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NEW EXPOSITION
OF
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

By J. G. FICHTE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN


By A. E. KROEGER.



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PREFACE.

The work herewith submitted to the philosophical public is, as its title expresses, a New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, that science, the original and first presentation whereof—published by Fichte in 1794—was published in a translation* by me in this country last year. Both works are the same in so far as the contents are concerned, but differ materially in respect to the presentation of those contents and to the terminology employed in the presentation. Thus, for instance, in the present exposition the word Freedom is always used in place of Ego, and Being in place of Non-Ego. Fichte, during his lifetime, elaborated quite a number of such expositions—for each course of lectures a different one—six whereof are printed in the German edition of his Complete Works. I selected the first one of 1794 for the introduction of Fichte's Science of Knowledge to the English-speaking public, partly because it is, in my judgment, the easiest and most systematic elaboration of that science, and partly because I wished to publish the Science of Rights† and the Science of Morals, both of which works connect most happily with that first representation.

I have selected the present exposition—written by Fichte in 1801, but not published till long after his death, in 1845—for the second edition in the English language of the Science of Knowledge, partly because it really was Fichte's second exposition, and partly because the most important points of that science are therein stated with great clearness and eloquence. Moreover, it was written by Fichte with especial view to publication, whereas all his other presentations of the Science of Knowledge were written for lecture-purposes. External circumstances, however, prevented that publication, and hence the manuscript was left in a somewhat unfinished shape, a fact which will explain the abruptness of transition at various points and the crudeness of several sentences. Finally, I chose this work because I had

* *Science of Knowledge*. Translated from the German of J. G. Fichte, by A. E. Kroeger. Published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, 1868.

† Published this year: *Science of Rights*. Translated from the German of J. G. Fichte, by A. E. Kroeger. Published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, 1869.

previously translated for the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*,* wherein this work was first published, Fichte's *First* and *Second Introductions* to his Science, as well as his *Sum-clear Statement* respecting that Science, three works which connect with the present exposition in a particularly happy manner.

As for the translation itself, it is an old work—indeed, my oldest attempt at a translation of Fichte's Science. It was begun at New York in 1860 and finished at St. Louis in 1861. Nevertheless, I believe I may conscientiously say, that it is a very accurate translation; therein differing materially from my translation of the first representation of the Science of Knowledge. For whereas in the present work only the divisions and headings are my own, in that other translation I both omitted and added to a large extent. I omitted all those sentences and paragraphs which I considered out of place in a book-presentation—though probably very much in place in a lecture-presentation—of the Science of Knowledge; and I added, for instance, the whole of the second portion of the theoretical part, which in the German edition is published as a separate work, but which really belongs where I have placed it—additions and omissions which, in my judgment, make my English version of the Science of Knowledge of 1794 much superior to the German original.

The few students whom this work may interest I would beg not to be discouraged by any possible failure to comprehend it at its first, second, or even third reading. To a mind educated in the method of our modern schools and colleges, nothing is so difficult as to find sense in Transcendental Philosophy; just as to a transcendental philosopher the most commonly accepted rules, doctrines, axioms, &c., appear utterly absurd and beyond comprehension. The Science of Knowledge is not a book to read, but a work to study as you would study the science of the higher mathematics, page by page, and year after year. Five or ten years may be needed to get full possession of it; but he who has possession of it has possession of all sciences.

The Sonnet which precedes the Science of Knowledge has generally been considered a very happy expression of the fundamental view of that science.

I have allowed my Essay on Kant's System of Transcendental Idealism to be published as an appendix because I thought it might lead some students to compare Kant's System with Fichte's, and to study Kant not merely in the Critic of Pure Reason, but in those three great works, which in their unity alone represent the system of that great man.

ST. LOUIS, October, 1869.

A. E. KROEGER.

* *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Published by W. T. Harris, St. Louis, Mo.

SONNET.

I.

What to my eye has given such wondrous power,
That all deformity has ceased to be;
That night appears as brightest sunlight hour,
Chaos as order, death as life to me?
What through the misty clouds of time and space
Leads me unerring to the eternal flow
Of beauty, truth and goodness and of grace,
Wherein with self is lost all selfish woe?
'Tis this: since in Urania's eye, the still,
Self-luminous, blue, and transparent light,
My soul has looked, all thought of self being gone,
Since then this eye my inmost soul doth fill,
Is in my being—the perennial one—
Lives in my life, and seeth in my sight.

II.

God only is—and God is nought but life!
And yet thou knowest and I know with thee.
If such a thing as knowing then can be,
Must it not be a knowing of God's life?
"Gladly to His *my* life I would resign;
But oh! how find it? If 'tis ever brought
Into my knowing, it becomes a thought,
Clad with thought's garb like other thoughts of mine."
The obstacle, my friend, is very clear,
It is thy Self. Whate'er can die, resign,
And God alone will hence breathe in thy breath.
Note well, what may survive this partial death,
Then shall the hull to thee as hull appear,
And thou shalt see unveiled the life divine.

NEW EXPOSITION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

INTRODUCTION.

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Part I.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

- § 1. *Preliminary Description of Knowledge by its Construction.*

This description is called preliminary, not because it will exhaust the conception of knowledge, but merely because it will enable us to point out those of its characteristics which are necessary to be known for our present purpose. The

question, therefore, which we might be interrupted with at the beginning—of what knowledge are you speaking? and what meaning do you attach to this word?—is not here in place. We use the term, referred to, in no other sense than will be explained directly, and mean no more by it than will appear from the following:

Construct a certain angle! we should say to the reader, if we were conversing with him. Now close the angle, thus constructed, with a third straight line. Do you presume that the angle could have been closed with one or more other lines—that is to say, longer or shorter ones, than the one you have drawn to close it? If the reader replies, as we expect him to do, that he presumes no such thing, we shall further ask him whether he considers this to be merely his *opinion*, his temporary judgment on the matter, subject to a future rectification; or whether he believes himself to *know* it, to know it as quite sure and certain. If he replies affirmatively to this question, as we also expect him to do, we shall again ask him, whether it is his opinion that the case mentioned is applicable only to that particular angle, which he happened to construct in that particular manner, and to those particular lines, forming the angle, which also happened to be just such particular lines; and whether other possible angles, enclosed by other possible lines, might not be formed so as to have their two sides united by more straight lines than one? We shall furthermore ask him, after he has answered the foregoing, whether he believes that this fact appears in this particular light only to him, individually, or whether he believes that all rational Beings, who but understand his words, must necessarily partake of his conviction in the matter; and lastly, whether he simply pretends to have an opinion on these matters, or whether he decidedly believes himself to *know* them. If he replies, as we expect him to do—for if only one of his answers should be contrary to our supposition, we should at once be compelled to forego further discussion with him until his state of mind had undergone a change; why? he alone can understand who has answered these questions correctly;—if he replies, that not one of all the infinite variety of possible angles, formed by any of the infinite number of possible lines, can be closed by more than one possible third line—that every rational Being must necessarily entertain the

same conviction, and that he is positive of the absolute validity of this fact, both as regards the infinite variety of angles and the infinite variety of rational Beings, we shall proceed with him to the following reflections :

You affirm, then, to have acquired a *knowledge* by the aforementioned representation, a firmness, and unshakable stability of this representation, on which you can repose immutably, and are sure that you can repose so forever. Now tell me, on what is this knowledge really based? what is this its firm standpoint, and what this its unchangeable object? To begin with :

Our reader had just been constructing a certain angle, of a certain number of degrees, by certain side lines of a certain length. Thereupon he drew, once for all, the third line, and in drawing it declared, once for all, that all further attempts to draw another straight line between the two points would always result only in reproducing the same one line.

In that instance of drawing a line, the reader must therefore have abstained from viewing it as a *present* instance; he must have considered that it was not the present act of drawing a line, but the drawing of a line under these particular conditions—i. e. for the purpose of closing this particular angle—and in its infinite continuability, which he surveyed at one glance; and he must really have viewed it thus, if his assertion is to have any foundation. Again: the reader pretended to know that this assertion of his did apply not only to the present angle, which he had just constructed, but to all the infinite number of possible angles. He must therefore have reflected not on the drawing of a line to close *this* angle, but generally on the drawing of a line to close *any* angle, and he must have surveyed this act of his, in its possible and infinite variety, at one glance, if the assertion of his knowledge in this matter is to have any foundation. Again: this assertion of his was to be valid, not merely for him, but for all rational Beings who could but understand his words. He could therefore in nowise have reflected on himself, as such a particular person, nor on his own individual judgment; but he must have surveyed the judgment of all rational Beings, looking out from his soul into the souls of all rational Beings, if his assertion of the pretended knowledge is to have any foundation. Lastly :

the reader, having joined all these facts together in his mind, asserts to *know* of them, thus confessing that he will not change his judgment of them in all eternity, and making of this, his momentary assertion, an assertion for all time to come as well as for the whole past—if in the past he should ever have had occasion to judge on this matter;—he, therefore, does not regard his judgment on this subject as one of the present moment, but he surveys the judgment of himself and of all other reasoning Beings on this subject for all time, i. e. absolutely timeless, if the assertion of his pretended knowledge is to have any foundation. In one word: the reader claims for himself the power of surveying at one glance *all representation*—of course, of the object we have applied it to. Now, nothing prevents us from leaving unnoticed the fact, that in the quoted example it was the representation of a line between two points, which was surveyed at one glance; and we are consequently justified in asserting the result of our investigation to be contained in the following, merely formal, sentence: To the reader, who has answered our several questions, there is a knowledge; and this knowledge consists in the surveying at one glance a certain power of representing—or, as we would rather say, Reason, but this word is to have no other meaning here than it can necessarily have in this connection,—in its totality. Nothing, we say, can prevent us from making this abstraction, provided we do not thereby intend to extend the result of our investigation, but leave it entirely undecided whether the one case we have quoted is the only object of knowledge, or whether there are still other such objects.

REMARKS.—Such an absolute gathering together and taking in at one glance of a manifold of a representing (which manifold will most probably turn out to be at the same time always of an infinite character), as we have described in the above construction of knowledge, is, in the following treatise, and in the Science of Knowledge generally, termed *contemplation*. In that construction, we have found that knowledge has its basis and consists only in contemplation.

[To this uniting consciousness is opposed the consciousness of the particular, which in the above illustration we found exemplified in the *present* drawing of a line between the two

points of an angle.] This consciousness we may call perception or experience. It has appeared that in knowledge mere perception must be abstracted from.*

§ 2. *Description of the Science of Knowledge as a knowledge of Knowledge.*

The Science of Knowledge is, as the term shows, a science, a theory of knowledge, which theory is doubtless based on a knowledge of Knowledge, generates knowledge, or in one word, is this knowledge. [This knowledge of Knowledge is first, as the words indicate, a knowledge in itself, a taking in of the manifold at one glance.]

It is, again, a knowledge of Knowledge. In the same manner as the above described knowledge of the line-drawing between two points is related to the infinitely varying possible cases of such line-drawing, is the knowledge of Knowledge related to any particular knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, presents the view of a manifold, which the knowledge of Knowledge takes in and surveys at one glance.

Or, still more clear and distinct: In all knowledge of the drawing of a line, the relation of the sides of a triangle, or whatever other descriptions of knowledge there may be, this knowledge, in its absolute identity *as knowledge*, would be the real seat and centre of the *knowledge of* line-drawing, relation of the sides of a triangle, &c. In it and its unity we would know of everything, however different it otherwise might be, only in the same manner; but of knowledge, as such, we should know nothing, precisely because we should know not of knowledge, but of the line-drawing, &c., in question. There would be a knowledge, and it would know because it would be; but it would know nothing of itself just because it would merely be. But in the *knowledge of Knowledge* this knowledge itself would be surveyed as such at one glance, and, therefore, as a unity in itself; just as the line-drawing, &c., was regarded, in our knowledge of it, as a unity

* It is therefore an evidence of boundless stupidity when some one asks to tell him how we can know anything except through perception (experience). Through experience we can know nothing at all, since the merely experienced must be thrown aside first in order that we may arrive at a knowledge.

in itself. In the knowledge of Knowledge, knowledge steps out of itself, and places itself before its own eye, in order to be reflected upon.

It is evident that knowledge must be able thus to seize, contemplate, examine, and comprehend itself, if a Science of Knowledge is to be possible. Now it is true, that we might even here from the reality of the consciousness of men deduce a proof, although an indirect one, of the reality and consequently of the possibility of such a knowledge. But the direct proof of it is the reality of the Science of Knowledge, and of this every one can become convinced by realizing it within himself. Relying on this proof by fact, which our present attempt will furnish, we can abstain from all other preliminary proofs, especially as we have commenced this factual proof already by the mere writing down of our § 1.

§ 3. *Deductions.*

1. According to the above, all knowledge is contemplation (§ 2). Knowledge of Knowledge, therefore, being itself knowledge, is contemplation; and being a knowledge of Knowledge, is a contemplation of all contemplation—the absolute uniting of all possible contemplation into one.

2. The Science of Knowledge being this knowledge of Knowledge, is therefore no system or collection of axioms, no plurality of truisms, but altogether one undivided contemplation.

3. Contemplation is itself absolute knowledge—firmness, unwavering stability, and immutability of our representation; but the Science of Knowledge is an undivided survey of all such contemplation. It is therefore itself absolute knowledge, and, as such, firmness, unshakableness, immutability of our judgment (§ 1). Consequently, whatever appertains to the Science of Knowledge cannot be disproved by any reasoning Being; it cannot be contradicted, it cannot be doubted; since no disproving, no contradiction, no doubt is possible except through this science, and is therefore far below this science. So far as individuals are concerned, this science can meet only one difficulty: some men may not possess it.

4. Since the Science of Knowledge is only the contemplation of knowledge (a knowledge of line-drawing, &c.)—which latter

has been and must be presupposed to exist independently of such science—it is evident that this science can open no new and particular branch of knowledge made possible only by it, no material knowledge (no knowledge of something). This science can be nothing but the universal knowledge, which has come to know of itself, and has entered a state of light, consciousness and independence in regard to itself. This science is not an *object* of knowledge, but simply a *form* of the knowledge of all possible objects. This science must on no account be considered as an external object, but as our own tool; our hand, our foot, our eye; and not even our eye, but only the clearness of the eye. The teacher makes it objective merely to the student, who does not yet possess it, and only until he possesses it; for the student's sake only is it explained by words; whereas whoever does possess it, speaks no more of it, but lives and acts it in his other knowledge. Strictly speaking, no one *has* this science, but *is* it; and no one has it until he has become it.

5. The Science of Knowledge is, as we have said, a contemplation of that general knowledge which needs not to be first acquired, but which must be presupposed to exist in every Being, gifted with reason, and which, in fact, constitutes such rational Being. This science is, therefore, the easiest and plainest that possibly can be. To attain it, nothing further is necessary than to turn our reflection upon our self, and to cast a clear glance into our inner Being. The fact that mankind has gone astray in search of this knowledge for so many centuries, and that the present age, to which it has been submitted, has not understood it, proves only that men have heretofore paid more attention to everything else than to their own self.

6. Now, although the Science of Knowledge is not a system of axioms, but an undivided contemplation, it may nevertheless be possible that the unity of this contemplation is not in itself an absolute simplicity, a first element, atom, monad, or whatever else you may call this first thought (perhaps because such a thing does not exist in knowledge or anywhere else); but an *organic* unity, a variety melted together into unity, and this unity diffused at the same time into variety and an undivided unity. In fact, this appears to be the case when we

remember merely that this contemplation is to be a contemplation of all the manifold contemplations, of which latter each one is again to contain an infinite variety of instances.

7. Now, if this should turn out to be the case, it might be possible, also, that we should be unable—not in our presupposed possession of this science, but in its demonstration to others, who are presumed not to possess it—to present this unity to the student in a direct manner. We might see ourselves compelled to cause this unity to organize itself from out of one or the other of the various instances, and then to disorganize it again into these, making the student a witness of this process. It is clear that, under such circumstances, the one instance selected from which to start the organization could not be understood by itself, since by itself it would be nothing; being something only as a part of an organized unity and comprehensible only in this unity. In this manner we could, therefore, never gain admittance into the Science of Knowledge; or if it were possible, and if such an isolated instance could be made clear to the student, it could be done only if the contemplation of this isolated instance should turn out to be accompanied—although in an indistinct and to us unconscious manner—by the contemplation of the whole unity; the isolated instance having its resting-point in this unity, and receiving from it its distinctness and comprehensibility, while at the same time imparting to this unity a peculiar distinctness of its own, when connected with it. Thus it would also be with all subsequent instances, to be taken into consideration. Still more: the first instance would not only throw a peculiar light on the second instance, but at the same time the second instance would reflect back a peculiar light on the first one; since this receives its complete distinctness from the Whole, of which the second instance is a part. In the same way the third instance would not only be illuminated by the first one, but would reflect back upon both preceding ones its own peculiar light; and thus on to the end. In the course of our investigation, each part would consequently be explained by all others, and all others by each particular instance. All investigated parts would have to be kept in mind, since with each step forwards we should get a new view not merely of the new instance, but of all others and *from* all others; and no

instance would be completely explained until all the others had been explained, and until the one clear view, by which all the variety is united into one and the one re-diffused into the variety, had been obtained. The Science of Knowledge would consequently—in spite of the successive demonstration adopted by us—remain the same one and undivided view, which—from the zero of distinctness in which it merely exists, but is unconscious of itself—is elevated in a successive and straightforward manner to that point of clearness and perspicuousness in which it is thoroughly conscious of itself and lives in itself; thus confirming anew what has already been seen, that the Science of Knowledge does not consist in an acquisition or a production of something new, but in illuminating and making perspicuous that which always has been and always has been *ourselves*.

We might add historically, that the method of the Science of Knowledge is really as we have here presumed it to be, and that it is consequently fixed for all time to come. This science is not a drawing of conclusions in a simple, straight line, from some starting-point or other—a proceeding which is possible only in a presupposed lower organism of knowledge, but of no use whatever in Philosophy (being, on the contrary, positively ruinous to it),—but a drawing of conclusions from and to all sides at one and the same time; from a central point to all other points and from all other points back again to the central point, just as in an organic body.

Part II.

ON ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1. *Concerning the conception of Absolute Knowledge.*

In order to pave a way for our investigation, let us first premise that the very conception of *knowledge* precludes all suspicion of its being the *Absolute* itself. For every second word added to the expression, the Absolute, destroys the conception of absoluteness, as such, and makes that word a mere adjective of the noun to which it becomes affixed. The Absolute is not knowledge, nor is it Being, nor is it identity or indifference of these two terms; it is simply and only the Absolute. But as we can never advance in the Science of Knowledge—and per-

haps in all other possible knowledge—beyond knowledge, this science cannot take its starting-point from the Absolute, but must commence with absolute knowledge. The question, how, under these circumstances, we are nevertheless able to assign to the Absolute its place beyond and independent of absolute knowledge—or, at least, to *think* it thus—as we have just now done, and how we could describe it, as we did, will undoubtedly be answered in the course of our investigation. It is possible that the Absolute enters our consciousness (is thought by us) only in the above connection with knowledge—or, as the *form* of knowledge.

The same question in regard to the possibility of thinking the Absolute, which we have just raised, can undoubtedly be objected to the thinking of absolute knowledge, i. e. if it should appear that all our real and possible knowledge is never an absolute, but, on the contrary, always a relative knowledge, limited or determined in a particular manner, and might be answered similarly: that this absolute knowledge can be revealed and is revealed to our consciousness only as the *form*, or, from another point of view, as the material part, or the object of real knowledge. This is the reason why we, having the intention of describing this absolute knowledge, and therefore undoubtedly persuaded that we know something about it, must for the present leave the question undecided how we ever came into possession of this our real knowledge of absolute knowledge. Perhaps we also view it, although as absolute, yet at the same time as never otherwise than in a relation, i. e. in its relation to all relative knowledge. In the description we are about to attempt, we can trust only to the direct contemplation of the reader, and must be content with asking him whether this description will call up in his mind what to him appears and forces itself upon his conviction as absolute knowledge. Or, if even this self-contemplation should desert him, we must wait and see whether in our succeeding paragraphs a light may not break upon his mind in regard to this first point.

§ 2. *Formal and Word-definition of Absolute Knowledge.*

Even if we should be compelled to content ourselves with the fact, which everyone will admit, that all our real know-

ledge is a knowledge of something—*this* something, and not that or the other something—yet every one of our readers will undoubtedly be able to understand, that there could be no knowledge of something if there were no knowledge pure and simple. So far as knowledge is a knowledge of something, it is a different knowledge in every other something of which it knows; but so far as it is knowledge pure, it is the same in all knowledge of something; and always altogether the same, although this knowledge of something might be extended into infinity, and consequently present an infinite difference. Now it is this knowledge, as the one and the same in all particular knowledge, to the thinking of which the reader is invited when we speak of absolute knowledge.

Let us make this thought, which we wish the reader to form, still more distinct by a few additional remarks:—It is not a knowledge of something, nor is it a knowledge of nothing (which would make it a knowledge of something, this something being nothing); it is not even a knowledge of itself; it is altogether no knowledge *of*; nor is it *a* knowledge (quantitative and in shape of a relation), but it is *the* knowledge (absolutely qualitative). It is no act, no fact, no something *in* knowledge, but it is simply that knowledge in which alone all acts and facts which can take place are contained. What use we can, nevertheless, make of this knowledge, the reader must wait to see. It is not opposed to the something of which is known, for in that case it would be the knowledge of something, or this particular knowledge itself; but it is opposed to the *knowledge of something*.

Some one, however, might say that this conception of knowledge pure and simple is after all nothing but an *abstraction* from all the particular of knowledge. To such an objection we must, of course, admit that in the *course of our actual consciousness* we are elevated to a *particular consciousness* of the absolute one and the same in all particular knowledge only by a free depression and subjection (generally called abstraction) of the particular character of a particular knowledge; although there may be another way by which to attain this consciousness, and although this may be the very way we intend to lead the reader. But what we protest against is, that this abstraction be supposed to produce from a multitude of

particulars what is contained in no single one of these particulars; and that such an objection should hold, that that character of knowledge, which every particular knowledge is presupposed to have, is on no account to be presupposed for the possibility of each single, particular knowledge, but enters knowledge only after a number of instances of knowledge have taken place, making then a knowledge what was previously a particular knowledge, although it never was *knowledge*.

§ 3. *Real definition of Absolute Knowledge—Description of the Absolute Substance of Knowledge.*

The real definition of absolute knowledge can be given only by demonstrating this knowledge through immediate contemplation. The reader must not believe that we can arrive at the nature of this absolute knowledge by drawing conclusions in a logical chain of reasoning; for, since this knowledge is to be absolute, there can be no higher, no more absolute point from which our logical chain of reasoning could start. We can form a conception of absolute knowledge only by a likewise absolute contemplation.

It is also apparent that such an absolute contemplation of absolute knowledge, and consequently the real definition of the latter, must be possible if a Science of Knowledge is to be possible; for the contemplation which forms the Science of Knowledge is to survey at one glance all reason and knowledge. The *particular* knowledge, however, cannot be surveyed at one glance, but requires particular glances, each one differing from the other. Knowledge must, therefore, be contemplated from that point of view in which it is one and the same knowledge, i. e. absolute knowledge.

In the description itself we shall assist the reader by the following introduction. Let the reader endeavor to think the Absolute itself, as such. Now, we affirm that he can think it only under these two conditions: 1st, as being *what* it is—reposing within and upon itself, without change or alteration, firm and complete of itself; 2d, as being *what* it is for no other reason than *because* it is—of itself, by itself, without any foreign influence; for everything foreign must vanish when we speak of the Absolute.

(It is possible that this duplicity of conditions, wherewith we designate the Absolute, being unable to designate it in any other manner—a fact rather curious, considering that we are speaking of the Absolute—may be in itself a result of our mode of thinking, as a knowledge; but this we must leave undecided for the present.)

The first condition we can term absolute rest, Being, a state of repose, &c.; the second, absolute change, or Freedom. Both expressions are to signify no more than is contained in the contemplation of the two characteristics of the Absolute, which we have asked the reader to undertake.

Now, knowledge is to be absolute, one and always the same knowledge, the unity of one and the highest contemplation, a mere absolute Quality. The two characteristics of the Absolute, therefore, which we have distinguished from each other above, must unite and become one in knowledge, so as to be no longer distinguishable; and this absolute union of both must constitute the real nature of knowledge, or the absolute knowledge.

I say, the melting together and close union of both into an indivisible unity, by which each part resigns and loses altogether its distinguishing characteristic, and both together form only one and an entirely new One, consequently their *real* union and true organization forms absolute knowledge; but on no account their mere co-existence, concerning which nobody is able to comprehend how they can co-exist with each other, and which would form a mere formal and negative unity; a non-diversity, which could after all (God knows for what reasons) be only postulated, but could never be proved. You must not understand it as if Being and Freedom entered into any particular, consequently presupposed, knowledge, and there uniting formed absolute knowledge by their union, thus constituting another knowledge within the first one. But *beyond* all knowledge, Freedom and Being unite, mix with each other, and this union and identity of both into a new being alone constitutes knowledge, as knowledge, as an absolute *Tat*. Everything depends on understanding this properly, and the neglect to so understand it has caused an infinity of errors.

But it might be asked, how we, who undoubtedly are also

gifted only with knowledge, can undertake seemingly to go beyond all knowledge and construct knowledge itself out of a non-knowledge; or, in other words, how the contemplation of the absolute knowledge, to which we have invited the reader in our demonstration, and which can also be surely only a knowledge, is at all possible—a possibility, however, which we have shown above to be the condition of the possibility of the Science of Knowledge;—and again, how we could undertake to describe this contemplation, or this knowledge, as a non-knowledge, as we have done. The answer to these questions will be found as we proceed. This continual referring to our further progress arises from the peculiar method of the Science of Knowledge, as demonstrated before. A clearness is wanting, which can be found only in a second link of our argument.

It must be considered, however, that the absolute knowledge has here been described simply so far as its *substance* is concerned. [Being and Freedom, we have said, *unite* together; *they*, therefore, are the active, if we can speak of anything active in this connection; and are active for the very reason that they are not yet knowledge, but simply Being and Freedom. But as they unite and give up their separate existence in order to form a unity, a knowledge, they are mutually connected with each other; for only thus do they form knowledge; separately they are merely Being and Freedom, and rest now in a state of repose.] This is what we term the *substance* of the absolute knowledge, or the absolute substance of knowledge. It is possible that this absolute substance holds the same relation towards the absolute form of the same knowledge which Being holds to Freedom in the absolute substance itself.

§ 4. *Real Definition of Absolute Knowledge continued— Description of the Absolute Form of Knowledge.*

Not the inactive Being is knowledge, we said above, neither is it Freedom, but the absolute union and fusion of both into one is knowledge.

Hence it is this union, regardless of what it is, that thus unites, which constitutes the absolute form of knowledge. Knowledge is a For-itself-and-in-itself Being, an inner life and

organic acting power. This its being what it is for its self is the light of life and the source of all appearances in the light; it is the substantial inner sight, as such. [We do not wish you to believe, that in *knowing* an *object* you draw a distinction between your consciousness (*of* this object) as the subjective, and the object itself as the objective; but we wish you to understand fully and be convinced in your innermost soul that both of these are One and a mutual *Uniting*, and that only after and by reason of this *Uniting* you are enabled to draw a distinction between both.] You must be convinced that you do not tie both together, after their dissolution, by a string, which you know not where to get, but that both are and must be organically melted together and united before you *can* divide them.

Or, think again the Absolute as it has been described above. It is simply what it is, and is this simply because it is. But this definition still leaves the Absolute without the power of looking upon itself; and if you demand, *for whom* it is—a question which will occur to you very naturally, and which you will understand immediately when put by another person—you will vainly search for an eye to look upon the Absolute outside of the Absolute. But even should we grant you this eye, which we cannot do, you would never be able to *explain* the connection between it and the Absolute, however loudly you might assert such connection. This eye (this being what it is for its own self) is not outside of the Absolute but within the Absolute, and is the inner life, the organic self-penetration (-comprehension) of the Absolute itself.

Science has given to this absolute within itself moving life, and being what it is for itself, the only appropriate name which seemed to express the idea: *Egohood*. But if the inner eye of any one of our readers is not gifted with the freedom to look away from all outside objects and fix itself wholly upon his self, all explanations and proper expressions will be of no avail in making us understood. Such a reader will misinterpret every new word we might add. He is blind and will remain so.

If, as appears from the above, *this being-for-itself* constitutes the real inner nature of knowledge, as knowledge (as an inner life of light, and inner sight), the nature of knowledge

must necessarily consist in a *form* (a form of Being and Freedom, i. e. of their absolute uniting), and all knowledge must consequently be *formal* in its real nature. And that which we have termed in the preceding section the absolute substance of knowledge—and which will perhaps remain altogether the absolute substance, as substance—appears to us here, where we have given to knowledge its independent existence, as a *form*, i. e. a form of knowledge.

§ 5. *Union of the Absolute Form and the Absolute Substance in Knowledge.*

A. Knowledge is absolute ; it is *what* it is, and *because* it is. For it is only by the uniting and melting together of separates—whatever these separates may be—but on no account by the separates in their separateness that knowledge arises. Being knowledge, it, of course, cannot transcend its own sphere, for, if it did, it would cease to be knowledge ; nothing can exist for knowledge but itself. It is, therefore, absolute for itself, and comprehends itself, and begins as real formal knowledge (a condition of light and inner sight) only in so far as it is absolute.

But we have said that as knowledge it is simply the melting together of separates into a unity ; and—let it be well remarked—this unity is within itself and according to its nature—whatever other unities may be—a melting together of separates, and no other act of unity.

Now, all knowledge begins with this thus characterized unity, which constitutes, in fact, the absoluteness of knowledge, and can never transcend it, or throw it aside, without destroying itself. This unity extends, therefore, as far as knowledge extends, and knowledge can never arrive at any other unity than a unity of separates.

In other words, we have here deduced the assertion of § 1, that all knowledge is the gathering together and reviewing at one glance of a manifold ; and we, moreover, have shown the infinity of this manifoldness, the infinite divisibility of all knowledge, about which we could learn nothing from the mere fact developed in § 1, but had to arrive at through a deduction of the absolute ; and this infinite divisibility is deduced from the absolute character of knowledge, which is *formal*.

Whatever your knowledge may grasp is unity: for knowledge exists and contemplates itself only in unity. But when you now again endeavor to grasp (comprehend) this knowledge, the unity of it will at once dissolve itself into separates; and the moment you try to seize one of these separates—of course, as a unity, since no other way is possible—this one separate part will likewise dissolve into a manifold, and so on, until you cease to divide. When you do cease, you have a unity which is a unity only because you pay no further attention to it. Now keep in mind that this infinite divisibility is within yourself, owing to the absolute form of your knowledge, which you cannot transcend, and which you contemplate—though without a clear consciousness of this fact—whenever you speak of infinite divisibility. [Let it, then, nevermore be said by you that this infinite divisibility might have its cause in a *thing per se*, an object of your senses—which, if it were true, would only be confessing that you found it impossible to discover its cause—since this cause has been pointed out to you as existing in your own knowledge, the only possible source thereof, where you can find it whenever you turn your eye with a clear and earnest glance upon your inner self.]

But it must be well remembered that knowledge does on no account consist in the *Uniting*, or in the *Dividing*, each by itself, but in the union of both, in their melting together and real identity; for there is no unity without separates, nor are there separates without a unity. Knowledge can never take its start from the consciousness of first elements, which you might possibly put together to a unity; for all your knowledge cannot arrive in all eternity to a consciousness of first elements; nor can it start from a unity, which you might perhaps divide into parts to suit your fancy, conscious that you could pursue your dividing into infinity; for you have no other unity than a unity of separates. Knowledge, therefore, balances *between both*, and is destroyed if it does not balance between both.⁴ The character of knowledge is *organic*.

B. Knowledge is not the Absolute, but it is absolute as knowledge. Now the Absolute, when regarded as in a state of repose, is simply what it is. What knowledge *is* in this regard, what its absolute essence, its unchanging *substratum* is, we have seen in the preceding section. But the Absolute

is, moreover, when regarded as in a state of progress or freedom—and it must be considered thus in order to be considered as the Absolute—what it is, simply *because* it is. The same must hold good in regard to knowledge.

It is clear that knowledge, in so far as it is not mere knowledge, but *absolute* knowledge, does not remain closed up within itself, but rises above itself, looking down upon itself from above. We shall not attempt at present to justify the possibility of this new reflection, which is after all self evident, since knowledge is an absolute *For-itself*. The deduction of this reflection, with all the consequences arising therefrom, we shall leave to the future.

But it will perhaps be well to remark, in order to throw all possible light on our subject, that this freedom of knowledge to reflect upon its own nature was silently taken into our calculation in the preceding division, and alone made it possible for us to demonstrate what we did. We said: "Knowledge is a For-itself for-itself, and can, therefore, never go beyond the unity of separates, and consequently can never go beyond the separates." Now there we had to presume, for the mere sake of making ourselves understood, that knowledge was not confined within itself, but had the faculty of expanding itself into the infinite.

But, furthermore, knowledge is as knowledge only for itself and within itself: hence, it can be only for itself because it is; and as knowledge it is because it is only in so far as it is this for-itself (not for any foreign and outside object), but internally for itself; or, in other words, because it posits itself as *being because it is*. Now this *being because it is* is not a characteristic derived from the absolute Being of knowledge (its state of unchanging repose), like the Being described in the preceding section, but is derived from the *Freedom* and from the *absolute Freedom* of knowledge. Whatever, therefore, is understood by and derived from the character of this absolute Freedom does not result from the *Being* of knowledge; this Being might even be possible without it, if knowledge were possible without it. This character, if it is, is simply because it is; and if it is not, simply because it is not; it is the production of the absolute *Freedom* of knowledge, which is under no law, rule or foreign influence, and is itself this absolute Free-

dom. From this point of view the reader must consider what we have just said; not as if we had intended to deduce this Freedom from something else—as we did in the case of the Being of knowledge, which we composed out of the union of the two predicates of the Absolute—but that we absolutely posit it as the inner immanent absoluteness and Freedom of knowledge itself. So much in regard to the formal part of this character of Freedom in knowledge.

Now, as far as its *substance* is concerned: “A knowledge is within and for itself because it is,” means: an absolute act of knowledge is taken—of knowledge, the *For-itself-Being*; consequently, an act of self-comprehension, or of the absolute *generation* of the *For-itself-Hood*;—and this act is regarded as the ground (cause) of all Being in knowledge. Knowledge is, simply, because it is, for me; and it is not for me, if it is not. An act it is, because it is *Freedom*; an act of *Egohood* of the *For-itself*, because it is Freedom of knowledge; *unity*, an altogether indivisible point of self-penetration in an indivisible point, because here only the act as such is to be expressed, and on no account a Being (of knowledge, of course) which alone involves the manifold, but which here belongs to the grounded and must therefore be carefully separated from the ground. An inner living point, absolute stirring up of life and light in itself and from out of itself.

PART III.

ON INTELLECTUAL CONTEMPLATION.

§ 1. *Union of Freedom and Being in Absolute Knowledge through Thinking.*

A. We have considered absolute knowledge in regard to its inner, immanent character—i. e. with abstraction from the Absolute itself—as absolute Being, and in regard to its inner, immanent generation as absolute Freedom. But the Absolute is neither the one nor the other, but both as a unity; in knowledge, at least, does this duplicity mingle into a unity. But, even apart from this, the absoluteness of knowledge is not absoluteness itself, as the term shows, but is the absoluteness of knowledge; existing therefore, since knowledge is for itself, only for knowledge, which is not possible unless its duplicity

melts together into a unity. There must consequently be within knowledge itself, as sure as it is knowledge, a point where the duplicity of its absolute character unites into unity. This point of union we shall now turn our attention to, having sufficiently described the separates.

At least one of the separates, which we have to unite with the other in knowledge, is the inner Freedom of knowledge. The higher point of union, which we are now to describe, is, therefore, founded on absolute Freedom of knowledge itself, presupposes it, and is possible only under such presupposition. From this reason alone, therefore, is it already evident that this point of union is itself a production of absolute Freedom, and cannot be derived, but must be absolutely posited; it is, if it is, simply because it is; and if it is not, simply because it is not. So much in regard to its outward form.

Again: the presupposition in the absolute reflection of the Freedom of knowledge, described in the preceding section, is, that all knowledge emanates from it as its first source; that, consequently, since Freedom is unity, we must start from the unity to arrive at a manifold. Only by this presupposition of the self-reflection of freedom is the higher uniting reflection (of which we speak now) made possible; but with the first we necessarily have the absolute possibility of the latter. Resting directly upon and emanating from unity, this higher reflection is therefore in its purest essence nothing but an inner *For-itself-existence* of this unity, which is possible in knowledge simply because it is possible, but possible only through Freedom.

(This reposing in the unity and inner for-itself-life, which has been shown to arise only from the exercise of the absolute Freedom of knowledge, is what is usually termed *thinking*. The moving in the manifoldness of the separates is, on the contrary, a *contemplation*. This we mention merely to define the meaning of these two words. But it must be remembered that knowledge does repose neither in the unity nor in the manifoldness, but within and between both; for neither thinking nor contemplation is knowledge, but both in their union are knowledge.)

Again: This uniting reflection presupposes plainly a Being, i. e. the Being of the separates, which are to be united; and

this Being the reflection holds and carries within itself, in so far as it unites them; each, of course, *for itself* as a unity, a point, because the reflection emanates from thinking. In this regard the reflection is, therefore, not a free knowledge, as above, but a knowledge which carries its *Being* within itself; is, hence, *in so far* bound by the law of the Being of knowledge, the law of contemplation: unable ever to arrive at any other unity than a unity of separates. What the reflection *does* is unity, represented by a point; what it does not, but simply *is*, and carries within itself, by virtue of its nature, without any co-operation of its own, is manifoldness; and the reflection itself is *materialiter*, in its inner essence—without regard to the two outer links connected by it—the union of both. What, then, is this reflection? As an act, unity in knowledge, and for itself a *point* (a point in absolute emptiness, wherein it seizes and penetrates itself); as Being, manifoldness; the whole, therefore, a point extended to infinite separability, and yet remaining a point; a separability concentrated into a point, and yet remaining separability. Consequently a living and self-luminous form of line-drawing. In a line, the point is everywhere, for the line has no breadth. In a line, manifoldness is everywhere, for no part of the line can be regarded as a point, but only as a line in itself, as an infinite separability of points. I have said the *form* of line-drawing, for there is no length as yet—this it gets only by grasping and infinitely extending itself;—nor is there even a direction given, as we shall presently see; it is the absolute union of contradictory directions.

