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THE HISTORY OF THE

THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF GOD AND THE WORLD

AS REVEALED IN THE INCARNATION

OF THE SON OF GOD

BY JOHN CALVIN

TRANSLATED BY G. W. COCHRAN

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THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF GOD AND THE WORLD
AS CENTRING IN THE INCARNATION.

BEING THE KERR LECTURES FOR 1890-91.

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MORALITY AND RELIGION

BEING THE KERR LECTURES FOR
1893-94

BY

REV. JAMES KIDD, B.D.
MINISTER OF ERSKINE CHURCH, GLASGOW



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THE KERR LECTURESHIP

THE "KERR LECTURESHIP" was founded by the TRUSTEES of the late Miss JOAN KERR, of Sanquhar, under her Deed of Settlement, and formally adopted by the United Presbyterian Synod in May 1886. In the following year, May 1887, provisions and conditions of the Lectureship, as finally adjusted, were adopted by the Synod, and embodied in a Memorandum, printed in the Appendix to the Synod Minutes, p. 489. From these the following excerpts are here given :—

II. The amount to be invested shall be £3000.

III. The object of the Lectureship is the promotion of the study of Scientific Theology in the United Presbyterian Church.

The Lectures shall be upon some such subjects as the following, viz. :—

A. Historic Theology—

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B. Systematic Theology—

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(2) Christian Ethics—(a) Doctrine of Sin, (b) Individual and Social Ethics, (c) The Sacraments, (d) The Place of Art in Religious Life and Worship.

Farther, the Committee of Selection shall from time to time, as they think fit, appoint as the subject of the Lectures any important Phases of Modern Religious Thought or Scientific Theories in their bearing upon Evangelical Theology. The Committee may also appoint a subject connected with the practical work of the Ministry as subject of Lecture, but in no case shall this be admissible more than once in every five appointments.

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V. Appointments to this Lectureship not subject to the conditions in Section IV. may also from time to time, at the discretion of the Committee, be made from among eminent members of the Ministry of any of the Nonconformist Churches of Great Britain and Ireland, America, and the Colonies, or of the Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Continent.

VI. The Lecturer shall hold the appointment for three years.

VIII. The Lectures shall be published at the Lecturer's own expense within one year after their delivery.

IX. The Lectures shall be delivered to the students of the United Presbyterian Hall.

XII. The Public shall be admitted to the Lectures.

P R E F A C E

My Kerr Lectures were delivered last winter to the students attending the United Presbyterian Theological College. They are now published in terms of the Deed of Foundation. In preparing them for publication, I have made some slight changes in arrangement, and have rewritten some sections with a view to greater clearness of statement. I have also included a good deal that, for want of time, had to be omitted in delivery. These alterations and additions do not, however, in any way affect the substance of the Lectures.

My best thanks are due to the Rev. A. R. MacEwen, D.D., Claremont Church, Glasgow, for valuable counsel and help both in the preparation and in the publication of the Lectures; to the Rev. W. R. Thomson, B.D., Caledonia Road Church, Glasgow, who has revised the proofs, and has in other ways rendered me assistance; and to my brother, the Rev. Thomas Kidd, M.A., Moniaive, who, besides revising the proofs, has drawn up the Index.

JAMES KIDD.

GLASGOW, *January* 1895.

CONTENTS



Part First

MORALITY



LECTURE I

CONDUCT AND MOTIVE

	PAGE
Object and plan of Lectures	1
Meaning of morality	2
Conduct, the object of morality	5
Motive determines the character of conduct	7
Legality and morality	8
Resolutions have moral value	10
Nature and genesis of motive	12
Nature and ground of alternative involved	16
Motive and aim	21
Analysis of Self-consciousness	24
Difference between its theoretical and its practical reference	26
Self-determination, self-satisfaction, and self-realisation defined	37
Relation between these	40
Definition of conduct	43

LECTURE II

THE MORAL IDEAL

Self-determination requires a standard within the self	44
This standard is an ideal for the self	47

	PAGE
An ideal implies obligation and freedom	49
Twofold reference of freedom	53
Relation between obligation and freedom	53
Analysis of term "Ought"	54
Freedom of realisation rests on freedom of determination	60
Can freedom of determination be lost?	62
"Ought" of means and "ought" of end	64
Whence comes the moral ideal?	66
Not created by the self, which is conscious of it	67
The self is social in nature	68
The ideal is, therefore, social in character	71
Yet not product of social relations	71
Dependent on power or principle underlying the social system	73
Social Evolution examined	78
Morality has a religious basis	100

Part Second

RELIGION

LECTURE III

SCOPE AND METHOD OF INQUIRY

Different applications of term religion	101
Dependence of ritual and creed on sentiment	103
Essence of religion apprehended by examination of religious sentiment	108
Religion not necessarily explained by accounting for beliefs and ideas regarding deities	108
The religious sentiment as an experience is subject to the conditions of experience in general	111
What these conditions are	112
Their bearing on the religious sentiment	115
To understand religion, only necessary to examine religious sentiment at its highest	116
Professor Max Müller's position	117
Defects of Historical and Comparative methods	124
Professor Edward Caird's <i>Evolution of Religion</i>	127
1. His conception of Evolution	128
2. His application of it to the facts of religious history	137
Religion primarily individual, and its essence to be apprehended by consideration of individual experience	145

LECTURE IV

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

	PAGE
Christianity presents religious sentiment at its highest	148
Its main feature is worship	152
Worship, the expression of fear	152
Fear may mean either dread or reverence	153
Reverence and not dread expressed in worship	153
Analysis and comparison of dread and reverence	153
Religion concerned with reverence	163
God the only true object of reverence	164
Reverence manifests itself in adoration and aspiration	166
Aspiration analysed	166
Its central feature is self-surrender	169
Self-surrender is—	
1. A voluntary act	169
2. Not an end but a means	174
Religion has a moral issue	175
Is result valid for all religious systems?	177
It admits of variety of form	180
Possibility of coexistence and co-operation of dread and reverence	186
Awe analysed	187
Reverence the essence of religion	188

LECTURE V

ILLUSTRATION OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

Unity of religious sentiment amid diversity of manifestation disclosed by examination of different systems	190
I. Vedism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism—	
These, stages in one movement	191
Their characteristics in respect of—	
1. Creed	191
2. Worship	196
Sense of separation and sense of relation in each, but in different proportions	200
II. Mohammedanism—	
Three periods in its history	210
Articles of faith	213
Religious duties	216
Chief sects	217
Presence and operation of aspiration	220

Part Third

THE RELATION BETWEEN MORALITY
AND RELIGION

LECTURE VI

NATURE OF RELATION

	PAGE
Examination of morality and religion has suggested points of difference between them	229
These, not absolute, but relative	230
Their statement and reconciliation	230
Morality and religion though intimately related, not identical	238
Connection between them defined by connection between God and the world	238
Relation of God to the world	239
Right attitude toward God includes right attitude toward the world	242
Connection and distinction between morality and religion	244
Analogy between relation of science to metaphysics and relation of morality to religion	248
Possibility of morality being in advance of religion explained	260
Emotion in morality and religion	266

LECTURE VII

EXTENT OF RELATION

Can there be morality without religion ?	273
Two points raised—	
1. Construction of moral code	274
2. Apprehension of moral ideal	274
Consideration of general principle and not of special instances furnishes answer	276
I. Construction of moral code—	
World, as relatively independent, may be studied by itself	278
But laws apprehended lack authority	278
Independence of morality implies independence of world	280
But independence of world demands materialistic estimate of it	282
Members of a material system cannot gain a knowledge of the system	284
II. Apprehension of moral ideal—	
Ideal must lie within the system	286
But independent system cannot furnish general ideal	288
And because material cannot furnish particular ideal	290
Particular ideal, if possible, would be utilitarian	293

CONTENTS

xiii

	PAGE
Can there be religion without morality?	297
Religion necessarily issues in morality	298
Religion not merely moral in basis and aim	299
Different aspects of sin	305
Is God a moral Being?	308
Ethical Monotheism	310
In what sense God determines Himself	314
Religion has more than moral reference and value	317

Part Fourth

THE TESTIMONY OF CHRIST

LECTURE VIII

THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Results of inquiry must harmonise with teaching and life of Christ	319
“Back to Christ” and “The Christianity of Christ”	321
Can the teaching and life of Christ be classed under a single category?	330
Kingdom of God an inadequate category	332
It is incompatible with—	
1. Fatherhood of God	337
2. Salvation	341
Christ’s use of phrase—	
1. Not habitual	351
2. Not uniform	357
Social salvation rests on individual salvation	361

LECTURE IX

THE DUTY OF MAN

Bearing of Christ’s teaching as to duty of man on relation between morality and religion	363
I. The existence of the relation—	
Though a religious teacher He dealt with morality	363
He emphasised the individuality of man	365
He taught the inadequacy of moral conduct without religious impulse—	
1. “What good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life?”	366
2. Almsgiving	369
He taught the inadequacy of religious service apart from moral conduct—	
“Leave there thy gift before the altar”	369

	PAGE
II. The nature and extent of the relation—	
1. "The first commandment of all"	371
2. The Parables of the Ten Virgins and the Talents, and the Last Judgment	382
His teaching illustrated by His life	396
He loved God with His whole heart and soul and mind and strength	397
He loved His neighbour as Himself	399

LECTURE X

THE NEED OF MAN

Need of man twofold : restoration and attainment	402
I. Conditions of satisfaction and bearing of these on relation between morality and religion—	
1. Repentance	403
2. New Birth	405
3. Faith—	
(α) its nature	407
(β) its relation to repentance	410
(γ) its relation to new birth	412
(δ) a means of attainment as well as of restoration	414
4. Truth	415
II. Satisfaction furnished by Christ—	
What sayest Thou of Thyself?	420
Son of Man and Son of God	421
What sayest Thou of Thy work?	423
Last Supper proclaims His death the central feature of His work	423
Wendt on relation of Christ's death to His work—	
1. Its necessity	426
2. Decreed by God	430
Death of Christ means of communication of life to men	432
Death of Christ ground of remission of sin	435
" My blood of the covenant "	435
Christ a ransom	437
" Reckoned among the transgressors "	441
Connection between remission of sin and communication of life	443
Why Christ spoke more of latter than of former	444
Bearing of results on relation between morality and religion	447

Part First

MORALITY

LECTURE I

CONDUCT AND MOTIVE

THE object which I have in view, in the present course of lectures, is to determine the nature of the relationship subsisting between morality and religion. In pursuit of this object, I propose to adopt the following method of procedure. I shall, to begin with, subject, first, morality, and then religion, to critical examination, with the aim of discovering what they, individually, are and involve. I shall thereafter endeavour, in the light of the results reached by their examination, to define their respective spheres, and to trace out their lines of connection. And I shall close with an inquiry into the bearing of the life and teaching and work of Christ on the question discussed, conducted with the view of testing the solution offered. The course will thus fall into four parts: I. Morality; II. Religion; III. The Relation between Morality and Religion; and IV. The Testimony of Christ. Of these, the first will embrace two lectures; the second, three; the third, two; and the fourth, three: in all, ten.

In accordance with the plan sketched, I proceed in this

lecture to the consideration of Morality. And, as indicated, what I mean to do is to examine it critically, with the view of learning what it is and implies, and what place it holds in the system of human life. Starting with the ordinary, everyday conception of morality, I shall seek by analysis to discover what are its postulates and presuppositions. This investigation will enable us to determine the position of morality in the sphere of rational existence. We shall thus see what are the elements of experience with which it is intimately connected, and what is the degree of intimacy existing between it and them. In this way we shall become possessed of some of the material necessary for answering the question that is before us.

Before, however, entering upon this investigation, we must come to an understanding as to the sense in which the term is to be employed by us. This is essential, because it bears two different meanings and is therefore ambiguous.

When we speak of a man as moral, we may mean, either that he is a moral being or that he is a moral individual; either that he is moral in constitution or that he is moral in conduct; either, that is to say, that, in virtue of what he is, he is the subject of moral judgment, or that, in virtue of what he has done, he is the subject of moral approval. In the former case, we say that, being what he is in constitution, sentence of some kind must be passed on him; in the latter, we declare what, in view of his behaviour, that sentence must be. Or, otherwise stated, we contemplate, on the one hand, the man's nature, on the other, the man's character. He is moral in both references, but moral in different senses. This becomes clear when we think of a bad man. To him the terms moral and immoral are both applicable. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is nevertheless correct to say that such a man is immoral just because he is moral, and that he could not be immoral if he were not moral. He is moral as man; he is immoral as this particular man. It is apparent that, in these

sentences, moral and immoral are not opposites. The opposite of moral as there employed is non-moral, the absence of the moral element. Immoral, on the contrary, implies the presence of the moral element, and indicates failure to meet its demands.

Such are the two senses of the term with which we are to deal; but it has to be observed that, though different, they are closely related, so closely that the one naturally leads to the other. What I have called the moral element is not a purely formal factor in human nature. It has a content which, implicit at first, is to become explicit with its recognition and exercise. It is not merely a faculty which we may employ in dealing with matter supplied to it; it is a constituent part of our constitution, and, as such, it makes a definite claim that must be met, if that constitution is to rise into perfect manifestation. Hence the exhibition of the moral element, if carried far enough, necessarily passes into the exposition of the moral law. We cannot well say *that* there is a moral element in man without saying *what* that moral element is, in part at least, in its general bearing and requirement. The term moral suggests obligation, but obligation means obligation to do or to be something. Obligation is a relative term, and suggests a law or standard that demands obedience and conformity. To say, therefore, that man is a moral being, is to say that he is a being who ought to act in a particular way. And this responsibility, as has been pointed out, at once gives him a standing and imposes on him a duty. The fundamental capacity to which it corresponds both sets him within a certain circle and assigns him a definite place in relation to the centre. In the former aspect he is contrasted with other creatures who are not endowed as he is; in the latter, he is judged by his conformity to the endowment which is his special prerogative.

But, as has been indicated, these two things are not distinct. The one, indeed, is the ground of the other, and

neither can be fully discussed without reference to the other. It is the quality which differentiates man from the irrational creatures that constitutes the basis of the judgment that is passed on his action. A man is moral in character when the element in his constitution that makes him moral in nature finds free and full expression, when he is true to himself. His moral quality not only fits him for a moral life and lays upon him obligation to live such a life, but determines the form of that life, and consequently supplies the test by which it is to be tried. And because this is the case, the treatment of the one application of morality necessarily leads to the treatment of the other. On the one hand, to apprehend accurately what it is that makes a man a moral being, is to apprehend in principle what it is that makes a man a moral individual, because it is to discover the standard, conformity to which constitutes moral conduct; and, on the other hand, to apprehend in principle what it is that makes a man a moral individual, is to apprehend what it is that makes a man a moral being, because it is to discover that feature in his constitution the presence of which renders him capable of moral conduct. The two applications of the term morality are thus intimately related, but though intimately related they admit of, and in certain circumstances demand, separate consideration. They are associated with different standpoints and with different lines of approach, and for this reason they must be carefully distinguished. If this is not done by us in our investigation, we shall run into error that will vitiate our inquiry. Employing the term in the same connection, at one time for the quality displayed by man as a rational being, whatever form or direction his conduct may take, and, at another, for the rule or principle which, as thus endowed, man should observe and apply, whether it embodies itself in custom or opinions or commands, or for the character which such observation and application express and develop, we shall fail to reach a satisfactory conclusion on the matters discussed by us.

In the following analysis, it is rather in the former than in the latter sense that the term is to be used. We are to regard it more as indicating a feature of human nature, than as the synonym for a complete code of conduct. But, as has been shown, consideration of it in the former aspect leads to consideration of it in the latter. In other words, we cannot take account of the form without taking account, to a certain extent, of the content, but this we shall do only so far as is necessary for a full apprehension of the form. The content discovered will have interest for us solely as exhibiting the nature of the moral element inherent in man as man, and not at all as explaining the details of duty devolving on men in their several spheres and relations.

We have then to inquire what morality, as just described, is and involves. And we begin by asking, what is its object? what does it concern itself with? of what does it take account? The reply generally given to these questions is, Conduct. And that will suffice for a starting-point. With conduct, then, we have to do. But what is conduct? To this inquiry various answers have been given, each offering a different definition, and some of them pointing in entirely opposite directions. It is not my intention to enumerate and discuss these. To do so fully would be to anticipate the results of the investigation on which we are entering. We should either have to assume what has not yet been proved, or to enter on the consideration of points that will more fittingly be treated in the sequel, that cannot, indeed, be adequately dealt with at this stage. This is not desirable, and it is not necessary. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we have a clear understanding as to the meaning which we are to attach to the term. And this we may express by saying, that conduct is the action of a rational being as such. This is not offered as an exact definition, but merely as a general description with which we may begin, but which will fall to be revised in the

Conduct

light of results gained. By the phrase "a rational being as such," I seek to indicate the phase or feature of action that gives to it the value of conduct. The action of a rational being may be purely physical, and, if so, it lies beyond the sphere of conduct. Though not purely physical, it may have a physical side, but it is not to that side that we direct our thoughts when we speak of it as conduct. With the physical side there is associated a rational, and it is in respect of the latter that it is reckoned conduct and comes within the range of morality.

To this statement objection may be taken, on the ground that rational action may be purely intellectual in nature, for instance, scientific investigation or philosophical speculation. But that is not the case. Rational action, though involving intellectual effort to a greater or a less degree, is never purely intellectual. It is more than the exercise of our faculties, it is the expression of our character. It is subject to a twofold judgment, as successful or unsuccessful, and as right or wrong; and it may evoke both praise and blame, praise in respect of the one reference, and blame in respect of the other. We may admire the skill and ability displayed by some one, while we censure the end sought and gained by him, or, while commending an object aimed at, we may have to admit that the endeavour to reach it has been feeble or faulty. This double bearing of rational action is more clearly seen in some cases than in others, but it is characteristic of all. The rational being, as rational, is under obligation at all times; and it is because his every movement is an expression of his relation to that obligation, that, while implying intellectual effort, it is more than intellectual. Reason, in short, is more than intellect. It contains, or rather is, the norm, which intellect is to honour and fulfil. Hence we say that rational action is never merely intellectual, but, in virtue of its rationality, lies within the sphere of morality. Hence, also, we say that the action of a rational being, as such, is conduct.

Conduct, then, is not so much certain kinds of action, as action viewed from a certain standpoint, and in a certain light. It is sometimes defined as "voluntary (*i.e.* willed) action," and this definition is practically the same as that just given. There is, however, one important objection to it, and it is, that it employs a word which, at the outset of our investigation, is of uncertain meaning, namely, "willed." To different schools of thinkers this adjective conveys different ideas. The definition is, therefore, capable of diverse interpretations, and that is fatal to its value. From this objection the definition offered is free, at least as free as any form of words can be. We assume that there is such a thing as a rational being; and we describe conduct as the action of such a being in so far as his rationality is involved in its production.

Morality, then, has to do with the action of a rational being as such. But this statement demands careful examination, in order that its precise import may be discovered. The action of a rational being is not simple, but complex, in character. We must, therefore, break it up into its component parts, and determine which of these has moral worth. And when we examine any action, we find in it three elements. These are, first, the act, *i.e.* the thing done; second, the result produced or the end gained by it; third, the aim or motive which led to it. Suppose, *e.g.*, that I shoot a man, not accidentally but of set purpose. In this deed of mine there are the act, the discharge of the gun; the result or end, the killing of the man; and the aim or motive, whatever it may be. Now, with which of these does morality concern itself? Certainly not with the first. The discharge of the gun is in itself neither moral nor immoral; it lies wholly within the physical sphere. What of the second? Looked at apart from its antecedents and surroundings, it does not afford material for a moral decision. Killing may not be murder, and therefore not culpable. Whether it is so or not depends on the aim or motive of the person who kills.

Until that is known, judgment must be suspended. It is this that determines the character of the action, or rather it is this part of the action that is the object of morality. This is always, professedly at least, the basis of the judgments we pass on our fellows, even in ordinary intercourse. We are not satisfied to know what they did, we seek to learn why they did it; and a knowledge of the circumstances, leading to the decision which has embodied itself in the deed, and fulfilled itself in the result, often compels us to alter entirely our estimate of their action, and to acquit where we had condemned.

We here touch the distinction between legality and morality, and a glance at this distinction may serve to confirm the statement made. Legality, in its strict sense, deals with the thing done, and asks whether or not it is in conformity with the law. The question which it puts is a question of fact and of fact alone. Morality, on the other hand, passes behind the act to the motive or aim which has produced it, and considers the state of the individual, of which the act is the reflection. Of course, in a perfect community, the two would coincide in subject-matter and in standard, for the law would be the accurate application in detail of the principles that ought to govern men in their varied circumstances and conditions. But the difference in the object would obtain even there, because the motive, being internal, does not come within the scope of judicial investigation. Our knowledge of it is due to inference or to confession, and the inference may be invalid and the confession false. Our conclusions as to the motives of our fellows never really pass beyond the bounds of probability. The basis on which these rest must always be circumstantial. Even in the case of a statement on the part of the accused this is its character, because we have to decide whether or not the statement is worthy of credence, and our decision on this point must rest on deductions we have made from facts and evidence laid before us. And human nature is too complex and subtle in its operation

and movements for us to say with perfect confidence that, in any case, even the most apparently simple, we have reached the spring and source of conduct. But even if we could be certain that the conclusion to which we had come was correct, we could not, from the purely legal standpoint, take account of it. To those who occupy this standpoint, the law alone is of consequence, so that there is really no scope for motive. The only motives recognised are respect, or the want of respect, for the form of the law. Man is not treated as a rational being, but as a slave to a code, and the sole question asked as to his conduct is, Does that show that he fully accepts the code or not? The former constitutes his motive to obedience, the latter his motive to disobedience, and these are the only motives which pure legality can recognise, and they are not, strictly speaking, motives at all.

It is quite different with morality. That deals with man as a rational being, and instead of resting satisfied with simple readiness to obey, or inclination to disobey, a specified code, it goes behind these, in search of that which is to be the object of its judgment, viz. the aim or motive that determines the man in the one direction or in the other. It may indeed have to do with a law, and with regard for a law, but if so, it does not hold merely to, and insist only on respect for, the letter of the law. It views the law as a special expression and application of a general principle, which, because special, is defective, and must, if it is to be rightly administered, be read in the light of the general principle which it is designed to embody. It recognises that conformity to the letter of a precept or enactment is compatible with violation of its spirit, and, conversely, that violation of the letter is compatible with conformity to the spirit. A command may be more honoured in the breach than in the observance, and it is so when the form is set aside as unsuitable to the circumstances that have arisen, and the idea which the form was intended to embody is seized and applied. "The law is good if a man use it lawfully"—if

he use it, understanding what its limits are, as a particular and therefore partial statement of a fundamental truth, the purpose of which is to secure the acknowledgment of that truth as a principle of action. This is the attitude of morality toward law, and, as a consequence, even when taking account of action in relation to a specific command, it passes behind the act to the spirit that has dictated it.

What I have said as to legality applies to a purely legal method of procedure, but such a method of procedure is scarcely ever, if at all, rigidly pursued. Certainly, as civilisation advances, it falls more and more into disrepute, and, in the administration of civil and criminal law, the moral method is increasingly recognised as the true one, and an effort is made to approximate to it. Motives are taken into account in adjudging guilt or in pronouncing sentence. And this fact confirms the conclusion reached by the preceding discussion, that it is the motive or aim that is the object of judgment; or, in other words, that it is not the action in its material form, or even in its result, but the action as embodying or reflecting a decision, that claims the attention of the moralist.

It appears then, that it is with the aim or motive that morality concerns itself. And this leads us to review the definition we offered of conduct. We spoke of it as "the action of a rational being as such." We now see that, if we are to retain the word "action," we must give to it an extended meaning. We must widen its scope, so that it may embrace decisions that do not take form in overt acts, as well as decisions that do. A man may resolve, but his resolution may not be carried out. It is none the less an object of moral judgment. This is sometimes denied. It is urged that the reason why the resolution is not carried out may be, and often is, the presence of some element in the character of the person resolving that arrests it, that, indeed, disqualifies him from giving effect to it, because he is either in reality better or worse than his resolves. "A man," says

Muirhead, "is not good because he makes good resolutions, nor bad because he makes bad ones. It is only when the resolution passes into conduct that it justly becomes the object of a moral judgment."¹ But this is an untenable position. The resolution is a decision, and, as such, it is an expression of character, and therefore moral. To limit morality to the completed act is to take a false view of its province. The completed act, indeed, is moral only as the sign and embodiment of a resolution. Of course one who has formed a resolution may correct it by forming another different from it; but if the change made affect its essence, and not merely the means of executing it, then it is the outcome of what is practically a judgment on it. We have thus two resolutions, and each is moral in character. Muirhead really admits this. He says: "We do indeed pass moral judgments upon resolutions, but they are only provisional."² Whether provisional or not, they are moral, and that is the whole case. Muirhead makes the mistake of fixing his mind on the act—"willed action," as he defines conduct—and not on the act of will. It is true that resolutions are, or may be, known only to the person resolving, but that does not affect the question. We have already seen that the motive or aim may not be known to anyone but the person who performs the deed, and that, because of a mistaken inference as to its basis on the part of his judges, one who is guilty may be acquitted when he should be condemned. But it is to the motive that his own thoughts turn, and it is a consideration of the motive that causes him to experience remorse. Muirhead's view, consistently carried out, would lead us away from the act of determination to the act of execution, and, by so doing, would leave us only the thing done on which to pronounce judgment. To exclude unfulfilled resolutions from the pale of morality would be to declare that vicious resolutions formed and entertained would, on reflection, awaken no sense of shame and remorse in the person forming and

¹ *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 48.

² *Ibid.* pp. 47, 48.

entertaining them if they had not been given effect to. And yet, if these resolutions are real resolutions, they are manifestations of character and are charged with moral significance. The man who forms a resolution intends, at the time, to carry it out. Without this intention there would be no resolution, and such an intention cannot be placed under the category of the morally indifferent. Martineau puts the case truly and forcibly, as follows: "The moment which completes the mental antecedents touches the character with a clearer purity or a fresh stain; nor can any hindrance, by simply stopping execution, wipe out the light or shade: else would guilt return to innocence by being frustrated, and goodness go for nothing when it strives in vain."¹

The object of moral judgment, then, is the motive or aim; that decision of the moral being that produces, or is sufficient to produce, action. When we put the matter in this way, we perceive that what we have to think of is not so much action as an actor, a rational being as agent. We have to do with man on his practical side, with character as revealed in decisions. Conduct "means not merely an overt act, but the attitude of a person in acting."²

Having learned that the motive is the object of morality, we must endeavour to discover what it is, and how it is formed.

And the first point that we note is, that it is not something merely given to the individual, a purely external influence exercised on him that impels him to take a certain direction, an injunction imposed on him which he cannot but fulfil. Such an idea is quite foreign to the conclusions to which we have been led. We have seen that conduct is not so much action as the attitude of a person acting, and that, consequently, that which determines this attitude must be a decision of the person who assumes it. Whatever is given to him must be accepted by him; whatever influence is

¹ *Types of Ethical Theory*, 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 26.

² J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 43.

exercised on him must be submitted to by him; whatever injunction is addressed to him must be considered by him, and either fulfilled or not; and it is in this acceptance, this submission, this consideration, that we have to look for the motive; for it is in these that the individual is seen as agent, as a person acting. Obedience to the command of a superior may be spoken of as my motive for acting in a certain fashion. But this is not an accurate form of expression. The obedience is not a motive; it rests on, and springs from, a motive. The important point is not the fact of my executing the command laid upon me, but the spirit which that execution expresses. On what does it rest? Is it due to a fear of evil consequences, or to respect for the command in itself? Am I swayed by the thought of the penalties attached to it, or by the inherent goodness of the command? In order that we may answer these questions, we must pass beyond the command, and must think of the way in which it is viewed. In other words, we must seek the motive, not in that which is given, but in the reaction of the individual on the same.

What, then, is the extent of this reaction? This we shall discover most easily and most surely by tracing out carefully the antecedents and the conditions of conduct. We are stirred to activity by our surroundings. It is because these appeal to us that we put forth effort. Now, what is the nature of this appeal? It is always twofold. In every instance two courses of procedure are suggested. This is sometimes overlooked, and the appeal is spoken of as if it were single and simple; but this is not the case. If it were so, there would be no moral problem for us to solve. It is just because there are at all times two possible lines of effort open to us that we have to take account of motive. Were there not for us a right and a wrong method of dealing with our surroundings, we should be machines and not men. Deliberation as to the course we should pursue would be not only unnecessary, but impossible. We can only hesitate and

choose when different ends are set before us, each presenting attractions that touch us. And we can only praise or condemn where possibilities of error have been avoided, and possibilities of good have been rejected.

Conduct, then, is our response to the twofold appeal made to us by our environment. But what gives to the appeal this twofold character? Whence come the alternatives that are presented to us? Clearly they do not come from the environment itself. Our surroundings are in themselves neither moral nor immoral; they may be wholly material in nature, and, if so, they are not twofold, but single, in aspect. It is only as *our* surroundings, as seen by us and related by us to our individuality, that they have moral significance, and it is in virtue of their relation to our individuality that they can become motives, or can contribute to the rise of motives. The question is not, how will certain objects presented to me control my action? but, how shall I determine to act in view of certain objects presented to me?—or rather, with what character do I invest these objects? That is to say, my apprehension of the objects adds to them because, by bringing them within the circle of my individuality, it invests them with a character which they could only have in connection with an individuality such as mine is. That such an addition is made to objects presented to us will be evident if we consider the behaviour of persons of different character in the same or similar circumstances. Let us suppose two men, both of whom are in financial difficulties equally great and pressing, intrusted with a sum of money, the possession of which would relieve them from their difficulties, and which they might appropriate without much, if any, risk of immediate detection. The one is strictly honest; the other is not. The surroundings of both are the same, but to each they take a different aspect. To the one the sum of money is merely an article that is to be handed by him to its owner; to the other it is a possible means of helping him out of his trouble. And it is these different aspects that form

the ground of the different actions of the two individuals, the one of whom proves true, whilst the other proves false, to the trust reposed in him. To the same object each gives a special character, and with that special character the motive of his conduct is associated. I have spoken of two men diametrically opposed in character, in order by a strong contrast to bring out the point on which I am insisting. But, taking human nature on its ordinary level, we may say, without injustice, that, in the circumstances supposed, every man would be conscious of the two possible courses, and would be compelled to choose between them. In other words, his feelings and desires would cast their light on his environment, and would so affect it that it would suggest not one, but two, ways of dealing with it.

It thus appears that the motive is not something that comes to us from without. So far is this from being the case, that, if we could look only without, we should find no room for a motive at all. It is only because that which is without is brought into relation to our personality, that a motive comes into existence, and its existence is due to the fact that our surroundings, by being related to our personality, are invested with a twofold character, or rather suggest to us two different courses of procedure. Inasmuch, however, as it is our feelings and desires that impart to our surroundings the power of suggesting to us different courses, we must turn our glance inward if we are to discover the formation of motive. Since the alternative, that alone gives room for motive, is due to a twofold effect produced on us, and only *appears* to exist without us, because it is projected by us on our environment, it must exist within us. Alternatives, rightly understood, are states of the individual, and that which pertains to the individual must be dealt with by the individual, and within the sphere of his individuality. In other words, it is the self that makes the motive, and it makes it by self-determination. What comes from without is only the material, the possibility, the exciting cause, but

the product depends on the activity of the self. This implies that in every instance the self asks, Which of the suggested courses will harmonise with my being, subordinate itself to my central purpose, express and develop the principle within? And in accordance with the answer given is the determination come to. What then we have before us is self-determination, the determination of the self to effort in view of appeals made to it, and in order that, by responding to these appeals, it may manifest itself and gain in fulness. A moral action is thus the outcome of a motive which is created by self-determination, is the expression of the existing self, and is at once its manifestation and its expansion.

Our investigation into the origin and nature of the motive has thus thrown us back on the self. It is the diverse possibilities attached by us to our surroundings that create a place for the motive, and this being the case, the motive cannot be given, cannot come from without; all that comes from without is our environment, and that, in itself, is simple. But if the constitution of the motive be really the choice of one of the alternatives which our environment is the means of exciting within us, then it must be formed within. The alternative is, in fact, a diverse movement of the self, due to contact with the object with which it is brought face to face, and control over such a movement can be exercised only by the self. The self, and the self alone, can determine which of its desires is to prevail, and that determination yields the motive.

Stress is here laid on the fact, that it is the self that invests its surrounding with its apparent power of creating for it alternative courses of conduct. That which seems to belong to its surrounding is really the projection and work of the self, and on this is based the contention that the motive is due to self-determination. This fact deserves somewhat careful consideration. What we have to discover, if possible, is the ground of this alternative. As has already been indi-

cated, no such alternative is possible to members of a purely mechanical system. These are acted on from without, and simply conform to the conditions created. In the lower animals, something like this alternative shows itself; but, though similar, it is different not only in degree but in kind. Instinct looks without, not within; the sphere of its choice is external, not internal. The alternatives are not moods of the self, at least not in the same sense as they are in the rational being. In the latter alone have we a true alternative. To what is it due?

In reply to this question, it is sometime said that there is a true self and a false self, a higher and a lower, and that the alternative is due to the response made by each of these to the object presented. There is thus a conflict between the two, and victory consists in the victory of the higher over the lower, the mastery of the false by the true. This is an admissible way of putting the matter, and useful enough so long as we are careful not to press it unduly. But it is inadmissible and misleading if we take it as an accurate description of our nature and of the moral process—if we allow ourselves to think of two selves within us struggling with each other. There are not two selves within us, and there cannot be. There is but one self, and the conflict of which we are conscious must be due to a defect or derangement in it, which is forced into prominence when a call to effort is addressed to it. The self is divided against itself, and the division can be healed only by the removal of its cause. The one self, then, is in such a condition that it can experience diverse feelings when confronted by material objects and social claims. How is this?

Principal Caird says: "It is of the very essence of a self-conscious nature to be divided against itself and to win its perfection, its ideal freedom and harmony, as the result of a fierce and protracted internal strife."¹ But this is an inaccurate statement. It is surely not of "the very essence of

¹ *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new ed. p. 251.

a self-conscious nature to be divided against itself." The highest self-conscious nature is not divided against himself. There is, indeed, difference in his nature, but there is unity in the difference. There is diversity, if you will, but not division. Were it otherwise, there would be disturbance and conflict at the centre of the universe of being, and the disturbance and conflict at the centre would make themselves felt throughout the whole circle. There would, indeed, be neither centre nor circle; for a divided centre is no centre, and cannot give symmetry of form and fixity of relation to that which surrounds it. The sport of unstable equilibrium, the system of existence would sway hither and thither with the varying fortunes of the contending elements. Instead of that unity of thought and purpose that forces itself on us when we survey the world that lies before us in its manifold departments and operations, and that reveals itself to us with increasing clearness the more exhaustive and detailed our observation and examination become, there would be everywhere signs of opposition and warfare, one part corresponding to, and obeying, one factor in the struggle, and another corresponding to, and obeying, another, or all the parts constrained to submit to each in turn as it gained for the time the mastery over its opponent. Chaos, and not order, would prevail. Science and philosophy would be impossible, at least as the apprehension and exhibition of the fundamental and the permanent. They might inform us about the past, tracing out for us the course of the conflict, but they could afford no guidance for the future, by acquainting us with laws and principles that are eternal in their basis and persistent in their operation. We have only to reflect on the result which would ensue to see that division there cannot be in the highest self-conscious nature. But if this be the case, then it cannot be "of the essence of a self-conscious nature to be divided against itself." We can at most accept the statement of Principal Caird if we insert "finite" before "self-conscious," and then the whole bearing of the statement will be

changed. The division will be of the essence of finitude, and not of the essence of self-consciousness, and these two things are quite distinct.

But can we accept the statement even with this change? I do not think we can. It seems to me that it is quite possible for a finite self-conscious nature to exist, the essence of which would not be to be divided against itself so that "a fierce and protracted internal strife" is necessary for the attainment of perfection, but would be to manifest unity in difference up to the stage which it had reached. It would, of course, be conscious of imperfection; but as the imperfection of which it was conscious would be that of a progressive being, moving steadily toward its goal, its condition could not with truth be described as division against itself. It would also be conscious of an impulse urging it upward and onward; but inasmuch as its every movement would be in harmony with its impulse, there would be no "fierce and protracted internal strife." In the same connection Principal Caird says: "The very dawn of self-consciousness is the awakening amidst the natural desires and impulses of a consciousness which is other and larger than these desires, which cannot fulfil itself in them, and which is capable of satisfaction only by breaking away from their bondage and becoming a law to itself."¹ This sentence is somewhat ambiguous. The consciousness which "awakens amidst the natural desires and impulses" is not necessarily in bondage to them, as is here assumed. The very awakening rather implies the opposite. But, apart from this, in what sense does the consciousness "awaken amidst natural desires and impulses"? Its awakening in relation to the natural desires and impulses is an awakening to the fact that they belong to it, and are to be controlled by it, so that they may contribute to its development. "But," says Principal Caird, "it cannot fulfil itself in them." If by this is meant that it cannot be limited to the satisfaction of these, that is true, but it is irrelevant. If it is

¹ *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new ed. p. 251.

“larger” than these, then, of course, it cannot be limited to them; but in this case the phrase “fulfil itself” would only mean “completely realise itself,” and the question would remain, Does it in part realise itself in them? And to this an affirmative answer must be given. It is in dealing with them that the self-conscious being fulfils himself. They are his, he knows them to be his, and the point for him is, how will he deal with them? will he subject himself to them, or will he make them subordinate, the means and instruments of his life?

We cannot, therefore, attribute the alternative which reveals itself within us, when we are appealed to on our practical side, simply to self-consciousness, even to finite self-consciousness, and maintain that it is a necessity for us as finite self-conscious natures. We must look for it in something that gives a peculiar character to our finite self-consciousness,—something that, though not essential to it, may be associated with it, and may affect it injuriously. In other words, the finitude of our self-consciousness carries with it the possibility, though not the necessity, of conflict. When we speak of a finite self-consciousness, what precisely do we mean? We do not mean a self-consciousness absolutely enclosed within the finite. In other words, we do not contrast a self-consciousness that is limited in every respect with a self-consciousness that is unlimited in every respect, and call the one finite in contradistinction to the other, which we call infinite. That would be to regard them in an external fashion, and to miss altogether the real character of the finite self-consciousness. Indeed, viewed in this light, the terms finite and infinite would lose all meaning. If I am absolutely limited to that which lies within the range of my consciousness, knowing nothing of anything lying beyond it, then I am as truly infinite as finite. I may appear finite to a being who can set me over against one who takes a wider sweep than I do or am able to do, but, as I know nothing of that wider sweep, I am to myself infinite. If we are to see the force of the phrase “finite self-consciousness,” we must take

our stand within the self-consciousness. Doing so, we perceive that a finite self-conscious being is one who is conscious that he is finite, and this he cannot be unless he knows that there is an infinite with which he is connected and toward which he may rise. Finite self-consciousness is the consciousness of limits that are not absolute, but that may be transcended. When we thus define the phrase, we see wherein the possibility of conflict lies. The self may rest in the finite, instead of finding in it an impulse toward the infinite, to the existence and superiority of which it testifies. And in proportion as this tendency manifests itself will there be conflict, because the inherent relation of the finite to the infinite will always make itself felt in the finite life. On the contrary, in proportion as the infinite relation is recognised and honoured, the conflict will cease. The finitude of human self-consciousness thus accounts for the conflict, though it does not render it necessary. We can conceive of a finite self-conscious being that would always view his finitude in the light of the infinite, and would therefore spontaneously assume the right attitude toward his environment, finding in it the means of advance. In such a being there would be no struggle, no conflict, no division against itself; there would be consciousness of difference, but it would be a difference that was being gradually and smoothly overcome. It is altogether otherwise with a being who has neglected the infinite and surrendered to the finite. The nature of such an one has been disturbed at its centre. Because of this, he is divided against himself. The finite element in his nature demands independence. This demand is rebellion against the infinite element, and as that element cannot abdicate its authority, conflict ensues. The issue of that conflict, whether in favour of the finite or the infinite element, is the motive which leads to action, and which, as doing so, is the object of moral judgment.

The motive, then, is the creation of the individual. It is the determination of the self by the self in view of its surroundings. It is the decision of the self to assume either

the finite or the infinite standpoint in regarding and dealing with its environment. It is the alliance of the self with one or other of the two courses of procedure suggested to it by the special circumstances in which it is placed. It thus marks the completion of the process antecedent to, and issuing in, effort. When the motive has been generated, all has been done, so far as morality is concerned. The motive is the impelling force that drives the individual into the path of action. In other words, it is that which moves to the execution of the purpose formed. It is sometimes spoken of as that which moves to the formation of the purpose to be executed, or to the resolve to execute the purpose that has been formed. Green describes a motive as "an idea of an end, which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise."¹ And Muirhead says: "Seeing that the motive is that which moves, and the will is not moved until it chooses, it seems more correct to define motive finally as the *idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will.*"² In these statements the aim and the motive are identified; but they should be distinguished from each other as cause and effect. Look at the latter of the two utterances. According to it, the idea of the object, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will to come to a certain decision, viz. to seek the object, the idea of which is present. The will is thus moved to move. But is not the issue of the movement of the will, or rather the movement of the will itself, the motive which is the object of the moral judgment? Prior to the movement of the will there is only the process, and that cannot be dealt with until it is finished and the issue emerges in the shape of a fixed decision. Of course, when the self admits the congruity of the object, the movement of the will may be said to be determined; but without the movement of the will the motive would not be in

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. i. § 87.

² *Elements of Ethics*, p. 58.

existence. As Green puts it in one place, the motive "is the act of will."¹ To say, then, that the motive moves the will, is to say that the motive produces the motive. The statement under discussion is thus a definition of the aim rather than of the motive. The idea of the congruity of the object with the self, is the feeling or belief that the self can be satisfied by the possession or enjoyment of the object; and, in harmony with this feeling or belief, the will comes to the resolve to secure the possession or enjoyment of the object. The aim or end, then, is prior to the motive, its condition indeed, and the motive is due to the acceptance of the aim by the will. Green, in the sentence quoted above, speaks of a motive as "an idea of an end which a self-conscious being presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise." But the presentation of an end to itself by a self-conscious being must be followed by the identification of itself with that end, if there is to be a striving on its part towards realisation. Of course, the aim and the motive are only logically distinct. They are not in reality different things; they are but two sides of the same thing. Still it is of advantage, in exhibiting the moral process, to take account of both, and to assign them their respective positions and values. If we treat them as identical, and speak of the will as moved by the motive,—that is, the aim,—we in effect separate the will from the self, for we imply that the self, apart from the will, creates the motive, and that the will submits to the creation of the self. But the will and the self cannot be thus held apart. The will is the self, on its practical side, asserting itself; and this self-assertion is the motive, led up to by a process of reflection, and expressing the outcome of that reflection. The motive, to quote Green once more, "is the will in act."²

By the motive, then, we understand the decision to act come to by the self, in virtue of its identification of itself with an end or aim suggested to it by its surroundings.

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. i. § 103.

² *Ibid.* bk. ii. ch. i. § 97.

We have been using the term self-conscious as descriptive of a rational being, and much of what we have urged has been based on the fact of self-consciousness. But of this feature in human nature we have as yet said nothing. It will help to make our position clear if we now turn our attention to it, and, in particular, consider it in its practical aspect and bearing.

What, then, do we mean when we say that we are self-conscious beings? What is implied in the fact, that we are conscious of a self? First of all, and in general, there is implied, the recognition that all our varied experiences are related to a subject that is more than they, that was prior to them, that will survive them, and that, in virtue of its continuity, binds them together, so that they form one experience and become the constituent elements of a single life. In other words, self-consciousness is the sense or apprehension, on the part of the self, that it is a unity in difference, and a permanent in change; that, throughout the manifold of its sensations, thoughts, emotions, desires, efforts, it remains essentially the same. Without such a consciousness as this, rational existence would be impossible. Did we not feel that our past and our present experiences were so related as to constitute a single experience, because embraced within the circle of one personality, there would be no cohesion or continuity in our inner life; it would be a succession of unconnected impressions and acts. Self-consciousness is in this aspect but another name for self-identity.

But the description just given is clearly inadequate. To rest satisfied with it would be to stop short of the full truth. We should then discern only the fact of unity and permanence and identity, not the value of these as factors in the self-conscious life; and yet it is this that is of consequence in our inquiry. We have spoken of self-consciousness as the recognition that all our varied experiences are related to a permanent subject. This being its character, if we are rightly to appreciate it as a determining force in our mental and

moral history, we must learn what are the nature and conditions of the relation of which it is the recognition. And we shall best learn what these are by considering how we become self-conscious, by asking in what way the consciousness of self is brought home to us.

Self-consciousness is, as we have seen, the sense or apprehension on the part of the self that it is a unity in the difference, and a permanent in the change, to which it is continually being subjected. We have also spoken of the self as that which is prior to the varied experiences through which it passes. These statements, however, do not mean that the self knows itself antecedently to, and independently of, experience,—that the unity and the permanent exist apart from the difference and the change with which they have to do and in which they maintain themselves. We do not, as rational beings, begin with the bare fact of unity and identity, and, taking this with us, move forward into difference and change. We do not start with the empty form of self-consciousness, and proceed to bring all our states and activities within its range. We do not know ourselves, as selves, before our entrance on our life of thought and effort, and carry this knowledge with us into the world in which we are to play our part. Such a condition is an impossibility. We have, and can have, no conscious existence apart from actual experience. *Cogito ergo sum.* Only as I think do I exist as a rational being. Only, therefore, in relation to, and in and by, experience, can I realise my identity, know myself as a unity and as permanent, become self-conscious. The apprehension of unity implies the apprehension of difference, and the conception of permanence carries with it the conception of change. Hence a being that was not the subject of difference and change would not know himself as a unity and as permanent. Thus the self perceives itself in, and by means of, its manifestations. It feels that it persists through all the varied states and acts with which it is associated. It thinks of these as its own, and this means

not merely that it has taken account of them, but that they are expressions of it, which testify to its existence and operation as the basis and ground of experience. Thus self-consciousness is inseparable from, we might almost say is a result of, the activity of self, or rather is that activity.

Having discovered in what way we attain to self-consciousness, we are in a position to consider the place and significance of self-consciousness in the rational life. It is bound up with the activity of the self. Now, that activity is twofold: it has a theoretical and a practical reference. The former of these has to do with the acquisition of knowledge; the latter, with the attainment of ends. We are self-conscious in knowing, and we are self-conscious in doing; but self-consciousness in the one is not quite the same as self-consciousness in the other. In order that we may appreciate rightly the difference between the two, we shall look at each with the view of discerning its precise character.

And we take, first, self-consciousness in its theoretical reference. This, it is evident, is more than self-identity, more than the conviction that it is one subject that receives the communications made and carries on the investigations and speculations pursued. It is the conviction that that subject is, by receiving these communications and pursuing these investigations, gaining what contributes to its growth and attainment. The self is not a bare unity and identity or an empty form, but a living force that is to display itself and to know itself by activity. As such, it is to expand and strengthen by the appropriation of that which is congenial to it. This appropriation is due to mental effort, and consists in the apprehension and assimilation of truth. Of the expansion which results from this appropriation, it is conscious. It knows not merely that it has seized and interpreted facts, but also that, in so far as it has done this, it has contributed to its development. The result of its study and thought is not simply a store of intellectual

wealth, but also, and most distinctly, an increase of intellectual life. As self-conscious, we not only know that we continue throughout the varied phases of our mental activity, but also that, in and by such activity, we are entering on our inheritance.

The practical reference of self-consciousness brings us face to face with a state of things different from that just considered. What we have to deal with in connection with it is conduct, action that is the outcome of deliberation and resolve,—action, that is, that is put forth with the view of fulfilling an accepted aim and reaching a conceived goal. Self-consciousness, in this reference, implies the identification of the self with the aim and the goal sought. It is more than the recognition that it is the self that acts, more even than the recognition that, by the achievement of the object contemplated, the self finds satisfaction; it is the recognition that it is the self that determines for itself the object toward which it directs its effort. In other words, it is the presentation of the self to the self by the self in such a way that the self becomes an object to the self. It is the projection, by the self-conscious being, of the self of which he is conscious, so that it blends with his surroundings, and by doing so becomes the aim of his treatment of them. A projection of the self of this kind clearly demands an apprehension, accurate or inaccurate, complete or partial, of the nature of the self. The projection of the bare self, even if that were possible, would not furnish an end for our endeavour. In order that we may secure this, we must give to the self a certain character. We must fill the form of the self with a content of some sort, if it is to determine and influence our conduct. And the self, thus defined, stands before us as the goal of our action. Thus, as self-conscious beings, regarded from the practical standpoint, we know, or at least feel, that it is the self which we seek when we decide to follow a certain course of conduct, whatever be the form of the object that is directly sought; and we know

or feel this because we have set the self before ourselves as the aim of our effort, because we have identified the self with the object which we seek.

Self-consciousness, then, has different meanings in these two spheres. Fundamentally, indeed, it is the same in all its references, so that the differences noted are differences of operation rather than of nature. At bottom, it is simply self-identity, the recognition of the unity that forms the basis and furnishes the possibility of a rational life. But in the theoretical and in the practical manifestations of that life, the unity which underlies it reveals itself under different phases. In the former, it assumes the form of a capacity, in the latter of a faculty. That is to say, so far as gaining knowledge is concerned the self is conscious of *experiencing* satisfaction and attainment, while, so far as putting forth effort is concerned, it is conscious of *seeking* as well as of *experiencing* satisfaction and attainment. A clear understanding of this distinction is of the utmost importance for our investigation. We shall therefore seek to make plain its precise import.

And we may state the matter as follows. An apprehension of the self by the self, and a presentation of the self to the self as an object to be pursued, are both involved in the practical reference, but not in the theoretical. In the case of the latter, all that is required is the activity of the self, whereby the individual sensations arising within the self are taken up by it and made elements in a single experience, an experience which yields satisfaction and contributes to attainment, but which, though doing so, does not demand for its coming-to-be a definite conception and projection of the self, with which it is in harmony. In other words, the process which issues in knowledge, though it produces within us self-satisfaction, is not a conscious striving after the satisfaction of a self that we set before ourselves to be satisfied. The self, if you will, finds itself in the knowledge acquired, not, however, because it has sought itself therein,

definitely conceived, but only because, having, as a self, apprehended what has come to it, it discovers that that is in agreement with its nature. It may be true that the self not only apprehends what comes to it, but, in virtue of its infinite relations, is impelled to seek fresh and fuller and wider knowledge; but this does not necessarily mean that it clearly realises itself, and definitely presents the satisfaction of itself, in its essence, to itself, as the goal of its inquiry and reflection, but only that it acts under an impulse, the bearing of which is revealed to it in the experience that results from the accomplishment of the end sought by it.

With regard to conduct the case is different. There we have not simply materials given in sensation that have to be apprehended, or objects presented that have to be investigated, or questions proposed that have to be answered, but alternative courses offered, between which we must make choice. In such circumstances, what is demanded is decision, and decision not only by, but in view of, the self that has to select and act. More is required than a movement of the self in the way of taking up and understanding and assimilating that which comes to it; there is required a movement of the self that deals with what has been taken up and assimilated and understood, in harmony with the claims of the self, and with the object of meeting these claims; in a word, self-determination. We might, indeed, sum up the distinction between the theoretical and the practical references of self-consciousness by saying that, while both involve self-satisfaction and self-realisation, the former involves these only as result, while the latter involves them both as aim and as result, and that, therefore, the latter includes self-determination while the former does not.

Green, in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, takes up a position that involves the denial of the validity of the distinction we have drawn between self-consciousness in its theoretical and in its practical reference. While admitting that "it is equally impossible to derive desire from intellect and

intellect from desire; impossible to treat any desire as a mode of understanding, or any act of understanding as a mode of desire," he insists that each "involves a mode of consciousness the same as that which is involved" in the other,¹ and that "the exercise of the one activity is always a necessary accompaniment of the other."² In other words, intellect and desire have "a common source in one and the same self-consciousness," and, inasmuch as that self-consciousness is single, they must always be found together. He sums up his discussion of the subject as follows:—
"On the whole matter, then, our conclusion must be that there is really a single subject or agent, which desires in all the desires of a man, and thinks in all his thoughts, but that the action of this subject as thinking—thinking speculatively, or understanding, as well as thinking practically—is involved in all its desires, and that its action as desiring is involved in all its thoughts. Thus thought and desire are not to be regarded as separate powers, of which one can be exercised by us without, or in conflict with, the other. They are rather different ways in which the consciousness of self, which is also necessarily consciousness of a manifold world other than self, expresses itself. One is the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself, the other its effort to carry itself out into the world; and each effort is involved in every complete spiritual act—every such act as we can impute to ourselves or count our own, whether on reflection we ascribe the act rather to intellect or rather to desire."³
Now, it is evident that, if the view here expressed be correct, self-consciousness in its theoretical as truly as in its practical reference includes self-determination, and, consequently, the conclusion to which we have come cannot be maintained. But is it correct? Is it the case that intellect and desire are the necessary accompaniments of each other? Let us deal with this question, first, from the standpoint of intellect, and then from the standpoint of desire.

¹ Bk. ii. ch. ii. § 130.

² *Ibid.* § 134.

³ *Ibid.* § 136.

From the standpoint of intellect our inquiry takes the form, Can we gain knowledge without desiring to do so? Green declares that we cannot. He says: "In all exercise of the understanding desire is at work. The result of any process of cognition is desired throughout it. No man learns to know anything without desiring to know it. The presentation of a fact which does not on the first view fit itself into any of our established theories of the world, awakens a desire for such adjustment, which may be effected either by further acquaintance with the relations of the fact, or by a modification of our previous theories, or by a combination of both processes."¹ In dealing with these deliverances, the first thing that strikes us is that they treat of a certain kind of knowing—what is called elsewhere speculative thinking. Throughout the section, indeed, this is the professed reference of the term intellect. It is not, however, consistently employed in this sense. It is spoken of sometimes as arresting "successive sensations as facts to be attended to," and sometimes as seeking to bring these into relation to each other, that the self may find itself at home in them and make them its own.² But these two activities of the intellect are not quite the same, and on the recognition of the difference between them rests the right treatment of the point raised. For, in the former sense, intellect is not associated with desire; in the latter, it is. This is practically admitted by Green in the last sentence of the quotation given above. He speaks of "the presentation of a fact which does not on the first view of it fit itself into any of our established theories of the world" awakening a desire for such an acquaintance with it as will lead to an adjustment of it with these. But the presentation of the fact must yield a certain knowledge of the fact, and must yield that knowledge apart from desire. This knowledge may impel us to seek further knowledge by investigation; but the acquisition of that knowledge is different, in its conditions, from the acquisition of

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 134.

² *Ibid.* § 132.

the other, and different just because it is consciously sought by us. It is not, therefore, correct to say that every activity of intellect involves desire; some do, but not all.

From the standpoint of intellect we pass to the standpoint of desire, that we may determine whether or not it always involves an exercise of intellect. That it does, cannot well be denied. Every desire that is "more than an indefinite yearning" is desire for some object either perceived or conceived, and, in the formation of such object, intellect has played its part. Green, however, gives desire too wide a reference. He speaks of it as an effort of consciousness to carry itself out into the world, and he says, "Towards this extinction of itself in the realisation of its object every desire is in itself an effort."¹ But desire is not strictly speaking an effort. It may lead to effort, but between it and the effort that is to satisfy it there lies the consideration not only of the means of its gratification, but also of our right to use these means,—the consideration, indeed, of the moral character of the desire. When this is noted by us, we observe that the implication of intellect in desire is not so great as we might at first sight suppose, and as Green is inclined to think. A desire suggests to the self within which it is awakened the identification of itself with the object by which it has been excited, but that suggestion may either be entertained or rejected; and it is in the treatment of that suggestion that the self determines itself, and it is as the result of this self-determination that effort is put forth. In other words, desire is the possibility of an act of will. This Green does not admit. To him the desire is an act of will: desiring is willing. What we have spoken of as desires he would speak of as "passions as influences affecting a man," or, by way of accommodating himself to our manner of expression, but under protest, as "mere desires." He closes his section on Desire and Will with these words: "The true distinction lies between passions as influences affecting a man—among which we may include

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 131.

'mere desires' if we please—and the man as desiring, or putting himself forth in desire for the realisation of some object present to him in idea, which is the same thing as willing.”¹ This statement we cannot accept. Notwithstanding all that Green says to the contrary, we are of opinion that willing is more than desire. Without, however, pursuing this matter further, we admit—what indeed is obvious—that intellect is a necessary accompaniment of desire in whatever sense it is employed, and certainly in the sense in which it is employed by Green, and with which consequently we have at present to do.

It thus appears that while desire always involves intellect, intellect does not always involve desire. We may know what we have not desired to know, what we could not desire to know, for the simple reason that, until it was known, we were not aware of its existence, and could not therefore experience any longing in its direction. Having, however, learned of its existence and gained a certain knowledge concerning it, we may experience a longing in its direction: it may become for us an object of desire, and may impel us to intellectual activity, to speculative thinking. Here the question naturally occurs, Is the desire in this case the same as it is in practical thinking? Does it demand the same kind of self-determination? Green, of course, holds that it does. He says, referring to the acquisition of knowledge to which one is impelled by the presentation of a fact that does not at once fit itself into our theories of the world: “The learner of course knows not how he will assimilate the strange fact till he has done so, but the idea of its assimilation as possible evokes his effort, precisely as, in a case naturally described as one of desire, the idea, let us say, of winning the love of a woman evokes the effort of the lover to realise the idea.”² In this passage two things are treated as identical which are distinct and ought to be distinguished. The distinction between them Green so far recognises. He

But the desire to know is not merely a mere human desire

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 147.

² *Ibid.* § 134.

speaks of the condition of a lover as "a case naturally described as one of desire." This expression indicates that there is a difference between the case of a lover and the case of the learner, with which he is dealing. That difference, however, is not definitely apprehended. What is it? In the one case there is desire for an object, the assimilation of which is believed to be possible; in the other, there is desire for an object with which he who desires it has already identified himself. Take the two instances suggested by Green. In the first we have a man who studies a fact with which he has been brought into contact, because he believes, or hopes, that he will be able to appropriate the interpretation and the information supplied thereby. The desire of such an one is vague and indefinite. It is clear and definite enough so far as the proximate object sought is concerned, but it is vague and indefinite so far as the ultimate object is concerned. It aims at the interpretation of the fact, but in what way the fact, when interpreted, will affect him who is to gain the interpretation it does not know. It does not imply the identification of the individual desiring with the thing desired, but only a general expectation on his part that, if the thing desired be secured, it will in some way or other take its place in the content of his rational life. It is quite different with the other instance. In it we have a lover who seeks the love of a woman. Here the desire is clear and definite. The lover does not seek something which he believes he will be able to assimilate. He seeks something which he knows he will be able to assimilate, something with which he has already identified himself, and the possession of which will certainly afford him satisfaction. When thus examined the difference between the two cases becomes plain. We might say that, in the first, the object of the desire excited is knowledge about a given thing, whereas, in the second, it is the given, or rather the accepted, thing itself: or that in the first the immediate object of desire is the means to a possible end, which can only be understood when

the means have been secured; while in the second it is the end itself distinctly apprehended. This difference in the object of the desires implies a difference in their basis. Both may rest on self-determination, but the self-determination is not the same for both. In the one it is fuller than in the other. In the one it is the self as identified with, and therefore as expressed in, terms of a fixed object; in the other it is merely the self as capable of assimilating material to be gained in a certain way, but the nature of which is not perceived. Self-realisation may, therefore, result from the fulfilment of both desires, but it is not the same in each. It is of course the same self that is realised, but it is that self in different aspects. In the one case it is the self as capacity, in the other it is the self as potentiality. These two aspects of the self are recognised by Green when he speaks of thought or intellect as the effort of consciousness "to take the world into itself," and of desire as the effort of consciousness "to carry itself out into the world." That which takes "the world into itself" must gain satisfaction therefrom, satisfaction that, since it is due to the filling up of the measure of our receptivity, must be self-realisation, the realisation of ourselves by apprehension and appropriation of that which, as rational beings, we were designed to know. And that which carries "itself out into the world" must manifest itself thereby; and since this manifestation is due to the impulse generated by our sense of imperfection and of capability, it must be self-realisation, the realisation of ourselves by development and attainment of that which, as rational beings, we were designed to be. Neither the taking of the world into ourselves nor the carrying of ourselves out into the world can leave us precisely where and what we were. It must affect us in the way of enriching and expanding our nature; and, inasmuch as our nature is rational, it can be enriched only by assimilation and expanded only by growth. But we can assimilate only that which is in harmony with our constitution, and we can grow only by the forthputting

of our powers. In the former case we have a demand that we must meet, in the latter we have a germ that we must unfold. We might almost say, that in the former we attain to self-realisation through self-satisfaction, while in the latter we gain self-satisfaction by self-realisation.

Green would of course deny the accuracy of the distinction we have drawn between Intellect and Desire, or speculative thinking and practical thinking. He would insist that the capacity and the potentiality of which we have spoken are fundamentally one, and that we are realising ourselves as truly in taking the world into ourselves as in carrying ourselves out into the world, because in each case we are overcoming the world which stands over against us. He tells us that "the element common" to Intellect and Desire "lies in the consciousness of self and a world as in a sense opposed to each other, and in the conscious effort to overcome this opposition."¹ "Each," he says in another connection, "implies on the part of the soul the consciousness of a world not itself or its own. Each implies the effort of the soul in different ways to overcome this negation or opposition."² Now, admitting the fact of opposition, or rather of the consciousness of opposition here emphasised, we have to note that the opposition is to be overcome "in different ways," and difference in the way of overcoming it involves difference in its nature or operation. Mr. Bradley, in the Analytical Table of Contents, states the different ways as follows: "Desire, to the consciousness desiring, strives to remove the opposition by giving reality in the world to an object which, as desired, is only ideal. Intellect strives to reduce a material apparently alien and external to intelligibility; *i.e.* to make ideal an object which at first presents itself as only real."³ In the former case we seek to make real what is ideal. The ideal is the aim with which we have identified ourselves, and which we seek to realise in and by means of our surroundings. We have formed that ideal as

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 130. ² *Ibid.* § 133. ³ *Ibid.* p. xvii.

a particular end which we seek to attain; and if it be a worthy ideal, it is a special expression of the central principle of our nature, that by our action is to embody itself in a perfect life. In the latter case we seek to make ideal what is real. The real stands before us as an existing fact or combination of facts, and we endeavour to apprehend it by seizing its meaning. We do not form the real, we only come into contact with it, and, recognising that it stands in relation to us, we set ourselves to appropriate it. Now, between these two activities there is a real difference, although they are activities of a single subject. Confining ourselves to the point that bears on the matter we are at present considering, let us ask what it is that is prominent in each as an impulse to effort. In the case of Intellect, it is the fact; in the case of Desire, it is the self. The self is certainly present in the former, but not present in the same way as in the latter, for the simple reason that in the latter it is the self that constitutes, we might say that is, the ideal pursued, whereas in the former the real to be made ideal is, so far as existence is concerned, independent of self. Hence, while in the former the self is satisfied, and, by being satisfied, is realised, in so far as the fact is apprehended and assimilated, in the latter the self is realised, and, by being realised, is satisfied. Or, otherwise stated, in Intellect the self, definitely conceived, is not set before us to be satisfied and realised, while in Desire it is. And thus, as we have already expressed it, the former involves self-satisfaction and self-realisation only as a result, whereas the latter involves these both as aim and as result.

Our discussion of self-consciousness has shown us that, in its practical reference, it involves self-determination, self-satisfaction, and self-realisation. It remains for us to determine the exact significance of these terms, and the relation in which they stand to each other.

By self-determination we simply mean, that the resolution come to has its ground within the self, that it is not

due to pressure from without, but that, though the occasion for it may spring from our surroundings, it is only because the appeal addressed to us is taken up by us, and is, in one of its references, accepted by us, that there is decision. Of course the decision come to issues, or at least is intended to issue, in an overt act, but the act is distinct from the decision of which it is the expression. The decision is really a state of the individual that manifests itself in a certain course of procedure. Self-determination is thus the outcome of the identification of the self with an object presented to it and apprehended by it, and the moral process of which it is the result deals with that identification. I speak of a process, because the identification is not necessarily immediate. It may be, and often is, preceded by deliberation. What then is the subject of deliberation? What, so to speak, is the question asked? It is, Does the object apprehended harmonise with the self, of which I am conscious, as interpreted by me? And according as this question is answered in the affirmative or in the negative will our determination be in one direction or in another. Thus self-determination, whether right or wrong, is determination of the self by and within the self.

From self-determination we pass to self-satisfaction. Speaking generally, this term indicates the state that results from the possession and enjoyment of an object that is congenial to the self. In the practical sphere, within which we are at present moving, the object possessed and enjoyed is not only one that is congenial to the self, but one that, having been definitely identified with the self, has been an object of desire; so that self-satisfaction is the attainment of a desired object. We experience self-satisfaction in this form when we gain that for which we have been longing. We might indeed say that it is the longing that is satisfied, but inasmuch as the longing is ours, a state of the self, its satisfaction is the satisfaction of the self. But the self that is satisfied, is the self as identified with the object and

expressed in the longing. It is a special form and manifestation of the self, determined by the conception of the self accepted by us. Now, this conception may be either true or false. The interpretation of our nature, of which it is the product, may be accurate, so far as it goes, or it may be fundamentally mistaken and erroneous. And according as it is the one or the other will the satisfaction felt be superficial or essential. If it be the former, then it is nothing more than the gratification of a particular desire which the self has been led to entertain, because, having brought itself within the limits of a particular appetite, it has surrendered itself to the object which solicits it. If it be the latter, then it is the meeting of the claim of the self in general; it is the supply of the fitting content for the form that lies within our nature; it is the fulfilment of the conditions which our constitution embodies; it is the assimilation by us of that which harmonises with the central element of our being. It is more than mere gratification: it is conformity to that which is fundamental. The words "self" and "satisfaction," indeed, have different meanings in the two applications of the term self-satisfaction we are seeking to describe. In the narrower of these, "self" means the self in a special aspect, the self in a single mode, the self reduced to one of its phases, and "satisfaction" means the appeasing of the appetite roused, the stilling of the passion that has been stirred; in the wider, "self" means the self in its fulness and essence, as the spiritual principle which constitutes the rational being, and "satisfaction" means the gaining of that which is in accord with that principle, and which when secured fills, in whole or in part, the capacity which that principle creates, corresponds to the central feature in our nature and answers its deepest want.

It thus appears that the term self-satisfaction admits of two widely different applications. And as it is desirable that these should be clearly marked off from each other, so that the one may not be confounded with the other, we shall

speak of the former as self-gratification, and of the latter as self-satisfaction.

We now turn to the last of the terms in question, viz. self-realisation. Regarding it, little requires to be said. Its bearing lies on the surface. It suggests the fulfilment of the design embodied in the self, the development of the germ that lies in our being, the actualising of the possibility inherent in us as rational creatures, the attaining, by conscious activity, of all that we are capable of becoming, the successful striving after the ideal that is implanted in our constitution. Self-realisation is growth, expansion, the unfolding into ever fuller and richer form of the vital element that makes us what we are, and that is the prophecy of the fulness of the stature of a perfect man.

In the light of what we have learned as to self-determination, self-gratification, self-satisfaction, and self-realisation, we go on to consider the relation in which these stand to each other. And we shall deal first with the connection between self-gratification and self-realisation, then with the connection between self-satisfaction and self-realisation, and lastly with the connection between these three and self-determination.

Now it is evident that self-gratification is different from self-realisation. It is not only different from it, but is opposed to it. For when we aim only at the gratification of desire to which we have subjected the self, and not at the satisfaction of the self as determining the desire, so far from realising, we are destroying, the self. We are hindering and not helping its growth. Instead of contributing to its development, we are denying to it that without which development cannot take place.

But what of self-satisfaction and self-realisation? These are often spoken of as if they were synonymous; and that they are very intimately related is apparent from what we have discovered as to their significance. Still there is a distinction between them which, though one of degree

rather than of kind, deserves attention. In both we have to do with the self, and with the self in its true character, as the spiritual principle that constitutes the rational being, but we have to do with it in different aspects. We might indicate the difference of aspect in the two cases by saying, that in self-satisfaction we view the self statically, and that in self-realisation we view it dynamically. In the former we think of the self as a definite object with a capacity to be met; in the latter we think of the self as an expansive energy, which by its expansion is to fulfil a purpose that is inherent in it. Or, otherwise stated, in self-satisfaction we regard the self as it is, manifesting itself, of course, in decisions, and we endeavour to execute these decisions, that by their execution we may do and supply what is harmonious with it; whereas in self-realisation we regard the self as it ought to be, and endeavour to do and supply that which is needful in order that it may attain perfection. The difference between the two rests on different estimates of the self. According to the one, the self is a fixed quantity, conformity to which is to be sought in all our decisions and efforts; according to the other, it is a vital force which is not only to embody itself in all our decisions and efforts, but is to rise through these to fuller expression. If we accept the former estimate, we shall move within the sphere of duty, and shall act according to rule, the rule which we believe to be the transcription of the law written in the heart; if we accept the latter, we shall transcend the sphere of duty, and shall be guided and controlled in our action by an inspiring conception and an upward impulse, the conception of an exalted character to be gradually attained by us, and the impulse of an inherent affinity with righteousness and truth and purity.

There is thus a real and suggestive difference between self-satisfaction and self-realisation. It is, however, as already said, a difference in degree and not in kind. We might even say that the relation is greater than the difference.

For self-satisfaction is the condition of self-realisation, and self-satisfaction tends to self-realisation, though it may stop short of this. In any case, so far as our present purpose is concerned, they may be treated as identical, since both have to do with the self in its essential nature, though taking account of it in different aspects.

We are now in a position to deal with self-determination, and to settle its connection with the other elements in moral action. These are self-gratification and self-realisation, the latter embracing self-satisfaction. From the preceding discussion it follows that both self-gratification and self-realisation are objects of self-determination, and that they are the only possible objects that it can have. That is to say, self-determination is a resolve to seek either the one or the other. In the case of the former it is a resolve to seek the satisfaction of a longing into which the self has, for the time, narrowed itself; in the case of the latter it is a resolve to seek the satisfaction of the self in its central feature, by the possession of an object that is in harmony with it, and the possession of which will contribute to its growth and attainment.

The result to which we have been brought touches the question already discussed as to the alternative, which is the ground of deliberation, and in view of which a motive is formed. That alternative, as we saw, sets before us a right and a wrong course of procedure, and the analysis we have just concluded suggests to us a way of stating the difference between these in their subjective reference that serves to bring out clearly the basis and import of that difference. The wrong course is that which points to self-gratification, and the right that which points to self-realisation. Both involve self-determination, but the self in the interest of which the determination is made is not the same in the two instances. In the one it is the self reduced to the limits of desire; in the other it is the self expressing itself in desire. In the former, what is sought is simply the gratification of

the present state and longing of the self, without reference to anything beyond present satisfaction; in the latter, what is sought is the gratification of the present state and longing of the self because, in and by that gratification, the self, as a permanent and developing subject, will not only experience satisfaction but gain in fulness. Satisfaction is the aim in both, but the conception of satisfaction is different in each.

Our examination of self-consciousness has thus confirmed and elucidated the conclusion formerly reached, viz. that the object of morality is the action of a rational being as such,—action, that is to say, that has moral value and significance as embodying and expressing a motive which is the issue of self-determination, due to the identification of the self with one of the lines of effort, suggested by environment, and to the conviction that, by following the line chosen, the self will experience satisfaction and attain to realisation.

LECTURE II

THE MORAL IDEAL

IN the last lecture we saw that the object of morality is the motive, and that the motive is due to self-determination—is, in truth, self-determination in its outward reference as the efficient cause of action. We must now inquire what this conclusion involves. For it marks not the close, but only a stage in our investigation. We must go deeper than we have yet done if we are to discover that which is fundamental. Self-determination is not an ultimate fact. All that it tells us is, that the conduct of a rational being is not a mechanical response to the appeal addressed to him by his surroundings, but is the result of a decision come to by him in view of that appeal. As to the conditions of that decision, it tells us nothing. It declares that, as a matter of fact, there is decision, but it does not exhibit the basis on which decision rests. In other words, we have discovered that without self-determination there cannot be action having moral worth, but we have not discovered what that is without which there cannot be self-determination, and this we must discover if we are to learn the place of morality in the sphere of human life.

What then does self-determination imply? Clearly it implies a standard. Whatever else it may demand for its exercise, it certainly demands this. We have seen that our surroundings bring us face to face with an alternative, and that we have to decide with which of the objects presented to us we shall identify ourselves. Now, acceptance of the

one and rejection of the other must rest on something beyond the alternative. The two terms of the alternative must be each brought into contact with a third, and it is on their correspondence with this third that the selection turns. We have to make a choice between two courses set before us, but a choice rests on a ground outside the things between which we have to choose. Were there no such ground there could be no choice. In such circumstances we should not have determination; we should have caprice. A standard, then, we must have. But this standard, though it must lie outside the alternative presented, cannot lie outside the rational being to whom that alternative is presented. It cannot be something entirely external to him. That follows from the conclusion to which we have come as to the origin and nature of the motive. That conclusion testifies to self-determination, but determination in view of a standard that is apart from and outside the individual is not self-determination. By self-determination is meant, not simply determination of the self, but determination of the self by the self. Now, had we only an external standard, self-determination in this sense would be impossible. We might, indeed, be said to accept such a standard as the rule of our action, but for our acceptance of it we should need to account, and we could account for it only by reference to another standard external to us, since *ex hypothesi* this is the only kind of standard admissible. The acceptance of this second standard we could account for only by reference to a third, also external to us, and so on *ad infinitum*. Were we, on the other hand, to rest the acceptance of the first standard on an internal basis, we should give up the external standard, because not it, but the internal basis of our acceptance of it, would be the real ground of our determination. In this case, our determination would be self-determination in the full sense of the term. That, since it is determination of the self by the self, is no merely formal procedure such as might have place between two separate individuals, and

might rest on what was distinct from both. It is a movement within the circle of one being, a movement that though complex is still a unity, a movement by which the being whose it is gives to himself character and direction. The self-determining and the self-determined are one, and the act of self-determination is the manifestation of this unity in concentration of effort, whereby the essential nature of that unity, as conceived, may be expressed.

This point will become clear if we pass from self-determination to self-satisfaction and self-realisation, with both of which we have seen self-determination is closely connected.

We shall look first at self-satisfaction. What has it to say as to the standard? It unmistakably declares in favour of its internality. Mere conformity to an external standard cannot yield self-satisfaction. What is satisfied by such conformity is the standard imposed or the person who has imposed it. It is true that I may experience satisfaction by acting in harmony with a standard that is prescribed to me, but, if I do so, it is because the standard has affinity with my nature, and, in virtue of that affinity, is the transcription, we might say the projection, of my self. There is self-satisfaction in such circumstances, but that is enjoyed not because of, but in spite of, the externality of the standard. The law without must be the formal statement of the law within, if observance of it is to yield satisfaction. This principle obtains on the lower level of our physical nature. We have wants that must be met. These wants are not independent of each other. They are different phases of a single being. They are our appetites, and we seek their satisfaction with a view to health and comfort. Now, what is required in order that this may be secured? It is not enough that we adopt a dietary arranged by experts in gastronomy. We must consider how far that dietary harmonises with our constitution, because only in so far as it does so will it afford satisfaction. The satisfaction

enjoyed by us is therefore due, not to obedience to a standard without us, not even to obedience to a standard within us with which we compare our desires, but to submission to our physical nature itself. In other words, the standard is the nature. Now, as with the lower, so with the higher. Self-satisfaction, in its moral reference, springs from conformity to a standard that is within the self because it is the self. Nothing else and nothing less than the self will suffice for a standard, conformity to which will issue in self-satisfaction. The conformity, indeed, and the self-satisfaction, are but different aspects of the same thing.

Our consideration of self-satisfaction has done more than confirm the conclusion drawn from self-determination. It has carried us a step beyond that conclusion. We have learned not only that we must admit a standard, and a standard that is within and not without the rational being, but also that this standard is the self in its fundamental character, the self of which we are conscious.

We must now direct our attention to self-realisation, of which self-determination is the logical antecedent, and self-satisfaction the logical condition. And but little reflection is needed in order to discover that it supports the opinion already formed. As to the inwardness of the standard, that is presupposed in the very idea of realisation, and as to the identity of the standard with the self, without that, self-realisation would have no meaning. Only that which is present in "promise and potency" can be realised, and only that which, in its very essence, is a "promise and potency" can be the subject of self-realisation. Thus, as in the case of self-satisfaction, we not only establish the result already reached, but advance a stage. So far we have spoken of a standard, but we now perceive that this term does not accord with the point of view to which we have been brought. It is suggestive of a law that is above us, which we are to honour and by which we are to be tested. But this is a conception that is alien to the circumstances of the

case, as these have been disclosed to us by our analysis. For "standard," therefore, we must substitute "ideal." It is an ideal that we carry with us. At first that ideal is but dimly apprehended by us, but our apprehension of it is not the measure of its content or of its influence. It is an abiding presence that continually obtrudes itself on our notice, and that is constantly pressing for recognition and manifestation. We are urged to know ourselves in order that we may be ourselves. This is the obligation that rests upon us. Our duty is a duty to ourselves, the duty, viz., of gradually realising that which we are capable of being, and which we must ever yearn to become. Obligation and duty are not indicative of an authority with which we have only an accidental connection. They rest on the ideal that is wrapped up in our nature. They are the demand of that ideal for free, full expansion, and, inasmuch as that expansion can take place only with our concurrence, responsibility attaches to us. An ideal is more than a germ. Given the necessary conditions, and a germ develops necessarily. It contains within itself a possibility that, in favourable surroundings, cannot but actualise itself. An ideal is different. It requires for its realisation more than favourable conditions. The conditions must be fulfilled by the individual in whom the realisation is to take place. This is essential, because the ideal is only the indication of a possibility. It presents itself to the person in whom it is to be embodied as an attainment toward which he is capable of rising. It is therefore, so to speak, complete in his thought before it embodies itself in his character. It invites him; it does not compel him. It is not that which must be; it is that which ought to be. If it were only that which must be, there would be no need for its being exhibited in order to its realisation. As necessary, it would simply work itself out along its own fixed lines. But since it is that which ought to be, there is need for its being exhibited. Without this there would be no room for determination or

obligation. These can exist only where there is a perceived end.

It is true that the ideal in question is the self, and that therefore the obligation is imposed on the self by the self; but this does not mean, as might be supposed, that the obligation imposed is the obligation of necessity. Though the ideal is the self, there is scope for the obligation of freedom. This assertion is justified and explained by self-consciousness, in virtue of which the self can be projected by the self and become an object to the self. Such projection is inconsistent with, if not impossible to, an existence whose progress is settled apart from its own action or decision. An existence of this kind could not transcend in thought, even if it could definitely apprehend, the stage in its development which it had reached. Consequently, self-judgment could not be exercised by it. But the rational being judges himself, and by this judgment he proves himself superior to the stage he has reached. He tries himself as he appears in his act, by himself as he appears to his consciousness. This he would not do, could not do, if he did not recognise obligation and duty.

The possession and the consciousness of an ideal, then, impose obligation and constitute duty. The impulse towards perfection that makes itself felt within, since it is an impulse that springs from our own being and strives toward the complete fulfilment of that being's design, cannot be disregarded by us with impunity. It is a call to effort, addressed to us by the central element in our nature. As such it is the exhibition of that which is essential to our comfort, because fundamental to our highest existence. It is the claim which we have and which we make upon ourselves, a claim, therefore, that we are bound in honour to meet, and bound by no external considerations or engagements, but by the bond of our personality. From this obligation we can never escape, because to escape from it would mean to escape from ourselves. The ideal from which it springs belongs to

our selfhood, and this being so, we could cancel it only by the destruction of the self. By nothing less than self-annihilation could we pass from under the sway of duty.

Thus to the fact of obligation and duty springing from the presence of an ideal in our nature, we have been brought by our analysis of self-determination. But, closely allied to this fact, there is another of equal importance, viz. freedom. Obligation and freedom are closely related. The one presupposes the other. Neither can exist without the other, and both rest on the same basis. The basis of obligation is the ideal that lies in our nature, that is at once "the root and the offspring" of our character as rational beings. This is also the basis of our freedom. Here we must recall the result of our examination of our ideal. That, we found, is different from a germ, which simply and necessarily develops in given circumstances. It is like a germ in that it is only a possibility, but it is unlike a germ in that it is a possibility that it is seized and apprehended in its relative fulness by the subject of which it is the possibility, and is consciously cherished and realised by that subject. It is not, therefore, imposed on the subject, but is presented to him for acceptance as the spring and aim of effort. It is the self-interpretation of his capabilities, and is thus the stimulus to attainment in the line of his constitution. It is, therefore, at once the self and that which the self may become. It is the self in idea, in design, in purpose, seen by itself and made an object to itself. But such a condition of things is inconceivable without the notion of freedom. The presentation of an ideal to a creature that is bound by necessity would be either a superfluity or a mockery. If the creature is irrational, it would be a superfluity, because he could not apprehend it; if the creature is rational, it would be a mockery, because, though he could apprehend it, he could not realise it, and would consequently be pained by its apprehension. But neither of these cases is possible. An

ideal, just because it is an ideal, cannot be presented to an irrational creature, that is, a creature devoid of the faculty for ideas. As little can an ideal, the realisation of which is absolutely beyond his power, be apprehended, as an ideal, by a rational creature, for the simple reason that an ideal is merely the highest possible manifestation of a given nature, and can, therefore, be apprehended only by one possessing that nature. In other words, we cannot think of perfection in a sphere from which we are excluded by the lack of powers, the possession of which is the very condition of admission thereto, as an ideal for us. A man utterly devoid of musical sense, *e.g.*, cannot set musical attainment before himself as an end to be striven after. He can think of it as an object of ambition for some of his fellows who are musically gifted, but not for himself; in other words, he cannot apprehend it as an ideal. The very fact, then, that we are conscious of an ideal, testifies to our ability to realise it; in other words, to our freedom. Such consciousness implies, on the one hand, that we can become that which we perceive to be the full expression and embodiment of the principle that lies at the root of our existence as rational beings,—that we are not bound to our present state, but may transcend it, rising ever higher and higher; and, on the other hand, that this is to be accomplished by definite acceptance of the ideal as the goal of our endeavour, and strenuous effort after its fulfilment.

Of our freedom we can never be deprived. Free we are and free we must remain, because we can never wholly lose our ideal. That ideal may be obscured, its appeals may become weaker and weaker, but it can never be wholly destroyed or completely silenced. If this were possible, then there would be a stage beyond which remorse and reformation would be impossible. It is just the indestructibility of this ideal that furnishes a ground of appeal to the base and wicked. To surrender our freedom and to become a creature of necessity would be to surrender the infinite side of our

nature and limit ourselves to the finite, and this we cannot do. As with obligation, so with freedom. As long as the self exists, it is alike under obligation and in the enjoyment of freedom. These indeed are but different phases of the same fact.

