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THE NATO SUMMIT AND THE FUTURE
OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 2, 1994

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
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THE NATO SUMMIT AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:38 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets today in open session to discuss the recent NATO Summit and other developments in Europe. Our witnesses are the Honorable Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and the Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

We are interested, of course, in the NATO Summit. We are eager to discuss with the witnesses a number of other issues, including, of course, U.S. policy toward the situation in Bosnia—the status of NATO planning for air strikes there and the status of UN-EC efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of this difficult conflict; the status of peace talks in Northern Ireland and the administration's recent decision to grant a visa to Irish activist Gerry Adams, a Sinn Fein leader; developments in Turkey; and U.S. policy regarding the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

The Chair is interested in hearing from our witnesses and, I understand, we have statements from both of you. Those statements will be entered into the record in full.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN A. OXMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. OXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos. It is a pleasure to be with you again.

I have submitted a full statement for the record, and what I would like to do now is just make a few summary remarks about the NATO Summit, and then, obviously, I would be happy to answer your questions later in the hearing concerning the other matters you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to the NATO Summit, which I was very pleased to have had the privilege of attending as part of the U.S. Delegation, I think I would first like to say I think it was a demonstration of

American leadership at its finest. I think President Clinton really showed what American leadership can do for the NATO Alliance. It was, after all, his suggestion last June which led to the holding of the Summit.

It was U.S. initiatives which we proposed last fall which were the ones that formed the core of the achievements at the Summit, and indeed the U.S. initiatives were unanimously adopted by our Allies. And now it is the task to put flesh on the bones so we make sure that this was not just a symbolic or a verbal effort but a very real effort.

I can tell you that sitting in the room at the NATO Summit and watching the President of the United States make his intervention, I think, every leader in that room felt the reassertion, the reemergence of American leadership in the Alliance, and I think that is a very good thing for our country.

I would like to comment on the fundamental concepts which underlie the initiatives that we came forward with at NATO. One of those is that the core of U.S. security interests remain in Europe. Ties of history, ties of economy, ties of ancestry, ties of shared values, ties of the most profound character undergird this fundamental fact.

Another fundamental fact is that the U.S. commitment to European security is an enduring one, and related to that is the fundamental concept that NATO is central to that commitment.

At the same time, we were driven by the idea that NATO must adapt to the changing security challenges of post-cold war Europe in order to remain relevant. It must adapt to remain relevant.

And finally, the fundamental concept driving us was that security in Europe will come from an integrated Europe, East and West, based on shared values of democracy, market economics and military cooperation.

With those fundamentals in mind, we made the proposals. The first and most important of the initiatives was to suggest that we must qualitatively transform NATO's relationship with the nations of the East; that we need to use NATO to project stability and security eastward.

We conceived of this in two ways. First, by making it very clear as a matter of principle that NATO is open for expansion as part of an evolutionary process; that we expect and would want that expansion. That was a very major development that was agreed unanimously by our Allies. It is a very significant advance over where we were even as recently as last June.

The second aspect of the outreach to the East was to create a practical vehicle for moving forward with cooperation, military and political cooperation, with the nations of the East, and that is the Partnership for Peace, which is really, I think, the main headline of the Summit.

The Partnership for Peace—we conceived of it as a nondiscriminatory inclusive effort, open to all the members of the NACC. The reason we went that way was we felt that, to draw new lines in Europe at this time, to imply the creation of a new bloc system in Europe at this time, to treat countries as second-class citizens in the East, that this would be inconsistent with our goal of trying to

seize the opportunity to create the best possible future for Europe, as the President has said.

The best possible future for Europe is one in which Europe is integrated, Europe-wide integration. Europe has a chance, perhaps the first chance in its history, to unify, and we felt that to adopt a discriminatory approach, a differentiated approach, would prejudice the outcome of this process, and that it is in our interest to avoid that, to try to maximize the potential of the present moment in European history.

At the same time, we recognized that the countries of the East are different from each other. They have differences, and we built into our proposal, which was accepted as I said, the concept that the nations of the East could choose for themselves how intensively they wish to be involved in the Partnership for Peace. And, by making that choice as to the level and scope and nature of their involvement, there would be a process of self-differentiation, and we felt this was a good way to meet that concern and to balance the various interests at stake.

We also felt very strongly that participation in the Partnership for Peace should be an important factor in the ultimate judgment process of deciding whether to take new members into NATO itself. It would not be a sufficient condition in and of itself, but it would be one very important factor. So there was that relationship between the two points, the relationship between participation in the Partnership for Peace, and the first point I mentioned, the openness, the affirmative openness to expanding the Alliance itself as part of an evolutionary process.

Now, obviously, the ultimate decision on the expansion of NATO itself will be one that needs to be taken in accordance with Article X of the NATO treaty, and Article X of the treaty refers to bringing in members who can support the principles of the treaty.

The treaty is interesting to look at, and to look back at. It was signed 45 years ago, 1949, and the principles of the treaty include a commitment to principles of democracy, to principles of individual liberty, to the rule of law, and to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

And we felt that we wanted to avoid trying to set down new criteria for NATO membership. We also wanted to avoid setting any particular timetable. This again was part of our effort to see if we could maximize the opportunity to forward the process of Europe-wide integration.

The other two major initiatives we came forward with at the Summit and which were welcomed by our Allies were first the concept of making NATO more flexible to deal with the new contingencies, the new sources of instability, and that was through the creation of what we called Combined Joint Task Force.

If I could just give a little bit of background on that. NATO has always been an organization about the East. It is also about the West. It is an organization about denationalizing the military structure, military establishments of the West so that we created peace among the NATO Allies themselves.

But the main thrust of NATO has been about the East, and until the last few years the main threat from the East has been a monolithic threat, the threat of an attack from the East, and NATO has

organized itself to defend against that. That has been the core mission of NATO and NATO will continue to be in a position to perform that core mission.

But the new security threats from the East are really ones that arise from instability growing from ethnic and national tensions and discord, and those kinds of threats require a greater flexibility on the part of NATO to be able to respond to them. That is not like responding to a massive attack.

To work toward that objective, the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force, which Secretary Slocum will amplify, is one which the United States designed, which our Allies welcomed, and which creates this greater flexibility to respond to these kinds of non-Article V contingencies.

The third concept we came forward with was the need to make it very clear that the United States affirmatively supports the development of a European Security and Defense Identity, the so-called ESDI. In an era where European integration is increasing, and we support that, and when there is a drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe and of other militaries in Europe, we think it is important that there be a rebalancing of responsibilities, and we made it very clear, and our Allies welcomed this, that we support the development of ESDI.

We support that development in a way that would avoid the creation of a duplicate military organization. None of us wanted to see a situation where the WEU would duplicate the things that NATO does, buildup assets separately. This would require new resources and could be a diversion and a waste of resources.

So, we came forward with the concept of creating and fostering WEU capabilities which would be separable but not separate from NATO. The concept there is that when there are occasions when the WEU may wish to pursue a mission, and when NATO for one reason or another may decide that it need not be a NATO undertaking, that the WEU would be able to use NATO assets in performing that mission. Those assets would be separable but not separate from NATO, and in this way we would avoid a duplication while at the same time fostering the development of the European Security and Defense Identity.

This is an innovative concept, if I do say so. It was welcomed by our Allies, and it fits very, very nicely with the Combined Joint Task Force concept itself, because in those kinds of contingencies that I just described, where the WEU may wish to perform a mission with the use of NATO assets, the Combined Joint Task Force concept permits and facilitates the deployment of separable but not separate capabilities, so there is a relationship between those two aspects.

Now, let me just say a word about putting flesh on the bones. We are determined to move forward promptly to make all of what I have just described a reality, to put flesh on the bones of the Partnership for Peace and these other initiatives. Toward that end we have NATO teams that are already out in the field visiting with the militaries and the political leaders of the countries in the East who have indicated an interest in joining, and indeed virtually all of the members of the NACC have responded favorably to this.

These joint military-political teams are on the road now. They will be continuing that process. We are not just sitting back in Brussels waiting for people to come in the door, although they are coming in the door. We have had several countries come in to formally sign the framework document, and we are gratified by that. But we think we need to do more. We need to reach out, be proactive in making this a reality.

We also have at SHAPE a building ready to accommodate the Partnership for Peace planning cell. The Secretary and I and others went to look at the building the other day when we were at the Summit. It is within the fence at SHAPE, as they say. It is available, ready to accommodate the representatives of the countries of the East.

We are also welcoming them at NATO headquarters in Brussels itself. We will also be working with each would-be member of the Partnership for Peace in developing an individual work program for them. They will present to us a so-called "presentation document." That document will set forth what they are prepared to offer and contribute militarily in terms of units, in terms of personnel who would come to SHAPE, who would come to Brussels, and it would also set forth their political proposals as to how to foster civilian control of the military in their countries, how to foster transparency of defense budgeting in their countries.

All of the things that NATO Allies already do are the things we will be encouraging these countries to do in developing an individualized work program. That process will be proceeding ahead promptly, and we are determined to see that an overall Partnership for Peace work program will be evolved in the near future.

On the Combined Joint Task Force, the implementation work is proceeding at NATO and will be reviewed again by the Ministers when they meet in June.

So, Mr. Chairman, that is a summary of some of the points that I think are critical about the Summit. My longer statement goes into them in greater detail, and, as I say, I would be happy, after the opening statements and after we have discussed NATO, to discuss any of the other issues that you have raised in your opening comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Slocombe, did you want to make any statement? You have a written statement that, of course, will be made a part of the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Much of what is covered in my statement has also been covered in Steve Oxman's statement this morning. I think, therefore, I would confine myself to talking briefly about how the Partnership for Peace will work, and then a few words about how the Combined Joint Task Force will work.

We are off to a fast start on the Partnership. I know that some members of the committee have had an opportunity to talk to Am-

bassador Hunter, who has been leading that effort, and who is back here in Washington for consultations.

Like all other NATO bodies, one is tempted to say all other bodies of government, there is a fairly substantial structure that will be created to support this, but the basic elements are really quite simple. The Partnership will be under the political guidance of the NAC; that is, of the Permanent Representatives, the Ambassadors from NATO. There will be a Partnership for Peace Steering Committee which will be the central forum for the development of policy for the program under the general guidance of the NAC. And then there will be a military coordinating cell at SHAPE headquarters which will be a military organization where the actual concrete planning for Partnership activities will take place.

The bureaucraties aside, we envisage the Partnership as affording an opportunity for the individual countries to develop, as rapidly as they are capable of and as there are resources to do, the kind of practical working relationships between their militaries and the militaries of the NATO Allies that really lie at the heart of the Alliance.

To that end, the military staff are moving aggressively with plans for military exercises that will include partner and NATO nations. There will be—at least we hope there will be, we expect there will be—a command post exercise late this spring and small field exercises in the fall. As a practical matter, most of these exercises will be held in East European countries to reduce the cost to the partner countries.

It is important to make the point that the Partnership for Peace is a series of bilateral relationships between NATO and the individual partner countries. In contrast to the NACC or the CSCE, it does not create a new European institution. We expect that, in practice we hope, that it will promote regional cooperation among the various partner countries. But that is an issue for them to decide on, not to be imposed.

And it will certainly be the case that one partner will not have a veto over the activities of another partner. The Alliance itself, of course, will have to decide on both practical and policy and military grounds what kinds of activities it wants to engage in, but there will be no issue of Partner A saying that it dislikes Partner B's proposal and therefore it cannot go forward because there is some rule of consensus.

It is also important to make the point that the Partnership for Peace is not a security assistance program, it is a security partnership. Most of the costs, both of Allies and partners involved in partnership activities, will be paid directly from national defense budgets. There will be some limited common costs for the NATO common effort that will be supported out of NATO common budgets—the Civil, Military and Infrastructure budgets.

The U.S. share of those common budgets will be relatively modest. The current estimate is that for a Partnership, the NATO common budget will pay an estimated \$4 million to \$8 million annually. That will be somewhat higher in the first year because of startup costs. The United States, through the regular NATO formula, will contribute about 25 percent of these costs.

There will, of course, in addition be direct U.S. costs. When we have American forces go to some Eastern European country on an exercise, that budget like all other military exercises is paid for out of the O&M budget of EUCOM. But our contributions to these NATO programs and our direct cost of U.S. forces participation will be dollars well spent.

In a fundamental sense, the partnership gives the best of both worlds. It enables us to prepare and to work toward the enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities. But it enables us to do this in ways that also give us the time to reach out to Russia and to the other nations of the former Soviet Union; that is, as the President has said, it leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that totally breaks with the destructive past we have known.

However, while it leaves open the best possible future for Europe, it gives us the means to deal with a future that is not the best, a future in which our common security would be protected by collective defense.

The Combined Joint Task Force is a separate concept, although in many ways complimentary with the Partnership. Steve Oxman has explained its broad purpose in relationship to the European Security and Defense Identity. Let me simply say a few words about how it could work in practice.

It is important to begin with the proposition that, in spite of the name "task force," it is not proposed that the Combined Joint Task Force would actually be combat units themselves capable of fighting. Rather it would be essentially a structure, a military command and control structure, for military operations.

Under the concept, NATO major subordinate commands would designate task force headquarters elements within each of their own headquarters which would conduct peace-time planning for non-Article V contingencies; that is, contingencies not involving NATO operations in direct defense of NATO territory. When directed, they would then be ready to form the nucleus for deploying headquarters for particular operations.

Thus, if the North Atlantic Council were to authorize a NATO operation, the Combined Joint Task Force in question would function within the NATO command structure, but it could be modified to include command representation for those non-NATO nations that might wish to participate.

By contrast, should the Council choose not to participate, it could authorize the use of NATO assets by, for example, the WEU or by a coalition of the willing who might wish to conduct an operation. Thus the concept offers the Alliance important new flexibility in its political arrangements as well as an operational ability necessary to meet the kinds of contingencies we are likely to have to face in the future.

The details of the concept, and indeed its final formal adoption, are still being worked out within NATO headquarters and within the major NATO commands. The issue often arises as to what would happen to American personnel who would be in a Combined Joint Task Force structure if the United States, for one reason or another, chose not to participate in the operation.

It is a part of the concept that national participants within the CJTF would normally be expected to deploy with the headquarters whether or not that nation chose to contribute combat forces to the operation. That provision is necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the headquarters but it remains true that in each and every individual case a political decision would be required in the United States and every other country whether or not to allow its nationals to participate in the Combined Joint Task Force. That essentially is how this concept will work.

I should add a word on a subject that will be familiar to the committee, and that is the NATO infrastructure. At Brussels, President Clinton pledged his administration would do its utmost to ensure that America would meet its commitments to the NATO infrastructure program. As you know, that program has been sharply restructured in recent years so as to provide very important support for U.S. priorities, such things as mobility and reinforcement. Indeed, a significant number of the projects are actually in the United States.

In view of this, the current rescission proposal to cut the U.S. contribution in half—and indeed even the original is below our normal obligations—is coming at a very bad time. Already we are seeing other Allies also reduce their contributions to the infrastructure fund and their support for other NATO budgets as a result, in part, of their perception that the United States is pulling away from its financial obligations.

If we don't restore the funding which is now subject the rescission, we can expect more Allies to follow suit. I recognize the many pressures on the budget, but I hope that the Congress will be able to give the importance of the infrastructure program its closest attention in the upcoming budget deliberations.

I know the committee wants to hear about Bosnia. I think it may be more efficient to do that in response to questions, but I am certainly prepared to discuss that issue as well as the others that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, with the exception of Northern Ireland, which happily is not a Defense Department issue.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe and Mr. Oxman. We appreciated your statements. I want to ask some questions about the areas that you testified on, but I think I want to start where you ended, Mr. Slocombe, on Bosnia.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

Let me just begin with this observation first. It seems to me that we are at a fairly critical point in Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslims, by all accounts, are doing better militarily. Their confidence has picked up. They have been gaining some ground, taking over some areas they had not previously had and taking them away from other parties, the Serbs principally.