B. The uniting reflection is, in its true nature, the for-itself existence of absolute knowledge, its inner life, and eyesight. Let us consider this a little further.

Absolute knowledge is not Freedom alone, nor Being alone, but both; the uniting knowledge must consequently be based on Being, but without detriment to its inner unity; for it is a self-comprehension (penetration) of knowledge; but knowledge comprehends itself only in unity, and this unity, the ground-form of the present uniting reflection, must be preserved to it. Or let us represent the matter from another side and in a more exhaustive manner. The present reflection is the inner nature of knowledge itself, its self-penetration.

Now knowledge is never the *Absolute* itself, but only the melting together of the two attributes of the Absolute into One. Knowledge is consequently absolute only for itself, and in this absoluteness only secondary, but not primary. In this One, simply as such, with total disregard of the infinite separability of contemplation, our present reflection rests and penetrates the same; that is to say, penetrates the oneness and goes beyond it to the attributes of the Absolute, which are melted together in it. To say, therefore, this uniting knowledge is based on, or reposes in, Being, means the same as, it reposes in the Absolute. (This is, in reality, self-evident; for as this reflection is the for-itself existence of *absolute* knowledge, the whole absoluteness of *knowledge*, described above, must appear in it. It is consequently no longer a knowledge imprisoned within itself, as we have heretofore described it, but a knowledge seizing, encircling and penetrating its whole self; from which fact we derive a slight glimpse of the possibility seemingly to go beyond all knowledge, as we did in a previous paragraph. Our mode of doing so was founded on the act of knowledge, whereby it penetrates its own nature, and which we have here deduced. It is, of course, understood that the two attributes of the Absolute are viewed as a unity.)

Now there are two points of repose and turning-points in this reflection, in Being or in the Absolute. Either this reflection reposes on the character of absolute Freedom, which becomes Freedom of knowledge only through further determination, thus simply presupposing Freedom; views only the outward form, the act; and in this respect the absolutely free and, on that very account, empty basis of knowledge appears as comprehending and penetrating itself simply because it does so without any higher reason, and the therefrom arising Being or Absolute (of knowledge) is inner sight, a condition of light. The whole standpoint of this view is simply form, or Freedom of Knowledge, Egoism, Inwardness, Light.

Or it reposes on the character of absolute Being, thus simply presupposing an existence, but making this an existence of knowledge in and for itself; views consequently the inward character of this act of self-penetration, and is thereby forced to subjoin a dormant faculty of such an act to the act itself, a Zero in relation to the act capable of being converted

into a positive fact by simply an exercise of Freedom. The fact *that* the act takes place, in regard to the mere form, is to have its ground in Freedom, as heretofore ; but the possibility that the act *can* take place is to have its ground in a Being, and in a Determined Being. Knowledge is not to be, as formerly, absolutely empty and to create light only through an exercise of Freedom, but it is to have the light absolutely within itself, and only to develop and seize it through Freedom. The standpoint of this view of the matter is absolute repose.

Let us now turn our attention to the inner essence of the reflection, as such. It is a for-itself existence of knowledge—which is itself a for-itself existence ;—and through this view of the subject, which we have always kept in mind, we gain a double knowledge, one, *for* which the other is (in the contemplation the upper, or subjective), and one, which is for the other (in the contemplation the lower, or objective). Now, neither the one nor the other, nor consequently both, would be knowledge if both together did not unite, and thus form only one knowledge. Let us now view this organic uniting of the reflecting and the reflected in knowledge both in a general way, and especially as it is connected with our present investigation.

1. That which, in uniting, forms knowledge is always Freedom and Being. Now in the reflection, spoken of above, the upper, subjective, with its actual result within knowledge, is a uniting, consequently an act or Freedom of knowledge, which can change into a knowledge only by uniting with a Being of knowledge, closely connected with it. (The line which is to be drawn can occur as line in a knowledge only when drawn within a something itself fixed and unchanging.)

2. Whatever is in the immediate neighborhood of and connected with this act of uniting, is, according to the above, the standpoint of the uniting reflection, in the unity of the point, which standpoint may be a twofold one. In it knowledge appears as an unchangeable Being, a Being simply what it is ; consequently, a remaining in the standpoint, on which it happens to rest, without faltering or changing, but on no account a balancing between both standpoints.

Now this uniting reflection, or thinking, must repose either in the first described standpoint of absolute Freedom ;—and then

the line is drawn from this standpoint to that of Being; knowledge is regarded as simply its own cause, and all Being of knowledge and all Being for knowledge, i. e. as it appears in knowledge, as having its absolute ground in Freedom. (The material contents of the described line would be *illumination*.) The expression of this view of the matter would be: there is simply no Being (of course, for knowledge, since this view is based on the standpoint of knowledge) except through knowledge itself. (Nothing is to which Being is not given by knowledge.) We will call this line the *ideal*.

Or the reflection reposes on the last described standpoint of the unchanging, the permanent;—and then it describes its line from the point of absolute Being and condition of light to the development of the same through absolute Freedom (and the material of the line would be *enlightenment*). We will call this line the *real*.

But upon *one* of these standpoints the reflection would necessarily repose; and when reposing upon the one, not upon the other; and one of the two directions the line would necessarily receive, and then not the other.

REMARKS.—I. A knowledge which, through its connection with its branch-knowledge, is posited as being simply what it is, is a knowledge of *Quality*.

Such a knowledge is necessarily a *Thinking*, for only thinking reposes upon itself by virtue of its form of unity; contemplation, on the contrary, never arrives at a unity which cannot again be dissolved into separates.

The knowledge of quality, of which we have spoken *here*, is the absolute *for-itself*-existence of absolute knowledge itself. Beyond and outside of this no knowledge can penetrate. Now, qualities are only in knowledge; for the quality itself can be fixed, determined, only by knowledge. The two qualities here deduced, Being and Freedom, are consequently the highest and absolute qualities. This shows how we came to find them above as the not-to-be-united and no-further-to-be-analyzed qualities of *the Absolute*. The Absolute is probably nothing else than the union of the two first qualities in the formal unity of thought.

II. Let us consider the following sentences, which can be proved by the immediate contemplation of every one:

1. No absolute, immediate knowledge, except of Freedom; or immediate knowledge can know only of Freedom. For knowledge is unity of separates or opposites: but separates are united into unity only by absolute Freedom (a point which we have proved above, but which everybody can moreover convince himself of by immediate contemplation). Only Freedom is the first, immediate object of a knowledge. (In other words, knowledge starts only from self-consciousness.)

2. No immediate, absolute Freedom, except in and through a knowledge. Immediate, I say; a Freedom which is what it is, simply because it is; or negatively, which has no other ground of its determined character than itself (no such other ground, for instance, as natural instinct would be). For only such a Freedom can unite absolute opposites: but opposites are united only in a knowledge. (In Being or Determinedness of quality opposites exclude each other.)

3. Knowledge and Freedom are consequently inseparably united. Although we draw a distinction between them—how, why, and in what regard we can do this will appear in due course of time—they are in reality not to be distinguished at all, but are simply one and the same. A free and infinite life—a *For-itself*, which sees *its own* infinity—the *Being* and the *Freedom* of this light, melted together in the closest union: this is absolute knowledge. The free light, which sees itself as Being; the Being, which sees itself as free: this is the standpoint of absolute knowledge. These propositions are decisive for all transcendental philosophy.

4. If this has been understood, the question will arise, how and from what standpoint has it been understood? From what higher truth can it be demonstrated? Everyone who has understood the foregoing will reply: I understand and see that the nature of knowledge must be thus simply because I so understand it; this conviction expresses my original Being.

In the above we have consequently created an immediate contemplation of absolute knowledge within us; and in the present moment, wherein we become conscious of this fact, we have again created a contemplation (for-itself-existence) of this contemplation. The latter is the point of union important to us here.

§ 2. *Description of the Absolute Substance of Intellectual Contemplation as the For-itself of that Thinking.*

We now return to the first contemplation, as the object of ours. In that contemplation, a lower contemplation (view) of knowledge and a *Being* of this knowledge were united. To begin with the former :

1. No immediate knowledge except of Freedom. Here the inner form of knowledge was presupposed, and from this form a conclusion was drawn as to its possible exterior, its object. The point of view was in this form, and this form placed itself before itself as Freedom.

2. No absolute Freedom except in a knowledge. Here the form of Freedom was presupposed ; in it the contemplation rested and viewed itself as of necessity a knowledge.

In the first instance we had an absolute for-and-in-itself Being of knowledge, as real unity, dividing itself into an outer absolute multiplicity, founded on Freedom. Its reflex (For-itself existence) lies in the centre.

At present we have an immediate self-grasping of the outward unity (through Freedom) in the multiplicity and melting together of the same to the inner and real unity of knowledge. The uniting reflex is here also in the centre. (*Inner and outward* unity we use here merely as temporary expressions to make ourselves better understood until we can explain them.)

Now both is to be simply one and the same : absolute Freedom is to be knowledge, and absolute knowledge Freedom. Both are not *viewed* (contemplated) as One—as we have seen, since we always have to proceed from one of the two points of view to the other ;—but they are to *be* one. The middle and turning point, which we characterized above as the reflex of the absolute knowledge, is this one *Being* ; and thus it also appears how the two possible descriptions thereof are always merely descriptions of the same Being of absolute knowledge. Unity of this Being and its two descriptions is consequently the lower contemplation.

Let us now approach the real end of our investigation, and make this contemplation again its own object ; that is to say, not, let us make an object again of this object-making ; but rather, let us ourselves *be* in the following this very contem-

plation, which, as it is the contemplation of the absolute intellectualizing, may well be called *intellectual contemplation*.

We are it in the following manner:—In the above described contemplation, absolute knowledge evidently seizes (grasps) itself, in its absolute spirit, in an absolute manner. 1. It *has* itself from itself, in its absolute nature, in the unity: it is, precisely because it is knowledge, in its existence at the same time *for* itself. 2. It grasps, contemplates and describes itself in this contemplation in the above mentioned manner, as unity of Freedom and of knowledge, which latter is here viewed in a somewhat different manner, and no longer as absolutely *being*.

But for the very purpose of describing itself, it is necessary that it should possess itself *as* knowledge (as realized knowledge). Now, what sort of knowledge is this latter? We have sufficiently described it: a firm, in-itself-reposing, in and through itself determined (presupposing, in relation to its form, no Freedom, but itself presupposed by absolute *Freedom*) *thought* (act of life, of thinking) of the before-mentioned absolute identity of Freedom and Knowledge (the last expression used in its former and broader sense, as the pure form of the for-itself). This living thought is it which views itself in the intellectual contemplation, not as thought, but as knowledge; because the absolute *form* of knowledge (the for-itself existence, absolute possibility, to be in every Being at the same time the reflex thereof) which lies within it, realizes itself (in making this reflection) because it can so realize itself by virtue of the absolute formal Freedom of knowledge. Thus the thought views itself in this contemplation in an absolute (absolutely free) manner, according to its absolute Essence. This is sufficient so far as the substance of the intellectual contemplation is concerned. Now in regard to its *form*, whereby we in a certain manner keep it no longer within us, but make it an object of our reflection.

§ 3. *Description of the Absolute Form of Intellectual Contemplation as Original Act of Reflection.*

The thought, or knowledge, takes hold of itself with absolute Freedom. This presupposes a previous tearing itself away on the part of the thought from itself, in order to take hold of

itself again, and make itself its own object; presupposes an *emptiness* of absolute Freedom, in order to be *for* itself. Freedom creates itself; and precisely this gives us a duplicity of Freedom, which must be presupposed, however, for the act of intellectual contemplation (and generally for every reflection, in its infinite, ever higher rising possibility), and which consequently belongs to the original nature of knowledge. It is this not-being of absolute Freedom, in order to be, and to enter Being, which we here direct attention to. In the lower (objectivated) knowledge, Freedom *is* and Being *is*. Here both *is* is not, but is *in progress of being*.

In this act knowledge stands revealed to itself: 1st, as *Freedom*, whereby it describes Being; and 2d, as *Being*, which is described. In this act *both* is for itself, and without the act neither would be; all would be blindness and death. Through this act Freedom actually becomes Freedom, which is at once apparent; and Thought becomes Thought, which is to be remembered. This act brings *visibility* and *light* into both; creates it within them. It is the absolute *reflection*: and the nature of this reflection is an ACT. (This is of infinite importance.)

No reflection, therefore, as an act, without absolute Being of knowledge; again, no Being (state of repose) of knowledge without reflection; for else it would be no knowledge, and would contain neither Freedom (*which is only in an act*, and receives its Being only through this *act*) nor Being of knowledge, which is only *for-itself*.

Thus both standpoints are united in this contemplation. Whether you deduce Being from Freedom, or Freedom from Being, the deduction is always the same from the same, only viewed in a different manner; for Freedom or Knowledge is *Being* itself, and Being is Knowledge itself, and there is positively no other Being. Both views are inseparably connected, and should they nevertheless be separated—the possibility of which we can as yet only partially comprehend—they will be only different views of one and the same.

This is the true spirit of transcendental Idealism. All Being is Knowledge, The foundation of the universe is not *anti-spirit*, *un-spirit*, the relation and connection of which with spirit we should never be able to understand, but is itself spi-

rit. No death, no lifeless matter; but everywhere life, spirit, intelligence: a spiritual empire, absolutely nothing else.

On the other hand, all knowledge, if it be a *knowledge*—how error and delusions are possible, not as *substantes* of knowledge, for that is impossible, but as *accidentes* thereof, we shall see in time,—is *Being* (posits absolute reality and objectivity).

Now to the whole of this absolute reflection there is presupposed a Being of Thought as well as of (in this place stationary and existing) Freedom; and here, also, the one is not without the other. At the same time there is in the lower knowledge likewise, as has been shown, Freedom and Being (i. e. possibility of reflection, and the pure, absolute Thought), and either is also not without the other, as above. Finally, the two connections of the same, the upper and the lower, are not without each other; and we thus arrive, when consciousness begins, at an inseparable *Fivefold*, as a perfect synthesis. In the centre of it, i. e. in the act of reflecting, the intellectual contemplation has its place, and connects both, and in both the branch-members of both.

§ 4. *The Absolute Ego as Absolute Form of Knowledge.*

The intellectual contemplation stands in the centre and unites: what does this mean? Evidently, the (lower) Being is *at the same time* in and for itself, and illuminates and penetrates itself in this for-itself-existence. The contemplation, the free For-itself, is consequently essentially connected with it; and only both together are a knowledge; and otherwise Being would be blind. On the other hand, the (upper) contemplation—the free For-itself—is received into the form of repose and determinateness, and only in this union becomes a knowledge; for, in the other case, the Freedom of the For-itself would be empty and void, and would dissolve into nothingness. Thus knowledge is partly illuminating its Being, partly determining its For-itself (Light): the absolute identity of both is the intellectual contemplation, or the absolute form of knowledge, the pure form of the Ego. The *For* is only in the light; but it is at the same time a for-itself—a Being placed in the light before its own eye.

Here—which is very important—the intellectual contempla-

tion dwells within itself; it is inwardly a pure *For*, and nothing else. In order to illustrate this very abstract and in itself incomprehensible thought through its opposite (because this thought, as will soon be shown, is possible only with its opposite): an object, as *Ego* (intelligence) is above, for which there is a lower objective; but this latter is itself nothing but the upper *Ego* (intelligence). In the upper the contemplation reposes and is grounded; in the lower, Being reposes and has its ground: but both are connected in an Identity, so that, if you do think a duplicity—and you cannot think otherwise—you are forced to predicate of *each* the contemplation and the Being. In other words, there are in reality not two members, one upper and one lower, connected by a line, but the whole is one self-penetrating point; consequently, not only the *being*—one of two members, and a knowledge outside of both (as, for instance, the contemplation of an external object), but the contemplation of *their* identity in the form of one *knowledge*. This alone is real consciousness—a remark which it is necessary to make here not only for the sake of the pointedness and clearness of our whole system, but which will turn up again at a future period with a highly important consequence.

Until now we have mounted upwards, have left all the different degrees of our reflection, by which we mounted, behind us, and stand now on the highest point, in the absolute form of knowledge, the pure *For*. This *For*-itself-existence is an *absolute* *For*-itself, i. e. simply *what* and simply *because* it is, not deriving its being from another object. Its contemplation reposes, therefore, in itself for itself, which we have termed the form of thinking. It is consequently, as an absolute form of thinking, held within itself; but it does not hold itself. It is a stationary, closed, within-itself luminous eye. (There is, as we have already shown in another way, an *absolute*, qualitative, determined knowledge, which simply *is*, but is not made; and precedes all particular freedom of reflection, alone making it possible.)

In this thus closed eye, in which nothing foreign can penetrate, which cannot go beyond itself to something foreign, does our system rest; and this closedness (in-itself-completeness), which is founded on the inner absoluteness of knowledge, is the character of transcendental Idealism. Should it, neverthe-

less, seem to go beyond itself—as we certainly have hinted—it would have to go beyond itself by virtue of its own nature, and this *itself* it would then posit as its self only in a peculiar manner.

And now, since we have discovered the absolute form of knowledge to be simply For-itself, the reflection of the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, which heretofore was active and produced something, which was known only to *him*, withdraws altogether. His reflection is henceforth only passive; and vanishes, consequently, as something particular. Everything, which is to be hereafter demonstrated, lies within the discovered intellectual contemplation, the root of which is the *For-itself* of absolute Knowledge, and is but an analysis of the same; let it be understood, however, not in so far as it is regarded as a simple Being or Thing, in which case there would be nothing to analyze, but in so far as it is regarded as what it is, as knowledge. This contemplation is our own resting-point. Still, *we* do not analyze, but knowledge analyzes itself, and can do so because it is in all its knowledge a *For-itself*.

From this moment, then, we stand and repose in the Science of Knowledge—the object of the science, knowledge, having been determined. Heretofore we sought only to gain admittance into the science.

PART FIRST.

**Knowledge posits itself as a Power of Formal Freedom of
Quantitating determined through an absolute Being.**

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Knowledge posits itself as a Power of formal Freedom of Quantitating determined through an absolute Being.

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§ 1. SYNTHESIS OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN KNOWLEDGE.

A.—Knowledge posits itself as primarily determined by its Being, and hence as limited.

Knowledge has now been found, and stands before us as a closed eye, resting upon itself. It sees nothing outside of itself, but it sees itself. This self-contemplation we have to exhaust, and with it the system of all possible knowledge is exhausted, and the Science of Knowledge realized and closed.

Firstly: this knowledge sees itself (in the intellectual contemplation) as absolute knowledge. This is the first consideration which we must make clear, for only by its means has our investigation acquired a firm standpoint.

In so far as knowledge *is* absolute for itself, it reposes upon itself, and is completed in its being and its self-contemplation. This has been explained above. But the Absolute is at the same time, *because* it is. In this respect, likewise, knowledge must be absolute for itself, if it is to be an absolute knowledge *For-itself*. This is its eye and standpoint in the intellectual contemplation.

The absolute knowledge is for-itself *because* it is, signifies therefore: the intellectual contemplation is for itself an absolute self-generation out of nothing; a free self-grasping of light, which thereby becomes a stationary glance and eye. No fact of knowledge (no being or determinedness thereof) without the absolute form of the For-itself, and consequently without the possibility, freely to be reflected upon.

But absolute knowledge must be for itself *what* it is. The just described *Because* must melt together with the inner simple *What*, and this melting together itself must be inwardly and for itself. This can be very easily expressed in the following exposition: Knowledge must be for itself simply *what* it is for the immediate reason *because* it is. The determinedness of the *What* has not its ground in the *Because*, but, on the contrary, has its ground in the Being of knowledge; the *Because*

containing merely the naked fact as such, or the *That* of a knowledge, and of a knowledge of something. Or, Freedom is here, also, purely formal; demanding only, that a knowledge, a For-itself existence, be generated; and is not material, or, does not demand that *such* a particular knowledge be generated. If knowledge did not find its nature to be generative, it would not find itself at all, and would have no existence, and of a What or a Quality of knowledge we should find it impossible to speak. But finding itself generative, it finds immediately, without generation, its *What*, and without this *What* it does not find itself generative; and this not in consequence of its Freedom, but of its absolute Being. Having thus discovered, at least, that we have to unite in knowledge not simple points, but even syntheses, we now proceed to the other links of our main synthesis.

The absolute What of Knowledge is here, as is well known, also but a mere form, the form of thinking, or of the in-itself confinedness of Knowledge. As this *What*, it is to find itself independently of all Freedom, just as Freedom finds itself. But all contemplation is Freedom — *is*, consequently, absolutely *because* it is (absolute self-generation from nothingness, as above). If this *Because* were therefore to contemplate itself, the *What in its absolute character would be annihilated*. The form of this contemplation is annihilated by its substance and vanishes in itself. It is indeed a knowledge, a For-itself, which is, however, again simply *not* for itself, a knowledge without self-consciousness; an altogether *pure* Thinking, which vanishes as such the moment we become conscious of it: an absolute knowledge of a What, without the possibility to state *whence* it comes, which Whence would be its genesis.

Here likewise there is a duplicity as there is everywhere: a Being, and a free contemplation lifting itself above the Being. But both links are not again united and melted together in the present instance as they were in the previously deduced synthesis of Freedom and Being, when we found the For-itself and the What, Contemplation and Thinking, to be melted together in the absolute unity-point of consciousness. The synthetical point of unity is here, therefore, not discoverable, and is not possible; there is a *hiatus* in the knowledge. (Each.

one when asked whence he knows that he *does* this or that, replies: I know that I do such and such a thing *because* I do it;—he presupposes, consequently, an immediate connection between his doing and his knowledge, an *inseparability* of both—and since all absolute knowledge is a *saltus*—a continuity of knowledge over and beyond this *saltus*. But if you ask some one: whence he knows, for instance, that everything accidental must have the ground of its determinedness in something else, he will reply: It is absolutely so; without pretending to give a reason for the connection of this his knowledge with his other knowledge or doing. He confesses the *hiatus*.)

But both (in their immediateness separate) links form only in their unity absolute knowledge; and this absolute unity, as such, must be for itself as surely as absolute knowledge is for itself. But this unity—to explain the proposition by its opposite—would be no absolute, but merely a factual unity having its ground in Freedom, as such, if we were to express it, for instance, in this manner: “While reflecting, my reflection hit upon this”; so that it might equally as well have hit upon something else; or, “I found this while *reflecting*”; so that it might possibly have been found also by some other process. The proper expression, on the contrary, is: From the What there results absolutely *such* a reflection (not the reflection itself as a fact, for in that light it does not result at all, and is simply a *free* act, as we have abundantly shown); and from the reflection, after having been presupposed as a fact, results *such a What*.

The immediate insight into this necessary consequence—for that is what we mean by the For-itself of that unity as absolute unity—would thus be itself an absolute Thinking (an absolute contemplation of the Being of knowledge), directed upon the form of pure Thinking (as described above), as having already a for-itself existence, and upon the free reflection as a fact, and contemplating both as *being*, and as being absolutely joined together.

In this thinking, or contemplation, the whole intellectual contemplation, as we have described it above, as an absolute—not Thinking or Contemplation, but real unity of both—would be placed before its own eye as what it really is: a firm know-

ledge, reposing upon the firm ground-form of knowledge already deduced. The intellectual contemplation reflects itself; and since this cannot be done accidentally, as if the intellectual contemplation could cease to do so and still *be*, the more proper way to express is, not to say, it *does* it, but it *is* this reflection of itself. Neither can it be said that the present reflection throws its light on the previously described and (*according to our propositions*) within itself blind and in a separated duplicity disunited contemplation; for this reflection has no light within itself except what is derived from the latter, in which the For-itself of knowledge has originally realized itself. It is, consequently, always one and the same point of contemplation, absolutely illuminating itself from itself, which we have been describing throughout the whole of our investigation, although at first simply according to its outward Being (when we took the light from ourselves), and only afterwards according to its inner light.

B.—But by positing itself knowledge posits a free act of reflection as ground of its Being.

Knowledge *is* absolute *for itself*, reflects itself, and only thus does it become a knowledge. Finally, having thus become knowledge—i. e. in our successive demonstration of the subject—it is *knowledge* for itself, and reflects itself no longer as Being, for as such it does not reflect itself at all, nor as a For-itself Being, but as both in their absolute union; and only thus is it now *absolute* knowledge.

This reflection is absolutely necessary like the former one (the original reflection, which constitutes knowledge), and is simply a result of the former, of a For-itself-being of knowledge, from which it is separated only by our Science.

The characteristic nature of this reflection is at once apparent from the fact, that, making knowledge, as such, its object, composing and genetically describing it, itself must penetrate beyond this knowledge, adding and adducing links, which, although existing in the reflection—and hence for our Science which makes this reflection a knowledge, also *in* knowledge—have no existence whatever *for* knowledge itself, which we have here made the object of our reflection, and which even do not belong to absolute knowledge (for this is also em-

braced by our present reflection). (Here the self-forgetting and self-annihilating character of knowledge appears in a still clearer light.) But how it is possible for us thus seemingly to penetrate even beyond absolute knowledge, can appear only at the close of our investigation, when our Science must fully and completely explain its own possibility.

Let us immediately enter the innermost synthetical central point of this reflection. The central point of the former reflection was *absolute* knowledge, as *pure* thinking and contemplation together: Freedom of reflection determined in regard to its What, by an *absolute* What. (This was expressed as follows: Knowledge must be for-itself simply *what* it is, for the immediate reason *because* it is, &c.) Now, this knowledge reflects itself as a knowledge, and as an absolute knowledge. This does not mean on any account: it is externally for itself; as it appeared to us in our scientific reflection of the foregoing paragraph, with the present additional assurance that it is absolute, although we did so express it temporarily; but it looks through and penetrates with its glance its own nature, according to the point of union and of division thereof, and by reason of the knowledge of this point of union *is* it absolute, and does it know itself as absolute in our present reflection.

In the preceding description of knowledge the *act* of reflecting was posited as independent of its material determinedness, while on the other side its determinedness was posited as independent of the act, and it was absolutely known that these thus separated parts did nevertheless form no twofoldness. But since the point of union in which they unite—although they may remain forever divided from another point of view, which we shall not here consider—was not known, that knowledge did not really penetrate itself; and though it *was* absolute knowledge, it was not absolute knowledge *for itself*.

The last ground of the act, which as act of free reflection must always remain absolute, is its *possibility*, which lies in the absolute *form* of knowledge to be for itself; the ground of the *determinedness* of the reflection is the primary *absolute* determinedness; the ground of the absolute unity of both is understood, signifies: it is understood that the act of that reflection would not be possible (consequently could not be) without

that absolute determinedness, which is the first basis and original starting-point of all knowledge.

C.—Hence Knowledge must posit itself as both: an original determinedness of Freedom, and a Freedom as the ground of its original determinedness; or, as formal Freedom of Quantitating.

The centre of the present synthesis was absolute knowledge, encircling, determining and passing beyond all real knowledge: and we had discovered that knowledge *formaliter* could only be free, could explain itself only out of itself, and posits its ground only within itself; and that it could not be possible in any other way. But in consequence of its immediateness and of the original determinedness inseparable therefrom, which, in its infinity, can be determined, distinguished, and at the same time related only by Thinking, knowledge commences with a determined, necessary Thinking, which in the present connection can be only the absolute Thinking, and consequently *making necessary* (for absolute Thinking and necessity are one and the same) of Freedom itself. It is considered so immediately in view of its being a knowledge, a factual existence of Thinking. But in the higher reflection it is recognized as generated through absolute Freedom, through the confinedness of original Freedom to a state of immediate determinedness; and at the same time as a free passing beyond this separable determinedness, in order to relate it (by Thinking): consequently, as unity of the fixed state of determinedness and the free passing beyond this determinedness, of *Being* and *Freedom*. (The difference between absolute Being and factual Being is to be well remembered; for both determinations are transferred to one object—Thinking—and are consequently only different views of what is really one and the same.)

But—thus we argue for the present—if all knowledge is determined by this absolute law, then the knowledge of this law, as a knowledge—with which something else in knowledge is to be connected—must also be determined by it: this knowledge must consequently view itself as really generated or illuminated by Freedom; or, in other words, it must be in and for itself.

(Every one will perceive that the knowledge which in our former reflection seemed to have penetrated beyond itself,

here returns again within itself; or that only a double view of this self-encircling and self-determining knowledge is possible as an *inner* and as an *external* knowledge, and that the real focus of absolute consciousness lies probably in the uniting point of this duplicity, in the balancing between both views.—This will appear also from another representation of the subject, for example: The Thinking, that the knowledge referred to is generated by Freedom, since no knowledge can be generated in any other manner, is, as we have represented it, in reality itself a free Thinking, the subjecting of a particular instance under a general rule. Consequently, this rule must appear in and be accessible to that free Thinking. But that free Thinking signifies the freely generated actual Thinking—and this consequently presupposes itself in fixing the rule.—Or still another example: If I transfer by my own *free act* Freedom to the presupposed knowledge, I must first have this Freedom in my own free knowledge. In short, it is the same proposition which we have met in advancing all our reflections. In order to direct my knowledge with freedom upon any subject, I must know already of the subject on which I am to direct it; and in order to know of it, I must have directed my Freedom upon it; and thus on infinitely, which infinite *regressus* must even here be stopped by an absoluteness which we have now to discover.)

* It is understood that this affirmation applies not only to the centre of knowledge, but through it and from it to all its syntheses.

We approach now the exposition of this knowledge in its centre. The knowledge that knowledge is *formaliter* free, is to be within and for itself. To begin with the easiest point: the first result therefore is that Freedom *is in itself* and reposes upon itself: it contemplates itself, or—which means the same, since only the inner reposing upon itself of Freedom is called contemplation—the contemplation rests; which is a balancing of knowledge between the undetermined separability (the not yet separated and distinguished infinity).

But this contemplation is not merely to *be*; it is, moreover, to posit itself as *formaliter* free; containing the *That* (to posit itself) of this Being within itself; and this formal freedom of the contemplation is to contemplate itself. (How could we possibly create this contemplation without imagination? Our

imagination furnishes the substance of the contemplation. But as we do not imagine idly at hap-hazard, but direct our imagination to the special point of our investigation, Thinking takes also part in it.) No doubt every one will find this as the result: Freedom, dissolved and running over into the undetermined separability, must, in order to become contemplation, gather itself together and seize itself in *one point*—duplicate itself—it must be even *for* itself. Only thus can it become a point of light *from* which to distribute light over the undetermined separability.

I say, only in this One point does the contemplation become light to itself; from this point, therefore, a light arises not only upon the separable, as I said just now, but also upon the two views of the separable. These two views are: a dissolving of the light within itself, and a seizing and fixed taking hold of the light; the latter from a central point, which is wanting when the light dissolves. From this standpoint we must therefore say: The focus of this contemplation of formal Freedom is neither in the central point (the *penetrated*), nor in its two qualitative *terminis* (the penetrating), but *between* both. In so far as the light has penetrated itself in such a unity point, and contemplated such penetration, and the manifoldness which is inseparable from this contemplation, as penetrated from out this unity point, the light has been factically, and the formal Freedom the That, has been immediately posited. But in so far as the light, in order to contemplate *itself*, *penetrating* the central point, now contemplates the manifold as an infinity without unity, it destroys and puts an end to the fact; and this absolute balancing between creating and destroying the fact (destroying it in order to be able to create it, and creating it in order to be able to destroy it) is, viewed from the standpoint of contemplation, the real focus of absolute consciousness. (Both united are exemplified in every contemplation: the contemplation of *Here*, for instance, is the annihilation of the undetermined infinity of *Space*, and the contemplation of *Now* the annihilation of the undetermined infinity of *Time*; while at the same time the infinity of both Space and Time is contained in the contemplation of Here and of Now, and annihilates them again in their turn. The contemplation of the determined *This* (= *x*) separates this *x* (a tree, for instance) from the infinite chain

of all the other These (trees and not-trees), and thus annihilates the latter; while, *vice versa*, all these others must be contemplated, and consequently posited as existing, if x is to be contemplated as x —that is to say, if x is to be distinguished from any other object, &c.)

It is further to be remarked here, that the Quantity—even the infinite separability—is here immediately connected with Quality, and proved to be inseparably united with the latter, as undoubtedly we were compelled to prove in explaining the idea of absolute consciousness. For the formal Freedom, which here becomes contemplation, what else can it be but the *absolute Quality* of knowledge externally? and the *contemplation* of this formal Freedom itself, what else is it than the absolute but *inner* (For-itself) Quality of Knowledge, as a knowledge? And thus we have found, even in contemplation itself—and nowhere else can we find it, since the contemplation is absolute contemplation and absolutely nothing but contemplation—that formal Freedom views itself only as the contraction of a dissolving manifoldness of *possible* light into a central point, and the distribution of this light from out this central point over a manifoldness held and really illuminated only by the central point. (The fountain of all Quantity is consequently only in *Knowledge*—that is to say, in real knowledge, in a more contracted sense of the word—in knowledge which comprehends itself as such. Every one can comprehend this sentence who has but gained a clear insight into his knowledge; and thus new light is thrown on real transcendental idealism and its caricatures. The absolute One exists only in the form of Quantity. How does it come into this form? That we see here. How does it come into knowledge itself, the qualitative, in order thereafter to enter its form of Quantity? Thereof now.)

§ 2. SYNTHESIS OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY, OR REALITY AND IDEALITY, IN THE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE.

A.—Knowledge posits itself *for* itself, or thinks itself in factical knowledge as *necessarily* such power of formal Freedom, and hence as determined in its absolute character as a knowledge of Quantitating: Objective condition of the Ego.

Absolute Being is, as we know, in absolute Thinking. This absolute Being has entered free knowledge, signifies: the contemplation, described in the preceding § 1, with its immediate

facticity, and at the same time with the annihilation of that facticity, is on that very account one and the same with thinking; and it is this in knowledge—that is to say, it is known to be the same, and is thus absolutely known. Now, what sort of a consciousness is this? Evidently a *uniting* consciousness of the absolute contemplation of formal Freedom, with an absolute going beyond this contemplation to a Thinking. In short, a taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge as terminated here and absolutely fixed in this termination. Knowledge *thinks* itself only by such a grasping of itself; it goes beyond itself only in thus grasping its *end*; consequently, in positing an *end* for itself. The manifestation of this is the feeling of *certainty*, of *conviction*, as the absolute form of feeling, and arises conjointly with the self-substantialization of knowledge—that is to say, with the knowledge that a manifold (what this manifold is, the reader will please leave undecided) *exists*.

Now this formal Freedom is the absolute ground of all knowledge—for us, as teacher of the Science of Knowledge, and—which forms the contents of our present synthesis—for *itself*. It is absolute for itself means: this Freedom, and the knowledge which it generates, are thought as simply all Freedom and all knowledge: it is *thought* as a reposing in an absolute unity. Knowledge encircles and completes itself in this Thinking *as* the one and entire knowledge. If we consider thinking and contemplation as two separates, their union is evidently *immediate and absolute*; it is the absolute knowledge, but which knows not nor can know anything about itself; in one word, it is the immediate feeling of *certainty** (that is to say, absoluteness, immutability) of knowledge. (We here discover once again the absolute junction of contemplation and Thinking, which we found to constitute the ground-form of knowledge; and this time explaining itself genetically in the Being of knowledge itself.)

(In order to elucidate this proposition, which it might be difficult to comprehend in this simplicity of its immediate evidence, let the reader consider the following: Above we said—

* It is for this feeling of certainty, which accompanies all true knowledge, that Fichte uses the word *Intuition* as an equivalent.

Freedom must direct itself upon something which is presupposed as determined; but in order to be able to take this direction it must know beforehand of the object, which knowledge it can have acquired only through Freedom; and since this knowledge presupposes again a determined object, we are thus thrown into an infinite progress. This progress is now done away with. Freedom requires no point outside of itself to give it a direction; Freedom is in and for itself the highest Determined—hereafter the substance of knowledge—and is posited as self-sufficient *absolutely*.

Or, since knowledge has been considered from the first as the gathering together of an undetermined manifold, the knowledge of knowledge depends on this, that we know we have comprehended the altogether uneradicable unity-character of all particular acts of knowledge, however infinitely different they may be in all other respects. But how can we know this? Not by considering and analyzing the particular, for we should never get through with it. Consequently by, in a manner, prescribing a law to the particular by this very unity. Now the question is at present about absolute knowledge; consequently, about the unity of all particular determinations of knowledge—and of the objects of knowledge, which is the same thing. A law must therefore be prescribed to this absolute knowledge, so that it can recognize itself as one, as always the same eternal and immutable One, and can thus be included in its own unity. This we have done here, and in the manner just described.)

Being is consequently united with knowledge in this way, that knowledge comprehends itself as an absolute and unchangeable Being (a Being what it is, wherein it finds itself originally confined.) The difference and the connection with our former argument is very apparent: it lies between *Freedom* and *not-Freedom*. Freedom (i. e. always the formal Freedom, with the material or quantitative freedom we have nothing to do in this whole chapter) is itself *not free*; i. e. it is latent Freedom, or Freedom in form of necessity, if there is a knowledge. Possibility of knowledge only through Freedom, necessity of the latter for actual knowledge: this is the connection with our former argument. The problem is solved, and the centre of the former synthesis is itself absorbed

in knowledge ; i. e. the centre of the present synthesis is fixed. Knowledge has its end in itself ; it encircles and rests upon itself *as* knowledge.

