OU_164740

THE
MUJADDID'S CONCEPTION
OF TAWHID

Imam-i-Rabbani Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thani
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's Conception of Tawhid

OR

THE MUJADDID'S
CONCEPTION OF TAWHID

By

BURHAN AHMAD FARUQI, M A, Ph.D
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh

With a foreword by

SYED ZAFARUL HASAN
M A (Alig), D Phil (Oxon), Dr Phil (Erl)

☆

SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
KASHMIRI BAZAR   -   LAHORE (INDIA)

Dedicated
to
my revered teacher
Dr. Syed Zafarul Hasan
who watched my life with paternal concern
and
at whose feet I learnt to understand
the fundamental problems
in
Philosophy and Religion

FOREWORD

IN this treatise Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi has
drawn our attention to a central point of reli-
gion, mysticism and philosophy.   شیخ اکبر affirmed
وحدت وجود which thereby became a widely accepted
doctrine amongst Islamic sufis.   شیخ مجدد firmly
and solemnly denied it, and persisted in his denial
throughout his career; and he based his denial,
not on extraneous considerations, but on mystic
experience itself.   Dr. Burhan has formulated and
clarified the issue between these two great mystics
with a care and perspicuity which deserves
praise; and he has brought religion and philoso-
phy to bear on it.   In this connection his dis-
course on the distinction of Religious Conscious-
ness from mystic consciousness and speculative
consciousness is indeed illuminating; while the
logic of his contention and the cogency of his
arguments seem to leave little to desire.   Now

after the relapse of Islamic mysticism again into وحدت وجود, it was high time that an earnest study of this kind should have been undertaken and pursued with the thoroughness characteristic of Dr. Burhan Ahmad's work. .

Another conspicuous service of Dr. Burhan Ahmad's book is that it has brought the great Mujaddid and his far-reaching movement within the purview of western orientalists. Certainly it is most interesting to note how deeply has this unique personality influenced the nerve of Islamic thought, specially in India. throughout the last three and a half centuries. The inquiry if pursued further and still more in detail will, I believe, repay the time and labour bestowed upon it.

It has been my privilege to watch the growth of this valuable treatise at every stage of its development. I can confidently recommend it to all Muslim scholars and western orientalists for sympathetic study and careful scrutiny.

Aligarh   S. Z. HASAN
30-9-40

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AM = 'Awn-ul-Ma'būd fi Sharḥ Abū Dāūd (Ar.), by Mawlwī
       Shamsul Ḥaq of Patna, Anṣārī Press, Delhi, 1323 A H.
At. = 'Abaqāt (Ar.), by Mawlwī Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, (undated).
DB. = Damagh-ul-Bāṭil (Per), by Shāh Rafī'-uddīn, MS. No. 1699,
       Oriental Library, Bankipur.
Ep   = Epistle
FH. = Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam (Ar), by Ibn 'Arabī, MS.
FM. = Futuhāt Makkīyya (Ar), by Ibn 'Arabī, Darul-Kutub al-
       'Arabia, Egypt, 1329 A.H.
FW. = Fayṣalat-u-Waḥadat-ul-wujūd-wa-sh-shuhūd (Ar.), by Shāh
       Walī-Ullah, Aḥmadī Press, Delhi, 1324 A.H.
HQ. = Urdu Translation of Khwāja Badr-uddīn's Ḥaḍrāt-ul-Quds,
       Islamia Steam Press, Lahore, 1341 A.H.
IK. = 'Ilm-ul-Kitāb (Per.), by Khwāja Mīr Dard, Anṣārī Press
       Delhi, 1308 A H.
KH. = Kalimat-ul-Haqq (Per), by Mawlwī Ghulām Yaḥyā, MS
       Shefta Collection, Lytton Library, M. U., Aligarh.
KhA. = Khazīnat-ul-Āṣfīya (Per), by Ghulām Sarwar Lāhawrī,
       Thamar-i-Hind Press, Lucknow, 1290 A.H.
M.   = Maktūbāt-i-Imām-i-Rabbānī (Per.), by Shaikh Aḥmad
       Sirhindī, edited by M Nūr Aḥmad, printed at Amritsar,
       1334 A H.
MM. = Mabda-o-Ma'ād (Per.), by Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī,
       Mujaddidī Press, Amritsar, 1330 A H.

MT   = Muntakhab-ul-Tawārīkh (Per), by Mullā 'Abdul Qādir
         Badāyūnī, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1865 A.D.

MtM. = Maqāmāt-i-Mazharī (Per), by Shāh Ghulām 'Alī, Mujtabāi
         Press, Delhi, 1309 A.H

NA   = Nāla-i-'Andalīb (Per), by Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir 'Andalīb,
         Shāhjahānī Press, Bhūpāl, 1310 A.H

Q   = Qur-ān   Anjuman-i-Himāyat-i-Islam   edition,   Lahore,
         1354 A H

RQ   = Urdu Translation of Khwāja Kamāl-uddīn's Raudat-ul-
         Qayyūmiyya, Civil Steam Press, Lahore (undated).

SA   = Sawāniḥ Aḥmadī, by Ja'far 'Alī, Sūfī Publishing Co Pindi
         Bahā-uddīn, Steam Press, Lahore (undated).

SM   = Sirāt-i-Mustaqīm (Per), by Mawlwī Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd.
         Mujtabāi Press, Delhi, 1322 A.H

ShF   = Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam (Ar.), by 'Abdur Razzāq al-
         Qāshānī, Maymaniyya Press, Egypt, 1321 A H

TA   = Tadhkirat-ul-Awliyā (Per), by Farīd-uddīn 'Attār, Mujtabāi
         Press, Delhi, 1305 A H.

TtA   = Taṣānīf-i-Ahmadiyya (Urdu), by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān,
         Aligarh Institute Press, Aligarh, 1300 A.H

TJ   = Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī (Per), by Mirzā Hādī, edited by Sir
         Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, his private Press, Aligarh, 1281 A H.

ZM   = Zubdat-ul-Maqāmāt (Per), by Khwāja Muḥammad Hāshim,
         Maḥmūd Press, Lucknow, 1310 A H.

PRELIMINARY

THIS dissertation is an attempt to work out the conception of Tawḥīd in the thought of that great Islamic mystic, viz., Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, who is generally called the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī [1] (the

---

[1] The word Mujaddid can be translated as the Reformer, the Regenerator, or the Renewer. I prefer Renewer.

The idea of Mujaddid has its origin in the ḥadīth:

ان الله يبعث فى هذه الامة على رأس كل مائة سنة من
يجدد لها امر دينها -

"God will, on the eve of every century, raise a person in this nation (Islām) who would renew the religion": Abū Dāūd (202-275 A.H.). It is maintained that many persons have accordingly been the Mujaddids of their centuries, e.g., 'Umar b. 'Abdul 'Azīz (d. 101 A.H.)—First Century; Imām Shāfi'ī Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 204 A.H.)—Second Century; Ibn Suraij (d. 306 A.H.)—Third Century; Imām Bāqillānī Muḥammad b. Ṭayyab (d. 403 A.H.) or Imām Asfrāyyinī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad (d. 406 A.H.)—Fourth Century; Imām Ghazzālī (d. 505 A.H.)—Fifth Century; Imām Fakhruddīn Rāzī (d. 606

1

Renewer of Islām on the Head of the second thousand of the Islamic Era). The Shaikh himself had the inspired belief that he was a Mujaddid.[1]

A.H.)—Sıxth Century; Ibn Daqīq Al'īd Muḥammad b. 'Alī (d. 702 A.H.)—Seventh Century, Imām Bulqīnī Sırājuddīn (d. 905 A H)—Eighth Century; Jalāluddīn al-Suyūṭı (d. 911 A.H.)—Ninth Century, and others of the subsequent centuries. (*Cf* AM., Vol. IV, p. 181).   However, ıt ıs noteworthy that only Shaıkh Aḥmad has claimed the dıgnıty of the Mujaddıd-ı-Alf-ı-Thani for hımself.

Khwāja Kamāluddīn Muḥammad Aḥsān has quoted two ḥadīthes ın روضة القیومیه :

(١) یبعث رجل عـلی احد عشر مائة سنة هو نور عظیم اسمه
اسمی بین السلاطین الجابرین یدخـل الجنة بشفاعته رجال
الوفا (حامع‌الدرر)

"A man will arıse at the beginning of the 11th century, who will be a great light and whose name will be the same as mıne , (he will arise) amıdst tyrant kıngs; thousands of men will enter Paradıse through hıs ıntercession."

(٢) یکون رجـلا فی امتی یقال لـه صلة یدخل الجنة
بشفاعته کذا و کذا (جمع الجوامع)

" There will be a man ın my nation who will be called a ' conjoıner,' through whose ıntercession there will enter Paradıse so-and-so."

It ıs believed that these predictions were made about Shaıkh Aḥmad   (See RQ., Part I, pp. 37-38.)

    [1] The Mujaddid keenly realises the need of a great Reformer

It was Mullā 'Abdul Ḥakīm of Sialkot (d. 1067 A.H.), the most illustrious scholar of the day and the <u>Shaikh</u>-al-Islām of India, who was the first to apply to <u>Shaikh</u> Aḥmad the epithet of Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-<u>Thānī</u>.[1] Indeed all the divines and mystics of eminence have acknowledged him as such. For example, <u>Sh</u>āh Walī-Ullah[2] and his son <u>Sh</u>āh 'Abdul

in a letter to his son <u>Kh</u>wāja Muḥammad Ṣādiq (1000-1025 A.H.). See M., Vol I, Ep. 234. Further he expressly claims for himself the dignity of Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-<u>Th</u>ānī. See M , Vol. II, Ep. 4. Again writing to his son, <u>Kh</u>wāja Muḥammad Ma'ṣūm (1009-1079 A.H.) he says:

الحمد لله الذى جعلنى صلة بين البحرين و مصلحا بين الفيئتين

"Praise be to Allah who created me a conjoiner between two oceans and a pacifier between two parties. (See M , Vol. II, Ep. 6.). The reference is perhaps to the last Ḥadī<u>th</u> in the preceding note

[1] KA , Vol. I, p. 614.

[2] <u>Sh</u>āh Walī-Ullah (1114-1176 A.H.). He was the most eminent divine of his age, and a mystic too. He belonged to the Mujaddidī Naq<u>sh</u>bandī School. He acquired mystic discipline from his father, <u>Sh</u>āh 'Abdur Raḥīm, and is said to be the 'Mujaddid' of his time. He is the founder of a school in Ḥadī<u>th</u> and Tafsīr. He translated the Qur-ān into Persian and is the author of many famous works on Ḥadī<u>th</u>, Theology and Mysticism.

'Azīz,[1] among a host of others, always speak of him as Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī. The latter is also reported to have said that amongst the mystics of Islām, Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir Jīlānī (470-560 A.H.) and Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī are the two greatest, only he could not decide which was the greater of the two.

- Shaikh Ahmad is the first and the greatest among the mystics of Islām who expressly and strenuously opposed the Pantheistic conception of Tawhīd known as Wahdat-i-Wujūd[2] or Tawhīd-i-Wujūdī. This conception had become almost universal amongst Muslim

---

[1] Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz (1159-1248 A.H.) was the eldest son of Shāh Walī-Ullāh. He was the most celebrated scholar of his day and universally respected like his father. He taught Hadīth to the famous mystic Shāh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwī, and also initiated him into the Naqshbandī School. He wrote many works on Kalām and Hadīth.

[2] Wahdat-i-Wujūd (وحدت وجود) or Tawhīd-i-Wujūdī (توحيد وجودى) is unity of Being. It is the doctrine of very many mystics in Islām. The exact equivalent would be Unityism—that is, existent is one. This soon becomes Identyism—that it is identical with everything else, which in the end passes on to pantheism,—that it is God and God is all. It

mystics, specially since Ibn 'Arabī[1] who wrote
on it extensively and has had enormous influ-
ence on the subsequent thought of Islām,
and gave it a strenuous push forward.

Now the opposition of Shaikh Aḥmad to
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd is based not on theological
dogma or philosophical argument, but on
Kashf[2] or direct religious experience. Con-

is also called Wujūdiyyat. Hence Wujūdiyyīn or Sufiya-i-
Wujūdiyya or Mawaḥidīn are those who believe in Unityism.

[1] Ibn 'Arabī, Muḥayyuddīn (560-638 A.H.) was a mystic of
great eminence. He is generally styled as Shaikh-i-Akbar,
the Greatest Shaikh. He was born at Murcia in Spain, but he
shifted to Seville which he made his home for thirty years.
In 598 A H he set out for the East from where he never
returned home. He visited Mecca and Mosul. His fame went
with him everywhere. Finally he settled down in Damascus
where he died in 638 A.H. He belonged to the Ẓāhirī School,
but rejected Taqlīd in doctrinal matters. Ibn 'Arabī's sole
guide was inner light with which he believed himself illuminated
in a special way. He is said to be the author of as many as 400
books. The most famous of his works are Futūḥat-i-Makkiyya
and Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam. In the latter he has discussed the
pantheistic conception of Tawḥīd at length. He was denounced
as Zindīq in Egypt, and there was a move to assassinate him.
Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A.H.), one of the greatest divines n
Islām, criticised Ibn 'Arabī unreservedly.

[2] Kashf (كشف) : Literally means unveiling ; it is apprehen-

sequently it gave rise to burning controver-
sies among mystics. Many scholars and
mystics of eminence took exception to his
position while others emphatically affirmed
it. It is worth while to go into the matter at
length and try to determine its exact position
as best as we can.

sion of facts and events as well as truths, mundane and celestial,
by inner sight or light : generally it is symbolic.—<u>Sh</u>uhūd (شهود)
is direct apprehension of the being and attributes of God.—Ilhām
(الهام) is inspiration ; technically it is confined to mystics ; it is
reception of guidance or inspiration from above. The guidance
thus received is not absolutely infallible, hence it is not binding
on all but only on the recipient of it, provided it is not contrary
to any injunction received through the Prophet.—Waḥī (وحى)
is literally communication or command ; technically it is com-
munication imparted by God to a prophet, its highest form being
communication through the agency of an angel. Guidance re-
ceived through it is absolutely sure and binding on all. Generally
Revelation may be regarded as an equivalent term to Waḥī, but
the exact significance of the term is as described above.

Biographical Sketch

A BRIEF biographical sketch of Sh̲aik̲h̲ Aḥmad, with special reference to his times, would not be out of place here.

Sh̲aik̲h̲ Aḥmad is a descendant of 'Umar, the Great. He was born in Sirhind in 971 A.H. Sirhind is really Sahrand, which means the forest of tigers. It is related that in the days of Feroz Sh̲āh Tug̲h̲laq (752-790 A.H.) once the royal treasury was passing through this forest under the imperial guard. A saint, Ṣāḥib-i-Kas̲h̲f [1] was travelling along with the treasury. When the caravan reached the spot where Sirhind is now situated, the saint had the inspiration that a very great saint will be born at the place. The news reached the King. He ordered the construction of a

---

[1] Ṣāḥib-ı-Kas̲h̲f (صاحب كشف) is saint, rather a person who has spiritual illumination.

town there and entrusted the work to Imām
Rafī'uddīn,[1] the ancestor of Shaikh Ahmad.
While the construction was in progress, Shāh
Bū 'Alī Qalandar[2] came and helped in it, and
informed Imām Rafī' that the great saint of
the prophecy would be his descendant.[3]

Shaikh Ahmad received his early education
at home. He learnt the Qur-ān[4] by heart

[1] Imām Rafī'uddīn is the sixth ancestor of the Mujaddid.
He was the brother of Khwāja Fateh-Ullah the prime minister
of Feroz Shāh Tughlaq and a disciple of the famous saint
Sayyıd Jalāl Bukhārī (707-750 A.H.) known as Mukhdūm-ı-
Jahānıan. Imām Rafī' was entrusted with the management of
the town of Sırhınd where he settled down after its construc-
tion.

[2] Sharfuddīn Bū 'Alī Shāh Qalandar of Panipat was a
saint of very great eminence. He came from 'Iraq to Panıpat,
where he died in 724 A.H. It is related that he helped in the
construction of the town of Sırhınd. However the dates do
not tally. For Feroz Shāh in whose time Sirhind was cons-
tructed began his reign ın 752 A.H., *i.e.*, 28 years after the death
of the Qalandar.

[3] RQ., Part I, pp. 22-23.

[4] The Qur-ān is the book revealed to Muhammad word by
word and letter by letter. It is the source of all the teachings of
Islām. All other sources must be in harmony with it. It is also
called Kitāb (كتاب)—the Book. Hadīth (حديث) is the
second source. It embodies the sayings and doings of Muhammad.

very early. Then he took to the study of Ḥadīth, Tafsīr or Exegesis and Ma'qūl (معقول) or Philosophy and went to renowned scholars at various places. When he was at Agra, studying Ḥadīth and Tafsīr, Abul Faḍl and Faiḍī, Emperor Akbar's right hand men, hearing of his brilliance, tried to draw him into their circle. However, this friendship did not last very long, because the Shaikh took serious offence to Abul Faḍl's anti-Islamic attitude. It is said that a portion of Faiḍī's celebrated *Sawāṭi'-al-Ilhām*[1] was written by

and as a source of Islām it is next in authority to the Qur-ān. Ijmā' (اجماع) is the third source of Islām, it means the consensus of the faithful on a point which is not to be found explicitly in the Qur-ān and the Ḥadīth. Qiyās (قیاس) means inference. By some it is regarded as the fourth source of Islām. In order to be valid it should be based on the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth (and on Ijmā').

[1] *Sawāṭi'-al-Ilhām* (سواطع الالهام) known as "Tafsīr-i-bi nuqaṭ" (تفسیر بے نقط) is a commentary on the Qur-ān in Arabic written by Abul Faiḍ Faiḍī, the poet-laureate of Akbar, which has the very difficult peculiarity of containing no letter with a dot. It is noteworthy that the Arabic alphabet has 15 dotted letters.

the Shaikh.[1]

After finishing his education at an early age
the Shaikh took to mystic discipline under
the guidance of his father who was an emi-
nent mystic and received Khilāfat[2] from him
in the Chishtiya and Suhrawardiya orders.[3]
When he was 28 he went to Delhi and joined
the Naqshbandiya order, and soon received
its Khilāfat from Khwāja Bāqī-Billah (972-
1012 A.H.).[4]   The Khwāja is the person from
whom this order begins in India.   It is said
that he was directed in a vision to leave his
home, Afghanistan, and go to India, where
he had to initiate a very great man into the
order.[5]   This great man was Shaikh Aḥmad,

---

[1] RQ , Part I, pp. 60, 62, 63 ; Cf. HQ., Vol. II, pp. 9-10.

[2] Khilāfat (خلافت):   In mystic terminology it is generally
the recognition of the spiritual leader that the disciple has com-
pleted the mystic journey and has reached such a high stage of
development that he can be authorised to guide others on the
way.

[3] RQ., Part I, pp. 69-70.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-81.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

who quickly went through all the stages of
the mystic journey, and became so great at
it that even the Khwāja used to sit before
him as a disciple,[1] and confessed that it was
through Shaikh Aḥmad's spiritual help that
he got out of the mazes of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd [2]

[1] RQ , Part I, p. 113.
[2] ZM., p. 155.

HIS TIMES

1.—*Mystics*

WHEN the great Mujaddid came to his task
of reform, he found that Taṣawwuf[1] had
taken complete possession of the Muslim
soul. A Pantheistic Deity had been substi-
tuted for the Monotheistic, Personal, Trans-
cendent God of Islām.[2] Excessive belief in
Karāmāt or miracles of saints was commonly
cherished. Many un-Islamic means of the
development of occult powers had been intro-
duced into Taṣawwuf itself. The mystics
had gone to the extent of denying the com-
mandments of Sharī'at[3] or the Law of Islām

---

[1] Taṣawwuf (تصوف) or Islamic mysticism is an attempt to
have the direct experience of what the Prophet of Islām himself
is supposed to have experienced.

[2] MT., Vol. II, p. 258.

[3] Sharī'at (شریعت) Law, the Code of Islām which pres-
cribes various modes of action and practice.—Ṭarīqat (طریقت)

as universally binding, and to regard Sharī'at itself as something external and superficial; indulgence in Simā'[1] or music hearing had become the order of the day. They were indifferent to the *Sunnat* or the example of the Prophet. They extolled Sukr[2] or ecstasy above Sahw, or sane rationality. The dia-

is the way towards God through purification of soul, for which some extra ascetic means are adopted by the mystic.—Ma'rifat (معرفت) is the knowledge of God acquired through spiritual development, inner purification and illumination.—Haqīqat (حقیقت) is the truth underlying the Sharī'at as grasped through spiritual illumination. According to the Mujaddid the Sharī'at is the Code of Islām. Tarīqat is the attempt to remove the conflict and a sense of revolt against the injunctions of Sharī'at. Ma'rifat is the realisation that man cannot know God directly; and Haqīqat is the perfect faith in the truth of the actions prescribed by Sharī'at.

[1] Simā' (سماع) means music hearing for the sake of bringing about ecstasy, prevalent in mystic orders.

[2] Sukr (سکر) is intoxication. It is that state of a mystic's mind in which he is overpowered by the love or vision or realisation of God, and more or less loses control of his self and reason.—Sahw (صحو) is opposed to Sukr, i.e., sobriety. It is the state of mind in which man has full control of his self and his reason and is not overpowered by emotion. Sahw is regarded as a state higher than Sukr.

logue[1] between Maḥmūd of Ghaznī and
S͟haik͟h Abul Ḥasan K͟harqānī is a pertinent
example showing clearly that since long the
mystics had practically severed their con-
nection with Islām and the Prophet.