The Croats are pressed and there are indications that they may be putting some of the Croatian forces into Bosnia in order to help the Bosnian Croats. The Serbs are also pressed and there are indications they too may be putting forces in.

The spring is shaping up as a time when we could very easily see increased fighting. In the last few days and weeks we have already seen an increase in the amount of violence. So, it is with that background that I ask the questions that I do.

I want to focus on two areas: one, the negotiations; and, two, the air strikes. We have had several visitors in recent days that I know have visited with you such as the Greek Foreign Minister, who now heads the European Union for 6 months. And Mr. Hurd was here, the Foreign Minister from Britain.

Now, Mr. Slocombe, I noted in your written statement, and I quote a sentence from page 7: "While in Brussels the President engaged his NATO counterparts on the need to move forward on the diplomatic track and to forge an agreement acceptable to all parties including the Muslims in Bosnia."

Now, if I understand what the French, British and Greek Foreign Minister's are saying to us it is precisely what we are not doing that you say we are doing. You say in your statement that we are urging our NATO counterparts to forge an agreement acceptable to all parties, and if I understand what our friends are saying to us, they are telling us that we are not sufficiently engaged, and they do that in very diplomatic language.

Mr. OXMAN. Well, the British do.

Mr. HAMILTON. And very politely. The British particularly. The French a little less diplomatic, but they press the point, and they think that the current fighting is only going to lead to more fighting and that the United States has to get away from its aloofness in the conflict and help bring about an end to the fighting.

Now, if I understand your position, it is that if we see any kind of a settlement that can be reached here it is as a partition of Bosnia, one that is not defensible morally and maybe not defensible militarily and wouldn't last.

So the choice is a tough one. On the one hand, try to bring an end to the fighting through negotiations, in which case that means putting pressure on the Bosnian Muslims which our President has said repeatedly, and the Secretary of State, don't want to do. But, if you don't do that, it looks like the fighting is going to accelerate and the killing will increase.

OK. Now, you tell me where I am right and wrong here and straighten me out.

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let's begin with what our policy is and then talk a bit about the British and French. The United States recognizes, and has made very clear to all parties, including specifically the Muslims, that this war is not going to end by military intervention from outside, and absolutely not by American military intervention to impose peace, and nobody else is interested in intervening either that has any capability to do it.

Second, that in our view the prospects for any of the parties to achieve a total military victory, and particularly for the Muslims to achieve a military victory, are very slight.

Mr. HAMILTON. Even with their increased success in recent days?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Even with their increased success. The Muslims clearly do believe that they are doing a little better on the battle-

field. My impression is that most of that has not been relative to the Serbs but to the Croats, which may be one of the reasons why we are getting these reports, which are presumably accurate, of the troops coming from Croatia proper and that the Muslims and all the other parties should reach an agreement.

It is clear that if there is an agreement, it will, in fact, be a partition. I think that enough progress has been made in the negotiations that that is, at least in principle, common ground among all the parties.

However, we believe that—quite apart from the cost—it would not be appropriate and would not be in our interest to go in and impose a settlement by military force. We don't believe it would be appropriate to go in and, in effect, present the Muslims, or for that matter any other party, with a map, with a treaty saying sign here because we have decided that this is the right agreement, and if you don't sign we will do various things.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think there is any chance of reaching a settlement among these parties without outside pressure?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If Steve wants to comment on that, I will be happy to give you my answer as well.

Yes, I believe that at some point the parties will reach the conclusion, in the Serbian case, that they have got basically what they want, and to some degree in the Croat case that they have got an acceptable outcome. And, in the case of the Muslims, that as tragically mishandled, abused and mistreated as they have been it is more in the interest of their population to get on with trying to create a state than to go on fighting.

I don't think any amount of outside political intervention will have a strong impact on that. And, in any case, we have made as clear as it is humanly possible to make clear to the Bosnian government that we are not going to intervene and that we believe it would be in their interest—

Mr. HAMILTON. We are not going to intervene in a military sense?

Mr. SLOCOMBE [continuing]. to reach an agreement.

The argument is often made that one reason the Muslims don't want to reach an agreement is that they expect that at some point the American cavalry will come galloping over the hill and rescue them. People can have any views they want, but we have done—far from doing anything to encourage that view, we have been extremely clear that it is not going to happen.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. OXMAN. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment for a moment?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, Mr. Oxman. Certainly.

Mr. OXMAN. I think you are absolutely right in saying that the administration will not join in a policy of putting pressure on the Muslims. And, to the extent any suggestion coming from other quarters of imposing a settlement would connote doing that, we are not going to support that. We are not going to do that.

We think that the pressure needs to be put on the Serbs, who after all are the main culprits in this matter, and the Muslims, in our view, are the principal aggrieved party.

If you look at where the negotiations stand, the parties for their own reasons seem to have come to a point of view that they can

negotiate on the basis of 33⅓ percent for the Muslims. That is not a figure that anyone outside the negotiation imposed. It is not a figure the United States suggested. Our consistent approach has not been to endorse a particular plan, but to have the parties work at coming up with what they can live with.

But the notion or the concept of a quantitative benchmark of 33⅓ percent seems to be common ground among the parties. The problem is that the quality of the territory being offered by the Serbs in the negotiation is unacceptable to the Muslims. And we think that the thrust of the efforts of the international community should be on putting pressure on the Serbs, the main culprit, to improve the qualitative offer that they are making.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of pressure?

Mr. OXMAN. Pardon me?

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of pressure? You have the embargo—the sanctions—obviously.

Mr. OXMAN. The various types of pressure available are not great, Mr. Chairman, obviously. We have the sanctions in effect which are having a serious effect on Serbia and we have taken the point of view that there should be no easing of these sanctions until there is an agreement that is being implemented in good faith.

You also have the sheer pressure that would come from a solid international front which says the problem now is the quality of the Serb offer and we are united internationally in pushing the Serbs to improve that offer so that we can get to a peace agreement.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now, let me tell you what bothers me here. As you put it, it is very reasonable, and the principles you state seem to me to be quite sound and all the rest of it. But you have to look at the consequences as well. It appears to me that if you continue to do what we are now doing, taking the position that you have outlined with regard to negotiations, with regard to pressure and all the rest of it, and if you look at the fact that the negotiations are themselves stalemated, the result is a continuation of the fighting, and, it appears to me, an escalation of the fighting. Highly likely.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. OXMAN. I think there is that possibility, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is the risk, isn't it?

Mr. OXMAN. There is a risk of that occurring. But, on the other hand, the fact is, if you look at this objectively, the Serbs have achieved a very high percentage of their objectives, and the question is would they gain from an increase in the fighting or are they so close to their objectives that with a qualitative improvement in their territorial offer which would lead to peace that this may not be the better outcome.

So, I think there is a question as to whether the fighting will of its own escalate, but that is certainly a very significant possibility.

Mr. HAMILTON. On the question of negotiation, may I ask you, are there any negotiating initiatives being considered apart from the efforts that have been made by the European Union now? Is that the forum for negotiation, in your view? Are any other fora being considered?

Mr. OXMAN. Right now that has been the focus, the EU/UN effort, which is to resume on February 10. Since our meetings in Paris last week we agreed with the French that we would consider with them and with the other Allies ways to reinvigorate the negotiating process, and that consideration is ongoing.

We had our meeting yesterday with the British Foreign Secretary, as you know, and we have been in touch with—met at the experts level with the French last week. So there is an effort underway to look at this anew, see if we can reinvigorate the process. But what we have said in these discussions is that there are these fundamental points that are constants in our policy.

AIRSTRIKES

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, let me go to the question of air strikes, and I apologize to my colleagues a little bit for taking more time.

Mr. SLOCOMBE, you spelled out in your statement the steps that are to be followed in the event of air strikes, and I want to kind of run through those to see if I understand your statement correctly.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is complicated.

Mr. HAMILTON. I know. And I am not sure that I do understand and that is why I want to ask the questions.

Well, first of all, let me ask you a simple question. Do you think air strikes of one kind or another are imminent?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Imminent?

Mr. HAMILTON. Imminent.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Frankly, no.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. You draw a distinction, as I understand it, between two different kinds of air strikes, and maybe more. But at least two. One is so-called "close air support."

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the other seems to relate to the question of the strangulation of Sarajevo.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And, if I understand your procedures here, they are different in each case?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON. First of all, you might define for us what close air support is.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Close air support would be the use of NATO air capability to come to the assistance of an UNPROFOR unit that had been attacked or was under attack and requested assistance; that is, it would be related to an immediate battlefield situation.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. In the close air support situation, number one, the ground commander makes the request.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Number two, the UNPROFOR Air Operations Coordinating Center—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Before we get to number two—

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Maybe I have skipped one.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is important and relevant to how the operation works.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And this, in a sense, goes to the point we are making about CJTF. That you need a command structure, you need a communication structure, for these things to operate.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are with these units NATO-qualified forward air controllers so that the request is made through a communication net that has been established between the U.N. unit and NATO headquarters, ultimately at Naples.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. The ground commander makes the request and then the UNPROFOR Air Operations Coordination Center refers the request to Boutros-Ghali for approval?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In most cases, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Now, he has the authority to make the decision?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the U.N. side, yes. The U.N. insisted that, as a part of this operation—in a sense in order to accept the offer—they wanted to be sure that there was a U.N. political decision made that it was appropriate to endorse the request of the U.N. commander for an air strike.

Mr. HAMILTON. That decision is not subject to a veto by any of the Security Council members?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You raise an interesting and important question of what would happen if there were a difference of view between the Security Council as a whole and the Secretary General.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, we haven't had to confront the issue.

Mr. OXMAN. I could comment on that particular point, Mr. Chairman. The Secretary General has delegated the authority in the case of close air support to Mr. Akashi, and the Security Council is aware of that, and there is no need for any Security Council action with respect to that, and no proposal for any Security Council action.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, that is with respect to Tuzla?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Tuzla and Srebrenica. Yes, sir.

Mr. OXMAN. That is right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Those two cases?

Mr. OXMAN. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. In those cases, Boutros-Ghali gets the request. He then refers it to Mr. Akashi?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON. He refers it to Mr. Akashi, and Mr. Akashi says, "OK, I want the air support," and it goes?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, as a practical matter, the request in that case would go directly to Akashi, but yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And so he becomes the person with the authority, the final authority to say yes or no?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the U.N. side.

Mr. HAMILTON. On the U.N. side. Russians cannot veto it. Nobody can veto it. It goes ahead—he is the guy. Is that it?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Akashi, in the case of a request for close air support related to Tuzla or the exchange of the Srebrenica garrison.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. And, if the U.N. Security Council members objected, it wouldn't override Mr. Akashi's request?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As a practical matter, we have always been of the view that it was more likely to have a situation in which the Security Council wanted to give the approval and the Secretary General wanted not to give the approval.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does the procedure I have just outlined on close air support, does that have the approval of the Russians?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now we are still talking about close air support, we are still talking about Tuzla, and we are still talking about Srebrenica.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. OK. That is a subset of close air support.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that. But I have to get that straight in my mind. If I understand what you are saying to me, the members of the Security Council cannot veto that. Mr. Akashi makes the decision. We don't make it. Bill Clinton doesn't make it. Manfred Woerner doesn't make it. Mr. Akashi makes it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Akashi makes the decision as to whether the U.N. will approve the U.N. commander's request. I don't want to get ahead of the story, but the request simultaneously will have gone to an air element in the NATO command that is physically located in Italy, and, of course, it is always the case that the commander there who reports to Admiral Boorda has to agree that it is a militarily feasible operation.

Mr. HAMILTON. NATO comes into it at that point and presumably NATO has already made the judgment it is feasible; is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. NATO has, in effect, delegated to Admiral Boorda the political authority to go forward and respond to a NATO request, if that is a militarily feasible operation.

Mr. HAMILTON. What I want to get straight is, put aside the military commanders for a minute, where does the final political authority lie to send those airplanes in? Mr. Akashi.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In the Tuzla and Srebrenica cases, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is where it lies. OK. That is what I wanted to get straight.

Now, let's go to the strangulation of Sarajevo. Go ahead.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Just for completeness, in the close air support case because—bear in mind that this is conceived of as an essentially immediate battlefield situation—if this process of debate goes on very long, a unit that was pinned down is going to be very interested in the political result but not helped much when the airplanes get there.

The idea is that the U.N. political judgment would be exercised by the Secretary General or anybody else only in respect to the first request. Thereafter, the decisions would be made on a U.N. military to NATO military basis.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now, maybe I can shortcut this by asking you, in the event of the strangulation of Sarajevo approach—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. And it is different.

Mr. HAMILTON. [continuing]. where lies the final political, the ultimate political decision to attack?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It lies in two places.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It lies both with the U.N. Secretary General—

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And here the issue of, in a sense, who the Secretary General works for may be more involved, because we are not talking in this case about an immediate battlefield situation. We would be talking about such a thing as a complete blockade of Sarajevo or something like that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Which is not now occurring?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Which is not now occurring.

And concurrently, the decisions which were made in August by the North Atlantic Council provided that the North Atlantic Council, that is, the political authority of NATO, would also have to approve an initiation of air strikes in response to this kind of a contingency.

Steve was the principal American representative and he should speak—if I have said anything wrong, he should correct me.

Mr. OXMAN. I think you are absolutely right.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now, Boutros-Ghali must approve a strike related to the strangulation of Sarajevo. The U.N. must approve it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The U.N. must approve it.

Mr. HAMILTON. And by the U.N. I presume you mean the Security Council?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well—

Mr. OXMAN. Do you want me to comment?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Go ahead, Steve.

Mr. HAMILTON. What I am driving at here is, can the Russians veto it?

Mr. OXMAN. Right. In the case of the strangulation of Sarajevo and that type of use of air power, the NATO decision said that the Secretary General would have the authority and would need to consent in the first instance.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, need consent of whom?

Mr. OXMAN. The consent of the Secretary General. Whether in that case the Security Council or its members would insist upon a reference to the Security Council is an open question, and it is unclear to me—as it is not unclear in the case of the close support—it is unclear in this case as to whether the Secretary General would feel he needs to go to the Security Council in the case of this type of use of air power.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, that is just not clear at this point?

Mr. OXMAN. That is not clear. In our view, under the NATO decision of August, it would not be necessary to go to the Security Council. But I can't tell you that I know that all the members of the Security Council agree with that point of view.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Russians have indeed contacted Mr. Boutros-Ghali, have they not, and indicated that they want to be consulted on that decision?

Mr. OXMAN. I believe they have, Mr. Chairman. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have they said to him we are going to veto it?

Mr. OXMAN. I do not believe they have said that.

ARE AIR STRIKES IMMINENT

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now, to go back to an earlier question I asked, Mr. Slocombe, are air strikes imminent? You said no.

Mr. Oxman, I presume you agree with that.

Mr. OXMAN. I would agree with that, but I would like to, if I could, make a comment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Surely.

Mr. OXMAN. We support the report of the Secretary General concerning Tuzla and Srebrenica. As you know, those were two important subjects discussed at the Summit, the need, the humanitarian need, to make progress in both cases. We support the report.

The report contemplates three different scenarios, the first of which is to try to achieve these objectives on a consensual basis. The second of which is, if you cannot get agreement to proceed to do it on a nonconsensual basis, and in that scenario to call for close air support as needed if the UNPROFOR troops are attacked and request assistance, and we very much support that.