B.—But knowledge in positing itself for itself posits itself as free, and hence as dependent only upon its Freedom: Subjective act of the Ego.

I. As we argued in C of § 1, so here. The formal Freedom which begins all actual knowledge (because it alone can give the latter a *For*, a light-point) has been thought as the absolute condition of the possibility of all knowledge, or as the necessity which conditions the character of knowledge. This thinking, by which we fuse Freedom and necessity together, must be *for itself*, must become a knowledge returning back within itself. Consequently even this knowledge, which encircles and penetrates all actual knowledge, goes again beyond itself to construct itself within itself. (In the same manner factual knowledge went beyond itself in order to arrive at the present knowledge of it. There is a triplicity, as every one can see now, and the present synthesis is again a synthesis of the two last ones.)

We enter into the centre of it. It is not at all the question and the object of our new synthesis to discover how in the uniting knowledge anything can be known of the formal act of Freedom, for the latter is the absolute contemplation itself, and absolutely originates factual knowledge from itself and by itself, but how anything can be known of necessity, and of necessity simple and pure, independently of its application to formal Freedom in the uniting Thinking.

Necessity is absolute fixedness of knowledge, or absolute thinking, and therefore excludes from its character all mobility and all penetrating beyond itself to ask for a *Because*, and it is not what it is unless all this is excluded. Now it is to be applied in a knowledge to contemplation ; consequently it must nevertheless enter knowledge, assume the form of the *For-itself*, contemplate itself, &c. But in contemplation it would see itself no longer merely as simply *what* it is, but as what it is *because* it is.

This contemplation consequently cannot contemplate itself, can arise to no knowledge of itself, because in doing so it would annihilate its form by its substance. We thus obtain

a knowledge, or (since we speak of forms generally) the *form* of a (perhaps later to be exhibited) knowledge, which absolutely does not posit itself as knowledge, but as (of course, formal) *Being*, and *as absolute upon itself reposing Being*, and which cannot be penetrated, nor permit questions about its *Because*, and which moreover does not itself go beyond itself, nor explain itself, and which finally is not either a knowledge for itself, nor anything of the kind that could be characterized as knowledge.

We have here discovered the real focus and centre of absolute knowledge. It is not to be found in the taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge (by means of formal Freedom), neither is it in its self-annihilation in absolute Being, but simply *between both*; and neither is possible without the other. It cannot take hold of itself as the *absolute* (of which we speak here, the One always coëqual, unchanging) without viewing itself as necessary, and consequently forgetting itself in this necessity; and it cannot *take hold* of necessity without *taking hold* (that is to say, without creating it) for itself. It floats between its Being and its not-Being, as it indeed must, since it carries its absolute origin *knowingly* within itself.

II. The centre and turning point of absolute knowledge is a floating between Being and not-Being of knowledge, and consequently between the being absolute and the being not absolute of Being; since the Being of knowledge cancels the absoluteness of Being, and since absolute Being cancels the absoluteness of knowledge. Let us make our standpoint firmer by a further vigorous investigation of the distinction between the Being of knowledge and absolute Being.

In order to connect our remarks with one of the links in the chain of our argument—it matters not which—let us argue thus: Knowledge cannot take hold of itself as a *knowledge* (as eternally the same and unchangeable) without viewing itself as necessary. But at present knowledge, in regard to its Being (Existence), is not at all necessary, but is grounded in absolute formal Freedom; and this must remain true as well as the former.

Now what is this peculiar Being of knowledge, in regard to which it is first necessary and not free, and at another time free and not necessary? It is true, this necessity is no other than

that of Freedom (and there can never be any other); but nevertheless it is necessity, Freedom in bondage. Hence this difficulty will easily be solved in the following manner: *If* there is a knowledge at all, it must be necessarily free (latent freedom); for freedom constitutes its character. But *that* there is a knowledge at all, depends altogether upon absolute Freedom, and it might therefore just as well be not. We will assume this answer to be correct, and see how it is *possible*. (In this investigation it will doubtless appear that it is both correct and necessary.) Knowledge was posited in this answer as that which might and might not be; we call this *accidental*. Let us describe this knowledge. It is evident that in this knowledge Freedom (formal Freedom, with which alone we have to do here) is *thought* (not contemplated) as realizing itself; for then knowledge *is*. It is *thought*, I say, and is thought, of course, as *Freedom*, as undecidedness, and indifference, in regard to the act; as melting together *Being* and *not-Being*; as pure possibility, as such, which neither posits the act, for it is at the same time checked—nor checks it, for it is at the same time posited. In short, the perfect contradiction, as such. (We try to discover here everything in knowledge, for we teach the Science of Knowledge. Thus absolute Being was nothing else to us than absolute Thinking itself, the fixedness and repose in itself, which can never can go beyond itself, the altogether ineradicable characteristic of knowledge. In like manner absolute Freedom is here the absolute *unrest*, mobility without a fixed point—the dissolving within itself. Hence thinking here annihilates itself; it is the above-mentioned absolute *hiatus* and *saltus* of knowledge which arises absolutely with all Freedom and all *originating*, and hence whenever *reality* originates from necessity. It is clear that through such a positive not-Being of itself knowledge passes to absolute Being. It is, of course, evident and admitted that of itself it is nothing; indeed, none of the links of our chain of reasoning is here for itself. It is a turning-point of absolute knowledge.

(Everything but this the logically trained Thinkers can comprehend. They shrink back from the *contradiction*. But how, then, is the proposition of that logic of theirs possible which says that no contradiction can be thought? They must have

taken hold of or thought this contradiction in some manner or another, since they make mention of it. If they would only once carefully question themselves, how they come to the Thinking of the *merely* possible, or the accidental (the not-necessary), and how they manage to do it. Evidently they jump *through* a not-Being, not-Thinking, &c., into the absolutely immediate, the free, the in-itself-originating—precisely the above contradiction actually realized. The impossibility to comprehend this produces in logical Thinking nothing less than a complete denial of Freedom, the absolute fatalism, or Spinozism.)

But this Thinking of formal Freedom is again, as we have seen above, possible on condition that the formal Freedom inwardly realizes itself in the manner described above. This realizing is now also *thought* in the present connection; for the entire disposition of knowledge, as regarded here, is one of *rest* and fixedness in itself. By this means, the lower contemplation becomes itself (i. e. to the reposing Thinking) a *Being* (condition, state), which, although it is and remains within itself agility, nevertheless conditions thinking, since it takes it from its balancing between Being and not-Being, in which it rested while a mere possibility, and fixes it down to positive Being.—Here we begin to get a clear view of subjectivity and objectivity, of ideal and real activity of knowledge. This duplicity arises from Thinking (which originates out of mere possibility) and from contemplation, which generates itself absolutely from itself (from realized Freedom) and is added as a new link.

Contemplation as contemplation, as that what it is, is only in so far as it realizes itself for itself with absolute Freedom. But this Freedom is posited in Thinking, so that this act, which produces the contemplation, could also be *not*, and only on this supposition is it an *act*; and since it is nothing else but an act, is it at all. Here, consequently, we already discover, through an easy and surprising observation, Contemplation and Thinking inseparably united in a higher contemplation, and the One not possible without the other. Knowledge, therefore (in the more limited meaning of the word, i. e. the actual knowledge which posits itself as such), does no longer consist in the mere contemplation, or in the mere Thinking,

but in the melting together of both. The form and the substance of Freedom is united, and so is also reality and possibility; since reality (as could not be otherwise) is merely the realization of possibility, and possibility (from this point of view, for we may arrive at another view of it) is nothing but a degree of reality; or, more strictly, is the reality, which is checked, in the reflection, in its transition from its possibility to its realization.

Let us ascend now to an adjoining link, which can receive nowhere so much light as in this connection. We introduced this argument by saying: *That* a knowledge is at all is accidental; but *if* a knowledge is, it is necessarily grounded in Freedom. The first part of this proposition we have explained; in the latter part, we evidently mention something concerning a knowledge which *may* be posited simply by means of the *If*, but which otherwise has neither been posited, nor not been posited. We go beyond this knowledge, and assert something about it with absolute necessity. Evidently this assertion is an absolute, unchangeable, in-itself-reposing Thinking of knowledge according to its absolute Being and Essence. Everyone sees that this assertion is not produced indirectly by the mere actual knowledge that a knowledge is (for the present instance, let us say) and has been produced by absolute Freedom, but that it must have an entirely different source; and here we arrive by another way to a more thorough and connecting reply to the question, how a knowledge of necessity can be possible? For as sure as the absolute knowledge (in the infinite facticity—actual existence—of each single knowledge) is only in the absolute form of the *For-itself*, so sure each knowledge goes also beyond itself; or, viewed from another point, is in its own Being absolutely outside of itself, and encircles itself *entire*. The *For-itself* Being of this encircling, as such, its inwardness and absolute reposing upon itself, which is of course necessary since it is a knowledge, is the just described Thinking of the necessity of the Freedom of all knowledge. The pure, inner necessity consists in this very reposing upon and not being able to penetrate beyond itself of *Thinking*; its expression is absolute essence or fundamental character (here, of knowledge); and the external form of necessity, the universality, consists in

this, that I absolutely can think every factical knowledge, however distinct and different it be from other knowledges, as a factical knowledge only with this defined fundamental character. Where, then, does all necessity come from? From the absolute comprehension of an absolute *Form of Knowledge*.

We have thus arrived at a new union. The contemplation of absolute knowledge, *as accidental* (containing an actual substance, determined in one way or other), is united with the Thinking of the necessity (i. e. the necessity conditioned by Being) of this accidentalness; and in this absolute knowledge reposes, and has exhausted its fundamental character *for itself*.

To explain:—Some one might say, all knowledge (in its infinite determinability, the source of which we, it is true, do not know as yet, but which we presuppose in the meanwhile historically) is comprehended and discovered as absolutely generating itself, which is impossible for two reasons, the second of which we have just mentioned. The real state of the matter, however, is as follows:—Knowledge is the contemplation of the described absolute Thinking of the accidentalness of the (factual) knowledge. Knowledge *is* not free because it is thought free, nor is it thought *free* because it *is* free, for between both these links there is no Why or Therefore, no distinction whatever; but the *Thinking itself free* and the *absolutely being free* of Knowledge is one and the same. We are speaking of a Being of Knowledge, consequently of a *For*; of an *absolute* Being of Knowledge, consequently of a *For* in *Thinking* (a reposing within itself), in which it completely penetrates itself to its very first root.

C.—Both are one and the same: Knowledge is necessarily free if there is a knowledge, but that there is Knowledge depends upon absolute Freedom; its thinking itself free and its being free are one and the same; the condition is not without the act, nor the act without the condition.

Back to the standpoint of the complete synthesis.

Through the itself realizing contemplation, the previously free and in-freedom-reposing-thinking becomes fixed; being no longer a *real*, factical, conditioned thinking;—and this thinking is thus fixed for itself. In *actual* thinking, as such, formal Freedom is annihilated; it is a contemplation, but on no ac-

count is this same contemplation at the same time not. The Not-Being, which was thought together with it in formal Freedom, is here (i. e. in so far as the Real and not the merely Possible is thought) annihilated; and this very annihilation of formal Freedom must be thought if the real Thinking is to comprehend itself as real and confined—if, therefore, it is to be for itself. (Hence the Subjective and Objective, the Upper and Lower in knowledge; the unchangeable Subjective, or the ideal activity, is the formal Freedom: either to be, or not to be: here, however, viewing itself as cancelled; the unchangeable Objective, the Real, is the confinedness as such, through which formal Freedom, however, as indifference of Being and Not-Being, is cancelled. We have explained here also the Thinking of the Accidence, or what in the Science of Knowledge signifies the same thing, of the Accidence itself. It is a Thinking in which formal Freedom is posited as cancelled; a confined Thinking, as all Thinking is, which, however, at the same time, is thought as confined for and within itself.)

All this becomes clear and productive only when we compare and connect it with its nearest adjoining links.—We said above: We cannot think a fact, as such, without thinking at the same time that it could also *not* be. Here again we thought accidentalness and united formal and real Freedom, the existence of the former and its cancelling through the latter, in one thinking, just as we do here. Now, are both one and the same, or different? The more similarity there is between the two, the more necessary is it to distinguish them, and the more productive of results the distinction; for, I say, both are not the same at all.

That previous thinking starts from the thinking of Freedom, reposes in this Nothing and contradiction of pure undecidedness (B) as its focus; and is consequently, whenever it reflects upon and seizes itself (as it does in the above thought) in order to get out of itself to the fact, a mere nothing, it is ephemeral, dissolving and cancelling itself. Consequently the fact, seized in such a moment, which is to be, although it could just as well *not* be, is likewise reflected and seized only as undecided and dissolving within itself, as the external form of a fact, without inner reality and life; as a point, it is true, but as a point which is never at rest, and which strays in the infinite

empty space, in a pale, lifeless picture; nothing but the mere beginning and attempt of a real thought and determining which never arrives at a real fact.

(It seems to us, that Philosophy might explain itself without difficulty on this question as something generally known not only to not-philosophers and to the empty, purely logical philosophers, but also to the public at large. For this sort of thinking is of the very kind which they have been cultivating the greater part of their lives; *that empty, desultory thinking which results when somebody sits down in order to think and reflect, and cannot tell you afterwards what he has thought about, or what thoughts have really occupied his time.* Now, how have these people existed during this time, since they must have existed in some way! *They have floated in the not-Being of real knowledge, in the standpoint of the absolute*, but where from sheer absoluteness no thought was able to form itself. It will appear, that the greater part of the system of knowledge of most men remains stuck in the Absolute; and that to us all the whole infinite experience which we have not yet experienced,—in short, *eternity*—and hence, indeed, the objective world remains also hidden in that very Absolute.)

The present thinking, on the contrary, stands within itself in its own confinedness; reposes, if we may say so, as if lost in this confinedness, in order to proceed progressively from it to the understanding that formal Freedom has been cancelled in this confinedness. In its root it is always factical, and proceeds only thence to the absolute, and only to the mere negation of it; while the former thinking was absolute in its root, and proceeded merely to an empty picture of a fact.

Now this confinedness is, as we know, a taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge, and its result is contemplation or light. To this therefore, to this state of light, thinking is confined by the above described cancelling and fixing of formal Freedom; or, to use a more common expression, by *Attention*, which is nothing but Freedom surrendered to the object you pay attention to, a forgetting of self, a confinedness, fixedness of thinking, &c., &c. It is apparent, therefore, that formal Freedom is *Indifference* to Light and Attention; it may surrender itself to them, or it may not; the very desultory,

in-itself-dissolving thinking, mentioned above; the floating in the absolute.

Now, how does knowledge know that it has thus taken hold of and holds itself? Evidently, immediately; for the very reason that it knows or thinks itself as the Holding; in short, through the *That* of formal Freedom. Again, how can knowledge obtain a sight of this *That*—the same formal Freedom—except by having sight (by being a For-itself)? Its light is dependent upon its Freedom; but since this Freedom is *its own*, Freedom is again dependent upon light, is only *in light*. Knowledge knows that it holds itself and is thus the absolute source of light, and this constitutes its absoluteness; and, *vice versa*, it knows and has light only in so far as it holds itself with absolute Freedom (is *attentive*), and knows that it does so. It cannot be free without knowing, nor know without being free.

Ideal and *real* views are altogether united and inseparable; the condition with the act, the act with the condition; or rather, in absolute consciousness they are not all divided, but are One and the same.

This absolute knowledge now makes itself its own object; firstly, in order to describe itself as absolute. This is done, according to the above, by constructing itself from out of not-Being; and this construction is itself internally an act of Freedom, which is however here lost within itself.

It is evident, however, that it cannot so construct itself without being; consequently without having, in some view, a fixed existence. If, in one of these views, it starts from its condition of Light, it will posit the *act*, Freedom, as the cause of Light; and should it reflect again upon itself in this positing, it will become aware that it could not see this act, unless by the presupposed light, immanent within itself, and then it will obtain an *idealistic* view of itself. If, on the other hand, it starts from Freedom as the act, it will view the light as the product of this act, and will thus be led to view the *original* Freedom as the *real* ground of Light, and view itself realistically.

But according to the true description of absolute knowledge which we have now drawn, it views itself in the one way as well as in the other only onesidedly. Consequently neither the one, nor the other view, in contemplation, but both united

in Thinking, constitute the true view, which is the basis of both these contrary views of contemplation, and upon it alone shall we be able to build anything.

§ 3. SYNTHESIS OF THINKING AND CONTEMPLATION, OR SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENCE IN ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

A.—Knowledge posits itself for itself as a Self-originating, and hence posits a Not-Being of Itself, or an Absolute Pure Being (Check), as its origin and limit: Thinking or Substance.

The conception of absolute knowledge having been exhausted in all respects, and we having found at the same time how it could thus exhaustively comprehend itself, or how a Science of Knowledge could be possible, we now rise to its highest origin and ground.

Besides the conception of the Absolute, established at the beginning, we have in our last investigations obtained a still clearer conception of the form of the Absolute: namely, that in relation to a possible knowledge it is a pure, altogether and absolutely within itself confined Thinking, which never goes beyond itself to ask the Why of its formal or material Being, or to posit a Because of it, even though it were an absolute Because; in which, on the very account of this absolute negation of the Because, the *For-itself* (knowledge) has not yet been posited, and which, consequently, is in reality a mere pure Being without knowledge, although we have to make this Being discernible in our Science of Knowledge from the standpoint of the absolute pure form of Thinking.

Knowledge therefore, as *absolute* and confined in its origin, must be designated as the *One* (in every sense of the term, of which indeed it receives several only in the relative), as ever the same unchangeable, eternal, and ineradicable *Being* (God, if we persist in connecting him with knowledge and leaving him a relation to it), and in the state of this original confinedness as *Feeling*=A.

Nevertheless, this Absolute is to be an absolute *knowledge*; it must therefore be *for* itself, which it can become, as we have seen, only in a fact, through the absolute realization of Freedom—in so far being simply *because* it is—by going beyond itself, and again generating itself, &c., which ideal series we have also completely exhausted=B.

Now—which is least important, but cannot be neglected—since as knowledge it generates B with absolute Freedom, but *within* knowledge—it will probably know also of this Freedom as the ground of this knowledge (=F—B).

Again—which is more important—this B is not to be merely a knowledge for and of itself as the product of Freedom,—which, even though it were possible in itself (although it cannot be so according to all former explanations, since the consciousness of Freedom can develop itself only in and *from out* of its own confinedness) would result in a completely new knowledge not at all connected with A; but B, according to our former deductions, is to be a For-itself of A in and through B. B must not tear itself away from and lose A.; for if it did, there would be no absolute knowledge at all, but merely a free, accidental, empty, unsubstantial knowledge.

From this follows, first of all, a simply immediate, and in-itself- absolute connection of A and B, $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ + \\ B \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ which, it is true, is not without B (the realization of Freedom); but which, if B is, arises altogether in an immediate manner, and arrives at a consciousness of itself according to its character in A itself; which is consequently known as a *feeling* of dependency and conditionedness; and in this respect we have called A Feeling.

Again: the knowledge B is a knowledge, a *For-itself*. This signifies now not only: it is a knowledge generated through Freedom; but, at the same time, it is a knowledge connected with and expressing the Absolute through the above connection +. (In the foregoing exposition A is added to F; consequently, A—F—B.) We have, therefore,

1. A *For-itself existence*, a reflection of absolute knowledge, which presupposes in itself that absoluteness (A). This reflection undoubtedly obeys its own inner laws regarding the *form* of knowledge, and with the clearer exposition of this reflection we shall soon have to busy ourselves.

2. A appears visibly twice, partly as presupposed prior to *all* knowledge, the substantial basis and original condition of it, and partly in *free* knowledge (B), in which it becomes visible to itself and enters into light (in accordance with the absolute form of the *For-itself*, expressed in the sign +). Where,

then, is the seat of absolute knowledge? Not in A, for then it would not be knowledge; not in B, for then it would not be absolute knowledge; but between both in +.

From this there results the following:

1. Absolute knowledge $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ + \\ B \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ is for itself (in B) just as absolutely *because* it is, as absolutely *what* it is. Both, though it seems to be contradictory, must, as we have shown, be kept together, if there is to be an absolute knowledge. The way and mode of this remaining together is to be found in knowledge itself, and constitutes the *formal laws* of knowledge, according to which the entire B is = A—F—B. In other words, the whole contents, A, must enter, through the realization of Freedom, F, in the form of light, B.

2. It is *For-itself* (=F) simply *what* it is (=A) — which expresses the contradiction in the most positive manner — can signify only: its *Freedom* and its *For-itself* or its knowledge is (and for this very reason for *itself*) at an end. It discovers in itself and through itself its absolute *end* and its limitation; in itself and through itself, I say; it penetrates knowingly to its absolute origin (from the not-knowledge), and arrives thus through itself (that is to say, in consequence of its absolute transparency and self-knowledge) *at its end*.

Now this is precisely the mystery which no one has been able to perceive because it lies too openly before our eyes, and because *in* it alone we see everything! If knowledge consists just in this, that it views its own origin; or, still more definitely and with abstraction from all duplicity, if knowledge itself signifies: *For-itself* Being, inner life of the *origin*; then it is very clear that its end and its absolute limit must fall also within this *For-itself*. Now, according to all our explanations and the evident perception of each, knowledge does consist in this very penetrability, in the absolute light-character, subject-object, Ego; consequently, it cannot view its absolute origin, without viewing its non-Existence or its limit.

3. What then, now, is absolute Being? It is the absolute origin of knowledge comprehended in knowledge, and consequently the not-Being of knowledge. It is Being-in-knowledge, and yet not Being of knowledge; *absolute* Being, because the knowledge is absolute.

Only the beginning of knowledge is *pure Being*; wherever knowledge is, there is *its own* being already; and everything else which might be taken for Being (for something objective) is this Being and obeys its laws. The pure knowledge viewed as *origin* for itself, and its opposite as not-Being of knowledge—because otherwise it could have no origin—is *pure Being*.

(Or let us say, if people only will understand us correctly, the absolute creation, as creation and by no means as the created substance, is the standpoint of absolute knowledge; this creates itself from its simple possibility, and this very possibility is pure Being.)

That is, this is pure Being for the Science of Knowledge and precisely because that science is a science of *knowledge*, and deducing Being from knowledge as its negation and being. It is consequently an ideal view of Being, and its highest ideal view. Now it may well be that here this negation is itself the absolute position (affirmation), and that our position itself is in a certain respect a negation, and that in the Science of Knowledge, though subordinated to it, we shall find a highest real view, according to which knowledge also does certainly create itself—and accordingly everything created and to be created—but only according to the form; according to the substance, however, after an absolute law (into which the Absolute Being now changes), which law negates every knowledge and being as the highest position. A pure moralism, which is realistically (practically) exactly the same that the Science of Knowledge is formally and idealistically.

B.—But Knowledge posits itself as a Self-originating for-itself, and hence originates itself in this self-positing or preposits itself: Contemplation or Accident.

a. The in-itself-confined thinking in A can be viewed as inwardly and originally (not factically, since this is denied by its essence) in itself confined and unable to go beyond itself. Such would indeed be its character in relation to a possible consciousness, the origin and foundation of which would be this very in-itself-confinedness, and at the same time the *consciousness* of this confinedness; we have therefore called it *Feeling*;—Feeling, even of this absoluteness, unchangeableness, &c., from which, it is true, we can derive nothing at present, and which is to serve us only as a connecting link. Besides,

it would be a realistical view, if it were and could be any view at all.

b. This A, however, is known in B, though altogether independent of it in *form*, and is viewed in it as an absolute origin, to which, in the same knowledge, a *not-Being* of knowledge necessarily attaches itself from the very nature of knowledge, which otherwise could not be a knowledge or viewing of its own origin. Here A seems to have arisen out of B, and the view is idealistic.

c. Now the important matter here is to us, that this knowledge *inwardly* and *for-itself*, and, let us add, in its immediateness (in its form), is *absolute*; or, which is the same, that the contemplated origin is absolute, or that the not-Being of knowledge is the absolute—expressions which all mean the same, and follow one from the other. It is this, means: it is so without the coöperation and independently of Freedom, consequently in a *Feeling* of confinedness; through which the above described feeling of absoluteness enters knowledge, and with it together constitutes the absolute A as real and as independent of Freedom. Thus the realistic and idealistic views are thoroughly united, and a Being appears which exists in Freedom, whilst also a Freedom is made apparent which originates *from out of* Being (it is the moral Freedom, or creation which comprehends itself as absolute creation from Nothingness); and both therefore—and with them Knowledge and Being—are united.

Let us explain:—1. In actual knowledge this is the feeling of certainty, which always accompanies a particular knowledge as a principle of the possibility of all *knowledge*. Evidently this feeling is absolutely immediate; for how could I ever, in mediated knowledge, draw the conclusion that anything is certain unless I presuppose a premise which is absolutely certain in itself? (For where is the drawing of conclusions to commence otherwise? or is absolute Unreason to precede reason?) But what is this feeling in regard to its substance? Evidently a consciousness of an unchangeableness (an absolute in-itself-determinedness of knowledge, of which the *That* is well known; but by asking after its Why or Because, we lose ourselves in the absolute not-Being of knowledge (=to the absolute Being). In certainty, therefore (=the *for-itself* of absoluteness of know-

ledge), ideal and real, absolute Freedom and absolute Being, or necessity, unite.

2. The *For-itself* existence of the absolute origin is absolute Contemplation, fountain of Light, or the absolute *Subjective*; the not-Being of knowledge and the absolute Being, which necessarily connect with the *For-itself* existence, are absolute Thinking—fountain of *Being* within the Light; consequently, since it nevertheless is within knowledge, the absolute *Objective*. Both fall together (unite) in the immediate *For-itself* of Absoluteness. This, therefore, is the last tie between subject and object, and the entire synthesis here established is the construction of the pure, absolute Ego. This tie is evidently the fountain of all *knowledge* (i. e. of all certainty), from which it follows that, in the particular case of this certainty, the subjective agrees with the objective, or “the representation of the thing with the thing itself.” This is only a modification of the discovered ground-form of all knowledge. (It is therefore very wrong to describe the Absolute as Indifference of the Subjective and Objective, a description which is based on the old hereditary sin of dogmatism, which assumes that the absolute Objective is to enter into the Subjective. This supposition I hope to have rooted out by the foregoing. If Subjective and Objective were originally indifferent, how in the world could they ever become different, so as to enable any one to say, that *both*, from which he starts as different, are in reality indifferent? Does, then, the absoluteness annihilate itself in order to become a relation? If this were so, it would become absolutely Nothing, as it indeed is the contradiction which we have pointed out above, only in another connection; and this system, iustead of absolute identity-system, ought to be called absolute nullity system. On the contrary, both are absolutely different; and in their being kept apart by means of their union in absoluteness, knowledge consists. If they unite, Knowledge and with Knowledge, they also are annihilated—and pure Nothingness remains.)*

d. We have said the origin is an absolute one, from out which and beyond which it is impossible to go. It seems, therefore, to be unchangeable in this *For-itself*; and yet it is

* This is a polemic against Schelling.—*Translator.*

presupposed by it. But the origin is not in this For-itself, except in so far it is realized through absolute formal Freedom (as we have learned to know this Freedom as that which can and cannot be); the origin is not contemplated unless it makes itself; it does not make itself unless it is contemplated (a difference of subject and object which, strictly, ought to be annihilated here in a unity of the subject, in fact in an *inwardness* of the origin); and it is not contemplated except in so far as this Freedom as such is for itself, or is viewed as in-itself-originating (itself realizing).

If I reflect upon the latter, knowledge appears in regard to its Being generally as accidental; in regard to its substance, however, which is nothing else than that knowledge is absolute, as necessary. From this the double result follows: that a knowledge is at all, is accidental; but that it, if it is, is *thus*—i. e. a knowledge reposing upon itself, For-itself existence of the origin, and on that very account not-Being, Contemplation and Thinking together—is absolutely necessary.

What, now, is that *Being* of Knowledge (inwardly; not according to the external characteristics, which we have become sufficiently acquainted with), and what is, on the contrary, this *Thus-Being* (Determination) of knowledge? The first, like all Being, a confinedness of Thinking, but of *free* Thinking; the latter a confinedness of the not-free, but absolutely in its own origin already confined Thinking. The Thinking is therefore only the formal, the enlightening, but not the generating of the material of the *Thus-Being*; the latter must be presupposed by the former.

But now both are altogether the same, and the only distinction is that in the latter Freedom is reflected upon and everything viewed from its standpoint, while in the former Freedom neither is nor can be reflected upon: that here knowledge, therefore, separates from itself, since in the higher thinking it does not presuppose, but generates itself, and in the lower thinking, on the contrary, presupposes itself for itself.

We have arrived at a very important point. The fundamental principle of all reflection, which is a disjunction and a contradiction, has been found: all knowledge presupposes in the same manner, and from the same reason, its own Being, that it presupposes its not-Being. For the reflection, standing

as it does on the standpoint of Freedom, is a for-itself Being of the origin as an *originating*; and thus the present proposition differs from the former. But the originating, as such, presupposes a not-originating, consequently a Being; and if we speak of the originating of knowledge, as we must, since only knowledge originates (Knowledge=Originating), a Being of knowledge; and if we speak of a confinedness to originating, as we have done here, an equally confined Being, or *Thus-Being* of knowledge: and *this* is the object of the reflection. Knowledge cannot generate itself without being already, nor can it be for itself and as knowledge without generating itself. Its own Being and its Freedom are inseparable.

Visibly the reflection, therefore, reposes upon a Being; is *formaliter* a free, and, in regard to the material, a fixed Thinking, and the result is therefore this: If the formal Freedom—which, to be sure, in itself always remains, but can just as well not be (not realize itself)—does realize itself, it is simply and altogether determined by the absolute Being, and is in this connection material Freedom. Thus the synthesis is completed, in which we can now move freely, and describe it in all directions.

C.—Both are one and the same: Contemplation, or the Freedom of undetermined Quantitating, can be thought only as determined by the original Thinking of an Absolute Being, and the thinking of an Absolute Being is determined by the Contemplating of a Quantitating: neither is without the other.

Let us describe it, then, from a new point of view.

1. A (the absolute Being, pure Thinking, Feeling of dependence, or whatever else we choose to call it, since it really presents itself in these different aspects as the reflection progresses) is reflected *with* absolute formal Freedom. I have said, *with*; the Freedom is added, might be and might not be. But this Freedom is an absolute For-itself; knows, consequently, in this its realization of itself. *What* it reflects, however, is the absolute Thinking; i. e. it thinks absolute; or, the formal Freedom is admitted in this absolute Thinking, and receives therefrom its substance, since it might just as well not be as be, but when it is, it *must* necessarily be *thus*. (Moral origin of all Truth.)

Remark here the absolute disjunction, and in two directions:

a. Knowledge is chained down in A: again it tears itself loose from itself in order to be for itself and form a free Thinking. Both statements are absolutely contradictory; but both are, if there is to be knowledge, *equally* original and absolute. This contradiction therefore remains and can never be harmonized; and this is an external view for knowledge, since its focus is really in us.

b. Let us now approach the inner view by throwing the focus into the reflection itself. The reflection knows immediately of the absolute Freedom, with which it realizes itself, knows free, or knows of Freedom. But now it also thinks confinedly. Both statements are in contradiction, and remain equally always contradictory. (The ground of all opposition, of all manifoldness, &c., is to be found in *confined* Thinking.) But both are also united in this, that the absolute Thinking is the principal, nay, the only possible origin of all free reflection; and thus Freedom is subordinated to absolute Thinking. Here is the ground of all substantiality and accidentality: freedom as *substratum* of the accident can and cannot be; but if it is, it is unalterably determined through absolute Being as the substance. (Spinoza knows neither substance nor accident, because he knows not Freedom, which connects both. The absolute accident is not that which can be *thus* or otherwise; for then it would not be absolute, but merely that which can be at all or not be; which, however, if it is, is necessarily determined.)

The turning-point between both is formal Freedom, and this turning-point is (not arbitrary, but *determined*) ideal and real. My knowledge of the absolute (the substance) is determined through the free reflection, and—since this is also confined, as we have shown—through its confinedness=accidentality. (We know of the substance only through the accident.) Or, *vice versa*, placing ourselves on the standpoint of Being, the determinedness of the accident is explained to us by means of the substance; and thus the in-itself eternally and absolutely disjoined is united by the necessity to proceed from the one to the other.

2. Formal Freedom, as we have seen, must in this reflection know of itself; otherwise it would not be subordinated to absolute Being, but would dissolve in it. But it knows of itself,

as we are aware, only through contemplation, which is an altogether free floating within the unconditioned separable, and over all quantitability. (That this whole quantitability is altogether a result of the self-contemplation of Freedom, we have proved sufficiently; but it must not be forgotten, since the neglect to remember it leads to dogmatism.) It views itself as free, means: it views itself as quantitating in the unconditioned, expanding itself over *infinity* and contracting itself in a seeming light-point. From this arises, therefore, still another material determinedness, which here, it is true, remains only determinability, and which arises simply from Freedom and its absolute representation in the reflection itself.

Here is visible the disjunction between the absolute formal Freedom (which can only be or not be) and the quantity-contents of it. The first is a Thinking, but a free Thinking; the latter a contemplation, and a *formally* confined contemplation. (I say, formally; for quantitability only, and not a determined quantity, has been posited as yet.) Both are united by the in-itself-dissolving form of Freedom, without which, according to our former conclusions, neither would be at all. It is further evident that this is the groundform of all *causality*. The actual Freedom is ground (cause), the quantity (no matter what quantity), result, effect. It is clear that the *Ideal* and *Real* thoroughly unite here. (Let no one say, that in knowledge a conclusion is drawn from the effect to the cause, although the cause is to be the real ground. Here effect is not at all without immediate cause; both fall together and unite.)

3. Now, according to 1, Freedom is to receive a material determination, i. e. absolute Being. In its nature Freedom is confined to a quantitating, but it has not *within* itself a determining law for this quantitating. (If it had, the necessity for that material determinedness would be done away with.) That material determinedness must therefore apply in the same manner to Freedom as to quantity. (The reader will remark how this is proved.)—Now pay particular attention to the following: The Ego—the immediate, real consciousness—knows not generally, nor does it know particularly of the determination of Freedom through the Absolute, except in so far as it knows of Freedom, or as it posits itself quantitating. Both (1 and 2) are mutually determined through each other.

Both consequently ought to unite—if a knowledge is to be ; the determination of Freedom through the Absolute as a material determination—not a formal one, for that is included in the form of Knowledge—consequently as a limitation of the quantitating—and a certain, no longer arbitrary, but through the Absolute determined quantitating ; and of both must be known absolutely because it is known—as is always known—and that this is absolute knowledge must also be known in the same immediate manner.

Thus there would occur in no knowledge the determination of the throughout formal pure Freedom through absolute Being, nor, if Freedom be already materialized, the consciousness of the quantitating as the product of that relation ; as if this consciousness would first look at that relation, and then quantitate itself accordingly with Freedom ; no less would there be found in any knowledge a *quantum* limited through absolute Freedom, as if knowledge could now relate this *quantum* to the original determination of Freedom through absolute Being : but a *quantum* is found with the immediate consciousness that it is determined by the absolute Being, and from this finding all knowledge commences. The union of both links, as a *fact*, takes place outside of (beyond) consciousness. (The result is plain : Truth cannot be seized outside of and without knowledge, and knowledge then be arranged to suit such truth ; truth must and can only be *known*. *Vice versa*, we cannot know without knowing something—and if it is a knowledge and knows itself as such—without knowing *truth*.)

D.—Results.

We contract all the preceding into a common result.

1. Knowledge, if it contemplates itself, finds itself as an inner and for and in itself originating. *If* it contemplates itself, I say ; for just as well as it might not be at all, it might not be for itself. Its duplicity as well as its simplicity depend on its Freedom. The entrance into the Science of Knowledge is Freedom ; therefore this science cannot be forced upon any one, as if it had already an existence within everybody's knowledge, merely requiring to be developed by analysis ; but it rests upon an absolute act of Freedom, upon a new creation.

Again: It contemplates itself—this is the second part of our assertion—as *absolutely* originating; *if* it is, being simply because it is, presupposing no condition whatever of its reality. This comprehension of the absoluteness, this knowledge which knowledge has of itself and what is inseparable therefrom, is absolute, is *Reason*. The mere simple knowledge, which does not again comprehend itself as knowledge, is *Understanding*. The common, also philosophical, knowledge understands, it is true, according to the laws of reason (of Thinking), and is forced to do so, because otherwise it would not be knowledge at all; it *has* therefore reason, but it does not comprehend its reason. To such philosophers their reason has not become something inward, something for itself; it is outside of them, in nature—in a curious sort of soul of nature, which they call God. Their knowledge (understanding) posits therefore *objects*, precisely externalized reason. All the certainty of their mere understanding presupposes in an infinite retrogression another certainty; they cannot go beyond this retrogression, because they do not know the fountain of certainty (the absolute knowledge). Their actions (prompted merely by the understanding) have an *end*, also externalized reason from another view; and even this separating of reason into a theoretical and practical part, and of the practical part into the opposition of *object* and *end*, arises from neglect of reason.

2. In this contemplation of the originating, knowledge discovers a not-Being, which moves up, if we may say so, to the former without any coöperation of Freedom; and in so far as this originating is absolute, this not-Being is also an absolute not-Being, which can be neither explained nor deduced any further. The not-Being is to precede the originating as a fact; from not-Being we are to proceed to Being, and by no means *vice versa*. (This moving up of not-Being, and its position as the primary, rests also upon immediate contemplation, and by no means on a higher knowledge, &c. True, everybody will say: “Why, it is natural that a not-Being should precede an origin, if it is to be a real, absolute origin; this I comprehend immediately.” But if you ask him for the proof, he will not be able to give it, but will plead absolute certainty. His assertion is consequently our absolute contemplation, expressed in

words, and is derived from it, not *vice versa*; for our doctrine remains one of contemplation.)

