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MYSELF AND DREAMS



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# MYSELF AND DREAMS

BY

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## PREFACE

IN the year 1867 personal human experience convinced me not only that personality survives death but that we, still in the body, may have communion with the disembodied. Since then I have lived for more than eighteen thousand days and nights and, like my fellows, had innumerable waking and sleeping dreams. All have passed away, leaving not a wrack behind. But that experience of 1867 and two, later, of a like kind, remain as clearly impressed in my memory of the present as when they occurred. They have certainly affected my direction of thought : I believe they have changed my life and conduct.

Why have I stated this at the outset ? Because I want to give to the reader as honest a book as I possibly can. In *The Curse of Intellect*, written in 1895, I tried to get at an independent point of view for the survey of human experience. The book in one sense was successful, but, as regards the main object, it was a failure,—the point of view was not independent.

At the outset, then, the reader must understand that nothing now written can be claimed to proceed from an independent point of view. I, who write, am tarred by the same brush as the most stubborn of ma-

terialists. But I have written conscious of this defect and have done my level best to hold the balance even. I have criticized opinions adverse to my own, but have striven to put any such opinion before readers in full strength. Before 1867 I was myself what is generally termed a materialist and believe there is in me still some lingering sympathy for the opinion of my comrades of old.

In the year 1867 I began to study Kant's *Transcendental Philosophy* and to pursue what has since been termed psychical research,—the first results of the pursuit were eminently unsatisfactory. I think, now, telepathy is established by evidential proof: I held this in *Personality and Telepathy*. But, in the present work, I do not rely directly on telepathy or the strong evidence we have in human experience towards proof of communication with the disembodied.

In 1904 I wrote *The Limits of Human Experience*. I think I must then have been under the influence of Hume's philosophy. I never so greatly delighted in writing a book. I used thought and proved by its use that contradictions are real realities! The argument was the same to prove time real as to prove it unreal; to prove the universe started from nothing as to prove it started from infinity, to prove Being was immanent as to prove it existed in unity. I enjoyed profoundly the humour of incomprehensible contradictions into which thought carried me.

Continuing my study of Kant and comparing his philosophy with that of others I next, in 1911, wrote *Personality and Telepathy*. Therein I tried to bring

Kant's philosophy into relation with telepathy<sup>1</sup> and then, considering telepathy itself, put forward the theory that it offers evidential proof of our existence as what is generally termed "souls."

While writing the last book I had the great advantage of long correspondence with C. C. Massey. From him I got insight into what the really real ultimate is. For it I use the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing." A great light slowly dawned on me: I was freed from the stumbling block of real contradictions which exist for thought. For the first time I understood Kant's explanation of his antinomies and got out of my way his use of the term "permanence."

But how could I transcend thought? For I *did* transcend it in awareness that the real contradictions which exist in and for thought had no real reality for myself!

I was driven to the conclusion that there must be power in me, as a subject, transcending thought.

When I wrote *Personality and Telepathy* I had merely read Kant's *Dialectic*, had studied but the *Æsthetic* and *Logic*. Now I studied the *Dialectic* and persuaded myself I understood it.

Since 1912 I have been writing the present book. The first part *Myself* proceeds on broad and general lines: students of Kant and Spinoza will notice how closely I follow the two. The second part *Dreams* breaks, I think, new ground.

<sup>1</sup> Kant ignored telepathy simply because in his time human experience did not support it sufficiently.

If the argument of the first part be accepted as sound it follows that not only does self-consciousness continue during the state of sleep, but that the "myself" therein has still human experience,—has even wider human experience than in the waking state. For in sleep, physical activity in relation to our little objective universe being subsumed, the field of psychical activity is widened.

I offer the second part *Dreams* as giving argument which is sound in principle. I have taken long, long time to make the argument sound in detail. But the ground travelled is new ground, and, as I who travel it am but one of at least fifteen hundred million fellows, the probability is that I cannot have taken the best road to the ultimate goal.

In writing I have tried to make each question considered in itself as complete as possible, and this has led to no little repetition. I must ask the well-read student not to be annoyed at this: some readers want what is put before them to be so clear in itself that they are not called on to use memory.

"Myself," though it cannot be defined in words, is not an empty abstraction, for, in relation to Transcendental Being, it exists in the accomplishing. Kant's statement that imagination is deep buried in the soul of man I accept and this further accentuates the fact.

Imagination can be no more defined in words than can "myself." But, transcending thought and even insight, we may, paraphrasing Coleridge, hold that

it is groundless because it is the ground of all other activity.

I owe much to William McDougall's *Body and Mind*, to Riehl's *Science and Metaphysics*, and to Laurie's *Synthetica*. Riehl, especially, gave me great assistance for insight into the contradiction between free-will and the categorical imperative.

In the second part I have largely used William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In that remarkable book he appears to me to have widened the purview of metaphysical philosophy. I have used his name as an authority. What I owe to the S.P.R. is obvious.

1st August, 1918.



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# MYSELF

## ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

### KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE

WE sense our universe as consisting of unrelated objects: what we sense is merely the occasion for thought which is external to it. We cannot think objects, we can only think about them. For thought, it is not objects but the ideas of objects that we use. Ideas exist in relations between objects, and these relations are not given to us when we sense objects. So when we say we think an object, what we really do is to think its likenesses and unlikenesses to other objects: we think about objects.

Ideas are useless for thought without schematic ideas, that is, ideas of the schemata of objects. But just as ideas give us information only about objects, so schematic ideas give us information only about the relations between the schemata. The genesis of thought cannot be traced back to our universe as sensed, our universe is merely an occasion for thought: objects can exist in our objective universe, the schemata of objects cannot therein exist; they have existence only in what is hereafter termed the intelligible universe.

### INSIGHT

Knowledge is relative and so necessarily exists between limits of contradiction. In ordinary parlance our universe is, *to us*, a universe of contradictions.

We cannot know these limitations of knowledge, for, if we did, knowledge would transcend knowledge which is impossible. But we are aware of these limitations and this awareness marks a power in us as subjects transcending knowledge. This power is herein termed insight. Insight gives us awareness and must be related back to imagination. Thought is an inhibited form of imagination, its form determined by the motion of the brain. The term intuition and its meanings are criticized.

#### SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Self-consciousness exists as a thing-in-itself. I do not exist because I think : even as a subject of insight I transcend myself as a thinking subject. I exist to myself because " I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that *I am.*" Thought, even insight, cannot be *mine* unless exercised by or presented to "myself," as a self-conscious subject, as " I am "; I exist in self-consciousness not in any content of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness simply *is* for each one of us : we cannot determine it in any way by its own content of thought or even insight. It is sometimes defined as permanent. But the term permanent contains in itself its contradiction, it is a limit of thought and so cannot be used. Self-consciousness transcends the permanent and its contradiction, change. If we make the self-conscious subject permanent then it cannot be a thinking subject, for as a thinking subject it would exist in change, that is, in contradiction. But, by the theory of transcendence, change is in the self-conscious subject though subsumed in its existence : for this subject transcends permanence and change. So the self-conscious subject may be—as it is—a thinking subject. The relation of " I am " to transcendental Being is considered.

## A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING

If we define God as Infinite,—as infinite goodness, infinite power, infinite presence, for example,—we use limits of thought for our definition and so the contradictory limits are always in our mind. The ideas we use for definition are meaningless to us unless their contradictions are also in our mind. Hence if we define God in idea we are driven to one of two conclusions: either, with Laurie, we must make our God responsible for evil as a thing-in-itself or we must also predicate a Devil of evil. Neither conclusion can be held false for thought. But here insight steps in and makes us aware that, in the ultimate, contradictions cannot exist. It is insight which leads us to such terms as Being—Becoming, All—One, for God. But even when such terms are used there is often confusion between thought and insight. For God is treated as Being *and* Becoming, All *and* One, whereas such terms, rightly used, import transcendence of All *and* One, of Being *and* Becoming. The terms, rightly, have no meaning for thought, they are but expressions of *something* which insight compels us to hold exists and yet which transcends thought.

The term, herein used for the ultimate, is “the accomplished in the accomplishing.”

## THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE

The distinction between the Intelligible Universe and the Sensible Universe is marked and considered and the subjection of the latter to the former is shown. The Sensible Universe as it now exists is largely the result of creation by man. And it is shown that man can have created no new object in the objective universe without first formulating an idea of it in the intelligible universe;<sup>1</sup> that is, that creation in the intel-

<sup>1</sup>The schematic idea of any object must be in the mind before the idea of the object can arise.

ligible universe is a condition precedent for creation in the objective universe.

#### IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT

Thought is an inhibited form of imagination. Thought is correlated to the motion of the brain, it cannot proceed beyond the field of possible motion of the brain : and this spells inhibition of the power of imagination from which the power of thought is derived.

Thought is imagination inhibited within the purview of the possible motion of the brain. So imagination " deep buried in the soul of man " uses the brain as a machine of motion in relation to the sensible universe : thereby the sensible universe becomes an occasion for thought.

#### THE LAWS OF NATURE

Unless the universe as presented were governed by the laws of nature the subject could not think about his objective universe ; he does not think about this universe, he thinks about it as governed by the laws of nature. It is the laws of nature which give to the subject the relations he requires for thought. Further, man could not exercise the power of variation over and creation in the objective universe, a power which he *does* exercise, unless these laws existed and he had observed them and kept them in memory for use : man can command nature but only by obeying her.

The laws of nature exist in the intelligible universe, they govern the sensible or objective universe. Imagination is free, deep buried in the soul of man : even its inhibited form of thought is subject to the laws of nature only when thinking about the objective universe or things possible therein.

#### IDEAS

Ideas exist, in their simplest form, in relations between objects. The universe as sensed cannot set

up thought of or about it, for relations are not sensed. It is when the subject reads into the objective universe the laws of nature that he reads in relations between the objects he senses, it is only then that ideas can come into existence. With ideas thought about these objects becomes possible.

Human thought is necessarily related back to a self-conscious subject capable of thought. To find any relation between thought and the laws of nature, which both exist in the intelligible universe, we must relate back the laws of nature to self-conscious Being.

The fact of relations existing between objects marks their reference back to the relatively permanent, the thing-in-itself. But to the thing-in-itself transcendence of unity and diversity is given by the present argument.

There is precedent necessity for schematic ideas before ideas can arise for thought: we think the relations between schematic ideas. Transcendental self-conscious Being and the thing-in-itself are considered.

#### THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION

Objects do not exist in any continuity of the material; they exist in etheric forms, the forms determined by the motion of a comparative few entities (particles or electrons). The resistance of matter results from the motion of these entities.

Thought, an inhibition of imagination, is correlated to motion of the brain.

The subject can create objects in the objective universe, but must *first* create the object in the intelligible universe, that is, must first have an idea of the object. Energy and the motion of the entities are determined by the laws of nature; all the subject wants for his idea is the idea of restricting within imagined boundaries the area of motion of certain entities.

When the idea is arrived at it is correlated to motion through the brain, which is an object, so the subject can imagine the object it has created in the intelli-

gible universe as an object in the objective universe. But, so far, there is no power to create it in the objective universe.

But the subject is embodied and embodied in a body of motion, which body has been evolved under the laws of nature. The subject, embodied, has thus given to it, under the laws of nature, a master-tool of motion. If the subject be considered as a mere automaton, it is an automaton of motion ; it moves its body automatically. The living organism, without self-consciousness, moves under action and reaction between it and its environment : possibly delirium manifests the automatic action of the brain.

When, then, the embodied subject has imagined for the objective universe an object which might but does not yet exist in the objective universe, it finds to its hands an automatic master-tool of motion in the objective universe. Just as the laws of nature exist in themselves, iron, eternal, so does this master-tool exist in itself as an evolution under the laws of nature. The subject must bow to both. But, just as when obeying the laws of nature the subject can use them for its own purposes, so it can use the automatic master-tool presented to it, for its own purposes. To man is given a master-tool of motion ; it is thus he can make objects in the objective universe.

By use of this master-tool of motion the subject can objectify the object it has created in the intelligible universe for the objective universe. A conceit of imagination is given suggesting a reason for the subject's embodiment.

#### THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE (II)

Man, as a subject of the intelligible universe, in exercising his power over the sensible universe, does not act as an automaton : he uses his power for personal purposes. No man could thus exercise power unless self-conscious ; man must be a subject of self-con-

sciousness: self-consciousness is, to each of us, a thing-in-itself. The laws of nature are supreme over the sensible universe, but as they exist in the intelligible universe it is argued they point to the existence of some ultimate self-conscious Being.

#### THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE BEFORE MAN'S APPEARANCE

We read into nature the existence of the laws of nature before self-conscious subjects or even living "things" existed. Man's conscious exercise of power over environment, for his own purposes, depends on the pre-existence of the laws of nature. And these laws have no existence in the sensible universe, they govern the sensible universe from their existence in the intelligible universe. Man uses the laws of nature for his own purposes and we must refer the fact of his exercise of power to the transcendental fact (?) that he is a self-conscious subject. If, then, we give real reality to the laws of nature as existing in unconsciousness, we are faced by the impossible,—*one* process of evolution in nature under evolution, with a sudden appearance, in the *one* process, of self-conscious subjects, where the self-conscious subjects *change* the process of evolution for their own purposes.<sup>1</sup>

Any such conclusion is opposed to reason: antinomies cannot exist in real reality. We are driven to assume that as the use of the laws of nature is by self-conscious subjects, so the laws themselves must proceed from some ultimate, transcendental Self-Conscious Being.

#### FEELING

If man were but an organism of thought, then he in possession of the finest brain would turn out the finest work. Human experience informs us that what is

<sup>1</sup>We have *one* process existing in two contradictory successive processes.

above stated is in disagreement with fact. It is feeling (desire, will) which determines the output of work, so that a comparatively feeble machine may turn out better work than one comparatively strong : it is something external to thought which sets thought to work and directs it : feeling directs thought. The thinking subject is subjective to itself as a subject of feeling.

The meaning of the term "feeling" is considered and the question of whether desire exists potentially for the subject free from the influence of physiological or psychical presentation is raised.

It is argued that the subject must be one of potentiality of feeling before any given presentation.

#### POTENTIALITY OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

Potentiality of thought exists for all human subjects, quite apart from manifestation of thought. For human experience informs us that, as to the vast majority of mankind, there is no full manifestation of thought and its possible resultant action. But we must not hold that this potentiality is sheer waste because never manifest in our sensible universe : evolution in our universe can offer no explanation for the greatness of man's thought and imagination and the littleness of their accomplishment in our sensible universe.

At first thought we must hold there is the same apparent wastage of feeling as of thought. But this question cannot be considered until we have more fully considered the meaning of the term feeling. We can only hold the "I am" to be a feeling subject when faced by resistance to its self-expression.

#### FEELING (II)

The question is considered whether, as subjects of insight, we are aware of feeling which cannot be referred to feeling, proper, of pleasure or pain, of desire or will. The argument is in the affirmative.



All forms of feeling are traced back as ancillary to a "blind desire" of the subject to express itself as "I am." The psychological "I" may be termed the human personality. The higher personality in each one of us—the "I am"—strives for freedom from the bonds of its human personality or to change the bonds into adjuncts for such freedom. Herein is found the categorical imperative for us all.

#### SELF-EXPRESSION AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Every man has a right to think and do what is best for himself: the meaning of "best" depends on what man himself is.

Various philosophies are considered and it is argued that full consideration of human experience of man's thought and conduct points to his being something more than a mere subject coming into existence on birth and ending on the dissolution of the body: it points to his period of embodiment being a mere passing stage in a, relatively, spiritual existence. Any satisfactory philosophy for man must cover all human experience and, if man be considered merely an embodied thing, there is failure to account for all his thought and conduct. Man's thought and conduct, considered generally, not only can be but are of such a nature that his mere desire as a thing of passing time cannot explain them.

The categorical imperative is found in man's "blind desire" for full expression of himself as "I am" as against resistance to self-expression. It is founded not on the arguments of the most enlightened moralists or on the moral judgment of every man who will make the attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law, but on a consideration of human experience. For this consideration not only is thought but insight used. Free will and moral good are not, as yet, considered.

## THE UNIVERSE WITHOUT SELF-CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS

The laws of nature we must recognize and use before we can think about our objective universe; it is their existence which makes such thought possible, and these laws were in existence before man appeared on earth.

Until self-conscious subjects appear, feeling subjects cannot exist, for feeling is dependent on self-consciousness. The laws of nature show no contempt for life, they simply use it for manifestation in numerous bodily forms and nothing can be charged against the laws because these manifestations come and go at longer or shorter periods in time.

So long as self-conscious subjects do not exist, sin, suffering, pleasure and pain cannot exist, nor can love, beauty, truth or justice.<sup>1</sup> There may be manifestations in appearance, but love, beauty, truth and justice, in themselves, exist only *for* self-conscious subjects. At the lowest the laws of nature are a-moral. It is not the laws of nature, it is man himself who introduces sin and suffering into our universe. Evil first appears when self-conscious subjects first appear.

## FREE WILL AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Free will is a contradiction, for thought, of non-freedom of will. And the question of freedom or non-freedom only arises with the existence of self-conscious subjects. For freedom and non-freedom of the will to have meaning for the subject there must be a standard of determinism and this standard must be in the consciousness of all, not in one self-consciousness. In thought, we must have the contradictions of free-will and a categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative is found in the subject's "blind desire" to express itself as "I am." But this desire lies at the back of self-consciousness: in

<sup>1</sup>Unless we bring in transcendental self-conscious Being.

the fore-front, that is, in thought, the subject finds free-will in self-determination of the form of struggle to express itself as "I am." The contradiction arrived at is one necessary for thought in our universe of contradictions.

The categorical imperative exists in the subject's blind desire to express itself as "I am." And, in human experience, this blind desire is manifest in the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice to which all mankind moves.

The contradiction between free-will and the categorical imperative is implicit for thought. The contradiction is explained away, hereinafter, by the use of insight.

#### PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS

The meaning of the terms pleasure and happiness as now used is defined. The subject is considered (1) as a bodily thing, (2) as one of conduct, (3) as a subject in the intelligible universe. Happiness is found to exist not in itself but as an appanage or the atmosphere of duty: the nearer the approach to fulfilment of duty the nearer the approach to happiness.

Pleasure is relative, it exists but for moments in time. In the series of moments of any subject's life moments of pleasure demand for their existence an average level of moments which are, relatively, not of pleasure. For moments of pleasure can exist only in contrast with—in relation to—moments empty of pleasure or, at the lowest, less pleasurable.

#### THE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE ACCOMPLISHING .

The contradictions that exist for our universe of thought are considered, especially the contradiction between free-will and the categorical imperative, which has been found in the struggle, implicit for the embodied self-conscious subject, to express itself as "I am."

It is a power in the subject transcending thought, which makes the subject aware of its limits as a thinking subject and that contradictions cannot exist in real reality. This reconciliation or subsumption is found in the term the "accomplished in the accomplishing," a term meaningless for thought as it is transcendent of thought. We must in thought refer to God, as Transcendental Being, the categorical imperative and also give Him free-will,—necessary contradictions for thought. Insight gets rid of the contradictions by giving to Him transcendence of both.

We can, dimly, interpret this reconciliation. For, to us, free-will exists only for a subject conditioned in time,—the past falls back into determinism, free-will can be referred only to, exists only for, the present passing now and the future : free-will is always falling back into determinism. Where time is transcended not only is free-will transcended but the categorical imperative.

Again, we cannot know or even be aware why the subject is embodied in a universe of sin and suffering. But we can, dimly, explain sin and, dimly, get rid of suffering. Sin exists because we exist embodied in the accomplishing. Suffering and pleasure are but relative terms and, most strangely, we find that the subject which chooses what is *best* for itself may find suffering take on the aspect of pleasure and pleasure take on that of suffering. We may surmise a spiritual law which rewards and punishes justly, spite of the appearance of injustice which exists because of our burdens of sin and suffering.

# MYSELF AND DREAMS

## MYSELF

### KNOWLEDGE IS RELATIVE

AT first thought any consideration of the proposition that knowledge is relative must be held to be mere waste of time, for its truth is denied by no one. But the subject in hand requires some introductory consideration in order to make clear what follows.

When we think, it is ideas<sup>1</sup> that we use for thought; and all knowledge is relative because ideas are relative. We sense the universe as presented to our senses, that is, we sense objects which are the phenomenal form in which the universe is presented to us sensually. What the universe may be in itself we do not know and cannot know, for there is presented to us only what is termed the sensible universe.

We may say that these objects which are sensed set up images or result in percepts or concepts in or on or of the mind. But they cannot set up ideas. For these objects are sensed as unrelated, so that relations between them are not sensed at all. And ideas are not now treated altogether as concepts or percepts; ideas if we consider them as existing in themselves have existence only in *relations* between the objects sensed. Now Kant ignored the short road to prove that the

<sup>1</sup> Ideas are not used in the Kantian sense.

mere sensing of objects can in no way set up ideas : we want something else. What this something else is will be explained when we consider more closely ideas and the laws of Nature.<sup>2</sup>

At present we rest content with the fact of the distinction now raised between ideas (which import relations) and percepts or concepts, as possibly, *direct* results of sensation.

A little consideration may be given to the statement that objects, as presented, are unrelated to one another.<sup>3</sup>

You sense any object, a chair or tree, for instance. As sensed it is a thing-in-itself, existing unrelated to any other object. For, assume that you are a subject without power in your mind of relating the chair or the tree to any other object. You will find no relation is presented by the chair or the tree as sensed. Or, again, assume that you, as you really exist, sense the sensible universe as presented to you as all of one colour and one shade of colour : you would then have no idea of colour, you could not think colour at all. You could not think it even as a thing-in-itself. And this is because your sensation of colour would set up no relation to anything else : colour for you would be non-existent in thought. When many colours are presented to you, you can think them because you can think relations between them ; but the *relations* are not presented to you through your sense of sight.

Generally, we may reduce the sensible universe to form, colour, size and substance, ultimately to motion. But not one of these can be the subject of thought. We can only think *relations* between varying forms, etc.

<sup>2</sup> The chapters on "The laws of Nature" and on "Ideas," may be here referred to, though their place in the sequence of argument comes in later.

<sup>3</sup> Hume finds this a difficulty, Kant deals with it; he says that though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience.

We do not think objects, we think about objects. When we say we think a chair, we really are thinking about its likenesses and unlikenesses to other objects.<sup>4</sup>

How can we think in this way?

If we sensed only one single object, unrelated in any way, we could not think about it at all. But we sense almost an infinite number of objects. Our sensing these objects is the beginning of knowledge of the sensible universe: the universe must, in some way, be presented to us before we can begin to think about it.

When, however, we sense any object, it raises in the mind what is termed an idea of the object.<sup>5</sup> We sense an object for a moment in time: the sensation is passing. But it leaves behind it an *idea* of the object which, at least so long as the subject exists, remains in the mind of the subject.<sup>6</sup> This idea is what I have termed a relation of distinction. It is not of the object itself, it is of the likeness and unlikeness of the object to other objects, of the relation of the object to other objects. A good example is to be found in mathematics. The symbols 1, 2, 3, etc., are meaningless in themselves. We sense them but we do *not* use them for thought. We use for thought their relations one to another. The most learned man uses the same symbols as the unlearned—the one man is more learned simply in that he knows more about the relations between them. Or, again, a wise man and a fool both sense the sun: the sensation on both is exactly the same. But the wise man is said to know more *about* the sun because he knows more about its internal relations and its relations to other objects.

<sup>4</sup> This leads to Kant's magnificent theory of the schematism of the understanding, but this theory it is now unnecessary to consider.

<sup>5</sup> The term *idea* is used in its ordinary, not Kantian, meaning. *How* the idea can be raised in the mind is, as already said, considered hereafter.

<sup>6</sup> Though memory is stored up in time, the storage is not conditioned in time for, at least, the life of the subject. Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*.

Whence comes this power to think relations? The relations are not sensed, they are not presented to the subject with the presentations of the sensible universe.

The power must be referred to the mind itself apart from the sensible universe. The sensible universe is the occasion for thought, it must be presented in some way for thought about it to begin: but the thought about it is external to the sensible universe. When we consider the intelligible universe we shall find thought exists in that universe as distinct from the sensible—the objective universe: we shall find thought can exist apart from the sensible universe: the mind exists in the intelligible not the sensible universe.<sup>7</sup>

This part of the argument is perfunctory because by common admission knowledge is relative. But still the argument is defective in that no nexus is shown between knowledge which is relative and objects given by sense which contain no relations. This nexus will be found in the chapter on Thought, Brain and Motion.

#### SCHEMATIC IDEAS

It is unnecessary for our purpose to enter on Kant's magnificent theory of the schematism of the understanding at any length, but as we use the term *idea* in its ordinary not Kantian meaning, something must be said as to what an idea is; as to what the ideas are that we use for thought.

We can and do think about objects in general. For instance, we can think about a table in general. If I say to you "I saw a table," this calls up for you the idea of a table: but this is not the idea of any particular table of determined size, form, colour and substance which exists or can exist in the sensible universe; it calls up for you the idea of a table in

<sup>7</sup> We can think about an object which we have never sensed; about an object, even, which cannot be sensed.



general. Following Kant we will term this general idea the schema of a table. What is really called up in your mind and what you use for thought is not the idea of any object, but the idea of the schema of an object. As against the idea of any object we will term this a schematic idea; in the particular case we have the schematic idea of a table.

Now when you think, for instance, about a chair<sup>8</sup> as different from a table, you do not think about it as different from any particular table but as different from a table in general, from the schema of a table. The idea you use for relation is not that of an objective table but of the schema of a table; the idea is a schematic idea. And this is true for all objects. You use schematic ideas, not ideas of objects for relation.<sup>9</sup> This is why in Kant's language: "In truth, it is not images but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions."

Very light consideration is required to understand that these schematic ideas which are used for thought cannot, *for genesis*, be traced back to the objective universe. For the general idea of a table cannot be represented in the objective universe as a table, and so can never be presented to us through our senses. All we can imagine or create in the objective universe is a *particular* objectified table. There can exist in the objective universe only objects which give rise to the beginning of ideas about them: no object can there exist which represents any one of the schemata of objects. Objects are really "starting points" for thought: these schematic ideas must exist for thought before ideas of objects can arise in the mind for use.

That these schematic ideas exist in thought *for* objects, before any such objects exist in the objective universe, will, later on, be seen. But we may here give an instance. Before any air-plane existed as an

<sup>8</sup> A chair in general or any particular chair.

<sup>9</sup> Schemata relate back, in Kant's grand theory, to some *ultimate* schema.

object, many of us had an idea of the schema of an air-plane. And this schematic idea *had* to exist in thought before man could create an air-plane as an object.

Again, until air-planes existed as objects, no one could use fully any idea of them as objectified in the objective universe as distinct from the idea of their schema. It was only when air-planes existed as objects that distinctions between objective air-planes came into existence and the possibility of ideas about relations between objectified air-planes arose.<sup>10</sup>

But, still, we do not think these schemata any more than we think objects: we think about them. We must still hold that knowledge is relative in itself, though we can think not only about objects but about the schemata of objects. Indeed, thought about the schemata of objects *must* precede thought about objects. We shall find the strange fact that man can create new objects in the objective universe, but that he must first have an idea about an object which does not exist in the objective universe before he can objectify any such object.

Let us consider the statement that, for thought, we do not use the schemata of objects as things-in-themselves, but that we use their relations to one another.

Our objective universe is one of limitation: imagine it still more limited than it is. Let us consider an universe of nothing but tables. Then we have presented to us only a vast number of tables, and these tables are presented to us through our senses as unrelated: there is nothing for thought to operate on. For thought to arise we must have some *centre* for relations to operate round and, our universe being one of nothing but tables, this centre must be the schema of a table, of a table in general. With this centre for thought we can think about the objective tables pre-

<sup>10</sup> But with the schema of any "class" of objects in mind, we shall find there can be ideas also of particular objects of the class, though not yet objects in the objective universe,

sented as differing objective forms in relation to our schema of a table. To think about this limited objective universe thought *only requires* one schema, the schema of a table: thought itself is not limited, it is its purview only that is limited. Thought has only tables presented to it and so, *in relation to the objective universe*, only thinks about tables. The schematic idea of a table exhausts our objective universe: we have the schema of our universe.

If we imagine our universe as one only of chairs or bedsteads or anything else, the same argument holds good.

But our universe exists not only of tables, chairs and bedsteads as objects, but of innumerable other objects. Let us consider, however, for the sake of simplicity, a universe of tables, chairs and bedsteads only.

Do we think about any one of these three things as distinct and unrelated to the other two? We do not: we think about them as related. But to think about a table, chair or bedstead, we use schematic ideas, and so to think about the relations between tables, chairs and bedsteads we use our schematic ideas of such objects. How can we use them? We can only use them as relative to one another.

In order to use ideas for thought about objects in the objective universe we must have schematic ideas. In a universe of tables the schematic idea of a table exhausts the universe: we have the schema of our universe. Where there is a universe of three objects we must have the three schematic ideas of these objects for ideas of these objects, and the schema of this universe must be the *centre* for relations between these schematic ideas. In the same way, faced as we are by our universe as it exists of innumerable objects, we use schematic ideas for thought and the centre of relation of these schematic ideas is the schema of our universe. (Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*, p. 50.) This schema is *not* presented to us through our senses, we do not sense it, and we know nothing about it;

we simply, as will be hereafter seen, arrive at its necessary existence, through a power in us as subjects transcending thought. But we do not think schemata, we think about them, think their relations *inter se*.

What is above written the argument demands. But the sole object has been to show that knowledge is relative though founded on schematic ideas.

## INSIGHT

ASSUME that the subject is no more than a thinking subject. Then the subject has no power to criticize, much less to determine, any limits for its own thought. It can only think; it has no power or faculty which can make its thought subjective. If thought itself is limited, thought cannot think its own limits. If I am nothing more than a thinking subject, there is nothing in me transcending thought which enables *me* to put any limit on myself as a thinking subject.

Consider any subject existing only in thought, and within any limits you will. Then for that subject nothing at all exists outside such limits, it cannot think outside such limits.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible, then, for it to determine its universe of thought as one of limits: being a mere thinking subject, it can only think relations and it cannot even begin to think about what is external to its universe in order to get something to relate its universe to. For what is outside the limits of its universe is related in no way in thought to that universe. If "I" can only think, by what possibility can I put any limit on my own thought? If I do, it means that I think my own thought as limited—my own thought transcends my own thought which is impossible.<sup>2</sup>

But, in fact, each one of us as a subject *can* determine his own faculty of thought as limited. To us, as subjects, our power of thought only extends to

<sup>1</sup> For such a subject limits of thought do not exist.

<sup>2</sup> The term sometimes used "absolute knowledge" I do not touch on. We cannot make absolute that which in itself is relative.

relations—knowledge is relative. More than this. Ideas existing only as relations we determine our universe of thought as one of contradiction: for thought (being relative) demands for its existence limits of contradiction. We cannot think evil or good, unity or diversity, infinity or nothing, in the absolute. For any idea of good there must be in the mind, also, the idea of evil—its contradiction. And so for unity and diversity, infinity and nothing. There is contradiction in our universe of thought.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, however, we *have* power to determine our own thought as relative; that is, that it has content only of relations. And, further, our reason leads us to a legitimate conclusion that behind or beyond these relations, which are the subject of thought, something exists of which these relations are phenomenal, or, more generally, that something necessarily exists because relations require this something for their existence. What term we may give to this “something” will be considered later on.<sup>4</sup> It is referred to, now, simply to emphasize the fact that, *to us as subjects*, knowledge is limited in that it is relative, and so to us, as subjects, something must exist beyond the purview of thought.

Again, our knowledge being relative, it can have existence only between limits of contradiction. But reason informs us that contradictions can only have phenomenal existence. In *real* reality they must disappear or be transcended by or subsumed under “something”: there must be transcendence of all contradictions. This again is true for us as subjects.

<sup>3</sup> We do not think good and evil, etc., they constitute merely the limits of contradiction of thought, limits which necessarily exist because knowledge is relative. We can only think up to and between the limits.

<sup>4</sup> This “something” is not a mere negation, though it is not the subject of thought. Kant says the *permanent* in phenomena must be regarded as the condition of (for?) the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience. The term *permanent* is considered hereafter.

But bear in mind that if the "is" and the "is not" be classed as contradictions, it is more than doubtful if there can be transcendence for such contradictions.<sup>5</sup>

This "something" is beyond thought; the very ground of reason in assuring us it exists, is based on the limited nature of thought. It is because we can determine thought as limited that we arrive at a conclusion "something" must exist outside the limits of thought.

We find that, *as subjects*, we have the strange power of criticizing our own thought, of determining that it has limits and that its limits are not real but phenomenal.

Can we think this "something" which is beyond the limits of thought? We cannot: thought cannot use thought as its subject. When we get outside the field of thought, ideas can give us no assistance in discovering what exists therein, for ideas are relative and exist only in the field of thought.<sup>6</sup>

We are driven to the conclusion that, *as subjects*, we exercise a power which transcends thought. By determining the limits of thought, we make thought itself subjective to this power: the power we exercise transcends the power of thought.

This power I would term "Insight" or "Awareness."<sup>7</sup> It is a power of the subject; there is nothing transcendental about it, in itself, though it will be found to be a link to transcendentalism. Insight transcends thought, for thought itself is relative. We do not *think* that thought is relative: we do not *think* the transcendence of contradictions. There is, herein, no brain activity, there is but awareness of the limitations of brain activity. So no expenditure of

<sup>5</sup> Is it possible that confusion arises in Hegel's philosophy because he uses ideas for his consideration of the 'is' and the 'is not.'?

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps it is incorrect to say ideas exist only in the field of thought. For if the greater include the less, Insight, hereafter referred to, does not destroy thought, but merely subsumes it.

<sup>7</sup> In this connection the term 'awareness' has already been indefinitely used in America.

physiological energy is involved, we are fully in the psychical.

The immediate argument is confined to proof that this power exists and exists in the subject. But the very fact of the existence of the power is of the greatest importance, even for psychology treated as a science. For the argument, if sound, proves that, not transcendently, but by the reason of the subject alone we can show that the subject has, of itself, power to determine its own limits of thought. The subject reduces presentations or objects to mere "starting points" for thought. For it cannot think these presentations, it can only think about them; that is, think them in relation: it can determine its thought as relative. Presentations are mere "starting points" for thought in that they do not originate thought, but merely give it occasion for exercise.

Having power to determine its thought as relative, the subject has also, necessarily, power to determine that thought can only exist between limits of contradiction, limits that it cannot think but up to and between which it can think. Good, for instance, is meaningless for the mind unless its contradiction, evil, is also in the mind; and, in the ultimate, the reason of the subject makes him aware that these contradictions are phenomenal only, that is, cannot exist in real reality.<sup>8</sup>

What does this all mean? That the *relatively* pure subject can, in transcendence of thought, determine the limits of thought of *itself* as a thinking subject.

It has been said more than once by no few of our leading men of intellect that we have vital knowledge of our own ignorance. The statement contains a germ of truth, but is incorrect as it stands: knowledge cannot transcend knowledge.

When, however, we say: "Man, as a subject, has the faculty of Insight which makes him aware of the

<sup>8</sup> In the ultimate there must be transcendence of both. Herein, insight travels beyond the purview of thought



limits of his thought as a thinking subject," we get directly at the germ of truth contained in the statement which relies on *vital knowledge*.

Insight or Awareness transcends Knowledge, is a link to transcendentalism.<sup>9</sup>

James Ward in reference to feeling defines the psychological "I" as :

"The subject of these feelings or phenomena *plus* the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena or objects."

But he states also that :

"Psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object, or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation."

In so stating, he has, I think, in mind the distinction between the metaphysical and psychological "I" and does not make his psychological "I" exhaustive of the ego. I venture to think he denies in no way the existence of Kant's pure ego or transcendental subject.

But if Insight be a power or faculty of the subject, which reason itself arrives at, must not the definition of the psychological "I" be widened?

That there is room for this widening of the definition of the psychological "I" is shown by James Ward himself.

"On the other hand, as has been said, the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject."

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Kant's Theoretical and Practical Reason. I do not think, as McDougal holds, Kant predicated two "intellects," but that his theoretical reason was given as transcending practical reason.

We are as conscious of this power of Insight as we are of thought itself.

It will be shewn hereafter that the brain is a machine of motion whereby relation is established between the subject and the external universe, so that the subject can have ideas about the objective universe. It is thus the objective universe becomes an "occasion" for thought.<sup>10</sup> Thought is an inhibited form of imagination, its form determined by the motion of the brain.

The genesis of insight is thus made clear. The subject, by its power of imagination, is aware of the limitations of its power of thought: is aware that thought is an inhibited form of imagination. This awareness marks what is now termed insight.

Insight is in some measure the same as, but must not be confounded with, intuition. The term intuition has been used as having many different meanings. It has been said that all these meanings have one thing in common—they all express the condition of an immediate in opposition to mediate knowledge. But now we deny the possibility of immediate knowledge—for knowledge is in itself relative; insight does not give immediate knowledge, it transcends knowledge.

Again, Kant makes the following statements: "All intuition possible to us is sensuous-"; "intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena"; "we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected"; "in relation to sensibility the manifold in intuition is subject to the formal conditions of time and space"; "a cognition may be an intuition"; "and intuition all his (God's) cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation."

Kant evidently uses the term "cognition" as of very wide meaning—it is used as meaning more than thought; he would appear to use it in a transcendental sense when referring to the cognition of God. When referring to God he also considers intuition (not

<sup>10</sup> (See page 75).

sensuous intuition) as transcendent in meaning : how then can intuition be conditioned as sensuous ?

What is above stated shows that "intuition" is used as having many and possibly conflicting meanings. We now, therefore, except for reference, do not use the term intuition. Thought is treated as limited in that it runs parallel with motion of the brain. Insight is a power of the subject whereby the subject transcends thought : this power is traced back to imagination. The subject is related to the objective universe through sensibility, so that it can sense its universe. Thought about this universe depends on the existence of the brain.<sup>11</sup> Understanding is a source of knowledge and if, with Kant, we hold that sense is also a source of knowledge we must hold that it is only so far a source in that, through sensibility, it gives "occasion" for knowledge. Sensuous intuition is now taken as an expression merely for effect from the external on the subject ; so it can be no more than what we may term a possible content *for* thought, it cannot set up thought.

We bring clearer light to bear on our power of reasoning by use of the term insight instead of the omnibus term intuition : we define thereby the limitations of thought ; knowledge is relative and lies between limits of contradiction ; insight makes us aware, as we are aware, of this limitation.

I think the argument follows Kant in that he gives to reason transcendence of understanding ; but no use is now made of Kantian ideas.

<sup>11</sup> Thought is not lost in insight, it is subsumed under it, the greater contains the less.

## SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

THE "*Cognito, ergo sum*" requires explanation. "I" do not exist because I think; I exist because I am conscious of thought; even if, for thought, we read the word "awareness." Self-consciousness must exist as a thing-in-itself; thought, if it is *my* thought, is but a content of self-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Thought may take place for ever and a day, even to the extent of a Newton or Shakespeare. But there is in such case only a thinking machine; there is no thinking subject in existence, unless there is a subject self-conscious of thought. The subject cannot exist solely in thought; its existence must be referred back to self-consciousness: for we do not use the term "subject" as defining merely what is a subject to others; we define it as meaning a subject in itself. And this can-

1 Sankara says, in substance: "Inasmuch, therefore, as consciousness makes both internal and external things its objects, it is not a material property. If its distinction from material objects be admitted, its independence of them must be also admitted. Moreover its identity in the midst of changing circumstances proves its eternity. Remembrance and such states of the mind become possible only because the knowing self is recognised as the same in two successive states." Huxley agrees with this; he writes: "In the first place, as I have already hinted, it seems to me pretty plain that there is a third thing in the universe (that is third to matter and force), to wit, consciousness, which in the hardness of my heart or head, I cannot see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modification of either, however intimately the manifestations of the phenomena of consciousness may be connected with the phenomena known as matter and force." *Collected Essays*, Vol. 9, Page 130. James Ward, as we have seen, expresses the same opinion in other words. Coleridge says: "Self-consciousness is groundless because it is the ground of all other certainty."

not be without self-consciousness. I suggest that for self-consciousness in itself there may be transcendence of subject and of object as generally understood. As to this, bear in mind the distinction between consciousness and content of consciousness. It is in thought that the "Not I" cannot exist for the "I" unless the "I" exist for itself in self-consciousness.

Riehl's argument that "something" exists in itself as distinct from consciousness is not denied. But does it not follow that consciousness must then exist in itself, as Huxley held? When, then, Riehl says "the experience *I am* is not simple but two-sided" because what is *originally* given is the reciprocity of ego and non-ego, he confounds consciousness with the content of consciousness: he really holds that consciousness cannot exist without what is, *to us*, content. But he has already given *real reality* to "something" which in itself exists as distinct from consciousness, so he makes consciousness subjective to this something which is *not* consciousness, because consciousness for its existence depends on this "something" for content. And yet he says again—"The assumption of an unconscious creative power of our consciousness does not harmonize with the actual character of the world given in perception."

When Riehl gives real reality to "something" which is not consciousness and makes consciousness contingent on content for its existence, he forgets an underlying fact, incomprehensible though it be:—he could not have promulgated his theory unless he had precedent existence as a self-conscious subject.<sup>2</sup>

Thought is presented to the self-conscious subject, otherwise it could not be his thought. You may if you like say that the subject, when no thought is presented, is merely a self-conscious subject in poten-

<sup>2</sup> Bear in mind we refer to a self-conscious *subject*, not to any being or ultimate Being of self-consciousness. Riehl himself says: Every possible explanation of consciousness must evidently presuppose consciousness itself.

tiality.<sup>3</sup> But that does not affect the argument, any more than the fact of a leakless, charged Leyden jar, which never does anything, proves its absence of static force. You may even say that statically the subject is a self-conscious subject, its dynamic force being manifest only in thought.<sup>4</sup> But that, too, does not affect the argument. The fact that I write and you read is, for us, definite proof of the incomprehensible fact that each of us exists as a self-conscious subject: the subject must be distinguished from its content.

To support what is above stated requires consideration of the relation of the self-conscious "I" to the thinking "I."<sup>5</sup>

There may be action and reaction between a living organism and its environment under the "laws of Nature" without thought on the part of the organism. For thought to exist for the organism, the organism must be one self-conscious of itself; there must be the "I" and the "not I" for the organism.<sup>6</sup> But this, it will be argued, involves, as a condition precedent, that the subject must be self-conscious in order that it may be a thinking subject. The subject as a thinking subject presents its thought to itself as a self-conscious subject.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This is not admitted now as correct unless potentiality be confined to thought about the sensible universe. We know nothing of what the psychic activity of the subject may or may not be.

<sup>4</sup> I deny that self-consciousness is exhausted by thought.

<sup>5</sup> Imagination is referred to at a later stage of the argument.

<sup>6</sup> If self-consciousness necessarily involves thought, the self-conscious I must be a thinking I, if we use the terms "I" and "not I" in their anthropomorphic sense, as apparently Descartes did. I argue that thought is not exhaustive of self-consciousness. If the faculty of Insight exists, thought is clearly not so exhaustive.

<sup>7</sup> This makes the brain a mere machine, external to the subject, which the subject uses for thought. The brain, "inhibits" the purview of self-consciousness. We can determine the brain as a necessary part of the thinking subject; but if, as Huxley held, consciousness is a thing-in-itself, then thought is presented to the self-conscious subject. Insight seems a power *linking* the thinking to the self-conscious subject. Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*, p. 17, where the argument is not as clear as it should be, because I had not then arrived at the faculty of Insight.

This self-consciousness of the subject has been defined as "a too widely diffused consciousness which, for the concentration necessary for thought, requires the inhibition of the brain." Though the author of this definition has great authority I affirm that it is on its face incorrect. The truth is that the inter-position of the brain is necessary for thought, but that this inhibition of the brain does not exhaust self-consciousness.<sup>8</sup> The brain simply acts as a machine for thought to exist. Thought, to us, is not exhaustive; we can determine it as using only ideas which are limited to relations: the self-conscious subject is also conscious of the power of Insight or Awareness transcending thought. Can the machine, the brain, criticize its own output? And can it be believed that self-consciousness is itself "too widely diffused?" That it is mainly sheer waste, useful only so far as inhibited for thought?<sup>9</sup>

But there is an implicit admission in the definition of self-consciousness referred to. It admits that self-consciousness is more widely diffused than is necessary for thought. If so, where is the subject? Is the subject one of this too widely diffused consciousness? Or, does the subject only come into being when the too widely diffused consciousness is concentrated by the inhibition of the brain for thought? In the latter case the subject is a mere thinking "I" dependent for existence on the existence of its brain and so disappearing with the dissolution of its brain. And, if this be so, where is the too widely diffused conscious-

<sup>8</sup> William James in "The Varieties of Religious Experiences" says: Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special form of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the flimsiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different.

<sup>9</sup> If the subject is no more than an object in the sensible universe, then its self-consciousness is exhausted by thought. But, if so, what becomes of the "too widely diffused consciousness"?

ness, before the subject comes into being?<sup>10</sup> If all consciousness, concentrated or not, is, for the subject, exhausted by thought, that is, if the subject as a self-conscious subject, is nothing except so far as it is inhibited as a thinking subject, there is no escape from the conclusion that its existence depends on the existence of its brain. Descartes held that the subject is always thinking and he held this because he held "I am, because I think,"<sup>11</sup> and only by continuity of thought could he explain the continuity of the subject.

But by what possibility can we define consciousness as too diffused or concentrated or as conditioned in any way? It simply exists, for us, beyond the purview of thought. Consciousness necessarily imports a self which is conscious, but no one can think his own self-consciousness: it simply *is*. Consciousness, as Huxley held, is a thing-in-itself, and even Haeckel, while declaring it must be an evolution from unconsciousness, admitted he could not produce any satisfactory evidence in support of his opinion.<sup>12</sup>

The question resolves itself into this: is consciousness exhausted by thought, or is thought merely a content of consciousness or something presented to consciousness? Presented to a self-conscious subject?

There is a passage in Kant's *Transcendental Philosophy* which I have been told on the highest authority is most difficult to understand. Cousin holds what is therein stated to be incorrect. It appears to me to be

10 What meaning has consciousness without a being who is conscious? We must 'invent' the term, apart from all experience, as Schopenhauer invented 'will.' If this 'too widely diffused consciousness' be referred to some ultimate self-conscious Being the whole argument based on it fails. Spinoza's theory may be referred to.

11 Descartes, it would appear, held the subject to be merely a thinking and conscious subject, not a subject to whose self-consciousness thought is presented. But, possibly, if Riehl be correct, I have wrongly interpreted Descartes' meaning.

12 His argument would have been exactly the same if he had set out to prove the unconscious was evolved from the conscious.



correct and easily understood. What the passage is will be stated hereafter. The following consideration of it touches the question before us.

We appear to know ourselves. I can determine myself in relation of distinction from others, in bodily form, mental ability and the environment of property and social status. I can do this because I can think relations. I can think about myself in relation to others. I can also think about myself as I existed at various past times and can imagine myself as I shall be in various future times because these "states" are relative and so the subject of thought.

But what is this "I" that I have been thinking about? It is a thing of constant change in time and space. Moreover, it is an object to *me*,—if it were not, I could not think about it: I do not think it, I think about it only. And even the object I think about has no permanence, it changes from moment to moment. What I do is to think about myself as a self changing from moment to moment.

If this changing thing is fully *myself* at no moment can it be true for me that *I am*. For at each moment I change. Again, if I as myself can think myself as I, I make myself an object to myself, which is the same as saying the "I" thinking is, for itself, the same as the "I" thought of. The thing knowing is the same as the thing known. Therefore, subject is object and object is subject.<sup>13</sup> But any such merger or reconciliation is impossible *for thought*: the knower is distinct from the known; thought is never its own content.

The only solution is to be found in Kant's statements, "I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself": "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that *I am*."

<sup>13</sup> The self known is both object and subject to the self knowing and the self knowing is both object and subject to the self-known.

As Locke has stated, personal identity consists in consciousness, which, I think, must be taken to mean in self-consciousness.<sup>14</sup>

The subject, through the brain, has the power of thought. The subject, conditioned in time and space as a human being, thereby becomes an object in the universe as presented. The subject takes on the appearance of an object and so, through thought, can be presented as an object to be thought about, to the self in self-consciousness. The really real subject marks, for us, only the *I am* : it is a fact beyond the purview of thought.

The pure subject then is the *I am*, which, for us, imports consciousness. And *in relation to the sensible universe* it may be termed a receptivity. For in its appearance as a human being it has a brain which, through thought, relates it to the sensible universe, whereby it is enabled not to think the sensible universe as presented, but to think about it. The "I am" can receive thought. Thought may be termed a content of consciousness.

Herein we find the relation of the self-conscious subject to the thinking subject. The thinking subject is phenomenal<sup>15</sup> of the *I am* and presents thought to it. So we cannot condition the subject *I am* in any way as existing only as a thinking subject. The faculty of Insight, itself, proves the subject to be more than a mere thinking subject.

When we say "I think myself," we state what is, for us, impossible in thought *unless* we distinguish between the *I* and *myself*. But how are we to distinguish? For the *I* and *myself* express, each, the same subject!

The only distinction can be that the "I" thinks the "*myself*" as conditioned in some way. The pure

<sup>14</sup> Kant says the 'I' intuits itself.

<sup>15</sup> It is a conditioned form of the *I am*.

"I" exists,<sup>16</sup> for us, in the "I am" beyond the purview of thought; the "myself" is the empirical "I"—the "I" conditioned in the sensible universe and thinking about the sensible universe by the exercise of thought through the brain.

The *I am* exists for each one of us. Try to think it, to determine it in thought. You cannot, it is elusive of thought. Your thought is merely relative, and the *I am* being to you a thing-in-itself, is not a subject of thought which is relative.<sup>17</sup> You cannot think yourself as duke or guttersnipe, rich or poor, clever or stupid, moral or immoral. You can only think *about* any such status of yours, can only think the relations between your status and that of others. You cannot even think any absolute standard by which to determine what morality or immorality is, what cleverness or stupidity is. All you can do, in thought, is to say morality and immorality, cleverness and stupidity, are limits of thought which you cannot think, but up to and between which limits you can think relations.<sup>18</sup>

But how can you have insight into the fact of this limitation of your power of thought unless you are more than a thinking subject? How can you have insight into the fact that all change, variation, the very existence of relations, demands the existence of what is ordinarily termed permanence,<sup>19</sup> unless you are more

<sup>16</sup> In the *Aesthetic* and *Logic* Kant refers to the pure ego as the "soul of man," in his *Dialectic* he terms it the transcendental subject. It is for the transcendental subject that Insight as a faculty of the subject, is so important; insight relates the subject to the transcendental.

<sup>17</sup> If you argue that this *I am* must equally apply to an oyster as to a man, I reply that it may or may not: I am ignorant on the subject.

<sup>18</sup> This does not import denial that a categorical imperative can exist for thought, though it cannot be thought about.

<sup>19</sup> The permanent can be thought as a contradiction of the non-permanent. The "permanent," as used in metaphysics must, I hold, refer to "something" under which change and non-change, etc., are subsumed, as "something" which transcends these limits of contradiction.

than a thinking subject? But this insight exists, you *are* more than a thinking subject.

When then we say "I think myself" we mean we think only *about* ourselves in relation to others. The *I am* has thought presented to it about itself constantly changing as conditioned in the sensible universe. This constantly changing "myself" is the *I am* conditioned in time and space in our sensible universe.

For this "myself" the "I" and "not I" holds good. But for the *I am*?

As we cannot either think the *I am* or think about it, the *I* and "not I" *as it exists* for the thinking subject, though it may exist phenomenally, cannot in real reality exist for the *I am*.<sup>20</sup> I doubt if Insight which transcends thought helps us to establish distinctions between one *I am* and another. The distinctions are, to us, but incomprehensible facts. Still, Insight opens an argument that the "I" and "not I" exists for the *I am* transcendently.

The phenomenal exists, so "something," generally termed the permanent, must exist.<sup>21</sup> For the phenomenal must be phenomenal of something: the very term "limited" imports, for thought, the unlimited, though both (contradictions) must, as Insight makes us aware, be subsumed under the "something" transcendent.

The "I" and "not I" exist for the thinking I. Can this phenomenal "I" create the distinction? The distinction, as thought, is anthropomorphic, but it is necessarily so because of the limits of the thinking I. And, for the thinking I to think the distinction, it has been shown that the *I am* must exist. The distinction could not be thought unless the *I am* existed.

It would appear impossible for the thinking I to

<sup>20</sup> Bear in mind that Gautama said he did not know what happened to the self (the *I am*) when freedom from Maya or delusion had been obtained.

<sup>21</sup> The use of the term "the permanent" is hereafter criticised. The phenomenal cannot be *thought* unless, in any case, its contradiction is also in the mind.

create the distinction. So it is fairly arguable that for the *I am* the "I" and "not I" must exist in some transcendent form.<sup>22</sup>

The following is perhaps a weak argument but it appeals strongly to most :

We all of us feel assured that we ourselves exist in continuity from the cradle to the grave. We do not contemplate ourselves as different selves in youth and age ; we speak of *my* youth, *my* age. And it is to this thing of relative permanence that we refer our human experience, our increase in growth and knowledge, our change in form and intellect. The changing self is always, in freedom from time, presented to this relatively permanent self.

I may lose part of my body but "I" remain the same. My memory is not affected by the loss and, using memory, I feel that "I" have not changed but *my* body has changed. I make my body external to myself as the *I am*.

But my brain, as part of my bodily structure, also changes from moment to moment ; its effectiveness changes at times in "jumps" ; to-day I can use it with ease, to-morrow with difficulty. But what do we mean when we say we use our brain ? We mean there is something "in us" which we can only turn into thought if our brains, as machines, will enable us to do so. A writer is seeking for a word to express thought. The word is "somewhere" (perhaps in his memory) but he cannot express it in words unless his brain permits him to bring it into consciousness in the *present*,<sup>23</sup> and in relation to the sensible

<sup>22</sup> Those acquainted with the Devanta, will understand that the above line of argument is taken from that source. The "I am" still exists, though all human distinctions which are necessary for personality as ordinarily understood to exist, have passed away as "maya."

<sup>23</sup> The word is in his consciousness, but it is useless to him for thought unless in consciousness in the *present* and in relation to the sensible universe. Using Myer's terms of distinction we may say the word is useless for thought in the subliminal consciousness, it must be brought up into the supraliminal consciousness before it can be of use for thought.

universe. The artist, inventor, poet, striving for expression, is striving to get his brain to enable him to think in the present and in relation to the sensible universe, something already in him.

But whether we fail or whether we succeed in getting our brain to do what we want it to do, do we feel that *we* change? We do not. It is the same *I am* whether successful or not successful.

Just as change in the body does not affect the "I am," so change in the brain does not affect the *I am*. And this is in agreement with the conclusion already come to. Though all thought is dependent on the existence of the brain, the *I am* is independent of thought and so the conscious I is more than a mere thinking I. The thinking I is not the same from one moment to another. The *I am* is relatively the permanent, the ego.<sup>24</sup>

But here, again, if we use the term "permanent" in its ordinary sense as applying to the "I am," the argument fails. For if the "I am" is permanent and the "thinking I" is a thing of change, the one stands in contradiction to the other and by no possibility can we make the one a conditioned state of the other. Change and permanence are, to us, pure contradictions which necessarily exist for us in our universe of thought. But for the "I am" we must get rid of the contradiction, though it must always exist in thought.

The error is apparent, but its explanation is also apparent.

When we define the "I am" as permanent we *condition it in thought*.<sup>25</sup> The "thinking I" we can condition in thought and so are justified in defining it

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*. Chapters on memory. Therein, contrasting the *I am* (termed, perhaps unfortunately, the intuitive self) with the thinking I, I show that memory in itself establishes the *I am*.

<sup>25</sup> For thought, the "I am" is permanent in relation to the thinking I.

as a thing of change. But the "I am" is not a subject of thought, so insight makes us aware that we can condition it in no way. We have the faculty of Insight which makes us aware that our thought is limited and that the limits of contradiction of our universe have only phenomenal existence. Insight tells us that the "I am" transcends the phenomenal.

How does this affect our consideration of the "I am"?

For the "I am" the limits of contradiction cannot exist as contradictions, while for the "I am," conditioned as the "thinking I," they do exist. For thought cannot inform us of its own limits; only insight can do this.

For the "I am" there must, then, be transcendence of these limits. That is, for the "I am" there must be "something" transcendent under which permanence and change are subsumed. We cannot think this "something," while Insight itself tells us nothing about it except that it must exist.<sup>26</sup>

When we accept this transcendence for the "I am" the difficulties we have encountered disappear. For this transcendence of the permanent and the changing the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" is now used. Its meaning is transcendental.

We can now understand how the "I am" may be conditioned in limits as a "thinking I": we can understand that *in relation to* the "thinking I" the "I am" is permanent: we can understand how the "thinking I" can present its thought to the "I am," the conscious self. For our faculty of Insight has enabled us to escape from the contradiction between the permanent I and the changing, thinking I. The thinking I is seen to be a conditioning of the "I am," not a contradiction. So the thinking I can be

<sup>26</sup> There is nothing original in what follows. Expressed otherwise all is to be found in the *Devanta*.

an object to the "I am." For the "I am" there is transcendence of the permanent and of change.<sup>27</sup>

The term "I am" for the self-conscious subject has been used deliberately because of its vagueness; we cannot think the "I am," while Insight itself only informs us of its existence, without any explanation of what its existence is.<sup>28</sup>

Throughout, great stress is laid on Insight as a faculty of the subject. As before stated more than one of our leading men of intellect have suggested that the supreme power of man exists in man's vital knowledge of his own ignorance. But, though the statement touches on the truth, it is incorrect as it stands. For, if correct, then man has knowledge transcending knowledge: which is impossible.

But when we bring in the faculty of Insight we find the explanation which follows for the statement referred to:—

Man as a subject has the power of Insight, which makes him aware of the limited nature of his knowledge. Man has the transcendent power not of thinking but of being aware that his thought is limited. The statement, then, corrected stands: "Man has vital Insight into the limits of his knowledge."

This "awareness" forms a link between the subject and the transcendental subject or the "I am." It enables us to escape from the contradiction between the thinking I and the "I am" and to be aware that the former is a conditioned state of the latter.<sup>29</sup>

The thinking I as a subject is a subject of change,

<sup>27</sup> The "I am" is the permanent in relation to the thinking subject, but the "I am" in relation to Transcendental Being is the accomplishing to the accomplished in the accomplishing. Unless we follow Spinoza we must hold that existence of the "I am" in "the accomplished in the accomplishing" is subject to some relative incompleteness as against ultimate Being.

<sup>28</sup> The term self-apperception equates the term "I am." The statement of Kant that the ego intuits itself suggests the term "Intuitive self," which I used in *Personality and Telepathy*.

<sup>29</sup> Kant gives the same nexus between his subject and transcendental subject. I merely emphasise his theory by introducing Insight as a faculty of the subject.



the "I am" as a subject is, relatively, a subject of permanence. But the subject is more than a thinking subject, it also has the power of Insight, and as a subject of Insight it can make itself, as a thinking subject, an object to itself: it can determine its thought as limited.

But the subject of Insight presents its Insight to the "I am" which, for us as subjects, exists, beyond the purview of thought or Insight, in self-consciousness. If, however, we give permanence to the "I am," *again* we are faced by a contradiction. We cannot condition the thinking I, a subject of change, under its contradiction, the "I am" which is permanent. Insight makes us aware that in real reality these contradictions cannot exist. There must be reconciliation or subsumption in transcendence. We are driven to give the "I am" transcendence relatively of both change and the permanent. We must have "the accomplished in the accomplishing."<sup>30</sup>

The meaning herein attached to the term self-consciousness requires some consideration as, throughout, I may have used it as having a different meaning from that generally given.

I use self-consciousness as meaning a "thing-in-itself." We may be conscious of this or of that, but whatever the content of self-consciousness may be or may not be, self-consciousness remains unaffected. As it is beyond the purview of thought or even of Insight, we can condition it in no way by its content, whereas in science (and even metaphysics?) it would appear to be defined as dependent on *some* content. Huxley held that consciousness is a thing-in-itself. I claim that reason justifies us in assuming consciousness cannot exist without a Being or subject which is conscious; but this does not import any necessary content or content of consciousness.<sup>31</sup> I fully admit

<sup>30</sup> This phrase is to be often used. I took it from C. C. Massey.

<sup>31</sup> Unless for self-consciousness the self be held a content of consciousness. Bear in mind we can but dimly compass the question of possible psychic activity for the self-conscious subject, even though, following Kant, we give the "I am" free imagination.

that consciousness without a content is unthinkable. But this means simply that, not being a subject of relation, it is beyond the purview of thought. If reason leads us to any conclusion we must accept it, however incomprehensible in thought or foreign, not necessarily opposed, to human experience.

We get rid of the contradiction for thought between the phenomenal and the permanent by holding that the ultimate is not in the permanent, but in "the accomplished in the accomplishing": there is transcendence of the contradictions of the permanent and phenomenal. It is only in thought, that is, relatively that the self-conscious subject can be termed permanent.

The Unity of God does not import denial of His Immanence just as the Immanence of God does not import denial of His Unity. If He exist in the "accomplished in the accomplishing" we transcend these contradictions of thought. It is Insight which enables us thus to transcend thought.

Kant says: "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only as *I am*." With this I fully agree. But when he goes on to say: "This representation is a thought not an intuition," I disagree. In the first place I can find no representation (or presentation). In my consciousness that *I am* there is no exercise of contemplation: I do not contemplate this real *myself*. And how can thought be involved, how can the content of thought for the thinker be the thinker himself? Kant himself says intuition is not involved.

My Self-consciousness exists in unity *in relation* to the congeries of lives to which I can refer back the apparent *one* life of my body: I, as a self-conscious subject, can by thought "dissect" my body and so learn that its apparent one life really exists as a mere synthesis of innumerable lives. My self-consciousness cannot be a function of my bodily life unless to each life of the innumerable lives going to make up the apparent one life of my body, self-consciousness is

given and my self-consciousness is held to be a synthesis of these self-consciousnesses.

Self-consciousness is for each of us our sheet-anchor of existence fixed deep, unknown, unseen, in the ocean of the universe, while we as subjects, like ships on the surface of time and space, toss about in storms of good and evil, happiness and misery, beauty and ugliness. It is insight, transcending thought, which gives us power to dive below our surface of time and space.

## A CONSIDERATION OF INFINITE BEING

OUR insight into the "I am" may be rendered clearer by a consideration of what is generally termed Infinite Being. It will be argued that the term Infinite is incorrect. For, if we use the term Infinite, we leave unbridged the chasm between the Infinite and the Finite.

In considering the question before us we must always bear in mind that in reasoning about anything we must necessarily start with an assumption that I who write and you who read exist as "I am," whatever meaning we may attach to "I am." Unless I and you exist, I cannot write and you cannot read;<sup>1</sup> and, when we assume our existence, this covers the assumption that I who write am not you who read: there must be for both of us the I and not-I. Even if I allege the theory of solipsism to be true for myself, this imports that, *for me*, it is true for you also. And, as I am not you, here again—a delicious contradiction for solipsism—we have the I and not-I. So, in any case, you and I are subjects, whether pure subjects or not. And this is why reason makes us aware there must be some ultimate all-embracing "I am" beyond the purview of thought. We arrive at what is ordinarily, but, I think, wrongly termed "Infinite Being."

Kant tells us that we cannot regard the world as finite or infinite. His proof would appear to be conclusive and he thereby opens an explanation of all his

<sup>1</sup> We write and read in the passing moment. Something in us uses these passing momentary operations in, to us, an ever present *now*. Only a continuous "I am" can do this.

antinomies. But it is necessary here merely to state that the finite and infinite are contradictions which exist only in and for thought: thought cannot transcend the contradiction. It is Insight which makes us aware that in real reality the contradiction cannot exist.