The question of whether that will unfold and how soon that may unfold is a function of whether an agreement is achieved under scenario one. And if not, how promptly the U.N. proceeds with scenario two.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me ask you, why, Mr. Slocombe, when I asked you, "Are air strikes imminent?" you said no? Why did you say that, might I ask you?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Because I believe that the outcome of this will be, if you will, U.N. scenario one. That is, if the U.N. proceeds on these fronts it will do so because it is able to get Serb consent for the operations. The exchange of the units in Srebrenica has already started and my sense is that that will presumably go forward with the usual hassling about what kind of equipment goes in and so on. How many people go in.

The U.N., if I understand it correctly, proposes to do the Tuzla airport reopening after the Srebrenica unit exchange has been completed, and the Serbs have not indicated that they will not agree to that. Whether that position will hold, time will tell.

Mr. HAMILTON. And on the question of strangulation—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In any event, the exchange of the unit isn't going to take place for a month.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Isn't going to be completed for a month, so I don't think we are in a situation where it is imminent.

STRANGULATION OF SARAJEVO

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, on the question of the strangulation of Sarajevo, I gather that under your view now the strangulation of Sarajevo is not occurring, even though we all know that the situation there is awful.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The situation in Sarajevo is an offense to humanity. I am in no way trying to say anything other than that.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the other hand, the August warning had in mind the situation in which the Serbs use their military power and

their geographical position absolutely to cutoff essential supplies by a variety of devices, and that is not happening.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it also true around Sarajevo that the Bosnian Muslims have had some gains, modest gains militarily? Is that correct or not?

Mr. OXMAN. There have certainly been—I wouldn't describe it as around Sarajevo particularly. Most of the positive gains have been in the central—

Mr. HAMILTON. I know the difference in the central, but I was thinking specifically around Sarajevo.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would be reluctant to characterize it as any significant gain around Sarajevo.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

I want to welcome Mr. Oxman and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe. We appreciate your assessment of what is happening in NATO and elsewhere in Europe. Events in Europe in the past few months have certainly created new sets of relationships, specifically the NATO Alliance and the future Partnership for Peace as well as ongoing concerns in Bosnia, Greece, Cyprus, and the after-effects of the Middle East.

These problems require a comprehensive and coordinated effort, whether political or military in nature, and we are at an important crossroads as we note the administration's concerns in discussing the future of Europe and our cooperative efforts.

With relation to NATO, we have a number of different institutions now in Europe whose stated mission is to address the issues of European security and stability: NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union, and now we have a United Nations role in the former Yugoslavia.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

Which of these—and I address this to both panelists—which of these institutions do you feel is primarily responsible for European security today? In what ways do these institutions complement each other and also overlap in their responsibilities? Are we in a situation where no single institution can address the types of conflicts that we see emerging in Europe today, in particular, the ethnic and nationalistic tensions? What are your views with regard to the implications of these situations and the various institutions that have been developed to address these problems?

Mr. OXMAN. Very good to see you, Congressman Gilman.

I would say that, as we said in the NATO declaration, NATO is the essential forum for the discussion and consideration of European security issues. This is the unanimous statement of the NATO allies: NATO is the essential forum.

And NATO is adapting itself so that it will be better able to meet the new kinds of security and stability challenges that come principally from the East.

At the same time, other institutions such as the CSCE have a very important role, and the lines between some of these functions

are not always very bright and very pristine, but the CSCE has a particular skill and capability to deal with conflict at what is called the lower end of the conflict spectrum, where it is possible that by sending in monitors or human rights observers, flashpoints can be addressed and flames can be avoided. So, the CSCE has a very important role to play at that end of the conflict spectrum.

The WEU, as we were saying earlier at the very beginning, is really in the process of building its own identity and doing so in a way that does not duplicate or replicate NATO but works cooperatively and in a complementary manner with NATO, and even will use NATO assets on a separable but not separate basis. So, there is a role for the WEU as well.

And I think I would come back to my first point, though, that we view NATO as the essential forum and then the other institutions do have an important function. It is important that these functions be coordinated effectively.

ROLE OF THE WEU AND NATO

Mr. GILMAN. I am not sure that I understand the distinction between the role of the WEU and NATO. What is the fine distinction between the role of these two institutions?

Mr. OXMAN. The WEU is really building its own identity at the present time. It is not comparable to NATO in the sense of being up and running and having assets and having common procedures. At the same time all of its members are members of NATO. So, it is a concept of developing a European Security and Defense Identity, to do it through the WEU, which we support as a part of the process of rebalancing responsibilities.

But it is very important that it be done in a way complementary to NATO and on a transparent basis so that we are not building up sort of a duplicate organization. And there is agreement among the Allies that it would be senseless to buildup a duplicate organization.

There was also agreement at NATO that we should work with this idea of making NATO assets available to the WEU when there are missions the WEU wishes to conduct in Europe which, for one reason or another, NATO does not wish to participate in, and these assets could then be made available to the WEU on what we have called a separable but not separate basis. The WEU could go forward with its mission, no duplication would have been occurring, and yet they would be operating as the WEU in that context.

Now, some of this is somewhat theoretical because the process is developing. But those are some of the conceptual guidelines that people are working with on the WEU.

Mr. GILMAN. Still sounds to me like a lot of unnecessary duplication.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Would it be possible to give to our committee an organizational chart showing the lines of distinction and categories, WEU, NATO, the joint task force, and even CSCE, where all of those—

Mr. OXMAN. Yes. We have that.

Mr. LANTOS. Senator Dole has already prepared one.

Mr. OXMAN. We would be happy to.

Mr. GILMAN. I am sure there may be some similarity in the charts when we see the final chart. But again, I am frank to say with all your explanation it almost sounds like WEU is a twin sister of the NATO group.¹

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE PLAN

Let me ask, what are the primary achievements of the recent NATO Summit in Brussels? It was the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force plan, as I understand it. The CJTF creates a mechanism for solely European military initiatives to take place with limited NATO support and involvement, again, almost duplicating what NATO does.

What is the significance of this proposal? Is this effort primarily directed at enhancing NATO's ability to get involved in peacekeeping and other missions where some but not all of the member states are willing to send out ground troops?

What kind of individual member state military initiatives does CJTF permit, and what type of NATO logistical support is involved? In what ways does CJTF further the goal of closer European defense cooperation that NATO can't do? What precisely then does this CJTF provide for, and what is the necessity for it?

Mr. OXMAN. Maybe I could take an initial stab at that, and then Secretary Slocombe could comment in more detail.

The CJTF—Combined Joint Task Force—is really a Combined Joint Task Force headquarters. It would be embedded in one of the major subordinate commands, one or more of the major subordinate commands of NATO.

So, you would have a dedicated unit, headquarters unit, within the major NATO subordinate commands that would be available to function when you have a non-Article V-type contingency, a peacekeeping problem, a search and rescue problem, a crisis management problem, a major humanitarian mission.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me interrupt.

Mr. OXMAN. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Can't NATO do that?

Mr. OXMAN. NATO can do that, but the way—as I was mentioning earlier—the way NATO has been structured since its creation was in a very different way to meet the threat of a massive attack, and the command structure at NATO, in a way that I am sure Secretary Slocombe can comment on better than I, has not been flexible enough to deal with these so-called non-Article V contingencies.

So, the whole concept here is to adapt NATO to be better able to meet these new kinds of problems. That is the beginning of the thought. And that could just be a NATO operation—right up to that point in the analysis it does not need to involve the WEU or anyone else.

But the concept links up with the WEU concept because there may be times when the WEU nations, the so-called defense component of the European Union, which is the WEU, the European pillar of the Alliance, which is this defense component of the European Union, they want to carry out some mission, let's say putting

¹ See letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, dated February 9, 1994 in the appendix. Attached chart, "European Security Institutions, 1993," may be found in the subcommittee file.

ships or boats in the Danube, which the WEU is now doing. They have boats—they have a mission in the Danube—which is a WEU mission.

Let's assume there is a mission they wish to do and which, for one reason or another, NATO, meaning in this case mainly the United States and Canada, say, "Well, we don't want to. We don't feel a need to join in that mission." Nevertheless, the WEU, rather than going off and creating a whole new infrastructure to carry out that mission, would have available to it, if NATO agreed, the Combined Joint Task Force headquarters that I mentioned that could be separated for this purpose to perform a WEU function.

So you have avoided creating a new headquarters unit. It is from a NATO headquarters unit that this CJTF is separated to be used on this particular function, and by avoiding duplication we have achieved an important result, that is, the concept of how the Combined Joint Task Force would work.

Now, if there are non-NATO nations and non-WEU nations who want to participate in some particular mission, if there is a major peacekeeping mission in the future, the CJTF concept also accommodates the notion that their troops, their resources, can participate and be part of the effort.

So, it is a very useful vehicle. It is a flexible vehicle, and it is quite new given the way NATO has been structured over time.

Walt, do you want to amplify that at all?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you want to add something to that, Mr. Slocombe?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think that is very well put. The problem with multinational military forces operating together is to have a structure, a command structure, a headquarters structure so that they can, in fact, operate in a coordinated function. That essentially is what NATO does for NATO—to provide that central nervous system, if you will.

Mr. GILMAN. Why can't NATO do it for all of these other countries?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, in a sense, there are two aspects to that. First, there will be occasions when "NATO," which has to operate by unanimous consent, does not get unanimous consent to act, either because—in the most centrally relevant case—the United States says this is not an operation which we want to send our combat forces.

The purpose of the CJTF is then to say, "OK. This is an operation we don't object to," and I will come to that in a second. "This is an operation we think is a fine idea if other people want to go off and do it. You provide the combat forces."

NATO would provide, if you will, the headquarters, the communications structure, the central nervous system for that operation, which was not per se a NATO operation.

Mr. GILMAN. Even though there isn't unanimous consent?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There would have to be unanimous consent to provide the headquarters structure. If you had a situation in which you had two NATO countries which were absolutely opposed to each other, or one NATO country which said, "This is a terrible

idea. It should never happen," then presumably the CJTF assets would not be available.

Mr. GILMAN. So, you are circumventing the unanimous consent theory?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, normally that is in our interest.

Mr. GILMAN. Oh, I see. In my mind, it is a great duplication and an added bureaucracy.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is exactly the opposite. It avoids a duplication. The European countries, for reasons that I find entirely understandable as they develop their economic and political and societal integration, are also going to want to develop foreign policy and defense integration. They are going to want to be able, in Steve's example, to go off and provide an interdiction force for an embargo or something like that.

The concern that the United States has historically had is that we have no objection to their doing this provided it is not done in ways that detract from the capacity of the Atlantic Alliance also to deal with problems. Partly detract politically by being a distraction. Partly detract just in terms of resources, by being expensive.

The WEU, if it wanted to, could create its own duplicate of a NATO headquarters with an international staff, with a communications structure, with a preexisting headquarters operation waiting to be used. What the CJTF does is precisely to avoid the necessity for the European countries to create this entirely duplicative operation.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, my time has run out. I thank the chairman for bearing with me, and I thank the gentlemen. I hope that at a later date maybe you could rid us of some of the haziness that surrounds all of this.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is inexcusably complicated and made worse by the fact that almost all of them have initials that, when translated, mean almost exactly the same thing to normal human beings.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just say I think Mr. Gilman has raised a series of very important questions that all of us have. We are struggling to understand this organizational arrangement, so your submissions to us I think are important and we hope that those will be prompt. The ones that Mr. Gilman requested.²

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. OXMAN. Could I just make one comment, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Sure.

Mr. OXMAN. I was confused myself on the phrase "Combined Joint Task Force." Walt can put this better than I, but I think "combined" refers to the fact that it is multinational, "joint" that it is multiservice—air-sea-land—and that is the reason for all the verbiage.

But we will submit something that clarifies your first point about the relationship of the organizations and gives greater amplification on the CJTF itself.

²See letter, dated February 9, 1994 from the Department of State in the appendix. An attached chart, "European Security Institutions, 1993," submitted by the Department of State may be found in the subcommittee file.

Mr. HAMILTON. And we would make that a part of the record, of course.³

Mr. Lantos.

WESTERN RESPONSE TO CRISIS IN BOSNIA

Mr. LANTOS. Well, with all due respect to both of you gentlemen, this has been one of the most surrealistic mornings I have sat through because fiction begets fiction and we have had an enormous amount of fiction. The reason why my colleagues don't understand things is because concoctions have been created because the real issues haven't been dealt with.

I am debating whether to deal with the Bosnia issue, which I will not because others here will. Let me just say that NATO would be at the pinnacle of its power today and would have total credibility had it issued a credible threat of force before this nightmare unfolded. And there is no way to crawl out from under the shame, the shame that is on all Western powers.

There are degrees of blame. The prime degree is on the perpetrators. The secondary degree is on the great European powers who have totally failed in their responsibility. The third degree is on the Bush administration which was in office when all of this unfolded. And I must say that this administration could have done a great deal better than it has.

And there is no degree of diplomatic verbiage that can camouflage the shame that I feel, and I hope to God you feel, in dealing with the issue of Bosnia. It is unconscionable to watch daily what is going on, and the diplomatic dithering doesn't cover up anything.

By the way, while still on that point, you talked about two kind of air strikes, Mr. Slocombe. Senator Glenn and a lot of other people who understand this talk about three kinds of air strikes, and the third kind being, of course, the only relevant one: namely, striking the decisionmakers.

The two you dealt with are peripheral. If air strikes are to be effective, in the judgment of those who understand these things, you deal with the decisionmakers. That is where air strikes are effective, not at the outermost tentacles of the octopus, trying to hit individual artillery pieces.

But let me get to NATO because others will deal with Bosnia. Bosnia is a shame that is hanging heavily over the whole West and no amount of diplomatic doubletalk can camouflage it. Now, about NATO.

NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONCEPT

I suspect there was quite a debate—I hope there was quite a debate within the administration when Partnership for Peace was finally agreed upon. And since Partnership for Peace was the policy that was finally decided upon, you as good soldiers support Partnership for Peace, and we as good soldiers will do our best to make it work. But let me tell you how serious the reservations are that many of us have concerning this whole concept.

³See letter, dated February 9, 1994 from the Department of State in the appendix. An attached chart, "European Security Institutions, 1993," submitted by the Department of State may be found in the subcommittee file.

It is a perverse concept. It has an illusion of equality. The Czech Republic and Turkmenistan have equal chances of joining NATO. That is what our Ambassador to NATO says, and on paper he is absolutely correct. And when you create fiction you get bogged down in fiction, and fiction compounded with fiction doesn't give you a decent answer.

The countries in greatest need of becoming partners of NATO are excluded. High-level administration officials say they don't want any more Greece- and Turkey-type conflicts. Well, the trouble is that in Central Europe and among the other countries that are theoretically eligible for NATO membership there are lots of potential Greece and Turkeys, which means that, theoretically, while the road is open, in fact, it is closed. If the Greek and Turkish conflict is pointed to as something we don't wish to duplicate, then clearly there are equally serious problems between Hungary and Romania or Hungary and Slovakia. Therefore, if that is the criterion, then none of the Central European countries will be admitted to NATO since admission requires approval by all 16 current members, and our Ambassador would vote against membership for these countries. I guarantee you this will be true 5 or 10 years from now, because there will always be somebody objecting to new members.

Let me also say that this open invitation enabled a country, Romania, one of the least democratic of those theoretically eligible for membership to pull a public relations coup. Romania was the first one to sign up as a partner in NATO, and it was a very clever move on the part of the Romanian regime. And they have made a tremendous public relations spectacle of this in Romania by saying: "Romania is number one, the first one to sign up for the Partnership for Peace Plan."

We should have determined the criteria by which nations qualify for participation, and ought not to have let the PR people take control.