3. Now let this thus described knowledge again reflect upon itself, or be in and for itself. This it *can* do necessarily, as sure as all knowledge can do it, according to its ground-form; but it is not compelled to do so. If, however, only the first and ground-view is to remain *permanent* and *standing*, and not to vanish like a flash of light, giving place again to the former darkness, then this reflection will follow of itself; indeed it is nothing else than the making that fundamental view permanent.

This reflection, or this new knowledge, comprehending the absolute knowledge, as such, cannot penetrate beyond it, nor wish to explain it any further; for then knowledge would never come to an end. It attains a firm standpoint, a reposing, unchangeable object. (This is very important.) So much about its form. Let us now investigate its substance.

There is thus evidently in this reflection a double knowledge: 1st, of the absolute originating, and, 2d, of the not-Being accompanying it, which was above a not-Being of all knowledge, but is here, as the reflection must *know* of it, merely a not-Being of the originating; hence a knowledge of a reposing absolute Being, opposed to knowledge, and from which Knowledge, in its originating, starts.

4. Let us view the relation of this twofold in the reflection of it. The comprehending of the absolute Being is a Thinking, and, in so far as it is reflected upon, an inner Thinking, a Thinking for itself. The For-itself of the originating, on the contrary, is a contemplation. Now neither the one nor the other alone, but both are reflected as the absolute knowledge. Both, therefore, must be again joined together in their mutual relation as the absolute knowledge. And firstly, since Freedom for itself is an undetermined quantitating, but is only through absolute Being (original Thinking, or whatever you choose to call it), this determination in knowledge must be that of a quantitating. (I say, expressly, in knowledge, as such, and thereby knowledge rises above itself, comprehending and separating *its own*, immanent law from the absolute.)

This is comprehended as absolute knowledge, means:—some particular quantitating is immediately comprehended as

that which is demanded by absolute Being or Thinking, and only in this falling together of both does *consciousness* arise. It is to be hoped that the whole matter is clear now, and every one can judge whether he understands it by answering the following questions :

Ques. In what standpoint or focus does absolute knowledge commence? or—which is the same—where does all relative knowledge stand still, where is it at an end, and where has it encircled itself?

Ans. In the knowledge of a particular quantitating as determined through absolute Being= A . Not in the knowledge of the quantitating by itself, nor of the determinedness of the same through absolute Being; but in the—not *Indifference*, but—*Identity-point* of both; in the imperceptible, consequently not further comprehensible or explainable, unity of the absolute Being and the For-itself Being in knowledge, beyond which even the Science of Knowledge cannot go.

Ques. Whence then, now, the *duplicity* in knowledge?

Ans. *Formaliter*: from the absolute *For-itself* of this very knowledge, which is not chained down to, but penetrates beyond, itself; from its absolute form of reflection, which on that very account includes infinite reflectibility: the free talent of knowledge (which can therefore be or not be) to make each of its own states its object, and put it before itself to reflect upon. *Materialiter*: Because this thus *found* and not *generated* knowledge is a *Thinking of an absolute quantitability*.

Ques. Whence, then, now in knowledge the *absolute* Being and the *quantitability*?

Ans. Even from a disjunction of that higher, the Thinking and the Contemplation in reflection. (Knowledge finds itself and finds itself ready-made; applied *Realism* of the Science of Knowledge.)

Ques. Is then, now, the Contemplation equal to the Thinking, or the Thinking equal to the Contemplation?

Ans. By no means. Knowledge *makes* itself neither of these two, but finds itself as both; although, *as* finding itself constituted by both, it indeed makes itself, since it elevates itself by its own Freedom (free reflection) to this highest idea of itself.

Now, in this very point the knot of the absolute misunderstanding of our science is to be found. (I shall never live to experience that this *is understood*, i. e. penetrated and applied!) Knowledge makes itself, according to its *nature*, its *ground-substance*: this is half, superficial *Idealism*. The Being, the Objective, is the first; knowledge, the *form* of the For-itself-Being follows from the nature of this Being; this is empty *Dogmatism*, which explains nothing.—Both must be kept apart in the conception of them and both also must be reconciled and united, as we have done here, according to their relation and position in reality—and this is *transcendental Idealism*. This discovered duplicity, however, is nothing else than what we have heretofore termed *Thinking* and *Contemplation* in their most original significance, and their relation to each other, whereof now.

Ques. Whence then, now, the relation of both to each other *in knowledge*? (I say, in knowledge, since only in knowledge a *relation* is possible.)

Ans. Because Thinking is the in-itself *firm* and *immovable*—penetrated by the real, by Being, and penetrating it—subjective-objective in *original* unity; therefore absolute cognizability, the real substantial basis of all knowledge, &c., &c.;—and because contemplation is *mobility* itself, expanding the above substantial (of Thinking) to the *infinity* of knowledge; because, therefore, the latter is brought to rest by the former, and thereby fixed *for the reflection*, thus becoming an *absolute* and at the same time *infinite* substantial—not a passing-away and in-itself-dissolving—*knowledge*.

This is the *conception* of absolute knowledge; and at the same time it is explained—from the absolute form of knowledge—how knowledge (in the Science of Knowledge) can comprehend and penetrate itself in its absolute conception. The Science of Knowledge explains at one and the same time, and from the same principle, itself and its object absolute knowledge; it is therefore itself the highest Focus, the self-realization and self-knowledge of the absolute knowledge, as such, and in that it bears the impress of its own completion.

PART SECOND.

**Knowledge posits itself for itself as a determined Freedom
of Quantitating, or as Nature.**



PART SECOND.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as a determined Freedom of Quantitating, or as Nature.

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- § 1. Knowledge cannot posit itself for itself as a determined freedom of quantitating without both *thinking* that Freedom as the ground of all quantity, and at the same time *contemplating* a quantity as factually the prior.

The standpoint and the result of the last reflection, which constituted absolute knowledge, was a determinedness of Freedom, as a quantitating, through absolute Being or Thinking. Let it be well understood, as a quantitating generally, but by no means yet as the positing of a fixed *quantum*. Upon this we must now reflect again, altogether in analogy with the former reflections. As absolute knowledge went beyond itself

and placed itself before itself, in its form of reflection, as a reciprocity of substantiality and accidentality, so also here.

Let us first, however, observe the following:—This reflection is, as we have seen, a multiplicity, if it views itself with respect to its components, which, in that case, are not knowledge, but merely the necessary components of knowledge; but as knowledge it is simple, and the very final point of all knowledge. We now propose to descend from this point, in order to discover *standpoints* of knowledge, which in themselves are again equally manifold. Their particular character must always be well remembered.

Now, while we said formerly, this reflection occurs; we here express ourselves thus: this reflection *must* occur. This *must* is a conditional must; it means, *if* a knowledge is to be, then a reflection must have taken place. But as knowledge, from its highest absolute point of view, is accidental, a knowledge *must* not necessarily be, and the necessity, which we have demanded, is therefore only a conditional necessity. Yet on that very account we must prove the conditional necessity of this and all other reflections which we shall hereafter put forth, i. e. we must deduce the reflection as such.

We approach this deduction. The knowledge, spoken of, is the knowledge of a determinedness of *quantitating*. But this is not possible, unless the quantitating, in its agility and mobility, as it was described above, is realized, and unless the focus of knowledge is concentrated in it. It must be well remembered: the quantitating, as such, in its form; and by no means yet a determined quantitating. The quantitating is for-itself only as a formal act. Where, then, should the determinedness come from?

This, then, would be the fundamental character of the new reflection. Let us immediately proceed to the representation of this reflection, and enter at once its central point. The act is, as we have said, a free quantitating, which is inwardly for itself, but at the same time reflects upon itself as confined and determined through absolute Being. The disjunction is clearly exposed: it is the opposition of confinedness and Freedom (of quantitating, of course, as such); the former is to be dependent *idealiter* upon the latter; the latter is to be dependent *realiter* upon the former. So much about this.

We proceed to the union of that disjunction. Only in so far as the freedom of quantitating is inwardly realized, i. e. as it contemplates itself, can it be taken hold of by a fixed Thinking. The Thinking, and whatever follows therefrom, is *idealiter* dependent upon contemplation. *Vice versa*, only in so far as this Freedom is subordinated to pure Being does this Freedom and the quantitating inseparable from it, as well as its contemplation, take place. In other words: only in so far as it is not, as it is consequently the pure Being, and presupposes its Not-Being in advance of its Being, is it an absolute originating. *Realiter* therefore, the contemplation of the quantitating, is dependent upon absolute Being and upon the determination of Freedom through absolute Being. In this closest reciprocity, this floating between the ideal and the real (in this thorough penetration of Contemplation and Thinking), and in the unity of both, which is no immediate object of knowledge, but knowledge itself, this reflection floats like every reflection—according to its specific character, of course—as reflection of the Freedom of quantitating.

We now proceed to the adjoining links of the argument.

1. The Freedom of quantitating *thinks* itself. Let us facilitate the comprehension of this proposition by calling to remembrance the conception of causality in the upper synthesis. There Freedom, as ground, was that through which the *quantum* (if any *quantum* was supposed as posited) was perceived in its determinedness. It was *realiter* thus determined in this manner, because Freedom had made it thus; and was perceived *idealiter*, because Freedom was perceived, as holding itself over and within it. But this Thinking—and this is the decisive remark—is no pure, original, but a syncretical uniting and reflecting Thinking, and Freedom was posited in it always in its factual *form* (but only the form) of determinedness. This Freedom is *here* thought pure and absolute, signifies: it is thought, in the highest universality, as the absolute, eternal, unchangeable ground of all possible quantity which can be thought. (The meaning of this can easily be explained: it is expressed in the general proposition which the Science of Knowledge has already uttered repeatedly, but which is now introduced into the real system of knowledge: *only* Freedom (whether actual or not, is here not

yet decided) *is the ground of all possible quantity*. But to us it is of importance that the derivation and the connection be understood, and, as this point is of the most important consequences, we shall add a few more words in relation to it.

In the common view, the Thinking pointed out here is related to the former as the general abstract proposition is related to the concrete: in the former, any determinedness of Freedom is posited as the ground of *some particular quantum*; in the latter, Freedom is posited as (absolutely by reason of its form) the only possible ground of all *quanta*. There we had an *application* of the conception of causality; here we have its own ground. Now we know well enough that this common view is altogether a false and wrong one; that each link presupposes the other one, and that abstractions, as commonly understood, have no existence. In the upper link Freedom was formal; could be and could not be. Here, as in the entire reflection, it is posited positively, and is materially determined, as quantitating, and as the only quantitating. The ground of this onliness, absoluteness, and universality, is itself absolute: the pure, on-itself-reposing, in itself unchangeable, and consequently an unchangeableness-asserting Thinking. Freedom is thus substantialized, and each of its possible quantitative states of determinedness becomes an accident for the very reason because the free quantitating is the connecting link of both.

2. Now to the second link. In the same way as we argued in the first synthesis, when representing absolute substantiality: Thinking is not possible unless contemplation takes place; so here also: The freedom of quantitating cannot be thought unless it has been contemplated, consequently not without the existence of a quantitating, and without this quantitating having already been found as existing. All Thinking of Freedom, as ground of all quantity, posits again a quantity, of which it cannot be said that it *is realized with (actual) Freedom* within consciousness (for here consciousness first begins), but which lies *beyond all consciousness*, in the not-being of consciousness, and which is only thought within consciousness as having its ground in the (from that very reason, not actual) Freedom. Where consciousness begins, this quantitating is not consciously produced, but is already found

existing within consciousness;—and of it we shall have to say nothing more, than that it may be the sphere of future possible acts of Freedom within consciousness, of the Freedom which posits itself and knows itself as such, or of actual Freedom. Only in so far as the contemplating consciousness—and without contemplation there is no consciousness at all—goes in itself beyond itself, thinks itself, and thinks itself as absolutely free, does it apply this contemplation to Freedom as its only possible (not actually to be *cognized*, but *thinkable*) ground. Nothing, however, is here to be said about the manner in which it is thus *ground*. This is unknown to us as yet, and nothing else is to be thought than what we have said.

Adding, however, in order to let the reader think something at least, what I can unhesitatingly add, that this latter view is ground of a nature (i. e. what is called nature, the absolute, within and before all knowledge presupposed nature), I immediately proceed to the following reflections.

§ 2. Hence all contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitating (World, Nature, &c.), which, however, it must think as accidental, or as having formal Freedom for its ground, and which it thus thinks by ascribing to itself a power of Attention.

Contemplation (in its originality) is, as we have said, quantitability; it has also been shown that all quantitability is posited in absolute knowledge as accidental (as that which can also *not* be—passing and changeable—not eternal); consequently, if it is, as *to be connected with a ground*, and, since it is quantitability, with Freedom. Here, then, is the connecting link, which leads us further; to the thinking of the accidental there attaches itself the thinking of Freedom, and, in so far as this accidentalness is thought as absolute quantitability, the thinking of absolute Freedom. In order to comprehend this quantitability (which in itself is only *form* of quantity, but which, for the sake of a better comprehension of the following thought, I not only permit, but even request the reader to think as possibly determined)—in order to be but able to comprehend it, I say, as accidental, the contemplation must describe or reconstruct its origin within itself: must construct itself as limiting itself from the absolute and in-itself-dissolving contemplation to this quantitability; thus making it a product of Freedom within knowledge. Not as if this quantitability were cre-

ated thereby—for we have seen that it appears together with the first origin of knowledge, and originates before all real consciousness—but it thereby becomes *accidental*. (The case is very simple; in form it is the same operation which, at least, we educated men perform every day, when we distinguish our representation of a thing from the thing itself;—although it may well be presumed that, for instance, savages or children cannot even do this, since to them, lost in wondering astonishment, both representation and the thing melt together, and cannot be kept apart. Now this very same operation is to take place here, only not in regard to a single object, but applied to the absolute ground of all objectivity, to quantitatibility itself. This is done in form, with Freedom. To him who does not perform it, this contemplation does not become an object of his knowledge, because he does not elevate himself above it; it is to him knowledge itself: he is imprisoned within it and melted together with it, as the child is fused together with single objects. He describes within it the other natural phenomena as the mathematician, who reposes in the contemplation of space, describes his figures within it. All that we have said, the entire synthesis—with the exception of that one link in which he reposes—has for him no existence. He is one of those intelligences, mentioned before, who *have* reason, but *are* not reason, and do not elevate themselves to its conception.)

But what has *he* attained for whom it has existence? A *new* altogether unfettered contemplation—that of formal Freedom, which it is not necessary to describe here, since it will accompany us to the end; and which resigns itself to the *original* contemplation, or rather includes it, and within which, as its sphere and its Freedom, the Thinking of Freedom, and of all that which lies within absolute knowledge, is now alone possible. (This Freedom, torn loose from the original ties of contemplation, it is which lifts itself above the *found* knowledge.) The latter contemplation is to be the determining, the former the determined; consequently a relation of causality, but different from the one mentioned before, from the pure causality. The Ideal ground is the *effect*, the real ground the effecting. Here, consequently, we have the secondary relation of Causality, hinted at before. (To the primary we elevate ourselves

only by a transcendental view; and this has never occurred to former philosophers.)

Let us now review the foregoing.

From the one side, contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitability; determined, at all events, in so far as it is contemplated as quantitability within an altogether in-itself-dissolving freedom (i. e. for him who here realizes within himself the necessary contemplation. How it is for him who cannot do so, we are not yet able to state: his knowledge we do not describe at present.) This determined quantitability is the absolute, last ground of all contemplation, and, in contemplation, cannot be transcended; it is the original determinedness with which all consciousness commences and first becomes *real*; the known end of all contemplation. (This is the world, nature, objective Being, &c. There can be no more clearly defined conception: and I am sure that this one is sufficient and explains all; and yet some persons foolishly think that this last determinedness ought again to be explained and deduced.)

Now, this quantitability is thought, for the very reason of its immediateness, as *accidental*, but no knowledge can rest in the accidental (whose knowledge rests there does not comprehend it as accidental). We therefore penetrate necessarily beyond it through Thinking and *free* intellectual (in contraposition to the confined, sensual) contemplation. And there we find that all quantitability, from its very form, is simply *the result of the in-itself-reposing, in and for-itself being Freedom*, altogether as such, and has in and for itself no connection whatever with absolute Being; that there is consequently in all these representations altogether no *knowledge*, no truth and certainty, not only not of absolute Being, things *per se*, &c., but even not of any sort of connection with this absolute Being. We discover, on the contrary, as the last and highest, a *material* (we could not term it otherwise) determinedness of Freedom—i. e. in such a manner that it nevertheless remains in and for itself *formal Freedom*, and everything that follows therefrom—*through the absolute Being*. The knowledge of *this* determinedness is the real end of knowledge, and first gives knowledge. If, therefore, the contemplating knowledge is nevertheless to be a knowledge, it can be nothing

else than the *determination of the pure*, absolutely through-itself-existing, consequently not formal or quantitating *Freedom through absolute Being*, which is gathered up in the form of knowledge as an inner *formaliter* free knowledge and seen through it as through an irremovable veil, and knowledge is realized within knowledge—i. e. absolute knowledge, or certainty—enters, when this very harmony, this falling together of the two ground-forms of knowledge, the formal and the material, is realized.

Quantitability in contemplation, therefore, and its formal determinedness, deduced by us, are the result of the in-itself-existing formal Freedom. But that knowledge should *rest* in this contemplation, and should *find* itself as resting (for it is contradictory to rest in quantitability), results from the, we know not how, thought determination of pure Freedom through absolute Being. Whatever knowledge can hold stationary, whatever does not dissolve within its grasp, is nothing but that determination; and again, only through this quantitability can that determination be perceived, since quantitability, and it only, is the eye and the focus of actual *consciousness*. But let it be well remarked, that this harmony, this falling together of the two endpoints, takes place only beyond knowledge, because knowledge, as such, does not go further than to absolute quantitability. That harmony is known only in absolute Thinking; consequently only its *That* can be recognized, but its *How?* cannot be contemplated.

§ 3. Results.

The results of the foregoing may now be expressed in a generally comprehensible manner as follows; the words must, however, be taken very strictly.

1. The world—i. e. the sphere of quantitability, of the changeable—is not at all *absolute* in knowledge, nor is it absolute knowledge itself, but it arises solely on the occasion of the realization of absolute knowledge as its immediate character, as its starting-point (and this whole second synthesis, in which *absolute* knowledge realizes itself, contains something new, grounded in that knowledge). Indeed the world is altogether nothing else than the in-itself empty and unsubstantial form of the beginning of consciousness itself, the firm

background whereof is the eternal and unchangeable, or the Absolute Being.

The world of the changeable is altogether *not*; it is the pure Nothing. (However paradoxical this may sound to unconsecrated ears, it is evident to him who but for a single moment considers it thoroughly; and I cannot use expressions too strong. Whoever remains entangled in this form has not yet penetrated from appearance to Being; from supposing and guessing to knowledge. All the certainty such a person can have is, at the utmost, a conditional certainty—*if* space exists, it must contain something limited, conditioned by space;—a certainty which, however, he must at least comprehend in the *form* of absolute, pure Thinking.)

2. The imperishable does not enter the perishable, whereby it would cease to be the imperishable (the *indifference* of the Infinite and Finite of Spinoza, which we have already refuted); but the imperishable remains for itself and closed and completed within itself; equal to itself, and *only* to itself. Nor is the world perhaps a mirror, expression, revelation, symbol—or whatever name has been given, from time to time, to this half-thought—of the Eternal; for the Eternal cannot mirror itself in broken rays; but this world is picture and expression of the formal—I say, formal—Freedom, and is this for and in itself; is the described conflict of Being and Not-Being, the absolute, inner contradiction. Formal Freedom is altogether separated in the very first synthesis from Being; is for itself, and goes its own way in the production of this synthesis.

3. But knowledge lifts itself above itself and above this world, and only there, beyond this world, is it knowledge. The world, which is not wanted, joins knowledge without any coöperation on the part of knowledge. But beyond that immediateness, whereupon does knowledge repose there? Again not on absolute Being, but on a determinedness of the—not formal, of course, for that is altogether undeterminable, but *absolutely real* Freedom through absolute Being. The Highest, therefore, is a synthetical Thinking (even the seat of the highest substantiality), in which we meet absolute Being, not as *for-itself*, but as a determining, as absolute substance,—which is already a form of knowledge, as Thinking—and as absolute ground, which is the same. Hence even absolute knowledge knows only mediately of this absolute Being.

Now let the reader further remark the conception of this Freedom. It is *eternally, unchangeably determined*, even as and because that which determines it is absolute *Unity*. Even therefore in relation to it does the world proceed its own way. But again: a harmony of this determinedness is to arise in knowledge with the contemplation of quantifiability. This determinedness therefore, and only it, must enter quantifiability, or rather must be perceivable through quantifiability in order to fill up the *hiatus* between two very unlike components of knowledge. Of this we shall speak in the following.

(I first insert, however, a parallel of my system with that of Spinoza, interpreting Spinoza's as favorably as possible. He has an absolute substance as I have; this can be described, like mine, by pure Thinking. That he arbitrarily separates it into two modifications, Extension and Thinking, I shall leave unnoticed. To him as well as to me—I interpret here to his advantage, as he speaks not only from the standpoint of knowledge generally, but also from that of the knowing individual;—*finite* knowledge is, in so far as it contains truth and reality, accident of that substance; to him as to me it is an absolute accident, unalterably determined through Being itself. He acknowledges therefore, as I do, the same highest absolute synthesis, that of absolute substantiality, and he also determines substance and accident much as I do. But now in this same synthesis—where indeed the difference must necessarily be, or we should be perfectly agreeing with each other—comes the point where the Science of Knowledge turns away from him, or, plainly spoken, where it can prove to him and to all others who philosophize in the same manner, that he has quite overlooked something; i. e. the point of transition from the substance to the accident. He does not even ask for such a transition; hence, in reality, there is none; substance and accident are in reality not separated; his substance is no substance, his accident no accident; he only calls the same thing now the one and now the other. In order to obtain a distinction he afterwards causes Being, as accident, to break into infinite modifications—another grave defect; for how can he, in this infinity, which dissolves within itself, ever arrive at firm fixedness, a finished Whole? I will consequently improve his expression and say, into a *closed* or completed *system* of modifications. And now,

leaving unnoticed everything else which might be objected, I will ask only: Is Being necessarily broken into these modifications, and does it exist in no other way? How, then, do you arrive at a Thinking of it as a Whole, and what truth has this your Thinking? Or is it in itself One, as you maintain? Whence, then, the breaking of it, and the opposition of a world of extension to a world of Thinking? The short of the matter is, you realize, though unconsciously, what you deny in your whole system, formal Freedom; Being and Not-Being: the ground-form of knowledge, in which lies the necessity of a separation and of an infinity for consciousness. The Science of Knowledge, however, posits this formal Freedom at once as the point of transition, and demonstrates the separation arising from it, not as that of absolute Being, but as the accompanying ground-form of the knowledge of absolute Being, or, which means the same, of absolute knowledge. The Science of Knowledge says: Absolute Being does indeed determine; not unconditionally, however, but under the rule just described; and its *accidence* is not *within it*—whereby it would lose its substantiality—but *without it*, in the *formaliter* free. Thus only is substantiality separated from accidentality in a comprehensible manner, and each made possible. The existence of knowledge—and only knowledge has existence, and all existence has its ground in knowledge—depends simply upon knowledge; not so, however, its original determinedness. Hence the accidence of absolute Being remains simple and unchangeable as absolute Being itself; and changeability is assigned to quite another source, to the formal Freedom of knowledge.

Should, therefore, the Science of Knowledge be asked as to its character in regard to Unitism—*ἐν καὶ πᾶν*—and Dualism, the answer is: That Science is Unitism from an ideal point of view, in regard to knowledge as real knowledge—knowing that the (determining) eternal One is the ground of all knowledge, of course beyond all knowledge;—and Dualism it is from a real point of view, in relation to knowledge as actual. Thus it has two principles, absolute Freedom and absolute Being; and knows that the absolute One can never be attained—reached—in a *real*—actual—knowledge, but can be attained only in pure Thinking.—In the balancing-point between these

two views knowledge stands, and only thus is it knowledge; in the consciousness of this Unattainable—which it, nevertheless, always comprehends, but as unattainable—does its essence as knowledge consist, its eternity, infinity, and incompleteness. Only in so far as infinity is within it—which Spinoza indeed designed—*is* it; but only in so far as it rests with this infinity in the One does it not dissolve within itself—from which Spinoza could not protect it—but is it a world, a universe of knowledge, closed—completed—within infinity.)

4. One point, about which I have asked the reader to remain undecided during the progress of our investigation, is now clear. Freedom must be thought—from a point of view which has not yet been designated, but which will hereafter be found—as ground of the determinedness of quantifiability; not, it is true, in a *factual* manner, but the real, eternal, and unchangeable Freedom, as determined through pure Being, must turn out to be beyond all consciousness—ground of the factual view of consciousness.

§ 4. Deduction of Space.

All consciousness begins with an already existing quantifiability, to which contemplation is confined. This state of confinedness must be *in* and *for* itself, must find itself as such, reflect upon itself as such, &c. This is a new reflection.

First of all: it is generally clear, and a matter of course, that this fixedness of contemplation, like that of knowledge, must be in accordance with the groundform of knowledge, a *For-itself*. In the present case, moreover, it is to be expressly posited as a *For-itself*. In order to secure our teachings against misinterpretation, let us remark the following:—A free, empty contemplation, according to the above, resigned itself to a state of confinedness. This, when regarded more closely, leads to nothing and explains nothing. If the contemplation is free, it is empty; if it is confined, it is not *for-itself*. Both must therefore be thoroughly united in such a manner, that the contemplation is *free* in its very confinedness; passing over, as it does, all the points of that confinedness at once with Freedom. Thus we receive a new, infinite quantifying of quantifiability itself.—Nothing and not even the difficulty

will, I think, prevent the reader from at once strictly comprehending this point.

The former proof was merely : If Thinking is to occur, contemplation must also take place ; and from that proof we derived quantitability, with which consciousness consequently commences. Now the difficult and almost incomprehensible point which remained, was this : shall this quantitability be a determined quantitability or not ? Indeed it can scarcely be conceived, what, if we speak of pure quantity, a determinedness of quantity might mean. (If anyone thinks he understands it, he misconceives our entire investigation, does not view quantitability pure, but mixes a *quale* with it in order to attain a *quantum*. Quantitability in itself is nothing else than the pure in-itself undetermined possibility of infinite *quanta*, which can receive their limitation only from the determinedness of the *quale*.)

It is true, that afterwards, when we had applied to it an absolutely empty Freedom, we spoke of determinedness, and accepted it as a proved fact, but only as a limitation of Freedom to *quantitability generally*. In short, quantitability is not posited in contemplation as it is posited in Thinking—i. e. not as a production of Freedom, but as something absolutely *found or given* beyond all consciousness ; and since Thinking is not without Contemplation, it is evident that quantitability must present within knowledge an entirely contradictory view. This, strictly taken, altogether only *qualitative* limitation to quantitability is here now itself contemplated, and thereby an infinite quantitating obtained. The view has indeed changed, having become more definite.

The case stands now thus : Quantitating *materialiter* takes place with Freedom, and is *contemplated* as taking place with Freedom ; *formaliter* it is *thought* as something, to which knowledge is confined.

After this general view, let us now enter into the branch-syntheses, and at first into that of Contemplation. Quantitating views itself as confined to itself ; it quantitates, therefore, really and with Freedom ; and if only to be able to view its own confinedness, presupposes itself, in this free quantitating, as its own necessary condition. Both links are altogether one. We must first become acquainted with one of them ; let it be the presupposed.

This is the *permanent, absolute* contemplation; hence manifoldness, which holds itself in a resting light, eternally and ineradicably the same. What, then, is it? It is, if knowledge is posited, the resting, permanent *Space*. If we know this space, we also know the pointed-out contemplation. Let the reader consider the following thought, which seems to me to light up the old darkness like a flash of lightning. Space is to be infinitely divisible. Now, if this is to be so, how then comes knowledge ever to take hold of space? Where has it finished the infinite division, and embraced the elements of space? Or, how does space ever attain its *inner solidity*, so that it does not fall through itself, does not thin off into a fog and vanish? If space is therefore, nevertheless, infinitely divisible, it is at least, from a certain point of view, also not so, or it could not *be* at all, and could not be *this*. Its manifold—not that within it, for of that we know nothing yet—must therefore mutually support itself, as it were, in order that space can support itself and attain solidity. Again, contemplation teaches everyone, at least, that we can perform no construction, which is always an agility within space, unless space rests and stands still. Whence this resting of space? Again: No one can construct a line without something mixing with the line, in the course of construction, which he has not constructed, nor ever can construct; which he, therefore, does not add to the line while drawing it, but which he has carried along by means of space before ever commencing to draw the line: it is the solidity of the line. (If the line is a running through an infinite number of points, the line becomes impossible; the points and the line itself fall to pieces. Nevertheless they would hang together within space, and are, in their infinite manifoldness, at the same time its continuity.)

Whence, now, this solid, resting and permanent space? It is the sufficiently described Contemplation (the For-and-In-itself-Being of formal Freedom, which is a quantifiability), which presupposes, however, itself as *absolutely being* to itself, according to the demonstrated law of reflection of consciousness. It is the on-itself-reposing, firm glance of the intelligence; the resting, immanent light, the eternal eye in-itself and for-itself.

How, then, is the *second* link of the synthesis related to

this? It is a free taking hold of itself within this contemplation; a constructing, remaking of the same, a loosening and again extending of space;—but let it be well remembered, a taking hold of what has already presupposed *itself*, since otherwise the first link would be lost, which must be guarded against in every reflection. Hence it is clear that the one cannot be at all without the other: no space without construction of the same, although not *it* (space), but merely the consciousness of it, is thereby generated (ideal relation); no construction without presupposing space (real relation). All knowledge of this description rests, therefore, neither in the one nor the other, but in both of the links, as was shown in the instance of the line. The mere direction of the line is a result of the last link of the freedom of construction; its concretion is the result of the permanent space. The drawing of the line is evidently synthetical.

We add the following remarks: *Firstly*, for this constructing process space is infinitely divisible; i. e. you can make an infinite number of points from which to construct within it. *Again*, space is evidently nothing but quantitability itself. The assumed determinedness is therefore and remains altogether formally a limitation to quantitability itself. We return here to the same proposition expressed above: formal Freedom, as such, is the only ground of quantitability and of all the results thereof. Even space is only quantitability, and nothing enters it which might originate from the thing *per se*. *Finally*, the substantial, solid, and resting space, is, according to the above, the original light, before all actual knowledge, only thinkable and intelligible—but not visible and not to be contemplated—as produced through Freedom. The construction of space, according to the second link of the synthesis, is a *taking hold of itself* on the part of light, a self-penetration of light, ever from one point and realized within knowledge itself; a secondary condition of light, which, for the sake of distinguishing it, we shall term *clearness*, the act *enlightening*.

COROLLARIA.—This deduction and description of space is decisive for philosophy, physics, and for all sciences. Only the last mentioned constructed and constructible space, which in itself is not at all possible, and would dissolve into Noth-

ingness were it not for the original in-itself-solid contemplation, has been held to be the only space; especially since *Kant*, whose system, in this respect, has done a bad service. (To him whose eyes have been opened there is nothing more funny than the ideas which modern philosophies promulgate about space.) Followed up, this view of the matter should have led to a formal Idealism. But people had a horror of that; so they went to positing matter (substance) into this spoiled space without considering that, if they had matter beforehand, space would have come to them without any further exertion on their part; or, that space without inner solidity (and this is the very ground of the famous matter or substance) dissolves into an infinite divisibility=Nothing.

Then they were afraid that if natural philosophy should attempt the construction of a material body, the powers of attraction and repulsion within it might one day lose their balance, without ever beginning to think that these two ideas are nothing more than a double view in the reflection of one and the same *balance*, the firm repose, which space carries within it.

§ 5. Deduction of the Groundform of Time.

We now proceed to an investigation which may lead us to the second branch-link of our synthesis. In the eternal space the manifold of it was lying quietly and steadily aside of each other before and in one glance, which is a glance, and one and the same glance only in so far as everything lies thus quietly and steadily together.

Reflect now upon any particular part of this contemplation. Whereby is such part kept in its solidity and repose? Evidently by all others and all others by it. No one part is in the view unless all the others are in it; the whole is determined by the parts, the parts by the whole, every part by every other part, and only in so far as it is thus is it the permanent contemplation which we have described. Nothing is, if all is not in the same standing unity of the view. It is the most perfect inner reciprocity and organization; and thus organization reveals itself already in the pure contemplation of space.

In the construction, on the contrary, we start from some one individual point, and the parts (for instance, the parts of the

above constructed line) come to follow in a certain order of succession, so that, this direction presupposed, you cannot arrive at the point B except from A, &c. But how have we been enabled to say what we have said just now? Only in so far as we posited such facts, formally at our pleasure; consequently, only in so far as we merely thought, and kept within the standpoint of construction. In the standing space beyond construction there are no points, no discretions, but it is the one concrete view just particularly described. Discretion, therefore—so we will express ourselves for the sake of the strictness of the investigation—has its origin in the Thinking of the constructing, and in what results therefrom, the changing of the constructing into a Thinking.

But wherein lies the ground of the determined law of succession? Firstly, *formaliter*, in the Freedom of the direction, which is altogether undetermined and changeable, floating in each point between infinity. This Freedom, therefore, must be presupposed, if a succession is but to be spoken of; and we thus arrive at the old proposition of Freedom as the ground of all quantitability—here, however, in a stricter, more definite sense. If Freedom, however, is once presupposed, then the succession is determined by the co-existence of the manifold in the standing contemplation or in space. The consciousness of the succession, therefore, like the previous consciousness, rests neither in the point of the construction, nor in that of the contemplation, but in both and in the union of both.

Now, while the lower, *objective*, Thinking or Constructing, always presupposing a determined direction grounded by its own Freedom within itself, is confined to the law of succession which contemplation furnishes, how is it *thought*? Evidently, as confined originally and beyond all Thinking and knowledge, in regard to every possible direction which it may give to itself; not *absolutely* confined, but under the condition of this or that particular direction which it gives to itself. Hence, as above, we presupposed an original necessary contemplation, so here an original, necessary Thinking is presupposed, and this itself is *thought*; for the designated point is surely a thought. But as the designated contemplation was and remained a mere quantitability, so this thought also is only quantitability, but a quantitability infinitely determinable

through Freedom of the direction. (Think one series, a second, a third, &c., and you have thought the separate determination of quantitability. But now you are to think no separate one, but simply *all* its determinations, and doing so you think a confinedness of Thinking.)

I have characterized quantitability generally above as nature, or as the material world. The law of succession, therefore, of which we here speak, is evidently the law of nature; and it is even now clear how Freedom is confined to it. Not only in so far as it must first be realized within itself in order to have a succession; but further, in so far as, after it has this succession, none of the laws of this succession apply to Freedom, unless Freedom has chosen itself a direction, of which directions an infinite number are placed before it from each point. (Space is here an altogether adequate picture.)

Even after the world is, and supposing that somebody were tied down within the world, unable to pass beyond it—were to remain in the second link of the synthesis, in which case his knowledge would be the production only of the contemplation originated beyond all knowledge—the world would still be to him not an absolute *power*. For even in the world infinite directions are possible, the choice of which depends upon him: hence his relation to the world, and the law of the world, by which he is bound, would always depend upon himself after all.

The complaints about human infirmity, weakness, dependence, &c., can no more be refuted than the complaints about the weakness of human understanding. Whoever asserts them, will probably know and have experienced them; we can trust his assurance. Only, we may beg him not to include us. Nevertheless it is often impossible to think ill enough about the immediate reality. However low we may draw its picture, experience nevertheless exceeds it. But he who thinks ill of mankind, according to its general faculty, blasphemes reason and at the same time condemns himself.

One more remark, which forces itself upon us and appertains to the subject: The described objective Thinking—each link of which is dependent upon another, which is *not* dependent upon the former (while in the conception of the resting space each link was dependent upon the other), where the dependence is therefore only one-sided, and does not move

retrogressively—carries at the same time the formal character of *Time* within it, the movements of which, as we well know, are related to each other in that manner. Nevertheless, I do not wish to be understood as having already deduced time. The succession, here pointed out, has moreover a characteristic which seems itself contradictory, that the discrete thoughts can nevertheless be also placed alongside of each other and surveyed in one glance. But we lack here still the solidity, the stoppage of the moments which we must have in time. We may, therefore, have arrived at the highest *ground of time*, but on no account have we arrived at its reality itself in the appearance. It is, however, clear that, if we are to elevate ourselves above time and to explain it we must not be tied down to its moments, but must survey them at one glance, as we just now did, with our links of Thinking, according to the law of succession.

We may, however, apprehend already what will be necessary to obtain this solid and real time; i. e. that its links must not be merely a Thinking, but, at the same time, such an organic, self-holding and supporting contemplation as we above described the contemplation of resting space to be. This, however, can be attained only after a disjunction of space from itself, after a most probably infinite multiplication of the same; and devolves, therefore, upon a new reflection. This much, however, is even now clear, that time is not that perfect correlative of space, which it has generally been considered to be. Philosophers have distinguished them as outward and inward contemplation. This is mere one-sidedness! For we should never get space outside of us if we had it not within ourselves. And are we not ourselves space? The viewing of space as an outward contemplation originated from that curious immateriality which was to be secured to us when degraded matter was no longer good enough for us. (Time stands in the same line of reflections as the true, genuine space. It is true, however, that time, on account of its relation to Thinking and as the form of Thinking, is carried higher, above all space; and this is the cause why the nature of time has been misunderstood and why it has been opposed to space.)