2.—*The Theologians*

FURTHER, the 'Ulamā' or theologians had

---

[1] Sulṭān Maḥmūd (d. 421 A.H) was once passing by
K͟harqān. He had heard the fame of S͟haik͟h Abul Ḥasan
K͟harqānī (d. 419 A H). He wished to see the S͟haik͟h   So he
sent his messenger to the S͟haik͟h asking his permission to visit
him. The Sulṭān instructed the messenger that if the S͟haik͟h
were not willing to grant him an interview he should recite the
Quranic verse : اطيعواالله واطيعواالرسول و اولىالامر منكــــــم
"Obey Allah, obey the Prophet and obey the sovereign from
amongst you." The S͟haik͟h did not attend to the Sulṭān's message.
The messenger accordingly recited the verse. The S͟haik͟h said :

من در ' اطيعوا الله ' چنان مشغولم كه در ' اطيعوا الرسول '
خجالتها دارم تا به ' اولىالامر ' چه مى رسـد

"I am so busy with ' obey Allah ' that I am ashamed to neglect
' obey the Prophet ' how can I obey the sovereign. (See TA.,
p. 352.)

taken exclusively to Fiqh or Jurisprudence as
the whole of religious learning; they had
ceased to refer to the Qur-ān and Hadith—
the genuine sources of Islām. Consequently
only the juristic view of Islām was alive, the
spirit of Islām had died. Many a theologian
was of the type of Makhdūm-ul-Mulk who,
in order to avoid the payment of Zakāt[1] or
tax on wealth, transferred his property at the
end of the year to his wife and had it retrans-
ferred to himself before the time of the pay-
ment next year.[2] They were busy in the hair-
splitting discussions of the problems of Fiqh;
minutest differences sufficed to cause peren-
nial quarrels among them. They were gener-
ally full of ambition, always hunting after
worldly success. They could be induced to
give Fatwā (فتویٰ) or decision of the sacred law,

---

[1] Zakāt (زکوٰة): Tax on wealth prescribed by Islām which
is $\frac{1}{40}$ of one's yearly savings. It is one of the five injunctions
of Islām.

[2] MT., Vol. II, p. 203

permitting the Ḥarām (حرام) or the prohibited
and prohibiting the Ḥalāl (حـلال) or the
permitted. Makhdūm-ul-Mulk is said to have
given a Fatwa that the ordinance of Ḥajj [1] or
Pilgrimage was no longer binding, that it had
rather become injurious.[2]

3.—*Akbar's Policy*

THE policy of reconciliation which the
Mughal Emperor Akbar persistently followed
throughout his long reign (963-1013 A.H.)
was naturally calculated to hurt and weaken
the religious consciousness of Musalmāns.
In certain of its phases it outraged their
feelings. They felt that Islām was undone
in India. Mullā 'Abdul Qādir Badāyūnī,

---

[1] It is binding on every Muslim to go on pilgrimage to
Mecca at least once in his life, provided he can afford the
expenses of the journey.

[2] MT., Vol. II, pp. 203, 259.

a contemporary historian and a zealous
Musalmān, describes the state of things pre-
vailing in Akbar's time, and his description
mirrors the sore uneasiness under which
every religious Musalmān of the day was suf-
fering. Mullā Badāyūnī says that the Emperor
wanted to win over his Hindu subjects. He,
therefore, turned his face against Islām.[1]   He
started encouraging 'Ulamā'-i-Sū (علماء سوء), *i.e.*,
the worldly divines, who would do every-
thing to win his favour. He managed to
surround himself with people who really did
not believe in revelation and the religious
code. To believe in revelation was considered
as Taqlīd[2] or following authority blindly—
a low kind of mentality and fit only for the

---

[1] MT., Vol. II, p. 255.

[2] Taqlīd (تقليد) literally means to follow; technically it
means acknowledging Ijmā' (اجماع) and Qiyās (قياس) of a
competent divine as the sources of Islām besides the Qur-ān
and the Ḥadīth. Muqallid (مقلد) is one who believes in Ijmā'
and Qiyās of some divine as the sources of Islām as regards the
point not explicitly found in the Qur-ān or the Ḥadīth.—Ghair

2

uneducated and the illiterate. Nay, the
Emperor went further. He openly opposed
Islām. He regarded the injunctions of Islām
as temporary and irrational. "In these days,
when reproach began to be cast upon the
doctrines of Islām and all questions relating
thereto, and ever so many wretches of Hindus
and Hinduised Musalmāns brought unmiti-
gated revilings on the Prophet ; and the
villainously irreligious 'Ulamā' in their works
pronounced the Emperor to be infallible
and contenting themselves with mentioning
the unity of God, they next mentioned the
various titles of the Emperor, and did not
have the courage to mention the name of
the Prophet (God be gracious to him and his
followers, and give them peace in defiance
of the liars) ; this was the state of things
which became the cause of general disgrace,
and the seeds of depravity and disturbance

Muqallid (غير مقلد) is one who denies Ijmā' and Qiyās as the
sources of Islām and sticks to the Qur-ān and the Ḥadīth.

began to sprout out in the empire. Besides
this the mean people of the higher and lower
classes, having put the collar of spiritual obe-
dience to the Emperor upon their necks, pro-
fessed themselves to be his disciples." [1]   The
Emperor had ceased to believe in the Qur-ān ;
he did not believe in life after death, nor in
the Day of Judgment.[2] He had gone further.
He had determined publicly to use the for-
mula لا اله الا الله اكبر خليفة الله " There is no god
but Allah, and Akbar is God's Representa-
tive." But as this led to commotions, he
thought it wiser to restrict the use of this
formula to a few people within the precincts
of the Ḥaram.[3] Sajda [4] or the form of pros-
tration reserved by Islām for God alone, was

---

[1] MT., Vol. II, p. 269.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Sajda (سجده) is a form of prostration reserved by Islām
exclusively for Allah and forbidden to anyone else. A
distinction was made, *viz.*, Sajda to Allah is Sajda'-i-'Ibādat
(سجده عبادت) and the same act if performed before kings is
Sajda'-i-Ta'ẓīmī (سجده تعظیمی).

made compulsory before the Emperor.[1]

Wine was declared lawful,[2] and bacon was made an ingredient of wine;[3] Jizya[4] or the military tax was abolished[5] and beef was declared unlawful.[6] Pigs and dogs were specially reared and regarded as manifestations of God.[7] The Ṣalāt (صلواة) or the prescribed prayers, the Ṣaum (صوم) or the prescribed fasts and the Ḥajj or pilgrimage to Mecca were abolished.[8] The Islamic calendar was replaced by the new-fangled Ilāhī months and years.[9] Indeed Islām after a thousand years was considered to have played itself out; the study of Arabic was looked upon as if it

---

[1] MT., Vol. II, p. 259.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[4] Jizya (حزيه) is the military tax collected from the unbelievers to maintain the Army for their protection.

[5] MT., Vol. II, p. 276.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[9] *Ibid.*

were something unlawful; the Law of Islām
or Fiqh, Tafsīr or the exegesis of the Qur-ān
and Ḥadīth or the traditions of the Prophet
were ridiculed; and those who prosecuted
these studies were looked down as deserving
of contempt.[1]

The Adhān (اذان) or call to the prayers, and
the Namāz-i-Jamā'at (نماز جماعت) or congre-
gational prayers which used to be, as prescribed
by Islām, offered five times a day in the state
hall were stopped.[2] Such names as Aḥmad,
Muḥammad and Muṣṭafā, the various names of
the Prophet of God, had become offensive to
the Emperor, and to utter them was a crime.[3]
Mosques and prayer rooms were changed in-
to store-rooms and into Hindu guardrooms.[4]

Islām was in great distress. Unbelievers
could openly ridicule and condemn Islām and
the Musalmāns. The rites of Hinduism were

[1] *MT.*, Vol. II, pp. 306-307.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 314.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

celebrated in every street and corner, while
Musalmāns were not permitted to carry out
the injunctions of Islām.   The Hindus when
they observed fast could compel the Musal-
māns not to eat and drink in public, while
they themselves could eat and drink publicly
during Ramaḍān. At several places Musalmāns
had to pay with their lives for sacrificing the
cow on 'Īd-al-Aḍhā. A number of mosques
were destroyed by Hindus and temples erected
in their place.[1]

Thus the times cried for the appearance of a
great reformer. Shaikh Aḥmad was a spiritual
man and at the age of forty, *i.e.*, in the year
1011 A.H., he felt the call. He had the ins-
piration that he was the Renewer of the
second millennium of the Islamic era.[2] But
the task before him was stupendous. Long
he worked, and strenuous and constant were
the efforts he made to turn the tide. Some

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 92.
[2] See foot-note 1, p. 2, *supra.*

of the means he adopted for this purpose were
the following :

Firstly, he prepared a number of his disciples
for the work and sent them in all directions
to preach the true Islām, to emphasise the
Ittibā'-i-Sunnat (اتباع سنة) or following the
example of the Holy Prophet, and to bring the
people back to the folds of the Sharī'at. This
work was effectively done, not only in India
but even beyond its borders in the neigh-
bouring Muslim countries.[1]

Secondly, he started a vast correspondence
with men of eminence in various parts of these
countries. These epistles were widely circu-
lated. They expounded religious truths, and
laid the greatest emphasis on Ittibā'-i-Sunnat.[2]

Thirdly, he enlisted the great nobles of the
Imperial Court as his disciples and used them
to bring about a change in the life of those

---

[1] RQ., Part I, pp. 166-67.
[2] For example M., Vol. I, Eps. 25, 36, 41, 42, 44, 75, 79, 114,
152, 165, 195, 249, 254, 255, 272.

circles, and to influence the Emperor towards a change of heart.[1]

Fourthly, when Akbar died and Jahāngīr succeeded, the Shaikh started a campaign. People had to take a vow that they will not obey any orders contradictory to Islām. This campaign was extended also to army.[2]

Āṣaf Jāh, the prime minister, advised Jahāngīr to take care of Shaikh Aḥmad whose influence was spreading widely in India, Iran, Turān and Badakhshān. He advised him further to stop the soldiers of the army from visiting the disciples of the Shaikh and taking the vow, and still further to imprison the Shaikh. Jahāngīr issued the orders and Shaikh Aḥmad became a political suspect. Jahāngīr also decided to send the Shaikh to prison. But it was not easy to lay hands on him. The great nobles revered him and were devoted to him.

[1] M., Vol., I, Eps. 23, 25, 43-54, 65-72, 119-21, 191, 194, 195, 198, 209, 214, 228, 231, 238, etc.

[2] RQ., Part I, pp. 170-74

So Jahāngīr sent them one by one to distant places—Khān-i-Khānan to Deccan, Ṣadr-i-Jahān to the East, Khān-i-Jahān to Malwa, Khān-i-Ā'ẓam to Gujrat, and Mahābat Khān to Kabul. Having done this he sent for Shaikh Aḥmad from Sirhind and accused him of publishing certain un-Islamic ideas in his Epistles. But the Shaikh met the accusations squarely. Jahāngīr had now to find some other excuse. He demanded Sajda (سجده) or prostration of the Shaikh. The Shaikh would not agree to it, because Sajda is exclusively due to God and to no one else. Thereupon Jahāngīr imprisoned the Shaikh and sent him to the Gwalior Fort, where he remained a prisoner for two years.[1] This imprisonment of the Shaikh greatly annoyed Mahābat Khān in Kabul and he expunged the name of Jahāngīr from the Khuṭba (خطبه) or Friday sermon and the coin in Kabul, and invaded India with his chosen army. It is narrated that

[1] RQ., Part I, pp. 175-186. *Cf.* TJ., p. 273.

he virtually took Jahāngīr a prisoner at
Jhelum. Mahābat might have gone further.
But the <u>Shaikh</u> sent him instructions to obey
the King and to cause no disturbance in the
realm. Thereupon Mahābat set Jahāngīr
free. Soon after followed the release of the
<u>Shaikh</u> from Gwalior (1028 A.H.). The
Emperor wished the <u>Shaikh</u> to see him. The
<u>Shaikh</u> would not come unless certain condi-
tions were accepted. Firstly, that the Emperor
would abolish Sajda-i-Ta'zīmī or prostration;
secondly, that all the mosques that had been
erased should be erected; thirdly, that all
orders prohibiting cow-slaughter should be
cancelled; fourthly, that Qāḍīs, Muftīs and
censors should be appointed to enforce the
Islamic code; fifthly, that Jizya or military
tax should be re-introduced; sixthly, that
all bid'āt (بدعات) or innovations should be
stopped and injunctions of the <u>Sharī'at</u> or
Law be enforced; and seventhly, that all
prisoners who had been sent to prison

in contravention of the above should be released.[1]

The Emperor accepted these conditions.[2] When the Shaikh came to him, the Emperor received him with great honour, giving him a Nadhr (نذر) or monetary offering as well as a Khil'at [3] (خلعت) or robe of honour.[4]   Henceforth the Shaikh, for the remaining six years of his life, became the special Adviser of the Emperor.[5]

[1] RQ., Part I, pp. 186-95.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[3] TJ., p. 273.

[4] Mirzā Hādī, the writer of *Tuzuk-ı-Jahāngīrī* is annoyingly brief and curt about this whole episode, and the so-called histories too are silent.   One has to depend for the details on RQ., which Ahsān-Ullah 'Abbāsī also follows in his " Life of the Mujaddid ".

[5] *Cf.* M., Vol. III, Eps. 43, 44 ; RQ., Part I, pp. 199-209.

HIS ACHIEVEMENTS

THUS, in the first place, the Mujaddid brought
the Islamic kingdom of India back to Islām.
In the second place, he induced the divines
of Islām to the study of Qur-ān and Ḥadīth,
which they had neglected so long. In Taṣaw-
wuf or mysticism he revolutionised the
doctrine of Islamic mystics, questioned their
pantheism, and brought them round to Ittibā'-
i-Sunnat (following the example of the
Prophet). Moreover, he widened the bounds
of religious experience, by realising and des-
cribing a large number of higher stages yet
untraversed and unknown to his predeces-
sors.[1] Further he made a fundamental depar-
ture from the accepted mystic doctrine
inasmuch as he propounded that Wilāyat
or sainthood is essentially different from

[1] M., Vol. II, Eps. 4, 6.

Nabuwwat [1] or Prophethood and not in one
line with it—indeed qualitatively different.[2]
Connected with this is the position which
the Shaikh established and which had long
been perverted, *viz.*, the Dīn or Religion and
not Sulūk-wa-Taṣawwuf [3] or mysticism is the

---

[1] Nabuwwat (نبوت) means prophecy from which comes
the word Prophet. But in Islām it means the stage where a
man becomes, in contradistinction to Wilāyat by sheer grace
of God, the subject of special divine favour and messages
for the guidance of man are sent to him by God.—Wilāyat
(ولايت) is that stage of spiritual development in which the
mystic realises that he has attained to nearness or proximity to
God. Everyone can get to it by dint of his continued effort and
struggle, though not without the grace of God.

[2] M., Vol. I, Ep. 260.

[3] Sulūk (سلوک) is the method of spiritual development. The
thing has been conceived as a journey or pilgrimage to God,
similarly Sair (سير) which means rambling. When Sulūk is
attained at a certain stage the mystic begins to experience the
adumbrations of Asmā'-o-Shuyūn (اسماء و شيون) i.e. divine
names and phases. This is called Sair-ila-'llah (سير الى الله)
i.e. journey towards Allah. Then he surpasses this stage
and enters into the experience of the Being of Allah. This is
called Sair-Fi'llah (سير في الله), journey inside Allah. After
that the mystic returns back in his journey and this is called
Sair-'an-Allah (سير عن الله) journey away from Allah. Then

indispensable thing for a Muslim.[1]

It is for these great reforms that he was
called Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī—the Reformer
of the second millennium.   Henceforth we
shall speak of him in the text as the Mujad-
did.

he resumes his duties as an ordinary human being in consonance
with the teachings of Sharī'at and directs his energies like the
Prophets to the reformation of his fellow beings.

   [1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 48.

HIS INFLUENCE

IT may be added here that the Mujaddid's influence on subsequent development too has been very great. His was really the call "*Back to Muḥammad*"; and it had had far-reaching consequences. Besides his conception of Tawḥīd which shall be considered in the following pages, this call inherently affected the Islamic mind and gave it a new turn in mysticism as well as in theology,—'Ilm-i-Bāṭin and 'Ilm-i-Zāhir.[1]

Firstly, with regard to mysticism, there arose a new yearning—a yearning to purify

---

[1] 'Ilm-i-Zāhir (علم ظاهر) is knowledge in general, such as Tafsīr, Ḥadīth, Fiqh and 'Ilm-i-Kalām. 'Ilm-i-Bāṭin (علم باطن) is cognition attained through mystic efforts. Hence the distinction of 'Ulamā'-i-Zāhir, those well versed in learning, theologians and jurists, who are guided by the word of the Qur-ān, etc., and not the spirit as the initiated or the mystics who are therefore called 'Ulamā'-i-Bāṭin, who try to have the direct experience of God and eternity.

mysticism from extraneous elements and
draw it exclusively from that pure and peren-
nial fountain-head from which Islām had
arisen ; in other words, a yearning to learn it
directly from the Prophet of God. Accord-
ingly it happened that Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir[1]
who belonged to the Mujaddid's school of
mysticism got into a trance which lasted for
ạ full week, and Imām Ḥasan, the grandson
of the Prophet himself, appeared to him in
his cell and initiated him into a new mystic
method, insisting that the method shall be
called after the Prophet, 'Muḥammadī,' because
that was the genuine method of the Prophet

---

[1] Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir 'Andalīb (d. 1172 A.H) was a lineal
descendant of the celebrated saint Khwāja Bahāuddīn, the
founder of Naqshbandıa order. In the beginning Khwāja Mīr
Nāṣır was a soldier in the Mughal Army. All of a sudden he
left the army and took to seclusion He became a celebrated
mystic. Indeed he founded a new order of mysticism called
the Ṭarīqa-ı-Muḥammadī (طريقۂ محمدى) or the method
of Muhammad. He wrote a voluminous book *Nāla'-ı-'Andalīb*
(نالۂ عندليب) in 1153 A.H. in the form of a story in which
he discussed most of the mystic doctrines.

of God. When the trance was over the Khwāja came out of his cell, and the first person whom he initiated in the new method was his son Khwāja Mīr Dard[1] who met him on the threshold.[2]

The father and son have written voluminous books on the method which they believe to have been the work of inspiration.[3] The essence of the method is: "Break away from everyone and attend only to your master (Muḥammad) and continue to attend on him incessantly."[4] It is, say they, the want of this principle that has created dissensions amongst

---

[1] Khwāja Mīr Dard (1131-1190 A.H.) was the second son of Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir. At the age of fifteen he wrote a treatise *Asrār-us-Ṣalāt* (اسرار الصلواة) He is the author of several works on mysticism, *e.g.*, *Wāridāt-ı-Dard* (واردات درد), *'Ilm-ul-Kıtāb* (علم الكتاب), etc. He was held in great esteem and even the Mughal Emperor Shāh 'Ālam used to visit his Majlis (مجلس) or gathering every month. Khwāja Dard was also a famous poet of Urdu and has a recognised position in the history of Urdu literature.

[2] IK., p. 85

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 95

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

3

Musalmāns. Go back to Kitāb-o-Sunnat,[1] the
Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet, and
attach yourself exclusively to the Prophet.
That is the right course.[2]

Similar is it with Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad
Barelwī.[3] He belonged to the school of

---

[1] Kitāb (كِتاب) literally means ' book ' Technically it means
the Qur-ān and the injunction of the Qur-ān. Sunnat literally
means habit , technically it means the Prophet's mode of habitual
actions, or the Prophet's example   Hence Kitāb-o-Sunnat means
the injunctions of the Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet

[2] IK., p 87

[3] Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (1201-1246 A H)   From early
childhood he was mystically minded and felt in himself a strong
propensity to follow only the Prophet   After some education
at Lucknow, he went to Delhi, where he became a disciple of
Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz However, he broke away from Shāh 'Abdul
'Azīz on the practice of Taṣawwur-i-Shaikh (تصور شيخ),
picturing the Shaikh in imagination, which he regarded as
idolatry, and pursued his spiritual development single-handed.
The progress he made was immense,—indeed Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz
himself wished to become his disciple in the end   Soon his
reputation spread far and wide   Mawlwī 'Abdul Hayy and
Shāh Ismā'īl, two eminent relations of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz joined
him   Thousands of Muslims adopted his views, and he was
everywhere hailed as the true *Khalīfa.* One of his biographers,
Mawlwī 'Abdul Aḥad, asserts that more than 40,000 Hindus
and unbelievers became converts to Islām through his preach-
ings   In 1232 A.H. Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad set out from his native

the Mujaddid and has a very high place
amongst the mystics of Islām. The Sayyid
believed that he had a special affinity to the
Prophet and that he got spiritual guidance
directly from him or from God.[1] He turns
round and sets up a new method, which he

city on a pilgrimage to Mecca, staying a few months at Calcutta
on the way. Two years later, on his return to India, he started
making active preparation for Jihād or religious war on the Sikhs
of the Punjab to rescue the Musalmāns of that province from
their tyranny. He made campaign after campaign against the
Sikhs and died a martyr fighting at the battle of Balākot in the
year 1246 A H

[1] In mystic terminology to get guidance direct from the
spirituality of the Prophet is called Uwaisiyyat (اویسیت).
The term comes from Uwais It is believed that Uwais got
spiritual guidance direct from the Holy Prophet, that he could
never meet him   The Mujaddid regards himself to be an Uwaisī
(اویسی), and it is remarkable that after him a large number
of mystics have claimed themselves to be Uwaisīs In our
times too there was a mystic of great eminence, Ḥājī Sayyid
Wāriṯẖ 'Alī Shāh (d 1321 A H), about whom it is said that he
received spiritual guidance directly from a'imma'-i-ahl-i-bait
(اثمئہ اھل بیت), the grandsons of the Prophet.

    Prof. F. Krenkow doubts the mysterious personality of
Uwais-al-Qaranī, which is supposed and claimed as the origina-
tion of Sufism, and is convinced that such person never existed
in reality. Imām Mālik b. Anas (d. 179 A.H.) is the first

calls, Ṭarīqa-i-Nabuwwat[1] or the Prophetical
Method. Other methods are according to him
only Ṭarīqahā-i-Wilāyat or mystical methods.[2]
The peculiarity of the new method is that the
mystic should first make all his actions conform
strictly to the law given by the Prophet;[3]
and only then take to 'Dhikr and Fikr', re-
membrance and contemplation.   The *dhikr*[4]

who heard of him and doubted his real existence. The biogra-
phies of Uwais are not convincing at all

   [1] Ṭarīqa-i-Nabuwwat (طريقه نبوت) is that method of
spiritual development which aims at developing only those
values which the the Holy Prophet aimed at. Tariqa-i-Wilāyat
(طريقه ولايت) is the method of mystic development, used by
mystics of Islām, and aimed at cultivating mystical mode of life.
The difference is that of being according to Sharī'at or in-
different to it

   [2] SM., p 8

   [3] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

   [4] Dhikr (ذكر) is commemoration. In it Asmā'-o-Sifāt, the
names and attributes of God, are recited, which is a help in the
progress of the mystic   Shughl is the practicing of dhikr.
Shughl-i-Nafī (شغل نفى) is the dhikr of لااله, denial of
everything other than God, and Shughl-i-Ithbāt (اثبات شغل)
is the dhikr of الاالله, the affirmation of God. Fikr (فكر)
is distinguished from Murāqiba (مراقبه). It is in general the

of the method consists in reading the Qur-ān and reciting the prayers which the Prophet used to recite ;[1] while the *fikr* of the method consists in contemplation on the Goodness and Grace of God which is so profusely spread about us, and in making our will wholly sub-ordinate to His Will, and in realising His omnipresence at every moment, etc.[2] The most beneficial aid to all this, according to this method, is that the mystic should take to the service of his fellow-beings.[3] Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad denies pantheism and believes in theism.[4] He puts *Saḥw* or sobriety above *Sukr* or spiritual intoxication. He preaches *Jihād* or fighting in the way of God in place of Simā' (سماع) or music-hearing for the sake of ecstasy, and demands social service instead

contemplation of the Ṣifāt-ī-Ilāhī (صغات الهی), attributes of Allah. Murāqıba ıs the concentrated contemplation.