But there is a more fundamental flaw that many of us see in this. For 45 years the Soviets claimed that NATO is an offensive, aggressive Alliance, and by saying these things publicly, we have sort of accepted this assumption.

Our statement, and one of you made this statement this morning, "We don't want to draw any lines." Well, there are lines. The lines are the current lines. And, if we don't want to draw any new lines, by definition, nobody can get into NATO.

There will be lines. Two years from now, 6 months from now, 6 years from now some country will be admitted, at which point, by definition, there are new lines because all of the countries from Turkmenistan to the Czech Republic won't be admitted all at once.

So, there is a logical inconsistency in the administration's statement, which I have heard at all levels, including from the two of you gentlemen, that we don't want to draw new lines in Europe. If you say that then, what you are saying is nobody can ever be admitted to NATO, which you state is not what you mean.

CRITERIA FOR NEW NATO MEMBERSHIP

So, you are either saying nobody will ever be admitted or you are saying, yes, there will be new lines. Because the moment you admit

the Czech Republic or Poland or Hungary or Lithuania there are new lines. So, you can't have it both ways, and everybody from Les Aspin to Warren Christopher on down has said it ad nauseam, no new lines in Europe, because that would be destabilizing. I would like both of you to react to that.

I would also express great disappointment in failing to recognize that laying out a realistic set of criteria, objective criteria that various countries can meet and when they meet them they will be admitted, would have done an enormous amount to strengthen the democratic forces in these countries. This is because NATO, while it is primarily a security Alliance, is also an enormous democratizing influence. By leaving this point vague, open, nebulous and mushy, so that theoretically Turkmenistan and the Czech Republic are on the same level, which you, as well as I know is not the case, we have done nothing to strengthen the democratic forces which so desperately need strengthening in practically all of these countries.

I truly believe that by following this very cautious approach, we are missing an historic opportunity, especially given the maniacal rantings of Zhirinovsky, which frighten a lot of people in that part of the world. We are providing NATO membership for Portugal but not for the Czech Republic, when the Czech Republic needs it a hell of a lot more than Portugal.

We also have not diminished our security obligations because were the Czech Republic to be attacked by anybody NATO would act. So, we have taken on responsibilities without the benefits of gaining additional members to NATO who are fully prepared to assume NATO responsibility.

I would be grateful if you would comment on any of my observations.

Mr. OXMAN. Thank you, Congressman Lantos.

I think that at the root of the point of view that you are discussing is perhaps the difference of view on this concept of inclusiveness at the starting gate. We looked at the issue very carefully of having a form of differentiation from day one, and we looked carefully at the arguments for doing that. We came to the view that by having an inclusive approach, a nondiscriminatory approach that would not draw new lines—because there are existing lines, I grant you, but that would not draw new lines—that we would be more likely to foster the chance of creating European-wide integration, and that we would not be taking a step which, on its face, could be interpreted as prejudging what the outcome is likely to be in countries to the East, including Russia.

There was no Russian veto on any of this. We thought this through. We asked ourselves: "If we want to try to capitalize upon the opportunity to create Europe-wide integration, a new phenomenon in history, really, why should we take a step which could always be taken later, if necessary? But why should we take it now if it could have the effect of impeding the achievement of that vision?" That was the concept.

At the same time, we recognized that these countries are very different from each other, and you have given examples of that. So, we built into our idea very much the ability for these countries to differentiate themselves through their own conduct, and you will

see that happening. You will see that happening as the Partnership for Peace unfolds.

I know from my own consultations with all of the governments of Eastern Europe that they have different ideas as to how intensively to involve themselves in the Partnership for Peace. So some will become more active than others, and this will be a relevant, very significant factor.

If, over time, it becomes apparent that our hopes have been dashed and the hope for very good progress toward a Europe-wide integration is not there, then we can change course. When we say it is an evolutionary process that means it is a process where judgments can be made along the way to take account of developments along the way. And in that sense you create time to make those judgments by the approach that we have chosen.

At the same time, we are very conscious of your point of wanting to strengthen the democratic forces in these countries. We do think that through participation in the Partnership for Peace, and through the fact that they can choose how actively to become involved, this process of strengthening those forces can occur without at the same time having to, as we say, draw a new line now in Europe. So, I think that is the fundamental point on which we may have a difference of view.

Now, if down the road we do take in new members to NATO, and the President has said the question isn't whether but when and how, that will be done pursuant to Article X of the treaty. That will require the votes of all of the members of NATO. It will require a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate.

We have not established a timetable for that, again because we want to take this time to see how events will develop before drawing a new line. But we feel that the Article X plus the principles of the treaty really set forth all the criteria that would be needed to make that judgment.

It is a very serious judgment that every single one of the NATO governments will have to make because it entails a security guarantee. It entails a statement that we will send our sons and daughters, if necessary, to defend. And we have felt that the treaty itself does have adequate provisions in this regard.

I want to make just one final point. We were very clear in deciding the Partnership for Peace that it does not entail a security guarantee, but we built in a provision for security consultations which is analogous to Article IV of the NATO treaty, and it provides formally that if one of the members of the Partnership for Peace believes its political independence or territorial integrity or security is threatened it has the right to consult formally with NATO about that situation.

Now, that is not a security guarantee, but it also is more than we had before. It is, we think, a significant development, particularly in the context of the overall effort of the Partnership for Peace.

With respect to your comment on people coming in to sign up, my only observation is that we have invited all the members of the NACC to join, and it really was for each of them to decide when to come and sign the framework document subject to their own internal procedures. I know some of the governments are still going

through internal procedures to get approvals on that. But we felt it was consistent with the rationale of the nondifferentiated approach at the starting gate.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The only thing I want to add to that is you made the important point about the preparation for a real military Alliance, and in an important sense what the Partnership will allow those countries that are—it is easier for you to say it than for me—that are the serious candidates for potential membership, it will allow them, in effect, to do much of the transition and preparation and association before membership rather than afterwards.

The point that Secretary Oxman makes about self-differentiation is, I think, central to this proposition; that is, while it is true that all of the countries that are eligible start out equal in a formal sense, it is certainly our understanding and our intention that they will not end up, because they won't be capable—in a variety of senses of the word capable, they won't be capable of maintaining the same relationship.

And what will count—you make the observation about Romania signing up first—what will count in the end is not who gets their signature on the framework document first, but the character of the cooperative relationships that they are prepared to enter into and the military associations and military security cooperation that is established under the Partnership.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, what bothers me about your very eloquent answers, both of you, is that it is analogous to my wanting to join a club which doesn't give me either a timetable or criteria to determine at which point I am qualified to enter the club.

Now, maybe you don't know, but I do, how unhappy the most likely candidates are with everything that has unfolded, and if for diplomatic reasons they don't dare so publicly that is understandable. They are furious and feel left out.

EU VETO OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

Let me also say that my understanding is that the British, at least the British, have taken the position that until a country joins the European Union they will not vote for its admission into NATO. That means that the European Union now has a veto on NATO membership. Is that accurate?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, virtually all the members of the European Union are de facto members of NATO. It is a point Mr. Oxman made and that I think Ambassador Hunter has made. It is simply a fact of how NATO works. But until there is a consensus on the admission of additional members none can be admitted. It isn't that the European Union—I don't necessarily agree with your characterization of the British position—but if it were the case it is a simple fact that unless the countries in the Alliance who are also members of the European Union want to agree to a country becoming a member of NATO it won't happen.

Mr. LANTOS. Norway is not a member of the European Union and it is a member of NATO.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right. But it isn't that the European—the simple answer to your question is no, the European Union has no veto over any NATO decision. But it is a fact that important members

of the European Union are also members of NATO and the members of NATO have a veto.

And your question, although it isn't intended to, in fact illustrates the complexity of the problem. That it is not simply a question of whether you or I or the United States would like to see these countries join NATO, and even if within the United States it were possible to agree that the Czechs are in and the Estonians are out, which would not be a terribly popular decision, it has to be a consensus operation for all of NATO.

What this offers us an opportunity to do, without having to deal with all of these immensely difficult formal issues is to begin the practical preparation for real security association with these countries. And, while it is true that—Steve has been to all of them, I have been to a lot of them—every country in Central and Eastern Europe would like to, in some sense, become a member of NATO.

I think it is also true that they have an understanding that this is not just a second best. But this is an important, positive step that they can take that doesn't just—I mean NATO is not a club. That is an analogy we should strike from our minds. I am not sure what the analogy is. But in an important sense—what it is is a military alliance and it is better to talk about it in those terms.

What the Partnership for Peace will offer countries that want to become NATO members is an opportunity to do the preparation, to get—even in the political sense that Steve mentions—to get some of the security association to do that preparation in advance of stepping up to what will inevitably be the very tough decision about formal membership.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.

EXPANSION OF NATO

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for letting me sit in on the subcommittee since I am not a member. I have tried to follow NATO affairs as closely as possible, as well as the evolution of the WEU from a moribund organization to what it is today, and the long debate about the form and formation of a European pillar for the North Atlantic Alliance.

I share some of the concerns that Mr. Lantos has voiced, but I don't share his conclusions. As I said to Ambassador Talbott when he appeared before us, I believe that the administration has taken the proper step with respect to the evolution of NATO into a larger body, and that your positions at the Summit were appropriate.

I think it is understandable how more precipitous action on moving toward membership would be very welcome in Budapest, or Riga, or Bratislava, or Prague, or anyplace else. But immediate membership is unlikely to be in the long-term best interest of the United States or the NATO Alliance to do that precipitously, and that if this evolutionary process has difficulties it can be accelerated.

So, I want to commend you for the steps you have taken. If you need somebody to support you in what you have done from this side of the aisle, I am your spokesmen, or one of them.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is very generous, and we appreciate it.

Mr. BEREUTER. I just have a couple of questions and concerns that I wanted to share with you that go beyond this question. I do think that we were caught short with the precipitous end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

"OUT-OF-AREA" POLICY

If we had had something in place like a firm NATO policy that they were willing to cross the out-of-area threshold, and if we had Combined Joint Task Forces as a concept that was up and working, perhaps we could have avoided what happened in Yugoslavia. But I think that the steps that are taken now, we have firmly crossed that out-of-area threshold, we have the Combined Joint Task Force as a concept that we can make work, it can avoid some of those problems.

My first concern is that the Combined Joint Task Force will only be as effective as the forces that are available for action under that leadership. If the United States doesn't participate, as we may well not participate in certain instances in the future, I think it could well be a hollow force.

If you take a look beyond the British and the French and the Americans for out-of-area kind of actions, there really are no substantial numbers of armed personnel. The Germans have tied one hand behind their back and seem unable at this point to break that knot. The Germans are out of action on out-of-area issues for the moment until they resolve the constitutional dilemma, or the perception that they have a constitutional dilemma.

We have a cascading reduction of forces going on in NATO, and it is being done without any discernible framework, and some of the countries have really decimated their forces and have other actions in line to further decrease their forces.

If you just focus on Belgium, that is probably the country that benefits most from NATO headquarters, and see what they have done; you are not going to have any forces left. I think the United States ought to have some leadership expressed to say this kind of dramatic reduction in force by NATO countries is not in the best interest of the West Europeans and the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO has to have some sort of framework for orderly reduction because now countries are preemptively making their reductions, getting them now before somebody finally brings some order to this problem. I urge you to take some action in that area, because otherwise the Combined Joint Task Force is a hollow concept.

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

The second thing I wanted to mention to you is something that I have seen evolve in the North Atlantic Assembly, the legislative arm of NATO. I know that the executive branch people look at the North Atlantic Assembly with some sense of humor or, perhaps, skepticism. But, in fact, that Assembly provides the consensus for action in the parliaments or congresses or legislative bodies of the 16 countries.

I have seen there, as you can see in some of the reports that we have done about the future of NATO, that there is now a slight majority of members basically left of center in the governments, the parties of the West European countries, that believe that NATO, in

effect, is an arm of the United Nations. We have had this fought out in forum and we have failed despite the unanimous opposition by the American delegation which spans from left to right in this Congress.

We have seen that they have pushed through in that Assembly the concept that NATO can be used for out-of-area actions only with the approval of the CSCE or the United Nations. That, of course, makes you hostage to a Security Council veto by China or any other country. And you are certainly not going to get a consensus, a unanimous position out of CSCE on anything.

So, I think this is something that will grow as a problem for the United States, and it will make it impossible for us to use the Combined Joint Task Force unless we make it absolutely clear that the decision rests with the NATO ministers of the 16 countries and has nothing to do with the Security Council, the United Nations or the CSCE.

I believe that this was clearly the position of the American Delegation and some 20 members recently. We have good support from some countries but we lose these arguments increasingly in the North Atlantic Assembly. I think you are going to have that problem among those European countries that are participants now if we don't begin to make the position quite clear that NATO and its Combined Joint Task Force are not limited to actions that are approved by the United Nations.

I wanted to share these two concerns with you and hope that maybe you will take some action on these as a part of your responsibilities. I would like any reactions you might have.

APPROVAL FOR NATO ACTIVITY

Mr. OXMAN. Could I comment on the last point, and then perhaps Walt could comment on the issue of the drawdowns. We agree with what you just said. NATO does not require U.N. or CSCE approval in order to undertake NATO activity, and we did not take any position inconsistent with that at the NATO Summit, either.

Obviously, there will be many instances where NATO will act pursuant to authority granted by the U.N. or under some form of expression of support from the CSCE. But it has been our position that that is not the exclusive way by any means that NATO can act, and I think you have seen that in some of the NATO activity with respect to Bosnia. So, we certainly agree with you on that point.

Mr. BEREUTER. I understand that. But this is consistent with the bipartisan view in Congress. It is consistent with the Bush, Reagan, Carter, and Clinton administrations. But my concern is what is evolving in Europe.

Mr. OXMAN. Well, that is a very good point and I can assure you that we are quite vigilant about that point because we think it is essential that we preserve this concept that NATO does not require this type of authority in all instances in order to act.

Walt, did you want to comment on the other aspects?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I fully agree with your concerns about not only the pace but also the shape and lack of coordination of troop cuts. All the countries in NATO, importantly, including the United

States, are making substantial cuts in their forces, and that is appropriate. It is the right thing to do.

It is extremely important that it be done in a coordinated way, and that we as an Alliance look at the forces that are going to be remaining and assure ourselves that we have used the resources that are available to meet common needs. That is a tough job because there are, as you know from your contact with European parliamentarians, there are in European countries even more than in this country all of the pressures on resources and so on.

NATO does have a structure. One of its advantages is that it provides a structure for a collective discussion of each other's defense programs. So, it provides a forum to do that. That doesn't provide the answers but it provides a mechanism to raise those concerns, and we have been raising them and will be raising them in the future.

I think one of the effects of people in Europe, as well as in this country, coming to realize even more vividly—and we have Mr. Zhirinovskiy to thank for this, at least in part—that military force remains relevant to the security of Europe will make people willing, perhaps, to look more seriously at some of the implications of what they are doing and to how we have to shape the drawdown of the forces so we keep an effective force NATO-wide.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for sharing your thoughts with us this morning.

LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IN BOSNIA AND WAR CRIMES

I have a single, fairly focused question and then just a more general musing. To return to Bosnia, Mr. Oxman said this morning that the lifting of sanctions would be tied or conditioned on a good faith implementation of a negotiated settlement. And I am under the impression that Ambassador Albright suggested in Croatia that the lifting of sanctions would be tied to the war crimes process. Those are two clearly very different processes on two very different levels involving different actors. Are we talking about an either/or situation or a both situation, or are we talking about different sanctions?

