that are within the Town, so that it is now properly an open Town, and incapable of any Defence.

The Buildings are universally of Freestone, and are covered with Tiles, or flat-roofed and terraced; which Terrace is the Matter of which their Floors are likewise made, resembling those so well known, of late Years in *London*, by the Name of *Venetian Floors*.

There is generally a Regiment quartered at *Mahon*. The Officers have a House assigned to each of them, and the private Men are dispersed in those of the lesser Burghers,

Burghers, which are converted into Barracks for their use. The Officers and Soldiers have a Proportion of Wood and Oil provided for them by the Town. A Subaltern's Allowance of Oil is sufficient for one Lamp, and his Wood, with very good Management, will boil his Tea-Kettle two Mornings in a Week.

The Streets of this Town, which are generally very narrow, are none of them paved. The native Rock appears almost every where, and in some Places is very uneven and troublesome to pass.

At the Foot of the Hill on which *Maben* stands, is a fine Wharf of great Extent in length, and proportionably broad. The whole Western End is set apart for the Use of his Majesty's Ships, and here all Kinds of naval Stores, except Masts, which are kept on the opposite Side of the Harbour, are deposited in convenient Magazines, to be in a constant Readiness for careening, repairing, and supplying the Men of War. The Depth of Water at the Key is such as enables Ships of the largest Size to come as near it, as they have Occasion. As there is no Tide, a dry Dock has never been hitherto attempted at this Place, though surely it would not be a Work of such mighty Difficulty, as it is usually represented, and yet be of infinite Service,

vice, if it could be accomplished : For the present Method of heaving down, as practised here, is liable to many other Objections, besides the most obvious one of its being a dangerous Strain to the Masts and Timbers of the Ships.

The Eastern Part of the Wharf is taken up by the Merchants, near which is the Practica-House, where Ships newly come into Port, must apply, and shew a clean Bill of Health, before they are admitted to break Bulk.

A little out of Town, in the Way to *St. Philip's* stands a small Convent of Carmelite Friars, where lately a sumptuous Edifice was begun by those Fathers, but stopped by order of the Government.

About a Mile below the Town of *Mahon* is the *English* Cove, which is the general Watering-Place for the Navy. It is plentifully supplied with sweet Water, and here the Harbour is near a Mile over. Half a Mile lower, and about a Mile short of *St. Philip's*, lies *Bloody-Island*, making almost an equal Division of the Harbour, yet leaving the greatest Breadth and deepest Water on the *Mahon* Side. Here is a capacious Hospital belonging to the Navy with Lodgings

for the naval Officer, Surgeon, and others, and a decent Apartment for the Admiral or Commander in Chief, on Occasion. The cool Breezes of the Sea, to which this little Island lies open, render it a comfortable Residence in Summer : And though at present it contains no more than this single Pile of Building, it could easily admit of many others, its Area containing about twelve Acres ; and here the Freshness of the Air, and the amusing Prospects of the most improved Spots, broke here and there with Rocks and Precipices, and intermixed with scattering Houses ; and the Castle and Town of *St. Philip's*, the Fort of *Philipet*, and the Signal-House at *Cape Mola*, at a picturesque Distance, with the moving Scenes all round on the Water ; these, I say, altogether, compose a Situation highly capable of being improved into one of the most delightful Retirements for a contemplative Mind, that is to be found in this Part of the World.

This Hospital was built, when Sir *John Jennings* was Commander in Chief of the Fleet in the *Mediterranea*, in the Year 1717, instead of an old one, that was inconveniently situated.

St. Philip's Castle is situated at the Entrance of *Mabon* Harbour, to which it is the Key, and the principal Fortification on the Island. It is seated on a Neck of Land between *Mabon* Harbour and *St. Stephen's* Cove, and its numerous Outworks, extend themselves to the Shore on both Sides. The Body of the Place consists of four Bastions, and as many Curtains, surrounded with a deep Ditch, hewn out of the solid Rock, which furnished Free-Stone for the Walls. The Area is bounded on every Side with Buildings, consisting of the Governor's House, a Chapel, Guard-Room, Barracks, &c. In the Center is a Pump, to supply the Troops with Rain-Water from a large Cistern, and the whole Square is well paved, and kept very clean.

Over the flat Roofs of the arched Buildings is a spacious Rampart, affording an extensive Prospect to the Eye, and the Bastions have Guns mounted on them. The Communication from the lower Area to the Top of the Rampart is by a Pair of Stairs: The Steps are about ten Feet long, three Feet broad, and rise one Foot. The lower Edge of the Step is of Free-stone, and there the rise is only three Inches; the rest slopes gently

ly upward, and is of common Pavement. I have been the more particular in describing these Stairs, as they are not only of easy Ascent for Men, but also for Mules and Asses carrying their Burthens on their Backs. Up these the Artillery People likewise draw their Guns when there is Occasion; and, if they did not take up so much Room, they would be well worth our Imitation.

The whole Body of the Place is undermined, and very serviceable subterranean Works are contrived in the Rock, and communicate with one another, wherever it is necessary.

The Chapel, which is reserved for the Service of the Church of *England*, is the least adorned of any in the whole Island; for, as the *Spanish* Governors constantly resided at *Ciudadella*, it received but little Improvement in their Time; and, our Governors living altogether at *Mahon*, it has been equally neglected by us.

Before the Entrance of the Castle is a Horn-Work, with other Out-Works to this and the rest of the Fronts. There is a great Number of large Guns mounted towards the Entrance of the Harbour, besides those that point to the Land, which may require the Service of
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a vast many Artillery-People on Occasion, as indeed the various Works demand a considerable Garrison, to dispute them with an Enemy.

