


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“NATIONAL CONVENTION.”



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DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.

It is now universally believed by Republicans, and admitted by many Whigs, that the Democratic party has a majority in the United States. Union is necessary to give that majority the ascendancy, and to enable it to elect a Republican President. If the party do not concentrate its strength on one candidate, it is probable that the election will devolve, according to the provisions of the Constitution, on the House of Representatives, a contingency to be avoided, if practicable, consistently with the rights and dignity of the several states.

To effect the necessary concentration of force, a National Convention of the Republican party is admitted by all to be expedient; but to ensure harmony when assembled, it must be formed on principles of equal justice to all the states whose delegates compose it. Any other basis of association will prove delusive, nay, more, must and will inevitably produce discord and distraction in place of the concert of action which is the only legitimate object of a Convention; for the minority can never be induced to surrender its preferences cheerfully, and cordially co-operate in the election of a nominee who is not its choice, but by a thorough conviction that due weight has been given to its numbers, perfect freedom allowed for the expression of its opinions and feelings, and all its rights most scrupulously respected.

How ought the Convention to be formed?

Three modes have been proposed: The first mode proposes that delegates should be chosen in each state by the Republican voters in districts, as in the formation of State Conventions, one for each Congressional District, and two by a State Convention, or the Democratic members of the State Legislature in convention, being equal in number, like the electors of President and Vice-president under the Constitution, to the senators and representatives in Congress. Where a state is not divided into districts, the delegates to be chosen in such manner as the Republican party in such state may deem most advisable, and best calculated to ensure a true expression of the will of the people. The delegates to vote *per capita*.

The second mode proposes that a general ticket of delegates, equal in number to the senators and representatives in Congress in each state, should be appointed by a State Convention, and to cast together the whole vote of the state.

The third proposes that four delegates in each Congressional District should be appointed, a majority of whom, in convention, to decide how the whole vote of the state shall be given.

The first system was first proposed by the Democratic Republican members of the Legislature of Maryland in convention, and adopted by them unanimously, without any difference whatever between individuals on account of their preferences for one or the other of the distinguished men who have been named as suitable candidates for the Presidency. This unanimity was induced by the perfect fairness of the plan; by its justice and impartiality to all the states, whether large or small; by its truly Republican character in bringing the election of the delegates home

to the people, and giving a free expression and representation of the opinions of the minority, and its adaptation to bring a full and fair expression of the public will. The Plan has, accordingly, received the sanction and approbation of the New-England and all the other states which have yet pronounced their opinion, except Pennsylvania: Georgia can hardly be considered an exception, as it adopted the general ticket from necessity, there being no congressional districts laid off. It will probably be adopted by a great majority, if not all the rest of the states.

The second system has been distinctly adopted by Pennsylvania only, being considered anti-Democratic, inasmuch as it takes the election of the delegates to the Convention from the people, and transfers it to a body removed from them, and therefore liable to be controlled by selfish and intriguing politicians, and because it destroys the just influence of the smaller states; while, on the contrary, the district system, with the *per capita*, or independent individual voting, is just and equal to all, and while it is essential for the preservation of the rights of the smaller states, cannot possibly injure the large.

The third plan has been adopted by Virginia only, and as her example has been followed by none, it is probable that, seeing the election by district and voting *per capita* adopted by nearly all the other states, it will adopt them also, after mature reflection, and from a magnanimous spirit of conciliation.

The general ticket system of appointing the delegates and of voting has been advocated by several highly-respectable journals in New-York, as well as some of her leading and influential politicians, and, therefore, entitles it to respectful consideration in comparison with the Maryland plan.

