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


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1862.

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Col. Julius Estey  
With regards of  
Chas. C. Holbrook







Col. GEORGE T. ROBERTS.



A NARRATIVE

OF THE

Services of the Officers and Enlisted Men

OF THE

7TH REGIMENT OF VERMONT VOLUNTEERS

(VETERANS),

FROM 1862 TO 1866.

BY

WM. C. HOLBROOK,

Late Colonel 7th Vt. Veteran Vols.

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TO THE SURVIVING OFFICERS  
AND ENLISTED MEN OF THE SEVENTH REGIMENT  
OF VERMONT VOLUNTEERS (VETERANS) THIS VOLUME IS  
DEDICATED, WITH A COMRADE'S KINDLY  
REMEMBRANCE.



## INTRODUCTION.

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**T**HE history of the Seventh Vermont Regiment during the late war has never been written, and to this day the services which that gallant regiment rendered, and the severe experiences through which it passed, are not, I am persuaded, fully understood or appreciated by those not connected with it.

It was, unfortunately, the fate of the regiment, during its entire service, to operate in fields far distant from Vermont, and, except for a brief period, shortly after its departure from the State, to be isolated from all other Vermont regiments, and for the most part from all other Eastern troops. Its history, therefore, is separate and distinct. Most, if not all, of the other Vermont regiments, at one time or another, were brigaded or attached to the same armies, and have, to a large extent, a common history. The duties performed by the Seventh from the early part of 1863 to the fall of 1864 were of such a nature that the more prominent features of its career are made up entirely of the individual achievements of its officers or detached portions of the regiment. After the return of the Seventh to New Orleans in the Autumn of 1864, it served continuously as a regiment until it was disbanded in April, 1866.

At the request of Hon. G. G. Benedict, State Military Historian, and at the solicitation of several members of the regiment, I have been induced to prepare the following narrative, in the hope that I may thereby set forth more clearly

than has heretofore been done some of the important events which occurred in its long term of service, and at the same time contribute my testimony to the conspicuous fortitude and patriotism of the brave officers and men who composed the Seventh.

I have been very much aided in this undertaking by material and data furnished me by Colonels Peck and Porter, Surgeon Blanchard, Captains Morse, Kilburn, Clark, Stowell, Woodman, Moseley and Stearns, and Lieutenants Gates and Murdick, and Messrs. Royce, Brooks and Cook, all of the Seventh, and by a sketch of the late Capt. Young, kindly obtained and sent me by Col. Samuel E. Pingree, formerly of the 3d Vermont Regiment.

I have also derived valuable information from letters written from the regiment cotemporaneously with the events which they chronicle, and published in the *Rutland Herald*. Among these are important communications from Lieut.-Col. Fullam, Captains Dutton, Hitchcock and others. So much of my statement as relates to the battle of Baton Rouge, and the atrocious treatment which the regiment received at the hands of Gen. Butler, is made up from the official reports of the commanding officers of the respective regiments and batteries that were stationed at that place at the time of the action, and from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, and from my own recollections of personal interviews with Gen. Butler, and from public proceedings at the time, and from other sources. I have also availed myself of the excellent annual reports of the late Gen. Peter T. Washburn, the lamented and efficient Adjutant and Inspector-General of the State from which I have obtained statistics that have greatly aided me. The Campaign of Mobile, by Brevet

Major-Gen. C. C. Andrews, I have also found of service, and have quoted extensively therefrom.

I have prepared this work in the midst of a busy life, and regret that my engagements have prevented my giving that time to it which its importance demands. I have long wished that a connected and continuous history of the regiment might be written, and I very much hoped that some more competent person would undertake its compilation. But as no one has come forward for that purpose, I offer the following narrative, well knowing that it does but faint justice to the many noble acts and achievements of the gallant officers and enlisted men of that veteran regiment.

I trust, however, that from this statement the Military historian of the State will derive information that will enable him to record the services and experiences of the Seventh in an appropriate manner, conscious as I am that its career for bravery and faithful performance of duty is second to none of the regiments sent forth by Vermont during the War of the Rebellion.

WM. C. HOLBROOK.

New York, August 16th, 1882.



## ERRATA.

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- Page 21, line 4, *furthest* instead of "fartherest."  
" 21, " 27, *from* instead of "in."  
" 48, " 22, *when* instead of "where."  
" 49, lines 13 to 20 should not be in quotation.  
" 97, line 26, no comma after Major.  
' 107, " 25, *page* 47 instead of page 7.  
" 123, " 4, *was scarcely* instead of "scarcely was."  
" 144, " 4, *way* instead of "ways."  
" 153, " 18, *April* instead of "March."

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assigned to General Butler's Division, and so originally fell under the command of that vindictive and unjust officer.\*

On the 10th of March the regiment left Rutland for New York City, where the right wing, under Colonel Roberts, embarked on the ship "Premier," and the left wing, under Lieut.-Col. Fullam, on the ship "Tammerlane," with sealed orders to proceed to sea. We were detained at Sandy Hook

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\* By an Act of the Legislature of Vermont, approved November 12th, 1861, the Governor was authorized to recruit and organize a regiment of infantry to serve for three years from June 1st, 1861, to be attached to the Division which the Secretary of War had authorized Gen. Butler to raise in the New England States, which regiment was to be armed and equipped at the expense of the United States

And by another Act, approved November 16th, 1861, the Governor was further authorized to recruit, organize, *arm and equip* an additional regiment of infantry to serve for the State "in the *army of the United States*" for three years from June 1st, 1861.

And by another Act, approved November 21st, 1861, the Governor was further authorized to raise one or more batteries of light artillery, to be attached to Gen. Butler's Division, which batteries were also to be armed and equipped at the expense of the United States.

It will be seen that under these Acts it was not contemplated that but one regiment of infantry should be furnished Gen. Butler. About this time he visited Montpelier and personally urged that the regiment authorized to be raised under the above Act of November 16th might also be assigned to his Division, but the State authorities were not disposed to comply with his wishes, preferring that the regiment should be sent to join the other Vermont regiments in the Army of the Potomac. It is said that Gen. Butler was much provoked because greater deference was not paid to his importunities. It seems that of the two regiments thus authorized to be raised, the Eighth was first selected for service in Gen. Butler's Division, and the knapsacks and equipage of that regiment were originally marked with the initials N. E. D., indicating that it belonged to the New England Division. This was not the case with the Seventh, and none of its equipments were ever so marked. How it happened that the Seventh was ordered to Gen. Butler's command I have not been able definitely to ascertain, but it is quite likely after his failure to obtain the acquiescence of the State authorities to the regiment being attached to his Division, that Gen. Butler applied and interceded with the War Department to bring about the result he desired, and meeting with better success thus obtained orders directing the Seventh to report to him at Ship Island. However the matter was brought about, it was most unfortunate for the regiment that it was sent to Gen. Butler, for almost immediately on its arrival at Ship Island he began quarreling with some of the officers, and kept up hostilities until his anger culminated in the gross and unwarranted attack which he subsequently made upon the honor of the regiment for the part it took in the battle of Baton Rouge. Many of the officers and men to this day entertain the belief that in this monstrous effort to humiliate and degrade the regiment and State, Gen. Butler was actuated to a considerable degree by the ill-feeling which he cherished for the State authorities in refusing to give their consent that the Seventh should be attached to his Division, on the occasion of his visit to Montpelier. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt had the regiment been under the command of a just and fair-minded officer, the assault made upon its valor and soldierly conduct would never have occurred.



for several days waiting for favorable weather to continue our voyage to Ship Island, which, about this time, we ascertained was our destination.

On leaving our anchorage, the two ships parted company and neither saw anything of the other until we reached Ship Island. The "Premier" and "Tammerlane" were both old-fashioned sailing ships built for the Merchant service, and hence were ill-adapted and poorly arranged to properly accommodate the large number of men with which each was crowded.

The voyage was long and uncomfortable. The weather, at first, was heavy and tempestuous, particularly "off Hatteras," and as few, if any, of us had ever before been upon the ocean, during the season of March gales, we suffered more or less from sea sickness. By the time we reached the Florida coast however, we began to be favored with pleasant weather and smooth seas which continued for the remainder of the trip, and the voyage thereafter became more enjoyable.

On the 5th of April the "Premier" reached Ship Island which, when first sighted, we discovered was a low and narrow strip of sand of uncommon whiteness and brilliancy and which in the distance resembled the snow covered fields we had left behind us. Our disappointment as we neared this desolate island was very great, for we had looked for a far more beautiful and attractive country. As there was no alternative left us however, we suppressed our wrath at being sent to so bleak a spot and concluded after all, that anything that could be called *terra firma* was preferable to life on a

troop ship, improvised as ours had been from a weather beaten and not over savory merchantman, and so we disembarked and pitched our tents in the sand of Ship Island, consoling ourselves with the reflection that we had at least escaped the enemy's cruisers and the perils of the sea.

On the 10th of April, the "Tammerlane" with the left wing on board joined us, having been delayed by rough weather and adverse winds. An incident here occurred which illustrates the unfair treatment which we had to expect from the commanding General, and is thus referred to by Lieut.-Col. Fullam in a letter dated September 23d, and published in the Rutland *Herald* on the 26th of September, 1862. \* \* \* \* \* "On my arrival (with left wing) " commenced that series of abuses to which the regiment has " been subject up to the present time. Upon reporting my " command to Col. Roberts, our regimental Quartermaster " caused the tents and baggage of the left wing to be disem- " barked with the men when, as it seemed, Gen. Butler's " order only mentioned the landing of the troops. The " Quartermaster was innocent of any intentional excess of " orders, but supposed that an order for the disembarkment " of troops upon a desert island where there was not even " the shelter of a friendly tree to protect them from the fre- " quent storms and burning sun of the climate, implied the " taking with them of such articles as were absolutely nec- " essary to make them comfortable. Although the landing " of the baggage did not occupy the "Saxon" (the boat used " for the purpose) much longer than would have been re- " quired for landing the troops alone, Gen. Butler wanted

“ her and was in a great rage at the delay, and declared  
“ somebody should lose his commission for it, and put the  
“ Quartermaster under arrest where he was kept for some  
“ days. \* \* \* The conduct of the Quartermaster  
“ saved the soldiers from much suffering, for a storm of great  
“ fury arose in the night and threatened the destruction of  
“ our camp by blowing down our tents and deluging us with  
“ water. It was impossible for us to bring from the ‘ Tam-  
“ merlane ’ the remainder of our camp equipage for several  
“ days, and but for the tents and means of preparing food  
“ much distress would have been caused among the men so  
“ long and so closely confined on ship-board.”

The Lieut. Colonel might well have stated the facts in much stronger language. To have landed five hundred men on this barren island at that season of the year, or indeed at any time, without cooking utensils or shelter would have been grossly cruel and inhuman, and the action of the Quartermaster was entirely justifiable and correct. The storm above alluded to, or some other unknown cause, apparently softened the obdurate heart of the Major-General commanding, and in due time Capt. Morse, with whom the whole regiment sympathized, was released from arrest.

Each wing lost one enlisted man by death during the voyage, which were the only serious casualties that took place during the passage.

While on Ship Island but little occurred to break the monotony of our life which was entirely of a routine character. We lived almost wholly upon salt rations seasoned, when the wind was high, with a liberal portion of sand which

persistently adhered to pots and kettles and intermixed with food in a way not at all to our liking, and although it was claimed that our grit was thereby increased, we should have much preferred working it up by some other process. Our time was devoted mainly to drilling and perfecting the knowledge of the men in company and regimental duties. We were not able, however, to accomplish as much in the way of executing battalion manœuvres as we desired, owing to the loose sand which not only made the footing insecure, but rendered marching as difficult and fatiguing as plodding through the deep snows of Vermont, and the fear of increasing the cases of hernia, several of which had already been occasioned by these exercises, prevented our doing as much in this direction as we otherwise should. Then too, early in May the regiment was broken up in consequence of an order directing me to proceed with a portion of it to take possession of Fort Pike.

In compliance with this order, Companies B, C, and about thirty men of Company D, commanded respectively by Captains Cronan, Porter and Lieut. Thrall were detailed for that purpose and on the 3d of May we embarked on the gun boats "New London" and "Calhoun" and proceeded to that fort which, on our arrival, we found had just been deserted and all the guns spiked. This fort is situated on the "Rigolets" and commands the entrance to Lake Ponchartrain from the direction of Mississippi Sound, and was considered one of the important defences to New Orleans. We found it a substantial and regularly bastioned and casemated fort surrounded by a deep water moat and capable, had it been properly de-

fended, of resisting any attack which we, with our small force, could have made. We at once set about putting the fort in order, and in less than forty-eight hours we had removed the spikes from the guns and were ready to meet any attack that might be made. But the enemy saw fit not to molest us and the only blood spilt was in repelling the assaults of an exceedingly fierce and athletic race of gallinipers whose domain it seems we had invaded.\*

On the 1st of May, New Orleans was occupied by our forces and shortly afterwards that portion of the regiment left on Ship Island was ordered there, and accordingly embarked on the steamer "Whitman" a Mississippi river boat of the "high pressure" pattern. Before they had proceeded far it was discovered that the engineer had matured plans to blow up the vessel. The affair is thus described by one of the men on board in a letter to the *Rutland Herald*. \* \* \*

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\* Shortly after our arrival at Fort Pike I was aroused early one morning by the announcement that a flag of truce was flying just over the rushes on the further side of the "Rigolets." Upon investigation it was found that two negroes desired to come within our lines. I ascertained by interrogating them that they had left their masters for cruel and inhuman treatment, and one of them, Emund Randolph, showed the stripes and cuts upon his back, from which it was patent that he had been most brutally flogged. His pitiable appearance and sad story strongly appealed to my sympathy and I resolved to give protection to the fugitives. Just before this an order had been issued by the War Department authorizing the commanders of Posts in their discretion to receive escaping negroes within their lines and when any were so received they were under no circumstances to be surrendered to their former masters. A few days later the masters of Edmund and his comrade made their appearance and arrogantly demanded a return of their slaves. Great was their disappointment and dismay on being informed that their wishes and demands would not be complied with, and the disgust depicted upon their countenances when they found they must depart without these, their "human chattels," led us to believe that their love for "Abe Lincoln and his Yankee myrmidons" was not thereby increased. This incident led to quite a long correspondence between Gen. Claibourn, ex-member of Congress from Mississippi, and myself, wherein he endeavored to convince me that the U. S. Government had no right to receive and retain fugitive slaves within its military lines. That such an interference with the "divine institution of slavery" could not be justified by the laws of either God or man. Finding that his arguments were of no avail, he finally subsided. I gave Edmund employment as one of my personal attendants and he proved a faithful and excellent servant. He now resides at Vernon, Vermont, and is much respected by all in the neighborhood.

“ It was midnight when we left Ship Island. We sailed  
“ three hours at the rate of ten miles per hour when it was  
“ ascertained that something was wrong with the engine,  
“ and upon an investigation of the matter it was found that  
“ we were being escorted by a rebel engineer with more than  
“ double the amount of steam allowed, and who had let  
“ nearly all the water out of the boiler, and having launched  
“ a small boat for his own escape, was just ready to let in a  
“ stream of cold water. It was discovered by the assistant  
“ engineer just in time to communicate the fact to Col. Rob-  
“ erts who caused the immediate arrest of the engineer.  
“ Had this villainous plot succeeded, every commissioned  
“ officer would have been blown into the heavens as they  
“ were just over the boiler. I was about ten feet from one  
“ end of the boiler asleep. Col. Roberts ordered the boat  
“ back to Ship Island where the rebel engineer was placed  
“ in the fort for safe keeping and a trusty one secured when  
“ we again started.”

The “ Whitman ” was a fated craft for a few months later she took fire through the carelessness of her officers and was sunk in the Mississippi river and a large number of sick and wounded soldiers who were on board lost their lives in consequence.

We subsequently had a good deal of experience upon vessels of this description. As a rule they were manned with inadequate crews, and inefficient and often times untrustworthy officers. At best they were dangerous to travel upon, and it is a wonder, with the engineers we had, that we were not blown up, as we came so near being several times. The boilers

were so exposed as to furnish a conspicuous target for the enemy's guns and on more than one occasion we were obliged to stand helplessly by under a heavy artillery fire, expecting every moment to be sent skyward by the explosion of the boilers from some well directed shot. On the departure of the regiment from Ship Island those of the sick who were unable to accompany it were left there, and among others left behind was Capt. Charles C. Ruggles of Company I. He was subsequently sent to the hospital at Carrolton, and as soon as he was able to do so resumed command of the convalescent soldiers in camp. But from over zeal and actuated by a desire to do even more than his full share of duty, he unfortunately received a sun stroke from the effects of which, in his then weakened condition, he died on the 24th day of July, 1862. His untimely death was much deplored in the regiment. He was a favorite officer and much esteemed by all who knew him.\*

On the arrival of the regiment at New Orleans, Col. Roberts was directed to report, with his command, to Brig.-Gen. J. W. Phelps at Carrolton some eight miles from the city, which point was reached about the 16th of May. It was exceedingly gratifying to the officers and men to be placed under Gen. Phelps' command for whom we all entertained the greatest respect and in whose military skill we reposed the utmost confidence. Many of the officers and men of the Seventh belonged to, and accompanied the First Vermont

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\*His remains were sent home, and were buried at Poultney, with impressive civic and masonic ceremonies, participated in by his own lodge and several others from the adjoining towns.

Regiment during its three months' term of service at the outbreak of the Rebellion. Gen. Phelps, who was then Colonel of the First, was universally respected and beloved by the officers and men of his regiment. Being a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, and having for many previous years served in the regular army with credit and distinction, and possessing great personal dignity of manner and courage, allied with the most unswerving honesty and rectitude of purpose, it was not strange that he won the confidence and esteem of his command. Probably no single regiment contained so many of the officers and men of the First Regiment as did the Seventh. Indeed it may almost be said that it was a reorganization of the First, and when it was ascertained that we were to be sent to Ship Island about the only consolation we had was the thought that we were to serve with Gen. Phelps, under whose immediate command we expected to be placed. As it turned out, however, our friendship for him and his for us, was of no avail. Shortly after our arrival at Ship Island, a controversy sprang up between Gen. Butler and Gen. Phelps relative to the expediency of emancipating and arming the negroes. The views of the latter on these questions, as is well known, were radical and pronounced, and as some thought too advanced, but in a short time his sentiments were substantially adopted by the government, and Gen. Butler very speedily resorted to the very measures he had suggested touching the formation of colored regiments. This dispute led to a voluminous correspondence which occasioned such bitterness of feeling that Gen. Phelps was finally constrained to resign. Many of the officers and men of the



Seventh concurred with Gen. Phelps as to the policy of organizing and arming the blacks, and generally sided with him instead of with Gen. Butler, whose motives they distrusted, and whose conduct of the controversy seemed to be marked with his characteristic unfairness and acrimony, and who it was apparent sought to so shape it that whatever credit might result should redound to his glory rather than to that of Gen. Phelps. The government, at this time, for some unknown reason, seemed to stand in mortal dread of Gen. Butler and hence favored him and utterly ignored the military suggestions advanced by Gen. Phelps—relative to the questions at issue. Chagrined at such a slight from the government he had so long and faithfully served, and provoked by the taunts and injustice of the political demagogue under whom he was obliged to serve, this gallant officer was at last forced to resign. No doubt this step on Gen. Phelps part caused Gen. Butler unmixed pleasure. But whatever may have been his feelings I believe the loss to the country was very great, and that Gen. Phelps' services should have been retained even had it involved the removal of a dozen such men as Butler. Every one who knows Gen. Phelps must admit his eminent purity of character and intelligence; as a soldier he was as simple in habit and as unostentatious as the heroic and lamented Sedgwick, and had he been placed in the command of troops in the field I believe his career would have been characterized by great good to the service and much glory to himself. At no time and in no place were such officers more needed than in the Department of the Gulf at the period when Gen. Phelps, with seeming indif-

ference on the part of the government, was suffered to sheathe his sword and retire to the walks of civil life.

At the height of this contention Gen. Butler, evidently for his own glorification, conceived the idea of issuing his infamous order relative to the conduct of the Seventh at Baton Rouge. As soon as I became aware of his intention I called upon Gen. Phelps, who, as might have been expected, warmly espoused our cause, and unhesitatingly denounced Butler's fell design as utterly unworthy of a commander inspired either with patriotism, fairness or decency. Whether or not Gen. Phelps' well known interest in the regiment operated to incite Gen. Butler to persist in his malicious purpose I know not, but from the vindictiveness of his character it would not be strange if it was an element which, in his footings of a grand total for a cause of offence, was not entirely overlooked. Gen. Phelps' views as to Gen. Butler's conduct in this particular are well illustrated by the following extracts from a letter I recently received from him: \* \* \* \*

“ The general (referring to Butler) who gave a fatal impression of trade and politics to his command instead of stimulating their patriotism and soldiership, began quarreling with officers of the Seventh almost before it had fairly landed at Ship Island, and he seems to have kept it up to the last, pursuing the Seventh through the strife and havoc of battle, *where he was not personally present*, and under circumstances of difficulty, crowned with success, where a generous spirit would have been disposed to overlook minor faults, even if they had been committed. What his motives were for thus pursuing the Seventh, and seeking

“ to incite variance between that regiment and the Twenty-  
“ first Indiana regiment, I cannot say, but it is evident that  
“ if he (Butler) were to run for the Presidency in the en-  
“ suing election of 1864, the large electoral vote of Indiana  
“ might be of great moment to him, and that it would be a  
“ good bargain to win it even at the expense of losing the  
“ Whig vote of Vermont. But whatever the objects of Gen.  
“ Butler may have been, they were little in accord with the  
“ occasion that called for military service in the Southwest  
“ in 1862, which was the most important theatre of action  
“ of the whole war. He gave a very unfortunate direction  
“ to the service there which the government subsequently  
“ endeavored to remedy by sending to that quarter general  
“ after general and commission after commission with but  
“ little effect. I can hardly think that it was necessary for  
“ the government to make such disastrous concessions to the  
“ Democracy as to employ Gen. Butler in the Southwest at  
“ that period. He exacted from the government terms  
“ altogether too advantageous to himself and party, as an  
“ old Democrat, to be compatible with a proper final settle-  
“ ment of the war issues before the country. *I doubt if*  
“ *there was an officer, even of the rebel army, who has occa-*  
“ *sioned the Republic so much injury as he has done.*”

It is much to be regretted that General Phelps was not assigned to the command of the troops on active duty in the field. Had he been sent to the front I believe the outcome of our subsequent operations on the river would have been far more glorious, and I am confident our regiment would have had accorded to it the commendation and praise which it so justly

earned, and which its faithful and heroic services so richly merited.

While at Carrolton, owing to the nature of the country, it was impossible to do very much drilling. Lieut.-Col. Fullam in his letter above referred to, speaking of the experience of the regiment there says. \* \* \* \* "The small space  
 " of ground appropriated to the troops gave us no oppor-  
 " tunity for drill in battalions, which we never had while  
 " there. Soon after our arrival the rising water from a  
 " crevasse in the levee made it necessary for us to spend our  
 " time in trying to protect our camp from its incursions ; we  
 " succeeded in this but the stench from decomposing animal  
 " and vegetable matter left by the water when it receded  
 " produced much sickness among us and we were finally  
 " forced to move our camp and occupy a much smaller space  
 " nearer the river. May 22d, Col. Roberts was taken sick  
 " \* \* \* \* which left me in command." And in speak-  
 ing of the circumstances attending the departure of the regi-  
 ment for Baton Rouge he says. . \* \* \* \* " This  
 " state of affairs continued until the 6th of June when I re-  
 " ceived an order from Gen. Butler to prepare the regiment  
 " to embark immediately on board the steamer 'Herville' with  
 " the tents of the regiment, and officers' baggage, limited to a  
 " valise, bag or knapsack to each. I prepared the regiment  
 " immediately according to the order, and the next morning  
 " was ready, but after waiting for the boat until the morning  
 " of the 15th, I went to New Orleans to see Gen. Butler to  
 " represent to him the condition of the regiment, ascertain  
 " our destination and if possible obtain leave to take more

“ baggage than allowed by the order, in which I thought  
“ there must be some mistake, since the trip was to be made  
“ by steamer, and our baggage could have as well been taken  
“ as left behind. I was at Gen. Butler’s office when he  
“ entered it in the morning, sent in my name immediately,  
“ requesting that I might see him a moment, but was forced  
“ to return to camp at night without having obtained an in-  
“ terview. When I arrived at camp I found the ‘ Iberville ’  
“ had been sent up during the day with an order to embark  
“ the troops immediately ; everything was nearly ready and  
“ hastily preparing myself I went on board without any order  
“ written or oral where I was to go, or what I was to do.  
“ \* \* \* \* \* “ We proceeded up the river, and in the  
“ afternoon of the next day the ‘ Iberville ’ stopped at Baton  
“ Rouge. Knowing that Gen. Williams was in command of  
“ our forces I went to his quarters, and informed him that  
“ although I had received no orders to report to him, the  
“ regiment was there, and I should be happy to receive orders  
“ from him. He said he had been informed that we were  
“ coming, and directed me to disembark the troops.”

About this time I was ordered to join the regiment at Baton Rouge, and accordingly left Fort Pike taking with me Company B, Capt. Cronan, leaving C and a portion of D company to garrison that post under the command of Capt. Porter.



## CHAPTER II.

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VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.—GRAND GULF.—EXPERIENCE OF COL.  
ROBERTS AND LIEUT. CLARK IN ASCENDING THE RIVER.

—“BUTLER’S DITCH.”—EXPOSURE AND SICKNESS  
OF THE REGIMENT.—DEATH OF CAPT. BROOKS.

—RETURN TO BATON ROUGE.

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1862.

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**ON** the 19th of June the regiment was ordered to embark on transports, to take part in an expedition against Vicksburg under Gen. Williams.

A few weeks before, Gen. Williams, with about 1,500 men, acting in conjunction with the naval forces under Admiral Farragut, had ascended the river as far as Vicksburg on a reconnoissance, and on his return had reported that he saw *no* chance of taking the place with the troops at his disposal, even with the aid of the navy, as it was heavily fortified and manned, and the enemy, in addition to the regular garrison, had at least 30,000 men within an hour’s call.

Notwithstanding this adverse report we were expected, with a land force of not exceeding 3,500 men, to take Vicks-

burg, an undertaking, as was subsequently demonstrated, wholly beyond our power, for the place was substantially as strong then, as it afterwards proved to be when attacked by Gen. Sherman with a very much larger command, and later when besieged by Gen. Grant with his formidable army.

The utter absurdity and futility of this enterprise is also illustrated by the observations of Admiral Farragut, who, in speaking of Vicksburg at this time, in a letter dated June 29th, after our arrival there, among other things says: \* \* \* \* "It seems to me that *any* man of common "sense would know that this place cannot be taken with our "present force, when the army in its rear consists of ten or "fifteen thousand men." And in a report dated July 2d, he further says: \* \* \* \* "Gen. Williams has with him "about 3,000 men. \* \* \* \* The army officers gen- "erally have shown a *great* anxiety to do everything in their "power to help us, but their force is *too small* to attack the "town, or for any other purpose than a momentary assault "to spike guns, should such an opportunity offer. \* \* \* \* "I am satisfied it is not possible to take Vicksburg without "an army of twelve or fifteen thousand men." (See Life and Letters of Farragut by his son, pp. 279 to 283.)

Gen. Williams' command consisted of the following troops, viz.: the Ninth Connecticut, Thirtieth Massachusetts, Fourth Wisconsin, eight companies Seventh Vermont, and Nim's Light Battery (Mass). Our regiment left Baton Rouge without any camp equipage save a few cooking utensils, and with only ten days' rations, and about a week's supply of medical stores. Our eight companies, including the field,

staff and other commissioned officers, numbered not far from 800 men. We were assigned to the transports "Ceres" and "Morning Light," two Mississippi steamers of the pattern to which I have already alluded. The expedition was convoyed by Farragut's entire fleet.

As we approached Grand Gulf, where the previous expedition had been fired into, we made a landing, and several companies of our regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Fullam were sent to make a detour for the purpose of capturing any hostile force that might still be lingering in the place. Lieut.-Col. Fullam thus speaks of the movement: \* \* \* \*  
"The march was commenced about mid-day, and the heat  
"was intense, producing great suffering among both officers  
"and men, many of them falling insensible in the road, or  
"fainting by the wayside from exhaustion. \* \* \* \* In  
"spite, however, of these difficulties, and the want of water  
"which was severely felt on the way, all the men came in  
"together at Grand Gulf, where we again went on board the  
"transports."

No signs of any considerable number of the enemy, however, were discovered, although a few stray shots were fired at our troops from some of the houses in the suburbs.

By way of retribution for the attack made from this place upon the previous expedition, and as a warning to other towns along the river of the punishment that would be administered if, from under their cover, our forces were again assailed, orders were issued to burn the entire village. Accordingly the torch was applied to it, and in a short time every house was in flames, and by the light of the conflagra-



tion, which wholly destroyed the place, we proceeded on our course.

Although Col. Roberts and some of our men were subsequently fired into at this point, the effect of the severe example thus made was that but few, if any more attacks were made upon our forces from inhabited towns. But instead masked batteries were planted by the enemy in the heavy forests which lined the shores of the river at numerous points, and frequently, when we least expected it, we were pelted with shot and shell from these batteries concealed in the woods. On these occasions, unless one of our gunboats was near at hand, we were completely at the mercy of the enemy, for on the transports there was no artillery, and the calibre of our muskets was too light to successfully cope with rifled cannon; nevertheless we invariably returned the fire with our small arms, without, however, inflicting anything like the injury and loss we sustained. The character of these attacks is well illustrated in an account furnished me by Capt., (then Lieut.,) Charles Clark, descriptive of his trip up the river in company with Col. Roberts and others, who joined the regiment after its arrival at Vicksburg, and is as follows: "Col. Roberts and I were in the hospital at Carrolton too ill to leave with the regiment when it was ordered up the river. It was some little time before we were able to follow. We first proceeded to Baton Rouge, where we waited several days for transportation. At last a steamer came along with a bark alongside with naval stores for the fleet. There were a few officers and men on board the steamer, also proceeding to join their regiments,

“ and about twenty sailors as a guard, and one small brass  
“ howitzer mounted on the hurricane deck. The pilot house  
“ was protected as much as possible by mattresses. The  
“ bark carried four guns. As we approached Grand Gulf  
“ we observed that fortifications had been erected and guns  
“ mounted. Before we came in range ; muskets were dis-  
“ tributed. Directly a solid shot came booming toward us,  
“ and as we neared a sharp turn in the river we came within  
“ range of other guns. The enemy’s batteries were so  
“ located that they could command our boats long before  
“ we could utilize our guns. As soon as we got the bark  
“ abreast of the fortifications we were able to return an  
“ effective fire, and succeeded in dismounting one or two of  
“ the rebel pieces and killing and wounding several men, as  
“ we were afterwards informed. Neither our muskets nor  
“ the howitzer were of any practical benefit, as we could not  
“ bring them within range. We were under fire for nearly  
“ an hour, and at one time our vessels were raked fore and  
“ aft, several shots passing entirely through the transport,  
“ the cabins and staterooms of which were greatly riddled  
“ and shattered. We were struck thirty times. One or two  
“ sailors were wounded, and we all had a very narrow escape.”

The regiment reached Vicksburg June 25th. Col. Roberts arrived and took command on the 8th of July. The transports, upon which we were quartered, were made fast to the river bank a little below the main batteries, but not out of range of the enemy’s guns.

The course of the river at this point was such as to form opposite Vicksburg a cone-shaped peninsula or tongue of low

land, from four to five miles in length, and at its base from a mile to a mile and a half in width. This peninsula was partially protected from overflow by levees built along the shore furthest from Vicksburg; but, nevertheless, a considerable portion of it was annually, and sometimes oftener, submerged for weeks at a time, especially after any unusual rise in the river. The soil consequently was largely alluvial, the upper stratum of which consisted of a thick layer of cohesive earth, made up principally of decayed and decomposing animal and vegetable matter.

At the time we reached Vicksburg the river was still high from the spring freshets, but it soon commenced to fall at the rate of nearly a foot per day, and before we left the water was fifteen or twenty feet below the top of the banks. We found the surface of the soil, in some places, in a comparatively dry state; but there remained here and there, large pools of water left from the last overflow, which had become stagnant, and were covered with a thick green scum, composed, as Dr. Blanchard expresses it, "of the concentrated essence of malaria, and containing as much death to the square inch as it would be possible for the laboratory of nature to compound," and from which much offensive effluvia was emitted. The surrounding country too, as a general rule, was low and swampy, so that at night and until after sunrise in the morning we were enveloped in a thick mist of intense humidity, surcharged with poisonous exhalations emanating in these cesspools and swamps, which literally reeked with miasmatic elements.

In a short time sickness made its appearance in the entire command, which was greatly aggravated by the want of wholesome food, and from an entire lack of suitable medicines and appliances for the proper care and comfort of the sick. We had no vegetables, and scarcely any fresh meat, and the rations furnished were of a poor quality. We were obliged to use the muddy and impure water of the Mississippi both for cooking and drinking purposes, having no means of clarifying it. The small stock of medical stores with which we left Baton Rouge soon became exhausted, and we were entirely without medicines, except such as Dr. Blanchard and Capt. Morse, our Quartermaster, were able to get from the fleet surgeons, who generously supplied us with all they could spare, but as the sickness among the sailors was steadily increasing, they could not furnish us with anything like the quantity which our necessities required. We were imperfectly supplied with camp equipage, having no tents, and consequently the men remained on board the transports until the number of sick became so great as to require all the available room, when the few men fit for duty were directed to encamp on the shore. We managed to get a few shelter tents, and with the aid of boughs and stray pieces of lumber succeeded in erecting a covering to crawl under at night, but which afforded little or no protection against the deadly night damps, and, sleeping as we were obliged to, on the poisonous ground, it is not strange that the malarial disorders increased at an alarming rate.

The sickness in the army was also greatly augmented by the work which the men were compelled to perform during the day. Immediately upon our arrival Gen. Williams, who was a great martinet, ordered daily drills with knapsacks.\* In addition to these duties, the men were set to work in the broiling sun digging a canal across the peninsula, which was designed to divert and wholly change the course of the river. It was claimed that by digging through a thin upper crust of earth a substratum of quicksand would be reached, and it was then proposed to let in the current of the river, the force of which, it was expected, would cut through the sand and form a new channel, and Vicksburg would thereby be made an inland city, and rendered wholly useless as an objective point.

This colossal piece of folly, according to Parton, seems to have been conceived by Gen. Butler, for in his book relating to Gen. Butler's career in New Orleans (pp. 554-5), after referring to the fact that Admiral Farragut and Genls. Williams and Weitzel had expressed the opinion that Vicksburg could not be taken with less than 10,000 men, he says: \* \* \* \*  
" This opinion being communicated to Gen. Butler, he devoted the *spare hours of a week* to the study of the position.  
" Many plans, measurements, natives of the town, engineer officers, and even works on geology were examined. The  
" conception of the celebrated cut-off was the result of his  
" cogitations. It was truly an ingenious and most *plausible*  
" scheme. Such a canal cut across almost any other bend of

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\* For the reason, as was alleged, that he was disgusted that a few of the men succumbed to the intense heat during the useless and fruitless march around Grand Gulf, and he proposed in this way to toughen and accustom them to the sun.

" the river would have answered the purpose intended. But nature had concealed under the soft surface of that particular piece of land a bed of tough clay which baffled the progress of diverting the course of the river. It happened also that the force of the stream at that point *tends to the opposite shore*, and could not be persuaded to co-operate effectually with the canal cutters. Consequently the Father of Waters kept to his ancient bed, and Vicksburg remained a river town."

The only merit this wonderful scheme had, as Mr. Parton truly says, was that it was "most plausible." It sounded well and superficially had the ring of a great military stroke, so much so, that some few sanguine souls predicted it would prove to be an achievement well worthy of a great master in the art of war. But to those who had to do with the practical part of it, and who imperiled their lives in the hopeless task of trying to make it a success, the undertaking from the start was regarded as an utterly chimerical one, and for that reason it was denominated "Folly Creek" or "Butler's Ditch." It was not strange that such a project should have been the coinage of the brain of the hero of Bermuda Hundred and of the Fort Fisher Petard, but it is strange that so absurd an experiment should afterward have been persisted in. Its failure is a matter of history, and it is now apparent that it was never practicable and at no time was there any possibility that it would prove a success. Of course had Gen. Butler triumphed in this scheme there would have been no limit to the degree of credit which he would have claimed and the occasion would have enabled him to issue a series of buncomb

orders celebrating the wonderful achievements of a handful of New England men who had opened to the Northwest the lower half of its great water course to the sea. It was the boast of Gen. Jackson that he had opened this highway to the Northwest, and had Butler succeeded in reducing Vicksburg, which at that time was the only important fortified point on the river not controlled by our forces, he could, and undoubtedly would have claimed a higher meed of praise than was awarded to the redoubtable Jackson.