Of the utmost Advantage to this Place are certainly the capacious Galleries that are cut out of the Rock, and extend themselves under the Covert-Way, throughout all the Works. This was an Undertaking equally necessary and expensive; for otherwise the People must have been torn to Pieces by the Splinters of Stone, in Time of Action, as well those off Duty, who had Cover to secure them, as those who were obliged to expose themselves. But these Subterraneans afford Quarters and Shelter to the Garrison, impenetrable to Shot or Shells, and not to be come at but by cutting a Way to them through the living Rock, against which too they are provided with a Number of Countermines, at proper Distances, and in such Places as by their Situation are most exposed.

In the main Ditch is a small Powder Magazine; another much larger is under the Covert-Way of the Place, and there are Store-Houses sufficient for every Occasion, with an Hospital near *St. Stephen's Cove*; and, as a Cistern is obnoxious to Accidents from
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the Bombs of an Enemy, there are several Wells within the Works, and a Quantity of every Species of Provisions is constantly kept up, to support the whole Soldiery of the Island, in case of a Siege.

On the Point of Land to the Eastward of the Castle is *Charles Fort*, built by the *Spaniards*, and of little Consequence, as it now stands. The grand Battery lies down at the Water's Edge, and has a high Stone-Wall for the Protection of the Gunners, who ply their Ordnance through a long Range of Embrasures. The Queen's Redoubt is most advanced of all the Works, towards the Country on the Side where it stands; between it and the Harbour are two other Works, one of them lately finished. On the other Side of *St. Stephen's Cove*, stands *Marlborough Fort*, on a much higher Ground than that of *St. Philip's*, and therefore it ought to have been fortified at any Expence, as an Enemy's getting Possession of it would render it very unsafe for the Garrison to appear upon the Ramparts of the latter.

The Araval, or Suburb of *St. Philip's*, consists of Officers Quarters, Barracks for Soldiers, the Church, and some hundreds of Houses inhabited by the *Spaniards*. Since
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the Out-Works of the Castle have been run out to such an Extent, the Glacis almost reached the Buildings in some Places; so that it was necessary to pull many of them down.

The great Parade is now large enough for reviewing and exercising two Battalions of Men, and is to be further enlarged and levelled, so as to receive a much larger Body. Near this is the main Guard, where a Captain, a Subaltern, two Corporals, two Drums, and thirty-two private Centinels do Duty every Day.

The Baranco is a hollow watery Place, and is the principal Garden from whence the Garrison and Town of *St. Philip's* are principally supplied. It is a flat irregular Plot of Ground, and bordered on both Sides by Rocks. It is a fertile Spot, and produces in great Abundance every Kind of Fruit, Greens, Herbs, Roots, and Pulse, that is known to the *Minorquins*.

There is a good Key at *St. Philip's* for the Use of Ships; and on the other Side of the Harbour, but a little lower down, stands *Fort Philipet*, where a small Guard does Duty, for the Security of the Powder there lodged in a Magazine. Here is a Battery of
Guns

Guns on a Level with the Surface of the Water, for defending the Entrance of the Harbour. On the elevated Top of Cape *Mola* is the Signal-House, from whence the Garrison has due warning, on the Approach of Ships and Vessels from Sea : A Bush hung out denotes a small Vessel, a Ball a Ship, two or three Balls the same Number of Ships, and a Flag a Fleet ; these Signals are hoisted on the Side where the Ships are discovered.

Cape *Mola* is high Land, and is almost severed from the Island by *Philipet* Cove and a small Bay on the North Side, and is universally esteemed capable of being rendered an almost impregnable Fortrefs, at a moderate Expence.

Now, as we have neglected all the Opportunities we had when we were at War with *Spain*, to free ourselves from any Conditions we were laid under by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, with respect to *Minorca*, and consequently are still bound to permit the free Use of the *Roman Catholick* Religion, and to preserve it in that Island, as far as is consistent with the Civil Government and Laws of *Great-Britain*, I shall give your Lordship a short Account of the People of *Minorca*, and
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the Civil Government they have established amongst them. As to the People, notwithstanding our having so long had the Dominion of their Island, they have still too much of the *Spaniard* in their Composition: They have still all that Pride, Laziness, and Bigotry to the Popish Religion, which have hitherto entailed Poverty upon the Body of the People in *Spain*, notwithstanding the immense Riches they have drawn, and do still draw, from *Peru* and *Mexico*; and this, indeed, is not to be wondered at, considering our Management of that Island; for our Governors have taken Care that none of our industrious People should ever settle in that Island; and so far have we been from establishing any Protestant Clergy in that Island, that tho' every one of our Regiments has a Chaplain allowed, at the Expence of 121 l. 13s. 4d. *per Annum* to the Publick, besides a Chaplain-General, at a plentiful Allowance, for the Garrison, yet no Chaplain has ever, or but very rarely, appeared in that Island, except when a Man of War happened to put in there, who chanced to have a Chaplain on board, and their Chaplains are too often as bad Preachers as they are bad Christians: We cannot therefore suppose, that the Na-

tives could learn Industry from our Soldiers, and this shameful Neglect in our Governors, with regard to publick Worship, could not but give them a very wrong Notion of the Protestant Religion, or rather could not but confirm them in their Bigotry to their own ridiculous Superstitions.