[1] SM., pp. 148-149.
[2] Ibıd., pp. 154-157.
[3] Ibıd., pp. 20-24.
[4] Ibıd., pp. 45-46.

of solitude. He punctiliously follows Kitāb-o-
Sunnat, Qur-ān and the example of the
Prophet, and strenuously and emphatically
denounces *bid'āt* or innovations.[1] That is why
he rose, organised the Musalmāns and raised
the standard of Jihād or the holy war against
the Sikhs who were subjecting Musalmāns in
the Punjab to religious persecution. He fought
long and fought valiantly and was himself
killed in Jihād (1246 A.H.) ; and with him
was killed also Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd who was
his chief lieutenant.[2]

Secondly, the call of the Mujaddid induced
theologians, those learned in the religious lore,
to turn to the Ḥadīth. Before the Mujaddid
religious learning consisted wholly of juris-
prudence or *Fiqh*. But the Mujaddid turned
the tide to the *Kitāb-o-Sunnat* or Qur-ān
and the Prophet. People started learning the
Ḥadīth or Tradition, and Shāh Walī-Ullah

[1] SM., pp. 45-46.
[2] SA., pp. 142-150.

established the first school of Ḥadīth in India.
With Shāh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwī the school
turned into Ahl-i-Ḥadīth[1] or Traditionists
which yet had room for mystic element in it.
Later the emphasis fell against *Taqlīd* or
blind following of the authority of the jurists
and there arose *Ghair Muqallidīn* or pure
and simple Ahl-i-Ḥadīth or strict traditionists.
In this connection we may also speak of the
reform and High Criticism inaugurated by Sir
Sayyid Ahmed Khān.[2] Sir Sayyid emphasised
the criticism of the Ḥadīth and forcibly direct-
ed attention to the *Kitāb* or the Qur-ān as the

---

[1] *Ahl-ı-Hadīth* (اهل حديث) : Those who follow only the
Ḥadīth or sayings and doings of the Prophet and not the school
of Islamic jurists. All great collectors of Ḥadīth really belong
to this school of thought. But it became a sect in the hands of
'Abdul Wahhāb of Nejd (d. 1201 A.H) and took its root in India
with the followers of Shāh Sayyıd Ahmad Barelwī (d. 1246 A.H.)
and his chief lieutenant Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd (d. 1246 A.H.).
Ahl-ı-Qur-ān: Those who follow only the Qur-ān and discard
the Ḥadīth also along with Fıqh or jurists.

[2] Sır Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1232-1315 A.H.) came of a family
connected with the Delhi Court. The fall of the Mughal

real source of Islām. This in the long run
gave rise to the sect of the Ahl-i-Qur-ān or
Quranists instituted by Mawlwī 'Abdullah.[1]

Sir Sayyid was brought up in the school of
the Mujaddid. His conception of Tawḥīd or
divine unity is theistic;[2] and with reference
to mysticism he went further and clearly an-
nounced that mysticism is nothing more than
a way of purifying the soul and the morals[3]—
something which was implicit in the teach-
ings of the Mujaddid, but which had not come

Empire in 1857 A D set him thinking, and he took to the work
of the reform of the Musalmāns of India. At last in 1875 A.D.
he founded the present Aligarh Muslim University. Sir Sayyid,
as he is generally called, has exerted a great formative influence;
indeed there is hardly any movement of importance—religious,
political, social, educational and literary—amongst the Musal-
māns of India which is not directly or indirectly traceable to him.

[1] Mawlwī 'Abdullah Chakrālwī (d. 1334 A.H). He was a
great scholar of the Qur-ān, and in the beginning of the present
century of the Christian era founded the sect of Ahl-i-Qur-ān.
He maintains that Qur-ān and Qur-ān alone is the genuine
source for all Islamic dogmatics, and that neither Qiyās nor
Ijmā' nor even Ḥadīth has any authority

[2] TfA., Vol. I, p. 156.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-91.

to clear consciousness.[1]   Later Sir Muḥammad
Iqbāl [2] also protested against Waḥdat-i-Wujūd
of the mystics, gave Islamic morality a new
spirit and preached life of Effort and Activity.[3]

*   *   *

   Now, Tawḥīd is the Problem on which the
Mujaddid has deservingly laid the greatest
emphasis and made great and original contri-

   [1] M., Vol. I, Eps. 207, 217.
   [2] Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl (1294-1357 A.H) was a great poet,
philosopher and scholar. Since he wrote his Asrār-ı-Khudī
about 1333 A.H , he became a force which modified the trend of
Muslim thought in politics and morals   He attacked mysticism
for its doctrines of ' Fanā ' or self-annihilation, and substituted
' Khudī ' or self-affirmation in its place. He also objected to
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism.
   [3] *Cf.* Iqbāl's poems Asrār-ı-Khudī (اسرار خودی) and
Rumūz-ı-Bıkhudī (رموز بیخودی).
   Asrār-ı-Khudī (Secrets of Self) : In this Dr. Iqbāl denounces
mysticism as un-Islamic in its origin and injurious to the
national and political life of Musalmāns.
   Rumūz-i-Bıkhudī (Secrets of Selflessness) : In it he lays
emphasis on the life according to the Qur-ān and the Sunnat,
and preaches such morals as are more positive.

butions. Thereby he has undermined the
whole structure of mysticism in its very
foundations, *viz.*, its pantheism. It is this
conception in the Mujaddid which I have
chosen as the theme of this Dissertation.

The Dissertation is divided into four
parts:—

Introduction develops the abstract forms of
the Unity of the World-Principle ascon-
ceived by the Speculative and the Religious
Consciousnesses in their distinctions; and
shows how these distinctions tend to be obli-
terated in Mystic Consciousness.

Chapter I describes the Mujaddid's con-
ception of Tawḥīd in contrast to and criticism
of Ibn 'Arabī's Pantheistic conception.

Chapter II traces how the conception of
the Mujaddid was received amongst the mys-
tics of Islām.

The Conclusion brings out that the pan-
theistic conception of Tawḥīd is a case of the
transformation of the religious unity into the

speculative unity, or rather the case of the identification of the two unities; that the Mujaddid's conception of Tawḥīd is in consonance with the religious consciousness, and that the attempts made by the successors of the Mujaddid to re-affirm the pantheistic conception of Tawḥīd are neither based on direct experience nor are they conclusive as rational arguments.

INTRODUCTION

Unity of the World-Principle

M AN takes different attitudes towards the
objects of his experience. These atti-
tudes are called different forms of conscious-
ness. Theoretic consciousness is the attitude
which he takes towards the world of objects in
order to acquire its knowledge; and epistemo-
logy or logic is the science that studies the
nature and implications of this consciousness.
Moral consciousness is another attitude that
man takes—he takes it towards mankind; and
ethics or moral philosophy is the science that
deals with the laws that arise in this field and
the implications thereof. Similarly religious
consciousness is the attitude that man takes
towards ultimate reality; and 'theistic' or

philosophy of religion is the branch of
knowledge that studies the nature and impli-
cations of this consciousness.

These various forms of consciousness have
definite limits, and they are valid only within
such limits.   But there are cases in which the
various forms of consciousness seem to over-
lap or conflict with each other. It is for philo-
sophy to consider the limits of these various
forms with a view to avoid their overlapping
and conflict, and to trace the error lying
therein. Further it has to determine the exact
sense in which each is valid. The unity of
the world-principle is a case of this kind.
The theoretical and the religious conscious-
nesses seem to overlap on this point.

The theoretical or the speculative conscious-
ness is, as said above, the knowledge-attitude
of man. It has an ideal of knowledge. It
yearns to realise that ideal. This ideal consists
in having a unified picture of the universe.   It
consists in finding out a unitary principle, out

of which could spring all the multiplicity of
the world—from which the multiplicity could
be *deduced.* Such unity has been hovering
before the gaze of every metaphysician. The
yearning for it is so intense that the specula-
tive consciousness is strongly inclined to go
forward and assert the *existence* of this unity ;
indeed it would go still further and grasp the
essence of it also. The efforts made in this
direction have different forms resulting from
the different tendencies of the thinkers who
have tried to determine this unity.—The
empirically-minded start from the side of the
objects of experience, *i.e.,* the multiplicity.
They want to seek some empirical object which
may be used as a principle of unity forming
the basis of all existence. Thales seeks this
concrete unity in 'water', which he finds to
be the principle of all things; Anaximander
finds it in 'matter undetermined'; Anaxi-
menes in 'air'. Democritus finds such a
unity in particles of physical things, *i.e.,* 'atoms

and void '. The British school of empiricists
finds it in ' ideas and sensations '. Each of
them tries to show that the essence of things
consists in these entities. Now, these entities,
when taken to serve as principles of unity, are
really concepts. Each of these attempts is,
therefore, an attempt to conceive the unity
as a concept from which the multiplicity is
deduced. For the unity in each case is not
something which exists over and above and
beside the multiplicity that is deduced from
it, but only as a general idea or concept.—The
rationalistically-minded thinkers held that
thought and being are essentially one ; or that
thought is the essence of being. They seek
the principle of unity expressly in a concept
or a system of concepts from which every-
thing could be deduced logically. Parmanides
finds that such a concept is ' Being '; Plato
finds it in ' Ideas ' or ' Idea of the Good ';
Aristotle in pure ' Form '. Spinoza regards
' Substance ' to be such a concept, and Hegel

'Absolute Idea' which absorbs the whole
system of categories in itself. Both these
tendencies agree in the assumption that there
is some such principle of unity and that things
can be deduced from such a principle. But
critical philosophy denies that. Kant comes
to the conclusion that Unity is only a
'Regulative Idea'. We cannot affirm its
objectivity—we cannot maintain that the
principle of the world is one. As a 'Regula-
tive Idea', it is only helpful in our attempt to
construct a unified system of knowledge; and
as such it consists in this that we should go
on making attempt after attempt to discover
a law from which all other laws could be
deduced or expressed as its modes;—though
we know that we can never fully succeed in
this attempt.

On the other hand a unitary principle is
the very mainstay of the religious conscious-
ness. The religious consciousness is that
attitude of man which he takes towards the

4

Ultimate Reality. But how does religious consciousness conceive this principle? Now, what is the religious situation? Man finds himself confronted in his course with insurmountable obstacles. On the one side stands he with his innate yearning after harmony with reality, after moral perfection and happiness, after knowledge and after beauty. On the other stands the universe, stupendous, dark and brutal, full of sin and ugliness, unamenable to harmony with his moral and spiritual yearnings, and unwilling to accede to the demands of his soul. He finds himself helpless—forlorn. There must be a Being who has the power, as well as the will, to help him, if he is to be rescued. Hence it is that religious consciousness affirms the existence of such a Being. He can help him in his natural wants and can guide him to the right path. He is Rabb or the Providence, and Razzāq or the Sustainer; and He is Raḥmān or the Beneficent, for He accedes

to his natural wants. He is Hādī or the Guide, for He guides him to the right course; and He is Ghafūr-ur-Rahīm or the Pardoner and the Merciful, Who can give him relief—relief from the unbearable burden of his sins and sinful nature. But He can truly help him only if He knows all facts open or hidden, past or future. Therefore He is Samī'-um-Basīr or the Hearer and the Seer, and 'Ālim-ul-ghaib wash-shahāda or the Omniscient. Further He must have power to do all He likes;—He is Qādir or the Powerful and Fa"āl-ul limā-yurīd the Accomplisher of all He might wish: the Omnipotent. But such power He can have only if He is the Creator[1] of the world and man. Therefore He is

---

[1] Because if things exist or come into existence independently of His Will, a limit is set thereby to His Power by their nature; His control over them and over the events of the universe does not remain complete. He thereby ceases to perform the function for the sake of which His existence was postulated. That is, He cannot satisfy the religious consciousness unless He is also the Creator, Khāliq (خالق) and Bārī (بارى).

Khāliq and Bārī or the Creator. Moreover
He must have the supreme will to lead him
to perfection ;—He is Dhul-fadl il-'azīm, the
most Gracious. He must consequently Him-
self be perfectly Good,—He is Quddūs or
the Holy. His help is grace. Man cannot
claim it as his right. When man realises his
own helplessness and the power of this Being,
he is filled with awe and devotion, and be-
seeches Him for help and guidance. He is
Ma'būd or the Object of worship, and Mujīb-
ud-da'wāt or the Answerer of human prayers.
The further implication that dawns on
Religious Consciousness, in view of the supre-
macy of this Being and the exclusiveness of
the right of devotion to Him, is that He is
One,—He is Aḥad or the One, and Ṣamad or
the Self-sufficient who needs nothing and to
whom recourse is had in every need. These
are the attributes of the Unity which religious
consciousness affirms in *relation to us*, and
which we understand and know. But *in Him-*

self—in His entirety and His essence, we do not know Him : ما يحيطون به علما—by cognition they cannot comprehend Him ; nor can we comprehend Him by analogy, for in His essence nothing is like unto Him : ليس كمثله شئى—there is nothing like unto Him. With this much of positive and negative knowledge of Him the religious consciousness is satisfied.

Now, it is of paramount importance to realise the inherent differences between these two unities—the speculative and the religious. In the nature of the case it would appear that :—

Firstly, the speculative unity is *unqualitative*, while the religious unity must necessarily be *qualitative*, *i.e.*, of a certain nature. The empirically-minded thinkers sought the principle of unity in " water ", in " matter undetermined ", in " air ", in " atoms ", in " ideas ", in " sensations ",—in some existent entity. The rationalists found it in " Being ", in " Idea of the Good ", in " Form ", in " Substance ", in

"Absolute Idea",—in some concept. The
critical philosopher sought it in 'Abstract
Law'. This shows that the speculative con-
sciousness is really indifferent to the nature of
the unity. It is satisfied if the ideal of unified
knowledge is realised. It is all the same to it
whether the unity is water or air, atom or
idea, matter or mind, conscious or uncon-
scious, mechanical or teleological. It may be
of any quality whatsoever, or it may be even
qualitiless. The only quality it should possess
is that it should be such that from it the
multiplicity could be logically deduced. The
speculative consciousness is not even keen
that it should be numerically one. It may be
one in number or it may be many.

But the religious consciousness is in dead
earnest exactly with regard to the nature of
the unity. The unity must be Rabb and
Razzāq,—Providence and Sustainer, and it
must be Raḥmān or Beneficent; further it
must be Ghafūr-ur-Raḥīm or the Pardoner

and the Merciful, and it must be Hādī
or Guide. Moreover, it must be 'Ālim-ul-
ghaib wa<u>sh</u>-shahāda or the Knower of the
Open and the Hidden, and it must be Fa"āl-ul
limā-yurīd or the Doer of whatever He chooses
to do. It must further be <u>Kh</u>āliq and Bārī or
the Creator of the Universe,[1] and Quddūs or
the Holy, and <u>Dh</u>ul Faḍl or the Gracious. And
more, it must have the exclusive right of
devotion to itself from man, *i.e.*, it must be
the only Ma'būd or the Object of worship;
and it must be one—numerically one or Aḥad.
Indeed, the religious consciousness is so keen

[1] *Creation* means bringing something into being out of com-
plete nothing. This conception, however, is a stumbling block
for the speculative consciousness, because such a coming into
being is absolutely inconceivable. The speculative conscious-
ness, therefore, must stop in its logical regress at some being
or Wujūd, from which it could, by modification, deduce the
actual world order. It cannot conceive that a substance can
come into being *ab novo*. About accidents or equalities of the
substance it does not seem to be so sceptical,—new qualities
do come into being as a matter of fact. But in its purity—in
its rigour, the speculative consciousness does yearn to deduce
even qualities from the primordial essence of the substance
(*cf.* Scientific Materialism).

on the nature of the unity that it yearns
even for the oneness of the unity only because
of its attributes. It is rather the attributes
that demand that the unity in question should
be numerically one, for then and then alone
can it give the satisfaction for which it has
been postulated.

Secondly, the speculative unity must natu-
rally be *immanent* while on the contrary the
religious unity must be *transcendent*. That
the speculative unity is immanent means that
it does not exist over and above the multipli-
city but only in multiplicity—which indeed is
only a form and modification of it. Empiri-
cally conceived, the unity is some existential
being, *e.g.*, 'water', 'air', 'matter undeter-
mined', 'atom'. The unity here is really
only of concept. It does not exist over and
above existing things. It is wholly exhausted
in its denotation. Rationalistically conceived,
it is evidently an abstract concept, *e.g.*, the
'Being' of Parmenides. It has only conceptual

being: it has no existence of its own. It becomes fact only in things, because they are conceived as its instances. Even critically conceived, the unity is only a conceptual principle, a law. As such it is abstract; it has no being of its own, and it exists only in its applications. Thus the speculative form of unity in all its three kinds is such that it is nothing other than the unity of an abstract concept;—in no case it is the unity of an existent being. The concept however either has no being at all, *i.e.*, in the sense of existence; or if it has one, it is exhausted in the being of the instances to which it applies. Thus the speculative unity, if it exists at all, is necessarily immanent.

On the contrary the religious unity must be transcendent. It must necessarily be over and above the world and man. It must be wholly an *other*. Because the despair of man amidst the obstacles that originate in his own nature and those that originate in the nature

of the world around him, demands that help
should come from a source which is other
than the sources of his troubles, and which
has full control over the whole world of men
and things. Indeed this succour from the
source over and above the world is the very
purpose for which religious consciousness
postulates the existence of such a Being.
That is why religious unity is necessarily
transcendent.

Thirdly, the speculative unity is necessarily
monistic, while the religious unity is *dualistic*.
In connection with immanence and transcen-
dence it has in general been brought out above
that the speculative unity has no being over
and above the multiplicity. This is monism ;
for it means that the one and the many have
no separate existences. But it means more ; it
means that only the one exists, and that the
many have no existence by the side of the one.
Now the speculative unity is of this nature ;
for speculative consciousness is out to con-

ceive the world as one or as differentiation of
the one. So far it is qualitative monism. But
at a certain stage speculative consciousness is
not satisfied with mere qualitative monism ; it
will also be quantitative monism,—the Real is
one, single, individual ;—it is *numerically* one.
At that stage the unity is conceived either as
a whole, or as a substance or as a spirit.   But
the whole, one single, individual, does not
exist over and above the parts,—it is only the
organisation of the parts and is incapable of
existing in its own right.   The position re-
mains that of mere immanence.   The unity is
consequently raised to the dignity of a subs-
tance.   Now the many become only modes
of the substance, its manifestations, its ad-
jectives ; they have no being of their own.
When the unity is conceived, not merely
as substance but as spirit, it is an Infinite
Spirit ; and finite spirits are conceived as
numerically identical with it.   They have
no being of their own ; while the material

world is conceived either as expressly unreal,
or together with the finite spirits as a re-
production or re-realisation of the Infinite
Spirit itself.[1]

But the religious unity must needs be dual-
istic. For the situation, that has given rise to
the postulating of the existence of a Divine
Being, is that man is disappointed with his
own self and the nature of the world. Neither
of them is capable of according any help to
him in his distress. He postulates the exis-
tence of a spiritual Being. To be in harmony
with Him alone would enable him to realise
his yearnings. This implies that God on the
one side, and the universe and man on the
other, must be fundamentally different in
nature. One is perfect, the other imperfect.

---

[1] It may, by the way, be remarked here that in putting the
emphasis on the reality of the one,—on its self existence and its
supreme value, already the influence of the religious conscious-
ness is present, and where it leads further to the apparent
affirmation of the many as existent, as in Plato or Green, the
affirmation is made most grudgingly and the point is left obscure.

Both exist—they exist side by side.   One is
other than the other.   On the contrary, if
religious unity were a whole, it would only be
an aspect or relation of the manifold ; it would
not exist in its own right,—only the manifold
would ; and if it were substance or spirit, the
world and man would only be immanent
expressions of and hence essentially, identical
with it,—there would be no room for man as
a separate existent and hence for the specific
religious yearnings ; for its object would be
already a realised fact or will necessarily be
realised without any ado and any kind of
external help.   In that case there need indeed
be no religion or religious yearning.   That is
why the religious consciousness cannot afford
to be monistic ; it must be dualistic,—it must
assert the existence of the imperfect on one
side and that of the Perfect on the other.   It
cannot permit the evaporation of the one, or
of the other.

Fourthly, the religious unity must be

Personal, while speculative unity need not be personal—indeed it tends to be *Impersonal*.

Personality implies consciousness; nay it implies more, it implies *self-consciousness*, consciousness of itself as over and above—as other than something else, *i.e.* as transcending them. But we can conceive a being who is self-conscious, and yet it will hardly deserve the name of personality unless it can determine its own action according to the principles of morality, *i.e.*, unless it is *free*. Again, such a being may be just—absolutely just ; it may be holy. But that is not enough ; it would then be only the doctrine of " Karma " hypostatised. We want more. It should be capable not only of justice but also of *grace*. It is grace which forms the distinctive feature of personality. A man who always gives you but your deserts, neither more nor less, will be regarded by you as lacking in personal elements. Now, the religious consciousness seeks a unity which is eminently personal. It seeks that

the Divine Being should be aware of my
actual condition ; and that it should be aware
of my yearnings ; more, it should have grace—
it should be capable of satisfying my yearnings
in spite of my shortcomings—in spite of my
failure to deserve what I yearn for. That
is to say, the religious unity must be fully
personal.