After a majority of our entire command had been brought down with malarial diseases, from inhaling the fumes and vapors which arose from the soil as it was excavated and exposed to the air and sun, a large auxiliary force of negroes, gathered from the surrounding country, was set to work. But notwithstanding, the expedient was a failure. The river persisted in falling, and we were not able to dig fast enough to keep pace with it, and so, much to our relief, we were ordered to abandon the enterprise.

Gen. Grant afterwards attempted to finish the job but met with no success. Personally he seems to have had no confidence in it, and it eventually culminated in a stupendous fizzle.

Badeau in his Military History of Grant thus refers to it.

\* \* \* “As early as the 20th of January, (1863) “Gen. Grant had instructed McClelland to enlarge the “canal. He had been ordered by Halleck to direct his attention particularly to this undertaking, as the President “attached much importance to it. It was a scheme—Badeau “says—of magnificent proportions, but more likely to attract

"an imagination like Lincoln's, than to *strike favorably a purely military mind.* \* \* \* On the 4th of February he (Grant) reported to Halleck that he had lost *all* faith in the practicability of the scheme. The canal"—he said—"is at right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs completely commanding it. Warren-ton, a few miles below, is as capable of as strong defence as Vicksburg." (pp. 163-4, vol. I.) Gen. Badeau then says. \* \* \* "As constructed by Gen. Williams, the canal was ten feet wide and six feet deep, but his excavations did *not* extend through the stratum of black alluvial soil to the sandy substratum; and in 1862, when the water rose so as to run through there was *no enlargement.* \* \* \* The result was a *total failure*, although Grant's men worked at it *two months* and finally when a rise in the river took place, instead of the water cutting under, it broke through the levees of the canal itself, and *came near drowning all the army engaged in its enlargement.* \* \* \* *The troops were obliged to flee for their lives. Horses were drowned, implements were broken and borne away by the current, and all the labor of many weeks lost.*" (p. 166, vol. I.)

In addition to the depression caused by the rapidly increasing sickness and frightful mortality in the command, our position was a perilous one. We were frequently subjected to heavy cannonades from the enemy's guns, and on one or two occasions were obliged to change our position to avoid the effect of their shells.



Some of our mortar boats anchored near to the Vicksburg shore were much annoyed by attacks made upon them from behind the cover of the thickly wooded banks by the rebel sharpshooters and infantry, and it was feared that an effort might be made to capture these vessels, as they lay quite close to the shore. For their better protection, and to prevent a surprise, a detail from our regiment, under Lieut. Jackson V. Parker, of Company B, with other troops, was sent across the river. After throwing out a cordon of pickets, the balance of this small force encamped in the swamps a short distance from the bomb-boats, which, in the meantime, had received additional armament in the shape of ship howitzers, and which were so planted that our troops, if attacked, could retire to their cover. The rebels seem not to have been aware of the arrangements thus made for their reception, for in a few days they sallied forth to effect the capture, not only of the entire guard, but, as some of the prisoners afterwards informed us, they "started in" with the expectation of taking a "blacksmith's shop" or two, such being the name given by them to the mortar vessels, on account of the quantity of iron disseminated from the shells they dropped.

The attack was made with an overpowering force, and our men were forced back to the very edge of the stream, closely followed by the "Johnnies," but as the latter emerged from the woods, they were met with such a shower of grape and canister from the howitzers that they were only too glad to beat a hasty and precipitate retreat, which shortly became a perfect rout and stampede. Many of them were killed and

wounded, and for days afterwards our men gathered up swords, muskets and cartridge-boxes discarded by them in their flight, to say nothing of the harvest of boots and shoes they left sticking in the mud as they hurriedly wended their way homeward through the swamps. No further attempts were made to molest either our men or the "blacksmith shops," further than to practice upon the former the art of sharpshooting from behind trees. Lieut. Parker and his men spent about ten days in this dangerous position. Much of the time they were stationed under the very shadow of the enemy's fortifications, and were continually exposed to the musketry fire incidental to outpost service.

By the middle of July so many men were prostrated by disease that it was with difficulty that we could furnish our complement of soldiers for necessary guard duty.

In our regiment, after the first fortnight, there was not at any one time over three or four officers and from ninety to one hundred men fit for duty. Hardly a day passed but one or two men died, and on one occasion three men from one company died within the rise and set of the sun. We had not men enough off duty to form a funeral escort *even* for an enlisted man, and those who died were necessarily buried without any ceremony, and generally in such covering as they had about them at the time of their death, and which consisted of nothing but their clothing and an army blanket.

" No useless coffin enclosed their breasts  
Nor in sheet, or in shroud we wound them."

A special correspondent of the *New York Tribune* in a letter dated July 19th, thus refers to the general condition of

both the army and navy. “The sickness on the fleet and in Gen. Williams’ command is steadily increasing and the deaths augmenting. The weather is conducive to disease, being of the hottest, most sultry and enervating character. The land forces are suffering greatly, and day before yesterday *seven* men died in one regiment. Some ascribe the sickness largely to the water. \* \* \* The surgeons have exhausted nearly all their stock of medicines and in numerous instances are unable to prescribe what is needed.”

And in another letter dated July 21st he says :

“The sickness on the ‘Flotilla’ continues to increase and nearly every vessel bears the appearance of a hospital. \* \* \* The weather is so hot and sultry that no one can sleep under cover, and when men lie in the open air they incur disease from the malaria in the atmosphere. One-half to two-thirds of *all* the persons on the ‘Flotilla’ are ill and unfit for duty, while Gen. Williams’ troops have suffered terribly as *many graves* on the Louisiana peninsula attest. Swamp fever, ague, dengue, dysentery, with general debility are the principal complaints.” (See N. Y. *Tribune*, August 2d, 1862.)

This was no fancy sketch, as those of us who were present can testify. The condition of the command was pitiable. The surgeons, with the limited means at their command had done all that lay in their power, and Dr. Blanchard, then assistant surgeon of our regiment, and the only physician we had with us, although very much affected himself with malaria, was untiring in his devotion to the sick, and deserves the greatest credit for the patience and skill he displayed.

On the morning of the 15th of July the rebel ram "Arkansas" after running through Admiral Davis' fleet of iron clads at, and below, the mouth of the Yazoo river, succeeded also in running through that portion of Farragut's fleet, which had previously passed Vicksburg and was lying at anchor in the stream on the opposite side of the peninsula, and in a short time was safely moored under the enemy's batteries. Our position, unprotected as we were, by any adequate force, was consequently greatly endangered, and a good deal of consternation prevailed. Had this formidable boat attacked us then, we could have offered no successful resistance, and our transports might easily have been destroyed.

Apprehending an onset, orders were received from headquarters to disembark the sick, and move them across the peninsula so that they might be under the protection of the fleet. The execution of this unnecessary and injudicious order is referred to by Dr. Blanchard, as follows : " By some means, I hardly know how, we got three hundred sick and helpless men over to the levee opposite Vicksburg, without tents or blankets, and without food or medicines. Just at night it began to rain in a drizzling sort of way, I managed to get a limited supply of crackers and tea, and spent the night wading through the mud distributing these articles of nourishment which was all I could obtain. The next morning we received orders to return to the transports."

Farragut, nettled by the fact that the "Arkansas" had safely run through his squadron, resolved that very night

to re-run the rebel batteries and resume his original position below Vicksburg. About nine o'clock at night his ships got under weigh and shortly afterward the mortar boats and our own batteries opened a furious bombardment. The enemy anticipating Farragut's movement, at once set fire to numerous tar barrels and other combustibles, which cast a very bright illumination over the river in their immediate front, and as the vessels of the fleet came within range of the rebels' guns a terrific cannonade was begun. For over two hours the roar of three hundred pieces of the heaviest ordnance was continuous. By midnight the entire squadron had passed the batteries, and was safely anchored nearly opposite our transports. It was a most brilliant exploit, and an achievement well worthy of the heroic commander who conceived it.

Although the fleet was not seriously damaged, it was felt that our position was an untenable and exceedingly hazardous one; we were practically surrounded; our supplies were nearly exhausted, and it was with the greatest difficulty and danger that our line of communication was kept open. No vessel could reach us except under the convoy of one or two gun-boats, and it was finally determined that we should return to Baton Rouge.

One incident occurred at this time which greatly enhanced the general gloom and sorrow, and was occasioned by the tragic death of Capt. Lorenzo Brooks, of Company F, who was killed on the transport "Ceres," while in command of a party of soldiers who had been sent to return the negroes employed in the work upon "Butler Ditch." The "Ceres" was

one of our hospital boats, and was selected for the purpose on account of her large deck space. Quite a number of our sick, including several disabled officers, were on board and preferred to remain rather than incur the risk of passing the night on shore in our pestilential encampment. Among the officers who accompanied the expedition were Col. Roberts, Capt. D. B. Peck (afterwards Colonel), Capts. Salmon, Dutton, John L. Moseley, and Lieuts. Harris and R. C. Gates, the names of the others I do not recall. The negroes were embarked about dark, and the "Ceres" started down the river. The result of her trip was thus described by a correspondent of the *New York Times*: "On the 22d of July the 'Ceres' " was sent to a point about twelve miles below Vicksburg, " with three or four hundred negroes who had been in the " employ of the government for the purpose of returning them " to their owners. After landing them, and while returning, " the 'Ceres' was fired into by field artillery, stationed " along the shore, thirty-two shots being fired in quick suc- " cession, consisting of grape, six pound shot and shells. " Eight shots passed through the boat; one charge of grape " lodged in the hull; one six pound round shot went through " the hull, six inches below the water line; six shots passed " through between the upper and lower decks, and one " through the cabin, killing Capt. Brooks." (See *N. Y. Times*, August 11th, 1862). This account is substantially corroborated by Col. Peck, who speaks of the affair as follows:

\* \* \* "I remained on board with the other sick " officers. The negroes were safely delivered about mid- " night, \* \* \* and we were within about five miles

“ of our camp, on our return, when the rebels opened fire upon us from a light battery placed where the river made a sharp bend, and the current ran very strong. The second shot struck the rail of the cabin deck and glanced upward, killing Capt. Brooks. \* \* \* Owing to the curve in the river we were necessarily within range for a long distance, and it is not surprising that we were struck twenty-three times out of thirty-two shots; eleven of these were in the hull, and five of them below the water line. The third shot struck the starboard engine, stopping it and of course leaving us turning round in the face of the battery. Fortunately for us it was nothing more serious than the knocking of the eccentric lever rod out of place, and this being promptly put back in position we soon passed out of range. Our worst leaks were stopped by tearing up mattresses and clothing and stuffing up the holes. We had no means of replying to the fire, except with muskets which were of no use.”

It seems the enemy had observed the embarkation on, and departure of, the “Ceres” without an escort, and so ran a light battery down from Vicksburg and planted it at the point indicated by Col. Peck, with a view, no doubt, of sinking the transport on her return. But for the darkness of the night, and the fact that the lights were extinguished as soon as the firing began, the “Ceres” would probably have been totally destroyed, and all on board would have been killed or lost. Capt. Brooks was an efficient and popular officer, and his loss was severely felt. He was buried with military honors at Baton Rouge on the return of the regi-

ment to that place, and subsequently his body was removed to his native place. The next day after this sad occurrence the entire command embarked upon the transports, and accompanied by the whole fleet proceeded down the river to Baton Rouge.

A few days before, a portion of the sick had been placed on board the steamer "Morning Light," under the command of Capt. John B. Kilburn of Company D, who furnishes me with the following statement :

"Some four days previous to the abandonment of Vicksburg, I was detailed to take the sick of our regiment to Baton Rouge. On my going aboard the "Morning Light" I found the sick were being removed from where the upper fleet lay to the boat. The day was consumed in getting the sick and necessary subsistence on board. I was directed to proceed down the river without a convoy or even a hospital flag. On reporting my readiness to leave, however, I was instructed to wait further orders. We were detained three days, and much suffering ensued, many of the men dying. Just before the expedition started on its return a gunboat was assigned to act as my escort, and I was directed to keep far enough ahead of the fleet so that the sick would not be disturbed by the guns, and not to use our cannon except for protection. There were three hundred and fifty of the sick from our regiment, and a few from other regiments on board. Every available place on the boat was occupied. The weather was intensely hot, and much discomfort and suffering was experienced from the crowded condition of the vessel. We left Vicksburg



“ on the morning of the 24th, and I ordered the officers of  
“ the boat to proceed with the utmost speed consistent with  
“ safety. About eleven o'clock P. M. I retired, but was soon  
“ aroused by the scraping of the keel and the stoppage of  
“ the ship. On reaching the deck I found both the “ Morn-  
“ ing Light ” and our convoy were fast aground. This was  
“ about one o'clock A. M. We worked all night trying to  
“ get afloat, but without success. In the meantime two of  
“ our men died, and we dug a trench on the shore, burying  
“ them in their blankets. About ten o'clock in the fore-  
“ noon we were overtaken by the advance vessels of the fleet,  
“ and with their assistance were dragged out of the mud and  
“ proceeded on our journey. Dr. Blanchard was on board,  
“ but was not able to do much for the sick, as he had no  
“ medicines. We reached Baton Rouge that evening, and  
“ took possession of a hotel as a temporary hospital, and  
“ began at once to remove the men. We succeeded in get-  
“ ting them ashore during the night, but *six* died in the re-  
“ moval. As to the boat running aground there was but one  
“ way of accounting for it, and that was that we had a rebel  
“ for a pilot.”

Dr. Blanchard, whose attention to the sick had been unremitting, was finally obliged to succumb to the malarial trouble from which, for some time, he had been suffering, and which was greatly aggravated by the anxiety and responsibility which had devolved upon him. Fortunately, under the judicious and careful treatment which he received he was soon restored to duty, and afterwards rendered most excellent and efficient service in the line of his profession.

The main body of the expedition left Vicksburg on the evening of the 24th, our regiment forming the rear guard. We reached Baton Rouge without important incidents on the 26th of July, and thus ended, after the sacrifice of many valuable lives, an expedition which, had the advice of military men of experience been followed, would never have been undertaken.



## CHAPTER III.

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CONDITION OF THE REGIMENT—DEATH OF LIEUT. CULL—  
BATTLE OF BATON ROUGE—DEATH OF COL. ROBERTS—  
RETURN TO CARROLTON—CHANGES AND PROMOTIONS.

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1862.

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ON our return to Baton Rouge the regiment was in a deplorable condition. Just thirty-six days before we had set forth from that rendezvous nearly eight hundred strong, buoyant with hope and eager for active service. In that short space of time, disease and death had so reduced our ranks as to leave us with less than one hundred enlisted men fit for duty. At a review which occurred a few days before the battle, two or three companies of our regiment were not represented, their services being required to bury the dead. Among those who fell a victim to disease, occasioned by our terrible exposure, was Lieut. Richard T. Cull of Company E, a most faithful officer. He died at Baton Rouge, and was buried there with military honors. Some days before the engagement we were joined by Capt. Porter with his company, and the men of D Company who had been left to garrison Fort Pike, numbering, in all, about one hundred men.

The battle of Baton Rouge was fought on the 5th of August. On the morning of the 4th I was detailed as field officer of the day. I was not relieved from duty until the evening of the 5th, and therefore was not with the regiment during the fight, and saw it but once during the progress of the action. Hence, in narrating the part which the regiment took in this battle, I am obliged to base my statements upon reports of those who participated in, and who were eye witnesses of, its movements during the day, and from such other materials and data as I gathered at the time and afterwards verified.

As the action was opened under my own observation I desire for the purpose of illustration briefly to refer to my personal experience prior to, and during the early part of the engagement.

On reporting to Gen. Williams on the morning of the 4th, I was instructed to carefully inspect the picket line and outposts as he was in receipt of information which led him to expect an attack from Gen. Breckenridge's army, which for several days had been hovering in our immediate front. Our picket line was a good deal extended, and formed almost a semi-circle, and in executing my orders I was engaged the better part of the day.

About dusk on the evening of the 4th I was apprised, by Gen. Williams, that his scouts had brought him intelligence which strongly indicated that the long looked for attack would take place either that night or in the early morning, and I was charged to direct our outposts and pickets to be especially vigilant, and to take every possible precaution

against a surprise. I accordingly started at once to make a second tour of inspection, accompanied by Lieut. Charles Clark of our regiment and a mounted orderly. The night was intensely black, and the fog so dense as to greatly impede our progress. It was nearly two o'clock A. M. before we completed the rounds. Everything at that time being quiet, Lieut. Clark returned to his quarters. I had dismounted and was engaged in getting some refreshments, preparatory to making another tour, when a few straggling shots were fired from a direction immediately in front of our regiment. I hurried to the spot with my orderly, but in the darkness and fog rode through and beyond our line until I encountered the rebel skirmishers, who, after sharply calling a halt, fired a volley, by means of which I discovered my mistake and at once retraced my steps; but on approaching our line, being mistaken for the enemy, our men opened fire, and for a short time we were exposed to the bullets of both friend and foe. Fortunately the fog was so thick that our exact position could not be distinguished, and we thereby escaped any serious consequences.

I had scarcely time to deploy my skirmishers before a furious onset was made upon our position on the Greenwell Spring road, and about the same time another assault followed on the Clinton road some distance to the left. Our men fought well, but we were outnumbered, and gradually driven from one stand to another, until at last we were obliged to fall back upon the main body when the action became general.

In the meantime Gen. Williams, to whom I had previously communicated the situation of affairs, rode up with a portion

of his staff. He seemed to have no particular scheme of defence in mind, and was apparently at a loss what instructions to give, but finding that the picket line could no longer successfully resist the enemy's advance, he ordered me to proceed to the line further on the right, which, at that time, had not been driven in, and to superintend operations there, and if forced back to the supporting columns I was directed to at once assume command of the pickets on the flanks resting on the river, which latter positions I was instructed to hold at all hazards, giving timely notice of any serious attack from that quarter. The General was extremely apprehensive of an attack on our left flank as he had been informed that the ram "Arkansas" was to descend the river and assail us from that point simultaneously with the assault which the rebel army was to make in our front. This seems to have been a part of the enemy's plan, but happily for us, it failed, in that the "Arkansas" did not make her appearance until the next day when finding our gun-boats were moving forward to encounter her she was grounded and destroyed by her own commander.

In proceeding to the picket line on the right I passed our regiment which at that time was in line of battle in front of its camp. I stopped for a moment to give Col. Roberts the point of attack, whom I found had received no specific instructions as to what he was to do, and while we were conversing a spent shot from one of the rebel batteries ploughed up the earth near us, glanced over our heads and struck one of the men of D Company knocking him down and causing serious injury. I saw nothing more of the regiment until

the engagement was over. Lieut.-Col. Fullam, in the letter to which I have adverted, thus refers to the condition of the regiment, and to the state of affairs before and on the day of the battle. “ \* \* \* The day before the fight our “ morning report showed 18 officers and 293 enlisted men— “ 311 in all—for duty. Of this number, 1 officer and 42 “ enlisted men were on guard duty, leaving 268 to engage “ in the battle. \* \* \* There were nearly 300 sick in “ camp, many of whom and several from hospital, although “ unfit for duty, joined our ranks during the action, prefer- “ ring to share the dangers of their comrades to remaining “ in security and inactivity. \* \* \* Out of the 118 days “ since our arrival at Ship Island we had not been able to “ drill as a battallion more than thirty times, and never to “ any effect since May 14th. \* \* \* From the occupa- “ tion of Baton Rouge, about the middle of May, up to the time “ of the battle, although it was well understood that our “ troops were liable to attack, the earth had not been broken, “ nor had a single tree been felled to prepare defences, and “ we found ourselves on the day of the engagement weakened “ by disease, and almost in a state of disorganization, in a “ position in which our gun-boats could not aid us, and with- “ out so much as a rifle pit to obstruct the enemy who “ greatly outnumbered us. \* \* \* Gen. Williams “ directed that in case of attack the regiment should be “ formed in front of the camp and wait orders, but if there “ should be sharp firing in any direction, Col. Roberts might, “ if he thought best, move to such spot. There was no posi- “ tion assigned us other than this, nor did I ever learn that

“any of the regiments were better informed in relation to their duties.”\*

While the regiment was waiting for definite orders, the firing became very heavy on the left, at a point which, in my conversation with Col. Roberts, I had indicated as one from which I thought an attack would be made. Col. Roberts, in accordance with the general nature of his instructions, very

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\*As pointed out by Col. Fullam, not a step was taken from the time we occupied Baton Rouge, early in May, toward the erection of any kind of fortifications to repel an attack, notwithstanding the post was constantly threatened by the rebels; and it was not until after the battle that intrenchments were thrown up. General Williams, although a brave and gallant officer, seemed to think it wholly unnecessary to make any preparations for defence, preferring to rely upon such fortuitous plans as should occur to him in the heat of action. Even on the eve of the engagement no proper or definite disposition of his troops had been made, and but few, if any, of the regimental commanders at the front knew what they were to do, or what positions they were to maintain. It is true the general tenor of their instructions were to form in front of their respective camps and wait orders; but they were also enjoined, if the firing was heavy at any other given point, to move thither. Of course, under such directions, with a dense fog prevailing and sharp firing going on at an opposite or different quarter, it was difficult to decide what to do. Whether to move or not was a question which necessarily occasioned much perplexity, especially as the position of many of the regiments was unknown, and could only be determined in a conjectural way. The result was that more or less confusion prevailed. Our own troops frequently fired into each other, as was the case when the 4th Mass. Battery fired at the Seventh, mistaking it for the enemy, and as also happened when the Indiana regiment ran under the fire of the Seventh, which was directed, as was supposed, toward the rebels. Other of our regiments had a similar experience, and the Indians, therefore, were not the only ones who suffered from the lack of an orderly and perfected plan of general operations. Indeed, during the early part of the engagement there was not the slightest pretense to either concert or unity of action. Each regimental commander was given discretionary power to do as he pleased, and was left to fight wherever in his individual judgment he could do the most good. The consequence was that many of the regiments were continually changing positions and scurrying about hither and thither all over the field, rendering it impossible to avoid mistakes, and the only wonder is that more serious blunders were not committed. While much of the disorder which ensued was due to the heavy fog, yet it would hardly have been possible, even with such an element to obscure the vision, that so much confusion should have prevailed, had proper precautions been taken in the first instance. I have been told by an officer of high rank, who knew Gen. Williams well, that he was courageous, but constitutionally rash and impulsive, and was far more apt to rush into action without any preconceived plan as to what he would do, than he was to block-out in advance a wise and judicious scheme of attack. While this “press-where-you-see-my-white-plume-wave” style is sometimes effective in the hurly-burly of an assault, it is rarely ever the part of wisdom to resort to it in defending a city, and certainly in this instance it was wholly unjustifiable. It was entirely practicable to have thrown up earthworks and to have so disposed of the troops as to have accomplished harmony of action instead of bringing about confusion and disorder. Had this been done we should have inflicted much greater damage to the enemy with far less loss to ourselves.



properly moved the regiment in that direction, and took up a position where he supposed the regiment would be able to render effective service. At this time the fog and smoke was so thick that it was next to impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Col. Fullam, who had gone forward to reconnoiter, and to ascertain, if possible, the position of the 21st Indiana, was unable to locate it with certainty, and could only learn that it had moved further to the right. About this time some of Manning's guns went into battery in rear of the regiment and opened an indiscriminate fire which greatly endangered its position. A round shot, followed by a shell, struck the ground between Lieut. Jackson V. Parker and Sergeant-Major George Brown, covering both of them with dirt; thereupon Col. Fullam was sent to the officer in charge of these pieces to acquaint him with the position of our regiment. Finding the men were so exposed as to be subjected to a heavier fire from our own troops behind, than from the enemy in front, Col. Roberts moved the regiment back to its original position in front of the camp. Col. Fullam says: \*

\* \* "As soon as I had executed this order (referring to his "instructions to go back to the officer in charge of the guns) "I attempted to rejoin the regiment. On the way I met and "caught the horse of Col. Roberts, and was leading him up "the road when I was assailed by a shower of bullets. The "Colonel's horse was frightened and broke away from me, "while my own was seriously wounded; and, judging it im- "possible to reach the regiment by that route, I took another "and came in through the right of our camp. \* \* \*

"From this time I was constantly with, and in command of

“the regiment, and during the day, while exposed to the enemy’s fire, we several times changed positions without disorder in any case.”

During the absence of Col. Fullam, our heroic and ever-to-be-lamented Colonel was borne from the field, in the thickest of the fight, mortally wounded.

“Right in the van,  
 “ ——— he fell  
 “Foeward, as fits a man.”

When the regiment resumed its original position the action was raging with great fury directly in front of our camp and that of the 21st Indiana. Owing to the fog, which had not yet lifted, and to the smoke which was constantly increasing, objects could not be distinguished ten yards ahead. Although the regiment was under a terrible fire, Col. Roberts wisely hesitated to give the order to commence firing as he was apprehensive that the Indiana regiment might be in his front. At this moment Gen. Williams rode up and peremptorily, and in an excited, and somewhat brusque, manner, instructed him to open fire. The Colonel was, of course, obliged to give the order, but did so very reluctantly.

Before many vollies had been discharged, an officer appeared and exclaimed that the fire of the Seventh was affecting the Indianians. The Colonel promptly gave the order to cease firing. This was his last command, for he immediately fell from a severe wound in the neck. While being carried to the rear he was again hit in the thigh by a Minie ball. Dr. Blanchard soon reached the spot to which the Colonel had been removed, and gave him all the medical aid possible.

Having no ambulance, a one-horse cart or dray was obtained, in which uncomfortable conveyance, on a thin litter of hay, he was taken to the hospital. I met him on the way, as I was returning from the picket line on the right flank. He was cheerful and bright, although seemingly suffering some pain. I expressed much sorrow that he, of all others, should have been stricken. He replied that he did not consider his wounds serious, and hoped soon to be on duty again. The wound in the thigh proved fatal, the ball having glanced upwards, penetrating the vital organs. Two days afterwards he quietly, and apparently painlessly, passed from among the living.

On the fall of Col. Roberts the regiment was temporarily left without a field officer, and until the return of Col. Fullam the command devolved upon Capt. (afterward Major and Colonel) Porter, who displayed great coolness and courage, and whose conduct was highly praiseworthy, and far more deserving of credit and notice in General Orders than that of some others whom Gen. Butler saw fit to eulogize. From this time on, and until the close of the action, the regiment bore its full part of the brunt of it. Col. N. A. M. Dudley, who commanded the right wing, which embraced our regiment, in his official report among other things says: \* \* \*

“ It cannot be expected that I should mention the brave exploits of persons, or even regiments, particularly when *all* did so well. On *no occasion* did I see a single regiment misbehave, *all* seemed to act with a coolness and determination that surprised even ourselves after the excitement was over. \* \* \* Under a close and severe fire

“ Mannings Battery was compelled to fall back, *which it did*  
 “ *with considerable confusion, leaving behind one piece and*  
 “ *a caisson.* \* \* \* \* Capt. Manning quickly rallied  
 “ his men, and went into battery on the right of the Indiana  
 “ 21st, *well supported* on the right by the Vermont 7th,  
 “ Lieut.-Col. Fullam (Col. Roberts having been mortally  
 “ wounded). \* \* \* \* In the meantime the enemy  
 “ appeared in strong force directly in front of the Indiana  
 “ 21st, Vermont 7th, and Massachusetts 30th. *At one time*  
 “ *these three brave regiments stood face to face with the enemy,*  
 “ *within forty yards, for full one hour. The contest for this*  
 “ *piece of ground was terrific.*”

Col. Cahill, 9th Connecticut, who succeeded to the command of the entire force, on the death of Genl. Williams, in his official report to Genl. Butler among other things said:

\* \* \* \* “ The officers commanding regiments and  
 “ corps may well say for themselves that more undaunted  
 “ bravery, coolness and skill in the handling of their com-  
 “ mands has not been displayed on any battle field than that  
 “ of Baton Rouge. \* \* \* Colonel Roberts of the 7th  
 “ Vermont fell mortally wounded and has since died. He  
 “ was a gentleman of a generous nature and of a cultured  
 “ mind.”

Gen. Weitzel, chief of staff to Gen. Butler, being sent to Baton Rouge after the battle to ascertain the condition of affairs reported to Gen. Butler in substance. \* \* \*

“ That his troops had won a glorious victory. That one-half  
 “ of the men who left the hospitals to fight could not march  
 “ over a mile. That their conduct was *magnificent* as well as

“ that of *all* our officers and soldiers. That the attack was  
 “ undoubtedly made upon the strength of representations of  
 “ rebels within our lines that our troops were *all* sick and  
 “ demoralized.”

Lieut.-Col. Fullam speaking of some of the incidents of the  
 engagement among other things says. \* \* \* “ I sent a  
 “ sergeant and twenty-nine men at the request of an officer  
 “ of Manning’s Battery to bring off a caisson. \* \* \*  
 “ Several men were wounded. One corporal of the color  
 “ guard lost an arm. Our national flag, (*we not being*  
 “ *allowed to take the State flag into action*) was borne by  
 “ Color-Sergeant Parkhurst from the time the line was  
 “ first formed in the grey light of the morning until after the  
 “ fight was ended, and most gallantly did he bear it, his tall  
 “ form nobly erect amid the smoke and blaze of battle while  
 “ the troops and even the color guard, were, a portion of the  
 “ time, made to lie flat upon the ground to escape the deadly  
 “ fire of the enemy. He did not flinch or falter and dis-  
 “ charged his duty faithfully to the end.”

Lieut. E. V. N. Hitchcock, of Company C, who at the time  
 of the fight was serving on the staff of Gen. Phelps, in a  
 letter published in the Rutland *Herald*, gives an account of  
 the action, which is in the main correct, and notwithstanding  
 he refers to me in highly flattering terms I am led to make  
 the following extracts for the reason that Gen. Butler in his  
 order No. 62 (which will hereafter be adverted to) sought to  
 convey the impression that none of the officers or men of the  
 Seventh were much more than casually engaged in the fight,  
 and that none of them were entitled to any credit. \* \* \* \*

“ Soon after the battle I was directed by Gen. Phelps to proceed to Baton Rouge \* \* \* to ascertain the condition of matters. Executing this commission, I was able to obtain a very full understanding of the whole affair. I went over the field of battle many times, and with many officers, each describing to me the operations on those parts of the field where he himself was. \* \* \* Not only from the many careful descriptions given me on the field but from conversations with all grades, and of all corps engaged, I take such facts as are *surely* attested. \* \* \* Col. Roberts had received instructions from Gen. Williams to go where the enemy pressed hardest. He took the extreme left, but subsequently moved back to his original position which had now become the hottest part of the field. The enemy were pressing vigorously and the tents of the Seventh were riddled with bullets and grape. Col. Roberts here fell. \* \* \* 'Twas now that twenty-one brave men felt the rebel lead. \* \* \* All this happened in a few moments. Lieut.-Col. Fullam had not yet returned from what proved a rather adventurous reconnoissance. The command devolved on Capt. Porter, who moved the regiment back the width of the camp where the line was formed on the new base already taken by other corps. \* \* \* After this retrograde movement, Lieut.-Col. Fullam assumed command. \* \* \* Color-Sergeant Parkhurst held the colors firmly. His giant form stood firm as a rock amidst the iron hail, even when the regiment was ordered to lie down. He ever kept the colors in their place, and a prouder place to stand I know not than near that color

“ guard. \* \* \* \* Capt. Peck, and many other officers  
 “ and privates, left the hospital to fight. I could tell of the  
 “ many expressions of admiration for Col. Roberts’ cool self-  
 “ possession, and of the many soldier hearts who mourn, as  
 “ only soldiers mourn who see their leader fall. Lieut.-Col.  
 “ Fullam showed himself to be as cool and collected in battle  
 “ as anywhere. A volley discharged for his sole benefit  
 “ wounded his horse, but he miraculously escaped. Major  
 “ Holbrook held nearly the most important position of the  
 “ day. He had command of the guards and outposts. Prob-  
 “ ably no officer was so actively and constantly engaged.  
 “ Flying from picket to picket, keeping the enemy’s advance  
 “ in check, conveying information of the direction, nearness  
 “ and even strength, of the enemy’s different columns. The  
 “ great task of doing everything but actually leading on our  
 “ men, belonged to the field officer of the day, and right  
 “ nobly did he do it. It is a wonder that he was not taken  
 “ off by sharpshooters, and that the storm of shot avoided  
 “ him. I know of nothing but the faithful performance of  
 “ duty by all the officers of the line. I have heard men of  
 “ Company C express their highest admiration of Capt. Por-  
 “ ter’s bravery, and of that of Lieut. Dickinson. I could  
 “ mention many names of men who showed themselves deserv-  
 “ ing of commissions, but I intended this account to be brief.  
 “ The surgeons, Drs. Kelley, Blanchard and Green, had a  
 “ severe trial, not more of skill than of endurance, and all give  
 “ them honor.”

In addition to these statements, I know that many officers  
 and men left their sick beds and made every endeavor to

join the regiment. Capt. Peck, who was seriously ill, made great efforts to get to his company, but was too weak to reach it in time to take part in the action.

Among others killed was my faithful attendant Jack Russell. He was a bright, intelligent lad from Bellows' Falls who accompanied me on the departure of the regiment from the State. Being too young to enlist, but wishing "to go to the war" I accepted his services as my personal attendant. On the morning of the engagement he made an effort to join me, and knowing I was on the picket line he made his way thither under a very heavy fire with an additional revolver which he thought I might need. His body, pierced with balls, was found the next day at the extreme front surrounded by the dead of both sides and a broken musket lying near him. The intrepid boy was drawn into the thickest of the fray and nobly sacrificed his life in his endeavor to render me a personal service.

"The broken gun beside him all his life's  
Short story told!  
How he did his duty bravely till the death tide  
O'er him rolled."

The report of Gen. Weitzel above alluded to was dated August 7th. On the 9th the following order was promulgated by Gen. Butler, which although addressed to the "Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf" was evidently meant to be specially and equally applicable to the several regiments which participated in the battle of Baton Rouge as their conduct was the theme which occasioned the issuance of this unique and bombastic mandate.



“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
“NEW ORLEANS, August 9th, 1862.

“General Order No. 57.

“*Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf:*

“Your successes have heretofore been substantially bloodless.

“Taking and holding the most important strategic and *commercial* positions with the aid of the gallant navy, by the wisdom of your combinations and the moral power of your arms, it has been left for the last few days to baptize you in blood.

“The Spanish conqueror of Mexico won imperishable renown by landing in that country and burning his transport ships to cut off all hope of retreat. You, more wise and economical, but with *equal* providence against retreat, sent yours home.

“Organized to operate on the sea coast, you advanced your outposts to Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, more than two hundred and fifty miles into the interior.

“Attacked there by a division of our rebel enemies, under command of a Major-General, recreant to loyal Kentucky, whom *some of us* would have honored before his apostacy, of *doubly* superior numbers, you have repulsed in the open field his myrmidons, who took advantage of your *sickness*, from the malaria of the marshes of Vicksburg, to make a cowardly attack.

“The Brigade at Baton Rouge has routed the enemy.

“He has lost three Brigadier Generals, killed, wounded and prisoners; many colonels and field officers. He has more than a thousand killed and wounded. You have captured three pieces of artillery, six caissons, two stands of colors, and a large number of prisoners.

“You have buried his dead on the field of battle, and are caring for his wounded. You have convinced him that you are *never* so sick as not to fight your enemy if he desires the contest.

“You have shown him that if he cannot take an outpost after weeks of preparation, what would be his fate with the main body. If your General should say he was proud of you, it would only be to praise himself; but he will say he is *proud to be one of you*.

“In this battle the northeast and northwest mingled their blood on the field—as they had long ago joined their hearts—in the support of the Union.

“Michigan stood by Maine, Massachusetts supported Indiana, Wisconsin aided Vermont, while Connecticut, represented by the sons of the ever green shamrock fought as *our* fathers did at Boyne Waters.

“While we all mourn the loss of many brave comrades, *we, who were absent*, envy them the privilege of dying upon the battle field for our country, under the starry folds of her victorious flag.

“The colors and guidons of the several corps engaged in the contest will have inscribed on them—‘Baton Rouge.’

“To complete the victory, the ironclad steamer Arkansas, the *last hope* of the rebellion, hardly awaited the gallant attack of the Essex, but followed the example of her sisters, the Merrimac, the Manassas, the Mississippi and the Louisiana, by her own destruction.”

“By command of

MAJ. GEN. BUTLER.

R. S. DAVIS, Capt. and A. A. A. G.

The following article was published in the New Orleans *Delta* about this time.