As to the Civil Government of this Island, which still continues the same it was when we got Possession, I shall observe, that the Court of Royal Government is the principal and supreme Tribunal of the Island, in all Causes wherein the Crown is concerned, (except such as regard the Royal Patrimony) in all Matters relating to the Jurats of the several Terminos, and in all criminal Cases; and to this Tribunal Appeals may be made from all the inferior Courts. The Governor presides in it, and all the Proceedings are in his Name. He is obliged to attend in Person at the Tryal of Criminals; but in civil Cases, especially those of little Moment, his Presence is dispensed with; and then his Assessor is the Judge, unless some Objection lies against him, in which Case the Governor appoints some other Lawyer as his Assessor in that Cause.

As to the Royal Patrimony or Revenue, it is regulated by an Officer called the Procurador Real, another called the Fiscal, and the Assessor ; but in all disputed Matters, relating to it, the Last is the chief Judge. Then as to the inferior Tribunals, they consist of the Jurats in each respective Termino, who are five in Number, one, who is called Jurat Major, chosen yearly by the Gentlemen or Dons of the Island, one by the Citizens, one by the Merchants, one by the Tradesmen or Mechanicks, and one by the Peasants ; which is an Office that every Man who is chosen is obliged to serve, and each, as soon as he is chosen, appoints one as his Counsellor to assist him. In these Jurats is lodged the chief Government of each respective Termino, and when they think it necessary to call a General-Council, they apply to the Governor for his Summons, which seems to be a Writ of Right, and such a one as he cannot refuse ; and by Virtue of this Right they assemble at *Ciudadella*, which Assembly may be called their Parliament ; but they seem to have no Power except that of imposing and regulating their Taxes, and representing their Hardships or Oppressions to the Governor, or, if they meet with no

Redress from him, to the King, formerly of *Spain*, now of *Great-Britain*, by sending over a Syndico for that Purpose ; and this of sending a Syndico to the King, is a Privilege that is enjoyed by each respective Termino, at its own particular Expence ; but as the Resolutions of their General-Council, as soon as it breaks up, and also the Resolutions of every particular Termino, must be communicated to the Governor, I have heard that some Governors have taken Measures to prevent any Syndico's being able to get out of the Island, nay, even to prevent any Letter's being sent from the Island, before being perused by him, which a Governor may now easily do for a long Time, as the Island has very little Foreign Trade.

There is likewise in each respective Termino a Bayle or Bailiff, who is Judge in all lesser civil Causes and all small Offences, that happen within the Termino ; and the Bayle of *Ciudadella*, called Bayle-General, has the same Jurisdiction all over the Island. There is likewise a Bayle-Consul, who is Judge in all maritime Affairs, and who, in a summary Way, tries all civil Causes of five Livres or under ; and there is an Almutazen, or Officer so called, who has the Care of all Weights and Measures, and is to remove, or cause to be

be removed, all publick Nuisances in the Streets or Highways. They have likewise something like our Coroners Inquest ; for the Officers of the Supreme-Council are obliged to make an Inquiry into the Death of every Inhabitant suspected not to be natural ; and their Method of Inquiry always gives great Diversion to our People, for it is by whispering into the Ear of the Deceased, to ask how he came by his Death, and other such conjuring Practices of equal Efficacy now, tho' in former Times they served to charge the Death upon some one against whom the Judges, or their Directors the Priests, had a Resentment.

Lastly, As to the ecclesiastical Courts, I must observe, that this Island was within the Diocese of the Bishop of *Majorca*, who had a considerable Revenue from this Island, and was Patron of all the Church Benefices ; but now his Revenue belongs to our Government, and our Governor is the universal Patron, so that our King may be reckoned Head of the Church in *Minorca* more effectually than he is in *Great-Britain*. However, the ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is lodged in the Vicar-General, who has an Assessor for assisting him ; but the Monasteries and Nunneries are under the Direction of the Superiors of their

their respective Orders in foreign Parts, and therefore ought to have been long since dissolved, as they are inconsistent with the Civil Government of *Great-Britain*, and as their Estates might by this Time have been a considerable Addition to the Royal Patrimony, or Revenue of the Island; especially as these Monks and Nuns serve for nothing but to entail Poverty upon the vulgar and ignorant, by taking every Method to conjure them out of the little Money they have to spare.

Having mentioned the Royal Patrimony or Revenue, I shall observe, that it consists in several Taxes and Impositions, a very small Part of which is applied towards the Support of the secular Clergy. All Goods imported or exported as Merchandize, pay a certain Duty, according to their Weight or Measure; all Salt made in the Island pays one Eleventh of the full Value. All Greens growing in the Island, including Tobacco, and even Barley for Forage, except what is raised by the Farmer for his own Cattle, pays one Eleventh of the full Value. Hemp pays one Thirteenth, Flax one Fifteenth, Grapes one Eleventh, Corn one Eighth and an half, and Cattle one Fifteenth of their yearly

yearly Increase. Besides these, there is a Sort of Land-Tax, called Cencoe, and a Sort of Excise upon all Liquors sold by Retail, the last of which, brings in the most considerable Revenue of any; and a Multitude of other little Taxes too tedious to mention, so that the Publick, or Royal Revenue of this little Island, even in its present unimproved State, must be very considerable; if duly collected, and regularly accounted for; but as I never heard of any Account of its being laid before Parliament; I am afraid, it is, like the Royal Revenue in *America*, mostly sunk or conjured into the Pockets of our great Officers, and their Deputies, Agents, or Favourites; the only Remedy against which would be an annual Parliamentary Inquiry, and a Parliamentary Encouragement and Protection to such as should discover any Embezzlement or Concealment; and even this would be ineffectual, if our Ministers should ever be able to obtain an undue Influence in Parliament; for Ministers too often connive at the Jobs of one another, and as they have the Appointment of, they are too apt to indulge the under Officers in their respective Departments, and to resent, in some secret Manner; at least, every Discovery that is
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made against them ; therefore a Sovereign of true Wisdom will take Care to preserve the Independency of Parliament, as it is the only effectual Check he can have against being cheated by his own Servants.