And by freedom we are not to understand lawlessness. This interpretation of it is inconsistent with the fact that the two terms of the equation lie within the self. In the exercise of freedom we are not called upon simply to select one from amongst a number of objects that present themselves to us. We are called upon to determine ourselves in one or other of two directions, and our determination is in harmony with the general attitude we have assumed. Our freedom is manifested less in relation to the details of life than in relation to its governing principle. The former are but varied applications of the latter. As it is, so will they be. Hence it is said that a man must decide according to his character. This is true, but it is not to the point, because the main question is as to the character. Is that a fixed quantity? If so, then the matter is settled, but not in favour of freedom. If not, then what is its ground and how is it governed? This question we shall best answer by asking another. What is character? It is the attitude assumed toward the ideal inherent in the self. Now, that attitude may be one either of submission or antagonism. But both of these involve the presence of the ideal, antagonism as truly as submission. Hence the assumption of the one or of the other must be due to the action of the self: it must be an act of freedom. It is the adoption of a certain standpoint in preference to its opposite, which is equally within our reach. The selection which we make is not necessitated by that which operates from without, since the alternative is within our own nature; and to say that it is necessitated by the character is to say that the self is bound by its own product, and, in the case of a bad character, that is to say that it has committed rational suicide, and is dead in finitude and limitation.

By the exercise of freedom, then, we turn in the direction

either of the finite or of the infinite; we set ourselves to the realisation of the ideal, or we refuse to do so. And according as we do the one or the other, we pass into liberty or into bondage. We attain to liberty by fulfilling the purpose of our being; we sink into bondage by submitting to that which is alien to our true nature. We are only really free when we find full scope for the harmonious employment of our powers, and that cannot be gained by us save by submission to the ideal of our existence. Submission to the finite is subjection to what is alien to us, because it is subjection to that which is to be transcended by us.

Freedom is thus employed by us in two different senses. These we may name freedom of choice and freedom of existence, or freedom of determination and freedom of realisation. The former is that which we exercise, the latter is that which we enjoy. We must not treat these either as independent or as identical. They are distinct, and yet related. We cannot have freedom of existence or realisation without freedom of choice or determination. Self-realisation rests on self-determination. The freedom that could be gained by us without a free rational act on our part would not be rational freedom; it would not be the freedom that consists in that balanced upward movement which is the conscious evolution of our being in its essence, lifting itself without let or hindrance toward the goal to which our natures point. It would not be *our* freedom, but a freedom secured to us by another. Freedom that is ours must be entered into by an act of freedom on our part.

What has been said as to obligation and freedom, and in particular as to their relation to each other, may be illustrated and confirmed by reference to a form of expression that is common amongst us, and that has been employed without remark in the preceding discussion, viz. the term "Ought." That is a word that we constantly, almost instinctively, use in speaking of conduct or character. However much some may desire to banish it from their ethical vocabulary, they cannot do

ought.

so, or, if they do so, they must find a substitute for it that will be identical in meaning. The idea which it conveys is central to our nature and standing as rational beings, and consequently demands continual recognition. It is therefore desirable that we should consider it carefully, and note its precise bearing.

And, speaking generally, it implies that there is something which men are called upon to be and to do beyond what they are or have done; something for the performance or attainment of which they were designed, so that failure to give effect to it in action and in life will bring condemnation or loss, or both; something that, while presenting an aim to be fulfilled, presents it merely as a possibility which, though congruous to the nature of those to whom it is presented, may not be realised by them. It is thus the middle term between a standard or ideal and conformity thereto. It indicates the existence of the former and the need of the latter. But it does more than this. It is addressed to individuals, and it expresses their relation to the standard or ideal on the one hand, and to conformity to it on the other. It asserts that the standard or ideal suggested is the formal statement of the course they are expected to pursue, and that conformity to that standard or ideal will be the test applied to decide their advance therein. It thus not only indicates the existence of a standard or ideal, and the need of conformity to it, but shows on whom the standard or ideal makes demands, and by, or rather in, whom conformity to it is to be manifested. This, however, is not all. It does not merely involve the existence of a standard or ideal, and the relation of individuals thereto, it involves also a consciousness, or at least the possibility of a consciousness, of these things on the part of the individuals concerned. The standard or ideal, and the relation of the individuals to it, must be capable of apprehension by the individuals. This is so, because the apprehension of these is the condition of their acknowledgment and realisation. I say of their acknowledgment and realisation, not of their existence, for that is not necessarily dependent

on their apprehension. They may, and certainly, in the deeper sense of the term "ought," they do, exist apart from apprehension, but, whether they do or not, they cannot be given effect to without it. That which we ought to do is something that we can know, and something that we cannot do unless we know it. It cannot be said that we ought to be satisfying the demands of a relation that is unknowable by us. It may indeed be said, and with truth, that we ought to be satisfying the demands of a relation that we have not recognised. But that is only saying that we ought to know what we do not know, and that we ought to know this not only because it can be known, but because it concerns us intimately. The term "ought" then implies the existence of a standard or ideal, and a relation between it and individuals; a relation that can be known by the individuals, and that must be known by them if it is to be honoured by them,—a relation, therefore, by their attitude to which, even by their acquaintance with which, the individuals are to be judged. It thus clearly presupposes both obligation and freedom, and these in close union and vital co-operation. Take away either, and the conception which it expresses will disappear. The value of our analysis, indeed, consists in this, that it proves conclusively that these cannot be separated: that without freedom there could be no obligation, and without obligation there could be no freedom,—that these are different phases of one complex condition rather than different conditions. And it proves this by exhibiting to us the elements that go to constitute each, or at least to render each possible, in such a way as to make plain at once their special features and their mutual dependence,—to show that, while each has its own basis and character, the one implies the other. In view of this result, what we have to do is to endeavour to interpret each in the light of the facts reached by us, and by the interpretation of each to discover the connection between them.

We begin with obligation. And what we have to do is to show that it rests on, and is the expression, in one of its

Obligation

aspects, of the fact suggested by the term "ought." That fact, as we have learned, is the consciousness on the part of those to whom it is applied of a relation to a standard or ideal. Our contention, then, is that only those who possess, or may possess, this consciousness can be described as under obligation. That this is the case will become apparent if we observe what such consciousness means. On the one hand it means more than the recognition of the existence of a standard or ideal; it means the recognition that the standard or ideal which we know to exist is a standard or ideal for us. On the other hand it means more than the fact of a relation between us and a standard or ideal; it means the recognition by us of that fact. If it meant only the recognition of the existence of a standard or ideal, it would not involve obligation. There must be a relation between it and me before it can have any claims upon me, and a relation of such a kind that it is a standard or ideal for me. But a relation is not enough. That, of itself, will not yield obligation. Before it can do this it must enter into my consciousness—I must apprehend it; and then it is not the relation, but the apprehension of it, or, if you will, the relation as apprehended, that is the ground of obligation.

There is, however, another element in the consciousness with which we are dealing that must be taken account of when we are treating of obligation. The relation of which we are conscious is a particular kind of relation, a relation of potentiality and not of actuality; a relation, that is to say, that does not express as attained, but suggests as attainable, a certain condition. This, indeed, is involved in relation to a standard or ideal. What that indicates is something that does not exist, but that is to be produced. That which perfectly fulfilled the standard or ideal could scarcely be spoken of as related to it; it would embody, or rather, it would be, the standard or ideal. But apart from perfect fulfilment, there is relation, and relation that is a call to conformity. This is an important point as regards obligation. Without it

our view of obligation would be incomplete. We should not discern exactly either its ground or its nature.

It thus appears that obligation involves more than the existence of a standard or ideal, more even than the existence of a relation between a standard or ideal and individuals; it demands a consciousness of that relation, and a consciousness of it that demands conformity. But what does this consciousness imply? It implies that the standard or ideal is not imposed on us, but is presented to us; that it is not the sign and measure of what we are, but the sign and measure of what we may become. In other words, it implies freedom. Were we not free to give, or not to give, effect to a standard or ideal, we should not be conscious of it, at least not as a standard or ideal; we should at most be conscious of it as a fact in our constitution and existence. Being conscious of it, however, in the sense explained, we can set it over against ourselves, and can assume either of two attitudes toward it. But in our ability to do this lies our freedom, or, more correctly, our ability to do this is due to our freedom. And the other side of that ability is obligation. For since it is a relation that points to conformity to a standard or ideal with which we have to do, the one possible attitude must be right, and the other must be wrong, for the simple reason that the one is the fulfilment of the relation and the other is not. That is to say, the relation in question defines the course that is in harmony with, or rather pertains to, our standing, and therefore expresses the claim which that standing makes upon us, a claim which, since it springs from our standing, rests not only on an external, but also on an internal basis, and connects itself with what is fundamental in our constitution. I have spoken of it as relation to a standard or ideal. As relation to a standard, the claim which it expresses is external in basis; as relation to an ideal, the claim which it expresses is internal in basis. Both references need to be taken account of in the present connection; but while both have to be taken account of, it has to be observed that the latter is, from the

standpoint we are now occupying, the more important, because if the standard were not an ideal we should not be conscious of it. A claim, then, of the nature described clearly imposes obligation. We are responsible for our treatment of it. If we meet it, we are true to our position; if we do not meet it, we are false to our position. In either case we undergo judgment: in the one case, judgment that issues in commendation; in the other, judgment that issues in condemnation. But judgment of this sort implies freedom.

From obligation we turn to freedom. And what we have to do is to look at it in the light of the result reached by our analysis of the term "ought." That, as we saw, implied the consciousness, on the part of the individual, of relation to a standard or ideal that called for conformity thereto. This consciousness, we have learned, involves freedom, inasmuch as it involves power to deal with the relation to the standard or ideal of which we are conscious in either of two ways. But this is not all that it involves. It carries us much further than this. It points to a condition that is the manifestation of our nature and the enjoyment of our true life. The relation with which we are concerned is not formal, it is essential. It therefore indicates the design and aim of our existence. It shows us what we must do and become if we are to be all that we are capable of being, and were meant to be. The standard or ideal to which we stand related is a standard or ideal for us. That is to say, it is the summary statement of our being in its deepest significance and central purpose. It is not prescribed for us; it is impressed on us and implanted within us. It is what it is because we are what we are; or perhaps we should say, we are what we are because it is what it is. This being so, it teaches us that, short of its acknowledgment and of submission to it, we are short of the attitude and the attainment which accord with our nature and standing, and which alone can yield us satisfaction by affording full play for our powers and faculties. In other words, failure to acknowledge it is sub-

jection to limits that prevent self-realisation. And so long as that failure continues we feel that we are under restraint, that we are being hindered by what is alien to us. Now, the mere existence of a relation between us and the standard or ideal would not produce this feeling. What is required for its production is the consciousness of that relation. Apart from this consciousness the bondage might exist, and might be apprehended by those who could observe and study us, but we ourselves should not know it. Only as we are aware of a relation, in and by the fulfilment of which alone we can enter on our inheritance, can we recognise that we have fallen short of that inheritance by denying that relation and yielding to another that is delusive, because opposed to our central feature and quality. And, conversely, because we are aware of such a relation when we are faithful to it, we experience the joy of realisation, of spontaneous movement and activity, of the possession and expression of ourselves without let or hindrance,—in a word, of freedom in its highest and fullest sense.

But this freedom, which we have called freedom of existence or freedom of realisation, suggests, and is closely connected with, the other kind of freedom, which we have called freedom of choice or freedom of determination, and to which we alluded in treating of obligation. What we are now dealing with is not simply the fact of freedom, but the experience of it. That experience, however, we cannot have apart from our own act. The free working and manifestation of our being is freedom to us only as it is the outcome of our decision. I can feel that I am free only as I make myself free. In like manner, I can feel that I am bound only as I surrender my freedom. No one can enslave my nature but myself. My body may be enslaved by another, but not my reason. With my reason I alone can deal. It is just this fact that is, in the case of failure, the ground of regret and remorse. Were it not for the conviction that my condition is due to my own act, that I am what I am because I have

not done what I might have done, I should not be filled with shame. And, on the other hand, were it not that it was I who had accepted and responded to the standard or ideal presented to me, I should not know satisfaction and peace. Someone else may observe a law on my account, and by so doing may secure for me escape from punishment. But the freedom thus attained is purely external. Though I gain the benefits of it, it is not really mine. It is merely freedom in respect of the results of the law; not freedom in respect of the law itself. That can be gained only when the law is, by a conscious act, taken in and assimilated by me. Then I obey the law not as something laid upon me and constraining me, but as something within me which I acknowledge and honour, and in acknowledging and honouring which I experience freedom. This point will become perfectly clear if we think of the law as an ideal. The realisation of an ideal is freedom in the higher sense. But the realisation of an ideal is not a mechanical process; it is a rational act. Reason and the exercise of reason are involved from beginning to end. Without reason we could not apprehend the ideal; the ideal, indeed, is reason in its practical reference. And without the exercise of reason we could not give effect to it. But a rational act is a free act. It is an act of self-determination; and if the self-determination be right, it is the introduction to self-realisation, and therefore to freedom.

It is thus apparent that freedom of realisation involves freedom of determination, that without the exercise of freedom we cannot have the enjoyment of freedom. This does not mean that freedom of realisation is due solely to freedom of determination. The exercise of freedom is not the only, is not the main, ground of the enjoyment of freedom. In other words, it is not simply, as the result of a free act, that the realisation of the ideal is a state of freedom. In dealing with, and estimating the relation between, the act and its issue, and the character of the latter, we must take account of the content as well as the form of the act. It is the

quality of the thing chosen, as well as the fact that it is chosen, that defines the significance and value of the issue. Were it not chosen it would not be what it is, but it is not what it is simply as chosen. This is a point that must be carefully noted by us. If it is not, the position we have been led to assume will occasion much difficulty. Our discussion will seem to prove too much. We may be inclined to argue that, if the realisation of the ideal be a condition of freedom, because the outcome of a free act, the rejection of the ideal must be equally a condition of freedom, because it also must be the outcome of a free act. Or, otherwise stated, if our treatment of the ideal be an act of freedom, it must be so because there is possible for it either realisation or rejection; but if this be the case it must have the same value in both references, and, consequently, if it lead to a condition of freedom in the one reference, it must lead to a condition of freedom in the other. The answer to this possible difficulty has just been suggested by the statement of the connection between the choice and the resulting state. As has been said, while the state would not exist apart from the choice, its qualities are not due wholly to the act of choosing, but chiefly to the nature of the thing chosen. This, indeed, is implied in the description of the state as the realisation of the ideal. Freedom of choice is not liberty of indifference; it is the liberty of a being with a definite aim, toward which he may, or rather must, assume either a negative or a positive attitude,—a liberty, therefore, that may issue either in freedom or in bondage, either in fulfilment or in non-fulfilment of the aim that marks for him the course of spontaneous movement. As conscious of an ideal, which is the expression of my capacity and potentiality, I am conscious of a call to a certain line of action whereby my capacity and potentiality will be met and developed; to that call I may either respond or not. If I respond, I become what I was meant to be, and, as a result, I experience the peace and happiness of a free and harmonious activity and existence.

If I do not respond, I do not become what I was meant to be, and, as a result, I experience dissatisfaction and restraint, being withheld from my true good and compelled to act in a manner that is opposed to the requirements of my nature. Our freedom is thus conditioned by our circumstances. It is freedom to choose the right or to choose the wrong, and according as we choose the one or the other do we attain to, or come short of, the condition of freedom, the possession and manifestation of ourselves.

It may, however, be asked if the assumption of a negative attitude toward the ideal does not indicate that freedom of choice has been lost, or at least has not been exercised. In other words, it may be suggested that the vicious are under bondage in entering on this evil course, and that by their conduct they simply confirm that bondage. And in this suggestion there is an element of truth. We must, however, observe carefully its exact bearing. It describes the condition of the vicious after they have begun to be vicious. We may state the matter in this way. Every time an individual assumes a negative attitude toward the ideal that is his as a rational being, he removes himself further from its influence, and weakens the force of the alternative which, in virtue of it, his circumstances present to him. The scope, we might almost say the necessity, for choice is thus diminished. Having committed himself to a certain position, he simply maintains that position. But does the power of choice diminish with its necessity? There is a sense in which we may say it does, and there is a sense in which we must say it does not. It may be said to do so, so far as particular habits are concerned; it cannot be said to do so, so far as the fundamental nature is concerned. We might express the state of the case by saying that it is surrendered, not lost; that it falls into desuetude, but is not repealed; that it is suspended, but not destroyed. That this is the condition of affairs we recognise when we remember that it is possible, by appeal, to intensify the alternative, and raise the neces-

sity of choice to the highest pitch, by compelling consideration of the position assumed; and, in this way, to succeed in effecting a change of position, a change that can be brought about only by the exercise of the power of choice. With the necessity, the power reveals itself. And this being so, it cannot have been forfeited. At most, it has been latent. But what has been said carries us further than this. It teaches us that in the initial act at least this power must have been exercised. The force that reverses the process must, in the circumstances, be the same in kind, though not in degree, as that which began it. It is a process within the self, a process of the self; a process, therefore, with which the self alone can deal. That which can be resumed by a free act must have been set aside by a free act. In the initial act, then, it must have been exercised. But if in the initial act, then really in all succeeding acts, though not in so pronounced or prominent a manner; less consciously, because of past procedure, but not less truly. We thus see that the suggestion we have been considering, while emphasising a point of importance, does not in any way affect the conclusion to which we have come.

We have learned, then, that freedom is implied in the consciousness of a relation to a standard or ideal, calling for conformity thereto, of which the term "ought" is the sign. And, having regard to all that has emerged in our discussion, we cannot help recognising that freedom implies obligation. Obligation, indeed, is but the other side of freedom rightly understood. We attain freedom by doing that which we are under obligation to do, inasmuch as that obligation is internal as well as external in basis. Were we not under obligation, we could not in any real sense enjoy freedom. Our lives would be a series of capricious acts, without connection, because unrelated to a permanent principle of action. The man who gratifies his every whim and passion is not really free. He may fancy that he is, but he is mistaken. A rational being is only free when he is master of himself, and is expressing him-

self in all that he does ; that is to say, when he is true to the purpose of his existence, and is meeting faithfully the claims which he has upon himself. This is the only service in which there is perfect freedom. It is the truth, and the truth alone, that makes free, the truth not merely as known but as assimilated and applied. Indeed, we only know the truth when we have experience of it, operating within us and bringing us into harmony with ourselves and with the system of which we form part. To have such experience is to enjoy liberty, because it is to rise above all that is alien and that might hinder the full and spontaneous movement of our nature.

Before leaving this subject it may be well to note that the term "ought" is sometimes employed in a non-ethical sense. We often say, that we ought to have done a certain thing, or to have taken a certain course, when we are not thinking of moral obligation, but of the conditions of success. If we fail in some enterprise which we have undertaken, we may be constrained to say that we ought to have foreseen and provided against some contingency ; or, having regard to the circumstances of some friend, we may tell him that he ought to be adopting a certain line of procedure. After what has been said, it is not difficult for us to determine the significance of the word as thus employed, and to mark the difference between this employment of it and that which has ethical value. That difference may be briefly stated by saying, that the former is relative, whereas the latter is absolute. Or, otherwise expressed, the one is conditional, whereas the other is categorical. The ought, in the first case, is the "ought" of means ; in the second, it is the "ought" of end. In the former reference, what we ought to do is something that will contribute to the attainment of the purpose we have in view. It is not to be done for its own sake, but for the sake of that of which it is the condition. It is an obligation that is imposed upon us by the object which we have set before us ; an obligation, therefore, that is extrinsic

in basis and temporary in claim. It is altogether different with the moral "ought." What it urges us to do is an end in itself, the one supreme end. It is to be performed simply and solely for its own sake, and not for the sake of what it will yield. Its reward, so far as it contemplates a reward, is in the doing of it. When we tell a man that he ought to be truthful, and honest, and pure, and generous, we do not intend to suggest that truth, and purity, and honesty, and generosity will help him in reaching the goal toward which he may be struggling. What we intend to suggest is, that these are themselves goals, or, rather, different aspects of the one goal, which he should be seeking to reach. We here touch the error of utilitarianism. To it "ought" has but one value. It admits only the "ought" of means. The question that determines obligation is, for it, a question of utility, of power to secure pleasure. Happiness is the aim we are to pursue, and the things that we ought to do are the things that will conduce to that result. We are not to be truthful and honest and pure and generous because truth and honesty and purity and generosity are ends in themselves, but because they will bring us pleasure. Now, that they will bring us pleasure is not denied, but the pleasure which they will bring is their accompaniment, not their product; it does not spring from them, but is associated with them. Hence we are to seek them and not it. It, indeed, cannot be sought. It is not a condition but the quality of a condition, and it is the condition and not the quality that must be the object of our quest. Without, however, pursuing this point further, let us note that the "ought" which utilitarianism acknowledges is the "ought" of means and not the "ought" of end; that the obligation which it enforces is an obligation that does not carry its own justification, but must look for that to what is external to it. And this, it is evident, is out of harmony with all that we have learned as to moral action. That is determined by an ideal, and is the realisation of an ideal. But an ideal demands more than the "ought" of

*Original
Utilitarian*

means ; it demands the "ought" of end. Its imperative is categorical, not conditional ; its claim is absolute, not relative. An ideal must seize and captivate us in and by itself, and must be sought and realised in and for itself. And it is to an ideal of which we are conscious that "ought" in its deeper sense points, and, because pointing to such an ideal, it involves both obligation and freedom, and these in close and intimate union.

At this point the question naturally occurs, Whence comes the ideal of which we are conscious ? This question we must endeavour to answer, for not until it is answered will our investigation be complete, and the basis and presupposition of morality be discovered.

I have asked whence it comes, because it is not created by us. We do not make it ; we find ourselves in possession of it. We do not call it into existence ; we become conscious of its existence within us. It is an essential element in our rational life, and must, therefore, be coincident with that life in its birth. It is thus received by us. And the point for investigation is, whence or from whom it is received.

Let us observe carefully what the question is for which we are to seek an answer. It is not, How are we to account for the moral ideals of the present day ? We are not, meanwhile, concerned with these. They are particular interpretations of the obligation that rests upon us, and special forms of duty, the results of experience, of reflection, and of speculation on human nature and its various relations, and these lie beyond the range of our present inquiry. That touches the basis of obligation and duty. It deals with the fact of an ideal, not with the forms in which that ideal may manifest itself. It does not inquire into the validity of this or that injunction, but into the origin or seat of that principle in our constitution that supplies a reason and a justification for the framing of injunctions. I have spoken of moral action as that which results from the felt presence within us

of an ideal, claiming recognition by us and realisation in our character. This, however, does not mean that we are always definitely conscious of the ideal, and in every decision deliberately bring it to bear on the practical problem presented for solution. We may, and do, come under its influence without discerning its nature. It is only, indeed, when we direct our thoughts to the struggle that takes place within our breasts, with the view of learning its cause and the issues at stake, that we apprehend the existence within us of a standard which, as bound up with the rational nature, presses for fulfilment in our every act. And the more thorough our examination of ourselves as agents, the more full and clear will be our view of the standard. We shall be made aware not only of its existence, but also of its nature. We shall know not merely *that* it is, but also *what* it is. Thus, at different periods in our own history and in the history of humanity, we shall find different degrees of moral consciousness. At one stage, that consciousness will be vague and indefinite, little more than the sense of a conflict in which we are so involved that the outcome depends on us and will materially affect us; at another, it will be well defined, embracing an insight into the conditions of the inner strife, a knowledge of the rival forces, and a distinct recognition of the ideal supplied by the self, as that which seeks to find for itself embodiment in the result, and which should be accepted by us as the determining factor. But, in the former as truly as in the latter, the ideal is operative, though not operative in the same degree or to the same extent. In each instance it is the self that prefers its claim and demands its due. This being the case, what we have to account for is not the apprehension, but the presence, of the ideal; not the ideal as it appears to the cultured of the present day, but the ideal as an essential element in a rational being, on whatever level of civilisation he may stand. As was stated at the outset, it is man, as moral, as capable, that is, of living a moral life, that is the object of our investigation. It is therefore his funda-

mental features that call for consideration, and not his attainments in the apprehension and development of these features. It is true that the study of those attainments will enable us to appreciate the features of which they are the apprehension and development, but we must distinguish between the apprehension and development and that which is apprehended and developed. And it is necessary that this distinction should be emphasised at this point, because, if it be overlooked, we may be led astray in our quest and may go in search of the wrong object. We may busy ourselves explaining the ground and means of self-knowledge, instead of exhibiting the source of the self that is known, or rather of the ideal which is the practical side of that self.

Whence then comes this ideal? In order to answer this question we must change somewhat our standpoint. So far we have dealt with the self in a formal fashion. Nothing more than this was required for the elucidation of the points raised by our analysis. The bearings and implications of self-determination, as a fact, could be grasped and presented without reference to the nature of the self. All that had to be shown was, that there was such a thing as a self, that it wrought in a certain manner, and that it could not so work unless it carried with it an ideal, the presence of which implied obligation and freedom. In other words, what we had to treat of was the conditions of the activity of a self. What a self was did not concern us, so long as we were only noting how it manifested itself. We could observe its behaviour, and could discern what was necessary in order that such behaviour might be possible, without investigating its nature. In order to understand self-determination we were bound to admit the existence of an ideal, but we were not called upon to exhibit its content. It is different when we have to face the origin of this ideal. It then becomes necessary to inquire into its nature. For only when its nature is seized can we see what is presupposed in its existence, and whence consequently it came. We must therefore inquire into the nature of the ideal,

and that means inquiring into the nature of the self, of which it is the interpretation. And the first thing that strikes us, when we enter on this inquiry, is, that the self is not self-contained, but has manifold relations, and that it is in and through these relations that it exists and expands. We cannot think of a human being as independent, free from relations of every kind ; we cannot, indeed, think of anything as independent in this sense. A human being is essentially the subject of relations, numerous and varied, and these relations can be apprehended by him. It is, indeed, in virtue of his apprehension of these relations that he becomes and continues to be self-conscious, and it is on the ground of these relations that he is called to self-determination. He is embraced in a vast system, and he not only knows this, but is capable of estimating his position and of meeting the claims which that position makes upon him.

Hitherto we have neglected this aspect of the subject. We have spoken of man as an individual, as if his task were simply to realise his own nature, as if self-consciousness involved nothing beyond the self of which the individual is conscious. But this is only part of the truth, valid and useful up to a certain point, but inaccurate beyond that point. When we consider self-consciousness more closely, we discover that it points beyond itself. We are conscious of a self only as we are conscious of a not-self. The subject realises itself only as it differentiates itself from the object. Consciousness is not untroubled passivity ; it is movement and activity, manifested in response to appeals from that which is distinct from the conscious being. A person is not a monad, self-centred and self-contained, automatic and isolated in his growth and effort, having all the conditions of his feeling and action within himself, and needing not to pass beyond the limits of his own being. A person is a member of a large and complex organisation, acted on by, and reacting upon, the several members, and realising himself in and through such action and reaction.

The highest division of that system (and to it we confine ourselves at present) is that which embraces self-conscious beings. We may call it the social section, meaning by that the sphere in which we observe the relation of self-conscious beings to each other. That sphere has different departments, such as the Family, Society, the State; but all rest on the same fact, the inherent connection of man with man as man. Were there no fundamental tie binding men together, the Family, Society, the State would be factitious unions, due solely to prudential considerations, or to caprice, and dissolvable at will. Now, this may be the character of special forms of such unions, but not of such unions in their idea, and that for the simple reason that they spring from, and rest on, what is fundamental and essential in human nature.

Here, then, there emerges a new view of the self-conscious being. As self-conscious, he is conscious of selves other than himself, and of himself as essentially related to these. Thus self-determination with a view to self-realisation is the determination of a self that is social in nature, with a view to the realisation of itself as part of a system of selves. The individual self is an abstraction. The attempt to realise it apart from contact with, and relation to, other selves is an absurdity.

In view of all this we must pass beyond the point formerly reached. We must widen our notion of the ideal that influences us in the formation of motives to activity. At first sight, it may seem that we have to alter it entirely. For the issue of the foregoing considerations appears to be that we are called upon to determine our course by the claims of our fellows. We have apparently to think of duties to others, to ask in every case what we owe to the members of the Family or the State or Society or Humanity. This is true, but it does not necessitate an entire alteration of the notion of the ideal already reached, inasmuch as the duties of which we think are not obligations imposed on us by an external authority, but obligations that spring from our own constitu-

tion. In other words, in discharging the duties we are realising our nature.

The main point to be attended to, however, is, that the individual, in deciding his course of conduct, must pass beyond himself to the extent of regarding himself as part of a community, in whose corporate life he is to share, and toward whose perfection he is to contribute. That is to say, the self is essentially social, and consequently the ideal of which the self is conscious is a social ideal. It suggests to the individual a type of existence which he can reach only by transcending the limits of his individuality. This does not mean that he is to destroy his individuality. It only means that, inasmuch as his individuality is the subject of manifold relations, it cannot be maintained and developed save by the apprehension of, and submission to, these relations. The type of existence presented is a type of existence for him, and the conditions laid down are conditions to be fulfilled by him, so that the outcome is his, the realisation of his self. But, as both the type and the conditions spring from his connection with the system in which he is embraced, the outcome is more than his; it affects the whole of which he is a member. The realisation of his self is the filling by him of his place, and the playing by him of his part, in the organism of which he is a member. Thus the ideal for the individual is a social ideal, and, as such, it shows that he is what he is in essence, because by his very constitution he belongs to a social sphere.

Our object in seeking to determine the value of the self was to discover the source of the ideal associated with it. Have we then gained the material needful for solving that problem? It might be supposed that we had. It might be argued that since the self is social, realising itself only as a member of a vast society, it must be indebted to that society for its ideal. In other words, it might be held that the moral ideal is created by the relationships in which the human being is held.

But a little reflection suffices to convince us that this is not the case. For what is the society in question? It is a community of self-conscious beings, each of whom has an individual life. These are not its products, but its constituent parts. They do not owe their existence to it, though they cannot exist save in connection with it. They are members of it, not elements in it. In other words, save as a union of self-conscious beings, society is an abstraction. Now a union cannot create its own conditions. The relationship of which society is the expression and medium cannot be the work of society. Those who are bound together by reciprocal ties cannot be indebted for their character to the system formed by those ties. The ties, indeed, are manifestations of the character. Society, so far from being the author of the selves which it embraces, is but the sign of a common element which they possess, and in virtue of which they are mutually related. Hence we must go behind society if we are to discover the source and ground of the principle or power that works in it in its various forms. With this principle or power every self-conscious being must have a vital connection. It is in virtue of this connection that all self-conscious beings are essentially bound to each other; and the full and hearty apprehension and fulfilment of the obligations which that connection imposes, would be at once the realisation of social morality and the attainment of individual perfection. Thus, the self determines and realises itself as a social being. In its deliberations and decisions, it aims at identifying itself with the system of which it forms part, not losing itself in the system, because consciously accepting its relation to it as the basis of action, and not separating itself from it, because, while determining itself, doing so in virtue of its relation to the whole; and all this because it passes behind both itself and the system, or rather behind the system of which it is a part, to the creative and informing principle of which the system is a manifestation, and allies itself with this principle as the source and ground

of existence,—its own and that of the system,—and, consequently, as the author of the rule of life.

The point on which we have been insisting may gain in clearness if we think of society as an organism, of which the individuals composing it are the members. It is often so spoken of, and the phrase is something more than a metaphor. Now, an organism is the sum of its members. It does not create them. It is not prior to them, and it does not survive them. It is nothing apart from them, and they lose their character if separated from it. We may speak of a body without reference to limbs and organs, but we know that, without these, it would be a name and nothing more; or we may speak of hands or feet without reference to a body, but we know that, without a body, they would be mere shapes. The organism, then, displays unity in diversity, but it does not account for either; on the contrary, it needs itself to be accounted for. The members stand alongside each other and discharge their several functions with relative independence, and this they do, not despite the fact that they constitute a whole, but in virtue of it. The ground of the unity must, therefore, lie behind the organism, and with it the several members must be closely connected. Were this not the case, there would be no organism. It is the common relation of the different parts to that which underlies them, that makes the organism or the unity possible. In the case of the body, this is the life—the soul. Because it is all in every part, the several parts cohere in a unity, and yet do not lose their independence. It is the same with society. It points to that which is beneath it, on which it rests, and of which, as giving form and character to the individuals that compose it, it is the reflection.

Whilst, then, society does not supply the ideal that influences us in our action, it shows us in what direction we must look if we would discover its source. It teaches that morality has its basis neither in the individual nor in the system of which he is a member, but in that which is

behind and beneath both the individual and the system ; that, ultimately, it rests on the common relationship in which each individual stands to the power or principle that underlies and operates in the manifold departments of the universe, within which he moves and acts.

It is clear that an ideal coming from such a source will display the features which we saw were characteristic of the ideal implied in self-determination, self-satisfaction, and self-realisation. It will impose obligation, and it will conserve freedom.

It will impose obligation because, as the creation of that which is the foundation and spring of existence, it sets forth the very conditions of life, suggests what is essential if we are to meet the requirements of our position and to fulfil the design of our nature as rational beings.

It will conserve freedom because, coming from no alien source, but from that whence we ourselves have sprung, and with which we must ever stand connected, it opens to us the possibility of spontaneous movement and full attainment, and yet, as only suggestive of the highest and best, it leaves to us to decide whether or not we shall strive after the end which it presents to us.

But it will do more than this ; it will guarantee the power needful for its realisation. It is a social ideal to be realised in and through individuals. This necessitates at once the separation of the individual from his fellows, and the identification of the individual with his fellows. He must seek his own good and the good of his neighbours at one and the same time. Now this he cannot do save as he conceives himself and others to be bound together by an internal tie, which is created by a common participation in a vital principle that underlies and animates an organism of which they are severally members. Such a conception carries with it the possibility of the individual accepting the central principle as his own, so that, whilst he is living his own life, he is advancing the life of the community. This he

could not do were he limited either to the purely individual, or to the purely social, standpoint. In the former case, it would be beyond his power to pursue the social aim, and, in the latter, it would be beyond his power to pursue the individual aim, for these would be, respectively, alien to the sphere within which he was confined. If purely individual in standpoint, he could only pursue the social aim as far as its attainment would yield benefit to him personally, and in respect of this result. That is to say, he could only pursue it as an individual. His point of view would be utilitarian, and utilitarianism can never be the impulse to social effort in the proper sense of the term. On the other hand, if purely social in standpoint, individual interests must be sacrificed, for the assertion or the admission of claims on the part of the individual would be the abandonment of the social position.

Nor do we dispose of the difficulty by thinking of society as a congeries of self-conscious beings, held together by accidental circumstances. That will never bring about the identification of the social ideal with the ideal of the self, and without this the individual is powerless to seek and to gain the realisation of the one in and through the realisation of the other. But what is needful is secured when we recognise that, if we are to understand society aright, we must not approach it merely from the point of view of the members composing it, or merely from the point of view of the unity in which these members are embraced, but from the point of view of the vital principle which differentiates itself in the members and binds them together in an organic union, of which society is the sign and manifestation. For we then see that the individual, if he estimates his position aright, and accepts alliance with the central principle, in virtue of that alliance gains not only a rule of life, but also a stimulus to obedience. He seeks his own perfection, but he does so in order that, being perfect, he may contribute to the perfection of the whole. He does not seek individual perfection for its own sake. On the contrary, he recognises that merely individual

perfection would not be true perfection, inasmuch as, in that perfection, the fundamental principle would only realise itself in part. Whilst, therefore, he works under the guidance of the ideal prescribed by his own individual self, he regards that ideal as but a side, so to speak, of the general ideal that is to be realised, and thus he unites himself to that which is the ground of this ideal, and as a result of this union he gains power to fulfil in himself a purpose that stretches far beyond himself—power that is consistent alike with a given ideal to be realised and a free realisation of the same. Apart from such a union with the principle that underlies all, the necessary energy would be lacking. For, without this, the underlying principle, which is to be our rule of life, would stand apart from us, and we should have to find a reason outside both it and our relation to it as the ground of our acceptance of it or submission to it; and that would mean, that we did not look upon it as the highest. We might yield respect to it because of the benefits it would bring, but this would imply a standard by which we should decide what were benefits, a standard that would be distinct from the underlying principle itself. Submitting ourselves to this principle would thus be rather a means than an end. What is demanded is, that we recognise our fundamental connection with that principle, and, accepting that connection, become the willing agent in its expression, by opening ourselves to its inspiration and appropriating its energy.

It thus appears that man is essentially a social being, and that, consequently, when we seek to understand him as moral we must regard him as social. Though social, however, he is not the product of society. He is a member of it, at once constituting and being constituted by it. This being so, his moral ideal is not gained from society. Though implying society, and dependent on society for its realisation, and even for its apprehension, it springs from a source that is prior to, and deeper than, society. It belongs to the essence of the individual, and is wrapped up in his very being. It is thus, in a real

sense, individual in character. But it is not merely individual ; it is also social. It must be social, because the individual within whom it lies is social. And it can be social while individual, because it is the manifestation of that which expresses itself in society as an organism. Men are more than individuals, and stand in vital relation to each other in virtue of a common fundamental relation to the power or principle that underlies and operates in the universe. As fundamental, that relation involves an ideal in each that is the central fact of his constitution ; and as common, it implies mutual dependence and reciprocal duties on the part of all. The ideal of one is, indeed, the ideal of the whole in one of its aspects, so that the realisation of it by one contributes to the realisation of it by the whole ; but just because it is the ideal of the whole, it cannot be created by the whole, and must therefore be communicated by that which is anterior and superior to the whole, and this communication can be made only to and through, or rather in, the persons of whose corporate existence the whole is the sign.

The position which we have adopted and expounded is different from that occupied by the advocates of social evolution. According to them, man becomes social by development. He is not social at the beginning, and in virtue of his constitution, but, influenced by his circumstances and surroundings, he gradually gains this character and displays this quality. At first he is purely individual in standing, but by degrees he becomes social, and, as he does so, he ceases to think of himself and his own good, and thinks of the community and its good, and therefore as he becomes social he becomes moral. Clearly, if this is a true account of the progress of man, the moral ideal is not inherent in man ; it does not pertain to him as man, seeing that there was a time when he had it not. In his first estate his aim was pleasure, personal satisfaction and comfort. Of a connection with others, that imposed on him obligation and defined for him the end to be pursued by him, he had then no concep-

tion. Such a conception was the result of experience, the creation of his environment, the issue of a process of discipline through which he passed. It may, indeed, be said that the account given of the rise and appearance of social feeling and of the moral sense is simply a statement of fact, a record of what actually took place, and that by it nothing is decided as to the original condition of the human being. In other words, it may be argued, that all that is offered is a description of the path along which man moved toward the consciousness of himself as moral, and that such a description does not deny, but leaves untouched, the question of the inherent character of the moral ideal, inasmuch as, even if it were inherent, it could exist at first only as a germ, and would therefore need to be developed. This, however, is not the case. The terms in which the theory is presented convey much more than this. They imply that the condition of man, after the advance sketched, was different in kind, and not only in degree, from what it was before. The theory, therefore, has interest for us at this stage of our inquiry. It runs counter to the conclusion to which we have just come, and consequently demands consideration.

As a statement of it, we shall take that given by Fiske in his *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*. It is a concise and lucid exposition, from which we can without difficulty learn the position assumed and the arguments by which it is supported. It differs, indeed, in some respects from statements made by other Social Evolutionists, by Mr. Herbert Spencer for instance, but the difference between it and them is not essential; it is a difference of detail and not of principle. In dealing with it, therefore, we are dealing with them, in their fundamental reference. The following is a summary of it. The moral sense is "the last and noblest product of evolution which we can ever know."¹ It is a mistake to regard it as an ultimate fact, "incapable of being analysed into simpler emotional elements";² because, though "ultimate for each in-

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 324.

² *Ibid.* p. 325.

dividual" at the present time, it is "derivative and . . . has been built up out of slowly organised experiences of pleasures and pains."¹ These experiences are its "emotional antecedents," "as exhibited in ancestral types of psychical life";² and their organisation, of which it is the issue, is due to the emergence and growth of sociality. How then did sociality come into existence? This will be most easily seen if we note the distinction between it and gregariousness, which was its precursor, and from which it sprang. "Gregariousness differs from sociality by the absence of definitive family relationships, except during the brief and intermittent periods in which there are helpless offspring to be protected."³ It "implies incipient power of combination and of mutual protection."⁴ It is not, however, in this reference that we are to look for its relation to, and difference from, sociality. What we have to think of, in this connection, are not unions for defence of a community, but unions for propagation of the species. Such unions involved "family relations." But these were at first weak and temporary. This was the case because the offspring, for the production of which they had been formed, speedily attained independence and parted from the parents, and these, not being held together by the necessity of caring for their young, separated from each other. The family relations, if such they can be called, were thus dissolved after a brief existence. But as we rise in the scale of being, we find that with each advance the time during which offspring are dependent on their parents lengthens, and with this change in the need of the offspring there comes, of course, a change in the strength and duration of the family relations formed in connection with their protection. When we reach man, the maximum of dependence is attained, and, as a result, the family relations become permanent. With this permanence of family relations, sociality comes into existence. Social evolution "originated

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 327.

² *Ibid.* p. 327.

³ *Ibid.* p. 341.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 340, 341.

when families, temporarily organised among all the higher gregarious mammals, became in the case of the highest mammal permanently organised . . . In the permanent family we have the germ of society."¹ How, out of the permanent family, society arose, it is not difficult to see. Within it there were first called forth and developed filial and fraternal ties. Then, as it expanded, tribal ties were formed. Later the tribe, by growth, or by alliance with other tribes, became a nation, and national ties were created. Thus by a natural movement, a varied and complex condition of things came into existence, with manifold and diverse relations to be recognised and honoured by those who were embraced within it.

Such is the genesis of sociality and society, and, concurrent with their genesis, was the genesis of the moral sense. Indeed the latter is an element in, or at least a necessary result of, the former. "Thus," says Mr. Fiske, "we cross the chasm which divides animality from humanity, gregariousness from sociality, hedonism from morality, the sense of pleasure and pain from the sense of right and wrong. For . . . by the time integration has resulted in the establishment of a permanent family group with definite family relationships between the members, the incentives to action in each member of the group have become quite different from what they were in a state of mere gregariousness."² What then we have now to observe, is this difference "in the incentives to action." What is that difference? According to the first part of the quotation, it is the difference between "the sense of pleasure and pain" and "the sense of right and wrong." The former belongs to gregariousness, the latter to sociality. Pleasure and pain concern the individual; right and wrong concern the community. "The actions deemed pleasurable are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the Individual, the actions deemed right are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the Community."³ It is the chasm between the

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 340.

² *Ibid.* pp. 345, 346.

³ *Ibid.* p. 338.

incentives to these two kinds of actions that we have crossed. That this is a somewhat wide chasm is apparent. On the one side are "pleasures and pains," which are purely individual; on the other, are "right and wrong," which are purely social. The former, we are told, would be sufficient "in dealing with the incentives to action in a race of brute animals,"¹ but are utterly insufficient in dealing with incentives to action in the case of man. For him, the community is to be all-important, and its well-being is to be sought by him even when that is incompatible with his pleasure. A wide chasm, in truth. By what bridge do we make the passage across it? By the threefold bridge of sympathy, remorse, and mythology. Let us note what these are and what they supply.

Sympathy is "the power of ideally reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person."² This power, which is "manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of a moderate intelligence," must "be strengthened and further developed when a number of individuals are brought into closer and more enduring relationships." "Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action."³ This sympathy however, this "power of ideally reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person," does not at first affect conduct to "strangers and lower animals"; it affects only conduct "within the limits of the clan," and it affects it there because "a curb" is put upon the exercise of "brute-like predatory instincts" by "a nascent public opinion, which lauds actions beneficial to the clan and frowns upon actions detrimental to it," and which is the product of "a sense of collective pleasure or pain." As a result of the curbing of sympathy by "a nascent public opinion," "the mere animal incentives comprised in personal pleasures and pains" must be often, and in some instances habitually, overruled. "The good of the

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol ii. p. 338.

² *Ibid.* p. 346.

³ *Ibid.* p. 346.

individual must begin to yield to the good of the community."¹

Remorse and regret, the feelings of which "are the fundamental ingredients of conscience," have to do with the contrast of past and weaker impressions with the ever-enduring social instincts, a contrast that brings retribution. In other words, "the incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation," while "the purely selfish impulses" are "accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness"; and consequently, when one of the latter has been gratified, the fact that the impression which remains is weak compared with that which would have remained if one of the former had been obeyed, occasions dissatisfaction with conduct.²

By mythology, "incentives of a mysterious and supernatural character" are furnished. It emerges at the point at which "some curiosity is felt concerning the causes of phenomena," and its first form is fetichism. The object worshipped is reckoned the tutelary deity of the tribe, and is supposed to punish "actions condemned by the community."³

It is then by sympathy, remorse, and mythology, as explained, that we cross the chasm that divides "hedonism from morality, and the sense of pleasure and pain from the sense of right and wrong." "These combined agencies" enforce upon the savage "an amount of self-restraint, in view of tribal sanctions, which differentiates him widely from any gregarious animal."⁴ This, however, is only "the germ of a moral sense." "The incentives which influence him are not what we call moral sentiments, in the strict sense of the phrase. They are simply sentiments that precede and make possible those highest sentiments which do not refer either to personal benefits or evils to be expected from men, or to more remote rewards and punishments."⁵ The

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 347, 348.

² *Ibid.* p. 348.

³ *Ibid.* p. 349.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 350.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 351.

feelings that pertain to this stage are happily characterised by Mr. Spencer as "ego-altruistic," whereas those that come under "the head of pleasures and pains are purely egoistic or self-regarding." Ego-altruistic feelings "concern the happiness of the individual in so far as it depends upon the feelings with which his fellow-creatures regard him." Generosity, for instance, is to a very large extent "ego-altruistic." It is altruistic as exercised to benefit another, it is egoistic because, when benefit is done to another, "the recipient's feeling toward the giver and the approval of spectators" is more vividly represented than "the pleasure given." It "is, however, unmixed in those cases where the benefaction is anonymous."¹

The complete development of "the germ of a moral sense," which the savage possesses, has been accomplished by "the enormous expansion of sympathy due to the continued integration of communities." It is true that all sympathy, or "the vivid representation of the pleasurable or painful feelings experienced by others," is "in its origin a kind of self-pleasing," but "the actions dictated by sympathy" are not on that account to be described as "selfish." For though it is the case that "when we relieve a fellow-creature in distress we do it only because it pains us to see him suffer," it is also the case that "when the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering, or by the idea of suffering and wrong when generalised and detached from the incidents of particular cases, becomes so strong as to determine our actions, then the chasm is entirely crossed which divides us psychically from the brutes."² That is to say, sympathy as "the power of ideally reproducing in ourselves the pains of another," is "a kind of self-pleasing," inasmuch as what it impels us to do, is to remove that which it is painful for us to see; but gradually it loses this character, because it ceases to be "the power of reproducing in one's self the pain of another," and becomes the power of "representing feelings

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 352.

² *Ibid.* p. 353.

detached from the incidents of particular cases," from which power there comes the "instinctive abhorrence of actions which the organically registered experience of mankind has associated with pain or evil," a power that, as "the sympathetic feelings are extended over wider and wider areas," becomes stronger and stronger, until at last it generates "an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible."¹

There is a further and final stage in the development of the moral sense. That is reached when "ethical conceptions begin to be reflected back upon the conduct of the individual, where it concerns chiefly or only himself; and the self-regarding virtues, as Mr. Darwin calls them, which are quite unknown save in a high state of civilisation, come into existence." As a result of this advance, "the injury of one's self, by evil thoughts, intemperate behaviour, or indulgence of appetite, comes to be regarded as not only physically injurious, but morally wrong; and there arises the opinion that it is selfish and wicked for one to neglect one's own health and culture."²

Such, as I understand it, is Mr. Fiske's theory of the "genesis of man, morally." I have stated it, as far as possible, in his own words. In order, however, to make his meaning quite plain, I have brought together deliverances bearing on the different points that, in his exposition, lie apart from one another. In doing this, I have sought to avoid in any way misrepresenting his position. That position I have set forth somewhat fully, because it seems to me that its exhibition is its best refutation. We have only to apprehend it in order to be convinced that it is untenable. Mr. Fiske has indeed crossed "the chasm that divides animality from humanity," but he has done so on the wings of imagination, and not by the solid bridge of fact and proof. At every stage in his argument he has to make assumptions that are not merely unwarranted by, but are at variance with, his main thesis, and to draw conclusions that are un-

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 355, 356.

² *Ibid* p. 357.

supported by the evidence that he adduces. "*Ex nihilo nihil fit*" is a principle that is practically denied on almost every page. Contradictories are treated as if they were identities, and states of mind and principles of action are represented as rising naturally out of, or as in friendly alliance and co-operation with, other states and principles that are essentially distinct from them. These are strong statements, and it behoves us, having made them, to justify them. It is, however, impossible, and happily it is unnecessary, for us to deal with all the fallacies that underlie the theory presented. With that theory we are concerned only so far as it touches the point in our inquiry which we have just been discussing. That is the origin of the moral ideal. All, therefore, that is requisite at this point, is to examine the view expounded as it bears on this question.

What, then, is said of the origin of the moral ideal? It might be replied that nothing is said on this subject, seeing that what is constantly spoken of is the moral sense. But the moral sense as treated of by Mr. Fiske is really the moral ideal. It is the only moral ideal that can be admitted by him. It is that which supplies incentives to moral action, and without which there would be no moral aim to pursue. When, therefore, we have been told how the moral sense has been generated, we have been told what are the source and the nature of the moral ideal.

Now, according to this theory, the moral sense is the product of evolution, its "last and noblest product." It therefore belongs to the final stage of that all-embracing movement. Fortunately, however, it is not necessary for us to follow the whole course of the process, at the conclusion of which it stands, in order to understand its genesis and significance. The transition point that marks its birth stands out clear and distinct, so that from it we can take our start. That transition point is the passage from gregariousness to sociality. When we leave the former condition and enter the latter, we cross the chasm that divides "hedonism from

morality, the sense of pleasure and pain from the sense of right and wrong." In the former there is no moral sense; in the latter there is a moral sense, at first feeble and uncertain, but gradually gaining strength and clearness, until at last it stands complete. Such is the view that we have to examine. And in order that we may appreciate aright the task that we have to perform, we must observe carefully the characteristics of the two conditions referred to,—that from which we pass and that into which we come,—so far as they bear on the ethical questions we are discussing. These are suggested by the terms "hedonism and morality," and by the phrases "the sense of pleasure and pain" and "the sense of right and wrong." Gregariousness is hedonistic. The incentive to action in it is "the sense of pleasure and pain." That incentive is individual in reference; it is a self-regarding impulse. It is not, therefore, moral in value. It suffices for "a race of brute animals," but it is insufficient for rational beings. On the other hand, sociality is moral. The incentive to action in it is "the sense of right and wrong." What exactly that incentive is, will be seen from the following statement, in which it is contrasted with the incentive to hedonism. "While the actions deemed pleasurable are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the Individual, the actions deemed right are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the Community. And while the actions deemed painful are those which detract from the fulness of life of the Individual, the actions deemed wrong are those which detract from the fulness of life of the Community. . . . The conduct approved as moral is the disinterested service of the community, and the conduct stigmatised as immoral is the selfish preference of individual interests to those of the community. And bearing in mind that the community, which primevally consisted of only the little tribe, has by long-continued social integration come to comprise the entire human race, we have the ultimate theorem, . . . that actions morally right are those which are beneficial to Humanity, while actions morally wrong

are those which are detrimental to Humanity.”¹ This quotation sets before us plainly the moral ideal that belongs to, and is created by, sociality, and by doing so it defines for us our task. What we have to inquire is, Can such a moral ideal be produced in the manner suggested? Is the evolution traced a real evolution, and does it issue in a moral sense corresponding to, or rather supplying, the moral ideal here represented? We do not meanwhile discuss the value or validity of that ideal. We admit it for the sake of argument, and inquire whether or not the process described is adequate to its formation.

In dealing with this question, we shall begin by considering the difference between gregariousness and sociality. Briefly stated, it is a difference in the duration of relations, a difference between temporary and permanent relations, a difference that is due to a difference in the circumstances of the individuals related, in virtue of which the relations were formed and maintained. It is not a difference that is due to a difference of nature. The mammals for whom family relations were temporary, were the same essentially as the mammals whose family relations were permanently organised. Hence the relations were fundamentally the same in the one condition as in the other; they were distinguished only by the time during which they lasted. When we note this fact, we perceive that the change from gregariousness to sociality is merely a change of form. But if it be merely a change of form, it cannot effect, or supply what is needful for effecting, the substitution of morality for hedonism. If “the sense of pleasure and pain” were the dominant principle of activity in the gregarious state, it will be the dominant principle of activity in the social state. The mere lengthening of the term of a relationship does not alter the relationship. A temporary relationship may become permanent, but unless the change is due to a change outside the relationship, in which case a new relationship will be formed, the relation-

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 338, 339.

ship will remain the same in nature. Indeed, the permanence in such a case is more apparent than real. It is but the prolongation of temporariness, so to speak; but temporariness, however far prolonged, is temporariness still; that is to say, the prolonged temporary relationship may cease to exist at any moment. Only that which pertains to, and is grounded in the nature, can be in the strict sense permanent. But the relationship from the prolongation of which sociality springs does not pertain to, and is not grounded in, the nature of the individuals related. It is due to external conditions and necessities. It is not, therefore, really sociality: it is only gregariousness in a different form, and therefore the incentives to action are not other than they were. For right, as equivalent to the well-being of the community, there is no place in this so-called sociality. The individual can only render "disinterested service" to the community if in some way he can identify himself with the community, and this he can do only if the relation between him and his fellows is a real relation, springing from community of nature, and not simply due to the fact that he and they have been held together by the demands of their environment. In other words, the change in the duration of the relations referred to by Fiske is dependent on a difference in the nature of the individuals that cannot be accounted for by mere alteration in circumstances. Men do not become social because brought into certain unions, but they form these unions because they are social. Social evolution, as here presented, confounds cause with effect, and because it does this, it cannot account for the existence of morality, or for the presence and operation of a moral ideal and a moral sense. We may prolong the process as long as we like, but inasmuch as it is purely external in character, seeing that it is initiated and controlled by the demands of environment, unless the individuals are social, potentially at least, at its inception, they will not be social at its close; but if they are even potentially social to start with, their last

state will not be separated by any chasm from their first—the one will not be non-moral in essence and the other moral. The assumption of the theory criticised, however, is that they are not social even potentially, but that they become social in virtue of the change in their relations wrought by their circumstances. But a change of nature cannot be produced by a change of relation. It is the nature that explains and determines the relation, not the relation the nature.

It may, however, be said, that what we have been dealing with is not the cause of the moral sense, but only the condition that is needful for the efficient operation of that cause. That is to say, sociality does not itself produce the moral sense; all that it does is to supply the environment within which, and under the influence of which, a force or quality inherent in the constitution of the individuals brought into permanent relationship is so developed and expanded that it becomes the moral sense. That force or quality is “manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of moderate intelligence,” but it is quite different as manifested by them from what it is as manifested by those who are within the sphere of sociality and are members of a society. The change from gregariousness to sociality affects it in such a way as to invest it with a new character. And with the rise of sociality into society, that character is confirmed and strengthened. This being the case, the force or quality in question does not produce the moral sense, but is transformed into it, and this transformation is due to the altered circumstances in which it has to be displayed. We must, then, examine this transformation with the view of determining its nature and worth.

And the first thing to be done is to inquire what precisely is the force or quality referred to. It is named sympathy, and it is described as “the power of reproducing in one’s self the pleasures or pains of another person.” Its practical outcome is, of course, effort on the part of those in whom it operates to conserve the pleasures, or to alleviate the pains, that have been reproduced in them. And it is with its

practical outcome that we have alone to do. What, then, is the exact import of the effort to which it impels? What is the nature of the incentive to action which it supplies? Why do we seek to aid one whom we see suffering? The answer which we must give to this question will be apparent, if we remember that it is because the suffering of him on whom we look is reproduced in us that we are led to act; if we remember, that is to say, that it is suffering which we ourselves experience, because of the reproduction in us of the suffering of another, that creates the impulse to which we give effect. What in such circumstances we seek, and must seek, is ultimately our own comfort, our own freedom from suffering. We seek, of course, the comfort of the suffering one, but we seek that as a means, not as an end; we seek to free him from suffering because, by freeing him from suffering, we shall free ourselves from suffering. This, Mr. Fiske frankly admits. He says, "it is true," that "when we relieve a fellow-creature in distress, we do it only because it pains us to see him suffer"; and he admits that "all sympathy is in its origin a kind of self-pleasing."¹ In other words, the aim of sympathetic effort, in its primary form, is not the happiness of the person whose misery has been forced upon us, but our own happiness, which has been destroyed, or at least disturbed, by the spectacle he presents and the reproduction of his misery in ourselves. The incentive to action furnished, is thus essentially individual and self-regarding, and therefore non-moral. What it contemplates is pleasure and pain, and we have been taught that these are incentives only for "a race of brute animals."

This, however, it is asserted, is its character and reference only when we first meet with it, and that is in the gregarious state. It is allowed that, to begin with, it is undoubtedly selfish and self-regarding, but it is said that in its final shape, so far from being selfish or self-regarding, it is social and disinterested. This change in its

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 353.

nature is due to development and expansion. Indeed, that development and that expansion are the gradual transition from the purely egoistic to the purely altruistic standpoint. Beginning with the purely egoistic, we pass through the ego-altruistic to the purely altruistic. But this transition seems to be, not evolution, but revolution, not development, but substitution, not the steady rising of one thing out of another, but the violent displacement of one thing by another. Out of the purely egoistic, it appears impossible for the purely altruistic to come. Nor does the employment of the ego-altruistic as a middle term remove the difficulty; it rather increases it, for it suggests the combination of opposites without any higher conception in which they are reconciled. One naturally supposes that what is essentially selfish in its origin and nature, will be selfish throughout its history, and selfish in its last state. That it can become utterly unselfish, "entirely free from personality," is a startling assertion, and yet that is the assertion that is made in the name of social evolution. Let us observe in what way the marvellous change declared to have been wrought is accounted for.

And the first factor in the upward movement that falls to be noticed, is "a nascent public opinion." This places a "curb" on the exercise by the individual of his brute-like predatory instincts within the limits of the clan. It is rendered possible, of course, by the permanent family relationships that have been established, and thus these generate "new incentives to action, unknown in the previous epoch of mere gregariousness, which must often, and in some instances habitually, overrule the mere animal incentives comprised in pleasures and pains. The good of the individual must begin to yield to the good of the community."¹ It is not easy to see what the connection is between this public opinion and sympathy. The two seem to be quite distinct and independent. It does not appear, either, that sympathy is required for the creation of a public opinion that will be a

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 348.

curb on the exercise of the brute-like predatory instincts within the clan, or that such public opinion, when formed, will influence sympathy and help it forward from the selfish to the social standpoint. And yet that the two are closely related, and act and react on each other, is implied. The introductory words of the paragraph dealing with the subject are: "Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action."¹ We must, therefore, look at the statements made from the point of view of sympathy.

And the first thing that suggests itself is, that for those possessed of even "a rudimentary capacity of sympathy," a curb is unnecessary. For sympathy, as has been explained, is "the power of reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person," and, inasmuch as this reproduction is pleasurable or painful, it compels those in whom it takes place to act in the way of securing pleasure or removing pain in their surroundings. But if this be its nature and its result, where is the need or the room for a "curb" on "predatory instincts" within the limits of the clan—anywhere indeed, but there in particular? Since the relations that subsist between the members of the clan are permanent, sympathy must manifest itself freely, and must of itself restrain "predatory instincts." For, what would the exercise of these predatory instincts lead to? It would lead to the infliction of pain, but the pain inflicted would be reproduced in him who inflicted it, and would cause him pain which would impel him to seek, for his own comfort, to undo the evil that he had done, and to refrain from its repetition. Indeed, to speak of control by public opinion is to abandon sympathy altogether as an incentive to action. So far, however, as this theory is concerned, they coincide in respect of aim. They are both ultimately individual and self-regarding. We have just seen that this is true of sympathy. That it is true of public opinion we shall see without

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 346.

difficulty if we recall what we have learned as to the value of the permanent relations that make public opinion possible. They are not essential, resting on the nature of the individuals related, but are accidental, resting on their circumstances. Such being their character, in what way will public opinion appeal to those who come within its range? On what ground will it secure respect? Simply on the ground of self-interest. It is the embodiment of the will and power of the majority, and the individual will recognise that it is better for him to submit to these than to rebel against them. By doing so, he will escape punishment and enjoy as much happiness as is possible for him in his surroundings. We are thus carried back to hedonistic ground. It would, of course, be different if the society, whose mind was declared in the public opinion, were rational in its basis, for then the individual could identify himself with it, and recognise that in giving effect to it he was realising his true self.

We have seen that sympathy, in the sense in which it is here used, does not need public opinion as a "curb" to the exercise of the predatory instincts. But it is as true that public opinion does not need sympathy for its formation. This becomes evident when we note its content. We are told that it "lauds actions beneficial to the clan, and frowns on actions detrimental to it." What, therefore, it considers and registers, is the well-being of the clan. And what is it that determines that well-being? It is "the present sense of collective pleasure or pain." I confess I am not quite sure what this phrase means, but I suppose it means the pleasure and pain of the individuals collected, or of the majority at least, who compel the minority to forego the pleasure and endure the pain which they would fain pursue or avoid. In any case, it is pleasure and pain, and pleasure and pain as felt or imagined by the individuals, that form the basis of public opinion. But public opinion created in this way has nothing to do with sympathy. It is altogether

independent of it in its origin and in its operation. It may, indeed, be said that it renders it possible by enabling the individuals collected to enter into the feelings of their fellows, and, by reproducing their pains and pleasures, to decide what is for the common good. But if this be so, would it not embrace in its working those against whom it is directed and reproduce in their neighbours the pleasures and pains of such, and in this way mould public opinion so as to include and not to curb them? If, however, this were the case, there would really be no such thing as public opinion. It would be too comprehensive and colourless to deserve the name, and, since it would admit the desires of all, there would be none on whom it would, or could, be imposed.

It thus appears that, on the ground furnished by the Cosmic Philosophy, sympathy and public opinion stand quite apart. This brings us to the main point, viz. In what way does public opinion influence sympathy, so as to contribute to its transformation from selfish to social? That it does influence it in this way is the assertion of our author. It is, indeed, with a view to accounting for this transition that it is referred to. In view of all that has been said, the question raised should occasion no difficulty. The answer to it, in truth, lies in the conclusions to which we have come as to the connection, or rather want of connection, between the two. If they are independent, as we have shown they are, the one cannot affect the other in such a way as to produce, or help to produce, within it a radical change.

We shall, however, for the sake of a full examination of Mr. Fiske's position, admit that the one might influence the other in the fashion suggested, and we shall inquire what the nature and result of that influence would be. Here we must recall what we have learned as to the nature of the public opinion with which we have to do. We saw that it was based on, and was organised by, "the sense of collective pleasure or pain," and that it lauded "actions beneficial to the clan, and frowned on actions detrimental to it," and that,

such being the case, it was fundamentally hedonistic, individual and self-regarding. The only effect, therefore, it could have on sympathy, would be to make it hedonistic, individual, and self-regarding, but this is just what it was not to do. These were the features of sympathy in its rudimentary, non-moral form, and of these it was to be purged in order that it might become moral. Clearly, it cannot be so purged by this agent. In its first shape it wrought for the benefit of those whose condition came within its view, but this it did not for their sake, but for the sake of those within whom it wrought. Public opinion, of the sort allowed by this theory, may bid it do what is beneficial, and refrain from what is detrimental, to the clan, but this it can do only on the basis of a "sense of collective pleasure or pain," and that is practically the basis on which it has already been acting. What sympathy was before public opinion came into existence, that it is after it has made its appearance.

A brief reference may, at this point, be made to the "ego-altruistic feelings." These mark the result of the influence of public opinion on sympathy, and they indicate what is still required for its purification and elevation. They, therefore, have interest for us at this stage of our examination. We are told that "they concern the happiness of the individual in so far as it depends upon the feelings with which his fellow-creatures regard him."¹ When we read this sentence, we naturally ask, Where is the altruism? The egoism is apparent enough. It is, in truth, all that is. Our happiness depends upon the feelings with which our fellow-creatures regard us, and we act in such a way as to secure that they will approve our action. When we do so, what is the incentive to our action? It is our own happiness, neither more nor less. We may, indeed, be led to help another, but why are we led to do so? Because that is the means by which our happiness can be secured. Mr. Spencer, in a passage quoted with approval by Mr. Fiske,² says: "The

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 352.

² *Ibid.*, p. 352.

state of consciousness which accompanies performance of an act beneficial to another is usually mixed; and often the pleasure given is represented less vividly than are the recipient's feeling toward the giver and the approval of spectators." Before pronouncing an opinion on this statement, we must know whether the representation indicated was before, or after, the performance of the act. Did it constitute the aim, or was it due to a result of the act, not contemplated when it was decided to be performed? If it were the former, then the act was egoistic and not altruistic, despite the fact that some one received benefit; if it were the latter, it has nothing to do with the character of the act. As already suggested, "ego-altruistic" is a contradiction in terms for a theory such as this, that sets egoism and altruism over against each, or, rather, really admits only of egoism. It has some meaning for a theory, that regards man as by nature social, so that, in the highest sense of the terms, he is most egoistic when he is most altruistic, realises himself most truly when he surrenders himself most fully. In harmony with such a theory we can have the mixed motives referred to by Mr. Fiske and Mr. Spencer, for we can have the preponderance of either of two impulses, both of which are to be admitted, but which may not always preserve the balance which gives each its due, as different phases of one fundamental principle.

The only other point that calls for notice is the so-called "enormous expansion of sympathy which has been due to the continued integration of communities."¹ By way of explaining this "enormous expansion," we are told that "when the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering, or by the idea of suffering and wrong when generalised and detached from the incidents of particular cases, becomes so strong as to determine our actions, then the chasm is entirely crossed which divides us psychically from the brutes."² It is "this expansion of the power of sympathetically representing

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 352.

² *Ibid.* p. 353.

feelings detached from the incidents of particular cases," that generates "at last an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible."¹ Of this expansion little need be said. It will suffice to point out, that expansion of an idea does not alter its essential significance. All that it can do is to widen the range of its application. We may generalise and detach from the incidents of particular cases the idea of suffering and wrong which these particular cases have suggested to us, but such generalisation and detachment cannot in any way affect the intrinsic value of the idea generalised and detached. That idea must be the feeling that we experienced on account of the reproduction within us of the pain which was endured by those whom we saw, and we have learned that that feeling, as ours, is individual and self-regarding. The action to which it at first led was action that had our comfort as its aim, that sought to free us from the pain reproduced in us. Such being the case, however wide our generalisation, and however complete our detachment of it may be, it must remain individual and self-regarding. The only difference between "the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering" and "the generalised and detached idea of that suffering," is that, in the one case, we are moved by a painful sight, and, in the other, by a painful imagination; and these, so far as their aim is concerned, are one and the same. They are distinctly personal in their bearing, and it is impossible to extract from either of them a moral sense that is "free from the element of personality." The truth is, that the element of personality is the only thing that they can yield. They begin with that which is personal, and they must end with it, for nothing intervenes that can affect it.

Our examination of this theory has proved that it does not, as it professes to do, explain the "genesis of man, morally." It leaves man where it finds him, in the sphere of

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 355, 356.

the individual, the self-regarding incentives to action. Professing to lift him above the dominion of "the sense of pleasure and pain," and to introduce him to the dominion of "the sense of right and wrong," it only succeeds in reducing "right and wrong" to the level of "pleasure and pain." Or, at most, it leaves the two alongside each other, and tells us that both must be recognised. In summing-up his exposition, Mr. Fiske says: "On the one hand, it is a corollary from the laws of life that actions desired by the individual and approved by the community must in the long run be those which tend to heighten the life respectively of the individual and of the community. And, on the other hand, it is equally true that there is a highly complex feeling, the product of a slow emotional evolution, which prompts us to certain lines of conduct irrespective of any conscious estimate of pleasures or utilities."¹ But what we want to know, and what a science of ethics should tell us, is not merely that these principles of action exist, but how they are to be reconciled, and what is the unifying conception that will bring them together, whilst doing justice to both. Mr. Fiske sees the individual; he sees also society; and he recognises that both should be equally accepted and honoured; but this he fails to do, because he begins with the abstract individual and endeavours, by the influence of his environment, to make him social. His failure is the natural result of his attitude and method. He cannot explain social evolution, because he does not start with that which is social, and he cannot preserve the individual because he must construct society. At the close, he makes a valiant attempt to save both. He says that "conscious devotion to ends conducive to the happiness of society is the latest and highest product of social evolution"; and he tells us that "at this stage, ethical conceptions begin to be reflected back upon the conduct of the individual where it concerns solely or chiefly himself; and the self-regarding virtues, as Mr. Darwin calls them, which are quite unknown save in a

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 356.

high state of civilisation, come into existence.”¹ Thus the individual is to devote himself consciously to ends that conduce to the happiness of society, and, at the same time, to devote himself to the cultivation of those virtues that touch him personally. How is he to unite those two different aims? To this question, a system such as Mr. Fiske’s can furnish no answer, for its boast is, that when it crossed the chasm that divides Gregariousness from Sociality, it left behind the “self-regarding feelings”; but “self-regarding virtues” imply “self-regarding feelings.” The system that will supply what is required must not leave these feelings behind, but must carry them forward with it, purifying them as it does so, by disclosing their true significance, as the feelings of one who, while an individual, is not merely an individual, but is a member of a vast organism, in the life of which he finds his true life, because he and those who constitute it stand in a common vital relation to the power or principle that animates and sustains it, and that seeks to manifest itself in and through it. The ideal which such a system will present to its members will be the fulness of life of the community in harmonious union and co-operation with the fulness of life of the individual. Right and wrong will be individual as well as social in reference, for they will apply to an individual who is fundamentally social, and who consequently, when he acts rightly or wrongly, meets or fails to meet the demands at once of his own nature and of the system within which he is embraced.

Our examination of social evolution, as presented by Mr. Fiske, has thus confirmed the position we were led to assume with regard to the origin and nature of the moral ideal. We possess a moral ideal as social beings. This means that we are members of a social organism, and that, as such, we have a relation to the power or principle that animates that organism, a relation in virtue of which we are related to our fellow-members. The ideal which is thus set before us can be ful-

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 357.

filled only by free surrender to the underlying power or principle, whereby we open ourselves to its inspiration and appropriate its energy.

But it is evident that we here pass beyond the moral sphere and enter the religious. What I have spoken of as the underlying principle is God, whatever we understand by that term, and the alliance with God, on which I have insisted, is a religious act,—an act of faith, an act of more or less conscious surrender to a power that is alike over us and in us,—in virtue of which we are quickened and enlightened and invigorated, so that we realise ourselves as spiritual beings, fill our place in the system in which we are embraced, and attain the highest individual perfection. Associating ourselves with the basis and ground of all, we naturally, and therefore gradually and spontaneously, by becoming what we ought to be, contribute to the perfection of the whole, and by our own elevation elevate the organism of which we are members.

Part Second

RELIGION

LECTURE III

SCOPE AND METHOD OF INQUIRY

HAVING completed our examination of morality, we proceed, in accordance with the plan sketched at the outset, to the consideration of religion. And our treatment of it will be the same in method and in aim as our treatment of morality. We shall subject it to critical examination, with the view of discovering its nature and bearings, and, in particular, with the view of discovering whether or not it stands in a definite relation to morality. Regarding it simply as an element in human life, we shall seek, by an inquiry into its ground and essence, to determine its connection with the other elements of human life, and especially with those that manifest themselves in the practical sphere.

Before, however, beginning our examination, we must, as in the case of morality, decide what exactly it is that we are to examine. And this we shall best accomplish by noting the most important of the different senses in which the term religion is employed by us.

And, in the first place, it is frequently used as synonymous with ritual, in the widest sense of that word. So used, it includes all acts and observances in the performance of

which man gives expression to his spiritual feelings and aspirations. It indicates the service in which man's spiritual nature seeks free utterance for its emotions and full communion with its object by means of praise, prayer, sacrifice, and similar exercises. This application of the term is familiar to us all, and, inasmuch as ritual is the outer and visible form of religion, it is a use that is legitimate and admissible, so long as its exact significance is kept in view. Speaking broadly and generally, the kind of service in which an individual takes part defines for us his religious standing, and may be spoken of as his religion. We have, as a rule, no difficulty in deciding under what religious category, men, individually or in an assembly, are to be placed when we see the acts and observances that are performed by them at their sacred seasons and in their sacred buildings. We at once speak of them, *e.g.*, as Protestant, or Catholic, or Jewish, or Mohammedan. As the expression of religion, ritual takes its character from the system with which it is associated.

In the second place, the term religion is often employed by us as synonymous with creed. In this case it suggests a body of truth that is taught and accepted. We speak of the Religions of the world, meaning the ideas and principles and doctrines that have influenced men spiritually in different countries. Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Christianity, *e.g.* as names of Religions, are symbolic of views of man, of the world, and of God, that have been received by, and have impressed the minds and hearts of, large sections of the human race. This application of the term, like that already noted, is permissible, we might even say necessary, for it is really only by associating a man with a creed that we can mark his place in the diversified field of religion; but here, as there, we must be careful to observe its scope and limits.

The third, and only other, use of the term to which it is needful at this point to direct attention, is that which denotes a state or attitude of mind and heart. By this reference we are carried within the man to the region of feeling, emotion,

conviction, aspiration. It is difficult to find a single word that rightly represents the sphere of which, in this connection, we are to think. On the whole, sentiment seems the most suitable. It has, it is true, associations that detract somewhat from its fitness, but, leaving these out of account, and keeping before our minds the sense in which it is accepted, we may employ it without risk as indicative of that inner condition which we call religious. Religion as sentiment, then, suggests an effect produced, and a movement excited, within the individual. I have spoken of it as a state or attitude of mind and heart. Speaking of it as a state, I seek to emphasise its inward, personal character, as an experience of the man; speaking of it as an attitude, I seek to emphasise its outward reference, its direction toward that which is external to the man. The main thing to be observed, however, is that it is not something that the man does, or something that the man accepts, but something that the man is or experiences, a condition into which he has come in virtue of submission to an influence exercised on him.

Such are the main references of the term religion, and of these the last is the most important. It alone, indeed, indicates that which, of itself, has true religious value. On association with it, the other two depend for recognition. Without sentiment as their basis and inspiration, ritual and creed are vain and profitless. The performance of acts and ceremonies is not religious, unless it be the expression of a state of mind and heart. If it stand by itself, it is worthless, because it is not spiritual in character. On the other hand, the acceptance and profession of a system of doctrine have religious significance only if they are the sign of sincere conviction, the outcome of apprehension or experience of the truth exhibited in the system accepted and professed. Ritual and creed thus stand in intimate relation to sentiment. This is the centre, connection with which alone imparts to them life and value. Only as resting on this basis have they meaning or justification. When challenged, this is the one

admitted authority to which they can appeal, the one valid plea which they can urge in their support and defence.

From ritual and creed, then, we naturally pass back to sentiment, as that on which they rest. And this common relationship to sentiment constitutes a bond between them, in virtue of which they influence each other. Ritual and creed correspond to each other in their essential features. The ritual of Judaism, *e.g.*, could not conceivably be linked to the creed of Confucianism. It is in harmony with, is, in one sense, the product of, the creed of Judaism. And it is the same with other systems. Nor is the reason for this far to seek. It springs from the fact that the two meet in the sentiment, and that in it the one, so to speak, passes into the other.

This is a point that will bear closer examination. And, in order that it may be clearly understood, we shall try to discover in what ways ritual and creed are related to sentiment. From one point of view, creed is the cause, and ritual is the product, of sentiment. In other words, it is the acceptance of a creed that stirs within us religious emotion, and it is the impulse to express that emotion that gives rise to ritual. The first part of this statement may be met by the objection, that a creed may not be framed until after sentiment has been experienced, and that, in such a case, it is as much a product of sentiment as is ritual. We may admit the premise of this criticism, and yet dispute and reject the conclusion drawn from it. It may be true, that a creed is not framed until after sentiment has been experienced, and yet not true, that the creed so framed is the product of sentiment. For what is this creed? It is an exhibition of the contents of the sentiment. It is an attempt, on the part of the subject of the sentiment, to explain and to justify to himself his experience, and the only way in which he can do this is by analysing, as far as possible, his mental and spiritual state. Such an analysis, whatever else it may do, will bring before him, with more or less clearness and fulness, the appeals and truths which have so affected him as to stir within him the

conviction and feelings of which he is conscious. He will learn what it is he believes, and the formal statement of what he believes, is his creed. His creed is thus the result of his examination of his experience, but, though the result of his examination of his experience, it is in no sense the product of his experience. On the contrary, it is the explication of that experience, and what is discovered and declared is the cause of the experience, that without which it would not have come into existence. Whether, therefore, a creed be formulated prior to sentiment, and prescribed for acceptance in order that sentiment may be stirred, or be the interpretation of sentiment, it is the cause of sentiment, inasmuch as its substance is the ground of the state of mind and heart produced.

From what has just been said, it will be apparent that when we say that creed is the cause of the religious sentiment, we do not mean either that a creed, in the sense of a fully formulated system of doctrine, must be presented to, and accepted by, an individual before the religious sentiment can be stirred within him, or that the presentation of such a creed is sufficient to bring about this result. As to the first point, all that is urged is, that religious conviction as rational in nature is produced by the operation of truth in some form or other, and that this truth is capable of being set forth in doctrinal form, and is, to a greater or less degree, so set forth by all who submit themselves to it. Every professedly religious man has a creed, long or short, simple or elaborate, and his creed is the translation of his sentiment, the statement of what he believes. He may, of course, accept as his creed certain dogmas that bear the stamp of authority, but these only truly constitute his creed in so far as they have affected him spiritually. His Confession of Faith, whatever it may be nominally, is really the exhibition of the content of the state of mind and heart that is due to acceptance of, or submission to, truth; and this being so, his creed is not the issue, but the ground, of his experience. Though later in

point of time, it is earlier in point of fact; for it is the presentation, in more or less complete and definite form, of the truth, to the operation of which the sentiment is due.

As to the second point, the creed or cause requires certain conditions in the individual before it can operate with effect; but of these we do not speak meanwhile, because they do not bear upon the matter under consideration.

In the sense explained, then, creed is the cause of sentiment, and, as such, it gives character, content, and direction to the sentiment. A man's religion will be in harmony with the truth he has accepted.

From creed we pass to ritual. That was declared to be the product of sentiment, and this declaration will be admitted by all. Ritual always is, or professes to be, the expression of an inner state or movement. It is only as such that it has meaning or value. It is true that it may, by individual adherents of a system, be divorced from its inner basis and practised for its own sake, but that does not affect its essential character and original import.

Our object, in dealing with the relation between creed and sentiment, and between ritual and sentiment, has been to bring out the relation between creed and ritual. That, it is apparent, is very intimate. The spiritual service which a man renders will be affected, shaped, and coloured by the spiritual truth which he accepts. The creed will determine the ritual, and the ritual will reflect the creed. It is true that, as a matter of fact, this harmony is not always preserved in detail. It would be easy to enumerate acts and observances performed by adherents of a religion—of any and every religion—that are not fully in accord with the creed of that religion as professed by these adherents. Such discrepancy, however, would not be difficult to explain. Creed and ritual do not adjust themselves automatically. Men are never perfectly consistent. Hence the inconsistency noted does not disprove the truth of the assertion made.

Creed and ritual, then, are related to each other in virtue

of their common relation to sentiment. A system of doctrine would not give rise to a system of rites and ceremonies if it did not influence, or were not viewed as influencing or designed to influence, men as spiritual beings. And a system of rites and ceremonies would not be framed if men were not stirred spiritually by conceptions, more or less definite, which could be formulated in a system of doctrine.

We have now seen the more important of the different senses in which the term religion is employed. We have also seen that each of these applications of it is admissible, so long as its precise bearing is observed and remembered. We have, further, marked off the several spheres which they embrace, and have traced out the links of connection that bind them together. From what we have learned, it is evident that each has its own contribution to make to the study of religion, and that that study will be full and fruitful in proportion to the care and completeness with which the different lines of investigation, suggested by the preceding discussion, are followed out, and the results reached brought together and harmonised. But while each has a contribution to make to this study, their contributions are not of equal value. That follows from what we have discovered as to their connection with each other, and their relative importance. Creed and ritual are incomplete without sentiment. The one is its content and therefore its cause, and the other is its product. But neither the content nor the product of a sentiment is equivalent to the sentiment itself. Both, in different ways and in different measures, serve to indicate its character, but neither fully represents or embodies it. The mental state is more than the truth, the reception of which produces it, or the act, the performance of which is its expression. Behind both, and deeper than both, there is the emotion, which these can only suggest, and the state of mind and heart, which these can but partially reveal. This being the case, an examination of creed and ritual cannot yield such rich results as an examination of

sentiment. The two former, indeed, must be interpreted in terms of the latter before they can add to our knowledge of religion. They are but signs and marks which, in the present connection, we examine not for their own sake, but as shadowing forth that which is greater than they. Religion, in the deepest application of the term, is, on the one hand, creed transformed into experience by a rational process of apprehension and appropriation, and, on the other, ritual reduced to experience by the warmth and glow of spiritual fervour, in which the form is dissolved. It thus appears that what we have ultimately to deal with, is religion as sentiment. We have to direct our attention to the state of mind and heart which we call religious, with the view of discovering its essential features, and we have to take account of creed and ritual only in so far as these shed light on the the inner movement and attitude to be examined.

It is of the utmost importance that we should seize and keep clearly before our minds the distinction on which we have been insisting. If we neglect it, we may include in the object of our inquiry elements that do not belong to it. Many have done so, and because of this their investigations have been less fruitful than they might otherwise have been. What we have to recognise is, that religion being in its essential significance a state of mind and heart, we can understand it only by apprehending the nature of the state of mind and heart in which it consists, by learning what that state of mind and heart is in itself, as a movement and attitude of our spiritual nature.

A theory of religion is sometimes spoken of as accounting for the beliefs and ideas which men entertain regarding their deities. To account for these beliefs and ideas is, on this view, to explain religion. Before, however, admitting that this is the case, we must inquire what is meant by accounting for these beliefs and ideas. We may account for them by reference either to the external circumstances and surroundings, or to the mental and spiritual constitution, of

those who entertain them. Man is determined in religion, as in other matters, both by his environment and by his nature, but his determination by the former is different from his determination by the latter. Determination by environment affects the form and colour of the beliefs and ideas entertained; determination by nature affects the state of mind and heart with which the beliefs and ideas are associated. We might say that, in the first case, we have to do with beliefs and ideas entertained, and that, in the second, we have to do with the entertaining of beliefs and ideas; or that, in the one, we are concerned with beliefs and ideas, and, in the other, with believing and with conceiving or accepting ideas. We distinguish, in short, between the sentiment in itself as a movement of our being, and the content or expression of that sentiment as shaped by outer conditions. When this distinction is grasped by us, we perceive at once that when we speak of accounting for the beliefs and ideas entertained by men regarding their deities, we are using ambiguous language. We may mean, or may be understood to mean, either, showing, by an accurate description of environment or condition, how this or that creed gained currency,—showing, that is, how, *e.g.*, polytheism became the accepted system in one country and pantheism in another, or showing, by a consideration of man's nature, how polytheism in the one country and pantheism in the other touched men and secured their acceptance. Between these two interpretations of our statement there is a wide and vital difference. The one will yield facts about religion, the other will yield a theory of religion.

It is sometimes said, for instance, that by a belief in ghosts men came to assume a religious attitude. Now suppose that this were an accurate theory of the origin of religion, would it tell us what religion is in its essence, as a state of mind and heart? It would not. It would only tell us what religion was, as creed, at a certain stage in the history of the human race, or rather, what were the conditions

of the appearance of religion. Having discovered that a belief in ghosts stirred the religious sentiment, we should have to inquire how it did so, in what way it affected the believer, to what elements in his nature it appealed, and, consequently, with what kind of mental and spiritual movement it was associated. Only when we have gained an answer to these questions, have we reached the result of which we are in search. It must have been because the ghosts in which men believed, or the belief in the existence of ghosts, to which they were impelled, touched them at some special point, and met some particular longing, that the ghosts became themselves, or led to a recognition of, objects of worship; and what we wish to know, and must know, if our consideration of the circumstances is to afford us an insight into the essence of religion, is what that point and that longing were. Short of this, we do not learn what religion is; we only learn the conditions of its appearance.

