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


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Thomas Prince his Book.



THE
NEW ART
OF LYING,
COVERED BY
IESVITES vnder the Vaile of
EQUIVOCATION;

DISCOVERED AND DISPROVED
BY
Henry Mason.



LONDON:

Printed by *George Purslowe* for *John Clarke*, and
are to be sold at his Shop vnder *Saint Peters*
Church in Cornhill. 1624.

THE

WELL

KNOWLEDGE

IS THE

FOUNDATION

OF ALL

LEARNING

AND

WISDOM

AND

TRUTH



TO THE MOST REVE-
 rend Father in GOD, the Lord
 Arch-bishop of *Canterburie* his Grace,
Primate of all ENGLAND, and
Metropolitane.

Most Reuerend Father,



He first newes that I heard of the Equiuocating Arte, was that which I learned out of your Graces writings. And well might this be to mee the first newes. For, if I mistake not, you were the first Writer, that published those trickes in print to the World : though (as beginnings vse to be) that discouery of this Art was but brieffe in comparison, either because that occasion did not admit of any long or full discourse, or because, but little of this mystery could then at the first be discovered ; the professors of that Trade, as your selfe also signifie, labouring to hide their secrets from the knowledge of other men. And indeed it may be obserued, that in managing of the Papacy, they haue certaine mysteries of State, which the

a Prefat.
 praefixâ
 Sex Pre-
 lection.
 cap.1. &
 cap.1.de
 Mendac.
 num.12,
 13,14

more they vse, the more they cōceale. One of which, is their power to murder Kings, and blow up Parliaments, & kill all that stand in their way, like the Assassini, who held it a point of great merit to murder all that were their aduersaries in Religion: but yet they are not willing that the world should know that this is any part of their Creede. Another such policy may be that of their Indices Expurgatorij, by which they haue circūcised the lips of such Writers, as spoke any word against the Roman Church: but this they kept as a great mystery among some few of themselues, till misfortune brought it to light, full sore against their wils. And for a third such-like policy, I may reckon also this Art of Equiuocation, which the Masters thereof did keepe secret as long, and as much as they could. And therefore it was no maruell, if your first discouery of this mystery were but brieue in compariscō. But afterward^a another Reuerend & learned Prelate, lighting vpon a more compleate Treatise then formerly had appeared, penned by a Popish Priest in defence of this Arte, and approved by the Arch-Priest, and the Prouinciall of the Iesuits: he pursued the point more fully according as that Treatise gaue him iust occasion. The crye of which pursuit did vnkennell the olde equiuocating^b Foxe, and

bunted.

a. D. Morton, B. of Lichfield and Coventry, Confutar. of Equiuocation.
 b Persons, who by occasion of the Bishops booke wrote a large Treatise in defence of Equiuocation.

hunted him into the open field, there to display himselfe, and to shew what trickes he could use, for saving his new Art from the infamy of lying. And here I finding him well chased, did by the sent follow after him vnto his Den, to espie if I might, what he and his Cubs were deuising in the darke. And I found them very busie in hammering Reseruati-
 ons and mentall frauds, vpon euery occasion and in all kindes of dealing, thereby to catch vs at vn-
 awares, who being plain and simple men our selues, could not suspect such frauds and impostures in o-
 thers. And in case these things should come a-
 broad, as in part themselves had discovered them a-
 gainst their wils: yet so confident and resolute did I finde them, to maintaine all for good and honest
 dealing, as that Father * Persons maketh a won-
 der of it, and thinketh that God should deale worse
 with men then hee had done with beasts, if hee
 should not grant them equiuocating trickes, and
 reserued wiles, as he hath granted to the Hare
 and the Foxe, their leapes and turnings, and
 windings, and going backe againe in the same
 trace they come, to deceiue the Dogges that
 pursue them. And yet all this confidence I take to
 be but a copie of their countenance. For euen in
 their printed Apologies of this Arte, they seeke to
 cast

a Mitigac.
 cap.9.nu.
 81.p.403.

cast mists before the Readers eyes, that hee may not be able to see the depth of their meaning. These things when I had found, as I thought, (though I know I am much short of finding all) I was willing, according to my abilitie, to impart them vnto well-meaning Christians, that they seeing the deepe frauds of these men, may learne to shun their company and acquaintance.

In which indeuour of mine, what seruice I may haue done for the publique good, I cannot tell: but sure I am, if there be any good in it, I should in reason returne it thither, where I first found it. The consideration whereof, hath made mee to presume so far vpon your Graces clemency, as to lay downe at your feete this poore Treatise, the grounds whereof I first learned from your owne pen: desiring (if therein I be not ouer-bold) that it may, vnder your name and protection, be sent forth into the world. Which being all, that at this time I haue to say, I humbly take my leaue, desiring the God of peace and truth, to preserue you from euery euill word and worke, that you may maintaine his truth in this world, and enioy his peace both in this world, and the World to come.

Your Graces deuoted in all seruice,



TO MY LOVING AND
Dearely beloued Parishioners, the
Inhabitants of S. Andrews vnder-shaft in
London, GRACE and TRVTH in
IESVS CHRIST.



IN the ordinary exercise of my ministry among you, when I came to speak of the ninth Cōmandement, the first thing that I met with to bee considered, was the matter of *Truth* and *Lying*. And considering hereof, I found two sorts of Lyes frequent among men: the one, an open and professed Lye; and the other, a cunning and artificiall Lye. The former was defended by the *Priscillianists*, an old kinde of Heretikes: & the latter is now defended by the *Romanists*, a latter sort of false Prophets. Both of them are odious to God, who is honoured by *Truth*; and pernicious to the societie of men, which is vpheld by *Truth*: but the latter is the more
(b) dangerous,

dangerous, because vnder a colour of *Truth* it beguileth simple soules, who are otherwise enemies to *Lying*. The consideration heereof, made me to enquire a little further into this *Arte*; which the fauourers thereof haue sought to conceile, by calling it by a new name. For beeing ashamed of the name of *Lying*, they haue christened it by the name of *Equiuocating*: a name as vnknowne in this meaning, as the *Arte* it selfe was vnheard of before these latter dayes. The mystery and iuggling tricks of which deuice, I did then and vpon that occasion, in part discouer vnto you: but briefly and plainely, the time, and place, and occasion not admitting of any long or Schoole-like discourse. But since considering, that together with the increase of false Prophets in this Kingdome, this *Arte* of falsehood hath abounded also: I thought it a part of my duty, (God hauing pleased to place mee as a Watch-man ouer your Soules) to giue you a fresh warning of this danger, and that in a more ample and large discourse, then formerly I had done, and in such a maner and sort, that you might haue something lying by you, that might aduertise you of this dangerous deceit, when I could

not haue opportunity to speak vnto you out of the Pulpit. And this I was moued to vnat this time the rather; because I haue of late obserued, that these artificiall Lyers (among their other deuices and forgeries, which vpon confidence of this Arte, they take liberty to vse without remorse) doe instill into the minds of their credulous followers, an opinion; and doe labour to spread abroad among others a suspition, that among our Learned men, many in heart are of their Church, howsoeuer for the worlds sake they dissemble their opinion: and that there are a good number among vs of the Clergie, who are better perswaded of their Religion, then of our own. Doctor *Sheldon*, a man well acquainted with their dealings, as hauing liued in their bosome, and taken the Orders of Priesthood in their Church, doth write, that * *whilest hee fed on Romes huskes, hee* * *Sheldon of the miracles of Antichrist, ca. 4. pag. 52.*
often heard of many grieuous imputations laied upon some of the greatest Clerkes in the Church of England, as though in heart they were theirs, which he then beleeeued to be true, as others did; but since hath found to be much otherwise. And my selfe haue met with some, (which perswadeth me, that they abuse others in this kind,

beside our *greatest Clerkes*) who haue more then intimated to my selfe, that I knew that which might iustifie their cause, if I would speake it. Which might well put mee into a muse, what had euer slipped frō me, why they should be perswaded that I had such an opinion of their Church: sauing that I considered, that this might well be one of the Iesuites equiuocating deuices, to instill that opinion concerning vs, into their Disciples minds, that so they might gaine more credit to their cause. Vpon which occasion, entring a more serious cōsideration of the point; I perceiued, that besides this *Arte*, they vse other deuices also, for this purpose, which I thought good; for your better caution and safety, briefly to relate in this place.

First then; if they meete with any of our *Clergie*, which are of weake braine, and vnsettled resolution, (as it is possible, wee may haue some such as well as they) they set vpon such weaklings, with plausible tales in commendation of their Church; whose open abominations practised at home among themselues, are not so well known to vs, who haue neuer trauelled into Popish Countreys. And if by
this

this meanes they chance to peruert a *weake* and *vnsettled* man, then the cry goeth, that such a *Learned* man, is become a *Catholike*, because euidence of truth forced him to forsake his old Profession.

Secondly, if they meete with men, who being either opinatiue of their own worth, think their good parts not sufficiently rewarded; or being indeed of good parts, haue but slender meanes: they tempt such, as the Deuill did our Sauour, with offers of gifts and preferments. And if by these allurements they can bribe any man to become their *Profelyte*, for *filthy lucre sake*, then they blaze abroad the conuersion of such a great and learned Scholar, who could not withstand the light of truth shining in the *Roman Church*.

Thirdly, if by these, and such like policies, they preuaile not: (for these deuices fit them best, because then they bring men ouer to their side, with their own mouthes to publish their owne shame; but if thus they preuaile not) yet one shift they haue behind, which is, to deuise lyes, of such and such mens conuersion to their Church, who euer hated it from their very soules. In which kind of forgerie, they

haue so farre proceeded, that they haue spared neither liuing nor dead. For, as if they had cast off all feare of shame, which was sure in the end to be their reward, they haue in writing belyed in this maner, the chiefeft Doctors in our Church, who haue suruiued to refute, and to detest their forgeries in Print. But when men are dead, then they become more bold: and of the most constant and zealous Professors of our Religion, they giue it out to the world, that such and such men of chiefe esteeme in the *Protestant* Church, did recant vpon their death beds, it being then no time to dissemble any longer. And when themselues haue first deuised these tales on their fingers ends; then they produce them in their serious bookes of Controuersie, as graue argumētts to confirme the *Roman* faith by. The discouery of which falsehood, I wish it may worke the like effect in your hearts, that it hath done in mine: which is, that whereas I vtterly disliked Poperie before, I do now detest it more then euer. And for this purpose I was the rather moued to penne this small Treatise, that you, of whose soules I knowe my selfe to haue vnderaken the charge, seeing these forgeries, may

may learne to beware of *Equiuocating Spirits* : who, though otherwise they professe strictnes of conscience, & according to the rules of the *Romane* Faith, are very deuout and religious ; yet can cozen you with an hundred lying deuices, and neuer feele the least grudge of conscience for it. For so Father *Persons* telleth vs, that* *Equiuocations are allowed principally to men of scrupulous conscience, for auoiding of lying.* By which he giueth vs a faire warning, (and I desire you take notice of it) that if there be any scrupulous and tender consciences amongst them (as some no doubt there are) though they would not tell a lye, if they knew it, for all the world, yet euen such men may without any scruple or feare, deceiue vs with *equiuocating reseruations*, and mentall deuices. And hauing thus giuen you this faire warning, now me thinketh I may speake vnto you, to the same purpose as our Lord did to his Disciples ; If they shall say vnto you, *Loe heere is Christ, or loe there, beleue it not* ; for there are many *false Prophets* arisen, and doe deceiue many. *Behold I haue told you before.* And if after all this warning, any of you shall suffer himselfe to be deluded by lying Equiuocators, *his blood will*

* Apologie
of Eccles.
Subordinat.
cap. 12. in
the very
end.

Matt. 24. 7.
23. 24.

Ezek. 33. 4.

bee

*bee vpon his owne head, but I haue deliuered mine
owne soule. But I feare not this in you, of whose
constancie and zeale I haue had good experi-
Gal. 5. 10. ence: so that I may rather take vp that saying
of the Apostle, I haue confidence in you through
the Lord, that ye will be no otherwise minded; but
that, if any man shall trouble you, (or seecke to
withdrawe you from your faith) he shall beare
his iudgement, whosoever he be. And in assurance
Gal. 6. 18. hereof, I leaue you to Gods grace, in the words
of the same Apostle; Brethren, the Grace of our
Lord Iesus Christ be with your Spirit. Amen.*

Yours, the vnworthy Minister
of Iesus Christ, and your ser-
uant for Iesus sake,

HENRI MASON.



To the R E A D E R.



When the Impression of this Treatise was almost finished, I obtained the sight of two severall papers of Latine Verses, composed long since, in the yeere 1606. by two then Students in the Vniuersities, now Doctors in Diuinitie, and my worthy friends. Which Verses being (according to the Academical custome) made vpon Questions then disputed in both the Vniuersities, in Publicis Comitijis, and happily concurring with the subiect of this Treatise; as I was glad that my selfe had gotten, so I was willing to impart them to the Reader, presuming that my two friends, and much-respected brethren, will not be offended, that I send them their Verses backe againe in Print.

A *Aequivo-*



Questio philo-
sophica in Comitijis
Cantabr.

*Æquivocationis tenebræ pugnant
cum rationis lumine.*

Ecloga. *Cui nomen Pseudolus,
siue Æquiuator.*

Personæ.

Simia.

Pseudolus.

*Vide passim Ho-
ratij Satyræ
quintam, &
Plauti Pseudo-
lum, cui iste sup-
par.*

*a Sic Black-
wellus Archi-
presbyter in sua
ad Catholicos
Epistola, dat. 7.
Novemb. 1605.*

*b Vinculo cæcæ
obedientiæ ob-
stringi omnes
Iesuitas & no-
vitiis Seminariorum pullos abundè notum est: Quo tenentur, quidquid Superior imperaverit,
χωρὶς ἀπλοίας exequi.*

Hoc quoq; docte Pater, præter narrata, petèti,
Pseudole, responde, quibus artibus in via rerū
Effugiam, nostræ propria pericula Sectæ.
Nonne vides quàm non satis est maria omnia circum
Romulæ quæsisse diu responsa Cathedræ,
Vinctos, adrafos, Iesu cognomen adeptos,
Iam revehi in patriam, Româ duce, & auspice Româ!
Hinc crucis, hinc vrget malus horror carceris; aut nos
Explorat densus, capita heu damnata, Satelles.
Pseud. ^a Nos nil interea miseri, nil tendere contra,
Nos tantum lachrymas, & nulli audita Deorum
Vota damus: vel, si nostra hoc Ecclesia poscat,
Idq; ^b Patri (qui nos in Sancta incepta remittit)

Quo tenentur, quidquid Superior imperaverit,

Præ.

Pseudolus.

Præcepisse lubet, bello, sicavè, venenovè
Extinxisse nefas, & gentem abolere nefandam
Conamur; vel, si zelus flagrantior adsit,
Forſan sulphureo diſperdimus obvia flatu. (veſter
Sim. Cuncta piè ac rectè, *Pſeud.* Quid rides? *Sim.* Simia
Ille ego. Nos inter quaſi c nos non norimus. *Pſeud.* Euge c *Lupus lupum
novit, &c.*
Simia quandoquidem tam ſanctè, tamq; ſeuere
Iſta rogas, noſtram miſſis ambagibus Artem,
Artem, quam magnus docuit *Pater* d *Arius*, Artem, d *Arj hæreſiar-
chæ ſophiſticæ
& Acquiſitato-
riura coram Impe-
ratore Conſtan-
tino inſuſuandura
recole apud So-
cratem Hiſt Ec-
cleſ. lib. 1. c. 25.
e Plautus in
Pſeudolo Act. 2.
Scen. 4.
Pſeud. Onerabo
meis præcep-
tis Simiam
Quid agat, ne
quid titubet, do-
ctè ut hanc ferat
fallaciam.
f Apocal. 9. 11.
g Quod olim
Femplarijs, quid
ni tandem le-
ſiſſis accidat!*
Cortinam quæ Phœbe tuam, quæ te quoq; Proteu,
Vinciat, & vincat (paucis adverte) c docebo.
Putide Tireſia. *Quicquid loquere aut erit, aut non :*
O quàm divinare tibi donavit Apollo.
Lentū eſt. Quicquid ego edixo *ſimul ipſum erit, & non.*
Æquiſitare mihi Stygius dedit f *Ἀπολλύων*
Sim. Eſt, & Non ſemper ſibi contradicere dixi,
Et didici à puero. Si iam hæc mutaverit ætas,
Auſa ratam violare fidem, & convellere prima
Fundamenta, quibus verorum innitur ordo,
Submetuo ne nos (quorum venerabile nomen
Amſanctum populis, & formidabile Sceptris
Nunc ſedet ad primas) s olim, volventibus annis,
Mutati in peius ſaſtidia publica ſimus.
Sed tu perge loqui quorſum hæc adeo ardua tendant.
Pſeud. Rectâ ad te, fili. Si te, ſub iudice (qualis
Hæreticæ nimium eſt vigil indagatio turbæ)
Contigerit reſponſa peti, vel dicere cauſam,
Accipe quâ ratione queas nec prodere verum,
Nec male mentiri, nec te obiectare periclo,
Nec reticere tamen. Captus aſtutus oportet
Lucifugam ſermonem, & verſicoloria diſta.
Sim. Ut ne vire ludam pueri de more Sophiſtæ?
Præterea, ſi quid perplexi ſubloquar, omnes,
Evolve, ingeminant. *Pſeud.* Vah nil ſapis : vt ere verbis *Ariſtot. de
Egmulweis 43.
cap. 1?*
Ex ſe perſpicuis, ſed mente interprete tortis,

Mente tua, non mente illa, quæ consona voci.

Sim. Me verò memini primo didicisse Lycæo
Sensa animi rerum, sensorum Symbolæ voces.

h *Act. 2. Sc. 2.*
Pseud. Tu in-
ventus verò me-
am qui forcillus
fidem?

Scilicet vtibilem linguæ articulantis honorem
Naturam tribuisse patet mortalibus, vt sit
In quo conueniant, & possint mutua fungi.
Quinetiam ratio.-- *Pseud.* h Num tu rationibus audes
Iniussu certare meo? meminisse decebat,

i *Act. 2. Sc. 3.*
Pseud. Dy im-
mortales auri-
chhalco contra non
charum fuit
Meum menda-
cium.

Me Patre cum primum nostrarū elementa Scholarum
Imbiberes, in verba manus te nostra dedisse.
Imperio iam discere meo: ac, dum prosequor, audi.
Forsitan hoc de te quærat, *Tunc Sacerdos?*
Non ego Respōde. Sim. Quid? mentiar? Haud ita Romæ.

k *Act. 4. Sc. 8.*
Nimis illic mor-
talis doctus, nimis
versutus, nimis
malus
Superavit dolum
Troianum atque
Vlysem Pseu-
dulus.

Pseud. Ipse fui Romæ; mentiri nescio. Num tu
Esse Sacerdotem te credis *Apollinis, Orci,*
fidos, aut Cereris? Tu sic intellige. i Fraus hæc
Argento contra non chara est, aut orichalco.
Sic itidem. *Tu? Romam adisti?* Non ego Romam
Vnquam adii (*capite incedens, aut compede vincetus,*
Aut furcam ere gerens, humerovè molatile saxum)
Simia, ne risu te ruperis. Hæc ego trado

l *Act. 2. Sc. 2.*
Pseud. Hic mihi
incus est, procu-
dam ego hodie
hinc multos
dolos.

Sobrius, ac prudens. *Sim.* k O te, Pater alme, cerebri
Fœlicem! quàm Dîa doces! Haud talia distant
Pythagoras, Anytivè reus, vel dogma Platonis.

Formula reserua-
tionum mentaliū
Iesuus v'statæ.
Non novi i. e.
apodictice.
Non vidi. i. e.
v'sione b'ati-
ficæ.
Vel non vt di-
sam tibi.

Pseud. Te præstas nobis l incudem Simia: tecum,
Dum loquor, ipse novas videor producere technas.
Si, cui consilii socium te adiunxeris, idem
Cum fuerit Patriæ suffossor, perq; -duellis,
Is coram sistatur, & hunc norisne rogeris?
Haud te nosse hominem, prius aut vidisse, repono.
Non nosse (*ex animum cantu, Boreave susurro,*
Non ex Æthiopum historijs, Troiave ruinis,
Non ex notitiâ, qua Demonstratio dicta est.)
Non vidisse (*oculis palpebra tegmine clausis,*
Non oculis Argus, non alta noctis in umbris,

*Non disiunctarum trans saxa septa domorum,
Non hoc, quem Coelum dabit olim Patria, visu:
Denique non, ut rem tibi, Iudex improbe, narrem.)*

Sic non lingua tibi mendax, sed dictio fallax.

Interea^m duplices condens in pectore sensus,
Viceris, & rabidos prædâ spoliaveris hostes.

Sim. O Pater: ô nulli quidquam mentite, quid autem,
Quid si iuratos recta ad responsa lacescant,
Si tangendæ aræ, si cœlum in vota vocandum,
Fallemusne fidem? *Pseud.* Fidei est sine corpore nomen
Hæreticis concessa fides. Periuria non sunt,
Quæ varium sumunt ex vocum ambage colorem,
Aut iniuratæ sunt dissona nuncia mentis.

Sim. Hæc super Hæretici iurabunt protinus omnes,
Papicolis non esse Deum: ⁿ ludibria Cœlo
Conceptis fieri, consultisq; impia verbis:

°Non posse (vt reliquæ cessant hoc nomine lites)

His pietate malis obsisti. *Pseud.* Simia, quicquid

Hic nobis inimica cohors obganniat (vt se

Ruperit inuidiâ) tu sic, licet vndiq; crescat

Suspicio, corvum ludes p̄ elapsus hiantem

Tortilis in morem anguillæ, & nova flumina inibis.

Deprendi miserum est, vel Apolline iudice vincam.

Me memini quondam bis ter vè his artibus vsus;

°Periurum aiebant. Quid tum? Non hoc mihi bilem

Moverat. Irascor, quòd non irasceris hosti

Arcius. *Sim.* Ipse quidem (sic me rationis egentem

Dementisse modo fateor) vix ista putaram

Digna fidè. Iam me Magnæ reuerentia Romæ,

Iam tua me virtus, censuraq; nescia falli

Imperiis egere suis, vt singula credam,

Et cupiam vt capiam tam sanctæ imitamina fraudis:

Iam liqueo in laqueos, totusq; interfluorimis:

Iam me vtinam celebres Romani nominis hostes

manifesto tenentur? Ch. Anguilla est, elabitur. ° *Act.* 4. *Sc.* 6. *Bal.* Malum & sceleratum, periurum
aiebant esse me. *Si.* Pol haud mentitur. *Bal.* Ego haud iratus sui.

^m *Act.* 2. *Sc.* 1.

Pseud. Ego in
meo pectore ita
paravi copias du-
plicis triplicis do-
los

*Perfidias, vt ubi-
cunq; cum hosti-
bus congyediari
malorum meorū
Erectus virtute
dicam, mea in-
dustria & maliti-
tia fraudulentia
Facile vt vincā,
facile vt speliem
meos perduellis
meis perfidys.*

ⁿ *Act.* 1. *Sc.* 3.

*Quid ais quantū
terra tegit homi-
num periurissime
Iuravisti te,
&c. Bal.* fateor.
Cal. nempe con-
ceptis verbis. *Bal.*
etiā consultis quo-
que. *Cal.* Periur-
ravisti scelerate.

° *Ibidem.*

Pseud. Non po-
test pietate obsistē
huic, vt res sunt
ceteræ,

*Deos quid ē, quos
maximè æquum
est metuere, eos
minimi facit.*

^p *Act.* 5. *Sc.* 4.

Pseud. Quid cū

Exagitent. Sic est. An mecum Pseudolus unquam
 Verba habuit, quærent. Nunquam, respondeo, quicquã
 Verborum (*virides urentum flatibus ornos,*
Aut animas Erebo, Scopulis, glacie ve cientum.
Non per canalem sonuit, Taurumve Perilli.
Non Arabum lingua Chaldaeorumve loquitur,
Non lingua τεπίδων, τετραχείρων, βατραχέγγων,
χόκκοσιδνεφάγων, φλογοπίδων, έρεβήσκων,
Μυομηγατενύχων. Pseud. Quo tendis nimbila supra?
 Sim. Κορυλλοκοιμομάχων. Pseud. Satis ô satis. Vnde sed ista?
 Sim. Nomina sunt longè populorum utroq; sub Indo,
 Quos è barbarie nuper sub fœdera Christi,
 Pontificisq; iugum nostri misère Sodales.

Act. 4. Sc. 1.
 Pseud. O homi-
 nem lepidum! te
 quoque etiam do-
 lis

*Atque etiã men-
 dacys. Iupiter te
 mihi seruet.*

* *Aequiuocatio
 circularis.*

Act. 4. Sc. 1.
 Et ego ob tuam,
 Simia, perfidiam
 te amo, et metuo,
 & magnifacio.

*κακὸς κόεσκος
 κακον, αἶον.*

Pseud. O lepidū, charumq; caput, quàm Pseudoliciffas!
 Simia non magis est imitatrix, Simia, quàm tu.
 Te mihi, te seruet Romæ, ac sibi Iupiter. Sim. Atqui
 Pluris adhuc ego sum. Si quando (scilicet haud sunt
 Semper in occulto nostræ mysteria Σεῖτæ)
 Suspicio est cæcos verbis me affingere sensus,
 Iurabo me non hoc fingere: dumq; ita iurem,
 Interea me non quicquam finxisse, negantem
 Fingere, iurabo. Tum tertia, quarta secundis
 Iuramenta supericiam catus. Omnia falsa,
 Et falsa omnes. Hæc *Aequiuocatio* nomen
 Me tribuente, potest *Reflexa* aut * *Orbica* dici. (te
 Pseud. Dapsile ob inventū hoc, nequeo, mi Simia, quin
 Osculer, argutumq; caput demulceam. Abundè
 Iam scio te nostris aurem adiecisse lubentem
 Consiliis; &, quæ superaddis, facta daturum.
 Sim. Quî verò nosti num non, dum, Pseudole, tecum
 Hæc loquor, æquivocè me iam tibi credere fingam,
 Aequivocè tibi pollicear me strenuè in hostes
 Vocibus æquivocis vsurum? Pseud. O improba virtus!
 Sim. Dum pullum doceas oculos transfigere, corve

Pseudolus.

Ipse tuis caveas. *Pseud.* Metuo malè, ne malus iste,
Et nimium præcox Patris anticipator, ab hoste
Protinus in nostros obuertat cornua. *Sim.* Nam quid
Impedit, in Caium qui sit periurus eundem
In Titium quoq; --- *Pseud.* Sed nostris sermonibus eundem
Nescio quis captator adest. Discede. *Sim.* Valeto.

Quid ni igitur

Pseudolus æquivocare docens, & *Simia* discens,
Verborum laqueos ambo luant laqueo?

THO. GOAD
Magister Artium.

^u Act. 4. Sc. 3.
Pseud. Peiorem
ego hominem,
magisq; versute
malum,
Nunquã ædipol
quenquam vidi
quã hic est *Si-*
mia,
Nimisq; ego illum
hominem metuo,
Et formido male,
Ne malus it em
erga me sit, ut er-
ga illum fuit;
Ne in re secunda
mibi obuertat
somnia.

An



Questio philo-
phica proposita in
Comitijs Oxon.

An Societati humanae infesti-
ores sinte vafr Amphibologi, } *Affirmo.*
quam aperte periuri.

* Guido Faux.
* Garnet Ies.

FAux crebi patriæ fax, fax mundi, *vnū at habebis
Patrem flagitii, flagitio parem.

Herculeas ambo sceleri posuere columnas,

Nil ultra, hic calamo pessimus, hic manu.

Nomine qui varius, qui vestibus, ore, colore es

Vectus trans mare tu? Non (* *mare mortuum*.)

* Parenthesis in-
cludit mentalem
Iesuitæ reservati-
onem.

Curia Papalistic tibi visa est? Non (*sine scortis*)

Sacris Papa caput? Non (*caput anem*)

Num tu mendicans abraso crine Sacerdos?

Non (*ritu antipodum*); Non (*apud inferos*)

Nonne a te binis grauidata est Fulvia natis?

Non, verum fateor (*bimula cum foret.*)

Heus laqueo nodos claudas hos ocyus vno,

Et nodo laqueos, in cruce carnifex.

Ignare æquiocæ fraudis constringito fauces,

Garnetto vniuocè guttura frangito.

Pendeat infelix, membris truncetur, aperte

Periuro æquiocus crimine dirior.

