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Note

"I began to make very large collections of what I read. But that I esteem most of all, from the perusal and meditation of De-Cartes's logic, I not only understood the principles of that science, but formed my mind to a habit of thinking and reasoning I had no idea of before."

Gibbon. Journal

Dec. 1755

in Miscell. Works. i

p 38. n.



A NEW
TREATISE
OF THE
ART of THINKING;
Or, A Compleat
System of Reflections,
Concerning the
CONDUCT and IMPROVEMENT
of the MIND.

ILLUSTRATED
With Variety of CHARACTERS
and EXAMPLES drawn from the
Ordinary Occurrences of LIFE.

Written in French by Mr. CROUSAZ,
Professor of Philosophy and Mathema-
ticks in the Academy of Laufane.


Done into ENGLISH.

In TWO VOLUMES.

V O L. I.

L O N D O N :

Printed for THO. WOODWARD at the *Half-Moon*
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M. DCC. XXIV.





P R E F A C E.



E N have conceived two different Prejudices against Logic. Those who confine this Name to what has hitherto been taught under it in the Schools, despise it as an Heap of Nonsense; and because they never remember without Uneasiness the Pains they have taken, and the Time they have lost in studying it, they do not like to hear any body speak of it, nor would they be much troubled if the Use thereof were for ever abolished. Others there are, who do indeed agree, that Logic ought to contain something more than what we meet with in Aristotle and Ramus; but they think it ought not to be extended much farther.

To fill a System of Logic with Maxims, which properly belong to a Treatise of Morality, is, in their Opinion, to lead the Reader from the Purpose, and to enrich one Science with the Spoils of another, is what they do not think allowable.

I NEVER cou'd imagine the Sciences to be distinguish'd by Bounds or Limits so exact and inviolable, as those that divide Kingdoms. I am sensible on the contrary, that the Difference of their Objects and Views, does not at all hinder their having a great many Parts in common, nor obstruct their confirming or illustrating one another. I look upon Errors and Vices, as Distempers of the Mind: The End of Logic is to prevent and weed out Errors; as the End of Morality is to oppose and eradicate Vices. But if there are Maxims and Reflections, which may with the same Success be opposed both against Error and Vice, as certainly there are; if one and the same Remedy is equally useful against both of these Evils; why should we be denied making use of them any where but in a System of Ethics? Has not a System of Logic, which teaches us to reason justly, an equal Right to whatever may promote the End it proposes?

I AFFIRM farther, That our Vices arise from our Errors; and that we should commit no Faults, if we were not mistaken, either about our Duty, or our true Interest: From whence I conclude, that our first Care ought to be to guard against Error. Whatever Rules, Maxims, and Reflections may serve to make us avoid this, we ought to make our own, and render very familiar to us; by these we ought to begin. Logic therefore has the best Right to be before-hand with Ethics; and it is the Part of the latter to take up with the Leavings of the former. There occurs to me some good Maxim, which will serve to advance me in Knowledge, and that may also help to improve me in Virtue: Must I therefore reserve it to secure me against Vice, and not employ it at all against Error? Should I lose the Benefit thereof, if I made a double Use of it.

SO far should we be then from making any Scruple to advance in Logic a Truth, which would also serve extremely well in Ethics, for fear of meeting with the same Argument twice in a Course of Philosophy, that on the contrary, we ought in one single Science to repeat constantly the very same Principles and Rules, as often as ever

there is occasion for them. *A System of Physick would be very imperfect, if in treating of any particular Distemper, it should decline mentioning the several Remedies proper for it, under the pretence of their being mentioned already under another Distemper, for which they are also proper.*

WE are subject to a great Number of Illusions : Error insinuates it self into us by a great many Ways, and Truth finds a thousand Means to escape us. How then? Because we have made good Advantage of a certain Rule in particular Circumstances, must we reject it in others, where it would be of equal Service ; and because it offends our Delicacy to hear the same Thing twice, must we deprive our selves of the Benefit we are sure to receive from it ?

SOME will perhaps further Object, That granting there ought to be a Liberty of making use of such Arguments in Logic, as are proper to Ethics, yet that it ought to be stretched no farther than just to the bare mentioning and urging them by the Bye, without insisting and dwelling upon them. But I imagine those who talk at this Rate, have scarce taken the Pains to reflect sufficiently

ently upon the Heart of Man, upon the Nature of Rules, and upon the Manner in which they ought to be used and applied, in order to reap the entire Fruits of them.

IT is necessary that Rules should be made very familiar to us, that we may constantly observe them whenever we have Occasion. It is necessary that our Minds should be so formed upon, and contract so intimate and perfect an Habit of them, that to follow them, we need not so much as to be at the Trouble of thinking on them. It is necessary that what we call Artificial Logic should become in us Natural Logic. The bare Knowledge of Rules could never produce this Effect: It is by the Use we make of them, that we learn to manage them, and form our selves to an Habit of employing them to the best Advantage. Explain to young People the Maxims of Logic as clearly as you please; make them get them by Heart, and repeat them an hundred and an hundred Times over; yet if you go no farther than this, you will teach them no more to think Justly, than you would to speak Eloquently, by explaining only to them the Rules of Grammar, and ranging them in their Memory, without taking any Pains to shew

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them,

them, in Discourses and Compositions, Examples of the good Effects of the Observation of them, and of the Ridiculousness that attends the Violation of them. In order to make a young Lad a good Logician, and to form him to Justness of Reasoning, after having taught him the Rules, it is absolutely necessary to exercise his Understanding upon a great Number of Examples: They should be such as are engaging, and drawn from various Subjects, that he may learn in all sorts of Things, to make use of the Helps these Rules afford. The Attention which I thought my self obliged to give to my Pupils, has taught me, by Experience, that my first Edition did not contain near so many Examples as were necessary.

IT is not enough to know the Distempers, whether of the Mind, or Body, so well as to be able to distinguish them by their several Names; we must also understand the Causes of them, if we would be assured of the Means to prevent them, and be able to put them in practise with better Success. The Remedies with which we oppose the Distempers of the Body, are for the most part disagreeable, and oftentimes

times painful: The Precautions with which we guard against Error, are neither very pleasant, but oftentimes difficult, and mortifying to Self-Love. To resolve to make use of these Remedies, it is expedient to be acquainted with all the Ridiculousness and Danger of those Evils, which cannot without their Assistance be avoided. I have therefore thought it the indispensable Duty of a Logician, to trace out the Sources of our Errors, and to dwell upon their Effects. If we were made more sensible of all the Consequences of our Errors, we should be more afraid of them, and should reason with more Circumspection.

T H E R E are Evils that reign so universally, and which we are so much accusom'd to, that we do not so much as regard them as Evils, nor does it even enter into our Minds that it is necessary to stand upon our Guard against them. So long as a Pension, so long as the good Graces of a Great Man, will determine us much more powerfully, and influence our Belief a great deal more effectually, than a Train of Syllogisms, we shall labour in vain to find Rules proper to be observed in Reasoning, because no Body will follow them,

P R E F A C E.

them, except in indifferent Matters; and they will be neglected in those, where it is most necessary to follow them. We ought to begin by gaining the Heart, and making the Observation of these Maxims more sacred and amiable to it, than any Consideration in the World beside, that may contribute to its Satisfaction. This Observation discovers the Reason, why I have spent so many Pages in representing Mankind as the despicable Sport of Error; because one Part find in their high Station, and Revenue, a sufficient Title to follow all their Fancies, and the other in their Dependance; a Reason strong enough to adopt them, and to endeavour to justify them.

T H E little Care that has been taken to apply the Rules of Reasoning to Matters of Practice, and to the Conduct of Mankind, has not a little contributed to make Logic, which contains these Rules, look'd upon as an useless Art, full of empty Promises. When we have seen nothing in the Behaviour of Men of Learning, that shews a greater Share of good Sense, of Rectitude of Heart, and of Clearness of Understanding, than in the Conduct of those who have never studied: When we have even seen them fall into the greatest Faults, we
cannot

cannot be persuaded that they think more prudently in Matters of bare Speculation; and we have ground to suspect, either that their Hearts are very vicious, or their Rules very useles. He who knows and loves these Rules as he ought to do, shou'd consult them upon all sorts of Subjects, but upon the most important, more than upon the rest: If once we accustom our selves to neglect them upon a great many Occasions, we shall easily neglect them upon all. These Rules ought to enlighten us, and serve for our Guide and Direction in Morality, as well as in Speculation. Logic is an Art, whose End is to render Men worthy of their Name and Definition, Rational and Happy, upon that very Account because they are Rational.

AS soon as I consider'd Logic in this View, it seem'd to me to be of much greater Importance, to make it expose the Ridiculousness of our Errors with respect to Morality, than the Absurdity of Sophistry upon Subjects of bare Curiosity. The Reason that most People cast their Eyes upon the Follies of others, is, that they may not have Time to perceive their own: I have endeavour'd to make them be taken in another Light, being persuaded that there is

no Study so useful as that of the Faults of others, when they are attended to only with a Design of avoiding the like our selves. A great Means to prevent our falling into Ridicule, is to see it in others, where Self-Love neither disguises nor excuses it; and to consider with our selves, at the same time, that we cannot fail of falling into the same our selves, since we are under the Influence of the same Principles, unless we use our utmost Efforts to discover and prevent them.

TO the Additions I have made in this Edition, to the Body of the Work, I have thought it proper to subjoin a great many Quotations. I have translated some of the Latin ones; others I have paraphrased; and of some I have been content to abridge the Sense, and give the Substance of them. I have thought it very useful to present the same Truths in different Lights. Every Thing which may contribute to make them better relish'd, and render them more familiar, seem'd to me to be of Importance. I have made Choice of such Authors where Logical Truths seem'd most dispers'd; and I have taken a Pleasure in ranging in some Order that which pleas'd me, in whatever Place

Place I found it, and which wou'd yet please more, if in reading there was no fear of forgetting.

WHEN I borrow from Authors Examples of the Errors Men commit by neglecting these Rules, I quote them if they be antient; but when I happen to find fault with any of the Thoughts of the Moderns, I neither mention their Names, nor their Books: It wou'd have been very difficult for me to have done it. Sometimes in reading, I put down upon a Piece of Paper the Substance of a Train of Reasoning, which does not appear just, and I take so little Pleasure in contradicting, let it be what it will, that in a little Time I forget from whence I took this Extract.

*IT may be, some Readers will here and there find some Thoughts, which they have met with before in other Authors; but I must beg of them not to take it ill, if I have not done Justice to those from whom they may think I have borrow'd them; I have done it as far as my Memory wou'd serve. It may have happen'd also, that some Things, which may be thought to belong to another, may yet be actually my own: The Roads
thus*

that lead to Truth are not so very numerous, but that we may meet with one another from Time to Time upon the Way, without setting out from the same Place. Besides this, as I cannot be supposed always to read with Pen in Hand, the Impression which some Truths in reading make upon me, may afterwards revive upon some certain Occasions, without its being in my Power to discover whether I owe them entirely to these Occasions only, or not. One Study from which I have received a great Part of my Reflexions, is that of the World; but it wou'd be equally impossible for me to refer to the respective Persons the several Mistakes and Errors I have taken Notice of: I remember the Faults, but forget the Authors. Some may imagine themselves described, whom I never thought of; and others, on the contrary, may have furnish'd me with Pictures, which they will not know again when they meet with them.






T H E
T A B L E
O F T H E
C H A P T E R S
Contained in the
FIRST VOLUME.



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A NEW
TREATISE
OF THE
ART of *THINKING*.

PART I.


SECT. I.

*Containing an Account of our Perceptions,
so far as they vary on the Score of the
different Faculties that give Birth to them.*



CHAP. I.

*Of LOGIC, or the Art of THINKING, in
general; and of the Method of Treating it.*

I.  T is frequent for Men to fall into *Error*; and sometimes indeed they happen to meet with *Truth*: But it will readily be granted that the compleat Use of our Faculties is to be able to think justly, without being liable to Mistakes. In order to this we must search out the *Principles* and Rules upon

upon which our Thoughts ought to be form'd, and carried on, directly to the Discovery of Truth, without being any way diverted or misled. LOGIC therefore, or the ART OF THINKING, is a *System* of such Principles, Observations, and Maxims, as are able to furnish the human Understanding with a greater Degree of Penetration, Force, Extent, Exactness, and Readiness either to discover Truth of it self, or to comprehend it when propos'd to it by others, or, lastly, to communicate it to them in its Turn upon its own Discovery.

II. To reduce these Observations and Rules into a *System*, that is, to range them in Order, so as to make the Knowledge and Practice of them more easy, it is necessary to divide them into distinct Classes, under respective Heads, according to the different Thoughts they are to conduct and direct. In the first Place are form'd our *Perceptions*, that are called *Simple*, because they are only the Representation of Objects, without determining any thing about them, either affirmatively or negatively. As, when I have the Perception or Representation of a Tree, of the Sun, or of a Triangle, or when I recollect in my Memory how they used to appear to me, without troubling my self whether the Objects themselves are really such as my Perceptions represent them, or not. Afterwards we compare our Perceptions together, and observe their Connexion, or Opposition, which is call'd *Judging*; as when I say, That *Trees are nourish'd by their Roots*; or that *one side of a Triangle is less than the other two*. Thus I say, *Knowledge is valuable*; and that *Riches are not sufficient to make Men happy*. When I compare the Signification of the Term *Knowledge*, with that of the Term *Valuable*, I find they agree; but when I compare what is signified by the Word *Riches*, with what is signified by a *Sufficiency to make Men happy*, I do not find any such Agreement; and therefore *judge* negatively in this Case, as in the former I *judged* affirmatively.

IN the same manner, as we compare our Perceptions in order to form our JUDGMENTS, we also compare our Judgments together, and from thence draw a Conclusion, which is call'd *Reasoning*. I know, for Example, that he is happy, who can satisfy his Desires; and in order to satisfy one's Desires, I perceive it necessary to moderate them. And from these two Propositions I conclude, that the Way to render our selves happy, is to learn the Mastery of our selves.

Lastly, By rightly disposing a great Number of Thoughts, Reflections, Reasonings, Principles, and Conclusions, we form

form what is call'd a *Discourse*; and to succeed the better in the right ordering of so many different Parts, a certain *Method* is necessary: And this is the fourth Operation of the Understanding, to which Rules must be prescribed. And with respect to these four general Differences in our way of Thinking, we should divide *Logic* (according to some celebrated Authors) into four principal Parts.

BUT because from our Infancy we gain an Habit of speaking as readily almost as we can think, there arises by that Means such a Connexion betwixt our Thoughts and our Expressions, that the one are hardly ever without the other; and this Connexion will oblige us to avoid separating these two Acts, and to give Rules for the one at the same time with the other. These Rules come so much the more properly within our Design, because the End of *Logic* is to assist the Understanding not only of it self to discover Truth, but moreover to comprehend it more readily from the Instructions of others, and to demonstrate it to them with more Clearness when discover'd.

It is evident that all this requires a great Attention to the Language that is made use of: But however, it is not necessary to make a *fifth* Part of *Logic* to teach the Art of speaking with more Propriety and Clearness, of entering more readily into the Thoughts of others, and of explaining more exactly their *Discourse*; only as we shall examine, in their Order, our several Ways of Thinking, and lay down upon each of them their proper Rules, we shall at the same time make Remarks upon the Sufficiency or Insufficiency of the Terms that are made use of to express them. And as the Exactness of Language depends upon the Relation it bears to our Thoughts, the Consequences will more immediately follow their Principles, when the Rules of our Language do immediately follow those of our Thoughts; so that this Method will spare the Reader the Fatigue and Trouble of Repetitions.

III. IN truth, the four principal Operations, upon which the Division of *Logic* is founded, have so great a Connexion together, that it is hardly possible to arrive to Perfection in one of them, without the Assistance of the others: They produce one another reciprocally. For to treat of *Simple Perception*, we must make use of *Method*; so that the fourth must precede the first, to which it self at the same time altogether owes its Original. It would therefore be impossible ever to arrive to Perfection in any one of these four Acts, since in order to this we

The four first Operations arise reciprocally one from another.

must first be supposed perfect in all the rest: For as to discover the Rules of the first, we shall want to understand the Rules of the second; so to discover these, we should want to be inform'd of those. But infinite WISDOM and GOODNESS, that created us on purpose for the Knowledge and Love of Truth, has provided for this Difficulty: There are implanted within us *naturally*, without the Assistance of Art or Precepts, Faculties sufficient to *perceive*, to *judge*, to *reason*, and to carry on *methodically* our Views and Conclusions. And it is by the Use of these natural Faculties that we discover Art, which afterwards serves to perfect those Principles from which it self was derived.

WHAT we have said of the Art of *Logic*, Cicero has applied to Arts in general: *Omnes enim, tacito quodam sensu, sine ulli Arte aut Ratione, quæ sint in Artibus ac Rationibus rectæ & præca dignantur, neque earum quemquam funditus Natura voluit esse expertem.* De Orat. Lib. III.

THOSE who have taken Pains to bring Arts to Perfection, have only left to others Helps and Rules to guide them more easily to that very Point, to which they themselves have first arrived without any Guide or Precept at all, but with abundance more Pain and Labour, and, as it were, by mere good Fortune. *Tradamus ea quæ nos Usus docuit, ut nobis ducibus veniant eo, quo sine duce ipsi pervenimus.* Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.

IV. THESE Dispositions, with which we seem *Of Natural* born, and which never fail of being display'd by *Logic.* Time, and improved by Experience; Dispositions which we follow without being sensible of, and without having occasion to reflect on; these, I say, form what we call *Natural Logic*. These supply the want of Art; they stand in the room of it, and produce the same Effects. The Reason we do not so easily discover and determine what they are, is our being used and habituated to follow those happy Inclinations without reflecting on them, and often without being sensible of them. However, I think they may be refer'd to these four Heads: 1. To adhere closely and solely to *Evidence*, and by that to form the Judgment. 2. To avoid *Presumption* in all Inquiries and Determinations. 3. To preserve a constant *Attenti v.* And lastly, 4. To maintain a perpetual *Tranquility* of Mind, secure from the Ruffle of our Passions, which do nothing but darken our Ideas, disturb our Attention, divert us from what we ought to dwell upon, and fix us to what we should be sure to avoid.

SECT. I. *the Art of THINKING.* 5

THE *Logic* which is to be met with in Books, and is call'd *Artificial*, should be needless to any that should happen to possess these four Dispositions in a perfect Degree. This is what constitutes the Abilities of great Genius's. And to perfect and establish them in us, should be the sole End of all our Searches and Remarks.

THEY all four improve in us according to the Inclination and Love we have for Truth; a Love which must be pure, sincere, lively, and exalted above the Fear of Mens Displeasure, the Desire of their Praises, and the Esteem of what is call'd *Fortune*. When nothing intimates, when nothing dazzles, when nothing affects it, in comparison to Truth, then the Mind becomes more and more composed, attentive, circumspect, and attached to Evidence only; nothing is neglected that leads to Truth, no Pains are spared that may help towards the Discovery of it, and there is no Stop made at any thing till it is found.

V. It is an Art of which we may say, as *The Usefulness of artificial Logic.* of all others, That Nature contains the Seeds and Foundations: And the Knowledge and Observation of Precepts make these Seeds

more fruitful, and teach us to build with more Success upon these Foundations. There are People that have wonderful Talents; some for Singing, some for Building; others for inventing and contriving Machines, for Painting, for Engraving, &c. But for the very same Reason that they are found to make a great Progress in them without Art and without Rules, we must conclude that with those Assistances they would have gone much further. Why should we think otherwise of *Logic*? With whatever Penetration, Extent, and Clearness of Understanding we may be born, why shou'd it not be possible by *Logic* to improve these rich Talents of Nature? Much more will it be of Service to those of lower Endowments (a).

I own, and Experience shews it, that a sufficient Application to any certain Science, may at last make one a tolerable Master of it, without being prepared with any Lecture of *Logic*, or having any Knowledge at all of it worth speaking of; but in such Examples, wou'd not there be a greater Progress made with greater Assistances? Wou'd not they gain a great deal more Ground in less Time? Wou'd not
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their

(a) Neque enim ignoro & quæ bona sunt, fieri meliora posse doctrinâ, & quæ non optima, aliquo modo acui tamen & corrigi posse: Cic. de Orat. Lib. I.

their Ideas be ranged in better Order? And wou'd not there be a greater Clearness in their Works? If we take these Learned Men, that owe their Success to an happy Genius, or to their great Industry, into Things that are new to them, and which they have not had time to examine on all sides, and make themselves Masters of, it is easy to impose upon them, because they are not furnished and guarded with those general Rules which secure from Error in all Subjects. It takes a great deal of time to get to our Journey's End without Guides; and it is not without a great many Tryals, and being often out of the Road, and obliged to go back again, that we find our selves right at last: Whereas we advance a great Pace, when the right Way is once laid out to us.

ALL Arts have been cavil'd upon; and some great Orators have thought Eloquence for the most part Natural, without owing any thing considerable to Art (*b*). Nature, say they, teaches us to sooth and insinuate, to declare and gain our Point; and Use perfects these natural Dispositions (*c*). I own all this; and yet at the same time maintain, that attending to Rules makes the Exercise of the natural Faculties more just and sure. For since we meet with false Reasoning, as well as just; and that among those who reason, some shall think finely, and others grossly, one shall confound the most simple and easy Subjects, and another shall clear and enlighten the most obscure and intricate; it must be granted, that if we do but observe carefully what it is that makes the one succeed so well, and the other so ill, we shall be able from these Remarks to discover an Art not to be despised (*d*). The Knowledge and Use of Precepts nourishes

(*b*) Res mihi videtur esse facultate præclara, arte mediocri. *Anton. apud Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.*

(*c*) Ita nati, ut & blandiri & suppliciter insinuare ab iis à quibus esset petendum, & adversarios minaciter terrere possemus, & rem gestam exponere, & id quod intenderemus confirmare, & id quod contra diceretur refellere, & ad extremum deprecari aliquid & conqueri, quibus in rebus omnis Oratorum versaretur facultas, & quod consuetudo exercitatioque, & intelligendi prudentiam acueret, & eloquendi celeritatem incitaret. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. I.*

(*d*) Cum plerique temerè aut nullà ratione causas in foro dicant, nonnulli autem propter exercitationem aut consuetudinem aliquam callidiùs id faciant, non est dubium quin si quis animadverterit, quid sit, quare alii meliùs quàm alii dicant, id possit notare. Ergo id qui toto in genere fecerint, is si non planè artem, ac quasi artem quandam invenerit. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.*

rishes and improves the Force of the Understanding, corrects its Faults, and brightens its Beauties (e).

THERE are some happy Genius's who are born to (if I may so say) what others arrive to with Study and Application: But we see also some that have very great natural Parts, that suffer themselves to be out-done by those of meaner Capacities, by the Advantage of greater Industry and Application. So that every Day's Experience will sufficiently refute whatever is alledged against the Usefulness of Arts. The *Mexicans* have built Towns and Palaces, without the Use of any more than those poor few Machines which they were acquainted with: But the Study of Mechanicks will be never the less esteemed or pursued upon that Account. We should always take care to distinguish between the Inconveniences that properly and truly belong to an Art, and those that only bear its Name, and are at the same time often directly contrary to what that Name promises. Thus *Montaign* combats only a Phantom of *Logic*, when he asks, **Who has obtained any Knowledge from Logic? To what End serve all its fine Promises?*

NEC AD MELIUS VIVENDUM, NEC AD COMMODIUS DISSERENDUM: That is, *It neither makes us better, nor wiser; our Lives are not mended, nor our Thoughts improved by it.* This piece of Criticism is best replied to out of *Cicero*. “(f) The Precepts of *Logic* do not teach us so much to discover Truth, as to weigh the Proofs by which those who pretend to have found it, endeavour to press it upon others. At last, adds he, the *Logicians* wound themselves with their own Weapons: Upon the Strength and Subtilty of their Art, they aspire to Questions out of its Reach, and which are not only impossible to be resolved by it, but do also in their Consequences destroy and overturn its very Principles and Foundations before laid down; so that by going too far, they find themselves obliged to return to the very Place from whence they first set out.”

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THIS

(e) Ingenii vis preceptis alitur & crescit, novasque persuasiones adjicit innatis, & depravata corrigit. *Sen. Epist.* 94. Imbecilliores adjuvabit & in bonum pronos educet ad summa. *Id. Epist.* 95.

(f) In hâc Arte, si modo est hæc Ars, nullum est præceptum, quomodo verum inveniatur, sed tantùm est, quomodo judicetur. ----- Ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus, & multa quaerendo, reperiunt, non modò ea, quæ jam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam quibus ante exorsa & potius detexta propè retexantur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

THIS Censure falls upon the Defects of a bad *Logic*, and not at all upon the Rules of a good one. These teach, without doubt, to discover and pursue with more Ease and Success the Road that leads to Truth: But if they serv'd only the better to distinguish those Errors into which we are liable to fall and fix, whether it be by the Heaviness of the Understanding, or by the Conceitedness of the Temper, or by the Course of a bad Education; wou'd not this Use alone be sufficient to evince the Necessity of them? For when two Men have reason'd differently, and by pursuing different Paths are come to Conclusions directly opposite, in order to discover which of them has thought the most justly, and to bring the other into the same Sentiment, is it not absolutely necessary to make them agree upon the Principles and Rules which ought to be follow'd in reasoning?


IN a word, the Knowledge of our selves being without Contradiction most worthy of our Attention, the Part which *Logic* contributes towards it, by giving us a Detail of what we have within us most excellent, will make it deserve all our Application. It teaches us in what Order our Thoughts succeed one another; and how they receive their Birth, their Enlargement, and their Perfection: It instructs us in the Relation between our Thoughts, and the Terms by which we express them: It distinguishes their different Kinds, and points out their Properties: It discovers the Sources of all our Mistakes, and shews how we may correct, and, what is more, prevent them: It displays those Principles and Rules which we constantly follow (though blindly, and without taking notice of them) whenever we think conformably to Truth, and that we succeed in our Enquiries. But our Business is to treat of *Logic* so as it may be understood, and not to declaim upon it, and set forth its Praises. Those who shall read it with Attention, will best judge of its Value, and be sensible whether, or no, it deserves the Applauses that are bestow'd upon it by those that esteem and recommend it.





C H A P. II.

Of Perception in general; and of its principal Kinds.

I.  T belongs not to *Logic* to examine to the bottom the Nature of *Thinking*, any more than that of *Judging*, or of *Reasoning*, or, in a word, of those *Faculties* by which we think. If it was necessary to know all this in order to discover and comprehend the Maxims of *Logic*, we must of Necessity be perfect Philosophers, before we could be Masters of the very Rules that are introductory to Philosophy. It is for this Reason that, in my present Design of treating upon the Maxims that help towards the Knowledge and Advancement of other Sciences, I take care not to borrow from those Sciences any Principles or Conclusions to demonstrate that very Thing which, in my Judgment, ought to precede them; and I reason only upon such Principles as are self-evident, without supposing any previous Study. The Musicians and Painters practise exactly the Rules of their Art, and make every Day Improvements in them, without, perhaps, ever so much as thinking of the Nature of Sounds and Colours. In trying to Sing and to Paint, certain Sounds have pleas'd, and certain Strokes have succeeded; by separating what displeas'd from what was agreeable, and reflecting on the various Compositions of Sounds, and Mixtures of Colours, they form their Rules. We need only attend to our own proper Experience, and that will sufficiently teach us to understand our Precepts, and even to discover them (a).

What Knowledge Logic supposes.

THIS

(a) Omnia ferè, quæ sunt conclusa nunc in Artibus, dispersa & dissipata quondam fuerunt, ut in Musicis Numeri, Voces & Modi; in ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere; adhibita igitur est ars quædam quæ rem dissolutam divulsamque conglutinet, & ratione quædam constringeret. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. I.*

THIS will inform us, that *Thought is an Act conscious of its own Existence*. The Motion, for Instance, of an Arrow perceives not any thing of it self: But Thought, for the same Reason that it exists at all, does perceive its own Existence, and cannot be without being conscious of it self: He who does not perceive himself to think, does not think at all. We may grant that the Original of our Thoughts is unknown to us; that the internal Principles which form them are not what we perceive; yet will it be nevertheless true, that Thought is an Act conscious of it self; and we must confess, that this Act upon this account is very different from its Principles: For, once more, Thought perceives it self, for the same Reason that it is Thought; it perceives its own Existence, and so perceives it as the Existence of Thought, and nothing else: Join to Thought, or suppose join'd with it, any thing else which perceives not it self; this will be something united to Thought, without being Thought it self. But without pushing this Dispute any farther, I shall content my self with affirming, That a *Logician* will look upon Thought in no other Light, than with regard to this Property it has of knowing and perceiving it self; for it is by this only that it can teach and discover to us, what we are desirous of knowing. In order to perceive what any Thought represents to us, it is absolutely necessary to perceive that we have such a Thought: And how can we perceive this, but by its perceiving it self?

WHEN this Act, which perceives it self, is not accompanied with any Determination either affirmative or negative, it is called *Simple Perception*; it contains nothing but what is to be found in the Judgment, but the Judgment adds something to it.

II. THERE are some Perceptions which perceive themselves Simply as they are; and there are other which at the same time that they perceive them, do also serve to make us perceive something else besides themselves. The Perceptions of Thirst, Pain, Sorrow, Desire, are of the first sort; those of a Tree, a Circle, an House, are of the second. The one have nothing but themselves for their Object; the others have an Object different from themselves: The first are called *Sensations*, and to the second I give the Name of *Ideas*. When we would represent to our selves something which is without us, and which resembles a Sensation, it is evident our Pains are to no purpose, and we pursue nothing but a Chimera, except we can represent in a Subject capable

capable of Sensation, some Sensation like to that about which we are employ'd our selves. A Sensation represents nothing but a Sensation: And Sensation being a Species of Thought, it cannot be conceived or represented but in Subjects capable of Sensation, and consequently of Thought. It is not so with our Ideas: I think sometimes after a certain manner, which represents to me a Tree, a Triangle, &c. which makes me know the Objects to which I give those Names: It represents them to me, it makes me know those Objects how different soever they are from my Thoughts: This is wonderful; but it is at the same time incontestable. If my Ideas were the same with their Objects, that which thinks in me would become successively like Iron, Darknes, a Bowl, a Bell, &c. which is impossible to suppose.

OUR Sensations do immediately occasion our Happiness or Misery; and as it depends not absolutely and immediately upon our selves to be either happy or miserable, it is not in our Power to excite or stay these Sensations the Moment we are enclined to do so, according as our Will would direct; but our Ideas are drawn as it were out of our own Fund, and as we will, we pass from one to another; 'tis true, sometimes more easily, and at other times more difficultly; but they are always excited by our selves, by a Power which is given us to display for that purpose. It was fit it should be so; because the Wisdom and Perfection of the Man depending upon his Ideas, and being his Duty, he ought to have it in his Power to make the proper Advances in Knowledge and Virtue. Hence will be understood the Reason why Words may produce Ideas in us, but not Sensations; for upon meeting with a certain Word, we immediately excite the Idea, of which we are before agreed to have that Word a Sign. This is necessary to enable us to communicate our Thoughts one to another. But though a Word may serve also as a Sign of a certain Sensation, that is to say, may be the Name of it; pronounce it never so soft, the Sound of it will never be able to produce the Sensation it self, that depending entirely upon its proper Object, to the Impression of which the Author of Nature has ordered it to be inseparably joined. A Word may occasion the calling to Mind a past Sensation, but the Remembrance or Idea of a Sensation is a different thing from the Sensation it self.

IN order therefore to understand the Things which exist without us, we must consult our Ideas, rather than our Sensations.

fations. By our Sensations we come acquainted with *ourselves*, and our own Condition; but our Ideas lead us to the Discovery of *Nature*, and of the Condition of *Things*, quite different from our selves. When any one can *express* his Thoughts *clearly*, it is a Proof of his having made good use of his *Ideas*; but if he expresses them cloudily, and has much ado to explain his Meaning, it is plain, that instead of forming Ideas, he has contented himself with *Sensations* only. When I call *Motion* an Effort, an Impetuosity, these Expressions are not clear, because they signify Sensations, and cannot be represented clearly in a Bowl, whatever there be in that which answers to it; but when I say that a Bowl in Motion changes its Situation, and applies it self successively to different Places, my Thought or Meaning will be very distinctly understood. Sensations are only understood by themselves: Whenever we would look upon them as Representations of certain Objects different from themselves, and which exist without us, we know no more what to say, or what to think; we suppose that which is not, and labour in vain to produce Chimera's. The Course of this Work will furnish us with divers Occasions to distinguish these two Methods of Thinking, and sufficiently evince the Necessity of this Distinction.

III. OUR Sensations and Ideas are either *Perceptions are simple or compounded*; and an Idea which is simple in one respect, is compounded in another. The Idea of a *Right-Line* is simple with respect to a *Triangle*, but it is compounded with respect to a *Point*.

SUCH Compositions as present themselves all at once, and whose Parts we have not yet reflected on, pass for simple, though they are at the same time very much compounded. So the Idea of a Circle appears to a great many People a simple Idea; but whoever enquires into the Nature of it, will find it a Figure very much compounded, and in which a great many Things are included. For Instance, a Circumference, a Space enclosed within this Circumference, the several Parts which compose this Circumference, a Distance always equal betwixt every Point in this Circumference, and a certain Point or Center enclosed within it.

IT often requires a great deal of Attention, Address, and Readiness to prevent confounding the Simple with the Compounded. A Painter will distinguish in the Strokes of the Pencil, a Musician in Sounds, and a Physician in the Pulse, a great many Varieties; whilst an infinite Number of other
People

People shall find nothing in all these but what is very simple. It is the same in Tastes and Odours, &c. (b)

FOR want of being attentive enough to the Composition of Things, Disputes often arise without any real Opposition of Sentiments: One affirms what another denies, and yet their Opposition is only in Appearance; for under one and the same Name they comprehend quite different Things, about which they must consequently reason very differently. For Example, Man is mortal, and immortal: He has great Perfections, and great Imperfections: Religion has done a great deal of Good of it self, and a great deal of Mischief by the ill Use Men have made of it: We shall treat yet more particularly of simple and compounded Ideas.

IV. THE *Logicians* have, almost to a Man, laid it down as an important Maxim, or a Paradox, that there is no Error in simple wonderful Perceptions. But this Remark to me seems founded upon an Equivocation; and when rightly explain'd, falls to nothing.

Whether there be any Error in simple Perceptions.

It is an Error when we conceive Things to be other than what they really are. If then by Means of an erroneous Idea, we imagine an Object existing which that Idea ought regularly to represent, whereas in Truth no such Object is really existing, I cannot see why we must not be said to have form'd a false Idea. I own, indeed, what they affirm, That he who forms an Idea is not deceived by it, but from the the Moment that he supposes this Idea to represent an Object which it really does not represent. In this Sense it is that his Error consists; not in forming the Idea, but in misapplying it, and taking it for what it is not. So the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, is in it self neither true nor false; but he that shall look upon it as a Representation of such a Mountain as might possible be, will think justly; whereas he that shall suppose that this Idea answers to a Mountain of Gold actually existing, will be deceiv'd by such Supposition.

V. 1. IN forming an Idea, we make use of a Power implanted within us for that purpose, which is call'd the *Thinking Faculty*. 2. In thinking of any thing, that which our Idea represents to us bears the Name of *Object*. 3. We think of this Object after a certain *manner*. For Instance, I represent

General Division of Ideas.

(b) Quàm multa vident Pictores in Umbris & Eminentis, quæ nos non videmus? Quàm multa quæ nos fugiunt in Cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati? *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

present to my self an Horse, either diminish'd, and at a Distance, or near me, and in its natural Magnitude. These three Things, *Faculty*, *Object*, and *Manner of perceiving*, are the Sources of the Varieties of our Ideas; and we shall lay down just so many general Heads, to which we shall in course refer our Remarks and Rules.

VI. WHEN external Objects act upon the *Division of* Organs of our Bodies, the Perceptions which *Faculties.* arise, or seem to arise, immediately from their Impressions, belong to the Faculty of *Sense*. So I perceive an Horse, a Tower, &c. when the Rays which proceed from thence make an Impression upon my Eye: But when we represent to our selves those very Objects which have formerly affected us in that manner, or something which resemble them; when, I say, we represent them to our selves as though they were actually present, at the same time that they really are not so, the Faculty which thinks in this manner is called the *Imagination*: So I represent to my self a Tree as though I actually saw it, though my Eye is shut at the same time. Lastly, when we think of any Thing without representing it under any Image, without conceiving it under any corporeal Form, we make use of the *pure Understanding*. We shall speak particularly of this in the following Chapter.


BESIDES these three Faculties, we experience in our selves a *Will*, *Inclinations*, and *Passions*; Faculties more active, and which determine us to think of certain Objects rather than of others, and contribute a thousand Ways to vary our Ideas: For we conceive Things very differently, according as our Inclinations prepossess us in their Favour, or to their Prejudice. We have moreover a *Memory*, that is to say, a Power to retain in some sort such Ideas as have once been presented to us, and to recollect them again when we have occasion. All these Faculties have their Defects and their Uses; and it is of Importance to find out the Means to correct the one, and to perfect the others.





C H A P. III.

Of the Understanding.

I. HEN I speak of *Desire, Contentment, Trouble, Apprehension, Doubt, Certainty, of Affirming, Denying, Esteeming, Approving, Blaming, Excusing, Condemning,* I understand what I say, and I pronounce Words not at all destitute of Sense; and yet I do not represent the Things spoken of under any Image or corporeal Form. The Power which we have to think in this Manner is called the *Understanding,* or the *Intellectual Faculty.*

Example of Ideas purely intellectual.

II. IN truth, at the same time that the pure Understanding is engaged and busy upon its Ideas, the Imagination is also at work, and presents its Images and Phantoms; but so far from assisting us by the Pains it takes, that we are only retarded and disturbed thereby. *Phantoms of the Imagination disturb the Understanding.* Would you know what Thought is? Enter into your selves, and be but attentive to what you find there; your Thought, which is an Act that knows it self, will it self discover to you what it is. It is precisely that which you perceive passes within you when you think; for all that which you are insensible of, and perceive not, certainly is not Thought, nor ought to bear that Name: Stop but here, and you are sufficiently informed. But the Imagination stops not here; but to gratify our Desire to know what Thought is, it presents to us I know not what Fire, I know not what Vapour, and I know what active and airy Bodies. And to what can all this tend, except it be to divert our Attention from what Thought is, to fix it upon what it is not? We persuade our selves ordinarily, that whatever we are not accustomed to do, must for that Reason be a great deal the more difficult; and as we pass our Minority, and often times a great Part of our Life besides, without making any Reflection upon, or Enquiry into the Nature of Thought, we fear it will be extremely difficult

cult to discover it. In this Prepossession we undertake the Work by raising up our selves to such Efforts, as do but in vain distract and fatigue us.

WE must then make a great Difference between the Ideas of the Understanding, and the Phantoms of the Imagination which may happen to accompany them. The Understanding conceives with Clearness; but in that which the Imagination presents, there is rarely any thing but Confusion. I comprehend very perfectly what is to be understood by a Figure which is formed by 120 or 124 equal Sides: I can demonstrate its Generation and Properties; but the Image which the Imagination makes of it is not at all distinct, nor to be discern'd from that of a Figure of 118 or 122 Sides. The Understanding determines all its Sides, and counts them clearly; the Imagination dares not undertake it, not having the Power to perform it. When I read in an History of 50 Battalions, and 53 Squadrons, of a Ditch of 49 Feet, of a Plain of 4700 Paces, of an Hill 90 Fathom high; all these Numbers, and a much longer Detail, are conceiv'd very determinately by my Understanding; but the Imagination is confounded with them, and what it conceives, is not at all different from what would be represented to it by a Detail of quite different Numbers.

THE Understanding does not only form exact Ideas of that which the Imagination presents but very confusedly, but even rectifies its Contradictions. The Imagination always represents the Antipodes as standing upon their Heads; but the Understanding demonstrates, that a Man can never be truly in this Position, when his Feet are nearer to the Centre of the Earth than his Head.

III. ARISTOTLE was pleas'd to say, That *Proofs of the nothing could enter the Understanding, without first passing through the Sense. NIHIL est Intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,* was a Maxim of the antient Schools. After a great deal of Pains taken to defend and support it, at last it was found necessary to be abandon'd. But as antient Sentiments are revived sometimes, as well as old Fashions, so has this been; and to give it a Grace of Novelty, they have improv'd upon *Aristotle*, and gone so far, as to deny that Man has any Understanding at all. We know nothing but by *Sense* and *Experience*, say some, who think themselves of the first Rank for Learning, and who, in bringing all Knowledge down to the Body, think to raise themselves to as great a Superiority above our ordinary Philosophers, as these have above the Vulgar

Vulgar. To those that think at this rate, I shall neither oppose the Ideas of Morality, nor those of Religion; but shall content my self to draw some Demonstrations from the first Elements of *Arithmetic* and *Geometry*. I demand then, Whether we are sure a Calculation is just, because a certain Method of trying it has succeeded several Times, and from thence may be made a Rule? or, whether it does not therefore deserve this Name, because it is a Series of general Ideas of Numbers, and their Combinations? Do we believe that *any two Sides of a Triangle, taken together, are greater than the third*; or that *the Sum of the three Angles of any Triangle is equal to the Sum of two Right ones*, only because we have found it so whenever we have been pleas'd to measure them? Or are we not rather convinced of the Truth of these Propositions, so as to look upon them as absolutely universal, because we have discover'd their Truth in the universal Ideas of a Right Line, an Angle, and a Triangle? If any one affirms the first, he must own that Experiment is more convincing than Demonstration; that we may indeed be sure, that so many Triangles as we shall take the Pains to measure have this Property; but we cannot be perfectly sure that it will be found in others that may be drawn. But he that shall declare on the side of Demonstration, must acknowledge an Understanding; for the Ideas of Sense are all at an end: The Eye is an utter Stranger to an universal Triangle; it is far from being able to form an Idea of one equally applicable to all the Triangles that ever we shall or can see. The general Formules, or Rules in *Algebra*, are also the Effect of Reasoning, founded not upon the particular Ideas of *Sense*, but upon the universal Ideas of the Understanding. Nor must it be said, that *Algebra* is entirely founded upon Signs or Characters; that it is a Science purely *Symbolical*, and only combines together certain Characters in the room of the Things whose Places they supply; for whoever knows any thing of Algebraical Calculations at all, knows that the Characters there used signify in effect what they ought to signify; and by consequence we have universal Ideas, of which they are the Expressions; and we have moreover an Idea of the just Relation these Characters bear to the Objects whose Places they supply. Without this we could never be certain whether they might not be deceitful and equivocal Characters; and as they do sometimes happen to be such, we are sometimes deceiv'd by confining our selves to Characters, without attending sufficiently to the Things themselves. So that to calculate with

Certainty, we must always join the Intellectual with the Symbolical Knowledge.

THE Geometers have invented a great Number of Curves, and have exactly demonstrated their Nature and Properties, even before they have discover'd the Manner how to describe them: They knew them before ever they appear'd before their Eyes, and consequently the Imagination added nothing to the Clearness and Exactness of their Ideas. Let any one study these Demonstrations, and they will find whether they consist only of Words, and whether their Clearness and Force depends only upon the Exactness with which the Figure is drawn. We may be soon convinc'd, when we have before our Eyes a very exact Figure, with which we compare the Demonstration, if we do but reflect, that in order to extend this Demonstration to all other Figures of the same Species, it must be demonstrated, that all this, which agrees with the determinate Idea of this particular Figure, does equally agree with the general Idea of this whole Species.

NUMBERS in themselves are very distinctly understood; all Mankind have the same Idea of them invariably: But the Images, with which the Imagination accompanies these Ideas, are not at all uniform. The *Latin*, the *Greek*, the *Hebrew*, the *Arabian*, when they think of an Hundred, think of the same Number. They have the same Idea, but their Images are quite different: Each has his Objects, each has his Characters; and the Idea of the Number would be all confounded with the Idea of the Character: 100 and C, as well as 50 and L, present to the Mind two very different Images; but each of those Characters does however express the same Number. There is then a great deal of Difference betwixt the Image of the Sign, and the Idea of the Thing signified. But it happens unfortunately that we are more affected with what is corporeal, than we are with what is not so; we are full of the one, and make no Reflection at all upon the other. It is wrong therefore to look upon the Idea of Numbers as an Idea of the Imagination, for it belongs to the Understanding: The Character belongs to the Imagination, but the Number to the Understanding. This has no Image, but is quite different from its Sign.

THE general Term of *Body*, is it only a bare Sound, to which there is no general Idea that answers? How then shall I know that this Term is equally applicable both to all the Bodies I have seen, and also to those which I never shall see, and which I have never once imagined, if I have no other

other Idea of it besides those with which Sense has furnish'd my Imagination? The very Idea of that wherein all the Bodies which I have seen do resemble one another sufficiently to bear that same Name, this Idea is universal and different from the Ideas of Sense, which are all particular and determinate. I have in my Hand a Ball of Wax; I flat it, then put it over the Fire; which, after having melted it, converts it into Flame, and dissipates it into Smoke: When I say that the same Body, which I saw solid and round, subsists yet, tho' vanish'd from my Eyes, and changed into Vapours, and that after having undergone all these Alterations, to which I have been Witness, it yet continues in one Sense always one and the same Body; do I not understand what I say? And yet in saying this, I pronounce only Words without any Signification, if I have no other Ideas besides those of the Senses and of the Imagination; for each of these Ideas presents the Wax to me under a determinate Circumstance, and each of them under a different Circumstance: It is the Understanding alone that conceives the Identity.

Do we not understand what we say, when we speak of the *Time past* and *to come*? That which we have seen, and that which we may see, when it is consider'd of by the Imagination, is always figur'd as tho' it were present: We understand what is meant by the Relation between the *Past* and the *Present*, but we do not see it, we do not imagine it. The *Conjunctions* which illustrate and adorn our Discourse, are they nothing else but Sounds intended to affect the Ears, or only Characters design'd to make an Impression upon the Eyes? Must we not have an Idea of these Conjunctions, of their Force and Use? And, in a word, must we not understand what these Characters signify, before we can know how to place them, or be sure that they are in their proper Places? But certainly their Idea concerns it self not either about their Dimension, their Figure, or their Colour, but entirely escapes the Notice of the Senses, and of the Imagination.

THE Reflections which we make upon the Perceptions of the Senses and of the Imagination, the Acts by which we combine them, compare them, study their Nature, their Origine, their End, and their Return, are these the Acts of the Senses and of the Imagination?

BODIES make their Impressions upon our Senses, and the Imagination represents to us these past Impressions; but, to be sure that these Impressions are something more than Illusions, and that we are actually placed in a corporeal

World, whose different Parts act upon our Senses in their turn, we must make use of Reasonings. In these Reasonings, as we shall see in the following Chapter, it belongs to the Intellectual Ideas, and to the Understanding, and not at all to the Senses, to judge of the Justness of these Reasonings, and of the Connection of the Parts which compose them.

WHEN I say, *There is something existing which never had Beginning*: For whatsoever has had a Beginning, and is become what it was not before, must necessarily derive its Existence and Condition from some Cause which did exist already. That which might or might not be, necessarily supposes some Cause which determines it rather to be, than not to be: Therefore it is necessary to acknowledge either a Chain of Causes which has no Beginning; or else in this Chain some first Cause, which has no Beginning. When I speak in this manner, I understand what I say; but it is not from the Senses and the Imagination that I derive this Knowledge: Each of these Faculties may very readily represent to us a Beginning; but neither the Senses, nor the Imagination, can reach or conceive that which never had Beginning. And these Terms would signify nothing to a Man, who had no other Faculty besides those of the Senses and the Imagination.

I FIND my self also under a Necessity of acknowledging, either a corporeal Extension, or a Space void of Matter, infinite and without any Bounds. The Eyes have never perceiv'd any thing but what is finite; and whatever Efforts the Imagination makes, it can never reach or represent to us any thing but what is limited: To be convinced that beyond that which the Imagination represents to us, there is farther an Extension absolutely infinite, is not a Conclusion within the Power of the Imagination.

IV. THE Habit, which grows upon us from our Infancy, of thinking only of such Things as are corporeal, is perhaps the only Cause of the Difficulty we find in thinking intellectually; and if it be not the only Cause, it is at least one of the most principal. But in order to weaken this Habit, and restore by Exercise to the Understanding the Force which it has lost, we must abstract with all our Power the Idea of Body, and think in such a manner as tho' there were no such Thing in Being, and give no more Attention to it, than if we had never known any such Thing. In this Supposition, in this Ignorance and Uncertainty of the Existence of the corporeal Universe, what would there remain of

*Method of
facilitating
the Exercise
of the Un-
derstanding:*

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Certainty? I should always be sure that I think, and exist my self; I should then have an Idea of a Being, which thinks, and by consequence knows something, namely, its own Existence and Thought, at least imperfectly, which knows a little, and is desirous of knowing more: And upon this Occasion I should advance to the Idea of a Being which has greater Knowledge, and at last to the Idea of a Being whose Knowledge equals its Desires, and which knows whatsoever it pleases. In this Ignorance and Weakness, I find in my self, I am not at all happy; and this Reflection leads me to the Idea of a Being more powerful, and more satisfied, who is able to do all Things, and need only to will it to put this Power in Execution, who is supremely happy, self-sufficient, knows and perceives his own Existence with perpetual Extasy. Hitherto I have had no concern with any thing corporeal; and thus far the Ideas of my Understanding have advanced without being at all disturbed with those of the Imagination. In pursuing this Method, I shall not only acquire a Readiness in the Exercise of the pure Understanding, but also advance extremely in the Knowledge of God, and of my self, of eternal Thought, and of created Thought.

V. THEY who please themselves so much in spoiling Man of his intellectual Faculty, and in rendering him as much corporeal as possibly they can, appeal to Experience for their Vindication. A Man, say they, brought up in a Wood by a Bear, or in the Desert by a Goat, of which there have been Instances, (b) would have no other Ideas than such as belong to those Animals. In what Stu-

In what respect the Understanding depends upon the Senses.

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(b) Dr. Conner, an English Physician, assures us, that he was at the Court of the King of Poland, when they brought thither a Man that was taken amongst a Company of Bears, who in Imitation of them, went upon all Fours, and made use of Arms instead of two Fore-Legs. He was perfectly as Savage as a Bear; and could by no Means bear being looking at, but would rise right up in a great Fright. By resting his Hands against a Wall, he was gradually tamed; and at last taught to speak. The same Author adds, that the Bears oftentimes carry off the Children of Labourers, which are laid under Cover of Trees, while their Parents are at Work; and it is their Opinion, that some Bear, whose young ones have been taken away, through the Uneasiness of her Milk, becomes a wet Nurse to the Child which she carries off.

Procopius relates, that during a certain War in Italy, all the Inhabitants of a particular Village having fled at the Approach of their Enemies, an Infant that was forgot and left behind was brought up by the Goats, which it learn'd to follow through the Woods, and amongst the Rocks,

pidity do they pass their Lives, who are born deaf, unless some extraordinary Education should be contrived to supply the Defect of those Instructions that are convey'd by the Ear? It is necessary then to instruct the Man, if you would have him know any Thing; and it is by his Eyes and Ears, that all Knowledge enters, and by Consequence there are no other Ideas than those of the Senses.

THIS Reasoning seems very well suited to such as make light of the Understanding, and are not willing to make any use of it. But they that set up to reform the Reason of almost all our Philosophers, and to persuade them out of their Prepossessions in favour of the Understanding, should, in my Opinion, reason a little more justly. If we have no other Knowledge but what enters by the Eyes and the Ears, whence comes it that we invent Things perfectly different from all that ever we have seen, and that we extend our Knowledge a great Way beyond what our Masters have taught us? The Objection might have some Force, if all our Knowledge consisted only in retaining the Memory of what we have seen and heard.

WE go a great Way farther than our Eyes and our Ears: And consequently we have in us a Power of drawing Ideas out of our own Bottom. That which we see and hear gives us Occasions to reflect, to exercise this Power, to perfect our selves, and enrich our selves out of our own Stock. Language it self would be useless without this Power: The Force of a Word pronounc'd, extends no farther than to produce the Sensation of a Sound; but it is the Soul which, upon occasion of this Sound, sets it self to work about forming Ideas. In truth, there are some Occasions where, at the same time that the Ear is affected with a Sound, we have the Object presented before the Eye, whose Idea this Sound would in the end recall to our Mind: But there are innumerable Occasions, where, without any Assistance of this Nature, by the Strength of an Attention more or less diligent, we can make our selves Masters of the Ideas of the Man who converses with us, and can think in the same Manner as he does. The greatest Part of our Discourses are Kinds of *Problems*, which the Mind busies it self in resolving. Some of them it resolves at first Sight; and these are to it very *clear* and *simple* Discourses: Others of them are much more difficult, and not to be found out without a great deal of Enquiry and Search; sometimes the Obscurity of the Expressions is the Cause of this; sometimes the Complication of the Subjects, or the want of Exercise on
Subjects

Subjects of a certain Kind. It is certain a Man may be all his Life-time shut up within himself, and may actually possess Faculties without ever exercising, or even knowing them. The Soul of the young Maid, mention'd by Mr. *Boyle*, who was born with two Cataracts, which were couch'd when she came to 18 Years of Age, pass'd all that Time, and, without this couragious Operation, would have pass'd the rest of its Days in an entire Ignorance of the Faculty of Seeing, which it certainly was possess'd of at the same time.

IN the same Manner a Man born deaf, and by that means, for want of Instruction, abandon'd to such a Degree of Stupidity, as to be wholly given up to the Influence of the most gross Sensations, might very well pass his whole Life without making any use of the *Faculty of chusing freely*, being perpetually determin'd by the Impressions of external Objects, by which Impressions he passively and entirely gives himself up; but yet it does not at all follow, that in this Condition his Soul is destitute of the Faculty of chusing for and determining it self, altho' it makes no use of it: For if by some lucky Accident this Man should recover his Hearing, as there happen'd an Instance at *Chartres*, mention'd in the *History of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris* for the Year 1703, the Soul of this Man would receive no new Faculties, only new Occasions would be presented to it to exercise those it had before.

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THE Occasions which are presented are external; but the Acts and the Ideas, which the Mind forms in consequence of these Occasions, are not furnish'd by them, but are derived by it self out of its own Stock. It could produce them in it self, without these Occasions, tho' perhaps without these Occasions it would never once think of doing so.

FOR Example: Perhaps a Man might never form a Resolution of applying himself to meditate upon the Nature of *Liberty*, if it were not for the controverted Disputes of Divines upon this Subject; yet is he so far from receiving all his Lights from these Controversies, that, on the contrary, he takes care to forget every thing his Ears have been stunn'd withal upon this Point, and refers himself to his inward Helps, and descends into himself to observe attentively what passes there, when he chuses for and determines himself: He derives then his Knowledge from his own Bottom, and could have derived it without this Occasion, tho' perhaps without it he would have neglected so to do.

WE may learn from hence, that it is possible for a Soul to be united to a Body, whose Organs may be so far disorder'd, as to put a continual Obstacle to the Faculty it has to reflect; a Faculty which is essential to it, tho' the Use of it be not so. When a Man, for Example, is weigh'd down by Sleep, or by some Excess in Eating and Drinking, the present Condition of his Body is averse to Meditation; but after some Hours Repose, he then finds himself in a Condition to meditate, not from the Objects which affect him, but from a Fund which he contains within, and whose Light is no longer clouded. It may very easily be supposed, that such a Soul as, by the Laws of Union with an unhappy Body, is become subject to a stupid Ignorance, would soon have been clear'd up, if in the Beginning of its Existence it had begun to exist separately without such Union.

VI. WHETHER I make use of my *Eyes*, or deliver my self up to my Imagination, it is always my Mind, that is to say, *my self* thinking, and *my self thought of*, or, if you please, that which is in me the *Principle of Thought*, is the same Principle which perceives inwardly, and also sees, and imagines. By consequence, the Imperfections of the Mind must needs affect the Senses, and the Imagination; but because, with respect to these two last, their manner of thinking has a greater Dependance on the Body, the Defect of the Body ought to have a greater Influence over the Imagination and Senses. The *pure Understanding*, which certainly depends not on the Body, or depends on it much less, will then be more just in its Operations, than the the Imagination and the Senses in theirs. If it departs from its Ideas, the Body has nothing to answer for, or contributes not near so much to it, as it does to the Errors of the Senses, and those of the Imagination.

VII. WE ought then to regulate and correct those that are least perfect, and most exposed to the Impressions of a greater Number of Causes of Error, by the most perfect; that is to say, we should regulate and correct the Ideas of the Senses, and of the Imagination, by those of the Understanding.

VIII. BESIDES, the Perceptions of the Understanding are all of the Number of those which we call *Ideas*, and which are given us on purpose to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and his Creatures: Whereas amongst the Perceptions

The Ideas of the Understanding depend not upon the Body.

And are on this account preferable to those of the Senses, and of the Imagination.

They are less mixed with Sensations.

tions of the Senses, and of the Imagination, there are a great many *Sensations*; and it is not by our Sensations that we ought to judge of external Objects, by representing them like to what we feel.

IX. MOREOVER, the Senses and the Imagination are a great deal more limited than the Understanding, and consequently are very much inferior to it. There are a great many Things which we neither know how to see, nor to imagine, and yet can understand them very well. For, besides what we have instanced in before, the Understanding, for Example, conceives very perfectly that there is no Part of Matter so small, but it has still some Extension, and is consequently divisible: It conceives farther, that the Portions and Parcels of this first Division may be again divided, since they are still Matter, and have some Extension; it comprehends, that the smallest Parts of all have their determinate Figure, as well as the largest. This being laid down, it conceives that one Grain of Seed may include in little an entire Plant, that is to say, in the full Proportion of its Parts. It follows from hence, that this little Plant has also its Seeds, which likewise contain their entire Plants; and these again their Seeds, and so on successively; and yet these Parts, how much soever they may be more and more diminished, cease not to be yet farther divisible to have their determinate Figures, or to preserve in these little Figures all the Proportions of the great ones. The Understanding perceives all these Things; it is convinced of their Possibility, and makes no Mystery at all of them. But these are Things which the Eyes can never discover, and to which the Imagination can never attain. The Ideas which we derive from our Senses, contradict themselves sometimes. When I move my Hand along a Stick which is half emerged in Water, my Feeling tells me it is strait; but if I look upon it with all the Attention I am able, my Eye makes me conceive it crooked. In this Contradiction the Understanding decides, because its Ideas never destroy themselves; what one teaches, is never contradicted by another: For when a Man perceives and retracts an Error, he does not correct one of the Ideas of his Understanding by another more just; but whereas he was deceived by pronouncing upon what he had not seen at all, or had but seen in part, he at last comes to the Truth by judging according to his Idea, and according to Knowledge.

*They extend
a great way
farther.*

IT is the Understanding then, which ought principally to be consulted, and in its Ideas above all to be followed; and it is from this Reason, that, as we have said before, they should give Rules to the Senses, and to the Imagination.

Errors of Men who do not follow them. X. INTO what Errors do Men fall, purely by taking the contrary Course to that which has now been laid down, and by giving the Preference to the Ideas of their Senses, and of their Imaginations, above those of the Understanding! Science, Wisdom, Disinterestedness, Equity, Virtue, and, in a word, true Glory, which consists in doing Justice to true Merit, with these People are made to yield to Pleasure, Pride, and Pageantry, and to a crowd of Flatterers; all these are apt to engage the Senses, and the Imagination, which are not at all affected by Objects of the first Kind, or but very little.

WHAT a Difference is there to a Man who is almost ignorant of his having an Understanding, so far has he always been from making any Use of, or Reflection upon it, between conceiving himself attentive to some Ideas, which clear up the Duties of Man, and their Excellencies; and between imagining himself Master of a stately Palace, or General of an Army, which carries into all Places Terror or Desolation? It is yet however true, that in these last Circumstances, how shining soever they appear, the Man only appears happy; whereas in the former he actually is so.

PYRRHUS, when he was thinking to make War against the *Romans*, and from their Defeat to proceed to that of other Nations, and from Victory to Victory, to make himself a Way to return into his Country, and to enjoy there in Peace the rest of his Days, in this Project deliver'd himself up to Phantoms of a dazzled Imagination; but the Courtisan, who advis'd him to enjoy from the present Moment a Repose which was in his Possession, and not to quit a Tranquility with which the King himself confess'd it was reasonable he should be contented, he consulted Reason, and followed the Ideas of the Understanding. And in general, when a Prince, obey'd by his Subjects, esteem'd by some of his Neighbours, and fear'd by others, who wants nothing to make his own Life easy and agreeable, and his Subjects happy, pours out that Blood which ought to be dear to him, and exposes himself to several Dangers in the pursuit of what is called Glory, that is to say, to fill the *Gazettes*, and to find

find Employment for Poets and Orators; does he take for his Rule the pure Ideas of the Understanding, or suffer himself to be led by confus'd Impressions of the Imagination?

THE *Entbusiasts*, who dishonour Religion with their Extravagancies, and give occasion to *Libertines*, who do not care for the Trouble of examining Things nearly, to confound the true Revelations with Visions, would avoid the Errors into which they fall, if instead of abandoning themselves to confus'd Imaginations, they would give themselves up only to the clear Ideas of the Understanding. Again, by consulting those, we should avoid *Superstition*, and prevent loading Religion with a thousand Externals, which take up the Minds of Men too much, especially the Vulgar, and make them forget the Essentials of Religion.

WE should live happy, indeed, if we could prevail on our selves to be determin'd always by the Ideas only of the Understanding. All our Slips, and all our Mischiefs come only from our limiting our Attention to the Impressions that are made upon the Senses, and upon the Imagination. It is agreed, for Example, that we ought to do a Thing; but the Question is, whether we should apply our selves incessantly to the doing it. The Idea of Labour remitted, always pleases the Senses and the Imagination; but the Understanding decides, that the more Pains we take, the better: When any one has spoken ill of you, if you follow the Bent of your Imagination, gall'd with an offensive Discourse, you will find your self ready to reply upon the Spot, and with Warmth; but if you consult the Lights of your Understanding, they will convince you that it is more for your Interest to establish your Right quietly. Ought we to prefer the Pleasure of good Cheer to the Preservation of the Health? Upon this Question the Senses will seduce us, but the Understanding will shew us the best Side. We ought then to accustom our selves always to consult it; this will be the Means never to abandon the Solid, or be dazzled with Appearances.

NOTHING but the Ideas of the Understanding give a true Firmness: He that abandons himself to those of the Senses, and of the Imagination, is the Sport of Passions and of Times: By forming his Designs upon Appearances which deceive him, he passes from Error to Error; presently he is disgusted at that which but now gain'd his Admiration, and soon after he returns to that which just before disgusted him: He approves
and

and condemns by Turns, and hardly knows himself what it is he would have. (c)

It is of great Importance to attend to the Limits of the Understanding.

XI. IT is not that the Understanding has not its Imperfections; it is even dangerous not to attend to them, above all to forget its *Bounds*, and suppose it to have a greater *Extent* than it really has. There are some People ridiculous enough to look upon themselves as the Measure and Rule of all Things. Whatsoever is above their Ideas, passes with them for an Impossibility and a Chimera. It is upon this blind Vanity, as well as upon the Corruption of their Heart, that the *Atheism* and Irreligion of our pretended great Wits are founded. Those that are short-sighted themselves, are apt to look upon others as Deceivers, who pretend to see Objects at a much greater Distance, for the same Reason as Men of mean Understandings are used to esteem such Enthusiasts, as pretend and really have a much stronger Knowledge and Penetration. To cure or prevent this dangerous Conceitedness, it is altogether of Importance to reflect seriously upon a great many Things which cannot be denied, and yet do lead to such Consequences and Difficulties as cannot entirely be clear'd up. There is, for Example, over my Head an Extension; and yet to this Extension, whether it be throughout corporeal, as some pretend, or beyond certain Limits only a perfect void Space, it is impossible for me to assign any Bounds. Wheresoever I terminate it, whatsoever Bounds I endeavour to assign it, I find my self forced to conceive beyond these Bounds a Space which encloses and encompasses them. From my Head upwards is an infinite Extension, and from my Feet upwards there is also an infinite Extension; and yet of these two Infinites the second is greater than the first. I find the same Inequality downwards, and to the Right, and to the Left, and on all Sides; all Infinites, and yet some greater than others. Who can extricate himself out of this Difficulty? And yet the Principle is incontestable, that there is such an Extension below and above me, and surrounding me on all Sides. Let us then fairly confess, that our Understanding cannot comprehend the

(c) Non potest cuiquam semper idem placere, nisi rectum. Quid est sapientia? Semper idem velle atque idem nolle. Nemo proponit sibi quid velit, nec si proposuit, perseverat in eo, sed transilit: Nec tantum mutat, sed redit, & in ea, quæ deseruit ac damnavit revolvitur. Sen. Epist. 20.

the Whole; and yet it would be extravagant to deny it, because we do not perfectly understand it. I am certain that I think and exist; but it is impossible for me to comprehend that I have always existed, and always thought; nor can I conceive any better, that I should come my self out of nothing; nor, lastly, am I able to represent to my self in what manner a superior Power should give me an Existence which I had not before. It is necessary that one of these three Cases should be true. I can demonstrate the two first to be false, and the last to be true. But in proving that a superior Power has created me, I do not comprehend any better the manner of my Creation. There are a great Number of Questions of this Nature, whose Foundations are incontestable: Such may be propos'd upon the Divisibility of Matter, upon Motion, upon Time; which all border upon Infinity, and raise such a Perplexity in our Understandings, that they are lost in it. It is good to reflect upon these, and pursue them, in order to learn to be modest, and to confess that we cannot comprehend all Things, nor must upon that account reject all Things. I am sensible that I can move my Arm whenever I will; but in what manner I perform this Motion, I am entirely ignorant: Must I for this Reason call in question a Fact which is so familiar to me? And because I cannot comprehend it sufficiently, must I imagine my self to have no Will or Action at all?

HE must have reflected very little upon the Bounds of his Understanding, who can believe it right to reject every thing which he cannot perfectly comprehend, altho' otherwise establish'd upon very good Grounds. There are in Religion Things which pass our Understanding; and so do also Questions that may be propos'd concerning the Divisibility of Matter: But do not they, who take occasion from some Difficulties to reject Religion and the Idea of God, substitute Suppositions more obscure in their Place?

I HAVE as strict a Demonstration of the Existence of God, as I have of the Existence of a Circle; nor is this last without its Difficulties: It is form'd by the Motion of a Ray about one of its Extremities; but how can a Line move about a Point? And must I, for this Difficulty, doubt whether there can be such a Thing as a Circle? It is equally unjust to call in question the Arguments which establish the Existence of God, because I have not so great an Extent of Knowledge as to resolve all Questions that may be propos'd concerning his Nature.

*See my Geom.
Book iv.
Sect. of Tangents.*

Means of extending our Knowledge.

XII. THERE are Things then which, according to Appearances, will in this Life, and perhaps always, be above our Understanding; but there are others which for a time do puzzle us, and afterwards become very clear to us. When we become Men, for Example, we comprehend very clearly those Things which were a Mystery to us whilst Infants; and a Man of Letters distinguishes in a Moment what an Idiot has not the least Notion of. In a word, it is beyond doubt, that some have a much greater Extent of Understanding than others, and that our Capacities may increase and grow stronger. It is of great Importance to know the Means of it; and upon this Point I am about to make some Reflections. One Sign of a more extended Understanding, is, when it can think of a greater Number of Subjects at one time, and when it passes more readily from one Thought to another, for the same Reason that an Arm is stronger that acts with greater Readiness, and sustains a greater Weight or Quantity of Matter at once. And I am of Opinion, that the Strength of the Mind, like that of the Body, is improv'd by Exercise; but it must be an Exercise that is moderate, and regulated, and whose Efforts advance by very insensible Degrees. A Mind that always remains in a State of Inactivity will always continue little; and one that shall undertake at once too great a Number of Things, and at first aspire to the most difficult, will but disorder and confound it self, and so far from redoubling its natural Forces, will only weaken them, and run the Hazard of losing them entirely. It is necessary then to proceed in order, that is to say, to begin first with the most easy, and from the most simple Subjects; not to pass immediately to the most difficult, but to advance by Degrees to those that are but very little compounded, and from these to rise to others that are a little more difficult to manage, and so on successively. We must never quit one Subject, without having first distinctly comprehended it, and made our selves Masters of it; we must revise, at one View, first two Things which we have clearly understood; then three; after that four, &c. By Means of these Precautions, we shall come to take in a great Number of Things, with the same Ease and Clearness as we did at first two or three of the most easy. Experience demonstrates, that by collecting by little and little, and in a proper Order, several Ideas, and by making such Collections familiar, by repeating them often, and with great Attention, we come at last to comprehend, at one View,

that

that which at first we could only perceive Part after Part. He that studies the Mathematicks with this Precaution, and aims not at the difficult Parts before he has made himself Master of those that are least so, will at last conquer the most complicated Demonstrations, with as little Trouble as he did at first the most simple ones. He that was puzzled at first with the simple Rule of *Addition*, by a continued Exercise will at last, without any Difficulty, go thro' Calculations of great Extent: He who was forced to exert his whole Strength, in order to comprehend a Demonstration of two or three Lines, will at last play with one that fills a whole Sheet.

THE general Formules in Algebra, or the universal Propositions of Geometry, Mechanicks, and Physicks, express'd in Algebraic Characters, will extremely contribute to augment the Extent of our Minds, provided we do but take care to form to our selves such Ideas of them as are perfectly clear, and to make them very familiar to us: To descend from their Universality to the particular Cases which they include; and to return again from these particular Cases to the Universality which includes them, together with an infinite Number of others. There is nothing of this kind, that I know of, which comes up to what Mr. *Varignon* has publish'd. If any one would see an Example of his, easy to be understood, he need only read the Article of the Motion of Fluids in the *Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences* for the Year 1703. Pag. 285,
&c. of the
Amst. Ed.

WE must take care to distinguish from the true Extent of Mind, which is always accompanied with Justness, a Fruitfulness that is without Taste, and without Distinction. One who, by frequenting the Bar, is accustomed to hear the Arguments *pro* and *con* upon the same Subject, and to see different Turns, more dazzling than just, given to one and the same Thought, will by this Means learn to cavil and contradict; his Understanding will become fruitful in trifling Niceties and Shifts, and become so far extended, as to raise immediately a great many plausible Arguments upon any Subject that offers: But these plausible Arguments will form, as it were, a Cloud, and entirely hide the Face of Truth. A Mind accusom'd to be amus'd with Appearances, knows not how to apply to any thing that is solid or certain. The Study of the Mathematicks, when pursued in its proper Order, at the same time that it convinces the Understanding by the Clearness of its Demonstrations, does also the most

of any thing contribute to give it the greatest Extent imaginable. By this we learn to see at once the Consequences in their Principles; and the more we draw of them, the more we see still rising, which we can very readily demonstrate, and range in order: But we must not give up all our Time to this Study. When we abandon our selves entirely to it, we lose the Relish of all other Things, and become incapable of managing or well understanding them, and perfectly depriv'd of all Benefit arising from the Conversation of the World.

VARIETY of Studies and Applications contribute extremely to enlarge the Understanding. Next to Inactivity and Idleness, nothing cramps it more than an Application to one only Science, and a Confinement to a narrow Conversation. By fixing the Eye only upon a small Circle, we become at last unable to see any thing farther. It is much the same with our *Thoughts*, as with our *Words*: A Man, who is grown old without ever knowing any other Language than that of his native Country, knows not how to learn any other, because it is too late. It is the same with a Man who gives himself up entirely to one Science, and converses only with a small Number of Men of the same Humour with himself: If ever he should meet with some others, who should entertain him with Subjects quite different from those which he confined himself to, and talk to him in a Way quite different from his former narrow Conversations, he would be apt to think himself amongst Intelligences of a different Rank, and could by no means enter into their Ideas; you would say he had nothing in common with them.

BUT we must make a great Difference betwixt varying our Applications, and permitting them to haste from Object to Object, for no other Purpose than just to glance on them: A Narrowness of Genius loves superficial Conceptions, and superficial Conceptions entertain in their Turn a narrow Genius in what Bounds they please. The People of Fashion, who live in a perpetual Wandering, for want of Reflection, contract a Levity, which certainly does not at all enlarge the Understanding: But those who pass thro' different States, who negotiate different Affairs, who are oblig'd to accommodate themselves to different Characters, and sometimes to Characters directly opposite, to avoid divers Inconveniencies, to foresee and prevent divers Obstacles, and to play a great many After-games, do as much enlarge their Capacities as their Complaisance.

OUR School-Masters, who have the Charge of the Education of Youth, are so far from enlarging the Genius of their Scholars, as they ought to do, that they commonly contribute to cramp them by the Authority which they assume over them. A School-Boy, who dares neither speak, nor even think, nor so much as dress himself, nor wear his Hair, nor almost sneeze, otherwise than just as his Master does, for fear of being reprimanded upon making the least Elopement, by little and little accustoms himself not to think at all. The Memory is the only Faculty he makes use of; and this he gives up into his Master's Hand, and must pursue no farther than as he pleases to direct.

NOTHING is a greater Obstacle to the Enlargement of our Understanding, than the conceited Opinion we are apt to have of it; we do not put our selves to the Trouble of acquiring what we already imagine we have no need of: But nothing is more vain than this Prepossession; our Understanding may be always improv'd, and not only acquire every Day new Knowledge, but also new Capacities. Studies that are well manag'd, do not only enrich our Minds with new Acquirements, but do also enlarge and strengthen them. This is one of the Wonders of our Nature, which great Genius's are much the most sensible of. Those of a narrow Genius seeing nothing beyond themselves, remain in Poverty and Inaction, ridiculously contented with their imaginary Abilities; while those of real Abilities, the farther they advance, still find they may and must go a great Way farther; and bending all their Thoughts upon the Way that lies before them, they have no Notion of being proud of having got so far.

XIII. IN Matters of Simple Theory, where we have all the Leisure we please, Time and Application may supply the Place of an enlarg'd Understanding; but in Affairs of Practice, which must be undertaken and executed presently, as all false Steps are of Consequence, and Mistakes cost dear, and even sometimes are not to be repair'd, and lastly, where Time often presses, and Opportunities are lost, it is of the last Importance to have an extended Genius, to discover, at first Sight, all the Ways we have to take, and all the Inconveniences we have to avoid, and which, by weighing exactly, and combining the Strength, Readiness, Expedition, and Certainty of the Means, always determines upon the best Method. We fall short of this Method, either by the Barrenness of the Understanding, which dis-

*It is above all
necessary in
Practice.*

covers too few of the Circumstances requir'd, and forgets entirely what it wants to find; or for want of a Capacity to chuse when it even presents it self, which almost always happens, when by a Narrowness of Genius we are overwhelm'd with a Multitude of Views. We ought then in the Histories we read, and in the Events our selves are Witnesses to, or which we hear of from others, to accustom our selves to consider the Collection of Causes which contribute to produce a certain Effect; we should reflect upon such Designs as have miscarried; and upon the Circumstances which occasion'd such Miscarriages, we should ask our selves what we would have done in the like Case, and compare our own Views with those of others; we should search into the Heart of Man, and learn all the Springs that put it in Motion; we should practise the World, and perpetually join Experience with Reflections, and Reflections with Experience. There are several who abandon themselves to their Ideas, without considering of Events: These will never bring forth any thing but Chimeras, and Projects that can never succeed. There are others, who can only imitate what they have seen; a Case never so little out of the way entirely destroys all their Measures.

XIV. THE Narrowness of our Understandings are follow'd with an infinite Number of Mischiefs: Men ruin themselves, damn themselves, and even in this Life draw upon themselves, by their Vices, innumerable Misfortunes; because being entirely taken up with the present, they have no time to think of what is to come; their short Sights reach not so far, and they consider no more the Consequences of what they do, than if they were absolutely sure they had nothing to fear.

A GENTLEMAN ruins his Tenants; neglects no Occasions of serewing and squeezeing all he can out of them, and makes them pay dearly for whatever Favours he does them: If he sees they have any thing he likes, he must have it: This Game pleases him, he applauds himself; but is all this time running on to his own Ruin, and his over-impatient Avarice will make his Children miserable. His Tenants will be impoverish'd; they will lose the Spirit to work, when they find they must not have the Advantage of their Labour; their Idleness will ruin them by Degrees, and their Misery at last entirely incapacitate them; and their Lord will not only be ill paid, but also ill served: He will be robb'd, his Villages depopulated, his Rents will fall with the Crops of his

his Lands, ill cultivated; he will lose the Benefit of his Fines when no body shall be in a Condition to purchase, and his Posterity, at least, will feel the Effects of his too short and too narrow Views. (d)

NOTHING

(d) *The Archbishop of Cambray, in more than one Place, gives us a Draught of a Sovereign, whose Understanding has its proper Extent. In the 3d Book of Telemachus (pag. 54. of the first Paris Edit. conformable to the Original Manuscript, 1717.) he makes a Citizen of that great City, which appear'd the common Receptacle of all Nations, to speak after the following Manner: " Give a welcome and easy Reception to*
 " all Strangers; let them within your Gates find Security, Conve-
 " niency, and perfect Liberty; suffer not your selves to be made
 " Slaves to Avarice or Pride. The true Way to gain a great deal, is
 " never to be desirous of gaining too much, and to know how to lose
 " in a proper Place. Make your selves beloved by all Strangers; suffer
 " even something from them; raise not their Jealousy by your Haugh-
 " tiness. Adhere constantly to the Rules of Commerce, which should
 " be simple and easy; accustom your selves to follow them inviolably.
 " Punish severely the Fraud, and even the Negligence or the Pride of
 " your Merchants, who ruin Commerce by ruining those who are
 " engaged in it. Above all, attempt not to cramp Trading, in order
 " to bring it to serve some Ends of your own: It is not proper the
 " Prince should meddle with it, but should entirely leave the Profit
 " of it to his Subjects, who have the Trouble of it; otherwise he
 " will discourage them: He will reap sufficient Advantages by the
 " Wealth it will bring into his Dominions. Commerce is like cer-
 " tain Springs; if you offer to divert their Course, you dry them up.
 " There is nothing but Profit and Conveniency that brings Strangers
 " amongst you: If you make Commerce less commodious and benefi-
 " cial to them, they withdraw insensibly, and return no more, be-
 " cause other People, taking the Advantage of your
 " Imprudence, are glad to receive them, and invite *Book xii. p. 262.*
 " them from you. Princes that are covetous, and
 " have no Foresight, think only of laying Taxes upon such of
 " their Subjects as are most vigilant and industrious in improving
 " their Talents, because they expect these will be most likely and
 " ready to pay them, and at the same time favour such as by Idleness
 " are reduc'd to a meaner Condition. Reverse this unjust Order,
 " which over-whelms the Good, and recompences the Vicious, and
 " which introduces a Negligence equally fatal to the King himself,
 " as well as to all his Dominions: Impose Taxes, Fines, and, if there
 " be occasion, other rigorous Punishments, upon those that neglect
 " their Fields, as you would punish Soldiers who abandon their Post
 " in Time of War: On the contrary, bestow Favours and Exemp-
 " tions upon such Families as increase; augment in proportion the
 " Tillage of their Lands; presently their Families will multiply; all
 " People will be encourag'd to work; it will even become honourable.

NOTHING is of greater Importance to the Good of Society, than a great Extent of Knowledge in those that govern. Magistrates should look upon themselves as immortal, because their Offices never die; and therefore should profit by the Knowledge of the past, in order to provide wisely for the future, which they should have full as much at heart as the present, unless they chuse rather to make the following Declaration: " Since a happy Fortune has placed me in my present Station, I shall make my present Interests my only Rule, without troubling my self with a Thought of those who are to come after me: This is the Centre all my
" Actions

Page 264. " But when the People shall thus enjoy Peace
" and Plenty, Luxury will corrupt them, and they
" will turn against me those Forces which I have
" given them. Fear not at all, says *Mentor*, this Inconvenience:
" This is a Pretext always alledg'd to flatter prodigal Princes, who
" would oppress their Subjects with Taxes. The Remedy is easy:
" The Laws which we come to establish for Agriculture, will make
" their Lives laborious; and in their Plenty, they will have nothing
" more than necessary, because we shall retrench all Arts which furnish
" Superfluities. This Plenty will also be divided by the Frequency
" of Marriages, and by the great Multiplication of Families:
" Every Family being numerous, and having little Land, will be
" oblig'd to cultivate it without ceasing. It is Softness and Idleness
" that makes the People insolent and rebellious.

Page 266. " Remember, that in those Countries where the
" Prince reigns most absolute, he is least powerful:
" He seizes; he ruins all; himself alone possesses his
" whole Country: But the whole Country also languishes; the Fields
" are uncultivated, and almost desert; the Towns every Day depopulated,
" and Commerce destroy'd. The King, who cannot be a
" King alone, and is only so by means of his People, annihilates himself
" by little and little, by annihilating insensibly the People from
" whom he derives his Riches and Power: His Country is exhausted
" of its Wealth and People. This last Loss is the greatest and most
" irretrievable; his absolute Power makes as many Slaves as he has
" Subjects. They flatter, they seem to adore him, and to tremble at
" the very Look of him: But behold the least Revolution, this monstrous
" Power, carried to so violent an Extreme, cannot subsist; it has
" no Refuge in the Hearts of the People; it has wearied and tired out
" all the Body of the State; it forces every Member of it to sigh after
" a Change. At the first Stroke that is given it, the Idol is thrown
" down, and trampled under Foot. Contempt, Hatred, Fear, Revenge,
" Defiance, in a word, all the Passions unite against an Authority so odious.
" The King, who in his vain Prosperity did not find one Man
" courageous enough to tell him Truth, in his Misfortune will not find one
" to excuse him, or defend him against his Enemies.

“Actions shall point to”. He who has imbibed the Principles of *Epicurus*, and reasons in this Manner, thinks accordingly.

FOR want of an enlarg'd Understanding, by pitying the Guilty, we deprive the Innocent of that Protection which we owe them.

FOR want of an enlarg'd Understanding we perceive not, that in Controversies we are so far from concluding upon any thing, that we only start new Difficulties, by such Answers as a false Shame and Unwillingness to yield usually dictate. Besides, a narrow Mind oftentimes sees not that the Blow which is aimed at the Adversary, will fall back upon it self; and that the Arguments which are produced to support one Part of its System, will but serve in the end to overthrow the other Parts.

OUR good Intentions are all in vain, if by reason of Idleness, or for want of Exercise, or of a good Method, our Genius be too much contracted: For whatever Project is proposed, if our Self-love be but flatter'd in it, we readily give into it with all our Heart, and are charmed to see it succeed: We applaud our selves for having contributed to it; and perceive not that we are all the time taking Pains to sap the Liberties of our Country, and giving fatal Blows to it, which our Posterity, and perhaps our selves, shall in a little time feel.

IN vain we instruct our selves in the Foundations of Right; in vain we learn, for Example, that the good of the Society should be the Rule of our Conduct, if we do not love this Principle, and make it familiar to us; if we have not our Understanding enlarged enough to apply it upon all Occasions, we shall sacrifice the essential Interests of the Society we belong to to little particular Interests, and to mean Conveniences, which are the sole Aim of narrow Minds. The Reason of our trampling under Foot the Rules of our Duty, is because we are ignorant or forgetful of those of Reasoning; and for want of a perfect *Logic*, we are confined to an imperfect Morality.






C H A P. IV.

Of the Perception of the Senses.

*Three Things to
be distinguish'd
in our Sensa-
tions.*

I. HEN we say, *we see*, for instance, *a Tree*, or that *we feel the Heat of a Stove*, we confound three different Things in one, and include them all under one

Name: For, 1. The Organs of our Body are *affected* by some external Object, which makes its Impression upon them. 2. This corporeal Impression is usually follow'd by a *Perception*, I say, *usually*, and not at all *necessarily*, because sometimes this Effect is interrupted, and this usual Consequence does not follow at all: As, when People pass by us without our perceiving them, altho' our Eyes are open, and in good Order, and turn'd that Way; we do not perceive them, I say, nor have any Idea of them, because we are taken up with other Thoughts, and yet the Eye is acted upon by the Object presented before it in the same manner as it always is; for external Objects do not wait to make their Impressions just when we are in the Humour to receive them. All this proves, without Contradiction, that to perceive, and to receive upon the Organs of Sight a very clear and very lively Impression, are two different Things, and that we ought not to confound Perception, with the Affection of the Organ. (a)

AFTER

(a.) Cicero has made this Remark, and concludes from it, that it is the Mind which sees and hears, and not the Organs, which it is obliged to make use of to see and hear. Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quæ videmus. Neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed ut non solum Physici docent, verum, etiam Medici, qui ista aperta & patefacta viderunt, viæ quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad nares, ad aures à sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliquâ vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris oculis, & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: Ut faciliè intelligi possit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi sunt fenestræ animi: Quibus tamen nihil sentire queat mens, nisi id agat, & adsit. Quid quod eadem mente res
dissi-

AFTER the Impression upon the Organ, and the Perception which follows, we *judge*, 3. That there is without us an Object which answers to this Perception, which is the Cause of it, and resembles it. Tho' this third Act generally follows the others, and follows them also so readily, as to be confounded with them; for which Reason we are us'd to take them all Three for One, yet sometimes we are able to separate it. When at a Distance, and in a dusky Light, the Eye is affected, and the Impression immediately follow'd with the Idea of a Wolf, I can however prevent my judging this distant Object to be actually a Wolf, and really to resemble my Idea.

II. It is always certain that the Ideas which we have and perceive are real; but it is not always certain that they are just Representations of the Objects which excite them: Our Perception is always a true Perception; but the Judgment which follows is sometimes deceitful. It is always true, that the Idea of a Wolf is actually the Idea of a Wolf, and there is no Error but in the too hasty Application which I make of it to an Object which it does not belong to.

*Wherein consist
the Errors of our
Sensation.*

WE must not confound our Sensations, with the Memory which remains of them; for we often remember with Pleasure, a Pain we have formerly sustain'd, and are no longer expos'd to: Sometimes this Memory is only an Idea, which represents a past Sensation under a mix'd Notion of Pleasure and Pain; sometimes, indeed, this Idea has Power enough to make some Impression upon the Organs, and by this means to raise some feeble Sensation.

III. ALL the World agrees, that there are certain Objects which have nothing in them resembling the Sensation which they excite. It would be extravagant, for Example, to imagine that a Pin should contain in its self any Thing resembling the Pain which we feel when prick'd with it; no Body has ever dream'd of such a Thing. But we often times imagine in Objects I don't know what Resemblance to the Sensations which they raise

*Our Sensations
are not in us the
just Representations
of Objects.*

D 4

in

dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, dorem, sonum? quæ nunquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eam omnia referrentur, ut idem omnium iudex solus esset. Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. I.

Father Lamy has taken a great deal of Pains to set this same Reasoning in the clearest Light.

in us; and sometimes we have not the Patience to be convinced that we have been too hasty in supposing this Resemblance. If I put my Hand, for Example, when it is very cold into warm Water, I should say that I feel this Water to be warm; but if after this I should plunge into it my other Hand extremely heated, I should feel this very same Water to be very cold. It is however impossible that it should have any Resemblance to these two contrary Sensations at the same time; and consequently I say I feel, when I do moreover judge, and I confound in my Judgment the Appearance with the Reality. It is the same, when by means of a Prism I display upon white Paper all the Colours of the Rainbow: I say I see them, because I judge them to be there, instead of judging simply that they appear there. We should therefore be *cautious in judging of Objects by the Perception of the Senses*: And till we have Philosophy enough to distinguish perfectly what belongs to the Soul, from that which belongs to the Body, it is best to *suspend our Judgment concerning the Nature of these external Appearances*.

Our Sensations acquaint us with the Relations which external Bodies have to ours.

IV. BUT if our Hand, some will say, makes us perceive in Fire an Heat which it has not, and our Eyes in Objects Colours which they have not, our Creator has put us under a Necessity of being mistaken every Moment. Not at all. The Fire appears to have Heat, and the Objects appear to have Colours: This is true; and we are not mistaken when we judge that they appear there. But we then begin to be deceiv'd, when we judge this Heat, and these Colours, to be actually and really in the Objects which carry the Appearance of them; and this is what the Senses do not teach us. They give us no Instruction concerning their Reality; they inform us only with regard to their Appearance; it belongs to the Understanding to decide the rest.

BUT here we may be assured of one Truth: 1. That our Sensations give us to know the Relation which the Objects which occasion them have to our Body. The more distant Objects are, the less they appear to us, because they have less Influence on us: Those which cause useful Vibrations, or such as agree with the Well-being of our Fabrick, produce agreeable Sensations: Those which cause such as injure the solid Parts, or dissipate and exhaust the Spirits, produce Effects which are follow'd by painful Sensations. Thus robust Bodies love violent Exercises; and those whose Fibres are hardened with use, are pleas'd with such active and penetrating

ting Liquors, as are insupportable to those whose Organs are of a more delicate Texture. To this it may be objected, that we eat with Pleasure unwholesome Aliment, and have an Aversion to healthful Remedies. But I answer, 1. That our Sensations do not acquaint us with the Relation which a Body, applied to ours, will have in the Event to our Health, but singly the Effect which it produces immediately upon the Part to which it is applied. I answer, 2. That the Frame of our Body has been put out of Order by the Consequences of Sin, and our ill Habits. An useful Remedy acts disagreeably upon a Body disorder'd, and in effect we were not originally made for Remedies, whose first Impressions are even hurtful as well as disagreeable. Man was at first design'd to live in Happiness and Health; and since the Fall, our Luxury and our Mixtures have corrupted our Taste, which without this, as acutely and justly as that of other Animals, which have not been corrupted by the Commerce of Men, would have distinguish'd by its Sensations of Pleasure or Pain that which it should seek, from that which it should shun.

I OBSERVE, 3. That our Sensations being establish'd to warn us of the Disorders to which our Body is liable, the usual Motions, and such as are continual, ought not to excite any Sensations; otherwise the Mind would be continually taken up with a thousand Sensations, and would never have any Leisure to form Ideas, reflect, or meditate. Such Motions as cause no stronger Vibrations in the Parts of the Body, than those which are occasioned every Moment by the continual Circulation of the Blood and Spirits, ought not to excite in us any Sensations; for if some of these Motions may have in the long-run troublesome Consequences, they are however quickly spent without any present Effect. It is not then proper they should give us every Moment useless Alarms. We may add to this, that these light and insensible Motions are perform'd in such Parts as are beyond the reach of Remedies; and that, lastly, since the Fall Man being born to die, it was but merciful in our Creator to appoint that our slow Steps to an inevitable Death, should not be attended with painful and grievous Sensations.

V. 2. THE Perceptions of the Senses do moreover furnish us with certain Proofs of the Existence of Objects which encompass us. Sometimes, I confess, we think we see what we do not see, as it happens in Dreams, and in the Case of a Delirium; may not therefore our whole Lives be a continued Sensation of such like Illusions? This Difficulty taken

*They assure us
of the Existence
of Objects.*

ken in the Grofs may perhaps disturb a weak Mind, which is afleep almost whilst waking; but a finall Attention to what our Senfes make us perceive, will foon clear it up: What! can I continually dream that I have for my Parents fuch Perfons as never were in Being? After I had dream'd, in the Time of what I call waking, that any Body is dead; if it were only a Dream, why fhould I never in this time of waking dream that he is living again? If I only dream that I am going a Journey; why fhould my wandring Imagination continually bring forth new Roads, new Towns, new Hofts, new Houfes, and new Appartments? why fhould I never fancy my felf in the very fame Place again, from whence I but juft now fet out? Can I dream of Studying, and in this Illufion inftitute my felf in exact Order, and make actual Advances in all Parts of Learning? It is eafy to purfue this Argument; and the longer we dwell upon it, the more entirely will our firft Doubts vanifh, if it be poffible for us to have any fo extravagant: For I can fcarce be perfwaded that there ever was any Body fo mad as maintain it in good earneft. There are fome over-thwart and cavilling Wits, which take a Pleafure in perplexing thofe of meaner Abilities with fuch like Objections; perhaps alfo by frequent Contradiction, and oppofing themfelves againft Truth, they have loft the Relifh of it, and at laft embraced thofe Opinions in earneft, which they did at firft ftart only in jeft; as it happen fometimes with common Lyers, to deceive themfelves, and believe their own Lye at laft by often repeating it, which they invented only at firft to deceive others. We may act the Madman fo long, till at laft we actually become fo.

A MODERN Author has undertaken to overthrow Scepticifm, by denying the Exiftence of Bodies, and admitting only that of Spirits. If he has any Design of impofing by this upon the reft of Mankind, and hopes to fucceed in it, he has a very bad Opinion of them; and if he thinks as he fpeaks, he does not give us any great Idea of his own good Senfe, and muft neceffarily fuppose other Mens Brains to be as much difordered as his own really are. If we believe him, we are all pure Spirits, and do but deceive our felves when we think we communicate our Thoughts by the Intercourfe of our Bodies, for we have no Bodies. This very Author has not really printed a Book; but has only had an Idea of one; and it is this Idea which we read: The Book-feller, of whom we imagine we buy this Book, exifts only in Idea, no more than the Money which we give for it. The

Treaties of Peace, the Wars which are concluded, the Fire, the Ramparts, the Arms, the Wounds, the Whigs, the Tories, have nothing of Reality besides their Idea; and all the Pains we take to make a Progress in the Knowledge of Metals, Plants, and of the human Body, advance us only in the *Ideal World*. There are neither Fibres, nor Juices, nor Fermentation, nor Seeds, nor Knives to dissect, nor Microscopes to view them; but by means of the Idea of a Microscope, there arise in me Ideas of the wonderful Texture of the little Ideal Parts.

VI. IF we do but attend to the Structure of the Organs of our Senses, the Wisdom and Goodness of the Author of them, will be sufficiently obvious: This Author, whose Wisdom and Goodness are inexpressible, and who creates nothing without Design, has visibly proposed to put us by means of our Senses in Possession of corporeal Objects, and in a Condition to enjoy and benefit by their Commerce. But this Commerce would be a perpetual Error, if by our Senses we could not certainly distinguish one Body from another. Indeed their Penetration does not extend so far as to discover to us the Nature, inward Constitution, and first Principles of them; but the Necessities of Life require that we should be able certainly, and without the Danger of being deceiv'd, to distinguish Objects, and to know that what we touch is, for Example, as it appears, an Horse, a Tree, a Man, a Stone, Bread, &c.

A MAN believes himself to have the same Wife to Day which he had yesterday; believes himself to dine with the same Children who supped with him the Night before; believes himself to confer with the same Magistrates with whom he was assembled some few Days before: Will any one say that this may be true, but that it is not certain? that the Information of the Senses is at best but founded on Probabilities? that it is possible all this may consist but in Appearances? and that these Appearances may be deceitful? What Pleasure could there be in a Life always floating in Uncertainties? would it be a Present worth receiving? There are some Men who have so weakened their Understandings by constant abstracted Speculations, and, if I may so say, have so beat their Brains about Metaphysical Possibilities, that to be assured of the Existence of Bodies upon the same Foot on which the Gross of Mankind are convinced of it, they are forced to call in Faith to their Assistance. If they who talk thus, mean honestly, as nothing obliges me to think the contrary,

trary, they certainly have not sufficiently considered what they say, but are plainly fallen into a Contradiction, unless by *Faith* they understand *Inspiration*, or an inward Revelation, and a secret and all-powerful Action, by which God engraves in their Souls an irresistible Perswasion of whatever he pleases: But if by Faith, according to the usual Sense of the Word, be understood a Perswasion of the Truth and Divinity of that Book which we call the *Old and New Testament*, it is evident this Perswasion is altogether founded upon the Testimony of the Senses. We must be assured that it is really a Book, and not an Appearance only or Phantom of a Book; that this Book is composed of such and such Characters; that these Characters form such and such Words; and that these Words have such and such a Signification. Further, this very Book would be found full of Sophisms, if the Report of the Senses were not a Foundation of Certainty: The Authors of it do every Moment appeal to the Testimony of the Senses; they confirm their Relations; they establish the Proof of the Divinity of their Mission up-

on *what the Eyes have seen, upon what the Ears have heard, and upon what the Hands have felt.* *

* 1 John ii. 1. It is from these Principles, supposed by them to be incontestable, that they draw their Proofs to bring Men to their Faith; whereas our pretended Philosophers have occasion for the Assistance of Faith to support the Testimony of the Senses.

VII. WE are deceived sometimes, it is true, in judging of Things by the Report of our Senses, and we mistake one Object for another: But it is when we judge rashly upon the first Appearances, and without using sufficient Precautions. But if after using all possible Precautions, we should yet be deceiv'd, we should be plunged in perpetual Uncertainty, without any Possibility of extricating our selves. These Precautions consist *in consulting more Senses than one; in dwelling upon an Object; in considering it oftentimes over, at different Times, and in different Situations; and in enquiring how it appears to others.* (b) If after all this we should still be deceiv'd, we have no Principle of Certainty left, and all our Conduct turns always but at best upon Probabilities; and even Religion it self, which is establish-
ed

(b) Et lumen mutari sæper volumus, & situs earum rerum quas intuemur, & intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, usque eò ut aspectus ipse fidem faciat sui judicii. *Cicero.*

ed upon Miracles, of which the Senses are the Witnesses, will be found to stand upon an uncertain Foundation.

THE Schools give three Rules, by which we may be certain of the Testimony of the Senses. The *Organs*, say they, ought to be *in perfect Order*; the *Medium* should be *rightly dispos'd*; and the *Object* in a *convenient Position*. I agree the Senses do not impose upon us when these three Conditions are fulfill'd; but as it is difficult to be assured of this, these Rules are insufficient. Our *Organs* are alter'd without our perceiving it; the Variations which happen in the *Medium*, how imperceptible soever in themselves, do not fail to produce very sensible Effects; and lastly, we are easily mistaken in our Judgments of the Situation and Distance of *Objects*: But, if we attend to the Rules which we before laid down, all this will be clear'd up to us. The *Medium* cannot be suspected when an Object appears the same, tho' *examin'd at different Times*; neither the Distance nor Situation can deceive us, when by *varying* them, we find no Difference in the Effect; and it is impossible that the Organs of all the Senses in one and the same Man, and much less in a great Number of Men, should be all equally disorder'd, there being never any such Uniformity in Disorder.

VII. IF our Eyes had such a Penetration as *Means of assist-* nothing could escape, we should have no- *ing the Senses.* thing to do but to direct them to an Object, and presently we should make a perfect Discovery of it, and of all it contains; not one of its Principles would escape us: And to become a complete Philosopher, we should have nothing to do but to fix our Eyes upon the Universe, and register in good Order all that we there observe. We supply the Weakness of the Senses by Instruments; Art comes into their Assistance, and separates that which they could not distinguish or perceive, but very confusedly. Thus with *Semicircles* we measure Angles with great Exactness; and with *Clocks* and *Quadrants* we divide the Time and the Course of the Sun into as many Parts as we please, with much Preciseness. Thus, by the Assistance of *Microscopes*, small Objects cease to be imperceptible; and the most distant seem to approach the Eye, when arm'd with a *Telescope*.

It must be agreed, that the Imagination does sometimes assist the Eyes, and we believe we see, what we only imagine. When two Men, one of whom we are well acquainted with, the other a perfect Stranger, present themselves, each at the Distance of an hundred Yards, we shall distinguish the Lines of the first as tho' he were but four
Yards

Yards off. This particular Clearness must be imputed to the Imagination, for the Sight perceives them both with equal Distinction. I conclude from hence, that in the Use of Microscopes, we ought to be extremely cautious, lest the Imagination should supply something in the Objects beyond what we see there.

Our Conjectures commence where our Senses cease.

IX. When the Effects only are found within the Reach of the Senses, and all the Causes escape them, then we have Recourse to *Conjectures*: We suppose some imperceptible Principles, but capable nevertheless of producing the Effects which fall under our Observation: And to be sure of the Justness of our *Conjectures*, we draw Consequences from them, which we take Pains to confirm by Experiments; those which Experience contradicts we reject; those which it verifies we adhere to.

When Reason fails us, we have Recourse to Experience, which is a Method much more feeble and inferior, says Montague. It is quite the contrary when we cannot find out any thing by Experience, then we have Recourse to *Conjectures*.

If this Method had been always follow'd, it would have prevented the ridiculous Disputes concerning the Causes of Facts, which Facts themselves are but supposed. Experiments require Pains and Time, and sometimes Expence: *Conjectures* cost nothing to a forward Imagination. Experiments are seldom sufficiently examin'd; we suppose them right, and hasten from them to our *Conjectures*. Mont. B. III. Ch. II. *When Facts are proposed, Men amuse themselves more readily to enquire out the Causes of them, than to question the Truth of them. They are satisfied at first setting out with Suppositions; but examine the Consequences with great Curiosity: They leave the Things, and run after the Causes. ---- How comes all this to be so? But must we say it is so? Our Discourse is capable of furnishing out an hundred other Worlds, and of finding out their Principle and Contexture: There neither wants Materials nor Foundation. Let it but alone, and it will build upon a void Space as well as upon a plain, upon a Vacuum as well as upon Matter.*

Dare Pondus idonea Fumo. . . . *Perf. Sat. V.*

I find almost every where, that one ought to say, there is nothing at all of it. And I should very often make use of this Reply, but I dare not; for they cry it is a Demonstration of Ignorance,

norance, and of a weak Understanding. And so I am forced to juggle for Company, and treat of idle Tales and fabulous Subjects, which I believe nothing of. Besides, that it is indeed a little rude and affronting to deny point-blank a Proposition of Fact; and few People fail in Matters not easy of Belief, to affirm that they themselves have seen them; or to vouch the Testimony of such, whose Authority will admit of no Contradiction. According to this Method, we know the Foundations and the Means of a thousand Things which never had Being: And the World is engaged in Arguments pro and con, where both Sides are false. *ITA est; finitima sunt falsa veris, ut in præcipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere.* Cic. Acad. Quæst. 4.

IN order to procure from Experiments all the Assistance they are able to afford, 1. We ought to make them without being first determin'd to any Hypothesis; or at least, we ought to be always ready to abandon an Hypothesis, or correct it by Experiments. 2. We ought to repeat them; for it is very easy to attribute an Effect to Causes, which it does not at all depend on, for want of being attentive enough to all the Circumstances, which it is hardly possible to be at the first Tryal. 3. We ought to make them at different Times, and in different Places, to discover how much external Circumstances may contribute towards producing the Effect, whose Cause we are enquiring after. 4. We ought to vary the Materials upon which we make them, that we may observe how much Assistance the Cause may receive from the Subjects upon which it operates. And to measure more justly the Extent of Causes, we should vary the Quantities, both of what they act with, and what they act upon. (c)

THE

(c) *Hist. of the Royal Acad. of Sciences, 1704.* "It is certain that an infinite Number of Things would not remain obscure, but for Want of a sufficient Number of Facts, which might present them before us in several different Views, or which might teach us all their essential Circumstances. *Page 17. Edit. Amst.*

"By substituting in the room of the acid Salt of Sulphur Oil of Vitriol; and in the room of the greasy and inflamable Part of the Sulphur Oil of Turpentine, we succeed in making a true Sulphur. *Page 47.*

"A Pendulum of three Feet eight Inches and a half vibrates seconds at Paris, Uranisburgh, and Bayonne. In the Isle of Gorée,

"in

THE Air produces very powerful Effects: *Examples.*
 We cannot see the Figure of its Parts; but we conjecture that they are elastic, and wound up round about themselves, like so many small Springs; that they unfold and extend themselves as soon as they have their Liberty. From this Supposition we conclude the Air capable of sustaining a great Weight; and to see if Experience will prove it to have this Force, we take some Tubes open only at one Extremity, and fill one of them with some Liquor; then stopping this open Extremity with one Finger, we turn it downwards, and immerse it in a Vessel full of the same Liquor, but freely expos'd to the Influence of the Air. This Influence sustains the Liquor in the Tube, whose open Extremity is immersed, and its closed Extremity, uppermost. We make the Experiment with Tubes of different Diameters, and the Height of the Liquor sustained is always the same, because there is in proportion a greater Column of Air to counterpoise it. To discover whether the Weight or Elasticity of the Air is the immediate Cause of this Suspension of Liquors, we try if the Experiment will succeed in Places perfectly enclosed. And to find whether it is not the Weight of the Air which causes its Elasticity, we repeat the Experiment in Places of different Heights. Lastly, we try Tubes of different Figures, and use Liquors of different specifick Gravities. From Liquors we pass to Solids; and by applying two Plates of Marble or Steel perfectly polish'd, one upon another, and hanging to the undermost a considerable Weight, we find both the Plate and the Weight added to it, supported by the Air. Behold with what Precautions, with what Exactness, with what Scruples and Doubts we ought to study Nature; and from thence to find our Conjectures verified, by which we endeavour to come at the Knowledge of what we can never see, let us take what Pains we will.

IT is not only in Matters of Philosophy, that we ought to take the Pains to justify our Reasonings by Experience; this Precaution extends a great way farther, and ought to be us'd in all Subjects that are capable of it. I shall instance in a very plausible

“ in fourteen Degrees Lat. the Pendulum for Seconds must be two
 “ Inches shorter; and in the Isle of *Cayenne* only one Inch and a
 “ quarter shorter. So many different Experiments prevent our being
 “ mistaken in conjecturing too hastily, that the Nearness to the
 “ Æquator is the true Cause of these unequal Lengths of a se-
 “ cond Pendulum,

plausible Argument, urged by some against *Operas*, which has taken with a great many People, and even with those who have not had the least Prejudice against publick Shews; *Nothing*, say they, *appears so contrary to the Action of Tragedy as Singing; and nothing can be more ridiculous than the continuing a Conversation in Musick.* This Argument has been long since made use of, and I remember it appeared demonstrative to me the first Time I read it; and in this Prepossession, that an Opera was a very unreasonable Entertainment, I had not even the Curiosity to go to one; and if it had not been out of Complaisance, I believe I never had seen one. But from the Moment of my having been there, I plainly perceived the Difference betwixt discovering Truth by Experience, and imagining it to be demonstrated by some uncertain Reasonings: That which such kind of Reasonings had made me treat with Ridicule, became the Object of my Admiration; and the Singing to me seem'd wonderfully to enliven the Sentiments it express'd, as well as all the Representations I saw, or rather all the Actions to which I imagin'd my self to be Witness. I then re-examined the Reasoning which had dazzled me; and in observing it with more Circumspection, to discover the Defect of it, I soon took notice, that my Mistake had been, in extending to all Sorts of Conversations, what would be very true of ordinary Conversations: Those which turn upon Subjects that are tedious and difficult, require a very great Exactness in the Terms, and a perfect Tranquility of the Mind. So unusual an Entertainment as Singing, would as little agree with common Subjects, and those of little Moment; but something extraordinary in the Tone and Pronuntiation, as well as in the Expressions made use of, does perfectly well suit with grand and extraordinary Events and Sentiments. There is a very wide Difference betwixt a Discourse composed of a long Chain of Ideas, and one that consists but of a few Words, which are to express, with an extreme Vigour, some very lively Sentiments. Prose is proper for the first; but Poetry and Musick agree altogether with the second. In a Chamber, as well as upon a Theatre, Verse and Singing engage the Heart very differently from ordinary Discourse.

It is good to lead the Imagination thro' a great Variety of Examples: This Variety will shew the Necessity of our Rules, and at the same Time teach their Use. If it be demanded, whether it is of Importance to have a Church in every Parish, Devotion and Zeal, complicated, as they frequently are, with different Passion, raise upon this Subject


a great Number of uncertain Reasonings; to the Examination of which the Religion of narrow Minds is always averse: But if we consult Experience, to which all Ranks of Understanding shou'd be subject, do we see those Men who need not go out of their Parish to find a Church, any Thing better edified, or leading better Lives, than those that are forced to go to the next Parish for a Church? We are deceiv'd then in expecting from a certain Conveniency of Nearness to a Church, an Effect which arises only from the Ability of the Preacher in the choice of his Subjects, and in his manner of enforcing them upon his Audience.



C H A P. V.

Of the Imagination.

*In what consist
the Ideas of the
Imagination.
The Extent of
this Faculty.*

- I.  T is a Truth universally acknowledged, that the Impressions of Objects upon the Senses pass to the Brain, and produce there what we call the Perceptions of the Imagination. The Custom which we have of connecting continually Ideas with Signs, is moreover the Cause that the Understanding hardly ever forms any Thought, but that the Imagination furnishes at the same time Names and Signs. Even in meditating we are speaking already, and expressing our selves inwardly. By this Connection it happens, that the Operations of the Understanding are quicker or slower, according as the Imagination supplies its Operations with more or less Activity. Moreover, our Reasonings and inward Sentiments are composed of the Ideas of each of these Faculties; for at the bottom, that which is call'd the Understanding and the Imagination, is the same Soul which thinks in different Ways, and distinguishes under different Names. This Faculty then has a very great Influence upon our Knowledge, and it is of great Importanceto take advantage of its Helps, and to know and be able to correct its Defects.

WE should be very grossly deceiv'd, if we should take occasion from these Names, *Understanding, Senses,* and *Imagination,* to suppose in the Soul three distinct Faculties one from another, as the Feet are from the Hands and Belly: It is the same Soul, the same Thought, which perceives in three different Manners: These three different Manners are distinguish'd by the different Names of *Understanding, Senses;* and *Imagination,* which are each subdivided into several different Species.

ONE Error is always follow'd by a great many others. There are some, who supposing a much greater Difference betwixt the Understanding and the Imagination than there really is, take occasion from thence to condemn the Use of Eloquence. *It advances not our Reason; say they; it reaches not the Understanding; for it affects and moves the Imagination, and whatever moves that stops there.* When the Terms we make use of excite Ideas; and by comparing these Ideas among themselves, we connect or disjoin them as we ought, we cannot be deceiv'd; we think reasonably in whatsoever Terms they are express'd: The Pleasure we take in hearing, is not a necessary Hindrance to our Understanding, but on the contrary often promotes it.

II. SEVERAL Laws contribute to vary the Imagination, and consequently to perfect or to weaken it; we shall run over them in their Order: The first which offers it self is the *Temperament.* We shall not undertake to explain the Nature and Effects of it philosophically, nor borrow from other Sciences Foundations for this, which is intended only as an Introduction to them. It was necessary there should be in Man Activity and Sluggishness, Fire and Phlegm; and the Mixture of these two different Qualities, according to their particular Proportions in one and the same Man, is call'd the *Temperament.* Without Fire we could not have liv'd at all; and if we had had nothing but Fire, it would have soon consumed it self, and we could have lived but a few Moments. The most happy Temperament is that which consists of such a Combination of these Qualities, as are most serviceable to our Health and Vigour: This is call'd *Sanguine;* because then the Blood is most pure, and less charged with such Mixtures as corrupt it. (a)

What is understood by Temperament.

III. THE

(a) " Quod humidissimum est in Igne, & Siccissimum in Aquâ, si in Corpore Temperamentum acceperint sapientissima sunt. -----

Advantages of a sanguine Temperament with respect to the Imagination.

III. THE strong Union which the Author of Nature has thought proper to establish between the Body and the Soul; requires that the Operations of the Mind should be performed with so much more Freedom as the Body is in a more happy Condition; and such is the Condition of it, when our Thoughts are neither produced and dissipated with Precipitation by too much Fire, nor yet retarded by too much Phlegm. This is the Advantage of Sanguine Temperaments: They conceive with Readiness, because the cold Part does not over-balance; and they can fix upon a Subject long enough to consider it thoroughly, because they are not hurried away by too much Heat. To these ready and just Conceptions answers an easy Style, full of Clearness and Force, in which true Eloquence consists; so that (b) they seem born to discover Truth, and to communicate it to others.

Its Disadvantages.

IV. THE Misfortune is, that this Constitution is too much exposed to Pleasures (for Health puts us in a Condition of procuring them more easily, and of relishing them more agreeably,) which appear so charming, that they are courted and caressed with Eagerness: They are perpetually pursued and ever desired; and yet as soon as enjoyed, they are found wanting. This puts the Mind into a constant Wandering, and Unsettledness; and makes it succeed the worst, in what it is really capable of succeeding the best. Its happy Foundation is buried under ill Habits.

Means to repair them.

V. THESE Habits will be prevented, by demonstrating that the Mind relishes Pleasures in the Knowledge of Truth, far beyond corporeal Pleasures; and that an Application to Virtue, is attended

“ Ex his autem Anima Temperata, sapientissima est, memoriâ valentissimâ prædita. ---- Si autem Ignis sincerissimi, itemque Aquæ temperamentum Anima sortiatur, sit autem Ignis paulò inferior ac defectuosior quàm Aqua, sapientes quidem sunt etiam hi, verùm defectuosiores quàm in priore Temperamento. ---- Si verò amplius adhuc superetur Ignis à presenti Aquâ, hoc jam alii desipientes, alii attonitos sive stupidos appellant. ---- Hi plorant nemine molestante aut Verberante, formidantque non formidanda, & tristantur in rebus nihil ad se pertinentibus. ---- Ex his verò sapientiores & desipientiores animæ fiunt.” *Hippocrat. de Diatâ. Lib. I. Ed. Vand Linden.*

(b) Institutam nostram sententiam sequitur Orationis genus. *Cic. de Orat.*

tended with a Tranquility far above the Price of the Sweets of a voluptuous Life. A Life which is taken up with the Shadow, instead of the Substance; and being engaged with Trifles, passes from Amusement to Amusement, without ever arriving at, or tasting true Happiness. These are Truths which may be demonstrated; but they should be urged in a proper Season, and when a convenient Opportunity offers for their Reception. If you press them upon voluptuous Men in the height of their Prepossessions, you only confirm them in an Habit of rejecting them. (c) There are Moments when, being discontented with themselves, weary with Trifles, out of Humour with their false Friends, seized with some Distemper, or galled with some Disgrace, their Attention will be at liberty to listen to a Proposal of a new Kind of Life, whose Pleasures may be more solid, and its Expectations more certain. (d) They become Converts the Moment you can engage them to make a Tryal of it, and to surmount courageously the Obstacles and Difficulties which attend only the Beginning of it.

WHEN I would propose to gain something upon a Man who is too much under the Influences of his Senses, and too much addicted to their Objects, I would desire of him to be pleased to make tryal of my Pleasures. He is sometimes dissatisfied with his own; he has occasion for a great Variety of Objects and Amusements to prevent or remove his Disgusts: I would beg of him not to be discouraged, if he does not immediately find the Pleasures I invite him to, come up to what I promised. Even our Games of Diversion themselves do not at first appear pleasant, before we come to relish them, the Pains we take in learning them far exceeds the Pleasure of them. To engage him the more to believe me, I make him sensible, that there can be no doubt but that the Pleasures most worthy of us, those which respect the most noble and excellent Part of us must needs be the greatest of all. The Satisfactions of a Man under the Dominion of his Senses, are not proportionable to his Inquietudes: He is the Sport of Illusions, and always hopes to find what he never meets with, his Disgusts increase with his Desires. The Moment the Senses have leave to ramble, and their Desires are once excited, he gives himself up to them without Reserve, and himself destroys his own Happiness by a mistaken eager Pursuit

(c) In morbis quoque nihil perniciosius quam immatura Medicina.

(d) Nullum tempus emendandi melius quam dum interquiescit, dum emendato similis est. Sen. Ep. XXV.

of it: He shortens his Days, spends his Vigour, and dulls his Appetite.

ON the other side, if to prevent these Inconveniences, we refuse the Senses some part of their Demands, and endeavour to moderate their Desires, then these Pleasures will be very much disturb'd and inconsiderable. So that in this case then, we must either be content with these half Satisfactions, or else seek out an Happiness of a different Nature. The Author of our Being, by impowering our Senses to procure us none but very imperfect Pleasures, sufficiently shews that he has created us for some much better Purpose. Let us then consider the great Ends of our Creation, that we may be able to answer them. We are made for *Contemplation* and *Method*, for *Science* and *Wisdom*: Let us then pursue these infinite Prizes, and our Senses will soon put themselves in Order, without giving us the Trouble to regulate them. (e) *True and solid Pleasures consist not in filling and pampering the Body, or raising its Desires: Our Security lies in keeping them quiet, and being free from their Importunities. To live Happy, is to live in perfect Tranquility, exempt from the Disturbances which are occasioned by Envy and Ambition, and above the insupportable Terrors which are administered by Superstition and a False Religion. To enjoy our selves and the Present, not to repent the Past, nor fear the Future, is true Pleasure; a Pleasure always uniform, a Pleasure never to be exhausted, and far from being burdensome to it self, becomes always more delightful, the more it is enjoy'd. The Man who lives in this Condition, cannot be said to be Content with a little, for he Enjoys every Thing.*

VI. AN

(e) Dicat ipse sibi: Voluptas fragilis est & brevis, fastidio objecta: quo avidius hausta est, citius in contrarium recidens, cujus subinde necesse est aut pœniteat, aut pudeat. In quâ nihil est aut magnificum, aut quod naturam hominis, Diis proximi, deceat: res humilis, membrorum ac vilium ministerio veniens, exitu fœda. Ista est Voluptas & homine & viro digna, non implere Corpus, nec Saginare, nec Cupiditates irritare, quarum tutissima est quies: Sed perturbatione carere, & eâ quam hominum inter se rixantium ambitus concurrit, & eâ quæ intolerabilis ex alto venit, ubi de Diis famæ creditum est, vitiisque illos nostris æstimavimus. Hanc voluptatem æqualem, intrepidam, nunquam sensuram sui tedium, percipit hic quem deformamus cum maximè; qui, ut ita dicam, divini juris atque humani peritus, præsentibus gaudet, ex futuro non peudet. Nihil enim firmi habet, qui in incerta propensus est. Magnis itaque curis exemptus, & distortis mentem, nihil sperat, aut cupit, nec se mittit indubium, suo contentus. Nec illum existimes parvo esse contentum, omnia illius sunt. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. VII. Cap. 2.*

VI. AN infinite Number of young People, who by their good Sense and happy Inclinations to Virtue, are born for Knowledge and the Good of Mankind, prepossess themselves against Learning, and oftentimes even against Prudence, by seeing the odious Gloominess, and supercilious Affectations of a thousand Pedants, whose only Aim is to make themselves look'd upon as the Sources of Science, and revered as the Rules of Duty. These *Dons* would think themselves dishonour'd, if they did the least thing like other People: They dress themselves differently; and if they walk, or speak, or cough, or even spit, it must be done learnedly and gravely. You wou'd say their Study is to keep Men at a distance, not to invite them nearer; that they find more Pleasure in contradicting, than in reforming; and that their first Principle is always to be the very Reverse of other Men. A young Man who observes this Pedantic Farce, is apt to look upon Men of Letters, as such whose Vanity and Extravagance make them more to be laugh'd at than imitated. Men have in all Times given into this ridiculous Humour. *Seneca* sets them off admirably well in his fifth Letter. (f).