A nomination of candidates for the Presidency and Vice-presidency by a National Convention is a proceeding, it is hardly necessary to say, unknown to the Constitution, and, if acquiesced in, a substitute, so far as party is concerned, for an election. To prevent its becoming an annulment of the Constitution, the spirit of the Constitution, so far as practicable, should dictate the mode of the election and action of the delegates in Convention. The great commentary on the Constitution which led to its adoption by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, the first being the principal writer, leaves no doubt that it was intended by its framers that the choice of the President and Vice-president should be in conformity with the will of the Union, without giving the states any distinct and separate influence, except so far as to add two to the number of electors to which each state from its federal numbers was entitled, combining to this extent, and no farther, the federal with the popular principle. That such was their intention is proved by the express declaration to that effect in the commentary of those great men. In the 68th number, they say "it was desirable that the *sense of the people* should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, *not to any pre-established body*, but to men *chosen by the people for the special purpose and at the particular conjuncture.*" Again: "they have referred it" (the election of the President), "in the first instance, to an *immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.*" That it was their intention that the voice of the people should prevail in the presidential election, is farther proved by the early practice, which it is believed was general, of choosing electors by districts. It is proved, moreover, by the mode of voting *per capita* being prescribed by the Constitution, which implies that each individual elector shall have an independent voice; for as voting *per capita* is the

corollary of district election, so it is evidence that election by separate districts was in the contemplation of those who prescribed that mode of voting, which, without district election, would be nugatory. Finally, it is proved beyond all doubt, that it was the intention of the Constitution that the election of President should not be *by states* in the first instance, inasmuch as it provides expressly that it should be by states in the last resort, *each giving one vote* as equal sovereigns in default of an election by the people.

Such is, undoubtedly, the spirit of the Constitution, and the intention of its framers, who left it to the states to prescribe the mode of electing the presidential electors, in the expectation, no doubt, that, in the exercise of this power, they would fulfil the intention of the Constitution; but this power has been abused by both parties to promote their respective views against each other; and the adoption of the general ticket system, by a majority of the states, left no option to the rest but to adopt it also, or lose all influence in the election. The necessary effect of this has been to diminish the direct influence of the people in the choice of electors, and to throw it into the hands of political managers in each of the states. Congress perceiving this to be the tendency of the general ticket system in the election of its members, has provided by law for the district system in future; and it is to be hoped that the people will call so loudly for the restoration of the Constitution to its original meaning as to bring about a uniform mode of choosing electors of President and Vice-president by district.

But the people, in the selection of their delegates to a *National Convention*, are, fortunately, trammelled by no laws prescribing the general ticket; and it is their duty as well as right to reject the general ticket system, so destructive of their own influence, and so irreconcilable to the spirit of the Constitution, and adopt the original practice under it of choosing electors by district, and apply it to the election of delegates to the National Convention.

From the above remarks, it will be seen that, though the general ticket or state system is allowed by the *letter* of the Constitution, it has been adopted for party purposes, in their conflicts for the mastery, in contravention of its spirit; that the district system of election, on the contrary, is not only according to the letter, but in complete conformity with and in pursuance of the spirit or soul and true original meaning of that sacred instrument; and that if this be not decisive in favour of the district system for appointing delegates to the National Convention, its manifest justice, its conformity to the leading principle of the Republican party *to bring home and secure to the people a practical control in the election of their chief magistrate*—its tendency to put down the influence of selfish intriguers and trading politicians—the protection it offers to the rights of the minority, and the security it gives to the maintenance of the just influence and dignity of the smaller states—in a word, its equal justice to all the states, large as well as small, and its adaptation to the development of the general will, commend it to the people of the United States with a force and power which must be irresistible, and ensure its adoption if it be properly understood, and its importance to the preservation of liberty and equal rights be duly appreciated.

Those who contend for the maintenance of the state influence in the appointment of delegates to the Convention, and make appeals to the pride of the large States of Virginia and New-York to induce them to keep their influence undiminished by division, lose sight of the true object of a National Convention, and act as if they were marshalling their forces against adversaries who are to be beaten out of the field, and crushed,

instead of coming into consultation with friends for the common good, and to promote the general harmony, where the least privilege that can be allowed to minorities—a privilege, indeed, which cannot, without the grossest injustice and oppression, be denied—is to give a fair opportunity for the independent expression of opinion, coming from whatever state or part of a state it may, and to promote the success of its wishes by fair and free argument. It is thus, and thus only, that animosities, which, from the necessity of common action, must in the end yield, can be reconciled to co-operate zealously in support of the decision of the majority against their wishes, and thus secure the attainment of the only legitimate object of a National Convention, concert of action, at whatever sacrifice of personal preferences, as to the general who is to command in the battle, when the conflict with the common enemy at last comes on.