\* \* \* “The Seventh Vermont Regiment, which had just returned from severe service at Vicksburg participated in the battle of Baton Rouge. It is sufficient evidence that they were at their post discharging faithfully the trust reposed in them, that their gallant Colonel, George T. Roberts, fell mortally wounded in the thickest of the fight. He was a true patriot, and an honorable, high-minded man. He first went into the service as a Lieutenant in Company A of the First Vermont Volunteers. When the Seventh was called for, he was tendered the Colonelcy and in every particular has proved his selection a good one, and though dying in a glorious cause his loss will be severely felt both by his regiment and his many friends in his native State where he was so well and so favorably known. His re-

“ mains were brought to this city on Friday whence they will be sent home, there to sleep the honored sleep of those who die fighting for the maintenance of government and law against treason and traitors.”

Col. Roberts died on the 7th of August, two days after the battle. He was an eminently just and large-hearted man in the truest sense, and was much respected and beloved by all his men. To me personally, his death was a great affliction, and to the regiment his loss was a serious calamity. Vermont never sent forth a braver or more chivalric son than George T. Roberts, and his name will ever gloriously shine in that niche wherein is kept “ *Memoria in aeterna* ” the list of her gallant dead who laid down their lives that the Union might be preserved.

The following extracts from the *Rutland Herald* indicate the high appreciation entertained for Col. Roberts by his townsmen.

“ Our community was shocked and grieved by the sad intelligence of the death of Col. Roberts. \* \* \* It is painful to think that this noble officer was cut off e'er his career of usefulness and honor had fairly commenced. Like the lamented Ramsom in Mexico, and Baker at Ball's Bluff, he fell with his face to the foe in the fearless discharge of his duty. So long as heroism is admired and patriotism loved, will green garlands of affectionate remembrance be laid upon his honored grave.”

“ He was buried at Rutland and his obsequies were attended by a large number of citizens from that and the adjoining towns, numbering from one to two thousand. \* \* \*

“ The Rutland Light Guards, former companions in arms of  
“ the Colonel, were present, and preceded the large concourse  
“ of citizens who followed the body to the grave. \* \* \*  
“ Thus was performed in befitting manner the last sad offices  
“ to one of the noblest and bravest of the sons of Vermont.  
“ In common with all the other conspicuous heroes, who have  
“ fallen in the deadly shock of battle, he will live in memory  
“ so long as lovers of liberty shall read the story of this  
“ great conflict for freedom.”

In addition to this testimonial, the citizens of Rutland at or about the same time convened in town meeting unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

“ WHEREAS, We, the citizens of Rutland in Town Meeting  
“ assembled, have learned with the deepest sorrow of the  
“ death of Col. George T. Roberts, our friend and fellow  
“ townsman, while gallantly leading his regiment in the  
“ memorable battle of Baton Rouge, therefore

“ *Resolved*, That in the death of Colonel Roberts, Ver-  
“ mont is called upon to mourn one of her best and bravest  
“ officers, and Rutland one of her most loved and honored  
“ citizens.

“ *Resolved*, That the profound sympathies of this meeting  
“ are tendered to the mourning relatives of the deceased in  
“ this their deep affliction, and as our late fellow townsman  
“ has given all he had, even his life, for us and for his coun-  
“ try, we give to his memory our tears and a grateful and  
“ lasting recollection of his patriotism and gallantry.”

Col. Roberts was a Green Mountain boy *par excellence*.

The following sketch of his early life and antecedents has been furnished me by a near relative.

“ George T. Roberts was born in the town of Clarendon, Rutland County, Vermont, October 3d, 1824. He belonged to a family of military traditions on both sides, being the third son of the late Benjamin Roberts of Manchester, Vermont, and a grandson of Gen. Christopher Roberts of revolutionary memory. His mother's maiden name was Sophia Hodges. She was the third daughter of Dr. Silas Hodges, who served as Surgeon in the Continental Army, and who was for some time in the military family of Gen. Washington. When about four years of age his parents removed to Manchester in which town he spent most of his boyhood. He was naturally fond of study, particularly of mathematics and astronomy, and acquired a very good education at Burr Seminary, a very popular institution of learning in Bennington County. Some years before the breaking out of the rebellion he was extensively engaged in superintending the construction of railroads in the West, and at the time of entering the service was the agent and manager of the marble quarries at West Rutland, of which his brother-in-law, Gen. H. H. Baxter, was the principal owner. In 1861, he was a Lieutenant in the Rutland Light Guards, which was one of the companies of the First Vermont Regiment. He served with that regiment in the field until its term of service expired. He afterwards took an active part in recruiting the First Vermont Regiment of cavalry, and was offered a position in that regiment which he declined. When the

“Seventh was organized he was offered its Colonelcy by Governor Holbrook, which office he accepted.”

And right well did he discharge the duties of this high trust, as all of those who served with, and under, him can testify. He was one of the first to respond to his country's call, and in the defence of its flag gallantly yielded up his life.

“*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*”

We remained at Baton Rouge—daily expecting to be again attacked—until the 20th of August, when the Post was evacuated and for a time wholly abandoned. This step was taken, as we understood, because of the paucity of our force, and for the reason that Gen. Butler felt uneasy about New Orleans, the rebels having threatened an attack upon that city, in order to wreak dire vengeance upon him for his arbitrary treatment of its citizens. This was the merest gasconade. Sufficient importance however, was attached to these threats to render it necessary, in his judgment, to recall us. The plan of sending so small a force to open communications with the northwest was not wise or feasible, at the time, and was generally condemned by military men. Nevertheless it would have been possible with the aid of the negroes, had they been properly organized, to have retained our position at Baton Rouge and other points further up the river. It was a part of the scheme suggested by Gen. Phelps in arming the negroes that they might be formed into regiments under intelligent and competent officers, and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the more important strategic points along the river for garrison service. Had this suggestion been promptly acted upon, with such an auxiliary force, we could have held our own on

the river at all salient stations below Natchez. But just at that time the question of putting muskets into the hands of the blacks was a mooted one. There was a great deal of mawkish sentimentality on the subject at the North lest such a step should unnecessarily exasperate the South. Many who then halted at the expediency and propriety of arming and allowing the negroes to combat our common foe, soon afterwards saw the folly of their scruples and learned that colored men were susceptible, under proper officers, of being made fit for any duty. Gen. Butler, whether because of political considerations or not I do not know, did not act with that promptness in utilizing the blacks which the exigencies of the service required. Had he put arms in their hands and sent them forward to our support, instead of frittering away his time in an unnecessary epistolary warfare with Gen. Phelps, we should not have seen the fruits of our three months' toil and exposure slipping from our grasp as we did when directed to retrace our steps to New Orleans.

As soon as Gen. Butler got rid of Gen. Phelps, he began forming colored regiments. But instead of seeking to promote their efficiency, he seemed, rather, to aim to make them as of little service as possible. For instance, there were a large number of ex-pugilists and bullies who found their way to New Orleans from Boston and New York, and several of these disreputable characters applied for, and received, commissions in these colored regiments. They were wholly unfit to be entrusted with duties so responsible and some of them, I understand, were afterwards cashiered or dismissed from the service. After evacuating Baton Rouge,

we returned to Carrolton, which place we reached on the 21st, and with other troops were ordered into camp near Metarie Ridge, at a point some two miles inland from the river, for the better protection, as was alleged, of the City of New Orleans. The locality selected for this encampment was quite as unhealthy as that which, but a short time before, we had quitted at Vicksburg; and although named Camp "Williams," in honor of the memory of our late commander, soon became known as the Camp of Death in consequence of the great mortality which prevailed in the entire command during our sojourn there, but more especially in those regiments that had participated in the Vicksburg and Baton Rouge campaign.

About this time several important changes took place in the regiment among the officers of the field and staff.

On the 26th of August Lieut.-Col. Fullam resigned. I was made Colonel, and Captains Peck and Porter were promoted, the former being made Lieutenant-Colonel, and the latter Major of the regiment.

On the 26th of August our faithful and efficient Quartermaster, Capt. E. A. Morse, who, up to that time, had shared all our dangers and hardships, also resigned to accept promotion to the office of Captain and Assistant Quartermaster of United States Volunteers, and subsequently, and until the close of the war, greatly distinguished himself in the discharge of many important trusts and responsible duties appertaining to that branch of the service.



On the 8th of September Surgeon Francis W. Kelley also resigned, and Assistant Surgeon Enoch Blanchard was promoted and commissioned as Surgeon, which office he filled with much fidelity and ability until September 20th, 1865, when he was honorably discharged.



## CHAPTER IV.

### GENERAL BUTLER AND THE SEVENTH.

1862.

#### [A SKETCH.]

DRURY'S BLUFF.— \* \* \* \* "Beauregard attacked Smith, \* \* \* \* who, although obliged to fall back, succeeded in checking the rebel onset. \* \* \* \* Butler *might* have redeemed the day had he moved up Gillmore, whose force had not fired a shot. \* \* \* \* But instead of this, \* \* \* \* he directed the whole line to fall back to the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred, \* \* \* \* across the neck of which a strong line of entrenchments reached, defending him against any attack."—General Grant. "His (Butler's) army, therefore, though in a position of *great security*, was as completely shut off from further operations against Richmond *as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.*"

Gen. Grant.—"In taking charge of a department where there are *no great* battles to be fought, but a *dissatisfied element to control*, no one could manage better than Gen. Butler. \* \* \* \* If the Department of Missouri and Kansas, and the States of Illinois and Indiana could be merged, and Gen. Butler put over it, *I think the good of the service would be subserved.*"

FORT FISHER.— \* \* \* \* "In connection with this expedition an experiment had been suggested by Gen. Butler from which *he* hoped important results. His idea was to blow up a vessel loaded with gunpowder in the neighborhood, \* \* \* \* with the expectation that the fort would be injured, if not destroyed, by the explosion. \* \* \* \* The opinion of the engineers was *adverse*, and Grant did not believe *a particle* in it. \* \* \* \* The explosion took place; the shock was not severe, and was scarcely felt a short distance off, and to the watchers on the fleet \* \* \* \* the report seemed no louder than the discharge of a piece of artillery. It was, however, heard at Wilmington, and a telegram was sent to the rebel commander inquiring as to the cause, who replied, '*One of the enemy's gunboats exploded.*' No damage of any description was done to the rebel works or forces, and the experiment was an *absolute failure.*"

Gen. Grant— \* \* \* \* "I am constrained to request the removal of Major-Gen. Butler. \* \* \* \* *The good of the service requires it.* \* \* \* \* There is a *lack of confidence* in his military ability, making him an *unsafe* commander for a large army. \* \* \* \* His *administration* of the affairs of his department is *also objectionable.* \* \* \* \* I ask that *prompt* action be taken in the matter." \* \* \* \* On the 7th of January Butler was relieved. He *never* received another command.

(See Badeau's Life of Grant, Index Title Butler.)

Upon our arrival at Camp Williams, we received intimations that statements, emanating from some of the Indiana officers, had recently become current which reflected upon the Seventh for the part it had taken in the battle of Baton Rouge. But as the rumors that reached us were neither definite or tangible in form, we paid but little attention to them. On the 26th of August I was ordered to report to Gen. Butler in person, and was informed that I had been recommended for the vacant Colonelcy occasioned by the death of Col. Roberts. It was then that I learned for the first time, officially, that certain accusations had been made to him to the effect that the Seventh had refused to support the Indiana regiment at a critical stage of the action, and during the fight not only broke in confusion, but ran away leaving its colors on the field. Gen. Butler also informed me, in substance, that he had, upon the strength of these charges, (which I ascertained originated chiefly from verbal complaints made by Col. McMillan and other officers of the 21st Indiana), already prepared an order rebuking the regiment for, what he was pleased to term, its "discreditable behavior in the face of the enemy." Further than this, I was not apprised of the nature of the charges or the purport of his proposed order, but I then and there indignantly denied that there was anything in the conduct of the officers or men which was at all deserving of reproach, or which called for censure; and I repelled as forcibly as I could the imputations that the regiment had refused to support the Indianians, or that it broke in confusion, or retired from the field in disorder, or left its colors thereon. I also reminded Gen. Butler that the official

report of Col. Cahill, based, as it was, upon the reports of the several commanding officers of regiments engaged in the action, contained no allusions which, in the slightest degree, reflected upon the Seventh, or which tended to support such charges, but, on the contrary, that he referred to all the troops in a like complimentary manner, while Col. Dudley, commander of the right wing, under whose immediate observation the regiment served through the heat of the battle, in his official report, spoke of its operations in a highly flattering way; also that Gen. Weitzel, his own chief of staff, in his report mentioned *all* participants most favorably, and that he, by his own Order No. 57, had honorably noticed the entire command at Baton Rouge without discrimination. And I contended that to attack our regiment in the face of these official statements, confirmed as they were by his own order, would not only be an act of self-stultification on his part, but that to condemn the regiment upon oral complaints and *ex parte* assertions (proceeding principally from prejudiced persons), without giving its officers and men an opportunity to be heard, would be a gross act of injustice, and I urged him to first investigate the matter and hear our proofs before committing himself to a course which was wholly unwarranted by the facts. All my efforts, however, were ineffectual.

Chagrined and disgusted at the determination which Gen. Butler evinced to utterly disregard anything I might say, I was obliged to return to my quarters feeling that I had accomplished nothing in the way of averting the dastardly assault which he contemplated making. I nevertheless called at

General Butler's quarters the next day, and again pressed him to give us a full and fair hearing, and endeavored to dissuade him from condemning the regiment unheard. I reiterated many of my statements of the previous day, and informed him that in the meantime I had conferred with Col. Dudley, and officers of his staff, as well as others not belonging to the Seventh, and also with the officers and men of the Seventh, present with it during the engagement, all of whom united in saying, that there was no unusual confusion in its ranks, at any time; that it was one of the last regiments to leave the field, and when doing so, retired with the main line, in perfect order, and that no command or request was received to support the Indianians, nor did the Seventh refuse or fail to aid them. I also gave him the facts in respect to the charge that the Seventh had fired into the Indiana regiment, and stated that the fire complained of was opened by the express *personal* directions of Gen. Williams, against the advice and wishes of Col. Roberts, and that if it was true that any of the Indianians were injured, the fault lay with Gen. Williams, and not with the officers and men of the Seventh, who had simply obeyed imperative instructions. I also informed him that the colors of the Seventh were not left in its camp or on the field, but were borne, throughout the fight, by Color-Sergeant Parkhurst, with great gallantry, and in the most conspicuous manner, and at no time left his hands or the custody of the regiment.

I also reminded him that the reputation of the State was involved and that to cast a stigma upon one of its regiments for unmilitary behavior in battle was too serious a matter for

hasty or immature action, and that it seemed to me that he owed a duty to the people of Vermont which made it incumbent that he should first investigate the facts in order to see whether the conduct of the Seventh had been such as to be deserving of censure, and I besought him to convene a court of inquiry to the end that all parties might be heard, and the truth ascertained. This request—so proper and reasonable under the circumstances—was refused, and I found that I could do nothing to avert the dastardly attack. On the 30th of August, Gen. Butler promulgated his infamous order which bore date as of a time anterior to my first interview with him, from which I take the following extracts.

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF.

NEW ORLEANS, AUGUST 25TH, 1862.

“General Order No. 62.

“The Commanding General has *carefully revised* the *official reports* of the action of August 5th at Baton Rouge to *collect* the evidence of the *gallant deeds* and *meritorious services* of those engaged in that brilliant victory. \* \* \*  
“Col. Roberts \* \* \* fell mortally wounded, while rallying his men.” (That he fell while rallying his men was a lie, as was subsequently proven.) “He was worthy of a better disciplined regiment and a better fate.

“Glorious as it is to die for one’s country, yet his regiment gave him the inexpressible pain of seeing it break in confusion when not pressed by the enemy, and refuse to march to the aid of the outnumbered and almost overwhelmed Indianians.” (This was another lie as was also subsequently proven.)

“The Seventh Vermont Regiment, by a fatal mistake, had already fired into the same regiment they had refused to support, killing and wounding several. (This was false. The Seventh fired by Gen. Williams’ orders.)

“The Commanding General therefore excepts the Seventh Vermont from General Order No. 57, and will not permit their colors to be inscribed with a name which could bring to its officers and men no proud thought.

“It is further ordered, that the colors of that regiment be not borne by them until such time as they shall have earned the right to them, and the earliest opportunity will be given this regiment to show whether they are worthy descendants of those who fought beside Allen, and with Stark at Bennington.”

Among others whom the Commanding General noticed specially in the foregoing order, was John Donaghue, of whom he spoke as follows: “John Donaghue, Fourth Massachusetts Battery, who brought off from the camp of the Seventh Vermont Regiment *their colors* at the time of their retreat.” (This was false; “*their colors*” were brought from the field by the Color Sergeant at the close of the action, and the Seventh *did not* retreat). Not an officer or man of the Seventh—although many of them performed signal acts of heroism—was mentioned in this order, save Col. Roberts, who, had his lips not been sealed in death, would have been foremost to resent the foul aspersions cast upon his brave regiment.

On the day the above order was published, Gen. Butler reviewed the troops at Camp Williams, and took occasion to supplement his atrocious attack by inflicting upon the regi-

ment an abusive harangue, which perforce, was received with suppressed indignation and silent contempt. Being thoroughly persuaded that it would be impossible to obtain fair treatment at the hands of a man so blind and insensible to justice as Gen. Butler had shown himself to be, I, the next day, addressed the following letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

“ CAMP WILLIAMS, LA.,  
 “ August 31st, 1862.  
 “ GEN. LORENZO THOMAS,  
 “ *Adjutant-General,*  
 “ Washington, D. C.

“ SIR:—In justice to the regiment which I have the honor  
 “ to command—the Seventh Regiment of Vermont Volun-  
 “ teers—I find myself under the necessity of calling for an ex-  
 “ amination into the statements made by the Major-General  
 “ commanding this department, in Order No. 62, dated  
 “ August 25th, 1862, which is calculated, in my opinion, to  
 “ bring unmerited disgrace upon the regiment and the State  
 “ from which it comes.

“ I accordingly respectfully request that a Court of In-  
 “ quiry may be assembled as soon as convenient to investi-  
 “ gate and report upon the Battle of Baton Rouge, and the  
 “ part taken in that engagement by my regiment, with the  
 “ view that justice may be done to it and the service.

“ Regretting exceedingly to find myself impelled to ask  
 “ for the scrutiny of a victory which should fill all generous  
 “ hearts with gratitude and pride, I have the honor to be,

“ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ WM. C. HOLBROOK,

“ *Major Com'd'g 7th Reg't Vermont Vols.*”



This communication was forwarded through the regular channel, and received the following endorsement from Gen. Phelps:

“ CAMP PARAPET, LA.,  
“ September 2d, 1862.

“ It is much to be regretted that a regiment in *this* quarter  
“ *should be compelled to defend itself against unmerited*  
“ *dishonor from its commanding General*, as well as against  
“ the enemy and *extraordinary exposure and disease*, but I  
“ concur with Major Holbrook in the *necessity* of an inspection  
“ into the facts connected with the battle of Baton  
“ Rouge by a Court of Inquiry, with a view of *doing justice*  
“ to the Seventh Vermont Volunteers and the service.

“ J. W. PHELPS,  
“ *Brig.-Gen.*”

Gen. Butler transmitted this application to the Adjutant-General, accompanied by the following letter:

“ HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
“ NEW ORLEANS, LA., Sept. 14th, 1862.

“ *General:*

“ I enclose the somewhat *anomalous* application of Major  
“ Holbrook, commanding the Seventh Regiment Vermont  
“ Volunteers, with a copy of the General Order complained of.

“ It will be seen that *I only give the result of official re-*  
“ *ports*, so that I do not feel *personally touched* by the matter  
“ *or manner* of the communication.

“ Of the conduct of Major Holbrook there is no complaint;  
“ being Field Officer of the Day he was not in the action.

“ *If consistent* with the rules of the service to inquire into  
 “ the *resumé* by the Commanding General of the events of  
 “ an action, I should be glad to have it done, for if the regi-  
 “ ment has been unjustly treated it would give no one more  
 “ pleasure than myself to see it righted. As there has been  
 “ *some rivalry* of feeling, I do not think it would be best to  
 “ detail a court from the officers at Baton Rouge. I may  
 “ further say that I suggested to Major Holbrook that he  
 “ might select his Court of Inquiry from *any officers here* not  
 “ of that brigade. I have the honor to be,

“ Very respectfully, your ob't servant,

“ BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,

“ *Adjutant General.*

“ *Maj. Gen. Comd'g.*”

The suggestion that I might select the officers to compose a Court of Inquiry was not made until after Order No. 62 had been issued.

Upon the perpetration of that gross wrong I was determined not to accept any proposition coming from Gen. Butler touching an official inquiry if an investigation could be obtained from the authorities at Washington, for the reason that the officers and men of the regiment distrusted the fairness of Gen. Butler and feared the influence which he might exercise upon a court drawn under his superintendence, we,

“ Refused him for our judge, whom yet,

We held our most malicious foe,

And thought him not at all a friend to truth.”

The fact that Gen. Butler seemed to entertain the idea that his “ *resumé* of an action,” was conclusive, and could not be inquired into, as revealed by one of his sentences in the

above letter, confirmed the opinion which we had formed that, left to himself, he would refuse to do us justice, but in a purely arbitrary spirit would claim that any step once taken by him was irreversible and final.

In due time my application was returned from Washington with an endorsement to the effect that the exigencies of the service were such that it was not *then* practicable to detail officers, outside of the Department, to serve on a Court of Inquiry. I have reasons to believe, however, that the action of the War Department was such as to amount to a direction to Gen. Butler to see to it that an investigation was had in compliance with my demand.

My reasons for this belief are based mainly upon the fact that the Legislature of Vermont, alive to the injustice which had been done to the regiment and State, in the meantime took the matter in hand, and the Senate on the 10th of October passed a resolution requesting the Governor to furnish any information he might possess touching the charges made against the regiment, in response to which the following message was received.

“ EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,  
“ MONTPELIER, Oct. 16th, 1862.

“ *To the President of the Senate :*

“ In reply to the resolutions of the Senate, calling on me for  
“ any information in my possession touching the alleged mis-  
“ conduct of the Seventh Regiment of Vermont Volunteers,  
“ at the battle of Baton Rouge, I have the honor to state that  
“ the information which I possess has been received from  
“ officers serving in the Department of the Gulf, and it is in

“ the shape of letters and statements, which, though not suit-  
 “ able to be laid before the Senate, induce me to believe that  
 “ injustice has been done to that Regiment, and that for the  
 “ credit of the State, as well as the Regiment, the subject  
 “ should receive thorough investigation. I herewith enclose  
 “ a copy of Gen. Butler’s General Order No. 62, in which the  
 “ allegations of misconduct are made. As the allegations in  
 “ *no way* comport with the history of our people, and the  
 “ conduct of our soldiers in all the various conflicts in which  
 “ they have been engaged, I have confidence in the belief  
 “ that the sons of Vermont will, everywhere, still be found  
 “ ‘ worthy descendants of those who fought beside Allen and  
 “ with Stark at Bennington.’

“ FREDERICK HOLBROOK,  
 “ *Governor.*”

Upon receipt of this message the following joint Resolution was passed :

“ WHEREAS, Charges of misconduct have been made by the  
 “ General commanding the Department of the Gulf against  
 “ the Seventh Regiment Vermont Volunteers. And  
 “ whereas, it is due to the honor and dignity of the State  
 “ that such charges be fully investigated, in order that  
 “ any injustice therein may be publicly declared, therefore,  
 “ *Resolved*, By the Senate and House of Representatives,  
 “ that the Governor be requested to *demand* of the President  
 “ of the United States, as an act of justice to said regiment  
 “ and to the State of Vermont, that a Board of Inquiry be  
 “ appointed to hear and determine such charges as soon

“ as may be, according to the usual course of military  
“ inquiry.”

Senator George F. Edmunds, one of Vermont's present distinguished United States Senators, then representing the County of Chittenden in the State Senate, accompanied the introduction of this Resolution with observations, thus reported in *Walton's Journal* :

\* \* \* “ He (the senator) had good reason to believe  
“ that the charges against the Seventh were false—that  
“ they were invented—*invented* (and he would use the term  
“ deliberately) by somebody. He had as good reason as any-  
“ body could have to believe that the regiment stood its  
“ ground with orders not to fire, when they were exposed,  
“ until the order of Gen. Williams himself, and it was  
“ in obedience to that order, that they fired as they did,  
“ so that nothing like the charges alluded to in the order  
“ of the General commanding could be the result of *any*  
“ ‘ *mistake* ’ which they or their officers made. All the  
“ testimony, aside from that, showed that the regiment  
“ behaved gallantly in *every respect*. It had been said that  
“ they left their colors on the field. The *identical* colors  
“ were at the Governor's room. They were a small insigni-  
“ ficant piece of bunting, which it were no surprise if they  
“ were left sticking in the mud somewhere on the battle field  
“ where nobody could notice them, all frittered as they were  
“ by the winds and rain of the Mississippi valley, until there  
“ was not enough silk left to make a *decent pocket handker-*  
“ *chief for a pauper*. To him *no* charge could be made  
“ which awoke in his mind the spirit of indignation and

“ mortification equal to this. \* \* \* When a man told him that a regiment of men from our green hills had been guilty of dishonor, he fairly rebelled with indignation.”

The action of the Legislature, with the remarks of Mr. Edmunds, the author of the Joint Resolution, were sent to me by the Governor, who stated, among other things:

“ There is much kind sympathy and friendly feeling expressed for the Seventh in all parts of the State. You and your comrades need have no fear that the valor and good soldierly qualities of the officers and men of your regiment is in the slightest degree questioned in Vermont. Everybody believes that, notwithstanding the regiment had so hard an experience at Vicksburg, and so many were enfeebled by sickness contracted there, still the regiment did its duty manfully at Baton Rouge, and will do so everywhere else.”

Although our efforts to obtain an investigation under officers not serving under Gen. Butler failed, he was constrained, on the return of my application from Washington, to order, as I at first suggested, a Court of Inquiry, the proceedings of which will presently be referred to.

Gen. Butler, in his order No. 62, by way of introduction, says he has “ *carefully revised the official reports* \* \* \* “ to collect the evidence of the *gallant deeds* and *meritorious services* of those engaged,” etc., and in his letter transmitting my application to the Adjutant-General of the army for a Court of Inquiry, he says, alluding to the above order, \* \* \* “ *It will be seen I only gave the result of official reports.*”

I have in my possession copies of the “official reports” of the commanding officers of the several regiments, batteries and cavalry detachments engaged in the action, or then stationed at Baton Rouge, including copies of the “official reports” of Cols. Cahill and Dudley, all of which have been furnished me by direction of the Secretary of War. After a careful perusal of these reports, I fail to find a single reference or word in any of them of a derogatory character to, or which in any particular reflects, or which can be construed to reflect, upon the Seventh, with the exception of the following portion of the report of Capt. Grimsley, who, for a time, commanded the Twenty-first Indiana Regiment, to wit:

\* \* \* “To add to the dangers and desperation of our situation, the Seventh Vermont, from their camp, back of us, opened a fire in the direction of all engaged, which killed many of our men outright, and wounded several more. At this we gave back, where we met Gen. Williams, and acquainted him with the fact; he gave the Vermonters a severe reprimand and ordered them forward to our support. We reformed and moved down to our old position. \* \* \* At the most critical period of the fight, when the Seventh Vermont which was ordered to support us, refused to do so, waving his hand and cheering us on to deeds of duty, etc., Adj. Latham was killed.”

And also with the exception of the following item from the report of Capt. Manning of the Fourth Massachusetts Battery, viz:

\* \* \* “*Incidents*— \* \* \* John Donaghue brought off from the camp of the Seventh Vermont their *camp*

“ colors [*not* their regimental colors] at the time of *the* [not “ their] retreat.”

None of the other reports, at least none of those in writing, and preserved as matters of record, contain any statements derogatory to the Seventh, but on the contrary, those which allude to it at all, and particularly the report of Col. Dudley, commander of the right wing, refer to its conduct in flattering terms:

As to the extracts from Capt. Grimsley's report, above cited, Gen. Butler had sufficient information from me to know that the Seventh was neither guilty of, or responsible for, the acts complained of. And it was subsequently shown that no “ reprimand ” was administered to “ the Vermonters,” nor did they even hear of any order to move “ forward.”

In respect to Capt. Manning's report it shows upon its face that John Donaghue simply brought off certain “ *camp* colors ” at the time of the *general* retreat. There is nothing in the report which can be construed into a complaint of misconduct on the part of the Seventh unless the accidentally leaving of *guidons* in camp can be so interpreted. It is plain from this “ *official report* ” that Gen. Butler's charge that the “ colors ” of the Seventh were left on the field (whereby he *intended* to convey the impression that its officers and men had deserted their regimental ensign) so far as it rested upon an “ official ” statement (and, as I have already shown, so far as it rested upon the facts) was absolutely false. Indeed there was no foundation whatever for the calumny. In point of fact there was nothing in the “ official reports,” when considered in the light of my



statements and explanations to Gen. Butler, which warranted his attack upon the Seventh, and it seems to me that if he had honestly and fairly revised them he would have seen that there was no ground whatever for censuring the regiment. Granting, however, that upon the theory of a strict construction of the "official reports" there was some ground for a portion at least, of his order, yet for consistency's sake Gen. Butler, relying, as he says he did, upon the "official reports" should have included in his vivifications not only a battery of artillery from his own State, but a regiment of infantry from an adjoining State—other than Vermont—against each of which organizations more or less damaging evidence (according to Gen. Butler's standard) appears in the "official reports." In my judgment the conduct of the men composing these organizations was not materially different from that of many other raw and inexperienced troops when first exposed to fire, and I allude to them only for the reason that the Seventh, even had Gen. Butler's charges been true, was no more deserving of censure than they were, and as tending to illustrate the unfairness with which our regiment was treated by the Commanding General, who while pretending to be just was extremely unjust, overlooking entirely the shortcomings of troops from other localities in order, seemingly, that he might wreak his fury and vengeance upon the Seventh.

By referring to Order No. 62 it will be seen that the charges made by Gen. Butler against the Seventh are briefly these :

1st. That Col. Roberts fell while rallying his men.

2d. That the regiment broke in confusion when not pressed by the enemy, and refused to march to the aid of the Indians, who, by a "fatal mistake," as alleged, it had already fired into; and,

3d. That the regiment retreated, leaving its colors in camp to be picked up and brought off by private John Donaghue of the Fourth Massachusetts Battery.

Before considering the sworn testimony adduced before the Court of Inquiry, I desire to call attention to the following statements and denials which, in my judgment, conclusively show the utter falsity of these charges.

Lieut.-Col. Fullam in his letter, herein before referred to, says: \* \* \* "Col. Roberts *was not* rallying his men at "the time he fell, and the regiment *had not* broken in confusion, and *had not refused* to march to the aid of the Twenty-first Indiana, for *no* officer or soldier ever heard an order to "that effect, or knew of any such request being received, nor "have I been able to learn that any such order or request "was ever sent."

I have already given Col. Fullam's account of the services of the regiment during the action, and his warm and just eulogium on the heroism of Color Sergeant Parkhurst. But the following extract from his letter, which has not been given, will serve to show why some of the men fell back as well as to indicate the partiality of Gen. Butler in praising indiscriminately everyone save the officers and men of the Seventh. \* \* \* "There were nearly three hundred sick "in camp. \* \* \* When the engagement began our sick "were *much exposed*, and were *properly* sent to the river to

“ be out of danger. Their irregular appearance, as they  
 “ passed through the city, might well have created an impres-  
 “ sion unfavorable to the regiment.” [This was no excuse,  
 however, for Gen. Butler to say that the regiment broke in  
 confusion or retreated when not pressed by the enemy.]  
 \* \* \* “ Of the regiments at Vicksburg with us only the  
 “ Thirtieth Massachusetts and ours were in the fight. The  
 “ other two Gen. Butler refers to by saying that although  
 “ they *were not brought into action they held their position.*”  
 This allusion was evidently intended as a compliment; and  
 as Col. Fullam well says, it would be difficult to say “ that  
 “ they did not *hold their position* as well as others would  
 “ have done if *not* attacked.”

Capt. Salmon Dutton, of Company G, an accomplished,  
 brave and efficient officer, who was with the regiment all  
 through the action, in a letter dated August 30th, 1862, and  
 subsequently published in the Rutland *Herald*, thus referring  
 to Order No. 62, says: \* \* \* “ The allegations [as to  
 “ the Seventh] are *unfounded* and *unjust*, and the disgrace  
 “ is unmerited and disheartening. I assert, and upon the asser-  
 “ tion stake my all, that the Seventh conducted themselves,  
 “ as a regiment, creditably. The regiment is disgraced for  
 “ no reason in the world but the malice and envy of those  
 “ *not* engaged in the fight. These statements I make, and  
 “ in making them speak the verdict of all the officers and  
 “ men of the regiment. By reference to the order you will  
 “ see that Col. Roberts is said to have fallen while rallying  
 “ his men. That he fell while giving orders to his regiment  
 “ is true, having dismounted, his horse becoming unmanage-

“able, and standing near the right of Company B [which was very near Capt. Dutton's position]; but *when* he fell the regiment was standing *firm as a rock under a most deadly fire, without one broken file*, at the same time loading and firing very rapidly.

“Again it is alleged that the regiment refused to march to the aid of the Indianians. The Seventh *never* refused to so march, and one thing is true—that every movement it executed brought us under fire from either artillery or musketry. The regiment was *never* ordered to support the Twenty-first Indiana. It is said we fired into the same regiment, killing and wounding several. Our regiment stood unmoved under fire without returning the same, until *ordered by* Gen. Williams to load and fire as rapidly as possible. That order *I heard myself* from the lips of Gen. Williams not twenty minutes before he fell mortally wounded.

“Again in the order it is said that John Donaghue brought off our colors. This charge is also *wholly* unfounded. When we formed in line of battle and moved into position we took only the national flag with us. [The State colors we were instructed not to take into action.] The colors brought by John Donaghue from camp consisted of a small flag formerly used as a marker in battalion drills, and which had been used by Major Holbrook at Fort Pike as a boarding flag for vessels passing the fort, and was afterwards used as a *blotter* in the adjutant's office, and had been thrown aside as worn out.”

This is strictly true as will appear by my testimony. The flag in question was so tattered and torn and blotted with ink marks as to be scarcely recognizable as a flag. I described and offered to show the rag to Gen. Butler before he issued his order, but he did not care to see it. I subsequently sent it to the Governor of the State and it was on exhibition in the Executive Chamber during the session of the Legislature already adverted to, where it excited the greatest derision, and called forth from Senator Edmunds the remark that there was not "*silk enough left to make a decent pocket handkerchief for a pauper.*"

Capt. Dutton continuing, says: \* \* \* "So much for our colors, which we are represented as deserting. It is a falsehood no man will presume to utter to an officer of the regiment. The national flag was borne by the Color Sergeant Parkhurst, who brought the same on to the line on which our regiment formed on that memorable morn, and by him was carried throughout the *entire* action, and which under a murderous fire he held aloft, and kept where the regiment could see and rally, if need be, around it. That flag *was ever where it should be*, and nobly did he stand by and bear the same from the field, *without its once leaving his hands*. Thus to impeach the bravery of a man who stood the test of Bull Run creditably to himself and his company as First Lieutenant, and to publish to the country that other hands than his bore our flag from the field of battle is a statement so unjust that I pray God it may *never stain the annals of our history*. I watched in the smoke of battle our flag, and watched him bring the

“ same to where we finally halted. *Our colors left us not for a moment.*”

Private James B. Royce of Company I, who was also present during the entire engagement, in a letter to me, thus describes the circumstances under which the Seventh opened the fire complained of by the Indiana men: \* \* \*

“ Gen. Williams rode up to Col. Roberts and wanted to know what that regiment [referring to the Seventh] was standing there for without firing. Col. Roberts replied that he was waiting for orders, and Gen. Williams directed him to give the command, at once, to commence firing. Col. Roberts *hesitated*, and told him the Twenty-first Indiana was in the woods and partially in our front, or at least he was afraid they were. Gen. Williams thereupon gave a *peremptory* order to fire, which was obeyed. After the third volley an officer rushed out of the woods shouting to us to stop firing as we were firing into the Twenty-first Indiana.”

I have given the above extracts as statements made by those who were with the regiment during the battle and because the testimony, although unsworn, is corroborated by that given before the Court of Inquiry, and for the reason that in the matter of such serious charges I have deemed it best to omit nothing which in the slightest degree operates to establish their untruthfulness, or which tends to vindicate the regiment from the calumnies so unjustly circulated concerning it.

On the 21st of October, my application to the Adjutant General of the Army having been returned, as already men-

tioned, Gen. Butler ordered a Court of Inquiry to "examine  
 "and report upon the facts and circumstances relative to the  
 "condition, as to discipline and efficiency of the Seventh  
 "Regiment Vermont Volunteers at the time of the battle of  
 "Baton Rouge, and the conduct of the officers and men in  
 "that action."