Now it is very generally held that finite being leads us, in reason, to an idea of Infinite Being.<sup>2</sup> And this is correct *for thought*. For when we use thought we use ideas which are relative, and infinity is, for thought, an ultimate as opposed to the finite or nothing. But Insight makes us aware of the limits of thought: it makes us aware that the finite and infinite are mere limits of thought, or rather, that we can only think the finite between the contradictory limits of 0 and  $\infty$ . Insight, then, as transcendent of thought, informs us that infinity is no more than a limit of thought: our ideas are "things" of relation, and infinity is a limit marking one boundary of relations. Insight makes us aware that, in the ultimate, the contradiction of 0 and  $\infty$  must be reconciled or subsumed under "something."

Instead then of predicating Infinite Being we must predicate some ultimate Being transcending the finite and also transcending the contradictory limits of 0 and  $\infty$ . Only thus can we arrive at a Being free from the limitations of thought.<sup>3</sup> It is Insight which enables us to arrive at such a transcendent existence; we cannot fathom it in thought.

If, transcending thought, we trust to Insight, we can imagine transcendence of good and evil, joy and sorrow, nothing and infinity, etc. Indeed, Insight *obliges* us to hold that, in some Ultimate, there is reconciliation or subsumption of all these contradictions which exist only in and for thought. But the contradictions—good and evil, for instance—as limits

<sup>2</sup> Those who start with a denial of the "I am" are not led to this conclusion. The subject is not, by the argument, a finite *being*. Any such theory leads to Pantheism.

<sup>3</sup> If such a Being can be thought it is a "thing" of relation.

do not disappear, are not blotted out in the ultimate. They exist phenomenally *for* conditions, in the unconditioned. The transcendence of the unconditioned does not mark destruction of the conditioned but *subsumption* of all conditions. At the same time not only this transcendence but this subsumption is beyond thought.<sup>4</sup>

When we define God as Unity or as the Manifold or as Immanent, or make Him Nature itself or define Him as external to Nature and Omnipotent and Omnipresent, what are we doing? Especially, when we say finite being implies Infinite Being in the ultimate, what are we doing?

We are using ideas to define God. It is true we define Him at a limit of thought: but the contradiction of this limit of thought is still in our mind.<sup>5</sup>

For example, if we define God as unity, we must hold at the same time He is not diversity; if we say He is Infinite Being, we say at the same time He is not finite Being. If we say, even, He is Infinite Goodness, then where is Infinite Evil? The one has no meaning for us without the other. If we attribute to God Infinite Goodness we define Him in thought as in contradiction to Nature, whereas I think we must hold He is manifest through or in Nature, however dimly or mystically. Insight makes us aware of our error.

It is quite true that those who define God as unity, do not deny His immanence, and those who define Him as immanent, do not deny His unity.<sup>6</sup> And this same form of denial of any exclusion attaching to God, applies to all definitions of Him. But what does

<sup>4</sup> I use the term "unconditioned" as meaning the "ultimate" not the infinite in contradiction to the finite; it transcends or subsumes all conditions.

<sup>5</sup> The idea of two opposing Transcendent Beings, one of Infinite Goodness, one of Infinite Evil, is sound *for thought*. Laurie says: Even the universe as *thought* of God unites *Him*, even though we say that the thought is within Himself.

<sup>6</sup> Laurie, in his "Synthetica," says we seek a one-universal. But this can be found only in transcendence of the one and of the universal.

this mean? It means that all admit their definitions of God are not exclusive; each definition is of use practically but, in theory, no one definition is assumed to exhaust the Godhead. Each definition is but a partial of God: points, in the ultimate, to a transcendental Being—transcendent of unity, diversity; immanence, externality; good and evil. That the "I am" in each of us leads us, through insight, to awareness of some Ultimate "I am" is fully admitted. But this Ultimate cannot exist in contradiction, so is beyond the purview of thought. For this Ultimate there must be transcendence of thought and so of the contradictions which necessarily exist for thought: it exists for insight not for thought.

The "I am" is the transcendental subject; it exists, for us, in self-consciousness; it is not a subject of thought. Through Insight we are led to an ultimate "I am," the transcendental Being.<sup>7</sup> This transcendental Being we cannot limit in thought, for He is beyond the purview of thought, so for this Being there is transcendence of all limits of thought. Thus we get rid of the distinctions in thought of the differing schools when considering the *nature* of God.

In the Christian Church, for instance, some orthodox teachers preach the unity, some the manifold, some the immanence of God; some make Him external to Nature, some Nature itself, some hold God revealed in the laws of Nature, some that these laws are but a partial manifestation of His governance.

The above are all honest and comparatively harmless attempts to define God in thought:<sup>8</sup> they are useful in bringing home to the many the fact of God.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> If we relate back "everything" to self-conscious subjects, reason leads us back to an exhaustive self-conscious transcendental Being. Cf. Berkeley.

<sup>8</sup> "Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas." James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

<sup>9</sup> The great majority of men require some dogmatic form for worship of the Deity.

But if we abandon opposing Gods of good and evil, we must give transcendence to the Ultimate Being.<sup>10</sup> And so all attempts to define God in thought, though useful for the passing time, must be held to fail. For, in the ultimate, we must get rid of the contradictions between good and evil, etc. There *must* be either reconciliation or subsumption under the transcendental.

So long as we confine ourselves to thought there can be no reconciliation between God and Nature: contradictions have, for us in thought, real existence—especially, the contradiction between good and evil. In whatever way, then, we may use *thought* for our definition of God, we must do one of two things. We must make Him responsible for good and evil as ultimate facts, or we must predicate two Gods—one of good, one of evil.<sup>11</sup> Neither solution, I think, appeals to reason.

But, here, Insight steps in and makes us aware not only of the limits of thought, but that in real reality contradictions must be reconciled or subsumed under “something.” Insight informs us that this real reality *must* exist.

Though the sensible universe exists, it will be found it is subject to consciousness<sup>12</sup> and consciousness imports the “I am.” It is the “I am,” as a self-conscious subject, which, as we shall see, has created in great measure the universe as presented to us. But the “I am” as a subject leads us, in reason, to a tran-

<sup>10</sup> I would suggest that our Lord Jesus Christ did this and that the charges against Him of inconsistency as to the nature of God fail because in the transcendentalism of God, contradictions must appear for reconciliation.

<sup>11</sup> Laurie, in his *Synthetica*, gives real reality to evil and so is driven to hold that evil is the failure of God-creative to realise the ideal of the individual and of the whole *on the plane of Being which man occupies*.

<sup>12</sup> This statement is considered at length hereafter.



scendent "I am" in Being. So, in the ultimate, the universe itself is a subject of the Transcendental Being.

Insight makes us aware that beyond the purview of thought there is, for this Transcendent Being, transcendent of all limits, even of good and evil. There is transcendence, for reason, of the I and the not-I, as we think them. But if for the Ultimate we use the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing,"<sup>13</sup> and as we, as subjects, exist in the accomplishing, even reason *may* find evidence in human experience to hold that the I and the not-I exist for the ultimate in the transcendent: revelation too may supplement reason. The term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" is, I think, of great assistance for our reason.<sup>14</sup>

It is often forgotten that mathematics is subject to the limitations of thought. We use the symbols 1, 2, 3, etc., merely as starting points for thought. They have no meaning in themselves; what we use in mathematics are the relations between them. These relations necessarily exist between limits of contradiction, the limits being 0 and  $\infty$ . We cannot think these limits, we can only think up to and between them, for it is only between them that relations exist. If we give reality to these limits we are landed in a bog of thought. For instance, a straight line of infinite length extends to opposite infinities.<sup>15</sup> But here insight steps in and informs us that mathematics, being a subject of thought, necessarily exist between limits of contradiction, which contradictions, though

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the Chapter so headed.

<sup>14</sup> This term I take from C. C. Massey. Cf. *Thoughts of a Modern Mystic* (Kegan, Paul and Co.). The term as transcendental gets rid of the difficulties surrounding any assumption of a First Cause; it marks transcendence of cause and effect. And, indeed, when we regard the past as accomplished we find effect is cause and cause is effect.

<sup>15</sup> The attempt to get rid of this impossibility by suggesting curvature of space simply explains the lesser difficulty by the creation of a greater.

real for thought, cannot exist in real reality. Mathematics, in Kant's language, does not deal with things-in-themselves.

At the same time mathematics does deal with a partial of real reality. The finite does not disappear or vanish in the infinite.<sup>16</sup> All we can hold is that we can think the finite and cannot think the infinite. We are justified in holding that thought, though infirm, presents us with a partial of real reality.

Herein we see that the infinite is not the limit in the ultimate of the finite, we might just as well hold that nothing, the contradiction of the infinite, is the limit in the ultimate of the finite. But there must be, as insight informs us, an ultimate. If we term the finite (which is changing) the accomplishing and, *in relation to the accomplishing*, we term  $\infty$  and  $\infty$  the accomplished, we find our really real ultimate in *the accomplished in the accomplishing*. But the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" is meaningless in idea, is beyond the purview of thought. For synthesis and analysis have existence only for thought, they have no existence for insight.

Again, consider motion. Imagine one particle in vacant space.<sup>17</sup> Let it be at rest, motionless, or travelling in any direction, at any rate. You will find you can neither think it at rest, or as moving in any direction at any rate. You must have another place in space known to you, besides the place where the particle is, before you can think the particle either at rest or in motion.<sup>18</sup> For motion and rest are meaningless to you in themselves, they have meaning only in relation, you do not think rest or motion, you think the relations between them.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> When we hold that  $\infty = \infty$ , where  $x$  is any number, all we mean is that the expression is outside all relations. We cannot relate  $x$  to  $\infty$  and so neglect it.

<sup>17</sup> To do this you must assume you are not yourself an object in space.

<sup>18</sup> For motion in three dimensions you must have two other places.

<sup>19</sup> For rate of motion you must think conditioned in time; for place you must be conditioned in space.

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Here again we find the limits of contradiction for thought in rest or motionlessness and infinite (?) motion. And neither can be the ultimate which insight demands. If we term rest (some hold to the theory that rest is the ultimate of motion) the accomplished in relation to motion, and motion (which varies) the accomplishing, we find our ultimate again in the accomplished in the accomplishing.

If we consider good and evil, we shall, at first thought, arrive at the same conclusion. That is, that we can think between the limits of contradiction of infinite good and infinite evil, and that insight makes us aware neither limit can be the ultimate.

But when we consider good and evil<sup>20</sup> we are getting away from the environment of the objective universe, we reach out ultimately to the non-physical and shall find we must use "second thoughts" in dealing with the question.

If we rely on the term the "accomplished in the accomplishing" we may hold that the subject exists in the accomplishing, Ultimate Being in the accomplished in the accomplishing. We thus get a nexus between the subject as the "I am" and transcendental Being as the ultimate "I am." And so we are free from any possible contradiction between the noumenal and phenomenal: the phenomenal is what may be termed a partial of the noumenal and this would appear not to be in opposition to Kant. But for the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" we must not use synthesis or analysis in order to define its meaning. The term is beyond the purview of thought, it may be called "an incomprehensible of insight."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The ultimate for good and evil is hereinafter found in love, beauty, truth and justice.

<sup>21</sup> Maimon says: But the greatest of all mysteries in the Jewish religion consists in the name Jehovah, expressing *bare existence* in abstraction from all *particular kinds of existence*, which cannot of course be conceived without *existence in general*. Cf. Spinoza's theory.

If, departing from the more or less definiteness of the Christian Church when attempting to define God, we indulge in the freer imagination of the Devanta we may say He is good and evil, everywhere and nowhere, rest and motion, nothing and everything. But thereby we still merely attempt, vainly, to define Him in thought.<sup>22</sup> What we really mean, what Insight makes us aware of, is that for Him there is transcendence of the contradictions that exist for thought.<sup>23</sup>

Laurie in his *Synthetica* uses for his ultimate the terms "the one-universal," "Being-Becoming" and, in the transcendental, such expressions mark closely the same as "the accomplished in the accomplishing." But he would appear to refuse any transcendental meaning for the terms he uses because that would lead to mysticism and he holds his theory is not mystic. He therefore argues at length to bring God home to us in knowledge: he holds there can be apprehension of God in idea.<sup>24</sup> This I deny, I hold God transcends all ideas, that we can only be aware of Him through our power of insight. God is an unknown God, He is not, in this sense, a God of knowledge. It is our power of insight that makes us aware of God, and in this sense He may be termed a God of insight.

Laurie attacks mysticism directly. He says "the mystic is impatient even of creation in his noble

<sup>22</sup> "It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, what canst thou know?"

<sup>23</sup> I suggest that if we hold contradiction exists necessarily for thought and that it is Insight which deals with the reconciliation demanded by reason, we elucidate rather than oppose what Hegel has theorized as to contradiction.

<sup>24</sup> Laurie as we have seen is thus driven to make God responsible for evil as a *fact* of our universe. In his own words, however, he does not consider the "Great God Himself" but "only the man necessity of Him; that is to say the aspect of His eternal and immeasurable Being which has actualized itself on this plane of His infinite possibility" (*Synthetica*, Vol. II. p. 193). Laurie considers merely a God of thought; I consider a God of insight transcending thought.

passion for the All-One. For creation is particularisation and is, so far, a departure from God, the Sole and Eternal. He abjures definite thinking on principle; for all that defines *eodem actio* limits."

If the charge of mysticism be brought against the present argument the reply is as follows:—

God, in thought, is the All and is the One: creation, in thought, is particularisation and so a departure from God, the Sole and Eternal. But so far, we have only touched God in thought and so necessarily are involved in a universe of contradictions. Here our power of insight steps in and makes us aware that our "All" and our "One" are in themselves mere limits of thought and so necessarily in contradiction the one to the other. Insight impels us to the transcendent, impels us to awareness that "Something" exists transcending the "All" and the "One," something beyond the purview of ideas. What then does the mystic mean by the "All-One?" It is the nearest approach he can make in words to define the transcendent: its really real meaning may be said to exist in insight: but, as insight transcends ideas, ideas reduced to words can only be used to suggest this meaning as in a parable.

Again Laurie says that mysticism is inverted Egoism and its attitude to life is the luxury of renunciation not the toil of sacrifice. If the present argument mark mysticism what Laurie says is incorrect. For it points not to inverted Egoism but to transcendence of egoism and altruism,<sup>25</sup> and the self-renunciation it preaches is not opposed to the toil of sacrifice: on the contrary it involves such toil.

But Laurie says at last that "the mystic is supremely right" and, again, "The Real is greater than the possibility of thought." His only charge against mysticism would appear to be that it preaches an unknown God; gives to man no "work-a-day"

<sup>25</sup> In the limit pure egoism is pure altruism.

proposition as to the God-head. Laurie, I think, holds that man wants a known God and therefore he raises against mysticism the charge which he ultimately withdraws. If this be so then his theory is fully pragmatic.

God exists in "the accomplished in the accomplishing," He transcends all, nothing, the finite and the infinite. There is no reason, therefore, from the human point of view, why He should not be projected into or manifest in the accomplishing: manifest anthropomorphically. This would give, to man, what Laurie would appear to think man requires.

No human subject is like to another: all differ, from the *crétin* to Sir Isaac Newton, from David to Goliath. *The probability* therefore, scientifically, is that at some time an approximately perfect human subject should appear.<sup>26</sup> And it must never be forgotten that Jesus Christ said "Verily he who does the will of God the same is my brother and my sister and my mother." If we hold to the infinite as a really real limit the incarnation of the Deity is, I think, impossible. If we hold to "the accomplished in the accomplishing" such incarnation is possible. The mere fact that man wants a God *in idea* for worship, establishes no ground for dragging down the Supreme into anthropomorphism: we must not drug reason for the sake of pragmatism. In what Laurie terms mysticism can alone be found for man reasonable explanation for dogmatic worship of the Deity.

I set up no denial of the Being or the Becoming, of the All or of the One for God. All done is to define such terms as limits of thought and to introduce transcendence for them all for God. Even as to unity, it is sometimes forgotten that Kant gives unity to God in a unity of reason, not in a unity of empiricism. In this sense the present argument may be said to give unity of reason to God.

<sup>26</sup> Religious belief is not now in question.

What has now been written as to the ultimate "I am" may have made clearer what is meant by the subject "I am." It is a subject to the ultimate "I am." But when we consider the relation between the two, we are met by a limit in, even, our faculty of Insight. Proof that the "I am" really exists in itself is beyond even the power of Insight:<sup>27</sup> the "I am" simply *is*: we must assume we exist in the "I am." Without that assumption I have not written, you have not read one single word. And this assumption leads us, in reason, to awareness of an ultimate "I am."

At the same time, if the argument for the existence of each of us as "I am" be sound, the mere dissolution of the body has nothing to do with the continuance or non-continuance of the "I am." And it is quite possible that we may have human experience of the continuance of the "I am," after it is free from the body. But such experience is not now considered.<sup>28</sup>

Though the question of the "I," and "not-I" for ultimate Being is beyond thought or even insight, we may, perhaps, exercise our imagination in considering it.

For Ultimate Being there is "the accomplished in the accomplishing," a term which must be treated as transcendental: the subject, existing in time, has existence only in the accomplishing; the subject is a thing of change. But the "I am" (the transcendental subject) has, relatively to the subject, existence in the accomplished: the accomplishing,

<sup>27</sup> Revelation is possible. But revelation is not herein considered. But, in reason, we can arrive at a degree of probability which we are justified in accepting as proof.

<sup>28</sup> It is considered in *Personality and Telepathy*. Apart from such evidence and from revelation, reason may point to the ultimate absorption of the "I am" in transcendental Being. Cf. Spinoza.

the change of the subject, is *for* the "I am," that is, for the relatively accomplished.<sup>29</sup>

Now for the subject and the "I am" we cannot hold that the "I" and "not-I" exists. For the subject is the "I am" in a conditioned state. We may then, in analogy, use imagination. As the subject is to the "I am," so is the accomplishing to the accomplished and, as the ultimate "I am," the Transcendental Being, is to the "I am," so is the accomplished in the accomplishing to the accomplishing. The "I am" is the ultimate "I am" in a conditioned state, where one "I am" differs from another merely in difference of the transcendental accomplishing of each.

So, as the ultimate "I am" exists in "the accomplished in the accomplishing" we can see, dimly, that the "I" and "not-I" may exist transcendently for the ultimate "I am," because, for the ultimate "I am," the accomplishing has existence always.<sup>30</sup>

Whether the above argument of imagination be sound or not, the existence of the impassable gulf generally assumed between the finite and infinite, good and evil, rest and motion, the accomplished and accomplishing is denied. For the Ultimate Being, contradiction cannot exist. But, as every word I have written is meaningless unless we accept the incompre-

<sup>29</sup> The photograph of a man fixes for years what would otherwise be but the momentary passing appearance of the man. The accomplishing from moment to moment, considered in itself alone at any future moment, is the accomplished. We may thus, by analogy, imagine, in the ultimate the accomplished in the accomplishing.

<sup>30</sup> This must be treated as merely a conceit of imagination. It may be compared with Spinoza's theory. We cannot hold that the ultimate purpose of man's creation is his conquest of the material. For this gives but an anthropomorphic idea of the ultimate; the ultimate is in the accomplished,—a mere limit of thought. In the same way there can be no "far off divine event" for God for that would put an end to God's activity. God is always accomplishing in the transcendent. But there can be a far off divine event *for us*.



hensible fact of self-consciousness for you and for me, so we must assume the incomprehensible fact of transcendental self-consciousness for the Ultimate Being.

## THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE

THE universe is revealed to us sensuously only so far as it is presented to us through our senses. It is presented to us in the form of objects: our senses are limited and so the form of presentation is, for us, determined by our power of receptivity through the senses.

The brain is part of each one of us as a subject, and it is through the brain that we are enabled to set up thought which connects us with the sensible universe.<sup>1</sup> It follows that the sensible universe must be presented to us in some way for thought about it to begin. But mere presentation cannot give rise to thought.

The universe of thought is termed the intelligible universe. It is a term now used for the universe as thought about.<sup>2</sup> And when we consider this intelligible universe in relation to the sensible universe, we find a strange fact. This fact has already been considered but requires re-statement here:—The universe must be presented to us through our senses before our brains begin to operate for thought in relation to it. But we *cannot think the sensible universe as presented*: we can only think about it: knowledge is relative.

<sup>1</sup> It is our power of thought which gives us command over the presentations from the sensible universe. But for this power of thought we want more than mere presentations. See pp. 1-4. We know one object from another by difference in form; it is shown hereafter that motion sets up form. Thought is correlated to motion of the brain.

<sup>2</sup> Its ultimate meaning must be expanded, when we refer to insight and imagination.

Objects are presented to us as unrelated "things." We may even "cram" our memory with images of mere presentations but still there are no relations between them in our memory. There might be innumerable images, percepts, concepts in or of the mind,<sup>3</sup> but if there were no relations in or for the mind thought could not exist for us as subjects.

When we assume to think objects, we do nothing of the kind. It is ideas of objects that we use for thought, and these ideas are not of the objects themselves, but of their relations *inter se*: knowledge is relative.<sup>4</sup>

So ideas are not presented with the presentation of objects. They exist in or for the mind alone. Thought has no existence in the universe as presented: it exists in the intelligible universe.<sup>5</sup>

This vital distinction between the intelligible and the sensible universe must be borne in mind throughout all that follows.

Let us first consider the sensible universe. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider two periods: the first when man is not in existence; the second when he is in existence.<sup>6</sup>

Considering the first period which to us is past we find we know nothing of the sensible universe as a thing-in-itself;<sup>7</sup> we know about it only in relation to the various forms in which we might have sensed it. But, also, by the use of ideas and memory, we

<sup>3</sup> That is, if images, etc., be defined as *not* importing relations.

<sup>4</sup> As already shown it is the schemata of objects that we use for thought, and these schemata can never exist in the objective universe.

<sup>5</sup> As presentation is assumed, I follow Kant, not Berkeley. We may speak of thought as *a priori*; the affection on us through our senses of the universe as presented, must not be confounded with thought, even empirical thought.

<sup>6</sup> There is a serious hiatus in the argument here. For all lower forms of life than that of man are largely ignored. But, still, I think the argument will ultimately be shown to be at least approximately sound.

<sup>7</sup> We hereafter reduce the sensible universe itself to the etheric in form. Cf. the chapter on Thought, Brain and Motion.

can think about it in the present *now* as it has been in the past, and so can picture to ourselves its past history in change of form. We thus arrive at what is termed evolution.

Evolution imports no change in the universe itself, which is unknown to us. It imports only change in form, that is, change in etheric form. Roughly, we find some primordial form of what may be termed chaos, which evolves in form and in complexity of form.<sup>8</sup> Matter in space takes on, for instance, the form of suns, planets, satellites, the matter of each body specializing in various forms. Then life appears,<sup>9</sup> vegetable and animal.

The above description of evolution is perfunctory because the argument depends in no way on its exactness.

The point is this :—Before man appears we can, if we consider nothing but the sensible universe itself, find no reason at all for evolution as it exists, no reason at all for the evolutionary change in form. Darwin, it is true, said that the mind of man revolts at the idea of the grand sequence of nature being the result of blind chance. But he went no further. And the explanation that the universe is supported by a gigantic tortoise is quite as reasonable or unreasonable as to say all results from the iron, eternal laws of Nature.<sup>10</sup> Nothing is thereby explained, for no one pretends to have been in a position to be able to cross-question either the gigantic tortoise or the eternal, iron laws of Nature.

In the second period man appears. What is the change in the evolution of the sensible universe?

<sup>8</sup> From the first (!) this chaos must have had in itself the potentiality of evolution in form *or* the evolution must have been effected by some external power.

<sup>9</sup> It is indifferent to the argument whether life is or is not a function of matter.

<sup>10</sup> Haeckel *thought* this explanation. Is he himself eternal in that he assumed to think the eternal?

There is no change. The evolution goes on simply in change of form, change in etheric form.

Bear in mind what we are now doing: we are scientific, we are thinking the sensible universe itself, not thinking about it. We are thinking the sensible universe, under the forms in which we sense it, as a *reality*. When we do this we find change only in form.

A chair has come into being. This is nothing but matter (something unknown) in a new form.<sup>11</sup> An electric battery has come into being. This is nothing but matter in a new form. You object, by saying that electricity has come into existence and is used for a purpose it was never used for before?

Electricity has not come into existence: electricity is but a "form" of energy, and energy in itself is not changed at all, it is merely made manifest in a particular form in the sensible universe. And of this particular form of energy you know nothing but its effect in relation to certain forms of the sensible universe: wireless telegraphy itself is meaningless unless in relation to certain forms of the sensible universe. You know nothing at all of electricity itself, you only know its manifestation in relation to the sensible universe. Destroy the electric battery referred to, then where is electricity? You say, also, electricity is used for a purpose it was never used for before. But we are considering the sensible universe scientifically, we are thinking *it* as a reality, not thinking about it. And the sensible universe has nothing at all to do with purpose<sup>12</sup> any more than it has with will or desire. Will is operative by volition on the forms of the sensible universe, it is external to that universe.

<sup>11</sup> What we sense as matter we hereafter reduce to motion, and this new object, quâ form, marks only the confining of motion to a new form of the etheric.

<sup>12</sup> This is true simply for the passing argument.

Now remember that, scientifically, we are quite ignorant why evolution in form exists as it does exist until man appears.

But when man appears, does this ignorance still remain? It does not. We know why the chair and electric battery came into form.

Man made them for his own purposes. If man had not appeared, we may assume they would never have appeared. More than this. Since man appeared the evolution of the sensible universe in form has always, in time, been more and more fully determined by man himself for his own purposes, good, bad or indifferent. As evolution advances, man, more and more, determines his own environment. And "his own" must be read in a very wide sense as including individuals of a coming generation. The form of the sensible universe is very largely determined by man himself.

Evolution, before man appeared, was, so far as the argument has proceeded, aimless. Is it aimless since man appeared? Or can we determine whence his power over the sensible universe comes?

If man thought the universe as he senses it he could have accomplished nothing: there could be nothing new in his thought, he would simply have power to think what *is*. For in such case he would not sense relations and, without thinking relations, no *new* relation can be thought.

When a chair comes into existence, that is, becomes an object in the sensible universe, what is it? It is a *new* object in the sensible universe.<sup>13</sup> But you cannot say it is a new object which has come into existence in form from the natural course of evolution; you cannot say that the innumerable new forms in the sensible universe which we can now

<sup>13</sup> Do not think about the purpose for which the chair was formed. There is no purpose in the sensible universe, though the sensible universe may be used for purpose.

sense and which are the creation of man have come into existence from the natural course of evolution.<sup>14</sup>

If you worry the whole question back, you will find that to explain the existence of these new forms in the sensible universe you must have the self-conscious subject gifted with imagination. None of these new forms came first into material existence in the sensible universe without a *precedent* idea about the form in the imagination of man (Cf. page 55) Man had the will that the form should exist, he was gifted with power to put his will into volition. But without the precedent idea in imagination,—the idea about some form which as yet did not exist in the sensible universe,—he could not have willed the new form; there was nothing for his will to operate on. Will, without content, cannot be active in volition manifest by effecting change in the form of the sensible universe.

No new form in the sensible universe which has come into existence for the purposes of man can have so come into existence without a precedent idea of it in imagination.<sup>15</sup>

But if we think the sensible universe as we sense it, that is think it directly, where is imagination?<sup>16</sup> If objects give images on the internal sense, and these images raise ideas directly, where is imagination? There is nothing to imagine: thought has for its content nothing but *existing objects*: in any such case, we do *not* think relations between objects, because we do not sense relations.

You may think a million objects directly, but you

<sup>14</sup> If you follow Haeckel and hold consciousness is an evolution from unconsciousness, you *can* say this. But then you make your self-consciousness a subject of the unconscious *in idea*. What do you mean?

<sup>15</sup> All conduct on the part of a self-conscious subject is the result of purpose unless to be referred to instinctive action

<sup>16</sup> Kant says imagination is a power deeply hidden in the depths of the human soul; his schematism of the understanding opens my line of thought.

will find imagination still "in the air." Where is your power to think any object which has no existence in the sensible universe? No object, as sensed, will give you the power; for, as presented, it is unrelated to any other object. Before the subject can objectify any new object in the sensible universe, the subject must first have an idea of the object in the intelligible universe.

Locke understood, dimly, that relations form the essence of cognition; Hume treated an idea as a copy or image of an impression, he assumed we think objects directly. And he admitted that, thereby, he failed to solve the riddle of cognition. Kant, going beyond the footsteps of Hume, held that all intuition<sup>17</sup> is sensuous, but he held also that "all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations." We, ourselves, in ordinary parlance, all admit that knowledge is relative.

But, even in Kant, the vital distinction between the impression or concept of an object on the one hand and the idea of an object on the other, is not always kept in mind. The idea is not treated as, in itself, relative; it is generally treated as if it were an image on the internal sense of an external object. Kant marks the difficulty when he tells us the sensible universe must be presented to us for knowledge about it to begin, but that it by no means follows all knowledge arises out of such experience,<sup>18</sup> and when we bear in mind that the ideas we use for thought are relations and that relations are not presented with objects, we can follow his meaning; we can fathom the distinction he raises between *a priori* knowledge and empirical knowledge, though the distinction is

<sup>17</sup> The term "intuition" has had an unfortunate career; it has been used, as before stated, as having the most diverse meanings.

<sup>18</sup> I deny that any knowledge arises from presentations; they are only the *occasion* for knowledge about the universe, as presented, to begin.



not now relied on. The vital distinction which I raise, between the intelligible and the sensible universe appears, to all intent and purpose, in Kant.

We must admit this vital distinction between the intelligible and the sensible universe, and so never forget that we must abandon the assumption that we think objects directly. In truth, we do not think objects, we think about them; we think relations between them, which are not given in "sensuous intuition." Our ideas of things are relative. We do not think an object, we think its likenesses and unlikenesses to other objects.<sup>19</sup> The realm of the universe as presented is objects: the realm of the intelligible universe is, so far as the argument has yet proceeded, relations between objects.<sup>20</sup> But for these relations to exist as ideas for thought, there must be, precedently in the mind, schematic ideas. (Cf. p. 4)

Before completing our consideration of the present subject it is advisable to consider the relation between imagination and thought and the laws of Nature, thereby opening an explanation of how ideas can arise in the intelligible universe.

<sup>19</sup> Any two men sense an object in approximately the same way; it is the same one object to each of them. But if one knows more *about* the object than the other, this is because he knows more about the relations of the object to other objects.

<sup>20</sup> Dreams we shall find prove that we can exist in the intelligible universe when our relation to the sensible universe, through our senses, is largely in abeyance.

## IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT<sup>1</sup>

You have sensed the objective universe as objects of varying size and form. Form involving quantity is presented to you.<sup>2</sup> The sensible universe has to be presented to you for thought about it to begin. But these objects have not been presented to you with any fixity of form and size, so you think into the sensible universe which you sense, potentiality of change in form and size quâ objects.

Now the ideas that you use for thought about these objects exist in relations between these objects. But this does not exhaust the ideas that you use. For you can relate ideas to ideas, which gives rise to derivative ideas: you travel still further away from the sensible universe as you have sensed it. You still use ideas and so still think, but your thought is now shown to be based on imagination. For now you are thinking beyond the sensible universe as you have sensed it: the ideas you use are not ideas of relations existing between existing objects in the sensible universe. These derivative ideas may be of objects possible in the sensible universe, but such objects do not exist in the sensible universe: they exist only for you in imagination, that is, in the intelligible universe.

Thought about the sensible universe required, for commencement, the reception on presentation of objects already existing, quâ our senses, in the

<sup>1</sup> I think that now I simply deal with a deduction from Kant's theory that imagination is a power deep buried in the soul of man.

<sup>2</sup> Form is etheric, but it involves mass.

sensible universe. But when, in thought, an idea about an object arises which results from our relating an idea to an idea, to what must we refer this new object in relation to the sensible universe? There is no corresponding object, no starting point for thought, in existence in the sensible universe which has raised the idea through our thinking about it. Where is the object?

It exists in the intelligible universe, in imagination.<sup>3</sup> But, once this new object is in imagination, man can, very possibly, *create* it in the sensible universe through his will and power of volition.<sup>4</sup> Without such previous existence in imagination, it could never exist in the objective universe.<sup>5</sup>

Let us consider an example of this power.

Before 1831 the dynamo was not an object in existence in the sensible universe. How did it come into existence? Faraday, using ideas for thought, related his ideas to one another and so imagined an object which as yet did not exist in the sensible universe: he exercised, as a faculty of himself as a subject, the power of imagination. He imagined a dynamo,<sup>6</sup> that is, he made a dynamo which did not

<sup>3</sup> What we have done is this. By thinking relations to relations (relating ideas to ideas) we have thought a new relation *for ourselves* in time quite apart from the objects existing in the sensible universe in space, which caused us to begin to think about the sensible universe. We have thought a new object without sensing it. That is, we have thought an object *for* the sensible universe which has no existence there. We think in time, objects of the objective universe exist in space.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of the parallelism of Spinoza between things and ideas, things are made subject to ideas; even the sensible universe itself exists for us only in subjection to law.

<sup>5</sup> Kant marks the fact that to think an object and to cognize it are by no means the same thing: we can think about an object which does not exist in the objective universe, but we cannot cognize it unless it exists therein. But he nowhere, I think, marks the fact that, for creation of any new object, we must think about it before we can create it for cognition.

<sup>6</sup> He must have started with what I have termed the schematic idea of a dynamo. For creation in the objective universe he must have had the idea of a particular dynamo.

exist in the sensible universe, exist in his imagination. He gave it existence in the intelligible universe.

When he had done this he exercised the power of will and volition that he had, as a subject in the intelligible universe, over the sensible universe. He made a simple model of a dynamo and so gave it existence for the first time in space; he created in the objective universe an object which before did not exist there.<sup>7</sup> When once this object existed in the sensible universe it became a "starting point" for other men to think about. The result was something akin to evolution in "starting points" for thought; something which led to the gradual appearance, as objects in the sensible universe, of more and more effective dynamos. But each stage of advance in the form of the dynamo as an object in the sensible universe was preceded by the existing of the form in imagination. The existence of any new object in the sensible universe is always contingent: it is contingent on its preceding existence in the imagination of man. Existence of the object in the intelligible universe necessarily precede its existence in the Sensible universe.

It follows that since man appeared on the earth the form of the sensible universe has been largely under his control; under man's control because he is a subject of the intelligible universe. What we term the laws of Nature always hold sway, but man *uses* the laws for his own purpose. How can he use these laws? As a subject of the intelligible universe, not as a subject of the sensible universe. Will and volition are useless without imagination: all three have no existence in the sensible universe, they are external to it. It is will, volition and imagination which, as manifest in or marking man, enable him

<sup>7</sup> Darwin says that man does make his artificial breeds, for his selective power is of such importance relatively to that of the slight spontaneous variations. But any artificial breed must exist in man's imagination before he can produce the breed in the objective universe.

to use the sensible universe for his own purposes, to create therein or vary its form.<sup>8</sup>

As a subject of the objective universe, the subject exists with a material brain capable of movement. This relates it to the objective universe so that through its senses it can be affected thereby.<sup>9</sup> But as a thinking subject of the intelligible universe the subject thinks what is not presented to him by the objective universe: he thinks relations between the objects presented. The objective universe is merely the occasion for thought not of the objective universe but about it. It is as a subject of the intelligible universe that man has the power to think and he thinks about the sensible universe because it is presented to him. The nexus between him, as in the intelligible and the objective universe, is his brain, for which motion runs parallel with thought.

But the subject has, also, further ideas in that he can relate the ideas he has about the objective universe, one to another and so get derived ideas for use. These relations of ideas one to another are not necessarily related in any way to the objective universe, they exist in the intelligible as distinct from the objective universe. But when they once exist in the intelligible universe they may possibly be used to create new objects in the sensible universe: the objective universe is subject to imagination.

Herein we find the subjection of the objective universe to the intelligible universe.

If man were no more than a subject of the objective universe and yet had also power to think the relations existing between existing objects, he could effect nothing; his will, desire, volition would be useless.

<sup>8</sup> Do not forget that we do not sense relations, so for ideas we must, as subjects of the intelligible universe, have *à priori* knowledge in Kant's use of the term. We must have the potentiality of knowledge before presentation.

<sup>9</sup> We hereafter reduce the sensible universe as presented to motion and etheric form. Motion is a common dominator for the brain and this sensible universe.

In such case he could only think about the objective universe as it is, there would be in him no foundation for the execution of any change therein. For the one and sole relation between man and the objective universe would be his thought about it as it exists, so that, admitting as we do in such case, thought to run parallel with brain movement, we leave without explanation the exercise of any power of the subject over the objective universe. For if man could think nothing new, he could invent nothing new.

But human experience informs us definitely that man *can* imagine an object for the objective universe which does not exist therein, and that, *after* imagining it, he has power to create it in the objective universe. It follows that man can do more than think about the sensible universe as presented, *he can change the form of presentation*. And this power not only cannot be imported as in him as a mere subject of the objective universe, but thought about the universe as presented must be backed by the exercise of imagination about objects *not* presented. Thought is related to imagination. It is because he is a subject of the intelligible universe that he exercises this power over the objective universe, over, even, himself, as an object therein.

What, then, is the relation of thought to imagination?<sup>10</sup>

I do not deny for a moment that imagination is a power deep buried in the soul of man, as Kant holds. Indeed, I refer imagination to the "I am," which may be treated as the same as Kant's transcendental subject. But at present we are considering the relation of thought to imagination: we are thinking, and so using ideas, which are relations.

When we relate ideas to ideas and so get derivative

<sup>10</sup> Never forget that thought and imagination are meaningless unless referred to self-consciousness and so to a self-conscious subject or Being.

ideas, then, if we use these derivative ideas for mental process, we are still thinking: we are using ideas for thought: so far as thought is concerned there is no distinction between ideas and derivative ideas. But the ideas we now use for thought are not ideas arising directly from objects sensed by us. The ideas are derived from imagination of objects not sensed by us. And it is because these ideas are derived from imagination, that, once existing in the intelligible universe, the subject may have power to give them existence in the objective universe. It is said the subject "may have" such power, because imagination is free and unfettered, so that it may not only give rise to ideas which make creation possible in the objective universe but, as we shall see when we consider Dreams, can travel far beyond the bounds of all possible human experience. Thought is a conditioned form of imagination.<sup>11</sup> When we think the relations between objects of the sensible universe we are using imagination. In such case imagination itself is limited in no way: it is its use that is limited.<sup>12</sup> The objective universe offers only a particular occasion for imagination and so requires only a particular and limited exercise of imagination in the form of thought, for thought about it.

When we use derivative ideas, that is, think relations between relations, there is more extensive

<sup>11</sup> Imagination is the foundation of thought. Imagination is conditioned as thought because the brain inhibits the full imagination of the subject. The death of the body, may indeed be the end of the sensational use of our mind, but only the beginning of the intellectual use. The body would thus be not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition contributive thereof, and, although essential to our sensuous and animal consciousness, it may be regarded as an impediment of our more spiritual life. By Kant. Cf. *Immortality* by William James. p. 57. Kant uses the term thought in a very wide sense.

<sup>12</sup> We must distinguish between imagination and its use, just as (in *Personality and Telepathy*) we distinguished between memory and the use of memory.

use of imagination, but we are still thinking, because we are still using ideas.<sup>13</sup>

We can only define thought as a presentation to, or something used by, a self-conscious subject. We cannot define it as an act without confusing act, in thought, with something positive in the objective universe.<sup>14</sup> Thought about the universe as presented marks our lowest exercise of imagination, thought using derivative ideas marks a higher exercise, and thought about imagined occasions a still higher exercise. Imagination is always involved, it is its use which is subject to degree. What may be termed pure imagination, that is, exercise of imagination not confined to the use of ideas, must be considered later on when we come to Dreams.

If we start with the "Cogito ergo sum" as confined to thought we make activity an implicit part of the personality. But what activity? Activity in the sensible universe. For the brain is an object and all thought is correlated to motion of the brain. With such an assumption there is no place for imagination: ideas can only exist for relations between objects sensed, these are the only ideas that thought can have for use. Ideas cannot be related to ideas, for ideas are confined to relations between objects already existing and sensed:<sup>15</sup> the relation of ideas to ideas requires the exercise of imagination and the scheme hypothesized has no place for imagination. Imagination remains unaccounted for, or must be—as it often is—treated as mere

<sup>13</sup> But we can imagine other sensible universes than that presented to us, under other laws than those of nature which govern our objective universe. So we can imagine occasions for thought, other than the particular occasion of our objective universe. But still we are thinking, though our thinking marks an extensive use of imagination.

<sup>14</sup> It is thus the error arises of holding thought to be creative, whereas it is the self-conscious subject who creates by the use of thought.

<sup>15</sup> Schematic ideas (which cannot be objectified) are necessary for such derived ideas.



surplusage or the result of irregular mental activity. Nor is any explanation given of what is held to have been proved, that creation by the subject in the intelligible universe must always precede creation in the objective universe; for creation in the intelligible universe requires imagination. My brain is made an implicit part of *me* and my brain is an object in the objective universe: there is no place for imagination, in that not only does all knowledge begin with experience, but all arises out of experience. Kant denies that all knowledge arises from experience and, I think, most accept his allegation. If the allegation be sound we must have imagination "at the back" of thought. Even the most materialistic of men of science admit they use imagination. Can they claim that it is an "emanation" from the motion of the brain? And, if so, what is its genesis. In any case, all admit that the subject exercises imagination.

For sound reasoning we must not start thus with the "Cogito ergo sum:" we must distinguish between the subject and its activity: in the deepest state of physical and mental coma, science itself admits that, even in such full state of absence of activity, the subject still remains as the same subject. And while we may not, perhaps, hold *à priori* that psychical activity is probable or improbable, we *must* hold that it is possible.<sup>16</sup>

Self-consciousness exists for each one of us; it *is*. And it *is* quite apart from its activity or indeed any content.<sup>17</sup> Herein we find the subject in the ultimate. The subject is related to the external by imagination "deep buried in the soul of man," but exercised by the subject when faced by the external.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Many of our leading men of science accept telepathy. If they are correct psychical activity is highly probable, so highly probable that it may be taken as proved. Kant himself held telepathy to be possible, in that it contains no inherent contradiction.

<sup>17</sup> Herein is no denial of activity physical or psychical.

<sup>18</sup> In exercising thought we cannot get beyond some form (idealistic?) of duality.

With the above assumptions we can explain the relation between thought and imagination, and the fact that by creation in the intelligible universe the subject can create in the objective universe.

The subject in the intelligible universe exercises imagination; the full exercise will be considered when we come to *Dreams*. The subject is embodied and its brain, as hereinafter shown (Cf. p. 75), relates it to the objective universe; that is, to the universe as sensed by us.

It still, embodied, exercises imagination. But the universe as sensed by it is but part of its universe, it requires but little of imagination for comprehension. The imagination of the subject must be inhibited for comprehension of the "occasion" presented to it and, in some way, it must be related to the objective universe for comprehension.

The subject, embodied, has a brain and this, through motion, relates it to the objective universe. By the exercise of imagination the subject sets the brain in motion. But the motion of the brain is determined by the constitution of the brain itself. So the subject exercises imagination only so far as the brain as a machine permits. The result is thought; an inhibited form of imagination, in that it is correlated to motion of the brain. By the use of imagination the subject sets the brain in motion whereby thought, an inhibited form of imagination, is produced.<sup>19</sup>

But if the subject be a conditioned state of the "I am," we have not yet exhausted the manifestation of imagination we should expect for the subject. We want, relatively, free exercise of the imagination, for the subject.<sup>20</sup> For the use of imagination by the

<sup>19</sup> Just as by the use of energy the subject sets an electric machine in motion whereby electricity, an inhibited form of energy, is produced.

<sup>20</sup> We want some human experience, though exceptional, pointing to the fact that the subject is moved by "free" imagination, though he uses it but partially.

subject has as yet been confined to thought, that is, confined round relations; and imagination, even for the subject, must give at least some glimmer of real reality. If we term relations a content of thought and find, as we have, a form of evolution for these relations, the ultimate for these relations is real reality. And we should expect at least a glimmer of presentation of real reality for the subject. But this question must be deferred: it will be considered when we come to Dreams.

## THE LAWS OF NATURE

WHEN man has created a new object in the intelligible universe, how is it that he is able, thereby, to create it in the sensible universe? This has not yet been fully explained. For, if we consider the universe alone as it is sensed by us, creation therein is impossible.

Animals, lower than man, re-act instinctively to the universe as it is presented.<sup>1</sup> They take food as it is presented to them and live subject to environment over which they exercise no power. This is approximately true of man when first appearing. Like the Australian aborigine, who still exists, he probably lived on the food which Nature produces, he was in subjection to the environment of Nature itself as given. Any creation in the sensible universe was impossible for him.<sup>2</sup>

Then he began to observe and to carry on, in time, what he observed, by use of his strange faculty of memory. He observed, possibly, that a branch rubbing against a branch does, on occasion, produce fire: he observed the form of growth of the animals and the vegetables that he lived on. Then, more and more, as time passed, he made use of his observation for his own purposes, he produced fire artificially, he

<sup>1</sup> This may not be altogether true, but the exaggeration will not affect the argument.

<sup>2</sup> This does not touch the question of what man was originally as a subject. It only touches the question of his relation to the sensible universe. Even a mute, inglorious Milton may exist.

planted seeds and confined animals, at his own will, for food<sup>3</sup>.

What does this mean? It means that he found out that the sensible universe as presented to him is not anarchic; he found out that it is subject to, and its motion and evolution are directed by, the *laws of Nature*. He could not have done what he did unless the laws of Nature had been in existence: he used for action his partial knowledge of these laws.

What then is it that man used in the past, and uses now, for his own purpose? He does not use directly the sensible universe: he uses it as *subject to the laws of Nature*. If Nature were not so subject to law he could not use the sensible universe in any way for any purpose. It is the very existence of the laws of Nature which enables man, when he has created in the intelligible universe, to carry his creation into the sensible universe.<sup>4</sup> We must refer back his power of creation in the universe as presented, *not* to mere presentation, but to his knowledge of the laws of Nature. Presentation is the occasion for his creation: it is the laws of Nature which give him his power.

We thus see how erroneous it is to say, without any qualification, that man is subject to the laws of Nature. There is subjection, but it is this very subjection which makes possible the exercise by man of power over the sensible universe. Man is not concerned with the universe as a thing-in-itself in any way; he is concerned only with the universe as presented and *as governed and directed by the laws of Nature*. When, even, he creates any object in the sensible universe he can only create it as subject to the laws of Nature.

It is not the sensible universe but the laws governing and directing it on which man depends for

<sup>3</sup> What more he has done up to the present time it is unnecessary, for the purposes of the argument, to define.

<sup>4</sup> Bacon said that Nature can be commanded by man; but only by obeying her.

exercise of his power over it: the sensible universe is but the occasion for this exercise. Unless Nature had been governed by laws and Faraday had known something about these laws, he could never have created the dynamo as an object in the sensible universe.

Man's power over the universe as presented has for foundation the existence of the laws of Nature.

Here mark this important fact. These laws of Nature had existence *before* man appeared as a subject of the universe as presented. When we say man reads the laws of Nature into the sensible universe we do not mean that he conceives the laws as coming into existence with himself: so far as he knows the laws of Nature, he thinks them as having been in existence *before* himself as a subject of the sensible universe. The materialist himself must think in this way, and no one can think the laws of Nature as coming into existence in time.<sup>5</sup>

We have seen that man, as a subject of the intelligible universe, exercises power of variation and creation in the objective universe: he does this as subject to the laws of Nature. But we have also seen that, for us, the laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe.

In the limit, it is the self-conscious in man to which his power so to vary or create must be referred. But man does not so create or vary directly: it is because the laws of Nature exist and because he can make use of them that his power exists.

Imagination is free: even when the subject uses imagination in the inhibited form of thought, there is no bondage to the laws of Nature, unless he is thinking about the objective universe or about something possible for the objective universe. Not thought itself, but the content of thought, is subject to the

<sup>5</sup> We can only think them, not out of time, but as existing in transcendence of time. As Kant points out, we can neither give beginning or no-beginning to the sensible universe.

laws of Nature. By the laws of Nature we mean laws of the objective universe, not of the intelligible universe. These laws exist in the intelligible universe, they govern the objective universe. But, for us, imagination, will and volition, all that exists in the intelligible universe, is meaningless without the assumption of self-conscious subjects. Can we then make abstraction of the laws of Nature which also exist in the intelligible universe? If not, then when we consider that the conduct of all subjects is governed by these laws, does not reason point to their resulting from self-conscious transcendental Being?<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The laws of Nature are further considered in the chapter on "The Sensible Universe before Man's Appearance."

## IDEAS

Now we can clear away the difficulty still facing us as to the foundation or origin of ideas.

If we merely sensed the universe as presented we should have no presentations of relations and so ideas could not arise in the mind.<sup>1</sup> But, after presentation, man begins to observe that the objective universe is governed by what we term the *laws of Nature*. The form, motion, the very evolution of this universe are all observed to be under the governance of the laws of Nature. This spells, for us, relations for form, motion, and evolution itself. The form of the seed evolving into the form of the tree or plant : the growth of life-organisms generally ; the motion and evolution in form, of matter itself ; all reveal the governance of the laws of Nature.<sup>2</sup>

We sense the universe as presented as unrelated objects, so we cannot think these objects : we think about them ; that is, we think their likenesses and unlikenesses to one another. In other words, we think relations between them. But whence come these relations which are not sensed, which are not given with the mere presentation of objects ? From the fact we observe that all objects are bound together under

<sup>1</sup> Certain living organisms, it may be, merely sense the universe as presented. This may set up action and reaction between such living organisms and their environment. There may be *instinctive* action and reaction without self-conscious thought. This opens an enquiry into instinct as distinct from self-conscious thought.

<sup>2</sup> "In explaining processes in Nature we use laws as major premises under which we subsume facts to reach conclusions." Riehl's "Science and Metaphysics," p. 235. Spite of Riehl's objection we are justified in so doing.



one governance, the governance of the laws of Nature. It is the fact of the existence of the laws of Nature that not only gives us power to think but power to vary and create in the objective universe. The laws of Nature give us the relations which we require for-ideas.

Destroy the laws of Nature. Where is evolution? Destroy man's knowledge of the laws of Nature, while giving him full sensuous knowledge (assuming that is possible) of presentations. Where is man's power to think about the universe as presented? Where is his power to *create* in the sensible universe? The powers of thought and creation are non-existent.

We must therefore refer ideas not directly to presentations but to the fact of the existence of the *laws of Nature which had existence before man appeared as a subject in the sensible universe*. It is the existence of these laws that makes thought and creation by man possible

But where do the laws of Nature exist? In the sensible universe? No. They exist, for us, in the intelligible universe: man thinks them, he does not sense them.<sup>3</sup>

We must refer man's ideas not only to the existence of the laws of Nature but to his knowledge of these laws. Given ideas, man exercises power over the universe as presented. The *occasion* for his exercise of this power in relation to the sensible universe is found in presentation, the power itself is derived through the laws of Nature.

The sensible universe is fully under the governance of the laws of Nature which exist, for us, in the intelligible universe. Man, as a subject of the intelligible universe, exercises like, but subordinate, power over the universe as presented to him. His power of thought is based on the existence of the laws of Nature. Destroy these laws, then thought is impossible.

<sup>3</sup> Even Haeckel with his closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution makes all subject to the eternal iron laws of Nature .

The foundation of ideas, then, is in the existence of the laws of Nature. It is the laws of Nature which, for us, establish relations between presentations, and it is these relations which make ideas possible, and so render thought possible. The objective universe presents us with unrelated objects, a possible occasion for thought. But we think in the intelligible universe, and our power of thought therein arises because the laws of Nature, existing in the intelligible universe, present us with the relations we require for ideas. It is these ideas we use for thought. If we imagine these laws as proceeding from an ultimate self-conscious Being we may interpret them as preparation for the thought and conduct of self-conscious subjects in and about our objective universe.

Imagination, which is exercised as a faculty by the subject, exists in transcendence of thought in that it is not confined to thought about the sensible universe: for we have seen that we can imagine objects which do not exist in the sensible universe as presented. So though the laws of Nature make thought about our objective universe possibly for us, the *genesis* of thought must still be found in imagination: it is only our objective universe that the laws of Nature govern.

The same conclusion is come to thus:—When we read the laws of Nature into the objective universe, we do not get directly the ideas we want for thought. To have an idea of an object we must first have in the mind its schematic idea: we do not even use schematic ideas directly for thought: it is the relations between schematic ideas that we use for thought. We are still driven to the conclusion that thought is no more than an inhibited form of imagination which is “deep buried in the soul of man.”

What, then is the relation between thought and the laws of Nature?

The laws of Nature were in effect before self-conscious subjects appeared: they manifest, to us, activity on the part of transcendental Being. The result is that a form of evolution existed in the

objective universe before we as self-conscious 'subjects appear.

When self-conscious subjects appear it is the fact of this pre-existing form of evolution which enables the subject to think about the objective universe. The self-conscious subject super-imposes on the existing form of evolution a further form of evolution, it varies and creates in the objective universe for the purposes of itself the self-conscious subject.

Now it is imagination, deep buried in the soul of man, to which we refer back, ultimately, this power in the self-conscious subject to so vary and create. But this power is dependent on the existence of the laws of Nature, that is, dependent on pre-existing activity on the part of transcendental Being. We must, therefore, from the point of view of the subject, give transcendent self-consciousness and imagination to transcendental Being or we have a breach in continuity.

If we refer back the form of evolution under the laws of Nature to this transcendent activity, and—as human experience makes us aware—the after form of evolution effected by the self-conscious subject to the one origin, imagination, we have a continuity, though the imagination of the self-conscious subject is subjective to transcendental imagination.

This gives us the following relation :—The laws of Nature proceed from transcendental imagination : thought is an inhibited form of imagination whereby the self-conscious subject can, while obeying, use the laws of Nature to superimpose a form of evolution on the form determined by the laws of Nature.

We may here deal lightly with the question :—

What does the fact of the existence, for us, of relations involve? The fact involved is that objects are not things-in-themselves, but all inter-dependent : it is the relations between objects, not the objects themselves, which, in thought, have reality for us. As before shown, we do not think objects, we think about them, think their relations *inter se*. And these

relations could not exist unless objects were inter-related, inter-dependent.

It follows that objects must be partial aspects of "something," or phenomena of what Kant terms a manifold.<sup>4</sup> They are, for thought, part of a whole: that is, we can think the sensible universe as presenting to us discrete parts of the universe itself. To use an analogy taken from "Personality and Telepathy," it is as if some ultimate thing-in-itself were sensed by us through a vast number of separate peepholes, opening to us the sensing of apparently unrelated parts of the whole which in themselves, as sensed, are meaningless for thought. Insight makes us aware of this thing-in-itself, though it is beyond the purview of thought. This thing-in-itself is then at the background of the content of your thought and my thought, and this explains how it is that relations between objects can have meaning for thought. Relations between objects could not exist if each were a thing-in-itself: for relations we must be able to relate back each object to every other object and so, in thought, reach out to what is generally termed an ultimate unity for all; that is, to an ultimate thing-in-itself.

This explanation is necessary to show what is meant when it is said ideas are not of objects, but of relations between objects: that we do not think objects, but think about them. For the meaning of "relations" is in the air unless we have the thing-in-itself at the background of thought. The fact of relations infers the fact of the relatively, permanent.<sup>5</sup>

This thing-in-itself is beyond the purview of

<sup>4</sup> The meaning I attach to "manifold" is determined, by the theory of an ultimate of "the accomplished in the accomplishing."

<sup>5</sup> Kant speaks of the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense. As I reject all sensuous knowledge, I do not use the term "the internal sense." The term intuition, also, I do not use, unless incidentally, for Kant, as before stated, gives it many meanings. He says, for example, the human understanding thinks only and cannot intuit. I hold the subject has the power of insight transcending thought. I do not think I thereby seriously oppose Kant.

thought : insight, only, makes us aware that it *is*. We can only determine it negatively as *not* a limit of thought in that it neither contains nor infers contradiction. And this thing-in-itself cannot be a thing of unity, for unity is no more than a limit of thought ; it must transcend unity and diversity beyond the purview of ideas.

Bergson says :—

“ We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an inter-connexion and organisation of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought.”

For “ abstract thought ” I would read mental analysis. But, applying Bergson’s statement to the present argument, I interpret his meaning as involving transcendence of the whole and part, beyond the purview of thought, or even conception, as the term is generally used. It is insight transcending thought and its ideas which makes us aware “ each one of which represents the whole.”

Perhaps in music or the rhythm of poetry we find the nearest approach to feeling the existence of transcendence of the whole and part. In music, as Bergson shows, very beautifully, we cannot separate the whole from the part.<sup>6</sup> But we cannot think this transcendence for the ultimate thing-in-itself : we can only be aware of it through our faculty of insight.

Even for insight this ultimate thing-in-itself is not me and is not you. I follow Kant, not Berkeley. But I suspect that in the transcendent there is some transcendent relation (!) between you and me on the one hand and the thing-in-itself on the other. If this be so, then transcendental Being transcends subject and object.

<sup>6</sup> Music gives instance for “ the accomplished in the accomplishing.” Notes of music affect us sensuously, what we feel in music is the relation between the notes.

In considering any ultimate we must travel beyond the purview of ideas; we are travelling beyond the universe of mere relations to which thought is confined. It is the power of insight which enables us so to travel.

## THOUGHT, BRAIN AND MOTION

SCIENCE at this present time proceeds on definite hypotheses as to matter and motion which are of great importance, not only in themselves, but in the deductions which follow as to thought and brain. The statement which follows shows the hypothesis on which the argument of this chapter is based. The statement was sent me, by the courtesy of the Editor of *Nature*, from "a distinguished man of science who has given particular attention to the question raised."

"There is, of course, nothing novel in his (Mr. Constable's) statement on the forms of matter, and I think most scientific men would agree that the atom is to be regarded as consisting of positively and negatively charged particles in motion and in equilibrium, and that the actual volume occupied by the particles is small compared with the ordinary accepted dimensions of the sphere of action of the atom. One must, of course suppose the presence of positively as well as negatively charged particles, and in the nucleus theory which I have advanced, the main mass of the atom is supposed to be concentrated in a positively charged nucleus of exceedingly small dimensions. If one believes in an omnipresent ether, it consequently follows that the space occupied by the ether in matter is very large compared to that actually filled by the component entities, all of which are supposed to have exceedingly small dimensions. I think your correspondent is quite safe in basing his argument on this foundation."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These entities, in size, as compared to the atom, are, in the average, as a pin's head to the dome of St. Paul's. Suppose the members of our Solar System are moving in free ether. Then reduce the system to the size of an atom, and its members, in size, give some idea, in relation to the area of motion of the whole system, of the size of the entities to the whole etheric form, which gives the form of the object.

Now all objects, from living beings and their brains, to pots and kettles, when we consider them solely as objects in the sensible universe, exist as forms of matter; we sense them as matter having form and resistance.<sup>2</sup> And up to the present we have been content with the terms matter, form and resistance, without any attempt to analyse their meaning. But now we have found out something about matter which must seriously influence our ideas in relation to it.

Form does not set up a material surface continuity as sensed by us, that is, as we see or feel it. We do not really see or feel any material continuity. For much the greater part of the object whose form we sense consists of ether: the constitution of the object is, mainly, exactly the same as the ether pervading space which, for us, has no form and sets up no resistance. It is the motion of the comparatively few component entities of the object which give rise to the form, surface and resistance which we sense. The form merely marks or expresses the area of the sphere of action of the entities contained in the object.<sup>3</sup>

Objects are, therefore, not continuities of the material as we sense them to be: they exist, quâ form, merely as differing etheric areas of the sphere of action of certain entities.<sup>4</sup> And the resistance of objects does not exist in the material but in the sum of the motions of their entities.

We find, scientifically, that the surface, form and resistance of objects as sensed are functions of motions: the properties of matter, as sensed, are functions of motion, motion of the hypothetical entities. Objects themselves do not exist in the material: they consist, mainly, of ether together with the motion of a comparatively few self-contained

<sup>2</sup> The best definition of form given is "the configuration or outline of a body by which it is recognised by the eye as distinct from other bodies." Cf. *The Encyclopædic Dictionary*.

<sup>3</sup> It is the molecule which sets up, for our senses, the properties of matter, but the molecule consists of these entities.

<sup>4</sup> It is indifferent to the argument what we term these entities.



entities. Their form is etheric, it expresses but the area of ether to which the motion of these comparatively few entities is restricted.

The ether, the entities and their motion may be considered as all determined : they simply *are*, for us, beyond the purview of thought, just as the laws of Nature simply *are* for us.

But what, then, is required for the creation of an object or to change the form of objects, that is, to make them other objects? Given the ether, the entities and their motion, all required is *restriction of the motion* of the entities within the area necessary for the objective existence of the object imagined.<sup>5</sup>

According to this scientific hypothesis, the ether and the entities are unaffected, unconditioned by time and space : they simply *are*. Whatever motion may be or may not be, the motion of these entities, *for us*, always remains the same. Objects may come and go, may be many or few, but though their existence demands the pre-existence of the ether and the entities and their motion, the existence or non-existence of objects does not affect in any way the ether or the entities and their motion : for objects, there is required only restriction of the area of the motion of their entities.<sup>6</sup>

What, then, is required for the creation of an object? Nothing but power<sup>7</sup> to restrict the area of motion of determined entities within imagined spheres of action.

We have shown that before man can create an object in the objective universe he must first create it in the intelligible universe, he must first imagine it even though he uses but the inhibited form of

<sup>5</sup> By changing the form of an object we can change the manifestation of life. We *do* make our domestic breeds of living creatures and thereby make new manifestations of life.

<sup>6</sup> Conservation of energy and the determination of the laws of Nature are assumed.

<sup>7</sup> This power imports the existence of a subject or being who can exercise the power, and this infers a self-conscious subject or being.

imagination we term thought. And we have shown that man can imagine an object for the objective universe without ever making it an object *in* the objective universe.

Therefore to be effective the power to create a new object in the objective universe requires creation in imagination before objective creation.

We will now apply this line of argument to the question of thought and brain.

Imagination is a power which we may regard as "deep buried in the soul of man"<sup>8</sup> and so, in itself, it exists quite apart from, it is dependent in no way on, the existence of the material brain.

Thought is a conditioned form of imagination : all thought is correlated to motion of the brain.<sup>9</sup> This is one important fact of human experience which underlies the following argument.

Now we may give the brain any complexity of form we like and may consider the hypothesis that it moves and by movement produces thought. But by no possibility can we imagine any such machine producing more than *determined* thought. For any thought so produced is a function of the machine as it exists, however complex the machine may be. Thought in such case could not be creative; its purview would be determined by the possible movements of the existing brain, it could not cover what is not, and so could not create what is not. Much less could it be *my* thought or *your* thought. For such a machine imagination only exists in the form of thought, where the form of thought is determined by the motion and form of the brain.

But thought *is* used for creation. It is the self-

<sup>8</sup> But imagination is used by the subject as a power.

<sup>9</sup> The entities of the brain, its (real?) materiality, are determined in motion. The motion of the brain referred to does not mean the motion of these entities, but the motion—the change in—their areas of motion. I admit the parallelism between thought and brain movement. But thought is an inhibited form of imagination, and the inhibition arises because of the parallelism.

conscious subject who *uses thought for creation*. So thought cannot be a function of brain movement : it is the self-conscious subject who imagines and, through the brain, can use imagination in the form of thought. It is this use of thought *by a self-conscious subject* which makes possible the creation of objects which before did not exist in the objective universe. Thought of itself as a mere function of brain movement could not exercise this power.

It is the self-conscious subject gifted with imagination who uses the brain for thought. We are, further, aware that the motion of the brain does not determine thought, because the subject has the power of insight which determines thought as limited, that is, as giving information only as to relations. And what does all this mean? It means that the thinking subject determines the motion of the brain. The brain is an instrument which the self-conscious subject uses for thought and, as the subject uses thought, so the brain moves. Thought functions the brain.