The pernicious Effects of Pedantry.

VII. IT is a Truth of Experience, That the Dispositions of the Mind answer to those of the Body. Let us but reflect upon the Difference there is in our manner of Thinking in the height of a Fever, and in the Exit of the Distemper; in the Morning fasting, and immediately after a full Stomach; and by these Relations betwixt the Condition of the Body and that of the Mind, we may easily judge what Influence the *Temperaments* will have upon the *Imagination*. Those which have an extreme Proportion of *Fire*, have a very

The Qualities of the Choleric.

(f) Illud autem te admoneo, ne eorum more qui non proficere, sed conspici cupiunt, facias aliqua, quæ in habitu tuo, aut genere vitæ notabilia sint. Asperum cultum, & intonsum caput, & negligentior barbam, & indictum argento odium, & cubile humi positum, & quicquid aliud ambitionem perversâ viâ sequitur, devita. ----- Id agamus, ut meliorem vitam sequamur quàm vulgus, non ut contrariam: alioqui quos emendari volumus, fugamus, & à nobis avertimus. Illud quoque efficimus, ut nihil imitari velint nostri, dum timent ne imitanda sint omnia. Hoc primùm Philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem & congregationem: à quâ professione dissimilitudo separabit. Videamus ne ista, per quæ admirationem parare volumus, ridicula & odiosa sint.

very ready and penetrating Apprehension: Their Imagination is more fruitful of Ideas than that of others; they rise in Crowds; and as abundantly as they are desired, their Inquiries take in a great many more Particulars than others can extend to. But the Fire which transports them, seldom gives them time to fix upon a Subject long enough to form Ideas sufficiently exact; and a great many things escape them, which a longer Attention wou'd have discover'd. It is with the Mind, as it is with the Eyes; if we roll them about hastily, we see things only in the gross, and at most can perceive but some particular ones with any thing of Exactness. Besides this, the Greatness of their Fire hurries them on to Extremes of all kinds: If you believe them, whatever they dislike must be extremely mean, and of no Value in the least: They make Prodigies of every thing they commend, and Monsters of every thing they condemn: They either magnify or annihilate. Whence the common Observation of these *Choleric* Constitutions is, That they are either a very great deal better, or a very great deal worse than others: When they succeed, nothing can do so well; when they miscarry, nothing can do so ill. Moreover, this excessive Fire being soon spent, they are very unequal in their Compositions; some Parts are perfectly finished, and others very indifferent: In some Places they are extremely clear; and in others so much the contrary, that you must guess at their Meaning, and it is a great chance whether you find out any thing by guessing. They are not however sensible of this Inequality; but on the contrary, because their exhausted Attention can see nothing more in the Subject, they imagine that in effect there is nothing more to be discover'd, that the Whole is already known to them, and that to go further is only to pursue Chimeras.

THERE are some Occasions where their Fire animates them, and prevents their being discouraged with the difficulties of an Enterprize. At other times this same Fire throws them into Impatience, so that not giving themselves time to consider Things to the bottom, they accustom themselves to know them only by halves; and so their Mind becomes every Day narrower and narrower.

THOSE who perceive in themselves a great deal of Activity, do sometimes undertake a greater Task than they are able to go thro' with: What they do, they do in an hurry, because they have and wou'd always have a great deal more upon their Hands; so that by aiming to succeed in too many Things, they really succeed in none of them. By thinking their

their Faculties, which seem so lively, to be more powerful than they are, they aim at Things beyond their strength, and so either sink under their Work, or discharge it but very imperfectly. *Ante omnia necesse est seipsum aestimare, quia ferè plus nobis videmur posse quàm possumus.* Sen.

VIII. THE Choleric easily grow impatient and transported. A Man then of this Disposition ought to take all Opportunities of observing the Extravagancies committed by those, who, like himself, are under the Dominion of *Choler*. Nothing can bring Men nearer to Madness and Lunacy (g); And, *when you see a Man in a Passion, do not enquire for the Cause of his Transport in the Subjects which he pretends to have for it, it is entirely within himself* (h). One of this Constitution will be put in a Rage for nothing; and a broken Glass, or a Friend ill treated, will equally raise their Cholera (i.)

Advice against Cholera and Impatience.

IX. WHEN Men have too much Fire, they generally like to make use of it all. Whatever is difficult, far from discouraging them on that Account, becomes more agreeable to them for being so. They love such Subtilties as other People cannot easily apprehend; and sometimes their Taste runs so much this Way, that whatever is plain and easy seems unfavoury, and they cannot submit to express themselves in the Way that Nature has dictated. They are so far from seeking the most simple Methods, that if they offer themselves, they will not make use of them. They ought however to consider, that by this Shew of Subtilty, they make all their Reasonings suspected, tho' otherwise they may be very solid. By the same Means also they oftentimes deceive themselves: For by liking every Thing that is subtil, they make it, as it were, a Character of Truth; whereas they ought to consider, that 'tis for the most part with

Against an Application to Subtilties.

(g) *Immediata Ira gignit Infaniam, & Ira Furor brevis est.*

(h) *Non interest ex quàm magnâ causâ nascatur, sed in qualem perveniat animum.*

(i) *Ferè enim justum quisque affectum judicat, quem agnoscit. Irascuntur boni viri pro suorum injuriis; sed idem faciunt, si calida non benè præbeatur, si vitrum fractum est, si calceus luto sparsus est. Non pietas illam iram, sed infirmitas movet: sicut pueri qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt, quàm nucibus.* Sen. *de Irâ, Lib. I. Cap. 12.*

with *Subtilties*, as with *Spiders Webs*, the finer they are spun, the weaker they are (*k*).

X. THE Distempers of the Mind are in one Sense easier to cure than those of the Body. To be thoroughly sensible of them, and seriously desirous to get rid of them, might be Remedies sufficient. When a Choleric Man is conscious of his Fire, and keeps upon his guard, he will prevent Precipitation, and all its ill Consequences. Not that it is amiss to endeavour to correct his Constitution by Medicines and a Course of Physic: But I am persuaded that as the Body has a great influence over the Inclinations of the Mind, and the Habits which by repeated Acts it contracts, do in their Turn also as much influence the Body; and consequently he that endeavours to moderate his Fire, will by the same Application mend his Constitution. Whoever will make the Experiment upon himself, will find what I say to be true. I advise every one therefore to consult himself sincerely; and if he finds his Case to bear any Resemblance to what I have been mentioning, instead of entirely pursuing his Heat and his Inclinations, let him break off his Speculations and Studies, before the Vigour of his Attention abates. He may, by frequent renewing his Pursuits, very well recompence the Loss of Time which such Interruptions occasion; and in all Cases it is much better to discover the pure Truth, tho' never so little, than to run the Hazard of suffering a Mixture of Error to spoil the whole. These Interruptions which I here recommend, are not to be attempted without a good deal of Pains and Trouble in the beginning: But let not this discourage; for by a courageous Perseverance, Use will make that easy, which at first appear'd very difficult. And if the Difficulty be extreme indeed, it must be consider'd, that the true Strength of the Mind consists in its gaining the absolute Dominion of it self (*l*). By resuming thus at different Times the

(*k*) Nihil est acutius aristâ, quædam inutilia & inefficacia, ipsa Subtilitas reddit. *Sen. Ep. LXXXII.*

Supereſt ex heſterno mihi cogitatio, quid ſibi voluerint prudentiſſimi viri, qui rerum maximarum probationes, leviffimas, & perplexas fecerunt: QUÆ UT SINT VERÆ, MENDACIO TAMEN SIMILES SUNT. *Sen. Ep. LXXXIII.*

(*l*) Ea demùm velocitas placet, quæ ubi juſſâ eſt veſtigium fiſtit, nec ultra deſtinata procurrit, & quæ flecti, & à curſu ad gradum reduci poteſt. *Ægros ſcimus nervos eſſe, ubi invitis nobis moventur:*
Senex

the same Subject, and considering it coolly every Time, he will at last entirely exhaust it, and prevent being hurried away with only a Notion of being Master of it.

XI. THOSE that Teach are under a particular Obligation of managing their Fire with great Address. There is a great Occasion for it, to rouse and keep up the Attention of their Scholars; to discover perfectly their Genius, with all their different Habits and Humours; to know when they have entirely entered into the Thought which is express'd to them; to find out what hinders and confounds them; to contrive the proper Remedies to remove these Difficulties; and to set what they are to be taught in such a Light, that they shall absolutely comprehend it. But as soon as ever the Fire of the Master degenerates into Impatience, it is more prejudicial to his Scholars than an Heaviness would be: They learn no longer, when once they are stunned; and the Ideas of young People, which have been but a short time exercised, must not be expected to arise with the Quickness of a Whirlwind; their Ideas must be form'd by little and little, and strengthen'd gradually: They seek not to learn, when they can't be permitted to ask a Question without running the Hazard of being mortified with a Reprimand. When a Master comes to be impatient that his Scholars do not go on as fast as himself, they will appear to follow him, but leave him in reality to go by himself.

Advice to Teachers.

I do not at all doubt but this is one of the chief Reasons, that it is so rare and difficult to meet with those that know perfectly how to Teach. Fire and Temper, two essential Qualities of a good Master, seldom or never meet. It is hardly possible to procure Fire, where it is not naturally; and where it is, 'tis as difficult to govern it. To gain this Point, requires a great deal of Pains, and a great deal of Reason; and he must well understand, and as well love his Duty, and count nothing a Trouble, who discharges it perfectly.

XII. WHERE *Phlegm* and Heaviness prevail, we call such *Phlegmatic*. These being not over hasty, advance slowly; but then the Time they take in considering of a Subject, gives them an Opportunity of comprehending it better; and

Of the Phlegmatic.

as

Senex aut infirmi corporis est, qui ambulare vult currit: Animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro arbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur. *Sen. de Irâ, Lib. II. Cap. 35.*

as they are not distracted with a Multiplicity of Employments, they often succeed better in what they undertake. It is true, if the Subject they attempt be very much compounded, they often content themselves with one of its Parts, and upon that determine and direct all their Views and Inquiries: After which they do not fail to persuade themselves, that nothing has escaped their Application, because they judge of the Extent of their Knowledge, by the Time they have spent in acquiring it. It has cost them so much Pains, that their chief Consolation is in thinking it absolutely perfect. The bare Suspicion of its not being complete, puts them into too an ill Humour to think of taking it into farther Consideration; and they conceive a strange Antipathy against any one that dares advise them to renew their Inquiries, which have already so extremely fatigued them.

MEN of a Phlegmatic Constitution are usually *timorous*: Their Timorousness makes them diffident; this diffident Humour is a Disposition to Hatred, whence they easily become Cruel. When they are out of Humour, every Thing displeases; and they are very willing to get rid of every Thing that displeases. Mr. *Spon* observes, That the Christian *Greeks*, who keep a great many Fasts, become very gloomy with this bad Nourishment; we may add also, by the Superstition which accompanies them, that the Darkness of their Constitution disposes them to a thousand criminal Habits, as Avarice, Envy, and Perfidy.

XIII. IT is seldom found that a Constitution can be changed at once: But it is certain that it may be regulated, and the bad Effects of it prevented. It is to this End that Logic directs its Precepts.

I confess that the Phlegmatic may, by the Assistance of Medicine, supply their want of Fire and Activity; Logic will prescribe sprightly Conversation and Lectures full of Vivacity. It will teach them that Knowledge may be exquisite in its Kind, and yet be of too narrow an Extent; and consequently, that it is of great Importance to join to one's own Discoveries,

(m) Nulla enim sapientia, naturalia Corporis aut animi vitia ponuntur; quicquid infixum, & ingenitum est lenitur arte, non vincitur. --- Nam ut quidam boni sanguinis sunt, ita quidam incitati & mobilis, & citò in os prodeuntis. Hæc, ut dixi, nulla sapientia abigit: alioquin haberet rerum naturam sub imperio, si omnia eraderet vitia. Quæcunque attribuit conditio nascendi, & corporis temperatura, cum multum se diuque animos composuerit, hærebunt. *Sen. Ep. XI.*

Discoveries, those of others, to make the Whole more compleat. It is also absolutely necessary, never to embrace any Opinion, till it has been submitted to Examination, and to suspend one's Judgment of one's own Discoveries, till others have view'd them on all Sides, and sounded the Depth of them. This is the way to avoid the ridiculous Character of being opiniated and conceited of Systems too contracted, and, what is worse, oftentimes erroneous.

XIV. TEMPERAMENTS are combined in a thousand different Ways: Activity and Heaviness are capable of being mixed in a thousand different Degrees and Proportions. It is impossible to enter into so large a Detail, nor would it be of any Use, since it could neither serve to discover new Defects, nor to establish new Rules. The greater Ascendant any one of the Temperaments before specified shall be observ'd to have in these various

The Variety of Temperaments is the Cause of the different Opinions, and the different Maxims of Men.

Mixtures, the more good or bad Qualities, which are the Consequences of that Temperament, will be taken notice of. Perhaps, if we consider it throughly, we shall find in this Variety of Temperaments the true Sources of that great Diversity of the Opinions, Manners, and Maxims of Mankind. The Inclination follows the Temperament, and our Ideas arise, are formed, and changed conformably to our Inclinations. This is the Principle from whence the several Illusions of Men have been derived. *Epicurus* being of a gentle Disposition, and desirous only of enjoying an easy Life, establish'd his *Summum Bonum* in Pleasure, and made it the Principle of his Morality.⁽ⁿ⁾ *Zeno* being severe, and of a Constitution apt to carry all Things to Extremity, allow'd of nothing but strict *Virtue* to bear the Name of Good, and entirely excluded every thing else which Men are used to pursue and esteem as such. *Aristotle*, who was of a sociable Temper, gave into Ideas conformable to his Humour, and join'd to *Virtue*, Glory, and Riches, and the Advantages of the Body. This Sentiment is of use in Society, and very well suited to the Ideas of a Multitude. The Principle of *Zeno* will not at all agree; and that of *Epicurus* is too dangerous: These are neither of them fit for any but

(n) Might not this be one of the Reasons which moved the Epicureans to discharge God of all Care and Sollicitude concerning human Affairs; because even the Effects of his Bounty towards us cannot be exercised without disturbing his Repose? *Mont. B. II. Ch. 12.*

but such as are desirous of living by themselves, in a Separation and Retirement from the rest of Mankind. Not only in Philosophy, but also in Religion, every one espouſes Maxims agreeable to his Constitution: One attributes to God a Diſpoſition to take no care of any thing, and conceives his Clemency under an Idea of Eaſineſs. Another, moroſe and auſtere in his Temper, cries out upon every little Fault as a moſt enormous Crime: He condemns every Inclination to Pleaſure and Eaſe; and laſtly imagines, that God has made the greateſt Part of Mankind for nothing but to be damned.

Maxims to form the Imagination of Youth.

XV. THE Imagination varies according to the Difference of *Sexes*; but becauſe the Temperament may be the Cauſe of this, and Education may yet further contribute to it, we ſhall not allow it a ſeparate Article, but paſs on to conſider the *Difference of Ages*, which we ſhall divide into *Three*. The firſt begins from our Infancy, and concludes at full Age, and may take in twenty Years, or ſome little more, according as the Mind comes quicker or ſlower to its full Strength. In this firſt Age the Imagination is extremely *flexible*, and eaſily takes all Sorts of Impreſſions: It is *weak*, and for that Reaſon ought to be manag'd with a great deal of Care. As in this Age the Attention cannot be kept up long enough to follow Reaſonings of any Length, ſo no body thinks fit to reaſon with Children at all: This requires too much Patience and Trouble, and for that Reaſon it is thought ſufficient only to exerciſe their Memories. This ſeems to me to be a great Fault; for by this Management they are only taught, like Parrots, to deal in Words, and have no Concern with Ideas; to give themſelves up entirely to their Teachers; to forbear examining into themſelves, and endeavouring to underſtand; and to be prepoſſeſs'd by the firſt that ſpeaks. I would therefore have them get nothing by heart, but what has been firſt explain'd to them, and is very clearly underſtood by them; that is to ſay, they ſhould be taught nothing but what is within their Reach, as the Rules of Language, Hiſtory, Geography, the Elements of Religion, the Facts and Experiments of Natural Philoſophy, Anatomy, and the Mathematicks; and laſtly, all ſuch Parts of Learning as are not ſubject to Error: Which are for that Reaſon well ſuited to this Age, that is ſo liable to be led into Miſtakes, and would be found to be much more within the reach of young People than they are imagined to be, if we did but take Pains to teach

teach them with more Clearness, and advance them by easy Steps, and by short Lessons. But it must be confess'd, that the gloomy Humour of most of our *Mathematicians*, who are so enamour'd with their own Studies, that they despise all others, and separate from Society, and wholly neglect all sprightly Lectures which polish and enliven the Mind; I say, their gloomy Humour clouds these Sciences with too much Obscurity. Besides, the Haste they are in to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, makes them content to build upon what their Predecessors have already laid down, and never trouble themselves to re-examine it sufficiently, or make it more clear: Their Understandings are cast in the Mould that is in fashion, and finds no Difficulty any where. This is in general the common Fault of Masters, to keep themselves up too servilely to what is establish'd, and which Custom has made easy to them, tho' it is capable of being made still much easier to their Scholars: And it is upon this wrong Principle, and to have the sooner done, that, in teaching Children, they borrow the Assistance of the Passions, rather than of Reason; and instead of explaining and shewing the Usefulness of the Task they set them, they chuse rather to conduct them by their Fears, or by their Emulation. By this means they are accusom'd from their Infancy to take their Passions for their Guide, rather than their Reason, which is hardly ever to be consulted, because they have not been taught to consult it. (o) But this Article very well deserves a separate Discourse.

XVI. As soon as the first Heats and Levities of Youth are over, even till *old Age* approaches, the Imagination enjoys its full Vigour as well as the Body; for the Faculties of the one usually answer to the Faculties of the other. In this Age the Attention not only, by being enliven'd, renders the Imagination more fruitful in Ideas, but does also, by keeping it self up, perfect those Ideas which it gives Birth to. This Age does oftner consult Experience, to which it is more accusom'd; and having reflected

*At full Age
Advice continues to be very
necessary.*

(o) Uter autem præceptor liberalibus studiis dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit, aut si parùm agilis in legendo oculus hæserit, an qui monitionibus, & verecundiâ, emendare ac docere malit? *Sen. de Clementiâ.* Lib. I. Cap. 16.

Si cui est mens tam illiberalis, ut objurgatione non corrigatur, is etiam ad plagas, ut passima quæque mancipia, durabitur. *Fabius.*

reflected (*p*) more upon its Faults, conducts it self with more Circumspection. What is most to be fear'd is, its building upon the Prejudices of Childhood. It is of great Importance to have been well instructed in the first Age; and before we rest sure of this, we ought to suspect every thing we then learn'd, and examine all over again anew, and not to engage in any Employments that may interrupt so necessary an Examination.

IDLENESS is not a more powerful Obstacle to this Examination, than the Eagerness of Learning, and appearing to know every thing; an Eagerness which makes us heap with Precipitation Lectures upon Lectures. It is an Ambition which must be cured, unless we would make a Chaos of our Understanding, and a monstrous Mixture of Truths and Errors, confounded beyond a Possibility of being distinguish'd.

BUT in putting off the Prejudices of Childhood, we must take care not to be prepossess'd in favour of our selves, and of our own proper Views: This is a common Fault of the Age we are speaking of. The Pleasure of being reckon'd amongst the Number of Masters, after being so long fatigued in the Rank of Scholars, is a Pleasure very dazzling: We persuade our selves easily that we are in effect what we wish to be, and what we are so much delighted to believe our selves to be. We first speak with an Assurance; then with an Air of Authority; and lastly, we expect to have our Sentences look'd upon as Oracles. We love to have others listen, and ask Questions, but cannot bear they should contradict us. In an Age less advanc'd, we think it an Honour to learn; but in this we are ashamed to be instructed. To get rid of this Infatuation, let us often reflect upon the Errors and Imperfections that accompany us even to the End of our Lives; let us consider that the Mistakes of *Childhood* attend us even to old Age. Thro' the whole Course of our Lives, from time to time, we have our Moments of appearing little, flexible, credulous, and precipitate, conquer'd by Flattery, or transported with Passion, and pursuing Chimeras with as much Readiness as Children do.

WHAT *Seneca* said of perfect Probity, is yet more true of Science. He who flatters himself with the Hopes of knowing every thing that can be known, or, at least, that deserves to be known, plainly demonstrates, that he does not even

(*p*) *Multis experimentis longa, & frequenti rerum patientia sese domuit, & ad salutaria mitigatis affectibus venit. Sen.*

even know what it is to know any thing; if he did, he would find himself infinitely short of such Expectations, and plainly perceive, that they can never be otherwise than very imperfectly fulfill'd, and that there will always remain a great many more Things to learn than what he already knows. (q)

How little do we know, in comparison to what we do not know! How many Obstacles are there to oppose our Progress in Knowledge! (r) The Care of our Health; the Necessities of Life; the Time we are obliged to spend in serving our Friends; the Interruptions we have from our Enemies; the Engagements of our Profession; an Attention which is very soon wearied; Passions that move us, and sometimes disorder us; a Self-Love, which never leaves us, and seduces us but too often: Dare we then, whilst under Subjection to so many Infirmities, and encompass'd by so many Obstacles, value our selves so much, as to reject the Lights and Assistance of others? We are charm'd to receive the Praises of others, and we always take Money with Pleasure from what Hand soever it comes; whether those we receive it from be Friends or Enemies, does not at all trouble us: But it is quite otherwise with Instruction and Advice: These are hated Presents, which must be accompanied with a thousand Insinuations to make them receiv'd. Is it then that we set too small a Value upon Truth? (s) I am entirely of Opinion, that this strange Repugnance which Men have to Advice at a full Age, proceeds from the Manner in which it used to be given to them when Children. Almost

(q) Si sciret quid esset vir bonus, nondum se esse crederet, fortasse etiam fieri posse desperaret. *Sen. Ep. XLII.*

(r) Non vis cogitare, quantum temporis tibi auferat mala valetudo, quantum occupatio publica, quantum occupatio privata, quantum occupatio quotidiana, quantum somnus; metire ætatem tuam: tam multa non capit. De liberalibus studiis loquor: Philosophi quantum habent supervacui, quantum abusu recedentis! *Sen. Ep. LXXXVIII.*

(s) " We fly Correction, which, to produce any notable Effects, " must be introduced by way of Conference, and not of Authority. " Upon any Opposition, we regard not whether it is just or not, " but right or wrong, how we shall get rid of it: Instead of Arms to " embrace it, we make use of Claws to keep it off. If any one con- " tradicts me, he raises my Attention, but not my Passion: I receive " him that contradicts me as one who is to instruct me. The Cause " of Truth ought to be the common Cause of one as well as the " other. *Montagne, B. III. Ch. 8.*

most all the Advice that is given to young People, tends to make them renounce that which they love, and to apply themselves not only to what they love less, but moreover to what they hate and avoid. They oppose themselves so much the more against receiving Advice, as it makes part of the Mortifications they are punish'd with: It is usually accompanied with Reproof; and these tiresome, mortifying, odious Circumstances do at last make odious in themselves the Counsels and Corrections they attend. Our Imagination has the Weakness always to confound in one, such different Objects as are often presented to it at one and the same time.

In an Age more advanced we often find it difficult to hearken to good Advice, for the same Reasons which have made us hate it when we were Children. The Haughtiness which they shew that give it, and the Pleasure they take in discovering the Superiority of their Understanding, turn our Love of it into Aversion. We do not like to receive any Thing from those who appear to despise us, because we care not to have any Obligation to them; but if we consider it well, we shall find, that the greater the Discouragements are under which Truth is proposed to us, the greater is the Merit in embracing it: And I am clearly of Opinion, that there is more Honour in submitting modestly to one single Truth, than in having discover'd a great Number of them, and afterwards proposing them with Pride and Haughtiness. The unpolish'd *Literati* are always in some Fault, and serve to heighten the Glory of those who have the Luck to be civiliz'd, and of a contrary Disposition. It is by this Character that, in the Republick of Letters, we ought to distinguish the illustrious and truly Learned from the gross Multitude. Let us then become rational; let us distinguish Things that are different, and separate the Facts from the Circumstances; let us throw off the Habits of Childhood, that the Love of Truth may set its true Value upon every Thing which may contribute to its Discovery: We love to know, and should therefore love to be undeceiv'd, for one Error extends its Influence a great Way; and assuredly this is not knowing, but heaping Error upon Error. Nothing binds us faster to our Friends than our Forwardness to consult them, and the Deference we pay to what they propose to us. Good Counsels are the best Offices that can be mutually done: In admonishing a Friend of a Fault, we take away from his Enemy the malicious Joy of exposing him. Nothing gives our Enemies a greater Advantage over us, than our adhering obstinately to our Mistakes. But if they shame us out of them, if it is a Glory to them

them, it is also an Advantage to us; whereas our continuing obstinate in them delivers us up intirely to their Mercy, and gives them an ample Field for Triumph. (t) *Diogenes* used to say, *That we stood in need either of sincere Friends, who would not fail to advise us; or of better Enemies, who would force us to mend our Faults.*

XVII. PRECAUTIONS against Conceitedness may be very usefully observed, whilst we are young; but it is a Mischief past Remedy, when once confirmed with Age. One of the most effectual Precautions against Conceitedness, is to let slip no Occasion of attending to the ridiculous Behaviour of those that are conceited. If they have but determined any Thing, whether it be without Knowledge, or by Prepossession, or Passion, or Chance, must not be consider'd. They have determined it; and this with them is Demonstration: To confess that they are mistaken, is a Reproach, a Disgrace, and a Mark of Infamy. Conceited Men are the most provoked with Reasons that are the most convincing: They love rather to shut their Eyes than to see: Their Passion is their last Refuge against Conviction. A Mind so overthwart as to look upon the Glory of retracting an Error as a Disgrace, will be always an inexhaustible Spring of false Reasonings, by the Pains it will take to support the first Error by a second. (u)

To what Purpose serves Conceitedness? It confirms the Conceited in their Error, without engaging others in it, at least not always: Truth will prevail over it at last, and the Conceited have the double Shame of neither being able to discover it themselves, nor of acknowledging it when it was presented to them by others. The supreme Merit, is never

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(t) Ratio id judicari vult, quod æquum est: ira id æquum videri vult, quod judicavit. Ratio nihil præter ipsum, de quo agitur, spectat: ira vanis & extra causam observantibus commovetur. Vultus illam securior, vox clarior, sermo liberior, cultus delicatior, advocatio ambitiosior favor, popularis exasperat. Sæpe infesta patrono reum datanat: etiam si ingeritur oculis veritas, amat & tuetur errorem: coargui non vult: & in malè cæptis, honestior illi pertinacia videtur, quam pænitentia. *Sen. de Irâ. L. I.* Nunc autem primum impetum sequimur; deinde quamvis vana nos concitaverint, perseveramus, ne videamur cæpisse sine causâ. *L. III.*

(u) "Obstinacy and Heat of Opinion are the most certain Marks of Folly. Is there any thing so immovable, resolute, regardless, contemplative, serious, and grave, as an Ass?" *Montagne, B. III. Ch. 8.*

to be mistaken; but where can this be found? The next, which is the only one that Men can lay claim to, is to return from our Errors. We pay a greater Homage to Truth, and set an higher Value upon it, when we receive with Acknowledgement the Correction of others, than when we correct our selves: When I see a *conceited* Man, I think I see the *Destiny* of the *Stoicks*: It is in the Fancy only that you must look for the Reasons of their Decrees; and their great Law is never to change.

BUT if nothing but Error makes up the Character of a *conceited* Man, this Title will be perpetually shifted off from one to another; because each will pretend to be on the side of Truth, for which they will plead an unshaken Steadiness absolutely necessary: But he that is conceited in Error will be the same in Truth; and he that is conceited in Truth will be so in Error: He is conceited whose Steadiness is founded in *Humour* rather than in *Reason*, and who is not only *ashamed* to return from an Error, but also *impatient* to listen to an Objection. We must have a large Fund of *Docility*, *Modesty*, and *Sweetness*, to make us always attentive to the Reasons of others, and first to be sensible of their *Strength*, before we seek out their *Defect*. By yielding to others all that we can possibly yield to them, we convince them it is not out of Prejudice that we do not yield to them in every Thing; we are very ready to do so, if *Evidence*, which is the *first Law* we submit to, did not determine us otherwise.

XVIII. OBSTINACY is yet stronger, and almost invincible in *Old Men*. Novelty is insupportable to them: The new Ways which conduct to important Discoveries, seem to tarnish their Glory, by reproaching them with not knowing enough; and to charge their Knowledge with being of too short an Extent, is robbing them of the Fruits of their long Fatigues. New Truths present to old Men, even by their Novelty, something too ungrateful and odious to engage their Attention: They reject them immediately, without inclining to examine them. New Examinations are too troublesome for their heavy *Imagination*: You provoke them to ask it of them.

IN Truth, the Defects of this Age, Heaviness, Confusion, and Conceitedness, are too difficult to correct, and never are conquer'd after they are once well rooted: But to prevent them, we should in time accustom our selves constantly to lodge nothing in the Memory, without having first very exactly understood it; to advance our Studies by just Degrees, from
the

the most simple to the most compounded, and not to apply to different Things at one Time; to consult others, and not to acquiesce in our own Ideas, before having compared them with theirs; to place our Happiness in the Progress we make in Knowledge, as well as in Goodness; and to advance from Knowledge to Knowledge, as well as from Virtue to Virtue. To grow old in these Dispositions, is the way not to grow old at all; whereas a Life ill managed, will have a miserable End. Father *Sirmond*, at the Age of seventy three Years, composed with as much Vigour as in his Youth. At eighty Mr. *de Limborch* has given us a *Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romans*. The Genius of the Abbot *Regnier*, continued thro' the whole Course of a very long Life. The Poem of Mr. *de St. Evremond*, upon *the passing the Boyne*, is not inferior to any he has written. The illustrious *Bishop of Avranches* is also old, but is still always composing, and always making himself admired. I am not at all of the Sentiment of *Montagne*, B. I. Ch. 57. *It is possible, to those that make good use of their Time, Science and Experience may encrease with their Years; but Vivacity, Readiness, Steadiness, and other Qualities much more our own, and important, and essential, will languish and dye..* Courage and Steadiness are the Effects of Reason, which in an advanced Age is yet more strengthened by accustoming our selves to be above Events, and to retire within our own Treasures, which increase with our Years, if we make a right Use of our Time. Our Ideas present themselves to us so much the easier, as they are more familiar to us: And an old Man has run them over oftner than a young Man; but it is necessary in running them over, to range them in good Order, according as they multiply.

XIX. HE that has pursued nothing but *Amusements*, will find himself without Support in an Age that is not made for Amusements: But he that has made his *Duty* the Foundation of his Felicity, will never find himself happier than in an Age where he will have no farther Occasion to put himself to any trouble in the Discharge of it, and where he will enjoy all the Sweets of those good Habits which he has taken the Pains to contract. He is never more useful than now, if he be but disposed to be so; and the young People who love Wisdom, are never more eager to benefit by the Instructions of a great Man, than when they perceive they cannot enjoy them long. In an advanced Age we enjoy our selves, and all the Good we have done. *Plena est voluptatis si illâ scias uti.* Old Age is charming when we

Means to make old Age happy.

know how to enjoy it; but this Science must be acquired whilst we are young.

AN old Man that has pass'd his Time in Amusements, or in Affairs of Ambition, finding himself no longer in a Condition of relishing Pleasures; and seeing his Credit diminishing every Day, and giving Place to new *Rising Suns*, suffers continual Disgraces. Every thing he sees, he sees through his Chagrin, as thro' a Glass which darkens every Object; every thing displeases him: He condemns the *present*, in which he has no sufficient Part; and values nothing but the *past*, which he would fain, with all his Heart, call back again. (x) The more he criticises, the more trifling he appears. By this Means he grows more and more out of Humour, and commits Errors which multiply every Day. On the contrary, an old Man, who is above the Follies of Youth, confirmed in Virtue, and enrich'd with Knowledge; who can remember the past with Pleasure, and can look towards the future with glorious Expectations, is in the most happy Condition of Life: He has nothing to fear, nothing to lament: He enjoys himself. Nothing is so melancholly as the Condition of an old Man who is despised, and sees even his Obsequies before his Death: But if we spend our Life well, the Miseries of it will not be able to pursue us thus far. (y)

*Different Ages
are mutually
assistant to each
other.*

XX. THE Wisdom of Providence, which has made Man for Society, obliges them in some Measure to Union amongst themselves, by mutual good Offices which they do one another. Young People, if left to themselves, would produce nothing but Whims and Fooleries: The Imagination of old Men, if they lived in Retirement and Solitude, would fall by Degrees into Stupidity. But as the Difference of Ages hinders not the young Men from conversing with the old, the too great Fire of the one, will be morderated by the Phlegm of the others; and reciprocal-
ly

(x) Jamque Caput quassans grandis suspirat Arator,
Et cum Tempora Temporibus præsentia confert
Præteritis. laudat fortunam sæpe parentis,
Et crepat antiquum genus ut pietate repletum.

(y) Si te ad studia revocaveris, omne vitæ fastidium effugeris; nec noctem fieri optabis tædio lucis, nec tibi gravis eris, nec aliis supervacuuus: multos in amicitiam attrahes, affluetque ad te optimus quisque.

Quare nihil turpius est quam grandis natu Senex, qui nullum aliud habet argumentum, quo se probet diu vixisse, præter ætatem. Sen, *de Tranquill. Animi.*

ly what remains of the Vigour of the last will not only be kept alive, but also rekindled by the Communication of the former: Young Men, without falling into the Heaviness of old Men, will benefit by their Circumspection; and the old, without imitating the Levity of the young, will reap some Advantages from their Vicacity. The one will continue a shorter Time in the Weaknesses of the first Age, and the others will arrive later to the Infirmities of the last.

THIS Counsel, if follow'd, will not only strengthen the Understanding, and put it in a Condition both of discovering Truth more easily, and of acknowledging it more readily when proposed by others, but will also lead to Wisdom, and what may be call'd the Art of Living. And as it will render the Lives of young Men more regular, so it will make those of old Men more comfortable.

WHENEVER young People give themselves up to their Fire and Fancy, they presently fall into Meannesses, and such Excesses as are very shocking to remember in a more advanced Age, and which they are already ashamed of, in these few Moments, when their Reason is at liberty. The Conversation of their Superiors is therefore very useful to them, because it forms them to Reserve and Circumspection.

ON the other side, every Thing changes, tho' by little and little, and by insensible Degrees; our Habits, Furniture, the Modes of Architecture and Fashions of Building, the Ceremonies of Entertainments and Salutations, the Stile and Turns of Conversation, the Forms of Civility and Politeness: Every Thing, I say, changes; so that whoever shall keep up to the first Fashion he is acquainted with, without any Variation, for want of going out of the narrow Circle of his Acquaintance of the like Age and Humour, will before he arrives to old Age already pass for a Man of another World. There are some that perceive this too late: They would willingly return back, and begin the World again, to model themselves according to the innocent Fashions in present use; but they are not receiv'd: They cringe, and importune; they become the Aversion of all Companies, or at best are look'd upon with Pity, as Objects worthy of some Compassion, and Subjects to exercise our Complaisance upon. We see some, who after having shone some Time by their Wit and Politeness, appear after a dozen or twenty Years, perfectly dull and clownish, of a vitiated Taste, and surprizingly ridiculous. What a Change! cries one: But he mistakes, they are still the same: But they that judge of them

are changed without perceiving it. They judge not any longer upon the same Maxims as formerly; and the Principles upon which they build Politeness and a good Taste are often changing, without their being sensible of it, because it comes on by little and little.

XXI. IT was necessary there should be
Of the Authority of old Age. *Subordination* in Society; that some should direct, and others execute; some govern, and others obey. Employments that give an Authority, are not to be enter'd upon before a certain Age; for which Reason young People are usually placed in the lowest Ranks. This engages them to pay Respect to those that go before them, which they pay with less Reluctance, by how much the Person who is to receive it is older than themselves. This Deference for Persons in Years, makes in the World one part of Politeness: We are accustomed to it from our Infancy; because in an Age where we cannot govern our selves, we are more readily used to depend upon others, and are charmed to find in them Protectors against the little Injuries of our Equals. Thus old Men find themselves in Possession of the Government of their Juniors, which ought not to be contested with them so long as they do not abuse it: But they are apt, for the most part, to look upon this as an Effect of their Merit, which is only a Consequence of their Age. Under this Mistake they treat as *Idiots* all those who dare think otherwise than they do; and look upon the Liberty any one shall take of making Objections which may puzzle them, as an Insolence which deserves Punishment. But they ought to remember, methinks, that the greatest Part of their Sentiments, which are now become sacred to them, were adopted by them when they were young themselves; and they ought to agree, that the frequent Repetitions of them change not their Nature, and that all the Service their Years are of, is only to make the Examination of them a great deal more difficult, by the long Habit they have contracted of taking them for granted, without any Examination. On the other hand, Ease and Idleness are the two great Motives which engage young People to submit to the Decisions of their Seniors. To these two Motives they join a third, more reasonable in Appearance, That old Men must needs be more *Circumspect*, because they are believ'd to be *Wiser*. It were to be wished, that this favourable Opinion of old Age were establish'd upon a better Foundation: If old Men do not any longer give into the Passions of Youth, it is because they have already taken their *Fill* of them, and
 Nature


Nature does not supply them with Faculties to continue all their Follies. As for the rest, it but too often happens that one Vice succeeds in the Place of another; and as young People love their Pleasures too much, so the old love also too much to cross and oppose them, and in the Discontents of of the former, they found their own Satisfactions. Those who are seduced by Pleasures are to be pitied; but these that give themselves up to Envy, deserve to be detested. (b)

(b) " We call Wisdom the Peevishness of our Humours, a Disgust to the present Age: But in Truth, we do not so properly part with our Vices, as change them, and, in my Opinion, for the worse too. Besides a stupid and decaying Pride, a tiresome Babbling, these crabbed and unfociable Humours, and Superstition, and a ridiculous Thirst of Riches after the Use of them is gone, I find there also a great deal more Envy, Injustice, and Malice." *Montagne, B. III. Ch. 2.*



C H A P. VI.

Being a Continuation of Remarks upon the Varieties of the Imagination.

I.  HE different Kinds of Life have *Of Solitude*, also a very great Influence over the Imagination. A Man that is employ'd in a great many Affairs, and is always conversing with others, has an Imagination quite different from that of one who passes his Days in Retirement. Each of these Kinds of Life has its Advantages and Disadvantages; for which Reason they ought to be mixed, that we may borrow from the one Means to guard against the Inconveniences of the other.

As we are not born purely for our selves, and for Solitude; so neither are we born to distract our selves continually in an Hurry of Business, or in the Amusements of Society: We should therefore first of all learn to live alone. He who does not know how to entertain himself by himself, and to be easy and satisfied alone, will be always the Slave of others,

others, and by his Easiness become the Sport of their Humours.

To learn them to live easy, we must learn to live by our selves: A ranging Life casts us infallibly into Disquiet. It is a sad Sign that our Wants are great, our Disorders many, and even grown to a terrible Excess, when we dare not look into our selves to examine them, to be sensible of them, and to apply Remedies to them. (a) *Conceal your self*, is a Maxim which such a Life as this must be begun with. In Retirement we learn to live for our selves: It is the first of Sciences; when it is once acquired, then it is time to learn to live for others.

WE learn in Solitude to entertain our selves more easily with whatever we please, to fix or lead on our Thoughts at Pleasure, to keep up our Attention, to suspend our Judgment; because we are not press'd to an hasty Decision, and by that Means we are accustomed to avoid Precipitation: We have moreover all the Leisure that is necessary, to go Step by Step, from Principle to Principle, and from Consequence to Consequence, and never to advance to a second Subject before having been confirmed in the first with all the Clearness and Perfectness it is capable of.

BUT if we would benefit by Retirement, we must make use of it to know and to correct our selves; whereas it is too frequently made to serve quite different Ends, to make us fly and avoid our selves as effectually as in the World, to employ our selves with Amusements, and to make a perfect Hurry of a solitary and religious Exercise. Moreover, a Man that is sunk in Solitude, with only one Friend of the same Humour with himself, will become by little and little incapable of being commonly civil to any body else; He cannot conform or accommodate himself to the Manners of others; the least Departure from his own provokes and disturbs him; the Objections and Advice, the Necessity of which we have already more than once treated of, to him will appear

(a) *Ægri animi jactatio est. Primum augmentum compositæ mentis existimo, posse consistere & secum morari. Sen.*

“ Whatever it be, whether Art or Nature, which directs this Condition of Living with respect to others, it does us more Mischiefe than Good: We neglect our true Excellencies, to put on such as shall appear so in the Opinion of the Publick: We do not so much regard what our real State is, as what it seems to be to others. Even the Blessings of Understanding and Wisdom appear to us without Fruit, if enjoy'd by our selves only, if they be not also produced to publick View and Approbation.” *Mont. B. III. Ch. 9.*

appear a strange Hardship. Pride thrives in Retirement as well as in the World; and the former has its Vanity and Affectation as well as the latter. Some retire from the World to avoid being Witnesses to the Glory of others, and think themselves humble because they live in a sort of Pride, that is less disturbing. Some even retire to be talk'd of; which is the most ridiculous of all Contradictions. To benefit by Solitude, we must put on happy Dispositions before we enter into it; we must be able to say, that when we are by our selves, we are not in bad Company. In Solitude we give up our selves more easily to our Prejudices and Humours than in the World. *Omnia nobis mala siolidè persuadet.* Sen. Ep. XXV. Lastly, in Solitude we fall into Inaction; from Inaction we sink into Slothfulness; we become incapable of doing any Good; we are an useleſs Weight upon the Earth, and might as well be already covered with it.

Otium sine Literis mors est, & hominis vivi Sepultura.

II. An Imagination accustomed to such a *Of Society.* Succession of Objects, as follow one another in the Conversation of the World, easily contracts an Habit of Unsteadiness. The Ideas, which the Objects that have most sensibly affected us, have engraven deep in the Imagination, will follow and possess it in spite of Opposition. Oftentimes when it would apply it self to one particular Thing, the Memory of another interrupts and entirely diverts it. In the Conversation of the World also, the Circumstances which pass, and upon which it is necessary to come to a speedy Determination, do not afford Time enough to reflect sufficiently in order to bring its Ideas to Perfection, and to examine the whole with Accuracy. (*b*)

BUT oftentimes also in Affairs which concern us, we are obliged to form very exact Ideas, and to think with great Accuracy: The least Mistake is presently discover'd and aggravated by ill Success, and our Errors are always punish'd by Events. Whereas in Solitude, we may build upon false Principles, trust to Illusions, and go upon Matters of Theory, from Error to Error without being sensible of them. We stave off Objections sometimes by positive Denials, sometimes by frivolous Distinctions; and the same secret Motives that lead us into Error, make us find an Appearance of Strength

(*b*) *Occupatorum animi velut sub jugo sunt, flectere se ac respicere non possunt. Sen.*

Strength in the Reasons which we endeavour to oppose to solid Arguments.

MOREOVER, in the room of Heaviness and Dulness, which we are apt to fall into in Retirement, we acquire in Conversation a Vivacity and Strength of Imagination, which makes us capable of distinguishing in a few Moments, that which a Man in Solitude must take a great deal of Time to make out: We learn also to bear Contradictions, without being offended, and, what is a Consequence of this, even to benefit by Objections. *Discere verum, dicere & audire.*

III. We must know therefore how to pass from Solitude to Society, and from Society to be able to retire into Solitude. By this we shall learn to be ready for Business, without being entirely given up to it. The want of observing this Rule, has occasioned in most Men such an Hurry and Unsettledness, as makes them incapable of any Thing that is a little difficult, and consequently prevents their making any great Progress in the Sciences. We see a great many People in the World very ready and knowing in their own Affairs, who reason very wretchedly upon the Sciences and upon Religion, in respect to which they stagnate quietly in the most profound Ignorance: And for want also of observing the same Rule, most of our Men of Letters sink into Heaviness, Confusion, Unpoliteness, Obstinacy, and Clownishness, and by this Means deter from Learning many happy Genius's, who might otherwise have admirably well succeeded in it. We shall find upon Examination, that the Lives of our greatest Men have a Mixture of both these different Qualifications. Retirement alone has made a great many conceited and whimsical People; and yet without Retirement we can never come to any Solidity or Coherence in our Knowledge (c).

WE

(c) *Ista inter se miscenda sunt, & quiescenti agendum, & agenti quiescendum est. Sen.*

Miscenda tamen ista, & alternanda sunt, solitudo & frequentia. Illa nobis faciet hominum desiderium, hæc nostri: & erit altera alterius remedium; odium turbæ sanabit Solitudo, tædium solitudinis Turba. Nec in eadem intentione retinenda mens est, sed ad Jocos revocanda. Sen. de Tranq. An.

So many Humours, Sects, Judgments, Opinions, Laws, and Customs, teach us to judge soundly of our own, and discover to our Judgment its own Imperfection and natural Weakness, which is no small Advantage. Mont. B. I. Ch. 25.

“ I am

WE ought to be alone to work upon our selves with any Success; but we must go into the Company of others, to find how well we have actually succeeded in the Pains we have taken to form our Hearts and Understandings. Action and Exercise make us know our selves, and discover both our Strength and our Weaknesses. (d) In the Society of the World we see best what we are: In Solitude we find it easiest to form our selves as we ought to be. We seldom find our selves in any Company, without seeing there something either good or bad; but we must be alone to make a just Distinction of them. It is so true, that we ought to join these two different Kinds of Life, that we can never succeed in either of them, if we absolutely neglect the other: A Man that is insupportable to himself, easily becomes so to others; and the same Merit which makes us easy and contented with our selves without Flattery, will infallibly draw to us the Esteem and Affection of others. *Qui sibi amicus est, scito hunc amicam omnibus esse.*

IF we do not, from time to time, retire and reflect upon what we have heard, upon what we have seen, and upon what we have done our selves; if we do not instruct our selves in secret, and withdraw from Tumult, and every Thing which may disturb us; it will be almost impossible to prevent having our Hearts and our Understandings depraved by the continual Conversation of the World: By being accustomed gradually to a Taste of false Principles, we leave our selves expos'd to dangerous Impressions. The Commendations and Accusations; Entertainments serious and comical; Friends and Enemies; those we depend on, and those who depend on us; are all dangerous, all deceitful, and do all very much require us to be upon our Guard (e).

THE

“I am pleas'd to see a General of an Army at the foot of a Breach which he is preparing to attack, sit down to Dinner and talk with his Friends cheerfully and composed. And *Brutus* having Heaven and Earth conspired against him, and against the Liberty of *Rome*, stealing from the Affairs of the Camp, some Hours of the Night, to read and abridge *Polybius* in private. *Mont. B. III. Ch. II.*

(d) Imperfectum ac languidum bonum est, in otium sine actu projecta virtus, nunquam id quod didicit ostendens. Quis negat illum debere profectus suos in opere tentare? nec tantum quid faciendum sit cogitare, sed etiam aliquando manum exerere, & ea quæ meditata sunt, ad verum perducere? *Sen. de Otho. Sap.*

(e) Nulla ad Aures nostras vox impunè perfertur: nocent qui operant, nocent qui execrantur, nam & horum imprecatio falsò nobis metus

THE Count de Bussi takes notice, in one of his *Letters*, Tom. IV. Lett. 69. That the MONKS are too much in Solitude, and the COURTIERS too much in Employment: There wants a Medium. A constant Hurry of Action leaves no Time for Thinking. He might have added, That in Retirement we think either too carelessly, or too conformably to our own Humour; and the Pleasure we have of going our own Pace, without finding our selves under any Necessity of conforming to the Temper of others, as we must do every Moment in the Society of the World, makes us amends for the Loss of the social Pleasures we renounce. *Those who shun publick Offices, and the infinite Difficulties, and great Variety of Faces, which a Man must have to deal with, who wou'd observe an exact Behaviour in civil Life, do, in my Opinion, save themselves a great deal of Trouble, even tho' they shou'd abuse a Life of some Severity. The flying a publick Life is far from Dying. It may have some other Consideration, but I think it has not that of Difficulty: For it is a much harder Task to keep right amidst the Waves and Throngs of the World, and discharge one's Duty to the Satisfaction of all its Members.* Mont. B. II. Ch. 33.

NOTHING is more common with Men than to make a Virtue of their Humour: The more extraordinary it is, the more apt they are to admire and consecrate it. This happens above all to melancholy People, who, when they once take a Fancy for Solitude, look upon it as a State of the most exalted Perfection. Nothing is more unreasonable than this Thought: Can the Perfection of Human Nature consist in such a kind of Life as tends directly to extinguish it? If Men had not learned at the same Time to Think and Reflect, as well as to Speak, they would have lived a Life not superior to the Brutes. We have given
Chap. III. Proofs of this already. The Conversation of the World is, as it were, the Fund from whence the Soul derives all its Ideas and Reflections; in vain does

metus & inferit, & illorum amor malè docet benè optando. Mittit enim nos ad longinqua bona, & incerta & errantia, cùm possimus felicitatem domo promere. Non licet, inquam, ire rectâ viâ; trahunt in pravum parentes, trahunt servi: nemo errat uni sibi, sed dementiam spargit in proximos, accipitque invicem. Et ideo in singulis Vitiâ Populorum sunt, quia illa Populus dedit: dum facit quisque pejorem, factus est. Didicit deteriora, deinde docuit: effectaque est ingens illa nequitia, congesto in unum, quod cuique pessimum scitur, Sen. Ep. XCIV.

does it contain within it self this Fund, which, without such Help, would lie uselefs and unfruitful. If from our Birth we had been given up to Solitude, we should never have known what Truth and Virtue are. How then can we be made to believe, that what compleats our Perfection is directly contrary to what begins and promotes it?

IV. YOUNG People listen with Pleasure to every Thing that is said of the Inconveniences of Solitude; but they almost always make a wrong Use of it, and under the Pretence of avoiding Gloominess and Unpoliteness, which reign but too much in the Schools, they contract in the World an early Habit of Unsettledness, which follows them thro' the whole Course of their Lives: Their Understanding does not at all serve to make them Wise, because they know not how to be long enough by themselves to make a right Application of it.

*We must be
Masters of our
selves.*

THERE is a certain Rule to discover immediately when the Society of the World becomes dangerous, and begins to exert too great an Empire in our Heart. If, when we retire from Company, the Ideas of what we have seen and heard there do still pursue us, if it is not in our Power to get rid of them, or if we find it very difficult to remove them, in order to think of other Subjects, it is a Demonstration that we have engaged too far with the World; our Liberty loses Ground, and those Amusements, which ought only to serve for our Diversion, are made our Business and Employment. What we see and hear only by the by, in Companies where the Understanding is more concern'd than the Heart, can never do any Hurt: It is by the Pleasure of reflecting upon what it has been once delighted with, that the Heart surrenders it self, and becomes dependent, and that at last it comes to make a serious Entertainment of what would otherwise have been but a light Amusement.

V. WE may as well, and sometimes better, spend our Lives in Solitude, than in the Company only of such as are extremely below our selves in Birth, Fortune, Genius, or Learning: To gather about us a little Court of such as know how to do nothing but Applaud, whom we can hear, reprimand, and make silent when we will, with whom we are under no manner of Restraint, we live, we speak without exerting our Faculties, without Attention, without Order, without Exactness; is a sure Method to confirm our selves, beyond Remedy, in all the Mischiefs which

*Society may
have the Faults
of Solitude.*

we are liable to in Solitude, without any of its Advantages. A Mind that is narrow, superficial, and impatient, full of Admiration of it self, and of Aversion to every Thing which does not bear some Resemblance to it, is the true and constant Character of one who by Idleness, join'd with a Pride of being foremost, confines himself within a Circle of his Inferiors.

THOSE who take upon them to teach, very often fall into the same Errors; which they might easily prevent if they loved Truth, if they were pleas'd to consider and study the the different Dispositions of the Understandings they have to deal with, if they loved their Scholars, if they had an Ambition to educate and form great Genius's; To improve their Studies with greater Ease and Plainness, to promote them with more Success, they would continually apply themselves to find out the most easy, simple, natural, as well as the most copious Methods. The Understanding of the Master becomes enlarged, by his having at Heart the Advancement of his Scholars.

VI. WE never find any Fire or Fruitfulness in the Imagination of those, who, for want of the Advantages of Fortune, and having neither Birth nor Dignity to set them off and give them credit, are obliged to live in continual Dependence upon others: They usually receive all their Ideas from those to whom they owe their Subsistence: They are restrain'd by Fear from forming any of their own; and oftentimes an excellent Genius is suppress'd, because it dares not discover it self (*f*). Idleness is natural; and these have no Courage to break thro' it, and to search and examine for themselves, for fear they should meet with something which might displease their Superiors, and ruin their Expectations. They content themselves therefore to become Parrots, or at best intelligent Echo's of what they hear and learn from their Benefactors. A Man thus intimidated, and thus dependent, has his Superiors perpetually before him; and when he undertakes any Subject, he thinks more of them than of it. The Pains he takes, are not to discover what he ought to think, but to know whether his Thoughts will please those on whom he depends. It is a great Bias to the Thoughts of a Man in Necessity, to find it his Interest to maintain a particular Opinion: To please those

(*f*) Contunde animos, & quicquid est indolis comminuetur trepidatione degeneri. *Sen. de Clem. Lib. I. Cap. 16.*

those in high Stations, you must be inferiour to them in every Thing, and appear in Understanding and Merit very much below them. They can never bear to find you upon the Level with them in any respect. A Grandee of *Spain* retiring from Court, told one of his Friends he was obliged to do so, because he had more Understanding than his Master. He who has no other Merit than the Greatness of his Quality, will admit of no other to imagine his Power to be absolute over his Inferiours. He can scarce perswade himself to reckon them in the Number of Men; if he should regard them in this View, he would often be ashamed; and it is without doubt for this Reason that great Men usually hate those that have more Merit than themselves, and are not far from hating all Mankind, so uneasy is it for them to esteem those they rule over to be Men like themselves.

IT is certain that Poverty gives terrible Shocks to Virtue: Many grovel in Ignorance, and from Ignorance pass into Vice, who might have made great Men, if they had been possess'd of the Means. He that is overwhelm'd with Wants, has neither the Time nor the Ease that is necessary to enlarge his Knowledge: Not having the Ability of examining Things himself, he becomes credulous; his Credulity makes him superstitious; and if he is a Man of Letters, to secure himself from Contempt, so insupportable to the Heart of Man, he conceals his Weaknesses and his Ignorance under an austere Gravity. How low therefore are the greatest Part of those Men reduced, from whom the Race of Mankind ought to receive their Instructions, and to derive their Learning! We have often the Blind for our Guides. It is the Part of the Magistrates to provide a Remedy for this Mischief: They must answer for it, and the Misfortunes of other Men will make up their Charge and their Condemnation.

AT the Sight of a rich Man, and all the Pomp which surrounds him, the common People are as it were stunn'd: They submit to him even their Liberty of Reasoning, and their Imagination is so affected, that it can do nothing but admire: Let but a rich Man speak, and presently he is applauded; and those who hear him will esteem it an Happiness to be able to come into his Sentiment, or to have their Understandings tuned in Consort with his.

VII. THE Ridiculousness of these Principles will be plainly perceived, if they be reduced into a proper Form of Argument, with their respective Consequences. *The Remedies.* *He keeps a good House, therefore*

fore he thinks Judiciously: He has a great Number of Domesticks, therefore he is Learned: His Horse is richly furnish'd, therefore his Studies have been pursued with great Industry and Exactness. How little soever we are interested in Truth, it is impossible for us to be impos'd upon by such monstrous Absurdities. Who would not laugh at the Folly of a Jockey, who should rate the Price of an Horse according to the fineness of the Stable where he is kept? And yet we regulate our Esteem of Men by the Costliness of their Habit, and such other Circumstances as are not in the least any better Proofs of Merit. (g)

SOME expose themselves very much by citing great Men upon improper Occasions: If any one is speaking of Encampments, Defences and Attacks, and quotes a General of Reputation; if he is upon Maxims and Interests of State, and cites a Minister of noted Abilities, I submit to the Force of these Authorities: But in an Affair within every Body's Sphere, if any one brings up the Name of a great Man to enforce his Argument, it is a piece of great Impertinence. One of these grave Fools told me one Day, *He had heard a certain Lord say, That playing at Tables discover'd the Character and Genius of the Gamesters.* If this Lord had said so, it was only by Hear-say, for he neither play'd the Game himself, nor was inclined to be a Spectator of it, but spent his Time in Employments much more worthy of him and of his Rank. The Proposition is at the bottom partly false, as well as the Citation childish. A Man that is uneasy, or unsettled, or covetous, or dull, or stupid, will discover himself on a thousand Occasions, as much as by playing at Tables: And as to that part of the Conclusion that relates to its shewing the Penetration, Solidity, and Turn of Genius, nothing is more false; it is a Touch-Stone merely imaginary. A little Mind will take a Pride in succeeding and excelling in it, whilst a solid and superior Understanding will despise it, as not worth his Time and Application. The Gamesters usually follow the Method of their Teachers, more than the particular Turn of their own Genius: Experience is more with these than Reasoning, and we see every Day those that arrive to a good Proficiency, who cannot, without a very great Hyperbole, be said to have a tolerable Understanding.

T o

(g) Quemadmodum stultus est, qui equum empturus, non ipsum inspicit, sed stratum ejus ac frænos: sic stultissimus est, qui hominem aut ex veste, aut ex conditione, quæ vestis modo nobis circumdata est, æstimat. *Sen. Ep. XLVII.*

TO quote the Authority of Great Men is sometimes an effect of a narrow Genius, as well as of Affectation. Those who take all Occasions to mention great Names, do it not so much for the sake of shewing they are honour'd with such Acquaintance, as to give a Flight to their narrow Genius, which is swell'd up with the Ideas of those whom they adore, and in whose Places they would be transported to see themselves.

VANITY is an inexhaustible Source of Illusions; and we believe that we advance our selves by interesting our selves in the Fortunes of Great Men, and by the Zeal with which we embrace their Sentiments: The Reflections we shall make upon this Weakness, may contribute to secure us from it. A Gentleman at his Country-Seat, and a Merchant in his Counting-House, computes his Happiness from the Victories of a Prince whom perhaps he never did nor will see: This Prince takes the Loss of a Battel without any Concern; the Forces that serve him are disturb'd at it; but the Tradesman, who has but an imaginary Interest in it, is overwhelm'd with it, and loses both his Stomach and his Rest. He need not read you his Advices, to let you know whether he has received good or bad News of his Hero; his Air either depress'd or insulting, his Walk either hasty or melancholy, discover all that at a Distance: He has dedicated his Ideas to those of the Conqueror; he is elevated with his Conquests, and cast down with his Defeats. You would say, that his very Being depended upon his Wishes, so much Delight does he take in forming them; and he wants nothing but a Turn of Devotion to believe that Providence determines Events by the Rule of his Wishes.

IT has for a long time been look'd upon as a Distemper of the Understanding, and a Disorder of the rational Faculty, to submit one's Thoughts to the Authority of another, and to sacrifice one's Liberty, without daring even to consider, whether those to whom we make such a Sacrifice do deserve it. Mr. *de la Motte* perhaps describes a much greater Number than he thought for, when, in his Discourse upon *Homer*, he says, That *in their Opinions concerning Works of Learning, Men commonly form two sorts of Judgments; one Publick, the other Private; one for Shew and Ceremony, the other for Reserve, and their own particular Use. We think without Constraint upon an Author whom we examine in our Studies; and far from concerning our selves with what others think of*

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him, we sometimes please our selves the more with the Idea we form of him, by how much the more singular it is, and, if I may say so, the more it is our own. But when once it is necessary to make a publick Judgment of him, we take care to conform to the Ideas receiv'd, how false soever we know them to be, and we become not at all nice. For I confess if the Respect we owe to the Publick went no farther than to make us examine our Thoughts with greater Severity, that we may be confirm'd in them if they are reasonable, or quit them if they appear to be otherwise; this Circumspection would be prudent, and consequently to be commended. But it extends for the most part a great way farther: It makes us betray our Judgment, for fear of offending the Majority; and we chuse rather to appear judicious, than to be so in fact; and to avoid striving against the Stream, we suffer our selves to be carried away with it.

So the Party of Error grows every Day stronger and stronger, even by those who have discover'd it; for undeceiv'd as they are, they nevertheless conform to the same Language with those that are still deceiv'd, and they become themselves a new Authority of deceiving others. After these Reflexions so reasonable and true, he adds, Ought this false Shame to extend to Things of so small Importance as the Reputation of a Poet? But there is a great deal more reason to add, Ought this false Shame to extend to Things of so great Importance as Morality and the Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures? There are, however, a great many People of this Character, and I cou'd my self mention several of the same Sentiments with my self upon these Matters, who for want of Courage, will perhaps become Censurers of them. These are again the Words of Mr. de la Motte.

THERE may be Duties which perhaps we do not pursue far enough, nor sufficiently know their Extent; perhaps also, there may be some which we stretch too far. Perhaps on the one side, we reckon trifling Ceremonies among the Essentials of Religion; whilst on the other, we cry out upon Errors that are not material, as upon the greatest Enormities. We may suspect that Religion has suffer'd a great deal of Difficulty and Darkness from the Perplexity and Obscurity of our Metaphysics; and that a false Philosophy, loaden with laborious Subtilties, has spread its Confusion over the Face of Divinity, and has robb'd it of that Simplicity which makes one of the Divine Characters of the Gospel. There are some who perceive, or believe they perceive this Confusion. They find it both in Practice and in

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Speculation: In Precepts and in Doctrines they meet with Difficulties and obstructions; They undertake to clear them up, and after some earnest Endeavours have the Pleasure of succeeding. But whenever they think of publishing their Discoveries, their Courage fails them, and the Fear of appearing to quit the Road that is authorized by Custom, sets them quite back again. They cease to open their Eyes to a Light which is dangerous to look at; and after having got a Glimpse of it, for fear of being suspected, they talk as if they were still in Darkness. One that wants to be inform'd, dares not complain of his Ignorance, but confusedly; and another who could instruct him, dares not do it otherwise than enigmatically. When once we begin to see, we shut our Eyes for fear of seeing too much; and for want of the Courage to remove a Difficulty that is revered, we touch upon it but softly and imperfectly; so that it is only made to give a little Way for a Moment, and after that suffered to revive in its full Strength.

LASTLY, that we may prevent putting our Reason in Irons, and making a Condescension so servile and unworthy human Nature, I know nothing more effectual, than to conceive a strong Passion for the Knowledge of Truth, and to think frequently with all possible Attention, that nothing is more shameful, or disgraces us more than Mistakes, whether they be in Opinion or Behaviour; that nothing debases a Man so much as Error and Vice; that Understanding and Virtue make up his true Glory and Grandeur; that *Riches* and *Titles* are far inferior to *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*. By these last Advantages we bear some Resemblance to the Deity; but the first are oft enjoy'd in common with the most wicked. He that seeks for solid Felicity, will never find it in Estate or Dignity: When they come to be possessed, he will find them very different from what he before imagined them to be. We are made for Truth and Rectitude: These are what give absolute Content, and are such Advantages as do not dazzle with a deceitful Brightness, and whose Value is every Day increased and better known. In whatever Condition we are born, to make these the Objects of our Application, and to prefer them above all Things else, is the Way to raise us above the Dependances upon Men, and upon the Vicissitude of Events. To know by Experience the true and greatest of Goods, is the sure Means of never being like to be dazzled with such as are of a lower Value. He who attends frequently to the Greatness of his Soul, and the End of his

Creation, sees nothing but Meanness in the Vanities which other Men are deceiv'd with, and seek their Grandeur from. (*b*) True Nobility consists in Merit, not in Blood; and our Station is then the most elevated, when our Virtue will not suffer us to eringe amongst the rest of Mankind. *

* *This last is an Expression of Confucius.*

VICE has made Subordination necessary amongst Men, otherwise born equal; but in whatever Condition of Life we are placed, if we do but live wisely, we shall always procure what is greatest and most esteemed among Men.

LET us but reflect that we are Men, and we shall be ashamed to sell our selves to other Men: Let us but remember that we have Souls made for Eternity and infinite Excellencies, and we shall be above purchasing trifling Presents at the Price of our Liberty, and sacrificing our Knowledge and Honesty for light Favours, which are very injuriously esteem'd gratuitous, because not bought with Money. (*i*)

WE must only take care that Vanity does not come in for a Share, and that we do not confound with the Love of Truth the dangerous Pleasures of contradicting, and the ambitious Desire of being distinguish'd and raised above those whom we find our selves inferior to in Birth and Fortune. We see some, who big with the Knowledge and Virtue which they pretend to have acquired, heighten the Pleasure they take in valuing themselves upon these internal Advantages, by that of contemning others who seem to want them. Not content with admiring themselves, they would engross all the Attention and Admiration of others; they cannot suffer any to come in for Shares with them. To allow of any Esteem or Consideration for Birth, Riches, and Dignities, belpeaks

(*b*) Cogita in te præter animum nihil esse mirabile, cui magno nihil magnum est. *Sen.*

(*i*) Gratuita nobis videntur, quæ carissimè constant. Ex eo licet stupor noster appareat, quod ea solum putamus emi, pro quibus pecuniam solvimus: & gratuita vocamus, pro quibus nos ipsos impendimus. Quæ emere nollemus, si domus nostra pro illis esset danda, si amænum aliquod fructuosumve prædium: ad ea paratissimi sumus pervenire cum sollicitudine, cum periculo, cum jacturâ pudoris & libertatis, & temporis. Adeo nihil est cuique se vilius. Idem itaque in omnibus consiliis rebusque faciamus, hoc quod concupiscimus, quanti deferatur. Sæpè maximum pretium est, pro quo nullum datur. Multa possum tibi ostendere, quæ acquisita acceptaque, libertatem nobis extorsissent; nostri essent, si ista nostra non essent. *Sen. Ep. XLII.*

bespeaks a Disorder of the Heart and Understanding, and is such a piece of Injustice as quite dismounts them: It is refusing them that Homage which they believe themselves alone to be worthy of, and paying it to Idols and Phantoms that no way deserve it.

WHEN we concern our selves so much about the Actions of others; we are usually wanting in attending to our selves; and it is a Sign we do not know the Value of true Excellencies, when we are not content with enjoying them, unless they are accompanied with the Admiration of other Men. We may say that they who take Pains with this View, make a Virtue of Necessity: If they would arrive at Esteem and Distinction by any other Road, they would never think of chusing this. He that singles it out because he finds it amiable in it self, contents himself with pursuing and advancing in it, and leaves other People to themselves. But it happens too often that we wish to be in the Places of those whom we are so hot in criticising upon; and that in our ill Treatment of great Men, by our Envy in not being such our selves, we have all their Vanities, and all their Weaknesses, without any of their Advantages. (k)

A LITIGIOUS Humour, a satirical Spirit, Rudeness, and Unpoliteneſs, fall but too often to the Share of Men of Letters, that are born in an obscure Condition. They are used from their Infancy to observe with Concern the Distinction that is made betwixt them and their School-Fellows, who are born to Titles of greater Respect. The Thought of others being ready to despise, and deny them the least Part of that Justice which they deserve, sets them at Defiance and Enmity with all the World. Having no other Refuge but in their Qualifications to make themselves consider'd, and well receiv'd in the World, they take Pains to display them; and by their Affectation it often happens that they lose the Fruits of them. They do all that is in their Power to be look'd on as still more learned and virtuous than they really are: They decide with an Air of Authority what they know very little or nothing of, as tho' they understood it compleatly: And that they may be respected as Men of so strict an Adherence to Virtue, that they cannot allow of the least Deviation from it, they are always ready to reprimand and censure, and to find nothing of Merit in any thing but what they do themselves.

(k) *Affueſcendum itaque Conditioni ſux, & quàm minimum de illâ querendum: & quicquid habet circa ſe commodi, apprehendendum eſt. Sen. de Tranq. Cap. 10.*

selves. [The Meanness of their Education hinders them from perceiving the Unpoliteness and Rusticity of their Manners. There are some Countries which are so far from having any Taste for Delicacy, that they have not so much as an Idea of it; and in some Nations their Minds are as ill form'd as their Bodies. Country Clowns entertain one another with handy Cuffs; and a Blow that is just great enough for them to feel, wou'd be enough to lame one of a less robust Constitution. A delicate Thought or fine Piece of Raillery is lost upon Men of this Make; nothing affects them but down right Injuries and violent Passions.

*Rules for those
of a superior
Rank.*

VIII. THE Complaisance we have for Persons distinguish'd by their Birth, their Fortunes, and their Employments; the Interest we have in flattering and submitting to their Authority, makes their Sentiments to be usually follow'd with Approbation, or at least with a respectful Silence; so that being under no Reserve by the Apprehension of the Censure and Criticism of others, they give a full Swing to their Genius, and very freely deliver their Thoughts. Their Imagination by this Means becomes courageous and fruitful; but the worst is, that it is apt to fall in with Presumption, and by conceiving presently the same good Opinion of themselves which others appear to have, (*l*) they determine of Subjects conceitedly, and therefore very imperfectly, the usual Effects of having too good an Opinion of our selves. They leave to the Vulgar Circumspection and the Fear of Mistakes, as well as the Obligation of answering particularly and seriously to what others may object. As to them, they are too much used to Applause, to look upon the Objections of others for any Thing more than Insults: (*m*) To dare to believe that they are mistaken, is to forget what they are. So that Dependance renders these too servile, and an high Station those too presumptuous. Great Men find by Experience that the Height of their Station authorizes every Thing they say, and makes every Fashion follow'd which they are pleas'd to invent. The Senses are the Receivers of Fashions; and the Mind being prepossessed in favour of those who establish them, enjoin the Senses to find that handsome, which is not so. Great Men

(*l*) Quales sunt aliis credunt.

(*m*) Citò nobis placemus, & si inveniamus qui nos bonos viros dicat, què prudentes, què sanctos, agnoscimus. *Sen.*

Mela consuetudo nihil contra voluntatem audierit. *Sen.*

Men establish any Thing, upon the Assurance of their Power to give a Currency to it; and as they would not like to say a mean Thing, so they believe themselves incapable of it, and for that Reason are never at any Pains to avoid it.

WE have so great an Interest in flattering great Men, that to succeed in it the better, we wink at all their Faults, and magnify all their good Qualities; and we do not so much regard our deceiving both them, and our selves, as that we find a great many more of the same Sentiments with us. We do not know how, because we would not know, and sometimes because we are become by our Habits incapable of knowing how to strip a great Man of his Externals, in order to view him by himself, and to judge of his Merit without Prepossession. Yet Titles and Riches are not the sure Signs of Truth: Evidence alone is its Characteristick; and it is by Attention and Circumspection that we must distinguish its true from its false Lustre.

LET us set what Value we please upon *Riches*, they will be at best, in those that possess them, only a Consequence of their good Fortune, not at all of their Merit. Do we value our selves upon our *Nobility*? If we look back from Generation to Generation, till we come to the Deluge, we shall find all of us descended from an Husbandman. And if we would go still farther, it is plain that God was the Father of the first Man. This is indeed the most grand Conception we could possibly have of our Original; but then this Glory is common to all Mankind, and for that Reason how infinite soever the Value of it be, it is lost in the Sight of the Great, who judge only of their own Eminency by the Debasing of others.

BIRTH and Riches furnish without Contradiction happy Occasions of acquiring Merit, but are not Merit of themselves; and yet they are esteemed as the most solid Merit; and Birth is with a great many made the only Title to Employments that require great Integrity and Abilities.

THE Great have at their first setting out, the Pleasure of giving way to their Fancies, and by that Means of sinning often without Unconsciousness, because they sin without Fear, being secure of the Impunity of this World. But Age brings with it Reflections of another Nature; and the Apprehension of a future State affects them the more sensibly, by its being new to them. To ease them of their Fears, two Methods offer; one of which they make Choice of according to their several Humours; and as they are daring or timorous, they give into either Atheism or Superstition.

Illusions, and Remedies.

IX. THE Misfortune is, that we cannot live in Grandeur without living in Illusion: We first impose upon our Inferiors, and then deceive our selves with their Prepossessions: We give our selves up to their Compliments and Flattery, and by that Means become the Sport of those we look down upon as so much below us, and whom we heartily despise; and for the sake of an apparent Grandeur, we sink into real Meannesses. A trifling and imaginary Happiness, deprives the Great of the lively and solid Felicity. By viewing themselves with other People's Eyes, and by deriving their Satisfaction from the Applauses of others, they become at last incapable of perceiving and tasting the infinite Satisfaction of a clear and easy Conscience. There is nothing real or solid in the highest Stations, more than just so much as they have of Truth; and the Distrust of our selves is the most sure way to Truth.

WHEN we see the Great not content to be serv'd with more Readiness, and obey'd more respectfully than others; not content to live more luxuriously, and to inhabit more spacious and magnificent Houses; to have more commodious and splendid Equipages, and a greater Variety of Pleasures; when, I say, not content with all these Advantages, they seem farther desirous of engrossing the Endowments of the Mind, and of claiming them also as their Due and Prerogative, as much as their Titles, their Pride, their Riches, and their Sensuality; when they disdain listening to others, and determine upon all sorts of Subjects as perfect Masters of them, and judge of Merit only by Externals, which usually conceal it; it is impossible to avoid being moved with Resentment and Indignation. But after having thought better of it, instead of condemning we pity them, and turn our Resentment and Indignation upon those that surround them. How can they hold out against continual Flattery? How can they distinguish it from Sincerity, of which they have no Idea? They understood it but imperfectly in their earlier Age, and have not now any Remembrance of it left. If a very great Number of People should agree to impose upon a Man, and should all assure him that he does not look well; that he is fallen away, that his Eyes are sunk, and his Voice alter'd; in spite of his Health and his Reason he would at last be perswaded he is not right, and would send and consult his Physician.

WHETHER the Great owe their high Station to their Birth, or to the Suffrages of others, at the same time that we

we address them with an Air of Respect, we treat them like Children and Idiots. When we cry up every Word a great Man speaks agreeably to common Sense for a Miracle, do we not laugh at him, in admiring to hear such Expressions from one of the most consummate Education, which might at best but deserve that Applause if they came out of the Mouth of a Child, or a Porter? (n) But after having complimented every Thing a great Man has said or done, and set it off in all the glittering Circumstances we can invent, we only pity him, when we find him charm'd with himself, sometimes for having said a very common Thing, sometimes for passing for having said what he never once thought of, or done what he never had the least Share in.

FOR my own Part, I should make a Conscience of infatuating a Man, purely for the Pleasure of hearing him say foolish Things, or to make him believe whatever I pleas'd, and to benefit by his Confusion and the Loss of his Liberty, even tho' this Alienation of Mind, which I should cast him into, were not to last above a few Hours.

BUT upon this Occasion, as well as upon a great many more, Men fall into the Pits which they dig for others, and have their ill Designs return'd upon their own Heads. A Philosopher sees this just Return with Pleasure, and his Pleasure would be compleat, if the Innocent did not suffer together with the Guilty; for the Courtiers very well deserve their usual miserable Fate. If you except a very few of them
who

(n) I have often thought, that under the Notion of Respect we treat Princes injuriously and contemptuously. This is what has offended me heinously in my earlier Age, to observe those with whom I have been engaged scorn to exert themselves in good Earnest, as thinking me not a Match worthy enough for them to draw out their whole Force against: Yet this is what happens to them every Day; every Body giving them their Way, as they would do to Children, and such as are not worth setting their Wit against. If it be but once perceiv'd that they have ever so little Desire for Victory, we are all ready to give it to them, and rather to belye our Faculties than to offend theirs: We employ just so much of our Strength as will serve to make their Conquest more honourable.----- When Briffon ran with Alexander, and purposely falter'd in the Race; Alexander rebuked him for it, but he ought to have given him the Strappado. Upon this Consideration it was that Carnades said, That the Children of Princes are taught nothing perfectly but the Management of their Horses; for in all other Exercises every one concern'd submits, and gives them the Advantage; but a Horse being no Flatterer, or Courtier, lays a King's Son in the Dirt as readily as a Porter's. Mont. B. III. Ch. 7.

who are so fortunate as to escape their just Destiny, they do all soon or late meet with Back-Reckonings, and more or less become the Object of Caprices; which themselves are the Authors of by extinguishing as much as possible their Reason which would prevent them, and substituting in its room an Infatuation which gives Birth to them.

If this Work shall happen to fall into the Hands of the Great, and they have Patience to read this Page, I hope they will approve the Zeal I shew on their Behalf against those petty Tyrants, who besiege and enslave them under the Pretence of admiring them. Nothing is more haughty than their Design; they aim at nothing less than ruling their Masters; and yet nothing is more servile than the Submissions they make to gain their Point. But those whom Providence has advanced into the highest Ranks, will secure themselves from these Snares that are laid for them; if, 1. They forbear giving into the Pleasure of being admired by others, till they are assured that what is admired in them is really Matter of Commendation, and convinced by a serious Examination that they are really possess'd of those Qualifications which are so much commended. The Emperor *Julian* said, That no *Panegyricks* are of any Value, except such as come from Persons that are in a Condition of blaming with Impunity.^(o) But there is another way of being sure of the Sincerity of

(o) " What Testimony of Affection and Good-will can I draw from
 " him, who owes me, whether he will or not, all he is able? How
 " can I value my self upon his humble Speeches and profound Re-
 " verence, which he dares not refuse me? The Honour we receive
 " from those that fear us, is not Honour; it is due to my Office, not
 " to me,

----- *Maximum hoc regni bonum est,*

Quod pacta domini cogitur populus sui
Quam Ferre, tam Laudare.

Sen. Thyest. Act 2.

" Do I not see that the wicked as well as the good King, he that is
 " hated, as well as he that is beloved, receives it equally and indiffe-
 " rently? My Predecessor was served with the same Appearances,
 " the same Ceremonies, and so will my Successor. If my Subjects
 " do not offend me, 'tis not any Testimony of their good Affection:
 " Why should I take it in good Part, when they could not, if they
 " would? None of them follows me for the Friendship that is be-
 " twixt us; for there can be no Friendship where there is so little Re-
 " lation and Correspondence: My Station puts me out of their Reach;
 " there is too much Disparity and Disproportion. They follow me
 " for Form and Fashion sake, or rather my Fortune than me, in order
 " to

of People's Praises, and that is to deserve them. Merit will make it self known; and when accompanied with Greatness will always be admired with Pleasure, and receive the Homage that is due to it. If, 2. they look upon Flatterers as Men who make it their Business to poison the Mind; and if they cast them off the Moment they discover them guilty of these Enormities.

Si vis exercere tibi utile, nulli autem grave imperium, submove vitia. Sen. Ep. XCIV. This is what their Honour and their Interest visibly requires. Why should they confide in People that make it their Study to deceive them? and who, to succeed the better in it, confound Virtue with Vice, and call black white, and pretend to admire what they really despise? What a Blot is it upon the Memory of *Alexander*, that he could be so weak, to be pleased with his Courtiers imitating his wry Neck! And was it not Madness in *Dionysius* the younger, to suffer Men to make their Court to him, by imitating his Short-sightedness, and awkwardly stumbling against every Thing that lay in the Way, as tho' they had no better Eyes than their Master?

LASTLY, Men in high Stations should be content to acknowledge by some Marks of Favour the most delicate and most rational Commendations; but should preserve all their Esteem for the Counsels that are given them, and should encourage the Liberty their Friends take in giving them, by their Eagerness in benefiting by them; and should judge of their Value according to the Justice of the Cause they engage in, and the Advantages their Subjects will receive from it. He who does this is Great indeed, and deserves to be so: He has but few Equals; and he would become little in his own Eyes, if he could once think himself the least aggrandized by these Externals.

A great Man, in the Idea rational Men have of him, is one whom Providence has created and educated for the Good of Society, by the Wisdom of his Laws, and the Goodness

*Interest inter
MAGNA &
TUMIDA. Sen.*

of

“ to make their own Fortunes. All they say to me and do is but Dis-
“ guise, their Liberty being every Way restrained by the great Power I
“ have over them: I see nothing around me but Masks and Covers.
“ When *Julian* the Emperor was commended by his Courtiers for his
“ just Administration; I should indeed be proud, says he, of these
“ Praises, provided they came out of the Mouths of such Persons as
“ dared to dislike or accuse my ACTIONS, if they were otherwise.”
Montaigne, B.I. Chap. 13.

of his Example; who loves Knowledge and Virtue, is the Support of Liberty and Wisdom, the Scourge of Ignorance, Unpoliteness, and Vice, an Image of the Divinity in Prudence, Understanding, and Uprightness. But according to the Notion of those that look no farther than the Body, he is one born to keep a good Table; to support Masquerades and Dancings, to carry in his magnificent Coaches those who please him; and lastly, to take the Liberty of doing openly, in the Face of the World, those Things which the common sort of Villains are almost ashamed of doing in private. The first of these Ideas furnishes us without Doubt with the *Right* Definition; but I leave it to those who are better Judges of the World than my self, to determine whether the last does not better supply us with the *Fact*.

IF the Great would open their Eyes to their true Interest, they would presently find that nothing is able to advance them to, or to maintain them in that Situation but Virtue. *Sensuality* confounds them with the Crowd, as it confounds these with the Brutes: The Magnificence of their Table is owing to the Skill of their Cooks and Caterers: They are beholding for the Pleasure of their Races to the Vigour of their Horses; and to the Huntsman and Hounds for their Sport. The Architects build them Palaces; and the Painters and Upholsterers furnish them: The Labour and Frugality of their Subjects is the Source of all their Riches; their Generals and Soldiers gain their Battles, and purchase at the Price of their Blood the Titles and Triumphs of the Conquerors. All the Glory therefore which they draw from these external Advantages is foreign to them, and the mere Contribution of others: But the Glory of being wise, learned, judicious, generous, temperate, chaste, and just, belongs to them entirely as their Property, and distinguishes them from their Equals, as well as from their Inferiors. The more Temptations they have of being mislead from Virtue, the greater is their Glory in adhering to it, and their Goodness receives no small Lustre from the Impunity with which they might be wicked.

I WOULD fain ask a great Man, whether he would have me esteem his Person, or rather that I would value his Equipage, his Horses, his Houses, and his Lands. Would he like I should change my Idea of him, as oft as he changes his Habit? Would he be looked upon as an Heroe in his embroider'd Coat, and a common Person in his Night-Gown? Would he like, in case his Revenue should by some bad Fortune be reduced, that we should cease to honour and esteem him?

him? 'Tis obvious therefore, that he would be esteem'd *Himself*, that he would be loved *Himself*: And with good Reason; for whatever is not himself, nor any part of himself, however valuable it may be, renders him no more valuable, than the Wealth of his Neighbour does, or the Treasures of the Grand Seigneur. Suppress therefore your Desires of being deceiv'd, and deceive not your selves first of all (p).

WHAT a melancholy Spectacle is a rich Man that has spent his Estate! Even they who have got most by him, are the most ashamed to appear his Friends, and the first that fly him: Whether it be that their Conscience will not let them look on him without being moved to make him Restitution, or only that they wou'd avoid the Confusion of remembering how very much they have honour'd one that no way deserv'd it. These Examples, which are not very rare, sufficiently shew that we flatter our selves we make use of our Reason and our Discretion, when we only make use of our Senses, and judge of the Value of Things only by their Information.

MOST Men neglect examining and studying themselves with Application; for they are afraid of nothing so much as of seeing themselves: And indeed can they see anything there but what they ought to be ashamed of? Notwithstanding this, they love to form a great Idea of themselves; and as to the Truth of this Idea, for that, as well as well as for almost every thing else, they appeal to the Testimony of others. But what are these Testimonies they give such Credit to? Testimonies which they have bribed and corrupted by their Threats and their Promises, and which are entirely governed by Hopes and Fears. Amongst the Crowd which surrounds a Great Man, there are some who know for what they are to praise and admire him; they would be undone if they did not: But there are also a great Number of others who are but Ecchos; they repeat what they hear said, and do what they see done; they

(p) " If we do but see a Man advanced to some Dignity, tho' we have known him just before a Man of little Consideration, an Image of Grandeur, and Sufficiency insensibly steals in upon us, and by increasing in Retinue and Credit, he is increas'd in Merit. We judge of him not according to his Worth, but in the fashionable Way, according to the Privileges of his Rank. If Fortune turns the Tables, and throws him down again amongst the Crowd; then every one wonders what it should be that cou'd raise him so High. Is this he? says one: Was not his Knowledge then more extensive than now? *Mont. B. III, Ch. 8,*

they have no Pretence to Discernment, but are downright living Machines. The Antichamber of an honest Citizen is set out with Prints; That of one of better Fashion is adorn'd with Paintings; those of a yet higher Rank add Busts and Statues; but then these are all mute and immoveable: Whereas the Antichambers of the Great are crowded with Statues that can do Reverence, and sometimes speak. There will be no Aggravation found in all this, if we remember two Things; one is, that I do not speak of all great Men; the other, that to deserve to be called Men, we ought to deserve to be called rational Creatures. If then such Homage as is rational, and proceeds from the Heart, be alone to be valued, we can be said to receive no more true Homage, than in proportion as we are Just and Good. These are Qualifications whose Scarceness enhances their Price: There is often so little Equity, and Greatness of Soul, where there should be most, that very frequently those who ought always to remember that they are design'd by their Birth for the Happiness of those below them, do on the contrary oppress them with so much less Regard, by how much more they reckon upon their Affection and Patience.

WHEN, in order to commend any one, we are forced to supply Virtues which he has not, or to take up with the Externals that surround him, and which do truly make no part of his Merit, is it not confessing that we can find none in him? And are such kind of Panegyricks any thing better than Satires?

IMOREOVER assure the Great of one Truth, which is known to all the World but themselves, and the Vulgar who never reflect at all; and that is, That they who make their Court with greatest Submission, are certainly such as love them least, and in whom they ought least of all to confide; for they who court the Favours of the Great at the Expence of their Honour and Honesty, esteem Grandeur too great a Blessing not to envy them it. To see it in the Possession of another, is to them Torment enough; and they have no other way of making themselves amends, for what they suffer in flattering those who give them so much Pain, than by the liberty they take in decrying them as soon as ever they can do it with Impunity. Pride is the only Principle of all their Condescensions; and they shew such an absolute Dependance upon their Superiors, only the better to gain their Confidence, and in reality to bring them under Dependance, and to reign in their Name, and make them do whatever they think proper. It is a Truth of Experience, That such as seem to be
Masters,

Masters, do very often live in a Dependance upon those over whom they imagine themselves to rule : So that we have frequently two Masters; one who appears; and the other conceal'd, who governs the first. This a great Misfortune upon the People; for each of these Masters are for making the same Advantages as tho' he was single. A Magistrate who knowingly lets himself be govern'd, wants Spirit; but he who lets himself be govern'd without knowing it, wants Understanding. Whoever undertakes the Government of others, shou'd himself be govern'd by nothing but Reason.

PERMIT me to add, That in the midst of so many Advantages as seem to raise the Great infinitely above the Multitude, in the midst of their Pride, their Pleasures, their Power, by which they live as they please, they want in my Opinion one infinite Advantage, the most precious Thing in the World, a sincere Friend, who is ready and able to bring them back to a Relish of Truth, which their Mind, intoxicated by continual Flattery, seems entirely to have lost; which would teach them that they are Men; that their Prosperity may forsake them; that there is a Difference betwixt obeying and being convinced, betwixt yielding to Reason and being conquer'd by an Enemy (q).

X. WHEN Great Men love Truth, and Virtue is dear to them, when they value Merit wherever it appears, and esteem a rational and honest Man above all other Considerations, I take their Conversation to be of infinite Service, and I do not think there is any Study from which we can reap so much Advantage.

*The Usefulness of
conversing with
the Great.*

The Esteem and Admiration which we have for them, makes us regard their Approbation, without considering its Consequences, as one of the greatest Blessings of Life : In order to please them, we exert all our Abilities and Faculties : Their Presence excites and supports our Attention: We are perfectly circum-
spect

(q) Monstrabo cujus rei inopiã laborent magna fastigia, quid omnia possidentibus desit. Scilicet ille qui verum dicat & hominem inter mentientes stupentem, ipsaque consuetudine pro rectis blanda audiendi, ad ignorantiam veri perductum, vindicet à consensu consentuque falsorum, --- & ab illis quorum unum certamen est, una contentio, blandissimè fallat; unde secuti iram, quam nemo revocabat, multorum sanguinem hausèrunt, fusuri novissimè suum, dum flecti non minùs turpe existimant quàm vinci, & perpetua credunt quæ in summum perducta maximè nutant. *Sen. de Benef. B. VI. Ch. 30.*


spect before them, because we reckon all Faults capital of which they are Witnesses. As they are from their Infancy accustomed to all possible Politeneſs and Delicacy in Language and Manners, the least Deviation will be perceived by them: They are not to be imposed upon by Compliments and Turns of Wit; they are too much used to them to be deceived by them. To their great Experience and Discernment, nothing will have any Relish but good Sense and a Justness of Thought. With our Equals, and much more with our Inferiors, we supply the Defects of our Reasonings with an Obstinacy in maintaining them: But these are Weapons we should be ashamed of using, and they would be of no Service against a learned Superior. The Great, who are endued with Penetration, have such frequent Occasions to make use of it, and have by that means so well learn'd to distinguish those that make it their Endeavour to deceive them, from those that ingenuously speak what they think, that it is dangerous to use any Disguise before them, and it is much the safest in their Presence really to be what it is our Interest to appear to be. By this means Sincerity will become natural, and we shall become like them; for they have no occasion for Disguise, but are by an happy Education from their Infancy brought into an absolute Familiarity with whatever is elegant both in Language and Behaviour. It is from them we must copy the Rules we ought to observe; but for them to be perfect, they need only follow their own happy Dispositions. In my Opinion, the good Fortune of those that have the Opportunities of such Conversation is not enough to be valued; they are such as few can be bless'd with; they that are, may be truly said to want nothing, provided they are not wanting to themselves: For with respect to the Great, of whom I am speaking, to be an honest Man, is the greatest and almost the only Recommendation they require: They naturally love those in whom they see such Qualifications, as they esteem and love in themselves.





C H A P. VII.

Of Custom, of the Air, of Diet, and of Humour, in general.

I.  HERE is nothing has so much Force in varying our Imagination as Custom; and it is to this, for the most part, that those Causes mention'd in the preceding Chapter are principally owing. But in these Effects of Custom, there is something so whimsical as is hardly to be reconciled.

The Effects of Custom. Sometimes it abates our Attention.

SOMETIMES our Attention is lessened by our being accustomed to any Thing; whereas every Thing that is uncommon engages us by its being such. The Reason is, that Novelty rouses us, and Custom lulls us asleep; because those Things we are used to excite in us but very feeble Sensations, not sufficient to keep our Faculties awake. By this means it often happens that we leave the Substance to run after the Shadow; that we usually esteem what we have not, far above what we have; and so we make our Lives miserable by neglecting to enjoy these, for the sake of pursuing those: We wear our selves out with Desires, when we want nothing but to take the Satisfaction of what we possess already (a).

THE little Value we set upon what is near at hand, is one of the Reasons that in Medicines, as well as in Things of common Use, we are apt to prefer what is far fetch'd, to what we have at home. *Simples* are less valued in the Countries where they grow than in distant Places, tho' it is probable Nature may have enrich'd every Soil with what is most

H 2

proper

(a) Quicquid exspectantibus fortuna projecit, id sine ullâ voluptate demittimus, statim ad rapinam alterius erecti & attentî. Hoc sapienti non evenit, plenus est: etiam si quid obvenit, securè excipit ac reponit. Lætitia fruitur maximâ, continuâ, suâ. *Sen. Ep. LXXII.*

Præcipitat quisque vitam suam, & futuri desiderio laborat, præsentium tædio. *Id. de Brev. Vir. Cap. 7.*

proper for its own Inhabitants. The *Europeans* drink the *Tea* of the *Chinese*, and the *Chinese* drink the *Sage* of the *Europeans*. This little Attention we are used to give to Things we have been accustomed to from our Infancy, is also the Reason that Authors, that write the History of their Country, omit an infinite Number of Things, for want of which, tho' they perceive it not, their Narration becomes very obscure. We should have lost a great many *Roman* Customs, if the *Grecian* Writers had not preserv'd the Memory of them.

WE may justly refer these Omissions to the want of Attention, as to their true Original. It is certain that our Sentiments are lively, and our Ideas clear; that they are more affecting and penetrating in proportion as we are more or less Attentive. The sole Impression of Objects is sometimes sufficient to excite our Attention: This is the Effect of such as are new to us. In this case we are barely passive, and our Attention is raised without any Pains on our part: This is what pleases idle Minds, and most Men are of this Disposition. They are Attentive as long as the Sensation of Novelty lasts, and cease to be so in proportion as the Object becomes familiar. But if we would make good Use of our Faculties, and excite them our selves to consider attentively the Objects that are most familiar to us, they will continue to appear exactly as they appear'd to us when they were new; nor can it be otherwise, since they are the same, and we observe them with the same Application. It will be a sure means of guarding against the Emptiness and Insufficiency of Objects, if we attend to them sufficiently; if we be not rash in determining their Value; if we take time to consider and know them perfectly; if we supply nothing to them, but prize them according to their just Worth. When we have done all this, let us but preserve the same Degree of Attention, and we shall find that they are always the same, and we shall like them as well to the last, as ever we did at the first.

II. BUT it happens also very often, that
At other Times Men are prepossess'd in favour of what they
it prepossesses in are accustomed to. They are used to some
in its Favour. particular Ideas and Customs, and approve or
 disapprove of every Thing as it is agreeable or
 disagreeable to these.

THERE are some Institutions so unreasonable, that if they had been to be propos'd at this time of Day, all the World would have rose up against them; and yet having
 been

been a long time establish'd, the going about to alter the least Part of them would be attended with the very same Clamour; such is the Prevalence of Custom: I am almost afraid to alledge any Instances, for fear of being thought too partial in a Work, which is to lay down Rules for universal Use: There is wanting a severe Law in *Ireland*, to prevent the Country Men from fastning their Horses to their Carriages by their Tails. The Use of *Coffee*, so universal at present, has met with great Contradiction in *Arabia* it self, where it first began, and which is, as it were, its native Country, nay, it has been even absolutely prohibited.

KHAIR BEG, Governor of Mecca, by the Appointment of the Sultan of Egypt, had never heard of Coffee, or of the manner of taking it. As he was going out of a Mosque one Day, after Evening Prayer, he observ'd in a Corner of it a Company of People drinking Coffee, who were to spend the Night there in Prayer, and was much offended at it. He thought at first they had been drinking Wine: Nor was his Surprise much diminish'd after they had explain'd to him the Use and Virtues of this Liquor. On the contrary, after they had inform'd him how much it was in use at Mecca, and what Merriment pass'd at the publick Places where it was sold, he was of Opinion, that Coffee was intoxicating, at least, that it conduced to Things forbidden by the Law.

Voyage into Arabia Felix, p. 282. Ed. Amst. 1716.

FOR this Reason, after having ordered these People to go out of the Mosque, with an Order never to meet again for the future upon the like Occasion, he convened the next Day a great Assembly of Officers of Justice, and Doctors of the Law, together with the Priests, and most eminent Men of Mecca, to whom he communicated what he had observ'd the Night before in the Mosque, and what he was inform'd happen'd frequently in the publick Coffee-Houses; adding, that he was resolv'd to remedy this Abuse, upon which he was desirous first to know their Opinions.

THE Doctors agreed that the publick Coffee-Houses wanted Regulation, as being contrary to the Law of pure Mahometanism; and declared, that with respect to Coffee, it was necessary at least to examine whether it was not hurtful either to the Body or the Mind; whether it did not by its bad Qualities occasion those Disorders in question. For if it did not, it would be sufficient to put by the Publick Houses where it was sold. The Conclusion was to take the Advice of the Physicians.

THE Governor call'd in two, who were Brothers, Natives of Persia, and esteem'd the most celebrated Physicians in Mecca,

tho' of very mean Abilities, and better skill'd in Quibbling than in Physick. One of them had even writ against the Use of Coffee, jealous perhaps (says our Author) least the Use of it should spoil their Practice; so they did not fail to declare, That the Berries, of which Coffee was made, were cold and dry, and by consequence very prejudicial to Mens Health.

A DOCTOR of the Assembly replied, That Bengiazlah, an antient Arabian Physician of great Authority, had said, in a Book of his, concerning Simple Medicines and Diet, That these Berries were attenuating and drying, and consequently could not have the Qualities just now ascribed to them. The Remark was judicious; for upon occasion of this Dispute, all the Physicians of the present Age do agree, according to the Doctrine of Bengiazlah, That Coffee is hot and dry, and not cold and dry.

THE two Persian Physicians, to maintain what they had advanced, replied, That Bengiazlah was a perfect stranger to the Berries in question; that those he treated of were indeed called by the same Name, but were of a quite different Nature; and so without taking any more Pains to prove this, they address'd themselves to the Casuists, and declared, That if Coffee was reckon'd amongst Things that were indifferent, and free for every body to make use of, yet since it was apt to lead to Things not allowed of, the safest way for true Mussulmen would be to hold it unlawful.

THIS Determination obtain'd all their Suffrages; and several, either out of Prejudice, or false Zeal, did not fail to affirm, That Coffee had actually disturb'd their Brain. One of the Assistants even maintain'd, That it intoxicated like Wine. Which set all the Assembly a laughing; because in order to make this Judgment of it, it was necessary to have drunk Wine, which is expressly forbidden by the Mahometan Religion. He was ask'd, whether he had ever drunk any Wine; and he had the Imprudence to answer in the Affirmative; which Confession condemn'd him to the Bastinado, the Punishment appropriated by Mahomet to the Violators of his Law.

THE Mufti of Mecca only, a Divine and Lawyer by Profession, undertook with Heat the Defence of Coffee against the Determination of the Assembly, and in spite of the Governor, who was set on by his Imam, a very scrupulous Man: But all the Courage of the Mufti, and his best Arguments, serv'd only to make the false Zealots load him with Calumnies.

COFFEE was condemn'd solemnly, as a Thing forbidden by the Law; and this Sentence of Condemnation was dress'd up in very pathetick Terms, to express a kind of Triumph over the Abuses which were pretended to be redress'd. Several

Doctors

Doctors signed it, together with the Governor, and sent it away as an important Dispatch to the Sultan of Egypt his Master.

AT the same time he publish'd an Order, expressly forbidding the Selling or Drinking of Coffee, whether in publick or in private, under the Penalty incur'd by them that transgress the Law, a Prohibition, which was follow'd by an exact and rigorous Visitation of the Officers of Justice, who shut up all the publick Coffee-Houses, and burnt all the Coffee they could find there, as well as in the Merchants Warehouses.

THE Lovers of Coffee, who were very numerous, could never submit to this Prohibition: They continued to drink it in their Houses, being otherwise perswaded that the Assembly had determin'd wrong; and that the Condemnation was unjust, since it had pass'd without the Consent of the Mufti. However, one of them being surpriz'd in his House in the Fact, was very severely punish'd, and afterwards expos'd, and led thro' publick Places upon an Ass.

BUT this Rigour was not of long Duration; for the Sultan of Ægypt, far from approving of the indiscreet Zeal of his Governor of Mecca, was surpriz'd that he should dare to condemn a Thing so much in favour at Cairo, the Capital of his Dominions, where there were Doctors of much greater Authority than those at Mecca, and who had not found any thing in the Use of Coffee contrary to the Law.

THE Sultan ordered him therefore to revoke his Prohibition, and to employ his Authority against the Disorders only, if there were any, committed in the Coffee-Houses; adding, that because it was possible to abuse the very best Things, even the Water of the Fountain Zeruzem *, so much esteem'd by all Mussulmen, it was not for that Reason necessary absolutely to forbid them.

THE Governor was oblig'd against his Will to obey. Nor was this the only Satisfaction the Sultan procur'd for the People of Mecca; for this same Governor, so scrupulous in Appearance, this Mahometan Pharisee, was an Extortioner, and a publick Robber; whom his Successor, having Orders to bring him to an Account for his Conduct, sentenc'd to a painful Death the Year after. His Brother kill'd himself, to avoid the like Fate.

THE Arabian Author adds, That the two Persian Physicians, who bore so great a Part in the Prohibition of Coffee, came also to an unfortunate End. Being despis'd at Mecca,

H 4

after

* The Fountain or Pit Zeruzem, according to the Mussulmen, is that which God discover'd in the Wilderness in favour of Hagar and Ishmael, after Abraham was oblig'd to withdraw with his Son. It is in the Body of the Temple of Mecca; the Mahometans drink of it out of Devotion, and ascribe great Virtues to it. (This Note is the Author's of the Voyage.)

after the Re-establishment of that Liquor, they retir'd to Cairo; where being convicted of cursing the Person of Selim, the first Emperor of the Turks of that Name, who made a Conquest of Ægypt, they were executed by his Order.

AFTER the Re-establishment of Coffee at Mecca, till the Year 1524, it met with no Contradiction; but in that Year the Cadi, or Chief Judge of the Place, shut up all the Coffee-Houses, upon account of the Disorders committed there, without hindring private Persons from drinking it in their own Houses. His Successor, however, permitted the Coffee-Houses to be opened again; and every body behaved themselves with so much Modesty and good Order, that the Magistrate was never after oblig'd to make use of his Authority.

IT is true, that in the Year of Hegira, 950, there arriv'd at Mecca, by the Caravan of Damas, an Order of Soliman the Great to drink no more Coffee. But this Order was hardly ever put in Execution; for it was soon known that it had been granted only unawares, at the Request of a Lady of the Court, something over-scrupulous with respect to this Liquor.

For the rest, the Sultan of Ægypt, who had ordered his Governor of Mecca to revoke his indiscreet Prohibition of Coffee, consulted his Doctors of the Law upon this Point, who gave their Opinions in Writing, and prov'd, by substantial Reasons, the Fallacy of that Condemnation, and the Ignorance of those that had pass'd it; which establish'd the Use of Coffee at Cairo upon a much stronger Foot than ever. But in the End this great City also met with a great deal of Trouble upon this Subject.

THIS was in the Year 1523 of the Christian Æra, in 930 of Hegira. At first a scrupulous Doctor was pleas'd to state a Question in these Words, and send it to the other Doctors: What is your Opinion of the Liquor call'd Coffee, which is drank in Company under the Notion of its being lawful to be taken, notwithstanding it gives occasion to Disorders of great Importance, intoxicates the Head, and is prejudicial to the Health? Is it lawful, or unlawful? At the bottom of the Question was his own Opinion sign'd, That the Use of Coffee is unlawful. Not one of his Brethren were of his Opinion, because it was obvious Coffee had not those bad Qualities be ascrib'd to it. So that this gave no Shock at all to a Custom so universally receiv'd.

BUT about ten Years after, a Preacher held forth so powerfully against the Use of Coffee, as a Thing prohibited by the Law, maintaining that those who drank it could not be true Mussulmen, that a great Mob of his Auditors at their
going

going out of the Mosque, fell upon the Coffee-Houses, broke the Pots and Dishes, and abus'd the Company they found there.

UPON this there were two Parties form'd in the City; one of which maintained that Coffee was prohibited by the Law, the other that it was not. But the Judge in Chief having conven'd an Assembly of all the Doctors, to have their Opinions, they all unanimously declared that the Question had been already determined by their Predecessors in favour of Coffee; that they were all of the same Sentiment; and that there was nothing farther necessary than only to restrain the extravagant Heat of the Zealots, and the Indiscretion of ignorant Preachers. The Judge who presided, and was of the same Opinion, immediately order'd all the Assembly to be served with Coffee, and took some himself; an Example which presently compos'd all Controversies, and made Coffee more fashionable than before.

HOWEVER, the Officer of the Policy having found four Years after a great Company at a publick Coffee-House in the Night, during the Season of Ramadam, or Mahometan Lent, committed them to Prison, and ordered them to be bastinadoed the next Day, not upon the Account of the Unlawfulness of Coffee, but for drinking it publickly in a Time of Devotion, and at an unseasonable Hour.

After all that pass'd with respect to Coffee, the most Scrupulous had but a poor Reason to alledge, That it ought to be prohibited, because it is drank in publick Companies in the same Manner as Wine. But their Mouth is easily stopp'd with the Example of Mahomet himself, who drank Milk in the Company of Friends, in the same Manner as Coffee is drunk. -----

AT the Time when this Custom was most prevalent in Constantinople, the Imams and Officers of the Mosques made a great Clamour that they were deserted, whilst all the Coffee-Houses were continually crowded. The Dervizes and Priests murmured at it extremely; and at last the Preachers fell foul upon Coffee, not only affirming that it was unlawful, but that it was a much greater Sin to go to a Coffee-House than to a Tavern. Page 296.

AFTER a great deal of Noise and useles Declamation, all the Priests united to obtain a solemn Condemnation of this Liquor. In order to it they were pleas'd to maintain, That Coffee roasted is a sort of a Coal; and that every Thing which had the least Relation to a Coal, was forbidden by the Law. Upon this they drew up a Question in Form, and presented it to the Musti, with a Request that he would determine it, according to the Duty of his Office.

THE *Musti*, without giving himself the Trouble of examining any Difficulties, gave a Determination conformable to the Mind of the Priests, and pronounced that Coffee was prohibited by the Law of Mahomet.

THE Authority of the *Musti* is held in such Esteem, that it is not permitted to call in doubt his Determinations. So all the Coffee-Houses were immediately shut up, and the Officers of the Policy ordered to prevent the drinking of Coffee in what Manner soever.

YET notwithstanding the Rigour that was us'd in the Execution of this Order, they could never entirely prevent the Use of it in private. Amurath III. again indulged a Liberty with regard to a Thing so agreeable, and which was believed otherwise not contrary to Religion; so that it was allow'd to be drank in Men's own Houses, and grew more and more in Esteem. At last the Officers of the Policy seeing there was no Remedy, were content for a certain Sum to permit it to be sold, provided it was not in publick; so that it was allow'd to drink it in private Houses, shutting up the Doors, or in Back-Shops.

THERE wanted but little to establish by Degrees the publick Coffee-Houses. It happened that a new *Musti*, less scrupulous, or more wise than his Predecessor, declared solemnly that Coffee ought not to be look'd upon as a Coal; and that the Liquor made of it was not prohibited by the Law. After this Declaration the Zealots, Preachers, *Musti* himself, and Lawyers, far from exclaiming against Coffee, took it themselves, and their Example was universally follow'd by the whole Court and City.

WE see by this, that in all Times, and in all Places, Men have been Men; that they have made Custom their Rule, and their Prejudices their Principles; that in all Ages, and in all Nations, they have made Religion a Cover to their Ignorance, their Humours, and their Vanity. It is infinitely more scandalous to find that not only Turks, but even Christians also are guilty of these Enormities.

Custom consecrates Fashions, and binds us even in Things most indifferent. The Use of Forks has formerly been forbidden in a certain celebrated Congregation.

Self-Love and Idleness are the Cause of these Illusions. We love our selves, and by that Means are in love with our Ideas, our Opinions, and our Manners. It is extremely difficult to put off our Prejudices, in order to examine impartially the Sentiments of others. It is difficult to correct our Ideas, or change our Manners; we give a very unwilling

willing Attention to what tends to condemn and reform us. Objections are almost always troublesome: We deny them our Attention; and by that means form very imperfect Ideas of them. Few People have the Justice and Resolution to conceive clearly the Opinions of their Adversaries: They run them over superficially, and add or diminish as they think proper. (b)

A GREAT Part of Men of Letters propose nothing more to themselves, than just to pass their Lives in quiet, and with as much of the Enjoyments of Fortune as they can possibly compass. Upon every Question, they begin with enquiring whether the Affirmative or Negative is more conformable to the Custom of the Place they live in; that they may, according to so prudent and convenient a Partiality, regulate the Attention they are to give to Proofs, and the Contempt they are to shew to Objections.

THERE are others, who being led by a Spirit of Contradiction, and an Ambition of obtaining a Name, do at first setting out in their Studies, make it their Business to distinguish themselves from the common Forms; and instead of beginning by learning what is already known, or at least thought to be known, and examining it impartially, do not so much as vouchsafe to give Ear to it, or at best, if they do, it is only for the sake of the Pleasure of opposing it. Prepossession and Humour are commonly very bad Guides, and always to be suspected.

WHEN our Idleness has the Ascendant over our Vanity, then we follow in the common Train, and are gently led by the Sentiments and Example of others, and entirely obedient to the Force of Custom. When our Vanity is uppermost, then we seek to distinguish our selves, and love to pursue unbeaten Paths: But when our Reason is superior, then we are without Prepossession for what is old, and without Fondness for what is new; without having any View of making our selves beloved for our Complaisance, or admired for our Discoveries, we apply our selves solely to think justly, and to see clearly.

THERE are an infinite many People, who, if you ask them why they do this, or that, will make no other Answer than that it is the Custom: If you ask them why they follow the Custom, they will reply, our Fathers taught us so to do. But is it always necessary to follow the Road our Fathers have pointed out
to

(b) *Inter studia versandum est & inter Autores sapientiæ, ut quæsta discamus, nondum inventa acquiramus. Sen. Ep. CIV.*

to us? Upon this Question some will determine point blank, that we ought to follow it without Contradiction; but others, who would appear more refined, distinguish upon it, and affirm, That there is a great Difference betwixt what their Fathers have prescribed and practised, and what the Ancestors of other People have appointed. If you press them yet farther, and demand the Reasons of this Distinction and Preference, they will either fall into a Fit of Laughter, or Anger, according as they believe you their Friend, or their Adversary. These are at least in some certain Countries Truths of every Day's Experience.

A GREAT many Things are done without knowing why; and yet they are done: And the oftener they are repeated, and the oftener they are seen done, with so much the more Obstinacy are they continued. Every one encourages himself by the great Number of those that accompany him in his Errors, and they all rely upon the Example one of another.

III. THE Prepossessions of Men for the *The Usefulness of Prepossessions.* Objects they are accustomed to, have sometimes such excellent Consequences, that it would induce one to believe them to be an Impression of the Divine Architect, who has by this Means contriv'd a Supply to the Weakness of our Reason. The common Sort of People know so little of the Use of Reason, that if their Prepossessions, and the Force of Custom, did not bind them to their Families, their Laws, and their Country, we should see such a Degree of Indolence and Uncertainty amongst them, as would be attended with constant Disorders throughout the whole Race of Mankind. But because this Instinct is very apt to run out to an Excess, it is necessary to be very careful in regulating it by Reason, our Actions being no farther commendable than just in proportion as they are govern'd by this.

IV. TRAVELS, and the Histories of them, *The Remedies.* by acquainting us with the different Opinions and Manners of so many Countries and particular People, who have lived, and do now live upon the Surface of our Earth, will remedy these bad Effects of Custom, provided we do but sufficiently attend to them, and consider that there is hardly a Man, or an Opinion, or a Custom so ridiculous, but you may find some Mixture of Good in them together with the Bad; as, on the contrary, there is nothing so excellent, but is yet capable of a farther Degree of Perfection. The Imagination, by being brought into

into the Acquaintance of different Objects, in order to heighten its Excellencies, and excuse its Defects, will at last be accustom'd to Variety, and will cease to be startled with any Thing new and extraordinary; (c) and, in the room of the Blindness of its Prejudices, will succeed a true Satisfaction and Complaisance.

WE should very early accustom our selves to distinguish upon every Subject the Good from the Bad. Custom, by being oppos'd against Custom, will no longer impose upon us; nor shall we reject what is contrary to our own Usage, without a very fair and strict Examination.

THOSE that have never travell'd themselves, nor read the History of the Travels of others, look upon the Customs of their own Nation as a perfect Model for all the World to follow. They go farther, and believe themselves to be the favourite Objects of Heaven: Each People think themselves only worthy of its Consideration and Favours. If it were not for the fatal Consequences of these Prepossessions, it would make one laugh to see Men prefer themselves one to another, and mutually despise one another, without any manner of Reason. It sometimes happens, that an Auditory is confirm'd in such like Prejudices by the Pains the Preacher takes to awaken them to Gratitude to their Master, from the Consideration that they have been the particular Objects of his Mercy and Goodness.

HE that would perfectly enlighten himself, and benefit by every Thing, and compleat his Taste upon a true Foundation of what he can find good in the World, must hearken to every Thing, read every Thing, and examine every Thing, with the same Spirit as the *Decemviri*, dispatch'd by the *Roman Senate*, maybe suppos'd to have examin'd the Laws and Customs of *Greece*. They were not to be prejudic'd in favour of any Legislator, or any People; they were to look upon every Thing with the same Eyes, and examine every Thing with the same Liberty. It is ridiculous to be taken up with the Customs of our own Nation: We are Citizens of the Universe. What signifies it of whom I learn, if I do but learn? Gold is acceptable out of whatever Mine it comes; and there is no Hand can make Poison agreeable, because no Hand can change the Nature of it. We may be prepossess'd in favour of all sorts of Subjects, and should therefore

(c) Ex omni natione si à Philosophiâ longissimè aversa est, eruerè aliquid conor, & utile efficere. *Sen. Ep. LVIII.*

therefore be always upon our Guard; and we may also benefit by them all, and should therefore not run over any thing too hastily. Oftentimes a ridiculous Humour, which we should never have perceiv'd in our selves, is discover'd in its true Light by our Observation of it in others; and sometimes we form our selves to Virtue by the Example of others, which perhaps, without this Inducement, we never should have thought of.

The Force of the Mind, in what it consists, and how to be acquir'd.

V. ONE of the principal Characters which distinguish great Minds from the Vulgar, is, that these always approve, without reasoning; whatever is conformable to their own Methods of Thinking or Acting, and reject whatever is contrary to them: Whereas those are above this Prejudice; and abstracting from them what Custom has made agreeable or disagreeable, they examine all Things in themselves as tho' they were all equally new, or equally familiar to them. (d)

THE true Force of the Mind does further, in my Opinion, consist in its being able to quit the present Condition it is in, and to suppose it self in another in which it really is not; to place it self in what Situation it pleases, and to look upon Things from such Points of View, and on such Sides, not as offer themselves first, but such as it is proper to examine them by. When a great Genius asks himself, *Which of any two Opinions he should prefer, if, without considering which is new or old, they were then only immediately to be broach'd, as the first time of their being mention'd*; he has the Power to examine them with the same Disinterestedness, as tho' in effect he had never heard of them before. When he asks himself, *In case he were in the same Dispositions with some others he sees, what Arguments would be most likely to prevail with him*; He enters into their Sentiments, as tho' they were actually his own, and sees every thing that is capable of confirming or changing them, as perfectly as if he could enter into their Hearts, and actually transform himself into their Condition: So that the Rules we have laid down against the Prejudices of Custom, conduce as much to the Skill of an Orator, as to the Exactness of our Judgment, and the Equity of our Decisions. To know how to put one's self into the Place of a stupid and obstinate Man,

(d) Magni est ingenii revocare mentem à sensibus & cogitationem à consuetudine abducere, *Cic. Tusc. 2. Lib. I.*

Man, and who, besides all this, has been very ill educated, is the true way to discover how to enlighten and convince him.

VI. To acquire this Force, needs nothing but our sincere Endeavours. The great Author of Nature has so prudently order'd it, that, by a just Recompence, good Habits become more easy the more they are practis'd, and by a just Punishment ill Habits, the more we give our selves up to them, the more difficult they are to be conquer'd.

Principal Habits to be acquired.

SINCE then the Power of Custom is so great, we may easily see of what Consequence it is to confirm our selves in good Habits, in which, as we have before observ'd, Natural Logic does consist, and in general to acquaint our selves betimes with the Maxims that lead to Truth and Wisdom, that is, with the Rules of our Thoughts and of our Morals. We shall make them natural to us, and at last find the Practice of them very easy, if upon every Occasion we immediately enquire how far we are short of them, and what Advantages we may receive from them. On the contrary, nothing is of worse Consequence, than to consider them as Matters of Speculation, and almost perfectly indifferent, without giving our selves the Trouble of making any Application of them: It is this that makes so many Logicians reason so unjustly, and so many Casuists behave so unhandsomely. Morality is perpetually in their Mouth, but never in their Practice: They content themselves with giving Rules to others, with remarking and criticising upon them; and as to themselves, they stick at nothing, but entirely give way to their Inclinations, being not more severe upon others than they are indulgent to themselves: They condemn Men by wholesale and retail, and think their Zeal in so doing is to them sufficient Satisfaction: They are so blind as to think this Contradiction betwixt their Words and Actions is not to be perceiv'd; but they are incurable, because having had their Remedy a long Time, without being the better for it, they are harden'd against the Virtue of it; like those, who having made a too frequent and unseasonable Use of corporeal Medicines, receive no Benefit from them when they come to have occasion for them. It is, without doubt, one of the most unfortunate Errors we can be guilty of, to accustom our selves to lay down Rules, without following them. Nothing is more easy than to propose good Laws; and it was proper it should be less easy to set good Examples. (e).

WE

(e) Plus openi est in eo, ut propositæ custodias, quam ut honesta proponas. *Sen. Ep. XVI.*

WE ought to be alarmed at every Thing, that leads to so fatal an Habit, tho' it be never so distant. As soon as ever we have understood the Usefulness of any Maxim, we ought immediately to make use of it; for fear we should accustom our selves to look upon it with Indifference. He who defers the Application of any Rule till to-morrow, seems to be but little acquainted with the Heart of Man, which loves to be always projecting, but never putting in Execution. The whole Life of a great many People is spent in promising themselves that they will become, what they never do become. (f) When in reading we meet with any Maxim that may be of use, we should take it for our own, and make an immediate Application of it, as we would by the Advice of a Friend whom we have purposely consulted.