Mr. OXMAN. I think with respect to the linkage of the lifting of sanctions to the peace negotiations we have been very, very clear, and this is a very important point because the sanctions are the most important leverage we have in this situation. The U.N. Security Council, when it last renewed the UNPROFOR mandate, passed a resolution which also made clear a linkage to the situation in Krajina in Croatia, that any effort to lift the sanctions would have to take this situation into account as well, and we support that.

With respect to the War Crimes Tribunal, we, the U.S. Government, expect all of the states of the former Yugoslavia to fulfill their obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 to cooperate with the Tribunal in what we consider to be a very, very important mission.

If Serbia does not cooperate with the Tribunal, the United States will consider such behavior when the time comes to make a deci-

sion on lifting or easing the sanctions, as Ambassador Albright said. And we will also consider the possibility of the Security Council imposing sanctions on any state of the former Yugoslavia that fails to cooperate with the Tribunal in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 827.

Mr. SAWYER. Do I hear you correctly saying that they are in effect coexistent, simultaneous, and may, in fact, deal with sanctions but that they are both—that there is no conflict between them, but rather—

Mr. OXMAN. No conflict at all that we see.

U.N. ROLE IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. Let me just offer this, and I would ask for your comments or not as the case may be. But it seems to me that one of the great difficulties that we have faced in bringing a clear conclusion to our current involvement in Somalia has been the difficulty in understanding the very high profile that the Secretary General took with regard to the whole business of disarmament, disarming I should say, in an arrest operation there.

I am left wondering what greater trust his military judgment might be in a vastly more complex European setting than it has been in a somewhat less complicated African situation, as both this Congress and the Nation more broadly has struggled to come to grips with our role in international multilateral operations.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, point one, I guess, is that it was not at the U.S. initiative that the Secretary General has the role which he has in either of these arrangements, which is not to say that it isn't understandable. It just wasn't our affirmative idea that it was workable.

However, the fact is that the operation in Bosnia is a United Nations' operation, and for reasons that are understandable from a U.N. perspective, and—you know the U.N. isn't a thing, it is a collection of countries that are active in the operation—they were unwilling to yield either to, in the case of the close air support, to the commander on the ground or in the case of the strangulation attacks they were unwilling to yield all that authority to NATO, and this was the reason they made that judgment.

I think it is fair to say that, in the concrete case of Srebrenica and Tuzla, the Secretary General has recognized the impracticality of having essentially tactical decisions be made at that distance. In the case of the strangulation, it is a more political decision and the same practical problems don't arise.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Borski.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. This gives me an opportunity to add one point. Along with what Mr. Lantos said, with most of the emotion I agree. There was one particular point that I do want to just make sure the record is correct on, that what he called the third type of air attacks is not excluded as a priority in the NATO August warning.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Borski.

Mr. BORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ISSUANCE OF VISA TO GERRY ADAMS

Mr. Oxman, I would like to ask a question or two about what happened this weekend with Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein and what the Department's view is. I noted in the *New York Times* today that the President overruled Mr. Christopher for the visa. Is that correct?

Mr. OXMAN. Congressman, I don't want to get into a discussion of the internal deliberations that led to the result. It is the position of the administration to waive the ineligibility so that he could have the visa for a very limited period, and it was motivated by the desire to advance the peace process and by a feeling that the Joint Declaration of the British and Irish Governments is a good thing and that we should be supportive of it.

But I would rather not get into a discussion of the internal debate within the administration which led to this particular outcome.

Mr. BORSKI. I am curious about the limitations, if you will. Are they normal when visas are granted to people such as Gerry Adams? Are the limitations normal? And specifically, the limitation on the travel?

I mean I can understand a visa having a limitation on hours and time, how long someone may be in a country, and a prohibition against raising funds. But it seems a little silly almost to have a limitation on how far a person can travel when in this country when, of course, you can go on Larry King and be in everyone's house all across the country. It seems kind of silly that you can't travel 90 miles to Philadelphia, if you so chose, from New York City.

Mr. OXMAN. I think it is not uncommon to have travel restrictions in visas. I was not familiar with any of the considerations that went into the particular limitations on this matter, except that it was clearly keyed to his interest in attending a particular event in New York City, which he did attend, as you know.

EXPANSION OF NATO

Mr. BORSKI. And now if I could shift gears to the Partnership for Peace for a few questions. In his press conference in Brussels, President Clinton stated ultimately that the Partnership for Peace will lead to an enlargement of NATO. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. OXMAN. I am not sure which particular statement you are referring to. I think the President's statement is that the issue is not whether NATO will expand but how and when. That is really the way I would put it, and that goes to the fact that in the NATO declaration there is a statement that the Allies expect and would welcome an expansion of NATO to include the democracies to the east as part of an evolutionary process. That is the position.

Mr. BORSKI. Is there any timetable that you have in mind? Are we looking at 5 years? Ten years, more or less?

Mr. OXMAN. We deliberately did not include a timetable, Congressman, either in our initiative, nor did the Allies seek to incorporate that into the NATO declaration. We wanted to preserve the idea of nondiscrimination and inclusiveness and then to see how the Partnership for Peace would develop so that judgments could

be made along the way as to when to move forward on the expansion of NATO.

POLAND AND NATO EXPANSION

Mr. BORSKI. A particular concern and interest in Poland, their place in history, that hopefully won't repeat itself. It seems to me that Poland has made great strides in establishing democratic institutions, freedom-loving democratic people.

How are they going to know how much to progress or how far to go to gain some kind of approval into NATO. It seems to me that they are on the right track, moving in the right direction, but don't know where the goal line is or when they will cross it. Is there any hope of establishing clearer criteria in the near term?

Mr. OXMAN. I think the main objective for the nations of the East, and I sense this in my own discussions with them, is to become very actively involved in the Partnership for Peace, both politically and militarily. We have not had it in our thinking to deviate from the idea of not setting forth new criteria other than those set forth in the treaty itself. We think that is a good approach. There are standards and principles set forth there.

And, while there is an understandable feeling on the part of some governments: "Tell us when, tell us exactly how," we felt that if we got into that we would then be acting inconsistent with the basic principle, which was not to imply a new bloc system, not to draw a new line at this time, because we have the conviction that this is a unique moment in history where, if we proceed wisely, we may have a chance of fostering true integration on a Europe-wide basis. So that is why we avoided that.

Mr. BORSKI. One final question, Mr. Chairman, if I may?

RUSSIAN VETO

How do you respond to the criticism that in denying membership to the Eastern European countries that you are effectively permitting a Russian veto?

Mr. OXMAN. Well, that is something that we have heard said, but I can tell you as someone deeply involved, as was Walt Slocombe, in all aspects of evolving our proposal and then carrying it through, there was no Russian veto, period. We did not hear from the Russians telling us what they thought we should do.

There were the statements that President Yeltsin made in Warsaw and then the various other statements, but this was not a factor in our decision. No Russian veto. This was a decision we made as the U.S. Government trying to think through what is best for our country, what is best for our Alliance.

Mr. BORSKI. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your generosity. As we all know I am not a member of the subcommittee, and I appreciate your leadership, particularly as to some questions previously asked in this hearing.

Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Oxman, good to see you both. I want to thank Mr. Oxman, because through all of our meetings and encounters and contacts, Steve, you have always treated me with dignity and courtesy and graciousness and intelligence.

Mr. OXMAN. I appreciate your comment.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY I don't really blame the failures that were alluded to as to Bosnia particularly on any one individual. I do, however, think there is a real leadership gap, to say the least.

I want to ask four or five questions. Two of the most innocent parties who are suffering the most severe problems and tragedies are Bosnia and Macedonia.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR BOSNIA AND MACEDONIA

As you know, we are going through another winter in Macedonia with severe food distribution and wheat availability problems. For 5 or 6 months, I believe, the Macedonian representative has been asking for 80,000 metric tons of wheat for bread. I have heard reports in the last week that they are slaughtering pigs and other farm animals that they can't feed anymore.

What is the administration's position on this? I know there has been a problem with the Greeks. I have also heard reports that maybe we would be ready to go on with this except for Mr. Tarnoff signing off and a very prominent and much respected U.S. Senator. Why can't this struggling little innocent, potentially dynamic, country which supports U.S. goals in a true stable democracy, and in a very tough situation, why can't we expedite some wheat to them, as January has passed and we are into February?

Mr. OXMAN. I want to look at the particular point you are raising there because it is my understanding that some of the things they are requesting by way of food assistance cannot be done with respect to a country that we do not recognize. But I want to look at what you are saying. If there is anything inconsistent with that—

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I praise the administration for the fact that we have troops in this country that we do not recognize.

Mr. OXMAN. Right. That is a very good point. What I was advised was there is a legal problem in connection with P.L. 480 assistance to a country we don't recognize, but I will double check that point.⁴

Let me just say generally we have provided assistance to Macedonia, economic assistance, and we are very, very conscious of their needs and of the important role Macedonia has in trying to help maintain regional stability.

RECOGNITION OF MACEDONIA

With respect to the question of recognition, we are currently reviewing the question of our diplomatic relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and we do not rule out moving ahead with recognition in the near future. That review is taking place in the context of the recent decision in December of several countries, including six of Greece's European Union partners—the UK, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark,—to establish diplomatic relations with the FYROM, as we call it.

And I believe it is the case, Congressman, that all EU countries other than Greece have now recognized FYROM. So, that is where that stands on recognition.

⁴See letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, dated February 9, 1994 in the appendix.

But we are very sensitive to the food issue that you have raised and I want to get you a specific answer on that point.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Maybe we can talk within a couple of days Steve. I would really appreciate it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. When can we expect a decision on this recognition of FYROM?

Mr. OXMAN. I can't predict that, Mr. Chairman. The review is ongoing and I don't have a specific time.

Mr. HAMILTON. It has been ongoing for quite a while.

Mr. OXMAN. Well, this is a review we undertook starting in December in the wake of the decisions by the various EU countries that I mentioned.

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't think a decision is imminent?

Mr. OXMAN. I would not rule that out, but I can't give you a specific undertaking on that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it at the White House level?

Mr. OXMAN. It will be made at the White House level, the decision on—

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that. Is it there now?

Mr. OXMAN. I believe it is in the White House. That is right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FOOD SUPPLIES IN SARAJEVO

Now, turning to Bosnia, I might say we all know what the current media reports are. And, Mr. Slocombe, I talked to Mr. Silajdzic within the last 2 or 3 days from Sarajevo, and for various reasons, I have every tendency to respect and trust him. He says the food supplies, et cetera, as to Sarajevo, and obviously other areas, are at a significant or perhaps an all-time low. I am sure it is well under 50 percent of adequate nutrition getting in to the Bosnian people in these various locations and it is probably worse in Sarajevo than elsewhere.

But today I guess I heard you say for the first time that a siege is to be defined as a total blockade or nonaccess, if you will. As you know, 50 people die a day. The shelling goes on. People are freezing. Eighty-two-year-old women jumping out of windows because there is no hope. I am not trying to pin you on this.

Mr. OXMAN. I understand.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. What I would like to get to for the record is a stated definition of a siege. Is it our policy that this is strangulation?

Mr. OXMAN. If I gave that impression, I am happy to have the opportunity to correct it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. OK.

Mr. OXMAN. And, as I know I did say, there is no question that what is going on in Sarajevo is an outrage.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No. I heard that loud and clear. I am talking about, obviously, what springs the reaction.

Mr. OXMAN. I understand. It is certainly not our position that only a complete and total cutoff of everything constitutes grounds to call on the Alliance to make good on its warning.

On the other hand, the fact is that there is a certain level of supply, and it involves two issues: one is cutting off supplies and the other direct attacks. We have made clear that the purpose of these warnings is not to find a reason to go and drop bombs. It is to change behavior, so that we have had a repeated pattern of Serb conduct that if continued, in my view, would force us to go to the Alliance and say: "OK, we said in August we would bomb. The situation is now such that we have to bomb." The normal pattern is then that that activity reduces. We had a big spike in shelling earlier this month.

There is not an agreed specific list of, if 2,800 shells hit for 8 successive days, then that is strangulation.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I understand.

Mr. OXMAN. We watch the situation constantly. We have used that warning, I think to good effect, in being able to affect Serb behavior, and if behavior of this kind persisted we would certainly be prepared to go back to the Alliance and urge in the strongest possible terms that we make good, that we carry out the bombing.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I don't want to go on and on about this. We all know the documented history. But, at some point, there has to be a follow-up on the threat or warning or what credibility we may have left is gone.

Steve, how about recent dynamics with the more formal Serb-Croat Alliance, the reports that more and more both Serbian and Croatian regular troops are pouring into Bosnia in violation of international norms, and what are we going to do about that?

SANCTIONS AGAINST CROATIA

I guess as Tudjman becomes more like Milosevic, and, as you know, I have been a friend and backer of Croatia, I am most disappointed by Croatian governmental leadership trends. But there has been some talk of sanctions on Croatia. Is there any action we can take with the European Community to reverse or mitigate that trend?

Mr. OXMAN. Well, let me say we are very concerned about the reports of a sharp increase in direct Croatian regular army support to the Bosnian Croat forces. We do know that individual Croatian advisers and soldiers formerly belonging to the Croatian army have been operating in Bosnia for some time, but we do not have firm information on these latest reports which are of great concern to us, and I know they are of concern here on Capitol Hill.

I believe there is an amendment on the Senate side, a "sense of the Senate" resolution, that the U.S. Government should impose sanctions on Croatia if they have, in fact, sent forces into a sovereign country, the sovereign country of Bosnia.

And we will make our view very strongly known on this, and I think if this continues there is going to be an international move in the direction of sanctions on Croatia. During her visit to Zagreb earlier in January Ambassador Albright made clear to President Tudjman that we will hold Croatia accountable for Bosnian Croat behavior in Bosnia, and that sanctions may be justified if Croatia directly intervenes in Bosnia militarily. And we are going to watch this very, very closely.

We have also put the government of Croatia on notice that failure to act to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts will have serious implications for our relations with Croatia. And, as you know, we don't want to jeopardize Croatia's willingness to help care for about 700,000 Bosnian refugees, about 300,000 of whom are Muslims, who are now in Croatia.

But we view the situation as extremely serious, these reports of regular Croatian army moving into Bosnia.

LIFTING OF ARMS EMBARGO

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Just one concluding question or observation. I recently polled my district, and quite frankly a strong majority of my district says no right now to any military intervention against my opinions or wishes or whatever in Bosnia, but I will say I can sense from the town meetings recently, the veterans groups, and meeting people in the coffee shops that the interest in this, with the genocidal images coming over the TV, is increasing. We may possibly be on the cusp of a turn or some statistical difference, to say the least, in public opinion.

I note 87 to 9 the U.S. Senate, to its everlasting credit, voted to lift the arms embargo in a nonbinding resolution and to provide military equipment. Does that mean anything to the administration, to see an 87 to 9 vote on an issue of such import?

Particularly, it concerns me as the Brits talk about pulling their forces, and the French also, out of Bosnia. The implication being that the arms embargo would still be in place and we would have an even more ongoing slaughter.

But, Steve, the State Department and administration had an 87 to 9 vote, you know, with people like Harry Reid getting up and saying: "I thought the other way until recently. I was wrong. I cannot take this anymore."

Is that being heard over in our—

Mr. OXMAN. Very much so. And, as you know, we have supported lifting the arms embargo. We have a difference of view in that it is our understanding that because this embargo was imposed through Security Council action that it can only be lifted by Security Council action, even by the terms of Article 51 of the charter itself, which specifically refers to—while talking about the right of self-defense, it goes onto address if the Security Council has moved in to act in a particular situation.