Pectore diffisso videas, quæ mente *reseruat*;

Evulsi latebras cordis et explices.

Ancipiti gladio Iesuitica texta fecentur:

Solvi nam nequeunt ancipites doli.

DAN. FEATLY,
Magister Artium.



THE
 NEW ARTE OF
 Lying, couered by Iesuites
under the Vaile of
 Equiuocation.



He ^a Apostle describing the state ^a 2.Thes.2.7e of Antichrist, doth signifie, that *a mysterie of iniquitie* should appeare in the managing of it: and this doth implie, that in the kingdome of Antichrist *iniquity* should reigne vnder a couert of *holinesse*. And the same Apostle doth foretell, ^b that in *the latter* ^b 1.Tim.4.1,2. *times* (which are the times of Antichrists reigne) men should *speake lies in hypocrisie*. And this, though it may bee extended farther, yet cannot bee more literally vnderstood, then of such as teach a practise of *lying*, vnder a pretence of preserving *trueth*. Now of these Prophecies of the Apostle I may speake in a like manner, and almost in the same words, as our ^c Lord spake ^c Luke 4.21. of the Prophecie of *Isai*; *This day are these Scriptures fulfilled in our eyes*; for now wee see those who exercise *a mystery of iniquity*, and *speake lies*, pretending thereby to maintaine and preserve the *trueth*: as (to

d *Loquendo cum Arte dissimulati-
onis vitatur pec-
cata, quæ cõmu-
niter, committun-
tur, &c.* Rodri-
quez sumâ, v.
mendac. nu. 4.

e *Aequiuocatio,
quam licitam tu-
emur, omnino ad
mendacia periur-
riq; vitanda
confert.* Heiffius
Refut. Aphoril.
cap. 4. Aphoril.
nu. 130.

f *Sive recreatio-
nis gratiâ, siue
quocunque alio
fine, iuret se non
fecisse aliquid
quod reuera fe-
cit; intelligendo
intra se aliquid
aliud &c. reuera
non mentitur.*

Sanchez oper.
moral. to. 1. l. 3.
c. 6. nu. 15. pag.
25.

g *Per hanc do-
ctrinam singula-
rem, possumus
excitare innume-
ra peccata, quæ
passim aliquot*

*negligentiores admittimus negando vel affirmando passim sine aliqua subintellellione, cum qua com-
mista essent vera.* Nauar. Comment. in C. Humanę aur. q. 3. nu. 13. h Proceeding a-
gainst Traitors. litt. I. 1.

omit all further instance) may evidently be seene in a
new-found Arte of *Equiuocation*. For the Masters and
maintainers thereof doe tell vs, ^d *That by speaking ac-
cording to this Arte of dissembling, sinnes are auoided,
which, without it, are commonly committed.* And that
^c *Equiuocation altogether serueth, or is of good use for a-
uoiding of lyes and periuries.* And ^f that for what end or
reason soeuer a man sweare, that hee did not doe a thing,
which indeed hee did doe, yet hauing his reseruatiõ with-
in himselfe, he in very deede telleth no lie. And ^g that by
this singular doctrine wee may auoid innumerable sinnes,
which through heedlesnesse diuers of vs doe euery foote com-
mit, by denying or affirming things vsually, without a reser-
uation vnderstood, with which if they were ioyned, they
would bee true. And to this purpose it is, that Father
^h Garnet, a Master of this Arte, when a booke was to be
licenced by him, the title whereof was, *A Treatise of
Equiuocation*, hee scored out that title, and put this in
the place of it, *A Treatise against lying and fraudulent
dissimulation*. By all which it may appeare, that these
men, while they teach the Arte of *Equiuocation*, do pro-
fesse notwithstanding, that all which they doe, is with
a religious obseruance and preferuation of the *trueth*.
But now in the second place I offer to prooue in this
short Treatise, that whatsoeuer shewes they make to
the contrary, yet this deuice of *Equiuocation* is in truth,
an Arte of fallshood and deceit, and such as the Scrip-
tures doe condemne vnder the name of *lying*. Which
point if it bee once cleared, then there can be no doubt,
but that the Church of *Rome*, and her Doctors, are they
which exercise a *mystery of iniquity*, and speake lies in hy-
pocrisie.

Now for the clearing hereof, and that the world may see more fully what to thinke of this *mystery*, there are five things, which I haue thought necessary to be considered of.


1 *The name, or what is meant by the word Equivocation in this Question.*

2 *The Originall of it, or who be the Authors and vjholders of it.*

3 *The obiect and matter, or in what cases they allow it to be lawfull.*

4 *The vse, or rather abuse of it, or for what turnes it may serue the Patrons of it.*

5 *The Grounds, or what the proofes or reasons are either for or against it.*



CHAP. I.

Of the name, and what is meant by the word Equivocation in this Question.



Hat wee may the better vnderstand what is meant by this word, wee must note that there are two famous accep- tions and vses of the word *Equivocation* among men. The first is a *proper* and *ancient* vse of it, frequent among all sorts

of writers, but handled and spoken of, especially in *Logicke*. The second is an *improper* and *abusine* acception of it, which was of late yeeres deuised by some writers and Doctors of the *Romane Church*. *Father Parsons* calleth the former, *verball*, and the later, *mentall Equivocation*. And of these hee saith, ^a that the *verball* is ^a *Mitigat. cap. 8* *proper Equivocation*; the *mentall* is so called, rather by a ^{nu. 10. pa. 314.}

a *Ibid. nu. 15.* certaine similitude, then propriety of speech, and that
 a the verball is onely true and proper Equiuocation, for that
 b *Ibid. nu. 10.* mentall in rigor is none. And againe, that ^b Equiuocation
 hath of later yeeres onely been accustomed to bee vsed in this
 sense, that is, for mentall Equiuocation. And Heissius ano-
 c *Refut. Apor. cap. 4. Aporis. 3. nu. 129.* ther Iesuite, & Patron of this Art, saith, that their *mixt*
 speech (which they call *mentall Equiuocation*) is not pro-
 perly Equiuocation. By which speaches of these Iesu-
 ites (especially seeing the one of them is a man so well
 seene in this *Arte*, and so much exercised in this argu-
 ment of *Equiuocation*) I presume I haue sufficient war-
 rant to say as I did, without the controll of any of our
 punie Iesuites, that the one vse and acception is *proper*
 and *ancient*, the other *vnproper*, and of a later growth,
 that is, since the *mystery of iniquity* did open it selfe
 more fully to the world, and men did more apparantly
speake lies in hypocrisie. But yet for the distinguishing of
 these two kindes, I will rather call the first *Logicall E-*
quiuocation, as being that which Logicke doth onely
 acknowledge: and the later I will call *Iesuiticall E-*
quiuocation, as hauing, if not its first deuising, yet at least, its
 polishing from men of that Order. The Question in
 this place is onely concerning the later, which I call
Iesuiticall Equiuocation. Notwithstanding for the better
 clearing of the point in controuersie, somewhat is first
 to be said concerning the former, which I call *Lo-*
gicall.

First then for the *Logicall Equiuocation*; it is an *am-*
biguous or doubifull saying, when one word or speech hath
two senses then one, and it hapeneth three wayes.

1. When a word by it selfe hath diuers significations
 and meanings; as this word [*to knew*] hath. For some-
 times it signifieth to apprehend and vnderstand the
 certainty of some truth: as when *S. Iohn* saith; *GOD*
 is greater then our hearts; and knoweth all things. 2. [*To*
know] is as much as to approue and allow of: as when

Dauid

David saith; The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous. Psal. 1. 6. And when *Christ saith to the foolish Virgins; Verily I say unto you, I know you not.* Math. 25. 12. The meaning is; I do not acknowledge you for any of mine. In this, and such like words as this, there is an *Equivocation*; because the word hath diuers acceptions and vses.

2. When words, which haue but one signification of themselves, yet are so ioyned together in some sentence, as that they may, by reason of the composition, make and yeeld diuers meanings: or when by reason of their contexture, they may haue moe meanings than one: as when *S. Luke saith; When they heard this, they were baptized in the Name of the Lord Iesus:* Acts 19. 5. these words are diuersly construed by the Learned. For some thinke them to bee the words of *S. Paul*, and to haue reference to the speech of *John Baptist*, immediately going before: and then the meaning must bee this; that when those brethren, there spoken of, heard *John* so teaching concerning *Christ*, they were baptized of *John*, in the Name of the Lord Iesus. But others thinke them to be the words of *S. Luke*, and to haue reference to the former speech of *S. Paul*: and then the meaning must be; that when those brethren had heard *Paul* discoursing in this manner of *John* and his Baptisme, then they were baptized of *Paul*, in the Name of *Christ*. In this Clause then, there are two senses giuen by the Learned; and that sheweth that there is an ambiguity; but that ambiguitie riseth not from the diuersitie of significations in any of the words; but from the different consideration of the contexture or composition of the sentence.

3. When the circumstances of time, place, persons, &c. are such, as that in reason; and in the iudgement of sober men; being well and duely considered, they may limit or restraine the speech to some speciall matter or subject; or otherwise alter the meaning of it from that

Acts 20. 27.

which it should haue, if it were in some other place, and vpon some other occasion. As for example: when *S. Paul* saith; *I haue not shunned to declare vnto you all the Counsell of God.* These words considered by themselves, doe comprize all the Secrets of God, and all the mysteries of His Wisedome: but if we consider the circumstances of the persons, time, place, and occasion; as that the speaker was *Paul*, an Apostle, whose office and imployment was to teach the mysteries of Religion; that the hearers were the Church of *Ephesus*, who expected information in matters of saluation; and that the occasion of their meeting at this time, and in this place, was onely for teaching and learning the Word of God, and the Gospell of Iesus Christ: these circumstances, in reason, may teach vs, that in this place, those words [*all the Counsell of God*] are not to bee extended to all the secrets and depth of Gods Wisedome; a great part whereof, is neither reuealed, nor necessarie to bee knowne of any man; and some part whereof, though it be reuealed, yet was not pertinent to this occasion; but rather, that those words are to bee limited and restrained, according to the present occasion, to signifie and note, all necessary things for them to know for their soules health and saluation. Or, to giue a more familiar example, and such as a Iesuite hath giuen instance in; wee may suppose, that two men going together in a journey; the one of them (his money sayling him) desireth to borrow ten pound of his fellow; who maketh answere, that he hath not so much: heere his meaning must be supposed to be, that he hath not so much in his purse, or so much in a readinesse about him, though he had foure times the like value in his Chest at home. But if the same thing should be desired of him, when he were at home in his owne house, then the meaning would be, that he had not such a summe at home. And the same answere, which was true, being giuen to his fellow-

fellow-Traueler by the way; would be a lye, if it were vttered to him in his house. Thus there may arise an ambiguity in a speech, by reason of the circumstances of person, place, time, and occasion; where otherwise there is no ambiguity either in the signification of any word, or in the composition of the sentence, considered in and by themselves.

And in what kind soeuer, of these now specified, there happeneth an ambiguity; that I call a *Logicall Equiuocation*; concerning which our present question is not. For as the Doctors of the Romane Church, so the learned of our side doe acknowledge, that there may be a lawfull vse of equiuocall speeches in euery of these kinds, if they be not extended too farre, or mis-applied to a wrong cause. For, to speake more particularly, it is granted,

1. That we may lawfully vse words, which may indifferently be taken in diuers acceptions and meanings, as they are then vsed. And this is plaine, partly because the Scriptures are full of such speeches; and partly, because our common conuersation and life cannot be without them.

2. It is not vnlawfull, when some case of further good doth require it, to vse these ambiguous speeches in the lesse knowne and common signification, and in another meaning then it is likely the hearers wil vnderstand them for the present. For so, when our Lord said, *Lazarus our friend sleepeth*: He meant that he was dead, Ioh. 11. 14. which was the lesse common and knowne signification; and therefore the Disciples, according to the more vsuall meaning, vnderstood him of naturall sleepe. And he did this for good purpose, and for the profit of the hearers; that they might heereby learne, either that death in generall is to Gods children but as a *sleepe*, by which they are refreshed, and made the more liuely: or that this death of *Lazarus*, was rather to be called

a sleepe, then a death, because hee was so speedily raised from it againe.

a 1. Sam. 16.
1, 2.

3 It is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech in any of these kindes, that thereby we may hide some thing from the hearers, which they should not know. This assertion hath not so direct prooffe from *Scripture*, as the others haue; & yet it is not without all prooffe from the *Scriptures* neither. For there wee finde, that a man may lawfully vtter one trueth, thereby to hide another trueth from the hearer. As for example, ^a God appointed *Samuel* to goe to *Bethleem* and anoint one of *Iesses* sonnes to bee King; and when *Samuel* obiected, *How can I goe? If Saul heare it, hee will kill mee. The Lord said, Take an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord.* And so *Samuel* did, as it followeth in the same Chapter; and by this he cōcealed his purpose of anointing a new King; which was the speciall intent of his going to that place. And if it be lawfull and warranted by Gods own appointment to vtter one trueth, for the concealing of another: then in reason I thinke it cannot iustly be condemned for vnlawfull, if a man, vpon iust occasion, doe vse an ambiguous speech in a true sense, thereby to hide from the hearer, something which hee should not knowe. For if in so doing any thing bee faulty, it must be, as I take it, the one of the two; either because an ambiguous speech is vsed in another meaning then it is likely the hearer will take it; and that to be lawfull, is prooued in the former assertion: or because this true sense in the ambiguous speech, is vttered to conceale another thing from the hearer; and that to be lawfull, is cleare by this example of *Samuel*. And therefore I thinke the conclusion may hence be inferred, that it is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech, that thereby we may conceale some other thing, which is not fit
to

to be vttered. And hereto agree our learned diuines also. For one, speaking of *Equiuocatio*, as it consisteth in the ambiguity of words vttered, addeth, ^a *That this kind of Equiuocation, especially in ordinary speach, no man doubteth but that it may lawfully be vsed.* And, ^b *this Equiuocation may haue his due place for concealing of Counsels, and hiding of secrets.* And againe, speaking to his aduerfary, ^c *Knowe (saith he) that those concealements, whether of Confessions or Counsels, whereof you speake, where they doe consist of ambiguities in the words, wee dislike not: onely if they be couered with a lie, that wee doe wholly condemne.* And another learned writer in our Church, speaking of one, that magnified the vse of Equiuocatiou, adioineth, ^d *If by the name of Equiuocation he vnderstand a plaine and sober concealing and couering of secret counsels, which in this miserable life is oft times necessary, I am of his opinion too.* This is the opinon and iudgement of our learned men, concerning the vse of *Logicall Equiuocation*; and herein we agree with them of the Church of Rome: or if there bee any difference among the learned of both sides in these cases already mentioned, as perhaps about some circumstances in the vse of those ambiguous speaches there may be, it is nothing to the present Question in hand, which is not concerning any of the kindes of these *Logicall Equiuocations*, which consist in the ambiguous acceptiō and meaning of the words vttered. And therefore when the *Equiuocators* of our time doe labor to confirme their *Arte*, by the authorized vse of such speaches, as are ambiguous by reason of the diuers meanings which the words may receiue, they misse the marke, beate the ayre, and spend their labour to no purpose.

And this being briefly noted, concerning the true and *Logicall Equiuocation*, I come now to the *improper* and *Jesuiticall*. And that what it is, I will set downe in their owne words, who professe to bee Patrons of it.

^a *Quā interdū, maxime in libro sermone, hoc quidem sensu ut licere nemo dubitat.* Abbot Antilog, aduersus Eudemono-loan cap. 2 fol. 18.

^b *Sit per illam cetandū consilijs, regendisq; arcanis suis locus.* Ibidem.

^c *Tu scias taciturnitates illas, quas narras, Confessionum & consiliorum, ubi amphibologis & ambiguitatibus consistunt, nobis non improbari: damuari prosumus à nobis, ut mendacio tegantur.*

^d *Si appellatione Acquiocationis, simplicem quandam & modestā relicentiam significet, aut dissimulationem consiliorum in hac misera vita sepe necessariam; planè eum ipso sentio.*

Casaubon. epi. ad Fronton. Duc. pag. 110.

a Mitigar. cap.
9. nu. 53. pa. 382

b Mitigar. ca.
12. nu. 3 p. 484.

c Possum absq;
mendacio ea ver-
ba usurpari, eti-
am si ex sua sig-
nificatione non
sint ambigua, nec
cum sensum ve-
rum admittant
ex se, nec ex cir-
cumstantiis oc-
currentibus, sed
tantum verum
sensum reddant
ex aliquo addito
mente proferentis
retento, quodcuq;
illud sit. Sanch.
oper. moral. l. 3
c. 6. nu. 15.

Father Persons ^a then, a man very laborious in the poli-
shing of this *Arte*, defineth it thus; *Equiuocation or Am-
phibologie in this our Controuersie, is nothing else, but when
a speech is partly vttered in words, and partly reserued in
mind, by which reseruatiō the sense of the proposition may
be diuers.* And again, ^b *mentall Equiuocation* (saith he)
*is, when any speech hath or may haue a double sense, not by
any double signification or composition of the words them-
selues, but onely by some reseruatiō of minde in the speaker,
whereby his meaning is made different from the sense which
the words that are vttered, doe beare or yeeld without that
reseruatiō. And Sanchez giuing a Rule concerning the
words vsed in this their Equiuocation, saith, ^c A man
may without telling of a lye, vse those words, although they
be not ambiguous by their signification, and doe not make a
true sense, either by themselves, or by reason of the circum-
stances then occurring, but doe onely make a true sense by
some addition, kept in the speakers minde, whatsoeuer that
addition bee. Thus they. By which descriptions it ap-
peareth, that Iesuiticall Equiuocation, is a mixt propositi-
tion, (as Persons also diuers times calleth it) part where-
of is vttered in words, and so taken it hath one sense;
and another part of it is reserued and vnderstood in the
speakers minde, which being added to the words spo-
ken, maketh another sense; as for example, A Seminarie,
or a Iesuite-Priest being asked by a Magistrate, *Are
you a Priest?* He answereth, *I am no Priest*, vnderstand-
ing and reseruing in his minde this clause, *So as I am
bound to tell you*, or any other which himselfe pleaseth
to like purpose: here (say they) is but one mixt pro-
position, part whercof is vttered in words, namely, *I am
no Priest*; and that taken alone as it is vttered, breed-
eth a false sense, and in this sense they would haue the
Magistrate to conceiue it: & another part of that propo-
sition is reserued and kept secret and close in the Priests
mind, & that is this, *So as I am bound to tell you*: And this
secret,*

secret & *mentall reservation*, being added to the words, maketh this one entire Proposition; *I am no Priest, so as I am bound to tell you*: and that being taken all together, maketh a true sence, and so the Priest vnderstandeth it. And therefore, if he doe but keepe, or referue, or vnderstand that or any such clause in his minde, though the words which he speaketh bee neuer so false, yet this man telleth no lye, nor speaketh no vntruth. Such is the vertue of this new-found Arte; and thus they describe it.

But that it may yet appeare more fully and more distinctly, it will not be amisse to set downe the mysterie of this Art in certaine distinct Propositions, all gathered from their owne writings, and approued dealings.

1. That this *mixt Proposition* of theirs, or this *Equiuocation*, as they call it, whether we consider that part of it which is vttered in words; or the whole Proposition as it hath the referuatiō added to it, which is kept in the speakers mind; hath in neither respect or consideration, as *F. P.* saith, *any doubtful sense of speech or words*, (a) Mitigat. cap. 8. nu. 10. pag. 313. by their doubtfull or double signification; but only that it vttereth not all the whole sense of the speaker; & therefore cannot be properly called equiuocall, according to Aristotles meaning & Definition. And againe, *These mixt Propositions* (b) Mitig. cap. 11. nu. 14. pag. 447. (b) Mitig. cap. 11. nu. 14. pag. 447. *Aristotle did define, &c. for that they doe not of themselues nor their own natures, signifie equally diuers things; but being vnderstood wholly, haue a simple and single signification in the mind and vnderstanding of the speaker: yet, for that the hearer conceiuing but one part thereof, apprehendeth a different sense from the speaker; they may, ab effectu, be called ambiguous; for that they leaue a different sense in the hearer & speaker, albeit of themselues they be plaine, cleere, and true, &c.* Out of which words, considered & ioyned with that which was formerly cited out of *Sanchez* and *Parsons*, we may note three things. 1. That there

is no *ambiguity* or *doubtfull sense*, either in the words vttered, if they be taken alone; nor in the whole Proposition, as they compound it of the words vttered, & the reseruatiō vnderstood, taken together. 2. That therefore they call it *Equiuocation*, or an *Equiuocall Proposition* or speech; because they signifie or expresse one meaning to the hearer, which is false; and retaine or vnderstand another sense within themselues, which is true. 3. That the taking of this word *Equiuocation* in this meaning, is not proper, and such as *Aristotle* did vnderstand and conceiue by it. Hee might haue said, that it is not proper; nor such as either *Aristotle*, or any man either learned or vnlearned, hauing but common sense in his head, and common honesty in his heart, did euer acknowledge before this last Age. And the truth is, they therefore call it an *Equiuocatio*, though the word was neuer known to haue any such meaning or signification; because they are ashamed to call it by its right name, which is, *A Lye*. But as the couetous man, though he practiseth the thing, yet abhorres the name; and therefore will be called *a good husband*, or *a thrifty man*: And as a thiefe is ashamed of his right name, and when he meeteth with a Traueller to whom he would signifie his errand; he saith, that *he is a Good-fellow which wanteth money*: So the *Romanists* teach an Arte of lying; and because they are ashamed of the infamous name of *Lyers*, they call themselues *Equiuocators*: and that which other men call *Lying*, they call *Equiuocating*.

2. That if a man will vse this benefit of *Equiuocating*, he must be warie and carefull, that he reserue some secret clause in his mind, which being added to the words vttered, doe make a true speech; or else all is marred, and he, for want of that clause, become a plaine Lye.

To this purpose, Father *Persons* saith, that the *Equiuocator speaketh a truerth in his owne meaning, and in the*

the sight of God; which alwaies he must doe, when hee vseth this Euaſion; for that otherwise he should lye, and commit sinne, if he had not some true sense reſerued in his mind, &c.

To declare this yet further: Say that two Priests were questioned by a Magistrate, whether they were Priests or no; and the one should say, *I am no Priest*: and should withall reſerue in his mind this clause, *So as I am bound so tell you*: and the other should answer in the very same words, *I am no Priest*: but should forget or neglect to frame or imagine in his mind that reſervation, or some such like: the former, who imagined that reſervation in his mind, should be an *Equiuocator*, and speake the truth; but the latter, who had omitted it, should be a *Lyer*, and vtter a falshood and vntruth, though hee speake none but the very same words; and they haue none but one signification and meaning.

This they say, to shew vs, how an *Equiuocator* doth differ very much from a *Lyer*. The truth is; this *Equiuocator* and this *Lyer* doe differ as much as two false knaues, the one of which is called a Thiefe, and the other, a *Good-fellow that taketh a Purſe*.

3. That whatſoever a man doe say or ſweare, be it otherwise neuer so false and absurd; yet if a man doe imagine a clause in his mind, which being added to the words spoken, would make a true meaning; then the former speech or saying, how false ſoever otherwise, becommeth true, and without all compaſſe of lying: because (saith Father ² *Persons*) it is freed from the nature of a *Lye*, by the due & iust reſervation in the ſpeakers mind. By the due and iust reſervation, saith hee. But suppose the reſervation be not iust and due, but that a man vse this arte, when he ought not to *equiuocate*? Why, yet euen then, he is by this reſervation freed from telling of a *Lye*, though not freed from all sinne. For *though it*

*Risum teneatis,
amici?*

a Mitigat. cap.
10. nu. 14. pag.
418.

should not be properly the sinne of Lying, nor against the negative Precept of Truth: yet should it be another sinne, against the publike good of ciuill society, and consequently against the affirmatiue Precept of Truth, &c. Thus speaketh Father a Persons. And to the like purpose Valentia^b. But Sanchez more plainly and roundly: If a man (saith he) either alone or before company, either being asked or of his owne accord, either for recreation sake, or for any other end, doe sweare that he did not doe something, which indeed he did do; vnderstanding within himselfe some other thing then that he did doe; or some other day then that in which he did doe it, or any other addition that is true; this man, in very deed, doth neither lye nor forswear.

Thus they speake, and so must all they that will maintaine this Arte. For whereas Father Persons, speaking of the Wife of Ananias, saith; ^d that shee being lawfully demanded by S. Peter in a lawfull cause, touching her owne vow and promise, no clause of reseruatiō could save her speech from lying: he doth herein not only contradict himselfe, as Lyers vsually doe, but doth also thereby ouerthrow the very grounds of this fond Arte. For if a reseruatiō in the mind doe free the Equiuocator from lying; because that being added to his words, both together do make a true Proposition; why should not a reseruatiō in this womans mind, saue her speech from lying, if it were such, as being added to her words, both together might yeeld a true meaning; which, according to the rules of this Arte, it had beene easie for this woman to frame?

4 That in any case, in which Equiuocation may be vsed, a man may frame any reseruatiō, whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth, so it be such, as being added to the words, doth make the whole compound to bee true. ^e Persons somtimes seemeth to require, that the reseruatiō be conformable to the matter, time, and place; & not framed at randome, as some fondly do imagine. But he doth but

mocke

a Mitigat. cap. 10. num. 23.

pag. 424.

b Tom. 3. disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. pag. 1136.

c Si quis vel solus vel coram aliis; siue interrogatus, siue propria sponte; siue recreationis gratiā, siue quocumq; alio fine, iuret se non fecisse aliquid

quod reuera fecit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud, quod non fecit, vel aliam diem

ab ea in qua fecit, vel quoduis aliud additum verum, reuera non mentitur, &c. Sanchez op. moral. l. 3. cap. 6. num. 15. p. 25.

d Mitigat. cap. 11. nu. 29. pag. 459.

e Mitig. c. 10. nu. 22. p. 424.

mocke his Reader; making shew of following the former Schoole-Doctors, whose words these are; when he hath no such meaning as they had in them. For, when he speaketh plainly, and so as you may vnderstand his distinct meaning, then his ^a words are; *I doe truly and really meane, that I am no Priest, in the sense that I speak it, which may be any that pleaseth me, or that I list to frame to my selfe: so as I may meane, that I am no Priest, such as I should be, such as I desire to be, such as is worthy of so great an office, and sacred a function; such as he ought to be, that occupieth the place of God in governing of soules; I am no Priest subiect to the demander, or obliged to answer his demands; or the like.* Thus, and such like, whatsoeuer he pleaseth, he professeth may be his *reservations*, when he denyeth himselfe to be a Priest: and what *conformity* these haue, at least the most of them, with the *Circumstances*, I leaue to bee declared by the Patrons and Masters of this Arte. Sure I am, if such large scope may be granted, and yet the *reservation* bee conformable to the matter, &c. and not *fained at random*, then it will be an easie matter to keepe within compass, and to obserue the wise rule of this graue Father. But, let *Persons* goe with his doubling, and let vs heare what others say. *Sanchez* alloweth any words, if they yeeld a true sense, ^b *By any addition, reserued in the minde of the speaker, whatsoeuer that addition bee.* And *Iacob de Grassis*, proposing a Case of one, who being taken by theeues, doth for feare promise them somewhat with an oath; ^c *If (saith he) he doe imagine some other thing in his minde, for example, I promise to giue this, or do that, if the Judge shal compel me to it, or if the skie shall fall, or the like, then he shalbe cleare from sinne.* And *Sanchez*, ^d *that a man may lawfully answer, that he killed not Peter, meaning another man of the same name, or that he killed him not, and tequam nascereur, before hee was borne.* And *Strange* the Iesuite, to shew what strange and vnlimited liberty they

Mitig. cap. 8.
nu. 55. p. 344.

^b *Ex aliquo addito, mente profertentis retento quoadcumque illud fit.* Sanch. op. moral. l. 3. c. 6.

nu. 15. pa. 25.

^c *Si iſſe aliud mente cogitauerit, verbi gratia, promitto dare aut facere, si iudice coactus fuero, vel si Culum ruat, aut quid simile, tunc a peccato crit immunis.*

Decif. Aur. par. .

l. 2. ca. 17. nu.

12.

^d *Oper. mor. l.*

3. c. 6. nu. 26.

pag. 18.