Those who advocate state representation by general ticket, do not deny that district representation is perfectly just and fair to the large states, and truly Republican in its character, as bringing home the selection of delegates to the direct agency of the people. While, on the other hand, the friends of the district system, and *per capita* voting, consider the general ticket as unjust and unequal, destructive of the rights of the smaller states, and calculated to excite jealousies and heart-burnings; as anti-Democratic, because it withdraws the election of delegates from the people, and tends to place it in the hands of intriguing and selfish politicians. By agreeing, then, to the district system, and *per capita* voting, in compliance with the anxious desire of the other states, Virginia, and the leading politicians of New-York, are called on to make no sacrifice of their just rights; while the other states consider themselves, when told by the politicians of Virginia and New-York that they have a right to adopt what mode they please to appoint their delegates, and intend to take the general ticket system, as menaced with a refusal of justice, an intolerable oppression, and a deprivation of their dearest rights. Does not this view of the feelings of the parties make a strong appeal to the large states to surrender their preference for the general ticket, if they are truly desirous of harmony and concert with the other states?

It is well known that one of the greatest difficulties in forming the Constitution arose from the necessity of reconciling the claims of the smaller states—which, regarded as sovereign communities, are, under all codes of national law, considered equal—to have an equal influence with the large states in appointing the chief magistrate. The large states, on the other hand, claimed to have an influence proportioned to their population. The matter was finally compromised by giving electors to all the states in proportion to federal numbers, with the addition of two to each state, without regard to their population, in acknowledgment of their equal sovereignty, accompanied, however, with the provision that the mode of voting in the electoral college should be *per capita*; that is, that each elector should give an independent single vote—an impossibility under a general ticket system—which, by exposing the influence of the large states to be diminished by division, took from them the power to crush the smaller states, and gave a voice to minorities in the states, which the general ticket system entirely silenced.

It was, moreover, provided, in the compromise in favour of the smaller states, that in case of no election by the electoral college, chosen by the people, the choice of President should devolve on the House of Representatives, where the equality of sovereign states was acknowledged, and the majority of the representatives of each gave one, and but one vote, to that one of the three candidates who had received the highest number of votes in the electoral college.

Such was the compromise between the large and small states, by which the contested question as to their relative influence in the mode of electing the President and Vice-president was settled.

We have seen, in the course of these remarks, how, in the conflicts of party, the voting *per capita* has been virtually nullified by the adoption of the general ticket system of appointing electors. But there is manifestly no reason why, in the constitution of a convention of political friends, assembled to preserve harmony and secure concert of action for the common good, the general ticket system of voting should be adopted, by which, in the selection of candidates for the presidency, not only the smaller states are crushed by the large, but by which is silenced the voice of a large portion of our common political friends in each state, who, on every principle of justice, equity, and brotherhood in political principles, have an equal right with all others to be heard; though, after all have been heard, and voted their individual and unbiased sentiments, they must finally submit and surrender their preferences, if still found in the minority of the whole. And this they will do cheerfully after a fair hearing, but not before.