Not so the speculative consciousness. It is
not interested in personality. It wants only a
unity ; whether it is personal or impersonal is
immaterial to it. As brought out above in dis-
cussing immanence and transcendence, as well
as monism and dualism, speculative conscious-
ness has conceived its unity pre-eminently as
impersonal. So long as the unity is only a
qualitative one, the issue is clear. But when
it becomes a quantitative unity—the whole,
the substance, the spirit, even there the specu-
lative consciousness is not inclined to conceive
the unity as personal. As a whole, it may be
any kind of whole ; as a substance again it may

be any kind of substance. Indeed, as such, it is,
as in Spinoza and Schelling, something other
than self-conscious.   Only as spirit it looks
like a person. Here it is the religious interest
that is at work.   However, the attributing of
a kind of transcendence to that spirit turns out
to be nominal; it loses itself in the demand,
inherent in speculative consciousness, for
immanence.   The spirit is not other than
anything else, or no being is other than the
spirit. This makes self-consciousness doubt-
ful; hence the idealist is strongly inclined
to refuse personality to it.   Moreover the
speculative consciousness is loath to ascribe
freedom to it, or it would interpret freedom
as identical with necessity ; for necessity alone
satisfies the demand of the speculative con-
sciousness ;—indeed it yearns for unity and
necessity. With necessity there hardly remains
any room for grace.   Thus all the elements
of personality are jeopardised by the require-
ments of the speculative consciousness.

Fifthly, the religious unity must be *Free*—absolutely free, and it must admit of moral freedom for man ; while the speculative unity need neither be itself free nor need it admit of the freedom of man.

Freedom means, positively, the possession of inherent independence in the object called free to determine the mode of its activity ; and negatively, the absence of any kind of external restraint or internal constraint on its action.—Religious consciousness conceives the unity as a perfect Being. It must therefore be morally perfect, have grace, and be self-sufficient.   Now, morality necessarily involves freedom ; the Divine Being, if He is morally perfect, must be fully free.   Further if He is to have grace, which is so inevitably demanded by religious consciousness, He must have freedom ; otherwise, if grace in its various forms, *viz.*, beneficence, sustenance, guidance, mercy, forgiveness and reward, is a necessity of His nature, then it will come to

5

us without yearning for it;—and more, it will hardly deserve the name of grace, for it will be from the moral standpoint of a lower kind than the grace which even man is capable of showing. Moreover, freedom is a requirement of His Ṣamadīyyat or Self-sufficiency. He does not *need* anything; not even the exhibition of any kind of attitude or action towards other beings. What He does for man is, therefore, absolutely unselfish, and hence absolutely free. And there is room for the freedom of man also, for man must be free, if he is created by Him to yearn for moral perfection and to seek His grace.

The speculative consciousness, on the contrary, yearns exactly for *necessity*,—it would have a unity from which all multiplicity could be deduced rigorously. Hence there can be no freedom in its unity, nor in the multiplicity which proceeds from it. When the speculative consciousness conceived the unity as existent object, *e.g.*, in materialism, etc., the

unity is conceived as a cause, from which the whole world process originates and proceeds on the principle of mechanical causality. When it conceives the unity as a rational concept, *e.g.*, the monism of Spinoza, the principle on which it acts and on which the multiplicity is derived from it is the principle of logical ground-consequence. When the speculative consciousness seems to go further and conceive the unity as a spirit, it has then the appearance of affirming freedom in the unity as well as in man. But then what is really meant is only the want of external constraint; and freedom is identified with internal necessity,—which in truth is no freedom.

Sixthly, *Immortality* is another point which is bound up for the religious consciousness with its unity, but which is hardly of any consequence from the standpoint of the speculative unity.

The religious consciousness yearns for per-

fection—perfection which is wanting in man,
and which to all appearances cannot be
attained by him in this short span of life ;
nor by his own endeavours, unless the whole
system of reality is somehow transformed into
a new order. It is for this reason that
immortality as well as the existence of Divine
Being is postulated by it.   The two are really
two phases of one and the same postulate,—
the former is the subjective condition and
the latter the objective condition of one and
the same requirement.

But for the speculative consciousness both
these conditions are unnecessary.   It neither
cares for a definite qualitative nature of the
unity, nor consequently for the survival of
human soul after death.   This because it is
not the interest of the speculative conscious-
ness that the multiplicity, or indeed that the
unity, should have a particular nature.   Its
problem is to find out the unity from which
the multiplicity as such could necessarily be

deduced. Hence it is that all the attempts
to determine the speculative unity and trace
the growth of multiplicity from it are in-
different as to the immortality of the human
soul. They are not only indifferent as to the
immortality of the human soul, they rather
strongly tend to deny it. If the unity is only
qualitative one, then too the soul is a transi-
tory mode of the substance. Its being is in
every case adjectival. Even when it seems
to attain to self-subsistence, as in idealism,
its survival after death is the survival of its
memory (or idea) in God or the survival of
the element common to all the souls, *i.e.*, their
general idea ;—in every case it is re-absorbed
in God.

Seventhly, the speculative unity must be
absolutely *knowable*, while the religious unity
need *not be knowable* at all.

The speculative unity has its origin in the
yearning *to know* reality. The speculative con-
sciousness is knowledge consciousness. It

assumes that reality is essentially knowable
by us.   Hence when the empirically-minded
comes to the task of metaphysics, he grasps
reality as fundamentally matter, material,
physical,—as the direct object of immediate
perception ; or as sensations and ideas, psychi-
cal, mental,—again as something which is
directly apprehended in introspection.   The
world-picture that is thereby constructed is
materialism or subjective idealism.

While if the task is undertaken by the
rationalistically-minded, the world is grasped
as a system of concepts or categories,—of that
which is the proper object of thought and can
be grasped by the intellect without remainder.
The world-picture thus produced is idealism,
etc.   But if the attempt were to be made cri-
tically, *i.e.*, on the principle of Kant, the unity
shall have to be conceived as that of a Law
from which all other laws could be rigorously
derived,—law which is again an abstract object
and is fully grasped by thought.   However,

for Kant it is only a regulative idea and has
no objectivity.   Thus we see that it makes no
difference what kind of unity is taken as the
unity of the world by the speculative con-
sciousness, it is through and through known
and knowable.

   But the religious unity need be only partly
knowable; it need not be wholly knowable,—
indeed it is not wholly knowable, because the
demand for it arises in the need of man for
a being who could protect and guide and help
him in the world-situation in which he finds
himself.   The unity must therefore have the
attributes requisite for the purpose.   But they
constitute the nature of the unity with regard
to—*in relation with* him.   They are neither
all the attributes, nor need they necessarily
define the absolute nature of the unity.   And
the humility incident to the attitude towards
the unity and the immense grandeur of the
unity necessarily lead man to maintain that it
surpasses the grasp of his tiny faculties and is

essentially incomprehensible by him. He has
to confess that لا يعلمه الا هو —no one knows
him but He Himself and ما يحيطون به علما—by
cognition they cannot comprehend him. In-
deed the religious consciousness in its highest
form, *viz.*, revelation seems to hold that the
unity is not knowable, even in relation to us,
at all, that it is knowable neither in its exis-
tence, nor even with regard to its attributes
in relation to us; for its existence and its
attributes are beyond experience, only it is con-
vinced of and hence *believes* in the existence
of the unity, and in such attributes of it as
necessitated the postulate of its existence;—
there is no question of knowledge.

Eighthly, each of these unities engenders a
different mode of life. The speculative con-
sciousness breeds *contemplation*, meditation,
quietude; while the religious consciousness
arouses yearning, struggle, *activity*.

The speculative unity, once grasped, brings
all activity to end. For if the unity is grasped

as perfect, the highest activity becomes the
timeless activity of thought which is "dialec-
tic" for Plato, and "theoria" for Aristotle :—
and human beings become perfect with the
perfection of God—the unity of which they
are modes (Spinoza); and hence there remains
no room for activity. But if the unity is
conceived as imperfect, there arise two alterna-
tives. In one case, it would be once for all
imperfect and determined by its inner neces-
sity; and hence all exertion to make it perfect
would be futile. In the other, that is if the
unity involves progress towards perfection,
it would of necessity grow perfect and no
activity on the part of us human beings is
required for its perfection.—In its very nature
the speculative consciousness in knowledge-
consciousness. And knowledge in itself pro-
duces contemplation and not activity.

But it is quite the other way about with the
religious unity. The need of the religious
unity has arisen in man from the situation that

there are many yearnings in his soul, and the
world around him as well as his own nature
raises insuperable obstacles in his way to their
realisation. The help and guidance from the
religious unity, *i.e.*, God, require and inspire
him to active struggle against these obstacles.
The struggle aims at bringing his own nature
in harmony with the Divine Will, and in
bringing the whole order of the world too in
harmony with His Will. This struggle to
create the subjective and objective harmony
is not the means to the realisation of these
yearnings; rather the struggle itself is the
gradual realisation of them. The task is so
gigantic that it must continue till the end of
the world, and requires enormous and inces-
sant work.—Indeed the religious consciousness
is *yearning*—it is yearning to become some-
thing, to get to something, to *bring about*
something; it is practical consciousness and
must needs generate *activity*.

These distinctions between the speculative

and the religious unities are of paramount importance. They must not be obliterated.

Now pantheism, the doctrine of Islamic mystics called Waḥdat-i-Wujūd, seems exactly to do this;—it obliterates these distinctions. It seems to identify the religious unity with the speculative unity. The confusion of these two very distinct unities is not confined to mystics only; it is found also in philosophers. There seems to be an urge in human nature to make of these two one unity. What happens is this. The two unities lie latent in the consciousness of the subject, the thinker or the mystic. Both are descriptions of ultimate reality. The primary approach to it is either through the medium of thought or that of intuition,—to the speculative unity or to the religious unity. If to the former, the attributes of the religious unity are unawares attached to it, if to the latter, those of the speculative unity. Thus are the 'Substance' of Spinoza and the 'Idea' of Hegel endowed

with Divine attributes ; and thus are the Deity
of Plotinus and God of Jāmī deduced from
the conception of pure Being.

   More particularly what seems to happen in
the case of a Muslim mystic is this. To begin
with, he is a Muslim. He believes in God,
he believes in His attributes, and he believes
in his own responsibility and in life-after-
death ;—indeed he believes in all that has
been given to him by the religious conscious-
ness as it manifested itself in Muhammad.
Then there happens to arise a yearning in his
soul,—the transcendental yearning of Kant,
to *know* God. Ordinary experience palpably
has no place here. He is led to believe that
there is a new kind of experience,—a trans-
cendental experience which can be acquired.
That is, there is something called "Kashf-o-
Shuhūd" by which one can know God. He
takes to it. He now *knows*;—he *realises* God
and he realises His nature. The reason that
he now uses in this connection too is Kashf-

o-Shuhūd; it is spiritual reason. Thus both
the elements of knowledge, *viz.*, experience
and reason get to their rights;—only they are
transcendental. In this way the Islamic mys-
tic passes over to the speculative conscious-
ness—to *knowledge consciousness*. All the
inherent requirements of the speculative con-
sciousness must now be fulfilled; God must
be grasped now as the speculative unity. The
mystic knows that He is knowable, that He
is immanent, that He is the only existent,
etc. The attributes, which he formerly
believed in, remain confusedly tacked on to his
newly-attained knowledge. Sometimes the
mystic himself remains unaware of the con-
fusion; sometimes he becomes aware of it,
and either throws such attributes overboard
in favour of the speculative attributes, or
permits the confusion to remain for fear of
dire consequences to himself or to the vulgar
who would lose all if they were told what the
truth is.

But what the Islamic mystics consciously held is this: Mysticism is an attempt to have a firsthand experience of what the Prophet of Islam is supposed to have experienced. The Islamic mystic believes that the Prophet experienced God and Eternity. The mystic is out to experience them himself. He adopts certain practices called "Mujāhida" or spiritual exercises. On his way he believes he acquires certain occult powers to work Karāmāt, miracles. With these we are not concerned. However it must be borne in mind that in all this he tries to keep to Islam and its spirit. What interests us is the third element of mysticism, *viz.* "Kashf-o-Ilhām" or intuition of God and Eternity. The mystic believes that he comes to apprehend eternal verities and God directly. This is what is also known as religious experience. The subject comes, so to say, in direct contact with Divine Being. He has immediate vision of God. The result is "Ḥaqq-ul-

Yaqīn "—[1] the infallible certainty of His exis-
tence and His essence. The competence and
validity of *Kashf-o-Ilhām* as the faculty
cognisant of Divine Being is assumed without
question; and it is maintained that Kashf is
qualitatively different from reason. It is the
direct apprehension of ultimate Reality.

Now it must be borne in mind that on the
principles of Islamic mysticism the reliability
of Kashf is to be measured by the criterion
of the spiritual experience of the Prophet of
God; for that was the highest and the truest
experience. This gives us a standard, so to
say,—an internal evidence of the truth or

---

[1] *Haqq-ul-Yaqīn* (حق اليقين) : Literally absolute certainty.
Yaqīn or certainty according to mystics has three stages; ' *ilm-ul-
yaqīn* ', ' *ain-ul-yaqīn* ', ' *ḥaqq-ul-yaqīn* '. One finds smoke and is
certain that there is fire, this is ' *ilm-ul-yaqīn* ', one sees fire
with his own eyes, he is more sure than the first person of the
existence of fire, this is ' *ain-ul-yaqīn* ' one puts his hand in fire
and gets a burn, he realises the existence of fire, this is *ḥaqq-ul-
yaqīn*. With reference to the Being of Allāh, the mystics
believe that one passes through similar stages of certainty and
realisation. But on the principle of the Mujaddid none of these
kinds of *yaqīn* is possible in case of the Being of God.

otherwise of the findings of a mystic.

Throwing a glance on the history and development of pantheism or Waḥdat-i-Wujūd in Islamic mysticism, we find that before Ibn 'Arabī and Ḥakīm-i-Ishrāq,[1] there are to be found only accidental utterances of sundry mystics purporting to pantheism. For example Bāyazīd Bustāmī (d. 261 A.H.) is said to have exclaimed, سبحانى ماأعظم شانى—Holy am I, how great is my Glory; and Manṣūr (d. 309 A.H.) انا الحق—I am the Truth; the implication thereof being that the relation between me and Him is that of identity. It was Ibn 'Arabī who seems to have been the first to interpret his own mystic experience of Tawḥīd, or unity in such a way as to be intelligible to others, and to have strenuously maintained that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd is the very essence of Islam. And Ibn 'Arabī tried to support his interpretation with verses of the Qur-ān and the sayings of the

---

[1] Shaikh Shahāb'uddīn Suharwardī, the author of *Ḥikmat-ul-Ishrāq*, (d. 578 A.H.).

Holy Prophet. Ibn 'Arabī has had enormous
influence on mystic thought in Islam. Conse-
quently Ibn Taimiyya had to write a treatise,
"فى ابطال وحـدت الوحود"—Refutation of Pan-
theism—in which he strongly criticised Ibn
'Arabī's conception of Tawḥīd and its impli-
cations. But perhaps Ibn Taimiyya's criticism
was too early.[1] At least it had little influence
in the Islamic East. Ibn 'Arabī had not yet
come to sway the Islamic soul. It was later
that his sway became complete. Practically
everyone accepted Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and held
it on the basis of mystic experience.[1]

It was at this stage that the Mujaddid
appeared. He found Waḥdat-i-Wujūd ram-

---

[1] Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A H) and Imām Dhahabī (d. 748
A.H.) as theologians strongly opposed Ibn 'Arabī. Dr. F.
Krenkow has kindly enlightened me on the point   He writes :
" In Syria and Egypt was a similar struggle against sufi Pantheism
waged by Ibn Taimiyya and the historian and Muḥaddith
Dhahabī.   In the eighth century the adherents of Sufism were
found in Egypt and Syria only among emigrants from Persia and
India and I fear they had a bad time. A Khānqāh in Cairo,
Sa'īd-as-Su'adā', generally harboured them."

6

pant.   He himself went through it in his
mystic development.   And the real point of
interest is that he throws it overboard as a
mystic, *i.e.*, exactly on the ground of his own
advanced *mystic experience*; and he seems to
have liberated the religious unity from its
complication with the speculative unity on
that very ground. And his findings apparently
bear the test, the criterion of the reliability
of mystic experience, namely, it coalesces
with the findings of the religious experience
of the Prophet as generally formulated by
Muslim divines!

Describing his internal history, the Mujad-
did writes that at first he only believed in
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd; for from early childhood
he knew it on rational grounds and was
thoroughly convinced of its truth. But when
he entered mysticism, it was then that he
first realised Waḥdat-i-Wujūd as a spiritual
experience and came to know it first-hand.
Long did he remain in that *maqām* or stage;

and all knowledge that is incident to that
stage was granted to him.[1]

Afterwards a new kind of spiritual experi-
ence took hold of his soul, and he found that
he could hold Wahdat-i-Wujūd no longer.
Yet he hesitated to give expression to his
new experience, because he had cherished
Wahdat-i-Wujūd so long. At last he had
to reject it definitely, and it was revealed
to him that Wahdat-i-Wujūd was a lower
stage and that he had arrived at a higher
stage, *viz.*, Zilliyyat or adumberation. His
rejection was now something which he could
no longer help, though he was really unwilling
to reject it because of the respect for the
great leaders of mysticism who all had held
it. However, he yearned to continue at the
stage of *Zilliyyat* or adumberation for Zilliy-
yat or adumberation has a kinship with
Wahdat-i-Wujūd. In it he experienced him-
self and the world as the *zill* or shadow of

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 31.

God. But the grace of God took him higher
up to the highest stage, *viz.* 'Abdiyyat or
servitude. Then did he realise that 'Abdiyyat
or servitude is very high above all other
stages; and he repented having yearned to
stick to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and Ẓilliyyat[1] or
adumberation.

   Naturally enough, one expects that those
of the Muslim mystics who have chosen to
differ with the Mujaddid and have gone back
to Ibn 'Arabī and his Waḥdat-i-Wujūd, for
example Shāh Walī-Ullah, should primarily
contest the position of the Mujaddid on the
basis of mystic experience, and not merely on
rationalistic or logical grounds,—that they
should base their case on the religious
consciousness and not on the speculative
consciousness.

   With these introductory remarks, let us
proceed to discuss the position of the
Mujaddid in detail.

   [1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

CHAPTER I

The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawḥīd

TAWḤĪD literally means oneness. But in Islam, the term denotes the religious unity. As we have seen, the religious unity must be numerically one, and unique in the possession of all the attributes of perfection. This is Tawḥīd.

The conception of Tawḥīd as developed by the Mujaddid has historically arisen in his mind in close contrast with—indeed as a protest against Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or the unityism. He takes Ibn 'Arabī in particular for criticism, because Ibn 'Arabī is the great mystic who, for the depth of his insight and comprehensiveness of his argumentation, may well be called the 'Imām' or the Leader of pan-

theistic mystics in Islam; indeed he is actually
called Shaikh-i-Akbar or the greatest Shaikh.
It is consequently necessary to give a brief
exposition of Ibn 'Arabī's conception of
Tawhīd and the Mujaddid's criticism.

I.—*Ibn 'Arabī's Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or Unityism and the Mujaddid's Criticism of it*

IBN 'ARABI'S position with regard to Tawhīd
is that Being is one,—it is that which exists.
This Being is Allah.   Everything else is His
manifestation.   Hence the world is identical
with Allah.   The identity of the world and
Allah is conceived on the basis of the iden-
tity of His *Dhāt-o-Sifāt*[1] or existence and

------

[1] The distinction of Dhāt (ذات) and Ṣifāt (صفات) is very
nearly the distinction of substance and attributes.   At times it
looks like that of existence and essence.   It can be rendered as
the distinction of Being and Nature, or It and Its Qualities.
Asmā' (اسماء) plural of *Ism*, means Divine Names with reference
to particular Ṣifāt or Dhāt as they occur in the Qur-ān, *e.g.*,

essence—substance and attribute; the world being only a Tajallı[1] or manifestation of His Şifāt[2] or attributes. In other words, the creation of the world is a form of emanation.[3] The theory of emanation as held by Ibn 'Arabī and especially as elaborated by his followers as well as the later mystics, *e.g.*, Jāmī, is this.

Rahīm (رحيم), the Merciful, as they are the names of Allah in virtue of His qualities or activities, *i e*, an *Ism* combines Dhāt and Şifāt.

[1] *Tajallı* (تجلّى) is really shining forth. The conception underlying it is that God is Light and this Light shines forth as if bodily in many forms Hence it may be translated as eradiation, effluence, emanation, manifestation and in philosophical terminology is equivalent to Mode When the Light shines forth on itself it is Tajallı-bi-nafsihī (تجلّى بنفسه). As the Light shines forth in various grades to the mystic it is Tajallı'-ı-Dhātī or Sıfātī, etc., with reference to the mystic it means the vision of the Light or illumination by it. If this vision is that of the attributes of God it is Tajallī'-ı-Sıfātī (تجلّى صفاتى), if it is the vision of the Being or Dhāt of Allah it is Tajallī'-ı-Dhātī (تجلّى ذاتى).

[2] ShF., p. 8, lines 15-21, and p. 9, lines 6, 11, 15, 16, 21.

[3] The act of creation by the word كن ("Be") is nothing but the descent of the Creator Himself into the being of things. See ShF., p. 178, lines 25-27, p. 183, lines 10, 11; p. 213, lines 11-12; p. 152, lines 11-16; p. 253, line 22.

The Being is indeterminate; it is the stage of
Lā-ta'ayyun or Indeterminateness of the unity.
In its Descent or Determination it passes
through five stages. The first two are 'Ilmī
or Cognitive and the last three are Khārijī
or Existential. In the first descent, the unity
becomes conscious of itself as pure being, and
the consciousness of Ṣifāt is only Ijmālī, *i.e.,*
general,—it is implicit. In the second descent,
the unity becomes conscious of itself as
possessing the attributes; that is the stage of
Ṣifāt-i-tafṣīlī, *i.e.,* attributes in detail,—it is
explicit. These two descents seem to be
conceived as conceptual or logical rather than
actual; for they are out of time, and the
distinction of Dhāt and Ṣifāt or its attributes
is only Dhahnī or logical.—Then begin the
real actual descents. The third descent
therefore is Ta'ayyun-i-rūḥī or the determina-
tion as spirit or spirits; the unity has broken
itself up into so many spirits, *e.g.,* angels. The
fourth of its descents is Ta'ayyun-i-mithālī or

ideal determination, thereby the world of Ideas
comes into being.   And the fifth descent is
Ta'ayyun-i-jasadī or physical determination ;
it yields the phenomenal or physical beings.[1]
These stages are only gradual realisations of
the capacities that were already latent in the
attributes.