Proceeding a-
gainst Trai-
tors. litt. l. 1.

they doe take in the framing of this fancie, affirme e that he was in the company, reseruing and intending secretly as added, this word, *Not*; when hee was questioned before the Lord Chiefe Iustice of England, and the Kings Attourney. These reseruatiōns, and others not much better, doe they allow and practise in the Arte of Equiuocating, whereof there is frequent mention in their Bookes and Treatises of this argument. By all which it appeareth, that they approue of any reseruatiōn, which a man can fancie, if the case be such as they allow of, and the claufe such, as may signifie a trueth.

a Mitigat. ca.
11. nu. 17. pag.
449.

b Mitig. c. 11.
nu. 43. pa. 468.

5. That this Equiuocation of theirs, is lawfull, not onely in ordinary speach, but in oathes also. This is plainly auouched by Father Persons, and vpon this reason, ^a Because it is a most certaine principle, as well in reason, as in Diuinitie, that what a man may truly say, hee may truly also sweare. And againe, ^b As all Diuines hold (saith hee) that which may lawfully be said, may also lawfully be sworne. And to this doe agree others of this Crue, who commonly handle this question of Equiuocation in their Treatises of Oathes, and allow it as a thing very lawfull, and of good vse.

c Mitig. c. 7.
nu. 14. pag. 284

d Cap. 7. nu.
22. pa. 289.

e Cap. 7. nu. 2.
pag. 274.

6. That this Arte was deuised, and so by them is vsed, that by it they may deceiue the vnderstanding of the hearer, and make him beleeu an vntrueth, when it may serue for their turne. To this purpose those words of Father Persons sound, ^c Equiuocation must sometime be practised, when no other euasion can be found for defence of innocencie, iustice, secrecy, and other like urgent occasions. And speaking of some cases of inconuenience, which hee would haue to bee auoided by Equiuocation, he demandeth, ^d Hath God and Nature, and Law of Iustice left no lawfull euasion in such cases? And againe, ^e Wee delight not (saith hee) in this Arte or maner of euasion by Equiuocation. By this it appeareth, that Equiuocation (to vse the Iesuites owne words) is an Art of euasion,

equivocation, which cannot be understood without a meaning and purpose to deceive the hearers understanding, and to make him beleue an vntrueth. The same Doctor of this Arte goeth on, and teacheth vs, that this their *Equivocation* is, *a* when any speech hath, or may have a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of the words themselves; but onely by some reservation of minde in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from that sense which the words that are uttered, do beare, or yeeld without that reservation. And by this is implied, that the purpose of this is, to imprint one sense in the speaker, which they acknowledge to be false, and to keepe within themselves another, which they imagine to be true. *Becanus* also, another Iesuite, having first proposed the question, *An liceat uti Aequivocatione: Whether it may be lawfull to use Equivocation:* he explaineth the point thus; *b* *Whether it bee lawfull to deceiue and beguile others by Equivocations.* In the prosecution of which question, though he wrangle, & would gladly shift off from themselves the imputation of this *equivocating* fraud; yea, and flatly denieth it: yet by explaining the questiō in such sort, he acknowledgeth, that their meaning who defend it, is to beguile and deceive men. And in like sort *Tolet* saith. *c* *It is sometimes lawfull to use Equivocation, and to deceiue the hearer.* And therefore when *Father Persons* *d* saith, that his intention is not to deceiue in this ment all proposition, but to defend himselfe, &c. and that the Priest (who denieth himselfe to be a Priest) that his principall intent is not *intentio fallendi, an intention of deceiuing; but rather, euadendi desiderium, a desire to escape and defend himselfe:* he doth either too boldly presume vpon his Readers simplicitie, or too grossely bewray his owne. For first, when hee saith, that his principall intent is not to deceiue, but rather to escape, hee implieth, that an intention he hath to deceiue, though that be not his principall

a Mitig. c. 11. nu. 3. pag. 484.

b *Sensus est, an liceat alios fallere, decipere aut cludere per Aequivocationes.* Manual. Controu. l. 5. c. 21. pag. 530.

c *Aliquando licet uti aequivocatione, & fallere audientem.* Tolet. Instruct. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 9.
d Mitig. cap. 8 nu. 58. pag. 346 & 347.
See also, Sober Reckon. c. 4. nu. 89. pag. 285

D intention;

intention; and that is enough to prooue (which hee denieth) that his *Equiuocation* doth herein agree with the nature of a *lye*, that as a *lye* is said to bee, *cum intentio- ne fallendi*, so his *Equiuocation* cannot be denied to haue the same purpose and intention in it. And secondly, where he saith plainly that his *intention* is not to *deceiue*, but to *defend*, hee speaketh as wisely, and to a good purpose, as if a thiefe by the high way side should say, that hee intended not to take away the true mans purse, but to supplie himselfe with money for his owne spending. For as the thiefe intendeth to robbe, that thereby he may supply himselfe; so the Iesuite intendeth to deceiue, that thereby he may defend himselfe.

Mitig. c. 7. nu. 2
pag. 274.

7 That to forbear the vse of this *Equiuocation* (vnlesse where by duety a man is bound to vse it) is better and more Meritorious then to vse it. To this purpose speaketh the great Master of this Arte; *Wee delight not* (saith hee) *in this Arte or maner of euasion by Equiuocation, though it be no lye at all; but rather do allow and like far better of simple, plaine, and resolute speech in all Catholikes, concerning aswel matters of ordinary conuersation, as of their conscience, &c.* And presently he addeth; *Yet for that perfection is one thing, and obligation is another, wee may not binde men to more then Gods precept bindeth.* By which speech hee plainly teacheth, that though it bee not vnlawfull to vse *Equiuocation*, because it is not forbidden by any precept; yet it is a worke of perfection, (such as they vse to call worke of supererogation) not to vse a mans lawfull libertie in this case. And yet further, *It is euident, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, and prepared to suffer iniuries, may lue without going to Law, without swearing, without diuorcing their wiues, without Equiuocation, &c.* yet for all that, men are not bound to this exactnesse, &c. And yet againe; *My wish is* (saith hee) *that Catholike people, but especially Priests, whose example must instruct the rest, should yeeld also of*
their

Cap. 7. nu. 5.
pag. 276.

Cap. 13. nu. 3.
pag. 548.

their rights, for increase of their merit and Crowne in heauen, and vse also plainnesse and synceritie in speech, and free discovering, not onely of their religion, but also of their state, where it is hurtfull to none but themselues. And in a word, plainnesse and syncerity of speech, he compareth with *virginity*, (which in their esteeme, is a glorious worke of perfection or supererogation:) and the practice of *Equiuocating* to *Wedlocke*, which is lawful, but not of such merit.

See Persons also
in his Sober
Reck. ca. 7. nu.
22, & 23. pag.
484, 485.

Now hence I inferre two Conclusions.

1 That the practice of Protestants in vsing *plainnesse and syncerity in speech*, according to their doctrine, is by the confession of the Iesuite, better and more holly, then the practice of Papiests in vsing *Evasions* and *Equiuocations*, according to the doctrine of the *Equiuocators*.

2 That according to the doctrine of Popish *Equiuocators*, Iesus our Sauour was not so perfect, nor vsed not so much *exactnesse in his speech*, nor *merited* not so much, as the Iesuites doe, many of them at least. For Father Persons saith, that *albeit good men desirous of perfection, may liue without Equiuocating, yet &c.* hee meaneth that though it may bee seene in such men, yet others are not bound to that *exactnesse*: and he implieth, that men *desirous of perfection*, doe vse to doe so. And such, I trow, the holy Order of *Iesuites* is, who for desire of this *perfection*, haue by solemne vow abandoned the world, and all the glory, and profit belonging to it. Besides, Father Persons graue aduice is, that *not onely Priests, but other Catholikes too*, should *yeeld of their right*, by forbearing to equiuocate, for the increase of their *merit and Crowne in heauen*: and, I trowe, the followers of *I E S U S* will not bee slacke to performe, what one of their owne Fathers doth aduise to bee so behoofe- full, not onely for seculars of the Clergie, but for lay-

a Sober Reck.
Append. nu. 16
pag. 682.
b Sober Reck.
in append. nu.
34. pag. 687.

Catholikes also. But now I E S V S our Lord, see how farre off the Iesuite maketh him to bee from this degree of perfection. For hee was so frequent in equiuocating, that Father *Persons* ^a findeth him to haue used the same in one onely Chapter of S. Iohns Gospel, aboue seuen or eight times at the least. Nay, and that ^b more then one Equiuocation was used by our Sauour in one sentence: and that eight or nine Equiuocall speaches at the least, are contained within a peece of one onely Chapter of our Sauours talke with the Jewes, Scribes and Pharisees. And indeede hee hath recited and alleadged nine seuerall examples out of our Sauours words, recorded in the latter part of the eighth Chapter of S. Iohn. And sure, hee that did equiuocate so often in so little compasse, cannot be imagined to haue forborne his right in this practice, for the increase of his merit and Crowne in heauen. Or if they will say, that notwithstanding this frequent vse of Equiuocation in so short space, that yet hee did forbear his right still, and so increased his merit thereby; then they will giue vs occasion to thinke, that Iesuites and Priests; and other Roman Catholikes may attaine this height of perfection, vnto which Father *Persons* aduifeth them, and coozen and deceiue vs silly fellowes with their Equiuocations seuen, or eight, or nine times in one houre.

I leaue it then to bee considered by the wise Reader, whether Father *Persons* doe cog with vs all this while, and make no small vse of this deceitfull Arte, while hee labourerth to defend it: or, whether in good earnest hee thinketh that our Lord and Sauour did not follow so exact a rule of perfection, as hee aduifeth all his Catholikes vnto.

These bee the most speciall properties belonging to Iesuiticall Equiuocation, as nere as I could gather and obserue them out of their bookes, which bee the abettors of this Arte, among whom the principall, Father *Persons*,

Persons, must needs bee acknowledged to bee. For hee hath laboured herein more then they all. Out of all which obseruations layd together, I leaue it to the consideration of any vnderstanding man, to iudge, whether these two things doe not follow.

1 That the Roman Doctors haue such rare wits, as that they can by their deuised sleights, transforme the nature both of words and things, euen as well as Alchymists can turne lead into gold. For as in matter of State, they^a haue found out a mystery; that a Clergie-^a *Clerici Rebellio in Regem non est crimen laesae maiestatis, quia non est subditus Regi:* man of their Church may moue *Rebellion* against his Prince, and yet be no *Traitor*: so in Conferences with men, they haue found a like mysterie; that any man of the Romane Church, may speake, and say, and sweare whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth, though it bee neuer so false, and yet be no Lye. The one they fetch from their doctrine of *Exemption*; and the other from their doctrine of *Equiuocation*: both dangerous practises to all humane society. The one whereof should teach Kings to be aware of their Swords, and the other should teach all men to beware of their words.

2 That by their doctrine, a man is at liberty to lye, without anie grudge in his conscience; and that the Abettors of this Arte, by a secret iuggling deuce, doe set open a schoole for decest and perurie; in which they teach an *Arte of Lying*; by the helpe whereof, he that can lye & forswear by the *Rule*, shall bee free either from lying or perurie: as^b a reuerend and learned Diuine hath noted. But hereof there will be fitter occasion giuen to say more hereafter. In the meane while, thus much shall serue to be said of the first Point.

in Regem non est crimen laesae maiestatis, quia non est subditus Regi:
S. d. Aphor. v.
[Clericus]
printed at Antwerp, 1599. and allowed and commended by Silu. Pardo, the Inquisitor.

Cuius beneficio, qui ad normam mentiat aut peieret, laud ille perurio aut mendacio reus censendus sit.

^b Abbor. Antilog. adu. Eudemon-Ioann. c. 2. in princ. fol. 11. fac. 1.

CHAP. II.

*Of the Originall of Equiuocation; and who they be
that uphold it, and giue life vnto it.*

* Hospinian.
Histor. Iesuit.
l. 4. c. 2. p. 228.



¶ *Quos Autores
habuerit, non
facile dixerim.*
Casaub. epist.
ad Frontō Du-
cūm. pag. 108.

Concerning the Originall of this Arte, ^a some learned men referre it to the *Priscillianists*, or *Arius* the Arch-heretike, who are read to haue vsed fraudulent and deceitful speeche. And such Heretikes had not beene vnmeete Fathers for such a deformed child. But this Brat was not then borne, nor for many Ages after those dayes. For mine owne part, vnlesse I shall hereafter meete vvith some thing more cleere then yet I haue seene, I must say with a iudicious and learned Writer, ^b *cannot readily say who were the first founders of this Arte.* Nor is it maruell, that a thing of this nature, though found out but yesterday, should appeare to the world without the name or notice of his Author. For, as the head or spring of *Nilus* hath beene long enquired after, and for ought I know, is yet scarce heard of; and the reason may bee, because it is supposed that that Riuer doth rise somewhere *in montibus Lune*, in some place of those great Mountaines, whose greatnes doth hide the place of the Well-head or Spring: So deuices of State, which neuer prosper after they are discouered, are commonly smothered for a time, and doe vsually appeare without name; themselues being vnwilling to owne them, and others being vnable to descrie them. And such is this Arte of *Equiuocation*, hatched by some rare wit, who yet had rather lose the glory of the inuention, then

then to lay open the mysterie of it : and smothered by the *Romane State* as long as was possible, till misfortune brought it to light against their wils. And yet now, that the Riuer appeareth with a full streame, notwithstanding, the Spring will hardly bee found. And if any *Romanist* shall hence inferre, that this Doctrin is therefore an *Apostolicall Tradition*, and came from Christ himselfe ; because I cannot tell who was the first Author, and at what time since it was first hatched ; as they vse to dispute in other cases against vs : I will send him to find me the head of *Nilus*, and when he hath found that, I will goe about to enquire for the Originall of this Arte. And yet in the meane while, though I cannot precisely say who was the first Father of this blacke *Arte*, yet some things may bee said, not impertinent to this purpose. And those (as I conceiue them for the present) I will lay downe in certaine Propositions or Assertions. And they be these.

I It is certaine that it is a late deuce, and found out the other day. *Persons* claimeth *Vniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent*, for the prooffe of this Arte. ^a His words are, that euery man may heare him speake in his own dialect; *Let vs consider* (saith he) *how this absurd and impious opinion* (if such it be) *could come to bee receiued so generally, both in approbation & practice, doctrine & action, throughout the Christian world, that is to say; The Doctrin in all Schooles, Pulpits, Chaies, Vniuersities, where teaching hath bene used, extant also in the Bookes and Workes of all learned men of what sort soeuer, before Iesuites were borne or heard of: but especially those haue most treated thereof, who haue written most tenderly of matters belonging unto conscience, whom we call Casuists. Lawiers in like maner, both Canon and Ciuill; Diuines, both Scholasticall and positive, haue approoued the same. And as for practice, it hath in due cases bene receiued in all Courts, in all Countries, in all Tribunals, and Seates of iudgement, both ecclesi-*

^a Mitigat. c. 7.
nu. 12. & 13.
p. 281. & 282.

asti call

astical and temporall; and neuer refused, condemned, or controled by any, so it were used with the due circumstances, &c. And a little after; Was there no man to stand for truth and reason in any Countrey, in any Prouince or State? in any place or time for this 400. yeeres, &c? Where it must be noted, that when he mentioneth 400 yeeres, his meaning is not to limit the approbation of this *Arte* to the compasse of those yeeres; but because he supposeth, but falsely, that his Aduersarie had granted so much; and so here he disputeth *ex Concessis* vpon the Confession of his Aduersarie; but he intendeth and meaneth the consent of former times also; as himselfe signifieth in the same Chap. ^a whereof he there promisseth to speak afterward; & so he doth. ^b For he bringeth the testimonies & practice of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and Iesus Christ himselfe, and that frequently declared. Where it may bee noted, that this Father is as bold to alledge *Vniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent* for the prooffe of this *Arte*, as the rest are for the prooffe of their *Church*. And sure the prooffe is as good and sound in the one, as the other. Onely, *Father Persons* affirmeth more boldly, and confirmeth what hee saith, more weakly. But the reason is alike good in both cases. But heere I haue onely to deale with *Persons*, about his *Equiuocation*. And against these great cryes, I oppose the confident and iust challenge of a Reuerend man; *Name me one man* (saith he) *out of all antiquity, Heathenish, Jewish, Christian: name but one man, who euer approued these your Reseruations, vlesse perhaps some who were noted with infamy for their paines.* I may adde; Nay, name me one, who defended this *Equiuocation*, which Iesuites call a *mixt* or *mentall Proposition*, or by a secret *reseruation*, in all the time from *Adam* to the *Trent Councell*. I will not say none such can bee named; for who can say or presume, that hee knoweth the sayings and opinions of all former Ages? but this I will

^a Nu. 16. p. 285.
^b cap 9. nu. 17,
 &c. and repea-
 teth it againe
 in his Sober
 Reckon. cap. 7.
 nu. 26, &c.

Da mihi vnum
 ex omni hominū
 antiquitate, Eth-
 nica, Iudaica,
 Christiana; davel
 vnum, cui Reser-
 uationes istae tue
 probate sunt, nisi
 siqui forte in in-
 famiam notati,
 &c.

Abbot Anti.
 cap. 2. fol. 25.

will say, that whereas the Abettors of *Equiuocation* haue bin challenged by two learned Doctors in our Church, to shewe any who in former times haue allowed this diuelish *Arte*; hitherto I haue seene no one man produced, who doth giue any plaine or direct allowance heereof. For as for the many authorities, which *Persons* doth alledge, they be Conclusions of his own, spun out of other mens sayings, by such consequences as himselfe fancieth or pleaseth to frame. For where holy or learned men haue vsed speeches, that may admit diuers interpretations, either by reason of the words vsed, or some circumstance occurring, according to which only former Ages were wont to expound them; he presently runneth away with an out-cry of *mentall reservation*, or *mixt Proposition*: as euery man that considereth the Allegations, may easily perceiue. In a word, *Persons* claimeth very boldly, and to speake truth, impudently, *Uniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent*, for this nouell, new-deuised, and vpstart fancie of their owne. Where I wish the Reader to consider, how farre he may credit such men, when they lay the like claime to all *Antiquity* and *Consent* of Nations, either for the prouing of their Church, or for maintaining of any other subordinate point of Controuersie. For mine owne part, till they shew me one who approoued a *mentall Equiuocation* or *reservation*, I will thinke and say there is none. And this is my first assertion; whereof see further prooffe in the next assertion.

2 My second is, that the latter sort of Schoole-men and *Casuits* gaue occasion, and laied grounds for this ensuing *Arte*; which at that time themselues, it seemeth, did not so much as thinke or dreame of. For, whereas some Cases were then debated, how farre a *Priest* might deny the things which hee had heard in Confession; and in what sort any man that was questioned by an vnlawfull Iudge, or proceeded against in

an vnlawfull maner, &c. might deny the things which he knew to be true: they, considering the *circumstances of the persons, place, and businesse*, did allow some hard *Equiuocations*, which the words would hardly beare in any true sence, yet such as they thought might be allowed and gathered out of those circumstances, and might well be vnderstood in those words, as there and then they were vttered. As for exāple, If a Priest were questioned, whether he knew or had heard any thing of such or such a matter; he might say, *No*: if he did not know or heare it any other way, but onely by *Confession*. And the reason of this answer is, because, *Words* (saith *Dominicus a Soto*) doe so signifie, as they are vnderstood or taken by the people. Now Christian people, when they heare a Priest swear, that he knoweth nothing of such or such a matter, they vnderstand him not to speake or meane any thing that he heard in *Confession*. And therefore those *Words* (of the Priest) doe onely signifie or import, that hee knoweth nothing out of *Confession*. And the like defence of this answer is giuen by *Sepulueda, de Rat. dicendi test. cap. 3*. Againe, it is a further Case, If the Priest be asked concerning the same thing, whether he know or haue heard it in *Confession*; whether may he then say, *No*, *I heard it not*? And the common opinion of the Doctors was, that in this case, he may swear he did not heare it.

^b But *Soto*, vpon better aduice, disliketh this answer, because in this Sentence, *Nihil audiui in Confessione*, *I heard nothing of it in Confession*; the Restriction allowed in the former case, cannot fitly bee vnderstood, to say, *I heard nothing in Confession, to wit, out of Confession*. And therefore he concludeth, that that answer in this case cannot be excused from being a lye; because the words cannot haue that construction. Another case is proposed; Suppose a Tyran should aske of a Priest, whether *Peter* (for example) did kill *Iohn* (which the Priest knew in *Confession* only) may the Priest say and swear, that *Peter* did.

^a Voces eo modo significant, quo recipiuntur à populo: populus autem Christianus, dum audit Sacerdotem iurantem se nihil scire, nihil intelligit de his quae nouit in Confessione: Quare verba illa solum significant nihil se scire extra Confessionem.

Soto Relect. de Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 2.

§. His vero.

^b Relect. de secreto memb.

3. q. 3. Concl.

4. §. Hactenus opinionem.

pa. 312.

did not kill John? *Adrian*, who afterward was Pope, and was called *Adrian* the sixth, he resolved the question, that he might answer negatively, that he killed him not: but *Soto* againe replyeth, that this which *Adrian* said, had no shew of reason; because the words admit no interpretation, that may excuse them from a Lye. For, saith he; ^aIt were a most fond interpretation to say, He killed him not that I may tell you, or (as our Equivocators use now a dayes to speake) He killed him not, so as I may tell you. And he giueth a further reason hereof, ^bbecause deeds haue no immediate relation to this word, [that I may tel it] as the word [I know] and other such words of sense haue. And in his Booke de *Iustit. & Iure*, disputing the like question, whether a man being questioned concerning his owne Act, may by Ambiguity elude the question; hee resolueth, It ^ccan no way be defended, that he may lawfully say, that he did not doe it: and hereof he giueth this reason; ^dBecause this speech [I did not doe it] cannot receive this sense; I did not doe it, to tell it, or that I may tell it, &c. His meaning in more plaine words, is this; that the Priest might truly say in the case proposed, I know not that Peter did kill John; because hee might reasonably vnderstand it thus, or with this restriction, I know it not out of Confession. And of such a knowledg, the Iudge is supposed to aske, and men do vsually vnderstand the Priest to speake. But the Priest might not say without telling a lye, Peter did not kill John; because, this restriction cannot without absurdity, bee applyed to those words. And consequently, these words could not bee so vnderstood by the hearers. A fourth case may bee added, and with that I will end. Suppose a guilty person be against order of Law examined by a Iudge, whether he haue committed such a crime, which indeede he hath done, but is not in this case bound to answer him: suppose (I say) he be inforced to answer, may he truly say, I did not doe it? And *Adrian's* resolution

^a Ineptissima interpretatio esset, non occidit, ut dicam.

^b Quia facta non habent ordinem immediatum ad hoc quod est, dicere, sicut scire & alia verba sensationum. *Soto* ibid. pag. 314.

^c Quod liceat ei dicere se non fecisse, nullatenus est sustentabile. *Soto* de *Iustit. & Iure*, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. prope finem.

^d Quoniam, Non feci, nullo modo amplecti potest sensum, Non feci, ut dicitur. [facere] enim non habet eandem connexionem cum eo, quod est, ut dicam, quam habet [scire.]

Potest secundū omnes Doctores respondere quòd nihil de factō ille nouit, vel certè, quòd non fecit.
 Adrian. in 4. de Sac. Conf. resp. ad 2. prin. pag. 143. col. 4.
Deficientia, ex qua eilicet reuelare.

Nescio qui sint illi omnes Doctores: fateor me nullum legisse.
 De Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 4. p. 316. v. etiam de Iustit et Iure, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2.
Sensus ille uolentissimus est
 &c.

Nemo veterum & nobilium Theologorum, quod e quidem sciam, affirmavit.
 Sepulu. de rat. dicend. testim. cap. 17.

Quorundam iuniorum Theologorum decretis consentaneam.

Illam veterum ac summorum Theologorum consensu damnatam opinionem.

Nostri & pa-

of the doubt, was; that in such a case, ^a he may truly answer, according to the opinion of all Schoole-Doctors, that he knoweth nothing of that fact, or at least, that hee did not doe it. And his reason is, because in this answer, he is supposed to speake ^b of such a knowledge of the fact, as he may lawfully discover. But Soto replyeth againe, ^c I know not who all those Doctors are, that Adrian speaketh of: I confesse, I haue read none of that opinion. And he addeth; ^d That meaning, in which Adrian interpreteth these words, is a most forced and violent sense.

Thus Soto declareth his owne opinion, and the opinion of other Schoole-Doctors and Casuists of that time, in these and other cases of like nature. And the like doth Io. Genesius Sepulveda, another learned man of the same nation, and about the same time. For hauing heard some defend some such like Equiuocations and ambiguities, he vndertaketh to proue, and that by the testimony of ancient Diuines, that in witness-bearing (for thereof hee doth in particular intreat) a Witnesse may not, *arte uerborum*, by cunning words, deceiue the Judge; but that he is bound to speak plainly, and according to the meaning of the Judge, who asketh the question. And of the contrary opinion, hee saith, ^e None ancient and renowned Diuine that I knowe, did affirme it to bee lawfull. And in the Preface to that Booke, hee saith, that while hee was in Rome, hee met with one, who maintained this opinion, which he calleth ^f agreeable to the Determinations of some yong or late Diuines: and when he came backe againe into Spaine, that *præter spem*, contrary to his expectation, he found some of their learnedest Diuines, maintaining, and instilling into their Students hearts and eares, ^g that opinion which was condemned by the ancient and chiefe Diuines. And, Chap. 15. hee sheweth who they bee, whom he calleth ancient Diuines; and that is in his owne words, ^h those which liued before our and our Fathers

thers dayes, such for example sake, as *Thomas Aquinas* is. trū memoriā superioris, qualis est Aquil. Thomas.

Out of which testimonies and sayings of these two learned men (the one of which was *Confessor* to *Charles* the fifth, and the other his *Historiographer*; and the one flourished about the yeere 1560. as *Possuin* saith, and the other died in the yeere 1572. saith the same *Possuin*, out of these their sayings) I gather and obserue these things.

1 That in the dayes of these two learned men, which was about some 60 yeeres agoe, there was little or no speach of any *Equiuocation* by *mentall reservation*, or of any such *mixt propositions*, as the Romanists now fancie. This I gather, first, because *Soto*, in oppugning these ambiguous Answeres and speaches allowed by some *Schoole-Doctors* of that time, doth no where (to my knowledge) charge them with any such opinion, or euer labour to refute it. Which (considering the argument that hee had in hand, and the diligence that he vsed in handling of it, and clearing of all doubts that belonged vnto it) no man may with reason imagine that hee would haue forborne to doe, if those times had giuen occasion of disputing such a question. Secondly, the same learned man, in oppugning that liberty, which others did grant, doth still ouerthrowe or confute their opinion, because the interpretation and the meaning which they doe allow those answeres to be taken in by the speaker, are such as doe not agree to the vse and signification of the words spoken, nor cannot bee applied to them, without incongruity and absurditie. By which reason of his, hee implieth, that these *Diuines* meant no other ambiguity, or interpretation, or meaning, in those answeres, then such as they thought, the words in that case in which they were vttered might beare. Or els his reason had beene insufficient and foolish; which yet he supposeth to be such, as that his aduersaries could not dislike as impertinent, if the

thing which he vrged were true. Thirdly, the same Author doth still so set down his opinion, that in the cases proposed, and others of the like nature; he alloweth any ambiguity or Amphibologie, *which the use of the speech can beare without a lye*, as in expresse words hee explaineth himselfe, but refuseth and condemneth all such, as is not noted and implied in the words. Fourthly, *Sepulueda*, he also disputeth against those, who think themselves not bound in the cases propounded to answer according to the common meaning, and acceptation of the words: and confuteth them, who hold it lawfull simply to denie the crime truly layed to their charge, although they *purposely speake some other thing in their minde*, which the *Iudge*, taking their words in the common meaning, *understandeth not*: Cap. 17. & throughout the whole Booke. But yet I haue not obserued in all that Booke any speech, in which hee mentioneth a *mixt proposition*, a *mentall Equiuocation*, or an ambiguity made by a *reseruation*. Against which opinion, (if there had then appeared any such to the world) hee might haue disputed with more probabilitie and shewe of substantiall reason. But he no where (as farre as I can obserue) either refelleth or mentioneth any such opinion among these late and punie Diuines. For whereas in the place last cited, he hath these words, *though purposely he speaketh some other thing in his minde*, that maketh nothing, as I thinke, for the *mentall reseruation*, which our *Equiuocators* haue deuised. For he meaneth nothing else, as I take it, but that the speaker doth frame in his minde, another sense and meaning of his words, then they in the common vnderstanding of men doe make, or then the *Iudge* according to the common vnderstanding doth take them in. And therefore those very Schoole-Diuines, whom hee and *Soto* doe refute for going too farre, and allowing too much liberty, yet goe not so farre as our now Iesuites doe, who

Quam vsitatus sermo citra mendacium ferre possit. Soto de Iustit. & Iure l. 5. q. 6. art. 2.