We believe the arms embargo has operated in an enormously unjust and unfair manner, and it has been our position since last spring, since the beginning of this administration, as you know, Congressman, to support a lifting of the arms embargo, but we have not been able to get a consensus view on that so that it could be done in the Security Council.

I think that vote is a very impressive vote. I grant you that very much.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I am being redundant, but I would urge increasing pressure and more energized leadership.

Thank you, Mr. Oxman.

Mr. OXMAN. If I could just say one further word on that. It is not just a technical legal concern that I am raising. The fact is that, given the legal provisions in question, if we were to act unilaterally

to ignore this resolution, then others could use this argument and say they are permitted to act unilaterally in other contexts.

For example, they are permitted to send in arms to Serbia, which is prohibited by the arms embargo. They could say, "Well, if you are disregarding that we are going to send arms into Serbia," and we think that would be very counterproductive to our position.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I understand. But I will say also, and we don't need to go into all of the legalities and histories of thought on this, but I think there is a seriously strong legal and moral case that no body can legislate away any sovereign nation's right to self-defense, and there is serious international law expertise on this, as you know. But we are not going to resolve that today.

Well, thank you very much. I really appreciate it.

Mr. OXMAN. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, I have got several questions I would like to ask. I know you have been here quite a while but there are some areas we haven't explored.

AIR STRIKES

I want to go back to the questions on air strikes in Bosnia, and ask you, Mr. Slocombe, since you are from the Defense Department, let's assume that we have air strikes. I would like you to just comment on how effective those strikes would be, in your judgment, and what the problems are and what the risks are?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is a little difficult to do that in open session because it involves some operational judgments. Let me say a few things generally.

There is no question that the threat of air strikes is an important lever and that there is also no question that a determined air campaign sustained over a long period of time would have a very strong effect on the military situation in the country.

Air strikes, however, are not a panacea, and certainly the military effect of a single strike of a limited character would, by definition, be limited. For example, people often talk, and it is in many ways an attractive idea, of using air strikes against Serbian heavy weapons, the weapons that Congressman Lantos so eloquently denounces. That is not even a tactically simple operation and it would be a significant military task to locate and strike those weapons over a sustained period of time, assuming that the Serbians took action to maintain their capability.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have heard a lot about how easy it is to conceal Serbian military artillery. Is that your view?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You don't have to be a military expert to understand that you can take the artillery which is now largely in the open, and if you think it is about to be attacked, or particularly if you understand that large parts of it were attacked yesterday, you could put it literally in barns, houses, schools, garages, under trees. At that point it becomes, obviously, more difficult to locate.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, I gather what you are saying to me here is that limited air strikes will not be all that effective. Is that what you are telling me?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Depends on what you mean by effective and limited.

Mr. HAMILTON. Excuse me.

Mr. OXMAN. Effective in striking—

Mr. HAMILTON. It depends on a lot of things. It depends on what I mean by limited. It depends on what I meant by effective. But I am just trying to get a sense from you—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let's take hypothetically attacking the artillery around Sarajevo. You will get, especially in the first attack, and if you keep the intention to attack out of the newspapers, you will get a fairly high percentage of the artillery that you have located will have been disabled.

One of the awkward points about artillery tubes is they are designed to have explosions go on inside them, so they are actually quite hard. But you will in the first round get a significant part of what you can find.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me get at it this way. You and I talked a little earlier in this hearing about the chain of command and the difficulties and so forth of ordering air strikes, and I think we have a sense of the political side of that as a result of the testimony you both have given.

So you are operating here in the world of what is feasible politically, given the limitations of the United Nations and our Allies and all the rest of it. And I don't think anybody would think under those circumstances you are going to see a long, sustained bombing campaign to blast out and eliminate Serbian artillery, as I understand the situation.

What you are really talking about here is a quite limited air strike in support of very specific objectives, getting the humanitarian aid through to the airport and so forth. And what I am trying to do is get a sense of how effective that kind of air support would be for the kind of things that you think are feasible air operations today.

Do I make myself clear?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. You make yourself clear but the answer isn't simple. Take the easiest case. The U.N. unit that is pinned down by a presumably Serbian, but it could be Bosnian or Croatian, fire. The military authorities are highly confident that they could attack because they would be in coordination with a unit that has got forward air controllers on the ground, that is a military unit in almost all cases integrated into NATO procedures, that they could relieve that unit with air attacks.

Go to the opposite extreme, trying to effect a political result; that is, to persuade the Serbians, for example, to make concessions on a map that would be acceptable to the Bosnian government. The simple fact is that the historical record of bombing people into treaty signing is not extraordinarily encouraging, and in this circumstance, has unusual problems because of the terrain, and also because these people have been fighting each other for 700 or 800 years.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Now, if air strikes were—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The terrain is extremely difficult as well.

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure. And the fact that you don't have straight lines here with all the parties on one side. You have a lot of intermingling.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And also it is a low-tech war.

Mr. HAMILTON. If air strikes were to occur, I presume U.S. forces would participate?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is pretty clear?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I want to make clear that the forces necessary to carry out these missions are identified, they are indeed to some degree literally in for the close air support, they are literally in the air over Bosnia on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. HAMILTON. The negotiator, Mr. Stoltenberg, said on January 31 that, at the negotiating session in January, a possible peace agreement was scuttled at the last minute by the Bosnian government. Is that your impression the peace agreement was scuttled by the Bosnian government?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You could have engaged in negotiations yourself, Mr. Chairman. It is always easy to blame the person who won't sign a "perfectly good" agreement for scuttling the agreement. I wouldn't agree with that characterization.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. That is what I wanted to check.

Mr. OXMAN. Could I comment on that, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure.

BOSNIAN TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS

Mr. OXMAN. I don't agree with the characterization either, but I think what it refers to is the fact that at the end of the discussions in Geneva, the last round, there was a proposal made to have arbitration as to 10 or 12 areas or cities, and this proposal was seriously considered by the parties, as we understand it, and the Bosnian government took the position that if there were to be arbitration that could take a year or two, then at a minimum during that period of time forces should be withdrawn from those areas that were the subject of the arbitration.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me get at it this way. If you talk to the Croats today, they are reasonably satisfied, aren't they, with things as they are? In other words, if you just said the war is over today, they are reasonably satisfied, are they not?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Except with respect to the Krajina.

Mr. HAMILTON. No. With respect to the Bosnian area, they are satisfied?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You get the answer except with respect to the Krajina.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. But in Bosnia itself they are satisfied. With regard to Serbia they are satisfied, basically, aren't they? I mean they would be glad to call it quits today and draw the lines where they are today and say that the war is over?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They have, in fact, offered to make very substantial withdrawals.

Mr. HAMILTON. Beyond what they now have. So, the party really today that is dissatisfied is the Bosnian Muslims; is that correct?

Mr. OXMAN. By and large, that is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, I am not trying to pass judgment on that.

Mr. OXMAN. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Indeed, we all have our feelings about that. But I am trying to get a sense of the dynamics of this thing.

Mr. OXMAN. By and large, the dynamic is that the Bosnian government has said the territorial offer is not of sufficient quality, and they have keyed that to specific—

Mr. HAMILTON. And we basically agree with the Bosnian Muslims that they ought to have more territory, do we not?

Mr. OXMAN. We are not taking a particular position except to say they shouldn't be pressured and that the quality of the Serb offer should be improved.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, do we think they ought to have a window on the Adriatic there?

Mr. OXMAN. We haven't taken a particular position on particular territorial issues.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Do we say that the Serbs ought to give up some territory?

Mr. OXMAN. We think that they should give up more territory to improve the quality of what is being offered to the Bosnian government.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. OXMAN. This is territory, after all, that was ethnically cleansed. It is not as though the Bosnian government is making a pie-in-the-sky request. They are addressing very specific territory and relatively small amounts, because again they have indicated a willingness to operate under the 33½-percent ceiling.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, Stoltenberg also said, I think he is the one that pointed out that you are really talking here about a very small percentage of territory, 14 towns or something of that sort. Is that, in your view, the Bosnian Muslim bottom line; that is, that if they get those 14 towns they are OK and they are ready to call an end to the war?

Mr. OXMAN. That is what they have stated. I don't think anyone can know definitively what any of the parties' bottom line is here. But they have stated that if those issues could be resolved as to those towns that they were prepared to proceed and sign the agreement.

Mr. HAMILTON. And resolve would mean that those towns would come under Bosnian Muslim control?

Mr. OXMAN. Right. And be returned, as it were.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you have a viable Bosnian Muslim government then?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The geography doesn't make that much of these towns. The Bosnians certainly make the argument that their access to the sea and to the Sava River are critical to the viability of the state.

Mr. HAMILTON. If you get a partition—assuming that they get these 14 towns—do you end up with a viable state?

Mr. OXMAN. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the 14 towns, they have made it clear all along that access to the sea and access to the Sava, as Secretary Slocombe has mentioned, are key to their conception of viability, and that does not seem like an unreasonable position for them to take.

But it is my understanding that if those issues are resolved plus the towns that they have indicated they are prepared to go forward.

REMOVAL OF UNPROFOR TROOPS

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. The British, the French and the Spanish say we are going to get out of there, or they are threatening to say they are going to get out of UNPROFOR. What are they doing?

Is that a serious threat? Do we really take that seriously, or are they trying to put pressure on the parties? They are trying to put pressure on us? What is going on here?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. With respect to the British at least what they have said publicly, and it is consistent with what they have said privately, is they have troops on the ground. They don't like the idea that this is an indefinite commitment where they are going to have several thousand British soldiers in Bosnia until—

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you take them seriously?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I take them seriously, but I don't like the idea of having, that they have an—

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think they are going to withdraw?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No. Well, I don't think they are going to withdraw anytime soon because they have also said they realize that if the UNPROFOR operation collapses the humanitarian operation will probably collapse, and they don't want that to happen either.

U.S. GROUND TROOPS

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. I want to clarify quickly about our position. We are not going to put ground forces into this situation?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Other than in the context of an implementation force.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. And in the context of an implementation force, are we going to?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have said that we are prepared to do that if certain conditions are met, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are prepared to put American combat forces on the ground to implement a treaty—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, that is right.

Mr. HAMILTON. [continuing]. If certain conditions are met?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Congress has to approve it. That is one of the conditions.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of those conditions is the support of Congress. There are others.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many troops are we talking about?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is a question I would rather not answer in open session.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would be perfectly happy to answer it, I just don't want to get into numbers in open session.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. But we have said we are prepared to put American ground forces into Bosnia to implement an agreement.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If certain conditions are met.

Mr. HAMILTON. If certain conditions are met.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think Secretary Christopher said it almost a year ago to the day, wasn't it?

Mr. HAMILTON. I was not under the impression he actually committed ground forces.

Mr. OXMAN. I think what we have said, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States, under the conditions Secretary Slocombe has referred to, would participate in the implementation.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, that's a very different thing.

Mr. OXMAN. Right. We have not specifically stated the exact form of that participation. But as you know—

Mr. HAMILTON. Have we ever said specifically we would put ground combat, American forces there in Bosnia to implement an agreement under certain conditions?

Mr. OXMAN. We have said that our participation could include the use of ground troops, but we have not stated that it necessarily would do so. We have also commented on the fact, and you and I have discussed, that the contingency planning done for this eventuality does contemplate American ground troops, but I would stress that that was contingency planning and there is no U.S. commitment to commit any particular level of ground troops to an implementation.

This will depend upon what is the final agreement. Is it different from what has been discussed before? What are its military provisions? There will have to be a very thorough analysis of that so that we can address the issue of what form U.S. participation should take.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. We are coming down, getting close here to the end, you will be glad to hear. But I want to ask a couple of questions about Adams, too.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, while you ask about Adams, can I take a 2-minute break?

Mr. HAMILTON. You certainly may.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will try to be brief.

BRITISH-IRISH JOINT DECLARATION

Secretary Oxman, my understanding is that we said to Mr. Adams you can come in if you meet certain conditions, and one of those conditions was a renunciation of violence and another condition was I think that he—I am not sure how he worded this—support the Joint Declaration in some way.

He comes back and he makes a number of statements, and my understanding there is that as a result of his statements we think those conditions were reasonably satisfied. Do I state this correctly?

Mr. OXMAN. Well, we think that his statements that we did seek an assurance that he would renounce violence—

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we think he did that—

Mr. OXMAN [continuing]. And support the Joint Declaration. We feel he made constructive comments on these two points. I wouldn't go so far as to say that he 100 percent said those two things, but we feel his comments that he did make were constructive on these two points.

Mr. HAMILTON. What he said was I want to see an end to violence. I don't advocate violence. He said that.

So, again, you think that is enough to move forward and grant the visa here and let him come in with respect to the condition of renunciation of violence.

Mr. OXMAN. That judgment was made, yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you believe that Mr. Adams when he says he does not advocate violence is telling the truth?

Mr. OXMAN. Now, you have asked me a question, it's almost unanswerable.

I certainly hope so. I certainly hope so, but what we are looking for are deeds and not words on this.

Mr. HAMILTON. Has it not been our impression that he has been in back of, in some way, the violence that has occurred there?

Mr. OXMAN. The reason he was ineligible, as you know, was his participation and membership in a terrorist organization. With respect to the particulars on that, Mr. Chairman, I would rather not answer that in an open hearing, but we, I think, could brief you on that.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is our assessment of the fact that we granted the visa and that he has been here? How do we feel about his appearance here?

Mr. OXMAN. I think he,—he came, as you know, for participation in the meeting yesterday and I think it is too soon to make a final judgment on that. I think the key will be what are the deeds rather than the words and is there support for the Joint Declaration, which, as you know, President Clinton has welcomed and supported from the moment it was announced, virtually from the moment it was announced.

And the Joint Declaration is not to be minimized in its significance. It was the product of very serious effort toward peace by the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom.

U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. I may want to hear from you a little bit on that. I want to ask you a couple of questions on Turkey.

As you know, I have had an interest there, and you have indicated to me, or I guess Mr. Tarnoff has indicated to me in response to a letter that I sent, that U.S. policy regarding the situation in southeastern Turkey is to support Turkey in its fight against terrorism while at the same time urging Turkey to seek a political and social solution to the problems of the Kurdish citizens in the southeast part of that country.

And my question is, do you believe that the Turkish Government is pursuing political and social solutions to the Kurdish problem?

Mr. OXMAN. We think that they are taking certain measures in that direction, but more can and should be done.

Mr. HAMILTON. What are they doing?

Mr. OXMAN. Let me just put that in a broader context. We feel that, and we have expressed this to the Government of Turkey, that as difficult as the situation is where they are facing a terrorist organization, terrorist threat and terrorist activity there, that there is not a military solution that really lies down the road, but there

needs to be a political solution, one that takes account of, obviously, a solution that respects Turkey's territorial integrity, but which seeks to address the concerns of the Kurdish minority.

They have taken various measures. I don't have the detail on that for you now, Mr. Chairman. There has been some modest improvement in areas such as attorney access to detainees and in the area of prison abuse, but the situation in most other areas remains about the same, and we have felt that more progress is warranted and we have made that view known.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we are doing an awful lot to help Turkey on the military side. We are providing excess military equipment. We provide military assistance. We apparently are providing aerial reconnaissance to assist Turkey in its cross-border raids into Iraq and into Iran, according to press. When the prime minister was asked the other day about a political solution her response was, "What is a political solution? Does it mean abandoning part of your country? You do not have the right to do that."

What concerns me here, I recognize the formidable problem they have in southeastern Turkey with terrorist groups. I don't mean to make light of that problem or underestimate it in anyway.