But the brain is an object ; my brain is an object to me, yours is an object to you. So the human personality has power to determine the motion of an object in the objective universe. And the possible movements or motion of this object, the brain, are far more complex and numerous than the movements or motion of any other object in our objective universe.

The self-conscious subject when thinking does affect movement in the objective universe.<sup>10</sup>

Now let us turn to the objective universe and see what we have reduced it to.

The so-termed material form of objects we have found not to exist : objects exist only in etheric forms and these etheric forms are determined by the areas to which the movements of certain entities are confined ;

<sup>10</sup> The internal motion of any object is not here referred to ; that is, its motion in relation to its own form. What man effects is change of form, which affects motion by restricting the area within which the motion exists.

it is by the particular form of any object that we are able to distinguish the object from other objects.<sup>11</sup> Objects exist, for us, in etheric form.

Again, resistance has been found to exist in motion : it is the motion of the entities in any particular confined area that gives rise to the resistance of the particular object : motion sets up what we term matter and the resistance of matter.

Now we not only do not sense the entities referred to but we know nothing about them. We may term them centres of force, or energy, ultimate matter, knots in or whorls of the ether, *lacunae* in the ether or anything else.<sup>12</sup> But any such definitions only reveal more clearly our ignorance, we might even relate them to ultimate unconsciousness in relation to ultimate consciousness. Neither sense nor thought gives us any information as to the nature of the being of these entities. It is etheric areas of motion only that the self-conscious subject is called on to use for change or creation in the objective universe by personal thought. Such change or creation is in form only, etheric form.

Consider the first simple dynamo. How was it made? By first determining in thought a new etheric form for an object.<sup>13</sup> The after creation of this new etheric form in the objective universe determined the area of movement of the entities in question. Faraday used his power to determine etheric forms of motion first by determining in idea the form of the new object, and then by creating it in the objective universe.<sup>14</sup> He had, at his service, command over etheric form ; with the entities he could

<sup>11</sup> This helps us to understand how it is that knowledge is relative in itself.

<sup>12</sup> Would Leibnitz have termed them centres of consciousness? If so, how would he have dealt with etheric form?

<sup>13</sup> The choice of "material" to be given form to, lay between the materials Faraday had human experience of.

<sup>14</sup> When we do anything in the objective universe it is motion that we use. The entities and the energy or force of Nature are under the laws of Nature. But we *use* them for our personal purposes.

deal in no way, their movement was under the laws of Nature. *But he could restrict their movement within etheric forms determined by himself.* He controlled the area of their movement.

Again, bear in mind that, so far as sight and touch are concerned, we distinguish object from object only by etheric form; all objects so far exist for us in etheric form.<sup>15</sup> And, by thought, we can determine, we can afterwards create, these etheric forms, which exist in restricted areas of motion of the unknown entities. It is by restricting, by interfering with the areas of motion, that we create new objects. No other power is wanted in the subject to do what he does do.

It may be objected that no reference has been made to the power of electricity which Faraday used: but the objection is baseless.

Energy or force simply is, we know nothing of it unless manifest in form in our objective universe and manifest *in relation to objects.*<sup>16</sup> Electricity is a particular manifestation in time and space of energy or force. How did Faraday use it? He found that the movement existing in one object opposed to or in relation to the movement.<sup>17</sup> existing in another object made electricity manifest. He experimented in relating motion to motion and so arrived at the manifestation of electricity.

Now consider together what we know about objects and what we know about thought and the brain.

We want something to connect the self-conscious subject with the objective universe so that the objective universe may be not only an "occasion"

<sup>15</sup> But we do not think objects; we only think their relations *inter se*.

<sup>16</sup> We cannot think about force or energy. We can only think about the protean forms in which it is manifest to us in time and space. For thought, we find herein agreement with Kant when he accepts the statement that: In all changes in the world the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable.

<sup>17</sup> The argument is not affected if for "movement" we write "area of movement." The question of Electricity being continuous or discontinuous is not now touched on.

for thought about it, but that the subject may be able to exercise power over it.<sup>18</sup>

We find this connection partly in the fact of the brain: treated as a machine we find in the brain parallelism between thought and motion in the objective universe: we think such motion.

It has been shown that for the creation of any new object in the objective universe, the object must first be created in the intelligible universe. But how can it be created in the intelligible universe? By personal exercise of thought. But, again, when there has been this exercise of thought, it has been correlated with *motion of the brain* regarded as a synthesis of areas of motion. The fact of the exercise of thought in the intelligible universe is always accompanied by the fact of the motion of the brain, that is, there is an *indissoluble link* between thought in the intelligible universe, and motion in the objective universe: the brain is an object. The brain as an object imports parallelism between the thought of the subject and motion in the objective universe. The brain is, as it were, the receiving centre, for each of us, for motion in the objective universe and thought about the objective universe. The subject can imagine the new object as an object in the objective universe because its imagination, as thought, is correlated to motion in the objective universe. It could not think as it does think about existing objects in the objective universe without this correlation, and this correlation is, so far, all we want. For we cannot and do not want to think about energy and the entities, they simply *are*. We can only think about objects, and we have reduced objects to things of motion, of areas of motion. We can, in thought, objectify the idea of an object we think about.

Now when the subject has created a new object in the intelligible universe, it has the power by will and

<sup>18</sup> As we have seen, the subject only wants, for creation in the objective universe, power over areas of motion.

conduct to create this object in the objective universe. And, by what has already been recorded, we are in some measure able to understand this power of will and conduct.

For the objective universe is not only an "occasion" for our thought about it, but our thought itself is indissolubly linked through the brain with the motion of the objective universe. Motion once set up in the brain by thought in correlation to thought of a new object, merely requires such motion to be "objectified" in the objective universe for the object to exist therein. For instance: you think out definitely a new machine possible of existence in the objective universe. When you have done this you can *imagine* it as an object in the objective universe, though it is not such an object. How is it you can so imagine? Because your thought of the object set up correlated motion in your brain and this particular motion requires only to be transferred to or made effective in the objective universe for the object to exist therein. The subject, by will and conduct, can so transfer to or make effective in the objective universe, his thought.<sup>19</sup>

And for this transfer what is required? There is required no power at all over the ether: there is required no power at all over the entities, except in determining their areas of motion. I think we have reduced "matter" to these entities: that is, there is nothing which we can still term matter but these entities. And, if so, no power over matter in itself is required for the creation of an object. All required is the restriction of the etheric areas within which certain

<sup>19</sup> Never forget that this thought about the thing is a condition precedent for the "thing" to be materialised in the objective universe. Why is it that you can imagine, even think about, certain things which you cannot create in the objective universe? It is because such thought is not correlated with motion in the objective universe. In any such case there may be correlated motion of the brain, but, if so, it is not of the brain as an object in the objective universe.

entities operate in motion : power to restrict motion within etheric form.

Self-consciousness is faced by the determinism of the ether and the entities : it interferes with these determinants, *per se*, in no way. All the subject does is, through the motion of its brain, which is correlated to its thought, to imagine an object as existing in the objective universe before it exists there. Then the subject, as one of will and conduct, has power to "objectify" what it has created in the intelligible universe.

But the argument still remains defective, for no relation has been shown between the subject as one in the intelligible universe and as one of conduct and will manifest in the objective universe. No power has, as yet, been found in the subject, by which it can objectify in the objective universe that which it has created in the intelligible universe.

If we consider our objective universe we find that, always, energy exists unchanging. We may, without affecting the argument, consider the entities as functions of energy, call them crystallisations of energy if we will. But, so far as we can know, we must treat these entities as unchangeable : they, with energy, must be treated as not subject to time and space.

Before self-conscious subjects appear this universe exists as objects between which there is action and reaction under the laws of Nature. But this universe is not static, it evolves and evolves under the laws of Nature. It may be<sup>20</sup> taken that this evolution in inanimate nature takes place also in animate nature,—in living organisms,—before self-conscious subjects appear. Assuming that it does, then there is nothing, so far, in our universe but action and reaction under the laws of Nature. Objects are automata of the laws of Nature.

<sup>20</sup> It is written "it may be" because we are ignorant how or when self-conscious subjects first appear and because, by the argument, life does not necessarily import self-consciousness.



But then appears the self-conscious subject and, thus, a new and determining factor is introduced and there is breach of continuity in evolution.<sup>21</sup> The objective universe still continues its same form of evolution under the laws of nature but the self-conscious subject is not an automatic subject of the laws of Nature. The self-conscious subject uses the laws of Nature for its own purposes; by itself determining its own action, it determines the reaction on it of other objects. Before self-conscious subjects appear all objects are subject to their environment: self-conscious subjects determine largely their own environment. The subject does not fight against the laws of Nature, it uses them for its own purposes. The laws of Nature still hold sway, but a form of evolution for the first time comes into existence which would not have come unless self-conscious subjects had appeared in manifestation.

The self-conscious subject becomes manifest on embodiment; and, as embodied, it is manifest as an object in our universe,—it is an object even to itself: you think about your own body, I think about my own body.

The subject then, as embodied, exists in the objective universe. But this is a mere embodiment, a limitation, of the subject in the intelligible universe, which subject still fully exists. Let us trace how it is that by conduct the self-conscious subject can set up action which determines the reaction on it of the objective universe. Human experience informs us of the fact, we want as far as possible to explain the fact.

The subject first of all, as a subject in the intelligible universe, thinks of an object for the objective universe which might, but does not yet, exist in the objective universe. It creates the object in the intelligible universe. Human experience informs us that, having once got the idea of the object, the sub-

<sup>21</sup> Unless we assume the existence of Transcendental Being. But such a Being is not now considered.

ject can, afterwards, objectify the object in our universe. How can it do this?

It has been shown that to create any new object or vary any existing object in the objective universe no interference with energy and the entities *in themselves* is necessary : for us, they simply exist unchangeable. All wanted is interference with their etheric form : new objects exist, for us, merely in new etheric forms, variations of existing objects exist, for us, merely in variations of existing forms.

When the subject arrives at an idea of a new object possible for the objective universe, it uses imagination in the inhibited form of thought. The inhibition arises because thought cannot travel beyond the limits of motion of the brain. The brain is a machine which can only employ imagination in the form of thought.<sup>22</sup> Imagination is applied to the machine and imagination sets it working : but it can only produce thought.

When imagination is so applied to the machine then, automatically, it sets up motion therein : imagination produces motion in an object, for the brain is an object, it is the most complex object in our universe. We have our relation between thought and motion in the objective universe. This is how the subject, having created an object in the intelligible universe, can imagine it as an object in the objective universe.

But when the subject has an idea of, that is, has created an object in the intelligible universe, though thereby it can imagine it as an object in the objective universe, it cannot *directly* objectify its idea.

But the subject is embodied, is embodied as an object ; not only this, we are all embodied as objects of *automatic motion*.<sup>23</sup> motion is implicit for our embodiment.

<sup>22</sup> If I have an electric cooking stove in a cottage the central supply of a vast amount of electricity can only cook at my little stove, so far as that stove is concerned.

<sup>23</sup> Motion under the laws of Nature may be termed automatic.

Consider an imbecile, assuming that, for him, self-consciousness does not exist. He is as much an object of motion as other men. The only difference is that his motion is automatic, must be referred to him as an automaton. He does not, through self-consciousness, determine his own action and so determine reaction. Our bodies (including our brains) move as automata when self-consciousness is absent.

Man enters the world, after nine months incubation, as an infant of automatic movement. There is, at first, no manifestation of the direction of motion by its self-consciousness. But it is not a mere material thing: it is an object which moves under the laws of Nature:<sup>24</sup> its movements are subject to its human form, and this form has evolved under the laws of Nature.

We may next state as a fact, without considering the fact, that, as time passes, the new-born accumulates human experience. The result of this experience is that the self-conscious subject becomes more and more manifest in its direction of its body,—more and more manifest in the use, for its own purposes, of the *master tool of motion* placed in its hands. The subject can make “tools,” however complex, by use and only by use of the *master tool* (the body) which the laws of Nature have evolved and presented to him. The master tool and all other tools can only be effective through motion.<sup>25</sup>

What we have arrived at, then, is this:—

The subject as one in the intelligible universe creates a new object for the objective universe or varies an existing object by creating it in the intelligible universe. This exercise of thought is correlated to motion in the objective universe and thereby the subject can *imagine* the object it has created in the intelligible

<sup>24</sup> The movements of any animate organism are determined by its form. Specialization of function is dependent on complexity of form.

<sup>25</sup> The subject can only make energy manifest in the form, for example, of electricity by the relative motion of objects.

universe as an object in the objective universe. The subject, through embodiment, has given to it, under the laws of nature, the *master tool* of motion,—the human body. It uses this tool to objectify in the objective universe the object it has already created in the intelligible universe and imagined in the objective universe.

We start with creation by the self-conscious subject in the intelligible universe and this creation is, through the brain, correlated to motion in the objective universe. Thought sets up motion in the objective universe. The self-conscious subject, embodied, is presented by the laws of Nature with a master tool of motion: the body. It is the laws of Nature which have evolved the human body as a master tool. This master tool can, automatically, move only under the direction of the laws of Nature. But the self-conscious subject can use this master tool for its own purposes. The subject can use it to create and vary in the objective universe. For the self-conscious subject is not an automaton of the laws of Nature, it can create and vary its own environment.

The subject creates in the intelligible universe, it objectifies in the objective universe what it has created by use of the master tool presented to it by the laws of Nature.<sup>26</sup>

In considering the above argument, which may be difficult to follow, as opening, to some, a new line of thought, bear in mind what, it is assumed, has been established.

By showing that resistance exists in motion and

<sup>26</sup> We may here indulge in what is, possibly, more than a conceit of imagination: The brain has been evolved under the laws of Nature and so exists as a machine for thought. But, even when its action is not directed by the self-conscious subject, it must be working; it is alive. This working is manifest in delirium. In delirium the machine is working quite apart from the supervision of the subject. So the ideas which arise and which are presented to the subject appear to the subject extraneous conceits of the imagination, it cannot trace the origin of these ideas to itself as a self-conscious subject; its dreams are dreams of delirium.

that the form of objects is etheric, we have gone far to bridge the gulf between the material and immaterial—unless the ether or the entities be termed the material.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, by denying the possibility of any sensuous knowledge and making the sensible universe merely an “occasion” for thought we have distinguished, vitally, between the intelligible and the sensible universe. *But* we have seen also the subjection of the sensible to the intelligible universe. Before the self-conscious subject appears the sensible universe is subject to the laws of nature. And these laws exist in the intelligible universe.<sup>28</sup> When the self-conscious subject appears he, as a subject of the intelligible universe, exercises command over the sensible universe.

There is, for the subject, duality.<sup>29</sup> The ultimate entities and energy or force exist, they simply *are*, for us: they are external to us and we can affect them in no way. But, under the laws of Nature, the subject can use these entities and energy or force for its own purposes in the objective universe. It can do this because the laws of nature exist. The subject, so long as it is conditioned in the body, is a thing of will and conduct and it can make its will and conduct effective in the objective universe because, through its brain, its thought is correlated to motion, and because the laws of Nature have presented it with a master tool of motion.

Our power of insight makes us aware of the limitations of our thought in that the ideas which it uses open to us only relations,—give us no information as to the thing-in-itself. And what is above written ex-

<sup>27</sup> If any hypothesis as to the constitution of the ether be sound scientifically, then the ether must be subject to time and, perhaps, space. It cannot be a thing-in-itself. There must still be the thing-in-itself in the background.

<sup>28</sup> These laws are referred back to transcendental self-conscious Being. Only thus can we escape a breach in continuity.

<sup>29</sup> But the theory now relied on is neither dualistic nor monistic. “The accomplished in the accomplishing” transcends either theory.

plains, in reason, why thought is so limited.<sup>30</sup> For thought does not bring the ether or the entities within the purview of its field of action : it holds a form of command only over motion in our objective universe. And motion is not a thing-in-itself, we can think only relations between different manifestations of motion in our objective universe. This, again, shows why we cannot think objects but can only think relations between them.

The command, then, of thought over motion gives no command over the ether or the entities, over anything, in short, that can be termed a thing-in-itself. Thought can only use ideas which are things of relation.

The above deduction is in agreement with what has already been proved as to the limited nature of thought. Insight, which transcends thought, alone makes us aware of the limited nature of thought.

Without any attack on science we can now state a problem for science.

Thought is correlated to motion of the brain : the man of science has the objective universe for his field of endeavour, his sole weapon is thought.<sup>31</sup>

But if he admit that thought in itself is relative only, can he *know* this by the use of thought? Must there not be a power or faculty in him transcending thought, for him to be aware of the limitations of thought? There must be. This power I term insight.

And if there be, in the subject, this power transcending thought, does it not follow, in scientific reasoning, that the motion of the brain cannot be held to evolve or produce thought of itself? If we hold to any theory of parallelism between thought and brain motion as our ultimate, where is the subject of insight?

<sup>30</sup> Thought cannot deal with energy and the entities unless manifest in time and space, that is, subject to relations.

<sup>31</sup> Science uses imagination, but imagination is useless for science unless ultimately inhibited in the form of thought.

By the theory now adduced the subject's power of creation in the intelligible universe must be exercised before creation in the objective universe is possible,—such after-creation we know is possible.

That the subject can, by will and conduct, change the etheric forms which determine objects is a fact of human experience. But we know that to determine these etheric forms all wanted is power to restrict the areas of motion of the unknown particles. We only want power to affect areas of motion in the objective universe. So we want only some correlation between thought and motion, and a master tool of motion. We have found both.

Must not psychology treated as a science take into consideration the power of insight which is in man?

But this power of creation only extends to objects in the objective universe. There can be no creation of love, beauty, truth, or justice, because they exist only *for* self-conscious subjects. A beautiful landscape, or the representation of scenes suggesting love, beauty, truth or justice, contains nothing of love, beauty, truth or justice in themselves as objects: it is as mere manifestations in the objective universe for our ideals that they exist in themselves. The very ideals have no existence in themselves: they exist only for self-conscious subjects. And here, again, we mark the limited nature of the objective universe in comparison to the wider purview of the intelligible universe. The brain, which gives us the nexus we want between thought and motion, has nothing at all to do with our ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice which has existence only for self-conscious subjects; its purview is confined to manifestations of love, beauty, truth and justice.

Self-consciousness is the one thing-in-itself which, for us, simply *is*. It is quite true that we have no human experience of self-consciousness without life. But it is quite possible that life itself may, in the future, be reduced by science to some complexity of

motion. Indeed, when we know that self-consciousness can not only create in the inanimate but in the animate objective universe, thus exhibiting its power over even manifestations of life, the possibility is opened that self-consciousness has power over the principle of life itself.<sup>32</sup>

The subject has the power to regard his universe in the past and, accepting the principle of evolution, we find that there was a time of our universe when life was not manifest: life appeared *in time* at some after period. . Now when the universe existed without life, can we assume self-consciousness did not exist?<sup>33</sup> For reasons already given I think no such assumption can be made.

Thought uses the brain to set up motion and so the subject, with its master tool, the body, is enabled not only to think about the objective universe, but to vary and create in it. We cannot speak of the life of the brain; we can only speak of life as a principle animating man whose brain is part of his organism, and this apparent *one life* is, as has been shown, really a synthesis of innumerable lives.

We sense the external. Through the correlation between thought and the motion of the brain we can think about what we sense and can exercise power as shown over the objective universe. But this power is limited. It extends only to power over manifestations of love, beauty, truth and justice; there is no power over them themselves.

Why we are embodied is beyond the purview of knowledge; even insight gives us no assistance. But, from the human standpoint, we may indulge in a conceit of imagination.

The subject is embodied for the fulfilment of duty.

<sup>32</sup> We know life only when manifest in material form: in ecstasy the self-conscious subject *is*, quite apart from manifestation in material form. Again, the self-conscious subject can determine the evolution of the manifestations of life from the simple to the complex.

<sup>33</sup> The word consciousness is useless, for it is meaningless unless we predicate consciousness in a subject or being.



It is embodied as part of a universe of sin and suffering and so partakes of the evils of sin and suffering. The universe, as external to the subject, is presented to it as a mirror for the manifestation or reflection of the transcendental ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. But it is presented so blurred and dulled by sin and suffering, that its reflection is sullied by hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice. The duty cast on the subject is, through long long ages of painful toil and strife in evolution, to clean the mirror presented till it reflects, in perfect purity, the transcendental idea. Therein we may, in thought, mark "the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."

We have found the relation between thought and motion, reducing the sensible universe to one of etheric forms: we have found how, when the subject imagines an object, it can imagine it as an object in the objective universe: we have found that the laws of Nature have presented the subject, embodied, with a master tool for objectifying what it has imagined.

But behind all stands the *isness* of the self-conscious subject. And behind all self-conscious subjects stands, *for our reason*, transcendental self-conscious Being.

## THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE AND THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE (II)

WE find that the sensible universe is largely the result of creation by man.<sup>1</sup> More than this. Man is a subject of the intelligible universe and we find that, before he can create any new object in the sensible universe, he must, by the exercise of imagination, create it in the intelligible universe. Without this creation in the intelligible universe there is no content for the exercise of his will and volition which he can use for creation in the sensible universe. So far, the sensible universe depends for its very existence on the intelligible universe.<sup>2</sup>

Though it is true that the universe must be presented in some way for thought about it to begin, the intelligible universe is subject in no way to the sensible universe. Imagination is free, is not confined to that which must ultimately lead to creation in the sensible universe. Thousands on thousands of "things" may be imagined which never result and never can result in creations in the sensible universe. And this fact of the freedom of imagination from any subjection to the sensible universe we shall find of great importance hereafter, when we consider Dreams.

<sup>1</sup> Every new creation in the sensible universe forms for man a new starting point for thought. So a Plato, Aristotle or Archimedes born into our century, with the same brain power, might effect more than he did in his life, because he would be born into an environment of more starting points for thought.

Schematic ideas cannot be objectified: they can only be used in the creation of objects in the objective universe, so far as that universe is concerned.

But still the argument is in the air.

Accepting it as proved that the sensible universe is largely a subject of the intelligible universe<sup>3</sup> and that, by will, volition and imagination, man can, by use of his master-tool the body, effect creation in the sensible universe, so that he has always evolving increase of power to determine the forms in which the universe is presented to us, we still find a lacuna in the argument. We still want self-consciousness.

The conduct of man in exercising his power over the sensible universe is not that of an automaton under the direction of will, volition and imagination. It is man himself who *uses* these powers; they are used for personal purpose. And no man could exercise these powers without consciousness of self. The self-conscious subject must exist before we can consider the intelligible universe and its governance, under the laws of Nature, of the sensible universe. This self-consciousness is, to each of us, a thing-in-itself.

Completing the argument, then, so far as it has gone, we find man as a subject of the intelligible universe exercising power, even to creation, over the universe as presented to him. And this exercise of power we must refer to him as a self-conscious subject: the self-conscious subject must exist. Consciousness exercises power over the unconscious as its subject. But consciousness is meaningless unless a subject or some Ultimate Being exists. Above all, supreme in power over the objective universe, are the laws of Nature, known or unknown to us. But these laws themselves, it is argued, must be referred to some ultimate self-conscious Being.

After man appears we find the "I am" holding large command over the universe as presented, even to creation therein. The subject is no more than a form, inhibited in time and space of the "I am."

<sup>3</sup> The sensible universe is *fully* a subject of the laws of Nature.

## THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE BEFORE MAN'S APPEARANCE

BUT *before* man appears? Has the sensible universe evolved without consciousness?

We must consider this question. And in considering it, we must keep clearly in mind what it is we are considering. We are not touching directly on any question concerning man's soul, his mortality or immortality: we are concerned only with the question of the presence or absence of consciousness as the ultimate factor in the evolution of the sensible universe before man appears.

Indeed, we may more closely define the subject under consideration. We may consider the question to be whether or not consciousness was such a factor before what we term *life* appeared on the earth.<sup>1</sup>

When we consider the universe as presented, it is generally assumed something purely material is presented to us. And this assumption there is no need now to quarrel with.<sup>2</sup> But if the presentation ended there, man by will, volition and imagination could exercise no power over the sensible universe. The presentation is subject to the laws of Nature and it is the existence of these laws that not only makes thought about the objective universe possible, but

<sup>1</sup> Do not forget that consciousness is meaningless unless there be "something" conscious, whether subject or pure Being. Thought is not creative, it is a self-conscious subject or Being who uses thought for creation.

<sup>2</sup> I rely on the existence of the unconscious, but do not rely on any vital contradictory distinction between the material and immaterial.

makes man's power, over the universe as presented, possible. Herein we find the subjection of the form of the "material" to thought and imagination. Man could not establish a new breed if there were no laws of heredity known to him: Faraday could never have created a dynamo if no laws governing matter and force had been known to him. Man cannot *directly* use mere presentation: he must first find out that the presentation is *governed by the laws of Nature* before he can think or exercise his power over the sensible universe. The laws of Nature in one sense dominate evolution, but it is these laws that man uses for the exercise of his power over the form of evolution. It is on the existence of these laws that his power is based. Without the existence of the laws of Nature man could not be in the position he is, that is, the position of a subject with evolving increase of command over the universe as presented to him. The very existence of these laws, so far as they are known to him, establishes the foundation on which his power in thought and action rests.

Haeckel's attempt to solve the Riddle of the Universe fails.<sup>3</sup> He theorizes moments of evolution and devolution in a closed circle under the "eternal iron laws of Nature." By admission he gives supremacy to the "laws of Nature." He cannot read these laws into the material, for the material is presented to him merely as unrelated objects, as *disjecta membra*. He can only get the laws of Nature from observation: from himself as a self-conscious subject. And, from his own observation, he admits the supremacy of the laws as something external to the material.

We read into Nature the fact that the universe as presented to us not only is subject but was subject before man appeared to the laws of Nature. It is our knowledge of these laws of Nature which not only

<sup>3</sup> Quite apart from his admission that he can find no evidence to support his theory that consciousness has evolved from the unconscious.

makes ideas possible but enables man to exercise his power over the sensible universe: so far as man is ignorant of the laws of Nature, so far he is unable to exercise, consciously, his power over the sensible universe.<sup>4</sup>

One conclusion would appear to follow. This may now be given, but we must not rush our fences and no full reliance is placed on it.

At first sight it would appear reasonable to hold that there is no breach in continuity of evolution, no sudden appearance *in time* of consciousness in an evolution of the unconscious. For, by admission, we have the laws of Nature transcendent of any condition of time: and, if we refer them to a supreme conscious lawgiver, we have consciousness always in existence unconditioned by time.<sup>5</sup> The "I am" for each of us thus become a particular manifestation of the all-embracing conscious Being and we have no breach in continuity of evolution. Here we come near to Spinoza's theory.

But it is sounder to start, at the other end, from reason and human experience, and see how far they lead us to a solution of our difficulty.<sup>6</sup>

The sensible universe is presented to us as objects, these objects are presented as unrelated objects. We do not think these objects, indeed any *direct* relation between thought and objects, reason informs us, is impossible.<sup>7</sup> We think about objects, we think relations between them.

But how can we think relations between objects which are merely presented to us as unrelated? Any such thought is impossible.

<sup>4</sup> There is no question here of man's exercising this power unconsciously as an automaton.

<sup>5</sup> This timelessness does not mean an "everlasting now." It means "something" transcending past, present and future and so transcending thought. We must have Kant's "duration."

<sup>6</sup> There can be no solution in thought. But man has also the power of Insight.

<sup>7</sup> Kant says the senses do not judge at all.

Here step in the laws of Nature. Man reads into the universe, as presented, the laws of Nature. His observation of the laws of Nature informs him that relations between objects exist. These laws of Nature govern not only the sensible universe as presented, but *himself* as an embodied personality.

Now the power of man as a subject of the intelligible universe over the sensible universe has, it is assumed, been proved. And we do not—quite impossibly—define this power as power directly over the sensible universe. We refer this power to *the laws of Nature*. And this we can do. For, the laws of Nature once admitted, we find, apart from man, that the universe as presented<sup>8</sup> is governed and directed by law. What then does man do in the intelligible universe? He uses the laws of Nature *already in existence* and he uses them for his personal purpose. How does he do this? By the power he has, as a subject of the intelligible universe, over the sensible universe.<sup>9</sup> When once, apart from man, apart indeed from all life, we make the sensible universe subject to law and give man some knowledge of these laws, we can understand that he may be so constituted as to make use of these laws, so far as known to him. For, so far as the sensible universe is concerned, all that man can create is by use of these laws for his own purpose.

Now we can state our problem.

It is self-consciousness which, in the ultimate, enables man to use the laws of Nature for his own purpose. Are we then to refer these laws, which consciousness *does* use for its own purposes, to an origin of unconsciousness? In other words, when we find we must refer the use of them to consciousness, are we to refer the laws themselves to the unconscious? If so, the power of the conscious was evolved from the unconscious.

<sup>8</sup> The universe itself? Insight may possibly justify us in holding it is governed by transcendental law.

<sup>9</sup> Do not forget that self-consciousness is at the back of his power.

The universe as presented is only the occasion for thought; thought about this sensible universe is possible and only possible because it is governed by the laws of Nature. We reduce the sensible universe itself to a subject of the laws of Nature. And we relate back the laws of Nature, quâ their governance of the sensible universe, to a time before the appearance of man, or indeed of any form of life.

These laws of Nature exist, for us, in the intelligible universe; they do not exist in the sensible universe; it is their governance of the sensible universe that is made manifest, to us, in the existing forms of the sensible universe. So the intelligible universe has governance over the sensible universe *before man appears*; for the laws of Nature exist only in the intelligible universe.<sup>10</sup>

When man appears he, as a subject of the intelligible universe, exercises power of creation in the sensible universe. His power depends on his existence as a conscious self, as the "I am." It is consciousness that, under the laws of Nature, exercises this power of creation.

Then did consciousness suddenly appear with the appearance of man?<sup>11</sup> Was there no "I am" before man appeared? Did the laws of Nature always exist simply in themselves? If so, we have a breach of continuity in time evolution.<sup>12</sup> For we cannot get away from the fact that consciousness is a thing-in-itself. How, then, can it suddenly start into being *in time* with the appearance of man, or any other form of conscious life? Do not forget that consciousness

<sup>10</sup> The laws of Nature must exist in the intelligible universe for the objective universe to be an occasion for thought: this existence is a condition precedent for the subject's power of creation in the objective universe.

<sup>11</sup> If, instead of man, we read amoeba or oyster, the argument might be the same.

<sup>12</sup> The theory that consciousness, under some material form, was introduced from the external into our universe at some moment of time, is not considered. It is simply the cutting of a Gordian knot. The conscious was in the ever, or evolved from the unconscious.



is meaningless without a self or some ultimate Being that is conscious, and that the "I am" is no more than an inexplicable fact for us. The "I am" is as inexplicable to us through our power of thought and Insight as any ultimate "I am." Thought and even Insight are presented to the "I am." The theory of the evolution of the conscious from the unconscious involves denial of the existence of self, as a self-conscious subject.

I think I am in agreement with Kant when I suggest that the problem, so far as proof for the present argument is concerned, is insoluble. Any dialectic can be used only for the purposes of man's reason.<sup>13</sup>

When we consider what we term *proof*, is not this proof merely a high degree of probability? I suggest that in the realm of thought we can only deal with probabilities.<sup>14</sup> Knowledge being relative, proof is impossible for us as thinking subjects. We can only arrive at a certain high degree of probability which, in practice, we term, and are justified in using as, proof. So far then as thought is concerned we can only deal with probabilities.

But man is also a subject of Insight and it is Insight which makes us aware of the limitations of thought. Insight, for us, *proves* this limitation. But the proof is useless, directly, for man as a subject of the universe as presented; useless, directly, for his conduct therein. For it transcends thought. Insight merely makes us aware that "something" *must be*, which is beyond the purview of thought.

So far we have no proof of anything. But I suggest that the probability is greater if we give real reality to some ultimate, conscious "I am," manifest,

<sup>13</sup> Mark that, if this statement be correct, it establishes at least the possibility of revelation.

<sup>14</sup> The Indian Evidence Act lays down that "a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."

to us, through the laws of Nature in their governance over the sensible universe, than if we hold consciousness, a thing-in-itself, to have been evolved from the unconscious.<sup>15</sup> I suggest that this probability is so great that it attains the highest degree towards proof capable for reason. Do not forget that all reasoning must start with an assumption of self-consciousness in each of us as the "I am."

We cannot think self-consciousness, it is but an incomprehensible fact for each of us, which forms a condition precedent for the existence of our human experience<sup>16</sup> And so it is divorced from any question of the past, present or future, even for the self-consciousness of each one of us.

By predicating this Ultimate Self Conscious "I am" we explain nothing in thought, we but get rid of the difficulty of consciousness as a *Deus ex machinâ* appearing suddenly in nature.

Bear in mind, however, that this argument on probability is quite distinct from a previous argument adduced in proof of an Ultimate Conscious "I am." The "I am" in me and you, leads us in feeling, supported by Insight, to belief transcending thought in the existence of an ultimate "I am." If we assume we each exist as "I am," the existence of an ultimate "I am" follows. And for this Ultimate Being we must have transcendence of time.

The sensible universe has existence in time: transcendent of all in time and fact, exists Ultimate Being.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> If we hold to this opinion we are faced by the contradiction that self-consciousness, which is a thing-in-itself, is the result of evolution in time.

<sup>16</sup> S. T. Coleridge says it is groundless *because* it is the ground of all other certainty.

<sup>17</sup> The subject of this Chapter is considered again from another standpoint in the Chapter on "The Universe without Self-Conscious Subjects."

## FEELING (I)

WE have as yet considered the subject only as one of Imagination, Thought and Insight. We shall find, on further consideration, that human experience informs us we have not, thereby, exhausted the subject; the subject is more than one of Imagination, Thought and Insight. We still want explanation of why the subject is active as a subject of Imagination, Thought and Insight: we still want explanation of what the driving force is which is at the back of the purposive conduct of the subject.

The power of thought, in relation to the sensible universe, depends on the material constitution and the form of the brain.<sup>1</sup> So, other things being equal, we must hold that the man of greatest brain power will manifest in recorded thought and conduct, in the universe as presented, the highest output of thought. That is, the man in possession of the finest brain machine, will turn out the finest work.<sup>2</sup>

But human experience teaches us that what is above stated is incorrect: the finest machine does not turn out the finest work. *My* thought does not work itself: thought in itself is not *my* thought. It is something external to thought which sets the thought of the subject to work and directs its course. It is desire, will, or something that comes under the head of feeling, that determines the use of and directs thought.

<sup>1</sup> Imagination is a power of the subject and transcends thought. Thought is an inhibited form of imagination.

<sup>2</sup> Varying environment for the man will vary the manifestation in output of his thought. This, however, does not affect the argument.

The man with the finest brain but with weak desire or will may accomplish nothing in action or recorded thought, he may even not use thought at all for himself. The man with strong desire, or will, but comparatively feeble brain, may accomplish much in action or recorded thought; he may even use thought largely for himself. The brain machine, it is true, may possibly work of itself, as in delirium.<sup>3</sup> But then the output is sheer chaos; the output of brain work is effective for the subject only when under the governance of *feeling*. And feeling here imports a feeling subject: in delirium the subject does not work the machine: the thought is not *his* thought in its origin.

The subject, therefore, is not only a subject of thought, but a *subject of feeling*. It is not denied there may be a subject of thought which is not a subject of feeling.<sup>4</sup> But we need not consider any such subject, for human experience teaches us unquestionably that we, as subjects, are not only subjects of thought but of feeling also.<sup>5</sup> And it is ourselves that we are considering, not other possible or impossible beings.

We find, that for the subject to be effective as a subject of thought, it must, precedently, be a subject of feeling. The subject, as a subject of the sensible universe, has a brain and thereby is related to the sensible universe as presented: so it can think about the sensible universe as presented. But for this thought to be effective for the subject, as it is effective, we must have something else: we must have desire or will or something that comes under the omnibus term of feeling. Give that machine, the brain, any complexity you choose manifesting static efficiency of any kind. It will not work itself for the subject: for the dynamic, it wants the steam of desire or will or, generally, feel-

<sup>3</sup> The self-conscious subject does not then direct the work.

<sup>4</sup> Such a subject must be an automaton.

<sup>5</sup> Kant points out that the feelings of pain and pleasure and the will itself are not cognitions.

ing. And, too, it wants a subject not only to turn the steam on and off, but to regulate not only the steam, but the machine itself.

We have already arrived at a conclusion that, as subjects of Insight, we transcend Thought. In the above argument, we find, further, that thought itself is ineffective without the existence of desire, will, or, generally, of feeling.<sup>6</sup> Though is not *my* thought, unless I am a subject of feeling.

It being thus established that the subject is a subject of feeling, it becomes necessary to consider what we mean by feeling. The thinking subject that we consider, must be a feeling subject. For it is the feeling subject only that can think as a subject. When I think, it is feeling that starts *my* thinking. Thinking is not *my* thinking unless I feel.

And now we enter on a path of great difficulty, for the expression "feeling" as used has infinite diversity, while the relation of the feeling to the thinking subject is nowhere made clear. Admirable as is James Ward's essay on psychology, I cannot but think that, in considering feeling and emotion, he is prevented from rising to the surface of his subject, so as to take in the widest possible view, from the clog-weight of the "psychological I" which keeps his head under water. Throughout the essay, it seems to me, he is himself conscious of the unsatisfactory point of view psychology *obliges* him to take, because he must treat it as a science: he must not transcend the facts of presentation.

The James-Lange theory makes feeling a function of presentation. The gladness of a hungry child is created by the presentation of a cake; the presentation of a bear to a man creates fear in the man.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The word "ineffective" is here used in relation to the sensible universe as presented. We have seen that will must have imagination at its back.

<sup>7</sup> The expression of gladness in the one, or of fear in the other, is, I think, no more than outward sign of the feeling held to be created by the presentation. This question is considered hereafter.

The truth is that the presentation in either case has no effect at all on the child or man quâ affection of feeling, except as a starting point for thought: it is no more than the occasion for thought. It is because the child has seen cakes before and remembers that they are good to eat, and the man has seen or read of bears, and remembers that they are dangerous, that the presentation sets up gladness or fear.<sup>8</sup> The subject must be a subject of thought, memory and feeling in both cases, or the presentations would have no effect at all in causing the particular form of feeling.<sup>9</sup>

Imagine that you are before a cinematograph representation and see a hungry child with a cake presented to it, or a man running away from a bear. You see the expression of gladness on the child's face, and the expression of fear on the man's face. So far as you are concerned as an observer, we may assume you sense what appears before you in the same way as if you had sensed a real child and a real man and their real environment. But you cannot read consciousness or feeling into the eidola sensed by you and, so, you cannot read into them gladness or fear: you can only read into them *expressions* of gladness or fear. There is before you only a presentation of the manifestations of gladness and fear in the universe as presented.<sup>10</sup>

We can even imagine so perfect a cinematograph representation that observers have no means of distinguishing what they sense from what they normally sense in human experience. And this proves how mere presentations of objects have, in themselves, nothing to do<sup>11</sup> with consciousness, thought or feeling.

<sup>8</sup> The bilious child revolts at sight of a cake, the inured hunter feels gladness at the presence of a bear. Even physiologically the effect of the presentation depends on the "state" of the subject.

<sup>9</sup> If heredity is relied on, then some progenitor of the subject is in question. I do not think this effects the argument.

<sup>10</sup> It should be stated that any "automaton" theory is rejected by the James-Lange followers.

<sup>11</sup> Except as starting points for thought.

Any presentation, therefore, cannot in itself evolve gladness or fear or feeling of any kind. When a beautiful tree is disfigured by a storm or a chaotic piece of marble is carved into some perfection of form, there may or may not be gladness or fear. We know nothing about this. It is ourselves we are investigating.

The universe as presented cannot give rise to thought about it: it is because the sensible universe is governed by the laws of Nature that thought about the sensible universe, as presented, is rendered possible. But thought cannot be effective for the subject without feeling to determine its use and direct it. We cannot, therefore, derive feeling from presentation.

The next step in considering feeling brings us to psychology treated as a science. Herein we find denial that feeling is a function of presentation; we find, as it were, parallelism between feeling and presentation.

James Ward says:—

“The simplest form of psychical life, involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasion of its feeling.”

In saying this he is treating psychology as a science and *must* say it, because psychology, as a science, is not called on to transcend the facts of presentation. But he also tells us, definitely, that the psychological ego is not the same as the metaphysical ego.<sup>12</sup> Science, quite rightly, ignores the possible existence of any metaphysical ego: it does not transcend the facts of presentation.

So, when he uses the term “the simplest form of psychical feeling,” he uses it for the purposes only of psychology as a science: he leaves severely untouched

<sup>12</sup> He does not treat the psychological subject as exhaustive of the “I am.”

the question of the possible existence of the metaphysical ego.

In defining feeling, for psychology, he says it may mean—

- (a) A touch, as feeling of roughness,
- (b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger,
- (c) An emotion, as feeling of anger,
- (d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain.

I think, considering the authority quoted, we may treat these definitions as exhaustive.<sup>13</sup> And if they are exhaustive, the definition of the simplest form of psychical life given above, stands. But, as to what follows, bear in mind, as before stated, that James Ward makes them exhaustive only for the psychological ego.

Feeling, so far as it has as yet been defined, is subject to, or runs parallel with, presentations. The former case we have considered: in the latter case, which we now consider, the form of feeling runs parallel with the form of presentation: feeling, as defined, is distinct from pure feeling.<sup>14</sup> Hunger or thirst, for instance, depends on the state of the stomach; ordinarily, pleasure or pain is referable to external effect. Even when we listen to music, or read poetry, or look at a work of art, the psychological feeling of pleasure or pain we experience must be considered together with the presentation. And, in the same way, when we feel physiological pain, not from personal pain but from the suffering of another, we must consider the feeling together with the presentation. In all such cases feeling must be referred to the "I" of psychology, not to the "I am."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> They show on their face that, as their author says, some further definition is requisite for the omnibus term feeling, even in psychology. But, still, psychology, treated as a science, cannot transcend presentations.

<sup>14</sup> Pure feeling is here used as meaning feeling without any presentation as defined.

<sup>15</sup> The ultimate effect on the "I am" opens another question. Bear in mind that if in the ultimate there is transcendence of the phenomenal, the phenomenal still has subjective existence.



But the term "feeling," as so far defined, does not include desire existing potentially in itself, free from the influence of any physiological or even psychical presentation. Does such desire exist for the subject?

The savage has self-consciousness, he is self-conscious that he is faced by a universe which, as presented, he cannot fully understand. He cannot think it, he can only think about it. To him, undeveloped as his power of thought may be, the universe as presented imports "something" beyond his thought, and he naturally uses his imagination in thinking about this "something." He doubts, and rightly doubts, the evidence of his senses and, false as his form of thought may be, he gives reality to "something" beyond the evidence of his senses, to "something" beyond, dominating the material, though he may try to make this "something" manifest in the material in various ways.

The savage can no more think the limits of his own thought about the sensible universe as presented to him than we can. But he also has the faculty of Insight.<sup>16</sup>

If we take Dr. Frazer's definition of religion given in the *Golden Bough* :—

"A propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life,"

then it follows, in due course, that the savage would ultimately, if not at first, *assume* these "powers superior to man" to be "conscious or personal agents" in the universe he, the savage, exists in. We find the same assumption even in the present day amongst Christians. The transcendental Being, "God," was merely made manifest to us through Jesus Christ,—

<sup>16</sup> It is no reply to say he never uses the faculty. Vast numbers of us in the present day scarcely use even our faculty of thought.

made known to us, that is, so far as we *could* know. But probably most Christians define Him to themselves as a personal, conscious Being in *our* universe : an anthropomorphic God.

That the savage should attempt to propitiate or conciliate or even threaten powers superior to man is natural to him as a subject. But why does he believe in these powers superior to man?<sup>17</sup> The belief must have preceded action resulting from the belief. His belief is founded on his feeling that something exists above and beyond his purview of thought, and that in some mysterious way he is related to this "something."<sup>18</sup> His desire to influence this "something" in his own favour follows.

Can this belief of the savage in the spiritual be held to have been originated or evolved from his human experience? And, if so, is it unreal because it is a function of human experience? Or has it arisen from his insight into the fact of the phenomenal nature of human experience, so that he has been driven by reason into belief in "something" transcending thought and human experience?

It is now argued that the latter explanation must be accepted because certain conduct on the part of the savage can only be explained by precedent belief as motive.<sup>19</sup>

This conduct on the part of the savage is to propitiate, conciliate or threaten a power existing external to his, the savage's, universe. The desire of the savage is to affect this power, external to him. His conduct to this end is to himself reasonable, however

<sup>17</sup> I would suggest that the earliest belief in man we can trace is in a power superior to man which, from the savage's standpoint, is incomprehensible in its exercise of power in the universe.

<sup>18</sup> Belief is possible for the subject, because of the limitations of the subject's power of thought.

<sup>19</sup> The savage falls back on belief in the supernatural not because his human experience leads him up, *per se*, to the belief, but because he is aware his human experience leaves "something" unexplained.

unreasonable it may appear to us.<sup>20</sup> And his conduct must be, in some measure, unreasonable; for not even the most moral and intellectual of men have such environment that their conduct is purely reasonable.

The belief must precede conduct, and; however irrational or immoral the conduct, the belief itself remains unaffected. A Torquemada, or Nero, whose conduct even the devil would shiver at, may be moved by this belief in "something" of transcendental power.

The genesis of the belief is to be found in feeling as distinct from cognition, or even thought.

Now, whatever the conduct of the savage, why does he do what he does do? Because he is moved by blind desire to affect for his own benefit "something" which he is aware exists beyond and above that which he can think about the objective universe.

His awareness is derived from insight, but it is because he is a subject of feeling that he can have desire. It is as a subject of feeling that not only the savage, but man of the present day, has built up his dogmatic forms of belief, from worship of a stick or stone as manifesting the unknown, to worship of an anthropomorphic God.<sup>21</sup>

Again, Darwin says:—"The birth both of the species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events, which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance."

What does this mean? That there must be some ultimate transcendental Being: for if we cannot refer back all to "blind chance" we must refer all back to transcendental consciousness. Darwin could not know this: he felt it. Insight made it possible for him to be aware of its truth though he did not pursue the course Insight opened to him. But I think Dar-

<sup>20</sup> We too often forget that in judging conduct we must judge from the standpoint of the actor, not from our own.

<sup>21</sup> Those of us who accept revelation as part of the subject's experience must still admit our Insight into the fact that there is "something" in us or of us beyond the purview of thought.

win, perhaps above all other men, pursued truth in the abstract as what he was centrally interested in. He felt this interest and, therefore, in his conduct pursued it. Feeling determined his conduct.

Huxley, again, who believed consciousness to be a thing-in-itself, as distinct from matter or force, felt the same interest, and therefore in his conduct pursued it. Feeling determined his conduct.

We find that the savage, Darwin and Huxley, are subjects of feeling as distinct from cognition and thought. Feeling, however, so far as we have as yet defined it, means

- (a) A touch, as feeling of roughness;
- (b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger;
- (c) An emotion, as feeling of anger;
- (d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain.

But the belief that the savage feels the desire for truth that Darwin and Huxley felt, cannot be brought under "feeling" so far as we have as yet defined it. We want a new term. Bear in mind that feeling must always be referred to a self-conscious subject.

Where there is presentation we can give a fairly definite meaning to feeling. But even then reason raises a difficulty. For we cannot say there is presentation to feeling: what we mean is that there is presentation to a feeling *subject*.<sup>22</sup> If we assume there can be no feeling without presentation, a certain deduction, which involves contradiction for science, follows.

The subject must have the potentiality of feeling *before* presentation. It cannot be created a feeling subject, by mere presentation to it; the presentation cannot create the feeling. Unless we accept the James-Lange theory, the potentiality of feeling must have had existence before presentation. The present-

<sup>22</sup> Any theory of parallelism for feeling and presentation I ignore as not appealing ultimately to reason, though such a theory is sound and necessary for science. Science confines itself, at present, to a form of reason.

ation is merely the occasion for a form of feeling to be manifest.

For psychology, then, we are not given a feeling subject. We are given a subject with the potentiality of feeling which *becomes* a feeling subject when there is presentation to it.<sup>23</sup> Psychology, quite rightly, considers the psychological "I" as a feeling subject because the science of psychology is not called on to transcend the fact of presentation. Psychology starts with the assumption necessary for science of an impregnable bond between feeling and presentation, and so ignores the question of whether or not the very fact of what results from presentation infers pre-existing potentiality of feeling in the subject.

But it is this pre-existing feeling or potentiality of feeling we now want to examine. We must travel beyond the bounds of psychology treated as a science.

For the savage's acceptance of the "unknown": for Darwin's state of mind in rejecting "blind chance": for Huxley's acceptance of consciousness as a thing-in-itself, I cannot find that feeling, as defined, applies; I cannot find any of the stated forms of presentation. Cognition is not involved: desire (as manifested), will, volition or conation is not involved.<sup>24</sup>

But here an explanation must be interpolated.

<sup>23</sup> The statement made would appear to be correct. But the statement has no meaning for science because psychology as a science does not transcend the fact of presentation. Here we find the contradiction above written of.

<sup>24</sup> Never forget that Insight is a faculty of the subject. So it is a fact for the subject, that "something" exists beyond the purview of thought. The "thinking I" is a subject to the subject of Insight.

## POTENTIALITY OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

WHEN we speak of feeling being used in the sense of pure feeling, we do *not* define feeling as without presentation. All we mean is that there is no presentation as known to us, no presentation *in relation to the universe as presented*. So we mean simply that we do not know whether there is or is not presentation for this feeling that we term pure. We cannot *know* that there is or is not presentation which transcends the possible presentations of our sensible universe.

What do we mean by potentiality of feeling?

When we speak of potentiality of thought or intellect we know where we are. Milton had potentiality of thought which was made manifest by his work in relation to the sensible universe. A "mute, inglorious Milton" had the same potentiality of thought, but the potentiality was never made manifest by conduct in relation to the sensible universe. And here it is important to remember that we must not hold that the potentiality of the mute, inglorious Milton was sheerly wasted because never made manifest in our universe: we know nothing at all about this. We cannot hold, generally, that the potentiality of thought in us, as subjects, is exhaustively made manifest in our universe. For human experience informs us to the contrary that, under our existing social environment, only few subjects have opportunity to make manifest in conduct or record of thought their potentiality of thought. Is all this potentiality sheer waste? Is nature so wasteful that it normally employs a Nasmyth's hammer to crack eggs? Can evolution

explain the greatness of man's thought and imagination and the littleness of their accomplishment in our sensible universe?<sup>1</sup>

If we consider any given generation of men we find that the potentiality of thought is never made fully manifest in relation to the sensible universe: the given generation would always have been marked by higher accomplishment if it had had a finer form of education and more favourable environment generally<sup>2</sup>. This is always true of any generation. We find, then, for any generation, that the power of thought is only partially used so far as manifestation in the sensible universe is concerned: there is always a reserve of force or energy ready to take advantage of more favourable environment.<sup>3</sup> The potentiality of human thought exists: it is never made fully manifest.

At first thought we should hold there is the same apparent wastage of potentiality of feeling as of potentiality of thought, and argument might be produced in support. But as we cannot condition the "I am" in any way, we cannot hold it to be, or not to be, in itself, a feeling subject. We can only hold it to become a feeling subject when it, as a subject, is open to the resistance to self-expression which its environment as a subject may make it encounter.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, as human experience informs us that the "I am" is conditioned as a feeling subject, we are justified in holding it has the potentiality of feeling, if and when conditioned as a subject. Beyond this we cannot go, in thought or insight. So, as we do not know why the "I am" is conditioned as a

1 *Meliora proboque deteriora sequor.*

2 Darwin finds the more efficient causes of progress in a good education during youth when the brain is impressible and of a high standard of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men, embodied in the laws, customs and traditions of the nation, and enforced by public opinion.

3 Do not run away with any "idea" of Bergson's *élan vital*. The idea neglects the one fact of self-consciousness.

4 The term feeling has meaning, for us, as subjects, only when the subject encounters resistance to full self-expression.

subject, we can scarcely hold that there is any waste of potentiality of feeling.

Bearing in mind, however, how vague and extensive is the meaning we have as yet given to feeling, it were best to continue our attack on it directly.



## FEELING (II)

DOES or does not human experience make us aware of feeling not covered by the given scientific definition? Especially, does it make us as subjects of insight aware of feeling which cannot even be referred to feeling, proper, of pleasure or pain, of desire or will?

The argument will be in the affirmative. That is, it will be argued that we are aware of feeling which is not covered by the definitions given, feeling which cannot be referred, in itself, to pleasure or pain, desire or will.<sup>1</sup> Whether or not such feeling is free for the subject from any qualitatively distinguishable presentations not yet defined we shall consider hereafter.

We have established the fact that the brain, normally, does not work itself. Thought, for the subject, results in correlated motion of the brain: our faculty of Insight makes us aware of the limits imposed on imagination when its use, as thought, is correlated to motion of the brain. And now it has been shown that something in or of the subject works the brain,—sets it in motion for particular work.<sup>2</sup> This is the feeling subject.

But still our argument is defective: we have, as yet, ignored self-consciousness. The result of thought

<sup>1</sup> Bear in mind how very wide is the definition we at present assume for the term feeling, and that desire can only be evidential of preceding potentiality of feeling.

<sup>2</sup> However great the potentiality of thought of any subject, it will accomplish nothing in the sensible universe unless moved by something external to thought.

accompanied by motion of the brain, cannot be *my* thought unless I am self-conscious of it.<sup>3</sup>

Now the "I am" exists for me outside the purview of thought. It is the one sheet-anchor in real reality, for *me*, that I have to stand by. And we have seen that thought to be *my* thought must be presented to me as a self-conscious being, as the "I am."

But now we find something which apparently intervenes between the "I am" and the presentation to it of thought. We have the feeling subject. Unless I, as a subject, am a feeling subject *my* thought cannot exist for me.<sup>4</sup>

How then are we, in the ultimate, to place feeling? Where does it come from? From presentation? Self-consciousness? Or must we seek further?

We are on the border-land between science and metaphysics, on unexplored ground. So our exploration may be unsatisfactory. Still we will venture into the desert and, to further our search, try what signposts we can find from human experience to assist us.<sup>5</sup>

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When Wordsworth tells us that we enter this world trailing clouds of glory as we come, or Shelley sings that all things by a law divine in one another's being mingle: when we listen to music or look at a work of art, we are affected in some way; we are said to feel.

Again, men from a sense of duty to God or their fellows, deliberately place themselves in environment which gives pain, not pleasure: the martyr is tortured or cruelly done to death: the reformer is subject to social annoyance or even ostracism: the altruist suffers death to save the life of another: the nurse, devoted to comforting the bodily ills of others, and the

<sup>3</sup> To be a feeling subject I must be a self-conscious subject.

<sup>4</sup> If the reader be tearing his hair at my use of the term *feeling*, he has my deepest sympathy.

<sup>5</sup> We are not searching for any *élan vital* unless it be referred to some ultimate transcendental Being. We *must* have the self in self-consciousness.

priest who labours to save men's souls by conduct which he believes to be honest, abandon the normal pleasures of this world for acceptance of lives of toil and penury. All such are said to feel. Men even live, silent, unknown, rejecting the pleasures of this world and ordering their thought and conduct by subjection to abstract principle which is free from all given presentations. Such men are said to feel: their conduct cannot be referred to cognition, thought or even insight.<sup>6</sup>

But *how* are all these said to feel?

Certain instances have been given above where the feeling comes under the scientific definition of feeling. But the later instances (the particular instances of the savage, Darwin and Huxley previously considered are now also in point) cannot be brought under the definition. We have not to consider whether men be fools or angels; we have to consider what human experience informs us is the conduct of sane men. And human experience informs us that not only sane men but the men marked amongst us as exhibiting the highest qualities possible for mankind, act under the promptings of principles which have nothing at all to do with presentation from the sensible universe: nothing at all to do with the promptings even of pleasure and pain.

Are we now landed in a quagmire of thought? I think not. We may leave standing the definition of feeling as given for psychology.<sup>7</sup> But what about feeling without the given presentations?

I would suggest we may use, for the subject, the term "desire for self-expression": that is, self-expression of itself as the "I am." But if the word desire be used, it must be used strictly, not loosely. Its *sole*

<sup>6</sup> Belief in the ultimate which amounts to certainty for the subject personally is not now considered.

<sup>7</sup> Even when accepting this definition we must not omit consideration of the fact that by what is termed self-control, we can govern or even prevent our feeling being affected by presentation. For instance, that which would raise anger in the ordinary man, leaves the philosopher unaffected.

aim must be held to be self-expression : its aim must be held to have nothing to do with pleasure or pain used, as they must be, as relative terms, nothing to do with desire or will in their ordinary meaning. We may term it "blind desire."

This desire for self-expression, I suggest, is manifest in the subject's constant struggle to destroy the tyranny of its environment and use environment for the purposes of its, the subject's, own self-expression. The desire itself is a manifestation of the potentiality of the "I am" ultimately to express itself fully in spite of its limitations as a subject. The subject moved by this blind desire, struggles always, effectively or ineffectively, for full self-expression of itself as the "I am." The potentiality is manifest in the subject by desire for self-expression.<sup>8</sup>

Gautama's teaching is part of human experience as is that of our Lord Jesus Christ. Gautama taught men to attain pure self-expression by the monastic principle : Maya is to be annihilated by each one in and for himself and by personal conduct for personal victory. Jesus Christ taught also the "rightness" of the desire for self-expression. But He told us we could attain spiritual self-expression only by self-sacrifice in this world for others, not for ourselves : the "I am," the spiritual self, cannot directly free itself from its bonds as a human being, for itself. It can attain full spiritual self-expression only by active life as a human being, where action is determined by the benefit accruing to others, not to oneself.<sup>9</sup> Gautama offered pure self-expression in passivity, our Lord Jesus Christ offered the same in activity. Confucius suggested, intellectually, an approximation to our Lord's teaching.

<sup>8</sup> It is no objection to this theory if it be held that the tendency is implanted in the subject by a transcendental Being. The sole question is whether human experience offers evidence that the tendency itself exists. There is no question just yet of its origin.

<sup>9</sup> I would suggest that the Christian reward of heaven and punishment of hell are mere incidents. He who governs his life by hope of heaven and fear of hell can never attain that pure self-expression which fulfils the hope and avoids the fear.

Many, if unsuccessful, have tried to carry out these forms of teaching and I cannot think these have all been influenced by desire for pleasure or fear of pain. Perhaps they may be said to have been moved by desire for the peace that passeth understanding. Even so, I cannot think the relative terms pleasure and pain should be said to have governed their conduct: for pleasure and pain are subjects of thought. They would appear, quite apart from feeling as generally understood, to have followed some tendency, even tyranny, deep down in their nature, free from any content of desire for earthly wealth, power or rank, any content of desire for pleasure or fear of pain.<sup>10</sup>

When we listen to music that appeals to us, or view some glorious landscape or work of art: when we read of heroic self-sacrifice for others or of a life of grief and sorrow deliberately entered on and endured for the benefit of mankind, it is true our feeling has a content of pleasure and pain.<sup>11</sup> But is there not also something else that affects us more powerfully? Is not the feeling of pleasure or pain often subordinate to a deeper feeling? This deeper feeling I think is from satisfaction in self-expression to some degree, of our deepest self; we are touched in what we term our spiritual nature, there is appeal to the "I am" in each of us. Bear in mind we are not now relying on the mystic; the appeal is solely to human experience.

The argument runs thus:—Human experience informs us that we are not only subjects of thought but also subjects of feeling. And feeling is not only not cognition, but thought cannot be *my* thought unless I am a subject of feeling.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> I am not speaking of men who strive under desire for happiness in heaven or under fear of hell.

<sup>11</sup> Music or art may raise in us a feeling of melancholy. But even this we *desire*.

<sup>12</sup> Thought is not creative. Thought cannot be creative unless it is *my* thought or *your* thought: thought is used by the self-conscious subject for creation. Self-consciousness uses thought for creation.

Neglecting the James-Lange theory we find in psychology a definition of feeling. But, under this definition, feeling runs parallel with presentation.

It is now argued that human experience informs us that the conduct and recorded thought of certain human beings must be referred to some abstract prompting which transcends the psychological definition of feeling, in that it has no content of any of the given presentations. This abstract prompting governs the lives of such men and leads them so to formulate their thought and conduct that they may be as free as possible from the bondage of human presentations. Instances of this have been given, but here a more general example may be offered. In times of national crisis a whole people may be found, abandoning all feeling for pleasure or pain, all feeling for personal material advantage, to fight, as one, for some abstract principle or ideal.

If there be men of such conduct and thought; if, at times, even the people of any nation be found abandoning self for an idea, even for an ideal in the abstract, then, I think, human experience informs us that this abstract prompting for self-expression of oneself as the "I am" does exist *in potentiality* for all of us,<sup>13</sup> and it can scarcely be referred to feeling as the term is generally used. The term *élan vital* I reject; for, as all roads are said to lead to Rome, so all reasoning leads to the one fact, incomprehensible but really real, for us, of self-consciousness.<sup>14</sup>

This abstract prompting cannot exist for the psychological "I," for there are no given presentations.

The subject has the power of thought, the subject has also the power of Insight. This power of Insight transcends thought in that the subject, by it, is aware of the limitations of thought. But the subject is also

<sup>13</sup> In human conduct it is manifest in varying degrees.

<sup>14</sup> I cannot think Bergson has completed his philosophy. It must finally bring him to a transcendental self-conscious Being from whom *élan vital* proceeds.

a feeling subject; if it were not it could not *start* using thought. For desire is necessary for its thought.

If we give to the subject this desire in the ultimate for self-expression as the "I am," we determine the origin and genesis of all the differing, even pettiest desires of man: they are ancillary to the ultimate desire.

Feeling is manifest in differing forms in relation to differing forms of presentation: this is true for psychology treated as a science. A man feels hunger because as a subject he is opposed by the resistance of environment. He tries by conduct to appease his hunger; that is, to overcome the resistance of environment. But the man who has never been hungry all his life has the potentiality of being hungry, of feeling hunger. A man, even, who has never been hungry during any particular week had, during that week, the potentiality of being hungry. We can, scientifically, consider any form of presentation with which runs parallel any particular feeling. But in such case we must now give the subject precedent potentiality of feeling. We cannot now, on the contrary, consider any form of feeling which, scientifically, runs parallel with any particular form of presentation, and then find, somewhere, precedent potentiality of presentation. For any presentation is passive and is not a subject to which potentiality can be given.

For the conscious subject presentations are not fixed and immutable as they are for unconscious subjects. For the subject exists in the intelligible universe and so has power to change, even to create, its own environment: it can change, even create, the presentations to it. It not only can, but does, do this.

And in effecting this change or even creation, the moving desire is not to be found exclusively in Cyrenaic attention to immediate pleasure: the conduct of the subject is such that it chooses, not seldom, present pain for greater future happiness. This, even, does not exhaust its conduct. For frequently its conduct

proves that it is moved by *desire* for pain during its earthly existence to the end of pleasure in future life. Not only this. The subject is found to be moved by desire for self-expression quite apart from any question of pleasure and pain :<sup>15</sup> it seeks this self-expression quite apart from the resistance of environment, though it may struggle, incidentally, to so change or even create its environment that it may be favourable to self-expression.

In all these self-conscious struggles of humanity against the tyranny of the resistance of environment, we find at the background desire in the subject for self-expression.<sup>16</sup> It is in the forms of struggle that difference is manifest, not in the struggle itself. The desire of the hungry man for food appears, at first thought, to have no relation to his desire for self-expression, as, in the same way, the desire of the architect for well mixed mortar appears to have no relation to his desire that he may find self-expression by embodying his dreams of beauty in a material work of art. But these petty desires exist as ancillary to the ultimate desire for self-expression. We may, perhaps, use a wider analogy taken from the fact that the pressure of resistance of the water of an ocean increases with depth with the decrease of light.