By Means of this Custom of regarding Rules as Matters of Speculation, rather than of Application, we often see People of the last Degree of Credulity preaching up Circumspection to others, and Men of a childish Timorousness speaking of the Contempt of Death, and of Resignation to Providence in the most courageous Terms, and with the most composed Countenance. They see clearly into the Faults of others, and are blind to their own: The Merchant that cheats all he can, complains that the Magistrate sells his Justice; and the Magistrate cries out upon the Extortion of the Merchant at the same time that he is a great deal more unjust himself, and sells in Secret, what it is a Shame to set a Price upon, *Justice* and the *Rewards* of Merit.

WE shall better confirm our selves in the Habit of practising these Precepts, if, in our Attention to every Thing we hear or see, we do but take care to observe that the Errors of Men, both in their Discourse and Conduct, always suppose a Neglect of these Rules. But the Faults of others will be of so much the more Service in reminding us of these Rules, by how much the more we place our true Felicity in the Observation of them. To think justly, and to live wisely, to know Truth, and to practise Virtue, is the undoubted and essential Foundation of our Happiness: All the rest do but border upon it, and are no more than Amusements, and slight Helps towards establishing our Satisfaction. It is by this Way that we must become Philosophers in Reality, and
not

(f) *Recognosce singulos, considera universos: nullius non vita spectat in crastinum. Quid in hoc sit mali, quæris? infinitum: non enim vivunt, sed victuri sunt; omnia differunt. Ep. XLV.*

not only in Name; and instead of dishonouring this Title by vain Babbling, we shall render our selves worthy of it, and even do an Honour to it. (g) Those whose Studies learn them only to speak, and not to live, are only *Grammarians*, and not *Philosophers*. (h)

THERE

(g) Illud admoneo, auditionem Philosophorum, lectionemque ad propositum beatæ vitæ trahendam: non ut verba prisca aut ficta captemus, & translationes improbas, figurasque dicendi, sed ut profutura præcepta, & magnificas voces, & animosas, quæ mox in rem transferantur. Sic ista discamus, ut quæ fuerunt verba, sint opera. Nullos autem pejus mereri de omnibus mortalibus judico, quam qui Philosophiam velut aliquod Artificium venale didicerunt; qui aliter vivunt, quam vivendum esse præcipiunt. Exempla enim seipfos inutilis disciplinæ circumferent, nulli non vitio quod insequuntur obnoxii Ep. CVIII.

(h) "Let him judge of the Advancement he has made, not by the Testimony of his Memory, but of his Life: Let him, when he has learn'd any thing, put it into an hundred different Lights, and apply it to as many different Subjects, to see if he has taken it right, and made it perfectly his own." *Mont. B. I. Chap. 25.*

"According to the present Method of Teaching, it is no wonder if neither the Scholars nor the Masters attain to greater Abilities, tho' they become more learned. The Truth is, that the Care and Expence of our Fathers go no farther than to furnish our Heads with Knowledge: As to Judgment and Virtue you hear little enough of them. If one should pass by our People, and cry, O ye learned Men! And another, O ye good Men! The first would infallibly draw all their Eyes and Respect. There would be a third wanting to cry, O ye senseless Wretches! Our first Enquiry is, Does he understand *Greek* and *Latin*? Does he write in Verse or Prose? But the principal Question should be, whether he is become wiser and better; and this is always put last. We should enquire who is the *best* learned, not who is the most learned. We take Pains only to fill our Memory, and leave our Understanding and Conscience quite empty. - - -

"If the Mind does not take a better Bias, if the Judgment does not become stronger, I had rather my Scholar should have spent his Time in playing at Tennis; for this at least would make the Body more active. After fifteen or sixteen Years have been spent at School, you find the Youth return the most unfit for Business that can be: All you will think him improv'd in, is, that his *Latin* and *Greek* have made him a greater Fool and Coxcomb than he was when he went from home. Instead of bringing back a Mind well fill'd, it proves to be only puffed up. These Masters are the only Persons that not only do not mend what is committed to their Care, as Carpenters and Masons do, but make it worse, and yet are paid for so doing." *Ch. 25.*

THERE are two Sorts of Sciencès: The one is confined to Speculation; the other extends farther to Practice: There is no Necessity of making an Habit of the first. When you have once clearly comprehended a Proposition in Geometry, for instance, or the Solution of a Phænomenon in natural Philosophy, and have consider'd it over and over, so often as to be able to recollect it again, whenever you shall

*Inhæreat istud animo, & tanquam missum Oraculo placeat:
Optima quæque dies miseris mortalibus ævi
Prima fugit. -----*

Quare optima? quia restat quod incertum est. Quare optima? quia juvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum, & adhuc tractabilem, ad meliora convertere: quia hoc tempus idoneum est laboribus, idoneum agitandis per studia ingeniis, & exercendis per Opera corporibus. Quod superest, segnius & languidius est, & propius a fine. Itaque toto hoc agamus animo, & omissis ad quæ divertimus, in rem unam laboremus: ne hanc temporis perniciosissimi celeritatem, quam retinere non possumus, relictæ demùm intelligamus. Primus quisque tanquam optimus dies placeat, & redigatur in nostrum. Quod fugit occupandum est. Hoc non cogitat ille, qui Grammatici oculis Carmen istud legit, ideo optimum quemque primum esse diem, quia subeunt morbi, quia senectus premit, & adhuc adolescentiam cogitantibus supra caput est: sed ait, Virgilium semper unà ponere morbos & senectutem, non meherculè immeritò. Senectus enim insanibilis morbus est. Præterea, inquit, hoc senectuti cognomen imposuit, tristem illam vocat.

----- *Subeunt morbi tristisque Senectus.*

Non est quod mireris, ex eadem materiâ suis quemque studiis apta colligere. In eodem prato bos herbam quærit, canis leporem, Ciconia lacertum. Cùm *Ciceronis* libros de *Republicâ*prehendit hinc Philologus aliquis, hinc Grammaticus, hinc Philosophiæ deditus: alius aliò curam suam mittit. Philosophus admiratur, contra justitiam dici tam multa potuisse. Cùm ad hanc eandem lectionem Philologus accessit, hoc subnotat, duos Romanos reges esse, quorum alter patrem non habet, alter matrem. Nam de *Servii* matre dubitatur: *Anci* pater nullus, *Numa* nepos dicitur. *Sen. Ep. CVIII.*

Vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur & rectè faciendi & benè dicendi magistra, neque disjuncti doctores, sed iidem erant vivendi præceptores atque dicendi, ut ille apud *Homerum* *Phœnix*, qui se à *Peleo* patre *Achilli* juveni comitem esse datum dicit ad bellum, ut illum efficeret oratorem verborum actoremque rerum.

Diffidium illud extitit quasi linguæ atque cordis, absurdum sanè & inutile, & reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent *Cic. de Oraç. Lib. III.*

shall have occasion for it, this is sufficient. But it is not so with the Precepts of Morality, and the Rules of Logic : they must take Possession of the Heart and Understanding ; the Faculties must be moulded and framed according to them, and will by this Means be made to observe them by their own natural Tendency and Inclination, without any occasion for reflecting on them : We shall never come at the Fruits of them, if we once content our selves with barely comprehending them. (i) We must make them our own, by applying them to an infinite Number of Examples, and by comparing with them, and examining by them, every Thing we hear, or read, or even compose our selves. So that what *Seneca* said of some other Sciences is more particularly true of these : *There are some Things that cannot be said to be known, by being barely understood, except they be also continually meditated on.* (k)

EVEN in Sciences of Speculation, if we would make much Progress in them, we must make the Principles of them very familiar to us ; we must be able to recollect them without Trouble, and to have them, as it were, always present, in order to manage them with perfect Ease and Readiness. In a word, it is necessary to contract an Habit of applying them upon every Occasion that offers. Without this we may indeed be able to understand what we read, and to benefit by the Instructions of others, but we shall never be capable of discovering any Thing our selves.

A FEW Precepts which are always at Hand, are of much greater Service than a very great Number which we perfectly understand, but cannot manage with the same Dexterity, is a Lesson

(i) Such is the Conduct of Men. They leave Laws and Precepts to take their Course, while they themselves pursue a different Road ; not only thro' the Irregularity of their Manners, but oftentimes thro' Opinion, and a contrary Judgment. If you hear read a Lecture of Philosophy, the Invention, the Eloquence, the Propriety of it immediately affects and moves you. There is nothing in it that pleases or pricks your Conscience, that is not at all spoken to. Is it not true, what *Ariston* says, That neither a Bath, nor a Lecture will be of any Service, unless they be kept sweet and clean ? We may have some Regard to the Shell, but it ought to be after we have taken out the Kernel ; as we are used to admire the Engraving and Workmanship of the Cup, after having drunk out the Wine that is in it. *Mont B. III. Ch. 9.*

(k) Quædam res semel perceptæ hærent ; quædam ut Scias, non est satis didicisse, intercudit enim eorum scientia, nisi continuetur. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. III. Cap. 5.*

Lesson of *Demetrius* the *Cynick*, recorded by *Seneca*. (1) The same Philosopher advises that the Precepts of Wisdom should so far penetrate into us, and as it were make part of us, that they might be constantly ready the Moment we have occasion for them; and what *St. Augustin* has said of the Rules of Eloquence, ought to be applied to all these Rules: *It is certain that in the Heat of Composing, we think no more of them than if we never had learn'd them; so that we are not eloquent because we follow them; but we follow them because we are eloquent.* So likewise a perfect honest Man, and a perfect understanding Man, have no occasion to consult every Moment, one of them the Rules of Morality, the other the Rules of Logic, in order to form their Actions and their Reasonings; their Hearts being under Subjection to these Rules, need only follow their own Inclinations to observe them. The End of Precepts is to perfect and polish Nature; but they never produce this Effect, unless they be converted into Nature. All that Art can do is found of no farther Service, than in proportion as it imitates Nature so very nearly, as to be taken for Nature it self.

Ideas that are familiar, have sometimes too much Influence.

VII. THE Road to Truth is so encompassed with Rocks and Precipices, that you cannot quit the one, without falling upon the others. If the Readiness with which our Habits present our Ideas has its good Effects, so likewise has it its bad ones; and the Difficulty is to keep a just Medium betwixt these two Extremes. The Ideas that are familiar to us present themselves upon the least Occasion, and taking Possession of our Mind, oppose and hinder its Fruitfulness in producing other Ideas. The Imagination of

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(1) Plus prodesse, si pauca præcepta sapientiæ teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi & in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. VII. Cap. 1.*

Hæc nusquam dimittere, imò & affigere & partem sui facere eoque quotidianâ meditatione perducere ut suâ sponte occurrant salutaria, & ubique ac statim desiderata præstò sint: & sine morâ ullâ veniat illa turpis honestique distinctio. *Sen. de Ben. Lib. VII. Cap. 2.*

Quæcunque salutaria sunt, sæpè agitari debent, sæpe versari, ut non tantum nota sint nobis, sed etiam parata. - - -

Philosophia dividitur in hæc, scientiam & habitum animi. Nam quid didicit, & facienda ac vitanda percepit, nondum sapiens est, nisi in ea quæ didicit, animus ejus transfiguratus est. *Sen. Ep. XCIV.*

It is not enough to give Knowledge to the Mind, it must be incorporated with it. It is not enough to have it sprinkled with it; it must be thoroughly tinctured with it. Mont. B. I. Ch. 24.

a Painter furnishing out his Objects, makes him see Regularities that have no Existence. The Moon is believ'd to resemble an human Face. A Man that has been already deceiv'd by strong Assurances, and still remembers it, suspects every one that talks in the same friendly manner to have the same Design. A Chymist would explain every Thing by his three Principles. A Divine who is warm upon any side of a Controversy, imagines he finds in every Passage Arguments to establish and confirm it. A Preacher full of a particular Aversion for certain Vices, falls perpetually upon them. And in common Conversation, how many People make themselves intolerable, by always repeating the same Maxims, or telling the same Stories? The oftner they fall into this Error, the more difficult is it for them to guard against it.

WE may possibly adhere to Truth by a kind of Infatuation; and then we find it where it is not, in the very same manner as where it is. Every Page of the *Holy Scriptures*, and every celebrated *Father*, do equally contain it. (m) It is with their Expressions, as with the Sound of Bells, they say whatever we would have them. The *Molinists* and the *Thomists* do each find their System in *St. Augustin*. *Budæus* and *H. Stephens* derive the *French Language* from the *Greek*; *Guichard* makes it descend from the *Hebrew*; according as each of them is taken up with one or other of these ancient Languages. Doctor *Hammond* finds every where the Principles of the *Gnosticks*. A learned Man, whose Memory is full of fabulous History and Mythology, presently finds Means to demonstrate the Truth of the *Revelations*. If an Author express himself modestly, without assuming a decisive Authority, a *Sceptick* lifts him in for one that doubts of

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every

(m) " We presently wrest the Sayings of others in favour of the Opinions with which we have already prepossessed our selves. To an Atheist all Writings are tinged with Atheism: He infects with his Poison the most innocent Expressions.

" Is it possible that *Homer* could ever mean all the Things he has been made to say? Could he ever intend to furnish with so many different Figures, that Divines, Legislators, Generals, Philosophers, and all sorts of Men that treat of any Science, tho' they treat of them ever so differently and even contrary one to another, should build all upon him, and refer themselves to him as to the general Master of all Offices, Works, and Artists, and universal Counsellor for all Enterprises? Whoever have had Occasions for Oracles and Predictions, have found in him several for their Purpose. *Mont, B. II. Ch. 12.*

every Thing, and dares be sure of nothing. If an Author exposes the Extravagancies of Superstition, and enlarges upon the Disorders it occasions in Society, a Libertine concludes presently that he agrees with him in making light of Religion, and that according to him Men have no Obligation even to common honesty.

THE *Civilians* have very ingeniously resolv'd a great many Cases, by supposing tacit Contracts. This Success has taken; and upon this an infinite Number of tacit Contracts have been imagined, wherthey were not at all necessary. There are some who have establish'd the whole System of Morality upon these imaginary Contracts. But by virtue of what are we obliged to keep our Word? Is it by virtue of a tacit Contract, which must it self suppose another tacit Contract? We must in the End agree that it is therefore necessary, because we ought to live conformably to Nature, and because that infinite Being, who is the Author of it, would have us live so. From these two Principles we deduce an infinite Number of Rules without the Help of these supposed Contracts.

AT the first Sight of a Person's Outside, we presently form to our selves an Idea of his Inside; for we never love to remain in Suspence: And from this Idea, which even the Novelty of it makes more lively, it is not easy to depart. Sometimes a Man's making a Mistake in his first Salute, is enough to disgust us against every Thing he shall say afterwards.

SOME happily explain several Effects of Nature, by means of some nitrous Spirits which the Air is charged with. Upon this, there are some Authors that attribute to these nitrous Spirits, all the Fermentations that happen in the animal Body, the glandular Secretions, the Formation of the Spirits, Nutrition, and in a word every thing else that we meet with, or enquire after. So some have endeavoured to account for the Nature of Colours from these Spirits.

A CERTAIN Author has applied himself to examine the Phænomena of the Load-Stone, and has contrived a new System to explain them; with which his Imagination is so fill'd, that every thing in Nature seems to him to be caused by some magnetick Power.

DESCARTES has been reproached with having brought into Philosophy the Mathematical Ideas, which he was wholly taken up with, and by this means making the Universe a vast Machine, which includes an infinite Number of others; all the Effects of which consist in certain Proportions of
Bulk

Bulk, Figure, Celerity, and Direction of the several Parts that strike upon one another. But if Philosophy ought in reality to be nothing else but a perpetual Application of Mathematical Truths; if all that passés in Nature be only a Series of Geometrical Principles evolved; if all the Phænomena of the Universe be only so many different Conditions of Extension, the Universe it self being only a vast Extension; it is happy for a Mathematician, as *Descartes* was, to incline to become a Philosopher.

WE ought not to do any Ill; but being incapable of doing any Good, we cannot act without acting ill: Therefore the best Way will be to do nothing, to abstain from all Action, and to remain entirely passive. This Conclusion is extravagant, and overturns the Principles from whence it is drawn; for to resolve to remain without Action, is to determine upon a certain Condition, and is therefore acting, and consequently acting ill. But an Imagination entirely filled, and entirely overwhelm'd with Disputes upon Man's Incapacity to do good; an Imagination, which esteems as a Robbery committed upon his Maker, the Thought of our being able to receive from him some Faculty, which if we make but a right Use of, we shall do as we ought: An Imagination so prepossessed, gives into a Conclusion suitable to those Ideas which influence it, and entirely possess it. It is so taken up with an extreme Fear of committing a Robbery upon its Maker, that it is not at Liberty to perceive the Extravagancies it gives into.

XI. It is living by Clock-work, to give our selves up to our first Ideas and Habits. (n) We should therefore be always upon our Guard, to prevent their too great Power, and to call to our Assistance our Attention, Circumspection, and Distrust of our selves. Moreover, to prevent the Imagination from confirming

Means to prevent them.

(n) " We should not nail our selves so fast to our Humours and Complexions: Our chief Capacity is to know how to apply our selves to different Employments. We may exist, but we do not live, if we oblige and confine our selves to one only View. The finest Souls are those that can conform to the greatest Variety. We have an honourable Testimony of old *Cato* to this Purpose: *Huic versatile ingenium sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcumque ageret.* My Opinion of Dressing is, to tie my self down to no particular Fashion, be it ever so good, so as never to be able to leave it: Life is an unequal, irregular, and various Motion. It is not being Friends to our selves, much less Masters of our selves; it is

firming it self to a small Number of Ideas, and being accustomed so to do, we should avoid fixing upon one particular Subject, or giving our selves up entirely to one only Application. The Variety of Studies, and the different Genius's of Men with whom we converse, are very proper to furnish it with Extent and Variety.

THE Truth is, we cannot excell in all Things; for which Reason it is but for every one to endeavour to compleat himself in that which his Talent and Taste leads him to. But all the Sciences are so closely connected, that is difficult to excell in one without having a moderate Knowledge of the rest. (o) Theory ought to serve for our Guide in Practice, and all its Rules are founded upon speculative Principles. The Nature and Origin of our Passions being well understood, will be of real Assistance towards establishing the Rules of Morality; History illustrates with Examples; Philosophy also finds in History Facts to explain; *Logic* serves as a Guide to the Critick, and the Critick rectifies *Logic*. But if this were not so, if every Science were independent of others, and received no Assistance from them, yet would it be necessary for Men of Letters to acquire a general Knowledge, and an universal Learning in order to be able to converse together. Society would be composed for the most Part of Members incapable of Union, and by consequence should be destroy'd, if every one should apply himself but to one particular Thing. Each would every Moment look like a Stone jutting out of a Building; one would be mutually insupportable to another. It has been said with a great deal of Justice, That an honest Man should be of all Professions, and, above all, to make no Ostentation of his own. Those that understand but one Thing, continually affect to be harping upon it; and this Affectation is Pedantry. A Soldier that can talk of nothing but Battles, a Story-Teller that can do nothing else, are Pedants in their kind, as much as a Man of Letters, that

“ being Slaves, to follow our selves perpetually, and to be so engaged to
 “ our Inclinations, as not to be able to leave, or vary them.

“ The Excellency of the Soul is to suit with all Heights; to know both
 “ to raise and to lower it self; to behave with Decency wherever
 “ Fortune leads; to confer with our Neighbours about our Buildings,
 “ our Diversions, and our Quarrels; to entertain with Pleasure a Car-
 “ penter or a Gardiner. *Mort. B. III. Ch. 3.*

(o) *Difficile est in Philosophiâ pauca ei nota esse, cui non sint aut
 grana, aut pleraque. Cic. Tusc. 2. Lib. II.*

that can't speak a Word except it be out of *Homer* or *Horace*.

IT is a great Fault in Men of Letters, especially in those that make it their Business to Teach, that they love to Speak rather than to Hear, and are better pleas'd to instruct others than to learn themselves. (*p*) By this means it happens, that Company which might enliven their Imagination, and renew and enrich it with Ideas and Turns, only furnishes them with Opportunities of repeating their Thoughts, and of confirming them in their Habits and Prepossessions. It will be therefore no small Progress for these to learn to be silent, and to hearken to others. If we engage Men to discourse upon such Subjects as they very well understand, we shall both do them a Pleasure, and our selves a great deal of Service; and by adding their Observations to those we have already, we shall very much improve and enlarge our Understanding. BUT

(*p*) " We owe this Care and this constant Correction and Instruction to those that are committed to us: But to go and preach to the first we meet with, and to reprimand his Ignorance and Folly, is a Presumption not to be endured. I would rarely do it on purpose to those that go along with me, and rather quit the Whole, than to make use of such far-fetch'd and imperious Instructions." *Mont. B. III. Ch. 8.*

" If you happen to clear and enlighten their Understanding, you will have no Thanks for your Pains. This is what I would say; My Conception is clear; and if my Expression be not suitable, it is the Fault and Defect of Language. It is lawful to make use even of Malice it self, to correct this haughty and brutish Disposition. *Charron of Wisdom B. II. Ch. IX. gives it for his third Advice,* To spare and husband the Knowledge and Abilities we have acquired; and to be more ready to hear than to speak, to learn than to teach: For it is a Fault to be more forward in making our selves known, and in talking of and shewing our selves, than in receiving the Instructions of others; and in making use of the Matter they furnish us with, rather than to bring in some new of our own." *And for his Fifth:* " To have an honest Curiosity of enquiring into all Things, or after having understood them, to husband and make a proper Advantage of them all." *All this is founded upon this Principle;* " That it is a great Capacity and Wisdom to be able to apply our selves to every thing; to be conformable and tractable; to know how sometimes to rise and aspire, and and sometimes to stoop and condescend, upon proper and suitable Occasions. The finest and best Capacities are the most universal; the most publick, applicable to all Ways of thinking perfectly communicative, and open to every body,

BUT there is a Whimsicalness that reigns amongst Men of Letters, as much, at least, as in any other Profession. If we see some that place their Esteem upon that Science which they chuse for their Object, and in which they believe themselves to excell: We meet with others also that bestow least of their Time upon that which deserves most of it; whilst they bend all their Studies and Pains towards those Things which they are much less obliged to understand. I am of opinion that this last Error is principally occasioned for want of making an Affection for Knowledge, and a Relish for Truth, the Foundation of our Studies. It is for the same Reason that we learn Things but very imperfectly, and only just touch upon them; but when we begin to teach, we give our selves the Trouble of repeating over and over again, what we know but superficially, and, as it were, by rote. The Necessity we find our selves under of returning back to it every Day, makes it insupportably disagreeable; so that we quit what belongs to our Profession, to amuse our selves with what belongs to others, in which we yet instruct our selves but in the gross, and confusedly.

VANITY contributes also to these Irregularities: When a Man, by the Addition of a Title of his proper Name, finds himself placed in the Rank of Masters, he believes himself to be a great Master. This Supposition gives too much Pleasure, and suits too well with Idleness and Vanity, to admit of a Resolution of examining it nearer, and more closely considering it. Finding therefore that we cannot but pass for Learned in the Profession we regularly exercise; we are apt to look upon it as a needless Piece of Trouble to spend our Time in making our selves perfect Masters of it. We expect to shine to greater Advantage, by attaining to some Skill in the Profession of others. This Remark is verified in all Conditions of Life, from the highest to the lowest; what we ought to know most, we know least. We may say that this unreasonable Affectation is one of the principal Sources of the Ignorance and Unskilfulness that reigns amongst us, and consequently of all the Disorders that arise from them. A great Man knows little or nothing of the Art of Governing, the Knowledge of which would do him so much Honour: Perhaps he is got into some certain Method of it; but he has never considered the Principles of it, nor studied the Foundation of it. Instead of this, he has been taught to spend his Time in learning a great many Languages, reading the Poets, and troubling himself with Trifles. In a word, he has been entirely employed in Things that

that indeed have their Merit, and may pass for Ornaments in Persons of an inferior Rank, but are no better than Digressions to him. (q) A great many Men run into the contrary Extreme, and under the Pretence that they are not born to shine in an University, they neglect and shun the Sciences as tho' they were created to know nothing. And
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(q) *The Speech of Aurengzebe to his Præceptor, in the first Volume of Mr. Bernier's Voyages, may serve for a Lesson to a great many People.* "What do you pretend to me *Mullah-gy*, Mr Præceptor, that I should make you one of the chief Omrahs of my Court? Undoubtedly if you had instructed me as you ought, there could be nothing more reasonable. For, as to my self, I was always of Opinion, that a Child, well educated, is more obliged to his Master than his Father. But what are all the fine Things thou hast taught me? Thou hast taught me that all this whole Frangistan is I don't know what little Island, of which the King of *Portugal* was formerly the greatest King, afterwards the King of *Holland*, and since that the King of *England*; as to the other Kings, as those of *France* and *Andaloufia*, thou hast represented them to me like our little *Rajas*, giving me to understand that the Kings of *Hindoustan* were superior to them all. That here only were the true *Houmayons*, the *Ekbars*, the *Jehan-Guyres*, the *Chah-Jehans*, the *Fortunate*, the *Great by Merit*, the *Conquerors*, and Kings of the World. And that *Persia*, *Usbec*, *Kackguer*, *Tatar*, and *Catay-Pegu*, *Siam*, *Thina*, and *Marchina*, tremble at the Name of the Kings of *Hindoustan*. Admirable Geographer! Thou shouldst have taught me to distinguish exactly all these different Parts of the World, and made me acquainted with their Force, their Method of Fighting, their Customs, their Religion, their Government, and their Interests. And by a solid Lecture of History inform'd me of their Beginning, their Advancement, and their Decline; how, from whence, and by what Accidents and Steps these great Changes and Revolutions have been brought about. I have scarce learned from thee, the Name of my Predecessors, the famous Founders of this Empire; much less the History of their Lives, and of all their so much celebrated Conquests. Thou hast rather chose to teach me Arabick than to write and to read; and I am very much obliged to you for having made me spend my Time in learning a Language which requires ten or twelve Yearsto come to any Perfection in it; as tho' the Son of a King should value himself for being a good Grammarian, or a Doctor of our Law, or for understanding other Languages, rather than those of his Neighbours, which he cannot well be without. As tho' he, whose Time is so very precious, and so much wanted for so many other Things of the greatest Importance, should have his Genius discourag'd and cramp'd with a Task so dull and dry, so long and tedious, as that of learning Words.

as the Mind cannot be without some Employment, their's are amus'd with Trifles that dishonour them; and we find them applaud themselves for their Understanding in Dogs and Horses, in Eating and Drinking; and sometimes after having spoken of a great Man, that he is a *Count* or *Duke*, &c. and after having added to his Titles, that he is a Sportfman, or some such trifling Observation, there is all they can say. The Affectation of appearing skilful in what we are either entirely ignorant, or know very little of, as well as in what does not belong to us to know, occasions Men to make so ridiculous a Figure, that it is a perpetual Comedy to those that know how to distinguish such Appearances. A Gentleman has his Heart full of his Family and Estate: You need only to see him to be convinced of it; yet when he speaks of good Eating, and of some favourite Sauce, the affected Air and Manner with which he expresses himself, would make one believe he values himself as much for being a good Cook, as he does for being a great Man. A Mother that has a great many Children, and is perfectly blind in their Education; if you banter her Ignorance in this Point, will never blush, but say perhaps that she never studied it; but if you charge her with not understanding the Rules of Gaming, she will not readily forgive you. A Soldier shall affect to say little of Fighting, but will wretchedly play the Disputant as long as you will have Patience to hear him. A Merchant will regulate Sieges and Campaigns with as much Assurance as he does the Papers of his Counting-House. Every one would act a Part different from his own. And upon this Subject I never remember to have met with a sharper and wiser Saying than that of *Hannibal*, when he had been tired with a long Discourse, which a Pedant had made upon the Art of War. *I have seen*, says he, *a great many old Men that have talk'd idly; but I never yet met with one so extravagant as the Man I have been hearing.*

*Advice against
the Force of
Custom.*

XII. Our Preposseffions for Custom will be remedied, if we frequently reflect upon the Ridiculousness of Men, in preferring themselves successively without Reason one to another. (r) To weaken the too great Power of the Imagination, and to bring it into a Dependance

(r) "I could freely excuse our People for making their now Customs and Usages the sole Rule of their Perfection. For it is
"the

dance upon Reason, it will be proper from time to time to deny our selves those Things which we find our Inclinations stand to, how well soever we find our selves disposed to succeed in them: And sometimes, on the contrary, we shall do well to force our selves upon others which we have an Aversion to. It is true, our Success will be but small in what we are compell'd to, because it does not engage our Attention; but there are Means of exciting it by little and little. A Conversation, for instance, upon the Subject we propose to meditate on, a Lecture relating to it, will dispose us towards it, and at last make that easy to us, which was at first extremely disagreeable.

WHEN by these Precautions we shall once become Masters of our selves, it is certain that the greater Government we have over our Thoughts, and by this means the greater Liberty of Mind, the more easily shall we excite in our selves all Ideas that are proper to give Light to such Subjects as we shall apply our selves to the Knowledge of. These Ideas will rise pure and unstained with any Prejudices.

XIII. THE Force of Habits is so great, and their Influence extends so far, that if it were possible for us to remember every thing that has happened to us from our first Infancy, we should thereby discover the Origin of an infinite Number of Mistakes, false Judgments, and unreasonable Inclinations, that attend us thro' the whole Course of our Lives. All our Prejudices flow from this Spring. There happens

*The Habits of
Youth continue
our whole Lives.*

“ the common Fault, not only of the Vulgar, but even of all Man-
 “ kind, to have their Aim and Attachment perpetually subject to
 “ the Direction of those, amongst whom they are born. I can be
 “ content if when they see a *Fabritius* or *Lalius*, they judge their
 “ Air and Behaviour strange and uncouth, because neither their Ha-
 “ bits nor Manners are suitable to ours. But I am much offended
 “ at their singular Indiscretion, in suffering themselves to be so led
 “ away and blinded by the Authority of a present Fashion, that they
 “ change their Opinions and Measures every Month, if Custom shall
 “ shall so direct, and can judge so differently from themselves.
 “ When they wear the Whalebone of their Doublet up to their
 “ Breast, they have convincing Arguments to prove that it is in its
 “ right Place: A few Years after, you see it lower'd to their very
 “ Hips, and the former Fashion is exploded as ridiculous, unbecom-
 “ ing, and intolerable. The present Fashion of Dress makes them
 “ immediately condemn the past with so much Warmth and Una-
 “ nimity, that it must be a kind of a Madness that can thus turn
 “ round the Understanding. *Mont. B. I. Ch. XLIX.*

happens to all Men, upon different Subjects, something like what *Descartes* has proved in his Chapter of Squint-Eyes. He was astonished himself to find something agreeable in that which, according to his own Ideas, was a real Deformity; but he remembred his Nurse was squint-eyed, and this Remark discover'd to him the Cause of this fantastical Inclination. The Reflections he makes upon this Subject, and the Principles which he takes occasion from hence to establish, will serve yet farther to explain a great many surprizing Effects. A compounded Effect arising from two Causes long acting together, being often repeated, will at last be turn'd into an Habit, and one Part will never be produced without the other accompanying it; so that what at first was the joint Effect of two Causes, will in the end be produced by either of those Causes singly. If we look upon a Person the first time we see him, under some particular View and Habit, it will be enough to represent him, whenever we shall afterwards hear him speak, in the very same manner as he appear'd to us at first. Even Places alone will dispose us to Joy or Sorrow, according as we have been used to be merry or melancholy in them. The Aversion which Men, otherwise very reasonable, have for the Sciences, and the Hatred they bear to Men of Letters, is the Consequence of an Habit contracted in their Infancy, by the Ridiculousness of the Tasks that were set them, and the odious Behaviour of those that had the Care of their Studies. We shall find from the same Spring the Cause of the Disrelish, and even Aversion, which a great Number of People have for Piety and Religion. Children are made to learn long Lessons, and long Prayers, which they understand nothing of: Upon which afterwards, without clearing them up any more, they must have long Discourses made to them with a solemn, severe, and discouraging Air. A wise and rational Man, who loves Truth, Religion, and his Duty, who is capable of Attention, and loves to read good Books, and to meditate upon serious Subjects, sometimes finds it difficult to forbear sleeping, even whilst he is hearing an excellent Sermon; and has occasion for all his Resolution to keep his Thoughts from wandering, even tho' the Subject pleases him, and is well treated of. The Reason of this is, that in his Infancy he was used to sleep at Church, or have his Thoughts wandering there; and as he advances into Years, he meets with but too many Occasions, almost pardonable ones, of being confirm'd in those Habits. Upon this Account it is, that an infinite many Circumstances will, in spite of him, affect

affect him with Sleepiness and Wandering, which, without the Force of Habit, would have been of no Effect.

RELIGIOUS Persons, even those that are truly such, and are perfectly pious, ought to be extremely upon their Guard with respect to the Force of Custom: They make an Habit of their Duty, and there is no Idea more dear and familiar to them. By this Means they are apt to look upon every Thing that is familiar to them, as an Appendix to their Duty. From hence every Thing that is new, by surprizing them, becomes suspected. They even go so far as to be offended at it; and their Imagination, warm'd by Zeal, furnishes them immediately with Reasons to condemn it. A religious Man that smokes Tobacco, and chaws it, will esteem those that open their Snuff-Boxes in Churches, to be Persons that pay but little respect to Religion. Another, who loves to be pleasant and good Company at Table, will condemn Musick as an effect of Debauchery and Licentiousness. If he is used to see Womens hands naked, to use Gloves is Coquetry: To draw their Headclothes close to their Face, or wear them more airy, is equally a Fault, if it be but a Novelty. To change Shoes for Slippers, or Slippers for Shoes, is want of Decency and Modesty. What a great Noise does St. Chrysostom make against embroidered Shoes, when that Fashion began? If it had been established before his Time, he would never have spoke one Word of it, whereas now he appears as zealous against this Trifle, as if it had been setting up Idolatry.

BUT *what can be a more trivial Sin, you will say, if it be any Sin at all, than to wear a Shoe well made, suited, and adjusted to the Foot? Will you then give me leave to stop the Mouths of these People, by shewing them the Meanness of this shameful Vanity? Then hear me without being uneasy; or I must tell you, that if you be uneasy I shall very little regard it. For you your selves are the Cause of my giving you this Trouble, it is you your selves that oblige me to descend to this Detail; in order to shew you the Extravagance of this Error, and to bring you out of the false Perswasion, that there is very little Sin in these ridiculous Vanities. Let us consider then whither this Evil tends, and examine it with some Care. Is it not a Meanness we ought to blush for, to have Silk embroidered on your Shoes, which you ought not to wear upon your Garments? If you will not be convinced with what I say, hear with what Earnestness St. Paul condemns this Excess, and submit your selves to so incontestable an Authority. LET HER NOT APPEAR ADORN'D,* says he, WITH THE PLAINTING OF THE HAIR.

HAIR, WITH GOLD, WITH PEARLS, OR WITH PRECIOUS STONES. *What Excuse therefore can you have, when St. Paul does not allow married Women to be curious in their Habits, to be so in your Shoes? Do you know what Hardships and Dangers Men are exposed to, in fetching you from foreign Countries these superfluous Ornaments? Ships must be built, and Men procured to handle the Oars, steer the Helm, and manage the Sails: All these People must abandon their Country, their Wives, and their Children, and even Life it self, to traffick in Barbarian and strange Countries; and all this in order to gratify your Curiosity, and to make you fine Shoes. Is there any thing more shameful than this Weakness? Our Fathers had an Aversion to this childish Finery: Their Dress was decent, without this unmanly Softness. For my own Part, I foresee that in a little Time the young Men of this Age will wear, without blushing, the same Habits with our Women. What is yet more insupportable in all this is, that the Fathers, who see this Extravagancy in their Sons, permit it without testifying their Displeasure, as tho' it were a Thing wholly indifferent. But if you would know what most moves me in this Affair, it is that you should run into these vain Expences, whilst so many poor Creatures are dying with Hunger. You see JESUS CHRIST in the midst of you both hungry and naked, and loaden with Irons: What Thunder-Bolts are you not worthy of, to neglect him in this Manner; and whilst he wants Necessaries, to employ the Money, with which he ought to be reliev'd, in adorning your Shoes after a new and extravagant Fashion? JESUS CHRIST formerly forbid his Disciples to wear any Shoes; but ours are so far from denying us this Conveniency in Imitation of them, that we must not be contented to use them only so far as Necessity and Decency require. I am in doubt whether to laugh at, or lament the Irregularity of those People, who at the same time discover the Effeminacy of their Heart, the Cruelty of their Temper, and the Weakness and Vanity of their Mind? Can a Man that is taken up with these Trifles, be capable of thinking of any thing useful or serious? Can he have any Regard for his Soul, or any Belief that he has a Soul? And must he not have an Heart of Iron, to bestow upon this cruel Vanity, that which is appointed for the Relief of the Poor? How can your Thoughts be applied to Piety and Virtue, when they are taken up entirely with such frivolous Subjects? How can he whose chief Glory is in being fine about the Feet, and in having Men admire as he walks the Brightness of the Silk, the Flowers and Colours of the Needle-Work, and all that Art can invent of this kind that is curious and agreeable, lift up his Eyes*

to Heaven? How can he attend to the Beauties of the Universe, who minds only those of his Shoes? The Lord has extended the Heavens above the Earth, and placed the Sun there so beautiful and luminous, on purpose that your Eyes might be engaged by so admirable an Object: And you on the contrary keep them fix'd on the Earth, in opposition to the Designs of the Almighty, and in Favour of those of the Devil, who is the Author of these Vanities. It is he that has invented these shameful Ornaments, to seduce you, and divert your Attention from the true Beauties. It is he that employs all his Power to make you descend from Heaven to Earth: And he has succeeded in it so perfectly, that whilst God shews you Heaven, and the Devil a Shoe, you postpone Heaven and prefer the Shoe. I condemn not the Matter of it, because it is the Workmanship of God; but the Luxury and Finery of it, because it is the Contrivance of the Devil. We see a young Man walking with his Eye fix'd on the Earth, altho' God commands him to lift them up to Heaven; and placing his Glory not in a good Life, but in a fine Shoe. We see him walking in the Streets on his Tiptoes, under the utmost Apprehension, lest a little Dirt in the Winter, or a little Dust in the Summer should tarnish the Beauty of his fine Shoes? How! will you plunge your Souls in the Dirt, by a Passion so mean, and not vouchsafe to relieve or raise it out of this Baseness, and yet be afraid to sink your Shoes in the Dirt! Consider but the End and Use of them, and you will quit these vain Apprehensions. Are not Shoes designed to walk in, without Fear, in the midst of the Dirt, and thro' the worst of Ways? If you be so afraid of walking for fear of spoiling such precious Shoes, why do you not put them on your Head, or hang them about your Neck, that they may serve only to adorn you. You laugh, my Brethren, whilst I am saying this; and for my part I can scarce forbear crying; for this Folly pierces me to the Heart, and this Attachment to Fooleries grieves my very Soul.

EXPERIENCE obliges Men that have any Reason, to submit at last to Truth. We see in the present Age Women of good Understanding and undoubted Piety, that wear Shoes with these Ornaments, which the famous *Chrystom* look'd upon as invented by the Devil

HIS Ridicule is just upon such as are dazzled at the Sight of so insignificant a Trifle, and think themselves upon the same Account worthy of the Admiration of others, if it be possible there could be any so extravagantly ridiculous. But these are rather Follies that move our Compassion, than Crimes that deserve our Horror.

ST. PETER does not disapprove of Ornaments, since the holy Women, which he cites for an Example, wore such themselves. But he commands us to give a quite different Attention to the Ornaments that make the true Merit; it is by these Ornaments we must perform our Duty if we would expect to please.

WHAT Zeal put into the Mouth of this celebrated Preacher against the Silk with which they embroidered Shoes, concludes equally strong against all sort of Commerce by Sea, which is at least so highly useful and necessary towards uniting all the Children of our common Father, and giving them an Opportunity of benefiting by the Labours of one another, and of seeing that the Wisdom of our Creator has with his Blessings and Favours amply furnish'd all the Climates of the Earth.

ALL that is said on the Subject of the Poor, the common Place which Preachers usually apply to vague and uncertain Ideas, is of the same Strain. It is a Piece of Charity wrong understood, that makes its Boast of feeding the Hungry. This Indulgence is a Cruelty that encourages them in Vice: They ought rather to be provided with Opportunities of working, and as all are not equally strong, it is necessary there should be Arts that may employ the most Feeble.

NOTHING is more Sophistical than his Reasoning deduced from Man's Grandeur; who to preserve his Dignity, should always as he walks be looking up to the Stars; but in order to this, it is necessary the Earth should be as level and even as a Floor. Besides, it is cover'd every where with Wonders, which so much the more demand our Attention, as we are able to consider them more nearly, and as we are much more interested in the Knowledge of them. The Light of the heavenly Bodies is not intended only for the Object of our Admiration; it is designed also to discover to us an infinite many Objects, besides enabling us to walk with Security. If we make use of the plainest Shoes that can be made, our Reason will teach us not to trail them in the Dirt: Decency and Respect to other Men will oblige us to take care that we do not appear before them unhandſomely, which always gives Uneasiness to those that have any Relish for Politeness and Decency.

ST. CHRYSOSTOM therefore was not a Friend to new Fashions; besides, he was out of Humour with the Court. Every thing displeases in those we hate; and there are a great many who condemn in general whatever they do not do themselves. When we are not in the Interests of the Great,

we endeavour to gain upon the Multitude, for our Hearts must have hold of Men in one Condition or another. The Applauses of the Vulgar are obtain'd by soothing their Poverty. But we ought to consider that by disgusting the Minds of the Great on Account of Trifles, we prejudice them against hearing us, when we undertake to recommend to them Duties that are truly important, both for themselves, and the Society which they govern.

THE most dangerous of all Habits are such as we contract in our Infancy, and which Education fortifies. It is extremely difficult to correct them entirely: Thro' the whole course of our Lives, they seduce us every Moment, and when we least think of it. Children give Life to every thing, and imagine in every thing that surrounds them, something resembling to what they feel in themselves, some Idea, some Sentiment, some Desire. They cry, if we abuse their Babies: They imagine that an heavy Body presses upon their Hand on purpose to incommode them. I shall say nothing of the Prepossession of the Schools, which has involved Philosophy in such Darknes for so many Ages. Since the happy Restoration of the Sciences, have not the most enlighten'd Philosophers, and such as have been best acquainted with the Mechanism of the Universe, frequently made use of the word *Nature*, as the Name of some secret Agent, which, with a limited Power and Knowledge, proceeds in the best manner it can to the End which it has in View? This Language does by no means express their true Meaning; and yet by means of hearing it often repeated, they are at last inclined to think as they speak, and their Minds are taken up with two opposite Opinions. If it be thought of attentively, *Nature* will be found to be only a Mass of Corpuscles ranged in certain Proportions: But if it be consider'd carelessly, it may be imagined to have Knowledge. Under this Supposition we take our full Swing, and fall into a thousand bright Expressions, but not at all just: For if by *Nature* we understand the *Work*, these Expressions will be found false, or will have no Meaning at all: If by this Word we would understand the *Author* of the Universe, then they are indecent, and as little conformable to the Duty we owe to him, as they are to Truth. But we listen with Pleasure to a Language in fashion, which suits with the manner we have been taught to think in from our Infancy.

NOTHING is more common than to see Fathers complaining of their Sons Expences, and Sons exclaiming against their Fathers Avarice. It is probable the Reason of this may

be, that in their first Infancy, Children need only ask in order to obtain; for in that Age they require little else but what is absolutely necessary, and what is of little Value. Being accustomed therefore for some Years to an Habit of never being refused any thing, they are at last brought to look upon the Affection of their Fathers as an inexhaustible Source, and their Surprize is infinite, to find that in an Age in which they think themselves most worthy of it, they should then cease to receive the same Measure of it.

WE love to see in Children a blind Submission to their Governors: This Deference is absolutely necessary in their most tender Age; for being incapable of distinguishing by themselves what is useful for them from what is hurtful, they ought to undertake nothing, whatever it be, without first consulting those that have the Care of their Conduct. After they are out of their Infancy they are committed to School-Masters, who always appear satisfied with their Scholars in proportion as they are found punctual in retaining and repeating exactly what has been taught them. They do not love such as exceed these Bounds; nor can they endure any young People should perplex them with Questions, and seem wiser than their Teachers. Hence it is that we are forced to confine our selves to an Imitation of our Masters: If their Instructions are truly learned, it is happy for us; if they are insignificant, or even erroneous, we receive and adopt them in the very same manner: And by this means the Chairs are successively fill'd with Masters that teach with Authority; but having never examined any thing, they know not whether they teach Nonsense or Truth.

THE pompous Ceremonies of Baptism and Marriage in the Church of *Rome*, with all their Train of Formality, are very proper to make deep and lively Impressions upon the Imaginations of young People, and to dispose them to look upon the one as a Sacrament, and upon the other as a Sacrament absolutely necessary for all. They need only be told so after the fine Shew to believe it; they submit immediately to Persuasions mix'd with such lively Ideas, and suspect no Deceit where the Imagination is so agreeably affected. A *Princess Palatine* of eight Years of Age, was made to be present at a Dispute concerning the Necessity of Baptism, and as there was care taken to form Ideas proper to make an impression upon the Imagination of an Infant, so hers was so entirely taken up with them, that she determined in the end to abandon the Protestant Communion.

WHAT Outrages has not Envy committed? It barbarously arms Men one against another; and when they have done making War, the same Passion deprives them of all the Benefits of Peace, by Parties, Cabals, Intrigues, Back-bitings, and underhand Dealings, by which they continually endeavour to undermine one another. What a Scandal to Sciences are the Disputes and Quarrels of those that make Profession of them! Disputes, which Envy carries to so great a length, that as soon as ever they begin, they understand one another no longer! From whence arises the tyrannick Power of this Passion, which in crossing the Repose of others, does also at the same time destroy that of those that pursue it? One of the Causes of it, without doubt is, that Children are presently tired with their Play-Things, Levity being peculiar to that Age, and are ever desirous of having what they see before them; and what they have already pleases no longer, when once they see their Play-Fellows have something else which they have not. Those that have the Care of their Education, think they do Wonders by taking the Advantage of this Weakness, finding that it is a Handle they are always to be taken by. There are no Motives that have more certain and sudden Effects: They are reproach'd and made ashamed, when they suffer themselves to be outstripp'd by their Comrades, and are encouraged to take an ill-natur'd Pleasure in leaving them behind. But does all they learn by this means deserve to be put in competition with the Poison they suck in with it? Can all the Instructions that are given them make amends for the horrid Disposition of envying the good Fortune of others, and the detestable Inclination of finding Truth less amiable in the Mouth of others?

SINCE therefore Habits determine Men after such a manner, we see how important it is to know their Strength, to discover their Principles, and to disengage our selves from them. If we are but on our Guard, nothing is easier than to prevent them, as nothing is more difficult to correct them when confirmed. *Principiis illarum obstemus, Melius non incipient quam desinent.* Sen.

XIV. I DO not deny but that the Air contributes also to the Varieties of the Imagination. But as its Effects may be referr'd to those of the Temperaments, I imagine we have already laid down Maxims sufficient to prevent its bad Consequences. Every one ought to abstain from such Diet, and Circumstances of Life, as give to the Mind either

*Of the Influence
of the Air, and
of Diet.*

an Heaviness, or Liveliness, which it cannot govern. Each must consult himself upon this Head; and if there be a general Rule to be given, it is to make use of the Words of Scripture, *To eat our Meat with Gladness and Singleness of Heart*. The divine Providence, by joining to the Pains we are at in seeking our Food the double Pleasure of satisfying our Hunger, and of relishing the Savour of our Dyet, has in this, as well as in all other Instances, given full Demonstration of his Wisdom and Goodness. By this Means not only the Body, but the Mind also is furnish'd with new Supplies of Strength and Vigour. Our Dyet affects us differently, according to the Humour we are in when we take it; if it be taken in a bad Humour it disposes us to Gloominess. And as nothing opens the Mind more than Cheerfulness, so nothing contracts it so much as Sadness. Those that are ill-humour'd, have their Understanding also indispos'd; they are barren in their Conceptions, and opinionated in their Sentiments. The first of these Faults keep them in Ignorance, the last confirms them in Error. These are Truths of Experience, which I need not bring Instances to prove, there being no Body that doubts of it, except it be such as have never reflected upon what passes within themselves; and it is not for such as these that *Logic* is intended, for Rules to them can be of no use at all.

XV. WE have before distinguish'd our *The Imagination loves lively Ideas.* Perceptions into two *Classes*: Into Sensations, which are simple Perceptions of themselves; and into *Ideas*, which represent to us something different from themselves. Sometimes the same Perception has a Mixture of both: Our Ideas are sometimes more, and sometimes less accompanied with Sensations; and those which by this Mixture present themselves the more lively, usually engage our Approbation: We are pleas'd with them, we submit to them, and acquiesce in them. This is the Source of an infinite Number of Illusions: We do not regard Ideas that are simple, and whose Effects are more languid, but haste on to those that are more compounded, and which by their Mixture make Impressions that are more lively, tho' less clear; and by this wrong Method, we often determine upon that which we have but imperfectly distinguish'd.

METAPHORICAL Terms, and a figurative Language, by presenting at one and the same Time both the Idea and Sign of the Thing signified, affect the Mind more powerfully, and by this means please and seduce it. By presenting corporeal Images, they excite brisk Sensations, which the Mind gives

gives it self up to without being the least enlightened. The Air, the Tone of the Voice, and all the Helps of this kind, owe their Effect to their adding to the Liveliness of the Ideas which he that speaks excites in us. It is by this Means that a Genius which is an Original, presently makes a Party, and gains Disciples: His Turn is bright and distinguishing; whereas those that have but little Fire, will never rise high enough above the common Pitch to be remarkable. Besides, he who appears in a Character peculiar to himself, pleases even by his Novelty; and we readily submit to the Opinion of an Author whom we hear or read with Pleasure.

HE who speaks passionately of a Thing which extremely affects him; an unfortunate Man that deploras his Misfortunes; a Man full of Joy, that describes the particular Subjects of it; an angry Man that exclaims against what has offended him; all these People raise very moving Sentiments in those that hear them. It is to these Sentiments, the Effects of *Passion*, or of Contrivance, that Enthusiasts give the Title of *Divine Inspiration*, an assured Character of Truth, according to them, altho' the Sentiments and Emotions which they honour with this great Name, do often accompany Chimeras, the Productions of a Mind transported, and hurried away with its Fire.

THOSE whose Imaginations are easily moved, do also with the same Facility move those of others, and make very lively and deep Impressions. To these Impressions answer powerful Expressions, and sprightly Turns. He that is very much moved himself, makes others have a Fellow-feeling of all that concern him. This was one of the Characters of *Montagne*: Whatever he gave his Attention to, always affected him in an extreme Manner. *B. I. Ch. 20.*

FORTIS IMAGINATIO GENERAT CASUM, say
the Learner. I am one of those that are extremely sensible of the Force of the Imagination. Every one is subject to it; but some are overwhelm'd with it. The Impression of it strikes through me; and my Art is in avoiding it, for want of being able to withstand it. I could not live but in the Conversation of such as are Healthful and Gay. The Sight of other People's Misfortunes afflict me perpetually; and my own Sentiments are always under the Influence of the Sentiments of others. To converse with one that is always coughing, would affect my Lungs with the like Disorder. I go with a great deal more Unwillingness to see my Friends when they are sick, than to see other People that are indifferent to me. I am seiz'd, and fall down with the Distemper I study upon. Nor do I wonder that the Imagination

tion should give Fevers, and even Death it self, to those that give way to it.

WE agree that a wise Man may be at first deceiv'd, and find in the Liveliness of his Sensations a more exquisite Pleasure, than he does in simple Ideas and Speculations. But as soon as ever he discovers the Illusions of this new Charm, and compares what it presents to him with what it deprives him of, he returns back to his first Tranquility, with a Resolution never to abandon it more. It is not so with Men of a little Genius, who are taken up entirely with Sensations: Custom always dulls the Edge of them, and by that Means lessens their Value. That which before charm'd them, does now cloy them; their Spirits languish for want of Impressions, till a new Object strikes them briskly enough to engage them forthwith. This will have the same Fate with the rest, and the second Passion will soon languish and cool, to give way to a third. When we are under the Conduct of Knowledge, we are wise and consistent; when we follow our Sensations, we are restless and inconstant.

IT is therefore of the utmost Importance to accustom our selves to distinguish our Evidence, which informs us of something from our Sensations which affect us inwardly, but teach us nothing: Without this Distinction, we become the Sport of a false and corrupt Imagination, of which I should give some Examples. It is very dangerous amongst those that are truly Religious, as well as amongst those that would be thought so; but yet more dangerous amongst those that are Irreligious. A Debauchee that speaks of his Pleasures; a worldly Man that describes the Glory and Majesty of the Senses; an Atheist that makes a Ridicule of Religion, and of the Mysteries and Duties which it contains; all these People express themselves with so much Earnestness and Assurance, that they often seduce those that are not upon their Guard, and persuade them to become conformable, without furnishing them with the least Reason for being so. To follow these obscure Impressions in the room of Evidence and Reason, is to pursue *Folly* in the room of *Wisdom*. Add to this a sufficient Quantity of Zeal, and you have a compleat Definition of a *Fanatick*. Every Thought which does not agree with the Ideas of the Understanding, favours of Enthusiasm in Proportion as it is lively.

Humour. XVI. THE Temperament, Education, Habits, Kinds of Life, in which we are engaged, do all unite to form what is call'd *Humour*. This Name is given to certain confused Sentiments, and to cer-
tain

tain Inclinations, which determine our Judgment and Actions, and which govern them preferably to our Ideas and Knowledge. Whatever agrees with the Humour which prepossesses and governs us, is sure to please and engage our Approbation: Whatsoever opposes it displeases us, and is upon this Account rejected as false.

WHEN an Author abandons himself to his Humour, and follows the Inclination of his Temperament, without giving himself the Trouble of correcting and regulating it, we may discover in this Humour and Temperament the true Source of all his Sentiments, and even of his Contradictions; for he who observes no other Rule than his Humour, can not be always consistent with himself.

I SHALL make use of *Montagne* for an Example, because his Characters are the most remarkable. He had too much Fire, and by that Means too much Penetration, not to be sensible that a weak Argument is but a weak Argument, and that Probability is but Probability. His being sensible of his Fire, and of the Force of it, gave him so high an Idea of himself, that he would not discredit himself with the least Disguise, nor lay down for certain what did not appear to him to be demonstrated. On the other side, having been used to give himself up to his Fire, it would have been too difficult for him to fix it, and to resolve to dwell upon a Subject long enough to acquire some certain Knowledge of it not to confine himself, not to trouble himself, or take much Pains to rise from Probability to Certainty, was a Part the most conformable to his Humours. *I have nothing of my own, wherewith to satisfy my Judgment: I have my Sight sufficiently clear and regular, but it is troublesome to make use of it: ----- What I have sketch'd out, I chuse rather to touch over again, than to strike out and begin again. ----- I can endure some Trouble; but then it must be of my own chusing, and just so long as it is agreeable.*

Molliter austerum Studio fallente laborem.

Hor. Lib. II. Sat. II. 12.

OTHERWISE, if I be not invited by some Pleasure; if I have no other Guide than my own pure and free Will, I am good for nothing, extremely idle, extremely free, both by Nature and by Art: I can as soon die as go through any Fatigue. I have a Soul that is free and absolute Mistress of it self, and accustomed to follow its own Directions. --- My Infancy it self was indulgent and free, and even then exempt from a rigorous Subjection.

jection. All this has given me a Complexion that is delicate and incapable of Solicitude. I love to keep no exact Account of what I have, that I may be less sensible of what I lose. And for my own Part, I know of no Passion which I could take any Pains to conceal and maintain. I would not prize Wisdom at so dear a Rate. I do not so much regard what I do, as what Pains it costs me not to do worse. --- And I had rather expose my Passions, than conceal them at my own Expence. It is better their Edge should fall upon any Thing else, than upon my self. Thus is he continually speaking of himself, being a Subject he was full of; and it would have been too much Pain to him to have opposed so agreeable an Inclination. He makes a thousand Apologies for it, and the most insignificant Reasons appear to him a sufficient Justification for it; for his Heart is entirely taken up with any thing that flatters his favourite Passion. *If the World complains that I speak too much of my self, I also complain that it should think of any thing else but it self. I say indeed not all I would say, but all I dare say. And I take the greater Freedom upon account of my Years; for Custom has indulged old Age with the Privilege of Babbling, and speaking impertinently of one's self. He will not so much as repent of his Faults, for fear of disturbing himself: He leaves his Reformation to the Lord's Management, as to his Divine Wisdom shall be thought convenient; but for himself he still pursues the same Courses. As to my self, I can wish in general that I were otherwise: I can condemn and be displeas'd with my universal Frame, and pray to God for my Reformation, and for Pardon of my natural Infirmities: But this, in my Opinion, ought no more to be call'd Repenting, than my being displeas'd that I am not Cato, or an Angel. My Actions are regular and conformable to what I am, and to my present Condition. I am not able to do better; and Repentance does not properly belong to those Things that are not in our Power, tho' I grant Sorrow may. I conceive Beings infinitely more exalted and regular than my own: But this does not mend my Faults, any more than the conceiving an Arm or a Mind, more vigorous than my own, will make mine stronger or better.*

I DO not comfort my self so much for having my Notions sprightly and learned, as I do for having them easy, and accommodated for the Purpose of Life. They are to me sufficiently true and sound, if they be but useful and agreeable. Mont. B. III. Ch. 9.

IT is my Misfortune, (for, God forgive me, to this very Hour it has not been my Fault,) that whereas other People take Time and

and Opportunity to think before they speak, I am forced to avoid any such Preparation, for fear of bringing my self under some Obligation, upon which I must afterwards depend.

HE carries this Humour so far, that those Virtues of great Souls, Gratitude and Generosity, are a Burden to him. My most favourite Qualities are, Idleness and Freedom: On account of these I have a mortal Hatred against being obliged to any other, or by any other than my self. I endeavour to the utmost of my Power to do without them, before ever I make use of the Kindnesses of others, let my Wants be what they will, either great or small. My Friends importune me strangely, when they beg of me to ask something more of them.

FEW People undertake the Trouble of correcting their Humour by Reason. They follow it exactly such as it is: And if we could but know perfectly each Persons Humour, and his prevailing Interests, we might almost constantly find the Causes of their several Sentiments. And it is because his Interests change, and his Humour varies, that we see a Man maintaining with Earnestness, what he had a little before condemned with the same Warmth. He approves and condemns according to his Taste, not according to Knowledge. An infinite Number of Men are like the Person in one of *Plautus's* Plays, who thought the best Reason for the doing any thing was, because he himself liked to do so. *To correct a Friend who has deserv'd it, is doing as one ought, because I my self shall this very Day correct a Friend of mine for deserving it.* (s) The celebrated *Montagne* reasons pretty much upon the same Foot, when speaking of Sadness, he says, *I am the most exempt from this Passion of any Man, and neither love nor value it, tho' the World has undertaken, as tho' upon some valuable Account, to honour it with particular Favours: It is made the Dress of Wisdom, Virtue and Conscience. Foolish and Vile Ornaments!* What he says is very true; but he begins with a Reason that is enough to make his Truth suspected: *He is the most exempt from this Passion,* that is to say, prepossessed with Cheerfulness. We have already observ'd, that he entirely follow'd his Humour, which was exceeding lively, and hence proceed his Flights: He loved also excessively his Ease and his Freedom, and hence comes his want of Method; for it required too much Pains

(s) *Amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam, Immune est Facinus: verum in ætate utile, Et conducibile: nam ego Amicum hodiè concastigabo pro commeritâ noxiâ.*

Pains to digest his Thoughts in order: Whatever he liked, he found Means to commend; whatever he disliked, he contrived Reasons to condemn.

HUMOUR oftentimes gets the better of Interest. In vain all Interests imaginable conspire to keep two Brothers united: Their Humours being opposite, determine them to Contradictions and Quarrels, and at last to become each other's mutual Ruin. Two neighbouring Nations might live in the most profound Tranquility, grow formidable to all their Enemies, and reap daily new Advantages from their Union: But they cannot love one another, their Humours being too different. The Thoughts of humbling the one are so pleasing to the other, that there is no room left for reflecting that the Mischiefs it is pleased with may fall at last upon its own Head. I have heard say, that if we would transact an Affair after the most successful Method, we must not reckon upon the Strength and Evidence of our Reasons; the surest Handle is to take Men by their particular Interests, and convince them that Way. This is the Art and Secret of persuading. Perhaps also it will be no less advantageous to consult their several Humours, and learn to conform to them. To study Mens Humours, is the way to discover which side they incline to.

THE *Barbarian* Nations thought themselves happy under the Government of the *Romans*, after they had got a Relish of their Politeness. But after the Infamy of the Emperors, and the Brutality of the Legions, that spared not their Masters, and whose Caprice could either inthrone or dethrone, had brought the *Barbarians* into the Court and Capital, the Provinces that had never given into this Degeneracy, having suffered so much by it, regarded the Government which their Fathers had so much esteemed as an intolerable Yoke, and their Hatred inspired them with Courage to throw it off.

SOME People have thought I ought to have mentioned *Original Sin*, amongst the principal Causes of the Irregularity of our Faculties. I take it as an Honour to find that

I lye under this Charge in common with one of
 Mr. Oster- the most celebrated Divines, who has likewise
 vald. omitted it in his excellent Treatise of the


Causes of the Corruption that reigns among Christians. We are both contented with enquiring into those Causes which are in our Power to remedy, and the greatest Part which we may possibly prevent. And it is for the same Reason, I have avoided speaking of the ill Construction of the

the Brain, tho' it is often the Cause of Madneſs and Enthuſiaſm. Laſtly, if I have not benefited by the Advice that has been given me, any more than by the Examples of ſome other learned Men, that have thought proper to mention in their *Logic* what I have omitted in mine, I muſt ſay in my Juſtification, that as I never expect to ſee my ſelf a Profeſſor of Divinity, I have not fallen under the Temptation of treating of a Subject out of its Place, in hopes of making my Court to Men of that Faculty.



C H A P. VIII.

Of the WILL.

I.  HE Will is abſolutely neceſſary to the exciting and perfecting our Ideas; for according as we will apply our ſelves to the Examination of any Subject, we ſhall procure a more or leſs exact and enlarged Knowledge.

The Power of the Will over our Ideas.

II. IN order to underſtand what I mean by the Word *Will*, we need only deſcend into our ſelves, and obſerve with Attention our own proper Acts. By this Attention to what paſſes within us, we perceive and are convinced that the Will, or, if you pleaſe, our Soul it ſelf, that which thinks in us, that Thought which is our ſelves, determines it ſelf to will this or that ſo arbitrarily, and is ſo much the ſole and immediate Cauſe of its own Reſolution, Choice, and Determination, that we cannot poſſibly alledge any other Reaſon for our Will, than our Will it ſelf: Why have we *will'd* ſo and ſo in one Caſe? Why we have *will'd* differently in another Caſe? The Reaſon is, we all know, becauſe we have *will'd* ſo.

The Will determines it ſelf.

III. WHEN I am pleaſed to make uſe of my Liberty by putting down my right Arm, or ſitting up my left; by opening one Hand, or ſhutting the other, juſt as I like beſt; what is it that determines me to one or other of theſe Choices? My ſelf only. I will ſhut my left Hand; and why rather than

Proofs of Liberty.

than my right? Because I will. The Will would not be the Will, if it were not Mistress of it self. So again, when a certain Number of Guineas are put into a Purse, and I am desired to guess whether the Number is even or odd, on Condition they should be mine, if I guess right; I see plainly 'tis my Interest to speak, but I don't know what. I have no Light or Information to encline me to one more than to another of the Words to which my Choice is confined; and when I say Even, for instance, rather than odd, it is the pure Effect of my Choice: I will so, is all the Reason I can give. I have Reasons indeed to determine me to speak, rather than to hold my Tongue; but I have none to determine me to say Even rather than Odd.

THERE are some Men, tho' few in Number, that deny Man's Liberty. You seem, say they, to act freely, but you are not really free. A secret, superior, and necessary Cause, forms all your Determinations. They may as well say, that I seem to think, but that perhaps, in truth, I do not think at all. For if our being sensible of any thing does not amount to an absolute Certainty, I can neither be sure that I think, nor that I exist: For we can have no stronger Demonstrations, than our inward Perceptions. And we have not a stronger inward Evidence and Perception of our Thinking or Existing, than we have of our being free and absolute Masters of our own Choice and Will.

Answer to Objections, IV. BUT, say they, does not your Will seem to move your Arm? It seems so, and yet we are not sure that it is so; the greatest Part of Philosophers deny it; and there is not one of them but is puzzled to explain so common an Effect. I answer, that if it does seem to me that my Will does move my Arm, and I accordingly believe it, tho' really it does not do so, and consequently I am mistaken; my Fault is in judging rashly of that which I do not understand. Indeed I am perfectly sensible that I will that my Arm should be moved, and I am certain that I will it; I am sensible also that I form this Will, and am for the same Reason certain that I am the Author and Cause of this Act: I perceive also in the third Place that this Will is succeeded by a Motion of my Arm. This is also very certain, and not to be contested; but I do not perceive at all, nor am any way sensible, how or in what manner I myself produce this Motion, or am the Cause of it: So far from this, that I do not know how it is done. All therefore that I am sensible of is certain; and that is only doubtful which I am not sensible of.

THERE

THERE are some who oppose Liberty with Arguments drawn from the divine Præscience, and the Decrees and Appointments of Providence. But it is a dreadful Mistake and Contradiction to make use of the most mysterious, or, if you please, of the most sublime Parts of Religion, to subvert the very Foundations of Religion. For without Liberty there can be neither Law, nor Virtue, nor Vice, nor Rewards, nor Punishments, and especially no Punishments, except such as are unjust. That which is most out of the Reach of our Understandings, ought not in the least to make us call in question that which is most evident to us. The Obscurity of such Consequences as we do not at all comprehend, ought not to shake the Certainty of such Principles as are most simple and evident.

I CONFESS, after a Determination of the Will is once form'd, its Existence is necessary in one Sense, that is to say, it is no longer in our Power to cause it not to have been, or not to be, at the Moment wherein it exists; for this would be a Contradiction, it being impossible for a Thing to be, and not to be at the same Time. But before it was form'd, it depended upon our Choice to produce it, or not produce it. Liberty is concerned in such Acts as are to be done, not in such as are already done, and by that means determined.

BEFORE we determine our selves we are free, when we are acting, we are free to continue or discontinue our acting; and when we have acted, we are at Liberty to act differently a second Time.

IF a Man who denies Liberty, should do me some considerable Services, promote my Interests amongst the Great, lend me Money, defend my Life, and, in short, publish my Praises upon all Occasions; if I should refuse to return what he lent me, if I should do him ill Offices amongst his Superiors, and should threaten and actually do him a Mischief, what would he not say to the Blackness of my Ingratitude? If after all this, the Judges should pronounce against him in my Favour, what Complaints would he not make of their Iniquity? He would have Reason, and yet would contradict himself; for if no body is free, no body is blamable: It is by Clock-work he has obliged me; and it is by Clock-work I have disobliged him. The Day and Night succeed one another so by Turns. We are sure to contradict our selves when we declare against some certain inward Principles; and these Principles will always demonstrate themselves when we do not endeavour to suppress them. When *Seneca's* Mind is taken up entirely with his Hypothesis

of Fate and Destiny, he declares expressly, *Frustra vote & studia fiunt*. "Vain are all our Wishes and Endeavours." But as soon as ever he lets drop this Subject, he is presently laying down Precepts and Rules for our Behaviour. See *Consol. ad Marciam*. A Man that makes a generous Use of his Wealth, and chuses with a great deal of Discretion whom to bestow part of it on, his Expences are elegant, he is beloved, and his Generosity and Discretion commended: But he would without doubt receive much less Pleasure in hearing these Praises, and in finding himself such as he is, if he did not perceive that his Actions were in his own Power, and the Effect of his own Choice. He perceives this Truth directly, who to this direct Pleasure avoids joining the Pleasure of perceiving it again by his Reflections; for after he is once convinced of his Liberty, he would find himself obliged to a great many other Things that are not agreeable to him, and by which he is resolv'd not to be confined.

V. BUT lastly, say some, nothing can be produced without a Cause; therefore it is necessary there should be some Cause to determine the Will. It is easy to answer this Objection. The Will determines it self: It chuses, because it wills; it is it self the Cause of its Determination. If every Being must necessarily be determined by some Cause different from it self, then there could never be a first Cause, and consequently there could be no Cause at all.

VI. WHEN we speak of the Will, we should not conceive it to be a Faculty distinct from the Understanding, as our Hearing is distinct from our Seeing, and the Hands from the Feet. It is not thus. There is not so much Composition in the Mind. One and the same Soul, one and the same Principle, is sometimes consider'd simply as *perceiving*, and at other times as *willing*. All the while it is in a State of perceiving, it *wills to perceive*; and all the while it is in a State of willing, it does at the same time *perceive it wills*. The Will perceives its self, and is an Act conscious of it self, as well as our Ideas. The Will and the Understanding are not so much distinct Faculties, as different Methods of Thinking: And it the same with the other Faculties. One and the same Soul sees Colours, hears Sounds, recollects past Ideas, and conceives Things without the Help of Images. These are the three different Methods of perceiving; which are each of them subdivided into a great Number of others. And these three general Heads, under which we rank our different

different Methods of Thinking, we call the Faculties of the *Senses*, of the *Imagination*, and of the *Understanding*.

VII. IT is therefore a certain Truth, that our Mind has the Power of determining it self by its own proper Choice. But this does not at all hinder, but that it should often regulate this Choice by the Ideas that enlighten it.

It regulates its Choice by its Ideas.

We love our selves essentially and necessarily, though voluntarily. It is not in our Power not to love our selves: We will love our selves, and it is not in our Power to will otherwise. When therefore we once know clearly what is for our Advantage, our Love of our selves never fails to determine us this Way. We will whatever we look upon as a Good, the Moment we believe it to be so; and by loving our selves, we are sure to love whatever is good for us.

VIII. IF Men had no Liberty, but were determined always to will by the Impressions of present Objects, or by the Footsteps and Remains of those Impressions, and to act conformably to these Impressions or Reliques, they would be perpetually acting amiss. A present Advantage is often times attended with a great many Evils; and a present Evil, may on the contrary, be follow'd with divers Advantages. It was therefore very necessary we should have the Power to resist present Impressions, to suspend their Effects, and to refuse complying with the Determinations which they do of themselves occasion, till we have Time enough to learn thoroughly their Nature, to distinguish all their Principles, and to prevent all their Consequences.

The Use of Liberty.

IN vain do we endeavour to keep Men to their Duty, or to express our selves in Terms conformable to the Hypothesis which denies Liberty; in vain do we endeavour to restrain them from such Acts as are injurious to Society, that is, such as would do too much Prejudice to other Men, by threatning them, by preaching to them, and by setting Punishments before their Eyes, if they have not the Liberty to reflect upon these Threatnings, and to give Attention to the Idea of Punishments to come, rather than to present Interests, from which these Threatnings and these Punishments ought to divert them. The Present and the Certain will always be more engaging than the Future and the Possible.

IF we have no Liberty, the Reproach we suffer for having failed of our Duty, our Confusion for having preferr'd Vice to Virtue, are nothing but Weaknesses, which have no other

Foundation than the mistaken Supposition of our being free. The returning of Thanks, and the bestowing of Commendations, can please none but Madmen, who believe themselves to be what they are not; and if all Men were learned, yet if none of them believe themselves to be free, they would never blame or commend any Person whatsoever. But if any one should think fit to prefer himself to one of these learned Men, who believe themselves without Liberty, and to judge himself to have much greater Abilities; if the Publick should appear inclined in favour of him who thus prefers himself; what Complaints and Clamours would they not make against the Insolence of the one, the Injustice of the other, and the Ignorance of them both? We would be commended; we think we deserve it; and consequently we perceive our selves to be free: We perceive it, I say, from time to time; we experience the Effects of it, altho' we refuse to reflect upon it, and to agree with it.

IT is a pleasant Imagination, says Montagne, B. II. Ch. 14. *To conceive the Mind at the same Moment equally influenced by two equal Desires. For it is certain it can never comply with either of them; because the Application and Choice supposes a Difference in the Value. And if any one should place us betwixt a Bottle of Wine and a Westphalia Ham, with an equal Desire of Eating or Drinking, there could not possibly be any Remedy, but that we must necessarily die of Hunger, or Thirst. To provide against this Inconvenience, the Stoicks, when they are asked, whence our Mind should be able to chuse out of two Things that are perfectly indifferent; and what should be the Cause that out of a great Number of Crown-Pieces we should chuse one rather than another, there being no Reason to incline us to this Preference; answer, That this Movement of the Mind is extraordinary and irregular, and arises in it from an Impulsion that is strange, accidental, and fortuitous. It would be better, in my Opinion, to say, That no two Things, can be presented to us so perfectly equal, but that there must be some Difference, tho' it be never so small; and that either to the Sight, or to the Touch, there is always some Choice which draws and engages us, tho' never so imperceptibly.*

Montagne had Reason to say it was a pleasant Imagination: And besides the Pleasure he always took in laying down Paradoxes every Moment, and of establishing by this or that Principles tending to Scepticism and Infidelity, he would have perceived and despised the Extravagance of this Imagination; but he wanted to come to the Conclusion with which he finishes

finishes this Chapter, * *Solum certum nihil esse certi, & homine nihil miserius aut superibus.* * *Plin.*

“ All we can be certain of, is, that every Thing is uncertain; and that there is nothing more despicable than Man, nor at the same Time more conceited: His Vanity is equal to his Imperfection. ” It is in order to come to this fine Conclusion, that he makes an Hotch-potch of the *squaring the Circle*; of the *Philosophers-Stone*; of *two Lines that continually approach, and yet can never meet*; of a *Centre as large as the Circumference*; of a *Man, in short, dying with Hunger and Thirst betwixt a Bottle of Wine and a Westphalia Ham, because he had an equal Appetite to either of them.*

THE Supposition of Liberty discovers the Ridiculousness of this Imagination; but rather than confess that we can chuse and determine our selves, he rather likes to lay it down as Fact, That there is always some Difference that determines us, tho' it be but imperceptible! That is to say, he rather likes to suppose that which cannot be proved or perceiv'd, than to agree with the Notion of Liberty, of which we need only consult and reflect upon our selves with Sincerity and Attention, to be fully convinced.

IT is true, that as we are encompassed with a great Number of different Goods, and as we can procure our selves Pleasures of all Kinds, our Will determines it self sometimes on one Side, and sometimes on the other; we sometimes are inclined to this, and sometimes to that. When our Attention is solely and entirely fixed upon an Object that is capable of serving our Wants, or our Pleasures, and we neither do or desire to think upon any other, it is not possible, in this Case, but that the sole Good that affects us should also be the only one that determines us: We will thus infallibly. But as we have the Power to divert our Attention from an Object, in order to fix it upon another, we always find our selves, in this Sense, to have the Liberty of chusing. Of all the Objects that encompass us, there is none that can so far get the Mastery of our Will, as entirely to enslave it; we can always pass from one to another, and whatever Reasons occasion us to act after a certain manner, or to make a certain Choice, determine us no farther than as we will consent to follow the Impression of these Reasons. A Man, for Example, that is taken up entirely with the Ideas of an Affront which he thinks he has received, join'd with the Ideas of the Injustice, Ingratitude, and Pride of a false Friend; and who being sunk in these Reflections, can see no other Remedy for the Uneasiness which they occasion

sion in him, than that of Revenge, chuses to revenge himself. He reckens that this is his Good, and the only Good that can reduce him to his Tranquility of Heart, and change his Condition of Uneasiness into a Condition of Satisfaction. So long as no other Ideas than these pass in his Mind, and that he will consult no other, he will persevere in the Will of revenging himself, and can have no other. But if he would but say to himself, (which is a very easy and natural Reflection,) Men are every Day blinded by their Passions, and do by this Means make themselves a Chain of Misfortunes, and to get clear of the first, they plunge into a second: Shall I not also add one to the Number of those that prejudice themselves? My Interest is concern'd, shall I neglect to examine it, and shall I myself add new Injuries to those I have received from others? If the unjust Action, of which I complain, has not robb'd me of all my Goods, why should I not enjoy the Pleasure of the rest? If I have Learning; if I have Virtue; why should I not enjoy the Pleasure of being sensible that I am above all Insults, and that I am Master of Treasures that are out of the Reach of Mankind? That if I find myself weak enough to make my Happiness depend upon their Caprices, why should I, in revenging myself, draw myself into new Difficulties, and find myself under a perpetual Necessity of disengaging myself from them? By pursuing these Reflections, we change our Will, and these new Ideas are follow'd by a new Determination. Our Liberty having been given us on purpose to suspend our Determinations and our Actions, till we can have sufficient Evidence of what is true and good. To *suffer our selves to be determined* by this Evidence, as it is the *End*, so is it of consequence the *Perfection* of Liberty.

IX. I confess that it is not common to Men that are moved with any Ideas, or prepossess'd with any Sentiments, to suspend determining themselves, till they have examin'd them, and till they have form'd some second Thoughts to compare with the former. Few give themselves this Trouble; and those who neglect it, deny to the others that Liberty which they do not experience in themselves, but which they might experience, if they would but vouchsafe to make use of it. The little Use that is made by most Men of this Liberty, is the Reason, that when we have reflected with Attention upon the Train of Ideas in the Mind,

Mind, and the Succession of Desires and Passions, we can explain and account for the Actions of Men pretty justly, and even foretell them very successfully in a great many Cases; because, in effect, their Liberty, which is the only Power that could interrupt the Chain of this Subordination of Ideas and Wills, and contradict this Piece of Mechanism, does not at all meddle with it.

BUT it is going too great a Length, to conclude that we have not this Faculty, because we commonly neglect to make use of it. It can never be just to draw this Consequence, till we have taken all possible Pains to discover whether we have it, or not, and to exert some Acts of it. The Hypothesis of a Piece of Mechanism has something taking in it; it flatters the Corruption of the Heart, and it is by this Means it pleases, and finds Patrons: But even whilst we suffer all this Mechanism to follow its own Movements, we yet continue all the while free, because we freely neglect making use of our Liberty.

IT is with this Faculty as with all others; it is stronger or weaker, in proportion as we use it more or less. It is for this Reason that we see an infinite Number of People, who being accustomed in Attention and Inconsistency, can never afterwards correct these Faults, but continue Machines even to old Age; for one of the same Habit both strengthens their Mechanism and weakens their Liberty: It does a double Mischief with one and the same Blow; one in making the Distemper, the other in taking away the Remedy.

WISDOM consists in never exercising the Will, without having first deliberated with all possible Attention; in never determining our selves, but upon very clear Ideas; and in never forming a Resolution, but upon Conclusions well demonstrated upon the Foot of Evidence only, without Passion having the least Share in them. This is the great End of Philosophy, which the nearer we approach, the more we deserve the Name of a Philosopher.

IF all the Objects, out of which we are to chuse, were perfectly known to us, or were all of the same Nature, we should never have any Trouble in determining our selves; but their Worth and Usefulness to us being of a different kind, it is seldom easy to make exact Comparisons of them. The Objects that are presented to our Senses, and the Ideas that engage our Imagination, precipitate our Deliberations, and ensnare our Choice.

*The Influence
of Sentiments
and Inclinations
over our Will.*

X. A MAN who hates Trouble, and who from his Infancy has been used to shun examining himself, and to suffer himself to be led by his first Views and Inclinations, instead of consulting just Ideas, gives himself up usually to confused Sentiments, to the Bent of his Inclinations, and to the Transport of his Passions. We will Things, or not will them, we court or avoid them, we like or dislike them, according as they suit our Inclinations, with which we are prepossess'd.

SINCE then the Will has so great a Part in the Origin and Perfection of our Ideas, and our Passions and Inclinations have so much Power over our Will, or rather are themselves only certain Conditions of the Will, we see plainly of what Importance it is to govern them rightly, that we may have the Benefit of that Part of them which may be useful, and avoid that Part of them which may be hurtful. This is the proper End of Logic and Morality. *Morality* lays down Rules to form *good Lives*, *Logic* to form *just Thoughts*; in which they appear to have a very strict Connection. Wisdom leads to Truth, and Truth to Wisdom. These Parts of Philosophy hold one of another, and are mutually assistant.



C H A P. IX.

Of the Inclinations and Passions.

*The Necessity of
speaking of them
in Logic.*

I.



HERE is not perhaps any Subject more properly belonging to Logic than this, nor more necessary to explained. When once Reason loses the Government of the Passions, it is sure to be overturn'd by them, and we think no longer, but conformably to their Interests. Objects appear no longer, but under the Colours that these give them, and we see them always such as our Passions present them to us. These are the Powers that carry us away; and the Paths by which they lead us always appear to us to be the best. In vain is the Mind furnish'd with all other Rules

Rules : It can make no use of them ; but as soon as ever it is possess'd by Passion, it loses Sight of them. The Illusions of the Passions have been a long Time discovered. *Seneca* has remark'd, *Tamdiu officiorum mali Judices, quamdiu illa depravat spes* De Ben. Lib. & *metus, & vitiorum inertissimum voluptas.* IV

“ We always judge ill of our Duties, (he might have said in general of every Thing,) so long as Hope, and Fear, and Voluptuousness, are seducing us”. We see Men of a good natural Understanding, and further also endued with Learning, act such unreasonable Parts when surpris'd by Passion, and maintain themselves upon such frivolous Grounds, that we can hardly know them again. And we see others, who, with fewer Advantages, see clearly in all Cases what they ought to Think or Act, because a prevailing Inclination for Truth, for Equity, and for their Duty, prevents every Thing that may divert their Attention, and hinder their making Choice of what is True, Just, and Useful.

I CONFESS Probity is often accompanied with Presumption and Obstinacy in narrow Souls, and that Men of Character determine sometimes rashly, and condemn with too much Precipitation and Heat what displeases them, tho' it be often too indifferent to merit their Displeasure. But when a Man is good in all Respects, when with his other Virtues, he has a Greatness of Soul, and an enlarged Understanding, he contains within himself a sufficient Force against Error. Prepossessions appear to him a contemptible Meanness ; he does not think Attention any Trouble ; he does not suffer himself to be moved with the Pleasure of being applauded by an ignorant Multitude ; and the Relish which he has establish'd in himself for solid Virtue, hinders him from reckoning amongst the Duties of Man such Actions as are indifferent. It is surprising, that it should be so lately thought proper to mention in Logic a Subject that belongs to it so essentially. Innovations always expose their Authors to some Hazards, and perhaps I should not have had the Courage to have publish'd what I have here write, if the Example of the famous Father *Malebranche* had not given me an Authority.

II. ONE Example will be sufficient to Shew the Difference I make betwixt *Inclination* and *Passion*. A wise Man regards Riches as the proper Means to procure to himself and others several solid Advantages of Mind, as well as of Body. In

What is meant by Inclination.

this View he values them, and neglects no lawful Opportunities of acquiring them: He will be very watchful to lay hold of such Occasions, and will be pleas'd to meet with them: He will take care to keep what he has acquired, will never spend them, except it be to purchase something truly valuable, but will never waste them. To be thus disposed, is to have an *Inclination* for Riches. When we have an Inclination for an Object, we esteem it, we court it with Pleasure, and with *some Eagerness*; but we think of it *without Trouble*, we seek it without Uneasiness, we endeavour for it without Alarms, and we lose it without Mortification.

BUT it is not so when *Passion* is join'd to it: Our *Ideas* are then more *lively*, our *Sentiments* more *piercing*, our *Emotions* more *frequent* and *powerful*, our *Desires* more *impetuous*, and we are a great deal less Masters of our Joys and Sorrows, more elevated with Success, and dejected with Disgrace, and, in short, entire Strangers to Tranquillity. Passions therefore are the *most vehement Inclinations*; so that the Rules which serve to regulate them, serve the more strongly to moderate the simple Inclinations; and for this Reason we shall not treat of them distinctly.

IV. WHEN we determine our selves by the Ideas that enlighten and convince us, if some agreeable Sentiment does not invite us to pursue what our Ideas recommend to us, we find it difficult to proceed in such Determination. We very readily form Resolutions from the Ideas which teach us our Duty; but it is necessary to have the joint Assistance of our Inclinations to persevere in such Resolutions. It is therefore of the utmost Importance to learn the true Government of the Passions and Inclinations, to benefit by their Assistance. I have already remark'd, that they differ only in Degree: The Passions are the most dangerous and most to be fear'd, because being the most violent, Reason has not always Power enough to govern them as it would. There is reason to believe that an Inclination becomes too powerful, and degenerates into Passion, when it does not allow us the Liberty to think of what we would, when the Idea of its Object follows and distracts us, even when it is of Importance, and when we desire, to bestow our Attention upon something entirely different. A Passion that makes a Progress, will presently become suspected by those that are accustomed to reflect and consider with themselves; but those that live without much Thought, and descend but rarely into

into themselves, will never take Notice of it till it be too late, and next to impossible to find any Remedy.

V. ALL the Passions have their first Rise from *Admiration*: They derive their Force from a certain *Surprise*, with which we regard the Object that excites and entertains them. When we cease to be agitated with this Motion, the Passions sink, and come to an End. This is the Reason that it is rare to see them continue long for one and the same Object. Custom sullies their Brightness, and diminishes their Power. It is something extraordinary, if a very strong and lively Passion, when it loses the Vehemence that made it a Passion, should settle into a calm and constant Inclination.

Admiration the Foundation of all the others.

VI. I SHALL not undertake in a Treatise of *Logic*, to examine strictly into the Nature of the Passions, their Causes, and the Manner of their Original, any more than into the Manner of their producing their Effects. I shall not enlarge upon every Thing that may be said upon this Head curious and useful; but shall content my self with establishing upon some Principles of Experience, Rules that may serve to produce some Fruits from the Passions, and to prevent the Interruptions they give us in the Search of Truth.

In what Manner we shall treat of the Passions.

VII. IT has been esteemed amongst Philosophers, a very great Conquest of Mind to get above Admiration, (a) that is to say, to be able to hinder our admiring whatever it be that surrounds us; because they regard this Passion as the Original of all the others, and think Wisdom incompatible with the Passions. We are prepossess'd for what we admire: An Object that surprises transports us, and as it affects

Admiration produces good and bad Effects.

-
- (a) Nil admirari propè res est una Numici,
 Solaque quæ possit facere & fervare beatum.
 Hunc Solem, & Stellas, & decedentia certis
 Tempora momentis, sunt qui formidine nullâ
 Imbuti spectent. Quid censes munera Terræ?
 Quid maris, extremos Arabas ditantis, & Indos?
 Ludicra quid, plausus, & amici dona Quiritis,
 Quo spectanda modo, quo sensu, credis & ore?
 Qui timet his adversa, ferè miratur eodem
 Quo cupiens pacto: pavor est utrique molestus,
 Improvisa simul species exterret utrumque, &c.

affects us agreeably or disagreeably, it engages or disgusts the Heart; we presently conceive for it either too much Esteem, or too much Aversion.

THE proper Government of our Admiration, has certainly a great Influence over our Felicity. A Good newly acquired, of what Nature soever it be, whether House, Land, Wife, Preferment, presently renders the Possessor easy and satisfied, at least for a Time. If he could persevere in this State of Satisfaction, he would continue to live contented. This is our greatest Happiness, and one of the principal Characters of a Wise Man. When the Object remains the same, and the Eyes that behold it unchanged, how comes it to appear different from what it appear'd at first, and that Indifference succeeds Inclination? The Reason is, because we admire it no longer: As the Object has ceas'd to be new, it has ceas'd to surprize; and because we are no longer affected but very weakly, we behold it without Emotion; and a State of Indolence being a State we are soon tired of, we seek others to move the Heart afresh. But we should not fall into this Indolence, if we could have kept up our Admiration; and we should have continued our Admiration, if we could have continued to think attentively. The Novelty of an Object engages our Attention without our meddling, and excites it without any Effort at all on our Part. We are always most affected with what we least expect, and most sensibly mov'd with it. A merry Expression out of the Mouth of a grave Man, gives a quite different Pleasure to what it does out of the Mouth of a merry Man: But as soon as this Object is become familiar to us, it no longer engages our Attention, but we must give our Attention to that. Our Attention must excite it self, and be join'd with Thought and Reflection, which few People are capable of, this being not to be done without a great deal of Trouble, and an acquired Habit.

VIII. OFTENTIMES our Admiration does
How it is to be it self oppose its own Continuance. We
afed. can never resolve to lose Sight of an Object
 which we find worthy of our Admiration;
 all the Time we refuse for this purpose, we seem to refuse
 to our own Felicity. (b) But an Impression, even by its
 being

(b) Difficile dictu est, quænam causa sit, cur ea, quæ maximè sensus nostros impellunt, voluptate & specie primâ acerrimè commovent, ab iis celerrimè fastidio quodam & satietate abalienemur. *Quantò colorum*

being a long time continued, ceases to be perceiv'd; so that our very Desire of enjoying, without Interruption, the Pleasure of admiring makes it vanish. We perceive it no longer, because we could not resolve to interrupt these agreeable Sentiments. From Liveliness we fall into Weariness; We are surpris'd at the Change, and impute it to the Object; we believe our selves to have been deceived in the Judgment we have made of its Worth, we condemn the Eagerness we have shewn for it, and we seek for others that may better deserve it: That Part of it which was most fine and delicate, and which was relish'd with most Surprise and Pleasure, is the very Part which we first cease to admire, because the most delicate Impressions are such as are of the shortest Duration. We ought therefore to take upon us, and assume the Courage to deny our selves from time to time the Pleasure we take in admiring an Object that appears worthy of it; and if we would admire it long, we must not admire it continually. Thus we see an Orator who would shine, without

lorum pulchritudine & varietate, floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque quam in veteribus! Quæ tamen, etiamsi primo aspectu nos ceperunt, diutius non delectant, quam cum iisdem nos in antiquis tabulis, illo ipso horrido, obsoletoque teneamur. Quanto molliores sunt & delicatiora in cantu flexiones, & falsæ vocalæ, quam certæ & severæ! quibus tamen, non modò austeri, sed, si sæpius fiunt, multitudo ipsa reclamatur. Licet hoc videre in reliquis sensibus, unguentis minùs diù nos delectari summâ & acerrimâ suavitate conditis, quam his moderatis, & magis laudari, quæ ceram quam quæ crocum olere videantur, in ipso tactu esse modum & mollitudinis & lævitatatis. Quin etiam gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maximè voluptarius, quique dulcedine præter cæteros sensus commovetur, quam citò id, quod valdè dulce est, aspernatur ac respuit? quis potionem uti, aut cibo dulci diutius potest? Quum utroque in genere ea, quæ leviter sensum voluptate moveant, facillimè fugiant satietatem: sic omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est. Quòd hoc minùs in Oratione miremur, in quâ vel ex Poëtis, vel ex Oratoribus possumus judicare, concinnam, distinctam, ornatam, festivam, sine intermissione, sine varietate, quamvis claris sit coloribus picta, vel Poëtis vel Oratio non posse in delectatione esse diuturna: atque eò citius in Oratoris aut in Poëtæ cincinnis ac fuco offenditur; quòd sensus in nimia voluptate natura, non mente satiantur, in scriptis & in dictis non aurium solum, sed animi iudicio etiam magis infucata vitia noscuntur. Quare, benè & præclarè, quamvis nobis sæpè dicatur bellè & festivè: nimium sæpè nolo, quanquam illa ipsa Exclamatio, NON POTEST MELIUS, sit velim crebra, sed habeat tamen illa in dicendo admiratio ac summa laus, umbram aliquam & recessum, quo magis id quod erit illuminatum, extare atque eminere videatur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. III.*

without interruption, from the Beginning of his Speech to the End of it, fall short of his Aim, by having it too much at Heart. That which is extraordinarily beautiful, ought to be mix'd with Beauties that are more simple and common, if you would have them perfectly admired. He who endeavours to keep the Mind always elevated, will only fatigue it, but not charm it. It is necessary to let it take Breath, and Repose it self after the Fatigues of Attention, by employing it upon Subjects that deserve it less. Shades set off Colours, and two fine Strokes, that are equally beautiful, seem to obscure one another. We are less sensible of the Beauty of each of them, when we cannot perceive any thing to set them off. Thus Criticks of the first Rank find the Virtues of *Aeneas* less bright than those of *Achilles*, because they are not mix'd with Defects.

WE see by this, that to support our Admiration we must present to the Mind Subjects worthy of its Attention and which will not cease to appear such, even after they are perfectly known. The Advantage of Words, and the Elegancy of Turns, ought not to promise any thing more to the Imagination than what the Things themselves will present to it. When a Discourse is not founded upon good Sense, it will engage the Admiration only of narrow Minds; and even this Admiration so engaged will very often be changed into Contempt.

GOOD Sense, and a compleat Understanding, are even Qualities so very rare, that till they grow more common, they will be sure to engage the Admiration even by their Rarity.

WE have already observ'd, that we always admire most what we least expect. For which Reason an Orator ought to take care that his Performance be better than his beginning Promises. Many a Discourse would have been heard quite out with Admiration, if the first Lines had not engaged it too much. *Oratio crescat*, say the Masters of the Art. The Beauties of a Discourse will not be truly relish'd, if they do not rise and improve one above another. The Reputation of the Orator will sink, if it does but maintain it self in an equal Degree of Brightness: If he would be esteem'd always the same, he must be always surpassing and exceeding himself; without this he will find himself fallen.

WE are always agreeably surpris'd with the Abilities of a Man, who without making use of any other than ordinary Expressions, yet by chusing them judiciously, and placing them successfully, raises the Mind to such sublime

Ideas,

Ideas, and excites in the Heart Sentiments so little common, that one would not think they could be possibly expressed or excited without contriving a Language on purpose.

ON the contrary, he who has nothing extraordinary besides Words, and who under very much labour'd Turns and Expressions couches only such Thoughts as are false, or such Ideas as are very common, instead of engaging our Admiration, will meet with our Contempt, and make himself ridiculous.

THE Desire of making our selves admired is very natural and common: It often throws us into Mistakes, and becomes a Source of Illusions. For which Reason the Remarks that tend to regulate it, appear to me to belong very properly to a Science, which makes the Subject of this Treatise.

IX. SINCE then our Admiration renders us attentive, and our Attention produces more lively and more numerous Ideas, we cannot deny but it must be of great Use to the Discovery of Truth. A Man who admires not the Beauties and Wonders of the Universe, and whose Admiration encreases not, nor rises higher in proportion as he advances, and comes to enter into Particulars, for want of meeting with the Pleasure of Surprise, to make amends for the Pains of his Study and Application, will presently quit such high Attempts, and content himself with low and superficial Knowledge. He who does not know how to admire the Abilities of excellent Poets and Orators, will never be capable of imitating, or even coming near them. Our greatest Artists in Mechanics, Painting, and Sculpture, &c. owe their Success to their Application to their Work, in which they frequently find Occasion, by meeting with something very beautiful, to employ their Admiration. And we see those remain in Ignorance and Inaction, who are indolent, and without Curiosity, and who neither admire nor are lively affected with any Thing. So that to know how to admire, and to persevere in admiring, is a very necessary Help towards making any considerable Progress. We give no Attention to what we do not admire, but let it presently slip out of our Memory. (c).

Its Uses.

X. WE

(c) Si quas res in vitâ videmus parvas, usitatas, quotidianas, eas meminisse non solemus: propterea quòd nullâ nisi novâ, aut admirabili re commovetur animus: at si quid videmus, aut audimus egregiè turpe, aut honestum, inusitatum, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id diu meminisse

*How to keep
it up.*

X. WE may find several Helps towards exciting and keeping up our Admiration. What appears to me to be one of the most natural, the most effectual, and at the same time the most innocent, is an Habit of Application. The more lively our Ideas are, the more are they accompanied with this agreeable Emotion, in which Admiration consists: But the more attentive we render our selves, the more lively are our Ideas; and consequently we ought, from the first, to contract an Habit of considering every Thing with Application. By this means we shall perceive a thousand Beauties which would have escaped a less steady Mind, and we shall find our selves sensibly affected with what would hardly have been taken Notice of, if consider'd with less Exactness. We ought therefore to indulge our selves in the Pleasure of conceiving Things with this Sensibility, in order to have the Satisfaction of having understood them exactly, and entirely exhausted them. This is the Way to form an excellent Taste; and in order to gratify it, we must continue to examine every Thing with Application. This Application will be follow'd with Pleasures, which we shall never think too dearly purchas'd at any Rate.

*Bad Effects of
Admiration.*

XI. BUT that our Admiration may produce no other than good Effects, and may be serviceable without being also hurtful, it ought, as we are about to demonstrate, to be it self the Effect of our Attention: It ought to follow, rather than to go before it. Our Admiration blinds us, when it is not conducted

meminisse consuevimus. Itemque, quas res ante ora videmus, aut audimus, obliviscimur plerumque: quæ acciderunt in pueritiâ meminimus optimè sæpè: nec hoc aliâ de causâ potest accidere, nisi quòd usitatæ res facillè & memoriâ elabuntur, insignes & novæ manent in animo diutius. Solis exortus, cursus, occasus nemo admiratur, propterea quòd quotidie fiunt: at Eclipses solis mirantur, quia rarò accidunt: & solis Eclipses magis mirantur quam Lunæ, quòd hæ crebriores sùnt. Docet ergò se natura, vulgari, & usitatâ re non excusculari; novitate verò & insigni quodam negotio commoveri. Cic. ad Herat. III.

To engage the Attention, you must find out the Secret of exciting Surprise and Curiosity. The reader of Virgil finds himself thus surpris'd, when Æneas says to Anchises;

O pater ane aliquas ad cœlum hinc ire putandum? Æn. VI. 719.

And this Surprise makes him more attentive to every Thing wonderful that Anchises is about to say.

conducted by Knowledge. There are some People with whom Novelty alone has the Power of exciting Admiration; but as it lasts no longer than whilst the Object that excites it continues new, it ceases always before they can have time enough to consider and comprehend such Object compleatly.

XII. MEN of this Humour who are sensible of the Pleasure of admiring, but know not how to keep it up by a continued Attention, run perpetually after Novelty, and pass without stopping from Object to Object; and being curious of knowing every Thing, they never know any Thing. Their Eagerness is content with being always inquiring, and never inform'd. (d) They admire, for the sake of admiring, and the most trifling Thing, as much as the most serious; and their Admiration being only founded upon Ignorance, ceases as soon as ever they begin to know any Thing. They no longer admire the most valuable Things, when once they come to be acquainted with them. They appear curious to know every Thing, and learn hardly any Thing, because they do not dwell long enough upon what they learn, to receive any Benefit from, or to make any Progress in it.

*Levity and Vain
Curiosity.*

XIII. WHEN once we are accustomed to the Pleasure of Admiring, every Thing which is ordinary becomes dull. We have no Taste for any Thing but what is extraordinary: This alone pleases, alone engages our Application and Inclination. Men that are thus prepossess'd, when they form Projects, give into Chimera's, and build Castles in the Air. In their Conversation they exaggerate every Thing, for fear, they think, lest they should disgust others in disgusting themselves. In their Systems and Opinions, in the room of Certainty and Evidence, which should be their essential Character, they seek for nothing but what is bright, great and surprising; and their Passion for what is Extraordinary, makes them often abandon common Sense. We become incapable of forming any rational Projects, or even of relishing those that are propos'd by others, when once we are confirm'd in a Custom of being pleas'd with such as are imaginary. Thus the reading of Romances, makes us despise the Truth of History: This is too simple, we are most delighted with what is compounded and surprising. If Dis-

*Prepossession for
the Wonderful.*

(d) Imperitorum oculi omnia subito, quia Causas non norunt mirantur. Sen.

guises deceive, they deceive agreeably; and the Life of some People is altogether like a Dream. There are some that think almost they do a particular Favour, and shew a great Piece of Complaisance, in vouchsafing to lend an Ear, and give Credit to simple and very natural Accounts of Things, whilst they give all their Attention to the most improbable Things in the World, and do not so much as question the Truth of them; so that in order to gain their Ear and Credit, you need only tell them such Stories as are incredible. We sometimes take this Turn of Mind in our Infancy, by the Mismanagement of those that educate us. We contrive something wonderful to amuse Children, and engage their Attention, and so form them to the reciting Stories, of what Nature soever they be. To encourage their Application, and to engrave in their Memory what we would have them repeat, we furnish their Narrations with great Ideas, and surprising Circumstances, and oftentimes so much the more surprising as they are impossible; but by this means their Minds are depraved, and by being accustomed to the extraordinary, the Truth appears dull to them for want of the marvellous to attend it: Their Case is something like that of hard Drinkers, who by using themselves to more spirituous Liquors, find Wine insipid and flat; their Taste is vitiated, and has neither Delicacy nor Discernment.

THE Weakness which human Nature has for the marvellous, and for every Thing, which, by its extraordinary Quality, strikes and surprises the Imagination, has not a little contributed, in Times of old, to change the majestick Simplicity of Natural Religion, and to disguise it with a Mixture of a thousand Stories and Superstitions. It consisted in the Study of the Great Book of Nature, in cultivating REASON, in perfecting the Mind, in acknowledging the Creator of the Universe, in respecting his Providence, in admiring his Works, in distinguishing Virtue which he loves, from Vice which he condemns, and in passing this Life in his Presence in Moderation and Justice; and lastly, in an Expectation of a better Life to come. But it was also agreeable to think, that Souls separated from their Bodies should yet take an Interest in the Concerns of this Life, we have lent an Ear to those that have undertaken to assign their Employments, and at last have invoked them. Hence the Universe has been peopled with *Genies*, and subordinate Divinities; all kinds of them have been invented, both good, and bad, and indifferent; and a Worship has been invented suitable to the Object. The Gross of the People have been contented

contented with external Pomp; those that have undertaken to think above the Vulgar, have rendred every Thing mysterious, and when the Christian Religion was to be propagated thro' entire Kingdoms, some have thought fit to have regard to these rooted Prejudices, and to translate into Christianity, what Paganism has added least offensive to Natural Religion. And by this Means it has happen'd, that Religion, which was intended to draw Men from a Dependance on their Senses, has subjected them to Externals, to Trifles and Amusements, which divert them from the true Devotion, and far from bringing them to it, make them lose Sight of it. For this true Devotion consists in forming just Ideas of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who exacts nothing of Men but what is very reasonable, a solid and rational Virtue, which in preparing them for the Happiness of the World to come, makes at the same Time their greatest Happiness in this.

MONTAGNE confesses, *That of different Lessons that are often interwoven with Histories, he holds most to that which is most rare and memorable: This is the Rule of his Critick. Notwithstanding he valued himself upon his Liberty, and was excessively fond of Independance; yet the Pleasure he found in Thinking after an extraordinary Manner made him a Slave to that Habit, since he discover'd an extraordinary Relish for it. I should as soon chuse to have my Life taken away, as to be debarr'd from living in the Way I have been so long us'd to. I am not now in a Condition to undergo any great Change, or to begin a new sort of* B.III. Ch. 10. *Life, tho' it were for the better. I have not Time to become any Thing else than what I am. - - - I shou'd even complain of any new Perfection I shou'd acquire: And it is almost better never, than so late to become an honest Man: To begin to think to live well, when Life is at an End. I that am going, am ready to resign to any one that comes, all the Knowledge I have acquir'd from the Commerce of the World: After Meat comes Mustard. - - - I would give this by way of Example: That the Alteration of ten Days in the Pope's Calendar, has given me such a Shock, that I have not yet recover'd it: I have liv'd a great number of Years after another way of reckoning: This long and antient Usage claims and challenges me: I am forced to be a little Heretical in this Matter, being incapable of Novelty, even tho' it be by way of Amendment. My Imagination, in spite of my Teeth, casts me always either ten Days forward, or ten Days backward.*

HE makes, in other Places, very judicious Remarks upon this Weakness of Mankind for any Thing extraordinary. In Minds not justly form'd, nor truly enlighten'd, Vanity very easily mixes with Devotion, and makes them think of Men, when they should have nothing in View but God Almighty, and content themselves with their Piety or Zeal, in proportion as they look upon themselves as extraordinary Persons, without considering that they may be extraordinary in Folly and Vice, even more easily than in Wisdom and Virtue. What I am going to quote out of the same Author will hold in a great many more Cases than that I shall apply it to. *In the Empire of Turkey there are a great many Men, who, in order to excel others, will not be seen when they eat, who will make but one Meal in a Week, who will cut and slash their Face and Members, who will not speak to any Body. Fanatical People, who think to honour human Nature by dishonouring it, who value themselves for what makes them contemptible, and mend themselves by growing worse! How monstrous is the Animal, that makes Himself dreadful to himself, and makes Pleasures of his Pains: There are some that conceal their whole Lives,*

Exilioque domos & dulcia limina mutant.

Virg. Georg. II. 511.

and avoid the Sight of other Men; who shun Health and Cheerfulness as prejudicial and hurtful Qualities. Not only several Sects, but several Nations curse their Birth, and bless their Death. In some Places the Sun is abominated, and Darkness adored. Our Ingenuity lies in misleading our selves: This is the Game our Intellects play: Dangerous Instruments of Irregularity.

O miseri quorum Gaudia crimen habent!

Gall.

Alas, poor Man! thou hast enough of necessary Inconveniences, without inventing any more; and art miserable enough by thy Condition, without being more so by Art: Thou hast a Sufficiency of real and essential Deformities, without forming any imaginary ones. Dost thou find thy self too much at Ease, if one half of that Ease be not turn'd into Torment? Dost thou think thou hast discharged all the necessary Duties that Nature has obliged thee too? and that thou hast nothing more to do, unless thou obligest thy self to new Duties? Thou art not afraid of transgressing the Universal and Eternal Laws, and yet standest

up for thy own partial and fantastick Laws; and art so much the fonder of them, as they are more singular, uncertain, and contradictory.

THE Inclination for the Marvellous has fill'd our Natural History with Fables, and made it impossible for us to rely upon Facts, which ought to be the Basis of Philosophy, and to constitute the most certain Part of it.

ABOUT four Leagues from *Grenoble* is a Piece of Earth six Foot long, and three or four broad; from whence issues a light wandering Flame, like that of burning Spirits. This Earth, which is nothing but a dead Rock, and like a putrified Slate, has been taken for a burning Fountain; and *St. Augustin* has already spoken of it as a supernatural and miraculous Appearance.

Hist. of Acad. Sc. 1699. p. 26. Ed. Amst.

THE Grotto of our Lady of the *Balm*, has been said to lead to a Lake, which after running two Leagues, loses it self in a Gulph. All this is no more than a little Rivulet that runs into the *Rhine*, the Depth of whose Basin, from whence it springs, is scarce a Foot, and the subterraneous Passage, where this pretended Lake is to be found, is not above twenty Fathom long.

Hist. of Acad. Sc. 1700, p. 4.

Hist. 1703. p. 26.

THE inaccessible Mountain in *Dauphine*, which has been affirm'd to have its Point downward, and Basis upward, is set right again, as the ingenious Writer of that History did foretell. * *The Academy*, adds he, (in speaking of another miraculous Fiction,) *thinks it self as well employ'd in disabusing the Publick with respect to false Wonders, as in presenting it with real ones.*

Hist. 1700, p. 6.

* *Hist. 1703. p. 27.*

MEN have learn'd to reckon upon their Fingers, and by this means have got as far as Ten, and have at last form'd an Arithmetick, whose Numbers are no other than such Tens repeated to Infinity. The *Pythagoreans* have sought for Wonders in the Number Six. Perhaps the same Thing might happen to the *Chinese*, who had a very simple Arithmetick of two Numbers, invented by the Emperor *Fohi*, but forgotten in the End; a Foundation of childish and chimerical Allusions.

See History Acad. Sc. 1703.

XIV. MOST Men prepossess themselves excessively for every Thing they admire; whether their Admiration arises simply from No-

Prepossession.

velty and Surprise, or whether it is the Effect of a continued Attention and close Application. To prevent giving into these Prepossessions, we should never compare what we do admire, with what we do not admire. For to judge of the Value of Things, we must be suppos'd to have equally examined, and to have form'd an Idea of that which we postpone, at least as clear and exact as of that which we prefer. We attribute Grandeur and Dignity to those Objects that affect us strongly with very lively Ideas. But there are a great many Things we neglect, with which we should be as briskly affected, as we are with those we admire, if we did but consider them with the same Care and Attention.

IT is this that *infatuates* and blinds so many People, and makes those that give themselves up entirely to the Pursuit of any Science, prefer it commonly to all the rest; any of which they would have preferr'd before this, if they had but happened to have made it their Study. And, in general, it is this that makes every one applaud himself in his own Taste, his own Manners, and his own Maxims. It is true that Self-love plays a great deal of this Game: For it is agreeable to persuade our selves, that what we apply our selves to, deserves in effect to be esteemed above what we do not apply our selves to: We see some Scenes of this Nature, upon very serious Occasions, that are full as ridiculous as the Contest in *Moliere* betwixt the Musick Master and the Dancing Master; every one prefers his own Art before the others. A Mathematician will pretend that there cannot be a good General without understanding Military Architecture, and consequently Geometry, &c. that is to say, without having been a long time his Scholar. A Rhetorician will maintain, with the gravest Countenance in the World, that nothing can contribute more towards the forming a General than the Art of Oratory, which enables him to harangue his Soldiers elegantly, and to enliven their Courage with the Spirit of his Discourse.

IT is good to have some Admiration for the Subject we apply our selves to; but there is a great deal of Difference betwixt relishing more sensibly and more perfectly the Beauty of some particular Art or Science than that of the rest, and actually preferring it to all the rest which we have not studied with the same Application. It happens sometimes that the Learned themselves, do, in their Harangues, fall into the same ridiculous Folly, which the Preachers of an inferior Rank are commonly reproach'd with. That when they make a Panegyrick upon their Saints, they degrade all
the

the rest, to make way and secure the highest Place for that particular Saint whose Feast they celebrate, and to whom they owe the Enjoyments of the Day.

IT is very seldom that we think but of one Thing. Our Ideas arise one from another: A First produces a Second, and a Second produces a Third. The Name of a Man collects to me the Idea of his Person, and this here is presently follow'd with a great many others: I represent him to my self in all the Habits I have seen him in: I think of all his Titles, and imagine I see his Equipages: I remember all his Discourses, his Actions, and his Designs. But after the same manner that our Ideas succeed one another, our Admiration also extends it self from Idea to Idea. Whatever we perceive for any Object, we also presently perceive for whatever has the least Relation to it. This is one of the Sources of Superstition; we perceive the same Movements for the Image as for the Original; and we conceive for Churches, and for the Stones of them, almost the same Veneration as we do for the Truths that are preach'd there, and the Divine Worship that is perform'd there. Age brings Wisdom, by extinguishing the turbulent Passions of Youth; but it brings also very often Peevishness, ill Humours and Complaints: And these Weaknesses oblige old Men to betake themselves to a retired Life. We confound all this, and admire as much the Retirement and Austerity of old Age, as we do its purest Wisdom, and its most essential Duties. By the same Principle we imitate the Defects of great Orators, and in general of all celebrated Persons: Any one of their Qualities ravish us; and upon this Occasion we are struck with Admiration for their Persons; and every thing that belongs to them appears equally extraordinary. A Man is consider'd for his Wisdom and his Probity; but at the same time his Corpulency, join'd to his advanc'd Age, obliges him to walk slowly, and to speak gravely. We regard with Veneration, even those weak Circumstances of the outward Behaviour, and endeavour to imitate them; and by our too much Eagerness of being thought wise, we cease in effect to be so, because we fall into Affectation, by quitting our own proper Character, and doing Violence to our own natural Genius. It is yet a great deal worse, when by giving Way to the Impressions of the Senses, we admire first the Pomp, Wealth, Birth, Dignities, and afterwards, (by the extreme Blindness into which all this leads us, and to which we give up our selves) all the other Qualities, good or bad, of those who possess these external Advantages. A

great Lord has said so, therefore he has Reason: A great Lord lives thus, therefore it cannot be ill to live so. We certainly act very wrong in esteeming as Proofs of a just Understanding and solid Merit, such Circumstances and Snares as very often hinder the acquiring of it.

THE Remedy to these Inconveniences, is, to examine separately every Part of a Subject that is compounded, and to judge of them by the Ideas which they represent to us, consider'd in themselves, and not by our Sentiments and Emotions.

XV. WHAT I have said of Admiration, is true of all the Passions in general. Love and Hatred extend themselves to every thing that has any relation to their principal Object. We hate the Friends of those we do not love; and by this means the Innocent often fall a Sacrifice to our Malice. We oppose a Man we know nothing of, and sometimes one whom we cannot avoid esteeming, because he has a Patron that is not in our Interest. (e)

XVI. BUT our Admiration is never more hurtful, than when it falls upon our selves. We never are more in the wrong, nor more ridiculous in this Passion, than when we admire our selves. He that is prepossess'd in his own Favour, decides hastily, and is opinionated in his Determinations. Precipitation therefore, and consequently Error, Infatuation, Obstinacy, Pride, and Insolence, are the Consequences of the high Esteem we have for our own Abilities. He that forms a great Idea of his own Merit, admires every thing which his Understanding brings forth, and believes it true, because he admires it. But he that is afraid of being prepossess'd in favour of his own Abilities, distrusts his Thoughts, and waits the paying any Respect to his Discoveries, till he is assured of their Truth by a strict Examination.

IT is as good as a Comedy to observe the ridiculous Things Men give into, by their Fondness for what is extraordinary, and their Inclination to admire themselves. They are accusom'd to admire the Extraordinary, and would have the Pleasure of admiring themselves: But oftentimes they are either too idle, or incapable, and sometimes both, to distinguish

(e) Et erat æque lex & vobis, Judices, atque omnibus qui nostris familiaritatibus implicantur, vehementer utilis, ut nostras inimicitias resti inter nos geramus, amicis nostrorum inimicorum temperemur. Cic.

distinguish themselves from the Vulgar by any thing excellent, and therefore distinguish themselves by their Follies, Extravagancies, and Affectation: *Nihil juvat obvium.* They turn Night into Day, and Day into Night: They quit common Sense, by their eager Desire of pursuing untrodden Paths; and oftentimes the Earnestness with which they aspire to the first Rank, of which they think themselves worthy, prevents their ever rising to the third or fourth, &c. (f)

A MAN of this Temper rides his Horse thro' the worst Ways, only because he has observ'd that others chuse the good, and he would not have any Equals.

IT is not because they are more thirsty than other People, nor because they find Wine better tasted, much less in order to enliven their Spirits, which on the contrary suffer by it, that Men drink to excess: They distinguish themselves by it, and shew that every one cannot bear their Quantity.

THERE are some that think themselves happy for being baptized by a Name that is very rarely to be met with. It would be a sad Mortification to them, if it should become common. If a Woman of Quality meets a Citizen's Wife dress'd in flower'd Clothes, and fine Lace, she will wear them no longer, but immediately makes up both Clothes and Linnen entirely plain.

I AM ready to believe, that a great many Men would become rational, if all the rest would agree not to be so. And as to this, I think there is Encouragement enough for them to become so; for they will distinguish themselves but too much. Let them think judiciously, and govern their Behaviour by the Rules of Virtue, and they will have very few Equals. Probity, Understanding, and Politeness, make a very rare Composition. But if every one should endeavour to acquire these good Qualities, how could Men distinguish themselves? To those that look upon this as a Misfortune, I have nothing to say, but to wish them an entire Satisfaction, that they were perfectly singular in their Taste, and that no body else may ever be of the same Opinion but themselves.

I KNOW some Men, that would think it the greatest Infamy in the World to find themselves reduc'd to the Necessity of thinking like other People. But they need not alarm themselves so terribly: For this sort of Fright carries its

(f) Ita ferè fit ut qui primi omnium esse contendunt, vix in tertio, quartove loco possint consistere. Vulgaria contemnunt, nova affectant, dum in omnibus regnum tenere volunt. *Huetius.*

own Remedy with it; and it is a sure Way of always thinking with an uncommon Singularity, to look upon it as a Discredit to fall in with the Opinion of others. Nothing is more diverting, than to observe the Contradictions which People of this Humour fall into, whenever they think fit to appear humble, and to affect a submissive Language. There is nothing their Heart fears so much, as the Shame of being of the same Sentiment with others; and yet their Mouth confesses, that they dare not presume to be able to think so justly as others. As singular as they are, there are however some Occasions when you may be sure to have them; for if you do but make a Comparison of two Authors, you may be sure to win, if you lay a Wager that they will give the Preference to the worst.

WITH what repeated Attention ought we to study our selves, if we would know our selves? We must distrust our first Thoughts, examine them strictly, consult others with Sincerity, suspend our own Judgments till we have weigh'd theirs, and think in exact Order. And yet all these Precautions will hardly secure us from Illusions. How will not our internal Defects conceal us from our selves, and our Self-love, that is, the Pleasure of believing our selves perfect, or in the way to Perfection, cast a Veil of Darkness over all our Faults! How many are there who admire themselves for those very Things, which make them ridiculous to all the World beside? Some are complaining continually of the extreme Delicacy of their Smell, who, at the same time, make those they converse with wish that they themselves had none at all. Some are every Moment boasting of the extreme Fineness of their Ear, who, by the manner of their speaking and reading, would be insupportable to others, if they were oblig'd to hear them without laughing, at least in their Sleeves.

XVII. WE should not deceive our selves so much, if we were not assisted in it by others. Some by Complaisance, others out of Interest, some by Malice, and others out of a Principle of Indifference, leave a Man that is prepossess'd in the peaceable Possession of all the favourable Ideas he has form'd of himself. Why then should it not be allow'd a Man to think of himself conformably to what other People think of him? But who has discover'd to you their true Sentiments? Have they no Interest in dissembling or flattering you? How can you be sure they conceal nothing, or magnify nothing? One Man is continually the Sport and
Bubble

Bubble of another: If you would have the Pleasure of being truly applauded, take care, above all Things, not to applaud your self. When this is once perceived, you fall into Contempt; and if any one praises you afterwards, it is certainly for nothing but to laugh at you.

PRAISES are for the most Part, neither a Proof of Merit in him who is praised, nor of Discernment in him who praises. It is a Language of Interest or Inclination. *P.* declares with an Air and Tone proper to command our Belief, that *B.* understands *Algebra* completely. Does *P.* know what *Algebra* is? Not at all. But *B.* is his Cousin. *C.* speaks of the intrepid Valour of *S.* and prefers him above all other Officers, with as much Assurance, as if she her self perfectly understood the whole Art of War, and had seen with her Eyes all that *S.* had done. We may imagine that *S.* is her Lover, and be sure we guess right.