By the above we have made an important step toward actual knowledge. Everyone knows that all actual know-

ledge, or knowledge of the actual, must be a particular knowledge within an undetermined manifold, and that its particular character, its Being generally, consists in this very relation to the manifold. But the manifold must moreover be surveyable; must remain firm before the glance and support it. This supporting sphere we have given to Thinking by the law of succession in the eternally standing and resting space, which space, as we have described it, is precisely that which remains firm to the construction, and supports it, which does not dissolve by infinite division into nothing. But this characteristic does not *fill* space. True, it is in itself not empty (for it is full of itself), but neither is it full of anything else; in that respect it is, indeed, empty. It is nothing but the solid, same and in-itself-resting contemplation.

It is evident that our next business must be to get something into this standing sphere which can be a particular something, whereby the in-itself everywhere same space (if anyone finds that this thought, in view of the manifoldness in space, is contradictory, I have no objection) can be distinguished from itself, and the links of one series of succession can be excluded from each other. If anyone supposes, starting from the idea of space, that this something will be *matter*, he is right. But it is highly probable, in view of the peculiar character of our system, that *matter* will have here quite a different signification from the usual one. For is there not also a *spirit world*, quite as discrete as the other? We shall, therefore, probably have to proceed from the unity of these two worlds to their distinction, and prove that matter is necessarily spiritual, and spirit necessarily material; no matter without life and soul—no life except in matter.

§ 6. Deduction of Matter.

We approach the designated investigation.

Formal Freedom is *posited*. But altogether inseparable from it is a quantitating, purely as such. Formal Freedom cannot be posited, as a simple point, in and for itself, contemplating itself; for in that case it would not be posited at all; neither it nor anything would be. The point is merely its one-sided view in Thinking; but here we have *contemplation*. Necessarily, therefore, a quantitating is posited at the

same time, but only in so far as it is inseparable from the positedness of Freedom.

This quantitating, it is true, is in and for itself simple and one and the same; but thus it is again unreal and unattainable. In the reflection it is double: *Concretion* and *Discretion* in succession. Hence both are absolutely posited, and preposited to the ground-form of knowledge. We must, therefore, answer these questions: What is involved in the concretion generally, and especially in the form of formal Freedom in which it appears here? What in the discretion to a succession, in the same respect? What, finally, in the absolute identity of both?

1. The concretion is, in regard to its substance, any particular space, even a concreting and self-supporting of manifold points which may be thought *afterwards* and *arbitrarily*. Without this *possible* manifold it is no concretion, as is immediately evident. But it is, again, not merely the space which keeps itself in equilibrium and fixes its contemplation; for then it would not be at the same time construction, and construction through Freedom. What, then, is it? An in-itself *space occupying manifold*, in which *points, penetrating each other in reciprocal concretion, can be posited infinitely, which commence, continue, and give direction to any line* with the most unbounded freedom. Agility is distributed through the whole, or can be so distributed; so also is the *solidity* of space distributed throughout the whole; and the agility, whenever it has determined itself or decided itself in a particular manner, is surrendered to this solidity—but always according to its own law and so as to remain Freedom in it, as we have shown in the preceding section. The basis is that resting, standing, space: but with it the Freedom of concretion is inseparably united.

This now is *matter*; and hence matter is the *fixed constructibility of space itself*, and nothing else whatever. Matter is not space; for space rests eternally and unshaken, and *carries* all construction; but it is *in* space; it is the construction which is carried. *Space* and *matter* are the inseparable view of one and the same, of quantitability (from the standpoint of contemplation), as *standing* and *general*, and at the same time *concrete* and *constructible*.

RESULTS.—A. Matter is necessarily a manifold; whenever it is taken hold of, it is taken hold of as such, and it cannot be taken hold of otherwise.

B. It is infinitely divisible, without dissolving into nothingness. It is carried by the abiding space in the background, which as such (as space) is not divided at all, but within which division takes place.

C. It is necessarily and in itself organic. The ground of a motion is distributed through it, for it is the constructibility in space. It may be in rest, but it can put itself in motion simply from itself.

2. If formal Freedom is posited in both, then a *constructing* is posited. But this is, however closely we may describe it, simply, a line-drawing; it produces a line, by no means a point. But the line presupposes a direction, which again is necessarily confined to an order of succession. By the positing of formal Freedom, therefore, there is necessarily posited and preposited, prior to all self-conscious Freedom, some succession of the manifold.

Now, this original succession, seized in *contemplation* (not in Thinking, as above), results in *Time*.—It is clear that the presupposed line is infinitely divisible. True, it is completed, and in regard to space a closed whole. But between every two points which stand in the relation of succession, I can put again other points which stand in the same relation. Hence, although the contemplation, of which we here speak, is evidently unity of the glance, and although every time-moment is probably a Time-Whole, discrete and separated from all other time-moments; yet, from another view, this time-moment is again an infinitely divisible moment of the one time; and only through this infinity of floating does the time-moment receive its solidity. The characteristic conception, which was wanting heretofore, is now deduced.

Again: through this very solidity does the contemplation seize itself as an objective, self-given, immanent light. For all light consists of a floating over infinite distinguishability, quantifiability, which must be at the same time infinitely determinable and constructible. The light is not something simple, but the infinite reciprocity of Freedom with itself, the

penetration of its unity, eternity, and primitiveness, by the manifoldness and infinite determinability arising therefrom. This light must appear to itself at some point, must seize itself in real knowledge; and this point of self-seizing is the described *contemplation* in the synthesis of space, matter, and time.

3. Both—concretion as well as discretion—are the position of formal Freedom, in which both are altogether united. The latter gives time, and hence actual knowledge; the former, space and matter. But the former is also the basis and condition of the latter. Hence there is no light (no knowledge) in its essential form except in matter, and, *vice versa*, no matter is (let it be well remarked *for-itself*) except in time and its light.

But let us consider each of these points more closely.

First of all, an important remark not yet dwelt upon: There is no knowledge and no life which does not necessarily last a time, and posit itself for itself in a time. Knowledge carries, by its very form, time within itself and brings it along; a timeless knowledge—for instance, an absolutely simple point within time—is impossible. But time is altogether only a confined succession of matter in space. Hence no time is *comprehended*, and—since it must be comprehended if life and knowledge is to be—no life and knowledge *is*, unless matter and space are comprehended. Matter can just as well be called a transformation of space into time, Freedom and knowledge; and thus time and space are regarded also in this central point as inseparably united.

Life necessarily describes itself in *matter*. *Vice versa*, matter cannot be described except by the construction of a line. But this line needs a direction; this direction a succession of points; these a knowledge in which a manifold can be united, for otherwise the line would become a point.

(If I had to do with somebody to whom I were compelled to prove the necessity of the idealistic view by one example, I should ask him: How can you ever attain a line except by keeping the points *asunder*, for else they fall together; and at the same time taking them together and annulling their being asunder, for else they never join each other? But you comprehend, undoubtedly, that this unity of the manifold-

ness, this positing and annulling of a discretion, can be only in *knowledge*; and we have just shown that it is the ground-form of knowledge. Now you ought at the same time to comprehend that space and matter consist, in exactly the same way, in such a *keeping asunder* of the points, but in a *unity*; and that they are, hence, possible only in knowledge and *as* knowledge, and that they are, indeed, the *real form of knowledge itself*.

This is now, in truth, as clear and evident as anything possibly can be; it lies right before every one who opens his eyes, and ought not first to be proved and acquired, but should be known so well that one ought to feel ashamed to have to say it.—Why, then, was it not seen? Because every thing lies nearer to us than the seeing itself, *in* which we rest; and because we have been stubbornly clinging to that objectivating which seeks outside of itself what lies only in us.)

We add two exhaustive remarks, casting light far around.

a. The ground of all actual Being (of the world of appearances) has been represented in the deepest and most exhaustive manner, partly in regard to its formal, partly in regard to its material character. The former consists in this, that the world is independent of all knowledge which is recognized by knowledge itself as knowledge; that it would be though the knowledge of it were not; again, that it is not necessarily, but could just as well not be.—We are especially particular about the first point, and it is a great error to suppose that transcendental idealism denies the *empirical* reality of the material world, &c.; it only points out in it the forms of knowledge, and annihilates it therefore as for-itself-existing and absolute.—The ground of its existence is, in one word, this: that knowledge must necessarily presuppose itself for itself, so as to be able to describe its origin and Freedom. Formal Freedom posits itself as *being*. Now this formal Freedom, in its positedness before all conscious use of Freedom, and nothing else at all, is the material world. It is related as substance to every knowledge reflecting itself as free which then is accident; hence it would be though no knowledge were. At least, this must necessarily be the conviction of him who remains in this synthesis. But everyone again who comprehends it, comprehends just what we said. (Kant calls it a

deception which we cannot get rid of. Such a phrase would merely prove that we had single light-rays, *lucida intervalla*, of the transcendental view, which vanish involuntarily. But whoever has this view in his own free power finds nowhere deception. He knows that it is necessarily thus from this standpoint, which is consequently correct; and that it is necessarily thus from the other, higher standpoint, which is consequently also correct; *but that the one absolute knowledge consists neither in the one nor in the other, but only in the knowledge of the relation of the ENTIRE system of knowledge to absolute Being.*)

b. Again: Of this resting and standing Being of the world, the two ground-qualities, spirit and matter, have been deduced from one central point as absolutely belonging to this Being, and as in themselves only a duplicity of the view of this one Being in knowledge. In so far as knowledge posits itself as being, it posits itself as matter; in so far as it posits itself as *being free*, it posits itself as a succession in time, as a standing and resting intelligence, confined to itself.



PART THIRD.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as an organic Power of Activity, or as a system of Feelings and Impulses.



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Knowledge posits itself for itself as an organic Power of Activity, or as a system of Feelings and Impulses.

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- ‡ 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factual Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factual Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence knowledge is both infinite and determined.
- ‡ 2. Knowledge in general to become factual Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence, as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.
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INTRODUCTORY.

It is not so important to exhaust the deductions which result from our last synthesis, as to seize the spirit of the whole by the right word in the right place. What follows in the systematic progress is clear enough to him who has the right insight; to others the separate propositions also will appear dark. Hence we prepare the following by a more general reflection.

1. Let us posit the universe as consisting of a system of single, for-themselves-closed Beings, thought in accordance with our investigation = synthesis of light and matter.

2. This system is in itself organized; the Being of each is determined by its reciprocity with all others. Now, if I bring into this system changeableness, I ask—admitting such a system, and I not only admit but assert it—is not this system, if it is to be the ultimate, a system which dissolves itself into nothingness? Evidently. Each single separate is determined by the others; where, then, does the *original determinedness* commence? This is an eternal circle, with which we content ourselves only because we tire out by *despair*. It will not do forever to borrow Being from another source; we must finally arrive at a Being which has it in its own power to be.

3. Now, in this One all Beings have part. The immediate knowledge of the relation of each separate is that separate's absolute Being, its substantial root; and this relation is not first produced by the Being of the others, but itself and all the others become absolute being to it only through this relation. But this relation carries an original duplicity within itself: it is a relation to an *ever-closed whole* (the eternal One)—for otherwise we would arrive at no standing, permanent relation, and at no standing knowledge; and, at the same time, it is a relation to an in-all-eternity *not closable whole*—for otherwise we would arrive at no free knowledge. Hence, each eye, in the infinite light-ocean of knowledge, which has been opened to itself, carries at the same time its closed and completed Being, and in this Being it bears its eternity within itself. *We comprehend always the Absolute, for outside of it there is nothing comprehensible; but, at the same time, we comprehend that we shall never comprehend it completely, for between the Absolute and Knowledge lies the infinite quantitability, according to which the relation of each separate to the Whole and to the Universe is both in itself closed and completed, and infinitely changing WITHIN that completion.*

4. But now comes the highest question: how can knowledge arrive at this view and comprehension of a relation, tie, or order of quantitability, a view which lies beyond its whole inner nature? Answer: The being, the *actuality* of know-

ledge would be altogether impossible if the order were not also absolutely posited; knowledge cannot realize itself except within that order and its thorough determinedness; and this condition is posited simply because it is posited, beyond all factual knowledge and comprehension of the How?—Remember the synthesis of the absolute substantiality. According to the central point of that synthesis, formal Freedom, and with it knowledge, quantitating, &c., could *be*, and could *not* be, therein altogether independent of absolute Being; and this result must remain. But it was shown that if this Freedom has once come to *be*, it must materially be determined by the Absolute. Determined in what? Doubtless in that which forms its nature, its root and substance, in the quantitating. *How* then? Even as the words say, determined, i. e. confined to an original order and relation of the manifold, in which quantitating consists. Absolute formal Freedom is confined to this order, but on no account is this true of any further determinedness of Freedom *within* that order.

Finally: *To what* is formal Freedom confined? To order and relation generally; on no account to this or that order, for then it would again not be formal Freedom, but would be determined in some *inner* respect. Knowledge seized itself in some one single glance (an individual=C, to whom we must, therefore, give a fixed relation to the universe). This, now, is that C's groundpoint, giving to him *his* relation to the universe unavoidably and unchangeably. Could—not *this* knowledge, for this knowledge is only that, the groundpoint whereof is the individual C, but—could not knowledge generally ignite itself equally well in other points? Evidently; and if it did, we should have here another order. Consequently, there is here in respect to the matter a reciprocity between absolute Being and knowledge, which, indeed, we had to arrive at.

5. Now this point of commencement beyond all real knowledge—the factual, before all fact—we cannot ascribe to that Freedom which we know in all knowledge. It falls into the incomprehensible. But how we, being posited by this incomprehensible reciprocity into life and knowledge, and hence in an altogether determined relation, can change this relation very much, while it nevertheless remains the ever co-determin-

ing basis, this we can see even now. The real is *absolute law* only for Freedom.

To sum up, and in order to connect what we have just said with the most general conceptions of the synthesis: Knowledge is *For-itself-Being* of the originating; this presupposes Not-Being, and, since this must be in knowledge, necessarily *Being* in knowledge as such. But this Being is nothing more than that whereby each knowledge that finds itself, finds itself determined through its nature. Now knowledge is again a quantitating; its confinedness is, therefore, a confinedness of the quantitating, altogether as such and altogether nothing else. Hence the already deduced ground-form of all actual in knowledge: space, matter, time. But knowledge, in seizing itself actually, is also the limitation of quantitating. Hence, drawn down to this region, that confinedness is the confinedness to such a fixed limitation in the deduced ground-forms of the actual. The determinedness of this limitation, however, depends itself upon Freedom; hence, also, the determinedness of the confinedness. Absolute Being is in knowledge law; knowledge can never be relieved of this law without losing itself; but how this law may appear to it, depends in all its possible contents, in all possible views and degrees, upon its Freedom. The highest relation of both is, therefore, not *causality* but *reciprocity*.

(I cannot deny myself here a continuation of the parallel of this system with that of Spinoza, for the sake of attaining the greatest clearness. According to Spinoza, i. e. where I interpreted his system most favorably, knowledge was, as with me, *accidence* of the absolute Being. He had really no connecting link between substance and accidence; both fell together. I connected them by the conception of *formal Freedom*. This Freedom is in itself equally independent; it is determined only *materialiter*, if it realizes itself. Now, in the same synthesis we have discovered something additional and new: even the material determinedness is only *formally* unconditioned—knowledge cannot be at all without being confined;—but on no account *materially*—in regard to quantity and relation,—for this again is the result of formal Freedom.)

6. The knowledge arising from this synthesis, after we have considered all its links, is therefore *infinite*, but also *abso-*

lutely determined; a conception which appears to be a contradiction, but which here is easily comprehended, and which in every-day life we realize almost every moment in spite of the apparent contradiction. Knowledge can exist in infinite, never-to-be-determined ways; but in whatever way it exists, it exists in a determined way and in the order of succession conditioned thereby. (The reader will please call to mind the game of chess.)

This, now, would give us the one, eternal, infinite *knowledge*, the whole accident of absolute Being. From Being arises neither the possibility nor the reality of knowledge, as Spinoza would have it; but merely, in case of its reality, its general determinedness. Now, this thus-to-be-comprehended knowledge is itself, in relation to the knowledge *for-itself*, substance. The knowledge produced by the position of formal Freedom is therefore doubly accident, partly of itself as knowledge, partly of absolute Being. We have hence here, in the second substantiality, explained in full the separation into a—not infinite, which, applied to reality, would be contradictory—but closed system of modifications of knowledge, which again are not modifications of knowledge in itself, but only of knowledge according to the groundpoints and successions of its seizing itself. Every such groundpoint is a *formaliter* necessary, *materialiter* altogether free limitation to one point in substantial knowledge, determined by its relation to the whole of knowledge. To the *whole*, I say. But how has that now turned into a whole, which even this very moment was a never-to-be-completed infinite? And, as we undoubtedly are not inclined to take back our word, how does it remain, together with its *totality, infinity*? (This is another important, rarely remarked, much less solved difficulty, least of all solved by Spinoza, who, without further ado, causes to proceed from the eternal substance an *infinite* series of finite modifications, and, consequently, loses thus the conception of the *universe*, which presupposes completeness—closedness.) A whole it evidently became by the separate knowledge seizing itself even as a separate, which, as the result of a determination through all others, can be only the result of a closed sum. An Infinite it remains at the same time if this deter-

minedness is not one of determinedness, but of determinability, as we have also posited it; from which again there results, in the same respect, the infinite modificability of that closed whole.

The actual universe is ever closed and complete, for otherwise no closed part and no knowledge could be realized within it; each would dissolve within itself. The inner substance of the universe, however, is the posited Freedom, and this is infinite. The closed and completed universe carries, therefore, an infinity within itself; and only therein is it closed, that it carries and holds this infinity.

‡ 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factual Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factual Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence Knowledge is both infinite and determined.

Now in this knowledge, which we have learned to know in its most comprehensive synthesis, of what is *absolute Being* the ground, and what does it carry within itself? Evidently, simply and purely the *Being*, the standing and reposing of knowledge, which keeps it from not dissolving within itself into an empty nothing: hence, the mere pure form of *Being*, and nothing else whatever. This, however, originates in it alone.

In this synthesis alone, as the highest of knowledge, does absolute Being appear immediate; hence it is clear that nothing more can be deduced from it in a lower synthesis. Absolute Being is in knowledge only the form of Being, and remains so forever. *That which* is known, depends altogether upon Freedom; but that *something* is, and if it comes to *this* something that it is *known* (that it completely enters and is absorbed in knowledge) is grounded in absolute Being. Only the *actual* form of knowledge, the determinedness of the *known*, but not the *matter* of knowledge (which consists in Freedom) results from absolute Being. From it results only that such a matter (Freedom) is at all possible, that it can realize itself, can become (actual) knowledge, and thus seize itself in any particular determination. Thus Freedom as well as absolute Being are both, in their respective positions, altogether mutu-

ally determined and united; the former is completely secured in its highest significance, and all absolute incomprehensibility (*qualitas occulta*) is totally eradicated from knowledge.

One incomprehensible, it is true, remains, as we have mentioned before, viz.: the absolute Freedom which precedes all actual knowledge. But this must not be confounded with the incomprehensible Being (the inscrutable will of God), for it is at the same time comprehended at every moment and correctly, as sure as we *know* anything at all. Again: we understand very well *that* it cannot be comprehended in its primitiveness, and that we likewise do not need to comprehend it thus. For that comprehending itself in its eternity and infinity consists precisely in *infinitely continuing* to comprehend: *the very reason why* it can never comprehend its own primitiveness.

Thus then is it, and thus is it necessarily comprehended by every intelligence which elevates itself in knowledge (even without the Science of Knowledge) to this view. To prove this in separate instances we have not time here; all systems and religions, and even the views of common sense, are full of propositions which result from it.

But at the same time it has been sufficiently shown from all our previous reflections, that that knowledge (in the highest synthesis of absolute Being and infinite Freedom) can begin from out itself, can become *actual* knowledge, only by an *actual contemplation* (the contemplation *in* and *for* itself, well known to us already) which limits itself within the infinite contemplability to a fixed *quantum*. That such a contemplation must be presupposed, as originally prior to all conscious Freedom and what its results are, has also been shown sufficiently. As such, this contemplation is a point in the infinite sphere of knowledge, in which knowledge seizes itself; hence a determinedness of quantifiability, which in the contemplation is changed into the one space and matter, and the one time. This point is therefore, necessarily, altogether determined in regard to each of these instances; but it can be thus determined only by its relation to the actual (no longer infinite or undetermined) whole; hence the point is for itself only in so far as the

whole is for it. This contemplation, therefore, is possible only in *Thinking*, in the free floating over that relation, and in the singling out of this one particular point *in* the whole from the universality of the latter. Thinking and contemplation penetrate each other here again; and their basis is *Feeling*, as we called it formerly: the uniting of a determinedness of Freedom and of absolute Being. In this Feeling we may, therefore, have discovered for a knowledge, with which we are not yet acquainted, however, the principle of individuality.

It is *one* of the points of concentration for the actual being of knowledge, and we take this point, of course, as a representative of all possible others. That it has the *form* of Being, its existence, from absolute Being, is clear; for otherwise no permanency of contemplation could take place at all. But its determined Being it has only from the reciprocity between its Freedom and the whole.

What then now—this is a *new* question—is the character of actual Being? Altogether only a relation of Freedom to Freedom according to a law. The *Real* (=R), which has now been found and which carries knowledge prior to actual knowledge, is, 1st, a concentration-point of all the time of that one individual, and it is comprehended as that which it is only in so far as this time is comprehended, which is, however, always comprehended and at the same time never. It is, 2d, a concentration-point of all actual individuals in this time-moment. Hence, of all the time of these, and of all hereafter possible individuals; it is the universe of Freedom in *one* point and in *all* points.

Only in so far as it remains such a concentration-point does it remain a real; otherwise it would dissolve into a simple, i. e. into an abstract nothing.

Is R then, now, something in itself, a permanent? How can it be, since its ground-substance is Freedom, the nature of which is eternal change! How then does a knowledge, nevertheless, repose on it; for instance, that of the individual, viz., J? Answer: In so far as J with his immanent freedom, according to the first synthesis—though not *in* it—reposes upon *absolute Being* (like all other individuals), can it repose on itself and

occupy a relation towards that of the other individuals, and *vice versa*. How does J know that these numbers of individuals, of which he knows, rest with their knowledge in absolute knowledge? Because otherwise he would *not* know of himself *in such a manner* as to know of them, but in another manner.

The ultimate ground of each momentary condition of the world is now discovered; it is the being and reposing of the totality of knowledge in the Absolute. It is true, that through it also the not always clearly perceived condition of each individual is determined, which again on its part determines the condition of the whole. But this ground and its result could be otherwise at every moment, and can become otherwise at every moment of the future. The highest law of that Being which carries laws is not a law of nature (law of a material being), but a law of Freedom, and is expressed in this formula: Everything *is* precisely as Freedom makes it, and does not become otherwise unless Freedom makes it otherwise.

Let us remark, however, at this place, in order to prevent possible misunderstandings, that we have here explained only the form of the actual, empirical Being (or of the taking hold of itself of knowledge). We have proved *that* a material (a *quantum* and determined relation) must be within that form; but concerning the ground of this determinedness we have been referred to absolute Freedom, or have said that this origin was incomprehensible. Now, let no one believe that here already we actually cause Freedom—as separated and isolated—to act, thus making it a real Thing *per se* and an altogether blind *chance*, in doing which we should again bring in the occult qualities, the real enemies of science. For this Freedom is in no knowledge, but is the Freedom presupposed prior to knowledge. At present we have, however, not yet arrived at any knowledge; where, then, should this Freedom be?

At some future time—and only then will our investigation be at an end—Freedom will find itself in actual knowledge *as* Freedom. It is true this Freedom, thus finding itself, will have conditions of its own being, and amongst them a *presupposed* Freedom; but it would find the presupposed Freedom *different* if it found *itself* different. From the latter only do we infer back to the presupposed Freedom, which is only thus accessible to knowledge. (What you, for instance *act*, first

opens to you the field of knowledge, and hence of your original character of Freedom.)

Now it may nevertheless be, that even this character, taken unchangeably, admits of different views of darkness or clearness, and hence degrees of power; and that in the highest degree each one *is* not limited, but limits *himself* with Freedom in knowledge.

‡ 2. Knowledge in general to become factical Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence posits itself as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.

The result of the former paragraph may be expressed in the following proposition: It is absolutely necessary that the in-itself altogether one and the same knowledge should limit itself and gather itself together in a point of reflection (concentration) if it is ever to arrive at an actual knowledge; but this point of reflection is infinitely repeatable—everywhere, however, the same. Now, if we remember that this knowledge is at the same time a pure, and in all knowledge absolutely *unchangeable Thinking*, the necessity results—after the possibility of knowledge has been ascertained from the determinedness of the standpoint—that each individual must hold himself in this altogether unchangeable Thinking. In this Thinking, therefore, all outward distinctions of individuals vanish: all of them perceive the same in the same manner, gathered up into the one fundamental contemplation of quantitability, with all other links involved in it, and carried by the one unchangeable Thinking of it. Only the *inner* difference remains; and there is, perhaps, no more proper place in the system to explain this *inwardness* of individuality than here.

I say, *I*, and thou sayest, *I*; both sayings mean altogether the same as far as the *form* is concerned; from both there follows altogether the same as far as the *matter* is concerned; and if thou didst not hear and think mine *I*, nor I thine, this no further to be distinguished *I* might just as well be only once. How does it happen that we, nevertheless, can posit it twice, and must posit it so, and that we keep both apart as never to be mistaken the one for the other?

I answer, according to our former explanations, as follows:

1. In all former knowledge a *subjective* and an *objective*

were distinguishable. The reflection rested upon an object, which it pictured only *formaliter*; and we know at present right well that this standing object originates everywhere in pure absolute Thinking, whereas its formalizing originates in the Thinking of the accidental, as also a Being. But in the absolute self-comprehension of knowledge there is no such distinction; the subjective and objective fall immediately together, and are inseparably united; and this is not, perhaps, merely *thought* as we have thought it here, and must think it; but it *is*, is absolutely, and this very Being is knowledge, as, *vice versa*, this knowledge is also again Being. It is the absolute in-itself-reposing of knowledge, without contemplating a generating, a beginning, &c.; hence it is that *in* which and *for* which all generating and all Being is: knowledge in the form of absolute, pure Thinking, immediate feeling of existence, which flows through all particular knowledge, and carries the same, as itself is carried by absolute Being—the highest and absolute synthesis of Thinking and contemplation.

But in this immediately-felt self thine *I* is not to appear; thy Ego I merely *think*, objectively, by loosening in Thinking my own self from me and putting it before me. I know very well that this signifies the same, and that thou loosenest in the same manner mine from thee; but this immediate ground of knowledge it never will and never can become for me, because I must *rest* permanently upon my standpoint in order to be I. It designates to me merely this *form* of absolute resting, and nothing else at all; and I cannot appropriate thy Ego simply because I can never get rid of my resting. It is the eternal unchangeable *That* of knowledge—and on no account some *What*—by which all individuality is *immediately* determined.

Hence everybody objectivates individuality, repeating it, and only through all individualities does he view the universe (in its one general contemplation wherein he stands) from his own point of reflection (of individuality).

The Isolation demonstrated here, in consequence of which I place thee outside of me, only thinking, not feeling thee, well knowing that thou performest the same operation in the same way, may possibly be the innermost ground of all other isolations and sequences of series, which we discovered above,

but which here we have blotted out by the too general standpoint of our investigation.

2. The question which remained unanswered above and was posited as incomprehensible: What is the ground of the particular determinedness of the point of reflection (point of individuality)? is now answered in the following manner:

From the mere empty form of knowledge—from the possibility of a knowledge generally—follows the determinedness or the limited seizing itself of knowledge in any simple point of reflection, but only the determinedness *generally* and in regard to the form; and from it follows also the material, as everywhere and altogether the same. There is no *particular* determinedness at all.

And thus it may, perhaps, appear that the original particular determinations in space and in time, which we have nevertheless discovered in contemplation, are also merely formal and figurative, but nothing *in themselves*, nothing which would hold firm to the unchangeable Thinking; and that if, finally, distinctions amongst these individuals should nevertheless be discovered, they can not be grounded in an original Freedom beyond all knowledge, but in a Freedom which is comprehended and understood as such.

3. Knowledge posits itself for itself therefore as an acting power or a tendency, and moreover as a system of acting powers, reciprocally determined and checked, and each determined or checked utterance of which is called a *feeling*.

The last result has removed an undecidedness of our former reflections, and at the same time we have obtained a further progress in the whole synthesis.

The in-itself-resting original contemplation of knowledge found itself (1) *outwardly* as a constructing, line-drawing, in a constructible *space*; (2) *inwardly* and for-itself from the one side as one and the same living *matter*, everywhere penetrated by life and liberty; and (3) and from the other side as lasting a certain time, as passing through a manifoldness of points one-sidedly dependent upon each other: *time*. This was the form of the actually posited inward and outward contemplation, its *That*, and was the immediate result of the positing of formal Freedom. But we could not account for the limitation of the *quantum* in that contemplation; the contemplation did not, therefore, appear, as in itself confined and limited,

and it was only generally asserted that the contemplation must be confined to a necessary limitation; this limitation we temporarily only pictured.

Now this omission has been supplied; through the absolute union of Thinking and contemplation we have demonstrated knowledge—in the individuality-points, in which alone it can be actual—as the absolutely finished, closed and completed result of a reciprocity within this inner manifoldness. It cannot go beyond its own limit whenever it actually seizes itself, and hence also its contemplation is limited as necessarily *its own*, and receives thus the character of empirical reality.

Again: what was designated above in the immediate For-itself-being as *Feeling*, becomes now in the contemplation—which has been united in a synthesis with Thinking, and which is necessarily an original quantitating—*Construction*; and its point of commencement—the very representative of the immediate point of self-seizing or feeling—becomes on that very account absolute, immanent *power*. This power is the found Freedom of constructing absolutely in one *point*, and hence is for the construction its point of commencement. Power is distinguished from mere Freedom as determined Being from general constructing, and as the ground of another Being from the general ground of constructing; it is the *found* (discovered) Freedom which seizes itself in such a point of individuality or of feeling, and hence—in regard to the seizing organ—the absolute synthesis of contemplation and feeling.

We thus have discovered another link for the characterization of empirical knowledge.

1. The Ego is not all (for itself) without ascribing power to itself, for it is Freedom which seizes itself in a *fixed* point; but Freedom is quantitating, and this, fixed in contemplation, is determined quantity. Hence it is impossible to posit power in self-contemplation without a manifestation of this power within this determined quantity, and as itself altogether determined. (We have here again the old synthesis, already known to us, of *Thinking* and *contemplation*, confinedness and determinedness, within a *general* sphere of quantitating.)

2. This manifestation of power, whatever it may be, is altogether originally and immediately found, and hence does not presuppose a prior Freedom in knowledge; nor is it at all an

arbitrary Freedom. For the consciousness of the power is an inseparable component of the absolutely existing knowledge, from which again the contemplation of a manifestation of the power is inseparable. Hence as soon as knowledge seizes itself, this manifestation is already there. (Which manifestation may, perhaps, be an organic one—in short, *organic life* itself.) And thus again, when we (i. e. the Science of Knowledge) elevate ourselves to Thinking, all individuals are equal. They are *all power*, in form; not this or that power. They are the positedness of formal Freedom even as a ready-found Being—and are nothing else at all—which Freedom can be repeated in infinite points, and is everywhere the same.

3. The determinedness of this Being, or of this power, is now altogether only for itself, i. e. in a knowledge existing for itself and confined to itself. But for this determinedness the power is determined not in itself, but only through its manifestations. The whole determined knowledge is therefore a knowledge not of power or powers, but of a system of manifestations of power. But these are determined only in their reciprocity with all others in the universe. By their relation to it, therefore, the power is determined in the same original manner.

4. Now this determinedness is, even if we look only upon the contemplation, a something divisible according to time and space. The Ego, therefore, whenever it seizes itself as determined power, encircles itself necessarily as living and as manifesting itself in a solid, lasting moment (it contemplates itself in the time-life), and also in space, as a *quantum* of everywhere and throughout animated and free matter (the body, the living matter which contemplates itself and is contemplated as Ego in space). But this Ego, in the empirical knowledge of which we speak here, is altogether confined to itself and cannot go beyond itself; hence it cannot also go beyond this contemplation of its time and materiality. However far perception may reach, this fundamental determinedness is its one, immovable basis. The body, thus seized in the original contemplation, remains the same, as sure as the Ego rests upon itself in all perception; and all perception, as sure as it is carried back in contemplation to its principle, its point of commencement, is carried back to the body; *all feeling, contemplation, perception of outwardness, is in reality only the*

self-feeling, self-contemplation of the change which has passed within the body. Moreover: the Ego cannot get out of its own time. This own time of the Ego now is it of which we speak here—not the general time, not the life of the one universe and the passing of events within it; a view to which the Ego can elevate itself only from *its own* time, and by abstracting from its own time. Now, it is very clear that this own time is not perceived, but only thought; it is evidently a conception. But in it is perceived whatever is perceived. *The Ego is confined to itself, and this absolute confinedness determines the character of empirical knowledge:* is a proposition which now signifies, *the Ego is confined to the identity of its body*—I say *identity*, for only from it, from the unchangeable point, can a body be at all comprehended—and *to the subjective, inner identity of its time, or of its time life.*

§ 4. The absolute power of Knowledge in manifesting itself as material *feeling* connects this feeling in perception with matter, and attributes it to matter as its cause.

A. Now, in regard to this individual time, it is important to explain the possibility of a single closed moment of perception within it, and the real significance and contents of this moment; i. e. of a moment *in* the individual time, not of itself, for itself is not perceived, but thought. According to the explanation of the system of knowledge through Thinking, the substance of this moment is reciprocity of the manifestation of my power with the power of the universe. But this manifestation is, in regard to its matter, Freedom; this Freedom is infinite, and if knowledge rested *merely* upon it, it would never become *actual* knowledge. In order to become such, it must tear itself away from it after the manner of Thinking, must seize the infinite Real—picturing it, if I may say so—within unity. This, we have seen, is the form of the law, according to which alone we can explain the occurrence of such a knowledge, completed (closed) within a moment. Hence, in order to make the application at once, the point of the single perception itself must involve a duplicity, the links of which are related to each other as Thinking is to contemplation, and between which, if we divide them in Thinking—this is important—the same absolute *hiatus* lies, which can be filled up by no reflection, but which constitutes the ultimate, the unattain-

able of knowledge, and which we have discovered everywhere between Thinking and contemplation. By the first link, the Ego seizes itself; by the second, it goes out of itself into the world and seizes itself in the world; but there is no Ego without a world, and no world without an Ego.

Now it is clear, and needs not to be recalled, that the Ego does not apply this law here with Freedom, since it is altogether confined in itself; only we, from our super-actual standpoint, explain it by that law which has been demonstrated in its universality. In the Ego itself it is thus, and if it were not thus there would be no knowledge; this determinedness of knowledge is precisely the Being of knowledge itself in *this* moment, or in *this*, &c. Without this Being of knowledge even our questions about it would be without sense.

This, for the present, merely to explain the possibility of such single moments. Next, it was important to deduce from some one point, as necessarily connected with it, others—nay, an infinite succession of other points. If this is not done, knowledge is never explained from itself and comprehended in itself; an occult quality is always necessary, from which to derive a new time, after having used up the present moment.

This, according to the foregoing, is easy, and explains again what we have just said. For in every moment the contemplation floats over an infinite: but, in order to seize it in *actual* contemplation, it must determine it, must limit it in a closed moment; actual contemplating and limiting is one. But this limiting is at the same time only a determining *within* the infinity. Thus *Thinking* is added to contemplation in an equally primitive manner; and this law of eternal reciprocity between contemplating and Thinking, a limiting and a positing of infinity, results in a never-to-be-completed infinity of single time-moments, joined together in a line. The solidity of time is derived not from limitation and closedness, but from the infinity which has been absorbed into it.

Originally there is a *series of Thinking* within the one matter of knowledge: within Freedom and quantitating. If this series of Thinking itself is *thought*, then the entire, infinite series is comprehended. But when it is *contemplated* actually, and hence *realiter* and limited, then you have *empirical knowledge*. The individualities also are such a line—not, however,

like the former one, reposing in contemplation, and *productions* of that original synthesis of contemplation and Thinking—but the infinity of that synthesis, which on its part finds its unity and basis in absolute Being, realizes and actualizes itself in those individualities.

2. Let us now drop that which in these thus described moments of perception carries the form of contemplation, and let us consider the form of identity. How, then, do the discrete moments of time hang together? Precisely in the thinking of time generally as the law of knowledge; but, as a *flowing* infinity, one-sidedly dependent upon each other. The Ego therefore, in its own self-contemplation, is in the same original manner confined to their *succession*; this succession in its partial determinedness can be no further explained or demonstrated as necessary. The law says only that some succession is necessary. (The fundamental character of empirical knowledge, or of pure perception in time-succession.) In every moment a further time is appropriated by Thinking and contemplation, and thus room is made in advance for concrete perception and a sphere prepared for it; but it cannot be ascertained by deduction what will fill up this time. This will be known only when that time shall have come, for the progressive development of the existing Ego extends into it. An actual perception is something altogether *new* for the perception itself, and can never be discovered *a priori*.

Hence so much is clear respecting the formal character of this knowledge: it is the altogether *immediate* knowledge, the knowledge which constitutes the time-being of him who knows: a Being which is simply knowledge, a knowledge which is simply Being; which, therefore, in itself isolated and discrete, is in every way primitively determined, and can, therefore, be neither actually nor genetically explained;—in one word, that which language terms most properly the *Feelings* (in the plural and $\alpha\tau' \epsilon\chi\omicron\gamma\iota\nu$) red, green, &c. That these feelings are the result of the reciprocity between each individual and the universe is what knowledge asserts when explaining itself. But how the forces of nature accomplish it, and in accordance with what rule and law they manifest themselves precisely in this manner, this no one will ever be

able to say, and this is the very absolute *hiatus* already described. Nor shall any one ever desire to say it; for, if he did, his knowledge would have been extinguished, and hence he would not say it. At the same time, it must not be understood so, as if the forces of nature manifested themselves in these feelings; both are nothing in themselves, and both are simply the relation of knowledge to absolute Being, which can never be comprehended in contemplation and facticity.