We have thus discovered what it is that we are to examine and analyse. We have, that is to say, marked it off from other objects, and in particular from those objects with which it is closely allied, and with which it may easily be confounded. We have learned that it is with religion, in its subjective reference, that we have to do; that what we have to study is a state of mind and heart—what we have called sentiment—as distinct from creed and ritual, which are respectively its content and expression. But to the study of this phenomenon we cannot at once proceed. There are some preliminary points, on the settlement of which depends the method to be adopted by us. We must, to begin with, determine the standpoint from which the object before us is to be viewed. All the facts of human life are complex and many-sided, and may therefore be looked at in several relations, each of which, when considered, yields truths valuable in the sphere within which they lie. We must therefore decide with which side of the fact under review we are to deal, and in which of its relations we are to consider

it. Otherwise we may approach it in the wrong way, and fail to gain the help it is fitted to afford us in our inquiry. Now it is evident that in the present instance we are concerned with that which is essential and fundamental. Our ultimate aim is to discover what religion implies, and to what it necessarily leads. This we can discover only by directing our attention to its central feature. But what is that feature? That is the question we must now answer. Having answered it, we shall know what precisely we have to investigate, and shall also be in a position to select the right course to be pursued.

And we shall be guided to the answer required if we look closely at the object with which we have to deal. So far we have only distinguished it from other objects. We must now think of it by itself, and ask what it is in its constitution. We must endeavour to apprehend its ground, and genesis, and character. It is the religious sentiment, or rather religion as sentiment, a state of mind and heart, which is described by the term religion. And in order that we may gain a clear view of its nature we shall, meanwhile, speak of it merely as a sentiment, as a state of mind and heart. We shall not, that is to say, take account of its speciality, of that which separates it from other states of mind and heart, but shall place it before our minds solely as a movement or attitude of our being. In other words, we shall regard it simply as an experience, and shall seek to learn the conditions of its rise and existence as such. What then does an experience, any and every experience, experience in general, imply? On what does it rest? Subjectively, it rests on our constitution, on our capacities and faculties; objectively, it rests on the presentation of an object correspondent to our constitution, in harmony with our capacities and faculties, and, therefore, fitted to meet and stir these to activity. It is the response of our nature to the appeal of that which is congenial to it. This is the common ground of experience. Ultimately, our experiences, merely as experiences, rest on our powers and endowments. They testify to

inherent qualities and impulses, the possession of which renders them possible. They depend on, and result from, the fulfilment of certain conditions that lie in our nature, and are the very elements of our being. They reveal the presence and activity of capacities and faculties, without which they would never arise. They also, as has been stated, reveal the presence and activity of an object; but inasmuch as that object operates only in respect of its agreement with the capacities and faculties affected by it, it does not in this connection demand attention.

Such being the character of experience in general, it is evident that, if we would understand the significance of any special experience, we must do more than look at it in its totality as a single result, apart from the process of which it is the outcome; we must break it up into its constituent elements, its cause and condition, the factors that combine and co-operate in its production. And, in particular, we must inquire what the capacities and faculties are that, by their exercise, have produced it, for only when we discern what these are, can we estimate it aright, and assign it its proper place in the circle of human life. Here, then, we reach that which is central, and learn to what we must direct our thoughts when we endeavour to determine the nature and significance of a given state of mind and heart.

In every experience, then, we have a manifestation of inherent qualities and impulses stirred by the appeal of an object congenial to them. But whilst this is the case, the manifestation of the qualities and impulses in question is not always the same in degree and extent. We know well that a special kind of experience, grief or joy, let us say, may, and does, vary much in intensity. It may be superficial or profound; it may only break the surface of our being into a gentle ripple, or it may stir that being to its depths. Now, to what is the difference due? As has just been suggested, it is due to a difference in the excitement and exercise of the capacities and faculties that supply the

basis of the experience. In proportion to the fulness and range of the excitement and exercise of any of our capacities and faculties, will be the fulness and range of the experience, of which the capacities and faculties excited and exercised are the ground. It cannot be otherwise, because the excitement and exercise of the capacities and faculties is the experience. The experience is not so much the effect, as a special aspect of that excitement and exercise. When our powers are stirred into activity, they make themselves felt in the sphere of consciousness, and whatever comes within that sphere is an experience. Hence the activity and the experience are substantially one and the same thing, and, consequently, the keenness and vividness of the experience will be determined by the activity of the powers. From this it follows, that if we are to understand completely any special experience, we must take it at its greatest intensity; for only when we take it at its greatest intensity can we see what precisely are the capacities and faculties that express themselves in it. The fuller the expression of these, the clearer will be the manifestation of their nature.

Another point that demands attention in this connection is, that the same kind of experience may be produced by different objects, at least by objects that differ in form and appearance. We have seen that the object producing a certain kind of experience must be correspondent to the capacities and faculties of which the experience is the outcome, but the correspondence demanded is a correspondence of idea, not of form. We have already referred, by way of illustration, to joy and grief. Now, these may be awakened within us by a variety of objects and circumstances, and yet, as experiences, they are the same, the same, that is, in respect of the process excited within us. The several objects and circumstances, however diverse in aspect, all make to us practically the same appeal, address us substantially in the same way, and touch us really at the same point. This identity of result, in different surroundings, is a matter of

the utmost importance in relation to the question which we are now considering. It confirms what we have already learned as to the method of procedure to be adopted by us in investigating an experience, with the view of discovering its exact character, and giving it its proper setting in the context of a rational life. It shows that it is not sufficient to direct attention to the object. That undoubtedly has its claim on our regard, a claim that must be honoured by careful examination; but it is subordinate to the experience as a phenomenon of consciousness. To confine our thoughts to it, therefore, would be to run into confusion, and to separate states of mind and heart that are identical in basis. What we ought to think of, primarily, is the state of mind and heart. This we should analyse, and having by our analysis reached the capacities and faculties of which it is the product, we shall be in a position to assign it its right place and value. Not only this, but our analysis will shed light on the object, and will disclose to us its true character. From the standpoint reached we shall be able to study it aright, and to distinguish between that which is ideal and that which is formal.

We have thus dealt with experience in its general aspect. We have now to apply the results gained to that special kind of experience of which we are treating. What are these results? Briefly stated, they are as follows. An experience is a fact of conscious existence, that is due to, or rather consists in, the response of our nature, in one or other of its phases, to the appeal of an object that is correspondent to it in that phase. As such it implies the exercise of certain capacities and faculties. Consequently, if we are to apprehend its character, and discover its place and relations, we must learn what these capacities and faculties are. Further, as every kind of experience may and does manifest itself in different degrees of fulness and intensity, and as the activity and, therefore, the expression of the capacities and faculties involved are proportionate to the fulness and intensity of the experience, we shall best understand the form

of experience examined by us if we take it at its highest. And, lastly, since objects varying in aspect may, in virtue of their ideal significance, be the means of producing what is fundamentally the same experience, we ought not to determine the nature of the experience by the object, but, having noted what the experience is, we should seek by analysis to discover what capacities and faculties it reveals, and in view of these determine the object.

Keeping these conclusions in view, let us now turn to the religious sentiment, to that state of mind and heart which we call religion. That sentiment, whatever else it is, is an experience, and as such it implies the excitement and activity of capacities and faculties that belong to us as rational beings. These capacities and faculties are, and must be, operative, wherever that sentiment appears, and, consequently, if we are to apprehend the sentiment, we must apprehend the capacities and faculties. In no other way can we penetrate to the essence of religion as a state of mind and heart. But the religious sentiment, like every other experience, is not always of equal intensity and depth and fullness. It appears in manifold forms, and displays the greatest possible variety. The difference between some of its phases seems at first sight a difference of kind and not merely of degree. But, despite this apparent diversity of phase, it is ever fundamentally the same. This being the case, in so far as any one phase is rightly interpreted, light is shed on the rest. To analyse accurately a single state of mind and heart, is to gain a key to the significance of all the others. But while any phase will yield information and guidance, the higher the phase the more reliable will the information and guidance be, because, in and by it, the powers which supply the conditions of the experience express themselves most clearly and distinctly, and can be most truly discerned. Indeed, the lower the phase the greater the possibility of error, for the lower the phase the more partial the manifestation of the powers involved, and

the examination of a partial manifestation can give only a partial view, and a partial view may be misleading. What we are to seek after, then, is the complete manifestation. If we can secure this, we do not need anything else; certainly we do not need anything less, for in that which is complete, the meaning of that which is incomplete is fully disclosed. If we can bring under review the perfect form of the religious sentiment, we shall gain a perfect insight into the meaning of religion in this reference. Nor does the multiplicity of the objects that have excited the religious sentiment affect the point. These, though different, must all in some way, and to some extent, have possessed qualities in accord with the constitution of man, for without such qualities they would not have affected their devotees as they did. But these qualities must all be possessed by the object which stirs the perfect sentiment, and, consequently, to understand that object is to understand all the others.

From all this it follows, that in order to discover what religion is, as a state of mind and heart, it is not necessary to subject to scrutiny all the known forms of religion in their subjective reference; it is not necessary to subject to scrutiny more than one, if that one be perfect in character. To the result of our examination and analysis of that which is perfect, nothing would be added by the consideration of that which is imperfect. One full-blown flower will tell us all that can be learned regarding the species to which it belongs. Certainly the information gained by a study of it, would be in no way increased or corrected by the study of a number of buds. What lies in the bud is fully disclosed in the flower. As seen in the bud, it is immature, and can therefore supply only partial knowledge, that cannot be truly appreciated save from the standpoint of the completed product. So is it with the subject before us. What we have to do in order to reach the end we have in view, is to fix our thoughts on that which is perfect, and, by careful investigation, endeavour to seize that which is central and fundamental.

We have to direct our attention to the state of mind and heart,—that is, the full expression of our nature on its religious side,—and, by an analysis of it, seek to discover what are the capacities and faculties of whose excitement and exercise it is the outcome. In so far as we are successful in our quest, we shall learn what religion is, and in what way it stands related to the other elements of our rational existence. Not only this, but we shall be in a position to estimate aright the immature movements of man's spirit with which the history of religion makes us familiar; for we shall know what is the ground of these, what it is that makes them possible, and what it is that is seeking to express itself in them. Having listened to the full-voiced utterance of man's heart and understood its significance, we shall listen with discriminating sympathy to the broken and faltering utterances of that heart as it seeks to articulate the feelings and aspirations that have been stirred within it by the glimpses it has gained of Him for whom it was made, and in response to whom it finds its life and its joy.

Before dealing with religion on the lines laid down, it will be of advantage for us to look at some of the other methods that have been adopted by writers on the subject. And I select for consideration those followed by Professor Max Müller and Professor Edward Caird in their recently published Gifford Lectures. These distinguished scholars approach the study of religion from standpoints that differ from each other in important respects. An examination of their procedure will therefore serve to illustrate and justify, in different ways, the course which we intend to pursue.

We shall look first at the method of Professor Müller. This it is not easy to characterise. We experience difficulty in placing it because of the want, on the one hand, of clearness and consistency of statement, and, on the other, of uniformity of procedure. The several statements made vary not merely in form, but also in substance, and the procedure at one point differs from the procedure at another.

Let us look at some of the statements. In the first of his lectures Professor Müller says: "The science of religion" consists, "first of all, in a careful collection of all the facts of religion; secondly, in a comparison of religions with a view of bringing to light what is peculiar to each, and what they all share in common; thirdly, in an attempt to discover, on the strength of the evidence thus collected, what is the true nature, the origin, and purpose of all religion."¹ In the first clause of this sentence he speaks of "the facts of religion"; in the second, of "a comparison of religions"; and, in the third, of the nature, origin, and purpose of "all religion." There is here ambiguity. We cannot help asking if "the facts of religion" to be collected are the details of "the religions" that are to be compared, or are something different, and if "all religion" is equivalent to "religions," or is to be taken as meaning religion in its essence. It is clear that "religion" is here used in different senses; and I call attention to the fact not because it occasions perplexity in this instance, but because it is common in this author's works, and in many instances leads to confusion. He frequently passes from the singular to the plural, without apparently recognising that in doing so he is passing from one meaning of the term to another. "Religion" is not the same as "a religion," and the distinction between them ought to be carefully noted and observed in a scientific treatise.

But to come to the method suggested by the statement. It is a method of collection and comparison of "the facts of religion," or of "religions." So far nothing has been said as to the arrangement of the facts, but elsewhere we are told that it is to be historical. This, indeed, is the special feature of the method, and it is on this feature that its claim to superiority is based. As has just been indicated, we are left in doubt as to whether or not "the facts of religion" and "religions" are to be regarded as identical. And subsequent deliverances do not quite dispel dubiety. In the second

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 11.

lecture we read: "If the Science of Religion is to be treated as one of the natural sciences, it is clear that we must begin with a careful collection of facts, illustrating the origin, the growth, and the decay of religion";¹ and in the third lecture a distinction is drawn between "Comparative Theology, or what may be called the Science of Religions," and "the Science of Religion," the former being described as that which "studies religions as they have been, and tries to discover what is peculiar to each and what is common to all, with a silent conviction that what is common to all religions, whether revealed or not, may possibly constitute the essential elements of true religion."² These sentences leave the matter very much where it was. It may, indeed, be urged, that the only "facts of religion" are "religions"; but that is not the case. There are "facts of religion" that may be dealt with apart from a consideration of religions. We may take sacrifice, *e.g.*, and discuss it without reference to any special system. But without dwelling on this point, we may accept these utterances as declaring that facts, as contrasted with theories, are the objects alike of the Science of Religion and the Science of Religions.

We are further led to understand that the historical method is evolutionary in character. "History," we read, "if it is worthy of its name, is more than a mere acquaintance with facts and dates. It is the study of a continuous process in the events of the world, the discovery of cause and effect, and, in the end, of a law that holds the world together."³ Evolution, our author says, "is history, or what used to be called pragmatic history, under a new name."⁴ And he tells us that his "principal object has always been to discover a historical evolution or a continuous growth in religion as well as in language."⁵ But this "historical evolution or continuous growth" is not to be taken as a movement along a single line, stretching from the first

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.* p. 53.

³ *Ibid.* p. 259.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 259.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 143.

appearance of religion among men up to the present day. It is rather a process that travels along parallel lines, so that different collections of historical facts, while showing the same principle at work, show it at work in different ways and under different forms. "Far be it from me," he writes elsewhere, "to say that the origin and growth of religion must everywhere have been exactly the same as in India";¹ and he tells us, that "though each religion has its own peculiar growth, the seed from which they spring is everywhere the same."² And, as indicating what can be done in the sphere of religion, he makes a reference to what has been done in the sphere of language; he says: "The Historical School . . . cannot claim to have accounted for the origin of all language, but only of one or two or three families of human speech."³ Alongside these quotations, it is instructive to place the following: "If the historical school has proved anything, it has established the fact . . . that in religion as in language there is continuity, there is an unbroken chain which connects our thoughts and our words with the first thoughts conceived and with the first words uttered by the earliest ancestors of our race."⁴ "Though we can nowhere watch the first vital movements of a nascent religion, we can in some countries observe the successive growth of religious ideas."⁵ We have not yet, however, got the full exhibition of the historical method as Professor Müller conceives it. In replying to some criticisms passed on him by Dr. Flint, he expresses himself as follows: "The historical school, because it calls itself historical, does not profess to devote itself to the history only of any given science . . . What the historical school meant to teach was that no actual problem of any science should be studied without a reference to what had been said or written on that problem from the day on which it was first started to the present day."⁶ And, with

¹ *Hibbert Lectures*, 2nd ed. p. 132.

³ *Natural Religion*, p. 207.

⁵ *Hibbert Lectures*, 2nd ed. p. 129.

² *Ibid.* p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 103, 104.

⁶ *Natural Religion*, p. 277.

reference to the work done by the historical school, we have this utterance: "All that the historical school ventures to assert is that it explains one side of the origin of religion, viz. the gradual process of naming and conceiving the Infinite."¹ Finally, he assures us that the historical school "begins with no theoretical expectations, with no logical necessities, but takes its spade and shovel to see what there is left of old things,"² only warning us that the old things dug up by us are by no means the oldest. "The Rig Veda," he says, "though it is the most ancient document of Aryan thought within our reach, contains relics of different ages, and even its most ancient relics are relics of Aryan thought only, and are separated by an immeasurable distance from what people are pleased to call the beginning of all things."³ More definitely still he writes: "These first beginnings are quite beyond the reach of what we mean by history. We shall never know what primitive man, or what the first man on earth, may have been. When we speak, nevertheless, of primitive man, we mean, and can only mean, man as he is represented to us in his earliest works."⁴

From these statements, in which the method to be pursued is described, we turn to consider the procedure followed, and, when we do so, we are struck by the fact that the first thing that Professor Müller does, is to go in search of a definition. He admits that, without this, it is impossible to make a careful collection of the facts of religion. And by a definition he does not mean a general description, marking out the sphere within which the collection is to be made, but a summary presentation of the essence of religion, an exhibition of its fundamental features. With the view of leading up to and justifying his own definition, he subjects the more important of the definitions that have been offered by others to examination. That which he aims at reaching is a historical definition, and this he declares to be "a definition of what

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 219.

² *Ibid.* p. 201.

³ *Ibid.* p. 131.

⁴ *Anthropological Religion*, pp. 184, 185.

religion has been, rather than of what, according to the opinions of various philosophers, it ought to be.”¹ Now, how does he set about constructing this definition? He begins by looking “into the workshop of what we call our mind,”² and then he enters on a discussion of the nature and relations of sensations, percepts, concepts, and names. This discussion involves considerations both of a psychological and a metaphysical character, and it is on the outcome of this discussion that he bases his definition. Having constructed this definition, he proceeds to collect and compare his facts; but in doing so he does not limit himself at one time to one field, and at another to another, but makes excursions into any field that seems to offer him a fact that will lend support to his interpretation of the facts specially under review. In truth, he is as often proving the validity of his definition as collecting facts of religion, comparing religions, or tracing out the historical evolution and continuous growth of religion.

The quotations I have given, and the references I have made, are more than sufficient to show how difficult it is to bring Professor Müller’s method under any of the recognised categories. It is, indeed, not one method but a combination of several, and the consequence is confusion,—a gathering of facts, interesting and suggestive, but, for lack of a single guiding principle, leading to no definite result, so far as our interpretation of religion is concerned. It professes to be historical, with an eye only to facts, but it is as much psychological as historical. This, indeed, Professor Müller practically admits. He says: “If the psychological analysis of the earliest religious concepts as I have given it is correct . . . it follows that religion is a psychological necessity.”³ Now, a truly historical method does not need, and in truth would not accept, at the outset, a full-blown definition, especially a definition that had been got by looking into “the workshop of the mind,” and analysing sensations and percepts and concepts and names. It would set itself simply and

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 90.

² *Ibid.* p. 119.

³ *Ibid.* p. 194.

severely to discover and bring together the movements of the several religions, in order that the material might be supplied either for framing a definition, or for testing definitions that had been framed on different grounds. Professor Müller really excludes himself from the historical school when he says that it "begins with no theoretical expectations, with no logical necessities, but takes its spade and shovel to see what there is left of old things,"¹ for he begins with some very definite "theoretical expectations" and "logical necessities," and, before addressing himself to the collection of the facts of religion and the comparison of religions, with the view of discovering what is "the true nature, the origin, and purpose of all religion,"² sets down the *conditio sine qua non* of all religion in four particulars. The truth is, he has run into error by not distinguishing between religion as sentiment, as creed, and as ritual; or between religion and religions,—between that which is, in its essence, permanent, and that which is, from its very nature, transient. Neglecting that distinction, he constantly commits the mistake with which he charges theorists and philosophers, of confounding what has been with what ought to be. Of this, the following is an instance: "I only assert as a historical fact, whatever that may be worth, that if once the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal had been conceived, man being what he is, was constrained, and, in that sense, justified in conceiving the author of both under the form of the best he knew."³ Surely this is not "a historical fact." A historical fact, as such, cannot tell us what man, being what he is, was constrained to do. It can tell us of external constraint, but not of internal. It can tell us that man did a certain thing; but whether or not he was constrained to do it, "being what he is," we must learn from other considerations than those resting on a purely historical basis. In other words, we must distinguish between that which is accidental and that which is essential, in any historical fact, before we can gain information from it regarding

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 201.

² *Ibid.* p. 11.

³ *Ibid.* p. 251.

the nature of man, and, in order to do this, we must pass beyond the merely historical standpoint. And this, as we have seen, Professor Müller does.

His lectures, indeed, so far from justifying the historical method, suggest its inadequacy as a means for determining the essence of religion. Its aim, he tells us, is to dig down and discover what is left of old things—to collect the facts of religion. Now, the value of such work no one will venture to question. The more we can learn of the various religions of the past and the present, the better. Our knowledge of these enables us to understand the problems presented by religion, and helps us toward their solution. We should, therefore, seek to make that knowledge as full and accurate as possible; and we are under a deep debt of gratitude to those who, like Professor Müller, have by their labours contributed so largely to this result. But the question is, as to the possibility of gaining, in this way, a theory of religion that will meet the necessities of the case. And in dealing with this question we have to observe, that by the historical method may be meant either the study of the several religions that have existed or that still exist, each by itself, or the study of the whole course of religion in the world, of which the several religions are elements and stages. By Professor Müller it is accepted at one time in the first of these references, and at another in the second. But the two are different in import. In the former, we have to deal with movements that run along different lines and on different levels, all of which, however, express the same principle, though in diverse ways. In the latter, we have to deal with a single movement, that, taking its rise in the primeval state, has advanced along a definite line, manifesting itself in a variety of forms. Now, it is evident that, in the former case, the historical method must be supplemented by the comparative—is, indeed, merely preliminary to it. This, Professor Müller allows. He says: "The science of religion consists, first of all, in a careful collection of the facts of

religion ; secondly, in a comparison of religions with the view of bringing to light what is peculiar to each, and what they all share in common.”¹ But if our comparison is to be adequate and fruitful of valid results, it must include all religions. One or two will not furnish what is required, for in them some feature that is essential may be lacking, or may be so obscured as to be overlooked or undervalued by us. A full knowledge of all religions, even the simplest and crudest, is necessary for a true and safe induction. Such a knowledge we do not possess. Great as has been the advance in this direction in recent years, we are still a long way from the goal. Our acquaintance with religions of whose existence and general characteristics we have long been fully aware, is gradually extending, compelling us to alter, in some important respects, our estimate of them ; and we have been discovering religions among peoples and tribes who were supposed and declared to have none. Our information is thus deficient alike in fulness and in range. Our survey does not embrace either all religions or all the facts regarding those that are observed. Hence the comparative method cannot, for lack of material, be applied with effect in the way of determining the nature of religion. A comparison of the religions known to us is, in the highest degree, suggestive and instructive in the way of illustrating, and, it may be, modifying, our theory of religion, but it cannot of itself furnish such a theory.

This consideration leads to another point, viz. that even if our knowledge were practically complete, mere comparison would not furnish what is sought. By such comparison we should learn “ what is peculiar to each, and what they all share in common.” But how are we to deal with their differences and their likenesses ? Are we to reject the former as accidental, and to accept the latter as essential ? If we do this, we shall certainly run into error. For the differences may be as valuable as the likenesses. Religion is an experience that is due to the responsive activity of an inherent capacity

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 11.

or impulse. But that activity is not necessarily uniform in its manifestation. It is affected by the surroundings that call it forth, and may, therefore, express itself in different ways. A religious experience may be onesided and partial, and, consequently, beliefs and observances that accurately reflect such an experience are not necessarily alike either in appearance or in significance. To neglect difference is, thus, to neglect what may be of the utmost value. On the other hand, if we confine our view to the likenesses, what shall we get? From one point of view, we shall often get nothing at all. Comparison will become contrast. For there are religions that, viewed externally, are the very antitheses of each other, the facts of which—their creed and ritual, *e.g.*—stand over against each other without any apparent point of contact. But even if we pass behind the facts, and, by interpretation of them, reach their basis and meaning, we shall get a residuum so small and poor, that from it we can gain no real insight into the nature of religion. To understand what religion is, we must see it at its fullest, when all its sides and elements are present and harmonised in one complete experience. If, therefore, by the historical method be meant the study of individual religions in their rise and progress, with a view to comparison and induction, it must be pronounced unequal to the task assigned to it.

What, then, of its other reference? That is, the study of the whole course of religion in the world, of which the several religions are elements and stages. Taken in this sense, it is really the Evolutional method. By it a process of development is traced, with the view of grasping the principle involved and operative. This method Professor Müller seems at times to recognise and adopt. "History," he says, "is the study of a continuous process in the events of the world, the discovery of cause and effect, and, in the end, of a law that holds the world together";¹ and he declares that evolution is history under another name. But, while recognising this method, he does not

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 259.

consistently apply it. His point of view is particular rather than general. It is mainly the development of special systems that claims his attention. While apparently assuming that all the systems that have appeared are bound together by one evolutionary movement, he does not steadily follow that movement through its successive forms and stages. We shall not, therefore, stay to deal with it, as suggested by him, but shall turn to the work of Professor Edward Caird, in which it is set forth from a different standpoint.

In his Gifford Lectures, Professor Caird has given us a valuable and suggestive treatise, the study of which will prove stimulating and helpful. Even though we may find ourselves compelled to dissent from some of his conclusions, the attempt to master his point of view, and follow him in his exposition, will bring us much benefit, enlarging our horizon and purifying our vision, giving us a wider and more varied outlook, and a deeper and more appreciative insight into the meaning and bearing of the moral and spiritual efforts and movements of the past and the present.

It is not our purpose to examine his work in its full extent. All that we propose to do, meanwhile, is to glance at his method. That, however, is so bound up with his theory, that it is almost impossible to consider the one apart from the other. We can only, at the outset, emphasise the side with which we are dealing, so that the scope of our criticism may be noted.

As the title of the Lectures indicates, the basis of his treatment of religion is Evolution. He seeks to show the significance of "the great reconciling principle of Development" for this sphere of human interest and endeavour, or rather to indicate, in a general way, what that significance is. "What I have aimed at throughout," he says in the Preface, "has been rather to illustrate a certain method of dealing with the facts of religious history in the light of the idea of development, than to exhaust any one application of that method."¹

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. pp. xi-xii.

This being his aim, the first point that demands our attention is his idea of development. This he states briefly as follows: "Development is a process in which identity manifests itself *just in* change, and returns upon itself *just by means of* change."¹ Here identity and change are presented as the poles of the development process. Let us note their relation to each other. Identity is logically prior to change; but, actually, it is co-existent with it, since it manifests itself in it. Without change it would not truly exist. But while manifesting itself in change, it does not lose itself in change; on the contrary, it "returns upon itself *just by means of* change." In and through change it expresses itself and maintains itself. Without change it would not realise itself in any sense or in any degree. Now, it is evident that if the process thus described is rightly named development, we must give a special character to the change referred to: we must think of it as a certain kind of change, that kind of change in and by means of which the identity not only manifests itself and returns upon itself, but, in doing so, attains greater fulness. That this is implied in the above statement is apparent from the succeeding sentence, which speaks of "a movement into difference from a unity which is never lost in that difference, but which holds its elements together even in their extremest antagonism, and which therefore in the end restores itself in a higher form just by means of that antagonism."² The "therefore" in the last clause depends, of course, on the nature of the holding together of the elements in their antagonism, or rather assumes that that holding together is of such a kind as to contribute to the expansion and elevation of the unity. It may be said that the only kind of change in which an identity can manifest itself, and by means of which it can return upon itself, is a change that involves the result indicated. But this is not quite evident, even if true. In any case, it is desirable that the point should be distinctly stated, so that we may clearly understand that the important matter, according to

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 172. ² *Ibid.* vol. i. pp. 172, 173.

this definition of development, is not merely that the identity developing, passes through change, but that it passes through change of such a kind that, in it, it manifests itself, and from it, it returns upon itself in a higher form. In other words, what is emphasised is not bare change, change viewed in a purely abstract fashion as simple difference of condition, since that idea of change gives no indication of the value of the result to which it leads, but change that is progressive in direction, that is advance, and advance in the way of expansion and attainment. What we are concerned with is not simply movement, but forward movement, movement from a less to a more perfect state.

The conception of development which we thus gain is quite general in reference. All that it tells us is, that in dealing with objects, or departments of existence that have been the subjects of development, we must be able to trace an onward and upward process by means of which there has been growth and fulfilment of purpose. Much more, however, than this is implied in Professor Caird's position. Development, to his mind, has to do with the content, as well as the direction, of the movement to be traced. Hence development has for him different meanings in different spheres of inquiry. This seems to me a misleading use of the term. Two things that ought to be distinguished from each other are confounded with each other, viz. the process of development and the thing developing. It is true that there cannot be a process of development without a thing that is developing. We cannot have a forward movement unless we have something that is moving forward. But we can have any number of things moving forward. Each, of course, is moving forward in its own way and in the line of its own nature, but to each the general formula is applicable. The thing that is developing is, as developing, but a special instance of a general process which a multitude of other things are undergoing, and not a special process which affects it, and it alone. Every case of development, indeed, has its own peculiarity by which

it is marked off from every other, but it has this peculiarity not in virtue of, but apart from, its being a case of development. That is to say, its distinction does not rest on the fact of development, but on the qualities that are being developed.

The bearing of these remarks will be seen, if we look at a passage in which Professor Caird states his view on the point in question. He says: "The transitions, from motion to life, and from life to sensation and consciousness, are qualitative; and the endeavour to extend those principles, which enable us to explain the lower terms of the series, to all its higher terms, is doomed to inevitable failure. Thus the general faith that the world is an intelligible system requires to be justified in a different way in every new science. Physics and chemistry have secrets which cannot be unlocked with a mathematical key; nor would biology ever have made the advance, which in this century it has made, without the aid of a higher conception of evolution than that which reduces it to a mere 'mode of motion.' And if the effort which is now being made to explain the nature and history of man is to succeed, it undoubtedly will require a still higher conception or principle of explanation."¹ With the general drift of this statement I fully agree; but there are in it one or two expressions that call for remark. The chief of these, as touching the point we have been discussing, is the phrase, "a higher conception of evolution." This phrase suggests that there are different conceptions of evolution, some higher and some lower. But in what sense can we speak of different conceptions of evolution? Or rather, are different conceptions of evolution possible? To my mind they are not. There is, and can be only one conception of evolution,—the conception, viz., of a movement from a lower to a higher state. Evolution is purely formal in its reference. It may be applied to different processes within different spheres and on different levels, but its meaning is the same in each case. The processes in question are all alike evolutionary, because, whatever

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 5.

be their matter, in them identity is manifesting itself in change, and returning on itself by means of change, in such a way as to reach, through change, a higher form. We can speak of different conceptions of evolution only if we take account of the content of the process; but if we do this, we give to evolution a meaning which does not rightly belong to it. This, Professor Caird seems to me to do. He speaks of a conception of evolution as a principle of explanation, and the explanation of which he is thinking is the explanation of the essence of the movements referred to. Now, a conception of evolution can only be a principle of explanation, in this sense, if evolution be taken to mean a special instance of evolution, and then it is not as evolution that it furnishes explanation, but as the record of the working of the essence of the object to be explained toward realisation. In other words, we bring to the examination of the object the conception of evolution. That marks out for us the line of our inquiry, in so far as it tells us that the present state of the object is connected with all its past states, and that consequently, to understand it fully, we must be able to trace the connection between its different states, because only when we have done so have we detected the central power that has been working itself out. Under the guidance of this conception, we carry on our investigation and gain an insight into the meaning of the process we are seeking to interpret. That insight supplies the principle of explanation; but this principle is something different from the conception of evolution: it is the conception of something that is evolving, of something that is subject to the law of evolution. In a note to the passage we are examining, Professor Caird says: "*Ultimately*, every object requires the highest principle to explain it, at least for a philosophy that accepts the principle of evolution." Here, apparently, a distinction is recognised between the principle of explanation and the principle of evolution. The latter is taken in its formal sense, as indicating a certain kind of process which governs the whole of existence, and in virtue of which every part is

related to every other, and all have their place in the development of an idea. If this is so, then, of course, everything will require for its ultimate explanation that which is fundamental. But what I wish to point out, is a want of harmony between the text and the note. In the former we are taught that different conceptions of evolutions—lower and higher—are principles of explanation for different objects; but, if this be so, then the highest principle of explanation will be the highest conception of evolution, and not something different from it. On the other hand, in the latter we are taught that the highest principle of explanation is different from the conception of evolution; but, if that be so, then the lowest must be different also. We have thus two different results, according as we take the one deliverance or the other. As I have already indicated, it seems to me that Professor Caird confounds what is formal with what is material, and transforms a regulative into an essential principle.

But I pass to another point. If different conceptions of evolution are demanded, as principles of explanation, for the different spheres of existence, what comes of the claim made on behalf of evolution, that it binds the whole universe of being together, by the proof which it furnishes that the highest phase has sprung out of the lowest by regular and natural growth? What we have, according to Professor Caird's statement, is not a single continuous upward movement from nebulosity to spirituality, but a number of movements on successively higher levels—parallel movements, so to speak, but movements that are separated from each other so completely that a different conception of evolution is required for each. This cuts at the root of the theory of evolution as an interpretation of the origin of the existing state of things, according to which it is but the latest stage in a process of development. This, Professor Caird practically admits. In the quotation given above he says: "The transitions, from motion to life, and from life to sensation and consciousness, are qualitative; and the endeavour to extend

those principles, which enable us to explain the lower terms of the series, to all higher terms, is doomed to inevitable failure." But if the transitions which we observe are "qualitative," we cannot apply to them the term evolution; we cannot even, strictly speaking, call them a "series." Each stands apart from the other in respect of its specific quality. This difficulty Professor Caird seeks to overcome by extending the meaning of the word development. "The change," he says, "which we call 'development' is always *qualitative* as well as *quantitative*, and to treat it as merely quantitative is to omit the distinctive characteristic of the facts we have to explain."¹ But this statement is inaccurate. Development is always quantitative and never qualitative, *i.e.* it is always an increase in the fulness, never an alteration in the nature, of the subject. If it be the latter, how is it brought about? Differentiation and integration will not account for it. These rest on identity; and the only result which they can yield, is the expansion of that identity by the unfolding of its inherent powers and features. To admit a qualitative change is to sacrifice the identity. An identity cannot manifest itself in, or return on itself by means of, a change that affects its quality. Identity is simply maintenance of quality. It is no doubt true, as Professor Caird says, that "to treat development merely as quantitative is to omit the distinctive character of the facts we have to explain"; but that does not prove that development is qualitative as well as quantitative. What it proves is, that development is inadequate as an explanation of the manner in which the manifold forms and grades of existence have come into being.

The above statements, indeed, are at variance with others to be met with in the lectures. We read, *e.g.*, that "the essential characteristic of development is that nothing arises *de novo*, which is not in some way preformed or anticipated from the beginning";² and that "the identity of a being that lives and develops is shown above all in the fact that,

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 50.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 182.

though it is continually changing in its whole nature, yet nothing absolutely new is ever introduced into it.”¹ The latter of these statements, it may be remarked in passing, is not self-consistent. It speaks of a being that “is continually changing in its whole nature,” and yet preserves its identity, and it declares that this preservation of identity is possible, because, although “continually changing in its whole nature, nothing absolutely new is ever introduced into it.” But surely, on the one hand, a change in “the whole nature” of a being would be the destruction of that being’s identity; and, on the other, a change of “the whole nature” implies the introduction of something “absolutely new.” If not, then we must take the change indicated to mean merely a change of the arrangement and combination of parts and elements, and that is a change of condition rather than of nature. It is certainly not a change of the whole nature.

But what I wish to bring out, is the want of agreement between the statements quoted and that which we have been considering. In the latter, it is asserted that development is a qualitative as well as a quantitative change; in the former, that the essential character of development is that “nothing arises *de novo*,” that “nothing absolutely new” is introduced into the nature of the being developing, that what results from development is “in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning.” These two assertions seem to me irreconcilable. A qualitative change involves the rise of something *de novo*, the introduction of something “absolutely new”; and the drawing forth of what has been “preformed or anticipated from the beginning” is not an alteration, but a revelation, of the quality of the subject. In other words, a change that does not admit what is “absolutely new,” but works solely in the way of evolving what is “preformed and anticipated from the beginning,” is merely a quantitative change, a change in the fulness of the manifestation of the being undergoing the change, not a

¹ *The Evolution of Religion* vol. i. p. 199.

change in the being itself. The attempt to give it the latter significance leads to a self-contradictory position. That it does so is shown, as already indicated, in the quotation made above, in which identity is spoken of as maintained through continuous change of its whole nature, and a change of the whole nature is spoken of as produced without the introduction of anything absolutely new.

The point on which we are insisting is of the utmost importance. It reveals the weakness and insufficiency of the Evolution theory as a complete explanation of the manner in which the existing state of things has come into being. In it different qualities are discerned, and the question for the Evolutionist is, How were these different qualities produced? This question he can answer, consistently with his position, only in either of two ways. He must either reduce difference of quality to difference of quantity or find a mode of transition from quantity to quality. In the former case, he will admit nothing but quantitative change—will, indeed, require nothing but quantitative change—to account for the rise of different phases and forms of existence. In the latter, he will admit qualitative change, but it will be qualitative change that emerges naturally from quantitative change, and in order to find room for this qualitative change he must hold that quantity can, by its own movement, transform itself into quality. These two positions, however, differ only in appearance. Quality that emerges naturally from a quantitative change is simply quantity under another name. Self-transformation of quantity can issue in nothing but quantity under a new phase. The thoroughgoing Evolutionist is thus thrown back on quantitative change as the only kind of change that he can recognise; and what he has to show is, that the qualitative changes, or rather the changes that seem to be qualitative, are in reality quantitative. If he can do this, then we shall be forced to believe that in the primal star-dust, or whatever else was the germ from which all that now exists has sprung, there lay preformed the powers

and faculties that are possessed and displayed by the highest product. If he cannot do this, then his theory, however suggestive and valuable, must be rejected as utterly inadequate to the requirements of the case. The meaning which Professor Caird gives to the term evolution surmounts the difficulty; but it does this only because it allows departure from the straight line of development—departure that involves the exercise of influences that have their source apart from the objects on which they are brought to bear, and that affect these objects in such a way as, by alliance with them, to endow them with qualities and powers not formerly possessed by them. In other words, it admits intervention, by whatever name we choose to call that intervention, inasmuch as it recognises a difference of quality that cannot be accounted for by merely quantitative change. Possibly Professor Caird would reply, that such intervention is quite consistent with evolution, because in all God or the spiritual principle is revealing Himself, and, this being the case, the self-realisation of the Divine Being supplies the necessary basis and nexus. But granting that this is so, what then? The qualitative changes to be accounted for are new and fresh expressions of that Being or principle that is realising itself in nature and in man; and such new and fresh expressions mean, that there are forces at work and features exhibited which were not at work or exhibited formerly, and the appearance of which was due to a movement within the Being or principle seeking realisation, and not merely within the realisation which had already been reached. God may be in all and realising Himself in all, but He is not in all and realising Himself in all in the same way and to the same extent; and it is just this diversity of realisation that has to be explained, and it is not explained by simple appeal to the unity that underlies the diversity. For the whole question is as to the manner in which the unity realises itself. Does it do so by one effort, in the result of which there lies implicitly all that is required for its full realisation,

so that it has only to make explicit by change that which lies within it? or does it do so by successive efforts, in each using as its base and material all that have preceded, but transforming these by the introduction of a new force? If the former, then there can be only quantitative change, because there is only evolution; if the latter, there can be both quantitative and qualitative change, because there is more than evolution.

We have sought to discover what precisely Professor Caird's view of Evolution is, in order that we may be able to deal rightly with the special application which he makes of it in his lectures. Accepting it as universal in its range and operation, he must bring human life in all its references and movements under its sway, or rather must believe that human life is conditioned by it, and must seek to arrange or interpret history in accordance therewith by marking the several stadia in the process through which it has passed in its onward movement. In the work before us he endeavours to do this for history, viewed on its religious side; or, as he puts it in his Preface, he seeks "to illustrate a certain method of dealing with the facts of religious history in the light of the idea of development."¹ What that method is we gather from the following statement: "The unity of mankind must for our purpose be interpreted as involving not only the identity of human nature in all its various manifestations in all nations and countries, but also as implying that in their *coexistence* these manifestations can be connected together as different correlated phases of one life, and that in their *succession* they can be shown to be the necessary stages of one process of evolution. The conception of development is thus a corollary which cannot be disjoined from the principle of the unity of man itself."² We have here identity and change,—the identity being "the unity of mankind," and the change the coexistent and the successive manifestations of that unity. The change is, of course,

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. pp. xi, xii.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. pp. 24, 25.

determined by the nature of the identity. Hence, in dealing with the statement before us, we have mainly to consider the identity. And we shall look at it in relation, first, to the coexistent manifestations, and then to the successive manifestations.

What, then, is the identity in question? It is the unity of mankind, and that unity is organic. Mankind is an organism of which men are parts and members. These are bound together, not as possessing a common nature, but as participating in a single life. In other words, "the fundamental fact of self-consciousness which unites them all to each other"¹ is not the self-consciousness of the men united, but is a universal self-consciousness in which they are embraced. They are not, strictly speaking, united because of what they are, but they are what they are because they are united. Hence the coexistent manifestations are "different correlated phases of one life," and the successive manifestations are "necessary stages of one process of evolution." Hence, also, "the conception of development" is a corollary from "the principle of the unity of man." But is this view of the unity of mankind admissible? That there is an organic connection between the members of the human race cannot be questioned. We cannot help regarding mankind as a whole, the several parts of which are so related that they influence one another, and influence one another in such a way that the achievements of one age become the inheritance of its successor. But to understand this organic connection after a fashion that reduces the movements of the several parts to moments in the growth and expansion of one life, is to do injustice to the parts and to deny reality to the movements. The parts are rational beings, and their movements are the outcome of their rationality. They must, therefore, have a relative independence, and an independence that, though relative, is real; and for this there is no room in the unity of which the conception of development is a corollary. But, further, Professor Caird speaks of coexistent manifesta-

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 15.

tions of human nature, and declares them to be "different correlated phases of one life." Though coexistent manifestations, they are different; but though different, they are correlated. Their correlation thus implies reconciliation. That it does so will be apparent if we think for a moment of the diverse manifestations that present themselves to us in the field of history at every epoch. Very different are the conditions and activities of contemporaneous nations. The link binding these together, and making them "correlated phases of one life," is not at once visible, and will, in many cases, be difficult to find. But what one feels constrained to ask is, If human nature be an organism in the sense that it is the organ of one life which is present in all the members, and which uses these as its instruments, how is it possible for it to put forth different coexistent manifestations that need, because of their diversity, to be reconciled and correlated? A life is a unity, and as such its manifestations at a given time must be uniform. It may have successive manifestations that differ widely from each other, but it cannot have coexistent manifestations standing over against each other and needing to be reconciled. On such a view as that we are considering, the diversity that displays itself in every age is inexplicable. There might indeed be variety of operation, different members playing their parts, and all uniting to make up one manifestation; but that would not give us coexistent manifestations differing from each other, as the manifestations of human nature do, in every era: there would indeed be but one manifestation of one life. The varied operation would be co-operation. We are thus taught that to translate identity of human nature into participation in one life is illegitimate, and that, whatever the organic unity of human nature may mean, it cannot mean the absorption of the individual human beings in one existence. The unity of mankind, thus understood, leaves unexplained, indeed renders impossible, the variety of state and effort that constitutes the coexistent manifestations with which we are

confronted when we survey the world in the several eras of its history.

But from the first part of the sentence under examination we turn to the second. This is for us the more important, because it shows what the application of evolution to history implies. It declares that the unity of mankind must be interpreted as involving, "that in their *succession*" the various manifestations of human nature "can be shown to be necessary stages of one process of evolution." They are "necessary stages." By this, as is evident from the context, is meant, that precisely these stages and no other could have been passed through by the one life of which the manifestations in question are correlated phases. The necessity emphasised is the necessity of an inherent energy which was bound to move, not merely toward full expression, but along the very line by which it has, as a matter of fact, travelled. In other words, the course actually pursued was determined by the essence of the unity. It was due solely to the inner dialectic of the central principle. This is true of all history, secular as well as religious. But it is with religious history that we are at present concerned; and in it we discern, according to this theory, three main stages in the onward movement of this dialectic. These are Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism. Polytheism was the first result; then, by a necessary recoil, Pantheism appeared; and later, by an equally necessary recoil, Monotheism arose. Not only did these three forms spring up, and spring up in the order named, but just these three forms and no others could have sprung up, and they could not spring up in any order save that in which they actually appeared. They, and the order in which they rose, are the reflex of the constitution and the governing principle of the unity whose manifestations they are.

Now, it is clear that the position here laid down rests on one of the many conceptions of development referred to by Professor Caird in an earlier quotation. He does not, that is to say, employ the purely formal conception—viz. that in

some way or other the several manifestations must be related, as antecedent and consequent—as his guide, and proceed to discover what the precise relation is between the different facts which observation has collected. He starts with a unity, and a unity that has a well-defined character, a character, too, of such a kind that it must develop, and must develop in a specified direction. The unity, in other words, with which he begins, not only points distinctly to a particular goal toward which, as the realisation of itself, it must struggle, but also defines the path by which it must travel to its goal,—a path from which it cannot turn aside, but along which it is constrained to go. This is the bearing of the closing sentence in the quotation we are considering: “The conception of development is thus a corollary which cannot be disjoined from the principle of the unity of man itself.”

What, then, of the unity in question? Of it we have already spoken. We have seen that while organic, it must afford scope for the free activity of those embraced in it. It is a rational unity, a unity of rational beings bound together by community of nature, and by community of relation to an underlying rationality. It is, therefore, at once one and many, a whole and a company of individuals. But we have also seen that if only a unity, in the sense of a single life, then different coexistent manifestations would be impossible. The unity must therefore admit of diversity: the one life underlying the manifold life of humanity must so communicate itself as to render possible relatively independent action on the part of its products. Now, if such be the nature of the unity, we cannot deduce from it the course which it, or rather its embodiments, will necessarily take; nor can we say that it, or they, must have taken just that course and no other, so that the successive manifestations observed are “necessary stages in one process of evolution,” for that would be to deny the relative independence without which different coexistent manifestations would be impossible.

Without, however, dwelling on this point, let us look at the matter from a somewhat different standpoint. It is with evolution that we are at present concerned, and this, we have been told, is identity manifesting itself in change, and returning on itself by means of change. This, we learned, implies not only change, but a certain kind of change,—change in harmony with, and within the nature of, the identity, in and by which the identity rises to a higher form. The successive manifestations then, since they are stages in a process of evolution, must be changes of the kind described. But what is required in order that such changes may take place? There is required the presence of an object which appeals to, and stirs to activity, the identity which is the subject of change. Were it not thus affected, the identity would remain *in statu quo*: differentiation and integration would be impossible for it. The self must come into contact with a not-self if it is to move, and the not-self must be in harmony with the self, so that it may influence it and be assimilated by it, if that movement is to take the form of evolution. Evolution might be described, in this aspect, as the result of appropriation of the object by the subject. The point, however, demanding attention is, that change demands for its production an object as well as a subject—that evolution implies surroundings and environment, and the action of these on the identity. Now, what will be the precise character of the action of his surroundings and environment on the rational identity. It will not only rouse him to activity, but will determine the form of that activity. The same kind of activity may be called forth by different circumstances, but it will manifest itself in different ways in the different circumstances,—in ways that are in harmony with the circumstances.

What has just been said bears very definitely on the point we are now discussing. If evolution requires both a subject and an object,—an identity and an environment by which it is affected, and affected not only in the way of ex-

itement to effort, but also as to the shape which its effort will assume, we cannot, by simply observing the identity, mark out the course which it will pursue in its evolutionary movement. In order to do this we must know what the environment will be, and, consequently, under what influences it will come. A study of the identity may enable us to forecast, in a general way, what its future will be, but it cannot enable us to describe definitely the various changes through which it will pass on its way to that future. Even the former it will enable us to do only in a limited fashion, for it is only as it manifests itself that the essence of an identity can be truly apprehended by us. This, Professor Caird shows with great clearness and force. He argues, and the argument is in its general bearing at least unanswerable, that if we are to understand religion we must study it in its highest form, for only in that form have we the full disclosure of its essence, and only as we perceive that essence can we estimate it aright. He, however, grounds his argument on evolution. It is because the highest form is the last stage in a necessary process that it furnishes a key to the past. But a consideration of the facts tells against the view that we have one process of evolution, so regular and continuous that the several religious systems must be regarded as necessary stages in an onward movement, culminating in the highest system known to us. What a consideration of the facts reveals, is a number of systems arising more or less independently, and moving along different lines; but lines that, though different, all converge on the same point, so that the system emerging at that point has a relation to all that have preceded, and yields a principle of interpretation that enables us to assign to each its true value.

The point of connection between the several systems is community of nature. Men, in their religious efforts, whatever shape these efforts may assume, are all moved fundamentally by the same impulses, are all seeking to satisfy the same yearning and to express the same aspiration; and, because

this is the case, to understand aright the perfect effort is to understand aright those that are imperfect. The diversity of the efforts put forth are accounted for by the diversity of influences under which those came who first put them forth. Of their surroundings, as well as of their nature, account must be taken, if we are to estimate aright the various religious attitudes assumed by men in the past and in the present. And this, it seems to me, is what Professor Caird fails to do. He fixes his thoughts on the nature of man, interprets that nature after a certain fashion, and requires that the course of events shall be arranged in harmony therewith. Accepting evolution as a principle of explanation, he insists not only that a connection must be traced between the religious systems that have appeared, of such a kind that each must be seen to rise naturally out of its predecessor, but also that that connection must exhibit a particular character, and must follow a particular line of advance. Thus, it appears to me, he confounds the Philosophy of Religion with the Science of Religions, the inquiry into the nature of religion, that aims at discovering its essence and learning what, in all its varied forms, it is and must be, with the inquiry into the origin and the accessories of the different systems that have come into existence. These two are not entirely independent of each other, but still they have their separate spheres, and they ought to be carefully distinguished. In the volumes before us they are not distinguished as they should be, and because of this the theory offered is defective. By his philosophy, Professor Caird constructs a frame into which the various religions must fit. But into this frame they will not go. This he himself is compelled to admit. He says, the different religions "are, in many cases at least, to be regarded rather as successive stages in one process of development,"¹ and "though there may be great difficulties in placing the different religions in any definite genetic relation to each other so as to exhibit a complete scheme of

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 40.

development; though, perhaps, it is an unattainable ideal to arrange all the forms of religion according to such a scheme, yet there can be little doubt or controversy as to the general direction in which the current of history has run."¹ These sentences amount to a surrender of the position taken up. "In many cases" is not sufficient to meet the demands of the theory presented, nor is the phrase, "the general direction in which the current of history has run," quite synonymous with the declaration that the successive manifestations are "necessary stages in one process of evolution." All that the former suggests, is a movement in the past that, on the whole, shows advance toward a certain end; and that there has been such a movement everyone will readily admit. But such a movement is not evolution, in the strict sense of the term. Professor Caird errs by concentrating attention on the subject of development, and neglecting the environment which conditions the course of development. Only when both are carefully observed and duly honoured, can we do justice to religious history. And not before, but after we have done this, with more or less fulness, can we decide whether or not, and if so, how far, evolution is applicable to this department of the universe of being.

Having thus examined the method adopted and pursued by Professor Caird, we feel ourselves compelled to pronounce it faulty. The fundamental objection to it is, that it seeks to apply evolution to a sphere to which it is not applicable. Its supposed applicability to that sphere rests on two assumptions, neither of which is warranted. The first is, that evolution admits of qualitative change in the evolving subject; the second is, that the unity of mankind is organic, in the sense of being the organ of a single life. Of these, the latter is for us the more important, because it indicates the author's view of the nature of religion. According to it, the unity of mankind implies more than community of nature, more than "the identity of human nature in all its various manifesta-

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 56.

tions in all nations and countries":¹ it implies oneness of being, participation in an existence that is steadily realising itself in the states and acts of the parts. But if this be the character of the unity of mankind, then religion is primarily a general process and not an individual experience. It is, of course, an individual experience; but that experience is only a moment in a general movement, the deepening self-consciousness of the spiritual principle, that is the ground and source of all and the vital force that works in and through all toward its complete expression. To me it seems that this is a mistaken view. To my mind, religion is primarily an individual experience, and with it, as such, we ought to begin. Only when we start from that point—when we inquire what religion means as sentiment, as a state of mind and heart—can we rightly estimate it, and discover what its essence is. Beginning with individual experience does not mean limiting ourselves to that which is individual. We shall find that through the individual we must pass to the universal; that the experience of the individual, while distinctly individual in value, must, in order to be truly understood and appreciated, be regarded *sub specie æternitatis*, that in it there lies and works an element that links it vitally to the "one increasing purpose" that through the ages runs, and to Him of whose thought that purpose is the embodiment and execution; but this discovery will not lead us to regard religion, in its various manifestations, as "correlated phases of one life" and "necessary stages in one process of evolution." It will rather lead us to regard these as different efforts, in different conditions and surroundings, on the part of men as spiritual beings to satisfy their longings and express their aspirations; longings and aspirations that are due to the divine breath that has been breathed into them, and that, consequently, by their satisfaction and expression contribute to the fulfilment of the divine purpose. Occupying this standpoint, we shall be able to bring the most diverse systems

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 24.

under the one category, without compelling them to take their place in a system of development with the forward march of which they are inconsistent. Community of nature, as proving identity of spirit amid variety of manifestation, constitutes the only unity that is necessary for this result. Learning, by a study of its highest manifestation, what that nature is, we shall gain the key to the interpretation of its other and lower manifestations, without reducing them to "necessary stages in one process of evolution." And this is the method we propose to follow.

LECTURE IV

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

IN the last lecture we determined the method to be adopted by us in our inquiry into the nature of religion. We saw that what we have to deal with is the religious sentiment, that state of mind and heart which we call religious, or rather religion. We saw, further, that if our investigation is to yield a satisfactory result we must study that sentiment at its highest, must seize and examine religion as a state of mind and heart in its perfect form. Here we are met by the question, Can we find anywhere the religious sentiment at its highest? Can we come face to face with a state of mind and heart that is a perfect religion?

Before attempting to answer these questions, we must observe in what way it is possible for us to deal with such a state of mind and heart as that indicated. It is evident that we cannot deal with it directly. It does not lie within the region of the visible and tangible, and cannot, therefore, be seen and touched. We can reach it only through its signs and manifestations. Our knowledge of its existence, and, still more, of its nature, must be gained by inference and deduction. We can, indeed, turn our gaze inward, and note the workings of our own mind and heart. In this way it might seem possible for us to study immediately the qualities and movements of our mental and spiritual nature. It might be supposed that our own experience would furnish the object of which we are in search. We have to remember, however, that we are concerned not with experience in general, but

with a special form of experience ; not with the workings of our mental and spiritual nature formally viewed, but with these moving in a definite direction and taking a particular shape, in response to a particular appeal. Were the former the object of inquiry, then an examination of our own conscious life would be legitimate and fruitful, since the conditions of thought and feeling are the same in all rational beings. But it is quite different when we have to treat of the latter. In this case, if we confined ourselves to our own experience, we should reach a result that would be limited, we might almost say individual, in its application ; for whilst the experience examined by us would be the special form of experience which we desire to understand, it would be that special form affected by the peculiarities of our personality, and, to that extent, it would be less than, and different from, the mental and spiritual state to be examined in its fulness and purity. It would be ours, and, because ours, not truly universal in character. It would not necessarily accord fully with that of any other, for it is doubtful if there are in the whole world two persons whose religious feelings exactly correspond. Fundamentally the same, that is, due to the presence and activity within them of the same elements, their emotions are, to however slight a degree, different, because coloured and moulded by their idiosyncrasies. Self-examination would thus yield too narrow a result. Instead of a single issue, we should have issues as numerous as the individuals subjecting themselves to examination ; and as, in many of these, peculiarities of temperament and accidents of environment would overshadow that which was fundamental, it would be an extremely difficult task to discern the tie binding them together, and to determine that which is common to them. Not only this, but before any effort in that direction could be made it would be necessary to fix on a principle that would furnish needful guidance. And that would imply the consideration of the sentiment in question in its broad and general aspect, apart from its appearance in

this or that individual. This, then, is the matter to which we must address ourselves, and, addressing ourselves to it, we shall reach a result that will explain individual experiences, enabling us to separate that which is essential from that which is accidental.

But how shall we reach this general sentiment? As has just been said, we can reach it only through its signs and manifestations. We must approach it by the path of creed or ritual, or both. We must consider what the state of mind and heart is that is associated with this or that creed, or with this or that ritual. Only in this way can we secure that which is requisite for our investigation. Hence we must alter somewhat the form of the question put by us. Instead of asking, Can we come face to face with a state of mind and heart that is a perfect religion? we must ask, Can we say of any system, past or present, that the state of mind and heart associated with it is the full and accurate expression of our nature on its religious side? And this question, it appears to me, admits of an affirmative answer, to this extent at least, that there is one system, viz. Christianity, which is fitted to evoke the perfect expression of our nature on its religious side, though it may never have actually done so.

Proof of this assertion will, no doubt, be demanded by some. And, were we free to accept and appeal to revelation, it would not be difficult to meet that demand. It would suffice to say, that a revealed religion, as the communication of truth to men by Him who is their creator, must, in its final stage, be capable of stirring to their highest possible activity and exercise the capacities and faculties of men, and therefore of producing a perfect religious sentiment, and to point out that the final stage in such a religion was reached when in the fulness of the time God sent His Son into the world, and, speaking by Him who was "the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person," gave a direct and definite declaration of His thought in relation to

the human race. The lines, however, that we have laid down for our discussion preclude such a reference. We must, meanwhile, leave revelation out of account, and deal with the system alluded to, as with other systems, on purely rational grounds. Where then can we find justification for the claims made on its behalf? We can find it, on the one hand, in the harmony between it and our nature, and, on the other, in the results achieved by it, in what it is and in what it has done. Viewed simply as a body of truth and a means of salvation, it is seen to accord with our constitution and our circumstances. And thus, even though, as a matter of fact, it may have failed as yet to produce a perfect state of mind and heart, the consideration of it will show us what that state of mind and heart would be, and will enable us to picture an ideal condition in which nothing will be lacking, and the analysis of which will supply that of which we are in search. Into this question of the correspondence between Christianity and our nature we cannot here enter. Its treatment would lead us far away from the subject in hand. And it is not necessary that we should deal with it, because we can gain all that is requisite for our purpose by a glance at the other ground of justification referred to, viz. the results achieved by it. We may accept it for its work's sake. What is that work? I have said that it has as yet failed to produce a perfect state of mind and heart. In saying this, I refer, of course, to individuals. I mean that, in no single instance has it done its perfect work and produced its highest possible result. But though that is the case, it has accomplished much. Its effects on men have been striking and varied; and even its greatest achievement, so far from suggesting that the utmost has been done, has suggested a higher possibility. While, therefore, we do not see, in any single instance, the complete issue, by taking the different issues and bringing them together, and, at the same time, noting the suggestion, in even the most advanced, of a fuller attainment, an attainment that is infinite in its

reference, we discover cause for viewing it as qualified to bring about the full manifestation of the religious capabilities of men. A consideration of the influence exercised, and the results achieved, by it, is thus sufficient to convince us that it is in complete accord with our nature, and that, such being its character, it supplies the guidance that is needful for studying the religious sentiment at its highest, and, by analysis, learning what are the ground and constituent elements of that sentiment.

We take Christianity, then, as our starting-point. And, in dealing with it, we shall, as far as possible, leave out of account its special doctrines, and confine ourselves to its general characteristics. We shall regard it rather as religion than as a religion. We shall note only those features of it that interpret for us the state of mind and heart which we call religion. And when we study it from this point of view, the feature that first arrests attention and claims consideration is worship. That, if not the chief fact in Christianity, viewed as religion in the sense in which we are using the term, is one of the most prominent and important, and is certainly the one best suited to our present purpose. Whatever else a Christian may be, he is a worshipper. His peculiar tone and spirit and attitude are more fittingly described by the term worship than by any other. And by worship I do not mean external rites and ceremonies and observances, but a disposition and direction of mind and heart which these are designed and profess to express.

We have, then, to consider worship in its spirit and essence, and, in particular, worship as it appears in connection with Christianity, and to ask on what it rests. We have to inquire as to its spring and animating breath, the inner movement and condition that render it possible and give to it existence, its peculiar feature and quality. And the answer to these questions is not difficult to find. It is fear, godly fear as it is often called. Without this, worship

is impossible; the form may be there, but the reality cannot. This is evident, so far as Christian worship is concerned. That it is true of all worship will be apparent by the time our discussion is closed. But what is fear? To this question we must devote some little attention, because fear is an ambiguous word. It is employed to denote two conditions that are radically distinct. It may mean either dread or reverence. These states are often treated as if they differed only in degree; but when carefully examined, they are seen to differ in kind. On the ground of this fundamental difference, we assign to the one a religious value which we deny to the other. Reverence is, dread is not, an element in worship. It is, therefore, with the former, and not with the latter, that we are at present concerned. But it will help us to understand the former if we contrast it with the latter. Doing so, we shall discover the distinction between them, and, in the light of that distinction, shall discern the precise nature of that with which we have to do, and shall thus be preserved from the somewhat common mistake of confounding the fear that is religious in reference with the fear that is not.

Dread is due to the apprehension of exposure to danger. We experience it when we are brought face to face with power in some form or other, power that seems antagonistic to us, free to act, and superior to the force at our command. These are the conditions of the existence of this emotion, or rather they are the constituent elements of the one condition on which it can exist, for all must be present before it can arise. If any one of them be absent, it cannot be stirred within us. Power in itself, however great, is not sufficient to produce this state of mind. It can do so only when it assumes, in our eyes, a threatening aspect, and appears to us able to carry out its threat because unrestrained by that which is stronger than it or unhindered by effort on our part. A child turns and flees from a stranger whose appearance is to it forbidding and menacing,

and hastens to its father for protection. The person from whom it seeks to escape may not be stronger than its father, and yet it shrinks from him. The difference between the two is to it a difference not of power, but of attitude. There is power on both sides; but in the one case it is associated with desire to injure, and in the other with desire to defend. Further, it is only when the power of the stranger, that appears to threaten, is compared by the child with its own power, and therefore seems able to inflict the injury that appears to be threatened, that it is the occasion of terror. So soon as it is compared by the child with the power of the father, which presents itself as able to prevent its working injury, it ceases to cause dread. Or, to take another illustration, an angry lion in a cage affects us very differently from what it would do if it were at liberty. We stand calmly beside the bars of its prison, watching without anxiety its impotent rage, but we should flee from it in alarm if we met it in street or field. It is not its power to injure us that affects us, for that is the same in both cases, but the possibility of its exercising that power with effect. And what is true of these, is true of all cases of dread. That emotion is always due to the conviction that we are liable to attack by a hostile power that is greater than we are, and is capable of doing us injury.

On the other hand, reverence is excited by excellence or nobility of character. It is the response of our nature to the appeal of greatness or goodness. It is honour paid by us to that which is higher and better than we. And this honour is paid by us spontaneously. It is not the issue of a purely intellectual process. There is of course an intellectual process, which results in the apprehension of the excellence before us; but the excellence being apprehended, the feeling ensues at once. We do homage immediately to the worth and dignity that stand before us; but, though thus immediate, the homage rendered is rational, for it is the response of a rational being. The intellectual and the emotional move-

ments of our nature are both alike rational, but in the former the rationality is explicit, while in the latter it is implicit. In the former there is argument and conclusion and acceptance; in the latter there is recognition and acknowledgment. Grief, love, hatred, *e.g.*, are not the outcome of ratiocination: they are produced directly by facts or circumstances or persons. By these, men are affected, touched, moved; and the emotion displayed is the issue of the influence exerted. Such is reverence. It is the spontaneous going forth of our being to that which, by its elevation, stirs us to respect and esteem. It is felt by the child in presence of age with its venerable aspect, by the student in the company of the distinguished scholar, by all with any soul of goodness in the society of men of rare moral worth and high spiritual tone. It is the silent confession by each of these: "He is greater, wiser, holier than I."

Dread and reverence, then, are quite different in basis. The one springs from the apprehension of danger, the other from the apprehension of excellence. The one is called forth by manifestation of power; the other by exhibition of character. Putting the matter in this way, we come in sight of another important distinction between the two, or rather of a different and more fundamental way of stating the distinction just noted. It is this, that dread has always a thing, while reverence has always a person, for its object. Here, as will be evident, the term thing is used in its widest sense, as applicable to whatever lacks personality. We do not, then, dread a person; we dread only a thing. We often, indeed, express ourselves otherwise. We speak, for example, of a slave dreading his master; but that is not a strictly accurate statement. What the slave dreads is not the master, but the power which the master has at his command—not the master *qua* man, but the man *qua* master; the man, that is to say, in a certain relation. He does not think of his character in the exact and full sense of the term. He may think of certain features and qualities displayed by him,

—his harshness and cruelty, for instance,—but he thinks of these in connection with the force which he can employ to give effect to them. What impresses him is not the personality of the man, but his position, and the ability to inflict injury with which that position invests him. He, indeed, seizes on an accident of his owner, makes an abstraction of it, sets it before his mind and cowers in the presence of its forbidding aspect. Think of him before and after emancipation. The character of the master is the same at both periods, but the attitude of the slave toward him is different. He is no longer moved by terror in his presence. The accident, which was the ground of his terror, has been removed. The power of the master has been taken away, and, as a consequence, he treats him with indifference, if not with contempt. And we may deal in a similar fashion with every case of dread, and, dealing with it thus, we are carried back to some object, some abstraction, some thing as its exciting cause, and never to a person or character.

It is quite the reverse with reverence. It always has, and always must have, for its object a person, and never a thing. What excites it is excellence, manifesting itself in attainment or character, and that implies personality. We do not revere a man for what he has, but for what he is. Those who touch us most deeply, and evoke our highest esteem, are often those who have neither position nor authority. They display no power, they utter no threat,—we should perhaps only smile if they did,—yet we honour them, we instinctively bow before them, we are at once humbled and elevated by their sweetness and grace and purity, by their saintly tone and temper.

Allied to this point of difference is another of great importance, namely, that dread relates itself to the lower, reverence to the higher, side of our nature. We might almost say that dread is physical in its reference, while reverence is psychical. In other words, dread contemplates possible injury either as distinctly physical, affecting

the body or the estate, or, if not distinctly physical, viewed from the physical standpoint, whereas reverence is always concerned with that which is mental, moral, or spiritual in reference. It might appear as if the feelings we experience because of danger threatening us on account of our action, that is to say, punishment, involved more than a physical reference, or at least might do so. But if we think only of the punishment, this is not the case. Though the punishment in question be definitely connected with the moral nature, the moral nature may be left out of view, and we may think merely of the suffering which we are to undergo, and may overlook the true evil that is done to us,—the moral punishment that results from the breach of the eternal laws of truth and goodness. We may even represent the future punishment of sin in a material way, so as to obscure its true character as moral and spiritual, and make it little, if anything, more than physical. If we forget that the worm that never dies and the fire that is never quenched are only analogies, and treat them as indicating realities, we descend from that high level on which alone moral and spiritual reformation can be wrought, and come perilously near the sphere of hedonistic or utilitarian religion. It may be urged, in opposition to this view, that a man under conviction of sin is filled with alarm, and that this alarm often issues in conversion, which it could not do if it were physical in reference. Now the reality of such an experience may be, indeed must be admitted, and the validity of the conclusion, that the result indicated could not ensue if the alarm were physical, may be allowed, and yet the view enunciated may be maintained. It is, in truth, just because the alarm in question is not physical, in other words, because it is not dread, that it can issue in conversion. It is more than dread, because it passes behind the punishment to its ground, recognises the justice of which it is the application, and trembles before the righteousness which it reveals, and in view of which there is self-condemnation. It is, in

truth, incipient reverence, impure because of an element of terror blending with it, but still the beginning at least of reverence. And it is this element of reverence that survives in the conversion. As a result of conversion, dread is growingly overcome, and finally completely expelled, while reverence, so far from being overcome, gains in intensity, as the righteousness behind the law is increasingly apprehended.

Springing from the distinctions just noted, there is another that deserves consideration. Dread contemplates that which is alien, reverence that which is allied, to our nature. It is the strange, the unknown, the unfamiliar, the unfriendly and antagonistic, real or fancied, that awakens within us terror or alarm. These emotions are caused by the sense of opposition. They rest on and express the conviction, that the power before us is menacing us, that is to say, has aims and wishes not only distinct from, but adverse to, ours.

It is altogether different with reverence. That, as we have seen, results from the appeal made to us, and the influence exerted on us, by excellence; but the excellence that appeals to and influences us is, and must be, excellence in the line of our own nature. The features that awaken within us esteem, are features in harmony with our being. We could not be affected in this way by what is wholly foreign to us and with which we have no affinity. The elevation of the object above us must not blind us to its relation to us. Whilst there is separation, there is also connection. It is, in truth, just this combination of separation and connection that forms the condition of reverence. Were there no correspondence there would be no point of contact. It is the union of correspondence with difference, and difference in the way of superiority and inferiority, that makes reverence possible. Only in so far as there is something common to us in the character presented to us, can we be moved by it. We are not stirred by qualities and attain

ments that lie apart from our nature and constitution. That which calls forth a response must be in harmony with that which gives the response. Reverence, then, is distinct from dread in this respect. The latter excludes, while the former includes, relationship between the object and the person experiencing it. This relationship, however, reveals itself primarily in a feeling of disparity. It is not at first apparent as a binding tie, because the distance between the objects is so great as to absorb attention. But reflection shows that, underlying the difference, there is unity; that without this unity the difference would not be apprehended by the individuals who stand over against each other, although it might be by those looking on both. When we manifest reverence, we really compare ourselves with those whom we revere, and the reverence manifested is the result in us of the comparison instituted. But comparison rests on a community of nature; we cannot truly compare things that are essentially different. There is thus consciousness of relationship between us and those in whose presence we experience reverence; but with this consciousness of relationship there is a consciousness of disagreement, which brings home to us our inferiority. In dread there is merely the sense of separation—separation so complete as to become antagonism. In reverence there is the sense both of separation and of relation, and consequently of separation that may be overcome, and of relation that may be strengthened.

In harmony with these conclusions are the respective attitudes assumed by the subjects of dread and of reverence. What the subject of dread contemplates is flight. His one desire is to escape from the presence and power of the menacing object. So long as he remains near it, he is in danger. He must thus seek a place of shelter and safety, or must secure these by some act of conciliation, in virtue of which the antagonism is overcome, but overcome in an external fashion. On the other hand, the subject of reverence does not contemplate flight. What he desires is

approach to, and closer contact with, the object. That has brought before him an ideal, has awakened within him homage and aspiration, and these stir an impulse in the direction in which the homage and aspiration point. But, along with the desire to approach, there is hesitation and shrinking, because of felt unworthiness. We would fain come near the person who has moved us. The honour we pay him is, in one aspect, the declaration of our desire for his favour. Because he embodies our ideal, we long for his approval and for fellowship with him. There is thus in dread a purely repelling force; while in reverence there is an attractive force, moderated by a restraining factor. This is in accord with what we have learned as to the two emotions. The former, we have seen, involves no relationship save that of antagonism, and from this there can result only repulsion; the latter, while involving relationship, produces a conviction of unworthiness, and from this twofold reference there results a twofold movement, toward, and away from, the object; or rather a movement toward the object that is hindered by the consciousness of unworthiness, and, as a consequence, of unfitness for communion. This result has another side, or, to speak more correctly, it gives rise to another movement. The desire to approach and to gain the favour of the person who has touched us into awe will lead us to strive to overcome the hindrance that lies in our way. In other words, it will constrain us to put forth endeavour, that we may realise the ideal set before us, seeing that only in proportion as we do so can we enjoy the favour and fellowship for which we long. We may state the matter otherwise in this way: since there is at once the sense of relation and the sense of separation, the emotion produced will be more than regard or esteem, it will be also longing and desire. We shall not only honour the excellence looked upon, we shall yearn after it. Because that excellence is in a line with our nature, we cannot help wishing that it were ours. There is, indeed, presented to us an ideal which,

because it is an ideal, must rouse within us aspiration. To take an illustration already suggested: let us suppose a student filled with reverence for his teacher, who is a master in the department in which he is working. The reverence which he manifests is more than honour paid by the student to the learning of the teacher; it is the expression of the student's own ambition. His natural bent is in the direction of the teacher's attainments, and whilst doing homage to that attainment, he is stimulated to endeavour by the sight which it affords him of the goal. In the reverence which he displays, he at once expresses his inferiority and his longing to transcend it. Reverence is thus a complex state, embracing acknowledgment of inferiority in presence of excellence manifested in attainment or character, a desire for the favour of and for communion with the object of regard, and, with a view to this, aspiration after the excellence perceived, without which the favour and communion desired cannot be enjoyed.

The preceding analysis has more than justified the assertion made, that the two states indicated by the word fear differ in kind and not only in degree. This has often been overlooked, and reverence has been spoken of as if it were only a higher form of dread. That this is not the case is apparent from what has been said. The two emotions are radically distinct, though they may often assume forms that resemble each other. They differ in cause and object, in attitude and expression. We are told that "perfect love casteth out fear."¹ And this statement is in harmony with the results reached, for the fear contemplated in it must be the fear that is dread, and not the fear that is reverence; only the former can be cast out by love, the latter cannot. So far from being cast out by love, reverence continues with it, and grows with its growth, and strengthens with its strength. We cannot love perfectly that of which we stand in dread. Neither can we love perfectly that which we do not revere.

¹ 1 John iv. 18.

The fear that is dread, then, is radically different from the fear that is reverence. In view of this difference, we have to ask with which of these states worship, and consequently religion, is concerned. And this question is answered by the analysis we have just completed. In the light of the results reached by that analysis, we can without hesitation say, that it is with reverence and not with dread that religion is concerned. It is apparent from what we have learned, as to their origin and nature and working, that reverence can, and that dread cannot, be an element in religion; in other words, that the former is, and that the latter is not, in harmony with the religious sentiment. Dread, as we have seen, springs from a sense of separation that, as absolute, takes the form of antagonism, suggestive of danger and injury; reverence, from a sense of separation that, as relative, takes the form of appeal, suggestive of attainment and communion. Or, otherwise stated, in dread, we stand over against the object in an attitude of defence, or seek to escape from its presence and power; whereas in reverence, we stand apart from it in an attitude of obeisance, desiring its favour, and only hesitating to draw near because of felt unworthiness. Now, the state of mind indicated by the former is alien to religion. Without committing ourselves to any opinion as to the etymology of the term, we may say that religion implies a relation, and a relation that is ideal. But dread is due to the absence of relation. To speak of it as religious would therefore be a contradiction in terms. It is quite different with reverence. That rests on a relation, and a relation that is ideal, and is, therefore, consonant with the requirements of religion.

It may of course be argued that dread implies a relation, and would be impossible without a relation; that we could not be terrified by that which was out of all relation to us. This is true; but it does not affect the preceding statement, because the relation implied in dread is negative and accidental, touching only what is external. It does not

embrace that which is essential; it is not ideal, and therefore cannot be the basis of religious feeling.

This general consideration might be confirmed by reference to the details of the analysis, but the bearing of these on the point is sufficiently clear to render special treatment unnecessary.

With reverence, then, we have to deal. This is the emotion that manifests itself in worship. So far, however, we have looked at it only in its general bearing, and are not therefore able as yet to say more than that it can be an element in religion—are not able, that is, to say that it always is religious in value. Indeed, we have spoken of it as existing in circumstances that are not religious. We have spoken, *e.g.*, of a student being moved to reverence in the presence of his teacher, and there is nothing religious in such a case. We must, therefore, go on to consider what it is that invests it with religious significance. Let us recall what we have gathered as to its nature. It comes into existence in presence of an ideal that affects us because of its affinity with our nature, compelling us to acknowledge its worth and to strive after its realisation. But such an ideal must be embodied in a character, and must be presented to us in a person by whom we are impressed, to whom we feel drawn, and whose favour and fellowship we long to gain and enjoy. Hence the cause or object of reverence is an ideal person whom we instinctively honour, and likeness to whom, the favour of whom, and fellowship with whom, constitute the aim of our effort; or, otherwise stated, the cause or object of reverence is one whom we instinctively honour because ideal, whose favour, as the basis of fellowship, we instinctively desire because a person, and likeness to whom we strive after, as the condition of approval and of fellowship, because an ideal person. Such is the conception of reverence in general which our investigation has yielded. But reverence may have a wider or a narrower range. It may be a partial or a complete movement of our being, and

its extent will depend on our view of the object, on the standpoint from which we regard it, and on the side or phase which it presents to us. In other words, it may be excited by special qualities displayed by the individual, or by the individual in the fulness of his personality. We may revere a person who is pre-eminently wise, or brave, or generous, merely as wise, or brave, or generous; or we may revere him because of what he is in spirit and disposition—because of the character which gives direction to his several qualities, which is the central element influencing and controlling all else, and investing the whole with value. Now, it is evident that religious reverence, in its full sense, must be of the latter sort—must be stirred not by special qualities, but by a character in which these are united and blended; for religion has to do with the individual as a whole, and that which moves him must be a person in the fulness of his personality.

For the sake of clearness I have, in the foregoing analysis and statement, used only the terms reverence and dread to designate the two kinds of experience covered by the term fear. These however, strictly speaking, apply to the respective experiences only at their highest. Within each sphere there are different grades that form a scale of intensity. Dread is the extreme of anxiety on account of possible danger; and between the mere suspicion of harm and the terror that masters, there are several intermediate stages. Reverence is also an extreme, the extreme of respect for that which is in itself worthy; and between the simple feeling of regard and the awe that fills us and moves us to the depths of our being, there are several intermediate stages. These we may designate respect, admiration, honour, esteem, and so forth. Such emotions are akin to reverence. They differ from it only in degree. In reverence the feeling manifested in them is raised to its highest power. This point calls for notice here, because it brings out the fact that only in religion does reverence, in the accurate sense of the word,

appear. It appears only in that region, because only there have we an object that can lift respect to its highest possible manifestation. As we have just seen, it is not individual qualities that excite or sustain this emotion in its intensity, but a person or character in which the qualities that appeal to us unite and blend, and such a person or character can be found only in the sphere of religion. In other words, we can reverence only God,—whatever we mean by that title,—the Being whom we recognise as supreme, because the embodiment of all that is noblest and most inspiring. We cannot reverence anything or anyone less than the highest, and, consequently, where we have reverence we have religion; where we have that which is less than reverence, we have not religion—we have, at most, its possibility.

Religion has been defined by Professor Seeley as “habitual and permanent admiration.”¹ But this definition is defective, at least in its expression. Admiration is not religious in value. It lacks intensity. The object of our admiration is not necessarily above us. We do not worship it, and we cannot. Admiration involves judgment and approval on our part, and we do not fall down before that which we judge and approve. We fall down before that which is so far above us and so much superior to us, that judgment and approval on our part would be arrogance and insult; or rather, we fall down before that which is the highest conceivable by us, and therefore judgment and approval of it on our part would be absurd, seeing that we could judge and approve of it only on the ground of its own nature.

Enough, however, has been said to show that reverence not only may be religious, but, in the strict sense of the term, always is religious; and that it has as its cause and object, the Highest and Best known to or conceivable by us.

Having thus discovered what reverence is and what it involves, we must consider in what ways it expresses itself in worship. And it is evident, from what we have learned

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 74.

regarding it, that it will express itself in two different ways. These rest respectively on the sense of separation and the sense of relation, which we have discovered to be the two sides of reverence, or rather the two elements, the union of which constitutes reverence. The former will take the form of homage, of adoration, of ascription of praise and celebration of dignity. The separation recognised is, as we saw, the separation of perfection from imperfection. The recognition of moral and spiritual perfection must evoke our adoration. Constituted as we are, we have an affinity with goodness, and cannot therefore help acknowledging goodness when we stand before it. Unwillingly even we may do it honour, just as we may be compelled to admit and admire the grace and beauty of some one whom we dislike.

But along with homage, springing from the sense of separation, there will be aspiration, springing from the sense of relation. Having seen and acknowledged our ideal, we cannot help feeling a desire to rise toward it. This desire may be evanescent, yielding no result in effort or attainment; but it must be excited, and in worship it is definitely and decidedly expressed. Worship is more than adoration, implying acknowledgment of superiority and confession of inferiority; it is yearning, implying desire to overcome inferiority and conviction that this is possible. And it is with this side of reverence that we have at present to do; for it is on this side, if anywhere, that a connection between religion and morality will be discovered.

We have, then, to consider aspiration as an element in worship, and, because an element in worship, shedding light on religion. And, as we have learned, it is stirred by the presentation and apprehension of an ideal person, and involves a longing to approximate to that person in character and attainment, that in virtue of likeness to Him we may gain His favour and enjoy free fellowship with Him. There are thus two points that demand recognition and consideration: first, a desire to become like Him who has moved us

by His excellence, and, second, a desire to secure His approval and enjoy communion with Him. But these two points are really one, inasmuch as it is with a view to the second that the first is admitted. In other words, the second is the end, and the first is the means. We seek commendation and communion, and these can be gained only on the ground of similarity of character. The primary question, then, is as to the attainment of that likeness which is essential to favour and fellowship. Turning our attention to the human sphere, we discover that in it this is possible, and can be accomplished by observing the laws which have been observed by those commanding our esteem, and by putting forth endeavour such as they have put forth. That is to say, the excellence which we have observed in them, and which has roused within us aspiration, is due to the fulfilment by them of certain conditions; and if these conditions be observed by us, we shall reach the same level as they, and, standing alongside them, shall have intercourse with them. Such is the answer that comes to us when we move within the human sphere. Is it applicable to the higher region into which worship lifts us? But little reflection is needed to convince us that it is not. We see that it is inapplicable whenever we contemplate the object of our reverence. He is not a Being who occupies a position and displays a character that have been gained by obedience to law and the fulfilment of conditions. He is Himself the law, and the conditions are the features of His own nature. He is simply self-consistent and self-controlled. He is not one among many who occupy an exalted station, and display striking qualities, any one of whom might have influenced us. He stands alone in His dignity. He is the highest, the purest, and the best conceivable. We cannot think of anyone above and superior to the object of our reverence, because to think of such an one is to make him the object of our reverence. How we have reached the knowledge of such a Being, whether by speculation and

investigation, or by intuition and reflection, or by revelation, is a matter of no consequence in this connection. All that concerns us is the fact that, if we worship at all, we must worship that which appeals to what is noblest in us, and which does so in virtue of inherent goodness, and not in virtue of a goodness reached by conformity to an ideal that has come from without. What we long for, then, as the aim of the aspiration stirred within us, is not growing up, as it were, alongside the object of our reverence, that, being tried by the same standard as He, we shall not be found wanting; but growing up toward Him, as the end of our effort and the perfection of our character, that, being tried, and approved, by Him, we shall gain His favour and be fitted for fellowship with Him.