Thus from the Description alone of this Island, and its most extraordinary natural Harbour, the Importance of it must very evidently appear ; but when we consider the common Course of Navigation, and the vast Traffick carried on in the *Mediterranean Sea*, this Importance must become still more manifest ; for all Ships sailing up the Streights of *Gibraltar*, and bound to any Part of *Africa*, East of *Algiers*, to any Part of *Italy*, or to any Part of *Turkey*, either in *Asia* or *Europe*, and all Ships from any of those Places, and bound to any Port without the Streights-Mouth, must and usually do pass between this Island and the Coast of *Africa*, and consequently, could not easily escape the Privateers from *Port-Mahon*, if their Enemies should be in Possession of this Island. Then as to the Ports of *Spain* in the *Mediterranean*, all the Ships bound from any of them to *Sicily*, *Turkey*, or the Gulph of *Venice*, or from any of these Places, to any of those Ports, do usually pass between

tween this Island and the Coast of *Africa* ; and indeed, the Island is so near to the Coast of *Spain*, and so exactly over against the Middle of it, that the Navigation of the whole Coast must be very much infested by the Ships of War of an Enemy, in Possession of the Island of *Minorca*. And with Respect to *Marseilles*, and the other Ports of *France* in the *Mediterranean*, their Ships cannot sail to, or from any foreign Port in the World, without being in Danger, of being intercepted by an Enemy who is possessed of *Minorca* . Even their Trade to *Genoa* and *Leghorn*, which is the least exposed, would nevertheless be in some Danger, as the Enemy's Ships, if like to be overpowered, could easily retire in Safety to *Port-Mahon* ; but their Ships bound to *Sicily*, *Turkey*, or the Gulph of *Venice*, could seldom escape a vigilant and well provided Enemy, as they must take their Passage between *Port-Mahon* and *Sardinia* ; and their Ships bound to the Eastern Coast of *Spain*, or any where without the Streights Mouth, would always be in equal Danger, as they must pursue the same Course, or pass between *Minorca* and the *Spanish* Coast, which would be still more dangerous, as the Passage is narrower.

And lastly, with Regard to the pyratrical States of *Barbary*, the Possession of *Minorca* is of the utmost Importance to any Christian State, that has any just Pretence to be called a maritime Power ; for none of these little States could subsist, or carry on their Pyracies, without the Friendship, or at least the Connivance of such a Christian State ; because their *Corfsairs* could never appear with Safety in the *Mediterranean*, and even those bound out of the Streights would be in Danger of being intercepted, either in sailing out of Port, or upon their Return.

From hence we must be convinced, that whilst we preserve our Possession of this Island, we must be respected, and even dreaded, by every Kingdom and State bordering upon the *Mediterranean*, or that has any Trade or Navigation in that Part of the World, because of the infinite Prejudice we may do them in Case of their coming to a Rupture with us. With Respect to the Pyrates, both of *Barbary* and *Morocco*, this has been fully confirmed by Experience ; for ever since we have had Possession of this Island, we have enjoyed almost a continual Peace with every one of them : Nay, so much Respect did the *Algerines* shew us,

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that at our Intercession, a good many Years ago, they readily agreed to a Peace with the *Dutch*, in which we shewed our Generosity at the Expence of our Interest ; for by the War between these two States we had solely ingrossed the Transport Trade in the *Mediterranean*, but after we had procured this Peace between them, the Dutch soon wrigled themselves into the greatest Share of this beneficial Trade. How they have since repaid this Piece of *Don Quixote* Kindness, I shall leave your Lordship to judge.

By Experience likewise it is known what infinite Prejudice we may do our Enemies, by Means of that maritime Force which the Harbour of *Port-Mahon* enables us to keep with Ease and Safety in the *Mediterranean* ; for in the last War with *Spain*, we put an absolute End to their carrying on any Trade in the *Mediterranean* : Even their Coasting-Vessels and Fishing-Boats durst hardly venture out of shoal Water, unless it was within Reach of the Cannon of their Forts ; and in the last War with *France*, can it be supposed, that we could have intercepted so many of their *Turkey* and *Italian* Ships, especially at the Beginning of the War, if we

had not then been in Possession of the Island of *Minorca* ?

It is said, I know, that our Possessions in the *Mediterranean* can never be of any Service unless when we have a superior Squadron there, and this we might have even tho' we had no such Possession, because we can never be at War with all the States bordering upon the *Mediterranean* ; and when our Squadron has Occasion to go into Port, they may go into the Port of some of those States that are in Friendship with us. But in the first Place, there are not many Ports which our large Men of War can get safely into ; and in the next Place, most States are shy, and no State is obliged to allow a very powerful Squadron to come into any of their Ports : I say a very powerful Squadron ; for in Case of a War with *France*, it will always be necessary for us to keep 30, 40, or 50 Line of Battle Ships in the *Mediterranean*, according to the Number of Ships *France* may fit out, even altho' we had no Possession there, because of the great Trade we now, and I hope always shall, carry on in that Sea ; therefore, if we had no Port of our own, we could not be always certain of having a safe Port for our Squadron to retire to, without
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going so far as to be quite out of the Way of protecting our Trade. But suppose we could be always certain of having a safe and convenient Port to retire to, could we in any such Port meet with proper Stores, or a proper Conveniency for refitting our Men of War, in Case any of them should be damaged, either by a Storm or by an Engagement with an Enemy? And if we could meet with such a Thing, would it be of equal Advantage with having our Ships refitted with our own Stores, by our own People, and in one of our own Ports? Where could Mr. *Matthews's* Squadron have been refitted after the Engagement off *Tboulon*, if we had not then been in Possession of *Port-Mahon*?