The officers composing the court, of course, belonged to Gen. Butler's command. He first selected them and then, *magnanimously* asked me if I had any objection to the members. I declined to become sponsor for a court convened under *his* direction. I did not then know, however, of any personal objections to the gentlemen chosen, nor have I any evidence that any of them, unless it was the Recorder, who failed to record many of my questions, and the answers thereto, acted otherwise than conscientiously, although I differed very much, as many others did, and as, I believe, many others will, from some of the conclusions at which they arrived.

The following synopsis of the evidence contains all that is material so far as the Seventh is concerned.

*Col. McMillan*, of the Twenty-first Indiana, testified: "That he was *not* in command of his regiment at the battle of Baton Rouge; that he was in the town *unwell*; that he saw *several* men of the Seventh in the town while the fight was going on; that about *fifteen minutes* before the close of the action he went to his regiment, passing the Seventh; that balls were flying pretty thick and the Seventh was not in line of battle, but was in confusion near its camp; that his regiment was directly in front engaging the enemy *from*

*behind trees*; that the Seventh was not engaging the enemy, and the only fire it was under at that time was *stray* (sic) shots fired at his men."

Col. McMillan admits that he was not with his regiment during the action and claims that he was sick. There is abundant evidence that he was not so sick, but that he could have joined and taken command of it had he been anxious to do so. Notwithstanding Gen. Butler says he twice "essayed to join his regiment but fell from his horse from weakness." He was seen by several officers during the progress of the fight frantically riding about the town attempting to disperse such of the "reserves" as had rallied on the grog shops. And as one officer of high rank expressed it, "he seemed to be having a hard, if not an agreeable task, as his face was very much flushed, which he was convinced did not proceed from bashfulness." Col. McMillan did not show himself at the front until the action was entirely over, nevertheless he was one of the most persistent and malignant defamers the Seventh had, and for that reason his stories seemed to meet with much favor from Gen. Butler.

*Capt. Frank W. Niblett*, Twenty-first Indiana, testified: "That near the close of the action he was informed that he was senior officer of his regiment and must return to it; that in doing so he found a regiment returning from the battle field which he *did not recognize* but was afterwards *told* it was the Seventh Vermont; that he asked the regiment to return to the line of battle, but no reply was made to such request; that the regiment was marching off *leisurely* in tolerable good order the officers appearing to have the men *well in hand*; that the



regiment thus marching off was about a square, or one hundred yards, from the camp of the Seventh Vermont. That *he did not see Col. McMillan* during the day until the action was over."

*Lieut. Walter C. Elkin*, Twenty-first Indiana, testified: "That his company was on picket duty, and when driven back things were so *much confused* he could not find his regiment: that the first infantry force he met was the Seventh Vermont, which was drawn up in line of battle directly in front of their camp; that Gen. Williams rode up to the Seventh, fifteen or twenty minutes after he joined it; "*he seemed very* much excited; it was in the thickest of the fight; he rode up to urge these men forward; he said the Twenty-first is holding their ground, if you go forward the victory is ours." Witness remembered *distinctly* of his saying the Twenty-first was holding their ground; that just as Gen. Williams rode off from the Seventh there was a tremendous volley of musketry, and the whole regiment broke, and his company with them; that the officers and some of the Sergeants tried to rally them; his company fell back in confusion with the rest; that he *thought* Col. Roberts was shot in this same volley; that all fell back to a ravine about fifty yards from the camp; his company staid there no longer than it took him to form it, when we joined the Thirtieth Massachusetts; that at the time the Seventh received the volley spoken of they fired in a left oblique direction and he thought they were firing upon his regiment; he thought so from what Gen. Williams had told him; Gen. Williams told the officers the same thing he had him; he thought the Seventh made no move forward

when Gen. Williams gave the order. On cross-examination witness said: His supposition that the Seventh actually fired into the Twenty-first Indiana, was a *matter of inference* arising out of what Gen. Williams told him; the "tremendous volley" of which he spoke passed almost entirely over the heads of the Seventh, and should not have prevented their going forward as Gen. Williams ordered; that the Seventh did not get over forty paces in front of their camp from the time he saw them till the close of the action."

This testimony is, in all essential particulars, contradicted by the officers of our regiment, and in many respects is also contradicted by Capt. Grimsley and Lieut. Henkle of the Twenty-first Indiana, and by Col. Dudley and Lieut. Norcum of the Thirtieth Massachusetts.

*Lieut. John W. Day*, Twenty-first Indiana, testified: "That he had occasion to observe the Seventh Vermont during the battle; that the Seventh was posted from ten to fifteen paces in front of their camp, and that his regiment was about one hundred and fifty yards in advance; that there was considerable fog *obscuring* the view and his regiment was fired into from the rear; the firing coming directly from in front of the camp of the Seventh, that two men were sent back, who reported who they were; about this time Gen. Williams ordered his regiment to fall back in line with the Seventh; that when it had done so, he asked if it could retake its position; they said they could and were ordered to to the charge; that the Seventh at the same time fell back to the Gas Works; that the first he saw of the Seventh after

they fell back was in the ravine ; that he did not again see them until they were in camp."

This testimony is not consistent with that given by other officers of the Twenty-first Indiana, and like the testimony of the last witness is contradicted in so far as he charges the Seventh with falling back at a critical stage of the action.

*Col. Cahill*, Ninth Connecticut, testified : " That he only remembered seeing the Seventh once during the heat of the fight ; that they were in line of battle *in good order* ; that he saw some of the men, not more than twenty, straggling ; that the Lieut.-Col. of the Seventh came to him during the fight, and said, ' For God's sake don't fire into us ; ' that he went to see where they were, so as to be sure not to fire into them. On cross-examination he said : I at *no time* noticed anything in the conduct of the Seventh prejudicial to good order or discipline ; the men of the Seventh that I saw straggling said they were sick ; I saw no officers among them."

*Lieut. W. S. Henkle*, Twenty-first Indiana, testified : " That he was acting Quartermaster, and carried an order given him by Lieut.-Col. Keith of his regiment requesting the Seventh to come up and support it ; that he delivered the order to the Major, *he thought, and supposed he made himself understood*, and had no doubt he did ; *that he could not command his horse so as to wait for a reply* ; that he did not have an opportunity to see whether the order was obeyed ; that he witnessed the firing of Seventh into Twenty-first ; that he rode back and told the officers of the Seventh that they were firing into it ; that the troops were *so posted* that if the

Seventh *was ordered to fire at all, they must fire into our own troops*; that in their position it was *impossible to see what they were firing at*; that the enemy were firing *over the heads of the Twenty-first and directly into the Seventh*; that the smoke and fog was *very dense.*"

QUESTION BY THE PRESIDENT: What was the reason which in your judgment justified the officers of the Seventh in giving the order to fire?

A. The fact that *they* were receiving the enemy's fire *very heavily. I do not know what reason they had to know the position of the Indiana regiment. The firing was such they had reason to suppose the enemy was immediately in front of them.*

To Col. Holbrook: I am pretty sure I gave the order to move forward to a field officer. I *think* it was Col. Holbrook I gave it to. I did not see *any disorder* in the Seventh until Gen. Williams gave them an order to fall back when many of the men fell out of the ranks.

This witness was clearly in error in saying he gave the order to me to go forward to the support of the Twenty-first. I was not with the regiment during the action. It is quite likely that Lieut. Henkle, if he delivered such an order at all, gave it to the wrong person or failed to make himself understood.

Capt. Grimsley, Twenty-first Indiana, testified: "That he commanded the Twenty-first after Lieut.-Col. Keith was wounded; that he had occasion to notice the action of the Seventh Vermont during the battle; that he heard Gen. Williams give an order to *some* officer of the Seventh to

move forward to the support of the Twenty-first; that the regiment moved up a short distance; that the next he saw of them they—the main portion of the regiment—moved by the flank to the town; that in ten minutes from the time he left them they moved in a contrary direction; that this was at 9 o'clock A. M. in the hottest part of the engagement; that when they moved to the rear they seemed to be moving in *good order, as though they might have had an order to so move*; that at one time his regiment changed its line; at that time it was partially concealed from the Seventh; that the enemy got into the camp of the Twenty-first, and for the time, seemingly directed their fire upon the Seventh; that they (the Twenty-first) were directing their attention to the enemy in their camp, and it was necessary to unmask themselves from the Seventh, and form immediately in their front; that by some mistake their colors were *not unfurled* and as they passed from *under the cover* of the fence surrounding the graveyard they received two volleys from the Seventh, killing several and wounding many men; that the Seventh had a clean view of them, at a distance not exceeding two hundred yards; that they were at the run and *came between* the enemy in their camp and the Seventh; he did not know whether the Seventh fired before they unmasked themselves; *that the enemy, in their camp, was firing into the Seventh*; that occupying the position they did the Seventh had *no means of knowing where they, (the Twenty-first) were*; that this was not more than half an hour before he saw the Seventh moving down the street: that *he did not think* the Seventh *broke in disorder* after firing the two volleys; that *many* of their soldiers

*afterwards filled up his ranks ; that Col. Keith and he went to the Seventh and told them not to fire into them ; that Gen. Williams was there and spoke very severely to the Commanding Officer and told him to reform his line and move up to the support of the Twenty-first ; that they advanced about thirty yards and then fell back."*

On cross-examination he said: \* \* \* "*All manner of mistakes might have been made that morning on account of the fog ;*" that he was positive that Col. Keith *did not* send any officer to the Seventh asking them to come up ; that he said, "Don't fire into us ; come up and help us ;" *he said this to a Captain who had his company drawn up in line fairly as though he was going to receive the officer of the day ; that his impression was that when they received the two volleys from the Seventh, they ran under a fire already going on.*

The testimony of this witness, to the effect that Gen. Williams gave an order to an officer of the Seventh to support the Twenty-first, is contradicted by so many witnesses, and in such a way, that it is clear Capt. Grimsley was mistaken about it. No officer or man of the Seventh ever received such an order, nor did any member of the Seventh ever hear, until Capt. Grimsley testified to it, that Gen. Williams reprimanded its commanding officer for firing into the Twenty-first. It will be observed that this witness's testimony is inconsistent with that given by Lieuts. Elkin, Day and Henkle, and on the whole tends to exonerate the Seventh from Gen. Butler's imputations.

*Lieut.-Col. Elliot*, First Louisiana (one of the regiments organized, and whose officers were commissioned by Gen. Butler), testified that he served on the staff of Gen. Williams; that he only knew of one instance where the Seventh showed *anything like* cowardice, and that was when they were subjected to the severe fire in which Col. Roberts was killed, and when the regiment was under the command of Lieut.-Col. Fullam; that they broke and fled, *perhaps one hundred feet*, to the cover of some gullies; \* \* \* that he did not see the regiment again in confusion; that he knew nothing of the Seventh refusing to support the Twenty-first Indiana.

With this witness, who seems to have been a favorite with Gen. Butler, the Recorder fitly closed the case for the prosecution. The Board, as will be seen hereafter, for some inscrutable reason credited his testimony as against that of at least seven witnesses who were wholly unimpeached; and, notwithstanding his general narration, is inconsistent with the facts.

*Lieut. Fredrick M. Norcum*, Thirtieth Massachusetts, testified: \* \* \* "That he was present at battle of Baton Rouge, and acted as aid to Col. Dudley, and had occasion to notice the conduct of the Seventh Vermont; that there was nothing unfavorable in their conduct which attracted his attention; that he did not at *any* time see *any* disorder in their ranks; that he was generally posted near them, and saw the regiment when the general order was given for the whole line to fall back; that they fell back *with the rest in good order* one hundred and fifty yards; that this was about 8 A. M.; that the falling back was by order of Gen.

Williams to the whole right wing; that the Seventh did not fall back *any further* than the rest of the force, *but with the line.*

*Col. N. A. M. Dudley*, Thirtieth Massachusetts, testified: "That he was present at the battle of Baton Rouge; that the Seventh was under his command during the latter part of the action, he being senior officer of the right wing; that he saw *nothing* to censure in the conduct of the Seventh; that the first he saw of the Seventh was when Gen. Williams sent him an order to *take back* his command to the neighborhood of Boulevard street; that in executing this movement he found the Seventh in the rear of their tents; that he asked what they were doing there, and they said they had fallen back *with the rest*; that he then gave them the order to fall back; that at that time there were regiments in their rear—the Fourteenth Maine was in their rear; that the *only troops in front of them* was the Sixth Michigan and Nim's Battery; that he gave the Seventh two orders himself, both of which they obeyed; that he had no knowledge of any of the orders which he sent by staff officers being disobeyed; that he did not know anything of the firing into the Twenty-first Indiana by the Seventh; that the Twenty-first was *scattered over* the field *very much*, and *it was impossible to tell where they were*, and *they even complained* of his regiment firing into them; that *he doubted* very much whether they were fired into *from the rear at all.*"

*Capt. Manning*, Fourth Massachusetts Battery, testified: "That he did not see the Seventh to recognize it as a regiment during the engagement; that John Donaghue of his Company brought off from the camp of the Seventh, at the time Col.



Dudley ordered them to fall back, four small camp flags marked Seventh Vermont, and a small American flag; *that they were camp colors.*"

*Major Henry M. Porter*, Seventh Vermont, testified: "That he was at the battle of Baton Rouge, and was in command of the regiment after Col. Roberts fell for about twenty minutes; that Col. Roberts *was not killed while rallying his men*; that soon after the line was formed Gen. Williams rode up and ordered the Seventh to commence firing; that balls were coming at it pretty fast; that the Colonel's horse became unmanageable, and he dismounted, and about the same time an officer from the Indiana regiment came up, saying "you are firing into our men"; that the Colonel thereupon gave the order to cease firing, and immediately after was wounded; that he was standing but a few feet from him at the time; that the right wing fell back through the camp, whether by orders or not he did not know, as he was engaged at the instant in removing the Colonel; that he was informed that he was to take command; that he immediately formed a new line, perhaps one hundred feet to the rear, and reported to Gen. Williams that he was in command of the regiment, and asked for orders; *that he directed him to take the regiment to the cover of an embankment*; that a part of the Fourteenth Maine retired with them; that he remained in command until the Lieut.-Col., who had been sent to see to a battery *which had been firing into the regiment*, joined it; that he heard *no* request from the Indiana regiment to come up to its aid, and knew of *no* order to advance to its support; that he *did not refuse* to obey any of the orders he received; that he thought the

regiment had fired about three volleys when it was announced that it was firing into the Indiana regiment; then the Seventh fired in the direction of the Indiana camp, where it was supposed the enemy was; that his company was Color Company; that it carried only the United States flag; that the State colors were not taken out on the field; *that the United States colors were preserved and brought off the field.*

*Capt. David P. Barber*, Seventh Vermont, testified: "That he was at the battle of Baton Rouge, and saw Col. Roberts when he fell; that the Colonel dismounted from his horse, which was unmanageable, came to the centre of the regiment and was there struck; *that there was then no break in the regiment*; that his company was in the centre of the left wing; that he *never heard* of any order for the Seventh to advance to the support of the Twenty-first Indiana, and did not know the position of the Indiana regiment when it fired into them; that *he heard* Gen. Williams give the Seventh the order to fire *three times*; that an officer came out of the woods and called to the regiment to cease firing as they were firing into the Indiana Regiment; that the order to cease firing came down from the right; that he *never heard* of any order being received to advance to the support of the Twenty-first; and during the action he had no means of knowing their position; that there was *no unusual confusion* when Col. Roberts fell; that after he fell the regiment was ordered to the rear; that the Seventh *did not* fall back until it was ordered to; that at *no time* during the action was the regiment in disorder, *every order* was obeyed promptly; that the Seventh *did not* leave its colors on the field; that he saw

the "colors" said to have been brought from camp by John Donaghue; that it was a small National flag called a marker, and if he had seen a regiment with it he would have supposed it was some old thing which had been thrown away."

*Lieut. Jackson V. Parker*, Seventh Vermont, testified: "That he was present at battle of Baton Rouge, and was on the extreme left of the regiment. The Seventh had an order from Gen. Williams to fire, and did so, and was shortly told its fire was affecting the Indiana Regiment; that an order came from Col. Roberts to cease firing, and just afterwards he saw him fall; that the regiment then moved to the rear; that a portion of the Fourteenth Maine fell back with it; that if there was any confusion in the right wing it was restored immediately; that he heard *no order* to advance to the support of the Indianians; that he saw the colors of the regiment brought off the field."

*Lieut. Austin E. Woodman*, Seventh Vermont, testified: "That he was at the battle of Baton Rouge; that Col. Roberts fell near the centre of the line; that the regiment *was not in confusion* at the time he fell; *that he never heard of any order* to advance to the support of the Twenty-first; that he saw the officer who came out of the woods and asked it to stop firing, but *did not hear* him call upon the regiment to go up and help them; that he saw the colors of the Seventh brought off *from* the field; that Color-Sergeant Parkhurst brought them off with the color company when it came off with the rest; that he saw the "colors" alleged to have been brought off by John Donaghue; one was a marker with a

figure seven on it. There was also a small United States flag—a fifteen or eighteen inch flag.”

*Capt. William Cronan*, Seventh Vermont, testified: “That he was at the battle of Baton Rouge; that he *did not* hear any order or request to advance to the support of the Twenty-first Indiana; that he *heard* Gen. Williams give the order to fire at the time it fired into them. An officer came out of the woods and called on it to stop firing; that he *did not hear* him ask it to come up and help them; that he saw our colors brought off the field.”

*Capt. Salmon Dutton*, Seventh Vermont, testified: “That he was at the battle of Baton Rouge; that the regiment received orders from Gen. Williams to fire, and while doing so an officer came out of the woods and called on it to cease firing; that he *did not hear* him call upon it to go up and help them; that he heard of *no order* or request to support the Indiana regiment; that he saw the colors of the Seventh brought off the field.”

*Color-Sergeant Sherman W. Parkhurst*, Seventh Vermont, testified: “That he was present at the battle of Baton Rouge, and carried the Regimental Colors; that they *did not leave his hands during the engagement: that he brought them off the field; that he was with the color company all the time; that the colors were unfurled; that he stood erect all through the engagement; that it was the United States colors he carried; that the State flag was not taken into the field.*”

It will be remembered that the orders from head-quarters were not to take the State flag into action.

*Col. William C. Holbrook*, Seventh Vermont, testified : "That the Seventh had about 250 men present for duty on the day of the battle of Baton Rouge ; that it had about 225 men in line ; that it had just returned from Vicksburg, and the sick 'in quarters' were all in camp ; that it had about 520 men on the sick list, of whom about 200 were in hospital ; that he was field officer of the day, and was not with the regiment, and therefore had no personal knowledge of the circumstances connected with the fall of Col. Roberts, or the firing into the Twenty-first Indiana, or the alleged refusal to support that regiment ; that all he knew personally was, that after the pickets were driven in he rode past the Seventh, told Col. Roberts the point of attack, and he, Col. Roberts, immediately moved the regiment to the left ; that he met Gen. Williams a short distance from the regiment, who asked him the point of attack, and he told him, as near as he could judge, where the different columns of the enemy would come ; that at this time he saw a great number of men running back towards the river, and remembered very distinctly Gen. Williams ordering them to halt ; that they did not, and he rode in among them, and they stopped, saying they were sick men from the Twenty-first Indiana and Fourteenth Maine ; that he judged there were 150 in all ; that Gen. Williams told them to take care of themselves if they were sick ; that he was then sent by Gen. Williams to look after the pickets on the right and left flanks, and to hold those positions at all hazards ; that he *never received an order or request to support the Twenty-first Indiana* ; that he saw no officer of that regiment until the action was over ; that the

sick men of the Seventh in camp had orders to retire to the river bank, with the exception of eleven commissioned officers, *all* of whom were in the engagement; that he saw the regimental colors with the regiment at the Penitentiary immediately after the final falling back of the lines; that on or about Sept. 5th he received through his Quartermaster *four guidons*, said to have been brought from the field by John Donaghue; three of them were *simple white flags with the figure 7* inscribed on them, while the other was a *small United States flag, very much tattered and torn; that it had been used in the Adjutant's office as a blotter; that he heard nothing* of the alleged misconduct of the regiment until he arrived at Camp Parapet, about the 24th or 25th of August; that just previous to the battle, the regiment had been on board river transports for the better part of six weeks; that at a review, a short time before the engagement, two or three companies were not represented, their services being needed to bury the dead; that about a week previous to the battle there was but ninety-five men present for duty in the entire regiment."

The report of Col. Dudley, an extract from which has been given at page 45, was read by me, and offered as a part of our case, at the end of my testimony.

The Court made the following report: \* \* \* "The  
" Board having fully weighed and considered the evidence  
" report as follows: It appears from the evidence that when  
" the Seventh was called upon to participate in the battle  
" of Baton Rouge it had been *very much* reduced in numbers,  
" and doubtless in *morale*, by the *severities* of the campaign

“ at Vicksburg, and by *long confinement* on board transports.  
“ On the morning of the battle the regiment had present for  
“ duty about 250 men, and about 520 men sick, of whom  
“ about 200 were in hospital. About 225 men were in line  
“ early in the action.

“ The Commanding Officer of the regiment—Col. Roberts—  
“ fell under the *sharpest volley* that was fired that day, and  
“ shortly after his fall the regiment fled about *one hundred*  
“ *feet* to the rear and to the cover of some gullies in a disor-  
“ derly manner. About two-fifths of the men present for  
“ duty did not return to position in line of battle during the  
“ day.

“ The only evidence to sustain the finding that the regi-  
“ ment fled about *one hundred feet*, is that of Lieut.-Col.  
“ Elliott, which as we have seen stands alone, and came from  
“ a swift witness and is contradicted by all the officers of the  
“ regiment. The finding that two-fifths of the regiment did not  
“ return to the line, after this alleged flight, was *manufac-*  
“ *tured*. It is *absolutely unsupported* by evidence and I  
“ defy any one to find in the testimony any warrant for it.

“ It appears that early in the action Lieut.-Col. Fullam  
“ had been dispatched by his Colonel to see to the firing of  
“ a battery which was endangering the regiment. That  
“ Major Holbrook was field-officer of the day. Upon the fall of  
“ the Colonel, therefore, the command of the regiment devolved  
“ temporarily upon Captain, now Major, Porter, who seems to  
“ have behaved *creditably* in a trying position. When the Lieut-  
“ Colonel returned he assumed command of the regiment.”

“ So far as any evidence appears, it would seem that the line-officers behaved *well* during the day.”

“ It appears that the Seventh, or a part of it, did fire into the Twenty-first Indiana, but there is an *exculpation* to be found in the testimony of the commanding officer of the Indiana regiment, Capt. Grimsley, to wit:—

“ Occupying the position they did, the Seventh had no means of knowing where we were. My impression is, when we received the two volleys from the Seventh, we ran under a fire which was already going on.”

“ It appears also, from the testimony of various witnesses, that the *field was covered by a dense fog and smoke*, so that it was *quite impossible* to distinguish a friend from a foe at the distance the regiments were apart; and, moreover, that the position of the Indiana regiment was frequently changed.”

“ It *does not* appear that any orders were communicated to the Vermont regiment during the day *which they disobeyed*.

“ *It appears that the colors of the regiment were retained by the color guard during the action, and were brought off the field by the color guard when the regiment fell back.*

“ It appears that the ‘Camp Colors’ alleged by Capt. Manning, Fourth Massachusetts Battery, to have been brought from the camp of the Seventh by John Donaghue, *were three markers in common use, and one small United States flag, which had been used for no military purpose for a long time previous.*”

It will be seen that the findings of the Court are all favor-



able to the regiment, except in two particulars, *i. e.*: (1) In charging, that the regiment fled about *one hundred feet*; and (2) that two-fifths of the men did not thereafter return to line. It has already been pointed out that the preponderance of evidence is entirely against the first of these findings; whereas, the second was *invented*, there being *no* evidence to support it. But let us suppose that there was a flight covering the enormous space of *one hundred feet*, and that there were "some gullies" at the end of the distance, was it such an uncommon incident, or was it such an heinous offence as to merit condemnation in General Orders? It seems to me it was not. The most experienced soldiers have been known to seek shelter from a deadly fire, and frequently it is the part of prudence to do so. *One hundred feet*, according to the usual measure, would be just the length of three and one-third of the rails of the Central Vermont Railroad—surely not such a tremendous distance, and, had all the facts been brought out, it would have been found that it was not one-tenth the space covered in the race for security run by some of the troops whom Gen. Butler saw fit to extol for gallantry in Order No. 62.

Upon the findings of the Court of Inquiry, Gen. Butler, with great affectation of pleasure, issued the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
"NEW ORLEANS, November 20th, 1862.

"General Order No. 98.

"The Commanding General, upon the findings of the Board  
"of Inquiry upon the conduct of the Seventh Regiment Ver-

“mout Volunteers at the battle of Baton Rouge, learns that  
“he was *led* into a *mistake* by the *official reports* of that  
“action, as to the loss by that regiment of its colors, *it prov-*  
“*ing to have been the Camp colors left in camp, and not the*  
“*Regimental colors* that were brought off the field by the  
“Massachusetts Battery (*sic*). He therefore, *has pleasure*  
“in ordering the regimental colors to be restored to the  
“regiment, not doubting that it will, in the next action,  
“earn for itself a position and name which will be a credit  
“to itself, its State and country.

“By command of

“MAJ. GEN. BUTLER.

“GEO. C. STRONG, A. A. GEN.”

This was a singular order for a General to make pretending to the slightest degree of uprightness or fairness, Gen. Butler's own court had virtually found that he had grossly traduced the regiment, yet to his mind the only effect of its findings seems to have been to enlighten him as to the fact that “Camp Colors” when so designated, in express terms, as in Capt. Manning's report they were, could not be taken to mean regimental colors, a blunder, it is needless to say, which the veriest tyro in military affairs, if honestly disposed, would not have made. But the order was in full keeping with the vindictive and malicious spirit evinced towards the Seventh by Gen. Butler in his dealings with it, and hence it is not strange that he should have refused to acknowledge, or attempt to repair the injustice he had so deliberately done to the regiment and State. I doubt if the annals of the war

furnish another such instance of premeditated iniquity as was this monstrous attack upon our regiment.

Although such harsh and unfair treatment was well calculated to cool the ardor and utterly disgust any body of soldiers, yet the men of the Seventh bore up under it right nobly. Conscious, as they were, that they had been most grievously wronged and defamed, they nevertheless performed their full duty under the temporary cloud of ignominy which encompassed them, their courage and fidelity in the glorious cause for which they were daily risking their lives never for a moment flagging.

“Fear to do base, unworthy things, is valor ;  
If they be done to us, to suffer them is valor, too—”

Most manfully did they bear their part in the long conflict which followed this event, as I can personally testify, and as the record of their subsequent career will fully attest.

Shortly before the expiration of their term of enlistment all the surviving and undischarged enlisted men, who were original members of the regiment, except fifty-nine, re-enlisted for three years further service, or for the war, and *long after* Gen. Butler had been retired to deserved obscurity, as a military commander, the officers and men of the Seventh were actively employed, and bravely performing duty on “flood and field,” trusted and respected by their “Commanding Generals,” and, because of their “discipline” and efficiency, ever given the posts of greatest danger and responsibility.

There is very much that could be said by way of criticism concerning Gen. Butler’s unjust treatment of the Seventh. But I must here limit myself to but a few reflections, and

first I would say that, in considering the charges brought against it—even upon the assumption of their truth—there was much in the state of health and physical condition of the officers and men which entitled their conduct to lenient scrutiny. The regiment had just returned from a trying and disastrous expedition, in which it had experienced great hardships and been exposed to an unusual amount of sickness. A large number of the men had perished by disease, and so many of the surviving members of the regiment were impregnated with, and suffering from malarial poison, that out of about 900 men not over 225 could be brought into line of battle on the morning of the engagement. Of this small number but about 100—the men who but a few days before had joined us from Fort Pike—were fresh and strong, the residue being largely convalescents, and hardly fit for any more severe service than light camp duty. Indeed, such was the state and condition of the regiment, that even Gen. Butler's Court of Inquiry was constrained to find that it was “much reduced in numbers, and doubtless in *morale*, by the “*severities* of the campaign at Vicksburg, and *long* confinement on transports.” That this was so is not strange, when the experience to which we had been subjected is taken into account. The Seventh left Vermont in the preceding month of March, and reached Ship Island early in April following. Within less than two months thereafter the regiment was ordered to take part in the river campaign, and with no opportunity to become acclimated, or even accustomed to the duties of a life entirely different from that which they had led from boyhood, the men were immediately

assigned to the most arduous field service, in performing which they were constantly exposed to an atmosphere charged with the elements of disease, with no adequate protection from the scorching rays of the sun by day, or shelter against the mephitic gases and dews of the night. An experienced soldier would surely have taken these circumstances into consideration in reviewing charges of misconduct in action on the part of a regiment so conditioned. Not so, however, was it with Gen. Butler. He seemed to think that as high a degree of discipline was to be expected from a body of men prostrated and demoralized by serious and depressing bodily ailments, so occasioned, as from robust battalions just out of garrison or camps of instruction; and hence he sought in Order No. 62 to convey the impression that the Seventh was an undisciplined regiment, and that the officers were blameable therefor. The "official reports" of the commanding officers under whom the regiment served, and who (unlike Gen. Butler) were eyewitnesses of, and personal participants with it, in its movements on the battle field, sufficiently refute this imputation, as they show conclusively that the Seventh had abundant *morale* left to do its duty bravely, notwithstanding it was handicapped with a sick list comprising over two-thirds of its members.

The secret impulses which actuated Gen. Butler in pursuing the course he did toward the Seventh are, of course, known only to himself. - But there were many circumstances, at the time, which tended to indicate that his action was inspired by malice and from a desire to add to his own reputation as a disciplinarian, and for political effect.

Allusion has already been made to the fact that the State authorities were opposed to placing the Seventh under Gen. Butler and to the indignation which it is said he felt in consequence. Also to his quarrels with the officers soon after our arrival at Ship Island and to his controversy with Gen. Phelps, and the well known interest which the latter took in our welfare. These things induced many of our officers and men to believe, and that belief has not yet become extinct, that Gen. Butler was influenced thereby to avail himself of the first pretext that offered to visit his wrath upon the Seventh, and his arbitrary and unjust refusal to listen to us when the charges in question were made, certainly lends color to the supposition that these early matters of difference did form a constituent part of his motives for attacking the regiment.

Gen. Butler at this time had acquired great celebrity for the audacity and vigor with which he had administered affairs in New Orleans, and had also achieved a factitious and less enviable reputation (as dear probably to him, however, as the former) for the severity with which he had waged war upon the women and non-combatants of that city. Gen. Dix in a moment of patriotic fervor had exclaimed, "If any man attempts to haul down the American flag shoot him on the spot," and Gen. Butler catching the spirit of this patriotic utterance caused one Mumford who had pulled down our flag to be put to a more ignominious death, and instead of shooting him "on the spot" caused him to be summarily hung. These and some other acts of a kindred character gave him much notoriety and prestige as a bold and aggressive officer

so far, at least, as dealing with rebellious subjects was concerned. No man understood better than Gen. Butler the admiration which our people have for a vigorous and courageous character, and no man at that time made greater efforts to acquire that reputation than he did. He was constantly posing before the public for effect and to acquire conspicuity, and was willing to resort to any means to obtain it and for "every deed of mischief, he had a heart to resolve, a head to contrive, and a hand to execute." But as a soldier, pure and simple, Gen. Butler had gained no renown and had displayed no capacity either for managing or handling troops. His fame consisted wholly in the prompt and fearless manner in which he had discharged his duties, as a Military Dictator under the dominance of martial law. The vast power with which he was thus vested made him arbitrary and frequently unjust, and the public service was often times prostituted and made subservient to his personal ends. At this time too, Gen. Butler entertained inordinate political aspirations, and it was apparent that he was bending every effort to secure such popularity as would lead to his being nominated for President. Of course under the influence of such an ambition he was likely to, and did, mould his actions largely toward bringing about this cherished result.

Gen. Phelps, in his letter, extracts from which I have heretofore given, is disposed to ascribe Gen. Butler's attack upon the Seventh largely to political causes. He says, among other things, \* \* \* "It is evident if he, Butler, were "to run for the Presidency in the ensuing election of 1864, "the electoral vote of Indiana might be of great moment to

“ him, and that it would be a good bargain to win it even at “ the expense of losing the Whig vote of Vermont.” (See p. 13 supra.) There is more, than may at first seem, in this view. The complaints against the Seventh, it will be remembered, originated wholly with the officers and men of the Indiana regiment. No fault was found with the behavior of our regiment by any of the other troops engaged in the action. The charges against it were also pressed exclusively by the Indiana officers, and in their zeal they were not content to apply for redress through the regular channels, but they appealed directly to Gen. Butler, whom they found predisposed to lend them a willing ear and hand, and who became so much enlisted in their behalf as to actually draft an order censuring the Seventh without even informing one of its members of his purpose. This disgraceful *coup de main* raises a strong inference that Gen. Butler wished to curry favor with the Indiana officers, even at the expense of doing us a gross injustice, forasmuch as by vindicating the imaginary wrongs of the Indiana regiment, he would secure the friendship of its officers and men, and might possibly win the suffrages of the people of that State, who would naturally stand by a champion so bold and prompt in defending their soldiers. Again some unfavorable comments had been circulated touching the behavior of Indiana troops in the Mexican War, and by impugning the honor of a regiment from some other State, Gen. Butler could claim credit for creating an offset to these unpleasant charges which might also be pleasing to the people of Indiana. Again it was important that he should display his capacities as a disciplinarian and show to the world



what *he* would do with a regiment that should presume to misbehave in the face of the enemy."\*

Vermont not being as important a State in a political sense, as some others, it was tolerably safe to carry out this scheme by making one of her regiments the victim. I don't suppose there is anyone credulous enough to imagine that if the same charges which brought us to grief, had been preferred against a regiment from the State of New York, or for that matter, against a regiment from any other large State, that the course pursued toward the Seventh would have been adopted. If there is anyone so minded, or who would fain believe that Gen. Butler would have taken such summary action as he did against the Seventh, going even to the length of refusing to its officers and men the common justice of a hearing, let them explain, if they can, why it was that Gen. Butler did not reprove Manning's Battery from his own State, in respect to whose conduct Col. Dudley, in his "Official Report," said: \* \* \* "It was compelled to fall back, " which it did with *considerable disorder*, leaving one piece " and a caisson. \* \* \* Lieut. Whitemore, Thirtieth " Massachusetts Volunteers gallantly dashed through the " smoke and succeeded in bringing off the caisson." And of whom Col. Fullam said: " I sent a Sergeant and twenty-nine " men at request of an officer of Manning's Battery to bring " off a caisson." (See p. 7, supra.) Or why it was he did not censure the Ninth Connecticut Volunteers, whose Lieu-

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\* It was currently reported at the time that Gen. Butler stated that as his force was small he deemed it necessary to disgrace at least one regiment, that his troops should know how sternly *he* would deal with them for misbehavior. Doubtless he intended to inspire them with the same fear and dread of him as had then siezed upon the women and non-combatants of the city.

tenant-Colonel in his report of its operations, among other things, says: "The regiment marched along a road, \* \* \* until coming within range of the enemy's guns, and receiving a shower of grape and canister *fled off* and formed line of battle *in a cornfield* on the right of the road." These little evidences of disorder were not, I admit, under the circumstances, discreditable to either Manning's Battery, or to the Ninth Connecticut, but they were just as grave offences as were those charged against our regiment, and upon the strength of which Gen. Butler accused it of "breaking in confusion."

It is hardly necessary to add that no sensible man, familiar with the history of Vermont troops, will believe that a body of Green Mountain Boys would, under any circumstances, be guilty of such gross misbehavior as that imputed to the Seventh by Gen. Butler. The thought that even the remnants of a sick and dispirited regiment hailing from the glorious old State of Vermont would take to its heels and run to the rear in battle, or would refuse to obey orders to march to the aid of their sorely pressed comrades, or would abandon their colors in action, is as unnatural as it is abhorrent. Such conduct in no way comports with the history of the people or soldiers of Vermont. The record made by Vermont troops in the late war is historic and grand. The officers and men who made up her battalions sprang from the same common ancestry. Substantially the same physical and mental qualities predominated in all the regiments. The same essences of character and courage prevailed in the Seventh as in the other Vermont regiments. Is there any-

one who, for a moment, will contend that the Seventh contained nothing but poltroons and cowards, while all other regiments drawn from the same general community, and from the same general stock, were comprised only of heroes and patriots? Such an idea is, of course, absurd, and yet to credit the accusations made by Gen. Butler, a course of reasoning equally nonsensical must be indulged in.

The fact is that Gen. Butler was egregiously in the wrong. His charges—with the single exception of the one relating to firing into the Indiana regiment—had no semblance of truth as a foundation, and he was subsequently forced to admit, publicly, that he had made one blunder, and had done the regiment great injustice in at least one important particular. In his General Order No. 98 he says that he was “led into a *mistake* by the *official reports* \* \* \* as to “the loss by the Seventh of its regimental colors,” etc.