Etiam si ex industria aliud prater ea mente loquatur.

who build all vpon a fancied *reſeruation* of their owne framing, no way included in the words ſpoken. Fifthly, ſay that thoſe *Diuines*, whom theſe learned men doe refute, did maintaine ſuch a *mixt propoſition*, & mentall *reſeruation* as our *Romaniſts* doe ſtrive for: yet *Soto* ſaith, that he had read no Schoole-Doctour, who allowed ſuch a fancie as *Adrain* imagined, which yet by a *reſeruation* of a *Ieſuite*, might eaſily bee ſolued. And *Sepulueda*, when hee came out of *Iталy* into *Spaine*, thought it ſtrange, that hee found *Diuines*, who contrary to the meaning of all the *Ancients*, did allow that opinion, which he there refuteth. And therefore if we ſhall ſay, that the *Diuines* againſt whom theſe men wrote, did hold this *Equiuocall reſeruation*, yet it was then a nouell opinion, lately ſprung vp, ſuch as *Soto* had read in no Schoole-Doctour of former time, and ſuch as *Sepulueda* did maruell to finde ſet on foote in his owne Countrey, where he liued. But, as I ſaid, theſe learned men did not know of any ſuch opinion riſen vp at that time. And therefore in thoſe dayes either this *Arte* was not yet found, or if it were, it was rather whiſpered in corners, or taught obſcurely, then publiſhed in Schooles.

Secondly, I gather out of theſe learned mens writings alleadged before, that *Schoole-Doctours* about that time, allowed and gaue liberty for ſuch ambiguities, as in opinion of theſe men, and in trueth the words could not beare: and therefore their interpretations were forced & violent, and ſuch as could not free their ſpeeches from being *lyes*. This without further deduction, is euident by the words before cited.

Thirdly, I obſerue, that theſe hard and harſh *Equiuocations*, by ſome *Diuines* then allowed, and the violent conſtructions that they made of the words, were then newly taken vp, and were vnknowne to the elder and more iudicious *Schoole-men*.

And out of all this, I leaue it to the judgement of the

the learned Reader, whether I may not vpon good reason inferre; that therefore in all probabilitie, the later sort of *Schoole-Doctōrs*, by the hard *Equiuocations*, which they allowed, did giue occasion & layd grounds for this *Jesuiticall Art of Equiuocation*, though at that time themselues did not thinke of it. For, may it not hence be reasonably conceiued, that the progresse and proceeding to the framing of this *Art*, was on this manner? that first of all, and in elder times, there was nothing, but *simplicitie* in their Oathes and answers, or if any *ambiguities* was allowed to be vsed, it was but in some such sense, as the *circūstances* of the persons, time, place, and occasion, did put vpon them, and that according to the intention of publique Lawes, and the reasonable construction that the Hearers might make of them: and that afterward they allowed violent constructions, and such as the words, together with the *circumstances*, could not beare, in any reasonable mans vnderstanding, but such as the speaker, in his minde did fancie to be agreeable to that businesse and occasion. And lastly, that this ouer-bold liberty in them, in framing such a sense, as the words in reason & cōgruities could not beare, made way to fine wits following after, to adde something to the former inuention, and to frame a sense of words spoken, which they acknowledge not to be signified by them, but made vp by a *Reseruation* in their owne breast, such as themselues would please to fancie, what euer it were, either pertinent to the businesse, or as farre different from it, as the *falling of the skie* is different from the *paying of money*. But this will appeare yet more plainely, if it be considered, that *Nauarre*,^a who liued at the same time with *Soto*, & *Sepulueda*, but wrote after them, and when they were dead, doth from the opinion of those *Diuines*, and in speciall from the opinion of *Soto* also, and from his sayings; labour to inferre and proue the lawfulnessse

(^a) *Nauar.*
Com. in c.
Humanae
atures, q. 1.
nu. 4. & nu.
8. & 9.

lawfulness of the Jesuicall Equiuocation; because (as hee saith) there is the like reason of them both. How truly he inferreth his Conclusion, from the sayings of *Soto* and the rest, I dispute not; I onely note in his course of disputation, that hee taketh their assertions for a ground to proue his owne by. And that sheweth that those former Writers gaue occasion, &c And thus I haue declared my second Assertion concerning the originall of this new Art.

3. The third is, that whosoeuer wit deuised it, yet it seemeth to mee most probable, that it receiued the first life and credit from the See of Rome, and the Romane state. My reason is from these grounds.

1. Doctor *Navarre*, who (as *Persons* saith, *Mitig. cap. 7. nu. 41. pag. 301.*) is held to be one of the most liberall and largest in admitting Equiuocations both in words and oathes, was thought a fit man to be the Popes Reader of Cases in Rome. And if I mistake not, hee was the first that broached this new arte. For hee read at Rome not long after the time of *Soto* and *Sepulueda*, who (as before was noted) had not yet heard any thing of this arte. And there he read & framed that a Commentary, in which he teacheth this mysterie, for the instruction of the Iesuits Colledge. and dedicated the same vnto *Gregorie 13.* the present Pope: which may breede suspition, that the Pope was well pleased with this new deuice of *Navarre*, of whom he made choise to be his publique Reader of Cases; and who, while he was employed in this seruice, did perfect that arte, and from whose Readings, the very Iesuits themselues may seeme to haue borrowed the grounds of that Doctrin, which afterward they polished with great dexteritie and care.

Secondly, In *Queene Elizabeths* time, there was a Treatise found out, which before was in the secret keeping of Iesuits or Priests: in which, beside the Resolu-

tions of *Nauarre*, were contrayned sundry instructions and directions, giuen by *Sixtus Quintus*, for the pra-ctising of this mysterie of *Equiuocation*. Which, if the Reader be desirous to know more fully, hee may reade a Relation thereof set downe by ^a a most reuerend and learned *Prelate*.

Thirdly, I finde that *Emm. Sà* in his *Aphorismes v. Mendac.* had giuen his opinion concerning this *Equiuocall reseruation*, in this manner: that in a case, ^b where a man is not bound to reueale the truth according to the intention of the Demander, some say, that a man may answer by understanding or reseruing something in his minde, as that is not so, to wit so, as that hee is bound to tell him: or that hee hath not such a thing, meaning, that hee hath it not to giue it vnto him. But others admit not of this kinde of answer, and perhaps, vpon better ground and reason. Thus hee gaue his iudgement of this poynt; and so the Booke passed in the Low Countries, and with approbation and commendation of *Silv. Pardo*, the Inquisitor and Censor there, and was printed at *Antwerpe* 1599. But when it came to be perused, and reuewed at *Rome*, the Censor there, *Io. Maria*, Master of the *sacred Palace*, he purged the Booke, and put out the last words, which were, ^c And perhaps vpon better reason. In which words *Sà* had signified that hee inclined to their opinion, who disliked this *Equiuocating by reseruation*. And hence it appeareth, how acceptable and welcome this Doctrine of *Equiuocation* is in the Popes *Palace*. For whereas *F.* ^d *Persons* saith, that in the last Edition of *Sàes* Booke at *Rome* 1607. this whole last sentence was left out, as though hee had changed his opinion. And ^e that it seemeth that *Emm. Sà* did afterwards change his opinion; it is but a tricke of iugling, such as this Father often vseth to delude his Reader with. For *Sà* died, as ^f *Ribadeneira* reporteth, in the yeare 1596. eleuen yeares before this edition

a G. Abbot in the Preface to his Sixe questions. cap 1. pag. 7. 8. &c.

b *Quidam dicunt, -- posse respondere aliquid subintelligendo, ut non esse, scz. ita ut ei dicere teneatur; velse non habere, scilicet ut ei det. At alij id non admittunt, & fortè potiori ratione.*

c Et fortè potiori ratione.

d Sober Rec- kon. cap. 4. nu. 76. pa. 276.

e Ibid. nu. 80. pag. 279.

f Ribaden. Catalogo Scriptorum Soc Iesu. in Eman. Sa.

of *Rome*, and three yeares before the impresion of *Antwerpe*, being then about threescore and ten yeares olde. And if *Sà*, after so many yeares deliberation, had changed his opinion, how came it about that that change was not seene in the *Antwerpe* Copy, which was printed 3. yeares after he was dead? Besides, the Edition of *Rome*, re-printed also at *Colone*, An. 1612. doth professe, that that Book was purged by *Joan. Maria*, the *Master of the Palace*, and not that it was corrected or amended by *Sà*, the first Author of it. Further, *Persons* giueth no one piece of a reason, by which the Reader may imagine, that *Sà* did euer change that point. And therefore, this is but one of *Persons* vsuall trickes of fittening, with which his Brethren of the secular Clergy doe so often charge him.

Now these considerations layed together, make mee thinke it very probable, that this *Arte* receiued its life from the *State and See of Rome*. But if any man can shew mee, whence it might rather haue its first ground, I will willingly yeeld to him; and be thankfull to him, that can and will discover the Spring, or Well-head, whence first flushed forth this muddy *Nylus*, so fertile of *Crocodiles*, I meane of this sophisticque *Crocodilites*, whereby vnware men are ouer-reached and caught.

4. My fourth Assertion is; It is obserued by learned men, that whosoever was the Author, yet the Iesuites, especially those of our *English Nation*, haue bene the chiefe Abettors, Defenders and Polishers of this *Arte*. For prooffe of this, I will set downe the words of some learned men. The a learned Gentle-

a Relation.
nu. 33. fol. 36.

man, who wrote the *Relation of Religion*, speaking of false newes, frequent at *Rome*, for aduantage of their Sect, addeth, that he found by obseruation, and iudgement of some wise men, that the Iesuites were the *Masters of that Mint*, and that all those coynes were of their stamp;

^a Histor. Ie-
suit. l. 4. cap. 2.
pag. 228.

^b *Vt non immo-
ritò Autores &
Inuentiones eius
esse vulgò dicantur.*

^c *Constat mul-
tos vestri ordinis
Theologos- eam
artem magna
cura, & explicu-
isse & assensisse.
Sed qui præcipuè
Æquiuocationem
excoluerint, eos
video fuisse
Anglos. Cas-
faub. Epist.
ad Front.
Ducum,
pag. 108.*

^e Reply to
Father Per-
sons Libell,
fol. 22. & 23.

^f Quodl. 2.
art. 6. pag. 39.

^g Quodl. 3.
art. 4. pag. 66.

^h Quodl. 2.
art. 4. pag. 31.

and, that the Iesuits were noted by some of their owne friends, to be too hardie Equiuocators, and their Equiuocations too hard. And *Hospinian*^a hauing cited many testimonies of Iesuites for this Arte, concludeth that therby it is euident, that many Iesuits with great care haue explained and defended it, ^b that not without cause they are commonly thought to be the Authors and Inuentiones of it. Adde hereto that which the learned *Casaubon* obserued, who was well acquainted not onely with the writings of all sorts of Iesuits, but with the proceedings and dealings of our English Iesuits also. Hee telleth *Fronto Ducum*, a learned Iesuit, ^c *It is a cleare case, that many Diuines of your Order haue explained and maintained that Arte: but they which haue especially polished it, I finde to be English men.* Yea and their owne Brethren, the Secular Priests, lay the ouer-bold vse of Equiuocation in their dish. ^e *For so famous (say they) and so notorious are their Equiuocations, and so scandalous, that the very Protestants take notice thereof, &c. and, such iugglings, and shiftinges of late haue beene vsed by them, that not onely Protestants, but also Catholickes, yea Priests can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise.* And a little after, *Howsoeuer this kinde of dealing may seeme excusable vnto them, vnder the name of honest Equiuocation; sure I am that few honest men will excuse it from dishonest lying.* And *Master Watson*^f calleth it the Iesuits rule of swearing and forswearing in a contrary sense and meaning; and ^g *a shift, which they call a lawfull Equiuocation.* And againe, hee^h calleth these Equiuocations, *their absurd paradoxes of Equiuocation.* And the like speeches may be found in diuers other places of the Priests bookes. By all which it may appeare, that learned men on both sides, not onely among the Protestants, but also among *Popish Priests*, haue noted this deuice especially in the Iesuits: which may be reason enough, (beside that which is to be found

in their owne writings) to make any sober man resolute, that the *Iesuites* haue had their fingers chiefly in this new deuised *Arte*. And reason may perswade the same to be most likely; because the *Iesuites* are an Order consecrated and deuoted from their very first birth to the *Popes* will, to doe what may serue his turne For so the *Iesuites* themselves, who published *Sanchez* Morall worke, doe professe in the Epistle Dedicatorie to Pope *Gregorie 15.* ^a that their first founder ^b did make himselfe and his Order or Societie vassals to the *Popes* command, in a new and unheard of manner. And therefore if the *See and State of Rome*, did (as before I shewed) giue life, and credit and authoritie to this *Arte*; then, in reason it must be conceiued that the *Iesuites*, who by their first institution are created the *Popes* vassals, to serue at his pleasure, and to doe his will, would be the most forward in the ranke, to vphold and maintaine with all their wit, this deare Childe of the *Popes* owne breeding. And yet when I conclude that the *Iesuits* are the most forward, and the men that haue polished this *Arte*, my meaning is not, either to include all of that Order within this compasse, or to exclude all others not of that Order from it. For first among the *Iesuites*, *Becanus* doth disclaime it, as ^c being not taught by the *Iesuites*, and *unlawfull to be practised by any*. Wherein hee saith well, that it is *unlawfull*; but ill, that it is not taught by the *Iesuites*. For their Doctrine this way is so cleare, and so open to the view of all men, that *Becanus* in denying it, must needs either vse the *Arte of Equiuocation*, which himselfe condemneth, or else tell a flat and downe-right lye, which is not much better. And the like may be noted in the writings of some other *Iesuites*, who deny and renounce this deuce. But they had best keepe themselves from Rome; for if they come in the *Censors* hands, it is to be feared hee will deale with them, as

^a Prefixed before the second tome.
^b *Se suanque Societatem Pontificis imperis more profus no-uo mancipauit.*

^c Manual. Controu 1.5. cap. 21. & Opuisc. Theolog. tom. 1. Opuisc. 17. in Respons. ad Aphoris. 13, 14, 15, 16. & tom. 2. Opuisc. 1. in Append. de fide Her. seruandâ in exam. 4. propositionis.

he hath done with their fellow *Sā* already; that i, circūcise their lips, and teach their pens to speake the *Roman Language* more purely. Secondly, among those that be no Iesuites, wee haue experience and examples good store, of them who haue learned this *Arte*, and maintained it as stiffely, as the best Iesuite can. In which number, I may place Doctor *Norrice*, who beeing apprehended in *Oxford*, denyed himselfe to bee a *Priest*, and afterward in prison did defend it by this sleight of *Equiuocation*, and that he maintained to be lawfull, by the example of our blessed Sauour; *Mar. 13. 32. But of that day & houre knoweth no man, neither the Son, &c. and Ioh. 7. 8. Ego non ascendam, &c.* For so he then alledged the place, as Father *Persons* also doth, against both the *Greeke*, and their owne approued *Latine*. In expounding, and applying of which Texts to his purpose, how weakely he behaued himselfe, he may now bee pleased to call to his remembrance: that as he braggeth of his victories ouer other men, so for his humiliation, hee may sometimes call to mind his owne infirmities. And that perhaps may stand his soule in as good stead, as the meritorious forbearing of *Equiuocation*, when he might lawfully vse it: which (as Father *Persons* saith) may increase his Crowne and merit in heauen.

But in earnest, he shall doe well, if in the next edition of his *Antidote*, he place this question of *Equiuocation* among the rest of his *Controuersies*, and tell vs in good sadnes, what, after so many yeeres more, he thinketh of this Point. But in the meane while, the Reader may vnderstand, that Dr. *Norrice* is not the only man that ioyneth with the Iesuites in the practice and maintenance of this *Arte*. For in this small Treatise may be seene diuers testimonies for it, out of other Writers. And the secular Priests, though they charge & vpbraide the Iesuites with a *niniuum*, too often and too bold a practice of it, yet themselues doe allow it, euen when they

they shew greateſt opposition againſt the Iesuites. So Master *Watſon* ^a ſpeaking of *Equiuocation*, as a *ſhift* ^a which the Iesuites uſe; ſaith, that *though there bee no* ^{art.4.p.66, 67.} *question to bee made of it, but that in ſome ſenſe it may bee lawfull, &c.* In which place, the ſum of that, wherein he ſheweth his diſſent & diſlike of the Iesuites, (for his owne words are too many to be ſet down in this place) is in theſe two things: Firſt, That the Iesuites doe allow *Equiuocation* in a caſe, wherein he thinketh a man is bound to ſpeake the plaine truth. And ſecondly, that *they doe hold, that they may not onely to their Aduerſaries (to Proteſtants) but euen alſo to any Catholike Magiſtrate, yea to the Pope himſelfe, anſwere one way, and meane another.* And to like purpoſe, the Author of the Replie to *Perſons* Apologic, beeing to anſwere for D. *Bagshaw*, whom *Perſons* had reprooued, as denying the doctrine of *Equiuocation*; ſaith, that the Doct^r, ^bno doubt, knoweth in what caſes doubtfull anſweres and *Equiuocations* are to be made to curious queſtions: neither is it to bee thought (ſaith he) that he diſſallowed thereof, but onely of the liberty, which is in the *Ieſuites* and their *Adherents*, in all their dealings with other men. By which it may appeare; that the difference betweene the Secular Prieſts and the Ieſuites in this point, is not about the equitie & lawfullnes of this Arte, but about the liberty and large ſcope that the Ieſuites take, to practiſe it among their owne Brethren, and before their owne Magiſtrates and Superiours, and in all their dealings. And ſurely, for our owne experience, I cannot learne any thing to the contrarie, but that our Tribunals and places of Iudicature, our Biſhops, Juſtices, and other Officers, who haue to deale in their Examinations, yea and that our common ſort of Chriſtians who conuerſe with them, doe find in their experience, that Secular Prieſts, and laie Papiſts of all ſorts, doe iumpe with the Ieſuites in the practice of this Arte. Not withſtanding, if any among them, which

^a Quodlib. 3.
art.4.p.66, 67.

^b Cap.17.in
the very end
pag.331.

which call themselves Catholikes, doe renounce and disclaime it, as well in deedes as in words; I am so far from fastening any imputation of disgrace vpon them for this iniquitie of their brethren, as that I wish and pray they may goe on, to forsake and abandon all other the abominations and errors of the Roman Church. But (to draw toward an end in this Point) all things considered, my Conclusion commeth to this head; That this *mystery of iniquity* spreadeth farre and neere in the Papall Kingdome, hauing receiued authority and countenance from the very *Roman See*, and finding entertainment and acceptance among all inferiour forts; but yet the Iesuites are they that haue chiefly polished it, and most boldly practised it; and among the Iesuites, our *English-men* (be it spoken to the credite of our Nation) doe beare the bell away. And from hence the Reader may see why our Diuines doe vsually ascribe this Doctrine to the Iesuites: and consequently what wee haue to answer to *Becanus* his question. For ^a *I desire to know* (saith he) *why you call this Arte of deceiuing, Iesuiticall Equiuocation*: and our answer is ready; We call it *Iesuiticall*, because men of that order, haue beene the chiefe Abettors and polishers of that Arte.

¹ *Quero cur hanc fallendi artem appelles Aequiuocationem Iesuiticam.* tom. 2. Opusc. 1. in Append. in examinatione 4. propos.

CHAP. III.

Of the matter or obieſt of Equiuocation, or in what caſes it is allowed by the Patrons of it.



Or the matter or obieſt, about which this Arte may be exerciſed, *F. Perſons* a ſeemeth to except two caſes, in which they hold it vnlawfull to equiuocate. *Fiſt, in matters of faith:* and ſecondly, *in buying and ſelling, in common conuerſation and humane traſſique,*

to the hurt or preiudice of any. But this is but another trick of his iugling, by which hee would bleare the eyes of his Reader; and make the world beleecue that they uſe no *fraud*, either in *matters of Religion*, or in *buſineſſes* with their neighbours, ſo that *any body* ſhould be hurt or beguiled by them. For fiſt, where he ſaith, that they may not uſe *Equiuocation* in *matters of faith*, perhaps in this ſaying he doth *equiuocate* with vs; and meaneth, that we may not ſo uſe *Equiuocation*, as to deny any point of *faith*. But that in handling & dealing about *matters of faith*, it may bee lawfull with them to uſe this Arte; there are good prooſes from their own Writings, beſide all the experience of their practice. For *F. Perſons* ſaith, that ^b*in matters of Religion, it becometh to the faith of the hearer, - to ſeek out the ſpeakers reſeruation for his better aſſurance.* Which is but a ſcender comfort to a poore Chriſtian, who had as good ſeek a *Needle* in a bottle of hay, as a *reſeruation* locked vp in an *Equiuocators* mind: but hence it followeth, that he alloweth *Equiuocation* in *matters of Religion*. A-

a Mitigat. cap. 7. nu. 7. pa. 277. & cap. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. & cap. 14. nu. 31. p. 460. & cap. 13. nu. 2. p. 547.

^b Mitig. ca. 11. nu. 23. p. 454.

G

gaine

^a Mitig. cap. 13. nu. 3. p. 548. Againe, the same Father *Persons* telleth vs, that ^a *no man can deny, but many facts and cases may fall out concerning matters of Religion, not tending to Confession (especially in time of persecution) wherein a man may, or perhaps also must by obligation use equiuocall speeches.* Here he granteth, that by their principles, it is an vndoubted conclusion, that in cases concerning Religion, a man may equiuocate, so the case be not such, as tendeth to *Confession*; 1. as I vnderstand it, if by equiuocating he doe not seeme to deny the Roman faith, which at such times, they hold it necessarie for their Children, without any tergieruation to confesse. But elsewhere hee vnfoldeth himselfe a little more plainly, when he saith of Equiuocation, ^b *that it may not be used in matters of Religion, where Confession of our Faith is required.* For this implyeth, that where Confession of faith is not required, there it may be lawfull enough to equiuocate. But euident and cleare it is, that the

^b Sober Reckon. in Append. nu. 25. pag. 687.

^c Mitigat. cap. 9. num. 25. & seqq.

^d Mar. 13. 32. *Of that day and houre knoweth no man, not the Sonne; &c.* And when hee said of himselfe, ^e *if iudge no man*: the Iesuite faith, that this speech without a mentall reseruatiō is false, and cannot stand, for that it should be contrary to many other places of Scripture: and should imply a deniall of Christs office to be our Iudge. He proceedeth to other examples, and telleth vs, that Christ did equiuocate about the Sacrament of Baptisme, when he said, ^f *Hee that shall beleene, and be baptized, shall be saved*: and about eating of the flesh of Christ, ^g *If any man shall eat of this bread, hee shall liue for euer*: and about Prayer, when hee said, ^h *If ye shall aske any thing of my Father in my name, he will giue it you.* Now the points here spoken of, and others of like nature,

ture, in which the Iesuite findeth Equiuocation to haue beene vsed in Scriptures, are, I trow, *matters of faith and Religion*. And hence it followeth, that Equiuocators must either confesse that they abuse the world in alledging these and such like Texts, to proue and vphold Iesuiticall Equiuocation, which is not there meant; or that they hold their Equiuocations to be lawfull, and sufficiently warranted, euen in principall *matters of Religion*, such as are Christs office of iudging, the doctrine of the Sacraments, and prayer in Christs name. In the first place then, when *Persons* excepteth *matters of faith* from the practice of Equiuocation, hee mocketh his Reader with generall speeches, when hee meaneth no such thing; but onely that men may not *equiuocate*, by denying in words their beliefe of the *Roman faith*, or some such like. Secondly, where *Persons* saith that they allow not *equiuocation* in *common conuersation*, in *buying, &c.* it may be obserued that *Nauarre*,^a the famous *Reader* in Rome, doth highly commend this Equiuocation as a ^b *singular point of Doctrine*, by which wee may auoid innumerable sinnes which wee commit by denying and affirming without this mentall reseruati^on, with which if the words spoken were ioyned, they would become true. This he explaineth and confirmeth thus: ^c *We are asked & demanded euery foot, whither we goe, what we haue eaten, how much money we haue, or haue borrowed, or haue giuen, what letters and newes we haue receiued, what wee haue written and related; what such or such a man said to vs, what wee know of such or such a one: and many hundred like. To all which (saith hee) wee might answer without sinne, & by vnderstanding somewhat in our mindes, which may make that true, which we affirme; and that false, which wee deny: As for example, when a man asketh of vs, money, or a Booke, or newes, &c. if wee answer him, I haue them not, or I know them not; vnderstanding, & so as I am*

a Comm. in
c. Human. au-
res q. 3 nu. 13.
b Per hanc do-
ctrinam singula-
rem possumus
euitare innumera
peccata, &c.
c Passim enim
interrogamur,
Quò vadimus,
quid comedimus,
&c.
d Subintelli-
gendo aliqua,
quibus sicut vera
quæ annuimus,
vel falsa quæ
negamus.
e Ita ut teneat
vel conueniat illi
prestare, tradere,
dicere, &c.

a Summa v.
mendac. nu. 4.
pag. 385.

b *Quæ doctrina
debet notari.*

c De præcept.
2. §. 1. nu. 8.

p. 49.

d *Causam habeat
non illum dandi.*

e *In communi
loquutione inter-
rogato de re,
quam secretò
seruare expedit,
licitum est dicere,
se nescire, intel-
ligendo, ita vt
expedit dicere.*

Sanchez O.
permoral. l. 3.
c. 6. num. 25.

f Mitigat. c. 9.
nu. 81. & 83.

pag. 403, 404.

g *In c. Human.
aures. q. 2.
nu. 12.*

h *Verum & in-
iustum damnatum.*

bound, or, as it is conuenient to doe it, or giue it, or to speake and make it knowne. The like is affirmed by ^a *Emm. Rodriquez*, who alledging this determination of *Nauarre*, and transcribing also some of his words, addeth in the end, to shew how hee esteemed this deuice, ^b *which Doctrine ought to be marked and obserued.* And *Fernandes* ^c in his *Examen* saith, that if a man being requested to lend a thing to his neighbour, ^d *haue a cause or reason, why hee will not grant or giue it, &c.* hee may *swear by Equiuocation, that he hath not such a thing.* And *Sanchez*, ^e *In common talke* (saith hee) if a man be asked of a thing which it behooueth him to keepe secret, it is lawfull for him to say, that hee knoweth not, understanding so as that it is expedient to tell it. And *Father Persons* ^f also thinketh it most iust and necessary, if a man come to borrow mony whom we may not deny without inconuenience, that we may then answer equiuocally that wee haue it not; vnderstanding, with any minde to lend it: or that wee haue it not in our purse, &c. Which instances and examples, if they be not matters of common life and conuersation, I know not where to finde any. But it may be said, that *Persons*, when he excepteth matters of common conuersation in buying, &c. hee addeth, to the hurt or preiudice of any; as if hee meant by that restriction, to leaue a libertie of equiuocating, euen in buying and selling, and humane trafficke; so it be without the hurt of any man: but then vtterly to forbid it. And I graunt, hee addeth those words: but I cannot tell, whether he meant the vulgar Reader to conceiue that meaning in them. Howsoeuer, there is a mysterie in those words, which *Nauarre*, (who vseth to deale aboue-board, and to speake more plainely) hath vnfolded, when he calleth it, ^h *a reall and iniust hurt or preiudice; by which hee vnderstandeth such an hurt, as wee may not doe to another, without sinne and iniustice.* And then, the meaning of this.

this goodly Exception of *Persons*, will be this; that in *buying, and selling, and humane traffique*, and *common conuersation*, wee may not *equiuocate*, if thereby wee doe *hurt* any man *vnjustly and unlawfully*: but else, if any of their *Catholiques* should thinke that the *hurt* which redoundeth to one of vs, is *lawfull and iust*, that then they may freely delude vs with their *amphibologies* and *reseruations*, in what matter soeuer, and for what end they please, though it were for *massacring* of an assembly, or for *murdering* of a Prince, or for *blowing up of a Parliament*, or for the *inuation* of the Kingdome by hostile and forraine forces. And so by this exception we are well freed from the feare of these deluding and *equiuocating* spirits. Let vs then dismiss *Persons*, with his shifting Exceptions, and enquire more particularly and directly what the cases be, wherein they doe in sober sadnesse allow their Schollers to vse the benefit of this *Art*. And for this purpose I finde two things said by them. First, that whensoever a man may lawfully keepe silence, and say nothing, or whensoever hee is not bound to reueale and lay open the truth, then hee may lawfully equiuocate, and vse this sleight of amphibologie: be it a *matter of faith*, or a *business of commerce and traffique*, or a *point of State*, or what else you will, it mattereth not to this purpose. For prooffe of this, first take the resolution of Father Garnet. He being prisoner in the Tower, and required to declare his opinion concerning this point, set downe his minde in writing, which is yet kept vpon Record: and it was this, ^a *Concerning Equiuocation this is mine opinion. In morall matters and common use of life, when among friends it is required of a man to speake truth, then hee may not use Equiuocation, &c. But as oft as there is occasion for necessary defence, or for auoyding of some iniury or damage, or for obtaining some good of weight or moment, without the perill of any man, then Equiuocation is law-*

a De Acquiuatione ita censeo. In rebus moralibus. & communi usu vite, quando veritas inter amicos requiritur, uti equiuocatione haut licet: id enim Societati hominum magno malo cederet. Quare hoc remedio in istis nullus locus. Quoties vero de necessaria defensione agitur, deque iniuria aliqua cuiusdam, aut damno, aut de consequendo aliquo non parui momenti bono, sine illo cuiusquam periculo, tum licita est Acquiuiatio. Casaub. Ep. ad Fronton. Duc. pag. 111.