Again, it may be said that, whilst we keep Possession of *Gibraltar*, we cannot suffer much by the Loss of *Minorca*. I shall most readily grant that *Gibraltar* is likewise a most valuable Possession, and, I hope, it will never be given up, either with or without the Consent of Parliament. But I cannot admit, that it is near so valuable as the Island of *Minorca* and Harbour of *Port-Mahon*. *Gibraltar* is no Harbour for Men of War, nor can a Squadron safely continue to ride in that Bay,

Bay, either in the Winter-Time, or when we are at War with *Spain*; and it is far from being so convenient a Station for our Squadron as *Port-Mahon*, either for protecting our own Trade or annoying that of the Enemy; to which I must add, that a Squadron at *Gibraltar* must always be more expensive to the Nation than a Squadron at *Port-Mahon*: At the former our Squadron must have all their fresh Provisions from Foreigners: At the latter they have all their fresh Provisions from our own People; for even the Natives of *Minorca* I must look on as such; and for the same Reason our Troops in *Minorca* are not so expensive to the Nation as our Troops at *Gibraltar*. But what is of still greater Consequence, if we lose *Minorca* it will scarcely be possible for us to preserve *Gibraltar*; for a strong Squadron with a sufficient Number of Land Forces might force a Landing somewhere upon *Europa-Point*, which runs above a Mile out into the Sea beyond the Town on that Side, and consequently could not be sufficiently defended by such a small Garrison as we generally have in the Town; and if an Enemy should once land and lodge themselves any where on that Point of Land, they would be able to make them-

themselves Masters of *Gibraltar*, long before we could send a Squadron from *England* to its Relief ; therefore we must always have a superior Squadron near at Hand for the Preservation of *Gibraltar*, and where such a Squadron could be stationed in the Winter-Time, cannot, I believe, with any Certainty be assigned, especially if we should again happen to be at War both with *France* and *Spain*, and *Portugal* perhaps so much over-awed as to refuse us the Use of her Ports for this Purpose ; for that it could not be safely stationed in the Bay of *Gibraltar*, the Fate of Admiral *Wheeler* and his Squadron in 1693-4 must convince us, as that Admiral himself with his Ship, two other Men of War, and several more Ships, were lost in that very Bay, not by mistaking the Bay for the Straits Mouth, as our Historians foolishly suggest, for let the Weather have been never so thick, their Compass must have shewn them this Error ; but the Truth is, such of the Ships as had, in approaching the Straits, plyed too near the *Gibraltar* Side, were forced ashore by the Violence of the Tempest, whereas those that had steered wide, were able to weather the Storm, and to get
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safe into *St. Jeremy's Bay*, on the Coast of *Barbary*.

But now supposing a Squadron could safely Winter in the Bay of *Gibraltar*, yet we could not clean or refit any of our Men of War there : By keeping a Magazine of naval Stores in that Fortrefs, they might indeed be provided with new Sails, or a fresh Supply of Ammunition, but if new Masts or Timbers were necessary, we must carry them as well as the Ship to some distant foreign Port, before they could be fitted. Thus supposing it possible for us to keep *Gibraltar* after the Loss of *Minorca*, yet the keeping of a Squadron there during the Winter, would be extremely inconvenient and expensive ; and yet during a War with any *European* State, or any of the Pyritical Towns of *Barbary* or *Morocco*, we must keep a Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, otherwise what must become of the Multitude of our little Ships that sail every Year, and mostly, in or towards the Winter, from *Britain*, *Ireland*, *Newfoundland*, *New-England*, &c. with Fish to *Portugal*, *Cadiz*, or the *Mediterranean*, for it would be impossible for them to wait for Convoy.

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It is therefore evident, that if the Island of *Minorca* were by some amazing Earthquake swallowed up, it would be of infinite Disadvantage to this Nation; but if it should fall into the Hands of any Nation that can be called a maritime Power, especially if it should fall into the Hands of *France*, all the Advantages we now reap from our Possession of it, would be then turned against us. I may almost say, that in such a Case we must bid adieu to any Sort of Commerce in the *Mediterranean*. We know by repeated Experience, what Use the *French* make of any Influence they can acquire over the Barbarians in every Part of the World. Should they have the Honour of taking *Minorca* away from us, they would thereby gain such a Respect, and such an Influence over all the Pyrratical States of *Barbary*, that they would soon prevail with every one of them to break with us. This, perhaps, we could not blame them for in a Time of War between the two Nations; but they would underhand continue the same Conduct in Time of Peace, so that we could never expect to be at Peace with any, at least not with all the Pyrratical States of *Barbary*, and this alone would in a few Years, transfer to the *French* not only

all our Transport-Trade, but all our Fish Trade in the *Mediterranean*, and our *Turkey* and *Italian* Trade would soon share the same Fate. What an Addition this would make to the Naval Power of *France*, what a Diminution to that of *Great-Britain*, I shall leave your Lordship to consider.