It is said that “an honest confession is good for the soul,” and we were thankful that Gen. Butler could make even one acknowledgment of the wrong he had done us, although had he been candid he would, at the same time, have admitted, as he has since informally stated, that he was in error in every other respect. But for present purposes it will suffice to refer to his concession in Order No. 98. It already appears that there was *no* “official report” showing that the Seventh had lost or left on the field its *regimental* colors, and that the only “official report” which in any way alluded to the colors of the Seventh, was that of Capt. Manning wherein he speaks simply of “camp colors.” Had Gen. Butler read this “official report” with *ordinary attention*, he could not have

failed to observe the distinction, and it therefore follows that he was either very stupid or else practiced a falsification in seeking to convey the impression by his Order No. 62, that the Seventh had abandoned its regimental flag.

There is a maxim of the law, "*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*"—False in one thing, false in everything—which is often applied in weighing evidence, the rule being that where one deliberately or knowingly distorts the truth as to any one material fact, all his statements may be disbelieved unless corroborated. This principle is applicable to the case in hand; and if put to use, Gen. Butler having, by his own admission, been caught in at least one act of falsification or distortion of the truth, ought not to be believed in any particular. Indeed, to any fair mind it must be apparent, without invoking such a rule, that the Seventh was most unfairly and unjustly dealt with by Gen. Butler; and I think, too, it must be evident that had he made an impartial examination of the complaints emanating from the Indiana regiment, giving us a fair opportunity to be heard, before taking action upon them, he would never have had occasion to censure or reprimand the regiment for the part it took in the battle of Baton Rouge, but on the contrary, would have found that the conduct of the officers and men was highly praiseworthy and commendable. There was much of the "irony of fate" in our experience under Gen. Butler. But the reparation which he refused to make subsequently came to us at the hands of the gallant and illustrious Sheridan, who gave the regiment a full vindication. A Board of Officers *not* convened by, and *not* amenable to Gen. Butler, made a report concerning the

services of the Seventh at Baton Rouge, which led to the promulgation of the following order :

“ HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,  
“ NEW ORLEANS, LA., July 10th, 1866.

“General Order No. 12

“ In compliance with the requirements of General Order  
“ No. 19, 1862, from the War Department, and in accord-  
“ ance with the *reports of Boards convened to examine into*  
“ *the services rendered* by the troops concerned, and by  
“ authority of the Lieutenant-General commanding the Armies  
“ of the United States. It is hereby ordered that there *shall*  
“ be inscribed upon the colors of the following regiments the  
“ names of battles in which they have borne a *meritorious*  
“ *part* as hereinafter specified.

[EXTRACT.]

“ Seventh Vermont Veteran Volunteer Infantry :

“ Siege of Vicksburg, Gonzales Station,

“ Baton Rouge, Spanish Fort,

“ Whistler,

“ By command,

“ MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN.

“ GEO. LEE, A. A. Gen.



## CHAPTER V.

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CAMP WILLIAMS—INCREASED MORTALITY IN THE REGIMENT  
—CAMP KEARNY—NEW ORLEANS—DEPARTURE FOR  
FLORIDA—EXPERIENCE ON STEAMER NASSAU—  
ARRIVAL AT PENSACOLA—GEN. NEAL DOW—  
BILLY WILSON'S ZOUAVES—ADVANTAGES  
OF PENSACOLA AS A SANITARY POST  
—CURIOUS DEFENCES.

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1862.

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**C**AMP WILLIAMS, as I have already stated, was situated in a very unhealthy locality. As Dr. Blanchard describes it, the encampments were placed “upon a strip of solid ground of some few hundred yards in width on all sides of which was a formation or combination, peculiar to the lower Mississippi, of soil or black clay and water in varying proportions, whose products, both animal and vegetable, were numerous beyond conception, and rank and offensive beyond description. Repeated representations of the terrible effect to health and the alarmingly high and rapidly increasing rate of mortality in the command, occasioned by exposure to the poisonous atmosphere and deadly

“surroundings of this miasmatic locality, were made by the  
“medical officers to the Commanding General without avail,  
“and for a month or more the men were left in these noxious  
“encampments, exposed to the scorching heat of an August  
“and September sun, so peculiarly intense in Louisiana, and  
“surrounded with all this reeking rottenness and corruption,  
“until absolute annihilation threatened us, when at last, but  
“too late to save many valuable lives, we were ordered to  
“an open space nearer the river.”

I doubt if a more unhealthy spot could have been selected for camps anywhere in the vicinity of that most unhealthy of places, the city of New Orleans, and had the much dreaded “yellow jack” made its appearance, I very much fear the “absolute annihilation” with which we were threatened would have actually been brought to pass instead of proving to be but an impending danger. As it was, our experience was a most severe and dreadful one. During the day the atmosphere was exceedingly close and muggy, and although we had frequent and often times almost a continual succession of thunder storms, the air was not cooled or purified, but on the contrary these rain-falls only increased its humidity and heaviness. At night and in the early morning we were enveloped, as we were at Vicksburg, in a thick watery mist, and the stench from the surrounding swamps was intolerable. All the drinking and cooking water was brought from the Mississippi, some two and one half miles distant. But owing to the condition of the direct road leading to the river, which was rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains, much of the water had to be transported five or six miles by cir-

cuitous routes, and the result was that our wants were but imperfectly supplied, and not unfrequently the men were obliged to use the waters from a bayou running in front of our camp. As might have been expected the sick list increased with alarming rapidity and to add to the horror of our situation the death rate kept at an almost even pace with it. It was not an uncommon thing for men to fall dead in their tracks, and numerous instances can be recalled of men who fell dead on the banks of the bayou, with the fatal waters of which they had sought to quench their fevered thirst.

At the time we reached Camp Williams the seeds of disease had been planted to a greater or less extent in every system, and it seemed to us rather hard that our vitality should be still further sapped by being sent to such an unhealthy locality. Other troops who had been comfortably quartered in the city and its vicinity and who had not been exposed, or compelled to undergo any severe strains we thought should have been selected for such service. There can be no doubt had our regiment been sent to a healthy spot immediately on our return from Baton Rouge, many lives would have been saved and many who were obliged to return to their homes shattered by disease, and disabled with chronic complaints, would have been restored to health and duty. But that was not to be, we were forced to remain at Camp Williams until September 30th, when we moved our quarters to "Camp Kearny" a short distance below Carrolton which was a slightly more desirable and healthy place. On the 4th of November we again moved to the city of New Orleans taking up our quarters at the Jackson Cotton Press in the lower



part of the city. We had been there but a few days when we were ordered to Pensacola, Florida. In the meantime I was detailed on a military commission but was almost immediately taken sick with remittent fever resulting from continuous exposure and arduous labors, and was obliged to go to the "Hotel Dieu" where I was most kindly cared for and treated by the Sisters of Charity, under whose direction it was managed, and in a short time recovered my health. I refer to this circumstance merely for the purpose of calling attention to these hospitals. Many of the officers and men, not only of our own regiment, but of the entire command can testify to the excellent manner in which these institutions were managed, and to the uniform kindness with which these Sisters of Mercy treated our soldiers while under their care. Never, to my knowledge, were the doors of one of these asylums closed to any of our men, however humble his rank, or whatever might be his faith or creed. All were treated with equal attention and skill. The attending physicians were men of experience and ability and no better nurses could be found in any hospitals than were these votaries of the Catholic religion.

On the 13th of November the regiment, under the command of Major Porter, embarked on the steamer "Nassau," and took its departure for the land of "Sun and Flowers." The "Nassau" was not designed for a transport, being nothing more than a large sized tug-boat. The men in consequence were stowed and packed away "like herrings." Most of them were obliged to stand or lie on the upper deck during the entire voyage for want of sufficient space elsewhere. To add

to their discomforts they encountered wet and heavy weather immediately after leaving the mouth of the Mississippi, so that all hands were drenched to the skin until they reached Pensacola. When off the entrance to Mobile Bay, in the middle of the night, the "Nassau" was suddenly brought to her bearings by a round shot, which passed just ahead of her bows, and which it was discovered came from one of our own gunboats. She was immediately brought to, when it was ascertained that she was inside of our blockading squadron, and heading directly toward Fort Morgan, then in the hands of the rebels. It was at once suspected that the captain was untrue, and intended running his boat under the guns of the fort, where all on board would probably have fallen into the hands of the enemy. The captain however protested his innocence, claiming that in the darkness he had mistaken his course. At that time there were no lights kept up anywhere on the Southern coast, the rebels having either demolished the light-houses or extinguished the lights, so that it was not an infrequent occurrence for navigators to lose their reckonings at night in dark or stormy weather. There were no means of determining definitely whether the captain was unfaithful or not, and so, after giving him to understand that his life would pay the penalty of any attempted treachery, Major Porter directed him to proceed to his destination. On the morning of the 14th the "Nassau" reached Pensacola, with as wet and disgusted a lot of men as can well be imagined. A considerable portion of our number were sick, and the severe exposure and discomforts of the trip were not calculated to aid or benefit these invalids. At that

time it was customary to issue rations of whiskey to the men whenever they had been subjected to any unusual exposure or toil, and accordingly, as soon as the regiment disembarked and got fairly into quarters, Major Porter made requisition for a suitable allowance of whiskey for his command. But the Commander of the Post happened to be that redoubtable warrior and sanguinary hero, Gen. Neal Dow, author of the Maine Liquor Law, who utterly refused to approve of the requisition, on the ground that he did not believe in the efficacy of spirits in any case. The result was that the men got no stimuli through the regular channel, but I have reason to think a supply was obtained notwithstanding Gen. Dow's compunctions. This great apostle of temperance, I am happy to say, was not destined to tarry long with us, for in a few weeks he was ordered to New Orleans, and assigned to a command near that city, where, if reports were true, his attachment for silver spoons became almost as great as that which Gen. Butler is reputed to have had.

Gen. Dow, while in command at Pensacola, had discovered a great fondness for pianos and miscellaneous articles of furniture, of which he had a large and interesting collection at his quarters. Numerous predatory raids had been made into the adjoining towns; and when we reached Pensacola it was said that the looting had been so effective that but little if any valuable furniture was left in all Western Florida. Subsequently, near Port Hudson, this pseudo General was taken prisoner. It was reported that the rebels offered to exchange him for *six pianos*, but the proposition seems not to have been accepted, and he was, I believe, afterwards exchanged in the regular way.

Shortly after our arrival at Pensacola, "Billy" Wilson's Zouaves, then stationed at Pensacola, were ordered to New Orleans. This regiment had an unsavory reputation, and was generally supposed to be made up of thieves, plug-uglies and other dangerous characters gathered from the slums of New York City. While there were desperate men in the regiment, it contained some good material, and on the whole compared favorably in discipline and *esprit de corps* with some other regiments recruited in the large cities. But little sympathy, however, existed between this regiment and Gen. Dow. His temperance proclivities did not accord with the bacchanalian habits of its rank and file, and his efforts to stop their "tod" was resented in a forcible and outspoken manner. When the order was received for the regiment to proceed to New Orleans, it was given out that the men would "make Rome howl" on the night before their departure. No one except Gen. Dow supposed anything serious was contemplated, but he seemed to be impressed with the idea that these threats would be literally executed. Accordingly the men of our regiment were directed to sleep on their arms. Two companies were also detailed as an additional guard at the General's house, and several extra patrols were sent out to apprehend all roysterers and soldiers outside their quarters. The night, however, was a quiet and peaceful one, and the next morning "Billy Wilson" and the "Bloody Sixth" departed, seemingly, to the great delight of Gen. Dow.

Pensacola like most other towns on the Florida coast is entirely free from malaria. The soil in the vicinity is of a

dry sandy character, and the surrounding country is an "open piney woods." The climate we found equable and generally pleasant. The air was pure and, in our condition, highly invigorating. The effects of this change from the malarious banks of the Mississippi were decidedly favorable upon the health and spirits of our men, and were perceptible at once, notwithstanding for the first two or three months after our arrival the death rate ran very high. This however was inevitable as the serious maladies contracted by so many on the river campaign would have proved fatal in any locality, even could the sick have been transported to their native air. The diseases most prevalent at that time were chronic diarrœhea, swamp fevers and pneumonia. The resinous elements in the atmosphere were particularly conducive to the recovery of those affected with the latter trouble. In a sanitary point of view Pensacola was probably the most desirable situation in the Department as a station for a regiment conditioned as ours was.

The following tabular statement of deaths in the regiment, and of those discharged therefrom for disability, in each year from 1862 to 1866, both inclusive, shows that our ranks were much more severely winnowed and decimated by death and disease in 1862 than in all the other years of our service put together, and also shows how rapidly the regiment improved after reaching Florida :

## DEATHS.

	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	TOTAL.
Commissioned Officers, .	4	2	1	—	—	7
Non " "	1	—	1	—	—	2
Company A, . . .	26	1	2	3	1	33
“ B, . . .	32	2	9	2	—	45
“ C, . . .	14	5	—	4	—	23
“ D, . . .	20	3	1	3	—	27
“ E, . . .	36	1	4	7	—	48
“ F, . . .	24	—	3	3	—	30
“ G, . . .	31	6	5	3	—	45
“ H, . . .	44	5	4	4	—	57
“ I, . . .	37	3	3	4	—	47
“ K, . . .	26	3	6	8	—	43
TOTAL, . . .	295	31	39	41	1	407

And by the following Tabular Statement it will be seen that more men were discharged for disability in 1863 than in 1862. Nearly every one of these discharges, however, was occasioned by sickness incurred in 1862 before we went to Florida, and hence should properly be included in our losses of that year. It will also be seen that in companies C and D there were fewer deaths than in the other companies. None of the men of C (except I think the color guard) and but a portion (a little over one-half) of D

company took part in the expedition to Vicksburg, which probably accounts for this fact.

DISCHARGED FOR DISABILITY.

	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	TOTAL.
Commissioned Officers, .	—	—	—	3	—	3
Non " "	—	1	1	—	—	2
Company A, . . .	8	10	1	1	—	20
" B, . . .	8	8	1	4	—	21
" C, . . .	7	8	—	3	—	18
" D, . . .	9	9	3	2	—	23
" E, . . .	12	11	2	4	—	29
" F, . . .	12	13	3	3	—	31
" G, . . .	11	7	—	2	—	20
" H, . . .	9	10	4	1	—	24
" I, . . .	7	8	3	3	—	21
" K, . . .	11	15	1	3	—	30
TOTAL, . . .	94	100	19	29	—	242

RECAPITULATION.

Total Number of Deaths, . . . . .	407
Total Number Discharged for Disability, . . . . .	242
TOTAL, . . . . .	649

We were able also to get much more wholesome food than any with which we had been supplied since leaving Vermont. Fish and game were abundant, and the beef, which was brought to us on steamers direct from the North, was of a

superior quality. We were also able to get fruits and vegetables to a greater or less extent in their season.

At the time we reached Pensacola, Gen. Dow was in a great ferment over an anticipated attack from the enemy, and as soon as we were fairly disembarked our men were set to work constructing a stockade, skirted by a sort of *chevaux de frize*, in front of our quarters and also in completing other unique barricades and defences devised by this doughty commander against a possible "surprise." A most comical affair in the shape of a redoubt was built out of wood and sand near the cemetery. None of us were ever able to discover the importance of fortifying this point, as the entire country in its immediate front was commanded by our own artillery and the guns of the fleet. But it was not for us to

— "Reason why

"T'was ours but to do and die."

and so the lamented Capt. Croft, I believe it was, received instructions to destroy the headstones and monuments in this ancient "Burial Acre," and to demolish the fences surrounding it lest the enemy should be protected, or our fire obstructed thereby. So unnecessary an act of vandalism excited great ridicule and disgust, and the order for its execution was never fully carried out.

On the 29th of December the regiment with other troops took part in an armed reconnoissance to Oakfield, a small settlement about five miles outside our lines, under the personal command of Gen. Dow. The enemy not being found there, and no *furniture* having been discovered, the "object of the expedition" was declared to have been "accomplished" and we returned to our quarters without important incidents.



## CHAPTER VI.

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DEATH OF LIEUT. FRENCH—SCOUTING AND ALARMS—SKIRMISH AT OAKFIELD—SANTA ROSA ISLAND—FORT PICKENS—EVACUATION OF PENSACOLA—BARRANCAS—CAMP ROBERTS—PICKET DUTY—CAPTURE OF PRISONERS AT PENSACOLA BY CAPT. YOUNG—ACCIDENT AT REDOUBT—YELLOW FEVER—REFUGEES AND DESERTERS—ARRIVAL OF GEN. ASBOTH.

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1863.

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Early in January Lieut. Henry H. French, of Company H, succumbed to an attack of fever, brought on by exposure and toil on the Vicksburg campaign, and on the 20th died. He scarcely was twenty-one years of age, but was ambitious and anxious to succeed in the profession which he had adopted, and apparently had a bright and useful career before him.

“ Death takes us by surprise,  
And stays our hurrying feet;  
The great design unfinished lies—  
Our lives are incomplete.”

His remains were sent to Vermont for interment.

About this time Major Porter was detailed on Staff duty in New Orleans, and as assistant Provost Marshal received much credit for his efficiency and ability.

During the months of January and the early part of February frequent scouting parties were sent out in the direction of Oakfield to keep track of the enemy's movements, and every night or two the "long roll" was sounded, and we were routed out to take position behind the stockade. On several occasions, during the day, we had sham fights, taking up different positions along the line of defences, so as to accustom the men to their duties in case of an attack. It was evident that Gen. Dow meant to be vigilant—a most essential quality in a soldier. But the frequency with which we were unnecessarily turned out at night, by false alarms, led us to think that such persistent and oft-repeated efforts to make the men prompt and watchful would have just the opposite effect. Fortunately, however, for our peace of mind at night, Gen. Dow, about the 23d of January, was ordered to New Orleans. Before leaving us he reviewed the entire command, and bade us an affectionate farewell, with the injunction: "Never allow yourselves to be surprised"—an admonition it would have been well for him had he heeded on the occasion of his capture. On the 17th of February Companies B and G, under Capt. Dutton, with some other troops, started on a scout. Just before reaching Oakfield they were attacked by a body of rebel cavalry, and quite a brisk skirmish ensued, which lasted some little time, but finally degenerated into a running fight, until Oakfield was reached, when the enemy precipitately retired. Probably

their retreat was not more rapid, however, than that executed by the chaplain of one of the Maine regiments and a clerical friend from our advance at the commencement of the combat. It seems these gentlemen "of the cloth" desired to accompany the expedition for the novelty of the experience, and so each had

" Buckled to his slender side  
The pistol and the simitar,"

resolved to perish, if need be, with the troops. Unfortunately, however, the first hostile shot came very close to the chaplain, who felt his valor suddenly oozing out, and thinking no doubt of the couplet,

" Those who fly may fight again,  
Which he can never do that's slain,"

"let out his last link" and without ado broke for our barricades, closely followed by his friend, neither of whom stopped until they were safely ensconced in camp, where they immediately spread the most ridiculous reports of the sanguinary character of the engagement, and of their "hairbreadth escape." Upon the strength of these statements reinforcements were about to be sent out when a courier came in with information which made that step unnecessary. The Chaplain was attired in a suit of black alpaca of an exceedingly bright and shining texture, and his account of the manner in which the bullets whistled about him without hitting his person, led to some speculations as to whether a ball fired from a rifle would penetrate alpaca, it being contended by some that the Chaplain's experience had demonstrated

that it would not, but on the contrary, that it would glance or fly off, from a substance so glossy, and some were inclined to the belief that his life was saved by his "outward apparel." Be this, however, as it may, the Chaplain was jocularly given the appellation of "Old Bomb-proof," by which title he was known as long as he remained in the command.

About the middle of February, orders were received to evacuate Pensacola. This was a wise and proper measure, as to hold the place quite a large force was required, and practically the same strategic results could be accomplished by removing the troops to Barrancas, which position was susceptible of being defended by a much smaller number. Besides at the latter point the Navy Yard at Warrenton and Wolsey could be much better protected. Pensacola harbor is very spacious, and its importance as a Naval Station alone made it necessary to keep a considerable number of troops stationed at and around the forts in the vicinity. The Navy Yard, although nearly destroyed by the rebels early in the war, was made the Headquarters of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, as a depot for coaling, fitting-out and repairing vessels. Consequently large supplies of naval stores of every description were accumulated there, which afforded a standing temptation to the rebels to attempt the capture of the place.

The entrance to the harbor was commanded by Fort Pickens, which is situated on the westerly extremity of Santa Rosa Island. On the 20th of February we were ordered to proceed to this fort, which we accordingly did, taking up our quarters outside of the fort in a camp which I named in

honor of Col. Stoughton, of the Fourth Vermont, under whom I first served. On the 22d of March Pensacola was wholly abandoned; and on the 28th of March, companies A, D and G were detailed for duty as artillerists in Fort Pickens which, up to that time, had been garrisoned by regulars of the First and Second Artillery, U. S. A. Several of these companies were ordered to report to Gen. Banks at New Orleans, and hence it became necessary to supply their places. While on Santa Rosa Island nothing of note occurred, unless the continual skirmish we were obliged to keep up with the fleas, is worthy of mention. At no place have I ever known these annoying insects so plentiful or voracious; and we all realized the truth of the lines—

“—— a flea  
Has smaller fleas that on him prey;  
And these have smaller still to bite 'em,  
And so increase *ad infinitum*.”

Rattlesnakes, and those of the “copperhead” breed, were also abundant, which did not at all add to our comfort.

On the 19th of June I was placed in command of the troops in West Florida, and I removed all of the regiment, except companies A, D and G, to Barrancas, where an attractive and pleasant encampment was formed, and which was called Camp Roberts, in memory of our lamented and gallant Colonel. My command (the honors of which I divided with Lieut.-Col. Peck), at that time consisted only of my own regiment and two regular companies of the Second U. S. Artillery. Afterward we were reinforced by two colored regiments and a company of the Fourteenth New

York Cavalry. About this time companies C and I were detailed to garrison Barrancas Redoubt, which was situated but a short distance from Fort Barrancas, then occupied by Capt. Larned's company of the Second U. S. Artillery. The balance of the regiment, when not performing picket duty, were kept employed drilling or in perfecting their knowledge in artillery exercises, which it was necessary they should be familiar with, as in repelling an attack we should have been obliged to rely mainly upon the batteries which we erected at different points. With so many of the companies detached, the duty of guarding properly the extended line we were obliged to protect was no light undertaking, and the labors of the men were consequently very arduous. A good deal of the time they were on the picket line every other day and night, and in the interim they were frequently compelled to work on the fortifications, as the rebels were quite active in our front and constantly threatening us with an attack. In order to follow their movements it was also necessary to send out scouting parties from time to time.

In response to my urgent request we were reinforced early in September by the 86th U. S. Colored Regiment, Col. Plumley commanding. Although his men were green and inexperienced they relieved us of a good deal of labor. But it was some little time before I deemed it safe to put them in dangerous or important points on the picket line. On the 6th of September I sent out a reconnoitering party under Capt. Mahlon M. Young and Lieut. Jackson V. Parker. The rebel cavalry were in the habit of riding into Pensacola with impunity and visiting one Morino the Spanish Counsel

who resided there, and who entertained them with much hospitality and from whom they obtained valuable information as to our strength and condition and as to the movements of the vessels of the fleet. Morino was accredited to our government, and when Pensacola was abandoned we offered him every facility to remove his Consulate within our lines, but being a native of Pensacola, and an arrant rebel, he preferred not to give up his residence there. His reasons for this were obvious. By remaining at Pensacola he was in a position to gain much important intelligence concerning our plans and contemplated operations which he could and did communicate to the enemy. I resolved, if possible, to put a stop to these illicit practices, or at all events to make it hazardous for the rebels to ride openly into the town. Capt. Young was accordingly directed to "lay low" for one of these junketing parties. On reaching the outskirts of Pensacola he concealed his command in the woods until after nightfall when he occupied one of the redoubts thrown up by Gen. Dow from which he was able to observe the approaches to the town without disclosing the presence of his command. The next morning he discovered a squad of the enemy's cavalry approaching, consisting of two officers and six enlisted men, who after examining the hollows and bushes and apparently satisfying themselves that there were no "Yanks" about rode directly by his place of concealment and proceeded to Morino's, where they dismounted and entered his house, without taking the precaution of throwing out a single picket. This enabled Capt. Young to surround the house and cut off all means of retreat, which was speedily done, whereupon he

suddenly appeared before the astonished rebels, and demanded their instant surrender. They offered no resistance, and were accordingly made prisoners. It seems, however, that one Capt. Wade, a naval swab, commanding a guard boat in the harbor, happened to be at the Consulate at the time under an illegitimate flag of truce, and at the instigation of Morino he was induced to protest against the apprehension of the rebels on the false theory that they too had entered the town under a flag of truce, and were consequently entitled to immunity from arrest. Capt. Young soon dispelled this illusion by pointing out that, before entering the town, the rebels had carefully surveyed the approaches, and *then* carried no flag of truce. Thereupon Morino bethought himself that he could secure their escape by claiming that they were protected by the flag of Spain, inasmuch as they were on the grounds of the Consulate when taken. Of course this was absurd, nevertheless Wade sided with Morino, and insisted that the rebels should be given up, and threatened to call a boat's crew to prevent their being taken away. He had tackled the wrong man however, for Capt. Young clung to and brought in his prisoners in spite of Wade's swagger. In a few days I received a communication from Morino, in which he claimed that the rebels should be released, and that to retain them would be a gross infraction of the "law of nations" and an insult to Spain, under whose flag they were harbored at the time of their capture, and stated that he had laid the matter before the Spanish Ambassador at Washington. A week or so later some cavalrymen appeared in front of our lines with a letter from Gen. Maury, Commander



of the Confederate forces at Mobile, wherein he peremptorily *demand*ed a return of the prisoners, on the ground that they bore a flag of truce and were "under the protection of the Spanish flag" when taken, and that their capture was therefore in violation of the rules of "civilized warfare." I positively refused to give up the captives, and informed both Morino and Gen. Maury that a Consular Agent accredited to the United States Government who persisted in remaining within the lines of its enemies, could give no protection to such enemies, and that his protests were entitled to no consideration whatever. I never again heard from either, nor did I ever learn that the Spanish Government considered either Capt. Young's act in taking, or mine in retaining the prisoners, as a *casus belli*. I had the satisfaction, however, of learning that open communications between Morino and the enemy ceased from that time.

The affair greatly exasperated Col. Maury, a cavalry officer and the leader of the rebel forces in our immediate front, and he sent in word through Widow Nix (the charms of whose daughters may still linger pleasantly in the memories of many), that he intended to "gobble" from us double the number taken by Capt. Young by way of retaliation, and that as to any negroes that should fall into his hands he would "flay them alive." In execution of his threats, he at once commenced a series of night attacks upon our outposts, several of which he endeavored to capture without success. Many were the nights that we stood to our guns expecting something more serious than an attempt to drive in our pickets, as it was well known that Maury's command greatly out-

numbered our small force. These assaults made it necessary for the pickets to be extremely vigilant, and the colored troops, who were inexperienced in such service, sometimes allowed their imagination to get the better of their prudence. An amusing incident occurred in this connection. Our picket line ran along a bayou, the shores of which were heavily wooded, and which, except at the mouth, could not be crossed save in boats or on pontoons. Two mortar schooners armed with old-fashioned 32-pounders and 10-inch mortars were anchored a short distance from the mouth of the bayou, and commanded the ford there situated, and from which position shell could be thrown some distance up the lagoon. At the principal picket stations a quantity of pine knots had been accumulated, which it was designed should be ignited in case of an attack as signals, so as to disclose the enemy's position in order that the commanders of the schooners might shell or rake the approaches with grape and canister as circumstances would admit. These stations at the time were all held by colored troops. One very dark night a small party of guerillas fired across the bayou at some of the men at one of these posts, who fancying that a formidable assault was contemplated set off the signal fires, whereupon the schooners opened an indiscriminate fire, which was kept up for some minutes. The din only added to the confusion of the darkies, who finally took leg-bail for camp. Of course we supposed at headquarters that the rebels must be attempting to cross the bayou in force and that a severe contest was imminent. I dispatched Adjut. Sheldon to ascertain the point and character of the attack,

and made such disposition of the troops in camp as seemed to be best. In the meantime one or two of the fleetest of the pickets had come in and I ascertained that they had seen none of the enemy crossing, or even attempting to cross the bayou, and that but three or four shots had been fired at them. They also stated that the signal fires had been lighted that they might see "who fired dose shot." This explained everything, and the officer of the day having re-established the picket line, we retired to our quarters, amused in spite of ourselves at the ridiculous *contretemps* of our "colored brethren."

On the 10th of September a serious accident occurred at the redoubt by the premature discharge of an eight inch sea coast howitzer. Our picket line had been fired into several times from the woods in front of this fort and I thought it desirable that the gunners should get the exact range of the edge of the woods at different points. A detachment from Company I was serving the gun. The catastrophe occurred in my presence and was occasioned by the carelessness of the corporal, in charge of the detail, whose duty it was to properly thumb the vent. This he did not do and by his negligence lost the middle finger of his right hand. Private Robert Ripley of Company I, had his right arm blown off and sustained other injuries from which he died within a few days, and Private James B. Royce was blown into the air and picked up for dead. To the surprise of every one, however, he revived and is now living, being in the service of the government in the Paymaster General's office at Washington. His left arm was badly shattered, being broken four times,

which it subsequently became necessary to amputate near the shoulder. He was also badly burned and bruised about the face and head, so much so that he was blind for several weeks, and has never fully recovered either his eyesight or hearing.

About the 1st of September a case of yellow fever was reported on a vessel lying in the harbor, which had recently arrived from an infected port. Shortly afterward a few sporadic cases occurred at Warrenton and Wolsey, and I at once determined to take every precaution, to prevent the epidemic from getting a foothold in our camps. After consulting with Dr. Blanchard and the other physicians, and with Major Allen of the Second U. S. Artillery, commandant of Fort Pickens, who had been through several seasons of the fever in Mexico and other Southern stations, we decided to establish a line of guards midway between our camp and Warrenton and Wolsey to prevent all intercourse and communication; and orders were issued that none of our men from the one direction, and none of the sailors, marines or citizens from the other, should be allowed to pass this line except upon passes signed by me personally. At the same time the police and sanitary regulations were rigorously enforced. So strictly was this blockade kept that we had not to exceed a dozen cases of the fever all told, and but two of which proved fatal, although at the Navy Yard, and in Warrenton and Wolsey (some two and a half miles distant), the fever raged for over two months, and after the first two or three weeks assumed a very malignant and fatal

form. I have forgotten the exact rate of mortality, but remember that the percentage was uncommonly large. The first one to be stricken with the disease in the army was Corporal Lucius O. Wilkins of company B, who was at once removed to a vacant house outside of our lines, where he died, Nov. 5th. The next to follow was Lieut. Rollin M. Green of company H, who was taken sick on November 15th and died November 17th in our regimental hospital at Barrancas. As soon as it was discovered that he was unmistakably affected with yellow fever, prompt measures were taken to prevent the other occupants of the hospital from becoming infected with the disease. All the efforts of Dr. Blanchard and his devoted wife, who fearlessly attended and nursed the dying Lieutenant during the last twenty-four hours of his life, were unavailing. He died about nine o'clock in the evening, and as an additional precaution, was buried in the Marine Cemetery about midnight by a few of the officers of the regiment. Lieut. Green was a courageous and efficient officer. No man held the honor of the regiment in higher esteem, and no one displayed greater alacrity than he to vindicate it when assailed. He rose from the ranks and won his several promotions by meritorious and gallant conduct.

“—— Formed on the good old plan,  
A true and brave and downright honest man.”

In spite of the care taken to check the spread of the fever it reappeared within a few days, whereupon Dr. Blanchard established a pest hospital at the house outside our lines,

where Corporal Wilkins died, to which all patients attacked by the malady were instantly removed. We were fortunate in being able to ward off the disease as long as we did. Within a short time after Lieut. Green was taken sick we were visited by slight frosts which had a tendency to greatly mitigate the virulence of the fever, so that the cases in the army, except the two I have mentioned, were of a mild type. Although the quarantine hospital, where many cases were treated, was established on Santa Rosa Island, some three miles from Fort Pickens, no cases occurred at the latter post. The same system of non-intercourse that we adopted being there enforced by Major Allen. The yellow fever greatly interfered with our comfort and pleasures. During the prevalence of the epidemic we were practically shut off from all communication with the outside world. No vessels were allowed to enter the port, and we got no regular mails or supplies. We could not safely fraternize with our naval friends; and our Saturday night meetings, dedicated in conformity to an old custom in the navy—"to sweethearts and wives"—had to be abandoned, and altogether we had a most lugubrious experience.

About this time a great many refugees and deserters came in and sought our protection. The conscript laws of the Confederacy were then being stringently enforced, and all males who could shoulder a musket were impressed into the service. Most of the deserters had been conscripted and forced into the army against their will. The refugees, on the other hand, were, as a rule, composed of the "poor white

trash," or "Florida Crackers," who ran away to escape conscription, and generally were an ignorant, lazy and worthless lot. As these fugitives accumulated they formed quite a large camp, and it became something of a problem to decide what to do with them.

On the 7th of November I was relieved by Brig.-Gen. A. Asboth, who assigned me to the command of the First Brigade, which then consisted of the undetached companies of my own regiment commanded by Lieut.-Col. Peck, and two colored regiments. It was supposed, however, that a considerable body of troops would soon rendezvous at Barrancas and Pensacola to co-operate with Admiral Farragut in the meditated attack upon Mobile, and we began to flatter ourselves that we were soon to see more active service. But our expectations of participating in an attack upon Mobile were not to be immediately realized. Soon after Gen. Asboth's arrival he set about utilizing the deserters and refugees, by attempting to form a regiment of cavalry from among their number. Adjutant Sheldon of the Seventh, who had seen service in the regular artillery, was also authorized to recruit and organize a light battery, and I believe secured men enough to man four guns. It was not altogether safe, however, to rely too much upon troops made up from such an element. They were not entirely loyal, and hence were unreliable and untrustworthy.

Gen. Asboth was a Hungarian by birth and a compatriot of Kossuth's, and came to this country with him. He was a brave man, but rash and injudicious, and, like many other

officers of foreign extraction, was prone to expose his men, and sacrifice their lives unnecessarily. Still he never asked his troops to go where he was not willing to lead. He was very fond of dogs and horses, and had a half-dozen or more of each.





## CHAPTER VII.

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COMBAT AT JACKSON'S BRIDGE—CAPTURE OF LIEUT. ROSS—  
ARRIVAL OF RECRUITS—RE-ENLISTMENT OF REGIMENT—  
COMBAT NEAR NIX'S CLEARING—ORDER FOR VET-  
ERAN FURLOUGH—ACTION AT GONZALES STA-  
TION—RETURN TO VERMONT AND RECEP-  
TION AT BRATTLEBORO—ACTION AT  
MARIANA, DEATH OF CAPT.  
YOUNG—RETURN TO NEW  
ORLEANS.

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1864.

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ON the 25th of January, I crossed the bayou with three companies of my regiment and about twenty men of the Fourteenth N. Y. Cavalry for the purpose of securing a quantity of lumber which we needed. Leaving the infantry at the head of the bayou to get the lumber, I started with the cavalry accompanied by Capt. Young and Lieut. George Brown of the Seventh, on a scouting and foraging expedition. After scouring the country for several hours we returned to Jackson's Bridge, which crosses a small run on the direct road to Pensacola, where we halted to water our horses and eat dinner. We had dismounted and had just begun our repast, when

several stray shots were fired in quick succession, and directly our vedettes came dashing in at a gallop, closely followed by several gray-backs. We had barely time to mount and wheel into position before we saw the rebels coming down upon us at the charge. It was impossible to tell what their force was, but as we were both about the same distance from the bridge I knew if the heads of column struck there we stood a pretty good show, even though they outnumbered us, as our men were the best armed and mounted, so I gave the order to charge, instructing the men to yell as loud as possible, and we bore down upon our opponent with much style. At this they discharged their pistols and carbines, killing one horse and slightly wounding one of our men, and then took to their heels. We pursued them about a mile capturing a lieutenant and nine enlisted men. Two rebels were wounded. Capt. Young and Lieut. Brown behaved very handsomely and with their accustomed gallantry. This following so closely upon the capture by Capt. Young at Pensacola exasperated our friend Maury still more, and he sent us word that the next time we "took a gallop" outside of our lines we would meet with more formidable opposition.