3. One other chief characteristic: The discrete within time—the series of actual feelings—is, according to all we have previously said, a mere absolute knowledge, altogether as such. Again, it is an empirical unity; it is *my* knowledge, connecting for me through time, and through nothing else: I am this my knowledge, and this my knowledge is I. There is no other I, no general I. The significance of this knowledge in *Thinking* (if thinking goes beyond it and explains it) is, that it is the knowledge of my Being in the universe. This it is to-day as it was yesterday, and it will be in all eternity in the same manner. What, then, is changed by the progress of my knowledge? It progresses through a chain of links dependent on each other one-sidedly: it is only formal; hence it can be changed only in its *form*, not in its *matter*, which remains the same. But the pure form of knowledge in regard to quantifiability is *clearness*. Hence by its progress it increases in clearness, which it expands over the knowledge of the universe; but this gradation is infinite.

Contemplation externalizes however, and transfers upon an objective universe what lies concealed in the Ego in the ground-form of contemplation; this is known from what we have said before.

B. Having described the formal character of perception, let us now review the entire synthesis artistically. Its inner central point, the focus of knowledge, is, in form, a material feeling. This is in *Thinking* (on no account in the immediate *perception*; hence, for the present, we only know of it, but itself knows nothing of it yet) a manifestation of the absolute power of the Ego. This power is the substance of the Ego, its own, inner nature, in which knowledge reposes forever; the manifestation is accident, but only *formaliter*; it can be, or not be; but if it is, it is necessarily that mani-

festation which it is, for it is determined by its unchangeable relation to the universe.

a. Altogether the same synthetical form appears here which we met in the highest synthesis of substantiality : as the one knowledge is related to absolute Being, i. e. as its formal accident, thus individual knowledge is related to the Being of individuality, which itself is, as we know well enough, nothing but the Being of the one knowledge, finding itself actual in an infinite number of points of concentration.

b. The power, I said, is the substance of the Ego ; it is always, whether the manifestation is or is not ;—not in itself, however, for, unless each of these links in the synthesis is, there is no knowledge ; but only after knowledge has developed itself, and thinks itself, is this power to be presupposed by every determined manifestation (which can and cannot be).

c. The entire synthesis is produced in Thinking ; hence only through Freedom. The actual knowledge can be, therefore, though this Thinking is not. Knowledge itself reposes in feeling, and this is the first absolute point which must be if an actual knowledge is to be.

The material feeling is for the knowledge which compresses itself into a moment and seizes itself within it (and which, in so far as it is quantifiable, can progress infinitely in clearness)—a mere pure Being—of the Ego in immediate feeling, of the universe in contemplation.

Let this latter point be noted. True, it has been sufficiently demonstrated and explained by the foregoing, but its importance deserves some additional remarks. We know that in contemplation the contemplating intelligence loses itself : hence, in spite of the contemplation, there is in it no Ego at all ; and only in the feeling does it seize *itself* in the form of Thinking. Now consciousness rests neither in the one nor in the other, but in both. Hence, if the material feeling (red, sour, &c.) is viewed from the one side as affection of the Ego, and from the other side as quality of the Thing, this duplicity itself is already a result of the dividing reflection. In actual knowledge, which no reflection can reach, it is neither the one nor the other, but both ; both, however, inseparable and still undistinguishable ; and in consequence of this absolute identity the distinguishing reflection must also posit both as

inseparable. No subjective feeling, no objective quality, and *vice versa*. (To speak strictly, therefore, the internal is not transferred upon the object, as transcendental Idealism may have expressed itself in opposing dogmatism, nor does the objective come into the soul; but both are thoroughly one. The soul, taken objectively—the feelings—is nothing but the world itself; and the world, with which we have to deal here, is nothing but the soul itself.)

The contemplation, which we are now discussing, is a constructing of space=matter. Hence, the feeling, as quality, is melted together with the matter—i. e. with a matter in the compact, ever-reposing space—but excluded from the matter in which I live (from my body). For, the former *I perceive*; my materiality, however, I do not perceive, but only think, as the *terminus a quo* of all perception. (Here again it appears why no individual can mistake anything outside of himself for himself, since the perceived matter is always outside of him.) But it is a constructing with a *quantum* of matter, since the infinity must be compressed by the form of thinking into a unity. Thus matter is here the bearer of the quality, which is its accident.

(There are in knowledge a number of places where dogmatism can be altogether refuted and idealism plainly proved. This is one of them: Is matter to be altogether perceptible to the feelings, even inwardly? I evidently assume this. How, then, do I know it? Not by particular perception; hence by the law of perception generally. I must have penetrated matter in my knowledge at once with the thought of perceptibility, as its continual *substratum*. Matter, therefore, is a *conception*, and is based upon the Thinking of a *relation*.)

This as a characteristic of contemplation in regard to space and matter; now the same in regard to time. The power of the Ego manifests itself only in an absolutely determined time-succession, that is, as determined by the fundamental character of time, namely: to admit only a succession of moments which are dependent upon each other one-sidedly. Evidently each new moment is a new, previously not known, character of the determined power; the power, as a determined power, is, therefore, seized by consciousness only in the progress of time, ever *clearer* and more and clearer. Entirely

clear it would be recognized only through the completion of the infinite time, which in reality is impossible, but can here well be thought figuratively. The contents of all the moments of the lifetime is, therefore, determined by the fundamental character of this power, and their succession, by the enlightenment which knowledge gets of this character. *Such* a time lies therefore in *such* a being, which knows of itself in an immediate manner. Another being, if it were possible, would give other time-contents and another time-succession. Only in pure Thinking is Being compressed into one point; in empirical knowledge it receives a time-character, which as such is altogether and irrevocably determined.

Hence in all possible time lies hidden the only possible true Being, which, however, has not yet become completely clear to itself, but has attained only a certain degree of clearness; and this Being bears at every moment that degree of clearness which is possible (and hence necessary) from the character of the time passed before it, and the time awaiting it in an infinite future.

- § 5. The absolute power of Knowledge cannot be thought as manifesting itself in a material feeling without being contemplated therein, and hence extended into a *direction* of feeling, and thus apprehended as *Impulse*.

The substance of the former reflection was, in its true significance, a manifestation of power, considered as a point in time. Its picture is the construction of a line. From every point an infinite number of lines are possible, according to the infinity of possible directions, and the actual line depends altogether upon the direction, and is itself that direction actualized.

1. The Ego, which takes hold of itself, is a point within the everywhere extended space. It cannot manifest itself except in a direction. Now, this direction is everywhere and altogether a determining of a point; but the point is the picture of the Ego. The direction, therefore, is to be considered as necessarily grounded in the Ego, or the direction is itself the Ego of the contemplation. The Ego is contemplated only in it, and by means of it as its directing power. In this knowledge of the direction lies the focus of contemplation in our new synthesis. We must at present proceed to describe it (a) in regard to its substance, and (b) in regard to its form.

a. So far as its substance is concerned it has altogether the form of a line within space, of the progressing from one point and through it to another point. Freedom, however, is in the whole line; i. e. the possibility that in each point the direction, and hence the line, may cease or change into other infinite directions. A consciousness of infinite *constructibility*, and, with regard to the actually constructed, of the *accidentality* of the same.

b. In regard to its *form*, the synthesis is a curious, and in its results, which will soon appear, very important compound of *contemplation* and *Thinking*. For if in *each* point the Freedom of direction, the taking hold of and continuing the line (for this is the intrinsic part of this contemplation) were thought, we should never arrive at a line. It is therefore necessary to assume a forgetting of self in the contemplation in order to be able to explain the concretion of the line; but it is equally necessary to assume a self-comprehension in the contemplation, a thinking within it, and a going beyond it, in order to give it the *direction*, without which it also would be no line. Hence both are necessarily united; it is a contemplating Thinking, and a thinking contemplation. In the reflection it is divided, and then we have not the one if we have the other, although the being held together of both beyond the reflection forms the real character of that conception.

(No direction, without a permanent manifold, which is not included in the direction at all; and *vice versa* no manifoldness for the Ego without direction. Thus here also real and ideal ground fall together and are one.)

2. We shall now develop the synthesis in its further connection. The Ego, of which we speak, is confined to itself—is a *Being*. The taking hold of the direction is therefore in the same manner immediate and actual, as we have described the character of empirical knowledge to be. Every one calls this Acting, i. e. altogether in a physical point of view. The picture of it is a *continued determining* of the given construction of matter through Freedom, i. e. here through material force and motion. Further than this no material acting reaches, and the ground of it is hidden here: it is a separating and external reuniting of matter, but never an organizing of matter from within, which latter is the character of the

original construction. Let it be well understood, I do not say that acting in itself takes place, for this is wrong, but that a knowledge of a real acting is the condition of all knowledge, and is in the present synthesis the lowest focus of all knowledge.

3. The Ego is in the empirical standpoint altogether tied down to its Being; but its Being, its discovered and discoverable Being, is nothing else than the result of its reciprocity with the universe, or it is itself the universe in one of its original points of penetration. A ground is posited in the Ego, means, therefore, the same as if we said: it is posited in the world. Indeed, only here does an Ego first enter knowledge; but this Ego is here nothing but the thought of the mere positedness of formal Freedom, of the *That* without any *What*; it is an objective, empirical, by no means pure Thought; it is an altogether empty, formal Ego, without any reality as yet. Hence, what we said just now: that contemplation and Thinking are here united in a peculiar manner—the Ego not positing itself in all points as giving the direction, but being swept along—receives here a more extensive and highly important significance. Its Freedom is altogether only its thought; the direction is contained in its *Being in the Universe*. The existing, actual Ego (as it ought to be called, since it is an empirical, real acting) gives itself the direction, or this point of Being in the universe *has* the direction: both statements mean altogether the same. Only the glance, the self-comprehension of knowledge, is matter of absolute Freedom, as has been exhaustively shown; if this were not, there would be no direction either, and no manifestation of power, and it would be impossible to speak any more about anything at all. But if this glance is, then the *direction* is there at the same time in its complete determinedness, and everything else which results therefrom. The manifestation of the original power, of which we have just spoken, unites, therefore, in an equally immediate manner with that glance; and hence that glance is—I believe it is called so—the feeling of an *impulse*, and its substance also is unchangeably determined by the Universe. Impulse, or the substantial in relation to an accident, it is only in so far as from its mere formal positedness, the *formaliter* free knowledge, does not follow as yet (this may join

it or not, and hence it is accidentence)—but on no account as if it could proceed in this or in a contrary direction (to *a* or to — *a*), which would be contradictory, and is one of the absurdities which have been ascribed to transcendental Idealism. Only in this opposition is it impulse; united with the reflection (the formal knowledge), it becomes an empirical physical acting, as we have described it.

Result.—I act never, but in me acts the universe. But in reality this does not act either, and there is no acting; I merely view as acting the doing of the universe, in the reflection of the same, as Ego. Hence, also, there is no real, empirical Freedom—i. e. within the limits of the empirical. If we desire to attain Freedom, we must elevate ourselves to another region.

(How greatly has the Science of Knowledge been misunderstood when it said, “We must start from a *pure acting*,” a proposition which, in our present exposition, is still of the future; and when this was supposed to mean the perishable acting which we carry on commonly—gathering stones and scattering them.)

4. Thus the universe, as the sphere of empirical knowledge, is still further determined, and we will at once make the application. This universe is a living system of impulses, which continues to develop itself in an infinite time in all the points, where it is seized by a knowledge according to a law contained within its own being, and which carries within it, it is true, the possibility of a knowledge, but on no account knowledge itself. (Here again we find a chief point of distinction, or rather a result from the one point which distinguishes the true idealism of the Science of Knowledge from Spinozistic* systems. In these latter systems empirical Being is assumed to carry knowledge within itself, as a necessary result, as a higher degree of it. But this is against the inner character of knowledge, which is an absolute originating, an originating from the substance of Freedom, not of Being; and shows the want of an intellectual contemplation of this knowledge. The same relation of knowledge to Being which has been discovered in absolute knowledge and Being—i. e. that the former has only an accidental Being in relation

* Alluding to Schelling's System.

to the latter as yet, is its accidentence, arising from the absolute (which, therefore, might also *not* be) realization of Freedom;—must everywhere and in every form remain the same. In empirical knowledge, we make the material world itself absolute Being, and with perfect justice, but the philosophical standpoint is to be a higher one, and is to be the transcendental standpoint.

5. We add the following remark:—The impulse expresses the mere Being, without any knowledge as yet; hence it is mere nature. The latter is expressed in a material body, in the form of space as form of body. It is organic manifestation. Only through Thinking does the point enter, and the form of construction from it, the form of a line. Now it is true that this is the only possible *immediate* mode of acting of the intelligences; but it has its ground simply in the form of knowledge. This is, therefore, only another view of the organizing form of body, and both are one beyond the Factical. The mechanical (we will call it so to distinguish it from the other) and organic manifestations are in themselves not different, but they are merely a duplicity of view. There is no mechanical action except through organic (evermore organically renewing itself) power—*real ground*; and again, no organization can be comprehended except through a picturing of the mechanism—*ideal ground*. Both are related like contemplation and Thinking, and each is inseparable from the other, and is the each-other-presupposing, double-point-of-viewing, the so-often-referred-to knowledge— $\alpha\tau' \xi\zeta\sigma\chi\eta\nu$.



PART FOURTH.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as an Absolutely Determined System of Moral Impulses, or as a Moral World.



PART FOURTH.

Knowledge posits itself for-itself as an absolutely determined System of Moral Impulses; or as a Moral World.

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- § 1. The perception of a Factical world is not possible without a further determinedness of that world, which is known as the Moral Law.

In the preceding part we have described and completed the conception of the material world; a conception which, rightly understood and applied, must suffice everywhere. A natural philosophy could be erected upon it without any further preliminaries. It is to be expected that its opposite reposes in

Thinking, as itself does in contemplation, and that that opposite will be the moral world, and that it will appear how both worlds are altogether one and the same, and that the moral world is the ground of the material world; the manner in which it is thus the ground, being however incomprehensible. Hence we add at once an investigation into the transcendental ground of the material world. The question is this: In order to be able to *think* the moral world, we *contemplate* it in the material world; (or, the material world is the contemplation of the thinking of the moral world;) and this would be easily comprehended if both worlds appeared in all knowledge. But common experience teaches that this is not so; that, by far, the fewest individuals elevate themselves to pure thinking, and hence to the conception of a moral world, whilst nevertheless every one has the sense of perception of the material world; and this is confirmed by the Science of Knowledge, since it makes Thinking dependent upon the realization of Freedom within the already realized factical knowledge, and hence denies its actual necessity altogether. But how, then, do these individuals, who do not think, arrive at a knowledge of their world? It is evident that the answering of this question decides the whole fate of transcendental Idealism.

1. According to our doctrine, confirmed as it has been in all our previous reflections, all possible knowledge has only itself for an object, and no other object but itself. It has also been shown that, as a result of the contents of the Science of Knowledge, the *entire* knowledge does not always and under every condition view itself; that, therefore, what in the Science of Knowledge is only a part, may, in a determined actuality, view itself as the entire knowledge, but that it may also go beyond itself in a lower point of reflection to a higher one, though always *remaining within itself*.

2. Hence there is a manifold of reflections of knowledge within knowledge, all of which are synthetically connected and form a system. This manifoldness, its connection and relation, has been explained from the inner *laws of possibility* of a knowledge, as such; an inner, merely formal legislation in knowledge, based on the realizing or not-realizing itself of a formal Freedom; when realizing itself, doing so without any further condition; and when not, remaining in mere possibil-

ity (the possibility to realize itself whenever it chooses): in it Thinking, Contemplation, Manifoldness, Time, Space—yes, nearly everything which we have heretofore deduced—is grounded.

3. But with this merely formal legislation, knowledge, as an infinite quantitating, would dissolve into nothing. We should never arrive at a knowledge, and hence never either at the application of that legislation, if knowledge were not in some manner checked in that infinity, and checked immediately, as soon as knowledge is formed or realized; on no account, however, within an already formed (realized) knowledge, for without that primary condition also no knowledge is realized.

4. The law, just uttered, does therefore no longer belong to the system of that legislation which relates to those manifold reflections within knowledge; for this system presupposes already knowledge, so far as the Being thereof is concerned, and determines it only *formaliter* within this Being; whereas the law referred to first makes this Being itself possible; only possible, not yet real. Hence it is in reality the result of a reciprocity between the absolute actually becoming Being and an absolute Being, which, according to the Science of Knowledge, is purely thought in knowledge, and *is to be presupposed* prior to every knowledge, to the real as well as to the possible knowledge. This is to prepare the following; for:

5. This state within quantity is in a certain respect—in which we shall shortly see—always a determined state, amongst other possible states. There is consequently a law of determination, and the cause of it is evidently not within knowledge, in no possible significance of the word, but within absolute Being. This law of determination will appear in pure thinking as the *moral law*. But how does it appear where knowledge arrives at no pure thinking? This again is the question asked before.

Now let us consider the following:

a. Knowledge never penetrates and seizes itself, *because* it objectivates and dirempts itself by reflection. The diremption of the highest reflection is into an absolute thinking and contemplation, while absolute knowledge beyond them is neither contemplation nor thinking, but the identity of both.

b. In the contemplation, which is altogether inseparable

from knowledge, the contemplation is therefore lost within itself, and does not at all comprehend itself. True, in thinking it comprehends itself; but then it is no longer contemplating, but thinking. The infinity, and with it the realism of contemplation, which results from it, is done away with altogether, and in its place we obtain as its representative a totalizing picturing of the infinity. Let us, therefore, pay no attention to this thinking.

c. The knowledge which comprehends itself, as we have just described it under *a* and *b*, thinks the contemplation as an inseparable part of knowledge, and for that very reason as not comprehending itself. That knowledge, therefore, thinks and comprehends very well the absolute incomprehensibility and infinity as the condition of all knowledge, the form, the *That* of it. (This is important.)

d. In this thus understood incomprehensibility = the material world, viewed objectively, not formally, we cannot speak at all about *determinedness* or *non-determinedness*. For all determinedness is founded on a comprehending and thinking; but here we neither comprehend nor think; the object of this contemplation is posited as the absolute incomprehensibility itself.

Conclusions.—*a.* The expression “material world” involves, strictly taken, a contradiction. In this contemplation, there is in reality no universe and no totality, but only a floating, undetermined infinity, which is never comprehended. A universe exists only in thinking, but then it is already a moral universe. (This will enable us to judge certain theories respecting nature.)

b. All questions about the best world, about the infinity of the possible worlds, &c., dissolve, therefore, into nothing. A material world, in its completion and closedness, we can obtain only after the completion of time, which is a contradiction; hence we can obtain it within no time. But the moral world, which is before all time and which is the ground of all time, is not the best, but is the only possible and altogether necessary world; i. e. the simply good.

c. But there is within contemplation in every time-moment a determinedness of quality and (since thinking applies the infinity to it) a determinedness of quantity; let it be well

remembered, for a simply objective and empirical thinking, finding itself as such at the realization of knowledge. This is the conception of an object of mere perception. Where is the ground of this determinedness? We now stand right before our question. Evidently in an *a priori*, altogether incomprehensible, and only actually in the time-moments to be comprehended absolute law of the empirical time-thinking generally.

It is an *a priori* incomprehensible law, we have said; for, if it were comprehensible by a free picturing and gathering together of time, the Ego would not be limited to itself and no knowledge would ever be realized. Hence it is an altogether immediate *determinedness through the absolute*—(only *formally* thinkable)—*Being itself*; the law of a time-succession, which lies altogether beyond all time. For every single moment carries, as we have already shown, all future moments conditionally within itself.

Result.—There is a law, which on no account forces a knowledge into being, but which, if a knowledge exists, absolutely forces its determinedness, and in consequence of which each individual sees in each moment a material, and materially thus constituted experience. The law is an immediate law of knowledge, and connects immediately with knowledge. *That* this is so, and that, if we are at all to attain a knowledge, this must be so, each one can understand; but concerning the substance of the determinedness, and the manner in which knowledge itself originates and in which that law connects with knowledge, *nothing can be comprehended*, for this very non-comprehension is the condition of the realization of knowledge. All attempts to go beyond it are empty dreams, which no one understands, or can demonstrate as true. The *moral* significance of nature can well be understood, but not any other and higher significance of nature; for pure nature is nothing more and portends nothing more than what it is.

Whoever says: there is a material world altogether constituted as I see, hear, feel and think it,—utters simply his perception, and is, so far, right. But when he says: this world affects me as in-itself-Being, produces sensations, representations, &c., within me,—he no longer gives utterance to his perception, but to an explanatory thought, in which there is not

the least grain of sense, and says something which lies beyond the possibility of knowledge. He can say only : if I open my exterior senses, I find them thus determined. More he does not know ; but every one can comprehend that, if more could be known, there would be no knowledge at all. (These are the immanent, strict proofs of transcendental Idealism.)

‡ 2. The perception of individual existence, and of a natural impulse, is not possible without the perception of individual Freedom.

As the first principle of the empirical, we have discovered :
1. A law, applicable only to absolute Being (how, we know not yet, nor is that the question), connects itself immediately with a knowledge, *if* a knowledge is, in order to develop a succession of qualities, which for that knowledge is altogether accidental and *a priori* incomprehensible. (The succession, as this fixed succession, does not lie within the law but within knowledge ; in the law lies only, that, since a succession must be, it must be qualitatively determined in such and such a manner.) As this law, if a knowledge is, realizes itself altogether in the same manner, we have taken only one empirical knowledge and one Ego as the representative of all empirical Egos. The Ego, therefore, which appears here, is the mere position of formal knowledge generally, *that* a knowledge is, and nothing else.

2. For this Ego the appearance of nature at each moment, i. e. each of her conditions, regarded as a whole (for we may discover another kind of moments), is, in accordance with our previous reflections, *impulse*—of course, an organic one, an impulse of nature (natural impulse).

The knowledge (feeling) of this impulse is, however, not possible without the *realization* of the same—*activity* ; and since (especially empirical) activity is not a thing *per se*, but can be only a passing condition of knowledge, we say the Ego appears to itself immediately as acting. This acting alone—at least, as far as we have come at present—must be regarded as the immediate life of the Ego, from which everything else which we have heretofore met, and especially the will-less impelling nature, is first understood.

3. But this acting appears, as we have often said, in the *form of a line* ; not as an organizing, but as a mechanizing, as free

motion, and hence within *time*. In so far the Ego in this acting remains confined within nature, and attached to it; it is itself the highest phenomenon of nature. But in the present nature infinite directions are possible from every point. About these directions nature, thus viewed, can determine absolutely nothing; because in nature, in the law of her contemplation, there can be altogether no determination of these directions. Hence in this point, in the giving itself a *direction*, the Ego tears itself loose, by the formal primary law of its character, from Being, or nature lets it loose, which means the same thing. Here, the *Being Free* is absolute, formal law.

4. Again: Even in so far as the intelligence gives itself up to the natural law of the concretion—as it certainly must, if it is to arrive at a knowledge of itself—it nevertheless thinks itself free in every point of this concretion; and hence makes at the same time the succession of nature its own *succession of time and motion*.

But in the same manner again the intelligence connects the single points of its freedom beyond the concretion of nature, into a higher *Thought-succession*, independent of nature; and unites the single moments of its acts in the unity of a *conception of a DESIGN* which forms a junction with nature, but, in its own connection, lies beyond it. From this we derive the following important result: Even the natural impulse elevates the Ego immediately above the *given concretion* of nature, in which it finds itself as contemplating, to a totality of acting, to a plan, &c.; because as acting it no longer merely contemplates itself, but also thinks. Hence the original self-contemplation of the Ego includes not only that it contemplates itself as free acting, giving direction, &c., but also that it should connect this acting, and hence posit independent designs within nature.

a. Through this reflection, the above assertion, “Each individual Ego comprehends itself necessarily as lasting a certain time, and as moving freely,” receives its real significance and application. The conception of acting and of positing designs as the real *contents* of that individual time and motion, is here added, and it becomes clear how the individual time and experience unlooses itself from the *general* knowledge, and how

the individual Ego originates within this general ground-form of knowledge.

b. The proposition: Unless I elevate myself to moral Freedom *I* do not act, but nature acts through me; means now, regarded more closely, the following: I, although an individual and determining myself with free will, hence torn loose from and elevated above nature, have nevertheless immediately only a *natural plan* and design, which I prosecute, however, in the form and according to the law of a rational Being. The Freedom of the Ego in regard to nature is here still formal and empty.

5. The result of the preceding may therefore be expressed in the following propositions:

a. The Ego does not arrive at all to the perception of the dead, will-less, in all its time-determinations unchangeably determined nature, without finding itself as acting.

b. The ground-law of this acting, that it assumes a line-direction, does not lie in nature, which does not extend so far at all, but it is an immanent, formal law of the Ego; and the ground of it lies altogether in knowledge, as such.

c. But the direction is a fixed one, and the Ego which reposes in this standpoint necessarily ascribes to itself also the ground of the determinedness of this direction, since it cannot ascribe it to nature; and since besides nature and the Ego, there is nothing here.

d. But as there is still a something higher for us, and perhaps for all knowledge, a going beyond its actual Being, in order to ascend to the transcendental cause of its possibility, which we have not yet attempted from *this* point, we shall not yet decide whether the Ego is also the transcendental ground of the direction, contenting ourselves with stating what we know. This, strictly, is only the following: The knowledge of which we now speak is perception; the Ego, therefore, perceives itself as ground of a fixed direction; or, more strictly, *the Ego perceives in the perception of its real acting, of which fixed direction it is the ground.*

6. Here we obtain at once an important result, which we cannot pass by on account of the strictness of the system. On the one side, the result of our former deduction was: The percep-

tion of the material world is dependent upon the perception (self-realization) of Freedom; the latter is the *ideal ground* of the former, for only through means of the latter do we arrive at all at a knowledge. On the other side, we have found above: that the perception of Freedom is dependent upon the perception of the material world; the latter is the *real ground* of the former, for only the latter gives to Freedom the possibility of a real acting. The relation is the same as in contemplation between form of body and form of line, which also were mutually dependent upon each other; or, higher, in the original synthesis of knowledge, as between the absolute form of contemplation and the ground-form of Thinking. Hence, perception, κατ' ἐξουχίαν, the absolute form and the extent of *immediate* knowledge, is neither perception of the dead world nor of the world of Freedom, but altogether of both in their inseparability and in their immediate opposition as postulated through immediate reflection; its object, the universe, is also altogether in itself the One; but is in its appearance divided into a material and an intellectual world. (It appears how our investigation approaches its close. The whole factical knowledge, the material world, has now been synthetized; it only remains to bring this world into a complete relation with its higher branch-member, the intellectual world, and our work is done. For with the separate subjects and objects, and their psychological appearances and differences, a Transcendental Philosophy has nothing to do.)

This perception of Freedom can easily be changed from an individual into a general one by this remark: My Freedom is to be the ground of a *real* acting. It has been shown, however, that I am not real except as in reciprocity with all other knowledges, and reposing upon the general one knowledge—thus really actualizing one of the *real possibilities* of this knowledge within itself. Hence, whatever there is perceptible for me in me, has, in so far as it has been *really* actualized, acted, done—entered into the sphere of the real (of perception), of all. Thus, in accordance with our premises, it is apparent of itself (what no former philosophy has thoroughly explained) how free Beings know of the productions of the Freedom of others: the actualized *real* Freedom is the determined realization of a possibility of the general perception, in

which the Egos are not divided, but are rather one—are only one perceiving Ego.

‡ 3. The *knowledge* (not mere perception) of Freedom is not possible without a contact with other free beings.

This connection of the general perception with Freedom and its self-realizations, and the principle of this relation, which we have touched upon only in passing, must be explained further. We introduce the explanation by the following considerations :

1. I, the individual, apply, according to a former synthesis, the particular manifestation of my power to a general power, which I did not at all perceive, but merely *thought* there, and which I placed before me in the form of contemplation as a something of an organized body (we select this expression with care). This my manifestation of power is real and enters accordingly into the general perception, means evidently : it is traced back, with all that follows from it, to the general perception, to the unity of a person, partly immediately posited in space, partly determining itself with Freedom. Now this person is at first a whole of nature, absolutely encircling a particular time-moment, and thus arising in the general time, and for the general perception, from nothing : a link of the described time-succession in nature ; but at the same time the commencement of the appearance of a *rational being* in time, of which an acting, extending necessarily beyond the nature-succession, catches back into nature ; finally, a determined body, at present only for the general perception of nature, but not as above, an undetermined somewhat of an organic body.

2. This free acting, accomplished through the medium of the body, according to what law can it move ? Evidently according to the same law through which, in our former reflections, knowledge of Freedom generally was produced : the law that it must be immediately thought and comprehended in perception as an acting, which can manifest itself only in the form of a line, and which, therefore, takes its direction not from nature, but from out of itself. The chief point to be observed lies in the *immediateness* of this self-contemplation, which excludes everything like a deduction, comprehending from premises,

&c., since this would destroy totally the character of the perception, and hence the possibility of all knowledge.

3. Let us also add the following passing remark, which is an important hint for the future. A certain time-moment in the general time, a space-moment of the universal matter, lies immediately in the succession of perception as filled with a body which can manifest itself absolutely altogether only as Freedom. The ground-principle of the *contents* of this succession, but on no account of its formal existence, was absolute Being. But, viewed as a principle of nature, absolute Being is altogether no principle of a view of Freedom; hence it becomes here particularly, at the same time, principle of Freedom and thus the ground of that mixed perception of a nature and of a rational acting posited within it at the same time, which we have just described. This may become important.

4. But what is—on the part of the general perception and of any representative thereof (any individual Ego)—the condition of contemplating other free subjects outside of itself, of the representative Ego? Evidently, since Freedom and its ground-law can be perceived only in an individuality-point, the condition is, that that Ego must find the ground-law within itself in order to be able to find it also outside of itself: hence, expressed in general terms; the condition is, that knowledge is not merely simply confined contemplation, but likewise *reflection, knowledge of knowledge*, i. e. of Freedom and the within-itself generation of knowledge. In the self-contemplation of our own Freedom, Freedom, *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, is known (direct, because it is the real substance of knowledge).

5. Again—let the *nervus probandi* be well noted which in my other writings has been very elaborately described, but which here, now that perception has been thoroughly determined, can be gathered into one word:—since the individual Ego contemplates its Freedom only within *universal* Freedom, which constitutes a closed thinking, its Freedom is *realiter* only real within a contemplation of infinite Freedom, and as a particular limitation of this infinity. But Freedom as Freedom is limited only through other Freedom; and actually manifests Freedom only through other actually manifested Freedom.

6. Hence it is the condition of a knowledge of knowledge,

of self-perception as the principle of all other perception, that, besides the free manifestation of the individual, other free manifestations, and, by their means, other free substances, should be perceived. Reciprocity through actual manifestation of free acting is condition of *all* knowledge. Each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows generally (*a priori*, through original thinking) of acting, of Freedom. Again: Each one knows of the acting of others, *idealiter*, only by means of his own acting from out of himself. Finally: each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows of the acting of others, *realiter*; for the character of his particular acting (and generally he himself) is in knowledge result of the knowledge of the acting of the totality.

Hence no free Being arrives at a consciousness of himself without at the same time arriving at a consciousness of other Beings of the same kind. No one, therefore, can view himself as the whole knowledge, but only as a single standpoint in the sphere of knowledge. The intelligence is within itself and in its most inner root, as existing, not One, but a manifold; at the same time, however, a closed manifold, a *system* of rational Beings.

(Nature—thus we will call her hereafter exclusively in opposition to the intelligences—is now placed before us as one and the same, coursing through infinite time and solid space, which she fills. If, as bearer of the free individuals and their actions, we must not split her further—which it is not the object of the Science of Knowledge further to do—she will always remain this One. In this very form she is the proper object of Speculative Physics, as a guide of Experimental Physics—for to nothing else must the former present claims—and must thus be received by that science. But in the world of intelligence there is absolute manifoldness, and this manifoldness remains always on the standpoint of *perception*; for knowledge is for itself a *quantitating*. Only in the sphere of pure thinking there may also be discovered a *formal*—on no account real—unity even of this world.)

§ 4. Results.

1. Each individual's knowledge of the manifestations of his Freedom is dependent upon his knowledge of the general

Freedom-manifestation and upon the general knowledge thereof. It is, as we have learned already from other examples, a determined closed thinking within another—just now discovered—thinking of a determined whole. Hence it is itself determined thereby; the Freedom in individual knowledge is result of the general Freedom, and therefore necessarily determined by it; there is no perceptible Freedom of a single individual. His character as well as the character of his acting proceeds from his reciprocity with the whole world of Freedom.

2. In the general perception of each individual, nature does not appear any further than follows from his reciprocity with his perceived system of Freedom. For the Ego of each individual, as this particular one, appears to him only in this reciprocity and is determined by it; but nature he feels and perceives and characterizes only in the impulse thus directed towards his particular Ego. Hence, if the possibility of a manifestation of Freedom is presupposed, nature results without anything further from the self-contemplation of that Freedom; is merely another view of Freedom; is the sphere and the immediately at the same time posited object of Freedom; and there is thus no further necessity at all for another absolute principle of the perception of nature. Hence nature, as manifestation of the Absolute, in which light we viewed it above, (let no one be led astray by this remark; perhaps a disjunction takes place here within nature, only without our perceiving it,) is totally annihilated, and is now merely a form of the contemplation of our Freedom, the result of a formal law of knowledge.

3. The impulse which is *idealiter* determined through the reciprocity of general Freedom and through knowledge, would thus be the only firm object remaining in the background, except the undeterminable and in so far in-itself dissolving general Freedom. This impulse would be the *substante*, but only in regard to that part of it which enters knowledge, and on no account determined in its real contents through knowledge; and the manifestation of Freedom would be its *accidence*; but, let it be well remarked, simply a formal, in nowise a materializing *accidence*; for only in so far as the impulse really impels, acts (apart from its body-form in which it appears in contem-

plation which falls away here), does it enter knowledge; hence, in so far as it is posited it impels necessarily. It is, therefore, accident simply in so far as it enters the form of knowledge, in so far as it is a knowledge at all. Thus also the *general* Freedom is not *realiter* free, but only *formaliter*; it acts ever according to all its empirical knowledge, and knows only of that according to which it acts. Only this knowledge itself seems still to be *materialiter* free, if there are impulses beyond real knowledge. (Of its formal Freedom, inner absoluteness, we do not speak now.)

4. According to a former remark, knowledge, in obedience to a formal law, separates the plan, assigned to it by the natural impulse, into a succession of mutually determined, manifold acts; and only thus does it arrive at a knowledge of its *real* acting, and hence of its Freedom and of knowledge generally. But the links of this succession have significance only *in* the succession; the next following links annihilate them. Hence the Ego expressly proposes to itself the perishable, as perishable and on account of its perishability, and makes this its object: a mere living from one moment to another without ever thinking on what will come next. But, still more, even every closed moment of nature itself (hence the impulse and plan of nature) lies within an unclosed contemplation, and thus carries within itself the ground of a future moment and thereby its own annihilation in that moment; and is therefore also, an essentially perishable plan. Hence, all acts excited by the impulses of nature are necessarily directed upon the perishable; for everything in nature is perishable.

5. According to what we have said previously, nature develops herself according to a law which can have its ground only in absolute Being. Now even if we intended to restore this law to nature, in so far as nature appears in knowledge as real, as the bearer of knowledge, it would still be, for the standpoint of perception, merely a *formaliter* posited law; but on no account one which could explain to us the connection which we can only perceive. Allowing this interpretation, about which we desire not to give an opinion at present whether it will be admitted or not, it would, to be sure, give to nature an apparent (because time is infinite and never completed) unity of plan, but of which each single plan would be

merely a piece torn out, the relation of which to the whole would remain unknown to us. We should thus, in these acts, give ourselves up to a strange, concealed plan, unknown to us, which we should not know ourselves, and hence knowledge would not yet have penetrated into itself, since its origin and root would still remain in the dark.

‡ 5. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in sensuous perception in the form of an absolute immediately perceptible Being.

We have advanced to the universality of the perception of empirical Freedom, and have deduced from it nature itself and the universality of the perception of nature. Only one thing remained, which we could not deduce and of which we remained ignorant, a certain impulse directed upon Freedom, which we, however, called impulse of nature, although we, it is true, knew so much of it that it was not an impulse of *dead* nature. It seemed to appear plainly that nothing more could be explained from that sphere. The empirical world may have been traced on its own ground back to its highest cause, where it becomes lost to the empirical eye.

1. Let us, therefore, commence from the other side, and from its highest point, which we know well enough already. Knowledge is an absolute origin from nothing, and this within an equally absolute *For-itself*. Looking at the latter, there is hence in knowledge a pure, absolute Being; and as soon as it comprehends this same Being, i. e. the pure thought thereof, as is required here, it is, in this respect, *itself* pure absolute Being; i. e. as knowledge. (By the last addition of the absolute self-penetration of pure thinking, the proposition becomes a new one; for pure thinking itself, as lost in the positing of objects, with the entire synthesis connected therewith, has been sufficiently explained above.)

Concerning this knowledge, its substance and its form, let the following suffice. As far as regards the substance, it is the absolute form of knowledge, of self-grasping itself; not as act, however, but as *Being*: in one word, the pure, absolute Ego. In its form it is unchangeable, eternal, imperishable; all of which, it is true, are but second-hand characteristics. In itself it is unapproachable; it is the absolute Being, the in-itself-reposing. Again, it bears, and should be

thought as bearing, the here altogether predominating character of perception; i. e. *formaliter*. This is to be understood as follows: Knowledge recognizes itself as accidental. But *how* then, and according to what premises? How does it recognize the accidental, and how does it class knowledge, let us say, as a *species* under that *genus*? Altogether according to no premises derived from experience—such an assumption would be an absurdity—but simply immediately, primarily. How does it think the absolute, in opposition to which it recognizes as only accidental? Likewise primarily. And how does it recognize in both these recognitions itself as absolute? Likewise in a primary manner. It is simply thus, and more cannot be said about it; knowledge cannot go beyond itself.