I need not, I believe, add any Thing more for convincing your Lordship, how careful we ought to have been to provide for the Security of *Minorca*, by sending a strong Squadron to the *Mediterranean*, before we began Hostilities against *France*. What Number of Line of Battle Ships that Squadron ought to consist of, must always depend upon the Number of such Ships, which the *French* may in a few Weeks have ready to sail from *Toulon*; but as they may privately send a few Ships from their Ports in the Ocean to the *Mediterranean*, our Squadron ought to consist of near double that Number; and considering the large Sums always allowed in our publick Accounts for secret Service Money, I cannot doubt of our having the most perfect Intelligence of the State of the *French* Naval Preparations in all their Ports, which may certainly be had, as such Numbers of Men of all

Ranks, must always be employed in such Preparations. We took Care to provide for the Defence of *Hanover* by proper Treaties and Alliances, before we began any Sort of Hostilities, and surely our own Island of *Minorca* equally deserved our Care. During the whole Time of our late War with *Spain*, and even before *France* became a Party, we took Care to keep a formidable Squadron in the *Mediterranean*. This Squadron, it is true, we did not in the Year 1741, make the proper Use of, with Regard to the Defence of our Allies, but we made such an Use of it as to defend our own Possessions in that Part of the World, and afterwards to ruin the Trade of *France*. Could it be supposed, that in a War with *France*, our Possessions in the *Mediterranean* would not be in so great Danger, as they had been, or could be in a War with *Spain*?

I was, therefore, a little surprized, when I heard of our taking the two *French* Men of War in *America*, that no formidable Squadron had been sent to the *Mediterranean*; but I was quite astonished when I heard of our seizing the *French* Merchant Ships in the Seas of *Europe*, without our

having previously sent a Squadron of at least twenty or thirty Ships of the Line of Battle, to the *Mediterranean*; and I must confess, that after our Gazettes began to mention the *French* Preparations for an Embarkation at *Toulon*, I was at last almost tempted to suspect something worse than Want of Care, for I could not suspect Want of Ability, as we had so great a Number of fine stout Ships in Commission, and as common OEconomy must always direct us not to put any Ship in Commission, till those already commissioned, have been fully or near fully manned. The vulgar dastardly Conceit of our being afraid of an Invasion, could not, with me, obtain so much as a Moment's Consideration; for there is not a Man of common Sense in the Kingdom, who does not know, that whilst we have such a Superiority of Naval Strength, the *French*, whatever they may pretend, will never seriously think of invading us, unless they expected to be joined on their Landing, by a great Part of our own People, or unless they could by some very extraordinary Accident send at once, and from one Port, such an Army as could conquer the Island.

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As to their expecting to be joined by any Number of our own People, in the Humour which the People now generally appear to be in, they could not expect to be joined by any one Man: Even the Papists so highly resent the late *French* Conduct towards this Nation, and towards themselves too, that I do not believe a Man of them would join them: I am sure no such Numbers would, as could give them any Chance for Success. And as to their being able by some most extraordinary Accident to send such an Army, as could without any Re-inforcements, make a Conquest of this Island, can any Man out of the Purlieus of *Bedlam*, imagine such a Thing to be possible? Fifty Thousand of the best Troops they have, would not be sufficient for achieving such a Conquest; for let them land where they will, we could meet them with double the Number, long before they reached *London*, whilst at the same Time, we might have another Army equal in Number, marching from the North, and a Third from the West; for in such a Case, all Liberties and Privileges would be at an End, our Sovereign, by our Constitution, would be absolute, and our Rulers, if they had any Spirit,

rit, would oblige every Man to march, whose Strength and Courage they could best depend on.

Gentlemen who have been bred to all the Punctilios of Discipline, do, I know, despise, what is called the Militia of any Country: They think no Man can fight unless he can turn out his Toes, regulate his Steps by Measure, and move as slow as the hireling Mourners of an Undertaker at a Funeral; but a brave and desperate Militia, led on by Gentlemen of good Sense and true Courage, would soon put an End to all the Punctilios of regular Troops: They never would give them Time to fire above once; for by breaking in Pell-Mell among them, with their screwed Bayonets or Broad-Swords, or even with Pitch-Forks and Hedge-Bills, they would not only prevent its being possible for them to charge their Muskets a second Time, but would put an End to their Regularity, and if once put into Confusion, I could engage, that such a Militia would never allow them to form again.

From hence I must conclude, that none of our Ministers ever had the least Apprehension of our being invaded, as we had in
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Commission four Times as many Line of Battle Ships as the *French* could fit out from all their Ports in the Ocean: I say, our Ministers could not have any such Apprehension, unless they either distrusted the Honesty, or despised the Courage of their Countrymen; and this, I should be extremely sorry so much as to suspect; for a Nation is in a most dangerous and dismal Situation, when the People begin to distrust or despise their Rulers, or when the Rulers begin to distrust or despise the People, because in the former Case, Faction and Rebellion, and in the latter, Oppression and Tyranny, is the certain, and often the immediate Consequence.

I cannot therefore suggest to myself any one Reason, why we did not send early in the Spring, to the *Mediterranean*, a Squadron much more powerful than any the *French* could fit out at *Toulon*, as we might have done this, and yet have kept a much stronger Squadron at Home, than any the *French* could fit out from all their Ports in the Ocean, and this without neglecting our Trade or our Possessions in any other Part of the World. For this Reason I endeavour to please myself with the Hopes of our Minister's having had certain Information, that
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the *French* have not provided a sufficient Land-Force for reducing that Island, before our having an Opportunity to send a sufficient Squadron, and a sufficient Land-Force for its Relief; but then these Hopes are again dashed, when I consider the defenceless Condition in which that Island is at present, occasioned chiefly by the wrong Measures we have taken for preserving it ever since it was yielded to us.

We have but one tenable Fortrefs in the whole Island, and I doubt, if there be a Man on whose Service and Fidelity we can depend, besides those of the four Regiments we have in Garrison there. I wish they may be compleat; for if they are not, the many Out-Works we have been at the Expence of adding to Fort *St. Philip's*, will weaken instead of strengthening the Place; because if there are not Men enough to defend them, they will furnish the Besiegers with Lodgments for attacking the Body of the Fort; and if the *French* should begin with making themselves Masters of *Marlborough* Redoubt, which I suspect they will, and easily may, it stands upon such high Ground, as I have been told, that it overlooks almost all the Works of *St. Philip's*,
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and will make it dangerous for our Men to appear upon the Ramparts of that Castle, consequently it will very much facilitate the taking of the Place.