Here we naturally ask, How is this result to be achieved? And this question constrains us to take note of another point, viz. that the object of our reverence is the fountain of life, the source of strength as of inspiration. He is the maker and the governor of all that exists, of the world and its inhabitants; "in Him we live and move and have our being." He is supreme, the one living and true God. That being so, if we are to grow up into Him, we must do so in virtue of help rendered, and of strength imparted by Him. There is no other from whom we can receive what is needful. All others are not only less than He, but dependent on Him, even as we are. We are not simply to imitate Him; we are to reproduce His character, and this we cannot do save by submission and assimilation. What we aspire after can be secured, not by striving, apart from Him, after an ideal He has realised and a goal He has reached, but by union to Him, who is Himself at once ideal and goal.

The result reached by us enables us to advance a stage in our inquiry. What we have learned as to the aspiration that springs from, or is involved in, reverence, gives to us a deeper insight into the nature of worship. It suggests self-

surrender as its note. Since the ideal, toward the realisation of which we are urged to strive, is not something outside and above God which is exemplified by Him, but is God Himself, and since God is the source of life from whom we must draw the strength needful for growth and attainment, the spiritual state which corresponds to the yearning for the realisation of that ideal must be a state of submission. When we worship, we yield ourselves up to Him whom we worship in the belief that by so doing, and that only by so doing, can we become that toward which our thoughts and desires have been turned.

With self-surrender, then, we have to do in worship. This indeed may be accepted as its central feature. But in order that we may appreciate it aright, and may discover what light it sheds on the nature of religion, we must examine it carefully. It is self-surrender, the surrender of the self to the influence and control of Him who is the highest and best. It is the recognition that not by isolation from, but by submission to, God, can we become like Him; that not by our own effort, but by effort initiated and sustained by the Divine Being, can we become good and pure; that not by independent endeavour can we fit ourselves for communion with Him who has awakened within us yearning, but by opening ourselves to the transforming operation of His spirit.

To understand, however, what precisely this self-surrender implies, we must note carefully two things regarding it. The first is, that it is a voluntary, a conscious act; and the second, that it is not an end but a means.

First, it is a voluntary, a conscious act. As self-surrender it is not only the surrender of the self, but the surrender of the self by the self, and therefore the issue of a decision definitely come to. It is a rational procedure, the determination and work of a rational being. I have spoken of it as an act, but it is more correctly described as an activity; for it is not a single act but a series of acts, constituting

a sustained attitude of mind and heart. It is a continuous movement, initiated and maintained by a personal resolve. The decision by which the course was entered on is constantly repeated, so long as the course is pursued. From this it follows, that it is not self-destruction. To surrender the self is not to efface the self. Self-surrender is not spiritual suicide. It is not the sinking of the self in the object to whom the surrender is made. Were this its nature, there could not be an activity or attitude such as that referred to. There could be only a single act, for self-destruction could happen only once. With self-destruction, there would, of course, be the loss of conscious existence; and if conscious existence were lost, self-surrender would be impossible. There would be no self to be surrendered, and there would be no self to make the surrender. The fact that religion is not summed up in one supreme effort, but is a permanent form of rational life, growing in fulness and richness, proves that the self, though surrendered, is preserved.

The mystic, indeed, claims to surrender himself so completely that he loses himself in the object of his devotion. But, in proportion as his claim is valid, he passes beyond the sphere of religion, because beyond the sphere of consciousness. The state into which he rises or sinks is a state of suspended animation, to which no term suggestive of actual experience can be applied. It is a mental and spiritual swoon, about which nothing can be said save that rational activity and apprehension have ceased. He does not only surrender himself, he destroys himself, or at least attempts to do so. He fails, of course, as fail he must, seeing that the self cannot be annihilated by the self. He returns to consciousness, wakes up again to the sense of individuality; and this return is proof of his failure, proof, indeed, that he is attempting the impossible. He is seeking to quiet the cravings of his soul by lulling it to sleep, and to still its longing for communion with God by lifting it to a height on which the capacity for communion is stifled.

Self-surrender, then, is compatible with self-preservation. It is due, indeed, to a sense of dependence; but this sense of dependence, keen though it is, does not deprive the dependent being who experiences it of his sense of personality; nor does his recognition of and submission to it destroy the conscious and voluntary character of the resolution taken by him, and the resulting condition. A glance at the dependence to which we are subject will enable us to appreciate the point with which we are dealing. It is sometimes spoken of as absolute; and by Schleiermacher religion was defined as a feeling of absolute dependence. Now, from one point of view, man is absolutely dependent. He has come into the world apart from desire or decision on his own part; and the conditions of his existence have been laid down and are rigidly enforced, so that to them he must conform if he is to live and prosper. Further, for the strength that is needful for the fulfilment of those conditions, he is indebted to Him who is the source of all vitality and vigour. Not being self-produced, he cannot be self-sustained. The life imparted to him may at any moment be withdrawn. Despite his earnest wish and strenuous effort, he may become weak and may die. And this, in its general bearing, is true of the higher, as of the lower, side of man's nature. Mind and spirit speak, as emphatically as does the body, of relation to something that is prior and superior to them, and of relation to it that is dependence. That something is, for religious thought, the Supreme Being. Religion acknowledges that all that a man can become or have, that his actual and his possible attainment and achievement, rest primarily on his reception of power from above. If he is to be or to do anything, he must accept the energy necessary from Him who, as omnipotent, at once manifests all power and generates and distributes all power. Not only this, but if he is to experience peace and happiness, he must enter into fellowship with Him to whom he is thus bound. Looked at from this standpoint, man is rightly spoken of as absolutely dependent.

But there is another standpoint from which he must be regarded, and, occupying it, we see cause to qualify, or at least to limit, his dependence. He knows his dependence, and knows it not only as a fact that can be recognised, but also as a condition that can be accepted; knows, that is to say, not only that he is what he is because he has been a recipient, but also that he cannot remain what he is, still less rise to a higher level, unless he consent to continue a recipient. Now, if his dependence were absolute, in the full meaning and reach of the term, he would not know it at all. The knowledge of dependence, on the part of the dependent being, proves that the dependence known by him is not absolute; shows that there must be an element present and operative that modifies the dependence. That element is the consciousness of freedom within the limits of the dependence. As indicated above, the dependence is a dependence of conditions. We have said that, if man is to be this or that, he must assume a certain attitude. We state the matter hypothetically, and must do so; but there is no room for hypothesis in the domain of the absolute. The hypothesis suggests that the dependence may either be submitted to or not; in other words, it indicates that in order to reach a given result, a definite and well-marked course must be pursued. We are absolutely dependent, then, if absolute be taken extensively and be understood to mean universally, in every act and movement, in simple existence and in special endeavour; for, as we have seen, we can never separate ourselves from Him who has called us into being. We are not absolutely dependent, if absolute be taken intensively and be understood to mean wholly, completely, the determination of our actual procedure and endeavour. Absolute dependence, as thus defined, can be known,—not only can be, but must be, known,—for only as known can it be submitted to in such a way as to make the submission rendered of value. But the knowledge of it is not enough. That knowledge must issue in acceptance

and submission. We must not only recognise the fact, we must also recognise that action in harmony with the fact is demanded, if the full benefit is to be reaped. We must perceive that the dependence is not an arbitrary limitation, but rests on the very nature of things and touches the very essence of our constitution, and that to honour it is to gain free play for our faculties and full satisfaction for our yearnings.

From what has been said, it will be evident that religion is not rightly defined as a feeling of absolute dependence upon God. It has already been suggested, that it is not the feeling of absolute dependence that constitutes religion, but the attitude and action which that feeling produces. The feeling of absolute dependence is nothing more than the recognition of the conditions on which existence and effort are possible; and the important question is, What effect does that recognition make upon us? Do we joyfully submit to the conditions or not? A feeling of absolute dependence would paralyse the whole nature. Submission would be a necessity, and, consequently, would neither possess worth nor yield satisfaction. But the truth is, a feeling of absolute dependence is an impossibility. So far as conceivable, it is a state of mind that is self-destructive. The more complete our feeling of absolute dependence, the less capable should we be of experiencing such a feeling. The perfected feeling of absolute dependence would be the effacement of the individuality and the death of consciousness. We need something more than a feeling of absolute dependence. That can at most give us a present fact, an experience. Beyond this we must go to a conviction of a permanent and universal condition, a conviction that will take form in a conscious acceptance of that condition as the way of life and attainment and happiness. Thus the feeling of absolute dependence will be the counterpart of the feeling of absolute freedom.

This discussion was entered on with the view of bringing out clearly the nature of self-surrender, and, in particular, of showing that the surrender of the self is not the destruction

of the self, but is consistent with its preservation. It has not only brought out the compatibility of self-surrender with self-preservation, but has taught that self-surrender is the means to self-realisation. This reminds us of the second point to be observed in connection with self-surrender, viz. that it is not an end but a means. We do not surrender ourselves for the sake of surrender. We could do so only on the basis of mysticism, or of the false idea of absolute dependence which we have just criticised. But we cannot do so on the basis of a rational interpretation of human life. Let us here recall what we have learned as to reverence. Briefly put, it embraces adoration and aspiration. Aspiration, in this reference, is desire to become like the person who has moved us, in order that His favour and fellowship may be enjoyed. But as the person in question is the One Supreme Being, likeness to Him can be gained only by growing up into Him. From this it follows, that we must exercise self-surrender. This self-surrender, we have learned, is a conscious act, consistent with self-preservation and contributing to self-realisation. But, that being so, it cannot end in itself. It is a bringing of ourselves into line with the nature of things, and, above all, with Him who is the object of our desire, in order that a certain result may ensue. When we surrender ourselves, we open ourselves to the power on which we recognise ourselves to be dependent, that, by the operation of that power within us, we may display the features and qualities in which that power naturally manifests itself. Self-surrender is thus a means to self-elevation. We must not, however, suppose that this elevation is wrought out in us apart from our own effort. The process is not mechanical but rational. This is implied in all that has been said. It is self-elevation,—the elevation of the self by the self,—and it is associated with, is, indeed, the outcome of, self-surrender, which is a voluntary and conscious act. It must, therefore, be rational in nature. The power exercised on us is assimilated by us. We receive and absorb it, so

that it becomes ours in a real sense. We work out our salvation, though it is God that works in us. Self-surrender is thus not complete in itself, or performed for its own sake. It is performed with a view to the appropriation and assimilation of that renewing and transforming energy without which we cannot reproduce the character of Him who has touched and moved us, awakening within us desire for likeness to Him and communion with Him.

We have now learned something as to the nature of religion. We have discovered what religion as a state of mind and heart demands for its rise, what are its elements and what its modes of activity. We have seen that it is stirred by the presence and appeal of a personality who is the embodiment of the best and purest we can imagine, and that it expresses itself in adoration and aspiration; the latter being twofold in aim, since it yearns after fellowship, and after perfection as the condition of fellowship. With a view to the attainment of perfection, it surrenders itself to the object, and by such surrender it assimilates and appropriates the strength communicated by the object, which strength naturally transforms the individual within whom it works, so that he becomes like Him from whom it has been drawn.

Keeping this result before our minds, we go on to ask, what the practical issue of the religious attitude will be in the case of those who assume it. Will it be purely subjective, or will it be objective as well as subjective? Will it affect the individual only in his feeling and personal attainment, or will it affect him also in his actions and social relations? Will it be solely a matter between him and the Being who is the object of his adoration and aspiration, or will it colour his view of, and mould his behaviour toward, his surroundings and his fellows? The answer to these questions may be reached from either of two standpoints, from the standpoint either of the object or of the subject.

The Being, who is the object of religion, is supreme. There is none above Him or beside Him. He is the first and the last and the living One. He is the source and the centre of all that is. From Him all things come, by Him all things are governed, and to Him all things tend. It is His will and purpose that are being executed throughout the wide universe of being. On Him the whole sphere of existence, with its manifold departments, depends, and in harmony with His nature and thought are the disposition of its parts and the course of its movements. It is to such a Being that the individual, who assumes the religious attitude, surrenders himself, and it is after likeness to such a Being that he aspires. What he strives to secure is participation in the life and thought of Him whom he adores. But participation in His life and thought will determine conduct in every direction, since everything stands in definite relation to Him—depends on His life, and is informed and controlled by His thought.

The same result is reached if we contemplate the subject. Religion touches that which is central and fundamental in human nature. It does not attach itself to what is accidental, but to what is essential, in the constitution of man. It is spiritual in reference. It is an affair of the heart. It affects the personality of the individual. But the individual is a unity. He cannot be broken up into parts, nor can he pursue wholly independent lines of effort. His action may be varied in form, but it is one in source and spirit. As his, it is the outcome of what is deepest in his nature. From this it follows that religion cannot be confined in its operation to one section of human life or one sphere of human activity, but must affect those who come under its sway in their every relation and movement. It generates an impulse that dominates action, whatever be its special shape or immediate aim. It covers the wide and diversified field of human interests and concerns in its length and breadth.

We have thus, working on the lines laid down, reached a definite conclusion as to religion. Accepting Christianity as the most advanced form of religion known to us, and, therefore, the form best fitted to afford us an insight into the nature of the religious sentiment, we have taken its characteristic feature and have endeavoured, by analysis and investigation, to interpret it in general terms, so as to reach a result that will be universal in its application. In this way we have learned something as to the nature of religion and the religious sentiment in themselves, viewed, that is, simply as facts of human experience, and not merely in the special phase they have assumed in one particular set of circumstances. We have, of course, dealt to a certain extent with a special form of religion and a special content of the religious sentiment—those of Christianity; but we have dealt with these not in their special aspects, but as affording striking illustrations of that which is the common basis and factor of all forms, however varied and diverse. It was only because the special form in question was the most pronounced manifestation of the general principle of which we were in search, that it received the consideration which it did, and the aim of that consideration was not the explanation of the peculiar manifestation, but the apprehension of the principle manifesting itself in that fashion. As the issue of our inquiry, then, we have discovered what religion is in its essence, what the religious sentiment demands for its existence, and what its movements and expressions are, whatever be the character of its object or the form of its activity. In other words, we have discovered the foundation and spring of religion regarded merely as a phenomenon in the history of the human race, presenting itself now in this light and now in that, appearing now in one guise and now in another, but ever substantially the same, having the same source and the same impulse in human nature.

But the claim to universality put forth on behalf of

the conclusion reached may be disputed, on the ground that it is inconsistent with facts. It may be said that a single glance at the history of religion is sufficient to disprove its validity. Systems may be cited to which it does not seem applicable; and it may be urged that few if any of the religions, either of the past or of the present, have sprung from reverence as described, have expressed themselves in surrender and appropriation, and have issued in morality. In other words, it may be contended that the outcome of our discussion is particular and not general in its range, valid, perhaps, as an interpretation of Christianity and kindred systems, but invalid as an interpretation of systems distinct from these in character. Now, it must be admitted that if these objections could be sustained, the conclusion reached would not be what it professes to be, and, not being so, it would not only be inadequate, but would be worthless for the purpose for which it was sought; it would not only fail to shed the light required on religion in general, but it would fail to shed that light on any special form of religion, even on Christianity. For it must be remembered that our study of Christianity has been carried on, not with the aim of discovering what is peculiar to Christianity, but with the aim of discovering what is the essential quality of Christianity as religion, and what consequently is the ground, in human nature, of religion as a form of experience, the ground on which religion must always rest, the ground, therefore, that is common to all religions. If, then, the issue of our inquiry prove to be incompatible with any special religious system, it is clear that it cannot be an exhibition of the common ground of religion, and cannot therefore be the ground of that from which it has been deduced. It may register facts, significant and important, concerning its rise and progress in the individual, but it cannot mark the ultimate fact, the fundamental condition, and if it cannot do this it must be rejected.

What, then, of the objections referred to? Can they be met by us? Can we justify our conclusion, as the embodiment of a universal truth regarding religion and the religious sentiment? Before endeavouring to answer these questions, let us observe what precisely is the point raised, and what exactly is required of us. By an examination of the most advanced form of religion known to us, we may say the perfect form, we have reached a result that, if our examination has been rightly conducted, must be applicable to all religions, to those that are imperfect as to that which is perfect. Its applicability to the imperfect religions, or at least to some of them, is disputed, and it is declared to be out of harmony with much that the Science of Religion has taught us. Now, that there is great diversity among the religious systems with which we have been made familiar we are all aware, but that, as religions, they have a common basis and a common principle, is a self-evident fact. And it is with this common basis and this common principle that we are concerned. What, then, we have to show is, that we have reached that basis and principle—that the truth, to which we have been led, is consistent with, and expresses the essence of, all the forms that have appeared in the past and that exist in the present, the perfect and the imperfect alike. To do this fully, we should have to take all the religions of the world, and subject each in turn to a careful scrutiny. Such a course is clearly impossible within our limits. We must, therefore, seek another and shorter line of procedure. And this is easily found. We can deal with the matter in a general way, by showing that the truth which we have gained admits of diversity, and of that kind of diversity with which we meet in the several systems known to us; in other words, we can leave details out of account, and can fix our thoughts on the main features of the beliefs and practices with which research has made us familiar.

I have spoken of imperfect, not of false, religions, because all religions, whether false or true, are religions. This is the

case, because they are due to the presence and the operation of the same element in human nature. The terms false and true, indeed, as applied to religions, have no meaning in the sphere in which we are at present moving. They attach themselves to the object worshipped, to the beliefs held, to the creed professed, and with these we have meanwhile nothing to do. We have to do only with that which makes profession of a creed possible, which underlies belief, which constrains men to worship, with the feature in our constitution that renders us capable of these things. When we exchange a false for a true religion, we do not call into exercise a new faculty; we give to the faculty already exercised a new direction, a direction that is in harmony with its nature and design, and that, consequently, affords it full scope. The exercise of this faculty is the same in essence in both cases; the difference is, that it is fuller and freer in the one case than in the other, because engaged in congenial work. Hence we use the terms perfection and imperfection when speaking of religion in this reference.

It is, then, as imperfect that we have to regard all the religions of the world except Christianity, and, regarding them thus, what we naturally expect to find, and do find, is, that in them the principle which we have discovered gains partial expression. It is not enough, then, to point to diversity in the systems in order to prove that the result reached is inapplicable. That result admits of diversity, because what it presents is the condition of religion at its highest and fullest, in its complete form, and, short of this, there may be numerous variations. Let us observe how these variations may arise.

Speaking generally, religion touches man's relation to God. It is the response which he makes to the appeal addressed to him by God. What is the nature of that appeal, and how is it made? It is the appeal of excellence. He who makes it is supreme, the highest conceivable, uniting in Himself all the qualities that can impress men, and these at

their best. He is, *e.g.*, powerful, wise, just, tender, holy; or rather, He is power, wisdom, justice, tenderness, holiness, and it is the exhibition of Himself as such that appeals to men, and touches them into reverence. But how is that appeal made? It is not made directly, by the personal appearance of God in the fulness of His personality, but indirectly, by the manifestation of His attributes. He cannot present Himself to men in all His perfection. He can only reveal that perfection by varied activity. In His acts and movements He displays the manifold features of His character, and in and by these acts and movements He speaks to men, impresses them and stirs them to reverence. But His acts and movements do not all display the same features, or rather do not display the same features with the same fulness. Though each may be truly said to reveal His whole nature, all do not reveal it in the same degree. One emphasises one attribute, and another, another. In this, power is prominent, and in that, righteousness; here, wisdom stands out impressively, there, love. Along with the special quality manifested all the others are present, but they are subordinate, and are only discovered by reflection. All are present in every instance, because He of whom they are attributes is, and acts as, a unity; but some are in the forefront and some in the background, because, coming within the limits of time and space, He must reveal Himself partially and successively. Here we perceive the possibility of that diversity which we have to explain. Men may take account of only one quality, and may identify the Divine Being with it. Impressed with the phenomena on which they look day after day, they may confine their thoughts to the features of which these are the manifestation, to the exclusion of others. Thus, for instance, God may be regarded merely as a God of power, and may be worshipped as such, the service rendered assuming a form in accordance with this view of His character.

We must now turn from the appeal to the response which it calls forth. That response is complex in its character,

embracing adoration, aspiration, surrender, and appropriation. These are the constituent elements of reverence, and that emotion is perfect when they are all present in due proportion, and blend in complete harmony. But that is not always the case. One or other may assert itself, if not to the exclusion, to the overshadowing, of the rest. The sense of separation, *e.g.*, may be specially keen in certain circumstances, so keen as to deprive the sense of relation of well-nigh all its force. It cannot wholly destroy it, because, as we have seen, the sense of separation rests on a sense of relation, but it may reduce it to a vague underlying feeling, without strength enough to constrain recognition. Where this is the case, the outcome will be adoration and homage, with but little aspiration. Adoration and homage may be so pronounced, indeed, that utter prostration will be the issue—a state of humiliation so great as to amount almost to paralysis and despair. On the other hand, the sense of relation may be in excess of the sense of separation, and in proportion as this is the case will men tend to the opposite extreme. Instead of adoration and homage, aspiration will be dominant. And the sense of relation, divorced from the sense of separation, will create a mistaken view of the relation. It may, *e.g.*, be regarded in an external fashion, and, as a result, the worship offered will consist of rites and ceremonies, in return for the performance of which benefits may be gained. The desire for the favour of God may assume a material character. Its expression may become little more than a request for protection and prosperity, for temporal goods and physical comfort. The surrender made will not be the surrender of self, but the surrender of that which belongs to the self, a surrender that is formal, and that is made, not as the ground and means of the appropriation of the life of Him to whom surrender is made, but as an act that will create a claim on His regard and help. Because the precise character of the relation felt is missed, favour is not associated with fellowship, or based on likeness. In such ways as these diversity may manifest itself in the

response given by men to the divine appeal, but this diversity is not inconsistent with the position laid down as the result of our investigation. It is not opposed to the idea that reverence is the note of religion. On the contrary, the diversity is due to the separation of the elements that are found in reverence, or rather to the recognition of one element and the neglect of the others, and when examined it disappears in the unity of the emotion. The mistaken lines of action referred to are not the fruit of something entirely distinct from the religious sentiment, but are only imperfect manifestations of it. They point to that which is higher and purer than themselves, and are the product and embodiment of an energy that, if permitted to work freely, will transform them, doing away with that which is imperfect. The service rendered is determined and dictated by the character of the divinity to be honoured; and he who renders it brings himself, or at least professes to bring himself, for the time at least, into harmony with Him to whom it is rendered.

In what has been said we have met the objection based on the diversity of belief and practice displayed by the imperfect religions, by showing that different degrees and shades of reverence are possible, even necessary, in the circumstances, and that, consequently, variety of form is in no way excluded by the principle which we have reached and accepted. There is, however, another and more formidable objection to be met. The result of the foregoing discussion may be accepted; and it may be admitted that reverence may be stirred in various ways and may manifest itself in various forms, but along with this admission there may be doubt, caused by a consideration of facts, as to the validity of the assertion that, in order to the existence of religion, reverence must be stirred in some way, and must manifest itself in some form. In other words, the possibility of different degrees and shades of reverence in religion is not the same as the necessity of reverence for religion, so that proof of the one is not proof of the other. The two, indeed, are

to a certain extent distinct, and of the two the latter is the more important. We must, therefore, devote our attention to it.

The outcome of our analysis and investigation, was the conclusion that religion always rests on, and springs from, reverence. In opposition to this it may be declared that, so far from this being the case, there have been, and are, many religions that have sprung from, and that rest on, dread. Now it is true that there are not a few systems, with which we are familiar, that seem to justify this criticism. It would not be difficult to draw up a somewhat lengthy list of beliefs and practices which betray the presence and working of terror in those who accept and observe them. There have been, and there are, multitudes who approach the objects of their worship with anxiety and trembling, whose limbs quake, whose voices quiver, and whose faces are shadowed with alarm, when they stand in presence of the Deity. These think of Him, to whom they render homage and offer sacrifices, as the terrible One, manifesting Himself in the blinding glare of the lightning, the deafening roar of the thunder, the wild sweep of the hurricane, the destructive rage and fury of the storm; and they crouch before Him, afraid lest He may crush them by His might. How then are we to deal with these facts? Must we not, in view of of them, surrender the position we have assumed? In order that we may answer these questions satisfactorily, we must note one or two points.

And the first thing to be remembered is, that our mental and emotional states are not simple, but complex. Many influences contribute to the production of our commonest feelings and desires. These influences, too, may be, and often are, diverse in character. Considerations and aims that are really incompatible with each other may co-operate so as to affect us in a certain way, and determine us to a certain attitude or course of action. It is just this complexity that creates difficulty in judging human conduct

aright. Singleness of purpose is much rarer than we are apt to suppose. Blending with and affecting that which seems the sole ground of decision, there are frequently others which, if known to us, would modify considerably the opinion we form and the praise or blame we express. I may, *e.g.*, take, in some special case, the line which duty demands, and may seem to be governed solely by a sense of responsibility. It may, however, happen that interest coincides with duty. I may see clearly that to pursue the path of righteousness and truth will be to secure for myself the greatest gain, and this belief may add much to my resolution. Desirous of doing what is right, I am greatly helped in giving effect to my desire by the thought of the benefit that will be reaped by me. Further, the execution of my resolve may mean injury to some one who has offended me. Revenge combines with duty and interest, and lends a certain zest to my action. I do not, and perhaps would not, deliberately form a vindictive plan, but I have none the less a certain satisfaction in knowing that, what I ought on other grounds to do, will have the effect of annoying and hurting him against whom I have a grudge. Besides these, other thoughts may influence me in my behaviour, but these will suffice for illustration. Now, in the supposed case, it may be difficult to determine the precise character of the motive, because it may be difficult to discover which of the factors is central and which accidental, and what are their relative contributions to the result; and until that is discovered we are not in possession of the material necessary for forming an opinion. In other words, we recognise that one of the factors is chief, while the others are subordinate, and that it is the former, as affected, of course, by the latter, that gives the resulting deed its place and value, the former being essential, while the latter are only accessory.

In the illustration employed it has been assumed that the several factors are present to the consciousness of the individual when deliberating as to his procedure. But that

is not always, is not generally, the case. We are often swayed unconsciously by diverse considerations, and only when we reflect on our conduct do we learn how manifold, and it may be conflicting, have been the impulses that have moved us.

Now all this bears on the point before us. We are confronted with religions that unmistakably display signs of dread, but we are not warranted in at once concluding, either that they are the offspring of dread, or that dread is the only emotion stirred within their adherents. To do this would be, in effect, to affirm that our mental and emotional states are necessarily simple, due to the operation of a single influence; and this, we have just seen, is not the case.

In the present instance we have two elements to deal with. Our investigation teaches us that reverence lies at the basis of every religion, that is one element; our observation reveals to us the presence and operation of dread, that is the other element. Now, our analysis showed that these two elements are distinct from each other in origin and character. The question, therefore, that we have to answer is, Can they coexist and co-operate? May both be stirred simultaneously and combine to produce a state of mind apparently simple in nature? If these questions must be answered in the negative, then the conclusion yielded by our inquiry must be rejected as particular and not universal in range. But if they must be answered in the affirmative, then the conclusion will hold its place as universal in range. And that the affirmative answer is the correct one, it will not be difficult to show.

Our analysis of dread and reverence taught us that the former was excited by a thing, and the latter by a person. We reverence the character which the individual displays, which, indeed, is the individual; we dread the power which the individual has at his command, and which he may exercise on us. These emotions are thus different in rise and nature. But, despite this difference, they may coexist and co-operate. The possibility of this coexistence and co-operation lies in the possibility of the union of power and character in an

individual in such a way that both may impress. Let us suppose that we stand in the presence of a man of saintly character, who is in weakness and in humble circumstances, utterly devoid of power and authority, and let us ask what our feeling will be. It will be regard, esteem, veneration. We shall do honour to the moral and spiritual nobility on which we look. On the other hand, let us suppose that we stand in the presence of a man of saintly character, who occupies a high position, is invested with authority and is able to exercise power, and let us ask what our feeling will be. As in the former case, it will be regard, esteem, veneration. We shall do honour to the moral and spiritual nobility displayed. But, along with this, there may be anxiety, alarm, dread, caused by the apprehension of authority, and of power associated with authority; and this will almost certainly be the case if we are definitely under the control and government of the individual in question, and accountable to him for our conduct. In that condition, too, the anxiety and alarm may be so great as to obscure to a large extent the regard and esteem which we feel, and yet the latter is the deeper and stronger of the two emotions, and is the real basis of our desire to act in harmony with the character displayed. This is evident from the fact, that the former may be overcome without in any way weakening the longing for conformity to the ideal presented, whereas if the latter disappear the longing will disappear with it, and there will remain at most a formal obedience to commands enforced.

The state of mind with which we are at present concerned is most fittingly indicated by the term awe. When we stand in awe of one, we fear him in both senses of the word. We recognise both his goodness and his might, and are influenced by both. The influence of the one, however, may be greater than the influence of the other, and, in proportion as the one or the other preponderates, our awe will approximate to dread or to reverence, sinking into the one or rising into the other if the respective influences be wholly withdrawn.

Awe, then, is a state of mind and heart produced by the co-operation of two influences that, though working together, are quite distinct, and may therefore be wholly separated. Those two influences are, briefly, character and might, and what they suggest is authority justified by goodness and supported by power.

We have thus discovered the possibility of the coexistence and the co-operation of dread and reverence. And we have only to carry the results reached up into the religious sphere, to see that the objection under consideration does not hold. In the Supreme Being, who is the object of worship, goodness and power combine, and both these qualities are manifested by Him. Both, however, may not impress men, or may not impress them with the same intensity, and according to the impression will be the emotion experienced. Confining ourselves to the condition of things contemplated by the objection, we have to think of men in presence of nature, and of nature in her sterner moods, and we have to think of them as moved by terror at the display of the power which they witness. They are the subjects of terror, as excited by the apprehension of the force that seems to threaten them. Now, what will be the issue of such terror? The answer often given is, worship. Men, it is said, moved by terror, offer sacrifice and prostrate themselves in abject humility. But this answer is not strictly correct. The force is personified, the power is related to a Being who exercises it, and it is to Him, and not to it, that worship is rendered. Further, worship is rendered to that Being because of a felt relation to Him on the part of the worshipper, and in this felt relation we have the germ of reverence, and, consequently, that which invests the act with a religious character. What is required in order to lift the nature-worshipper to a purely religious position, is the development of this germ, and as it develops, the terror decreases. So far from being religious, dread is alien to religion, a hindrance to it, marring its purity. Its true character may be overlooked, because of

its association with religion ; but a careful examination of the circumstances shows us that it is quite distinct from religion, and that, in uncivilised and rude ages, religion existed not in virtue of it, but in spite of it. In those religions there was, and must have been, present in some degree, however slight, that reverence which Professor Caird rightly calls the "saving salt" of religion.¹

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 224.

LECTURE V

ILLUSTRATION OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

IN the last lecture we analysed and examined the religious sentiment, with the view of apprehending the nature of religion. As a result of that analysis and examination, we have learned that the note of religion is reverence, and that reverence embraces adoration and aspiration; the former springing mainly from a sense of separation, and the latter, from the co-operation of the sense of separation and the sense of relation. We have thus discovered the essential features of religion. We have seen what are the constituent elements of that state of mind and heart, the content of which is creed, and the expression of which is ritual. Our inquiry, therefore, has taught us that, in whatever ways it may manifest itself, the religious sentiment involves a sense of separation and a sense of relation, and, as the outcome of these, adoration and aspiration. Both may not, indeed, be equally prominent,—one of them may be so much more conspicuous than the other as to cast it entirely into the shade,—but neither can be wholly absent. That which may, at first sight, seem to be lacking, will disclose itself to earnest and sympathetic investigation. A consideration of some of the forms which religion has assumed will justify this assertion, and at once illustrate and establish the conclusion to which we have come.

We shall look, first, at religion as it appeared in India in early times. I speak of religion, and not of religions, because, from the standpoint which we at present occupy, the religions of which we shall have to speak are special phases of one

movement, different stages in one process that bring into prominence different factors in its underlying impulse and motive. Of these manifestations there are three that demand consideration, Vedism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism. But these three are one in respect of their basis in human nature, and it is because of this unity that they have interest for us at this stage. Their unity, however, can be discovered and apprehended only by a study of their diversity. We must, therefore, look at each and observe its special features, if we are to see the relation in which they stand to each other, and to understand the process of which they are stages. And inasmuch as Brahmanism sprang from Vedism, and Buddhism rose partly out of, and partly in opposition to, Brahmanism, we must deal with them in the order of their appearance, and, in dealing with them, we shall not attempt to do more than mark their outstanding features and characteristics. Our aim will be to apprehend what is fundamental. We shall thus leave out of account details and diversities within the systems, and shall fix our minds on that which enters into their substance. More than this it is impossible for us to do within the limits at our disposal, and more than this is not required for the object we have in view.

We begin with Vedism, and we use this term as designating the period prior to that in which Brahmanism took shape. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp chronological line between these two, and to say where the one ended and the other began. But it is not difficult to mark them off from each other, so far as their main features are concerned. Though we cannot say exactly at what point Vedism gave way to Brahmanism, we can say that here we have Vedism, and that there we have Brahmanism, and we can determine in what respects they differ from each other.

Vedism, then, speaking generally, was a religion of nature. The objects of its worship, when we first meet with it, were the powers of nature. These were, however, to a certain

extent personalised, and their personalisation was continued until all, except perhaps Agni and Soma, lost their physical character. Monier Williams says: "The phenomena of nature were thought of as something more than radiant beings, and something more than powerful forces. To the generality of worshippers they were more than distinctly concrete personalities, and had more personal attributes."¹ There was thus a multitude of divinities. But, though that was the case, the system was not, strictly speaking, polytheistic. It is best described as henotheistic. While each of the special deities was invested with its own special character, it was to the worshipper, whilst he was engaged in its service, the only deity—a form of that which was supreme. This was a feeling rather than a doctrine. Men acted under its influence without bringing it out into clear consciousness. De la Saussaye says: "The belief in the unity of the world may be said to be the fundamental dogma of all Hindu conceptions."² But, long before that belief became a distinct dogma, it was present and operative in the thoughts of men. There was a sense of unity prior to, and as the precursor of, a belief in unity. In the Vedic period, that sense asserted itself with increasing emphasis. But, as it only gradually gained the mastery, we find the greatest variety in the terms in which religious minds expressed themselves. "The early religion of the Indo-Āryans was . . . a belief which, according to the character and inclination of the worshipper, was now monotheism, now tritheism, now polytheism, now pantheism";³ and the theology of the Veda "hovers between two extremes; on the one side, polytheism, pure and simple; on the other side, a species of monotheism with several titularies, the central figure of which is, if I may say so, always changing places with another."⁴

But in due course the unity claimed and secured full

¹ *Religious Thought and Life in India*, p. 7.

² *Manual of the Science of Religion* (Eng. trans.), p. 499.

³ Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, p. 11.

⁴ Barth, *The Religions of India*, p. 29.

recognition. With this recognition, Brahmanism came into existence. Behind all, beneath all, in all, there is one power of which all existences are, in various ways and degrees, manifestations. This primordial Being is Brahmā. He is Âtman, breath, spirit. He is without attributes. "The one bëent," says Oldenberg, "is neither great nor small, neither long nor short, neither hidden nor revealed, neither within nor without; the 'No, No' is his name, inasmuch as he cannot be comprehended by any epithets, and yet his representation is the syllable of affirmation, Om; he is the *ens realissimum*."¹ Henotheism has broadened into pantheism. How that change was effected, what the different steps were in the advance from many to one, does not concern us here. All that we have to observe is, that Brahmanism, in its complete form, recognised only one existence, "one bëent," as Oldenberg expresses it.

Buddhism was a recoil from Brahmanism. And, from the present point of view, the two systems seem to present the most complete contrast. In Brahmanism a god is acknowledged who not only embraces all that exists, but who is all that exists. Whatever appears to be distinct from him is mere appearance, an illusion. In Buddhism no god is acknowledged. No god is needed, and no place for one is found. Man is concerned with himself alone. As Oldenberg puts it, "God and the universe trouble not the Buddhist: he knows only one question: 'how shall I in this world of suffering be delivered from suffering?'"² Hence Buddhism is spoken of as a religion without a god. These remarks, it may be observed, apply only to the earliest Buddhists; we might say only to Buddha himself, for to his followers Buddha supplies the place of a god. To their minds he takes the character and is clothed with the authority of a divinity. But what of the earliest Buddhists? What of Buddha himself? What of Buddhism in its central feature? It is, of course, indubitable that Buddha did not acknowledge

¹ *Buddha*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.* p. 130.

a god, and that his system, as propounded by him, was constructed without reference to a god. But that does not settle the point. A theory may involve more than its author is aware of. It may, indeed, include the very features that it is designed and supposed to exclude. A change of name or of standpoint may be mistaken by us for a change of object. How is it with the theory under consideration? The circle within which it moves is that of suffering. Its aim is deliverance. It is from the fact of suffering that it starts, and it is to freedom from suffering that it points. But what is the cause of suffering? It is desire for continued existence. That desire may, of course, take different forms, but fundamentally it is the wish to be. But why is desire for continued existence the cause of suffering? Because it is desire for the impermanent, for that which is unreal, for that which does not endure, for that which is not. The knowledge that all material forms (sensations, perceptions, etc.) are impermanent, is freedom from desire and, therefore, salvation. He who possesses this knowledge "turns himself from material form, turns himself from sensation and perception, from conformation and consciousness. When he turns therefrom he becomes free from desire; by the cessation of desire he obtains deliverance; in the delivered there arises a consciousness of his deliverance; re-birth is extinct, holiness is completed, duty is accomplished; there is no more a return to this world, he knows."¹ It is the impermanence of its object that makes desire produce suffering. But impermanence implies permanence; the unreal presupposes the real. If men turn from material forms because they are only appearances, they must turn to that which is more than appearance. In the passage quoted, Buddha speaks of a consciousness of deliverance rising within the delivered. But a consciousness must have a positive as well as a negative side, and, since its negative side is freedom from desire for the impermanent, its positive must be a sense of union to the permanent. Of this

¹ *Buddha*, p. 214.

side, Buddha says nothing definite. He evades, indeed, questions regarding it, and insists on the negative side as that with which alone he is concerned. But his refusal to deal with the subject does not dispose of it. The point for us, when we endeavour to understand the general bearings of his system and determine its character as a religion, is not what he set before his followers, but what his teaching and his attitude implied. Oldenberg is right when he says: "The characteristic fundamental outlines of Brahmanical speculation turn up again in this discourse of Buddha's with dominant force. We have shown how that speculation works in the conception of a dualism. On one side the eternal immutable, which is endowed with the predicates of supreme freedom and happiness: that is the Brahma, and the Brahma is nothing else but man's own true self (Âtman). On the other side the world of origination and decease, birth, old age, death, in a word, of suffering."¹ In other words, in this reference, the difference between Buddhism and Brahmanism is not that the latter has a god while the former has none, but that while the latter acknowledges and gives a character to its god, the former is silent regarding that which is the background of its thought, and which, if admitted, must have been assigned the place and character of a god. Buddhism is agnostic, not atheistic. It confines its attention to the present and the manner in which the present should be regarded, without recognising that which is essential to the view of the present which it holds and proclaims. It emphasises the mutable and the need of escaping from its fascination and control, but it does not observe that the mutable can only appear as mutable in contrast to the immutable, or that escape from its fascination and control can be accomplished only by submission to the immutable. What, however, was not evident to, or at least was not definitely declared by, Buddha, is clear to us when we subject his system to examination. Oldenberg says: "The speculation of the Brahmans

¹ *Buddha*, p. 214.

apprehended being in all becoming, that of the Buddhists becoming in all apparent being.”¹ But the becoming apprehended by the Buddhists was controlled. “The world is the world’s process, the formula of causality is the expression of this process of the world, or at least of that side of the process, with which alone man, bound in sorrow and seeking deliverance, has anything to do. The conviction of an absolute law, which rules the world’s process expressed in this formula, deserves to be set out in bold relief as one of the most essential elements of the body of Buddhist thought.”² “Being is, we may say, the procession—regulated by the law of causality—of continuous being at every moment self-consuming and anew begetting.”³ A causal nexus is thus recognised, and a causal nexus implies an underlying ground and governing principle.

In harmony with the positions assumed, as to the existence of a divinity or divinities, by Vedism and Brahmanism and Buddhism, were their views as to worship. In Vedism sacrifice had a large place. The sacrifices offered varied alike in substance and in significance. It is difficult to determine their precise value in the eyes of those who made them. Doubtless that value differed at different times and in different circumstances. In one case it was a thank-offering, in another its aim was to secure the favour of the god to whom it was offered, and to gain benefit from him. But with the ideas of gratitude and conciliation there seem even in early times to have united others that were deeper and purer. Benefit was conceived as gained not from, but in, the sacrifice. Sacrifice was, as it were, the principle of existence, so that, in sacrifice, men brought themselves into contact with that which was central. Sacrifice was thus omnipotent. By it the gods were actually created.⁴ It was by sacrifice, indeed, that they gained their high estate. It was on an act of sacrifice also that the first act of creation rested; and it

¹ *Buddha*, p. 251.

² *Ibid.* p. 249.

³ *Ibid.* p. 262.

⁴ De La Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion* (Eng. trans.), p. 511.

was by sacrifice that what we may call providence was rendered possible. The sacrifice not only induced, but enabled, the gods to act in the way desired by the worshipper. "Sacrifice is the condition for the regular course of the world, as well as for the preserving of life."¹ Oldenberg speaks of the offering as "the great fundamental power, and the fundamental symbol of all being and of all procession of being";² and Barth says: "In the consciousness of the believer, sacrifice is a highly complex act; but before everything else it is a mystery, a direct interference with the phenomena of nature and the condition even of the normal course of things."³ A point of interest and importance in this connection, is that the study of the Veda was regarded as sacrificial in character. It was one of the five daily duties to be scrupulously performed by all. From these references it is clear that sacrifice had a very wide and varied meaning; but beneath all the difference there lay the desire to secure the favour and help of the divinity thought of, by acting in harmony with his character, and supplying what was necessary for his activity.

When we pass from Vedism to Brahmanism, we come face to face with a condition of things different from that just described. The view entertained of sacrifice, and the attitude assumed towards it, in the later, are materially distinct from what they were in the earlier, system. In the later, indeed, there appear two tendencies that diverge somewhat widely on this point. There is a ritualistic tendency and there is a philosophical, and each has its own theory of sacrifice. For the former, sacrifice is of the utmost importance; the sacrifices that have to be offered are numerous, and everything depends on the manner in which the offering is made. The utmost care must be exercised in carrying out the various details, for the slightest mistake or omission will render the service worthless. In order

¹ De La Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion* (Eng. trans.), p. 511.

² *Buddha*, p. 46.

³ *The Religions of India*, p. 36.

that there may be no such mistake or omission in the performance of the rites imposed, a sacerdotal community must be formed and maintained whose office it will be to minister in things sacred. Sacrifice thus holds its place, but the estimate of sacrifice has changed. It has taken a new character. It is now regarded as symbolical, and the symbolical aspect of it gradually excludes every other. It is this estimate of it that forms the ground of the elaborate ritual that is insisted on, and that gives the priestly caste their standing and authority. For the philosophical tendency, on the other hand, sacrifice is secondary and subordinate. It has value for those who move on the lower levels, but it is worthless for those who have gained the heights of insight and knowledge. To those who occupied the philosophical standpoint, it seemed that if there were only one power or existence that manifested itself in all forms of being, there was no room for offerings. "If every man was a part of God, what necessity was there that God should propitiate Himself?"¹ The aim to be pursued was deliverance by identity with the one universal spirit, and that could and must be gained by other means than sacrifice. "Deliverance is the attained unity of the soul with its true mode of being, the Brahma";² and this is to be gained by the path of knowledge, not by sacrifice. When that path is entered on, the ordinary course and interests of life must be abandoned. Earthly concerns, since they belong to the sphere of illusion, can only hinder return to, and union with, the One Existence; they must therefore be eschewed. "The appearance of the doctrine of the Eternal One and the origin of monastic life in India, are simultaneous: they are two issues of one important occurrence."³ For those who have not attained to the knowledge that is deliverance, and who continue attracted to earthly concerns, sacrifice, as has been said, has a certain value. It may secure prosperity and

¹ Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, p. 25.

² Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 47.

³ *Ibid.* p. 32.

comfort during the present existence, and attainment by transmigration to an honourable position in a future existence, but that is all; it cannot secure return to, and identity with, the underlying principle. "Sacrifice is only an act of preparation; it is the best of acts, but it is an act, and its fruit is consequently perishable."¹

Buddhism, consistently with the position taken up by it, turned wholly aside from sacrifice. For it worship had no meaning. In its view there was no object to which worship could be offered. Man had to act for and by himself alone. Knowledge of the "four truths" was all that was demanded for deliverance, and these dealt with the present and the visible. Freedom from the sway of that which appears to be, but is not, sums up the condition of salvation. Of what is, if there be any such thing, no account need be taken. For such a theory, it is clear, worship in the ordinary sense of the term could have no meaning. On one occasion, Buddha, after citing various kinds of offerings, says: "The highest offering which a man can bring, and the highest blessing of which he can be made participator, is, when he obtains deliverance and gains this knowledge: I shall not return to this world. This is the highest perfection of all offering."²

We might, perhaps, correctly characterise the three systems with which we are dealing as follows. Vedism, as a religion of nature, sought the favour and help of the gods by meeting their desires and coming into sympathy with them in such a way as at once to influence and aid them. Brahmanism, as a spiritual pantheism, sought by transcending difference to gain identity with the one universal spiritual power. Buddhism, fixing its gaze wholly on the present, with its movement and change and suffering, sought to escape from trouble by the extinction of self through concentration of self, by means

¹ Barth, *The Religions of India*, p. 81.

² Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 173, 174.

of which, relation to what was impermanent would be destroyed.

Having thus noted the more important features of the three forms which religion took in India, we go on to ask, how far they harmonise with, and illustrate, the conclusion reached by us as to the nature of religion. According to that conclusion, religion embraces adoration and aspiration, the former springing mainly from the sense of separation, and the latter from the combined sense of separation and relation. Adoration expresses itself in praise; aspiration is the desire for approval and communion, and, as the condition of these, for likeness to the object apprehended. And the likeness sought can be gained only by assimilation, and assimilation can issue only from surrender and appropriation. We saw that, while these elements constitute the essence of religion, they do not necessarily all appear with equal prominence in every form of religion, but that one or other may in a particular form be so pronounced in its manifestation as to overshadow the others, and lead to the opinion that it, and it alone, is present and operative. What, then, of the forms of which we are at present thinking?

In these we perceive the presence and operation of both the sense of separation and the sense of relation, but the proportion between them is not the same in all. In one the sense of separation is greater than the sense of relation; in another the sense of relation is greater than the sense of separation. Indeed, it is just the change that takes place in the relative positions and values of these factors, as one system makes way for another, that invests the process, of which these systems are stages, with significance for the inquirer into the nature of religion. We shall endeavour to trace this change.

In Vedism, the sense of separation and the sense of relation are both active, but clearly the former is in excess of the latter. The powers that are worshipped are conceived of as the bestowers of benefit, as protecting and providing for

those who satisfy their needs and demands. Originally powers and forces of nature, they have been personalised. As powers and forces of nature, they were, of course regarded as standing apart from men, and their personalisation did not, at once, at least, bring them nearer men. They had in the later, as in the earlier period, to be influenced by sacrifice, if their aid was to be secured. This, indeed, was the chief, if not the only thing that was required from men in order that blessing and bounty might be dispensed by the several divinities. There was, strictly speaking, no yearning for communion, no conviction that more than benefit should be sought, if full satisfaction were to be enjoyed; that, if this were to be gained, there must be union and fellowship with the object of worship, since to the object the worshipper was essentially related. This, indeed, was impossible in any real sense for those moving within the Vedistic sphere. For, though that was not purely and simply polytheistic, it embraced "gods many and lords many"; and this multiplicity, even if viewed in a henotheistic light, was inconsistent with that strong sense of essential relation that is the basis and spring of a longing for union and fellowship. Monotheism, in some form or other, is necessary for the existence and manifestation of a sense of essential relation.

The sense of 'separation, then, was the dominating influence in the Vedistic worship. But the sense of relation was also present and operative. It is involved, indeed, in the appeals made for assistance to the gods. Had there not been some kind of feeling of relation between the devotee and the divinity, the confidence that was reposed in the offering would not have been felt by the offerer. The offering was meant to form a tie between the offerer and the deity to whom the offering was made, which should be the channel of blessing, but the belief that such a tie could be formed rested on the latent sense of a natural relation. This latent sense is a postulate of sacrifice. In order, how-

ever, that we may appreciate fully the activity of this sense of relation in the Vedistic ritual, we must observe the meaning that was attached to sacrifice. It was conceived of as a means, not merely of gaining the favour and assistance of the deity by gratifying his taste, but also of fitting the deity for performing the act required by meeting his wants. Without sacrifice, and the right kind of sacrifice, the deity not only would not, but could not, grant the request presented. "It was by sacrifice—it is not said to whom—that the gods delivered the world from chaos, just as it is by sacrifice that man prevents it lapsing back into it."¹ Sacrifice was thus conformity to the condition of things in which gods and men were alike embraced, and, by this conformity on the part of men, the gods were both inclined to, and qualified for, the action that was requisite for the relief and comfort of those appealing to them. This view of sacrifice was doubtless definitely accepted only by the few, the more thoughtful and speculative, but it is none the less significant on that account. It is but the interpretation and articulation of the attitude and action of the adherents of the system within which it arose. And its significance consists in the testimony which it offers to the presence and operation of the sense of relation. This feeling was revealed in the mere act of sacrifice. That involved the recognition of a relation, but the relation recognised was not necessarily internal and essential: it might be only external and economical. What was sought was material benefit and physical satisfaction. In order to secure this there must be surrender, but not self-surrender. What was offered was something that belonged to the individual, not the individual himself. On this a considerable advance is made when sacrifice is viewed as affecting the ability of the gods, because touching the order of existence. In that conception of it we have, at least, the suggestion, not only of an intimate connection between the person sacrificing and

¹ Barth, *The Religions of India*, p. 37.

the person to whom the sacrifice is offered, but also of the need for harmony between the two, if the result desired is to ensue.

It thus appears that this form of religion is in accord with the conclusion reached by us as to the nature of religion. In it all the features to which that conclusion points are not equally manifest, but it may with truth be said, that those which appear to be wanting are present in germ. There is adoration: there is also aspiration in a somewhat external form indeed, but not without "the promise and potency" of that which is internal. If favour be sought rather than fellowship, benefit rather than likeness, yet in the idea of co-operation with the objects of worship by means of sacrifice, there lies that which points to likeness, and to surrender and assimilation as the basis thereof.

From Vedism we pass to Brahmanism, and in considering this system, we shall confine ourselves to its more developed, its philosophical phase. Here we have a condition of things very different from that which has just engaged our attention, though rising out of it. The many have become one, and the one is all-embracing. With this change in the object of worship there has come a change in the attitude of the worshipper. The sense of separation has given way to the sense of relation. The first has become last, and the last first. The sense of separation is still keen and intense, but it is keen and intense because, relation being recognised, separation is felt to be a contradiction. It is not accepted as the normal state, but is regarded as a state from which escape is to be sought. We might, indeed, say that the sense of separation is, viewed by itself, more keen and intense than it was; but, relatively to the sense of relation, it holds a less prominent position than it did. The sense of relation is fundamental, and by it all else is determined. This is seen clearly in the estimate formed of sacrifice. It ceases to be of supreme importance. It may bring to the sacrificer benefits that

pertain to his continued existence in the present, or in future, states of being, but it does not play any part in the attainment of what should be the aim of all, identity with the one spiritual essence. It is of this that the philosophical Brahman thinks, and toward this that he strives. But the attainment of this implies the surrender of the self; not only the surrender of that which belongs to the self, but the surrender of the self in its essence; and this, in turn, implies such a change in condition and circumstances as will remove the ground of separation and give free play to the relation.

In this system, as is evident, it is not in adoration but in aspiration that the religious sentiment expresses itself. Adoration has almost reached the vanishing point. It is, therefore, with aspiration that we have to deal. And the aspiration that is displayed is clearly onesided in its movement and manifestation. What is longed for is assimilation, but it is not assimilation of the power of the deity by the individual; it is assimilation of the being of the individual by the deity. Union with one spiritual power is sought, not that likeness may be gained, and on the ground of this favour and fellowship enjoyed, but that individual existence may be lost by absorption in the one existence. For likeness and favour and fellowship, there is no room in a thoroughgoing pantheism. What, however, concerns us in the present connection, is the central thought, or rather the governing impulse of the attitude assumed. And that is, that man's chief good is union to the Supreme Being, and this is of the very essence of religion. The way in which the union is conceived may be faulty, but that should not hide from us the recognition of the need for that union.

Further, the union is to be brought about by the surrender of self. That, again, is a true thought, though the false estimate formed of the self leads to a mistaken idea of surrender. The surrender contemplated is, in truth, an impossibility. Men cannot by any act of their own

efface themselves. They cannot by insight or knowledge rise above their personality. That personality was not the outcome of their decision or effort. It was created and fixed apart from their consent or endeavour. Hence, all that is possible for them in the way of attainment is, by learning its nature, to deal with it wisely, and to observe the conditions that are needful for its development. When we thus consider the state of the case, we experience no difficulty in determining the precise import of the Brahmanic theory. It is the exaggeration of one element of aspiration, and the neglect of the others. It is a partial and mistaken expression of the conviction that, if we are to attain to peace, we must enter into union with the Supreme Being by self-surrender. But it regards self-surrender rather as an end than as a means. It is not self-surrender with a view to assimilation and appropriation issuing in likeness, and, therefore, in favour and fellowship, that is contemplated, but self-surrender that is absorption and annihilation. The conceptions formed of the self and of the Supreme Being do not admit of the former. But, notwithstanding this, it is the true issue and outcome of the sentiment stirred. This is so far implied in the fact that, in order to self-surrender, we must bring ourselves into sympathy with the power to whom we surrender ourselves, for that sympathy is really assimilation and appropriation with a view to likeness, since it involves the removal of everything that would hinder our being possessed and controlled by that existence of which we form part. There is here a distinct advance on the Vedistic position. What was aimed at by it was the reception and enjoyment of benefits, mainly of a temporal character, whereas here such benefits pass out of view, and what is thought of is a condition in which these become of no account to the individual, because in it the individual is a part of, or rather is lost in, the One Existence, and is therefore lifted above the need of temporal benefit. In both there is aspiration; but in the former it is external and

formal, while in the latter it is internal and essential. The Vedic worshipper seeks to connect himself with the gods by means of the sacrifice, or, at least, to act in such a way, that his act will harmonise with the conditions of activity that obtain for the gods and thereby secure the end sought; whereas the Brahman seeks to connect himself with the one god, by ceasing from activity and by surrendering individuality. Thus in both there is an impulse toward definite communication with that which is above, an impulse that expresses itself differently in each, the one expression emphasising the independent existence of man and God, the other emphasising the dependence of man on God. The true expression of that impulse would have emphasised both these truths, and harmonised them in a theory that would have insisted on a unity that, though vital, was not identity, and an independence that, though real, was not absolute.

From Brahmanism we turn to Buddhism, and when we look at that system from the present standpoint, we perceive that it is the assertion and development of the higher form of Brahmanism on its negative side. The thought of the latter was twofold. It contemplated, on the one hand, withdrawal from the temporal, and, on the other, union with the eternal; the former being regarded as the condition of the latter. The thought of Buddhism is, or at least professes to be, single. It contemplates only withdrawal from the temporal. It cannot anticipate union with the eternal, because for it there is no eternal. It does not recognise any underlying, encircling, permeating power with which it must come to terms, but only changing existence from which it must sever itself. Such a system cannot urge to adoration, for there is nothing to adore; neither can it urge to aspiration, for aspiration is desire, and desire is suffering; it can insist only on recoil, retiral, withdrawal, quiescence. But these, when carefully examined, are seen to involve that which they appear to exclude. They are, indeed, but one side of that aspiration, of which they seem to be the denial. Men seek to escape

from suffering. They therefore long for a state in which suffering will be impossible. In order that they may reach that state, they cut themselves off from the existing condition of things. By meditation they rise to a mental and spiritual attitude, that implies the severance of the ties that bind them to the impermanent. But, as has already been shown, that negative movement implies a positive. Over against the impermanent there stands the permanent, and movement from the former is movement toward the latter. This movement, too, is fundamentally self-surrender, because it is in virtue of the possession of a self that man is conscious of the impermanent, and feels its pressure and pain. What he seeks to escape from is not something lying wholly without, but is an inner condition, which is the effect of relation to that which is without. The change demanded then is a change within, a change that involves a change of relation to that which is without. But, inasmuch as the relation to that which is without is determined by the character of the self, by ignorance, which is the first in the chain of causes, the change demanded is really a change in the character of the self, the removal of ignorance. But that change involves the submission of the self to the knowledge whereby ignorance is removed. It is, therefore, self-surrender. And self-surrender is more than a turning of the self from that which is unsatisfactory; it is a turning of the self to that which is, or seems to be, satisfactory. It is the surrender of the self to something other than itself. To surrender, men are impelled by the conviction that they are not what they might be and ought to be, and that this they can only become by relation to what is above them, and that in order that this relation may be realised, all must be given up that is purely individual in reference. There is, and must be, something in view of which, and for the attainment of which, surrender is made, and it is the contrast between that which we are and that which we may become that constitutes the impulse to self-surrender.

Buddhism, then, is a call to self-surrender, and that with the view of attaining the ideal state. It is here that the ground of its influence lies. The teaching of Buddha gained acceptance, because it appealed to the craving of the human heart for union with that which is perfect. Perfection to the Indian mind was rest, untroubled existence, freedom from pain and anxiety. These seemed to be bound up with existence. Hence, the ideal condition suggested must be the opposite of existence. Whether that meant non-existence, or a different kind of existence, "the Exalted One has not revealed this."¹ He confined himself to the unsatisfactory nature of present existence, and to the need for being freed from its control. Therein he was wise in his generation. He directed the thoughts of those to whom he appealed to that which was nearest to them, to that which they felt most keenly, the burden of this life with its cares and perplexities and afflictions, and he professed to teach them how they might rid themselves of this burden. Beyond this, he did not go. What their condition would be after the burden had been cast off, he did not say. Each could form and entertain his own conception of it, and to each it would present itself as a contrast to that from which escape was being sought. Deliverance was to Buddha, not a means, but an end. It was not freedom from that which hindered growth and development,—it was freedom from that which pained and wounded and saddened. It was this that gave it power, and that lent to it attraction. There are times when men think only of salvation in its negative reference, when their one desire is to be rid of that which oppresses and annoys, when the ideal of life presents itself to them in a purely negative aspect, when, we might say, there was for them no ideal of life, but only the conviction that life is an evil, and that continually. It was to men in this mood that Buddhism spoke, and spoke with effect. To such it offered that for which they were sighing—salvation, deliverance,

¹ Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 278.

freedom from care. But salvation, deliverance, freedom from care imply a change of circumstance. The desire for these is fundamentally a desire for entrance into a sphere different from that in which we are. That is not consciously recognised, but it is none the less true on that account. Its non-recognition, however, affects the form in which men present to themselves the nature and way of deliverance. Thinking of salvation only as detachment from that which perplexes and pains, men may not inquire as to the true condition into which they ought to come, may not take account of any Supreme Being with whom they have to do, and by union to whom alone the one state may be exchanged for the other. But, though they may not recognise such a condition or such a Being, it does not follow that they are entirely free from the influence of these. There may be factors at work within them that are not observed by them, and that reveal themselves only to reflection. This was the case with the Buddhist. When he, by meditation, withdrew himself from the world of the impermanent, he was yielding to an impulse toward union with the permanent, and was seeking to bring himself into harmony with it by gaining the knowledge that was requisite for deliverance. His action and attitude thus implied self-surrender; and though it appeared to him that it was only self-surrender in the way of renunciation, it was really self-surrender in the way of appropriation. The longing for release was at heart aspiration after attainment.

Having thus examined the different phases of religion as it appeared in India, we see that these confirm and illustrate the conclusion to which our inquiry brought us. In them we discover the presence and working of reverence. We observe it manifesting itself mainly in the form of aspiration, but not without suggestions of adoration, even when aspiration is most pronounced. We observe, further, the different elements which we have found in aspiration asserting themselves at different times and in different degrees, one being prominent

at one time, and another at another. The presence and working of reverence are revealed in the recognition of that which is above and superior to the limitations of this lower sphere, and in yearning for alliance with it, to be gained by surrender to it,—a surrender that is sometimes thought of as identity with the One Existence, and sometimes as deliverance from the impermanent manifold of the existence that now is, but the thought of which really embraces both of these ideas. In the former of these we have the ground of adoration. This, however, does not find clear or constant expression, because of the way in which the One Existence that is above and superior to the limitations of this lower sphere is conceived. But the very conception of such an Existence carries with it the impulse to praise and honour. In the early system that impulse reveals itself often in striking and beautiful fashion in the Vedic hymns, and though it seems to become weaker in Brahmanism, and to vanish away in Buddhism, it does not actually do so. It is only for a time pushed into the background by other impulses that in the course of events press for manifestation. Its persistence and strength are proved most impressively by the manner in which it compels even Buddhism to admit its claim and find scope for its operation. As has already been said, and as is well known, for the Buddhists, Buddha occupies the place of God. To him honours are paid. By his disciples he is adored; and in the adoration which they pay him, we have significant proof that this feature of reverence cannot be entirely suppressed. It may be neglected, but if so, it will avenge itself for its neglect by emphatic and even exaggerated expression.

As to the other element, aspiration, nothing requires to be said. In the preceding discussion it has been fully considered, and the different forms, with the causes and references of each, have been adequately dealt with.

From the religions of India we turn to Mohammedanism. And in order that we may discover whether or not this system illustrates our conclusion as to the nature of the

religious sentiment, we shall glance at its history, noting its main facts and features. And its history divides itself into three periods, of which, speaking generally, the first ends with the flight of the Prophet from Mecca; the second extends from his flight to his death; and the third covers subsequent developments of his system. These three periods we name respectively, the religious, the political, and the doctrinal. To the first we apply the title religious, because in it Mohammed appears and speaks most distinctly as a prophet, believing that he has been commissioned to proclaim the truth and to work reformation, and devotes himself to the fulfilment of his commission by endeavouring to persuade his neighbours to receive the revelations he has to offer, and to discharge the duties he has to inculcate. The second we call political, because in it he appears as leader and judge rather than as prophet, or perhaps we should say, that his prophetic gifts and authority are exercised in the discharge of civil and judicial and military functions. A decided change takes place in his attitude and his activity after he goes to Medina. He does not merely seek to win men to the acceptance of the truth; he governs those among whom he resides, dispensing justice and directing affairs, and he leads them forth to battle. The Church has become the State, and has well-nigh lost itself in the State. The third period we have designated the doctrinal, because in it discussion arises as to the significance of different tenets laid down by the Prophet and held by the Faithful and sects spring up representing different views. Of these three periods, the first and the third demand our special attention. The second does not claim particular notice, because in it there were few movements by which the essence of the system was affected. We are concerned with the first, because in it the fundamental dogmas and precepts were formulated and enunciated; and with the third, because in it there were incidents that shed light, either negatively or positively, on the significance and value of these dogmas and precepts as means of satisfying the spiritual

nature of man. To the second we shall only have to refer occasionally, for the sake of making clear points raised in connection with the first.

Mohammed was a monotheist. It was as a preacher of monotheism that he appealed to his fellow countrymen. He was led to assume the rôle of Prophet by the revelations that he believed himself to have received. The first of these came to him during a season of retirement for prayer and meditation. But prior to this experience he had turned away from the polytheism of his time, dissatisfied with it, and yearning for something that would meet, as it could not, his spiritual longing. The object of his yearning had also in a general way been perceived by him. In perceiving this he was assisted by his surroundings. It is difficult to determine what exactly were the influences to which he was subjected, but it is clear that he came into contact with those who, more or less, definitely acknowledged the unity of God. He certainly knew sufficient of Judaism to understand that this was its cardinal principle. And there were some in Mecca itself, who, though not Jews, had passed behind and above the "gods many" of the accepted religion to Allah, who, in name at least, was recognised as the chief deity, ruling over all and imposing duties on all. It may be a mistake to speak of these as a sect, and to identify them with the Hanifs. But whether few or many, organised or not, their existence cannot well be doubted, and the movement which they initiated and sustained could not but produce an effect on Mohammed in his time of inquiry.¹ In moving forward in the direction to which they pointed, he was not really abandoning the faith of his fathers; he was only reforming it, by sweeping away the false divinities that had been permitted to dim the glory and usurp the place of Him who was the only Divinity, until He had become a mere shadow, overlooked and neglected except on special occasions.

¹ Cf. art. "Mohammedanism," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. vol. xvi. p. 546; and De La Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Zweiter Band, p. 348.

The result of his reflection, or, as he declared, his revelation, is summed up in the well-known dogma which, Gibbon says, "is compounded of an eternal truth and a necessary fiction," that there is only one God, and that Mohammed is His Prophet. The former was the theme of which he had to discourse, the latter was the credential he had to offer, and they were presented as of equal importance. Both must be accepted by the Faithful. Each, indeed, must be insisted on, in order to gain acceptance for the other. The eternal truth was presented rather as an authoritative declaration to be simply received, than as a spiritual fact that should commend itself to every man's conscience. He who presented it must therefore occupy a peculiar position, and hold a special commission. To cast doubt on the claim of Mohammed to be the one Prophet of the one God was to cast doubt on, or, at least, to make it possible to doubt, the validity of the message he brought. On the other hand, the Prophet was to direct men in every department of their activity. This being so, He, in whose name he spoke, must be the one, the only God; for if not, he could not claim the right to intermeddle with all their interests and concerns. The two were thus intimately connected and mutually dependent. Both, indeed, were not always emphasised alike; at one time the one was accentuated, and at another the other. In the first period, with which we are at present dealing, and which we have called the religious, the former was prominent; the unity of God rather than the prophetic standing of Mohammed was asserted; but in the second period, which we have called the political, it was different. Then the latter was prominent; the prophetic standing of Mohammed became all-important, because of the judicial and legislative functions he had to discharge. There was thus highest wisdom in combining the two, and requiring the profession of them as one.

Though Mohammed was the Prophet of God, he did not receive his commission direct from God; it was conveyed to him by the angel Gabriel. God was too exalted to hold

communion with men, even with His Prophet. The revelation made to him, however, was divine in source and nature. The Scriptures were God-given; they were even eternal, complete from the beginning, though made known to men in parts and as occasion demanded. It could not be otherwise, because the one God must be immutable. He cannot be subject to change either in Himself or in His relations. He must therefore have determined from the first what was to happen, and, consequently, what would be required in the way of legislation and instruction. And this was written down in the brilliant and dazzling volume, of which a vision was granted twice a year to Mohammed.

What has been said suggests the next point in the creed, viz. Predestination. That all things that happen in the lives of men and in the history of nations, as in the course of nature, are irrevocably fixed by Allah, is distinctly declared; and, in harmony with this declaration, is the demand made for absolute submission to the divine will. From one point of view, indeed, absolute submission is the note of the system. Islam, the name given to it, and Moslem, the title applied to those who become adherents of it, both express this idea. It is, however, difficult to say what exactly predestination and submission or resignation meant for the Prophet. There is no doubt that he frequently presents them in a fatalistic form. He often speaks of God as if He were essentially a despotic and an omnipotent Being, who issues His decisions and executes His will in such a way that men have simply to yield themselves blindly to the circumstances in which they find themselves. While, however, this is true, it must be admitted that, at the beginning of his career at least, predestination is set forth by him in a manner fitted to encourage rather than to hinder pious effort, and resignation is inculcated in a fashion that suggests rational acceptance of the divine will rather than unintelligent and compulsory acceptance of an iron necessity.

In this connection we naturally think of the last article of

the faith, viz. Resurrection and Final Judgment. Mohammed emphasised strongly the responsibility of men. It would appear that this was the thought that pressed most heavily upon him in his period of preparatory reflection, for it was to it that his first revelation gave expression.¹ But such a thought is inconsistent with fatalism. Obligation and sentence according to conduct are utterly out of harmony with an abstract predestination. That leaves no room for deliberation and decision on the part of men, and where there is no room for decision and deliberation there is no room for judgment. The individual has simply done what he was compelled to do, and for the issue of compulsion there can be neither commendation nor condemnation. Duty can have no meaning for those who are under the sway of a hard fate, and where there is no duty there can neither be reward nor punishment. Men are, indeed, taught that admittance to heaven is not gained by good works, but by God's mercy. This does not, however, meet the difficulty. Abstract predestination has no place for mercy. By it everything is absolutely determined. To whom then does it, or can it, show mercy? Not to the person who has simply given effect to its own determination. That would be to constrain to a certain line of action, and then to overlook or to obliterate its result. But the latter as truly as the former would be determined. The mercy, in such a case, would not create an opportunity that might be embraced; it would constitute a condition that must be accepted.

As already suggested, the contradiction between predestination and judgment was not at first apparent or operative. "In the oldest suras we have monotheism in its positive and practical form,"² and in harmony with this form, these two conceptions were presented as aids and encouragements to a pious life. Gradually, however, a change took place, and the unity of God in its abstract form was proclaimed, with the result that men, instead of

¹ Sura xevi.

² Art. "Mohammedanism," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xvi. p. 548.

being stimulated spiritually, were arrested and paralysed. This change was due to the altered surroundings of the Prophet. It is clearly visible in the second, or political, period. During that period he found it needful to claim and exercise absolute authority. Such authority could belong to him only as the Prophet of an absolute ruler, who did not speak to the hearts and consciences of men, but who issued commands that, whatever their character, must be unhesitatingly obeyed, and that might be obeyed regardless of consequences, since by him all things were fixed and settled. Thus predestination tended to become fatalistic, and judgment lost its moral quality.

We must now glance at the religious duties imposed by Mohammed on his followers. These were four, viz. Prayer, Almsgiving, Fasting, Pilgrimage.

Prayer, the Prophet declared, was the pillar of religion and the key of paradise. Hence he insisted on it, and gave minute directions regarding it. Five times a day the Faithful were to prostrate themselves before Allah. With prayer were associated preparatory washings and purifications. At first these had a subjective reference—they were symbolic of the state of mind and heart in which men should approach God; later, they lost, to a large extent, if not altogether, this character, and became formal ceremonies to be observed for their own sake. What precise value Mohammed attached to prayer it is not easy to say. So far as his followers are concerned, it consists mainly in a devout repetition of a certain number of phrases and ejaculations. That repetition must be supposed to possess some efficacy and to secure some benefit; but what that efficacy is, and how benefit is secured, does not appear. By the orthodox Moslem it cannot be regarded as a means of communion with God, for He is too exalted to hold communion with men; neither can it be offered with the view of gaining help and support in the duties of life, for even apart from belief in abstract predestination, it is not supplicatory in its terms. The truth,

perhaps, is that here, as elsewhere, Mohammed's spiritual nature constrained him to embrace in his religion elements that were inconsistent with its fundamental doctrine, and blinded him to the inconsistency of which he was guilty.

Almsgiving was partly compulsory and partly voluntary. A certain proportion of one's substance was to be surrendered, and above and beyond this the poor might be helped. This arrangement, while fostering a feeling of brotherhood, suggested the claim which God had upon men in virtue of their dependence on Him.

On fasting and pilgrimage it is unnecessary to dwell. Their general bearing is apparent, and their details are not of importance for our present purpose.

We have thus noted the main features of Mohammedanism in the early stages of its history, and have discovered the general characteristics of the system as it was shaped and moulded by the Prophet himself. We must now glance at the third or doctrinal period. And what concerns us in it is, as the title given it suggests, the differences of view that manifested themselves within, or at least in relation to, the system. The numerous sects that came into existence are interesting as affording an insight into the teaching of the Koran. This they do by making plain the ambiguities and contradictions in it that render diversity of creed possible, and by exhibiting its failure to meet certain elements in the spiritual nature of men, the craving of which they sought to satisfy by the fusion with it of material drawn from other sources. To these sects, then, we must turn our attention. Happily, however, it is not necessary that we should either enumerate them all or deal in detail with those to which we refer. Of the seventy-three that are said to have existed, only a very few need be alluded to, and regarding these a brief indication of their special standpoint and doctrine will suffice.¹

¹ The sketch which I give of the different sects referred to is drawn mainly from De La Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Zweiter Band, pp. 375-402, and art. "Mohammedanism," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. vol. xvi.

We begin with the Mo'tazilites. The subject to which the members of this sect devoted special attention was the nature of God. They insisted on His unity and on His righteousness. In connection with the former, they discussed the divine attributes. These they denied. They argued that to admit that God has attributes is to surrender His unity; because such attributes, if they exist, must be eternal, and being eternal must be kind of deities. "We ought not therefore to affirm the existence of an attribute,—that of justice, for example,—but simply to affirm that God is essentially just."¹ In connection with His righteousness, they rejected predestination, at least in its hard, abstract form. Such predestination seemed to them inconsistent with righteousness, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it involved God in the evil of the world, and, on the other, it left no room for human freedom, and, therefore, no room for the judgment of men by God; no room, indeed, for a moral law, or a moral order of the universe.

The Jabarites were at one with the Mo'tazilites with respect to the divine attributes, but not with respect to predestination. They believed that every act of the individual, even the most trivial, had been determined from all eternity. According to them, men are foreordained to paradise or to hell for no other reason than that God has willed it. They did not therefore admit human freedom or the divine righteousness, as exercised in judging men and rewarding or punishing them according to contract.

Of the Şifatites nothing requires to be said, excepting that they opposed both the Mo'tazilite and the Jabarite view of the divine attributes, and that in their zeal for these they fell into the grossest anthropomorphism.

The Khárijites and the Shí'tes were distinguished from each other politically as respectively opponents and supporters of Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed, and his descendants. The former assumed a democratic position. They refused to admit

Art. "Mohammedanism," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. vol. xvi. p. 592.

that the members of any family or tribe possessed, as such, a special right or special qualifications for the Caliphate, and insisted on the equality of all believers. Every Moslem was, in their opinion, fit for that office, and the community had the right to depose the Caliph. What was of importance, in their estimation, was character and conduct. They held fast to the spirituality of Mohammedanism, and the theocratic character of the society which it was to create; and they protested against the identification of it with a temporal kingdom, whose basis and aims were secular and political. The weight they attached to the conduct of men led them to reject predestination as it was presented by the orthodox. They declared that a correct life should accompany belief, and refused to assent to the theory that a great sinner could be a good Moslem. They have been rightly called the Zealots of Islam, and compared with the Puritans of England.¹

The Shī'ites, as already stated, were partisans of Ali and his house. It is not, however, of their political, but of their theological, position that we have at present to think; and the important point in that position is their belief that Ali and his descendants were incarnations of the Deity. This belief was not held by the earlier Shī'ites, but it gradually gained acceptance, and at length became the central tenet of the party. This was clearly a departure from the purely monotheistic standpoint; but it secured, if it was not adopted with the view of securing, authority for those who were recognised as Caliphs. In any case, it was admitted that God could appear in human form, and was constantly so appearing in those who were to govern the Faithful. Of the Shī'ites there were several divisions, each doing honour to a different descendant of Ali. Of these, the Ismailian is the most important. They taught that God, who was unapproachable by human reason, had created the universe by the agency of the Universal Reason, who was produced by an act of God's will. The Universal Reason in turn produced

¹ De La Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Zweiter Band, p. 377.

the Universal Soul, which gave being to primitive Matter, to Space, and to Time. Man, as the creation of these, had a tendency to reascend to his source. The chief end of his being was to attain to perfect union with the Universal Reason. For this he needed guidance; and that this guidance might be supplied, the Universal Reason and the Universal Soul became incarnate in the prophets, and latterly in the descendants of Ali.¹

The only other sect requiring to be noticed is the Şúfites. These were mystics; they believed that it was possible for them, by ascetic exercises, to reach a state of ecstasy in which they could contemplate the Divine Being face to face. Beyond this belief they did not at first go; but gradually they came to assume a pantheistic position, arguing that "God being one, the creation must make a part of His being; since otherwise it would exist externally to him, and would form a principle distinct from him; which would be equivalent to looking on the universe as a deity opposed to God."² This argument is clearly a contradiction of the fundamental doctrine of Mohammedanism. Kuenen scarcely puts the matter too strongly when he says that "the true Şúfite is a Moslem no more."³ Still his appearance within the circle of Islam is significant and suggestive.

Apart from the several sects to which we have referred, the only element in later Mohammedanism that calls for remark is the worship of saints and the veneration paid to their burying-places, and these it is sufficient to mention.

Having thus noted the main features of Mohammedanism, and the chief movements that are associated with it, we must endeavour to exhibit its harmony with our theory of religion. That embraces two elements, the sense of separation and the sense of relation—adoration and aspiration. Now, that the former finds expression in Mohammedanism is evident; this, indeed, is its characteristic feature. If the Moslem does

¹ Art. "Mohammedanism," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. vol. xvi. p. 593.

² *Ibid.* p. 594.

³ *Hibbert Lectures* p. 47.

anything at all, he adores Allah. His whole life is a prostration before God, and an acknowledgment of His greatness. His religion is Islam, resignation to the Supreme Being, whose will is law. Of that Being he may have no very definite conception, but he at least believes Him to be the Highest and the Greatest and the Best of Beings, whatever these terms may mean. And, in the Koran, every title is applied to Him that can suggest attributes fitted to awaken within men feelings of devotion. Adoration there certainly is in this religion. But is there aspiration? At first sight it might seem that to this question a negative answer must be given; but a careful examination of the system, both in its earlier phases and in its later developments, suffices to convince us that this is not the case. It is true that its doctrines and requirements do not definitely recognise relation to God; but, if we pass behind the letter and form of these, and consider what they involve, and, in particular, if we note the significance of the different modifications which the system underwent in different circumstances, we shall discover indications of the presence and operation of a sense of that relation. We shall find that, in all stages of its history, it is influenced by aspiration to a greater or a less degree, and inasmuch as it yields to this influence, for the most part unconsciously, we might almost say unwillingly, it furnishes striking proof that aspiration is an essential element of religion. We shall seek to justify these statements by a brief examination of the facts.

It was when Mohammed was in retirement, and in retirement for the purpose of meditation and prayer, that he received what he believed to be his first revelation. That is to say, it came to him at a time when he had gone aside from worldly engagements and human companionship, because he felt a longing for truth and for communion with God. In other words, in acting as he did, he was swayed by a desire for fellowship with the Divine Being, and by a conviction that such fellowship was possible. Further, with

a view to this fellowship, he sought to make himself acceptable to God. He not only meditated and prayed, but he engaged in ascetic exercises, which he fancied would fit him for communing with, or at least for receiving communication from, God. When we note these points in his conduct, we perceive the influence and operation of the sense of relation. We recognise that aspiration had been stirred within him, and was manifesting itself in conjunction with adoration. It may be true that he himself thought only of adoration; but the question is not what he thought of, but what was involved in his procedure. And light is shed on his state of mind by the requirements which he laid down for his followers. For them he prescribed prayers and fasting and pilgrimage. On prayer he laid special emphasis, insisting on its regular and punctual observance. The prominent element in prayer, as ordained by him, was perhaps adoration; certainly that has become its characteristic. But prayer implies more than adoration, more than the acknowledgment of the transcendent superiority of the being to whom it is offered. It implies a feeling of need, and of need that can be satisfied only by Him who is approached. It is speech addressed to God, in the belief that benefit of some kind will ensue. But to speak to God is, for the time at least, to enter into relation with Him. As has already been indicated, Mohammedanism, taken strictly, leaves no room for prayer. If God be so exalted that He cannot hold communion with men, and if all things are fixed so that no change in their condition need be sought by men, then prayer has no meaning. But, as was suggested, Mohammed was constrained, by the necessities of his spiritual nature, to give prayer a place in his system, and the system, of course, reacted on prayer. And, in connection with prayer, we have to remember that purificatory ceremonies were to be observed before engaging in it. These, too, were at first, whatever may have been the case later, symbolic in character. They were suggestive of the inner state that was necessary, if

prayer were to be effectual or acceptable. And that state was determined by the character of the object of prayer. Because He was pure, those who approached Him were to be pure. When we thus reflect carefully on the whole circumstances, we perceive that at the bottom of the admission and practice of prayer, there lay the sense of relation which is the spring of aspiration. Latent it doubtless was, but still exercising an influence.

Fasting and pilgrimage point in the same direction. Take the latter. Why should men betake themselves to special places, which have been invested with a sacred character? Because, at those places, they come near Him who alone is truly sacred. The professed object may be to adore the Great and Holy One, but definite association of the Great and Holy One with particular spots implies a relation between Him and them, and also a relation between Him and those who frequent them. The command to visit Mecca is at heart a recognition of man's need of contact and communion with God as the means of spiritual benefit. It is, of course, entirely out of harmony with Mohammedanism, rigidly interpreted; but just because of this it is valuable and suggestive, as testifying to an element in man's spiritual nature that may be overlooked, but cannot be suppressed.

Predestination may seem to be at variance with aspiration, but when considering it we must remember that it was often, and, at first mainly, insisted on as a support to pious effort. Men were encouraged to do what was right by the thought that, in doing what was right, they were carrying out the will of God. They were to work because God was working in them. In harmony with this view was the call to resignation, to surrender to the divine will. This resignation was often demanded in the form of irrational and unintelligent submission to a hard fiat, which expressed an eternal decree, and it was in this form that it was too often manifested by the Faithful. But it had another form, and

that must not be overlooked by us, however much it may have, as a matter of fact, fallen into the background. And viewed from this standpoint, predestination and resignation testify to a sense of relation. He with whom men have to do has eternally fixed the order of their lives. He does not arbitrarily decide on one course to-day and on another to-morrow. What is to happen has been determined from the beginning. But that implies a permanent relation between Him and them,—a relation that rests, indeed, on His will and not on His nature, but a relation none the less. And this relation is to be realised by resignation, which is to issue in a pious life, and which yields assurance that meets and sustains aspiration. Of course this involves freedom on the part of men; and Mohammed, so far from expressly denying this, frequently expresses himself in terms that presuppose it, inconsistent though it was with his fundamental doctrine. That there were irreconcilable elements in his system is apparent from the different sects that arose, all claiming to found upon its teaching, while advocating views the most antagonistic. Of this, a striking illustration, bearing upon the point more immediately before us, is furnished by the Mo'tazilites and the Jabarites. The former as we have learned, insisted on righteousness as the essence of God, and, consequently, proclaimed the freedom of man, since, without this, righteousness would have no scope; while the latter held to absolute predestination, by which every act of men on earth and their fate hereafter were eternally and irrevocably fixed. Resignation, in the one case, was a rational act, the apprehension of a certain course as right, because the expression of the divine will, and the decision to follow that course in order that harmony with the divine nature might be secured; in the other, it was the necessary acceptance of a settled and unavoidable line of action, and, therefore, was resignation only in name. The first was a dim conception of, or a vague feeling after, the higher freedom which is rational liberty, and the impulse

toward which cannot be destroyed, or even long suppressed ; the second was an exaggerated expression of the feeling of absolute dependence, which has sometimes been regarded as the very essence of religion. It is true that it is from the divine, rather than the human, side that the subject is regarded, and hence it takes the form of righteousness in the one case, and power in the other ; but our estimate of the divine carries with it an estimate of the human corresponding to it, and when we inquire as to the estimate of the human that is implied in the two estimates of the divine which we are contemplating, we perceive that it involves both the sense of separation and the sense of relation, though in very different proportions, and that, therefore, while it seems only to yield adoration, it by no means excludes aspiration, though that is rather implied than expressed in the states of mind produced.

The Khárijites, it will be remembered, maintained the equality of believers, and insisted on purity of life as a necessary accompaniment of belief. All the Faithful were alike in the sight of God. The truth proclaimed and the society to be formed were spiritual. Mere descent did not entitle to office and authority in the community. Character, and not birth, was the qualification for the Caliphate. Clearly, those who assumed this position were under the influence of conceptions of God that lay outside absolute superiority and abstract unity. His favour was enjoyed on the ground of character, of conformity to His will, not in word, but in deed and in truth. More than mere adoration, more than formal prostration before Him as Almighty, was demanded. There must be the embodiment of His commands in conduct, surrender to His purpose as good and holy.