THERE sometimes happen Cases, where it is impossible to withstand all together, not only our continual Inclination to Self-love, but also the Torrent of Flatterers, who all unite to confirm us in it, and who deceive us not only in the Praises they bestow, but also in the Admiration they seem to have.

WE may, however, guard our selves against the most seducing Circumstances, and support our selves against all these Attacks, if we take care not to join with them against our selves; if we think rather upon what remains to be acquired, than upon what we have already acquired; if we esteem the Progress we are sensible of having made, not so much a Reason to be content with our selves for having acquired it, as an Encouragement for us to endeavour to go farther; if we remember all the Pains we have been at, and all the Precautions we have us'd to secure us from Error, in order to continue them, for fear of losing all the Fruits of them; lastly, if above all we avoid comparing our selves with others, whose Worth we are no Judges of; or if we do, it ought to be with those whose good Opinions of themselves has thrown them into a thousand Errors, that we may be sure not to imitate them.

XVIII. BUT if it be permitted to bestow *Precautions to* our Admiration on the Subject to which we *avoid it.* apply our selves; and if it is of Importance, to be sensible of the Pleasure of the Progress we make, in order to encourage us to pursue it farther, and to be always advancing yet more forward; how shall we avoid admiring our selves, and by what Precautions shall we contain our
selves

selves in such exact Bounds, as not to pass from an Admiration of the Works, to that of the Author? I confess the Transition is very natural, and for that Reason it appears to me to be so necessary to be upon our Guard. A Man indulges himself in the Pleasure of a Discovery, either because it is true, or because he himself is the Author of it. If he loves it principally because it is his own, he will certainly become too partial, both to himself and to it. But we may be satisfied, that the Pleasure we find in reflecting upon a Truth which we have discovered, comes from the Value we have for every Thing that is true, when we are as agreeably affected with the Discoveries of others, as with our own, and when we are as much pleased with learning from them, as with having them learn from us. We ought to have just such a Thirst for Truth, as covetous Men have for Riches: Whether their Wealth be owing to the great Liberality of others, or to their own Scraping and Pains, is all one to them: They want only to grow Rich, and either of those Ways will equally answer their Purpose. But we have a great deal of Reason to be dissident of our selves, and to fear that we are in Dispositions altogether opposite to those we have recommended, when we let slip no Opportunity of speaking of our selves; when we think we do not do our selves Justice, if we publish the least Discovery, without declaring at the same Time, that we owe it entirely to our selves, and that it never was hit upon by any Body else. This Folly furnishes us with Proof of another Error which our Passions occasion: Their usual Effect is to disappoint us of our true End, and to engage us in Excursions, from our real Interest. This is what befalls those who seek to make themselves admired. What, do they propose by this Earnestness to draw upon them continually the Eyes of others? Will not the Learned discover of themselves whether what we publish be all our own, or borrow'd from others? But the common Sort of Readers will not be able to make this Discovery; and therefore it is necessary to advertise them of it, if we would have them do us Justice. But are their Applauses worth exposing our selves to the just Suspicions of want of Modesty? Besides, those that are least Learned are oftentimes most ambitious of being applauded themselves; and none are more watchful to take all Opportunities that offer to refuse and obstruct the Applauses of others.

IF the Rule I have here laid down to content our selves with the Pleasure of finding our Discoveries to be true and useful, without adding any dangerous Consideration of our selves as being

being the Authors of them, and so taking part of the Admiration upon our selves, which is due only to the Work; if this Rule, I say, shall be thought too Nice and Speculative only, and consequently impossible to be reduced into Practice, that we may judge of this the better, and be convinced that there is not betwixt these two Acts such a strict Connection, as makes them impossible to be separated, we need only reflect upon what happens every Day with respect to disagreeable Sentiments. As little rational as a Man is, when he has committed a Fault, and is made sensible of it, he confesses it, and blames the Action, acknowledges the Injustice, Ridiculousness, and Deformity of it: But then he generally stops here, and does not proceed so far as to condemn himself, or own himself ridiculous, contemptible and odious; he complies with the easiest part of the Penance, but excuses himself this last Severity of it. There are some, indeed, that go so far as to condemn and punish themselves with just Sentiments of Contempt; and this is the true *practical Repentance*, a *Repentance of the Heart*: Whereas we may call that which contents it self with condemning the external Action, without any Reflection upon our selves, a *Repentance in Idea, and in Speculation*. It is therefore possible not to impute to our selves the Merit or Demerit of the Actions we are Authors of.



C H A P. X.

*Of Contempt, of Love, of Hatred, of Desire,
of Fear, of Joy, of Sorrow.*



SO long as we are strongly affected with a new Object, and the Surprise, which it occasions, continues, we lose all other Thoughts, and in some Measure forget our selves, to give our selves up to this new Sentiment, and to the Contemplation of this new Object. But as the Heart is incapable of forgetting its self long, and of losing entirely the View of its Interests, it will soon ask its self

*The Origin of
Contempt, and
Precautions
against its bad
Effects.*

self

self of what Service this new Subject of Admiration may be, and of what Influence towards our Felicity.

IF we discover nothing of it which may either serve or prejudice us, we repent our having admired it, and revenge our selves of the Confusion we are under, by a Contempt and total Negligence of it. (a) But we ought to remember that the human Understanding, which is confined within very narrow Bounds, and which, besides this, does by Reason of its Emotion usually proceed too precipitately, cannot perceive so immediately all the Uses and Services a Thing may be capable of, and consequently ought to take the Pains to examine it well, and allow it self time to be thoroughly acquainted with it, instead of rejecting with Impatience and Contempt that which we do not sufficiently understand. Idleness makes us despise a great many excellent Things, which if pursued would have been extremely useful. It is troublesome to learn them, and for that reason we refuse to bend our Thoughts to them; and because, before we do learn them, we are ignorant of their Service and Value, we suspect that they are not of any use at all; and this Suspicion so agreeably flatters and encourages our Idleness and Vanity to reject them, that we adopt it for a certain Truth,

THERE are some Minds that cannot stop at any Thing. As soon as ever they are once in Motion, they yield themselves up to it; they cannot abandon one Extremity, without running into another; and whenever they come to abate ever so little of their Esteem for any Object, they begin infallibly to despise it. By their Inconstancy they admire every thing that is new; and by the same Inconstancy they are disgusted with every Thing that is not so. But the Merit that is found in new Objects, and the Praises that are bestowed upon them, are not always a Proof of Inconstancy. A Heart full of Goodness, and by the Effect of this Inclination, accustomed to perceive in every Subject whatsoever is good in it, finds immediately some Good, because there is indeed some Good in every Thing. Time may discover at length what it was unwilling to see; and when it changes its Sentiment, it is not because it is tired with what it at first esteemed, but because it is shock'd with what it did not at first perceive. If it is changed it is not any Fault of its own, the Rule of its first Esteem was Evidence and Goodness; and it is abated by the same Rule

(a) *Sorrow and Commiseration are mixed with some Esteem for the Thing we are sorry for: But those Things which we make a Jest of we do not value at all.* Mont. B. I. Ch. 50.

Rule, by farther Evidence, and the Effect of its good Taste. It admires less, but yet admires.

WE are so desirous of being content with ourselves, that we are not at all difficult in the Means that may contribute to it. How little soever we find our selves applauded, how few soever they are who esteem us, we yet perswade our selves, without the least doubt, that we have Reason to be content with our selves; and under this blind Prepossession we look upon Things as superfluous which others pursue and acquire, if we possess them not. A Professor has run thro' his Course, oftentimes very imperfectly, as it happens when a first Work is hastily perform'd. That signifies nothing: It is finish'd, and therefore compleat: His Pupils admire it, and his Collegues approve it: *They allow his Bleeding, that he may allow their Vomiting.* But every Day sees the Sciences more advanced and enriched with new Discoveries. Men go too far, says one, and soar into the Clouds, and lose themselves. Instead therefore of following those that proceed forward, and making an equal Progress with them, we chuse to go by our selves, in order to lay hold of what we call Solid; and this Solid is to provide for a good Time, and to treasure up Wealth. Or if we do chuse to appear in Action, it is to put us in a Condition of obtaining a new and more considerable Employ either for Honour or Profit.

WHENCE come it that so few People apply themselves to the Mathematicks? It is demonstrated that all, or the greatest part of Philosophy depends upon it; and it is equally ignorant and presumptive to call a Man a Philosopher, who is no Mathematician. Yet notwithstanding this, in our University, a Professor of Natural Philosophy shall have one or two hundred Pupils, whom he teaches nothing but general and trifling Matters; whilst a Professor of the Mathematicks, who would direct them in the true Road that leads to the Knowledge of Nature, has not above ten or a dozen that will attend his Lectures. But Natural Philosophy formerly knew nothing at all of that mechanical Part, which is not to be understood rightly without the Help of the Mathematicks. So that a long Custom having separated and made these two distinct Sciences, those who have learned the first without the last, can by no means consent to have them united, because that would be declaring themselves to be such as pretend to know something, but do in reality know nothing.

II. AS on one Hand we refuse our Attention to those we despise, and on the other prejudice our selves against those that despise us,

*An exact Idea
of Contempt.*

and

and find an Aversion to all their Sentiments, it is very visible that Contempt is very capable of hindring the Truth from enlightening the Understanding. A Man who shall appear contemptible, may yet think justly; and being too proud, does not always deceive. It is therefore of Importance to be upon our Guard against this Passion, and for this Purpose we can do nothing better than to form an exact Idea of it: Contempt may either be just or unjust; we oftentimes treat others with Contempt without designing it.

IT is certain that all Men are not equally to be esteemed, because they have not all the same Degree of Merit. It is certain also, that we do not owe them all the same Respect, because they are advanced in different Ranks, and bear different Relations in the Society. But there is a great deal of Difference betwixt despising a Man, and not having so much Esteem for him as for another; and there is also a great deal of Difference betwixt not having so much Esteem for him, and not paying him the same Respect.

ONE Man has less Merit than another, either by his own Fault, or not. When a Man has neglected to cultivate his Talents, and to improve the Opportunities he has had of advancing himself, he deserves to be made sensible of his Fault, and to perceive that he is placed by way of Punishment, in an inferior Station to that he might have enjoy'd. But it would certainly be a Piece of Hardship and Injustice, to treat him in the same manner, who cannot be reproached with any such Neglect. If an infinite Number of Men be inferior to others, it is altogether their Misfortune: Circumstances which they were not Masters of, were the Occasions of it; if they had met with the same Helps, and the same Education, they would have obtained the Places and Merit of those that are their Superiors. But it is always cruel and unjust to make an unfortunate Man more sensible of the Wretchedness of his Condition: Humanity on the contrary teaches to divert him from the Thoughts of it. The Injusticetherefore of Contempt seems to me to consist, in the Pleasure we take to make others sensible that they are our Inferiors, and that we think our selves happy in seeing them below us. A Condition which we are accustomed to, is not found uneasy, or thought troublesome. The Pleasure we find in the Informations we receive from Men of greater Learning, makes us delight in their Abilities, and think our selves happy in the Opportunities we have of consulting them. The Benefit we receive from the Protection of a Superior, makes us esteem it our Happiness, that he is
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in that high Station. But if the Learned and the Great should take a Pleasure in mortifying others, by making them perfectly sensible of the great Distance there is betwixt them, it would be impossible not to be disturb'd at a Station that gives such a cruel Power, and not to lament our being expos'd to such barbarous Insults.

To despise, is not to prize justly, that is to say, *not to esteem* an Object according to its *true Value*: It is the Fault of those, who treat others haughtily, and with too much Pride. If they did but consider that those they treat in this manner are Men, and consequently are born with Faculties and Dispositions, which, perhaps, would have given them the Superiority, if their Birth or Education had been accompanied with the same Circumstances: They would be ashamed of insulting their Misfortunes, and would be afraid to draw any Part of their Happiness from the barbarous Pleasure of disturbing that of others, who have as good a Foundation for it as themselves. He who finds himself superior to others, by what ever Advantage it happens, may by his gracious and courteous Behaviour to them, make them content with themselves, at the same time that they know themselves to be his Inferiors: He may also by a contrary and haughty Usage make them yet more wretched. The Choice is in his Power; but then he should consider, that the Difference of his Choice makes in himself the Difference of a *Man of Honour* from a *Brute*.

III. WHEN we discover in the Object we *Love is a Source of Prepossession.* admire, and with which we are strongly affected, Qualities proper to contribute to our Felicity, the Emotion of the first Surprise makes way for a second, which is call'd *Love*. When we are possessed with this Passion, the very simple Idea of the Object already gives Pleasure, we applaud it under the Notion of our esteeming it. And because we are pleas'd with this Condition, and are resolv'd to persevere in it, and have the Power of exciting in our selves Ideas suitable to our Inclinations, so long as this Passion lasts, we perceive in the Thing we love nothing but what enhances its Value: If any thing presents that would abate it, we presently divert our Thoughts from it. *To love*, is to take a *Pleasure in esteeming*; but when the Idea of an Object gives a great deal of Pleasure, the Delight we take in thinking upon it extends to every thing it contains, and to every thing that accompanies it; we see all of it with Pleasure, and consequently we love and esteem all of it; for we never are willing to cross the Pleasure we find in loving, by
con-

confessing to our selves that we love that which does not at all deserve it.

THE Heart is always much more engaged with Sensations, than with Ideas; it loves agreeable Sensations, and yields it self up to them in Proportion as they are lively. A State of Tranquility appears comparatively tiresome to it; and it returns not thither without having first cruelly proved, that it has paid too dearly for the Pleasure of its Passions. There is nothing so insupportable as disapproving and condemning our selves: There is nothing we fly so much as being at War with our selves. For which Reason, after an Object has once engaged our Affection, we imploy all our Thoughts upon what may justify it: We clude all other Considerations; and as we have no regard to them, they are nothing to us.

OUR Ideas arise one from another: They arise also from our Sensations, as Experience demonstrates. Whoever will take the Pains to reflect upon himself, and attend to what passes within himself, will be convinced, that every Idea has so much more Relation to the Idea or Sentiment that succeeds it, as we are more attentive to it. But as the Passions engage the Attention, and possess it entirely, they do not suffer any Ideas to arise but such as are agreeable to them, they permit Objects to be seen only on this side; and Reason perceives no more than what is to authorize them, and therefore all its Abilities are imployed to justify them. If some Circumstance happens to open our Eyes, and makes us see Things as they are, a little more perfectly, this Light lasts but for a Moment; we may have a Glimpse of what is contrary to our Passions, but we do not attend to it, but lose Sight of it presently. We see with Pleasure this Game of the Passions in those Places, where Poets describe the Agitations of the Heart floating betwixt two contrary Passions, and engaged in a Contest betwixt what it ought and what it is enclined to do.

ALL the Passions justify themselves; and by justifying them, we encourage our selves to persevere in them, we oblige our selves to them, (b) and confirm our selves in them, indeed by

(b) Concipit interea validos Ætias ignes:
Et luctata diù postquam ratione furorem
Vincere non poterat; Frustrà, Medea, repugas;
Nescio quis Deus obstat; -----
Excute Virgineo conceptas pectore flammæ,
Si potes infelix. Si possem, sanior essem.

by a Reason misled, but always by Reason. *Luctus sibi jus facit, eoque adducit ut putet turpe desinere.* Sen. A Man who afflicts himself, would believe himself wanting to his own Well-being, if he did not do so: (c) He would be ashamed to finish his Sorrows all at once; and it is but by little and little that he resolves to become pacified. When we are given up to any Passion, we suffer our selves to see nothing but what favours that Passion, and reject every Thing that would

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Sed trahit invitam nova vis; aliudque Cupido;
Mens aliud suadet; video meliora, proboque:
Deteriora sequor. Quid in hospite, regia virgo,
Ureris? -----

----- Vivat tamen; idque precari.
Vel sine amore licet. Quid enim commisit Iason?
Quam, nisi crudelem, non tangat Iasonis ætas,
Et genus, & Virtus? Quam non, ut cætera desint,
Forma movere potest? certè mea pectora movit.
----- Prodamne ego regna parentis,
Atque ope nescio quis servabitur advena nostrâ,
Ut per me sospes sine me det lintea ventis,
Virque sit alterius; pœnæ Medea relinquet?
Si facere hoc, aliamve potest præponere nobis,
Occidat ingratus. Sed non is vultus in illo,
Non ea nobilitas animo est, ea gratia formæ.

Ergò ego Germanam, Fratremque, Patremque, Deosque,
Et natale solum ventis ablata relinquam?
Maximus intrâ me Deus est. Non magna relinquam;
Magna sequar. -----
Quemque ego cum rebus, quas totus possidet Orbis,
Æsoniden mutasse velim: -----
Quid quòd nescio qui mediis concurrere in undis
Dicuntur montes, ratibusque inimica Charybdis.

Nempe tenens quod amo, gremioque in Iasonis hærens
Per freta longa ferar. -----

----- Quin aspice quantum
Aggrediare nefas; & dum licet, effuge crimen.
Dixit: & ante oculos rectum, pietasque, pudorque
Constiterant: & victa dabat jam terga Cupido.
Cum videt Æsoniden, -----
Spectat; & in vultu, veluti nunc denique viso,
Lumina fixa tenet: nec se mortalia demens,
Ora videre putat: -----

*Ovid. Metam. Lib. VII. 9. & seq. See also the Beginning
of Book IV. of the Æneid,*

(c) Est quædam flere voluptas.

obstruct and weaken it. Particularly, when Love has once taken Possession of our Heart, it takes away the Relish of every thing that has not some Relation to the Object with which we are enamour'd; and by this Indifference for every thing else, we lose an infinite Number of Pleasures, for which we have but very poor amends. For the few and oftentimes very imperfect Pleasures of that Passion are not equal to the Torments and Uneasiness that always accompany it; for Complaints are the usual Language of Lovers, and their Looks are almost a continual Proof of their Discontent. Trouble, Uneasiness, Distractions, Desires, Jealousies, Reproaches, and Injuries, are sure to be their Lot. If you would conclude from hence, that Love has some very precious Recompences for those that are under its Influence, since so many Evils do not at all discourage them, you will be very much deceiv'd. Its principal Endearment is not so much owing to the Pleasures it affords, as to the Indifference it occasions with respect to all other Engagements. It does not hinder our thinking our selves unfortunate; but then it blinds us so far, as to make us believe we should be more so in any other Condition of Life. Love makes less Conquest by the imaginary Charms it adds to the Object beloved, than by the real ones it takes away from all others, and by the Veil it casts over all they have that is valuable.

THE Beginning of Love presents nothing but Pleasures. We are never more happy than at the commencing of this Passion: Our Desires are then but moderate, and the little we wish for is easily obtain'd. Besides, every Thing which is accustomed to give Pleasure, continues still to give it, and the Heart enriches it self with a new Satisfaction, without losing any of those it has already. And as we are never so much Masters of this Passion as at the Beginning, we may say, that Love is never so easy to conquer, as when we have most reason to be satisfied with it, and when we least think of getting rid of it. Does it then owe its Power to the Pains it makes us suffer? It is said so; but I do not believe it: Our *Songs* nourish it with Tears, but in reality it owes its Empire and tyrannick Power only to our Blindness. When it is but beginning, we have yet some Value left for other Objects, and might deliver our selves up to one to cure our selves of the other: But when once we find our selves enamour'd with one particular Good, because we have lost the Idea and Relish of all but this one, if we would disengage our selves from what we love, we must break at once with all the Remains we have left of Felicity. . .

MEN of Letters have also their Affections as well as other Men, and these Affections engage them in the same Illusions: They affect one particular Science; and for no other Reason than because they study none but that, are infatuated with it: They add to its real Merit an imaginary one, and seldom or never see any Worth in other Sciences; because to give themselves Time to study those, requires them to lose too much in the Study of that which they particularly love.

COMMENTATORS are like Lovers: They make every thing beautiful, and admire Trifles; every Thing is of weight, every thing is of value, which they engage in; and after having finish'd one Work, they undertake another, like those that cannot live without their favourite Passion. They change the Object without changing the Discourse. The last Work they are upon, if you will believe them, is always the most to be admired; but if you examine well all they say, you will find they have already spoken of others with the same Exaggeration.

PASSION engrosses every Thing. The most trivial Disputes appear of the utmost Importance to those that maintain them, and are urged with the greatest Warmth one against another; and for fear of acknowledging, even to themselves; that they are warm about nothing, they find means to interest *Religion* in Trifles, and by this means dishonour that to make it a Cover to their Honour.

WE love in different Manners, and in different Degrees, but seldom or never without some Illusion. We praise in proportion as we love; and this is a Key very necessary towards the explaining the *Stile of our Praises*. They seldom express the Ideas of an enlighten'd Understanding, but are the Language of an Heart that is prepossess'd. Those whom we love, have Understanding, Virtue, and, in general, Merit, in proportion as we love them. I know a great many People, in whose Mouth all these Expressions, *He has an infinite Understanding, He has a perfect Piety, He is extremely obliging, He comprehends every Demonstration with the utmost Clearness, He has an invincible Valour*, signifies nothing more than that *he is their near Relation*; and, in the Mouth of others, that *he is their Friend, or their Protector*.

As Children are never in a Condition of conducting themselves by Reason, it would be uneasy for them to discover the Faults of their Parents, and of those that are entrusted with their Education; and this Discovery might engage them to Sentiments of Contempt, and even of Hatred.

Nature has provided for this, by making their Inclination precede their Knowledge, and their Love prepossess their Reflections. By this Prepossession they regard nothing but what they ought to regard, and do not at all concern themselves with what it is not proper for them to consider: So that if this Prepossession does deceive and impose upon them, it does upon the whole do a great deal more Good than Mischief. It is better that Children should imitate some Faults; and, as to the rest, live in Obedience and Respect to their Governors, than that they should proceed to Contempt, and shake off the Yoke, and, in an Age of Fancifulness, refuse to receive any Law but from themselves.

IV. BUT after we have attain'd to the *Means to prevent them.* Age of Discretion, and have acquired some Power over our selves, after we have learn'd to conduct our selves by Ideas, and to regulate our selves by Evidence, if we perceive that we begin to be in love with an Object, even before we are perfectly acquainted with it, we ought immediately to divert our Thoughts from it, (d) in order to let these first Emotions vanish, till we can bend all our Attention to make a full Discovery of it. It is by a compos'd Examination that we come to this Discovery.

THE Diversion which I here recommend, is the most certain Remedy against the Passions. We never succeed in attacking them directly; we must give them time to cool, by diverting our Attention to other Objects; and what *Cicero* says of Anger, is equally true of all the Passions, *We only enrage and enflame them by a direct Opposition.* (e)

BEFORE therefore we fix our Inclination upon any Thing whatever, we ought to discover, and be assur'd of the Value of the Object. But, in order to maintain this Maxim, it

(d) *Sine dediscere oculos tuos; sine aures assuescere sanioribus verbis. Quoties processeris, in ipso transitu aliqua quæ renouent cupiditates tuas, tibi occurrent. Quemadmodum ei, qui amorem exurere conatur, euitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis: nihil enim facilius, quàm amor recrudescit: ita qui deponere vult desideria rerum omnium, quarum cupiditate flagrauit, & oculos & aures ab his quæ reliquit avertat. Sen. Ep. LXIX.*

Facilius initia illorum prohibere quàm impetum regere. *Sen. Ep. LXXXV.*

(e) Ab iratis, si perspicuè pax & benevolentia petitur; non modo ea non invenitur, sed augetur atque inflammatur odium. *Cic. de Inv. Lib. I.*

it is necessary to turn it into an Habit, and for this Purpose to follow it constantly in the most inconsiderable; as well as in the most important Objects.

V. BUT when we have evidently discover'd that an Object is worthy of our Pains, our Application, and our Enquiries, we may very well submit our Hearts to it. (f) This is not difficult; for the Attention which we give to its Excellencies, will of it self engage our Affection; and if it be a Work, or a Science, our Inclination will very readily support our Endeavours and Perseverance; to succeed in it we proceed farther, and finish more perfectly whatever we are in love with. But here we ought to be upon our Guard; and as every part of one and the same Subject is not of the same Importance, we shou'd take care not to dishonour our Affection for what deserves it, by an equal Respect to what deserves it not. We shou'd be jealous of placing our Esteem right, and take care to conduct always by Evidence, and never by Inconsiderateness; we should be attentive to distinguish what is useful from what is not so, and such Advantages as are real, from such as only appear so.

The Usefulness of Love.

It is not usual to make this Distinction; and for the most part we shew an equal Earnestness for all that has any relation to the Subject we are fond of. Those who have the Care of the Education of Youth, are impatient to see their Scholars accomplished: They would teach them all at once, and mend all their Faults at the same time. This Eagerness making it impossible for them to dissemble, or excuse any thing; they look upon every Fault as capital, and all Idleness as an irreparable Loss of Time. They torment and chide them; and by recommending sometimes, and even very often, the *Circumstantial* and the Inconsiderable with the same Air as the *Essential*, they give occasion to their Scholars to regard, in their Turn, the Essential in the same Light as the Inconsiderable, and to neglect it with the same Security.

THE Mathematicks are of great Use; which no body, that knows what Service they have been of, can deny. But are we not too fond of every Thing that bears this Name?

N 3

Do

(f) Tu verò omnia cum amico delibera, sed de ipso prius. Post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam judicandum. Ibi verò præposterè officia permiscet, qui contra præcepta Theophrasti, cum amaverint, judicant, & non amant, cum judicaverint. Diu cogita, an tibi in amicitiam aliquis recipiendus sit: cum PLACUERIT fieri, TOTÒ ILLUM PECTORE ADMITTE. Sen. Ep. III.

Do we not give into Subtilties that perplex those of the first Rank? Is it worth the while to take so much Pains, to convince a few Men of our Abilities and Patience? Would not the Labours of great Genius's be more usefully employ'd in Subjects of greater Importance? And would they not make even a better Use of their Understanding and Time, by putting in a better Order, and setting in a clearer Light, those Things that have been already discovered, than by drawing, as it were, out of nothing, new Speculations, which the human Understanding, being soon tired with the Uselessness and Difficulty, will in time suffer to return to their Original Darkeness.

BUT Religion it self, which relates entirely to Eternity; Religion, which is so august, that its very Name engages our Respect; and Divinity, which contains its Mysteries and Evidences, are not in every Part of equal Importance, but have something that may be omitted, and not understood, without Prejudice or Danger. And yet we see but too many learned Men, whose Zeal sometimes gives sad Shocks to Religion by their Rashness and Obstinacy in defending and explaining what they do not at all understand. Do we not see mutual Forbearance, Love, and Charity, Virtues so necessary, so worthy of Mankind, and so essential to Christianity, trampled under Foot in favour of other Things, which may even be placed below Circumstantials, and which are the Sport of Infidels, and the Concern of all that are rational?

IF I make a particular mention of Divines, it is because I think them under a greater Obligation to set good Examples. But as to the rest, what Profession is exempt from the same Reproach; and in what Science do not Men of Letters controvert with Passion such Subjects as do not deserve to divide them? At least the warm Controversies of Divines have a plausible Pretext: They say that the Glory of God, and the Salvation of Men are concerned in them; but when Philosophers and Mathematicians grow angry and hot, their *Disputes* are childish; and we cannot forbear concluding, that it is not Love alone, of all the Passions, that makes Men appear like Children, but that Ambition produces the same Effect, and makes those that give themselves up to it, look upon Trifles as Things of Importance, as necessary to their Quiet, and worthy of their Pains,

VI. I HAVE all along reason'd upon this Principle, That we esteem, and take a pleasure in esteeming, because we love. But if this be true, whence comes it that we are sometimes ashamed of having it perceiv'd that we love? and that there are some Things which we use, and which we destroy for the very Reason of our loving them? Two Observations will be sufficient to clear these Difficulties: There are some Things which we love for their own Sakes; and whatsoever we love after this manner, we always esteem. There are others which we love as Means conducing to some certain End, which is esteem'd and lov'd for its own Sake. It is thus we love to use disagreeable Remedies, and to take some difficult and troublesome Precautions to preserve or recover our Health; the Idea of which does already give Pleasure. We value these Remedies, and these Precautions, because they are so useful, and oftentimes even admire their Virtues; but we should esteem them much more, and at the same time love them also better, if we did not find something troublesome in them; for it is only that which gives Pleasure that we love in them.

THERE are Things which we take care to preserve upon the Account of our loving them: Thus we preserve, for instance, a fine House, fine Pictures, &c. There are others that give Pleasure in proportion as they are consumed, and which they would not, without this, think worth their Attention: Thus we love good Eating and Drinking, &c. Lastly there are others which please of themselves, and which we for this Reason are fond of preserving; but which we still love better to make use of, than barely to preserve. We preserve for instance, a Warren, and kill the Rabbits for our Use; we take care of our Horses, in order to make use of them; we love Soldiers, whose Valour may be of Service.

I OBSERVE in the second Place, that the Passions are not always in Friendship with themselves. We sometimes esteem an Object, and are charm'd to find something agreeable in it; but at the same time perceive that the Passion we have for it is directly opposite to our Views of Interest, or Ambition, and in this Respect, we esteem it not, nor love it any longer. Sometimes Reason shares in deceiving us, and furnishes Passion with some Pretences to justify it self in secret: But this Reason has still Light enough left to condemn, in divers Respects, a Passion which it justifies and excuses in other Respects. We turn our Eyes from a Light, which does not give Pleasure to a Heart that is unwilling to follow it. But

because we do not believe that others will shut their Eyes with the same Complaisance, we conceal from them as much as we can of a Passion which we foresee they will condemn. But if once our Passion can get the better of our Reason, and entirely hoodwink, and fix it in all its Interests, then we regard those who think otherwise as People that are deceiv'd: We despise them; and make not only a Pleasure, but an Honour in contradicting them; and we place our Glory where we ought to find our Shame. The most Vicious would find leis Pleasure in their Infamies, if they did not glory in them, either among themselves, or each to himself in the Secret of his Heart, and attribute such Names to them as are only due to Virtue (g).

VII. THAT which produces disagreeable Sentiments, that whose Idea displeases, that which may contribute to our Misery, becomes an Object of Hatred. But for the same Reason that it displeases and mortifies us, we divert our Attention from it, and consequently become incapable of perfectly knowing it; and if we take a little Pains to consider it, it is to make our selves amends for the Trouble it has given us, by discovering something in it which deserves to be despised, disliked, and condemned. Our Eyes are open to all its Faults, which are presently discover'd, because our Attention is fix'd upon them, and they are shut to every Thing that may be remarkable for its Goodness. This Passion may then very easily mislead us from Truth, and is of great Force to throw us into Error and Excess. We reject every Thing, where we ought only to reject something.

WHAT an Extravagance is this! We will not embrace the Truth, because it comes out of the Mouth of one who has sometimes advanced Errors. An Author is fallen into contemptible Mistakes; therefore he is himself odious, and to be condemned in every Thing: We must not agree with him in any Thing, if he does but mistake in one Thing: But from whom must we receive our Informations, if we must only listen to such as are infallible?

THE

(g) Ille effusus in voluptates, reptabundus semper atque ebius, quia scit secum voluptate vivere, credit & cum Virtute: - - - deinde vitiis suis sapientiam inscribit, & abscondenda profitetur. - - - Itaque quod unum habebant in malis bonum, perdunt, peccandi verecundiam. Laudant enim ea quibus erubescabant, & vitio gloriantur: ideoque ne resurgere quidem adolescentiæ licet, cum honestus turpi desiderii titulus accessit. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. C. 12.*

THE Love of our Interests oftentimes mixes, and is confounded with Truth: I am willing a Sentiment should please me because it is true; perhaps also it pleases me because it is my own, that is to say, because I am the Author of it, or have adopted it. Our Zeal for Truth wou'd be usually less lively, if it was not supported by some Interest, and this Interest is for the most part prejudicial to Truth. It casts into Impatience; it hinders us from seeing it, when presented by Persons we do not love; and it is with Difficulty we submit to Truth, even when we are thoroughly perswaded of the Superiority of the Teacher. To love it as we ought to do, we should love Truth only, or love it to such a Degree, that every Thing else should seem to deserve our Neglect in comparison with that.

VIII. WE ought to hate Errors and Vices; for we shall keep at so much the greater distance, by how much the greater Aversion we conceive for them. (*b*) In order to this we should fix our Attention upon all the Blemishes of each of them, and upon whatsoever they have that is unworthy of us; we should dwell upon their fatal Consequences, and pursue all the Prejudices that we may possibly receive from them. We shall then be sufficiently apprehensive of being mistaken, and shall always take care to distinguish Virtue, which we love, from Error, which we hate: We shall be sure to reject the last, and embrace the first, wherever we meet with them; and no Circumstances will make Error favourable, nor Truth disagreeable, so as to confound them, and make us mistake the one for the other. The same Precautions which guard us against Error, will guard us against Vice, since the Reason of our sinning, is our not knowing how odious Vice is.

We must hate Faults without hating their Authors, and endeavour their Reformation.

BUT as we are not Masters or Judges of those that sin and commit Mistakes, it does not belong to us to hate them, and to punish their Faults and Mistakes with our Aversion, and all its Consequences: It is more agreeable to pity their Follies, and to endeavour to cure them. Above all, it is just to compassionate those who have been misled by the Example or Perswasion of others, and who perhaps are not come to the same Degree of Obstinacy. But nothing is more effectual in recovering Men out of their Errors, whether they be in Speculation or Practise, than to gain them upon their

(*b*) Magna pars hominum est, quæ non peccatis sed peccantibus irascitur. *Sen. de Irâ, Lib. II.*

their own Principles, to make them sensible that they have themselves laid a Foundation for clearer Knowledge, and that they have fallen into their Mistakes by deserting their own Maxims. When a Man deceives himself, or sins, it is certain he does not at all reason and conduct himself after the same Manner, upon the same Principles, and in the same Way, as when he thinks justly, and discharges his Duty. Since then he has sometime follow'd the universal Laws of Evidence and of Order, and has understood and perceived their Beauty, Force, and Necessity, we should recall to his Memory, and set before his Eyes, what he himself has approved. The greatest Enthusiasts sometimes reason very well, and the most Vicious do good Actions, and from time to time respect Virtue, and find themselves inclined to follow it. It is proper to make them observe that these Parts of their Conduct and Management have been signalized with a glorious Distinction, and to advise them to continue and not discredit them by a contrary Behaviour.

I QUESTION whether it ever happens for a Man to deceive himself in all Respects: He who deceives himself, sees some part of Things as they really are, but supposes something of them that is really not so. One great means to bring him to see his Error in what he thus supposes; is to agree with him in what he sees aright. To reform Men therefore, we ought to observe every Thing which they say true, or do well, in order to make a good Use of it. To recover them from their mistaken Sentiments, and convert them to ours, we must have some common Maxims by which we may unite together. This is what may very easily be done, if we love them; but will be never thought on, or very difficultly resolved upon, and very imperfectly performed, if we hate them.

IN endeavouring thus to discover Truths amongst the Errors of those that deceive themselves, and the Traces of Virtue amongst the Faults of those that desert it, we shall perceive the Distance which our Prepossession made us believe too great lessen by little and little, and even our Aversion often change into Esteem. And can we perceive any Humanity, without being charin'd with such Reasons as offer to make us find those amiable, who might have appear'd odious to us.

WE ought to have a great Foundation of Esteem for our selves, and to believe our selves above Error and Vice much more than we really are, to conceive against those, who do not think or live justly, an Aversion, which we should be troubled

troubled to be the Object of our selves, and which perhaps we merit as much as they. Who would dare to say to himself, I deceive my self in nothing, and no body can condemn any Thing whatsoever in me? Our Hatred for those that err, is therefore an Effect of Injustice and Inconsiderateness. (i) Our Hatred for the Faults of others, and our Indulgence for our own, do mostly go hand in hand: We allow in others only some of our own Vices. To be favourable to our selves, and severe to others, is a Vanity that proceeds from the same Principle. This is so true, that the most *rigid* are not commonly the most able, nor the most zealous the most upright. They pardon in themselves what they cannot bear in others: Indulgence is for themselves, and Severity for others.

WE are all of us born in too great Darkness, we are all of us educated into too many Prejudices, we are naturally subject to too many Infirmities, to deserve to be ill treated by Men, when we happen to be mistaken. Shall we be angry at a Man that stumbles in the Dark, at a deaf Man that does not hear perfectly, at an Infant, or Person that is distempered? To err is a Distemper, and a Consequence of Childishness. (k)

WHEN

(i) Peccantes verò quid habet cur oderit, cum error illos in hujusmodi delicta compellat? non est autem prudentis, errantes odisse, alioquin ipse sibi odio erit. Cogitet quam multa contra bonum morem faciat, quàm multa ex his quæ egit, veniam desiderent: jam irascetur etiam sibi. Neque enim æquus Judex aliam de suâ, aliam de alienâ causâ, sententiam fert. Nemo, inquam, invenitur qui se possit absolvere: & innocentem quisque se dicit, respiciens testem, non conscientiam. Quantò humanius, mitem & pacatum animum præstare peccantibus, & illos non persequi, sed revocare? Errantem per agros ignorantia viæ, melius est ad rectum iter admovere, quàm expellere. Corrigendus est itaque qui peccat, & admonitione, & vi, & molliter, & asperè: meliorque tam sibi quàm aliis faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine irâ: quis enim, cui medetur, irascitur? *Sen. de Irâ, Lib. I. Cap. 14.*

(k) Illud potius cogitabis, non esse irascendum erroribus; quid enim si quis irascatur in tenebris parùm vestigia certa ponentibus? Quid si quis surdis, imperia non exaudientibus? Quid si pueris, quod neglecto dispectu officiorum, ad lusus & ineptos æqualium jocos spectent? Quid si illis irasci velis, qui ægrotant, senescunt, fatigantur? Inter cætera mortalitatis incommoda, & hæc est caligo mentium: nec tantum necessitas Errandi, sed Errorum amor. Ne singulis irascaris, universis ignoscendum, Generi humano venia tribuenda est. Si irascaris juvenibus, senibusque, quòd peccant: irascere infantibus, quòd peccaturi sunt. Num quis irascitur pueris: quorum ætas nondum novit rerum discrimina? Major est excusatio & justior, hominem esse quam puerum

WHEN I make a wide Difference betwixt the Aversion we ought to have for Error and Vice, and the Hatred we may conceive for those that think or live amiss, I distinguish two Things that are actually separated every Day; for not only Parents, but in general all honest Men to whom the Education of Youth is committed, do not go through with the great Pain and Trouble of their Office so much out of Respect to their Scholars, as out of the Aversion they have to the Errors against which they endeavour to secure them, and to their Faults which they apply themselves to correct.

ONE of the first Movements which the Heart of most Men is sensible of, at the Sight of one that thinks differently from them, is that of Hatred: The Reason is obvious, because this leads them naturally to make two Reflections, which are both very disagreeable. Perhaps he has Reason to think differently; and this Suspicion presently Shocks their Self-love, and gives them Pain to see another more knowing or happy than himself. To extricate them out of this Uneasiness, there is no other way besides a very strict Examination, which is a second Mortification for Men who are not pleased with Trouble, and who are afraid that their Pains may possibly end in convincing them of the Superiority of their Antagonists. The *Education* which is usually bestow'd upon Children, can alone produce the same Effect with these two Principles. What then must they do when joined together? Children are taught to regard with Horror those that live not in the same Communion with themselves, and who do not join in the same Confession of Faith for a Rule of their Belief and Morals, or rather of their Inclinations and Aversions. In Matters of less Importance than these of Religion, as in Philosophy and Humanity, the Professors for the most Part never speak of those whose Sentiments they relish not, in any other than Terms of Hatred; and those of their Pupils that enter most into the Passion of their Professors, are sure to be the most favour'd. In Colleges the Youth lose the Pleasure of advancing in their Studies, by the Reproofs they find it proper to give to their Comrades, and by the Mortification of falling back when they come to be corrected by them in their Turn. The Apprehension they are under for
fear

rum. Hac Conditione nati sumus, animalia obnoxia non paucioribus animi, quam corporis morbis: Non quidem, obtusa, nec tarda, sed acumine nostro malè utentià, alter alteri vitiorum exempla. Quisque sequitur priores, malè iter ingressos; quidni habeant excusationem, cum publicà vià erraverint? *Lib. II. Cap. 9.*

fear another should differ from, and outstrip them, forces them to take Pains, to which they have naturally an Aversion: If they could but all agree to do alike, they would all live at Ease. Upon the least Inclination to become reasonable, it is easy to cure these Weaknesses, by reflecting upon the Ridiculousness of their Principles. To these may also be joined the Inconveniencies of their Consequences.

IF we cannot bear the Idea of a Sentiment that is opposite to our own, without Emotions of Hatred and Impatience, we can never possibly enter far into the Minds of those who think differently from our selves; for we never do exactly, what we do with an Aversion: We shall therefore confine our selves within our selves, and within our own Ideas; and by this Means shall every Day more and more contract our Genius, and hinder it from receiving either Manners or Learning.

BESIDES this, till we have got rid of our Prepossessions, we can never taste any Tranquility: For we must either bury our selves in Retirement, without informing our selves of what passes beyond the Walls, where we think fit to immure our selves, or to resolve to live unhappy; or lastly, to bring our selves to see every Moment, without any Uneasiness, Men who, upon an infinite many Subjects, have Sentiments different from ours.^(l)

WHEN we love Virtue perfectly, this is not at all difficult: When we are pleas'd with a Man, who, upon all Subjects whatsoever, thinks in the same manner with our selves, what Obligation is he under for our Esteem and Friendship? Is it the Effect of my Choice? or do I not rather find my self determined by a Mechanism of which I am by no means Master? But when two Men esteem and love one another, tho' upon a great many Subjects, and even Subjects of Importance, they do not think alike; these Differences even enhance the Merit of their Union: They ought to esteem themselves happy, and must necessarily be mutually possess'd of some excellent

(l) "I condemn my Impatience, and maintain, first, That it is equally
"vicious in him that is in the right, as well as in him that in is the
"wrong; for it is a tyrannical Aversion not to be able to bear a Form
"different from one's own. And next, That is in truth the greatest,
"most constant, and extravagant Foolery of all, to be disgusted and angry
"with the Foolery of the World." *Mont. Book III. Chap. 7.*

*Folly is a very bad Quality; but not to be able to bear it, to be always
angry, and piqued with it, as I am, is another sort of Imperfection, still
as importunate as Folly it self.* *Ibid. Ch. 8.*

cellent Qualifications which prevent the natural Effect of other Oppositions; and this only Thought, that they are both above the Weakness that is common to almost all Mankind, deserves to bind them, and does always effectually bind them the faster. But most Men know no other Merit in others, than that of thinking upon certain Points of Speculation, after a certain manner; because they themselves think of them after that manner. He is an excellent Man, of a good Life and Conversation, a Child of God, and one of his Elect, because he relishes my Method: He explains a Phænomenon upon the same Principles, and draws from them the same Consequences; he approves of the same Ceremonies, and the same Habits; he gives to obscure Words the same Signification, and follows the same Methods with me in his Sermons, or in his Calculation. It is by this sort of Weakness that Men are united, and it is by the very same sort of Weakness that they hate and persecute one another. But do you not know a great many Men, who live in the same Sentiments, or Speculations, with your selves, and yet are covetous, proud, deceitful, idle, envious, &c.? And have you not seen, on the contrary, those that are prepossessed with Opinions opposite to yours, who have yet been polite, friendly, sincere, generous, Lovers of Equity, full of Duty to the Divinity, and of Humanity for their fellow Creatures? Let us be content therefore with proposing our Reasons modestly to those whom we believe to be in an Error; and it is a good Point gain'd, if we can get them to take kindly the Pains we give our selves to undeceive them. We shall never prevail with them by assuming an Air of Authority; and we shall yet encrease the Distance that is betwixt us by Marks of Hatred and Impatience.

OUR Passions, being whimsical in themselves, are already so in their Birth: Sometimes the Aversion we have to some certain Sentiments makes us hate those that maintain them; and sometimes also the Hatred, with which we are prepossessed against a Man, makes us contradict the Opinions of which he is the Author. Some would never have thought fit to oppose with Warmth the Philosophical Conjectures of another, if it had not been the Work of a Collegue, whose Character they envy, and with whom they have had Disputes.

IT cannot be denied, but that we are obliged to *love Truth*, and to *search* it heartily and *sincerely*: But in searching it thus, it may sometimes happen that we cannot possibly find it. And I would fain ask whether this Misfortune, which is the Effect of human Weakness, is a *Misfortune* not to be excused

excused before the Throne of the infinite Mercy of our Creator, who knows the Extent of our Weaknesses.

IX. WE desire the Good before we possess it, and we rejoice when we obtain it. We fear the Evil before it comes, and it brings Sadness with it when it comes. Desire and Fear respect the future, but Joy and Sadness the present. As these Passions are founded upon Love and Hatred, and arise from thence, their Effects, with respect to the Knowledge of Truth, are very little different from those of their Originals.

The Consequences of Love and Hatred.

X. As we apply our selves to Ideas that give Pleasure, and fly from those that give Pain, the Pleasure we find in thinking that what we desire should come to pass, makes us confine our Thoughts to such Things as may facilitate its Success, without troubling our selves with what may obstruct it. A Man who suffers himself to be seduced with this Pleasure, never sees Things but by Halves: The most difficult seem to him very easy, because he has not sufficiently attended to all that is necessary to execute them. He often attempts Things that are impossible; and whensoever his Projects fail by Obstacles and Accidents, which he never attended to, but might have foreseen and prevented, he soothes and comforts himself with the Thought that they were above all human Foresight, judging of other People's Sagacity by his own.

The Illusions of Desire.

THIS is the Character of the *Chimerical* Class; who when once they have given into great Ideas, find every Thing that is simple, every Thing that is common, every Thing that is of the ordinary Taste, become insipid to them. They are not at all affected with, nor so much as vouchsafe even to think of what is practicable. Nothing but what is extraordinary appears worth their pursuing. They love to promise themselves Success, and so flatter themselves with Hopes of obtaining. And when their Hopes are vanished, how can they, under their present Relish, find any Amends for the Loss of an Hope so shining, by the Pursuit of what is easy and common? They begin therefore a new Project of the same Nature with the first; and being always dazzled with some Design that charms them, they spare themselves as much as possible the mortifying Trouble of considering its Difficulties. Their Sight dims and extinguishes the Joy they would obtain, and which they would be pleased to give themselves up to.

DESIRE has also its Uses: By Means of desiring a Thing, we promise our selves to acquire it the more easily. By this means we are encouraged to take Pains: The Hopes of Success animates

animates us, and we never doubt of Success, because we look upon our selves as in Possession of what we so earnestly desire.

Precautions. XI. WE shall always fall from Mistake into Mistake, if before we give Way to our Desires, we do not take care to examine not only whether what we desire deserves the Eagerness with which we desire it, but also, and above all, whether it be a Thing that is practicable. The Way then to be assured of the whole Probability there is of Success, is, to compare exactly the Means which may promote it, with the Obstacles that may hinder it.

WE would be happy; and in order to become so, we find it necessary to be put in Possession of some Goods. These Principles generally reign in all Hearts. But the greatest Part suffer themselves to be gain'd upon by the first Objects that present themselves: They find in the Ideas of these Objects something that pleases them, and they meet with something agreeable in their Impressions. Thus their Affection engages their Application to them: First they love them; presently after they desire them; and, lastly, inform themselves of the Means of acquiring them: But the Passion which animates them does not allow them to stay and examine them, nor give them time to deliberate upon the Choice they ought to make. When Passion thus regulates our Designs, we succeed sometimes, but are for the most Part disappointed, and our Life passes partly in vain Desires, and partly in Disappointments.

BUT if we would take the Light of Reason for our Guide, and make no false Steps, that would teach us presently that we cannot acquire every Thing, and consequently that we ought to limit our Desires, and not to give way to others before we have acquired them. But where shall we begin? Must it be by the most shining ones? If private Men should direct their Views and Desires to Scepters and Crowns, all the World would take them for Madmen. We approach therefore the nearer to this *Folly*, the nearer what we desire comes to an Impossibility, and consequently we are *wise* in proportion as our Determinations are practicable.

To submit only to Evidence, to make that our only Rule, to endeavour to discover it, to proceed from Knowledge to Knowledge, to improve every Day the Order of our Thoughts and Motions, are, in my Opinion, the Goods which are not only most worthy of our Application, but, besides this, the most in our Power. To be born with Principles that render us capable of extending our Knowledge to Infinity, to be capable of knowing even God himself, are the inexhaustible

Sources of Happiness. (*m*) If after we have bestow'd our Attention to this End, and have engaged our selves in these Views; we think fit to add to this Solid something that is only circumstantial, that is to say, to join to those internal Advantages some others that are only external; our Mind being ealy and already satisfisd with the Possession of *the first*, does not suffer it self to be dazzled with the latter, and its principal Desire being to commit no Faults, he will begin by the Examination of the Easiness of any Thing, afterwards by that of Merit, and will at last determine himself to desire or neglect it, from an exact Comparison of the Value of it with the Pains it will cost us.

Would you spend your Time with Ease? Regulate your Desires, by limiting them to Things that are within your Power. When you have undertaken an Enterprize, the Success of which appear'd probable, and which Reason approved of, and ordered you to put in Execution, and after some Care and Pains have it frustrated by some Events which you did not attend to; if you could not possibly have foreseen them, take the Advantage of this Lesson of Experience, and become more circumspect, and think your self happy for an Opportunity of growing Wiser. If you could not possibly foresee those Obstacles, Reason will never enjoin you either to foresee or to surmount them; you have made a Tryal of what it engaged you to undertake. If your principal Aim be to obey and act according to Reason, you have attained your End, and ought to be content. In all our Enterprizes we should not have the Success of them so much at Heart, as to omit nothing that is within our Power to succeed in them. To act reasonably, and to behave according to our Duty, ought to be our principal Desire, and most pleasing Satisfaction: The rest is only accessory. Every Project ought to be accompanied with this Exception, *Si nihil inciderit quod impediatur*, and with this Clause, *If the Lord Will*. He who thinks after this manner is sure never to

Sen.

James iv. 15.

(*m*) Bonâ conditione conditi sumus, si eam non deseruimus. Idegit rerum natura, ut ad benè vivendum non magno apparatu opus esset: unusquisque facere se beatum potest. Leve momentum in adventitiis rebus est, & quod in neutram partem magnas vires habeat; nec secunda sapientem evehunt, nec adversa demittunt. Laboravit enim semper, ut in se plurimum poneret, intra se omne gaudium peteret. Sen, *Conf. ad Helv. Cap. 5.*

be deceived in his Projects, because he never promises himself anything but conditionally. (n)

Effects of Fear. XII. A Man that does not know how to regulate his Desires, finds himself presently a Prey to Disgust and Repentance, or to Fears and Alarms; (o) unhappy if he does not obtain what he desires, and oftentimes more unhappy if he does obtain them. Some unforeseen Obstacles do every Moment demonstrate their Labours to be to no purpose, and disappoint their Expectations. Every Thing which surprises, makes powerful Impressions upon an Heart which is governed by Passions, and do not fail of covering it with Disorder and Confusion. When we are seized

(n) Huic enim propositum est in vitâ agendâ, non utique quod tentat efficere, sed omnia rectè facere. ----- Non enim prohibentur opera ejus omnia, sed tantùm ad alios pertinentia, ipse semper in actu est, non in effectu. *Sen. Ep. LXXXV.*

(o) Apud Hecatonem nostrum inveni, cupiditatum finem, etiam ad timoris remedia proficere. DESINES, inquit, TIMERE, SI SPERARE DESIERIS. Dices, quomodo ista tam diversa, pariter sunt? Ita est, mi Lucili: cum videantur dissidere, conjuncta sunt. Quemadmodum eadem catena & custodiam & militem copulat: sic ista quæ tam dissimilia sunt, pariter incedunt: Spem metus sequitur. Nec miror ista sic ire, utrumque pendentis animi est, utrumque futuri expectatione solliciti. Maxima autem utriusque causa est, quod non ad præsentia aptamur, sed cogitationes in longinqua præmittimus. Iraque providentia, maximum bonum conditionis humanæ, in malum versa est. Feræ pericula quæ vident, fugiunt; cum effugere, securæ sunt: nos & venturo torquemur, & præterito. Multa bona nostra nobis nocent; timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantùm præsentibus miser est. *Id. Ep. V.*

Nam qui multa agit, sæpè fortunæ potestatem sui facit: quam tutissimum est rarò experiiri, cæterùm semper de illâ cogitare, & sibi nihil de fide ejus promittere. Navigabo, nisi si quid inciderit; & Prætor fiam, nisi si quid obstiterit: & negotiatio mihi respondebit, nisi si quid intervenerit. Hoc est, quare sapienti nihil contra opinionem dicamus accidere; non illum calibus hominum excepimus, sed erroribus: nec illi omnia ut voluit cedunt, sed ut cogitavit; in primis autem cogitavit, aliquid posse propositis suis resistere. Necessè est autem levius ad animum pervenire destitutæ cupiditatis dolorem, cui successum non utriusque promiseris. *Id. de Tranq. An. Cap. 13.* Faciles etiam nos facere debemus, ne nimis destinatis rebus indulgeamus; transeamus in ea, in quæ nos casus deduxerit: nec mutationes aut consilii aut status pertimescamos: dummodò nos levitas, inimicissimum quieti vitium, non excipiat. Nam & pertinacia necessè est anxia & misera sit, cui fortuna sæpe aliquid extorquet: & levitas multo gravior, nusquam se continens. *Ibid. Cap. 14.*

seized with Fear, our Attention is too much taken up with this very lively Impression, and with this violent Emotion, to be in a Condition of discovering the true Means of putting ourselves in Safety. Under this Agitation the Mind forms none, or very few Ideas, and those very weak, and very imperfect. For want of a greater Choice, we are confined to do what first presents, and limited to useles Precautions, and oftentimes determined to Means that do more Hurt than Good. Fear is always an evil Counsellor, *Nunquam fidele consilium daturus timor*: He that is afraid may be made to believe any Thing. When after having represented to a vicious Man the Horror of his ill Courses, or aggravated even to an honest Man, but timorous either by the Means of his Constitution, or his Education, the Slips and Omissions which he may have been guilty of, we farther overwhelm them with terrible and repeated Descriptions of Hell, and the insupportable Ideas of eternal Punishments, when we lead their Imaginations thro' Millions and Millions of Ages of Torment and Misery, without ever approaching in the least any Thing nearer an End, how largely soever they heap Duration upon Duration: They are so overwhelm'd, and confounded with these Ideas, that they lose all Liberty, Strength, and Capacity of Reasoning, and receive any Impression we think fit to give them. It is thus Men are fill'd with Superstition; it is thus that Penitents are carried to such vain Extravagancies; it is thus that Fancifism has been establish'd. A Man whose Ideas have all been hurried with terrible Alarms, gives immediatly into Enthusiasm. It is upon this Foundation that a cunning Priest of a subtle Understanding, and outward Gravity, by joining to the natural Fears of Death the Terrors of an ill spent Life, sell their Ghostly Advice and Consolation to dying Persons at what Price they think fit; and if he gives them any Hopes, he makes them pay as dearly for them as he pleases.

XIII. WHEN we are seized with Fears, are we in a Condition of examining, or making *Remedies*, Inquiries? We arm our selves with whatever we can find, we lay hold of every thing that presents it self. It would be useles to search for Precepts, by which to regulate our selves when under Fears, because when once we are seized with them, we are no longer Masters of our selves. Happy is he who has then in his Interest a faithful and understanding Friend! But it is in our Power to prevent our Fears: We need only forbear running Hazards; and without Reflection upon what may come to pass, lay down a Plan of an exact Life, foresee the Evils to which we may be exposed, take

take our Resolutions before-hand upon every thing that we shall have to do in every Case, and repeat them over and over again; and when one of these Cases shall happen, it is but following, without wavering, the Resolution, we have taken before-hand.

THAT we may not be without Remedy in the Evils which we may be exposed to, it is a wise Precaution to take Measures at a distance, to form Schemes, and determine before-hand what we shall do in Misfortunes.(p) But it would be a senseless Precaution to be perpetually looking for ill Fortune, for fear the Surprise should increase the Weight of it. Such a Remedy is worse than the Disease. It is plunging into certain Mischiefs, in order to soften some uncertain ones, and making our selves very miserable by our Fear of becoming so. Our Happiness depends upon our way of thinking, and it is impossible to be happy whilst the Mind is constantly dealing in melancholy Ideas. Of a thousand Evils which we may fear, we rarely meet with one; and, besides, it is often with our Evils as it is with our Goods, they are found much less than what our Imagination promised them to be, and the Mischiefs sometimes cures the Fear of it.(q)

F R E-

(p) Aufert vim præsentibus malis, qui futura prospexit. *Sen.*

(q) " A great many Things seem greater in Imagination than in Fact. " I have pass'd a good part of my Age in a perfect and entire Health, " I say, not only in an entire, but in a chearful and vigorous Health: " This jovial and festal Condition made me find the Consideration " of Sicknes so terrible, that when I came to experience it, I found it " tolerable and easy, in comparison to my Fears." *Mont. B. II. Ch. 6.*

Plura sunt quæ nos terrent quam quæ premunt, & sæpius opinione quàm re laboramus. *Sen. Ep. XIII.*

" To what Purpose is this Curiosity of anticipating all the Inconve- " niences of human Nature, and of preparing with so much Pain how " to behave even under those which there is no like- " lihood of our ever meeting with? *Parem passis* " *tristitiam fecit pati posse.* Or what Madness is it to " punish our selves this very Moment, because it may happen that " Fortune will one Day punish us after this Manner; or to put on a " great Coat at *Midsummer*, because we shall have Occasion for it at " *Michaelmas*? Learn to experience all the Mischiefs that can befall " you, even the most extreme; provethem, say they, and make sure of " them: But on the contrary, the most easy and natural Method " would be to discharge even the Thought of them." *B. III. Ch. 12.*

FREQUENT Reflections upon the Steadiness of others will give us Courage, by making us ashamed of our own Weakness. We fear as insupportable Evils what others bear with Ease, and even regard with Indifference. (r)

FEAR is never useful: (s) It is a Weakness which is even but very rarely pardonable, and is, for the most part, a Proof either that we do not know how to form a Scheme, or to follow it when form'd. (t) The better we have taken our Measures against a Storm during the Time of a Calm, the more exactly we shall determine what our Behaviour shall be when it comes, and we shall be so much the more above being afraid of it. It is therefore during a Calm that we should learn to despise a Storm, (u) and convince our selves that no Event ought to give Fear to a good Man, because he cannot be overwhelm'd with any Loss, which his Virtue and good Courses will not make him amends for. Those who without this Foundation set themselves above Alarms, have nothing but a Fool-hardiness founded upon Stupidity, or upon the Heat of Passions, which blind them like a kind of Drunkenness.

THE Ardor with which a Man precipitates himself against his Enemy, hinders him from seeing the Danger to which he is exposed; and if he fears them not, it is because in that Moment he has no Idea of them. How many Soldiers appear to contemn Fire and Sword, only because they feel

O 3

them

(r) " I see to what Limits natural Necessity extends; and considering the poor Beggar at my Door is often times more cheerful and healthful than I am, I put my self in his Place, and endeavour to frame my Mind according to his Model. And thus pursuing the Examples of others, altho' I think Death, Poverty, Contempt, and Disease at my Heels, I readily resolve not to be afraid of that which one inferior to my self takes with so much Patience; and am unwilling to believe that a mean Understanding can do no more than an able one, or that the Effects of Reason are not of equal Force with the Effects of Custom. And finding how little there is in these accessory Conveniencies, I do not fail, in the full Enjoyment of them, to put it up to Heaven, as my principal Request, that I may be made content with my self, and with the Goods that are born with me." *Mon. Book I. Ch. 38.*

(s) Despectum utilitatis timor periculi excutit. *Sen. Ep. CIX.*
Cauto decet non timere.

(t) Quidquid deinceps dierum rerumque venturum est, ex alto prospicit, & cum multo risu seriem temporum cogitat. *Ep. Cl.*

(u) In ipsa securitate animus ad difficilia se præparet; & contra injurias Fortunæ, inter beneficia firmetur. *Sen. Ep. XVIII.*

them not! This Courage, which we admire in them, abandons them to the least Wound, and gives Place to Confternation. An heedlefs Man, that wafes his Eftate with as much Eagernefs, as the moft covetous have hoarded it up, does he regard Poverty with Indifference? His Defpair will foon make him know the Difference, when once he is fallen into this Poverty, which he certainly ran into, and contemn'd, only becaufe he did not know it.

It is not only to military Men that Courage is neceffary. There are Occafions, where the Profeflion of a Man of Letters requires it as much as that of a Soldier. Some Men may in a Day of Battel be able to raife themfelves above the Fear of Death, who would not have Courage enough to oppofe Errors univerfally receiv'd, or defended by Perfons of great Rank and Credit. The Fear of Infamy does often extinguifh the Fear of Death. But when we advance new Truths, we expofe our felves to the Reflections, the Contempt, and the Infults of thofe whofe Approbation we are accuftomed from our Infancy to court, and with whom we have propos'd to pafs all our Days agreeably. Nothing but a very great and pure Application to our Duty can make us refolve to take the Pains to undeceive and inftruct thofe who are fure to take it very ill from us. The Thought that Pofterity will judge of it more foundly, and the Idea of a Piece of Juftice, which we fhall never be Witnefses to, would never be able to fupport us, if that were all, againft a long Courfe of prefent Mortifications.

THERE are fome, whom the fole Thought of its being poffible for them to fall from their Dignity, or to lofe fome part of their Pleafures, affects fo much, as to deprive them aétually of this Tranquility fo neceffary, not only to think juftly, but alfo to enjoy what is already in their Poffeffion. They would find themfelves above thefe Alarms, if they had experienced that its poffible to be happy in a Condition, even inferior to that whofe Idea they are afraid of. To be convinced of this, let them difengage themfelves of this Pomp, (*w*) and pafs by this Pride that blinds them; let them deny themfelves thefe Superfluities that govern them, and keep them in a kind of Slavery; let them make themfelves familiar with their Inferiors, and make a Tryal of the Pleafure there is in enjoying one felf, in relifhing the Charms of Simplicity, and in finding that the moft valuable Bleffings which the Author of Nature

(*w*) Aliqui dies interponendi, in quibus imaginariâ paupertate exercemur ad veram, *Sen. Ep. XX.*

Nature has bestow'd upon Mankind, are actually the most common. This is the Advice of *Epictetus*; *Live sometimes as a sick Man, in order to learn to live as it becomes a Man in perfect Health. Suppress your Desires, in order to bring your self into a Condition to form none but such as are reasonable.*

As a Man, at the Approach of Death, gives into Superstitions and Extravagancies, we have Reason to impute his Easiness of Belief to the Fears with which he is seized. It is not so, when a dying Person comes to think more rationally than ever he did before. We often see Examples of this: When we end our Days, we begin to be assured of what we before have all along doubted. If a Libertine thinks fit to say, that all this is the Effect of Fear, he betrays his Cause; for what is become of all those Principles which made him lead his Life in so much Security? What is become of those Reasonings so just and so sensible, which made him regard the rest of Mankind as the Sport of Error and Superstition? What is become of those Lights, by which he pleased himself with being freed from the Yoke of Fear and Obedience? He was deceived: He had nothing in him determined, proved, or demonstrated: Vanity, a Desire of Independence, a Love of Pleasures, a Spirit of Contradiction, Intrigue, Party, or Imposture, and such like Principles as these, furnish him with certain Maxims, which he believes to be true, only because they are agreeable to him; and by means of repeating them, he comes at last to regard them as demonstrated. But as soon as the Charm is ceased, the drunken Fit off, the Pleasures and Interests that supported these Illusions vanished, Light succeeds to Darknes, Ideas to Passions, and so Truth comes to be perceiv'd. Without Contradiction, it cannot be, because we have a troubled Understanding, that we see more clearly, and have our Ideas more exact. A Man that is dying, esteems Wisdom, Modesty, Moderation, Sincerity, Justice, Generosity, and Humanity; and condemns Pride, Debauch, Infidelity, Cruelty, Extravagancy, and Idleness: Will any one say that this is an Excess of Extravagance, which then comes to seize him? He recovers his Health again, and preserves these Sentiments, becomes sober, honest, adores the Creator of the Universe, and thinks himself happy when he meets with any Opportunities of serving Mankind, or of procuring them any solid Advantages. Will any one say that his Follies have not at all left him? For whom then is the Title of Wise intended? For those that have no View besides Self-int

terest? for the Debauchees, for the Revengeful, for the Proud, for Impostors? for those whose Pleasures must be season'd with Mischief, the Scourges of Mankind?

*Desire and Fear
sometimes pro-
duce the same
Effects.*

XIV. THE different Disposition of the Temperament, or Habits, in which Men find themselves, does so much influence the Effect of Fear and Desire, that Desire shall produce upon one the very same Effect which Fear shall do upon another. A courageous Man, made for Pleasure, and accustomed to flatter himself, easily believes whatever he desires: Desire with him stands in the room of Proof, and excuses his seeking for any other: When once what he is made to hope for is agreeable to his Inclinations, he doubts no farther of it, but thinks every Thing which flatters his Expectation to be incontestable: He forbears with the same Partiality; believing whatever displeases him, he denies it, even till Truth appears before his Eyes in spite of him.

ON the contrary, a Man of a Disposition inclined to Fear, or who is become timorous, by having met with a great many Misfortunes, fears every Thing, and can hope for nothing: His Fear with him stands in the stead of Proof; and to terrify him, is sufficient to make him believe whatever we please. The sole Idea of a Mischief, the sole Recital of a Piece of ill News, confounds him, and takes away the Power of informing himself: He is so moved, that he thinks he already sees it: He receives every thing that is said to him as so many Realities, instead of uncertain Conjectures, which he is all the while entertained with,

*Of Joy and
Sorrow.*

XV. I SHALL say one Word more upon Joy and Sorrow, with respect to their Influence over our Knowledge. I have already remark'd, that the Acts of the Mind have a very near Relation to the Condition of the Body. The Union of these two Substances consists in this Relation, or at least, is the Effect of it. Sorrow equally overwhelms the Mind and the Body. In this Condition we are without Vigour, without Activity; we form very few Ideas, and those but very weak and imperfect; we have no Power of exciting our Attention, and much less of continuing it. Whoever loves Knowledge, ought to guard against this fatal Passion, and it is perhaps easier to prevent it, than is generally believed,

I SHALL resumé a Principle, which I have already made use of: We would be happy; and in order to this, it is necessary not only to possess some Good, but also to be sensible of it. It is our Attention that makes us sensible, and gives

gives Advantage to Objects over us. (x) But most Men are ignorant of fixing their Attention, or of exciting it by themselves: It must be the Objects that must engage it. As therefore these excite it no longer, when once they become familiar, it happens that we quickly cease to think of what we have, in order to employ our selves about what we have not. (y) By means of this Habit, a Good which we do not regard, whilst it is in our Possession, becomes the Subject of our Attention when we want it, and the Loss of it afflicts us, how indifferent soever it appeared whilst we possess'd it.

XVI. LET

(x) "Even Pleasure and good Fortune are not to be relish'd without Vigour and Understanding."

---- Hæc perinde sunt, ut illius animus qui ea possidet,
Qui uti scit, ei bona, illi qui non utitur rectè, mala.

Ter. Heaut. Act. I. Sc. II. 23.

"The Goods of Fortune, such as they all are, require a Disposition proper to taste them. It is enjoying, not possessing them, that makes us happy."

Non Domus & Fundus, non Æris acervus & auri,
Ægroto Domini deduxit corpore Febres,
Non animo curas; valeat possessor oportet,
Si comportatis rebus benè cogitat uti,
Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum sic domus aut res,
Ut Lippum pictæ tabulæ, Fomenta Podagram.

Hor. Lib. I. Ep. II. 47.

"He is a Fool: His Taste is vitiated and lost. He enjoys them no more, than a Man that has a Cold does the fine Flavour and Taste of the *Grecian* Wines, or than an Horse does the Riches of the Harness with which he is betrayed. *Plato* says the same Thing, That Health, Beauty, Strength, Riches, and whatever of this Kind is called Good, are equally evil to the Unjust, as they are good to the Just; and Evil on the contrary. And therefore where the Body and Mind are in a bad State, what will signify these external Advantages, since the least prick of a Pin, or Passion of the Mind, is sufficient to spoil the Pleasure of the Monarchy of the World? --- Is it to be imagined, that the Singing Boys in a Choir take any great Pleasure in their own Musick? Satiety soon cloyes them, and makes it tiresome. Feasting, Dancing, Masquerading, and other publick Diversions, please those that enjoy them but seldom, and such as are Strangers to them; but to them who have much of them, they become dull and disagreeable. He that does not give himself time to be Thirsty, can never know the Pleasure of Drinking. The Feats of Activity of the Mountebank are to us a Diversion, but to himself a Drudgery."

(y) Hæc quidem est natura mortalium, ut nihil magis placeat quàm quod amissum est; iniquiores sumus adversus relicta creptorum desideria.

*Means of procur-
ing lasting
Content.*

XVI. LET us accustom our selves there-
fore to be sensible of what we possess; To fix
our Attention upon what we have, and to
divert it from that which we have not, is the
sure Means to banish Sorrow. In every Condition there
will be something left that is proper to administer Satisfaction.
It is a great Art to procure it; and in order to this, we ought
first to know from whence it Springs: *Hoc ante omnia fac,
disce gaudere, nunquam deficiet, cum semel unde paretur in-
veneris.*

ALL the World seeks Joy, but few know from whence
it arises: We seek it where it is not, and where it is only
for a Moment; like the Joy of those that are drunk, it dis-
appears presently, and, that I may so say, falls asleep, and
Sorrow immediately takes its Place. Such is the Effect of
all Kinds of Debauches: This is the End of our Ambition
and a Desire of shining, by what means soever we seek to
shine, tho' it were even by Virtue. (z)

THE Soul contains always the greatest of all Goods in
(a) the Knowledge of Truth, in an Application to Wisdom,
and in the Liberty of making perpetually a Progress in each
of them: And these are Goods which cannot be taken away
from us. As to others, we need only open our Eyes, and do
our selves Justice; we shall find them almost always super-
fluous. If a Man should go out of the Kingdom with an
Understanding as well form'd as can be at the Age of Twen-
ty Years, or more, and with Inclinations to Pleasure also as
strong as they are found in the most voluptuous of Men: If
this Man having seen nothing, heard nothing, tasted no-
thing, should find himself all at once in the Condition
which we call a moderate Fortune, a small convenient
House, a suitable Neighbourhood, some Fields to till and
answer his Cares, two or three Dishes for his Table, and a
Revenue capable of supplying this little Expence; let us be-
sides

(z) Omnes tendunt ad gaudium; sed unde stabile magnumque con-
sequantur, ignorant. Ille ex conviviis & luxuria: ille ex ambitione,
& circumfusâ clientium turbâ: ille ex amicâ: alius ex studiorum libe-
ralium vanâ ostentatione, & nihil sanantibus liberis. Omnes istos oblec-
tamenta fallacia & brevia decipiunt: sicut Ebrietas, quæ unius horæ hi-
larem insaniam, longi temporis tædio pensat. *Sen. Ep. LIX*

(a) Utique animus ab omnibus externis in se revocandus est; sibi
confidat, se gaudeat, sua suspiciat: recedat, quantum potest, ab alienis,
& se sibi applicet, damna non sentiat, etiam adversâ benignè interpre-
tetur. *Sen. de Tranq. Anim. Cap. 14.*

sides this, place him in a healthful Air, and pleasant Situation; voluptuous as we suppose him to be, if he could complain of any thing in this Condition, it must be that he has no more Eyes or Hands than two, or Mouths than one. Could he have an Opportunity of thinking that any Body is better furnished with them than him self? But this Reflection would come in the End. This would be his Fault, if he stopp'd here. Let him continue to fix his Attention upon the Objects which did at first give so much Satisfaction: They are not changed, and his Senses are always the same; there is nothing wanting but himself to receive their Impressions. Why should we thus enhance the Price of what we desire, and undervalue what we possess? Instead therefore of letting our Thoughts rove after what we have not, let us reflect upon the Advantages we are already possess'd of; let us try to reckon them up, that we may see what we have to lose, and we shall be tired before we have made an End of counting

HE who cannot make himself content with the Goods I have already mentioned, will never be so at all. They would be sufficient, if any thing could be so; (b) and if he is insatiable, it is his own Fault. His bad Taste is the only Cause of his Uneasiness; and in order to be happy, he must cure himself, and become reasonable; he must learn to see and perceive. (c) *A Man contains within himself immense Advantages; He who cannot see or taste them, were he Master of the Universe, would be always miserable.* It is thus that Epicurus himself speaks. An Uneasiness for a Superfluity, which we imagine we want, hinders us from relishing the necessary and even superfluous Goods which we already have in abundance. He that knows how to content himself with what he has, is already arrived at the Point, which the Covetous and the Ambitious do but vainly aim at. (d)

XVI. BUT

(b) *Ei satis fuisset, si quid satis esse potuisset. Sen. Ep. XV.*

(c) *Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi Dominus sit, tamen miser est. Sen. Ep. XV.*

(d) *Petite hinc Juvenesque Senesque,
Finem animo certum, miserisque viatica Canis:*

“ The Heart of Man is made to Love and to Desire; and because it does not know how to employ it self in what it ought, it consumes it self in Superfluities. *Charron of Wisdom.*

In what Sense it is that Nature is content with very little.

XVI. BUT some will say, it is very easy to advise Men to content themselves with what they can easily procure; but, perhaps, when we come to think of it, we shall find it impossible to put this Advice in Practice. The Heart of Man was not made for a moderate Happiness: A secret Inclination leads him on to advance himself, and to procure Pleasures more exquisite than those he has already experienced. And so this Maxim, so much celebrated, that *Nature is content with very little*, is found to be absolutely false. Nothing moderate can satisfy her. Whilst she eagerly pursues the infinite Advantages for which she is intended, what she meets with on the Road may amuse her for some Time; but she soon considers that this is not the Point she aspires to, and so her Desires engage her as before to new Pursuits. All that is true in this Objection, perfectly confirms the Principles I intend to establish. The Heart of Man will never find it self in the sole Possession of sensual Pleasures sufficient to fix and satisfy it entirely: But when it has once tasted the most solid Pleasures that arise from the Knowledge of Truth, and the love of Virtue; and by the Care it takes in improving in Wisdom, finds it self in the way to infinite Happiness; then it can easily dispense with Externals, and become so much Master of its Senses, as to make them be contented with very little. Then we presently find it useless to have a great Number of Apartments, when we can take up but one; and that it is as vain to fill our Table with a great Number of Dishes, when the Capacity of our Stomach can receive but a very little part of one of them. (e) It is only when we deceive our selves in seeking for perfect Felicity where it cannot be found, I mean in the Objects of the Senses, that we give our selves up a Prey to Desires which we can never satisfy. (f) Very few Things will content

(e) Quid profunt multa cubicula? in uno jacetis. Non est vestrum, ubicunque jacetis. Ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda & insatiabilis Gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras: Alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur; nullis animalibus, nisi ex fastidio, pax est. Quantum enim ex istis epulis, quæ per tot comparatis manus, fessæ voluptatibus ore libatis? Quantum ex istâ fera, periculose captâ, dominus crudus ac nauseans gustat? Quantum ex tot Conchylis, tam longè advectis, per istum Stomachum in explebilem labitur? Infelices etiam quod non intelligitis, vos majorem famem habere, quam ventrem. Sen. Ep. LXXXIX.

(f) Naturalia desideria finita sunt: ex falsâ opinione nascentia, ubi desinant, non habent; nullus enim terminus falso est. Sen. Ep. XVI.

Content the Senses of a Man who is attentive upon much greater Pleasures. The Satisfaction of finding our own Strength deserves to be esteemed something; and it is no small Pleasure to be able to find Content in that, which to another would only be the Subject of complaint.

WHEN a Man is never content with what he has; when he is perpetually desiring, and pursuing with Uneasiness, what he will be sure to regard with Indifference a little time after he has obtained; when he thus spends his Life in great Disquiets and moderate Pleasures, it is a Demonstration that he neither possesses nor understands the true Goods. When we have a Heart content, every Thing pleases; when we are prepossess'd with Discontent, nothing gives Pleasure; the Objects that present themselves seem to take a Tincture from the Humour we are in. One Man, if he gets an important Cause, will make good Cheer of a moderate Meal: But another, if he fails in a Claim which he has at Heart, can find no Relish in the most delicious Entertainment, perhaps, even his Concern will embitter it. It is therefore true, that when we have a Fund of Joy, every Thing amuses agreeably; and it is from hence that external Objects borrow their greatest Value: But whence must we procure this solid and unchangeable Fund of Joy? From the greatest of all Goods, and the only ones that are in our own Power, I mean Wisdom and Virtue. It is a very clear Demonstration that these are what deserve our principal Care, because, without them, the greatest of all others are nothing, and with them the least are considerable. He that shall love them for their own sake, will soon experience this to be true; and to learn to love them thus, we need only attend to their Worth, and compare their Value with that of the others. Which is most preferable to fill the Mind with perfect Ideas, or the Stomach with Dainties? the Heart with good Principles, or the Stable with fine Horses? to build Learning upon Learning, and Knowledge upon Knowledge, or a Palace of one Story upon another? Ought we to take most Pleasure in placing our Pictures, or in ranging our Ideas? in commanding a great number of Domesticks, or being Master of our Passions? When we have an Heart possess'd with these true and essential Advantages, if the Accessory be added to them, we relish it agreeably; if not, we do not find any want of it.

XVII. THE same Precautions that serve to remove Sorrow, will procure Joy. This condition is almost of absolute Necessity to

*The Usefulness
of Joy.*

discover

discover Truth, and advance in Knowledge. Joy opens the Mind, as much as Sorrow does the Mouth; it gives Vivacity and Fruitfulness, and excites and keeps up the Attention. When we have an Heart content, we find Pleasure in every Thing; and what we do with Pleasure, we apply our selves to with Perseverance; so that we see by this, that what is useful to the Body, is no less so to the Mind.

I NEED not observe here, that this Joy which I recommend is widely different from those Pleasures which prejudice the Health, and weigh down the Mind, are inconsistent with our Ease, and make the Heart successively the Seat and Sport of Trouble, Impatience, Uneasiness, and lastly of a Contentedness which presently gives place to new Desires, and, in the end, to Impatience, &c. So that in all these different Conditions thro' which we pass, we find our selves equally unsettled.

The Usefulness of Sorrow, XVIII. I KNOW but one Case where Sorrow may be useful; and that is, when we have deviated from our Duty, by some ill Biass either of our Temperament or Habits, and that the same Circumstances, as well internal as external, may be very likely to unite to cast us a second time into the Forgetfulness and Error. It is good, in such a Case, to view attentively the Deformity of the Fault, to be overwhelmed with Confusion for it, and to persevere in these mortifying Reflections, that we may conceive for the Subject which causes them, a Displeasure, a Disgust, and Aversion, which may deprive it of what it has tempting and seducing. But after having corrected and conquered this evil Tendency, it is just to enjoy the Pleasure of the Victory; for this will be one of the most effectual means to encourage us to new Attempts, and to maintain the Ground we have already conquer'd.

THERE must be Care taken to avoid two Extremities: Some are content with seeing their Faults, and think it sufficient to cast an Eye upon them, but, after the first View, ask nothing farther, nor speak any more of them. You would imagine, that in ceasing to Think of them, they had renounced the Occasion of them, and entirely destroy'd all the Principles of Evil: And yet it is quite the contrary; the Circumstances that misled and seduced the Heart at first, cannot return a second Time without bringing back to the Mind the Sorrows they have occasioned, if they have been once truly felt, or thought of a sufficient Time; whereas the Care that is taken to avoid them, and the Readiness to forget them, throws down all these Fences against present and deceitful

ceitful Pleasures; and a second or third Temptation has even more Force than the first, because assisted by Habit.

XIX. BUT to spend, under this Pretence, the greatest part of our Days in Sorrow and Remorse, is running out of one Extreme into another. What we truly love, cannot fail of pleasing and giving us Joy; and a Man who must take Pains and Trouble to do his Duty, has not understood the Beauty of it. Every Thing turns into an Habit, and so does Sorrow; and we find a sort of Pleasure in following it, because it is an Habit: If we abstain from Joy, Vanity makes us amend by the Pleasure we take in condemning those that give way to it, and in believing our selves to be far above their Weaknesses: And in this manner we cure one Vice by the Assistance of another; or rather do not Cure any, since *he that offendeth in one Point of the Law, is guilty of all.* Zealots of an austere and discouraging Humour, do certainly violate one of the greatest Duties, that of edifying and engaging others to do what they ought by the Force of a good Example: They make Virtue suspected; and no body can persuade himself that an All-wise and infinitely Good Master should take a Pleasure in making his Creatures miserable, and in giving them Pleasures only to prohibit their enjoying of them, and in denying them Happiness till they have purchased it with the most shocking Struggles, and the most terrible Dangers.

Bad Effects of Sorrow.

Jam. ix. 10.

THE Heart of Man is by Turns govern'd by two Principles, Reason and Passion: Reason enlightens it, Passion blinds it: Virtue is the effect of Light, and Vice of Darkness. Every thing which serves to enlarge our Knowledge, is capable of making us more readily acquainted with Virtue, and to relish it more perfectly: Every thing, on the contrary, that contracts and darkens the Understanding promotes Error, and is apt to hinder us from distinguishing the Good from the Bad: But, without Contradiction, Sorrow contracts the Understanding: A Man overwhelmed with Grief is credulous, and gives into every Thing that may give him hopes of getting rid of it. In this Condition we are not inclinable to examine; and if we are, we have not Power to do it. Observe but the Credulity of sick Men to their Physicians; not only the Patient himself, under the Oppression of his Distemper; but also those about him, if they are truly interested in, and sensibly affected with the Distemper of their Friend, believe without Proof or Foundation what the first Comer says, and over-load the Patient by their Eagerness to cure

cure him. When he is dead they make a Duty of lamenting him; and the Thought of being comforted appears a Temptation to Ingratitude: The Rites of Burial would not have been mix'd with so much Superstition; the mournful Solemnities of Funerals would never have been thought grateful to the Dead, nor the Pains we take in honouring their Name and Memory. These Imaginations would have found no more Credit in the Mind than Dreams, if Sorrow had not made it credulous: But we are never so incapable of distinguishing the Certain from the Uncertain, as when we are in Distress, and have our Faculties depress'd.

How to conquer it.

XX. I KNOW nothing more difficult than to get above Sorrow, when we are every Moment Witnesses to so much Injustice and Infamy; when we hear nothing talk'd of but Baseness, Treachery, Hardships, and Cruelties; when we see that Vice is made the Road to Honour, and that good Men are every Hour expos'd to the Insults of the Wicked. To be able to lead our Lives with any Ease in the midst of so many Abominations, is assuredly a Conquest of Philosophy. The Maxims which I think most proper for this purpose are these :

FIRST, What Advantage can we have from our Sorrow? Will our grieving make the Wicked, who take a Pleasure in our Mortification, change their Courses for fear of giving us Pain? This is the very Thing they want, and our Enemies are never so well pleas'd with themselves, as when they perceive that they disturb our Peace. (g) Can a Traveller dry up the Roads by storming against the Dirt? After he has
thrown

(g) " Hatred is a strange Passion, which disturbs us extremely; and without Reason; and what is there in the World that can Torment us more? By this Passion we put our selves in the Power of those we hate, to vex and afflict us. The Sight of them troubles our Senses, and the Remembrance of them disturbs our Minds, both sleeping and waking. We represent them to us with Chagrin and Disquiet, which put us beside our selves, and strike to our very Heart; and by this means receive our selves the Pain and Mischiefe which we desire to others. He that hates is the Patient, and he that is hated the Agent, in Contradiction to the Terms themselves. The Hater is in Torment, and the Hated at Ease: But what do we hate? Men or Things? Certainly we hate nothing we ought: For if there be any thing in the World to be hated, it is Hatred it self, such like Passions as are contrary to what ought to govern us. There is not in the World a greater Mischiefe than this." *Charron of Wisdom. Book I. Ch. 21.*

thrown off his great Coat and Boots, he will find no Remains of it; nothing can suffer from it but his Clothes. The Attempts of the Wicked can reach only those Things that surround us; they cannot affect what is properly our own; and what we ought most to esteem. This is my second Reflection. They can neither rob us of our Ideas; nor of our Integrity. (b) Throw them some of your loose Corns, and they will leave you in quiet Possession of your Losses. If you pursue Knowledge and Wisdom, if you make these your principal Aim, you will have very little Concern with impertinent People. Would not you think your self happy, if in crossing a Forest you should meet with Rogues that would let you pass quietly, upon condition that you would not desire to share their Plunder with them? or that should find only Papers about you, your true Riches, and should not think it worth while to trouble themselves with them?

WHY should you complain of your Lot, since if you take it altogether, it is infinitely preferable to that of those whose Elevation and Power begin to move and mortify you? Would you change Conditions with them? Would you like to be altogether as they are, and to exchange your Internals for their Externals? Would not you like better to pay your Ransom to a Pyrate, than to enrich your self with taking Ransom from others? If we judge of Men by true Ideas, they are all equal, except only such as the Knowledge of Truth, and Wisdom which is the Consequence of it, advance above others. All the rest is but like the Externals of Comedians: One plays the Master, and another the Man; but they will not be always upon the Stage. You are concern'd because the King of the Play acts his Part ill, and, being dazzled with his glittering Ornaments, forgets what he is to say, and how he ought to express himself. Instead of being concern'd, you ought rather to laugh at his Folly: He looks upon himself as an extraordinary Person, whilst he is only a Servant, that will soon be punish'd as he deserves, for having acted his Part so indifferently. (i) Let us take Things as

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(b) *Proprium magnitudinis veræ non se sentire percussum. Sen.*

(i) *Nemo ex istis, quos purpuratos vides, felix est, non magis quam ex illis quibus sceptrum & chlamydem in scenâ fabulæ assignant; cum præsentē populo elati inceserunt, & cothurnati, simul exierunt, exalceantur, & ad staturam suam redeunt. Nemo istorum, quos divitiæ honoresque in altiore fastigio ponunt, magnus est. Quare ergo magnus videtur? Cum basi illum suâ metiris. Non est magnus Pumilio.*
licet

they come, and in their several diverting Appearances. If an Actor keeps up to his Part, I laugh at the Original, which he represents; if he plays his Part poorly, I laugh at his Acting. The World is a Comedy: When I see a good Actor, I commend him; when I meet a bad one, I despise him; and whatever Part he acts, I find my self superior to him. Men who consult Reason, are the proper Judges of those that act contrary to it.

IN the great Theatre of the World, have but a little Patience, wait but till the End, which will certainly not be long, continue to be Wise, and a Death-Bed, which will be to you a Bed of Triumph, will be to the Wicked a Scaffold, so much the more dreadful, as it is Eternal Justice that pronounces their Sentences. Correct therefore the Vicious, whenever a proper Opportunity offers; and if they be incorrigible, despise their Brutishness, and laugh at their Folly: Their Ridiculousness will furnish you with continual Matter of Diversion, and the Mischief they do falls heavier upon themselves than any other Person whatsoever (k).

THE

licet in monte constiterit: Colossus magnitudinem suam servabit, etiam si steterit in puteo. Hoc laboramus errore. Sic nobis imponitur: quod neminem aestimamus eò quod est, sed adjicimus illi & ea, quibus adornatus est. Atqui cum voles veram hominis aestimationem inire, & scire qualis sit, nudum inspicere; ponat patrimonium, ponat honores, & alia fortunæ mendacia. Corpus ipsum exuat: animum intueri, qualis quantusque sit, alieno an suo magnus. *Sen. Ep. LXXVI.*

Ille qui in scenâ elatus incedit, & hæc resupinus dicit,

*En impero Argis; regna mihi liquit Pelops,
Quæ Ponto ab Helles atque ab Ionio mari,
Urgetur Isthmos.*

fervus est, quinque modios accipit, & quinque denarios. Ille qui superbus, atque impotens, & fiduciâ virium tumidus ait,

Quod nisi quieris Menelæi, hæc dextrâ occides.

Diurnum accipit, in cænaculo dormit. Idem de istis licet omnibus dicas, quos supra capita hominum, supraque turbam delicatos lectica suspendit: omnium istorum personata felicitas est. Contemnes illos, si dispoliaveris. *Ep. LXXX.*

(k) Heraclitus quoties prodierat, & tantum circa se malè viventium, imò malè pereuntium viderat, flebat, miserebatur omnium qui sibi lati felicesque occurrebant, miti animo, sed nimis imbecillo: & ipse inter deplorandos erat. Democritum contra, aiunt, nunquam sine risu

THE celebrated *Scarron* is to me a great Hero; and I place him far above *Democritus*, because he laugh'd in Pain, and almost in continual Pain. A Man must have an Heart uncommonly soft, to be able to read the following just Encomium on him, without being transported with such uncommon Courage.

*Ille ego sum Vates, rabido data præda Dolori,
 Qui supero sanos Lusibus atque Jocis.
 Zenonis soboles, vultu Mala ferre sereno,
 Et potuit Cynici libera Turba Sophi.
 Qui medios inter potuit luisse Dolores,
 Me præter toto nullus in orbe fuit.*

THERE is so much Grandeur in the Sentiments which these Verses express, that whoever attends to them, can hardly forbear wishing that he might deserve such an Elogium himself. He was able to brave continual Pain with continual Mirth, *Médios inter potuit luisse dolores*. But what are the other Calamities of Life in comparison to Pain? A Man must make himself unfortunate on purpose, and take

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Pains

rifu in publico fuisse; adeo nihil illi videbatur serium eorum, quæ serio gerebantur. *Sen. de Ira, Lib. II. Cap. 10.*

Quanto risu persequenda sunt quæ nobis lacrymas educunt. *Sen. de Ira. Lib. III.*

Occupat enim nonnunquam odium Generis humani, & occurrit tot scelerum felicium turba, cum cogitaveris, quam sit rara simplicitas, quam ignota Innocentia, & vix unquam, nisi cum expedit, fides, & libidinis lucra damnaque pariter invisæ, & ambitio usque eo jam se suis non continens terminis, ut per turpitudinem splendeat. Agitur animus in noctem, & velut everfis virtutibus, quas nec sperare licet, nec habere prodest, tenebræ oboriuntur. In hoc itaque flecendi sumus, ut omnia vulgi vitia non invisæ nobis, sed ridicula videantur; & *Democritum* potius imitemur, quam *Heraclitum*. Hic enim quoties in publicum processerat, flebat; ille ridebat: huic omnia quæ agimus, miseræ; illi ineptiæ videbantur. Elevanda ergo omnia, & facili animo ferenda; humanius est deridere vitam, quam deplorare. Adjice, quod de humano quoque genere melius meretur, qui ridet illud, quam qui luget. Ille spei bonæ aliquid relinquit: hic tamen stultè desinet, quæ corrigi posse desperat: & universa contemplatus, majoris animi est, qui risum non tenet, quam qui lacrymas; quando levissimum affectum animi movet, & nihil magnum, nihil severum, nec serium quidem, ex tanto apparatu putat. *Sen. de Tranquil. Anim. cap. 15.*

Pains to make himself miserable, if he will be so sensibly affected with what passes without him, as with what passes within him, and what is indeed himself: And he must have a very uncommon Strength of Mind, and Greatness of Genius, who can conquer the Sense of Pain by agreeable Reflections, and stifle what he suffers by the Attention he gives to his Thoughts. But why should any Man disturb himself with external Accidents, and afflict himself by dwelling upon melancholy Events, which ought only to affect People of a narrow Genius? We are encompass'd with an infinite Number of Objects, which solicit us to this Concern; we need only open our Eyes, and both Heaven and Earth will present them on all Sides of us. When a Mischief is without Remedy, and when our Mind is neither steady enough to bear the Idea of it, nor volatile enough to speak of it without Attention, there is yet one sure Way left, and that is, not to think of it at all.

BUT what hinders our pursuing this Method, is, that we have a Notion and Desire of living happy in the Imagination of others. It is from them we borrow the Idea that we form of our selves; and we imagine our Felicity really to diminish, in proportion as it lessens in their Esteem. We shun our selves, and want to govern others: We desire to have a Part in the Affairs of the World; and when they do not go according to our Minds, we look upon it as a Misfortune to be oblig'd to retire into our selves. This is our Fault; if we have but the greatest Hand in them, we are always best pleas'd: Every Thing seems to go well, when it goes to our Satisfaction, and is under our Management; and every Thing goes ill, when it is under the Government and Direction of others. But this very Thing should rather be a Subject of Laughter to us, to see the Folly of others, who think themselves above regarding us, and do every Thing in Contradiction to us, because they believe themselves superior to us.

THERE are a great many good Men, whose tender Hearts are very sensibly affected with the Misfortunes of others: Their Life is spent in Sorrow, because they lay it down as a Rule to themselves, to share in all Afflictions and Misfortunes. It is a Weakness of Mind which arises from a very good Foundation; and I make a great deal of Difference betwixt a Man who sees unmov'd the Abominations of Mankind, because they are all indifferent to him, and Vice and Virtue are no more with him, than fair Weather and foul; and one that spends his Life in Tears, because

he sees others spend theirs to make themselves eternally miserable.

BUT when shall we have an Opportunity of *being joyful*, and enjoying the Blessings of this Life with Thankfulness, if we must wait till there be no Misfortune in the World, and if we must never allow our selves to laugh, so long as some shall think fit to laugh, and others to cry, unseasonably. I look upon God as a good Father: Reason and Revelation agree to give us this Idea of him. But if in a numerous Family one Child should become vicious, another should be undone by or without its own Fault, a third should fall sick, a fourth die, in what Condition would a Father, whom we suppose full of Wisdom and Goodness, like best to see the rest of his Family? In Tears, in Affliction, overwhelm'd with Sorrow and Uneasiness, insensible of all Pleasure, averse to Joy, in a languishing and unhealthful Condition? or rather unshaken in the midst of all Misfortunes, attentive to repair them, engag'd in their Business, taking care to preserve themselves, looking upon that Part of Happiness which they have left, and seeking their greatest Consolation in their Steadiness and Application to their Duty and to Virtue?

GOD has created *Man upright*; but he has also created him free: And this Liberty was absolutely necessary, that he might chuse what is Good, and might say, with the Apostle, *Glory, Honour, and Peace*, Rom. xi. 10. *to every Man that worketh Good*. For if there was only the same Mechanism in the Soul, as there is in the Body, the Virtuous would deserve no more Commendation for being virtuous, than Water for moistening, or Fire for burning.

MEN happen sometimes to abuse this Liberty, and by this means dishonour their Nature, and draw down terrible Mischiefs upon themselves, and occasion a great many to others. God himself, to whom all Disorder and Abuse of his Favours is much more odious than to me, is Witness to them, and permits them for Reasons worthy of his Wisdom; and why then shall I think ill of, and make my self uneasy at them? Would we have God deprive a Man of his Liberty, as soon as ever he finds him ready to make an ill Use of it? This would be the same Thing as if he had not any Liberty at all; and a good Man would never have the Satisfaction of his acting with Choice; an Heart devoted to Wisdom would act just in the same manner as one abandon'd to Folly. Art does its Author so much the more

Honour, as the Mechanism of its Works are the less capable of being put out of Order; but where there is Liberty, the Deformity of the Licentious sets off the Beauty of the Obedient. It is from such Reflections as these, and from an entire Resignation to Providence, that we derive this *Greatness of Soul*, which keeps us easy and unmov'd in Adversity, and is quite different from the *easy Stupidity* of some Men, who do not think at all, and from the *easy Indifference* of those who think irregularly. Those who occasion in Society Disorder and Confusion, are not at all the less criminal, because it is in our Power to avoid being affected with this Disorder and Confusion; for there is a great deal of Difference betwixt not bearing them at all, and bearing them without being put out of order by them. We may see an hundred odious Objects, without being shock'd at them, and preserve our Tranquillity in spite of so many disagreeable Impressions; but yet we are sensible of these Impressions; and that we suffer no more from them, costs us a great deal of Time, Reflection, and Trouble, which might be employ'd more usefully, as well as more agreeably, both for our selves and others.


BESIDES, there is an infinite Number of good Men, very much to be valued for the Uprightness of their Heart, who having been disappointed either of a Genius, or Education sufficient to procure such a Steadiness of Mind as I have been speaking of, do yet pass their Lives in Trouble and Uneasiness, and all their ill Consequences. There are some, who, by the Injuries of wicked Men, find themselves depriv'd even of Necessaries; and what Philosophy can support them against extreme Necessity? There are some whose moderate Virtue is soon discouraged and extinguish'd, and who being weary with resisting, suffer themselves to be carried down the Stream of those, against whom it is so difficult to maintain themselves. The Happiness of those that despise wicked Men, and who have learn'd the Secret of being above their Reach, does not at all extenuate their Crime, any more than the giving Poison is any thing to be excused, because the Force of Remedies may possibly prevent the fatal Effects of it.





C H A P. XI.

Of the different Objects of our Affections.

I.  ESIRE makes us uneasy: Fear is the most galling Yoke that can be: Joy is often of a very short Duration: Sorrow makes us miserable: But Love pleases us; and for this Reason we take a great deal of Pains to preserve it; so that by its Pleasure and Constancy it is a most powerful Passion, and, when wrong apply'd, one of the most dangerous. It is therefore of Importance to study all its Varieties, in order to prevent all its Illusions; and enjoy all its Advantages.

Love is the most powerful of all the Passions.

II. THE Love of our selves is the Foundation of all the rest of our Affections: We love other Things, because they procure us some Satisfaction, and appear advantageous to us. But we should not love that which pleases, and is advantageous to us, any more than that which is uselefs and disagreeable to us, if we do not love our selves.

Self-Love the Foundation of all the rest.

THE Enthusiasts, who condemn all Self-love, and imagine themselves to have renounced it, do not perceive that they contradict themselves, which is their usual Fault; and it cannot be otherwise, since one of their Maxims is to avoid reflecting upon themselves. When they condemn every other Motive but simple Obedience, it is without doubt because they consider this Motive as the most pure, and such as renders Virtue the most perfect. But why should they prefer the most perfect Condition to that which is less so, if they were indifferent to themselves? If they did not love themselves, it would be indifferent what Condition they were in.

To do that which God commands by Obedience, is to submit to his Grandeur: To propose to be happy by him, is to give Glory to his Bounty: To seek in him perfect Felicity, is to acknowledge him supremely amiable. It is necessary

cessary to join these Motives; for *to approach God Almighty*, and endeavour to please him only by pure Obedience, is what we should do out of the Acknowledgment of his Power, even tho' we should not believe him amiable. It is necessary therefore to desire him: This is one part of our Homage; for we must acknowledge and serve him as God, and consequently as very desirable. But to desire a delightful Object, supposes our desiring to be happy, and consequently supposes our loving our selves.

THIS renouncing of our selves, such as these extravagant People suppose and recommend, would put it out of God Almighty's Power to recompence such of his intelligent Creatures as serve him with the greatest Resignation and Devotion: For whenever he should please to bestow any Favours upon us, we should receive them, indeed, out of respect to the Hand from whence they come, but we should neither value these Blessings, nor take any Pleasure in the Enjoyment of them; only fearing to offend our Master by refusing them, we accept of them by pure Obedience. And how shall this new Obedience and Homage be recompenced? Must it be by new Favours? We shall regard these also with Indifference, and they will only furnish us with new Opportunities of honouring our great Master. Besides, how shall we acknowledge our selves obliged to him for this Life and Existence, if we do not love this Life and this Existence? And if we love this Existence, is not that loving our selves? The true Acknowledgment consists not in making Compliments, but in being truly sensible of the Value of the Favours conferr'd upon us.

THIS Love of our selves is not only very innocent, and very lawful, but also essential to us. A Being which knows, perceives, and wills, and yet does not love it self, is an inconceivable Chimera. Those that kill themselves, do it to avoid living unhappy. Those that are severe to themselves, and become their own Tormentors, do it only to prevent their undergoing greater Miseries, or because they are discontented with themselves, and consequently have an Interest in all they do. (a)

I T

(a) Neque enim, si nonnulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos, aut alia exitia querant, aut, ut ille apud Terentium, qui decrevit tantisper se minus injuria suo gnato facere (ut ait ipse) dum fiat miser, inimicus ipse sibi putandus est; sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur: & cum in mala scientes ruunt, tamen optime sibi consulere arbitrantur: itaque dicunt nec dubitant.

Mihj

IT would be a very odd Notion, if we should imagine that a good Man should cease to be so from the Moment he begins to set a Value upon himself. If we are obliged to know our selves, we are obliged to study our selves. And can we study our selves as we ought, when we do not discover in our selves what really is there, and imagine to be there what really is not there? A wise Man, therefore, an attentive Man, who seeks the Truth, and fears Mistakes, sees that he has some good Qualities, and sees them as they really are, and consequently esteems them: But if he is not insensible of the Good, neither does the Evil escape his Notice. The Knowledge of our Faults teaches us what we ought to apply our selves to, and that of our good Qualities supports us in this Application. When we see nothing but the Good, we let our selves go quietly on; when we see nothing but the Evil, we lose our Courage: The Knowledge therefore both of the one, and of the other, may be of great Service to us. But we have no Interest that engages us to compare our Merit with that of others, in order to know if we ought to *prefer* our selves to them, or them to us. It is even a Comparison which is almost impossible to be made with Justice; for without mentioning the Pleasure we find in preferring our selves to others, which is extremely apt to seduce us, if it be difficult to know our selves, it is yet perhaps much more difficult to know others exactly. We can see nothing of their Insides, but must judge of them only by Externals; which are for the most part deceitful, and capable of being justified or excused by an infinite Number of Circumstances.

T H E R E

Mihi sic usus est: tibi ut opus est facto, face: velut qui ipsi tibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent: nec verò sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quòd sese malè rebus suis consuluisse dicerent: eorum enim est hæc querela, qui sibi cari sunt, seseque diligunt: quare quotiescunque dicitur malè de se quis mereri, sibi que esse inimicus, atque hostis, vitam denique fugere: intelligatur aliquam subesse ejusmodi causam, ut ex eo ipso possit intelligi, sibi quemquam esse carum. Nec verò id satis est, neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit: sed illud quoque intelligendum est, neminem esse, qui, quomodo se habeat, nihil suà censeat interesse: tollitur enim appetitus animi, ut iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores simus, item in nobismet ipsis, quemadmodum affecti simus, nihil nostrà arbitramur interesse.

THERE are some that advise our fixing a strong Attention upon what we find in our selves that is faulty, and to pass hastily over what is deserving, under the Notion that this Precaution may serve to moderate the Inclination we find to value our selves too much, and to prefer our selves to others. This Advice may have its Uses: But if we find that it is too difficult to proportion our Attention in this manner, and to measure with this Exactness the Degrees which we may give to the Good with those which we ought to reserve for the Bad, we may attain to the same End, and even avoid with greater Ease the dangerous Consequences of our Esteem for our selves, provided, that amongst the Qualities which we esteem, we esteem most those that are actually the most deserving our Esteem, and without which we should not have the least Reason in the World to think well of our selves: These Qualities are Attention, Circumspection, Moderation, and Diffidence in our selves. He who knows these, and is convinced that they are the Source of every Thing that is true in our Thoughts, and regular in our Actions, will take care never to be without them: He will continue to keep himself attentive, circumspect, moderate, and diffident of his first Thoughts, and of his first Inclinations: He will not give way to them, nor pursue them, till he has first strictly examined them; and the more Satisfaction he receives from the happy Consequences of this Attention and this Distrust, the more will he be confirm'd in the Resolution of never determining any Thing hastily, and of never presuming upon his Capacity, or Probity, or Understanding.

VIRTUE can never be an Enemy to Truth; and no body shall ever persuade me that there is any Merit in deceiving our selves. We ought not indeed to affect any Thing; and it is equally extravagant to imagine, that *Virtue totters when once we begin to esteem it, and that it cloaths it self with the Appearance of Faults to avoid Presumption.* We must not become a bad Example, by the Appearance of Faults, to prevent an excessive Love of our selves; which is so strange a Precaution, that even this would make us prouder of our selves than any Thing.

IF we despise our selves too much, we are injurious to our Maker, in not sufficiently esteeming his Present. *Non est vilis sibi, quia scit se suum non esse.* The Wise Man knows he is not his own Property; and therefore takes care not to despise what belongs to God, and is his Work, THE

Sen. de
Tranq. An.
cap. II.

THE Mistakes which are owing to Self-love, do not arise barely from our loving our selves, and seeking to procure to our selves Pleasures and Advantages, but from our ill Choice of the Objects from which we expect to procure them.

III. IN Self-love, and in general in all sorts of Love, we ought to distinguish two Acts, which tho' they constantly go together, are yet entirely distinct. These two Acts in Self-love are, *to esteem our selves*, and *to wish our selves well*. Both the one and the other may be well or ill regulated: There are a great many People that love themselves they know not why. They would not change their Condition with any body else; they would do this, and they would suffer that: With them, to say themselves, is to say every Thing: They love and esteem themselves, you must expect no other Reason from them. It is thus that Fools esteem themselves.

The Manner of esteeming our selves.

WE see others whose blind Extravagance goes so far as to publish their Vices, and make a boast of their Faults. (c) The Esteem which they have conceived for themselves, without knowing why, is so excessive, that it extends it self to every Thing that belongs to them. Perhaps they may please themselves with thinking that what disgraces others, is drowned in them by the rest of their excellent Qualities, and no Detriment in the least to their Merit. They congratulate themselves upon the imaginary Privilege of being the only Persons that are in the Right, and not to be contradicted.

ONE Part of Mankind therefore esteem themselves without knowing why: They esteem themselves, because it is agreeable to them so to do. And of those who seek to have the Pleasure of esteeming themselves with some Reason, or at least with some Appearance of Reason, the greatest Part use their Eyes so ill, that every Thing appears valuable which they see in themselves. If there be but few that go so far as to admire their Vices, almost every body excuses and palliates them; and if they cannot change them into Virtues, they yet honour with that Name the most indifferent Inclinations, and all the Consequences of their Humour and Temperament. The Virtues which they want, are not in their Eyes very necessary; those which they have, or believe themselves to have, are the essential Virtues,

ONE

(c) *Vitia nostra quia amamus, defendimus, & malum excusare illa quam excutere. Sen.*

ONE admires his Strength; and to keep up his Pride, has no occasion for any other Quality. Another is charm'd with his Beauty and good Address, and contents himself with these. Those who have not so much Reason to be pleas'd with their Bodies, find some Excellency in their Minds: A Fineness and Subtilty of Thought, an extensive Memory, and a Readiness of Expression in the Mind of those that possess them, pass for the most excellent Qualifications.

A GREAT many have little or no Value for Memory, Subtilty, Eloquence, Vigour and Gracefulness: These are what they are too cunning to examine themselves upon, being very sensible that such Examinations are useless: The Externals which surround them, their Riches, Titles, and Dignities, are the Mirrors which they look at themselves in. A Man of Wealth, who wants the Advantage of Birth, looks upon Nobility as a Chimera, and thinks the true Distinction amongst Men to be founded upon Riches. A Gentleman without Fortune, on the contrary, knows nothing more glorious than the Privileges of Birth, nothing pleases and delights him so much as the running over in his Mind his Ancestors, whose Name he inherits.

IF you were to hear the Reasonings of all these several People, they all terminate in this; I will esteem my self, therefore I deserve to be esteemed; I will think my self superior to all others, therefore what I find in my self is more valuable than what I see in them.

LASTLY, There are some who know true Merit, and who give Attention to the Qualities of their Minds, to regulate their Esteem of them; and these do not all proceed alike. Some of them give to their good Qualities no more than their just Value, esteem them no farther than they deserve, and confine themselves within the Bounds of Truth and Modesty. When they examine themselves, they set the Ill which they discover in themselves against the Good, turning their Eyes upon the one as well as upon the other. Others on the contrary, not liking to see their Faults, content themselves with perceiving what they have that is valuable, and not only so, but they even magnify and heighten this, by the flattering Comparisons they make of themselves with others.

A CERTAIN Sign of our not having truly regulated our Esteem of our selves, is, the Humour of being perpetually speaking of our selves: It is a Demonstration of our being full of it, when we see nothing in our selves but what pleases, and when we think it a Favour to believe others have any thing like the good Taste which we have our selves.

THIS

THIS is a Fault which reigns amongst the Great; but it is a Fault for which their Inferiors are very responsible. For as each of them aims principally to please those upon whom his Fortune depends, he entertains his Superiors with nothing but themselves, and with such Events as they have had a Share in. If they would forget themselves, it is not possible they should, because it is the constant Endeavour of others to remind them continually of what they have said and done. These never listen to them with so much Earnestness, as when they make themselves the Subject of their Discourse: But it is good for them to consider, that those that give the greatest Attention to them, are the first to expose and ridicule them.

To take this Matter right, we are not at all more unreasonable in speaking of our selves, than in speaking of others, provided we do it but seasonably, and conformably to Truth. But a wise Man chuses rather to abstain from speaking of himself when he has a just Occasion, than to run the Risque of speaking more than he ought; and as a just Aversion for such presumptuous Wits, who determine boldly upon every Thing, as well upon those Things which they do not understand, as upon those which they do, oftentimes occasions reasonable Persons to propose Truths, which they are very well assured of, with as much Modesty, as tho' they were doubtful. So likewise a Man who is an Enemy to Vanity, expresses himself upon what he has already acquired and obtain'd, as tho' he was only about to acquire it. For fear of esteeming our selves beyond our just Value, and falling into the Nets of Flattery, where the Tongue always goes before the Thought, we should never forget this fine Maxim of *Seneca's*, *Neminem tanti ab alio, quanti à seipso aestimari*: "We should be sure that others have as good an Opinion of us, as we have of our selves."

To regulate truly the Esteem which we ought to have of our selves, we should give as much Attention to our Faults, as to our good Qualities: I dare even say that we ought to give a greater, because our good Qualities engage our Attention to them, and fix it by the Pleasure which we find in seeing them; whereas if we do not take some Pains to support it, it is immediately diverted from the Sight of our Imperfections. To take notice only of our Advantages, in order to judge by this means of our Worth, is just the same Fault, as if in computing the Wealth of a Man, we should
only

only reckon up what is in his Possession, without taking any Account of what he owes. (d)

A MAN of Merit has a clear Understanding, and knows as well what he wants, as what he has: But a Man of Vanity flatters himself, attributes to himself what he has not, and sees not what he wants: He is more satisfied with an imagined Merit, than he would be with a real one, if it were to fall short of his vain Ideas.

*The Advantage
and Disadvan-
tage of Self-love.*

IV. AS to the good Things which we wish for, and endeavour to procure, Self-Love truly enlightnied inclines to the Solid, and when blinded to the Superfluous. The Love of our selves makes us wish for two Things; for excellent Qualities, and for an agreeable Sense of them. And as the most solid Satisfaction is the Effect or Consequence of the most perfect Dispositions; and as the most accomplish'd Condition, with respect to Knowledge and Virtue, is always attended with the most exquisite Relish; we ought first to make it our Business to enlighten and reform our selves; and the Love of our selves should immediately sollicit us to an Improvement in Wisdom and Goodness. From these Acquirements will naturally, and of themselves, arise the most agreeable Sentiments.

INSTEAD

(d) *Contra totius Generis humani opiniones mittenda vox erat: Infanitis, erratis, stupetis ad supervacua, neminem aestimatis suo. Cum ad patrimonium ventum est, diligentissimi computatores, sic rationem ponitis singulorum: quibus aut pecuniam credituri estis, aut beneficia: (nam hæc quoque jam expensa fertis.) Latè possidet, sed multum debet: habet domum formosam, sed alienis nummis paratam: familiam nemo citò speciosiore producet, sed nominibus non respondet. Si creditoribus solverit, nihil illi supererit. Idem in reliquis quoque facere debebatis, excutere quantum proprii quisque habeat. Divitem illum putas, quia aurea supellex etiam in viâ eum sequitur, quia in omnibus provinciis arat, quia magnus calendarii liber volvitur, quia tantum suburbani agri possidet, quantum invidiosè in desertis Apuliæ possideret: Cum omnia dixeris, pauper est; quare? quia debet. Quantum, inquis? Omnia; nisi fortè judices interesse, utrum aliquis ab homine, an à Fortunâ mutuum sumpserit. Quid ad rem pertinent Mulæ faginatæ, unius omnes coloris? Quid ista vehicula calata?*

--- *Instrati ostro alipedes, pictisque tapetis,
Aurea pectoribus demissa monilia pendent.
Tecti auro fulvum mandunt sub dentibus aurum.*

· *Ista nec dominum meliorem possunt facere, nec mulam, Sen. Ep.*
LXXXVII.

· INSTEAD of this; our first Care is to procure agreeable Sentiments. This Eagerness inclines and confines us to the Pleasures of the Senses, because they present themselves first; By this means our Blindness encreases; these Pleasures stupify and divert us from Truth; and being altogether taken up with Sensations, we know not how to regulate our selves by Ideas. Besides this, the Pleasure which we find in admiring our selves, and in believing that we have Reason so to do, makes us join an Idea of Esteem with whatsoever gives Pleasure, and add a Value to whatsoever occasions in us an agreeable Determination. This is an inexhaustible Spring of Prepossessions, and of ill-match'd Ideas.

· FROM the same Principle, from this too eager Inclination to Pleasures, arises also this fatal Delicacy, and this obstinate Repugnancy, which we naturally find to every Thing that gives Trouble, and which is not to be obtain'd without Difficulty. A *Self-love*, rightly inform'd, *animates* us to *Labour*, supports our Application, and makes us think the Pains nothing, by the Attention it gives to the Advantages which these Pains will procure. But if instead of reasoning, and being conducted by Knowledge, we determine our selves only by Sensation, as most Men do, we shall always incline to what is easy, in preference to that which is difficult.

· THESE two *prima Mobilia*, the *Inclination to Pleasure*, and the *Aversion to Pain*, are not so inseparable, but that they may be found sometimes in Opposition. There are Cases where they possess the Heart at the same Time; and there are others where they reign by Turns, and succeed one another. This is the Cause of those Contradictions so frequently to be met with in the Conduct of Man. Sometimes he buys his Pleasures by Labour, and sometimes he sacrifices his Pleasures to his Aversion for Pain.

· WE shall always live miserable so long as we are subject to so many Contradictions. In order to be Happy we must be in perfect Agreement with our selves.

THESE two Principles are united in those that pass their Lives in Pleasure and Amusement: But sometimes we are so terrified at Pain, that the greatest Interests in the World solicit us to it in vain; and sometimes, again, the Violence of a Passion does not allow us to take the least Repose or Ease.

THE Eagerness which we have to become happy, makes us take the first Means towards it that offer themselves, without previously considering what may contribute most to our Happiness; so that we might more easily make our selves happy, if we made less haste to become so.

THE Principles in the Soul are the *Seeds of Knowledge*: We cannot give too much Attention to them, or make them too familiar to us; it is by this Application that they become active and fruitful: But as they have nothing Attracting, we have no Relish for them, and so pass lightly over them: They are easy to comprehend, and also easy to recollect; but because they are simple, instead of making lively Impressions, they affect us but weakly; and if we do but give the least Attention to them possible, we are yet apt to think it so much Time lost. Thus for want of considering and attending to them, they become almost useless; they do not present themselves when we have occasion for them, and we are at a Loss for all those Consequences which might be drawn from them. We do not only not benefit sufficiently by the true Principles, but for want of taking some Pains to know them, we often embrace the false, because they have some Appearance of Truth; and the more we build upon them, the more we heap Error upon Error. These are the Fruits of Impatience; which hinders us from attending to those Things for which we have not naturally a sufficient Relish.

ALTHO' Mathematicians are esteemed the most exact of all Men of Letters, yet even they sometimes are too tedious in their Demonstrations, and sometimes draw them from false Principles: Their Impatience to advance prevents their attending sufficiently to their Principles; they do not apply themselves with Industry enough to confirm themselves in an Habit of Simplicity; they are not sensible of its value, but prefer in their Works every Thing that seems labour'd and intricate, as like to do most honour to its Author. It is by having first taken the Pains to understand such complicated Demonstrations, that we come to admire the Abilities of one that demonstrates the same Truths in a few Words, by deducing them from the most simple Principles.

THE Philosophers do every Moment, upon the particular Phenomena of Nature, indulge themselves in Conjectures, which however ingenious, are not at all solid, because they agree not with the Nature of Body, or that of Motion. But they pass lightly over these Principles, and form only uncertain and superficial Ideas of them, because they hasten to Particulars with Precipitation and Eagerness. It is the same in Morals: If after having exactly established the true Definitions of Nature and Virtue; after having clearly discover'd the true Foundations by which we are to distinguish Mens Actions into good, bad, and indifferent, we shou'd accustom our selves to make a just and immediate Application

tion of these Principles to all our particular Actions, to discern what is convenient for us to do, from what is otherwise; I do not at all doubt but we should forbear to confound with our Duties those extravagant Maxims, those superstitious Customs, those useless Ceremonies, which are even as slavish and troublesome as they are useless, by which Men clogg and make the Way to Heaven more difficult, and without advancing at all in it themselves, do yet keep others out of it.

WE do not attend sufficiently to the Principles; and so by despising their Simplicity, deprive our selves of the Consequences that flow from them: But for the same Reason, one would think we should at least have a Relish for Particulars: They furnish us with a pleasing Variety; and he that makes himself Master of some of them, finds he knows something. But these Particulars cost too much Pains, and we love nothing but Ease and Pleasure. It is nothing to know Things only in the Gross: To receive the Fruits of our Studies, we must enter into Particulars. But these Particulars are long and difficult, and therefore few apply themselves to them.