   This brings out that for Ibn 'Arabī Dhāt
or Being is identical with Ṣifāt or atributes,
and Ṣifāt express themselves in tajalliyyāt, *i.e.*
manifestations or modes which are the world
and its objects.   This same identity of divine
modes with His attributes, and of attributes
with his Being, is brought out in another way.
Ibn 'Arabī maintains that Asmā'-i-Ilāhī or
Divine Names are identical with the Musammā
or the Named, and the Musammā is the very
being of Allah ;[2] and that the Divine Names,
although they are many, denote   the same

   [1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 1.
   [2] ShF., p. 143—text of FH.

entity;[1] and that whatever is denoted by
each name separately is denoted by all of
them together. God can be praised with any
name or with all the names together, because
all the names denote the same being.[2] Just as
He is manifold as regards His Names, and
One as regards His Being, so He is Aḥadiyyat-
i-Maʿqūla[3] like Hayūlā[4] or 'matter' or a
conceptual unity as regards His being, and
manifold as regards His existence, because the
created beings are nothing but He himself
in self-emanation.[5] Now this identification of
Asma' or names and Musammā the named
is only another name for the identification
of Dhāt and Ṣifāt, *i.e.*, Being and Attributes,

[1] ShF., p. 223—text of FH.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.

[3] Aḥadiyyat (احديت) is the quality of being one; it is a stage
in mystic journey where the mystic turns away from multiplicity
and sees only unity. Aḥadiyyat-i-Maʿqūla (احديت معقوله)
means conceptual unity—unity which is conceptually grasped.

[4] Hayūlā (هيولى) is 'Matter' in the Aristotelean sense, which
has Sūrat (صورت) or ' Form ' as its correlative.

[5] ShF., p. 253—text of FH.

because 'Ism' or name is nothing but the description of the object in virtue of an attribute of the being.

As to the relation between the world and God, Ibn 'Arabī holds that it is one of identity. In bringing out this identification he proceeds either from the negation of the world or from the affirmation of God. Proceeding from the negation of the world, Ibn 'Arabī holds that the world as such is merely nominal, unreal, imaginary, objectively non-existent,[1] and that God alone exists. The world or multiplicity exists only as the modes of the unity—as His modes; it has no existence of its own : لا عيان ماشمت راشحة من الوجود —[2]

---

[1] ShF., p. 117, lines 3-5—text of FH.

[2] Ā'yān (اعيان) is plural of 'Ain (عين). It means essence in the terminology of Ibn 'Arabī. But essence can be conceived in two ways; either as the *concept* of the nature of a thing or as the *nature* of a thing itself. The latter is something which exists, and may rightly be called the existent nature of the thing. It is in this sense that Ibn 'Arabī uses the term Ā'yān. Ibn 'Arabī calls it Ā'yān-uth-Thābita (اعيان الثابتة). They are Thābita because they are posited as existent, they are therefore existent essences.

the essences which are existent nature of
things have not got the slightest touch of
reality about them.[1] Proceeding from the side
of God, Ibn ‘Arabī maintains that the world is
God ; it is the modes in which the unity has
differentiated itself ; these modes exhaust the
unity wholly; the unity has no existence over
and above them : مابعد هذا لا لعدم المحض—there
is absolute nothingness beyond these modes ;
and the mystic should not take the trouble of
seeking God beyond this world.[2]

But this experience of identity is not a
permanent experience.   Hence Ibn ‘Arabī
comes to speak of a new experience called
Farq-ba‘d-al-jam‘[3] (difference-after-Identity).[4]

---

[1] ShF., p. 63, lines 14-15   [2] *Ibid*, p. 33, line 17.

[3] Farq (فرق) literally means difference ; in mystic terminology
it signifies the state of mind in which the mystic feels the sense
of being other than God and separate from Him.—Jam‘ (جمع)
means coming together; in mystic terminology it signifies the
state of mind in which the mystic feels one with God Farq-ba‘d-
al-Jam‘ (فرق بعدالجمع) means separateness after unification ; in
mystic terminology it is the state of mind in which the mystic
has outgrown the stage of Jam‘ and feels himself other than God.

[4] ShF., p. 91, line 24.

One may call that which really exists God
or one may call it the world, or one may
express his inability to differentiate between
the two.[1] It remains one and the same. Again
Ibn 'Arabī denies transcendence, and he denies
immanence, because these conceptions imply
duality of existent.   He puts it thus : if God
is posited either as transcendent or as imma-
nent His infinitude would be lost.   Hence
Tawhīd should be affirmed with ' Tanzīh ' and
' Tashbīh '[2], *i.e.*, with transcendence and imma-
nence both.[3]   Again, according to Ibn 'Arab
Allah is Aṣl or the Thing and the world is His
Zill[4] or adumberation.   But ẓill or adumbera-

---

[1] ShF., p 134, lines 22-23, p 147, lines 10-11.

[2] *Tashbīh* (تشبيه) literally means likeness. In theology i
means attributing likeness of Creatures, *i e*, the qualities of the
creatures to the Creator. Ibn 'Arabī takes likeness to be iden
tity and hence Tashbīh comes to mean immanence.—*Tanzī*
(تنزيه) literally means to purify. In theology it signifies tha
the attributes of creatures cannot be ascribed to God. In Ibr
'Arabī it comes to mean transcendence.

[3] ShF, p 45, line 12—text of FH , p. 48, line 31.

[4] *Aṣl-o-Zill* (اصل وظل) means the Thing and its Adumbera
tion or shadow. In Ibn 'Arabī ẓill seems to be used as equivalen

tion is the appearance of aṣl or the thing ; it is aṣl appearing, manifesting itself.   Hence the world is identical with Allah.[1]

As to the relation between Man and God, Ibn 'Arabī maintains that the relation between God and man is that of identity, of immanence,[2] of Qurb or nearness.   Really qurb or nearness as affirmed in the verse, نحن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد—We are nearer unto him than his life-artery, means nothing other than the fact that God Himself is the very essence of the limbs and parts of man.[3] Again, man is said to be created after the

to appearance ; it is conceived as In'ikās (انعكاس) or Reflection, which is well-nigh equivalent to Tajallī or Emanation.   But in the Mujaddid zill in the beginning means shadow which signifies resemblance with the Thing   But as he advances, ' zill ' becomes more and more of a mere shadow and indicates insignificance and unreality.   In the end it comes to mean only an effect

[1] ShF., p. 113, line 12, and p. 116, lines 10, 11, 13, 14

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 77, lines 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and p. 79, lines 9, 13

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 128, lines 2-5—text of FH

image of Allah : خلق الادم على صورته—He created man after His own Image. That means that man possesses all the attributes of God. In fact it is His attributes that are manifested in man ; they are bodily there in man.[1] That is why it is said : من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه —one who comes to cognise his own self comes to cognise his God.[2] That is, knowledge of self is knowledge of God.

Ibn 'Arabī's Waḥdat-i-Wujūd comes out also in connection with his theory of the Purpose of Creation. The purpose of creation, according to him, is the yearning on the part of Allah to know Himself : كنت كنزاً مخفياً فاحببت ان اعرف فتخلقت الخلق—I was a hidden Treasure ; I wished that I should be known, so created the creatures. The yearning to know Himself is the yearning for self-perfection. This perfection consists in expression or realisation of His own self through the

---

[1] ShF., p. 252—text of FH.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 185, lines 1-5—text of FH.

temporal and eternal qualities that manifest
themselves in the world-process; in other
words in actualising all the qualities that were
potentially there in Him.   Thus from what-
ever side we start, Ibn 'Arabī unambiguously
leads to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.

Now turning to the Mujaddid we find that
his mystic progress in general has had three
stages,[1] *viz.*, wujūdiyyat or pantheism, zilliyyat
or adumberation and 'abdiyyat or servitude.
At the first stage he has the spiritual experi-
ence of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.   The object of
mysticism at this stage is to turn the belief
based on faith or reason into sure and certain
knowledge based on direct experience with
regard to God and His relation to man and the
world,—that God exists, that He is imma-
nent in man and the world, and that His
relation with the world is that of identity.
This stage lasts for a long interval and the

---

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

Mujaddid realises it in all its detail and in all its depth.[1]   Then he passes over to the stage of ẓilliyyat or adumberation. This is a transitional stage.   At it he finds that the world has a being of its own, though it is only the ẓill or a shadow, semblance of reality.   Allah is the Aṣl or the Real.   A sense of duality arises ; he seriously begins to doubt Waḥdat-i-Wujūd ; but he does not yet possess the clarity and the conviction to deny it forthwith.   Indeed he yearns to stay on in this stage because it has affinity with Wujūdiyyat,—the world is seen as ẓill or adumberation of the Aṣl or the Real, *i.e.*, of Allah.   He finds himself reluctant to outgrow this stage. In course of time, however, he outgrows this stage also, and passes over to the stage of 'abdiyyat or servitude the highest stage. Duality of God and the world now becomes clear to him like the light of the day.   The

[1] M. Vol. I, Ep. 31 : Vol. II, Ep. 42.

7

world and God are *two*. He is thoroughly
convinced of this; and he must promulgate
their duality whatever odds there be against
him.[1]   At this stage he realises that all his
previous mystic experiences were really sub-
jective and unreliable;—they did not corres-
pond to objective reality. No room is left
now for the identity of God and man. His
confidence in the objective validity of mystic
experience is gardually being undermined. In
the end he comes to realise that to speak of
an experience of God, which the mystics do,
is blasphemy. God is far and far above the
grasp of our faculty of reason and of *kashf* :
ان الله وراء الوراء ثمر وراء الوراء [2]—Allah is beyond
the Beyond, and again beyond the Beyond.
Neither His being nor His attributes are
directly knowable. The only justification
for mystic discipline that remains to him
now is not the possibility of the experience

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep 42.
[2] *Ibid.*, Ep. 1.

of the Divine, but its trend towards the puri-
fication of morals.[1]   The Mujaddid expressly
realises here that Imān-bil-ghaib or the faith
in the Unseen alone is the truth.[2]

   With these stages of the development of his
mystic experience in view, we may now turn
to the Mujaddid's criticism of Ibn 'Arabī's
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.   Let it be remembered
that the Mujaddid contests it exactly on the
basis on which Ibn 'Arabī held it, *viz.*, mystic
experience;[3] though in the exposition of
them both rational argument is mixed up
with the description of mystic experience.
That in God dhāt-o-ṣifāt or existence and
essence, being and attributes are identical,

---

   [1] *Imān-bil-ghaib* (ایمان بالغیب): Faith in the Unseen,—
Ghaib (غیب) is opposed to Shahāda, *i.e.*, to that which can be
seen and observed, faith in entities which cannot be seen and
observed, *e.g.*, God, Angels, Heaven, Hell, etc., is Imān-bil-
ghaib. The term is used in this dissertation with particular
reference to the Being of God.
   [2] *Cf.* M., Vol. I, Eps. 207 and 217.
   [3] *Ibid.*, Ep. 31 ; *Cf.* Ibn 'Arabī, ShF., p. 12, line 24.

and that the world is the tajallī or emana-
tion, or mode of ṣifāt or attributes; these
two premises necessarily involve Waḥdat-i-
Wujūd. The Mujaddid must therefore meet
each of these premises. Consequently he holds
that each of these premises is invalid. The
ṣifāt or attributes are not identical with the
dhāt or being; but they are over and above
the dhāt. This is a truth directly apprehen-
ded by kashf-i-ṣaḥiḥ or veridical intuition, *i.e.,*
by genuine mystic experience. Moreover it
is also in harmony with Revelation, because
the Qur-ān says: [1] ان الله لغنیٌ عن العالمین
verily God is wholly sufficient unto Himself,
—He needs none of the worlds; (29 : 5)—the
worlds or the creation being but only the
Ṣifāt, in their actuality or realisation according
to Ibn 'Arabī. He is perfect in Himself. The
attributes, by which He turns to the world
and creates it, are other than His Self. Indeed
right reason also demands that the attributes

---

[1] M., Vol. III, Eps. 26, 100, 110.

must be other than His being.—Nor is the
world the *tajallī* or emanation of the ṣifāt or
attributes. For if the world were the tajallī
of God's ṣifāt, it would have been identical
with them ; but the *ṣifāt* are perfect while
the world is full of imperfections.[1] For exam-
ple, human knowledge has no resemblance
with God's knowledge, so that one may be
called the tajallī of the other.[2] Further
Kashf-i-Ṣaḥīḥ or true mystic intuition bears
testimony to it that the world is not the
tajallī or emanation of ṣifāt or attributes.
Moreover when we turn to waḥī [3] or Revela-
tion, which is the criterion of the truth of
mystic experience, it bears us out. It says :

سبحان ربك رب العزت عما يصفون —thy Lord is
holier than the qualities which they ascribe

---

[1] M., Vol III, Eps. 113-114

[2] *Ibid.*, Ep. 100.

[3] *Waḥi* (وحی) is revelation in general but in Islam it is a
revelation of specific nature. It is information or guidance
communicated to a Nabī (نبی) by Allah through the agency of
an angel or directly.

to Him (37 : 180). That is, there is no
likeness whatsoever between the Divine and
the human attributes.[1]

Now where Ibn 'Arabī starts from the
denial of the world as such and maintains that
' A'yān-u<u>th</u>-<u>th</u>ābita' the existent essences of
the world have not had the slightest touch of
reality, and that it is God alone that exists,
the Mujaddid observes that Ibn 'Arabī is
talking at the stage of Fanā[2] or annihilation.
It is after the mystic passes over to the
higher stages, that he realises the error in-
volved in this stage. It is then alone that he
understands the reason of having formerly
regarded the world as non-existent. At the
stage of Fanā or annihilation the mystic was
absorbed in the being of God and utter

---

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 1.

[2] *Fanā* (فنا) literally means self-annihilation. In mystic ter-
minology it means the stage at which the mystic turns his face
away from everything other than Allah and forgets it totally.
The obliviousness leads in certain cases to the denial of every-
thing other than Allah.

forgetfulness with regard to mā-siwā—things other than God had taken hold of him. Hence he could perceive nothing but God.[1] Consequently he began to deny the existence of everything else and affirm the being of Allah alone. Just as when the sun shines the stars disappear in its light and cannot be observed, although they are actually present in the sky and have not ceased to exist; in the same manner the mystic was so much occupied with the being of God that he was unable to apprehend and affirm other things in spite of the fact that the things were actually there.[2] In fact Ibn 'Arabī does not seem to have realised Fanā or annihilation adequately, for he is still aware of the world; that is how he could identify it with God.[3] Secondly, Ibn 'Arabī's position does not satisfy the criterion of kashf-i-ṣaḥīḥ or veridical in-

[1] M. Vol. I, Eps. 122, 291
[2] *Ibid.*, Ep. 43.
[3] *Ibid.*, Ep. 272; Vol. II, Ep. 35.

tuition, *viz.*, it is not in accordance with 'Waḥī'.
It is against revelation. We have been taught
by revelation that God is wholly other than
the world, and that the world exists.   Had
it not been so, awāmir-o-nawāhī or the com-
mandments of commission and omission, and
the actions in accordance with those com-
mandments, should have become meaning-
less.   The   imperatives   and   the   actions
according to them can have meaning only if
the world really exists.   Otherwise reward
and punishment cannot rightly follow on
them and the Hereafter becomes meaningless.[1]
Thirdly, it is scepticism to deny the objective
reality and external existence of the world
and call it unreal and non-existent; indeed
it is a denial of God's attribute of Ibdāʿ or
creation and of the fact that He really created
a world.[2] Moreover to call it mawhūm
will not do.   For mawhūm may mean a

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 67.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ep. 44.

number of things. In one sense mawhūm
means that the world is simply the invention
of our imagination; it is nothing but our
own ideas. In this case it would disappear
if our imagination were to disappear. This
is downright scepticism and denial of God's
attribute of Ibdā' or creation, as said above;
and it is wholly untenable. In the other sense,
mawhūm means that the world does exist
objectively, though its existence as compared
to God's is as insignificant as the existence
of a mere imaginary thing. In this sense it
would be wrong to hold that it is identical
with God.[1] For the world is contingent,
while God is necessary; they can never be
identical with one another. The former is
temporal, the latter is eternal. One is subject
to 'How' and 'Why', and the other is above
it. Consequently from both the points of
view, religious and rational, it is impossible
to hold that the world does not exist, or that

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 58.

it is identical with God.[1]

Further where Ibn 'Arabī starts with the sole reality of God, the Mujaddid points out that Ibn 'Arabī is speaking at the stage of Tajallī'-i-dhātī or vision of Being, *i.e.*, the stage at which the mystic feels that he is directly apprehending the being of God. But the mystic discovers the error involved therein only when he outgrows that stage. Then and then alone he realises that God is wholly other and beyond this world, and that he cannot approach Him, and that the identity of the world and God was a fabrication of his own mind. Ibn 'Arabī took the world as identical with God because he did not pass beyond this stage. It was the highest stage of his mystic progress. Had he advanced further, he would have realised that God is beyond all kashf-o-shuhūd or intuition and experience.[2] Indeed had Ibn 'Arabī realised

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 31.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Ep. 75

Tajallī'-i-<u>dh</u>ātī or vision-of-being fully, he
should have talked only of God, and not at
all of the world and its identification with
God.[1] Further, this mystic intuition of Ibn
'Arabī, unless interpreted otherwise, is abso-
lutely opposed to Revelation. According to
Revelation it is a heresy of the worst kind.[2]

Another aspect in Ibn 'Arabī's exposition
of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd is his doctrine of Farq-
ba'd-al-jam' or difference after identity. The
objection that the Mujaddid raises in this
connection is this: If it is true to say that
Ā'yān-i-<u>kh</u>ārijī or existent essences have not
had the slightest touch of existence, how is
it possible that affirmation of God only
bit-tanzīh, *i.e.*, as a transcendent Being, can
change His infinitude into finitude? God is
existent and the world is non-existent and
imaginary, having no objective being. How
can an imaginary being set limits to the

---

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 32.
[2] *Ibid.*, Ep. 89.

existentially real? It is equivalent to saying
that the mere idea of God's equal can destroy
the quality of His uniqueness![1]   Secondly, if
tashbīh or immanence must be joined with
tanzīh or transcendence, the mā-siwā-'llāh
or things other than God cease to be. Hence
it is why that Ibn 'Arabī maintained that
worship of any object whatsoever is the
worship of Allah;[2]—which is diametrically
opposed to *waḥī* or Revelation.   The Qur-ān
teaches : قل يآ اهل الكتاب تعالوا الىٰ كلمة سواءٍ
بيننا و بينكم لا نعبدو الاالله ولا نشرك به شيأً ولا يتّخذ
بعضنا بعضاً ارباباً من دون الله ٔ فان تولوا فقولوا اشهدوا
بانا مسلمون O—Say : " O followers of the Book !
Come to an equitable proposition between us
and you that we shall not worship any but
Allah and (that) we shall not associate aught
with Him, and (that) some of us shall not take
others for lords besides Allah ; but if they
turn back, then say : ' Bear witness that we are

---

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 74.
[2] *Cf.* ShF., p. 55, lines 4, 9, 10, 11.

Muslims'[1] ". That means that 'Ahl-i-Kitāb' or
the people of the scriptures worshipped some
things other than Allah, and that things and
beings other than Allah there are.[2] Thirdly,
those who combine immanence with transcen-
dence do not know that God is beyond the
reach of our reason and comprehension, and
that what they regard as immanent are mere
fabrications of their own imagination, whom
they have raised to the dignity of God. God
is high above our kashf-o-shuhūd[3] or intuition
and experience. Fourthly, the stage which
Ibn 'Arabī calls the stage of Farq-ba'd-al-jam',
i.e., difference-after-identity, is not the stage
of Farq-ba'd-al-jam'. That stage is attained
only when the world and God are realised as
different from one another, while Ibn 'Arabī
did not realise them as separate and distinct.
In fact Ibn 'Arabī did not reach this stage;

[1] Q., 3 : 64.
[2] M., Vol. I, Ep. 272.
[3] *Ibid.*, Ep. 9.

that is why he proposes that one may call the 'real' God, or he may call it the world, or he may express his perplexity on account of their indistinguishability.[1] The stage of Farq-ba'd-al-jam' is realised only when the mystic differentiates between the world and God; and it is a higher stage than that reached by Ibn 'Arabī.[2]

Again where Ibn 'Arabī has based Waḥdat-i-Wujūd on the identity of aṣl and ẓill, *i.e.*, the thing and its adumberation, the Mujaddid contends that the ẓill or adumberation of a thing can never be identical with the aṣl or being, the ẓill is only a copy or a likeness of the aṣl. In case of God the ẓill is contingent, and the aṣl Necessary. The essence of the contingent is non-being and that of the necessary being. Hence aṣl and ẓill can never be identical.[3] For example, if the shadow of a

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 71; *Cf. Ibıd.*, Vol. I, Ep. 285.
[2] *Ibıd*, Vol. I, Ep. 290.
[3] *Ibıd.*, Vol. II, Ep. 1.

person is prolonged, it can never be said that
the person is prolonged. Now, firstly, the
world is not the ẓill of God; and secondly,
even if it may be taken as the ẓill of God, the
identity of the two is not proved.[1]

As to man and his identity with God, Ibn
'Arabī is not right in basing it on the verse :
نحن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد—We are nearer
unto him than his own life-artery. Certainly
God is nearer to us than our life-artery; but
the nature of His Qurb or Nearness is beyond
our comprehension.[2] Nor is he right in his
interpretation of خلق لا ادم على صورته—God
created man after His own image. This does
not mean that man is the embodiment of the
attributes of the Creator. It only means that
both God and the human soul are non-spatial,
and that they resemble each other in this
respect.[3] Otherwise there is a vast difference

---

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ep. 46.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 287.

between man and God, as there is, for example,
between the spider that warily spins its web
and a being who by a single breath can wipe
out the whole structure of heaven and earth.
God and man simply cannot be identical.[1]—
Again Ibn 'Arabī is not right in his inter-
pretation of من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه —one
who comes to cognise his self comes to
cognise God. That knowledge of the self is
the knowledge of God, does not mean that
therefore the self and God are identical.
No. It only means that one who has fully
become conscious of the defects and imper-
fections in his own nature realises that values
and perfections are possible only through
God; and that God is the source and embodi-
ment of all values and perfections.[2]

As to the Purpose of Creation, the Mujad-
did observes that Ibn 'Arabī's position implies
that God was not perfect in Himself; and

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 310.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 234.

that He had to depend on the world for His
perfections. But, firstly, this is against reli-
gion and against Revelation. According to
Revelation God is absolutely independent of
the world. ان الله لغنى عن العالمين—verily Allah
is sufficient unto Himself and needs no
worlds.[1] Secondly, according to Revelation
the purpose of creation is not knowledge at
all but 'Ibādat,[2] service. The Qur-ān says:
ما خلقت الجن والانس الا ليعبدون—I have not created
man and jinn but exclusively for 'Ibādat
(51:56). However, one may say that 'Ibādat
means Ma'rifat, *i.e.*, knowledge of God. All
the same, in the knowledge of God consists

---

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep 110.