In the Shí'ites the idea of incarnation is prominent. This sect was influenced by Gnosticism, and was not, therefore, a pure outgrowth of Mohammedanism. But the fact that it took root and spread on Mohammedan soil is suggestive of an element in the spiritual nature that was left

unsatisfied by the existing system. That is the sense of relation with the divine. The orthodox view held God apart from men. He was too exalted to maintain communion with them. But the separation declared was too wide. We have, indeed, seen that, even for the orthodox, it was in reality by no means so wide as it seemed. In theory, however, it was presented at its utmost stretch. But a God afar off does not meet the craving of men, and the acceptance by the adherents of Mohammedanism of the idea of God entering into human life in human form is a testimony to a defect in that religion, in so far as it did not satisfy that craving. It is, at the same time, a testimony to the partial recognition by it of that craving. For those who accepted the idea in question claimed to be Moslems. They believed that their attitude was consistent with the principles proclaimed by the Prophet, and this they would not have done had there been nothing in the system that seemed to furnish a basis for their view. We have already seen that there were suggestions in it that pointed to that relation; and to these, under foreign influences, they gave a mistaken, and, in the case of the Ismailians, a fantastic expression.

The Şúfites, as advocates of a pantheistic mysticism, were far removed from the orthodox position. With them the one God above men became the one God in men. To Him as the only Being, all things were not only related, but united. In this movement, as in the Shí'ite, we observe a neglected spiritual element avenging itself by exaggerated demands.

A last point, on which a word requires to be said, is the worship of saints so common in later times. Of this Kuenen rightly says, that in it "the sense of dependence and the need of redemption assert their claims"¹; and he adds, "it is a protest against the very religion in which it occupies so prominent a place."² In worshipping saints, men seek objects of veneration that, while above them, are yet in

¹ *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.* p. 43.

sympathy with them, that, while separate from them, are yet near them, so that with them they can hold communion. With saints the Mohammedan endeavours to fill the void that is left by the abstract monotheism of the orthodox creed.

We thus discover that Mohammedanism, when carefully considered in all its stages and phases, confirms and illustrates the result of our analysis of the religious sentiment, inasmuch as it proves that both the sense of separation and the sense of relation must be recognised if the spiritual nature of man is to be satisfied. In its original and orthodox form, indeed, it aims at expressing only the sense of separation; but close examination shows that it expresses also, though in a minor degree and unconsciously, the sense of relation, or, more correctly perhaps, that its expression of the sense of separation is affected by the sense of relation. Though adoration is its characteristic feature, aspiration is involved in the attitude assumed and the arrangements made by it. While, therefore, concentrating attention and effort on the sense of separation, it is compelled to submit to the influence of the sense of relation, and, because of this, it testifies in a striking fashion to the inadequacy of the former, and to the need of the presence and activity of both in order to the existence of a religious state of mind and heart. And the testimony which it offers, in its original orthodox form, is confirmed by the rise, within its borders, of those sects, in which the sense of relation forces itself into prominence and claims its right, even at times to the depreciation of the sense of separation. These sects were really a protest against the system as defective, and, such being their character, they disclose the importance of the element which had been ignored by it. The system and the sects, indeed, must be viewed by us in their relation to each other, if their bearing on the matter before us is to be rightly apprehended. And when we view them in this way, we perceive that the one emphasises, and even exaggerates, that which the other overlooks, and that,

inasmuch as they are parts of one movement, the truth to which they bear witness is to be gained by bringing them together, and accepting the different elements which they recognise as of equal importance, and as related to each other in such a way that neither can truly exist without the other. These elements are the sense of separation and the sense of relation, finding expression in adoration and aspiration.

Part Third

THE RELATION BETWEEN MORALITY AND RELIGION

LECTURE VI

NATURE OF RELATION

IN the preceding lectures we have analysed and examined morality and religion. This we have done with the view of discovering what they individually are and involve, in order that, having discovered this, we might be in a position to determine the nature of the relation in which they stand to each other. As a result of our investigation we have learned that morality has a religious basis, and that religion has a moral issue. The former is the case because the ideal which men are to realise by self-determination, since it is social in reference, implies, as its ground, a power or principle underlying and animating the system within which it is to be realised, a power or principle that is and must be God—the Being with whom religion has to do. And the latter is the case because the response which men make to the appeals addressed to them by God, since it is a movement of their nature in its essence directed toward, and involving surrender to, **Him** who is “head above all,” must influence their whole thought and effort, and, consequently, must find expression in the sphere of moral action. These,

in general, are the conclusions to which our inquiry has led us, so far as they bear on the point under consideration. And it is evident that they testify to the existence of a connection between morality and religion. They do not, however, disclose the precise character of that connection. But, while not disclosing this, they offer suggestions that, if followed up, will lead to its discovery. Having regard to them, we perceive that the differences between morality and religion, indicated by our analysis and examination, are not absolute but relative, and that, consequently, a consideration of these will reveal the points of contact between morality and religion, and will thus, by making plain at once their distinction from, and their agreement with, each other, enable us to appreciate aright the connection between them. We shall, therefore, direct attention to the points of difference with the view of apprehending what precisely they are, and in what way they can be reconciled with each other.

And the first to be noted is that which touches the inner states and activities with which morality and religion are associated. These are, respectively, self-determination and self-surrender. And that these differ from each other, in some important respects, is apparent. They imply different conditions and they point in different directions. Self-determination is the action of the self on the self; self-surrender is the submission of the self to that which is distinct from the self. Self-determination is the ground of resolve and endeavour; self-surrender is the ground of appropriation and communion. In self-determination we do not, primarily at least, look beyond ourselves. The struggle through which, as moral beings, we pass, when we determine ourselves, is due to an attempt on the part of the present impulse to defraud the fundamental principle of its right, and is, therefore, internal, though not without reference to what is external alike in its rise and its result. In self-determination, therefore, the self exercises its own powers, and puts forth the energy that pertains to it as a rational

being, and this it does with the aim either of gratifying its longing or realising its ideal. With self-surrender it is different. In it we look beyond ourselves. From the first we take account of that which is without us, and is greater than we, but toward which, though it is without us and greater than we, we feel drawn, in order that we may gain from it help and enjoy with it communion. And that which we seek cannot be secured merely by the exercise of our own powers, or the forthputting of our own energy. It can be secured only by submission to the influence and operation of the object that has touched and moved us. We must surrender ourselves to it if it is to act on us, or rather in us.

Such are the characteristics of self-determination and self-surrender. And at first sight, it seems as if, in view of these, we must place them under entirely different categories. But a little reflection suffices to show that they are not so far apart as they appear to be. Both are activities of the self,—determination and surrender by the self; and both are effects produced on the self,—determination and surrender of the self. Now, the self is a unity, diverse in operation and experience, but fundamentally one and indivisible. This being the case, self-determination and self-surrender must ultimately coincide. And they do so, alike in basis and in issue. They run back to a common ground and they reach forward to a common goal. They rest on the personality, and they contribute to its development. Determination and surrender are both due to an impulse toward self-realisation. It is because the self is not yet all that it ought to be and is capable of becoming, and is more or less conscious of its imperfection, that it endeavours to attain the end of its existence by dealing wisely with itself and with that which appeals to it. We may even go further than this and say that self-determination involves self-surrender, and that self-surrender involves self-determination. For what are these in their full import and bearing? Self-determination is the

identification of the self with the purpose of a system within which it is embraced, and is, therefore, the surrender of itself to that purpose, under the conviction that its fulfilment will conduce to its growth; and self-surrender is the submission of the self to the operation of that which has touched and moved it, and is, therefore, a determination on its part to admit that which will quicken and elevate it.

What has just been said suggests another way of stating the distinction and the agreement between these two movements of our being. It reminds us that both imply the presence and operation of an ideal. The nature, however, of the ideal, and, consequently, of the influence exercised by it, are not the same in the one case as in the other. We may express the difference between the two by saying that in self-determination the ideal is internal, and that in self-surrender it is external. That is to say, in self-determination it lies within the self, and in self-surrender it is exhibited to the self. In the former, it is bound up with the self, and, therefore, continually asserts itself, demanding fulfilment in every act; whereas, in the latter, it is apart from the self, and, therefore, appeals to it, inviting it to submission with a view to realisation. But the difference thus stated between these two ideals is more apparent than real. When we consider them carefully we recognise that the ideal of self-surrender is as truly internal as the ideal of self-determination, and that in so far as the former can be described as external, the latter can also be so described. As to the former point, the ideal of self-surrender, apart altogether from its content, and merely as an ideal, must be internal, because, from its very nature, an ideal must lie within the being, whose ideal it is; it must, in other words, be a potentiality of the being who is conscious of it, and feels impelled to seek its realisation. This being the case, it might seem as if it were a contradiction in terms to speak of an external ideal, an ideal exhibited to the self and inviting the self to strive after its reproduction. And, strictly speaking, that is the

case. But there is a sense in which the expression is admissible, and even useful. We are not self-centred beings, living our own life apart from all other forms of existence; we stand in intimate and vital connection with that which is around us and above us. Our ideal, therefore, includes within it the fulfilment of the various relations within which we are embraced. Hence it is stirred by the presentation of the claims which these relations impose upon us. While lying within us, it is excited to activity by the presence of that to which it corresponds. As spiritual beings, we have a spiritual ideal that is excited by manifestations of Him who is Spirit; and as social, we have a social ideal that is excited by our social surroundings. And to that which excites, since it is the reflex of that which is excited, the title ideal may be applied. When thus applied, that title has an external reference; but it is clear that it has more than an external reference,—that it is applied to the thing presented, not in itself, but as influencing the person to whom it is presented, in the way of constraining him to recognise what he ought to be. So far, however, as its external reference is legitimate, it attaches to all ideals alike, and therefore to the ideal of self-determination as truly as to that of self-surrender. What, however, specially concerns us meanwhile, is the internality of these ideals, the fact that both lie within the self. And when this is recognised by us, we perceive that they cannot be radically different from each other. For the self, since it is a unity, cannot have two separate ideals, both of which it is seeking to realise. What, therefore, seem to be two ideals, and, from one point of view, are rightly regarded as two, are not fundamentally two, but are different phases of one. From this it follows that self-determination and self-surrender, the two states or activities that are associated with the two ideals, are not essentially distinct, but are closely related to each other.

A second point of difference calling for notice is that which obtains between the exciting causes of the states or activities just described. These, from our present point of

view, may be spoken of as the objects of morality and religion. They are the world and God. Morality is concerned with the existing condition of things, with the surroundings of the individual, with the sphere within which he has his place, in its various aspects. It is from our environment that those appeals come which stir within us conflicting desires and call for decision. We have relations with the universe within which we move, and it is in virtue of these relations that we lie under obligation. Our duties are simply the maintenance of right relations with the persons and things that, along with us, constitute a system, and it is of our duties that morality takes account. Religion, on the other hand, is concerned with God. Its object is the Supreme Being. It is called forth by the appeals which He, who is the highest and the best, the source of all power, and the embodiment of all excellence, makes to men. It thus carries them beyond the present and the visible to the unseen and the eternal. It lifts them above the existing condition of things, and brings them face to face with Him who has made them for Himself, and who invites them to enter into fellowship with Him.

There is, thus, an important difference between the object of morality and the object of religion. But that difference is not absolute. The two objects, though distinct from each other, are closely connected with each other. This becomes apparent when we remember that it is in and through the world, in its various departments and movements, that God makes those appeals to men to which religion is the response, and that, consequently, the world is a manifestation of God. In it He expresses Himself in manifold ways. By Him it has been called into existence, and by Him it is continually sustained. He is its ground and animating principle. The world and God are related to each other as cause and effect, as author and product, as vital energy and material form. They are, indeed, in a sense complementary, at least for us. So far as our knowledge of them is concerned, they are

mutually dependent. We cannot, indeed, say that the Being, who has created and who sustains and governs the system within which we are embraced, could not exist without that system, but we can say that without it He would not exist for us, since it is as its creator and sustainer and governor that He is known to us. Even at its highest, His revelation of Himself is a revelation in and by, or at anyrate in relation to, the world in its several departments; and our apprehension of Him is determined in its direction by the revelation of Himself which He grants. We cannot know Him save through His manifestations. His attributes are not merely qualities, they are activities; and it is as activities that we become cognisant of them, and these activities lie within, or rather constitute, our environment. Hence, and in this sense, we say that for us God and the world are complementaries, so that a full consideration of either involves a recognition of the other. This does not mean that our knowledge of God is necessarily limited to His manifestations of Himself in the world, but only that we cannot gain a knowledge of Him except by means of these manifestations. It is not limited to them, or at least need not be, because they suggest more than they declare. They are the expressions of a personality, and we can pass behind them to the personality which expresses itself in them. We can know God not only in His manifestations, but in Himself, in virtue of the manifestations which He grants. It is so in the human sphere. We know our fellows by their words and deeds, and seek and enjoy their friendship on the ground of that knowledge. We could not know them did they neither speak nor act, but when they speak and act we discern what manner of men they are. We do more than hear what they say and see what they do, we gain by our hearing and seeing an insight into their nature and temperament. We are touched and affected by their manner and tone, by a subtle and indefinable influence that stirs esteem and affection. While, therefore, we could not know them apart from their

sayings and doings, our knowledge of them is not confined to their sayings and doings; it cannot be, for they are more than their words and deeds. And what is true of our fellows is true of God. While limited in our knowledge of Him by His activities, we are limited by these only in respect of the lines along which we must look, not of the things we shall see—only as to the way of attainment, not as to the object attainable. What, however, we have to observe at present, is the existence of a relation between the world and God, and, as a result of that relation, the reconciliation of the difference between morality and religion in respect of object.

There is a third point of difference, closely connected with that just discussed, which claims consideration, viz. the ends contemplated by morality and religion. From the standpoint of morality, men aim at filling rightly their place in the system of which they form a part. They recognise that they cannot separate themselves from their surroundings, and that, consequently, they determine themselves truly only when they determine themselves in harmony with these. We may here be reminded that it has already been urged that morality has to do with that which lies within the personality, that the struggle which it involves is a struggle within the self, and that the determination in which it issues is a determination of the self with a view to self-realisation, and we may be charged with inconsistency in now describing the aim of morality as the right discharge by the individual of the duties imposed on him by the system within which he is embraced. But when we remember that the moral being is not a self-centred being, but is what he is because a member of an organism, and that it is only as a member of an organism that he can determine himself, the seeming inconsistency disappears. He cannot realise himself except in relation to a whole of which he is a part. Hence, while it is within his own breast that the resolution has to be taken, and in his own character that that resolution primarily and chiefly manifests its effects, it is in relation to his environment that

it is taken, and it is on the ground of its congruity or want of congruity therewith that it is commended or condemned; and this implies that an effect is produced on his environment corresponding to that produced on his character.

From the standpoint of religion, on the other hand, men aim at communion with God. But communion with God cannot be enjoyed by men unless a right relation has been established, and is being maintained, between them and Him. Likeness to God is an essential condition of communion with Him. In proportion as we reflect His character do we experience His favour and enter into fellowship with Him. But we cannot become like God if we stand entirely apart from Him; we can reflect His character only as we submit ourselves to His influence. Such submission, however, involves a right relation to Him. Hence religion concerns itself with man's relation to God; and what it aims at is a perfect relation which will be a living bond of union, the channel of blessing, and the ground of fellowship.

The end contemplated by morality is thus different from the end contemplated by religion. But though different, these ends are not only compatible with each other, but are intimately related, so intimately that the attainment of the one implies the attainment of the other. This becomes apparent when we remember that they deal respectively with the world and with God. For we have learned that the world and God are closely connected. The world is a manifestation of God; in it He has expressed, or rather is expressing, His thought and purpose. This being the case, a right relation to the world must carry with it a right relation to God, and, conversely, a right relation to God must carry with it a right relation to the world. It could be otherwise only if the manifestation of God were out of harmony with His character, or if His thought and purpose were essentially different at different times and in different places. But neither of these is possible. The manifestation of God always is, and always must be, a true reflection of His character, for "He

cannot deny Himself." And His thought and purpose are and must be essentially the same at all times, for He is unchangeable in nature, with Him "is no variableness neither shadow of turning." Morality and religion are thus harmonious in aim. In the former we, so to speak, endeavour to assume the normal attitude toward the various sections and segments of the circle of existence, and in the latter we endeavour to assume the normal attitude towards its centre. But these attitudes involve each other. Right relation to the centre brings us into right relation to the various sections and segments, and right relation to the various sections and segments implies right relation to the centre. Or, otherwise stated, if we fill truly our place in the system in which we are embraced, discharging perfectly our duties to its parts and members, we shall stand in a right relation to Him of whom it is a manifestation; and, conversely, if we stand in a right relation to Him who manifests Himself in the system in which we are embraced, we shall fill truly our place in that system, and shall discharge perfectly our duties to its parts and members.

We have thus considered the main points of difference between morality and religion that are suggested by our inquiry into their nature, and have sought to show in what way the distinctions emphasised may be reconciled with each other. We have learned that these distinctions are not absolute, but relative; and that, when carefully examined, they prove themselves to be not the opposites, but the complements of each other. The result of our investigation is, therefore, the conviction that morality and religion are so closely connected that, while each may be treated by itself, neither can be adequately treated without reference to the other. From this conclusion, it might be inferred that these two terms are practically synonymous, and indicate only two sides or aspects of the same thing; in other words, that morality and religion are ultimately identical. Such an inference, however, would be a serious mistake. The reconciliation of difference is not necessarily the establishment of identity. Distinctions may

disappear in a relation of subordination as well as in a relation of equality. What pertains to a lower stage may be proved harmonious with what pertains to a higher, without the elevation of the lower to the level of the higher. We are not, therefore, entitled to conclude from what has been said that morality and religion are equivalent in scope and value. All that we have learned is, that they are vitally connected. Whether or not they stand on the same level and are of equal importance, or stand on different levels so that one is superior in importance to the other, we have not yet discovered. This is the point with which we have now to deal. And it was as preliminary to the treatment of this point that we entered on the preceding investigation. Our consideration of the points of difference between morality and religion and the ground of their reconciliation was intended to prepare us for determining precisely the nature and extent of the relation in which morality and religion stand to each other, by showing in what direction we must look if we would reach the end in view. And this it has done. It has taught us that the right apprehension of the relation between morality and religion rests on the right apprehension of the relation between their objects; and that, consequently, to these we must devote attention. This follows from the fact that both the inner states and activities and the ends contemplated are dependent on the objects. By them the former are excited, and the latter are determined. Hence, for a right understanding of either of these, a right understanding of the objects is demanded.

With the objects, then, we are concerned. These are God and the world. And the world, we have learned, is a manifestation of God. In order, therefore, that we may define the relation between them, we must inquire into the character, or rather the extent, of this manifestation. We must ask if the world is a complete or a partial expression of the Divine nature; in other words, we must consider the relation in which God stands to the world. Into this question we cannot enter at length; we must content ourselves

with a general indication of what seems to us the true view. And that lies between the extremes of transcendence and immanence. God is neither above the world, in the sense of being apart and distinct from it, nor is He in the world, in the sense of being one with it. He is both above it and in it—above it and yet not apart and distinct from it, in it and yet not one with it. He is above it as its cause, its source, its creator. It is a manifestation of Him, and He must be superior to His own manifestation. It is the expression of His wisdom and power; but these are greater than their expression, and He is more than they. On the other hand, He is in it, as its sustaining energy and its governing principle. It displays, in its varied movements and operations, an order and a harmony that testify to a permanent force and intelligence working in every part and at every stage with unity of design. The relation of God to the world is thus twofold, or, rather, may be regarded from two different standpoints and in two different aspects. We may, of course, fix our thoughts on one of these aspects to the exclusion of the other. It may, indeed, be at times necessary for us to limit ourselves to one, and, for the moment, to neglect the other. And no harm can come of this, so long as neglect does not become denial. But if our view and our treatment of the subject are to be full and adequate, we must recognise both.

God and the world, then, are not equivalent terms. The former is more comprehensive than the latter. The latter, indeed, from one point of view, is but the name for one side of the activity of the former. The world exists, and exists in the form in which it does, because God is what He is; but it is not the complete expression of the divine nature, or the complete embodiment of the divine thought and power. God determines the world, but the world does not determine God; it only reveals Him, and its revelation is limited by its finitude. It exhibits to us the movement of the Divine Being along certain lines and within

a certain sphere, fixed and framed by His own purpose, but it does not exhibit to us the movement of the Divine Being in the utmost range and complexity of His nature. It does not display that nature in its essence and fulness. It thus offers only a partial revelation. But, though partial, the revelation which it offers is accurate and trustworthy, so far as it goes. It cannot be otherwise, for there is no division or caprice in the nature and effort of Him whose work it is. All His acts are harmonious and consistent, because governed by the central principle of His being, and are, therefore, each in its own way and degree, true reflections of His essence. We speak of the divine attributes, and we arrange these, now on one principle and now on another, but while we do so we recognise, or at least ought to recognise, that these are but phases and modes of a fundamental unity, with which their exercise must always accord. When, then, we observe the exercise of one or more of these, we are in contact with the true and living One, and not merely with evanescent shapes and appearances that can yield nothing real and enduring,

We have thus discovered the relation in which God stands to the world, and in the light of that relation have defined the nature of the world viewed as a manifestation of God. We must now inquire what bearing the results reached have on the question under discussion. And we shall deal with the subject first from the point of view of the world, and then from the point of view of God.

The world then is, so far as it goes, an accurate and trustworthy manifestation of God. This being its character, those who stand in a right relation to it will of necessity stand in a right relation to God. It is the expression of His will and purpose, and conformity to His will and purpose implies harmony with Himself, for His will and purpose are always the reflection of Himself. But while the world is an accurate and trustworthy manifestation of God, it is not a complete manifestation of Him. It is partial, limited by the temporal conditions within which it is given. Hence a right relation

to it is not coextensive with a right relation to God, though in a line with it. The two are not equivalent, though consistent, and in part coincident. The latter is more comprehensive than the former. It embraces, so to speak, more of the divine nature, and thus, while including a right relation to the world as an expression of, and therefore in harmony with, the divine nature, it goes beyond it, and comprises elements and experiences that lie outside it.

From the standpoint of the world we turn to the standpoint of God. And, in relation to the world, God is at once immanent and transcendent. Now it is apparent that right relation to God as immanent, carries with it right relation to the world in which He is immanent. Right relation to Him involves sympathy with, and apprehension of, His thought, and these involve a right attitude toward, and a right treatment of, that in which His thought has embodied itself. But He is not only immanent, He is also transcendent. While in the world, He is above it. He has not exhausted Himself in His creation. This being so, right relation to Him is more than right relation to the world. It is union to Himself in the fulness of His personality.

We thus perceive that the relation in which God and the world stand to each other, from whichever standpoint it be regarded, not only confirms the conclusion to which we have come as to an essential connection between a right attitude toward God and a right attitude toward the world, but reveals the exact character of that connection. It shows not merely that the one implies the other, but that the latter is embraced in, and is subordinate to, the former. Our attitude toward God is more extensive in range, so to speak, than our attitude toward the world; and hence our attitude toward the world is determined by our attitude toward God, we might almost say is a special and limited reference of that attitude. Or, otherwise stated, both attitudes are fundamentally due to the same impulse, but in the one that impulse finds, or at least may find, full expression, whereas in the other its expression is

only partial. The difference between them is not a difference of impulse, but a difference, on the one hand, of expression of impulse, and, on the other, as conditioning that expression, of the sphere within which the impulse expresses itself. This becomes apparent when we remember that the world is a manifestation of God, partial but still accurate and trustworthy, so far as it goes, and that while God is above the world He is also in it. For since this is the case, we are dealing with God even when we seem to be dealing only with the world; though not dealing with Him directly and in the fulness of His personality, we are dealing with Him indirectly, in and through His activity. And inasmuch as God is a unity, ever self-consistent and harmonious in His thought and activity, so that in all His movements and operations He expresses Himself in His essence, or at least in conformity therewith, the spirit which we display when we deal rightly with the world is the same as the spirit which we display when we deal rightly with God. In the former case, however, its application is more limited than in the latter, because in the former we are contemplating only a manifestation of God, whereas in the latter we are contemplating God Himself. From all this it follows that a right attitude toward the world does not merely involve a right attitude toward God, but is embraced within it and dependent on it.

Here we may with advantage refer to a point that was raised in connection with self-determination and self-surrender. When considering how these could be reconciled with each other, we saw that each involves an ideal, but that inasmuch as an individual can have only one ideal which he is seeking to realise, these two ideals cannot be radically different, but must ultimately coincide. In other words, what seem to be two ideals are not really two, but are only different phases of one, that presents itself to us in a twofold aspect. What this one ideal is, and what consequently is the connection between its two aspects, we did not inquire, because we were not in a position to settle the point. This we are now able to

do. In the light of the results reached by us we perceive that the ideals in question are not co-ordinate as aspects of an ideal that is superior to both, but that the one—the ideal of self-determination—is embraced in and is a special and partial manifestation of the other—the ideal of self-surrender. This follows from the fact that the world is a special and partial manifestation of God. We have learned that the ideals of which we are conscious are excited within us by the world and God, and this being so, the relation between these ideals must be the same as the relation between the world and God. The effort therefore to realise ourselves as social selves is not fundamentally different from, but is an element in, the effort to realise ourselves as spiritual selves, and only when it is thus regarded is it rightly understood and truly appreciated. In other words, our estimate of our position as members of the system within which we are embraced, and of the duties which that position lays upon us, is inadequate and faulty unless that position and its consequent duties are looked at as involved in our relation to Him of whom the system is a manifestation, and in the claims which that relation implies.

In view of the results reached by us we are able to discern accurately the ground at once of the connection and of the distinction between morality and religion, and, thus, to determine exactly the relation in which they stand to each other. We shall look first at the connection. And, to begin with, we shall consider it from the standpoint of morality. That has to do with the world, and the world is the embodiment of the thought and purpose of God. Such being its character, to learn truly its meaning is to learn something about God, and to fill rightly a place in it is to act in harmony with the divine will. Viewed apart from God, its significance for us is missed and its ethical reference is destroyed. But viewed in relation to God, it discloses an ethical bearing, and not only affords us scope for moral effort but invests all our activity with a moral meaning. And, in virtue of this dependence, a sure and satisfactory basis for

conduct can be found only in religion. Short of that, we are within the system, and the system, being dependent, cannot yield authoritative guidance to its members. Only a system that is independent and self-existent can do this, for only such a system carries within itself the reason for its existence. A system that is determined by that which is prior to and above it, can be rightly dealt with only by those who go beyond it and discover the determining power which acts on it; and, in the present case, this can be done only by religion, since it is by religion alone that we can transcend the present and visible, and come into communication with that which is fundamental and essential. And, inasmuch as those who deal with the system are themselves parts of the system, apprehension of the determining power is not only knowledge but is also energy,—the strength to be and to do what is required by the constitution of the system,—for it is the recognition of a relation to that power, which implies alliance with it and submission to it.

From the standpoint of morality we pass to the standpoint of religion. And by religion we enter into communion with the Divine Being. Such communion implies recognition of His greatness and harmony with His character. It is participation in His nature and submission to His spirit. But these imply the existence and operation of an impulse to act in accordance with His will and purpose. And that will and purpose touch us, as they are embodied in the system of which we are parts. We recognise that system to be the outcome of the divine thought, and we acknowledge that our place in it has been assigned us by Him of whom it is a manifestation. This at once imposes on us the obligation to meet the requirements of our position, and sustains us in the effort so to do, or, rather, it quickens within us an impulse in the direction of the central purpose which carries us forward in the right path.

From the connection we turn to the distinction. And, as before, we begin with morality. That has to do with the

world, and the world is dependent on God, because a manifestation of God. But, notwithstanding this, it to a certain extent and in a certain degree stands by itself. This it does because it is the embodiment of a relatively complete plan, if we may use the expression. The several strata of existence that appear within it are bound together in such a way that they constitute a universe. It presents itself to us as a whole, and the aim of our observation and investigation of it is to apprehend the place and value of its several parts as members of a sphere of being that has an arrangement of its own, calculated and designed to work out a definite purpose, the completion of which will be its perfection. As such, the world supplies the conditions that are necessary for the discipline and development of self-conscious beings, individually and as forming a community. Though, then, called into existence and maintained by the Divine Being, it possesses a real, though relative, independence. It may therefore, for special purposes, be taken and studied by itself, apart from Him who created it and sustained it. And the result of this study, in its highest application, will be morality. It will give us an insight into the social sphere in which we are to play our part, and will bring home to us the claims it has upon us. It will set before us in detail the obligation that rests upon us, and will enable us to interpret aright the self that we are to realise in and through the community of which we are members. For, as we have already seen, though the self be ours,—an ideal within us to be fulfilled by self-determination,—it is but a possibility, latent within our constitution, the potentiality of which can be understood only by reflection; and, since it is in its essence social in character, the reflection that is to issue in an understanding of its potentiality must ultimately be directed toward the social fabric in which it has its place and as a member of which it has to play its part. We thus perceive not only the possibility of, but the necessity within limits for, morality as a scheme of duty, a consideration and formulation of man's obligations in

view of his situation as a member of the Family, of Society, of the State, and of Humanity.

And as with morality so with religion. If we can deal with man in relation to the world alone, we can deal with him in relation to God alone. Not only can we do this, but, with a view to a clear apprehension of the matter, we require to do this. Religion is more than creed and other than theology, but it implies both, in so far as these are the explications of its content. It is sentiment, but the sentiment needs to be excited by an exhibition of the divine character, and the more full and clear that exhibition is, the deeper and richer will that sentiment be. Now, in whatever form we suppose that exhibition made to us, it will demand consideration and investigation, if its complete significance is to be seized by us and its perfect work is to be wrought in us. And in carrying on that consideration and investigation we naturally concentrate our attention on the Divine Being and His manifestation of Himself, to the exclusion of the social and other aspects of the world, except in so far as these shed light on the points under discussion.

Such, briefly, are the grounds of the connection and the distinction between morality and religion. We have stated these mainly in terms of the objects, because, as we have learned, it is by the relation between the objects that the relation between morality and religion is ultimately defined. And, having regard to what has been said, we perceive that morality and religion neither stand entirely apart from each other, nor are merely different sides of the same thing, and therefore practically identical, but that morality is subordinate to religion—its subordination being analogous to that between a member and the organism of which it forms part, on which it depends, and from which it takes its character. Regarding them objectively, we may say that morality covers part of the field, the whole of which is covered by religion; or that morality is limited in range, while religion is infinite, and, because infinite, is inclusive of morality. Regarding them

subjectively, we may say that morality is a special application of a principle accepted by us, which finds full expression in religion; or that in morality we seek to realise ourselves in one aspect of our nature, whereas in religion we seek to realise ourselves as a whole. In the former case, what we think of is, on the one hand, the manifestation of a person, and, on the other, the person whose manifestation it is, in the fulness of his personality; in the latter, what we think of is a movement of our being that, in accordance with our constitution, has both a general and a particular aim, and that therefore, though fundamentally a single movement, may be regarded either in its totality or in a special reference. The difference between them is, thus, a difference that implies the subordination of the one to the other. In other words, morality is less than, because an element in, religion, and is therefore dependent on it for the energy required for its exercise; and religion is more than morality, because embracing it, and therefore finds in it a real though partial expression. As we have already expressed it, morality has a religious basis, and religion has a moral issue. While, however, morality involves as its basis the whole of the religious object and the whole of the religious impulse, since without the whole the part would not exist, religion does not exhaust itself in its moral issue, but only manifests itself in that form because, as dealing with the whole, it must deal also with the part.

We have thus, working on the basis of our analysis and examination of morality and religion, determined, in its general bearing, the character of the relation subsisting between these two spheres of human interest. But, as this is the central question in our inquiry, it is desirable that it should be looked at from different standpoints, in order that its solution may be fully and clearly apprehended. And a suggestive and instructive standpoint is furnished by the relation in which science and metaphysics stand to each other. Between that relation and the relation we are discussing there is an

interesting and significant analogy, the consideration of which will not only serve to illustrate the conclusion we have reached, but will shed light on some important points in our investigation. We shall therefore, even at the expense of some little repetition, devote our attention to it.

Science aims at reaching truth of fact. Its object is the right apprehension of the phenomena and processes that are open to investigation. It deals with things as they appear, and strives to learn their nature. The scientist observes, analyses, classifies the objects and movements that present themselves for inspection, and the results reached by him are embodied in laws. He seeks to discover and to exhibit the different elements that go to constitute the sphere of present existence, in their combinations, relations, and operations. He takes the world in its various departments as he finds it, and examines it with the view of learning what it is and how it works. Nor does he confine himself to the material region. He claims as his domain the whole realm of facts and events. He deals with man as with matter, with the course of history as with the course of nature, with the psychical as with the physical. But in all he professes to deal only with what actually exists, or has actually occurred, within the circle of the visible and the tangible. And what he attempts to gain, and does growingly gain, is a knowledge of the forces that manifest themselves in this mundane region, and of the modes of their activity.

Metaphysics, on the other hand, aims at reaching truth of being. Its object is the right apprehension of the ground and principle of existence in all its forms and phases. It is thus different from science, in that it goes deeper. It begins where science ends. It passes behind and beneath what is visible and tangible and inquires as to the fountain and source of these. It deals with being in itself, and not with the manifold shapes in which it clothes itself, or the manifold processes in which it expresses itself. It accepts the results of science, and endeavours to reach, by means of these, a theory of

existence, or, at least, to construct a theory of existence that will do justice to these. It proceeds on the assumption that there is something underneath that with which we come immediately into contact, which is its basis and determining principle, and it seeks to discover this underlying element and to gain an insight into its character. As the scientist sets himself to note the component parts and the varied operations of the machinery of the universe, the metaphysician sets himself to discover the quickening energy and the informing thought that have fashioned it and that govern it, with the view of apprehending its foundation and spring, its ground and essence.

These two departments of inquiry, then, are distinct from each other, and yet related to each other. Their objects are different, but their difference is the difference between matter and form, between vitality and expression. And correspondent to the difference between their objects, is the difference between their methods. The one collects, arranges, analyses, and classifies facts and events, so as to seize their constituent elements and their relations; the other interprets and explains existence by penetrating to, and exhibiting, its central idea and animating force. Each has a work of its own to do, but the work of neither would be complete without that of the other. Each may be regarded apart from the other, and to a certain extent must be so regarded, but ultimately they must be brought together. Science rests on metaphysics, and is indebted to it for the conceptions with which it starts, and without which it would be powerless either to begin or to proceed. This, indeed, the scientist often denies. He claims to accept and investigate only what is given, and, on this ground, asserts that he makes no assumptions and works independently. But there is nothing really given. What is supposed to be given is apprehended, and apprehension involves the use of categories that have a metaphysical root. But if science needs metaphysics, metaphysics needs science. To the results gained by the former,

the latter is indebted for expansion and enrichment. Science requires metaphysics for its completion and justification, and metaphysics requires science for its exposition and realisation. Science must fall back on metaphysics, because it deals with manifestations of that principle of which metaphysics treats; and metaphysics must take account of science, because, in the light of the results reached by science, it is enabled to discern the movements of that principle with which it deals and to perceive with increasing accuracy its nature and value.

Such, in general, is the relation in which science and metaphysics stand to each other. The analogy between it and the relation in which morality and religion stand to each other rests on a parallel between the objects of science and of morality on the one hand, and those of metaphysics and religion on the other. If, therefore, we are to appreciate that analogy, we must apprehend the twofold parallel which is its basis. And this we shall be in a position to do if we define, in somewhat different terms from those already employed, the objects of morality and of religion.

Morality concerns itself with the relation of rational beings to their surroundings. It takes account of the existing condition of things, and deals with the attitude which men ought to assume toward it. It regards man as an agent, who is under the necessity of determining himself in view of appeals addressed to him by the system of things within which he moves. Primarily, therefore, it has to do with the person or self; but as the person or self with whom it has to do is a part of the system in which he has his place, it has to do with his treatment of that system, and of that system as a whole. In other words, morality embraces in its outlook the world in its widest extent,—the whole environment of the individual, all with which he comes into contact in his daily life and activity, his material as well as his social surroundings. Hitherto we have emphasised his social surroundings, because these were the more important for the line

of thought we were pursuing. But his material surroundings also claim consideration from the standpoint of morality. The two, indeed, are closely connected. The social system of which man is a member does not stand entirely apart from the material, in which he is embraced. It is bound up with it, finding in it the instruments and means of intercourse between its members. From the point of view of morality, indeed, the social and the material systems within which we stand are less separate environments than different aspects of one environment, each of which, in its own way, makes appeals to us with which we must deal, but each of which, in making appeals to us, involves a reference to the other, more or less definite. Our treatment of things material affects not only ourselves and our relation to the material sphere, but also our relation to our fellows. And, to a large extent, we discharge our duties to our fellows by using rightly the material means that are at our disposal, and by taking advantage of the opportunities which our material surroundings present to us. Hence the sphere within which morality is to manifest itself is the world, in the full sense of the term, the whole system of things with which rational beings stand connected; and moral truth is the right apprehension of the connection of rational beings therewith, and of the obligation which that connection imposes on them.

Religion, on the other hand, concerns itself with the relation of rational beings to Him who is the author of their surroundings, of whom these are manifestations, and whose will and thought they embody and execute. That there is a relation between rational beings and the author of their surroundings is, from our present point of view, involved in the fact that they do not stand apart from their surroundings, connected with them only in an external fashion, but are so closely associated with them as to form, along with them, a vast and varied universe, and therefore to share, according to their nature, in the relation that subsists between the system, thus constituted, and Him who is its source and

ground. The relation of which religion takes account is, of course, a personal relation, the relation of the individual to God. But the individual is not an isolated unit; he is embraced in the world, and, as having a place in it, he is to a certain extent determined by it. His relation to God is not, therefore, wholly distinct from his relation to the world. And, on the other hand, God is the creator of the whole sphere of being within which the individual has his standing and of which he is a part. His relation to the individual cannot, therefore, be entirely separate from His relation to the sphere within which he is embraced. In any case, the object of religion is the Being who, as the source and sustainer of all that exists, is the moving and animating principle of the world in its manifold departments, and religious truth is the right apprehension of the relation between that Being and His rational creatures.

In view of the descriptions just given of the objects of morality and religion, the parallel between these and the objects of science and metaphysics respectively must be apparent. Science and morality deal with the things that are seen and temporal; metaphysics and religion with the things that are unseen and eternal. The former contemplate the existing order in its various aspects and movements; the latter, the underlying and determining principle that embodies and expresses itself in that order, imparting to it an ideal and a spiritual reference and value. And the parallel between the objects of the different members of the two pairs indicates the analogy between the relations in which the members of each pair stand to each other. As science rests on, or at least implies, metaphysics, morality rests on and implies religion. Or, otherwise stated, as metaphysics justifies the presuppositions of science, religion furnishes a basis for, and lends authority to, morality. And as metaphysics implies science as the investigation of the detailed expression and operation of the ideas and conceptions with which it deals, religion implies morality as the application to

existing circumstances of the principles which it has apprehended.

Here it may be asked, Are we then to treat science and morality and metaphysics and religion as respectively identical? Certainly not. What has been said touches merely the relation subsisting between the members of each pair, and points out that there is a striking and suggestive analogy between the relation of the members of one pair and the relation of the members of the other pair. This analogy, however, does not constitute identity, though it suggests affinity. According to the exposition given, we seem to have two pairs of terms, each of which covers the whole sphere of being. Take, first, science and metaphysics. Of these, the former embraces the things that can be touched, and tasted, and handled,—everything indeed that can be observed and analysed; while the latter embraces the things that are invisible and intangible,—pure being in its essence. Take now morality and religion. Of these, the former concerns itself with the present system of things; the latter, with Him who is the author and governor of that system. Each of these pairs, as has been said, appears to cover the whole sphere of being, and in a certain sense they do so. Or, to speak more accurately, the corresponding terms in the two pairs cover the same field, and the higher of these are each the equivalent of all that exists in its basis and source. Are they not then identical in reference? If not, what is the difference between them? They are not identical, and the difference between them is a difference of attitude, of point of view. Dealing in effect with the same objects, they deal with them in different ways and with different aims.

In science and metaphysics we look out on existence, in its several phases, as something to be apprehended by us. We, so to speak, stand apart from it, and regard it merely as an object that is to be known by us. In morality and religion we look round on existence as that of which we are parts. We do not stand apart from it; we connect ourselves

with it, or rather recognise that we have an inherent connection with it, and set ourselves to learn what that connection is. Such, briefly stated, is the distinction of which we are in search. What is its import? Passing from science and metaphysics to morality and religion, we change our standpoint. That is evident. But to say this is not enough. The change of standpoint must be accounted for. It is not arbitrary, it is necessary. And the ground of that necessity does not lie in the object, but in the subject that deals with the object. The object is to all intents and purposes the same in both cases. But the very fact that it is to us an object points to a difference between it and us, and forces on us the conviction that we are more than objects. Were we not more than objects, we should not know objects. We are objects, and objects to ourselves, but we could not be objects to ourselves were we only objects. It is because we are not only conscious, but self-conscious, that we can deal with ourselves and our surroundings. When we note this, we reach the solution of our problem. We may express it in one word, viz. personality. It is because we are persons that we cannot rest in science and metaphysics, but must go on to morality and religion; that, in other words, we cannot rest content with knowing what a thing is, but must endeavour to learn what it is for us. It is not enough that we should note its elements and activities, we must relate it to ourselves, and ask how we are to deal with it, or act toward it. Personality thus marks the distinction between the two standpoints. And while marking the distinction, it discloses the connection between them. And that connection does not suggest two entirely separate lines of inquiry without relation to each other, but two lines of inquiry that, while approaching the same object from different quarters, converge on the same point. In order that this may be made plain, let us look first at science and morality, and then at metaphysics and religion.

Science, let us suppose, makes some discovery, and, in

order that our illustration may be clear and pointed, we shall assume that the discovery made is sanitary in reference, and that by means of it the conditions of health are more fully and accurately apprehended than they were before. In itself, and in its first reference, wholly indeed, as a discovery, it is scientific. It has been reached by observation and investigation within the physical sphere, and it is due to a deeper insight into nature and a more complete understanding of natural law. It consists in an exhibition of facts and processes in the material region that have hitherto been unknown and unsuspected, and it affects our bodies, disclosing their dependence on these facts and processes for vitality and vigour. But, though thus in itself scientific, it is for us more than scientific. We must, or at least ought to, bring it within the moral sphere. It enlarges the field of duty, or perhaps, to speak more correctly, it defines more distinctly the content of duty in one special department. We have to think of it as imposing fresh obligation on us, by bringing to light relations in which we stand to our surroundings that have up till this time remained hidden. We are bound to preserve our life. That is a responsibility that rests upon us. And in the discovery made we have guidance in this direction. We are taught what is necessary, if we are to avoid disease and continue strong and active. It may be said that the new laws promulgated touch only the body and do not reach beyond the physical. But, though touching only the body, or just because touching the body, which is ours, they do, as affecting us and claiming our regard, reach beyond the physical. The preservation of physical life is for us, who are rational beings, more than a physical necessity; it is a moral obligation. With our physical life there is associated a psychical. The determination to maintain health is self-determination, the determination of a self, that is, to realise itself in and by its dealings with the several parts of the sphere within which it is embraced. To assume a right attitude toward the new laws is, therefore, a form of duty

devolving upon us. We are not only to acquaint ourselves with them, we are to apply them in our daily life. And the obligation devolving on us to do this does not rest on self-interest. It does not touch us merely as individuals. In determining ourselves to self-preservation we are acting as social beings; we are aiming at meeting to the utmost the demands that are made upon us by the system of which we are members. Sufficient, however, has been said to make plain the point on which we are insisting. That is, that personality marks at once the distinction and the relation between morality and science. We have, on the one side, the knowledge of certain physical facts and processes, or of the laws which have been gained by a study of these, and, on the other, a decision to act in harmony with these laws, in order that by the maintenance of life there may be full discharge of personal and social duty. Clearly the point of contact between the knowledge and the decision is to be found in the personality. The passage from the one to the other is made by connecting definitely the thing known with the person knowing, as an agent. As a thing known, it is scientific; as a thing applied, it is moral. In the former case, it does not carry us beyond the world as an intelligible system; in the latter, it brings us face to face with the world as a sphere of practice. In the one instance we have to do merely with elements and operations in the material region; in the other, we have to do with these as factors in the production of conduct and character. We are concerned with the same objects in both references, but, in the first, it is with the object itself, and, in the second, it is with the object in relation to a person.

What is true of science and morality is true of metaphysics and religion. Metaphysics has, as its subject, pure being, the fundamental principle and central truth of the universe, that which underlies, animates, and reveals itself in the system of things on which we look,—the basis and source, the informing spirit and quickening energy of all that exists.

An advance in metaphysics, therefore, means a deeper insight into, and a clearer view and firmer grasp of, the essence of the world, of the thought and purpose which it embodies, and of the ground and spring of its manifold forms and movements, not merely as expressed in these, but in its own nature. Such advance is, in the first instance, intellectual and theoretical. It is gained by speculative effort, and it is presented in philosophical terms. But it may, and indeed should, become spiritual and practical. An advance in metaphysics should issue in an advance in religion. For, what does such advance imply? It implies a fresh appeal, rising out of deepened and enlarged apprehension of our ultimate and intrinsic relations. We are included in the system of things toward the explanation of which a contribution has been made. We have, therefore, a definite interest in the new facts and elements that have been disclosed. They affect our standing and nature, or rather our conception of these. They teach us what we are in germ and purpose, by setting before us the inner significance of the world within which we have our place. They therefore constitute a call to us to assume an attitude different from that which we have assumed in the past, or, more correctly, to move forward on the path on which we have entered. By extending the horizon of our interests and possibilities, they urge us to accept and apply them, that these interests and possibilities may be realised in us. And, when accepted and applied by us, they cease to be merely theories discerned and understood by us, and become vital forces that stir and quicken us, yielding satisfaction because carrying us onward to attainment. As in the case of scientific discovery, we may regard them in themselves as simply speculative and theoretical, but to do so is to miss their true value and importance. We should recognise their bearing on ourselves as rational beings, designed to enter into conscious relation with the rational ground of our existence. But to recognise this is to occupy the religious position. It is to respond to the claims made upon us by that power not our-

selves, in union with which alone we can live and move and have our true being. It is surrender and submission of ourselves to that to which, as central and fundamental, we must surrender and submit if we are to experience peace, to that which, as the ground of our existence, creates the conditions of our growth and development—conditions that can be fulfilled only by free conscious relation to it. I have spoken of a power, but the power is a person. This is a necessity of the religious position, whatever may be the case with the metaphysical, and into that question I do not enter. Religion requires personality in its subject. Only a person, a self-conscious being, can be religious. And personality in the subject implies personality in the object. A person cannot truly rest in, or hold communion with, anything but a person. The central and fundamental truth of things is God, and every metaphysical advance is really a fuller comprehension of the divine nature. That advance may be presented in the form of abstract truth, but it really runs back to Him in whom abstract truth has concrete and vital existence,—to Him who is the truth. This is perceived by us whenever we bring that truth into relation to ourselves. When we receive it as a principle of life, in its highest reference, we experience the influence of a personality that touches us and meets our deepest longings, lifting us to higher levels of vitality and attainment. We thus discover the connection between metaphysics and religion. The object of both is the same, but the standpoint from which it is regarded is different in each. In the former, it is truth, seen and apprehended as the truth of existence; in the latter, it is truth, accepted and submitted to by a person, because harmonising with and meeting what is deepest in his personality.

The position maintained in the preceding paragraphs does not imply that science and metaphysics have no value in themselves, and have interest for us only as yielding guidance in the sphere of conduct. They have great value in themselves, merely as enlarging our view of the universe, as giving

us a deeper knowledge of its central principle and its manifold details. The impulses of which they are the outcome are not purely or primarily practical. We desire to know as well as to act, and not simply in order to act. We do not seek to understand the world merely that we may rule it. We seek to understand it for its own sake. But while this is the case, we cannot help bringing the knowledge we have gained into definite relation to ourselves, and inquiring how, in view of it, we should conduct ourselves. This necessity is due to the twofold position we occupy. We are at once within the world and separate from it. As separate from it, relatively, of course, we can know it; as within it, we must conform to it. As conscious and self-conscious beings we can make the system of things, of which we are members, an object to be observed and analysed; as physical and social beings we must place ourselves within the object, so to speak, and, in doing so, we must be guided in our action by the results of our observation and analysis of the object. We do not, therefore, set science and metaphysics on the one side, and morality and religion on the other, denying to the contents of the former reality and value, or subordinating them entirely to the latter. What science and metaphysics furnish is reality, and it is just because it is reality that we are bound to take account of it in the moral and religious spheres.

What has been said enables us to deal with a point that is often raised, and that is supposed to create a very serious difficulty. When the dependence of morality on religion is asserted, it is often urged in opposition that moral ideas have frequently been in advance of religious, and that religions have often been discarded by nations because they shocked the moral sense of the community, or have held their place only by conforming their doctrines and practices to the moral standard of the time. This statement is frequently made with the view of disproving a connection between the two. So far, however, from doing this, it points in the opposite

direction. The very fact that men insist on moral and religious ideas being in harmony with each other, implies that they look upon them as in some way related to each other. Were this not the case, they would not feel that there was anything anomalous in religions countenancing, and morality denouncing, certain courses of conduct. It may, of course, be said that the demand made that religion should conform to morality is merely the demand that morality should rule in every sphere of life, and that, therefore, nothing is involved in the objection as to the existence of a relation between morality and religion, or even as to the reality of religion, but that all that is contended is, that doctrines and practices called religious have been condemned by the moral sense of the community. But a little reflection shows that this is not a true account of the matter. There is more than simple condemnation by the moral sense of the community; there is condemnation by the idea of religion. It is not merely that the practices in question are ethically wrong, but that, being so, they should not be observed in the name of religion. The latent conviction is, that if there is to be a religion, it must be moral in character and bearing; must, at the very least, be abreast of the ethical theories of the age in which it flourishes,—that, in short, an immoral religion is a contradiction in terms.

It is not, then, the fact of a connection, but the nature of the connection that exists, with which we have to do. And the objection raised seems to disprove what has been said as to that connection, and to prove that, so far from morality being dependent on religion, religion is dependent on morality, inasmuch as morality has frequently been in advance of it, and has once and again led to its reformation.

As a preliminary consideration, it might be noted that not seldom the objection quoted does not amount to more than this, that adherents of a certain religion fall below the moral standard of the time. But this contention, which may be freely admitted, does not touch the question before us; or

it only does so if the adherents referred to are in full accord with their religion, and that is not always the case. That it is sometimes the case, however, cannot be denied, and yet that this does not militate against the dependence of morality on religion must be maintained. The explanation of the seemingly serious difficulty is not far to seek. We shall reach it at once if we think of science and metaphysics. Is it not the case that metaphysical theories have often to be corrected in view of scientific advance? Science, dealing with things seen and tangible, is first in order of time. First that which is natural and afterward that which is spiritual. Men may disregard the invisible sphere, but they cannot disregard the visible. It is there, touching them at every point, and they are driven to seek a fuller acquaintance with it by the necessities of their position. But the metaphysical basis may be neglected. I say neglected, for it is there as much as the physical fact that compels attention, though it does not obtrude itself on the notice of the observer in the same way, and may therefore be unheeded by him, even when he is carrying on investigations that presuppose it. Men can live without metaphysics, at least without definite and conscious recognition of it, but they cannot live without a science of some sort, without a belief in an order of nature and an attempt to understand that order as it affects their condition and activity. Apart from intellectual curiosity and impulse, practical need will compel them to study their physical environment. From all this it follows that science will often be in advance of metaphysics, and metaphysical theories will often need to be revised in view of scientific progress. But this does not mean that science is superior to metaphysics, or is even on the same level with it. It only means that they are intimately connected. Their relative positions must be determined on other grounds.

Now in what has been said as to science and metaphysics we have a valuable suggestion as to the difficulty with which we are dealing. We have already seen that there is an

analogy between the relation of science to metaphysics and the relation of morality to religion; and, following out that analogy, we perceive that it is possible, might we not say inevitable, that morality should in some circumstances be in advance of religion.

Morality has to do primarily with our relations to our fellows, in the Family, Society, the State. These relations force themselves upon us and compel us to endeavour to understand them; and if we do not admit a revelation that sheds light on the problem they present, and guides us to its solution, we must seek the origin of one aspect or element of religion in attempts to explain and enforce these. By which I mean, that men must seek a ground on which these can be based, and their religious instinct leads them to find it in a Being who is at the head of the Family, or Tribe, or State. But, in such a case, we need not wonder that moral ideas should often be ahead of religious; it is only what we should expect. The God whom man makes for himself must correspond to his interpretation of his surroundings, and must consequently be subject to change, as that interpretation becomes fuller and clearer. But the changes which advancing interpretation demands may be deferred until the incongruity becomes so pronounced as to compel alteration. Moral ideas, since they affect man's present condition, press for acceptance and application, but religious ideas, since they may be and often are looked upon as affecting solely that which lies apart from the present condition, may be for long left out of view. The sacredness, too, that attaches to them generates and encourages a conservatism that tells against alteration even of their form, and delays it until it becomes absolutely necessary.

If, instead of associating the origin of religion with the customs and claims of the Family or the Community, we trace it back to a worship of the powers of nature, the explanation offered of the advance of morality on religion at certain stages will be even more pointed and pertinent. We

can easily see how a religion resting on a purely natural basis will need constant correction, and will ultimately be overthrown, or at least completely transformed, by the progressive purification of moral conceptions.

If, once more, we admit a revelation, the case is not materially altered, and the explanation given applies in its main reference. For a revelation must be such as can be apprehended by those to whom it is given. It must be stated in terms and presented in forms which those who receive it can understand. It may come in the shape of definite declarations and specific commands, or it may come in the shape of dealing and leading; in other words, by communication or by experience. But in either case it must harmonise with the circumstances and environment of the people to whom it is granted. This is clear, so far as the latter alternative is concerned. Dealing and leading, or experience, is of necessity conditioned by the character and state of those to be acted on and influenced. Our experiences must find their basis and starting-point in our attainments and the capacities which these create. It is precisely similar with the other alternative, although perhaps not so apparent. For even the statement of general principles must to a certain extent take a particular form, dictated by the intellectual and moral condition of those to whom it is made. The form, of course, while particular, must, as the statement of a general principle, be capable of ever fuller interpretation. And this interpretation will be gained not always by successive verbal expositions, but often by varied and wider experiences impelling men to read anew the statement made in the light of what has happened, and to seek by that light to gain a deeper insight into its significance. In other words, communication requires experience in order that it may do its perfect work. Suppose, then, that we have a revelation. It will be both moral and religious in character. It must, of course, be religious, because it is the utterance or expression of One who is exalted,

so exalted that a special movement on His part is needful if He, or at least His thought and will, are to be known; in a word, of God. But it must also be moral. It must have a bearing of some kind on the conduct of those addressed and influenced. The fact that God grants a revelation to a people means that He has a definite relation to that people, and such a relation—the relation of God to man—carries with it authority on the one hand and service on the other. And this service cannot be understood simply as ritual. That may be part, but it cannot be the whole. As a revelation, it is addressed to men as rational beings. It is an appeal to them. It is the presentation of truth in presence of which men are to apprehend their own nature and to determine themselves. It involves, as we have just said, a definite relation; but a relation is not of one, it is of two at least—in this case, of many. The revelation must therefore be a revelation of both terms of the relation. In His revelation God not only makes Himself known to men, but makes men known to themselves, so that they may apprehend what is required of them.

A revelation, then, must be both religious and moral, and, as was pointed out, in whatever form it comes, it must be capable of development. But the one side—the moral—may develop faster than the other—the religious. The ground and possibility of this has already been exhibited, and it is as strong in the present as in the instances formerly discussed. For the fact that the two are given in one revelation does not affect the matter. Though given together and forming one communication, they must to a certain extent be given separately. The necessity for this separation could only disappear in a perfect spiritual state, in which morality was lost in religion; but in such a spiritual state no room would be found for a revelation.

It thus appears that disparity between morality and religion does not disprove a connection between them; neither does the fact that morality is often in advance of

religion prove that morality is independent of, or superior to, religion. The truth is, that each instance of disparity and advance has to be looked at by itself, and judged on its own merits.

In the preceding discussion an important element has been left out of account, viz. emotion. Nothing has been said as to the place of feeling in morality and religion; and yet that it plays an important part, in religion at least, will be admitted by all. We must, therefore, turn our attention to it, with the view of discovering what light it sheds on the question before us.

We are all familiar with Matthew Arnold's definition of religion, as "morality touched with emotion." This definition seems to assume that morality does not include emotion. But, as we have seen, that is not the case. The basis of morality is the felt relation between us and our surroundings. Only from a felt relation could obligation spring. Of course that felt relation can be grasped and analysed, so that detailed duties may be understood; but this merely means that while felt, it is, as felt by us, rational in character. In so far, then, as it excludes emotion from morality, the definition offered is defective. It is also defective as identifying the scope of morality and religion. But, despite these defects, it is suggestive. It emphasises an important feature in the relation between morality and religion, viz. that in religion emotion holds a more prominent place than in morality. In the latter, it is at the minimum; in the former, it is at the maximum. This statement is in harmony with the results already gained.

In order that we may discover the precise state of the case, let us look at the objects. The object of morality is the sphere in which the individual moves, and, in particular, that sphere in its highest, its social aspect; the object of religion is God. The former is manifold, the latter is one. That is to say, in the former we have to consider our relation to the several parts—in other words, our duties; in the latter

we have to consider our relation to the one Being who is over all and in all. Now this difference of object implies a difference in the emotion experienced. It will clearly be more intense in the one case than in the other. In morality it is diffused; in religion it is concentrated. So great is the difference between these two, that it seems to pass beyond a difference of degree and become a difference of kind. We might express the difference by saying, that in religion we have, and in morality we have not, to do with a person. It is true that in morality we have to do with persons, but we have to do with them as parts of a system in relation to which they have rights as against us, and we have duties as toward them. In religion it is different. There we have to do with a person simply as such, a person who has, indeed, manifold relations of which we are to take cognisance, but who is above and not within these relations; with whom, therefore, in the fulness of his personality, we come into direct and definite contact. To put the matter thus, is to discover the nature of the distinction between the emotions. In morality it is the emotion that accompanies the fulfilment of duty; in religion it is the emotion that belongs to the satisfaction of the heart.

There is, then, an emotional element in both morality and religion, but it is much less in the former than in the latter. We have now to ask what the relation is between emotion in the religious, and emotion in the moral, sphere. We have seen that morality and religion rests each on a felt relation, and that in proportion as to the keenness of that feeling of relation are we zealous and devoted. We have also seen that that feeling is keener in religion than in morality, inasmuch as the relation in religion is relation to a person, while in morality it is relation to a community. But since the person and the community are vitally connected, the latter relation runs back into the former, and the emotion stirred by the latter is in a line with, and can be stimulated by, the emotion stirred by the former. Thus the emotion of

religion quickens the emotion of morality. In other words, the religious feeling lends force to the moral, so that the idea of mere duty is transcended, and the fulfilment of obligation becomes a labour of love. The note of true religion is love, love to God; and this love, while it strengthens the obligations that rest upon us, invests these with a kindly and genial character that wins rather than demands obedience. Doing duty as unto Him who is the object of our deepest and purest affection, we find it not a burden or a task, but a pleasure and a delight. It ceases to be mere observance of law and precept, to which we are constrained by a sense of responsibility or necessity, and becomes a spontaneous response to the appeal of love, to which we are impelled by a longing to afford gratification, and to experience the joy of sweet communion. The heart knows nothing of law and duty; it knows only yearning and surrender, impelling to action that will express its devotion and, by yielding pleasure to its object, will satisfy its own demands. And it is the heart that is the seat and organ of religion. If the heart be set on God, the yoke of law and command will be easy and their burden will be light; for they will appear less claims and requirements to be met than manifestations of the nature and desire of Him whose they are, whereby we are taught what is in harmony with His being and well-pleasing in His sight. Thus does religious emotion supply needed stimulus to moral effort, transforming it by the light of affection, and lending to it a new and an attractive character by bringing it into living connection with that service which is highest freedom,—the free, glad movement of our spirit toward Him who is the centre of our thought and the object of our desire.

We may illustrate the point on which we are insisting by reference to the state of things within the purely human sphere. As members of that sphere we are under obligation to treat justly and kindly those who are akin to us in constitution. This obligation rests on the relationship that is

formed by community of nature. It is thus universal in its range, embracing men of all classes and conditions. But this universal obligation, due to a general relationship by which all are bound together, may be intensified and may assume a special character in the case of individuals, because of special relationships formed by them, in virtue of which they are drawn closely to one or more of their neighbours. Where this is the case, not only will new duties emerge, corresponding to the new ties that have been created, but the old duties that spring from the tie of a common humanity will take a new character, and will be discharged with increased ease and care. Nor will these special relationships affect those united by them only in respect of the attitude which they assume toward each other; they will affect them also in respect of the attitude which they assume toward such as stand connected with the object of their regard. Suppose we are drawn to love one of our fellows. What is the effect of this tender tie on our conduct? It, of course, strengthens our relation to the object of our affection, gives to that relation, indeed, a new meaning and value, with the result that we not only accept and discharge fresh obligations, but meet with heightened zeal the obligations under which we lay prior to its formation. Or, rather we cease to think of obligations, old or new, and, under the sway and guidance of the passion that has been awakened, act rightly toward our friend. The claims that spring from our affection absorb, while they transcend, the claims that spring from our common nature, so that the satisfaction of the former is the satisfaction of the latter, a truer satisfaction, too, than would be rendered if these had been definitely considered. The duties that we owe the object of our affection as a man are lost in the ties that bind us to him as a friend. We surrender ourselves to him and, as a consequence, adopt his welfare as our aim, and by pursuing that aim honour him truly as a rational being while offering to him in devoted service the tribute of the heart. But this is not all. Not only is there

a change in our bearing toward him, there is a change in our bearing toward those connected with him. We feel an interest in them deeper and stronger than that which we felt before we yielded to his fascination, or would have felt had we not linked ourselves to him by the bonds of friendship. Our interest in them has been vivified and intensified by our esteem for him to whom they are intimately related. We feel obligation and discharge duty toward them which, as to form, may be precisely what they would have been in ordinary circumstances and intercourse, but which, as to impulse, are different, and different because mediated by our affection for him who stands between them and us, and who has touched our heart. The reflection of his winsome nature falls upon them and invests them, for us, with a special character, that incites us to special regard for their interests and welfare. We cannot separate our friend altogether from his associations. These must be acknowledged by us, and their acknowledgment implies recognition of those who are embraced within them.

It will help us to appreciate the point we are seeking to present if we think of a family. The members of a family have duties to each other merely as human beings, but these duties take a special character and gain a special weight from the special relationship which the family tie creates and constitutes. Those embraced in that relationship are to treat one another not merely as human beings, but as brothers and sisters. The bond of humanity becomes for them fraternal. It takes this particular aspect, and by doing so imposes particular obligation. But on what does the fraternal relation rest? It rests on the filial. It is as children of one father that men are united to each other as members of a family. The bond of union between brothers and sisters is common parentage. This being so, they are linked to each other through the parent, and the admission of the fraternal obligation implies the admission of the filial. Hence the impulse to the right discharge of the former is

the accompaniment of the impulse to the right discharge of the latter. In other words, brother sees brother, so far as he regards him as a brother, in the light of his connection with the father, and in view of that connection accepts fraternal responsibility. It is love to the father that incites the children to the right performance of their mutual duties and sustains them therein, making it a pleasure and not merely a task. These duties may be performed on other grounds. Fear of punishment by the parent may compel the children to refrain from injuring each other, and to render help to each other. Or children may be drawn to each other by affinity of nature, and on this basis may manifest affection for each other. But in neither of these cases do the children deal with each other as children, as members of a family, bound together by common parenthood. In the former case there is no bond of union at all, at least none is recognised and admitted. The natural bond is denied and dishonoured, and those who should feel its presence and submit to its influence are held together by constraint. In the latter case, the bond of union has no definite relation to the family. It could exist without it, and outside it, in the broad human sphere. Filial love, then, is the one ground of fraternal love. From it, and it alone, can there come the right impulse to the discharge of duty within the family circle. Regard for the head carries with it regard for the members. Through him who is the centre those composing the household are connected with each other. If the heart of the child be set on the parent so that he love him truly, he will assume a right attitude toward those whom the parent loves.

We thus perceive the relation of religious feeling to moral action. The emotion that is an element in the response made by us to the appeals addressed to us by the Divine Being supplies the stimulus that is demanded for the hearty discharge of duty, because through devotion to the head it brings us into sympathy with the members. Claims

recognised and admitted by us, that would otherwise be external obligations to be met by us, because imposed on us, become impulses within us, the operation of which is congenial to our nature. Morality, quickened by the genial and kindling breath of religion, ceases to be a hard, chill discharge of duty, a constrained and, at times, sullen obedience to laws that environ us and demand obedience, and becomes the free, hearty expression of affectionate regard. We view each other not merely from the standpoint of a common nature, or of the social system of which we are members, but in the light of the fatherly love within which we are embraced, and viewing each other through this medium we rightly appreciate and gladly respond to the claims that rest upon us. Assuming any other attitude, it will often be difficult for us to love the brethren; and even when this is possible, our effort will lack that sweet savour of spontaneous and hearty interest that will make it not only a delight to us, but a joy to those who are its objects.

LECTURE VII

EXTENT OF RELATION

IN the last lecture we defined the nature of the relation between morality and religion. In the present lecture we shall consider some questions suggested by the results reached, the discussion of which will enable us not only to apprehend more fully the nature of that relation, but also to determine its extent.

And the first of these questions with which we shall deal is, Can we be moral without being religious? Or, more explicitly, Can we have morality without religion as its ground and support? Can we gain and maintain a right relation to the system within which we stand without reference to, or recognition of, God? Having in view the course and the results of the preceding discussion, we at once answer that we cannot. This answer, however, is met by an argument that seems pointed and forcible, and that demands careful consideration. It is said that the independence of morality is proved by the lives of men and women in the past and in the present. Instances are cited of individuals who either took no account of religion or who definitely discarded it as worthless, and who were, nevertheless, high-toned, pure, just and honourable in character, not only rivalling, it is suggested, but surpassing, in moral quality, some who did not merely make a profession of religion but who held prominent places within the sphere of religion. And such instances are accepted and offered as evidence that without the aid of religion we can discover what the obligations are that rest upon us as rational beings, and can fully meet these obligations, discharging faithfully

the duties that devolve upon us and maintaining an unblemished reputation. Now it is clear that, if the instances cited are admitted as genuine cases of morality apart from religion, the conclusion drawn must be allowed, and, if so, the position we have assumed must be surrendered. We must, therefore, devote our attention to the subject with the view of discovering the precise value of the cases referred to, and the validity of the deduction drawn from them.

And, at the outset, we must determine what the contention we have to consider involves, and what are the points which it raises and which must be dealt with in estimating its worth. As generally stated, it is that there have been men and women who have led moral lives though occupying non-religious positions. In other words, that there has been moral action without religious influence. Now what do we mean by moral action? We mean action in harmony with a rule or standard that is the interpretation and expression of our nature and our relations as rational beings and as members of a rational system. But action in harmony with such a rule or standard implies a knowledge of it. If we are to do what is right, so that our doing of it will be moral in character, we must know what is right, and must decide to give effect to our knowledge. When, therefore, we say that there have been men and women who have lived moral lives, though occupying non-religious positions, we imply that there have been men and women who, without the help or the recognition of religion, have constructed or gained a moral code. But this is not all. More than conscious conformity to a moral code is demanded by morality. Or, rather, the question asked by morality concerns the nature of the conscious conformity. There may be conformity to the letter alone, but that is insufficient. The rule or standard is the interpretation and expression of our nature and our relations. It is not, therefore, something that lies entirely without us, which we are to obey because it commands, but something that is to be accepted by us, with which we are to

identify ourselves, and which we are to realise for its own sake. In other words, it is an ideal as well as a rule or standard, and it is as an ideal that it supplies us with an aim, the pursuit of which invests our action with moral significance. To say, therefore, that there have been men and women who have lived moral lives, though occupying non-religious positions, is to say that there have been men and women who, without the help or the recognition of religion, have apprehended and realised as the aim of their endeavour the ideal of existence. When we thus carefully examine the objection urged against our conclusion we discover that it is by no means so simple as it appears. It raises at least two important questions. This has not always been recognised, and, as a result, its discussion has been partial and superficial. Those who have offered it, and those who have sought to meet it, have too often limited themselves to the deeds performed and the character manifested by those to whom reference is made, and have left out of account the conditions on which alone the deeds could be performed and the character manifested. To follow this course is to mistake the bearing of the problem to be solved, and to deprive the solution reached of point and worth. For it is not enough, on the one hand, to show that certain persons, who made no profession of religion, and refused its guidance and support, have lived high-toned and upright lives; and it is useless, on the other, to attempt to deny that there have been such persons. What ought to be considered is the possibility of men apprehending the rule or standard and the ideal, of which morality is the fulfilment and realisation, without the operation of religion, or the acknowledgment, explicit or implicit, of that which is the basis and ground of religion. This is the question that we must discuss if we are to treat the matter fully and to arrive at a sound and satisfactory conclusion.

And this question, as we have seen, is twofold. What we have to ask regarding the individuals referred to is, first, Did they gain a knowledge of what was moral apart from

religion or religious influence? and, second, Did they gain the ideal, that supplied a moral aim and invested their action with moral value, apart from religion and religious influence? To these we should, perhaps, add a third, concerning the energy needful for giving effect to the knowledge acquired, and realising the ideal apprehended; but inasmuch as we are regarding the ideal as furnishing the aim, it practically includes the energy required for action, so that this does not need to be specially considered. From what has been said regarding them, it is evident that the two points stated are closely connected with each other, so closely that the answer to the one really carries with it the answer to the other. It might therefore seem as if it were only needful to deal with one of them. And, strictly speaking, that is the case. But it is desirable that both be considered. It is of advantage to view our subject in all its aspects. Each aspect brings us face to face with special questions, and the greater the number and the variety of the questions discussed by us the clearer will be our view, and the firmer our grasp, of the truth.

Before, however, proceeding with our inquiry we must determine the method to be adopted by us. This is necessary, because there are two courses open to us. We may regard the question raised either as a question of fact or as a question of possibility. In the former case we should begin with the instances cited, and should endeavour, by discovering the forces that were at work around and within those referred to, to determine what exactly their state and action involved; in the latter case we should begin with the system of things in which, as rational beings, we have our place, and should endeavour, by a consideration of its nature, to determine whether or not morality can, in any aspect, exist without the influence and help of religion. Or, otherwise stated, in the former case we should, by the examination of the special instances cited, seek to establish a general principle; in the latter case we should, in the light of a general principle, gained by an examination of the system of which we are

members, estimate the character of the special instances cited.

Of these methods we shall adopt the second. That this is the wise, indeed the only satisfactory, method will be apparent on a moment's reflection. Were we to follow the other we should have to face an extremely difficult, if not an absolutely impossible, task. For our investigation of any instances submitted to examination would not be complete until we had discerned, in their full extent and exact relation, all the elements that were present and operative in the environment and in the nature of the persons in question, since each of these elements would contribute to the resulting condition and action. And it would be no easy matter to convince others, even if we could convince ourselves, that we had embraced in our survey every factor in the case. The influences under which men come, and by which their thought and feeling and desire and decision are affected, are often subtle in their working, and therefore liable to be overlooked even by a careful and conscientious inquirer. Nor can we accept as conclusive the statements of the individuals concerned. Even they do not always fully realise the nature of their surroundings or the constituents of their motive. They may readily overlook circumstances and influences that, though less pronounced than those detected by them, are more important than they, and affect to a greater degree their character and conduct.

Having thus come to an understanding as to our line of procedure, we go on to the consideration of the first of the points raised by the assertion of the independence of morality. That touches the possibility of constructing a moral code apart from the recognition or influence of religion. What, therefore, we have to ask is, Can we gain a rule of life by confining our view to the world, and leaving God and all ideas and impulses that involve the existence of God out of account? Now, in the last lecture we saw that the world, while a manifestation of God, may be treated as a whole and

dealt with apart from its cause and ground. And this being so, we recognise that there is a sense in which the question asked by us must be answered in the affirmative. We must admit that, since the system of which men are members has a relative independence, it is possible for them by reflection on it to gain a knowledge of its principles and demands, more or less complete, without in any way going beyond it and acquainting themselves with its basis and spring, or apprehending Him who has called it into being and impressed on it its character. By simple observation we may recognise that we are under law, and by examination and experience we may learn, with increasing accuracy and fulness, what that law is in its main idea, as well as its varied applications; and if we rest content with this result we may be said to stop short with morality. To this extent, then, we must admit the possibility of morality without religion, of a theory of the universe in its practical reference that, in its main lines, is or may be correct, so far as it goes, and, in so far as it is correct, affords guidance to those who receive it.

But to admit this is not, after all, to admit very much, for it is just after this stage has been reached that the problem of the dependence or independence of morality has to be faced. It is not enough that we should interpret the system around us, and embody our interpretation in laws. We must justify our interpretation, and find a basis for the laws in which we embody it, if these are to carry weight and authority and to secure respect and obedience; and this we cannot do unless we pass behind and beneath the system, with its diversity and its change, to that which is its ground and informing principle, the permanent and pervading unity that manifests itself in its variety. It may be possible for a select few to rest satisfied for a time with an induction from facts and processes as a rule of life, but there comes a period of reflection and inquiry when this is felt by them to be insufficient, and something more fundamental is demanded. Even if the result of the induction be a right apprehension of

the principles to be applied, it must become more than an induction if it is to retain the respect of those who have accepted it. And, for the ordinary run of men, authority of some kind or other must be exhibited or professed if laws are to be honoured and obeyed; and the only authority that can command permanently their regard and homage is an authority that is self-evidencing, that is not derivative but original and independent, that carries with it its own guarantee, that gains its weight and dignity from its own inherent nature. But authority of this kind does not belong to the laws of the system within which moral action is put forth. That it does not, follows from the fact of its dependence. Only an independent, a self-existent system can yield authoritative guidance to its members, since only such a system holds within itself the reason for its existence. A system that is not self-existent must seek the ground and explanation of its appearance and activity outside itself, and, if it is to find the full ground and explanation of these, it must work upward to the one self-existent Being who is the source of all existence. Now, the world is not self-existent, it was not self-originated, and it is not self-maintained. If, then, we are to understand fully its laws and the conditions it imposes on us, we must pass beyond it to that which originated it and which maintains it. It is a system of effects, and effects are due to causes. When we seek to understand an effect we go in search of its cause. And we are not satisfied with its proximate cause. That we treat as itself an effect, the cause of which must be discovered, and so on backward, along the line of which the effect with which we have to deal is the last stage, until we arrive at a cause which is not itself an effect. In it, and in it alone, can we find the principle that will explain perfectly the phenomenon that stands before us. Of this principle, then, which is at once primary and permanent, transcendent and immanent, surrounding and permeating, we have to think when we investigate and endeavour to interpret our environment, and

our interpretation will be full and accurate in proportion to the clearness with which we discern its presence and working. If we limit ourselves to our environment, and neglect or exclude or deny its informing principle, we shall fall short of the truth. We may apprehend much that is interesting and valuable, but we shall not apprehend that which is the basis of all, and which, as such, furnishes the true explanation of the world, and lends to its perceived processes and laws the character and authority that are necessary if they are to awaken a keen sense of obligation, and to command respect and obedience for their own sake. In other words, we may by observation and deduction seize the form of the claims made upon us by our surroundings, but we shall miss their spirit, and shall, in consequence, fail to appreciate their full significance as the expression of eternal verities possessing supreme weight and value. In such circumstances we may honour them after a fashion, but we shall not honour them as we ought; and, most of all, we shall lack that deep conviction of their paramount importance from which alone there can spring the impulse that will issue in unwavering allegiance and unflinching compliance despite difficulty and obstacle and loss.

The truth is, that the independence of morality implies the independence of the world. We can only maintain that morality is self-sufficient by maintaining that the world is self-sufficient. For whenever we admit that the world has relation to that which is above it, we admit that its arrangement and constitution, to be fully understood, must be studied in the light of that relation. If it be a continuous product and effect, then merely to acquaint ourselves with its structure and its processes, with its various sections, and with the activity and interaction of its manifold forces, is not to apprehend its full meaning, or to estimate aright its significance. So far from this being the case, what we gain by such investigation is little more than a knowledge of the problem we have to solve. Our inquiry does not so much

furnish an explanation of the world as disclose the nature of the explanation demanded if its secret is to be discovered. This applies to all its departments. It applies especially to the department of morality. Here, more than anywhere else, we must take account of that which is the basis and determining principle of the system if we are to recognise aright its bearing, for here we are in the sphere of deliberation and resolve and effort. It is not enough that we know, we must also act; and we seek to know in order that we may act. We cannot rest satisfied with noting what passes before us, the changes which the world, in its various departments, undergoes; we must endeavour to discover the exact nature and import of these, in order that we may deal with it aright. And since, in dealing with it, we are really dealing with ourselves, we must seek to apprehend ourselves as well as it, or rather ourselves as parts of it. And neither of these can we accomplish by merely observing the course of events, and deducing therefrom general laws. Such laws will be only the register of what has been, not the statement of what ought to be. The latter cannot be discerned save by passing to the centre and seizing that which is essential. And this, we have learned, implies a religious attitude and process, since the centre and essence of all is the Divine Being.

In what has been said we have sought to show that the theory under consideration, even when taken on its own terms, cannot furnish a moral code. In other words, we have assumed, for the sake of argument, what the theory implies, viz. that, consistently with the view of the world which it involves, men can gain a knowledge of their surroundings, and of the demands which these make on them, and have confined ourselves to proving that such knowledge, taken by itself, cannot yield an authoritative moral standard. This, however, is an assumption that careful examination of all the circumstances will compel us to reject. To see that it is not warranted, it is only necessary for us to note what the essence of the system must be if the estimate of it, on which

the theory in question rests, be correct. So far we have not referred to this aspect of the matter. We have thought of the system only in its form and relations, not in its quality and substance, as these must be regarded from the standpoint we are criticising. But that standpoint affects the latter as well as the former. The one, indeed, is bound up with the other. Our investigation would, therefore, be incomplete if we did not deal with both. The full bearing of the assertion made, as to the possibility of morality without religion, can only be seen when all that it includes and presupposes is exhibited and discussed.

What, then, must be the nature of the system, within which we are embraced, if the view we are considering be correct? In endeavouring to answer this question we shall start with those features of the system which we have already discovered. We have seen that the independence of morality implies the independence of the world; and that the world, if independent, is self-produced and self-sustained, self-existent and self-sufficient. Our task, then, is to settle what the essence of a system possessing these characteristics must be.

It is self-produced and self-sustained. All, therefore, that it is or can be, is and must be the outcome of its own inherent energy. It may have, in the past, assumed many different phases, and it may, in the future, assume many more, but all the changes which it has undergone, or may yet undergo, must be internal changes, due to the operation of its own nature. Further, it is self-existent and self-sufficient, and, as such, it must be identical both in quality and in quantity throughout. That is to say, its changes must be simply changes of arrangement; they cannot be changes either in essence or in content. It cannot be subject, strictly speaking, to growth and expansion, or to transformation; for these imply dependence on external conditions and subjection to external influences, and such influences are excluded by the theory under consideration. Now, this being the case, it must be manifest in its extent and essence at every point and period

of its history. At no time can it be present only in part, and at no time can that which is fundamental be absent or hidden. A self-existent and self-sufficient system must be always there, and always there in its totality and in its central feature. It cannot be the subject of development, in the sense of gaining increase in bulk or of displaying fresh qualities. Apparent increase in bulk or display of fresh qualities must be due to alteration in distribution or setting of its original material, or to new combinations and activities of forces that are native to it and that have been operative from the first, not to addition or introduction, or to the exhibition and forthputting of energies that have hitherto been latent and unsuspected. The world then, if it be an independent system, must have been, and must always be, present in its fulness and essence. Now, in thinking of it, we observe a great variety of forms and aspects of state and operation. The question therefore occurs, In which of these are we to discover that which is central? How shall we get behind the varied distributions of substance and compositions of forces, with which we meet, to the basal substance and the central force, of which all that we see are but varied manifestations? The answer to these questions is not difficult to find. We shall gain that of which we are in search if we note that which is always discernible—not that which is to be found only at one time and stage, or in one section and not in another, but that which is to be found at every time and stage, and in every section. Now, what is it that is thus universally present? It is matter. At certain points in the course of the world's history there appeared life and intelligence, but in the earlier epochs these were not in existence. And yet, if they belonged to the essence of this self-existent and self-sufficient system, they would have been in existence from the first, in the earlier as in the later periods, for, as has been shown, such a system must always be there in its totality and in its central feature. Matter is the only thing that is permanently and persistently present and operative.

Hence we must conclude that matter defines for us the nature of the system, and that to it all else must be reducible. Life and intelligence must be looked upon as modes of matter. Mind and spirit must be pronounced products of material processes, or rather phases and manifestations of matter, and must therefore be fundamentally material. We cannot, consistently with the position under review, assign them any other character. We cannot regard them as factors or energies added to, or introduced into, the system. Such a theory of their origin is inconsistent with the independence of the system. Neither can we hold that they were in the system from the first, as separate and distinct factors and energies, and that they lay there, hidden from view, until the hour struck for their appearance. Such an idea is out of harmony with self-sufficiency. In a self-sufficient system, that which is central and fundamental must be disclosed and active at every stage, and inasmuch as the system of which we are speaking is the visible sphere which lies open to observation, its fulness in its main features must be apparent to us when we reflect on it. It would be different with a system related to, but lying beyond, the temporal, so far at least as we are concerned. For, in respect of it, all that we could perceive would be the expression that lay within the temporal, and that might, or rather would, be partial and progressive, assuming one form at one time and another at another. The point insisted on above, viz. that a self-existent and self-sufficient system would always be manifest in its fulness and its essence, would, however, still apply to it. It would not be partial and progressive in itself, but only in relation to us, limited as we are to special forms and successive stages of its activity and manifestation. In itself, it would at all times be complete, displaying its central feature in its every condition, and apprehended in its fundamental quality by all who could survey it in the wide range of its existence.

Thus the position under review ultimately leads to, or

rather rests on and necessitates, a materialistic estimate of the world. The bearing of this result on the point with which we are dealing is obvious, and it is in the direction already indicated. That point concerns the attainment of a knowledge of the laws and arrangements of the world, as these bear on conduct, by those embraced within it. In the previous part of our discussion we proceeded on the assumption that such knowledge was attainable by us, even if we regarded the world by itself as altogether independent of anything prior to it or above it. But the conclusion to which we have been brought compels us to declare that assumption unwarranted. For if the world be independent, and therefore materialistic in essence, those who are embraced within it are merely parts of a material organism. But the parts or members of a material organism cannot possibly know anything but their present condition and their past experience; indeed, strictly speaking, they cannot know even these. Such knowledge implies intelligence, and from pure matter intelligence cannot spring. Rationality can come only from reason, and if we are to find reason we must transcend the physical. If there is a mind within the world, that thinks and observes and reflects, there must be a mind, without the world, that is, its creator, and with which it has a definite and permanent relation. Only in so far as reason has wrought on and in the world, can reason interpret and understand the world. The material object or process may be the sign and expression of thought, but it cannot be its source and origin. It thus appears that if we are to gain a knowledge of the system of things that possesses moral significance,—any knowledge, indeed,—we must admit, consciously or unconsciously, that which lies beyond it, and such admission is religious in its bearing, though it may be a long way from the distinctively religious sphere. If, then, the world be independent, and therefore materialistic, so far from its being possible for us to reach an estimate of our surroundings that is defective as a moral code, merely because it lacks authority,

we cannot reach any estimate of it at all, and cannot consequently apprehend, even in their formal aspect, the demands of morality.