On the 27th of January, Lieut. George Ross of B Company, was ordered by Gen. Asboth to proceed with a detail from his company to Point Washington, at the head of Choctawotchie Bay, to protect and forward refugees wishing to enter our lines and enlist in our army, and he accordingly embarked on the schooner "Sarah Breeze" with seventeen men for his destination. From Point Washington he advanced about twenty-five miles inland, where he

struck and surprised a camp of rebel infantry, capturing three officers and forty privates, besides one or two army wagons. This company, it seems, had been stationed there to prevent refugees and deserters escaping to our lines. In trying to bring in his prisoners and plunder he was unable to make as rapid progress as he otherwise would, and before he could get back to his starting point he was overtaken and in turn surprised by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry and after a stubborn resistance was captured with eleven of his men and all his prisoners. It was reported at the time that several rebels were killed and wounded before Lieut. Ross was overpowered. He was a plucky officer and if he had a chance I have no doubt he made a stout fight, before giving up. A few days later all of his men not taken prisoners reached our lines in safety.

On the 13th of February, Lieut. Frank N. Finney of D Company returned from Vermont with 110 recruits which we were very glad to receive.

During the same month all of the enlisted men of the regiment remaining from those originally mustered in, except fifty-eight, re-enlisted for three years further service, or for the war, the War Department having previously decided that the original term of service of the regiment would expire June 1st, 1864. By the provisions of this order the re-enlisted men were entitled to return to Vermont early in April for a furlough of thirty days. But owing to a series of vexatious delays we were not able to embark until August 10th. From the time of the re-enlistment the regiment was authorized to assume, and

was afterwards known, by the name of the Seventh Regiment Vermont Veteran Volunteers.

On the 19th of February a serious conflagration took place at Pensacola, over one-half of the town being burned to the ground. The next day a scouting party was sent there to ascertain the origin of the fire. But we never knew certainly how or by whom it was caused. About this time we were ordered to participate in the Red River Campaign under Gen. Banks. Happily transportation arrived too late, and we escaped being mixed up in *that* stupendous "cotton raid."

On the 2d of April Gen. Asboth received word through widow Nix that some of Col. Maury's men were at her house, and he accordingly sent out Capt. Schmidt with his entire troop of horse to capture them. In a short time heavy firing was heard across the bayou, and all of the Seventh in camp was ordered to the rescue at double quick. Before we could reach the scene of action the fighting was over. But we found that a serious combat had taken place near Nix's clearing between Schmidt's company and a battalion of rebel cavalry, in which the former had been successful. His first-lieutenant, Mr. Lenike, a very gallant fellow, whom I am informed was killed in the late Franco-Prussian War, was wounded, and several of his men, while the rebel loss was two killed and ten wounded.

On the 18th of May G Company was detailed to relieve Capt. Larned's company of the Second U. S. Artillery at Fort Barrancas, and K Company was detailed to relieve Major Allen's company of regulars at Fort Pickens, which left but four companies of the Seventh in camp.

About this time rumors reached us that a combined attack was to be made on the Navy Yard by a land force under Maury and by the ram "Tennessee," then lying in Mobile Bay. This vessel, which was subsequently surrendered to Farragut, was probably the most formidable ironclad the Confederacy ever had, and if her commander had run successfully the gauntlet of our fleet he would have given us very serious trouble. In anticipation of such an attack a water battery, mounted with 11 and 15-inch guns, was constructed on the end of Santa Rosa Island by Companies D, F and K, so as to command the channel; while, on the Barrancas side, we made additional defences to meet any attack from that direction. Every few nights there was picket firing, and we were frequently under arms all night. In the meantime Farragut's preparations for an attack upon Forts Morgan and Gaines, at the entrance to Mobile Bay, were being pushed steadily forward. Neither were the rebels idle. They were constantly strengthening their position, Reinforcements for the garrisons and additional supplies were being brought from the interior, most of which passed over the railroad running from Pollard, and beyond, to Mobile. Gen. Asboth conceived a scheme for destroying this road, and thus cutting off this important line of communication. His idea was a good one, but, unfortunately, we had not a sufficient force to carry it into effect. Nevertheless he resolved to attempt its execution. Accordingly an expedition was fitted out consisting of the following troops to wit: Four companies of the Seventh, (A, B, E and H,) Schmidt's New York Cavalry, First Florida Cavalry, Eighty-third

and Eighty-sixth U. S. Colored Regiments and two mountain howitzers, commanded by Adj. Sheldon, and which for want of horses were dragged by mules and denominated by ways of pleasantry "Sheldon's Mule Battery." On the afternoon of July 21st, we left Barrancas with Schmidt's cavalry in advance, followed by our four companies and Sheldon's guns, the other troops bringing up the rear. We were informed that a considerable force of the enemy was intrenched at Gonzales Station (or as it is sometimes called the "Fifteen Mile House," that being its distance from Pensacola), whom we hoped to surprise, and our march was, therefore, so timed as to reach that point early in the morning. This we accomplished, that is to say we struck their outposts a little before daylight, and were soon engaged in an exceedingly lively skirmish. Deploying a portion of the Seventh I was directed to take charge of the right of the line and push forward as rapidly as possible. The enemy, however, contested our advance very stubbornly and it was some little time before we reached the clearing in front of their fortifications, which I soon perceived consisted of a square redoubt crudely made up of logs and earth. It nevertheless afforded protection to their riflemen and as an attempt to carry it by assault might cost several lives, I deemed it best to first try the effect of a few shells. Accordingly Sheldon brought up his howitzers and with remarkable precision landed a half-dozen rounds of spherical shot directly in the fort which caused no little confusion, whereupon Capts. Darwin A. Smalley and John L. Moseley of A and E companies respectively, with a portion of the Seventh, very gallantly led an assault across the clear-

ing, and before the rebels could do more than discharge a couple of volleys, they were over their works and among them which led to a hasty and headlong retreat on their part. They did not effect their escape, however, until several of their number were taken prisoners. In the meantime, heavy skirmishing was going on in front of Gen. Asboth in the centre and on the left of the line, but on the fall of their fort the rebels gave way, and after being pursued for some distance by our cavalry, finally, in consequence of the thick woods, eluded capture. Several men were killed and wounded on both sides, but I don't recall the number. It was evident that the enemy under-estimated our force, indeed we were informed by the prisoners that they supposed, until we opened with artillery, that the attack was from but a small portion of our cavalry. In the haste of their flight the rebels left us a very good breakfast of "corndodgers" and bacon. Although this affair can hardly be called a battle, yet for over an hour the officers and men of the Seventh were exposed to a severe musketry fire. No troops could have behaved better than they did, and all alike were entitled to, and received from Gen. Asboth much praise for their steadiness and intrepidity. After a rest of several hours we again resumed our march in the order I have stated, and had pushed forward some ten miles when a deserter from the enemy came in and informed Gen. Asboth that Col. Maury with a force of four thousand men was marching toward us with a view to cutting off our retreat and was only five or six miles distant. We received this intelligence about dark. A hasty consultation was held and it was decided to retreat, as Maury's force largely

outnumbered ours, besides we were not sure how the Florida battalion would behave in a pitched battle. Accordingly we faced about and started for Barrancas, marching all night. A hard rain storm set in, which somewhat impeded our progress, but which fortunately, as it turned out, saved us from a severe action, if not from capture, for Maury was nearer to us than was reported, but owing to the heavy rain all traces of our return were obliterated and it was not until sometime in the following forenoon that he discovered our retreat. It was then too late to overtake us, as we were within a short distance of our lines. We reached camp with our prisoners on the morning of the 24th pretty well jaded and worn, having marched over fifty miles since our departure.

On the 4th of August Gen. Gordon Granger, under the cover of Farragut's guns, landed with a small force on Dauphine Island, at the eastern extremity of which Fort Gaines is situated, for the purpose of participating in the contemplated attack upon that fort by the fleet; and on the same day Farragut wrote to his wife as follows: "I am going into Mobile Bay in the morning, if God is my leader, as I hope he is. \* \* \* If he thinks it is the proper place for me to die, I am ready to submit to his will." The next morning he fought that most brilliant of all his many memorable and successful naval encounters, the battle of Mobile Bay. Although thirty miles distant we could distinctly hear the roar of the guns. On the 7th of August Fort Gaines surrendered, and Gen. Granger transferred his force to Mobile Point and invested Fort Morgan. We were momentarily



expecting orders to join him, but in the meantime the steamer Hudson arrived to convey us north on our long-looked-for furlough, and on the 10th of August, leaving the recruits behind, we left Barrancas and Fort Pickens, and for the first time in nearly two and a half years turned our faces homeward. Just before our departure the following order was issued by Gen. Asboth :

“HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST FLORIDA,  
BARRANCAS, FLA., Aug. 9th, 1864.

“Special Order No. 184.

“The Seventh Vermont Veteran Volunteers being about  
“ to leave this District, the General commanding considers  
“ it his pleasant duty to express his full appreciation of the  
“ good order and *discipline* always maintained, and the ef-  
“ ficient service constantly rendered by them, not only as  
“ infantry at their several posts and in the field, but also  
“ most conspicuously as artillerists at the important forts of  
“ Pickens and Barrancas. The departure of this Veteran  
“ Regiment becomes thus a severe loss to this command,  
“ and the best wishes and warmest thanks of the General  
“ commanding follow their gallant commander, Col. W. C.  
“ Holbrook, and all the brave officers and men to their homes  
“ and wherever duty calls them. May we meet again in  
“ better days for our beloved and common country, the great  
“ Republic of the World.

“ (Signed), ASBOTH,  
“ *Brig. Gen. Commanding.*”

The steamer Hudson must have been built about the time of the Ark, for a slower boat could not well have been found. Notwithstanding we had the Gulf-stream with us we were ten days in reaching Fortress Monroe where we were obliged to stop for coal. On reporting our arrival and making known our wishes for a sufficient quantity of coal to enable us to reach New York, an adolescent surgeon, representing the Health Department, was sent on board to ascertain whether there were any cases of yellow fever. On learning that we had come from the port of Pensacola he said it would be necessary for us to proceed at once to the quarantine station some miles distant, where he proposed to keep us for thirty days. In vain did we protest that there was no infectious sickness among the men, and that we had simply touched there long enough to get a few tons of coal, and that to detain a regiment of men aboard ship so long would surely bring on sickness in some form. This nincompoop of a doctor was deaf to all reason however, and directed that we proceed at once to quarantine, saying that if we wished to proceed on our course it would be necessary to obtain an order from the Post Commander. Fortunately, the Post Quartermaster, in compliance with our requisition, had sent a couple of barges laden with coal alongside the Hudson before the doctor came aboard, and upon his arrival we were actually engaged transferring the coal to our ship. This work we were allowed to finish. In the meantime I made a written application to the Commandant of the Post, setting forth the orders I had received from the quarantine physician and the circumstances of the case, and asked

for leave to go to sea forthwith. To my great surprise I shortly received a communication in reply, that my application would be forwarded to Washington for the action of the authorities there, but that "in the meantime the directions of the Health Officer must be complied with." We began to think that the spirit of Butlerism (for we were then, I believe, within the limits of Gen. Butler's command) was still abroad. But, as the saying is, "where there's a will there's a way," and we determined to sail for New York that very night, the orders of the Health Officer and Post Commandant to the contrary notwithstanding. So, as soon as we had taken aboard enough coal for the trip, the captain of the Hudson was instructed to drop down to Quarantine and there come to anchor, banking his fires. While this was being done, that I might not be guilty of direct disobedience of orders (the orders having been given to me personally), I went on the sick list, having been ill for some time, and Lieut.-Col. Peck assumed command. As soon as it became dark Col. Peck directed the captain to proceed on his voyage. Accordingly anchor was weighed, and we were soon out of Hampton Roads and on our course to New York, where we safely arrived some three or four days later. In exculpation of the officers of the regiment for not serving out the full period of quarantine probation prescribed as above, an amusing letter appeared in one of the New York papers, written by Col. Plumley, of the Eighty-Sixth U. S. Colored Regiment, who made the trip with us from Pensacola, wherein he undertook to demonstrate that the Hudson, through no fault of any one, actually dragged her anchor all the way from

Fortress Monroe to New York. Whether the Commandant of the Post, or the Health Officer who had compassed our detention, and to whom copies of this effusion were sent, placed any credence in the reasons thus given for our sudden departure from their jurisdiction I do not know. But all apprehensions of any trouble which they might make were dispelled three weeks later, by the return to me at Brattleboro of my application for leave, beautifully decorated with red ink and favorable endorsements from the Adjutant-General of the Army down to the Commandant of the Post, whereby we were graciously given permission to complete our voyage. We arrived at Brattleboro August 26th, where we were most handsomely received by His Excellency Gov. Smith and the citizens of the town, who had provided for us a fine collation, which, it is needless to say, was heartily enjoyed. The next day the re-enlisted men of the regiment were furloughed for thirty days, and the non-re-enlisted men were mustered out of the service.

To be again among our kindred and friends after the severe experiences through which we had passed, was peculiarly delightful. And yet there was much in this happy reunion which brought back many sad and painful memories. Of the comrades who left the State with us in March, 1862, we had buried on the banks of the Mississippi, in Florida, and at sea, over 350, and had discharged for disability upwards of 200 more. To a large number, therefore, the recollections recalled by the return of the survivors of the regiment was tinged with deep sorrow.

“ We welcome back our bravest and our best ;  
Ah me ! not all ! some come not with the rest,  
Who went forth brave and bright as any here.”

On September 13th, Lieut. John Q. Dickinson, who for some time had acted as regimental Quartermaster, was commissioned as such. He discharged the duties of that office, which were by no means light, very acceptably to the regiment and with much fidelity and ability. He was subsequently made Captain of Company F, and was honorably discharged for disability October 10th, 1865. Upon leaving the service, like many other of the Union soldiers, he elected to cast his lot with the people of the South. For a time he was engaged in the lumber business in Florida in partnership with Col. D. B. Peck. But after a little they relinquished that business and Col. Peck returned to the North. Capt. Dickinson, however, remained in Florida, and entered somewhat into politics, and finally secured a public office at Mariana, I believe. He was an educated gentleman, and a facile and pleasing writer. In disposition he was as agreeable as he was amiable, and was the last against whom it would be expected that any one would harbor harsh or hostile feelings. Nevertheless, it seems that his superior attainments did occasion much hatred and jealousy on the part of the Floridians of the neighborhood, who wanted no "Yankees" to administer their affairs, or to hold office in their State. A trifling newspaper article, or something of the kind, was seized upon as a pretext to inform Mr. Dickinson that his presence was not wanted at Mariana, and accordingly a notice, emanating from that most fiendish and hellish of all organizations, the Ku Klux Klan, was served upon him in due form, whereby he was warned to depart under the penalty of death. To this threat he paid no attention.

His friends, however, were so apprehensive of the great danger he incurred, that they entreated him not to let it pass unheeded, and urged him to return home. But he was not willing to retire, as he expressed it, "in the face of the enemy," and would not have it said that he had been driven from his post by any such menaces, and he determined to remain where he was, notwithstanding he received two or three subsequent warnings that his life would surely be taken if he did not depart. Finally, one evening, after he had closed his office, a message was sent to his house that he was wanted there on important business. Not suspecting danger he started to comply with this request. It was then dark. Shortly the report of guns was heard. Either that evening, or the following morning, his dead body was found beside the road riddled with bullets. He was murdered by the Ku Klux. His remains were sent home, and on their arrival at New York a meeting of a few of his old comrades and friends was held, at which appropriate resolutions were passed. Although he escaped the rebel balls on more than one battle field, he at last fell a victim to rebel hate, which was as unrelenting for years after the war as it was during its progress. He believed that every man was privileged to reside where he pleased, and that, in the South as well as at the North, the right of free speech was not to be abridged or taken away. In seeking to maintain these principles of liberty he died. He was as much a martyr as though he had fallen in full armor, and in the thickest of the fray.

While we were on furlough it was proposed by the State officials to present the regiment with a new stand of colors

and on the 22d of September I received a communication from Governor Smith's secretary asking me to select a day for the presentation. To this I replied to the Governor substantially as follows: "I would respectfully request that the regiment be allowed to retain and carry back to the seat of war the colors that have been identified with its history ever since its organization. To receive from the State a token of confidence and trust in our ability to maintain and support the proud name she has always borne, would indeed be a high honor. But, owing to circumstances well known to your Excellency and the people of the State, all connected with the regiment have peculiar and delicate feelings regarding the old colors, and I cannot but think that it would be more gratifying to all the officers and men to return to the field with them than to bear a new stand."

In accordance with our wishes we were allowed to retain our old colors, which remained with the regiment until it was finally disbanded in March, 1866.

On the 27th of September the regiment re-assembled at Brattleboro, and on the 30th again departed, for the Department of the Gulf. We arrived at New York October 1st, and on the 4th embarked on the steamer "Cassandra" for New Orleans, which city we reached on the 13th, and immediately took up our quarters in a cotton press on Annunciation Square.

On our arrival at New Orleans we received intelligence of the death of Capt. Young. This gallant officer had been left at Barrancas in charge of the recruits on the occasion of the departure of the regiment for its veteran furlough, he having

previously been in Vermont on recruiting service. It seems Gen. Asboth learned that a body of rebels had established their headquarters at Mariana with a view to intercepting refugees and fugitives desirous of entering our lines, and he consequently determined to break them up. Accordingly he fitted out an expedition composed of all the available troops he had. Capt. Young was invited to accompany him as Chief of Staff, which invitation he accepted. On reaching Mariana it was found that the enemy was there in considerable force, and had barricaded the streets and were waiting for the attack. It turned out afterwards that nearly every man, woman and child in the place was armed with some kind of a weapon, the bulk of them having double barreled shot-guns loaded with buckshot and slugs. With his usual rashness Gen. Asboth ordered an assault instead of first making use of his artillery. At the word of command a detachment of the First Florida Cavalry and some of the colored troops attempted to escalate and capture the barricades, but they were met with such a murderous fire that they fell back in considerable disorder and were thereupon quickly rallied by Capt. Young, who, with Gen. Asboth and some fresh troops, led a second assault. The fire they encountered was even more severe than that from which the first assailing column had recoiled, but they pressed forward into the town where Capt. Young fell dead from nearly a dozen buckshot and other wounds. About this time too, Gen. Asboth was carried to the rear severely wounded in the face and left arm. Col. Zulavsky, of the 86th U. S. Colored Regiment, who succeeded to the command, has since told me that the



slaughter of our men was very much greater than was necessary. That had the artillery been used in the first instance in all probability but few if any lives would have been lost. That the point selected for the assault was more effectually barricaded than any other part of the town, and was surrounded by buildings, from the windows of which the rebels were able to direct a withering fire upon our columns as they came up the streets, which they could not effectually reply to. That Capt. Young fell at the head of the charge, very close to the obstructions which checked their advance. From this position the rebels fell back to a church and there opened a galling fire upon our men. It became necessary to burn the church to dislodge the enemy, several of whom were burned, and the balance, after a severe contest were taken prisoners. A large number of men were killed and wounded and the rebel loss was equally heavy. I doubt if a more desperate defence, according to the number engaged, was made during the war. than that at Mariana. Capt. Young was buried there with the dead of both sides, including those who died from burns, as well as those who perished by the sword and bullet. It has been said "that in the place where the tree falleth, there it should lie." From a soldier's standpoint there could be no more fitting place for Capt. Young to lie than the spot where he fell.

" Silent he lies on the broad path of glory,  
Where withers ungarnered the red crop of war,  
Grand is his couch, tho' the pillows are gory  
Mid forms that shall battle, mid guns that shall rattle  
No more."

Capt. Young was a fine specimen of the volunteer soldier. Always cool and collected, his advice was invariably sound and valuable. He was courageous as a lion and was ever ready to go wherever he felt his duty called him. Left to himself he would never have been guilty of so reckless an act as to charge into the barricaded streets of Mariana until he had exhausted all other expedients, but when the order was once given to execute that most unwise movement, I am confident that no man was more prompt than Capt. Young to see that it was obeyed and fully carried out.

The following brief sketch of Capt. Young has been kindly furnished me by Col. Samuel E. Pingree of Hartford, Vt., late of the Third Vermont Volunteers, and who, it is well known, was himself a most distinguished officer.

Mahlon Miner Young was a son of Jacob and Lucy Neal Young, and was born at Royalton, Vt., A. D., 1841. His father soon afterwards moved to Hartford, Vt. Mahlon enjoyed the ordinary common school opportunities (found in one of the back districts) and was accounted a bright boy and a good scholar for the chances he had. He worked at farm labor after attaining suitable size and strength, until a year or so before the war and then sought and found employment in a chair factory at Hartford Village until the outbreak of the Rebellion, when at nineteen years of age he volunteered as a private in Company B, First Vermont Volunteer infantry, and accompanied that regiment during its three months term of service. Shortly after his return to Vermont he was authorized to recruit a company for the Seventh at and in the vicinity of

Woodstock. He was made Captain of H Company, and went to Ship Island with his regiment in March 1862. In 1864 he returned to Vermont on recruiting service, and while there married Esther Gould of Tunbridge, Vt. On his return South he served in Florida until his honorable and heroic death on the battlefield at Mariana, September 27th, 1864.

Capt. Young, as will be seen by the above sketch, was a very young man when he entered the service. Like so many of the youth who rushed to the war, he was inspired with the spirit embodied in the following lines of an old author :

“Arouse the youth—it is no human call—  
Our country’s ’leagured—haste to man the wall ;  
Haste where the—banner waves on high.  
Signal of honored death, or victory.”

As Col. Pingree well says, he met with an “honorable and heroic death,” although he did not live to see the final victory. Gen. Asboth never fully recovered from the wounds he received at Mariana ; at the close of the war he was appointed Minister to one of the South American States, and died, I believe, somewhere in Brazil ; his death being accelerated from a fresh breaking out of the wounds he received in this action.

While stationed at Annunciation Square, the regiment was employed principally in performing guard duty. We had not enough space to indulge much in battalion drill, but company drills were gone through with every day, and we also drilled extensively in Street manœuvres and firing. Quite

a number of the officers were detailed for duty on Military Commissions and Courts Martial.

At this time the Department of the Gulf formed a part of the "Military Division of West Mississippi," which was commanded by Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby, a regular officer, and one of the most discreet, accomplished and courageous soldiers in the army. His headquarters were at New Orleans. We were shortly destined, under his leadership, to participate in the Mobile campaign, which resulted in the capture of the city of Mobile, and led to the surrender of Gen. Richard Taylor's army, the third largest in size in the Confederacy.



## CHAPTER VIII.

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DEPARTURE FOR MOBILE POINT—MOBILE CAMPAIGN—MARCH  
TO AND INVESTMENT OF SPANISH FORT—CAPTURE OF  
CAPT. STEARNS AND PICKETS—OPERATIONS AND TER-  
MINATION OF SIEGE—INCIDENTS—BLAKELY  
—OCCUPATION OF MOBILE—ACTION AT  
WHISTLER — MARCH TO M'INTOSH  
BLUFFS—SURRENDER OF TAYLOR'S  
ARMY—RETURN TO MOBILE.

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1865.

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GEN. C. C. ANDREWS, in his history of the Campaign of Mobile,\* says that “Early in January it was decided that operations should be undertaken against Mobile but the plan was not arranged until some time afterwards. \* \* \* Canby’s movable forces had lately been organized into brigades of the Reserve Corps of the Military Division of the West Mississippi, and consisted of about ten thousand men. Subsequently other troops were added, and this Reserve Corps was merged into and organized as the Thirteenth Army Corps, comprising three divisions, of which Major-General Gordon Granger was given the command. The troops constituting this corps were all veterans.”

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\* History of the Campaign of Mobile, by Brevet Maj. Gen. C. C. Andrews, late commanding 2d Division, 13th Army Corps.

On the 19th of February we received orders to embark on the steamer "Clinton" and report to Gen. Granger at Mobile Point. We arrived there on the 21st and were assigned to Brig.-Gen. Benton's Division of the 13th Corps. This point of land is situated at the entrance to Mobile Bay, and forms a long, low peninsular of white sand as destitute of verdure and as bleak and barren as Ship Island itself, to which it bears a close resemblance. Here we were stationed for three weeks, living under shelter tents, and subsisting upon exceedingly "short commons." Gen. Canby's theory was that efficiency and mobility would be secured by rejecting everything not essential to field service, and he accordingly issued an order, for the campaign, that clothing should be limited to the suit the soldier had on, and a change of under garments and an extra pair of shoes; that coats should not be issued when blouses could be supplied; that camp equipage should be reduced to the *lowest possible* limit, and that shelter tents only would be issued; that all cumbrous articles should be left behind; that the equipment of officers should correspond to that of the men, and everything in excess of the established allowance was to be rejected by the inspectors. Subsistence also was to be limited to the essential articles of bread and meat, and a reduced amount of small rations, and when obtainable, "bacon and hard tack," were to be given the preference. The troops also were "habitually" to have on hand three days cooked rations "so as to be in readiness to move at any moment." With such a bill of fare, and under such a programme it will be seen that we did not "riot in

sumptuous living," nor was it possible to obtain any luxuries. Sutlers, those wonderful purveyors of small comforts, were rigidly interdicted, consequently all dainties from that source were cut off, and so we were brought down to the rugged realities of "glorious war." We had experienced, it is true, greater deprivations and hardships before, but still we did not find "camping out" under such circumstances altogether agreeable. The periodical February and March storms were not at all conducive to a comfortable life under shelter tents, located as ours were, upon a promontory, across which the breezes had a purchase in every direction, nor did the continuous rains add to the felicities of the occasion. When, therefore, marching orders were received there were none who regretted leaving Mobile Point.

Gen. Andrews in speaking of the plan of operations says :  
" The fortifications around Mobile were so strong that a  
" direct movement on the place from the western shore would  
" have encountered unequal resistance, and involved a pro-  
" tracted siege. It was therefore determined to flank them.  
" The base would be fixed on the eastern shore, and the  
" main army moving upon that shore, with the aid of the  
" navy, would carry the forts on the islands and mainland,  
" and then approach Mobile by the Tensas river or one of the  
" channels coming in above. On this plan a large portion  
" of the troops and supplies could be moved by water into  
" Fish-river, affording a secure base within twenty miles of  
" Spanish fort. \* \* \* If the reduction of the eastern  
" shore defences demanded too long a time, then the army  
" would pass them, move on to Montgomery—*which was*

“ *really the objective point*—leaving Mobile to fall in due time by these indirect operations.”

We broke camp early in the morning of March 17th; Gen. Andrews thus describes our march: \* \* \* “The movement [*i. e.*, the opening of operations] was commenced by Benton’s Division, 13th Corps. The first day they marched nine miles along the peninsular and went into camp in an open pine forest. On the 18th they marched thirteen miles on a good road, over a natural shell bank, and camped at 3 P. M. on Bayou Portage. On the 19th the unreliable and swampy character of the ground disclosed itself, the firm-appearing surface proving, when wet, to be a mere crust, under which was a bottomless quicksand. Through this crust the wagons sank to the hubs. The head of the column passing round Bon Secours’ Bay moved only a few miles, and the rear guard got only a mile and a half. Large details were set at work corduroying the worst places. On the 20th, starting at 9 A. M., they moved slowly, the rain falling in torrents, and the corduroy afloat, and made four miles by night. On the morning of the 21st the rain was still pouring; Benton’s division moved on, but the train could not even get out of park. Every team seeking an untried path soon got mired, and wagons were seen in all directions sunk down to the axles. The poor animals, in their struggles to haul the trains, half buried themselves. In this dilemma long ropes were made fast to the teams, and the soldiers, with cheerfulness and alacrity, hauled both animals and wagons out of the mire with a rush, and it was only their speed that saved



“each team from again sinking at every rod. The same  
 “laborious efforts were applied to the field artillery. \* \* \*  
 “In hauling the 26th N. Y. Battery through a bad  
 “place, where the newly-made corduroy had been washed  
 “away, the men moved some distance in mud and water  
 “waist deep. These labors were watched by Confederate  
 “scouts. Only about two miles were made that day. The  
 “division went into camp at 3 P. M., and made some fortifi-  
 “cations on their right. \* \* \* On the 22d the division  
 “went into camp near Fish River, and on the 23d moved  
 “over a fair road, though hilly, six miles, to the north fork  
 “of Fish River, crossing it on a pontoon, and went into  
 “camp on the right of the Sixteenth Corps, the bands play-  
 “ing, ‘Oh, ain’t you glad you’re out of the wilderness?’”

This description of our march gives but a faint impression  
 of the obstacles and embarrassments we had to overcome.  
 Officers and men were kept constantly at work with the axe  
 or spade, felling trees for roads or throwing up temporary  
 fortifications. Our artillery and trains gave us infinite  
 trouble. With roads and a soil such as Gen. Andrews has  
 described, it may be imagined that escorting and pulling  
 mule teams through the mud was not a pleasant occupation.  
 Those who have had a similar experience know how little  
 such duties tend to soften or sweeten the disposition, and I  
 fear our men, like the “Army in Flanders,” frequently used  
 language more forcible than polite. While bringing up our  
 division train a squad of rebel cavalry attacked our men,  
 but they were soon dispersed without serious loss on our side.  
 We remained at Fish River until the 25th, thus having a

chance to become somewhat acquainted with the men of the Sixteenth Corps, which was commanded by Major-General A. J. Smith. It had moved across the bay on transports from Fort Gaines to Danley's ferry landing.

This corps was made up entirely of Western men, and was typical of the "free and easy" discipline which pervaded many of the organizations hailing from that section of the country. No deference was paid to rank, and it was oftentimes impossible to distinguish an officer from a private. All alike believed in the inalienable right to forage as much as they pleased, and it was a common saying that after the Sixteenth Corps had been ten minutes in camp no chicken was ever heard to crow within a circuit of five miles. Nearly every organization maintained a squad of "bummers" whose duty it was to scour the country and confiscate all poultry and pigs for the use of the company or regimental commissariat. But few, if any, of the officers ever interfered to prevent such a system of rapine, and the practice seems to have been regarded as entirely legitimate. Indeed, the reply imputed to a western Colonel, to whom a southern matron is said to have made a bitter complaint because some of his men had made off with her hens and chickens, very well illustrates the sentiments of Smith's men on this subject. As the story goes, the dame upbraided the Colonel for the license he allowed his men to plunder the barnyards of helpless women, and insisted upon reparation being made in the form of a restoration of her fowls. This demand the Colonel was constrained to refuse, with the observation that the "rebellion must be put down if it took every hen and chicken in the

State of Alabama." In the Eastern regiments such forays were wholly discountenanced; but in serving with troops who utterly ignored the sanctity of hen-roosts and pig-stys, I have no doubt our men were more or less contaminated by such unmilitary behavior, and occasionally indulged (*sub rosa*, of course,) in a dinner of fricasseed chicken or fresh roast pig, although Gen. Canby's order admonished them to give the preference to "bacon and hard tack." Notwithstanding these little idiosyncracies, the Sixteenth Corps was an excellent fighting body, and with all the contempt for restraint which characterized the officers and men composing it, the record which it made in the field and in many hard-fought battles, for valor and general good soldierly qualities, was second to none other in the armies of the Southwest.

"On the 25th," (Gen. Andrews says) "Canby moved forward twelve miles with both corps and some of the heavy artillery; the men carrying four days rations in haversacks."

The next day we moved cautiously as we found indication of a considerable force in our front. That night we bivouaced within about three miles of Spanish Fort. More or less skirmishing had been going on all day and as we were then so near the main body of the Confederates, unusual precautions were taken against surprise. In the course of the evening we received an order to be ready to move at daylight the next morning. Gen. Andrews thus describes our preparations to advance: "The morning of the 27th came with a prospect of heavy rain, which to veteran soldiers was some sign of a battle. The men had taken their accus-

“tomed breakfast of hard bread, coffee and a slice of bacon  
 “toasted on a stick—as Achilles cooked the fat chime at the  
 “feast for the heroes. The usual hum of talk and specula-  
 “tion was heard around the expiring fires of the bivouacs.  
 “\* \* \* Soon was heard the spirited roll of the drum  
 “to ‘fall in’ greeted by that habitual and never-to-be-for-  
 “gotten shout or cheer of the men. Then the cartridge-box  
 “with its forty rounds is buckled on; the blanket is twisted  
 “up and thrown around the shoulders; the intrenching tools  
 “are picked up, the muskets taken, each company is formed,  
 “the roll is called, and, at the time fixed, the regiments are  
 “in line prepared to move forward.”

Before entering upon the account of the occurrences of the 27th, it may conduce to a better understanding of the character of the works against which we were about to move to give Gen. Andrews’ description of the line of field fortifications known as Spanish Fort, which is as follows: “These defences,” he says, “were on the bay shore, seven miles due east of Mobile. \* \* \* Old Spanish Fort was a bastioned work, nearly enclosed, and built on a bluff whose shape projected abruptly to the water. Its parapet on the bay side was partly natural, being made by excavating the earth from the side of the bluff, and was thirty feet in thickness. The fort was armed with 7-inch Columbiads and 30-pounder Parrotts—the latter made at Selma—and was designated No. 1. Extending around that in a semicircle was a continuous line of breastworks and redoubts. The right of this line commenced 400 yards down the shore on the highest and most prominent bluff, upwards of 100 feet

“ above the water, with a strong enclosed fort called McDer-  
“ mettt (No. 2), and armed with ten heavy guns (10-inch  
“ Brooks’ rifles). The slope of the bluff toward the bay is  
“ precipitous, and from its base to the water is a marsh 200  
“ yards wide, on which the timber had been felled. To the  
“ north and left the descent was gradual, along which ex-  
“ tended a line of rifle pits, crossing a ravine and stream of  
“ water, and then up the slope from the bluff on which was a  
“ strong battery designated No. 3. From there the line of  
“ the works continued 600 yards in a northerly direction,  
“ and then turned toward the bay, striking the marsh on  
“ Bay Minette, at a point about a mile above old Spanish  
“ Fort. This outer line of works was upward of two miles  
“ in length, and the batteries were all on high and command-  
“ ing ground. The surface was covered with open pine  
“ timber, but in front of the outer line of works the trees  
“ were felled for a few hundred yards. Every ravine had  
“ borne a heavy growth of hardwood, which having been  
“ slashed, made, with the underbrush and vines, an almost  
“ impassable obstruction. The ditch in front of the breast-  
“ works was five feet deep and eight feet wide, but in front  
“ of Fort McDermettt it was deeper and wider. In front of  
“ the batteries were also detached rifle pits for sharpshooters ;  
“ and along the entire front was a line of abatis fifteen feet  
“ wide.”

Returning to our movements on the morning of the 27th. Our division (Benton’s) was massed and moved forward, each regiment being in line of battle, directly toward Spanish Fort proper, and, at the same time, the other divisions of the

Thirteenth Corps and the entire Sixteenth Corps also moved forward, either on our right or left, the Sixteenth Corps, however, being entirely on our right. After marching about a mile our skirmishers met those of the enemy, whereupon sharp firing commenced, and the rebels were pushed back to within a short distance of their works. Our brigade (the Second) was not halted until we were within 600 yards of the rebel earthworks, and midway between old Spanish Fort and Red Fort, the guns of which commanded our position through a long ravine. The men were ordered to lie down on account of the heavy fire to which we were exposed, both from artillery and musketry. It was given out in the morning that our division was to lead an assault, and so we waited patiently all day for the order to come. Fortunately, upon a personal inspection of the works, Gen. Canby saw that the chances were altogether against the success of an assault, and so resolved to proceed by regularly investing them. This was a wise and judicious decision, for an attempt to storm these formidable defences at that time would have been attended with very great slaughter. The enemy's fortifications, as mentioned by Gen. Andrews, were on the crest of an elevation several hundred feet high. The side of the hill up which we should have been obliged to move, was one continuous mass of fallen timber, interlaced and arranged in the most intricate manner, so that it would have been absolutely impossible to have marched even a corporal's guard up the hillside abreast.