On the contrary, the very fact that the desire of victory by one party over the other has, through the adoption of the general ticket in choosing electors, annihilated the advantage intended by the Constitution to be secured to the smaller states by the vote *per capita*, affords the strongest reason for restoring it to the smaller states in the formation of the convention for nomination, the object of which is to prevent the election coming into the House of Representatives, and, of course, to deprive the smaller states of the chance of the equal vote which the Constitution gives them in that contingency. Surely, surely, then, when they are called upon to aid in curtailing their own undisputed constitutional power and advantage as to the election of the President, the least they can expect in return from the large states, is to be allowed, in the formation and action of the nominating Convention, the advantage of district election and voting *per capita*, originally intended by the Constitution in the election and voting of the electoral college. (Or, if the larger states, contrary to all reasonable expectation, insist on voting by states in the Convention, then let them come down to the footing of equality with the smaller states, prescribed by the Constitution, when the election of President comes to the House of Representatives, and the voting is by states—each state, in virtue of its sovereignty, giving one vote. There are but two modes of voting known to the Constitution—the one *per capita*, and the other by states. When the former is employed, each state has electors in proportion to federal numbers, each elector voting one independent vote; but when the vote is taken by states, their original equality revives, and but one vote is allowed to each state. Let the larger states, then, choose one mode of voting or the other. If they reject the equal vote, prescribed by the Constitution when the vote is given by states, and choose the mode of voting *per capita*, let them, like the other states, take the chance of having their influence divided, and let them not, according to the advice of some grasping politicians, who, if they do not desire to break up the Convention, so necessary to success against our common adversary, recommend the course best calculated for that purpose, insist on imposing conditions on the smaller states too unreasonable, unjust, and degrading to be submitted to, and in a dictatorial and menacing tone claim to vote by states, but to count *per capita*, and thereby secure to themselves the advantages of both modes of voting, and to be exempt, at the same time, from the disadvantages of both.

A writer in "Kendall's Examiner," whose production is republished in the "Albany Argus" for the benefit of the New-York Convention, about

to meet at Syracuse, and for whose instruction, perhaps, it was originally written, contends for the right of the large states to vote by general ticket, and urges the exercise of it; and illustrates his doctrine by the following case: He supposes that if New-York should elect delegates to the Convention by districts, there might be given twenty votes to Mr. VAN BUREN, and sixteen to Mr. CALHOUN; that is, that five ninths of the Democratic votes in New-York are in favour of Mr. VAN BUREN, and four ninths for Mr. CALHOUN. He then contends that New-York can *rightfully* claim, and ought to claim by adopting the general ticket system, through the agency of a State Convention, not only to silence the voice of four ninths of the Republican voters, but *impress* them into the service of the majority, to beat down and crush the majorities in other states. Let us do no injustice to this writer. The following are his words: "New-York," says he, "has thirty-six votes in the election of President and Vice-president, and South Carolina nine, *to be given by a majority of each state*. Ask a majority of the New-York Democracy, Whom do you prefer? The answer is, Mr. VAN BUREN. Ask a majority of the South Carolina Democracy, Whom do you prefer? The answer is, Mr. CALHOUN. The Convention thus ascertains that in those two states Mr. VAN BUREN would probably receive thirty-six votes, and Mr. CALHOUN nine. But cut up the state into as many districts as they have electors, and ask a majority of each district whom *they* prefer. Twenty districts in New-York may answer Mr. VAN BUREN, and sixteen in New-York, and nine in South Carolina, may answer Mr. CALHOUN. Thus in these two states Mr. VAN BUREN would get *twenty* votes, and Mr. CALHOUN *twenty-five*, when *those who are to give votes* declare that, by no possibility, in a contest for the Presidency between the two, could Mr. CALHOUN command more than *nine* out of the *forty-five*."