^a Proceeding
against Tray-
tors, lit. u. 4.

^b *Ea etiam uti
licet, quum iuste
quis interrogatur,
si datur rationali-
bilis causa non re-
spondendi ad me-
ntem Interrogan-
tis.* Fernand.
Exam. de præc.
2. cap. 5. §. 1. nu.
8. p. 49.

^c *Non solum quæ
inimiosa est in-
terrogatio, sed et-
iam absque cul-
pa interroganti,
sepe non tenemur
ad mentem eius
respondere, quan-
do inique scilicet
Interrogans non
habet ius impe-
randi responsio-
nem, & Interro-
gato idonea mini-
meq; levis illius
denegande causa
suppetit. Nam
cui tacere licet, is
præter quæstia,
aliud quid cum
Deo, Cœlitibus,
aut secum loqui
potest, seu vocali,
seu mentali oratio-
ne -- seu mixta,
.i. partim vocali,
partim mentali.*
Heiff. Refut.
Aph. c. 4. Aph. 2
su. 117. p. 191.

full. In which speech, Master *Casaubon* doth truly note by the way, that those words, *without the perill of any man*, are onely added for a colour, and to blind the simple with; as I noted the like before, in a like sentence of Father *Persons*. But the thing that I now note for this purpose, is, that he saith; *In comon use of life, when it is required of a man to speake truth, then it is not lawfull to equivocate.* By which words he implyeth, that where a man is not of duety bound to speake or reueile the truth, there he may obscure & hide it by this *Arte*. The same Father *Garnet*, while hee stood at the *Barre*, in fewer words, and plainer manner explaineth his meaning thus; ^a *No man may equivocate when he ought to speake the truth, otherwise he may.*

To like purpose *Fernandes* ^b *A man may lawfully use it also, when he is iustly or lawfully demanded, if hee haue a reasonable cause not to answer according to the meaning of the Demander.* And *Heiffius* the Iesuite, ^c *Not onely (saith hee) when the question is uniuersall, but also when it is without fault, We are many times not bound to answer him that asketh the question, according to his intention and meaning: and that is, Whensoever the Demander hath not right to command an answer; and the Demanded hath a sufficient and not idle reason to deny it. For he that may lawfully hold his peace, may, passing by the things that are asked him, speake some other thing with God, the heauenly Spirits, or with himselfe, either by vocall or mentall speech, or by a mixt speech, which is partly vocall and partly mentall.* In these two last testimonies, the instance is in a particular case, when a man is examined or questioned: but the ground on which they build their determination, is a generall Rule, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, then he may lawfully equivocate, and speake by a mixt Proposition; as appeareth plainly in the reason of *Heiffius*, now set downe in his owne words. And in a word, *Equivocators* say, that if

if ^a a man vse Equivocation with mentall reservation, he doth not offend against the negative Precept, which forbiddeth a man to lye; because, whatsoever he speaketh in that maner, is a truth: onely hee may offend against the affirmatiue Precept, if he doe then equivocate, when he is bound to vtter and reueile the truth. And hence I inferre, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, as not being bound to reueile the truth; then in these mens opinion, he may lawfully speake by Equivocation. And this is the first thing that they say for this purpose.

The second thing is, that ^b there is iust cause for vsing of Equivocation, whensoever it is necessary or expedient for preserving of bodily safety, honor, houshold goods, or for any other act of vertue; so that the hiding of the truth may then be thought to bee expedient and honest. So speaketh Sanchez, meaning this rule of such an Equivocation as is ioyned with an oath. For else, ^c if there be no oath vsed, then honest sport vsed for lawfull recreation, may make the vse of Equivocation lawfull. But if there were an oath added, then it is an evident fault, because of the vaine and indiscreet vsing of Gods Name. So speaketh the same Author not long after. From which words of the Iesuite we may gather two things. 1. That an easie cause may suffice for iustifying of Equivocall speeches, in a simple assertion without an oath. If there bee no other cause but onely for merriment and recreation, yet that is reason inough to make the vse of Equivocation lawfull and honest. 2. That when other Equivocators doe require some kind of necessity or vtility which may draw men to vse it; they are to be vnderstood of Equivocation ioyned with an oath, and not when it is vsed in a bare and simple affirmation or negation: vnlesse wee may conceiue, that sport and merriment goeth with them for a matter of necessity or great moment. And

^a Persons mit. c. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. Greg. de Valent. tom. 3. Disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. §. Ad. 2 Arg. Sanchez moral. 3. c. 6. nu. 16. p. 26.

^b *Causa iusta vtendi his amphibologis est, quoties id necessarium aut vtile est ad salutem corporis, honoris, res familiares tuendas, vel ad quemlibet alium virtutis actum: ita vt veritatis occultatio confectur, tunc expediens ac studiosa.* Sanchez op. moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 19.

^c *Dum Sotus ait non esse culpam Amphibologiis uti joco, & inridiculis, intelligi quando absque iuramento id fieret. Tunc enim honestus ille ludus, recreationis iuste causa exercitus, honestum redderet amphibologie usum. At si iuramentum adesset, est manifeste culpa.*

propter vanitatem indiscretam Divini Nominis usurpationem, Sanchez. moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 22.

indeed,

indeed, this difference giuen by Father Sanchez, betweene *Equiuocation* with an oath, and without it, hath reason in it, if we consider their grounds and principles. For in affirmations and negations, there are two things required. 1. That no lye be told: for this is required by the negatiue precept of truth, as they vse to speake. And this fault, as they thinke, they auoide by their *arte of Reseruation*. And secondly, that men conceale not a truth, when they are bound to disclose it: for this is required by the affirmatiue precept of *truth*. But in an Oath, besides truth in the speech, there is a third thing required, and that is, that it be vndertaken with iudgement, that is to say, aduisedly and with due discretion. Else, by swearing a truth *vnadvisedly*, Gods Name may be prophaned. There is reason then for this difference which Sanchez maketh. And now by all this, the Reader may see, that an easie cause is thought sufficient for the vsing of this *Arte*. If it be for ease of the body, safety of a mans goods, preferuing of his credite, &c. then by their doctrine, a man may *equiuocate* with an Oath: but if it be for *sport* and *merriment* only, yet then it may bee lawfull in affirmations and negations without an Oath: provided that it be such a case, in which a man may lawfully hold his peace, and bee not bound then to disclose the *truth*.

By this it appeareth in generall, in what cases they allow the vse of this *Arte*. But for fuller satisfaction of the Reader, and for more distinct conceiuing of their meaning in this point; it will not bee amisse to point out some speciall and particular Cases, in which they giue expresse leaue for the practising of this sleight. And they be these, and such like.

1. If a Priest, that hath heard another mans Confession, should be demanded, whether such a one had confessed such a sinne vnto him, or not; -- he may answer directly, that hee hath not confessed any such thing vnto him, albeit hee had done

done so: yea, he may sweare also this answer of his, understanding and reserving in his minde, that the Penitent hath not confessed the same unto him, so as he may utter it. These be Father Persons ^a words. And hee saith, they be agreeable to the mind of all Schoole-Doctors.

2 ^b If a Penitent be asked without a iust cause, whether he haue confessed such or such a sinne (which he had confessed to the Priest) he may sweare he confessed it not, understanding, so as that he is bound to tell him. So speaketh Sanchez, and citeth others of the same opinion.

3 ^c If a Iudge do against iustice question a Defendant, and doe not question according to order of Law; the Defendant may vse Equivocation, and sweare according to his owne meaning: that is, by a secret reservation kept in his mind. So saith Tolet. And Sanchez saith the like,

^d When the Iudge that questioneth, is not the lawfull Iudge of him that is questioned, or is not his Iudge in that peculiar case; the Defendant may vse Equivocation. And the like he saith, if the Iudge bee an Excommunicate person. And the like Father Persons doth largely confirme, ^e When the Iudge is not lawfull, or not competent at least in that cause, or proceedeth not lawfully. In these cases, they thinke that a man questioned before a Magistrate, may vpon his oath, by an equivocall reservation, deny that which he knoweth to be true.

4 ^f If one doe ignorantly kill a man, thinking him to be a wild Beast, (a Deere for example) or if he kill a man in his owne defence; he may being questioned of the fact, denie it vpon his oath.

5 ^g When an uniuert tax is set vpon a commoditie, if a man sell it for more, or maketh light waight, and scant measure, so that he make himselfe satisfaction for the wrong of the Taxe, and yet sell his commodities worth the moeny; he being examined by a Iudge, whether he sold the commodi-

gnorãter, putans esse seram, occidat, aut in propriam defensionem - id negare. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 29. ^h Quando taxa alicuius rei est iniusta, si plus vendens, aut defraudans in pondere & mensura, ita ut sibi satisfaciatur pro pretij iniustitia, & reddat correspondentes merces pretio dato; potest hic interrogatus a Iudice, an plus

^a Mitig. cap. 10 nu. 2. pag. 407, 408.

^b Utinã, Deducitur Penitentem temere rogatum, an hoc vel illud peccatũ passus sit, posse iurare se non confessum, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illi explicare. Sanchez mor.

l. 3. c. 6. nu. 44. ^c Si contra iniustitiam petit, et iuridice eum non interrogat, potest uti equivocatione, et iurare secundum propriam mentem. Tolet. de Instruct. Sa. l. 4. c. 21. num. 10.

^d Fidem ambigoloy potest uti Reus, quando Iudex interrogans non est legitimus Interrogati Iudex, aut in hoc casu peculiari. Sanchez l. 3. c. 6 nu 27.

^e Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 11. and in the rest following.

^f Si quis hominẽ potest de eo factõ rogatus in iudicio, id negare.

vel defecerit in ty for more, or came short in his waight or measure, hee
 pōdere aut mēsu- may deny it, and say, that he sold it for the price that was
 ra, id negare, as- set him, and that he gaue full waight and measure; meaning
 ferereq; se pretio so, as that selling for more, or coming short in his waight
 taxato vendidif- or measure, he did commit an offence.

se, & integrè
 pondus & mensu- 6 ^a If a man be found slaine, with a Sword lying by him;
 ram tradidisse, in- and a guiltlesse person should be asked, whether that sword
 telligendo hac, were his, or whether hee passed that way at such an ioure,
 ita ut pluris ven- (Which things are true, and are inquired after as signes of
 dens aut defici- that murder, which he committed not) he may denie it.

ens in pondere aut
 mensura deli- 7 ^b If a man haue borrowed money, and paied it againe,
 querit. Sanchez and be examined of the Iudge, concerning the money that he
 moral. l. 3. c. 6. borrowed; he may swear that he borrowed not that money;
 nu. 29. understanding so as that he is now bound to pay it. And so
^a Si reperto cada- a man may swear, that he had not such money, which hee
 uere, quis interro- did receive; if through pouerty he be excused from making
 getur, an gladius payment, or if he should be vrged to pay it, before the day
 ibi repertus sit su- that it is due.

us, vel tali hora
 illac transferit, 8 ^c If a Creditor haue money owing him upon Bond,
 que vera sicut, part whereof is payed unto him, but as much is due unto
 & petuntur ab him some other way, for which hee hath no Instrument to
 eo, tanquam illi- shew: if he be required before a Iudge, to swear whether
 us homicidij indi- part of that debt were payd him; he may swear that it was
 cia quod verè nō not paied, understanding, so but that as much is now due to
 commisit; potest him, some other way.

negare. Sanch. l. c. nu. 30.
 b Ratione optima 9. ^d If a man be forced to promise marriage to a Wo-
 = docent eum, qui man, whom otherwise he is not bound to marrie [the mea-
 nummos mutuo ning is, if he be vrged and pressed by a Iudge against
 acceptos soluit, reason, to make that promise] he may swear, that hee
 posse à Iudice ro- Will marry her, though hee meane it not, understanding
 gatum de mutuo, iurare se illud non accepisse, intelligendo, ita ut teneatur id soluere. -- Atque idem credo si tunc non
 iurare se illud non accepisse, intelligendo, ita ut teneatur id soluere. -- Atque idem credo si tunc non
 teneretur soluere, eò quòd terminus, ad quem mutuum datum fuit non est impletus; vel præ pauper-
 tate excusatur debitor à tunc soluendo. Sanch l. c. nu. 31. ^c Non, deducitur Creditorem virtute
 Instrumenti publici exigentem coram Iudice debitum, -- etsi pars illius summæ debite soluta sibi sit,
 &c. Si Debitor reconueniat coram Iudice Creditorem, ut iuret an pars illius debiti soluta sit sibi,
 potest iurare solutam non esse, intelligendo, ut modò non sit tantundem sibi debitum. Sanch. l. c.
 num. 36. ^d Vndecimò deducitur, coactum aliquam accipere in sponsam, quam ducere non te-
 netur, posse iurare se accepturum, intelligendo intra se, Si tencor, vel si posse a placuerit mihi. San-
 chez ibid, num. 39. Tolet. de Instruēt. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11.

Within himselfe, If he be bound to doe so, or, if after ward I shall like of it.

10^a If a Woman, that hath played the Whore, bee asked by her husband, whether she haue committed adultery, shee may sweare that she hath not done it, understanding within her selfe, so as I may or meane to tell you of it.

11^b If a man haue contracted himselfe to a Woman, and after ward make another contract with another, by words de presenti: and being called before the Bishop, and there asked, whether he made such a contract de presenti with this later woman, he may sweare hee did not, understanding, so as that it is a marriage.

12^c If a man bee requested to lend money, when hee is not bound to lend it, though he haue the money by him, yet he may sweare that he hath it not, understanding within himselfe, so as that he will lend it him.

13^d If a man come from London in a time of Infection, to Couentrie, where he cannot be admitted to lodge, vntil he will sweare, that he came not lately from London; hee may sweare that he came not from London, reseruing in his mind, so as that he am infected with the plague, if vpon good reason he thinke that he is not infected.

14^e If a man in common talke bee asked of any matter which it behooueth him to keepe secret, he may lawfully say, that he knoweth not, understanding, so as it is behoouefull

matrimonium fuerit. Treatise of Equiuocation, allowed by Blackwell and Garnet by D. Abbot Antilog. cap. 2. fol. 13. and Casaub. Epist. ad Front. pag. 115. Decimo quinto deducitur, cum, a quo mutuo pecunia petitur, quam reuera habet, posse in iurando affirmare, se eam non habere, intelligendo intra se, ut mutuo det. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 43. & Nauar. Com. in c. Human. aures, q. 3. num. 13. Persons mitigat. cap. 9. num. 81. pa. 401, 403. Londino quis, sciens ibi peste, proficiscitur Couentriam, quem magistratus de verbis sue incolamitate solliciti, diuersis sibi non patiuntur, nisi prius iuret se Londini nuper non fuisse, non inde venisse, iurare poterit non se venisse Londino, cum hac reservatione mentis, ita ut infectus peste venerim. Treatise of Equiuocation, apud D. Abbot Antilog. c. 2. fol. 13. The like is said by Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 35. by Tolet. de Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. num. 12. by Nauarre Enchirid. cap. 12. nu. 19. In communi loquutione interrogato de re quam secreto seruare expedit, licitum est dicere se nescire, intelligendo, ita ut expediat dicere. -- potest etiam -- uti quamuis alia amphibologia, &c. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 25.

• Si vir ab uxore petat an sit adultera, ista potest dicere, Non sum, (quamuis verum fuerit eam adulterium commississe) intelligendo, ut tibi reuelam Tolet. Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11. Sanch. moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 41. Persons, mitig. c. 10. nu. 37. pa. 436.

• Contraxit quis matrimonium per verba de presenti, qua de re postulatus coram Episcopo, potest adhibito iuramento respondere, non se contraxisse per verba de presenti; seruata sibi clausula, ita ut mat-

^a *Observandum quoties licitum est, ad se tuendum uti aliqua equiuocatione, id quoque erit licitum, etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam equiuocationem. and, Quatumcumq; reduplicet inquis Interrogator, ut inret se nulla equiuocatione uti, & absque omni profus equiuocatione id intelligere: adhuc id iurare potest, intelligendo, ita ut plane debeat loqui et explicare, vel aliquid aliud mente concipiendo, quo verum id reddatur.* Sanchez. moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 45. and the same is said in the Treatise of Equiuocation apud D. Abbot Antilog. fol. 13. fac. 2.

to tell it: or With any other reseruation that he will imagine-
 Lastly, ^a If he that asketh the question, doe exclude the use of Equiuocation, and require a man vpon his oath not to use any Equiuocation, and that he meaneth what he speaketh without any Equiuocation at all (as it is in the Oath of Allegiance) yet he may sweare it still, understanding, so as he ought to speake plainely; or framing some other reseruation in his mind, by which it may be made true.

These and such like be the cases, in which they allow their Equiuocating fraudes. I could adde more, but I feare I haue wearied the Reader by too many already.

Surely, by this that hath beene said, we may learne two things, which it is requisite all plaine-meaning Christians should take notice of.

1 That *Equiuocators*, and such as are instructed in this *Arte*, doe take vnto themselues a large liberty of vsing this fraudulent deuce. For out of the premises it may appeare, that whatsoeuer busines or occasiõ be offered, be the matter sacred or ciuill, publike or priuate, in open Courts of Iustice, or in common practice of life; yet if they can perswade themselues that they haue any *serious cause* to conceale the truth, whether it be for some good to their soules, or for safety of their bodies, or keeping of their goods, &c. they may freely sweare the contrary to that truth, by an *Equiuocall* or mentall reseruation. And if they haue any light cause or reason, if it be but for *sport* or *merriment* to recreate themselues, then they may deceiue vs by an *Equiuocation*, in a simple affirmation or negation, hauing no Oath in it.

And this being so, I desire euery Christian, that would not be deceiued, to consider with himselfe, whether he can thinke of any busines that passeth between man and man, in which hee may promise to himselfe plaine dealing, or may presume that he shall not bee deceiued by some *mentall deuce* or other, if hee haue to doe with them, who doe professe this Equiuocating *Arte*.


Secondly,

Secondly, we may learne, that there is no limitation, or exception, or explication, be it neuer so wise or wary, nor any thing which mans wit can deuise, that may restraine or keepe backe these *Equiuocators*, from deluding vs by their equiuocall speeches; but that say or doe what a man will or can, they will take libertie to equiuocate still: so that no Oathes, how warily and carefully soeuer they be framed, can hold these men, further then themselues will. ^a *Paceni*us discoursing of the Oath of *Allegiance*, laugheth at the simplicitie (as hee calleth it) of our King and State, who thought by that Oath to prouide for their safetie: as hauing hedged it about with so many circumstances, as that, to their thinking, no man could winde himselfe out of it with a safe conscience. But they consider not (saith hee) that if the Pope shall dissolue this Oath, all the bands of it, either for performance of fidelitie to the King, or for not admitting a dispensation from Rome, are shattered in peeces. Nay, [†] will say one other thing (saith hee) that is more admirable. An vnjust Oath, when it is declared to be such, bindeth no man: but that, this Oath is vnjust, hath beene sufficiently declared by the Pastor of the Church. Hee meaneth the Pope. And hereupon hee inferreth in an insulting manner; ^b Thou seeest now (saith hee) that the band of that Oath is vanished into smoak, so that the band which so many wise men thought to be as strong as Iron, proueth weaker then straw. Thus this man boasteth, that by the Popes dispensation, or declaration of the vnlawfulness of it, no Oath in the world is any thing worth. A great priuiledge fure for them, that can so easily winde themselues out of bands, euen the strongest that can be thought of, among men: And yet me thinketh, aliud admirabilius, the *Equiuocators* haue found a more admirable deuice then this of *Paceni*us is. For he sen-

^a Vide in tanta astutia quanta sit simplicitas. Quia omnem securitatem in iuramento sibi statuisset, talem se modum iuramenti, tot circumstantijs conexuisset existimabat, qui, salua conscientia, nulla ratione à quoquam dissolui posset. Sed videre non potuit, si Pontifex iuramentum dissoluerit, omnes illius nexus, siue de fidelitate Regi prestanda, siue de dispensatione non admittenda, pariter dissolutos fore. Immo aliud dicam admirabilius. Nosli, credo, iuramentum iniustum, si tale esse euidenter sciatur, vel aperte declaretur, neminem obligare; Regis iuramentum iniustum esse, ab ipso Ecclesie Pastore sufficienter declaratum est. Barthol. Paceni, Egeles.

Epistol. Monit. Iacob. Regis lit. B. 2 & 3. ^b Vides igitur iam in sumum abyssum illius obligatione; ut vinculum, quod à tot sapientibus ferreum putabatur, minus sit quam stramine.

deth a man to Rome, to fetch a *dispensation* thence, or to get the Popes *declaration* of the vnlawfulnesse of the Oath, and then they may breake all. But our *Equiuocators* haue that at home, and within their own brests, that may free them from all. For if themselues doe but thinke that the thing is vnlawfull, or that they haue some reasonable cause, to dissemble, they may take this or any other Oath whatsoeuer, and by an *equiuocall* reservation, breake the band of that Oath, before they take it. And if such be the priuiledges of these men, how great is their danger, that liue and conuerse with them: God preserue all well-meaning men from such deceitfull tongues.



CHAP. IIII.

Of the vse, or rather abuse of Equiuocation, and for what turnes it may serue.



Equiuocation, such as hath beene described before, may be beneficiall to them that vse it, many wayes, and for diuers purposes. For in the generall it may serue them for all turnes, in which by mis-leading the Hearer, they may make any aduantage to themselues: and more particularly it may serue them for these speciall ends and purposes.

First, in State-busineses, and matters of policie, it may serue great men, to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by: and yet to make faire weather towards all men, and beare them in hand that they meane nothing but friendship and loue. In this kinde

a In c. Human.
aur. q. 3. nu. 14.
pag. 353.

*Monarcha cum
primis maximis*

Nauarre telleth vs of a great *Monarch*, who hee thought

thought had vsed, and did then vse *this good art* (as he calleth it) by the benefit whereof, euery man was contented and pleased, that came to him, or had to deale with him about great affaires. ^b For (saith he) *hee is thought so to entertaine and to heare those that come vnto him, and in answering, so to expresse and declare himselfe vnto them with whom hee hath to deale, as well by gesture, as by words and deedes, that the things being understood according to their meaning, doe please and content them, though in themselues they be false, but are true according to the reseruations understood by the Answerer.* The same *Navarre* addeth further, ^c that he thinketh another great Monarch meant to teach his sonne ^d *this doctrine and good arte of Equiuocating*; when for some secret defect, hee drew him backe from the studie of learning, saying, *I would not haue my sonne to haue any more Latine, then onely that one Apophthegme, * Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare.* Doe they thus instruct their *Catholique* Princes, to dissemble and equiuocate? and call they it a good *Arte*, by which they may possesse men with a good opinion of them, when they meane quite otherwise; that so they may worke their ends, and bring about their proiects and plots? Why, then, I neede not feare to say, that one turne, for which the *Doctrine of Equiuocation* doth serue them, is in *State-busineses* to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by it. Which as it is aduantageous to themselues, so it is dangerous for those that haue to deale with them.

Secondly, It may serue them, for a meanes to hide their mischieuous plots, against the *State and Religion*, and yet to escape the hand of iustice after all. For when they haue plotted and acted *Treasons*, or are about any vnlawfull businesse, forbidden by the whole-some *Lawes of the Kingdome*; *Equiuocation* serueth to hide both themselues and their *Associats*, from the en-

quiry

^b *Creditor enim ita excipere & audire ad se venientes, & sic ipsdem respondendo, significare tam gestu, quam verbis & factis, ut placeant eis, cum quibus rem gerit, intellecta secundum intentionem illorum, licet sint in se falsa, &c.*

^c *Ibid. nu. 15.*

^d *Hanc doctrinam & artem bonam.*

* *He that knoweth not to dissemble, knoweth not to raigne.*

quiry of the Magistrate, be hee neuer so vigilant and carefull. For if one of them be examined or asked, whether hee haue reconciled such a man to the Pope, or absolued such a subiect from his bond of Allegiance, or haue conspired against the life of the King, or haue beene acquainted with a plot of blowing vp the Parliament; though all these things be most true, yet hee may without scruple deny them all vpon his Oath. Or in case one be detected otherwise, and examined, who were his Associats, whether such a Priest, or such a Iesuite, or such a Gentleman were priuy to the thing; though these men were all of them as deepe in the villany, as himselfe; yet he may swear that none of them all did know the least iote of the matter. And by these trickes they can worke all mischief to Kings, and Nobles, and People, and Parliaments; and yet wind themselves and their complices out of the hands of iustice; vnlesse God doe disclose them, as many times he doth beyond the prouidence or expectation of man. For rather then Treasons should goe vnspied, God maketh

a the Bird of the ayre to carry the voyce, and that which hath wings to tell the matter, saith Salomon. This vse Southwell the Iesuite made of this Arte. For, fearing to be detected, b hee instructed a Woman-Disciple of his, that if shee should be examined, whether himselfe were or had beene in that house, shee should vpon her oath vtterly deny it; and so shee might safely doe, vsing but the helpe of this Arte, though shee had often sene him there, and knew him to be in the house. And to like purpose c Tresham, one of the Gun-powder Traitors, vpon examination did confesse that Father Garnet was priuy to the Treason, and had talked with him about it; but afterward, hauing been better instructed or confirmed in this rare mystery, when he lay sicke on his death-bed, and not aboue three or foure houres before his death, hee protested, and tooke it vpon his Saluation,

a Eccles. 10.
20.

b G. Abbot
prelect. de
mendacio.
pa. 50. nu. 13. &
R. Abbot An-
tilog. cap. 2.
fol. 13. fac. 2.
c Proceeding
against Trai-
tors. Cc. 2.

uation,

uation, and set it downe vnder his hand, that his former Confession was false, and that hee had not seene *Garner* of sixteene yeeres space before, at the least. And thus hee died. Which protestation of his, vpon his oath, was proued not long after, to be most vntrue. Yea, and *Garner* himselfe confessed, that within that space hee had seene him many times. Whereupon this graue Father, and grand *Equiuocator* being demanded what he then thought of *Treshams Testimentall protestation*, hee answered, *It may be hee meant to equiuocate.* And this reuerend Father himselfe, who was Prouinciall of the Iesuits, when after secret conference betweene him and *Hall*, another Iesuite in the Tower, hee was asked before all the Lords Commisioners, whether *Hall* and hee had any conference together, and was desired not to equiuocate; hee stiffely denied it vpon his Soule, reiterating it with so many detestable execrations, as wounded their hearts to heare him. And afterward, when he knew that the thing was knowne, and that *Hall* his fellow-Iesuite had confessed it; hee cryed the Lords mercie, and said hee had offended, if *Equiuocation* did not helpe him. And though the Priests accuse the Iesuites for it, yet when they are examined before a Magistrate, or Officer, they also say and sweare and protest all maner of falshoods and vntruths, that so they may winde either their fellowes or themselues out of the danger of the Law. And indeede this is the chiefe and principall turne, for which *Equiuocation* is intended to serue them.

Thirdly, In matters of Religion this *good Art* may serue them to auoide arguments and euident reasons brought against them, which their owne consciences doe acknowledge to be true. For hereby they can glosse the Fathers sayings against their meaning, and deny all sorts of authorities that are alledged against them. For so themselues professe to their friends in

a Proceeding
against Trai-
tors. Y. 3.