[2] 'Ibādat (عبادت) may generally be called worship but is not
exactly that. It is rather the consciousness of one's own in-
significance and humility in relation to a being whose qualities
are incommensurable, and not the consciousness of the qualities
of that being. Hence ''Ibādat' is any action performed with
a will to be in harmony with Him. According to Islam Allah
is exclusively the Ma'būd (معبود), object of worship. Ma'bū-
diyyat is the quality of being Ma'būd. 'Abd (عبد) is the person
who performs 'Ibādat.

the perfection of man and not the perfection of God, who is perfect in Himself and is not affected by the creation of the world. He is as He was before the creation, لان كما كان —He is now just as He was, *i e.,* Perfect.[1]

Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is not true, wujūd or Being is not one, insists the Mujaddid.—The experience of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or identity of being is not objective ; it is subjective, it is merely Waḥdat-i-_Shuhūd_[2]—apparent identity—the mystic only feels or sees One. And the Mujaddid traces the origin of this mistake in mystic experience. How does

---

[1] M , Vol I, Ep 266

[2] *Waḥdat-ı-_Shuhūd_* (وحدت شهود) or *Tawḥīd-ı-_Shuhūdī_* (توحيد شهودى) means unity of appearance It is the Mujaddid's interpretation of Waḥdat-ı-Wujūd The exact translation is difficult. It may be translated as apparentism According to him the experience of Waḥdat-ı-Wujūd is only appearance. It appears to be so but is not really so , it is mere _Shuhūd_ or seeming So Waḥdat-ı-_Shuhūd_ or Tawḥīd-ı-_Shuhūdī_ may be apparentism : however it is generally taken to mean the theory of creation propounded by the Mujaddid (pp. 149, 158. *infra*) which apparently a mistake Sufīyā'-ı-_Shuhūd_ıyya are the mystics who believe in this theory

this subjective experience arise? The Mujaddid points out that the source of the experience is different with different classes of men. With some it originates in cognition; with others in feeling. The former begin with excessive meditation on the Unity of Allah, and come to interpret لا اله الا الله (there is no object of worship but Allah) as equivalent to لا موجود الا الله (none exists but Allah). The dawn of this kind of Tawḥid on the consciousness of the mystic is due to the dominant cognitive aspect consequent on persistent thinking and meditation on the Unity; by constant repetition it becomes impressed on his mind and he begins to imagine that he directly apprehends Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unity and identity. With others the experience originates in excessive love of the Divine Being. The mystic is lost in the object of his love to such an extent that he loses sight of everything else. He beholds nothing but the object of his love

and finds nothing other than Him. Conse-
quently he comes to believe that none but
the Divine Being exists. When he turns to
the world he perceives the object of his love
in every particle of it, and he comes to regard
multiplicity only as a mirror or reflector of
the beauty of the Beloved. Some of these
mystics who are perfectly lost in the con-
templation of the object of their love pray to
remain always absorbed in it and yearn that
their own existence may never be brought to
their consciousness. They regard any re-
ference to their own self as heresy. Their
ideal is annihilation. They have no rest.
Rest requires oblivion,—forgetfulness which
is impossible when the fire of love is constant-
ly consuming them. Yet oblivion is necessary.
Hence they must occupy themselves with
such pursuits as suit their capacities, keep
their attention diverted and conduce to for-
getfulness. So some of them take to music
and dancing, and others to writing books and

giving expositions of the implications of their
love-consciousness,   *viz.,*   Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.
But there are others who in course of time go
forward in their mystic experience and out-
grow this stage.   In their case the experience
of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unity and identity
disappears once for all, and they never get it
again.   Then they repent of the pantheistic
beliefs to which their former experience had
misled them.[1]

The Mujaddid's Tawhīd

THE conception of Tawhīd as advanced by
the Mujaddid himself is this.   We cannot
know God through kashf-o-shuhūd or
intuition and mystic experience.   Hence we
should revert to Revelation and to Ulamā-
i-zahir or divines, because their conception

is derived direct from Revelation.[1] Conse-
quently the Mujaddid discusses dhāt-o-ṣifāt
or the being and the attributes of God on the
principle of Muslim theologians; and there
he follows not the Asharite school but the
Maturidite.[2]

As mentioned above, the Mujaddid passed
through wujūdiyyat or unityism and reached
ẓilliyyat or adumberation where the error
involved in wujūdiyyat was revealed to
him; and after ẓilliyyat, adumberation, he
attained the stage of *'abdiyyat*[3] or servitude.
At this stage he is so thoroughly convinced of
the error of wujūdiyyat or unityism that
he feels himself compelled to denounce it
emphatically. It is at this stage that he clearly
realises that mystic experience has no objec-
tive validity with regard to dhāt-o-ṣifāt or

[1] M., Vol I, Ep 286.

[2] *Ibid*, Ep. 266.

[3] *'Abdiyyat* (عبديت) is the attitude appropriate to man that
he takes towards God.

the being and attributes of God. Hence he confesses to the following negative attributes or peculiarity of the Divine Being ; God is beyond all asma'-o-sifat or names and attributes as can be comprehended by us. He is beyond all shuyūn-o-i'tibārāt[1] or modes and relations, all zuhūr-o-butūn or externalisation and internalisation, beyond all burūz-o-kumūn or projection and introjection, beyond all mawsūl-o-mafsūl or realisable and explicable, beyond all kashf-o-shuhūd or mystic intuition and experience ; nay even beyond all mahsūs-o-ma'qūl, empirical and rational, and beyond all ' mawhūm-o-mutakhayyal ' or conceivable

---

[1] *Shuyūn* is plural of Shān (شان), literally state, condition rather an exalted condition or state. The word occurs in a verse of the Qur-ān شان فى هو يوم كل—everyday He is a new exalted condition (57 : 29) Ibn 'Arabī and others seem to understand by it, Sifāt at a phase of theirs, a transverse section of the World-Process, the Universe or God at a certain point of time. But the Mujaddid puts Shān between dhāt and sifāt. According to him Shān is an aspect or phase of the dhāt, while sifāt are something over and above dhāt and derivated from Shān. *Cf.* M., Vol. I, Ep. 286.

and imaginable, هو سبحانه وراء الوراء ثمر وراء الوراء

ثمر وراء الوراء—He the Holy One is beyond the
Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again
beyond the Beyond.[1] Whatever is known
through mystic intuition is merely a subjective
experience, without any objective validity
whatsoever. In short, God can never be
apprehended through mystic experience,
Consequently īmān-bil-ghaib or faith in the
Unseen is unavoidable. Such a faith is possi-
ble only when thought and imagination get
tired in their futile efforts, and it becomes
evident that God is unapproachable, inex-
perienceable, inexplicable and unknowable.[2]
Such a faith alone is valid in His case, because
it is in keeping with our limitations and His
unapproachableness or Beyondness.

If it is possible for us to get to know any-
thing besides this about God, that is through

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 1.

[2] *Ibıd.*, Ep. 9.

Revelation. Therefore we ought to follow the
theologians as they derive their conception of
the being and attributes of God exclusively
from revelation.[1] On that basis, the Mujaddid
maintains that God is K͟hāliq or Creator of
earths and heavens, mountains and oceans,
vegetables and minerals as well as of human
beings with all their potentialities. In short
He is the Creator of all things, and He has
created them out of 'adam-i-maḥaḍ or *pure
nothing.* He alone is the bestower of all
blessings, the healer of all ills and the provider
of all needs. He is the Sattār[2] or Conniver
who overlooks our sins, He is Ḥalīm or
Forbearing who does not take us hastily to
account for our wrongs. He deserves all praise
and gratitude for His innumerable benefec-

---

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 287.

[2] *Sattār* (ستّار) literally means concealer.   It is a name of God.
Because He knows our sins and our secrets and neither divulges
them nor takes us to task there and then, but covers at them and
graciously tolerates our sinful being.

tions. Man does not know even how to value His goodness and greatness. He is the Hādī or *Guide*, who through His Anbiyyā' or Apostles[1] enlightens the ignorant mankind according to their capacity of His existence and essence; and who informs us of what He approves and what He disapproves, and of the useful and the injurious in this world and the Hereafter. He is the Āḥad or One, the Waḥdahu-lā-Sharīk, has no equal.[2] He is the only Divine Being; there is no one else who possesses the same ṣifāt or qualities, and He alone deserves 'ibādat or worship.[3] He encompasses or comprehends everything, is everywhere with us, and is

---

[1] *Anbiyyā'* (النبياء) plural of Nabī (نبى); neither the word ' prophet' nor the word ' apostle' is a correct equivalent of the term Nabī. It means a person to whom guidance and information is given through sheer grace of God for the good of mankind.

[2] Waḥdahū-lā-Sharīk (وحده لا شريك). The term really means the one who has no co-sharer. The conception is that He alone is the master of the universe and the object of worship. No one else shares these qualities with Him.

[3] M., Vol. III, Ep. 17.

nearer to us than our own life-artery or
ḥabl-al-warīd. But the nature of His Iḥāṭa or
comprehension and Ma'iyyat [1] or co-presence,
qurb or nearness is beyond our understand-
ing. Ḥayāt or Life, 'Ilm or Knowledge, Qudrat

---

[1] *Ma'iyyat* (معيت) literally means togetherness. Mystics
have taken it from the Quranic verse : وهو معكم اينما كنتم—
that He is with you wherever you are (57 : 4). From togetherness
Ibn 'Arabī concludes identity of God and man. The Mujaddid
takes exception to this conclusion and holds that we do
not know the nature of Ma'iyyat (معيت).—Qurb (قرب)
literally means nearness. Mystics have taken the term from the
Quranic verse . ونحن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد—We are
nearer to him than his life-artery (50 : 16). Ibn 'Arabī holds
that Qurb of God is identity with God. The Mujaddid
denies this and maintains that the nature of Qurb is not
known.—Iḥāṭa (احاطه) is encompassment or comprehen-
sion. Mystics have taken the term from the Qur-ān :
كان الله بكل شىءٍ محيطا—Allah comprehends every-
thing (4 : 126). Ibn 'Arabī conceives it as inclusion and
derives identity of God and man from it. The Mujaddid takes
exception to it and holds that the nature of Iḥāṭa is incompre-
hensible, though at a certain stage he was inclined to hold that
Iḥāṭa is comprehension by knowledge.—Siryān (سريان) literally
means permeation. Ibn 'Arabī and others ascribe Siryān to Allah
with reference to the world, i e. immanence. The Mujaddid
rejects this.

or Power, Irāda or Will, Sam'-o-Baṣar or
Hearing and Seeing, Kalām or Speech, and
Takwīn or Creation belong to His attributes,
which are like His being bī chūn-o-bī chigūn
i.e., incommensurable and uncomprehensible
for us.[1]

Reflection on the Mujaddid's description of
Divine attributes shows that they are of two
kinds, negative and positive. The negative
attributes again are of two kinds; firstly those
which are meant to deny all imperfections in
God's Being, *e.g.*, that He has no equal and no
rival, no parents and no children;[2] secondly
those which indicate His beyondness, *e.g.*, that
He is not body or physical, is neither substance
nor attribute, is not space or spatial, is not
limited or finite, has neither dimensions nor
relations, *i.e.*, He is above the application of
our categories of thought. Again the positive
attributes are also of two kinds. Firstly,

[1] M., Vol I, Ep. 266.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol III, Ep 17.

relative attributes which are relatively true
of Him, *e.g.*, Qidam or Self-Subsistence,
Azaliyyat or Eternity, Wujūb[1] or Necessity
and Ulūhiyyat or Worshipability. We affirm
these attributes of Him only because the
attributes opposite to them are signs of
imperfections ; and in comparison with these
attributes denote perfection ;—and not because
they adequately describe His nature. Other-
wise the Divine essence has nothing to do
with necessity and possibility, etc. But human
thought is confined to the three fundamental
categories of being, *viz.*, necessity, possibility
and impossibility: therefore it is proper to
attribute necessity to Him. Secondly, essen-
tial attributes which adequately describe His

---

[1] Note: According to Islamic thinkers being is of three
kinds: Mumkin (ممكن), Mumtana' (ممتنع), Wājib (واجب).
Wājib is that of which the non-existence is inconceivable.
Mumtana' is that of which the existence is inconceivable.
Mumkin is that of which neither the existence nor the non-
existence is inconceivable. Wujūb (وجوب) is the quality of
being Wājib and may well be translated as Necessity.

nature and are absolutely true of Him. They
form part of His essence, *e.g.* Ḥayāt or Life.
'Ilm or Knowledge, Qudrat or Power, Irāda
or Will, Sam' or Hearing, Baṣar or Seeing,
Kalām or Speech, and Takwīn or Creation.

As regards the relations between the dhāt
or being and the ṣifāt or attributes of God
on   one   hand   and   between   dhāt-o-ṣifāt
and the world on the other, the Mujaddid
maintains that His ṣifāt or attributes are
other than and in addition to His dhāt or
being, and that the world is the ẓill or effect
of His ṣifāt or attributes.   The problem
really is a problem of theology.   Hence the
Mujaddid follows here the Maturidite school.
However, he corroborates the conception on
the basis of his mystic experience as well, and
maintains that according to it too the attri-
butes are not identical with the being and
that the being of God is perfect by and in
itself and does not stand in need of the
attributes for its perfection.   God is mawjūd,

has existence ; but he exists by His own being,
by His own self, and not in virtue of the
quality of wajūd or existence which has been
added to this being.   In the same manner He
is Ḥayī—He is Ḥayī or Living by His own
being, He is ʻAlīm or Knowing by His own
being ; He is Qadīr or Powerful by His own
being: He is Murīd or voluntary Agent by
His own being; He is Samīʻ or Hearing by
His own being ; He is Baṣīr or Seeing by His
own being; He is Khāliq or Creator by His
own being.   His attributes, *viz.*, existence,[1]
life, knowledge, power, etc., are the taʻyyanāt
or determinations or the descents of His
being.   Indeed the Mujaddid would avoid the
use of the term of tanazzul[2] or taʻyyun be-
cause it tends to signify identity.   According
to him the ṣifāt or attributes are the aẓlāl or
effects of the dhāt or being ; and the world is

---

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 26.

[2] The Being is conceived as coming down from the high
pedestal of Pure-Being—down to determinate existence. Hence
tanazzul means Descent or Determination.

the ẓill or effect of the ṣifāt or attributes.
The gradation or order of these tanazzulāt-
o-taʻyyunāt or the aẓlāl in the system of the
Mujaddid is that the Perfect Being is the
cause of the quality of wujūd or existence.
Then follows the ṣifat-i-ḥayāt or the quality
of life, because life is not conceivable without
existence.   After life comes the ṣifat-i-ʻilm
or the quality of knowledge ; after knowledge
ṣifat-i-qudrat or the quality of power, and
after power ṣifat-i-irāda or the quality of
will ; after will the ṣifat-i-samʻ or the quality
of hearing, after hearing the ṣifat-i-baṣar or
the quality of seeing ; after seeing the ṣifat-i-
kalām or the quality of speech, and after
speech, the ṣifat-i-takwīn or the quality of
creation.   The ṣifat-i-takwin or the quality
of creation is the cause of the creation of
the world ; the world is its ẓill, *i.e.,* its
effect, and not its tajallī, *i.e.,* its mode. These
attributes of God are over and above the
being of God, for the Perfect Being brings

them into existence one by one for the sake
of creating the world; the gradation is logical.
It is by means of these attributes which He
adds to His being that the Perfect Being who
is sufficient unto Himself and needs nothing,
turns to the creation of the world and creates
it.[1]

The Mujaddid's theory of creation is this:
God is Wujūd-i-Kāmil or the Perfect Being,
comprehending all ṣifāt-i-kāmila or attributes
of perfection in His essence. He is sufficient

[1] That the Ṣifāt or attributes are زايد على الذات, *i.e.*, over
and above the dhāt or being of God and not identical with it
is the doctrine of the Maturidites whom the Mujaddid follows.
These are conceived as additional to the Ṣifāt or attributes
which go to make the essence of God. They are Iḍāfī or
relative. They come to be in relation to the creation of the
world and are produced by God in His own Self for that
purpose. This is a mode of conceiving which avoids the pitfall
of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism of which one premise was that
these Ṣifāt or attributes are identical with the Dhāt or being
(M., Vol. III, Ep. 26)—that the Ṣifāt are created and not part
of the essence of God was also the doctrine of certain Muta-
zilites, but on a different ground. They held unity in the
essence of God, and consequently found the Ṣifāt to be multi-
plicity incompatible.

9

unto Himself, needing nothing whatsoever
besides Himself;—not even 'adam or
nothing as the opposite of His being. He
decides to create the world. For the sake of
this He creates the ṣifat-i-wujūd[1] or the
quality of existence in His being; also He
creates other ṣifāt or qualities, *e.g.,* the ṣifat-
i-ḥayāt or the quality of life, the ṣifat-i-'ilm
or the quality of knowledge, the ṣifat-i-qudrat
or the quality of power, etc., in Himself. These
qualities are forms of this ṣifat-i-wujūd.
Now opposed to this wujūd or existence is
'adam-i-maḥaḍ or pure nothing, opposed to
this Ḥayāt or life is a form of 'adam called
mawt or death; opposed to this 'Ilm or
knowledge is a form of 'adam called jihl or

---

[1] Thus the Mujaddid holds that Wujūd or existence is an
attribute which is produced by God and does not form part of
the essence of God. He thereby seems to mean firstly that
the being of God is of another kind, and we cannot call it
Wujūd or existence of the kind we know; and secondly that
Wujūd or existence of the things is like a quality inasmuch as
it has been given to them by God.

ignorance; opposed to this Qudrat or power is a form of 'adam called 'ijz or powerlessness, etc. God casts an in'ikās or ẓill[1]—reflection or shadow of this pure wujūd or existence of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila or opposed nothing, *i.e.*, into pure ''adam' or nothing and there comes to be finite existence. He casts a reflection or shadow of this Ḥayāt or life of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila, *viz.*, into mawt or death and there comes to be finite life. In the same manner He casts a reflection or shadow of this 'Ilm or knowledge of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila, *viz.*, into jihl or ignorance, and finite knowledge comes into existence. Thus the existence, the life, the knowledge, etc., of the finite being is the result of the mixture of 'adam or nothing and Wujūd or existence, etc. The essence of the

---

[1] Note that this in'ikās (انعكاس) or ẓill of which the Mujaddid speaks is not conceived by him in the sense of Ibn 'Arabī. By these expressions the Mujaddid really means that the wujūd or being, etc., of the finite is *produced* by this Wujūd, etc., of God, as will come out later.

finite in itself, however, is pure ''adam' or
nothing, the ' wujūd ' or existence, the 'ḥayāt '
or life, the ''ilm' or knowledge, etc., which are
found in it, are pure gifts of God.   That is
how the finite world has actually come to
be,—has come into being out of nothing, and
has acquired actual, real existence.   So also
the various qualities of the world and its
objects.[1]

In truth God alone has real, actual indepen-
dent being ; and the world has an existence
beside God only as a gift of God.   In reality
the being of the world is not more than
appearance,—appearance without genuine re-
ality.   And yet the appearance is not such
as to depend on our fancy or imagination ; it
exists independently of us.   The reality or
existence of the world is something like this.
Suppose there is a stick of wood.   One of its
ends is put into fire and catches flame.   The
other end of the stick is held fast and quickly

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 1 ; *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Eps. 58, 60.

moved round in a circle. This would produce
the appearance of a circle of fire. Suppose
this appearance is somehow perpetuated,—it
is made to exist by itself. A circle of fire
shall have been produced thereby. The exist-
ence of the world is of the kind of the exist-
ence of such a circle.[1]/ Or suppose a juggler
by his magic produces the semblance of a
garden ; the garden bears fruit. Forthwith the
king who was watching the trick orders that
the juggler be executed ; for the king believed
that if the juggler were killed instantaneously
the garden will continue to exist as a real
garden. The story says that the garden of
magic still exists and bears fruit. Now the
existence of the world is like the existence
of that garden. It is not real in itself ; reality
has been somehow bestowed on it ; and it is
a very unsubstantial kind of reality.[2]

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 58.
[2] M., Vol. II, Ep. 44.

The Mujaddid insists that there is abso-
lutely no relation between the world and its
unique Creator except that the world has
been created by Him and is a sign that indi-
cates His hidden attributes.   All other asser-
tions, *viz.,* ittiḥād or union or identity, iḥāta
or comprehension and ma'iyyat or co-existence
are due to sukr or the ecstatic condition of
mystics.   Those who have reached the higher
state of saḥw or sobriety are free from such
so-called ma'ārif or cognitions. True, they too
came across such cognitions in the course of
their mystic journey ; but they have left them
behind and they criticise them in the light of
Revelation.   Indeed, to speak of the relations
of ittiḥād or union, 'ainiyyat or identity, etc.,
between God and the world is an awful mis-
conception.   It is a misconception of this
sort. Suppose a highly accomplished man
invents an alphabet and certain sounds to
display his ingenuity and capacity. Some-
one comes forward and maintains that the

alphabet and the sounds are identical with
the inventor.[1]

As to man, the Mujaddid holds that the
essence of man is the soul, and that the soul
is the creation of God. However, the soul
does not belong to ''ālam-i-khalq'' or the
universe of process, to which material things
belong; it belongs to ''ālam-i-amr'' or the
universe of instantaneous creation.[2] It is
bī-chūn-o-bī-chigūn or incomparable and in-
explicable. It is something unique which
cannot be explained by something else; that
is, it cannot be derived from anything else.