WE make a great Account of the Course of Logic, of Morality, of Natural Philosophy, &c. which lays down perfectly all the chief Heads of them, but does nothing else besides laying them down. We applaud our selves under the Notion of being compleat Masters of a Science, because we have form'd some uncertain Ideas of all the Parts of which it treats: But if we stop here, what Fruit can we receive from them? what Use can we make of these uncertain Ideas? We know in the Gross, for Example, that Colours arise from the Modifications and Motions of the Rays of Light; but so long as we do not know the particular Mode and Motion which forms each Colour, we shall be incapable of explaining the Phænomena that affect us every Moment. We know also in the Gross, and it has been proved to us, that we must not revenge an Injury; and that we must love our Neighbour as our selves: But if we do not understand that Love and Revenge are very complicated Acts; that the Sentiments which concur to form these Passions are of different Kinds, and are sometimes united, and at other times separated; that certain Circumstances may forbid all of them, others enjoin all of them, and others again only forbid or enjoin part of them; if all these Particulars are not distinctly known, we shall run the Hazard of being often deceiv'd, and of miscalling the Acts of Justice, and the Precautions of Prudence, by the Name of Revenge, and of making the

Want of Charity pass for the Perfection of Zeal. Toleration and Compassion for those that deceive themselves in Matters of Religion, pass with a great many People for a loose Indifference, and is, in their Opinion, carrying the Love of our Neighbour too far. We see some, on the contrary, who complain that we do not love them so much as we ought; that we treat them too unkindly and unequally, in preferring to them those who do indeed, by their Knowledge and Virtue, actually deserve to be prefer'd to them. When our Ideas are not perfectly clear and distinct, when we do not know how to apply general Principles to particular Cases, and when we have not considered our Duties in their utmost Extent, the Passions very easily play their Game, and by the Favour of the Darkeness which they spread over us, they turn our uncertain Ideas which Way they please.

Precautions against Self-love. V. THE usual Weakness of Men in approving, admiring, and loving every Thing in such Objects as have once gain'd their Affection, is more particularly remarkable in the Love which they are prepossess'd with for themselves. A great Means of curing this Weakness, is to reflect attentively upon the ridiculous Effects of it in others; but then those Reflections must be made only with a View of guarding our selves against it. Every one almost follows the Direction of a Taste, which he can justify upon no other Reason than that it is his own: Every one almost is charm'd with his own particular Style and Method. Do we ever meet with a Poet who reckons many superior to him? (e) Is there ever an Orator that does not regard his own Thrash, as the most sublime Production of his Pen? Let us study to look upon our selves with the same Eyes as we look upon others, for fear of giving them a just Occasion to look upon us with the same Eye we look upon them.

IT is visibly our Interest not to be mistaken in the Choice of such Objects, in the Possession of which we seek for Happiness, and, by consequence, the Love of our selves engages us to examine them with all the Precaution imaginable. When once any End appears to be convenient for us, it is farther our Interest to see if it is actually worth all the Trouble we must necessarily take to obtain it: If it deserves our Pains, the Love of our selves, that is to say, of our own proper Interest, will determine us to think them nothing, and to undergo them readily. We need only therefore begin by

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(e) *Suum cuique pulchrum est: Adhuc neminem cognosci Poëtam qui sibi non optimus videretur: sic se res habet, te tua, me delectant mea. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. Lib. V.*

a strict Examination, by consulting Evidence, and by determining our selves according to Knowledge; and with these precautions Self-love will be of very great Service

THOSE who neglect such Precautions, and think after another manner, that is to say, the Gross of Mankind, deliver themselves up immediately to sensual Pleasures, and from thence grow presently covetous of Riches, which serve to procure them. They at last aim at Glory, which pleases of it self, and at the same time leads to Riches, as Riches reciprocally in their Turn lead to Glory. These are, as all the World knows, the three great Objects of our Desires; and because they are also three Sources of Error, it properly belongs to Logic to treat of them, in order to preserve our Minds from their fatal Influences.

VI. We have already treated of the Mistakes we are apt to be led into by our Inclinations to Pleasures, and have proposed the necessary Means and Precautions to prevent them, under the Head of Temperaments. A Man who is, by his Inclination to the Pleasures of the Senses, carried away from the Application he ought to make to the Pleasures of the Mind, that is to say, to the Knowledge of Truth, the Possession of Wisdom, the Practice of our Duty, will rarely render himself attentive, and frequently fall into Miscarriages. His prevailing Inclination recalling him perpetually to the Pleasures of the Body, will not give him Time enough to form exact Ideas of any thing whatsoever; and this Confusion will spread it self every Day more and more, so that it will be impossible for him ever to arrive at any true Knowledge. The little Pleasure he will find in seeking what he does not love, not allowing him Time enough for the finding it, he will content himself with his first Conjectures, and will decide rashly, and hasten to conclude, to be excused the Trouble of a longer Examination.

BUT after a Man has once tasted the solid Pleasures, after he has once known the true Advantages, and is so well confirmed in them, as to find himself in his Element; whenever he endeavours to inform and regulate himself by the Light of Reason, it will then be proper to add the Necessary to the Principal, and to make some Allowance to the Desires of the Senses, and not to despise Recreations. (f)

BY

(f) Nascitur ex assiduitate laborum, animorum habetatio quædam & languor: nec ad hoc tanta hominum cupiditas tenderet, nisi naturalem quandam voluptatem haberet Lusus Jocusque. *Sen. de Tranq. Anim. Cap. 15.*

By this, the Body will maintain it self in Vigour, and the Mind will perceive its Activity, as we have elsewhere shewn. When the Mind wants Fruitfulness, as it confines it self to a few Ideas, not only its Knowledge will not be advanced, but it will easily fall into Prepossession and Obstinacy, and compose narrow Systems, and reject every Thing which they do not include.

BESIDES this, the Aversion to Pleasure weighing down the Body, will throw it into a gloomy Humour, and make it unfit for the Conversation either of those that are inclined to Mirth, or of those that are inclined to Melancholy: For the first will be made uneasy by such Conversation, and the last will be confirm'd in their Error; so that he will quickly fall into all the Inconveniences that are the Consequence of an extreme Retirement, and which we have already treated of. The languid Imagination of Men of this Stamp giving no Fire to their Discourse, the Attention of their Audience will not be excited, and consequently little Improvement can be made by their Instructions. They therefore become useless, and not only so, but also hurtful, and discouraging to all those that do not find themselves born to Austerity and Contradiction. They are the Cause that the Sciences are esteem'd the Sponge of Politeness: They fright away by their Gloominess those that would have the Curiosity to study them; and whenever they endeavour to soften themselves, they differ so greatly from their usual Character, and appear so intolerably affected, that we find them as despicable in their Fawning, as odious in their Austerity. A Man of this Temper, easily becomes censorious: He imagines himself to hate Vice, because he loves to censure it: He esteems an unreasonable Humour for a Virtue. (g)

THERE

Quædam enim, etiam si in summam rei parva sunt, ut & subduci sine ruinâ principalis boni possint, adjiciunt tamen aliquid ad perpetuam lætitiâ, & ex virtute nascentem. Sic illum afficiunt divitiæ, & exhilarant, ut navigantem secundus & ferens ventus, ut dies bonus, ut in brumâ ac frigore apricus locus. Quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum virtus, negat etiam hæc quæ indifferentia vocamus, habere in se aliquid pretii, & alia aliis esse potiora. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. Cap. 22.*

(g) Sicut sapiens nullum denarium intra limen suum admittet; male intrantem; ita & magnas opes, munus fortunæ, fructumque Virtutis, non repudiabit, nec excludet. Quid enim est, quare illis bonum locum invidet? veniant, hospitentur. Nec jactabit illas, nec

THERE are some therefore whose Hearts are wholly taken up with sensible Objects. They take Pleasure in these alone: And as to Knowledge and Virtue, if ever they take Pains to acquire them, it must be by continual Efforts upon themselves, and by the Pursuit of serious Reflections to which they are sollicitated with great Reluctance. We see others, on the contrary, who having accustomed themselves to abstain from the Recreations of the Senses, do so entirely break off Commerce with external Objects, that you would think them shut up within themselves as in a sort of a Prison. (b) The Medium betwixt these two Extremities ought to be made choice

nec abscondet; alterum infruniti animi est, alterum timidi & pusilli, velut magnum bonum intra sinum continentis. Nec, ut dixi, ejiciet illas è domo. Quid enim dicet? Utrumne, Inutiles estis; an, Ego uti divitiis nescio: Quemadmodum etiam si pedibus suis poterit iter conficere, ascendere tamen vehiculum malet: sic si poterit esse dives, volet: & habebit utique opes, sed tanquam leves & avolaturas: nec ulli alii, nec sibi graves esse patietur. *Id. ibid. Cap. 23.*

(b) " It is the specious and settled Opinion of those that would appear learned, and Professors of singular Sanctity, to despise and trample under Foot all sorts of Pleasures in general, and all Improvements of the Body, withdrawing the Mind to it self, without allowing any Commerce with the Body, and raising it to higher Objects, so as to pass this Life, as it were, insensibly, and without relishing or giving any Attention to it. To this sort of People, the common Phrase of *passing their Time* agrees perfectly well; for they imagine themselves to make a perfect good Use and Application of this Life, in letting it slide and pass away; and, as it were, in stealing themselves and withdrawing from it, as tho' it were something wretched, burdensome, and grievous; and are so careful in shunning and declining the World, that not only the Conversation, Recreation, and Pastimes of it, but even the natural Necessities, which God has encouraged by Pleasures annex'd, appear disagreeable, and odious to them. They never submit to them without Reluctance; and whilst they are forced to attend to them, they always keep their Mind exercised in something else; so that, in short, Life is a Pain to them, and Death a Comfort, according to that unnatural Sentence, *Vitam habere in patientiâ, Mortem in Desiderio*. But the Extravagance of this Opinion may be made to appear several Ways: First, There is nothing so beautiful and reasonable, as to act the Part of a Man well, and to go through this Life decently and as we ought to do. It is a divine and very difficult Task, to know how to enjoy our Being in a proper Manner, and to conduct our selves according to the Laws of Nature and our own present Circumstances, without seeking for any others. All these Extravagancies, all these artificial and studied Efforts, these Lives so contrary to Nature, arise from Folly and Passion: They would throw aside the Infirmities of Mankind, and become Conjurers, and they become Fools." *Charron of Wisdom* Q 3

choice of. This Medium is to esteem the Advantages of the Mind above all, to be perfectly sensible of their Excellence; and to think nothing equal to them, or to bear any Proportion to them: It is also to love the Pleasures of the Body, but very far below those of the Mind, whose Taste and Value they are only intended to heighten, and to support it by this Means in a Condition of pursuing its true Interests with more Liberty and Activity, and, consequently, with more Success.

IF we are upon our Guard, and truly apprehensive of being deceiv'd, we shall easily perceive the Difference we ought to make betwixt these two sorts of Objects. Do we not love a great many Things in very different Degrees? We love a full Consort of Musick much better than the Sound of any one single Instrument; and yet we love sometimes to hear one Instrument by it self. We prefer a Palace to a small Country Seat; and yet we sometimes quit the first for the Pleasure of the latter. The meaner Pleasures owe their Value to this Difference, and serve to heighten the greater ones which they are made to succeed.

WE need only consult Experience, and how little soever we assist it with our Reflections, it will presently teach us what we have to do. We are made neither solely, nor principally for the Pleasures of the Senses; for if we abandon our selves entirely to them, it will cost us too dear, and it will cost us also too dear to moderate them. (i)

ON the other side; He that has no Taste but for the Pleasures of the Mind, he that forgets the Care of his Body by his Eagerness to enrich his Soul with Knowledge, will presently put himself out of the Condition of enlarging his Knowledge. Our Strength will instruct us in the Extent of our Duty: To undertake more than we are able, is an Effect of Ignorance or Vanity, or rather of both at once.

Of the Love of Riches. VII. A MAN that is rich, and by this means exempt from a thousand Cares to which

Men are naturally subject, finds himself at liberty to bestow what Time he pleases upon the Improvement of his Mind, and is in Possession of all the necessary Help towards it, as Books, Voyages, and Experiments. All these are expensive; and how many excellent Genius's have liv'd in Obscurity, who would have done an Honour to the Sciences, as well as to their Name and their Country, if their Fortune

(i) "I would not have the Pleasure of going abroad take away the Pleasure of retiring within my self: On the contrary, I find that they maintain and improve one another." *Ment. Book III. Ch. 9.*

Fortune had been better. It would therefore be very wrong to despise Riches, because it is extravagant to propose any End, and to neglect the Means that serve to obtain it.

WE shall be no longer surpris'd at the little Progress Mankind have made in Knowledge, or at the Obscurity under which the Sciences do still labour after so many Ages, if we do but once reflect upon the mean Circumstances of those who have had the Care of them, and upon the Wants they live under, to the eternal Disgrace of those who have it in their Power to put them in a Condition of pursuing them with greater Success. A poor Man, who, for an Addition to his Misfortune, sees himself surrounded with a Family, which he has very much ado to maintain, how can he arrive to any great Pitch of Learning! Can he examine his Thoughts? Will his Necessities allow him any spare Time? Whilst he is overwhelm'd with Cares, can he be in a Condition to reflect upon Matters of Theory, and to polish these Reflections, and set them in their best Light? That he may more readily persuade and please, he is reduced to read but little, and to follow blindly what he sees establish'd by others. A Man under Poverty is too much overwhelm'd with the Sense of his Wants, not only to think agreeably, but even to think justly. He follows what he finds establish'd, and makes Profession of the Sentiments to which he owes his Livelihood.

INTO what Ignorance, gross Errors, and Brutishness, must a Man plunge himself by submitting himself thus, without Examination or Distinction, to whatever he finds receiv'd? Every Age adds some new Mistake to those that are already authorized by Custom: The New mix themselves with, and slip insensibly amongst the Old. These Errors are not even always in Agreement amongst themselves. Thus we blindly receive Heaps of Extravagancies and Contradictions: We have Eyes on purpose not to see.

BUT under the Pretence that Riches have their Uses, an infinite Number of People spend their Lives in the pursuit of them, without ever making them subservient to the Ends for which they are appointed. To make the Means the End, is an usual Mistake; and how gross soever it be, we are not willing to discover it, because we should be too much ashamed to be so imposed upon, and to confess so much to our selves. The greatest Part of Mankind therefore love Riches, and are eager in the Pursuit of them, upon Principles quite different from those that make them truly amiable. From our first Infancy we are accustomed to see Men labouring almost continually to become rich; we see them appear chearful or

fad, haughty or humble, in Proportion as they meet with Success or Disappointments. The Attention to procure Wisdom and Knowledge is no where to be seen; but the Endeavours to heap up Riches are every where before our Eyes. If we judge therefore of Mankind by what we see, we must believe they make Riches their capital Concern; and with respect to the Majority we shall not be mistaken. Hence we regulate our selves by Example, and live by Imitation, and use our selves to make that our principal End which we see every Body else pursuing.

WHEN our Reason is once cleared up, and we are a little better instructed in what we ought, and ought not to do; if we shou'd be asked concerning our Esteem for Riches, whether we make them our End, or only the Means that conduce to a better, our Answer will be not only conformable to our real Thoughts and Sentiments which we shall then have, but also to such Thoughts and Sentiments as we ought to have. And as we are not apt to take too much Pains to know our selves to the bottom, but rather to persuade our selves easily in whatever pleases us, and to give our selves up presently to whatever flatters us, we shall soon believe our selves actually to be, what our Answer will shew it our Duty to be. By this Deceit a Man will always have the Pleasure of proceeding in his own Pace, and of following his prevailing Inclination, without once thinking of examining it, and much less of correcting it; nor will his Reason, to which he has the Satisfaction to believe himself entirely conformable, ever reproach him.

BUT if Men were such as they profess themselves, and even if they were such as they believe themselves, I don't know whether there would be one covetous Man, at least there would be very few; for who is there that confesses he makes Riches his principal Object and Aim? But without amusing our selves with hearing Men, when they speak a Language which deceives themselves first, let us consult their Conduct with a greater Attention than they are used to do themselves. Fathers have usually more at Heart to find Knowledge and Wisdom in their Children, than to acquire it themselves. The Understanding and Virtue of their Children do honour to them, without putting them under any Restraints, and costing them any Pains. And yet with Regard to these Children, whose Education they seem to have so much at Heart, which do they think on most seriously, which are they most uneasy about, and which do they take most Care of? Their Externals, or their Internals? their

their Probity, or their Fortune? They very quietly resign to others the whole Care of their Education and Conduct; but do themselves continually labour to procure them a good Settlement in the World. What Zeal do they shew for those who are able to contribute towards it? and what Acknowledgements do they make to those that do contribute towards it? We may say, in truth, that it is with this View they bestow so much Care of their Education; and that this is the End of all the Expences they are at in forming their Heart and Understanding. For they hear of the Progress they make with more or less Satisfaction, and excuse their Negligence with more or less Readiness, according as, by the Condition of their Birth and Estate, they have more or less Need of the Assistance of others, or of advancing themselves by their own Merit, in order to make a Figure in the World.

A FATHER sees that he cannot leave all his Children rich; he has too many of them, and therefore must needs think of giving them an Education, which may supply the Smallness of their Inheritance. But if he finds himself in a Condition to establish them in Wealth and Honours by his own sole Power, he then thinks of nothing more than to secure their Health, and make them live agreeably: Wisdom and Knowledge would be superfluous Helps; the good Fortune of their Birth exempts them from these Wants. As we endeavour to supply Riches by Merit, so also we take it for granted, that Riches in their Turn will supply Merit.

WE ought to think quite otherwise. A Man of an obscure Birth, lives in Obscurity, and scarce are his Faults known to his Neighbours: He need take no care of them; for he will have no occasion to have them seen any more than his Virtues, if he had any. But all the World have their Eyes upon a Great Man; and it is absolutely necessary for him either to be greatly honoured or dishonoured in the Eyes not only of honest Men, but in general in the Eyes of all such as are not prepossessed. Their Vices, or their Virtues, have too great an Influence, and are conspicuous either to their Shame, or to their Glory.

CHILDREN enter absolutely into the Mind of those to whom they owe their Birth and Education: (k) Their only

(k) *Admiratiōnem nobis Parentes auri argentique fecerunt: & teneris infusa cupiditas altiùs sedit, crevitque nobilcum. Deinde totus populus in alia discors, in hoc convenit: hoc suspiciunt, hoc suis optant, hoc*
 Diis

only View is to make their internal Riches serve to acquire the External: Their Zeal for Knowledge and Goodness is in proportion to the Pitch of Fortune they aspire to. He who aims at the highest Employments, and greatest Places, takes all possible Pains to obtain some uncommon Excellencies: He who contents himself with lower Views, is satisfied with a slighter Tincture, and does not give himself that Trouble. They apply themselves to the Sciences that are most esteemed, rather than to those that deserve to be most esteemed; and in their Studies, they chuse not that which is most excellent, but that which is most fashionable, and most likely to advance them: They are prepossessed presently for those Opinions which they cannot relinquish, without giving themselves up to Poverty, or abandoning some great Expectations: They never rest till they have given them some plausible Turn; and as soon as ever they appear on any side tolerable, they lay hold of them immediately, and think no more of others; they avoid seeing them in any other Light, than that which pleases them. They regard at the same time with Aversion, all such Sentiments as cannot be embraced without costing too much; they disguise them, they shut their Eyes against the Brightness of them, they conceal what they contain that is true, evident, and deserving, and turn them on all sides so long, till at last they believe they have found some weak and obscure Place, on which account they may safely be rejected.

UPON these Principles, Men change their Sentiments, as their Interests change. When a new Fortune, and a new Point of View makes them see Objects in a different Light from what they have appeared in before, they love to think that

Diis velut rerum humanarum maximum, cum grati videri volunt, conserant. Denique eò Mores redacti sunt, ut paupertas maledicto probroque sit, contempta divitibus, invisâ pauperibus. Accedunt inde carmina Poëtarum, quæ affectibus nostris facem subdant, quibus divitiæ velut unicum vitæ decus ornamentumque laudantur. Nihil illis melius nec dare videntur Dii immortales posse, nec habere.

*Regia solis erat sublimibus alta columnis,
Clara micante Auro.*

Ejusdem Currum adspice.

*Aureus Axis erat, temo aureus, aurea summa
Curvatura Rotæ, radiorum argenteus ordo.*

Denique quod optimum videri volunt sæculum, aureum appellant.
Sen. Ep. CXV.

that this is the most Just, and ground themselves upon this Thought. *Pope Pius II.* one of the most zealous Defenders of the Liberties of the Church at the Council of *Basil*, exerted all his Power, after he was elected Pope, to abolish the *Constitution of Prague*: He then saw Things with a different Eye.

VIII. OUGHT we not to be ashamed to make our selves Slaves to an external Advantage, which soon passes away, so far as to sacrifice Truth to it, which will for ever endure?

Means to regulate the Love of Riches.

It is certainly shameful to weigh Truth in the Ballance of Interest. Can Men that value themselves upon Knowledge and Virtue, continue to make their Glory and good Fortune consist in what is common to them with the most Ignorant and the most Wicked? Can reasonable Men sink into such Sentiments so unworthy of them, that they neither dare declare them to others, nor own them themselves, so that to retain them with any Ease, they are obliged to disguise them to others, as well as to themselves?

Is it not better to have every Thing at Peace within our selves, and to have our Heart actually prefer that which Reason cannot avoid preferring, and which the Virtuous love, and the Vicious themselves are forced to commend above all Things? If any one has found this Preference not to be just, and has made it with Sincerity, and yet repents himself of it, let him declare it, and we will hear him. Sometimes, after some Efforts, we come at last to sacrifice Fortune to Truth; but if this Sacrifice does not come from the Heart, if only some gnawing Remorse has extorted it, we shall afterwards recover our selves, and return to our first Inclination. But he will prefer with Perseverance, who prefers with Knowledge and Affection: Such a Preference is never revoked. He who has once known the solid Pleasures, will never quit them for such as are superficial. The Relish of the true Riches will put us in a Condition of making a right Use of the external Riches when they shall happen to us, and of losing them with a good Grace whenever they leave us.

EVERY Thing that favours this Passion for Riches, and is apt either to excite or improve it, ought to be so much the more suspected by us, as it belongs to every Age, and increases with our Years, and is strengthened by all the other Passions. The Inclination to Pleasures, and the Inclination to Glory, are in themselves opposite; but in the present State of Things, and at the Pass that Men are now come to,

Riches

Riches do effectually conduce both to Pleasures and to Glory. There is no Passion which they do not contribute to satisfy: As many Errors, so many Occasions for Riches: We want them to gratify all our Whimsies. Age commonly makes us neglect Pleasures, and abates the Eagerness with which we pursue them; and the Difficulties which we are oblig'd to undergo to obtain our End, makes us sometimes abandon Projects of Ambition. But being convinced by a continual Experience that Money supplies the most despicable Imperfections, that they cover the most odious Defects, and easily surmount the most difficult Obstacles, the Covetousness of acquiring them encreases in Proportion as we think we stand in need of external Helps. At first therefore we love them for the sake of what we procure by their Means; afterwards the Love of the Effect extends to the Cause which produces it; and by thus loving the Cause, together with the Effect, we at last come to love it by it self. We come by little and little to make our End, of what we loved only at first as the Means leading to other Ends. When once we are arrived thus far, it is absolutely necessary that the Love of Riches should have no Bounds; we find Pleasure in heaping them up, and can never have enough of them. For want of knowing that we are born for some greater Purpose, we seek in the heaping up of Riches for a Greatness and Esteem which cannot be found there. Those who instead of making use of the Advantages which Riches give them to acquire more Knowledge with greater Ease, on the contrary do not apply themselves to acquire any Knowledge but as a Means to procure Riches, dishonour the Sciences; and such Men have always done them a great deal of Injury. This is what made *Simonides* say, *There would be no Doubt but to be Learned and Wise is of much greater Value than to be Rich, if we did not so often see the Wise and the Learned at the Gate of Riches.* But these Riches ought to have a double Shame: One, in not knowing that the principal Goods are still wanting, and in being ignorant where to find them; the other, in staying to ask of them, what they ought of themselves to offer.

WHEN we are sick, we think only of recovering our Health: We make our selves easy; we trouble our selves no more about our Trade, or our Estate; we reject all the Ideas of Fortune; we think of no Intrigues; but listen solely to our Physicians, and adhere to their Medicines. But we are far from taking that Care of the Soul: That is almost blind, lives in Darknes, is inclined to a great many Vices, is prepos-
sessed

feſſed with a thouſand Errors, and oppreſſed with a thouſand ill Habits: But we do not endeavour to cure them; we have a great many other Things to do: We muſt purſue the moſt urgent; we muſt heap up Wealth; we muſt make our ſelves a Name in the World; and, in one Word, we muſt ſacrifice to a Fortune always uncertain, and which will at laſt very certainly paſs away. (l) Inſtead of giving to external Things no more Attention than a Mind duly inform'd by right Reaſon would think proper, we beſtow upon the internal and eſſential no more Time than what we have left to ſpare from the ſuperfluous Cares of the Body.

ARE the Advantages of this World worth the Trouble and Constraints we muſt undergo to acquire them? We have a little Part of Life left to finiſh, and Time ſteals upon us, iſ hurrying us away to the Grave: We have within ſome Treasures that are properly our own, and in the great Theatre of the Univerſe ſome that are in common with other Men; which then ought we to be moſt concerned about? which ought we to be thinking upon? Provided we would, we ſhould have always ſomething to admire in our ſelves; and ſhall we quit this ſolid Satisfaction to run after Shadows? Muſt our Lives be ſpent in purſuing without enjoying? and in order to obtain what we ſhall be very little ſatisfied with, when obtained, muſt we flatter a Fool, and make our Court to a Knave? Happy is he who, knowing exactly the Value of external Advantages, does not think them worth purchaſing at ſuch a Rate.

IX. GLORY

(l) Contra evenit in iis morbis, quibus afficiuntur animi: quo quis pejus ſe habet, minus ſentit. Non eſt quod mireris Lucili, cariffime. Nam qui leviter dormit, & ſpecies ſecundum quietem capit, aliquando dormire ſe dormiens cogitat: gravis ſopor etiam ſomnia extinguit, animumque altiùs mergit, quàm ut uti ullo intellectu ſinat. Quare vitia ſua nemo confitetur? Quia etiam nunc in illis eſt. Somnium narrare, vigilantis eſt: & vitia ſua confiteri, ſanitatiſ indicium eſt. Expergiſcamur ergò, ut errores noſtros coarguere poſſimus; ſola autem noſ Philoſophia excitabit, ſola ſomnum excutiet gravem. Illi te totum dedica: dignus illa eſ; illa te digna eſt; ite in complexum alter alterius: omnibus aliis rebus te nega, fortiter, apertè. Non eſt quod precariò Philoſopheris. Si æger eſſes, curam intermiſiſſes rei familiaris, & forenſia tibi negotia excidiſſent: nec quemquam tanti putares, cui advocatus in cauſam descenderes: toto animo id ageres, ut quamprimum morbo liberareris. Quid ergò? non & nunc idem facies? omnia impedimenta dimitte, & vaca bonæ menti; nemo ad illam pervenit occupatus. *Sen. Ep. LIII.*

Of the Love of
Glory.

IX. GLORY consisting in the Approbation of Persons of a good Taste, who think judiciously, and assign to every Thing its true Value; to be insensible of true Glory, would be to regard with Indifference that Esteem which of all Things in the World is most to be esteemed. I agree, therefore, that we may take a Pleasure in being well thought of by all the World, especially by the learned and wise Part of it; that we may find in their Conversation, and in the Pleasure of their Approbation, a Reward for the Pains it cost us to distinguish Truths that are but little illustrated, and to discover those that are not yet known. The Pleasure which we taste in finding our selves esteemed by Persons whom we honour, serves also to encourage a reasonable Man in his Pursuits; which are often so difficult, that he is obliged to raise himself above all his Prejudices and Habits, and to withstand the seducing Allurements of a thousand Objects, which often divert him from the most just Resolutions. It is so important, and at the same Time so difficult, to maintain our selves in the Discharge of all our Duties, that we should be much in the wrong to neglect any Assistance that might serve to confirm us in it.

THE Love of Glory, for the Comfort of the World, supplies the Place of Virtue in the Hearts of a great many Men; and the Fear of Ignominy that of the Hatred which we ought to have for Vice it self. It is for this Reason that Satire is of so great Use. There are few that love Virtue; but there is hardly one who is not jealous of his Reputation. An infinite Number of People, to whose Passions the Voice of Conscience opposes but weak Obstacles, are stopp'd short by *what People will say of them*. And those who seem not to fear this Censure, would live after a quite different manner, if they did not indeed fear it at all. *O Athenians, says ALEXANDER, what Hardships have I sustained, and what Dangers have I despised to be commended by you!* The Sentiment which occasioned his speaking in this manner, is very common to all Men: The Great feed themselves up with the Applauses of the Multitude, which they regard so much below them; and altho' they appear to reckon them as nothing, they yet notwithstanding are afraid of their Censure. When a Man sells his Reputation for five hundred Pounds, we may conclude from thence, that his Virtue could not have defended it self against one hundred. And in general, the Appearance is esteemed of greater Consequence than the Reality it self; and the same Person shall comfort himself in a
Week's

Week's Time for a private Misfortune, whose Concern would be of much longer Continuance, if the Publick were but informed of it. We make our selves a kind of a Life in the Imagination of others.

BUT nothing is more common than to allow this Passion too great a Sway. (*m*) Glory is a very empty Diet; a Vapour that never satisfies; and the Desire of which encreases in Proportion to the Possession, of which there is no End. It is the violent Thirst after a Glory not rightly understood that has arm'd Men one against another, that has given a specious Pretence to the Rage and Fury of Children of the same Father to destroy one another, that has fill'd the Earth with Murders and Desolation, and under a pompous Title has made it the Image of Hell. The Love of Glory is capable of annihilating the most natural Sentiments; and an Heart that is abandon'd to Ambition, quits by Degrees all Compassion, Humanity, and Justice. But I would confine my self to the Injury it does to the Sciences. A Man that is greedy of Glory, and thinks only of eclipsing that of his Contemporaries and Predecessors, being hurried away by this Passion, and making haste to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, examines very slightly, or not at all, and precipitates his Judgment every Moment, that is to say, falls frequently into Error. He studies the most obscure rather than the most useful Subjects, and prefers those that are most shining to those that are most necessary to Mankind. By this means his Success is more difficult; for those Things that are least necessary, are generally least easy, and even if he does succeed, the Fruits of his Discovery are very small.

A MAN

(*m*) "There is some, I do not know what, natural Pleasure in being commended; but we make a great Addition to it our selves."

Laudari haud metuam, neque enim mihi cornea fibra est
Sed recti finemque extremumque esse recuso
Euge tuum & belleè.

Perf. Sat. I. 47.

"I do not comfort my self so much with what I am in the Opinion of others, as with what I really am within my self. I would be rich in my self, without borrowing. Strangers can see nothing but external Events and Appearances; one may put on a good Out-side, tho' he be internally much out of Order. They cannot see my Heart; they can only see my Countenance." *Mont. Book II. Ch. 16.*

A MAN that pursues Glory, regards as his Rivals all those that are engaged in the same Pursuit. Envy and Hatred presently take Possession of his Heart; and how can he ever arrive at Virtue under the Conduct of such dangerous Guides? None love to receive Instruction from their Rivals, or to be taught by their Enemies; they like better to contradict them: And if these advance any Truth, they for that very Reason incline to the side of Error.

HE that studies only to shine amongst Men of Letters, and to procure himself a great Name, seeks impatiently for something new; and when he has found it, embraces and defends it with Warmth: For he takes Passion for his Guide instead of Reason; and his Aim is not Knowledge and Wisdom, but the Reputation of them. But if he does not find his Genius lie at Invention, despairing to distinguish himself by new Discoveries, he then conceives a secret Disgust against all new Discoveries: He despises them without understanding them; his Dislike furnishes him with Weapons to attack them, he fortifies himself with the Antients, he submits and lists himself blindly on their side, so as to be a mere Echo of their Sayings, whether good or bad.

LASTLY, This Thirst of Honour ill understood, this ardent Passion for Glory, often makes those that possess it give into every thing, without Reason, that carries any Mark of Distinction. It is by this Means that Men are infatuated with the Extraordinary, and lay down Maxims that are singular, and affect to think and speak differently from the rest of Mankind. You would think that they would believe themselves dishonoured, to have the same Notions with other People: Every thing which is common, appears dull and insipid; and they have so great an Aversion to the ordinary Methods, that for fear of coming any thing near them, they quit the Road of good Sense. This last Character is confirmed by the Pleasure they take in doing themselves that Justice, which is refused them by others. There are Distempers of the Mind, as well as of the Body, which arise from a Complication of Causes: All the Seducements of Admiration join to make this last Infatuation incurable. This Inclination to be distinguish'd, produces different Effects, according the different Inclinations with which it is combined.

THERE are few People who do not wish to shine; every body loves to be in this World upon a Foot of Distinction. But then on the other side, there are but few that are willing to give themselves the Trouble of it: They are, above all,
averto

averse to take Pains in the Reformation of themselves. Under these Dispositions we neglect acquiring the solid Merit, and content our selves with external Advantages, and when we are in Possession of them, we give to slight Appearances the entire Value of the Reality. Few People think as *Cicero* speaks: *Satius est enim me meis rebus florere, quam majorum opinione niti, & ita vivere, ut ego sim potius meis nobilitatis initium & virtutis exemplum.* "I love to shine by my own proper Merit, rather than by a Name inherited from my Ancestors; and like best to begin my own Nobility myself by the virtuous Examples I leave to Posterity." In truth, we may suspect those that use this sort of Language, make a Virtue of Necessity; but what can we say against those, who being born with an illustrious Name, do yet reckon this Glory nothing, unless they support and honour it by their own personal Merit?

X. THERE are few Means more effectual for curing of Ambition, than that of attending to the Extravagances into which it hurries those whom it possesses. Disquiet, Envy, Infatuation, Affectation, Error, and Conceitedness, are its ordinary Effects; so that the Vanity of Men oftentimes prevents our honouring them, and their Eagerness for Glory makes them take the Way that leads to Contempt. The surest and almost only Way of establishing a Man's Reputation, and of securing the Esteem and Commendation of others, is never to think of it, or to have it in View. There is nothing that Men love to give with more Freedom; but when once they perceive it is expected and sought after, they are always sure to refuse it. To bespeak Praise, is for ever to be disappointed of it; to fear it, is to deserve it; and to turn one's Back of it, is to be sure to have it follow. The Reason of which I take to be this: To take a Pleasure in regarding the Merit of others, and after having discovered it, to love to do it Justice, and make it taken Notice of by others, is one of the most certain Characters of a fine Soul, and of an Heart truly great; but the more Greatness of Soul there is in doing Justice to true Merit, the more free we would be in the doing it; and we imagine there is so much more Honour in discharging this Duty, by how much less they that are the Objects of it think themselves entitled to lay Claim to it. Esteem is a *Recompence*, not a *Debt* to Virtue; and we bestow it out of Generosity, not by Compulsion. We have Foundation enough for Complaint against those that refuse to pay us what they owe, it being a manifest In-

*Remedies and
Precautions.*

justice; and we have no Obligation to them that discharge a Debt which we could compel them to pay. But whatsoever Merit we may have, we ought to be thankful to those that give us what they might as well have refused. The Glory there is in recompensing, always loses Part of its Lustre when the Recompence is sollicitated; and there is a far greater Generosity in preventing the Request of others, than in complying with them. Men are so desirous of being free in the bestowing of Praises, and so little willing to be prevented in this Affair, that commonly they that praise first are those that praise most: They seem to partake of the Glory of a good Action, or of an excellent Discourse, by their Earnestness to do the Authors of it Justice. We also observe that those who say fine Things, are always the less applauded for them, the more they are found to be sensible of them themselves, and the more they appear to have said them with a Design of being admired.

GLORY therefore flies him who seeks it; but he who only seeks to acquire Merit, will together with it acquire all the Consequences of that Merit. A Man that bestows all his Pains to think judiciously, and to live justly, is sure to distinguish himself without proposing any such End to himself; but he that fights only for Distinction, will never be distinguish'd, except it be from wise Men; for he will be rank'd with Fools, and will at best be only the Head of a particular Species of Folly.

IT is very seldom that we have any Ease, when we propose Glory for our Aim: That which comes without our seeking it, is the only one that affords us a reasonable Satisfaction. (*r*) Ambition is a Source of Troubles; and for this Reason all the World is averse to those that are possess'd of it. Modesty, on the contrary, makes the Pleasure of Society; it gains all Hearts; and when it is accompanied with excellent Qualities, makes them Objects of the highest and most constant Admiration.

WE see by this, that what we call Glory and Reputation, the Bubble which we pursue with so much Pains, is a very trifling Thing: If we desire it much, we usually go without it; and if we obtain it without wishing for it, we have not much Relish of it: For the Heart of Man seldom tastes any Pleasure, but in proportion to the Warmth with which it is pursued.

ONE

(*r*) Opinionem quidem & famam eo loco habeamus tanquam quæ non ducere, sed sequi debeat.

ONE of the most fatal Effects of this Thirst of Glory is, when it is wrong understood, and carried to an Excess; when we are fond of all sorts of Praise, and even have a Dependance upon Flatterers. In truth, it is my Opinion, that he who pretends to look upon these Marks of Esteem with Indifference, is either a Liar, or a Fool; he is in Society a Stone that juts out of the Building, a perfect Manner-hater, if there be one. Since God himself esteems Praises, when they come from the Heart, can it be lawful to look on them as absolutely contemptible, or entirely indifferent? It would be deviating from Virtue, to give just Encomiums to Persons that are deserving, if it be their Duty not to listen to such Encomiums. But they ought to be receiv'd with the following Precautions: First, We ought to give no Attention to those who praise without a Capacity of distinguishing perfectly, that which is truly praise-worthy from that which is not. As it is a distemper'd and *canine Appetite* that makes us devour every Thing, (o) so it is an extravagant Thirst of Glory, that makes us hear with Pleasure the Praises of Fools; and by this more than one half of Mankind are excluded from the Privilege of pleasing wise Men with their Praises, which suppose in them that Praise, Willdom, Understanding, and Discernment. (p)

WE

(o) " Let us despise this base and scandalous Thirst after Honour and Renown, which makes us court all sorts of People whatever: "
 " (*Qua est ista Laus qua possit è Macello peti?*) by the most abject
 " Means, and at the vilest Rate that can be. It is a Dishonour to be
 " thus honoured. Let us learn to be covetous of no more Glory
 " than we are capable of. To be puffed up with every Action that
 " is innocent and useful, it is necessary to do it before those who may
 " esteem it uncommon and extraordinary. They are willing to make
 " it answer the Price it costs them. In proportion as a good Action
 " is glorious, I abate of the Goodness of it, by the Suspicion of its
 " being done rather on the Account of its being glorious than good:
 " Exposing it so much, is half selling it. Those Actions appear
 " with much the best Grace, that slide from the Hand of their Au-
 " thor insensibly, and without Noise; and which some honest Man
 " will, upon the Account of their Merit, take some Opportunity of
 " removing from their Obscurity into their proper Light: *Mibi*
 " *quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quae sine Venditione, & sine*
 " *Populo teste sunt.* Mont. Book III. Ch. 10.

(p) Nec idè te prohibuerim hos quoque audire, quibus consuetudo est admittere populum, ac disserere: si modò hoc proposito in turbam prodeunt, ut meliores fiant faciantque meliores: Si non ambitionis hoc causà exercent. Quid enim turpius Philosophiam captante clamores?

WE ought never to have Cause to reproach our selves, with having rendred our selves worthy of the Contempt of any one whomsoever: For we should always love and esteem human Nature: But if those who do not understand Reasoning think fit to ridicule us, and use their utmost Endeavours to decry us, we ought to be content to confute them by the Wisdom of our Conduct and Conversation. We ought to despise the Injuries of those, whose Praises would be of no weight: It is submitting our selves to an ignorant or malicious Man, to appear sensible of the Contempt they shew us. Nothing advances us more, than to know how to be above those that are unworthy of our Attention, as nothing abases us more than to seek Glory in the Praises of those who deserve none themselves. (q) When *Diogenes* was ask'd, *Whether he did not see that all the World laugh'd at him: Suppose*, replied he, *that some Asses were to grin at this Company, would you think them worth your Notice? Much less do I what these Fools say of me.*

WHEN once a Man finds a Pleasure, and makes his Glory consist in seeing himself admired by the Multitude, he adopts all the Errors of the Vulgar. An open House, Equipages, and a great Name, with him supplies the Place of Merit. They that once apply themselves to please him, must become as much Fools as himself; they must be Slaves to every Thing which he admires and adores. Superfluities become necessary; nor is it any more out of Necessity, or even out of Delicacy, but out of Ambition, that our Tables are cover'd with the greatest Dainties. It is not so much to please our own Eyes, as to dazzle those of others, that we fill our Apartments with fine Tapestry and Paintings,
make

Numquid æger laudat medicum secantem? Tacete, favete, & præbete vos curationi, etiamsi exclamaveritis, non aliter audiam, quam si ad tactum vitiorum vestrorum ingemiscatis. - - - Quanta autem dementia ejus est, quem clamores imperitorum hilarem ex Auditorio dimittunt? Quid lætaris, quod hominibus laudaris, quos non potes ipse laudare? *Sen. Ep. LII.*

Boni viri judicent, id est maximi momenti & ponderis. *Cic. Or. in Vatim.*

(q) Æquo animo audienda sunt imperitorum convitia, & ad honesta vadenti contemnendus est iste contemptus. *Ep. LXXVI.*

Quanta Dementia est vereri ne infameris ab infamibus. Argumentum recti malis displicere. *Alibi.*

Nemo enim non eo, à quo se contemptum judicat, minor est.

make a whole Street of one House, and enclose entire Fields and Forests in our Gardens. (r)

THIS Baseness, with which we seek the Applauses of the ignorant Multitude, has also done a prodigious Injury to the Sciences themselves. We content our selves to treat of them superficially, and are in no Pain for Order and Exactness. The Vulgar do not expect any Thing further from us. We have given more Attention to Words than Things; Bombast passes in the room of Sublime; little Turns or Expression are taken for bright Thoughts; and the Length of a Discourse, void of any Meaning, for a Copiousness of Oratory (s).

WE must conclude therefore, that as it shews a Want of a good Taste, to have no Regard to the Approbation of such as have a good Taste, (t) who think justly, and never flatter; so is it an Argument of very narrow Views, and of a little Mind, to be pleased with being the Object of Admiration of the Ignorant and Illiterate; we must have very little Foundation for it in our selves to seek it in this manner.

WHO would not resolve to throw off this Thirst of Praise, and be afraid of the Mischiefs that attend it, when he sees so many People that, after having studied upon this Motive, and not being able to procure the Esteem of the Learned, have condescended to court the Praises of the Vulgar, and come at last to admire themselves in a Circle of Coxcombs?

IN the second Place, Praise ought to be an Occasion of examining our selves strictly and impartially, if we are sincerely

(r) *Inducenda est in occupatum locum Virtus: quæ mendacia contra verum placentia extirpet, quæ nos à populo, cui nimis credimus, separet, ac sinceris opinionibus reddat. - - -*

Quis eam, quam nulli ostenderet, induit purpuram? Quis posuit secretam in auro dapem? quis sub alicujus rusticæ arboris projectus umbrâ, luxuriæ suæ pompam solus explicuit? Nemo oculis suis lautus est, ne paucorum quidem & familiarum, sed apparatus vitiorum suorum pro modo turbæ spectantis expandit. Itaque irritamentum est omnium, in quæ insanimus, admirator & conscius. *Sen. Ep. XCIV.*

(s) Nihil enim æque & eloquentiam, & omne aliud studium auri-bus deditum vitiavit, quàm popularis Assensio. *Sen. Ep. CII.*

(t) Cujus, inquit, bonum est claritas, id est, laus bono à bonis red-dita, utrum laudati an laudantis? Utriusque: meum qui laudor, quia natura me amantem omnium genuit; & bene fecisse gaudeo, & gratos me invenisse Virtutum interpretes laetor. Hoc plurimum bonum est, quod grati sunt, sed & meum. Ita enim animo compositus sum, ut aliorum bonum, meum judicem; utique eorum, quibus ipse sum boni causa. *Id. ibid.*

creely afraid of being made the Tools of those that praise us, and who very often make a Jest of us. There is nothing we ought to examine more scrupulously than Praises, because there is nothing more equivocal. The most modest and delicate Praises are sometimes only the Effect of the Vanity of those that bestow them, whose Aim is more to compose a fine and ingenious Encomium, than to make the Picture really like.

WE must know very little of the World, and have pass'd our Lives either in a close Retirement, or in a continual Hurry, not to have observ'd, that Men praise more out of Interest than Knowledge; and that few People, when they are at liberty amongst their Friends, make a Scruple of despising what they have before appear'd so much to admire in the Presence of those whom they are oblig'd to carress. Custom has even so far exaggerated the Matter of Praise, that the most sincere cannot forbear enlarging a little. An exact Encomium, that should contain only the bare Truth, like a Testimony given in a Court of Justice upon Oath, would be reckon'd very clownish. Good Manners require that the Style of Praising should be something swelling. If any be thereby deceiv'd, it is not the Fault of those that use this Language, since Custom has made it sufficiently clear, but their own in misinterpreting, and construing it in their Favour in the full Extent of the Letter, which ought to be always understood figuratively, and with proper Allowances.

WE ought to reckon so little upon Praises, that where we have not some other Evidence, all that can be safely concluded from a Funeral Oration, is, that the Person who is the Subject of it is dead. All that can be learned from a Monument, is, that the Person to whose Memory it is erected bore such a Name, lived in such an Age, and discharged such and such Employments. All the rest may have been, and often is dictated by Fear and by Interest.

THE Custom of the World, when it is accompanied with Reflection, is a great Preservative against Flattery; and we should certainly avoid those Snares, if we did but observe how ridiculous they are that suffer themselves to be caught in them. We frequently see Men praise those whom they hate from the Bottom of their Hearts; we see them catching at every little Occasion, and magnifying it in order to frame an Encomium upon it; but we seldom or never see any one that praises, except it be with a Design of surprising the Credulity of those whom they praise, and of imposing upon them.

IN the third place, we ought to be well assured, that what we praise is actually Matter of Commendation. There are those that commend all Vice, as well as Virtue. If we be but in a Condition of being serviceable to them, that is sufficient to make us the Objects of their Admiration in all Respects, at least in Appearance. A Man has Reason to believe himself poorly stock'd with Merit, when he sees those that want to praise him, reduced to the Necessity of disguising his Vices, or of founding his Encomium upon something that is external to him, and which may the next Moment pass into other Hands. We praise in an Horse his Swiftness, Strength, and Proportion of Parts; but who ever reckons amongst his Excellencies his Bridle, Saddle, Houzing, and other Furniture, that serve rather to conceal than shew his Beauties (*u*)? Was it not Extravagance in *Alexander* to love to be called the Son of *Jupiter*, and to be worship'd like a God? All the Illusions of Men do more or less border upon Folly. Let People account me whom they will, I shall always remember what I am my self. *Sen. de Vit.* *Me hominem esse tunc maxime cogitabo, Beat. cum deus undique consulatabor.*

WHEN upon examining our selves we do not find those Qualities in us, for which we are prais'd, we ought to apply our selves incessantly to acquire them, if at least we would have the Satisfaction of being truly esteem'd, and if we think it ridiculous to be content with Dreams and Appearances. Praises ought to be the Subjects of Confusion, when the Voice of our Conscience cannot join with that of others: But when, after a scrupulous Attention to our selves, we do really find our selves such, or very nearly such, as the Praises which we receive make us, yet the Pleasure of this Discovery ought not to be an Occasion of our applauding our selves in the Idea of our own Merit, nor of giving into the Admiration of our selves, nor of contenting our selves with

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(*u*) Omnium istorum personata felicitas est. Contemnes illos, si despoliaveris. Equum empturus, solvi jubes stratum, detrahis vestimenta, venalibus, ne qua vitia corporis lateant: hominem involutum aestimas? Mangones, quicquid est quod displiceat, aliquo lenocinio abscondunt. Itaque eminentibus ornamenta ipsa suspecta sunt: sive crus alligatum, sive brachium adspiceres, nudari juberis, & ipsum tibi corpus ostendi. Vides illum scythiæ Sarmatiæve regem, insigni capitisdecorum? Si vis illum aestimare, totumque scire qualis sit, faciam solve: multum mali subillâ later. Quid de aliis loquor? Si perpendere te voles, sepone pecuniam, domum, dignitatem: intus te ipse considera. Nunc qualis sis, aliis credis. *Sen. Ep. LXXX.*

that Degree of Knowledge and Virtue which we have already acquired. We cease to deserve Praise, when we thus abuse the Praises we receive, and make them serve for a Pretence to Idleness, which are intended for an Encouragement to our Industry. A wise Man measures what he ought, by what he is able to do; and he judges of what Remains to be done, by what he already has done. There are some idle Minds, upon which Vanity will have a sufficient Influence to make them acquire a certain Degree of Merit: But when once they have obtain'd this, they flatter themselves that it is time to take their Rest, and to enjoy their Glory quietly. This is a Mistake, for it is the sure Way to have it soon extinguish'd. He that comes to make a Stand, will seem to fall; for the Impression of Objects become weaker in proportion as they grow more familiar; and for this Reason it is necessary for *Merit* to be always *encreasing*, in order to be esteemed the same.

ABOVE all, we ought to forbear making Comparisons *betwixt our selves and others*: These naturally lead us to regard with Envy those that are superior, and with Contempt those that are inferior to us. There is a great deal of Difference betwixt being agreeably affected to find that we have a Share in the good Opinions of honest Men, and taking a Pleasure to be esteemed by them in Preference to others. The first of these Pleasures is innocent, the other very dangerous. For when once a Man makes part of his Felicity consist in being sensible that he has a Superiority over others, of what Nature soever this Superiority may be, whether it consists in Reputation, Understanding, Knowledge, Dignities, Riches, or lastly, even in the more liberal Enjoyment of the Pleasures of the Senses, he must necessarily, for the same Reason, find himself less happy, when he cannot perceive this same Disproportion betwixt himself and others. The good Fortune therefore of others will always extinguish his: He will decrease in Proportion as others encrease; and how can he avoid being mortified at the Sight of that which impairs his own Felicity? how can he prevent conceiving an Aversion to every Thing which eclipses that in what manner soever? The View therefore of the Evils and Wants of others, is a very equivocal Remedy to soften the Torment of our own. *Malum solatii genus est turbam miserorum.*

THOSE who make all their Glory consist in out-shining others, do not only hate those that are their Rivals in point of Riches and Dignities: They cannot endure that anybody in the World should aspire to any other Glory, or make their

Honour

HONOUR consist in improving their Understandings, and living conformably to such Improvements: They hate a Merit that is not according to their Taste and Relish: They exert their utmost Endeavours to extinguish it by despising it; and being enraged to find their Contempt not regarded, they proceed to Violence, and persecute Virtue.

A MALIGNITY, which is but too natural to the Heart of Man, is, without doubt, one of the Causes which makes them take so much Pleasure in believing themselves above others: But it is not to be doubted, but that *Education* very much corroborates this Malignity. We are every Moment setting this mischievous Principle at work, because it is one of the most active, and never fails of producing its Effect. Sometimes we make Children ashamed to suffer themselves to be equal'd; sometimes we make them take a Pleasure in leaving others a great Way behind them: And in order to correct them of any Fault, the Argument commonly used, is, That it will confound them with the meanest; whereas they ought to be made sensible of the Ideas of Wisdom and Duty. Thus, very often, to cure them of some very slight Imperfections, we confirm in their Hearts one of the greatest Vices, and most incompatible with the Happiness of Mankind: The Habit which we thus contract, often throws us into childish Weaknesses.

THIS Passion might be tolerable, if its bad Effects extended no farther than to make those ridiculous whom it possesses. But what are we not to expect from it, since by this means no body is content with his Lot, but every one is aiming to advance himself upon the Disgrace of others, and seeks to render himself happy, by rendering them miserable? I know of no Method more effectual, to disengage us from an Inclination so fatal, and so deeply ingrafted, than to reflect often and attentively, That the great Master of the Universe has Thought fit to exercise his immense Power and Wisdom in the infinite Variety of his Works: He would have had less Satisfaction in seeing them all of one sort, and his Glory would have been more contracted: But being infinitely good, he loves that each should be content with his Station. It is not the Elevation of it, but the Manner of filling it, that entitles us to his Approbation. In this vast Theatre, each Part is equally esteemed by our Great Master, if it be but well acted and maintained. When therefore we have such an Idea as we ought to have of the Supreme God, and are assured of his Esteem, Approbation, and Favour, can we yet trouble our selves that we are not esteemed by this or that Man preferable

ferably to others? This Uneasiness would be the direct Means to make us lose the Approbation of God; and the Tranquility which is opposite to it is the sure Way to preserve it. Does the Courtier, who is sure of the good Opinion of his Master, trouble himself about what the lowest of his Fellow-Subjects may think of him?

OUR Advantages, consider'd in themselves, do, if we are reasonable, furnish us with sufficient Grounds to be contented, and at the same time to be thankful to the great Author of them, as also to Men who may have contributed towards them: Nor need we, for this purpose, to heighten the Value of these Advantages, by comparing our Condition with that of others. The Joy which arises from this Comparison, has always a Mixture of Malice; and this will inevitably make us miserable. (w) How wretched is the Fate of that Man, who has made himself a Slave to a Passion that will raise him up as many Rivals almost as there are Men! The Shame of being out-stripped throws him into Despair, and so does almost that of being equalled. You aspire to the first Rank, without considering that you make all those your Enemies, who will not be content with the second Place. And why should they be content with it any more than you?

I KNOW nothing that shews a greater Degeneracy of Mind, than the thinking our selves less happy, because we see other People equally happy. If this depraved Taste were equal in all his Creatures, God Almighty, with his infinite Power and Goodness, would be able to make no more than one of them happy. This one would be without Equal, but all the rest must find themselves miserable. (x)

A MAN on the contrary, who has cured himself of this Prepossession, in esteeming Happiness only in Proportion as it is superior to that of others, and has freed himself from

(w) Relinque Ambitum: tumida res est, vana, ventosa; nullum habet terminum; tam sollicita est ne quem ante se videat, quam ne post se alium; laborat invidia, & quidem duplici. Vides autem quam miser sit, si is, cui invidetur, & invidet? Intueris illas potentium domos, illa tumultuosa, rixa salurantium, limina? Multum habent contumeliarum, ut intres: plus, quam intraveris. Præteri istos gradus divitum, & magno aggestu suspensa vestibula; non in prærupto tantum istic stabis, sed in lubrico. Hoc potius te ad sapientiam dirige, tranquillissimæque res, & simul amplissimas, pete. Sen. Ep. LXXXIV.

(x) Nulli ad aliena respicienti sua placent: Inde Diis quoque irascimur, quod alii nos antecedant.

from the mischievous Opinion of admitting nothing for a true Good, but what we can have the Pleasure of enjoying exclusive of all others; a Man, I say, who has disengaged himself from these false Principles, has found out the Secret of being Happy. He who envies no body any Thing, does almost enjoy every Thing; and certainly our Property in any Thing is so much the greater, by how much we can enjoy it with less Interruption; and for this Reason nothing is so much our own, as what we enjoy in common with others.^(y) What fine Scenes does the whole Universe present to our Eyes and Understanding! A very little will content the rest of our Senses!

LET us but love instead of envying, and we shall have the Pleasure of enjoying even what belongs to others. We shall look upon it as our own, on account of our loving those that possess of it. *Terras omnes tanquam meas videbo, meas tanquam omnium.* Sen. de Vit. Beat.

WHEN we love Truth and Virtue as we ought, they always give Pleasure to others; and our Instructions and Examples are follow'd with Pleasure: But when we aim only at Reputation, when we have nothing more in View than to raise a great Name, we shall always find that the Glory of others will eclipse that which we want to shine with, and continually mortify us.

How can we think our selves truly devout, and full of the Love of God, and of Resignation to his Providence, when we are pleas'd with the Fall, and mortified with the Elevation of others; when we love to distinguish our selves from all others, and to make them sensible of our being superior to them? How many *Saints* ought to be struck out of the Catalogue of those that truly deserve this Name.

WHEN I think of the Humour that reigns amongst the greatest part of the learned World, I find nothing greater or more distinguishing than this Elogium of *M. Cassini*: *He communicated, without Reserve, his Discoveries, tho' at the Hazard of having them stole from him; and was more desirous of having them serve to advance the Sciences than his own proper Glory. He publish'd his Inventions, not to make a Shew, but a publick Use of them.* Hist. Acad. Sci. Anno 1712. p. 137. Ed. Amst.

THE

(y) *Sapiens nihil judicat suum magis, quam cujus illi cum humano genere consortium est.* Sen. Ep. LXXIII.

THE celebrated *THALES* being asked what Recompence he had promised himself for his fine Discoveries, answer'd, That he propos'd no other than that of making them publick.

M. COLLIERS wrote to *M. GREGORY* in the same Sentiments: *Non est quod metuas cuiquam quicquid miserim communicare, parùm enim sollicitus sum utrumne meo an alieno nomine in publicum prodeat.*

IF after having studied with a sincere Desire of improving our selves, we come to compose with no other View but that which ought to be the only one, the *Publick Good*, we shall never do like Children, who for having corrected one Word, and sometimes a single Letter, admire and bless themselves for having become worthy of the first Rank. We shall never expose our selves to the Contempt of the reasonable Part of Mankind, by an Eagerness in setting too high a Price upon a Discovery, which loses all its Value when once we begin to boast of it; but being content to have it of some Use to the Publick, we shall not dispute with others the Honour of having done it this Service. Would you be secure from being surpris'd in this Weakness, of writing only for your self, and for the sake of obtaining a Name? Would you avoid being reproach'd with it? Then clear your self of it. Employ your Thoughts upon the good Effect your Instructions may produce in others, and don't once suffer your self to think of the Honour they may do to your self. (z)

I WOULD fain ask a Man who would have the sole Glory of knowing any Thing, and who would be so weak as to think himself undone, if he should see himself equal'd, what new Misfortune is befallen him, that his Air appears so much alter'd and dejected? His Answer would be, *That having, with a great deal of Pains and Trouble, at last made a considerable Discovery, he finds another has also made the same, about the same Time as himself.* I would reply to him, Never think of that at all, for you have made it nevertheless.

WHEN

(z) " It is acting for our Reputation, and particular Profit, not for the publick Good, when we do in the Market-Place what we might as well have done in private, and at high Noon-Day, what we had done the Night before; and are jealous of doing our selves, what others can do as well. Thus some Surgeons in *Greece* perform'd their Operations upon Stages, in the View of the People, to encrease their Practice, and draw Customers. They imagine that good Regulations cannot be understood, but by Sound of Trumpet." *Moss. Book III, Ch. 10.*

WHEN a Man, who is not indolent himself, sees with Pleasure the Talents of another of the same Profession with himself, the excellent Use he makes of them, and the Fruits he receives from them; this generous Part, which he takes in the Interests of another, is in my Opinion, one of the most incontestable Proofs of the *Greatness* of his *Soul*, and of the Purity of his Virtue.

AN eminent Philosopher of our Days makes *M. de Tschirnhaus* the *Greatness of Soul*, and true Generosity, to consist in loving Truth in such a manner, as to receive it with the same Pleasure from the Hand of another as from his own; and he regards this Equity as the most certain Character of Wisdom, and the best and most valuable Fruit of Philosophy. (a) The Earnestness with which he recom-

(a) Si autem hic omnem profus errorem vitare cupimus, in primis necessum erit, ut, quod maximè notandum, nullum alium in finem, quàm ob meram delectationem, quæ ab eâ profuit, veritatem acquirere studeamus; ideoque gloriæ cupiditas summopere hîc fugienda est, nec ulla laus propterea apud homines nostri ævi aut posteros aucupanda. Etenim quicumque ejusmodi cupidine capiuntur, næ ingentes sibi animi perturbationes atque anxietates conciliant. Veritates enim detectæ, quoniam ab initio non tam utiles apparent, quam reverà aliis rebus applicatæ postmodum cognoscuntur, dediti illi vanæ gloriæ subito tristitiâ anguntur, si suorum inventorum non statim appareat insignis utilitas, quia vident, se propterea eos, quos sectantur, honores consecuturos apud alios non esse. Imprimis autem supra modum anguntur, si in disquisitionibus suis, in ejusmodi incidant inventa, quæ licet sint utilissima, interim tamen ab aliis jam dudum fuerunt in lucem edita; atque ita perspiciunt gloriam quam impensè sectantur, sibi ab aliis esse præreptam. Si porò observaverint, alios ad similia studia, quæ ipsi tractant, feliciter promovenda idoneos esse, eosque nactos occasionem, ea ex voto prosequendi, summopere timent, ne ab illis sibi gloria præripiatur, & eâ de causâ, quantum possunt, (clanculum tamen, ne insatiabilis gloriæ cupiditas, aliis animadversa, in turpem ignominia pudorem definat) iisdem adversantur. Denique si egregia ingenii aliorum specimina viderint, ac audiverint, ejus auctorem eorum summis extolli encomiis, mallent ea non audire, atque invidia exesi orationem aliò deflectentes ægerrimè ferunt, se solos suo Marte ista non aperuisse. E contra verò, qui veritatem solius delectationis, quam præbet, gratiâ detegere studet, ex omnibus hisce circumstantiis sibi voluptatem quærît. Hic siquidem uti ob innumeras rationes, ita præprimis propter has, gloriam parvi facit, tum quòd, cum ipse sit solius veritatis amans, melius se ipsum, quàm quisquam alius, noscere, &, quanti sint dotes suæ faciendæ, scire queat, ac proinde existimationem, quam apud alios obtinet, semper aut justo majorem, aut justo minorem esse videat; tum, quòd nullo non tempore, & multos fautores, & multos invidos præter institutum

recommends it, would have been yet more effectual, and have done himself greater Honour, if he had always been an Example of it. But he was sometimes carried away with the Torrent, and has propos'd some of his Discoveries ænigmatically, and also given the Solution of some Problems, without adding the Demonstrations; (b) and in losing him,

institutum sibi conciliet, qui utrique ipsi multum temporis eripere valent, atque ita efficere, ut eò minùs illà fruatur delectatione, quam ex veritatis acquisitione percipit. Quantum ad inventorum utilitatem attinet, licet ea non statim appareat, delectatio tamen, quã afficitur, ipsi sufficit. Ad hæc nihil novit utilius esse hãc dote, quã semper nova detegit: hæc enim ratione aptior evadit ad utilissima quæque producenda. Nec opinandum est, eos, qui hominibus utilissima aperuerunt, statim ab initio in tam utilia incidisse, sed, tentatis primò multis inutilibus. Licet quoque inventa sua cum aliorum cogitatis congruant, multum tamen delectationis ex eo capit, se tantum Scientiæ nactum esse, ut etiam valeat ea detegere, quæ à magnis viris summã cum laude publicæ luci jam pridem exposita fuerunt. Quoniam verò infinita detegenda supersunt, neque solus iis omnibus ex tenebris eruendis par est, meritò lætatur, alios etiam ignotarum veritatum indagationi aptos inveniri: ita enim absque ullo labore suo multo in animo possunt excitari delectationes ob tot nova, & curiosa, quæ ab aliis inveniri queunt. Et proinde si sui esse officii unquam crediderit, aliis inservire, hoc præcipue tum sibi incumbere judicabit, cum occasio similium rerum inventoribus grata officia præstandi sese obtulerit: quando quidem sic aliis inserviens sibi ipsi inserviet: perinde ut omnes, si non nisi ductu Rationis veritatem ambirent, nec quicquam aliud agerent, quàm ut sibi ipsis hæc in re prodesse cogitarent, eo ipso etiam aliis necessario & quàm optimè inservient, hoc est, & sibi, & aliis prodesse eodem rediret, nec alterum absque altero existeret. Ita omnes ferè generosi essent; cum è contrario, si solum, quod è re nostrã esse videtur; ductu affectuum quæramus, atque hinc mundi gloriam, aut ejusmodi alia, præter solam veritatem, sectemur, necessario aliis adversemur. Denique solius veritatis cultor aliis nova inventa in lucem publicam edita nullatenus invidet, hinc siquidem voluptates aliquas percipit, quibus aliàs caruisset, quæque ad difficiliora detegenda, & propterea ad majores sibi creandas voluptates adjumento esse possunt. *Medicine Mentis.* Part I. p. 14.

“ He lov'd therefore the Sciences with this pure and disinterested Affection, which does so much Honour both to the Object which inspires, and the Heart which is inspired. The manner in which he expresses himself in some Places, upon the Extasies that are caused by the Enjoyment of Truth, is so lively, that it would have been inexcusable for him to have propos'd any other Recompence. ” It is thus the *Academy of Sciences* has pleas'd to express themselves on his Account. *Hist. An.* 1709. p. 149.

(b) “ M. de la Hire disputed with M. Tschirnhaus a Generation, or Description,

him, the Learned World have also had the Misfortune to lose some of his Secrets. (c) And yet he did not conceal them out of Interest; for he had no Regard to that, having no occasion for it. (d)

THE Habit we contract of judging of our Felicity by the Comparison we make of others, does also by degrees become the Rule of estimating our own *Merit*. Some will believe themselves to be very learned, and very honest Men, who

“ scription, which he gave of the Caustick by Reflection to a Quadrant.
 “ *M. Tschirnhaus*, who concealed the Demonstration of this Method,
 “ did not submit to *M. de la Hire*, who on his Part persisted to
 “ look upon this Generation as very much to be suspected. The
 “ Author himself was so sure of the contrary, that he sent it to the
 “ Publisher of the *Leipsick Journal*, but without Demonstration.” *Hist.*
Acad. An. 1709. p. 146.

“ *M. de la Hire* has since demonstrated, in his *Treatise of Epicycloids*,
 “ that this Caustick is one of them; that indeed it was of the length de-
 “ termined by *M. Tschirnhaus*, but that it could not be described after
 “ the Manner he proposed.” The Dispute would have been soon at an
 End, if *M. Tschirnhaus* had perfectly explained himself at the Beginning.
Ibid. p. 147.

(c) “ This Glass (says *M. Fontenelle*, speaking of the great double
 “ Convex-Glass, which performs such wonderful Novelties in natural
 “ Philosophy) is an *Ænigma* to the Learned: Whether it was wrought
 “ in Basons, as the common Telescopic Glasses? or whether it was
 “ cast in a Mould? We may divide our selves upon this Question, and
 “ shall find that both these Methods have very great Difficulties. So
 “ that nothing can give us a more noble Idea of the Mechanicks which
 “ *M. Tschirnhaus* made use of. He has declared, but perhaps he had a
 “ Mind to conceal the Secret the more, that he wrought it in Basons;
 “ and that the Mass of Glass which he wrought it out of weigh-
 “ ed 700 Pounds, which is also a wonder in Glass-grinding.” *Ibid.*
p. 152.

(d) “ He presented a Glass of this Kind to the Emperor *Leopold*, who
 “ in return for his Present, and also as a Recompence due to his Merit,
 “ would have invested him with the Title and Privileges of a Baron;
 “ but he refused them with all the Respect that ought to accompany
 “ such a Refusal, and accepted no other Favours of the Emperor, than
 “ a Picture of his imperial Majesty hanging by a Chain of Gold. To
 “ make this Incident appear less fabulous, we shall add another of the
 “ like Nature. When King *Augustus* would have done him the Ho-
 “ nour to have made him one of his Counsellors of State, he even re-
 “ fused it. It may be suspected that one who does not seek Honours,
 “ may do it on account of their Difficulty, or perhaps the Fear and
 “ Shame of not succeeding; but the most witty Malice can find no-
 “ thing to say against him that refuses them, even when they offer
 “ themselves.”

who are very far from deserving those Names; but they claim them by comparing themselves with others that are more ignorant and vicious than themselves.

THIS Inclination to judge of our selves by Comparison with others, and to believe our selves absolutely to be what we only are relatively, does some times throw us into monstrous Absurdities. It would be of Service to take Notice of them, as Opportunity presents them; because it is natural to avoid those Faults which we observe to make others so manifestly ridiculous. We have already hinted, that the Pleasure of comparing our selves with others is a Source of *Envy*; but this *Envy* is disguised under the Name of *Emulation*: Nor is this ingenious Distinction more just, That a generous *Emulation* aims only to get before a Rival, *Envy* to trip up his Heels. The true Generosity knows no Rivals. When therefore a Man makes it his Business to discover what is valuable in the Conduct of others, in order to equal, and, if possible, to excel it, he is said to be animated with a noble Emulation; a Motive that is very powerful and innocent in it self, but very dangerous on account of the Vice of *Envy*, upon which it borders very nearly. Man is born imperfect, but is design'd for Perfection, and ought to make that his Aim: He ought therefore consequently to excite himself to the Imitation of every Thing which he sees of that kind in others. Their Examples will instruct him too clearly, to leave him any Excuse for Ignorance or Idleness. What one Man has done, why cannot another do? If it cost him more Pains, he will have so much the more Merit. But as we usually fly Pain, we soon take an Antipathy to those whose Example invites and solicits us to undergo it. We are neither willing to run, nor yet to be out-run; we must however resolve upon the one or the other: But instead of breaking through our Idleness, we amuse our selves in opposing those that have taken Pains; and we see with Spite the Success of those whom we cannot follow. All little Minds! And these make the Majority, recommend Emulation, and fall into *Envy*.

EMULATION excites us to endeavour to equal others, and encourages us to take Pains: We are pleased at the Progress they make, and only reproach our self for being behind. But when once we are mortified at their Advances and Improvements, we fall from Emulation into *Envy*.

ALTHO' this Vice be one of the most common, it is however generally condemned. But a great many People flatter themselves that they are free from it, at the same time that

that they are fuller of it than they think for. All those that are envious do not repine at, or supplant others; there are some that moderate this Passion: But all those that have Occasion to heighten the Sentiment of their own Advantages, by comparing themselves with those that have fewer, have an Heart turn'd to Envy.

THE Encomiums with which we see a fellow Collegian honoured, distract an envious Heart, but are very entertaining to the Ears of an honest Man. By this Touch-Stone we may distinguish the Principles with which the Heart is possess'd. He that cannot hear others praised without Pain to himself, is always mortified at their Merit, and it is a certain Argument that he has none himself.

GOD himself did, indeed, in order to set off the Value of the Favours which he conferr'd upon his ancient People, bid them consider that they were very singular ones; but whenever the Holy Scriptures invite Men to make *Comparisons*, I am of Opinion that it is only because their excessive Obstinacy demands it; and because there is no other Way but this to make ungrateful People ashamed; and to rouse them out of their Stupidity, Murmurings, and Complaints, by shewing them, that without meriting more, they yet have more than other People. This Argument is particularly full of Weight, and confounding to those that complain of their Condition, when others who are in a worse, are yet content with it. It is only in this View that we ought to regard the Maxim of the Philosopher *Phavorin*. *In order to live easy, we ought to cast our Eyes upon those that labour under the greatest Misfortunes.* And it is in the same Sense that we ought to take the Advice of *Seneca*: "After having taken notice *how many* People there are that go before you, count also how many there are that follow you, if you would live agreeably to your self, and thankfully to God. But what need is there of comparing your self with others? Compare your self with your self: You have outstripp'd your self." *SUBINDE itaque, Lucili, quam multa sis consecutus, recordare: cum adspexeris quot te antecedant, cogita quot sequantur. Si vis gratus esse adversus Deos, & adversus vitam tuam, cogita quam multos antecesseris. Quid tibi cum cæteris? Te ipse antecessisti.*

XI. I SHALL recapitulate in few Words, *Recapitulation.* what I have laid down concerning the Inclination of Men for Glory. There is an *Internal Honour* which consists in *Merit*; and this we ought to take Pains to acquire, and make our principal Aim. There is also an *External one*,

which consists in the Approbation of the Wise and the Learned; and this we ought to have some Regard to; for this Approbation has also its Use and Value: It animates us to great Undertakings; it supports us in our Endeavours; and, besides this, hinders our giving any Attention to the impertinent Encomiums of the Ignorant. But we ought not to *propose for our Aim* the Approbation of particular Men: (e) For this being not sufficiently in our Power, our Happiness would depend too much upon others. Besides, since the Wisest have sometimes their Faults; it is much to be fear'd, that in order to obtain our End, and acquire the Approbation of a Person very much to be valued on a great many Respects, we might have the Weakness to approve even of his Faults. Add to this, that to appear to seek Esteem, is far from a sure Way to obtain it. But when we receive Marks of Esteem without having sought them, it is but just to receive them with Pleasure and Thankfulness. This Sensibility is a necessary Consequence of the Affection and Respect which we owe to Persons of Merit. What those People say who affect to recommend a *Carelessness* of our own proper Interests, and pretend that we ought to neglect and regard only with Indifference the Esteem or Contempt of Men; that a *wise Man is uneasy at being praised*, are nothing but fine Expressions, if any Thing can be finely express'd in a Language that signifies nothing, and is made up of Contradictions. There are some indeed, who, by an excessive Pride, become indifferent to all that may be said or thought of them; and this is the Effect of the profound Contempt they have for other Men. There are also some Debauchees, whose violent Passion for gross Pleasures shuts their Eyes against all other Considerations whatsoever, and by this means set them above regarding what others may say of them. But as to these pretended Sages and perfect *Saints*, whose heavenly Souls, if you believe them, see nothing [that is terrestrial but in Miniature, and at a Distance: If you would know how very negligent they are of themselves, and how far they extend this Insensibility, (f) do but attend to the holy Zeal with which

(e) Si de me benè vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum, quo, si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim si me cognoverint, idem sentient. Par illis idemque judicium est: æque verò instituitur ab his, qui dissidere non possunt. Ita pro eo est, ac si omnes idem sentiant: quia aliud sentire non possunt. *Sen. Ep. CII.*

(f) Requiritur ad humilitatem contemptus negativus sui ipsius, quo quis de se non labore, se non curet, commoda non sui causâ, non sui con-

which they throw down and trample upon those that appear wanting in Respect towards them: The Deference which they affect not to expect on account of their Persons, they know very well how to exact with Usury on account of some Relations which they bear. I don't know whether they cheat themselves by these Illusions and frivolous Distinctions, but I am sure they cheat no body else but Fools.

XII. WE have seen that our Inclinations to Pleasure, to Riches, and to Glory, are the Sources of Illusions and Errors, and we have laid down some Rules to regulate them. Let us therefore propose to our selves a more solid End; an End which we may dare to own both to others, and to our selves; and in Pursuit of which we may employ all our Strength and Faculties in the Face and Sight of the whole World, without fearing on its Part any Reproach for the present, or Reflection for the future. These Characters are not to be found in Pleasures, nor in Riches, no more than in Glory. Who is there that dares say, I have no other View than only to procure my self Pleasures, or to heap up Riches, or to secure Praises, all that I do is purely for these Ends. He who acts only upon these Views, would be out of his Wits, if others knew it; he conceals it even from himself. But he who makes an Advancement in Wisdom, and Knowledge his principal Aim, is hinder'd by nothing but Modesty

The Love of Truth and Virtue regulates our Passions.

contemplatione, sed solius Rationis parans. Amor Dei ac Rationis hoc agit in amante, ut se ipse deferat, à se penitus recedat, nullum sui rationem ducat. Est incuria sui. Fractus ejus, summa, quæ inde cadere potest, sublimitas, celsissima, ad quam evehi potes felicitas: Hunc fructum gestat in pyxide, sed ne referas! Nam id ipsum sunt, quod sunt si expectes: venena verò si affectes. *Geulincs Ethic. Cap. 2. Sect. 2.*

“ Humility is a perfect Forgetfulness, a total Neglect of our selves. “ We do not quit this Forgetfulness and Neglect out of any Regard to “ our selves, but only out of pure Obedience and Submission, and “ consequently out of Humility. The Fruit of this Forgetfulness “ and Condescension, is the highest Perfection, and the most sublime “ Felicity. But take care not to think too much upon it; rather be “ content to wait for it. This excellent Fruit will be apt to turn “ into Poison, to those that propose to reap it. It is sufficient to read “ this Fustian, to see the Absurdity of it. Let us see how smartly “ this good Man, who teaches others so perfectly to forget themselves, “ attacks those that mistake his Sentiment.” *Sycophantæ tantum apud imperitos, mancipia sua, valent, ut subinde non dicere non sit integrum nisi simul dicas te non dicere.*

Modesty from owning it; and if others discover it without his telling them, he can never blush for it. (g) The more we think of it, the better we shall be convinced, that nothing is more worthy of our Application. We see an infinite many ignorant People, that repent themselves of not having studied; and a very great Number of worldly Men, that blame themselves for not having secured a part in Wisdom: But there never was a learned Man, that wish'd he had liv'd in Ignorance, nor a wise Man that was sorry he did not give into the Follies of the World. Those indeed, who apply themselves to Study, only as a Means to advance their Fortunes, or for a Subsistence, do sometimes repent that they did not make Choice of some other, which might have proved more effectual for that Purpose. But we are speaking only of those that make Knowledge their End, and not the Means of making their Fortune, which blinds and stupifies them.

THOSE that seek their Felicity in Externals, have no Foundation to reckon upon. The Relish of their Pleasures perishes in proportion as they are enjoy'd; but that of having done our Duty endures: We can never remember the last without a sensible Satisfaction (h)

IT is a Truth of Experience, That one prevailing Passion weakens all the rest; it extinguishes them, or at least overpowers them, and makes them subservient to its own Ends. A Man therefore who ardently desires Wisdom and Knowledge, he who makes it his sole Business to instruct and reform himself, will either be without Passion for any Thing else, or will make use of every Thing to advance his Knowledge, and confirm his Virtue.

BUT how shall we render these just Inclinations so prevailing? This is not so difficult; we need only resolve upon it seriously and constantly, and the Success will be infallible.

(g) *Ea demum magna voluptas est, æqualem ac parem verbis, vitam agere. Cic in Cr. Salust.*

Si honesta sunt quæ facis, omnes sciant; si turpia, quid refert neminem scire, cum tu scias? O te miserum si contemnis hunc testem! *Sen.*

(h) Quomodo, inquis, hoc effici poterit? assiduâ intentione: si nihil egerimus, nisi ratione suadente; hanc, si audire volueris, dicet tibi: Relinque ista jamdudum ad quæ discurretur; relinque divitias aut periculum possidentium, aut onus; relinque corporis atque animi voluptates: molliunt & enervant; relinque ambitum, tumida res est. *Sen. Ep. LXXXIV.*

libe.⁽ⁱ⁾ We soon contract Habits of, and Passions for all those Things which we pursue with some Assiduity. Games, Walking, Husbandry, Business, Hunting, Building, Reading, Conversation, &c. every one of these become presently the Passion of those who bestow their Time upon them: Wisdom therefore and Knowledge must, for a much stronger Reason, produce the same Effect; because we are born to think justly, and to live regularly, and can never be happy but in proportion as we answer the End of our Creation.

A THINKING Nature cannot exist without Perception; and a willing Nature cannot exist without Inclination. Further, we would be happy, and cannot possibly divest our selves of this Will. But there are two Things that contribute towards this Happiness; solid Pleasures and Amusements. Our present Circumstances require both the one and the other: We have something too Grand in our Make to be able to live without the first, and something too imperfect to do without the last: We therefore stand in need of them both. But the Misfortune is, that having tasted the more trifling Pleasures, before we are acquainted with the others, we are apt to seek in them the Solid, which they have not. If we esteem them only as an Amusements, and if we reckon upon them for no more than they are truly worth, we shall never find our selves deceiv'd after obtaining them, and they would always please us equally. But not finding them such as our mistaken Representations of them have suggested, we are soon disgusted with them: From Esteem we pass to Contempt, from Love to Hatred; and by this Means we contract an Habit of Unsteadiness; which coming to extend its Influence upon our Studies, makes them as superficial as our Felicity, and as fluctuating and uncertain as our Pleasures. We ought therefore to apply our selves, to the Solid, and make that our Capital, in order to procure a Tranquility and Constancy, necessary as well for the obtaining of Knowledge as of Happiness.

To acquire this End, we need only make a Beginning, and the Pleasure we shall find in succeeding in what we undertake, will infallibly engage us to persist in it. In all other Projects, we are frequently disappointed; but in these

we

(i) Optima vivendi ratio est eligendo, eam jucundum consuetudo reddet. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib. 4.*

Cogita quid honestè, quid fortiter feceris: bonas partes tecum ipse tracta; memoriam in eâ quæ maximè miratus es, sparge. *Sen. Ep. LXXVIII.*

we advance continually. He who takes Pains, and makes his Felicity consist in doing what he wills to do, by confirming his Will to what he is able to do, is always sure to do what he proposes to himself. For who can hinder him from doing what is in his Power to do? An Obstacle which puts it out of our Power to advance, and which stops us for some Moments, does upon that Score excuse us, and Wisdom orders us in this Case not to be uneasy. He who runs after Glory, frets at all Impediments: He who pursues Wisdom is troubled only at those which he himself is the Cause of. All that Happiness which others find in the Variety of their Occupations, the Application to the End which I have here recommended, is so far from depriving us of, that it puts us in a Condition of relishing it still more deliciously. The Love of Truth and Wisdom does not dull the Senses, or clog the Imagination; it only regulates the Use of them, and teaches us to benefit by external Objects, without Inquietude, Disgust, and Repentance. The Multitude lose a thousand Pleasures for want of knowing how to render themselves attentive to them; they languish in their continual Diversions, which lose a great Part of their Relish by the Habit they make of them. But the wise Man, who uses them only now and then, always finds a Pleasure in their Novelty; and as he has other Inclinations that call him off, he does not dwell so long upon his Diversions, as to give them time to become troublesome and insipid. If they offer themselves, he tastes them; and if they do not, he can do very well without them, because he always finds within himself, more than without; so that he never is at a Loss either for Pleasure or Employment. It is in these Sentiments, so very reasonable, and justly regulated, that we ought to make our Glory consist. He whose Riches and Titles inspire to Pride, does not deserve them; he is made up of Ignorance, Blindness, and Wretchedness; and he is so far from being in the Enjoyment of the true Goods, that he has not so much as a Knowledge of them. A Man who possesses these, and is truly sensible of the Value of them, finds every Thing else below them; and in whatever Rank he is placed, he can never be acquainted with Vanity: Whatever Relation he stands in, he esteems it lower than it really is. *Sapiens in cælo impositus intelligit, cum sellam aut tribunal ascenderit, quam humili loco sederit.*

Sen. Ep. LXVIII.

XIII. THE Condition last mentioned is so happy and glorious, and has so much Grandeur in it, that for this very Reason, instead of being a Remedy, it may become even a Temptation to Vanity. In order to prevent this, I must once again advise, That we need only avoid comparing our selves with others. There certainly can be no harm in being acquainted with our Advantages, and in rejoicing in our good Fortune, because there can be no Virtue founded upon Ignorance and Blindness: But to magnify our Happiness, by comparing it with that of others, and to think our selves more happy, because others are less so, is to establish in our Hearts the Throne of Pride, and to sow in them the Seeds of Envy. For if our Happiness encreases in our Eyes, by the Attention we give to the Misfortunes of others, this same Happiness must diminish by their Advancement. And how can we see, I do not say with Joy, but even with Tranquility, that which renders us less happy?

Love of Preference always dangerous.

THERE are but two Cases where this Comparison of our selves with others can be lawful. 1. When we make this Comparison *in gross*; and that it turns only upon the Difference of two Conditions considered in themselves; as, the Condition of Ignorance with that of Knowledge; and the State of Passion with that of Tranquility. Thus by comparing Conditions, and not Persons, we prefer the best to the worst. 2. In the second Place, when we are so foolish as to become discontented with our own Condition, it may be very useful to cast our Eyes upon those who enjoy fewer Advantages than our selves, and who, notwithstanding this, do yet live contented. But the End of this Comparison is not to make us think our selves happier by a View of the Superiority of our Condition to that of others, but to make us sensible of our Mistake, in complaining of our Condition, notwithstanding we have a great deal more Reason to be content, than they who really are so. By thus avoiding to compare and prefer our selves, we may find Pleasure in Riches and Praises; for that these are Advantages, we have already prov'd. But when once we want to be richer, or more praised than others, then Envy and Hatred mix with them, and after that Disorder and Illusion; for Error follows commonly at the Heels of Vice.

IF we would trace the Source of all the Disturbances that that happen among Men of Letters, to their great Dishonour, and which retard their Progress in Learning, we should find I have not enlarged too much upon this Head, of the Pleasure

sure we take in seeing our selves esteemed in Preference to others, nor will any one be surpris'd, that I return to it more than once.

The general Character of the Passions.


XIV. I SHALL conclude with a Remark on the Passions in general, which is, That when they once possess themselves of our Heart and Attention, they confine us to consider only what is agreeable to them, and what may contribute most to their Gratification. They remove all other Considerations, and divert our Thoughts from them, and by this Means oppose the Enlargement of the Understanding. The Capacities of the Mind are always greater in proportion to its Tranquility; and if together with this Tranquility, it is active and industrious, its Views will extend so far that nothing will escape them. Experience every Day verifies this Maxim. The Passions are like Optick-Glasses, and either magnify Objects, or multiply, or diminish, or colour them, and in various Manners always modify the Ideas of them. Sadness makes every Thing appear disgusting, and Joy pleasing.



C H A P. XII.

Of Attention and Diligence.

Attention the Principle of our Knowledge.

I. UCH is the Nature of the human Understanding, that its Ideas arise one from another: They arise so much the more readily, and in a greater Number, more clear, distinct, exact, and compleat, in proportion as the Attention is more enlivened and active.

THE Attention depends upon the Will; for when we are attentive, we will to be so; and when we resolve to be attentive, we become so in effect. It is true we are not always equally disposed to do what we will, no more than to will always with an equal Resolution. Some times it is very easy, and at other times very hard to obey the Dictates of the Will, that is, to execute what we have resolved upon. A good many of the Maxims which we have before laid down, tend to make us more submissive to the Laws of Reason, and to give a greater Activity and Steadiness to the great Principle of the Fruitfulness of our Understanding, I mean

mean the *Attention*; but the Importance of the Subject very well deserves a Chapter by it self.

II. IN order to be attentive, we must first will to be so. There is nothing more easy than Willing in general; nothing more easy than a simple Act of the Will; but there is hardly any Thing more difficult than to will, with Perseverance, that which gives some Uneasiness. We depend entirely upon our *Habits*; and these do principally regulate the Easy and the Difficult: We follow these with all our Hearts, and it is very difficult to resist them; their Power encreases with their Duration; and the longer we live, the harder it is to form new ones: But from our very Infancy we contract two Habits altogether contrary to Attention.

Obstacles to Attention, and Means to surmount them.

FROM the Moment of our coming to have any Notion at all of our Existence, we have a Will to be happy; and as our Reason is not then sufficiently form'd to comprehend wherein the solid Felicity does consist, and to discover the Way to it, we stop at the first Impressions that give us any Taste of it, and bear the least Character of it. We avoid Pain, and apply our selves to Pleasure. (a) Our Aversion to Pain makes all Efforts disagreeable; and our Thirst after Pleasure makes us run from Object to Object, in order to make amends, if possible, by their Multitude, for the Insufficiency of each of them. Attention demands Efforts; and we are used to look upon Labour as an unfortunate Condition. Attention fixes the Mind upon one Object; whereas we are accustomed to be pleased only with the Multitude of them, and by running them over hastily.

WE have already demonstrated the Error of these two Prejudices: We have proved that Labour is the Way to Felicity; that our Happiness depends upon Attention, because our Learning and Virtue depends upon them; and consequently to know how to be attentive, is to know how to make our selves happy. But to make these Truths the more effectual, we ought to repeat them, and frequently to run over the Proofs of them, that we may make them perfectly familiar to us.

2. WE

(a) Fieri enim non potest, ut animus Libidini deditus, amore, desiderio, cupiditate, sæpè nimia copiâ, inopia etiam nonnumquam impeditus, hoc, quicquid est, quod nos facimus in dicendo, non modò agendo, verùm etiam cogitando possit sustinere. Cic. pro. M. Galio.

2. WE ought to oppose Habit against Habit. Habits arise and are confirmed by repeated Acts: We need only therefore will frequently, and this Will must turn into an Habit. Let us say to our selves every Moment, I will be attentive. Thus after having will'd very frequently, and with some Trouble, we shall at last come to will always, and without Reluctance.

3. WE ought to excite this Will, and give it room to arise by the Pleasure of its commanding and governing it self, and of being Master of it self, and of obeying Reason, which only informs and advises it, and leaves it free, rather than be under the Slavery of confused Sentiments, and of blind and rebellious Inclinations, which tyrannize over, and captivate and compel it. To follow the first of these Principles, is to live like a Man; to pursue the last, is to become a Machine.

4. TO encourage us the better to make Attempts upon our selves, and upon our blind Habits, we ought to reflect on the Advantages that arise from these Attempts; and give our selves up to the Pleasure of relishing the Fruits of them. By pleasing our selves with the happy Success of our Attention, we shall dispose our selves always more and more towards it.

5. AND since the Success confirms the Will in its Resolutions, we ought to make use of all Opportunities and Assurances in order to facilitate them. When we find our selves in the Humour for Application, these are the precious Moments which must not be lost. An Habit of Attention will strike Root more deeply at such Times in the Space of an Hour, than it will in a great many Days under Dispositions less favourable. Health, Tranquility, Solitude, and Morning Hours, will present us with these happy Opportunities, which we ought to embrace and employ with so much Care, and which are of such Importance to be improved.

SOLITUDE, which reduces us to the Necessity of being by our selves, and of entertaining our selves with our own proper Thoughts; the Morning Hours, at which Time the Impressions of Objects which amuse us are in part effaced, or at least weakned, by the preceding Night's Rest, would dispose us towards Tranquility, and by that means become very great Helps to Attention, if Men did but know what Use to make of this Tranquility. (b) But to the greatest

(b) Sed non multum ad tranquillitatem locus confert: animus est, qui commendat omnia. Vidi ego in villa hilari & amœna moestos, vidi in media solitudine occupatis similes. Sen. Ep. LV.

est Part of them it is a very troublesome Condition, and a Source of continual Uneasiness. They must perpetually have some Amusement to possess their Minds and Hearts; and their Spirits flag, if they have not constantly some Trifle to support them; and at the very Time when they might be most by themselves, and thinking of their Duty, they seek most eagerly for some Diversion. For want of Objects, they recollect the Ideas of them; and by this Means, they seem to do all they are able, to prevent their having any Time left to improve themselves.

It is for this Reason, that I have placed this Chapter, after those that treat of the Passions. We are more or less attentive, in proportion as we know how to revive and excite the Passions in a proper Manner. When we are once Masters of these, we are Masters of every Thing. In the greatest Hurry, and in the thickest Crowd, we can think of that which ought to be the Subject of our Thoughts; we see no more than what we have a mind to see, and we understand only that which we would understand. Without Tranquility, Solitude is no better than Tumult
(c) *Non multum locus confert, nisi se sibi præ-* Sen. Ep.
stet Animus, qui secretum & in occupationibus CIV.
mediis, si volet, habebit.

6. AS we give our Attention without Reluctance to that which is not disagreeable, and that the Subjects in favour of which we are prepossessed, engage it of themselves, it is visible that in order to form our selves towards an Habit of Attention, it is of the utmost Importance to begin by employing our Studies upon that which is most easy, and most pleasing.

7. AFTER we have found some Relish in our Studies, and are become capable of a sufficient Attention, then the *Mathematicks* are the most proper Studies to confirm and complete it. For in the practical Part of them, if, through the least Inadvertency, we make but one single Mistake, we perceive

(e) *Omnia licet foris resonent; dum intus nihil tumultus sit, dum inter se non rixentur Cupiditas & Timor, dum Avaritia Luxuriaeque non diffideant, nec altera alteram vexet. Nam quid prodest totius regionis silentium, si affectus fremunt?*

Omnia noctis erant, placidâ composita quiete.

Falsum est; nulla placida quies est: nisi quàm ratio composuit; nox exhibet molestiam, non tollit, & sollicitudines mutat. Nam dormientium quoque insomnia tam turbulenta sunt, quàm dies. Illa tranquillitas vera est, in quàm bona mens explicatur. Sen. Ep. LVI.

perceive at the End of the Calculation, that we are mistaken, but neither know how, nor where; so that we are obliged to begin all over again. To save therefore the Trouble of repeating the same Operation so often over again, we are forced to be upon our Guard against Mistakes. We see that if we mistake but in any one single Place, it is sufficient to deprive us of the Fruit of all the Pains we have taken in every Place besides; and by this means we accustom our selves to a continual Attention.

As to Demonstrations we are obliged to comprehend them either entirely; or not at all. In Matters of History, Morality, or in the Explication of a Phænomenon in Natural Philosophy, we may comprehend in gross the Thought of him who is instructing us, or whose Works we are reading: We may retain Part, without having any regard to the rest. But here we must have all, or nothing; the least Part omitted, leaves us in the Dark; and he that would speak of Part, without comprehending the Whole, must speak without knowing what he says, and will be very sensible himself that he does not comprehend what he says.

THE Study of the Mathematicks does, besides all this, occasion one of the most happy Habits that can possibly take Root in the Mind of Man. It is that of *loving Truth*, and of finding it worthy our Attention *on the account of its being Truth*. We accustom our selves to love Knowledge for its own sake; we love to instruct our selves, even tho' we know not what Fruit we shall reap from our Instructions. Mathematicians are every Day charm'd with a thousand and a thousand Theorems, whose Value is, that they are undoubted Truths, which arise one from another. Is not this a Proof that Man is born for Truth, and that his greatest Satisfaction consists in Knowledge? The Truths of Divinity, Morality, and even of Natural Philosophy, are more engaging; they have a very near Relation to our Passions, and very often to our Fortunes. In the sacred Doctrines, and in our Duties also, and Philosophical Hypotheses, we think we love Truth, when we love only our Prejudices; and very often we Study more to cheat our selves with what is convenient, than to inform our selves of what is true. But in studying the Mathematicks, we learn to study with Attention, and without Prejudice.

8. WHEN we read other Works with the same Application as those that are Mathematical; when in an *History*, for Example, we have always present all the Interests and Characters of the Persons whose Words or Actions we are reading;

ing; when we have always before our Eyes the Situation and Plan of all the Towns and Countries whose Revolutions are describ'd; when in a Piece of Oratory, we forget no one Circumstance, but have a continual Regard to the Propriety of the Terms, the Order of the Arguments, the Chain of Reasonings, the Justness of the Thoughts, the Beauty of the Images, the Delicacy of the Turns, the Force of the Expressions, the Harmony of the Periods, and to whatever is said, and is capable of being understood; we shall soon discover the Value of Attention by the inexpressible Pleasure we shall receive from it, on whatsoever Subject we fix: It is never without Recompence, even upon the slightest and most inconsiderable Subjects. If we be at Table, or assisting in a Consort, the casting our Eyes upon Pictures, Buildings, Gardens, or Landskips, upon all Occasions, Wandering and Carelessness will diminish our Pleasure, and *Attention will encrease it.*

9. FOR fear of falling back into Idleness, and giving room to the old Habits to be revived again, we ought to do nothing that has any relation to Study without Application. It happens every Day to People, who amuse themselves with reading of Histories, which are Books that require the least Attention of any, that they retain only here and there a Place, which they afterwards connect by some Supplement of the Imagination, or else confound them with others which resemble them in some Respect. But it is a great deal better to sit still, than to lose in this manner in Amusements the Fruit of our other Studies, which we have been pursuing with Application. The Pleasure of reading without Application, is a dangerous Pleasure. Useless Books we ought to lay aside; and to make all possible Advantage of those, from which we may reap some Fruit. If they treat well upon good Subjects, they deserve our Attention, both for the Matter and Manner of their Performance: But if they contain only sorry and mistaken Accounts of their Subjects, which their *Title-Page* promises us a compleat Explanation of, the reading of them may vitiate our Taste, by accustoming it to Confusion and Obscurity, unless we have Judgment enough to discover their Defects, and find out the Means to avoid them.

III. BUT since the Attention cannot be supported always in the same Vigour, what Precautions must we take to avoid returning into the dangerous Habit of Inattention, by the Pleasure we shall find in refreshing our selves, and in ceasing from
Action

Of Refreshment.

Action after being fatigued? When the Attention is exhausted by means of the Spirits being exhausted, we ought to seek to recruit them by Nourishment and Rest; but, if we have no Occasion for either of these, we had much better do nothing at all, than to employ our selves carelessly about any Thing. For how little soever we have of natural Activity, we shall never be pleas'd long with doing nothing, and consequently need never fear contracting an Habit of it; Uneasiness, and a sad Wearisomness, will rouse the most Idle from Inaction.

IT is even certain, that an agreeable Employment contributes a great deal more to recruit our Spirits and Faculties, than a simple Repose; and it is upon this Account that human Nature stands in need of Recreation, and of some Amusements which require less Attention, and consequently will not fatigue it: But, if we wou'd reap the full Benefit of these, and expect that they shou'd divert and refresh us for new Applications, we ought to give as much Attention to them, as is necessary to relish the entire Pleasure of them. When therefore our Attention relaxes, not so much by the Exhaustion of the Spirits, as by the Continuance of our Application, which makes it tedious by diminishing the Pleasure which it gave at the Beginning; we may interrupt it, and give a little into the secret Inclination of the Heart for Variety. We may unbend our selves from Meditation by Reading; and a second Reading upon some other Subject will divert the Fatigue of the former, not by the Carelessness of our performing it, but by the Variety of the Subject, which, besides this, must also require a less Degree of Attention. We have Walking, Musick, Conversation, (d) and such-like Diversions, to amuse, relax, and refresh our Faculties; and provided it be not entirely exhausted, the Attention will be reviv'd much sooner than it was weary'd, by being apply'd successively to such Subjects as will require no more of it, than what we can give without Trouble.

I AM not so superstitious to condemn *Games* in themselves: I even acknowledge that they might be of Use to Society. The important Services which Men do for one another, are not what binds them so much together; for, besides that the Instances of these are very rare, they are often uneasy both to the Author, on account of their being expensive,

(d) Indulgendum est animo: dandumque subinde otium, quòd Alimenti ac virium loco sit: & in Ambulationibus apertis vagandum, ut Cœlo libero & multo Spiritu augeat attollatque se Animus. *Sen. de Tranq. An. Cap. 15.*

five, and to the Receiver, because of their laying him under Obligations. But the Heart is easily won by the frequent Returns of pleasing Amusements. We at last contract a Friendship for those who are assisting in our Recreations; we cannot possibly avoid it, and when we are requested to do them some Services that are even troublesome, we are too much engaged in their Acquaintance to refuse them. Notwithstanding all this, I wou'd not recommend *Games* to Men of Learning as useful Amusements, and proper to divert them. They produce this Effect only in those that take a Pleasure in them. But young People run a very great Hazard in giving into them, and bestowing part of their Time upon them; because for one that uses them moderately, there is an hundred that abuse them. However, if we have not got an Habit of them in our Youth, we shall hardly take a Fancy to them in an Age more advanced, and consequently they will then neither relax nor divert us.

THERE are some *Games* which the graver People take a sort of Pride in, as *Chefs; Back Gammon; &c.* but wou'd think it a Disgrace to them, to amuse themselves with *Games* more common and easy. But this Notion is the Effect of their Vanity, and of the Pleasure they take in imposing upon the ignorant Multitude.

THERE are some People, whose Lives are so taken up in certain *Games*, for their Skill, in which they very much value themselves, that if it were not for these, they wou'd hardly make any use at all of their Thought and Attention: But Men of Letters would do much better to apply themselves to some useful Composition or Study, than to a fatiguing *Game*. Nor can they esteem as an Amusement, that which tires, and puts them out of a Condition of making any farther Application till after an Interval of Repose. Besides, they are but too subject to contend for the Glory of the first Rank, and to be ambitious of out-shining one another. This Inclination, to which they are every Moment exposed, has but too much Influence over them; and they ought rather to oppose it incessantly, than to encourage it by giving into *Games*, where all the Fruit they reap for their Trouble in learning them, is only the rejoicing at the Mortification and bad Fortune of their Fellows, and the Pleasure of finding themselves most skilful.

IV. So far therefore thou'd we be from reading upon any Subjects carelessly, under the Pretence of diverting our selves, that we ought to begin all our *Studies*, by examining the Impor-

*The Influence
of Inattention
upon our Lives.*

tance

tance of that which is to be the Subject of them. If it be not worth our Pains, then we ought to lay it aside; but if we find it very well deserves our Application, then we ought to give our selves entirely up to it, by serious and repeated Reflections both upon its own proper Excellency, and upon the Advantages we may make of it. Above all, we ought to take care that our Attention be continu'd and maintain'd uniform from the Beginning to the End. For if by any Neglect we mistake in the Principles, the farther we pursue the Consequences, the more we wander in Error; and if, after having well establish'd the Principles, we suffer our selves to be misled by Precipitation into some false Consequences, amongst a great many true ones, this is also losing the Fruit of all that we have before laid down with so much Care. We ought therefore upon all Occasions to remind our selves of the indispensable Necessity of Attention. In Practice, we hardly ever sin, or commit a Fault, either against God or Man, but for want of Application. For we know the general Rules; and in gross, have a Desire to please God, and be esteem'd of Men. But we apply these Principles too precipitately, and by this Means we are not sensible that we deviate in particular Circumstances, from the End we proposed to our selves in general.

THE Impertinence which takes up the greatest Part of our *Conversations*, those frequent and almost perpetual Ramblings from what is or ought to be the Subject of them, and which very often oblige those that are more rational, to close in with some *Game*, in order to avoid being drawn into nonsensical Disputes, where nothing will ever be understood; whence comes all this, but from the Want of Attention? The greatest Part of Mankind remain Children all their Lives, and being equally ashamed of being taught, and proud of teaching, they boldly advance whatever happens to rise uppermost in their narrow Minds.

IN *Theory* also, there is no body but wou'd avoid Error, and consequently we fall into it only thro' Inadvertency. For fear, therefore, that the Lightness of any Subject shou'd give our Attention an Occasion to relax, we ought to consider, that there is no Error so small, but by its Fruitfulness, and Connexion with others, may become fatal. We shou'd do well also to observe, that all we shall establish will be nothing but Mistakes, and that the Consequences will deviate so far from Truth, as they are connected with false Principles. Not to mention, that the very same manner in which

we

we reason upon a Subject of small Importance, where we fall into some small Error, which, for want of our Attention, escapes our Correction, will also be follow'd in a Subject of greater Importance; and where we cannot commit a Mistake without Danger. It is demanded, whether Taste, Whiteness, Weight and Motion, &c. ought to be consider'd as so many little distinct Beings and Realities, which are superadded to corporeal Substance? or whether they are only some certain Conditions and Manners of the Existence of that Substance? Whether the Qualities of any Body, be not the Body it self under some certain Conditions, as the Roundness of a Ball of Wax, is the Wax it self under a certain Disposition? The Question appears very subtle, and of pure Curiosity; and yet, for want of its being formerly determin'd in the manner it has been lately, since the Philosophy of *Descartes*, it has given room to a Doctrine, which wou'd otherwise have never been thought of, whose Consequences are deplorable in discouraging those that might become Converts, and in giving great Advantages to the Enemies of our most Holy Religion.

To run without Scruple the Risque of being deceiv'd, by deciding without Attention upon a Subject, which seems not to be worth the Trouble of being examin'd with Application, shews a Narrowness of Genius. There is no Mistake so inconsiderable in it self, but may, by being pursued from Consequence to Consequence, become the Principle of a great many more, and at last become fatal. The Maxim of *Aristotle* is applicable to this Purpose, *Puerile est contemnere parva, unde deduci possunt magna.*

THE *Stoicks* maintain'd the *Summum Bonum* to consist in *Virtue*, and the *Summum Malum* in *Vice*. To regard this Sentiment in it self, if it be an Error, it still tends to aggravate the Turpitude of Vice, and to set off the Beauty of *Virtue*. And this may perhaps be rather thought an happy Prepossession, than a Mistake of any bad Consequence. But from hence it will follow, that a Man truly virtuous is supremely happy, and consequently wants nothing, not even Immortality. The vicious Man, on the contrary, is supremely miserable, and by Consequence is sufficiently punish'd, there being no Torment to be compared with supreme Misery. After we have once drawn these Consequences, and have by Prepossession receiv'd them for true, all the Arguments deduced from the Accidents, Misfortunes, and melancholy Condition of good Men in this Life, in order to establish the Hopes of a better, fall immediately to the

Ground: A future State, to make a Retribution, is by no means necessary. The Virtuous is sufficiently recompens'd, since he is supremely happy; and the Vicious sufficiently punish'd, since he is supremely miserable. Hence the *Stoicks*, in order to defend Providence against the Objections of the *Epicureans*, instead of insisting upon a Life to come, when all Accounts were to be made up, which was a very natural and obvious Reply, were obliged to have Recourse to Subtilities suitable to their grand Principle, the Brightness of which prevented their discovering their Error.

V. DIVERSION is a particular Sort of *Of Diversion*. Obstacle to the Attention; for all those who thro' Carelessness or Unsteadiness neglect to be attentive, cannot be said to be diverted from Attention. This is meant only of those who are put off and diverted from attending to what is said to them, whether it be out of a natural *Stupidity*, or by an Habit which comes very near it, and makes them incapable of thinking attentively, or whether a continual *Rambling* has made it impossible for them to fix; or, lastly, whether too great an Application to their own proper Thoughts, diverts them commonly from those of others, and hinders them from entering into what is said to them.

THERE are some who may be said not to think at all, or to think upon nothing. That is, there are some whose Ideas are so loose, and their Sentiments so weak and confused, and who do moreover so rarely reflect upon their Ideas and Sentiments, that they have not so much as a Memory sufficient to speak what they have been thinking of, even the Moment they have thought it. They have a very thoughtful Look, and seem to be taken up in profound Reflections; but, if you once ask them what they are thinking of, you surprize them. They seem to start as out of a Sleep, and as tho' waked out of a Dream, whose Idea presently vanishes with their Sleep; for the Memory of nothing is preserv'd, but of that which we think of with Reflection.

WHEN young People are inclined to this Fault, if we wou'd prevent the Consequences of it, we must reason upon such Subjects as are within their Reach, and are not disagreeable to them, and upon which we find some Means to excite their Curiosity. They shou'd be obliged to repeat frequently these Reasonings, and be confin'd from Solitude, from Fatigue, from Conversations upon Subjects too high for them, and from all such Companies where they cannot be free; and they shou'd be kept in Pleasure, and in Action, and be indulg'd

indulged in a perfect Liberty of Thought, for fear the Commands we lay upon them to regulate them, shou'd discourage them from thinking at all. When they make a Mistake, they ought to be shewn it with a great deal of Softness and Moderation; and with all possible Marks of Friendship. We shou'd not only not make use of Censure, nor Surliness, nor Raillery, but moreover their Faults shou'd be represented as Trifles; and what we substitute in the room of them, shou'd be propos'd not so much for a Correction, as for something a little better. They shou'd be very seldom reprimanded.

THOSE who appear diverted by the Effect of too great an Application to their own proper Thoughts, may correct this Fault, by studying to moderate their Desires, and to govern their Passions; by not confining themselves to the Conversation of their Inferiors or Friends, but by frequenting as much as possible the Company of their Superiors, before whom they will be obliged to appear with Submission and Regard. I would advise them also to pass every Hour to different Studies, in order to accustom themselves to make room for succeeding Ideas, notwithstanding the strong Impression of the first. Lastly, to correct themselves more effectually from this Diversion, whenever they fall into it, they ought to punish themselves for it, and confine themselves to read over a second, third, or fourth time, that which they have pass'd over too carelessly, and even oblige themselves to get by heart those Subjects from which they have been diverted.

A MULTITUDE of Business sometimes occasions a Diversion in Minds otherwise the most capable of, and the best disposed to Attention. For which Reason, we ought to take care to make it an indispensable Duty to burden our selves with no more than we can bear, and to regulate always our Undertakings according to our Faculties. Besides this, we ought to form very clear and exact *Schemes* of all we have to do. All that we foresee we shall have to transact for our Day's Work, we shou'd begin by laying out every Part in the manner we are to perform it. When we have executed part of a Scheme so well regulated, we shall never be diverted by any Uneasiness from the succeeding Parts, being assured we shall discharge it very exactly, because we are already perfectly well prepared for it.

THERE are some who are diverted from giving Attention to what we say to them, by the sudden Rise of some Ideas in their Minds, upon which they immediately fix, for

fear they should slip away unregarded. But this is an Abuse of our Faculties ; for when the Mind is justly form'd, and we once come to know how to think regularly, the same Principles that have once given Rise to any Idea in a proper Manner, will infallibly excite it again, whenever we shall think upon the same Subject with Attention.

VI. WHEN we have once discover'd the *How to engage the Attention.* Means to make our selves attentive, we shall easily understand what is necessary to engage the Attention of others. There must be *Perspicuity*, for fear of discouraging and tiring the Attention ; *Brevity*, to prevent Tedioufness and Impatience ; and *Order*, to encourage the Memory : The Arguments should be just and *solid* to interest the Attention, the Turns *lively* and *new* to employ it with agreeable Sentiments. The Whole must be *natural*, because Nature pleases, and Affectation disgusts our Self-love. And it must be so contrived, that the Hearer may be made sensible of his own *proper Genius*, whilst he listens to that of the Orator ; and that he penetrates so much better into the Sense and Beauty of the Ideas that are presented to him, as he has himself the better Understanding. When the Hearer is entirely satisfied, we ought to *conclude* ; and, if we have yet something left to say, we should so order it, that what we have already said may make him *desirous* of hearing what we have resolv'd to add farther.

VII. THE same Unsteadiness which opposes the Attention, does also yet farther oppose *Diligence*, which is a continued Attention, and is never interrupted any longer than is necessary to refresh our Faculties, and reanimate our Vigour. Every Thing that engages our Attention, disposes us to Diligence ; we lose the Fruit of our preceding Attention, if we neglect to persevere in it. A Labourer loses his Pains, if he does not continue them ; and, in general, to reap the Fruit of any Work, it is in vain to make an happy Beginning, unless we make the same Ending. (e) The Mind is too much limited, and the Things to the Knowledge of which it ought to apply it self are too numerous, and too much compounded, to suppose that they can be all comprehended in a little time.

As we have a great deal to do, we ought to labour with Earnestness, and persevere in the Work. The sooner we acquire

(e) Perdet Agricola quod sparsit, si labores suos destituit in semine, multâ curâ sata perducuntur ad segetem, nihil ad fructum pervenit quod non æqualis cultura à primo ad extremum profecquitur. *Sen.*

acquire any Thing, the longer we enjoy it. If we do but accustom our selves to it, we shall find no more Trouble in it; and even the Pleasure of working will become one of the Fruits of the Work. (f) It is with Learning, as with Snow-Balls roll'd from the Top of an Hill, which gather and grow bigger every Turn they make. To enjoy the Benefit of the Pains we have been at, we must persevere in the Work. If we have begun with a View of Learning, why shou'd we stop, when we have still so many Things to learn? *Tamdiu descendum, quamdiu nescias.*

A MAN that wou'd use Diligence, must, 1. Set before his Eyes, on the one side, the Examples of great Genius's, whose Idleness and Unsteadiness have stopp'd their Advancement; and, on the other, those of such, as with moderate Talents, and a great Assiduity, have not fail'd to arrive at very great Abilities. He ought to remember that Application enlarges the Understanding, and Idleness contracts it. We know not how to see any Thing beyond the little we have already acquired, after once we have softly indulged our selves in the Habit of making no farther Endeavours to extend our Acquisitions. The Hopes of a Victory contributes very much towards the gaining it; and in most Things, if we fail of Success, it is for want of Courage. (g)

IDLENESS is an infallible Source of Vice. When the Love of Knowledge prevails in the Heart, the Way to it is never thought troublesome: But when once we have little or no Love for it, we suffer our selves quietly to be led away by our Fancy, and wandring Imagination, we
abandon

(f) Persevera ut cœpisti, & quantum potes propera: quo diutiùs frui emendato animo & composito possis. Frueris quidem etiam dum emendas, etiam dum, componis. *Sen. Ep. IV.*

Philosophiæ nullum Tempus satis magnum est, etiamsi à pueritia, usque ad longissimos humani ævi terminos vita protenditur. *Sen. Ep. LXXII.*

(g) Imitetur illum, cui sine dubio summa vis dicendi conceditur, Atheniensem Demosthenem, in quo tantum studium fuisse, tantusque Labor dicitur: ut primum impedimenta naturæ diligentia industriaque superaret, cumque ita balbus esset, ut ejus ipsius artis, cui stude- ret, primam literam non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius eo locutus putaretur. Deinde, cum spiritus ejus esset angustior, tantum continenda anima in dicendo est affectus, ut una continuatione verborum (id quod ejus scripta declarant) binæ ei con- tentiones vocis & remissiones continerentur, qui etiam (ut memoriæ

abandon our selves to the Influence of our Senses and Passions.

As Vanity is very consistent with Idleness, when we cannot resolve to take Pains our selves, we conceive a secret Disgust against those, who, by a suitable Application, advance themselves to such Abilities as we cannot, in spite of our selves, forbear acknowledging even at a very great Distance. And when by the Credit of the Rank we are in we would supply those Abilities which we have not, we expect all should submit to Authority, we substitute it in the Place of Reason, we trample upon those that dare consult this last, and we favour only those who shut their Eyes against it.

WE not only prevent a great Number of Vices by contracting an Habit of Diligence, and of Love for Application, but also secure our selves from the most intolerable Condition in the World, the Uneasiness and Disquiet in which those Men live, who neither know how to continue to be in Action, nor to be without it. (*b*)

2. IT is good for young People to give an Account of their Labours and Advancement to their Superiors, or at least

proditum est) conjectis in os calculis, summâ voce versus multos uno spiritu pronunciare consuecebat, neque id consistens in loco, sed inambulans, atque ascensu ingrediens arduo. Hisce ego cohortationibus, Crasse, ad Studium & ad Laborem incitandos Juvenes vehementer assentior. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. I.*

(*b*) Cunctatio Vitæ parùm se explicantis, & inter destituta vota torpentis animi situs. Quæ omnia graviora sunt, ubi odio infelicitatis operosæ ad otium profugerunt, & ad secreta studia: quæ pati non potest animus ad civilia erectus, agendique cupidus, & natura inquietus, parum scilicet in se solatiorum habens; idedque detractis oblectationibus, quas ipsæ occupationes discurrentibus præbent, domum, solitudinem, parietes non fert, invitus adspicit se sibi relictus. Hinc illud est tœdium, & displicentia sui, & nusquam residentis animi volutatio, & otii sui tristis atque ægra patientia: utique ubi causas fateri pudet, & tormenta introrsus egit verecundia, in angusto inclusæ cupiditates, sine exitu, se ipsæ strangulant. Inde mœror marcorque, & mille fluctus mentis incertæ, quàm inchoata habent suspensam, querentiumque nihil ipsos habere quòd agant, & alienis incrementis inimicissima invidia. Alit enim livorem infelix inertia; & omnes destrui cupiunt, quia se non potuerunt provehere: & ex hac deinde averfatione alienorum processum, & suorum desperatione, obirascens fortunæ animus, & de sæculo querens, & in angulos se retrahens, & pœnæ incubans suæ, dum tædet sui, pigetque. *Sen. de Tranq. An. Cap. 2.*

least to make Choice of some Friends, whom they may regularly entertain with them. Without this we may easily forget our selves, and grow remiss; but these frequent and stated Entertainments and *Conferences* renew our Diligence, which must produce the Subjects for them (i).

3. IF we stand in any Awe of our Maker, if we love him, and consider the Time, as well as the Faculties, which we have receiv'd of him as Presents and as Talents committed to our Trust, of which we must give him an Account, we shall be sure to examine our selves in his Presence; and every Day, every Week, and every Month, we shall compare the Progress we have made, with what we have before made in the same Space of Time. If we find that we have made as much as we ought, we shou'd enjoy the perfect Pleasure of the Sense we have of it: We shou'd ask our selves whether we had rather be ignorant of all that we have acquired; whether we repent our selves of the Pains we have taken; whether we shou'd have found a greater Advantage, and been better pleas'd with following our Fancies. If, on the contrary, we have made no Advances, we ought to compute what we might have done; we ought to ask our selves what we find left of all those Amusements which we have been taken up with. By observing these Precautions, sometimes the Satisfaction of having discharged our Duty, will confirm us in it; sometimes the Confusion of having forgot it, calls us back to it.

THIS Article does not only contain the Maxims of a Christian Philosophy; the *Gentile* Philosophers thought after the same manner. They rank'd this Precept, *Husband your Time*, TEMPORI PARCE, together with these, *Know your self*, *Carry nothing too far*, *Submit to the Divinity*, and others of this Nature; which, in a few Words, comprehend a very large Meaning, and which were refer'd to God as their Author. Upon this Foundation they are astonish'd at the Extravagance of Men, who wou'd purchase a good
Part

(i) Aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, & omnia tanquam illo vidente faciamus.--- O felicem illum, qui non ad spectus tantum, sed etiam cogitatus emendat! O felicem, qui sic aliquam vereri potest, ut ad memoriam quoque ejus se componat, atque ordinet! Qui sic aliquam vereri potest, citò erit verendus. *Sen. Ep. XI.*

Part of their Goods, ſome Months of their Lives, and quietly loſe whole Years without making any Advantage of them. *The greateſt Expence of all, is that of Time (k).*

CAN it be call'd Living, to paſs our Lives in doing nothing? Can we be ſaid to make the beſt Improvement of our Time, when we let it ſlip, without reaping any durable Fruit from it, and without procuring any other Satisfaction than ſuch as paſs away together with it? (l) What is there, how little ſoever, that remains of a whole Week ſpent in Amuſements? What is done by Day, is like what paſſes in the Mind by Night; all is equally vaniſh'd, as tho' it had been only a Dream. How many are there, who, if they be ask'd at the End of four and twenty Years, what they have done that deſerves to be eſteem'd, can hardly reckon up enough to make a good Week's Work? Tho' theſe People have been a long time upon upon the Earth, it is certain, however, that they have lived but a little while; or if they have lived, it has been no better than a Life of Plants and Brutes. I eſteem thoſe in the Number of the Dead, who do not live like rational Men. But if we have acquired Knowledge, if we have diſcharged our Duty for ſome Days, theſe Days are not loſt; they ſeem to endure yet, and all the Satisfaction you receiv'd as they paſt, does and will ſtill ſubſiſt (m).

VIII.

(k) Πολυτελές, ἀνάλωμα ὁ χρόνος.