Such is the doctrine, and such its results. Can there be a stronger illustration of the iniquity of a general or state tickets, which, when it is admitted Mr. CALHOUN has *twenty-five* votes in his favour, and Mr. VAN BUREN only *twenty*, by the *hocus-pocus* of political jugglers, in a State Convention *thirty-six* may be made to appear for Mr. VAN BUREN, though fairly entitled to only *twenty*, and only *nine* for Mr. CALHOUN, though he is fairly entitled to *twenty-five*? Let us pause and ask any true Republican, any real and sincere Democrat, who is a friend to equal rights, who believes in the sovereignty of the people, and recognises the principle that, when the popular will is fairly and deliberately ascertained, it should be obeyed; let me ask him, if New-York and South Carolina have together *forty-five* votes, *twenty-five* of which are for Mr. CALHOUN and only *twenty* for Mr. VAN BUREN, whether it be not right and just that, in a convention of political friends, belonging to the same party, professing the same principles, and assembled solely for the object of obtaining a fair and just expression of the will of the party, *twenty-five* of the *forty-five* votes should be given to Mr. CALHOUN, and *twenty* to Mr. VAN BUREN? Or must a minority, consisting of *twenty*, control a majority consisting of *twenty-five*, merely because the *twenty* reside in New-York, and constitute a majority of the *thirty-six* votes belonging to that state? What say those in New-York to whom belong the *sixteen* suppressed votes, and who prefer Mr. CALHOUN to Mr. VAN BUREN, though residing in the same state with the latter? Are they willing to have their voice silenced—nay, more, made to speak a language contrary to their wishes, and become the instruments of annihilating, not only the weight of the nine votes of South Carolina, but *seven* other votes in some other states, which sympathize with them in attachment to Mr. CALHOUN? Are they willing that their sixteen votes shall not only be diverted from their favourite candidate, but given to Mr.

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VAN BUREN contrariety to an appointment, giving him a comparative strength of thirty-two votes, nevertheless, of eight belong to him. In the name of justice and equal change, is this Republicanism? Is this Democracy? Is this the fruits of our institutions? Are our people so tame in spirit as not to revolt against this outrage? Can Americans practice or submit to such injustice!

But the sentiments uttered, and the language used, might well be expected from a writer, who, in another part of his masterly effort at mystification, as if in scorn of all popular and Republican institutions, and with the design to bring them into contempt, holds the following language: "It will be of no use to inquire in whose favour are a majority of the people of the United States—men, women, children, black, white, and mulatto. Nor will it be of any use to inquire which candidate is preferred by a majority of the voters who elect." And yet this writer in favour of state against popular supremacy is said to be a late cabinet officer of Mr. VAN BUREN, and his genuine Democracy is endorsed by the Albany Argus, said to be the organ of Mr. VAN BUREN's sentiments! Never had man more cause to cry out, "Save me from my friends!" for if anything is well calculated to make New-York odious among her sister states, and to indispose them to support Mr. VAN BUREN, it is the promulgation of such anti-American sentiments. To these we may add the remarks on the above production: "The suggestion, too," says the Albany Argus, "that the selection of delegates to the National Convention by Congressional Districts in this state, might be the means of giving the vote of New-York to a candidate who was not her first choice, should be constantly borne in mind in all the discussions that are likely to arise out of this question."

This language is in exact conformity to the sentiment above quoted, that "it is of no use to inquire in whose favour are a majority of the people of the United States, or which candidate is preferred by a majority of the voters who elect." According to this writer, "the true point of inquiry is to ascertain which of the Democratic candidates is likely to concentrate the most votes in the election," by which he means *electoral votes appointed in general ticket by states*. In another place, speaking of the electors of New-York, he says, "Those who are to give the votes declare, that by no possibility in a contest for the presidency between the two" (Mr. VAN BUREN and Mr. CALHOUN), "could Mr. Calhoun command more than nine of the forty-five votes" belonging to New-York and South Carolina. All these sentiments and doctrines the Argus approves, and recommends to the adoption of his readers! And is it really true that the Republican party of the great State of New-York considers the National Convention as a field where *hostile* forces of different states are to be arrayed against each other? or is it to be, what other states suppose, a friendly consultation among brethren and *equals* of the same principles, assembled from all parts of the Union with a sincere desire to ascertain to whom, according to the will of the Republican party *fairly expressed*, the whole of the Democratic votes, *the thirty-six of New-York included*, though the nominee should not be the *first choice* of that great and respectable state, should be given in the contest between him and the nominee of the Whigs? If it be true that candidates for nomination, if not the *favourites* of New-York, though the choice of a majority of the Republican party in the Union, can by no possibility receive the votes of New-York, it is time that the other states should know it. And it is time, also, that Mr. VAN BUREN, for his own sake, should disavow the sentiments uttered by his intimate friends, unless he is willing to occupy the odious position, in which they are placing his state, of dictator to the Union, threatening denunciation against all candidates except her own first choice.