The enemy's fire was so heavy during the day that we were not able to do anything towards intrenching ourselves,

and until dark we lay on the ground exposed to a continuous fire. The colors of the respective regiments were planted in the ground and served as targets for the rebel artillerists. Notwithstanding a ten inch solid shot would occasionally topple over a tree, or a huge shell explode and cover us with dirt, but a few of our men were injured, although in the brigade several were killed and wounded during the afternoon. More danger was to be apprehended from the musketry than from the artillery however, as we learned whenever it became necessary to take up any other than a reclining position. The enemy had an exceedingly efficient corps of sharpshooters, and any conspicuous exposure of the person was a hazardous operation. This state of things continued until darkness set in. The engagement was general all day and extended along the entire front of both corps. Soon after we halted in the morning, pursuant to orders from Brigade Headquarters, I sent forward Capt. Salmon Dutton with his company (G) to relieve a portion of the Ninety-first Illinois on the skirmish line. He remained out until after nightfall, expending most of his ammunition and having several men wounded, whereupon Capt. George E. Croft with his company, (D) were detailed to relieve him. During the night Capt. Croft succeeded in driving back the enemy in his front and advanced with his men to within ten paces of the rebel works where he remained several hours harrassing them exceedingly. At daylight the rebels ranged two or three field pieces upon him and raked his position with canister. He remained in the immediate vicinity, however, for some time, his men protecting themselves by rolling behind logs and stumps. When-

ever they got an opportunity his men would pick off a Confederate gunner. Capt. Croft brought in much **valuable information and was highly praised** by brigade and division commanders for his handsome behavior. He was relieved by Capt. Austin E. Woodman, with his company (I), and by company H. I don't remember who then commanded it. Both companies were subjected to a severe fire during the entire day. As soon as it became dark, the Seventh and the Fiftieth Indiana were set to work throwing up intrenchments. So diligently and faithfully did they handle their picks and spades, that in the morning they had constructed a line of earthworks sufficiently long to cover the front of two regiments, besides assisting in placing a portion of two field batteries on either flank. Soon after daylight we were relieved by the Ninety-first Illinois, and started back to encamp in a position near that which they had just vacated, some two or three hundred yards to the rear. This movement was witnessed by the enemy, who must have noted the spot to which we removed, for before we had finished our frugal breakfast they commenced shelling us in the most vigorous manner. Their practice was perfect, and the very first shell struck within a few feet of the regimental line, knocking over a stack of muskets. This was followed by a solid shot from a Parrot gun which killed an orderly and his horse within a few feet of Col. Peck and myself. The orderly was about mounting, having just delivered to me a written order from Brigade headquarters. Finding that we could get neither peace or comfort in this position, we moved some little distance to the left. About noon, however, we were again



shelled out, the rebels having ascertained our location and got our range, and were obliged to move our camp further to the rear. That afternoon Gen. Benton and Col. Day (~~Brigade Commander~~) called and desired me to accompany them for the purpose of selecting a suitable place for a brigade camp, it being important that the men coming out of the trenches should be able to get a few snatches of sleep, undisturbed by the explosion of ten-inch shells. While we were upon this survey we necessarily discovered ourselves to the enemy who treated us to a shotted salute from their Brooks' guns; but, failing to exterminate us, they turned their attention to the field battery on our left flank, and soon demolished a good part of our work of the previous night, behind which it was located.

On the evening of the 28th, Companies F (Capt. Edgar M. Bullard) and C (Capt. Henry Stowell) were sent out on the skirmish line, with written orders to advance as far as possible, intrenching themselves as they progressed. Capt. Stowell has furnished me with the following account of their experience: "We left camp about 8:30 p. m. I soon relieved  
" Capt. Woodman's company, which was on the side nearest  
" our camp, and, as the advance had already been made by  
" the line on our right (Smith's Corps), Companies F and C  
" advanced up the hillside without opposition, until the right  
" struck the left of the Sixteenth Corps line, when they  
" took more distance, and with the few spades they had (five  
" or six) went to work digging saps and rifle pits as ordered.  
" I felt much concerned about our safety, as the other regi-  
" ments in our brigade had failed to make their appearance

“ on the line, and, of course, our left was wholly unpro-  
“ tected. To prevent a surprise, we put six men of F Com-  
“ pany on the left flank, at right angles with our line.  
“ About midnight the Officer of the Day came around, but  
“ made no change in our position. He said the Western  
“ men would soon advance and join our left. This they failed  
“ to do, and at daylight (29th) I discovered their line at least  
“ fifty yards in rear of our left, which distance they kept all day.  
“ During the night our men, by diligent use of the few spades  
“ we had, and with bayonets and cups, managed to excavate  
“ a trench about thirty-five feet long, with the necessary  
“ angles, and which afforded them considerable protection.  
“ Nothing of importance transpired in our front during the  
“ day. But few of our men were wounded, and but one  
“ mortally, though, on account of our advanced position, we  
“ were in equal danger from the Western troops in our rear  
“ as from the rebels in our front. Lieut. McCormic of C  
“ Company at various times put his overcoat on a musket  
“ and held it up to show to our friends behind where we  
“ were. At dark but few of the eighty rounds (per man) of  
“ ammunition we brought out were left, and so orders were  
“ given not to fire except in cases of necessity. As the night  
“ was intensely dark we posted a few men in advance of our  
“ pit as a precaution against surprise. We should have been  
“ relieved at 9 P. M., but as our relief did not come I sent  
“ a Corporal to Brigade Headquarters at 11 to guide the  
“ relief should they not know the way. The men had  
“ worked hard all the previous night and had been busy all  
“ day. They were out of water, and were hungry and

“ fatigued. At 1.20 A. M. I sent in a Sergeant, as the Corporal had not then returned. On his (the Sergeant’s) way to camp he met Capt. Croft of D Company, who had been detailed Field Officer of the day in place of one wounded. He had with him a few men of B Company who were trying to find our line. Company B (Capt. Jackson V. Parker) having been sent out early to our relief, but on account of some heavy firing in front of the brigade on the extreme left of the line, and the many obstructions caused by the fallen trees, together with the darkness of the night, had got scattered. About 3 A. M. of the 30th, Capt. Croft and the Sergeant I had sent in, came up to our line, and shortly afterwards some of the men of B Company came up, followed directly by Capt. Parker and the balance of his men. I gave him what information I could and then started with the two companies (F and C) for camp.”

On the morning of the 29th the regiment again went into the trenches, where we were exposed more or less to the enemy’s fire. Gen. Andrews says: “ the firing on both sides, this day, seemed to have increased in severity.” In the evening I sent forward Capt. Parker with his company (B) to relieve companies F and C on the skirmish line. In my official report to Gen. Washburn, I say: “ about midnight the rebels made a furious assault on our skirmishers, and succeeded in creating some little confusion without driving our men back much. There was such an intricacy of fallen timber and trees that it was with the greatest difficulty that the men could be kept well in hand, but Capt. Parker showed great skill and bravery in keeping his men together, and

“in rallying fugitives from other regiments, and by his “personal courage soon re-established the line.” The confusion to which I referred did not exist among any of the men of the Seventh, but arose in some of the western companies. In the darkness Capt. Parker lost his way, and in attempting to find companies F and C, fell in with these troops whom he aided and was largely instrumental in assisting them to reform their line.

For several days and nights we were in the trenches continuously, sleeping in the mud or on the ground with no covering but our rubber blankets and constantly exposed to an artillery and musketry fire. On the evening of the 30th I sent Capt. Riley B. Stearns with his company, (K) to relieve Capt. Parker on the skirmish line. Col. Peck and I noticed during the day that the enemy was devoting a good deal of attention to Capt. Stearns and that from time to time they shelled his position very vigorously. We became apprehensive for his safety and I spoke to our brigade and division commanders about him, and offered to send forward some men to his assistance. Neither Gen. Benton or Col. Day would consent to this, however. I then asked that the guns which were annoying him might be silenced, which request was not complied with. Early in the afternoon the brushwood and timber in the rear of Capt. Stearns was fired (as we afterwards learned by the rebels) and the smoke obscured him from our view. All this time a severe cannonade was kept up and I suspected some mischief was contemplated. But I was powerless and could not go, or send forward others

to Capt. Stearns' relief. That evening he was captured with twenty of his men. The following is his report of the affair :

“ CAMP PAROLE, NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS.

“ APRIL 16th, 1865.

“ LIEUT. GEORGE W. SHELDON,

*Adjutant Seventh Vermont Veteran Volunteers.*

“ SIR : I have the honor to report, that, in obedience to  
“ instructions from Regimental and Brigade Headquarters, I  
“ relieved Capt. Parker on the skirmish line, in front of our  
“ regiment on the evening of the 30th ult. Nothing of interest  
“ transpired during the night ; the enemy fired at our position  
“ several times, which was returned by my men. Soon after  
“ daylight on the 31st the enemy opened on me with shell  
“ from a gun on one of the inland faces of the fort on our  
“ extreme left, and I soon found that they had got our range  
“ admirably. I had, during the night, constructed rude  
“ bomb-proofs, and during the shelling ordered my men into  
“ them. The shelling soon stopped, and all was quiet on the  
“ line until about 12 M., when the same gun again opened  
“ fire. The shelling was now so terrific that I determined  
“ to fall back a short distance as soon as it became dark, and  
“ dispatched Corporal Crothers to regimental head-quarters for  
“ instructions. I sent word by him that I expected to be  
“ assaulted before dark, and requested that the gun which was  
“ annoying me be silenced, or that the enemy's lines in my front  
“ be shelled, and I would fall back under the fire. At about 4  
“ o'clock P. M. the enemy fired the slash of trees, etc., covering  
“ the ground on the right of me, and I gave the order to my

“ men to fall back singly, as I foresaw that we would be  
“ smoked or burnt out, for there were several trees felled  
“ close to my position. As soon as the first man left I coun-  
“ termanded the order, for hundreds of bullets were sent  
“ after him. I think, however, that he was uninjured.  
“ During the shelling many of my men, and others on the  
“ left, had left their rifle pits and fallen back. In doing this  
“ one of my men (Private Storrs) was wounded. Just before  
“ sunset the fire had extended around my rear and on my  
“ left, making so dense a smoke that our lines could not be  
“ seen. At this time the shelling was resumed, and in less  
“ than ten minutes fifteen shells were exploded inside and  
“ directly over the pit in which myself and ten men were  
“ stationed. I had my men cover themselves as best they  
“ could, and ordered bayonets to be fixed in anticipation of a  
“ charge being made.

“ At sunset the shelling suddenly ceased, and the charge  
“ was made in which myself and twenty of my men were cap-  
“ tured. The assaulting party was composed of Capt. Wilcox,  
“ (should be Watson), of Gen. Gibson's staff, a Lieutenant and  
“ thirty men, fifteen of whom were picked from the entire  
“ garrison. The remainder were volunteers. The charge  
“ was so sudden and vigorous that we could offer but little  
“ resistance. I gave the command to fire, which was obeyed  
“ by the majority of my men, but the next instant every man  
“ had at least one musket at his head, with a summons to sur-  
“ render. I found two muskets and a revolver pointed at me,  
“ with a request to come out of the pit. I accepted the alter-  
“ native thus offered, and in a short time found myself before

“ Gen. Gibson, C. S. A., who paid a very high tribute to the men  
 “ of my command. He said he had never seen troops stand  
 “ shelling as we had that day. From him I learned the plan  
 “ which resulted in my capture, which is as I have described it.  
 “ The fire was kindled that the smoke might cover the as-  
 “ saulting party from our batteries. Gen. Gibson informed  
 “ me that no other part of the line would be molested; that  
 “ mine was particularly obnoxious to them, as that forenoon  
 “ we had killed his Chief of Artillery, Col. Garnet (should be  
 “ Col. Burnett), and wounded several others. I was taken  
 “ to Mobile the 1st, to Meridian, Miss. the 3d, where I have  
 “ been confined in a stockade until three days since I came  
 “ to Jackson, and from there to this place. Arrived here  
 “ last evening. Appended is a list of the men captured. I  
 “ do not know how many got away; think some must have  
 “ been killed.

Respectfully your obedient servant,

R. B. STEARNS,

*Capt. Seventh Vt. Vet. Vols.*

Corporal Crothers, of whom Capt. Stearns speaks of having  
 sent back for aid, after numerous narrow escapes succeeded  
 in reaching our lines, but it was then too late to send forward  
 re-inforcements. The cannonading just before the sortie was  
 very heavy along our entire front, and several of Capt.  
 Stearns supports had fallen back. Indeed it will be seen by  
 Gen. Andrews' account of the affair, that Capt. Stearns and  
 his men were all the time in advance of the main line of  
 pickets. I am happy to give this distinguished officer's

version to set off the brilliancy of the exploit, as well as Capt. Stearns' modesty in reporting the behaviour of himself and his gallant command in a most trying and dangerous position. Gen. Andrews says, after referring to Capt. Stearns relieving Capt. Parker on the night of the 30th in front of Confederate Battery No. 3. \* \* \* "There was but little firing " during the night, and Capt. Stearns advanced his line " about twenty-five yards and dug new pits—though the " detail had but one spade—which brought him in advance " of the brigade line of skirmishers. He was within one " hundred and fifty yards of the works of the garrison, " and the musketry fire of his men was exceedingly trouble- " some to their gunners. Soon after noon a shot from that " vicinity had instantly killed Col. Wm. E. Burnett of Texas, " Confederate Chief of Artillery, and a valuable officer. " He had for a moment taken a rifle in his hand, and was in " the act of aiming it from behind the breastworks through a " wooden embrasure. Capt. Barnes, in Battery McDermott, " had been giving considerable attention to these skirmishers, " and they were also subject to a fire from Red Fort. Begin- " ning early in the morning, Barnes shelled the line with a " 6-pound and a 24-pound howitzer for three or four hours, " and *made* some of the men on Stearns' left fall back " into the ravine. There was now a lull, and the skir- " mishers popped out their heads and did some firing them- " selves, for they were fair marksmen, and had plenty of " pluck. Barnes then brought out two 6-pounders from " McDermott, placed them on the hilltop, and again fiercely " shelled Capt. Stearns' position. \* \* \* The severe fire to



“ which he was exposed had already attracted the attention  
“ of Col. Holbrook, the commanding officer of his regiment.  
“ Arrangements were made in the garrison for a sortie. Capt.  
“ Clement S. Watson, of Gen. Gibson’s staff, volunteered to lead  
“ it. The rest of the party was to consist of Lieut. A. C. New-  
“ ton, Company E, Fourth Louisiana Battalion and thirty  
“ men, fifteen of whom were picked. At two o’clock in the  
“ afternoon preparatory to the sortie the garrison caused the  
“ slashing and brush on the right of Capt. Stearns to be fired,  
“ and the smoke blew over and in front of him. \* \* \*  
“ It was now sunset. The cannonading ceased. The same  
“ instant Capt. Watson and party were over the garrison  
“ works, and concealed by the smoke, vigorously rushed upon  
“ their expected prisoners. \* \* \* Capt. Stearns and  
“ twenty of his men were captured. Without parley and  
“ without delay their captors received their arms and hurried  
“ them away into the garrison, none of the sortie party  
“ stopped to occupy the pits. The prisoners were rapidly  
“ taken a roundabout way to a position near the water,  
“ which appeared to be sheltered from the fire of the besiegers  
“ by artificial ravines. But no curiosity now inspired them  
“ to notice the interior of the garrison. They were confident  
“ their gallant comrades left behind, would, before many days  
“ have full possession of every thing around them; and  
“ the regret that they could not be present to participate in  
“ the enthusiasm of victory increased that distress of mind,  
“ which is ever experienced by the patriotic prisoner. The  
“ prospect before them was dreary.

“ Capt. Stearns was soon notified that he was to have an interview with the General commanding the garrison, and was accordingly conducted down into a ravine, some sixty or seventy feet deep, and about thirty yards wide at the opening. The ravine was triangular with its base facing north. In the apex were two wall tents, into one of which he was taken and introduced to Gen. Gibson. There were present Capt. Watson and the Lieutenant who accompanied him. The General invited Capt. Stearns to partake of his supper, a frugal repast consisting of cold fowl, cold water, with tin table furniture. This invitation was accepted. It was a compliment which would have been paid *only to a gallant officer*. The garrison had the best opportunity to judge of the courage and fortitude of their prisoners, and the General was generous in acknowledging the tenacity and courage with which, under a most severe fire, they held to their position; and the intelligence and address of both the captors and prisoners seems to have excited mutual respect.” Gen. Andrews also gives the following rebel accounts :

“ Heavy firing around Spanish Fort all day. Col. Burnett, Chief of Artillery to the Major-General Commanding, killed. Picket line of the enemy on right centre dislodged and twenty-one prisoners captured.”—*Diary of a Confederate Officer*.

“ Gen. Lidell to Col. Garner (Chief of Staff), Blakely, March 31st. Gen. Gibson has just telegraphed me the following: Capt. Clement S. Watson of my staff and A. C. Newton, Company E, Fourth Louisiana Battalion, led a

“sortie at sunset, and drove the enemy from his advance on Battery 3; killing a large number and capturing one Captain and twenty-one (should be twenty) enlisted men. These brave comrades deserve the thanks and have entitled themselves to the admiration of this army.”

After the capture of Spanish Fort, I went to the pit occupied by Capt Stearns, with several officers of our own and other regiments, and it was the opinion of all that none but a hero could have held out as he did, and it was conceded that his conspicuous bravery and that of his men deserved the highest commendation and praise.

About the 6th of April we were detailed, with the Twenty-ninth Iowa, to assist Bertram's Brigade, which held the extreme left of our line, in running saps and advancing our approaches to Old Spanish Fort (Battery No. 1) and to McDermott (Battery No. 2), which, it will be remembered, were the strongest and most heavily armed of all the enemy's works, and, in some respects, were the most important, as they commanded the channel. It was against these forts that naval operations were directed, and, with the heavy ordnance here concentrated on both sides, and the obstacles to be overcome, owing to the peculiar topography of the country, the work to be performed required intelligence and courage. We soon found out the difference between the explosion of a 10 and 15-inch shell and one discharged from an ordinary field piece; nor were we long in ascertaining that a projectile sent from a Brooks' rifle was more destructive to fortifications than the small pellets fired at us from light Napoleons. Gen. Granger told me that he selected our regi-

ment *himself* for this perilous work. That to properly conduct operations against these powerful batteries it was necessary that his engineer officers should have a thoroughly disciplined and reliable force to assist them, and for that reason he picked out the Seventh and Twenty-ninth. We accordingly removed our camp to a bluff overlooking D'Olieve's Bay and the Apalachee River, within comfortable range of the enemy's guns, and at once commenced work. The regiment was divided into equal details, which alternated in reporting to the Chief-Engineer, Capt. Palfrey, an accomplished and courageous officer of the regular army. The duties of these details consisted in putting the siege guns into position, and running the zig-zag lines and approaches usual in siege operations. In doing this they worked, so to speak, with the spade in one hand and the musket in the other. Each day brought them nearer the enemy's works and increased their peril. On the day before the evacuation our advance saps were within less than one hundred yards of the rebel ramparts. This work was extremely difficult and dangerous. Our men were under fire every moment. If a man exposed any part of his person he became the target for sharpshooters, and as each battery was erected the enemy sought to demolish it with their heavy artillery. Day and night there was the constant wailing of shells, and bombs from co-horn mortars were continually dropping into the saps and trenches, requiring much agility and "ground and lofty tumbling" to escape the effects of their explosion. At night the burning fuse disclosed their semi-circular course, and we could calculate with a little certainty where they

would fall; but, during the day, it required an acute eye to see their approach, or to determine where they would light.

Gen. Andrews, in speaking of the operations of the sixth day of the siege, says: "On the right, in McDermett, Capt. Barnes received from Mobile two 20-pound Parrotts and one 8-inch mortar. The latter was put in position one hundred yards inside the fort on the interior of the hill. These increased the whole number of the pieces to eighteen."

By this time we had got our siege guns into position and were able to do much more effective work than during the early days of the investment. Gen. Andrews, speaking of the seventh day of the siege, says: "Sunday morning opened clear and mild, yet gave no pause to the roar of artillery and the screeching of shells. \* \* \* The usual Sunday morning inspection was observed at 8 o'clock by those of the besiegers not on duty; the drum-beat all along the line gave the signals; and afterward were heard the cheering strains of the brass bands. When the garrison artillerists could do so, they were disposed to blend with this agreeable music the explosion of a shell. The two left sections of Mack's Eighteenth N. Y. Battery—four 20-pounder rifles—opened in Granger's front (slightly to the right of our position) four hundred and fifty yards from McDermett. \* \* \* The firing was exceedingly lively and accurate, and was ably answered by the guns under Capt. Barnes. \* \* \* Solid shot and shell literally hailed. \* \* \* About eleven Slocum's Washington Artillery came to the assistance of Fort McDermett, for the latter was receiving some heavy blows also from the First Indiana's 8-inch mortars and

“ the Massachusetts light guns on Mack’s left and rear.” (This was at that point of the line where we were stationed and the batteries engaged we supported.) “ The Washington Artillery almost enfiladed Mack’s position, and hurled their hideous projectiles at him from 11 o’clock till one in the afternoon. Having no guns to bear on them—they being too far to his right—he could only increase the intensity of his fire on the guns in his immediate front. \* \* \* Soon after 1 o’clock the enemy ceased firing, but at 4 P. M. they opened again, \* \* \* and the combat continued until dark.”

Speaking of the eighth day of the siege, Gen. Andrews says : \* \* \* “ The four 10-inch mortars of Company K, Sixth Michigan Heavy Artillery, were set in the rifle pits \* \* \* close to the edge of the bluff (our position), four hundred and fifty yards from McDermott. \* \* \* A battery of four 8-inch howitzers of the First Indiana also took position there the same day. The first section of the mortars opened in the afternoon in a satisfactory manner in presence of Gen. Granger and several other officers. \* \* \* The enemy’s mortars did considerable shelling during the day, and at 3 P. M. the Washington Artillery on Mack’s right again commenced throwing shells, and kept it up incessantly to a quarter to five P. M.” Speaking of our labors at this time, he says : “ The toil of the besiegers was incessant and severe. \* \* \* The second parallel had been opened ; in some places the third ; approaches or saps dug, and heavy batteries from day to day being constructed. It was by no means smooth work, for in some places the

“ground was rocky, in others it was filled with stumps and roots and covered with large logs. The details had become so wearing on the men that the officers sometimes took the muskets and went on duty themselves as sharpshooters, while the men rested and slept. Besides the work already referred to, the besiegers had, in rear of their first or outer line, constructed bomb-proof quarters. For the most part these were regular and sunk in the earth. The pits would hold from three to eight men, and were so arranged that the occupants could lie down. They were covered over with layers of logs, sometimes three thicknesses, over which were from one to four feet of earth, varying according to the exposure of their situation and the industry of the occupants.”

Gen. Andrews also gives the following account from the rebels of this day's proceedings: “Gibson to Maury: We have been thoroughly shelled all night, and there is brisk musketry this morning. I never saw such digging as the enemy does—he is like a mole. He is constructing heavy batteries on my extreme flanks that are going to give me great trouble. I wish I had more men and guns. We have been up all night. It is digging all night and fighting all day. Be certain to send more wooden embrasures, iron screens and the heavy guns.”

*Diary of Confederate Officer*:—“April 4th—Mortar firing going on steadily all day at Spanish Fort. The enemy's batteries are largely increased. Tremendous cannonading from 4 P. M. to 7—from thirty to forty guns and a dozen mortars. We reply from nearly the same number. One sap roller appears in front of our left centre.”

About 5 o'clock P. M. of the ninth day of the siege (April 4) a general bombardment of the enemy's works, along our entire line, was ordered, and all the troops were directed to form in line of battle behind our earthworks to be ready to make an assault if it should be deemed best. We took position nearly in front of Old Spanish fort and McDermett, where the artillery fire was very heavy for over two hours. It was a grand sight and will not soon pass from the memory of those who witnessed it.

Gen. Andrews thus describes this day's operations: \* \* \*  
“ At this time the advance parallels of the besiegers were  
“ within a hundred yards of the different salients of the  
“ garrison fortifications. The garrison had also extended  
“ counter approaches and rifle pits, so that the sharpshooters  
“ on both sides were within talking distance. \* \* \* In  
“ Granger's front, Battery No. 1 on the *extreme left* was  
“ finished for eight pieces. \* \* \* In anticipation of the  
“ general bombardment that was to commence at 5 P. M., the  
“ besieger's artillery fired but little before that hour. The  
“ 10-inch mortars \* \* \* on the left did not, however,  
“ entirely neglect McDermett, and their fire was answered.  
“ A 24-pound shell exploded at the entrance of a magazine, but,  
“ did no harm; another shell struck among the men while at  
“ dinner, wounding a corporal and arousing an Irishman's  
“ apprehensions for the safety of the coffee. During the day  
“ the garrison were quite annoying with their co-horn mor-  
“ tars, and troubled the infantry in their advanced pits ex-  
“ ceedingly. The fire from small mortars was troublesome  
“ on both sides.



“ At this date we had in position thirty-eight siege guns (including six 20 pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field guns, all of which (75) opened fire at 5 P. M. and continued till 7 P. M. The orders were for each gun to fire every three minutes. There was not much response except from the guns of Old Spanish Fort. It was a well sustained and grand bombardment. The garrison sought shelter in their bomb-proofs. Clouds of dust rose from their parapets. The earth, says a correspondent, actually trembled from the effects of this mighty fire. Meanwhile the sharpshooters in the skirmish trenches, or pits, kept up their accustomed firing.”

Referring to the 10th, 11th and 12th days of the siege, Gen. Andrews says: “ April 5th.—At this stage, mortar shells were thrown into the enemy’s works through the night at regular intervals. \* \* \* There was a moderate amount of firing by our artillery to-day. \* \* \* The mortars in front of McDermott were actively engaged, and disabled a 24-pounder howitzer in that fort. The enterprise of *our* men on the *left* was marked, and Gen. Gibson was apprehensive an effort would be made to turn *his* right. Capt. Barnes [rebel] while signalling to his 8-inch mortar, in the rear of McDermott, was struck by a musket ball and fell severely wounded.

“ April 6th.—There was but little artillery firing during the day. There was no interruption of work in the trenches. On the left some of our men established a new line, taking some rifle pits in which were found three confederate dead.

“ April 7th.—The gunboats steamed up and anchored close to the torpedo net, 5170 yards from Spanish Fort, but did not open fire however, on account of the presumed exposed condition of the land forces in their advanced rifle pits. But on the morning of the 7th, the flagship signalled the Octarora to fire, which she did. The fire continued at intervals during the day.

“ Our infantry were busy still in advancing their approaches; and the sharp-shooting on both sides from the advance rifle pits rendered it unsafe for a man’s head to be exposed there for a moment. In the morning there was a sharp struggle on the left to hold an advanced position our men had gained. \* \* \* During the day the artillery’s fire was light. In the afternoon there was a heavy fall of rain. We were getting ready for another bombardment.”

Referring to the 13th and last day, Gen. Andrews says :

“ On the morning of the 8th Gens. Gibson and Holtzclaw were of opinion it was time to evacuate. But Lieut. Col. Williams expected to finish a Battery for four 12-pounders to enfilade our left, and have them in position the ensuing night. It was therefore concluded to hold on another day to give Williams an opportunity to try his battery. Meanwhile orders were given for all the garrison artillery to open vigorously at 4 P. M. In view of the close approach of the besiegers steps were also taken to have additional torpedoes planted.”

In this connection it should be mentioned that we were greatly annoyed by those destructive explosives from the time of leaving Fish River and several men and horses were killed.

The principal roads were strewn with loaded shell and covered over with a thin layer of earth so as to conceal their whereabouts. A very slight pressure would cause their explosion. I recall one instance when two cavalry men and their horses were killed by one of these missiles, they having unconsciously ridden over the spot where it was planted.

A net work of torpedoes was also planted in front of the enemy's fortifications; pathways, like walks in a garden, were marked out, which were known to the rebels, whereby they were able to move in front of their lines in safety, but our men, not knowing the position or direction of these paths, were in constant danger of being blown up. Continuing his account of the last day of the siege, Gen. Andrews says: "In Bertram's front the works were carried to within one hundred yards of McDermett. There was now in position in the Minette Bay Battery (extreme right) four 30-pounders and two 200-pounder rifles; against Spanish Fort, fifty-three siege guns (including nine 20-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirty-seven field guns, a total of ninety-six guns. Four siege rifles and five siege howitzers on the left center enfiladed the garrison's centre and left, and four siege howitzers close in on the extreme right enfiladed their centre. A bombardment, which proved to be the final one, opened from all these guns at 5:30 P. M., and continued till 7:30 P. M. Gen. Canby was intending to assault the garrison's works the following morning at 8 o'clock. \* \* \* Before the bombardment commenced the besiegers took the precaution to double the force of their sharpshooters and the reserves. The garrison having

“arranged for a general artillery fire, opened before the bombardment was begun. \* \* \* The fire of so many large guns, and the loud explosion of shells, produced one of those sublime scenes which seldom occur, even in the grandest operations of war. There is scarcely anything in the phenomena of nature to which it could be compared; certainly not the distant murmur of the thunder, nor its near and startling crash.”

In the course of the evening a portion of Carr's Division Sixteenth Corps effected a lodgment inside the enemy's fortifications, and at 1 o'clock A. M. we became aware that the enemy had abandoned their works, and we immediately took possession. At this time a detachment of the Seventh were within less than one hundred yards of McDermott, constructing a battery. Thus after thirteen days ended the siege of Spanish Fort. I have quoted quite extensively from Gen. Andrews' interesting history which although relating to the operation of Gen. Canby's entire army gives a pretty good idea of our every-day experience. It will be seen from the extracts I have made, that the extreme left where we were stationed was a very important position, and that the troops occupying that point were exposed to constant danger, and were obliged to labor incessantly. For thirteen nights and days in succession there was not a moment that the Seventh was not exposed to either a musketry or artillery fire, and much of the time its officers and men were exposed to, and working under a most severe and galling fire from both. Notwithstanding all this, however, there was not an instance in which there was evinced the slightest disposition on the part of its

members to flinch or shrink from performing any duty however arduous or perilous. Many individual acts of heroism were performed by the line officers and enlisted men, and I regret that I have not the material at hand to here narrate them. The Field and Staff too deserve mention. Col. Peck was ever ready to perform his duty, and took his chances with the rest in the trenches and at the front, as did also Adjut. George W. Sheldon.

Gen. Andrews, in speaking of the incidents of the siege, says :

“ Reckless exposure of life in a siege commands no part of  
“ that applause which is earned by daring in its true sense.  
“ Yet light censure will be cast on such examples, consider-  
“ ing the tendency of men to grow timid by long continued  
“ service in trenches. The daily history of every regiment  
“ in the siege would doubtless exhibit individual acts of gal-  
“ lantry, and even of rashness, on the part of the enlisted  
“ men. \* \* \* Sometimes the firing between the Federal  
“ and Confederate sharp-shooters would cease and there would  
“ be some conversation between them. Conversation, when it  
“ occurred, was generally jocular and sarcastic in its character.  
“ When a Federal addressed a Confederate he called out  
“ ‘Halloo Johnnie;’ the Confederate answered ‘Halloo Yank.’  
“ In Spanish Fort the artillerists named their heavy guns in  
“ honor of the ladies of their officers, with the name in large  
“ letters placarded on the gun as ‘The Lady Gibson,’ ‘The  
“ Lady Slocum,’ ‘The Lady Maury,’ etc. The gunners spoke  
“ of them by their names instead of No. 1, 2, etc., and were  
“ always exceeding polite and complimentary to them. They

“ also named the Federal guns, but called them ‘Anna Maria,’  
“ ‘Sarah Jane,’ ‘Elizabeth Ann,’ etc. And when a Federal  
“ gun was fired the sentinel would say, ‘Look out, boys,  
“ “Anna Maria” is going to speak.’ It would pass down  
“ the line, and all knew in advance the direction the shot  
“ would come, and get shelter.

“ The effect of some of the shells was fearful. One day a  
“ Federal mortar shell fell inside the garrison works, plung-  
“ ing through seven feet of earth and logs, and killing  
“ four men and wounding three, all of whom were asleep.  
“ One of the men was thrown up twenty feet into the air and  
“ came down dead, of course, for every bone in him was  
“ broken, but he was not at all torn.”

At daybreak of the 9th (Sunday), we were able to look over the ground embraced within the enemy's lines, for which we had so earnestly contended. Early that morning I received orders to report back to our brigade, which I did. Shortly before noon the entire Thirteenth corps, except Bertram's brigade, left to garrison Spanish Fort, was on its way to Blakely, which, since April 2d, had been besieged by Major-General Steele's forces from Pensacola. As we drew near Steele's line, towards evening, we noticed there was very heavy firing going on. In a little while an order came down the line for us to prepare to take part in an assault. Before we could reach ground proper to form upon, Steele's men had gallantly stormed and carried the rebel works, and we were therefore deprived of participating in that honorable affair.

The assaulting column suffered greatly from torpedoes. The rebels had planted them in front of their works at Blakely, even more extensively than at Spanish Fort, and it was unsafe to approach the fortification, even during daylight. Gen. Andrews says: "All the forepart of the night, there were explosions of torpedoes, and some were killed by them while searching for the dead and wounded." Here, as at Spanish Fort, the enemy had pathways through these beds of explosives, regularly staked or marked out. The next morning Gen. Steele very properly set the rebel prisoners at work clearing the ground of these torpedoes. This was done by spreading brush over the ground and setting fire to it, which caused many of them to explode. As a space was burnt over the prisoners would spread more brush over an equal distance in front, and so on until a roadway of sufficient width was obtained. Of course some of the torpedoes did not go off, and it was hazardous business walking upon the ground, even after it had been burnt over, and hence the rebels were indignant that they should be set to do such dangerous work. But Gen. Steele was inexorable, taking the ground that if such a system of warfare was resorted to they should be the first to suffer from it.

We remained at Blakely until the morning of the 11th, when our division and another of the Thirteen Corps, under Granger, marched back toward Spanish Fort to Stark's Landing, where we embarked on transports. During the march we received intelligence of the fall of Richmond. The next day (the 12th), escorted by a fleet of tin clads and gunboats, we proceeded across to the western shore of the bay, where

we effected a landing at a place called Magnolia Point, some seven miles from the outskirts of the City of Mobile. Our regiment was one of the first to disembark. We anticipated some fighting before getting possession of the city, but we afterwards learned that arrangements had been substantially agreed upon previously between the Mayor and Gen. Granger, that the city should be turned over to him without opposition. A jovial tar—Capt. Kirkland—happened to command the tin-clad convoying the Seventh, and just before we landed he asked me if it would not be well to drop a shell or two in a clump of trees near where we were about to disembark to ascertain whether any of the enemy were concealed or asleep there. Not having been consulted by Gen. Granger or the Mayor, and being ignorant of the arrangements they had entered into, I replied that I thought the scheme was a good one, and so Kirkland with exquisite accuracy lodged a 30-pounder Parrott shell directly in the centre of this pretty little bunch of magnolias. It seems some of the Peace Commissioners had assembled there at a tavern concealed from our view, intending, I suppose, to receive us when we landed. The result of Kirkland's marksmanship however, broke up the gathering rather rudely and summarily, for before he could land another shell, three or four carriages filled with citizens, emerged from the grove and started up the shell road toward Mobile for dear life. To my astonishment a huge shell was next dropped just in the rear of the last vehicle, but not so as to endanger the occupants. I asked why this was done, as the fugitives seemed to be non-combatants, and received for reply, "that the



gentlemen appeared to be without whips and it was feared they would be late for dinner if the pace of their horses was not accelerated."

The shell road was a favorite place for the "chivalry" to speed their horses, and doubtless good time had been made over it, but I doubt if four hacks ever made such remarkable time as those containing these Peace Commissioners, spurred on as they were by Kirkland's guns.

On landing we proceeded up the shell road to within about a mile of the city, where we encamped for the night. The Field and Staff and some of the other officers slept on the soft side of the floor of a toll-house, which was the first time in nearly two months that we had not lain either in sand or mud. Although the orders were not to leave our posts a few of us got permission to ride into the city that evening. As we had not had a square meal for some time we repaired to the Battle House, thinking we might there get a sumptuous repast. In this however we were disappointed as about the only thing in the way of food left in the city was bacon and corn bread. We therefore sadly returned to our own bacon and hardtack.

The next morning Benton's division was ordered in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and accordingly marched through the city and to a station on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad called Whistler, where the machine shops of the road were situated. The rebels had removed most of the rolling stock, but it was reported that they were destroying much valuable property, and hence we were pushed forward to intercept this work. Our brigade held the advance

and shortly before we reached the town Col. Day with the Ninety-first Illinois and Twenty-ninth Iowa branched off to the left leaving me to march along the railroad with the Seventh and Fiftieth Indiana. In a few minutes we heard rapid musketry firing from the direction taken by Col. Day, who sent back word that he had encountered a large force of the enemy and directing us to come to his support at once. I gave the order to unslung knapsacks and we proceeded to the front at double-quick, the men obeying with great spirit and alacrity. We were soon under a heavy fire. Fortunately the woods were very close and not as many men were injured as would otherwise have been the case. The rebels had crossed a run or swamp, and were posted on a slight eminence but a short distance off. Across this strip of marsh was a wooden bridge, which they had fired as they fell back over it. The Lieut. Colonel of the Ninety-first Illinois, instead of attempting to put out the fire and cross on the bridge, sought to march his regiment through this thick fen, in the execution of which movement he had mired and entangled over two-thirds of his men, so that upon our arrival they were in an unfortunate dilemma, and were in danger of sustaining severe loss. Many of the men were waist deep in the mud; and so completely stalled that they could offer no effectual resistance to the enemy, who threatened to swoop down upon them. At this juncture I tried to get the Fiftieth Indiana into line of battle (that regiment being ahead of the Seventh), but without success; thereupon I brought the Seventh into line, and we forged ahead under a heavy fire, passing the Indianians at a run, and were soon

up to the bridge, where from line of battle we changed to close column by companies, and rushed over the bridge, which was still burning, although Lieut. Milton L. Gilbert, of G Company, and some others in advance, had succeeded at great personal risk in abating somewhat the flames. As soon as we were over the stream, we again deployed into line of battle and opened fire upon the rebels, who, after discharging a few volleys, beat a precipitate retreat. Capt. Croft again distinguished himself on the skirmish line, as did also Lieut. Gilbert. The regiment also behaved remarkably well, and the steadiness displayed in the manœuvres of changing front and deploying under fire was highly satisfactory to me, and reflected much credit upon the officers and men, as showing the high proficiency to which they had attained in discipline and in executing battalion evolutions.