Clamat ecce maximus Vates, & velut divino furore inſtinctus ſalutare carmen canit:

*Optima quæque Dies miſeris mortalibus ævi.
Primo fugit.*

Quid cunctaris, inquit, quid ceſſas? Niſi occupas, fugit: cùm occupaveris, tamen fugiet. Itaque cum celeritate temporis, utendi velocitate certandum eſt; velut ex torrente rapido, nec ſemper caſuro, citò hauriendum eſt. Hoc quoque pulcherrimè ad exprobandam infinitam cogitationem, quòd non optimam quamque ætatem, ſed diem dicit. Quid ſecurus, & in tantà temporum fugà lentus, menſes tibi, & annos, & longam ſeriem, utcunq; aviditate tuæ viſum eſt, exporrigis? De die tecum loquitur, & de hoc ipſo fugiente. Non dubium eſt ergò, quin prima quæque optima dies fugiat mortalibus miſeris, id eſt, occupatis: quorum pueriles adhuc animos ſeneſtus opprimit, ad quam imparati inermesque veniunt. *Sen. de Brev. Vita, Cap. 9.*

(l) Anguſtè fruſtus rerum determinat qui tantùm præſentibus lætus eſt.

(m) Longa eſt vita, ſi plena eſt; impletur autem, cum animus ſibi bonum ſuum reddidit, & ad ſe poteſtatem ſui tranſtulit. Quid illum octoginta

VIII. IF we bestow'd no more Time in taking Pains, than just that in which we find our selves disposed, and, as it were, invited to it by some secret Inclination, we shou'd very rarely employ our selves, at least in the Time of our Youth; and we shou'd run the Hazard of contracting one of the most troublesome Habits imaginable, that of not being able to make any Application, but by Fits and Starts; an Habit which wou'd make a great many of our Days pass without any Fruit. However, it is certain, that if we do not apply our selves heartily, and with Pleasure and Satisfaction, we shall never succeed in any Thing. We must therefore find some Means to change our Reluctance into Inclination. In order to this, when we find our selves not in an Humour to engage in any Thing, we ought in the first place to reflect upon all the Reasons which urge the undertaking it. If the Heart does not submit to these Reasons, if its Inclinations will not conform, we ought to be ashamed of its extravagant Humour. We ought to consider, that Men are *Wise* in proportion as Reason directs them, and *Fools* in proportion as they are govern'd by Humour: And that neither the one nor the other of these Dispositions continues in the Weakness of its first Condition and Beginning, but is always encreasing and growing stronger and stronger. He who opposes Humour, prevents Folly.

*Means to make
our Humour
submit to our
Reason.*

THE

octoginta anni juvant, per inertiam exacti? Non vixit iste, sed in vita moratus est; nec serò mortuus est, sed diu. Octoginta annis vixit. Interest, mortem ejus ex quo die numeres. At ille obiit viridis: sed officia boni Civis, boni Amici, boni Filii executus est: in nulla parte cessavit; licet ejus ætas imperfecta sit, vita perfecta est. Octoginta annis vixit. Imò octoginta annis fuit: nisi fortè sic vixisse eum dicis, quomodo dicuntur arbores vivere. Obscuro te, mi Lucili, hoc agamus, ut quemadmodum pretiosa rerum, sic vita nostra non pateat multum, sed multum pendat. Actu illam metiamur, non tempore. Vis scire quid inter hunc interfit vegetum contemptoremque fortunæ, functum omnibus vitæ humanæ stipendiis, atque in summum bonum ejus evectum, & illum cui multi anni transmissi sunt? Alter post mortem quoque est, alter ante mortem periit. Laudemus itaque, & in numero felicium reponamus eum, cui quantulumcunque temporis contigit, benè collocatum est. Vidit enim veram lucem, non fuit unus è multis: & vivit, & vixit, & vixit. *Sen. Ep. XCIII.*

THE Confusion we shall be under to depend thus upon a blind Humour, and consequently our Resolution to take Pains to reform and improve our selves, will encrease, if we do but remember that we are form'd after the Image, and intended for the Imitation of an infinitely wise God, who looks upon us and would assist us like a Father, if we did but seriously apply to him. Would not his Presence have as great an Influence over us, as that of a Great Man, to whom we never refuse the most laborious Undertaking that he can set us about? Will the Consideration of our Duty be of less Influence upon us than the Idea of a Recompence? A considerable Interest will prevail with us, and surmount all the Obstacles of our Humour; and what *Interest* is so great as that of being rational?

SADNESS puts a damp to the Activity of the Mind: We are never capable of undertaking any Thing, or at least of succeeding in it, when we are in a gloomy Humour. But when we have met with some Loss or Misfortune, will sinking under it repair it? Will Sorrow and Dispair make our Condition better? Why should we add to the Evils which we already feel, those which Inaction draws after it? And why should we plunge our selves into mortifying Reflections, instead of diverting our selves with more agreeable Employments? Adversity and Misfortune cannot hurt us, if we do not assist them our selves. Let us turn our Thoughts upon the Subjects of Joy which we have, and we shall not be sensible of the Circumstances which cross them.

THERE are several other Means to rouse us out of Heaviness, Obstinacy, and Dullness. *Solitude* is of Assistance to some; it makes them look into themselves, and gives them time to open their Eyes upon their true Interests. Exercise will restore others to Tranquility, Joy, and Good Humour: With some, *Musick* will produce the the same Effect. Sometimes we have occasion for our Friends to converse with upon the Subject, which we would, but know not how to undertake. In these Cases it is only the Beginning that is troublesome; we shall easily go on after we are once got into the way: We soon discover the Unreasonableness of our Obstinacy, when once we are got ever so little out of it. A quarter of an Hour's Reading will bring those who know how to read with Attention and Pleasure, into a Relish for Study and Contemplation, especially if they make choice of such Books as are most agreeable and proper to reanimate their Thirst of Knowledge.

IT is thus we ought to use all possible Skill to withstand these secret Inclinations, which Reason condemns, and by little and little to get the better of them. If we should attack them directly, it would be the way to feel the full Weight of them, and to sink under it. (n) Opposing them openly, is raising a weak Bank against a raging Torrent. We ought to steal away from them dextrously, and withdraw our Attention from them by seeking other Objects to fix it on. These blind and imperious Inclinations will cease to disturb us, when once we are accustomed not to obey them. (o) It is more true of the Distempers of the Mind, than of those of the Body, that the mildest Medicines are often times the most effectual; and that with a little Patience we obtain our End, which would be impossible to be done by too much Eagernefs and Haste. (p)

WE can never begin too early, nor use too much Precaution, to avoid listening to these seducing Influences, and giving way to these blind Inclinations. We can never form our selves too soon to a constant Habit of following only the Laws of Reason, which are the only ones that can remedy these Disorders that dishonour a Life, otherwise the most perfectly regular. Those who live in Dependance upon others, have not time to follow their own proper Fancies, but are very soon accusom'd to Submission. But the *Great*, who are continually beset by those that apply themselves to study their Humour, in order to conform all their Discourse to it, and in general their entire Behaviour, being ready either to persist in, or to change their Sentiment, according as their Superior shall change or persist in it; the *Great*, who are surrounded with other Men, as with so many Looking Glasses, which represent and reflect their Likeness, and in all their various Postures, do still constantly flatter them, and turn into extraordinary all they do and say; the *Great*, I say, ought to be particularly upon their Guard, and if they would keep themselves rational, they must have Recourse to themselves for those Helps which others refuse them, under the flattering Pretence that they have no need of them. It is from the Habit they have contracted of depending upon their Humour, and of following its Varieties and Caprices, that
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(n) Quædam non nisi decepta sanantur.

(o) Desinent si intermittendi consuetudinem fecerimus.

(p) Ut corporum, ita & animorum molliter vitia tractanda sunt. Sæpè quod explicavit mora, pertinaciâ trahentis abruptum est. *Sen. de en. Lib. VII. cap. 30.*

we see them so different from themselves, that the shining Parts of their Lives are counterpois'd by others which, like so many Spots, take off the Lustre of them; and that after having been greatly elevated by heroical Exploits, they precipitate themselves into shameful Meannesses, and sometimes into enormous Faults; which give occasion to those who love them not, to ascribe their Glory to Chance, or to the Assistance of others, and to impute to themselves only all their Shame and Weaknesses. None have more Interest in taking care to submit to the Empire of Reason, than those who govern others: (q) It is in proportion as they submit to this, that they are worthy to command, that they command wisely, and that their Commands and Orders tend to the publick Good. Nothing suits better with an high Station than a Greatness of Soul, and nothing dishonours it more than Meannesses.

We ought to husband the smallest Moments.

IX. A MAN who loves Application, and all the Advantages of it, does also nevertheless love Repose and Recreation, if it were but to put him in a condition of continuing his Application with Success: But the Pleasure he finds in refreshing and amusing himself, may become a great Obstacle to his Diligence, by stealing away part of the Time which he should employ in Application. This Inconvenience may be prevented, if we make it a Law and a Custom to repose our selves no longer than we are weary, and to seek only to divert our selves when we find our Imagination exhausted, and that we can think no more without Difficulty and Trouble. Repose is dangerous upon any other Occasion: Nature accustoms it self to it presently; we ought to contract an Habit of avoiding it. There are a thousand little Intervals in Life, which, put together, would make up a considerable Space of Time, and might advance us a great Way, if we were to make the best of them. The waiting for a late Dinner, the Expectation of a Visit, the Negligence or Indisposition of a Master who fails coming at his appointed Hour, afford Instances of these little Intervals, whose Shortness furnishes Idleness with a plausible Excuse against an Application which seems to be of no Use. But it is very dangerous to accustom our selves to lose our Time without Regret: (r) Young People do but too often count the Hours they

(q) Si vis tibi omnia subdicere, te subdice rationi. Multos reges, si ratio te rexerit. *Sen. Ep. XXXVII.*

(r) Quod fugit occupandum est. *Sen.*

they spend in Idleness, as so much clear Gains, without once thinking that they ought to reproach themselves for it. In my Opinion, they might be employ'd very usefully in miscellaneous Readings, which might be continued or interrupted as occasion required: They might be also bestow'd in learning Words and Sentences by Heart. Books of Letters, miscellaneous Essays, and various Observations, are the most proper of all in these Intervals. We might even run over compleat and connected Treatises in them, provided we have read and well understood them before; for, without this, it would be dangerous, lest the Uneasiness of being interrupted in the middle of an Argument or Narration, or the Impatience we might be under to know the Conclusion, might keep our Thoughts from fixing upon those Things of more Importance, from which they were but now called away, and to which they must be again presently applied, and so might insensibly accustom us to Inattention. We ought to avoid every Thing which may give Occasion to this: But when we are obliged to break off a Subject which we are very fond of, it is extremely difficult to divert our Thoughts from it all at once: The Mind continues engaged in it, even tho' commanded another Way: Oftentimes that which we have quitted follows us, and hinders us from succeeding in that which we leave it for. We do every Thing ill, when we have too much to do.

THE Pleasure of reposing our selves is what we ought to be upon our Guard against, for it will easily lead to Idleness. The Trouble there is in passing from one Employment to another, quite opposite to it, makes us favour Repose, and hate Action; but this must be conquer'd. You are called almost every Day into Company; you are taken up with Business of your own, or of others; you are diverted with Visits, and if these return often, it is possible your Diligence and Eagerness for Study will by little and little abate. You ought therefore to lay down a Law to husband all the Moments you can meet with between these Avocations; and if you can find but a Quarter of an Hour for your self, and for Meditation, that Quarter of an Hour ought to be sacred.






C H A P. XIII.

Of the Memory.

*The Usefulness
of the Memory.*

I.  HE Force of the Memory depends upon that of the Attention. We very easily remember what we have consider'd with Application, and as soon forget

what we have hastily run over. This also is one of the Fruits of Attention, and one of the most necessary too; for in vain do we endeavour to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, if the second effaces the first; in vain do we aim at acquiring it, if it immediately slips away, and is not to be retained. Besides this, we shall be able to explain a Difficulty, and to solve a complicated Question so much the easier, as the Memory more readily furnishes us with the Principles and Theorems upon which the Truth which we seek is established. And we shall deliberate upon an Enterprize with so much more Success, as the Memory, making use of the past to illustrate the future, presents a greater Number of Cases, a greater Number of Advantages to weigh against the Disadvantages, and of Expedients to balance the Obstacles.

II. IN attributing to the Memory a great Influence over the Judgment, I am sensible I appear to contradict an Opinion very generally receiv'd, and, moreover, confirm'd by Experience, That a very happy Memory, a ready Genius, and an exact Judgment, are very rarely found together. But this arises from the wrong Method of forming our Studies. Those who find themselves able and ready to make Discoveries of themselves, being rich in their own Wealth, scorn to furnish their Memory from any other Fund; and they who have a quick Apprehension, and a perfect good Memory, being content to benefit by the Labours of others, spare themselves the Pains and Trouble of seeking and examining Things themselves. By this means it happens, that they inconsiderately fall into Sentiments opposite one to another,

another, which puts them afterwards into Uncertainty and Confusion. The Precipitation with which they read and apprehend, accustoms them also to take up with Words which they understand not, and afterwards to speak without Understanding what they say. But they would avoid this Inconvenience, if they admitted of nothing without having first examined, and distinctly understood it; if they pursued their Studies in Order; if they consider'd that the Memory is both of Credit and Service, when full of Truths, and not of Errors and Uncertainties; and if they took Pains to enrich themselves with Ideas, as well as with Words.

ON the one Side, therefore, Men of great Penetration and Judgment sometimes are deficient in Memory, which is only for want of having cultivated it; for in short, the same Vigour of the Attention which furnishes the Mind with Penetration and Judgment, is at the same Time one of the principal Causes of improving the Memory. On the other side, if we meet with some whose Memories are filled with a great Stock of Learning, and yet want a suitable Delicacy and Judgment, it is not because these excellent Qualities are inconsistent with a good Memory, but because he who apprehends and remembers with Ease, contents himself generally with apprehending and remembering, and neglects to perfect his other Faculties by Exercise, and to improve them so far as they are capable.

BESIDES, when Men of great Parts complain of their Memories, there is sometimes reason to doubt the Truth of it, and we ought not always to take their Words for it. Some of them indeed, whilst they they complain of the want of an Advantage, which they really have, do yet speak what they think, because their Ardour for Knowledge is so great, that however rich their Memory may be, yet they immediately cry out upon its Weakness, if the least Thing escapes it; and because it does not contain every Thing they would have it, their Discontent makes them think they have no Memory at all.

THERE are some, however, who with less Sincerity, desire to be thought to have bad Memories, that they may be supposed to have so much the better Genius. We have indeed some reason to have a better Esteem for those who are Authors of their own Knowledge, than those who borrow it from others; but it cannot but be look'd upon as a most unreasonable Vanity in those who would be thought to have meditated little, and to have read less, in order that all they say may be look'd upon as the Fruit of so happy a Genius

Genius as to need no Cultivation in the least. Suppose that it really were as they would have it believ'd; the happier they are, the less they deserve to be commended. Yet this is what they aim at; but what does it import? Their Vanity blinds them, and does not allow them to look near enough upon Things, to make themselves truly deserve Admiration and Esteem; it is enough if they can distinguish themselves from others, and have few Equals, whatever be the Cause of this *Distinction* for which they so much applaud themselves.

THE Memory is a Faculty absolutely necessary, but it is one of the most imperfect in it self, and has most occasion for Assistance. It is not only rich in borrow'd Wealth, but does also continually grow weaker and weaker, and is not to be preserv'd or improv'd without continual Art. It is lost for want of Exercise, and wears out if it be not made good use of. Oftentimes we impoverish it in proportion as we endeavour to enrich it; and the new additions we make to it, thrust out what was there before. (a)

III. IF we would not lose the Fruit of our Studies, we ought first to read with Attention. We have already laid down the Necessity of this Precaution. We ought secondly to read with Reflection. This is also a very necessary Condition, but very much neglected. When we read an History, for Example, we comprehend it clearly, nothing being more easy to comprehend. We think we shall not forget it, and yet the hasty reading of a hundred Leaves is no sooner finished, but we perceive half of them are already escaped. We ought therefore to reflect upon what we have read, to repeat it in our Minds, and to say to one's self, *I will remember it.* This Method and Resolution will certainly be of very great Service. (b)

3. The Memory of what we have read, or thought of, will be still less effaced, if we make it the *Subject of Conversation with others.* This Method has more than one Use, and cannot be sufficiently recommended. When young People have established a Society amongst themselves to give an Account of their Studies, their Diligence is quicken'd, as we

(a) In primis fragilis est memoria, & rerum turbæ non sufficit; necesse est quantum recipit, emittat, & antiquissima recentissimus obruat. *Sen. de Ben. Lib. VII. cap. 28.*

(b) The Latin Expression seems founded upon this Truth; for in the *Stile of that Language, to learn, is mandare memorix.*

we have observ'd in the preceding Chapter; their Stile is improv'd, that being the Effect of Use and Exercise; their Ideas are rectified; for oftentimes we imagine we comprehend a Thing, but when we come to talk upon it, the Confusion we find our selves under, makes us sensible that we have not sufficiently studied it. Lastly, The same Ideas are repeated; and that which enter'd in at the Eyes, the Mind receives again by the Ears; and this double Impression always engraves Things deeper upon the Memory. We are never so well assured of our understanding any Thing, as when we are able to teach it; and even in teaching it we apprehend it better than before. *Homines dum docent, discunt*, says *Seneca*.

4. WE ought to take care to connect what we have newly learned with what we knew already. We shall by this means confirm the Memory of former Acquisitions; and these, in their Turn, will assist us in recollecting the new ones which have succeeded them. Thus we connect a second Chapter to the first, a third to the second, we run over again the entire Section, and then recollecting all the Sections of the whole Work, we review it all successively. And that we may not consider all this Pains as a Loss of Time, it is almost the only Means not to lose the least Part of it, and to prevent taking Pains to no purpose. I confess, that by this Method, we shall not finish an hundred Pages, in the time that we might without it have finished a thousand, but we retain these hundred entirely; whereas out of the thousand there would scarce remain fifty. We therefore have made double the Progress, if we judge by the Knowledge acquired, rather than by the Number of Pages we have read, and by the Fruit we reap from our Studies, rather than by the Number of Hours we bestow upon them.

5. WHEN we recollect an Idea in our Memory, we excite it a second time. This second Production is made very like the first, from which it differs only in its Readiness. We shall therefore remember any Consequence so much the more easily, as it is more closely connected with its Principle; for the more proper this Principle is to give Birth to it, the more proper is it also to revive the Memory of it. We shall farther also retain much better what we learn from others, if we enter into their Ideas in the same Order in which they entred into them themselves, and if, in order to benefit by their Discoveries, we follow the same Method they did in making them. For by studying in this Method, each Truth will not only of it self lead to the Discovery of others, but will also help to make it self remembered. By this

means we shall form our Judgments, and confirm our Memories.

BUT before we give our selves the Trouble of remembering what we have read, we ought to be well assured of its being worth the while, and that it is rational, and well approved. When we neglect this Precaution, we run the Hazard of charging our Memories with so many Nothings, or Words void of Sense, and, farther, of incumbering it with Errors much worse than Ignorance. But if we should even be so happy as to meet only with Truths, yet if we neglect the Examination of them, we may heap up a great Number, without knowing one of them; for to speak truly, we *know nothing but what is demonstrated to us*, and what we have made our own by searching and examining it (c). If we have not a great Care in ranging what we learn in the most exact Order, we accustom our selves to Confusion; and by contracting an Habit of it, become at last incapable of stating Questions rightly, in order to discover their true Principles, and to proceed from Consequence to Consequence, and from Knowledge to Knowledge, to the Conclusion which we propose to establish. Those who have studied without Method, always reason confusedly. Heaping up a Medley of Knowledge without Order, weakens our Reason, and contributes only to make the Mind fruitful in Absurdities.

IF our Love of Knowledge were greater; if we had Learning more at Heart; if we took a greater Pleasure in Application; if we were careful to make a greater Use of our

(c) Turpe est enim feni aut prospicienti senectutem ex commentario sapere. Hoc Zeno dixit: Tu quid? Hoc Cleanthes: Tu quid? Quousque sub alio moveris? Et impera, & dic, quod memoriæ tradatur: aliquid & de tuo profer. Omnes itaque istos nunquam auctores, semper interpretes, sub alienâ umbrâ latentes nihil habere existimo generosi, nunquam aulos aliquando facere, quod diu didicerant. Memoriam in alienis exercuerunt. Aliud autem est, meminisse: aliud, scire. Meminisse, est rem commissam memoriæ custodire. At contra scire, est & sua facere quæque, nec ab exemplari pendere, & toties ad magistrum respicere. Hoc dixit Zeno, hoc Cleanthes. Aliquid interfit inter te, & librum. Quousque discas? Jam & præcipe. Quid est, quare audiam, quod dicere possum? Multum, inquit, viva vox facit; non quidem hæc, quæ alienis verbis commodatur, & actuarii vice fungitur. Adjice nunc, quòd isti qui nunquam tutelæ suæ fiunt, primùm in ea re sequuntur priores, in quâ nemo non à priore descivit: deinde in eâ re sequuntur, quæ adhuc quæritur; nunquam autem inveniatur, si contenti fuerimus inventis. Præterea qui alium sequitur, nihil invenit, imò nec quærit. *Sen. Ep. XXXIII.*

our Judgment than of our Memory, or at least to enrich this last Faculty with new Supplies of Knowledge, instead of being content with having made a moderate Collection once for all: Lastly, if we did but reflect every Day upon what we say and do, and upon the respective Reasons we have for so doing; we should avoid one of the most common Faults, and not weary others with a Repetition of Stories an hundred Times over, which please the Teller as much, as they torment those that are condemned to be the Hearers. These perpetual Repeaters of the same Things, must either have contracted a strange Habit of looking upon themselves as Oracles, or of speaking without Attention, and having no other View besides amusing themselves, without being in any Pain for other People, or for the Uneasiness they give them (d).

IV. IT is good to minute down the Heads of what we read, and it is very necessary to make at least Abridgments of what we have discovered our selves amidst our Studies, without which they will soon be forgotten; but we ought to take particular Care to examine them well, and to conceive them clearly before we sit down to write.

The Method of making Collections.

WE oftentimes happen to overcharge our selves with too great a Number of Collections. For a Multitude produces Confusion, unless prevented by Exactness of Order. It would therefore be very serviceable, in my Opinion, whenever we would make our selves Masters of any Science; to make choice of some Author, who has treated of all the Parts of it in the most simple and natural Method, and to a moderate Extent. We ought immediately to read him thro' with Circumspection, and not to let the least Passage slip without Examination. We ought carefully to distinguish what we meet with that is evident and clear, from what is obscure and uncertain. After having made this Work very familiar, when we read others upon the same Subject, we need not stop at the same Thoughts we have before sufficiently entred into,

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(d) " Repetition is every where troublesome, even in *Homer* himself: But it is intolerable in superficial and transient Subjects. I am disgusted with frequent Inculcation, even in useful Things, as in *Seneca*. Nor do I like the Custom of his Stoical School, to repeat upon each Head the Principles and *Postulata* at large, which serve them all in general; and always to urge over again the Arguments and Reasons that are common and universal. *Mont.* Book III. Ch. 9.

into, nor at the Proofs we have already weigh'd with Care in our former Reading ; we have only occasion to examine the new Arguments, and the new Hypotheses, as they present ; and after having examined and abridged all that we find new, to make so many Notes of them, wherewith to enrich the former System. Lastly, We ought to read from time to time all these Additions, in order to make one entire Body of them in our Memories ; which will not be difficult, because of their being ranged in an Order, which has been made long since very familiar to us, and by which our new Acquisitions have been continually connected with the old.

UPON every Part of Learning, we shall have so many distinct *Systems*. I do not by this Term understand a Work so compleat, that you cannot overturn any one Part of it without destroying the Whole, and which, by a small Number of Principles, gives a perfect Light to all Questions that relate to it, and solves all Difficulties which may be opposed to it. We endeavour at such Systems as these ; we approach them by Degrees ; but we must not rashly conclude that we have brought them to this Perfection. In the meantime we may make use of a Work, which at least mentions with tolerable Exactness all the Subjects that belong to any Science, and ranges them in an Order easy to be remembred, by avoiding Repetitions, by assigning different Places to different Things, and by passing gradually from the most simple to the most compounded, from the most easy to the most difficult.





A NEW
TREATISE
OF THE
ART of *THINKING*.

PART I.


SECT. II.

*Of the Variety of Ideas, which arises from
their Objects.*



CHAP. I.

*Of the different Objects of our Ideas, as those
Objects are consider'd in themselves.*

- I.  UR Ideas must needs vary according to the Difference of those Things we desire to know; *Substances and Modes.* and our *Mistakes* arise only from applying some Ideas to several Objects, which they do not belong to. Logic must therefore enable us to make our Ideas

Ideas agreeable to their Objects. Some Maxims may be of use to that End.

WHEN I consider a Piece of Wax, I see it is a real Thing; and I perceive likewise that its *Figure* (its Roundness, for instance) is something *real*; but I find a very great Difference between those two Realities. The Wax has its *own Existences* a *separate* Existence, which is *not the same* with the Existence of the Bodies that surround it; 'tis the Existence of that Wax, and *not of any other* Thing whatsoever. The same cannot be said of its *Roundness*; for it *does not exist separately* from the Wax: That Roundness is the Wax it self terminated after a certain Manner; 'tis the State of the Wax: And the State of a Thing is the Thing it self, existing after a certain Manner.

WE learn from thence to distinguish two Ideas, which arise from two Sorts of Beings: Those that have their *own Existence*, a *separate Existence*, are call'd *Substances*; and we call *Modes* those Realities, which have not a separate Existence, and the Existence whereof is the same with the Existence of the Reality, of which they are Modes.

EACH Substance is in a certain State, and consequently has its own Modes, and exists after a certain Manner: Destroy a Substance, all its Modes will vanish away; for, they have no Existence of their own. As soon as a Thing ceases to exist, none of its States remain, since they were that Thing it self. But the Destruction of a Mode does not imply the Destruction of the Substance, since the Substance has an Existence of its own, which is not the Existence of the Mode. Though there happens a Change in the Substance, yet it preserves its own Existence, it subsists still, and always remains a Substance. If the Wax be annihilated, its Figures and Colours are also annihilated; but, if you alter its Figure never so much, if you alter its Colours, it will always be Wax, or always extended.

THOUGH the Ideas of *Substance* and *Mode* be simple Ideas, yet I dwell upon their Explication, I enlarge upon it; and in order to raise those Ideas, I use synonymous Expressions and many Phrases, which signify the same Thing. Such Repetitions are not always useless, and ought not to be look'd upon as a vain Tautology, when they happen to be necessary, in order to keep the Mind attentive to the same Subject. This is particularly of use with respect to simple Ideas, and to make them clearly understood; for, because they are simple, they are generally neglected, and slightly passed over; and what does nor belong to those Ideas, is frequently

quently added to them; so that they are conceived either too weakly, or too confusedly, and sometimes both Ways together.

I HAVE not used the Definition of the Schools, That a Substance is *what subsists by it self*. This Definition is equivocal; for *to subsist by it self*, is either *to have a separate Existence*, which is the same with what I have just now said, or *to exist insepably*, and to owe its Existence to no other Thing; which is false as to all created Substances, and occasions metaphysical Questions about the Independency of Creatures, too much perplex'd to make the Understanding of one of the simplest Notions depend upon them.

II. WHAT we call *Mode*, has been also styled *Accident*; but that Word does not appear to me proper. It gives occasion to fancy that Accidents befall a Substance, and tend towards it. And indeed they have been represented in the Schools, as certain Realities different from the Substance; but at the same time so imperfect, and wanting so much Reality, that in order to subsist they must have some Help, and be supported by a Subject which receives them. But such Words afford no clear Idea. Whatever has an Existence of its own, is for that very Reason determin'd to subsist; and though a Being be united to other Beings, yet each of the Parts, thus united, has an Existence of its own, a separate Existence, and consequently separate from the Existence of its neighbouring Parts. To talk of a Reality so weak, that it will be annihilated, unless it be supported by a Subject, is to speak unintelligibly. Those Words are metaphorical, and signify that a Reality, which has *an Existence of its own*, will be annihilated, unless it be joined to another: Which is plainly false; for, since it is a Reality, it is already determin'd to continue in its Existence.

Impropriety of the Word Accident.

THIS Supposition, That there are Beings of such a weak Reality, that they will come to nothing, unless they be preserved by some other Beings; this Supposition, I say, is only grounded upon Prejudices, and the Habit of judging of the Reality of Things from the Report of our Senses. What escapes our Eyes, is accounted to be nothing, and no longer reckon'd among Beings by those whose Understanding reaches no farther than their Eyes; but we ought to be undeceived by Reason. If a very thin Surface, a very small Skin, does not meet a Body upon which it may rest, it will indeed vanish away; but its Parts will be separated without being annihilated.

THE wrong Notion of Substance, and its Accidents, as two Sorts of Entities really distinct, gave occasion to this impertinent Question: Whether Matter acts by its Accidents? or whether Accidents act by Matter? What a vast Field for wrangling did such an unintelligible Question afford?

WE can have no Notion of a Substance, but in some State; and in whatever State we conceive it to be, its Idea, as a Substance, remains the same.

III. A *MODE* being nothing else but the Substance it self (of which it is a Mode) in a certain State, and having no other Existence, as soon as I suppose the Substance to be destroy'd, I cannot preserve the Idea of the Mode. Can I, for instance, deny Extension, and yet conceive that Figure or Motion remain? Besides, a Mode being only the Substance in a certain State, the Idea of the Substance makes the Idea of the Mode clearer and more compleat. When I think of a particular Body, a Piece of Lead, for instance, square, and in Motion, I have clearer and more compleat Ideas, than if I spoke of Motion and Figure in general.

THOSE Principles are evident, and teach us that the Soul is a Substance distinct from the Body, since *Thought* is not a Mode of Extension and material Substance; for though I should doubt of the Existence of all Bodies, and even deny it, yet the Ideas of my Thought, and of my several Ways of Thinking, would never be the less clear. The Idea of Matter, far from making them clearer, makes them obscure. A thinking Body is a Chimera: A Figure and a Motion, that perceives, is an Extravagance; and I never conceive Thought better, than when I don't think of Matter. Since we admit of Extension without Thought, why should we not admit of Thought without Extension? The Idea of the one is not the Idea of the other: They have nothing common, and do not clear one another,

WHAT should we think of the Extravagance of a Man, who should believe that a Stone can learn Arithmetick? It is no more in my Power to combine together the Ideas of Thought and Extension in general, than to imagine the Knowledge of Arithmetick in a Stone. The Ideas of a Stone and Arithmetick, the Ideas of Extension and Thought, do equally exclude one another.

EVERY Quality, which does not reside in the Parts of a certain Substance, which is not one of their Manners of Being, or does not result from their Union, belongs to another Substance.

NEITHER

NEITHER can Motion be a Thought, no more than Blue and Red can be a sharp and sweet Savour. Ideas quite different have quite different Objects. We cannot think otherwise.

IV. THE Division of Substances into *Division of Substances.* *Thinking* and *extended* Substances, is grounded upon the foregoing Observations. Substance is also divided into *Finite* and *Infinite*. We easily conceive a finite Being; but it is more difficult to think of an infinite one.

By a finite Being we mean a limited Being, and a Being which has only a certain Degree of Reality: But when we speak of an *infinite* Being, we think first of the Reality. It is a positive Idea: We understand very well what that Word signifies; and then we forbear assigning any Limits to that Reality. This latter Act is a negative one; so that the Idea of Infinity, is the Idea of Reality, and even the Idea of the absolute Being, that is, the Idea of the *Being*, to which we forbear joining the Idea of any Limits.

THAT Idea is very different from the *general Idea* of *Being*, which agrees equally to all Creatures, and is indifferently apply'd to each Being in particular, in the same manner as the general Idea of a Triangle is apply'd to each Triangle. But the Idea of the unlimited Being, the Idea of *simple and absolute Reality*, is determined in its Application, and *can only belong to one Being*. When I suppose an unlimited Being, I suppose a Being of which I can deny no Reality without contradicting my self; for, when I have said that this Being is Reality it self, did I conceive a Reality which does not belong to it, I should deny that Reality it self is all the Reality; and after having supposed that it is unlimited, I should confine it, by saying it has not the Reality I deny.

No one can say it implies Contradiction, that there should not be many Infinites. An infinite Being may certainly exist alone; and therefore if there were many Infinites, they would be contingent Beings, and consequently they would not necessarily exist; they would not be infinitely perfect; and whatever may exist, or not exist, if it exists, is an Effect of some Cause, which has determined its Existence rather than its Nonexistence.

I EXCLUDE from the perfect Being imperfect Realities, Realities necessarily attended with Nonreality, such as Matter, which is not self-conscious, which breaks, which receives a thousand Impressions, which is subjected to the
Beings

Beings that surround it, and depends upon a thousand external Causes. The perfect Being is so much a Reality, that no Defect or Nonreality can be ascribed to it in any Sense whatsoever; but I exclude no perfect Reality from it. Wherefore, it is a Contradiction to suppose two Beings absolutely perfect, one of which should possess nothing, but what is likewise to be found in the other; for if the Reality of the one was not without the Reality of the other, they would be but one Being. If each of them had a separate Reality, but like that of the other, those Realities would not be unlimited. We conceive them to be great, and call them infinite, (which is quickly said;) but if we mind it, we shall see we contradict our selves. Whoever says *Infinite*, forms an Idea of Being, and forbears denying of it not only some Reality, but absolutely any perfect Reality; and yet, in this Case, because the first Being would not be the second, it must be said that the Reality of the first is not the Reality of the second. The first would be conscious of his own Knowledge; but he would not be conscious of the Knowledge of the other; and the more Reality there would be in the one, the more Reality would be deny'd of the other. The Infinite does not include all that is imperfect with all that is perfect; but it comprehends all that is perfect; and out of it there is no Perfection to be found.

Division of Modes. V. BULK, Figure, Rest, Motion, and Situation, are Modes of Matter; we have clear Ideas of them. The Soul either *perceives* only, or besides *acquiesces* and *willeth*: Its Perceptions are either *Sensations*, or *Ideas*. When it *acquiesces* in the Comparison of its Ideas, it *judges*: When it *acquiesces* in the Comparison of its Judgments, it *reasons*: When it is *willing* to acquire some Good, it has *Inclinations* or *Passions* according to the Vehemency of its *Will*.

What an Idea is. VI. PHILOSOPHERS are at a Loss to know what an Idea is: Several Hypotheses have been formed upon that Subject; and the Defenders of each of them do mutually overthrow the Defenders of the others, without laying down their own Opinion. Perhaps they are all in the same Error: They suppose an Idea to be a certain internal Object, different from Thought, and to the Contemplation of which the Thought does immediately apply it self. Do they not judge of the Understanding, as they judge of the Senses, and fancy that because, when we see, there is always an Object of our Sight, which is different

different from the Perception, whereby it is represented and known to us, in the same manner, the Understanding has its Eyes and its Objects? Whereas it is more natural to conceive that Thoughts proceed one from another; that our Thought varies and goes successively through several States; and that according to the Variety of its States and Manners of being or thinking, (for, with respect to Thought, to think and to be are the same Thing,) it attains to the Knowledge sometimes of one Thing, and sometimes of another. It is Self-conscious, it is its own immediate Object; and by that Self-consciousness it represents to it self at the same time Things different from it self.

THOUGH we should suppose internal Objects in the Understanding, and I know not what spiritual Pictures called *Ideas*, of a Tree, for instance, or a Circle, &c. yet, 1. That Picture must raise a Thought; and then, 2. That Thought would be self-conscious, and thereby it would be its immediate Object. 3. By that Self-consciousness it would know what it thinks of; it would know that pretended internal Picture, or Idea of the Tree; and, lastly, with the Help of that intelligible Tree, it would know the material Tree.

BUT why so many Circuits? Is it not more natural, as well as shorter, to conceive that the Thought is self-conscious, and that by such a Consciousness of its Way of thinking, it learns to know what a Tree is, and so with other Objects?

VII. IT remains to shew how Thoughts arise one from another; but such a Discussion does not belong to Logic, and I have treated that Subject elsewhere*. I shall only add, That, according to this Supposition, the famous Controversy about *innate Ideas* will be more easily determined. We are not born with a great many Thoughts; for we never have but one Thought at once; sometimes indeed more simple, and sometimes more compounded: And it is very likely, that in our first Age we did not proceed very quickly from one Thought to another; that our Thoughts were not much compounded, and ran most of them upon Sensations; and that they hardly were any thing else. But I am also of Opinion, it might be demonstrated that Men are born with a Disposition to form regular Thoughts, and to represent to themselves the same Objects in the same manner; and that all the Variety to be observed in them, in this respect, proceeds from a greater or lesser

Of innate Ideas.

** In a publick Thesis.*

leffer Vivacity and Attention, and most Times from Education, which excites or blunts the natural Dispositions. We are born, for instance, with a Disposition to be self-conscious, and to know something; to take Delight in that Consciousness and Knowledge; to desire the Continuation and Increase of that Pleasure; and consequently to desire more delightful Sentiments, and a more extensive Knowledge. We have a Disposition to proceed from thence to the Idea of an Intelligence that knows every Thing: It is equally natural to rise by the same Means to the Idea of an Intelligence, which is omnipotent, and infinitely happy, in a word, to the Idea of the perfect Being. Some attain to it sooner, and others later, according as they are more or less used to reflect, or more or less fond of corporeal Sensations; and that Idea is more or less pure and free from Error, or more or less obscured by Mixtures, according to the Prejudices of Education.

VIII. I KNOW no Substance so simple as to include but one Reality. A Collection of many Realities is looked upon as one Thing, and goes only by one Name. Bulk, Figure, Mobility, Length, Breadth, Depth, &c. are Realities, the Collection whereof is called *Body*, and they are called *Attributes*: An Expression, which is *not convenient*; for it seems to intimate that there is a Subject to which those Attributes belong, in which they reside, and which is different from them all. What is attributed to the Body, if we are willing to speak exactly, ought to be different from the Body to which it is attributed. Hence it is that Men have imagined a *corporeal Substance*, whereof all the Things just now mentioned, and Extension it self, are Attributes; and for the same Reason they suppose a Substance still unknown, to which they ascribe Thinking, which they conceive to be different from it.

BUT herein they seem to be no less mistaken, than if, after having called the Soul and the Body *the Attributes of Man*, and *three Lines*, and *the Space* included by them, the *Attributes* of the *Triangle*, they should enquire which is the *common Subject* that receives the two Attributes of the Soul and Body, and which is that *Figure* different from the Space and the three Lines that include it, and whereof that Space and those Lines are Attributes.

AMONG the many Realities of which a Thing is composed, that which is the Base and Ground of all the others, is called *Essence*. Those that are inseparably united to it, are called *essential Properties*, or only *Properties*; and those that are sometimes

sometimes in it, and sometimes out of it, go by the Name of *accidental Properties*, or *Accidents*. To be included by three Lines is the Essence of the Triangle; and the Union of the Soul and Body constitutes the *Essence* of Man. That two Sides of a Triangle taken together are always greater than the Third, is an *essential Property*, as Self-consciousness in Man; and whether the Triangle be red or black, whether Man be sorrowful or well pleased, fully persuaded or doubtful, 'tis an *Accident*.

IX. MEN are not only mistaken about the Words *Accident* and *Attribute*, but also speak confusedly of most Objects. They speak of Things which do not exist, in the same Stile as they discourse of those that exist; nay, unwary Men ridiculously endeavour to represent to themselves Nonentity as a sort of Being. They speak sometimes of Things which cannot exist, for instance, of a material Thought, or a thinking Body; of a single Body in many Places; of a perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and holy, who prescribes Laws to Men, in order to execute his eternal Decree of damning them, and for the sake of which he has created them. In such Cases they do not form a Collection of Ideas; for such a Collection is impossible: But at first they conceive separate Ideas, and then suppose them to be connected, and connect their Names together. This they do whenever they are mistaken, by supposing what is impossible to be possible.

BUT when they consider what is impossible as impossible, and say, for instance, *An Ascent without a Descent, a Valley without Mountains, is an impossible Thing*, they don't speak exactly. One would think they have an Idea of Impossibility, an Idea of what cannot exist, which they compare with that of a Valley without Mountains; but they neither have, nor can have such Ideas. They would speak more properly, if they should say; He who undertakes to separate the Idea of Mountains from the Idea of a Valley, undertakes to separate what is inseparable: Or, *A Valley cannot be conceived without Mountains. Whoever takes away one of those Ideas, takes away the other.*

WHEN the Discourse runs upon what *may exist*, but does not, and even *will not exist*, and Men say, for instance, *A Mountain of Gold, a Man a thousand Feet high, may exist*, it is a Query, how the Power of Existing is ascribed to that Mountain, or to that Man, if they are a mere Nonentity? For, why should any Thing be ascribed to Nonentity?

The

The next Query is, What that Man, and that Mountain are above Nonentity? All those Questions are grounded upon an Impropriety of Speech. It should have been said: *I have an Idea of such a Man, and such a Mountain; and there is a Being, who is able to produce, whenever he pleases; Creatures answerable to those Ideas.* All the Reality, supposed in those Words, is partly in my Thoughts, and partly in a Power, which actually exists.

LASTLY, When Men say of a Thing, which does not exist, that *it will exist*, for instance, that *Flowers will grow the next Spring*, they speak still of a Nonentity, to which they seem to ascribe a sort of Existence: But those Words signify that *some Causes do actually exist; that they are determined to continue; and that from such a Determination; and its Effects, there will arise an Effect answerable to our Ideas.*

SOME Men complain, that though they have used their utmost Endeavours to conceive Nonentity, yet they cannot do it. What is it that preceded the Creation of the World? What is it that supply'd its Place? Nothing. But how can one have an Idea of it? It is more easy to fancy an eternal Matter. Those Men use needless Endeavours; which is the Reason of their Perplexity. They would have an Idea of Nonentity; but because every Idea is real; what is represented to them by it is also real. When we speak of Nonentity, we must *forbear fancying any Thing whatsoever*, that our Thoughts may be answerable to our Words. Before the Creation of the World, God did exist. But what is it, that supply'd the Place of the World? Nothing; no Place: The Place was made with the Universe, which is its own Place; for it is in it self, and not out of it self. Was there nothing at all? But how can one conceive it? You must conceive nothing. Whoever says *Nothing*, declares by that Word that he lays aside all Reality: He must therefore lay aside all Ideas. 'Tis true, we never abstain from thinking at all: We always think; but, in such Cases, *to think is only to be self-conscious*, to be conscious that we abstain from forming to our selves any Representation.

X. 'TIS not therefore an Idea, but a *Negative Terms*. Negation, an Absence of an Idea, which answers in our Mind the Word *Nothing*; so that all those Terms which denote a Nonreality should be *negative*.

BUT they are most of them positive; and, on the other hand, negative Terms are used to denote real Things. We have

have plain Instances of it in the Words *Mortal* and *Immortal*, *Finite* and *Infinite*, *Corruptible* and *Incorruptible*, and many others, which make us apt, by degrees, to have a very wrong Notion both of what is positive and negative. When Men say, God cannot do contradictory Things, they seem by that negative Expression to confine the Power of God within certain Bounds; but (a) 'tis the quite contrary. They affirm by those Words, that God is infinitely perfect; for he who cannot contradict himself, does perfectly agree with himself, as he who cannot be mistaken, is omniscient and perfectly attentive; and he, who cannot die, does necessarily exist.

ON the contrary, the Power of erring, and the Power of committing Sins, are Negations expressed by positive Words. Men, for want of due Attention, involvè themselves into Difficulties about Creation and Providence: They ask, how far the most Holy *God is concerned* in the Errors and *Vices* of Mankind? He is not at all concerned in them. Every Thing Man has received from his Creator, is good. He might have given it in a higher Degree; he has not done it: 'Tis a mere Negation. He was under no Obligation to do it. The Degree was sufficient, if Man had been willing to make a right Use of it: 'Tis therefore his Fault; it cannot be imputed to God, who gave him the Power of Willing. We ought to take great Care that we be not imposed upon by fallacious Expressions.

I THINK it is a very probable Conjecture, that the *Confusion*, which prevails in positive and negative Terms, was introduced, because Names were at first bestow'd by Men upon the most obvious Things; but when they came to find out in Process of Time that there were Things quite opposite to those which they knew before, instead of inventing new Words for new Ideas, they were contented to add a Negation to those Words, that were already in use. Hence it is, that the thinking Substance was called *Immaterial*;

(a) " I have always been of Opinion, that these Expressions, *God cannot die, God cannot retract himself, God cannot do this or that*, are full of Indiscretion and Irreverence; I don't approve that the Divine Power should be thus confined within the Laws of our Speech: The Import of those Propositions should be represented more reverently and religiously. Our Speech has its Weaknesses and Imperfections, like all other Things." *Montagne, Book II. Chap. 12.*

terial; a negative Word, which makes one apt to believe that Thinking is less real than Extension.

AT first, Men were only taken up with few Things: Their Thoughts ran only upon the Necessaries of Life. When (b) Plenty came in by degrees, those who lived an easy Life, survey'd a greater Number of Objects, and formed new Ideas; but they did not invent a new Word for every new Idea; they confined themselves to the old Words. This we may observe in the *Hebrew* Tongue, which is one of the most antient Languages. The same *Hebrew* Word, to give an Instance of it, signifies to instruct, to correct, to chastise, to bind. There is some Relation between Instruction and Correction. Chastisements are frequently used in order to correct. Instruction, and the Fear of being punished, work the same Effect as Bonds, by restraining Men from evil. The Works of Nature were known before the Works of Art; which is the Reason why the latter have their Names taken from

(b) "As poor People wear the same Cloaths every Day, and have but few Utenils; in like manner, those Men whose Knowledge is very narrow, want only few Words to express their Thoughts, and use them for every Thing. Ignorant People seldom or never reflect. They are not nice enough to distinguish different Things; and therefore those Things appear to them alike, and they express them by the same Words; which appears by the Language of the *Barbarians*, who live like Beasts, and mind nothing but eating and drinking. They have no other Terms, but such as denote those Actions. Men, who are not skilled in *Botanicks*, look upon most Simples to be alike, and are contented with the general Words *Herb*, *Plant*, and *Simple*. Physicians, having a distinct Notion of each Simple, went farther, and look'd out for Names suitable to each Kind of Plants. Wherefore, according as Things have been more attentively consider'd by the several Nations of the World, their Words are attended with more distinct Ideas, and in greater Number. The same Thing is susceptible of many Degrees." *Father Lamy's Rhetorick, Book I. Chap. 7. p. 29. Amsterdam Edition, 1712.*

"The *Mogul-Tartars* have but one Conjugation. All their Verbs have only two Tenses, viz. the Time past, and the Time to come, which they distinguish by two Particles." *Chap. 10. p. 47.*

"The Language called *Lingua-Franca*, is understood upon all the Coasts of the *Mediterranean Sea*. It consists only of a few *Italian* and *French* Words, which are necessary to express one's Self in Things relating to Trade. Those Words have no Gender, no Number, no Case, no Declensions, no Conjugations, no Construction; and therefore that Language is quickly learned." *p. 49.*

from the former. We say, for instance, the Foot of a Bed, of a Table, of a Wall, as we say the Foot of an Animal: Whatever supports any Thing, goes by that Name.

XI. SOME Words have no Meaning; and supposing they have some Signification, *Words that signify nothing.* yet they are the Cause of a thousand Errors.

A Man (for instance) games; and because he will not own the Faults he has committed, or does not remember his Inadvertencies, or, because he has no Idea of all the Motions of the Cards or Dice, occasioned by the Agitation of the Hands, instead of ascribing his Loss to one of those three Causes, or to all of them together, he ascribes it to an imaginary Cause, which he calls *Chance*. He has no Notion of Chance; but that Word grows familiar to him, and is apply'd no less improperly to other Cases. Some will have it to be a particular Object of the Divine Providence, and give it a venerable Character. Others, on the contrary, make use of that Word to deny Providence, and ascribe to Chance the Disposition of the Universe.

THE Obscurity of the Word *Fortune*, a Term wrongly defined, has occasioned the most equivocal Applications. She is sometimes vindicated as a *wise Cause*, which does nothing but what she ought to do; and sometimes she is represented as a *fantastical Power*, making Sport with Order, and despising Equity. *Seneca*, in one and the same Page, justifies her, and speaks of her respectfully, as of Divine Providence, though he had represented her, a little before, as an odious Power, which may be insulted to ease one's Grief for the Harm she has done. *We are in the wrong*, says he, *to think our selves no longer beholden to Fortune, for all the good Things she has bestow'd upon us, as soon as she withdraws any of them; for she only takes away what she has given; and if it be an Injustice, it has been already made up by a great many Favours, and will be so again by new Ones* (c). But he had said a little before, *Let no Body wonder at her Injustice and Cruelty: we ought to be us'd to it. Can she have any Regard*

(c) Quod ad ipsam fortunam pertinet, etiam si nunc agi apud te causa ejus non potest: omnia enim illa quæ nobis dedit, ob hoc ipsum quod aliquid eripuit, invisæ sunt: tunc tamen erit agenda, cum primum æquiores te illi judicem dies fecerit: tunc enim poteris in gratiam cum illa redire. Nam multa providit, quibus hanc emendaret injuriam: multa etiam nunc dabit quibus redimat: denique ipsum quod abstulit, ipsa dederat tibi. *De Consolat. ad Polyb. Cap. 37.*

Regard for Justice, and use Men with Moderation, since she has no Respect for the Gods, and brings Death into their sacred Beds? Let all Men join in upbraiding her, she will nevertheless go on; she will be above all Prayers and Complaints. Such has Fortune been at all Times, and such will she always be. She thinks she may do any Thing: She will grow more violent: She has been so bold, as to enter the Porches of the Temples to do Mischief, and to bring Affliction and Mourning into Palaces, the Gates whereof were covered with Laurel (d).

MEN fancy they may be allowed to say any Thing against Fortune, because they have no clear Idea of that Word. In the mean time, by reason of that Obscurity, they use themselves by degrees to entertain a wrong Notion of the Management of the Universe, and to find fault with the Governor of the World.

SENECA goes on in the same Strain, in his Letter of Consolation to *Marcia*. *When we were born, we experienced the hard and inflexible Power of Fortune, in order to receive good Things, or Evils, at her Discretion. She is an inconstant and humourful Mistress; and under Pretence of Love for her Slaves, she bestows upon them Favours and strikes them at random (e).*

XII.

(d) Nemo itaque miretur, aliquid ab illa aut crudeliter fieri, aut iniquè. Potest enim hæc adversus privatas domos ullam æquitatem nosse, aut ullam modestiam: cujus implacabilis sævitia totiens ipsa funestavit pulvinaria? Faciamus licet illi convicium, non nostro tantum ore, sed etiam publico: non tamen mutabitur: adversus omnes se preces, omnesque querimonias erigit. Hoc fuit in rebus humanis fortuna, hoc erit; nihil inausum sibi reliquit: nihil intactum relinquet. Ibit violentior per omnia, sicut semper est solita, eas quoque domos ausa injuriæ causâ intrare, in quas per templa aditur, & atram laureatis foribus inducet vestem. *Id. ibid. Cap. 35.*

(e) Hoc fatum ab utero statim profæquebatur. In regnum fortunæ, & quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius arbitrio, digna atque indigna passuri; corporibus nostris impotenter, contumeliosè, crudeliter abutetur: alios ignibus peruret, vel in pœnam admotis, vel in remedium: alios vinciet; id nunc hosti licebit, nunc civi: alios per incerta nudos maria jactabit, & luctatos cum fluctibus, ne in arenam quidem aut littus explodet, sed in alicujus ventrem immensæ belluæ detrudet: alios morborum variis generibus emaceratos, diu inter vitam mortemque medios detinebit. Ut varia & libidinosa, mancipiorumque suorum negligens domina, & pœnis & muneribus errabit. Quid opus est partes deslere? tota vita flebilis est. Urgent nova incommoda, priuquam veteribus satisfeceris. Moderandum est itaque, vobis maximè, quæ immoderatè fertis: & in metus, & in dolores humanum pectus dispensandum. *Cap. 10.*

XII. SOME Words are not void of Sense, but they express only Ideas, without any actual Objects answering those Words. Such are the general Words *Substance, Figure, Number, &c.* For, there is no Figure, that is Figure in general; nor any Number, but what is a certain determinate Number: Yet, Men are sometimes mistaken about those Terms, and suppose the Existence of certain Objects which they know not, and which ought to answer those Words. Thus, for instance, after having defined Matter, an *extended Substance*, and the Soul a *thinking Substance*, they are at a Loss to know what is that Substance, whereof Extension is an Attribute; and what is that Substance, whereof Thinking is a Modification. Their Notions would be clearer, did they consider that there is *Thought* and *Extension* in us; that the general Idea of Substance agrees to both of them; and as we say of the *Triangle*, that it is a *Figure*, we say likewise that *Thinking* and *Extension* are *Substances*; because, the general Idea of Substance is apply'd to both.

SPINOSA having consider'd that Word, which in its general *Acception* is only the Name of an *indeterminate Idea*, applicable to many Subjects; *Spinoso*, I say, having consider'd that Word as the Name of a single Thing actually existing, concluded from thence, that there is but one Substance, and his whole System is built upon such a gross Error. *We have* (says he) *but one Idea of Substance*; for *we can make but one Definition of it*. Therefore, there is but one Substance, which he is pleas'd to call God. As for us, and other Things, which the Vulgar calls *Creatures*; we are either the Divine Substance, or Attributes and Modes of that Divine Substance. Certainly, a Man, who yields to such a wretched Sophism, must needs have a great Inclination to Atheism. One might as well say, There is but one Definition of Figure, and but one Definition of Number; therefore, a *Triangle* is a *Circle*; therefore 22 and 24 are not particular Numbers; a Triangle and a Circle are but Modes of the only Figure that exists; 22 and 24 are but Modes of the only Number existing. If I consult my determinate Ideas, and express them by Words, that are Names of external Objects actually existing, and if I say: *I have the Ideas of many Substances, and define them differently, Water, for instance, Wood, Stones, the Sun, &c. therefore there are many Substances; otherwise my Ideas and my Definitions would be false*: I overthrow *Spinoso* by imitating him, and argue better

better, because I judge of external Things, not by general, but determinate Ideas, and such as are most proper to represent to me those Objects, which actually exist as I conceive them.

GENERAL Words are not *fallacious*, whilst they are consider'd as Names of general Ideas; but they *become* fallacious, when apply'd to determinate Objects, and when we fancy that we know determinately what has only a general Name bestow'd upon it. Such was the constant Illusion of the Schoolmen. It is well known, that there can be no Effect without a Cause. They had, therefore, like all other Men, a general Idea of Causes, to which they only gave different Names as occasion offer'd. Fire is hotter in the Winter than in the Summer: 'tis an *Antiperistasis*. A Stone falls as soon as the Hand ceases to hold it: 'tis by a *centripete Quality* of the Earth. A Pail, that is still in a Well, may easily be rais'd: 'tis because the Pail is in its *Element*. A Load-Stone draws another: 'tis a *Sympathy*. The opposite Pole makes it fly back: 'tis an *Antipathy*. The Schoolmen were like Children, who asking about a Thing unknown to them, What is it? are contented with the bare Name of it. Their Curiosity goes no farther; they want to know the Name of that Thing, in order to discourse about it, or to ask for it whenever they please. Thus Men from their early Years use themselves to be satisfied with Words without minding their Signification.

XIII. THERE are some Cases about *A Parallel between what exists, and what does not exist.* which we cannot argue right, if we are more attentive to those Things that exist, than to those which do not exist: But we cannot so easily think of what we do not perceive, as we do of what we perceive:

Hence it is that Men are frequently mistaken about Questions, which require an equal Attention to such unequal Objects. Those who are so weak as to give Credit to Predictions, and who rely upon the Presages of Stars or Dreams, are very willing to remember some few Facts, which have answer'd groundless Predictions; but they keep no Register of a great many false Presages and Dreams. Should any one in Company discourse of these latter Dreams, he would be look'd upon as a raving Man: But give an Account of a Dream attended with its true Consequences, and do it with an Air of Admiration, the most rational Persons will hear you with great Attention, and be almost convinced of the Truth of

of that Dream. But what Strength can there be in a Fact contradicted by a thousand others? (f)

MEN being extremely desirous to know future Things, have been imposed upon by the least Probability; and one would think they were unwilling to use their own Reason, for fear of being undeceived. There was a Time when *Homer* and *Virgil* were consulted about Things to come, and they were so often consulted, that they did at last afford something that look'd like a Prefage. The Bible has been made use of to the same Purpose; and it was a religious Practice.

XIV. I HAVE said in the beginning of this Chapter, that there are *Things*, and that those Things are in a certain *State*. And therefore every Word, that is *significative*, and signifies more than a mere *general Idea*, denotes a *Thing*, or that *Thing in its State*, or the *State* of that Thing. If a Language was perfectly exact, every sort of Things would have a sort of Names peculiar to it, whereby one might presently know what sort of Beings is spoken of; but a great Confusion has been introduced by too great an Eagerness of bestowing Names upon what was unknown. 'Tis true, that *Things* are denoted by *Substantive Nouns*, a Man, a Horse, a Tree; that *Things modified*, that is, considered in their State, are expressed by *Adjective Nouns*, White, Wise, Learned, Strong, High, Heavy; and lastly, that in order to denote the State in it self, and by a separate Idea, Men have *deduced* from *Adjective Nouns* certain Words called *abstracted Terms*, which are *Substantives derived from Adjectives*, Whiteness, Science, Wisdom, Height, &c. But this being not universal, occasions the more Mistakes, as it is more frequent, because the Exceptions are less minded. We say that a Man is dressed; and yet his Cloaths are not a Mode, but a Substance. 'Tis

The Names of Substance and Modes are sometimes confounded.

(f) At mors insculta Gracchum est; causa quidem, credo, aliqua morbi gravioris, non emissione serpentis: neque enim tanta est infelicitas atuspicum, ut ne casu quidem unquam fiat, quod futurum illi esse dixerint. *Cic. de Div. Lib. II.*

Vitiosum est, in comparandis rebus alteram rem efferre, de altera mentionem non facere, aut negligentius disputare; ut si comparetur, utrum satius sit populum frumentum accipere, an non accipere: quæ commoda sint in altera re, curet enumerare; quæ in altera re incommoda sint, & quanta, velut depressa prætereat, aut ea, quæ minima sunt, dicat. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib. II.*

true, that Example occasions no Mistake ; it would be too gross. But, when we say that Man is a thinking Being, and that Matter is extended, such Expressions make us apt to look upon Thinking as an Accident of Man, and upon Extension as a Mode of Matter ; whereas it is Matter it self. Thus, again, after having called *Matter* that wherein all Bodies are alike, and *Form* that wherein they differ, Men have imagined two Principles, and two Substances, which are united to compose a Body. The former is the same every where ; it is (in their Opinion) *neither this, nor that* ; it has neither Bigness nor Smallness, neither an occult nor a manifest Quality : They don't know what it is (g). The *Form* is still more incomprehensible : 'Tis an unknown Substance, which does not exist before its Generation, and yet is not created : It is not known in it self, and is only manifested by the Qualities with which it is invested. Men labour in vain to form a Notion of a Chimera, which has a Name bestowed upon it. Thus again, after having called a *vegetative Soul* what makes Plants spring, grow, and bring forth Fruit, they look for I know not what Substance, distinct from the Wood, Fibres and Juices, in a Word, different from every Thing that is or may be known. That Word, bestowed at a venture, in Expectation of a fuller Knowledge, is afterwards looked upon as a Word wisely invented ; and they fancy every Thing depends upon the right Explication of it.

XV. SOMETIMES we speak of a Mode, as of a Substance, to which we ascribe other Modes. Thus we say that a Whiteness is lively : This Word expresses the Degree of the Whiteness. We say that a Colour is rough : This Term denotes the Effect of the Colour : For Relations are also confounded with Modes, by reason of the Unexactness of the Language. When we say, Exercise is wholesome, we seem to represent Health as a Mode of Exercise, which would be the Substance. *Exercise* would be the *Thing*, and *Health* would be the *State* of the Thing : Whereas Exercise is a State of Man, an active Mode ; and Health, another Mode, is an Effect of that Mode (h). But, that

(g) *Neque quid, neque quantum, neque quale.*

(h) " Our Spittle cleans and dries our Wounds : It kills Serpents.
 " What Quality shall we ascribe to it with respect to Us, or with re-
 " spect

that Instance offers at least a real Relation. There is a Connexion between the State of Exercise and the State of Health; whereas sometimes Men represent as Modes some Relations so external, that they make no Alteration in the Subject, to which they are ascribed, and do not modify it. To be Praised, to be Famous, Rich, all those Things leave us such as we were, as much as to be first and second, if a Man should place himself successively to our right Hand, and then to our left. Whilst I am asleep, a Man makes me his Heir: Does that new Relation make me different from what I was? Not in the least; and I rise such as I was, when I went to Bed. I may be so foolish as to grow Vain upon Account of that Inheritance, or so Wise as to live a comfortable Life by the Use I shall make of it; but I shall be the Cause of those Effects, and that Inheritance will only be the Occasion of them: It is not a Mode of my Soul, nor of my Body. The Vanity of Man, always ready to take Advantage of the least Pretences, moves him to consider himself as being united to his Wealth and Titles: He appropriates to himself those external Things, no less than his most real Qualities. To be Sick, to be Wise, are like Expressions: One would think that the Things, denoted by them, are equally internal. That Conformity of Names keeps the Vulgar in their Error: They seldom go beyond Words. Besides, they are far from looking upon Riches as something less belonging to rich Men, than Wisdom to the Wise. But, whoever thinks above the Vulgar, makes a great Difference between what belongs to a Man, and what is not altogether in his Power. Though he be told that his Riches raise him above other Men, he does not believe it. *Illas circumfusas sibi: multum diuque miratus, quod ad se venerint, ridet, suasque audit magis esse quam sentit.* Let the Vulgar value Men only for those Things which surround them, and are quite different

Sen. Ep.
XX.

‘ spect to Serpents? By which of the two Senses shall we find out its true Nature? *Pliny says, There are Sea-Hares in India, which poison Men; and that Men poison them with their mere Touch.* Where does the Poison truly lie, in Man, or in that Fish? Whom shall we believe, that Fish with respect to Man, or Man with respect to that Fish? - - - - -

“ When we press our Eyes, the Bodies we look upon, appear to us longer. The Eyes of many Animals are thus pressed. That length is therefore by chance the true-Form of those Bodies, and not that which our Eyes in their natural Situation ascribe to it”. *Mont, Book II. Chap. 12.*

rent from them. Though you be raised to the first Rank, if you have no Merit, I look upon you as a Dwarf placed upon a Mountain: Your Elevation will only make me more sensible of your Littleness.

BUT that Error, though never so gross, is one of the most common. Most Men judge of themselves by *external Relations*, as if they were real and internal Attributes. Such a one fancies himself to be a great Man, because he makes a great Figure; and yet nothing can be more contemptible than his Genius, unless it be his Soul. Such a one fancies himself to be a very holy Man, because he has an Employment which requires a great Holiness. If that Man, after a due Examination of himself, finds that he is only above others by a certain Knowledge, and by a Zeal to force upon the Belief of other Men what he thinks to be true, he will place the essential Part of Religion in some Theories.

MEN not only fancy that mere Relations are Modes of a Subject, though they make no Alteration in it; though they may cease, or come again, without taking away, or restoring any Quality; but besides, they look upon a *mere Beginning*, an imperfect Progress, as a *perfect*, compleat, and absolute Quality. All those Mistakes arise from the same Cause. Men

mind only Words. *Wealth* and *Learning*
 * *In the* * being Terms of the same Gender, the
French, la Things, signified by them, are also looked
 Richeffe & la upon as being of the same Class. Learning
 Science. is a real Quality, which modifies the Man
 in whom it is to be found: 'Tis a Perfection

which raises him above an ignorant Man. Riches are also accounted a Merit. He who knows something, is called a learned Man, as well as he who knows every Thing he ought to know. 'Tis therefore an equivocal Term; but that Equivocation is not minded. When a Man happens to be honoured with that Title, he cannot bear being suspected of Ignorance in any Thing whatsoever. 'Tis with the Titles of Learned, Honest, Sober, and Brave, as 'tis with those of Rich, Powerful, Great Lord. A Man is so in the Opinion of some, and not in the Opinion of others. According to the Age, or the Nation, you lived in, notwithstanding the same Quantity of Land and Money, and the same Degree of Knowledge and Probity, Men will give, or deny you, the Titles of Rich, Learned, and Virtuous (i).

(i) " If Languages had been made by Philosophers, they might
 " certainly be more easily learned. Philosophers would have estab-
 " lished

THE *Stoicks* were deluded by a gross Sophism, in supposing the Sense of a Word to be Absolute, though its Signification was altogether Relative. 'Tis a Happiness to be Wise: Therefore, a *wise Man is most Happy*. If he is most Happy, nothing can be wanting to his Felicity: It cannot be encreased: *Quis beato beator?* It has been a Query in our Days, Whether any Man can be sure of seeing the *absolute Magnitude* of Bodies, as if there could be an absolute Magnitude, and the words *Great* and *Small* were not necessarily relative Words? (k)


“lished every where an Uniformity, and Relations, which would
 “have proved a safe and infallible Guide; and the manner of forming a Word, would have implied its Signification by vertue of certain Principles laid down at first. The uncivilized Nations, who
 “are the first Authors of Languages, fell naturally into that Notion, with respect to certain Terminations, all of which have
 “some common Property and Virtue; but that Advantage, unknown to those, who had it in their Hands, was not carried far
 “enough”. *History of the Royal Academy of Sciences, 1701. pag. 174. Amsterdam Edition.*

(k) *Magnitudo non habet certum modum: comparatio illam aut tollit, aut deprimit.* Sen. Ep. XLIII.



C H A P. II.

Of the Relations of Objects with respect to us.

I.  **A**MONGST all the Operations of the Mind, there are none so frequent as Comparisons. *The Frequency of Comparisons.* Men compare Substances with Modes: They compare Substances one with another, and Modes among themselves: They distinguish what is common to them from their Differences, and their Connexion from their Disagreement: They examine their mutual Dependencies: They consider their Force, and determine their Power. It is highly necessary
 to

to lay down Rules for the Direction of our Thoughts in our different Comparisons.

Relations of Objects with respect to us, already treated of in a great Measure.

II. BUT, before I give a particular Account of the Relations that are found out, when Objects are compared one with another, it will not be improper to examine their Relations with respect to us.

'TIS true, that Subject has been already treated of in the foregoing Chapters. Our Temper, Habits, Inclinations, and Passions, make Objects work upon us with a Force they would not have in themselves, were they not supported by those Dispositions. Objects are pleasing or tedious, and raise or tire our Attention according as we are prepossessed by those Principles. So that he, who stands upon his Guard against his Temper and his Habits, and knows how to regulate his Inclinations, will not suffer himself to be imposed upon by the Relations of Objects: to those Dispositions, nor by the Force they get from them. Thus we have already laid down such Principles as may direct and preserve us from Mistakes in the different Relations of Objects to us.

The Power of Novelty and Antiquity.

III. HOWEVER, there are some still, which deserve to be taken Notice of in this Chapter.

REAL or pretended Truths, offered to the Mind, are either *newly* discovered, or have been known *long ago*. Each of these two Relations has a Power of its own. Some Men are only fond of *Antiquity*, and others of *Novelty*; and between those two Extremes Men are divided a thousand different Ways. Sometimes they are pleased with Antiquity, and sometimes with Novelty. I shall not describe their Humours and Oddnesses in that Respect.

Why Novelty pleases.

IV. NEW Objects occasion a Surprise: They raise Attention, Curiosity, and Admiration: In a word, they make a more lively Impression; and by that means we are better

pleased with them. We need not wonder at it: I have accounted for it before: Those Sentiments are innocent, as long as we don't make an ill Use of them.

MAN being born to enjoy a great many comfortable Things, and to perceive an infinite Variety of Objects, 'tis no wonder, if he takes delight in proceeding from one to another: It may be said that he was created partly for that Purpose.

BESIDES, by proceeding from Knowledge to Knowledge, and to that end, from one Novelty to another, he knows his own Strength; he is pleas'd with enriching his Mind; and those Sentiments are too agreeable not to endear to us the Objects which occasion them. Hence it comes to pass, that Variety sets off the Value and Charms of Novelty: Because what is new, flatters Ambition and allures Self-love; a new Proposition is eagerly taken up. By this means the Taste is spoiled by Degrees; for, by yielding to Novelty in such a manner, an Homage is paid to it which is only due to Evidence, and it becomes the Character of Truth. A Man has some new Thoughts; 'tis no matter whether they be Conjectures or Demonstrations, certain or probable: They are New; he thinks he must make the best of them.

VANITY and Moroseness are the two great Springs of a contradicting Humour; and that Humour makes also a Man extremely fond of Novelty: He feeds himself with the Pleasure of preferring himself to all others: He is well pleas'd with opposing the common Notions, and making others Uneasy: He laughs in private at their Trouble, and applauds himself for being the Occasion of it.

SOME Men, extremely desirous of distinguishing themselves by something new and extraordinary, neglect to learn the most common Principles, in order to publish some *Paradoxes*. He, who can't so much as speak *Latin* correctly, presumes to judge from the Style of a Book, whether it was written by the Author, whose Name it bears.

PRAGMATICAL and factious Men will necessarily be fond of Novelty: New Opinions must needs please them, as well as new Maxims and Settlements. One Habit begets another: A restless Man contradicts every Thing; and he must needs lay down something in the room of what he opposes.

IT frequently happens that Men, being vexed, because they have not succeeded in a certain Course of Life, condemn it absolutely, and take up a new one. This appears to them more easy than to mend those Faults, which have been the Occasion of their Miscarriage. Men love to lay their ill Success upon others. 'Tis some Comfort to find fault with the Circumstances, whereby they were engaged in a certain Party; but 'tis very hard to accuse one's self, and to acknowledge the wrong Use of those Circumstances.

HENCE it is that a Man, who has not been able to improve in Learning, by reason of his Idleness, instead of mending that Fault, looks for a better Fortune in the Profession

feſſion of War; and a Soldier, who has ruined himſelf by his Debauchery, abhorring the Trade of War, much more than his own Intemperance, embraces a monaſtical Life.

'TIS by a like Mechanism that ſome Men, who have lived a vicious Life, inſtead of acknowledging, that it is for want of minding the Precepts in which they were inſtructed from their early Years, being well pleaſed to think their Vices proceed only from want of good Inſtruction, find fault with their Religion, and heartily take up the Novelty of any *Vifionary*, who knows how to take Advantage of their Diſpoſition.

MEN are therefore naturally diſpoſed to Novelty; and that Inclination is afterwards ſtrengthen'd by their Inconſtancy. When a Man cannot fix his Mind, and ſettle his Attention upon any Thing whatſoever, he muſt needs continually proceed from one Amuſement to another, and conſequently hunt about after Novelty. Thoſe two Cauſes of Men's Fondneſs of Novelty, are attended with others, *viz.* Vanity, a contradicting Humour, a Spirit of Faction, and, laſtly, *Superſtition*, which, in ſome Caſes, likes Novelty, and finds its Account in it.

THOSE, who by a long Habit happen to be ſubjected to the Power and falſe Glimmering of Novelty, *are to be pitied*. It is no eaſy Thing to be cured of that ill Habit; for the Power of new Objects ariſes from a Surprise; and Reaſon is never leſs powerful than in a Surprise. Care ſhould be taken that Children ſhould avoid all Examples and Diſcourſes proper to beget in them an ill Habit, which, by making us the continual Sport of Error, diſables us from enjoying any ſolid and laſting Satisfaction.

INCONSTANCY hinders Men from knowing the Value of Things, and dwelling upon them. They are not fond of any Thing a long time; they are always for new ones, and at laſt they grow weary of Life it ſelf (a).

A

(a) Jam ſectamus curſum ad urbem; nimis diu à plauſu & fragore aures vacaverunt: juvat jam & humano ſanguine frui. Aliud ex alio iter ſuſcipitur, & ſpectacula ſpectaculis mutantur, ut ait Lucretius,

Hoc ſe quiſque modo ſemper fugit.

A MAN, who can stand upon his own Bottom, and does not much concern himself in the good Sense of others, has no small Diversion, when he sees a new Comer take the Place of another Person. "What a lovely Man! no body can be more Polite: He understands the World in Perfection: He has a great deal of Wit: He is a Man of a charming Conversation." Novelty occasions all these Praises; and a great many People, by such Expressions, commend only an unknown Person.

CERTAINLY we ought to be very much indebted to those, over whom Novelty has so great a Power, when they continue to have an Esteem for us.

V. THOSE Men of Letters, who have got an early Habit of meditating much, make frequent Discoveries, and allow others to do the same: They are well pleased with new Discoveries, though they are not the Authors of them. But dull Men, incapable of any Production, or whose Productions are an Effect of a great Labour, and those whose Learning consists only in a good Memory, don't love Novelties. They think it hard to have new Tasks laid upon them, and to be obliged to study new Propositions: They hate to have their Labour encreased, and are sorry to see others possessed of Talents of which they are destitute: They would have no Masters: They wish they might say, they know every Thing, and that no body can reach them any Thing.

From whence proceeds the Fondness of Antiquity.

'Tis no small Mortification for them to see every Day new Masters start up: They can bear with those antient Masters, to whom every body submitted, when they came into the World. They have learned a System with great Labour; and now some new Comers would have them to begin again. In order to know whether they are in the right, they must enter upon an Examination; a Thing they are not used to. The shortest way is to reject them with Indignation, and to condemn them without Hearing. A Man,
who

Sid quid prodest, si non effugit? sequitur se ipse, & urget gravissimus comes. Itaque scire debemus, non locorum vitium esse quo laboramus, sed nostrum. Infirmi sumus ad omne tolerandum, nec laboris patientes, nec voluptatis, nec nostræ, nec ullius rei diutius. Hoc quosdam egit ad mortem, quod proposita sæpè mutando, in eadem revolvebantur, & non reliquerant novitati locum. Fastidio illis esse cœpit vita & ipse mundus: & subit illud rabadarum deliciarum. Quousque eadem? *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap. 2.*

who is only for Repeating, will easily envy the Pleasure of Inventing.

WHEN Dulness, and the Incapacity of producing any Thing, happen to be supported by Obstinacy, the Aversion to Novelty, and the Fondness of Antiquity encrease. Vanity, which has a hand in every Thing, does not fail to come in for her Share, and will be concerned for Antiquity, as she is sometimes for Novelties. The latter become particularly intolerable, when they are proposed by Men inferior in Birth, Age, or Employments. What! shall a Doctor, applauded like an Oracle, who is grown old in instructing others, and receiving their Homage, stoop to learn of a Scholar? Whoever is so presumptuous as to offer to Teach him, is, in his Judgment, an extravagant Man, who deserves to be punished rather than heard (*b*). If we must learn every Thing, let us learn of the Antients: We are all Disciples of those Masters. But, if the Moderns can invent any valuable Thing, we must then resolve to reckon our Contemporaries among our Teachers. Men, out of Malignity, make it their Business to magnify the Dead, in order to depress the Living, whose Brightness offends their Sight (*c*).

THE Spirit of Party does also engage Men to adhere to the common Notions, and to reject whatever is said by the contrary Party. In point of *Religion*, especially, Novelty is very much suspected, and Antiquity is of great Weight. Men know in general, that the most antient Religion is the best; which is very true; for, that Religion is the nearest to the fountain Head, the Divine Revelation. But, without taking care to go to the fountain Head, a Man looks upon the Belief of his Grandfather to be the most antient Religion. Antiquity reaches no farther than some Years: From that time, every thing is a Repetition; and three or four Men draw after them a crowd of Admirers.

BESIDES, Men are bred up from their Infancy in a profound Respect for the common Doctrines; and when they are grown, they can hardly resolve to examine without Prejudices those Objects of the publick Veneration. Moreover, Men are very lazy; and if they were more
active

(*b*) Naturaliter audita visis laudamus libentius, & presentia convivia, præteritâ veneratione prosequimur: & his nos obrui, illis instrui credimus. *Velleius*.

(*c*) Vitio malignitatis humanæ vetera semper in laude, presentia in fastidio. In laudem Vetustorum invidia non obstat, *Sen*.

active, they would not be much taken up with religious Doctrines. They are very willing to dispense themselves with such a painful Examination, and to rely upon the Judgment of others; which is very convenient. Such a general Disposition has produced a general Effect. The Religion of the *Heathens* was built upon no other Foundation. We have been taught so by our Ancestors, said they: This was their only Proof (*d*). The *Mahometans* make no Enquiries into their Religion: it would be a great Sin. We are told the *Muscovites* rely upon the Knowledge of the Czar; and every Body knows the *Latin Church* argues upon the same Principle. It falls out unluckily, that the same Dispositions are not altogether extinct in those Christian Societies, which have separated from the Church of *Rome*. The Presumption of the Doctors on the one hand, and the Indolence of the Laity on the other; their Backwardness to instruct themselves, and their Inclination to rely upon the Judgment of others; are like to make from time to time, and here and there, some petty Popes. We can hardly forbear countenancing in the Practice, what we condemn in the Theory.

POLITICIANS do also very much suspect Novelty; and this Suspicion is not groundless. 'Tis certain the Peace of the State depends upon the Observation of the Laws. It is no less certain, that if the Bulk of Mankind submit to those Laws, their Submission does not proceed from their apprehending

(*d*) Quæ est autem gens, aut quæ civitas, quæ non aut extis pecudum, aut monstra, aut fulgura interpretantium, aut augurum, aut astrologorum, aut fortium, (ea enim ferè artis sunt) aut somniorum, aut vaticinationum (hæc enim duo naturalia putantur) prædictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quàm causas quæri oportere. *Cic. de Divm. Lib. I.*

Nec me ex ea opinione, quam à majoribus accepi de cultu Deorum immortalium, ullius unquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. Sed cum de Religione agitur, T. Coruncanium, P. Scipionem, P. Scævolum Pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthem, aut Chryssippum sequor, habeoque C. Lælium augurem, eundemque sapientem, quem potius audiam de religione dicentem in illâ oratione nobili, quàm quenquam principem Stoicorum. Cumque omnis Populi Rom. religio in sacra, & in auspicia divisa sit, tertium adjunctum sit, si quid prædictionis causa ex portentis & monstris Sibyllæ interpretes, haruspicesve monuerunt: harum ego religionum nullam unquam contemnendam putavi: mihi que ita persuasi Romulum auspiciis, Numam sacris constitutis, fundamenta jecisse nostræ Civitatis, quæ nunquam profecto sine summa placatione Deorum immortalium tanta esse potuisset. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. III.*

hending their Wisdom and Usefulness. Most Men never reflected upon that Subject, and indeed they are not capable of it: But from their early Years they have been taught to pay a due Respect to the present Establishments. *Custom* therefore is to them instead of Knowledge. Make any Alteration, you accustom them to slight the Object of their Respect; and because every Thing they are used to, appears to them of equal Importance, nothing appears to them essential, when they see that the most authorized Customs are altered. They look no longer upon the Laws, but as a Yoke laid upon them by cunning Men.

HENCE it is, that some wise Magistrates, being reduced to the Necessity of parting with some Laws, went about it with so much Dexterity, that the People were sensible of the Respect paid to them, and hardly perceived that they were altered. The *Lacedemonians* finding the Inconveniency of a Law, which did not allow the same Person to be made an Admiral twice, raised to that Dignity a Man who was not qualified for it, and appointed *Lysander* Superintendant of the Marine. It was not lawful at *Athens* to take away a Table, upon which a Law had been inscribed: The Interest of the State requiring that a certain Law should be altered, *Pericles* bethought himself of turning the Table instead of removing it.

I ADD, that Men are sensible of all the Inconveniences of a Law, but do not always perceive all the Advantages arising from it; for Evil makes a greater Impression than Good. On the contrary, they easily foresee the Advantages of a new Establishment, since those Advantages have occasioned the Thoughts of it; but they do not perceive its Inconveniences. Experience does frequently discover a great many, which had not been foreseen at all. Wherefore it is highly necessary to make no Alteration in a State, without very plain and weighty Reasons. But to oppose all Novelty under that Pretence, lest a Novelty in one Thing should reach all other Things, and the Government it self, is to lay down Barbarousness as the Foundation of Society. At this rate, it might very well be said, That those Princes who did not oppose Christianity and the Reformation, ought to be looked upon as sorry Politicians. Were it true, that the Arts and Sciences are the Ruin of a State, the Publick Peace would be establish'd upon a better and more lasting Foundation, if Men lived still in Caves, and had no other Food but Acorns.

ONE must have very little Wit to entertain any Suspicion about those, who apply themselves to the Improvement of Arts and Sciences. No one ought to be less suspected by the Government, since no one is so much concern'd in the Publick Peace as they are. Peace, and its happy Consequences, make Arts and Sciences flourish (e). Those should rather be mistrusted, who affect a more blind Dependence, a more absolute Submission, and seem to be most pleas'd with Slavery. Men will not make themselves Slaves for nothing: They have something else in view; they are truly Slaves to Fortune and their own Interest: These are their true Masters, to whom they are always ready to sacrifice all other Men.

VI. IT appears by the foregoing Reflections, that something may be said for and against Novelty and Antiquity. A Man of a shallow Wit is continually enquiring about new Things: He admires and greedily takes up whatever comes to his Knowledge, and every Thing he never heard before. Such a Character is so contemptible, that it prepossesses us against Novelty. We are ashamed of an Inclination, which makes a Man childish.

A Parallel between Novelty and Antiquity.

ON the other hand, those are certainly ridiculous, who take nothing to be true but what was said by their Predecessors;

(e) Errare mihi videntur, qui existimant, Philosophiæ fideliter de- ditos, contumaces esse ac refractarios, & contemptores Magistratum ac Regum, eorumve per quos publica administrantur. E contrario enim, nulli adversus illos gratiores sunt: nec immerito; nullis eni- plus præstant, quam quibus frui tranquillo otio licet. Itaque hi, quibus ad propositum bene vivendi aditum confert securitas publica, necesse est auctorem hujus boni, ut parentem colant: multò quidem magis, quam illi inquieti, & in medio positi; qui multa principibus debent, sed multa & imputant; quibus nunquam tam plenè occur- rere ulla liberalitas potest, ut cupiditates illorum quæ crescunt, dum implentur, exsatiat. Quisquis autem de accipiendo cogitat, oblitus accepti est; nec ullum habet malum cupiditas majus, quam quod in- grata est. Adjice nunc, quòd nemo eorum qui in Republicâ versan- tur, quos vincat, sed à quibus vincatur, adspicit: & illis non tam ju- cundum est, multos post se videre, quam grave, aliquem ante se. Ha- bet hoc vitium omnis ambitio: non respicit. Nec ambitio tantùm instabilis est, verum cupiditas omnis: quia incipit semper à fine. At ille vir sincerus ac purus, qui reliquit & curiam, & forum, & om- nem administrationem Reipublicæ, ut ad ampliora secederet, diligit eos per quos hoc ei facere tutò licet, solusque illis gratuitum testimo- nium reddit, & magnam rem nescientibus debet. *Sen. Ep. LXXIII.*

fors; who being deluded by the Word *Antients*, look upon them, as Children look upon grown Men and old People; and who in their ripe Years, fancy they are still Children, and have the same Credulity. Such a ridiculous Character makes us side again with Novelty, and look upon the stubborn Followers of Antiquity as doating Men.

THERE has been a warm Dispute in our Days about the Merit of the Moderns, compared with the Merit of the Antients. That Dispute is famous by the Reputation and Ability of the Disputants, and has produced several Works full of Wit and Learning. But, after this sincere Acknowledgment, I should be willing to add, that it was a very useless Dispute, were I not persuaded that Men want many Amusements to take up their leisure Hours. We have not a sufficient Number of Monuments to judge of the whole Merit of the Antients. Besides, 'tis well known, that in order to make just Comparisons, Things of the same Nature ought to be compared together, Morals with Morals, History with History, a Poem with a Poem; and not only natural Philosophy with natural Philosophy in general, but an Explication of a Phænomenon by the Antients with an Explication of the same Phænomenon by the Moderns. Every Thing must be calculated and summed up, and right Subtractions made from the total Sums.

I GRANT the Moderns may exceed the Antients, since they have the Help of their Knowledge. Standing upon their Shoulders, we see farther than they; nay, we are the Antients in one Sense; for the World was formerly younger.

ONE Day adds to another Day; and Learning encreases by that Means. The wrong Notions of the Antients are mended; their good Thoughts are made use of and improved: The Antients themselves did so with respect to their Predecessors (*f*). But we are discouraged by our Laziness: We fancy we want Strength, because we will not use it. Are we Men of a different Kind? Do we inhabit another Earth? Are we enlighten'd by another Sun (*g*)? Can we give

(*f*) Recentissima quæque sunt correctæ & emendatæ maximè. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

Optima conditio est ultimi, *Sen. Ep. LXXIX.*

(*g*) Nos quoque aliquid ipsi faciamus animosè: simus inter exempla. Quare deficimus? quare desperamus? quicquid fieri potuit, potest. Nos modò purgemus animum, sequamurque naturam, à quâ aberranti cupiendum timendumque est, & fortuitis serviendum. Licet reverti in viam, licet in integrum restitui. *Sen. Ep. XCVIII.*

give no Example to those, who shall come after us? Are we necessitated to transcribe those, who lived before us, and to follow their Steps in a servile Manner? I grant they began the Race; but certainly they did not go through it; and their Discoveries ought rather help than hinder us from making new ones (*b*).

ON the other hand, the Antients lived longer than we: They were less prepossess'd than we are; for Prejudices encrease more and more in Process of Time. The Spirit of Party, and a factious Zeal did not so much prevail in their Days as in ours: The Zeal for Religion has reached all human Sciences. Perhaps the Antients, not clogged with so much Reading as we are, had a stronger and more lively Genius. They were not obliged to learn a thousand Fooleries, which we must learn, or be disparaged by those, who dispose of Rewards, or are consulted for the Distribution of them. Lastly, the Antients were able to bestow upon Things the Time we lose in learning Words.

THE Dispute about the Preference of the Antients to the Moderns has proved much like the Vineyard in the Fable. Those who manured it, in hopes of finding a Treasure, were disappointed; but they grew rich by the Fruits of their indefatigable Labour. The Quest of the Philosopher's Stone has, in like manner, enrich'd Chymistry and Physick with a great many useful Discoveries. The Controversy about the Antients and the Moderns is not yet determined, and in all likelihood will never be decided, or only after some Ages. Both Parties acknowledge the supreme Tribunal of Reason; and each of them make her discourse differently, and bring her on their Side. But that Dispute has produced excellent Fruits. The Partisans of the Moderns have endeavoured to exceed the Antients, and, as some think, made use of their Assistance to go farther than they. The Admirers of the Antients have explained their Precepts, illustrated their Works, and set their Beauties in a full Light.

WE are prepossess'd in favour of the Time past by the usual Complaints of old Men, whom we have heard with great Respect from our Childhood. *Things grow worse every Day*: Such is their usual Language. But Men have been Men at all Times; and Things did always go much at the same

(*b*) Nullum sæculum magnis ingeniis clusum est. *Sen. Ep. CII.*
 Qui præcesserunt non præcipuisse mihi videntur quæ dici poterant, sed aperuisse. *Inventuris inventa non obstant. Ep. LXXIX.*

same rate. Manners are a little altered ; the Corruption of the Heart remains constantly the same. (i)

WE are born in a Dependence upon those, who are older than we. We have seen from our early Years old Men possessed of the first Places : By that Means, we have been induced to honour and imitate them ; and that Custom extends to every Thing, that goes by the Name of Antiquity. We have a Respect for the Works of the Antients, because we look upon them as venerable old Men.

WE are indebted to the Antients ; and out of Gratitude we ought to make a good Use of their Knowledge. But, we ought also to mind Posterity ; and in order to imitate the Antients, we must go farther than they, and leave something of our own to those, who shall come after us. We must improve the Stock our Fathers have left us, and transmit it to our Descendants.

THE reading of the antient Authors is doubtless agreeable and useful ; for, not to say that a Man, who loves to learn, reads no good Book without Pleasure, and some Benefit, it is very pleasant to find, by the reading of the Antients, the Agreement of Reason and Religion. It is very pleasant to observe that they have had a Glimpse of what we see now more clearly. What a Pleasure for the Modern Philosophers to read these Words in *Seneca*? *Must we wonder that the Periodical Times of Comets, which appear so seldom, have not been yet determined? 'Tis not yet fifteen hundred Years, since the Grecians gave Names to the Stars. Many Nations in our Days know nothing in the Heavens, but what may be seen at the first Glance : They are still ignorant of the Causes of Eclipses, and of the Phases of the Moon ; and 'tis not long since we have learned them. There will be a Time, when*

(i) Sic finiamus, ne in nostro seculo culpa subsidat. Hoc majores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimus ; hoc posteri nostri querentur ; evertos esse mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas & in omne nefas labi. At ista stant loco eodem, stabuntque, paululum dumtaxat ultro aut citro mota, ut fluctus, quos ælus accedens longius extulit, recedens interiore littorum vestigio tenuit. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. I. Cap. 10.*

Expectant ii qui audiunt exempla in veterum memoriâ & monumentis ac literis, plena dignitatis, plena antiquitatis. Hæc plurimum solent & auctoritatis habere ad probandum & jucunditatis ad audiendum. *Cic. Act. V. in Verrem.*

when more attentive and laborious Men will discover what is not now well known to us (k).

GOOD Sense, which supplied the want of Art among the Antients, did also frequently enable them to make Reflections, wherein one may observe a surprising Application of some general Maxims, which they followed, though perhaps they never had a distinct Notion of them.

IF it should be acknowledged that Eloquence has not attained yet to the Degree it was in among the *Grecians* and *Romans*, such a Confession would not prove the Superiority of the Antients in point of Wit and Knowledge. One might easily find out the Reason of their Superiority, as to Eloquence, in certain Circumstances, which would still produce the same Effect, if they had not ceased. Among the *Grecians* and *Romans* Eloquence was the Way to Dignities; and the best Speakers had generally the greatest Share in the Government. The Eloquence of *Cicero* raised him to the first Dignity of the World, though his Name was perfectly new in the Commonwealth. To that Reason others may be added, which are more essential, and more peculiar to Eloquence it self. Eloquence requires an important Subject, Hearers of a good Taste, and a numerous Audience. An Orator would be ridiculous, if he should make a very earnest Speech about an inconsiderable Subject, or even if he should display the nicest and the most lively Strokes of Eloquence about a noble Subject, in an Assembly of twelve or twenty People. Every thing, that may give occasion to the most perfect Eloquence, is now to be found in the Parliament of *England*. We see now and then some admirable Passages out of Speeches made in that Assembly.

THE Pulpits of our Churches seem to afford the most magnificent Theatre for Eloquence that ever was. But,

Y 3

how

(k) Quid ergò miramur Cometas, tam rarum mundi spectaculum, nondum teneri legibus certis: nec initia illorum finesque notescere, quorum ex ingentibus intervallis recursus est? Nondum sunt anni mille quingenti ex quo Græcia

--- stellis numeros & nomina fecit.

Multæque hodie sunt gentes, quæ tantùm facie noverint cælum, quæ nondum sciant cur Luna deficiat, quare obumbretur. Hoc apud nos quoque nuper ratio ad certum perduxit. Veniet tempus, quo ista quæ nunc latent, in lucem dies extrahat, & longioris ævi diligentia.

Sen. Natur. Quest. Lib. VII. cap. 25.

how can a Clergyman preach well, when he is obliged to ascend the Pulpit so often? Those, who are not sensible of this Truth, don't know what a good Sermon is: They never heard a good Sermon, or if they have heard some, it may be said they were not worthy to hear them, since they could not judge of their Excellency.

BESIDES, our Preachers explain, or endeavour to explain Theological matters; but the Thorns, with which those matters are beset, do not suit with Eloquence. A Preacher, in order to be an Eloquent Man, ought to understand very well what he says; but, it frequently happens that the matters treated of in the Pulpit, by the very Confession of our Preachers, are unintelligible. I add, that Preachers are generally constrained by a certain Method, with which they must comply, to avoid the Censures of those, who are not willing they should have a greater Merit than themselves. A Preacher must have a full Liberty, in order to make a Sermon, that may be worth Hearing. The Method of Preaching, such as it is prescribed by many Divines, is an Art, which teaches to explain unintelligible Things, and to compose without much Labour, and in a very short time, a long and tedious Discourse. But, to go farther still: At the very time when Eloquence was in its Height, the Rhetoricians, who professed to teach it, were most of them very great Sophists. Ever since the first Emperors, good Taste decayed, and Eloquence became more and more false. The most Eloquent Fathers of the Church had no excellent Masters. When we read them without Partiality, we find many poor Things under great Words, Questions wrongly stated, weak Arguments, Quibbles and Exaggerations. And yet they are recommended to us as Models: We are advised to conform to their Taste, to quote them frequently, and write in their Style.

VII. IN order to know whether the Antients have been so happy as their Admirers will have it, or, whether the Moderns had a better Success, we must enter upon an Examination, and do it impartially, for fear of being mistaken in the Enquiry. We must examine an antient and common Opinion, in the same manner as if it was now proposed the first time; and we must consider a new Opinion, as we would have done in the first Age of the World, when every Thing was new.

WHAT is now True, should always have been acknowledged to be so; and what was not True from the beginning, will never be True. A new Truth is a Truth: An old Er-

ror is an Error. The Antients might, and have been sometimes mistaken: We are more clear-lighted in some Things than they were: This is undeniable. Whoever has Eyes, ought to use them; and those, who are mistaken, ought not to be believed without Proof. Let us therefore examine Things in themselves, without minding the words *Novelty* and *Antiquity*, which may hinder us from discovering Truth. After all, if we have so great a Veneration for the Antients, let us study their Works, and endeavour to imitate them. As they have invented, let us invent in our Turn (l). A rational Man ought to be no less fond of Knowledge, than a covetous Man of Riches. The latter, not contented with the Riches he has inherited, makes it his Business to encrease them every Day. Let us, in like manner, encrease the Stock which the Antients, and in general all our Predecessors have left us (m). Why should we not apply to many Subjects, what the illustrious Marquis *de l'Hôpital* says concerning Geometry, in order to draw up a Parallel between the Effects of a blind Admiration, and the Effects of a noble Boldness (n)?

LET

(l) Aliquid & de tuo profer; omnes istos nunquam auctores, semper interpretes, sub aliena umbra latentes, nihil habere existimo generosi, nunquam ausos aliquando facere quod diu didicerant. *Sen. Ep. XXXIII.*

(m) Agamus bonum patremfamilie: faciamus ampliora, quæ accipimus; major ista hereditas à me ad posteros transeat. Multum adhuc restat operis, multumque restabit: nec ulli nato post mille sæcula præcludetur occasio aliquid adhuc adjiciendi. Sed etiam si omnia à veteribus inventa sunt: hoc semper novum erit, usus, & inventorum ab aliis scientia & dispositio. *Sen. Ep. LXIV.*

(n) "What we have of the Antients concerning those Matters, especially of *Archimedes*, does certainly deserve our Admiration. But, besides that they only touched upon very few Curbs, and even slightly; we hardly find any Thing in them but particular Propositions, which discover no regular and continued Method. However, this can be no Reflection upon them. They must have had a very great Genius to break through so great an Obscurity, and to enter into a Country altogether unknown before. If they did not go far, at least, whatever *Vieta* may say, they did not lose their Way; and the more difficult it was, the more are they to be admired for not missing it. In a word, it does not appear that the Antients could do more for the Time they lived in. They did what our best Wits would have done in their room; and if they were now in our room, one may very well believe they would have

LET us therefore examine each Propofition and each Proof, without minding from whence it comes (*o*). If we are convinced of a Truth, after a ftrict Examination, let us take hold of it: We may lay claim to it, whoever be the Author (*p*). Let us be afraid of being impofed upon by Antiquity: Let us miftruf Novelty: Let us admit nothing merely becaufe the Antients believed it, nor reject any Thing, only becaufe they were ignorant of it: When we read a Book, we muft lay afide the Author's Name, and examine in themfelves the Matters treated of by him. Let us fancy the Title Page is loft.

Useful or Ufelefs Enquiries.

VIII. THE Knowledge of thofe Things, to the ftudy of which we apply our felves, is either Ufeful, or of no Ufe. It is highly neceffary to make a very great Difference between thofe two Relations.

OUR Lives are too fhort to beftow our Time upon ufelefs Things, and our Faculties too much limited to exhaust them by *Superfluities* (*q*). Perhaps there is nothing, that has fo

“ the fame Notions we have. This is a Confequence of the natural
 “ Equality of Mens Minds, and of the neceffary Succelfion of Dif-
 “ coveries.

“ Wherefore, it is no furprifing Thing that the Antients went no
 “ farther; but one cannot fufficiently wonder that great Men, that
 “ the Moderns, fhould have ftop'd fo long there, and that through a
 “ fuperftitious Admiration of the Works of the Antients, they fhould
 “ have been contented to read and comment upon them, without al-
 “ lowing themfelves any other Ufe of their Knowledge, but what
 “ was neceffary to follow them; without daring to be guilty of Think-
 “ ing fometimes without Book, and of making Discoveries of their
 “ own. Such was the Method of many People: They did write:
 “ Books were multiplied; and all the while nothing went forward.
 “ All the Labour of many Ages has only filled the World with re-
 “ fpected Commentaries and Tranflations of Originals, which were
 “ often defpicable.

“ Such was the State of the Mathematicks, and epecially of Phi-
 “ lofophy, till M. *Descartes* appeared. That great Man, animated by
 “ the Superiority of his Genius, left the Antients, in order to follow
 “ no other Guides, but that fame Reafon which the Antients fol-
 “ lowed. That noble Boldnefs, which was called a Rebellion, has
 “ occafioned a great many new and ufeful Discoveries. Men began
 “ then to open their Eyes, and to think.”

(*o*) *Æftimandum quid dicatur, non à quo. Sen.*

(*p*) *Quod verum eft, noftrum eft. Sen. Ep. XII.*

(*q*) *Quæ dementia eft fupervacua difcere in tanta temporis ege-
 ftate?*

ſo much contributed to prepoſſeſs the polite World againſt Learning, than to ſee Men of Letters grow warm about Fooleries, and tell Trifles and impertinent Things with a grave Tone, as if there was ſome Senſe in every Thing a Man ſays, when he wears a long Beard, and a Diſcourſe changed its Nature by being made with a frowning Countenance (r).

IX. THERE are many Degrees in the Uſefulneſs and Unprofitableneſs of our Knowledge. In the firſt place it is to no purpoſe to go about to learn what cannot be underſtood; for, to attempt an Impoſſibility is to loſe one's Time.

Why Men are fond of thoſe Things, that are above their Capacity.

THOUGH this Maxim be very evident, yet there are many People, who boldly diſpute about the Nature of the Divine Perfections, the Trinity, God's Decrees, and Providence; a Raſhneſs the more intolerable, becauſe, by their own Confeſſion, thoſe Subjects are incomprehenſible, and becauſe by endeavouring to know them, one runs the Hazard of falling into Errors of a very dangerous Conſequence.

A MAN, who undertakes to meditate upon Things, that are above his Reach, may eaſily fancy he underſtands what he does not underſtand; and then he pitches upon ſome Words, whereby he pretends to expreſs Things of which he has no Idea. That Language grows familiar and dear to him; for 'tis an Effect of his moſt ſublime Meditations: And that ſacred Style is as much reſpected by him, as the Subject to which he applies it.

ANOTHER Man meditates likewiſe upon the ſame Subject, and falls into other Deluſions. But fancying, as well as the former, that he underſtands what he ſays, he alſo pitches upon ſome Words to expreſs his pretended Ideas, and grows fond of them. That Difference of Language kindles a War between thoſe two Zealots: They accuſe one another of Erring, even in Matters of the greateſt Importance. And yet they have the ſame Thoughts, but ſpeak differently. The Caſes of thoſe Men are alike: They have no Ideas: They don't underſtand what they ſay: They are in Ignorance, but not in an Error; or, if they are miſtaken, their Miſtake conſiſts in confounding Words with Things, and reſolving to maintain vain Sounds. Had ſome Queſti-
ons,

(r) O pueriles ineptias! In hoc ſupercilia ſubduximus. In hoc barbam demulimus. Hoc eſt quod tristes docemus & pallidi.

ons, which made a very great Noise, been examined peaceably, they would have been brought to this Query, not whether it be lawful to Think, but whether it be lawful to Speak differently from other Men.

THE *Eastern* Churches grew warm (and from Disputing they proceeded to Persecution) about this Question, all the Terms whereof are great: Whether there are two Natures and one Person in JESUS CHRIST: Whether there is but one Person and one Nature: or, Whether there are two Persons and two Natures. If they had asked one another what they meant by the words *Person, Nature, Union*; some would have been silent, and perhaps sensible, that they fought about Words, of which they had no Ideas. Others would have apprehended that they did not think differently, though they used different Terms. And yet, the Emperor *Theodosius* ordered that the *Nestorians* should be called *Simonians*, * *In the French* from *Simon Magus*. They might as well *Pantouffiens*. have been called *Slipperians* *; for, their Error had no more relation to *Simon Magus* † *In the French* than to a *Slipper* †. *Pantoufle*.

ST. *HILARY* used this Expression, *Trina Deitas*. *Hincmar* of *Reims* condemned it: Others vindicated it. They spoke differently; but their Thoughts were the same; or rather they had no Thoughts about a Subject, of which they had no Idea.

IT frequently happens that the less Men understand what they say, the more obstinately they maintain it, because it would be a shameful Thing for them to own that they grew warm about Words void of Sense. Besides, they fancy they understand something in a Subject, that is incomprehensible; and the more others complain that they have no Notion of that Subject, the more they think themselves to be above them.

IF Doctors are so easily mistaken, what can we expect from the People? Most Men are mere Parrots in many Things. Would to God they were not more Parrots about Religion, than about any Thing else! They piously submit to Words consecrated by their Leaders. And indeed, how can they believe that a venerable Man, whose Age and Dignity they respect, whose Learning and Uprightness they value, should speak without knowing what he says, and boldly determine what he does not understand? The less they understand him, the more learned they think him to be; the less they apprehend what he says, the more they are

are persuaded he delivers fine Things (s). This has been the Cause of the most shameful Divisions among Christians in all Ages. 'Tis a Disgrace upon human Nature. A profound Respect for Religion, and for God who is the Object of it, should put an End to many Questions, which are above us, and the Ignorance whereof is not prejudicial to our Salvation. (t) (u)

X. WHEN a Man is thus peremptory about Things that are beyond our Reach, we should imitate his Weakness, did we seriously dispute with him; for how can one dispute about a Subject, that is not understood? Where can we find Arguments to convince an obstinate Antagonist?

A Method of disputing about those Matters.

(s) Nam auditor, cum eum, quem adversarii perturbatum putant oratione, videt animo firmissimo contradicere paratum; plerumque se potius temerè assensisse, quàm illum sine causâ confidere arbitratur. *Cic. de Inv. Lib. I.*

(t) "Some hold that the World was made to give a Body, as a Punishment, to each of those Spirits, which fell by their own Fault from the Purity, in which they had been created; the first Creation having been only incorporeal; and that according as they departed more or less from their Spirituality, they were embodied more or less dully. From thence proceeds the Variety of so much created Matter. But the Spirit, which was invested with the Body of the Sun for his Punishment, must have had a very uncommon Alteration. All the Extremities of our Enquiry vanish away. As *Plutarch* says of the Beginning of Histories, that in the same manner as in Maps, the Borders of known Lands are full of Morasses, large Forests, Desarts and uninhabitable Places. Hence it is, that the grossest and most childish Conceits are to be found in those, who handle the sublimest Things, and dive farther into them, sinking themselves in their Curiosity and Presumption. The End and Beginning of Knowledge are alike. See how *Plato* soars up in his Poetical Clouds. See in his Works the Jargon of the Gods." *Montagne, Book II. Chap. 12.*

(u) Veteres autem parcissimè de rebus divinis philosophabantur, neque quicquam audebant de his pronunciaré, quod non esset apertè proditum his literis, quarum auctoritas nobis est sacrosancta. Sed huc primum perpulit Joannem Evangelistam, Cerinthianorum & Ebionitarum impia temeritas, ut arcana quædam de Christi divinâ naturâ literis mandaret: post Arianorum curiosâ subtilitas ad majorem necessitatem adegit orthodoxos, videlicet ut de potentione naturæ divinæ, de supercreatione filii, de adoptione in nomen Dei, tum autem, *τὸ τὸ ὁμοίου, καὶ τὸ ἁμοιουσίου*, magnis contentionibus dissererent, ac denique desinerent. Subinde necessitatem hanc deplorat sanctissimus vir Hilarius, haud quaque ignarus quàm periculi plenum sit, quàm parùm religiosum, de rebus ineffabilibus eloqui, incomprehensibilia

Antagonist? How can we shew him that he is mistaken, and that he ascribes to the Subject in hand what does not belong to it, since that Subject is not sufficiently known, and we are ignorant of what he ascribes to it? IN

fibilia scrutari, de longè semotis à captu nostro pronunciare. Sed in hoc pelagus longius etiam provectus est divus Augustinus, videlicet felix hominis ingenium, quærendi voluptate, velut aura secundiore, aliunde aliò proliciente.

At ea quæ nos scrutamur, quæ definimus, interdum nec sacris literis prodita sunt, ut si comprehendi non possint, certè credi debeant: nec ul. is rationibus idoneis probari, nec cogitatione concipi, nec similibus adhibitis adumbrari, ut sunt, possunt. In quibus vestigandis, quum à felicissimis ingeniis summâ vi diu desudatum fuerit, hic demum est extremus profectus, ut intelligant se nihil scire: & adèd ad vitæ pietatem nihil faciunt, ut nusquam magis habeat locum illud Pauli, *Scientia inflat, charitas edificat*. Quod supercilium, quas contentiones, quos tumultus, quæ mundi dissidia videmus ex hujus generis inscita scientia scaterere. Quumque tam fugax sit vita nostra, interim ea negligimus, sine quibus nulla spes est cuiquam assequendæ salutis. *Nisi condonâro fratri, quod in me peccavit, mihi non condonabit Deus, quod in ipsum admisi. Nisi mundum cor habuero, non videbo Deum*. Hoc igitur totis studiis agendum erat; hoc meditandum, hoc urgendum, ut livore, ut invidia, ut odio, ut superbiâ, ut avaritiâ, ut libidine purgem animum. Non damnaberis si nescias, utrùm spiritus à patre & filio proficiscentis, unicum sit principium, an duo: sed non effugies exitium, nisi curaris interim habere fructus spiritûs, qui sunt, charitas, gaudium, pax, patientia, benignitas, bonitas, longanimitas, mansuetudo, fides, modestia, continentia, castitas. Ad hæc igitur vertenda est, huc intendenda præcipua studii nostri cura. Summa nostræ religionis pax est & unanimitas. Ea vix constare poterit, nisi de quàm potest paucissimis definiamus, & in multis liberum relinquamus suum cuique judicium: proptereâ, quod ingens sit rerum plurimarum obscuritas: & hoc morbi ferè innatum sit hominum ingeniis, ut cedere nesciant, simul atque res in contentionem vocata est, quæ postquàm incaluit, hoc cuique videtur verissimum, quod temerè tuendum susceperit. Atque hâc in re adèd modum nesciere quidam, ut postea quàm nihil non definierant de rebus divinis, novam etiam in his, qui nihil aliud sunt quàm homines, *Σεβήματα* commenti sint: quæ quidem plus quæstionum, & atrociores tumultus excitavit orbi, quàm olim Arianorum temeritas.

Olim fides erat in vitâ magis quàm in articulorum professione. Mox necessitas admonuit, ut articuli præscriberentur, sed pauci & apostolicæ sobrietatis. Deinde hæreticorum improbitas adegit ad exactiorem divinatorum voluminum excussionem, pervicacia compulit, ut quædam ex auctoritate Synodorum definirentur. Tandem fidei symbolum in scriptis potius quàm in animis esse cœpit, ac penè tot erant fides, quot homines. Creverunt articuli, sed decrevit sinceritas; esferbuit contentio, reffixit charitas. Doctrina Christi, quæ priùs nesciebat

IN order to avoid being imposed upon by those Men, and to bring them off from their Delusions, they must be desired to explain themselves. If they refuse to do it, they bear Witness against their own Darknes and Ignorance; and if they venture upon it, they will quickly be sensible that they cannot explain their Meaning. Urge them never so little, they

bat λογωμαχίαν, cœpit à philosophiæ præidiis pendere: hic erat primus gradus Ecclesiæ ad deteriora prolabentis. Accreverunt opes, & accessit vis. Porro admixta huic negotio Cæsarum auctoritas, non multum promovit fidei sinceritatem. Tandem res deducta est ad sophisticas contentiones, articulorum myriades proruperunt. Hinc deventum est ad terrores ac minas. Quumque vita nos destituat: quum fides sit in ore magis quàm in animo: quum solida illa sacrarum literarum cognitio nos deficiat, tamen terroribus huc adigimus homines, ut credant quod non credunt, ut ament quod non amant, & intelligant quod non intelligunt. Non potest esse sincerum, quod coactum est: nec Christo gratum est nisi quod voluntarium. *Erasmus, Præfatio in Hilarium.*

Here follows the Substance of those Quotations.

“ Men were formerly very cautious in speaking of God, and of his
 “ Nature and Attributes, being contented with what the Scripture
 “ says of them in express Words. A rash Curiosity broke through
 “ those Bounds insensibly, and made Men forget how dangerous it
 “ was, as well as contrary to the Spirit of Religion, to venture to
 “ explain what is unspeakable, and to search what is incomprehen-
 “ sible. Though God has confined our Life within a very short
 “ Space, yet, instead of minding only what is necessary, we perplex
 “ our selves with Subtilties, of which one may be ignorant without
 “ any danger. Peace is the Perfection of Christianity; but without
 “ considering that a Multitude of Articles is not a very proper Means
 “ to preserve that Peace, many Questions have been debated; and in
 “ order to determine them, Men have at last established a human
 “ Authority in the Church, and made a kind of a Deity of a Man.
 “ The Wealth and Splendor of Ecclesiastical Dignities, the Haughti-
 “ ness of those who were possessed of them, the Authority of the
 “ Emperors too indulgent to the Clergy, Subtilties and Sophistry,
 “ Threatnings and Punishments, have at length brought Men to pre-
 “ tend to believe, or to fancy they believe, what they do not believe
 “ at all, because they have no Idea of it, and to profess to love what
 “ they do not love, because they do not understand it. Such is the
 “ Faith of a great many Christians, and even of those, who should
 “ be most knowing. Nothing can be more opposite to the Light
 “ of the Gospel than the Darknes of Ignorance; nothing can be
 “ more inconsistent with the Sincerity essential to a Christian than
 “ Force and Constraint. And yet those, who blindly submit to
 “ the Yoke of Authority, are well beloved.”

they will have recourse to Incomprehensibility, about which a *respectful Silence* is the only Way, that can be reasonably taken.

ANOTHER Method may also be used to reclaim them from their Illusions, or to convince them that those Illusions are past remedy. 'Tis but asking them now and then some Questions, as it were to instruct one self, in order to give them Occasion to heap up Nonsense upon Nonsense. By much talking without Ideas, they will not fail to contradict themselves; and those Contradictions will afford some Reasons to enlighten their Minds, if they will reflect; or to give them over to their Infatuation, if they will not hear.

XI. SOME Things are altogether above the Reach of Mens Minds; and some are above the Capacity of some Men, but not above the Capacity of others. How many People, for instance, who cannot distinguish the thinking Substance from the extended Substance? How many, who are not able to follow a Geometrical Demonstration somewhat compounded? And how many indifferent Geometricians are stopp'd by *Algebraical* Calculations? The same may be observed in Practice, as well as in Speculation. Extraordinary Instances of Fortitude, Courage, and Disinterestedness, are looked upon as idle Stories by Men of a shallow Wit, who judge of others by themselves, and fancy that nothing is possible but what they can do, or have been Witnesses of (*x*). To avoid the Shame of owning themselves to be inferiour to any Body, they endeavour to believe that no Body is really possessed of what is wanting to them (*y*).

A MAN continually taken up with the Thoughts of growing rich; a Man, whose Breast is full of ambitious Projects; who is not sensible of their Injustice; who commends, applauds, and congratulates others, only to deceive them, and make them subservient to his Designs; who loves nothing but Intrigue, and delights in seeing others overthrown, that he may raise himself by their Fall; I say, Men of that Character

character

(*x*) Non putant fieri quicquid facere non possunt; ex infirmitate sua de virtute ferunt sententiam. *Sen. Ep. LXXI.*

Aiunt nos loqui majora quam quæ humana natura sustineat.

(*y*) Expediit nobis neminem videri bonum, quasi aliena virtus exprobratio delictorum vestrorum sit. *Sen. de Vit. Beat.*

Ipsi quoque hoc facere possunt, sed nolunt. *Ep. CIV.*

rafter cannot apprehend that any Body else should act by other Motives and Principles. Notions of Virtue, Disinterestedness, and Generosity, appear to them mere Chimera's, which may be made use of to good Purpose, in order to impose upon weak People, who have a Respect for great Shadows. To commend and urge those Motives, is not a proper Means to get into the Confidence of those Men. The more your Discourse upon that Subject proceeds from your Heart, and appears to be free from any Dissimulation, the more they will believe you are a perfect Hypocrite. What can those Men give, that will make amends for the Loss of one's Time, and the Danger one runs by waiting upon them?

THERE are Men, whose Designs, and even Conjectures, do not reach beyond their Senses. All the Wonders of Nature, that are unknown to them, all the Discoveries and Reasonings, which cannot be made plain to their weak Understanding, are accounted by them mere Delusions. Many, after having contrived a very shallow System, will not believe the Mind of Man can go farther. Their Vanity does not allow them to value what they are not possessed of, and cannot expect to possess, because the Length and Difficulty of the Work hinders them from going about it. Contempt is a shorter Way than Study: their Laziness and Vanity find their Account in it. (z)

THE famous Chancellor *Bacon* says of those Men, if I am not mistaken, That they fancy themselves to be the Mirror of the World, and so exact and perfect a Mirror, that nothing can escape it. And therefore they will not reckon among things that exist, any thing of which they do not find an Image in themselves, that is, any Thing which they do not clearly apprehend. 'Tis the quite contrary. That Mirror is a false one. (a)

THE

(z) "What a Man does not know, he is willing to call a useless Thing; 'tis a sort of Revenge. And because Mathematicks and Natural Philosophy are not commonly understood, they are commonly accounted useless. The Cause of their Misfortune is very obvious; they are hard, wild, and of a difficult Access." *Hist. of the Royal Academy of Sciences, 1699. Preface.*

(a) *Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum; qui suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet & inficit. Nov. Org. Lib. I. 59.*

"We must not judge of what is possible or impossible, by what appears to us credible or incredible, as I have said elsewhere. And
" it

THE most shallow Men are most apt to look upon themselves as Models of Perfection. The Inhabitants of the Isles of the *Ladrones*, who are the most ignorant People in the World, despise the rest of Mankind to the highest Degree. They could not bear to hear of a Paradise common to them with the Vulgar.

A SHALLOW Wit is quickly filled up: No new Thing can get into it. If a Style be clear, and consequently different from the Jargon of a shallow Man, 'tis a sufficient Reason for him to tax it with Obscurity.

THE Ridiculousness of all those Prejudices, if it be well minded, will be a powerful Means to avoid them. But besides, a Man ought to consider that he will never understand those Things, which he fancies cannot be attained to; for, he will not go forward, if he believes all his Steps will be usefess. One may understand and believe what at first appears to be incredible, because it is not understood: 'Tis but instructing one self, by proceeding from Principles to Consequences, and from what is Simple to what is Compound. The Strength of the Mind will encrease with its Knowledge. But, as I have just now said, a Man must instruct himself *methodically*: Every body does not do it: Men do not dwell long enough upon Principles: Their Impatience and Vanity raise them immediately to difficult Things: Their Curiosity hurries them to what is wonderful: They desire to be admired by others, and believe the most sublime Knowledge will answer that Design.

WHEN

“ it is a great Fault, into which, however, most Men fall, not
 “ to believe that others can do what we cannot or will not do.
 “ Every Man fancies the Principal Form of human Nature is in
 “ him, and that all other Men are to be regulated by it. If he be
 “ told of any Action or Faculty of another Man, the first Thing he
 “ consults, is his own Example. The World must go, as Things
 “ go with him. What a dangerous and intolerable Impertinence!
 “ As for me, I look upon some Men to be much above me, espec-
 “ ally among the Antients. And though I am very sensible, I can-
 “ not follow them at the distance of a thousand Paces, yet I follow
 “ them at Sight, and judge of the Springs whereby they are thus
 “ exalted, of which I perceive some Seeds in my self. I judge like-
 “ wise of the great Shallowness of Mens Minds, which I neither
 “ wonder at, nor disbelieve, &c.” *Montagne, Book II. Chap. 32*

*Non me fugit vetera exempla pro fictis fabulis jam audiri atque ha-
 beri. Sen.*

WHEN Men are acted by such Principles, they quickly find themselves in an unknown Country; and then, some have no Hopes of going forward, and fall into Scepticism: Others fancy they go on, and walking in Darkness, take Shadows to be Realities; and pompous Words are to them instead of noble Ideas. I have known some Men, who having used themselves to prefer the *Wonderful* to Evidence, had so much spoiled their Taste for any Thing that could be clearly demonstrated, that they would hear and believe nothing, but what was incredible. Men love Amazement: Were they enlightened, their Admiration would cease; and therefore they avoid the Light and Information.

WHEN a Man is used to neglect Evidence, he has no other Principle of his Opinions but a Fondness for Custom or Singularity; and being thus equally disposed to admit a great many Propositions, if he confines himself to some, 'tis out of Laziness, or by Chance.

XII MAN, being only susceptible of Ideas, Sensations, and Motions, his Knowledge, *The Usefulness of our Knowledge.* which consists in Ideas, ought to make him wiser by regulating his Motions, or more happy by freeing him from painful or disagreeable Sensations, and raising him above those, which are too short, in order to procure him more solid and lasting Sentiments. (b)

MORALS, which teach us to distinguish what is just from what is unjust, in perplexed Cases, which discover to us the Excellency of Virtue, and the Heinousness of Vice, and enable us to perform our Duty, carry the Proof of their Worth in their Definition; and if any one should want many Arguments to be convinced of it, he is too much depraved to be reclaimed by reasoning.