We have, thus, dealt with the first of the two questions raised by the objection to our conclusion which we are examining. We now proceed to the consideration of the second. That, it will be remembered, touches the perception or acceptance of a moral ideal apart from religion or religious influence. And, as already indicated, it is that ideal as furnishing a moral aim, as supplying the ground of determination and the end to be sought by us in moral action, that we are to contemplate.

What, then, we have to inquire is, Are there any grounds of moral determination open to those who exclude religion from their lives? Does the attitude assumed by such admit of a moral ideal that will inspire and guide? That attitude implies that the world is an independent whole, self-produced, self-existent, self-sufficient, and self-controlled. Those who assume it must, therefore, regard the system within which they stand as an end in itself, containing within itself its own ground and explanation, and generating, by its own movement, the energy and the impulse that are necessary for its varied manifestations. It is, therefore, with this estimate of the world that we have to do; and what we have to ask is, Can such a system furnish a moral end to those embraced within it? And it is evident that, if it can, it must itself create it. Clearly it cannot supply, or even recognise, an ideal that does not spring from, and is not determined by, itself, an ideal, that is to say, that lies or points beyond itself. For to do so would be to acknowledge not only that there is something beside itself, but that with this something it has definite relations, and such an acknowledgment is inconsistent with its independence. And, of course, it cannot admit of ideals within itself that are not subordinate to, and elements in, an ideal that is inherent in, and limited in bearing to, its own constitution. The admission of such ideals would be a denial

either of its unity or its independence. The existence within a self-existent and self-sufficient system of ideals distinct from the nature of that system, is an impossibility, for it would mean that those for whom they were ideals had a reference and a value of their own for which the system had no place; and this would mean that the system was not really a system. I have said that it would be a denial of the unity of the system. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that it would be the assertion that there are several systems. We should, in fact, have to break up the apparent whole into a number of parts corresponding to the ideals recognised. But this we cannot do. The world is a whole, the manifold parts of which are definitely related to each other. But if we maintain its unity, as we must do, we must reject as illusory all ideals that do not issue from its constitution, or else we must surrender its independence. For the ideals in question, since they do not issue from the constitution of the system, must have reference to what is beyond the system; and as those whose ideals they are, are parts of the system, the system must be involved in that relation, and cannot therefore be independent, self-existent, and self-sufficient. Hence if the world, regarded as the theory in question must regard it, can furnish or admit of an ideal, it must itself produce it, and the ideal produced by it must be limited in its reference to it.

We have thus narrowed the sphere of our investigation. We have learned within what limits we must look for the solution of the problem before us. We have to consider whether or not the world, viewed in itself, as unrelated to anything beside or above it, can supply a moral ideal, can set before men an end that will furnish them with grounds of moral determination. Now there are three conceivable ideals or ends—three possible grounds of moral determination. These are, first, the realisation or perfection of the system as a whole; second, the realisation or perfection of the individual members of the system; third, the realisation or perfection of

the individual members in and through the realisation or perfection of the system as a whole. I say these are conceivable ideals. I do not say that they are all true ideals. Into this question I do not enter. It is sufficient for our present purpose that they may be, and have been, in one form or another accepted as ideals. I merely assume that they are possible aims for rational decision and action, and I do so with the view of discovering whether or not they, or any of them, are consistent with the estimate of the world which we are examining.

We have then to look, first, at the general ideal. We have to ask if the world, viewed as an independent, self-existent, and self-sufficient system, can set before its members, as the aim and goal of their action, its own realisation or perfection. And a moment's reflection shows that it cannot. Realisation or perfection, as an aim or goal, implies advance. The system that is to be realised and made perfect must be not only capable of, but impelled to, progress and development. It must, in other words, be imperfect, and, as imperfect, it must strive toward perfection, toward completeness of form and fulness of content. But the system of which we have to think is *ex hypothesi* self-existent and self-sufficient, and such a system neither needs, nor is capable of, such advance. It cannot grow or develop, for, as self-existent and self-sufficient, it is perfect. It may admit of internal movement, but that movement can issue only in the rearrangement of its parts and elements, whereby different phases and aspects of its essence may be disclosed; it cannot contribute to its perfection, in the sense of bringing about a fuller realisation of its nature or a higher fulfilment of its purpose. A movement that has this as its result is inconsistent with independence. It points to that which is beyond the subject of the movement, which has impressed on it its nature and determined for it its goal, and on which, therefore, it is dependent. A self-existent and self-sufficient object must be self-determined in the fullest sense of the term. It must contain within

itself all that it is capable of becoming, and that not as a germ contains within itself the plant into which it may rise by subjection to, and assimilation of, diverse influences, but as light contains within itself the various colours into which it may be broken up. These colours may be exhibited with varying clearness and fulness, in proportion to the completeness of the prismatic analysis to which the light is subjected. We may therefore speak of one exhibition as more perfect than another, but we do not mean by this that the light is more perfect in the latter than in the former. What we mean is, that our apprehension of its constituents and possibilities is more perfect. The light is constant in quantity, and is always perfect. That is to say, it always is what it is, and it can in reality be nothing else. The changes which it may undergo when affected by atmospheric or other influences, are changes within it rather than of it. By them the ray is decomposed, not developed. There is no such thing as progress, growth, realisation of an end. So would it be with the world as a whole if it were a self-existent and self-sufficient system. Were such its character we could not speak of it as imperfect, and as working toward perfection. We could not, therefore, speak of the parts as having the perfection of the whole as an ideal, according to which they could determine their conduct. We could only speak of them as manifesting, by their different constitutions and activities, different elements in the perfect system. We could, perhaps, think of the self-sufficient unity as broken up into its constituent elements, though it is questionable if such a thought is possible regarding the world, but we could not think of this breaking up as a stage in, or a means to, its evolution and attainment, and consequently as a forward movement with which the members could ally themselves, and in view of which they could decide on a course of action.

From the general aim we turn to the particular. That, it will be remembered, is the perfection or realisation of the

individual. And what we have to ask is, Can such an aim be supplied by a system that is self-existent and self-sufficient? This is a question that is answered as soon as it is asked. For an individual who is a member of a system cannot be furnished by that system with an ideal that concerns himself alone. In other words, he cannot be regarded merely as an individual. His individuality is conditioned by his relation to the system of which he forms a part, and, consequently, the ideal presented to him must be an ideal that is bound up with the well-being of the system. Thus the second of the conceivable ideals mentioned by us runs necessarily into the third. That is to say, the perfection or realisation of the individual must be regarded as an element in the perfection or realisation of the system of which he is a member. But we have learned that the system as a whole, viewed as independent, in harmony with the theory we are considering, has and can have no ideal. Being self-existent and self-sufficient, it can have no end toward which it is to strive, to the attainment of which the individual may contribute, and in the attainment of which the individual will share.

It may, however, be said, that though there is no ideal to be realised by the system as a whole there may be an ideal to be realised by the individual, inasmuch as there may be room within the system for the growth and development of the members. In other words, it may be contended that a self-existent and self-sufficient system may admit of internal movement and change, and that, as having a place in such internal movement and change, the individual may, or rather must, have an end to fulfil that fixes the part that he has to play in relation to it. But, even admitting that there is such internal movement and change within the system with which we are dealing, and that the individuals have a part to play in relation to it, what is demanded would not be forthcoming. Of this we shall be convinced if we recall what we have learned as to the nature of the system. We have discovered

that, consistently with the view we are examining, it must be regarded as materialistic in essence. And a materialistic system is a mechanical system, and in a mechanical system necessity rules. But necessity does not admit of an ideal, of an aim presented to and accepted by those under it, to be consciously pursued by them. Of the parts of a mechanical system we cannot say that they ought to do this or that, we can only say that they must do it. They are hemmed in and controlled by the constitution of the body and the force that is working in it. Not only can they not free themselves from these, they cannot even be conscious of them, so as definitely to identify themselves with them and accept the rôle which they assign them. They may seem to act freely, but they do not really do so. They may appear to deliberate and decide, but it is only appearance. As a matter of fact their course is settled apart from their choice by the constitution and operation of the organism to which they belong. They may fulfil an end, and by doing so may at once realise their own nature, and further the internal development of the system within which they are embraced, but they cannot know that they are doing so, and therefore these results cannot constitute an ideal for them. Thus, even if we admit that there can be within a self-existent and self-sufficient system, such as that with which we have to do, inner movement and change by which an end is fulfilled, we do not reach an individual aim, we do not find room for conscious endeavour on the part of the individual after his own perfection or realisation. There is indeed, strictly speaking, no such thing as an individual. There are objects of diverse character which may be distinguished from each other, but none of these, not even those that may be spoken of as the highest in the scale of being, have personality, that unity of existence which, as issuing in self-consciousness, is the basis of individuality. They are but instruments of a power that employs them for its own purpose, and to which they cannot help submitting, because apart from it they are nothing.

It would be different with a rational system, a system, that is, that is rational not only in design and government, but in essence. Within such a system there would be room for individuals and individual ideals, for rational beings who could apprehend the meaning of their existence and their surroundings, and could set these before them as ends to be pursued and attained by them. For such a system, whatever else it would produce, would certainly produce rational beings, and the relation between such a system and its products would be a free relation. They would be more than parts or members of it; they would, as rational, be self-conscious, and would therefore be at once distinct from and connected with it. They would apprehend themselves as unities, having a life of their own, to which they themselves are to give form and direction in harmony with its perceived end, but, at the same time, they would apprehend themselves as standing in definite relation to a community, in accordance with which they must order their conduct if they are to become all that they are designed to be. I have spoken of a rational system, but a rational system runs back to, rests on, and is the expression of, a personality. What we have to think of in this connection is not a power not ourselves that makes for rationality, but a Being who is rationality, and who as such seeks to reveal Himself in and to rational creatures with whom He may commune, and with whom He can commune in proportion as they cherish the germ He has implanted within them, and by doing so fulfil the end of their existence and reflect His nature.

It may, however, be said that we have been pressing the point unduly, and it may be urged that our discussion and conclusion lack point and force because the estimate of the system on which we have founded our argument, as involved in the theory we are considering, would be repudiated by upholders of that theory. That it would be repudiated by upholders of the theory is no doubt true, but it may none the less be involved in the theory, as we hold it is; and if this

be the case, it is desirable that it and its bearings should be exhibited, in order that the precise character and significance of the theory may be discerned. And this we have attempted to do. It will, however, be of advantage for us to leave out of sight the ultimate issues with which we have been dealing, and to look at the matter from what may be considered the practical standpoint; to admit, that is to say, that as a matter of fact men and women may adopt and pursue an individual aim without acknowledging religion in any shape or form, and to inquire into the nature and worth of that aim.

Now in considering the possibility of constructing a moral code apart from religion or religious influence, we saw that this must be admitted to the extent that, since the world has a relative independence, its laws and arrangements may be apprehended by those confining their attention to it, and, in view of the laws and arrangements apprehended, a course of conduct may be formulated which will in form, and so far as it goes, be correct. The question which we have now to consider is, What kind of ideal does such a moral code, or the attitude of which such a moral code is the outcome, imply? Clearly it must be an ideal that lies wholly within the system. It cannot point to or connect itself with anything that is outside the system, for that would involve a religious reference. But, further, it cannot be a general ideal, expressive of the end which the system as a whole is to fulfil, because as independent the system cannot have an end to be fulfilled. It must, therefore, be merely conformity to the laws and arrangements of the system as these are discerned by us. But such an ideal is purely individual in character. It urges us to conformity to apprehended laws and arrangements. But why should we conform to these? The only reason is, that since these constitute our environment it is our interest to do so. If we fail to conform we shall suffer. The laws and arrangements are above us and we are subject to them. We must, therefore, either render obedience to them or pay the penalty. We cannot grasp their inner

purpose in such a way as to identify ourselves with it, and make its accomplishment the object of our action. All that we can do is to recognise the conditions that have to be fulfilled by us, if we are to live in harmony with our surroundings, and to escape the evil consequences of collision with these. In other words, since our aim is the result of our examination of the condition of things within which we stand, and is, therefore, merely the summation and expression of the demands which that condition makes upon us, it cannot do more than declare what is necessary if we are to maintain our place therein. It may be said that, besides maintenance of place, it points to development of nature. But, even if we grant this, the position laid down by us is not affected. What we have to think of is still maintenance, though it be not only continuous but progressive. The ideal gained, then, is purely individual in character, and because purely individual it is hedonistic or utilitarian. It may, indeed, be argued that the individual, when he endeavours to act in accord with what he perceives or believes to be the constitution of the world, has in view the benefit of others besides himself, and that, therefore, his aim is more than individual and utilitarian. But that is not the case in the supposed condition of things. His action may, as a matter of fact, benefit others, but what concerns us is not the result, but the basis of his conduct. What we have to ask is, Can he set the good of others before himself as an aim? And the answer is, that he cannot if he is limited to conformity to an environment which he has apprehended. A man can conform to his environment only for himself. He may seem to occupy an altruistic position, but he does not really do so. The ultimate object of his resolve and effort is his own benefit. I say the ultimate object, because there may be a proximate object, but with it we cannot rest satisfied. We must pass behind it to that which is its ground. Failing to do this we shall mistake entirely its real significance. Indeed the objection to our conclusion, to which we have just

referred, is due to a consideration of the proximate object alone and a neglect of the ultimate object. It is quite true that men, when seeking to conform to the laws and arrangements apprehended by them may, and frequently do, aim at the good of others. But why do they do so? In the circumstances with which we are dealing they do so because that is a means of meeting the demands of their environment, and producing the condition of things that will yield them highest good. It is because by the happiness of others their happiness will be secured, that the happiness of others becomes for them an object to be pursued. Their relation to others, which makes them dependent on the state of others for satisfaction, is the result of movements within the system that have created for them for the time special surroundings, and determined the form in which they are to gain personal benefit. In the gregarious state, the laws and arrangements apprehended called only for egoistic effort, but when gregariousness had made way for sociality, the effort called for was social. It was, however, social only in form; its basis and impulse were still egoistic. This was proved, in the second lecture, when we were considering Mr. Fiske's theory of the "Genesis of Man, Morally," and need not be further dwelt on here.

It thus appears that the only aim with which, according to the theory we are now considering, the individual can be furnished is a utilitarian one. What determines him is not the right, but the useful, or rather the right as useful. If he limit his view to the system of which he is a member, he cannot really rise above the thought of the benefit resulting to him from his effort. His aim may seem to be altruistic, but behind the altruistic there is the individual. The good done to others has a reflex influence on the doer, and it is the thought of this that determines him to action. He, at least, shares in the issue of his own endeavour, and it is the desire for that share that constitutes the end and impulse of his activity. Conformity to the laws and arrangements of the system within which he moves is striven after not for its

own sake, but for the sake of that to which it will lead. The aim is thus distinctly utilitarian, and a utilitarian aim has no moral worth.

I do not, of course, mean that all who profess to occupy non-religious ground are utilitarian in attitude, but only that, if they were consistent, they would be. Men are often in their practice far in advance of their creed. They are influenced by movements and principles which they do not recognise, and from which they fancy they have divorced themselves. Their interpretation and their treatment of the world are, to a greater or a less degree, affected by the spirit of the age in which they live. They cannot separate themselves altogether from the ideas and influences of their time, and these have been in a large measure moulded and coloured by religion. It is, for instance, impossible in this nineteenth century of the Christian era for anyone to keep himself entirely free from contact with, and even submission to, Christianity. The truths proclaimed by Christ are in the very air he breathes. It is not too much to say that the standpoint from which he must regard his surroundings has been fixed by the teaching of Jesus. As a consequence, those who claim to be able to live moral lives without the aid of Christianity, and who offer their estimate of the world as a substitute for Christianity, are indebted to Christianity for that which gives value alike to their code and their conduct. They are, in truth, fighting Christianity with the weapons that Christianity has put into their hands. This being the case, in dealing with them what we have to do is not to denounce them as wicked and worthless because they do not acknowledge religion, and in particular the Christian religion, but to show them that their refusal to acknowledge it is not equivalent to their utter rejection of it, that in spite of themselves they have been honouring and applying it, and that the features in their character that lend to them attraction and moral significance are due to its presence and operation.

We conclude, then, that there cannot be in any true

sense morality without religion, or the influence of religion. There may be the recognition and acceptance of moral laws, and a course of conduct that rests on respect for these, and consists in obedience to them, although there be not only no acknowledgment of religion, but a professed rejection of it. It does not, however, follow that religion has in no way contributed to the result indicated. All that follows is, that the operation of religion has not been detected by those who came under its control. For a careful analysis of their surroundings and their thoughts and impulses shows that these imply the admission and employment and working of conceptions and forces that belong to, and issue from, the religious sphere. We do not, therefore, deny that there have been men and women who have lived pure and just and honourable lives while occupying, or rather professing to occupy and believing that they did occupy, a non-religious attitude, but we do deny that such instances justify the belief that morality is independent of religion. The truth is, that such men and women are moral not because, but in spite of, their declared separation from religion.

We have thus dealt with the question, Can men be moral without being religious? That question suggests another, viz. Can men be religious without being moral? Or, otherwise expressed, Does religion necessarily issue in morality? To this question the conclusion to which we have come as to the relation between morality and religion compels us to give an affirmative reply. The validity of this reply, however, is denied by some, who declare that it is inconsistent with facts. These assert that religion has often existed without producing a moral result. They say that many who have made a religious profession have led lives that were mean, base, selfish, even vicious, and they argue that this would have been impossible if religion necessarily issues in morality. Now it must be admitted that the lives of those who make a profession of religion are not always noble, pure, unselfish, virtuous. But this admission does not in any way affect the point under

consideration. For those who make a profession of religion are not of necessity religious. We must distinguish between a religious profession and a religious state of mind and heart. Men may accept a creed and observe a ritual without experiencing the sentiment to which these correspond, and, if so, they are not truly religious, though they may claim, and may seem, to be so. And it is difficult to determine in special instances how far that which is external is justified by, because a reflection of, that which is internal. Instead, therefore, of deducing the bearing of religion from particular cases, the precise character of which is doubtful, we ought to look at religion in itself with the view of discovering what it implies as result in the character and conduct of those in whom it really exists, and, having discovered this, we should judge particular instances in its light. And when we follow this course we learn that the claim to be religious can only be admitted if, and in so far as, it is justified by right conduct, and that, therefore, the individuals referred to cannot be accepted as instances of religion without morality. In other words, the absence of morality, instead of proving, as a general principle, that there is no essential connection between religion and morality, proves that, in the particular cases cited, religion in the true sense of the term is wanting, and that the claim to be religious made by those referred to is unwarranted because resting only on empty profession. For what is religion? It is submission to, and alliance with, Him who is the source and ground and governor of all that exists, submission and alliance that spring from, and are expressive of, a desire to become like Him, and enjoy fellowship with Him. It is thus the formation and maintenance of a definite and directing relation between men and God. But the existence of such a relation implies that God is working in us, and if He is working in us we must, to the extent to which we have surrendered ourselves to His working, act in harmony with His will and purpose; and since the world, which is the sphere of morality, is the embodiment of His will and purpose in one of its

phases, we must treat it aright. Submission to, and alliance with, the ground and source and informing principle of the system within which we move, is incompatible with self-will and self-assertion, which are synonymous with rebellion against the laws of the system, and refusal to meet its demands. The assertion that religion can exist by itself without affecting the attitude of those who come under its influence toward their surroundings, and constraining them to strive after that which is right and true, betrays a mistaken conception alike of religion and of morality. Religion is confounded with theology or with ritual. The knowledge of God and the recognition of Him in formal service are separated from surrender to Him, without which they are worthless. Religion is a vital movement by which men are quickened and enlightened, so that they put forth activity in the line of the central thought of the system within which they stand. Of course, the conduct of those who are religious is not always, or indeed at any time, perfectly moral. Religion in the individual is progressive, and its outcome in his attitude and behaviour will be proportioned to its advance within him and to the fulness of its hold upon him, but if he be truly religious, and to the extent that he is religious, he will be moral. A true conception of religion, therefore, meets the objection which we are considering, since it shows that the connection between religion and morality is essential, and that, consequently, religion that is real and vital cannot exist without producing morality.

Closely connected with the point just referred to, is another of importance that demands consideration and that will require fuller treatment. It concerns the nature of the impulse toward religion, and, consequently, the value of religion for those who manifest it. We have learned that religion cannot exist without producing a moral result. From this it might be inferred that the production of that moral result is its sole end and aim—that it has interest and significance for men merely as affording them needed guidance and help in

acting rightly in their daily life and conduct; and, therefore, that it is a moral motive that leads men to become religious, and that it is by moral appeals that we are to seek to induce them to assume a religious attitude. That this inference has been drawn, or, at least, that the estimate of religion and of the impulse toward it, which that inference implies, has been accepted by many, tacitly or avowedly, cannot be doubted. But that it is incorrect, careful examination will prove. Suppose that it were valid, what would be the position of affairs? Religion would be subordinate to morality. For if it were the case that the apprehension of the claims resting on men, and the desire to secure what is necessary in order that these may be met, constituted the impulse toward religion, then religion would have no value apart from the satisfaction of a moral need and the supply of that which is requisite for the discharge of moral duty. It would not be an end in itself, to be sought and cherished for its own sake. It would be called forth by morality, and it would exhaust itself in morality. It would thus be merely accessory to morality; or, at most, it would be identical with it. But neither of these positions is consistent with the condition of things. It is true that religion has a moral result, and necessarily takes form in right conduct; and this being so, men may and should seek its aid in the discharge of the duties that devolve upon them. There is, therefore, a sense in which we may say that men ought to become religious in order that they may be moral. Such a statement is admissible if all that is meant is, that this is part of the object contemplated; but it is inadmissible if what is meant is, that this is the whole result desired and achieved. For religion is relation to God formed by acknowledgment of Him and surrender to Him. By it we are brought into sympathy with Him whose thought and purpose governs the world, and sympathy with Him will certainly guide us truly in obeying His laws. But our relation to Him is more than relation to Him as manifested in His works; it is relation to Himself in the

fulness of His being. And it is the realisation of that relation, with all the satisfaction and joy of communion which that realisation brings, that is the aim of religion. Only when this is perceived is religion truly appreciated, and only he who thus appreciates religion can become religious in the full sense of the term. To rest satisfied with religion as an auxiliary to morality is to fall far short of the benefits it is fitted to afford, for it is to limit our view to one aspect of the divine nature, and to shut ourselves off from the blessings which that nature in its totality can bestow upon us, and which it does bestow upon us in proportion to the depth and reality of our religion.

The validity of the foregoing argument may be denied, on the ground that the appeals to which we respond and the impulses which we obey, when we become religious, are and must be moral in reference and value; and that, consequently, the resulting condition must be distinctively moral, and our relation to God, whatever it may involve, must be moral in character. To this point we must direct attention. What, then, of the conditions of our assuming a religious attitude? Are these merely moral, or are they, even when seemingly moral, more than moral? The supposed objection declares that they are merely moral, and that they can be nothing else. Assuming for the moment that merely moral influences are sufficient to evoke religious feeling, let us inquire if these are the only influences that can do so, or if there are other influences that may produce this effect. That is to say, Must we pass through moral conviction in order to experience a desire for, or a constraint toward, religion, or may we feel such a desire or constraint apart from definite moral conviction, and as the result of influences other than moral? Must we begin with an apprehension of moral demands, so that religion is resorted to with the view of gaining what is requisite for the satisfaction of these demands, or are there other suggestions and conceptions that can urge us in the direction of religion, presenting to us

benefits that, while, it may be, including the satisfaction of moral demands, transcend these, and cast them for the time being into the shade? Is religion dependent for existence on morality in the sense that we must start from the duties imposed on us by the system within which we move, and from these pass to the recognition of, and fellowship with, God, or may we start from the thought of the satisfaction and peace and strength which the favour of and fellowship with God imply, and in view of these take up a religious position? That the latter course is at least possible becomes apparent when we consider our circumstances. We are not confined within our surroundings. Though in them, we are not of them. We have relations to that which is above and beyond them. We are spiritual beings, and because spiritual we do not exhaust ourselves in moral activity, though it is as spiritual that we put forth such activity. We may, therefore, be appealed to spiritually, and may respond spiritually. Our nature in its highest phase may be touched and influenced and quickened without definite recognition of that which is lower, though that which is lower will be affected by the change that will be produced in that which is highest, since the highest embraces in its movements all the forces that can act in the lower.

It thus appears that we may become religious on other than moral grounds. That is to say, there are appeals to which we may respond, and impulses that we may obey, which are religious in bearing, and which, as such, do not contemplate directly, still less primarily, moral needs. In order that we might deal with this point freely we assumed that it was possible to rise to religion from a purely moral basis. We must now examine that assumption. We must inquire if moral considerations, taken by themselves, are sufficient to awaken within us truly religious longings, and to induce us to assume a truly religious attitude. The conclusion to which we have just come determines the answer that must be given to this question. The religious appeal

and impulse which we have seen cause to admit, while not moral in form, embraces that which is moral. The moral is an element in it, but it is only an element. Now an element in a given movement cannot yield the result that corresponds to the movement in its fulness. If, therefore, we have only that which is moral, we cannot rise to the religious level and enter the religious sphere. We may speak of duty, and even of a Lawgiver, but if we do not recognise that duty is more than obligation, and that the Lawgiver is more than a Governor, we shall not manifest a religious spirit. Before this can happen we must regard duty as the expression of a vital relation that touches what is central in us, and the Lawgiver as the Being who is the Alpha and the Omega of our existence; but in order to do this we must transcend the purely moral standpoint and occupy the religious,—we must, that is to say, think not merely of discharge of obligation and respect for a Lawgiver, but also of spiritual satisfaction and inspiring communion with One who, as truth and goodness, meets the deepest want of our nature. What seem, therefore, to be moral influences are more than moral. Moral in form and in their primary reference, they involve ideas that are religious in character. This, indeed, results from the dependence of morality on religion, with which we dealt in the last lecture. If, as was there proved, we cannot even gain a moral code apart from religious influence, we cannot seek to bring ourselves into a proper attitude to that code without, consciously or unconsciously, admitting religious considerations.

Those, therefore, who fancy that they can themselves become religious by merely taking account of moral need, or that they can induce others to become religious by pressing on them arguments and appeals that are limited in their bearing to the moral sphere, are labouring under a serious mistake. They are overlooking what is the very note and essence of religion, surrender to Him who is the Ideal One, and who, as ideal, stirs within men a longing to enter into fellowship with Him and to enjoy His favour, a longing that

is distinct from the simple desire to meet obligation, even if that desire include a reference to Him who, as Lawgiver, can alone guide to the attainment of the end in view. They are confining their thoughts to what is at best an external relation to God, formed not for its own sake, but for the sake of an issue which it will render possible, and such a relation is not, in the strict sense of the term, religious. It is the product of alarm, not of awe or reverence; it is due to the apprehension of evil consequences and a wish to escape these, not to the attraction of goodness and submission to it. It may, of course, be said that duty may be presented as the claim of goodness, as the expression of that which is best and most desirable, and that, presented in this way, it may win respect and awaken reverence. But it can only do so if it be identified with a person, not merely as the transcription of that person's nature in relation to those who are under it, but also as finding its fulfilment and having its end in communion with that person on the part of those who honour it; and then it is more than duty. Duty, indeed, always points beyond itself to something that is its ground, and to something that is its aim. "Duty for duty's sake" is a high-sounding phrase, but it is really meaningless. We may be led to discharge duty by consideration of the results that will flow from our doing so, or from our failure to do so, or by our acceptance of the principle that is embodied in it, but in neither case do we discharge it for its own sake. In the former case we discharge it for the sake of the consequences to which it points; in the latter, we discharge it because we have allied ourselves with that which is its basis and source, so that our discharge of it is the spontaneous outcome of our inner state, a state that is determined by our submission to that which is fundamental and central,—a state, therefore, that is essentially religious.

What has been said does not of course mean that we may not, either in our own case or in the case of others, begin with moral considerations,—with thoughts of duty, of failure to discharge duty, of that which is requisite for the discharge of

duty, and so forth,—but only, that if we do not rise above these to a stage superior to the thought of simple duty we shall not become religious in any real sense, for we shall not truly unite ourselves by vital, spiritual bonds to the Divine Being.

Light will be shed on the points with which we have been dealing if we think of sin. Sin has two aspects, both of which must be noted and considered by us. It is violation of the law of God, and it is separation from God. The former consists chiefly in immoral conduct, since it is in relation to action that law is published; the latter displays itself in a state of mind and heart that is enmity against God, in self-will and in self-assertion. In dealing with men as sinners we may emphasise either of these phases. In the one case we shall urge them to abandon wicked courses and to strive after that which is pure and true and good; in the other case we shall urge them to surrender themselves to Him for whom they were made. At first sight it may seem that these two phases of sin, with the appeals to which they give rise, are quite different in character, that the one is moral and the other religious. And that there is a difference between them is evident. The former contemplates man's failure in respect of duty, and calls for a change of procedure; the latter contemplates man's failure in respect of communion, and calls for a change of attitude. But, while this is the case, we are not warranted in speaking of the one as moral and the other as religious. We may, if we choose, say that the one is moral rather than religious, and that the other is religious rather than moral; but we must observe that both are at once moral and religious, though in the one the moral reference may be prominent, and in the other the religious. This will become apparent if we inquire to what the different appeals point. That which springs from the thought of violation of the law of God points to observance of that law. But how can that observance be accomplished? Only by right relation to Him whose law it is, for the law is not apart

from Him, but is Himself in one of His relations. On the other hand, the appeal, which springs from the thought of separation from God, points to union with God. But what does union to God imply? Clearly it implies sympathy with Him, and, therefore, action in harmony with His thought and purpose. The two sides of sin, and the two calls based on these that are addressed to men, thus run into each other; they are fundamentally related, so that, while we may start from either, our treatment of that from which we start, and our response to it, will not be truly effective and fruitful unless it embraces a recognition of the other. That this truth has an important bearing on the question we have been discussing is evident. That question concerned the possibility of becoming religious on purely moral grounds, in view merely of moral need and a moral result,—the possibility, in short, of a merely moral religion. Now we have seen, that if we are to be kept from violation of the law of God we must unite ourselves to God, and, consequently, when we urge to obedience of the moral code we must urge to surrender to God as the condition of such obedience; we must, that is to say, rise above the purely moral standpoint. But is this not to make religion a means to morality? No, because though obedience to the law of God is dependent for its manifestation on union to God, union to God is not dependent for its existence on obedience to the law of God. The union certainly issues in obedience, but it is as certainly not created by it. Without obedience, indeed, there would be no union; not, however, because the union is formed by obedience, but because obedience is the necessary outcome of union, and therefore where there is no obedience there can be no union.

Separation from God is sometimes spoken of as if it were the effect of sin. According to this form of statement, sin is identified with, and confined to, violation of the law of God. Violation of law and separation are not regarded as different aspects of sin, but as sin and its consequence. But this view is unwarranted and misleading. Separation from God is as

truly sin as violation of the law of God, and so far from being its effect, it is strictly speaking its cause. Men violate the law because they are out of sympathy with, and have separated themselves in thought and feeling from, Him of whose nature the law is the reflection and expression. If, therefore, we are to connect them as cause and effect at all, we must treat separation as the cause and violation as the effect. Hence the salvation required is a salvation that brings us to God, that removes the ground of separation and issues in union, and not merely a salvation that fits us for the discharge of duty by means of which we may unite ourselves to God.

It is perhaps natural that we should approach the matter from the practical standpoint, and should think mainly of our conduct in reference to the present condition of things, since it is in dealing with it that we learn what manner of men we are. And inasmuch as we are transgressors, and, therefore, occupy an abnormal position, our thoughts are almost necessarily fixed on the transgression of which we have been guilty, and on the ground of which we are judged. This being so, we readily commit the mistake of regarding the transgression, in its visible form, as primary instead of secondary. We forget that it is the outcome and evidence of a spiritual condition which is alienation from God, and that consequently from it to this condition we must turn, since only by the removal of that condition and the creation of its opposite can freedom from transgression be secured.

A right estimate of sin, then, confirms the conclusions to which we have come. For it shows that morality is not the aim of religion, that we are not to seek to become religious merely that we may be moral, but are to recognise that, even if we begin on the moral level and with moral facts and claims, we must transcend these and come into a condition that, while yielding right conduct, has results that are wider and higher in range and reference than the

fulfilment of obligation,—that we are to become religious for the sake of religion, because in and by it we find rest, by resting in Him who has made us for Himself.

It may here be asked, Is God not a moral Being, and if He is, must not our relation to Him be moral in character, and consequently dependent on moral conviction and effort for its origin and continued existence? Now, it is evident that God cannot be less than moral. It does not, however, follow that He is rightly described by this term. He may be more than moral. He may occupy a position, and display features, higher and nobler than those which we designate moral. He may stand on a level, and manifest a character, so exalted, that to speak of Him as moral is to convey a false impression of His essence and attributes. We must, therefore, inquire whether or not this expression can with strict accuracy be employed regarding Him, and, if it can, in what sense it must be understood.

Perhaps the most general answer to the question we have to put would be, that God is moral inasmuch as His actions are all in harmony with moral law; in other words, inasmuch as His character and government are marked by justice, truth, purity, and so forth. But what does the conception of a moral law imply? Whence come the ideas of justice and truth and purity? Formally regarded, they are due to the conviction that the system within which we move is a unity, having a rational basis, and ruled in every part by a single principle, that manifests itself in varied, but consistent, conditions and activities, so that all its members and sections ought to stand in a well-defined relation to each other. By acting justly, *e.g.*, we mean acting in harmony with the fundamental thought and arrangement of the universe, giving to each that which belongs to him in virtue of his place in the world. It is practically the same with truth and purity. These point to that which pertains to the essence of the system, and each is the recognition of that essence in one of its references. But this system is a rational unity because

it is the expression of the Divine Being, the outcome of His decision and the embodiment of His thought, not only the product of His skill but the reflection of His nature. Hence the qualities to which we have referred—justice, truth, and purity—are relations that exist within the system, and are particular applications of the one principle which is its central and determining factor, a principle that springs from the divine nature. We therefore display the qualities referred to when, and in so far as, we conform to these relations. We are moral when we satisfy the demands of our environment. But if this be the reference of the term moral, it is evident that it cannot, with perfect accuracy, be applied to God. We cannot speak of Him as conforming to relations that are manifestations of His own nature, that are what they are because He is what He is, and would be other than they are if He were other than He is. We cannot, in any real sense, judge His conduct and pronounce sentence upon it. Judgment requires a standard, but the only standard that is available is the nature of Him whom we are to judge. We can try Him only by Himself. We cannot possibly raise any question regarding His action save that of self-consistency; and even that we cannot truly raise, because, in order to do so, we must have a test of consistency, and that can be gained only by a complete comprehension of that nature. All that, in this connection, we can say of the Divine Being is, that He is what He is, and that He does what He does because He is what He is.

It thus appears that we cannot apply the term moral to God, in the same sense at least in which we apply it to men, to indicate, that is, action in conformity with moral law. To do this is to carry up the relations within which we are embraced and impose them on the Divine nature, forgetful that they are the product of that nature. We err when we reason that, because we are under law, and prove ourselves moral by conforming to that law, God is also under law, and proves Himself moral by conformity thereto. This is to

overlook the distinction between us, as finite, and Him, as infinite.

The point on which we are insisting may be illustrated by reference to the term religious. Though we apply this term to ourselves, we do not apply it to God. We never speak of Him as a religious Being. We do not argue, that because we have religious feelings, He must have religious feelings. Why is this? Clearly because we recognise that religion is relation to a superior, a supreme Being, and that there is no Being superior to Him with whom He could hold relation,—that He Himself is supreme, and that whatever His relation to Himself may be, it cannot be described as religious. In this connection we speak of Him as a spiritual Being, or rather as Spirit. It is as Spirit that He stirs and satisfies religious longing. We conclude that because we are spiritual beings, He must be spiritual, and not that because we are religious, He must be religious. In other words, we make our nature, and not our relation, the ground of our deduction concerning Him. And as it is with the term religious, so it is with the term moral. We cannot apply it to God as we apply it to ourselves. All that we can do, is to infer that our moral ideas have their ground and source in Him, and that as He is a unity, one in nature and thought and manifestation and activity, His dealings with us must always be of such a kind as, when properly understood, to appeal to and satisfy those ideas. "He cannot deny Himself."

We may here, with advantage, refer to a phrase that is much in vogue at the present time, viz. "ethical monotheism." In some ways, and within limits, this is a useful form of expression, marking as it does a point of contrast between false forms of monotheism and the true form. In view, however, of all that has been said, it will be evident that it is really tautological. For if there is but one God, then all that exists must be the expression of His nature, and in every department His thought must rule; and the nature that is

expressed and the thought that rules must always be the same in essence. These cannot be different at different times or in different places, seeing that He whose they are is one, and the only One. A non-ethical monotheism is, therefore, a contradiction in terms: it is not really monotheism. This will be seen at once if we ask what it means, or is supposed to mean. It may mean that the one God is thought of as not always acting morally, as in His conduct either violating a law known to His subjects, or falling beneath an ideal apprehended by them. But neither of these is possible on monotheistic ground. If He violate a law, the law violated must either be His own or it must have emanated from another than He, but, if it be His own, His violation of it will disprove His unity, and, if it emanate from another, its existence will disprove His universality and supremacy. The same result flows from the other alternative. If He fall beneath an ideal apprehended by His subjects, either His unity or His universality and supremacy is disproved. The former is the case if the ideal be created by Himself, since He acts in opposition to His own creation; the latter, if the ideal be created by another, since that other must be at least His equal.

But the so-called non-ethical monotheism may be presented in another form. It may be employed to indicate the conception of the One God, as the God of might, using His power in an arbitrary fashion to defend and further the interests of those whom He has chosen, or who have acknowledged Him, without regard to their character or their conduct. But a God who could act thus would not be the only God. He would be confined in His operation to a part of the universe of being. Beyond the range of His authority, even of His interest, there would lie the moral sphere at least, and, as that sphere must have a presiding and governing Deity, the God of might would have a rival, or rather a superior, to whom in due time He would be compelled to succumb. He would certainly not be the only

God recognised, though He might be the only God honoured, by His worshippers.

When we thus consider the subject we perceive that ethical monotheism is simply pure monotheism, the conception of, and belief in, one God, who, as the only God, governs all departments of existence, so that movement and effort in any one department are in harmony with movement and effort in every other; and who manifests, and, as One, must manifest, His essence at all times and in all places, a Being "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning," "the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever." The phrase is therefore, as already indicated, really tautological. The term "ethical" does not qualify monotheism: it only serves to emphasise a feature of it that might be overlooked. It marks an upward step in the apprehension of the divine nature—advance in the direction of pure monotheism. It points to the apprehension of the ethical basis of divine judgment, of the fact that God deals with men in view of their conduct, and that belief in Him, as the one God, necessitates this view of His action. It thus touches the idea of God entertained by men, and emphasises an important difference between the true idea and the false. This is its legitimate application, and, so long as this is carefully observed, it may serve a useful purpose. But sometimes it is employed in another and very different reference. It is accepted as practically a definition of the divine nature, and the ethical monotheist is regarded as having seized the highest conception of God. In other words, God is declared to be essentially ethical in character. This, we have learned, is not the case. And our consideration of the expression "ethical monotheism" has tended to confirm our conclusion. It has taught us, indeed, that God deals with men on the ground of their character and conduct, that is to say, as moral, but that does not imply that He Himself is moral, any more than His treatment of the material forces, as material, implies that He is material. It only implies that He must deal with His creatures in terms of the conditions in

which He has placed them, and the powers with which He has endowed them. He Himself, however, is superior to those conditions, and more than those powers. He must not, therefore, be brought within those limits, but must be viewed as their ground and source. And if His nature is to be determined by them, it must be determined by those that are highest. Now man is more than moral, he is religious. He is capable not only of acting rightly, and meeting the demands of the moral law, but of uniting himself to, and of holding fellowship with, Him of whose nature the moral law is an expression. In other words, he can not only obey God, but relate himself to Him and commune with Him. Our conception of God must, therefore, correspond to the religious, and not merely to the moral, side of man's nature; it must be spiritual, and not simply ethical.

It may, however, be said, that while God is not moral as conforming to the moral law, He is moral as the author of that law, inasmuch as that law implies the adoption and prosecution by Him of moral ends in the creation and government of the world. The moral law, indeed, may be regarded as simply the expression of the ends contemplated by Him in calling into existence the system within which we move and in connection with which we display moral conduct. Now, that there are ends embodied in this system which are to be fulfilled, and which are being fulfilled, by the course of events, and that the moral law is the expression of these ends, is evident. It is, in truth, the existence of these ends that constitutes our moral environment; and it is by the moral law that we learn what they are and what is demanded of us, if we are to act in conformity with them and to share in their fulfilment. They have, therefore, for us a moral value. Their existence makes us moral in nature, and conformity to them makes us moral in character. But what of their relation to God? Do they warrant us in speaking of Him as a moral Being? Are we justified in describing them as moral when we refer them to Him as their author? From one point of

view these questions have been answered by what has been already said. We have seen that the moral law is the outcome of the divine nature, the exhibition of that nature in one of its relations. The ends embodied in the world are not, strictly speaking, adopted by God, but spring freely out of His being. To speak of them as moral in relation to Him is really to separate them from Him, and to judge His acceptance of them by a standard outside and above Him. But this is impossible, because He Himself is the only standard. The ends contemplated by Him in His works run back to, and rest on, His nature; they are manifestations of His essence. They cannot be other than they are, since He, whose they are, is the source and ground of all. God is not simply a Lawgiver who issues commands, that are applications of principles apprehended by Him, and that, consequently, can be judged by these principles. The principles that are applied by Him in his legislation are elements in His own nature. In order to deal with that legislation rightly, therefore, we must pass behind it to Him whose it is. And when we do so we must regard Him as more than a Legislator. Our relation to Him is not summed up in giving effect to the ends that have been embodied by Him in the system of things. We have to do with Him in His essence as well as in His detailed activity; the former, in truth, includes the latter. To apprehend His essence would be to understand His activity, for it would be to grasp that which is central and fundamental. And this we can accomplish only by religion. That brings us into union and communion with Him who is the source of all. It is more than the recognition of the moral law as divine commands; it is surrender to, and alliance with, Him of whose nature the moral law is a partial manifestation.

But we may be reminded that God, as self-conscious, must determine Himself, and that this self-determination gives to the ends which he sets before Himself a moral significance. In order that we may deal with this point, we must inquire what self-determination can mean for God. And it is

apparent that it cannot mean determination of the self by the self in view of an apprehended ideal, and with a view to the realisation of that ideal. For the Divine Being there cannot be an ideal, the conception of a possible state into which He may come by a free act of will and by effort resulting therefrom. Growth, development, fulfilment of aim, these can have no meaning for Him. He is the "I am that I am," the eternally perfect existence. He knows Himself, not as a potentiality but as a reality. He determines Himself, indeed, but His self-determination lies wholly within His own being. It is not due to an appeal from without to which He responds. Neither is it due to an impulse that springs up within, pointing to a condition beyond and in advance of that reached. What He wills is His own nature. He cannot will anything else. But this necessity is not external in basis; it is internal—the necessity of absolute perfection. The will does not dominate the nature, nor does the nature dominate the will; they condition and are conditioned by each other. This complete equilibrium, which is highest freedom, is the specific quality of pure spirit. The ends, therefore, which God is said to set before Himself in the creation and government of the world must be conceived of not only as expressions of His nature, but as realised in that nature—as, in their fulfilment, elements in the being that is eternally willed and eternally exists in its fulness and complexity.

It is of course difficult, or rather impossible, for us to reconcile this view of the divine nature with that movement in time by means of which the divine purpose is being executed, and, in particular, with the free realisation of that purpose by rational creatures. But notwithstanding this impossibility, the circumstances demand it. To deny it would be to declare the dependence of God on the world for perfection. It would be, in effect, to maintain that only at the close of the time-movement, in and by which the ends which He has set before Himself are being realised, would He be complete in nature. Up to that point a part of His essence apprehended by Him

in idea, and presented to Himself as an ideal, would be unfulfilled. But an incomplete, a gradually self-realising Deity, does not meet the necessities of the case. For one thing, such a Deity is subject to temporal conditions, with all the limitations which these imply. But the very idea of a Deity, the only idea at least that can satisfy the rational nature of man, is that of One who is above such limitations, who is unconditioned by anything external to Himself, the terms of whose movement and activity lie wholly within His own being. He is of necessity infinite and eternal, with no past to which He looks back, and no future to which He looks forward. But, further, the apprehension of an ideal implies relation on the part of him who apprehends it to one who is above him, by whom the ideal is created. An ideal is more than a mere conception: it is the recognition of a call to conformity to that which is essential. It rests on reality, on the nature of things, and is the exhibition of the possibility which that presents to the individual, and the obligation which it lays upon him. To think of the Divine Being, therefore, as setting before Himself an ideal, is to presuppose the existence of that which is the ground of the ideal. But we cannot presuppose anything but the Divine Being Himself. He is the only reality to which there can be conformity, and, as He is infinite and eternal in nature, this conformity cannot be progressive; the apprehension of the ideal and its realisation must be coincident; in other words, there is, strictly speaking, no ideal for Him.

What has been said suggests another point. To suppose a progressive realisation of the divine nature would be to weaken the force of the moral law. That has commanding authority, because it points to, and rests on, that which is existent. It issues a Categorical Imperative, because it is the expression of the fundamental principle of the system within which we are embraced. It does not call upon us to create an absolutely new condition of things, but to give effect to a condition of things that already exists. It suggests an ideal;

but an ideal rests on reality, and is the expression of the relation thereto of the individual whose ideal it is. The moral law, therefore, involves a fixed and unchanging order that is to be recognised and submitted to, by those who are subject to it. But that order must have its basis and source in a Being, for whom it is a fact and not merely a possibility.

The self-determination of God, then, is not determination with a view to self-realisation. It is the determination of His nature in its fulness, a determination that neither indicates a desire for, nor issues in, advance, but that marks the complete satisfaction of Himself with Himself,—the perfect harmony of aim with existence, the unity of will and essence.

Within His nature, since He is Spirit, there must be room for movement, but this movement must be not only consistent with, but a manifestation of, His eternal self-determination. Its spring and its issue must be within the nature as willed—must, indeed, be that nature. It will, of course, be manifold and varied in character, revealing itself in diversity of form and phase, but the different forms and phases are not so much special determinations as elements in the one determination that is involved in His existence. They are not so much special ends that He wills in their singularity as relations and conditions that are involved in, and that emerge from, the one supreme act of self-determination, in which will and nature blend and co-operate. They do not, therefore, constitute Him a moral being; they rather, when rightly regarded, show that this is an inadequate category under which to place Him. And this being so, we do not come into full relation to Him when we limit ourselves to them. To consider only the special ends that disclose themselves in the system within which we stand, is to take account only of the movement of the Divine Being as that is revealed in time. But this is insufficient. Behind the time-revelation of the movement we must pass to the movement itself, and, when we do this, we come into contact

with the self-determination, which is of the very essence of the Divine Being. In other words, we take account of the Divine Being Himself, and enter into union with Him. Such union is more than acceptance of, and obedience to, the moral demands made by the ends embodied by Him in the universe : it is surrender to Him in the fulness of His personality, a surrender that necessarily produces conformity to these ends, but is not identical with such conformity, nor sought merely with the view of securing it. It has its own worth, and is desired for its own sake. But this surrender is religion. Our consideration of the nature of God has thus confirmed the conclusion to which we were led. It has taught us that God, while the source of moral law, is not rightly described as moral ; that He is more than moral, and that, consequently, we have relations with Him that are other than moral ; that as Spirit He touches us in our spiritual nature, and that therefore we may respond to Him on spiritual grounds. In other words, religion, while involving morality, is greater than morality, inasmuch as it is surrender and union to Him of whom the moral law is but a partial expression, and may therefore come into existence apart from definite moral considerations ; but, whether it does so or not, it is not merely moral in reference and value, but, while embracing moral results, transcends these, lifting us to communion with Him of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things.

Part Fourth

THE TESTIMONY OF CHRIST

LECTURE VIII

THE KINGDOM OF GOD

IN the two preceding lectures we have exhibited the nature and the extent of the relationship subsisting between morality and religion. Our determination of these has been based upon our analysis of human nature and human experience in their moral and religious reference. We have left out of account special systems, and have devoted our attention to that which is fundamental and essential in our constitution, and which, because fundamental and essential, defines the relation in which our various states and activities must stand to each other. Thus the result to which we have come, claims to be universal in application. What it professes to show is not what has been, or will be, found in certain circumstances, but what must be found in all circumstances. It asserts that, man being what he is, morality and religion must always be connected in the manner indicated. Now, if the claim which it makes to universality of application be valid, it must find confirmation in the various systems that have won the regard and influenced the lives of men. Each of these must, in its own way, illustrate the theory which we have been led to adopt. The illustration furnished

will in some cases be positive, and in some negative. That is to say, some will justify our conclusion by their failure to retain their hold on men, or to meet the moral and spiritual necessities of men, and some by their success in these directions,—the failure and the success being due, respectively, to neglect of, and to regard for, that which is central in human nature. This being so, a study of these systems would supply a series of tests by which our result would be tried. To pass all of them under review is, however, impossible for us within our limits. And, happily, it is not necessary in order that the position we have attained may be put to the proof. What is required for this purpose can be gained by the consideration of one of the many systems that have influenced men. That system is Christianity. And by it our position can be fully tested, because it is the perfect expression of the truth concerning man. It is the word of God, of the One True God, of Him who is the source of all the varied forms of existence, by whom and for whom we, as rational creatures, were created. Its declarations and demands must, therefore, be in complete accord with our constitution. The system presented to us by Him, who made us, and who desires that we should fulfil the purpose of our existence, cannot but be in agreement with our nature. In this respect, indeed, it differs from other systems. They were framed by men who were seeking to understand themselves and their surroundings, and were the expression and application of their interpretation of these. That interpretation was, and, in the circumstances could not but be, even at the best, partial and inadequate. But Christianity was an interpretation by Him who “knew what was in man.” Consequently it recognises that which is essential in human nature, and its deliverances and provisions are in harmony therewith. By it, therefore, the issue of our investigation may be fully tested. By it, indeed, that issue must be tested if its claim to universality of application is to be admitted, for by nothing else, because by nothing less,

than agreement with the perfect system can such a claim be established.

We pass, then, to a consideration of Christianity from the standpoint of our inquiry. And by Christianity I do not mean the theological system suggested by that title, but the historical facts and the reported utterances on which that system rests, and from which it has been drawn. Were we to study the system, in its bearing on the question before us, we should be compelled to take a very wide range, and to enter on the consideration of questions that lie entirely beyond the scope of our investigation, and the treatment of which would tend to obscure the point that is actually before us. On the other hand, by going back to the fountainhead we shall narrow greatly the field of our discussion; and by confining ourselves to the sayings of Christ and the facts of His life, as these bear on the subject before us, we shall be able to concentrate our attention on the precise matter before us for settlement.

In adopting the course indicated we are acting in harmony with the spirit of the age. The cry of the religious world at the present day is "Back to Christ," and from all quarters there comes a demand for the "Christianity of Christ." Now we propose to go back to Christ, and to seek the Christianity of Christ. But these phrases admit of two different applications. We must, therefore, explain in what sense we accept them, in what sense, indeed, they should be accepted of all. And this will become clear if we ask how far the cry and the demand which they express are right and valid. And they are right and valid, if they mean that we should seek the closest possible contact and communion with Christ, and should accept only what bears the unmistakable stamp of His authority. We ought certainly to strive after an intimate acquaintance with Christ, and a full and accurate knowledge of His teaching and effort. We should listen to His words, and meditate on His deeds, and study His character, that, becoming familiar with these not only in the

letter and the form, but also in the spirit, we may understand what He said, what He did, and what He was, and may thus apprehend the truth He came to proclaim. This, however, does not mean that all else is of little or no importance, and may without loss, if not with positive gain, be overlooked. "Back to Christ" is a misleading cry, and "the Christianity of Christ" is a mistaken demand, if they spring from the feeling that all that has intervened between the departure of Christ from the world and the present era is, if not actually worthless, of small value, so far as gaining a deeper insight into, and a fuller view of, Christ's message and mission is concerned. Yet some such feeling they seem frequently to express. Those who utter them often speak as if the various movements that constitute the history of the Gospel from the day that Christ was taken up until now, instead of contributing to the elucidation of Christ's teaching in the way of development and expansion, had perverted or at least obscured it, by mistaken apprehension and faulty application, as well as by fusing with it the vagaries of unbridled speculation, and running it into the moulds supplied by philosophies that were alien to it in spirit. Now, it is true that during these nineteen centuries much has been said and done and written, in the name of Christ and in the supposed interest of His cause, that has been entirely out of harmony with His teaching and aim. But this admission does not necessitate or warrant the depreciation of all that has happened, or of all that has been accomplished by His servants, singly or collectively. To reject all, because much merits condemnation, is neither wise nor just. What we ought to do, is to discriminate between that which is true and that which is false. We should endeavour to separate the tares from the wheat, that we may reap the harvest of instruction and enlightenment which the course of events is offering us. For that there is such a harvest, ready to be gathered in, we cannot well doubt if we have regard to the words of Christ Himself. Speaking to the Twelve, He

pointed forward to supplementary disclosures that were to be granted after He had passed away from earth. On one occasion He said: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth."¹ He had many things to say unto them which He must then leave unsaid, but He would not leave them for ever unsaid. He would declare them by His Spirit, whom He was to send, and by whom His followers were to be guided into all truth. Such was the promise which He gave. And this promise was not for the Apostles alone. It was for all who, like them, should yield themselves to His power and influence. It was for the Church in the widest sense of the term, and it was as representatives of that Church that the Apostles were addressed. This becomes evident when we remember that the Spirit, who was to be the medium of communication, was not withdrawn at the close of the Apostolic age, but has continued, and still continues, to act within the Church. And the promise thus given by Christ has been fulfilled gradually and increasingly, as His people have been able to bear it. The many things that He had to say, He has been saying by the lips and the pen of the devout, within whom the Spirit has shed abroad "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ,"² and by His dealing with the Church through the Spirit, by whose inspiration and quickening and government it has, despite many failures, extended and advanced. To neglect or depreciate these communications, still more to deny that they are communications, is not to honour, but to dishonour, Christ, for it is to reject the prophecy which He uttered concerning them, or to hold that that prophecy remains unfulfilled; it is to cast reflection either on His foresight or on His power. To go back to Christ, indeed, is to discover that we must move forward from Christ, that we cannot do full justice to the word and work of Him who is "the same yesterday, and to-day,

¹ John xvi. 12, 13.

² 2 Cor. iv. 6.

and for ever,"¹ if we confine ourselves to the few years of His earthly manifestation and activity. By all means let us go back to Christ, that, seeing Him in the fulness and richness of His personality, we may reach the standpoint from which alone we can study aright the revelation that has come by Him, and may discover the principles of which that revelation, in its several parts and stages, are the varied expression and application, but let us not commit the mistake of supposing that that revelation was absolutely closed when He left the world. Let us rather, while acknowledging Christ as the medium by which truth in its essence and purity has been conveyed to men, and regarding His appearance and life in the world as the means by which its central and fundamental elements have been presented to men, gratefully accept the guidance and the help toward a right perception and comprehensive grasp of that truth which the post-ascension activity of Christ is fitted to afford.

That there was room and need for instruction and enlightenment, beyond that given by Christ to His disciples, becomes apparent when we consider the circumstances. As a teacher—and it is in this capacity alone that we think of Him at present—He came to declare the truth; not truths merely, but the truth. Now the truth is a unity. It has, indeed, manifold sides and applications, but these are all consistent with, and vitally related to, each other, as parts and manifestations of an organic whole. This being so, its presentation is not complete until its unity has been exhibited. But that unity could be exhibited only by Christ. That this is the case we recognise at once when we remember that He not only declared the truth, but was Himself the truth. It might, however, be exhibited by Him in either of two ways—by setting forth in consecutive order the varied aspects and references of the truth, or by guiding His followers so that they would be able to seize the inner significance and mutual connection of His words and

¹ Heb. xiii. 8.

deeds, and to bring them into harmony with each other, as different expressions of one root-principle. In other words, He might either construct and commit to His followers a complete and rounded system of truth, or furnish them with materials out of which such a system could be constructed, and, if the latter were the course pursued by Him, He must afford them help, in order that their treatment of the material furnished by Him might be wise and effective.

What, then, was the course followed by Christ? Clearly it was the latter. His discourses were not connected as members of a progressive series, each taking up and carrying forward the thought of its predecessor, so that as a whole, and in the order in which they were spoken, they constituted a body of truth "fitly joined together." Their place and form and content were not determined by the logical development of a fundamental idea, the aim of which was to embrace consecutively, and according to their relative importance, the several departments of man's spiritual existence and interests. Many of them, too, were practical in character, dealing with cases that appealed for treatment, so that the truth of which they were special applications did not at once appear in its full breadth and import. Consideration and insight were required to distinguish the general principle from its particular expression.

And Christ taught not only by His word, but also by His deeds and by His life and His life-work. His miracles were, in a real sense, manifestations of the truth He had come to declare, but He did not explain their significance for, or define their place in, His system. He left it to His followers to learn what these were by careful and devout study. Without, however, dwelling on His acts of mercy and power, let us turn to His life and His life-work. As has been said, He taught by these as well as by His words and deeds. By this is not meant that these had no function beyond that of teaching, but only that teaching was one of their functions. By His life and His life-work, then, He set forth the central

principle of His mission. He not only proclaimed a revelation ; He was Himself a revelation. His person, His character, His experiences were all presentations of the message He had brought to earth. But as with His sayings and His miracles, so with these. He left them, with all their mystery, to be apprehended by His disciples, and He could not well do otherwise. The secret which was wrapped up in them could only be declared when the great consummation had been reached. His life and His life-work could not be rightly interpreted until they were finished. By His death, and by His death alone, could their value and import be made plain. Only from the cross could there come the light that would illumine them, and make their bearing apparent. In the months preceding the close of His career He did, indeed, seek to lead the Twelve to the right standpoint from which to regard Him and His effort ; but what He said was necessarily vague and indefinite—fruitful after the event, when it was called to remembrance, rather than before it, when it was heard. It is true, that if they had been as fully prepared as they might have been, they would have understood more than they did ; but they could not have understood all. It was only after Christ had died, and risen again, that the facts to be seized and construed could be presented to men in their real character. Prior to these events, the nature of Christ, as well as His aim and method, could be only partially disclosed. Sufficient could be, and was, disclosed to prove Him the Messiah, and to warrant a demand for acceptance and condemnation for rejection ; but it was one thing to recognise His Messiahship, and another and a very different thing to know precisely what His Messiahship involved, even in its narrower reference. For this the final act in the Messianic effort was required. Without that act the data were incomplete, the conditions were wanting, even for a clear view of the problem that had to be solved. When we fairly and fully estimate the situation, we recognise at once that much concerning Christ and His mission on earth could be learned

only after He had finished the work that had been given to do. It was expedient for His followers that He should go away, for, had He not gone away, they would have failed to discern the wide range and the deep significance of His appearance and endeavour. And this being so, His life and His life-work, like His words and deeds, do little more than furnish the material out of which a systematic presentation of the truth may be constructed.

The interpretation and arrangement, then, of Christ's teaching and activity, of His life and of His death, were to be undertaken and carried through by His followers. But, for the accomplishment of this arduous and important task, they were not to be left to their own powers and resources. They were to be aided and guided at every step. Without the assurance of aid and guidance they might well have hesitated to proceed. But an assurance that was clear and emphatic was given to them once and again. "The Spirit of truth" was promised to "lead them into all truth." They received also the word of encouragement, "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."¹ The presence of the Master was to accompany them in all their movements and activities. They were not even to enter on their labours until conscious of that presence and of the strength and stimulus it supplied. They were to tarry at Jerusalem till they were "endued with power from on high."² And, in their Pentecostal experience, they found evidence that what was requisite had been bestowed and a pledge that, according to their need, there would be granted to them support and enlightenment; and not to them only, but to all who might, like them, acknowledge Christ as Lord and Master and labour for the spread of His Gospel and the furtherance of His cause. And that pledge has been, and is being, abundantly fulfilled; and because of its fulfilment, "the truth as it is in Jesus" has been growingly apprehended and declared. The desire of the faithful for a deeper insight into the meaning of the word

¹ Matt. xxviii. 20.

² Luke xxiv. 49.

and work of the Master has not been left unsatisfied. "Declare unto us this parable" has been the request, often repeated, of the Church, as it was the request of the Apostles, and to it there has come a gracious response; a wider view and a clearer vision has been granted. In this manner Christ has been continuing and completing His teaching, and the communications made by the Exalted One are as worthy of our regard as the communications made by the Incarnate One.

On earth He "began both to do and to teach,"¹ and what He began He must carry forward to completion. From His doing and His teaching in the second stage, as in the first, we may, and we ought to, gain instruction and enlightenment. It is true that, in the former, He works by human agents, whereas, in the latter, He wrought Himself, so that His present activity may be, and too often is, hidden and hindered by human error and frailty, while His past activity stands out clear and distinct. To dissociate the divine from the human is sometimes a difficult task, but it is a task that has to be performed by us if we are to receive the full revelation granted in Him by whom grace and truth came. And for this task we shall be fitted by a careful study of Christ's own sayings and doings. That study will bring us to the right standpoint, and will give us that sympathy and that acquaintance with His aim and purpose without which our insight cannot be keen and true, nor our meditation fruitful and helpful. Hence we should go back to Christ as He walked with men on the earth, not that we may move only within the limits of those years of humiliation and toil, but that, seeing Him in His grace and wisdom and power, and communing with Him as He appeared on earth, we may follow on to know Him as He has been revealing Himself throughout the centuries in the history of His Gospel. Thus our return to Christ in the flesh, and our observation of Christ in history, will act and react on each other, and will yield to us an in-

¹ Acts i. 1.

creasingly complete view of His nature and character and effort.

I have spoken of the task that devolves on the followers of Christ as the interpretation and systematising of the sayings and doings of Christ. Perhaps I ought to say that by systematising I do not mean merely formal arrangement. Systems of Theology have often been nothing more than this, and have consequently been hard, dead, repellent; not presenting the truth in its vital and vitalising character as a spiritual force,—a body of doctrines, every member of which is bound to every other as the manifestation of one living principle,—but setting side by side, in an external fashion, and uniting by a factitious bond its *disjecta membra*. The system of which I have been thinking is something quite different, as is apparent from the fact that it rests on, and is, the embodiment of interpretation, the discovery of the inner meaning and the essential relations of the elements combined. It is not so much the formation as the recognition and exhibition of a system which is a unity in diversity. And because this is its character, its advance towards completeness can be spoken of as a means of revelation. The change wrought under the guidance of Christ is more than a change of form. The material possessed is not simply placed in a new setting, but, by being placed in a new setting, its meaning is more clearly seen; or rather, because its meaning has been more clearly seen, it demands a new setting. The altered setting thus rests on and declares what is really a revelation, a distinct advance in insight into the truth which it was the work of Christ to declare. It is just because this is its character that it demands consideration, and that to neglect it is to refuse what Christ is offering us for the better understanding of His ministry, with its manifold phases and references.

Having thus made plain what we mean by going back to Christ, let us turn our thoughts to Him, that, by observing Him and listening to Him, as He moves about amongst men, we may learn His mind on the subject of our inquiry. Were

we undertaking a complete investigation of the point raised, we should require, as we have just seen, to take a wider range, and to embrace within our survey the course of the gospel during these nineteen centuries, so far as it bears on the matter in hand. A complete investigation, however, is not necessary for our purpose. The question which we are seeking to answer is general in character. What, therefore, is demanded for its settlement is the apprehension of principles in their broad outlines, and not in their varied applications. And, in the present instance, the former is to be gained by studying Christ as He lived in the world; the latter, by studying the movement which He initiated in person, and which, by His spirit, He has been directing and controlling for the furtherance of His purpose. An examination of His career on earth is thus all that is needed for the attainment of the end we have in view.

With His life on earth, then, we have to do. And for information regarding it we must look to the four Gospels, which contain the only authentic record of it we possess. These, or at least selections from them, must be subjected to scrutiny. This is the only way in which we can reach the principles enumerated by Christ, and can learn His views on such topics as that we are at present discussing. For, in the Gospels, we do not find definite and dogmatic deliverances on points in Theology or in Ethics. What they offer is not a treatise on doctrine or on morals, but a report of events and sayings that have a doctrinal and a moral bearing. They do not, consequently, furnish an immediate answer to the question put by us; all they do is to provide data from which an answer may be drawn. It could have been otherwise only if Jesus had developed and committed to His followers a full and exhaustive theory of human life, or if the Evangelists had interpreted the incidents and utterances with which they were familiar, and, on the basis of their interpretation, had built up such a theory. But neither of these courses was followed. That Jesus did not present

His teaching in systematic form, has been shown in the preceding section. And that the Evangelists did not interpret and theorise about what they had to relate, is evident. They were biographers. Their aim was to set forth faithfully what He, whom they called Lord and Master, and whom they believed to be the Saviour of the world, had been, and had said, and had done, so far as they were able to do so. They did not seek to explain His person, or to expound His teaching and effort; they left these to speak for themselves. They were content to describe Him of whom they wrote as He had appeared to, and had impressed Himself on, His followers. It is true that each occupied His own standpoint, and arranged His material in harmony therewith, and, to this extent, they may be said to have interpreted what they had seen and heard, or had received. By giving to the facts at their command a special setting, they practically declared that these pointed in a certain direction and served a certain purpose. But this was only the recognition and indication of one of the general references of the life and activity which they had to chronicle; it was not the exhibition of the inner significance of that life and activity in varied and harmonious detail. Only if the latter had been attempted should we have been warranted in looking for distinct deliverances on the problems of Theology and of Ethics. As it is, we cannot gain more than incidents and sayings which, as expressing or suggesting principles, will furnish what is requisite for the settlement of these problems.

It may, however, be said, that though a fully developed system, offering an immediate answer to our questions, cannot be found in the Gospels, yet, inasmuch as the work of Christ was a unity, it should be possible to seize its central thought and determining principle, and in its light so to read all that has been written that its precise meaning will be easily apprehended. Now, that the effort of Christ was a unity, and that, consequently, there must be a central thought and a determining principle, we have seen. And it is evident

that, if these could be seized by us, we should be able, in their light, to see all that is offered to us in its right relation and true proportion—should, indeed, by simple examination of that thought and principle, and by deduction therefrom, reach the answer to general questions, such as that before us, without taking account of, or subjecting to scrutiny, the facts recorded. But can these be apprehended by us? Having regard to what has been said as to the contents of the gospel, we seem forced to reply that they cannot, at least *à priori*. If they can, it must be by, and as a result of, a thorough examination and an accurate interpretation of what has been written. Not until we have passed the facts recorded, and the sayings reported, under review, and have discerned and unified their teaching, can we reach that which is the central and determining thought. So far, therefore, from being able to begin with this, it is the goal toward which we are to travel by the path of reflection and exposition. Every fresh insight into the meaning of what has been transmitted to us concerning Christ will render fuller and clearer our view of the fundamental principle of His mission. This is often forgotten, and the aim of Christ's coming and work is summed up and set forth in a single phrase or a brief sentence,—a phrase or a sentence that perhaps emphasises and exhibits a most important side of Messianic effort, and a side that is sufficient for the object in view, but that does not, and cannot, express what is, in the full sense of the term, essential in that effort. Indeed, we have only to pause and inquire what any such phrase or sentence means in order to see that, simple and sufficient as it may appear, it cannot meet all the claims that may rightly be made upon it in virtue of its professed comprehensiveness, and that other ideas than those which it suggests are needed to balance and correct its oneness.

It would lead us far away from the purpose in hand to enter on a discussion, however brief, of such phrases and sentences as are common amongst us. But there is one

that demands consideration, because of its close connection with our subject, viz. "The Kingdom of God," or "of Heaven." This phrase is accepted by many, in the present day, as indicative of Christ's aim, and as furnishing a key to a right understanding of His teaching and effort. It is said that He came to establish the kingdom of God, and that, as this was the object which He had in view, His words and His works must be studied in its light, and must be regarded as suggestive of its different phases and relations. Candlish says, "that the kingdom of God is . . . the name by which our Lord habitually spoke of His work."¹ Wendt declares, that "the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus (and under the "teaching" he includes everything, even the sufferings and death) can be classed under this general theme (*i.e.* the kingdom of God), and the two points of view from which He expounded it."² And Bruce expresses himself thus: "The doctrine of Christ in these Gospels (*i.e.* the Synoptics) is the doctrine of the kingdom of God. Under this category all may be ranged; there is no other entitled to be placed above it, or that does not easily find a place under it. . . . I have no hesitation, therefore, in regarding the kingdom of God as an exhaustive category."³ These assertions are supported by references to statements made by the Evangelists as to the subject-matter of Christ's preaching, and to the prominence which He Himself gives to the kingdom of God in His discourses. We are reminded that it is said, "He came preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God," and that not only in parable after parable did He set forth the nature of the kingdom of God, but that this expression was constantly on His lips. Now, this is an attractive theory. It is specially attractive for us in our present inquiry, for it is apparent that, if we could accept it, our labour would be much less than it must otherwise be. If

¹ *The Kingdom of God*, p. 6.

² *The Teaching of Jesus* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 173.

³ *The Kingdom of God*, 2nd ed. pp. 40, 41.

Christ's effort could be adequately described as the establishment of the kingdom of God, it would be a comparatively easy task to discover what His views were as to the relation of morality and religion. We should require only to analyse the conception of the kingdom of God, in order to gain what we are seeking. But, attractive as the theory is, and helpful as it would prove, we cannot accept it, because it seems to us, in several respects, defective and unsatisfactory. Let us examine it carefully, with the view of justifying our rejection of it.

Before, however, entering on its examination, we must pause to inquire what precisely it is. If we are to discuss it fairly and effectively, we must be clear as to the meaning of the terms employed and the statements made. And as these admit of more than one interpretation, we must direct attention to them in order that we may determine their scope and significance. And the question we have to answer turns on the value to be attached to the phrase, "kingdom of God," and in particular to the term "kingdom." Is this term to be taken literally, as strictly descriptive, or metaphorically, as generally suggestive, of the end which Christ sought to realise? Does it definitely embody and express what is central and fundamental in the mission and work of Christ, or does it only indicate one way in which the result of His effort may be presented? When it is said that the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus can be classed under the kingdom of God, what are we to understand by the statement? Does it mean that these contents are simply expositions and applications of the ideas of kingship and citizenship, so that their import is determined by these ideas? In other words, is it held, by those who so speak, that the relation between God and man, and between man and man, which Jesus came to establish, is merely the relation of sovereign to subject, and of fellow-subject to fellow-subject, so that His various deliverances and activities are nothing more than exhibitions of the different sides and aspects of these relations, and

attempts to secure their complete recognition and establishment? Or is the term kingdom to be translated freely, as implying only the formation by Christ of a community, of which God is the head and men the members, but not fixing definitely the nature of that community, so that classing the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus under it would simply be placing them under this as a suitable and convenient heading? Whichever of these interpretations be adopted, the purpose of Christ is thought of as the constitution of a corporate body; but by the one its character is specifically settled, by the other, it is not. That there is thus a vital distinction between them is evident. Which of them, then, must we understand to be accepted by the supporters of the view we are considering? Now, it is apparent that, if the statement that the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus can be classed under the general theme of the kingdom of God has any point at all, it must mean that the term "kingdom" is to be taken in its strict significance, and that, in it, we have the ruling and determining conception, to which all that Christ said and did must correspond. If those who make, or subscribe to, this statement were to insist that it did not mean this, but was intended to express the other thought indicated, they would deprive it of all force. For if "the kingdom of God" be only a metaphor, a phrase used freely to suggest the general aspect, rather than the particular quality, of the community called into existence, there is really no meaning in saying that the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus can be classed under it. Of course the whole contents of the teaching can be classed under it, just as they can be classed under any other of the metaphorical phrases employed by Christ, but they can be classed under it only as they can be classed under them, by extending its reference so as to admit features and elements that do not essentially belong to it.

We may, perhaps, be reminded that what we are dealing with is "the kingdom of God," a special kind of kingdom, a

kingdom that is spiritual in nature because divine in basis. And it may be urged that a qualifying clause ought to affect our conception of the thing qualified, and that, consequently, in speaking of the significance of the phrase in question, we should not devote our whole attention to the term "kingdom," but should treat the expression as a whole, intended to present a single idea, and should translate the former in terms, or at least in the light, of the latter. Now, it is true that a qualifying word or clause ought to affect our conception of the thing qualified, but it ought not, at least not always, or even as a rule, to affect that conception materially. It may emphasise some feature of it, or some element in its structure, but it does not, in any real sense, touch its essence. We may, for instance, speak of a triangle of wood or stone or gold, and the clauses "of wood," "of stone," "of gold" define for us the special object described in its substance, but they do not in any way affect its shape. It is a triangle in each case. So we may speak of a "kingdom of God" or a "kingdom of the Devil," and the two phrases will call up to our minds two different organisations, but, if the term "kingdom" is to be taken literally in both phrases, the difference will not be a difference of organisation, but a difference of spirit and principle. The relations between the head and the members, and between the members themselves, will be the same in both. Therefore, to say that the kingdom which Christ came to found is, because "of God," and, as such, spiritual, other and more than a kingdom, and consequently may embrace ideas that are out of harmony with the term kingdom, strictly defined, is to say what is not warranted; it is, indeed, to declare that the phrase "kingdom of God" is not descriptive, but metaphorical, and therefore not entitled to be regarded as "an exhaustive category," "under which the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus can be classed."

Having thus cleared the ground, by defining exactly the theory with which we have to deal, we proceed to its examination. And we begin by asking if it is the case

that the kingdom of God is "an exhaustive category," under which "the whole contents of the teaching of Jesus can be classed" in a real, organic relation,—in such a way, that is, that they will be seen to harmonise perfectly with it, and to rise freely out of it. The field of investigation opened up by this inquiry is exceeding broad, too broad to be surveyed by us in its full extent. We must be content to glance rapidly at one or two of its main divisions. Nothing more than this, indeed, is required for our purpose. It will be enough if we can show that some of the cardinal ideas in the system of Jesus lie outside the conception which the theory accepts as the central and determining principle of His doctrine and effort. For, however much it may be possible to include under that conception, if there be anything, vital to the system, that cannot be included under it, the claim made on its behalf, to be assigned the chief and commanding rank, cannot be allowed. What we have to show, then, is that there are elements in Christ's teaching that cannot legitimately be brought under the category of the kingdom of God.

And the first of these elements to which we shall allude is one that all will admit holds a foremost place in the doctrine of Christ,—the Fatherhood of God. In some respects this was the very kernel of His gospel,—the fundamental truth which He had to proclaim, and the ultimate ground of the effort He was to put forth. What, then, of this element? Surely it is apparent that it cannot, in any real sense, be classed under the category of the kingdom of God. Fatherhood does not suggest or pertain to a kingdom. It suggests and pertains to a family. The ideas that flow from it are not kingship and citizenship, but parenthood and sonship. The relations which it connotes are not those that subsist between sovereign and subject, but are paternal and filial in character. The community of which it is the sign is not civil and political in basis and arrangement, but is formed by ties of nature and is maintained by ties of affection. A careful comparison, or rather contrast, of fatherhood with kingship

leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to bring them into organic relation with each other.

This conclusion, however, may be declared invalid, on the ground that it is inconsistent with fact. It may be said that history presents them to us as organically related. We may be told that a study of the past shows that kingship is a development of fatherhood; that, as the family expanded into a nation, the father passed into the king, by a natural process of evolution. According to this view, the head of the larger community was an outgrowth of the head of the smaller community, which was the germ of the larger. The king, in fact, was the father transformed by new conditions, and assuming a character and discharging functions in harmony with these; and, this being so, kingship and fatherhood are intimately connected with each other. Thus not only does their organic relation with each other seem to be proved, but the possibility of classing fatherhood under kingship seems to be established, seeing that fatherhood is but the first, or an early, stage in that movement of which kingship is the issue and result. But is this actually the case? Supposing the above to be a correct account of the course of events, and an accurate representation of the circumstances, does it necessarily lead to the conclusion indicated? We think not. To us it appears that, rightly understood, the transition from fatherhood to kingship does not in any way disprove, or even render doubtful, our contention that these cannot be brought into organic relation with each other; that, on the contrary, it lends confirmation to it. It may show that these have been closely associated with each other in the past, and may be closely associated with each other in the present and the future, but that is a very different thing from showing that they are diverse phases or applications of one idea, or that the one is a comprehensive idea, under which the other can be ranged because rising out of it and deducible from it. And that neither of these is shown by a reference to the evolution of kingship

becomes evident when we reflect on the circumstances. For with the appearance of the king the father did not disappear. The king did not wholly displace the father; in truth he did not displace him at all. The position that he filled and the duties that he performed had not, strictly speaking, been filled and performed by the father as such. What was transferred to the king from the father was not of the essence of fatherhood, but had only been associated with it in special circumstances, and consequently could be detached from it when fresh circumstances emerged, without loss or injury. It was only after, by the growth of the family, he had become more than a father, that he was invested with the dignity and authority which by and by, in a more pronounced and impressive form, gathered round a royal personage; and, therefore, of these he could be divested and yet remain a father in the full sense of the term. It thus appears that, even if the father was the predecessor of the king, kingship did not rise out of fatherhood, but out of what was temporarily united with it. Or, if a closer connection between the two than this be demanded, the most that we can say is, that certain elements of fatherhood were embodied in kingship; we certainly cannot say that fatherhood in its fulness passed into kingship. Had this been the case, and had kingship been simply developed fatherhood, there would have been no need and no room for a new title expressing an entirely distinct idea and relationship. When the facts are thus carefully considered, it becomes evident that, whatever history may have to say as to the connection between kingship and fatherhood in respect of the genesis of the former, it cannot identify the two, or prove that the latter is embraced in the former in such a way that it can be included under it. King and father are not synonymous terms. Each has its own value and significance, and must be treated apart from the other.

We may here be reminded that we apply both terms to God, that we ascribe to Him both Kingship and Fatherhood.

But, though we do so, we do not necessarily attach to both the same value. All that we do is to attempt to express two different sides of His relation to us. That relation is complex, and, in order that it may be rightly estimated, must be viewed from different standpoints. And these standpoints may be on different levels, so that the resulting views may be of different worth; the one may yield a higher conception than the other, because involving a wider sweep or a deeper insight. A prince thinks and speaks of his father as king. He regards him in both aspects, and applies to him both titles. But these are not, to his mind, of equal significance. The one has a deeper and fuller and richer meaning than the other. Father speaks of a connection and obligations and benefits that are quite distinct from those suggested by king. Though, therefore, we call God both King and Father, we do not mean that the two names are synonymous. They embody different aspects of the divine relation to us, and the aspect of fatherhood is higher than the aspect of kingship. Behind the latter we are driven, or rather drawn, to the former by the sweeter and tenderer thoughts which it suggests.

The two terms, then, must be regarded as embodying different ideas. These ideas may be quite compatible with each other, but, in the first instance, they must be viewed as independent. Identical in reference and significance, kingship and fatherhood cannot be. But what of subordination? Can the one be accepted as a partial or particular expression of the other? To this question the preceding discussion appears to necessitate a negative answer. If, however, it leaves room for subordination, it must be the subordination of kingship to fatherhood, not of fatherhood to kingship, because fatherhood suggests that which is based on the very nature of things, while kingship suggests that which is allied to a condition of affairs that does not necessarily exist at all times and in all places. We have seen that even though fatherhood may have prepared the way for kingship, and may have surrendered to kingship some of the prerogatives it had enjoyed and exercised,

it yet survived the rise of kingship. And we can imagine the human race existing in communities, and enjoying peace and prosperity, without kingship, but we cannot imagine it existing thus without fatherhood, not only in its lower, but also in its higher reference. The family, of which fatherhood is the basis and bond, determines the tone and character of social life. If, therefore, we must class one of these under the other, we must assign to kingship the lower and to fatherhood the higher position; we must reckon the former as resolvable into the latter. This, indeed, is practically admitted by upholders of the theory under review. They are constantly falling back from kingship to fatherhood. Bruce says, "the title Father is the appropriate name of God in the kingdom of grace";¹ and he speaks of "the kingdom Christ preached" as "a kingdom of filial relations with God."² In these, and passages of similar import that might be quoted from this and other authors of this school, kingship really disappears, and is lost, in fatherhood. Of a kingdom, indeed, little remains but the name, and when the name occurs the context constrains us to think of a family, of family ties and family privileges.

From the Fatherhood of God we pass to Salvation. This is a comprehensive term, designating an activity that is complex and many-sided in character. Meanwhile, however, we are concerned only with those aspects of it that are incompatible with the category of the kingdom of God. Others, which are equally important perhaps, and some of which will fall to be considered later, must meanwhile be left out of account. Their omission does not, therefore, imply either their denial or their depreciation.

To the aspects of it that we desire to emphasise we shall be led by an examination of the following pregnant sentence, in which Christ on one occasion defined His character and work as Saviour: "The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost."³ He here declares that it is of

¹ *The Kingdom of God*, 2nd ed. p. 109.

² *Ibid.* p. 90.

³ Luke xix. 10.

the "lost" He has to think, and that it is for the "lost" He is to labour. The condition and need of the "lost" will, therefore, shed light on the salvation which He brings. Who, then, are the "lost"? or, rather, What does the term "lost" imply when, as here, it is applied to the spiritual state of men and women? An answer to this question is fortunately furnished by Christ Himself. Having regard to words spoken by Him in the course of His ministry, we recognise that the term "lost" has for Him two different, though related, meanings,—that, as employed by Him, it indicates two aspects of the condition of those whom He has come to benefit. They are lost to God, and they are lost to themselves. The former reference of the word is forcibly illustrated by such parables as the "Lost Sheep" and the "Lost Coin." These parables were spoken by Christ in defence of His conduct in receiving publicans and sinners. He explains that He has come that He might gain such as they; and He declares that, in His effort to reach them, He is like the shepherd going after the sheep that has strayed from the flock, and like the woman who, having lighted a candle, sweeps the house diligently, searching eagerly for the coin that has slipped from her hand; and that, when He sees them turning to Him in response to His appeal, He echoes the joyful exclamation of the shepherd and the woman, "Rejoice with me, for I have found that which I had lost," an exclamation that is the expression of the thought and feeling of Him who had sent Him on His mission of grace. But not only were men lost to God, they were lost to themselves. They had forfeited what was of highest value,—what alone was of value,—their true nature. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it."¹ The loss of life, of rational, spiritual life, was the loss of themselves; and that was the loss which those had incurred in whose interest Christ toiled and suffered. I have already said that these two different meanings of the term are related to each other. That relation is most intimate.

¹ Matt. xvi. 25.

They are, indeed, but two phases of one fact and condition. Loss to God and loss to self are mutually dependent. The extent of the one is measured by the extent of the other. The closeness of their connection with each other is set forth plainly and impressively in the parable of the Prodigal Son. The younger brother was lost to his father as well as lost to himself. The father, indeed, realised his loss of his son sooner than the son realised his loss of himself. Whenever the son passed from under the parental roof,—whenever, indeed, he asked for his portion of goods,—the father felt that he had ceased to be his, in the filial sense of the word. But it was not till want and disgrace pressed upon him in the far country that the son understood the significance of his action. From the first, however, he was lost to himself as well as to his father. In harmony with this double reference of his conduct is his return and recovery. The turning-point from loss to restoration is described in the significant words, “he came to himself.” The process, of which the self-apprehension expressed in that phrase was the outcome, was the passage from loss to restoration,—a restoration that was completed, or rather fully appreciated, when the glad father, embracing his penitent child, exclaimed, “This, my son was lost, and is found!”