I am therefore under the most melancholy Apprehensions that this Place, notwithstanding the Expence we have been at, cannot hold out very long against a besieging Enemy, well provided with every Thing necessary for the Purpose, as the *French* generally are ; and when this single Place is taken, the Possession of the Island is gone from us ; whereas, if we had begun to take proper Measures for securing our Possession, as soon as the Property of it was yielded to us, it might by this Time have been so full of Inhabitants, those Inhabitants so much attached to this Nation, and so well armed and disciplined, and so many Towns and Places in the Island compleatly fortified, that it would have required a very numerous Army, and a very long Time to have reduced it. For this Purpose we should have resolved to begin with taking all proper Measures for converting, without Compulsion, the Natives to the Protestant Religion ; which we might have done without a Breach of any of our Engagements by the Treaty of *Utrecht*. In

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Purfuance of this Resolution a Number of young Clergymen of the Church of *England*, and of the best Character as to their Life and Conversation, should have been presently sent over, and sufficiently provided for, with Orders to make themselves Masters of the *Minorca* Language, and to apply themselves towards converting as many of the Natives as they could, and with an Assurance of being at last provided for, here at Home, in Proportion to their Diligence and Success. By this Method many of the Natives might have been converted before our first War with *Spain* in 1718 ; and, as all former Treaties were then cancelled by their Declaration of War against us, we should have taken that Opportunity, at least to dissolve all the Monasteries and Nunneries in the Island, and to convert their Estates, as the Friars and Nuns then in being died off, towards the Maintenance of a Church of *England* Clergy in the Island ; so that before the last War with *Spain*, the far greatest Part of the Natives might probably have been converted, and then we might, even with their Consent, have made the Church of *England* the established Religion of the Country, but with a free Indulgence to all other

other Sects of Religion, not excepting even that of the *Papists*.

So much with Regard to the Religion of the Island, and then with Regard to the Civil Government, it would have been necessary for some Time at least, to have left the Natives their own Laws and their own Form of Government as well as their own Judges, but both ought by Degrees to have been brought as near to the *English* as possible ; and both their Laws and Form of Government have such a near Resemblance to ours, which was the Reason I thought myself obliged to give some Account of them, that a thorough Similarity might in a short Time have been established. That of Trial by Jury might, I am persuaded, have been presently introduced, with the Consent of the Natives themselves ; and after the *English* Language had become general among them, for the effecting of which every proper Method should have been taken from the very Beginning, the Proceedings in all their Courts ought to have been directed to be in *English*. In short, their Laws, their Language, and their Religion, ought as quickly as possible, but without any compulsive Methods, to have been made the same with those in *England*, and every Per-

son born in *Minorca*, if a Protestant, ought to have been declared, by Act of Parliament, a natural born Subject of *Great-Britain*. If these Methods had been taken, together with such as I am just going to mention, as soon as the Property of this Island was yielded to us by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, I am convinced, that by this Time almost every Native of *Minorca* would have been a zealous Protestant, and as faithful a Subject, and as ready to take Arms for the Defence of our Government, as any Soldier we have now in the Garrison. But our Misfortune has always been to think only of possessing the Lands and the Dominion of the Country we conquer, without taking the least Thought how to possess ourselves of the Hearts of the Inhabitants, a Conduct that must always be attended with fatal Consequences, of which I could give many glaring Instances, and it is perhaps in a great Measure owing to the Popularity of our Form of Government.

As the Natives of *Minorca* are generally computed to be about 28,000, they must have at least 4000 Men able to bear Arms, which would have been no inconsiderable Addition to our Strength, if we could have depended upon their Fidelity and Courage ;
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but as this Island lies so conveniently for Trade, and a Communication between the richest Parts of *Asia*, *Africa*, and *Europe*, it would certainly have soon become a general Magazine and Mart for the Trade of all those Countries, if we had at first established the Civil Government and Laws of *England* for all *British* Subjects and Foreigners that should settle in, or come to trade in the Island ; and this would have increased the Number of Inhabitants so much, that by this Time, instead of 28,000, their Number might have amounted to 3 or 400,000. For this Purpose it would have been necessary to have established a civil as well as a military Governor, and to have made the former absolutely independent of the latter, unless when the Island was in Danger of being invaded, and martial Law proclaimed with the Consent of a Council and Assembly, the former appointed by the Crown, and the latter chosen by the People, with the Approbation of the Crown, or of some Officer appointed by the Crown ; for such an Approbation would have been necessary, in order to keep factious and seditious Men out of such a popular Assembly.

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Then with regard to Trade, the whole Island, with every Harbour and Creek thereof, ought to have been declared a free Port, without any Sort of Duties or Fees either upon Importation or Exportation, nor any Tax upon Goods of any Kind, until they came into the Retailer's or the Consumer's Hands. Even then the Taxes ought to have been as moderate, and collected in as easy a Manner, as was possible, in order to have made living in the Island both cheap and convenient; for very moderate Taxes of this Kind, with a Land Tax of 2s. in the Pound in Time of Peace, and four in Time of War, always fully and equally, and for that Reason frequently, assessed, would have probably produced as much as would have paid all the regular Troops, we should have been obliged to keep within the Island in Time of Peace, and perhaps would have spared a considerable Sum yearly for maintaining and improving the Fortifications of all those Places, which could by Nature have been the most easily fortified, and which were the most necessary for enabling the Inhabitants to make a long and obstinate Defence.