^a Quum in Catholicis veteribus alijs, plurimos feramus errores, & extenuemus, excusemus, excogitato commento per sepe negamus, & commodum ijs sensum affingamus, dum opponuntur in disputationibus aut in conscriptionibus cum Aduersarijs: non videmus cur non eandem equitatem & diligentem recognitionem mereatur Bertramus. Index Belgic. lit. B. in Bertramo. pag. 12. in 8^o.
^b Mitigat. ca. 7. num. 34. & seqq.

secret, ^a Seeing (say the Belgicke Censurers) in other ancient Catholiques, wee beare with very many errors, and doe lessen and excuse them, and very often by some deuised shift doe deny them, and feine vnto them some commodious meaning, when they be objected against vs in disputationes and conflicts with the aduersaries: wee see no reason why Bertram may not deserue the like equitie or favourable dealing, and diligent reuising. This they professe among their friends (for their meaning was not that euer it should come to our sight :) and being that they hold all lying to be so sinfull, that they may not tell a lye for the sauing of a soule, it were too hard a censure to thinke, that against the light of their owne consciences, they would so wilfully thrust themselues on that danger, and so boldly professe it in the eares of their friends. But by this fine Arte they can quiet the murmuring of their consciences, because by it, they can say any thing, neuer so false, and yet by a *reseruation*, make it as true as the Gospell.

This consideration maketh mee not to maruell, when in men, that professe such religious *strictnesse*, (as Father *Persons* ^b saith they doe,) I finde such broad and vnreasonable *expositions* and glosses of Fathers and other Writers, as that no man of vnderstanding who readeth the places, but will see, that the *glosse* doth corrupt the *Text*, and the *expositions* doe clearely depraue the Authors meaning. For I know that an *Equiuocator* hath an Arte, by which hee can make all speeches to become true, if once they doe but come forth of his mouth.

Fourthly, It may serue them for deuising and counterfeiting of strange apparitions, and heauenly visions, and diuine miracles. This, how frequent it hath bene heretofore, the wisest and most learned among their owne Writers doe confesse and bewaile. And of late yeeres their owne ^c Brethren doe say, that the miracles

^c The Author and the Publishers of the Iesuites Catechisme.

rales and visions reported of ^d Ignatius, and ^e Iustinian and ^f Xauier, and others of the Iesuiticall straine and order, are not much better. And what should let vs to thinke, but they which presume so much in other things, *in ordine ad Deum*, and *pro bono societatis*, *in reference to God*, and *for the good of their Order*; would not sticke to fittē and faine and tell of glorious facts, and admirable wonders which were neuer done, and make faire shewes without substance, if these may helpe to aduance the papall dignitie, or the Iesuiticall order, especially seeing they know how to say and write and sweare any thing for *so great a good*, without the least grudge of conscience?

Fiftly, It may serue them for forging and diuulging of false, especially slanderous reports, against their aduerfaries and enemies of their profession. A thing so generally and so boldly practised by the men of this faction, especially by the Fathers of Ignatius his Order, that ^g wise men haue much wondred, when in such politique persons as Iesuites are, they haue seene and obserued such a strangeliberty in coyning of forged tales, as that the vnruthes which they haue broached, might well be called *splendida mendacia*, *transparent lyes*, such as by their owne light bewray themselves, or such as within a few dayes might and haue appeared to the world to be loude and lewd lyes, that might shame their Master. And wee might well wonder, if we knew not the Iesuites *new Arte*, that men of any either conscience or honest minde, could let passe out of their mouthes, or from their pens, such shamefull and yet shamelesse fictions. For example (to giue the Reader a taste of their forgeries and lying slanders) Luther was a great *mawle*, that battered their *Babel*; and of him they reported, and printed it too, that hee was dead and buried, which was no great wonder: but (that which was worth the straining of their wits) *when hee*

d L.I.C. 18.
fol. 64.
e L.I.C. 17.
fol. 62.
f Ibid.

g Relation of
Religion, num.
33. Beza Re-
diiu. Epist. ad
Gul. Stuck.

lay a dying, hee tooke order, that his bodie should be layed on the Altar, and adored as a God. And when hee was dead, and buried, that there was such a terrible noyse and tumult about his graue, as if heauen and earth had gone together. And the night after his buriall, that there was a much greater and more hideous noyse and shrieking then before. And when, vpon the occasion of this fearefull noyse, which frightened all the Citizens out of their sleepe, his graue was opened the next day, there was neither bodie, nor bones, nor graue-clothes to be seene; but so hellish a stinke came out of his graue, as with the poyson of it, it had almost killed the standers by. And all this while Luther was aliue, and did helpe to demolish their Babel still; and not long after the same time, published a booke in print, & gaue it this title, *Contra Papatū à diabolo institutum*, *Against the Papacie founded by the Deuill*.

This story if any man be desirous to see, he may read *Melch. Adamus*, in the booke which he wrote of the liues of German Diuines. ^a Where he may also reade the words of the lying Relation, printed by them in Italian, and afterward translated into Latine. After this practice against Luther, they fell vpon Calvin, the wounds of whose pen were deepe in their sides; and of him they scattered this newes in the Courts of the German Princes, and in a generall Assembly in Germany, that Calvin now was weary of his Religion, had revolted, and was turned Papist. And at this very time, was hee printing his booke of Institutions: and in a ^b Preface prefixed before this booke, doth make answer to this slander, and telleth these lying Spirits, ^c *The Deuill and all his rowt of lying spirits are deceiued, if they thinke by lading me with base lyes, to discourage or hinder mee in my course*. In like manner, but with more shamelesse impudency, they afterward traduced Beza. Of whom there were not onely false reports scattered through

^a In vita Lutheri pag. 152.

^b Directed to the Reader.

^c *Fallitur cum tota sua caterua diabolus, &c.*

through Italie, Germany, & other Countries, but letters also were written & diuulged to this purpose; That *Beza* a little before his death had recanted his Religion in a full Assembly of the Senators of *Geneua*, beseeching them that if euer they would be saued, they should renounce *Caluins* errors, and betake themselues to the profession of the *Romish* faith; that for more full testification of his *unfained* Conuersion, after his death hee desired them to send for and to be aduised and directed by the *Iesuites*; that hereupon the *Pope* had appointed the *Bishop* of *Geneua* to absolute *Beza*, and other learned men, such as could be had neere at hand, to goe to *Geneua*, and consider of the businessse, and deale with the Inhabitants, if any were more backward, about points and Articles of Religion in question. After which Relation, the Reporter addeth, that this newes is most certaine and true; as may appeare by the numberlesse company of letters written to this purpose, and will (as hee saith) appeare at the next *Franckford Mart*, by the store of Bookes which would then flye abroad in the World, for the witnessing of this thing. Hee yet goeth on further, and for more abundant prooffe, telleth vs, that *Putcanus*, the Generall of the *Iesuites*, who liued within twelue miles of *Geneua*, had by writing related this newes, adding moreouer, that himselfe was one of those Fathers, whom the *Pope* had appointed to goe and instruct the Citizens of *Geneua*. Yea, and moreouer, saith the Relator, the *Landgrane* of *Hessen*, being scared with this newes, sent messengers to *Geneua*, who after their returne confirmed all this to be true. This they reported of *Beza*; without either fear of God or reuerence of men. For all this while *Beza* was aliue; and continued preaching and writing against the superstitions and idolatries of the *Romane* Church, for diuers yeeres after. And for the clearer detection of this shamelesse lye, he wrote a Booke, the title whereof is *Beza rediunus*, *Beza* returned to life againe: Wherein

See the Iesuits Catechisme, l. i. cap. 17. f. 62. a *Vise marti vicinum sensit, coram pleno Senatu Geneuensi palinodiam cecinit.* *Beza Rediuiu. Epist. Colonia missa,* pag. 9.

he hath laid open the Iesuites forgeries, to the shame of their Order. I could bring more instances of their abominable forgeries of this kinde, but I am afraide to cloy the Reader with such vnfaoury fictions. Yet two examples there are, (both within mine owne knowledge and experience) which I cannot omit, without some short rehearfall. The one is, of the famous Diuine, Doctor *Rainolds*, *President of Corpus Christi Colledge in Oxford*: and the other, of the worthy *Prelate Doctor King*, *Bishop of London*, my euer-honoured Lord. Of the former, some well-willers to the Roman-Church, were discovered to haue diuulged reports, in the time of his long sicknesse, (for hee died of a lingring consumption) that hee voyded his owne Ordure vpward by the mouth: (of which I ye what construction ill mindes would frame, any man may easily conceiue.) This report was brought to him while he was yet aliue, which made him to send for the partie, who was said to be the *author*, or at least a *reporter* of this forgerie, and shewed him what the matter was, that hee vsed to spit out of his mouth, euen the very same that other such sicke men vse to doe. But these Iyers might haue proceeded perhaps to fowler fictions, had they not beene preuented by the timely prouidence of some learned, and his louing and religious friends. For they remembring and considering the shamelesse practices of Papists, in scattering false newes to disgrace the Worthies of our Church, came to him the day before his death, put him in minde of their false dealing, and desired him, that for the preuenting of such slanders after his death, hee would now make an open confession of his faith, and constant beliefe. Which he being not able to doe with his owne mouth, his speech hauing fayled him some dayes before, left the composing of a forme of Confession to them, to which hee would subscribe. And they considering his weakenesse,

weakenesse, framed it in generall and few words, in this manner :

These are to witnesse vnto all the world, that now in this my weakenesse, wherein I looke for my dissolution, and hope shortly to be with my Christ, I die in a constant beliefe, persuasion, and profession of that holy truth of God, in defence whereof I haue stood both by writing and speaking, against the Church of Rome, and whatsoever other Enemies of Gods truth. And for mine owne resolution touching mine owne state of Saluation after this life, I assure my selfe thereof, by the merits of Christ Iesus onely, into whose hands I commend my spirit, as vnto my faithfull Redeemer.

To this he readily subscribed with his owne hand ;

John Rainolds.

And his friends then present, who had beene eye-witnesses and eare-witnesses of the whole passage of this businesse, did by their hands witnesse the truth of the act to the world, in these words :

That hee made this Subscription with his owne hand, with such willingnesse and chearefulnesse, as ministred great comfort vnto vs, who were then present ; wee testifie by this subscription of our names also hereunto. May 20. 1607.

Henrie Airay Vice-Chancelor.

Henrie Wilkinson.

Edward Rilkton.

Richard Taylor.

Henrie Hindle.

Daniel Faireclough.

Henrie Mason.

Alexander How.

John Dewhurst.

The Originall hereof signed with Doctor Rainolds owne hand, and subscribed by the afore-named parties, I haue in my custodie : out of which this is a true and faithfull Transcript here published. Now blessed be his counsell, and blessed be hee of the Lord, that gaue this aduise for the stopping of these slanderous mouthes.

For

For had not this preuention beene vsed afore-hand, we may feare that such as belied him in his sicknesse, would not haue spared him after his death. And for want of some such prouidence and preuention it is, that that Reuerend and learned *Prebete*, (whose memory is precious with all good men that knew him) our late Bishop of *London* I meane, mine euer-honoured Lord and Patrone : for want, I say, of some such prouidence afore-hand, this glorious Soule hath beene traduced by worthlesse pennes, and foule-mouthed fiends (the indignitie of the thing maketh mee, against my nature and custome, to giue them that name whereof they are most worthy) as if hee had made defection to the Roman Church; to whose errors notwithstanding he shewed himselfe an Enemy to his dying-day : as those that knew him inwardly, doe know very well, how in the very time of his sicknesse, hee spared not vpon occasion to expresse his zeale that way. But of all foule-mouthes, that haue slandered that blessed Soule; hee that wrote the *Bishop of Londons Legacie*, is the most shamelesse and impudent lier. The Author of the *Protestants plea* is but a milke-sop to this noble Champion : and Father *Persons* himselfe must now be forced to resigne vp to him the *Whetstone*, which his secular Brethren bestowed vpon him for his excellency in the *fittening Trade*. For they and other of their fellowes, haue played their prizes well : but this *L yer excellēt* them all. He hath made two publications of one indiuiduall Booke, qualifying, or rather destroying in the latter, some transparent lyes, which with an Whores forehead, and without regard of the Worlds censure, hee had auerred in the former. For, in the yeere 1622. when hee first diuulged this Libell, he made the worthy *Bishop* to speake those silly Motiues, which his worthlesse selfe had deuised. And so hee went masked vnder the *Bishops* name : but with such difformitie and

*Egregiè illi
quidem, sed nihil
ad Parmenonis
Smem.*

and disproportion euery way, as made mee remember the Assle in the Fable ; which presuming to weare the Lyons skinne, did by his long eares bewray himselfe to be an Assle notwithstanding. He saith, that the *Bishop* himselfe did penne those Motiues, and deliuered them to this *Publisher*, this publique Lyer, to be committed to the Presse. I would the world were worthy to vnderstand what rare man this is, that had such inward acquaintance with that learned and wise *Bishop*, as to heare from him the secrets of his heart, and to receiue from him the studied Reasons of his Conuersion, which were neuer made knowne to any bodie else. And sure, it were a great honour to see that face, that could come and goe, and conuerse with the *Bishop* about these weightie affaires, and in this serious manner, without being once seene of any other man ; as if by the vertue of some *Gyges* his Ring, he had bin transformed into an inuisible Spirit. But he goeth on, and saith that the man is knowne that reconciled the *Bishop* to the Romane Church. But it is to be feared, he will neuer make knowne the mans name to the world, lest if the *Reconciler* should proue more shamefaste, then this *Publisher* is, hee might returne the lye vpon the Author that deuised it, and spit his shame in his owne face. And yet say, hee both can and will name the man, what great mastery is in this ? or what great credit might such a circumstance, comming from an Equiuocator, gaine to his cause ? For did not *Puteanus* the Prouinciall of the Iesuites, name the man that reconciled *Beza* to their Church ? Yes. He said expressely (not with *Ifs* and *Ands*, as this *Publisher* doth) that the man was the *Bishop* of *Geneua*. And did hee not name beside, both the man that was sent to catechize the Citizens of *Geneua* in the Romane Faith ; and the man that sent messengers to enquire of this news in *Geneua*, & found it to be true ? Yes. For, for the

one, he nameth himselfe, who among others, was going to *Genoua* to instruct them. And for the other, hee nameth the Lantgraue of *Hessen*, who was a Prince not farre off, and knew the vndoubted truth of this newes. Iesuites and Equiuocators are ashamed of nothing. And yet, I would we might be so much beholding to this *Publisher*, as to publish the *Reconcilers* name, that performed so great a worke for this great man. To this purpose this publike Lier spake in the first publication of his Booke; which not long after was suppressed and kept from the view of the world. I suppose, some of his Superiours more wary then himselfe, being ashamed of such *shining lyes*, did call in the Booke, till some kinde of qualification might temper those shamelesse and hideous vntruths. And then in the yeere following 1623. hee made a new publication of the same worthy Worke, changing onely the Title-leaf, and the Preface to the Reader. And in this second publication, hee is contented to owne his owne abortiue Brat, which in the former hee had without shame fathered vpon the worthy Bishop: and wisheth that himselfe may be taken to haue written those motiues, as a precedent or patterne warranting any Protestant in the change of his Religion, though by a Poeticall freedome peculiarly applied to the Bishop. And whereas throughout the whole Booke, hee maketh the Bishop speake what himselfe had forged; hee now giueth his Reader leaue with his full consent and allowance, to suppose all these passages to be *fictiones personarum*, and warranted by the figure *Prosopopeia*, that is, a fiction of the Person. It were some signe of grace, if he had acknowledged the whole *fiction*, as hee doth this part of it. But he goeth on still: and euen in the new altered Preface, or Aduertisement to the Reader, hee accuseth the Bishop of defection from his Religion; and by a figuratiue kinde of *Preterition*, hee spareth peremptorily to
affirme.

affirme, that the Bishop did write and deliuer to others any Reasons or Motiues of his change in Religion. In which speech, this Slanderer would haue his Reader to vnderstand that, which himselfe dareth not speake; that when it shall appeare to be a shamelesse forgery, hee may wipe his mouth with the Whore in the *Pro-uerbes*, and say, that hee said it not. But, *foule-mouth*, if thou hast any thing to say, spit out: and labour to giue some satisfaction to the World, to auoid the euidence of *coozening the liuing*, and *slandering the dead*. For know, that the World already is possessed with this opinion, that thou must needes be some ignorant Iesuite: (for none else can be imagined to be so Bayardly bold.) And if now thou forbear to produce some prooffe, or some probabilitie, or some possibility, how these things might be; wee shall resolue vpon it, that *Persons* his *ghost* is risen from the dead, and hath brought with him *seuen other spirits worse* and more lying then himselfe: and that that is the reason, why such vast and shamelesse Forgeries doe shew themselues in this man. But I leaue this Lyer for this time: and humbly pray the *Worthies* of our Church, that they would take these things into their consideration: and as men that deale with Thornes, doe fence their hands with thicke Gloues; so seeing they doe liue, and must die in the midst of such slanderous Tongues, they would arme themselues against such malice, by an open profession of their Faith, at such times especially as they are ready to leaue the World; lest they may be slandered after their deaths, when they will want libertie to defend themselues. But heere I stay my course. For I perceiue I haue in part digressed already; and yet not so, as that I am gone from the matter in hand. For I was saying, that Equiuocation did serue the Masters of it for this turne among others; that by it they might without scruple of conscience,

defame and belye the *Worthies* of our Church, that so they might gaine the more credit to their owne. Now how they vse to defame our learned men, I haue declared fully by this digression, if the Reader will so esteeme it: and what vse Equiuocation may stand them in this practice, will not be hard for any man to conceiue. For a wonder it might seeme, that men of any religion or conscience, should endure themselues, while they broach such broad-faced lyes. But the Arte of Equiuocation will presently remoue all such scruple or grudge. For, it teacheth how to speake all vntruths, without telling of the least lye: and so the Equiuocator needeth not to haue any scruple in that respect. And this doubt being once remoued, there can be no further let to hinder their proceeding. For, what though the Heretiques complaine of wrong and iniustice done to them in their good name? that skilleth not. For, *in ordine ad Deum*, and *pro bono Societatis*, that is lawfull enough, or rather very meritorious. For the ^a Seculars tell vs, that when a Priest complained to the Iesuites, or some one among them, of *wrong done to Master Bennet* by their defamation, reply was made, *that it was necessary or conuenient hee should be disgraced, because hee was against their Societie*. Where the Author or Authors of that Booke adde further, that the Iesuites hold such *deuillish Principles*, whereby they may at ^apleasure defame whom they please. And if they take such libertie of Conscience against their own Catholique Brethren; they will out of question make no bones to slander and disgrace an Heretique. This then is one turne among the rest, and it is a speciall one and of great vse for their purpose, that by this Arte of Equiuocating, they can defame and disgrace, and (as we plaine-dealers doe call it) belye whom they will, without any offence or grudge of conscience.

Sixtly, In ordinary dealings and course of life, Equi-
uocation

^a Reply to
Persons Libel.
pag. 18.


uocation may serue them, for concealing of any truth, or perswading of any vntruth, if either of them may make for their aduantage. So a *Nauarre* telleth vs, that if wee be asked what wee haue eaten, how much money wee haue, what wee haue heard, &c. In these and all such cases as these, if there be aduantage to be gotten by it, we may by this fine Arte, conceale the truth, or speake an vntruth, so as by *subintellection*, or a mentall reseruatiō, wee make vp the matter. And the ^b Seculars tell vs, that the Iesuites make *Equiuocation* to serue their turnes so frequently in this kinde, as, that their owne *Catholique* Brethren; nay, their fellow-Priests can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise. They might haue added, no nor their holy Father the *Pope* neither. For, Father *St. andish* cooze- ned and deluded him also, by *Equiuocation*, thereby to oppresse the Secular Priests; as ^c they complaine in diuers places of their Bookes. And if this Arte can serue for this turne, when they deale with his Holinesse himselfe; no maruell if they make the same vse of it, whensoever they haue to deale with Heretiques and enemies of their Religion: as Father *Lister* also did, who ^d giuing his Faith, in verbo *Sacerdotis*, to be true prisoner to the *Knight-Marshall*, yet did breake that word and that Oath. But the good Father (say his Secular Brethren) had perhaps some mentall euasiō, wherewith to rescue his Soule, at least from remorse, though not from the *Deuill*. As for example, as hee was in that minde hee would be true prisoner, or for any thing the Keeper should know to the contrary, till hee were escaped; or that hee meant not to runne away on his head, but on his feete; or that hee would not breake away so long as the *Knight-Marshall* or his Deputie stood by and looked on; or that hee would not breake away as a Priest, but as a *Iesuite*; or that hee would not scape with a minde euer to come againe with his will; or that *nulla fides seruanda*

a Comment. in c. Human. aur. q. 3. nu. 13.

b Reply to Persons Libel. pag. 23.

c Reply to Persons Libel. cap. 3. pag. 57. True Relation pag. 55, 56. Quodl. 3. art. 4. pag. 66. in the Margin.
d Answer to a Letter of a Iesuited Gentleman, p. 104.

Hæreticis; or, how many Ors might I make upon this point? saith the Author of that Booke. But the point is plaine, and as well proued to be true, of all sorts, as heere it is affirmed of the Iesuites; though I will not denie these Fathers the precedencie in this practice. *Equiuocation* then serueth for many singular turnes, and for vses of great consequence and moment: and therefore it is no maruell that they doe so hugge and embrace it, as a dearling of great worth.



CHAP. V.

Of the Grounds and Arguments, either for or against Equiuocation.



IN setting down the Reasons on either side, I shall not neede to be long; because I haue beene large already in vnfolding the nature and conditions of this Art, in the points hitherto spoken of: and the discouery of such a monstrous deuce is argumēt inough to disproue it. It may then be sufficient for this place, first, to answer the chiefe Arguments, which are brought in defence of it; and then in the second place, to set downe some fewe Reasons, that may refute it.

And first, for their Arguments, they are many in particular; for Father *Persons* findeth 8 or 9 at least, in one piece of a Chapter: & how many then might he haue found, if he had sought all the Chapters of the Bible, in the like maner? But the Wren hath moe birds then the Egle: and errors doe more vsually abound with their

their rotten proofes, then Truths doe with sound and substantiall Reasons. And it is no maruell. For a false Conclusion hath no direct or good prooffe at all: and Cauils and impertinent flourishes for euery thing, may bee infinite and without number. And so it is in this case. For such proofes, as the 8 or 9 are, which Father *Persons* findeth in one Chapter, he might haue found 8 or 900 in the compasse of the Bible. But howsoeuer the particular allegations be so many; yet all of them may easily be reduced to some few heads: and so many of them together may be cut off at one blowe.

The Heads then, to which the substance of all that they say, may be reduced, are these three. 1. Examples of holy men. 2. Examples of God himselfe. And 3. Examples of Iesus Christ our blessed Sauour.

And first, for Examples of holy men, they bring in, the Patriarches and Prophets, and other Saints of God. For *Abraham*, say they, did equiuocate, when he said of *Sarah*, that she was his Sister: and *Jacob*, when hee said, *I am thy first-borne Esau*: and *Moses*, when he said to *Pharaoh*, that they would goe three dayes iourney into the *Wildernes*, but meant to go to *Canaan*: and *Samuel*, when he said, he went to offer *Sacrifice*, but principally inteded to annoint *Dauid* to be King of *Israel*: and *Dauid*, when he told *Abimelech*: *The King commanded me abusinesse, &c.* and *Ieremie*, when to the question of the Nobles, who demanded of him, What saidst thou to the King, &c. He answered, *I presented my supplication to the King, that he would not cause me to returne to Ionathans house, to die there*: whereas hee talked with him, concerning his yeelding vp to the King of *Babylon*.

For answer to these and the like, I note 2. things, by way of preamble. 1. That the old Hereticks, the *Priscillianists*, who defended the lawfulnessse of *Lying*, as now the *Papists* doe of *Equiuocating*, did alledge these same places and examples, at least many of them, for prooffe

Gen. 20. 2.

Gen. 27. 19.

Exod. 5. 1.

& 8. 27.

1. Sam. 16. 1, 2.

1. Sam. 21. 2.

Ier. 38. 25, &c.

prooffe of their heresie; which our Iesuites doe for confirmation of their opinion. And they had better shew of reason then these men haue; for diuers of those Instances were either direct and culpable vnruthes, or seemed at least to border too neere vpon such obliquity: but as for this newfound *Equiuocation* by mentall reservation, it hath no shew nor semblance of probability, to be gathered from them. 2. That neither S. *Augustin*, who most diligently confuted those Heretikes, nor any other ancient Writer, for answering of these obiections, did euer flee to this Arte of *Equiuocation*; or once say, that those Fathers and holy men did not lye in any of those speeches, for that they spoke the truth by a mentall reservation. Which answer, if it had bin true, had bene most pertinent and easie; as our late, *Equiuocators* doe not only confesse, but bragge of it too. For *Narræ* saith, that from his doctrine of *Equiuocatio*, there ariseth, or may bee gathered, *nouus modus excusandi à mendacio Patriarchas*, a new way to excuse the Patriarches from lying. Where, when he saith that it is a new way, he acknowledgeth that it was not knowne to S. *Augustin*, or those other Worthies, who in former times did beate downe these Errours of the Heretikes. And when he saith, that this way ariseth out of his doctrine, he intimateth, that if the Fathers had knowne this, they might easily haue answered the *Priscillianists*, by interpreting those Texts after his new way. Now from hence it followeth, that the Ancients did not vnderstand these passages of Scripture, as making any thing for *Equiuocation*. And therefore, when *Equiuocators* alledge S. *Augustin*, and some others of the Fathers, for their interpretation, they abuse both their Readers, and the ancient Fathers.

These things being first noted, I come to giue a more direct answer to the obiections; and it is this; As they affirme, so I deny, that these or any of these sayings alledged,

*Comm.in C.
Human. aures
q. 3. n. 7.

ledged, were meant, or are to be vnderstood and construed with any *Equiuocall reservation*.

Yes, say they, that they are. For if they be not so construed, they are *apparent lyes*, which may not be supposed of those holy men.

Answ. 1. If they be not vnderstood and made true by *mentall reservation*, they are *apparent Lyes*, say they. If this doe not follow, then our *Equiuocators* doe great wrong to those ancient Worthies. And plaine it is, for diuers of them, that they doe so. For when *Abraham* said of *Sarab*, *She is my Sister*; and when *Moses* said to *Pharaoh*, *We must goe three dayes &c.* and when *Samuel* said to the Elders of *Bethleem*, *I am come to sacrifice vnto the Lord --*; and when *Jeremie* said, *I presented my supplication &c.* these speeches were all of them true, in the words as they lye, and according to the common acception and meaning of them. And therefore there is in them no *Jesuiticall Equiuocation*, in which the words are false, till a secret thought doth make them true. And in this sence, and to this purpose, *Abraham* doth interpret his owne meaning, and explaine his words. For when *Abimelech* challenged him for concealing his wife, and asked, *What sawest thou, that thou hast done this thing?* he answered for himselfe, *Because I thought, Surely, the feare of God is not in this place, &c. and yet indeed she is my Sister; she is the daughter of my Father, but not the daughter of my Mother.* In which answer we may note three things. 1. He sheweth the reason which moued him to conceale her to be his wife; *Because I thought the feare of God, &c.* 2 He defendeth his speech to be true as the words doe sound; *and yet indeed she is my Sister. q.d.* That which I said is very true. And hereby it appeareth, that *Abraham* did not equiuocate; because *Abrahams* words in their vsuall signification, and as they were vttered by him, were true: but the words of an Equiuocator, as

Gen. 20. 11, 12.

^a Apologie for
Ecclef. Subord.
c. 12. in the end
fol. 202.

^b So S. Aug. in-
terpreteth this
place, lib. con-
tra mendac.
cap. 10.

they are vttered, are false, till an inward *reseruation* do patch them vp, and make a truth of them. And it further hereby appeareth also, that *F. Persons* did not only belye *Abraham*, but Almighty God himselve, when he saith, that ^a both *Abraham* and *Sarah* said, that shee was not his Wife, but his Sister: and that this was one among diuers sayings and speeches in Scripture allowed by the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, *Abraham* explaineth his words, or rather sheweth how they were true and vnfaigned, and that is, because she ^b was his neere kinswoman on the Fathers side, and such women in the vsuall language of those Countries, were called their *Sisters*. *Abraham* then sheweth that his speech was true, because the thing was so, as his words did sound; and not because he had some *secret reseruation* in his minde, by additiō wherof they became true. And this sheweth againe, that in these words of *Abraham*, there was no *Equiuocation*, such as our new Doctors doe imagine. And *Abrahams* example in interpreting his owne words, may serue vs for a patterne to interpret the rest by. And so; as he said, *Indeed she is my Sister*, as I said: so we may say of them, *Indeed*, and intruth the things were so, as they said. Only in these examples, though all that was said, was true: yet something that was true, was concealed; which we grant to bee lawfull: nor doth it any way helpe the Iesuites, or fauour their imaginary fiction.