Such are some of the unjust and oppressive, unequal and anti-Republican consequences that would flow from the adoption of the system of voting by states, accompanied, as claimed, with counting *per capita*. Even though the

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instruction, perhaps, the large states to er, has now become impossible from the large number of s. and illustrates his eady decided for the district system with voting *per capita*, and the dispo can d e manifested in all the others, who have not yet acted on the subject, to adopt the same—if we except the leading politicians in New-York, still its uniformity, oppressive to the small states as it is, and objectionable as it is in many other points of view would give it some appearance of fairness. But knowing that it is now impossible to get even a majority of the states, or even one third part of them, to adopt it, certain leading politicians in Virginia and New-York have broached a new doctrine to suit their case and inclinations, and put it forth *ex cathedra*, and with a magisterial air of infallibility, as if its truth was not to be questioned.

Mr. Ritchie, of the "Richmond Inquirer," in his comments on the Convention of South Carolina, says, "Each state must be left free, and *will be free*, to pursue its favourite plans and adopt its own course of intermediate action. The delegates from each state, however appointed, *must be permitted* to meet in grand council, and participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Convention. The fact of a *bonâ fide* election or appointment can be the only test of a right to occupy a seat among the assembled delegates." "*For ourselves, too, we claim the right to decide* whether our electoral voice shall be given separately *per capita*, or announced *aggregately* by our delegation." Opinions like these have also, if we are not greatly mistaken, been authoritatively put forth by the "Albany Argus."

The position is, that *each state has a right to appoint its delegates, and prescribe their mode of voting in such manner as it pleases, whether aggregately or per capita*. Notwithstanding the confident air with which the truth of this position has been assumed, we venture to ask, nevertheless, "Is it true?"

If either Virginia or New-York chooses to have a Convention to regulate their own matters, I admit that no other state has any right to question either its formation or its mode of action; but when a Convention is formed by several states, which has authority to affect and decide upon the interests of all, there must be some basis of association to which all the parties composing the Convention assent. The one most obvious and necessary is equality. But what equality can there be between states, some of whose delegates cast an aggregate vote, *counting per capita*, however, and others divided votes? What equality can there be between states where the voice of the minority is excluded, and others where it is admitted? Let us suppose the case which has heretofore been considered for illustration, in order to make our ideas clearly understood: If New-York, through a State Convention, appoint thirty-six delegates, and instruct them to vote *aggregately*, she will on all occasions have the weight, in comparison with other states, of thirty-six of the whole number of votes in favour of her favourite candidate. If, on the contrary, she should adopt the plan of district delegation and voting *per capita*, and twenty of her delegates should prefer Mr. VAN BUREN and sixteen Mr. CALHOUN, New-York in this case, sixteen of the votes given for Mr. Van Buren being neutralized by the sixteen given for Mr. Calhoun, would have the comparative weight only of *four* votes, or one ninth part only of the weight she would have when voting *aggregately* and counting *per capita* under a general ticket. And this is the comparative weight which she would be fairly entitled to exercise in favour of one candidate against another professing the same principles and advocating the same measures in a convention of states, all having district delegations and *per capita* voting, and all, therefore, liable, like herself, to have a divided influence from giving a fair and proportionate voice to their minorities; a weight not to be exerted against the candidate, who is preferred by a majority of the delegates from New-York, in favour of a *hostile* candidate of a different party, professing adverse principles and advocating adverse measures, but in favour of another candidate of the same party, of the same principles, and the friend