Imagine a mighty ocean inhabited by self-conscious subjects all struggling under desire for ultimate life in full light. The deeper the stratum of water in which they exist, the greater the resistance of their environment to light and so the more petty their struggle towards light. All are moved by the same one desire for ultimate life in full light, but the form of their struggle to that end is determined by the form of resistance of their environment. Those in a comparatively low stratum may be moved by blind desire

<sup>15</sup> As shown above, this, at critical times, is true for humanity at large.

<sup>16</sup> Herein we find something like Bergson's *élan vital* which, as an ultimate, has close likeness to that of Schopenhauer. But we find, also, a reason for his *élan vital*.



for full light though they appear, to themselves, to be merely struggling for more favourable environment: their thought may be confined to thought about environment, though their desire transcends environment.<sup>17</sup>

Generally, if the ultimate desire for self-expression as the "I am" exist for the subject, these differing petty desires in relation to environment must exist as ancillary: they are forms of the ultimate desire. However high the ideal for life of any subject, he must live in order to ensue it, and without the desire when hungry to eat, he would not live: however beautiful the building the architect has imagined may be, his desire for its manifestation in the objective world would never be fulfilled without satisfaction of his desire for mortar. We are justified in relating all these forms of desire, however insignificant in themselves, to a genesis of some ultimate desire.<sup>18</sup>

If we consider the question from the "other end," we must bear in mind we are considering conscious, not unconscious, subjects. So we cannot hold that the desire of the hungry man for food is confined to the desire for eating. It is not merely satisfaction of hunger he desires. He desires to live and contemplates the fact that satisfaction of hunger is necessary for him to live and think and act in the future *after* eating. So the desire of the ignorant workman in mixing mortar<sup>19</sup> cannot be confined simply to the mixing of mortar. Desire for the welfare of his wife and children, to say nothing of his own beer and tobacco, comes in: he may even feel he is fulfilling his own desire by taking part in the creation of a beautiful building.

<sup>17</sup> The wife of the workman who desires that emblem of respectability, a parlour, is moved by desire for self-expression though, to herself, there is but desire for more favourable environment.

<sup>18</sup> "Sermons in stones and good in everything."

<sup>19</sup> It is assumed that he thinks: those who pass through life as automata, whatever their social position, we neglect in argument: they belong to the unconscious.

Human environment does change in evolution under the consciously exerted power of humanity to change and even create in the objective universe. This change and creation is the result of the conscious thought and conduct of humanity, and humanity thinks and does all this consciously *for itself*. Herein we find not only our *élan vital* but the reason for it. We find this reason in the constant struggle of the subject for self-expression of itself as "I am."

Perhaps we may say that the "I am" or transcendental subject exists in potentiality of struggle for self-expression, which struggle becomes active when the "I am," conditioned as a subject, is opposed by the resistance of environment.

If, in relation to the universe as presented, we give to the "I am" this potentiality of self-expression when conditioned as a subject, the manifestation of *desire* for self-expression in the subject follows, so that we have an explanation for its appearance in human experience.<sup>20</sup>

No question arises as to the "I am" when free;<sup>21</sup> for any such question is not only beyond thought but beyond the purview of Insight. The "I am" we consider is the "I am" conditioned as a subject in our sensible universe. So, if we give potentiality of self-expression to the "I am," it would naturally manifest this, as a subject, in desire for self-expression which would be shown in its efforts for freedom from the bonds of the flesh. The greater its freedom from the conditionings of the sensible universe or the more subject these conditionings are to itself, the fuller the self-expression of the "I am" as a subject.

We find support for the above argument from, perhaps, an unexpected direction.

Certain forms of feeling, it is generally held, can be

<sup>20</sup> Fichte's theory as to the *purpose* of will may be here compared.

<sup>21</sup> Kant says transcendental freedom is impossible. I shall suggest the term is meaningless.

the subject of thought.<sup>22</sup> James Ward, as before stated, says feeling may mean :

- (a) A touch, as feeling of roughness ;
- (b) An organic sensation, as feeling of hunger ;
- (c) An emotion, as feeling of anger ;
- (d) Feeling proper, as pleasure or pain.

These exhaustive forms of feeling will, at first thought, be held to be subjects of thought. For touch, hunger, anger, pleasure and pain are all relative terms, so we can think the degree or kind of each one of them : we feel hunger, for example, and can, in thought, compare our degree of hunger felt at the time with other degrees of hunger or its absence, felt in the past.

But we do not really think the feeling ; we think but the form of presentation with which, scientifically, the feeling runs parallel. We hold that the feeling is greater or less, because the hunger, the pleasure or pain, is greater or less. It is on this fact that the false James-Lange theory is founded. In truth, there is the one feeling subject which, as a subject of the sensible universe as presented, manifests, in relation to presentations, greater or less feeling. If we make feeling subject to presentation, then we have not one subject : we have a constantly changing subject in feeling, determined at any given time by presentation.

Relying, however, on the original argument, let us assume potentiality of feeling exists for the " I am," so that feeling exists for the subject because of the resistance of environment. Then, this potentiality of feeling for the " I am," which becomes active for the subject because of the resistance of environment, cannot be the subject of thought. What can be the subject of thought are the presentations which make feeling manifest in relation to the presentations.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> If feeling itself,—not forms of feeling—can be the subject of thought, the argument that, for thought, the subject must be a subject of feeling, fails.

<sup>23</sup> This is in agreement with Kant who places the subject of thought in a subjective position to the subject of feeling. The categorical imperative is hereafter considered.

Has then feeling, in the ultimate, no content for the subject? Or can we say that desire for self-expression is a content?

The argument is not easy to follow and difficult to put clearly in words.

The "I am" is, for us, conditioned as a subject of the universe as presented. Self-expression may be said to be innate in the "I am," to exist potentially in its self-consciousness,<sup>24</sup> but the *desire* for self-expression only comes into existence when the "I am" meets with resistance to its natural self-expression.<sup>25</sup> As a subject of our universe it meets with such resistance and, in relation to this resistance, desire for self-expression is manifest in the subject.

When, then, it is stated that the subject must be a feeling subject in order to think, we do not mean it must have qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasion of its feeling: its only content, *a priori*, is desire for self-expression as the "I am." Even to speak of this desire as a content is questionably correct. For the "I am" conditioned as a subject desires, for self-expression, *freedom* from all qualitatively distinguishable presentations of our universe: so far as they affect it *in resistance*, they prevent pure self-expression.<sup>26</sup>

But this freedom from qualitatively distinguishable presentations does not necessarily spell absence of such presentations: it does not drive us to accept Gautama's theory. For the subject has power which

<sup>24</sup> There is no proof for this, but reason impels us to assume it, though thereby we travel beyond the purview of thought and Insight. We use imagination as free.

<sup>25</sup> What this natural self-expression may be we can only imagine. The question is whether human experience informs us that something in us is constantly struggling against resistance, for freedom from resistance. On this human experience is founded the theory of evil being inchoate good. The desire for self-expression could not exist without constant opposition to fulfilment.

<sup>26</sup> From the subject's point of view desire may be said to exist in order so to create its environment that it may be in agreement with the subject's full expression of itself as "I am." Cf. Fichte's theory.

evolves to change the tyranny of environment into environment favourable for its own self-expression. The subject *ought* to exercise this power.

The above argument constitutes no attack on science. For psychology treated as a science never transcends the fact of presentation: it is not part of science to seek out the genesis of feeling. Science confines itself to a consideration of feeling when manifest in relation to presentations. That man does, for his own purposes, effect change and even creation in the objective universe is a fact of human experience: we have human experience of evolution being directed by man. Long before Bergson ever lived, reason had informed man that there must be some *élan vital* at the back of evolution and, whatever this may be, science remains unaffected.

The *élan vital* is now traced back to the struggle of the "I am,"-conditioned as a subject, for full expression of itself as the "I am" against the resistance of environment. This is manifest in the desire of the subject for self-expression. Feeling, as defined in psychology, still stands good for thought. But feeling, so defined, becomes in its manifest ramifications or desires merely ancillary to the ultimate feeling (desire) for self-expression. There must be an origin and genesis for the manifold forms of feeling to a consideration of which manifold forms science confines itself. This genesis and origin is now found in the feeling or blind desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am."

Herein, we find our categorical imperative. We trace back feeling in the ultimate to the categorical imperative which exists for us all.

The "I am" is; we may term it the pure self-conscious subject. The self-conscious subject, embodied, is moved by desire for full expression of itself as "I am." This desire may be referred to feeling. It is because of this desire that the subject thinks and acts. The subject could not be one of thought and conduct unless it were one of feeling. For all thought and

conduct of a self-conscious subject centre round purpose and, though the purposes of self-conscious subjects vary almost infinitely—from desire for food for sustenance of the body to sacrifice of bodily life for the spiritual welfare of humanity—the root of these purposes is to be found in desire for self-expression.

The psychological “ I ” may be termed the human personality. The higher personality in each one of us,—the “ I am,”—strives for freedom from the bonds of its human personality, or to use the bonds for such freedom. This is the moving force or *élan vital* which underlies the thought and conduct of the human personality.

Before the self-conscious subject appears there is a form of evolution in our universe under the laws of Nature. When the self-conscious subject appears it superimposes on this form of evolution a new form of evolution which it effects by its power of varying and creating its environment. It is so active for *itself*, for its own purposes. We trace back all its activity, good, bad and indifferent to a driving force from the “ I am ” under which the subject struggles to express itself as “ I am ” against the resistance it encounters from embodiment as a subject.

Indefinite as the term feeling is we must refer this driving force to feeling, and herein we shall find our categorical imperative.

## SELF-EXPRESSION AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

IF, when man appears as a subject, we hold there is this constant struggle of the "I am" for self-expression against environment and, so, constant struggle to get rid of the tyranny of environment and use it for the purposes of self-expression, we get our *élan vital*: but we refer it back to self-consciousness. We find in this struggle of the "I am" an explanation for the form of evolution which takes place in the objective universe after self-conscious subjects appear.<sup>1</sup> The subject must be self-conscious as "I am," before it can enter on the struggle for self-expression. What the subject struggles for is expression of itself as the "I am," against the resistance of environment. The subject changes, even creates, its environment with the design of fulfilling its own purpose.

We refer this struggle for self-expression to *feeling*: what relation has it to feeling as psychologically defined?

Psychology deals with feeling only when manifest in relation to qualitatively distinguishable presentations. It deals, not with feeling itself, but with feeling manifested in innumerable different forms determined by the presentations.

Now all men during their existence as conscious subjects do something, they are "things" of con-

<sup>1</sup> If we refer the laws of Nature to the unconscious there is a breach in the continuity of evolution when self-conscious subjects appear.

duct.<sup>2</sup> And, to a certain degree, seeking each his own good, they will consider immediate, rather than ultimate good for themselves. One man conducts himself under the feeling that wealth, another that power, another that social rank is good, while many confine their conduct to acts for the mere preservation of existence by labouring only for daily bread. These examples mark forms of feeling and they determine, subject to environment, the form of manifestation in conduct. All these men desire something, and the form of desire is largely the result of environment.<sup>3</sup>

It is from these differing forms of desire that differing conduct in men arises, and it is from the conflicting conduct of men, *inter se*, that the evils which burden us arise. It is not that the ultimate desire of man is evil, the evils arise from his desire being concentrated on a particular form of desire without relation to other forms of desire. We may say that these are limiting forms of the ultimate desire for self-expression. Evolution could not exist, for man, without desire in man: evolution could not exist without resistance to it.

What is the basis of this desire? What we want to do is to find some full explanation for human conduct and to this end we must determine how the basic desire in man arises. Let us consider two schools of thought.

The theory of the Epicureans and that of the Platonists follow directly from the differing assumptions that each school starts with.

The Epicureans consider man as no more than a subject coming into existence at birth and going out of existence at death. They merely developed the theory of Aristippus.

But every man is, and is rightly, a hedonist; every man has an absolute right to do what is best for

<sup>2</sup> In the sleeping state man is not, physically, a thing of conduct.

<sup>3</sup> The form of the subject's brain is here considered as part of his environment.



himself. The *real* and only question in dispute is "What is man?" Is he merely a subject of time,—of three score years and ten,—or is he the "I am," so that his earthly life is merely a passing phase in a far more extensive existence?<sup>4</sup> To explain man's conduct we must first find out, if possible, what man is.

It is ridiculous to deny I am right in doing what is best for myself. The question is *what am I*.<sup>5</sup> For on the reply depend my thought and conduct in seeking what is best for myself: what is *my* best depends on what I am.<sup>6</sup> Or put the case in another way. It cannot be denied that I have a right to so act that I may attain the greatest personal happiness, if this is the best for myself. But here, again, the answer to what is the least, what is the greatest, personal happiness for me, depends on the answer to the question "What am I?"<sup>7</sup>

As an Epicurean the subject confines his attention to his existence as a human personality, he has no other personality to consider.<sup>8</sup> The theory is practical, hence its attraction for so many: and it may lead to conduct which is worthy of praise: even Aristippus understood that it may be advisable to bear present ill for future greater good.

But the Platonist starts from a different basis for thought and conduct. His subject is not a mere human personality. He starts with the "I am," so that, for him, the subject is a conditioned form or manifestation in time of the "I am."

<sup>4</sup> The Cyrenaic starts with man as a thing of the passing moment, though Aristippus is not consistent in his philosophy.

<sup>5</sup> When Spinoza distinguishes between the "natural" man and the "social" man and, so, between man in a natural state and an evolved state of reason, he does not consider the "I am" at all.

<sup>6</sup> Darwin considers only the fittest. The question whether the fittest is the best only arises when man as a conscious subject appears.

<sup>7</sup> And this involves the question of what happiness is in itself.

<sup>8</sup> I deny that Spinoza does this, for he gives to the human mind an eternity of (intellectual) love for God.

The problem for the Epicurean is,—what is best for the subject? The problem for the Platonist is the same. But in the former case the subject is a passing thing in time; in the latter, the subject is no more than a passing manifestation in our universe of the “I am.” It is because of the widely differing starting points for reasoning that the Epicureans and Platonists take, that the conclusions they arrive at differ so widely.<sup>9</sup>

For the Epicurean the desire of man can only be the desire of a passing subject in passing time. For man, by assumption, being no more than this, his desire, thought, insight and imagination, which must all arise so far as his personal purview extends, *from himself*, cannot outrun their source: their origin is to be found only in himself. And he is a thing of passing time.

In this we find, as before said, the attraction for so many: Epicureanism is practical, the “I” differs very little if at all from the psychological I. For if man be but a passing thing in time, then his feeling runs parallel with qualitatively distinguishable presentations.

But for the Platonists the desire of man is the desire of a subject, conditioned in time, to get rid of the resistance of his conditioning or exercise command over it for his own purposes, in order that his desire for self-expression of *himself* as the “I am” may be attained.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> I do not refer to Aristotle for I cannot accept the distinction generally drawn between the basis of his philosophy and that of Plato. Aristotle seems to me to have differed from Plato in mainly centring his attention on the practical side of Platonism. The stoics, with Marcus Aurelius, though never for the most part directly admitting the soul in man, still, I think, want the soul in man to make their philosophy acceptable.

<sup>10</sup> I must ignore the possible theory that man is merely a passing thing in time, but inspired for conduct during his term of life by a transcendental Being. The theory is attractive, but I think human experience points to our survival as personalities after death. Cf. the philosophies of Plotinus and of Laotze as to this survival.

Epicureanism, therefore, attacks the problem of what is best for man during his human life. Platonism attacks the problem of what is best for man, assuming that man's life on earth is but a passing phase in a far more extended existence.<sup>11</sup> Hence arises the conflict, between the Epicureans and the Platonists, as to the meaning of what is "best."<sup>12</sup>

Now for the Platonist no difficulty arises as to the categorical imperative. But this imperative must not be confounded with morality: for the Platonist morality is still merely a relative term; it is a subject of thought. Pure morality is a term which imports contradiction as fully as does absolute knowledge.

When theory starts from an assumption of the "I am," we find explanation of man's altruistic struggle for the abstract,—for love, the beautiful, truth and justice: we find explanation for his acceptance of an evil state in our universe and even in his desire for "something" which he can never attain on earth. But if man's life is merely one of passing time, he is unreasonable in sacrificing it for the good of others, or in deliberately *making* it one of pain and suffering for the sake of abstract principle. Such conduct is inexplicable:<sup>13</sup> it is contrary to man's seeking the best for himself.

If, with the Platonists, we hold our life on earth to be but a passing phase in a far more extended

11 "It is meet, my friends, that we should take note of this:—that the Soul, being immortal, standeth in need of care, not only in regard of the time of this present life, but in regard of the time without end, and that it is now, even to-day, that the jeopardy is great, if a man will still be careless of his soul."—The *Phaedo*.

12 Thus what may be proved to be the greatest happiness for man by the Epicurean, may be proved to be the reverse for man by the Platonist. Before we can judge William James's pragmatism must we not first determine what man is?

13 Unless he is a thing of time directed by some external transcendental Being. Instinct alone cannot explain such conduct, unless instinct be held as a thing-in-itself tyrannizing over reason. Roman Catholics give a particular meaning to instinct.

existence, we can fathom the reason for certain forms of human conduct, even the choice of misery and suffering, during the little span of human life. Aristippus himself says the reasonable man will choose present evil for greater future good: how much rather would the reasonable man prefer the passing evils of his short life in time for ultimate freedom from evil.<sup>14</sup>

Following the Platonists, in their theory as to human personality, the categorical imperative is now found in the imperative fact of the struggle of man against resistance in order to attain self-expression as the "I am." It has been shown already that we find in human experience manifestations of this desire,<sup>15</sup> and now reference may be made to the fact that we cannot reconcile the beautiful and the ugly, morality and immorality, good and evil, justice and injustice, we cannot get rid of inequality of opportunity; we cannot think the one without the other in our mind: in thought and conduct we compromise. *But we desire to reconcile these contradictions,*<sup>16</sup> while Insight makes us aware that in real reality they are and must be reconciled or subsumed under "something:" Insight justifies without explaining our desire. This, again, would appear to mark desire for pure expression of the "I am."

But desire is meaningless unless it is *my* desire: there must be self-consciousness. As subjects, we see but through a glass dimly, we err constantly in our attempts at self-expression. But, fail as we must, we always strive after full self-expression.

Let us further consider the Epicurean philosophy. The main point to bear in mind is that it holds this

<sup>14</sup> This does not necessarily spell desire for ultimate happiness, though such an ultimate may be incidental. Cf. the Chapter on "Pleasure."

<sup>15</sup> This desire in its origin is blind desire; we can only think about it when manifest in our universe in some determined form.

<sup>16</sup> It will be argued that the form of reconciliation we desire imports the subjection of injustice to justice etc.

life to be the only life : the death of the body marks the end of the personality.

This philosophy teaches us what man's conduct should be in order to attain what is best for himself. What such conduct should be must always be doubtful, there must always be wide differences of opinion. But, when we consider what human conduct is in fact, we have a firm foundation to build on : for conduct is part of human experience.<sup>17</sup> We can consider not only our own conduct, but that of others.<sup>18</sup>

Now the conduct of man is not of such a nature that his desire as a mere thing of passing time can explain it. Some men, it is true, pass through life apparently thinking and acting under the desire of the passing moment : they are Cyrenaics. Some, again, use little or no thought and act under the prompting of preconceived ideas determined largely by environment. The man of rank, power or wealth, the great mass of the labouring classes, use their power of thought, for conduct, largely under the influence of ideas resulting from relation to their differing environment.<sup>19</sup>

But, still, as the many examples already given show, the conduct of man is frequently of a nature which is inexplicable if he is moved merely by desire as a thing of passing time. He, frequently, does not seek that which is best for himself as a being blotted out at death : not seldom he deliberately so conducts

<sup>17</sup> He who alleges altruistic human conduct to be unreasonable, still admit the fact of such conduct. Rightly, then, he should give some explanation for the existence of such conduct.

<sup>18</sup> Bear in mind we are not now considering instinctive conduct. So we find conduct to be the result of thought where thought is the result of feeling. And this is not, I think, in opposition to the Epicurean philosophy.

<sup>19</sup> There is no obligatory dispute between capital and labour : disputes arise because the capitalist thinks under preconceived ideas of right determined by his environment as a capitalist and because the workman thinks under preconceived ideas of right determined by his environment as a workman.

himself that his life on earth, which might be one of full happiness, is one of full misery.<sup>20</sup>

And this conduct of man does not lead necessarily to that tranquillity of spirit which Epicurus taught was the greatest good.<sup>21</sup> It may lead to strenuous and painful struggle in our universe as exemplified transcendently in the life, passion and agony of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

That the conduct of man is largely determined by environment is not denied; that the thought of man is largely the result of feeling determined by environment is not denied. But there is a residuum of conduct which is not so determined. We have seen, even, that the prompting to such conduct is potential in all mankind, though its manifestation is so largely prevented by the resistance of environment.

Now such conduct cannot be reasonable conduct if the philosophy of Epicurus be sound; that is, if man be but a passing thing of time: it is not conduct which enures for the best.

We find great beauty in the philosophy of Epicurus; the teaching of moderation, tranquillity, the acceptance of present ill for greater future good, equality of opportunity and common courtesy. But its object is what is best for man in his human life of time and the philosophy itself does not fully consider human experience, does not fully cover the conduct of man: does not give a full explanation of human conduct. The question seems never to have

<sup>20</sup> Happiness and misery are here used as relative terms. There is no denial that this conduct of man may result in feeling transcendent of happiness and misery—may result in real reality. This transcendental feeling is not a negative state, though beyond thought. But we cannot refer this transcendent feeling to a mere subject of passing time.

<sup>21</sup> Epicurus made this tranquillity the end-all and be-all for man in opposition to or in distinction from Gautama's Nirvana. For Gautama said he did *not* know what happens to man after the extinction of delusion. The later school of the Bhuddists did not, in the greater vessel, submit to Gautama's doubt as to the effect of Nirvana. It taught that there is a soul in man.

been raised and met by the Epicureans of *why* some men—all men at times—manifest by their conduct rejection of what is best for themselves as things of passing time: why their conduct is that of men seeking something which cannot affect them in any way if dissolution of the body puts an end to them.<sup>22</sup> If man is a passing thing in time, so that there is no basis for any desire in him for anything beyond bodily death, how can his conduct be prompted by desire for something absolutely foreign to and impossible for him? Where does the desire come from? This desire is implanted in man, and any philosophy for life, however admirable it may be for conduct during human life, must be held to start on some false assumption if it does not cover all human conduct.

The philosophy of Epicurus does not account fully for human conduct. The Platonist philosophy does, even though it may on occasion deal too definitely with that which is beyond the purview of thought.

The Cyrenaic starts with an assumption that man should treat himself as no more than a personality of the passing moment *now*, and it has been shown that if the ultimate "I am" does not exist, this assumption is not unreasonable. Granted the truth of the assumption, the expediency of the philosophy follows.<sup>23</sup> But the philosophy gives no full explanation of human conduct.

The Epicurean starts with an assumption that the "I am" exists for a passing time; that is, exists only during the time of life on earth of the subject; for if the *same* subject did not continue in time, the same subject could not reasonably accept present ill for future greater happiness. Granted the truth of the assumption, the truth of the philosophy follows.

<sup>22</sup> As already shown, belief in this something must precede conduct towards it.

<sup>23</sup> Aristippus when he held man should entertain lesser present evil for greater future happiness admitted, perhaps unconsciously, that man is more than a thing of the passing moment.

But, still, the philosophy gives no full explanation of human conduct.

The Platonist accepts fully the "I am." I think it is not incorrect to say he holds the subject to be in no more than a passing conditioned state or manifestation of the "I am." Granted the truth of the assumption, the underlying truth of the philosophy follows. The term "underlying truth" is used because the assumption made by the Platonists opens such vast vistas for human reasoning that, naturally, the deductions from the assumption differ largely one from another. The Cyrenaic and Epicurean may be said to be practical; the Platonist also is practical, though he opens the possibility of conflicting theories as to what practice should be. The Platonist philosophy, however, opens a *full* explanation of human conduct.

But if we want to determine what human thought and conduct should be, we must first determine what they can be.

Now we have driven back man's thought and conduct to desire, ultimately to the blind desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am." All human thought and conduct results from this desire, which is manifest in infinite variation in relation to qualitatively distinguishable presentations. What man's thought and conduct can be is therefore subjective to desire for self-expression as the "I am."<sup>24</sup>

It has been proved that man's thought and conduct not only can be, but are, of such a nature that his mere desire as a passing thing of time cannot explain them. So far as this general course of reasoning goes, we find that the thought and conduct of man are of such a nature that we must assume he is some-

<sup>24</sup> That is, there is, in the ultimate, the categorical imperative. Kant is perhaps not quite clear in the distinction he relies on between freedom of the will and transcendental freedom. If there is no transcendental freedom for the subject, there is, for him, determinism in the ultimate: there is, for him, the categorical imperative.



thing more than a passing subject of time and we have found our categorical imperative for the subject manifest in the subject's desire for self-expression of itself as the "I am." Human experience informs us that this desire of the subject is manifest in conduct: the subject is always struggling against the resistance of environment in order to get rid of its tyranny and use it for the subject's own purposes, where the ultimate purpose is self-expression as the "I am." This struggle not only can be, but is.

But still our consideration of the categorical imperative is not exhaustive. For we have found it, as yet, in nothing but the blind desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am:" we have formulated no moral good for mankind, we have no tyranny of the conscience in man.<sup>25</sup>

And here comes in a difficulty which must be faced and in facing it, though I may appear to oppose, I think I do not really oppose Kant.

Proof of any ultimate definite goal, any ultimate tyranny of the conscience in man, is impossible for us as subjects: we can only be aware dimly of any such ultimate through our faculty of insight which transcends thought.

But in thought, we can, as subjects, find evidence of such an ultimate goal or tyranny; and the evidence may be of such a nature that we may be justified in accepting it as proof. We have no proof, for instance, of gravity and its laws.<sup>26</sup> But the evidence is of such a nature that we may be justified, in reason, in assuming evidential proof has been arrived at.

Herein we find the importance of the expression "the accomplished in the accomplishing."

<sup>25</sup> Transcendental free will is impossible for man: what we term free will is a meaningless term unless there exists some standard of determinism, whether transcendental or not. Free will, in itself, spells no standard for conduct and no personal responsibility. Riehl is on this, I think, unanswerable.

<sup>26</sup> In remote space we find bodies moving whose movements cannot as yet be brought under the rule of gravity and its laws.

The thought and conduct of man in relation to any such goal or tyranny, exists in the accomplishing, never in the accomplished. But this accomplishing is not in opposition to the accomplished. For it has already been shown how false is the general assumption that rest and motion, the finite and infinite, even good and evil, are really real contradictions. They are real contradictions for us in thought but in the ultimate must be reconciled or subsumed under the transcendental.<sup>27</sup>

So man's thought and conduct in the accomplishing towards the accomplished may be treated by us, for the purposes of reason, as part of the transcendental ultimate, as part of the accomplished in the accomplishing. We see now as through a glass dimly, but what we see is not false: it is incomplete truth, or truth in the accomplishing.<sup>28</sup>

The expression "the accomplished in the accomplishing" for the Ultimate, clears away, for metaphysics, many intolerable contradictions. If it be used for the interpretation of Kant's philosophy we find at once what he meant by "the manifold," why he held that we can neither prove the world finite or infinite and, I think, it justifies in some measure, his dialectic. It is true that he says moral theology leads inevitably to the conception of a First Cause. But when we bear in mind that, before so writing, he had already shown that cause and effect can only exist in time, it is clear he must refer to a First Cause merely for the purposes of reason: he does not mean a First Cause in itself. He means a Primal Being, to use his own words, which to us, in thought, has the appearance of a First Cause. For this Primal Being we can only hold that there is transcendence of cause and effect.

In considering the Categorical Imperative, Kant says:—

<sup>27</sup> Kant is followed directly here, but perhaps not Hegel as generally interpreted.

<sup>28</sup> Sight is here used as in a parable.

“I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely *a priori* (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness) the conduct of a rational being, or, in other words, the use which it makes of its freedom<sup>29</sup> and that these laws are *absolutely* imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends) and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.”

But, surely, if we accept this assumption there is no more to be said: we have at once our Categorical Imperative.<sup>30</sup> No matter whether we give reality to these moral laws in themselves or refer them back to a transcendental Being, we have our Categorical Imperative: we have the driving moral force at the back of all human thought and conduct.<sup>31</sup>

I do not think we are justified in accepting the assumption: Kant makes it dogmatically and would appear to support it dogmatically without argument in support.

We must be critical: we must consider our human experience of the thought and conduct of man to find whether for explanation thereof, we do, or do not, want any Categorical Imperative. We must not, dogmatically, introduce it as a *deus ex machinâ* and by its aid explain human experience. Our only firm foundation for argument is human experience.

The argument I put forward relies on the moral judgment of man and the arguments of the most

<sup>29</sup> This does not mean transcendental freedom, it refers only to a form of freedom under the governance of pure moral laws.

<sup>30</sup> This is a categorical imperative of reason. I find the categorical imperative manifest in the desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the “I am.” This desire, blind to us in itself, is manifest in differing ways by differing subjects,—manifest it may be said in impure desire. Kant, himself, finds the freedom of the subject in its freedom to act in accordance with its own true reasonable self.

<sup>31</sup> Shaftesbury discarded the moral sanction of public opinion.

enlightened moralists in no way : it is based on our experience of human conduct. We have traced back human conduct to ultimate desire in the subject for full expression of itself as the "I am." This desire of the subject is manifest in its conduct as struggling, against environment, for self-expression. It is thus we have arrived at the Categorical Imperative.

But still we have not touched on free-will nor have we arrived at what may be termed "moral good" for mankind.

If we consider the evolution of our universe, we may for the purpose of the present argument, divide it into two periods : the first when no beings have appeared manifesting self-conscious thought and conduct, the second when beings exist manifesting self-conscious thought and conduct.

During the former period there is full determinism : evolution proceeds under the laws of Nature. The thought<sup>32</sup> and conduct of the existing beings are determined by the laws of Nature. So, for this period, though a form of the categorical imperative exists,—for thought and conduct if existent are determined by the laws of Nature,—the categorical imperative, as a tyranny of *personal* conscience, does not exist. For personal conscience cannot exist without self-consciousness. We are concerned, therefore, only with the second period when subjects exist manifesting self-conscious thought and conduct.

<sup>32</sup> I merely allege that thought *may* exist, but, if it is not self-conscious thought, the thought (and so necessarily the conduct) of existing beings is not determined in any way by themselves.

## THE UNIVERSE WITHOUT SELF- CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS

BUT some consideration must be given to this first period before we proceed to a consideration of the second. For we are faced by an apparent breach in continuity of evolution: there would appear to be absence of moral law in the first period and its sudden appearance, from nowhere, in the second.<sup>1</sup>

Riehl says:—

“ What always produces the confusion of determinism with fatalism is a certain widespread view of the reign of law in nature, which really gives these laws being, and makes them *things*. In explaining processes in nature, we use laws as major premises under which we subsume facts, to reach conclusions. This procedure really produces a sort of illusion by suggesting that the laws really precede the facts which happen according to law, that they are independent of these, and prior to them . . . . By this false conception the real is as it were doubled for our minds . . . . The objective world and its obedience to law are not two separate facts, but a single fact expressed in two ways, according as it is related to sense, intuition, or to logical thought.”

Riehl is in error here. What he really does is to be scientific and make the laws of Nature run parallel with the manifestation of the laws. He writes as a

<sup>1</sup> There can be no moral law in itself, no personal responsibility except for a self-conscious subject. If the laws of Nature exist in themselves, there is a-morality.

psychologist, that is, he refuses to transcend the fact of presentation. But he cannot so refuse, for he is writing as a metaphysician.

The fact is that the sensible universe as presented is merely the occasion for thought, and thought, as already shown, could not seize the occasion if the laws of Nature did not exist. The objective world and its obedience (subjection?) to law are not one fact expressed in two ways. The objective world, indeed, is not a fact that we can compass, for we cannot think it; we can only think about it.<sup>2</sup> The sensuous merely presents us with unrelated phenomena.<sup>3</sup> Thought spells relations which are not given with our sensing of phenomena: thereby we have power to think *about* the phenomena which we sense as unrelated. And these relations could not exist, for thought, unless the laws of Nature held sway over the objective world. If the objective world and law constitute one fact, the laws of Nature can have existence only with the existence of the objective world. What authority have we for holding this to be true, even if they have existence only for the objective universe? None: any proof, if possible, would be transcendent of thought. On the other hand, the objective world has, for us, *no existence* unless under the governance of the laws of Nature. We cannot, of course, give precedence in time to the laws of Nature,<sup>4</sup> but we can say that the objective world would have no existence for us unless under

<sup>2</sup> We think the laws of Nature, not simply think about them. We can think *about* our objective universe because we can think the laws of Nature. For example, we think timeless continuity for the laws of Nature, but for the objective universe, even in mathematics, we have no continuous calculus, we have only an infinitesimal calculus.

<sup>3</sup> The meaning of sensuous intuition is doubtful. I think the sensuous cannot give rise directly to intuition, whatever intuition may mean. As in the argument throughout I use thought and insight I do not use intuition at all.

<sup>4</sup> The laws of Nature transcend time: the objective universe exists in time.

the governance of the laws of Nature. If the two constitute one fact, the one has as full governance over the other, as the other over the one. But the objective world exists to us merely in subjective manifestation of the laws of Nature and their governance. How can this mere manifestation govern the laws of Nature? The laws of Nature exist in thought: the objective world as presented is merely an occasion for thought: we can only think *about* it.<sup>5</sup>

The widespread view of the reign of law in Nature is sound for reason, sound for insight.

Till beings appear with self-consciousness, there is full determinism in Nature:<sup>6</sup> the laws of Nature hold tyrannic sway.

But during this first period our universe is not standing still, it is evolving.<sup>7</sup> From chaotic vapour or chaotic mass of discrete atoms, it is evolving into a form giving environment for self-conscious beings. This gives no proof, but it offers evidence of design.

During this period life is a factor in evolution—the laws of Nature use life as a factor. Life, as a factor, appears manifest in various physical forms. It is the one principle, life, which is manifest equally in the forms of the amoeba and the elephant; the one differs from the other only in complexity of form and specialization of function. These manifestations of life in physical forms are innumerable in number, and no fixed period can be determined when they, or

<sup>5</sup> The laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe. The subject, as a subject of the intelligible universe, is still subject to the laws of Nature when changing or creating in the sensible universe as presented. But by using the laws as reality it does change the form of the objective universe: the laws are, for us, fixed, immutable; the objective universe is not.

<sup>6</sup> I write "determinism in Nature." What determinism means for the ultimate is considered hereafter. The subject reads determinism into nature.

<sup>7</sup> If this universe is evolving to some end under design, the design itself is beyond the purview of thought: the very infirmity of thought might be relied on for evidence of design.

any one of them, first suddenly appeared : they may be always appearing.<sup>8</sup>

But, at the same time, there is always, in regard to some of these forms, evolution in complexity of form and specialization of function. Why this form of evolution exists in our universe we cannot know. But I think we are justified in holding it cannot be fully accounted for by action and reaction between the living organism and its environment. It is quite true there is always a relation between the organism and its environment and we can well understand the survival of the fittest,—always bear in mind that the term the “fittest” has some relation to environment.<sup>9</sup> But this does not explain why evolution in complexity of form and specialization of function should exist.

It is a fact that living organisms of increasing well-balanced complexity of form and specialization of function, do evolve and do survive and increase in number, so that the evolution must find favourable environment. But this power of survival is not found in mere physical superiority :<sup>10</sup> beauty and love, for instance, are factors which have part in survival. It may be argued that beauty of form attracts sexual copulation and so leads to survival. But this explains in no way *why* the organism is so constituted that beauty attracts it. It may be argued that the love of the parent for the offspring makes for survival and

<sup>8</sup> Their appearance in time may be subject to evolved environment which may be unfavourable to their appearance. But I cannot understand in what way we can fix any particular period for the first manifestations of life.

<sup>9</sup> The “fittest” must always be interpreted as in relation to environment. It is when man appears with power to determine his own environment that the question of the “fittest” being the “best,” arises. Huxley was quite wrong if he held that man must fight against the laws of Nature. I think he meant man must *use* the laws in order to accomplish that which the laws of themselves could never accomplish.

<sup>10</sup> How could the strong tiger survive if its feeble prey did not survive also?



that survival only is the object of the love. But this explains in no way *why* the organism is so constituted that love moves it. There is no reason, if the laws of Nature have merely survival for object, why every offspring should not be born impervious in itself to all ills. In one view, nature seems clumsy in going out of its way to attack the offspring by evil while at the same time protecting it from evil by love.<sup>11</sup>

It is no reply to say that love and beauty are good in themselves: they exist and are good in themselves only *for self-consciousness*. Before self-conscious subjects appeared we may assume that beautiful forms existed in nature. But these were mere manifestations of beauty, they were mere forms in the objective universe of beauty, and form has no beauty in itself. So,—if we assume self-conscious Being did not exist before self-conscious subjects:—beauty had then no existence: there was no self-consciousness for which it could exist.

Again, still considering this first period, we find amongst living organisms the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Herein do we find nature red in tooth and claw in its contempt for life? We do not. Life is life, the laws of Nature interfere with it, in itself, in no way. The laws *use* life for manifestation in differing physical forms; they show their interest in life in using it for these innumerable forms. And they show contempt not for these forms,—for they bring them into existence,—but only for the *time* of their existence. So far, when we as self-conscious beings consider this first period, no question of morality arises. For there is no question of morality involved in life being used for innumerable forms of manifestation and none in the fact of

<sup>11</sup> Hippolytus was quite right in saying that nature would have freed the world from all its evils arising from sexuality, if it had never introduced the dual state of man and arranged that children could be bought from the Gods at a price. If my memory serves me correctly, a higher price was suggested for a male child than for a female.

the *time* during which any or all of these manifestations remain in existence, being long or short.<sup>12</sup>

But pleasure and pain?

Herein we find marked the crass conceit of man. As a self-conscious being he has power to use the laws of Nature for his own purposes: he can even create in the sensible universe as presented. It is man himself who has used these laws to introduce the evils of theft, murder, envy, hatred, malice, bloated wealth and chill penury; all the evils, in fact, which exist in our social state. And then he turns round and puts the responsibility for these evils on the laws of Nature; he libels them as being red in tooth and claw! Not only this: instead of admitting that it is he himself who has introduced sin and misery into the world, he claps himself on the back as a godlike being, because he fights against the very evils which he has himself introduced. The laws of Nature are, at the lowest, a-moral: it is man who by his use of the laws of Nature introduces evil.

But what do we mean by pleasure and pain? What do they depend on? Here we must at present enter on the commonplace: the question is more fully considered hereafter.

Physical pleasure or pain can have no existence in itself: for the existence of either, or both, there must exist a subject with potentiality of feeling. The pleasure or pain of a man fully anæsthetized under an otherwise painful operation is as impossible as that of a piece of land<sup>13</sup> tortured by an earthquake. Pleasure or pain exists only for a feeling subject. There may be to us, manifestations suggesting physical pleasure or pain, but these are mere manifestations unless feeling exist. There may be, for us, physical appearance of pleasure or pain, where

<sup>12</sup> When we, as men, pray for long life on earth as a blessing we confound quality with quantity. As Bergson, though in another connection, has shown, we falsely measure quality by quantity.

<sup>13</sup> If assumed to be unconscious.

neither is felt. A dead man may be made to laugh or cry, exhibit movements manifesting pleasure or pain; the cinematograph may bring before us any possible manifestation of feeling. But these are mere manifestations: there is no pleasure or pain because there is no feeling subject.<sup>14</sup>

But we are considering the first period of the evolution of our universe and during this period physical forms manifesting life have no self-consciousness and no subject can be a feeling subject without self-consciousness. Therefore, during this period pleasure and pain do not exist. So far, then, the laws of Nature are not responsible for either or both.

It is quite true that during this period living organisms are never fully in agreement with their environment; it is on this very disagreement that evolution exists and the struggle for survival, in which the fittest are successful, takes place.<sup>15</sup> So when we, as self-conscious subjects, regard this period there is an *appearance* of pleasure and pain for living organisms; there is, to us, manifestation of pleasure and pain as with the cinematograph. But these are mere manifestations: for there are no feeling subjects.

This argument, however, must not be pressed too far. For we do not know when self-conscious subjects first appear in our universe. I assume man is the first self-conscious subject, simply because I am myself a man and self-conscious of myself. If I were a tiger or even an oyster I *might* find myself a self-conscious subject. As to this I know nothing, and so leave the question raised unanswered. And the question may quite justifiably be left unanswered. For, even if other self-conscious subjects exist, I am certainly my-

<sup>14</sup> A man may be a feeling subject without experiencing pleasure or pain: his feeling may be potential only. But pleasure or pain can have no existence in itself unless a feeling subject exist. This would appear to open a good reply to the James-Lange theory.

<sup>15</sup> The "fittest" refers to those most nearly in agreement with the environment of the time. But this agreement may be of such a nature that it is beyond the purview of our observation.

self one of them and so justified in using my own self-consciousness in argument.<sup>16</sup>

The only point here made is that, while the laws of Nature hold full sway and self-conscious subjects are absent, pleasure and pain do not exist. It is when self-conscious subjects appear, with power to use the laws of Nature for their own purposes, that pleasure and pain come into existence. It is, using a suggestion of James Ward's in another connection, as if the laws of Nature presented to self-conscious beings a neutral state which self-conscious beings analyse into pleasure and pain.

All written in this chapter is in defence of the laws of Nature. At the lowest they are a-moral, though it is suggested that they are manifestations of what is, to us, an ultimate Being. It is when man appears as a self-conscious subject with power to use the laws of Nature that, from our point of view, a-morality is differentiated and reintegrated into partials of morality and immorality—of pleasure and pain. The doctrine of original sin, as part of the laws of Nature, has been used by man in excuse for his own wrongdoing. Under that doctrine God made man as a thing of original sin, and then God died on earth to correct what He Himself had already done. By this means God is made responsible for man's wrongdoing and man arrogates to himself credit for right-doing. If, however, the sacrifice of our Lord is regarded as transcendental we can find in it a revelation to man for his assistance towards self-expression as the "I am": the way was pointed out as to *how* he should struggle to use environment for spiritual self-

<sup>16</sup> The tiger *plays* with its prey. Finding pleasure in exercise of power or in anticipation of a meal? The prey finds the reverse of pleasure? I do not know anything about this. I cannot judge by mere manifestations. The tiger and its prey *may* be self-conscious; if so they, like man, are embodied in a universe of pain and pleasure. Why so embodied we cannot know. (*Cf.* the Chapter on Pleasure.)

expression.<sup>17</sup> But no such question is in point so long as there are no self-conscious subjects in our universe.

Moral responsibility, pleasure and pain have no existence till self-conscious subjects appear: we cannot read them into the eidola of the kinematograph, for instance, because the eidola have no self-consciousness.

The attacks made on the laws of Nature as being "red in tooth and claw" are not to be justified. It is when and only when the laws of Nature are used by self-conscious subjects that evil *to be felt* is brought into existence. Evil first appears when self-conscious subjects first appear.

Moral law exists only *for* self-conscious subjects. So while the universe exists without self-conscious subjects we are powerless to hold that moral law does or does not exist. There is no breach in continuity.

<sup>17</sup> God is transcendent of those very laws of Nature which man can only use for self-expression. The supreme Sacrifice is an historical fact, but its interpretation is beyond the purview of thought: it must be transcendental.

## FREE WILL AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

WE consider now the second period, when self-conscious subjects make their appearance.

If we assume the existence of the categorical imperative and also that of the freedom of the will we are faced by what is termed an antinomy of reason. Kant refers to this antinomy when he says that transcendental freedom of the will is impossible, while, at the same time, freedom of the will is not only possible, but exists. Riehl is more explicit: he finds an antinomy of the practical reason thus:—

“ Responsibility, an unquestionable fact of consciousness, is not possible on the supposition that the will is free, or that it is not free.”<sup>1</sup>

When we accept the fact of the infirmity of thought and give to man, as a subject, the faculty of insight, we shall find we can attack this so-termed antinomy directly. Our first attack is indirect.

If we consider the objective universe only we find no question of the freedom of the will exists: there is, for us, determinism under the laws of Nature. If, even, we make living organisms, whose conduct is

<sup>1</sup> Responsibility, as an unquestionable fact of consciousness, I trace back to the desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the “I am.” For the struggle is not of one “I am,” but of many interrelated “I ams.” So far I follow Riehl. But free-will I hold to be a contradiction for thought of non-freedom of will.

instinctive, part of the objective universe, still no such question arises. The question of freedom or non-freedom of the will only arises with the existence of self-conscious subjects. Again, even if we assume that a self-conscious subject can think or do anything without any exception at all, still no question of the freedom of the will arises. For freedom of the will is a subject of thought and so freedom of the will is meaningless without its contradiction, non-freedom, being also in the mind, and to think between these limits of contradiction there must be a standard of determinism. Without such a standard freedom of the will is impossible.

Here comes in a fact affecting freedom and non-freedom of the will which must be borne in mind.

When we thing up to and between the limits of, for example, 0 and  $\infty$ , we necessarily take an arbitrary standard to start from: this standard is unity, as before shown. We are dealing with quantity, which imports time and space, and the unity involved is not fixed, immutable, it is no more than an arbitrary centre, a necessary assumption for the estimate of relations: it is a starting point for thought.<sup>2</sup>

But, when we consider freedom of the will, quantity, time and space are not in the question, do not come in at all. And yet, when we think up to and between the limits of freedom and non-freedom of the will, we must have some standard to start thought from,—there must be some point to start thought in its process to freedom of the will as one limit of thought and non-freedom of the will as the contradictory limit of thought. This standard must be a standard of determinism. So even at this point of the argument we arrive, with Riehl, at the necessary fact of determinism before freedom of the will can be considered.

As already stated we must, before we begin to con-

<sup>2</sup> The number one, or unity, may be taken to mean anything from an elephant to an atom.

sider the question of the freedom of the will, assume self-consciousness exists. Is it then enough to assume the existence of one self-conscious subject?<sup>3</sup> It is not; we must assume the existence of self-conscious *subjects*. We have no human experience at all as to the relation of one self-conscious subject to the environment of our objective universe, though we try to consider the objective universe as something fully external to ourselves and are greatly interested in our attempts.<sup>4</sup>

But all such attempts fail. Make abstraction of your relation to other self-conscious subjects, not only of the present but of the past and future. What remains of yourself and your human experience? Suppose, even, that as the one solitary subject of self-consciousness you were a Platonist,<sup>5</sup> what then would be your thought and conduct? Any question of morality, of pleasure or pain, you would refer to yourself alone, as the one self-conscious subject. You would be a pure hedonist, as the term is generally understood. You would, as a Platonist, interpret "pleasure" as meaning what is best for yourself,<sup>6</sup> but you could not interpret "pleasure" as being involved in any way in the pleasure of others, not yourself; for you alone would exist. The ultimate of morality—do unto others as you would others should do unto you—would be impossible for you.

We may thus understand that though morality exists for each subject, a condition precedent for morality is that humanity should exist; it is because there are self-conscious subjects, not merely one self-conscious

<sup>3</sup> We ignore, at present, any question of an ultimate self-conscious Being.

<sup>4</sup> This is why Robinson Crusoe always has such supreme interest for all. Each one of us, in reading, puts himself in Crusoe's place.

<sup>5</sup> You could not be a Christian; the Supreme Sacrifice was for humanity, and, for you, humanity has no existence.

<sup>6</sup> Kant says all *hoping* has happiness for its object. But the meaning of happiness depends on what the subject is that feels happiness. What hope may be depends on what the subject is.



subject, that morality can exist.<sup>7</sup> And so we are enabled to follow Riehl directly when he says:—

“ Responsibility is a phenomenon of social ethics, and as such it is to be explained by social psychology. Individualistic psychology must pass helplessly by phenomena of the mental life, like duty and responsibility, which originate not in the single consciousness, but in the consciousness of the community.”

So before any question of free will arises, we must have self-conscious subjects, not merely one self-conscious subject; this is necessary for the standard required to measure freedom of the will.

The next step in argument seems to follow directly.

We find full determinism for the objective world; that is, the tyranny of the laws of Nature. If then this common responsibility exist for humanity, it must have existence in the intelligible universe, not in the sensible universe as presented: it exists in thought. We may or may not manifest the thought in conduct.

But we have already found the supremacy of the intelligible universe over the sensible universe as presented: imagination determines the thought and, as a content of will, the conduct of humanity in destroying the tyranny of determinism and using the laws of Nature for its own purposes.<sup>8</sup>

The position is this: the laws of Nature have full sway over the sensible universe as presented, that is, over the objective universe; so far there is determinism. But, so far, the intelligible universe has no existence;<sup>9</sup> the intelligible universe comes into existence with the existence of self-conscious subjects.

<sup>7</sup> Max Stirner in *The Ego and His Own* ignores this fact; his whole argument is based on a false foundation. Nietzsche, at times, is influenced in his argument by building on the same false foundation.

<sup>8</sup> Imagination cannot be exercised by the embodied subject unless the subject be moved by desire.

<sup>9</sup> Unless we refer back the laws of Nature to a Law Giver in what may be termed a transcendental intelligible universe. With any such question we are not now concerned.

When self-conscious subjects come into existence, then comes into existence their power to use, not the objective universe, but the objective universe as governed by the laws of Nature: they can and do use this universe governed by law for their own purposes. In other words, they can change, even create, their environment. It is self-consciousness, manifest in self-conscious subjects, not in one self-conscious subject, which enables the subject to exercise this power over the tyranny of the laws of Nature. The subject is free, as a subject, to exercise this power.

What do we mean by transcendental freedom?<sup>10</sup> It is an unfortunate term and has led to as great confusion of thought as the terms absolute knowledge or ultimate unity.

Freedom is a subject of thought and so cannot exist without the existence in the mind of its contradiction, non-freedom. Freedom gives no idea for thought unless the idea of its contradiction is also in the mind. Just as we cannot think infinity or nothing, but can only think up to and between such limits of contradiction, so we can only think up to and between the limits of contradiction of freedom and non-freedom. Transcendental freedom can no more exist in real reality than transcendental non-freedom. In the ultimate there is transcendence of both.<sup>11</sup>

Applying, again, for our ultimate, the expression "the accomplished in the accomplishing," we find, in the transcendental not transcendental freedom but an ultimate of freedom as accomplished in the accomplishing.<sup>12</sup> We arrive at this transcendent through our faculty of insight, which informs us that in the ultimate the necessary contradictory limits of thought

<sup>10</sup> I deny that the argument now departs from Kant.

<sup>11</sup> Riehl does not distinguish between transcendental freedom of the will and freedom of the will: hence his antinomy for practical reason. His antinomy will be shown to be false otherwise.

<sup>12</sup> Freedom accomplished takes on, for us, the aspect of the determined.

are and must be reconciled, though the reconciliation or subsumption is beyond the purview of thought.

Now desire may be blind,<sup>13</sup> and potentiality of will, which exists for the subject, may be termed blind. But when we speak of the freedom of the will, we speak of will with an assumption that it has, in some way, been effective or non-effective in thought or conduct. Will cannot be effective without content; there must be precedent desire and, as already shown, there must be the exercise of imagination in the intelligible universe before will can be effective for the conduct of the subject in creating or even changing its environment. At first thought, then, it might be fairly argued that the will is not free.

But the argument is false, for it treats freedom as a thing in itself, whereas it is relative. Freedom of the will has no meaning unless there is resistance to its freedom. We are, again, confounding, in thought, relations with facts in themselves. Riehl himself made this error in stating his antinomy.

Responsibility, an unquestionable fact of consciousness, we find in the ultimate imperative desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am." For the desire, in the accomplishing, of any particular "I am," ought not to conflict with the desire, in the accomplishing, of other "I am's." So far there is determinism *for the subject*. But we find in this very determinism the fact which is necessary before freedom of the will can exist for us in thought.<sup>14</sup> We find the standard of determinism necessary for us to begin to think up to and between the limits of freedom and non-freedom of will.

While will is potential merely, no question of its freedom arises. Where, even, it is effective in thought and conduct, no question of freedom arises

<sup>13</sup> The ultimate desire of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am" is a blind desire; it has no content unless faced by resistance to its self-expression.

<sup>14</sup> Never forget that freedom is a relative term.

unless its exercise has been against resistance. For us, as subjects, right and wrong exist and freedom to do right or wrong imports freedom *not* to do wrong or right; for freedom of will there must be, for the subject, the possibility of choice.<sup>15</sup> But if we destroy right and wrong, that is, if we have no standard determining that *this* is right and *that* is wrong, where is freedom of the will? It is non-existent. Suppose, more generally, that your will is transcendently free and unconditioned, so that you can think or do anything. Then freedom of the will has no meaning. Your character, will, desire can have no part in your exercise of will. For if character, will, desire be *yours*, they determine the exercise of your will: your will is not transcendently free.<sup>16</sup> So transcendental freedom of the will infers absence of your character, will, desire. In such case you exist as a mere unrelated entity.

For freedom of the will there must be a standard of determinism against which freedom can be measured; this standard must exist for the subject, otherwise choice could not exist.

It has been said there can be no miracle from the standpoint of God, while there can be from the standpoint of man. It were better said that from the standpoint of God there is transcendence of the miraculous and non-miraculous.<sup>17</sup> By analogy there is for the "I am," relatively to the subject, transcendence of freedom and non-freedom.

The categorical imperative is found in the fact that the subject necessarily struggles against the resistance of environment, for self-expression of itself as the "I am": there is always the accomplishing. The freedom of will for the subject is found in its power so

<sup>15</sup> For choice to exist there must be some standard of determinism.

<sup>16</sup> But from the subject's point of view it is free. For he appears to himself to exist in his *own* character, will and desire.

<sup>17</sup> The former statement makes God subjective to transcendent laws of nature.

to struggle in differing ways. From the subject's point of view this is a real and free power; it infers choice.

We, as subjects, are conscious that we exist in the ultimate as the "I am": we are conscious, as subjects, of our responsibility to the "I am" and because of this consciousness we necessarily struggle for self-expression as the "I am." Hence the categorical imperative. But this consciousness is at the background of consciousness. In the foreground of consciousness the subject regards itself,—as a thing of thought and conduct,—as imbued with freedom of will in determining the form of its struggle for self-expression. What each of us holds is:—my character, my thought and conduct are my own and I use them as I myself desire. Therefore I have free will.<sup>18</sup>

If we take for our standard of determinism the imperative struggle of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am," we find the subject has, for itself, this freedom of will. Let us consider this statement further, for as yet no evidence in human experience has been offered of its truth.

Freedom is a relative term and, if the thought and conduct of humanity are effective in no way, then we find in human experience a negation for freedom and non-freedom. But, in the accomplishing, we find the thought and conduct of humanity are effective, and effective, from our point of view, towards some ultimate though unknown purpose.<sup>19</sup>

The intelligible universe holds sway over the universe as presented and we find the thought and conduct of humanity effective in this way:—as time passes the thought and conduct of humanity effect constant change, even creation, in the objective uni-

<sup>18</sup> Or we may say there is for the subject an appearance of free-will. If we stop short at the psychological I, there is a form of reality for free-will.

<sup>19</sup> Do not forget freedom, as relative, exists in the accomplishing only; in the ultimate of the accomplished in the accomplishing, there is transcendence of free-will and the categorical imperative.

verse. Day by day, the form of this universe changes and this is brought about by the thought and conduct of humanity. More than this: this change is evolutionary; for day by day this sensible universe takes on more closely the form determined by humanity for its own purposes. There is the "accomplishing" for humanity and so far the thought and conduct of humanity are effective. The ideal we dimly pursue is an accomplished state when environment shall have so evolved that it is fully in agreement with the full expression of the subject, of itself as the "I am."

There is direct evidence in human experience of the evolutionary increase of manifestation of power of the intelligible universe over the objective universe. In this the thought and conduct of man are shown to be effective: there is evidence of the accomplishing and so, from the subject's point of view, of free will: humanity itself has effected, and is effecting, the evolutionary change for its own purposes.<sup>20</sup>

But, so far, we only find that the thought and conduct of humanity have effected evolution in environment. Still, however, though the change is in environment only, we find the change effective for humanity in that, by bringing men closer together in time and space, it has made opportunity for closer brotherhood amongst them; keener apprehension of likeness between us all. And, by reducing the time necessarily required for the support of the body, it has also made opportunity for men to employ more time in the exercise of brain power for mental, rather than physical purposes. They have more time to use for the improvement of their environment. The effective change in environment has enured in some accomplishment for the benefit of humanity.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Darwin's theory of evolution marks the accomplishing of "something," though this something be meaningless to us in thought.

<sup>21</sup> The accomplishing when past takes on, for us, the appearance of the accomplished.

But during this time of evolution in environment, does human experience inform us that humanity has been struggling effectively in any way for the abstract? Has it shown any desire for love, beauty, truth, justice? Is there any evidence that humanity is moved by desire, even blind desire, to accept, in thought and conduct, the principle:—do unto others as ye would others should do unto you? Is the categorical imperative moral?

Can we, in the thought and conduct of man, find that the categorical imperative is manifest in power in *any balance* for man? That is, can we, when we consider the diverse thought and conduct not only of individuals separately, but of humanity at large, hold that, for us, there is any ultimate standard or ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice? A standard towards which humanity is blindly groping?<sup>22</sup>

Herein we find, again, the importance of our definition of the ultimate as the accomplished in the accomplishing.

The subject exists in the accomplishing: the subject, in relation to the "I am," is as the accomplishing is to the accomplished: it is a partial of the "I am." Man, as the "I am," is said to be made in the likeness of God: in a like way we may say the subject is a projection in time and space of the "I am."<sup>23</sup>

But human ideals exist for human conduct only in and for the accomplishing: we even define ideals as "something" we can struggle towards, but never attain: if attained they cease to be ideals. But as they exist in the accomplishing, they are not phenomenally false: they are, or may be, partials of the ultimate

<sup>22</sup> If we cannot find this or any other ideal we are driven to Haeckel's closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution.

<sup>23</sup> The noumenal is not opposed to the phenomenal. I read the phenomenal as a partial of the noumenal. But I do not make use of either expression, for their use introduces confusion between the intelligible and the objective universe: though, as Kant used them he assumed the latter universe to be a subject of the former.

ideal or goal of the subject for full expression of itself as the "I am."

So it may be possible, in human experience, to find some ideal in the abstract to which the thought and conduct of the subject move in the accomplishing. And if we can find this ideal, it is an ideal in the accomplishing, that is, it partakes of real reality; it is a partial as it were of the accomplished in the accomplishing. It represents dimly and partially the ultimate ideal for humanity, the full expression of the self-conscious subject of itself as the "I am."

Now we find in human experience that we have the ideals of love, beauty, truth and justice. It is true we have these ideals because we falsely define the ultimate in a limit of thought,—just as we *think* God as unity or as immanent. But if anyone who takes love, beauty, truth or justice separately as his ideal uses his insight and reasons, he will at once find his error: he will find that the faculty of insight prevents us from holding that love can exist in the ultimate without beauty,<sup>24</sup> truth and justice, and so for each one of them. If, for example, we think love as an ultimate, insight pulls us up and makes us aware of the fallibility of our thought in that this thought imports thought also of beauty, truth and justice.<sup>25</sup> The ideals of thought are, through insight, subsumed under a transcendental ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. The ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is itself an ideal transcending each detail. And yet each ideal exists in the accomplishing.

Love, the beautiful, truth, justice, as subjects of thought, convey no meaning to us unless their contradictions are also in the mind so that, as subjects of thought, we never have human experience of any of these in the abstract;<sup>26</sup> we can never have any ideas

<sup>24</sup> Forms of beauty are not referred to, for they are merely manifestations of beauty.

<sup>25</sup> To a mother's love, the ugliest child may be beautiful.

<sup>26</sup> For thought, absolute love, etc., are all impossible.



of them in the abstract. But, beyond thought, we are gifted with insight and imagination as part of human experience and so we may be aware of love, beauty, truth and justice as an ideal in the abstract. It is true this awareness has not the definiteness of thought. For we are aware that love, beauty, etc., in the abstract are for thought mere expressions; it is insight that we have into transcendence for them all. Beauty is meaningless without love, any one of the terms is meaningless without the others also. We cannot imagine truth in the abstract without justice in the abstract. Any one imports all the others. At the back of our awareness there is transcendence.<sup>27</sup>

It is suggested that we can imagine a universe of pure love, beauty, truth and justice, but that, when we imagine it, there is at the back of our imagination some transcendent form of perfection where love, beauty, etc., are all subsumed under "something": something beyond imagination. If so, there is a blind, transcendent ideal for humanity.<sup>28</sup>

But, if there be no categorical imperative, and so no freedom for the subject, we must be able, in the same way, to imagine the contradiction of this transcendent ideal: we must be able to imagine a universe where love, beauty, truth and justice have no existence.

Bear in mind what the argument is. We can think between the limits of these contradictory ideals: we can think a universe where love and hatred, beauty and ugliness, etc., exist in differing degrees. The argument, however, is confined to insight and imagination transcending thought.<sup>29</sup>

But the categorical imperative exists and I doubt greatly that we can imagine a universe of absolute

<sup>27</sup> The faculty of insight relates the subject to the transcendental.

<sup>28</sup> We find an ideal of an eternal and predestined harmony for mankind. (*Cf. Leibnitz.*)

<sup>29</sup> Insight and imagination are referred not to the soul of man alone, but to the subject also, subject to its embodiment.

evil. Imagination would appear to be constructive, not destructive. I doubt greatly that we can imagine a chaotic mass of humanity where no bonds of love, beauty, truth and justice exist at all. In such case each subject would, quite impossibly, have transcendental freedom of will, without any existing standard of responsibility. The sensible universe as sensed by us is meaningless for thought : there are given but unrelated objects. It is only when the bond of the laws of Nature is read into the objective universe that we can think about it. In the same way, I suggest, it is only when the bond of love, beauty, etc., is read into humanity as affecting it in some way, that we can even think about ourselves and our fellows.

We are now considering human experience and it must be admitted we are on perilous ground. But the argument is of profound importance for any consideration of the categorical imperative.

We are considering self-conscious subjects who, as subjects of the intelligible universe, have the power of thought and thereby can, by conduct, exercise power over the objective universe. We are considering these subjects in their relation to themselves and their fellows.

Can we, by insight and imagination, picture to ourselves a universe for ourselves where love, beauty, truth and justice are absent? When these, which form bonds between ourselves and others, are absent, what sort of universe is it that we can imagine? If, for me, love, beauty, truth and justice have no existence, I am nothing but an unrelated entity and in such case it were difficult, I think impossible, for me to be a self-conscious subject : I could not only never use thought, but I could not use insight or imagination, for both require the precedent assumption that I exist not only as a self-conscious subject, but as one of many such subjects; which imports some ultimate bond between us all. And, in fact, I do use insight and imagination. The physical and mental establish distinctions, not any bond, between human beings.

If the bond is to be found it must be found elsewhere. In a universe of hatred, ugliness, injustice and falsehood it seems difficult for any such bond to be found.

I suggest, as a further argument, that human experience makes us aware of a general self-consciousness<sup>30</sup> for humanity, under which the self-consciousness of each subject, while still existing, is subsumed. And I suggest that, because of this, we cannot imagine a universe of evil in the abstract, because in such a universe, this general self-consciousness would be wanting.

On the other hand we are not in the same way prevented from imagining a universe of good in the abstract, for general self-consciousness is not therein impossible.

Again, as already shown, my existence as a self-conscious subject, infers necessarily the existence of other self-conscious subjects. My existence depends on that of others from which it follows there must be some underlying community or bond between all self-conscious subjects. But this bond cannot be found in human personality. For the human personality of each one of us exists in definite distinctions from his fellows,—in differing forms of body and brain.<sup>31</sup> We must seek, therefore, for the bond between self-conscious subjects, elsewhere than in the objective universe or in human personality.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> This general self-consciousness is meaningless unless referred to a transcendental self-conscious Being. But such a question does not now arise.