THE Knowledge of Man, which in it self deserves our Attention, is also the great *Foundation* of Logic and Morals. Their Force and Perfection are grounded upon that Principle. The better we know our selves, the more we shall be sensible of the Importance of Precepts laid down for the Conduct of our Lives. Besides, the Observation of those Precepts will by that Means grow more easy to us.

WITHOUT the Knowledge of God, our Creator, we are in a dark Abyss; and all the Knowledge we can get about our Duty, will not make sufficient Amends for so many Endeavours

(b) Omnis auctoritas Philosophiæ consistit in beatâ vitâ comparandâ. Cic. de Fin. Lib. V.

deavours to know and perform it, and for so many Misfortunes, which attend even the most virtuous Life. But, if God commands Virtue, there is an infinite Difference between the Practice and the Neglect of it.

WE depend upon so many Things, and all the Parts of the Universe are so linked together, that the Knowledge of our selves will always be very imperfect, whilst we are ignorant of the Nature and Powers of the Bodies, that surround us. This Consideration would be sufficient to recommend *Natural Philosophy*. But, we shall be more convinced of its Usefulness, if we consider the great Helps it affords for the Preservation of Health, the Cure of Diseases, and the Allaying of Pain. Moreover, the Creator has been pleased to make himself known by his Works; and each Discovery in Nature makes us more and more sensible of his Power, and raises a greater Admiration for his Wisdom and Goodness. I cannot believe that the supreme Intelligence, from which we have received our Being, and our Understanding, designed to confine us, like Brutes, to the Exercise of our Senses. I cannot believe that God has confined us to the Out-side of Nature, and concealed from us the Inside of his Works.

SOME idle People, who are without doubt some of the most useless in the Society, go up and down the World to raise in others an Admiration for a certain Skill, which is despised when known, and which the Vulgar pay for, to have the Pleasure of being deluded by it. If any one should be afraid that the Works of Nature would be less admired, if their Causes were known, such a Fear would be injurious to the Wisdom and Goodness of the supreme Being, who governs the World. The Idea of the Greatness of God does not proceed from our Ignorance: He is more worthily glorified by an Admiration grounded upon Knowledge. And indeed the great Satisfaction we enjoy in being acquainted with his Works, and unfolding their admirable Structure, plainly shews that we were made, at least in part, to draw our Happiness from that Study. Besides, that Knowledge enables us to despise the Allurements of the Senses, and to raise our selves above those Pleasures, which so frequently induce Men to Sin: This Consideration ought to convince us of the Obligation we lie under to improve such a Help.

A MAN, charmed with those spiritual Delights, will be far from indulging bodily Pleasures. Being sensible of his solid Elevation, he looks upon those, who give themselves

up to Riches and Honours, as Men who run after Shadows. He does not envy them, and will not leave his Way to cross them in their Pursuit.

ALL those Truths will convince us, that the Universe is the Temple of God, who created it; that Men are the Ministers of that Temple; and that they are guilty of a shameful Neglect, if they do not apply themselves to know its Parts, and admire its Beauties (c).

MONTAGNE * has a wrong Notion * Book III. about this Matter. *The Knowledge of Causes* Ch. II.

(says he) *concerns only that Being, which governs the World, and not Men, who have a full Use of Things, according to their Wants, without penetrating into their Origin and Essence. Wine is not more pleasant to him, who knows its primitive Faculties. And the Soul and Body alter their Right to the Use of the World and of themselves, by mixing Knowledge with it. We are concerned in the Effects, not in the Means. Determination and Distribution belong to Mastership and Government, as Receiving belongs to Subjection and Dependence.* Perhaps Montagne would have spoken otherwise, if Natural Philosophy had been in his Time such as it is at present; but it was not then very proper to please a Man of Parts and of a good Taste.

'TIS therefore true, that the Study of Physicks is very useful and entertaining. It raises us to God: It affords Plea-

Z 2

asures,

(c) Curiosum nobis natura ingenium dedit; & artis sibi ac pulchritudinis suæ conscia, spectatores nos tantis rerum spectaculis genuit, perditura fructum sui, si tam magna, tam clara, tam subtiliter ducta, tam nitida, & non uno genere formosa, solitudini ostenderet. Ut scias illam spectari voluisse, non tantum aspici, vide quem nobis locum dederit. In media nos sui parte constituit, & circumspectum omnium nobis dedit: nec erexit tantummodò hominem, sed etiam ad contemplationem factum, ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset, & vultum suum circumferre cum toto, sublime fecit illi caput, & collo flexibili imposuit. Deinde sena per diem, sena per octem signa produxit, nullam nou partem sui explicuit, ut per hæc uæ obtulerat ejus oculis, cupiditatem faceret etiam cæterorum. *Sen. de Otio Sap. cap. 32.*

Hæc qui contemplatur, quid Deo præstat? ne tanta ejus opera sine este sint. Solemus dicere, summum bonum esse, secundum naturam vivere: natura nos ad utrumque genuit & contemplationi rerum, & actioni. *Id. ibid. cap. 31.*

Inest in eadem explicatione naturæ infatiabilis quædam è cognoscendis rebus voluptas: in quâ una, consecutis rebus necessariis, vacui negotiis, honestè ac liberaliter possumus vivere. *Cic. de Fin. Lib. IV.*

tures, whereby we grow less fond of those Things, which corrupt most Men, and hurry them into Vice. The same Study enables us not only to perform our Duties more easily, but also to discover them; and it may be said to open the true *Sources of Morality*. Can a Man, who does not know himself, nor the Relations he has to the Objects, with which he is surrounded; can such a Man know how he ought to live, that his Life may be suitable to his Nature and Destination (d) ?

A MAN, who is skilled in Opticks, and understands the Structure of the Ear, and the Theory of Sounds, is lively affected with the Wisdom of the Creator, who has combined an infinite Number of Motions, to make us hear agreeable Sounds and Symphonies, and to adorn Objects by offering them to our Sight, terminated by different Figures, and painted with an infinite Variety of Colours. A Man endowed with such a Knowledge, and full of a just Admiration, will not fall into the ridiculous and superstitious Opinions of ignorant People, who fancy they honour and please their Maker by refusing to enjoy the Gifts of his infinite Wisdom and Goodness (e); for, nothing less than infinite Knowledge could have united so many Things, which must concur together to please our Eyes and our Ears.

THE Knowledge of Natural Philosophy is a sure Preservative against Superstition. How great was the panick Terror of whole Nations, in former Times, at the Sight of an Eclipse and a Comet! If Men had been as well skilled in
Physicks

(d) *Physicæ quoque non sine causâ tributus idem est honos; propterea quod qui convenienter naturæ victurus sit, ei & proficiscendum est ab omni mundo, & ab ejus procuratione. Nec verò potest quiscquam de bonis, & malis verè judicare, nisi omni cognita ratione naturæ & vitæ, etiam Deorum, & utrum conveniat, necne, natura hominis cum universa: quæque sunt vetera præcepta sapientium, qui jubent tempori parere, & sequi Deum, & se noscere, & nihil nimis: hæc sine physicis quam vim habeant (& habent maximam) videre nemo potest. Atque etiam ad justitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias, & reliquas caritates quid natura valeat, hæc una cognitio potest tradere. Nec verò pietas adversus Deos, nec quanta his gratia debeatur, sine explicatione Naturæ intelligi potest. Cic. de Fin. Lib. III.*

(e) *Uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum rectè poneretur, si quod esset animal, quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in se, quod esset secundum naturam: ut valetudo est. Sed id ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit, ut non repugnet ipsum sibi. Cic. de Fin. Lib. IV.*

Physicks two hundred Years ago, as they are now, the wise *Melanchthon* would never have been fond of judicial Astrology.

MATHEMATICKS are the Key of true Physicks, and of great Use to human Life. How many Helps have they not afforded to the Sight and Hearing? We are indebted for Engines, Architecture, and Chronology, to those who have cultivated that Science.

WITH the Help of History we travel, without going out of our Closets, not only into the remotest Countries, but even into former Ages; so that it enables us to learn present and past Transactions for our Improvement. Experience makes us prudent; Conversation makes us wary; History supplies the room of both. The Wiles and Devices it mentions, teach us to stand upon our Guard; the Examples of Virtue and Merit are Models for our Imitation; the Examples of Vice deter us from it. Lastly, as Experiments are the Ground of Natural Philosophy, in like manner History is the Foundation of Morals and Politicks. It affords several Phænomena, which unfold the Heart of Man, and let us into it.

THE Knowledge of Languages is necessary to understand History, and all sorts of Books. We learn Languages to read Authors; we read for our Instruction; and we instruct our selves to reap some Benefit from our Knowledge. History is useful when it teaches us to know our selves and regulate our Lives. Physicks are useful, not only when we make that Science an innocent Amusement, but especially when it raises us to the supreme Author of the Wonders of Nature, and affords some Helps, as well as Mathematicks, to supply our Wants, and increase the Sweets of Life. Speculation tends therefore to Practice; and Practice ought to tend to the Glory of God.

THOSE, who have such an Aim in the Course of their Studies, and in order to attain to it, follow such a Method, will make no useles Steps. But, Men have strangely wandered from that great Aim, and the Way that leads to it. They have, out of Conceitedness or Vanity, and frequently by those two Principles, clogg'd Arts and Sciences with painful and wretched Fooleries.

XIII. I SHOULD fright my Reader, should I give him a List of the barbarous Terms, invented by Logicians to express the Phantoms and Chimeras, with which they have filled Logic, instead of those Rules which they promised to lay down; their *Categories*, their *Universalia*, their *Barbara*,

Fooleries introduced into the Sciences.

their *Baroco*, their *Catagorems*, and *Synecatagorems*, &c. Books stuffed with such Fooleries, are read, and Professors paid to infatuate with them the Youth committed to their Care. Moralists, making an ill Use of the Subtilty of their Wit, have invented ridiculous and extravagant Cases, which will never happen, to have the Pleasure and vain Satisfaction of debating extraordinary, perplexed, and scandalous Questions. By their nice Enquiries into Motives, and by pretending to refine Virtue, what Nonsense have they not published about Self-love? They have filled their Books with Chimeras; they have undertaken to separate what is inseparable; they have beset the Way with Thorns, and given free Scope to Visionaries.

MORALISTS, and Logicians more still, being over fond of useles Things, have so much neglected what is necessary, that they seem to have lost the Taste of it. Their Patience, great Endeavours, and Subtilties, shew they might have made themselves useful. 'Tis pity they should have exhausted their Wit about insignificant Things (f).

SOME

(f) Invenissent forsitan necessaria, nisi & superflua quæssissent. Multum illis temporibus verborum cavillatio eripuit, & captiosæ disputationes, quæ acumen irritum exercent. Nectimus nodos, & ambiguum significationem verbis illigamus, deinde dissolvimus. --- Quid mihi vocum similitudines distinguis, quibus nemo unquam nisi dum disputat, captus est? res fallunt; illas discerne. Pro bonis mala amplectimur.---

Venit ad me pro amico blandus inimicus: vitia nobis sub virtutum nomine obrepunt: temeritas sub titulo fortitudinis latet: modèratio vocatur ignavia: pro cauto timidus accipitur. In his magno periculo erratur: his certas notas imprime. Cæterum qui interrogatur, an cornua habeat, non est tam stultus, ut frontem suam tentet: nec rursus tam ineptus aut hebes, ut non habere se nesciat, quod tu illi subtilissimâ collectione persuaseris. --- Quid ergò? non eo potius curam transferes, ut ostendas omnibus, magno temporis impendio quæri supervacua: & multos transisse vitam, dum vitæ instrumenta conquirunt? *Sen. Ep. XLV.*

“ Do you think that Phlegmatick, Eye-blear’d, Dirty Man, whom you see come out of his Study after Midnight, looks out among his Books, how he can make himself a better Man, more contented and wiser? Not in the least. He will die in his Study, or teach Posterity the Measure of *Plantus’s* Verses, and the true Orthography of a *Latin* Word. Who would not willingly prefer Health, Quietness, and Life, to Reputation and Glory, the most useful, vain and false Coin, that is current amongst us?” *Montague Book 1. Corp. 38.*

SOME Books concerning *Passions*, and the *Knowledge of Men*, written by celebrated Authors, were formerly read with great Applause; and yet no Benefit could be reaped from them, because they were only full of vain Antitheses, pompous Quibbles, and childish Declamations of Rhetoricians, who teach their Scholars to speak their Jargon.

IT is well known, that instead of the Knowledge of Nature, what went formerly by the Name of *Physicks*, contained nothing but *Trifles*, *metaphysical Cavils*, and a Mixture of undeterminate Notions, false Ideas, and sensible Qualities, disguised under Names partly pompous, and partly barbarous, which were only proper to stun ignorant People, and swell with Vanity foolish Men, who fell into that Snare.

AND since Experience has been consulted, and Philosophers have undertaken to verify all Reasonings by Matters of Fact, it had been better to proceed therein more orderly, to be more willing to convince one's self by simple Experiments, than to satisfy one's Curiosity by Experiments more compounded and more surprising, and always to prefer useful Things to those that are *wonderful*.

BESIDES, under Pretence that we grope in the Discovery of Nature, Men have allowed themselves the Liberty to make all sorts of Conjectures, and vented all their Imaginations, when they could be adapted to some Experiments. They did not mind whether a Conjecture was probable, and have not scrupled to advance Principles, which they did not understand, provided they could draw probable Consequences from them.

THUS a Man may be an Author at a cheap Rate: He amuses himself agreeably, and continues in Scepticism, with which he is pleased, because it justifies his Repugnancy to make strict and repeated Enquiries, and favours in all Respects the Corruption of the Heart.

I SHALL go on with my Account of the vain Labour, which attends Sciences, and of the useless Things they have been clogged with. A Man does plainly forget the Design of History, who makes it his main Business to mend some Letters, to correct some Dates, and to publish, by much conjecturing, some Names, about which however he has nothing to say, that is worth reading (*g*).

Z 4

LET

(*g*) Non sunt otiosi, quorum voluptates multum negotii habent. Nam de illis nemo dubitavit, quin operose nihil agant, qui in literarum inutilium studiis detinentur: quæ jam apud Romanos quoque magna

LET my Guide remember the Design of his Employment, (says Montagne, speaking of an Author;) let him rather fix the Characters of Hannibal and Scipio in the Mind of his Pupil, than the Date of the Destruction of Carthage (b).

THE Study of Medals is now highly valued, and there is more Glory to be got by it, than by any other Study. I don't pretend to find fault with the Encomiums bestow'd upon it, and will not dispute with any body about that Subject. I shall only observe, that the Difficulty of that Study does perhaps set off the Value of it, in the Opinion of many People: I mean a Difficulty altogether external. Medals are dear, and few Learned Men are able to enrich their Libraries with them. When Princes make them an Ornament of their Palaces, a private Man gives himself an Air of Grandeur by an indifferent Cabinet of Medals. Besides, Princes want Learned Men to collect and put those Medals in order, and to explain them; so that this Knowledge is a Sign, the Antiquary has an Access to great Men, and may set up for a Learned Person of no small Distinction. Part of the Worth of Medals arises from their Scarcity; for some of the most useles, but hardly to be found, are more valued, and bear a greater Price, because their Number is very small. I must add, that if those, whose Business it was formerly to get Medals stamp'd, had the same Taste as those, who are now entrusted with that Care, Medals are no less deceitful than History. Some have been stamp'd in our Days, which will afford Matter of dispute to future Ages; nor can the Antients be altogether depended upon in this Matter.

SOME Points of History, and even of Chronology, have been controverted long ago; and that Dispute cannot be determined

magna manus est. Græcorum iste morbus fuit, quærere quem numerum remigum Ulißes habuisset: prior scripta esset Ilias, an Odyßeia: præterea an ejusdem esset auctoris. Alia deinceps hujus notæ: quæ sive contineas, nihil tacitam conscientiam juvant; sive proferas, non doctior videberis, sed molestior. Ecce Romanos quoque inanis studium super vacua discendi. His diebus audivi quemdam sapientem referentem, quæ primus quisque ex Romanis ducibus fecisset. Primus navali prælio Duillius vicit, primus Curius Dentatus in triumpho duxit elephantos. Etiamnum ista, & si ad veram gloriam non tendunt, circa civilium tamen operum exempla versantur. ---- Hoc quoque quærentibus remittamus, quis Romanis primus persuasit navem conscendere? *Sen. de Brev. Vit. Cap. 13.*

(b) Transmutemus solertissimas nugas, & ad illa, quæ aliquam operam sunt nobis latura, properemus.

terminated by Medals. *Martin V.* is represented in some Medals opening the Holy Door; and yet that Ceremony began only under the Pontificate of *Alexander VI.* How can we be sure that no antient Medals have been engraved after the Event? *Gallienus* is always fortunate in his Medals, and always worsted in History.

IN a Medal stamp'd by Order of the Senate, *Commodus* is called *Father of the People.*

CARACALLA and *Elagabalus* are called *Optimus Maximus.* *Commodus* is styled *Germanicus & Pius.* *Verus* is call'd *Armeniacus,* though the *Armenians* were only beat by his Generals.

IT is well known, that *Maximinus* had a very mean and cruel Soul in a huge Body, so far as to say, that he wish'd he might swallow the whole Empire; and yet, upon the Reverse of some of his Medals we see *Minerva* holding a Branch of an Olive-Tree, as if that Prince had only delighted in making Peace and Plenty flourish.

SOME Learned Men have given themselves the Trouble to penetrate into the remotest Ages, with so much Courage and Patience, that they have made us almost as well acquainted with the Antients, as if we had seen them. They have not only informed us of their Manners, Customs, and Fashions in general, but also described their Cloaths, and all their Ornaments, their Collars, Rings, and Clasps, their Locks, and the Hinges, and Bolts of their Doors. If those Learned Men were able to succeed in better Things, we are very much indebted to them for reaching us, in a few Days, what they could not learn but in many Years; and if they had not a Genius for other Subjects, if they were not qualified for Reasoning, we are still more obliged to them for laying aside Matters, which they would have perplexed more than they were before. So that, in whatever Capacity they be consider'd, we ought to thank them. It were only to be wish'd, out of Gratitude and Concern for them, that they would be contented to deliver, as Trifles, Things that are only Trifles; by which Means they would give no Occasion to suspect, that Self-Love makes their Labours appear to them more valuable than they really are.

IT would be very wrong to call the *Hebrew Antiquities* trifling Things; they are certainly of great Use, since they enable us to clear several Passages in the Holy Scripture. But those, who will only read in the Original Authors, though never so obscure and confused, what Learned and Laborious Men have already extracted out of them, do certainly value

value themselves for losing their Time. Experience teaches us, that a Man grows by degrees like those, with whom he converses, and that he assumes the Character of those Authors whom he studies with great Application. Can we therefore expect any Thing judicious and well expressed from a Man, who reads chiefly the *Rabbins*, a sort of Writers without Clearness, without Elegance, and besides full of idle and impertinent Things? I desire no other Proof of the Narrowness of Mind contracted by that Reading, than the Quotations with which some Learned Men of that kind adorn their Discourses, their Letters, and other Compositions. *A Rabbin said very ingeniously; a Rabbin said very wisely;* but what did he say? One of the most trivial Proverbs, or a Truth as well known, as Two and Two make Four. This would be tolerable, if an elegant Turn should make a common Thought look like a singular Maxim; but generally nothing can be more vulgar and insipid. An Admiration for what is mean and gross, makes one lose the Taste of what is nice and sublime; he is no longer sensible of it.

SOME Things are so useless, that they would be of no worth, if their Discovery did not require a great deal of Time. But does not a Time, so ill spent, make the Works of an Author and himself equally contemptible (*i*)? An Emendation of an obscure Passage, which would have been read a hundred Times without any Attention and Benefit, if it had never been corrupted, puffs up a Learned Man more than a fine Explication of one of the noblest Phænomena of Nature, or the clearing of an important Point of Morality. Men are most fond of those Things, which are of no other Value but what they set upon them.

THE

(*i*) Quid dicitis difficile? utrum laboriosum, an artificiosum? si laboriosum, non statim præclarum; sunt enim multa laboriosa, quæ si faciatis, non continuò gloriemini: nisi forte etiam, si vestrâ manu fabulas, aut orationes totas transcripsissetis, gloriosum putaretis: sin autem istud artificium egregium dicitis, videte, ne insueti rerum majorum videamini, si vos parva res, sicuti magna, delectat. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib. IV.*

Omnium autem ineptiarum, quæ sunt innumerabiles, haud scio an ulla sit major quàm illorum, qui solent quocunque in loco, quoscunque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissimè disputare. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.*

THE Knowledge of *Languages* is only *valuable*, as it serves to improve one's Mind by reading. But do those Men, who spend their Lives in learning many Languages, make such a Use of them? The foolish Vanity and proud Meanness of that Sort of Men of Letters are like those of a covetous Man, who continually heaping up what is of no Value, but by its Use, yet never uses it: Death overtakes him, before he has any Thoughts of enjoying his Labour.

LET no Body say that I wrong them, since by learning Languages they read the Authors; for there is some Difference between reading and instructing one's self. To fill one's Head with Opinions without any Choice and Examination: I don't call it *to improve*. To clog one's Memory with a monstrous Heap of what Men have dreamed or seen, is to confound Dreams and Realities together. Such is the Case of most of those unmerciful Readers: They are too hasty in heaping up to give themselves the Time of weighing and chusing.

To be sensible of the Delicacies of an Author; to take his Character; to observe the Clearness, Strength, and Turns of every Language, in order to convey them into one's own; to use one self to think and express one's Thoughts with greater Justness and Beauty; this I call to improve by Reading. But, on the contrary, there are many Men, who after their long Labours, have only the pitiful Advantage of knowing how to repeat a poor Thing in many more Words (*k*), and always ill; for they understand many Languages, but can speak none. And their Eloquence, if they can make any Shew of it, consists only in borrowing the Thoughts of other Men, patching them up together, and sometimes venturing their own Notions, disguised under foreign Expressions. Some, in order to excite the Diligence of their Scholars, borrow from some Author the Words made use of by a General to animate the Courage of his Soldiers. Some, (which is a very antient (*l*) Fault) affect
to

(*k*) Tandiu enim istis immorandum est, quandiu nihil animus agere majus potest; rudimenta sunt nostra, non opera. - - - Unum studium verè liberale est, quod liberum facit, hoc sapientiæ, sublime, forte, magnanimum: cætera pusilla & puerilia sunt. An tu quidquam in istis esse credis boni quorum professores turpissimos omnium ac flagitiosissimos cernis? *Sen. Ep. LXXXVIII.*

(*l*) Est autem vitium quod nonnulli de industria consectantur: Rustica vox & agrestis quosdam delectat, quo magis antiquitatem, si ita sonet,

to speak ill, at least, if a Man may be said to speak ill, when he speaks obscurely. They would be very sorry to be easily understood: If you say, you can hardly understand them, they take it as a Commendation. Lofty Phrases, though ill placed, great Words, though very obscure, please them wonderfully, and hinder them from being sensible of the Barrenness of their Genius, grown heavy by continual Efforts. To mind only the Outside of Things, is to confound the Means with the End.

ONE may very well wonder, that Men of such an ill Turn of Mind, should sometimes hold the first Place in the Commonwealth of Learning, to which they are rather a Disgrace than an Ornament; for would any Man of Sense be a Scholar, if he was afraid of being like them?

I THINK I have found out the Reason of the undeserved Esteem they are in. Most Men reason little; and much less do they examine the Reasonings of other Men. Such an Examination appears to them too painful; and they are frequently incapable of it. When a Man expresses himself with great *Clearness*, in order to be easily Understood, they fancy they could do the same without much Labour. They judge of the *Facility* of inventing and placing the Things they are taught, by their easily understanding them; and they do not *much value* what seems to them to be so easy. Besides, those who reason little, believe they can reason well, whenever they please; but every body is convinced that he is ignorant of a Language, which he does not understand, and he knows he is inferior to him, who speaks it easily. Every body is sensible that a Language cannot be learned without Pains; and most People judge of the Worth of a Thing by the Difficulty it is attended with. Labour, when obvious, is a Proof of Learning adapted to the Ignorance of Men. I add, that a great many People hardly learned any thing but Words in their Youth: They have no Notion of any other Science: They fancy a Man of Letters is only a Pilferer of Books; and he, who reads most, has, in their Opinion, the Key of more Treasures.

LASTLY,

sonet, eorum sermo retinere videatur, ut tuus, Catule, sodalis L. Cotta gaudere mihi videtur gravitate linguæ sonoque vocis agresti; & illud, quod loquitur, prisicum visum iri putar, si plane fuerit rusticanum. Cic. de Orat. Lib. III.

Some Men affect to be clownish and unpolite, in order to be commended for having still the Taste of the Antients, that is, of their Fathers or Grandfathers.

LASTLY, the *Pedants* use their utmost Endeavours to keep Men under those Delusions : They do it very sincerely, being themselves deluded in the same Manner : And there are very understanding Men, who, instead of judging by their own Eyes, being taken up with other Business, rely altogether upon the Judgment of the *Pedants*.

THE *Latin Tongue* has been the common Language for a long Time, because it was the Language of the Empire, having spread it self from *Rome* and *Italy* into all the Provinces. It was also for the same Reason the Language of the Church. Prayers and Sermons were made in *Latin*. And when the *Latin Tongue* became a dead Language, and the Invasion of the Barbarians had altered the Face of the Empire, that Language continued still to be the Language of the Church and Courts of Judicature. Prayers were in *Latin* : No Alteration was made in them, because the Necessity of such a Change came only by Degrees. The Laws were in *Latin* : They were not translated : The publick Instruments continued to be written in the same Language ; and in the barbarous Ages to speak and write *Latin* was an uncommon Ability.

WHEN the Taste for Learning was revived, and Men resolved to get out of that profound Ignorance, which had prevailed for some Ages, there were only two Ways of doing it ; either by inventing every Thing anew, or improving one self by the Knowledge of the Antients, and finding out what had been written in the learned Ages. This last Method was pitched upon : The Libraries were searched, and Manuscripts collected : Men not contented with the *Latin*, studied also *Greek* ; and because the Study of Languages was then extremely difficult, for want of Helps, none but Men of a great Genius, and animated by an eager Desire of Knowledge, were able to succeed in it. At that time, to understand Languages was no equivocal Sign of Merit and Ability : Nothing but a predominant Inclination for the Knowledge of Things could have supported a Man in a Labour, wherein those of an indifferent Genius never failed to miscarry.

IN Process of Time, the Study of Languages became one of the most easy Studies : It hardly requires an indifferent Genius. With a strong Body, a tolerable Memory, and some Labour, a Man will always succeed in it. Nevertheless those, who understand Languages, have been esteemed ever since ; and a great many People in our Age value as much that Knowledge, as when it was absolutely necessary,
and

and always attended with the Knowledge of Things. However, 'tis certain, if we consult Experience, that Study may be accounted a *dangerous* one. The words, with which many People fill their Heads, occasion, as it were, a Flood, which drowns Modesty, Politeness, good Taste, and even frequently common Sense.

ONE must have some Courage, and a sort of Rashness, to attack the Learned Men of that Class; for they will by no means bear it. And indeed such a painful and barren Study must needs sower their Mind. Can any Thing but Vanity support them in a Labour so disagreeable, and so little becoming a Man? To deprive them of those Praises, they are so fond of, is to take from them a Prize, for which they frequently sacrifice their Duty, their Parts, their Health, and their Lives.

THERE are some Things, which may be accounted useful, even before one studies them; but, there are others, of the Usefulness whereof one cannot judge, unless they be known. Before a Man learns any Rule of Arithmetick, and even before he knows how to write any Arithmetical Figure, he apprehends that a compendious Method, with the Help of which one may easily cast up great Sums, must needs be of great Use. He apprehends also that an Art, which teaches how to Measure great Distances, and to know the Extent of Surfaces, though never so irregular, is worthy of his Application. But how can one give an Idea of the Usefulness of Algebra, answerable to the Attention and Time it requires, to those, who do not understand it at all? Most Beginners are amazed, and almost frightened at a new Language, of which they cannot foresee any Benefit. They know not whether they are taught a Science of some Use, or only exercised with an Amusement, upon which Vanity sets some Value, because few People are able to succeed in it.

MEN being ignorant of a great many Things, the Knowledge whereof would be beneficial to them, one cannot but commend the Niceness of those, who scruple to bestow some Part of their Time upon insignificant Things. But, we cannot charge those with losing a precious Time, who spend it in Enquiries, the Use whereof is unknown to them; and it would be too great a Presumption to draw this Inference: I don't see the Use of a certain Theory: Therefore it is of no Use at all.

BUT, when a Man has acquired a certain Knowledge, without apprehending what Use it may be of, and when the
farther

farther he carries it, the less he perceives the Use of it, may he go on with it? This Objection was made to me against those Things, which Mathematicians look upon as the most subtil Part of their Science. In order to prove that subtil Speculations ought not to be given over, under pretence that their Use is not immediately perceived, the Cycloid has been alledged, which at first was only a Subject to exercise the Attention and Sagacity of the Mathematicians of the first Rank; but at last Mr. *Huygens* made use of it for the Improvement of Clocks. After such an Application of a Theory, which had been minded for a long Time only to have the Pleasure of inventing, trying one's Strength, and perhaps displaying it before others, Mathematicians thought they might very well indulge themselves in the most refined Theories. Though a Speculation was never so unlikely to be of any use, yet they hoped that in Process of Time Mankind would reap a wonderful Benefit from it. Many Curbs were invented, without considering that if some Property of Use should be found in their Nature, such a Discovery would prove useless, because it would be impossible to describe them exactly, by reason of their excessive Composition.

MATHEMATICIANS being well pleased, that a Curb, which they had studied so long, only to have the Pleasure of knowing it, should prove very useful for Clocks, and then for Navigation, concluded immediately that there would be an extreme Difference between Clocks wherein it should be used, and those wherein it should be neglected. Some Time was requisite to be undeceived, and to make bold to consult Experience upon that Subject. At last, it appeared that Pendulum-Clocks might be as exact and regular without the Cycloid, as with the Cycloid. It was no difficult Thing to apprehend the Reason of it; and the above-mentioned Answer can no longer be made to those, who exclaim against the Uselessness of painful Theories.

PERHAPS they might be answered, That Men were born not only for an active Life, but also for Contemplation. If Mankind had liv'd in a State of Innocence, the Pleasure of proceeding from Knowledge to Knowledge would have taken up the greatest part of their Time. Suppose the Cycloid does not afford the Benefit, which Mr. *Huygens* expected from that Curb; yet it offers some Theories, that deserve our Attention, about certain Properties of Motion. There are many Men, who believe their noble Birth, or great Riches, are sufficient Reasons for them not to trouble themselves with any Thing. They live for themselves; they live to
pass

pass away the Time pleasantly. They make Use of the Labours of other People, without doing any Thing that can be beneficial to others. It is a Privilege about which nobody makes them uneasy: They are allowed to indulge themselves in a soft Life. Why should the same Privilege be denied to an extraordinary Genius? Are Birth and Riches the only Things that can allow a Man to chuse a Course of Life, and to taste certain Pleasures, without crossing the Pleasures of other Men?

THOSE Mathematicians, who indulge their Speculations, might return to those, who blame them for it, the same Answer that *Cicero* returned to those, who found fault with his great Application to Philosophy. *Excellent Things ought to be known, in order to apprehend how difficult it would be to bestow only a small Part of one's Time upon them.*

CICERO affords me again another Thought, which may serve to justify the great Application of some Mathematicians to their Science, an Application, which appears excessive to many People. That Great Man had bestowed the greatest Part of his Time upon his Country, whilst he could be of some Use to his Fellow-Citizens: But, as soon as Violence succeeded Reason, and *Rome* was only governed by the Fancies of an unjust Master, instead of indulging his Grief to no purpose, or spending the remaining Part of his Life in an Idleness unworthy of him, he looked for some Comfort in

Philosophy. *Ego autem, quamdiu Resp. per Off. Lib. II. eos regebatur, quibus se ipsa commiserat, omnes meas curas, cogitationesque in eam conferebam. Cum autem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur: neque esset usquam consilio, aut auctoritati locus. - - - Nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis restitisssem: nec rursùm indignis homine docto voluptatibus. - - - Nihil autem agere cum animus non posset, in iis studiis ab initio versatus atatis, existimavi honestissimè molestias deponi posse, si me ad Philosophiam retulisssem.*

IF a Man desires to live a quiet Life, he is obliged, in Point of Divinity and Morality, to enquire what other Men think, rather than think for himself; and he is almost necessitated in some Countries to fetch all his Ideas from the Head of one single Man. But there are also some supercilious Divines, who extend their Jurisdiction to Logic and Natural Philosophy. Their Opinions must not be examined according to the Rules of good Sense; but on the contrary, the Rules of good Sense must be tried by their Opinions. A Man draws also their Indignation upon himself, if he observes

serves in the Universe some Principle or some Contrivance different from that, which they have imagined. A Philosopher will find a Refuge in the Labyrinth of sublime Mathematicks against those cruel ambitious Men, who take upon themselves to captivate the Reason of Mankind. Retire into those delightful Windings: Those Divines are too dull and too lazy to follow you thither. You may be there secure from their Persecution, and allowed to think freely, and to live, without any danger, like a rational Man.

IF, by much Reasoning, and after many Experiments, a Man should at last make the Ground more fruitful by a new Way of manuring it, he would not be taxed with losing his Time in insignificant Things. Why then should a Man be charged with the same Fault, because he encreases every Day the Penetration, Strength, Capacity and Fecundity of his Mind? Is this Culture less valuable than that of Land? Is it lawful to prefer what concerns animal Life, to what concerns the Understanding (*m*).

'TIS true, those who make it their only Business to encrease the Strength and Sagacity of their Mind, will be asked again, what Use they design to make of that Strength and Sagacity, which they think they never carry far enough: If they answer, That their Design is to acquire a Strength, whereby they may be enabled to raise themselves to new Subtilties, by which Means they will get again a new Strength in order to unfold more perplexed Subtilties; perhaps few People will be satisfied with that Answer. But they would stop the Mouth of the Gainsayers, and bring their favourite Study into Repute, if they would be pleased to try their Strength upon other Subjects (*n*), and prove by their Success that what they say in favour of their beloved Art, is not a vain Excuse, whereby they impose upon themselves, and endeavour to impose upon others, by justifying a sort of Study, wherein many People fancy that Humour, Chance, and perhaps Vanity, have a greater Share than Reason.

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C H A P.

(*m*) "Whatever enables us to make Reflections, which, though merely Speculative, are Great and Noble, is of a Use, that may be called Spiritual and Philosophical." *Preface to the History of the Royal Academy of Sciences*, 1699.


(*n*) "The Geometrical Genius is not so confined to Geometry, but that it may be conveyed into other Sciences. A Book relating to Morality, Politicks, or Criticism, and perhaps a Book of Eloquence, will be finer still, *ceteris paribus*, if it be written by a Geometrician." *Ibid.*



C H A P. III.

Of the Relations of Things between themselves, and first, of the Relations of Conformity.

Origin of Relations.

I.  N order to find out the Relations of Things between themselves, those Things must be compared together. Every Comparison runs at least up-

on two Objects; and, 1. 'Tis necessary that the Things compared one with another should exist, or may exist; for what is impossible, cannot be apprehended; and if it was apprehended, it would not be impossible. 2. One must have the Ideas of both Things; otherwise the Mind could not compare them. 3. Those two Ideas ought to be perceived at once, and be present to the Mind at one and the same Time.

WHEN a Man compares, for instance, two Coins, he looks upon both at once, or preserves the Idea of the first which he has seen, and consults it, when he casts his Eyes upon the second; for if he had lost the Idea of the first, he could not determine whether it be equal to, or different from the second.

MEN can hardly believe that we can think of many Things at once; and yet there is nothing more common. He who thinks of a Number, thinks of many Units; and if it be a great Number, he thinks of many Tens, and of the Units which make up the Tens. He that looks upon a Tree, or a House, has at one and the same Time the Ideas of many Parts; and when he remembers that he has seen one of them, at the same Time that he looks upon another, he has the Ideas of both at once. But most People fancy, they never think of many Things, but when they reflect upon different Subjects

all

all at once (*a*); and therefore to think of many Things at one and the same Time, appears to them a strange Paradox; for, in their Opinion, 'tis ascribing to one single Act of the Mind many Reasonings, and many Reflections.

Two Ideas may be present to the Mind at one and the same Time, without comparing them. Wherefore, there is a certain Act of the Mind, which makes the Comparison; and that Act constitutes the Essence of what is called *Relation*, which consequently is, altogether in us, and belongs to us.

OBJECTS, and their Attributes, are out of our Minds. We compare Objects together: Their Attributes may be also compared. But suppose the Number of Objects and Attributes was a thousand Times greater than it is; if they were not compared by any Mind, there would be neither Comparison nor Relation among them; for a Relation is nothing else but two Attributes, or two Objects compared together: And that Comparison must be made by a Mind.

WE give a Name to that Act of the Mind, which forms Comparisons: We call the Comparison it makes a *Relation*; and we bestow that Name, which is the Name of one of the Acts of our Mind, upon the Objects themselves: We ascribe to them what passes within us, when we think of them; and then we seek in them, to no purpose, something answerable to that Name, which does not agree to them. This is what perplexes that Matter, which would be otherwise very easy; for it is only what passes within us, and may clearly be known by consulting our selves. Let us suppose for a while, that there is but one Circle in the World: It cannot be compared with other Circles, and cannot be said to have a Relation to them. That Circle has its Magnitude, its Figure, and Properties. All those Things are really in it, and belong to it: They are not compared with the Magnitude, Figure, and Properties of another Circle; but that Comparison is possible. Let us suppose now,

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that

(a) *The Latin Word Cogitatio, which answers the Word Thought, is used in that Sense by Cicero, de Invent. Lib. II. Causa distribuitur in impulsione, & in ratiocinationem. Impulsio est, quæ sine cogitatione perquamdam affectionem animi facere aliquid hortatur: ut amor, iracundia, ægritudo, vinolentia, & omnino omnia, in quibus animus ita videtur affectus fuisse, ut rem perspicere cum consilio & cura non potuerit: & id quod fecit, impetu quodam animi potius quam cogitatione fecerit. Ratiocinatio autem est diligens, & considerata faciendi aliquid, aut non faciendi excogitatio. . .*

that there arises a second Circle at a hundred Leagues distance from the first. Does any Thing new happen to the first Circle by the Rise of the other? Does it grow larger or lesser? Is its Figure altered, or become more perfect? Does it acquire some Property it had not before? And because there is no Object in the World, but what may be compared, either in one Respect, or in another, or even a thousand different Ways, with that new Circle, shall we say that this Circle has produced new Realities on all Sides, and that a single Stroke of a Pair of Compasses has filled the Universe with Properties, that did not exist before? The old and new Circles continue therefore to be in themselves what they would be, if each of them existed alone. If some Thing new happens by the Rise of the second Circle, it does not happen to the first Circle, but to the Mind, which compares them together, and thinks of them otherwise than it would do, if it did not compare them.

IF the Language of Men was exact, a Relation would always be expressed by a Term, which would offer the Idea of the two Things compared together to form that Relation; whereas the Names of Relations are frequently absolute; and therefore we are mistaken by supposing what is only Relative to be Absolute. Hot, Cold, Savoury, Agreeable, are relative Terms. No one Body is absolutely Hot, or absolutely Odoriferous, Savoury, &c.

II. WHEN the Idea of an Object agrees exactly to another Object, those two Objects are said to be *alike*. That new Name bestowed upon them, does not denote any Thing new in them: It signifies only that the Idea, which represents the one, does also represent the other. They have indeed those Attributes, which the Mind perceives in each of them; but the Attention of the Mind upon the Unity of the Image, which represents them both, and wherein consists the Relation of Likeness, is in the Mind, and not in the Objects.

WHEN the Mind, measuring two Objects, finds that the same Idea, which discovers to him the Degrees of the Quantity of one of those Objects, discovers also the same Degrees of Quantity in the other, that Conformity of Ideas occasions their being called *Equal*; so that it may be said that *Equality* is a *Likeness of Quantity*. When the Mind, thinking of two Objects, perceives a Relation between them, and discovers the same Relation between two other Objects, that Conformity of Relations is called *Proportion*.

III. MAN, being naturally Lazy, is well pleased to find in an Idea, already familiar to him, the Image of a new Object; and therefore he loves those Comparisons that run upon Resemblances; and because he loves them, he does not examine them, but is immediately perswaded they are very just and exact.

*Comparisons
are deceitful.*

WE are also pleased with Comparisons upon another Account; and consequently they deceive us again in that Respect, because we yield too easily to every Thing that pleases us. Uniformity tires the Mind; for it loves Variety; but it grows also weary of Variety: So that Men love all at once Uniformity and Variety. They find those two Things in Comparisons, which offer two like Objects; for those Objects, notwithstanding their Likeness, have always some small Difference. Though they be different, a single Idea, is almost sufficient for both; and we proceed, without any Trouble, from the Knowledge of the one, to the Knowledge of the other. Hence it is that we are better pleased with Comparisons fetched from a very remote Subject, when they are just, because, though they offer two very different Objects, they discover a Relation of Likeness, which was not expected. *Virgil* in his *Georgics*, fetches his Comparisons from the most lofty Subjects, and in his *Æneid* from the most common Things; for according to the Matter he treats, he thinks fit to raise or unbend the Mind of his Reader; and the Variety he uses, serves to those two Ends. We love what is surprising; we love what is ingenious; and it seems to us that there is more Wit in discovering a Resemblance between two very remote Subjects, than between those that are less remote. A Metaphor, which offers a Relation that was not expected, pleases in proportion to the Surprise it occasions. We love a judicious Vivacity; and it pleases the more, because it is uncommon (*b*).

A a 3

WE

(*b*) Atque hoc ingenere persæpè mihi admirandum videtur, quid sit, quod omnes translatis & alienis magis delectantur verbis, quam propriis & suis: nam si res suum nomen & proprium vocabulum non habet, ut pes in navi, ut nexum, quod per libram agitur, ut in uxore divortium; necessitas cogit, quod non habeas, aliunde sumere: sed in suorum verborum maxima copia, tamen homines aliena multò magis, si sunt ratione translata, delectant. Id accidere credo, vel quod ingenii specimen est quoddam transilire ante pedes posita, & alia longè repetita sumere: vel quod is, qui audit, aliò ducitur cogitatione, neque tamen aberrat, quæ maxima est delectatio, *Cic. de Orat. Lib. III.*

WE are therefore naturally disposed to be pleased with Similitudes; and because 'tis a difficult Thing not to approve what pleases us, we yield too easily to Comparisons. This is the Spring of many Mistakes; for to be mistaken, is to confound Objects, to take Two for One, to fancy that Objects, which have no Resemblance, are perfectly alike; and lastly to look upon those, which have a very imperfect Likeness, as being little different.

RASHNESS is confounded with Valour, and Meanness with Modesty. A liberal Man is confounded with a prodigal one; and a wise Man, whose Expences are suited to his Income, is taxed with Avarice. A *prodigal Man*, who lavishes away his Money to indulge his Pleasures, though he does not pay his Creditors, nor requite the Services done to him, is accounted a liberal Man: No one can be more generous than he, in the Opinion of those, who get something by his expensive Fits. On the contrary, a Man, who minds his Business, is look'd upon as a Miser. A *superstitious* Man is honoured with the Name of a true Christian, notwithstanding his Vices; and a true Christian, who minds only the essential Part of Christianity, will be very happy, if he is not placed among profane Men, and is only charged with too much Indifference for Religion. Cruelty is accounted a *Veil*, and Moderation a Cowardice (c).

As we are apt to fancy that those Things, which have a great Resemblance, are perfectly alike, we judge frequently of others by our selves. Good Men are credulous, and Knaves believe every Body is a Cheat. Some profane Men look upon true Christians as so many Hypocrites. We are surpris'd to see Men of a different Taste from ours, and that they should be displeas'd with what we love. Because other Men have two Legs, two Arms, a Nose, a Mouth, we suppose their Souls to be like ours. A Man has some Features of

(c) Unicuique virtuti finitimum vitium reperietur, aut certo jam nomine appellatum, ut audacia, quæ fidentia: pertinacia, quæ perseverantia finitima est: superstitio, quæ religioni propinqua est, aut sine ullo certo nomine. *Cic. de Invent. Lib. II.*

Quam is, qui contradicet, justitiam vocarit, nos demonstrabimus ignaviam esse, & inertiam, ac parvam libertatem. Quam prudentiam appellarit, ineptam, & garrulam, & odiosam scientiam esse dicemus. Quam ille modestiam dicet esse, eam nos inertiam, & dissolutam negligentiam dicemus. Quam ille fortitudinem nominarit, eam nos gladiatoriam, & inconsideratam appellabimus temeritatem. *Ad Heren. Lib. III.*

of another Man, who pleases us, or who has offended us; those Features are sufficient for us to love or hate him. Great Men are more liable to that Delusion, because they have got an Habit of sticking to their first Thoughts, without mending them; and not being obliged to be very cautious in their Judgments, for fear of a Censure, they peremptorily judge of the Merit of other Men, and their Esteem or Contempt for them are grounded upon their first Notions. Those great Men, whose Success is owing to their Dissimulation, look upon others, who cannot comply with a base Thing, as Men of a narrow Genius, who will never succeed in any Attempt.

FOR the same Reason, every Man is never weary of talking of himself; for, he thinks that what pleases him, cannot fail to please others. He would argue much better, if he drew from that Principle a quite contrary Inference, by saying, other Men are like me. But they tire me, when they talk of nothing else but themselves, and their Concerns: Therefore I tire them, when I talk only of my self, and those Things, wherein I am concerned. If a Man remembers this Reflection, he will never talk of himself but when he is obliged to do it.

A LOOSE Man judges of all Women by those whom he has debauched. Wit is confounded with Malice. A crafty Knave is accounted a Man of greater Wit than an honest Man. 'Tis a gross Error, but very common. Want of Conscience does frequently more contribute to the Reputation of being well skilled in Affairs, than the Penetration and Extent of the Mind. The Vulgar, and others, who take only a superficial View of Things, admire the great Abilities of a Man, who has raised himself to Places, and is grown rich. *It must be confess'd*, say they, *that he is a Man of Parts*. Let us enquire more narrowly into the Matter, and we shall see that any body might have done the same, without having more Wit than is necessary not to be a Fool. Must one have more Wit to say that White is Black, than to say that White is White. No certainly; one must have only more Impudence. Is Lying at every Turn a Proof of good Parts? Must one have a great Penetration to weigh Merit to the highest Bidder? An honest Man cannot well bear a Repulse; 'tis for this Reason he does not venture to ask, and not because he has not Wit enough to know how to ask. But a base Man is not concerned with Honour: Whether he obtains his Desires by his Merit, or Importunity, or by something worse, he is satisfied. Besides, an

honest Man rejects those Projects, with which the other complies heartily : They do not so much as come into his Mind ; for as melancholick Notions do not rise in a joyful Heart, nor merry Thoughts in an afflicted Mind, in like manner, mean Projects and unjust Designs do not offer themselves to a noble and honest Soul.

WHAT is beautiful, is admired. Men admire also what is rare ; and therefore what is uncommon, appears to them beautiful. Some Authors are justly esteemed, because they oppose and ridicule general Errors with lively, bold, and ingenious Strokes. But when a Man with the same Strokes writes Paradoxes and Sophisms against Religion and Morality, he is accounted a great Genius : Men are imposed upon by the Boldness of his Objections, and the Novelty of his Sentiments.

A MAN finds some Relation between a new Proposition and an old one, by reducing them to general Ideas ; this is sufficient for him to conclude, that the new Proposition is only new in Appearance, and that whatever can be known, was already known before. Whereupon he confines himself to Reading ; and if he aspires to the Glory of Novelty, he is contented to offer, under a new Turn, what he has taken out of a Book : He makes a Paraphrase upon it ; and that Paraphrase does frequently spoil it. A new Proof in favour of the Antients ; for generally a Thought is never better expressed than by its original Author.

THOSE, who being full of Admiration for the Antients, make it their only Business to tread in their Steps, are followed by a Sort of Men, who desire to imitate them ; but have an ill Success. Some, in order to get a Name, pitch upon an antient Author : They compile upon each Word of that Writer, all the Passages of the other Authors where that same Word is to be found ; and by such a Display of their Collections, they contrive the Matter so, that the Reader loses the Sight of the Text, which they proposed to explain. A Man fancies he is an admirable Man, because he thinks he is like those who are admired, though he only does something like what they have done.

2 Cor. vi 15. ST Paul affirms there can be no Agreement between *Christ* and *Belial* ; and that a Man cannot be a Member of the Christian Church, whilst he practises the Idolatry of the Heathens. Therefore, say some People, in order to a Reunion, there ought to be no Error on either Side ; every Body must have, or pretend to have, the same Thoughts about every Thing. But why do they not fur-

ther say, every Body ought to be free from Vice, and have the same Degree of Virtue? Practical Faults are excused; but speculative Errors must not be forgiven. What is the Reason of this? It would be too difficult to be an honest Man; and it is also difficult to love those, who believe they have truer Notions than we.

NOTHING can be more easy than to disguise Matters under Comparisons. Men love a flattering Glass, a flattering Painter; they are pleased with Comparisons, wherein they find their Vices disguised under Images of Virtue. A Flatterer compares to Lions and Eagles those great Men who delight in doing Mischiefs. As for me, I place them among Scorpions, Serpents, Toads, and sometimes among *Tarantula's*, which deprive a Man of his good Sense, before they deprive him of his Life. When a Man is turn'd a Knave and a Libertine to please them, he must get himself knock'd on the Head to preserve their Favour.

As soon as a Principle has been of great Use to explain a Phenomenon, it is apply'd to all other *Phenomena*. The *Pythagoreans* ascribed to the Power of Numbers many Effects, which certainly do not depend upon those general Ideas. Some find every where a magnetick Virtue; and some Learned Men have pretended to discover in Light and Colours the Undulations of Sounds, their Consonances and Dissonances. Some, finding three Things in a Subject, either Attributes, or Relations, &c. make it an Image, and sometimes a Proof of the Trinity. Mechanism has had a good Success for the Explication of material *Phenomena's*; it is apply'd to the Mind, to deprive it of its Liberty. The Principles of good Sense go by the Name of common Notions, because every Body acknowledges them; but every Body follows the Maxims of Custom. *Whatever is out of the Hinges of Custom, is thought to be out of the Hinges of Reason.* Montagne, *Book I. Chap. 21.*

A PLAIN Style is confounded with a low one, and a swelled Style with the sublime. A nice Thought, which, under a modest Turn, says a great deal, though it seems to say little, is confounded with a Sublimity, that vanishes away upon Examination. Ridicule is accounted Humour (d),
and

(d) Atque hoc etiam animadvertendum est, non esse omnia ridicula faceta. Quid enim potest esse tam ridiculum, quam Sannio est? sed ore, vultu, imitandis moribus, voce, denique corpore ridetur ipso. Salsum hunc possum dicere, atque ita non ut ejusmodi Oratorem esse velim, sed ut Mimum. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.*

and Nonsense, a profound Learning. 'Tis but speaking boldly; Impudence appears to the Vulgar a Proof of a great Merit. An agreeable Voice, a bold Delivery, a correct Language, a rallying Humour, some Vivacity, and a Quickness of Repartee, are sufficient for many People to honour with the Title of *Wit*, a Man, who is far from being a Wit, and wants many essential Things to deserve that Title.

AN Orator makes a great Impression by his Characters. An injudicious *Imitator* flatters himself with the same Success, without considering that his Characters are, at most, amusing, whereas the others are instructive. Some Characters edify, others are scandalous. The Spirit of Satire makes some of those Characters, as well as the Spirit of Zeal.

WHEN Subjects, compared together, are not well known, a Man does easily lose himself in Analogies. *As Nonentity is to Space, so is the Point to God.* The Infinity of God and Space, when known, may occasion Analogies; but Analogies cannot discover it. This Remark reaches all sorts of Subjects.

WHEN a Comparison seizes the Imagination by the Pomp of its Images, it will also possess the Mind with the Help of Imagination; and if it contains some sacred Terms, it is received with a religious Respect, even when it tends to the Overthrow of Religion. *As Rivers are swallowed by the Sea; in like manner Souls are reunited to the Source of Spirits; they will sink in it, and subsist only in that Principle of Life.* This pompous Language signifies nothing at all. One would think by it, that human Souls are loose Parts, which will be reunited to their Whole.

THE Scripture mentions the terrestrial Paradise. Mythology mentions the Garden of the *Hesperides*. Therefore this last Garden is the same with the Garden of *Eden*, somewhat disguised by Fables. Thus *Bacchus* is said to be *Noah*. Is a common Thing, a proper and determinate Character?

MOSES and *Aaron* were Brothers; that's enough to prove them to be *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*. *Moses* made use of a miraculous Wand; 'tis plain he is *Mercury*.

ISIS, and *Osiris*, her Brother and Husband, are *Adam* and *Eve* disguised under other Names. Their Enemy *Typhon* is *Pride*. *Aso*, Queen of *Ethiopia*, who favoured *Typhon*, is the *Serpent*; for *Aso* signifies *Serpent*. A Hodge-podge of Etymologies, derived from several Languages, imposes upon the Reader by its Erudition.

THUS

THUS it has been found out, that the *Satyrs* were the People of *Israel* concealed in the Wilderness, as the *Satyrs* concealed themselves in Forests; and to make that Comparison more probable, their Name is derived from the *Hebrew*, and its Etymology is said to signify *Retirement*.

A PROOF may be far fetched, and require a great deal of Learning, without being the more convincing for it. One may be mistaken in all Sorts of Languages; and a Man, after having perused many Dictionaries, may be as unsuccessful in the Resemblance he has imagined, as that Monk, who would have *Æneas*, coming out of *Troy*, to be an Image of *St. Peter*, leaving the See of *Antioch*, and *Romulus* and *Remus* to be Images of *St. Peter* and *St. Paul*.

So many Mistakes shew us, how necessary it is to be extremely cautious with respect to Comparisons.

IV. LET us find out the Precautions, which ought to be used to preserve our selves from *Rules*. Error, when we make or hear a Comparison.

Two Things are sometimes compared together, in order to know exactly how far they are alike, and in what Respects they differ. One may compare together, for instance, the Impulsion of hard Bodies and that of soft Bodies, Christian Virtue and the Virtue of the Heathens. One may compare the Notions of Christians about the Soul with those of the ancient Philosophers, to shew wherein they agree, and wherein they differ (e).

IN such Cases, each of the Subjects compared together ought to be examined by it self, and thoroughly understood; and then it will be very easy to find out their Likeness and their Difference. The Knowledge of the Subjects ought therefore to be the Ground of their Comparison, without which it could hardly be exact.

IF any one, for instance, would draw up a Parallel between *Descartes* and *Gassendus*, in order to know how far their Systems agree, it would be much better to learn at once the Sentiments of each of those Philosophers, by reading all their Works, than to read the Opinions of the former, and then the Opinions of the latter, upon each Subject. This Comparison ought to be put off, till he has a Notion of all their Principles, and the Consequences they draw from them.

AGAIN,

(e) "That Parallel may be seen in Mr. *Le Clerc's Bibliothecque* "*Choisie*." Tom. VIII. p. 65.

AGAIN, if any one desires to know exactly wherein the Divines of the different Christian Societies agree, and wherein they differ, he must study each System by it self, and with the same Attention as if he was born in the Society of the Author whose Book he reads, or rather, as if he was not born in any of those Societies, and disliking *Paganism* and the *Alcoran*, study'd the Doctrine of the Christians only to embrace that which should appear to him most agreeable to the Gospel. He will be able to make a just Comparison, when he has got very clear Notions of all those Things which he designs to compare.

How we ought to proceed from the Knowledge of a Subject, to the Knowledge of another.

V. BUT sometimes we are also willing, with the Help of a Comparison, to make the Knowledge of an Object subservient to the Discovery of another. After we have supposed them to be alike, we conclude, that what we find in the one, is also to be found in the other. Thus from the Heat, which arises by the rubbing of one's Hands, we infer that in other Bodies Heat is occasioned by an Agitation. Thus again, from the Heat and Light of Fire we draw this Consequence, that the Sun is a Flame, and apply to it the Ideas of our Fire.

'TIS plain, that those Resemblances may be carried too far. Man is naturally inclined to strain them, and to find a perfect Equality wherever he discovers some slight Appearances of it. His Laziness makes him confound those Things, which are somewhat alike, and suppose that they are perfectly alike. It would require too great a Labour to know all the Relations, and to distinguish the Relations of Likeness from those of Diversity; and when Laziness is attended with some Passion, Resemblances become a Source of Delusions, in which Men grow obstinate. That Fault is committed in Practice, as well as in Speculation; and perhaps I have given but too many Instances of it.

WHEREFORE, I believe that in order to proceed safely from the Knowledge of one Subject, to the Knowledge of another, we ought in the first Place to be well informed of the first Subject; and when it is well known, either because it is less compounded, or because we are more able to examine it, or lastly, because some happy Circumstance has discovered it to us; I say, when we are well informed of it, all its known Attributes ought to be placed in order, and then we must look for them one after another in the new Subject we study. The first Subject therefore does not immediately discover

discover the second : It serves only to find out the Way that leads to it.

WHEN therefore two things appear to us to be alike, being considered in general, it does not follow that they are alike in every Particular. But in order to know how far that Resemblance goes, and to proceed from the Knowledge of one of those Things to the Knowledge of the other we begin with that which may be more easily examined, and we study it thoroughly. Afterwards we seek the Attributes of the Thing already known, in that which is not so well known, but is like the first, at least in some measure. I know in general that our common Fire is like that of the Sun. I examine it ; and then I find in the Sun a very swift and confused Motion, Whirlings, and a Matter bubbling up, and rushing from the Center to the Circumference ; but I discover in it no Fuel, no Ashes, no Nitre, no Sulphur, &c.

WHEN a Man designs to make us grant a Consequence about a Subject not well known to us, he makes us draw a like Consequence from a Principle we are well acquainted with : By that means, the Method of arguing we are put upon, grows more easy and familiar to us. That Method is particularly useful, when the Conclusion, to which we are to be brought, will be against us, make us uneasy, and oppose some of our Prejudices or Inclinations : For if a Man should begin with that, we would dispute, shift, and endeavour to elude the clearest Argument. A Man therefore pitches upon a Subject, which does not confine our Reason : He teaches us how to argue about that Subject, and requires from us that we should continue to acknowledge the Justness of the Argument. It was by such a Method that *Nathan* made *David* sensible of his Fault. In order to bring a Man to own and condemn his Faults, they must be represented to him in another Object under Colours, that is, under Names which disguise them : If it be a lively Picture, he will condemn himself before he perceives that it agrees to him, and that he is the Original of it.

A MAN must argue about like Subjects in the same manner, or else he falls into Contradiction ; which happens to those who judge of Things out of Passion : For generally Passions contradict themselves. He who commends *Amianus Marcellinus*, a Heathen Historian, for speaking of the Christians as he does, will call a Prevarication the Sincerity of a Christian Historian, who mentions
the

the Faults of his Party, and does not pass over in Silence what appears to him commendable in the Party of his Adversaries.

WHEN we make such Comparisons as we are now speaking of, we chuse for the Subject of the Comparison, the most familiar Ideas of the Person we design to convince, that he may draw the Consequence more easily, and be more sensible of its Justness and Necessity.

IT matters little whether the Subject of the Comparison be real, or imaginary: The only Design of it is to make one sensible of the Necessity of a Consequence, and teach him how to draw it. But Consequences may be drawn from a false Supposition, as well as from a true one. When I say of a living Man, that if he was dead, he would not speak, the Consequence is no less undeniable, than if I should say of a dead Man, he is no longer alive; therefore he does not speak.

GREAT Care ought to be taken that the second Conclusion be as necessary a Consequence from its Principles, as the first is from its own, otherwise it would be wrong to judge of the one by the other. If I say, for Instance, "What signifies it, whether you be reported to be sick, if you are well? You do but laugh at it. Why then should you vex yourself, because they would make the World believe that you are an ignorant or a vicious Man, since you are neither the one, nor the other?" That Comparison is not just; it draws up a Parallel between very different Cases. For 1. A Man's Reputation does not suffer at all, even though he be really sick. 2. When he is well, he can convince every body that he is in Health. It is not so with Learning and Probity; one may sometimes lose very real Advantages by being suspected of wanting either the one or the other. A Man would be very sorry to be reported to be sick, if that Report was to be attended with some Prejudice. 'Tis true, in such a Case, the real Pleasure of enjoying a perfect Health might make amends for the ill Consequences of that Report. The comfortable Sense of Knowledge and Virtue may in like manner make amends for the Charge of Ignorance and Vice. In that Sense the Comparison is just; but, as I proposed it first from some Authors, it went too far.

WHEN we go about to prove that a certain Effect will ensue by our comparing it with another Effect, it is necessary that the Cause which produces the one, should act in the same manner as that which produces the other; for
without

without this Supposition, a Comparison cannot have the Source of a Proof. Some Effects may be like in some Respects; and yet their Causes are not alike, and consequently no Consequence can be drawn from the Cause of the one to the Cause of the other.

THE Velocities of Water, running out through Holes made in Ponds of an unequal Height, are as the Square Roots of those Heights. The Velocities of Bodies falling by their Gravity are also as the Square Roots of the Heights from which they fall. The Cause of this last Property had been discovered before the Cause of the other was inquired into. That Conformity of Proportions in those two Effects, created a Belief that they proceeded from the same Cause, and prevented for some time the Discovery of the true Cause of the first, though more simple than that of the second.

TO account for the Reflexion and Refraction of Light, the Rays that are incident, reflected or refracted, have been look'd upon as having among them a certain common Point, like the Centre of Gravity of two Bodies, whose Weight is equal; and this has been the Principle of Reasoning on this Head. But to give an Assurance that this Reasoning is good, it is necessary to have the same Foundation for the Supposition, and drawing the Consequences of one, as the other, that is, a Centre of the Rays of Light operating like that of Weight or Gravity. Till this be clearly evidenc'd, it is a Way of arguing that may be thought ingenious, and agreeably turn'd; but then it only diverts, it proves nothing.

BUT, supposing the Condition just now mentioned, a Comparison is just; and 'tis in vain, in order to elude its Strength, to object the Differences that are to be found between the two Things compared together. This is indeed a Precept of the *Rhetoricians* (f); but herein, as well as in most other things, their Design is rather to teach how to speak easily, and a great deal, than to teach how to think well. Provided a second Conclusion arises from its Principle in the same manner, and by virtue of the same Causes, as the first arises from its own Principle, the Comparison is just, whatever

(f) Contra autem qui dicet, similitudinem infirmare debet; quod faciet, si demonstrabit illud, quod conferatur, ab eo, cui conferatur, diversum esse genere, natura, vi, magnitudine, tempore, loco, persona, opinione. *Cic. de Invent. Lib. II.*

whatever Difference there may be between the Things compared together.

One of the most celebrated Politicians of the last Age (g) compares the State to a *Pyramid*, either standing upon its *Base*, and settled by that Situation, or *inverted*, being hardly able to stand, and falling by the least Impulsion: If that Comparison was carried farther, one might say, A Sovereign supports the State; he is the *Base* and *Foundation* of it: But, if that *Base* is very small, in comparison of the *Weight* it bears, and the vast *Surface* above it, how can it be steady? Those Images make a strong Impression: The Words *To bear*, *Base*, and *Foundation*, impose upon the Mind. Perhaps that Comparison thus expressed might be true in some Sense; but certainly it is false in other Senses; and nothing could be more easy than to make a wrong Application of it. But, the same Subject might afford a Comparison quite opposite, which appears to me more exact. Those, who govern the State, are above those, who live under their Conduct; so that when too many People have a hand in the Government, the upper Surface is too vast, and the Pyramid is overthrown.

BUT, in order to judge of the Exactness of those Comparisons, by the Rule just now mentioned, let us see, on the

(g) "The Safety and Firmness of any Frame of Government may be best judged by the Rules of Architecture, which teach us that the *Pyramid* is of all Figures the firmest, and least subject to be shaken or overthrown by any Concussions or Accidents from the Earth or Air; and it grows still so much the firmer, by how much broader the bottom, and sharper the top. - - -

"On the contrary, Government, which by alienating the Affections, losing the Opinions, and crossing the Interests of the People, leaves out of its Compass the greatest Part of their Consent, may justly be said, in the same Degrees, it thus loses Ground, to narrow its Bottom; and if this be done to serve the Ambition, humour the Passion, satisfy the Appetites, or advance the Power and Interests not only of one Man, but of two, or more, or many that come to share in the Government: By this Means the Top may justly be said to grow broader, as the Bottom narrower by the other. Now by the same Degrees that either of these happen, the Stability of the Figure is by the same lessened and impaired; so as at certain Degrees it begins to grow subject to Accidents of Wind and of Weather; and at certain others, it is sure to fall of it self, or by the least Shake that happens, to the Ground." *Sir William Temple's Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government.*

the one hand, what makes a Solid steady upon its Base; and on the other, what settles a State. The larger the Basis, if compared to what is above it, the less each Part of that Base is loaded with the upper Weight; which is the Reason why a Pyramid is more steady upon its Base, than a Cylinder upon its own. I add, that the larger the Base is, the more easily the *Æquilibrium* will be preserved, and restored, if it be altered.

Now I ask, whether Subjects are less sensible of the Weight of the Government, as they have more Masters and Governors, or whether it be quite otherwise? Besides, as the Number of those who have a hand in the Government encreases, Parties may be formed powerful enough to overthrow the others; and then what happens to a Pyramid overthrown, happens to a State: That Part, which seems at first to be uppermost, falls upon the next; and the Fall of the one occasions the Fall of the other.

WHAT is it that makes People sensible of the Sweets of the Government, without feeling the Weight of it? or, to use metaphorical Words, what is it that keeps the Pyramid from being overthrown? 'Tis the Equity, Moderation, and Mildness of their Governors. What is it that preserved the *Æquilibrium*, so that each Part strives to keep its Place, and resume it; as it happens to a Pyramid, that is somewhat inclined? 'Tis Equity, Moderation, Politeness, good Order, Plenty, and a good Trade, whereby Money circulates, and every body relies upon the Wealth of others, as upon his own. And indeed, the same Politician acknowledges, "It might also be said, that those Governments
" are the best, which have the best Governors; and that
" the Difference is not so much in Magistracy it self, as in
" the Persons of the Magistrates. Which was perhaps the
" Design and Meaning of that antient Saying, taking also
" Men endowed with Probity and Wisdom to be the same
" with Philosophers; That the *best Governments were*
" *those in which Kings were Philosophers, or Philosophers*
" *Kings.*"

MATERIAL Things being more familiar to us than Spiritual Things, afford the most usual Subject of Comparisons (*b*). But because 'tis necessary to proceed easily and

(*b*) *Omnis translatio, quæ quidem sumpta ratione est, ad sensus ipsos admovetur, maximè oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus. Nam*

and naturally from one Member of the Comparison to the other, that it may have its Effect, it seems that the Nature and Properties of Matter are not very proper to manifest to us the Nature and Properties of the Soul. The more the Ideas of Matter disappear, the more clearly we perceive the others: The Images of Matter perplex the Notions of the Mind: Imagination ought to be silenced, to use a pure Understanding. I have often observed, that an eminent Author, who has otherwise very clear Thoughts, perplexes the Readers, when he borrows material Images to explain the Nature and Properties of the Soul. His Parallels, though well drawn up, and his Comparisons, though very ingenious, occasion that very Perplexity which he endeavours to remove; and I know many People, who not being able to extricate themselves out of the first Passages in that excellent Book, gave over the reading of it, thinking it was too difficult for them.

SINCE Comparisons are made use of to enlighten the Mind, it is not sufficient that they should be just in some Respects, and that the Subjects compared together be like in some Things: It is also necessary that those Things should offer themselves almost alone. If some others offer themselves as naturally, and give false Ideas, the Comparison is wrong, and contrary to the Design of the Author; and in general, since a Comparison ought to enlighten the Mind, those that give the greatest Light are the most valuable. One may justly complain of a Comparison, which offers only a vain Shadow. Such is perhaps the following Comparison. *As we love to see the Banks of the Water, when we walk upon the Land; in like manner we love Verses bordering upon Prose, without being prosaick.* A Comparison loses its Gracefulness, if it wants a Commentary.

EVERY Comparison offers one Thing under the Image of another; and therefore, if an Author brings in *too many* Similitudes, he tires the Reader, who loses the Sight of the main Subject. *Seneca* is admirable in his Comparisons; but sometimes he heaps up so many together, that instead of instructing and convincing us, he only amuses us and diverts

& odor urbanitatis & mollitudo humanitatis, & murmur maris, & dulcedo orationis sunt ducta à cæteris sensibus. Illa verò oculorum multò acriora, quæ ponunt penè in conspectu animi, quæ cernere & videre non possumus. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. III.*

verts our Attention. In his second Letter (i), he justly blames those, who study without any Method; but if you read his Comparisons, you will be apt to forget the principal Subject of them. *A Man is no where, who is every where. Those, who spend their Lives in travelling, have many Hosts, and no Friends. Meat affords no Nourishment, if it be immediately thrown up. A great Variety of Remedies is an Obstacle to the Cure of Diseases. A Wound too often handled, will not be consolidated. A Tree frequently transplanted, will die. Seneca dazzles the Mind by those Heaps of Comparisons: The Reader yields without being truly convinced. In order to prove that old Age is the most lovely Part of a Man's Life, that Philosopher says, Fruits are never more acceptable, than when they are near their End. Youth appears in its greatest Lustre, when it is almost gone. Drunkards are best pleased with that Glass, that throws them upon the Ground. The Pleasure of Life is like other Pleasures: It is never more lively, than when Life is far advanced (k).*

HERE follows another Comparison of the same Author, who is always lively, but his Expressions are sometimes overstrained: *A sick Person, says he, does not desire a Physician, who speaks well, but who can cure Diseases.* QUERIT æger Medicum non eloquentem, sed sanantem. *Ep. LXXV.*
Bodily

(i) Illud autem vide, ne ista lectio multorum Auctorum, & omnis generis voluminum, habeat aliquid vagum & instabile. Certis ingeniis immorari & innutriti oportet, si velis aliquid trahere, quod in animo fideliter sedeat. Nusquam est, qui ubique est. In peregrinatione vitam agentibus hoc evenit, ut multa hospitia habeant, nullas amicitias. Idem accidat necesse est iis qui nullius se ingenio familiariter applicant, sed omnia cursim & properanter transmittunt. Non prodest cibus, nec corpori accedit, qui statim sumptus emititur. Nihil æquè sanitatem impedit, quàm remediorum crebra mutatio. Non venit vulnus ad cicatricem, in quo crebrò medicamenta tentantur. Non convalescit planta, quæ sæpè transfertur; nihil tam utile est quod in transitu proficit. Distrahit animum librorum multitudo.

(k) Gratissima sunt poma, cum fugiant: pueritiæ maximus in exitu decor est: Deditos vino potatio extrema delectat, illa quæ mergit, quæ ebrietati summam manum imponit. Quod in se jucundissimum omnis voluptas habet, in finem sui differt. Jucundissima est ætas devexa jam, non tamen præceps: Et illam quoque in extrema tegula stantem, judico habere suas voluptates: Aut hoc ipsum succedit in locum voluptatum, nullis egere. Quàm dulce est, cupiditates fugasse ac reliquisse? *Ep. XII.*
B b 2

Bodily Diseases are not cured with Words: They are not cured by instructing a sick Person, raising his Attention, and mastering his Passions; and if sometimes a Physician can contribute to his Cure by that Means, his Eloquence will be one of his Remedies.

THE same Author, in the Book he writes *Ch. XXXI.* to *Polybius*, makes use of a Comparison, which runs only upon a Quibble. "It is some Comfort to divide one's Grief among many People; for Grief being thus divided, you will be better able to bear that small Part of it, which remains in you." *Est autem hoc ipsum solati loco inter multos dolorem suum dividere, qui quia dispensatus; inter plures, exigua debet apud te parte subsidere.* Grief is not thus divided, as it were, with a Weight. The Concern of others lessens the Sense of it, because turning our Attention upon the Pleasure of being loved by them, it makes us less attentive to our Sorrow.

WHEREFORE the Success of a Comparison does frequently depend even upon its want of Exactness: It offers one Thing for another; and by that means it diverts our Attention from the Subject about which the Author of the Comparison designs to impose upon us. *A Man after a good Meal, rises from Table without any Uneasiness. He sat down with Pleasure; he goes away satisfied, and takes his Leave handsomely. We should depart this Life in the same manner, after we have enjoyed it.*

Cur non ut plenus vitæ, conviva recedis?
But there is an infinite Difference betwixt Death and a Pleasure, which is only interrupted, and may be renewed at any Time. Death is not a mere Interruption, but a total Extinction of Life. Would it be an unhandsome Thing for a Man to shed Tears in taking Leave of his Friends, when he knows he will never see them again, and that he is going to remove into another Continent? But the Philosophers, and the Stoicks themselves, who would not yield to any Body in Fortitude, shook off the Fear of Death, as much as they could; and to appear more steady, they were not contented to ground the Contempt of it upon the Hope of an immortal Life.

HERE follow some other Metaphors too different one from another. I have found them somewhere. *Tinsel has sometimes a greater Lustre than true Gold; and empty Casks make a greater Noise, when struck, than if they were full.*

SOME Comparisons are accounted ingenious, and please us by the Turn, Vivacity, and Delicacy of the Expressions,

sions, &c. But they may be compared to those Pictures in Miniature, with which we are pleased by Reason of the Lustre of the Colours, and the Beauty of the Painting, though they are not very like the Originals. A Comparison is inconsistent with the Design of it, and consequently has an essential Defect, when it makes us lose the Sight of its Object. If that Fault be excusable, 'tis only when a Man may be allowed to conceal some Defect of the Subject upon which his Discourse runs.

COMPARISONS are made use of to place the Mind of a Man in that Point of Sight, where he ought to be, that he may see a Thing as it is represented to him. *Cicero* being willing to expose the Affectation of the Stoicks, in disguising, under pompous Expressions, what other Philosophers had already said before them, concerning the Excellency of Virtue, makes use of this Comparison; *As Thieves change the Marks of those Things which they steal, in like manner the Stoicks, in order to ascribe to themselves the Thoughts of other Philosophers, and be accounted the Authors of them, have changed the Terms of those Philosophers, whereby they would have been discovered (l).*

ONE of the most useful Rules concerning the Relation, which makes the Subject of this Chapter, is, that about like Cases one ought to argue in the same Manner. A Man, who contradicts himself, pronounces his own Condemnation: Which generally happens to those, who judge of Things out of Passion and Humour.

VI. THE only Use of some Comparisons consists in adorning the Discourse; and they are never employed but with such a Design. We may say in general of Comparisons, what *Cicero* says of Metaphors, That the Use of them was at first introduced out of Necessity (m). But because

A third Use of Comparisons.

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(l) Aliquot reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa computant: Sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tanquam rerum notas mutaverunt. *De Fin. Lib. V.*

(m) Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi latè patet, quem necessitas genuit inopiâ coacta & angustiis; post autem delectatio jucunditasque celebravit: Nam ut vestis frigoris depellendi causâ reperta primò, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis & dignitatem; sic verbi translatio instituta est inopie causâ, frequentata delectationis; nam gemmare vites, luxuriam esse in herbis, lætas segetes etiam rustici dicunt: quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio potest,

an *Ornament* does no longer deserve that Name, when it is needless and wrongly placed, it ought not to be used every where, and upon all sorts of Subjects; and some Comparisons would have an ill Effect, though they should be expressed with great Eloquence. When a Subject deserves to be enlarged upon; when the Orator has some Reason to believe that his Hearers will be pleased, if he dwells upon it, and that they would be unwilling to lose the Sight of it so soon; after he has shewed it such as it is, and under its true Form, it will not be improper to offer it again under some resembling Pictures. The Hearer has the Pleasure of dwelling upon the same Object as long as the Orator desires it, without being tired with the same Words, nor with the same Images. It is very agreeable to see the Strokes that set off the Beauty of several Subjects, reunited in that which appears to deserve the greatest Attention.

PREACHERS, being persuaded that a serious Discourse ought not to be destitute of Ornaments and Amplifications, do not fail to use Comparisons; and they do it the more willingly, because of all the Ornaments of Speech, Comparisons are best adapted to the Capacity of the common People, whose Instruction they ought not to neglect. But I wish that in such important Matters as those of Religion and Morality, they would advance nothing but what is very solid. When a grave Divine says, *That in the Authority of those,*

test, id translato est dictum; illustrat id, quod intelligi volumus ejus rei, quam alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo. Ergò hæ translationes quasi mutuationes sunt, cum quod non habeas, aliunde sumas. Illæ paulò audaciores; quæ non inopiam indicant, sed orationi splendoris aliquid accersunt, quarum ego quid vobis aut inveniendi rationem aut genera ponam? Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitâs, quod verbum in alieno loco tanquam in suo positum, si agnoscitur, delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur. Sed ea transferri oportet, quæ aut clariorem faciunt, ut illa omnia:

----- *Inhorrescit mare.*

*Tenebræ conduplicantur, noctisque & nimbium occæcat nigror,
Flamma inter nubes coruscat, cælum tonitru contremittit:
Grando missa imbri largifluo subita præcipitans cadit,
Undique omnes venti erumpunt, sævi existunt turbines,
Fervet æstu pelagus:*

Omnia ferè, quo essent clariora, translatis per similitudinem verbis dicta sunt. *De Orat. Lib. III.*

those, who govern us upon Earth, we see an Image of the Authority of the Creator of Heaven and Earth; when he says, That the same Creator adorns the Clouds of Heaven with admirable Colours, that we may cry out, If the Porch is so wonderful, what will the Sanctuary be? I would not have him to add, The Brightness of Dignities is like that of the Clouds: The Colours we see in them, are an Effect of some Vapours, that will quickly vanish away: The Lustre of Dignities passes away in the same manner. It is not enough to have a right Aim: One must go to it the right Way.

VII. LASTLY, Comparisons are used to move, and to affect. This is a Matter of Fact *A fourth Use.* confirmed by long Experience; and 'tis no difficult Thing to apprehend the Reason of it. Comparisons take in many Ideas, and we are more lively affected with a Multitude, than with a small Number. Besides, they are fetched from material Things, the Ideas whereof stir the Imagination, agitate the Spirits, and by that means raise the Passions. Lastly, an Orator, who designs to move, gives the Images he uses the most lively and affecting Turn he can possibly give them.

WHEN a Man is moved, and willing to convey the same Emotions into the Minds of others, he excites himself to find out Expressions answerable to the Vivacity of his Sentiments. The Imagination offers some; he takes hold of them without enquiring into their Exactness: He is contented with their Strength.

WHEN Comparisons have no other Aim, they ought not to be looked upon as Arguments: They are not so much as Explanations. It is not required that they should be Clear, provided they be Strong, and the Sentiments occasioned by them be grounded upon Reason. With those two Conditions, a Comparison may be admitted, and cannot be justly condemned.

THUS the Holy Scripture ascribes to God an Eye, that sees every Thing, an omnipotent Arm, a dreadful Anger: It says that God is a consuming Fire: Attention, Constancy, Respect, a Fear of offending God, are the Effects of those Images: They are designed to move, and not to enlighten the Mind. Those who know how to use their Understanding, will not make a wrong Use of them, nor mistake their true Meaning; and if some Men are not able to use that Faculty, it were in vain to endeavour to bring them to pure Ideas: 'Tis better to move them as well as one can, than to

give them up to Vice and Ignorance. If their Ideas are confus'd, their Inclinations will be good.

WHEN a Man has any Doubt about the Lawfulness of the Sentiments occasioned by Images, he must examine them without any Prejudices, and consequently strip the Image of its dazzling Power, consider the Sentiment in it self, and judge of it by the undeniable Principles of Equity and perfect Evidence.

HE must therefore enquire, in the first place, whether those Sentiments be reasonable, and whether it be his Duty to be affected with them; and if he finds it so, he may give up himself to the Images by which those Sentiments are to be rais'd.

A Man born a Heathen, for instance, is convinc'd of the Truth of Christianity; but being ready to profess it, he perceives that his Father will die of Grief upon that Account: He is told he will be a Parricide. This is a moving Image; but without any Regard to the Heinousness of that Word, he must examine this Question: Whether it be lawful to persist in the Worship of Idols, in order to preserve the Life of a Father.

WHENEVER a Man is urg'd to do something, or instructed about any Subject in figurative Words, he must, to prevent being delud'd by that Language, change metaphysical Expressions into simple and literal ones: The Ideas will then be clearer, and the Judgment he makes of them easier and truer.

GOD is indivisible: The Soul and Truth are also indivisible. The Light is not without Heat: Therefore one cannot have the one without the other; and consequently Truth is not to be found among unregenerated Men. If you express that figurative Language in proper Words, there will be no Sense in that Argument, which has been made by some Men very seriously.

A METAPHORICAL Word includes a Comparison: It expresses more than one Idea: It affirms that one Thing is like another. But, because it does not determine how far that Resemblance goes, in order to know it, 'tis necessary to have a clear Notion of the Thing, and of the Image under which it is offer'd; and in order to understand the Sense, which an Author puts upon those Words, he must be consult'd in those Places, where he expresses himself with more Simplicity.

SOME Men, to banish Eloquence from the Pulpit, argue thus: *The Preachers of the Gospel are Fishermen, and their*
Bait

Bait is not a Ruby; 'tis only a Worm. But as a Fisherman uses the best Method he can think of to obtain his End, in like manner a Preacher speaks elegantly, that he may the better instruct and move his Audience. A Worm is made use of to catch Fish, not because it is a contemptible Insect, but because Fish love that Food. In like manner, a Preacher ought to conform himself to the Capacity of his Hearers. If you insist upon that Comparison, you will find that a Fisherman deceives Fish, and kills them under Pretence of feeding them.

HERE follows another Argument of the same Nature. *A Pastor is the Father of his Flock; but any Man of Sense would think it very ridiculous, that a Father, speaking to his Children, should use all the Ornaments of Oratory.* I shall say nothing of some Imperfections of that Argument, whereby Study, the Use of Cloaths, and the Ringing of Bells, might be as well forbidden as Eloquence. I shall only examine the Justness of the Comparison, which appears at first somewhat plausible. In a proper Sense, a Father has given Life to his Children: He is their Master, and may oblige them to obey his Commands. From their Childhood they have been used to submit to his Orders: It is their Interest, as well as his, that he should preserve that Authority; lastly, his Family does always consist of few People. None of those Characters agree to a Pastor, with respect to his Flock. Those Persons, who make up his Flock, are no further obliged to have a Fatherly Respect for him, than as they are convinced of his Care to teach them the Truth: It is upon that Account he deserves the metaphorical Title of Father. But though he has as much Love and Zeal for his Flock, as a Father for his Children, yet it does not follow that he has the same Right. That very Thing, wherein he is like a Father, requires from him that he should use his utmost Endeavours to preach with a good Success, and consequently not to neglect Eloquence.

IF we enquire also into the Reasons, why Children ought to obey their Parents, even in the most indifferent Things, we shall see that the same Reasons do not oblige a Flock to have the same Complaisance for their Pastor. The Education of Children, the Quiet of Families, and the Peace of the Society, require the Submission of Children to the Will of a Father. But the Beauty of a Religious Society consists in having no other Rule but the Will of God; in *examining every Thing, to retain only what is Good*; and not being so blind, as to fancy that we obey the Commands of God, when we only
obey

obey the *Commands of Men*. Whenever an Ecclesiastical Superior usurps the Rights and *Authority* of Reason over those who are committed to his Care, Superstition rises upon the Ruins of true Piety, and Prejudices are confounded with Religion.

THE Question, so warmly debated about the *Flight of the Pastors**, would have been more easily determined, if it had not been clogged with Metaphors. A General, who forsakes his Army: A Shepherd, who leaves his Sheep to the Mercy of the Wolves, as soon as he sees them: Those Images make an Impression upon the Mind: The Army is lost: The Sheep are destroyed: 'Tis an unavoidable Thing. Besides, we are used to the Metaphor of *Pastor* and *Flock*, and not unwilling that the Head of a Church, which is a small Spiritual Army, should be compared to a General. But laying aside the figurative Style, the Question comes to this; Whether a certain Number of Men will be given up to Error and Vice, as soon as a certain Orator is no longer at their Head. Books can be no longer of any Use to them to learn their Duty: They cannot love God and his Laws: They must be instructed by a Man, who has a Title. If Men cannot avoid being imposed upon by Sophisms, without the Help of a General, who resolves them, an Assembly of Christians will turn Mahometan, if their Head is not so eloquent, bold, and subtil, as a General or an Orator of the Sect of *Mahomet*.

THE Advice I have just now given, seems at first to take away all the Benefit of metaphorical Instructions; for, it will be said, that if in order to understand them, the Nature of the Thing in question must be the Rule of its Explication, it follows, that to reap some Benefit from those Instructions, it is already necessary to apprehend what they are designed to teach, and consequently that they are useless. I answer, 1. That it would be lost Labour to instruct us about a Subject altogether unknown to us: It were in vain to name it; its Name would not be attended with any Idea. When we are Instructed, we are always led from a general Knowledge to a more determinate one; and what we learn about a Thing, can never be inconsistent with what we knew of it before. 2. Metaphorical Instructions enable us to encrease our Knowledge, because, as I have already said, they afford us an occasion of proceeding to the Discovery of a new

new Subject, by seeking in it orderly, and one after another, the Attributes of a like Subject, which is already known to us.

VII. I HAVE said that a Metaphor is a sort of Comparison; for there are Comparisons of many Kinds. A *Parable* is fetched from what has, or may be done; but the Image of an *Apologue* or *Fable* is plainly fictitious. In both of them, all the Strokes of the Image are not minded: They are not all significant. Some, like the Frame of a Picture, do not contribute to the Resemblance, but are only an Ornament: 'Tis enough that the Application in general be Just; the Design is only to be minded. An *Emblem* requires more Exactness: Every Stroke ought to be significant: 'Tis an Image, which offers a Thing under many Views; and each Part of that Image must have a Relation to some Circumstance of the Thing signified. Some *Allusion* is commonly added to it, that is, some remarkable Words, spoken the first Time for another Subject, but applicable to this, by reason of some Resemblance.

Many Sorts of Comparisons.

THE Rules of Morality have been necessary to Men at all Times; but no System of Morality was composed, or even thought of till after many Ages. The Laws have always appeared hard to Mankind, because they lay a Constraint upon their Liberty; and sometimes the Lawgivers themselves had their own Interest more at Heart than the Good of Men. The Laws were more favourably received, when proposed as mere Counsels. Sometimes their Lustre has been set off with bright Expressions: It was thought grave Sentences would contribute to make Men sensible of their Importance. It was also believed that the Sweetness of Verses would insinuate them more easily into the Mind. But of all the Methods that have been used to instruct Men in their Duty, I question whether there has been any more ingenious and more effectual than Fables; and indeed that Method is very antient (n). A Man may see the Enormity, or the Ridiculousness (o) of Vice, not only in other Men, but

(n) In the ninth Chapter of the Judges, Jotham does lively represent his Right under the cover of a Fable.

In the most antient Times of the Republick of Rome, Menenius pursued an End to a popular Tumult with the Help of an Apologue.

(o) What Cicero says of Comick Poets, ought to be said of Fables. *Hæc conficta arbitrò à Poëtis, ut effectos nostros mores in aliis personis*

but also in another sort of Beings, and by that Means he is the more willing to condemn it, because he is not so sensible that he condemns himself. Besides, the Images offered in a Fable are very just. The Light of Reason and the Rules of Morality differ only in Name; and when a Man departs from his Duty, he dishonours his Nature, to act like Beasts, which are only governed by their Senses and Passions. When a Man is not prepossessed by some Interest, which blinds his Mind, he is sensible of what is Good, and discerns by Instinct what is Just, from what is Unjust. A Fable works upon that Instinct, and places Man in that Point of Sight where he ought to be, in order to perceive the Turpitude of Vice.

A *RIDDLE* is a Series of Comparisons, which denote the particulars of a Thing by Names taken from many different Subjects, but resembling that of the Riddles, each in its own way. Sometimes to make the Solution of a Riddle more difficult, it is perplexed with a Mixture of plain and figurative Style.

THERE was a Time when the Eastern Kings glory'd in writing, and resolving Riddles. The Taste of a Prince, illustrious by his Wit or Power, was sufficient to introduce the Use of them. It may be also, that the Style of the antient wise Men in their Instructions did contribute to it. They writ them obscurely, perhaps that Men might always want their Help to understand them; perhaps also with a Design to make their Knowledge the more valuable, because it would be less common; and lastly, perhaps they expressed themselves obscurely about those Things, which they understood very well, only to conceal their Ignorance of those, which were not so well known to them, and about which they could not express their Thoughts more clearly.

I ADD, that Nature being a Riddle, and because 'tis extremely difficult to discover the Causes of those Things, which strike upon our Senses, and we cannot pretend to have found out the true Cause of a Phenomenon, but when it may be
apply'd

sonis, expressamque imaginem vitæ quotidianæ videremus. *Orat. pro P. Quint.*

Illi qui simpliciter, & demonstrandæ rei causâ eloquebantur, parabolis referti sunt: quas existimo necessârias, non ex eâdem causâ qua poëtis, sed ut imbecillitatis nostræ adminicula sint, & ut discentem & audentem in rem præsentem adducant. *Sen. Ep. LIX.*

apply'd with an equal Facility to all its Parts and Circumstances ; the Riddles of Words afford the Mind an Exercise, whereby it learns to unfold the Riddles of Things themselves.

THERE is a Time for every Thing. Riddles were in Vogue about the End of the last Century ; and perhaps they are none of the most glorious Things of that Age. At least it seems to me, that if I had been so weak as to comply with that Humour, and follow the Stream, I should be now perfectly ashamed to read my Name in a long List of idle People, and to see that there was a Time, when I took a Pride in letting all *France*, and almost all *Europe* know, that I, an Inhabitant of such a Town, had been so witty as to guess that the Design of a certain Heap of Words was to express a Flute, an Arrow, a Fan.

SOME Men of a very superior Rank exercise themselves now, and harass one another with Riddles of a different Kind. They are Problems, the Solution whereof requires an uncommon Sagacity, and a great Skill in Calculation and Geometrical Theorems. Those Learned Riddles are like those just now mentioned, in this Respect, that 'tis more easy to invent than to resolve them. It frequently happens, whilst a Man is in search of a Truth, that another Truth offers it self, which he did not look for. He finds all of a sudden, and by chance, what he would not otherwise have found, but after many Attempts. As he goes along, he happens to be in a certain Point of Sight, from whence he easily discovers what others cannot observe without great Difficulty, for want of placing themselves in that same Point of Sight, which is not to be attained but after many Essays, or by a happy Chance. In his Enquiries, he takes Care to make his Way easy, and to see it at every Step ; but when he puts others upon the Search, instead of paving their Way, he often stops it, and makes it as dark as he can. He joins together several Parts one after another ; but he offers them to others under one single Idea, or Expression, in which they are involved ; and then *Analysis* is much more difficult than *Composition*.

THERE are still many Things to be learned, that Men of Letters, instead of obstructing their Way mutually, should all unite, and lend one another a helping Hand, to make a greater and quicker Progress. If a Man discovers something, without knowing what Use it may be of, let him only discourse about it with his Friends, or publish it as a mere Curiosity. Nay, if a Discovery does not appear useful, I
think

think it would be more glorious to publish it as a Trifle found out in one's Way, than as a sublime Theory, which required a great deal of Time. As for those Things that are of some Use, they cannot be imparted to the Publick too soon, nor too clearly. A Man ought to make such a Present to others, because he is a Man.

“ BUT (say those Geometricians) we are willing the Learned should have the Pleasure of resolving a Problem; it is certainly a much greater Pleasure than that of reading it resolved.” Perhaps, one may very well doubt of it. Are they not willing, on the contrary, to make others pay dear for the Knowledge imparted to them, and to make them sensible it has not been acquired without a very great Labour? Would they be heartily sorry, if instead of procuring to the Learned the Pleasure of resolving a Problem, and being thereby convinced that they are as able Geometricians as he who proposed it, they should engage them to take great Pains to no Purpose, and to acknowledge their Inferiority? After all, a Man, who will have the Pleasure of trying his Strength, may do so still. When he has read the Title of a Problem, he may look for the Solution without reading it; and because all Men have not the same Strength of Mind, some will resolve it without any Help. and others after the Reading of some Lines.

WHEN a Series of Metaphors is clearly understood, it goes by the Name of *Allegory*; and if an Allegory is full of Metaphors too far fetch'd, or if their Number is too great, especially when they are inconsistent, those Metaphors become a Riddle (*p*). In religious Matters an Allegory signifies

(*p*) Quo in genere primùm fugienda est dissimilitudo :

----- *Cæli ingentes fornices.*

Quamvis sphaeram in scenam (ut dicitur) attulerit Ennius, tamen in sphaera fornicis similitudo non potest inesse.

----- *Vive, Ulysses, dum licet :*

Oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape.

Non dixit cape, non pete; haberet enim moram sperantis diutius esse sese victurum : sed rape, hoc verbum est ad id aptatum quod ante dixerat, *dum licet*. Deinde videndum est, ne longè simile sit ductum, Syrtim patrimonii, scopulum libentius dixerim, Charybdim bonorum, voraginem potius : facilius enim ad ea quæ visa, quàm ad illa quæ audita sunt, mentis oculi feruntur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. III.*

“ It

nifies the Expression of a Spiritual Thing, under the Cover of a material one.

A TYPE is a Representation of a future Event, as a *Monument* is a Representation or *Memorial* of a Thing past. The Words, which express those Images, agree sometimes equally to the Image and the Thing represented by it. Sometimes they are only true with Respect to the *Body* of the Image; and at other Times they are only meant of the Thing signified. *What a fine Air it has! It was made by a very able Hand! What an admirable Man!* Those Things are said of a Picture.

THE Use of Allegories is very antient. Men admire what is obscure. What they easily apprehend, seems to them to be small; and on the contrary, what they do not understand, appears to them great and sublime. Those who profess'd to teach the Sciences, thought fit to comply with that Humour, and found their Account in it, as I have already said. Men could not be without their Help; and their Writings were not the less valued, because they wanted to be cleared by Word of Mouth. People grew fond of Riddles and Hieroglyphicks. Under the Cover of one Thing, another Thing was meant. The Heathen Philosophers took Advantage of that Custom to justify the Absurdities of their Religion. The Histories of *Jupiter, Juno, Mars, Venus, &c.* contained, in their Opinion, Physical and Moral Truths. It were to be wish'd the antient Fathers of the Church had been more free from that ill Taste. They have, without any ill Intention, sported with the Scripture, and left to their Successors an Example the more dangerous, because it is grounded upon their Authority. Whoever has any Respect for common Sense, must needs wonder at the Multitude of poor Things that came from the Pen of those good Men; they might be reckon'd by Thousands. Here follow some of them.

THEODORET pretends that one of the Goats, mentioned in *Leviticus*, represented the Human Nature, and the other

“ It has been objected against *Cicero*, that he transgresses his own Rule, and uses inconsistent Metaphors, one after another. He rejoices because the City of *Rome* has vomited *Catiline*; and he adds, that this Monster comes out against its Will, and shews by its Looks and Motions that it would devour the City. One cannot have in his Body, and much less throw out of his Mouth a Monster, which may devour him.

other the Divine Nature of Christ. St. *Irenæus* will have it, that the Ass of *Balaam* represents the Body of Christ loaded with our Sins; but *Origen* is of Opinion, that the Ass bearing *Balaam* represented the Church bearing Christ. The Love of Types made St. *Irenæus* fancy three Spies instead of two, to make them a Type of the Trinity. St. *Jerome*, otherwise a judicious Man, fancy'd that the seven Sons of *Job* represented the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and his Three Daughters the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel. He might as well have found in them the seven Tunes, and the three principal Keys of our Musick.

IT were to be wished, some judicious Divines would be so courageous as to lay down clear Rules for Typical and Allegorical Explications; otherwise there will be no End of running into extravagant Notions; and that Method of explaining the Scripture will be a Source of inextricable Absurdities and Contradictions.

IT is a sad Thing, that in an Age so learned as ours is, and when Divines are more concerned than ever, not to expose Religion to the Jest of Libertines, whose Number was never so great, and who never disputed with so much Boldness and Subtilty, some Men should indulge their Imagination so far, as to make the Scripture say whatever they please, and frequently with as little Reason, as Children make Bells say whatever comes into their Minds. 'Tis opening a Way to become a Visionary. Mystical Men and Visionaries are less timorous than mere Allegorical Divines: They have quicker Flights, and those Flights go farther; but 'tis the same Genius at the Bottom: And if it be once lawful to leave the Way of common Sense, why may not one depart from it four Steps, as well as two?

I DESIGN to ask some Favours of the LORD, or express my Acknowledgment to him for those I have received, or I design to celebrate his Greatness and Perfections. To that End, I borrow the Words of *David*, and I think I understand them. But it seems, that whilst I am only taken up with the Performance of the Duty of Prayer, I utter Prophecies, without knowing it; I foretell the Calling of the *Gentiles*, the Conversion of the *Jews*, the Reformation of the Church, the Destruction of Antichrist, the Wars of *Germany*, and the Victories of *Gustavus Adolphus*; I repeat some Dialogues between the Father and the Son, and some Treaties stipulated according to all the Formalities of Civilians.

WITHOUT

WITHOUT giving so great a Scope to my Fancy, I shall easily find the greatest Mysteries of Theology in the *Odes of Horace*. I shall find them in every Part of Nature; and, if I please, I shall see in the different Kinds of Birds, in the Variety of their Singing and Feathers, very plain Types of all Religious Orders.

SOME will have it, that the Ark, an Image of the Church, tossed by the Waters without Sails, without Cars and a Helm, is a Type, which teaches us, that the Preservation of the Church is only owing to Providence, and that the Art of Men has no Hand in it. Others will tell us, That the Tabernacle, another Image of the Church, about which the *Levites* encamped, is a Type of the Assistance which the Church receives from the Arms and Power of Princes.

A MAN, who has some Wit and some Vivacity of Imagination, thinks all those Comparisons are too mean, and too easy to glory in them; but a shallow Wit, a Man of a dull Imagination, admires them: He knows not how he comes to have such refined Thoughts, and gives Glory to God for those subtil Discoveries, which he ascribes to the Divine Goodness.

A PREACHER is overjoy'd to inform his Audience, that he and his Collegues are mention'd, under Types, in every Page of the Old Testament; and the Respect of the Hearers encreases for an Orator, whom GOD has been pleas'd to represent under so many Figures. But a Preacher, instead of pretending to be where he is not to be found, should make it his main Business to teach solid and essential Duties, and enforce the Practice of them.

A PREDICTION is a Proof of the Divinity of what is propos'd to be believed. But a Proof ought to be convincing; and every Passage, that is capable of a very natural Sense, without any propheticall Thing in it, cannot be accounted a Prediction. Besides, what is the Design of Prophecies? To make us believe. And what is the Design of Faith? To make us live a good Life, and glorify GOD by our Sanctification (q). This being laid down, is it reasonable to look for a propheticall Sense under the Cover of Words, which certainly contain a moral Sense? Were it so, the Outside would offer a more useful Instruction than
the

(q) *Matt.* v. 16. vii. 21. & seq. xii. 50. xxii. 37-39. xxv. 34. & seq.

the Inside, and the literal Sense would deserve our Attention more than the spiritual Sense.

AN Example contains also a Similitude. If it be good, it ought to be imitated; if it be a bad one, every Thing that is like it, ought to be avoided.

EXAMPLES must not be confounded with Proofs. An Example clears a Proposition, but does not prove it. It clears a Proposition, because it offers the Sense of it under more affecting Ideas, as being more determinate. That new Light pleases: Men are contented with it, and look upon it as a Proof, though it be no Proof at all. When I have said, *One has the same Product by changing the Multiplicand into the Multiplier, provided one changes at the same Time the Multiplier into the Multiplicand*; I clear that Proposition, which is obscure, as consisting of general and somewhat uncommon Terms, by saying, When after having multiply'd Three by Two, I have the Product Six; if I multiply Two by Three, I shall have again Six; and it is all one to say Two times Three, or, Three times Two, make Six. The Sense of the Proposition is understood: The Truth of it is acknowledged in that Example, to which some others are added, and the same Proposition is still verified; and, lastly, we rather chuse to suppose that it will be so in all other Examples, than to go on with them *in infinitum*.

BUT, that an Example may prove the Truth of an universal Proposition, one must be sure that whatever is laid down in that Example, and by vertue of which one concludes, will necessarily be found in all others. Thus, after having drawn in a Circle a Line through the Center, and another Line which does not pass through the Center, I plainly see 'tis impossible there should ever be any Circle, in which I cannot do the same; at least in Thought. I see with the same Evidence, that in each of those Circles, one may always draw two *Radius's* from the Center to the Extremities of the Line different from the Diameter; from whence it plainly appears, that all the Inferences from those Principles will also prove true in all Circles.

IX. WHEN a Man does easily find out Comparisons, 'tis sometimes a Sign of a great Extent of Mind. Besides, some Vivacity and Penetration are requisite to discover in one Subject some Attributes like those of another Subject, which, at first, seems to be quite different from it. Moreover, one must have a *Justness* of Thought to borrow from the one, something that

A great Quantity of Comparisons is frequently a Sign of a superficial Wit.

that may clear the other. But a great Quantity of Comparisons is also frequently a Sign of a *superficial Wit*. For, because the same Idea may be apply'd to Subjects so much the more different, as it is more indeterminate, those, who consider Things only in general, confusedly and lightly, those whose Ideas are neither exact nor determinate, do not perceive the Differences of Things, being only affected with their Equality. And those superficial Wits dwell the more upon Comparisons, and make them the more frequently, because they are amusing, and afford Pleasure; without tiring the Mind, and requiring any great Attention.

IT is very dangerous to be too fond of Comparisons and Figures: Such an Inclination makes a false Wit. A Man too eager in the Search of Resemblances is apt to see in Objects whatever is in his Imagination. There are but too many Men, who, when they venture to Reason, are like those who fancy they see any Thing in the Clouds. That Illusion, carried to the highest Degree, makes mad Men. He, who takes the Trunk of a Tree for a Man, and embraces it as an intimate Friend, is certainly out of his Senses: Wherefore a Man departs from Reason and Wisdom, when he admits of false Resemblances. Which being so, may not one fear to spoil the Taste of young People, by requiring from them Exercises, the greatest Part of which runs upon *Similitudes*, before they have got a sufficient Knowledge to make them just? Thus Masters put off teaching the Youth how to think well, till they have spoiled them, by using them to speak and write, without understanding frequently what they say, or what they write down. They fancy they do wonderful Things by discovering to them great Truths, both Physical and Moral, concealed under the Cover of Metamorphoses and Fables, written by a loose Poet to indulge his Imagination. Afterwards young People bring the same Notions into Religion; they give out groundless Conjectures for venerable Mysteries. They admire their own Dreams, and cry out: O Wonders! O Depth! Some People are surpris'd that among Men of Letters some should have so little Sense: They should rather wonder how they come to have any Sense at all, having had an Education so contrary to common Sense.

Argumenta à Simili.

Conclusions from more to less, or from less to more.

X. WHEN a Comparison runs upon *more* or *less*, the Argument goes either from more to less, or from less to more. In some Cases those Arguments are true; but in other Cases they have no Strength. Here follow the Rules: I look upon *Less* as a *Part*, and upon *More* as a *Whole*. If the Whole is not sufficient, a Part will be insufficient; but a Part may want a Force, to be found in the Whole. Reciprocally, if a Part is sufficient, much more the Whole; though one cannot conclude from the Sufficiency of the Whole to that of a Part. Thus in *denying*, I go from more to less; and in *affirming*, I go from less to more.

BUT those Conclusions have no Place in those Effects, which do not depend upon the sole Quantity, but upon the *Dose*, that is, upon the Quantity reduced to a certain Proportion. Most Effects in Nature depend upon a certain Proportion between the Causes which produce them, and the Disposition of the Subjects which receive them. When that Proportion is altered, the Effect ceases, or does extremely vary (*r*). The most useful Causes become pernicious, when they are not confined within a certain Medium. Too great a Heat, and too much Rain, are equally prejudicial to Plants and their Fruits: Too much, as well as too little Nourishment spoils the Health: He, who eats too much, oppresses his Strength; and he, who does not eat sufficiently, suffers it to be exhausted. A wise Man governs himself by fixed Proportions from which he does not depart; but such a Wisdom is uncommon. Most Men run always into some Extreme: The avoiding of two Extremes requires too great an Attention: Every Body almost indulges his Humour, and Humour over-does every Thing (*s*). One Man is liberal, and

(*r*) "The Quantity ought frequently to be so precise, that if it be missed never so little, the Operation will be quite different from that which was intended." *Mém. of the Acad. of Sciences, for the Year 1699.* p. 69. See also the *History for the Year 1700*, p. 61. "The Virtue of the *Ypccacuanha* must needs consist not in the Quantity of its active Principles, but in a certain Dose; for the Brown has fewer saline and refinous Particles than the Gray, and yet it works more violently."

(*s*) "To that Purpose the Antients say, *Ne quid nimis*: And Solomon, *There is a Time to laugh, and a Time to weep; a Time to be silent, and a Time to speak; a Time to get, and a Time to lose.*" *Eccl. Chap. iii.* "A Man would have often pleased others, if he had not been so fond of pleasing them; and a Discourse would have appeared more beautiful, if the Author had not beautified it too much."

and being well pleas'd with the Notion of his Generosity, squanders away his Estate. Another is hard, or timorous; he loves to keep what he has, and minds nothing but getting and denying. The Pleasures of this World, violent Passions, and a continual Hurry, draw Men from the Way to Heaven. Whereupon, in order to avoid the Allurements of Pleasures, and the Violence of Passions, some fancy their Life can never be too austere, nor too remote from the Commerce of Men: Others, to whom such a Retirement appears neither necessary nor reasonable, launch into the World, and live in it, as if a Man was so much the more rational, as he is more worldly.

MEDITATION increases the Justness, Strength, and Capacity of the Mind. Some are only for meditating, and will read nothing; and yet Reading enriches the Memory, and affords a great many Things, which would not be discover'd without much Labour; it enlarges the Imagination, and by offering various Characters, it may hinder a Man from growing too fond of his own. Some, on the contrary, will not meditate: They are only for reading; whereby their Minds become weak and barren, and often incapable of any Discernment. Every Body might do what he does, if he did something else.

XI. WHENEVER two Things are to be compared together, and their Comparison ought to run upon more or less, it is necessary that those two Things should be of the same Kind, and as like as possible, and so that they should only differ in Degrees. Otherwise it will be difficult to find a common Measure to determine the more, or the less; and there will arise Disputes, whereby the Question will only be more and more perplex'd. Nothing can be more necessary than that Rule; and nothing can be more neglected than its Observation. It is not only ridiculous to dispute about the several Degrees of quite different Subjects, as, for instance, whether *Cæsar* was a greater Captain, than *Cicero* a great Orator (t); but, in like Cases, when

A necessary Caution, when a Comparison runs upon more or less.

(t) " Father *Vauvassour* did very much exclaim against a Thought of Father *Rapin*, who seem'd to raise the Genius of a great Poet above that of a General of an Army, and of a Minister of State. That Thought was censur'd with a great Vivacity; and Mr. *Bernard* observes very judiciously upon that Quarrel, that any Body

when they are compounded, (and indeed they are all so,) it is necessary to compare a Part with another Part, and not a Whole with a Whole. I shall therefore compare, when the Question is about two Orators, the Strength of the Voice of the one, with the Strength of the Voice of the other: Afterwards, I shall compare the Purity of the Diction of the first, with the Purity of the Diction of the second; and so I shall successively run over the several Characters, which contribute to make an Orator esteem'd (*u*).

PERHAPS that Rule is never more grossly transgressed, than when a Man compares himself with others. He sees in others some Qualities, which he has not, or which he has only in a very inferior Degree; and he finds also in himself some Qualities, which are not eminent in others. But it is very difficult to make a right Estimation and an exact Comparison of Qualities of a different Nature. Men do not trouble

“ will be at first offended at a Parallel between a great Poet and a great
 “ General of an Army, or a great Minister of State,
 Nouv. dela Rep. “ because the Genius of both of them is grounded upon
 des Lett. Febr. “ quite different Qualities. A Hero may have a
 1710. p. 131. “ sufficient Extent of Mind to form great Designs,
 “ and a sufficient Courage to execute them, with-
 “ out being able to represent them well, for want of a happy Ex-
 “ pression, and a copious Imagination.”

(*u*) Et auribus multa percipimus, quæ etsi nos vocibus delectant, tamen ita sunt varia sæpè, ut id, quod proximum audias, jucundissimum esse videatur, & oculis colliguntur penè innumerabiles voluptates, quæ non ita capiunt, ut unum sensum dissimili genere delectent, & reliquos sensus voluptates oblectent dispares, ut sit difficile judicium excellentis maximè suavitatis. At hoc idem, quod est in naturis rerum, transferri etiam potest ad artes. Una fingendi est ars, in quâ præstantes fuerunt Myro, Polycletus, Lyfippus, qui omnes inter se dissimiles fuerunt, sed ita tamen, ut neminem sui velis esse dissimilem. Una est ars ratioque picturæ, dissimillimique tamen inter se Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles: neque eorum quisquam est, cui quicquam in arte suâ deesse videatur: & si hoc in his, quasi mutis artibus, est mirandum, & tamen verum; quantò admirabilius in oratione atque in linguâ, quæ cum in iisdem sententiis verbisque versetur, summas habet dissimilitudines, non sic, ut alii vituperandi sint, sed ut ii, quos constet esse laudandos, in dispari tamen genere laudentur. ----- Suavitatem Isocrates, subtilitatem Lylas, acumen Hyperides, sonitum Æschines, vim Demosthenes habuit, quis eorum non egregius? tamen quis cujusquam nisi sui similis? Gravitatem Africanus, lenitatem Lælius, asperitatem Galba, profluens quiddam habuit Corbo, & canorum, quis horum non princeps temporibus illis fuit, & suo tamen quisque in genere princeps?

trouble themselves with it; and without any Hesitation, they decide in Favour of themselves.

CONVERSATIONS frequently run upon Comparisons; and because the Rule I have just now mentioned is commonly neglected, 'tis no wonder if Misunderstandings prevail in Conversations, and if the latter, generally speaking, serve only to amuse idle People. Men are weary of Disputing, before they perceive that they spoke all the while without Understanding one another.

A COMPARISON cannot run upon more different Subjects than when Finite is compared with Infinite; and therein consists the following Sophism. 'Tis supposed that *Achilles* can go a hundred Feet, whilst a Tortoise goes one Foot. This being laid down, 'tis said that *Achilles* will never overtake the Tortoise; for during a time *Achilles* will go a hundred Feet, and the Tortoise one. During the hundredth Part of a Time *Achilles* will go one Foot, and the Tortoise only the hundredth Part of one Foot. During the hundredth Part of that hundredth Part, *Achilles* will go the hundredth Part of one Foot, and the Tortoise the ten thousandth Part. They go on with that Progression, and *Achilles* is always found behind the Tortoise.

THE Sophism of that Argument proceeds exactly from hence, that in a Comparison, which runs upon more and less, two Things are compared together, which are the most improper to be compared in that Sense, *viz.* Finite with Infinite. A part of Extension is Finite in one Sense; for it has, on the right Hand, for instance, a Surface, beyond which it does not reach, and it is likewise terminated by another Surface on the left. But, between those two Extremities, it may be divided into two equal Parts, one of which may be also divided into two others, and so on. That Division may be continued without any End; and in that Respect a Part of Extension is infinite, that is, a last Term cannot be assigned to it. The same ought to be said of Time. A Minute begins and ends. Its Beginning follows immediately and without any interruption the End of a foregoing Minute; and its end is in like manner followed, immediately and without Interruption, by the Beginning of the next Minute. That Minute, being thus placed between two Terms, is divided into equal Times; one of which is also divided into two others; and a last Term cannot be assigned to that Division. Time runs continually; and between the Beginning and End of each Part of it there is a Middle.

A FINITE Space of Extension is run over during a Time, which is also Finite; and that Part of Extension, which is divided without End, is run over during a Time; which is also divided without End, and proportionally. Thus without any Sophism, Finite may be compared with Finite, and also Infinite with Infinite.

BUT when the Question is to compare a Body in Motion with another Body, the Motion whereof is ten Times, or a hundred Times slower; when the Question is to know where the one will overtake the other; those Questions run upon Finite. Infinite ought not come into them.

SINCE the Tortoise goes one Foot, whilst *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet, the Tortoise will go $\frac{1}{99}$ Parts of a Foot, whilst *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet and $\frac{1}{99}$ of a Foot. For $100 \cdot 1. :: 100 \times \frac{1}{99} = \frac{100}{99} = 1 \frac{1}{99}$. Wherefore *Achilles*, at the End of a certain Moment, overtakes the Tortoise, and will begin to out-run it. Now if *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet in one Minute, he will go a hundred Feet and $\frac{1}{99}$ of a Foot in one Minute, and the ninety ninth Part of one Minute; so that at the End of that Time, that is, at the End of one Minute, and the ninety ninth Part of one Minute, the two Bodies in Motion happen to be upon the same Line. They will not stop there; for the End of a Time has no Duration. Between the Moment of their Arrival at that Line, and the Moment of their Departure from it, there will be no Interval; but one of them will leave its Line or Surface a hundred Times more swiftly than the other; and at the End of one Minute, *Achilles* will be ninety nine Feet distant from the Tortoise.

XII. WHEN I say, that the same Idea, which
Identity. discovers to us one of two like Things, discovers also the other, it is not necessary to suppose that Ideas are Pictures, and that one of those Pictures represent many like Objects. 'Tis enough that the same Form, the same State of the Thought may be applied indifferently to any of several like Objects, and that the Mind continuing in the same Way of Thinking may successively know many Attributes, represented by that constant Manner of perceiving.

THE Reader will apprehend more distinctly what to continue in the same Way of Thinking is, if I explain the Force of that Term, and the Nature of *Identity*. 'Tis a Subject proper for this Chapter. We frequently say of like Things, that they are the same; and Identity is a kind of Relation, which results from the Comparison of a Thing with it self.
We

We say, it remains the same, when at different Times we always find it like, and conceive it a second Time such as it was known to us the first Time.

WANT of Exactness in the Language of Men leads us continually into Error, when we make it the Rule of our Ideas. Sometimes Things are multiplied, because they have different Names; and at other Times, very different Things are confounded together, because they have but one Name: This is what happens with respect to Identity.

SOMETIMES *to remain the same*, signifies to continue to exist. In that Sense, I say the Universe is now the same, as it was two thousand Years ago, that is, the Universe, which did exist two thousand Years ago, has not been annihilated, and another created in the room of it. I, who did exist twenty Years ago, do still exist. I was a Being, and I have continued to be a Being to this Day. I was a self-conscious Being twenty Years ago, and I am still a self-conscious Being; I know that my Self-consciousness remains still among a great Variety of other Sentiments, which lead me to the Knowledge of outward Objects.

THOSE Ideas are simple: They ought not to be perplexed. The same ought to be said of Modes. The Roundness of a Wax-Ball, which has not been altered, remains the same: That round Wax is still round Wax. The Substance remains still the same, whilst it is a Substance, that is, whilst it has a separate Existence, whilst its Existence is not the Existence of any other Thing, or, which comes to the same, whilst it is what it is, and not something different from it self: And consequently a Substance remains the same, whilst it does exist; for it would cease to exist, if it should cease to be a Substance. And a Mode remains the same, whilst its Substance exists in the same State.

THIS leads us to the second Sense of the Word *Identity*. A Thing is said to be no longer the same, because it has undergone some Alteration, though it continues to exist, and be still a Substance; and reciprocally it is accounted the same, because it has preserved its Modes without any Alteration. But it ought to be observed that a Substance, having many Modes, may lose some and preserve others; and therefore it is affirmed or denied to be still the same, according as it is considered with respect to those it has lost, or to those it retains still.

SENECA makes a Sophistical Argument (*x*), by composing it of the different Significations of the Word, the Ambiguity whereof I have just now removed. To ease a Man's Grief for the Loss of his Friends, he represents to him that other Friends may be got. *But they will not be the same. You are not the same neither,* says he; *You change continually.* When a Man complains that new Friends do not succeed those, whom he has lost, it is not because they are not of the same Humour and the same Age, and have not the same Degree of Health: These are the Changes we undergo. But we do not become other individual Men, as new Friends are individual Men different from the old ones.

WHEN the Alterations of a Thing are not sensible, it is thought to remain the same, because those Alterations are not observed; which happens, when they are made by Degrees. Thus a Boat, mended every Year, is accounted the same Boat that was launched a hundred Years ago; and a River is said to be same, because its Chanel is not altered, and because the new Water makes continually the like Impression upon the Senses, as that which did run before. A Senate is always accounted the same, because we forget the Changes made in it by degrees, and because we continually perceive that the Senators have the same Rights, and the same Authority.

C H A P.

(*x*) Quemadmodum frondium jactura facilis est, quia renascuntur: sic istorum quos amas, quosque oblectamenta vitæ putas esse, dampnum: quia reparantur, etiam si non renascantur. Sed non erunt iidem. Ne tu quidem idem eris; omnis dies, omnis hora te mutat: sed in aliis rapina facilius apparet: hic latet, quia non ex aperto fit. Alii auferuntur: at ipsi nobis furto subducimur. *Sen. Ep. CIV.*

What we read in Montagne, Book II. Chap. 12. is also a Heap of Equivocations, and consequently of false Thoughts. "He, who borrowed some Money heretofore, does not owe it now; and he, who was invited last Night to come to Dinner this Morning, comes to Day uninvited; for, they are no longer the same, but other Men. - - - Yesterday dies in this present Day; and this present Day will die in the next: And there is nothing that remains still the same. - - - It is not likely that we should have new Passions without a Change; and what undergoes a Change, does not remain the same, and consequently does not exist, Wherefore the Senses are mistaken, and deceive us, taking what appears for what exists. - - -

The same happens to Nature, which is measured by Time, as to "Time, that measures it; for there is nothing in it that remains and subsists; but every Thing is either born, or really to be born, or dying".



C H A P. IV.

Of the Relations of Diversity.