Answ. 2. When they say, If the speeches be not vnderstood with *mentall reseruation*, then those men told a *Lye*: I answered, that that may be granted of some of them, without any absurdity, or wrong of those worthy men. For if we be forced to confesse, that *Dauid* did commit murder, why should we bee afraid to confesse that he told a *Lye*, if he vttered any such words as had not a true meaning, as our *Equiuocators* say that he did? And if we grant it in *Dauid*, what harme is there,

there, to acknowledge it in others of Gods best seruants, if by the Text and their owne speeches any such thing doe appeare? If then any of these holy men did speake words which were vntrue, wee may without inconuenience grant, that as they did sinne in other things, so they might in this: and therefore herein we must not take example by them, to doe as they haue done before vs. This answere S. *Augustin* maketh to the *Priscillianists*, when they alledged the example of ancient men and women, to prooue that *Lying* was lawfull. For *when we reade of these things in the Scriptures* (saith he) *we must not therefore thinke that we may doe them, because we know that they did doe them; lest we violate Commandements, while without choice wee follow examples.* Say then, that the words of some of those holy men cannot haue a good meaning or true construction, in themselues considered; it will be no inconuenience, to grant that such good men did therein doe amisse, and made a *Lye*. And (to speake more particularly to the point) so I thinke *Iacob* did, when hee said, *I am thy first-borne Esau*: and *Dauid*, when hee said, *that hee had made a rode against the South of Iudah*, &c. *1. Sam. 27. 10.* And so wee may say of *Rahab*, and the Mid-wiues of *Egypt*, and some others.

Obiect. But S. *Augustin* doth excuse those words of *Iacob*, from being a lye.

Answ. 1. Be it so. Yet S. *Augustin* doth not interpret them to be vnderstood and made true by any *reformation* in the mind. And this doth no way helpe our *Equiuocators* at all.

2. Say that S. *Augustin* doe giue vnto those words a more fauourable construction; yet *Cornelius à Lapide* disliketh that, and preferreth the other opinion, which granteth that *Iacob* did lye, before this of S. *Augustin*. in *Gen. 27. 19.* And for that interpretation, he citeth S. *Chrysostome*, *Lyra*, *Caietan*, *Lippomau*, *Pererius*, and others.

a Hæc quando in Scripturis sanctis legimus, non ideo quia facta credimus, etiam facienda credamus, ne violemus præcepta, dum passim sectamur exempla. Aug. contra mendac. c. 9. p. 18. A.

b Contra mendac. cap. 10.

Relect. de Se-
creto memb. 3.
q. 3. Concluf. 7.
pag. 321.

3. *Dominicus Soto*, a learned Frier, doth defend or excuse both Saint *Augustine* & *Jacob* in this manner; It may be (*quod puto sentit Augustinus*, Which I thinke was *Augustines* meaning) that those words of *Jacob*, were used in that Countrey, in that signification and meaning that they might be uttered by him, without telling a lye.

But howsoever it be, *Jacob* was so plaine a man, (saith à *Lapide*) that it is not to be supposed that hee did vse *equivocation* in his speech: nor doth any of former time so vnderstand his words.

2. The second head of Arguments, containeth the example of Almighty God, the *God of Truth*. But what hath this iust God, this *God of Truth* done or said, for which hee should be thought to *equivocate*, that is, to keepe one meaning to himselfe, and to deliuer another to his people, and by a *double-sensed* proposition to *deceiue* them, whom he professeth to teach? Yes, say these men, he said to *Niniveh*, *Yet forty daies and Niniveh shall be ouertrowne*, *Ion.* 3. 4. And he said to *Ezekias*, *Set thine house in order: for thou shalt die and not liue.* *Jf.* 38. 1. And yet neither of these came to passe, according to these words spoken. And therefore they are not true, vnlesse they be helped by some inward *reseruation*, seeing in the sence that the words yeeld, they were not fulfilled.

Ans. These and other such speeches of God, are words of *Commination* and *threatning*. Now words of *Commination* in Scripture, are meant by Almighty God that spoke them, and are vnderstood by men that heare them, with exception of repentance and amendment, or some such conditions in the persons against whom they are uttered, as may moue GOD to reuoke the sentence. For God himselfe hath declared his owne meaning to be so, in such like sentences and speeches. ^a *At what instant* (saith he) *I shall speake concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdome, to pluck*

^a *Ier.* 18. 7, 8.

vp and to pull downe, and to destroy it : if that Nation
 against whom I haue pronounced, turne from their euill, ¶
 will repent of the euill, that I thought to doe vnto them.
 And^b when I shall say to the Righteous, &c. And when I^b Ezek. 33. 13.
 say to the Wicked, Thou shalt surely die : if he turne from
 his sinne, &c. none of his sinnes, that he hath committed,
 shall be mentioned vnto him. &c. And according to this
 plaine Rule giuen by God himselfe concerning his own
 words, we are to vnderstand Gods threatnings, with
 some such exception. As for example, yet *fortie daies*,
 and *Ninueh*, &c. that is, vnlesse *Ninueh* repent, and
 obtaine Gods fauour for their preseruation. And, *Thou*
shalt die, &c. that is, vnlesse thou by prayer and humili-
 ation obtaine Gods fauour, to lengthen thy life be-
 yond the ordinary course, or such like. And these ex-
 ceptions are not secret *reseruations*, kept in Gods owne
 brest, and concealed from the hearers, as the *Iesuites*
reseruations are ; but they are conceiued and euer haue
 bene vnderstood by men acquainted with Gods lan-
 guage, to be meant by the very words. And therefore
 when God had threatned the Iewes, yet the Prophet
 exhorteth them to repentance, that so they might
 moue God to stay his iudgements. ^c *Who knoweth* c *Ioel* 2. 14.
 (saith hee) *if hee will returne and repent, and leaue a bles-*
sing behinde him ? And *Daniel*, when he had told *Ne-*
buchaduezzar of Gods Decree against him, yet hee gi-
 ueth him counsell^a to breake off his sinnes by righteous-^d *Dan.* 4. 27.
nesse, and his iniquitie by shewing mercy to the poore, that
this might be a meanes to lengthen his tranquillitie. Yea,
 and in the very examples alledged to the contrarie,
 when *Tomas* pronounced, yet *fortie daies*, &c. the men
 of *Ninueh*, as either hauing had some aduertisement
 thereof by Scriptures, or by some of Gods people, or
 conceiuing so much by the common light of reason,
 they did vnderstand these words of the Prophet as a
 threatning, that implied an exception of repentance.

And therefore the King with his Nobles proclaimeth
 a Ionah 3.8,9. a Decree, ^a *Let Man and Beast be couered with sackcloth, and cry mightily vnto God, &c. For, who can tell if God will turne and repent, and turne away from his fierce anger, that wee perish not? And when God had threatened Ezekiah, Set thine house, &c. yet Ezekiah* ^b *turned his face to the wall, and prayed to the Lord, &c. Where his prayer for freedome, sheweth that hee vnderstood not Gods threatning to be meant without exception. And thus the people of God haue euer beene wont to vnderstand such like speeches, till our late Doctors of Rome haue made God to be an Equiuocator, that they might alledge him for a patrone of their sinne.*

b Iſai.38.2.

c Contra Mē-
 dac. cap. 2.
 pag. 14. A.

The third head of Arguments, containeth the example of our blessed Sauour; who though hee were the Truth it selfe, and that there was neuer any *guile found in his mouth*, yet these men will needs draw him in, to be a fauourer and ring-leader of their falshoods and vntruthes. And so did their Predecessors, the *Priscillianists* doe before them. For they (as ^c *Saint Augustine* saith of them) for defence of their Doctrine of lying, brought testimonies out of Scriptures, and encouraged their Schollers by the examples of *Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and Angels*, non dubitantes adde-
 re etiam ipsum Dominum Christum, *making no scruple to adioyne also our Lord Iesus Christ, as a patterne of their lyes. And right so for all the world, doe our Equiuocators deale now-a-dayes. They bring examples of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and blessed Angels, not fearing to draw in God himselfe, and Iesus Christ his blessed Sonne, to be Abettors of their frauds.*

But of God wee haue heard what they say already: let vs now heare what they say of Iesus Christ: and how, and when, and wherein hee vsed this Arte of Equiuocation. Yes, say they, he did equiuocate, when
 d Luk.24.28. *being with two of his Disciples, ^d hee made as though hee*

hee would goe further : and when speaking of the day of Iudgement, he said, ^a *But of that day and that houre knoweth no man --, nor the Son, but the Father onely :* and when hee said to his Brethren, ^b *Ego non ascendam,* ^b *Ioh. 7.8.* &c. *I will not goe vp to Ierusalem to this Feast,* and yet hee meant to goe vp, and so went ; and diuers other times. ^c *Persons Mitig. c.7.num.29. pag.293.*

Ans. Neither in these, nor in any other place, was our Lord, the spotlesse Lambe of God, ever found to equivocate, according to the rules of this new Arte.

Not in the first place, *Luke 24. 28.* For first, there our Lord is said to doe something ; *hee made as though hee would goe further :* but he is not said there to haue said any thing, in which this supposed reservation might be vnderstood.

Ob. Yes, but deedes also may signifie as well as words.

Ans. Deedes sometimes are equiualent to words, and doe signifie as well as words doe : and that is, when as words, so they doe declare our meaning, *ex instituto*, or by some kinde of compact and agreement among men. And that may be done two wayes. First, expressely, when some words ioyned with the deedes, doe declare that to be the meaning and purpose of him that vseth them. As when *Iudas* kissed his Master : this signified that hee was *Iesus*, whom they came to apprehend, because before hee had giuen them this signe, ^c *Whomsoeuer I shall kisse, that same is hee.* And ^c *Matt. 26.48.* when *Iesus* gaue a sop to *Iudas*, that signified that hee was the Traitor, because hee had told them before, ^d *Hee it is, to whom I shall giue a sop, when I haue dipped it.* And so, when an oath is ministred or tendred vnto vs, if wee lay the hand vpon the Booke, and kisse it, this signifieth that wee consent to the taking of the Oath, because that is appointed and required for this purpose. Secondly, deedes may bee equiualent to words,

a *Facta nihil huc attinent, nisi certam & expectatam ab altera parte, sine significationem sine quasi responsionē contrariā debeat.* Abbat. Antilog. c. 2. pag. 26. And againe, *Otiosè totum hoc de strategematis usurpatum, quia nulla ibi consuetudinum communicatio, nulla signorum intercessio, que mentibus nostris invicem aperientis constituta sunt.* Ibid. pag. 26.

b *Non magis in hoc factō video mendacij speciē, quā in eo quod simulavit se peregrinum seu viatorem.* Lucas Brugens. in hunc locum.

c *Magnum discrimen est inter verba & opera: verba ex prima institutione, significandi vim habent; non item opera.*

words, when by some outward circumstances wee doe declare, that we intend them as signes of our meaning, and doe referre and vse them to that purpose. In this kinde, wee may see a man, who is borne deafe and dumbe, to talke and conferre with his neighbours. And in this kinde a *shrugge of the shoulder*, (if as *Persons* saith, it be so meant and taken in *Italie*) may be a signe, and haue the signification of a Negation or deniall. And when a man openeth his mouth, and sheweth a defect in his tongue, and maketh a gabbling noyse and vndistinct sound, this is a signifying deede, and doth import that that man is dumbe. In either of these kindes, deedes and gestures are equiuallent to words, and may containe truth or falshood in them, as well as words doe. But else, deedes and gestures, if in some such manner, *ex instituto*, by appointment and agreement among men, a they be not referred and intended for signification of our minde, though they may carry shew, and men may gather some meaning from them, yet they are not equiuallent to words; neither is there any lye contained in it, though the shew be not answerable to the thing. And such a deede as this, was that of our Sauour, when hee shewed by his gesture, a purpose of going further: and therefore this needeth no reservation to make it true; seeing without any reservation it hath no false or lying signification, such as words haue. And thus *Lucas Brugensis*, a learned Diuine of the Roman Church, doth vnderstand and interpret this place. His words (that the Reader may iudge of his meaning the better) are these, ^b *see no more shew of a lye in this fact of Christ, then when before he seemed to be a stranger or a way-faring man.* And he giueth his reason, why hee thinketh there is no vnruth in this deed and gesture, ^c *for there is a great difference betweene words and deedes. For words by their first institution haue the power or vse of signifying; but so haue not deedes.* And hence

hence he inferreth that deedes, actions, and gestures, though oftentimes they be, yet they are not alwaies signes either of some ensuing action to follow, or of our present purpose and meaning; nor haue they the nature of a lye in them, *etiamsi ad decipiendum aliquando fiunt*, though they be sometimes done, to deceiue the vnderstanding of the beholder, and to make him beleeeue that which is not true. So that if our Lord did make shew of going further, and intended it not, as Father Persons saith; yet in this learned mans iudgement, there was no lye in it: and consequently there needeth no mentall reseruatiō to saue it from being a lye.

Secondly, and more agreeably to our Sauours mind, wee may answere and say, that our Lord made as if he would goe further: yea, and meant it too, if their intreaties and importunitie had not stayed him. Therefore the Text saith, *They constrained him*; that is, they importuned him to stay; and he, ouercome by their intreatie, stayed with them. The clearer meaning of which words, we may the better conceiue and vnderstand by a like speech, *Luke 9. 53*. For there it is said, *The Samaritans receiued him not, because his face was as though hee would goe to Ierusalem*; that is, by his behauiour it seemed that hee meant to goe thither: and so hee did meane it indeed. And so in this place, when it is said, that *hee made as though hee would goe further*; the meaning is, that hee tooke his leaue, and bad them farewell, or vsed some other such like behauiour, which made it seeme, that hee meant to goe further. Yea, and so hee meant indeede, sauing that at their request hee was contented to abide with them.

And thus *Barradius*, and *Ribera*, two famous Iesuites, doe interpret this place. Wee may answere saith the one of them, *a Dominū voluisse ulterius progredi, si non retineretur à Discipulis, &c.* That our Lord indeed would

a Barrad. ca.

4. l. 8. c. 12.

pag. 386. 2.

M

haue

haue gone further, had hee not beene detained by his Disciples, and that there was no vntruth in this shew. And the other, a *Nihil veritas fingit*, Christ who is the Truth doth not feine any thing. But the common sort might thinke that hee did feine, but it was no fiction or counterfeiting; ^b For if they had not detayned him, he out of doubt had passed by, and had gone on further. Thus not onely the euidence of truth, but the authoritie of Romish Doctors and Iesuites doe vindicate this place from that false glosse that *Persons* putteth vpon it; and doe free our Lord Iesus from that slanderous imputation, which the Iesuite doth lay vpon him, when ^c he saith that Christ in this place did *equiuocate*: and when ^d hee calleth this dealing of his, *The dissimulation and fiction of our Sauour*.

The second place mentioned, and produced for Equiuocation, is that speech of our Sauour, *Mar. 13. Of that day, and that houre, &c. This proposition* (saith ^e *Persons*) *had some reseruation of mind, for that otherwise it had beene false.*

Ans. Not so. Nay this inference of the Iesuite is false and foolish too: for our Sauour, according to his wonted manner elsewhere, speaketh of himselfe, as he was reputed and knowne to be, that is, as he was man. And in that sense, the words haue an vsuall and cleare construction and signification; which is, that as he was man, he knew not of that day. This interpretation (as ^f *Persons* doth acknowledge) is giuen by ancient Fathers in great number. Nor is this a *mentall reseruation*, as *Persons* would haue his ignorant Reader to beleue: but an interpretation vsuallly meant and vnderstood by Christians, in these and such like speeches as these. And therefore our Sauour in this sentence did not keepe one *secret sence* to himselfe in his inward minde, and signifie another to his Disciples in the words vttered.

But

a Ribera in
Amos 2. nu. 21.
P^{ag}. 344.

b *Si enim eum
non tenuissent,
transisset sine
dubio, & esset
longius.*

c Mitig. cap. 9.
nu. 58. pa. 386.

d Mitig. cap. 9.
nu. 72. pa. 397.

e Mitig. ca. 9.
nu. 45. pa. 378.

f Mitig. cap. 9.
num. 48.

But if it be an Equiuocation, such as they fancy, what then shall the reseruation be? *Persons*, knowing that no man before the late inuention of this new *Art*, did euer thinke of secret *reseruatiōns*, or mentall imaginatiōns in our Sauours words; calleth euery Exposition that any good Author giueth, by the name of *reseruatiōn*, and reckoneth that Author, for a fauourer of his, like the mad man in *Athenaus*, who when any ship came to the Hauē, put it in his Tables as one of his owne. But that which carrieth most shew of a *reser-* L.c.nu.49.
uatiōn, is this; *The Sonne doth not know* the day of iudgement, meaning that hee knew it not so, as hee would discouer it vnto them. For this explicatiō is giuen by Saint *Augustine*, and other Fathers, saith *Persons*; and hee addeth, (as triumphing in so plaine a prooffe) that this exposition *expresseth the very same reseruatiōn* in *Christs* words, which they talke of in their mixt and equiuocall propositions.

Ans. To this I answere two things: First, That the Exposition giuen by those Fathers, doth not imply any equiuocall reseruatiōn. Secondly, That it doth not giue the true sence or meaning of the place.

First, It containeth not any Iesuiticall *reseruatiōn*. For those Fathers which giue that interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *not to make you know it*: or rather, *the Sonne knoweth it not*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*; doe fetch and gather this exposition, not from any secret conceit reserued in our Sauours minde, but from the vse and acceptiōn and signification of the word, as it is vsed in Scripture. For so, say they, this word, *scio* or *noui*, is often vsed. As when God said to *Abraham*, *Now I know that thou* Gen.22.12.
fearst God: and to the Israelites, *The Lord your God* Deut.13. 3.
proueth you, that hee may know, whether yee loue the Lord, &c. the meaning is, *that hee may make you to know*. And from this vse of the word *scio*, to know,

Rob. Abbot
Antil. cap. 2.
pag. 22, & 23.

frequent, as they say, in Scriptures; they thinke they may by the like reason, keeping the same proportion of speech, interpret the word *Nescit*, *knoweth not the day*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*. Concerning which meaning of the Fathers exposition, if the learned Reader desire any further prooffe, he may haue enough to satisfie his minde, in that reuerend and learned Bishop who wrote against *Eudamon-Joannes*. Now this interpretation of the word, being drawne from the vsuall acception of it in Scripture, is nothing at all to the Iesuites purpose, who fancieth a *secret* clause kept in the minde, but no way included in the vse of the word.

Secondly, This interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *hee doth not reueale or make it knowne to you*, as it maketh nothing for the Iesuites Equiuocation, so it is not greatly to our Sauours meaning. My reasons are two. First, If that were the meaning, then it would follow, that the Father did so know the day of iudgement, as that hee did *reueale* it vnto them. For that which this sentence doth deny of the Sonne, it doth by vertue of the exceptiue particule adioyned, affirme of the Father; *No man, no nor the Sonne doth know it, but the Father*. Where, if wee fill vp the construction, and make the sentence perfect, the whole speech must be this; *No man, nor Angell, neither the Sonne, doth know it, but the Father hee doth know it*. Now in this speech take the word [*know*] in the sense of those Fathers, *hee knoweth*; that is, *hee maketh to know*, and then the sentence thus expounded, in plaine words will be this, *No man, nor the Angels, neither the Sonne, doth make you to know the day of iudgement: but the Father hee doth make you to know it*. But this is not true of the Father; and therefore that is not the true interpretation or meaning of the word.

My second reason is, Our Sauour in these words,

No man -- knoweth; meant to shew how secret and vn-knownne the day and houre of Gods iudgement was: but take the word in this sence, *hee knoweth not*; that is, *hee reuealeth not, or doth not make you to know*: and then this sentence doth not imply or inferre or signifie any secrecie of that day. For, if thousands knew it, yet it might be said of them all, *They know it not*; that is, *they doe not reueale it, or make you to know it*. And consequently, this interpretation doth crosse our Sauours meaning, and ouerthrow that, for which hee intended it. Now, lay these together, and then there is lesse then nothing in our Sauours speech for the Iesuites purpose: both because the word cannot beare that sence in this place, which onely might seeme to fauour them; and because, that sence, as it was vnderstood by the Fathers, was not meant to include any such *re-seruation*. And so I haue done with this second place, which is the one of the places, that Doctor *Norrice* did defend his Equiuocation by.

Onely, lest some Popish Cauiller, according to their vsuall manner, should raise clamours after mee, that I doe deny and gain-say the exposition of the Fathers: let the Reader remember, that the other interpretation, which I follow, is confessed by Father *Persons* to be giuen by other Fathers in great number. And againe, if any shall quarrell with mee for leauing an exposition of some Fathers, where I haue so good reason for it; let him know, that I can produce diuers of their owne Writers, who doe reiect as great a number, and perhaps vpon lesser reason.

Thirdly, The third testimony is from the words of our Sauour, *John 7. 8.* which Father *Persons* and other Equiuocators recite thus, *Ego non ascendam ad diem festu istum,* I will not goe up to Ierusalem to this Feast; and yet (say they) he meant to goe vp, and so he went. And therefore here he had a secret *re-seruation*.

Asw. They corrupt the Text two waies, 1 by altering the words. 2 by peruerting the sence.

1. By altering the words. For the Originall Greeke is, *Εγω ουκ αναβαινω*, that is, *I doe not yet goe vp*. And their authentick Latin, *Ego non ascendo*, *¶ doe not goe vp*. And whereas some Copies had corruptly read it, *non ascendam*, *I will not goe*; ^a *Lucas Bragensis*, lest any man might afterward mistake, hath giuen admonition, that according to the *Roman Correction* of their Bible, set forth by the Popes authority, they may not change *ascendo* into *ascendam*. Yea, and their Rhemists reade it in their English Translation, *¶ goe not vp to this Festiual day*. Which was true in the very Letter, & meant by our Sautour according to the expresse words. For he did not meane then to goe vp, but afterward when time serued. And yet our *Equiuocators*, to gaine some shew from our Sauours words, doe corrupt not onely the Originall and truely authentick Greeke, but their owne Latine Text too. But it is no maruell: for such a false Arte could neuer be vpheld by true dealing.

2. By peruerting the sence. For say the words had beene, *¶ will not goe vp*, as *Persons* and *Doctor Norice*, and others would faine haue it: yet the circumstances of the Text doe shew, that that could not be meant of the whole time during the feast, or that hee would not go vp at all; because it followeth in the next words by way of reason, *because my time is not yet accomplishe*, as the Rhemists translate it; or *because my time is not yet fully come*, as it is more plainly in our Translation. Which words doe plainly shew his meaning to be this, that he would not then goe, when they would haue him: but would goe when he saw his owne time. And this he might both doe and meane, according to the plaine sence of the words spoken. By which it may appeare, that it is want of prooffe, and weakenes of their cause, that made them to drawe in this Text, which is so
cleere

^a Roman. Correct. Ioh. 7. 8.

cleere against them. And so, it is the very same reason also, that forceth them (*for necessity hath no law*) to produce the many other speeches of our Saviour, which haue as much affinity with Popish *Equiuocation*, as there is agreement betweene Christ and Belial, or betweene Christ and Antichrist: as I could easily shew, if it were conueniēt to stand vpon all their friuolous & idle allegations. But I thinke it not worth the while, either to tire the Reader, or to trouble my selfe with such fond Cauils. Only for a generall answer to them all, let this be remembred; that there is neuer a Text produced by them for this purpose, but that learned expositors, both ancient and moderne, as well of their Church, as of ours, do interpret and expound it in some determinate sense, which they gather or obserue either from the signification of the words, or the vse & application of them in the Scriptures, or from some circumstances or considerations in the Text it selfe. And therefore such Texts, in the iudgement of all such Interpreters, are not to be expounded or vnderstood of any *Popish reseruations*, kept secret in the Speakers minde. For such *reseruation* as I shewed before, may be any that themselues will fancie. Insomuch, that the Priests do frame seuen seuerall and distinct reseruations, all alike fit for Father *Listers* Equiuocation, when he deceiued his Keeper; and doe intimate that they might haue framed many moe, and all to as good purpose. And no doubt, as they imagined those seuen, they might haue inuented seuentie moe, that would haue serued the turne. In all which it is not possible, for the Hearer or Reader of such a speech, to imagine, what the Speakers *reseruation* is; it being not such as the signification of the words, or any circumstances of the businessse doe yeeld, but as the minde of the *Equiuocator* will fancie within his deceitfull heart. Nor do they in their *Equiuocations* mean, that the Hearer should knowe their

their *reservations*. For their intent is, to referue one sense in their owne breast, and to imprint another in the Hearers minde. This only short note being obserued, it will be easie for euery Christian, that will open his eyes, to see that no place produced by them out of the Bible, doth include their secret and hidden *reservations*. Or if any Equiuocator will caull, or can say, that there is any testimony of theirs, which may not receiue satisfaction by this generall Rule, and is in his opinion worth the standing vpon; let him produce it: and I will promise him either a solution of his reason, or a recantation of mine opinion. And thus much shal serue to be said concerning the Grounds and Reasons which Equiuocators doe build vpon.

Now I proceede to set downe some few reasons against this new-found Arte, and fond deuce of *Equiuocation*. And those for this time shall be these five.

1. Because this late doctrine of *Equiuocation* destroyeth the true nature of *Equiuocation*, whose name it beareth.

2. Because it maintaineth a practice of lying, vnder a colour of Truth.

3. Because it disturbeth humane society, and hindereth mutuall commerce.

4. Because it impeacheth God of folly, in making his Lawes against Lying.

5. Because it freeth the Deuill from all iust imputation of being a Lyer.

Arg. 1. The Iesuiticall doctrine of *Equiuocation*, doth destroy the true nature of *Equiuocation*, which hitherto hath beene receiued of all men, and now (for ought I know) is not reiected of any. This I prooue thus; *Equiuocation*, in the true nature thereof, is, when a word or speech hath moe senses than one. This the word doth import. For *Equiuocum*, by the very notation of the name, is *vox aequè plura significans*, a word indifferently

rently betokening *moe things*. And in some such manner as this, doe Writers of all sorts explaine and describe *Equivocation*. But in this new-devised *Equivocation*, there is no word, nor no sentence, or saying, that hath *moe significatious or senses than one*. For in their *mentall equivocall Proposition*, which they fancie, neither the words taken by themselves, nor the whole saying and sentence intended by the speaker, haue any *Ambiguity* or doubtfulness of signification, or any *moe senses than one*; as I haue shewed ^a before, out of the *Equiuocators own Rules*. And hence I may inferre, that either their *reserued Proposition*, is not an *Equiuocall and double-sensed Proposition*, as they call it without reason, and consequently, that they doe not by *Equivocation* speake truth in one sense, and mis-lead the Hearer with another sence: or else, if notwithstanding this, that Proposition bee *Equiuocall and double-sensed* still, then we must say, that there may bee an *Equivocation*, where there is but one single sense and meaning. And that destroyeth the true nature of *Equivocation*.

^a Cap. I. p. 11.

To this reason, first their confesion is, that ^b *verball Equivocation*, which is, When a word or speech signifieth *diners things equally*, ^c indeed is onely true and proper *Equivocation*, and agreeth onely to the Definition of *Equivocation*, deliuered not onely by Philosophers, but Orators also: and that ^d it is properly called *Equivocation*, when a speech or word signifieth *diners things equally*, if we consider the proper nature of *Equivocation*: and, ^e that *mentall Equivocation in rigor is none*.

^b Perf. mitig. cap. 8. num. 8.

^c Perf. ibid. num. 15.

^d Perf. ibid. num 8.