But I must say to you—on the basis of what I know, maybe I don't have all the facts—I do not see Turkey pursuing a political and social solution to that problem. On the basis of what I understand the facts to be, they are looking at it as a pure and simple military operation to subdue them, and they are using U.S. provided assets to achieve it. Now, that is my impression, and I want you to come back to me and let me know what you think are the good things happening here, if they are happening.⁵

And I think the situation in Turkey generally is deteriorating very badly. The situation on the border is difficult that I have referred to as well, and the Turkish economy is deteriorating. The lira is not stable, and I don't think they are making any progress against the PKK there everyone though they have engaged in these cross border raids. So, I have a deep concern there.

Let me conclude with a question on Cyprus and get just your sense of where that stands at this moment.

SITUATION IN CYPRUS

Mr. OXMAN. I think on Cyprus there has been some positive movement. We were encouraged when the Turkish Government made known publicly again its support for the conference-building measures, particularly I have in mind the measures concerning Varosha and the Nicosia airport.

We are also hopeful that, based on comments that Mr. Denktash has made, that he will be more constructive in connection with moving forward on the conference building measures. We hope that President Clerides will agree to resume the discussions now under the U.N. sponsorship, and we have our special Cyprus Coordinator, Ambassador Robert Lamb, in Nicosia, yesterday and today, to try to be helpful in that process.

⁵ See letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, dated February 9, 1994 in the appendix.

We feel that moving forward on these confidence-building measures is the way to go. This is in the context of the overall so-called set of ideas that the U.N. has put forward and we think perhaps there is an opportunity for some movement here, and we certainly hope so. We think that those measures concerning the airport and Varosha, if they could be agreed and implemented, would have a very important effect on the psychology of the conflict because there would finally be progress.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think the confidence-building measures are now supported by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Government and the Turkish Government—are they all supporting those confidence-building measures?

Mr. OXMAN. Not without reservations and conditions, and this is the problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any one of those parties that is causing most of the trouble on—I am not talking about the settlement—but moving ahead on the confidence-building measures?

Mr. OXMAN. At the present time I could not say that. Until the last week or two it was the situation that the Turkish Cypriots had pulled back from the discussions that were almost successful in June. They then had their elections in the fall, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and now we have seen some positive movement and we hope it can lead to a resumption of the talks and prompt closure on the confidence-building measures.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Mr. Gilman and I both have a large interest, as do many other members, with respect to the Cyprus question, and we hope that progress is made there.

Gentlemen, we thank you very much for your testimony the this morning.

The meeting of the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement of Hon. Stephen A. Oxman
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
before the
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
House Foreign Affairs Committee

February 2, 1994

"The NATO Summit and the Future of European Security"

It's a pleasure to meet with you again as part of our continuing consultations with the Congress. The President's recent trip to Brussels, Prague, Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk achieved remarkable results for the United States, Europe and the world. I want to focus today on the results of the NATO summit, and their implications for the future of European security.

I. NATO and the Future of European Security

From the outset, when President Clinton called for this Summit, we conceived it as a key opportunity to accelerate NATO's transformation. NATO remains the central element of the transatlantic security structure. Its future must be to provide security to its members, while taking on the new task of helping to integrate the former communist states within the compass of Western security and values. Because Europe remains at the core of U.S. security interests; because the U.S. commitment to European security is enduring; and because NATO is central to that commitment, the Clinton Administration set this task for itself and our Allies: To make sure that NATO is up to the security challenges of the new post-Cold War Europe, and that the basis for continued U.S. engagement and leadership in European security is solid.

In preparing for the Summit, we examined the challenges confronting the Alliance, with the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia and the hard march to reform in the East constant reminders of the new and difficult era before us, and set out an agenda keyed to meeting these challenges.

- o We determined that the Summit as its first priority had to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and transform its former adversaries into lasting partners. NATO's unique strengths as a political instrument can help ensure that, for all the countries of Europe, war becomes as unthinkable as it has become among the NATO Allies.

- o We also decided that we needed to adapt NATO's military capabilities. In order to project stability throughout Europe, NATO must continue to improve its capability to carry out new missions and conduct what used to be called out-of-area operations.
- o We also looked at the shifting political balance created by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and progress towards European integration, as well as the drawdown of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. We looked for ways in which NATO could take the important step of actively encouraging and supporting the development of a "separable but not separate" European defense capability, anchored in NATO, which would respond to European political and military requirements, avoid senseless duplication, and strengthen the European contribution to our transatlantic partnership.
- o And finally, we decided that NATO should take up the issue of how it can best contribute to controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with proliferation once it has occurred, efforts which are vitally important to our security.

The Summit took action to advance each of these objectives. All the key decisions of the Summit resulted from U.S. initiatives. They also reflect close cooperation with our Allies. Our proposals were intended to help lay a foundation on which a future democratic and prosperous Europe can rest, while leaving NATO's effectiveness as a defensive alliance undiminished.

Taken together, the Summit decisions mark a significant and perhaps even historic change in NATO's role in Europe. They reflect our determination to find new cooperative structures to meet new security threats. At bottom, they are grounded in a broad concept of security that melds political, military, economic and human rights considerations. Our policies seek to integrate all of Europe based on shared values of democracy, market economics, and military openness and cooperation, not to re-divide it. NATO will play a key role in helping us achieve these objectives.

II. The NATO Summit

A. NATO Expansion and the Partnership for Peace

Let me talk about the Summit's achievements, and how they furthered our goals, in a little more detail. First and foremost, the NATO Allies made a historic choice by opening the door to an evolutionary process of expansion of NATO membership and by initiating the Partnership for Peace. These steps are an investment in a future Europe undivided between Allies and enemies. Over the next months our focus will be on getting the Partnership up and running. The first partners are signing up, and we expect all the members of the former Warsaw Pact to subscribe along with other European states. NATO briefing teams

are arriving in Eastern capitals as we speak to begin implementing the Partnership. SHAPE is ready to welcome Partners to the day-to-day work of building their relationship with NATO.

Our approach to the expansion of NATO and the Partnership for Peace is a fundamentally important decision for the future of Europe. It has the enthusiastic support of all of our Allies, and has now been widely welcomed in the East. But some in this country and abroad have objected that the Partnership is a half-way measure which does not go far enough to ensure the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and that it falls short because it does not offer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe early NATO membership. I disagree; the Partnership is the right policy at this time for European security, and our own.

From the first, the Clinton administration decided that the Summit must transform NATO's relationship with the East. That, after all, is where today's greatest European security challenges lie. In answering the question "how?", we had to balance three requirements:

- o Build a close and meaningful relationship between NATO and the post-communist states that will allow us to work together to address common problems;
- o Avoid drawing new lines in Europe that would in themselves be de-stabilizing;
- o Preserve NATO's essential capabilities and mission undiminished.

The Partnership strikes the right balance among these.

Through the Partnership for Peace we will build close political and military ties with the emerging democracies. These ties will be real and concrete. The political commitments that Partners must make to civilian control of the military and transparency in defense budgeting, and the joint planning and training that Partners will do with each other and with NATO, will advance the process of integrating Europe. And Partners will have the right to consult with NATO if there is a direct and immediate threat to their security. The attraction of NATO, like the attraction of the EU, will be a powerful force for cooperation and integration.

But our approach does not re-create the division of Europe: it opens the door equally to all who are willing to transform themselves politically and militarily. Why, as the President asked in Brussels, should we foreclose the best possible future for Europe -- a democratic Russia committed to and working with NATO for the security of all its European neighbors, a democratic Ukraine comfortable with its neighbors to both East and West, and democratic governments throughout post-communist Europe? We would like to see all of these countries moving forward, at different speeds and levels, but all of them committed to economic progress and prosperity, to shared security and democratic ideals.

That is the future President Clinton wants to work for. And our desire to provide for this "best possible future" is at the heart of the Partnership initiative. Our approach is hopeful, but not starry-eyed. It is not a half-way measure, nor was it adopted in deference to Russian objections. We proposed it, and our Allies endorsed it, because we want to build towards the possibility of a future that leaves behind, finally, Europe's destructive past.

But, at the same time, it preserves the means to deal with a darker future, should it occur. If necessary, it can provide the basis for NATO to strengthen its collective defense role against a new threat, should one emerge in the East. Russia's integration into the European community depends upon its acceptance of international standards of conduct outside its borders. Its choices about its own future will affect the future of NATO and the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership, like Russia, can go either way.

Immediate NATO membership may sound like an easy solution to the security problems of Eastern Europe. But as H.L. Mencken said, "For every complex problem there is a solution which is neat, plausible...and wrong." NATO has opened the door to expansion. It has given Partner nations the chance to develop military and political cooperation with NATO, and with each other. Those who so wish can develop the capacity to assume the heavy responsibilities of full membership. The ultimate decision on NATO membership will be a political one, made by us and our Allies, after close consultation with the Congress, based on an assessment of the needs of transatlantic security and the prospective members' commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes that are at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.

B. European Security and Defense Identity

The Summit took other important decisions as well. NATO's endorsement of our proposal to support "separable but not separate" European defense capabilities will enable our European partners to take on more responsibility for their own security. This will better balance the burden of responsibilities within the Alliance, while putting to rest any doubt that the United States supports European integration or will remain engaged in European affairs. Our European allies have already shown their willingness to take on a greater security burden, including through their efforts in the former Yugoslavia. NATO will now help them to do so, by providing command and control and logistics support for European military operations. This will prevent costly duplication. Europe will be able to act, with the support of other Allies and common NATO assets, in cases where NATO itself chooses not to engage. In the end this will strengthen the Alliance itself, and vindicate our post-war efforts to help reconstruct a strong, united Europe.

C. Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO itself needs new capabilities to support its new missions, and the Summit decided further to adapt NATO's military structure by developing the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This initiative will create tools for a much more flexible NATO: headquarters units which can assemble rapidly ad hoc military formations to conduct specific missions short of the defense of NATO territory itself. This will be used to support NATO out-of-area operations. It will enable NATO better to work with countries that are not part of its military structure. The CJTF will serve as an important vehicle for supporting European capabilities, and to contribute to UN and CSCE operations, or those under the Partnership for Peace. It is the operational key to NATO's new military roles, and we are pushing work forward as a matter of priority.

D. Non-Proliferation

Finally, the Summit commissioned a full review of NATO's role in non-proliferation, making this key issue an important part of NATO's future work. We want NATO, without duplicating the work already underway in other forums, to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and reduce and protect against the proliferation threat. We need to bring NATO's unique political and military capabilities to bear.

E. Bosnia

As you know, the Summit also addressed Bosnia. We told our Allies that the U.S. remains committed to helping NATO implement a viable settlement freely agreed to by all the parties. We also made clear we would seek the support of Congress on this issue. The Summit reaffirmed NATO's August warning on air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas. The President's emphasis on the seriousness of the warning and the need for NATO to be prepared to follow through give this reaffirmation added significance. We urged UNPROFOR to do the planning needed to ensure the rotation of UN troops in Srebrenica and to open up the Tuzla airport. That planning has been completed, and the UN is prepared to achieve those objectives through negotiation if possible, but with the use of UNPROFOR military assets if necessary. NATO close air support will play an important role in support of UN forces. In connection with these operations, the UN Secretary General has delegated to his Special Representative the authority to call in close air support. We will carry out this action if we are called upon to do so.

The Bosnian conflict is the type of regional crisis that presents a danger to European stability. That is why we have worked -- successfully so far -- to prevent the conflict from spreading. The Summit decisions, especially on the Partnership, were taken to try to move towards a Europe in which conflicts

like this one do not happen again. It is much easier to prevent fighting than to stop it; and democracies working together in an integrated framework of political, economic, and military cooperation are much less likely to begin conflict.

There are many near-term problems in European security, as we all know. They require innovative solutions, including the creative use of military power. Our actions at the Summit will enable NATO to contribute to these solutions through its military and political capabilities. In the longer term, NATO has an important role to play in creating a Europe of integration and cooperation, in which new democracies are committed to each others' security in the same way as NATO countries are today. We are putting NATO at the center of a growing array of practical security ties that cross old boundaries of enmity, helping to moderate the security concerns of both Allies and Partners. NATO will remain at the core of the defense of its members against any threat, and Europeans will take on a larger responsibility for aspects of their own security. The United States will continue to be engaged and provide the leadership which will be essential for the future peace and stability that we are laying the groundwork for today.

Thank you. I am interested to hear your comments on these important issues, and will respond to any questions you may have.

**U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East**

**NATO Summit Testimony
February 2, 1994**

**The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy**

It is an honor and a privilege to appear before this hearing to discuss what was an extraordinarily successful NATO Summit.

NATO, as a result of the January Summit, has seized an historic opportunity to realize our long-standing objective of an undivided Europe closely linked by the US and Canada. As you know, NATO leaders adopted two key initiatives. First, the Alliance accepted President Clinton's proposal of a Partnership for Peace, which demonstrates NATO's commitment to reach out to the East by embracing military cooperation with nations of the former Warsaw Pact. Second, NATO adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which helps us meet the broader challenges of the post-Cold War world by providing NATO the flexibility to conduct operations outside the core Article V mission of collective defense.

Both the Partnership for Peace and CJTF initiative have important practical operational implications for NATO which have become a focus for our work in Washington and Brussels.

Partnership for Peace: The Concept

The Partnership for Peace is open to all former Warsaw Pact states and other non-NATO nations in Europe. The Alliance has declared that it expects and would welcome expansion to include the democratic states to the East. These nations will have the chance to develop the cooperative habits that lie at the heart of an effective alliance. They will join Alliance forces in such military activities as peacekeeping efforts, disaster relief, and search and rescue operations. Partners will be able to participate with NATO on

planning, exercises, and training with allied forces. They will have representation with NATO's military and political bodies. Partners will have the opportunity to pick up NATO's standard operating procedures and routines of consultation. Over time, the partners will develop forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members. In short, the Partnership is a process for building broad patterns of defense cooperation with NATO, at a pace geared to each partner's interests, needs, and capabilities..

Active partners can participate in political consultations. A partner will have a formalized right of consultation with NATO if it perceives a threat to its security.

The Partnership provides the right incentives for former communist states to adopt the democratic processes that NATO members share. For example, partners will specify the steps they'll take to promote democratic control of their militaries, and make their defense budgeting more open to the public.

The Partnership for Peace has three principal purposes. The first is to take another step on the road to a safer Europe. The Alliance intends to extend to the new democracies in the East the security and stability that have made NATO and Western Europe prosperous for the past half century.

The second objective is to further develop NATO's capability to respond to new contingencies beyond the core mission of collective defense. NATO's relevance to the missions of the post-Cold War world was profoundly demonstrated two years ago. The multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein performed virtually seamlessly thanks to the four decades of cooperation built through NATO. The habits of cooperation -- interoperability, joint training, integrated communications -- that made NATO so successful in the Cold War are precisely the things Partners will develop to respond to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Partners will have agreed to develop and maintain capabilities to contribute to NATO-led operations, including those in support of UN or CSCE mandates.

Third, Partnership for Peace is a path to future NATO membership for those nations seeking it and which are able to add to the Alliance's overall security.

As President Clinton underscored in Brussels, Americans want the newly independent states of Europe and the former Soviet Union to succeed -- not just for their sake, but for the sake of American security as well. A stable Eurasia based on market democracy means fewer US tax dollars spent on defense, a reduced threat from weapons of mass destruction, new markets for US products, and new partners for diplomacy and cooperation with which to confront the challenges of the post-Cold War world -- and, most of all, the end to the confrontations in Europe that caused two world wars and propelled us too close to a third.

The Summit's message was explicit -- that our defensive alliance can expand, when conditions are right. Some have called on NATO to allow some East European nations to immediately become full members. Doing so would be premature. Membership in NATO must presuppose certain levels of military capabilities and resources.