According to Pollard, in his book entitled "The Lost Cause," Colonel Spence of the Confederate Army, with a cavalry force, was left to cover the rebel retreat from Mobile. I understood at the time that the force we encountered at Whistler was commanded by that officer. I refer to this because Gen. Taylor, in his book entitled "Destruction and Re-construction,"\* alludes to this affair as being the "last engagement of the Civil War." In this I think he is mistaken, for an account is given by Tomes, in his book entitled "War with the South," of a combat in Texas on the 11th of May, at Palmetto Ranch, on the Brownsville road, about fifteen miles above Brazos, between some of our cavalry

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\* Destruction and Re-construction, by Richard Taylor, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army.

under Col. Barrett and a body of rebels, which he speaks of as being the last battle of the war. Pollard, in his "Lost Cause," also says "the last action of the war was a skirmish near Brazos, in Texas." Although in consequence of this affair we were not able to say that we were participants in the very last engagement of the war, yet the action at Whistler was fought near enough to the termination of hostilities to enable us to claim that we were in "at the death." Subsequently the regiment camped over night at Palmetto Ranch on its march to Brownsville.

We remained at Whistler till the 19th, when the entire Division marched to a place called McIntosh Bluff, on the Tombigbee River, about forty miles from Mobile, where we went into camp. On the 23d we received intelligence of the assassination of President Lincoln which caused the most intense horror and indignation. As soon as the news reached us in the morning several southern families in the neighborhood sought our protection, fearing that the soldiers in the exasperated state they were in would commit acts of violence. It was but natural that such apprehensions should arise, but, notwithstanding, the troops were very much moved and incensed, no indignities were contemplated or offered to anyone.

It now became evident that the backbone of the Rebellion was broken. Lee surrendered on the 9th of April, and although we were informed that it was intended to continue hostilities on the west side of the Mississippi, and that the "last ditch" was to be dug there, the course of events was such that in a few days it became apparent this was but an idle rumor, and that the war was over. On the 27th of April

Johnston's army capitulated to Sherman. The next to follow was the army in our immediate front, commanded by Gen. Taylor, from whose book "Destruction and Re-construction," above referred to, I take the following extracts of the circumstances attending his surrender. After referring to the fall of Mobile, and the retirement of Gen. Maury and his forces to Meridian, he says :

“ From the North, by wire and courier, I received early  
“ intelligence of passing events. \* \* \* Before Maury  
“ left Mobile I had learned of Lee's surrender, \* \* \*  
“ which left us little hope of success; but while Johnston  
“ remained in arms we must be prepared to fight our way to  
“ him. Again, the President and civil authorities of our  
“ Government were on their way to the South, and might  
“ need our protection. Granting the cause for which we had  
“ fought to be lost, we owed it to our manhood, to the memory  
“ of the dead, and to the honor of our arms, to remain stead-  
“ fast to the last. \* \* \* Intelligence of the Johnston-  
“ Sherman convention reached us, and Canby and I were  
“ requested to conform to its terms until the civil authorities  
“ acted. A meeting was arranged to take place a few miles  
“ north of Mobile, where the appearance of the two parties  
“ contrasted the fortunes of our respective causes. Canby  
“ who preceded me to the appointed spot—a house near the  
“ railway—was escorted by a brigade with a full military  
“ band and accompanied by many officers in 'full fig.'  
“ With one officer \* \* \* I made my appearance on a  
“ hand-car, the motive power of which was two negroes.  
“ Descendants of the ancient race of Abraham, dealers in cast-

“ off raiment would have scorned to bargain for our rusty suits  
“ of Confederate gray. Gen. Canby met me with much  
“ urbanity. \* \* \* In a few moments we agreed upon a  
“ truce terminable after forty-eight hours notice by either  
“ party. Then rejoining the throng of officers, introductions  
“ and many civilities passed. \* \* \* The party separated,  
“ Canby for Mobile, I for Meridian, where within two days  
“ came news of Johnston’s surrender, the capture of President  
“ Davis, and a notice from Canby that the truce must termin-  
“ ate as his Government disavowed the Johnston-Sherman  
“ convention. I thereupon informed Gen. Canby that I desired  
“ to meet him, for the purpose of negotiating a surrender of  
“ my forces. The military and civil authorities of the Con-  
“ federacy had fallen, and I was called to administer on the  
“ ruins as residuary legatee. It seemed absurd for the few  
“ there present to continue the struggle. We could only  
“ secure honorable interment for the remains of our cause.  
“ \* \* \* At the time no doubts as to the propriety of my  
“ course entered my mind, but such has since crept in. Many  
“ Southern warriors, from the hustings and in print, have  
“ declared that *they* were anxious to die in the last ditch,  
“ and, by implication, were restrained from so doing by the  
“ readiness of their generals to surrender. One is not per-  
“ mitted to question the sincerity of these declarations, which  
“ have received the approval of public opinion by the eleva-  
“ tion of the heroes uttering them to such offices as the people  
“ of the South have to bestow, and popular opinion in our  
“ land is a court from whose decisions there is no appeal on  
“ this side of the grave.”

After notice had been sent to Gen. Taylor that the truce must end, as the Government did not approve of the Sherman-Johnston armistice, we prepared to resume field operations. On the morning of May 2d I was ordered out with the Seventh and Fiftieth Indiana on a scout. We had not proceeded far when we encountered a flag of truce from the enemy, informing us that negotiations for a surrender on the part of Gen. Taylor had been resumed, and shortly afterwards we were overtaken by a courier from Gen. Benton's headquarters confirming this intelligence, with an order for our return. A few days later the capitulation took place, and is thus described by Gen. Taylor :

“ On the 8th of May, 1865, at Citronelle, forty miles north of Mobile, I delivered the epilogue of the great drama in which I had played a humble part. The terms of surrender demanded and granted were consistent with the honor of our armies, and it is due to the memory of Gen. Canby to add that he was ready with suggestions to soothe our military pride.”

This surrender included all troops east of the Mississippi River.

The next day (the 9th) our entire Division returned to Mobile, our regiment going down the Tombigbee river on a transport. On our arrival at Mobile we went into camp a short distance outside the city limits.

It was now rumored we were to form part of an expedition to Texas under Gen. Sheridan, to operate against Gen. Kirby Smith's army and the other Confederate forces west of the Mississippi, and for a few days we indulged in the hope that we

were to see a little field service under that dashing and brilliant officer. But that was not to be. On the 11th of May, Gen. Jeff Thompson, commanding the rebel troops in Arkansas, surrendered on substantially the same terms as those granted to Lee, Johnston and Taylor. This left only the forces under Gen. Kirby Smith commanding the trans-Mississippi Department. It would have been utterly impossible for him to have successfully resisted the army then at Gen. Sheridan's disposal, and so on the 26th of May he too surrendered to Gen. Canby.

With the capitulation of Gen. Kirby Smith as Pollard says : " the war ended, and from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, " there was no longer an armed soldier to resist the authority of the United States."

The following extract from Gen. Taylor's book, " Destruction and Re-construction," shows the demoralization then existing in the trans-Mississippi Department, and the circumstances attending this last surrender. " I was at New Orleans," \* \* \* (after his surrender) " when Generals Price, Buckner and Brent came from Shreveport (Gen. Kirby Smith's Headquarters) under flag of truce and sent for me. They reported a deplorable condition of affairs in that region. Many of the troops had taken up the idea that it was designed to *inveigle* them into Mexico, and were *greatly incensed*. Some Generals of the highest rank had found it convenient to fold their tents and quietly leave for the Rio Grande; others who remained were obliged to keep their horses in their quarters and guard them in person, and numbers of men had disbanded and gone off. By a



“ meeting of officers, the gentlemen present were deputed to  
“ make a surrender and ask for Federal troops to restore  
“ order. The officers in question requested me to be present  
“ at their interview with Gen. Canby, who also invited me,  
“ and I witnessed the conclusion. So, from the Charleston  
“ Convention to this point, I shared the fortunes of the Con-  
“ federacy, and can say, as Grattan did of Irish freedom,  
“ that I ‘sat by its cradle and followed its hearse.’ ”

On the surrender of the last Confederate Army, and peace having been practically declared, I resolved to resign, I had been in the service since September, 1861, and had received but one furlough, to wit: when I returned to Vermont with the Seventh on veteran furlough. I accordingly tendered my resignation, which was accepted by Gen. Canby, June 2d, 1865.



## CHAPTER IX.

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DEPARTURE FOR TEXAS—EXPERIENCE ON THE RIO GRANDE—  
MUSTER OUT—DISBANDMENT OF THE REGIMENT.

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1865—1866.

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AT this time Maximilian was in Mexico, and for some reasons, best known to the government, it was decided to maintain a large Army of Observation on the Rio Grande, and for nearly a year after the close of the war a force of from ten to twenty thousand men under the immediate command of Gen. Weitzel was kept in Texas to observe and wait the development of the operations of Maximilian and his French allies.

The Seventh was one of the regiments designated for this service, and on the 30th of May, under Lieut. Col. Peck (who subsequently was commissioned Colonel, Major Porter at the same time being commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel and Capt. Edgar M. Bullard Major), marched to Mobile and embarked on the steamer "Starlight," and proceeded down to the lower bay, where they were transferred to the ocean steamship "Gen. Sedgwick." On June 2d they sailed for Brazos, and arrived there June 5th. The next day they dis-

embarked and went into camp, where they remained until June 14th, when they proceeded to the mouth of the Rio Grande, near Clarksville, and went into camp at White Horse Ranch, three miles up the river. About June 25th they again moved their camp to a location nearer the mouth of the river. Nothing of importance occurred there. The 4th of July was duly observed; the Declaration of Independence was read, and an oration was delivered by Gen. Cole to the assembled command from the deck of a wrecked schooner at the mouth of the Rio Grande. On the 14th of July the one year recruits were mustered out. August 2d the regiment left Clarksville and marched for Brownsville, some thirty miles up the river. The first night they encamped at "Palmetto Ranch," where, it will be remembered, the last action of the war was fought. The next day they reached Brownsville, where they went into camp on the east bank of the Rio Grande, and where they remained until they were mustered out in March, 1866.

On the 26th of August Colonel Peck resigned, and Lieut. Col. Porter was commissioned as Colonel, Major Bullard Lieutenant-Colonel, and Capt. Darwin A. Smalley Major. Subsequently Major Smalley resigned and Capt. George E. Croft was commissioned Major.

Life at Brownsville was monotonous and uneventful. The only service then required was to watch Maximilian's forces and the Mexicans. The former held Matamoras, which was fortified, or partially so, and frequently the Mexicans laid temporary siege to the place. The besiegers, however, never got near enough to suffer seriously from the Imperialist's guns,

and their operations were highly farcical and ridiculous. It is said that some of our men amused themselves, and gained more or less pecuniary advantage by letting themselves out to fight on behalf of the Mexicans for five dollars a night. I cannot vouch for the truth of these reports, but I should judge from the accounts I have received that the duties of our men were not so arduous as to prevent, nor was the service so dangerous as to deter, them from participating in a "strife" so lucrative and rapturous. About all the regiment had to do was to perform guard and police duty. The principal topic of conversation seems to have been in reference to the question as to whether the Army of Observation was to move across the river and drive out the Imperialists, and as to when the regiment would be mustered out. Washington's Birthday (February 22d, 1866) was celebrated by a grand ball at Brownsville. A few days later, to wit: March 14th, the regiment was mustered out of the service at the same place, but proceeded as a body to New Orleans, and thence direct to Brattleboro where it was disbanded. The object I believe mustering out the regiment at Brownsville was to enable those who wished to remain at the South to quit the service there.

On arriving at Brattleboro, a grand reception was given to the officers and men; and, as I am informed a special effort was made to show that the citizens of Vermont appreciated the services of the Seventh.

On the 6th of April, 1866, the regiment was formally disbanded, and all its arms and equipments, except such as were purchased by the men, were turned over to the United States

authorities. The Seventh was the last volunteer regiment from Vermont to be disbanded. Many of its officers and men were the first to enter the service; and during the entire war I venture to say that no troops from Vermont or elsewhere acquitted themselves any more creditably than they did. For their patience, fidelity and courage, the officers and men of the Seventh are entitled to the thanks and esteem of the people of Vermont. No more gallant regiment was ever sent out by the State than the Seventh Regiment of Vermont Volunteers.

*FINIS.*



# LIST OF DEATHS

IN THE SEVERAL COMPANIES FROM FEBRUARY 12th, 1862,  
TO APRIL 6th, 1866.

COMPILED BY LIEUT. OLIVER P. MURDICK.

" The muffled drum's sad roll has beat  
The soldier's last tattoo ;  
No more on life's parade shall meet  
The brave and daring few ;  
On fame's eternal camping ground  
Their silent tents are spread,  
And glory guards, with solemn round,  
The bivouac of the dead."

## COMPANY A.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Allen, Geo. H. . . . .	Sept. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Archambuatt, Oliver F.,	Aug. 19th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Bacar, Eugen . . . . .	Dec. 29th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Brackham, Geo. M. . . . .	Sept. 15th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Brouer, James . . . . .	Dec. 22d, 1864	Off the coast of Fla.
Brown, Wm. . . . .	Aug. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Burns, Daniel G. . . . .	Aug. 22d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Camell, Magney . . . . .	July 4th, 1862.	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Casey, Martin . . . . .	Oct. 11th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Fort, James L. . . . .	July 22d, 1865	Philadelphia, Penn.
Frenier, Agustus . . . . .	Oct. 13th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Green, Wm. . . . .	July 21st, 1862	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Hamelton, Thomas . . . . .	June 18th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Hicks, Myron D. . . . .	Dec. 26th, 1864	New Orleans, La.
Hosford, Geo. B. . . . .	Sept. 22d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Lander, Peter . . . . .	July 14th, 1862	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Lapier, Joseph . . . . .	Nov. 29th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
McDoraigh, John . . . . .	Sept. 28th, 1862	Carrolton, La.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Mullin, James . . . .	Aug. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Nichols, Leroy . . . .	Dec. 11th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Proctor, Charles . . . .	Oct. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Perrigo, Bronson . . . .	Oct. 3d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Page, Geo. W. . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Page, John K. . . . .	July 21st, 1862	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Pearl, Phinias . . . . .	Aug. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Perry, Harris . . . . .	Nov. 22d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Prior, Homer . . . . .	Aug. 9th, 1866	New Orleans, La.
Riley, James . . . . .	Oct. 7th, 1862.	Carrolton, La.
Smith, Geo. . . . .	June 16th, 1865	Clarkville, Texas.
Wells, Henry . . . . .	Aug. 9th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
White, James . . . . .	Sept. 15th, 1862	Camp Williams, La.

## COMPANY B.

Allen, Wilber F. . . . .	Sept. 11th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Beckhorn, Wm. . . . .	June 7th, 1862	Fort Pickens, Fla.
Barker, Isaac . . . . .	Aug. 3d, 1862.	Baton Rouge, La.
Bump, Volorous S. . . . .	Aug. 24th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Burns, John . . . . .	Nov. 28th, 1864	Andersonville Pris'n.
Bolyo, Ambro . . . . .	Oct. 3d, 1864	Andersonville Pris'n.
Connell, Wm. . . . .	Aug. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Combs, Harrison . . . . .	Not known	While Pris. of War.
Dinn, Edward . . . . .	Sept. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Daniels, Charles H. . . . .	Nov. 30th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Falloon, Jeremiah . . . . .	Sept. 13th, 1865	Brownsville, Texas.
Foot, Levi B. . . . .	Aug. 3d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Gee, Abishia G. . . . .	Dec. 28th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Goodrich, Martin V. B. . . . .	Oct. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Hopkins, Elizur . . . . .	Nov. 28th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Lincon, Geo. M. . . . .	Dec. 3d, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Lamphier, James S. . . . .	Oct. 4th, 1864	At Sea.
Morrison, James K. P. . . . .	July 31st, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Morris, Thomas . . . . .	Aug. 20th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Mortrom, Geo W. . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
McArthur, L. S. . . . .	Sept. 21st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Maloney, Michael . . . . .	Feb. 14th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
McDonold, James . . . . .	Aug. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Noice, Wallace E. . . .	July 14th, 1862	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Peters, Chas. L. . . .	Aug. 3d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Pelkey, Wm. . . . .	Aug. 24th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Parkhurst, Arthur H. . . .	Sept. 15th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Packard, Charles H. . . .	Dec. 1st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Pettet, Alexander . . . .	April 9th, 1864	Barrancas Fla.
Pettit, Edgar . . . . .	Dec. 15th, 1864	At Sea.
Rovlin, Orlando F. . . .	June 6th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Rugg, Nelson B. . . . .	Aug. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Riley, Willson . . . . .	Sept. 15th, 1862	Camp Williams, La.
Stearns, Amasa . . . . .	Aug. 23d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Stearns, Eli M. . . . .	Aug. 24th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Stocker, John F. . . . .	Aug. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Stocker, Henry W. . . . .	Not known	While Pris. of War.
Townson, Damon W. . . .	Aug. 23d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Trumbull, Stephen P. . . .	Not known	While pris. of War.
Whitcomb, Cyrus K. . . .	July 13th, 1862	Vicksburgh, Miss.
Whitcomb, Geo. E. . . . .	Aug. 28th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Wilkins, Charles . . . . .	Sept. 21st, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Wilkins, Lucius O. . . . .	Nov. 5th, 1863	Barrancas, Fla.

## COMPANY C.

Alexander, Henry M. . . .	Feb. 5th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Allard, Charles W. . . . .	April 8th, 1865	Lake Port, La.
Arceo, Joseph . . . . .	Jan. 25th, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Billings, Bertrand W. . . .	Aug. 6th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Bradford, Samuel . . . . .	Dec. 13th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Butler, Abren . . . . .	July 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Chase, Charles W. . . . .	Jan. 28th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
English, Samuel J. . . . .	Oct. 17th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Fassett, Francis G. . . . .	July 1st, 1865	At Sea.
Farmer, Henry S. . . . .	Nov. 14th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Grover, Riley L. . . . .	Jan. 20th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Lander, Jeremiah . . . . .	Oct. 19th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Lagnee, Charles . . . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Leue, Jacob . . . . .	Dec. 7th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Laberty, Lewis . . . . .	Oct. 12th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Morgan, Almon S. . . . .	May 17th, 1865	Mobile, Ala.



NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Page, Nelson . . . . .	Nov. 18th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Piper, Geo. H. . . . .	Dec. 6th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Sellick, Jonathan . . . . .	Feb. 9th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Ward, Charles A. B. . . . .	July 19th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Wescott, Charles . . . . .	May 15th, 1863	Santa Rosa Isl., Fla.
Willson, James . . . . .	Oct. 4th, 1862	Carrolton, La.

## COMPANY D.

Buxton, Burnus M. . . . .	Mar. 26th, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Bishop, Smith B. . . . .	Dec. 3d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Brown, John A. . . . .	Aug. 12th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Bull, Elisher . . . . .	April 26th, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Coppins, Culmer . . . . .	June 21st, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Cheney, Geo. A. . . . .	Dec. 14th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Champagne, Charles . . . . .	Oct. 1st, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Evans, Alonzo . . . . .	July 22d, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Griswold, Stephen A. . . . .	Nov. 30th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Haselton, Hiram M. . . . .	Sept. 9th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Haselton, Myron . . . . .	Jan. 4th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Long, Arunah A. . . . .	Oct. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Mosier, Thomas C. . . . .	Nov. 3d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Post, Alpha C. . . . .	Aug. 27th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Peters, Henry M. . . . .	July 30th, 1865	Clarksville, Tex.
Pingury, Robins R. . . . .	July 27th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Phillips, Josiah . . . . .	Aug. 22d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Rowell, Cordon R. . . . .	July 2d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Smith, Geo. W. . . . .	Jan. 22d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Shepard, Dexter E. . . . .	Aug. 2d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
St. Peters, Joseph, Jr. . . . .	Nov. 22d, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Thompson, Wm. B. . . . .	Oct. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Vanguilder, Thomas . . . . .	Feb. 4th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Wells, Marten . . . . .	Sept. 19th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Wood, Zeb . . . . .	Dec. 19th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Williard, Oliver . . . . .	Jan. 10th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Whittier, Benjamin E. . . . .	Sept. 19th, 1864	Fort Pickens, Fla.

## COMPANY E.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Babcock, Marshal . . .	July 21st, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Baulch, Charles M. . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Barnes, James M. . . .	Dec. 7th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Brown, Josiah . . . .	April 22d, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Cull, Richard L. . . .	July 28th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Chase, Cassius M. . . .	Nov. 29th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Clafflin, Horace . . . .	Oct. 9th, 1862	Camp Kearny, La.
Calgrove, James . . . .	Aug. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Davne, Oramel . . . .	July 18th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Darwin, Orin . . . .	Sept. 19th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Dumbray, Frank . . . .	Dec. 28th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Eagle, Thomas . . . .	Feb. 20th, 1865	Lost overboard.
Emons, John W. . . .	July 11th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Fields, Joel D. . . .	Oct. 29th, 1862	Algiers, La.
Fletcher, Elias . . . .	July 8th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Fuller, Alanson . . . .	Aug. 3d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Fletcher, Henry C. . . .	Jan. 23d, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Gile, Albert . . . .	Oct. 11th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Hanley, Geo. W. . . .	July 21st, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Heath, Henry L. . . .	Dec. 18th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Harding, John . . . .	May 5th, 1865	McIntosh Bluff, Ala.
Hall, Byron S. . . .	May 30th, 1865	Mobile, Ala.
Irish, Harvey . . . .	Dec. 6th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Lamphier, Rufus G. . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Lomondy, Lewis . . . .	Sept. 15th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Leach, Stephen H. . . .	Dec. 5th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Lilley, Carlos . . . .	Nov. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Mathews, James M. . . .	Nov. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Musey, Frank . . . .	Jan. 4th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
McIntire, David B. . . .	Oct. 15th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Mead, Geo. D. . . .	Aug. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Parront, Peter . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Philbrook, David C. . . .	Aug. 23d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Pixley, Wm. . . .	Nov. 16th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Palmen, Edward C. . . .	Nov. 25th, 1865	Montpelier, Vt.
Robinson, Ancil H. . . .	July 28th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Smith, Perley . . . .	Aug. 9th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Streeter, Lucias . . . .	Sept 26th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Smead, Geo. M. . . .	July 3d, 1865	Brazos Santiago, Tex.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Stewart, Charles W. . . . .	July 13th, 1865	Clarksville, Tex.
Tillotson, Curtis . . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Townson, Obert . . . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Townson, M. . . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Wilkins, Durane . . . . .	Sept. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Willson, Ebenezer . . . . .	Sept. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Willey Ransalin : . . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Wescott, Noel B. . . . .	Jan. 16th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Whitehill, Calvin K. . . . .	Sept. 16th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Whitehill, Pedon C. . . . .	Sept. 29th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.

## COMPANY F.

Brooks, Lorenzo D. . . . .	July 23d, 1862	St. Albans, Vt.
Bordo, Joseph . . . . .	Nov. 15th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Campbell, John . . . . .	Nov. 5th, 1864	New Orleans, La.
Church, Wm. . . . .	Aug. 8th, 1865	Clarksville, Tex.
Connor, Martin V. B. . . . .	Aug. 31st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Clark, Stephen B. . . . .	June 26th, 1862	Ship Island, Miss.
Croft, John W. . . . .	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Casby, Andrew A. . . . .	Nov. 2d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Dupen, Dana . . . . .	July 2d, 1862	Camp Parapet, La.
Davies, Leander . . . . .	Nov. 1st, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Edwards, Benjamin . . . . .	July 17th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Fitch, James L. . . . .	Oct. 14th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Grimes, Rufus . . . . .	Nov. 15th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Hatch, John E. . . . .	Oct. 8th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Hill, Frank . . . . .	May 14th, 1865	Willetts Point, N. Y.
Hagle, Henry F. . . . .	Sept. 20th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Jones, David N. . . . .	Mar. 29th, 1865	Fort Gaines, Ala.
Joyal, Joseph E. . . . .	Sept. 23d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Kibbie, Henry H. . . . .	Dec. 27th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Mason, James D. . . . .	Oct. 25th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
McRenney, John . . . . .	Sept. 22d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Mitchell, Eli B. . . . .	June 12th, 1862	Camp Parapet, La.
Peters, Norman L. . . . .	Dec. 11th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Peters, Wm B. . . . .	Sept. 20th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Ridgdill, John S. . . . .	Dec. 22d, 1864	At Sea.
Stearns, Erastus . . . . .	Aug. 20th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Stearns, John M. . . .	July 17th, 1862	Camp Parapet, La.
Truax, Thomas . . . .	July 3d, 1862	Camp Parapet, La.
Wright, Eber . . . .	Aug. 30th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Washer, Benjamin . . .	Oct. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Wooster, B. M. . . .	Oct. 16th, 1864	Santa Rosa Isl., Fla.

## COMPANY G.

Adams, Elmer L. . . .	May 24th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Allen, David . . . .	Aug. 11th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Alger, Seth L. . . .	Oct. 29th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Burnham, Thomas F. . .	July 13th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Baldwin, Geo. W. . . .	Aug. 1st, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Barnard, Sylvanus S. . .	Nov. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Barker, Sewell . . . .	Jan. 12th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Cummings, Thomas B.	Sept. 27th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Carson, Henry C. . . .	Oct. 16th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Coolbeth, Winthrop D.	Jan. 9th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Cook, Amos D. . . .	Oct. 18th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Connell, James . . . .	Jan. 26th, 1863	New Orleans, La.
Dodge, Wesley M. . . .	Aug. 24th, 1864	New York Harbor.
Dodge, Daniel D. . . .	Aug. 3d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Duncan, Fred . . . .	Jan. 28th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Earl, Alfred S. . . .	Aug. 2d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Ellis, Jason . . . .	Dec. 26th, 1864	At Sea.
Fuller, Geo. . . .	June 30th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Gibson, Albert B. . . .	Sept. 11th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Gibson, Henry H. . . .	Jan. 12th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Holden, Hial W. . . .	Dec. 26th, 1864	At Sea.
Hoodley, Henry C. . . .	Sept. 28th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Larkin, James H. . . .	Oct. 15th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Miller, Fletcher W. . . .	July 21st, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Martin, Horace H. . . .	Oct. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Marshal, Charles H. . . .	Oct. 12th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Marcy, Oliver H. . . .	Nov. 8th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Olney, Moses . . . .	Aug. 28th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Pease, Wm. H. . . .	Sept. 13th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Pratt, Mortimer . . . .	Oct. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Paine, Sewell B. . . .	Dec. 26th, 1864	At Sea.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Page, Chancelor . . .	Jan. 21st, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Picket, Lewis . . .	July 10th, 1865	Philadelphia, Pa.
Randall, Joseph S. . .	July 25th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Richardson, Ebenezer . . .	Aug. 28th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Rimley, Oetis . . .	Oct. 21st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Rowe, Robert . . .	Jan. 26th, 1863	Carrolton, La.
Rhodes, Ebenezer . . .	Nov. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Stevens, Henry . . .	Sept. 23d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Thornton, Frank W. . .	Oct. 3d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Tarbell, Charles . . .	Oct. 18th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Walker, Horace . . .	Aug. 4th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Wade, Stephen . . .	Aug. 11th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Walker, H. M. . . .	Not Known	Island Pond, Vt.
Wallace, Geo. J. . . .	April 16th, 1865	New Orleans, La.

## COMPANY H.

Allen, Anderson . . .	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Avery, Samuel S. . . .	Oct. 19th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Allard, Asa . . . .	Jan. 11th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Brown, Asa O. . . .	July 28th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Baulch, Lenard . . . .	July 27th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Boynton, Edward . . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Bogue, Oscar . . . .	Dec. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Berry, Edwin . . . .	Dec. 6th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Barnes, Seldon . . . .	Dec. 19th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Bailey, Daniel W. . . .	Jan. 29th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Brinn, Wm. H. . . .	Oct. 30th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Cowen, Charles E. . . .	Sept. 25th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Currier, Lewis . . . .	Nov. 10th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Chamberlin, Franklin . . .	Dec. 22d, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Chamberlin, Isaac . . . .	Jan. 18th, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Davis, James H. . . .	Oct. 26th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Darbey, Royal . . . .	Jan. 6th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Dockum, Geo. F. . . .	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
French, Henry H. . . .	Jan. 20th, 1863	Woodstock, Vt.
Flanders, Caleb . . . .	Aug. 2d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Fairbanks, Carlos F. . . .	Dec. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Gould, L. W. . . . .	Nov. 29th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Gray, Silas E. . . . .	Aug. 7th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Green, Rollin M. . . . .	Nov. 17th, 1863	Barrancas, Fla.
Hubbard, Horace . . . . .	Nov. 23d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Hutchinson, James P. . . . .	Not known	Rutland, Vt.
Jackman, Edward K. . . . .	July 26th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Kelley, Edward . . . . .	Nov. 16th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Leuce, Wm. . . . .	July 7th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Morse, Chester B. . . . .	Aug. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Mitchel, James . . . . .	Sept. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
McDaniels, Carlos . . . . .	Nov. 22d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Newton, Edgar S. . . . .	Nov. 21st, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Pike, Milton E. . . . .	Aug. 2d, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Page, Charles W. . . . .	Oct. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Pond, Geo. R. . . . .	May 11th, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Parmeter, Stephen M. . . . .	July 11th, 1865	Bristow, Buck Co., Pa.
Raymone, Geo. . . . .	Oct. 14th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Raymone, Chaucey E. . . . .	Nov. 20th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Ricker, Allen G. . . . .	July 28th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Scofield, Fred. . . . .	June 22d, 1862	Drowned in Miss. R.
Spaulding, Albert L. . . . .	Aug. 22d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Smith, Chas. A. . . . .	Aug. 27th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Snow, Geo. P. . . . .	Aug. 4th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Stone, Wm. E. . . . .	Sept. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Spaulding, Charles N. . . . .	Oct. 6th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Smith, Fitch C. . . . .	Dec. 9th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Stowell, Asa W. . . . .	Nov. 15th, 1864	New Haven, Ct.
Trowbridge, Albert V. . . . .	Aug. 6th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Tyrrell, Oscar A. . . . .	Nov. 10th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Tilton, Austin . . . . .	Jan. 10th, 1865	At Sea.
Willey, Danforth . . . . .	July, 28th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Wing, Geo. L. . . . .	May 26th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Woodward, Geo B. . . . .	Aug. 17th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
White, Silas M. . . . .	Sept. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Willey, Hollis S. . . . .	Oct. 20th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Walbridge, Dan C. . . . .	Nov. 27th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Young, Mahlon M. . . . .	Sept. 27th, 1864	Marianna, Fla.

## COMPANY I.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Biglow, Amara P.	Oct. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Buttler, Edward	Oct. 16th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Batchelor, John L.	Oct. 17th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Blossom, Frederic	Oct. 11th, 1864	New Orleans, La.
Crandall, Everand	July 31st, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Durkee, Nelson	Oct. 19th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Davis, Thomas	Oct. 9th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Draper, David	Oct. 8th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Draper, Alanson L.	Sept. 10th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Furman, Aaron G.	Oct. 2d, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Gibbs, Perry G.	Sept. 5th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Goslon, Enos	April 26th, 1862	Ship Island, Miss.
Hurley, Elisha A.	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Huntoon, Daniel S.	Aug. 4th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Holdin, Hollis K.	Oct. 3d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Hanks, Geo. G.	Oct. 21st, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Higgins, David E.	Nov. 26, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Halley, Nicholas	Dec. 13th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Heap, Andrew	Dec. 31st, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Janbor, Henry	July 27th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Johnson, James M.	July 29th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Jones, Lewis P.	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Larrabee, Charles	Aug. 26th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Langley, Geo. J.	Oct. 13th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Larrabee, Samuel	Nov. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
McIntyre, Thomas	Dec. 15th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.
Meade, Geo.	July 31st, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Morton, Wm.	Aug. 7th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Monroe, Wm. H.	Sept. 17th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Puffer, Geo. L.	Aug. 19th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Peters, Alfred	Jan. 26th, 1863	Pensacola, Fla.
Powers, Henry C.	April 26th, 1865	Not known.
Price, Frank	April 1st, 1862	At Sea.
Reed, Albert J.	Sept. 17th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Ripley, Robert	Sept. 20th, 1863	Barrancas, Fla.
Ruggles, Charles C.	July 24th, 1862	Poultney, Vt.
Schyer, Warren	June 6th, 1865	Annapolis, Md.
Stutts, Geo.	Jan. 23d, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Schryer, Geo.	Oct. 23d, 1864	New Orleans, La.

NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Sprague, James . . .	Nov. 4th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Sheldon, Chauncey L. . .	Aug. 5th, 1862	Baton Rouge, La.
Stodard, James F. . . .	Sept. 4th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Willson, Samuel . . . .	June 6th, 1862	Brazos Santiago, Tx.
Welles, Charles . . . .	Sept. 21st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Ward, Wm. . . . .	Oct. 3d, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Wheeler, Seneca . . . .	Aug. 8th, 1862	Not known.
Woodward, Harvey . . .	Oct. 11th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Young, Thomas . . . .	Dec. 25th, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.

## COMPANY K.

Balch, Wm. D. . . . .	Oct. 12th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Blood, Chas. W. . . . .	Oct. 6th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Call, James B. . . . .	July 24th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Clafin, Geo. W. . . . .	Sept. 28th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Clukey, Frank . . . . .	July 22d, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Cruss, Henry M. . . . .	Nov. 30th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Cutler, Chas. F. . . . .	Sept. 3d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Constintine, S. . . . .	Oct. 14th, 1864	Fort Pickens, Fla.
Duey, John . . . . .	Oct. 14th, 1864	Fort Pickens, Fla.
Durham, Chas. E. . . . .	Dec. 22d, 1864	At sea.
Flanders, John W. . . . .	Sept. 23d, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Freeman, Daniel C. . . .	Feb. 3d, 1865	New Orleans, La.
Fish, Elbridge . . . . .	Aug. 6th, 1865	Brownsville, Tex.
Fitzgeralds, John . . . .	Sept. 1st, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Fish, Alonzo S. . . . .	Aug. 17th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Fowler, Lucius S. . . . .	Oct. 6th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Greenleaf, Calvin W. . . .	Sept. 28th, 1864	Fort Pickens, Fla.
Hatch, Pacol . . . . .	Sept. 22d, 1864	Fort Pickens, Fla.
Hallack, Stephen W. . . .	May 30th, 1865	Fort Gaines, Ala.
Heath, Nathan C. . . . .	Aug. 18th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Huston, Oscar A. . . . .	Oct. 13th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Kimbol, Lelon F. . . . .	Sept. 8th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Morfett, Henry . . . . .	Nov. 14th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Morfett, Russell . . . . .	May 5th, 1863	Camp Stoughton, Fla.
Murphy, Wm. . . . .	Dec. 8th, 1862.	Pensacola, Fla.
Pollard, Riley H. . . . .	Sept. 28th, 1865	Brownsville, Tex.



NAME.	DATE OF DEATH.	INTERMENT.
Parmarter, Rufus N.	April 16th, 1864	Barrancas, Fla.
Quimby, Wm.	Oct. 16th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Rich, John E.	July 18th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Shepard, Dension B.	Nov. 17th, 1865	Fort Gaines, Ala.
Stowers, Charles	April 10th, 1865	Mobile, Ala.
Steaphens, Stilman S.	July 17th, 1862	Vicksburg, Miss.
Sulivin, John	Sept. 4th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Sturtivens, Wm.	May 10th, 1863	Camp Stoughton, Fla.
Willey, Geo. W.	Nov. 20th, 1862	At Sea.
Wade, Joshua	Aug. 12th, 1862	New Orleans, La.
Williams, Frank	Sept. 13th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Welch, John	Oct. 7th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Wing, Geo. G.	Oct. 14th, 1862	Carrolton, La.
Woodbery, Chas. E.	Dec. 2d, 1862	Pensacola, Fla.

### RECAPITULATION.

Company A,	31
“ B,	43
“ C,	22
“ D,	27
“ E,	49
“ F,	31
“ G,	45
“ H,	58
“ I,	48
“ K,	40

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NOTE.—The above list is not quite accurate. The total number of deaths during the period amounted to 407 (see p. 120 supra). I think, however, it can be made to correspond with the tabular statement by adding the field and some line officers, who died or were killed, and who are not mentioned in the above list, and also adding one death from A Company in 1866.

W. C. H.









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