<sup>31</sup> There is presented to each one of us the same objective universe, our thought and conduct in relation to this universe differ because each one of us differs from his fellows: it is our regard of the universe that marks individual differences. Riehl himself says: He who separates men from each other psychically, as physically they stand over against each other, and treats psychical being and action as attached to the body of the individual, or even to some point in that body, shuts his eyes to the reality of the universal mind above the individual, the real subjects of which are not individuals as such, but the bonds uniting individuals.

<sup>32</sup> Human personality is here used as meaning personality conditioned by body and brain.

Now, at present, we neglect any question of an ultimate transcendental Being. We cannot, then, give reality to love, beauty, truth and justice in themselves: they have existence only *for* self-conscious subjects. Love, beauty, truth or justice cannot exist for me unless it is *my* love or *my* beauty as the case may be. So no one of them can have existence in itself; each has existence only for self-conscious subjects.

The cinematograph may here again be used for illustration and we may move forward a little in time and assume that not only Nature and its beauties but the appearance, conduct and speech of human beings are presented to us.

Assume that you are sensing a cinematograph play presenting to you beautiful scenery and men and women speaking and conducting themselves under the apparent influence of love, hatred,—of all the moving desires of humanity.

Now consider what you sense, neglecting the effect it has on you.

You are faced by expressions in manifestation of good, evil, love, hatred, beauty, ugliness, justice, injustice, truth and falsehood. But not one of these exists for any one of the eidola of men and women whose speech and conduct are manifest to you. And why not? Because the eidola are not self-conscious subjects.<sup>33</sup> One of the eidola may deliver a speech on love, beauty, truth and justice; his conduct, his gesture, may represent deep feeling, heartfelt emotion. But love, beauty, desire, emotion do not exist for him, because he is not a self-conscious subject. You may endow the eidolon with any quality you like, you may even endow it with thought. But if it be not self-conscious, not even thought can be *its own*.

When, however, you consider the effect on yourself

<sup>33</sup> Even if these eidola were exact copies of men and women but without self-consciousness this would still be true.

of what you sense, you find that love, beauty, truth and justice can exist for you. The play you sense affects you as manifesting them. Why does this difference exist? Because love, beauty, truth and justice do not exist in or for the objective universe: they exist only for self-conscious subjects and, so, they exist for you.

Our universe, for example, is full of an infinite variety of manifestations of beauty. This fact in itself demands not only the existence of subjects or a Being for whom the Manifestations exist, but that beauty itself must be a "spiritual" ideal for the manifestations of which our objective universe is merely the "occasion." Self-conscious subjects desiring love, beauty, truth and justice as rightly *their own*, have not only struggled against environment resisting their possession but have used the objective universe to make manifest that which they desire.

Now the cinematograph play is part of the objective universe. And how has it come into being? Self-conscious subjects as subjects of the intelligible universe, moved by desire, have used thought, imagination and will to create it in the objective universe. Herein we find the genesis of the creation. And the play has been created by self-conscious subjects for their own purpose,—for their own pastime;<sup>34</sup> they have created something in the objective universe for their own purpose. Self-conscious beings have created in the objective universe material shadows of "something" which has no existence in the material: of "something" which has existence only in and for self-consciousness.

If we consider, practically, all cinematograph plays

<sup>34</sup> Pastime marks time which humanity uses when free from the labour necessary to support life. In such time it naturally seeks the highest personal satisfaction; under the influence of environment it may find this satisfaction in a travesty of normal labour. But, thought being divorced from labour for support of life, insight and imagination may in such time be free to attain satisfaction in witnessing what *ought to be*.

of human thought and conduct, we find an underlying appeal to love, beauty, truth and justice. The makers of the play thus appeal to the public because it *pays*, the appeal is to the strongest underlying desire of humanity. There are manifestations also in the play of hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice. But this resistance is used most generally to emphasize the ultimate victory of love, beauty, truth and justice.<sup>35</sup> And, indeed, as every spectator exists as a self-conscious subject in the accomplishing, that is, exists in struggle against the resistance of environment, the thought and conduct of man when made manifest in the objective universe must be faced by this resistance against the ideal of humanity. But there is no ideal, no victory of an ideal, in the play itself: it appeals only to an ideal and the desire for victory of the ideal which exists in and for self-conscious subjects. The objective universe has been used by self-conscious subjects merely to portray love, beauty, truth and justice in order to touch our already existing ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.<sup>36</sup>

It would appear, so far, that in human experience we have for the subject of insight and imagination an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, while we can find no ideal in contradiction, of hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice. If so,—bearing in mind that the subject existing in the accomplishing is a partial of the “I am” existing, relatively, in the accomplished,—we arrive at a remarkable conclusion:—

<sup>35</sup> Dion Boucicault and Kipling had to alter the ending of plays written by them in face of the public demand for a “happy ending.” We like plays showing men and the universe as they ought to be not as they are.

<sup>36</sup> Cinematographs sometimes appeal to “beastly” sensuality in man. This is an appeal to falsely centred desire. Sensual desire is natural and it is also moral when the conduct resulting from it is reasonable. The desire is necessary for the continued existence of the race of men. Men and women must eat to preserve their personal existence, they must have sexual intercourse to preserve their race.

There is, for the subject, the accomplishing towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, and so we are justified in assuming that, for the ultimate, when the self-conscious subject attains full expression of itself as the I am, the ideal exists in transcendence of love, beauty, truth and justice as opposed to their contradiction. The transcendental ideal may be said to be presented to or involved in the existence of the "I am," while to each of us, as a partial of the "I am," it appears through a glass dimly, broken up into anthropomorphic ideals of love, beauty, truth and justice.

And in considering this do not forget what human experience has taught us through the cinematograph. Love, beauty, truth and justice do not exist in the objective universe, do not exist in or for ourselves as objects<sup>37</sup> in the objective universe: they exist, in and for us, apart from the material. This human experience tells us. The cinematograph show merely manifests in the objective universe, expressions of love, beauty, truth and justice. The ideal, the standard for each and all, exists only in and for us as self-conscious subjects. The cinematograph is, as it were, but a mirror reflecting the outward and visible signs of the inward and spiritual grace of love, beauty, truth and justice. The objective universe is but the *occasion* for outward manifestation of that which does not exist in it. In no way can we make our ideal subject to its occasion.

If we consider the thought and conduct of humanity in general, we must bear in mind not only the enormous strength of the resistance of environment but the fact that, in his present stage, man uses but little his powers of insight and imagination. So if we seek, in human experience, for evidence of man's desire

<sup>37</sup> If the human eidola of the cinematograph existed in three, not only two, dimensions and had in themselves the resistance of matter, *still*, love, beauty, truth and justice would not exist for them.

for the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice we can hope to find only the vaguest and slightest traces of it. Indeed if we can merely find the *balance* of man's thought and conduct weighted towards the ideal we shall have all we can expect.<sup>38</sup>

The consideration already given to this question of balance, especially when we considered "Self Expression and the Categorical Imperative," justifies us in holding that human experience establishes a probability—which we may accept and use as proof—that the balance inclines towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.<sup>39</sup>

Herein is no denial that the social state of humanity is so evil that it would be unbearable but for its humorous inconsistencies, or that dogmatic forms of religion have been so used for evil purposes that many sincere and upright men have come to regard religion itself as a curse of humanity. The true wonder is that the thought and conduct of humanity should be as good as they are, when we consider the weight of resistance from environment and the fact that we use insight and imagination so little. The environment of rank, wealth and power and their contradiction, mindless and powerless destitution is so evilly resistant that, at first thought, it may appear almost ridiculous any man should dare to suggest that an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice can exist as the ultimate desire of humanity.

But the consideration we have given to the thought and conduct of man generally shows, I think, that we find always at their back this ideal, in spite of the fact that humanity has, apparently, so misused its power over the objective universe. And we may, further, rely on the fact that wit, humour, pathos, satire and irony have real existence for humanity.

<sup>38</sup> The fact that men live together in communities even as nations is strong evidence that this balance exists. Without it there would be anarchy.

<sup>39</sup> The noblest and best thoughts and acts of human beings pass in time unknown, unpublished.



What is their basis? The ideal of a universe of hatred, ugliness, injustice and falsehood? The ideal is the reverse; it is a universe of love, beauty, truth and justice.

What standard, what ideal, does Swift assume against which to measure the meanness of man? Love, beauty, truth and justice. Without such an ideal his satire and irony are meaningless. Thackeray was no cynic; it was against his own supreme ideal that he measured men and women and flagellated them (and himself!) for pretending to be what they are not; the wit, humour and pathos of Dickens live and delight us in appeal to our ideal of full brotherly love; Hugo's greatness exists in the fulness of his ideal background; the maze of Meredith holds at its centre its unapproachable Utopia, and Carlyle's "damned continued fraction" marked his *desire* for unattainable perfection. Even Shakespeare, though he confined himself to so cruelly true a mirror of human nature, reveals his belief that the mirror is held in the hands of God.<sup>40</sup>

Deny to humanity an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, no matter how besmirched by evil environment, then where are wit, humour, pathos, satire and irony?

The power of the ignoble to exploit their fellows is based not only on the average simplicity of mankind but on its inherent respect for and belief in truth and justice. And, perhaps, the most striking instances of this are to be found in the political and diplomatic history of Europe. Prussia offers a glaring instance,—exceptional, possibly, but not unique. Its aggrandisement has been founded on deceit, dishonour and the constant deliberate breach or falsifica-

<sup>40</sup> Great as George Eliot was, is it possible that we find a want in her writings? Our admiration is intellectual; the ideal of feeling, beyond this life, is not presented to us. Wherein lies the strength of the attack of such works as "The City of Dreadful Night," or "The Martyrdom of Man," unless against an ultimate ideal of good?

tion of international treaties.<sup>41</sup> Even Carlyle, who regarded Frederick the Great as a demigod, expressed an opinion in writing that the Prussians were the greatest liars in history.

But what, also, is true of Prussia and of Frederick the Great himself? In order that the people might put forward their greatest effort in support of undisclosed political designs, appeal was always made to their ideal of national right and justice; no autocrat ever asked his people to fight under the banner of the devil; even if commanded to burn, ravish and murder, the people are always asked to so act under the banner of a God of right and justice.<sup>42</sup> Has there ever been any war between any two nations, when both the peoples were not told that God was fighting on their side? The facts are so obvious that they need not be dilated on.

But, if it be a fact of history that rulers, politicians and diplomatists, however foul their objects, invariably whitewash these objects with truth and justice before appealing to their peoples for assistance in carrying them out, it follows directly that they do this because they know, *for the general consciousness of their peoples*, there is a deep-down respect, prejudice if you will, in favour of truth and justice, and they know that only by trading on this prejudice can they rely on the support and call forth the strongest efforts of their peoples. Machiavelli while instructing rulers that for the preservation of their power they should always be ready to *do* the most inhuman, uncharitable and irreligious things, tells them also that they must always *appear* to their

<sup>41</sup> Events after August, 1914, are not referred to; the personal equation might falsify argument.

<sup>42</sup> The past history of the Jews shows what horrors can be perpetrated under a *national* God. But, even so, there is an appeal to truth and justice as believed in and respected by the people. The error arises from confining the attention of the people to their sense of their *own* truth and justice; in the glare they cannot see truth and justice for others.

subjects all goodness, integrity, humanity and religion. A whole people may be inoculated for a time with a foul form of militarism; but, as they are inoculated, they are instructed that militarism is but an unpleasant method for attaining ultimate truth and justice.

If hatred, ugliness, falsehood and injustice were man's ideal, could what is written above be true? If, even, man had no ideal, could it be true?

Deny to humanity an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, no matter how besmirched by evil environment, then where is the power that rulers invariably exploit to make their peoples strive after objects hateful to them? Even Milton's Devil argues the justice and right of his own offence.

Again, consider human happiness. There is perhaps a scum of humanity marked in some, if few, of the idle rich and submerged ten thousand, capable only of happiness drawn from immediate environment. But, for humanity at large, happiness would appear to be little influenced by environment. The meanest home where, however vaguely, an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice holds sway, makes for greater human happiness than the great house where wealth, rank, power, social position or intellect is regarded as an end in itself. Let environment be what it may, he who most truly struggles towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is the man nearest to the "best" happiness.<sup>43</sup>

Even considering the intellectual, we find the best work done for humanity and the calmest form of happiness, for those men who have used their mental ability under governance of the ideal of love, beauty, truth or justice,—of truth especially.

If this ideal exist for humanity it exists in the accomplishing, and we are justified by reason in

<sup>43</sup> Greville marks the fact that the giants of human success in war and politics often crop Dead Sea fruit, while the man of science or humble parson may feed on content.

holding it is a partial of the ultimate which exists in the accomplished in the accomplishing. To this ultimate as a standard we may refer the struggle of the self-conscious subject towards expression of itself as the "I am."

Herein we find the conscience and the "moral good" for man.

The categorical imperative is found in the imperative desire, involving necessary struggle, of the subject for self-expression of itself as the "I am." The freedom of will of the subject is found in its form of freedom to struggle for self-expression. In Kant's words the freedom of will of the subject is found in its freedom to express its true self.<sup>44</sup>

If we think the above explanation we are faced, as Riehl shows, by a contradiction: we have determinism—in the categorical imperative; we have the contradiction of determinism—in free will. But never forget we can only think between limits of contradiction,—they mark the boundaries of thought. It is insight which makes us aware these limits have reality only for thought: they do not exist for insight.

To reconcile the contradictions of the categorical imperative and free will we can use only insight and imagination in transcendence of thought: no reconciliation of the contradictions is or can be offered for thought. For thought exists between limits of contradiction.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> I would suggest there is no freedom to express, but differing forms of freedom, in the accomplishing, towards expression. We thus get rid of the contradiction involved in Kant's dictum.

<sup>45</sup> This reconciliation is considered in the Chapter "The Accomplished in the Accomplishing."

## PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS

ALL now written about pleasure and happiness consists mainly of repetition of arguments already put forward and recorded by others. But the scheme of the argument demands consideration of the subject.

Any consideration of what is termed eudaemonism is neglected for the same reason that the term intuition is not considered: it would lead to interminable consideration of what the term means. Even when the common terms pleasure and happiness are used, some preliminary explanation of the meaning now given them is necessary.

Our sheet anchor for real reality we find in the self-consciousness of the subject. So I use "happiness" for what may be termed a state of the subject apart from all questions of presentation, as presentation is generally used. At the same time it must be borne in mind that self-consciousness is a thing-in-itself to each of us, and therefore cannot, in thought, be conditioned in any way.<sup>1</sup> So we can in reason only treat happiness—as now defined—as a possible atmosphere, as it were, for the self-conscious subject. One peculiarity of happiness, as now defined, is that, if sought for itself, it is never to be found: it is not momentary, it depends on the past, present and future of the subject. But, as manifest, it must be held to vary in degree. We cannot think any ultimate for it but—without opposing reason—we may

<sup>1</sup> This does not exclude conditions in the transcendental. But such conditions our reason cannot touch, we cannot hold that they do or do not exist.

imagine an ultimate of the peace that passeth understanding.

Pleasure, as now defined, marks feeling running collaterally with presentations. The purely sensual we may neglect so, for the subject, pleasure imports mentality and, as we make the brain but a machine for thought, it follows that pleasure imports presentation. Pleasure, if followed for itself, may be seized. But the possession is only lasting for passing time.

We may find the genesis of all forms of pleasure in transmitted experience or, indeed, in anything else that has had origin in time. But, even so, what have we effected? We have effected nothing towards discovery of why or in relation to what the subject, *ab initio*, has been so constituted that it can feel pleasure and happiness. Any such question is still in the air. For I reject any theory that the object for man's creation is that he should feel pleasure; pleasure is merely a relative term. Men, indeed, may seek that which they think will be pleasurable for themselves; but, if we then attempt to give definite meaning to the word pleasure or, herein, its equivalent happiness, we find ourselves in a bog of thought—as has already been shown. For the word "pleasure" has infinite variety of meaning, even contradictions in meaning. Its meaning depends on *what* the subject is assumed to be and so varies from the pleasure of the Cyrenaic to the pleasure or happiness of the Platonist, while the Christian may find peace transcending happiness in the negation of what we ordinarily term happiness."<sup>2</sup>

Now it has been shown that the moving force for man is to be found in his blind desire for full expression of himself as a self-conscious subject, that is, of himself as "I am." How, then, do pleasure and happiness come into the scheme?

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Accomplished in the Accomplishing* (p. 227).

The categorical imperative is found manifest in the subject's blind pursuit of the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. The state of the subject or we may say, perhaps more correctly, the feeling of the subject, varies almost infinitely between the limits of pure pleasure and pure pain. The word "pure" is here used merely to mark the limits of thought between pleasure and pain as necessary contradictions for thought. The subject's state cannot be one either of pure pleasure or pure pain; it exists only between these contradictory limits.

It will now be argued that the subject's state approaches the more nearly to the limit of pure pleasure, that is, to pure happiness, as the subject approaches, in thought and conduct, the more nearly to fulfilment of its ultimate desire for full expression of itself as the "I am."<sup>3</sup> Happiness, in manifestation, varies with the degree of fulfilment of the duty which the subject owes to the categorical imperative; it exists not in itself but results from strife towards fulfilment of duty.

The subject exists conditioned in the body, but it is in itself a subject of the intelligible universe and, in the ultimate, is found in the "I am." Transcendental Being exists in the accomplished in the accomplishing; the "I am" *in relation to* Transcendental Being, exists in the accomplishing only. Herein we find how the "I am" is a subject to Transcendental Being and yet savours of Transcendental Being. The "I am," though still a subject to Transcendental Being, exists *in relation to* the subject as the accomplished to the accomplishing.

The above statement is given because to establish the present argument we must be evolutionary in method; we must consider first the embodied subject, then the subject as one in the intelligible universe and then as "I am." We start with consideration

<sup>3</sup> This follows the argument that the subject's ultimate desire is manifest in pursuit of the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.

of the subject in its lowest state; that is, as conditioned in the body. We consider the bodily state alone. We then consider higher states.

#### THE BODY

In what state should the body be that the subject may be best conditioned to obey the categorical imperative? At first thought we should hold it must be in full agreement with its environment. But there are difficulties in considering what this agreement means.

We speak ordinarily of the one life of each bodily subject. But there is not one life for each such subject. For example, every one of the innumerable red corpuscles and phagocytes of each subject has life and the life of the subject is made up of these innumerable lives. Disease, even death, follows for the subject on the disease or death of the corpuscles. There is no unity of life for any mere bodily subject.<sup>4</sup> The form of life of the subject is a synthesis of innumerable other forms of life.

What we want then for the human body is a sound, healthy state not for a single life but for the congeries of lives which go to its constitution. And this body includes the brain.

The sounder and healthier the body the better adapted it is for reasonable thought and conduct. And the more reasonable thought and conduct, the better is the subject adapted to accomplish its desire for self-expression. Conduct depends in some measure on the *mens sana in corpore sano*.

<sup>4</sup> We have found any given so termed material body exists in etheric form and the motion, therein, of a comparative few corpuscles or entities of "something." We must have *form* for manifestation of life and form is etheric. For the bodily form of man there exist *lives*, not one life. Can unity of self-consciousness result from a synthesis of these lives, even if we accept Leibnitz's theory of monads?



Herein we find the relation between self-expression and pleasure. For the sounder and healthier the bodily subject, the more nearly does its state approach to that of pleasure.<sup>5</sup> Very little argument is necessary to prove what is above stated, for it is in full agreement with human experience. Good health spells soundness in body, including blood and brain, and the nearer the approach of the subject to good health, the nearer its bodily approach to full pleasure. But, other things being equal, the better the health of the subject, considered as a bodily thing, the better adapted it is to fulfil its duty to the categorical imperative. When we consider only the *machine* which the subject uses for conduct, we find the fitter the machine the more pleasurable the state of the subject.<sup>6</sup>

It is important to bear in mind also that the sounder the health of those we are surrounded by, the better placed we are to fulfil our duty to the categorical imperative, so far as the body is concerned.

#### CONDUCT

We consider, next, the conduct of man. And now we must admit the fact of self-consciousness. For conduct, as defined, is always the result of some purpose and must be related back ultimately to the blind desire of the subject for self-expression. But now we consider conduct alone.

Conduct, however, in practice, seldom or never fulfils the purpose which led to it; practice falls behind theory. The dream-creation of the architect, poet or writer, is seldom or never fulfilled when the

<sup>5</sup> Do not trouble now with the question of *what* it is that feels pleasure.

<sup>6</sup> In the present war the introduction of a vast number of men to physical training new to them, has opened to them pleasure in mere life before unknown.

dream becomes concrete in the objective universe; the mortar that the workman makes and the potatoes that the farmer produces generally fall behind purpose. This is why repetition of the same form of labour leads to better output,—by repetition environment can be better and more directly used for expression of dream-purpose.<sup>7</sup>

Man must labour, or get others to labour for him, in order to preserve his existence. It is an error to say men would not work unless obliged to; love of life is imperative. The categorical imperative uses life for labour. And when labour is free, that is when each man is engaged on that form of labour he is, physiologically, best adapted for, the labour is pleasant to him.<sup>8</sup>

The point above made is that while it is the duty of man to labour the better the work done by him, the greater the pleasure he feels; the nearer his conduct approaches to the purpose which induced it, the greater the pleasure he feels.

It is necessary here to consider the fact that the purpose leading to the conduct in question need not, necessarily, be good in itself, for the pleasure to follow: the meanest form of labour is better than no labour at all. It has already been shown that mean desires are ancillary to the ultimate desire for self-expression,—to fulfil his dream of a beautiful building manifest in the objective universe, the architect must have good mortar. The desire for wealth, power or rank is bad only when the subject concentrates his desire on the particular purpose to the neglect of other desires. For, from the subject's point of view, we may say that the ultimate desire for self-expression exists in a synthesis of mean

<sup>7</sup> In relation to conduct, thought in the intelligible universe is like to dreaming.

<sup>8</sup> Man varies from the laziest to the most energetic. But the lazy man will work rather than die,—just now he gets others to work for him. The average man enjoys free labour,—when he can get it. Labour is rightly a blessing, idleness a curse.

desires; evil results from men concentrating their desires on particulars of the synthesis. The millionaire may make good use of the money he has accumulated by foul means, just as the thief may keep his family in sound health and even morality on the proceeds of his irregular proceedings. But the millionaire has found pleasure in accumulating wealth by foul means, just as the thief has found pleasure in his own form of attack against society. The labour even of the millionaire or thief is better than the loafing of the idler.

We find that whatever a man's purpose may be, pleasure results for him so far as he can carry it out in conduct. The laws of Nature give pleasure in return for conduct so far as conduct fulfils purpose. For the categorical imperative demands conduct on man's part; he must not only dream, but do something in pursuance of his dreams. He is conditioned in the body that dreams may result in action. It is from the welter of men's conduct, good and bad, that the ultimate, transcending good and evil, is led up to.

But pleasure is a relative term and the question is: Does human experience show that the nearer conduct is to desire for self-expression, the greater the pleasure experienced? This I would answer in the affirmative. But proof is impossible, for the evidence is evidence from human experience and so we can only arrive at that high degree of probability which, in reason, we may accept and use as proof.

To determine the state of happiness of any subject, *quâ* conduct, we must consider the subject in time generally, that is, in the continuity of its life from the cradle to the grave; we must not consider merely isolated moments of pleasure.

The millionaire who by a "corner" has starved thousands of people and made his pile; the whore-monger who has raped a virgin; the woman of society who has injured her country by obtaining high command for an incapable son, all experience moments of extreme pleasure which the simple individual who

has led a moral life in that station God has fitted him for, never feels. But the pleasure of such creatures is but momentary, their average life marks but a low level of happiness, even if conscience never upbraid them. Man does not, as a thing of conduct, live in these moments of pleasure; he lives in a continuity of time from the cradle to the grave. The egoist's moments of pleasure stand, marked and high, against the average low level of his pleasure in life; his very moments of pleasure must, for existence as moments of pleasure, stand in relation to a general low level. For they are moments of personal pleasure.

Unless, with Gautama, we treat our human experience as embodied spirits as pure *maya*, that is, treat our subjection to environment as a blot on the scheme of Nature which the subject should strive to get rid of, we must hold that conduct, good and bad, is part of the scheme of Nature; as herein held the categorical imperative demands conduct on the part of the subject. And the differing conduct of each subject leads to differing forms of pleasure, even differing levels of happiness for each subject in passing time. All now alleged is that, on a general view of the earthly life of any subject, the level of happiness is higher the more nearly the subject's conduct is in agreement with the dictates of the categorical imperative.

Most of us accept Scott's allegation that one hour of glorious life is worth an age without a name; the allegation is true and is false.

World-conquerors have had their hours of glorious life when success has crowned their personal ambition. But these hours are not worth the conquerors' past ages of brutal conquest, if all have been passed in strife for personal success. Such men are not happy even in the moment of victory or, if sense of victory be read as happiness, the happiness is evanescent,—it begins and ends in personal achievement and its crowded hour of glory. The soldier

on the other hand who, unknown to fame, has fought for duty and returned home maimed perhaps for life, carries with him, for all his future on earth, a higher level of happiness from the undying feeling of duty fulfilled. Such instances are commonplace, but they are not, for that reason, the less true for human experience.

If we regard humanity at large we find that the vast majority of us pass through life as an age without name; it is but the few who experience what Scott has termed hours of glorious life. But this does not affect the question of the average level of happiness. Possibly the highest level is attained by those who have striven for these glorious hours and never attained them,—men who, nameless, have striven painfully through life towards some ideal for their fellow men and dropped unknown by the way-side. The man supremely victorious is he who has sacrificed himself in thought and conduct for an ideal,—an ideal never attained. Pleasure exists for itself, and exists but in momentary, passing time; real happiness is entered into under lasting feeling of constant strife towards the ideal; strife importing conduct.<sup>9</sup>

We are all influenced by personal ambition and, where personal possibilities justify desire for "getting on," the feeling is reasonable and constitutes a righteous spur to endeavour. But, if we want to find the genesis of pleasure or happiness, we must not depend on personal feeling; we must judge from some general point for humanity at large. So judging, I think we find for each subject that happiness, even pleasure, follows duty fulfilled,—duty high or low.

The question has nothing to do with the forms of conduct we choose for ourselves; as already pointed

<sup>9</sup> A Shelley, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Kant, Pasteur, or Darwin, who records for the benefit of mankind the product of his thought and imagination is a man of conduct.

out, we all fail in conduct, even in purpose for conduct. We may feel almost ecstasy when we contemplate the conduct of our Lord Jesus Christ; we may realise its glory and perfection. But, strive as we will, we stumble off the way when trying our hardest to follow in His footsteps. Still, down at the bottom of the heart of the overwhelming majority of mankind, we find desire that the world should be better than it is; the purpose of mankind is always ahead of its conduct. And though, for each of us, personal conduct is infirm, we all of us, *when we regard the lives of others*, can recognise the fact that the conduct of the simple man, who fulfils as nearly as he can his duty to the categorical imperative, attains for him a higher level of happiness than that of the man who centres desire on personal aggrandisement. We generally admit this as true in theory, though in practice we do not follow it.

The nearer the approach of the conduct of the subject to fulfilment of its duty to the categorical imperative, the higher its state of happiness.

It is important to bear in mind also that the more closely those surrounding us seek by conduct to fulfil their duty to the categorical imperative, that is, to struggle towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, the better not only can we ourselves so struggle but the greater our pleasure in life. The meanest man desires others to be noble, though possibly only that he may exploit their nobility.

#### THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE

We next consider the subject as a subject of the intelligible universe. Bear in mind that we have already established, under the laws of Nature, the command of the subject, as a subject of the intelligible universe, over the objective universe. The body of man and his conduct in relation to the objective

universe are subjective to man as a subject of or in the intelligible universe.

The conduct of the subject is in relation to the objective universe. So we must now consider the conduct of the subject as determined by the subject as one in the intelligible universe; we consider the purposes which have determined conduct.<sup>10</sup>

The general tenor of what has already been written under several heads points to the conclusion we must arrive at when we consider the subject as a subject of the intelligible universe. So only a summary is now necessary.

The purposes of men determining their conduct vary from those based on pure egotism to those based on pure altruism. The happy mean is that shown by Shaftesbury:<sup>11</sup> The man who recognises the fact that he does not exist alone, but as one of many; that as a self-conscious subject he exists not alone but as one of many self-conscious subjects, so that his object in life and his pleasure in life are, extricably, parts of the objects and pleasures in life of others will arrive, by reason, at the conclusion that pure egotism spells pure altruism.<sup>12</sup> His object in life should be like to that of others: his pleasure in life should be like to that of others.<sup>13</sup> He and all others are mere subjects, so that not only must there be some bond between himself and others, but,—as he and others exist as self-conscious subjects—there must be transcendent self-conscious Being. The bond between us, as subjects, we have found manifest in blind desire for the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. The pure purpose of man is best mani-

<sup>10</sup> We neglect, now, psychical conduct in, for example, full sleep, though it is possible in that it contains no internal contradiction.

<sup>11</sup> What I am about to state is but an extended paraphrase of Shaftesbury's theory. Perhaps I may be fairly accused of going beyond him.

<sup>12</sup> Reasonable conduct in the limit transcends egotism and altruism.

<sup>13</sup> This can be but an ideal to be striven towards,

fest in conduct following the command, "Do unto others as ye would others should do unto you." For any such man the physical distinctions between personalities fade away into nothingness. But there is a higher form of personality opened to him.

But where, now, is pleasure?

We have found that pure egotism spells pure altruism.<sup>14</sup> In the same way we have found, when considering man's life from the cradle to the grave, that the deprivation of exceptional pleasure leads to a higher general level of happiness for the subject than the pursuit of exceptionally high momentary pleasures. When egotism spells altruism, there is no destruction of either: there is transcendence of both. But the state of the subject is not then negative, for the subject is still a thing of conduct. So the man whose conduct is ruled by the purpose to do unto others as he would others should do unto him, has reached no negative stage; his state may still be one of positive pleasure.

But what do we mean by positive pleasure? The term is unsatisfactory. It has been used merely as a contradiction of the negative. It must be amended.

The man who regards the welfare of others as of equal importance with that of himself abandons a great part of earthly pleasures. If his conduct be free and, physiologically, he be built for conduct whether as a man of art, science or literature or as a hewer of wood or drawer of water, he will carry on that work he is best adapted for: he will act under the promptings of his nature. He will understand that happiness exists not in itself but as a measure of health and conduct expressing purpose.<sup>15</sup>

So such a man will pursue his labour for the sake of the labour itself, not for the happiness resulting,

<sup>14</sup> The word "pure" is here used, as before, merely to mark a limit of thought. There is transcendence of egotism and altruism for our ideal of human thought and conduct.

<sup>15</sup> As Emerson says, the reward of a thing well done is to have done it.



—by this means only can true happiness be attained. He may rise to high station in the world but not because he has sought it moved falsely by personal ambition: the attainment will be the direct result of natural causes.

But men do find pleasure in striving for personal aggrandisement over their fellows whether in wealth, rank or power: they do find pleasure in centring their endeavour on personal aggrandisement.<sup>16</sup> All such pleasures in life the man who regards the welfare of others as of equal importance with that of himself, abandons. But this loss is accompanied also by gain: he is free from moments, even long periods, of chagrin on failure in strife for personal aggrandisement.

To which men should we give the higher level of happiness or even pleasure throughout human life? To, on the one hand, a Darwin, Mendl, or General Booth, or on the other hand to the egotistic politician who, with the troublous existence of mixed success and failure involved in his form of life, attains supreme personal success?

In the limit, we may consider the man who has abandoned all earthly pleasures resulting from desire centred on personal success over his fellows and has confined himself to fulfilment of his duty, so far as possible, to the categorical imperative. That is, the man who, whatever his physiological constitution may be, uses it as best he may for purpose and conduct under the rule, "Do unto others as ye would others should do unto you."

Do not reply you are sick of the question just because it is so common-place and has been put to you before *ad nauseam*. Do not reply that such a man never has and never can exist. For that, if true, does not mark the whole truth. If in the limit

<sup>16</sup> It is more than doubtful if lasting pleasure in the form of happiness results from success in such endeavours, as already shown.

such men do not exist, thousands on thousands in all ranks of life make such a life their ideal and strive to attain it. There are thousands on thousands who deliberately refuse rank, wealth and power, refuse the pleasures of competition for such prizes and accept quiet lives of duty in those stations they feel, under God, they can lead the best lives. And the lives of such men are strenuous in labour. It were scarcely exaggeration to term them the salt of the earth in that they keep humanity sound and pure.

Now such men may be said to have abandoned all so-called earthly pleasures: their desire is confined to the fulfilment of duty. But happiness is not a thing-in-itself. It results, in the first place, in some measure from bodily health as already shown. Bodily health, however, is largely under the control of the subject as a subject in the intelligible universe. Happiness results also as already shown from purpose and conduct. And purpose and conduct are also under the control of man as a subject of the intelligible universe.

When purpose and conduct are centred on personal aggrandisement, they are centred on the pursuit of personal pleasure. The result is moments of exceptional pleasure on a dull background of a low level of pleasure; in any series, moments of pleasure can only exist when the other moments are relatively pleasureless: they can exist only in contrast.

When purpose and conduct are centred on fulfilment of duty then, in relation to the physiological constitution of the subject, the *moments* of exceptional pleasure (and exceptional pain) are lost. But there is a far higher level for happiness throughout life. This level we can regard as a high level but, when it is *our own* level, it appears to us as mere contentment with lot.<sup>17</sup>

If it be objected that competition for rank, wealth

<sup>17</sup> This explains the envy the simple man often feels for his fellows of rank, wealth or power.

and power makes the world go round, the objection is false. For this competition is confined to very, very few and those few not the picked few, morally, physically or intellectually.<sup>18</sup> The competition really prevents scientific competition for the overwhelming majority. And, further, the best work of the world, that is, the work which has best tended to advance the progress of humanity morally, intellectually and physically, has been carried out by men desiring the fulfilment of duty rather than personal aggrandisement.<sup>19</sup>

Happiness refuses to be caught. When pursued it cries, "I am not to be caught, I am a servant of duty, I follow duty. You catch duty, then I will serve you."

We, as self-conscious subjects, are servants of the categorical imperative and, in reason, we must refer this imperative to Transcendental Being of transcendent self-consciousness. No bribe of pleasure or happiness is offered. It is by reason and human experience only that we can find out,—hardly, laboriously and stumbling painfully by the way—that happiness is an appanage or the atmosphere of duty.<sup>20</sup>

We are, now, not in the region of thought, imagination or insight, we are in the transcendental: but the subject is related to the transcendental. For Transcendental Being exists in the accomplished in the accomplishing, while the subject exists in the accomplishing.<sup>21</sup> If we are all moved, blindly, to

<sup>18</sup> The philosophy of Max Stirner and Neitzsche is *best* only for the very few, it is *evil* for the overwhelming many.

<sup>19</sup> Almost without exception leaders in thought have been rejected of men. But the practical men, to whom we give credit for human advance, base their conduct on the still living dreams of past leaders in thought.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle said happiness comes from energy of the soul on the lines of perfect virtue and in a perfect life.

<sup>21</sup> This is why reason entertains the possibility of ultimate absorption of self-conscious subjects in self-conscious Beings. Herein lies the importance, for us, of evidence that we exist after dissolution of the form of the Body. Revelation, too, is possible.

attain the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, we find manifestation, for us, of the categorical imperative. We are involutions of the transcendental.

We cannot attain happiness directly: if we catch at it we find it in itself a mere shadow, evasive and formless: we can catch but momentary forms of pleasure. But we can learn that happiness is the atmosphere of duty, so that companioned by duty we have it with us, always. We exist in the accomplishing, but we are, thereby, part of the accomplished in the accomplishing: we are, in human parlance, parts or involutions of the transcendental.

Reason justifies us in holding that the nearer we approach, in thought and conduct, to fulfilment of our duty to the categorical imperative the nearer we approach to happiness.

Happiness thus appears in the scheme of life as the atmosphere of duty: it has no existence in itself.

#### MEMORY

The human experience, including thought and conduct, of each one of us is stored up in each one of us, timeless and spaceless. This is memory. We *use* memory in time and, possibly, in relation to space.<sup>22</sup>

How does this use of memory in time and this storage of memory affect our pleasure or happiness?

The man, rich or poor, clever or stupid, finds the greater pleasure in his state, at any time, the more pleasurable the use of his storage of memory. Which storage is the more pleasurable when used,—the memory of duty honestly fulfilled throughout a lifetime or that of effort concentrated on personal egotistic success?

There is no question here of personal choice. Any

<sup>22</sup> The details of this theory are given in *Personality and Telepathy*.

entity of poor humanity, if given choice at any moment of life, would probably choose to be a millionaire, a prime minister or successful general,—if not a beautiful and attractive woman. The question is: when we regard others, not ourselves and our personal choice, to whom should we give the palm for nearest approach to pure pleasure when using memory?

There would appear to be no doubt as to the reply. Do *not* consider yourself, consider all the people you know; when you consider yourself the personal equation dominates you to the exclusion of sound, general reasoning. You will then find that those who have the healthiest and soundest bodies have, quâ body, the highest level of pleasure in life: those who have most nearly been simply and honestly doing their duty in life, no matter what their station, have the highest level of happiness in life from the cradle to the grave. Wealth, rank and power do not in themselves necessarily give pleasure in life. They may and do exist as environment *for* pleasure, but it is the form of use of wealth, rank and power on which depends nearness of approach to pure pleasure.

Whatever degree, then, a man may have had of wealth, rank or power, the pleasure he feels from using his storage of memory depends on how far he has used his opportunities for fulfilment of duty to the categorical imperative. Memory used is the happier the more it marks past fulfilment of duty.<sup>23</sup>

Memory in itself, if never used in the present, would appear also to affect the state of happiness of the subject,—in some possibly transcendent way,—during the subject's passing existence in bodily form. It is true Beattie held that the memory of past good or evil gives neither present happiness nor pain. But I doubt this. I think human experience shows that

<sup>23</sup> We exist in the accomplishing, we look down on our past as, relatively, the accomplished.

the state of the subject at any given time is the happier as its storage of memory even if unused in the present, marks the closer approximation to past fulfilment of duty. What now follows may explain how our storage of memory, though unused in the present, may affect the degree of happiness (as what may be termed the state) of the subject. I give but a digest of that which is argued out at length in *Personality and Telepathy*.

Human experience gives us awareness that we can dream a lifetime in a moment, as it were, of time: that even an external event may give rise to a dream, apparently long in time, *preceding* the event which gave rise to the dream. Human experience, again, gives us awareness that, at a crisis of life<sup>24</sup> we can be conscious, in an instant of time as it were, of *all* our past experience, that is, of all our storage of memory.

Now we must hold that dreams cannot originate any power or faculty in the subject and that any crisis in life is equally futile to such an end. It follows that the dreams referred to merely give manifestation for some power already existing in the subject not ordinarily exercised in his active life and that the crisis in life referred to shows merely an exceptional manifestation of this power inherent in the subject.

In normal life we possess each our own storage of memory, stored up *in time*, but *when* stored up not conditioned in time. In normal life we use this storage piecemeal in time; but the storage being unconditioned in time we can use it arbitrarily in time, —I can think *now* what happened ten minutes ago or ten years ago just as I choose and in any succession I please.

But human experience makes us aware that we can also, at a crisis, think all our past, that is, all our storage of memory, in "a lump" in the present

<sup>24</sup> For instance, at the time of experience of near death from drowning.

*now*. How is this to be explained when we know such a crisis cannot originate any new power in the subject?

The reply is that the subject is *always* being affected by its storage of memory in a lump, but that in normal life self-consciousness of this is confined to what we may here term the subliminal consciousness: the crisis in life is necessary for it to be made manifest to the supraliminal consciousness.

But dreams? How, for instance, can the pole of a bed falling on a man's head, give rise to a long connected dream of trial before Robespierre, condemnation to death and death itself by the guillotine, —the long dream, precedent in time, being set up by the after event?

In dreams imagination is free, unconditioned by time.<sup>25</sup> It is only when we awake and regard our dreams as, necessarily, conditioned in time that we drag out the "lump" of our dreams into the successive chain of events in time. It is when the chain is "reeled out" that for the first time the blow takes its place as last. How the blow sets up the particular stream of free imagination we need not now consider.<sup>26</sup> But we can know that it relates the stream of free imagination to an event in the objective universe.

The point now made is that the subject is always being affected by his storage of memory even though he does not use it in the present, passing *now*.<sup>27</sup> The probability follows that memory, though unused, affects the degree of happiness of the subject. This probability, I think, is so great that we may treat it as proof.

Now until old age shadows life with its inherent

<sup>25</sup> Some dreams are in time.

<sup>26</sup> Free imagination exists, transcending time, for the "I am." So, in itself, it includes all possible details: the fall of the pole is already *in* free imagination.

<sup>27</sup> The supraliminal self is a conditioned form of the subliminal self.

inactivity in the objective universe, the subject is so absorbed in the activity of the passing *now* that the question of degree of happiness from storage of memory seldom arises. It is when, in natural course, bodily activity begins to fail that the subject is thrown back on to the importance of his psychic existence. The question of happiness from storage of memory grows in importance with the growth in bodily age of the subject.

A great deal that is erroneous has been written about old age,—possibly because most of that recorded has come from the brains of those who have had no human experience of old age.

For every subject death is a certainty. For every subject evolution towards age and old age is a certainty. Age and old age themselves are certainties unless death itself step in untimely. We should, therefore, not only in reason but common sense, accept age, old age and death with sheer indifference: they are all parts of determinism, though lying in the future. How pathetically foolish then it is of youth to talk of crabbed age, of its sorrows, its uselessness, of its inactivity in the objective universe, when it is a determined part of youth itself? It is far more pathetically foolish than for the child to cry because it must wash its face and teeth every morning,—for such actions are not determined. Would it not be more reasonable for youth to say: "Youth is mine now, age and old age will be mine in the future; therefore, bowing to the inevitable, I will use my passing time of youth so that my future certainty of age may be the *best for myself*"? Alice's Duchess displayed profound philosophy.

By crying before she cut her finger she took the pain out of the sting before it had come. Youth should follow her example; youth knows the sting of age will come. Then, by a reasonable life, let youth take out the pain of age before its sting has come. For old age, to the man with a storage of memory made up of earnest thought and action in



youth towards the performance of duty, has had the pain of its sting withdrawn before coming, so that even senility may thus mark a stage approaching as nearly as possible to that of pure pleasure.

We are all so sick of the innumerable platitudes that have been written about old age that it may seem unwise *renovare dolorem*. But, still, let us venture.

Put yourself out of the question and consider all your fellows that you know from duke to guttersnipe. Some, in age, are happy, some unhappy. Which do you find the happier, those with a storage of memory of long endeavour to fulfil duty or those with a storage of memory of long endeavour towards personal egotistic success? The question we deal with is not one of rank, intellect or power but simply of happiness.

The old agricultural labourer, sleeping, inactive before his fire, empty of thought, is happy from his storage of memory of past simple duty well performed. The old leader amongst men successful in past higher form of labour for self aggrandisement, sleeping, inactive, before his fire but still full of thought of past personal achievement, is unhappy, raging against his enforced inactivity: still self-centred on the past, which exists for him *only as his own*, he feels his personality passing away.<sup>28</sup> For to him personality spells his own personality in activity in the objective universe and that is passing from him. His storage of memory is meaningless to him without himself there as an active subject in the objective universe. It is where storage of memory marks past endeavour to fulfil the duty of the subject to God and His creatures that it brings the atmosphere of happiness. Where it marks but past endeavour to perform only the duty due to oneself, the atmosphere of happiness is wanting.

We have already marked the fact that there is one

<sup>28</sup> Max Stirner and Neitzsche ignore happiness for bare power.

and one only objective universe, while each one of us has a different regard for this one universe. So this difference in regard must be based on differences between subjects *in themselves*, in what we term personality. But these differences cannot be found in subjects as bodily subjects fully dependent on environment. And on this has been based the argument that the differences must be found in the subject's personality as "I am": the really real subject is a transcendental subject, therein is really real personality found.

But, from the materialist's point of view, each self-conscious subject can only differ from his fellows in *content* of self-consciousness, the materialist finds his subject in the psychological I, not in the metaphysical I. So, as to the influence of storage of memory when unused, on the happiness of the subject, we may, even from the materialist's point of view, use the following argument.

Let us term the self-consciousness of each subject a box and assume that the differences of personality are found in the differences between the contents of the boxes, and not in any difference in the boxes themselves.

Some boxes hold a content of past self-achievement for personal ends, some hold a content of past self-achievement for the benefit of humanity at large under a sense of duty directed from God. The time of activity for the box-holders is, we assume, waning or past. Which contents as personal possessions are the more valuable?

The possessions of past personal achievement for personal ends are no longer of any use: they are past, determined. And the interest of the possessor in them is past not future; though he can use them in the present, they have no relation for him to the future. Old age spells for him the waning of his personality: for his personality is centred in himself as an active subject of the past in the objective universe. Such storage of memory, if of any effect,

cannot give the effect of happiness; it is too deeply coloured with regret for present inactivity, and it is of the past.

The possessor of past personal achievement not for self but for duty, is faced by no regret for present inactivity. For his past activity has been for duty, not for self. And, though in natural course, his activity in the objective universe is waning, duty for humanity at large still lives on. His storage of memory is one *not for self but humanity at large* under the categorical imperative: his storage of memory is inextricably part of the storage of memory of all subjects who have been active in fulfilment of duty.<sup>29</sup> This storage can never die and the possessor, finding his own personality in that of others, has a direct interest in the future. The storage is *his*.

Such storage of memory must involve the atmosphere of happiness. The inactivity of old age is accepted with courage and without fear or hope: it is part of the inevitable. But there is also an ever present consciousness of obedience to duty during the past of activity and this must make for happiness. Spinoza's philosophy is very beautiful<sup>30</sup> and I think its pursuit must make for happiness, even though he be held to deny survival of personality after death.

But the appeal now made is personal, it is an appeal to the personal experience of each reader. Regarding not yourself but others, which class of men do you find the happier in their remembrance? Those with a storage of memory of duty performed honestly to God and their fellows, or those with a storage of memory of a life passed in the selfish pursuit of selfish aims?

Happiness has no existence in itself, it is the atmosphere of duty.

<sup>29</sup> The God of H. G. Wells is an anthropomorphic God. But even H. G. Wells relies on the transcendentalism of this argument.

<sup>30</sup> Though I have herein before tried to reduce it to support of my argument.

## THE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE ACCOMPLISHING

ON October 22, 1904, Professor Barrett took me to see Mr. C. C. Massey. A long correspondence followed thereon and on the 20th January, 1905, C. C. Massey wrote to me:—

“I am so glad we are in agreement as to the ‘Accomplishing given in Accomplishment.’ We have here the absolute and the finite in one, and the dynamical in the statical and the necessity of the incomplete as a form of reality, and time in (or under) eternity. But much more elucidation is wanted.”<sup>1</sup>

It was C. C. Massey himself who first suggested to me the term “accomplishing given in accomplishment” and pointed out how useful it was as an expression for the ultimate. I thought over it long. It *had* meaning for me and yet it was meaningless in thought. It was not till many years after, when I arrived at the conclusion that as a subject I must have some power transcending thought, that I understood how what was to me meaningless in thought *had* some meaning for me. I then termed this transcendent power, insight, and the information which it gave, awareness, as distinct from knowledge. The term absolute knowledge I rejected as contradictory in itself.

With this term as an ultimate, many difficulties in the way of philosophy seemed swept away and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Thoughts of a Modern Mystic*, p. 109. Kegan, Paul & Co.

I began to write the present book. I lay no claim to originality, I rely almost fully on Emanuel Kant and doubtless my line of thought owes much to the long correspondence I had with C. C. Massey.<sup>2</sup>

Kant says: "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, not as I am in myself, but only that *I am*."

Now my self-consciousness as *I am* is mine and your self-consciousness as *I am* is yours: The assumption we proceed on throughout is that this self-consciousness is the self-consciousness of each one of us as a transcendental subject; it exists for us transcendently quite apart from any question of content. It is in self-consciousness as a thing-in-itself for each of us that, as subjects, we reach out to our ultimate personality as transcendental subjects; therein we are aware of the soul in man.

The psychological "I" does not transcend the facts of presentation. But for the transcendental subject the question of presentation does not arise. We do not hold it either has or has not content; all we hold is that it transcends presentation in relation to the objective universe. At the same time it must not be forgotten that my human experience is mine and yours is yours. We are all faced by the same one objective universe, and so this difference between your human experience and mine must be found in difference between ourselves. The difference between one "I am" and another is transcendental, the difference between the human experience of one subject and another is not transcendental. But the subject, through its power of insight, is linked to the transcendental. The transcendental does not destroy: it subsumes or reconciles.

<sup>2</sup> I saw him but once. A great and humble man of thought, but thought too advanced for him to leave a name on earth. I wish he were here to help me to put my meaning into better words. He died in March, 1905.

The subject is more than a thinking subject; it is a subject of insight which transcends thought and its ideas. It is this power of insight which makes the subject aware that its thought is merely relative and exists only between limits of contradiction. It is this power also which makes the subject aware that contradictions cannot exist in real reality. As Kant says: "Contradiction is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure *a priori* conceptions." For "pure *a priori* conceptions" I use the term insight. The limitations of thought are marked by the fact that it exists in an intelligible universe of contradictions; insight, transcending thought, makes us aware of this limited nature of the intelligible universe of thought.

We must, then, for our ultimate of real reality throw aside all ultimates of thought, for any ultimate of thought contains in itself its own contradiction: in thought, good, for instance, is meaningless unless its contradiction is also in the mind. So we must throw aside absolute good as a limit. And the same is true for all ultimates of thought,—faced only by insight can they be reconciled, subsumed or otherwise transcended. But they do not disappear, they still remain as partials, as it were, of real reality. In thought we "see" dimly; in insight we "see" more clearly. The nearest approach we can make to any ultimate of real reality must be by exercise of our power of insight: we must transcend ideas.

Already this ultimate of insight has been defined as "the accomplished in the accomplishing." The definition necessarily uses words expressing ideas; the accomplished and the accomplishing both express ideas. But the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" is used in a transcendental sense; it has no meaning in idea, only a transcendental meaning in insight: neither the accomplished nor the accomplishing disappears. Both are subsumed or reconciled transcendently.

A consideration of existing theories shows, I think,

that all are based on some limit of thought for their ultimate and thus involve contradiction.

Consider for example the theories of monism and dualism, always remembering that we cannot really consider monism and dualism themselves but only the way in which the mind of the subject considers them: the question is what we think about them or are aware as to them. It will be found that when they are considered thought only is used—not insight. Monism cannot be considered without dualism as its contradiction also in the mind. For monism is an ultimate limit of thought and so meaningless without its contradiction also in the mind. The same is true for dualism. Only insight can transcend these contradictions: only in insight can ultimate truth (which exists free from or in transcendence of contradictions) be considered.<sup>3</sup>

As to monism, Sir W. Hamilton says: “If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the object be evolved from it as its product, the theory of idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object be assumed as the original and genetic, and the subject be evolved from it as its product, the theory of materialism is established.”

The above might be taken as sound reasoning for thought if we could examine it from some external standpoint. But this we cannot do. For, whichever conclusion is arrived at, it is arrived at by a subject; in either case the pre-existence of the subject is demanded. The hypothesis that the object is original and genetic is made by a subject which existed before the assumption was made. The subject by exercise of the power of thought, which power does not exist in or for the object, arrives at a conclusion that it (the subject) has been evolved from the object. The thoughtless object has evolved power of thought and so power over itself in the subject: the

<sup>3</sup> For thought, subject and object have necessary contradictory existence.

intelligible universe is made subjective to the objective universe. On the contrary hypothesis the subject dogmatically assumes that what is external to itself was originated by or from itself. Herein we find the necessary contradictions which face thought when it invades the realms of insight.

Dualism may be said to put the objective universe in a compartment water-tight from the intelligible universe. But here, again, we cannot consider dualism as a thing-in-itself which can be or do anything of itself. When we say "dualism may be said" we predicate someone speaking: we *assume* a pre-existing subject.

Now for the objective universe it is true, as Kant alleged, that "the phaenomena of the past determine all phaenomena in the succeeding time." But how far is this true? It is true only so far as the laws of Nature have full sway. Even at this point we see that the process of Nature is not that of a machine which works itself, but one which is worked by the laws of Nature, external to Nature. And the laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe. But when the self-conscious subject appears it *uses* the laws of Nature for its own purposes. Cause and effect still hold sway and, so far, the phaenomena of the past determine the phaenomena of the future in time, but the subject *uses* cause and effect for its own purposes: by obedience it commands. The mechanical water-tight compartment leaks: for the self-conscious subject must come first.

Herein is no attack on monism or dualism as theories well based on thought; the fact that they conflict is implicit for thought.<sup>4</sup> The charge is that they attempt by the use of thought and its ideas to solve a problem which transcends ideas and so is soluble,—so far as it is soluble,—only in insight.

<sup>4</sup> Both take a *limit of thought* as their ultimate. These limits are limits of contradiction, so the theories stand in contradiction one to the other.



Perhaps in solipsism we see most clearly the stone wall of contradiction against which thought bruises its head when trying to solve problems of insight.

For assume we grant with the solipsists that "I cannot transcend experience." This involves the additional assumption that "experience is *my* experience." But the idea of experience being *my* experience is meaningless unless I have in mind also the idea that *your* experience is yours: for the idea of anything being mine is relative and so has no meaning unless there is relation for it in the mind. And, in solipsism, this relation can only be found by opposing my experience to your experience. F. H. Bradley might affirm that, for himself, only he himself existed. But he could not stop there. For the theory is put forward as of general truth and so as true for each one of us: the solipsist, while alleging the truth for himself, implicitly alleges it as true for others. He has in mind other personalities external to himself. The statement that experience is my experience is meaningless unless meaning is given to the word *my*, and this cannot be unless *your* is also in the mind. If the solipsist be admitted to prove the unreality of the objective, he still admits the existence of something external to himself.

Monism, dualism and solipsism, each, contains in itself its own contradiction, and this is explicable: for our reason informs us that all such theories use mere thought and that thought exists only between limits of contradiction. What is attempted to be solved is insoluble in thought: reason using only thought operates but within the impregnable walls of contradiction.

In the present argument no weight is attached to the contradictions of the material and immaterial, of substance and spirit.<sup>5</sup> The attempts made to formulate an idea of ultimate substance savouring of the

<sup>5</sup> Science itself tends to reduce matter to some form of manifestation of energy.

spiritual as distinct from sublunary matter, have arisen from an assumption, possibly at the background of consciousness, that personality cannot exist without *some* form of embodiment,—excursions into insight have been hampered by a clothing of thought.

It is of interest, here, to contrast the philosophy of Kant with that of Berkeley. They both *use* limits of thought for their ultimate.

Even for thought, apart from insight, we must have the self-conscious subject. But the subject is faced by the objective universe and, confining ourselves to thought, we must do one of two things: treat the external as illusory or give to it some substratum of changelessness,—permanence of substance (or matter). These are limits of thought and so necessarily in contradiction the one to the other. It is apparent that these contradictory hypotheses are open to the same disproof, as with Kant's antinomies.

Now Berkeley treated the external as illusory,<sup>6</sup> and we can understand Kant when he says:

“We cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances.” (Meiklejohn's ‘Kant,’ p. 42).

But what did Kant himself do? He held that

“In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased.” (Meiklejohn's ‘Kant,’ p. 136).

So far, Kant took the *opposite* limit of thought to Berkeley for his ultimate and, so far, his statement is open to the same disproof as Berkeley's. But Kant was fully aware of this. For he qualifies his statement: he says that in making it he is considering phenomena *not* any substantia noumenon and that:

<sup>6</sup> This is how Berkeley's philosophy is generally interpreted: the interpretation may possibly be incorrect.

“ This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.”

Berkeley's and Kant's statements are sound for thought,<sup>7</sup> though contradictory: awareness of the contradiction arises for us because we have the power of insight which opens to us the fact that the contradictions which necessarily exist for thought can and must be reconciled or subsumed in the transcendental. Kant, I think, is clear as to this and, though I have not studied Berkeley's Philosophy and so must write under correction, I think his philosophy was transcendental in that he did not make the object vanish for God but made God transcend subject and object. Both, I think, merely *used* limits of thought for argument.

When we rely, as we now rely, on insight we do not cast overboard all theories like monism, dualism or solipsism: each and all may contain germs of truth. Thought is not false, it is an inhibited form of imagination. All we do is,—having by insight become aware of the contradictions implicit for all such theories because they are based on thought and its ideas,—to attempt to deal with the contradictions.

We cannot touch the transcendental subject: that simply is: it is in Coleridge's words “groundless because it is the ground of all other certainty.” Nor can we touch Transcendental Being for that is arrived at by direct and necessary implication from the existence of transcendental subjects.<sup>8</sup>

But we are all faced by a universe in flux, all faced by the fact that we exist in the passing *now*, moving in time between the past of the accomplished and the future of the accomplishing. We must now start with the self-conscious subject as existing and

<sup>7</sup> They both reason soundly from contradictory hypotheses.

<sup>8</sup> Spinoza's theory of ultimate absorption is, I think, met by human experience of our survival after death.

with Transcendental Being as existing: we must start with them as facts though transcending thought. It is the flux in the objective universe, the flux in our thought and feeling as embodied subjects that lie open for our consideration<sup>9</sup> All this flux is a function of time and it is for time that we find the accomplished in the past and the accomplishing in the march of the *now* and in the future. If, as the argument holds, time is not blotted out in infinity, but that, in the ultimate, there is transcendence of time, then we have for our ultimate the accomplished in the accomplishing.

We cannot condition the power of Transcendental Being in the accomplished or its contradiction the accomplishing: it is manifest to us in both. All limits of thought, for example good and evil, both relative terms, point, for us, to an ultimate, though they exist—in manifestation—both in the accomplished and in the accomplishing. We want some term transcending the contradictory limits of thought, transcending beginning and ending,<sup>10</sup> the permanent and the changing, *not* a term in opposition to and destructive of either the one or the other: beginning and ending, permanence and change, good and evil, must all still exist for thought: for insight transcends thought, does not destroy it. Insight simply makes us aware that the contradictions which have real existence for thought owe their reality to the fact that thought is an inhibited form of imagination. In real reality contradictions are not blotted out: they are transcended.<sup>11</sup>

If it be objected that the present argument involves mysticism, in that it is an attempt to transcend the

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Montaigne.

<sup>10</sup> Kant in interpreting his antinomies marks this want and, I think, supplies it. We must remember that he said Maimon was the only man who had understood his philosophy.

<sup>11</sup> Romance writers and poets of genius play largely with the occult relation between love and hatred, while Shakespeare said, "There's nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so."

ordinary powers of the understanding, the objection is not well based. For, though the argument is based on the limited power of thought, this limitation is accepted by all in the accepted fact that knowledge is relative. The argument really expands rather than contracts the purview of the understanding. For, while rejecting the term "absolute knowledge" as meaningless on account of its internal contradiction, it adds to the understanding the power of insight. The power of insight cures the infirmity of thought. For thought is infirm in that it lies between limits of contradiction, and it is insight which makes us aware,—as we are aware,—that these limits of contradiction exist for thought and yet in real reality are transcended.

Perhaps the term now used, "the accomplished in the accomplishing," is the best we can find for what we want. It has been used already in the argument preceding, but is of such importance that it requires separate treatment.

When taken as a definition for our ultimate, it throws further light on the contradiction between free-will and the categorical imperative.

The argument as to free-will and the Categorical Imperative, may have been, so far, partially successful: for we have perhaps thrown a dim light on the contradiction between the two. But there has been no direct attack on the antinomy between free-will and determinism: the categorical imperative spells determinism. If the argument has been correct in finding manifestation of the categorical imperative in the constant struggle of the subject towards the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice, for expression of itself as "I am," still this struggle marks determinism at its back and exists in contradiction to free-will.

Riehl holds that responsibility, an unquestionable fact of consciousness, is not possible on the supposi-

tion that the will is free or not free. This responsibility spells a categorical imperative. And Riehl does not get rid of its contradiction to free-will.<sup>12</sup>

Kant holds that the freedom of will of the subject is found in its freedom to express its true self. This statement without further explanation must be treated as merely dogmatic or it must mean that the freedom of the subject to express itself involves its non-freedom not to express itself.<sup>13</sup> In each case it amounts to no more than a statement that the subject has free-will because it does what it is obliged to do. The contradiction between determinism and free-will is left standing.<sup>14</sup>

But, during our consideration of this question, what have we been doing the whole time?

We have been treating the subject as a mere subject of thought: with the use of ideas we have been trying to solve a problem which is beyond the purview of thought. Thought we have found exists in a universe of contradictions. We are aware of the contradictions of infinity and nothing, unity and diversity, good and evil, determinism and free-will, etc. We have assumed, quite wrongly, that by the use of thought we can deal with these contradictions of thought: we have, quite wrongly, assumed thought can transcend thought.

Hence the existing confusion for human thought.<sup>15</sup> The subject feels there is, for him, subsumption, reconciliation or an explanation of some kind for these antinomies. Treating himself as a mere thinking subject he assumes he has power, by thought, to explain the antinomies and so offers to himself,

<sup>12</sup> He says the difficulty of solving this antimony is the sole reason why the question of freedom has not been settled.

<sup>13</sup> If not, there can be no categorical imperative.

<sup>14</sup> There are passages in Kant which show that he had the explanation in his mind though perhaps he does not make it clear in words.

<sup>15</sup> The transcendentalism of the Devanta is excepted from what is here alleged.

innumerable impossible explanations which he involves in a maze of words and then rests—discontented.

These antinomies exist in and for thought. They are therefore insoluble by thought.

But the subject has a power transcending thought. It is a subject of insight. It is only as a subject of insight that it can be aware of the infirmity of its thought—that its ideas are relative and exist only up to and between limits of contradiction. As a subject of insight the subject transcends itself as a subject of thought; it denies contradiction in the ultimate.

It is as subjects of insight we are aware that these contradictions exist for us as subjects of thought. As subjects of insight they do not exist for us: they would not exist for us consciously as subjects of thought unless we were subjects of insight transcending thought. How then can we get rid of the antinomies? Thought fails us: ideas fail us.

We must use insight, which gives us transcendence for the contradictions of the categorical imperative and free-will. Insight makes us aware that we *must* have this transcendence—transcendence of thought and its ideas. This transcendence is ours as subjects of insight. Determinism is a limit of thought, free-will is its contradictory limit of thought. We cannot think these limits; we can only think up to and between them. It is insight which makes us aware of these limits of thought and which also makes us aware that they cannot really really exist. We want something which, in transcendence, subsumes or reconciles them or which offers some explanation for them, by showing they are merely phenomenal aspects of the same "thing" or partials, as it were, of the same "thing." To attain what we want we must use our power of insight.

The struggle of the subject towards the ideal which manifests its desire for self expression of itself as "I

am" is its own struggle: we may give the subject free-will in the form of its own struggle.<sup>16</sup> And this struggle is always in the accomplishing. For, the ideal attained, there is no longer the accomplishing towards the ideal, there is no longer exercise of free-will in the accomplishing. The ideal attained, free-will in activity comes to an end. The ideal itself no longer exists. If the subject be once in agreement with its ideal there is accomplishment and, so, determinism: for any struggle on the part of the subject no longer exists, its state is determined.

For thought, then, the relation of free-will to determinism is the relation of the accomplishing to the accomplished.<sup>17</sup> For thought we find a contradiction: the accomplished is not the accomplishing, the accomplishing is not the accomplished: the accomplished in the accomplishing exists only in and for insight.