The Partnership allows the Alliance to start a process while not imposing a new division of Europe. Rather, the Partnership's goal is to extend peace, democracy and prosperity to the entire continent, and to provide all the nations of Europe the opportunity to embrace democratic leadership and to open meaningful military cooperation. The Partnership is a dynamic solution to a dynamic challenge: it opens a path without closing doors.

In sum, the Partnership demonstrates, in tangible terms, that NATO is prepared to forge new security relationships with its neighbors to the East. Indeed, it sets in motion a process that leads to the eventual enlargement of NATO. Ultimately, it will help prepare nations for possible membership in NATO if they take full advantage of Partnership opportunities and adhere to the path toward democracy and economic reform.

Partnership For Peace: How It Will Work

At the January 10 Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government invited North Atlantic Cooperation Council members and other European nations, as agreed in the future, to become Partners for Peace. Romania was the first to accept this invitation by signing the Partnership For Peace Framework Document on January 26, Lithuania signed on the 27th. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic are expected to sign on in short order. Others who

have indicated they will join the Partnership include Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Sweden, Latvia, and Estonia.

At the Summit, President Clinton called for NATO to quickly dispatch delegations to the nations of Eastern Europe to explain and promote the Partnership. NATO teams are now en route to ten Central and East European nations, including the Visegrad 4 and the Baltic states. In the weeks ahead, teams also will be sent to Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union.

In Washington and Brussels, we are pushing hard to get Partnership off to a fast start. NATO recently convened the initial meetings of the Partnership for Peace Steering Committee. This Committee will be the central forum for development of the Partnership program, under the direction of the North Atlantic Council. The Steering Committee will advise the NAC on its political guidance to the Military Committee or Partnership for Peace planning cell.

Among the first task partners will undertake will be to prepare their Presentation Document, an outline of their cooperative activities of interest, forces and assets they can make available to the Partnership. The document also will provide long-range defense planning goals, and plans for meeting Partnership political objectives. NATO planners will be available for consultation on the development of this document. Work on the document is critical because it will help determine the scope, pace and level of partner participation in NATO activities.

The Steering Committee also will oversee the planning for all future Partnership activities. These include, besides the Partnership Presentation Document, an overall Partnership For Peace program of activities and individual Partner work programs. These documents will be jointly developed by individual Partners and the NATO authorities. No Partner's activities will be subject to veto by another Partner.

SHAPE military staff also are aggressively moving ahead with plans for military exercises to include Partner and NATO nations. Initial plans call for a Command Post Exercise late this spring and small field exercises in the fall. We hope that these exercises will involve a number of Partners., and be held in one or more East European countries.

NATO administrators currently are developing plans for work space to accommodate Partner delegations both at NATO headquarters and in Mons where SHAPE head-quarters is located. We expect temporary arrangements to be available in a matter of weeks. Partner representatives will thereafter participate in appropriate political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and at the Partnership coordination cell at SHAPE. At this point, we expect the initial representation to be an appropriate political representative in Brussels and a Colonel-level military representative in Mons.

NATO planners also are at work meeting the numerous other initial administrative requirements. These include the legal and diplomatic requirements for establishing permanent Partner delegations in Belgium, national and NATO disclosure policies, security and access provisions in NATO buildings, and additional personnel requirements.

The Partnership for Peace is not an assistance program -- it is a security partnership. Most costs -- both of allies and Partners -- will be paid directly from national budgets. However, there will be some common costs. In order to implement this program quickly, the NATO common budgets -- Civil, Military, and Infrastructure -- will need funds to cover start-up costs and ongoing program-wide costs.

The U.S. share of the common NATO budget's contribution to these Partnership costs will be relatively modest. In general, all PFP participants, NATO and otherwise, will pay their own costs. The NATO common budget will pay an estimated \$4 - 8 million. The total common NATO annual costs of Partnership activities will be determined by cost share, that is, what portion of proposed activities will be eligible for funding from the combined NATO budgets. Initial estimates indicate that start-up costs for 1994 program activities -- establishing Partnership offices in NATO Headquarters and at SHAPE, field training and exercises (most of these are national costs) and training courses -- will total roughly \$10 to \$14 million. The US will contribute about 25% of these costs.

Our modest contributions to these NATO programs and our direct costs of U.S. forces' participation will be dollars well spent. The Partnership gives us the best of both worlds. It enables us to prepare and to work toward the enlargement of NATO when other

countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities. It enables us to do it in a way that gives us the time to reach out to Russia and to those other nations of the former Soviet Union. That is, it leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that totally breaks from the destructive past we have known. However, while it leaves open the best possible future for Europe, it also leaves us the means to settle for a future that is not the best but is much better than the past, a future in which our common security would be protected by collective defense.

Combined Joint Task Forces

Earlier I noted the second major objective as we approached the Summit -- improving the Alliance's ability to respond to contingencies beyond the core mission of collective defense. We sought to define adjustments to the Alliance that would provide new strategic capabilities while protecting the integrated military structure that is at the heart of NATO's effectiveness. And we searched for a mechanism that, while providing those capabilities, would support the development of the European Security and Defense Identity as the European pillar of the Alliance.

The Combined Joint Task Force proposal tabled by President Clinton achieves those aims. Under that concept, NATO Major Subordinate Commands would designate task force headquarters elements, within the headquarters, to conduct peacetime planning for non-Article V contingencies as directed, and when directed to form the nucleus for deploying headquarters.

If the North Atlantic Council were to authorize a NATO operation, the CJTF would function within existing NATO command structure, modified to include command representation for those non-NATO nations that might participate. Should the Council choose not to participate it could authorize use of NATO assets by the WEU or by "coalitions of the willing" that might wish to conduct an operation. Thus, the concept offers the Alliance new flexibility in its political arrangements, as well as an operational ability necessary for the new strategic environment.

Details of the concept are now being worked within NATO headquarters and within the major NATO commands. It is our view that national participants within the CJTF would as a matter of course be expected to deploy with the headquarters, whether or not that

nation chose to contribute forces to the operation. That provision is necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the headquarters.

NATO Infrastructure Program

At Brussels, the President pledged that his Administration will do its utmost to ensure that America would meet its commitments to the NATO Infrastructure Fund. In view of this, the current rescission proposal to cut the U.S. contribution in half is coming at a very bad time. Already we are seeing other Allies reduce their contributions to the Infrastructure Fund, and their support for other NATO budgets as a result of their perception that the United States is not going to meet its obligations to the Alliance. If we don't restore the funding which is now subject to rescission, we can expect more Allies to follow suit. I urge you to give this matter your closest attention in your upcoming budget deliberations.

Bosnia - The Way Ahead

Today, we continue to work towards a solution in Bosnia, though the hurdles we must overcome in doing so are numerous. President Clinton held firm in Brussels that US ground forces will not directly intervene in this bloody conflict, and indeed would be involved at all only to help implement and enforce a peace settlement entered into by all parties in good faith, and subject to Congressional involvement.

This tragic war will only end by agreement -- not by total military victory or outside intervention. We remain committed and are actively engaged in seeking a peaceful settlement and the prevention of further tragedy in Bosnia. While in Brussels, the President engaged his NATO counterparts on the need to move forward on the diplomatic track, and to forge an agreement acceptable to all parties, including the Muslims in Bosnia.

But diplomacy is not the only tool available to NATO. NATO has successfully carried out all those concrete military tasks it has been given by the political decision of its members. Responding to UN requests for assistance in enforcing sanctions against Serbia, NATO established a maritime presence in the Adriatic that effectively sealed the Adriatic coast. To enforce the UN mandated No Fly Zone, NATO combat aircraft have flown thousands of missions over Bosnia, eliminating air power as a factor in the war. On the

humanitarian front, the NATO airlift, supplemented by the U.S. and allied airdrops, has delivered thousands of sorties of humanitarian supplies, a NATO headquarters was created to command and control the distribution of humanitarian aid, and a US hospital was deployed to Zagreb to support UN relief operations.

President Clinton also made it clear at the Summit that the NATO air strike threat issued last August still stands, so that NATO is ready to use air power to help prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo. Underscoring our commitment to action, President Clinton cautioned other Allied heads of state and government not to reissue NATO threats of air power unless they were prepared to act on them if circumstances warrant.

In addition to the August warning against "strangulation," the Alliance is also prepared to provide close air support to any UNPROFOR unit in Bosnia which is under attack if UNPROFOR requests support. Such close air support would be available to protect any UNPROFOR unit engaged in efforts -- which the Summit called on the UN force to undertake -- to open the airport in Tuzla, and to facilitate a troop transfer in Srebrenica. UN planning is proceeding on both fronts. The replacement of the Canadian unit in Srebrenica by a Netherlands unit should begin shortly. The plan for Tuzla is to open that airport for relief supplies. UNPROFOR would take control of the airport from the forces of the Government of Bosnia, in order to ensure that its facilities would not be used for purposes other than the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is intended that an agreement will be concluded similar to the one which has, since June 1992, governed the use of Sarajevo airport.

Should UN forces, in either effort, come under attack and request NATO air support, it would be available to them. NATO military authorities have completed plans for close air support in these circumstances. UNPROFOR forces and their commanders are currently equipped and trained to request NATO close air support. Let me detail for you the sequence for initiation of NATO close air support: a UNPROFOR unit commander on the ground initiates a request for close air support through his forward air controller (who is trained in NATO procedures and accompanies the unit) to the Air Operations Coordination Center located at the headquarters of UNPROFOR-Bosnia. The Coordination Center approves the request. NATO fighter-bombers are then dispatched to the location of the unit under attack. There, the fighter-bombers contact the forward air

controller who gives them the latest target information and clears the fighter-bombers to conduct the air strike. Note, however, that the UN Secretary-General would have to approve the first request for close air support, i.e., the Coordination Center would relay the first request to the UN Secretary-General. NATO has agreed that only the very first request would have to be approved by the UN Secretary-General. Hence, the Air Operations Coordination Center would approve subsequent requests for close air support on its own authority and would not be required to seek further clearance from the Secretary-General.

This procedure has been modified somewhat for UNPROFOR troops rotating into Srebrenica or opening Tuzla airport -- in those cases the Air Operations Coordination Center can refer the request for close air support to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary General to Bosnia-Herzegovina; the UN Secretary-General has delegated close air support clearance to him.

I should point out that the procedures I have just outlined for providing close air support to UNPROFOR, which NATO offered last June, are quite different from procedures to be followed in the case of conducting air strikes, pursuant to the NATO warnings of August 2 and 9, in response to strangulation of Sarajevo or other population centers. In the latter case, the NAC and UN authorities would first have to agree that the situation on the ground constitutes "strangulation," and both the NAC and UN authorities would have to agree on when and where appropriate air strikes would be conducted.

The Counterproliferation Initiative

Finally, I would like to say a word on the President's efforts to bring focus to NATO's efforts to deal with the security and defense issues posed by the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In the post-Cold War environment, the spread of these weapons is an issue we must guard against, and at its summit, NATO has taken the initiative to do so. Specifically, NATO heads of state and government agreed that the Alliance is determined to address the proliferation problem in all its political and defense dimensions, and will work to prevent proliferation, reduce the threat, and protect members against it.

Work is now beginning in two NATO fora to follow-up on the Summit initiative. A political-military group will develop a political framework for an overall Alliance approach to proliferation. Also, a defense group, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, will look at the proliferation threat, review military doctrine, plans, and policy, and evaluate NATO and national military capabilities to address the threat.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we should take heart in the fact that the President's leadership at last month's successful and historic NATO Summit has effectively addressed the issue of NATO's relevance to the post-Cold War world. But we should take note that the real work of turning these initiatives into long-term successes requires more work and dedication from all of us, both in the Administration and on Capitol Hill. By remaining engaged in NATO and the future of European security, we can build on the historic decisions taken at the Summit and press forward in our efforts to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to the new Europe



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 9, 1994

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to provide the following additional information in response to questions raised on February 2 in the course of testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East by Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs. The issues raised included Representative Gilman's question about the relationships among European security institutions, Representative McCloskey's question about PL-480 aid for Macedonia, and your question about the Turkish government's policies towards political and social problems in southeastern Turkey.

European Security Structures

Representative Gilman requested a chart and written materials to clarify the relationship among NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the NATO Summit's decision to refine NATO military structures through establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFS). I am attaching a copy of the best chart that we have seen for clarifying the respective memberships, responsibilities and functions of European security institutions, including NATO, the WEU, and CSCE.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept is not included on this chart. It is not a security organization, but rather a concept for reform of NATO military structures that was approved only last month at the NATO Summit. Detailed implementation plans are to be developed by the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of NATO Military Authorities, and will be submitted for approval by NATO Foreign Ministers in June. To implement the concept, NATO will create, within its existing Major Subordinate Commands, CJTF headquarters elements that will be tasked with planning, training and exercising for non-traditional missions (i.e., missions that do not involve defense of Allied territory under Article V of the NATO Treaty). In the event that such a mission were called for, the CJTFs would form around these pre-designated headquarters elements and be assigned various national forces tailored for the contingency at hand.

The CJTF concept provides unprecedented flexibility for NATO military operations, preserving the strengths of the NATO integrated military structure that has been developed over four decades, and refining it to meet new kinds of contingencies. It

will allow non-NATO states (and NATO members such as France and Spain that do not participate in the integrated military structure) to train and operate with NATO members for these non-traditional contingencies. Moreover, if NATO decides that an Alliance-wide response is not needed to deal with a given contingency, a CJTF could be used to support the Western European Union or an ad hoc coalition of Allies prepared to deal with that problem. Thus the CJTF concept has three important applications:

- to improve NATO's own ability to address non-traditional contingencies flexibly,
- to facilitate participation by non-NATO states in NATO operations (as when Partnership for Peace states may join with NATO forces in an operation), and
- to support non-NATO operations by, e.g., the Western European Union or ad hoc coalitions of Allied and other states.

PL-480 Aid to Macedonia

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was ineligible for aid under Title I of PL-480 until February 9 because, in order to extend such assistance, the U.S. would have had to enter into a bilateral agreement with the government of FYROM. Without first recognizing FYROM, the U.S. could not enter into such an agreement. This obstacle was removed by the February 9 U.S. announcement of formal recognition of FYROM. We can now offer Title I assistance if the government of FYROM applies for this aid. FYROM officials were informed about USDA programs during a recent visit to Skopje by the regional USDA Agricultural Counselor based in Sofia.

Turkey's Policy toward Problems in Its Southeast

Turkish government efforts to address political and social problems in the southeast have largely stalled with the upsurge in violence by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) over the last two years. There had been a trend toward progress up until then. Legislative reforms in 1991, for example, partially removed a ban on use of the Kurdish language and prompted a surge of Kurdish-language publications and cassettes on Kurdish subjects, although suppression of speech on controversial political issues in Turkish as well as Kurdish continues. The current coalition government publicly expressed an interest in further reforms last summer but faced massive public opposition in the face of continued PKK terror. The government has also made efforts to win over PKK militants to a cooperative approach, most concretely through the offer of a partial amnesty last spring.

On a more general level, there have been some important human-rights improvements that serve Kurdish interests, including the establishment of a multiparty human rights commission in 1991. A government initiative to build on this achievement by decreeing the establishment of an undersecretariat for human rights was struck down by the courts on procedural grounds. The government believes that many political and social problems in the southeast stem from economic underdevelopment. It continues efforts to develop the area, including the GAP water project and a proposal to develop a commercial airport in the region. Our Trade and Development Agency has funded feasibility studies for several such projects. However, the upsurge in PKK violence has greatly complicated the task of economic development.

I hope this information is helpful in responding to the concerns of members of the Subcommittee. Please do not hesitate to contact me if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Wendy R. Sherman

Wendy R. Sherman
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Chart on European Security Institutions

The Honorable

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

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