---

[1] M., Vol. I, Eps. 31, 287.

[2] 'Ālam-i-khalq (عالم خلق) is Universe of process. The distinc-
tion is based on the Quranic verse: قل الروح من أمر ربى —say
that the soul is my Lord's command (17 : 85). This is interpreted
to mean that the rūḥ (روح) does not belong to 'ālam-i-khalq to
which the material universe belongs, but to another 'ālam, *viz.*,
the 'ālam-i-amr, the world of instantaneous creation. The
universe of matter is clearly the world of process—things in it
gradually come to be in course of time. The rūḥ is therefore not
such. It belongs to the world of instantaneous creation. The
distinction suggests a rationalistic background, in which the per-
ceptual is temporal and the conceptual non-temporal. *Cf.* M.,
Vol. I, Ep. 260.

Now the original inclination of the soul
was to seek Divine approval. But the soul
has been intertwined with the 'ālam-i-khalq
—it has been given a body. This has aroused
in it certain new tendencies, *e.g.*, to sin, to
disobey God. This state of things has given
rise to the need of purifying the soul and
encouraging and strengthening its original
inclination. The tendency to disobey God
is the fountain-head of all evils and vices.[1]
The soul begins to hate virtue and indulges
in vice. The state is called nafs-i-ammāra
or the Evil self. But in spite of sin and dis-
obedience the soul preserves the capacity of
overcoming vice.[2] So through purification
there begins gradually to arise in it a state of
repentance. This is called nafs-i-lawwāma

[1] MM., pp. 19-20.

[2] The Mujaddid emphatically maintains moral freedom in
man. For it is kufr (كفر) or heresy to believe in jabr (جبر)
necessity (M., Vol. I, Ep. 289), firstly, because the Qur-ān
says فمن شاء فليؤمن و من شاء فليكفر —so let him who
please believe, and let him who please disbelieve (18 : 29 ; *Cf.*

or the Reproaching-self. Having progressed further, it attains to another stage where it achieves perfect harmony with the Divine Will. To act according to any commandments of commission or omission ceases to be unpleasant to it. This stage of spiritual development is called nafs-i-muṭma'inna or the beatified self. This is the zenith of human perfection and the highest end for man; indeed it is the very purpose of the creation of man.[1]—The attainment of nafs-i-muṭma'inna or beatified self is called the stage of 'abdiyyat or servitude. ''Abdiyyat' is attained when man becomes absolutely free from bondage to everything other than

M., Vol. I, Ep. 289) ; secondly, because لا يُكَلِّفُ اللهُ نَفْساً إلاَّ وُسْعَهَا—Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability (2: 286 ; *Cf.* M., Vol. I, Ep. 289) ; and thirdly, because Islam and reason conceive actions as subject to approval and disapproval and to consequent reward and punishment (M., Vol. I, Ep. 260). He discusses the question fully on theologico-rationalistic grounds in Epistle 289, M., Vol. I,

[1] M., Vol. II, Ep. 50; *Cf.* Q. 89 : 28-30.

Allah. Mark that love of God is not the end-in-itself, it is only a means; it is a means to dissociate oneself from mā-siwā-'llah[1] or things other than Allah and to get to 'abdiyyat or servitude.

The relation between man and God is according to the Mujaddid that of 'abd and ma'būd or the worshipper and the worshipped. 'Abdiyyat or servitude means that man should change his whole life according to the Divine will and should obey His commandments of commission and omission simply because they are His commands.[2] There is also another relation between man and God, *viz.*, ma'rifat or cognition. But true ma'rifat or cognition only means that man should realise that he is incapable of knowing God. As Abu Bakr-aṣ-Ṣiddīq said: العجزمن درك لاادراك

ادراك فهو سبحـان مـــن لـو يجعل للخــلق الـــيه
سـبيلا لا بالعجز عن معرفته —to realise one's

---

[1] M., Vol. I, Ep. 30.

[2] *Cf.* M., Vol. I, Eps. 30, 160.

inability to comprehend Him is the true
comprehension ; Holy is He Who has not kept
any road to Himself open to His creatures
except by way of realising their incapacity
to know Him.[1]

[1] M., Vol. III, Ep. 122.

CHAPTER II

The Reception of the Mujaddid's Conception of Tawḥīd

TAWḤĪD or unity of God is a characteristic tenet of Islam. In course of time the Islamic mystics gave it the form of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. The influence of mysticism gradually permeated Islamic society. Waḥdat-i-Wujūd became an accepted dogma. It influenced the whole of Islamic society from top to bottom. It affected its religious attitude, it affected its moral attitude, it affected its deeds; it affected its æsthetic consciousness, it affected its literature and poetry; and it affected its philosophy and outlook. It was the deepest truth to which man could have access,—indeed it was the

real meaning of Islam's teaching. It was
revealed to the initiated, to great and holy
souls, and was directly apprehended by
ka<u>sh</u>f-o-<u>sh</u>uhūd or intuition and mystic
experience. So it was an epoch-making event
that a great personality like that of the
Mujaddid, great in religious learning and great
in mystic experience, took Waḥdat-i-Wujūd
up for criticism and evaluation, criticised it
unsparingly and trenchantly, and exposed its
errors in their very foundations and expressly
and unremittingly denied the objective
validity of the experience on which it was
based; and further advanced a conception
diametrically opposed to it, and insisted that
his conception, and not Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism, was the genuine Islamic concep-
tion—the conception which alone is derivable
from the revelation granted to the Prophet
of God. Thereby the Mujaddid veritably
gave a new turn to the Islamic mysticism and
brought it nearer to the original teachings of

Islam. This was a revolution, and his ideas spread far and wide with such speed that the greater part of the Islamic world acknowledged him as the Renewer of Islam in his own life-time.

Few had the courage to oppose the Mujaddid. No one in Naqshbandiya school contradicted him. Other schools of mysticism too kept silent, though they seem to have stuck to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd. The first important personage who took up the cudgels seems to have been Shāh Walī-Ullah a divine of very great eminence and a mystic of the Naqshbandiya school. Shāh Walī-Ullah flourished about a century after the Mujaddid. About 1143 A.H. he wrote a small treatise فيصلة وحدتالوجود والشهود " Decision on the case of unityism and apparentism ". The gist of his contention is that there is no substantial difference between the ideas of Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid; that both mean really the same thing, *viz.*, Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism,

that their differences are in reality only
verbal. In his treatise Shāh Walī-Ullah
begins with the claim that God almighty has
granted to him the special gift of synthesis or
reconciliation.[1] Further he makes it clear
that he was not discussing the problems on
the basis of first-hand mystic experience, but
simply as an arbiter, keeping the statements
of both Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid in view
and considering and evaluating them rational-
istically.[2] This attempt of Shāh Walī-Ullah
at a synthesis of Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid
led inside the mystic circles, and even outside
them to a keen and prolonged controversy
which lasted for over a century. In the
following pages we shall try to follow it in
its main outlines in important mystics.

[1] FW., p. 3, lines 9-15.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 5, lines 13-15

1.—*Shāh Walī-Ullah*

SHAH WALI-ULLAH holds that Wujūd[1] or being is something qā'im-bi-nafsihī and muqawwim-li-ghairihī, existent by itself, and support of the existence of everything other than itself; and that this is an unequivocal dictum of dhawq-i-ṣaḥīḥ or genuine intuition. Wujūd or being is wujūd-i-munbasiṭ or self-unfolding being; it takes up the forms of things. It has its tanazzulāt or descents. These tanazzulāt or descents are of two kinds— 'ilmī and 'ainī—conceptual and existential. The first tanazzul or descent of wujūd-i-

---

[1] *Wujūd* (وجود) is Being or existence —Wujūd-ı-munbasiṭ (وجود منبسط) is self-unfolding or self-emanating Being. It has had three stages of its descents. The first stage is Wujūd lā-basharṭ-ash-shai (وجود لا بشرط الشئ) indeterminate (concept of) pure Being. The second is Wujūd basharṭ lā-shai (وجود بشرط لاشئ), pure concept, *i.e*, the concept of determinate Being. The third one is Wujūd basharṭ-ash-shai (وجود بشرط الشئ), determinate existent being, the being of a particular existent object.

10

munbasiṭ is tajallī-bi-nafsihī—its becoming
conscious of itself.   As such it is all compre-
hensive and implicitly contains in itself all
the details.   The next tanazzul or descent is
tafṣīlī—the explicit or the detailed conscious-
ness of itself.   After tanazzulāt-i-'ilmī   or
conceptual descents come tanazzulāt-i-'ainī
or existential descents.   They in their very
nature cannot be implicit; explicitness or
detail is necessary for them.   Now according
to mystics the essence of contingent beings
are nothing but modes and differentiations
of the   wujūd-i-munbasiṭ or self unfolding
being. Consequently, when it is apprehended
in its capacity as mutalabbas or dressed, it is
the contingent being; and when it is appre-
hended in its capacity as mutalabbis or
dresser, it is the necessary being.[1]   For ex-
ample, there is a piece of wax; it is moulded
into various forms, *e.g.*, man, horse, etc.   All
the same it remains wax; it is wax which has

[1] FW., pp. 12, 13.

taken these different forms. These forms
are simply modes; their being is nothing but
the wax.[1]   At another place Shāh Walī-Ullah
says that the wujūd-i-munbasit or self
unfolding being is the common element of
the perceptual and the conceptual.   As such
it is wujūd-i-munbasit or indeterminate
being and the opposite of 'adam or non-
being and is the hayūla or matter of all
beings.   At the second stage it is wujūd
bashart la-shai or pure *concept, i.e.,* the
concept of determinate beings, *e.g.,* man,
horse; and at the third stage it is wujūd
bashart-ash-shai or determinate or existent
being, *e.g.,* Aristotle, my horse.[2]   This is the
doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.

The doctrine which is called Waḥdat-i-
Shuhūd or apparentism is this.   The asma'-
o-shuyūn or names and phases of the necessary
being reflect themselves in their ā'dām-i-

[1] FW., p. 6, lines 12-18.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

mutaqābila or opposite non-beings, thereby
the contingent coming into existence.[1] Now,
contends Shāh Walī-Ullah, if we leave simile
and metaphor aside, it is essentially the same
doctrine as that of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.[2] To
say that the essence of the contingent beings
are the asma'-o-ṣifāt or names and attributes
of the necessary being differentiated in the
conceptual stage, as Ibn 'Arabī holds, or to
say that the contingent beings are the asma'-
o-ṣifāt of the necessary being reflected in
their ā'dām-i-mutaqābila or opposite non-
beings as the Mujaddid maintains, is practically
the same thing. If there be any difference
between the two positions, it is so insignificant
that the critic need not take it into account.[3]
Consequently the assertion of the Mujaddid
that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and
Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism are different

[1] FW., p. 23.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

from one another is simply an error,—Ibn
'Arabī too means the same as the Mujaddid
does; and the controversy of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd
or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or appa-
rentism is only a verbal rather than a real
one.[1] By Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism
all that is intended is to throw emphasis on
the perfection of the necessary and the
imperfection and insignificance of the con-
tingent being. But even in this respect Ibn
'Arabī meets the Mujaddid; he too holds
that the contingent is insignificant and all
perfection belongs to the necessary being.[2]

2.—*Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir and Khwāja Mīr Dard*

THIS synthesis or reconciliation, which really

[1] FW., p. 29.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

amounts to a denial of the problem, was
however not accepted by mystics who believed
in the Mujaddid, *e.g.*, Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir
'Andalīb who maintained unequivocally in
his voluminous book *Nāla'-i-'Andalīb* that
speaking objectively Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism is absolutely invalid; it is not the
truth about reality. Objectively Waḥdat-i-
Shuhūd or apparentism alone is valid. But
speaking subjectively, *i.e.*, in their bearing
on the sālik, mystic and his spiritual growth,
both the doctrines are directed to the same
end, *viz.*, to dissociate him from mā-siwā[1] or
things other than Allah. Khwāja Mīr Dard
discussed the problem first in his *Wāridāt-i-
Dard* (1160 A.H.), and then at greater length
in his *'Ilm-ul-Kitāb* (1172 A.H.) which is
intended to be a commentary on the *Wāridāt*.
It may be noted here that both the father
and the son discuss the problem on the basis
of kashf or mystic experience. Indeed the

[1] NA., pp. 736-773; *Cf.* IK., pp. 183-186.

latter holds that each and every word of his *Wāridāt* and *'Ilm-ul-Kitāb* is divinely inspired.[1]

Khwāja Mīr Dard holds that the doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism in its correct and valid significance simply means that God alone is the self-existent being. It does not mean that the essence of the contingent is identical with the necessary and that man and God are identical with one another, or that God, like a kulli'-i-ṭabi'ī or natural universal, is immanent in the individuals. For that would be rank heresy, ilḥād-o-zindiqa. To take Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism in the latter sense is due to sheer want of insight into what eminent mystics meant by it. In the sense that Wujūd or being is immanent in multiplicity, Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a doctrine which is of no significance in religion whatsoever.[2] For Waḥdat-fi'l-kathrat

[1] IK., p. 92.
[2] IK., p. 183.

or one-in-many which is on the lips of the
common folk and of every Hindu Yogi is a
doctrine for which no Imān or faith in God
and His Prophet is required. It is a very
common-place doctrine which everyone can
be made to grasp easily. It cannot be some-
thing for which prophets had specially to be
sent by God with the mission of teaching it
to humanity.[1] The other doctrine is Waḥdat-
i-Shuhūd or apparentism. What it really
means is this : The contingent being cannot
exist without the necessary being ;[2] they exist
only by the light of the necessary being.
Ignorant people, who do not understand the
meaning of what the Mujaddid meant, wrongly
attribute to him the belief that the world is
the ẓill or adumberation of God. This view
was taken by him in the course of his progress
towards his final position. Most of the
immature mystics, who in their self-conceit

[1] IK., p 465.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

regard themselves as having attained perfection, when they go through those works of the Mujaddid in which he has discussed the duality of man and God and the doctrine of hama-az-ūst or 'all is from Him' think that he was ignorant of the truth of the matter; and that because Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a difficult conception, he could not fully understand or realise it. But they do not see that according to the verse, كل من عند الله —all is from Allah (4 : 78), the doctrine of hama-az-ūst or 'all is from Him'[1] is corroborated by revelation.[2] Consequently hama-az-ūst alone is the truth, and hama-ūst or 'all-is-He' is absolutely false. The net result is that objectively Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is false, and subjectively Waḥdat-i-Wajūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-<u>Sh</u>uhūd or apparentism both bring about the same result, *viz.*, liberation of the qalb or soul from the

[1] IK., p. 187.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

bondage of ma-siwā-'llah or things other than
Allah.   Hence if a mystic realises either of
the two states, or both of them, that makes
no difference.[1]—Indeed neither of these
doctrines descends from the Prophet;[2] both
are products of later times.   However, the
doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism
primarily abides by reason; and only second-
arily by the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth, which it
turns and twists to make them fit in with the
requirements of reason; while the doctrine of
Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism primarily
abides by the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth and only
secondarily by reason.   Says Khwāja Mīr
Dard: " Most of the ṣufīya'-i-wujūdiyya or
pantheistic mystics follow their own reason
and intuition, and they rely on the first
instance on their own findings.   Only in the
second instance, they try by the way to
follow the Holy Prophet also.   They mould

[1] IK , p. 184.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 609-610.

the verses of the Qur-ān and the sayings of
the Prophet according to their own taste, as
if they have nothing to do with the Sharī'at
or the law of Islam. That alone is valid which
they come to know by their own reason and
intuition.   It is not their real object to follow
the religion of Muḥammad.   They have the
conceit that they apprehend truth directly;
their purpose really is to ascertain whether
the contingent is identical with the necessary
or different from it, or whether the created
is identical with its Creator or different from
Him.   In this quest the reason is their only
guide, and they go their way by its light
alone; only they forcibly drag faith and
religion along with them . . . while most of
the ṣufīya'-i-shuhūdiyya or apparentist mys-
tics follow faith and religion in the first
instance.   They really believe in religion.
Only in the second instance and under the
guidance of faith do they permit their reason
to act . . . As if they have nothing to do with

reason, but what God and His Prophet have
affirmed, that alone is the truth for them. . .
They believe in their hearts that the truth is
that which is taught by God and the Prophet,
and that their object is not to inquire whether
the necessary and the contingent are identical
or different from each other. They steer their
course in the light of faith, and forcibly drag
reason along with them.[1]

Consequently, urges Khwāja Mīr Dard, we
should revert to Tawḥīd-i-Muḥmmadī or the
unitarianism of Muḥammad. God is eternal
and self-existent; He is other than the world
of objects. He is not like kullī'-i-ṭabī'ī or
natural universal inside it. The truth is that
God exists by Himself with all His attributes
which are His qualities of perfection; and
the existence of the contingent beings makes
no addition in His being, nor does their
annihilation take away anything from it.
‫شئ‬ ‫معه‬ ‫یکن‬ ‫لم‬ ‫الله‬ ‫کان‬—God existed and

[1] IK., p. 610.

nothing existed along with Him ; and لا ن کما کان
—He is even to-day exactly as He was
before.[1]

3.—*Mawlwi Ghulām Yaḥyā*

THE discourses of Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir and
Khwāja Mīr Dard are not openly directed

---

[1] IK , p. 186

Note.—In 1162 A H. ‘Allūma Mīr Muḥammad Yūsuf Bil-
grāmī wrote a treatise الفرع النابت من اصل الثابت (*The
Growing Offshoot from a Firm Root*), in which he deals with the
controversy without directly entering it. He bases his con-
tention exclusively on the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth and rejects
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd, suggesting that the experience of God which
unityistic mystics claim is, according to Islam, impossible in
this life. His treatise is an exhaustive survey and review of
the sources which the two schools claim for their doctrines in
Qur-ān and Ḥadīth. However the treatise, though able and
scholarly, does not seem to have been taken much notice of.
There is extant only one copy of it which is in the handwriting
of the author himself, in the Subḥān-Allah Section of the Aligarh
University Library.

against Sh̲āh Walī-Ullah. Gh̲ulām Yaḥyā,[1] a
scholar of great eminence, expressly criticised
Sh̲āh Walī-Ullah in his *Kalimāt-ul-Ḥaqq* (The
Announcement of Truth—1184 A.H.) which
he wrote at the instance of Mirzā Maẓhar,[2] a
spiritual descendant of the Mujaddid. Gh̲ulām
Yaḥyā emphatically maintains that Sh̲āh Walī-
Ullah is absolutely wrong in holding that both
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and Waḥdat-i-Sh̲uhūd or
apparentism hold the same views as to the
essence of things and the relation between the
temporal and the eternal, and that there is no

---

[1] Mawlwī Gh̲ulām Yaḥyā (d. 1195 A H.) was a scholar of
great fame in the philosophical and religious sciences. He
used to give lectures (*dars*) to students at Lucknow. He has
written commentaries on many books of philosophy. In the end
he entered mysticism under the guidance of Mirzā Maẓhar and
gave up philosophy.

[2] Mirzā Maẓhar (1111-1195 A.H.), was the fourth spiritual
descendant of the Mujaddid. He was the greatest mystic of
his time in the Mujaddidī order. Indeed it is in the line of
Mirzā Maẓhar alone that the complete Sulūk-i-Mujaddidī is
preserved. He was a devout follower of the Mujaddid. He
was murdered by a fanatic Sh̲ī'a in the year 1195 A.H. whom he
forgave before expiring

difference between the two doctrines. Indeed,
urges he, the two doctrines can in no way be
even reconciled.[1] For Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism is based on complete identity of the
created and the Creator, while Waḥdat-i-
Shuhūd or apparentism is grounded in abso-
lute difference between the two.[2]   In the
first place, says Ghulām Yaḥyā, according to
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism the essence of
contingent being are Ā'yān-i-thābita, *i.e.*, the
determinations of the Asma'-o-Ṣifāt or names
and attributes of Allah.[3]   But according to
Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism the essence
of the contingent beings are the azlāl or
adumberations which Asma'-o-Ṣifāt or names
and attributes have cast in their ā'dām-i-muta-
qābila or opposed not-beings.[4]   Now there is
a world of difference between these two doc-

[1] KH., p. 23.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp., 24-26.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

trines.   According to the former the contin-
gent beings are modes of Asmā'-o-Ṣifāt or
names and attributes and identical with them;
according to the latter they are the azlāl or
adumberations of the Asmā'-o-Ṣifāt or names
and attributes and the zill or adumberation
can never be identical with the aṣl.   In the
second place, Shāh Walī-Ullah is totally
wrong in saying that it was a mere oversight
on the part of the Mujaddid to oppose the
two doctrines.[1] No, the Mujaddid does not
do it by the way; he is emphatic on the
opposition.   He is absolutely clear on the
point.   He insists on the difference between
the contingent and the necessary over and
over again in his epistles, and holds that it is
heresy and atheism to identify the two.   His
epistles are full of such emphatic assertions.[2]
In the third place, according to Waḥdat-i-
Wujūd or unityism, change enters in the being

[1] KH., pp. 28, 29.
[2] Cf. H., pp. 26, 28.

of God itself, for it is He who modifies Himself and becomes the contingent world;[1] while, according to Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism, by creation of the world no change is wrought in the being of God,—He remains intact. Any one who would carefully study these two doctrines, urges Ghulām Yaḥyā, would realise that they are so different from one another that neither can we reduce one of them to the other, nor is any reconciliation possible between them.[2] It may further be remarked that Ghulām Yaḥyā's discourse tends to suggest that he had one more objection to Shāh Walī-Ullah, namely, that Shāh Walī-Ullah had no right to speak on the question and deny Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism, or identify it with Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism because he was not basing his contention on Kashf or mystic experience.[3]

[1] KH., pp. 25, 26.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-29.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 29.

Mirzā Maẓhar, the spiritual guide of G̲h̲ulām
Yaḥyā, supports him on the point and wrote
a Foreword to *Kalimāt-ul-Ḥaqq*; and S̲h̲āh
G̲h̲ulām ʻAlī (d. 1290 A.H.) who was a great
mystic, and who succeeded Mirzā Maẓhar,
expressly says in this connection that
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-
S̲h̲uhūd or apparentism are two different
stages of the mystic journey; and for those
who have been through both these stages, it
is impossible to synthesise or reconcile the
two experiences,—the implication thereof
being that S̲h̲āh Walī-Ullah did not pass
beyond the stage of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism and get to the stage of Waḥdat-i-
S̲h̲uhūd [1] or apparentism.