2. Now, this thus described thinking is not possible without an opposite quantitating contemplation, in accordance with the synthesis which has become so familiar to us. In this contemplation absolute knowledge, or the pure Ego, quantitates itself; i. e. it repeats itself in a (scheme) picture. This contemplation as adjoining link of a thinking is the—necessarily closed—contemplation of a system of rational Beings. Reason, therefore, in the immediate contemplation of itself places itself necessarily also outside of itself; the pure Ego is repeated in a closed number, and this results altogether from the thinking of its formal absoluteness. (Let it be well understood: it is no contradiction of the above that this system, as it enters sensuous perception, is infinite, i. e. actually unattainable for this perception and not to be completed; for between thinking and perception there enters here one of the ground-forms of quantitating—infinite time. But it does follow that in every moment wherein perception is to take place the Ego must be posited as closed for perception, although the infinite continuation of perception carries it in each future moment beyond its present. It does not, however, *follow* from any empirical premises, but *is* absolutely so, that the Ego—the Egos—beyond all perception, and as ground of the same, are closed in the pure idea of reason, or in God.)

This is the ground-point of the intelligible world. Now to that of the opposite, the sensuous world. From the manifoldness of the Egos contained in the contemplation of reason, we select one as a representative. This, in perception, is alto-

gether confined to itself as individual, and cannot, as in thinking, go beyond to the contemplation of a pure reason-world. But this confinedness is the ground of all perception, which, as being itself absolute contemplation, is the condition of the possibility of absolute thinking. As an individual, however, it is the *thus or thus* determined individual in the whole succession of individuals; but since this succession and its totality exists only in thinking, how is it then, or rather its *result*, before all thinking? And if, in the whole reason-world, no individual were to elevate himself to thinking—which is possible since thinking depends upon Freedom—how will it then be in perception? According to the above, in its form, even as an empirically absolute and only perceptible, but no further explainable *Being* (which is thus, because it is thus and finds itself thus). We touch here again, only in another form, the impulse, which remains in the dark.

But how, now, does this relation, which in pure thinking is recognized as determined through absolute Being, become here, where it is not recognized and can therefore not be the result of a recognition, nevertheless an *immediately perceptible* Being?

Important as the question is, the answer is quite as simple. This question is the highest and most important which a philosophy can propose to itself. It is the question after a harmony, and since the question concerning the harmony of things and knowledge (which presupposes a dualism), and the question concerning the harmony of the several free Beings, which is based upon the idea of automatic Egos, have vanished into empty air—because it was shown that those separates could not but harmonize since they were in reality one and the same; in the one direction, the same in the general perception; and in the other direction, the same in the *One absolute Being*, which posits itself in determined points of reflection within an infinite time-succession, according to the absolutely quantitating ground-form of knowledge—it is the question after a harmony between the *intelligible world and the world of appearances*—the material world;—(that is, where this exists, in the immediate-itself-grasping, factical ground-form of knowledge, which therefore appears even prior to the realization of Freedom—of thinking—of which it is the pre-

supposition, and where there is, on that account, not yet true individuality.) The answer is easy and immediately apparent:

The universal perception has for its ground-substance nothing else than the relation of the perceiving individual to other individuals in a purely intelligible world; for only thus *is* that perception, and is a knowledge at all. Without this that perception would nowhere come to itself, but would dissolve in the infinite emptiness—if, in that case, there would be any human understanding at all, to posit it for the mere sake of letting it dissolve. And this is so in consequence of its relation to absolute Being, which relation is in perception itself never recognized, but remains concealed to it for all eternity. This relation, considered in the previous paragraphs in the form of impulse, is the immanent root of the world of appearances to every one who appears to himself. Now this perception brings its time, its space, its acting, its knowledge of the acting of others, and hence its knowledge of nature along with itself, and can therefore not go beyond its really egotistical and idealistical standpoint; its world, therefore, and—since this applies to the universal perception—the whole world of appearances is purely the mere formal law of an individual knowledge, hence the mere, pure Nothing; and instead of receiving from the region of pure thinking perhaps a sort of Being, the material world is, on the contrary, from that very region decisively and eternally buried in its Nothingness.

‡ 6. Harmony of the Moral world and the Faetical world in knowledge in a determinedness of the system of moral impulses through the absolute form of a law.

Now to the union of the groundpoints of both worlds *within* knowledge, for outside of knowledge they are united through the absolute Being.

Empirical Being was to signify a particular, positive relation of the perceiving individual to an in so far perceived number of other individuals, according to a law of the intellectual world, which other individuals are, therefore, presupposed as differing in their primary Being. But in the contemplation of reason they do not (at present) differ at all in their essence, but are merely numerically different. Hence it would be necessary, for the possibility of perception, to presuppose another differ-

ence of the individuals, not merely a numerical, but a *real* difference, lying beyond perception; and this difference must appear in knowledge when it is to elevate itself to the thinking of perception, as having its ground in the intellectual world. It would be, what we are seeking for, our last problem, a connecting link between absolute thinking and absolute contemplation. This, now, is easily found, and has, indeed, already discovered itself to us, if the principle of perception is *thought* in the very same manner as we have just now thought it, i. e. as the result of my relation to the absolute sum of all individuals, but in such a manner that it *appear* at the same time *in perception*. This last clause is decisive, and I wish to be understood in respect to it. In point of fact, as we well know, thinking and contemplation never join together, not even in their highest point. Only through thinking are they *understood* as one and the same; but in contemplation they remain divided by the infinite gulf of time. The true state is this: It is always only perception which is thought by that intellectual conception; this perception is, it is true, beyond and imperceivably altogether one, and embraces in this oneness the relation of all individuals to each other; but I have never perceived *the whole* of my relation, awaiting, as I do, from the future further enlightenment. Hence the world of reason is never surveyed entire as a fact; its unity *is* only, but is not perceivable; and it is not known except in Thinking; in actuality it expects from that *Being* infinite enlightenment and progress.

Formaliter there results from this, firstly, that it is perception and the principle thereof which is thought. The inseparable ground-form of perception as inner contemplation is time. With this contemplation there enters a something of discovered time, and if the real substance of the perception is an acting, there enters also a plan of this acting—dividing itself into mediating acts—and with the thought of this plan an infinite time, for each moment of that time falls within an infinite contemplation which demands future moments.

Secondly, there results this, that a thinking takes place, and that it is the Ego which is thought as principle of the perception. The character of the Ego in relation to knowledge—and in that relation the Ego is to be thought here; let this be well understood—is absolute starting and causing to originate

from nothingness; hence free manifestation in a time-succession; and thus the Ego thinks itself whenever it elevates itself to the thinking of itself. There arises for the sphere of perception a succession of *absolute creating from Nothingness, realiter* recognizable for each moment of perception. (I express a comprehensive statement in few words; these words, however, are not to be understood metaphorically, but literally.)

Let us now gather together this infinite time with its determinations into one through a conception; we cannot abstract, in doing so, altogether from time; for, if we did, we should lose the relation to perception, the determinedness of the individual, and we should again return to the merely numerical difference of the Egos in the pure contemplation of reason. The contents of that time is the determinedness of an acting of an individual—as principle of perception—independent of and preceding all perception.

But what, moreover, is the ground-principle of this determinedness? In the idea, the absolutely closed sum of intelligences; in perception, the sum of those intelligences that have entered knowledge and been recognized at a particular time. But the intelligences are posited in the contemplation of reason as altogether harmonizing in their absolute self and world knowledge; hence, also, as harmonizing in the perception which is determined through this contemplation of reason through the uniting thinking. What everyone thinks absolutely of himself, he must be able to think that all who elevate themselves to absolute thinking, think likewise of him. The outward form of the described acting is, therefore, that everyone should do (I will express myself in this manner for brevity's sake), what all the intelligences embraced in the same system of perception, absolutely thinking, must think that he does, and what he must think, that they think it. It is an acting according to the system of the absolute harmony of all thinking, of its pure identity. (I believe we term this *moral acting*.)

Finally, what was the ground of this idea of a closed system of mutually determined intelligences in the pure thinking of the contemplation of reason, and the thinking of perception determined thereby? Absolute Being itself, constituting and

carrying knowledge : hence an absolute mutual penetration of both. The deepest root of all knowledge is, therefore, the unattainable unity of *pure* thinking, and the above described thinking of the Ego as absolute principle within perception = the moral law as highest representative of all contemplation. Now, this is on no account *this* or *that* knowledge, but simply absolute knowledge *as* such. How *this* or *that* knowledge is attained within it, we shall soon explain from one point. Now, this absolute knowledge is attained only on condition of the absolute *Being* entering even *knowledge itself*; and as sure as this knowledge is, the absolute Being is within *it*. And thus absolute Being and knowledge are united; the former enters the latter and is absorbed in the form of knowledge, by that very means making it absolute. Whoever has comprehended this, has mastered all truth, and to him there exists no longer an incomprehensible.

Thus in ascending from the one side; now let us determine the adjoining link of perception. The ground and central point of both links, of the material world and of the world of reason, is nothing else than the individual, determined through his reciprocity with the world of reason, as absolute principle of all perception. This individual *is*, for the eye of the merely sensual perception, firm and standing; but it is also a development of the absolute creative power of perception in a higher (reason-) time, starting *from an absolute point of beginning*.

(Only this point, as an apparently new addition, seems to require a proof, and this proof is easy. The knowledge of that power generally is dependent upon an absolute free thinking; hence appearing itself in consciousness as free. But this thinking again is dependent upon a contemplation, also appearing within consciousness (empirical knowledge generally) within an already ignited knowledge. Its beginning, therefore, as an absolute point falls within an already progressing succession of the knowledge of time generally. And it is necessary that this higher determinedness should be perceived, if any particular moment within it is to be perceived, which latter moment becomes then for the perceiving individual the beginning-point of a higher life.)

The Ego, therefore, is for this thinking, not reposing and

stationary, but absolutely progressing according to an eternal plan, which, in our thinking of God, is altogether closed, and *recognized* as such, though never perfectly *perceived*. But the Ego is also, in the same determinedness, absolute principle of general perception. Hence, by its progression, perception in its principle progresses also. That higher divine power in reason and Freedom (in absolute knowledge) is the eternal creative power of the material world. More expressive: The individual starts always from the perception of mere Being, for thereupon depends his knowledge generally, and particularly the thinking of his moral determination; and thus it is altogether a production of the often described reciprocity, but nothing at all in itself. But as he elevates himself to the thinking of his determination and becomes a something higher than all the world, an Eternal Being,—what, then, does the world become to him? A somewhat, in and upon which he elevates and erects what lies not in nature, but in the idea, and in the eternal, unchangeable idea which the closed system of all reason realizes in the (now free and thinking) Egos, and which it must possess in each moment of an infinite perception.

Let us take care not to carry the coarse materialistic ideas of a mechanical acting like those of an objective thing in itself, which we have already annihilated in the sphere of the empirical, over into the pure world of reason! The individual develops in thinking his individual determination: but he appears to himself as principle of sensuous perception, in the existence of which he also always rests; hence the determination of his power appears to himself here, according to our former conclusions, as actual acting. His pure thinking, therefore, becomes in perception, truly enough, an actual acting; but here only for himself and his individual consciousness. To be sure, it thus becomes a material appearance and enters the sphere of the universal perception, also according to our former deductions. But the intellectual character of his acting can be recognized only by those who by their thinking have elevated themselves into that system of reason, who contemplate themselves and the world in God. To the others it remains a mere material moving and acting, just as they act also. (It is the same with that intellectual character as with

the theory of the eternal which we teach here. Those other persons also hear our words, formulas, chains of ideas, &c. But no one, whose inner life is not awakened, discovers their meaning.)

What, then, is now—and with this I give the promised last solution—the mere, pure perception in its reality, without any thinking of the intellectual determinedness? We have already said it above: simply the condition on the part of the absolute, that knowledge is to appear at all in its empty, naked form. In thinking, the principle becomes principle of an altogether new and progressive knowledge; in the perception it is merely the connecting knowledge; hence—if it were not in regard to a possible progress of enlightenment altogether a mere nullity—the darkest, most imperfect knowledge which can be, if a knowledge is at all to remain and not to vanish into nothingness. In this lowest and darkest point the knowledge of perception remains forever, and all its apparent work is nothing but an unwinding and eternal repetition of the same pure nothing according to the mere law of a formal knowledge. They who remain in such a standpoint and such a root have indeed no existence at all; hence, also, do nothing, and are, therefore, in sum and substance, only appearances. The only thing, let it be well remarked, that still supports these appearances, relates them to and keeps them within God, is the mere possibility which lies beyond their knowledge, that they still *CAN* elevate themselves to the intellectual standpoint. The only thing, therefore, which may be said to—I do not say the vicious, the evil, the bad, but—the very best of men, as long as they remain in their immediateness—for viewed from the standpoint of truth they are equally null—to those who remain wrapped in sensuality, and do not elevate themselves to the ideas, is this: “It must not be quite impossible for you as yet to elevate yourselves to ideas, since God still tolerates you in the system of appearances.” In short, this decree of God of the continuing possibility of a Being is the only and true ground of the continuation of the appearance of an intelligence; if that is recalled, they vanish. It is the true moral ground of the whole world of appearances.

If the question, therefore, is put: why does perception stand just in that point in which it stands, and in no other? This

is the answer: *materialiter* perception stands in no point whatever; it stands in its own point as required by its formal Being and remains standing in it forever. The *real* time has not yet at all commenced within it, and its own time never produces anything new and solid (as the circular course of nature sufficiently demonstrates empirically); it is therefore, in reality, also no time at all, but a mere formal appearance (=0) awaiting a future filling up. Experience is never this or that experience, in an accidental and single manner, but always that experience which it must be according to that immanent law and the connection resulting therefrom. If persons speak about the best world and the traces of the kindness of God in this world, the reply is: The world is the very worst which can be, so far as it is in itself perfectly nothing. But on that very account the whole and only possible goodness of God is distributed over it, since from it and all its conditions the intelligence can elevate itself to the resolve to make it better. Anything further even God cannot grant us; for, even if he would, he cannot make us understand it unless we draw it from him ourselves. But that we can do infinitely. Glorification of pure truth within us; and whoever wants anything else and better knows not the Good, and will be filled with Badness in all his desires.

- ‡ 7. The Science of Knowledge as the schematic representation of the whole Ego and the absolute realization of its whole Freedom, in its form of absolute reflectibility of all the relations of the Ego.

Knowledge has been regarded in its highest sphere as pure originating from nothing. But in that it was regarded as positive, as real originating, not as non-originating. That was the form. But in the substance of originating it is already expressed that it might also not be; and hence the being of knowledge, when related to absolute Being, becomes accidental, a being which might also not be, an act of absolute Freedom. This accidentality of knowledge is yet to be described.

It evidently is the last remaining problem which we have to realize in actual knowledge. The realization of the idea of Being and Not-Being at the same time, which was advanced in our first synthesis, is a *thinking* by means of a picturing of the form of Being itself. Like all thinking, this also is

not without contemplation; here, not without the contemplation of knowledge, as having already realized itself. Now, this existence of knowledge, in its *reality*, is cancelled by the thinking; but, in order that it may be but cancelled, it must first be posited in *thinking*. (This is the highest picturing which has so often been mentioned, and the form of all other. Yet the thing is easy enough: only it has gone out of use by the common mode of thinking. Whoever says: A is not; to him A is on that very account in his thinking. Now, in the above, knowledge is not negated generally, that it cannot be; but it is negated in regard to absolute Being; i. e. it is *thought*, in its Being, as that which might also not be.) Now, this is Freedom, and here absolute Freedom, indifference in regard to the absolute, whole (not this or that) knowledge itself.

a. Freedom, $\kappa\alpha\tau' \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\sigma\chi\eta\nu$, is therefore only a thought, and only within him, of course, who is himself the result of Freedom.

b. It is, *negatively* considered, nothing but the thought of the *accidentality* of absolute knowledge. Remark well the seeming contradiction: Knowledge is the absolute accidental or the accidental absolute, because it reaches into the quantity and the absolute ground-form of the same, the infinite time-succession. *Positively* considered: that Freedom is the thought of the absoluteness of knowledge, of the *self*-creation of knowledge through the self-realizing of Freedom. The union of both views is the conception of Freedom in its ideal and real existence.

c. This thought of the Freedom of knowledge is not without its Being, just as there is no thinking without contemplation; it is the same thorough connection as in all our former syntheses. Now, this is Freedom, $\kappa\alpha\tau' \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\sigma\chi\eta\nu$, and all other Freedom is merely a subordinate species; hence there is no Freedom without Being (limitation, necessity), and *vice versa*. Time is under the rule of this necessity; only thinking is free. The intelligence would be altogether free after time had run out; but then it would be nothing—would be an unreal (beingless) abstraction. Hence it remains true that knowledge in its substance is Freedom, but always Freedom *limited* in a determined manner (in determined points of reflection).

2. The absolute formal character of knowledge is, that it is

real originating; hence whenever knowledge is realized, it always arrives at a knowledge of *Freedom*. The lowest point in the principle of perception is feeling—the mere analogy of thinking. (It would become a thought if that principle were to attain the described possibility of the higher Freedom.) Every individual at least feels himself free. (This feeling may be disputed by wrong thinking; it may even be denied, though no sensible man has yet done so; but still it remains ineradicable, and can be demonstrated also to every thinker who is not totally enwrapped in his particular system.)

But this feeling of freedom is not without a feeling of limitation.

Hence, all Freedom is an abstraction from some particular reality—a mere picturing of the same.

3. In every lower degree of Freedom there is consequently contained for the individual a higher real Freedom, which he does not recognize himself, but which another individual can require him to recognize, and which for him is a limitation, concretion of himself. For instance, that lower degree of Freedom we have learned to know as the conception of some arbitrary sensuous end or purpose. Generally expressed, it is that Freedom which permits you to reflect or not to reflect upon the material object to which that end or design applies. (Here necessity and Freedom unite in one point.) Here knowledge posits itself as free, indifferent only in regard to this particular object; but it is confined in perception generally, though without remarking it. This is the condition of the sensual man. Everyone who stands higher can tell him that he has the power to elevate himself also above that state of bondage; but he does not know it himself.

But he also who knows of this other world may still abstract from that world; may not want to know at present, nor to consider, what this point in the succession of appearances signifies in its intelligible character. Such a person stands in the Freedom of reciprocal conditionedness; he is kept in bondage and imprisoned by his laziness. It is impossible, however, that a person who has reflected to the end should not act in accordance with those reflections; impossible that he should allow himself to be restrained from this acting by indolence.

But even in this state of mind and in this spirit a person may be theoretically enchained, though he be practically free; and this is the case when he does not explain his own state of mind to himself, when he allows it to remain an occult quality within him. (This is the condition of all mystics, saints, and religious persons, who are not enlightened in regard to their true principles; who do what is right, but do not understand themselves in doing so. Even to these, a theory like the present one can tell that they are not yet perfectly free, for even God, the Eternal, must not keep Freedom in subjection.)

In the total abstraction from all material objects of knowledge, from the entire contemplation with all its laws, hence, in the absolute realization of Freedom and in the indifference of knowledge with regard to contemplation, nevertheless also in the limitation to the one, immanent, formal law of knowledge, and its succession and consequence, does logic consist and everything that calls itself philosophy, but is in reality only logic; that which cannot go beyond the result of that standpoint: namely, finite human understanding. Its character is, like that of logic, its highest product, always to remain within the conditioned, and never to elevate itself to an unconditioned, to an Absolute of Knowledge and of Being.

In the abstraction from even this law, and from quantity in its primary form, hence also from *all* particular knowledge, does the Science of Knowledge consist. (It might be said, from another point of view, that this science consists and arises from a transcendentalizing of logic itself; for, if a logician were to ask himself, as I have frequently exemplified in the foregoing: how do I arrive at my assertions? he would necessarily get into the Science of Knowledge, and, in this manner the science has really been found by Kant, the true discoverer of its principle.) The standpoint of the Science of Knowledge is in the elevation above all knowledge, in the pure thinking of absolute Being, and in the accidentality of knowledge; it, therefore, consists in the thinking of this thinking itself; it is a mere pure thinking of the pure thinking, or of reason, the immanence, the *For-itself* of this pure thinking. Hence its standpoint is the same as that which I described above as the standpoint of absolute Freedom.

But this thinking (according to all our former reflections)

is not possible, unless knowledge is nevertheless within the contemplation wherein it is only figuratively annihilated. And thus the last question which I have promised to answer is solved, and with that our investigation concluded: the question, how the Science of Knowledge, being forced to go beyond all knowledge, could do so; whether, it being itself a knowledge, it did not always remain within knowledge and tied down to knowledge; how, therefore, it could go beyond itself *as* knowledge? It carries knowledge forever along in contemplation. Only in thinking it annihilates knowledge in order to reproduce it *in the same*.

And thus the Science of Knowledge is distinguished from life. It generates the *real* life of contemplation figuratively (schematically) in thinking. It retains the character of thinking, the schematic paleness and emptiness; and life retains its own, the concrete fullness of contemplation. Nevertheless both are altogether one, since only the unity of thinking and contemplation is the true knowledge—which in reality is indeed unapproachable and separates into those two links, each of which excludes the other;—it is the highest central-point of the intelligence.

The Science of Knowledge is absolutely factual from the standpoint of contemplation: the highest *fact*, that of knowledge (because *it might also not be*), is its basis; and the Science of Knowledge is deduction from the standpoint of thinking, which explains the highest fact from absolute Being and Freedom; but it is both in necessary-union, connecting with the actuality, and going beyond it in Thinking to its absolute ground. But what it thinks *is* in contemplation, though only immediate; in Thinking this is linked together as necessary. And it thinks that which *is*, for Being is necessary; and that which it thinks is, *because* it thinks it; for its thinking itself becomes the Being of knowledge. (The Science of Knowledge is no going beyond and explaining of knowledge from outside, hypothetical premises—for whence should these premises be taken for the universal?)

The Science of Knowledge is theoretical and practical at the same time. *Theoretical*: in itself an empty, merely schematic knowledge, without all body, substance, charm, &c. (And let it be well understood, all this it should despise.)

Practical: knowledge is to become free in actuality; this is part of its intellectual determination. Hence the Science of Knowledge is a duty to all those intelligences who in the succession of conditions have arrived at its possibility. But to this succession of conditions we arrive only through inner honesty, truthfulness, and uprightness.

Hence the honest endeavor to distribute this science is itself the carrying out of an eternal and imperishable design; for reason and its once acquired clear insight into itself is eternal. But it must be distributed in that spirit which an eternal purpose demands, with absolute denial of all finite and perishable ends. Not with the view that to-day or to-morrow this one or that one may comprehend it, for in that case only an egotistical object would be derived; but let it be unreflectingly thrown into the stream of time, merely in order that it be there. Let him who can, grasp and understand it; let whoever does not comprehend it, mistake and abuse it; all this, as nothing, must be indifferent to him who has grasped and been grasped by it.

last par. missing.

KANT'S SYSTEM
OF
TRANSCENDENTALISM.

KANT'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.

I.

In our days the word Philosophy has ceased to have the meaning attached to it in the last century, as the name of an in-itself absolutely closed Science of Pure Reason, or Science of Knowledge. It is now again held to signify merely a more or less connected argumentation on any kind of matters and things, and embraces almost any class of writings wherein but the shadow of argument presents itself. Philosophy is no longer conceived to be a science of *a priori* universal principles; but the crudest individual reflections of men like Herbert Spencer and Stuart Mill are classified under its name. Any author who collects the notions that may chance to run through his brain, or even those that have run through the brains of others, is now-a-days called a Philosopher. The sacred importance connected with that word in the times of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, has been lost to the present generation, which cannot conceive anything higher than infinite "fine reflections" and "beautiful thoughts," and stands aghast at the possibility of a science which proposes to cut off all those infinite reflections and thoughts in their very root, by establishing a universally valid system of all reason.

By the student of Kant, however, it must be borne in mind, that in his days the word Philosophy did stand for such a closed science, and not for infinite reflections. The neglect to remember this has been one of the reasons why Kant has been so woefully misunderstood. He does not intend to be a mere arguer and setter forth of opinions—at least, not in his works of pure philosophy—but the teacher of a specific science; indeed, of the Science of all Sciences. There are two other reasons why Kant has been so lamentably misrepresented, more particularly in English literature; the first one being, that the English translations of his Critic of Pure Reason suffer from serious defects; and the second one, that only this Critic

has been translated, whereas the other two Critics constitute equally important parts of Kant's system. Concerning the latter subject, however, Kant himself may deserve some censure in that he named his first Critic "The Critic of *Pure Reason*," thereby suggesting it to constitute the whole of his system, whereas he should have published his whole system under the general title: Critic of Pure Reason; with the three subdivisions—Critic of Theoretical Reason, Critic of Practical Reason, and Critic of the Power of Judgment. That he did not do this happened probably because the full conception of his system was not in Kant's mind when he set out upon his work; or because the word Reason was not taken by him at first as involving all the faculties of the Ego. For the Ego is not merely a power of theoretical cognition, which power alone is treated of in the Critic of Pure Reason; it is also a power of practical acting or willing, and finally a power of relating its cognitions to its willing, or a power of judgment. But if the full conception of his work was not thus clear in Kant's mind at the outset, it certainly became so at the end, when he wrote his Preface to the Critic of the Power of Judgment, wherein he not only develops this triplicity in the Ego, but moreover assigns its ground; which ground is, that every synthetic science must necessarily treat, 1st, of the Condition; 2d, of the Conditioned; and 3d, of the Conception which results from the union of the Conditioned with its Condition.

It is, however, to be remembered, that the latter part as connecting with the first two parts, need not be separately treated in an artistic representation of the whole Science of Reason, but may—and perhaps with better effect—be treated along with those first two parts. Kant, indeed, suggests this course to the future completer of his system, and Fichte, in dividing his Science of Knowledge, followed Kant's advice. In the Science of Knowledge there are only two parts: the theoretical (Critic of Pure Reason), and the practical (Critic of Practical Reason); the Critic of the Power of Judgment being divided, in its fundamental principles, between the two parts.

The great discovery which led Kant to undertake the immense labor of gathering all the material for a complete system of reason, and which initiates one of the most momentous epochs in the development of our race, was this: that a

Science of Philosophy could not be possible as a Science of so-called Metaphysics, but only as a Science of Reason or Knowledge; and that hence the Science of Metaphysics, in so far as it pretended to furnish theoretical cognitions of supersensuous objects, dwelt in an utter illusion; the only supersensuous cognitions possible being cognitions of cognition itself. Hence his two problems were:

1. To prove an absolute Science of Reason possible.
2. To prove a Science of Metaphysics impossible.

It was owing to this twofold, and, at first glance, apparently contradictory object of his labors, that Kant was so generally charged with doublesidedness and contradiction. His critics could not understand how the same man could be so zealous in pleading the *a priori* absoluteness of the categories, and so earnest in overthrowing all theoretical proofs of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The theological arguers grew wrathful because he destroyed their proofs of those three principles; while materialistic arguers were equally indignant because he demonstrated, that knowledge would not be at all possible unless we had absolute *a priori* knowledge.

Probably every reader of the Critic of Pure Reason has, at the first reading, been struck by a difference even of tone between the first two books and the third book of that work. The cause of that difference arises precisely from the reason stated. In the first two books, wherein the two questions—How is a science of pure mathematics possible? and, How is a science of pure physics possible?—are investigated, the answer runs: they are absolutely possible; for if we had not *a priori* contemplations of time and space wherein to place our sensations, and *a priori* conceptions of the forms of relations whereby to relate and connect those sensations, experience would be impossible. In forcibly insisting upon the absolute character of those contemplations, as well as of the forms of relation or categories, Kant appears as an unwavering idealist, who bases all knowledge upon the Ego, and shows that, unless it were so based, knowledge itself would be impossible. The very character of the proof required, namely, a positive character, gives to Kant's language, throughout these two books, an energy and vehemence of conviction which is strikingly in contrast with the style of the third book.

In that third book Kant answers the third of the three questions whereinto the fundamental question of a Science of Reason—How are synthetical cognitions *a priori* possible?—had been shown to separate. That third question was: How is a Science of Metaphysics possible? Now, as a Science of Metaphysics meant, in Kant's time, a science of supersensuous objects—that is, of God, Freedom, and Immortality—and not a Science of Knowledge, Kant's proof in this book had to be negative, and moreover partly qualified, which naturally gave a less decided character to the style. That answer, it will be remembered, runs: precisely because we could have no experience (empirical knowledge) unless we had *a priori* absolute contemplations of time and space, and *a priori* absolute forms of relation whereby to connect the objects in those contemplations, can we have no experience of any objects not determined by those contemplations and categories. Hence theoretical cognition of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is a contradiction and impossible. In uncompromisingly insisting on this impossibility—though suggesting another mode of cognition for those objects—Kant appeared to many a rooted realist, if not materialist, who denied the possibility of any cognition not grounded in sensation. Now, it must be confessed, that in so far as Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, had never touched upon the origin of the *sensations* in the Ego, the Ego throughout that Critic appeared to that extent dependent upon a foreign Other, which gave it the sensations; which foreign Other the last named class of Kant's opponents concluded to be Matter; but as Kant had been careful not to touch that question at all, as not belonging to the Critic of Theoretical Reason, there was no warrant for such an inference.

The ground for the mistake has already been mentioned. The Critic of Pure Reason investigates merely the power of theoretical reason, or of cognition through the intellect. Hence the question where the intellect gets the sensations which it casts outside of itself, and objectivates in time and space, is not considered in it. These sensations are assumed as given; and an investigation of theoretical reason shows merely that reason furnishes out of itself the forms under which it knows of these sensations. In short, the theoretical faculty appears

to be legislative and absolute only in so far as it prescribes to itself the rules under which alone it can take knowledge of the manifold in time and space; that is, it is only *formally* absolute; but in so far as that manifold is not shown to be *produced* by the intelligence, the theoretical faculty appears dependent upon a Given, a foreign Other, a Non-Ego. In the merely theoretical part of a Science of Reason the Ego posits itself as only *formally* self-determined, and as *actually* limited by a Non-Ego.

It is one of the most difficult problems in philosophy to make the full significance of this result clear to the student, or to show that the merely theoretical intellect cannot do otherwise than posit itself as limited. It seems so contradictory that the intellect should posit itself (by an absolute free act) and yet posit itself as dependent. The solution is, that we call the theoretical faculty of the Ego that faculty which cognizes under the forms of time and space and the categories. Hence it comprehends only by means of the causality-relation; and on that very account it can never rise to the conception of any first cause or origin, becoming self-contradictory and absurd when trying to do so.*

Hence, even when thinking itself, the theoretical faculty cannot think itself otherwise than as already determined; and applying the causality relation to this determinedness, it necessarily posits an Other, a Non-Ego, as the ground thereof. At the same time the Ego can know of this its necessary procedure, can know that it does so and why it must do so, and through this knowledge, therefore, can rid itself of that dependency. This, however, is only an ideal riddance, and furnishes only the conception of *negative Freedom*; while practically the Ego remains dependent. Every system, indeed, which views the Ego as merely a theoretical faculty, as merely a thinking power, must necessarily teach the dependency of the

* It is astonishing that sensible men should still continue to search for the origin of the world, the origin of man, and the origin of language, as if those problems were not by their very nature removed from search; and it is still more astonishing that this search should be kept up chiefly by men who scoff at transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy has never been guilty of such a transcending of the limits of reason; nor, indeed, of such unwarranted metaphysical speculations as crowd the writings of men like Comte, Mill, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Vogt, Moleschott, and Buechner.

Ego. Spinoza's system* is the most illustrious example, and is, indeed, the offspring of that view. Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, although it also shows that the Ego must think itself as dependent upon a Non-Ego, partly removes that dependency, as we have seen, by showing it to be simply the result of the Ego's own laws of thinking. Partly, but not wholly; nor could the difficulty ever be wholly removed were the Ego a mere power of thinking.

But the Ego is not only a power of theoretical cognition; it is moreover a power of practical acting, and in so far an actual determining of the Non-Ego, provided this acting may be viewed as simply the self-determination of the Ego. Upon this question hinges, indeed, the whole sanctity and absoluteness of reason, and the possibility of a Science of Practical Reason. Should this question be answered in the affirmative, the Ego would no longer determine the Non-Ego merely ideally, but likewise really—although it might appear that the latter determining could never be completed in any time.

As the Critic of Pure Reason had for its chief problem the question: How are synthetical *cognitions a priori* possible? so the Critic of Practical Reason must propose to itself the question: How are synthetical *principles a priori* possible? Or, since practical principles involve in Kant's terminology two classes of rules, whereof he calls the one that announces a determination of the will, which is valid only for the will of the *subject*, Maxims, and the other, which are recognized as valid for the will of *all* rational beings, Laws—How are synthetical practical *laws a priori* possible?

Now it is clear that no practical law of rational activity can

* Spinoza's system is merely the Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge; and it is because his system lacks the Practical Part that it is one-sided. In his system the Ego, therefore, posits itself as dependent upon an unknown Non-Ego, which Spinoza sometimes calls God, and at other times Nature or Substance. His system is the most logical development of that view, as Fichte already observed; and every system which holds the Ego to be merely a power of thinking must lapse into Spinozism. There is in his system neither positive freedom, nor free design; his Ethics is, indeed, the saddest book ever written; blind fatality rules everywhere. Jacobi, in his famous writings on Spinoza, took particular pains to show that all speculative reasoning must lead to Spinoza's results; and, in so far as he understood reason to signify merely the power of thinking, he was correct enough; but Kant first, and Fichte after him, showed that the practical power of the Ego is even superior to the ground of its theoretical function.

be *objectively* valid, i. e. valid for all rational beings, and can therefore be known to be the result of absolute self-determination, unless it is in the form of an *Imperative* (of a *Shall*); that is, unless it is not the product of self-conscious reason as a general rule of action; for such a rule applies merely to the subject which produces it in so far as it suits its own subjective inclinations: whereas Imperatives are characterized by an objective compulsion, and signify that the reason which utters them would without fail act them out if reason alone determined the will. But to be objectively valid, practical laws must be not only in the form of an Imperative; this Imperative must, moreover, be unconditioned or categorical. For if the Imperative addressed itself to the will not simply as will, but conditionally, or subject to the possibility whether the will *can* execute the Imperative or not: they would not be necessarily *valid*, but made dependent upon pathological facts.

All those practical principles, therefore, which presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, can never rise to the dignity of objectively valid laws, being firstly empirical, and secondly valid only for the subject; and since ALL *material* practical principles do presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, or since they all rest upon self-love or pursuit of happiness, it is evident that practical laws or categorical Imperatives, if at all possible, must be purely *formal* laws; that is, that they can involve only in *form* the ground of determination of the will.

At this result Kant, in his Critic of Practical Reason, pauses a while to demonstrate at length that *all* material practical rules of action presuppose an object of desire so determining the will, and hence are all based on selfishness; and to indulge in a polemic against those who think that they can arrive at moral laws by discriminating in the character of the desire which determines the will in such cases. Kant shows, that whether this desire arises from an enjoyment which we expect to derive through the senses, or from one which we expect to obtain through the understanding, does not at all change the fact, that in all such cases we are merely impelled by a desire for pleasure. We may justly enough call some pleasures coarser and some finer; "but on that account to say that the

latter constitute a mode of determining the will otherwise than through the senses, when they presuppose for their possibility a capacity for such pleasures in us, is just as absurd as when ignoramuses, who like to dabble in metaphysics, think of matter so fine, so superfine, that they get dizzy in their poor heads, and then believe that so doing they have thought a *spiritual*, and yet also *extended* Being."

The problem, therefore, is to discover a will which may be determinable by the mere *form* of a law. Now such a form of a law is clearly a pure thought of reason, and in no manner whatever an object of the senses or an appearance. Hence it is also not thought to be subject to any of the categories that apply to the world of appearances, and can in no manner be thought as determining the will in the same way as the law of causality is thought as determining objects in the world of nature. For under the law of causality the determining ground is always itself again thought as determined by a previous determining ground, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is evident, therefore, that the will, which is to be discovered, must be thought—if it is to be thought as determined solely by this form of a law—as altogether independent of the world of causality which rules in nature. Such independence is called freedom, and a will which is determinable only by the form of a law will therefore show itself to be, if we succeed in finding it, a *free* will. Can we, then, find a free will determined solely by the form of a law?

Now the important point here is to confess that the answer to this question cannot be demonstrated theoretically, just as little as you can demonstrate to anyone that he is an intelligent being: each one must look into himself and find whether or not he discovers such a will there. Meanwhile Kant asserts that it is in every rational being, and that its determination through the form of a law is known in language as the Moral Law. But this can be shown: that if there does occur in rational consciousness such a fact as Moral Law, then that Moral Law is identical with freedom, i. e. with positive freedom, and in fact is nothing but the Absoluteness and Self-determination of Reason in general or of the Ego. For we cannot obtain knowledge of positive freedom—as distinguished from that negative freedom which is merely an independence

of determinations of nature, and which certainly arises in immediate consciousness—in any immediate manner, such immediate consciousness being able to express only negative freedom; nor through external cognitions, since these are all subsumable under the conception of causality and mechanism; and hence we should have no way of arriving at the conception of a positive freedom did there not occur within our consciousness the phenomenon of a command—Thou shalt?—utterly opposed to and overthrowing the determinations of our nature. It is, therefore, only through the occurring of this phenomenon that human reason has ever been impelled to consider the conception of positive freedom; and he who has but once experienced that the command, *Thou shalt*, or *Thou shalt not*, does utterly override all the impulses of his nature, has thereby become conscious of absolute freedom, and proved to himself that there does occur in the Ego a power of determining the Non-Ego, and hence has proved to himself the absoluteness and self-sufficiency of the Ego. Moral Law, therefore, or conscience, or the inner voice of God—whatever it may be called—is nothing but the manifestating and realizing itself of the absolute self-determination of the Ego; and that absolute self-determination or self-sufficiency is nothing but the Moral Law or positive freedom.