of the same measures of policy. But change the mode of election of delegates by the people in districts to an appointment, by a State Convention, of a state ticket, with the right, nevertheless, of counting *per capita*, and keep the mode of district election unchanged in the other states, and you give to a *majority* of the Republicans in New-York the weight of thirty-six, or nine times as great as before to the *whole* Democracy of New-York, first, to enable her to commit the injustice at home of silencing the voice, not of enemies, but of brother Republicans, who prefer a different candidate of the same principles, and, next, to commit an injustice against their brother Republicans of other states, by bringing an addition of thirty-two consolidated votes to break down their majorities who prefer the candidate, that is, the favourite of the New-York Republican minority. No illustration can place in a stronger light the unfairness—nay, the iniquity, injustice, and tyranny—towards brethren, too—of such a proceeding; a proceeding which would probably give New-York alone the entire control of the nomination, without aid from any other large state; for all the other delegations, being divided, some with a majority of two, some of one, some of three, and so on, New-York, by making use of her sixteen *impressed* votes, may countervail the majorities of all the other states differing from her, and thus control the nomination, and give the victory to the *minority of the Republican party* against justice and right, and all its avowed principles of equality and impartiality. Such a procedure, of which nothing could have induced the adoption in the choice of electors but the desire of conquest over a political *enemy*, would inevitably inspire discontent and dissatisfaction against New-York among the associates, and expose to hazard, when the great battle with the common enemy comes on, the triumph of the Republican party, now certain with union and zealous concert, which are impossible between those smarting under injustice, and their oppressors who inflict it.

Will New-York, or any of the other large states, consent to render herself detested and odious among her sister states by such a tyrannical disposition and use of her numerical power? Will the other states quietly submit to it? for it will be vain to attempt to render resistance to injustice odious by endeavouring to attach to it the false name of *dictation to others*. There is a love of justice allied to, or rather springing from, the principle of self-preservation, which is deeply implanted in the human heart, and constantly disposes it to rebel against oppression. Without justice for its basis, there can be no permanent association among men. Even the bad must make it the foundation of their combination. If there were a resurrection from the foot of every gallows and gibbet on earth, and the revived malefactors of the world were to assemble for the formation of a civil society, they would be obliged to adopt justice and fair dealing with each other as the principle of their association. Even with them the predominance of oppression, if attempted, could not last. How momentary, then, must be its triumph in an enlightened and moral community! It can exist but for an instant, to be followed by hatred and distrust of the oppressor. Is New-York prepared to assume this character? Can Virginia, mother of great and just men, abase her high character, and consent to play the tyrant of her fellows? We fearlessly answer, No. Virginia, watched by the guardian spirits of her Washingtons, her Henries, her Jeffersons, her Madisons, her Lees, her Randolphs, and Masons, dare not—nay, cannot, in the midst of them and in the face of the world, rise up and proclaim that *might is right*, in violation of all the principles she has professed, and the practice of which has made her name glorious and revered among men.

No. Reflection, examination, and discussion among freemen and patriots will reconcile all differences that stand in the way of the success and triumph of the great and holy cause in which they are engaged. Many differences have already been settled by them. At first the Republican party were divided as to the time of meeting. Virginia and New-York have yielded their preference

of an early period to the wishes of a majority of their sister states. Let New York, if she still inclines to the vote by states—or Massachusetts, the Republican members of whose Legislature have decided in favour of district delegation, appeal in their conventions, like Indiana, in regard to the time of meeting to the same tribunal, a majority of the states, to decide the remaining preliminary questions, whether State Conventions shall appoint general tickets, or the people shall freely choose delegates in their several Congressional Districts, and thus prevent an appeal by oppressed minorities to the people of the several Congressional Districts, and the consequent necessity which would be imposed on the National Convention to decide between two sets of delegates from several of the states, one appointed by a Convention and the other directly chosen by the people themselves. By the adoption of such a course harmony will be restored to the Republican ranks; discord will vanish, and the Democracy of the Union, animated with zeal against the common enemy, inspired with enthusiasm, and, hoisting the glorious banner, inscribed with FREE TRADE—LOW DUTIES—NO DEBT—SEPARATION FROM BANKS—ECONOMY—RETRENCHMENT—and STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION, will march under its ample folds to certain victory and triumph.

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