Such was the twofold meaning which Christ attached to the term “lost” when He applied it to men and women. And the salvation of which He spoke, and which He was to render possible, was designed and fitted to meet the twofold need to which it pointed. It was recovery to God and to self—restoration of men and women to Him whose they were, and restoration to men and women of the life they had forfeited. Hence it was both a seeking and a saving,—a seeking with a view to saving, and a saving with a view to finding. God sought those whom He had made for Himself, but who had refused to fulfil His purpose in their creation, that He might satisfy His longing for fellowship with them. He could not but seek them. His heart yearned for them, and would not

surrender them without a struggle. There was more in the divine breast than compassion for erring and miserable beings : there was love, unquenched and unquenchable even by neglect and insult. There was more expressed in the mission of Christ than desire to succour those who were in distress and exposed to danger : there was the craving of disappointed affection : " I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against Me."¹ " God so loved the world " is the keynote of salvation ; and this being so, the Fatherhood of God forms its ground and supplies its motive-power. As Father, God went after His wayward children. He did not wait until they returned, ready to receive them to favour ; He pursued them, tracked them out, appealed to them in tender, beseeching tones, striving and hoping in this way to win them back.

It was, then, as the objects of His love that He pitied them. His pity was a special manifestation of His love ; He longed to deliver them from the evil, the fatal consequences of their error and evil-doing. Until He had done so, indeed, His heart could not find pleasure in them. His seeking of them must, therefore, be a saving of them. They could not be left in the condition into which they had sunk. Lost to Him they were lost to themselves, and they must be restored to themselves before, in any real sense, they could be restored to Him. He could not find delight in them unless they were finding delight in themselves, because acting in harmony with their constitution. He could not have pleasure in creatures that were lying in degradation and wretchedness. He must see them ennobled and happy if He were to look on them with complacency, and experience joy in communion with them. Hence He wrought for their deliverance.

It does not follow from what has been said, that God in Christ thought nothing of men in themselves, but regarded them only as a means for His own gratification, and sought to save them only that this might be attained. The sayings of Jesus which we have been interpreting merely imply that

¹ Isa. i. 2.

it is in virtue of their relation to God that men have worth and dignity, and that, consequently, it is only when that relation is maintained, or, if it has been disturbed, is restored, that they can gain and become that which they ought to possess and to be. "Since thou wast precious in my sight, thou hast been honourable, and I have loved thee."¹ Human beings could not, because of the nature and endowments which God has bestowed upon them, be treated by Him simply as instruments of His satisfaction. They must be dealt with as inherently and individually valuable, demanding consideration for their own sake. But inasmuch as they were thus valuable, because made in the divine image, and therefore bound essentially to the Divine Being, to deal with them for their own sake was to deal with them for the sake of that connection with God which gave them their standing and made them what they were; and to deal with them in this way, since it was to carry out the purpose of their creation, was of necessity to afford satisfaction to Him who had created them. It is on the fundamental tie that links man to God that the twofold reference of the term "lost" and of the salvation which is recovery rests, and it is by that tie that these twofold references are held together in indissoluble union. God could restore men to Himself only by restoring men to themselves, and He could not restore them to themselves without restoring them to Himself. But seeing that the relation of man to God is primary and the basis of man's relation to himself, emphasis is placed upon it, and on it we take our stand in surveying salvation on that side of it with which we are meanwhile concerned.

What has been said as to the individuality of man leads us to the consideration of another point in connection with salvation. It compels us to look at the relation between men and God in a somewhat different light from that in which we have been regarding it. As individuals, men, so to speak, stand over against Him with whom they have to do.

¹ Isa. xliii. 4.

They act for themselves, and for their action they are accountable to Him. He is the Lawgiver who marks out the course they are to pursue, and to Him they are responsible. By Him they will be judged; by Him they are constantly being judged. When they disobey His commands, they come under condemnation. They are condemned on the ground of their violation of authority and breach of law. "Condemned" in this reference of human conduct corresponds to "lost" in that which we have been considering. Both describe the state into which the erring come, but each describes it from its own standpoint; the former, as the result of a sentence pronounced, the latter, as an effect produced immediately by behaviour. The two, however, are quite consistent with each other. Indeed, they must be combined if a full view of the case is to be gained. Condemnation carries with it loss, the loss of the favour of God. As offenders against God, men cannot expect to have His smile resting on them; they can only have "a certain fearful looking for of judgment."¹ With this loss, the other losses are in perfect accord. When men lose the divine approval and incur the divine displeasure, they are lost to God and lost to themselves; but so long as they retain that approval and avoid that displeasure, they cannot be lost either to God or to themselves. "Condemned" and "lost" are thus complementary terms. Both take account of man's relation to God, but each views that relation in a different light; the former regarding it from the standpoint of transcendence, the latter, from the standpoint of immanence. Hence the former emphasises the authority of God, expressing itself in laws, declared or implied, and the obligation of men, demanding respect and obedience; while the latter emphasises what we may call the divine and the human community of interest in man's welfare, in virtue of which the conduct and condition of the individual affects both the individual and God, either contributing to the realisation of the individual, and by the realisation of the individual, to

¹ Heb. x. 27.

the fulfilment of the divine thought and the satisfaction of the divine desire embodied in him as a spiritual being, or hindering that realisation, and, by so doing, frustrating the divine thought and disappointing the divine desire. What light, then, does condemnation shed on salvation? It reveals to us the element of forgiveness. It shows us salvation as the outcome of mercy. He whom we have disobeyed makes Himself known as "ready to pardon." The gospel is the declaration of the remission of sin. What was necessary that the remission of sin, on the divine side, might be secured, does not concern us here. It is enough that that is an element in the salvation we are considering. And when we recall what we have already learned regarding it, we perceive that without it the other elements would have been insufficient. Seeking and saving had to be accompanied by forgiving, if they were to be effectual. Without forgiving, indeed, there could have been no seeking; those who had to be sought, because lost, would have been cast off. And, this being so, there could have been no saving, for seeking was its condition. Seeking and saving were the outcome of deep and intense love,—of love so deep and intense that it could meet the necessities of its objects in pardoning mercy and reconciling grace.

Salvation, then, is a seeking and saving of the lost, and a forgiving of the condemned, by God in Christ. But this salvation rests on sacrifice: "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son";¹ "the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many."² There was surrender, and surrender of that which was of highest value, in order that the object contemplated might be accomplished. On this point it seems unnecessary to dwell. Sacrifice, self-sacrifice, is admittedly the note and central principle of Christianity, and finds its highest and fullest expression and illustration in the advent and work of its Founder. Salvation, then, is a divine effort that aims at the recovery by God, and the restoration to their

¹ John iii. 16.

² Matt. xx. 28.

rightful place, of men who, because of error and waywardness, are lost to God, who made them for Himself, and have fallen from their rightful position, so that they cannot realise their true nature and enjoy the privileges that are theirs as spiritual beings,—an effort that implies mercy as the condition of its initiation, and sacrifice as the condition of its execution.

We have now to ask if salvation as thus defined, or the aspects of salvation and the conceptions which it involves as thus exhibited, can be classed under the kingdom of God. And that they cannot seems evident. The sphere within which we have been moving cannot, with anything approaching to accuracy, be designated a kingdom, and the attitude and action which we have been considering are not such as are suggested by, or harmonise with, kingship. We have been speaking of endeavour on behalf of the disobedient and wilful that, dictated by love and resting on sacrifice, seeks to win these back by appeal and by assurance of favour and blessing, in order that He who puts forth the endeavour may find satisfaction in them, and they themselves may have comfort and joy. Now, endeavour of this kind does not accord with sovereignty. Kingship does not naturally, does not at all, strictly speaking, express itself in love for erring and rebellious subjects, issuing in pity for them, and involving surrender of that which is most valuable on their behalf. We do not think of a monarch as one who himself, or by deputy, goes after those who, by lawless acts, have forfeited the rights and privileges of citizenship, that, by appeals addressed to them in gracious word and beneficent activity, he may induce them to resume their place under his sway. A monarch is a governor, and, being a governor, his function is to make and maintain laws. He is both a legislator and a judge. In him authority resides, and by him authority is exercised. He is to interpret and to embody in enactments the interests of the community over which he presides, and is to guard and secure the well-being of the community by insisting on

obedience to the commands issued by him. When, therefore, he has to deal with those who despise or disregard his authority and violate or neglect his commands, he is bound to inflict on them punishment, and, if need be, to expel and exclude them from his dominions. He may, indeed, pardon those who have broken the law, but, if he do so, it is not in obedience to the demands of his position, but under the influence of feelings that are stirred by considerations other than those which that position permits him to entertain. He pardons less as a king than as a man, and he regards him whom he pardons less as a subject than as a man. His pardon, if it be granted in the interest of the kingdom and be not merely an act of caprice and favouritism, is not meant to set aside the law, but to go deeper than the law, and, by touching the human nature of the offender, lead him to assume a right attitude toward the law. Salvation, therefore, as the recall and recovery of those who have come under the condemnation of God, or who have withdrawn themselves from relation to God, thereby suffering loss, cannot be expressed in terms of a kingdom or of kingship. It must be brought under another and an entirely different category.

It is true that, in the Old Testament, God appears as King, and in this capacity is represented as saving His people. But this saving was preservation from harm and deliverance from oppression, not pardon and recovery from the consequences of disobedience and transgression. When the latter is spoken of, Jehovah is presented in a different character, and features that do not belong to kingship are emphasised. As King He rules, and avenges Himself on those who set at nought His laws; but it is as the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob that He remembers His covenant and passes by transgression, and it is as Jehovah, the Great I Am, the Being of beings, the vital and vitalising spiritual centre to whom all spiritual existences are related by a bond of reciprocal attachment, that He is merciful and gracious, long-suffering and ready to pardon.

Within the conception of a kingdom it is impossible to find room for the term "lost" as employed by Christ. Kingship on the one hand, and citizenship on the other, are utterly inadequate to the thoughts suggested by it. These demand a connection between God and man that is vastly stronger and fuller, more intimate and more inward, than can be represented by a civil or political tie. They point to a community of life, whereby the fortunes and experiences of the participating subject are reflected on and affect the communicating subject. They imply an essential and affectional relation, the breach of which does injury alike to him who commits it and to Him against whom it is committed. But such ideas as these are far away from the idea of a kingdom. To bring them under it would be to transform it entirely, and to divest it of all that is characteristic of it.

We have thus seen that the Fatherhood of God and Salvation, two of the most prominent elements in the teaching and work of Christ, cannot be ranged under the conception of a kingdom, save in an external and artificial fashion. And this is sufficient to convince us that the claim advanced on behalf of "the kingdom of God" is unfounded, and that that category, whatever its value may be, is not entitled to be regarded as "exhaustive." For, as has already been said, it can only be so regarded if every doctrine taught by Christ and every effort put forth by Him can be brought into organic relation with it, and two at least of these, and those of vital importance, have been proved to lie outside it.

The conclusion to which we have just come may lead some to ask, What, then, of Christ's use of the phrase? Does not the fact that He employed it so often as He did indicate that, in His opinion, it was an "exhaustive category," under which the whole contents of His teaching could be classed, and, if that be the case, does not the preceding argument and decision reflect on the estimate which He formed of His message, and so on His wisdom? These are pertinent

questions, and deserve careful consideration. In order that we may be able to answer them satisfactorily, we shall inquire into Christ's use of the phrase. And in this inquiry there are two points that must be kept distinct, and dealt with each by itself. The first touches the frequency with which Christ used the phrase in question, and the second, the sense in which He used it. We shall look at these in the order named.

First, then, as to the frequency with which Christ used the phrase. It is often said that He employed it constantly and persistently in discourses and conversations. Candlish declares that "it was the name by which our Lord habitually spoke of His work,"¹ and with him many agree. But was this really the case? That He used it very often no one will venture to deny. But, though He used it very often, He did not use it only or always. There were other terms employed by Him once and again to which, judging from the context and circumstances, He attached as much weight as He did to it, and which, consequently, are entitled to at least equal rank with it. This much a general view of the subject constrains us to say. But a careful examination of the facts carries us further than this, and produces the conviction that some of the other terms have an even higher value than it. When we follow closely the records given us of Christ's life we observe that it does not appear with equal frequency throughout His career. At one time it is the ordinary, almost the sole, form of expression adopted by Him when expounding His mission; at another, it is only occasionally adopted, others taking their place alongside it; while, at a third, it is well-nigh, if not wholly, discontinued. And what is of importance, is that these periods are successive, following each other in the order in which they have been stated. That is to say, at the beginning of His ministry the phrase "kingdom of God" was constantly employed by Him, but, as His ministry progressed, it was less and less employed by Him, until, toward the close, it was almost, if not altogether,

¹ *The Kingdom of God*, p. 6.

discarded by Him. That this is an accurate statement of the facts cannot, we think, be denied if the fourth Gospel be admitted as a faithful record of the utterances of Christ. In that Gospel the expression occurs only once, viz. in the conversation with Nicodemus. When before Pilate, Christ speaks of His kingdom, but this is scarcely a case in point. If, however, we take it into account, we have only two instances in John's narrative of the use of this phrase by Christ. But the admission of the fourth Gospel may be objected to. We may be reminded that there are serious difficulties in the way of accepting the Johannine authorship, and that, in any case, the sayings of Christ have been so affected by the individuality and circumstances of the author, whoever he was, that his work cannot be regarded as a faithful reproduction of these; and, on this ground, it may be urged that when we seek to learn what Christ really said, we ought to confine ourselves to the Synoptics. This, indeed, is the course generally followed by those who accept the kingdom of God as an exhaustive category.

Into the question of the authorship of the fourth Gospel we cannot here enter. Nor is it necessary that we should do so. All that is requisite for our argument can be gained apart from the settlement of that problem. Wendt, indeed, admits all that we require. While keeping the fourth Gospel separate from the first three, he admits that it is in harmony with these. His words are: "Although, in the discourses of the fourth Gospel, this title of 'the kingdom of God' occurs only in one place (iii. 3 and 5), yet, in reality, the whole contents of those discourses, their testimony to His Messiahship, and their exhortations to faith in Him, can be ranked under the general subject of the kingdom of God, and the two aspects under which He expounded it."¹ He here allows that the contents of the Gospel which bears John's name are in perfect accord with the teaching of Christ, as that is reproduced by the Synoptics. But these

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 174.

contents profess to be reports of that teaching, and that they are reports, and not merely products of the imagination, however modified by transmission or by the idiosyncrasy and reflection of him who makes them, is not denied. This, at least, is the inference to be drawn from the fact that they can be classed under the same general theme as the contents of the Synoptics, which are accepted as genuine and faithful reports. What we have, then, according to this writer, is reports of utterances that must originally have been, if not expressly connected with the conception of the kingdom of God, dominated and moulded by that conception, and in these reports the utterances are so changed that not only is this conception never, save in one, or, at most, two instances, mentioned or even definitely referred to, but also that the ideas presented, and the lines of thought developed, are so distinct from this conception that only by patient investigation and reflection, and the exercise of not a little ingenuity, can it be extracted from them or imposed on them. This seems to me an impossible situation. I can understand a follower of Christ being attracted by, and seeking to preserve, aspects of His teachings that had not attracted or been preserved by others, but I cannot understand such an one, in the very early years of the Christian era, and in the circumstances in which the author of the fourth Gospel, whoever he was, must have lived and written, departing so completely from the standpoint of Christ as not only never to allude to the central and determining principle of His system, but to present his material in such a way as never even to suggest such a principle. For, be it observed, the question does not turn on the presence or absence of a certain form of expression, but on the character and significance of the statements and discourses recorded. I could of course understand this if there were evidence of a desire or intention to restate the system of Christ, and place it on a basis other than that on which He Himself placed it. In that case the conception of the kingdom would be deliberately excluded, and another

conception accepted and employed, and the details of the system would be arranged accordingly. But that there is no such desire or intention is apparent. The retention of the phrase in the conversation with Nicodemus is fatal to any such suggestion. It seems to me that we must either reject the Fourth Gospel entirely as a report of Christ's words, or allow that the general bearing, at least, of its contents must be taken into consideration in determining the ground and course of Christ's teaching. And, as already indicated, I think the latter the right course to follow, and following this course we discover a gradual change in the frequency with which Christ used the expression kingdom of God.

In this connection, it is worthy of notice that in His conversations with the Twelve the conception of the kingdom is not at any period in His career employed so often as it is in His discourses to the people, and that, toward the close, it makes way entirely for other conceptions. In His farewell words to them, for instance, it is not made use of at all, though by these He was seeking to bring home to their minds that which was central and fundamental. Instead of expounding the kingdom of God, He speaks of showing them the Father, of their abiding in Him and His abiding in them, mutually and vitally related as the Vine and the branches, and of the gift of the Spirit, who should lead them into all truth. And in His intercessory prayer He expresses His aim and desire thus: "I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me, and hast loved them, as Thou hast loved Me."¹

Without dwelling further on details, we may sum up the situation as follows. Christ employs the phrase kingdom of God almost constantly at the very beginning of His ministry, but, as His ministry advances, He substitutes for it other modes of expression that convey ideas different from that conveyed by it; and, in harmony with this, when addressing

¹ John xvii. 23.

the multitude, He employs it freely, whereas, when addressing the inner circle, He shows a tendency to depart from it and to adopt other forms of presenting His work and purpose,—a tendency that is the reflection of the advance of the disciples in knowledge, and, consequently, of their growing ability to receive the truth in its fulness and depth. From all this it follows, that for Him it does not possess a special and unique value, and that, to His mind, it is not the only, still less the best, or even an adequate, category. It is merely one of many, having a special fitness in certain surroundings because emphasising the phase of the subject that appealed most to those to whom he was speaking, but limited in its range, and therefore needing to be supplemented by others.

What has been said will be explained and confirmed by a glance at the circumstances in which He began His work. He was a Jew, addressing Jews, and His desire was to convince His hearers that He had come not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it, and, by fulfilling it, to meet the longings and aspirations which it and the whole dispensation to which it belonged were fitted to excite and intensify. For His coming the prophets had sought to prepare the way, and in their endeavour to do so they had cast their utterances into the mould that was suggested by the history, and was in harmony with the condition, of the nation. They had spoken much of a kingdom that was to be established, and of a King that was to reign in righteousness and in peace, and they had done so because the chosen people, having been formed into a kingdom, and having come to associate prosperity and happiness with the reign of a wise and good king, like David, this was the most natural and striking manner in which to present to them the coming epoch with its purified community. It was after this fashion, therefore, that the people of Palestine pictured to themselves the work of the Messiah and the blessings that He was to bring. And Christ, as a wise teacher, began on the level of His hearers, and, at the outset of His work, accepted their phraseology. In accepting it, however, He

sought to widen its scope, and to give to it a larger significance, so that He might gradually transcend it, and lead those to whom He spoke to higher standpoints and to wider views of the effort He was to put forth and the organisation He was to create. Wendt says: "In adopting this idea, He sought to set His preaching in an intelligible relation to the hopes of salvation which His contemporaries built upon the prophetic promises of the Old Testament, and He claimed that, in the kingdom of God which he announced, those hopes found their true and express fulfilment."¹ This statement is correct as an explanation of Christ's use of the phrase kingdom of God, but there is ambiguity in the last clause that claims notice. Christ did undoubtedly claim that, in the kingdom of God which He announced, the hopes of His contemporaries found their true and express fulfilment; but it has to be observed that it was in the community to which He was provisionally applying the title kingdom of God, and not in that community regarded simply as a kingdom, that these hopes found their true and express fulfilment. As we have already seen, He showed a disposition to abandon that designation of His purpose and effort, and to substitute for it others that, while more or less in harmony with its main thought, were deeper and broader than it. A full view of Christ's environment suffices to explain at once His employment, and His gradual disuse, of the phrase in question.

It may, however, be said, that though the phrase "kingdom of God" was not the only form of expression employed by Christ to designate the theme of His teaching and the aim of His effort, it was the form of expression most generally employed by Him; and it may be urged, that the persistence with which He employed it can be explained only on the ground that, to His mind, it possessed a unique value, and was in a special degree fitted to suggest the central thought of His system and work, and that, this being the case, the right method of procedure is to assign it the chief place, and

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. i. p. 175.

to range other forms of expression employed by Him under it, and interpret them in accordance with it. This is a position that may well be assumed by those who reject as unauthentic, or set aside as doubtful, the Fourth Gospel, and confine themselves to the Synoptics. For it must be admitted that, in the latter, the phrase in question occurs very much oftener than any other; so much oftener that, if we had no data beyond those which they supply, and if the matter could be settled by a simple comparison of the times that it appears with the times that others appear, we should be compelled to accept it as the determining category. That we have other data than those supplied by the first three Gospels we have sought to prove in the preceding argument. It may, however, be of advantage to consider what the result would be if the Synoptics were alone accepted. Let us then ask if, supposing we look only at the reports of Christ's sayings to be found in the first three Gospels, we must regard the "kingdom of God" as "an exhaustive category."

This brings us to the second of the points which we saw were raised by a consideration of Christ's use of the phrase "kingdom of God," viz. the sense in which He employed it. In dealing with this point the first question that we have to answer, and the only one that, in the present connection, we need to answer, is, Did He always employ it in the same sense? And as we are dealing with a theory that interprets it after a certain fashion, that question takes a more definite form, viz. Did He always employ it in the sense indicated by the interpretation which the theory in question puts upon it? Or, more explicitly, Did He always employ it to suggest a community analogous to the civil and political communities which we call kingdoms?

Now, that a negative reply must be given to this question cannot, we think, be denied. Even the most superficial glance at the sayings of Christ will detect many occasions on which He applied this form of expression freely and loosely, and associated it with concep-

tions and conditions that do not cohere with it, or spring from it. Of these we shall mention only a few.

In one of His parables He likened the kingdom of God unto leaven, which, being hid in three measures of meal, leavened the whole mass.¹ By this analogy He suggests the inwardness, the penetrating and permeating and quickening quality of that which He was introducing into the world. He represents it as a force that is to operate within men, and, by doing so, is to develop and expand; as an energy that, being generated in the spiritual nature of the individual, is gradually to fill and colour his whole thought and activity, and that, having been generated in one member of the community, is to be communicated to others, and is thus to vitalise and purify the whole. Clearly the thought which He is expressing lies far apart from the conception of a kingdom. That is an external and visible institution that grows by inclusion, not by infusion; that spreads by a force that compels, not by a force that impels; that extends by triumph, not by transformation. It is not a principle that is to commend itself to mind and heart, and to enlighten and ennoble the life: it is an organisation that is to embrace and govern its members, constraining them to obedience and service. It is true that it may be spoken of as being within the loyal and patriotic citizen, who gladly accepts and submits to its authority, but that is a metaphorical statement, and does not rest on a natural reference of the term. What that term indicates is not truth working within individuals, revolutionising them and drawing them within its influence, but a community of individuals, held together, it may be, by an external necessity and restraint, and subject to one head and ruler; and yet it is the former and not the latter that can be likened unto leaven.

In two parables, that follow immediately that of the leaven, the kingdom of God is likened to a pearl of great price, and to treasure hid in a field, which appeared so

¹ Matt. xiii. 33.

valuable to those who were aware of their existence that they went and sold all that they had in order that they might be able to secure them.¹ The ideas which these analogies suggest are possession and enrichment, with the satisfaction and happiness which these produce. The pearl and the treasure are things that may be gained by us and may become ours. And such is the kingdom of God, in one of its phases. This phase, too, is often exhibited and emphasised by Christ. His first beatitude was, "Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,"² and the note that is there struck by Him is sounded once and again throughout His ministry. But the thought which it indicates does not coincide with the conception of a kingdom. The latter points to an organisation to which we may belong; the former, to an object which may belong to us. Of a kingdom we may be members, of pearls or treasures we may be owners. Between a political institution and an article of value, in respect of the relation which men can bear to them, there is an essential distinction. They stand on different levels and pertain to different spheres. Hence, in the parables before us, Christ is clearly employing the phrase "kingdom of heaven" loosely and generally, as a convenient title for His work supplied by the circumstances of His age, but which, by the combinations in which He presents it, He is declaring inadequate, and is slowly merging in that which is more comprehensive and more penetrating.

It would be easy to mention other instances of the use by Christ of the phrase "kingdom of God" in a sense that lies apart from the conception of a kingdom, taken in its strict significance, but this is unnecessary. They are so numerous as to force themselves on the notice of every reader of the sayings of Christ. They are to be met with in almost every page of the Synoptics. Indeed, the difficulty is not to find cases in which the expression must be interpreted loosely,

¹ Matt. xiii. 44-46.

² Matt. v. 3.

but to find cases in which it must be interpreted literally. The latter are extremely rare. Very seldom does Christ expound the kingdom of God in terms of kingship and citizenship. Most frequently He exhibits its nature and bearing by reference to other and entirely different conditions and relations. This being so, there is no occasion for us to cite numerous passages. Those that have been referred to will serve as examples. They are representative of a large class, the members of which, however diverse in many respects, unite in testifying to the varied application by Christ of the conception of the kingdom of God.

We thus discover that even if we confine ourselves to the Synoptics, and admit that the phrase "kingdom of God" was the usual form of expression employed by Christ in describing the subject of His teaching and the object of His endeavour, we are not thereby compelled to accept the "kingdom of God" as an exhaustive category, or a determining principle under which all that He said and did must, or even may, be classed. The ideas associated with it are so varied that need is felt for a conception that will unify them; and that conception must be one that is deeper and fuller, more penetrating and more vital, than can be presented in terms of kingship and citizenship.

To the line of argument we have been pursuing exception may be taken by some, on the ground that those who accept the "kingdom of God" as an exhaustive category do not take the term kingdom in its strict and literal sense. That they do not is freely admitted, but that they are inconsistent in this we have sought to show. It is, however, easier to say in what sense they do not take it than to say in what sense they do take it. Sometimes, apparently, it does not mean anything particular, but is merely a heading under which the teaching and work of Christ are ranged, in a loose and unconnected fashion. As such, it is clearly not a category in any sense of the term, and cannot be regarded as a determining principle affording guidance in the effort to under-

stand what Christ said and did. Sometimes, however, it is treated as suggestive of an ideal community in general,—a community, that is to say, the nature of which is left undefined. Viewed in this way, it indicates that Christ's aim was social in character; that what He sought to do was to found a society within which righteousness and truth and purity would manifest themselves, but a society that was not to correspond exactly in its structure to any of the organisations with which men were familiar, but was gradually to embrace and transform all these. Now, that there is much truth in this representation of Christ's aim cannot be denied. His aim, indeed, could not but be social in reference. Those whom He came to save were social by constitution; and inasmuch as His salvation was central and fundamental in its effects and operation, it must influence in their social relations those who submitted to it. The social element in their nature would be strengthened and purified by their relation to Him; and this would of necessity draw them together in intimate fellowship, and impel them to seek the realisation of the ideal which that fellowship suggested in the world at large. The result to which Christ looked forward was, without doubt, the founding of an ideal community, or rather the transformation of existing communities into ideal communities, all of which would be parts of one great community, of which God would be the head and purified human beings the members. But, while this is the case, it does not follow that the conception of such a community, by whatever name it is named, is an exhaustive category, under which the whole teaching and work of Christ may be classed. To me it seems that, while lifting into prominence one side of that teaching and work, it casts the other, and, in the circumstances, the more important side, into the shade. What we ought to emphasise is the individual aspect of Christ's effort: certainly we ought not to belittle it by employing phraseology that does not suggest it. "Social salvation" is an expression that presents an important thought, but, at the same time, it may

convey a false impression. It may lead those who use it or hear it to forget that "social salvation" rests on, and is the issue and summation of, individual salvation, and to fancy that there can be reformation of men in the mass. It may, of course, be said that the opposite error may be committed, if individual salvation be insisted on. And that is true; but seeing that man is essentially social, if the salvation of the individual be real it must manifest itself in a social form, and hence the danger is less in this than in the other case. The wise course is to keep both phases in view in stating Christ's aim. Any conception that exhibits only one phase must be pronounced inadequate. This being so, "the kingdom of God," even if understood to mean only a community in a general sense, cannot be accepted as exhaustive, or as a determining principle. Indeed, its very generality would prevent us assigning to it this character. What a community in general means, if it really means anything at all, it is very difficult to say, but, as general, it does not possess the qualities necessary for guiding us in our endeavour to discover the inner significance of the teaching and work of which it is the declared outcome.

From all that has been said, then, on this subject, it follows that Christ's mission and message cannot be summed up in one conception or category, by the analysis of which we can discern His mind on the subject of our inquiry. In order to learn the bearing of these on the matter under consideration, we must examine in detail His utterances and the facts of His life, in so far as these affect the point raised. It will not, however, be necessary to examine all such utterances and facts. A selection will be enough, provided that the selection made be sufficiently wide and varied to bring before us His treatment of the different phases of the question.

LECTURE IX

THE DUTY OF MAN

IN this and the succeeding lecture we are to consider the bearing of Christ's teaching and life on the relation between morality and religion. And these may be looked at from two different points of view, viz. the duty of man and the need of man. In the present lecture we shall deal with them in the former reference. And what we have to ask is, Did Christ in His teaching and life, as these touch the duty of man, testify to the existence of a connection between morality and religion? and, if so, What was the nature of the connection to the existence of which He testified?

First, then, as to the existence of a connection. Did Christ represent these two spheres of human interest as standing in a definite relation to each other? To this question an affirmative answer must be given. The very fact that He discoursed of both proves that He held that there was a bond of union between them. This becomes plain when we remember who and what He was. He was the revelation of God to men. He had come to proclaim on earth good news and glad tidings of great joy. These good news and glad tidings were spiritual in import. They were a declaration of divine grace and an invitation of divine love. He who was the means of their communication was to influence those to whom He spoke in such a way that they would surrender themselves to the divine will. His aim was the reconciliation of men to God. His work was therefore religious in character; this was its distinctive feature. He occupied a religious

standpoint, fulfilled a religious mission, and inaugurated a religious movement. He was pre-eminently the Founder of a religion. And yet, though the Founder of a religion, and, as such, a religious teacher and reformer, He does not confine Himself to the treatment of religion in the strict sense of the term, but devotes much of His attention and effort to the exposition and inculcation of duty, personal and social. That He should have done so shows unmistakably that, to His mind, morality is intimately connected with religion. Were this not the case, then His method of procedure would be utterly inexplicable. We should be completely at a loss to understand why He should have turned aside to discourse of matters that lay entirely outside the field of His work. Not only would His action have been inexplicable, it would have been blameworthy; for He would have been neglecting the special task assigned Him, and dissipating the strength that should have been expended in the proclamation of the truth He had been commissioned to make known, in discussing questions with which He had no special concern.

Further, having regard to the large space occupied by moral subjects in His teaching, we should be compelled to say that, if he did not look upon morality and religion as vitally related, His procedure reflects on His wisdom and skill. For the large place assigned by Him to morality would have obscured for His hearers the supreme importance of the truth about God, and man's relation to God, which He had come to declare. His line of action would have been, in the highest degree, unwise and prejudicial to His cause. Only on the ground of a conviction that morality was a matter of the greatest importance, and stood in such a definite relation to religion that to treat of it was to treat of religion, or was, at least, a necessary preliminary to that treatment, could Christ have acted as He did. And thus, apart altogether from the substance of His utterances, and in view merely of the topics discussed by Him, we find warrant for saying that, for Him,

morality and religion are most intimately connected, and have a definite bearing on each other.

The conclusion, reached by a consideration of Christ's method, will be confirmed by an examination of His teaching. And, as bearing generally on the fact of a connection between morality and religion, we notice that Christ emphasised the individuality of man, the unity of human nature and, therefore, of human life. On one occasion He said, "No man can serve two masters."¹ The masters to whom He referred—and He indicated that they were the only masters to whom men could render service—were God and Mammon. He was discoursing of devotion to the world, and He was seeking to impress upon His hearers that such devotion was quite incompatible with devotion to God. In order that He might give point and force to His warning, He bases it on a general principle. Divided allegiance, He says, is impossible in any sphere. We cannot, at the same time and in the same circumstances, obey two superiors who are opposed to each other in aim and purpose. And yet that is what those are attempting who are seeking to be at once worldly and religious. They are endeavouring to apply in their conduct two principles that are antagonistic to each other, and this they cannot do. It is, however, rather with the general bearing than with the special application of the saying that we are at present concerned. What, then, does it imply? It implies that man is a unity, and that, being a unity, he must be governed in all his movements by one principle. If he definitely accept the world as his principle, he will be worldly throughout; and if he definitely accept God, he will be godly throughout. He cannot honour the one principle at one time and place, and the other at another. For the rational nature in its essence, indeed, there is neither time nor place. The bearing of this thought on the point before us is evident. If man be thus a unity, he cannot have one basis for his moral life and another for his religious;

¹ Matt. vi. 24.

he cannot be moved by one impulse when dealing with his fellows, and by another when dealing with God. Fundamentally, that which sways him in spiritual affairs will be the same as that which sways him in temporal affairs. And, therefore, morality and religion stand in intimate relation to each other.

But the utterance before us has another reference, which lends confirmation to the result just reached. Christ indicates that, if God be truly served by men, He must be served by them in all circumstances. This implies that God claims every department of human effort as subject to His government. Were this not so,—were there any section, however small, outside His rule,—then it would be possible, not only possible but necessary, for men to serve two masters. But if the divine government be thus absolute and universal in its extent, it must be honoured both in morality and in religion; and since there can be no division in the divine nature, the principle that holds in the one must be in harmony with the principle that holds in the other, and, in virtue of this harmony, the two spheres must be linked together.

So far we have dealt with the matter under consideration in a quite general fashion. We have sought to show from Christ's method, as from Christ's theory of human nature, that in His system morality and religion are closely related. We come now to look at some statements that have a special bearing on the point.

And we begin by noting some sayings that set forth the inadequacy of morality if it be not based on religion. The first of these to which we shall allude is the response of Christ to the young man who asked Him what good thing he must do that he might have eternal life.¹ Christ, it will be remembered, first enumerated certain commandments, and then, when the young man declared that he had kept these from his youth up, He bade him go and sell all that he had,

¹ Matt. xix. 16.

and come and follow Him. It is important to notice what the commandments were that Christ cited. They were those of the Second Table: "Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, honour thy father and thy mother: and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." They were those, that is to say, that belonged to the sphere of morality. They touched, and touched only, man's relations to his fellows; none of them touched, directly at least, man's relation to God. That Christ should have passed over the religious section of the Decalogue, and fixed His attention and the attention of His questioner on the moral, cannot be without significance. He was clearly suiting His reply to the need of the youth who had appealed to Him; He was leading up to a statement that would form the injunction and direction sought and required. "All these have I kept from my youth up: what lack I yet?" said the young man. Christ does not question the truth of this response; He rather admits it. It was no doubt true, as true, at least, as any such statement could be. Evidently the young man had been correct in his behaviour, scrupulous in his regard for the requirements of the Law, eminently moral in his life and conduct. But there was something wanting, without which eternal life could not be enjoyed by him. This he himself felt, and Christ not only confirmed, but interpreted his feeling. "Go and sell," and "come and follow me," said He. The injunction of Christ is twofold: "Go and sell" and "come and follow me." The former suggests that more than he had yet done was demanded of him, and the latter indicates the source whence the stimulus needful for the doing of it may be derived. In the past he had occupied a purely negative position. He had not done any murder, he had not committed adultery, he had not stolen; in a word, he had not violated the several commands to which Christ had referred. In the future he must exchange the negative for the positive. He must recognise that it is not enough for him to be able to say that he has

not defrauded any man; he must be able to say that he has helped not a few. He must be brought to feel that he may be defrauding his fellows, although he take nothing from them, if he refuse to share with them the plenty he possesses. He must show himself ready to give up all that he has if occasion should arise. Short of that point, he could not attain the peace that he sought, because, short of that point, he was short of that self-surrender that is the condition of life eternal.

But Christ said more than "Go and sell." He said, also, "Come and follow me." He inculcated an act of self-consecration as well as an act of self-denial. The latter was but the preliminary and the means to the former, and the former was to supply the impulse and the motive-power for the latter. Christ sought, by awakening devotion to Himself, to kindle an enthusiasm that would consume selfishness, and make the abandonment of worldly position and goods easy. In other words, He endeavoured to quicken the religious sentiment, and, by so doing, to lift the young man out of the purely moral region in which he had hitherto been moving. What was meant by following Him is clearly shown by the remark made by Christ when the young man went away sorrowful: "A rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven." "Following Him" was thus entering into the kingdom of God. It was occupying the spiritual standpoint, accepting the spiritual principle, and pursuing the spiritual aim. "Following," then, was as necessary as "selling"; more necessary, indeed, for the selling might be performed with a subordinate motive; and, in any case, if it stood by itself it would not supply that which was lacking.

Here, then, we have a striking testimony on the part of Christ to the inadequacy of morality without religion. The keeping of the Commandments was insufficient; the selling and distribution of goods was insufficient. Along with these there must be "following"—personal attachment to Him who is good.

Another passage that points in the same direction, is that in the Sermon on the Mount in which Jesus deals with the giving of alms.¹ In it He connects care for the poorer brethren with regard for the Father in Heaven. He indicates that it is not enough to be considerate and kindly; considerateness and kindness must have a religious basis if they are to possess real value. The Pharisees were far from the apprehension of this truth. They did what they did, to be seen of men. It is this mistaken aim that Christ is exposing and endeavouring to correct. And what is noteworthy is, that He does not seek to purify their aim by merely urging them to act from a feeling of brotherhood, by merely calling upon them to cherish, in modern phraseology, an altruistic spirit, but that He passes at once to the highest ground—the religious. He declares that God takes account of what is done by men on behalf of their fellows, and rewards them for their good deeds; and He bids those to whom He is speaking keep this divine interest in their conduct before them, as a stimulus and a guide.

We have thus learned that Christ taught that morality is insufficient of itself, and that it requires religion to give to it true value. We must now take the other side, and adduce evidence that Christ taught that religion which does not issue in morality is without real worth.

In the Sermon on the Mount we read: "If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee; leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."² This is clearly a special application of a general principle. What is presented to us is a worshipper going up to the temple with an offering, that he may discharge his religious duties. With the offering no fault whatever is found. So far from objection being taken to it, it is referred to as suitable. The worshipper is not bidden cast it aside as worthless, but is only commanded to

¹ Matt. vi. 1-4.

² Matt. v. 23, 24.

hold it over till the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. "Leave there thy gift before the altar"; "then come and offer thy gift." Now what are the conditions? They are the adjustment of relations with those with whom the worshipper has to do. Against him one of these has some ground, some just ground, of complaint, and of this ground of complaint he is aware; and the declaration is, that so long as that ground of complaint is allowed to exist, no gift offered will be received by God. Here the settlement of a dispute, or at least the attempt to effect a settlement, is laid down as essential to acceptable worship. Injury done to a brother, not repented of and atoned for, is fatal to acceptance with God, however costly the gift with which He is approached. These things might seem to us to be quite distinct from each other, so distinct that they could be united only in a formal and artificial fashion, but Christ, in the utterance under consideration, brings them into closest union, or rather discloses the closeness of their union, to each other. He links them together in such a way that the one becomes the condition of the other, so that the one without the other is worthless—not honouring and pleasing, but dishonouring and displeasing, to Jehovah. Nor is the ground of Christ's deliverance difficult to discover. The offering of a gift on the altar is a religious act. As such it is the expression, or professed expression, of a certain state of mind and heart produced by a perception of relation to God. It therefore implies surrender to God and obedience to His will on the part of him who makes it. But the will of God governs the whole sphere of being, and thus refusal to recognise that will in one department neutralises willingness to recognise it in another. He that offends in one point is guilty of all. Hence to make sacrifice while violating the divine arrangement in one of its references is not to exalt, but to insult, Him to whom the sacrifice is made. It is a purely formal procedure, and is, therefore, without value. In the case supposed by Christ, value can be imparted to it only by

effort to repair injury done in the social sphere. From this it follows that religion which does not determine a man's relation to his fellows, and constrain him to act toward them in a just and honourable fashion, is worthless,—is not, strictly speaking, religion at all.

Having thus learned that Christ, in His discourses, teaches that morality and religion are intimately related to each other, we go on to ask what He said as to the nature and extent of their relation. And we begin our inquiry with a consideration of the answer given by Christ to the lawyer who asked Him about "the first commandment of all."¹ Christ's reply was: "Hear O Israel; The Lord our God is one Lord: and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these." This is an important utterance, perhaps the most important that we have bearing on the point before us. Before considering its content, let us observe one or two things concerning it.

First of all we note that, though the inquiry only bore on the first commandment, Christ does not stop with what He calls the first, but adds another, which He calls the second, and which He unites to the first in such a way as to indicate that the two are vitally related. "There is none other commandment," says He, "greater than these." And this combination appears all the more remarkable when we remember that the two commandments do not stand together in the Old Testament. The first is quoted from Deuteronomy and the second from Leviticus. That Christ should have bound them together, as He does here, implies that He regarded them as essentially related to each other. It is clear that, in His view, to have repeated the first commandment alone would have been to give an incomplete and misleading reply to the question addressed to Him. Not

¹ Mark xii. 28-34.

that the commandment itself was incomplete and misleading, but that the standpoint of the inquirer was such that he would have failed to discern its precise bearing and import, and would have limited its reference to specifically religious duties. There was, therefore, need for an addition that would be exegetical, bringing out a particular application of the injunction that would otherwise have been overlooked. Christ, in effect, says, the first commandment concerns itself with the relation of man to God, but it must be remembered that the relation of man to God affects the relation of man to man.

The next point to be observed is the order in which Christ arranges the two commandments. The combination of them was His own. He was, therefore, free to state them in whatever order seemed to Him best. Hence the order which He adopted is not without significance. He puts first, that which defines man's relation to God, and second, that which defines man's relation to man. He thus indicates that the former is greater, more comprehensive, than the latter—is, indeed, its basis.

Passing from these preliminary points to the substance of Christ's response, we note that what is set forth as the first commandment consists of two parts, viz. "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord," and "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." Of these, the first is a doctrine and the second is an injunction. That the doctrine is of the utmost importance is evident from the place it holds not only in Christ's reply, but also in the lawyer's response. It is, indeed, the ground of the injunction. With it men must start if they are even to attempt to obey the injunction. If the unity and the universality of God be not accepted, the call to love Him with our whole being will sound absurd. With this, Israel was to begin—"Jehovah our God, Jehovah is one." And, having admitted this fact, they were to go on to love, with all their powers and faculties, the

One God whose existence they acknowledged by that admission. On Him their feelings were to be concentrated, and in Him their nature was to find its object,—the sphere of its exercise and the satisfaction of its yearning.

In the injunction, we have not so much a command as an indication of the attitude which a true conception of the nature of God will compel us to assume. It speaks of love, but love cannot be the subject of a command; at anyrate, it cannot be manifested merely in obedience to a command. It is emotional in basis, and must, therefore, be spontaneous, the response of our nature to a character presented to us. Jehovah is One, the only One, so that to Him our thoughts should be turned; and the issue of our contemplation of Him, if that be real and earnest, will be love, love that is a consuming passion, deepening in intensity with growing insight. This, of course, implies the possession and manifestation, by Him who is contemplated, of qualities, that are fitted to awaken love. And He whom Israel knew possessed and manifested such qualities. As their creator, He had made them in His own image, so that to see and know Him was to see and know that One in whom was realised all that they were capable of conceiving or becoming, and who, accordingly, appealed to that which was deepest in their nature. To see and know the One God, then, in His true character, was to surrender themselves to Him as their very heart's desire. But to Israel He was more than a creator. For them He bore a special character and occupied a special position. He was Jehovah, the covenant God, who had interposed on their behalf and done great things for them, who had delivered them and defended them, who had provided for them and guided them, bestowing upon them manifold tokens of His fatherly affection and interest. He had proclaimed and proved Himself, "the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth";¹ not only dispensing bounty, but

¹ Ex. xxxiv. 6.

passing by shortcoming and transgression, and, when He afflicted and punished, revealing, in the affliction and punishment, a loving purpose, and associating with these, comforting and encouraging promises and assurances. Thus, alike in His general and in His special character, Jehovah was the object of affection to the devout children of Israel. As the only God, He had a claim on their reverential regard and their loving surrender; and as the covenant God, He not only disclosed the full significance of that claim, but lent to it a new and peculiar weight, so that those who rightly apprehended the meaning of the name by which He had called Himself would be constrained, by the impulse of a spiritual response, to love Him "with all their heart, and with all their soul, and with all their mind, and with all their strength."

From the first commandment we turn to the second. In it, also, love is enjoined; but the love that is enjoined in it differs, alike in object and in measure, from the love that is enjoined in the first. It is "our neighbour" that we are to love, and we are to love him "as ourselves." The latter is the important point in the present connection. So far as God is concerned, we are to love Him with our whole heart and soul and mind and strength. To love Him as ourselves is not enough. In relation to Him no standard is admissible. He is one and alone, the source and ground of all, so that to Him there must be complete surrender. It is quite different with respect to our neighbour. He is not above us; he is on the same level as we, embraced in the same system. This being so, we are called upon to treat him as we treat ourselves, in a manner that is becoming our nature and place in the organism of humanity. We are not to regard him as an isolated unit, who is to be viewed as standing apart from us, and whose claim upon us is to be determined by his individual attainments or special circumstances. We are to regard him as a member of a vast system, taking his character and deriving his position and rights from his connection therewith. In other words, we

are to think of his essential relations rather than of his actual condition. The latter will often repel rather than attract; and if we view our fellows only as individuals, we shall feel no impulse toward them, regarded merely as our neighbours. Only when we recognise that we are united to them, as members with us of one system, shall we experience affection for them apart from any special tie binding us to them. And it is by this community of membership that the standard of the love we are to cherish toward them is fixed. We are to love them "as ourselves." But what is it that determines our attitude toward ourselves? What is the basis of self-respect? From the present standpoint, it is the appreciation of our standing as parts of the organism of humanity, with all that this implies. By apprehending the position that is ours, in virtue of our constitution, we discover what is due to ourselves and how we ought to treat ourselves. But since our fellows are the same in constitution as we, to apprehend our position is to apprehend theirs, and to discover what is due to ourselves and how we ought to treat ourselves, is to discover what is due to them and how we ought to treat them. The attitude we are to assume toward our neighbours is defined by the attitude we are to assume toward ourselves. Self-respect is the ground and spring of respect for others.

Having thus looked at the two commandments, taken separately, we proceed to consider the relation between them. Both enjoin love, but the love enjoined by the one differs from the love enjoined by the other, alike in respect of object and of measure; and difference in these respects implies difference in character. But what is the nature of that difference? Is it absolute or relative? The answer to this question will be reached by an examination of the terms employed by Christ. He says that we are to love God with all our heart and soul and mind and strength, and that we are to love our neighbour as ourselves. Of these two requirements, it is evident that the latter is a

special application of the former. In other words, love of our neighbour is embraced in love of God. Were this not the case, then either the one or the other must be pronounced impossible, and either the one command or the other would be unwarranted. We cannot love God with all our heart and soul and mind and strength, if, apart from our love of God, we can manifest love to our neighbour, for the simple reason that an exercise of the faculties indicated is demanded for the manifestation of the latter love, and their exercise in the manifestation of the latter admits only of their partial exercise in the manifestation of the former. Hence if we are to love God with all our heart and soul and mind and strength, and at the same time to love our neighbour, love to our neighbour must not only harmonise with, but must be involved in, must, indeed, be the issue of, love to God. We may, indeed, love some of our fellows apart from love to God, but that love is different from the love referred to in the commandments cited by Christ. It is individual in character, an emotion determined by the peculiar temperament of him who cherishes it; whereas the other is general in character, springing not from temperament, but from constitution,—the attitude and disposition which, as rational, spiritual beings, we ought to assume and display toward all the members of the human family.

Confirmation of what has been said will be gained if we think of the objects of the two loves. The object of the first is God, "our God" according to the statement quoted and homologated by Christ. He was the God of Israel, and it was as such that they were to love Him. He was, indeed, the God of each, but he was the God of each because the God of all. That is to say, His relation to each rested on that which was common to all. Hence, a man who loved God truly would love those who stood in the same relation to God as he did. It was, indeed, this community of relationship that constituted neighbourhood. And what was true of God in relation to Israel was true of God in relation to humanity.

This it was part of Christ's mission to declare. And as a result of this declaration, He taught that the neighbours of the Jew were not merely those who were bound with him in the Covenant, but all men, whatever their nationality. In dealing with the second commandment, we saw that we could love men as ourselves only as we recognised that they and we were members of the organism of humanity. That result is in perfect harmony with the position just laid down. For the organism of humanity is not independent and self-existent. It is dependent on God, and exists as a unity and a community in virtue of its relation to Him; and therefore right relation to it is implied in right relation to Him. We thus perceive that love to God carries with it love to our neighbour. And this being so, the second commandment is implied in the first, and so far from enjoining something different from that which is enjoined in the first, it does little more than emphasise an element in its demand.

Thus the reply of Christ to the lawyer, when rightly interpreted, sets before us plainly the position of Christ on the subject under discussion. He places religion, as love to God, in the forefront. It is first and fundamental. In a sense, it is the sole requirement, because all else is included in it. Hence it stands by itself in Deuteronomy. But lest the statement of it alone might mislead, by being taken in a narrow sense, Christ adds the moral requirement that springs from it. Along with love to God, and as a special application of it, we are to manifest love of our neighbour.

The scribe who had put the question to Christ is impressed by the inwardness of the reply which he receives. He says that the states of mind and heart indicated by Jesus are "more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices." These were, in themselves, external acts, and might have no real basis in feeling—might not be expressive of love to God, and might be performed entirely apart from love to our neighbour. Christ says, "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." He was not far from the right standpoint. He had, to a

certain extent, grasped the bearing of the commandments, but he had not quite attained the spiritual point of view. The mention of burnt-offerings and sacrifices, and the comparison of these with love to God and to our neighbour, betrays a legal outlook. What was required, that he might take his place within the kingdom, was the idea of God which Christ had come to give. Without this, the nature of Jehovah and of His relation to Israel could not be rightly apprehended, and, so long as this was the case, the full meaning of the two commandments could not be perceived.

In order, then, to complete our examination of Christ's utterance, we must consider what according to Him the term God meant. That He invested it with a new meaning we are all aware, and yet the new meaning was rather an unfolding of what lay wrapped up in the old than an addition to it. God was, from the first, all that Christ showed Him to be. He is the unchangeable One, the same in essence throughout all the mutations of that movement which is the manifestation of Himself and the execution of His thought and purpose. Not only was He in Himself all that Christ showed Him to be, He was so in His relation to His people; but, owing to the hardness of their hearts, they could not at once appreciate His words to them and His dealings with them. That was disclosed to them gradually, and was finally and fully declared to them by Jesus Christ.

What, then, was the idea of God which Christ presented to men? What was the new truth He taught regarding Him? It was the idea of Fatherhood; it was the truth, that God stood in a paternal relation to men. This was the fundamental, the central thought of His system; this was the basis and burden of His teaching; this was the ground and guarantee of His work. It is, however, with its bearing on men and their obligations that we are at present concerned. Clearly the character with which God is invested will affect our estimate of the duties that devolve upon us. This it will certainly do if we recognise that there is but One Lord.

That One Lord, then, is our Father, and we are His children. The attitude to be assumed by us toward Him is the attitude of children to a father, and, in agreement with this, is the attitude we are to assume toward our fellows. They are children, even as we. They are our brethren, and we are to display toward them brotherly sentiments and brotherly conduct. Our attitude toward God is to be filial; our attitude toward men is to be fraternal; the latter is thus an issue of the former, or rather, it is a special phase of it. This is distinctly stated by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount. Having bidden His hearers love their enemies, bless them that curse them, do good to them that hate them, and pray for them that despitefully use them and persecute them, He proceeds, "that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven."¹ It was as children of the common Father that men were to determine themselves in their dealings with their fellows. From the Fatherhood of God there sprang the brotherhood of men.

What, then, is implied in fatherhood? It suggests a tie of some kind. Perhaps the first thought that occurs to us in seeking to answer this question is, that the father is the one from whom the child draws his life, and by whom he is supported and cared for. But this is clearly inadequate to the circumstances. It would not furnish a basis broad enough for the structure reared upon it. At most, it would yield the conception of duty. The parent might feel obligation to provide for the child whom he had called into existence, and the child might feel obligation to obey the parent who has done so much for him; but this idea of obligation is far short of the content and reference of fatherhood and sonship. These carry us beyond duty, and lift us to the sphere of affection. They speak of love, of an emotion that makes duty a pleasure and service a delight. Now, what is demanded for the existence and maintenance of that emotion? There is demanded affinity of nature; not simply a recognition, but a

¹ Matt. v. 44, 45.

sense, of relationship. In other words, if fatherhood and sonship are to be truly manifested there must be advance beyond the simple fact of generation, the formal tie created by communication of life. This furnishes only the conditions needful for the manifestation of the sentiment of filial regard; and if there be nothing but the conditions, the end will not be realised. "Honour thy father and thy mother" is the form given in the Old Testament to the duty resting on children. Honour is required, but honour implies something more than simply submitting to conditions within which we find ourselves. Honour is the response of our nature to that which appeals to and moves us by its nobility.

When Christ, then, taught the Fatherhood of God, He taught more than the dependence of men on God for life; He taught the existence of a bond linking men to God, a bond real, tender, vital, because springing from affinity of nature. God is the Father of men not merely because He has made them. Creator and Father are not synonymous terms. He has made much beside man, much that is less and lower than man. He has made the sun and the moon and the stars, plant and flower, beast and bird and fish; but He is not spoken of as the Father of these, or as loving them. They were not made in His image. He has not breathed into them His own breath. There is no affinity of nature between them and Him. He finds delight in them, but He does not commune with them. When he walks in the garden of His fair creation, it is not that He may hold converse with the flower or the tree, the bird or the beast, but that He may speak with men. God, as Father, stands in intimate relation to men, a relation that is the ground at once of obligation and of hope.

Wendt says that Christ, primarily, in His name of Father takes into account the "unmerited, bountiful, forgiving love"¹ of God. But this is not a quite correct statement. It is

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus* vol. i. p. 193.

true that Christ emphasised the unmerited and bountiful and forgiving character of God's love to men, but He did so because of the special circumstances with which He had to deal. His revelation was given to those who had sinned, and its form was determined by their state and need. It was necessary for Him to make plain that the love of which He had to speak was a forgiving love, but He did not limit Himself to that phase and expression of it. On the contrary, He taught that the love was the normal sentiment, existing apart from the need of men due to sin, and that the provision made for that need was the outcome of love,—was, indeed, love straining after its object, which it would not willingly let go. To declare, therefore, that Christ primarily took into account the unmerited, bountiful, and forgiving love of God when He spoke of Him as Father, is, to say the least, to minimise somewhat the depth and intensity of the love, concentrating attention on the special manifestation of it called forth by man's folly and misery. Indeed, the terms employed to characterise the love are out of harmony with the title Father and the idea of Fatherhood. These have no concern with merit and bounty. Such terms suggest an artificial relationship utterly foreign to that which Christ came to exhibit; and even forgiveness does not stand apart from paternal affection in its ideal form, so that its manifestation appears abnormal, but is the natural and necessary movement of that affection meeting the special condition of its object.

The proclamation of the Fatherhood of God is the proclamation of the love of God to men, resting on no special necessity of men, but on the original and essential relation of men to God, and is, therefore, a call to men to love God with all the heart and soul and mind and strength not merely as an acknowledgment of benefit received, but as the surrender of the being to Him to whom they are bound by their very constitution, and in whom alone they can find rest.

But the Fatherhood of God carries with it the brother-

hood of men. It is as children of the Father in heaven that men are to love their neighbours, who also are children. Thus love to our neighbour is an integral part of love to God. These are not really two emotions. The former is but a special expression of the latter. We shall love men in proportion as we love God. In and by our love to men, the love of God to men has its perfect work: it operates through us when we come under its influence. We transmit the current of affection that flows to us from the centre. We reflect the kindly light of paternal interest and affection that falls upon us from the most excellent glory with cheering and quickening beam, so that men are drawn by us to Him for whom their souls are yearning, and who is waiting to receive them and to lavish on them the gifts of His grace.

Thus does Christ plainly declare the connection between morality and religion, and thus does He exhibit the nature of that connection, showing that morality rests on religion, and draws its impulse and energy from it, so that it is but applied religion in the sphere of earthly relations.

Another passage that may with advantage be considered in this connection is the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew. That chapter contains three sayings of Jesus that, when carefully examined, are seen to shed light on the matter in hand, viz. the Parables of the Ten Virgins and of the Talents, and the description of the Last Judgment. These, it is evident, are closely connected with each other. Not only were they spoken at the same time, but they deal with the same subject, though dealing with it in different ways. They form, indeed, a series, the several members of which are designed to contribute to a general result. They may of course be taken separately and treated as single deliverances; indeed they ought, in the first place, to be so taken and treated, for each is, in a real sense, complete in itself, presenting a definite thought. But their completeness is relative. It is the completeness of a part, not of a whole. Hence each must ultimately be brought into relation to the others that with it,

constitute a full discourse, in order that its teaching may be supplemented and corrected by the teaching of its companions.

It is thus, as exhibiting different aspects of an important truth, that we have to look at the three utterances before us. What concerns us, therefore, is their central idea. We do not need to devote attention to their details, except in so far as that is necessary for the discovery of their main reference. And we shall be guided in our search for this if we begin by noting what is common to them. Having apprehended this, we shall be in a position to understand the special aspect of it that each emphasises. Now they all speak of the second coming of Christ and of the manner in which men will be affected thereby. That Christ will come again, and that His coming again will be followed by the separation of men into two distinct classes,—this is the burden of each of the three sayings. The form in which these two facts are presented is different in each, but the difference in the form of presentation does not hide the fundamental unity of the facts presented. A glance at the several statements is sufficient to convince us that He who makes them is seeking to express one thought and to enforce one lesson, a thought and a lesson that are many-sided, and that consequently require to be regarded from different points of view. The necessity for variety of treatment becomes apparent whenever we discern the point dealt with. That, as already said, is the second coming of Christ, and the way in which it will affect men. It has, however, to be noted, that it is the latter rather than the former of these that is the theme of the threefold discourse. It is not the second coming of Christ in itself, but that coming in its bearing on men, that is dealt with. Hence it is on this that we have to fix our minds when we endeavour to interpret the declarations made. Now the second coming will be followed by, or will result in, a division of men into two classes. That is the thrice-repeated declaration. But it is not merely the fact of a division that is

stated; the principle of which the division will be the expression is also stated. Christ's aim here, as elsewhere, is practical. He is anxious that those hearing Him should be ready for the great event of which He speaks, and, in order that they may prepare for it, He offers them guidance by exhibiting the grounds of the separation which it will effect. For that separation will not be capricious, determined solely by the will of Him who comes; it will be judicial, determined by the condition of those to whom He comes. Here, then, we reach the precise point of the utterances under examination. That is neither the fact of Christ's second coming, nor the fact of a separation as the consequence of that coming, but the test that will be applied by Him who comes, and that, being applied, will necessarily issue in division. But that test cannot be fully and accurately described in a single sentence, or even in a single parable. Human nature and human life are complex and varied in character and reference, and the test that is to be applied will touch these in their fulness and diversity. Hence if it is to be truly understood, so as to furnish ample guidance, it must be set forth in its relation to the different sides of human nature and of human life. Herein lies the explanation of, indeed the necessity for, the different and, at first sight, distinct deliverances given by Jesus on the subject. The task that lies before us, then, is to apprehend the special idea of each, and, having done this, to bring the three ideas together, that by their combination we may gain further insight into Christ's mind on the subject of our inquiry.

In the Parable of the Ten Virgins, the division is between those who had supplied themselves with oil and those who had not. The former went in with the bridegroom to the marriage, the latter were shut out, being refused admittance, even after they had replenished their lamps. What, then, was the ground of this division? In seeking to answer this question we note that the bridegroom is the centre of the scene depicted. It is to meet him that the virgins go

out; it is when he comes that they bestir themselves; it is with him that the wise go in to the wedding; and it is to him that the foolish appeal on their return, and from him that they get answer. It is thus of him that we have primarily to think, and it is the attitude of the virgins toward him that decides their fate. Five had assumed the right attitude and five had assumed the wrong attitude. Five had made preparation for doing him honour; five had not. Five, that is to say, had such esteem and affection for him that they were scrupulous in providing everything that was necessary for joining his train; five had no such esteem and affection, and consequently, though accompanying those who went out to pay him respect and to rejoice with him, they were careless and indifferent and forgetful. The first five were sincere, the second five were formal, in their expression of regard for the bridegroom. The feeling of the two classes toward him, and their relation to him, were quite different, and it was these that formed the basis of the separation that took place. This is made plain by the reply given to the foolish when they knocked: "Verily I say unto you, I know you not." "I know you not." It was not a question of oil or no oil, as they had erroneously supposed, but of attachment and interest; and that question they had answered by their neglect to make the necessary arrangements for his reception. "I know you not." Whoever you are, and whatever you may have, you are not my friends, and only friends of mine have a right to enter the wedding chamber.

In the Parable of the Talents, the division is between those who had been faithful and those who had been unfaithful to the trust reposed in them. In the case of the former there is a difference in the extent of the trust; but this difference is of no consequence so far as our present purpose is concerned, and may be overlooked by us. The commendation is the same in both cases: "Well done, good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things"; and it is in the commendation that we have the key

to the characteristic feature of the one class, and to the line of demarcation between it and the other. I speak of the other class, though mention is made of only one individual, because he is clearly typical and representative. The numbers, it is evident, do not affect in the least the main idea of the utterance. It is, then, of those who were faithful and of those who were unfaithful, that we have to speak. To both these, talents had been given. The former had traded with those talents, the latter had not. The former recognised, that merely to preserve and return that which had been committed to them was not to meet the obligation resting on them. To their mind, substance carried with it the possibility of increase, and consequently imposed on those to whom it was committed a serious responsibility. They were bound to employ it to the best advantage, that in the end they might be able to show, by the amount gained, that they had dealt with it rightly. They, therefore, availed themselves of the opportunities which their circumstances presented, and availed themselves of these so successfully that they doubled the sum in their possession, and were thus in a position, when the time of reckoning came, to give in a good account.

It was quite different with the other. He did not regard property consigned to him as laying on him any obligation beyond its safe return to him who had conveyed it to him. He thought of his master rather than of the goods which his master had placed under his care, and, having but a poor opinion of his master, he resolved to run no risk of losing what he had received from him. "He digged in the earth and hid his lord's money." When, therefore, the day of reckoning came, he brought the talent forth from its hiding-place and handed it to his master, explaining as he did so why it was that he had acted as he had done. He knew that he with whom he had to do was an hard man, greedy and grasping, demanding all his own, and more than his own, and he had determined to avoid the possibility of exposing himself to his censure.

The manner in which the master expresses himself regarding the two classes is deeply significant. He speaks of those who have traded as "good and faithful," and as having been "faithful over a few things." The precise bearing of these words will be more easily and more fully perceived after we have examined the reply given to him who hid his talent. That reply was: "Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed: thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents. . . . And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." This reply consists of three parts. In the first, the master describes generally the action and character of the servant; in the second, he shows the hollowness of the reason he had given for his conduct; and, in the third, he passes sentence on him. We shall look first at the second of these. In that, the servant is convicted out of his own mouth. He is told that if he had really thought of his master as he professed to do, he would have taken a course the very opposite of that which he had taken. He would have put forth every effort and used every means to make as much as he could, so that he might have been able to gratify the avarice of his lord. This, then, was not the real ground of his decision. He may have fancied that it was, but, if so, he did not rightly know himself. The true reason for his behaviour is suggested by the first part of the reply. In it he is declared to be "a wicked and slothful servant." When we read this declaration we cannot help noting that the terms employed in it do not exactly correspond to those employed with reference to the servants who had acted rightly. They were described as "good and faithful"; this one is described as "wicked and slothful." He was faithless, indeed, but his faithlessness was due to his slothfulness. It was not due to dishonesty, to any

desire to defraud his master, but to his unwillingness to exert himself, and that unwillingness was, in turn, due to his failure to appreciate the responsibility that rested on him in virtue of the position in which he had been placed; or perhaps we should say, was not checked and overcome by the appreciation of that responsibility. He was "slothful," and his slothfulness controlled him, because he did not realise that the talent committed to him was a call to activity. For his slothfulness he found, or thought he found, an excuse and justification in the view which he entertained of the master's character. That view, however, was the product, and not the cause, of the slothfulness, and consequently instead of accounting for it, it was accounted for by it.

When we thus examine carefully the words of the master we see clearly the difference between the two classes. The one felt and responded to the claim which substance intrusted to them made upon them; the other did not. This is the point that is emphasised, and that must be seized by us if we are to apprehend the meaning of the parable. What is presented as the ground of division is not attitude toward the master. That is certainly involved, but it is not prominent. We are not to regard the first class only, or even mainly, as those who had a right estimate of their master's character, and were moved by respect for him. That is not necessarily involved in their trading with his capital. This is apparent from what is said to the wicked and slothful servant. He is told that the opinion of his master which he professed to hold should have led him to do this very thing,—to put his money to the exchangers,—that at his coming he should have received his own with usury. What his lord points out is, that had he acted in the line of his declared conviction he would have been able to show a gain. The difference between the two classes, then, is not primarily a difference of attitude toward the master, but a difference of attitude toward property committed to them. It is the manner in which they regard and treat money which, for the time being,

is theirs, that is the object of judgment. And, it is to be observed, that as to the manner in which they were to regard or treat that property the master says nothing. He gives them no command or instruction. The test, therefore, that was applied was not a test of obedience; it was a test of nature, of temperament. Those who were to be tested were to be thrown upon themselves, in order that they might show what spirit they were of. When we thus consider the statements made by the master to the two classes, and note the attendant circumstances, we discover what the fundamental idea of the parable is. As has been said, it is not the relation of the servants to the master that is emphasised, but the relation of the servants to the trust reposed in them by the master. The former is, of course, involved in the latter, and must be taken account of, but it is not the main object to which our thoughts are directed. What is chiefly presented is the manifestation of character in the due appreciation and right use of that which forms a trust. To the "good and faithful" the master says, "thou hast been faithful over a few things," not faithful to me, or to my instructions, but "over a few things," discerning truly the burden which these laid upon thee, and acting rightly in respect of them.

We must now glance at the third part of the master's reply to "the wicked and slothful servant." That contains the sentence passed: it is twofold. First, the talent which he has failed to treat aright is to be taken from him and given to "him which hath ten talents"; and second, he is to be cast into outer darkness. It is the former that is of importance for us. According to it, the unprofitable servant is to be deprived of that which he has neglected to use. He is to be deprived of it, to lose it; for though it was only intrusted to him by his master, it was to remain his so long as he dealt rightly with it. He who had the ten talents was allowed to keep them, in order, of course, that he might still further trade with them; and because he had given evidence that he was alive to the duty which substance, placed under

his care and control, laid upon him, and was scrupulous in its discharge, the sum that had been misused, because not used, and had been unproductive, was transferred to him, that in his hands it might increase. From all this it follows, that it is to the relation of the unprofitable servant to the talent handed to him and neglected by him that the sentence pronounced upon him refers, and that it is on the ground of his failure to treat it as it ought to have been treated that he is cast into outer darkness.

In the description of the Last Judgment, the division is between those who have been kindly and charitable and those who have not. The scene depicted represents the Son of Man coming in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, and taking His seat on the throne of His glory and separating into two great classes the nations gathered before Him, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats. He appears as King, and as King He is Judge. It is His to decide who are to be admitted to the position and the privileges of citizenship. The grounds on which His decision rests are set forth by Him plainly and distinctly, and it is these that concern us at present. Those on His right hand are invited to enter the kingdom, because they have cared for the hungry, the thirsty, the strangers, the naked, the sick, the imprisoned; while those on His left are bidden depart, because they have neglected such as were thus poor and needy. The King does not, indeed, put the matter in this way at the outset, but His subsequent explanations show that this is what He means. To begin with, He speaks of what the one class had done, and what the other class had not done, to Himself; but in reply to their surprised inquiry, as to when they had had opportunity of aiding or succouring Him, He says that inasmuch as they had done, or had not done, it unto one of the least of His brethren, they had done, or had not done, it to Him. He thus identifies Himself with the wretched and the suffering, and declares that treatment of them was treatment of Him. We have thus two points for consideration. The first

is, that the ultimate test of citizenship is devotion to, and sacrifice for, the King; the second is, that devotion to, and sacrifice for, the King are displayed in right dealing with the subjects. I say "in right dealing with the subjects," because, although Christ mentions only those in affliction and poverty, we are not bound to limit His reference to these, but must extend it to all classes. Those specially alluded to are selected by Him clearly because, in their case, the claim which our fellows have upon us for consideration and assistance assumes a pressing and clamant form and expression, insensibility to which implies insensibility to it in its normal form and expression. But the claim, whatever its form and expression may be, is one and the same in essence. Pity for, and effort on behalf of, the famishing and naked and oppressed is but a special recognition of the obligation that rests upon us, as social beings and members of a vast organism, to seek, and to contribute to, the good of all the parts. On one occasion Christ was asked, Who is my neighbour? In reply, he spoke the Parable of the Good Samaritan, who aided and provided for the traveller whom he found by the wayside robbed and wounded. But He did not mean by this, that His questioner was to display a neighbourly spirit only to those who were in the same or similar circumstances. He merely made use of a pronounced manifestation of neighbourliness, that, by so doing, He might exhibit plainly and impressively the point which He wished to emphasise and enforce. So is it here. Failure to recognise the tie that binds us to those who are in sore straits, with its resulting responsibility to render help, is, ultimately, failure to recognise the tie that binds us by nature to our fellows; and this Christ declares to be inconsistent with recognition of the tie that binds us to Him as King.

In order that we may apprehend the exact significance of the two points noted, and their relation to each other, let us glance at the details of the description. Christ deals first with those on His right hand. He tells them that they are accepted because they had helped and relieved Him in His

time of need. They are astonished at His words, and ask when they had done the good deeds which He attributed to them. They were not conscious of having ever seen Him in the conditions indicated, and were, therefore, unaware of having ever comforted or succoured Him. In reply He tells them, that in showing kindness to men and women in these conditions, they had been showing kindness to Him. In other words, He declares that the spring of their generous action was regard for Him. They had not, indeed, acted generously with the view of pleasing Him, but they had imbibed His spirit, and, under its influence and control, had treated their brethren tenderly. He thus places their conduct in a light in which they had never before seen it. This He does by disclosing its root and revealing its inner meaning. By what He says, He corrects an error into which they had fallen. They had been regarding surrender to Him and interest in their fellows as distinct. He teaches them that they are not distinct, but are closely connected, the one being the outcome of the other. What He declares is, that a right attitude toward men is based on, and is proof of, a right attitude toward Him.

Having dealt in this way with those on His right hand, He turns to those on His left, and He tells them that they are rejected because they had not helped and relieved Him in His time of need. Like the others, they express surprise at His statement. They had never at any time seen Him in want or trouble. If they had, they would certainly have afforded Him every assistance within their power. In response to this defence He says, that inasmuch as they had seen men and women in misery and distress, they had seen Him in misery and distress, and that inasmuch as they had left those men and women uncared for, they had left Him uncared for. In other words, He declares that a true attachment to Him would have compelled them to realise their obligation to their unfortunate fellows, and to stretch forth to them a helping hand. These two things were not distinct,

as they supposed, but were so intimately related that the former could not exist without producing the latter.

We have, therefore, in the two deliverances, two aspects of the same truth. That truth is, that a right relation to the King and a right relation to His subjects are inseparably united. On the one hand, it is asserted that where the latter exists, the former also exists; and, on the other, that where the latter does not exist, the former does not exist. The two assertions, it must be observed, are not simply the negative and the positive statements of a single thought. The second carries us further than the first, and is, therefore, more than its repetition in different language and from a different standpoint. It might be admitted, as the first asserts, that attachment to the subjects could not truly exist or be manifested apart from attachment to the King, and yet it might be supposed that attachment to the King could exist and be manifested without attachment to the subjects. That this is not, and cannot be, the case in the kingdom of the Son of Man is distinctly declared in the second of the deliverances contained in the saying before us. We must, therefore, take account of both if we are to appreciate aright its teaching.

We have thus examined these three discourses with the view of discovering the central thought of each. In what has been said regarding them we have, as far as possible, limited ourselves to exposition, and avoided interpretation. We must now pass from exposition to interpretation. We must endeavour to seize their meaning in its deepest and widest reference, that, having seized this, we may learn in what way precisely they stand related to each other, and what their bearing, singly and unitedly, is on the subject of our inquiry.

The first, then, clearly suggests affection for, and devotion to, Christ. He is the Bridegroom who is to come, and the preparedness or unpreparedness of men to receive Him when He appears is an indication of the presence or the absence in

them of interest in Him and regard for Him. What, therefore, is emphasised, is feeling and sentiment, not action and attainment—an inner state that expresses itself in honour paid to its object. The five wise virgins represent those who have experienced the tender and captivating influence of Christ, and have so surrendered themselves to Him that, come when He may, He will find the flame of love burning bright and clear. The five foolish virgins represent those who have heard of Christ, but who, though mingling with His true disciples, have never been touched and moved by Him, and consequently have no deep and heartfelt esteem for Him. The former are known of Him ; the latter are not.

On the other hand, the second parable speaks of the employment by men of the powers and faculties with which they have been endowed. These are the talents with which we, as rational beings, have been intrusted, and their possession imposes on us obligation. We are called upon to make the most of them, that we may realise the possibilities that lie wrapped up in our nature. This is the point presented in this saying. What is emphasised is our relation, and our duty, to ourselves. Constituted as we are, a responsibility rests upon us to act after a certain fashion, and according as we apprehend and meet this responsibility will our place and condition hereafter be determined. The reference of the utterance is thus mainly personal. It deals with our action, or rather with our character, as that is revealed in, and developed by, our action. But though mainly, it is not wholly, personal in bearing. Inasmuch as the powers and faculties possessed by us are endowments bestowed upon us by God, we are accountable to Him for our use of them. This is clearly set forth in the parable, and must be kept definitely in view when we seek to discover and exhibit its full teaching ; but it is not its chief thought. Its aim is not to declare the responsibility of men to God, but to exhibit the responsibility of men to themselves.

The third of the sayings treats of our relation to our

fellows, and of the basis on which that relation rests. We are bound to our brethren, and they have claims upon us which we are under obligation to discharge. These, however, we cannot discharge unless we have recognised and accepted the tie that binds us to Him who is the head of the community of which they and we are members. We can only assume a right attitude toward men if we assume a right attitude toward the Son of Man. And this attitude must reveal itself in practice. It must issue in self-sacrifice and brotherly sympathy, in generosity and beneficence, in care for, and exertion on behalf of, those around us, especially those who are in want and distress. In this utterance, then, there is emphasised both feeling and action, both inner state and external effort, both duty to God and duty to those who are around us, and these in intimate and vital relation.

After all that has been said there should be no difficulty in discerning the bearing of these three sayings on the subject under discussion. Throughout our treatment of them we have avoided the terms morality and religion, but it must have been evident that it was with morality and religion that we were dealing. Taken together, the utterances we have been considering furnish striking evidence that, in Christ's view, morality and religion are intimately connected with each other. They also show us what, according to Him, is the nature and extent of their relationship. In the Parable of the Ten Virgins religion is accented—regard for, and surrender to, Jesus Christ. In the Parable of the Talents morality in its personal reference is exhibited, but with this there is associated religion, in so far as the nature to be developed by us is bestowed upon us by God, and that to Him we must give account of our action. In the description of the Last Judgment morality and religion are presented in close combination, the former being set forth in its social reference, and the two being declared to be interdependent. Each has thus its own truth to declare regarding the question before us, but the several truths are not independent. Were

we to accept the first alone, we should think only of religion, and should suppose that it stood by itself, and could exist apart from character and conduct. Were we to confine ourselves to the second, we should regard as alone important the right use of our powers and faculties, and our relation to God would seem to consist in showing that we had so used them when the day of reckoning came. Were we to devote our whole attention to the third, we should treat morality and religion as identical, both being of equal importance, and of equal importance because two sides or aspects of the same thing. But when we bring the three together, we reach the full and rounded truth. We see, first, that both morality and religion are required; second, that they are so closely connected with each other that neither can, in any real sense, exist without the other; third, that morality rests on religion and religion expresses itself in morality; and, fourth, that religion is primary and fundamental, and is wider and more comprehensive than morality. The last point is proved by the fact that one whole discourse is devoted to religion, whereas, while morality is dealt with in two discourses, it is in both related to religion; in the one by implication, and in the other by distinct declaration.

We have thus glanced at some of Christ's utterances, with the view of discovering what He taught regarding the subject of our inquiry. We have learned that He insisted on a close and vital connection between morality and religion, declaring that each was necessary for the full manifestation of the other; and that, while thus linking them together, He set forth religion as the basis and spring of morality. Having considered the bearing of His teaching on the question before us, we now turn to consider His life and conduct, and to ask what these have to say on the subject. In these we expect to find confirmation of our interpretation of His teaching. Should we fail in this, we shall be compelled to doubt the soundness of our reading of His deliverances. He was the Truth. He not only spoke the truth; He lived it. This was

His peculiarity as a teacher. His conduct was in perfect harmony with His discourse. His life was the illustration of His system. His words, indeed, were but the exposition of His character and mission and effort. He did not merely bring a revelation from God to men; He was that revelation. In this respect He differed from all the other teachers to whom the world has listened. They were, at most, channels of communication; He was the communication itself. "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."¹ Hence what would be an injustice to others is fairness to Him. To rest our acceptance of philosophical systems of the past or the present on the consistency of the lives of those who framed and promulgated them with the principles which they enunciated, would manifestly be an unwise and culpable procedure, a wrong done alike to the thinkers and to the truth. What we are bound to do in respect of these is to test the theories constructed, apart from the behaviour of those who constructed them. But with Christ it is different. He and His theory are one, and, because this is the case, the one sheds light on the other. Because divine, He was the truth in its unity and fulness; and, because human, He was the truth in practical form, the truth working with human hands, conforming to, and illumining, human relations. He did not simply declare, He fulfilled, the whole duty of man. His teaching, then, is intimately related to His life, and therefore we turn from the teaching to the life for confirmation and support.

What, then, of Christ's life? The most cursory glance at it discovers the two elements with which we have been dealing. That life is the embodiment of His answer to the lawyer. Love of God and love of our neighbour are its two poles. He loved God with His whole heart and soul and strength and mind. This love glowed in His every word and deed. It was the passion that endowed Him with courage, and it was the power that endowed Him with patience. His meat was

¹ John i. 17.

the doing of His Father's will. On this point it is unnecessary to enlarge, as it will be freely admitted by all.

But besides love to God, He displayed love to man: He loved His neighbour as Himself. He met fully and faithfully the requirements of the condition into which He had come; and this He did freely and spontaneously, as the outcome of an inner impulse that carried His thoughts and feelings outward as well as upward.

The earliest glimpse we get of Him reveals the twofold reference of His position. As a boy He went to the Temple at Jerusalem with Joseph and Mary. Fascinated by all that He saw, He remained behind, and had to be sought for. When found and upbraided by His mother, He said, "Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?"¹ And having asked this pointed and pregnant question, "He went down with them to Nazareth," and "was subject unto them."² Though feeling specially attracted to the Temple, and believing that while there He was in His Father's house, He did not insist on remaining there, but met the call of duty, and went to the distant village and the humble home. He recognised obligation to His mother as fully as relation to His Father. And what is of importance is, that He did not separate them. This He clearly could not have done. The business of His Father must always claim His attention and secure His regard. He could never set that absolutely aside. Wherever He was, He must give attention to it. Hence His going down to Nazareth was not distinct from, still less opposed to, that business. It was in a line with it, or, rather, it was that business itself in the form suitable to the circumstances of the time and the conditions of the work assigned Him; and, recognising this, he went down and was subject. By going down and being subject, He was doing

¹ It is immaterial for my argument whether this saying of Christ be rendered "about My Father's business" or "in My Father's house." Even if the latter be the correct rendering, the idea expressed in the former is involved in the utterance, and as it is that idea I wish to emphasise, I quote it in this form.

² Luke ii. 41-52.

that business. In order that He might fulfil His mission a place had to be filled by Him within the human sphere in the family, in society, in the State, and the proper filling of that place was the due fulfilment of the mission. Thus this simple and beautiful incident of His boyhood has a far-reaching significance. It discloses the principle of His activity, and testifies to the unity that characterised His life.

But we turn to look specially at what we may call the moral side of His effort and attitude. That He loved His neighbour, and loved him as Himself, cannot well be denied. His life was pre-eminently one of self-sacrifice. He went about doing good; and continued His beneficent work not only at the cost of ease and comfort, but in the face of opposition and misunderstanding and danger that became more and more pronounced month by month, until it ended in persecution and death. Whatever view may be taken of His character and work, this must be admitted as a prominent feature of it, if not its very note and nerve.

And the kind and intensity of that love is rightly indicated by the phrase "as Himself." This becomes evident when we think of the sacrifices He made in order that that love might have free course. He did not refuse to surrender the divine dignity. Willingly, joyfully, He laid all aside that He might become the servant of men. Instead of exercising His power and His wisdom as a king, He came in weakness and humility, only exercising the power and wisdom that were His for the furtherance of His work. Had He loved men less than Himself, He would not have come in the form of a servant.

But, further, the aim of His coming and endeavour was the communication to men of that which He possessed. He gave His life not only for men, but also to men. He surrendered all that He might benefit the brethren, but His surrender, with the benefit resulting, was not apart from them; it was, in its final issue, within them. He sought to make them sharers in His own gifts and endowments,

that they might become what He was. "My peace I give unto you."¹ "That My joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full."² "As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God,"³ that, in the language of the apostle, they might be "heirs of God, and joint heirs with" Him; might stand on the same level as He did, and might be glorified together with Him.

This line of thought brings us face to face with the Incarnation. Without this, indeed, we could not speak of Him loving His neighbour "as Himself." As the Second Person of the Trinity, He stands on a height to which men can never rise. As divine, He is different in nature from those for whom He sacrificed and toiled. He is infinite, and they are finite. And an infinite being cannot love a finite being "as Himself." He can love him, and love him up to the measure of his finitude, but not beyond it. Hence there was need for a descent into the limits of the temporal on the part of Him who would elevate the finite to His own level. Christ became human that, by becoming human, He might place Himself within the organism of humanity, and might, as a member thereof, love the other members as Himself, seeking to make them what He Himself was. It was in virtue of His partaking of the flesh and blood of the brethren that He, so to speak, learned what the brethren ought to be. Realising what He Himself must be, or rather was, as the ideal man, He understood what others ought to be, and what He must endeavour to make them. He was to love them "as Himself," and to endeavour to make them like Himself,—to lift them to the height on which He stood. He could not lift them to His level as the Second Person of the Trinity, but He could lift them to His level as the first-born among many brethren, the embodiment of the Father's purpose in the creation of beings in His own image.

From what has been said, it is clear that Christ's love of God and Christ's love of men were not distinct, but bore an

¹ John xiv. 27.

² John xv. 11.