The first section of the Analytic of Practical Reason having thus shown that pure reason is practical, or can absolutely determine the will—which proof it has furnished by the fact of the occurrence of the Moral Law in us, which is inseparable from, nay, identical with the consciousness of freedom—that section seems utterly to overthrow the result of the Critic of Pure Reason, that we can have knowledge only of a world of internal perception, and that we are, in all our knowledge of it, determined by it. Hence this fact, which everyone can verify for himself, furnishes us the strange manifestation of a world determined by reason alone, existing together with a world determining reason: a moral world and a world of nature; a world of freedom and a world of mechanism; a *natura archetypa* and a *natura ectypa*!

Now this is certainly calculated to shock one at the first glance; for what are we to place trust in? The *fact* which asserts a Moral Law, but confesses the impossibility theoreti-

cally to explain it, or the *theoretical faculty* which we accept as our guide in all other matters, but which declares itself impotent to explain a fact which forces itself upon us every moment of the day.

This duplicity in human reason is developed quite at length by Kant in two appendices to the first section of the *Analytic*, headed "Concerning the Deduction of the Principles of Practical Reason" and "Concerning the right of Pure Reason in its practical function to an extension which is not permitted in its speculative function."

The grounds of this duplicity we have already shown as in its very root the impossibility of the Ego in its theoretical function to do otherwise than apply the laws of that function (and hence the causality-relation); from which impossibility it results that the Ego cannot *in reflection* posit even itself free. The Ego can only *be* free; but the moment it reflects upon its freedom, its freedom is again thought under the laws of reflection—that is, under the causality-relation—and hence as not freedom.

By this insight the great difficulty in the way of demonstrating real freedom is removed. For when it has been shown, that the fact of an absolute impulse in reason to determine itself cannot be theoretically proved from the very nature of the case, no one can require anything more than to experience the fact in himself, and cannot ask for a theoretical proof without stultifying himself. The impulse would not be an absolute impulse, and hence the freedom would not be true freedom if it could be demonstrated.

Thus the very impossibility of a theoretical proof turns out to be, after all, merely the result of the supremacy of the practical power. The Ego in its fundamental essence is not a thinking, but an acting power; not theoretical, but moral; not limited, but absolute; and all its limitedness is simply the result of the theoretical faculty of the Ego, which requires that this acting shall become visible to itself. All limitedness is the result of reflection, of a making-clear-unto-itself. Originally the whole activity of the Ego extends into the Infinite; but because this activity is not to be a mere appearing of the Ego, but is to be such an appearing of the Ego *for the Ego itself*, it is reflected back, checked, and is a Non-Ego posited as the

ground of that check. To ask that this duplicity of reason should be removed, is to ask that reason should cease to be reason; for it cannot be reason unless it is an acting, and it cannot be an acting *for itself* unless its acting is checked and the check ascribed to something not itself.

By showing, therefore, in consciousness the fact of a Moral Law, we obtain the practical certainty of freedom; as by demonstrating that the Ego posits the causality-relation between itself and the Non-Ego, and thus makes itself dependent upon the latter merely by virtue of its own laws of thinking, we rise to the comprehension of its ideal freedom.

The result of the investigation undertaken in the first section of the Critic of Practical Reason may, therefore, be popularly summed up as follows:—There appears in all finite reason an impulse to act in a certain manner altogether independent of any external purpose or motive, and merely for the sake of such acting, and this impulse is called the Moral Law. It is a determinedness of freedom: freedom determined by its own absoluteness, and may be put in a formula as follows:

Act in such a manner that the maxim of your will can be valid always as the principle of a universal legislation.

For this formula expresses the form of a law, and the only possible form of a law which can be thought as determining the will of all rational beings absolutely, and which has therefore the same validity for practical reason as the categories have for theoretical reason; since to act so that the maxim of my will can be always valid as principle of a universal legislation, means simply to act in obedience to an *absolute* form of a law, or an absolute impulse.

In the second section of the Analytic of Practical Reason, "Concerning the Conception of an Object of Practical Reason," Kant renews the proof of the absolute fact of the Moral Law in all rational beings by showing that the conceptions of the only two possible objects of practical reason—namely, the Good and the Bad*—far from determining in our mind the Moral Law, rather are determined by it, and could not possibly arise in our mind except through the conception of that

* The German words *das Gute* and *das Böse* express much more unambiguously the purely moral character of the two conceptions for which they stand.

Law. For if the conception of Good, for instance, were not determined by the absolutely *a priori* Moral Law, it could arise only through comparison with a feeling (of pleasure or pain) in us, and hence the conception of Good could not be in the nature of a universally valid law, but merely of a practical rule to promote our happiness; a rule which would differ in every individual and change according to external circumstances, so that it could never be foreknown.

The fact, therefore, that there are such conceptions as those of Good and Bad as distinctively moral conceptions, which have no reference to empirical feelings of pleasure and pain, gives additional proof to the *a priori* character of the Moral Law; and these conceptions having been established as the only possible objects of practical reason, there remains merely the question: how the Moral Law as a law of freedom can possibly become applicable in a world which stands under the law of causality and mechanism. It will be noticed that the difficulty is of the same nature as one that occurs in the Critic of Pure Reason, where we have pure *a priori* conceptions, and cannot at first see how they, as altogether supersensuous can possibly become relatable to a manifold of empirical objects; a difficulty which is removed by showing that all sensations of empirical objects are after all given to reason (as schemes) in the two likewise *a priori* forms of contemplation: time and space.

But, in the present case, the objects of practical reason, the Good and the Bad, cannot be made relatable to the supersensuous *will* by means of contemplation, since they do not enter the form of contemplation. Nevertheless—precisely because, in the present case, it is a relation to a *will* and not to a power of cognition—the application can be made possible. Not, however, by means of a scheme of sensuousness, but by a law. In short: the supersensuous will can apply the Moral Law in a world of mechanism by subsuming the conception of that law under that of the law of causality, which rules in the sensuous world, and thus by changing the formula of the Moral Law into the following:

Act in such a manner that if that act should occur through a law of nature you could look upon it as possible through your will.

This formula Kant calls the *Typus* of the Moral Law—the universality and absoluteness of the law of causality in the natural world typifying the universality and absoluteness of the Moral Law in the supersensuous world;—and this *Typus* is quite proper so long as we transfer merely the *form of lawfulness*, and not its sensuous contemplations, from the world of nature to the Moral World.

Having thus established in the first section of the *Analytic* the general principle of the Moral Law, in the second section the objects of that principle, and in the third the possibility of applying that principle to those objects in a sensuous world, Kant in the concluding section treats of the relation of practical reason to sensuousness, and of its necessary, *a priori* cognizable influence upon it. The beauty of Kant's *style*—which has so unjustly been condemned as rough, intricate, heavy and unartistic, whereas it is generally of wonderful clearness and finish—finds here occasion to develop his most heartfelt convictions, highest emotions, and noblest aspirations; giving proof, if any were needed, that the *Critic of Practical Reason* was written by him not as a concession to popular prejudice, but rather with more enthusiasm and interest than the *Critic of Pure Reason*. Characterizing the nature of that influence as reverence, Kant thus speaks of it:—"Reverence always relates to persons, never to things. The latter may inspire *affection*; and in the case of animals, as horses, dogs, &c., even *love*; or *fear*, as in the sea, volcanoes, &c.; but never *reverence*.... A man also may be the object of love, of fear, or of admiration, even to a high degree, and yet he may not be to me an object of reverence.... Fontenelle says: 'I bow down before a noble, but my spirit does not bow down'; and I add: but my spirit does bow down before a common citizen in whom I perceive honesty of character to a greater degree than I am conscious of possessing myself; and my spirit does so bow down whether I will or not, and however high I carry my head in order to show him my superior rank."

"Far from being a feeling of enjoyment, reverence is rather a feeling to which we submit very unwillingly in respect to another person. We always try to discover something which might diminish this feeling in us, some kind of fault to hold us harmless against the humiliation which such an example

inflicts upon us. Even the dead, particularly if their example appears to be beyond our reach, are not always secure against this criticism. Nay, the very Moral Law itself, in its solemn majesty, is exposed to this tendency in man to escape the reverence it compels. Or, why that constant desire to drag it down to the level of an ordinary inclination, and that persistent endeavor to make it a favorite prescription for our own advantage and enjoyment, unless it is to escape that terrifying reverence which holds up to us so severely our own unworthiness? Yet again there is so little of disagreeableness in the feeling, that, if we have once thrown aside our self-merit and have admitted that reverence to practical influence upon us, we can never get satiated with the glory of this law; and our soul seems to elevate itself in the same degree as it sees this holy law elevated above itself and its sinful nature."

That this feeling of reverence is *a priori* cognizable Kant establishes by showing that the Moral Law is a restriction upon all our inclinations, our self-esteem included, by the condition of obedience to that law; and that hence it would be merely of a negative nature and humiliating for our sensuous character were it not at the same time elevating for our moral nature. As such a positive influence, Kant calls reverence the *incentive* of pure practical reason, which incentive awakens gradually a moral *interest*, and finally leads to the establishing of moral *maxims*.

The act which that Moral Law prompts Kant calls Duty. Being prompted purely by that law, exclusive of all motives of inclination, this Duty involves in its conception practical compulsion; that is, a determination to act, however disagreeable it may be to us. The feeling which arises from this consciousness of compulsion is not pathological, but altogether practical, and hence as submission under a compulsory law, far from being accompanied by pleasure, is rather accompanied by aversion; but at the same time, precisely because it is a compulsion of our own *reason*, independent of all external motives and incentives, does it also elevate us in our feeling, in which shape we call that feeling self-approval or self-reverence; and it is of the greatest importance to remember that in finite rational beings the Moral Law always must assume this shape of compulsion, and that the Holiness of

Will, which implies a perfect harmony between the Moral Law and the Will, and hence no compulsion, can never be reached by us. Kant loses no occasion to insist that this conception of Duty must be held in its strict purity as an absolute compulsion, and that it is both absurd and harmful, as leading to *Schwaermerei*,* to teach that morality ought to be practised for the love of it. It is absurd to require love for a command, and it is harmful to mix up a pathological affection with the highest manifestation of reason, with that which has its ground in absolute freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature: duty for the mere sake of duty! "The venerable character of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own peculiar law and its own peculiar tribunal. Nay, even if we should try ever so much to mix both together like medicines, in order to give the draught thus mixed to the sick soul, they yet will immediately separate of themselves; and if they do not separate, then the former will not operate at all. But even if physical life should gain some strength by this mixture, moral life would die out beyond redemption."

The second book of the Critic of Practical Reason treats of the Dialectic of Practical Reason, the first book, or the Analytic, having developed the principle of Practical Reason as well as the application of that principle in the empirical world. That application, or the object of that principle, was there shown to be the promotion of the Good. The dialectical principle of theoretical reason, therefore, which persists in connecting the conception of the unconditioned to an object of reason raises this conception of the Good to that of the Highest Good. The Highest Good, however, is a conception which involves two distinct determinations, namely, that of virtue, or Doing the Good, and that of happiness, or Enjoying the Good, and hence a dialectical conflict of opposites. Now if the conception of the Highest Good were an analytical one—that is to say, if the above two determinations were joined in it by a merely *logical* connection, then the dialectic in that conception could be easily solved by showing it to be a mere word-dispute; and the famous opposition of the Epicureans and Stoics, whereof the former said, "To be conscious that our principles lead to happiness is virtue"; whereas the latter replied, "To be conscious of our virtue is happiness,"—would have been

nothing more than such a word-dispute. For as they did not consider virtue and happiness to be two utterly distinct determinations of the one conception of the Highest Good, their whole difference was one of words: the one calling the Highest Good virtue, and the other calling the Highest Good happiness.*

But the conception of the Highest Good is a synthetical conception—that is, a conception wherein two, lower, conceptions are *really* (and not merely logically) united; and hence stand not in the relation of identity but in that of causality to each other. The Epicureans and Stoics, therefore, instead of assuming that the endeavor to become virtuous and the endeavor to become happy were identical, ought to have regarded either the endeavor to become virtuous as of necessity (through causality) conferring happiness, or the endeavor to become happy as of necessity conferring virtue. For neither virtue alone nor happiness alone constitutes the Highest Good, but both in their real union constitute it.

The antinomy which results from the fact that the conception of the Highest Good is such a synthetical conception, is this one:

Either the desire for happiness is the motive impelling virtue—but this is not possible, because such a motive would not be *moral*, and hence could not impel *virtue*—or virtue must be the producing cause of happiness; but this is also impossible, since the practical connection of cause and effect in the sensuous world depends not upon our obedience to the Moral Law, but upon our knowledge of nature and upon a physical power to use nature. Now, since the Moral Law impels us necessarily to promote the Highest Good—not for the sake of the happiness to result therefrom, but for the sake of the unconditioned totality of the object of the Moral Law, of the Good—and since the Highest Good has shown itself to be impossible of realization, it follows that the Moral Law itself is impossible of realization; and hence that it is a mere creation of the imagination and essentially false.

For this antinomy Kant offers the following solution: It is

* Strange to say, even at this day most of our disputes are merely such word-disputes, and the result of mistaking analytical for synthetical conceptions.

altogether true that the desire for happiness cannot impel virtue, but it is not equally true that virtue *may not be* the productive cause of happiness. True, it may not *necessarily* produce happiness as its necessary effect, but neither is there a reason why it should not. Hence only the first assertion of the antinomy is absolutely false, and the latter only conditionally false. And as it was discovered in the antinomies of Theoretical Reason that although the category of freedom could not be shown to be applicable in a world of natural mechanism, neither could it be shown to be inapplicable in such a world if that world were no longer regarded as a world of appearances but as an intelligible world: so may it now be said that though it cannot be shown that virtue produces its proportionate happiness in the world of nature by natural causes, it is at least quite possible that it may produce that happiness as its effect in so far as that world can also be viewed as an intelligible world wherein such a relation of causality between virtue and happiness may have been implanted by an intelligible creator. Nay, this is all the more possible as the fact of the Moral Law shows that we not only may but must view nature in that two-fold manner, as both a world of appearances and an intelligible world.

It is, therefore, quite admissible because practically possible to desire the promotion of the Highest Good, the whole antinomy having vanished—as all antinomies vanish when we remember that the world may be viewed as both an appearance and *phenomenon*, that is, as a Non-Ego determining the Ego, and as a thing in itself and *noumenon*, that is, as absolutely determinable through the Ego—and it being thus quite possible to think virtue and happiness as necessarily associated. It is clear that the higher of these two conceptions in the synthetical conception of the Highest Good must be virtue, and that hence virtue may produce happiness as its infallible effect. *May*; that is to say, there is no theoretical reason to prove why it should not, although, to be sure, there is also no theoretical reason to prove why it should. It is only practical reason which demands this necessary connection, and demands it for the sake of the Moral Law. That Moral Law we know to be a fact in us: hence, as sure as that fact is in us, is there in the intelligible world (i. e. in the supersensuous

world, independent of time-connection, precisely that world which manifests itself in us as the Moral Law) a necessary connection between virtue and happiness.

Having thus shown that the requirement of the Highest Good is a necessary and thinkable one, Kant proceeds to connect the dialectic conception of the unconditioned with the two determinations of the Highest Good: virtue, or morality, and happiness. It will appear that unconditioned morality presupposes Immortality, and unconditioned Happiness, as its necessary associate, God. For if the unconditioned Highest Good is to be attained through a will determinable by the Moral Law, that will must also be *unconditionally* conformable to the Moral Law. It must be not only a virtuous, but a *holy* will. But in the Analytic it has been shown that no finite rational being can ever attain a perfectly holy will. Hence that requirement can be realized only in the thinking of an *infinite progress* towards the realization of that holiness; and hence such an infinite progress must be assumed as the real object of our will. Kant lays particular stress on the practical use of the insight into such a progress, as once for all doing away with the fantastic and lazy expectation of an undeserved beatitude which degrades the majestic conception of Holiness; and in a foot-note insists that it is even a matter of infinite progress, and hence of continuous endeavor, to keep fixed in that progress after having once entered upon it, or, in theological language, that no amount of conversion and sanctification can secure perfectly against a relapse.

From this infinite progress Kant argues the immortality of the soul, "*because it is possible only under the presupposition of an infinitely continuing existence and personality of the same rational being*; which is called the immortality of the soul. Hence the Highest Good, practically, is possible only under the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, and hence the latter, being inseparably united with the Moral Law, is a *postulate* of Practical Reason; that is, it is a theoretical proposition, which, though not provable as such, is inseparably connected with an *a priori* unconditionally valid practical law."

It will be noticed that, however short and unsatisfactory this statement is, it touches the real source of immortality by

connecting it with the *will*. It is because the will must become holy that *the same individual* must continue to live. Those persons who attempt to prove immortality from an infinite progress in general culture, or in higher knowledge of God, &c., invariably open themselves to the following refutation: That culture and that higher knowledge can also be attained if there is no immortality, for succeeding generations will take up our culture and knowledge and develop them higher. But no future person can take up my will and unfold and develop it. If my will is to become holier, it is I myself, the individual—for I as individual am precisely my will—who must continue to live.

But the Highest Good is also not attained unless the happiness proportionate to the virtue manifested is invariably secured. "Happiness," says Kant, "is the condition of a rational being in the world, to whom everything happens according to his wish and will." Now, the Moral Law commands unconditionally and regardless of the effect its obedience will produce in nature; hence finite rational beings, in so far as they are dependent upon nature and are not the creators of nature, cannot possibly order things so that things will happen in the world of nature according to their wish and will because they do their duty in the Moral World. Hence there must be postulated a supreme cause having a causality in nature equal to and harmonizing with the morality manifested, and since such a causality implies *will*, and such a distribution according to a plan, *intelligence*, there must be postulated a Being who by his will and intelligence is the cause of nature: God. As sure, therefore, as there is a Moral Law in us which requires the accomplishment of the Highest Good—a requirement that is not possible unless a God is presupposed—just so sure is it morally necessary to believe in a God. It is on account of this conception of God, Kant adds, that the christian doctrine may be said to be the only one which establishes a full conception of the Highest Good; and it is because the Greeks lacked this conception, that they were never able to solve the problem of the Highest Good. The Greeks never rose from the ideal of the Cynics' *natural simplicity* and that of the Epicureans' *prudence* to any higher than that of the Stoics' *wisdom*, whereas the Christians have the

ideal of *holiness*. Nay, by apprehending correctly that synthetic character of the Highest Good, and joining therefore to the conception of the highest morality that of the highest happiness, the Christian doctrine has further risen to the apprehension of a Kingdom of God, which *shall* come, "wherein nature and morals will be made to harmonize in a harmony utterly foreign to each by itself, through a holy originator."

Freedom, Immortality, and God, are, therefore, the three great cognitions which have been secured to reason by its practical function as an activity; and this result having been reached, it may be well to recapitulate the different kinds of proof whereby reason has throughout both Critiques attained its various cognitions.

Theoretical reason takes hold of a certain system of sensations given to it—or of an Ego determined by a Non-Ego—and proceeds to unite the manifold of those sensations into a unity for the purpose of perception. It appears that reason in thus uniting that manifold, or in making perception possible, can do so only in the forms of time and space, and in a certain triplicity of relation: the categories. Hence all the proof which theoretical reason furnishes for its cognitions run in this wise: *If experience or sensuous consciousness is to be possible, then this or that must be.*

Hence, also, theoretical reason applies only to experience, or to the objects of the empirical world which appear in consciousness; in short, to appearances, or *phenomena*.

Practical reason, on the other hand, takes hold of no limit-
edness, of no Ego determined by a Non-Ego; *of no object, therefore, to which theoretical reason could apply.* It, as the higher function and basis of the intelligence, rests altogether upon itself; and the only cognition, therefore, which it utters is the immediate one of its own absoluteness and self-determination, its positive freedom, or the Moral Law. Upon this freedom all knowledge rests; and, to state the matter concisely: all reason is nothing but this absolute freedom; theoretical reason being merely the result of its making *visible* itself unto itself. Hence higher than any fact or cognition of theoretical reason stands this absolute fact of the Moral Law in us.

But this Moral Law, not in itself, but *in its application to*

the empirical world, may and must again become the object of theoretical reason; from which fact arises the singular phenomenon that theoretical reason nevertheless applies its categories to the object of the Moral Law: the Highest Good. In this application theoretical reason postulates in an analogous manner as it does in its application to empirical objects: *If the Moral Law is to be possible*, then the immortality of the soul and a God must be assumed.

There is, therefore, no distinction between the manner in which reason grounds its cognitions of immortality and a God and the manner in which it grounds its cognition of cause and effect, for instance. The mode of argument is in each the same. But because the former objects are grounded upon an absolute immediate fact, and the latter upon a mediated knowledge of an external object, we call the cognitions of immortality and a God *Faith*, and only the latter cognitions we call knowledge. It is well to make this remark and call attention to this distinction in the character of the cognition to avoid word-disputes, and to cut off once for all idle and anthropomorphistical speculations concerning the Deity.

The Critic of Practical Reason concludes with these memorable words: "Two things fill the soul with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and longer the mind busies itself with them: *the starry heavens above me and the Moral Law within me.*" Both of these I need not hunt up, or suppose concealed in darkness or in the region of phantasms beyond my vision: I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins at the place which I assume in the external sensuous world, and extends the connection, wherein I move, into that immensity of worlds above worlds and systems of systems, wherein the eye loses itself; and, moreover, into unlimited times of their periodic movement, of their beginning and duration. The second begins at my invisible self, my personality, and represents me in a world which has true infinity, but is apprehensible only to reason, and wherewith (and thereby at the same time with those other worlds) I recognize myself—not as there in a merely accidental—but in a universal and necessary connection. The first beholding of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it

were, my importance as an *animal creature*, which must return the matter from which it was formed to its planet (a mere point in the universe), after having been endowed with life for a short time, no one knows how. But the second, on the other hand, elevates my worth as an intelligence infinitely, through my personality, wherein the Moral Law reveals to me a life altogether independent of the world of animals, and even of the whole sensuous world, at least so far as may be presumed from the proper determination of my existence through this law, which is not limited by the conditions and limits of this life, but extends into the Infinite."

Reason, as a practical faculty, posits itself as absolute. As a theoretical faculty it posits itself as limited. The synthesis of this thesis and antithesis is, as we have seen: precisely because reason posits itself as an absolute acting *for itself* does reason posit itself as limited. It could not be an intelligence if its absolute activity were not checked. This checkedness of its absolute activity it cannot, of course, ascribe to itself, since the conception of itself is that of an infinite activity, and hence cannot include the contradiction thereof; therefore it ascribes the check to a Non-Ego. The immediate consciousness of the check is that original system of sensations upon which all theoretical cognition is based. These sensations the Ego throws out as not belonging to it, and thus objectivates them in space, taking them in again and bringing them to consciousness in time. It relates them to each other under the thought forms of quantity, quality and relation, and thus rises to a cognition of what it beholds as an external world. This cognition appears and must appear to it as altogether fixed and determined; hence as without freedom or the possibility of freedom. Nevertheless the Ego must become conscious of itself as absolute and positively—not merely negatively—free, if it is to become conscious of itself as Ego. Hence there must be for the Ego another mode of viewing itself than as a merely theoretical function. This other mode is the manifestation of a practical power, of an absolutely self-determined activity. But the question arises: How can the Ego entertain these two diametrically opposed views? How can it view the universe as a connected piece of mechanism, and yet also view itself as an absolute free activity interfering in it?

The answer to this question gives rise to the Critic of the Power of Judgment.

It is evident that the Ego could not posit itself as Ego if this two-fold view of the universe were not possible; and that hence there can be no rational being that does not in point of fact view the universe in this two-fold way.

Each rational being, however much he may deny it, does view the universe as not only a system of externalized sensations whereof each one is dependent upon the other mechanically and hence is necessarily what it is, but also as a system of sensations whereof each one *might be* otherwise than it is, or as a system of purposes or designs. In truth, the purely mechanical view of the universe is upheld only theoretically by philosophers (one-sided idealists) like Descartes, Swedenborg, Spinoza, &c., whilst the pretended pure naturalists invariably apply the conception of design; as, for instance, when arguing that because certain plants are produced somewhere, nature *must* have prepared such and such a soil, climate, &c., for them.

It is therefore very true that we may, and indeed should, from a certain point of view, regard* the universe simply

* "Not only does the quantity of force remain the same, however, but likewise the direction of that force,—a point which Descartes had overlooked,—and hence arises the third great principle of the

"*Pre-established Harmony*. For if, in nature, not only the sum of force and its manifestation, but likewise the sum of its directions, must be viewed as always remaining the same, only the sum of motion increasing and decreasing in mechanical order, it follows that every movement in Nature, in so far as it has a direction, may be viewed as purely the result of a mechanical force; and since it will be possible to trace it thus to a mechanical source, it will be impossible to prove it to be originated by the self-conscious soul. If every movement of and through our body can thus be explained as the result of the universal mechanical law of motion, clearly "our body operates as if there were no soul in it and our soul as if there existed no body." Hence the possibility of a pure mathematical science of nature, without reference to a God or soul as a power in nature, and of an explanation of all possible phenomena upon mechanical principles.

"But this would exclude all relations between the monads as such, that is, as concentration-points of the pure Ego. No Ego could ever become conscious of itself, if the movements of nature could be explained altogether by the law of mechanics. The Ego could not be for itself an Ego, and, since it is Ego only in so far as it is for itself, could not be at all. The question arises: How can the characteristic of intention or the conception of an end find expression in movements which can be comprehended at the same time as purely mechanical? And the answer is: Absolutely because they can. There is a *harmony* between the world of rational ends and the mechanical changes in nature which makes this possible; and this harmony is absolute, has no external ground. When a rational being sees a piece of

under the forms of theoretical cognition, that is to say, mathematically under the forms of time, space, quantity, quality, and relation; but it is equally true that this view is only a part-view, and leaves unnoticed a power in us which is quite as much a fact as the power of cognition, namely, the power of absolute acting. That power of absolute acting or the Moral Law in us once admitted—and every rational being does admit it at least secretly to himself—and we can no longer be satisfied to view the world under the forms of theoretical cognition alone, since these forms exclude real freedom, and hence do not permit the thinking of freedom together with that of the objective world. It is, therefore, through the union of the forms of theoretical cognition with the manifestations of freedom, and indeed as the only possible scheme whereby to make those manifestations intelligible to our reason, that there arises in us the conception of a World of Purposes, wherein each part is viewed as determined by the other no longer under the causality relation, but under the relation of design; and since this design may be viewed in a two-fold manner, as applicable either to the subject or to the object, there arise the two worlds of *Æsthetics* and of *Designs*—an art-world and a teleological world; both of them being nothing more than the different modes of viewing the Moral World in the World of Natural Mechanism. On the other hand, the fact that we do view the world both *æsthetically* and teleologically proves our freedom.

Reason views itself as absolute in the first manner—that is, by judging upon the conformability of external objects to its own subjective requirements—in all *æsthetical* judgments;

material nature which has been moulded for the expression of rational end, that expression makes itself absolutely known to the beholder.* To ask how would be absurd; since, if you could assign a ground, you would be merely pushing a new link between reason and matter, without at all making the relation between reason and the new link clearer. Thus you might continue to ask for a further ground, and insert new links, without at all approaching nearer to the solution. On account of the absoluteness of this relation between mind and matter, Leibnitz usually terms it a harmony; and it is this harmony which shows how we must view the existence of a world of the pure Ego within a world of pure mechanism. The world of mechanism “corresponds,” as Swedenborg would express it, to the world of intelligence; or, in Fichte’s terminology, the world of nature can be comprehended in its relation to the Ego only as a moral world.”—[Extract from article on *Leibnitz* in the *North American Review* for January, 1869.]

* Compare Fichte’s Science of Rights.

since these are all absolute in character, appealing to neither mental nor emotional interest. It is only the agreeable and the good which excite our interest, the first an interest of a pathological and the second an interest of a practical character. But the simply beautiful arouses interest neither in our heart nor head; it neither delights us nor calls for our approval: it simply pleases us, and it pleases for no other reason than because it is beautiful; and, moreover, although our judgment has no *ground* for claiming universality for it, we nevertheless do postulate this universality, and ask all other rational beings to conform to our judgment. This fact that all purely æsthetical judgments are of a thetical character and at the same time claim universality, prove them to be the products of the absolute character of the Ego, and hence in giving these judgments the Ego necessarily views itself as absolute and free, although it views not its pure moral nature but an objective world.

The question, therefore, "How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible?" which is at the head of the first section of the Critic of the Power of Judgment, *The Analytic*, is answered thus: They are possible because the absoluteness of reason extends even to the objective world. Each individual, as having in himself the fulness of that reason, necessarily presupposes in every other individual the same reason or the same "supersensuous substrate of humanity," as Kant calls it, and hence expects the same judgments; of course, however, only so far as that reason is undetermined by individual pathological or practical limitedness, and hence only in regard to objects of pure beauty. Even judgments touching the sublime have, therefore, not this element of universality; for whereas reason views itself as absolute in all pure æsthetical judgments touching the beautiful simply because it pronounces them, thereby positing the object judged upon as adequate to itself and hence as absolute in form, reason views itself as absolute in all judgments touching the sublime in precisely the opposite manner; the sublime being the name for that, to conceive which arouses in us a power of representation to which no sensuous representation can adequately correspond; and to become conscious of this is a subjective condition, which we cannot universally presuppose. The beautiful arouses in us pure pleasure, a sense of adequateness

in the external world to our absoluteness, which we must presuppose in all; whereas the sublime arouses a feeling of displeasure, or a sense of the inadequateness of sensuous imagination to the absolute requirements of pure reason—an inadequateness which may be expressed both quantitatively in the mathematically sublime and qualitatively in the dynamical sublime—which we cannot presuppose in all precisely because it has a subjective presupposition.

It lies not within the purpose of this essay to follow Kant through the latter part of the first section of the *Critic of Judgment*, wherein he elaborates his views on the beautiful and sublime, and on art and art-matters. But it may be well to state that that part constitutes one of the most profound and elegant treatises upon Art-matters—a fit companion to the works of Schiller, Lessing, Winckelmann, and Herder; and a treatise which shows us Kant as a man of the world, eminently susceptible to all the refinements of culture, genial, witty, appreciative, and unbiased.

In the *Dialectic* of the æsthetical power of judgment, the peculiar absolute nature of all pure art-judgments is developed in the following antinomy:

Thesis: A pure æsthetical judgment is not founded on conception (reflection); for else it would be possible to decide upon it by reflective proof.

Antithesis: But it must be founded on conception (reflection); for else it would be impossible to demand universal assent to it, and hence to enter into a dispute if that assent is withheld.

This antinomy, however, is easily solved by joining both propositions together in the following

Synthesis: It is true that a pure æsthetical judgment is founded on a conception; but that conception is the *undetermined* conception of the pure Ego, and hence admits of no proof or cognition.

Thus through beauty do we behold freedom, and in art enter the realm of absoluteness. Out of nothing does the artist create his work; the ideal is neither seen, heard, nor touched by him. He who painted the transfigured Christ, created out of himself and saw independently of his eyesight; he who wrote the Seventh Symphony, created and heard independently of his hearing. In music this absolute creativeness of the pure Ego is most clearly apparent. The whole art of mu-

sic is an absolute creation, a new world made by man. Of this freedom and absoluteness every member of rationality becomes conscious in pronouncing an æsthetical judgment; and it is because art and beauty thus develop within us the consciousness of freedom that the culture of our race is so prominently indebted to its artists.

Reason views itself as absolute in the second manner—that is, by judging upon the conformability of external objects to each other—in all objective judgments expressing a purpose or design; because in all such judgments it can view the external world as created for freedom, or as the production of that absolute Ego whereof itself is an individual representation. This view Kant develops in the second book of his Critic of the Power of Judgment, or in the Critic of the *teleological* as distinguished from the *æsthetical* power of judgment.

In the first section of the second book treating of the *Analytic* of the teleological power of judgment, Kant gives the deduction of that power as having its ground in the impossibility to comprehend the universe as simply a mathematical machine, reason being constantly compelled—particularly in every case of organized life—to connect the parts into a whole by the conception of a purpose. This compulsion is evidently grounded in our freedom, which thus endeavors to comprehend the whole universe as existing for a purpose—namely, for the purpose of freedom itself—freedom or reason being its own end, and in its own absoluteness being simply because it is.

For it is true, that it is explainable why the Ego should be *generally* limited—because the infinite activity of the Ego must be checked in order to be reflected back into it, through which procedure alone reflection can arise;—but it is absolutely not explainable why the Ego should be limited in precisely the manner in which it is limited. In other words, the determinedness of that limitedness is unexplainable; we can well understand why there should be a universe, but not why the universe should be constructed precisely as it is. To be sure, we can (like Spinoza) view the whole matter as a mechanical process, and as the necessary process of the repulsion and attraction of the atoms which fill up the universe; but it is also evident that this is an infinite process, which will never, therefore, explain fully; and that to have a full comprehension we must have another mode of explanation.

This mode of explanation must be one which has its *absolute* ground, and hence one which rests upon the conception of freedom or of the Ego, since the Ego alone is absolutely grounded in itself. Such a conception lies in the conception of purposes. In asking for purposes reason necessarily presupposes itself, and thus it comes that from the teleological point of view the universe is judged to be the production of a design. Hence this judgment has perfect validity, provided we remember its origin and hold it to be merely a necessary manner of viewing, or, as Kant terms it, the result of the peculiar constitution of our reason, but not an actual historical fact. We are compelled to view the organized universe as the result of a design, and hence as accidental and not as necessary; at the same time we know that historically it could not have been made like a work of art after a preconceived pattern. By comprehending the ground of this necessary procedure on the part of our teleological reason, we at once understand also its limitations.

The second section of the second book treats of the Dialectic that occurs in this procedure and finds concise expression for the difficulty just mentioned in the following antinomy:

Thesis: All generation of material things and their forms must be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Which antinomy is solved in the following

Synthesis: All products of material nature must be judged as if they were *possible* according to merely mechanical laws; but at the same time they may well be thought under another form of relation, namely, that of design. This is not only allowable, but a necessity grounded in reason; nor can it lead to any misapprehension, provided we mistake not a necessary procedure of our intellect for an objective historical fact.

Such a mistake is made when the teleological view of the world is made the basis for a proof of the existence of a God as the maker and arranger of that system of purposes in the world which we ourselves have put into it. This proof, for the reason pointed out, can never have objective validity. We may well and must indeed view the universe *as if* it were created after a preconceived plan—the reason why we must do

so has been pointed out,—but we must also be careful not to place this law of the Ego in the shape of an objective cognition and attribute it to an independent Being endowed by us with personality. To do so is unwarranted, and establishes a transcendent dogmatism. Precisely, therefore, as the Critic of Pure Reason warned against applying categories of existence to anything which is not known to us empirically—to God—and as the Critic of Practical Reason warned against going any further than to say, that if we do acknowledge the fact of a Moral Law in us we must assume a God; so does the Critic of the Power of Judgment conclude by warning against the unwarranted assertion, that because we must view the world as if it were created after a plan, therefore it must have been historically created by a God.

It is this manner of keeping that which is a necessary mode of acting of our intelligence from being taken for an objective, i. e. empirical fact, which gives to Kant's system the name of transcendental idealism, and which is the key wherewith to unlock all the mysteries of the region of thought. Whoever has it in his full possession sees everywhere clearly; for him there is nowhere darkness. The transcendental idealist cheerfully confesses that he can bring no theoretical proof to establish the existence of a God, of Freedom, and of Immortality; but he shows the absurdity of asking such proof by showing that the very nature of that proof is such that it reaches only to empirical objects. But the transcendental idealist shows directly—through pointing out in men the occurrence of a Moral Law—and indirectly—through the fact of æsthetical and teleological judgments—that rational beings not only know themselves free, but must also judge themselves to be free. And it is important to remember that the proofs of God and Immortality are based upon that of Freedom. This explains why, as Kant says: we can have no cognition of God theoretically, as to what he *is*, but only practically, as to what he does. Or, as Fichte expresses it: the conception of God cannot be determined by categories of existence, but only by predicates of an activity. Or, as we stated at the commencement of this article: a Science of Metaphysics as a science of theoretical cognitions of supersensuous objects is impossible precisely because all theoretical cognitions apply merely to empirical objects; but a Science of Knowledge itself is not

only possible but even necessary, because upon it rests the possibility of any knowledge. We know of a God and of Immortality because we know of Freedom, and we know of Freedom because if we did not know of Freedom we should not be able to know at all.

In conclusion, it may be well to touch upon a peculiarity in Kant's representation of transcendental philosophy, which at first is apt to confuse the reader, namely, that he seems to distinguish between things as they are for us (phenomena) and things as they are for themselves; as if there really were such a valid distinction, and as if it really were possible for us to assume that in the eyes of other beings things might be different from what they are to us. For it ought to be præeminently clear that as rational beings we can speak and wish to speak of things only as they are *for us* (i. e. for rational beings), and that it is absurd and contradictory to presume that they might be different *really*. They are *really* for us only that which they appear to be to us, and can never be for us otherwise. A cow is for me a cow; what it is in itself it is nonsense to speak of, since we can speak of it only in relation to something else, and—since speaking is reasoning only in relation to reasoning. In itself—i. e. unrelated to anything else—the cow is nothing; and what it is to the ant, to the horse, to the moon, and to all the *infinite* sensuous objects in the world, it is preposterous to inquire. Hence we can speak of the cow—and so of all things—only in their relation to rational beings, and things are nothing but what they are to reason. There is, however, an ineradicable tendency in the mind to forget this (an illusion Kant calls it), and always to speak as if the world might be otherwise in itself than what it appears to be, and this tendency haunts even Kant's speech. The ground is that reason adds unconsciously—but by virtue of a necessary law of reason—to every phenomenon something which does not belong to the phenomenon—namely, Being; and now assumes this Being to be given to the phenomenon from some outside power merely because itself never becomes empirically conscious of having added that Being itself.*

* See article in Vol. II. of this Journal, "A Criticism of Philosophical Systems," particularly pp. 143-47.

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