^e ibid. num. 15

2. Their answer is notwithstanding, that their *mixt Proposition* may be ^f called *Equivocation*, in a more large and ample signification, as *Equiuocall* may signifie an *ambibological, doubtfull or double-sensed Proposition*, in respect of the *Speaker and Hearer*, whereof the one understandeth the same in one sense, and the other in another. And the cause why it is so called, is rather by a certaine similitude,

^e Perf. mitig. cap 8. num. 10.

p. 8. 313.

tude, then propriety of speech: to wit, that even as Equivocation properly by communitie of name in things of different natures, by variety of significations in the selfe-same words or speech, by custome of phrase and composition of sundry sorts, doth make different and doubtfull senses and meanings to the Hearer: so in this case, by mentall reseruation of some part of the foresaid mixt Proposition, the like effect of doubtfulness is bred in the Hearers understanding. For more ready vnderstanding of which perplexed speech, I note that there are three things said by this doubling Equivocator. 1. That it is onely true and proper Equivocation, & such as is comprised in the Definitions, given both by Philosophers & Orators, when there are diuers senses and significations in the words. 2. That Equivocation as they meane it in this question, hath no such propriety in it, nor is comprised in the Definition, that Philosophers and Orators haue described Equivocation by. 3. That notwithstanding all this, yet it may rightly be called Equivocation, because as true Equivocation breedeth diuers senses to the Hearer, by the Ambiguity that is in the words; so this new-deuised Equivocatio may breed diuers senses, one in the Hearer, and another in the Speaker, by reason of the secret reseruation that the Speaker imagineth in his own mind. And this may seeme not so vnreasonable, because words doe signifie *ad placitum*, and may be changed euery day. And therefore it is no such fault, to frame a new meaning and another signification in this word, then euer any body did thinke of heretofore.

Rep. This answer doth not weaken mine Argument, it confirmeth and strengtheneth it rather. For first, I doe not except so much against their new signification of the word, as against the new explication and description of it. For they say, that they call it *Equivocall*, because it is a *double-sensed* Proposition; and a *double-sensed* Proposition there fore they call it, because

cause by it they signifie one sense to the Hearer, and imagine another to themselves. But this doth vtterly destroy the very essence & entity of true *Equiuocation*. For true *Equiuocation* cannot be conceiued to be without a diuersitie of meanings in the speech: nor was it euer heard of, that a Proposition could be *double-sensed*, which had none but one single meaning: nor is it imaginable that that saying should be ambiguous, which the Hearer can take or construe but one way.

Secondly, Their change and alteration of the word, to another different meaning, as it is by them here v-fed, doth conuince them of false and naughty dealing; such as we may obserue Thieues to vse, when they haue purloyned other mens goods. For Thieues (saith *A Tullie*) when they haue taken away other mens goods, doe change the markes of them, that it may not be knowne whose they are, or to whom they belong. And right so doe our Equiuocators deale in this case. For they change the names, which are true markes of things; that hereby they may conceile and hide the nature and propertie of the things themselves. I grant then, that names may change with times; nor is it any fault to alter the vse of a word, so there bee no wrong done to the thing, by the misse-applying of the word: as likewise it is no fault neither, to change the markes of goods, when there is no fraud intended by it. But if the markes of goods be changed, that the propertie of them may be conceiled, that is a plaine trick of thieuerie. And so, if names be changed, that the nature of the things may be peruerted or obscured, that is a trick of iugling, not inferior to that cousonage of the Thiefe. And so it appeareth to be in this case. For this mungrell Proposition of theirs, if it should be censured by Philosophers, Orators, or other learned men, no man but would iudge it at the first sight to be a lye: and so hitherto all men haue euer called such speeches. But now

• *Ut reliqui finibus, carum rerum quas ceperunt, signa commutant: sic isti -- nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutauerunt, Cic. de finib. bon. & mal. l. 5. nu. 74. pag. III.*

our new Artificers haue found another name for their new Arte: they call it, Equiuocation. And this they doe for a colourable shew, that it may be thought that there is no vntruth, but onely an Ambiguity in the speech: and that they in deceiuing men by *mentall reseruations*, doe nothing but what honest men are wont to doe, when they vtter sentences, that may haue diuers meanings. Thus, while they change the names, they doe also confound the things, and destroy their true nature, which wise men, and *Aristotle* among the rest, haue euer acknowledged to agree vnto them.

a Mitig. cap. 8.
num. 16. pag.
310.

Obiect. Nay, saith Father ^a *Persons*, but if *Aristotle* did not comprize this our reserved Proposition under some of the three sorts of Logical Equiuocation, mentioned by him in his *Elenchs*, then he erred grossely in making an insufficient Diuision, which comprehendeth not all the parts of the thing deuided. For if the said mixt Proposition (saith he) be an Equiuocation, (as Iesuites say it is, in spite of all reason, and against the doctrine of all ages) then must it haue place among some of these three kindes; or else the Diuision should be insufficient.

Rep. A ridiculous conceit: whereto I know no example, that may be paralell; but I will imagine one as neere as I can. Suppose then, a Father deuideth his Lands among his owne Children, and a Conie-catcher there by steppeth in, and layeth claime to a share among them: and when the matter commeth to be debated, in the Court, the Iudge parteth the Lands among the Brethren, to whom onely they belonged, and shutteth out the Conie-catcher for a wrangler, that layeth claime where he hath no right. What if in this case, the Conie-catcher should complaine of the Iudge, for partiall dealing, and reason against him, as *Persons* doth against *Aristotle*, that if this Conie-catcher haue a right, and a share in those Lands, as himselfe saith he hath, then the Iudge erred grossely, that had excluded

ded him? Would not euery Boy kicke such a wrangling foole or knaue shall I call him? out of the Court? And such a ridiculous wrangler, is Father *Persons*, who accuseth *Aristotle* of a grosse error, for not rancking among his kinds of Equiuocation, this of the Iesuites, neuer heard of in the world before; and which the wrangler himselve doth else-where acknowledge not to be true Equiuocation.

Arg. 2. This doctrine of Equiuocation doth maintaine a practice of lying, because hee whom they call an Equiuocator, is in truth a Lye, and that which they call an Equiuocall Proposition, is a lying assertion. I proue it thus. He that speaketh to another that which himselve knoweth to be false, is a Lye, and a lye it is, whensoever there is ^a *falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi*, a false signification with a mind to deceiue the Hearer. Or, to speake in a Iesuites words, ^b A Lye is *verbum falsum, cum intentione fallendi*, a false speech, with an intention to deceiue. Which description of a Lye, so far as concerneth this purpose, he explaineth thus. A false speech is heere ment, when a ^c man speaketh otherwise, then himselve thinketh: and it is said to be with intention to deceiue, because ^d *Hee that speaketh otherwise then himselve thinketh, doth deceiue another, and intendeth to deceiue him. For he would not so speake, but that thereby he may engender a contrarie opinion in another mans mind: and this is to deceiue.* Thus the Iesuite describeth a Lye, and that agreeably to the receiued Doctrine of the Schooles. But this which is said to containe the nature of a Lye, is all of it found in the new-deuised Equiuocall Proposition. For first, that which the Equiuocator vttereth, is false, and so he knoweth it to be: for ^e *it may seeme (saith *Persons*) to haue falsitie in it; and sometimes also hath indeed, in respect of the words onely, or vnderstanding of the Hearer.* And the case is cleere, that the words vttered by the Equiuocator, containe an

^a Aug. contra mendac. c. 12.

^b Tolet Instr. l. 3. c. 54.

^c Non est mendacium, dicere quod non ita est, sed dicere aliter quam homo putat. Tolet. ibid.

^d Qui aliter quam sentit proloquitur, alterum fallit, et fallere intendit. Non etenim sic profert, nisi ut diuersam opinionem in animo alterius generet. Hoc autem est fallere. Tolet. ibid.

^e Pers. mitig. c. 13. num. 2. pag. 484. & cap. 10. num. 22. p. 424.

vnt^ruth and a fals^hood : for else they could not serue him for *euas*ion. But the words vttered are all that the Equiuocator speaketh : and therefore that which hee speaketh, is *verbum falsum*, a false word or speech. And secondly, that he vttereth this fals^hood *with minde and purpose to deceiue* the Hearer, in the sence that *Tolet* here explaineth it, I haue ^a shewed and proued out of their owne writings : nor can it stand with common sence, to conceiue it otherwise. And hence it followeth that the Equiuocator is a plaine lyer.

a Cap. r. pag. 16. num. 6.

Ans. Their answer is, that though the words considered by themselves, and as they are vnderstood by the Hearer, be false : yet as they are meant by the Equiuocator, and as they are ioyned with the *reseruation* kept in his minde, they are true. The summe is, they are false of themselves, but they are made true by the imagined *reseruation*.

Re. This is a weak answer, & an impertinent shift; because their *mentall reseruation* hath nothing to doe either with Truth or Lying; as may appeare by this reason. Truth as it is heere meant, and Lying which is the contrary to it, are morall acts contained in the second Table of the Decalogue or Tenne Commandments : and therefore doe include a respect to our Neighbours, nor can they be vnderstood without reference and relation vnto other men : so that lying consisteth in a signification of fals^hood vnto others, and truth in signifying or vttering of that which is true; and without such signification, either performed by outward signes, or meant and intended to be performed, if occasion should be offered, Lying and Truth morally taken, can haue no place. Vpon this ground, which hath cleare euidence in it, *Bannes* a learned Schoole-man doth refute their opinion, who thinke that there may be a lye, where there is no *purpose to deceiue*. ^b *I thinke (saith he) that a minde to deceiue, is so necessary*

b *Mibi vsque adeo videtur ille animus fallendi necessarius ad rationem mendacij; quod sine illo mendacium esse non possit. Vt v. g. si Petrus absque aliquo teste proferat professionem, quã scit esse falsam; ille non mentitur, quamuis dicat falsum in voce. Similiter si Petrus dicat Ioanni; Tu non es Ioannes: et id non menti-*

necessary in a lye, as that without it, a lye cannot exist. This hee declareth thus: If Peter, no man being within hearing, should utter a speech, which hee knoweth to be false, yet hee should not lye, though hee should speake an vntruth in the words. In like sort, if Peter should say to Iohn, Thou art not Iohn, doubtlesse hee should not lye, though hee spake an vntruth, because hee cannot speake that with purpose to deceiue Iohn himselfe. And hereof hee giueth this reason, Because a lye is a kinde of fiction or faining, which is in the Will, with reference to another, by which a man intendeth that another man may beleue otherwise than himselfe, who telleth the lye, doth thinke. And that a lye doth include such respect and reference to another, is plaine (saith hee) because that veracitie, or the vertue of speaking truth, which is opposite to lying, doth consist also in relation to another, because it is a part of iustice. Thus reasoneth this learned Frier. In this discourse of his wee may note two things. First, His Conclusion, which is, that both lying and truth morally taken, which hee calleth veracitie, doe consist in a relation and reference to others; so that no words vttered, without respect of signifying somewhat to some other by them, can be either the sinne of lying, or the vertue of true-speaking. Secondly, wee may note his reason for prooffe of this Conclusion; which is, that veracitie, or the vertue of speaking truth, is a part of iustice: and iustice hath a respect to some other, to whom it giueth that which is his due. This reason I take to be vnanswerable; and then his Conclusion must needs be vndeniable. It is proued then that truth morally meant, for a vertue or act of speaking truth, which is a part of iustice, and a dutie which wee owe to our neighbours; doth include a reference and respect to others, which respect consisteth in signifying or declaring our meaning to them, truely and sincerely. But now in the *mentall reseruation*, shut vp in the

tur, quamuis dicat falsum, quia illud non potest dicere animo fallendi ipsum Ioannem. Huius ratio esse potest, quia mendacium est fictio quedam, quae est in voluntate, propterea quod est ad alterum per quam intendit homo, ut alius credat aliter, quam sentit ille, qui fingit, & mentitur. Quid autem mendacium sit ad alterum, patet. Nam citra veracitas, quae est virtus opposita est ad alterum, quum sit pars iustitiae, ut ait S. Tho. Dominic. Bannes to. 3. in 2. 2. q. 1. art. 3. Dub. 1. §. Pro decisione. pag. 16.

Equiuocators breast, there is no such reference or relation, nor doth it admit of any intendment, to signifie or declare his meaning to others. Nay, it is therefore suppressed, and broken off from the speech which is vttered in words, that nothing thereby may be signified to the Hearer. It followeth then, that this *reseruation* hath no point nor piece of morall truth in it. And therefore, if that part of the Equiuocators proposition, which hee vttereth in words, were a false and lying speech before; it must needs remaine a lye still, for any helpe that this Reseruation can yeeld it.

Arg. 3. The Doctrine of Equiuocation doth disturbe humane societie, and destroyeth that mutuall commerce that one man should haue with another. I proue it thus. This societie and commerce must needs be disturbed, when men in wisdome may not beleue one another, vpon their words or oathes: but if this Doctrine of Equiuocation be receiued, men may not beleue one another, either vpon their words or oaths. This is proued thus. The Equiuocator professeth to *equiuocate*, whensoever hee may lawfully hold his peace; and if it be for any aduantage of weight, vpon his Oath too. Which how farre it may extend, I haue declared in part already, and euery man may easily conceiue by himselfe: but sure in what business soeuer I haue to deale with such a man, I cannot tell, but that he may thinke it lawfull to conceale the truth, and consequently to *equiuocate* with mee. And in case his conscience will permit him to *equiuocate* with mee, (as in what case it will not permit him, I know not) then am I as sure to be deceiued, and ouerreached by him, if I doe beleue him, as if I beleued a plaine and downe-right lye. For, my credence or beleefe can reach no further then to the words vttered; nor can I learne any thing from the Equiuocator, but that which I can gather from his words:
but

but all that is false and lying ; as hath beene shewed by their owne Confession. And therefore if I beleue a man, when hee doth *equiuocate*, I am sure to be deceiued. I declare this yet further by a familiar example. Say, two Priests haue layed a plot of Inuasion for the King home, and being questioned vpon their oaths concerning the plot, they both deny it. And the one, hee saith, *I neuer meant or intended any such thing*, vnderstanding within himself, *so as I meane to tell you of it*: and the other, hee answereth in the very same words, but hath forgotten to frame a *reseruation* in his minde : the one of these by their Doctrine is a lyer, and the other an Equiuocator. But in respect of being deceiued by them, what difference is there betweene them ? Shall I not as soone be deceiued by the Equiuocator, as by the Lyer ? Yes certainly, it is no more safe to beleue an Equiuocating Iesuite, then a lying Deuill. And if this be so ; then where men teach and professe the Arte of equiuocation, there in wisdome men may not beleue one another : and consequently, they cannot haue that commerce and societie that men should haue among themselues. I conclude this argument against Equiuocators, in the very same manner, as Saint *Augustine* did against Lyers, onely putting the name of Equiuocator, where he did the name of Lyer. ^a *Either* (saith hee) *wee must not beleue honest men ; or wee must beleue them*, who wee thinke ought sometimes to tell a lye ; or else, *wee must beleue that honest men will not at any time tell a lye. The first of these three is pernicious*, (and ouerthroweth societie.) *The second is foolish*, (and exposeth a man to the mercy of euery cheating companion.) *It remaineth therefore to say, that an honest man will neuer tell a lye.* Thus that learned Father: by whose example I may reason against Equiuocators in the very same manner. Either wee must not beleue honest

a Aut non est credendum bonis ; aut credendum est ijs, quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri ; aut non est credendum bonis aliquando mentiri. Horum trium primum perniciosum est. secundum stultum. Restat ergo, ut nunquam mentiantur boni. Augustin. de Mendac. cap. 8.

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men pag. 6. f.

men on their words or oathes : or wee must beleue them, who wee thinke may *equiuocate* with vs both in words and in oathes : or else, wee must beleue that an honest man will not *equiuocate*. The first is pernicious, the second is foolish : and therefore wee must resolve vpon the third, which is, that an honest man will not *equiuocate*.

Arg. 4. This Doctrine of Equiuocation defeateth all Lawes made against lying, and doth by consequence impeach God of folly for making any such Lawes. I proue it thus. It is a folly to make such Lawes, as are vnauaileable, and cannot reach to the ends, for which they were made. But if Equiuocation be admitted, Lawes against lying cannot serue for the purpose, to which they are intended. This appeareth by two things. First, Gods Lawes and precepts against lying were made for this purpose, to restraine mens tongues from speaking of falshoods and vntruthes. But by the Arte of Equiuocation a man may speake any and all falshoods that hee will, and yet these precepts against lying shall neuer take hold of him : because by a mentall *reseruation* warranted by this Doctrine, hee may make any falshood to become true. And therefore the Equiuocator, notwithstanding all Lawes of God and men against lying, yet is at his libertie to vtter what vntruthes hee will, without the least transgression of any of those Lawes. Secondly, Lawes against lying doe intend preuention of hurt and deceit to be vsed against our neighbour. But admit once of this new doctrine of Equiuocation, and no deceit toward our neighbour can be preuented by any Lawes against lying. For if this Doctrine be warrantable, then all Lawes against lying must be meant onely against such as doe not keepe a *reseruation* in their mindes, to make true the falshoods that they vtter in their words.

words. And so, for example, when *Moses* saith, ^a *Ye shall not lye one to another*: and when *Saint Paul* ^a *Leuitic. 19.* saith, ^b *Put away lying, and speake truth euery man with his neighbour*; the meaning of these Precepts must be ^{11.} *to this purpose; Speake no vntruth, nor vtter no falshoods to your neighbours, vnlesse yee haue some secret reseruation kept in your minde, which if it be added; will make them to become true.* For, by the Equiuocators Doctrin, if such *reseruatiōs* be kept in the minde, then all their words become true: and therefore they are no way included within these Precepts against lying. But if this interpretation of such Lawes may be admitted, and such libertie of speech may be granted, without any breach of these Lawes: then these Lawes doe no way preuent the least danger of deceit and dammage that may come to our Neighbour by vntrue and false speeches; because I can deceiue him as much by this equiuocall *reseruatiō*, as by a formall lye: as hath been proued already. And from these considerations it followeth, that Precepts against lying are vaine, if the practice of Equiuocation be lawfull.

Arg. 5. If the Doctrin of Equiuocation be true, then neither men nor Devils can be conuincd of lying. First, men cannot. For though they speake neuer so vast and apparent falshoods, yet who can say but that they haue some *reseruatiō* in their minde, that may free their words from being lyes? And yet all sorts of men, when they heare euident vntruthes vttered, doe without controll of any, charge the speakers with falshoods and lying. Which sheweth that all men iudge of lying and truth, by the words vttered, and not by fancies reserued in the minde. As for example, the Secular Priests doe charge *Father Persons* with a continuall practice of lying, so that ^c they giue him *the Whetstone, and leaue*

^c *D. Ely* in his Notes vpon the Apologic. cap. 9. pag. 311. *D. Bagshaw* in his Answ. to *Persons* Apologic, pag. 42. Reply to a brieve Apologic, cap. 2. it pag. 11.

it with him too, as if they thought there were no such a bold and impudent lyer in the World, that could winne it from him. But how did the Priests know, but that *Persons* spake with some *equiuocall* referuati-
 ons? And if so, then they broke the rule of charitie, in censuring him for a lyer, when hee was but an Equiuocator. And againe, Father *Persons* chargeth the Seculars with a *infinite number of vnruthes, lyes, slanders, and open falshoods vttered without scruple of conscience*; so that *the vse of Equiuocations was little needfull for them*; because they could take libertie enough without it. But how doth Father *Persons* know, that his Secular Brethren did not vse Equiuocation in all these vnrue speeches: and so made them true by some *referuation*? Thus all men, when they finde apparent vnruthes vttered, sticke not to charge the speakers with lying. But if the Doctrin of Equiuocation be true, no man can be conuincd of the least lye, vnlesse himselfe will confesse it.

Secondly, The Deuill himselfe, if this Doctrin be true, cannot be conuincd to be a lyer. For who can say, but when he telleth vs most palpable vnruthes, yet hee may referue within himselfe some clause to helpe all? Nay, if this Doctrin be true, it cannot be supposed with any reason, that the Deuill euer would or euer did tell any lye at all. For, whatsoeuer he hath spoken at any time, be it otherwise neuer so false and lying; yet it might be made true by a *referuation*: and hee neither wanted wit to deuise such *referuations*, nor will, by such or any other meanes to free himselfe from the imputation of lying. First, hee wanteth not wit. I shall not neede to proue this; because, as I suppose, it will be confessed, that hee is as quicke and nimble at such deuices, as the finest witted Iesuite in the packe. But, if any man shall

a Apologic
 for Subord.
 cap. 12. in the
 latter end.

shall question it, I will engage my selfe to proue it. Secondly, hee wanteth not will, by this or any other tricke to saue his credit, and to auoid the imputation of lying. For, hee knoweth that the greatest hinderance to his proceedings, is, because the World esteemeth him for a lyer, and the Father of lyes: and if he could once but gaine to be accounted a true and honest dealer, (as by vsing Equiuocation, he might as well proue himselfe to be no lyer, as any Iesuite can:) then hee might finde more credit in the World. For which cause, ^a the Apostle saith that hee *transformeth himselfe into an Angell of light.* And an ancient Writer telleth of a Monke, who was a strict and religious liuer, that the Deuill, ^b *purposing by a custome of Visions to winne him to the beliefe of a future illusion* which hee intended for him, *did for a long time, as a messenger of truth, shew him all true Visions.* And when by this meanes hee had gained credit to be beleued, then by another Vision, hee perswaded him to renounce Christ, and to become a Iew. And it is an vsuall obseruation among Christians, that the Deuill will tell some truthes, that hee may gaine afterward the more credit to his lyes. And therefore it can be no doubt, but that the Deuill desireth not to be reputed a lyer; and would gladly put off from him all such imputation, if by any trickes hee could deuise how to effect it. Now lay these two positions together: first, That the Deuill wanteth no wit to deuise *reseruations*; and secondly, That hee wanteth no will, by this or any other such deuice, to auoid the discredit of a lyer: and then it will follow, that in reason wee cannot imagine, that the Deuill euer would or did tell a lye, if by an *equiuocall* reseruation hee could cleare himselfe. And hence againe it may be deduced, that as our Equiuocators doe challenge vs for

a 2 Corin. II.

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b *Quum volens eum consuetudine visionum, ad credulitatem future deceptionis illucere, verissima quaque multo tempore, Diabolus, velut veritatis nuncius, reuelasset: ad extremum, &c.* Calsian. Col. lat. 2. cap. 8.

flandering them; because wee call them lyers, when they sweare falshoods by imagined *reseruations*: so the Deuill himselfe might challenge G O D (be it spoken with reuerence to his Maiestie) for iniustice and slander, because hee hath branded him with the note of a lyer, and calleth him the Father of lyes. But these consequents are most absurd: and therefore the Doctrine of Equiuocation, from whence they follow, is most false.

Thus, by Gods grace, I haue declared, and I trust, in some measure also cleared the poynts propounded in the beginning. Now, for conclusion, I will onely commend one Caueat to the well-meaning Christian; and that is, to beware of trusting them, whose profession is to *equiuocate*. For such men are both more impious and more dangerous than any other sort of lyers, that I know beside.

First, They are more impious, because among men of other Religions, though there may be vicious persons, that make too common a practice of lying deceits; yet that is the fault of the men, and not of their Doctrine. But in the Church of Rome, their great Doctors doe not onely practise this deceit, but praise it too: and commend it to their Disciples, as a *good Arte*; very fit for *scrupulous consciences*. Which doctrine cannot be conceiued to be without great dishonour to God, and much disgrace to Religion.

Secondly, They are more dangerous then any other sort of Lyers, because they come masked vnder a vizard of truth, & armed with resolution to protest, and sweare, and pawn their soules and saluations, vpon the truth of that which they say, notwithstanding that for so much as they vtter, and for all that you can heare or gather by them, all is most false, which they speake. From the consideration whereof, I inferred before, that it

it was not safe to belecue a Iesuite, or any of his fellows or schollers; for that a man may as soone be deceived by an Equiuocating Iesuite, as by a lying Deuill. Now I adde, therefore wise Christians must beware of them; and if wee will not be deceived, wee must not belecue either their words or oathes, in what businesse soeuer wee haue to doe with them. This Caueat, that it may the better appeare how farre it is to be extended; I will, for example sake, set downe some speciall cases of ordinarie vse, in which it will not bee safe to belecue them.

1. First then we may not safely belecue them, when they are disputing, and arguing for their Religion, and deliuering points of their faith. For they tell vs, that Iesus our Lord did equiuocate, when hee preached of Prayer and Sacraments, and of his office of iudging the World, &c. And I trow, Iesuites will be ready to imitate the example of Iesus, whose name they beare. But we need not doubt of their meaning in this case; for they therefore alledge the example of Christ, that they may defend and make good their owne practice. And therefore when I heare a Priest or a Iesuite telling of Popes Pardons, and preaching of *S. Patricks* Purgatorie, &c. and when for these, he telleth me, of the consent of the ancient Church, and alledgeth many Fathers to confirme his Assertion; how can I be sure, that hee doth not *equiuocate* with mee in that case? or what reason haue I to thinke, but that he speaketh against his knowledge, and conscience? or how can I, without a note of rashnes and temeritie, belecue that hee doth not wilfully belye the Fathers, and other Authors to serue his owne turne? and when he hath done all, make vp all with a secret *Reseruation*, that I neuer dreamed on?

Secondly, Wee may not belecue them, when they
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giue Answers, or beare witness in a Court of Justice, or before a Magistrate; no, not though they sweare what they say, and take it vpon their soules and saluations. For they professe to *equiuocate* in such cases, if either the Iudge be *incompetent*, or if he proceed *incompetently*. And when I heare one of them speake and sweare before any of our *Gouernors* or *Rulers*, either *Ecclesiasticall* or *Ciuill*, what can I tell, but hee may thinke either the Iudge, or his proceedings to bee *incompetent*, and *vniust*? Nay sure, in most cases, in which they haue to doe before our *Gouernors*, they are knowne to hold, either the Iudge, or the proceeding, or both, to bee *incompetent*. And therefore I cannot see how wee may safely beleue them, when they make answer, or giue euidence vpon their oath.

Thirdly, Wee may not beleue them, when they tell of great wonders and Miracles, done by men of their Order and profession; and by *Saints* and *Images* of their owne making. For they professe to *equiuocate*, when it may bee for some good to themselues, and therefore much more when it may proue so great a good to their Order, to their Church, and to their Religion. And therefore, when they tell mee of many great miracles done by their men in the *Indies*, and by the *Ladies of Laurett* and *Hall*; how can I tell, that they doe not fitten and deuise all that vpon their fingers end. to gaine credite to their profession?

Fourthly, We may not beleue them, when they publish and disperse disgracefull tales and reports against the professors and Doctors of our Church. For the disgracing of these men, may breede great aduantage to their Religion: and beside, it is an Axiom of theirs, *He must bee disgraced, because he is an Enemy to their order*. And therefore, when they tell mee of *Luther*,

ther and Calvin and Beza and Bucer and such others, that they either despaired, or recanted, or renounced their Religion; how may I beleue them, that they doe not Equiuocate? Nay it is certaine, that in the forging of these reports, they did either lye, or *Equiuocate*, or both. And therefore when they now tell vs, that many of our Reuerend Bishops, and learned Preachers and Schollers, are of their opinion, and thinke them to be in the right, but that for the worlds sake, they dissemble their iudgement; how can I giue credit to their words, or to their writings? And when they tell vs, that such a Doctor, vpon his death-bed; and such a Bishop toward his latter end, turned Papist, and renounced in their eare, what he had taught in the Pulpit, and was reconciled to the Church of Rome, by one that came and went inuifibly; shall wee beleue them to speake as they thinke? Nay, wee should rather spit in the Lyers faces, that presume vs to bee so simple, as to beleue an Equiuocator in a case so auailable for his Order, and in a thing so vnlikely and absurde in it selfe; that the narration of such a thing, might call in question the truth of a knowne honest man.

Fiftly, We may not beleue Equiuocators in matters of common life, and ciuill conuersation. For they professe to *equiuocate* in most cases of common practice, and in all cases in which they are not bound to reueile the Truth, if the thing may be for their aduantage. And therefore if one of them should contract to marry a mans daughter amongst vs, how can any of vs tell, that the Equiuocator thinketh himselfe bound to lay open his heart, and to speake the truth in this case; and that therefore in his opinion may not equiuocate and deceiue vs? And if he promise to pay me a summe of money, how can I tell that

he keepeth not a *reservation* behind, that may difanull his promise aforehand; as that he will pay it, if himselfe shall thinke it necessary, or if he shall haue so much to spare, or if hee haue nothing else to doe with his money? &c. And so, if he vndertake to be my Sollicitor for my Law-businesse, or my Physitian for my body, or my Counsellor in any doubtfull case, &c. how shall I be assured that I may belecue his word, and that he doth not for some secret reaso kept to himselfe, think it lawfull to cheate me by a mental *reservation*? Surely, for mine own part, if I may know him that professeth the Art of *Equivocation*, I wil trust him no further then I would doe a common and noted Lyer, that is no further then I do see him.

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FINIS.