But, for thought, the free-will of the subject exists in relation to future accomplishing: it does not exist in relation to past accomplishing, for all past accomplishing has taken on, for the subject, the aspect of the accomplished, the determined. And the determined is not a subject of free-will. So, even for thought, we find that change of time in regard of the accomplishing and accomplished, may make the one take on the aspect of the other and so may make that which is *now* the subject of free-will, not *then* the subject of free-will.<sup>18</sup> For instance, you exercise

<sup>16</sup> My struggle, good, bad or indifferent, is my struggle: Yours is yours. We are both conditioned in the accomplishing; these struggles exist in the accomplishing.

<sup>17</sup> Each past stage of the accomplishing when looked back on from the present moment *now*, exists in the accomplished. So, for thought, all stages of the accomplishing when looked back on from some ultimate *now* exist in the accomplished.

<sup>18</sup> Time determines whether a "thing" be in the accomplishing or accomplished. Thought exists in the "now" between the accomplished and accomplishing. Should we hold our thought is relative because we are conditioned in time or that because thought is relative we have an idea of time? The argument follows the latter conclusion.



your will in going for a walk. While you are taking the walk you are exercising your will freely. But when you have taken your walk you have no longer free-will to take the walk, for the walk is determined. So, even for thought, we find that whether a "thing" is to be regarded as accomplished or in the accomplishing, that is, a subject of determinism or free-will, depends for the subject on whether he regards it in time as past or future from his standpoint of *now*.<sup>19</sup> For the subject, conditioned in time, the accomplishing is, from moment to moment, becoming the accomplished: from moment to moment free-will as an activity in the accomplishing is being determined in that, from moment to moment, free-will falls back into determinism.<sup>20</sup>

What is above written shows not only that free-will and determinism are limits of thought but that for the subject conditioned in time any "thing" which the subject regards, now, as future and as the subject of his free-will becomes when, in a coming *now*, he regards it as past, *not* a thing of his free-will: it is determined. I think, even for thought, we see dimly that the thing as determined and the thing as subject to free-will are the same. The appearance of difference results merely from the subject regarding the thing from differing standpoints in time.<sup>21</sup>

Determinism is a limit of thought: free-will is a limit of thought, so neither can be the ultimate. Insight makes us aware that the contradiction between the two cannot and does not result in real reality. What then is our ultimate?

The categorical imperative for thought, spells determinism: the accomplished. Free-will exists in

<sup>19</sup> *Now* is not a fixed time, it is of continuous progression in time.

<sup>20</sup> Herein we see that the embodied subject exists in a constantly progressing now between determinism in the past and free-will in the future: determinism and free-will are functions of time.

<sup>21</sup> If time be eliminated, where, then, is the distinction between determinism and free-will?

the accomplishing. Our ultimate must transcend both and it is to be found in "the accomplished in the accomplishing." We must refer back both free-will and the categorical imperative to God, the transcendental Being. We can only do this by giving to Him transcendence of both. It is by insight we reconcile the necessary contradictions of thought.

I repeat that I do not allege the term, "the accomplished in the accomplishing," has any meaning for us as subjects of thought. The very term transcends thought and is arrived at by us as subjects of insight transcending thought. For thought there is distinction between the term the accomplished and its contradiction the accomplishing: for insight the contradiction does not exist in the term "the accomplished in the accomplishing." But it is not a merely negative expression for, if accepted, it clears away for us many obstacles now standing in the way of our reason. There is no language for conclusions of insight: we can only use parables of thought.

If we assume that the categorical imperative is an unconditional command of conscience proceeding from God, the transcendental Being,<sup>22</sup> then we leave sin and suffering, even struggle towards an ideal, unaccounted for. Any such assumption is an assumption of thought and so, as subjects of thought, we may examine and criticize it.

Under any such assumption man should and would have no free-will, he should and would be bound under command to be fully moral and fully happy. God Himself is made responsible for all sin, suffering and painful struggle by man towards an ideal. If we condition God in thought as fully revealed to us in power of command to be moral and happy and give Him power to make us obey His command then we find, in thought, He is One who

<sup>22</sup> This covers an assumption that free-will does not proceed from God.

has deliberately made man's lot immoral and unhappy.

Under such an assumption God has given man free-will, that is freedom to sin and be unhappy: God Himself has given this free-will and man has exercised it under the command of God. Under such an assumption the belief,—still held by some,—in a personal Devil with power *against* God, seems to me reasonable in its excuse.

Under such an assumption what do we mean by free-will? It can only mean the contradiction of determinism,—of the categorical imperative. God—or the Devil—has given power to man by free-will to disobey the command of conscience. There *ought* to be peace surpassing understanding for all mankind, a state of absolute rest in agreement with the unconditional command of conscience. Evolution, motion, struggle towards an ideal, are mere surplusage; they cannot be brought into the scheme. Why are we left to struggle towards that which God could give at once and for ever?

But any such assumption conditions God in thought: we have set up for ourselves an anthropomorphic God. And, in so doing, we have incidentally been obliged to treat our universe, intelligible and sensible, as mere surplusage,—indeed, we have not only failed to explain its existence in any way, but have made it a foul creation originating sin and suffering.

It is insight which makes us aware that we cannot condition God in thought. It is true that as self-conscious subjects we exist in the accomplishing and that God to us, in relative thought, exists in the accomplished so that in each of us is *something* of God. But while we are aware of this link between ourselves and God, insight also makes us aware that God transcends both the accomplished and the accomplishing and so, for insight, exists in “the accomplished in the accomplishing,” a term meaningless for thought. The self-consciousness of each

of us is, as it were, a partial of the transcendent self-consciousness of God.<sup>23</sup> But we cannot, by thought, relate our personal self-consciousness as subjects to transcendental self-consciousness. The term "the accomplished in the accomplishing" has meaning only for insight; so ideas, which are limited to relations, cannot touch its meaning.

In the ultimate there must be transcendence of determinism and free-will. We can understand this imperative when we consider the fact that the contradictions of determinism and free-will exist only for time, whereas in the ultimate there is transcendence of time.

We cannot fathom the reason why our universe exists and why self-conscious subjects are therein embodied and in their struggle towards self-expression meet with resistance of environment which gives rise to sin and suffering. But if, from the higher platform of insight, we consider what we know about our universe and its sin and suffering, we find some explanation for the contradictions that exist for thought: we partly indeed explain away sin and suffering.

Before self-conscious subjects appeared the universe, judged from the universe presented to us, existed under the laws of Nature: there was full determinism. But this universe was not static, it was dynamic. Evolution existed. And we can understand why evolution existed and exists in the universe as constituted.

If all objects<sup>24</sup> from molecules to living organisms

<sup>23</sup> This must not be interpreted as Pantheism. Each self-conscious subject is not a partially integrated *being*, for that would make God not distinguishable from a full integration of humanity.

<sup>24</sup> Any ultimate entity we can only assume to exist in ignorance of anything about it, except its being. If we term this ultimate matter, then we are equally ignorant of energy or force; we are aware only that it is. But in both cases we *must* have the pre-existence of the self-conscious subject.

were in full agreement with environment the universe would not be subject to evolution as it exists. Evolution exists because in our universe as constituted, even apart from our appearance as self-conscious subjects, objects are not in agreement with their environment. It is on this disagreement that the struggle for existence and survival is based; the struggle could not exist if the disagreement did not exist. And the result of this struggle is the survival of the fittest,—that is, those most successful in the struggle. And those most successful in the struggle are those nearest to agreement with environment.<sup>25</sup> Reason informs us that our universe is so constituted.<sup>26</sup>

As it happens that we had nothing to do with the making of our universe, which existed before we existed, and as we had nothing to do with the laws of Nature governing it we must accept it as it is: we must bow to the physical constitution of our universe and have no choice but to submit to the laws of Nature. It is not only preposterous, possibly impious, but supererogatory to criticize this universe and the laws governing it.<sup>27</sup>

We have found that the foundation of our evolutionary universe before self-conscious subjects appear exists in disagreement of objects with environment. And, as yet, sin and suffering do not exist. We find, it is true, manifestations of love, truth, beauty

<sup>25</sup> As the universe is subject to evolution, this agreement is never in the accomplished but always in the accomplishing. The agreement is never more than an approximation to full agreement with environment. The strongest, physically, do not necessarily survive; if the tiger's prey did not survive, the tiger would not survive.

<sup>26</sup> For evolution we must have not only variation and the survival of the fittest but *also* absence of agreement, for the organism, with its environment.

<sup>27</sup> The laws of Nature gave us power to think. Can thought criticize its creator? Do we pretend to have exhaustive knowledge of these laws?

and justice: but only manifestations. There are no self-conscious beings for whom alone love, truth, beauty and justice can exist.<sup>28</sup>

What, then, is the universe into which self-conscious subjects are introduced? It is a universe of the accomplishing where the accomplishing exists because objects are in disagreement with their environment. This is the universe to which the self-conscious subject, so long as it is embodied, must bow down and whose laws it must obey. The subject, embodied, exists as an object in this universe: embodied he is an object even to himself.

Now with the self-conscious subject there come, for the first time, sin and suffering into the universe. Why do they come? Because the self-conscious subject embodied finds itself in disagreement with its environment.

I must repeat here that we are altogether ignorant of why the self-conscious subject is embodied and so embodied that it becomes a subject of sin and suffering. Fichte's explanation that the object is that the self-conscious subject may conquer and subject environment to its own self-expression is very beautiful. But it is anthropomorphic: it is a beauty of thought.<sup>29</sup> All we can rely on is the fact that we are so embodied and,—as we have determined the universe as presented and the laws governing it into and under which we are embodied,—we can determine the results of such embodiment. They are sin and suffering for us because, as embodied, we are in disagreement with environment. Unless this disagreement existed the accomplishing could not exist.

(Sin). For our present purpose we may treat sin as two-fold: as original sin and as deliberate sin.

<sup>28</sup> These manifestations suggest, in thought, God as maker of the laws.

<sup>29</sup> Transcendently, I argue that the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice exists for the subject. Possibly this transcendental ideal justifies Fichte's theory—for thought.

This distinction is not raised with reference to the controversy between St. Augustine and Pelagius, for now sin must be treated for the greater part from an anthropomorphic point of view.

If we regard the story of Adam and Eve as symbolic of the first embodiment of the "I am" as a self-conscious subject in our universe, we touch the genesis of what is now termed original sin. Adam symbolizes the entrance of the self-conscious subject, as an embodied subject, into our universe.

This universe exists in the accomplishing and so necessarily Adam, the first man, was in disagreement with his environment, a disagreement which prevented his full manifestation as "I am." He (and his descendants) was necessarily "guilty" of original sin in not fully expressing himself as "I am." This is and always must be true for all embodied subjects, while in the accomplishing.<sup>30</sup> But are we justified in terming this sin, sin against God? The very term "original sin" shows that man is born "involuntarily" into a certain state which we term original sin: in thought we make the sin God's sin. For God made man.

The error arises from our trying to fathom with thought what is too deep for thought. What we term original sin results necessarily from the constitution of our universe. But we are ignorant of why the universe is so constituted and so cannot hold it necessarily imports or does not import sin as an offence in its Creator.

Original sin is a mere expression for the necessary consequences of the "I am" being embodied. It marks the conduct of the subject in the accomplishing towards the relatively accomplished, and as the accomplishing cannot exist unless against resistance man may be said to be born into original sin. But

<sup>30</sup> The accomplishing exists only so long as there is failure to attain the accomplished: original sin exists, for thought, in failure of full accomplishment.

this *sin* is implicit in the universe which exists in the accomplishing. No responsibility then can be thrown on the subject for original sin.

Can responsibility be thrown on God? It *can* in thought. But insight transcends thought and, in insight, no such responsibility exists. We reduce sin to mere disagreement with environment, where such disagreement is implicit in our universe of the accomplishing.

The second form of sin has for content the thought and action of the self-conscious subject: there is personal responsibility to oneself and others. There are degrees of sin; for, in all cases where thought and conduct depart from full expression of the pure desire of the "I am," sin results, and, in no case, can we find this full expression. We must say that we are all, in degree, sinners. For original sin we have seen there is no responsibility for the subject and for the forms of sin we now consider there can be no responsibility for the subject unless there be in him self-consciousness of some standard against which he can measure the goodness or badness of his thought or action. But this standard we find and we find it in our general "sense" of responsibility to humanity which has, herein, been traced back to the categorical imperative,—to the necessary struggle of the subject for full self-expression as "I am," manifest to us in our ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.

But now, again, what have we reduced self-conscious sin to?

The subject exists in the accomplishing, exists only in the accomplishing. So long as it exists in this state it is struggling for self-expression against resistance. So long as the struggle continues self-conscious sin continues and is implicit. But the sin, being self-conscious sin, infers the responsibility of the sinner.

You object that the giving of this free-will to the subject establishes a contradiction to the determinism



of God. And so it does,—for thought. But the solution of the difficulty is clear for insight, if incomprehensible for thought. God does not exist in determinism or in free-will. He transcends both determinism and free-will.<sup>31</sup> We have seen that the subject is embodied in a universe of the accomplishing where self-conscious sin is inherent and this universe we can but relate back to God. This universe is, to us, founded on determinism (the laws of Nature), but self-conscious subjects therein can use this determinism for free-will. If we hold there exists in real reality something transcending determinism and free-will<sup>32</sup> then we have for our universe an analysis as it were of this transcendent into determinism and free-will: thought analyses this transcendent into free-will and determinism, so that, *for thought*, both exist as contradictions for thought. If, unconsciously using insight, we consider these contradictions of thought, we arrive at the fact that they are limits, because we find we cannot think them,—we can only think up to and between them as limits.

The contradiction between determinism and free-will is like to that between good and evil, unity and diversity: all are contradictions of thought: it is insight which makes us aware they exist as contradictions.

Just as good and evil exist for us as subjects so determinism and free-will exist for us as subjects. We, ourselves, find determinism in the laws of Nature and free-will in our thought and conduct.<sup>33</sup> We find in our universe both determinism and free-will. We find more. We find, for all the contra-

<sup>31</sup> We cannot, in thought, deny both determinism and free-will to God. But both are mere limits of thought.

<sup>32</sup> Insight makes us aware there must be this transcendence.

<sup>33</sup> When we use memory to recall in the present past thought and conduct, though they may still have the appearance of relative good and evil, they do not take on the same appearance as at the time of such thought or conduct. And, as determined, they no longer appear as subjects of free-will.

dictions of thought, that they exist in our universe because it is a universe of the accomplishing in contradiction to the accomplished. We must then, in thought, refer free-will to the accomplishing and determinism to the accomplished.<sup>34</sup>

But God, transcendent of time, exists in the accomplished in the accomplishing and so transcends free-will and determinism. They may, without danger to reason, be regarded by us as merely differing as parts of the same "thing."<sup>35</sup>

(Suffering). It has already been shown that happiness is not a thing-in-itself. It is the atmosphere or appanage of duty fulfilled. The nearer the approach of the subject in thought and conduct to expression of itself as "I am" the more fully is the subject envired by the atmosphere of happiness. But suffering is no more than a contradiction, for thought, of pleasure or happiness: increase of pleasure marks decrease of suffering.

What then do we mean by suffering?

In the first place for suffering to exist there must be a subject conscious of suffering. If a tree or a worm be assumed not to be self-conscious suffering cannot exist for it.

Consider our universe before self-conscious organisms appeared. It is generally held that there was manifestation of suffering and from this it is deduced that suffering existed in our universe before self-conscious subjects appeared. But suffering has no meaning without self-consciousness of suffering: manifestation itself has no meaning unless there be given a self-conscious subject for whom the manifestation exists. If this be not so, then we make

<sup>34</sup> For good and evil it has been argued that the ultimate for the subject is full self-expression, manifest in the human ideal of love, truth, beauty and justice.

<sup>35</sup> We have seen that the same "thing" takes on for us the aspect of determined when viewed as past and as the subject of free-will when viewed as future.

suffering exist in itself and manifestation exist in itself.<sup>56</sup>

The self-conscious subject has free-will to use the determined laws of Nature. And it is from the form of our use of these laws that suffering has mainly arisen. It is true that "accidents" of Nature may cause personal suffering: a volcano may be active or a tree may fall. But man, if we regard him at his present stage, is mainly responsible even for suffering arising from what we term accidents. Indeed, as time passes, the possibility of such "accidents of Nature" decreases.

Consider, for instance, our own country, England. Most of the objects we sense have been brought into their present form of existence by man as a self-conscious subject. Houses have been built, trees planted, roadways for forms of locomotion laid down, etc. So man, being responsible for the existence of these objects, is responsible for accidents arising from them: the very laws he passes to prevent or warn against accidents manifest his sense of responsibility. The bodily suffering of each one of us, morally, physically and intellectually, is the result, mainly, of personal failure in thought or conduct of ourselves, our progenitors or our fellows. Our nation has power, collectively, to put an end almost entirely to such personal suffering: it could prevent extremes of wealth and poverty, blot out the ignorance of the mass and, promulgating laws based on the principle that our 45,000,000 are spiritual beings and not mere things of labour give, to all, environment for reasonable lives.<sup>57</sup>

But we must not charge the idle and dissolute rich only with responsibility for our present state of

<sup>56</sup> Unless some ultimate of self-consciousness be predicated, love, beauty, truth and justice with their contradictions as thought of hatred, ugliness, falsehood, sin and suffering, cannot exist in or for a universe of unconsciousness.

<sup>57</sup> There is pungent reflection on our existing social state in the fact that warfare spells decrease of unemployment and crime.

suffering. Most of those forming such a class are, by nature, unfeeling and weak-minded Cyrenaics: little, apart from wealth, has been bestowed on them. They are, by nature, largely incapable of feeling and so incapable of any useful action to get rid of the human suffering around them. The responsibility rests on us all collectively. Some responsibility, though slight, rests on the class referred to, but the main responsibility rests on those who feel most deeply the suffering of humanity,—the more a man has the more God claims from him. And, in the flesh, real feeling is expressed in real action: the man who feels acts or he is not doing his duty as an embodied self.

On a large view we must hold that humanity in general is responsible for the use it makes of the laws of Nature and so is responsible for human suffering.

Religion itself has been exploited to blind men to their collective responsibility; even the saying of our Lord, “the poor ye have always with you,” has been prostituted in order to justify the social conditions which man himself has set up,—set up by misuse of the laws of Nature. The responsibility rests, in degree, on each one of us. And we cannot get rid of this responsibility by placing it on the shoulders of a class of mankind, the laws of Nature or, even, on God Himself. Only when humanity takes up its cross can there be full hope for social regeneration.

Now in considering pleasure we have found the nearer the approach of the subject in thought and conduct to the fulfilment of the duty it owes to the categorical imperative the nearer its approach to pleasure in the limit. But suffering,—a wider term than that of pain,—is the contradiction, for thought, of pleasure. Both mark the “atmosphere” of the subject in its process of fulfilment of duty. So we find that the nearer the approach of the subject to non-fulfilment of its duty to the categorical imperative the nearer its approach to suffering. What is true for pleasure is true, in contradiction, for suffering.

But God, in thought, exists in our universe in the accomplishing. In thought, therefore, He is responsible not only for the pleasure but the suffering of His subjects. In thought, we make God offer us a bribe of pleasure for good thought or conduct and a deterrent of suffering for evil thought or conduct. We make God exist in a meaningless ultimate of absolute pleasure for us all.<sup>38</sup>

In such case we must make God responsible for suffering even for evil generally, as a reality. This must be true for any known God, any God of knowledge. Laurie in his *Synthetica* understands and recognizes that this is true for his theory,—which gives reality to good and evil. He says: "Evil is the failure of God—creative to realize the ideal of the individual and of the whole *on the plain of Being which man occupies*. Does God truly fail? Our answer must be, assuredly: and the failure is more conspicuous, the higher the grade of finite being."

The error arises from not recognizing the distinction between the subject's powers of thought and insight and the transcendence of the latter over the former. Good and evil with all its suffering are treated as things-in-themselves and so necessarily God is made responsible for both. It is true God is termed Being,—Becoming or the One—All. But Being and Becoming, One and All, are treated as things in themselves, whereas Being—Becoming and One—All should be treated as recorded ideas (containing contradictory limits of thought) intended to *suggest* that which is transcendent for thought. The term used in this argument,—the accomplished in the accomplishing,—is used merely as an attempt in words to express in suggestion the "something" we want transcending the accomplished and accomplishing.

<sup>38</sup> Or absolute suffering for the many, with absolute pleasure for the few!

God is not a God of Knowledge, He is a God of Insight transcending knowledge.

God exists in the accomplished in the accomplishing. The fact is to us a fact of insight: it is incomprehensible in knowledge just as my self-consciousness or your self-consciousness *is* to you or me though it is incomprehensible as a fact in knowledge. Self-consciousness is the only real reality for you and me: it simply *is* or we could not be, as we are, subjects of insight, imagination and thought as embodied subjects. In the same way God *is* in the accomplished in the accomplishing: there is transcendence for Him of the accomplished and of the accomplishing.

It follows, as before said, that why our universe exists, as it does, in the accomplishing is beyond thought, beyond even the awareness of insight. For us, the universe simply *is*: we cannot know or be aware why God has placed us, embodied, in our welter of pleasure and suffering. All we can arrive at is that in our universe of the accomplishing we are involved in an atmosphere the limits of which, for thought, are pure pleasure and pure suffering and that the nearer we approach to fulfilment of our duty to the categorical imperative the nearer our approach to pure pleasure and the farther our distance from pure suffering.<sup>39</sup>

Still, however sound our reasoning may be, we have not got rid of the fact of suffering. But now comes in the pertinent question,—what is suffering? Is it real?

Here human experience steps in to assist us. It assists our reasoning by proving that not only can we establish no hard and fast line between pleasure

<sup>39</sup> My suffering may be yours, yours may be mine. As our universe evolves, the pleasure or suffering of the one tends more and more to be the pleasure or suffering of the many.

and suffering, but that the one may take on the appearance of the other.

It has been already shown that the subject not only at times chooses, as what is best for itself, present pain for future happiness but, even, an embodied life of ever present suffering under the prompting of fulfilment of duty. The self-conscious subject *chooses* suffering as best for itself: there is mystic self-satisfaction which outweighs the suffering.

Instances of this are innumerable. We have, first, the supreme life sacrifice of Jesus Christ and on a lower stage that of Gautama. Amongst the saints and martyrs we find countless instances.<sup>40</sup> William James in his remarkable work, "The Varieties of Religious Experience," tells us of the founder of the Sacred Heart that: "Her love of pain and suffering was insatiable. . . . Nothing but pain," she continually said in her letters, "makes my life supportable." Again, Saint Teresa wrote: "The soul after such a favour is animated with a degree of courage so great that if at that moment its body should be torn to pieces for the cause of God, it would feel nothing but the liveliest comfort." Job does not stand alone in ultimate praise of God for personal suffering; cases are not few where what, scientifically, should cause intense suffering, results in intense pleasure.

William James, again, and Harold Begbie,<sup>41</sup> give many instances of so-termed conversion. The subjects in question have always lived, and so become habituated to, one form of life. At some period of their lives, termed the time of conversion, their regard for themselves and the external is affected; it may be, almost instantaneously affected. The result

<sup>40</sup> The question is not whether they were right or wrong, but whether they did or did not choose suffering under the influence of feeling it was *best* for themselves.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Broken Earthenware*, written after William James' work.

is that their form of life, their thought and conduct undergo change. What formerly gave them pleasure now causes suffering, what formerly gave suffering now gives pleasure. As bodily things they remain the same, but there is change in them as subjects of thought and conduct.<sup>42</sup>

Even in our ordinary life we must often choose suffering under desire for what is best for ourselves. But is this suffering a thing-in-itself? You have undergone a painful operation which has given you a healthy body you never enjoyed before. Can you *think* the past suffering as separate from the present happiness? Is there not an indissoluble link between the two? Even during the pain of the operation you may have been contemplating the future happiness the pain would bring.

Now all the instances given and referred to above are drawn from human experience. And they show that both pleasure and suffering are subject to man's regard. They are subject so completely that, as the regard changes, the one may take on the aspect of the other.

And here direct reference must again be made to the term the accomplished in the accomplishing. While suffering is in the accomplishing it may take on the aspect of suffering: when in the accomplished it may take on the aspect of pleasure. A man suffers during an operation; when enjoying after full health he may find pleasure in contemplating the past accomplished suffering in relation to his existing health.

We find, as we should expect, that suffering exists only in relation to pleasure. But we find more as, perhaps, we should not expect from human experience. We find, for the self-conscious subject, that the one may take on the aspect of the other. It is

<sup>42</sup> These instances do exist as part of human experience. As William James himself says, no explanation of human experience can be acceptable to reason, unless it include explanation of these many instances.



impossible, *in human experience*, to give real reality to either.<sup>43</sup>

In the limit of human experience suffering may mark the highest form of pleasure, pleasure may mark the deepest form of suffering: in thought we cannot travel beyond these limits of contradiction; but, even in thought, we find that the limits change place! Even for thought we find the subject cannot judge by his state *in time* whether pleasure or suffering is preferable for him: he must regard the past, present and future. While embodied the subject exists in a continuously progressing *now*; the past exists for him in the accomplished, the accomplishing exists in and from the continuously progressing *now*. The accomplishing, in continuity, is always falling back into the accomplished, free-will falling back into determinism.

Man can regard the past, present and future and, when so doing, he finds not only that pleasure and suffering may change place, but the one may take on the aspect of the other. It follows that they are merely aspects of "something" which transcends them both. But so-termed sin is implicit: it must exist for man so long as he remains embodied in the accomplishing.

By thus exercising our power of insight which is unconditioned by time we have got rid of the contradiction between determinism and free-will which exists for thought because thought, being exercised through its machine, the brain, is conditioned by time; we have arrived at some explanation for suffering and found the place of sin.

It is not pretended that any explanation has been given of why suffering exists in the world. But as

<sup>43</sup> The subject of insight makes itself, as a subject of thought, dimly aware of the fallibility of its own thought. Is physical suffering implicit for the embodied? Can we not imagine a future for man on earth when, by increased command over environment, he has blotted out such suffering? Mental and spiritual suffering result from failure in oneself or others to obey the dictates of duty.

human experience informs us that the subject may determine suffering as preferable for itself to pleasure we find, even for thought, that some state must exist for the subject *preferable* to a state of pleasure or suffering; a state transcending both.<sup>44</sup>

(The Human Ideal). I think the dilemma to which Spinoza is said to be reduced between extension and mind, is got rid of when we introduce the power of insight as transcending thought. I would suggest that what he had in his mind, though he gives no expression to it, was transcendence of extension and mind. It was in trying to reconcile the contradiction *in thought* that his dilemma arose.<sup>45</sup>

But now we are not concerned with extension, we need only consider his treatment of mind.

By making God infinite and not transcendent of the infinite and finite, Spinoza necessarily theorized absorption of the finite mind of man in the infinite mind of God. And yet he had, also, to hold that there is something of the infinite in the mind of man.

This contradiction he argues is got rid of thus: He assumes he can speak of the human mind as part of the infinite thought of God while he gets rid of any reality for the human mind by holding no reality for it exists from the standpoint of God, the reality appearing, to us, from the standpoint of man: the finite exists only by abstraction and negation, so that in the presence of the infinite it disappears.

It follows that he can consider, for man, only a personality which is human; make abstraction of all human passions and all human thought and conduct and, if we follow Spinoza as, I think, generally interpreted, no personality remains.

<sup>44</sup> We may surmise that spiritual law reigns which rewards and punishes justly, the injustice which arises from inequality of sin and suffering being in appearance only. For the subject, most strangely, has power to make pleasure and suffering change places in appearance.

<sup>45</sup> His use of the word *modos* suggests this.

But here, I think, comes in the weakness of his argument. Consider the following statements of Spinoza himself:—

Nevertheless there is necessarily given in God an idea which expresses the essential being of this and the other human body under the aspect of eternity.

“The human mind cannot be entirely destroyed with the Body, but of it something remains which is eternal.

“We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge (intuition) and our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause. From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge springs joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is to say the love of God, not as though we regarded Him as present, but in so far as we realize His eternity and this is why I call the love of God ‘intellectual.’ This intellectual love of God is eternal.

“Although this love towards God has had no beginning, yet it possesses all the charms (perfectiones) of Love just as though it had an origin, as we supposed just now.

“If we regard the ordinary opinion of men we shall see that they are conscious<sup>46</sup> of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse this with duration and identify it with the imagination or memory supposed to remain after death.

“God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love with which God loves Himself.<sup>47</sup>

Spinoza holds that personality can exist only in duration (of time) and not in eternity: he never contemplated the possibility of the persistence of personality resulting from man’s eternal love for God, never, I think, contemplated a form of personality

<sup>46</sup> Mark this word “conscious.” Spinoza, I think, misses its importance. Must not this consciousness be self-consciousness?

<sup>47</sup> I have taken these passages in translation from J. Allanson Picton’s Spinoza (Archibald Constable & Company).

higher than human personality. Kant on the other hand contemplated this higher form of personality in his transcendental subject.

But if man have love of God, whether eternal or not, this love requires for existence personality in self-consciousness: otherwise any such love is meaningless. Spinoza exhausts the content of self-consciousness so far as human passions, thought and conduct are concerned; but he does not get rid of self-consciousness, for he holds love remains for it as a content.<sup>48</sup> And, again and again, in our argument it has been shown that we cannot condition self-consciousness in time: it simply *is*, for us. How can a finite consciousness have infinite content, if we hold, with Spinoza, that the finite disappears in the infinite?

And Spinoza does not stop here, he holds that the consciousness in man of eternal love for God, makes men *feel* blessedness transcending human happiness and human misery. This still more strongly imports the self-consciousness of a subject, apart from human passions, thought and conduct.

Without going into the question of extension or memory, I think we must hold that Spinoza, while getting rid of the human personality, still holds really to man's eternal existence as a transcendental subject.<sup>49</sup>

Again it has herein been attempted to prove that a human ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice exists for all humanity, pointing to a transcendental ideal for the "I am." And Spinoza offers an ideal. But it is not an ideal for all humanity: though it is transcendent it is yet for a class. He does not hold that all strive for his "blessedness" and that

<sup>48</sup> He says men are conscious of the eternity of their mind. How can a finite being be conscious that it exists in or is partly constituted by what is infinite in eternity?

<sup>49</sup> It does not follow that Kant gave the same meaning to the expression transcendental subject or that Spinoza's meaning is now accepted.

all attain some limited form of success while in the body. So far as mind is concerned he makes the "I am" to exist in each of us,<sup>50</sup> but it is effective during bodily life only for the few. It is the few who attain "blessedness" on earth, the many never do,—this appears to be the result of his philosophy as generally interpreted.

And yet in reading one cannot, perhaps, help feeling he had in mind transcendence for God, and that a transcendental subject exists in and for each one of us. If so, we should hold he offered to all humanity a human ideal. We cannot hold that the infinite exists in itself and the finite in itself: there must be between them what we term, in thought, a relation. But errors constantly arise in useless attempts to define this relation in thought. The relation does not really exist in thought, if existing it is transcendent of thought: it may be said to exist in insight.

Both Spinoza and Kant found their ideal in duty, reducing pleasure, happiness or blessedness to the atmosphere, as it were, of duty fulfilled. Kant finds the freedom of will of the subject in its freedom to express its true self.<sup>51</sup> His ideal follows.

When we use the term the accomplished in the accomplishing for Transcendental Being we, possibly, get rid of Spinoza's dilemma<sup>52</sup> and we do not interfere with Kant's philosophy, even with his Dialectic.<sup>53</sup> It is true he never defines insight as a power of the subject transcending thought and that, possibly, confusion arises from his use of the omnibus word tuition. But he *assumes* the power of insight

<sup>50</sup> Spinoza says the mind in man is eternal—or partakes of eternity?

<sup>51</sup> I read this not as freedom to express but freedom in the accomplishing towards expression.

<sup>52</sup> This does not infer that as to extension he was either right or wrong though, so far, I do not follow him.

<sup>53</sup> Dialectic Kant terms a logic of appearance not a doctrine of probability. His record was for the purposes of reason.

when holding that, for the subject, the contradictions of our universe can have but phenomenal existence, coupled with his statement that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations.

The difficulties that arise from any such terms as Being-Becoming, One-All, as expressions for God arise from the terms being considered as conveying ideas: the same objection, indeed, might be raised against the term the accomplished in the accomplishing.

It must, then, be kept sedulously in mind that the term the accomplished in the accomplishing is not now used as conveying any idea. It has meaning only in insight, none in thought. It is but an expression suggesting "something" which transcends the accomplished and the accomplishing. It is the same as with free-will and determinism: in thought we must give both to God.<sup>54</sup> But insight transcends thought and gets rid, for us, of the *contradictions* thought attaches to God. Insight makes us aware that for God there is transcendence of free-will and determinism. This conclusion is *our own*; insight opens transcendentalism to us as subjects.

Herein is no denial of the unity or immanence of God, no denial for Him of any supreme attribute: all such definitions, indeed, may be left as sound for thought. But insight transcends thought and so denies that any limit of thought, even to supreme attribute, can define Ultimate Being.

There must be, for Ultimate Being, transcendence of all limits of thought. The idea of "one far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves" is very beautiful, but if we consider it we find it to be no more than a limit of thought. For if we refer it to God then, when the divine event is accomplished, God's work is accomplished. If, on the other hand,

<sup>54</sup> Dogmatic forms of religion are of use for mankind.

we refer it to man, then, when the event is accomplished, the object of man's existence is accomplished and we are driven to some ultimate like to that of Spinoza as generally interpreted. Gautama appreciated the difficulty for he said definitely that he did *not* know what happened when Nirvana was attained.

Our ultimate cannot be found in any limit of thought. It exists, for us, in insight; in something transcending thought. And the term now used is "the accomplished in the accomplishing."





DREAMS



## DREAMS

### SLEEP

IF what has already been recorded be regarded as proof that the really real personality of each one of us is found in the "I am," even so, we must contemplate a difficulty for thought. For the *ground* of proof is personal in that it exists in self-consciousness, while self-consciousness itself is "groundless because it is the ground of all other certainty." In fact, when we use thought we can only arrive at evidential proof, that is, at that high degree of probability which we use and are justified in using as proof; the argument has led only to evidential proof. When we consider the foundation of thought,<sup>1</sup> we transcend thought in that we treat it as a mere limit of imagination. We have nothing to rely on absolutely but self-consciousness which is not thought, insight or intuition. It simply is: it is a positive, really real fact for each of us, personally. So there is, therein, more than evidential proof: there is personal really real proof for each of us. Kant says the permanent must exist at the background of phenomena. This permanent we find relatively in self-consciousness.

This "I am" we may term the transcendental subject or the soul in man. To it we give psychical activity in that imagination is "deep buried in the soul of man." More than this. When the subject is dis-

<sup>1</sup> This foundation has been found in imagination. In the first part we had to consider insight which transcends thought.

embodied we give to it full memory of its human experience, though we are ignorant what aspect such experience may have for it. But when, as we now do, we reduce the subject to a mere passing embodiment in our time and space of the really real subject, we find a lacuna in the argument already preferred. We have assumed that all human experience has been considered. In fact, what may be the most important part of human experience has scarcely been referred to. We have not considered the state of sleep and its dreams.

In psychology treated as a science the subject is considered, and rightly considered, as one of activity in relation to the objective universe—psychology does not transcend the facts of presentation. Even in metaphysics the distinction between psychical and physical activity is often lost sight of.

But now we have reduced presentation to a mere occasion for thought in relation to our little material universe and we have found how limited is thought in itself. It follows that, for the “I am” while still embodied, imagination and memory remain even when this occasion for thought is absent and all personal physical activity in relation to our objective universe is possibly in abeyance.

During the state of sleep, then, the “I am” still exists, the only difference is that it is not a thing of personal activity in relation to the objective universe as when in the waking state. In sleep, however, the embodied self may still think—arrive at ideas *for* the objective universe—though it cannot, as in the waking state, objectify its ideas.<sup>2</sup>

During the state of sleep, the subject has human experience and this experience we have not as yet considered. Emanuel Kant himself never, I think, considered our human experience as divorced from waking experience. He only touches on it in his

<sup>2</sup> Bear in mind there *must* be ideas for objects before such objects can be materialised.

“ Dreams of a Spirit Seer,” and, therein, he laughs at himself for an excursion into the *Ewigkeit*.

But now it will be argued that dreamland is not only part of the subject's universe, but opens a fuller and wider universe than that of the waking state.

That the subject is unconscious during the state of sleep is a false conclusion based on the fact that during sleep the subject is divorced from physical activity<sup>3</sup> in relation, as an embodied self, to its objective universe. That sleep is merely a state of physiological rest from activity, for the storage of fresh energy for activity in after waking states, will be shown to be erroneous even from the scientific point of view.

But though what has now been written would appear to follow from the hypothesis, it is advisable to consider at some length the theory as to sleep which is very generally held.

<sup>3</sup> It is not divorced from the psychical activity of thought.

## PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

UP to the present time Sleep has been considered almost solely from the physiological point of view: it has been held as consisting of necessary physiological periods of rest from intervening periods of physiological activity. And as consciousness has, very generally, been treated as running parallel with physiological activity in mind and body, it has been assumed that self-consciousness is in abeyance during sleep. The possibility of psychical activity during physiological inactivity has been practically ignored as part of human experience.

But, following what it is assumed has been proved already, we must now approach our consideration of the sleeping state from a psychical<sup>1</sup> not physiological point of view.

Personality has been found in the "I am," in self-consciousness. The subject exists in the intelligible universe. It is embodied and so is manifest as an object in the objective universe. As embodied it becomes a thing of conduct; through its brain it uses its master-tool, the body, for conduct. But its conduct is determined by itself as a subject in the intelligible universe. The subject uses its will for volition, but its will is useless without imagination "deep buried in the soul of man." The subject is fully a psychical subject, its state physiologically is but a passing state in time.

The objective universe is, then, merely an "occa-

<sup>1</sup> Rejecting psychological materialism, it is held now that the psychical is the same as the psychological.

sion" for the conduct of the embodied subject under its direction as a subject in the intelligible universe. Only a minute part of the subject's power of imagination is used, in the inhibited form of thought, for conduct as to this passing "occasion" for conduct.

The main distinction then—if the theory now adduced be sound—between the waking and sleeping states, is that in the former the subject is actively a thing of conduct in the objective universe while in the latter it is not. In the latter state, being still embodied, it remains statically a thing of conduct, for it can create objects in the intelligible universe *for* the objective universe. But, dynamically, it is not a thing of conduct. For, during sleep, it cannot use its body to create in the objective universe what it has already created in the intelligible universe.

Now we must, for our present consideration, use thought: we want to arrive at a decision in thought. So any proof, it must be repeated, is impossible; we can only attain that degree of probability which we are justified in assuming to amount to proof.

Let us compare these two theories which may be termed physiological and psychical.

By the former, personality in full self-consciousness is to be found only in the waking state.<sup>2</sup> And this is because the personality of man is to be found in him only as a thing of conduct; sleep marks but periods of physiological rest necessary for the subject to continue his life of activity of conduct.

But great difficulties stand in the way for any acceptance of an explanation, fully physiological, of sleep. And these difficulties have been lately increased by the general acceptance of the phenomena of hypnotism as veridical and by the acceptance by some of the existence of what Myers terms the subliminal self.

<sup>2</sup> Albert Moll in his *Hypnotism* holds there is in sleep, essentially, some disturbance both of consciousness and self-consciousness—by consciousness he must here refer to consciousness in relation to the objective universe.

Under this theory we find no satisfactory explanation forthcoming to explain how sleep causes unconsciousness. There is self-consciousness of the continuity of personality from the cradle to the grave and this is hard to reconcile with constantly intervening states when self-consciousness does not exist—for mere abeyance of self-consciousness cannot come within the four-corners of the theory.

Again, the theory offers no satisfactory explanation of what is termed exaltation of faculty during sleep.<sup>3</sup>

As, indeed, the theory holds that, during sleep, the cerebral material is recuperating for after work in a waking state and so is in a relatively bloodless condition, this exaltation would appear to contradict the theory. For this exaltation of faculty is manifest through action of the brain and so demands expenditure of physical energy. In such case sleep can give no physiological rest for the accumulation of such energy. And how can the brain in its relatively bloodless condition manifest exaltation of faculty?

Again, during sleep, we dream. And we sometimes dream happy and comforting dreams which *increase* the physiological rest and refreshment in energy we find from sleep. This fact cannot be denied scientifically. Some of these dreams it must be admitted are dreams of insight and so spell no expenditure of physical energy. But some exist in thought: we dream perhaps most often anthropomorphically and some of *these* dreams give us restoration of physical energy.

But all thought is correlated to motion of the brain: thought spells motion of the brain, and this imports *expenditure* of physical energy. How then can this expenditure result in accumulation of energy?

Again, if the real personality is to be found in the subject as a thing of conduct, the subject is not merely embodied: it is a thing of embodiment. Its body in such case is *part* of its personality, for only as a bodily

<sup>3</sup> This exaltation is considered in the following chapter on Waking and Sleeping Dreams.



thing can it be directly a thing of conduct. The subject is a thing whose interest in existence is confined to its existence in time as a bodily thing : its conduct is but a passing phase in time and when its powers of conduct come to an end in time, its personality comes also to an end. But, if this be so, where is the personality that can dream—as we all dream—of a state free from embodiment ?

It is because of the influence, sometimes unconscious, of the preconceived idea that man is a mere bodily thing of conduct, that we find such confusion and contradiction in attempts to interpret the relation between the sleeping and dreaming states.

If man be merely a subject of conduct he is an automaton worked by the laws of nature. He may be worked, possibly, for some object but, if so, for an object not only unknown to him but in which he has no personal concern. For the conduct of each man in passing time can be but an infinitesimally small part of the conduct of humanity through the ages. And each man, having fulfilled his part, ceases to exist. Determinism stands fully established.

In such case what relation has the sleeping state and its dreams to man as a thing of conduct ? The sleeping state is reduced to states of physiological rest.

But dreams ? Phantasy ? Ecstasy ?

All absolute surplusage, all extraneous to the realities of life ; the very "play" of imagination itself, except so far as it is reduced to thought for conduct, is sheer incomprehensible waste. Our universe exists only so far as it can be reduced to eating, drinking, human strife and competition ; to human endeavour for what is best for oneself as a bodily thing.<sup>4</sup> Self-sacrifice to put dreams into the reality of the objective universe ; dreams of and longing for a better objective universe when one has oneself cast off the flesh ; the

<sup>4</sup> If there be any ultimate purpose in man's conduct, man personally has no concern in it.

ecstasy of awareness of the freedom of the soul from the body, are all not merely unaccounted for: they are sheer useless waste.<sup>5</sup>

If it be argued that the subject feels pleasure in such dreams and the pleasure of the subject be relied on as a reason for the dreams, it may be replied that the subject also feels the reverse of pleasure from dreams. But the main reply is that, if such a reason exist, it is extraneous to the subject's existence as an automaton of conduct. Huxley said: "Our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes that take place automatically in the organism." At first thought this would make the subject an automaton of conduct. But now, while the parallelism between thought and organic brain changes is admitted, the argument makes this parallelism merely inhibit imagination as thought: thought determines the organic changes. Hypnotism gives direct evidence of this. We may thus explain Huxley's statement. And it must be remembered he was only suggesting a theory while holding consciousness to be a thing-in-itself.

Albert Moll, in his "Hypnotism," enters at large on the subject of sleep and dreams and refers at length and in detail to the authorities on the question, discussing the various and conflicting theories on the subject. He uses the terms self-consciousness and consciousness, consciousness being treated as non-existent unless manifest in some way in relation to the objective universe.

But Albert Moll's work need not be dealt with in detail, for it is now referred to solely because it not only shows there is no common agreement as to the relation of sleep and dreams to waking thought, but treats dreams as only a form of mental disorder; they are not brought within any one defined scheme of life for

<sup>5</sup> Unless the Supreme uses this Nasmyth's hammer for some purpose extraneous to man to be fulfilled by man's conduct on our infinitesimally small speck of universe.

the subject. All exercise of imagination, which cannot be made manifest as of use for man as a thing of conduct, is treated as mere surplusage which has to be explained away as irregular mental activity.<sup>6</sup> The only realities for the subject are held to be realities of or related to the objective universe, so that all the powers of the subject which are exercised and which cannot be found to be related to the objective universe are necessarily held to be mere surplusage, or, in their manifestation, to result from irregularity in mental activity. There is confusion, also, between consciousness and its content.

Now the argument at present adduced, based on the psychical, not the physiological, may be sound or unsound, but it at least covers all human experience and gives one scheme for the continuity of the subject under Transcendental Being.

It is true it starts on hypothesis, the hypothesis that the subject's really real existence is to be found in it as a self-conscious subject with the power of imagination. But with this hypothesis the theory, I think, gives as full an explanation of human experience as, in thought, is possible.

Bear in mind that the self-conscious subject simply *is*: we do not think it; we may, perhaps, say that we are aware of it outside the purview of ideas. So no question arises either of its beginning or ending: it simply *is*, in transcendence of time. Where there is transcendence of time, the question of any beginning or ending does not arise.

The self-conscious subject becomes embodied as an object in the objective universe on conception<sup>7</sup> and we may consider it, for nine months, simply from the

<sup>6</sup> Moll admits that organic changes can be brought about by mental processes. But he refers nowhere to any recorded cases of dreams or telepathy which cannot be explained, scientifically, by psychology treated as a science.

<sup>7</sup> Man only is considered because I who write and those, if any, who read are men, using the term inclusively.

physiological point of view.<sup>8</sup> It attains separate existence as an object at the end of the nine months. It so comes into existence with the power of imagination : it dreams. But such dreams have not at first any relation to the objective universe : the subject must have human experience of the universe to which it has just been introduced before its dreams can relate to that universe. It is embodied in a human body, a master-tool for activity in the objective universe—an automatic tool of motion.

At first the motion of this master-tool is automatic under the laws of Nature which have evolved it. But as time passes the dreams of the subject take in human experience for content and so some of the dreams are related to the objective universe. Then the subject with its power of will<sup>9</sup> begins to use its master-tool for its, the subject's, own purposes. It evolves into a subject of activity in the objective universe. For a time it remains a subject of such activity. Then its powers of activity begin to fail and end altogether—so far as its own master-tool is concerned—when the subject is freed from embodiment.

But, always, this activity is the result of purpose, of thought. No activity in the variation of any object or the creation of any new object in the objective universe is possible without a precedent idea of the new or varied object. Creation in the intelligible universe must always precede creation in the objective universe. The psychical always commands the physical.

We shall find now from what is above stated the relation in human experience between the waking and sleeping states.

<sup>8</sup> If we accept Haeckel's theory that the individual organism in its development is to a great extent an epitome of the form-modification undergone by the successive ancestors of the species in the course of this historic evolution, we still want explanation of the psychical and can find it only—as he does—in holding that every living cell has psychic properties. But where, then, is self-consciousness?

<sup>9</sup> The will cannot be exercised without imagination at its back.

When the subject first comes into separate existence as an object it is not a subject of activity based on purpose : its waking state is useless for it—except instinctively to demand and take in sustenance for its body and otherwise to act instinctively for the continuance in life of its body. It dreams, but its dreams, at first, have no relation to the objective universe : that relation but slowly evolves. Its dreams do not require or demand physiological activity and so do not require the waking state for activity ; it passes the greater part of its time in sleep.

As in time its human experience accumulates, its dreams evolves more fully in relation to the objective universe : it grows more fully a subject of activity, and for this activity it requires more waking time. It passes more and more of its time in the waking state, till, its power of activity decreasing with time, it again passes more and more of its time in the sleeping state.

We thus find an explanation for the relation between the waking and sleeping states. The waking state is necessary for activity and so when the subject is most capable of activity it spends most of its time in the waking state.

Again, when we first come into the world we find our dreams cruelly interfered with by the limits of time and space suddenly imposed on us. We cry for the moon, attempt to touch directly things at a distance and delight in destroying the tyranny of space by throwing a ball away from us or by walking or kicking about our arms and legs. This shows that the subject from its entrance on objective life is exercising imagination, and so *feels* the inhibition embodiment has caused : the limitations of time and space are at first offensive to it as a thing, *in itself*, free from such limitations : it enjoys fighting against its environment.

The dreams of children are for the most part kept to themselves, grown-ups absorbed in conduct cannot understand them or, if told, may even punish for wicked display of fond imagination : what imagina-

tive children have suffered from Gradgrind parents is too terrible for record. The objective universe is itself, at first, but a new restrictive dream, a dream that children retreat from when they can into their own faeryland.

And what is this faeryland? It is a land of free imagination, so far beyond thought, that waking sub-lunary existence seems so definitely an ugly prison-bound part of it that we delight, even when waking, in fairy tales which *pretend* we are not slaves to the ridiculous limitations of time, space and the sloth, evolution.<sup>10</sup>

This experience of childhood is, again, what we should expect if we are introduced into the objective universe merely for a passing time in order that, by conduct we may accomplish something. On the other hand, if our really real personality is found in us as things of conduct, all this "dreaming" is mere surplusage and to be rejected as marking but irregular mental activity which not only is no part of the personality but marks a blot on personality.<sup>11</sup>

And here we may consider the hypothesis of Haeckel which, rejecting the *isness* of personality, the freedom of will and any personality for God, makes our universe a closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution under the eternal, iron laws of Nature—laws existing impersonally in themselves.

Under this hypothesis imagination must be considered as sheer waste except in so far as it can be reduced to thought for scientific activity. Man exists purely as no more than a thing of conduct and thought in time.

It follows that Haeckel's subject is a thing of evolution and devolution in time: its time of full activity—of full personality—is its time when its thought is

<sup>10</sup> I suspect many "grown-ups" enjoy fairy tales as much as I do myself.

<sup>11</sup> Mental activity cannot explain all dreams: trance and ecstasy remain inexplicable.

most concentrated on effort and when it makes its activity most fully manifest in the objective universe.

Now Haeckel considers the stages of man :

(1) Childhood.

(2) The stage of full activity in thought and action.

(3) The ensuing stage of inactivity in old age.

For thought and action he necessarily relies on the middle-stage as the highest and most trustworthy, treating the first stage as marking but inchoate personality, the last but decay of personality. He makes childhood but a preparation for the evolution of the full personality and age to mark its gradual disappearance.

Haeckel notices the fact that no few marked men have during their time of full activity in thought and conduct accepted, more or less, his (metaphysical?) hypothesis ; while, as age has crept on them, they have reverted to some theory of animism. And he holds that this change in age results from decay of faculty, from growing weakness in thought and action. So while he finds the change natural, he holds that the opinion of such men in age is relatively worthless.

If Haeckel's hypothesis be sound this conclusion of his is sound : the opinion of men is most trustworthy when their powers of conduct are at the highest.

But while he admits he can offer no evidence to prove the conscious is evolved from the unconscious—a necessary part of his hypothesis—he ignores imagination, unless inhibited in the form of thought : he treats " outside " imagination as mere surplusage : it does not come within the bounds of his hypothesis. He gives no full explanation of human experience.<sup>12</sup> And in attacking this change of belief in age he ignores one fact :—the men who have changed their belief have not necessarily changed their belief in Haeckel's theory as a man of scientific thought : that stands.

<sup>12</sup> Human experience has been considered at length in the first part of this book.

They disagree with him only when he dogmatizes beyond the boundaries of scientific thought. Incidentally, they deny that a machine can not only work itself but think itself, and that the laws of Nature existing impersonally can evolve consciousness in subjects that they are governed by the unconscious laws which have evolved them.

It would appear, then, that these men who have changed their belief have thereby manifested no weakening of their intellectual power, but merely change in their attitude towards intellectual conclusions touching the transcendental.

On the other hand, though now we, too, start on hypothesis and the hypothesis leads us, through insight, to transcendence of thought, we do offer a full explanation of human experience so far as thought and insight will carry.

The stage of embodiment marks only a mere passing phase for the subject in time : it marks only a passing time for conduct in the objective universe. But, during this passing time, the conduct of the subject is determined by its dreams as a subject in the intelligible universe. We find relation and continuity between the subject's passing stage of activity in thought and conduct and its previous and after stages. The subject's conduct is not determined by all its dreams of free imagination, but by those only which create in the intelligible universe *for* the objective universe. Imagination must be inhibited in the form of thought for objective creation to follow on creation in the intelligible universe. Instead of an incomprehensible inchoate mass of human experience where no personality is to be found and which is of use merely for the crystallisation in passing time of a personality of thought and conduct, we have the *isness* of personality embodied for passing time as a thing of thought and conduct. Free imagination is made part of human experience and, instead of rejecting it or leaving it unaccounted for, we mark its share in the real personality.

But while it is true that the conduct of man is de-



terminated by himself as a subject of the intelligible universe, we must not degrade conduct. Man is embodied for conduct and, though we cannot know why he is embodied and so cannot know the ultimate scheme, if any, of earthly life, we can, in idea, surmise or "make a shot at" the scheme: we can surmise "the one far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves." For the poet to create divine poetry; the architect Kubla Khan's palace; the legislator laws for the welfare of man, man must live and be a thing of conduct. And to live he must, most vulgarly, eat and drink to keep in good order his master-tool, the body. In the first part of this book it has been shown that the conduct of the subject, however mean, can be referred back ultimately for cause to a common ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.

As the argument proceeds we shall find more definitely that conduct results from dreams. For waking thoughts are like to dreams of sleep in kind: there is distinction only in degree, dreams of sleep come often from free imagination, waking dreams mostly from imagination inhibited in the form of thought.

We shall find, even now when we consider the sleeping state, that conduct is founded on imagination. It is as a subject in the intelligible universe than man determines his conduct. But he never knows fully what the result of his conduct will be; intention, indeed, generally, if not always, outruns conduct. Conduct, is based on ignorance and, so, on hope that conduct will have its intended effect. Conduct is little more than a domestic servant of imagination.

Last of all we shall find in human experience of phantasy and ecstasy personal proof for some that the subject is a self-conscious subject of wider power, wider content than a mere subject of thought.

Ecstasy must be considered, but considered apart from normal experience. For while therein is found proof for certain subjects, these subjects can offer to their fellows only evidence in the form of parable. The experience transcends thought and so can only

be brought within the purview of ideas in the form of parable.

A simple experiment in hypnotism<sup>13</sup> may be here referred to, for it points directly to the subject being relatively spiritual, so that embodiment is, for it, merely a manifestation in inhibited form.

A. is hypnotised. While hypnotised he is told that on awaking a table with an object on it will be presented to him, but that he will be unable to see the object. This form of experiment is well known and human experience shows that it may be successfully carried out.

A. awakes and is directed to look at the table with the object on it. He does look at the table, he does sense the table *and* the object on it. But, in common parlance, he cannot "see" the object. Why is this?

Because he merely senses the object and the senses do not judge at all. The presentation of the object establishes no more than an "occasion" for knowledge. But now A. cannot use this "occasion" for knowledge, the mere sensing of the object does *not* make the object an object *for A.* Why is this?

The effect of the object on A. through his senses is the same on A. *as a bodily thing* as in any normal case. But A. is not this bodily thing. A. exists in the intelligible universe, his existence in the objective universe is but mediate manifestation in passing time. He cannot use the "occasion" for knowledge offered him through his senses because as a subject in the intelligible universe his mind has, by hypnotism, been inhibited from using it. Instinctively—that is as a bodily thing without self-consciousness—A. still acts and reacts to environment. But as a self-conscious subject he cannot use this "occasion" for knowledge presented to him because its relations to other objects

<sup>13</sup> Hypnotism, whatever it may be, may be regarded as a form of sleep, differing from sleep in that the subject hypnotised can communicate to others its human experience while in this form of sleep.

no longer exist for him. So he can have no idea of the object and, though the object is sensed by him, he cannot think it because he cannot think about an object without an idea of it. The object has no existence for him in the intelligible universe in which he really exists. It is merely an "occasion" for thought, so that when divorced from thought it *disappears*. It is no longer a phenomenon for thought.

These experiments in human experience point, I think, very strongly to the theory that the subject as a bodily thing of sensibility exists merely as an inhibited form of the subject in the intelligible universe and so support the argument that sleep is more than a state merely for physiological rest.<sup>14</sup>

During sleep the subject can still imagine and think *for* the objective universe, all he cannot do is to objectify his thought. But when the subject thinks in sleep and so expends physical energy, how can sleep spell restoration of physical energy—as happy dreams do?

It would appear probable that sleep, because it is associated with rest from the activity of conduct, thereby sets up opportunity for the inpouring of psychical energy. We thus find an explanation for the restoration of physical energy in sleep even when sleep gives rise to dreams.

<sup>14</sup> We can all have ideas of objects which do not exist objectively. So there is no magic when, by hypnotism, anyone is made to "imagine" an object which has no material existence.

## WAKING AND SLEEPING DREAMS

CAN we find in human experience the alleged likeness between waking and sleeping dreams? Are waking thoughts the same in kind as dreams of sleep?

In considering this question the term "sub-consciousness" must be ignored as meaningless.<sup>1</sup> For the very basis of the argument is the existence of the self-conscious subject, which simply *is*. The content of self-consciousness may differ, the manifestations of self-consciousness may take differing forms, but the self-conscious subject simply *is*. Normal consciousness is but a "slice" of full consciousness, as Myer's held.

Consider Clifford's definition for dreams: "A dream is a succession of phenomena having no external reality to correspond to them."

In sleep we use memory, so, in sleep, we may call up phenomena which *have had* for us external reality. At the same time, though the phenomena of sleep may have had, they may also never have had, external reality.

But we have already seen not only that the subject must first think about an object in the intelligible universe before he can create any such object in the objective universe, but that he must have a schematic idea of the object before he can think about any already existing object.<sup>2</sup> That is, he must first think

<sup>1</sup> But Myers' distinction between supraliminal and subliminal consciousness is sound, though many commentators have misunderstood and misapplied his meaning.

<sup>2</sup> We use schematic ideas for ideas about objects in the objective universe.

about a succession of phenomena *having no external reality* to correspond to them not only before he can think about existing objects<sup>3</sup> but before he can create new objects in the objective universe.

How, then, does this waking thought about any such succession of phenomena differ from sleeping dreams about them? If we hold that dreams are confined to a succession of phenomena which, though having no external reality, *might have* such external reality, then there is no difference at all.<sup>4</sup> Imagination in the inhibited form of thought is the genesis of both.

More than this: the mental activity of sleep involved in Clifford's definition for dreams, is necessary as a precedent for conduct. The mental activity in sleep giving rise to dreams is the same as the mental activity in the waking state which necessarily precedes conduct in the objective universe. The waking state, then, so far as it gives effective power over the sensible universe, even power to think about such universe, is like to the sleeping state. The subject, so far, is the same waking or sleeping, except that in the latter state it is not a subject of conduct.<sup>5</sup>

Human experience informs us that men, at times, solve mathematical problems in sleep, invent new objects in sleep, determine certain courses for future conduct in sleep. Cases of this kind are so well known and so numerous that it is unnecessary to give particular instances.<sup>6</sup> Indeed there are authentic records of such abnormal mental activity in sleep that some hold sleep makes possible the exaltation of faculty. The possibility of any such exaltation of faculty is denied: thought is an inhibition of imagination, the

<sup>3</sup> The presentation of objects is simply an "occasion" for thought about them.

<sup>4</sup> That is, no difference apart from the question of conduct.

<sup>5</sup> If you object to this reasoning it is because you claim for dreams *more than* mere mental activity. The objection is hereafter supported.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. XII. *Pro. S.P.R.*, pp. 11 *et seq.*, may be referred to for certain well-established cases.

inhibition being determined by the limits of motion of the brain : there can be no exaltation of these limits. All there can be is *abnormal* manifestation of power : and this we find in sleep.

Whether the subject be waking or sleeping the mental activity in solving a problem, inventing a new object, determining on any course of future conduct is the same : we have no sound ground for holding there is any difference. There is in both cases mental activity in the Intelligible Universe and, *waking or sleeping*, this mental activity is a condition precedent to any conduct in the Sensible Universe.

The man who has solved a problem in sleep wakes up and records the solution. Waking, he has forgotten how he solved it in sleep. But what do we mean by saying he has forgotten? All we mean is that he cannot use his memory in the present : the solution is his, but he cannot relate the process of solution to the present passing *now* in time. The process of solution took place by mental activity : on awaking the process is forgotten, the result is remembered. Any such "defect" in memory cannot affect what before took place. There has been accomplished exactly the same mental activity as if he had been awake when working out the solution.<sup>7</sup>

So far human experience supports us in holding there is no radical distinction between waking and sleeping dreams; both result from mental activity. Waking or sleeping this mental activity is a condition precedent for conduct.

Returning to Clifford's definition we have : "A dream is a succession of phenomena having no external reality to correspond to them." But we have also found that unless, waking or sleeping, we first use mental activity in thinking about a succession of phenomena having *no external reality*, we cannot, as

<sup>7</sup> In sleep mental activity may be freer than in the waking state and so manifest abnormal results. Thereby the present argument is strengthened not weakened.

things of conduct, create any such external reality. The external reality can never exist unless it has been first an *internal* reality in the waking or sleeping state.<sup>8</sup>

Waking and sleeping dreams are, so far, the same; Clifford's definition covers both.

We find, then, that waking or sleeping the personality, the "I am," remains unaffected. In both states it remains embodied;<sup>9</sup> in both states it remains a subject in the intelligible universe; but in the former it is capable of activity in the objective universe, in the latter it is not. Dreams of sleep, so far as we have considered them, are the same as waking thoughts using ideas.

Two peculiarities of dreams must be now noticed, though consideration of them must be deferred.

In sleeping dreams where imagination is free to use the brain for thought without reference to activity, physiological rest may result. But, ordinarily, mental activity when the subject is awake absorbs energy and so causes physiological fatigue. We should naturally expect, as before stated, that the same physiological fatigue would follow from mental activity in sleep. But this is not always so. Dreams of sleep *may* cause fatigue, but they may, and often do, increase the physiological rest, that is, assist the restoration of energy which, physiologically, sleep is intended for: such dreams appear to have the result of storing up instead of absorbing physical energy for the subject.

The second peculiarity is that when sleeping "the objectivity of the dream images is usually unquestioned."<sup>10</sup> *While* sleeping the subject, in dreams of a certain class, appears to itself to be as fully a subject in the objective universe as when waking and it is only when waking he thinks about his dream by the use of

<sup>8</sup> To think about the objective universe we must first read the laws of Nature into Nature.

<sup>9</sup> Freedom from embodiment, in ecstasy for instance, is considered hereafter.

<sup>10</sup> What this objectivity means is hereafter considered.

memory that he holds his dream images were not objective. This peculiarity is recognised scientifically. A deduction, however strange it may be, follows: It must be held to be within the bounds of possibility that at any moment the so-termed waking subject may *really* really wake up, and, from his then transcendental state, contemplate his past life in the objective universe as a mere dream.<sup>11</sup>

So far we find no difference between waking and sleeping dreams; both result from intellectual operation. Dreams that transcend thought have not as yet been considered. But such dreams are the same in kind as those resulting from mental operation; they differ but in degree: The latter are confined to imagination inhibited in the form of thought. The former exist in a wider universe.

<sup>11</sup> In ecstasy something closely akin to this is experienced.



## MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY

BEFORE we proceed with the argument something further must be written as to the statement that the subject may really really wake up and, from his then transcendental state, contemplate his past life in the objective universe as but a dream. For we shall find this possibility is a fact of human experience. We shall also find, incidentally, a strong argument that the really real subject is the "I am," an argument which could not be considered in the first part of the book because it involves consideration of the sleeping state.

Multiplex personality is a fact of human experience, the evidence is too strong even for any scientific denial.

If we consider any one of the recorded cases we find that one and the same brain is involved, no matter how many human personalities may be made manifest.<sup>1</sup> It follows that under any materialistic theory we have differing human personalities from *one* machine, the brain. But if we dissect the multiple personalities which exist for any one case we find<sup>2</sup> they emanate from some one, single self.