³ John i. 12.

intimate relation to each other. "I came down from heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me."¹ His mission was at once His own and His Father's. It was because of His perfect harmony with the Father that He was qualified for the work undertaken by Him. His essential relation to the Father was not destroyed by His incarnation. He had come down from heaven, but He was in heaven. Thus His relation to the Father endured; it underlay His life on earth, manifesting itself in affectionate submission and filial aspiration. It was the ground and spring of all that He did. Had He not loved God, He would not have loved men. And He loved God in terms of His special position. The essential relation took the form of an accepted relation. He loved God as a member of the human race, and, loving God as a member of the human race, He loved all His fellow-members and strove to bring them to the experience of that same love. The two were thus closely connected. The one was the outcome and special manifestation of the other.

On Christ's character, viewed in its purely individual aspect, it is scarcely necessary to dwell. He was "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners."² Even His enemies failed to find any moral accusation to bring against Him. He could say, boldly and without fear of charge or condemnation, "Which of you convinceth Me of sin?"³ Though occupying a distinctively religious position, or, rather, because occupying such a position, He was careful to keep Himself "unspotted from the world."

Thus alike in the teaching and in the character and conduct of Christ do we find confirmation of the result reached in preceding lectures.

¹ John vi. 38.

² Heb. vii. 26.

³ John viii. 46.

LECTURE X

THE NEED OF MAN

IN the last lecture we considered the teaching and life of Christ as these bear on the duty of man. In the present lecture we are to consider them as they bear on the need of man. Christ, in His word and work, had in view the state in which men were, as well as the character which men were to manifest. He did not confine Himself to a declaration and an exhibition of what they ought to be and to do. He showed them what was required by them, if they were to live the life which He set before them in discourse and by example. Besides presenting to them an ideal, and urging them to strive after its realisation, He laid down the conditions that must be fulfilled if its realisation by them were to become even possible. And the latter aspect of His mission and effort is as important as the former.

And when we examine it, we discover that it is twofold in character, having both a negative and a positive reference. Of these, the former has regard to the present state of man, the latter, to his future attainment. The present state of man is abnormal, and abnormal because of transgression. As a result of sin, man has fallen from the position which he was designed to occupy. He is not, therefore, able to meet the claims that rest upon him. In order that he may be fitted for this, he must be lifted to the level from which he has sunk. Restoration is thus the necessary preliminary to spiritual activity. But restoration is not all that is demanded. Men are not merely to recover the position

they have lost; they are to advance on that position, moving forward in the path of spiritual attainment. Restoration is but a means to an end, the removal of that which hinders effort and growth. Now, both for restoration and for the advance of which it is for us the condition, we require help. We can neither return to our original state, nor fulfil the end of our existence, in our own strength. When we remember this, we appreciate fully the twofold character of our need,—what I have called its negative and its positive reference. We recognise, also, that Christ deals with our need in both references. He speaks of, and works out, salvation from sin; and He urges to, and supplies what is requisite for, growth in grace. By the former He provides for restoration, and by the latter, for advance. We must, therefore, in considering His life and teaching in the present connection, keep these two phases of it before our minds. We shall begin with its negative side.

And the first point on this side that claims attention is repentance. That is laid down by Christ as one of the conditions, the primary condition indeed, of entrance into the kingdom of heaven. The summary given by the Evangelists of His teaching when He began His ministry was, "The kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel."¹ And though the form of His teaching changed with changing circumstances, its burden remained the same. From first to last He insisted on repentance as the preliminary to spiritual benefit. Now what did repentance, as used by Him, mean? It meant a change of mind, issuing in a change of attitude and action; a change of direction in thought and feeling and effort. It implied a turning from one object to another; from sin to God. It was not merely a turning to God. That was but one aspect of it. The subject of repentance had not been in a state of inactivity, from which he had simply to be roused; he had been following a course in which he had to be arrested,

¹ Mark i. 15.

and which he had to abandon, turning his face toward the opposite goal. The aim of repentance was the enjoyment of the favour and fellowship of God, and the first step toward the realisation of that aim was the giving up of sin. In repentance, therefore, we have the union of morality and religion. For what was it from which men were to turn in repentance? What is the meaning of sin in this connection? It is not merely doctrinal error, a mistaken apprehension of the truth revealed; or neglect of ritual, failure to meet the demands of the ceremonial law; it is neglect of duty, violation of the enactments of the moral law. It touches daily life, with its individual and social obligations. When Christ began to preach, He linked His utterances to those of the Baptist. He, too, had called for repentance; and the significance of his call is made plain by the answers he gave to the several classes who appealed to him for explanation and guidance. "He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do likewise." "Exact no more than that which is appointed you." "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages."¹ He spoke of the selfishness, the dishonesty, the oppression, the falsehood, the fraud, the discontent of which his hearers had been guilty in the past; and warned them that fruits meet for repentance could not be brought forth unless such practices as he had indicated were given up, and a course of conduct entirely different, the very opposite indeed, were pursued. From the explicit utterances of the Forerunner we gain information as to the requirements of the Messiah. Like John, Jesus thought of evil deeds and vicious habits when He bade men repent that they might enter into the kingdom. He declared that He had come to call sinners to repentance. And those who heard and responded to His call understood fully its meaning. Women of impure lives sought the path of virtue, stirred into shame and hope by His keenly tender words of rebuke and

¹ Luke iii. 11-14.

invitation. They did not, for a single moment, contemplate the possibility of attaching themselves to Him while continuing their wicked career. And Zaccheus, when he stood before Jesus and desired to proclaim himself His disciple, promised to restore what he had unjustly appropriated and to deal generously with the poor.¹ Such a declaration on the part of the candidate for discipleship is a valuable testimony to the character of the Master's teaching. Zaccheus does not speak of prayers and sacrifices and worship, but of reformation of life and atonement for wrong done. He is penitent, and on the ground of his penitence he seeks the favour of the Messiah; but his penitence is more than sentiment, more than a turning of thought and feeling to God. It is practical, a turning from evil deeds and sinful courses. Without the latter the former would have been worthless, and of the former the latter was the necessary accompaniment.

Christ, then, lays down repentance as the condition of entrance into the kingdom of heaven. Only those who repent accept Him as Saviour, and only those who accept Him as Saviour are accepted by Him. But the condition of entrance into the kingdom is sometimes presented in a different form. Instead of repentance a new birth is insisted on. This was the qualification which Christ emphasised in His conversation with Nicodemus.² To the ruler of the Jews He did not speak of repentance. Had He done so, he would have failed to touch him. The need for repentance would have been freely acknowledged by this master in Israel as a general requirement, but it would not have come home to him as a demand that pressed upon him personally. He was not a sinner marked by vice and crime, guilty of outstanding errors and glaring wickedness. He was an honoured member of society, not only making a religious profession, but scrupulous in his observance of the moral and ceremonial law. Such was his estimate of himself, and, having regard to it, Christ does not speak of repentance, but of a new birth. He tells

¹ Luke xix. 8.

² John iii. 3.

His astonished visitor that he must be born again, born from above, born of the spirit as he had been born of the flesh. The reason for this change is, that what is born of the flesh is flesh, and that what is born of the spirit is spirit. There are two spheres in which men may move, two characters which men may display,—that of the flesh and that of the spirit. These are distinct. In one sense they are opposed to each other. To walk after the flesh is not to walk after the spirit; it is to walk against the spirit. Christ suggests to Nicodemus that he is in the sphere of the flesh, and that if he is to enjoy the benefits of the kingdom of God, he must rise into the sphere of the spirit. He further teaches him, that as by birth he entered into the sphere of the flesh, by birth he must enter into the sphere of the spirit. But birth is the beginning of life. Christ is, therefore, thinking and speaking of two kinds of life, that of the flesh and that of the spirit. But life implies movement, activity, conduct. Wherever there is life, there is effort of some kind, and effort in harmony with the quality and the supply of life. Thus both flesh and spirit point to action, to behaviour, to character. Hence when Christ insists on a new birth, He does not insist merely on an inner change, that will be purely subjective in its effect; but on a change that, while inner, because fundamental, must manifest itself in attitude and endeavour, must influence the whole being, and give tone and direction to every word and deed. When closely examined, the new birth proves itself to be practically the same as repentance. It is a change that implies a turning from and a turning to, a turning from the flesh and a turning to the spirit; a change, therefore, that is both moral and religious. The difference between the two methods of stating the matter is, that the former sets forth the general nature of the change demanded, while the latter traces it to its cause and shows what is its essence. The new birth carries us deeper than repentance, but both describe the same process. The one cannot be produced without the other. Where true repentance has been manifested, the new birth

has taken place; and where the new birth has taken place, repentance has been manifested. And the condition to which these are the introduction is not a condition separate from the ordinary affairs of human life. Spirit and flesh are different points of view rather than different spheres, different impulses rather than different forms of service. Those who are transferred from the flesh to the spirit are not taken out of the world or withdrawn from connection with it. They have, of course, a relation to God, and duties flowing therefrom, which they had not before; but along with this there continues their relation to the world in which they live, with the duties correspondent thereto,—a relation and duties, however, that are seen in a new light and met in a new spirit, in virtue of the change undergone. This does not mean, that the life which comes with the new birth manifests itself fully in the visible sphere, so that this gives limits to its expression, but only that, whatever other forms and directions it may take, this form and direction it must take.

From repentance and the new birth we pass to faith. That faith holds a central place in the teaching of Christ no one will deny. The demand for faith on the part of those addressed was constantly presented and pressed by Jesus. We might almost say, that faith held the chief place in His system, was its characteristic feature, and constituted its fundamental requirement. In order that we may discern its significance for the point under consideration, let us note its main references.

And, first, we observe that it was the condition and measure of temporal and physical blessing. To the sick and the maimed and the distressed who came seeking health and healing and relief, it was said, "Thy faith hath made thee whole," and, "According to thy faith be it unto you." Such sayings as these plainly rest the bestowal and enjoyment of benefit on the exercise of faith. Its exercise renders possible the granting of the prayer presented, and the measure of its exercise determines the extent of the response. And these

positive utterances are confirmed by statements of a negative kind. In connection with His rejection at Nazareth we read in Matthew, "He did not many mighty works there because of their unbelief,"¹ and in Mark, "He could there do no mighty work . . . and He marvelled because of their unbelief."² Want of faith made His power inoperative. Though at all times able to act, He could act only when those who needed His help assumed the right attitude toward Him. Faith is thus exhibited as the ground of temporal and physical blessing.

Now what is the precise nature of this ground? Are we to regard the demand for faith as arbitrary or essential? Was the connection between faith and cure external and factitious, or was it fundamental and vital? In insisting on faith as the terms of help and succour, was Christ making a claim of His own that might have been dispensed with, or was He making a claim that rested on the nature of things? Was the limit to His power, which He observed, self-imposed, or was it imposed by the mission which He had undertaken? The answer to these questions is not difficult to give, and yet it is important that it should be given, and carefully noted. Clearly the condition He laid down was essential, and the connection between faith and cure which He emphasised was fundamental and vital. Christ did not demand faith from the sufferer who cried to Him, as the price, so to speak, of His skill, but as the environment within which alone that skill could be exercised with effect. Faith was the submission of him who manifested it to Him who was its object, and in virtue of that submission a tie was formed by which the life-giving current could flow from the one to the other.

When this point is seized by us, we perceive that the faith manifested was more than simple belief in the power of the Great Physician on the part of him who manifested it: it was the beginning, at least, of a personal relation between the two, so that the bestowal of temporal and physical

¹ xiii. 58.

² vi. 5, 6.

blessing had its basis beneath that which was purely temporal and physical. If this had not been the case, it would not have been true that He could do no mighty works because of unbelief. The fact would have been that, though He could, He would not. In other words, had He stood wholly within the visible sphere, then, inasmuch as His power to do mighty works was a permanent possession, He always could have performed them, and His willingness to do so would have been the sole condition of their performance; but because He stood within a sphere other than the visible, by the requirements of which He was controlled, though always willing, He was not always able, to afford assistance. Christ's work in the world was manifold and various, but it was single and harmonious in purpose and spirit. What that purpose and that spirit were, is only seen when we study its higher bearings and references. The lower must be interpreted by the higher, and cannot be understood apart from it. And as it was with Christ's work, so it was with the demands made by Him on those with whom He had to do. What He required on the lower levels of life cannot be taken by itself, but must be viewed as the reflection of that which pertains to the higher.

In harmony with this view of the nature and bearing of the faith that gained for its subject health and succour, is the fact that with the bestowal of these temporal blessings Christ frequently associated the bestowal of spiritual blessing. To say, "Thy sins be forgiven thee" was as easy as to say, "Arise, and walk."¹ The two, indeed, were not distinct and separate. They were but different expressions of one power and principle, called forth by different degrees of a certain state of mind and heart. This brings us to the consideration of the second point, viz. that faith is the condition of spiritual blessing. In dealing with this point, it will be necessary for us to consider separately different aspects of the spiritual blessing bestowed. It has already

¹ Matt. ix. 5.

been observed that Christ treated the spiritual need of men both negatively and positively; indicated, that is to say, what was required for restoration, and what for continuance and growth in grace. And we have placed repentance and the new birth under the negative category, because they are concerned with recovery. Faith is both negative and positive in its application. It is required alike for recovery and for maintenance and advance.

In the former reference, it is closely connected with repentance and the new birth. It is, in a sense, the connecting link between the two. Without faith, indeed, there can be no repentance, in the strict sense of the term. There may be regret and remorse, keen sense of failure and transgression, and bitter experience of misery and suffering resulting therefrom, but there cannot be a turning from sin to God. Before this can take place there must be "the apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ"—reception of, and resting on, Christ, belief in the forgiving goodness of Him against whom we have done evil. Conviction of sin and repentance are not identical. Conviction alone will breed despair. Only when conviction is associated with faith does repentance ensue, and peace fill the heart. But when this condition is reached, the new birth has taken place. We are new creatures in Christ Jesus. We "have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him."¹

Here, then, we have the division of this part of the subject. We have to inquire what Christ taught as to faith, first, in relation to repentance, and, second, in relation to the new birth.

First, as to Christ's view of faith in relation to repentance. This touches the objective result of sin. Man has relation both to that which is around him and to Him who is above him. By sin, he disturbs both relations: he places himself in opposition to that which is around, and he offends Him who is above. Repentance is the removal, or rather the

¹ Col. iii. 9, 10.

desire for the removal, of the disturbance caused by sin. It is the recognition and abandonment of opposition, the confession of offence, and the resolve after new obedience. And the question before us is as to the connection of faith with this result.

In order that we may gain an answer to this question, let us return to the statement of the Evangelist already referred to regarding the preaching of Jesus. He "came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel."¹ "Repent ye, and believe the gospel." Here repentance and faith are closely connected, and are set forth in their connection as the basis of citizenship in the kingdom about to be established. What the nature of that connection is, we shall discover if we consider what is said of faith, and, in particular, of its object. That is the gospel. What, then, is the gospel? In its full extent, it is the whole revelation given by Jesus Christ. But here, we have to think of that revelation in one of its many aspects and references. What that is, is determined for us by the terms of the statement. The gospel in which men are to believe is a gospel that harmonises with repentance, a gospel that meets the case of the penitent, comforting and encouraging and guiding them. Now repentance is a turning from sin to God. The gospel that harmonises with this act must, therefore, be at once an exposure and a condemnation of sin as a violation of divine law, and a declaration of mercy and grace on the part of Him whose law had been violated. Did it not expose and condemn sin, it would not lead to a turning from sin; did it not declare mercy and grace, it would not lead to a turning to God. Belief in the gospel is thus belief in the righteousness and in the love of God, and belief in these of such a kind as to impel to confession of wrong-doing and to acceptance of forgiveness. Faith, then, as thus described, is more than

¹ Mark i. 14, 15.

formal assent to certain statements made in our hearing; it is the response of our nature to utterances that appeal to our feelings and our needs. Consequently, it is the assumption of an attitude, toward that which is without and above, that implies the formation, or rather the reformation, of a relation that has been disturbed by us, a relation the maintenance of which we recognise to be essential to our safety and happiness. The assumption of such an attitude is clearly a religious act, since it is the acceptance of divine truth and the surrender to divine grace; but it is a religious act that has a moral reference and result. Our belief is allied to repentance,—is at once the impulse to, and the condition of, repentance,—but repentance has to do with character and conduct as manifested in our dealings with our surroundings and our fellows. Hence our belief must issue in a change of character and conduct.

We come now to consider Christ's teaching as to the relation of faith to the new birth. Here we touch the subjective effect of sin. That is declared to be spiritual death. By his evil-doing, the transgressor removes himself from the source of life, and, as a result, declines in vitality. He is "alienated from the life of God";¹ he is "dead in trespasses and sins."² He must, therefore, be raised in newness of life, and he is so raised when he is born again. With this vitalising change, Christ connects faith. He tells Nicodemus that whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish, but have everlasting life,³ and to the Jews He says, "He that heareth My word, and believeth on Him that sent Me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life."⁴ In these statements, and others of similar import that might be adduced, Jesus lays down belief as the condition of the possession of spiritual life. In the one case, the belief required is belief in the Messiah, and in the other, it is belief on Him that sent Him; but these are not distinct. He who sent and He who was sent

¹ Eph. iv. 18.² Eph. ii. 1.³ John iii. 16.⁴ John v. 24.

are the same: "I and My Father are one."¹ What, then, of faith in this connection? It is clear that it must be different in reference and value from what it was in relation to repentance, but though different from it, it must be compatible with it. Here it leads to life. It is the recognition of, and the surrender to, an internal and essential relationship between us and God. It is the acknowledgment that only in union to Him who has made us can we realise our nature. It is the opening of ourselves to the vital and vitalising influence of Him who has created us for Himself, and apart from whom we must perish. Life is not the reward, but the issue, of faith: it is not a benefit attached to it, but its natural and necessary outcome. To exercise faith is not to secure life, it is to live. Whenever we believe, we live. Faith in this connection is, therefore, a movement of our being that is central and radical. As the accompaniment of repentance, it looks outward; as the accompaniment of the new birth, it looks inward. In the former reference, it points to a violated law, the need of forgiveness, and the resolve after new obedience; in the latter, it points to separation from the source of life, the need for reconciliation, and the desire for quickening. The first speaks of pardon and acceptance, the second, of renewal and union. But, as has been said, the two are compatible with each other. They are, in truth, but different aspects of the same thing, neither of which can be safely overlooked without injury to the other. This is suggested by the following passage, which we have already quoted: "He that heareth My word, and believeth on Him that sent Me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation: but is passed from death unto life." "Hath everlasting life," and "shall not come into condemnation." Here the possession of everlasting life and freedom from condemnation are linked closely together. Both are due to the same act on the part of the individual. They are but the two sides of one process and result.

¹ John x. 30.

What, however, concerns us at present is the effect, as described, in character and conduct. It is moral, as well as religious, in its range and operation. That it is religious is evident. It is surrender to the Divine Being, with the view of participation in the divine life; and that is of the very essence of religion. That it is also moral is scarcely less evident. It is self-surrender, submission to a spiritual power and energy that is to possess and dominate the whole nature. It must, therefore, affect the activity of the individual in every direction. It is the purification and the quickening of the spring of our feeling and our thought; it is the adjustment of the centre of our being, and it cannot but reveal itself in word and deed. We have seen that faith, viewed in relation to repentance, has also a twofold reference. The basis, however, is different in the two cases. Faith, viewed in relation to repentance, is the reception of truths concerning God, or of a revelation of God, that meets the sense of shortcoming and transgression, and leads to a change of attitude toward the divine will. Faith, viewed in relation to the new birth, is surrender to Him who is the manifestation of God, and by whom the life of God is imparted to those who receive Him. In the former case, the issue is both moral and religious, because man as a unity must seek harmony in his beliefs, and must therefore bring the truths accepted by him into relation to his whole thought and feeling, in such a way that they will determine his aims and purposes. In the latter case, the issue is both moral and religious, because man as a unity can have but one life, one vital principle, of which his every movement is an expression more or less full and articulate. Thus faith, viewed in relation to the new birth, is more fundamental and penetrating than faith viewed in relation to penitence. The former, indeed, includes and embraces the latter; whilst the latter points to the former as its completion.

This brings us to another point, that is at once a correction and an extension of that which we have just been

considering. Hitherto, in dealing with Christ's teaching as to belief and life, we have confined ourselves to the new birth, and to faith in relation thereto. We have done so because we were occupying the negative standpoint. But there is a positive as well as a negative standpoint, and, as has been pointed out, faith has to be regarded from both. It operates not only in the way of recovery, but also in the way of maintenance and advance. The transition from the one to the other is effected by the new birth. That is not an isolated experience; it is the beginning of a movement that is to continue. By it life is stirred within us, and the life that is stirred within us is eternal. It is not only to be preserved, it is to be deepened and enriched and increased; and the condition of its expansion is the same as the condition of its initiation. On faith, as acceptance and surrender, rests the possession of life eternal—its rise and its growth. "As thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee";¹ that is the principle of the divine dealing with men. The disciples prayed, "Lord, Increase our faith";² and this is a petition that all who seek to grow in grace must constantly echo, for without faith there cannot be growth, and in proportion to the faith exercised will be the growth.

Closely connected with the points of which we have spoken, there is another that demands consideration. In His discourses, Christ frequently used the word truth as descriptive of that which He presented to men for acceptance, and the acceptance of which was essential to the attainment of spiritual life. The Evangelist declares that by Him there came grace and truth. He Himself declared that He was "the truth." He upbraided men because they did not believe the truth which He set before them. He asserted that by the truth men should be made free. He prayed the Father to sanctify His followers through the truth which was His word. He promised to send the Spirit of truth to carry forward His work in them, leading them into all truth. These

¹ Matt. viii. 13.

² Luke xvii. 5.

and similar passages show us the prominence that was assigned by Christ to truth. It is exhibited by Him as the object and content of faith, that which was to be imparted to and received by those who exercised faith, and that which, working in them, was to develop their Christian character. Now what are we to understand by truth in this connection? It is evident that it is suggestive of more than correspondence with fact and reality. In this sense we often employ the word. We speak of what is true, or of a truth, or of truths, when we wish to indicate that special statements are in accordance with what actually exists or has taken place. The statements in question satisfy a test that is applied to them, and, in virtue of this, are accepted. But what Christ speaks of is truth, or the truth; not that which corresponds with fact and reality, but fact and reality itself. He does not merely claim that His utterances are in accordance with what actually exists or has taken place, but that in Him that which actually exists, or that which is the ground of what has taken place, stands revealed. "Thy word is truth":¹ the word of God, the thought of God, that is truth. Hence He who is "the word" is "the truth," and that Spirit which proceeds from the Father, by His indwelling and working, leads men into all truth.

When we thus apprehend the significance of the word truth, as used by Jesus, we perceive that it is vital and vitalising in character and operation. It is a living principle that must influence powerfully all who receive it. It is not a proposition or dogma that may be admitted by us without in any way affecting our character and life. It is a force that must work within us. We do not simply apply it to our circumstances: we submit ourselves to its control, and by that control we become children of the truth. It is an energy that embodies itself in a definite character. "The truth shall make you free,"² said Christ. The freedom here promised is no external deliverance. It is the liberty of the sons of God.

¹ John xvii. 17.

² John viii. 32.

It is the release of the spirit of man from the bonds by which, in its natural state, it is bound; so that, delivered from the hindrance and the impediment which these imposed on it, it spontaneously fulfils the purpose of its being.

But the truth not only makes free, it sanctifies. Sanctification is an inner process that cannot be either initiated or carried forward by a purely external influence. It is accomplished by the gradual permeation of our nature by a cleansing and ennobling power that expels all that is base and cherishes all that is good. The truth that accomplishes this in us must be more than doctrines intellectually apprehended by us; it must be a force that identifies itself with us. Only on the ground of that identification could it have within us its perfect work.

It is clear that this element in the teaching of Christ has a most important bearing on the subject of our inquiry. It confirms most emphatically the conclusion to which we have been brought. The truth, when it touches men, and is assimilated by them, must determine them both morally and religiously. It is "the word of God," and as such it sanctifies them. It thus of necessity brings them into right relation to God. It is the divine thought moving within them, and the movements of the divine thought must always be toward the Divine Being. But it also brings them into right relation to their surroundings in their varied aspects. Because, bringing them into harmony with reality, with the nature of things, it dictates the proper attitude and guides into the proper course. The truth is not only to be believed, it is to be obeyed, and is, therefore, to manifest itself in character and conduct. Wendt insists that the term should be taken as equivalent to "the right," or "rectitude," "the rightness of faithful and dutiful conduct";¹ and though such a rendering does not exhaust its significance, or suggest the fulness and depth of its meaning, it exhibits accurately one side of it and emphasises its practical reference. "He

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. i. pp. 257-259.

that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.”¹ This is a weighty and valuable utterance. In it the religious and the moral are united. The deeds performed are described as “doing truth,” and they are declared to be “wrought in God.” There is, thus, conduct, which is the issue and embodiment of the truth, and which, as such, springs from relation to God, whose nature determines it and whose power produces it.

The truth, as will be evident from what has been said, is intimately associated with faith, repentance, and life. It is received by faith. Belief in the truth is acceptance of it and submission to it. And it is by its working on and in men that repentance is manifested and life is begun and increased. Christ said, “I am the way, the truth, and the life”;² and by that saying He bound together in His person the different elements of His teaching.

We have thus examined Christ’s utterances as to the need of man. We have seen that He dealt with that need both negatively and positively. He spoke alike of recovery from evil and of advance in righteousness. With regard to the former, He urged the necessity of repentance and of revival, thus emphasising the objective and the subjective aspects of sin and its consequences, viz. guilt and death. By repentance, guilt was overcome, and restoration to place and privilege was secured; by revival, death was overcome, and life was stirred, so that the faculties might be exercised, activity might be put forth, and growth might result. Associated with each of these was faith. Without faith, neither repentance nor revival was possible. It supplied what was requisite for their appearance. In respect of repentance, it seized the truth concerning divine grace, that made return to God possible; in respect of revival, it effected a union with Him who was the life, so that His life was communicated to the nature that was “dead in trespasses and sins,” quickening it into “newness of life.” And the life thus communicated

¹ John iii. 21.

² John xiv. 6.

remained a permanent possession, a vital force that was to strengthen and expand, finding for itself ever fuller expression. These movements, we saw, were both moral and religious in reference and result. They touched man in his relation both to God and to the world; they affected his attitude alike toward that which was above and toward that which was around. Producing a right state of mind and heart, they produced a right form of conduct.

Having thus considered Christ's teaching as to the need of man, we turn to consider His character and work, so far as these bear on that subject, with the view of gaining confirmation of the results reached. We followed this course in connection with our inquiry into Christ's teaching as to the duty of man. And here, this course is more necessary, and should yield more helpful results. So far as the duty of man is concerned, Christ is an example and an inspiration; but in relation to the need of man, He is vastly more than this. He is the means and channel by which that need is supplied. What is demanded, as the condition of satisfaction, is faith; and the object of that faith is Jesus the Christ. Men are to believe in Him, and in proportion as they do so they experience recovery, revival, growth in vitality and vigour. That belief, too, is to produce union, a union that is close and living. How close and living this union is, Christ shows in His discourse about the True Vine. He there declares that as the branch is to the vine, so His disciples are to Him. If they are to bring forth fruit, they must abide in Him. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me."¹ The belief, then, of which He speaks is no external, formal acquiescence in His utterances concerning Himself; it is a reception of, and a submission to, Him, in the fulness of His personality and power. It is by relation to Him alone that recovery and revival can be realised. When this is seen, we perceive the importance for our inquiry of the character and the work

¹ John xv. 4.

of Christ. Unless these be adequate to the demands of faith as thus described, the teaching will be but a mockery and a delusion.

What, then, of Christ's character and work? What was He, and what did He do? Was He such an one, and did He act in such a way, as to bring within the reach of men recovery, revival, life? For an answer to these questions we must listen to His own testimony concerning Himself, because He alone can interpret Himself aright. And that testimony we shall consider in reference, first, to His personality, and, second, to His mission. We shall ask, What sayest Thou of Thyself? and, What sayest Thou of Thy work?

What, then, of Christ's personality? What did He profess and claim to be? To this question we do not find a full and complete answer in any one of His recorded utterances. In order to reach such an answer we have to bring together statements made at different times. The reason for this is, that Christ did not begin by producing credentials, or making declarations concerning His nature and position. He addressed Himself at once to the work He had been sent to do, proceeding on the assumption that, in and by that work and His manner of doing it, the Jews would recognise Him and receive Him. "He came unto His own" expecting that, because they were "His own," apprised of, and prepared for, His coming, they would know Him and receive Him. It was only, therefore, when misunderstood or attacked that He uttered definite testimony concerning His nature and standing. And such being the case, a full view of the testimony offered by Him can be gained only by a consideration of His several deliverances on the subject.

Apart, however, from special utterances on the subject, the general tenor alike of His speech and action sheds light on His view of His nature. Consideration of this shows that He regarded Himself in two different aspects—a human and a divine. In connection with this twofold estimate of Himself,

we remember that He spoke of Himself as the "Son of God" and as the "Son of Man." These titles are clearly intended to suggest two sides of His personality. The former implies a definite and unique relation to God, the latter, a definite and unique relation to man; the former speaks of divinity, the latter, of humanity. Some who admit that "Son of Man" implies humanity, deny that "Son of God" implies divinity, at least in the full sense of the term. This is the position of Wendt. He labours hard, displaying not a little skill and ingenuity, in the attempt to prove that the phrase "Son of God," as used by Christ in application to Himself, does not imply a position other than that occupied by, or at least possible to, the children of men. Summing up his discussion on the subject, he says: "Both names have value for the consciousness of Jesus in so far as they involve direct views of the characteristic relations of His person to His nature and work,—the one a view of the relation of His person to God, the other a view of His relation to the human race. If, through His self-designation as Son of God, He gives expression to His lofty consciousness of standing in an inward fellowship of love with God as His Father, so, by designating Himself as 'Son of man,' He expresses His lowly consciousness of at the same time being a weak finite man, like other men, who was not exempt from the specific manifestations and experiences which belong to frail humanity."¹ When we read the latter part of this statement, we cannot help observing, that in it two different values are attached to the term "Son." In the one clause, it indicates only "the consciousness of standing in an inward fellowship of love with God as His Father"; in the other, it indicates a community of nature. As "Son of God," Jesus is bound to the Father by a "fellowship of love"; as "Son of Man," He is bound to humanity by the possession of a human nature. In the former case, it is a bond of affection that is suggested, in the latter, it is a bond of nature. In the first instance, the tie is

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 149.

sentimental, in the latter, it is essential. But this double reference of the term is not permissible. It must be taken in the same sense in both clauses. Sonship must indicate the same kind of relation in the two titles. Now, that Christ was truly human is evident. He was born, grew in wisdom and stature, showed all the qualities of humanity. Proof of this is to be found on every page of the sacred record. But if His title "Son of Man" rests on His community of nature with men, His title "Son of God" must rest on His community of nature with God. And that it did is distinctly declared by Him. On one occasion He said, "I and My Father are one."¹ Those who heard this utterance declared it blasphemous. They understood it to mean that Jesus claimed equality with God. Christ's defence in no way contradicts that interpretation. Wendt, indeed, seeks to show that by His reference to those who were called gods, because unto them the word of God came,² He intends to place Himself in the same class as they, only on a higher level.³ But that is not the case. He does not say of Himself, what He has said of them, that unto Him "the word of God came," but He speaks of Himself as "Him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world."⁴ He contrasts Himself with those referred to not in respect of different degrees, but in respect of different kinds, of privilege and honour. In accordance with this high, unique position, which He claims for Himself, He adds, "the Father is in Me, and I in Him."⁵ This statement He repeats later. In reply to Philip's request, "Shew us the Father," He says, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," and asks, in a tone of disappointment, "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me?"⁶ These utterances point to a union, the closest and most intimate conceivable, a union that is essential in character. Only on the basis of

¹ John x. 30.

² *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. pp. 164, 165.

³ John x. 38.

² John x. 35.

⁴ John x. 36.

⁶ John xiv. 8-10.

such a union could Christ speak of men seeing the Father in Him. Short of this there could only be a revelation of the will of the Father, not a revelation of the Father Himself.

Christ, then, is at once human and divine. He is both the Son of Man and the Son of God. This is what He says of Himself. But a personality so strange and unique demands explanation. It must have come into existence for a special purpose. Extraordinary in nature, it must have an extraordinary mission. Hence the answer to the question, What sayest Thou of Thyself? gives rise to the question, What sayest Thou of Thy work? That He had come into the world to do a certain work, Christ declared once and again. What, then, according to His teaching, was that work? In endeavouring to gain an answer to this question, we must remember the varied and progressive character of His teaching. He did not at once set forth the whole truth concerning His mission, nor did He, even to the close of His life, set it forth with equal explicitness to all to whom He spoke. He found it useful to prepare even His followers for the announcement He had to make, and He always suited His communications to the circumstances of His hearers, making known to them only what they were able to bear. We do not, therefore, deal rightly with the subject if we accept all His statements as of equal value. We must determine their worth as explanations of His work by the time at which, and the circumstances in which, they were made. Further, though His work was one, it was many-sided. This being the case, we must be careful to fix our attention on that which is central.

In this connection, we remember that He instituted a rite, the observance of which was to bring Him and His work vividly before the minds of His followers. Now, in instituting a rite of this kind, He would most assuredly make it suggestive of that which was fundamental and essential. It is inconceivable that one who was imposing on His disciples an ordinance, the aim of which was to keep before

their minds His character and achievement, and, by doing so, to cherish and intensify their devotion to Him and His cause, should select for commemoration what was secondary or subordinate. He would naturally seek to embody in the institution ordained by Him that which He believed to be the strongest claim He had on the esteem and regard of His fellows. On the monument which He was raising for Himself, He would inscribe His highest effort and attainment. The symbol which He selected would be one that was fitted to recall His personality at its highest and His endeavour at its fullest. In the rite instituted by Jesus, then, we have a sure guide to what, in His view, was central in His work. In order, therefore, that we may discover this, we have only to ask what it was that He enshrined in the ordinance which He bade His followers keep in remembrance of Him. To this question only one answer is possible. It was His death that He emphasised in the words of institution. It was His death that was to be showed forth by eating bread and drinking wine. Here, then, we reach the standpoint from which, according to Jesus Himself, we can estimate aright the work which He came to do, and which at the close of His life He declared He had finished. All that He did must be viewed in relation to the final act, and must take its character and value from that relation. That act must be regarded as the consummation toward which everything else was designed to contribute,—as the purpose of His mission to which all else was subsidiary. And this implies that His death was not accidental, but necessary. That is to say, it was not brought about solely by the circumstances in which He found Himself, but formed part of the work given Him to do, so that without it that work would have been incomplete. Had it been an accident, due to the special surroundings within which that work had to be executed, the rite instituted would not have been limited to it in the way it was. It might have been made commemorative of it, but it would have been made commemorative of it in such a fashion as

to suggest that it was accidental, and to indicate what was essential. As it is, what is definitely emphasised by the broken body and shed blood is the fact of dying, and that not as an arrest of activity, or as a defeat of purpose, or as a testimony to the sincerity of Him who died, or as an illustration of the truth taught by Him, but as the culmination and achievement of the mission undertaken by Him, and, consequently, the natural and necessary close of the task assigned to Him as Messiah. The declaration symbolically expressed in the Lord's Supper is, that in the death of Christ the significance of His coming and effort was summed up and disclosed, and that by it the purpose of His coming and effort was attained; that, indeed, without His death His coming and effort would have lacked explanation and completion,—would, in truth, have lacked explanation because lacking completion. For inasmuch as the object of His coming and effort was not an aim external to these, to be pursued and secured by means of and in virtue of them, but an aim internal to them, to be fulfilled in and through them, and to be wrought out by their accomplishment and execution, it could not be truly disclosed till they were completed; their completion, in fact, was its disclosure. By the institution of the Lord's Supper, then, Christ teaches us that His death is an integral part of His work, that in it the thought and principle that were the inspiration and the impulse of His appearance amongst men, and that were operative in His whole activity, found their highest application and embodiment, and that, this being so, it was the final stage of that activity, implied in all that had preceded it, and bringing the movement of which it was the last term to full fruition.

That the death of Christ and the work of Christ are thus essentially related is often denied. By some the connection between them is declared to have been wholly external and accidental. To these the death appears to have been not a help, but a hindrance, to the work; not its consummation, but its interruption; not the goal toward which it must travel, but

an unlooked-for disaster that arrested its advance toward completion. For the death there was no necessity, so far as the performance of the work was concerned; it was due entirely to the hate which the work excited in the breasts of those amongst whom it was being wrought. It was simply a calamity that befell Jesus as a reformer, the fate of the martyr who would rather die than desert his post or betray his cause. That such a view is out of harmony with Christ's procedure in instituting the Lord's Supper has already been indicated. It need not therefore detain us further.

We turn to consider another position that lies midway between those described. According to it, the connection between the death and the work of Christ was not wholly accidental, and yet it was not essential in the full meaning of the term. The death was in a real sense necessary for the completion of the work, so necessary that it may be spoken of as appointed by God; but the necessity for it did not lie in the nature of the work, but in the circumstances amidst which it had to be wrought. This is the position of Wendt, as expounded at length in his *Teaching of Jesus*. His view may be summarised as follows. The task assigned to, and undertaken by, Jesus was the establishment of the kingdom of God; this was to be accomplished by means of "truth-revealing teaching." In the prosecution of His task He met with opposition, which became increasingly bitter and at length threatened Him with death. From this death He felt He dare not shrink. To have done so would have been to deny His calling and His teaching. He had declared that the truth He had come to proclaim demanded, if need be, the surrender of all earthly good and the endurance of suffering, and, such being the case, had He refused to face the pain that confronted Him, He would have belied His own preaching and would have stood discredited before men. But besides this negative consideration, there was a positive. By undergoing death He would not only justify, but would lend force to, what He had said. His death would confirm and carry for-

ward His teaching. He, therefore, submitted to death for the sake of His work. He yielded up His life in the cause of the kingdom of God. Further, because thus coinciding with, and contributing to, the fulfilment of His task, it belonged necessarily to His Messianic calling, and was decreed by God. Not only this, but it was the means of winning the life of blessing for men, and so had a saving significance.¹ Such, in brief, is the theory offered by Wendt of the relation of Christ's death to His work. It is marked by great subtlety and ingenuity, but it either goes too far or it does not go far enough. It is an attempt to find a *via media* between giving the death of Christ the central place in His work and treating it as purely accidental to that work; but, despite the ability which it displays, the attempt must be pronounced unsuccessful. The most cursory glance reveals inconsistencies and contradictions. Features are brought together that are quite incompatible with each other; and in different paragraphs, sometimes in the same paragraph, even in the same sentence, statements are made regarding the significance of Christ's death and its connection with His work, that cannot be harmonised with each other. Let us look a little closely at the theory enunciated, with the view of justifying these criticisms.

The fundamental position is, that the death of Christ was not necessary for the completion of the work of Christ. It is true that it is sometimes spoken of as necessary, but when we examine the passages in which it is so spoken of, we find that the necessity does not relate to the work in itself, but to the special circumstances in which that work had to be performed. We read, *e.g.*, that Jesus, "amid the hardships and conflicts which arise to prevent His carrying out the purpose of salvation for men, is ready to yield up His own life on behalf of the salvation of His people."² It is here plainly stated, that it is because of that, which prevented the carrying out of the

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. sec. iv. ch. iii.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 251, 252.

purpose of salvation, that Christ must yield up His life. His death is not, therefore, necessary for the carrying out of that purpose, taken by itself, but only in view of the hindrances to its carrying out that have arisen, and in order that by these it may not be arrested. Had nothing occurred to prevent the execution of the purpose, the death would not have taken place. In the second clause of the sentence quoted, Christ is spoken of as ready to yield up His life "on behalf of the salvation of His people." The force of the phrase "on behalf of" must, however, be determined by that which precedes. It does not mean that the yielding up of life really formed part of the salvation, but only that it was required and performed in order that the completion of the salvation might become possible. Elsewhere it is said that He yielded up His life "in the cause of the kingdom of God,"¹ and that His death was "for the sake of His Messianic calling."² And all these phrases have the same import. They suggest something apart from, and only incidentally connected with, the undertaking that is being executed. This is very pointedly expressed in the sentence from which the second of these expressions is taken. In it, it is declared that Jesus retained the conviction "that His death, for the sake of His Messianic calling, would not bring detriment, but rather furtherance to the kingdom of God." But if it had been necessary for the work itself, an essential element in that work, there would have been no thought of "detriment," and there would have been thought of more than "furtherance."

Another important passage is the following:—"As Jesus did not regard the external significance and slowness of His success as a discouraging token of the inadequacy and defectiveness of His Messianic activity, but rather as being necessarily conditioned by the nature of the kingdom of God, so also the ignominious death of a criminal to which, at the close of His brief ministry, He was delivered by the hostile

¹ *Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 222.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 223.

leaders of the Jewish people, and which implied from an external mode of view the shipwreck of His pretended Messianic efforts, could be viewed as serviceable to the purpose of the realisation of the kingdom of God on earth, and therefore as necessarily belonging to His Messianic calling, and as tending to stamp it as truly successful.”¹ This statement at once confirms what has just been said as to Wendt’s position, and carries us a step further in our criticism. In it, the death of Christ is brought into line with the slowness of Christ’s success, and both are regarded in the same light. The latter is declared to have “been necessarily conditioned by the nature of the kingdom of God,” while the former is spoken of as “serviceable to the purpose of the realisation of the kingdom,” and “therefore as necessarily belonging to His Messianic calling.” Now, a little examination shows us that there is in these statements ambiguity and confusion of thought and expression. First of all, it is not correct to say, that the slowness of Christ’s success was “necessarily conditioned by the nature of the kingdom of God.” That is at best half the truth. What the slowness of His success was necessarily conditioned by, was the state of the Jews to whom He discoursed of the kingdom of God. Had all been waiting for the consolation of Israel, His success would not have been slow. By Wendt, the necessity for the slowness of Christ’s success is placed within the nature of the kingdom of God, whereas it lies without it. In the succeeding clause, the opposite mistake is committed. What lies within “the purpose of the realisation of the kingdom” is placed without it. The death of Christ is spoken of as “serviceable” to this purpose. But it was more than “serviceable,” it was essential, to it. Its ground did not lie in the opposition that was offered to it by the hostile leaders of the people, but in the nature of the purpose itself. This Wendt seems to admit, for he goes on to speak of it as “necessarily belonging to His Messianic calling.” But when we note the context in which

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. pp. 218, 219.

this sentence stands, we see that it does not carry the meaning which we naturally attach to it. It is because serviceable to it that it necessarily belongs to it and, because necessarily belonging to it that it stamps it with success. Now in what sense can we speak of that which is serviceable to a purpose as necessarily belonging to it? or rather, Can we, in any intelligent sense, speak of that which is serviceable to a purpose as necessarily belonging to it? Strictly speaking, that which is serviceable to a purpose is external to the purpose to which it is serviceable, and does not therefore "necessarily belong" to it. We may, indeed, use the term freely to indicate that which touches the essence of a purpose, and supplies the essential conditions of its success, but, in that case, to say that that which is serviceable necessarily belongs to that to which it is serviceable is tautological and unmeaning. But that this is not the sense which it bears in the present case is evident from the whole tenor of the passage, as well as from the whole drift of the argument of which it forms part.

To take another point. It is said, that the death of Christ, as serviceable and as necessarily belonging to the Messianic calling, "tends to stamp it as truly successful." I confess I am at a loss to know how what is serviceable to a thing can stamp it as successful. The manifestation of that which belongs to a thing may, in a certain sense, be spoken of as stamping it as successful,—though the expression is not very happy,—but only if, by "necessarily belonging to it," we mean forming an essential part or element of it, and, as we have seen, that is not its meaning in the statement under consideration.

But I pass to his statement as to the death of Christ having been decreed by God. It is as follows:—"When He declared the necessity of His sufferings and of His being put to death, He meant not only that His fate was unavoidable in spite of its incompatibility with His Messianic calling, but that it was decreed by God because, on account of the nature

of the kingdom of God which He was to set up, it formed part of His Messianic calling.”¹ This is quite as remarkable a sentence as that just criticised. Christ’s being put to death was declared by God to be necessary; yet it was incompatible with Christ’s Messianic calling; but, though incompatible with His Messianic calling, it was decreed by God, because it formed part of the Messianic calling; and it formed part of the Messianic calling on account of the nature of the kingdom of God. It was thus at once “incompatible with the Messianic calling” and a “part of the Messianic calling!” Of course, an attentive reader of the section knows what is meant by this somewhat perplexing utterance, but it is scarcely too much to say that one who writes in this fashion is not dealing fairly either with his subject or with his readers. The misleading character of the utterance is due to the endeavour to preserve the form of the Scriptural statements while surrendering their spirit. Wendt feels that he must bring the death of Christ into definite relation with His work, but, in order to escape the natural consequence of regarding it as vital to that work, viz. attaching to it a real and efficient saving value, he seeks to show that that relation, while definite, is accidental,—that, since in the course of things it had to be endured, it must have had some effect on the work performed, but that there was no reason in the work itself for its occurrence. This is an untenable position; it admits either too much or too little. According to it, Christ saw that though His death formed no essential part of His Messianic calling, it was inevitable on account of the opposition which He was encountering and which was becoming more keen and malignant day by day, and, in that sense, was necessary; and in connection with this, that, as all things are under the government of God, He has decreed that death, as He has decreed whatever happens, and, in virtue of this decree, it becomes a part of Christ’s Messianic calling. That, at least, is what, reading it in the

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 225.

light of the rest of the discussion, I take it to mean. It is true that the latter part seems to mean more than this. In it we are told that God has decreed the death of Christ because, on account of the nature of the kingdom, "it forms part of the Messianic calling." But we have already discovered that what we are to understand by "the nature of the kingdom" is the state of the people to whom the kingdom was presented; and, when this is observed, the above reading of the passage will seem to be correct. If it be not correct, and we are forced to give the clause, "because on account of the nature of the kingdom He was to set up, it formed part of the Messianic calling," its natural meaning, then the two parts of the sentence will fall apart and stand in open contradiction. In the one, the death will be declared to be necessary, though incompatible with the Messianic calling, necessary, that is to say, because of the opposition roused; and in the other, it will be declared to be necessary, because decreed by God as part of the Messianic calling and as belonging to the nature of the kingdom; and both of these declarations cannot be accepted.

To Christ's death, then, we must direct our attention, with the view of discovering its import and bearing. And, as before, we limit ourselves to Christ's own teaching. Our aim is not to reach a theory of the Atonement, but merely to note the significance of Christ's work for the question we are now discussing; and we speak of His death, because in it the character of that work is most clearly exhibited. Now, there are two points that in this reference stand out distinctly. These are the remission of sin and the communication of life. Both of these Christ associated with, and made dependent on, His death.

We shall deal, first, with Christ's relation of His death to the communication of life to men. We take this first because it bulks much more largely in Christ's utterances than the other. Why it should have done so we shall see later. That He had come to give life to men Christ declared once

and again. His aim was not merely to stir life within them, but to impart life to them. The life which they were to manifest was to be His life communicated to them. This is emphatically declared in the Parable of the True Vine, already referred to. As the branch brings forth fruit in virtue of its participation in the life of the tree, so the disciple does what is right and true in virtue of his participation in the life of the Master. But what is the condition of this communication of life? The answer to this question is furnished by Christ in that pregnant utterance: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."¹ This statement was made in connection with the desire of the Greeks, who had come up to the feast to see Him. That desire carried His mind forward to the spread of His truth and the extension of His kingdom throughout Gentile countries. But the thought of this outward movement pressed upon Him the thought of the suffering that must be endured before it could be initiated. He must "be lifted up" if He were "to draw all men unto Him," and His soul was troubled at the prospect. He experienced a strong temptation to ask the Father to be delivered from that hour, but He overcame that temptation by reflecting that it was for this cause that He had come to that hour. Thus, in the utterance quoted, He suggests the purpose of the death He should die. That was, that the vitality which dwelt in Him should multiply itself, and make itself manifest in a variety of lives. Without death, He declares that this would be impossible, and this was the object of His advent and effort.

On another occasion He said: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. . . . He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, dwelleth in Me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live

¹ John xii. 24.

by the Father; so he that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me." ¹

In these sentences the dependence of men for spiritual life on a close and vital relation to Jesus is asserted. So close and vital is that relation, that it can only be described by saying that men dwell in Him and He dwells in them. And the means by which this relation is formed is eating His flesh and drinking His blood. But how do the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood become possible? They can become possible only by His death. This is not stated in the paragraph under consideration, but it is distinctly implied in it. The words uttered by Christ at this time, like so many others spoken by Him, were to be illumined and interpreted by subsequent events. They contained much more than could be plainly exhibited to those to whom they were addressed. But they were so chosen, that when the events to which they referred took place, their reference to those events could not well be missed. Indeed, the phraseology used by Jesus in His discussion with the Jews is practically the same as that used by Him at the institution of the Supper. In that rite the disciples are invited to eat the bread, which is His broken body, His flesh; and to drink the wine, which is His blood. In the earlier utterance Christ does what He was accustomed to do: He states what is required of men without indicating all that is involved in the meeting of that requirement, or is needful in order that that requirement may even be fully presented. These, the latter especially, could not, from the nature of the case, be explained till the close of the process, the issue of which was to be the creation of the necessary conditions.

By His death, then, Christ was to make the communication of His life to men possible. How exactly His life was, or could be, communicated to men is a question that, however interesting and important, does not concern us meanwhile. What we are seeking to discover is Christ's

¹ John vi. 53-57.

teaching as to the bearing of His death. And what we find is, that He represented that death as the condition on which the communication of His life to men rested. That is the fact stated by Him, and the fact is all that we need for our inquiry.

From Christ's relation of His death to the communication of life to men, we turn to speak of His relation of it to the remission of sin. On this point He made very few definite and explicit statements. There is, however, one that is so clear and distinct as to suffice, even if no other can be found. I refer to the words used by Him at the institution of the Supper. When He gave the cup to His disciples, He said: "This is My blood of the covenant, which is shed for many unto remission of sins."¹ Such is the report that is given by Matthew; and although the latter part of the statement is not included in the other reports we possess, there is no reason for rejecting it as an addition by the Evangelist. Though not occurring in the parallel passages, it is not only harmonious with these, but is involved in them.

Meyer, while maintaining its genuineness, and characterising it as an epexegetis of the words "My blood of the covenant," holds that it is "an explanatory addition introduced into the tradition, and put into the mouth of Jesus."² This opinion he bases on its absence from all the other records. But if it be an epexegetis of the preceding clause, is it not more likely that it would be omitted than that it would be added? As the significance of Christ's death came to be set forth by the apostles, and apprehended by their hearers, the need for an explanatory addition would not be felt. It would be sufficient to employ the main phrase, seeing that its bearing was fully understood. Further, if such an explanatory addition were deemed necessary, we should expect to find it in those reports that were composed for Gentile readers, who were not familiar with the ceremonial

¹ Matt. xxvi. 28 (R.V.).

² Commentary, *in loco*.

law and its numerous rites pointing to the remission of sin. But in these we do not find it. We find it only in that Gospel the motto of which is, "that that which is written might be fulfilled"; only, that is to say, in the writing in which it was least required.

I take the words, then, to have been spoken by Jesus when instituting the Supper. But, even if we were forced to reject them, the bearing of the statement made by Him would not be materially changed, since the blood of the Covenant points to the remission of sin.

Christ, then, brings His death and the remission of sin into the closest possible connection. He indicates plainly that the former is in some way or other the condition of the latter. He speaks of the "blood of the covenant," and of that blood as "shed unto remission of sins." Now, the "blood of the covenant" is that which furnishes what is needful in order that the covenant may exist. It is not an accident or accessory of the covenant; it is essential to it. And it is shed for the "remission of sin"; that is the aim of its shedding. It is not simply to contribute in some subsidiary fashion to this result; it is the objective condition of its attainment. Without it that result would not have emerged. There is thus the most intimate relation between the shedding of His blood and the remission of sin. What precisely that relation is, it does not fall to us to discuss. All that we are concerned to show is that Christ declared the fact of relation, and that He did so is evident from what has been said. That such was the opinion of those to whom the words just considered by us were first addressed, as soon, at least, as they were able calmly to consider them, does not admit of doubt. Their preaching after the day of Pentecost points unmistakably in this direction. In their interpretation of them they had doubtless been guided by the post-resurrection discourses of Christ. In one of these He "said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day: and that repentance

and remission of sins should be preached in His name.”¹ In this declaration He links together His death and the remission of sins. The latter is to be preached “in His name”: in the name of Him who had died and risen again, and therefore in virtue of His death and rising again. Such an utterance would shed light on the words spoken on that memorable evening in the upper chamber, and would make plain to those who heard them their meaning. What, to their minds, that meaning was does not, as I have said, admit of doubt. It may be asserted that they were mistaken in their interpretation. Of this, proof is wanting and will be difficult to find. Until it be forthcoming we must regard the presumption as all the other way. Those who companied with Jesus until the day He was taken up could scarcely be left in error on such a vital point as this. And it cannot be urged that they were prepossessed in favour of this view. If they had been, they would have played a very different part at the crucifixion. But their training and illumination did not cease when their Master was taken up. On the day of Pentecost the Spirit was shed abroad, the Spirit of truth that was to lead them into all truth. The testimony of those who enjoyed such privileges is not to be lightly set aside.

Alongside the words used by Christ at the institution of the Supper we may place those spoken by Him at an earlier period: “The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.”² These two utterances are practically parallel. The phrase, “give His life a ransom for many,” indicates that death was to be the means by which deliverance was to be secured, and this in the sense that by the giving of life those demands were met and those conditions were fulfilled without the meeting and the fulfilment of which deliverance was impossible. While holding this view, I am fully alive to the difficulties which the passage presents, and especially to the difficulties which attach to the term “ransom.” It is clear

¹ Luke xxiv. 46, 47.

² Matt. xx. 28.

that we cannot give to that term a literal application. The analogy must not be pressed by us to the utmost, otherwise we shall run into error. The question is, How far may we carry it? To this question various answers may be given. Hence there is room for difference of opinion. Wendt, *e.g.*, maintains that the analogy is to be taken as suggesting only the fact of deliverance, and not at all the nature of the deliverance referred to, or the means by which that deliverance was accomplished. He says: "If Jesus employs the figure of the ransom on account of this main point, that the ransom is a means of deliverance, He could leave quite out of account the circumstance that a ransom, in human transactions of that kind, stands as the equivalent for the objects or persons to be ransomed, and, in exchange for these, passes over into the possession of the person to whom the payment is made."¹ This, however, is much too narrow an interpretation of the saying, for it leaves out of view all that is characteristic of a ransom. To deal with it in this way is not to deal with it figuratively, as Wendt urges it should be dealt with; it is practically to set it aside altogether. So far as his theory goes, Christ would have said all He desired to say if He had used the term "deliverance" instead of "ransom"; if He had said, "give his life for the deliverance of many." But if this were all He desired to say, why should He have selected such a forcible and vivid word as ransom? To me it appears that the choice of such a word implies that He meant to indicate something specific regarding the deliverance of which He was thinking. The inadequacy of Wendt's reading of the passage comes out clearly when he goes on to explain the deliverance which Christ declares He was to secure for men by His ministry. In explaining that deliverance, he takes as his starting-point the invitation and promise, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 234.

shall find rest for your souls. For My yoke is easy, and My burden is light";¹ and he tells us that, by "the servile relation, from which He declared many would be freed," Christ meant "the condition of oppression by and servitude on account of earthly sufferings, and also specially on account of death."² The deliverance wrought he describes as follows: "By the voluntary God-consecrated sacrifice of His life to sufferings and death, He delivers from their bondage to suffering and death many, namely, all those who will learn of Him; He teaches them by His example to raise themselves inwardly, through pious humility and assurance of salvation, and so to transform death from being a dreaded foe to a means of salvation."³ I confess that I can see no connection between the idea of a ransom and this "inward deliverance from sufferings and death." If this were all that Christ intended to set before His hearers, then the analogy employed by Him, so far from making plain His thought, has obscured it. But it is not all. As I have already said, we must not press the metaphor unduly, but we are bound to give it some value. We do not deal fairly with it if we lay aside all that is peculiar to it, and accept only that which it has in common with others of the same class. To treat Christ's sayings in this fashion would be to lose more than half the truth they were designed to convey. But little reflection is needed to convince us that Wendt's starting-point is mistaken. The passage which he cites, in which Christ calls the weary and heavy laden to Himself, does not really suggest "a servile condition," from which men can be freed by a ransom. It suggests a condition of trial and trouble, of anxiety and toil, and to such a condition the description "servile" does not apply. In it the idea of subjection to a master, who claims full control over us, is certainly not prominent, even if it be implied. Its reference is mainly subjective, whereas "servile" and "ransom" suggest that which is objective.

¹ Matt. xi. 28-30.

² *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 230.

³ *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 231.

There is another saying of Christ which may help us to give to that under consideration its true value. Speaking to the Jews on one occasion, He said, in reply to their indignant protest that they had never been in bondage to any man, "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin."¹ In this utterance we have the description of "a servile condition"; those indicated are servants, and servants of sin. They have come under its control, and they yield obedience to it. That obedience is not congenial or honourable; it is the obedience of slavery, obedience that is compulsory, because those rendering it have sold themselves to him to whom it is rendered. Christ speaks of this state in connection with His offer of freedom. It is true that the freedom of which He speaks is subjective, the freedom of the truth. What that truth is, or what its presentation involves, is not said. Only the fact that the knowledge of it brings freedom is emphasised: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."² In order that the truth may be brought to bear on men, an objective process or movement may be necessary. In any case, we have a distinct declaration that men are in bondage; and with such a condition the idea of a ransom harmonises. Without, then, insisting on every point in the analogy suggested by the term "ransom," we can, by reading the one passage in the light of the other, do full justice to it. Christ, by giving His life for those who are slaves of sin, breaks the power of sin, meets the claim which sin has on the sinner in virtue of his past action, and introduces him to a new condition. All that this includes is not at once apparent, and it does not lie within the scope of our inquiry to exhibit it. It is enough for us to observe that this "giving" by Christ, since it is on behalf of men who are slaves of sin, points to a definite relation between His death and the remission of sin.

So far I have dealt with this passage by itself, with the view of discovering its bearing on the point before us. But we can, and in one respect ought to, deal with it as only a

¹ John viii. 34.

² John viii. 32.

part of Christ's teaching, and as related to that which went before and to that which came after, and, consequently, as revealing its full meaning only when looked at from the point of view of the close and consummation. Now, we have contemplated the close and consummation. We have seen Jesus instituting a rite which was to be a remembrance of Him in the fulness of His character and achievement, and was to be such a remembrance of Him because, in the language of the apostle, it was to be a showing of the Lord's death,¹ and we have heard Him declare that His blood was shed for the remission of sins. Looking back from the standpoint reached, we can see the point and bearing of much that, regarded by itself, would be strange and mysterious. It is so with the statement with which we have just been dealing. If we take back with us to its examination the statement made by Jesus on the night on which He was betrayed, we shall experience no difficulty in understanding it. If His blood was shed for the remission of sins, then giving His life a ransom for many must simply mean, dying in order that men might be freed from the guilt and the power of evil.

The position which I have been maintaining finds support in the following utterance of Christ: "I say unto you, that this that is written must yet be accomplished in Me, And he was reckoned among the transgressors: for the things concerning Me have an end."² Christ here applies to Himself a part of the last verse of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. I do not pause to ask whether or not His statement amounts to a declaration that the words of the prophet were originally spoken of Him, for the answer to that question does not materially affect the point which I wish to bring out. It is sufficient for my present purpose that Christ applies the utterance of the prophet to Himself, and applies it so fully as to say that it must be accomplished in Him. Now, when we seek to estimate the significance of the application of that utterance by Christ to Himself, we are forced to notice that it does not

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 26.

² Luke xxii. 37

stand alone, but forms part of a deliverance that is not only a singularly vivid and graphic description of the character and position and experiences of Him to whom it refers, but is also a unity, the different parts of which cannot with justice be dealt with by themselves. To appropriate one part is, therefore, to appropriate the whole. It would, of course, be quite permissible to quote a sentence or a clause by itself for the purpose of illustration. Such an employment of a part would not imply that the whole bore on the point to be illustrated. But that is not what Christ does. He not only says that the part quoted must be fulfilled in Him, but He speaks of the contents of that part as the things concerning Him, and such statements as these demand something more than illustration; they amount to appropriation.

What, then, is the bearing of the whole statement? It speaks plainly and distinctly of suffering because of transgression, borne by one who was not himself a transgressor, in order that those who were transgressors might escape the result of their transgressions. The immediate context of the clause cited by Christ expresses this thought. "Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his soul unto death: and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."¹ "He bare the sin of many." It was in order that he might do this that he was numbered with the transgressors. So far as he himself was concerned, there was no reason why he should be numbered with the transgressors. He was "righteous": "he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth."² In respect of character, he stood entirely apart from the transgressors. Why, then, was he numbered with them? Such a strange circumstance calls for explanation. And the explanation required lies to our hand. We have only to read on in order to find it. "He bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the trans-

¹ Isa. liii. 12.

² Isa. liii. 9.

gressors"; and he did this at once because, and in spite of, his being numbered with the transgressors. In order that he might do this, he must link himself to the transgressors, but at the same time he must not be a transgressor. Such is the bearing of the verse from which Christ quotes, and that verse does not stand alone; it is in harmony with those that precede it. In them we read, "he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed";¹ "for the transgression of My people was he stricken";² "yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; He put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand":³ "My righteous servant shall justify many; for he shall bear their iniquity."⁴

If, then, we read, as we ought to do, Christ's quotation in the light of the whole prophecy from which it is taken, we reach the same estimate of His death as that which we gained from a consideration of the word used by Him when instituting the Supper. It is true that the remission of sin is not expressly mentioned by the prophet, but it is clearly implied in all that He says. "An offering for sin"; justification by bearing iniquity; "intercession for the transgressors"—all these suggest guilt that needs to be removed, and the connection in which they stand indicates that it is to be removed by the sacrifice of one who is not guilty.

Christ's death, then, according to His own statements, has a twofold bearing. It touches the remission of sin and the communication of life. The former is its negative, the latter its positive, reference. The two are not, therefore, distinct. They are but different phases of one result. The remission of sin is the condition of the communication of life, and the communication of life can come only with the remission of sin. Sin is separation from the author of life, and is, consequently, the loss of life. Only when that

¹ Isa. liii. 5. ² ver. 8. ³ ver. 10. ⁴ ver. 11.

separation is overcome can life be restored, and that separation can be overcome only by the remission of sin. The remission of sin is therefore first in order, though not first in importance. It is really a means to an end, and that end is the possession of life eternal. This thought enables us to appreciate aright some features in Christ's teaching that are at first sight perplexing. It explains, for instance, why it was that Christ spoke less about remission of sin than we might have expected, and why He said so little about the necessity for His death as an atoning sacrifice. This does not mean that He regarded the remission of sin as a point of little importance, or that He did not contemplate a sacrificial act as necessary in order that that remission might be effectual amongst men. It only meant that He sought to stir within men right feelings and desires, by presenting to them that which is ideal and fundamental, knowing well that, if He succeeded in this, that which is intermediate and which pertains to their special necessities would, in the light of what had been apprehended, stand out clear and distinct. Could He convince them that life eternal is essential for spiritual satisfaction and peace, and awaken within them a desire for its possession in order that these might be enjoyed, He would really do all that was requisite. For this conviction and this desire involve considerations that point beyond their immediate reference, and that necessarily force themselves upon those who experience them. They imply that men are not what they ought to be. The conviction is a conviction not merely of need, but of need because of failure; and the desire is a desire not merely for that which is not yet possessed, but for that which has been lost. The conviction thus issues in penitence, in acknowledgment of error in thought and action; and the desire has a reference to the past as well as to the present and the future. In other words, they involve a sense of sin and a longing for its remission. And those who experience them accept with

joy the salvation provided in and by Him who has come a propitiation for sin.

In this connection, we have also to remember that Christ spoke to a people who had undergone preliminary training and discipline, and that He addressed Himself to them in terms suitable to their circumstances. It was not necessary for Him to set before them the fact of sin, or the need for the remission of sin, or the relation between the remission of sin and sacrifice. These points were all fully presented in the Law, which had been given to Israel at the beginning of its history, and had been confirmed and expanded throughout that history. What was needful was, to convince them that He was the Messiah "of whom Moses in the Law and the prophets did write."¹ Could He produce that conviction, the nature and bearing of His work would be at once apprehended. He would be regarded in the light of Old Testament utterances and events, of the Temple with its services and offerings, of the types and prophecies that had pointed on to Him and were waiting fulfilment in Him. On this He concentrated His effort in His dealing with the Jews. In different ways, and along different lines, He sought to bring them to a right understanding of their position as members of the chosen race, that they might discern the obligations resting on them, might realise their need as disclosed by the Law, and might thus hail Him with joy. To the disciples whom He joined on the way to Emmaus He said, "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken: Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?" and having said this, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself."² His utterances and His procedure on this occasion plainly indicate what He expected from the Jewish people, and what the direction was in which He laboured. He expected that, having listened to Moses and

¹ John i. 45.

² Luke xxiv. 25-27.

the Prophets, they would be prepared to receive Him, but in this He was disappointed: "He came unto His own, and His own received Him not."¹ They had not understood that which had been spoken concerning Him, and consequently they did not recognise Him when He stood before them. He, therefore, sought to make plain to them the meaning of their own Scriptures, that through them they might be led to discern His nature and mission: "Search the scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life: and they are they that testify of Me."²

When we thus consider all the circumstances, we find no occasion for surprise in the fact that Christ devoted so little of His time and teaching to the explicit treatment of the remission of sin and the relation of His death thereto. This was in harmony with the conditions within which He wrought. These brought Him face to face with a larger question, and in dealing with that larger question He was dealing with all that it embraced. The greater included the less. In endeavouring to convince His hearers that He was the Messiah, the Consolation of Israel to whom all their past pointed, He was endeavouring to set them at the point of view from which His effort might be rightly apprehended and fully appreciated.

The thought which I am presenting explains also why, in the institution of the Supper, Christ speaks only of the remission of sin. In His earlier reference to the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood, He spoke only of life. Clearly His point of view is different in the two cases. In the one, He is thinking of the final issue, of the fundamental need of men, and He teaches His disciples that that is to be met by the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood, whereby life would be imparted to them. In the other, He is thinking of the proximate issue, of the need of men springing from their abnormal condition, and He teaches them that that is to be met by His broken body and shed

¹ John i. 11.

² John v. 39.

blood, inasmuch as these are effectual for the remission of sin. That is to say, when face to face with the event, He does not speak in general terms of the end which it will serve, but He points definitely to that which has rendered it necessary,—brings out distinctly the fact that it was called for by the existence and effects of sin in men, and that its first result is the removal of these effects, the sweeping away of the obstacles that hindered the outflow to men, and the reception by men, of the divine life. While the two statements are thus different, they are in perfect harmony with each other, complementary and not contradictory.

We have now seen what answers Christ gives to the two questions, *What sayest Thou of Thyself?* and, *What sayest Thou of Thy work?* He tells us that He is at once divine and human, and that His work was to secure for men the remission of sin and the enjoyment of life. Of this work, His death was an essential element. Without that death the remission of sin would not have been gained, and without the remission of sin, life would not have been enjoyed. Thus, in His death, we have the point of view whence the several parts and phases of His activity can be rightly seen and truly understood.

Having thus learned what Christ was and what He did, we must inquire what light His personality and work shed on the problem which we are seeking to solve. Do they testify to a close relation between morality and religion, and, if so, what precisely is the nature and extent of that relation? These are questions which may be answered in a few words. We have already seen that Christ's teaching as to the need of men points to an intimate relation between these two spheres of human effort, giving to religion the chief place, as that which is central and fundamental, but at the same time emphasising the necessary manifestation of religion in the form of morality within the visible sphere. And it is apparent that Christ's personality and work are in harmony with His teaching as to the need of men. He taught that

men must repent, must be born again, must manifest spiritual life, and, with a view to these, must exercise faith. And we have discovered that Christ's work points in these very directions. It speaks of the remission of sin, which is but the other side of repentance, and of the communication of life, which is the ground of the new birth; and as that work rested on His personality, and was its natural, we might almost say, necessary outcome, a fitting object is presented for faith. But if the teaching and the personality and work are in absolute agreement, they must give the same deliverance on the subject under investigation. Apart therefore from special examination we can decide the point raised.

But it may be well to look specially at the personality and the work. As to the former, we have learned that Christ was both human and divine. This means that, being divine, He became human. The divinity, that is, must have been first. A divine being may become human, but a human being cannot become divine. And the becoming human of this Divine One had as its aim, the rendering of help to those who were human. The help to be rendered must, therefore, have been moral as well as religious; it must have had a human as well as a divine side; it must have touched man in his earthly as well as his heavenly relations. Had it only had a religious reference, then the Incarnation, at least the kind of Incarnation of which the New Testament speaks, would not have been necessary. Were it possible, that is to say, to separate man's relation to God from man's relation to his present surroundings, it would be possible to adjust his relations to God when disturbed by a movement that lay entirely outside his relations to his present surroundings. In other words, could we confine religion to acts of worship, to the observance of rites and ceremonies, to communion with God, to that which lies within the purely spiritual sphere, then failure to meet its claims would not need an incarnation issuing in a life of pain and suffering and a death of agony and shame in order that the effects

of that failure might be overcome. It is just because we cannot make the distinction alluded to that Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh, and His coming in that likeness showed that, while religious, the help which He rendered was also moral in character.

On the other hand, if that help had been only moral in reference, if, that is to say, man's relations to his fellow-men and to his surroundings were distinct from his relation to God, so that the disturbance of the former did not affect the latter, an Incarnation would not have been demanded. There would have been no call for a Divine Being to become human. One belonging to the human sphere, keenly alive to its requirements, with a deep insight into its nature and a passionate devotion to its maintenance, and possessing power and authority, would have been able to redress wrongs and work reformation. Thus the personality of Christ, as at once human and divine, testifies to the close and intimate relation between these two spheres, a relation so close and intimate that He who exercises influence in the one necessarily exercises influence in the other. And what is true of His personality is true of His work. That, as consummated in His death, had for its aim the remission of sin and the communication of life. The remission of sin has both a moral and a religious side. It has a moral side because the sin remitted has been committed within the visible sphere, and it has a religious side because, although committed within the visible sphere, it has been committed against God. So is it with the life communicated. That is spiritual life, but it is spiritual life that is transmitted by a human medium. As spiritual, it is to quicken the heart, but the quickening of the heart is to take form in character and conduct. He who is our Life is also our Example. He seeks to renew and revive us that, sharing in the vitality, the communication of which was the aim of His coming and death, we might walk as He did, worshipping God in spirit and in truth, and filling rightly our place in the world;

loving the Lord with all our heart and soul and strength and mind, and our neighbour as ourselves.

I have thus, very imperfectly, as I am keenly conscious, dealt with the question selected as the subject of this course of Lectures. In accordance with the plan sketched at the outset, I began by subjecting morality and religion to critical examination, with the view of determining their nature and bearing, and of thus gaining the means necessary for discovering in what way they are related to each other. The issue of that examination was the discovery, first, that morality implies the existence and influence, if not the definite recognition, of a power or principle underlying and affecting the system of which men are members, and within which they are to play their part, and that, consequently, it has a religious basis; and, second, that religion is the response of the whole being to Him who is not only the Highest and Best, but the Source and Governor of all that is, and must therefore influence those who manifest it in their every attitude and activity, and that, consequently, it has a moral issue. On the ground of these conclusions and in the light of the discussions that led to them, I endeavoured to trace the lines of connection, and to note the points of distinction, between the moral and the religious elements in human life. The distinction, we saw, rests on and is explained by the connection. Morality is not separate from, but is subordinate to religion. It is religion applied to the present sphere, whereby the meaning and claims of that sphere are rightly apprehended and duly honoured. The world within which morality obtains is dependent on God, and the dependence of the world on God implies a right relation to God on the part of those who treat it aright and meet wisely its demands. Such a relation is required not only for guidance, but also for impulse. Sense of obligation, and stimulus to its discharge, spring from sense of relation and surrender thereto. But sense of relation to the several parts and members of the

system in which we are embraced, results from sense of relation to that which is the ground and essence of the system,—is, indeed, but one of its references. And as the ground and essence of the system is God, the realisation of our relation to God carries with it, and is necessary for, the realisation of our relation to the world. Surrender to Him by whom and through whom and to whom are all things results in, and is essential to, right relation to our surroundings. Morality is thus dependent on religion, and religion expresses itself in morality. But religion is not exhausted in morality. It transcends it, rising into the purely spiritual region and lifting its subjects into the presence of the Great Spirit, that with Him, who has made them for Himself, they may have free and full communion. The outcome of our inquiry, conducted on broad, general lines, we have found to be in harmony with the teaching and work of Him who is the Truth. Christ emphasised and inculcated morality, but in doing so He based it on religion. He honoured it and invested it with highest value not by claiming for it independence, but by insisting on its religious significance. And while bringing morality into connection with religion, He brought religion into connection with morality, constraining those to whom He appealed to recognise its practical reference and import.

The subject we have been considering is of the utmost importance. It does not possess a merely speculative interest and value; it touches that which is vital to men as rational beings. To establish and define the relation between morality and religion is to justify and enforce the claims which they prefer and the appeals which they make,—is, indeed, necessary if they are to gain and to maintain a hold on human life and activity. They cannot be separated from each other without mutual loss and injury. Divorced from morality, religion will become a sickly sentimentalism or a fitful superstition, from which keen, healthy, virile natures will turn with contempt as a caricature or a delusion.

Divorced from religion, morality will become a calculating prudence whose only principle is self-interest, or a fickle expediency whose only law is opportunity, which will debase instead of elevating men. If religion is to win and to retain the regard of men, it must appeal to and influence them as rational beings in the fulness of their nature, raising them above the world, indeed, but, doing so that, by bringing them into union with Him of whom the world is a manifestation, it may fit them for filling their place in it, using it and not abusing it. And if morality is to exercise authority and secure respect and obedience, it must justify itself at the bar of reason, and this it can do only if it prove itself the expression of fundamental and eternal principles, principles that, while embodied in a visible system of manifold relations, have their root in the invisible Will and Thought that are the ground and source of all existence. To show that religion and morality meet the demands made upon them is thus a work of profound and far-reaching significance, and it is toward the performance of this work that I have sought to contribute in these Lectures. The treatment of the special point contemplated has been inadequate, but happily the conclusion stands, for it rests on that divine word which is its own argument, commending itself to every man's conscience. "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God."¹ "Without faith it is impossible to please God."² "Faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone." "Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect?"³

¹ Micah vi. 8.² Heb. xi. 6.³ James ii. 17, 22.

GENERAL INDEX

- ACTION**, moral, definition of, 10, 274.
- Adoration, its nature, 166; in Religions of India, 209 *seq.*; in Mohammedanism, 220 *seq.*
- Aim, distinguished from motive, 21-3.
- Almsgiving, Christ's view of, 369.
- Arnold Matthew, his definition of religion, 266.
- Aspiration, its nature, 166; implies self-surrender, 168; in Religions of India, 209 *seq.*; in Mohammedanism, 220 *seq.*
- Awe, analysis of, 187.
- "BACK to Christ," the cry, examined, 321 *seq.*
- Barth, quoted, 192, 197, 199, 202.
- Brahmanism, its creed, 193; place of sacrifice in, 197; illustrative of religious sentiment, 203-6.
- Bruce, Professor A. B., on Kingdom of God, 333, 341.
- Buddhism, its creed, 193; no place for worship in, 199; illustrative of religious sentiment, 206-10.
- CAIRD**, Principal, on self-consciousness, 17.
- Caird, Professor, on Evolution, 127-37; on the Evolution of Religion, 137-46.
- Candlish, Professor J. S., on Kingdom of God, 333, 351.
- Christianity, religious sentiment at highest in, 150.
- "Christianity of Christ," demand for considered, 321 *seq.*
- Christ, life of, illustrative of teaching, 396; love of God by, 397; love of man by, 398; personality of, 420, 448; as Son of God and Son of Man, 421; work of, 423, 448-9; death of, central feature of work, 423, communicative of life to man, 432, ground of remission of sin, 435; as ransom, 437.
- Code, moral, authority required for, 274 *seq.*
- Comparative Method of Study of Religion, 125.
- Conduct, definition of, 5, 12, 43; character of, determined by motive of, 7.
- Creed, religion as, 102; its relation to ritual and sentiment, 103-6.
- DEVELOPMENT.** *See* Evolution.
- Dread, analysed and contrasted with reverence, 153 *seq.*
- EMOTION** in morality and religion, 266.
- Ethical Monotheism, examined, 310 *seq.*
- Evolution, Professor Caird's view of, examined, 127-37; its application to religion, 137-46.
Social, Fiske's statement of, examined, 78-98.
- Experience, conditions of, 111.
- FAITH**, nature of, 408; relation of, to repentance, 410; relation of, to new birth, 412; issue of, moral and religious, 414.
- Fatherhood, idea of, 379.
- Fatherhood and kingship, their historical connection, 338.

- Fatherhood of God, as taught by Christ, 337, 380.
- Fear, expressed in worship, 152; two senses of, dread and reverence, 153-64.
- Fiske, on Social Evolution, 78-84; criticism of his theory, 84-98.
- Freedom and obligation, 50.
- Freedom of determination and of realisation, 53-62.
- GIBBON, quoted, 213.
- God, only true object of reverence, 165; relation of, to the world, 239, 277 *seq.*; Is He a moral Being? 308; more than a Lawgiver, 303, 314; self-determination of, 314-7; relation of, to Israel, 373.
- Green on motive, 22; on self-consciousness, 29 *seq.*
- Gospel, Fourth, authorship of, 352.
- HISTORICAL Method of Study of Religion, 124.
- IDEAL. *See* Moral ideal.
- Incarnation of Christ, necessity for, 400, 448.
- Individuality of man emphasised by Christ, 361.
- "KINGDOM of God," examined and defined, 333 *seq.*; inadequate category of Christ's life and teaching, 337, 360-2; incompatible with Fatherhood of God, 337-41, and with salvation, 341-50; use of, by Christ, not habitual, 351-7, and not uniform, 357-60.
- Kuenen, quoted, 220, 226.
- LEGALITY and Morality distinguished, 8.
- Lord's Supper in reference to Christ's death, 423.
- MACKENZIE, J. S., quoted, 12.
- Man, need of, restoration and attainment, 402.
- Martineau, quoted, 12.
- Metaphysics and science, relation of, 249 *seq.*; analogy between religion and morality and, 251 *seq.*
- Meyer, on Matt. xxvi. 28, 435.
- Mohammedanism, its history, 211; articles of faith, 213; religious duties, 216; chief sects, 217; illustrative of religious sentiment, 220-8.
- Monotheism, Ethical, examined, 310.
- Morality, different meanings of, 5; distinguished from legality, 8; has religious basis, 100, 274 *seq.*; possibility of advance on religion, 263; inadequate without religion, 366.
- Morality and religion, relation of, 229 *seq.*; their connection, 230; grounds of, 244; their distinction, 232; grounds of, 245; analogy of relation between science and metaphysics and, 251 *seq.*
- Moral code, authority required for, 274 *seq.*
- Moral ideal, necessity for, 48; involves obligation and freedom, 49; its character, 71; its source, 71-8, 288 *seq.*
- Motive, nature and genesis of, 12; distinguished from aim, 21.
- Muirhead on resolutions, 11; on motive, 22.
- Müller, Max, on Science of Religion, 117; his views examined, 117-27.
- NEW BIRTH, the, nature of, 405; relation of, to faith, 412.
- OBLIGATION, moral, 49.
- Oldenberg, quoted, 193 *seq.*
- "Ought," analysis of term, 55; of means and of end, 64.
- RELIGION, different senses of term, 101; primarily individual experience, 145; has moral issue, 175, 298, but more than moral reference and value, 300-6, 317; inadequate without morality, 369 *seq.*; relation of, to morality, *see* Morality and Religion.
- Religious sentiment, analysis of, 102-15; diversity of manifestations, 190 *seq.*
- Repentance, meaning of, 403; relation of, to faith, 410.

- Resolutions, moral value of, 11.
 Restoration, need of, for man, 402.
 Reverence, expressed in worship, 153 *seq.*; contrasted with dread, 153, 186; includes adoration and aspiration, 166; essence of religion, 188.
 Rich young man and Christ, 366 *seq.*
 Ritual, religion as, 101; its relation to creed and sentiment, 103-6.
- SALVATION, recovery of "the lost," 341; forgiveness of "the condemned," 345; involves sacrifice, 347.
 Saussaye, De la, quoted, 192, 196, 197, 212, 217.
 Seeley, Professor, his definition of religion, 165.
 Schleiermacher, his definition of religion, 171.
 Science and Metaphysics, relation of, 249 *seq.*; analogy between morality and religion and, 251 *seq.*
 Self-consciousness, analysis of, 24; its theoretical and practical reference, 26.
 Self-determination, self-satisfaction, self-realisation, defined and distinguished, 37.
 Self, the, social in nature, 70.
 Self-surrender, analysis of, 169 *seq.*; voluntary, 169; not an end but a means, 174.
 Sentiment. *See* Religious sentiment.
 Sin, different aspects of, 305.
 Standard, moral, required for self-determination, 44; an ideal, 48.
- TRUTH, its significance as used by Christ, 415.
- VEDISM, its creed, 191; place of sacrifice in, 196; illustrative of religious sentiment, 200-3.
- WELLHAUSEN, quoted, 215.
 Wendt, on Kingdom of God, 333, 352, 356; on Fatherhood of God, 380; on Christ as Son of God, 421; on death of Christ, 426-32, 438.
 Williams, Monier, quoted, 192, 198.
 World, relation of, to God, 239, 279 *seq.*
 Worship, essence of, 152.

INDEX OF TEXTS

TEXT	EXODUS	PAGE	TEXT	LUKE	PAGE
xxxiv. 6		373	ii. 41-52		398
	ISAIAH		iii. 11-14		404
i. 2		344	xix. 8		405
xlili. 4		345	xix. 10		341
liii. 9, 12		442	xxii. 37		441
liii. 5, 8, 10, 11		443	xxiv. 25, 27		445
	MICAH		xxiv. 46, 47		437
vi. 8		452	xxiv. 49		327
	MATTHEW			JOHN	
v. 3		359	i. 11		446
v. 23, 24		369	i. 12		400
v. 44, 45		379	i. 17		397
vi. 1-4		369	i. 45		445
vi. 24		365	iii. 3		405
ix. 5		409	iii. 16	347,	412
xi. 23-30		439	iii. 21		418
xiii. 33		358	v. 24		412
xiii. 44-46		359	v. 39		446
xiii. 58		408	vi. 38		401
xvi. 25		342	vi. 53-57		434
xix. 16		366	viii. 32	416,	440
xx. 28	347, 437		viii. 34		440
xxv.	382 <i>seq.</i>		viii. 46		401
xxvi. 28 (R. V.)	435		x. 30	413,	422
xxviii. 20	327		x. 35, 36, 38		422
	MARK		xii. 24		433
i. 14, 15	403, 411		xiv. 6		418
vi. 5, 6	408		xiv. 8-10		422
xii. 28-34	371		xiv. 27		400
			xv. 4		419
			xv. 11		400
			xvii. 17		416
			xvii. 23		354

INDEX OF TEXTS

ACTS		PAGE	HEBREWS		PAGE
TEXT			TEXT		
i. 1		328	vii. 26		401
			x. 27		346
	1ST CORINTHIANS		xi. 6		452
xi. 26		441	xiii. 8		324
	EPHESIANS			JAMES	
ii. 1		412	ii. 17, 22		452
iv. 18		412			
				1ST JOHN	
	COLOSSIANS		iv. 18		161
iii. 9, 10		410			

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