I have said all those Places, for surely we ought to have had more fortified Places in
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this important Island, than one single Citadel ; as *St. Philip's* can be called nothing else. Without having been upon the Island, it is impossible to say what Places most deserved to have been fortified ; but some of the Cities, and particularly *Ciudadella* ought to have been as compleatly fortified as the Nature of the Ground would admit, because if we had taken proper Measures we might have depended upon the Inhabitants for their Defence. The Town of *St. Philip's* ought likewise to have been made a fortified City, and extended up the Harbour as far as the next Cove, from whence the Rampart ought to have run as far as the Head of *St. Stephen's* Cove ; and as the Ground on which *Marlborough* Redoubt now stands is so high, the highest Part of it ought to have been included within a regular and strong Fortification. For the further Security of the Harbour of *Port-Mahon*, the intended Fortification of *Cape-Mola* ought to have been finished, and *Philipet* little Redoubt very much enlarged, both which might have been easily done at no very great Expence ; and for the Security of our naval Stores *Bloody-Island* ought to have been well fortified quite round, and filled with Magazines casmated, and made as much Bomb-proof

proof as possible. These Fortifications, I shall grant, would have been expensive, but if our Ministers ever bestowed a serious Thought upon Commerce, which, I fear, they seldom did, they would not have grudged this Expence, as it would have been fully compensated to the Nation by the increased Security of our Trade ; and might perhaps have been at last repaid by the Surplus of the Revenue arising from this little Island.

Lastly, With Regard to the natural Produce of the Island, and the Improvements that might have been made therein, we should have discouraged their producing Wheat or any other Sort of Corn, because with this they might have been at all Times furnished from *England*, and we should have encouraged their turning their Lands, as much as possible, to the producing of what cannot be produced here, such as Wine and Fruits of several Kinds, or to the producing Hay and Forage for the Horses and other Cattle in the Island. Indeed, the Improvement of Trade and Increase of Inhabitants would of itself have produced this Effect, because the Landholder would have made more of his Land by these Sorts of Produce, than he could have made by producing Wheat or any Sort of Corn. And
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by communicating to them a little of our Art and Skill in Agriculture, the natural Produce of the Island might have been vastly increased: The Sides of many of their Hills, which now produce little or nothing, might, by making Reservoirs for Rain-Water at the Top, and the Use of our Water Engines, when there was Occasion, have been made extremely fruitful; and some of their low tough Clay-Grounds which now produce nothing but Rushes, or a Sort of Herbage that no Beast can eat, might by Lime, Sea-Weed, or some such Manure, and sowing with a proper Sort of Grass-Seed, have been made to produce as good and as sweet Hay as any in *England*.

But there are two necessary Materials for our Manufactures, which it is surprizing we have not yet got produced in this Island, either by the Natives, or by sending People thither for the Purpose, and that is Cotton and Silk. The planting of the Cotton-Shrub has been tried in this Island with Success; and the *Maltese* produce such Quantities of it, that they export 15,000 Quintals of Cotton-Wool yearly; therefore it seems to be certain, that it might be produced in *Minorca*, and that as this Island is much

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larger than *Malta*, we might now have had large Quantities of Cotton-Wool from thence yearly, if we had encouraged the producing of it, by allowing it to be imported Duty free, as it is from our other Colonies. And as to Silk, it seems probable, that Mulberry-Trees would have grown very well, if planted in *Minorca*, as great Numbers of them grow in the Countries on all Sides of it: If such Trees had been found to thrive in the Island, it would certainly be a fine Place for breeding Silk Worms, as they seldom have any Frost or Snow, and never of any Continuance; therefore the Planting of such Trees ought at least to have been tried, and if the Trial had succeeded, the People ought to have been encouraged to plant them, and afterwards provided with a Breed of Silk-Worms.

Then as to those Commodities of which they do now produce and even export a little, I shall mention two, which are Wool and Salt. What Kind of Wool theirs is, I do not find mentioned by any of their Historians; but as their Climate, Soil, and Herbage, are the same with those in *Spain*, it is probable, that their Wool would be as fine, if they were provided with the same Breed

of Sheep ; in which Place the Exportation of it to any Place, except to *England*, ought to be strictly prohibited ; and let it be fine or coarse they ought to have been encouraged to work it all up into some Sort of Manufacture. And with Respect to their Salt, as it is made in the same Way, I can see no Reason why it may not be made as good as any Sea-Salt we bring from beyond Sea. Whatever it is we ought long since to have encouraged the Importation of it, by freeing it from the foreign Duty, especially as large Quantities of it might be made with very little Labour.

Thus the Island of *Minorca* might have been, and still may be made an Island of the utmost Importance by its Produce, and the Trade that might be established there, as well as it must always be, by its Situation, to a trading Nation and a maritime Power, therefore a Squadron ought to have been sent thither, at least Time enough to prevent a *French* Army's landing in the Island ; for if a sufficient Number of *French* Troops for reducing *St. Philip's*, with all Necessaries for a Siege, should be once landed in the Island, I doubt much, if the strongest Squadron we could send, could beat them out, or prevent their

their making themselves Masters of that Fort, and consequently of the whole Island. Nothing but a superior Number of Land-Forces could do this, and your Lordship knows how expensive this would be to the Nation ; but let it be never so expensive, I hope, it will be done, which is the chief Reason of your Lordship's having had this Trouble from,

My Lord,

London, April 29,
1756.

Your Lordship's, &c.

F I O N N I S.

Handwritten initials and scribbles, possibly including the number '21' and a signature.

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
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

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