Consider the well known case of Miss Beauchamp. (*Pro. S.P.R.* Vol. XV. p. 466). But how are we

<sup>1</sup> In Sally Beauchamp's case (*Pro. S.P.R.*, Vol. XV., p. 466) there were four; in Louis Vive's case (*Myers' Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 338) there were six; and in a case reported by Dr. Bramwell (*Myer's Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 171) sixteen manifestations of personality.

<sup>2</sup> Unless we accept the theory of possession which supports the theory now relied on.

to consider it? From what point of view? From two points of view. In the first place from our own point of view as external subjects.<sup>3</sup> This is *one* point of view: we have, from the external, to consider one body and one brain. So, to us, Miss Beauchamp does not exhibit differing personalities: she exhibits but differing manifestations of personality. And, as she has but one body and one brain, we must refer each of these differing manifestations to partial and particular psycho-physiological activity of part of the one brain.<sup>4</sup>

But what, then, do we from our point of view hold as to those parts of the one brain inhibited from use? They still remain in existence. In what existence? The existence of Miss Beauchamp. The inhibited parts of her brain are as fully part of her brain as those in use. They still have potential existence *for* Miss Beauchamp.


It follows that each manifestation of personality exhibited by Sally Beauchamp is but a limited form of manifestation of her real personality: there is some one underlying personality of Sally Beauchamp.

So far my argument is closely in agreement with that of Dr. Morton Prince. But now I must separate from him when considering what this underlying personality of Sally Beauchamp is.

I shall assume that anyone who is sufficiently interested in this subject to read what is now written has at his command the full account of Dr. Morton Prince and has read and considered it. So I proceed at once to the chart set out by him on page 480.

<sup>3</sup> I do not consider the question of possession. For if possession is fact then the present theory that the really real self is fully psychical is established.

<sup>4</sup> The second point of view is that of Miss Beauchamp herself, which is considered hereafter.



Now this chart is not clear for we find, amongst the differing personalities, duality in the origin,—the complete self is made up of Miss Beauchamp, the original self, and her subliminal self. We find, too, a confusing “cross” between the differing personalities and the independent existence (subliminal self?) of Sally Beauchamp.

Whence does this confusion arise? From the *starting-point* being one of duality.

How does the present objection come in? It comes in from denial of the fact that Miss Beauchamp constitutes the original (or normal) self as *against* the other differing personalities. The error arises from treating the original (normal) self as a *fact* of personality against the other differing personalities as *accidents*.

Let us consider this question.

No single man ever appeared on earth who, in manifestation, exhibited his full embodied existence. No man ever lived with his body in that perfect state of health that it constituted as perfect a machine as it might have been for human conduct;<sup>5</sup> no man ever lived who, with differing environment of birth, wealth and education, might not have been more effective in conduct. Every man, as manifest as a personality, is an *accident* of birth, wealth and education. Consider two like street Arabs. The one encounters the accidents of slum-birth and a life of

<sup>5</sup> I except our Lord. It is a strange fact that we have no recorded evidence of His ever being subject to the normal ills of the flesh.

poverty for brain and body. The other (after slumbirth) encounters the accidents of a life of fullness for brain and body.<sup>6</sup> The two, quâ personality, start from the same point. The one, by accident, ultimately manifests one form of personality, the other, by accident, develops another and altogether differing personality.<sup>7</sup>

Every one of us is conscious that his personality, as manifest, is an accident. Every one of us dreams of what *he himself* might have been, in manifestation of personality, had environment been more favourable: the dreams are real and have sound foundation, their content is subject to accident.

It is from this consciousness that the discontent with lot, the vanity and conceit of man, arise. The cow,—if we assume it is not self-conscious,—acts and re-acts instinctively in relation to environment. The man, conscious of power over environment and yet subject in some measure to it, is thereby conscious of *how* the accident of environment bars him from full expression of himself. He is, then, discontented with his lot or, dreaming of himself as he *might be* manifest in personality, falsely relies on this dream as objective reality and so regards himself as superior to the self he manifests to his fellows. Thereby he displays conceit or vanity. This false estimate of self is evil because man is not embodied to dream and to rely on dreams. He is embodied for conduct; that is, for activity in thought and action as manifest in the objective universe.


What follows directly as to the Beauchamp case? Miss Beauchamp's "original self" is only an ap-

<sup>6</sup> Romance deals largely with these interesting accidents.

<sup>7</sup> The Vicar of Wakefield speaking of his two daughters says:—"The one entertained me with her vivacity when I was gay, the other with her sense when I was serious. But these qualities were never carried to excess in either and I have often seen them exchange characters for a whole day together. A suit of mourning has transformed my coquette into a prude, and a new set of ribands has given her younger sister more than natural vivacity."

proximation to her real self as embodied. The other states of Miss Beauchamp are the same in kind as her original self. They differ only in degree,<sup>8</sup> however great that degree may be.

Every one of us is conscious that his personality as manifest is *not* full manifestation of himself as embodied. There is for each of us the "what might have been." And this "what might have been" is related, for each of us, to the underlying self. I would, therefore, on Dr. Morton Prince's chart cut out Miss Beauchamp's original self from its position as part of her complete self and relegate it to the same class as B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, etc. I would *start* with the subliminal self as the really real or complete self. We have then the following chart:—



"Myself" exists in the transcendental: it is Kant's transcendental subject.

"Myself Embodied" exists in the intelligible and the objective universe. It is related to the transcendental through insight. The relation between the transcendental and intelligible universe is indeterminate and so marked only by a dotted line.

<sup>8</sup> Bear in mind that even Sally Beauchamp was ignorant of the thoughts of B. IV. Even normally we do not always keep to one personality. We all are subject in degree to change, though not normally to the exceptional change marked in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

Miss B. B., etc. are the personalities of Miss B. as embodied, which are manifest in the objective universe.

Each reader must judge for himself whether or not the above chart is preferable to that of Dr. Morton Prince: it is, at the least, simpler and, if accepted, leaves the main timbers of the doctor's built up argument standing.

We have first the "myself" which is transcendent and exists in the transcendental. This "myself" is embodied and, as embodied, exists both in the intelligible universe and the objective universe. Bear in mind the intelligible universe holds sway over the objective universe. This embodied self is the *potential* embodied self. This potential embodied self is manifest in the objective universe as "partials" of personality. Each one of us is conscious of himself embodied and conscious that this embodied self is but partially manifested. We *compare* our real embodied potential selves with these manifestations and so, in dreams, waking or sleeping, feel discontent with lot or, as before shown, exhibit to our fellows vanity or conceit. But our dreams, sleeping or even waking, of our existence as personalities other than we are in manifestation have sound basis in our potentiality. There is, for each of us, "what might have been."<sup>9</sup>

Herein, I think, lies a strong argument that our *potential* personality is real as against our manifest personality, and, if so, we find again the command of the intelligible over the objective universe. Dreams support the argument.

But the chart, as I offer it, has another important bearing on the argument generally.

The plane dividing the transcendental from the intelligible universe is marked only by a dotted line. The dotted line is crossed by Insight. And here we

<sup>9</sup> Even "may be" in some future.

are on firm ground. For the subject, even as embodied, has the power of insight transcending thought and its limits of relation lying between limits of contradiction.

Insight cannot be referred to the brain: the brain's motion only covers motion set up by thought. The subject embodied has therefore, in it, something of the transcendental and to this we *must* give pre-eminence in transcendence of thought.

This is the fact relied on which relates the embodied self to the transcendental beyond the purview of ideas and which leads us, in reason transcending ideas, to regard the self as limited by embodiment,—that is as being in itself a transcendental subject.

The chart I have given is general in form, except that I have marked the manifestations of the self as Miss B. etc., in order to bring the chart into likeness with that of Dr. Morton Prince.

Miss B. may still be termed Miss B.'s original self. But that means only the embodied self manifested: it is still a "partial" of Miss B. as "myself embodied." B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, etc. are also "partials" though some exhibit a fuller degree than others of psychophysiological activity of the brain.

Now from *our* point of view we regard all these successive states of Miss B. as states of *herself* determined by time: we regard them as "partials" of personality.

But Miss B., herself?<sup>10</sup> How does she, when manifest in any one state, regard her other states?

We regard our fellows as subject to differing manifestations of personality. Brown may be sane for four years, then insane for one year, then sane again. Papa is not the same personality when he comes home tired and cross and hungry as Papa rested and good-tempered after a well-cooked dinner. The for-

<sup>10</sup> We now consider the phenomena from our second point of view; that is, Miss B's.

mer Papa we know would refuse our reasonable request; the latter grants it.

But when we regard, not others, but ourselves we find we relate what is external to us, to ourselves as personalities in the particular form of manifestation of ourselves which exists for the passing time. The world *is* black to Brown rejected by Sophonisba, the world *is* bright and glorious to him accepted. Brown has nothing to do with the external world as a thing-in-itself. As a personality the only reality for him is its effect on him. And the little word "yes" or "no" has—for him—the Brobdignagian power of making the world—for the time being!—heaven or hell.

Miss B. in any one state of personality regards her other states as non-existent or as foreign to herself. In any one state,—if she can exercise her memory, in the present, to recall any other state,—she must treat that other state as foreign to herself: the Miss B., in that other state, is to her another person. The Miss B. in that other state is not part of Miss B.'s objective life,—she regards herself in that other state as a dream. So we find that what to us, from our point of view, is objective is, from her point of view, not objective. And as to this bear in mind that what is objective to the dreamer is not objective to him when he wakes.

But evidence on one point is wanting, I think. I should have expected that in *any* state Miss B. would have had a feeling that she as an embodied self was not fully manifest.

There is a remarkable case reported which illustrates what I mean:—

"Lorsque je me trouvais seul," said a patient of Krishaber, "dans un endroit nouveau, j'étais comme un enfant nouveau-né, ne reconnaissant rien. J'avais un ardent désir de revoir mon ancien monde, de redevenir l'ancien moi: c'était ce dé-sir qui m'a empêché de me tuer." (*Pro. S.P.R.* Vol. IV. p. 502).



This man was still conscious of *himself* as existing: his suffering arose from the divorce of his old *content of* consciousness from himself as a self-conscious subject. This I should have expected to find in the case of Miss Beauchamp, but I can find no evidence on the point.

Now when Miss Beauchamp in any one state regards her other states as foreign to herself, have they not, *for her*, fallen back into dreamland? You dream you were a King: you wake and *then* regard the dream as a dream. But, while you dreamt, your dream was objectively true to you: you for the first time regard it as a dream when you wake. It follows that if Miss Beauchamp,— or you yourself,—could find your own personality in your potential embodied state, you would be fully “awake”<sup>11</sup> and regard your past states as dreams.

If you object to this reasoning it is because you are under the influence of the preconceived idea that the objective is real, the intelligible unreal,—no more than a reflection on the real. But, if you deny this relative reality of dreams, how do you account for the fact that certain dreams do *not* result in the expenditure of physical energy: that they *do* result, on the contrary, in the accumulation or restoration of physical energy?

Just as our normal consciousness is but a “slice” of our full consciousness, so our normal personality is but a “partial” of our potential embodied personality. And the form of this partial differs in time for each one of us.

We all exhibit multiplex personalities. As to this I said, in *Personality and Telepathy* (p. 273):—

If, however, we hold our normal self-consciousness and these various phases of consciousness are but mani-

<sup>11</sup> So far as you can be while still embodied.

festations in our time and space of an unique and indissoluble self-consciousness, we get rid of the difficulty : we arrive at a real personality in each of us.

And I cited Myers' fine analogy :—

But the question of origin will still remain : and it is not an hypothesis wilder than another if we suppose it possible that that portion of the cosmic energy which operates through the organism of each one of us was in some sense individualized before its descent into generation, and pours the potentiality of larger being into the earthen vessels which it fills and overflows. (*Pro.*, Vol. VI., p. 215).

The fact of multiplex personalities supports the argument that on disembodiment we may really really "wake up" and then regard our past states as states of dreamland. But, if so, we do not reduce our existing states to mere *maya* as Gautama does. We *subsume* our past in the transcendental.

## HALLUCINATION AND ILLUSION IN DREAMS

IN considering this subject we cannot do better than to begin with a statement taken from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, for a statement proceeding from that authority may be held to offer, at the least, a view generally accepted:—

“DREAM. The state of consciousness during sleep; it may also be defined as a hallucination or illusion peculiarly associated with the condition of sleep, but not necessarily confined to that state. In sleep the withdrawal of the mind from the external world is more complete and the objectivity of the dream images is usually unquestioned, whereas in the waking state the hallucination is usually recognised as such.”

This passage must be criticised.

In the first place I would hold there cannot be different states of consciousness for the subject: the self-conscious subject simply *is*. What we really find is not differing states of consciousness itself but differences in its content and form of manifestation. There may be a state of sleep or of waking for the subject; there may be differences in the content of consciousness or in the presentations to or manifestation of consciousness. But consciousness—which imports a self-conscious subject or being—is no more to us than a really real fact beyond the purview of thought: it can be conditioned in no way.

But the greatest error in the statement is, I think,

the underlying assumption that because, when the subject awakens, its past remembered dream appears to it to be the result of hallucination or illusion, the dream, therefore, was false to reality in being illusory or hallucinatory. To judge the dream correctly it should be judged from the point of view of the dreamer,—the dream was the dreamer's dream.

Suppose that you could communicate with the dreamer during his dream and were to tell him his dream was the result of illusion or hallucination. His dream is objectively true to him: he would laugh you to scorn.<sup>1</sup>

Suppose someone were to communicate with you and tell you that your life on earth, objectively real to you, is but a dream, the result of illusion or hallucination. You would laugh him to scorn.

What difference is there between the two cases? There is none. If you reply: "But no one ever has come to me to tell me my life is but a dream," the reply is worthless: for if he were to come you would laugh him to scorn. To the dreamer *personally* his dream is as real as your waking experience is to you personally.

Again, there is no evidence at all that the dreamer's dream was not objectively true, apart from the fact that he can find no reflection of it on our objective universe when he wakes up. But what is this evidence worth? Why, from moment to moment, your *own* body undergoes innumerable and intricate changes of which you are not only unconscious but which leave you, as a self, altogether unaffected. Your own body might, to your full ignorance, be used as a medium for the transmission of a wireless current of electricity which causes an objective explosion at a distance. Faraday "dreamt of" a dynamo and this very dream enabled him to *make*

<sup>1</sup> If, under hypnotism, the subject criticises his own dream as hallucinatory or illusory, he is *not* fully in dreamland.

a dynamo,—a thing which would never have existed but for the dream. If his dream was hallucinatory or illusory, then all objectivity is the result of hallucination or illusion.

That dreams can be rightly judged from the waking subject's point of view can only be justified by an assumption—by an assumption which influences even the deepest reasoning of no few influential writers.

The assumption is that the subject, awake as a "thing" of conduct, is the really real subject and so holds command over the subject as one in the intelligible universe. We assume to be right in judging our dreams from the point of view of "things" of conduct; we make the "self" a thing of conduct,—we make the self to exist only as embodied. For, cut out all embodiment, and the self cannot be a "thing" of conduct in the objective universe.<sup>2</sup>

The writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* himself admits that, for the dreamer, "the withdrawal of the mind from the external world is more complete and that the objectivity of the dream images is usually unquestioned." What I think he means is that *because* the dreamer is divorced from external affects in the passing *now*, *therefore* his dreams take on the aspect of objectivity. He admits that from the dreamer's point of view hallucination and illusion do not exist.<sup>3</sup>

And what does he mean by objectivity? If he means merely that what the dreamer experiences appears to him as fully veridical as waking experiences he is correct. But if he means dreams are to the sleeper as fully subject to the laws of Nature, of evolution, and to the resistance of matter as waking

<sup>2</sup> Disembodied it may, possibly, influence or affect the embodied.

<sup>3</sup> If they do, the dream is not a pure dream; the subject is criticizing himself as a dreamer.

experiences he is wrong. It is largely *because* imagination in dreams is not subject to these inhibitions that, to the waking subject, they appear to exist in hallucination or illusion.

We need not trouble about illusion for it may be held to arise from error in judgment as to external sensuous affects.<sup>4</sup> But hallucination, what does it mean?

Hallucination is said to mean the apparent perception of some external thing to which no real object corresponds. Now by a real object is here meant an object in the objective universe, so I think hallucination should be defined as the imagining of something which can but does not exist in the objective universe or of something which cannot exist in the objective universe. For I do not know what "apparent perception" means. It can only mean a perception which is not real because impossible to be related to anything in the objective universe. And, if so, it gives real reality to the objective universe: it denies reality to the intelligible universe.

If the present argument be sound, however, we find hallucination as to the imagining of things which can but do not exist in the objective universe, is necessary even for waking subjects before any new object can be created in the objective universe:<sup>5</sup> so hallucination is not peculiar to dreams, it exists equally for waking thoughts. For instance, Faraday had to "see" his dynamo, Bell had to "hear" his telephone, before either did or could exist as an object in the objective universe.

Hallucination as to things possible of existence in

<sup>4</sup> Kant says an object of intuition may be thought. I suggest it can only be thought about. Illusion results from error of judgment in thought about an object, not in thinking the object itself. What is real to the subject is the idea of, not the object itself.

<sup>5</sup> We consider sane men only. The irregular working of the brain is a question of pathology. The brains of Coleridge, Shelley, for example, worked normally.

the objective universe, is not a peculiarity of dreams: it applies equally to waking thoughts.<sup>6</sup> So far, then, the distinction between dreams as subjects of hallucination and waking thoughts as free from hallucination falls to the ground. And as pure dreams—that is dreams in full sleep where there is freedom from external affects from the objective—are free from external sensuous effect, the distinction between dreams as subject to illusion and normal waking thoughts as free from illusion, also falls to the ground.<sup>7</sup>

But in dreams there is another form, as we have seen, of hallucination: dreams are not confined to images of things possible of existence in the objective universe.<sup>8</sup> The imagining of things possible of existence in the objective universe *must* be, either waking or sleeping, before such things can be given existence to in the objective universe. The imagining of things impossible of creation in the objective universe is useless so far as after creation in the objective universe goes.

Hallucination and illusion exist equally for dreams and waking thoughts except so far as dreams may transcend the purview of thought.

Hallucination is of two kinds or, rather, has two branches. The one, the imagining of things that might be given existence in the objective universe, the other of things that are therein impossible. The former kind of hallucination *must* exist for the subject, sleeping or waking, before any new object can be created in the objective universe. It is the latter kind that we find more difficult to explain.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Unless we hold that Faraday and Bell *suffered* from hallucination before the objective existence of the dynamo and telephone.

<sup>7</sup> Dreams may be caused by external affect. Such dreams are not considered now.

<sup>8</sup> This may be true, also, for waking thoughts.

<sup>9</sup> Bear in mind that, without imagination, will and conduct can have no effect in the objective universe.

But, at present, we need only point out the conclusion forced on us as to the hallucination of dreams.

So far as hallucination is defined as play of imagination round things possible of existence in the objective universe there is nothing abnormal about it: it is a condition precedent for the subject, sleeping or waking, to be able to create in, even to think about, the objective universe. The second branch marks free imagination round "things" impossible of creation in the objective universe.

Thought exists as an inhibition of imagination where the inhibition is determined by the motion of the brain. Thought exists only so far as it can exist in relation to motion of the brain.<sup>10</sup> Imagination, through the brain, sets up motion in the objective universe which is all the subject, with its master-tool the body, wants for creation therein.

In now considering hallucination and illusion we are assuming the brain of the subject to be healthy and normal. Illusion may involve error as to sense presentation but, the brain being assumed to be normal, it operates correctly with reference to what appears to be sensed. So we have nothing to do with the hallucination and illusion of the insane: that raises but a pathological or physiological inquiry. All we need note is that if, as the present argument assumes, the brain is no more than a machine which permits thought—a limited form of imagination—to operate on it for the setting up of motion then, if the machine be imperfect, the thought manifest will also necessarily be imperfect. And this is in agreement with modern medical views. For insanity is very generally held to be a symptom of imperfection or disease of the brain: insanity is not held to result from an insane mind manifest in a healthy brain; it is physiological, not psychical.

<sup>10</sup> But we shall see that free imagination may colour even thought.



Hallucination and, in some measure, illusion<sup>11</sup> are part of normal human experience, waking and sleeping; they are not peculiar to sleep alone. They exist for the normal motion of the normal brain. Human experience informs us that human beings, with sound brains, *do* dream, and even think when waking, about things possible and impossible for the objective universe.

It is now denied that the self is a mere thing of conduct, that it exists only in embodiment. And the hallucination and, in some measure, the illusion of dreams, waking or sleeping, form a normal part of human experience. To get at the "self" we must admit hallucination as part of human experience as fully as we admit normal conduct to be part.

Physiologically we must admit that sleep, even with its dreams of hallucination, gives rest from conduct to the self of consciousness, from conduct in relation to the Objective Universe. But, psychically, what place do we then give to dreams? We find them definitely associated with the subject when in a state which gives physiological rest. This must mean, physiologically, decrease of expenditure of physical energy by the subject. But dreams, pleasant dreams certainly, increase rather than decrease the measure of physiological rest which sleep gives. If dreams import expenditure of energy, where does the energy come from?

Using the term psychical energy, it is now argued that the expenditure of psychical energy on pleasant dreams spells rest from expenditure, even increase, of energy in a physical sense. And this makes physical energy subjective to psychical energy, just as we have found the objective universe subjective to the intelligible universe. Or we might, on the other hand, say that pleasant dreams exist without

<sup>11</sup> Illusion, pure and simple, results from sensuous error, but it varies up to hallucination.

any expenditure of energy at all. If this be so then we want to know if dreams are possible beyond the purview of ideas; that is, without intellectual operation? For intellectual operation involves physiological motion of the brain and so expenditure of energy.

The subject has the faculty of insight which transcends thought. Why should he not have *some* human experience of a universe of insight transcending thought? Such human experience is possible for it contains, in itself, no contradiction. And, in itself, it involves no physiological expenditure of energy.

Illusion we may leave for physiological investigation. Hallucination must exist for the subject, waking or sleeping, or he could not be, as he is, a thing of conduct.

The sleeping state of the subject with all its hallucinations marks greater freedom for the subject in the intelligible universe than its waking state. In its waking state there is inhibition of the free play of imagination: the waking subject generally uses thought, only, for conduct in relation to the objective universe. The sleeping subject has free play of imagination without its being inhibited to the form of thought: so its content transcends the content of thought.

The definition of "Dream" that we are considering admits that "in sleep the withdrawal of the mind from the external world is more complete" than in the waking state. This external world is the objective universe which, by the present argument, is but an occasion for thought. Imagination is not confined to thought about the objective universe: the objective universe is not exhaustive of real reality or even of reality. Dreams, then, have a content beyond, wider than, the reality of the external world. It follows that dreams must mark hallucination as to "things" not only possible but impossible for the objective universe. Dreams travelling beyond the limited

reality of our little objective universe *must* have for content what is impossible for our universe. The only reply to the above argument is, I think, that our objective universe exhausts reality.

## IGNORANCE, HOPE AND FAITH

It has been shown that waking thoughts and sleeping dreams are alike in kind, the difference existing but in degree. Imagination, inhibited in the form of thought, is the foundation of one class of both waking and sleeping thoughts where sleeping thoughts take the aspect of dreams. But in sleep the subject is divorced from the affect, in the passing now, of the external and so imagination is freer to *colour*<sup>1</sup> thought. We find imagination colouring thought even in the waking state: much more must it colour thought in the sleeping state. In the sleeping state, also, the subject, being free from the inhibition of the external, can exercise more freely its power of imagination beyond the purview of thought. Dreams are higher in degree, have a wider purview, than waking thoughts.

The subjection of the objective universe to the intelligible universe and the command of the subject,—as a subject in the intelligible universe,—over the objective universe have been shown. And the subject in the sleeping state remains a subject in the intelligible universe; it is simply divorced from physical not from psychical activity.

We find, then, that the conduct of the subject being determined by purpose the subject, when divorced by sleep from activity as a thing of conduct, can still exercise imagination *for* the objective universe though it cannot objectify what it imagines: it can still entertain purpose.

<sup>1</sup> That is, thought itself manifests a background of free imagination.

Hope and faith affect purpose and they have existence in the intelligible universe:<sup>2</sup> there may be purpose which does not result in conduct. For conduct imports activity of the subject in the objective universe whether in relation to objects or fellow-subjects. Conduct, then, demands the embodiment of the self in the objective universe.<sup>3</sup>

Can we find any relation between conduct on the one hand and hope and faith on the other? If so we may find conduct subject to faith and hope and thus again establish the command of the intelligible over the objective universe.

The foundation of all activity in conduct of the embodied self exists in ignorance: if we were things of full knowledge embodied life would spell mental hell. As we are constituted we cling to life: the man suffering extreme physical or mental suffering clings to life; even the most confirmed idler would prefer labour to death. With full knowledge we should all seek immediate death.

Consider what your state would be with full knowledge. The statement of Kant that "the phaenomena of the past determine all phaenomena in the succeeding time,"<sup>4</sup> would be really true for you, not exist only in phenomenal truth. You would not only know everything generally but in detail. At every passing *now* your future conduct and its results would be known to you. Your "memory" would cover not only the past but the future: both, for you, would be fully determined. For your future would be determined by your full knowledge of what had to be. You would have lost the power of choice between differing courses of conduct and so your interest in your own conduct would have disappeared: all com-

<sup>2</sup> So they have existence for the subject in both the sleeping and waking states.

<sup>3</sup> Therefore conduct exists only for the waking state

<sup>4</sup> Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 148.

petition, noble or ignoble, with your fellows; all strife against environment; all effort to improve your own lot or that of your fellows, would be absent: there would be, for you, no standard of morality to judge what were *best* for you as a self-conscious subject. You would exist as that awful "thing," a thing of determinism, with hideous self-knowledge of your machine-like existence.

What would be left you to live for? You cannot pretend you would live on imagination of coming pleasures any more than you would live on imagination of coming evils. For there would be no place in you for imagination: your past, present and future would be determined and you would know fully *what* was determined.

What constitutes one of the greatest of our human troubles? Monotony. And why do we feel monotony as an evil? Because it bars imagination as to our future: we contemplate a *determined* future like to our past; like to something which we already know.

If you try to imagine what your conduct would be as a thing of full knowledge you will find the very idea so preposterous that imagination fails you. In February you know that in the coming March you will break your leg; propose to someone who will reject you; speculate and lose a fortune; run a race and come in last; plant an acre of potatoes that will fail as a crop. What then is your state in February? You *must*, in the future, do all these things, for you the phaenomena of your past not only determine the phaenomena of your future but you *know* the future. Thinking, as you are now constituted, you will find it simply ridiculous to imagine you could remain a thing of conduct if with full knowledge. Your course of life exists and can only exist while you are ignorant. Full knowledge would destroy the very foundation of your embodied life.

But how is it that full knowledge would destroy the foundation of your embodied life? Destroy it

by *adding* full knowledge? An addition to life cannot destroy life. It must be that full knowledge would have effect in destroying something which is vital to your life as a self-conscious subject. There is no *tertium quid*. What is the reply?

The very foundation of your embodied life exists in hope:<sup>5</sup> hope is based on ignorance of the future, it could not exist without such ignorance. And this is a conclusion from human experience. Human experience informs us that all are moved by hope.

As we accumulate human experience our knowledge of what will *probably* happen in the future enlarges. The probabilities that the sun will rise to-morrow at a known time; that if you drop an apple from your raised hand it will fall to the ground; that if you cut your finger it will hurt you, are all so highly probable that we are justified in treating the probabilities as involving proof. But we do not hope for all this that we practically know; knowledge excludes hope. The child who does not know the times of rising of the sun may hope that to-morrow, a holiday, God may make it rise earlier than usual; the child who first drops an apple from its raised hands is surprised and pleased to see it drop to the ground and, dropping it again, may feel interest in speculation as to what it will do; the child who has cut its finger may not only hope it will not pain but may run to its mother to kiss it and stop the pain, and—*mirabile dictu!*—the kiss often does stop the pain. Where there is ignorance there is hope.: where there is knowledge there is no hope.

And here a strange fact as to ignorance may be again referred to. The more truly learned a man is, the fuller is the content of his consciousness of his own ignorance: the less learned a man is, the less is the content of his consciousness of his own ignor-

<sup>5</sup> Faith is considered later on.

ance. Modesty marks the learned philosopher or man of science; dogmatic assurance and vanity mark the unlearned crank. Why is this? Because the more we learn the more closely is brought home to us our *vital ignorance*.<sup>6</sup> The limits of human knowledge are more definitely appreciated by the philosopher than by the crank. The more developed man's reasoning power as an embodied subject, the fuller his insight of consciousness into the limits of this reasoning power. Huxley perhaps of all men most boldly faced the problem of personality. And, if he rested on agnosticism, he not only admitted that the problem faces us but declared his belief in consciousness as a thing-in-itself. The unlearned man denies his ignorance: the learned man finds his ignorance vital.

But when we hold that hope is based on ignorance what do we mean by hope? We do not mean a vague indefinite longing, we mean something concrete: hope always has content. What then is it that we hope?

We hope that our dreams may come true. Our dreams are real to us; we hope that this reality may be reflected in the objective universe. We hope that the internal objectivity may be reflected in external objectivity. The child must first imagine a fine day before it can hope for a fine to-morrow: there must be the idea created in the intelligible universe before, in any case, there can be hope that the idea may be objectified. Even for objective creation, Faraday could not be sure, when he had formulated a concrete idea of the dynamo, that his conduct would result in objectifying it. His conduct was based on hope which existed because of his ignorance.

Now bear in mind what we have already seen,—

<sup>6</sup> This is considered at length in the first part of the work. Cf. p. 12.



that creation in the intelligible universe must always precede creation in the objective universe.

We find that, for the self-conscious subject, his dreams are real; they are free in that they have no necessary relation to the objective universe: for they may be of what is impossible in or for the objective universe. They may or may not result in conduct leading to change or creation in the objective universe: conduct, in this, may or may not be effective. We reduce conduct to a mere incident of dreams, just as in the first part of the book we have found the objective universe a mere "occasion" for thought. It is a part and only a very small part of our imagination that can be used for the purposes of conduct and when we use this small part we can never be sure that our conduct will have the effect we desire. Hope is based on ignorance. Hope is a certainty for the self-conscious subject, the detail of its objectivity in our little objective universe is an uncertainty. If you object to this statement it is because at the back of your mind you still give real reality to the objective universe.

If we start with the self-conscious subject possessing the power of free imagination we find it embodied for a passing time. During this time it exercises a small part of its imagination inhibited in the form of thought, thought giving it relation to the objective universe wherein, using its master tool, the body, it is a thing of conduct. But this conduct is directed by imagination and the subject is always more or less ignorant whether its conduct will have the effect desired. The subject's conduct is moved by hope for success: this hope is based on ignorance.

If we start with the subject as a thing of conduct we can only consider imagination so far as it is inhibited in the form of thought: free imagination is extraneous waste. We thereby relegate free imagination to irregular mental activity or as marking some form of lunacy or superstition. We have no full explanation of human experience.

Free imagination when not inhibited in the form of thought *is* sheer waste in relation to the objective universe. But why? Because free imagination is extraneous to the personality? No. It is because our objective universe is so infinitesimally small a speck of the universe open to free imagination that it *requires* only an infinitesimal part of free imagination for its regard: it requires only an inhibited part of the psychical energy of the "I am"—inhibited in the form of physical energy—for command over it. If, with Haeckel, you refer the psychic back to each living cell, from where do you get the command of the psychic over the physical? What evidence is there that the organism can determine its own environment *before* the self-conscious subject appears?

Now imagination has nothing to do with ignorance or knowledge; in dreams imagination is free.<sup>7</sup> It is when we bring in our little objective universe we find the question of ignorance and its attendant, hope, come in. What we are ignorant of is how far our imagination inhibited in the form of thought may be successful for purpose in relation to the objective universe. We *do* hope; hope is a certainty of human experience. But the objectification of any purpose of hope is not a certainty of human experience. For instance, you can dream freely of success as to any purpose you have formed, your dreams are certain. What is uncertain is whether your dreams will have any effect in relation to the objective universe. You dream that Sophonisba accepts your offer of love and returns it. The dream is a certainty. But when Sophonisba—who is but an embodied self, however supereminent in charm—listens to you, the result is uncertain; uncertain, that is, till it is a thing of the past and so determined. Hence the uncertainty. Sophonisba consents: your dream is objectified.

<sup>7</sup> But in dreams a higher form of hope than that now considered is opened to us.

Sophonisba refuses: your dream is not objectified. But the dream itself remains an implicit part of your memory. A happy or unhappy part? That, again, is uncertain; for your memory exists in transcendence of the past, present and future. You may feel unhappy at the moment of refusal, but when in after time you look back on it? You may rejoice in that which at the time gave you pain. But your dream remains a certainty for you, though it may have taken on a different aspect.

Faith is used as having many differing meanings. As now used we may hold it exists in transcendence of knowledge, rather than in ignorance. For, as to faith, what we have to consider is the subject who determines his own conduct as a spirit surviving embodiment. Bowing to the categorical imperative he exercises his freewill as an embodied self under a full sense of duty.<sup>8</sup> His faith is not hope;<sup>9</sup> there is no content of earthly hope. For, as we have already found in the first part of this work, he may deliberately abandon all earthly hope and so conduct himself that, to his own knowledge, bodily and mental suffering will, on earth, probably be his lot. Some men *do* so conduct themselves, human experience is clear as to this, and any full explanation of human experience must, as before said, include explanation of such conduct. Such a man may, indeed, have hope of ultimate spiritual happiness, but even so his idea (?) of happiness has no earthly content. He imagines happiness but as an atmosphere, transcendent of earthly ideas, that he may become absorbed in from adherence to duty.

Whether what is above written is based or not on

<sup>8</sup> The foundation of faith may be false. In any such case conduct based on a false sense of duty may have the most evil of results.

<sup>9</sup> Unless we term it transcendental hope.

sound reasoning must be decided by each reader for himself. All I can do is, from my own standpoint, to offer it as sound reasoning. And, with this hypothesis, we may compare the conclusion we now arrive at with that we arrived at in the first part of this work.

In the first part we found that the self-conscious subject does, as a subject in the intelligible universe, exercise command over itself as an object in the objective universe: it uses its body as a machine of motion to vary and create its own environment. And the environment of the self-conscious subject, that is, its objective universe, we reduced not only to a mere "occasion" for thought, but in a great measure got rid of its materiality. We reduced objects to appearances in etheric form, their appearance of materiality and resistance being traced back, for foundation, to motion. We found that the self-consciousness of the subject is the one real reality for it: it is "groundless because it is the ground of all other certainty." To this "I am" we gave psychical activity and full memory of its past (?) stage of embodiment.

We arrived at the above conclusion from considering the human experience of the subject in a waking state.

But, now, when we have been considering the human experience of the subject in relation to its sleeping state, what have we found?

In the sleeping state the subject remains fully a subject in the intelligible universe, it is simply divorced from physical activity; cannot use its machine, the body, for activity in its little objective universe. It still thinks, though its thought takes on the appearance of dreams. If Faraday dreamt of an objective dynamo, he *did* dream of it for a certainty: he, probably, also dreamt of numerous other "things" that he never objectified. Such dreams were certainties to him though never affecting in any way our material speck of universe. The uncertainty

as to his dynamo existed in the question whether he would or would not objectify his dream. Dreams are as real as waking thoughts, and thought about an object (as a dream) must be *before* any new object can be objectified. The thought (or dream) is certain for the self-conscious subject, its objectification in our Lilliputian objective universe is uncertain.

In considering our human experience during the sleeping state we arrive at the same conclusion as when we considered the waking state. We, indeed, strengthen the conclusion for we find that the "I am," in sleep, exists in a wider universe than when awake. In sleep, its psychical activity *may* still exercise power over physical activity.

Now comes a difficulty in the evolution of the argument, a difficulty that arises from there being at "the back of the mind" of most readers a standpoint of thought that the sleeping state is subjective to the waking state. Many commentators of established reputation start their consideration of Kant's philosophy with an assumption that his really real subject is the subject he considers, whereas his really real subject is the transcendental subject and his subject is but a form, conditioned in time and space, of the transcendental subject. This has led, I think, to no little unjust criticism of his Dialectic.

The transcendental subject exists with imagination deep buried in it: it exists transcendent of time and space. It is manifest in embodiment as a human being. What does this mean? The soul of man, manifest in human form, exists as a subject *inhibited* in time and space.

The subject exists in two states: the sleeping and the waking state. In both states it remains fully a subject in the intelligible universe, in both states it has full psychical energy. Even in the sleeping state it is, statically, a thing of physical energy but only when waking is it dynamically a thing of

physical energy,—only when waking can it use its tool, the body, for physical activity.<sup>10</sup>

Reason, supported by human experience, informs us that the transcendental subject coming, *in time*, into manifestation as a subject must be and is ignorant of what its conduct, if any, as an object in the objective universe will be. But human experience informs us the subject *is* a thing of conduct. And as it is a thing of conduct based on purpose and is ignorant whether its purposes will be objectified we *must* find something which causes the conduct.

We find that hope is the foundation, the cause of conduct.

Dreams on which hope is based are certainties whatever their content may be. If, from our position as dreamers, we could fully consider the wider universe in which we then exist, we should probably find some wider transcendental hope open to us: faith opens transcendental hope to us. For we exist always in the accomplishing in relation to transcendental Being.<sup>11</sup>

But dreams are not founded on earthly hope unless they are in the form of thought related to our objective universe. Such hope comes in when dreams are *for* the objective universe and the hope is that the internal reality of the dream may be reflected in external reality,—as we term it,—on the objective universe.

Our consideration of ignorance and hope has led to the conclusion that the state of sleep is a higher and freer state for the subject than that of waking. It is an intermediate state between the state of activity in the physical universe and the state when the subject is free from the limitations of embodiment.

The sleeping state governs the waking state; for

<sup>10</sup> It *may* possibly, in the sleeping state, use its psychical energy for physical energy through subjects still embodied.

<sup>11</sup> The "I am" exists in the accomplished *in relation to* the subject.

the subject, waking, could not be a thing of conduct without its dreams as a cause of conduct. But the waking subject uses, for conduct, only those dreams which are *for* the objective universe: the inhibited form of manifestation of the subject requires only a small part of its dreams for its conduct inhibited in time and space.

These conclusions are in accord with those arrived at in the first part of the book. For, therein, we gave the subject in the intelligible universe command over itself as inhibited in form in the objective universe. Now, by making conduct depend on hope, we strengthen the argument. For hope exists in the intelligible, conduct in the objective, universe.

The sleeping state governs the waking state, for the universe of dreams with its free imagination is wider than that of the waking state. The waking state is a particular of the dream state, demanding for the conduct of the subject only imagination inhibited in the form of thought. The dream-state sets the subject free, for a time, from its labour, its conduct, in our little spec of the objective universe: death sets the subject free, altogether, from such labour. Sleep gives partial freedom from embodiment, death gives full freedom.

The subject, ignorant of what its conduct will be, is moved to conduct by hope. As subjects we have no human experience to give us information<sup>12</sup> as to any transcendental form of hope which exists for the disembodied. All we can arrive at is that imagination being deep buried in the soul of man, with full memory of its embodied human experience, the soul has psychical energy and so, in all probability, some transcendental form of hope exists for it.

But hope with its human content? Hope, varying from the dream of the agricultural labourer's wife that she may in time possess a parlour to the dreams of Utopias for mankind? We have, in the first part.

<sup>12</sup> That is, apart from ecstasy.

traced back this hope to the categorical imperative manifest in the blind desire of humanity for an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.

Man desires the best for mankind; but, ignorant of how his purpose may be reflected objectively on our earth, his conduct has made a very hell for us all. Why our universe is so constituted we cannot know. But we can mark, down through the ages, the evolving increase in command of the self-conscious subject over its environment and so the increasing responsibility of mankind for existing sin and suffering. Nothing else? We can mark, too, I think, the increasing sense of responsibility in mankind for the existence of sin and suffering coupled with an increasing sense that sin and suffering *ought not to be*. And, I think, human experience makes us aware that this increasing sense of responsibility is tending to evolve higher and purer purpose in man, so that the probability increases that his conduct, based on purpose, will tend more and more towards the amelioration of our human lot.

Dreams, in their wide universe, are really real, they are certainties. Even Max Stirner could not deny that my dreams are mine and yours are yours. It is the objectification of dreams on our little material speck of universe that is uncertain. Nothing can be thereon objectified without a precedent dream. Conduct only can produce this objectification, and conduct is uncertain in that it is based on ignorance as to what it will be and what its effect will be.

Disabuse your mind of the preconceived idea<sup>13</sup> that man is no more than an embodied self. Start thought from the "I am," the soul of man. Consider this "myself" as with psychical energy and the subject as merely this "myself" manifest in time and space with physical energy. Then, I think, you will find continuity in the argument and,—instead of treating

<sup>13</sup> It is only an idea



imagination as sheer unaccountable waste in manifest creation, unless inhibited in the form of thought,—a reasonable relation established between the subject of thought and the transcendental subject of imagination.

The war now raging brings us, most strangely, light from on high. Why such foul sin and suffering should exist we know not. But, in the presence of death, mowing down by thousands the best of humanity, it is brought home to us with overwhelming force that death cannot be the end, death cannot spell sheer waste. We stand amazed at our ignorance, amazed at the foulness of human conduct our ignorance involves us in. But, behind all our mental and spiritual trouble, hope still stands firm. Stands firm? Hope stands stronger than ever before, even approaches the certainty of faith. Mankind, in its ignorance, crushes itself remorselessly under its grindstone of conduct, destroys itself materially with the foully material. But this very sin and suffering sets free the spirit of man; sets it free in hope and faith.

“Lord, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”

If the subject be no more than an embodied self of conduct, then sleep can only be regarded physiologically; that is, as existing in states of rest for the restoration of physical energy. For, then, the subject is no more than a thing of conduct in the objective universe: its very foundation is the material, so that the psychical has but subjective existence, existence manifest in the useless and meaningless vagaries of imagination outside the objective universe. The objections to this physiological theory have already been considered.

But it is apparent, without argument, that if the subject be more than an embodied self it must, at least, exist as fully in the sleeping as in the waking state. For, in the sleeping state, there is merely

absence of power to *use* embodiment in the objective universe: the power still exists, for the self is still embodied. But the power is static, not dynamic. If the subject be merely a physiological thing, there is difficulty as before shown to account for states of unconsciousness in states of sleep. But if the really real subject be the "I am" there is no breach in continuity. We find in sleep continuity of self-consciousness still existing: it is merely that the subject is freed from conduct in relation to the objective universe.

Now in the first part we marked the distinction between the subject of instinct, that is, the subject without self-consciousness and the subject with self-consciousness. It was shown that the subject without self-consciousness acts and re-acts instinctively in relation to its environment, its conduct being determined not by itself but by the laws of Nature. And it was shown that the conduct of the self-conscious subject, while subjective to the laws of Nature, *uses* the laws of Nature for its own purpose.<sup>14</sup> The self-conscious subject varies and even creates its own environment.

To this subject, in the ultimate, we gave imagination deep buried in it as a soul, with full memory of its human experience during embodiment.

Then we traced back the conduct of the embodied subject to its struggle for freedom of itself as the "I am," from the inhibiting bonds of its bodily environment. This struggle we found manifest in the blind desire which, in the ultimate, moves all humanity towards the transcendent goal of love, beauty, truth and justice. We traced back to a dream the origin of human conduct.

But now we are considering, directly, the sleeping state. And what have we found?

In dreams, imagination is, relatively, free. For

<sup>14</sup> Herein we find a definition for instinct in relation to intellectual operation.

we dream not only of what is possible but of what is impossible in and for our little material world. We *must* use an inhibited form of imagination, that is, we must use thought, before we can objectify our dreams. And please bear this in mind: we use mere thought not because imagination is useless in itself unless inhibited in the form of thought, but because our objective universe is so small and insignificant that it requires only an infinitesimal part of the imagination of the "I am" in order to enable the subject to grapple with it.<sup>15</sup>

We dream: dreams are and must be facts, before man can, by conduct, vary or create facts in his objective universe. Dreams are certain, conduct is uncertain.

The subject dreams and then tries, by conduct, to objective his dreams. He is ignorant whether his conduct will be successful. What nerves him to conduct? Hope, real hope, that he may succeed in objectifying his dreams.

It follows that the state of sleep is more real and free than the state of waking. For in sleep dreams are free from inhibition to what is possible in and for the objective universe. It is only when awake, when a thing of dynamic conduct, that the subject is faced by the impossible. The impossible arises only when we find it impossible to make certain real dreams exist objectively in or in relation to that little speck of materiality which we term our objective universe. It is to the dreams themselves we can give reality, not to their content: waking we are not in a state to judge the content. The object now in view is to point out that when we use the relative terms possible and impossible, the standard of possibility we judge by is objective. We hold a "thing" possible or impossible as it is possible or impossible in the objective universe.

<sup>15</sup> The materialist must treat imagination, unless inhibited in the form of thought, as sheer waste which cannot be accounted for.

But hope is concrete, it does not transcend presentation. Any particular conduct having purpose to some particular variation or creation in the objective universe or to purpose in relation to one's fellow-men, arises from some definite, concrete hope. What then is the genesis of these forms of hope? Again we find it is in blind desire, in transcendent hope, for the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. The argument for the sleeping state is the same as that already given for the waking state. But we find, too, that the realm of dreams opens a wider and freer universe to the subject: in this realm ignorance so far as the objective universe is concerned is absent.

And, I think, the wider and freer state of dream-land is seen from another point of regard.

The mystery of Our Lord's supreme sacrifice shows us that spiritual advance lies through the suffering of physical ill. Down through the ages it is marked that he who forgets himself and, under God, lives for the betterment of humanity, must suffer some form of martyrdom. There is the beast in man which leads him to think only of himself as a separate entity from humanity at large and so to regard his fellows as but things existing and to be used solely for his own personal benefit.

But where do we find the beast in man? In his dreams, waking or sleeping? No. Dreams waking or sleeping are harmless. Man can only manifest the beast in him *after* objectifying his dreams. Dreams must be objectified before man can martyr his fellow-man: physical evil has existence only in the objective universe.<sup>16</sup> In the wide realm of dream-land physical evil sinks back into a mere burden of the flesh borne for but a little passing time in space. Even waking we may look back on past human suffering as *best* for us,—*forsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit*. It is only for the embodied self we can speak

<sup>16</sup> It is for this reason the despised and rejected can, by the spiritual, transcend physical evil.

of the beast in man: for its existence there must be human conduct: in the realm of dreams, human conduct is in abeyance. Herein, again, we find that the sleeping is a wider and fuller state than that of waking.

But it may be objected that dreamland opens to us dreams of suffering, even of horror; and this is true.<sup>17</sup> But most of such dreams are not pure dreams, they are dreams set up by physical environment,—Nicolai's dreams, so far as set-up by a disordered stomach, give a case in point.

Some of such dreams, however, arise from mental disturbance. It is in the memory of no few of us that children were once<sup>18</sup> imbued with living horror of hell as a future. They were taught that the results of our Lord's mystic sacrifice was that salvation was offered to us all, but that the offer was coupled with the threat that rejection meant everlasting misery. And they were taught that as millions on millions reject the offer, the probable result of the supreme sacrifice was that a majority of mankind were, by the sacrifice itself, doomed to eternal perdition.

Such teaching certainly must give rise to dreams, to dreams of suffering, even horror. And the dreams are not confined to childhood.

But such dreams are not pure dreams; they are dreams coloured by, set up by, environment. The teaching impresses those taught with a preconceived *idea* of the ruthless cruelty of the Almighty and the preconceived *idea* may be so strong as to inhibit *insight* from getting through, to inhibit the full play of insight. Many, many children, troubled by teaching of a personal devil, have prayed in secret to God for the poor, forlorn, hopeless creature; have even told God they cannot be happy though in

<sup>17</sup> The sexual theory of Freud is not, I think, supported by human experience, so it is ignored.

<sup>18</sup> Even now the same teaching may be extant.

heaven while that poor wretch burns in everlasting flames. Children are logical, they are fully aware in their dream-land of a real reality where the contradictions that shackled thought sets up vanish into thin air: they feel transcendental Being. It is man who, in his ignorance, imbues his fellows with false anthropomorphic ideas of the ultimate and so makes them subject to false preconceived ideas which warp insight. The suffering, the horror of dreams has origin not in dreams themselves but in the colour given them by false anthropomorphic preconceived ideas.

Hope, with faith in the background, gives rise to all conduct: ignorance exists in relation to conduct. This is why conduct fails to fulfil hope.

Our master is hope and we want to be good workmen. But we are clumsy with our tools, ignorant how rightly to use them. The tools are sharp and well adapted for their master's purpose. But we, ignorant, can only understand that purpose dimly so that we cut and wound ourselves and our fellows as we labour.

But, faced on earth with ignorance, hope and faith, I think we can see some movement towards our transcendental ideal. Mankind grows more fully aware of its own ignorance, more fully aware that sin and suffering arise from this ignorance. And, so, it tends to take on its own shoulders, not leave on the devil's, the burden of sin and suffering. So long as mankind denies this burden is its own, so long it will regard the devil as carrier. And the devil is ready and willing to protect the existence of evil for ever and a day.

Christian carried his burden of sin and suffering on his own shoulders; he did not employ the devil to walk by his side and carry it for him. Christian, himself, after spiritual advance through physical evil, was able at last to cast away the burden. On the devil's shoulders it would have remained through eternity.

Carrying each his own burden of ignorance we must all plod forward through our earthly slough of despond stumbling and hurting ourselves by the way, stumbling against and hurting our fellows by the way. But always our eyes are fixed on, are guided by hope and faith. Hope shines eternal, timeless in the supreme. Most surely the slough of despond must be traversed, but it has to be traversed *in time* and in time we cast off our burden of ignorance.

Sin as we may, suffer as we may, we have done our duty if, in our path through the slough of despond, we leave but one footprint of firmer ground for the easier passage of after pilgrims. Hope and faith remain for us eternal: human ignorance is but a passing ill of passing embodiment. Even when embodied we cannot exhaust thought. On the contrary, the more we discover the greater is the vista opened to us for further discovery. This in itself points to the eternity of hope.

## DREAMS

THE argument so far as it has proceeded gives, if sound, evidential proof that dreams of sleep and waking thoughts are the same in kind. So hereafter the term "dreams" will be used as an inclusive term; that is, as covering waking thoughts.

But dreams sometimes are within the purview of ideas and sometimes transcend the purview of ideas. I suggest now to divide dreams into dreams of phantasy and fancy: dreams of phantasy transcending the purview of ideas,<sup>1</sup> dreams of fancy marking dreams within the purview of ideas but coloured by imagination.

What is meant by ideas "coloured by imagination" is this: Even when we think, we find thought with a background of insight. We think of—in ordinary parlance we imagine—space and time other than our own; we think in opposition to the tortoise form of evolution we, embodied, are subject to; we think ourselves other human personalities than those we are confined to in our space and time. There is something in us, at the background, which revolts against our human limitations,—even for thought imagination, beyond the purview of ideas, "gets through" and colours ideas.

The argument, also, has offered evidential proof that the purposes of the subject's conduct are realities for the subject, while its conduct towards the objectifying of purpose is subjective to this reality. For the subject is ignorant whether its conduct will fulfil

<sup>1</sup> Bear in mind insight transcends ideas.



its purpose: it is hope that its purpose may be objectified that moves it to conduct. This hope, which is the foundation of conduct, could not exist without ignorance. The self-conscious subject differs radically from the subject which is not self-conscious. Self-consciousness, a groundless certainty, enables the subject to change and even create its own environments, a power non-existent in the subject which is not self-conscious. But the self-conscious subject must purpose to so change or create before it can do anything, and when it sets out to do anything it is hope of doing that inspires it,—not knowledge that it will succeed.

Dreams involving hope are the genesis of the conduct of the self-conscious subject. But there are dreams which end as dreams and result in no conduct: such dreams are realities not followed by any resulting so-termed realities in conduct. The form of our infinitesimally small speck of objective universe remains in such case unaffected. Whether such dreams have or have not effect in the wider universe of dreamland we cannot know. But do not forget these are dreams of insight transcending knowledge.

Let us consider, first, dreams of fancy, that is, dreams within the purview of ideas.

Such dreams are part of human experience. But the human experience of such dreams of each one of us differs,—from that of any Mr. Gradgrind to that of Coleridge. So when we refer to human experience we must refer to it as the average experience of the average man.

The importance of dreams of fancy for our present argument lies in this: They show a revolt of the dreamer against the material limitations of his embodied personality; revolt against the restrictions of time and space and the subjection of evolution to tortoise time.

This revolt is *part* of us as subjects, and how can it be an implicit part if the subject be no more than

an embodied self? For the embodied self all such dreams are mere surplusage. Where, then, do they come from? What is their cause, their effect? If there be nothing at all existing for the subject outside embodiment, how *can* such dreams arise?

## ROMANCE AND FAIRIE<sup>1</sup>

OUR daily life is really one of jog-trot romance and fairie. For we are not creatures of conduct; our conduct is based on imagination and imagination has for such content not what will be but what may be. Our real daily dreams of what may be are never fully accomplished in any reality of our objective universe.

Excavate to its foundation human delight in romance and fairie. It will be found to be built on revolt against the preposterous limitations in time of each one of us to one body and against our subjection to the tortoise progress of evolution: there is revolt against the unkind limitations of time and space. The subject feels it is more than a chrysalis and wants to break its bonds and be free. It feels there is something in it which *ought* to be free.

The child entering on bodily life rejoices in its new plaything, the body. It moves the thing, makes it walk, laugh and cry, it exercises with delight its power to move other things in relation to its new plaything, the body. But, soon, the new come subject feels a want: it finds itself, as a subject of imagination, hampered by its new plaything, the body. It thinks itself at the moon: why is it not there? It ought to be there, it is there in reality, in thought. And yet it cannot get away from its new plaything. For the body puts on the brake against the travel of thought.

Note.—When I wrote this Chapter I had not read Stewart's "Myths of Plato." If the reader will refer to Page 6 of the above work he will find a marked coincidence.

And as we, still children, grow older? We dream and our dreams are real, real in freedom from the bodily oppression which inhibits full self-consciousness. Perhaps we tell someone of our dreams: we are whipped or warned against nonsense or—worst of all—laughed at. So, as a rule, we tell no one of our dreams.

And what are our dreams, our earliest dreams? Dreams of ourselves, of reality; dreams amid clouds of glory which roll away when we are faced by the waking world. And later dreams of manhood? Dreams of revolt against the objective universe, of revolt against ourselves as objects therein. Dreams where we are Kings or Queens,<sup>2</sup> the whole world rich and happy, beautiful and true,—even we ourselves, though *really* Kings or Queens, making a pretence of not being richer or happier, more beautiful or truthful than our subjects.

In fairy tales and, often, in romance we find manifest this revolt against the tortoise progression of evolution and our preposterous restriction to the limits of our body. We know the truth as children, sneakily believe in it during manhood and, with hope, return to it in old age. For, in old age, our power as things of conduct begins to fail and we are driven to fall back on our higher selves.<sup>3</sup> In truth we feel that evolution is but a slothful thing of time and our bodies but “occasions” in time for human conduct.

Before Lewis Carroll the giant Emanuel Kant is but a puling child in long-clothes. The philosophy of *Alice in Wonderland* transcends the Critique of Pure Reason.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Even in these dreams we, each one of us, want personally to lead the way to love, beauty, truth, and justice.

<sup>3</sup> In age the universe of objects takes on more and more a form of unreality, while the universe of insight becomes more and more real.

<sup>4</sup> The Gryphon understood much more clearly than the human being, Alice, that nothing can be done without a purpose—it even showed transcendent freedom in spelling.

The freedom, for us, of romance, the restrictions of the objective, are well shown in Alice's waking stage:—

“ ‘Who cares for *you*?’ said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this time). ‘You're nothing but a pack of cards!’ ”

She was coming back to poor human thought: she was now but Alice, fixed as before in size, in time and space; cards were but cards. She was leaving reality for the narrow prison of the objective. But, still, as her sister kissed her, she woke to love: she found love even on earth.

But while she slept? While *she herself* and her imagination were free, unrestrained by the commonplace motion of her brain and its tortoise tyrant, evolution?

Something interesting was always going to happen. What was going to happen she knew not, but she had always calm content in certainty that whatever happened would be interesting. And it always was interesting,—and still is, even to you and me. And it was interesting to Alice because she was free from the common jog-trot of her waking life, and it is interesting to you and me because we, in reading about it all, are free in imagination from the common jog-trot of our waking life. In reading, even time, evolution, the very laws of Nature bind us no longer; for our imagination is free. Such holidays “out of bounds” are always interesting.

The white rabbit with pink eyes that Alice first meets does just what all rabbits ought to do: it talks. It is rather funny for it to take a watch out of its waistcoat pocket, but still quite possible and extremely interesting. And then Alice simply does what she ought to be able to do when awake,—she follows the rabbit down its hole. And then how reasonably she falls down the well! Not with a crash under the silly law of gravity, but so smoothly and slowly that she has time as she falls to see all sorts of funny and interesting things and think all sorts of funny

and interesting thoughts. And then the long passage and the little gold key and the peep through the little door into the loveliest garden you ever saw! How could she do and see such interesting things unless dreams were kind enough to carry her away from our fond little jog-trot world?

And though Alice cried because she was too big to get through the door, she knew she was going to get through somehow,—her size did not matter in such a sensible place. And, of course, she did get through; imagination, free from the servitude of matter, carried her through. And then?

She was free: free in imagination. She was always the same Alice; she had been still herself, even when she feared she might be someone else and was growing up bigger than an elephant or growing down smaller than a mouse. It was always she herself who was thinking she might be someone else: she only thought about change of body. And she was always in some interesting place, though she did not get directly to the loveliest garden you ever saw.

The delightfulest part of the adventure, though, was the pleasure found in companionship. Alice made up all the people she saw and they were all made up of her, and she was made up of them: they were a happy family all living not in themselves but in one another. And they were all free and *most* interesting. The very first companions she met, the duck, the mouse, the Dodo and their companions, just took what bodies were *most* interesting and all manifested supraliminal intelligence in that they recognised the dryness of history as it is writ and the silliness of its dryness,—dryness which could not even dry feathers or fur or clothes!

And how sensible the rabbit was in understanding it couldn't burn down Alice and the house because, if it did, Alice would set Dinah loose! And how wise the baby in turning into a pig so that it might be a handsome pig and not grow up an ugly baby.

And the Cheshire cat? It was natural, of course, though a little puzzling, for it to appear and vanish so suddenly. Its habit, though, of leaving a grin behind it without a cat, was *most* interesting.

And the Mad Hatter, the March Hare, the Queen and the King, the Duchess, the Knave of Hearts, and soup transcendently made of pepper? All dream-realities in their kingdom of her imagination: dream-realities which a poor waking thing like you or myself dare not even dream of shackling in the bonds of thought,—as well might a slug try to capture a wireless message running round the world. For all these "things" *are* Alice and are *not* Alice; time and space and the laws of our evolutionary universe do not bind them: Alice herself is free.

And, if you please, how could you and I criticize these dreams, even if we dared? From what point of view? A dreamer dreamt them and,—scientifically!—from her point of view they were *objectively* real! How could you or I, waking, and so bound down to the inhibition of thought, reasonably judge the human experience of one free in imagination? I do not suggest, for one moment, that Alice's adventures were real, but then, also, I do not suggest for one moment they were unreal: that is my point. What I deny is our right, waking, to criticize at all. Blinded, spiritually, by the inhibitions of our waking state we can no more use our ideas for sound criticism of dreams than a mole can judge soundly of daylight experience.

Assume, for the moment, that you have died and that, disembodied, you are no longer a thing of conduct in the objective universe. And assume you can still think, in remembrance, of your past human experience. Assume further that in relation to your now wider personality, you regard your past human experience as a dream. Whose dream was it? Yours. Because, disembodied, it is a dream to you, does this affect the fact that while you were in the body it was all objectively true? Unless you make

self-consciousness a function of waking bodily form, there is no reply to the above statement. And, if self-consciousness be such a function, you do not continue in being when disembodied; that is, you no longer exist. And, as you no longer exist, you cannot answer the question I put to you!

If the subject were a mere "thing" of the objective universe and its laws, it could not proceed beyond the limits of its being. But romance and fairie prove that it does proceed beyond such limits.

When we consider the romance of life generally, we find the same difficulty in the way for those who hold we are mere embodied selves, existing only during embodiment. For romance colours the lives of all, if in differing degree, from the dreams of the guttersnipe round his "penny dreadful" to Coleridge's dream of Kubla Khan. And all such dreaming must be treated by the materialist as mere extraneous "stuff," useless to the scheme of creation. For, in a universe of a closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution, where are these dreams? What part have they in evolution and devolution? The materialist must necessarily hold they have no part at all; that they are mere extraneous "stuff." But is not his position open to attack? If, for instance, it be admitted by him that the ideas called up by reading the penny dreadful have affected the after-conduct of the guttersnipe, a fact hard to be denied, it must also be admitted that conduct is subjective to ideas. Even in so extreme a case we find the subject in the intelligible universe, holding sway over itself as one in the objective universe.

But now let us consider our dreams of romance, waking or sleeping, generally, and let us try to find out what "I am" is.

It has been said there are three John Smiths: one known to himself, one to his fellows, one to his God. Is this statement correct? Even if correct must it not be read: There are three forms of manifestation



of personality for John Smith, one known to himself, one to his fellows, one to his God? Even so expressed its truth is doubtful, although in such form we emphasize the fact that one really real John Smith must be the foundation of the three forms of manifestation. Still, even so, I think its truth doubtful.

In searching for Human Documents, that is, for fully honest records by human beings, revealing fully how they appear to themselves in fact, I have found only three.<sup>5</sup> Good as so many other records are, they all, I think, involve some amount of self-dramatization. John Smith not only does not know himself, but won't know himself. He is made up of his dreams, not of what he is, but of what he ought to be or wants to be: he regards his environment as sheer accident and finds himself as more real in his dreams than he is as an object in his objective universe. Charles Dickens, far away in the realm of imagination, with his comrades Pickwick, Micawber, Tom Pinch, and their fellows around him, marked the real Charles Dickens. On the stage of man with a black, black coat starred by a red, red rose, a staring, fixed, oiled curl each side of his face, his very wrinkles theatrical, there was but the pathetic visible material of genius: the real Dickens never stood there.

And you, sir or madam, who read, content as you may be with your earthly lot, do you not feel that some change, however slight, in your environment would enable you *yourself* to find fuller expression? Are *you* the thing that is, or the thing that might be or ought to be? Do you not feel in you that you really are the thing that might be, if environment were favourable?

We none of us rest content with ourselves as we are in the objective universe. We dramatize our-

<sup>5</sup> (1) The Life of Benvenuto Cellini, (2) the Journal of Marie Bashkirtseff, and (3) Memoires de General Marbot.

selves to ourselves, find our real existence in dreams, not in objective waking reality.

Thus dramatization of what ought to be may lead to discontent ending in despair. But far, far more often it is this consciousness of what ought to be for oneself that leads to conduct in exercising the power innate in man to change and create his own environment: to so change and create that the "I am" in each of us,—the "I am" we try to dramatize in fact,—may have greater freedom.

In any case, this discontent with our personality, as manifest in bodily form, is meaningless waste unless it marks in fact the struggle of some really real personality for freedom. The romance of life is real; environment is accidental.

Again, as you really exist, are you known to your fellows? Is there any one of you who will affirm that in society he reveals himself as he really is and tells those round him what he really thinks about them? Why, the very first thing we teach a child is reticence,—the truthful child is an *enfant terrible*. I would not suggest for a moment that reticence is not advisable. Kant himself, while pointing out the dangers, has pointed out also the benefits arising from subservience to public opinion. The only point I make is that the personality you offer to your fellows is not that of yourself, even as known to yourself, but a self-dramatization of yourself.

And the John Smith known to his God?

If there be no God and you rely on the beautiful expression of *élan vital* as explaining all things, then no question arises.<sup>6</sup> But if there be a God, transcendental Being?