[1] MtM., p. 81.

4.—*Shāh Rafī-uddīn*

SHAH RAFĪ'-UDDIN,[1] son of Shāh Walī-Ullah, forthwith wrote a voluminous book called *Damagh-ul-Bāṭil* or 'Crushing of the False' as an answer to Ghulām Yaḥyā in the same year (1184). All that is relevant in this book to our argument is briefly this. Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is the true doctrine.[2] It is the truth of Islam.[3] All eminent mystics have cherished it,[4] while Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism is a new doctrine, advanced by the Mujaddid who had not grasped

---

[1] Shāh Rafī'-uddīn (d. 1249 A.H.). He was a younger son of Shāh Walī-Ullah, one of the very first translators of the Qur-ān in Urdu, and a well-known scholar. He wrote *Damagh-ul-Bāṭil* (دمغ الباطل) against Mawlwī Ghulām Yaḥyā to vindicate his father's attempt to synthesise the doctrines of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism. His argument is based on the commentary of *Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam* written by Shāh Sharf-uddīn, one of his father's pupils.

[2] DB., p. 8 (b).

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 10 (a)-15 (b).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 4 (a).

the argument of Ibn 'Arabī and believed
that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism was alto-
gether different from Waḥdat-i-<u>Sh</u>uhūd or
apparentism.[1] The right course, therefore, is
to take Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism as the
basic doctrine and interpret Waḥdat-i-<u>Sh</u>uhūd
or apparentism in its light, as <u>Sh</u>āh Walī-
Ullah had done. <u>Sh</u>āh Rafī'-uddīn does not
take the argument any further, and his attempt
in this field is mainly a heated apology in
favour of his great father.[2]

5.—<u>Sh</u>āh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī

SHAH SAYYID AHMAD BARELWI too contri-
buted to the controversy on Waḥdat-i-Wujūd

[1] DB., p. 4 (a).

[2] Cf. ibid., pp. 3 (b), 4 (a).

Note : <u>Sh</u>āh Ismā'īl <u>Sh</u>ahīd (1194-1247A.H.) was a grandson of
<u>Sh</u>āh Walī-Ullah. He too wrote a book called 'Abaqāt (عبقات)
or Perfumes on the reconciliation of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unity-
ism and Waḥdat-i-<u>Sh</u>uhūd or apparentism. <u>Sh</u>āh Ismā'īl

or unityism. His whole discourse is based on Kashf-o-Shuhūd or direct mystic experience, and is to be found in *Sirāt-i-Mustaqīm* (1233 A.H.)[1]. He says that when love dominates the mystic, the yearning for Taqarrub or nearness and communion with God grows more and more intense in his soul. This state gradually overpowers him. In this connection he attains to the stages of Fanā and Baqā, annihilation and resuscitation. Thus his condi-

expressly acknowledges that his argument is not based on Kashf or direct mystic experience (At., p. 33). He holds that Ibn 'Arabī is right and the Mujaddid wrong. The difficulties, which are attributed to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism can be, thinks Shāh Ismā'īl, squarely met on his own theory. His theory is very much the same as Berkeley's later position. It is this. When God chose to rule as an absolute monarch, He created the universe on the best design. The world is for us objectively real; it is not imaginary or illusive. But in fact it is not outside the mind of God; it is in it. It exists only as an idea in the Divine Mind (At., ﻋﻘﯿﺪﮦ 17, pp. 26, 27).—That is what Nicholson would call Panentheism, and distinguishes from pantheism. But afterwards Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd became a follower of Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī. That means that Shāh Ismā'īl changed his views and gave up Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. *Cf.* SM., pp. 12-13.

[1] SM., p. 95.

tion becomes that of a piece of iron, which is thrown into the furnace and fire permeates into its very being and to such an extent that it acquires all the characteristics of fire;— even its appearance becomes that of fire. One could affirm of it all that could be affirmed of fire. While in this condition, the piece of iron would, if it could speak, claim that it was fire itself. However the fact remains that it has not become fire; it is still iron as it was before. In the same manner when love of God takes hold of his being and he is completely overpowered by it, the mystic too begins to utter such phrases as انا الحق—I am the Truth, and ليس في حبتي سواء الله —there is none in my cloak but Allah.[1] But afterwards if he rises to a higher stage, the mystic is blessed with another experience. He feels infinite expansion ; he finds that all the realities of the universe and the contingent beings are dissolved in the being of

[1] SM., pp. 12, 13.

Allah, and the relation of identity which he had, at the previous stage realised between himself and God, obtain between God and all other existents. At this stage he begins to utter هو الاول والآخر والظاهر والباطن—He is the First and the Last, and the External and the Internal (57:3). But, firstly, to adopt the <u>Shugh</u>l-i-nafī[1] or exercise of negation never means that really everything ceases to exist, the purpose of the <u>shugh</u>l or exercise only is to do away with the consciousness of everything other than Allah. That everything else has thereby ceased to be is a mistaken notion; indeed it is absurd.[2] Secondly, if after Fanā or annihilation the mystic attains to the experience of Tawḥīd-i-Ṣifātī or unison in attributes, he feels that He is the source of all multiplicity, and that he has expanded to the extent that the whole of the universe is accommodated

[1] <u>Shugh</u>l-i-nafī.—It is the <u>Dh</u>ıkr of لا اله الا الله—' there is no god,' the practice of which creates the state of negation in the mind of the mystic.

[2] SM., p. 107.

inside himself. Here again arises the tendency in favour of the doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. But he should not be misguided. He should remember that the idea is contrary to the fact and that his condition is merely an indication of the stage of Tawḥīd-i-Ṣifātī;[1] and after this will come the stage of Sair-fi'llah—the journey inwards Allah. In short, according to Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad in whatever manner Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is experienced, it is no objective experience;—it is only a subjective experience. That is, thereby everything does not actually become God.[2]—Indeed Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad is absolutely opposed to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and regards it as one of the bid'āt or innovations of the pantheistic heretics and not worth discussing. However, as people talk of it frequently, one must know this much that the creatures are not

[1] SM., pp. 109-110.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13, 46, 107.

identical with the Creator, though He is undoubtedly their Qayyūm or Mainstay. The relation might be conceived on the analogy of ṣifāt or attributes. The ṣifāt or attributes are not identical with the dhāt or being nor are they apart from it ; they depend on the dhāt. In the same manner, makhlūqāt or creatures are not identical with the Ṣifāt or attributes, nor independent of the Ṣifāt or attributes ; they are Maẓāhir or phenomena of the Ṣifāt or attributes. The Ṣifāt or attributes are sufficient unto themselves ; they need no Maẓāhir. Yet in spite of their self-sufficiency, God has in His wisdom chosen to give them phenomenal expression in the forms of created beings called makhlūqāt. And that is really what great mystics meant.[1]

It appears that after Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad

[1] SM., p. 46.

Note: About this time the controversy seems to be taken up also by Ulamā'-ı-Ẓāhır (علماء ظاهر), the learned in general. Mawlwī Faḍl-ı-Ḥaqq of Khairābād (1212-72 A.H.), who is regarded as the Imām-i-Falsafa or chief of philosophers of

Barelwī no mystic of eminence wrote on this
controversy; while the mystics who belonged
to the Naqshbandiya order got into confu-
sion on the point under the influence of Shāh
Walī-Ullah.   The present-day mystics gen-
erally have taken to silence on the problem.
Some of them do make no difference whatso-
ever between the two doctrines ; while others
do not want to open their lips on the contro-
versy because of their allegiance both to Ibn
'Arabī and the Mujaddid.   They would give
out that each doctrine is vaild in its own
place, and that both Ibn 'Arabī and the
Mujaddid are right.

the Khairābādī school of Philosophy in India, too wrote a
brief treatise called روض المبجود فى وحــدت الوحود in this
connection. The argument wherein is purely philosophical and
does not concern us here.

THE CONCLUSION

THE foregoing discussion brings out that those who contradicted or vindicated the Mujaddid, assigned a meaning to the term Wahdat-i-Shuhūd as if it were the name given by the Mujaddid to his doctrine of the creation of the world and its relation to the Creator. But that is not correct. What the Mujaddid really meant by the expression was only this that the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism which the mystic acquires at a certain stage of his spiritual development is only subjective; that it is mere Shuhūd or appearance; that the Wahdat or unity which the mystic has experienced is only Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparent unity. It is not the experience of objective fact; the experience

is not objective ; objective reality is different
from what the mystic has experienced.

In fact the Mujaddid has given no name to
his own theory of creation.   If a name must
be given to it, then *Tathniyya-i-Wujūd* or the
dualism of being, or perhaps *Waḥdat-i-Wujūb*
or the unity of the necessary, would be more
appropriate terms.

Another point worthy of notice is that the
Mujaddid's denial of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or uni-
tyism is not based on rationalistic argument ;
it is based solely on kashf-o-shuhūd or direct
mystic experience.   The Mujaddid holds
that the experience of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism is a stage in a mystic's evolution.   If
the mystic outgrows this stage and attains to
still higher stages, he comes to realise that
the experience of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unity-
ism was simply a subjective experience,—
that the Waḥdat or unity he experienced
was merely Shuhūd or appearance ; and
that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is not an

objectively real fact. Consequently those
who intended to contradict the Mujaddid
on the point, too, ought to have based their
case on kashf-o-shuhūd, mystic intuition and
experience. In other words, Shāh Walī-Ullah
and his followers should have asserted either
that the Mujaddid's statement that there are
stages higher than the stage of the experience
of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism, is wrong ;
or that there are still higher stages where
the conviction in the objective validity of
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism reinstates itself.
But they keep absolutely silent on the point.
Indeed they leave it alone and take recourse
to logic and reason.

Next, a review of the arguments advanced
by Shāh Walī-Ullah and others in favour of
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism shows that all
such arguments are untenable ; and further
that the arguments suffer from a confusion
of the religious unity with the speculative
unity which is characteristic of the mystic

consciousness.

Now to start with, they are arguments for
a metaphysics of reality, intending to prove
that it is one, single, individual, self-identical
being.   But after Kant, we know that unity
of the world is only a " regulative idea " and
not a proved fact,—and that any further des-
cription of reality as self-identical, etc., is
absolutely beyond the competence of human
reason.   Taking the arguments in detail, we
find that S͟hāh Walī-Ullah starts with the
blank assertion that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or
unityism is a dictum of all sane rational con-
sciousness.   But plainly it is not that.   Plain
unsophisticated consciousness believes rather
in pluralism than in monism.   It must make a
great effort of abstract thought to come even
to dualism ; while monism is a requirement
only of the speculative consciousness.   And
even the speculative consciousness does not
come to monism so simply as that ; and when
it comes to it, it comes to it by a strained

effort of abstraction and has to affirm it
dogmatically. In the case of Shāh Walī-Ullah
himself let us see what is the Wujūd-i-Wāhid
or unitary being? It is, in the first instance,
Ahadiyyat-i-maʻqūla, *i.e.*, that which is com-
mon between the conceptual and the empiri-
cal, the universal and the particular. Now to
conceive that there is something common
between two such disparate entities as the
universal and the particular, requires the most
strenuous effort of abstract thought; indeed
it is hardly possible to grasp what the common
element is between validity and actuality. In
the second instance, Shāh Walī-Ullah speaks
of it as Dhāt-i-bahat or Wujūd-i-Munbasit—
being which is absolutely without determina-
tion. Again, such a being is nothing that
can be experienced or imagined; it can only
be conceived by highly abstract thought. And
then Ahadiyyat-i-Maʻqūla and Dhāt-i-bahat
both are objects of thought,—concepts
universals. Whence is it that Wahdat or

oneness or numerical unity, *i.e.,* actual being, is ascribed to them? Indeed, one may ask, can it be ascribed to them? Clearly it can not,—not so long as they are concepts. Only when the concept, the universal is, by a leap over an unbridgeable chasm, turned into a particular, can numerical unity be ascribed to it. But can a universal be turned into a particular? Or can we even say this much that the concept has but one individual as its denotation? Hardly: for taken strictly there is no individual being which it denotes; and taken loosely it denotes each and every being, actual or possible. What has actually happened is this. The speculative unity was only qualitative; it did not require to be quantitative at all. But under the stress of religious consciousness it has been turned into a quantitative unity and has become the one,— a numerically single, individual existent.

Then we must ask, how does Aḥadiyyat-i-Ma‘qūla or conceptual unity, Dhāt-i-baḥat or

pure being, Wujūd-i-Munbasiṭ or being-un-
folding itself which is somehow one Individual
which is the really real, become Mustajma'-i-
ṣifāt-i-Kamāl, comprehensive of all perfec-
tions? For in itself it is the barest shred of
being; how can we say that it has all perfec-
tions in itself? Undoubtedly it *actually* has
no perfections in it. What can at best be said
of it,—and said not as a necessity of thought
but only as a requirement of explaining the
empirical, is that it has all that *potentially* in
itself which later actually came to be. But
what has actually come to be are not perfec-
tions, but imperfections. We can therefore
attribute only the potentiality of imperfec-
tions to it, and not of perfections!—Here
again what has happened is this. The require-
ments of the religious consciousness have un-
consciously pressed the thinker dogmatically
to ascribe all that is good to this bare imper-
sonal being and thereby turn it into Mustajma'-
i-ṣifāt-i-Kamāl, the all-Perfect, *i.e.*, into the

12

personal Divine Being of religion.

Now coming to the Tanazzulāt or descents by means of which this Perfect Being comes to be the world, no reason whatsoever is advanced why the Tanazzulāt or descents do take place in this being. Taken strictly, *i e.,* as a concept which it is, it is devoid of all principle of movement. But even taken as an actual being which is the common element between the concept and the percept, or even between the mental and the material, it would be difficult to point out a principle of movement which is common to all these forms of being and which can therefore be ascribed to it. But what has happened is this. The speculative consciousness demands that the world-process must be explained as a manifestation of the assumed unity and hence a principle of movement be ascribed to it. This demand is met. A purpose is ascribed to it. It is affirmed that this being wants to know itself. Now the grounds of this

teleology are at bottom religious. Further
characterisation of the process as 'ilmī or
conceptual and then 'ainī or khārijī or exis-
tential is again hardly speculative. If any-
thing, the motif is religious. It is the
religious motif that is at work and has
modified the speculative motif. For the
unity has been conceived as God; it must
therefore be first self-conscious and then
produce Wujūd-i-Khārijī or actual existence
out of itself.—However the speculative motif
reasserts itself,—and that with a vengeance.
The Wujūd-i-Khārijī or actual existence is
a manifestation of Divine Being; it is that
being itself in one of its modes; it is identical
with it.

Now begins express conflict with the re-
ligious consciousness. The speculative con-
sciousness is monistic; it will have the Primal
Being immanent in the world; and it will have
necessity as the principle of its progress. If

so, then evidently I am He and I am acting
under stringent necessity; mysticism would
hardly deny that. The question therefore
arises: whence want and suffering in me,
which are the very foundation of the religious
consciousness; and whence duty and res-
ponsibility, or whence freedom without which
no higher religion can survive for a moment?

Moreover, the doctrine produces that atti-
tude of mind which is characteristic of the
speculative consciousness, *viz.*, the contempla-
tive one. The mystic aims at 'Irfān or
knowledge, and passes his life in murāqiba-
o-mukāshifa—contemplation and apprehen-
sion, having for his ultimate goal Waṣl or
annihilation or absorption in the Primal
Being. There is indeed no room left for
immortality, though at times he speaks of it
at the stress of the religious consciousness.—
It may be noted that although here and there
important elements of religious unity enter
the mystic consciousness, it is the speculative

consciousness which holds the sway.[1]

And we must inquire further: Is Shāh Walī-Ullah right in saying that the position of the Mujaddid is substantially the same as that of Ibn 'Arabī, *viz.*, that it is Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and all that makes it look different is only simile and metaphor,— which indeed misled the Mujaddid himself to regard it as different? In justice to the Mujaddid, Shāh Walī-Ullah should have

[1] Attention may here be drawn to the fact that Taṣawwuf or mysticism in its various aspects bears too much resemblance to Neo-Platonism to which historically it is indebted. Its doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and tanazzulāt—unity and its descents, its attitude towards life and society, rahbāniyyat-o-inziwā (رهبانيت و انزوا) or asceticism and monasticism, its end of man as 'irfān (عرفان) or knowledge, and waṣl (وصل) or unification and annihilation in the Primal Being, are to all intents and purposes the same as we find in Neo-Platonism. And more, it is grounded in the same effort of making a religion out of the speculative consciousness—in the same identification of the religious with the speculative unity, in which Neo-Platonism was grounded. It is further interesting to note that Neo-Platonism aimed at becoming a religion to save Hellenism from the onslaught of Christianity; and taṣawwuf or mysticism too is acting as an inward religion running inside Islam and really supplanting Islam.

shown in detail that the difference is only
apparent and due to metaphorical language.
But unfortunately he makes no such attempt.
In truth the difference between the Mujaddid
and Ibn 'Arabī is not of mere simile and
metaphor; it is a very real difference.   It is
as real and as great as that between the
speculative unity and the religious unity.
It appears that the use of the word ẓill or
adumberation in this connection is at the
bottom of Shāh Walī-Ullah's assertion.   Ẓill
or adumberation is certainly a metaphor.
But so is 'aks or reflection and tajallī or efflu-
ence and talabbus or dressing, etc., the terms
which Shāh Walī-Ullah and Ibn 'Arabī use.
Ẓill or adumberation, however, is a safer
metaphor than tajallī or effluence, etc.   It
indicates otherwise from the aṣl or the
thing, it indicates dependence on the aṣl or
the thing, and it implies insignificance of the
ẓill or adumberation, while tajallī or effluence
indicates quite the reverse of it all ;—indeed it

is intended to indicate the reverse. These differences in the implications of ẓill or adumberation and tajallī or effluence are undoubtedly of fundamental importance. And had the inquiry been carefully pursued, it would have become clear that the Mujaddid really meant by ẓill or adumberation not only something other than the aṣl or the thing, but merely an effect of it,—indeed only as an act of creation on the part of God.[1]

---

[1] Note: A brief note on Aṣl-o-Ẓill or the Thing and Adumberation is to be found on page 93 above. But it seems necessary here to trace the meaning of the expression ẓill in the Mujaddid more closely, as misconception of the term has given rise to confusion.

At the first glance, the Mujaddid looks like using the term ẓill very much in the sense of 'aks (عکس) or partaw (پرتو), *i.e.*, *reflection*; implying the suggestion that it is, so to say, somehow a part of the aṣl.—While at the stage of Ẓilliyyat, the Mujaddid tends to think of ẓill in this sense,—though even there ẓill indicates for him a lower reality than 'aks or partaw (M., Vol. II, Ep. 1).

Later we find that he uses the term ẓill to indicate the Ghairiyyat (غیریت) or *otherness* of the multiplicity from the aṣl or God (*Cf.* M., Vol. I, Ep. 160) ; and that the purpose of employing it is to express the *insignificance* of the multiplicity in

What the Mujaddid really means is this.
The contingent's own essence is nothing but
'adam or non-being; that is, by itself the
contingent has no being whatsoever. Only
Divine grace gives it being and gives it
qualities which bear a faint and distant
resemblance to the being and attributes of
God. In other words, God produces the
world, not out of Himself as Waḥdat-i-
Wujūd or unityism would say, but out of
nothing. Its being is due to an act of
creation,—creation out of nothing, which is
something absolutely inconceivable for the
speculative consciousness and its offshoot, *viz.*,
Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.   And He gives it an exis-
tence of its own, which is not God's existence

contrast to the aṣl or God, as well as to show that the multipli-
city *can not exist* without the aṣl (see M , Vol. II, Eps. 1, 11).

However in the discussion of takwin (تكوين) or creation the
Mujaddid strongly tends to use the term only in the sense of an
effect (M., Vol. II, Ep. 4).—In the end the Mujaddid realises the
inadequacy of the term, discards it, and speaks, in its place, of
the *acts of creation* which are incomprehensible to man (M , Vol.
III, Ep. 122).

but other than it. So also He gives it certain
qualities, consciousness, freedom, etc., which
are not God's qualities but its. Thus it
becomes an agent in its own right and there-
fore responsible for its actions. Being a
mixture of Wujūd and 'adam—of being and
non-being, it is essentially finite and limited,
though it has a yearning for improvement.
Consequently, it needs religion ; and it needs
a religious unity with all the attributes of
perfection. However, being limited it cannot
comprehend the infinite ; it can not see God.
It can only believe in Him,—if God could be
pleased to let it know that He exists and
wants him to act in such and such a manner.
Revelation performs this function and opens
the way to the realisation of the human
yearning to live in harmony with Him and
in His presence. And revelation prescribes
life of action, of struggle, of endeavour, and
indeed of Jihād or fighting in the way of
God in order to achieve this end,—to achieve

the state of mind called Nafs-i-muṭma'inna
or beatified soul, and to attain to 'Abdiyyat
or servitude.   The 'Abd or servant remains
the ' 'abd ' in the end as he was in the begin-
ning.   He never becomes God.   He is never
re-absorbed into the being of God ; he remains
himself and survives death ; he has immor-
tality,—though of course God has the power
to annihilate him.   In life after death he will
live, by sheer grace of God, in actual conscious
presence of God, and see Him.

   This is, if anything, the reclamation of the
religious consciousness from the bondage of
the   speculative   consciousness   into   which
mysticism had thrown it.   The doctrine is,
clearly dualistic and not monistic ; holds to a
transcendent, qualitative and personal unity,
and not to an immanent, unqualitative and
impersonal one ; its unity is free and does
not act under compulsion.   While the world
and the human soul are according to this
doctrine   not   identical   with   the   Primal

Being;—the souls bound in their action and
gazing at it all the while and yearning to be
re-absorbed in it. No, they have an existence
of their own over against God, however
meagre that existence be;—the souls being
free agents, actively endeavouring to live the
life prescribed by Him. Evidently this doc-
trine is as near to religion or Islam as Waḥdat-
i-Wujūd or unityism is away from it.—And
the Mujaddid seems to have successfully
brought about this reclamation;—though he
is not wholly out of the clutches of rational-
istic thought in which his opponents are
revelling, which probably is the reason why
one had had the courage of questioning the
value of his truly revolutionary achievement.
However there can hardly be any doubt that
the call of the Mujaddid to all Musalmans
and Islamic mystics is

Away from Plotinus and his host,
and
BACK TO MUḤAMMAD.

INDEX