Are you known to God as an infinitesimal speck of matter confined to conduct, the result of which is

<sup>6</sup> In such case you make the impersonal evolve in your self-consciousness. What do you mean? How could the impersonal exist for *you* unless you were precedently self-conscious?

unknown to you? Are you, to *yourself*, nothing more than this Lilliput of conduct? Where, in such case, is your imagination of what you might or ought to be? Where are your dreams, your romance of life? How can you explain the bond that exists between you and your fellows, manifest in you in hope for their welfare? How explain the conduct of those who have deliberately placed on their own shoulders and carried through earthly life, a cross of sorrow and suffering? Men who have sacrificed themselves to relieve their brethren? How explain your own admiration for these fellow-altruists?

For all of us, as part of us, there is this romance, this self-dramatization. The "I am" exists and struggles for self-expression. Each of us makes a "shot" by self-dramatization for freedom as the "I am": slowly and painfully in time we grow better marksmen, but only in the supreme is the bull's-eye struck.

In romance, in self-dramatization, the subject moves beyond his inhibited purview as a mere object in the objective universe. He gets nearer to *himself* than he can in mere earthly conduct, though his duty lies through such conduct.

The really real John Smith is found in dreamland.

The romance, the glamour of love, marks the soul in man. From whence arises the contentment, the strength that the man and woman who love find in companionship?<sup>7</sup> There may be conflict of intellect between the two, difference in human aim, even no likeness in choice of companionship. And yet these contradictions may even increase the contentment and happiness each finds in the other's company.<sup>8</sup> We cannot trace the result to sexual or intellectual feeling, we must go deeper into personality.

<sup>7</sup> This may occur between two of the same sex.

<sup>8</sup> "For it carrieth a burden without being burdened, and maketh all that which is bitter sweet and savoury."

The cause, I think, is thus found:—

Each of us is the more content and the stronger as a personality as he is freer to express himself not only to others but to himself. The man in the society of the woman he loves<sup>9</sup> finds himself exceptionally free to express himself: he finds sympathy, sympathy transcending sexual attraction or any intellectual satisfaction from agreement in mere thought. His dreams, his romance are hers,—and in mutual love her dreams, her romance are his. The bond existing between all human beings is, as it were, objectified on earth for these two. The two find in dreamland the reality of existence so that, in the presence of love, mere earthly lot falls back into maya.

Civilized man tries to destroy and vulgarize love,—Francis Galton, even, partially justifies the “man of ancient lineage” who marries an heiress to support his house. And you who read, how do you regard marriage? You may read and cry over King Cophetua and the beggar-maiden, but, if the choice were to come to you or yours, how would you, by conduct, decide?

But still love lives on: it is the romance of life, it is the leading reality of dreamland. Even for those coupled together by wealth, rank, propinquity, or sexual bodily attraction, love remains a reality of dreamland: the very thought of what might have been strengthens the hope of what may still be in the future. Consider the woman hopeless in her marriage. What does hopeless mean? It means that still in her is the contradiction, hope; the one is meaningless without the other in mind. Her hopelessness of what is, exists in contradiction to her hope of what may still be.

We are not personalities manifest in the knowledge of ourselves, the knowledge of our fellows and the knowledge of God. We are more than mere bodily things.

<sup>9</sup> The same is true if the sexes be reversed.

It is in romance and fairie, in self-dramatization, that we most clearly, if still dimly, find our really real selves. The "I am," for us, simply *is*: a groundless certainty. And this groundless certainty *must be* for the vitality of our dreams of romance and fairie.

## THE LIMITS OF ROMANCE AND FAIRIE

LET us now consider how far Romance and Fairie so far as they are matters of record proceed beyond the limits of the objective universe.

The originators have indulged, as far as they can, in phantasy: they have been in revolt against the tortoise evolution, the limits of time and space, the restriction of the self to one body: they have even freed themselves from the laws of Nature.

But these men have *written down or spoken* all they have imagined; they have recorded their imaginings for the benefit of others. And words, spoken or written, can do what? Express ideas: they can do no more. They can *state* the fact of insight but they cannot deal with insight as they can with ideas.<sup>1</sup>

Romance and Fairie, therefore, only express imagination in the language of thought, though they mark the revolt above written of. In fact, we are not, as yet, considering the full phantasy of dreams, we are considering only the phantasy of dreams so far as it can be reduced to writing or speech. This is why I term such dreams dreams of fancy. There is phantasy at their back but they are recorded merely as coloured by imagination.

Now, how do we ordinarily judge romance and fairie? As records of unreality, as excursions of imagination into the impossible. But, even so, we

<sup>1</sup> Writing and speech can only establish intercourse between subjects to make others aware of one's own ideas. Ideas precede writing or speech.

make a distinction. When old Mother Shipton wrote of carriages moving without horses, and of ships flying in the air, what she wrote was, at the time, treated as impossible romance. When, in after time, her imaginings became objectively real, we thought of her writing as prophetic. We ordinarily judge romance and fairie from the point of view that nothing can be real unless it is or can be objectively real, it is so we distinguish between the possible and impossible.

But we have already shown the subjection of the objective to the intelligible universe.<sup>2</sup> Not only this: we have already shown that we have power to think about the objective universe *because* it is governed by the laws of Nature which have existence only in the intelligible universe. The very foundation for our ordinary consideration of Romance and Fairie is unstable because nothing is possible in the objective universe unless made possible, previously, in the intelligible universe. The possibilities of the objective universe are dependent on possibilities in the intelligible universe.

Human experience informs us that man can imagine a flying carpet or a flying trunk quite as easily as he can imagine a flying aeroplane: he can imagine "the seven-leagued boots" as easily as any 100 miles locomotive engine: he can imagine he is "puss in boots" or a mighty jin shut up in a tiny bottle as easily as that he is himself in human form: he can imagine sudden, not evolutionary, change. Imagination outruns human experience.

Now, if with Spinoza, we hold *imagination* to be a mere process of fictitious image-making, a travesty of things as they are, we treat this great power which the subject has as mere surplusage. Human experience is largely made up of phantasy, and if phantasy,

<sup>2</sup> A thing must be, to us, real in the intelligible before it can be real in the objective universe.

which includes fancy, is mere surplusage, all this part of human experience is sheer waste.<sup>3</sup>

But imagination cannot be treated as mere surplusage: man could have created no new object in the objective universe without some exercise of the power. So we must read Spinoza's objection as meaning "imagination is a mere process of fictitious image making *unless* the image it makes is one capable of existence as an object in the objective universe."

But, even so, how can we distinguish between the two forms of imagination, the possible and impossible? Was Daedalus's imagination of flight mere surplusage because it ended in the death of Icarus, and Wright's imagination *not* mere surplusage because it has enabled so many to fly without losing their lives? If Faraday had fully imagined his dynamo and then died and no dynamo had ever been made an object in the objective universe, can we hold his imagining would have been mere surplusage? Faraday, as a self-conscious subject, used thought for immediate creation in the intelligible universe: his after creation in the objective universe was mediate. If there was any surplusage it was in the mediate creation.

And what do we mean by surplusage? We mean that the vast power of imagination implanted in man, which is free from the limits of our little objective universe and free even from its laws, is absolute waste unless it can be used for the mediate "occasion in time" of our little material universe. What we really do is to make the subject a mere embodiment in the objective universe and then, faced by the indubitable human experience of imagination, we are obliged to treat imagination as mere surplusage because it is in contradiction to our definition.

Now, following out what it is assumed has been

<sup>3</sup> Herein a breach with Spinoza is marked. But I doubt if he ever worried out what the meaning is of "things as they are." He was not a materialist.



already proved, let us consider Romance and Fairie from another point of view.<sup>4</sup>

The subject has the real power of imagination, the thinking subject exercises this power in the inhibited form of thought. For thought is correlated to motion of the brain and the brain is an object in the objective universe. The thinking subject is an inhibited form of the subject of imagination: imagination is the foundation of thought. So, even when exercising thought about the objective universe, the imagination of the subject beyond the purview of thought can still "colour" or "play round" the objective universe. If the subject were merely a thinking subject it could only think about the objective universe as presented: for in such case imagination would exist only in the inhibited form of thought. But human experience informs us that the subject can exercise imagination to colour its thought in relation to the universe as presented: Romance and Fairie prove this.

If we give reality to imagination in relation to thought as an inhibited form of imagination, we get rid of the difficulty of having to treat imagination as dealing with the possible and impossible. Imagination is not only possible but is a fact for us all. There is no difference, in kind, between imagination of the seven leagued boots and a locomotive engine: before either can become an object in our universe, it must be created in imagination. The one can, the other cannot, become an object in our universe simply because of the limitations of our universe: that is the only distinction.

If you object that the idea of seven leagued boots is sheerly nonsensical and I ask for a reply, the only reply you can give is that it is nonsensical because seven leagued boots cannot be made an object in our universe: no other reply is open to you: for you have imagined seven leagued boots. Underlying your

<sup>4</sup> We still do not yet consider the full phantasy of dreams.

reply is an assumption that our universe presents to us the only real reality. And for this assumption the sole ground you have is your experience as an embodied subject, whereas *your own* imagination carries you beyond the objective universe. Naturally, you must treat this imagination as mere surplusage, when you regard yourself as no more than an embodied thing.

But, again, it may be urged that an aeroplane, locomotive engine or dynamo has meaning for you, while a flying carpet, seven leagued boots or the unembodied smile of a Cheshire cat has no meaning for you. And in this way it may be urged that the argument carries us into the realms of the fictitious. And if by the fictitious is meant that which is impossible in or for the objective universe, the argument is sound. But unless the whole argument adduced is unsound, a full reply is possible. The argument throughout has been evolutionary.

The subjection of the objective universe to the intelligible universe<sup>5</sup> has been established. The power of insight is possessed by the subject and through that power the subject is aware of its limitations of thought. Thought has been shown to be an inhibition of imagination, and it has been shown that our power over and our thought about the objective universe are rendered possible by this correlation between thought and motion: it is by this correlation that the objective universe can be an "occasion" for thought and ideas can be objectified.

But now a consideration of Romance and Fairie has carried us beyond the occasion of our objective universe; we have seen that, even when exercising thought, thought itself is coloured by imagination; that is, when exercising thought we are, *in relation to the objective universe*, carried into the realms of the fictitious.

<sup>5</sup> The laws of Nature exist in the intelligible universe.

What, then, do we mean by the fictitious? We mean no more than something which is outside any possible explanation to be drawn from the objective universe. The fictitious means simply that we are aware, beyond the purview of ideas, of the limited nature of our objective universe,—that we are faced by Carlyle's "damned continued fraction." But imagination must be inhibited in the form of thought before the objective universe can be an "occasion" for imagination to touch it. So imagination, not so inhibited, *must* transcend the mediate occasion. The colouring of thought by imagination *must* be fictitious if we accept the definition of fictitious which has been given. Where then is the present argument?

The argument is that the "I am" exists, it exists with the power of phantasy or unrestrained imagination. What then is its experience?

This experience is unknown to us, except in the inhibited form of human experience, but we are aware of the fact that it exists because our thought is coloured by imagination transcending the occasion of our objective universe. The "I am" exists in the accomplishing and so has experience, though such experience transcends human experience, transcends all ideas.

We can neither judge Romance and Fairie as fictitious or not fictitious. For we cannot judge them at all: it is reason that makes us aware of this.

When a subject thinks about anything in agreement or possible of agreement with its experience of the objective universe, such thought is said to be reasonable: we have seen that such thought must exist *before* objectification. When a subject thinks about anything not in agreement or in possible agreement with its experience of the objective universe its thought is said to be unreasonable. But the subject *does* think thus unreasonably. How then can such thought arise? It can only be from free imagination colouring imagination inhibited in the form of

thought : it results from the influence of imagination beyond the limits of thought.

All these "imaginative" ideas are, in relation to human experience of the universe as presented, unreasonable, ridiculous, preposterous, fictitious,—add any terms that occur to you. But these ideas are yours and they are necessarily unreasonable etc. in relation to our little objective universe for the simple reason that they have little or nothing to do with it. If "something" exist beyond the purview of knowledge, any experience of it must be, in relation to the known, unreasonable and fictitious. Why confine imagination to its reflection on the infinitesimally small speck of material on which we exist in the body?<sup>6</sup>

Consider an anthropomorphic analogy. A man existed two thousand years ago. He dreamt and dreamt he lived in our present time. He found himself, in his dream, travelling swiftly and noiselessly in a carriage with nothing propelling him. Over his head were men flying like birds : he was in darkness when suddenly a great sunlike ball above, untouched by hands, blazed down light : he was in Rome and his wife from Constantinople was talking into his ear : before his eyes was a moving picture showing in detail his marriage ceremony which, to him, was ten years past and gone : he was in a battle and the gods from above and from below the land and sea were dealing out death and destruction.

Then he awoke and told his dream. As reasonable? No. As unreasonable, ridiculous, preposterous, fictitious,—add any abusive terms that occur to you.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Laurie in his *Synthetica* while admitting that the mystic is supremely right says:—"In one aspect of things, indeed, reason is an impertinence." I would rather say that the highest exercise of reason is in making us aware of our power of insight and so of the limitation of our power of thought.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Edgar Allan Poe's *Thousand and Second Night*.

But how do *we*, living now, regard his dream? We must regard it as not only a dream of things possible in the objective universe but prophetic of objects which in the future were to *be* objects in the objective universe.

His dream was objectively true to him while sleeping. How was it objectively true, when his "dream-things" were not objects? In exactly the same way that Faraday's dynamo was objectively true to him when he made it *an object in the intelligible universe*, before he had made it an object in the objective universe. We cannot, so far, distinguish between the exercise of imagination by the man dreaming two thousand years ago and Faraday "dreaming" yesterday. Faraday had to dream his dynamo *before* he could make it an object in the objective universe, some one or more had to dream *like* the dream man of two thousand years ago before any of the things he dreamt of could be objects in the objective universe. The objective universe is subjective to the intelligible universe.

Now it is admitted generally that during sleep the objectivity of what is dreamt is usually unquestioned while it is held that in the after waking state the hallucination is generally recognised.

The man who dreamt two thousand years ago found in sleep the objectivity of all he dreamt: when he awoke he regarded all he had dreamt as mere hallucination. Which judgment was right? The judgment of sleep or the judgment of after waking? If you hold his waking judgment was correct because, *at the time of the dream*, what was dreamt of could not be objectified, you admit that objectivity is a subject of time. You hold that what is impossible to-day *may be* possible to-morrow, and therefore you hold that there is merely a question of time involved for contradiction between the possible and impossible. Time reconciles the contradiction.

If we make thought about the objective universe subjective to that universe as at any time it exists, we shall be involved in confusion of thought: for the dream of two thousand years ago must then be treated as fully hallucinatory,—the dream was of that which had no existence. If, on the other hand, we make the objective, subject to the intelligible universe, we have a full explanation.

The man dreamt, for example, of the electric light in the same way as Faraday dreamt of his dynamo: there was exercise of imagination in the intelligible universe. The electric light existed *for* the dream-man as an object in the intelligible universe, in the same way as the dynamo existed *for* Faraday in that universe. Both were “things” possible of creation in the objective universe, but both had to be created in the intelligible universe before creation was possible in the objective.

You object,—but the dream-man was altogether incapable of making the electric light he dreamt of as an object in the objective universe, while Faraday not only had such power but exercised it. And your objection is sound. But it only strengthens the argument.

Let us put Faraday himself in place of the dream-man, in order to stave off any objection based on evolution of intellect. Suppose Faraday, besides living amongst us the other day, lived also two thousand years ago?

Two thousand years ago he dreamt of the dynamo just as he dreamt of it the other day. But *then* he could not make it an object in the objective universe. Why? His intellect was the same. It was because he had not the accumulated “starting points” for thought which two thousand years after he had at his command.<sup>8</sup> Two thousand years ago humanity had not, for its activity in the objective universe, the vast

<sup>8</sup> Newton said he stood on the heads of giants.

number of recorded ideas which humanity now has. Daedalus had the same schematic idea as Wright as to man's flying in the air, but he had not the same number of "starting points" for thought that Wright had and so could not deduct from his schematic idea the idea of a practical flying machine in the intelligible universe which was a condition precedent for his making an effective flying machine an object in the objective universe.

Two thousand years ago Faraday could imagine a dynamo but could not objectify it. In our days he also could imagine a dynamo and he could objectify it. What conclusion follows directly? Imagination is a fact, objectification a mere *accident of time*.

When, then, anyone has a schematic idea in dreams which he cannot reduce to an idea in the intelligible universe and so cannot make it an object in the objective universe, the idea is fictitious: it is fictitious *simply because* it cannot be made an object in the objective universe. Daedalus's dream of flying, Mother Shipton's dreams, even all dreams about objects not existing in the objective universe are fictitious. But this simply means that the objects dreamt of are not *yet* objects in the objective universe; they may or may not be in the future. We draw the sting from the term fictitious.

When waking, after dreams, we cannot use our waking judgment to determine our dreams as reasonable or unreasonable: our sleeping judgment that what we dream is objectively real is more trustworthy: in the cases for the man dreaming two thousand years ago and Faraday living two thousand years ago, we have found that the sleeping judgment was correct, the waking judgment incorrect.

Romance and Fairie, recorded, are recorded dreams, showing the inroads of imagination on our ideas about the objective universe and the laws of Nature. And it is not now alleged that the matter

of Romance and Fairie is reasonable. The point made is that we cannot use our waking judgment to determine it as reasonable or unreasonable. To the Caliph, Scheherazade's romance of the thousand and second night was false to reason: all her previous romance was true to reason. We, with the use of more "starting points" for thought, laugh at the Caliph for holding what was reasonable as unreasonable and what was unreasonable as reasonable. Many like instances can be imagined and they all show what a quagmire of thought we are landed in if we make the intelligible subject to the objective universe.

What, then, are the limits of Romance and Fairie so far as we have now considered the question?

The argument is that Romance and Fairie are part of human experience: they mark that thought is coloured by that free imagination which is the foundation of thought. Thought itself is an inhibited form of imagination, but thought itself reveals its origin in imagination in that it exhibits the colouring of imagination which is *not* inhibited in the form of thought.

But in Romance and Fairie we are not dealing with imagination directly. For we have considered Romance and Fairie as something which can be recorded. That is, we have not considered Romance and Fairie directly as we think about them or are aware of them but as recorded ideas,—as recorded in words for all of us,—not only for the originators—to consider. We have considered them subject to record.

In recording them words have had to be used and language has only been evolved to express ideas. Phantasy which transcends ideas is at the back of Romance and Fairie. But Romance and Fairie *for record* can only use ideas. Therefore Romance and Fairie can only express phantasy in parable. They try to express imagination, but, for record, can only express it cross-gartered by thought. This is why I



have referred Romance and Fairie to fancy as an inhibited form of phantasy.<sup>9</sup>

It is when we come to consideration of phantasy itself which transcends ideas that our difficulties in expression become almost insuperable.

<sup>9</sup> In Murray's Dictionary somewhat the same distinction is set up between phantasy and fantasy. But, perhaps quite wrongly, the distinction therein set up appeared to me too fine for use now.

## PHANTASY

Starting with the assumption that imagination is deep buried in the soul of man we have found that while thought is an inhibited form of imagination even thought is coloured by free imagination—by imagination, that is, beyond the purview of ideas. And the attempt has been made, at the same time, to show that human experience itself is of such a nature that if we do not start with our hypothesis of the “ I am ” we must regard all imagination beyond the purview of ideas as meaningless, incomprehensible waste in creation, although it is part of human experience. For human experience proves that we exercise imagination beyond the purview of thought and, if we are mere embodied selves, the vast field of imagination so opened is useless and meaningless except in its detail of inhibition in the form of thought.

We have already considered fancy as a form of phantasy, that is, we have considered thought about the objective universe coloured by imagination not inhibited in the form of thought. But what is phantasy in itself?

If you consider the definitions given of phantasy you will find that they all admit phantasy is something of which we have human experience: it is admittedly a fact of human experience. And, generally, phantasy is held to mark the exercise of imagination in relation to what is impossible for the objective universe. It is *because* imagination “ plays round ” what is impossible for the objective universe that it is said to take the form of phantasy. The assumption is that real reality exists in and for the objective universe

only, so that phantasy, which travels beyond the objective universe, is necessarily defined as irregular fancy, whim, caprice, the forming of unreal, chimerical, or grotesque images in the mind, etc.

And these definitions are sound if we give real reality to the objective universe.

But now we deny this real reality of the objective universe, so the definitions must all be rejected. We hold, on the other hand, that the objective universe is no more than an occasion for thought, where thought is no more than an inhibited form of imagination. The objective universe, then, only constitutes a mediate part<sup>1</sup> of the content of imagination.

If we give this real reality to the objective universe phantasy is sheer incomprehensible waste in creation: it gives rise to unreal images in the mind, unfounded ideas, distorted fancy, etc. In such case, when you brush your hair in the morning, consume a sausage, or powder your nose you are part of real reality. But when you dream of an ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice there is no real reality in you or in what you dream about: *you* do not exist in your dream and your dream itself marks but unfounded ideas resulting from disordered fancy.

It is suggested as more in accordance with reason to give real reality to dreams—even to dreams of love, beauty, truth and justice—than to confine real reality to what human experience informs us is an infinitesimally small speck of the ultimate universe. Even apart from personality dreams would appear to have a purview reaching far beyond what we see, hear and feel as mortals, and so to open a universe transcendent of that known to us, whether or not we have part in this transcendent. But how, in reason, can we imagine the existence of a subject with the power of dreaming about that which is altogether extraneous to itself?

<sup>1</sup> A mediate part means that the objective universe forms no necessary part of the content of imagination—it is merely an "occasion" for thought.

If you say the dream is merely in your mind, do you mean that your mind is not yourself? Your finger is yours and yet if you cut off your finger you yourself remain. But a dream once yours is yours always: it remains stored in your memory.

Now we have considered phantasy in the form of what I have termed fancy. But the purview of phantasy is wider than that of fancy. I suggest that fancy marks the colouring of ideas by imagination as already stated. But phantasy in itself extends beyond the purview of ideas; we may term this pure phantasy. Such phantasy is within the realm of insight transcending ideas.

It is this (pure) phantasy which we must now consider at large. And we must not confound it with ecstasy. Phantasy is imagination or a form of imagination. Ecstasy is a state of the subject. Imagination deep buried in the soul is transcendental. Phantasy may be defined as the exercise of imagination by the subject so far as the subject, still embodied, can exercise it.

In considering human experience of phantasy we have, as yet, confined our attention to it as something which is evidential and so have met no insuperable difficulty in expression. But in pure phantasy, which we now consider, we travel beyond the purview of ideas: we are in the realm of insight which transcends ideas. And when we travel beyond the purview of ideas two difficulties face us which must, at the outset, be considered.

The first arises from the fact that our language and speech have been evolved only for the full expression of ideas. When, then, we want to express our human experience of phantasy which travels beyond the purview of ideas, we are met by the difficulty that no definite means of expression have yet been evolved.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For instance, in the extreme case when we want to state that for God the contradictory limits of thought of good and evil disappear we can only state that He exists in transcendence of good

The second difficulty which attends the first is that though those who have had human experience of phantasy in dreams find therein real reality they find it only for themselves: they have no direct evidence to offer in words of their personal experience. For the only way in which they can manifest to their fellows what they have experienced is by the use of language and speech which can only express ideas. It follows that they can only express their experience in parable. This is why the manifestations in speech and language of those who have had human experience of phantasy is found so unsatisfactory and, even, contradictory. Preconceived ideas, too, come in and give personal colour to the parables. But it must be borne in mind that these, in some measure, false manifestations by no means prove the falsehood of the experience on which they are based. The most difficult false cases to unravel in Courts of Law are those which are based on a foundation of truth.

And, here, to clear our way a most strange fact of humanity must be considered; for it marks, I think, an abnormal instance of inverted modesty. Can it, possibly, have part in the regard of the reader for what is now written?

So far as we can trace back the history of mankind we find a very general belief that man is more than a mere embodied self created at birth, lost and gone on death. And in the east this belief very generally survives.

But, in the West, a large body of highly intellectual men discard this belief as involving unreasonable superstition.<sup>3</sup> These men hold that they themselves and their fellows are mere material things of passing time: they regard as victims of a baseless dream those

and evil, where the term "transcendent" has no meaning in idea. Laurie in his *Synthetica* admits that the God man thinks is not the Great God Himself. It is the God who has actualised Himself on our plane that he considers. It is only this God of thought for whom he assumes failure.

<sup>3</sup> No reference is here made to agnostics.

who believe that themselves and their fellows are more than mere material things,—are spiritual subjects of a universe transcending our little material world. And here comes in the strange fact of inverted modesty.

These men of intellect, for the very reason that they hold themselves and their fellows to be so mean in degree, regard themselves as intellectually and even morally superior to their fellows who claim a higher status for mankind. What they claim against their dissenting fellows is:—We prove our superiority to you by our knowledge that both of us are mere material beasts. You prove your inferiority to us by your belief that both of us are more than mere material beasts.

It is strange that the acknowledgment, the very claim, of common inferiority should evolve personal pride in intellectual superiority. Such men cannot, with Malvolio, term their fellows idle, shallow things and claim themselves as of another element; for their pride is based on general likeness. Even Malvolio thought nobly of the soul.

This inverted form of modesty is most interesting.

That for some of us there is, in dreamland, phantasy transcending the purview of ideas is a fact of human experience. Before we consider phantasy itself can we find any reason for, or probability of, its existence? Let us consider this question.

If we are mere material things of embodiment phantasy cannot exist. For the subject in such case could not travel beyond the purview of ideas which it can use through its brain: phantasy does travel beyond this purview.<sup>4</sup>

But when we make the subject a manifestation of the transcendental subject then phantasy is possible, though whether or not it exists must, for us as subjects, remain a question of human experience. For the "I

<sup>4</sup> This fact is the very fact on which the materialist relies for *proof* that phantasy marks disordered fancy.

am " exists still, though manifest as the embodied subject, and phantasy marks exercise of a form of imagination. The " I am," then, having imagination deep buried in it as a soul, can still exercise imagination when embodied, but as an embodied subject can exercise it, only, subject to embodiment: this is what is now termed phantasy. But the recorded evidence of phantasy, as before said, can only exist in parable.

Many of us, more indeed I think than is generally believed, suffer at times from a sense of the inadequacy of embodied existence in thought and conduct. We try to think the best: we cannot. For all our best thoughts have in the mind, also, evil thoughts in contradiction: our *best* disappears if our *worst* is not also in the mind for comparison. We think to do good; our activity in conduct always imports some activity in evil. We find good always with a shadow of evil and we find, even, evil always with a shadow of good. Our perplexity seems to arise from the fact of embodiment.

At such times we exercise imagination under the prompting of a want " at the back " of our minds to get rid of this conflict between good and evil: we want free psychical energy and for this we want freedom from human conduct which is implicit to embodiment.

I think what really prompts us is blind desire for a state of transcendence; we grope dimly after a state for ourselves beyond the purview of ideas, where there is freedom from the contradictions implicit for embodiment.

This blind desire exists and it is either a senseless, meaningless parasite of reasonable creation,—born of and ending in nothing—or it must arise from and be part of the personality as it really exists. In the latter case it marks the struggle of the " I am " against the inhibition of embodiment.

If we have this blind desire of the subject manifest in human experience and hold we exist as transcendental subjects, the blind desire points to the possi-

bility of phantasy in dreams. It does more. It points to the phantasy of dreams resulting as a fact from the state of the subject being in sleep one, relatively, free from embodiment. In sleep, the subject, as already shown, still exists as a subject of the intelligible universe. And it is then free from the disturbing influence of physical activity : its imagination finds less impediment to free exercise than in the waking state.

But what is our human experience of phantasy in dreamland ?

Children dream. As they grow into a state of full physical energy in conduct, they dream less.<sup>5</sup> For their imagination is then more nearly centred in thought for conduct. And this is right ; man's duty lies in physical activity. The Mother is righteous in making her Foster Child, man, ignore for passing time the glories he has known, for concentration on earthly duty.

During manhood in its most active time of conduct, the subject dreams less : its imagination is centred on thought for conduct.<sup>6</sup> As the age of activity passes, the subject dreams more. Its objective life being less and less active in conduct, its imagination is less and less centred on thought for conduct : it is freer to dream.

By what is above suggested we find made explicable that continuity of personality which faces us all in human experience. And bear in mind we have

5 The Youth, who daily further from the east  
Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,  
And by the vision splendid  
Is on his way attended ;  
At length the man perceives it die away  
And fade into the common light of day.

6 But perhaps during this time moments of ecstasy are most likely. The contrast between free imagination and its inhibited form of thought is then greatest.



nothing to do, as before shown, with any beginning or ending of the "I am": it exists in transcendence of time: beginning and ending have no meaning where there is transcendence of time.

If, on the other hand, we follow Haeckel's theory, the subject is no more than a thing of conduct in the objective universe, coming into existence *in time* and going out of existence *in time*. In such case there would appear difficulty in explaining the timeless, changeless continuity in personality of the subject from one determined period to another *in time*. Again, I cannot imagine consciousness without a subject or Being that is conscious and, if the reader will consult the essay on Psychology, by James Ward, as it appears in the last and preceding editions of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, he will find in the latter edition the statement, "We can imagine consciousness without self-consciousness." But in the *last*, the eleventh, edition he will find this statement cut out root and crop.

Now Haeckel must have an evolution of consciousness from unconsciousness if his theory is to stand. Where is his "self"?

The "I am" during its most active time as an embodied self dreams least, and the reason for this has been explained. But it is during this time of greatest activity that we find the noblest conduct in man. It is quite true that ideas in the intelligible universe govern conduct, but it is by conduct only that the lot of man in relation to material environment can be evolved towards betterment.

Still, we are apt to forget that our ultimate foundation for the advance of humanity exists in thinkers. We glorify achievement so excessively that the basis of our highest form of legislation, the House of Lords, has representatives chosen almost exclusively of those who have survived by possession of personal power in personal acquisitiveness. If we consider the majority of noblemen we shall find their existing noble

families founded originally by some ancestor gifted with personal power of acquisitiveness in wealth and influence and blest by descendents with personal power to retain or even increase what their ancestor acquired. We do not find a Shakespeare, Milton, Turner, Faraday, Huxley, or De Morgan marked as founders of families.

What is above stated is not in derogation of our nobles—who are all honourable men—but to mark our too definite worship of conduct. For it is men of thought like Shakespeare, Darwin, Pasteur, etc., who form the signposts for the advance of humanity, while the men of acquisitive conduct, however well they may use their wealth and power, mark but guardians for the continuance of environment as it is.

It is during this time of greatest activity in conduct that our leading men of thought in politics, social economy, art, literature and science establish, by conduct, signposts for the advance of humanity. It is during this time that men of objective conduct, following the signposts, lay down firm, stable roads for the onward passage of humanity.

And what follows? That the more truly these signposts point to a common ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice the straighter and easier the roads laid down by men of objective conduct towards our blind desire for our blind, but noble ideal.

Even when men dream least phantasy is at the back of their thought and conduct.

As old age comes on and the subject finds his time of activity in conduct passing, he dreams more and more. And, if embodiment be but a passing stage in time, this is natural and what we should expect. Earthly life takes on more surely the aspect of maya. Personal interest in earthly life passing away, the sense of camaraderie with all mankind strengthens and the old man finds personal happiness and unhappiness transcended by wider sympathy, a closer bond, with his fellow-men. In this loss of earthly personality, he finds, too, a wider personality for him-

self in a wider transcendent universe. Sleep, the gate to life through death, opens its portal more and more widely for him.

And what are our dreams of phantasy? Dreams from childhood?

The child on its mother's knee, says, "Mummy, I had such a beautiful dream last night."

"What was it about?"

"Oh! Mummy!" and on the little face there is a look of surprise at the question. "Of course I don't know now. It was just beautiful, really, *really* beautiful."

And the mother, if a wise woman, kisses her child and says no more; remembering, perchance, that she herself, long, long ago, had like dreams.

Or the child, in no few cases, may have what we impertinently term a vivid imagination and may have read much from the *Revelations to Hans Andersen's Fairy Tales*. And so it may translate its dream in parable, tell of gorgeous palaces and beautiful scenery, of living beasts and trees talking man's language. And as the tale is told it widens and widens.

But, even so, there is the glamour of pure phantasy behind the ideas.

"And, Mummy, there was a beautiful lake and one beautiful fish I loved most. And then the fish was me and I was the fish. And yet we was everybody and everything else. It was so funny, but so *very* nice. But I can't tell you right, can I? It was too nice to tell. You understand?"

Does the mother understand? Have you, Mrs. Gradgrind, ever had one of your children tell you such a story *for* you to understand? The first slap for telling lies closed the mouths of all your children.

The Podsnaps and Gradgrinds of our time venerate human thought with gilt. But the wood is true. Peter Pan and the Blue Bird float into our universe and humanity crowds—paying its footing even with its adored gilt,—to stare at the strange visions.

Why? They lift the eyes of humanity to that phantasy which exists outside embodiment and which humanity is conscious marks the really real in itself.

Whence comes the pleasure which not only the young, but those in full activity of body and even the aged feel in the presence of Peter Pan or the Blue Bird? From the presentation of fantastic, useless, meaningless vagaries of imagination? From disordered fancy? If so, what an incongruous creation each one of us is! For we are but things of thought and conduct; things using, rightly, only that part of imagination which is inhibited in the form of thought. And yet we find the highest form of happiness for ourselves in using *wrongly* imagination of what is impossible for us as things of thought and conduct. How can that which is extraneous to our being appeal so definitely to our sense of happiness?

And bear in mind, if you please, that this pleasure we feel has physical effect on us,—helps to keep body and brain healthy. And how could pleasure which is not physical affect you if you are made up purely of the physical? The only reply is to be found, I think, from Spinoza. There must be the External All Infinite Being who spiritually commands and affects us as physical subjects.<sup>7</sup>

Peter Pan, The Blue Bird, fairy tales, fairie and romance in general do exist for us all whatever their existence may be. And, I think, they affect us generally thus:—they mark our revolt against the limits of our embodiment. They ignore the limits of space, the slow progress of time; they rebel against stereotyped forms of wealth, rank, intellect, even against the confinement of each one of us to one material body. They all result from imagination of that which is impossible for us as mere embodied selves.

Some of these records of imagination are bad, some good, some very good. But all of them, I think, we judge by *one* standard: we measure their goodness

<sup>7</sup> Spinoza's philosophy has already been considered. Cf. p. 230.

or badness by one standard. What standard is this? The transcendent ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice. And what is it in these records that opens to us this ideal? It is phantasy. Even Swift's keen satire is meaningless to us unless we have in the background of our mind the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice.

For our ideal we must get outside, beyond our little universe and our embodiment in it with all its sin and suffering. Phantasy alone can and does effect this for us, phantasy gives us freedom and it is our feeling of this freedom, for the passing time, that touches our sense of happiness. How could you possibly find pleasure in *The Blue Bird* if it were but a record of disordered fancy, of what is absolutely impossible *for you*? In such case you would be opprest by sadness at your own limitations.

But you reply: Phantasy does open to me visions of what is impossible for me. And the reply is sound, but sound only if you are a mere embodied self with no future beyond the grave. In such case, however, you leave inexplicable the pleasure you feel in phantasy. This pleasure does exist for you, it *is* yours. How can it possibly be yours as a mere embodied "thing"? What touches *you* is the phantasy at the back of the play.

In phantasy you still remain embodied: the very rebellion of phantasy is against still existing embodiment. And, if this embodiment is *you* and you cease to exist on disembodiment, the rebellion is meaningless, hopeless. But phantasy does exist for you: the rebellion of phantasy does exist for you and, I affirm, we feel in ourselves that the rebellion has meaning and is based on sound hope.

This hope lies in the future: phantasy opens this future to us.

Phantasy transcends the possible and impossible. The analysis, as it were, of this transcendent into the possible and impossible only results when we bring in the relation of our objective universe. It is in re-

lation only to that speck of the ultimate universe that the question of what is possible or impossible arises : we can even *think* the possible and impossible.

Romance and Fairie exist as part of human experience and they show that imagination beyond the purview of thought does colour thought itself. And this leads, in reason, to an assumption that the genesis of Romance and Fairie must be found in the transcendent which we term phantasy. So far we can use the language of thought. But phantasy itself we can only express in parable : there is no language for the transcendental.

## ECSTASY

WE have travelled from thought to phantasy and thereby we have exhausted human experience in general as our ground for argument.

For now when we enter on the consideration of ecstasy we have but the human experience of, comparatively, a few to rely on for argument. And yet, as we shall see, the human evidence for ecstasy is of such cumulative force that some, though they have never had experience of the state, hold the probability that it exists to be so great that it amounts to evidential proof.

The general acceptance of ecstasy as a possible state for the subject appears from the fact that all dictionaries give definitions for it. But we may now confine ourselves to certain of those definitions given in Murray's dictionary—they would appear to be the most inclusive of all proffered in attempts at definition.

### DEFINITIONS

1. An exalted state of feeling which engrosses the mind to the exclusion of thought; rapture, transport. Now chiefly, intense rapturous delight, the expressions, ecstasy of woe, sorrow, despair, etc., still occur, but are usually felt as transferred.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That is, felt as in metaphor. There is still, for the subject, embodiment, and so relations in thought. Or, may it be, that in ecstasy, woe, sorrow, etc., are transcended, and yet there is awareness of their existence for embodiment?

2. The classical senses of *εκτῶσις* are "intensity" and "bewilderment," but in later Greek the etymological meaning received another application, viz.: "withdrawal of the soul from the body," "mystic or prophetic trance." Hence in later medical writers the word is used for trance, etc., generally.

3. (Pathology.) By early writers applied vaguely or with conflicting attempts at precise definition to all morbid states characterized by unconsciousness, as swoon, trance, catalepsy, etc.

4. (Modern Scientific use.) The term ecstasy has been applied to certain morbid states of the nervous system, in which the attention is occupied exclusively by one idea and the cerebral control is in part withdrawn from the lower cerebral and certain reflex functions. These latter centres may be in a condition of inertia or of insubordinate activity, presenting various disordered phenomena, for the most part motor.

William James in "The Varieties of Religious Experience" (p. 380) considers mystic states, by which I think he refers to states of ecstasy. He says:—

"The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced: it cannot be imparted or transferred to others."<sup>2</sup> He says further (1) Mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> They are states of *insight* (my italics) into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. (2) Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. (3) In mystical states there is a feeling as of abeyance of personal will accompanied sometimes by the feeling

<sup>2</sup> For the state of ecstasy there is transcendence of ideas and language is confined to the expression of ideas, as we saw when we considered phantasy.

<sup>3</sup> I suggest states of insight transcending knowledge.



of being grasped and held by a superior power. (4) Some memory<sup>4</sup> always survives any mystic state and always a profound sense of its importance.

It has been advisable to give the pathological and scientific definitions but they may now be ignored, for they do not transcend the fact of presentation. But still we may note that in pathology there is difficulty in arriving at any satisfactory definition for ecstasy, while in science it would appear to be referred to the isolated action of the highest cerebral centre. The difficulty for science, generally, in arriving at any exhaustive definition lies in the fact that, scientifically, ecstasy must be treated as a morbid passing state but—as the patient does return afterwards to his normal state—he must still, *during the morbid state*, remain as a self-conscious subject. This “isolated” state of self-consciousness, science cannot deal with.<sup>5</sup> It *must* consider the state of ecstasy as one of unconsciousness and so it *must* put an end to the subject during its morbid state and reinstitute it as a subject on return to normal life. Without any reflection on science this does not fully appeal to reason and, very possibly, had some part in influencing Huxley towards his belief that consciousness is a thing-in-itself.

The definition for ecstasy now considered is:—“the withdrawal of the soul from the body.” Ecstasy is considered as a state transcending the waking and sleeping states of the embodied subject. In other words, it is argued that some have human experience of a state transcending thought and embodiment so that they have personal human experience of their really real existence as “I am.” This human experience though only of the few may still be of such cumulative force that those who have never experienced it may be justified in accepting it, for themselves, as evidence,

<sup>4</sup> This being memory of insight can only be *recorded* for the benefit of others in the form of parable in ideas.

<sup>5</sup> The self-conscious subject as a thing-in-itself exists for science. But science, quite rightly, ignores it.

establishing that high degree of probability in reason which may fairly be accepted as proof. William James, for instance, in his remarkable work, already referred to, says (*Cf.* p. 379):—

“ Whether my treatment of mystical states will shed more light or darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can only speak of them at second hand. But, though forced to work upon the subject so externally, I will be as objective and receptive as I can; and I think I shall at least succeed in convincing you of the reality of the states in question, and of the paramount importance of their function.<sup>6</sup>”

Spinoza, too, accepts ecstasy as a fact. He says :—

“ The human Mind cannot be entirely destroyed with the Body, but of it something remains which is eternal.”<sup>7</sup>

Spinoza is said to have raised a distinction between time and eternity. What I think he really did was to hold that time and duration are mere limits of thought: his “eternity” transcended both. His ultimate, I think, cannot be distinguished from “the accomplished in the accomplishing” and if he be held to use the word “eternity” in this transcendent sense, his theory is not weakened: it is perhaps made more amenable to our comprehension.

Again he says :—

“ The supreme virtue of the mind is to know God or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge

<sup>6</sup> Ecstasy is not mystic for those who have experienced it: it is an integral part of their human experience. It is mystic for those of us who have not experienced it.

<sup>7</sup> Bear in mind that Gautama said he did *not* know what resulted from the destruction of illusion; he did not affirm the loss of all transcendental personality for the subject

(intuition).<sup>8</sup> And this virtue is all the greater in proportion as the mind has a fuller knowledge of things by this kind of knowledge. Therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes into the highest perfection of man . . . . Accordingly from this kind of knowledge springs the most perfect peace that can be given.<sup>9</sup>

Allanson Picton commenting on this, says :—

“And it is this reality, unattainable to mortal thought except *in some momentary ecstatic glimpse* (my italics) which the Master has in view when he speaks of Body and Mind in the aspect of eternity.”

Now when Spinoza speaks of the supreme virtue of the mind and its intuition, this mind he, for the time, assumes to be the mind of the subject. And when he says perfect peace follows this kind of knowledge he means perfect peace felt by the subject : this perfect peace exists in and for the personal human experience of the subject, though experienced only in momentary ecstatic glimpses. What then is to be deduced as his meaning ?

He says that the subject though free from, transcending all thought, is self-conscious of absorption in the Deity. Not only this, he says the subject is self-conscious of perfect peace in such absorption.<sup>10</sup> The subject, as a human subject, is in a state freed from the limitations of body and thought, but *still* remains in existence in some form of self-consciousness. This can but point to a transcendental subject. So Spinoza's absorption in the Deity must be read to mean merely absorption of the human personality,

<sup>8</sup> Intuition, as here used, is a (transcendent?) form of knowledge. I use the term “insight” as transcending knowledge.

<sup>9</sup> I read this perfect peace as marking transcendence of happiness and unhappiness.

<sup>10</sup> It is contended that Spinoza's statement is meaningless for us as subjects, unless this self-consciousness is assumed.

where transcendental personality still exists in self-consciousness.<sup>11</sup>

If, on the other hand, we hold Spinoza's theory of absorption in the Deity imports full loss of personality for the subject, his argument is in the air. For he holds that the state of ecstasy can exist for the subject while still embodied. But, if this state spells full loss of personality how can any subject have human experience of it? How can you or I have human experience of a state in which we have no consciousness of self, even as transcendental subjects.<sup>12</sup>

In making the above allegation as to Spinoza's theory it must be borne in mind what is meant by the "I am." It is what Kant terms the soul of man or the transcendental subject. Though there is for the "I am" freedom in transcendence from the stage of human personality, personality still exists in self-consciousness. But if Spinoza be held to mean that absorption in the Deity spells full absence of ultimate self-consciousness for the subject, then the state of ecstasy he refers to of which the subject has human experience is no more than the experience of the human subject: it cannot be the experience of the ultimate "I am" for any such "I am" has no existence. It is impossible, then, in such case, for the subject to be conscious of absorption in the Deity for neither the subject nor the really real subject exists for such consciousness. Still less could the subject feel perfect peace in such absorption.

But, even if the above interpretation of Spinoza's theory be rejected, he is still claimed as a supporter of the fact that the state of ecstasy, as it has been defined, exists for human experience.

<sup>11</sup> This conflicts with the general assumption that Spinoza was a pantheist, but I doubt whether the interpretation weakens his theory.

<sup>12</sup> Philo says that in ecstasy man *enjoys* the vision of God, though his consciousness disappears. Plotinus says that in ecstasy all thought is transcended and all consciousness of self lost in the *absorbing ecstasy*. But in both cases some form of self-consciousness must still exist.

In considering phantasy we were considering what may be termed a content of self-consciousness. Imagination is a power deep buried in the "I am" where the "I am" has self-consciousness beyond the purview of thought. And we have seen that though thought is an inhibited form of imagination, thought itself is coloured by phantasy. We have been dealing mainly with cognition.

But now, in considering ecstasy, we get quite away from cognition, we are in the realm of feeling.

We have already given consideration to feeling and found that the self-conscious subject, embodied, before it can be active in thought and conduct, must be a feeling subject: for the subject as of feeling transcends the subject as of thought. The state of ecstasy may be said to be the ultimate state in feeling of the subject: ecstasy is, for some, part of human experience. But in the present argument, good and evil, unity and diversity, etc., are treated as mere limitations of thought, they are contradictions which necessarily exist but exist only for thought. Insight is a power of the subject and it makes us aware of the limitations of thought in that as thought deals only with relations, its universe is one of contradictions. Insight transcends thought and so transcends its limits of contradiction. This is why our ultimate is transcendental and, for it, the term is used the "accomplished in the accomplishing."

We should expect, then, that when we do not transcend the facts of presentation and so consider feeling from the scientific psychological point of view, we should find manifestations of feeling which suggest or point to ecstasy as the ultimate state of feeling, though psychology does not bring this ultimate state within its purview.

Now we have already seen that the relative state of happiness of any subject does not depend on his degree of intellect, physical strength, wealth, or social status: the idiot, pauper, infirm, may be happy: the man of genius, millionaire, goliath, may be unhappy.

The state of feeling of the subject depends on his regard for the universe : the same one universe takes on differing aspects for differing men. This is true for all : the state of feeling determines the regard and the reaction of the same one universe on the subject : the universe differs as the regard of the subject differs.

The young girl wakened for the first time to the mystery of reciprocated love sees and feels for the passing time what is to her a new universe. The grey, gloomy world she knew has changed suddenly to one of glorious beauty. But in truth she sees and feels the same one universe : it is her regard that has changed.

Herein we find that though there be but one universe under the " eternal iron laws of Nature," your universe is not mine, mine is not yours. Each subject finds a differing universe, because each subject has differing regard for the same one " thing."

Even psychologically we are driven to acknowledgment of the supremacy of feeling for the subject, and, if feeling in the ultimate be as free from all " material" environment as alleged in this argument, there must be some ultimate state for feeling to which all feeling even when not transcending presentation, must be referred. I cannot distinguish this state from that of ecstasy.

In " The Varieties of Religious Experience," William James gives much attention to the " New Thought " and " Mind Cures " movements in the United States, and as to the results he says : " The blind have been made to see, the halt to walk ; life-long invalids have had their health restored. The moral fruits have been no less remarkable."

But what has been the principle used which has had these results ?

The normal physician, for human ills, uses bodily remedies.<sup>13</sup> The " New Thought " depends on changing the regard of the subject : its cures use the

<sup>13</sup> But self-suggestion is being used more and more, though often *sub rosa*.

mind. Like to all adventurers on new paths the expounders of mind cure and new thought claim far greater power and success than they possess. But they *have* power and they effect numerous cures where direct attacks on the body have failed.

What is the basis of their method?<sup>14</sup> It exists in the assumption that each man determines his own universe by his own regard and that each man can will what his regard shall be.<sup>15</sup> He who is a pessimist is instructed to be an optimist, he is told to *regard* the universe as good and to ignore its evil. And, foolish as the teaching may appear to many, there are some who have not only found it not foolish but, by pursuing it, have changed their state from unhealthy weakness to healthy physical strength, from unhappiness to happiness.

What do these cures point to? Reduce them to the lowest; assume the great majority of them never, in fact, took place. Still, there is a residuum of veridical cures left, and for any full explanation of human experience these veridical cases must be accounted for.

Consider the case of anyone who has been so cured.

No material means have been used for direct material effect on the body or brain: no change in material environment even has been used. It is what we term the mind of the subject that has been used to affect the body and brain; the mind has been used as having command over body and brain. We see, herein, the general principle applied that the intelligible universe has command over the objective.<sup>16</sup>

But what do we mean by the "mind" of the subject? We do *not*, when using the term, refer to any degree of intellect, inborn or developed by environment: we do not refer to any degree of bodily

<sup>14</sup> So far as it depends on the mystic it is not now considered.

<sup>15</sup> There is no necessary conflict here with my argument that will is powerless without imagination.

<sup>16</sup> The cures effected by hypnotism exemplify this principle. Cf. Moll on Hypnotism and the many cases reported in the Journals and Proceedings of the S.P.R.

strength. We mean by the "mind" something "at the back" of all intellectual manifestations effected through that complex machine the brain. When we refer "will" or "will based on imagination" to the mind of man we are referring to something *which commands intellectual operation*.

We refer the mind of man to something external to the brain and its working: to something which dominates the brain and its work.

Where, then, is this "mind"? I have my mind, you have your mind: my mind is not yours, yours is not mine. And this mind is external to body and brain: it exercises command over both, irrespective of the intellectual force it may cause to be manifested.<sup>17</sup>

We must refer this "mind" to each one of us as a subject who is not a mere subject of body and brain: the "mind subject" commands the subject of body and brain.

The man as a "mind subject" has cured himself as a subject of body and brain, and the "mind subject" is purely spiritual in that it exercises command over the material and objective.

I suggest, then, that what is above stated opens the possibility for the still embodied subject to dream veridically of itself as free from embodiment. For the mind is external to body and brain, and so may have moments of consciousness of divorce from body and brain.<sup>18</sup> The objective universe (the very body and brain of each of us) is but an occasion for thought and thought is an inhibited form of imagination. Withdraw this occasion, withdraw or subsume all thought about it. Imagination remains and remains deep buried in the soul of man. May not the subject, then, experience moments of the withdrawal of the soul from the body? Experience of ecstasy?

<sup>17</sup> The degree of intellectual manifestation is but a degree of *manifestation* of the power of the mind.

<sup>18</sup> Desipere in loco.



But ecstasy marks the withdrawal of the soul from the body : it marks the fact not only that the soul is a separate " thing " from the body, but that its embodiment inhibits its full freedom. For it finds this full freedom only when divorced from the body.

Ecstasy, then, if accepted as a fact, constitutes our Ultima Thule for belief that man exists as a soul.

Ecstasy, to those who have experienced it, is a transcendent fact : for those who have experienced it there is personal proof, beyond evidential proof, that they exist as souls.

But what is the regard of those who have not experienced it? What evidence have they to rely on for proof? Evidential proof only is open to them, personal proof is wanting.

In considering the above questions we are faced by a difficulty which must be acknowledged : for it cannot be removed. The difficulty is that, for fully sound reasoning, we must have human experience in general to rely on, while in considering ecstasy we have only the human experience of a comparative few. With the use of reason we may find the *possibility* of human experience in general of ecstasy : but any fully sound philosophy is based, for proof, on human experience in general as fact. Our reasoning as to ecstasy may still be comparatively sound but it must rely in some measure on authority : we must rely on belief in the truthfulness of others when they allege they have had experience of a state that we ourselves have not had. I may be right in my argument that reason shows to us that the state of ecstasy is *possible* : I doubt if reason shows it is even probable. Consciousness that oneself as a soul is withdrawn from the inhibition of embodiment is, for reason, possible, but I cannot allege that it is probable. It is here that personal proof by personal experience steps in and supplements, does not contradict, reason. Laurie goes so far as to say that " in one respect of things, reason is an impertinence."

The relation of reason to human experience appears from Kant's and Spinoza's philosophies. Kant admitted that, in reason, telepathy is possible, but he refused to consider it even as possible because, in his time, there was no sufficiency of human experience to support it. Spinoza, on the other hand,<sup>19</sup> holds that the personality of each one of us disappears on death. If, in his lifetime, there had been the human experience we now have of survival of personality after death, he might have changed his form of reasoning.<sup>20</sup>

Reason is halt when it has not full support from human experience in general: but still reason can deal with the possibility of such experience.

It may be objected that Spinoza himself, without personal experience, arrived at the certainty of ecstasy for some of us: but I doubt this. I think a full consideration of his life and conduct leads one to assume he had personal experience of the peace that passes understanding where there is full submission to the categorical imperative.

Our greatest difficulty in attacking ecstasy exists in this:—There is no language available to us for any record of personal experience during the state of ecstasy. The state itself transcends ideas, the experience itself transcends ideas, while the only language at our command does not extend beyond the purview of ideas. So the state itself and its experience can only be recorded *in parable* by those who have experienced it: can only be recorded *in parable*, for the benefit of those who have not experienced it.

It is true that Philo, Plotinus, and even Spinoza, try to express the inexpressible by vague negations—they try to raise ideas into the air of the transcendental<sup>21</sup>—and it is true that their records appeal to something in us. But this appeal is to something in

<sup>19</sup> I assume now that the interpretation usually accepted of Spinoza's philosophy is correct though personally I do not accept it.

<sup>20</sup> I may be fairly accused of changing it for him!

<sup>21</sup> And fail as Daedalus failed.

us transcending our being as subjects of thought and conduct. These negative records affect us directly only in parable.

When we turn to the innumerable records which exist of the state of ecstasy and its experience, we are in a sea of trouble and contradiction. Any such record is coloured by the preconceived ideas of the writer: each writer gives us parables of his state and experience which are consonant with his own dogmatic form of faith or religion. Collate and compare these records: they will be found not only to differ, *inter se*, but to conflict directly.

Are they, then, to be treated as wholly false and worthless? I think not. In science, art and literature we find the false and the true, find them often pathetically confounded one with the other. In records of ecstasy we must also expect to find the true confounded with the false, and even records from charlatans. But I agree with William James in holding there is at the lowest a residuum of truth in these records which justifies us in assuming the state of ecstasy is experienced by some, if only a few.

In the records of such men as Philo, Plotinus, even Spinoza, there is an *underlying* likeness which appeals to our reason. Reason informs us that if the state of ecstasy exist certain conclusions follow:—Freedom from the body spells freedom from the inhibitions of time and space: freedom of imagination spells thought not lost but subsumed: as the state of ecstasy transcends happiness and unhappiness it may be well described as one involving the peace that passes understanding: as all anthropomorphic distinctions from one's fellows are subsumed, the personality of ecstasy must be transcendent.<sup>22</sup> All this, which we arrive at by a process of reason, is supported by the records of such men as Philo and Plotinus.

<sup>22</sup> My reason refuses to allow me to give meaning to "world consciousness" unless I refer this consciousness to transcendental Being.

But must we reject the more dogmatic records, which are so numerous and contradictory? I think we must accept some as veridical though coloured by preconceived ideas.

Write down a simple story and read it to twelve honest men on whose word you fully rely. Let them each write down the story as heard. The probability is that not one record will be fully in agreement with the original; each record will differ from the others and some may even be in contradiction to others. If your story involve matters of faith or religion, the probability is that each record will be coloured by the preconceived ideas of the writer. In cases coming before Courts of Law, witnesses may be fully honest and yet give diametrically opposite evidence as to the same facts.

And yet, in spite of the differing and contradictory character of these records, I think examination of them will show that all are attempts to describe some one underlying truth.

Suppose, for instance, you offered the twelve records of your simple story to some independent person for perusal. I think he would find out for himself that from some *underlying* likeness in these records they were proved to be attempts, though failures, to portray the one underlying truth—the simple story.

In the gospels, for instance, we find differences, even contradictions. We find more: we find the record of each of the four writers coloured by preconceived ideas, resulting in great measure from personal constitution. But many of us, while rejecting the dogmatic statements, find an underlying truth in the mystic teaching and revelation of Our Lord. There is basic likeness in the four gospels, while the conflicting dogmatic forms of belief which Christianity now manifests can be traced back as evolved forms from the differing original dogmatic records of the one underlying truth.

If the records of ecstasy and its experience which we accept as veridical be considered, it is true we find

them differing *inter se*, even contradictory. But I think they point to an underlying reality of the state of ecstasy and its experience. They all mark the subsumption of a material under a spiritual personality, the transcendence of time and space, the sense of "oneness" in God and one's fellows. It is preconceived ideas which come in and, on this one sound foundation, erect differing structures.

Phantasy we can bring within the purview of human experience in general because it colours our ideas. But, for ecstasy, reason has not such experience to rely on: human experience is halt.

But is it for us to grieve over our comparative failure? Have we any right to expect that we, embodied as lilliputian objects in a lilliputian universe, ought to be able to solve the riddle of the transcendental universe?

Try to get rid of your consciousness as a self. You cannot. Your body, nerves, muscles, thought, insight, imagination, are yours, not mine. How can all this be yours, how can you be aware they are yours, unless *you* are a self-conscious subject?

Now try to define your self-consciousness. You cannot. It is groundless because it is the ground of all other certainty. If you cannot define your ultimate self, how can you define your ultimate state?

Reason informs us that the state of ecstasy is possible. More than this. It points to this state as the ultimate state of "myself." Must we not, then, be as incapable of defining in any way this *state*, as we are incapable of defining the subject—myself—of this state?

## THE ETERNAL

From the cradle to the grave each one of us is conscious of his relatively permanent state as a subject of self-consciousness. This "myself" is not conditioned by time or space; it is transcendent of both. So to this "myself" we can give neither beginning nor ending. What we can give beginning and ending to is the process of manifestation as embodied selves in time and space.

For each one of us the eternal exists in self-consciousness, transcendent of time and space. For—ignoring at present what meaning definitely or indefinitely we attach to the eternal—the reason of man revolts against any such succession as:—nothing, something, nothing. The succession is meaningless. Even if we relate back the universe to a genesis of chaos we mean by "chaos" something with the potentiality of evolving or being evolved into order. Beginnings and endings are mere ideas: insight transcends ideas.

Nature exists in the eternal and, for us embodied, it exists in processes of Nature to which we give beginnings and endings. You light a match; the flame begins and ends: you plant a seed; its evolution in form begins and ends: you are placed in the objective universe and manifest as an object; your manifestation has a beginning and an ending. But at the back of your reason, at the back even of your thought, stands the eternal, transcendent of time and space. Time and space exist for us only *in idea*, they mark the conditioning of processes in the eternal.

We cannot regard these processes in time and space as foreign to, as excrescences on the eternal: they

are conditionings of the eternal. That is why I hold time and space not swallowed up and lost in the eternal but transcended. The eternal is not an empty abstraction; it is something in itself groundless because it is the ground of all processes in Nature, physical and psychical. We find analogy to Coleridge's definition of self-consciousness as groundless because it is the ground of all other activity.

But it has been shown that the objective universe—the physical—is subject to the intelligible universe—the psychical. Though, then, we cannot define the eternal in thought or insight, we can, for it, give supremacy of the psychical over the physical. Even Haeckel gives supremacy to the "eternal iron laws" of Nature, and, even he, cannot make these laws savour in any way of the material though he may claim parallelism for them and the material.<sup>1</sup>

The self-conscious subject exists and exists in the eternal. It may be that Spinoza's philosophy as generally accepted is sound, so that the ultimate of the subject (or being) is absorption in the Deity. But, following Kant, I have argued that each one of us exists as a transcendental subject—as "myself."<sup>2</sup> So, right or wrong, we must now pursue the same argument.

What is man's future in the eternal?

We cannot know, we cannot all of us be aware even by insight though, as before shown, there may be personal proof for some transcending evidential proof. This personal proof, however, cannot be manifest in language: for it transcends ideas and language can but express ideas. It can only be manifest in parable.

Are we, then, at the end of our tether of reason? I think not.

And now *please* do not forget that the eternal is not

<sup>1</sup> All theories of parallelism seem to me explanations of the riddle of the universe which, on their face, fail.

<sup>2</sup> The human evidence for our survival on disembodiment is very strong: it is considered in *Personality and Telepathy*.

a solitary peak standing up alone and unrelated to an infinite number of processes in Nature which are not eternal. The eternal *transcends*, does not blot out, time and space and all the processes of Nature : they are all conditionings of or in the eternal. The eternal simply *is* so, for it, we cannot distinguish between what has been, what is and what will be : we cannot distinguish between the accomplished and the accomplishing. That is, we must give to the Eternal transcendence in some such parable-form as "the accomplished in the accomplishing." The eternal subsumes, does not blot out, all beginnings and all endings.

But it may be objected that what is above written applies only to the physical, whereas I have given, for the eternal, supremacy of the psychical (or spiritual) over the physical. But I think the objection fails when dissected.

For, even granting that the physical exists in the eternal, then, as it is subject to the psychical, the psychical must in itself be eternal. But I myself find here a crux of duality which can only exist for thought : I *must*, beyond the purview of ideas, make the physical merely phenomenal.<sup>3</sup> And, then, psychical activity still remains eternal and, for the eternal, must be marked by the accomplished in the accomplishing : there is transcendence of permanence, transcendence of change. And when Kant's explanation of his antinomies is fully digested this transcendence of permanence and change will be found, I think, not to be in opposition to his philosophy.

We find, perhaps strangely, evidence in human experience for the eternal in psychical activity.

There is no end to knowledge for, the more we learn, the wider is the field opened to us for more knowledge. There is no end to insight : for, the more

<sup>3</sup> It is strange that for a subject conditioned in three dimensional space not only objects in two dimensional but objects in *four* dimensional space are immaterial.



we learn, the wider and more mysterious grows the field of insight opened to us for more insight. Do we not find herein, from analogy to human experience, eternal hope in an eternity of the accomplishing in psychical activity?

Through eternity hope springs eternal. It may be that on disembodiment from human form personal physical activity is at an end. But psychical activity which governs the physical still remains. Eternal hope is ours in the parable of eternal ignorance.

You would solve the riddle of the universe? You would, as a pragmatist, ask for supreme knowledge in the ultimate? What then would be your state? What then would be left of you, what left of any value? When passed from human form we may or may not be manifest in other forms, physical or psychical: these forms may or may not be related to forms known to us. But, if any personality reach an ultimate of the accomplished, the personality has then come to an end. The accomplished is a function of time, a function of past time. Only so long as personality exists in the accomplishing in relation to the transcendental of the accomplished in the accomplishing can there be continuity of personality.

If we contemplate the possibility of personality being a mere function of bodily process and so beginning and ending with the process in time, then self-consciousness steps in and bars the way: for self-consciousness is groundless as the ground of all other activity. It may be, as Spinoza is generally assumed to have held, that the ultimate of "myself" is absorption in the Deity. But argument has been offered which, while supporting Spinoza's philosophy in the main, brings it into agreement with Kant's philosophy in holding each one of us exists as a transcendental subject. The present argument follows Kant.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The great body of human evidence, yearly accumulating, towards proof that our personality survives bodily death, was not available in Kant's lifetime.

Transcendental Being we must leave as a fact of the incomprehensible, transcending thought, even insight. But for the transcendental subject—myself—there can never be the accomplished: there is the accomplishing in the eternal; an eternal process in the transcendent of the accomplished in the accomplishing.

Most surely for each one of us *Karma* exists. Most surely for each one of us the more nearly we obey the categorical imperative in thought and conduct, the nearer we approach to pure manifestation of “myself.” And most surely, transcending all human ideas, the ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice is ours through the eternal.

The eternal, for us as subjects, spells the eternal in the accomplishing. And if, through the eternal, we must for ever and a day be marching on in the accomplishing to our transcendent ideal, we must bow to our subjection or contemplate annihilation in the accomplished.

Even on earth, eternal hope is ours; even on earth, more than eternal hope is ours. For he who honestly strives to do his duty in thought and conduct to God and his neighbour can, in transcendence of earthly happiness and unhappiness, attain the peace that passes understanding.







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