WHEN the Idea we form of an Object, cannot discover to us another Object, which we compare with it, those two Objects are said to be *different*, or *unlike*.

Wherein Diversity consists.

Each of them is represented by its Idea; and the Idea of the one, cannot be the Idea of the other.

II. WHEN two Things, notwithstanding their Difference, are found in one and the same Subject, they are only called *diverse*, *different*, *unlike*, and retain the general Name.

There are different sorts of Diversity.

Thus in one and the same Person there is Learning and Probity; in one and the same Body there is Figure and Motion: But when the Difference goes as far as Inconsistency; when two Attributes cannot subsist together in one and the same Subject, but exclude one another; when one of them does necessarily suppose the Absence of the other; we conceive between them a Relation of *Opposition* and *Contrariety*.

III. SOMETIMES Diversity is over-stretched, and carried as far as Opposition; and sometimes Contrariety is only called *Unlikeness*. Philosophers are divided in their Explications

Which are confounded together.

of a Phœnomenon; and it frequently happens that each of them thinks well, without thinking of every Thing; and that he sees part of the Truth, and not the whole Truth. They should therefore agree, instead of opposing one another: Their Mistake consists in this, That each of them believes he is the only one who has hit upon the Truth (a). One says, That *Heat* is occasioned by a confused Motion; Another

(a) "When the Matter is narrowly examined, the two Opinions are found to be True, unless they should pretend to exclude one another." *History of the Academy of Sciences, for the Year 1700.* pag. 37.

Another pretends it consists in the Rotation of the small Corpuscles, which compose the large-Masses, or are scattered in them. Each of those Causes may contribute to Heat; for those Motions are different; but they are not opposite. Saline and Sulphurous Particles may chiefly contribute to Savour and Smell; and all the other Particles, which are neither Saline nor Sulphurous, may also produce such Effects. There has been a warm Dispute about this Question; Whether *Digestion* is performed by a mere Trituration, or by Fermentation, or by the Activity of the Spirits. Each of the Disputants proves his Opinion well enough, without destroying the Opinion of the other. They may be united; and it seems to me that Digestion is owing to those different Causes.

ONE ascribes to Acids, and another to fiery Particles, the Power of making Drunk, and Rotting. Those two Causes may produce those Effects. A red-hot Iron, put into Oil, at several Times, loses its fiery Particles as well as its Acids. The same ought to be said of the other Preparations, whereby it is soften'd.

IN the Conduct of Life, and the Judgments made of other Men, we commit a thousand like Mistakes. A Man is Polite; 'tis inferred from thence that he wants Sincerity. He is Gay and Complaisant; and therefore he is accounted a worldly Man. Because he is cautious, he is charged with want of Zeal and Courage. Laziness goes by the Name of Modesty; and a careful Examination is looked upon as Presumption and Uneasiness. Men go generally from *one Extreme to another*. Every thing appears to them Great or Small, highly Valuable, or very Contemptible. A Man does not shew all the Probity, that was expected from him; he is therefore an ill Man, a Man of no Principles, no Conscience. He has not cleared a certain Point to our Satisfaction: He is an ignorant Man (b).

THIS is one of the main Causes of *Superstition*. Indifferent Actions are not so bright as Virtues; and therefore they are placed among Vices. To spend Part of one's Time in Recreations, to love the Pleasures of the Senses, even when the Use of our Senses is necessary, is, in the Judgment of some, to be a *carnal Man*, and not a *spiritual Man*, to live like a Beast, and not like a Christian, and consequently to depart from God and the Happiness of Eternal Life.

(b) Non statim pusillum est, si quid maximo minus est. *Sen.*

Life. But can a rational Man think that a good and wise God is displeas'd with us, when we live agreeably to the Nature he has given us; and that our Actions are not acceptable to him, unless they be attended with painful Duties? Difference is confounded with Inconsistency; which is very wrong. A Man may be a Philosopher, and eat at a good Table; he may be a Philosopher and a Father; unless we suppose that Wisdom destroys human Nature in this Life, and changes it into the Nature of Angels. According to that Hypothesis, (I desire the Readers to mind this Observation,) what would Justice and Charity come to, which God does so much recommend to us? They would procure or preserve good Things, which it would not be lawful to enjoy. A good Man desires that his loose Son should be reclaim'd from his Vices. His Son, at last, not only gives over his Mistresses, and leaves off Drinking, but grows insensible to every Thing. He has no Pleasure at his Father's Table, no Fondness for his Wife and Children. Must a Man, in order to please God, take a Course of Life, which a rational Man cannot approve?

IN Point of Religion, if instead of dooming and condemning unmercifully one's Neighbour to everlasting Punishments, Men would be so charitable as to believe that others may think upon some Articles otherwise than themselves, without being undone by it, their Opinions would be more quietly examined; and it would frequently appear that the Notions of Christians are different without being contrary; that there is a greater Opposition between their Words than between their Ideas; and consequently that their Divisions proceed chiefly from the ill Humour of the leading Men, whose Authority draws the Multitude after them.

VIRTUE is preferable to Riches, Honours, and Pleasures; and therefore Pleasures, Honours, and Riches, are set in Opposition to it. To make that Opposition greater, 'tis affirmed that those Advantages have no manner of Affinity with Virtue. We are told that Virtue is the only Good. Nothing else deserves that Name. But if it be so, when a Man is stripp'd, since what is taken from him is, properly speaking, of no Value, and he only loses what is neither good nor bad, what Harm does he suffer? What Reason can he have to complain?

THE Stoicks made it their Business to strain that Opposition. *I don't complain, says Seneca, because Pleasures are preferred to Virtue: I complain, because they are set on the same Level: 'Tis an Indignity which I cannot bear.* Virtue

is an irreconcilable Enemy to Pleasures : It despises them ; it cannot bear them (c).

ON the contrary, Men undertake sometimes to reconcile those Things, that are the most inconsistent ; which is the Cause of so many Contradictions they fall into. They ascribe to material Beings, Inclinations and Reluctancies inconsistent with their Insensibility and Want of Knowledge. One Man ascribes to a blind Cause the wisest Order and Contrivance : Another entertains such Ideas of God, as overthrow his Goodness, his Equity, or some other of his Perfections : And a great many People fancy they are in the right Way, notwithstanding their Indulgence for several Habits quite contrary to the Purity and Uprightness of the Heart. Interest and other Passions do not allow Men to perceive the Force of an Opposition ; and they are contented to look upon it as an inconsiderable Difference.

IV. ALL those Mistakes proceed from the same Cause. Men do not take a sufficient Care to have right Notions of Things. Instead of dwelling upon those which they desire to know as long as they should do, to be able to judge of them, they are contented to take a cursory View of them ; and then they suppose they are only what they would have them to be ; either opposite, if they like it so ; or consistent, and only different, if it suits best with their Inclination : And after they have given them a Name, they rest satisfied with it, as if it was a certain and infallible Mark. From that Time, Things are what they have thought fit to call them.

WHEREFORE we ought, in the first Place, to form clear and right Notions ; and then by comparing them attentively, it will not be difficult to know whether one of them implies the Exclusion of the other. If they do not exclude one another, the Attributes which they offer, may be united in one and the same Subject ; but if one excludes the other, they are opposite ; they cannot be reconciled. *An Angle* does not imply *Motion* ; but it does not exclude it : Therefore one and the same Subject may be pointed, and in Motion.

(c) Non indignor, quòd post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quòd omninò cum voluptate confertur. Contemprix ejus & hostis est, & longissimè ab illa resiliens, labori ac dolori familiarior, virilibus incommodis, quàm isti effœminato bono inferenda. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. IV. cap. 3.*

Motion. An *Angle* excludes *Roundness*: Therefore a Circle has no Angles. *Thought* is necessarily self-conscious; for, it would not be Thought, if it was not self-conscious. Therefore Thought can be nothing, That is not self-conscious: Its Idea excludes every Thing that does not perceive it self; and consequently it is no *extended* Thing; for, Extension can be perceived by Thought, but it does not perceive and know it self. If Thought was a Mode and a State of Extension, Extension, which is not self-conscious, would be in a perceiving State: Its Mode or its State would be self-conscious, but Extension would not be self-conscious; and yet the Mode and State of a Thing, is the Thing it self. The State is the Thing it self; the State knows it self; and the Thing, whereof it is the State, does not know it self. This implies an Exclusion, and a Contrariety. The Union of Thought, with Extension, is therefore chimerical.

IF we are willing to speak accurately, we ought not to say that Men join together inconsistent Ideas; for then such a Conjunction would be possible. Those Ideas therefore would not be inconsistent, and one of them would not necessarily exclude the other. But Men suppose such a Conjunction without apprehending it; and then they give a *Name* to that pretended Conjunction; and after they have given it, especially when it is grown familiar to them, they rely upon it with the same Assurance as upon common Notions. That Name, upon which they dwell, is the pretended *Knot*, which they suppose to join together Notions that cannot be united.

MEN easily fall into those Contradictions about Matters, which they do not understand sufficiently, or about which they express themselves in an extraordinary Language; for then they suppose that certain Words agree in the Sense, though the Signification of the one overthrows the Signification of the other. For instance, when a Man says that Accidents are real Entities, which have a separate Existence from that of the Substance, but cannot subsist without being supported by it, the Contradiction of that obscure Language is not obvious; and a Man frequently rather chuses to grant the Thing, than to give himself the Trouble to examine it.

FOLLY consists in making such chimerical Conjunctions, and WISDOM in avoiding it. A Man is so much the more affected with Folly, as the Things he joins together in his Brain, are more remote. When the Error of those Conjunctions

junctions is obvious to the Senses, those who make them are accounted mad Men. Such would be the Extravagance of a Man, who should speak to Trees, and believe they answer him. But when the Mistake is not so plain, those who fall into it, are only accounted *Visionaries*. There are many sorts of them, according as the Folly of their Supposition may be discovered with more or less Difficulty; and whoever is mistaken, may be said to be a Visionary in some measure, since he fancies to see what he does not see.

THE Imagination of young People is often spoiled, and they are prepared for *Fanaticism*, when their Masters affect to appear ingenious, and to shew their Abilities by discovering in those Authors whom they explain a Sense, which surprises by its Novelty, or its Sublimity, or its Delicacy, and in general, because it is very remote from the literal Sense, and the Subject of the Author. It is a dangerous Thing for a Man to be fond of his Thoughts, when he believes he sees what he does not see, and pretends to find out Resemblances and Connexions, without any Ground for it.

FOLLY is contagious; and that Contagion is the more dangerous, because a Man does not believe he is sick, if he is not more sick than others. When an Opinion is once taken up, out of Deference to those who propose it, though it be never so chimerical, it will be respectfully entertained, to avoid a painful Examination, or out of Fear of bringing ones self into Trouble. *Time justifies* it every Day; and the Number of those who believe it, supplies its want of Evidence, and the Weakness of the Proofs it is grounded upon. At length, one dares not so much as doubt of it, for fear of being accounted a ridiculous Man; for Wisdom appears an Extravagance to those who have a settled Folly. If all the Inhabitants of a Country should fancy that they are become Negroes, or that their Heads are like those of Birds; and if a Stranger should come and tell them that they are White, and have human Heads; they would look upon him as a mad Man: In like manner, when an Opinion, though never so extravagant, is conveyed from the Head of a Man of Letters, who has a great Interest, into the Heads of great Men, and of the Multitude, it can be no longer attack'd, without being accounted a rash Disputant, and frequently an Infidel, and being exposed to the dreadful Consequences of that reproachful Language.

MEN are only mistaken in their Arguments, because they ground them upon false Suppositions, which they take to be Principles

Principles of an undeniable Truth; and those Suppositions run upon a pretended Conjunction of inconsistent Ideas, which destroy one another, and are only a Heap of Contradictions. It is therefore highly necessary to mind carefully the Relations of Opposition, and to have right Notions of them.

V: OPPOSITION is never more sensible, *Contradiction*. than when the Affirmation of one Term is compared with the Negation of that same Term: Being, not Being; Luminous, not Luminous; Thinking, not Thinking; Extended, not Extended: This is called a *contradictory Opposition*.

'TIS plain, it admits of no Medium, and that every Thing, which does not belong to the first Term, ought to be placed in the Class of the second. What exists, and is *not extended*, is a *Being without Extension*; and reciprocally, every Thing, which is *not without Extension*, is an *extended Being*. Whilst we go no farther, we cannot be mistaken.

BUT because the *Negative* Term affords no Idea by it self, and shews only what the second Member of the Opposition is not, without teaching what it is; after we have made a Division, which takes in every Thing, and leaves no Medium, we seek what ought to be placed in the Class of the Negative Term; and then we begin to use other Words. In the room of the Negation we put a *positive* Term, to which we annex a positive Idea; but in doing this, it may easily happen, that this new Term will have a lesser Extent, than that in the room of which it has been put; and consequently we shall forget something in the Change of the Division, and limit its Extent.

WHEN I divide the Line into *Strait* and *Not Strait*, and call the Line not strait a *Curve*, I preserve the whole Extent of my Division. But after I have divided the Curve into *Regular* and *Not Regular*, if I place under the Regular the *Circle*, the *Ellipsis*, the *Hyperbola*, and the *Parabola*, and under the Irregular all the others, I may forget some Members, and I do so. Thus again, when I say that *Substance* is *extended*, or *not extended*, I leave out nothing; but if I add that the Substance not extended is *God*, the *human Soul*, and the *Intelligences* like our Souls, perhaps the Substances, not extended, may, and ought to be placed under a greater Number of Classes. I think all the Actions of *Animals* are easily explained by supposing they have a *Soul* capable of *some Ideas* of material Things, of *Sensations* and *Passions*, without *Reflection*. Because they do not reflect,

nor proceed, at their own Choice, from one Idea to another, they are not liable to Distractions; but they do not improve themselves by Reasoning. Being wholly taken up with one Idea, they follow it immediately; for they cannot be diverted from it. A Bee, a Castor, are necessitated to follow a small Number of Ideas, with which they are entirely taken up.

A MAN is necessarily Generous, or not Generous: But if I am contented to call the Man not Generous a covetous Man, I confine to one Vice a Name which implies many other Vices. In like manner, there is a Difference between not learned and ignorant, between zealous and indifferent, between not laborious and lazy. Men *strain* Things continually: When they indulge their Humour, they make a positive Term as extensive as a Negative one.

THERE is nothing more easy than to be mistaken in making contradictory Oppositions; and there is nothing more common than those Mistakes, when the Terms, by which those Oppositions are expressed, happen to be *equivocal*, because their Signification is sometimes extended, and sometimes restrained. Such are the contradictory Oppositions between the Words Piety and Not Piety, Honest Man and Dishonest Man, Commendable and Not Commendable. There are some Men, to whom the Contempt of some trifling Things, for which they have a Respect, appears a Piece of Ungodliness: Others, on the contrary, will do, without any Scruple, whatever is not contrary to the imperfect Notion they have of an Honest Man. Lastly, others fancy that a Man disapproves and condemns whatever he does not think fit to commend.

WHILST the Division proceeds by contradictory Parts, it is *full*, and leaves out nothing. The Omission and Mistake happen only, when the negative Term is changed into a positive one; and consequently a Man ought to be cautious in making that Change; and if he will omit nothing, he must carry contradictory Divisions and Subdivisions as far as he can.

VI. SINCE a contradictory Opposition is the most obvious of all Oppositions, in order to know whether two Terms, both of them positive, are truly inconsistent, one must see whether one of them can be changed into a negative one; for when two Ideas cannot be united, one of them does always exclude the other; and that which is excluded, may be expressed negatively. *Angular and Round* is

*The Usefulness
of these Opposi-
tions.*

is *Angular* and *Not Angular* : *Rest* and *Motion*, is *Rest* and *No Motion* : *Thought* and *Extension* is what is *Self-conscious*, and what is *Not Self-conscious*. By this Method, a Man uses himself to see a Contrariety, and is no longer mistaken about it, by supposing a Conjunction of contrary Things.

WHEN Ideas are not thus expressed; as we do not so well perceive their Opposition, we are more apt to suppose that their Objects may agree; and therefore we invent Words to join them together, and we build upon those Suppositions. This is a great Cause of our Errors. We admit of a Contradiction, without being sensible of it, and upon the first Contradiction we build a great many more.

VII. I SHALL give an Instance of it, taken from the very Subject I am upon. It is a Query, whether *God can do contradictory Things*. He, who proposes that Question, does already contradict himself, and speaks without knowing what he says. I omit that in *God to act is to will*. Though his Power were distinct from his Will, yet 'tis certain it would only do what he wills; so that if God did a contradictory Thing he must will it, that is, he must will a Thing, and at the same Time will what is inconsistent with it, or, which comes to the same, he must not will it. To make, for instance, a Stick without two Ends, he must will a Thing with two Ends, and he must will the contrary. If he should command the Existence of a Stick, he must command the Existence of two Ends, and at the same Time he must not will it. To contradict oneself, is not an Effect of a Power: 'Tis an Imperfection infinitely remote from God, who is essentially wise, and does always perfectly agree with himself (d).

Whether we ought to ascribe to God a Power of doing contradictory Things.

HERE I cannot but wonder that Men should be so apt to follow blindly the Authority and Footsteps of a celebrated Author, and Head of a Sect. *Descartes*, to get off from the Objections of some People, answered, that he would not deny but God can do contradictory Things. His Followers

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(d) “ The Almighty Power of God can never confound, nor change the Essences of his Creatures. It cannot cause the same Creature to exist, and not to exist, at the same Time; a Mountain to be a Valley, whilst it is a Mountain; and a Circle to be a Circle and a Triangle. It cannot likewise leave the Free-Will of Man, and take it from him, nor bestow a Grace, which necessitates, and is not a necessitating Grace”. *Archbishop of Cambray. Past. Instr. Letter XIII.*

made an Aphorism of that equivocal Shift, and building upon a Principle that has no Sense in it, launched into metaphysical Enquiries about the Ideas of God, their Original, and the Possibility of the Existence of Things with a Nature, not only quite different from, but also quite opposite to what they have now. Those Men are *Cartesians* in the *Peripatetick* Way; they think it their Duty to admire *Descartes*, and to believe he was a wise and judicious Man in every Thing. Thus old Errors are revived, as well as old Fashions.

SOME Men have, by Degrees, entertained Opinions contrary to Nature and Reason. They have confirmed themselves in those monstrous Opinions, either by false Principles, with which they have been deluded, and for which they have a great Respect, or by a Spirit of Party. Being reduced to disbelieve what has been sacred to them from their early Years, or to maintain what they cannot free from Contradiction, they suspect at last, and then positively affirm, That the Divine Power may reconcile contradictory Things; that the eternal Being was so free in the Choice and Creation of Ideas, that if he had been willing, 6 and 9 would not make 15, and the three Angles of a Right-lined Triangle would not be equal to two Right ones. If they mean that God might have made no Triangle, and that if he had not been willing to produce the Idea of that Figure, it had never been true, that the three Angles of a Right-lined Triangle are equal to two Right ones, since a Right-lined Triangle would never have existed, not so much as in Thought; I am willing to grant it. I will also grant that God might have caused 6 and 9, added together, to go by the Name of 20, since Men themselves, who are Masters of Names and Signs, may make that Change whenever they please. But to say that the Idea of 6 Units and 9 Units, added together, might have been different from that which we express now by the Word 15, is to speak without minding what one says: 'Tis to say, that the Idea of 9 and 6 might have been different from the Idea of 9 and 6, since the Idea of 9 Units, added to 6 Units, differ from the Idea of 15 only in Name, and 'tis the same Thing at the bottom; for the Attributes of a Thing do not differ from the Thing it self, whereof they are Attributes. When I say that a Right-lined Triangle has the Property of containing three Angles equal to two Right ones, I say that a *Right-lined Triangle is exactly three Angles equal to two Right ones*; so that to pretend that those three Angles might have been greater or lesser than two Right ones, is to pretend

that a Triangle, being what it is, might be what it is not, unless it be said that God might have created a Nature different from a Triangle, which nevertheless would have been called a Triangle. But this would be a childish Thing under the Cover of a surprising Paradox.

VIII. WE ought not to be too hasty in *Seeming Con-* judging of the contradictory Opposition of *traditions.* Things; for, in order to infer such an Opposition, the Idea of the one must exclude the Idea of the other. We ought therefore carefully to compare those Ideas; and in order to do it exactly, they must be very clear and exact. We ought never to judge peremptorily of those Things that are unknown to us. Heat melts the Ice, and hardens the Dirt, two very contrary Effects. In order to know whether it be contradictory, that one and the same Cause should produce them, we ought to know the Nature of that Cause, and the Nature of the Subjects upon which it acts so differently. The celebrated Mr. *Locke* relates, very much to the purpose, a pleasant Story upon a like Subject. An *Asiatick* King fell into a Passion against a *Dutch* Ambassador, thinking he laughed at him, because he told him, that in our Climates cold hardens Rivers to such a Degree, that they can bear Waggon. The Imagination calls every Thing absurd, that escapes its Knowledge; but there is nothing truly absurd, but those Things in which the Understanding perceives a Repugnancy, when it compares together the clear Ideas of Words, the Conjunction whereof appears to it ridiculous.

WHILST the Objects we reflect upon, are not sufficiently known, the Contradiction we observe between them, may be only a seeming one; and we should run the Hazard of being mistaken, should we take it for a real Contradiction. We cannot affirm that it is such as it appears to be, before we know the Nature of the Things set in Opposition, that we may clearly see that one of them is excluded by the Idea of the other. It would be as great a Rashness to suppose Contradictions in unknown Subjects, as Folly to reject no Contradiction at all, under pretence that our Minds are limited.

FOR fear of speaking of God undecently, and ascribing Contradictions to him, we ought to be very cautious about Questions importing, whether such and such a Thing be an Object of his Almighty Power; and we must know those Things, before we answer those Questions; otherwise, any Absurdity will appear possible by such a Method. It is there-

fore a *Sophism* to say, *There may be Atoms, there may be a Vacuum; for God can do both. His infinite Power can make Machines, that will perfectly imitate whatever Choice and Liberty can do.* I have no Idea of it; and I shall take care not to affirm it.

ONE ought to be the more cautious upon that Head, because the Power ascribed to God, about contradictory Things, affords the Atheists a Pretence to deny his Omnipotency, and call it a Chimera.

Diversity and Opposition are of Use to clear a Subject.

IX. IN order to clear a Subject, we frequently begin with the Exposition of its Contrary. The Knowledge of Rest leads to the Knowledge of Motion: The Calamities of War set off the sweets of Peace. The Light, which one of the Contraries receives from the other, is grounded upon two Things: 1. Variety raises the Attention; for we are generally less sensible of those Things we are used to. 'Tis for this Reason we ought to reflect upon the Inconveniencies of Anarchy, in order to know the Usefulness of the Laws. 2. In the same Order that the Attributes of one of the Contraries are known, in that same Order the Attributes of the other are considered, by seeking in them opposite Characters. The Manner of that Enquiry makes the Success of it more easy.

BUT because two Things may be opposite, without being contrary in all Respects, great Care ought to be taken not to multiply Contrarieties without any Reason. *Health, for instance, is contrary to Sickness: Health is of some Use; therefore Sickness is of no Use.* It does not follow. Each of them is a real State, and a Subject proper for Reflections: They are alike in that Respect, notwithstanding their Opposition. We ought to know exactly wherein consists the Contrariety of two Subjects, in order to draw about one of them, Inferences contrary to what has been discovered in the other; and we must ascribe to them neither opposite Causes, nor opposite Effects, but in that Sense wherein they are contrary.

IT appears from thence, that the famous *Canon of Contraries* is a useless Rule. Two Things are supposed to be contrary: A certain Attribute is observed in one of them; therefore, by the Rule of Contraries, the other has an Attribute quite opposite. But, to be sure of the Justness of that Conclusion, one should be sure that the two Objects, supposed to be contrary, are really so in that Sense, wherein a Conclusion is drawn from the Attribute of the one to the opposite Attribute of the other. In order to know it,

it, both of them ought to be well examined; and when they are well known, the Argument, taken from the Rule of Contraries, to make them known, becomes needless; and 'tis no longer necessary to argue, in order to know what is already well known. An excessive Cold is the Cause of Death: Therefore an excessive Heat would restore Life. This is not a true Consequence, because Heat, merely as Heat, does not give Life, but as it is confined within certain Bounds and a certain Sphere of Activity. Wherefore to judge of that Conclusion, one must know wherein Life consists; in what manner Heat contributes to Life, and how far Cold is contrary to it. But when those Things are known, there is no need of arguing any more.

MATTER is a condensed Extension: Therefore the Mind is a rarified Extension. Those two Substances ought to be known, in order to be compared together; and when they are known, perhaps a Man will not make that Argument, which is, besides, unintelligible.

WHEN two Things are set in Opposition to raise the Excellency of the one above the other, it frequently happens that Men look upon what is only *inferior in some Respects*, as *inferior in all Respects*. Thus every body admires the Science he professes; and other Sciences appear to him inconsiderable: But he is ready to speak another Language, as soon as a better Occasion moves him to teach what he spoke of with so great a Contempt. Thus again, an Orator, according as he is acted by Prejudices or Interests, sees nothing but Happiness in the Nation he designs to commend, and nothing but Misery every where else. Again, to set off the Advantages of Rich People, in Opposition to the sad Circumstances of the *Poor*, the latter are, in a manner, made to believe, that they may be *Lazy and Fraudulent*; and that they are never sufficiently indemnified for the hard Unequality they have been reduced to by the Unhappiness of their Birth. Again, by magnifying the *Happiness* of good Men in this Life, in Opposition to the Troubles of the Wicked, the Argument taken from the Prosperity of the latter, and the Tryals of the former, to prove the Necessity of a future Judgment, loses its whole Strength.

THAT Method of arguing from the Rule of Contraries has something plausible in it, and therefore it is very frequently used; but nothing can be more fallacious. *Knowledge puffs up: Therefore Ignorance makes a Man humble*. But, don't we see many ignorant Men intolerably proud? A Man happens to fall into *Error in examining*: Therefore he will

prevent it by a blind Submission. But does not such a Submission confirm a Man in Error without Recovery? Besides, Masters would not be very cautious in teaching, if they knew they would be applauded, whatever they might say. Those Countries, wherein the Supreme Power is limited by the Laws, are liable to Troubles; therefore Despotism is very proper to prevent them, and to establish a *firm* and *constant Peace*. Experience proves the quite contrary. When the Consequences of a Civil War cannot very much encrease the Misery of the People, even though it should turn to their Disadvantage, Men do not scruple to venture upon it. Wherefore we ought to know perfectly the Subjects about which we argue, instead of judging of them by general Ideas.

NOTHING is more common than to strain Oppositions, and to go from one Extreme to another. Out of Contempt for Superstition Men fall into Libertinism: Out of Hatred for Flatterers, they become unpolite. Perhaps the *Cynicks* despised outward Decencies, only out of Hatred against those Men who placed all their Virtue in a fair Outside.

X. THE Clearness and Liveliness of *Antitheses*. *Antitheses* proceed from their raising the Attention, and supporting it by a Variety of Objects, which they offer at the same time. But they ought to be just, otherwise they will not afford what is expected from them; and they are a Sign of a false Taste, which confounds the Opposition of Words with the Opposition of Things.

IT is not enough that they should be just, they must also be natural, that is, they must appear to arise from the Subject, as it were, of themselves, and without the Help of Study; for Affectation is always odious. We love an Orator, who pleases; but we cannot bear an Orator, who affects to please, and we deny him the Praises we should perhaps have bestowed upon him, had he not shewn that he desired them.

SENECA loved Antitheses: The Vivacity of his Imagination made him fond of bright Thoughts. He loved not only to make Antitheses, but also to relate those, which he had read elsewhere. *Æschines* told *Socrates*, *Your other Disciples, who give you a great deal, keep still for themselves more than they give you: As for me, I give you every Thing I have, by giving my self.* *Socrates* replies to *Æschines*, *I shall return you a better Man than you was, when I received you.* Whereupon *Seneca* adds an Insult to Fortune in the Name of *Æschines*, *I have received nothing from thee,*
and

and therefore I shall not express my Acknowledgment to Socrates with those Things that are thine, but only with my own (e).

THE Antithesis gives a greater Life to this ironical Apology for those Magistrates, who, having obtained a Place by unlawful Means, discharge the Duties of it accordingly. *What Wonder is it, that a Man should sell what he has bought? Is it not the Law of Nations? A great Care of the Beauty of the Body, says Seneca, a little lower, is not a Sign of a noble Soul (f).*

THOSE, who raise themselves most proudly, are generally Men who know how to creep with the greatest Meanness; and none are more eager to tread others under Foot, than those who have learned to affront others by being affronted (g).

THERE is a great Difference between hastening to return a Benefit, that one may have the Pleasure of being thankful, and doing it, to have the Satisfaction of being no longer indebted (h).

TO say that one is rich, is (at least very often) to speak as improperly, as when a Man says *he has a Fever*; for most People are not Masters of their Riches, but their Riches,

(e) Socrati cum multa multi pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent: Æschines pauper auditor, Nihil, inquit, dignum te quod dare tibi possim, invenio: & hoc uno modo pauperem me esse sentio. Itaque dono tibi quod unum habeo, Me ipsum. Hoc munus togo qualecunque est, boni consulas, cogitesque alios cum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse. *Cui Socrates: Quidni tu, inquit, mihi magnum munus dederis, nisi fortè, parvo te æstimas? Habebo itaque curæ, ut te meliorem tibi reddam quàm accipi. Sen. de Benef. Lib. I. Cap. 8. Nihil egisti, Fortuna, quod me pauperem esse voluisti: expediam nihilominus dignum huic viro munus: & quia de tuo non possum, de meo dabo. Ibid. Cap. 9.*

(f) Nam Provincias spoliari, & nummarium Tribunal, auditâ utrimque licitatione, alteri addici, non mirum, quando, quæ emeris, vendere, jus gentium est. *Ibid. Cap. 9.*

Cultus Corporum nimius & Formæ cura præ se ferens animi deformitatem. *Ibid. Cap. 10.*

(g) Quæ est tanta animi discordia? eodem tempore servos despicias, & colis. Imperiosus intra limen atque impotens, humilis foris: & tam contemptus quàm contemnens. Neque enim ulli magis abjiciunt animos, quàm qui improbè tollunt: nullique ad calcandos alios paratiores, quàm qui contumelias facere, accipiendo didicerunt. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. III. Cap. 28.*

(h) Multum interest utrum properes referre gratiam, ut reddas beneficium, an ut ne debeas. *Sen.*

Riches, like a Fever, *possess them, and keep them in Subjection* (i).

A CERTAIN Gracefulness, a certain Observation of Decencies, is the Master-piece of Art; and yet the only Thing that Art can neither give, nor even explain exactly. This is a Remark of Cicero: *Caput est Artis dicere, quod tamen unum id est, quod tradi arte non possit.* De Orat. Lib. I.

HERE follows another Remark of the same Author, which does not appear to me clear enough. "To be able upon every Subject to do what is proper, is a Fruit of Art, and a Gift of Nature." *Omnique in re posse quod deceat facere, artis & naturæ est; scire quid, quandoque deceat, prudentia.* But an exquisite Prudence, which discovers what is best to be done, is also a Fruit of Study, an Effect of an excellent Genius, and of a natural Justness of Mind.

ANTITHESSES, and the Quibbles with which they are attended, impose sometimes even upon those who make them. *If Passions arise (says Seneca) without the Consent of Reason, they will prevail, notwithstanding its Opposition* (k).

THAT Argument is not just; for a Man may be surpris'd, and afterwards mend his Fault. Passions generally arise without the Consent of Reason; but they seldom continue, without bringing it on their Side. They are sometimes perfectly master'd by Reason without being weaken'd, seldom attack'd by it, and always conquer'd if Reason goes on with the Attack.

I HAVE read this Antithesis somewhere: *We rather chuse to feel than to imagine; and we rather chuse to imagine than to think.* It is too general to be granted. There are some Things we rather chuse to imagine than to see; such are a Tempest, a Battle. There are others we rather chuse to think of intellectually than to imagine; for they are conceived by the Mind clearly and without any Labour; but it would require great Pains to imagine them, and yet it would be but imperfectly. Such are a Figure of 999 Sides, and in general all Curves.

THE following Antithesis does not appear to me just neither: *It is a great Fault in a Discourse, to have no Faults.* Must a Discourse have a Fault, to be without Faults? When an Orator, extremely apprehensive of any Fault, takes great Pains,

(i) Sic divitias habent quomodo habere dicimur febrem, cum illa nos habeat. Sen. Ep. 119.

(k) Si invitâ ratione cœperint, invitâ perseverabunt. Sen. Ep. LXXXV.

Pains, and leaves in his Discourse, as it were, an Impression of his great Labour, the Fault of such a Discourse does not proceed from being without any Fault, but from having a great one, an Air of Constraint.

HERE follows a just Antithesis: *None but excellent Orators are allowed to be prolix, because Heaven has enabled them, and none else, to be prolix without appearing to be so.* Antitheses contribute to make one sensible of the following Truths; *If good and solid Morals do not mend our Passions, 'tis almost impossible but our Passions will teach us a false Morality. We rather chuse to believe that our Actions are not vicious, than to acknowledge that we are vicious. We do not blame, with a good Grace, those Faults with which we are pleased.*

SOMETIMES an Antithesis, though it be just, and contains a great Sense, appears obscure, if it be considered in it self, and independently from what goes before. Such would be this Antithesis, *Truth ought to be adorn'd, but not painted.* Its Justness could not be perfectly known, without knowing what Difference there is between the Ornaments, that deserve to attend Truth, and the Intricacies, which hinder us from perceiving all the Evidence of the Proofs it is grounded upon.

THE Opposition between the *Mind* and the *Heart*, is of Use to unfold a great many Things that pass in the Inside of Man. The Usefulness and Brightness of that Antithesis, made it immediately current; but some Men of confused Thoughts have discredited it by their wrong Applications of it, and by their Nonsense. I think it will be free from Obscurity, if by the *Mind* we understand the Soul intent upon her Knowledge, and by the *Heart* the Soul indulging her Sensations and Passions. In this Sense the following Antithesis is partly false, and partly true. *Prejudices tyrannize over the Mind, as Passions tyrannize over the Heart. They are unreasonnable Masters, who oppress Liberty. A Man prepossess'd, and a Man, who indulges his Passions, do no longer chuse with Knowledge.* It might be said, that Prepossession and Passions are two different Masters, who tyrannize over Reason, and oppress its Liberty. When a Man is prepossess'd, and indulges his Passions, he only sees what his Passions and Prejudices allow him to see. But Prejudices belong to the Heart as well as Passions. Laziness, Interest, Custom, and Passions, are the Causes of our Prejudices.

BUT it is necessary to observe about Antitheses, that some Turns and Ways of Speaking, which are not proper at a certain

certain Time, *have been proper at another Time*; for, in Point of Language, some Allowance must be made for the prevailing Taste. The figurative Style, and particularly Antitheses, were *formerly much more in Vogue* than they are now; it was chiefly the Taste of the Eastern Nations; and the Old and New Testaments are written in that Style.

WHEN St. Paul sets two Things in Opposition, he borrows the Name of one of them to give it to the other; and so offers them like two opposite Species of the same *Genius*. The *Law*, that is, the *Knowledge of our Duty*, is a *Principle*, which moves us to perform it: We find in our *Passions* a contrary *Principle*. That Principle is called *the Law of the Members*; and *the Law of the Spirit of Rom. vii. Life, which is in Jesus Christ, frees us from the Law of Sin and Death*. That is, our Inclination for worldly Things yields to the Precepts of *Jesus Christ*, supported by his Example, and by Faith in his Promises. That Metaphor wants now to be unfolded, and plain Expressions must be put in the Room of it, to make it intelligible; but formerly Men, being used to it, saw immediately through its Cover, and the Figure did not perplex any Body in the least.

XI. THERE are some Differences, not perceived by Men of an ordinary Genius; but they do not escape the Knowledge of Men more attentive, and of a more refined Wit. They have their Worth, when they are of Use; but they are very contemptible, when no Benefit can be reaped from them; and there is no surer Sign of a shallow and false Wit, than to be fond of Discoveries, that are only valuable, because they were not made by others, and required a great Attention. Wherefore there are *solid* and truly valuable Subtilties; but there are also *vain* and contemptible ones. Besides, there are *false* Subtilties, which suppose a Difference where there is none at all. I shall give some Instances of all those Subtilties.

One Man (says Seneca) thinks he owes some Money, which he has received; another the Consulship, to which he has been raised; another a Sacerdotal Dignity, another the Government of a Province: But the Benefit is not confined within that Money, that Consulship, and that Government. A Benefit is above our Senses; the Mind only can perceive it: The Matter of a Benefit must not be confounded with the Benefit it self. Money, Dignities, and other Presents of that Nature, proceed from a good Will, and are Signs which ought to recall the Remembrance

membrance of it. *A Man does not return what he has received from his Benefactor, and does not sufficiently express his Gratitude, by returning Money for Money, and Honour for Honour: He owes him his Heart, because the Heart made his Benefit valuable. What a Man receives, may be lost; but a Benefits does always remain with the Obligation of acknowledging it. I preserved your Children from Shipwrack, from a Fire; a Disease deprives you of them. However, you owe me still what I gave you, when I preserved the Lives of your Children (l).* That double View, in which *Seneca* represents a Benefit, offers a subtil Distinction, but of great Use; since it enables us to be truly thankful.

SOME Reflections are not *necessary*; and yet they do not deserve to be accounted *superfluous*. That Distinction is no less important than subtil. If you confine your self to what is necessary, your Dryness will tire the Reader. If you

(l) Hoc primum nobis esse discendum quid accepto beneficio debeamus. Debere enim dicit se alius pecuniam quam accepit, alius Consulatum, alius Sacerdotium, alius Provinciam. Ista autem sunt meritorum signa, non merita. Non potest beneficium manu tangi: animo cernitur; multum interest inter materiam beneficii, & beneficium. Itaque nec aurum, nec argentum, nec quidquam eorum quæ à proximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas. Imperiti autem id, quod oculis incurrit, & quod traditur possidentque, solum notant; contra illud quod in re carum atque pretiosum est, parvi pendunt. Hæc quæ tenemus, quæ aspiciamus, in quibus cupiditas nostra hæret, caduca sunt; auferre ea nobis & fortuna, & injuria potest: beneficium verò, etiam amisso eo quod datum est, durat. Est enim rectè factum, quod irritum nulla vis efficit. Amicum à piratis redemi: hunc alius hostis excepit, & in carcerem condidit; non beneficium sed usum beneficii mei sustulit. Ex naufragio alicui raptos, vel ex incendio liberos reddidi: hos vel morbus, vel aliqua fortuita injuria eripuit: manet etiam sine illis, quod tu illis datum est. Omnia itaque, quæ falsum beneficii nomen usurpant, ministeria sunt, per quæ se voluntas amica explicat. Hoc quoque in aliis rebus evenit, ut alicubi sit species rei, alicubi ipsa res. Imperator aliquem torquibus, murali, & civicâ donat; quid habet per se corona pretiosum? quid prætexta? quid fasces? quid tribunal, & currus? nihil horum honor est, sed honoris insigne. Sic non est beneficium id quod sub oculos venit, sed beneficii vestigium & nota. Quid est ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium, capiensque tribuendo, in id quod facit prona, & sponte sua parata. Itaque non quid fiat, aut quid detur, refert, sed quâ mente. Quia beneficium non in eo quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo, *Sen. de Benef. Lib. I. Cap. 5, & 6.*

you run into Superfluities, he will grow weary of your Proximity. Happy are those Authors, who know how to make such a wise Distinction, and who, by keeping off from one of those Rocks, avoids the other! Whatever makes Part of a Science, is *necessary*, as well as every Thing without which one could not understand the Explication of what is necessary; and what *facilitates* the Understanding of it; and makes one more *sensible of its Usefulness*, though it be not *necessary*, ought not to be accounted superfluous.

THERE is some Difference between *wanting a Thing*, and *not having it*. Many Things are not in our Power; and yet we don't stand in need of them. A Man, who is in want, is always a Sufferer, at least in some Degree; but he may be easy in his Mind, even when he is destitute of many Things. However, he does not despise them; he values them in proportion to their Worth, nay, he acknowledges it were better for him to enjoy them; but, if he does not despise those Things, he does not think himself contemptible, because he is not possess'd of them. *Sapiens que sibi desunt, non desiderat, sed non deesse mavult.*
Sen. Ep. IX: *Ita de se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit.*

IT might also be said, that there is some Difference between wanting a Thing, and standing in need of it. The *Stoicks* made a Distinction between *δεινόν* and *ενδεον*. Reflection and Taste are requisite to be sensible of that Difference; but it is no less solid than subtil.

UNCOMMON Talents are admired, and frequently supply the Room of *Merit*; and yet, to speak the Truth, Merit consists only in the good Use a Man makes of his Talents.

AS there are judicious and solid Subtilties, there are also vain and unreasonable ones. Such were the Subtilties whereby the *Stoicks* distinguished themselves from other Philosophers. Riches and Health it self, said they, are not *good Things*, they are at most *Conveniencies*. When a Man is sick of the Gout and Gravel, he *struggles*, but he *suffers* no Evil; his Condition is rather a State of Labour than of Uneasiness; *Laborat, non dolet*. 'Tis in vain to represent Evil in a subtil Manner, under a Word that disguises it; Sense will always contradict the Subtilty. Words do not change the Nature of Things.

HERE follows another Reflection of *Seneca*, Ep. XIV.
“ *Cæsar* and *Pompey* are contending for the Empire. To
“ what Purpose should you side with one of them against
“ the

“ the other? He, who shall be worsted, may be the worse Man; but the Conqueror cannot be the better Man.” *Potest esse peior, qui victus fuerit, non potest esse melior, qui vicerit.* What’s the Meaning of those Words? If *Cæsar* and *Pompey* are equal in Probity, the Vanquished will be as honest a Man as the Conqueror; and if they are unequal in that Respect, the more honest will remain what he is, whether he miscarries, or not.

THE same *Seneca*, in his 30th *Letter* says, “ That Death must be expected, but not feared; for we expect what is certain, but fear only what is doubtful.” *Certa expectantur, dubia metuntur.* I see here an Opposition between Words, but not between Things. We suffer at the Thoughts of an expected Evil; and this we call to fear it. A Man may, if he pleases, forbear using that Word; but the Nature of the sorrowful Sense, expressed by another Word, will always remain the same. When that Philosopher sports with such Distinctions, he forgets his own Maxims. *To what Purpose* (says he elsewhere) *are those Subtilties, which will perplex no Body but in a Dispute? A Difference must be shewn between Things, and not between Words.*

WHEN your Head is giddy upon the Brink of a Precipice, you are not seized with Fear; ’tis a Commotion, which Reason cannot prevent. As many Words, as many Errors; for that Commotion is a true Fear, and it may be prevented.

SOMETIMES a Man seems to say something, that was not observed before. His Reflection appears subtil, because it escaped every Body. But when we come to unfold the Sense of that Expression, it offers nothing but what is common, and contains only, with more Obscurity, what every Body grants.

THERE is but one Passion, viz. *Self-Love*. When those, who are pleased to talk so, are desired to explain themselves, it appears they acknowledge as many Passions as other Men, and that all their Windings come only to this; That *Self-Love* has a Share in every Passion; that we are affected with different Passions, according to the different Relations of Objects with respect to us, and as they appear more or less proper to make us happy; and that different Passions arise from those different Relations. This is no new Thing; it was always understood so.

SOME pretend, that every *Virtue* is a *Kind of Humility*. Others affirm, that all *Virtues* are nothing else but *Diligence*, which assumes different Faces, and acts under different Forms. One would be apt to think, that those Men have meditated upon

upon the Nature of Virtue more than others, and refined upon it more than all the Moralists. But there is no such Thing. After in any unnatural, intricate, and far-fetch'd Definitions, they mean only that Virtue is spoiled by Pride; that a virtuous Man is governed by Knowledge; that he considers attentively what he is, the Worth of those Things for which he labours, and the Merit accruing to them from certain Circumstances; that he does not magnify his own Worth, nor the Worth of any Thing different from himself. It is in that intricate Sense that each Virtue is a kind of *Humility*. A Man is not virtuous, when he has but an indifferent Love for Virtue; and he does not value it sufficiently, unless he be very eager to practise it upon all Occasions. When a Man is truly virtuous, he is neither cold nor lukewarm; as soon as an Occasion offers to perform his Duty, he performs it with all his Heart. But this is a Thing known to every Body. In that Sense Virtue is a *Diligence*.

XII. THE Relation of Resemblance is sometimes joined with the Relation of Opposition; and those Comparisons, which reunite the Force of two such different Relations, have often a very good Effect. *As there is nothing finer than to help Men in Danger against their Will; in like manner, to grant Mens Desires, when it is to their Disadvantage, is to conceal one's Hatred under a seeming Goodness (m)*. In these Words *Seneca* sets in Opposition a great Duty and a great Fault; but in those two Cases the Appearances are very different from the Reality; and in that Respect the two Cases are alike.

HERE follows another Example: As the ill Usage of a Person, who never offended us, is an odious Action in its own Nature; in like manner, to love to do a Kindness, is an amiable Disposition in it self, and independently from its Consequences, and the Benefit *that can be reaped from it (n)*.

As it is a Piece of Luxury to be fond of Delicacies; in like manner, it is a Piece of Extravagance to deny one's self those

(m) Quemadmodum pulcherrimum opus est, etiam invitos nolentesque servare; ita rogantibus pestifera largiri, blandum & affabile odium est. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. II. Cap. 14.*

(n) Quomodo injuriam facere per se vitanda ac fugienda res est, sic beneficium dare per se expetenda. *Id. Lib. IV. Cap. 15.*

those Things that are common, and may be got at a cheap Rate (o).

XIII. THE Comparison of Relations of *A Parallel between both.* Resemblance with Relations of Diversity, has occasioned a Remark, which deserves some Reflection. Here follows that Remark: Some are pleased with looking for Resemblances, whilst others love to find out Diversities. The former are accounted ingenious, and the latter are said to think judiciously: Wit is ascribed to the former, and Discernment to the others.

IT seems to me, that this Thought may be placed among false Subtilties; for one must have Wit and Penetration to discover in Subjects, which appear perfectly alike, some Differences not perceived by those who see Things only in general and superficially. And a Man must have Justness and Discernment to find out wherein different Subjects agree.

IT is more important to observe, that there is a *false Wit*, and also a false Imitation of *Discernment*. When Images are borrowed from a Subject to represent another Subject, they are the more affecting, because unexpected; and a Man is admired for the Extent of his Wit, and for joining together Things that are so remote. But if the Image is not just, that bright Comparison ought rather to be looked upon as a Flight of a wandering Imagination, than as an Effect of Penetration, and of a true Extent of Mind. As for what concerns Differences, 'tis true, a great Wit will observe some in those Things, wherein a superficial Wit can perceive none; but some Persons will imitate Men of a great Genius, and do it wrong. Being too greedy of Reputation, and willing to be thought to have a more refined Wit than others, they run into imaginary Differences, or take great Pains to make others perceive Differences so inconsiderable, that no Use can be made of them. There is the same Difference between a false Vivacity and true Wit, between a vain Subtily and a solid Discernment, as between Talkativeness, and a judicious and instructive Eloquence.

A GREAT Difference is made between those, who first propose a new Opinion in Religion, or depart from the common Explication of some Passages in the Scripture, and those who embrace that new Opinion, and those new Explications. The latter are only called *Hereticks*; but the others go by the

(o) Quemadmodum delicatas res desiderare, luxuriæ est: ita usitatas & non magno parabiles fugere, dementia est. *Sen. Ep. V.*

the Name of *Herefiarchs*. Some Men can have some Indulgence for those who suffer themselves to be seduced, but they inveigh with a fiery Zeal against the Seducers, and yet the Difference, to be found between them, is not a reasonable Ground for that different Treatment. If the Error of the former proceeds from Pride and Libertinism, the same Principles may have the same Effect upon the latter. If some Disorder in the Brain can excuse the latter, the same Disorder may also excuse the others. Lastly, the Error of both may proceed from a commendable Desire of knowing the Truth; and perhaps that Desire is not attended with all the Attention and Capacity requisite to discover the Weakness of some Arguments, which, being considered in a certain Sense, want neither Weight nor Probability.


MEN are also very much mistaken in the Difference they make between a *Layman* and a *Clergyman*. One would think they are two Beings of a different Species; that there will be a different Decalogue for each of them; and that they will not be judged by the same Law, and the same Gospel. A Layman does not scruple to do a great many Things, which would appear to him horrid in a Clergyman; and a Clergyman ascribes to himself several Rights and Privileges, which he would look upon as so many Encroachments in a Layman. The Clergy, in order to preserve those Privileges, and make themselves more respected, have laid upon themselves a great many Obligations, most of them very hard, but of no Use to Salvation. By reason of that Distinction, their good Actions have no Influence but upon their Brethren. Lay People do not think themselves obliged to imitate the Clergy, and look upon them as Men who have separate Laws of their own.



C H A P. V.

Of the Relations of Unity.

Unity and Multitude.

I.  HEN those Objects that are compared together, and the Ideas whereof are present to the Mind, happen to exist united out of our Minds, as their Ideas are united in our Intelligence, they offer themselves under a Relation of

of

of *Unity*. But, if they are conceived separately, their Relation is a Relation of *Multitude*.

AMONG the many Objects known to us, every one of them, though never so simple, contains many *Realities*; but those *Realities*, though very numerous, form one *Whole* by their Union. Some are united in one *Whole*, because they cannot exist separately. Thus Length cannot be without Breadth and Depth. Those three Dimensions are necessarily united. In like manner, a Portion of Matter does essentially include Mobility, Figure, and Impenetrability. If we give the Name of *Parts* to those *Realities*, that are thus necessarily united, their Compound will be a *necessary Whole*.

THERE are also *Realities* which indeed may exist separately, but they *ought to be united*, in order to compose a *Whole* of a *certain Kind*, and of a certain Name. For instance, Particles, separated one from another, and in a very swift Motion, are requisite to form what we call *Fire*. Stones, Sand, Lime, and Water, are requisite to compose what we call a *Wall*. Those *Parts* may exist at a Distance one from another; but they must be joined together to make a *Wall*. The *Units* of that Kind may be called *contingent Wholes*. I do not live in two Houses, but only in one House, though that House consists of many Apartments; and my Soul is not united to two Bodies, though my Body consists of many Members.

II. IT appears, that *Parts* taken together, *Wholes of different Sorts*, and the *Whole*, are one and the same Thing; from whence it follows, that there are many Kinds of *Wholes*, according to the Nature of the *Parts* they consist of, and the Manner of their Union. And therefore, besides the Division I have just now made, the *integral Whole* is also distinguished from the *essential Whole*; and that Distinction comes pretty near the foregoing one. The *integral Whole* is composed of *Parts*, which may exist separately, and consequently of *Substances*. Such is the Human Body, each Member whereof may be extirpated, without ceasing to exist, though it ceases by that Separation to preserve its good State. The *essential Whole* is composed of *Parts*, some of which, at least, cannot exist separately. Thus the Roundness of a Leaden Ball will be separated from it, if that Metal be melted; but it will no longer exist.

Two Bodies make one *Whole*, either by their immediate *Contact*, or when each of them does immediately touch a third Body, lying between them. But, because

these are Relations, we may compare as we please two or many Bodies, and conceive between them a greater or lesser Number of Bodies. Thus we say, that many Stones make one House, that many Houses make one Town, many Towns one Country, many Countries one Land, and many Spaces one Universe. Those Wholes might be called *Physical Wholes*.

I DON'T apprehend, that *Intelligent Beings* can form one Whole, otherwise than by the *Conformity* of their *Sentiments* and *Will*. If the Ideas, Sentiments, and Inclinations of one of them are an exact Rule of the Ideas, Sentiments, and Affections of all the others, so that there is nothing wanting for a perfect Conformity, they will form one Whole. Thus we may conceive the Union of the Blessed with *Jesus Christ*; and that Union comes the nearer to a perfect Unity, because the Uniformity is more compleat. Such are *Intelligent Wholes*.

MAN is an Example of an Union so singular, that he himself cannot sufficiently wonder at it. An *Intelligence united* to a Body; Thought making but one Whole with Extension. Perhaps one of the Difficulties about the *Union of the Soul with the Body*, proceeds from our supposing that Union to be more like a material Union than it is. If we do not suppose the Soul to be more united to the Body than we are convinced of it by Experience, the Difficulties will vanish away. What does Experience teach us? That certain Motions are attended with certain Thoughts; and that certain Thoughts are attended with certain Motions. This is a *Concomitancy*, which has been called *Union*; the Name does not alter the Thing, and oblige us to suppose more than we perceive. But what is the *Cause* of that Concomitancy? It may be found in some general *Laws* establish'd by the Will of the *Supreme Being*.

I SHALL further observe, that in order to apprehend exactly in what Manner the Soul may be united to the Body, we should have a more exact and perfect Idea than we have, not only of the Nature of the Body, but especially of the Nature of the Soul. We know the Nature of Matter sufficiently to conclude, that a Body can act upon another Body, only by touching and moving it; but we have not a sufficient Knowledge of the Soul, to conclude, that a Body cannot act upon it in another Manner. There will be a Time, when we shall be unfolded to our selves; and I think the Hope that our Knowledge will be so far increased, as to enable us to know what we are, is not one of the most inconsiderable

inconsiderable Motives to make a good Use of our present Knowledge.

I DON'T know how to call the Thought of a great Man, who fancy'd the Material World to be a Machine of such a Composition, that as soon as the Creator put it into Motion, every Thing we see in it, must have infallibly happen'd, though no Intelligence had been further concern'd in it. Whatever happens upon Earth, would have been effected, though the Bodies of Men and Animals had been only mere Machines, without any Soul united to them. Those Machines would have invented Swords, Pikes, Fire-Arms, Gun-Powder, Mortars, and all Instruments made use of to throw Bombs. Mines would have been searched: Money would have been coined. Those Machines with a human Form would have been luxurious to the highest Degree. They would have built Palaces, raised Thrones, erected Tribunals, enacted Laws, ordered Punishments and Rewards. Some would have been determined by, the Impression of the Laws upon their Eyes: Others would have been determined by the Rays of Light, reflected by Money, and united upon the *Retina*. The Art of War would have been such as it is now; and after many bloody Battles, Treaties of Peace would have been set on foot without knowing what Peace and War are. Ambassadors would have been sent, and Quarrels started about the Breaking of one's Word, without knowing what Speech is. Printing would have been invented the very same Year. The same Machines would have writ one against another; disputed about the Superiority of the Antients above the Moderns; quarrelled about the first Discovery of the Doctrine of Fluxions; which would have been understood by no Body, no more than it is now by Labourers. Again, those Machines would have preach'd and inveigh'd against Prophanation: They would have bewail'd Sins, of which they were not guilty; and those, which had not spoke as others did, would have undergone all the Severities of the Inquisition; which, in such a Case, had been only a Comedy acted by mere *Automata*.

ON the other hand, if GOD had been pleas'd to create the Soul of *Adam*, without uniting it to a Body, and without creating any Matter at all, that Soul would have been made after such a Manner, that she would have necessarily fancy'd her self to be united to a Body: She would have looked upon that Body, as not being different from her self: She would have fancy'd to see an Earth, a Sun, a Moon, which did not exist; to manure a Garden existing only in her Ideas;

to be asleep, and to find *Eve* by her Side, when she awaked; to contract Guilt, and make her self liable to Death by eating an imaginary Fruit: She would have fancy'd her self to be hungry, to eat, to be tired with working, to be sick, to prepare Remedies, and those imaginary Remedies would have cured her of her imaginary Illness. One must have a great Courage not to be terrified with those Consequences, and not to mistrust the Principle from which they arise. A long Habit of making happy Conjectures, and forming Ideas, which lead to Truth, has occasioned too hasty an Admittance of some other Ideas; and they have been thought to be of the same Nature, because they were formed by the same Mind.

MANY Men do also make up one *Whole*, when they unite in order to obey certain Laws, to enjoy certain Rights, to execute what is ordered by one Person, or resolved upon by a Majority of Votes, or to submit to it. This is a *Whole of Association*; it may be also called a *Moral Whole*. Many People enter upon the same Treaty, contract the same Obligations, and acquire the same Advantages. The Consent they give to that Treaty, is *external* or *internal*, *express* or *tacit*. The same Interest, the same Dependance, the same Relations to one Head, are the Ground of the *Unity* of a Community.

LASTLY, there is a *Whole* much more relative than those above-mention'd, and which, for that Reason, may be called *Relative* by way of Eminency, because it has the least internal Reality. Many Things, though very much separated, are looked upon as united in one *Whole*, when each of them has the same Relation, as all the others, to a certain Subject. Thus Money, Houses, Land, Flocks, are thought to make up one *Whole* with a Man, who differs still more from them, than they differ among themselves. I say, they make up one *Whole*, because each of them has the same Relation of Dependence, that is, depends in the same Manner upon a Man, who equally disposes of them all.

III. IF Men had been more exact in their *Relations are* Thoughts, and more cautious to avoid *confounded.* Mistakes, they would not have given, by reason of some slight Resemblances, one and the same Name to very different Relations. In all the Cases just now mentioed, there is indeed some Union; but they have nothing else, that is common to them; and in other very material Respects they differ extremely. Yet, because they have a common Name, Men, who have minded Words

at all Times, judge of one of those Relations in the same Manner as they judge of the others, and by that Means frequently fall into Error.

BECAUSE the *Inhabitants of one and the same Country* are called *the same People*, during a long Course of Years, provided they continue to be subject to the same Fundamental Laws, and possessed of the same principal Rights; those, who live in the following Ages ascribe to themselves all the *Glory* and *Virtue* of their remotest *Ancestors*, with the same Assurance, and, as they fancy, with the same Right, as an old Man values himself for the noble Actions of his Youth, which really belong to him, because he is still one and the same Person. Men, without any Scruple, take Advantage of every Thing that pleases them, and flatters their Vanity; they do not care to enquire into the Ground of it without Partiality.

THERE is nothing, that is less in our Power, and less our own, than our *Birth*; and therefore, of all the Pretences a Man takes hold of to value and prefer himself to others, that of his Birth appears to me the most groundless; and the Truth is, a Man does seldom insist upon it, but for want of another Merit. However, those who despise the Advantages of Birth, which they cannot boast of, are very often in the wrong; and if they were tender of their Reputation, they should, like rational Men, secure themselves by their Silence from the Suspicion of envying an Advantage, which, by their own Confession, is an insignificant Thing. One of the greatest *Advantages of Birth* is, in my Opinion, the Right of speaking of it exactly, and giving it its true Worth. It was highly necessary, for the Good of the Society, that Sovereigns should be able to acknowledge the Services of their Subjects by Rewards that should cost them nothing, and consequently not chargeable to their People. A mere Title would have been a Reward too inconsiderable, if a Man could not have transmitted it to his Posterity. A Man is the more tied to his Country, because he finds in its History that of his own Family; he loves those Masters, by whom he has been esteemed from Father to Son; and it was no small Secret to bestow Rewards upon Men, that they should think themselves more and more obliged to deserve them. Men distinguished by their Birth are the more bound to distinguish themselves by their Merit, because all their Actions are more attended to. Besides, the Meanness of Vice disgraces them more than others, by its Contrast with their Elevation; and their Virtues are the more admired, because they may offend with greater Impunity.

IT is also highly necessary, for the Good of the Society, that all Occasions of Envy should be removed. People easily submit to those, whom they are used to obey; they are not so well pleased with the Elevation of an Equal; and nothing but an extraordinary Merit, attended with great Moderation, can make them bear such a Superiority. The Generality of Men having but little Taste for a solid Virtue, 'tis well that some practise it by a Point of Honour. When a Man values himself for his Riches, his Furniture, and Equipage, and thinks himself as great as he would be by the Beauty and Strength of his Body, the Knowledge of his Mind, and Uprightness of his Heart, *the Conformity of Names deceives him*, and does not allow him to reflect upon the Difference of Things.

IT appears therefore, that Men are unreasonable in valuing themselves upon a great many Things, which, far from making part of them, are not so much as their own, since they are not in their Power, and they may be deprived of them by many Accidents. They would be much more ashamed of their Mistakes, if they would consider by what indecent Means they generally come to great Preferments, and the ill Use they make of them. If they suffer for it, 'tis their Fault. As soon as they see a Man above them, which way soever he has raised himself, how careful are they to persuade him by their Encomiums that he really is what he should be? Nay, in Point of Reasoning, Rank is instead of a Proof; Authority supplies the Room of Knowledge; and a Man's Compliance is grounded upon the Titles of the Person he quotes, and the Figure he makes in the World.

IV. WHEN all the Parts, which make up a Whole are alike, that Whole is called *homogeneous*; and when they differ one from another, it is styled *heterogeneous*. And because the Parts of a Whole are more or less alike, a Whole is also more or less homogeneous. Nay, it will be homogeneous in one Sense, and heterogeneous in another Sense. A Lump, consisting of several Metals melted together, will be an homogeneous Whole, with respect to a Mass consisting of Metals, Minerals, and Stones. A Lump of pure Gold will be homogeneous, with respect to a Mixture of Gold and Silver. The Mercury, Salt, and Sulphur of Gold, when separated, will form Wholes more homogeneous than Gold it self, though never so disengaged from any other mix'd Body. These are plainly relative Names; and

Whole homogeneous and heterogeneous.

and the same Subject may have relative Names quite different, and even quite opposite.

INSTEAD of the Remarks I have just now made, the Schools mention some other Kinds of *Wholes*: But because they are only impertinent Distinctions, and useles Fooleries, I should abuse the Patience of my Readers, should I lose my Labour in mentioning them. 'Tis time the Synagogue should lie buried in Oblivion: Should we perform still her Obsequies, she would perhaps awake and rise out of her Grave.

V AMONG those Parts, which make up a *Subject and Whole*, if one of them receives the others, we *Adjunct*. conceive between them a Relation of *Subject and Adjunct*. A *Substance* is always the *Subject* of Modes; for Modes having no separate Existence, suppose the Existence of a Substance, and exist in it: They are the Substance it self in a certain State, as I have shewn before.

A *MODE* is looked upon as the *Subject* of another Mode, when the second exists only by Virtue of the first. Thus Motion is the Subject of Determination; for 'tis by Motion that a Body describes a certain Line: 'Tis because it moves, that it departs from one Term, and comes near another in a certain Way. 'Tis not the Way that makes the Motion; 'tis Motion which describes a certain Way.

LASTLY, a *Substance* becomes the *Subject of another Substance*, when it Supports it. Thus the Ground is the Subject of a House; and when a Substance is made for another Substance, they are looked upon as forming a sort of a Whole; and the former is accounted an *Adjunct* of the latter. In this Respect, a House is an *Adjunct* of a Man, as well as his Cloaths. Words are very unexact: A small Resemblance makes them common to very different Objects. I say *my* House, as I say *my* Colour. It is very proper to be frequently put in mind of this, since the Confusion arising from it is so frequent.

VI. THESE are three Sorts of Subjects and Adjuncts, so called, because they are *External Denominations*. Realities, which make up a Whole, and some whereof receive the others, each in its own Way. But 'tis very improper to take for *Adjuncts* of a Subject some Things, which are not united to it, and do not make up one Whole with it. To be on the Right Hand or on the Left of a Man; to be near or at a Distance from him, are no Adjuncts; for though a Man turns about me, though he comes near me, or removes from me, as much as he please

pleases, yet I always remain the same, and in the same State. These are therefore *external Denominations*.

THE following Expressions ought to be placed in that Class, *to be esteemed, to be praised, to be despised, to be abused,* and the like. Esteem, Praise, Blame, are Actions, not of those who are esteemed, praised, or blamed, but of others, who are commendable or blameable, according as they esteem or blame justly or unjustly.

WHAT they say of us, does neither add any Thing to us; nor take any Thing from us; but we vex our selves, or grow vain, upon Account of the Opinions of other Men.

A MAN, who bestows just Praises, and does Justice to Merit out of Generosity, gives a Proof of his good Taste. A Man, who cannot resolve to acknowledge the good Qualities of others, shews by that Reluctancy, that he has an ill Heart. A Man, who commends what ought to be looked upon with indifference, or what rather deserves to be blamed, is mistaken, and has wrong Notions of Things. Praises are in those who bestow them. They are extraneous to those who are commended, and make no more a Part of them, than the Health of their Neighbours makes Part of their own Health (a).

WHETHER God be offended or honoured; whether we be rewarded or punished by him; whether he acts like a Father, or like a Judge; he remains immutable: Our Inconstancy makes no Alteration in him. When we change, our Relations to him change; but he persists in the Will of favouring those who seek him, and forsaking those who depart from him. To be received, or to be forsaken, are different States in Men; but whether God be found or not found by Men, his State is not altered: These are only *external Denominations* with respect to him. Without changing my Situation, if a Man turns his back to me, he does not perceive me; and if he looks upon me, he sees me.

OUR Mistake upon this Head proceeds altogether from Expressions too like one another, about unlike Subjects. Men take a Substantive Noun to denote a Subject, and an Adjective to denote its Adjunct. I do the same to express
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(a) Dicit nobis, utrum laudantis, an laudati, bonum sit? Si laudantis bonum esse dicitis, tam ridiculam rem facitis, quam si affirmatis meum esse, quod alius benè valeat. Sed laudare dignos, honesta actio est: ita laudantis bonum est, cujus actio est, non nostrum qui laudamur. *Sen. Ep. CII.*

an external Denomination and its Subject. I say, a *celebrated Man*, as I say, a *learned Man*; and I judge of the one as of the other. I imagine in both Phrases a *Subject* and an *Adjunct*; but there is a great difference. Learning is in Man, and modifies him. Reputation is an extraneous Thing, and does not improve a Man. It is a State and an *Adjunct*, not of the Man, who is approved, but of those who approve him.

VII. THOSE Realities, without which a Subject cannot Exist, are called its *necessary Adjuncts*. Those that can be separated from it, are *contingent Adjuncts*. A Portion of Extension cannot Exist without Figure; but it may Exist without Roundness. Figure is the *necessary Adjunct*, Roundness is the *contingent* one.

Necessary and contingent Adjuncts.

VIII. WHATEVER *Adjunct* be ascribed to a Subject, great Care ought to be taken that it may agree to the Nature of the Subject; for I have already said in the foregoing Chapter, that we are always mistaken, when we pretend to join together Things that are inconsistent. Wherefore nothing ought to be ascribed to a Subject, till we have sufficiently considered its Nature, and formed a right Notion of what we design to join to it.

The Subject and the Adjunct discover one another.

AND whenever there is some Obscurity in a Discourse, which runs upon some Subject, and some *Adjunct*, we must out of two Ideas, assume for a Principle, that which is best known, and make use of it to remove the Obscurity of the other; for the *Adjunct* ought to be explained in a Sense agreeable to its Subject, and reciprocally.

IT is certain we come to the Knowledge of a Subject, if we consider its *Adjuncts*; for we call *Adjunct* of a Subject its Manner of being, its different States; and the State of a Subject, its manner of Existing, is the Subject it self disposed and existing after a certain Manner. In some Cases reciprocally, the Knowledge of a Subject leads to the Knowledge of its *Adjuncts*; and whenever *Adjuncts* are expressed in metaphorical Terms, it is highly necessary to know the Nature of the Subject to which they are ascribed; for otherwise, by straining the Sense of those Metaphors, one may easily ascribe to a Subject an *Adjunct*, which cannot agree to it, and so fall into Contradictions. It appears from thence how useful those Sciences are, which, by discovering to us the Nature of Things, prevent the Absurdities we might

fall

fall into, by ascribing to a Subject what is repugnant to its Nature.

*Maxims of the
Rhetoricians
about Adjuncts.*

IX. THE antient Rhetoricians referred to the Class of Adjuncts a great many Relations, which did not belong to it: They placed in that Class, most of those Things which surround a Subject, when they contributed to the clearing of it. Such are *Signs*, for instance, which they defined thus: A Sign is a *Thing, which leads us to the Knowledge of another.* Afterwards they divided them into many Orders, and among others, into *preceding, attending, and subsequent Signs.* But 'tis plain, that an Adjunct does neither precede nor follow its Subject: It attends only the Subject, and makes one Whole with it. They confounded the Causes and Effects of a Subject with its Adjuncts (*b*). The Rhetorick of the Antients

(*b*) Omnes res argumentando confirmantur, aut ex eo, quod personis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis est attributum. Ac personis has res attributas putamus: nomen, naturam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes. Nomen est, quod unicuique personæ datur, quo suo quæque proprio, & certo vocabulo appellatur. Naturam ipsam definire difficile est: partes autem ejus enumerare eas, quarum indigemus ad hanc præceptionem, facilius est. Hæ autem partim divino, partim mortali in genere versantur. Mortalium autem pars in hominum, pars in bestiarum genere numeratur. Atque hominum genus & in sexu consideratur, virile an muliebre sit: & in natione, patriâ, cognatione & ætate. Natione, Græcus an Barbarus. Patria, Atheniensis an Lacedæmonius. Cognatione, quibus majoribus, quibus consanguineis. Ætate puer an adolescens; natu grandior an senex. Præterea commoda & incommoda considerantur ab naturâ data animo, aut corpori, hoc modo: Valens an imbecillus; longus an brevis; formosus an deformis; velox an tardus sit; acutus an hebetior; memor an obliviosus; comis, officiosus, pudens, patiens, an contra: & omninò qua à natura data animo & corpori considerabuntur, in naturâ consideranda sunt. Nam quæ industriâ comparantur, ad habitum pertinent: de quo postèrius dicendum est. In victu considerare oportet, apud quem, & quo more, & cujus arbitratu sit educatus, quos habuerit artium liberalium magistros; quos vivendi præceptores; quibus amicis utatur; quo in negotio, quæstu, artificio sit occupatus; quomodo rem familiarem administret, quâ consuetudine domestica sit. In fortuna quæritur, servus sit an liber; pecuniosus an tenuis; privatus an cum potestate. Si cum potestate, jure an injuria, felix, clarus, an contra; quales liberos habeat. Ac si de non vivo quæretur, etiam quali morte sit affectus, erit considerandum.

Antients enabled an Orator to speak easily, but not accurately. Their main Design was to speak *ex tempore*, to please and dazzle the Audience: Probabilities are sufficient for that Purpose. A great Clearness would have betrayed them in bad Causes, which they affected to defend: A dexterous Confusion was more serviceable to them than a Demonstration.

X. AMONG Adjuncts, that which contributes most to *specify* a Thing, that is, which contributes most to place it in a certain Rank, to give it a certain Name, and make it such a Thing, I say, the Adjunct, which is the *Foundation* of all the Adjuncts, whereby a Subject may be *distinguished* from all others, and which consequently makes their first and *main* Difference, is called not only *Essence*, (a Term already explained above,) but also *Form*; and the Subject of such an Adjunct goes by the Name of *Matter*; for the Subject of Form is called *Matter*.

Matter, Subject, Form, Adjunct.

XI. THE prevailing Custom of reckoning Matter and Form in the Number of *Causes*, is a plain Proof that the Antients did not think much, and minded *Words* more than *Things*. The same Question is sometimes answered by alledging the Cause, and sometimes by alledging the Matter and Form. Why is it Day-light? Because the Sun is upon the Horizon. Why do you call what you hold in your Hand a Fork? I call it so by Reason of its Figure. Why do you set so great a Value upon it? Because of its Matter, which is Gold. This is sufficient to confound very different Relations, and so place them under the same Class. That Fork is Gold disposed after a certain manner. Gold and its Disposition is the Fork it self. To say that Gold and its Figure are the Causes of the Fork, is the same, as if one should say that it is the Cause of it self.

Matter and Form are not Causes.

XII. THOSE Terms, designed for material Things, which they express clearly enough, bring no small Confusion into *Spiritual* and *Moral* Things, when applied to them; for we conceive Moral and Spiritual Things the more clearly, as we are less disturbed by the Phantoms of Imagination.

A wrong Use of those Terms.

WHAT

Negotiis autem quæ sunt attributa, partim sunt continentia cum ipso negotio, partim in gestione negotii considerantur, partim adjuncta negotio sunt, partim gestum negotium consequuntur. *Cic. de Invent. Lib. I.*

WHAT an Obscurity have not Divines themselves introduced into their Sacred Systems, by bringing Matter and Form into some of those Subjects, of which they are composed (c)? Matter and Form of Predestination, Matter and Form

(c) *Wendel. Theol. Lib. I. Chap. 24. Thef. 6. Efficiens fidei principalis est Deus, & singulariter Spiritus Sanctus. Impulsiva est misericordia Dei, secundum eternam electionem: Meritoria, Christi meritum: Instrumentalis, verbum Dei.*

Thef. 8. Materia in qua, seu subjectum recipiens, est homo ad vitam æternam electus, cujus intellectus & voluntas fide afficitur.

Thef. 9. Materia circa quam, seu objectum, quod salvifica fides apprehendit, est commune vel proprium.

Thef. 10. Commune objectum est veritas divina verbo Dei revelata: oportet enim fidelem credere Deo loquenti in verbo, & pro veris habere omnia, quæ Spiritus Dei affirmat vel negat, imprimis autem ea, quæ ad salutem pertinent.

Thef. 11. Proprium, principale & proximum objectum est promissio Evangelica de peccatis per & propter Christi mortem expiatis, omnibusque peccatoribus pœnitentibus & credentibus, propter Christum crucifixum fide apprehensum, in gratiam ex misericordia receptis. Hanc promissionem in specie singuli fidelis per fidem sibi applicant, & sic ad salutem dicuntur credere.

Thef. 12. Hactenus materia fidei justificantis. Sequitur forma, quæ consistit in tribus partibus, nempe, notitiâ, assensu & fiducia.

That is, in order to have a right Notion of Faith, one must know, that "Faith, besides its *principal Cause*, which is God, and particularly "the Holy Spirit, and its *instrumental Cause*, which is the Word of "God, has a *Matter in which*, a *Matter about which*, which is also "the Word of God, and a *Form*, which consists in Knowledge, Acquiescence and Trust". From thence will arise many Controversies.

Thus again in the 25th Chapter, which runs upon Justification. "Its *efficient and principal Cause*, is God the Father, the Son, and the "Holy Spirit: The *impulsive*, his Mercy: The *instrumental*, Faith. "The *Matter* is the Satisfaction of Christ, or his passive Obedience. "The *Form* is the Imputation of the Righteousness of Christ applied by Faith, and the Forgiveness of Sins, or the Absolution from "the Curse": These are Matters which open a large Field for Dispute.

In the 4th Chapter. "The *principal Cause* of Reprobation is God. "The *Impulsive*, Sin, The *Matter*, the greatest part of Mankind: "Its *End*, the Manifestation of the Divine Justice: Its *Adjuncts*, "Eternity and Irrevocability: The *Effects*, being forsaken by God, "and Hardness of Heart".

Predestination is an eternal Decree of God. What is the *Matter* of that eternal Decree? Men, who did only exist an Eternity after that Decree.

Form of Justification. Those metaphorical Expressions raise material Ideas where there is no occasion for them: Besides, they are very general. One Man takes them in one Sense, and another in a different one; and so they clear nothing.

THERE was a Time when I admired that Method. Nay, I did now and then wonder, that the Matters, contained in the Holy Scripture, were not disposed in such a Method, which appeared to me so proper to learn them, and to dispute about them with Subtilty

XIII. By *Matter*, we may understand what is common to all Bodies, what is to be found *True Matter*: in all of them, and wherein they are perfectly alike. Such is *Extension*; for all Bodies are extended. Which being laid down, the *Form* would consist in the *Varieties* of which that Extension is susceptible in the different Bulk of its Parts, and their several Figures and Motions.

THE Name of *Matter* may be also particularly bestowed upon the *smallest* and most *lasting Particles*, of which Bodies are composed; and the Name of *Form* might be given to the different *Mixtures* and *Combinations* of those Particles.

AND those Particles may be divided into two Sorts, either the *Molecule* of Sulphur; for instance, Salt, Earth, &c. which by their Union will form Iron, Gold, Stones, Wood, &c. or the small Parts, and, as it were, the *Roots* and first *Elements* of those *Molecule*. Those Roots and elementary Parts will be disposed in a certain Manner; which may be the Cause of the Difference of different Sulphurs or Salts, or perhaps only of the different Soils, which are the Receptacles of Salts and Sulphurs.

IN order to know the Matters of which mix'd Bodies are composed in this Sense, one should be able to resolve those Mixtures, to separate their different Parts, and collect those of the same Kind into sensible Heaps. The more exactly
that

Chap. 5. *Thes.* 6. He acknowledges that *the Matter of Creation was nothing*. He says the *Form* of that Creation is *the Production out of Nothing*.

This is sufficient to shew the Confusion occasioned by those material Ideas and metaphorical Expressions in Matters, which are already difficult enough in themselves. If that Divine had been a Bishop, and against Toleration, Woe to the Priests of his Diocese. Besides, had he been in the Prince's Favour, he would have endeavoured to persuade him, that all those who did not admire his Scholastick Language, were contriving a new and dangerous Religion.

that *Analysis* would be performed, either with Fire, or other dissolvents, the more we might be sure that we know the Matter of Bodies, and have discovered their Principles.

WHAT is to be feared in those Operations, is that the Force of the Dissolvents, which separate the Particles, will destroy their Contexture; that the Particles extricating themselves violently one from another, will break, and alter their Figures; and lastly that the smallest and the most active will escape, instead of forming *Moleculæ*, that is, small visible Heaps.

HOWEVER, we may believe we are come the nearer to a compleat *Analysis*, according as the separated Particles contain a greater Number of the Qualities, which they diffused in the Mixture; especially, if those Qualities are more lively and active in the separated Principles, than when those Principles were mutually tempered by their Union.

LASTLY, the Conjecture will go as far as Certainty, if the reunited Principles form a second Time the same Compound with a very small Difference: I say, with a very small Difference, for some Particles do always escape; and it is no easy Thing to give again the same Disposition to all the others.

THE Smallness of those Particles appears incredible, though it cannot be doubted of. An Ounce of Gold is actually drawn into a Thread, that might reach fifty Leagues; and a Grain of Colour, of the Bigness of a Lentil, can dye many Ounces of Oyl; and that Oyl communicates its Colour to the Flame for many Hours, though the Flame vanishes away continually.

*How those
Forms may be
known.*

XIV. IN order to know how the Particles ought to be modified to give a Body a certain *Form*; to make it, for instance, hard, liquid, hot, luminous, &c. we observe, 1. Whatever is *common* to those different Bodies, in which that same Form is to be found, for instance, Fire, Dunghills, and other hot Bodies, otherwise very indifferent. 2. We consider what *shines*, especially in those Subjects wherein that Form is to be found in its highest Degree. In Fire, for instance, we see a very great Mobility. 3. We observe whether that same Mode appears in *weaker* Subjects in a proportionable Degree. 4. We enquire whether that Form, which we suspect to be an Effect of a certain Mode, be *inseparable* from all the Subjects, from which that Mode is not separated; as Fire is never without Heat and Mobility. 5. We observe whether what gives *Rise* to that Mode, produces at the same

same Time the Form, which ought to depend upon it; and whether what takes away the Mode, *destroys* the Form. Whatever produces a Shaking in the Particles, heats a Body; and whatever puts a stop to it, such as a direct and strong Blowing, removes its Heat. 6. The *Generation* of a Thing, when it can be observed, discovers its Form; for a Thing has only what it has received from its Cause. Thus, when we stir Water, and make it foam, because we only produce a Multiplication of Surfaces, each of which reflects some small Light, we conjecture that Whiteness consists in a Reflection of Light somewhat weakened.

BUT to make such a Discovery, the Generation must be neither too slow, nor too quick, lest the Manner of it should escape our Attention.

WE also proceed from a *like* Subject to another, as I have shewed, speaking of that Relation. Lastly, it is sometimes necessary to join together *many Modes*, for the Establishment of *one single Form*, such as the Smallness and Smoothness of Parts, and a confused Motion to explain Liquidity. The illustrious *Bacon* is the first who published all those Hints. He calls them Instances, and gives them singular Names, most of which are Metaphorical, according to the Custom of that Time, when Men were fond of Terms of Art.

XV. IT will be sufficient to observe here, *Simple and compounded Forms.* in few words, that in order to succeed in the Discovery of Forms, we ought to know simple Forms, before we proceed to the Enquiry of the more compounded ones. Whilst Philosophers will be contented to publish separate Treatises upon curious Matters, the Principles whereof have not been yet laid down with great Solidity, their Conjectures will never Rise above Probabilities, as Moralists will never demonstrate the Beauty and Necessity of a good Conduct, the Principles of which have not been set in their true Light.

XVI. BEFORE Nature and Art had been *Natural and Artificial Forms.* well studied, and their Difference was well known, Logicians have been pleased to imagine two Sorts of Forms, *Natural* and *Artificial* Forms (d). But whereas the Design of *Distinctions* is

(d) The best Way of explaining Nature, if it could be frequently practised, would be to counterfeit Nature, and to give, as it were, Representations of it, by making known Causes produce the same

is to clear Matters, and they ought to remove Difficulties, the Distinction I am now speaking of, perplexes Authors to the highest Degree. If they say that Artificial Forms run upon Bulk, Figure, and Motion, they will be asked, What other Principles Nature makes use of? Is any Thing produced without Motion? Is any Alteration made without it? And does not every Thing that moves, act differently, according to its Bulk and Figure, and according to the Bulk and Figure of what it meets with? If they ground their Distinction upon the great Changes, and the Variety of Forms whereby Nature diversifies her Works; they will be told, That Corn is changed into Meal, and then into Bread; that Wool is changed into Cloaths, and Hemp into Paper; Transformations which equal, and even exceed several natural Forms. Lastly, if they insist upon the Imperceptibility of the Ways of Nature, they will also be told, That some Works made with Mens Hands, cannot be unfolded without the Help of Microscopes. The Force of Nature runs upon Motion, Bulk, and Figure, and upon the Collections of Agents with which it works. All human Industry is exerted with the same Helps. Nature is therefore the Model of Art, and Artificial Forms are Natural Forms.

Effects. In such a Case, we should no longer guess; we should see with our own Eyes, and be sure that Natural and Artificial Phenomena proceed from the same Causes, or at least, from Causes not much unlike.




C H A P.



C H A P. VI.

Of Causes and Effects.

I. FTER having compared Things by considering them with respect to what they are, we consider them with respect to what they *can do*; and if we discover that one of them can produce the other, or only alter it, we conceive between the Agent, and what arises from it, a Relation of *Cause and Effect*. And because that Relation does always suppose some real Change, some new Being, or some new Manner of Being, out of our Thoughts, it may be that what happens in that particular Relation, gave occasion to fancy that all the other Relations do also consist in certain Realities, which befall the Terms compared together, and are different from them. The Agent, the Thing acted upon, and the State resulting from that Action, exist out of our Minds; but the Comparison of all those Objects is made within us.

The Relation of Cause and Effect more real than the others.

II. A *Cause* is that which gives *Existence*, *Definition*, the *Virtue* whereof produces a Thing, the *Reality* whereof gives *Rise* to another Reality, and by the *Efficacy* of which a Thing is formed. What is produced, what receives its *Existence*, what arises from the Cause, goes by the Name of *Effect*.

III. THE *Power* of the Cause is the Reality of a Thing considered with respect to the Rise of another Thing, which depends upon it. That Power is called *Active*; and the *Passive Power* is the Disposition of a Thing to receive an Alteration, or it is the Thing itself considered, as being *Mutable*. Those Ideas are Simple, and can hardly be defined but by *Synonymous Terms*. The *Action* of the Cause is the Reality of the Thing, as operating.

Power and Action.

IV. WE are convinced that a Thing has the Character of a *true Cause*, when it implies Contradiction that it should act without producing an Effect; for what surer Sign can we have that a

Character of the true Cause.

Cause is really a Cause, that it deserves that Name, that it is real and not imaginary; I say, what surer Sign can we have of it, than the infallible and necessary Certainty that it will produce its Effect, than the Impossibility that its Effect should not ensue?

GOD is certainly a true and most real Cause; for it is absolutely and plainly Contradictory, that a perfect Being should want Efficacy; that the Power of an unlimited Reality should be limited; and that an Infinite Being should make useless Efforts.

THERE are also true Causes among Creatures. Upon a thousand Occasions, we are sensible that we determine our selves; and there is no Certainty above that of Self-consciousness. It implies Contradiction that a Body should move the Length of a *Toise*, for instance, and that the Bodies lying along that *Toise* be not put into Motion: I say, it implies a Contradiction that a Body should continue to move, and not carry along with it the Bodies that are in its Way. *Motion* does therefore necessarily move, because it is Motion: Its Power may be lost; for Motion it self may cease; but its Force is essentially annexed to its Reality and Existence: It received at the same Time its Efficacy and its Nature. The eternal and unlimited Being, who willed the Existence of Motion, willed for that very Reason its Activity. 'Tis true, its Nature and its Force are derived; but however, it has both of them really, and not in Appearance; and because it does not only appear to be Motion, but is really so; it does not only appear to move and impel, but actually moves, and carries along with it what lies in its Way.

V. I KNOW that some great Men, for whose Merit I have a due Respect, have reckoned all Creatures among occasional Causes, that God alone might have the Glory of doing every Thing immediately. *Upon occasion of the Sun, placed in Heaven, God imprints a Motion in my Eye, and Traces in my Brain; and by that means he makes me see in himself the Spiritual and Eternal Representation of the Sun.* That Hypothesis appears great. *Properly speaking, we have no Commerce but with God. He is the World of Ideas, which the Soul surveys in its own Way.* When our Thoughts are pleased with such a high Flight, the whole material World appears to us of a contemptible Smallness. It vanishes away from the Eyes of a Man, who opens them only to contemplate the intelligible World.

BUT how many Inconveniencies is that Hypothesis liable to, when applied to other Examples? If we speak the Language of those Philosophers, Butchers do not kill Calves and Sheep: God himself does it immediately. Upon occasion of a Knife, he opens the Skin, thrusts in his Arm, and drives out of the Veins a Blood, which would not come out, were it not for that immediate Mover. A Scullion does not Light a Fire in a Kitchin; but a certain Figure of his Mouth, a certain Conformation of his Muscles, are only an Occasion for God to blow it. The Meat between our Teeth affords the supreme Being an Occasion of moving our Jaws. A Philosopher would speak agreeably to Truth, and give the first Cause all the Glory due to it, if he should say that a bad Razor, with want of Skill in his Barber, has afforded the supreme Being an Occasion of cutting his Face. A Man is frighten'd, when his Imagination carries those Examples farther; and I am perswaded that a sacred Respect, removing a great many such Images, did not allow those Philosophers to see the Inconveniencies of an Hypothesis, which would have forced them to give it up.

THE exact Proportion which God has established, and which is constantly observed between Causes and their Effects, convinces me that they are not mere Appearances of Causes, but real Causes: I say, that constant and exact Proportion does not allow me to doubt of it. Otherwise we must say, that the Wisdom of God has left nothing unattempted to give an Air of Reality to mere Appearances, to lead us into Error, and prevent our knowing it. If there was to be no real Cause, it had been as well that the Motion and Impulse of a Cannon-Bullet should be an Occasion of making a Wall steady, as an Occasion of shaking it: A Bullet is, in it self, as proper for the one as for the other. The acute Angle of an Edge has no more Aptitude in it self, to cleave Wood, than an obtuse one; and the Grafts of a Pear-Tree would be as proper Occasions to produce Apples and Cherries, as the Grafts of an Apple-Tree and of a Cherry-Tree.

IT will be said, that the Wisdom and Goodness of GOD required, that Men should easily know the occasional Causes assigned to each Effect, and distinguish those Occasions one from another; and that the apparent Proportion of those Causes, with their Effects, teaches us the Use of them. At this rate, that a Man may have Plums, when he desires it, a certain Graft has been appointed to be the apparent Cause of the Formation of a Plum-Tree, which will be also in time

an Occasion to the Production of Plums. If a Man did not offer to GOD that Occasion of producing Plums, he would never have any. But if GOD has resolved to produce Fruits for the Satisfaction of Men, why so many Windings? Why is not that Desire it self the occasional Cause of what may satisfy it? The Desire is indeed the occasional Cause of the Motion whereby a Man takes hold of a Graft, and inserts it. That Graft is the Occasion of the Tree, and the Tree is the Occasion of the Fruit. But, since GOD alone is the Author of the Motion, whereby the Graft is inserted, and of the Tree and its Fruit, I ask once again, to what Purpose so many Windings? Had it not been a shorter Way to produce the Fruit upon the sole Occasion of the Desire, since that Fruit is only designed to satisfy it? Every Thing that intervenes between the Desire and the Production of the Fruit, is a mere Ceremony without any Efficacy, without any real Force. A Man desires to eat Plums: GOD, far from disapproving that Desire, is willing to display his Power in order to satisfy it. But 'tis not sufficient, that a Man should offer that humble Desire to GOD, as a natural Prayer; if he has a Mind to be heard, his Prayer must be attended with certain Practices, which might be called the Mysteries of Natural Religion: He must take hold of a certain Graft, insert it in a Trunk of a certain Kind, and besides pitch upon a certain Season. At this rate, may not one find a mysterious Allusion to occasional Causes in the Advice of the Sibyl to *Æneas*, not to go to *Proserpine* without a golden Branch, gathered in the thickest Part of a certain Forest. Nothing will be deny'd to a Prayer attended with that Ceremony; nay, the most inviolable Laws of Nature will yield to it; and a Man will return alive from the very Abode of Death (a).

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- (a) *Quod se tantus amor menti, si tanta cupido est,
 Bis Stygios innare lacus, bis nigra videre
 Tartara; & insano juvat indulgere labori;
 Accipe, qua peragenda prius. Latet arbore opaca
 Aureus, & foliis, & lento vimine ramus,
 Funoni inferna dictus sacer: hunc tegit omnis
 Lucus, & obscuris claudunt convallibus umbra.
 Sed non ante datur telluris operta subire,
 Auricomas quam quis decerpserit arbore fœtus.
 Hoc sibi pulchra suum ferri Proserpina munus
 Instituit: primo avulso non desicit alter
 Aureus & simili frondescit virga metallo.*

Ergo

A GREAT Difference ought to be made between a *second Cause* and an *occasional Cause*. Second Causes have received their Existence, their Nature, and their Force; but they are actually possessed of the Reality and Power they have received; whereas occasional Causes have no Aptitude, no Reality to produce their Effects. Thus the Handkerchiefs, touched by the Apostles, were occasional Causes of the Cure of Diseases; and in the usual Course of Nature, it may be said, that the Division, made by a Pin in the Fibres, is an occasional Cause of the painful Sensation it is attended with; for there is no necessary Connexion between a Motion and a Sensation; it is an arbitrary Institution of the supreme Author, who might as well have annexed to that Division the disagreeable Sense we are affected with, when we hear a Dissonance. His Wisdom, Goodness, and Power appear in the Use, Distribution, Constancy and Regularity of those Connections, which he has established between Motions and Thoughts; but we plainly see that the former are not true, necessary, and immediate Causes of the latter, as the Impulse of a Body is the Cause of the Motion of the Body impelled, and as the Figure of a solid Tube is the Cause of the Figure of the Liquid poured into it.

IF there are none but occasional Causes among Creatures, and if the Sun does no more enlighten the Earth than the Earth the Sun, where is the Wisdom of the Creator in the Disposition of the Universe, and the Variety of Creatures? If, properly speaking, GOD does every Thing, and we are only mere Witnesses of what we fancy to be our own Actions, what does Morality signify? What signify the Words *Law, Virtue, Vice, Reward and Punishment*? What becomes of Religion?

IT has been objected against *Homer*, that he changes his Heroes into Gods, and his Gods into Men. Does not the System of occasional Causes expose its Defenders to the same Objection? If their Opinion be true, Man does nothing; he only seems to act, but, in truth, GOD alone does every Thing. A Thought of a Man is the Occasion of another Thought; but GOD, and not Man, is the Author
of

*Ergo altè vestiga oculis, & ritè repertum
Carpe manu : namque ipse volens, facilisque sequetur,
Si te fata vocant : aliter non viribus ullis
Vincere, nec duro poteris convellere ferro.*

Ancid, VI. 133. & seq

of that first Thought. Where will the Fault begin? What can we find in Man, that deserves Punishment? Can any one be more innocent than he, who does no harm, because he is incapable of doing any Thing? It cannot be said neither, that he neglects any good Thing, that he is wanting to any Duty; for neither we, nor our first Parent, who was no less a Creature than we, ever had the Power of doing any Thing whatsoever. Wherefore Man in that System would be perfectly innocent; and in his Disorders and Sufferings, a Consequence of his Disorders, he would be very much to be pity'd; and the first and only Mover, the first and only Cause of all his Ideas, Sensations and Motions, would appear a Being infinitely cruel, who makes his Creatures suffer for doing what they cannot forbear doing, in the Circumstances wherein they have been placed by him. And indeed all Deists and Libertines embrace the System of occasional Causes; 'tis their Favourite System; they love to fancy they are Machines, which have necessarily and unavoidably received from the first Mover all the Motions whereby they are determined.

CAN metaphysical Ideas, general Expressions, (the usual Cause of Equivocations and Fallacies,) hold out against such plain Consequences? Must the Ideas of Virtue and Vice, Law, Obligation, Reward, Merit, Demerit, Reproach and Thanks, Praise and Blame, be accounted chymical, because they do not agree with I know not what metaphysical Abstractions?

WE are told, that to act is to bring something, some Substance or some Mode out of Nothing into Being. But from Nothing to Being there is an infinite Distance; and therefore an infinite Power is requisite for that. Every Production is an infinite Effect, which exceeds the Power of a finite Being. Such are the Speculations whereby the Universe is changed into a Puppet-Shew, and Religion into a mere Mummery.

WHEN a Man says, that whatever exists, is for that very Reason infinitely above Nothing, he uses an Expression almost consecrated by a long Use; but I don't think it to be the more exact upon that Account: For a Being appears to me to be distant from Nothing, only in proportion as it is Being. But when it is only a finite Being, when its Essence, Attributes, Power, &c. are finite, why should I say, it is infinitely distant from Nothing? It can only be distant from Nothing by virtue of what it is; and since it is finite, it has only a finite Distance from Nothing.

I CONJECTURE, that the Error upon this Head is originally derived from an Equivocation, at a Time when Men minded Words more than their Sense. When these two Expressions, *To be, Not to be,* were set in Opposition, the second was said to deny *in infinitum*, because it deny'd not one or two Beings, not a certain Number of Beings, or Kinds of Beings, but all Beings, and all their Kinds. For this Reason finite Terms were called *infinite*, when the negative Particle was prefixed to them. Which gave Occasion to these equivocal Words, *To be, Not to be.* The second Term is infinite; and therefore it is infinitely distant from the first. But by a like Argument I might conclude, that all those who are not very learned, are infinitely far from becoming learned; for I would say, *Very learned, Not very learned.* I might conclude, that a Lamb is infinitely far from becoming a Sheep, &c.

A PIFCE of flat Wax is not so far from receiving a round Form, as Nothing is far from Being; and the Production of a Ball out of Nothing would be a greater Effect than to bring it from a State of Rest to a State of Motion. If one of those Effects was infinite, the other would not be so, since it is not so great. What does not exist, has no Disposition to exist; but a Body, which already exists, is actually susceptible of a certain Figure, and a certain Motion.

SOME Men are not sensible, that by zealously depriving Creatures of all Power, they strike at the very Power of the Creator, who can do nothing that is active and truly real, and whose infinite Power can only produce Appearances, and surround us with Illusions, whereby we are apt to believe that he has done what he cannot do.

WE are used to judge of the Merit and Happiness of Men by comparing them one with another. Some indulge the same Habit, when they form an Idea of the Greatness of God. One would think that Greatness arises only from our Depression; and that though it be infinite, it would lose Part of its Lustre, if we were something more than nothing. But 'tis the quite contrary: There is nothing more natural and reasonable than to judge of the Excellency of a Cause by the Greatness of its Effects. Wherefore, it is more glorious to create intelligent Beings, than mere Matter; the Power and Wisdom of GOD are better observed in Plants than in Stones, and more admired in Animals than in Plants. For the same Reason, it is doubtless more glorious to be able to create real Beings than mere Appearances, and Beings truly
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active than Beings without Force and Activity. Such Beings are more worthy of GOD, whose Power is unlimited.

The first Cause. VI. THESE Reflections lead us to distinguish Causes into their different Kinds. I shall, in the first place, divide them according to the Nature of those Things that go by the Name of Causes, and are really so. In this Respect there is a *first Cause*, and there are *second Causes*.

THE Properties, whereby the first Cause is distinguished, are first to have an unlimited Power, as it has an infinite Essence and Reality. From whence it follows, secondly, that being unlimited, or infinite, it acts with an infinite Easiness, and consequently, that it acts by the sole Efficacy of its Will; for, if the first Cause, being willing to produce an Effect, wanted an Application besides its Will, it would not act with a perfect Easiness, since there is no perfect Easiness, but when the Effect exists, because it is ordered, and when to will and to do are the same Thing. We produce in our Bodies several Effects; only because we will them; our Will, upon many Occasions, without any Effort, is immediately follow'd by the Execution. If it be said, that our Will is only an apparent and occasional Cause of those Effects, which seem to arise from it; I answer, that it is highly proper to ascribe to the Will of GOD the Reality of which the Appearance is to be found in ours, and to believe that he is actually possessed of the Power, whereof we have a Shadow and an Image in our selves.

THIS Notion of the Divine Power is altogether worthy of GOD, and extricates us from many Difficulties. It is not necessary to suppose that his Essence acts continually upon our Souls, to produce in them that numberless Variety of Perceptions, which arise one from another, or are the Consequences of the Motion of the Brain. He acts only by his Will. Let us therefore conceive that he is willing that the Division of the Fibres, made by a Pin, be attended with a certain Sensation; that Sensation cannot fail to arise. Let us conceive that his Will, in creating Man, establishes a Law to regulate the mutual Succession of the Motions of the Body and the Sentiments of the Soul, for all possible Men and all imaginable Cases, (for he has an Idea of all Men, and all Cases,) and that the same Will he had in creating the first Man, remains unvariable; for his Will is not changeable, like that of Men. That constant Will, which has regulated all the Cases, must be attended with the Execution in all those Cases; and because 'tis as easy for the supreme Intelligence

gence to form a thousand Millions of Ideas, as to form a single one, his Will has not only establish'd a Connection between a Pricking and a Pain, but also with the same easiness a Connection between each Thought and each Motion.

WHEN I put a Piece of Sugar upon my Tongue, I don't engage the supreme Cause to produce in me a new Effect, since I do not determine it to a new Will: I only make use of the Will it had, before I existed, and which remains the same still.

THE third Character of the first Cause, is to produce any Effect without any Help; and indeed what Help can it want? The Power of GOD is not limited; and whatever he is pleas'd to make use of, has its Existence from him. GOD has certainly as much Power, as he has given to any Creature he would be pleas'd to make use of.

THE first Cause therefore wants no *Instruments* to act; and it does not suppose any Subject to act upon. It produces every Thing out of nothing. *Creation*, that is, the Existence of a new Being, the Production of a new Substance, is not an Effect above its Strength; this we may easily be convinc'd of. A firm Resolution, and a long Habit, contribute to make those Things, which we undertake, *easy* to us; but an *Effect* is in it self the more *easy*, as it requires a lesser Change; and with respect to its Cause, it is the more *feasible*, as its Reality is inferior to the Reality by which it is to be produced. But we know no Being, and there can be none, the Reality whereof comes near the Reality of God; and how great soever the Change from Nothing to Being may be, it is not above the infinite Power of the necessary Being, who is infinitely far from Nothing.

EVERY Effect consists in a Change; and consequently, the Difficulty or Greatness of an Effect is exactly answerable to the Greatness of the Change wherein it consists. Lastly, that Change is so much the greater, or, which comes to the same, so much the more difficult, as there is a greater Distance from the Term a Thing is taken from, to that wherein it is placed. Now, though we suppose the Difference and Distance from the Non-Existence to the Existence of an infinite Substance to be never so great, yet that Distance will always be infinitely lesser than the Distance and Difference there is between Nothing and the necessary, perfect and infinite Being, and his perfect and infinite Power.

THIS is a convincing Argument. The Power of creating does plainly belong to the first Cause, though the Manner of
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that Operation is above us. We cannot apprehend how the Will of GOD creates, though we can demonstrate that the Power of creating does essentially belong to it. We cannot apprehend what State the Will of GOD is in, when it makes a Being exist by willing; for, in order to have an Idea of the Will of GOD operating in that Manner, we should dispose our Will, as he disposes his own; we should will and think, as he wills and thinks, when he creates Substances; but because we have not received that Power, we have no Idea of it. If we had never willed, we should not know what Will is; it is by Self-consciousness that we have learned to know it. We know such Manners of Willing, as are like those we have experienced. As for the others, we know nothing of them; we cannot apprehend them; and we never experienced that creating Will in our selves.

I HAVE not undertaken in Logic to prove the Existence of GOD, and to treat of his Nature and Attributes. I never designed to confound this Introduction to Philosophy with Natural Theology. I only thought it proper to explain in this Place the Notions of Causes according to the Order of their Kinds.

To conclude what I have to say upon this Head; nothing but a voluntary Obstinacy, and an Averseness to the Idea of GOD, can make one prefer to the System of a first Cause, the System of a Subalternation of Causes *in infinitum*. I acknowledge that there is *Infinity* in both, and consequently Incomprehensibility. But in one of them Infinity is placed in a proper Subject, in the perfect, necessary and unlimited Being, in Reality it self; whereas in the other, Infinity is to be found in a Succession of finite and imperfect Parts, an infinite Number whereof does no longer exist, and numberless Millions did not exist during infinite Ages. It cannot be said, that any of them did necessarily exist; for then it would exist still; and one cannot suppose without Extravagance a fortuitous Infinity, which might never have existed, and which exists only by I know not what Chance. Admit a necessary Being, who has created all Things by a free Choice; and then instead of a dark Chaos you will be surrounded with Light.

A MAN, who is willing to use his own Reason, will plainly see that the several Parts of the Universe, and their Disposition, move us to go higher than what we call second Causes. Nothing can be more incomprehensible than Atoms, Particles of Matter, which, without a Cause, happen to have a certain Form, and to be moved in a certain Manner and
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in a certain Degree, though Extension, and each Part of Extension, be equally susceptible of Rest and Motion, of all sorts of Figures, and all sorts of Motions. It would be more credible to suppose, that Wheels, disposed without the Direction of an intelligent Being, can form a Watch, that goes regularly. The Resurrection of a dead Man, which makes our *Epicureans* laugh, is more easily conceived than their Principles.

A SUCCESSION of Beings, each of which depends upon those, by which it was preceded, I say, such a Succession of dependent Beings, eternal and necessary, is a Contradiction; for, no Part of that Whole would be necessary, otherwise it would be self-existent; and how can that Whole be necessary, if none of its Parts are so (b)?

VII. THE Causes, produced by the first *Intelligent Cause*, and which act by a Power derived *Causes* from it, are *Intelligent* or *Material*. *Intelligent* Causes act not only outwardly, but also upon themselves, as we know by our own Experience. Knowledge and Choice precede their Actions; and we are sure of it by the same inward Experience. I have already sufficiently explain'd the Notion of *Liberty*.

HOWEVER, an intelligent Being does not always consult his Ideas as much as he can, nor suspend his Judgment as much as he should. He does not always sufficiently mind what he undertakes; he does not consider the Circumstances of it with a sufficient Exactness, nor foresee its Consequences with a sufficient Circumspection. And therefore, in his *Ignorance*, he does what his Knowledge would have prevented; and that Ignorance is more or less excusable, as it was more or less in his Power, or more or less his Duty to avoid it.

THERE is an *Ignorance* altogether *involuntary*. Such would be in all Respects the Ignorance of a Man carry'd away and nursed by a She-Bear; and in a particular Case, the Ignorance of a Man, who being dazzled with a violent Blow upon his Eyes, and running away from a cruel Enemy, should meet his Father without seeing him, and throw him down. There is a Cause, which, though *invincible* in some Circumstances, yet is accounted *voluntary*, because it should have

(b) " See the *Bibliothèque Choisie*, Tom. XXVI. p. 280 You will find there the Characters of the first Cause very plainly demonstrated.

have been prevented. Such is the Ignorance of a Man, who being drunk does not know what he does; or the Ignorance of a Judge, who does not understand a Law-Suit, because he neglected to be instructed in his Youth, to use himself to be attentive, and to get a Clearness and Justness of Thought.

A CAUSE, incapable of acting with Knowledge and Choice, cannot be *answerable* for what it does. From whence it appears, that the *Greatness* of a Fault depends upon the Extent of the Knowledge, which has been neglected, and the Easiness of acting according to that Knowledge. The Uncertainty of Knowledge does not set off the Worth of Virtue; for, there is no Virtue in acting at random, and without knowing whether we do well; but we judge of the Degrees of Virtue, by the Obstacles that have been overcome to preserve it. For Liberty was given us, to enable us to prefer the Dictates of the Understanding to the Suggestions of the Senses.

'TIS true, that GOD, who searches the Heart, and perfectly knows our Inclinations, may see in a Soul, which delights in doing her Duty, so great a Desire of performing it, that she would overcome the most discouraging Difficulties: So that the Greatness of Virtue is measured, not merely by what a Man does, but rather by what he could do; not by the Victories he has obtained, but by those he could obtain. When we meet with no Difficulty, we have Reason to congratulate our selves (c). When we meet with Obstacles, we have an Occasion to know our selves; and in our present State upon Earth, 'tis by our Perseverance in those Virtues, which are opposite to our Temper and present Interest, that we can be sure of the Purity of those, to which we are naturally inclined.

VIII. BECAUSE intelligent Causes act with Knowledge and Choice, they can act or forbear acting, and they can act to Day quite contrary to what they did Yesterday; they grow eager or remiss, as they think fit. And therefore they are called *Contingent*, because sometimes they operate, sometimes they are unactive, and sometimes they act contrary to what was expected. But though material Causes always act without Knowledge, and do

(c) Ego illum feliciorẽ dixerim, qui nihil negotii secum habuit: hunc quidem de se melius meruisse, qui malignitatem naturæ suæ vicit, & ad sapientiam se non perduxit, sed extraxit. *Sen. Ep. LII.*

do every Thing necessarily, and according to the whole Extent of their Power; yet, when an Effect depends upon a very hidden Cause, or an uncommon Combination, the Uncertainty we are in about that Event, moves us to call that material Cause a *contingent* Cause, though it be necessary. Our ignorance about that Cause makes the Prediction of its Effect as uncertain, as it was a free Cause. Wherefore that Name goes from the free Cause to the necessary Cause, not because they are alike, but because we are equally uncertain about their future Effects.

UNBELIEVERS and Superstitious Men make an ill Use of the Words *Chance* and *contingent Cause*: And therefore it is necessary to give a right Notion Sect. II. Ch. of them. We have already seen that the I. § 10. Word *Chance* signifies nothing, and that it becomes a vain Sound, without an Idea, when applied to a Cause which is neither free nor necessary. That Word has no Sense, but when it is used to denote a Cause, which is not sufficiently known to foresee its Effects. In that Sense, to say, *Chance has done it*, is the same as to say, *I cannot tell how it came to pass*. Unbelievers, who will not acknowledge an intelligent and free Being to be the Cause of the World, are obliged to ascribe it to a blind and necessary Cause. When they are desired to consider attentively, whether it be possible that a blind Cause should produce such a numberless Multitude of regular Things, and when they answer that such a Disposition is owing to Chance, is it not the same as if they should say, *I cannot apprehend how such a Thing could happen?* Such is at last the Confession of those Men, who pretend to be infinitely more clear sighted than every body else.

AGAIN, if the word *Chance* signifies Nothing, or if it signifies a Cause, or many Causes, not sufficiently known to us; when a Man says that Providence is particularly concerned in the Effects of Chance, he knows not what he says, or he affirms that Providence has a greater Share in Events, according as we know less how they come to pass; but that very Thing is sufficient to shew the Unreasonableness of that Decision, since it is against Reason to pretend to judge of Things that are unknown. When two Effects appear to me very obscure, and I am asked to which of them Providence contributes most, if I am a reasonable Man, I shall answer that I cannot tell; and if one of those Effects is known to me, and the other unknown, Reason requires again from me, that I put off my Answer to that Question till,

till I understand equally the two Terms upon which it runs.

BESIDES, all Men have not the same Degree of Knowledge, nor one and the same Man at all Times; but according as he improves his Time and his Attention, a Subject, which at first appeared to him obscure, will at last be very clear to him. It will not be doubted that there are intelligent Beings, whose Penetration exceeds as much that of the most knowing Man, as the Knowledge of the latter is above that of the most ignorant People. Which being laid down, it must be acknowledged that the same Effect, which appears contingent to the one, does not appear so to the other. A Subordination of Causes, united to produce an Effect, may appear extremely obscure to one, whilst another will apprehend that Series as clearly, as a Clock-Maker sees the Connexion of all the Wheels of his Clocks. Thus one will fancy that Providence has been particularly concerned in an Effect; and another will plainly see that there is nothing extraordinary in it. Is it not a secret Vanity which disposes Men to look upon every Thing they cannot account for, as being above the Power of Nature, and to believe that God directs whatever appears obscure to them?

RELIGION is not free from Obscurity; and it cannot be otherwise, by reason of the infinite Sublimity of its Object. But that Obscurity has been very much encreased by the Laziness of Men, their Want of Taste for the true Objects of Religion, and their obstinate Vanity; and yet they pretend that this Obscurity should be as much respected as the other. As soon as they think fit to draw a Veil over what they are ignorant of, it is a sort of Impiety not to have a Religious Respect for their Ignorance. On the one hand, Men think it convenient to lay upon Providence the ill Success of their own Imprudence; and on the other, they are no less pleased to look upon themselves as the Favourites of that Providence, when Things succeed according to their Desires. By those secret Principles they grow fond of certain Imaginations, and cannot be reclaimed from them by the most evident Reasons.

CAN any Thing be answered to this Argument? God would work in a Gaming-House more Miracles in one Day, than are mentioned in the Old and New Testaments. When an unskilful Man plays at Billiards and wins, 'tis by chance, and consequently Providence is concerned in it. But as soon as he grows better skilled by Exercise, Providence has not so great a share in his Gaming. A Man plays
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at Chefs, he is very much troubled with the Head-Ach, he is weary, he hardly knows what he does; and yet he wins. Providence has therefore presided over his Game in a particular manner. If it be so, Gamsters do not cry out without Reason, *O God!* at a surprising Throw. There are nine White Balls, and a Gilded one in a Bag; and he who takes hold of the latter, is the Happy Man. If he looks into the Bag, he can tell how and why he has taken that Ball; but, if he takes it without seeing it, he cannot tell why he has taken that rather than the others. Therefore Providence has directed his Fingers miraculously; and 'tis but shutting one's Eyes to move Providence to work Miracles. But is it not agreed that Wisdom does always use the simplest Means to obtain its End? How comes it then that Providence frequently rather chuses to work many Miracles by diverting the Hands of those for whom it does not design the gilded Ball, than to work one single Miracle by making the Lot fall, in order to draw first, upon the Person, for whom that Ball is designed? It appears by this Example how necessary it is to form distinct Ideas, that Religion may not be set in opposition to Reason. A clear Knowledge is no less useful in the Practice than in the Theory.

IT is a curious Thing to see how Men bestir themselves to prevent the Effect of some natural Impressions, whereby they might be brought to Truth, and cured of some Errors, of which they are grown fond. A Man believes that Providence is immediately and particularly concerned in Chance Games; and that the Throws of Dice are a sort of Prayers, whereby we beg its Assistance. Whereupon it is natural to propose this Question: Must we then altogether forbear those Sorts of Games? They answer, that it is an impious Thing to pretend to bring Providence into our Amusements, and consequently that it is not lawful to Play for mere Diversion. But, say they, one may Play to recover or preserve one's Health, by such an amusing Occupation: One may desire to Win, in order to make a good Use of one's Gain. But he, from whom I win, and who is not so well pleased with losing, as I am with winning, does he not want Health, or does he want it less than I do? Does he not love the Poor so much as I do? Does he less deserve to win, that he may have the Pleasure of relieving them? Do we offer up Prayers one against another, that are contrary, and yet equally reasonable?

IX. A *necessary* Cause is said to be contrary to a *contingent* one; and we are told that there are three Sorts of Necessity: A *blind Necessity*, like that of a Stone, which falls: A *Necessity of Event*; as when 'tis said that a wise Man will infallibly repair, though very freely, to an Assembly, whether his Duty requires he should go, if he remembers it, and be not prevented by some Illness, or some more urgent Business. Lastly, a *Necessity of Constraint*. This Necessity is *absolute*, when a forcible Power acts upon our Body independently upon our Will; and it is *mixed*, when we are reduced to do what displeases us, in order to avoid an Evil to which we are still more averse. In those Cases, the more a Man is terrified, the less he is answerable for what he does.

MEN have too easily bestowed one and the same Name upon different Things, minding only some Likeness which they observed in them. A Stone does not fail to descend, when it is no longer supported. A rational Man does not fail to repair whither his Duty calls him. And a Man does not fail to resolve upon an Evil, in order to avoid a more grievous one. The first of those Causes is necessary; but the Notion of the others becomes obscure by ascribing to them a kind of Necessity; and after it has been precariously supposed, one can hardly reconcile it with Liberty and Choice.

I CANNOT tell why a fourth Necessity has not been added to the three Necessities just now mentioned. It might be called a *Necessity of Consent*. Thus we necessarily desire to be happy. Man cannot but love and seek his Happiness (*d*). He can put an End to his Life; but he cannot forbear desiring

(*d*) Nemo enim sibi beneficium dat, sed naturæ suæ paret, à quâ ad caritatem sui compositus est: unde illi summa cura est nocitura vitandi, profutura appetendi. Itaque nec liberalis est, qui sibi donat: nec clemens, qui sibi ignoscit; nec misericors, qui malis suis tangitur. Quod aliis præstare liberalitas est, clementia, misericordia: sibi præstare, natura est. Beneficium res voluntaria est: at PRODESSE SIBI NECESSARIUM EST. Quo quis plura beneficia dedit, beneficentior est. Quis unquam laudatus est, quod sibi ipsi fuisset auxilio? quod se eripuisset latronibus? nemo sibi beneficium dat, non magis quàm hospitium: nemo sibi donat, non magis quàm credit. Si dat sibi quisque beneficium, semper dat, sine intermissione dat: inire beneficiorum suorum non potest numerum. *Sen. de Benef. Lib. V. cap. 9.*

desiring what he thinks to be his Good : And when he kills himself, 'tis with a Prospect of being less unhappy; nay, according to his Notions of Things, it is with a Prospect of bettering his Condition.

X. WHEN an intelligent Cause is determined to act by the Idea of a Good it desires, that Idea, whereby it is determined, is an efficient Cause of its Choice and Determination : It is called a *Final Cause*.

THE Idea of Good raises a Desire, which is attended with a Resolution of seeking that Good ; the Resolution puts a Man upon acting, and the Action produces the Effect. This is a Concatenation of efficient Causes, though the first be called a *final Cause*, as it were, to distinguish it from the Efficient. 'Tis true, Liberty can break that Chain, divert the Attention from an Idea, and put an End to the Desire raised by that Idea. A Man can also oppose an Idea to another Idea, and a Desire to another Desire; and herein the final Cause differs from the other efficient Causes, which are necessary, and called *physical Causes*.

THE Object of the determining Idea has been confounded with the Idea it self, because Men *stick to Words*, and because the Thought and the Object of the Thought are expressed by the same Name. And yet the desired Object cannot be always called a *Cause*, since frequently it does not exist even before the Desire, but is only an Effect of it; as when a Man studies to improve his Knowledge, or to get some Reputation; or when a Man marries, that he may have some Heirs of his own Name. For then he is acted upon and determined by an Idea, and not by the Thing he desires to acquire, and which does not exist yet, and will only be a Consequence of his Actions.

BECAUSE the Use of a Thing is frequently the End intended by doing it, that Use is also called a *final Cause*, and sometimes improperly. The Use of a House consists in living in it; but a Man may resolve upon building out of Vanity or Interest; and in such Cases, the final Cause differs from the Use, which is an Effect rather than a Cause.

SOME *Likeness*, as I have already observed in the foregoing Chapters, and in this, has given occasion to impose one single Name upon Things, that are not like in every Respect; and that Unity of Name has occasioned their being confounded together. Thus again, the last Term of a Thing is called its *End*, (as Death, for instance, is called *The End of Man*,) though that last Term be not the Aim, the final Cause, and the Destination.

XI. THOUGH *material* Things act without Knowledge, yet they may be said to tend to their End, when they are subservient to the Use for which they were designed by the intelligent Being who made them; and their most excellent Effects are looked upon as the End for which they were formed. A Tree, for instance, which bears Fruit, tends to what is the End and Destination of a Tree. Now we are sure that certain Works have been made by an intelligent Being.

1. When those Works are of great Use. 2. When among the many Parts, which concur to the same Effect, there are none, or very few, that necessarily depend one upon another, and have among themselves such a strict Connexion, that the Position of the one does unavoidably imply, or absolutely suppose the Position of the other, and is the Cause or Effect of it. For since such a Conjunction of Parts might exist, or not exist, it must have been determined by some Cause to exist, rather than not to exist. That Conjunction not being an Effect of Necessity, must be an Effect of Choice, and consequently of an intelligent and free Cause. Would any Man, who should find a Violin with its Bow, and Notes pricked down by it, ascribe all those Works to a fortuitous Concourse of blind and necessary Causes? There is no Necessity between the Existence of one of the small Boards of the Violin, and the Existence of another; no Necessity between their Figures and their Positions; between the Handle and the Pegs; the Strings and the Bridge; the number and bignets of the Strings; the Bow and the Rosin; the Paper and the Lines; the Lines and the Notes. There is nothing more easy than to discover by a like Reasoning the supreme Cause of Mankind and the Universe. A Man who should look upon a Sphere as a Work of Chance, would be accounted a mad Man; and yet some dare ascribe to Chance the magnificent Sphere of the World (e). Such Thoughts are plain Proofs of Folly and Malignity.

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(e) Qui igitur convenit signum, aut tabulam pictam cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem: cumque procul cursum navigii videris, non dubitare quin id ratione atque arte moveatur: aut cum solarium vel descriptum, aut ex aqua contemplare, intelligere declarari horas arte, non casu: mundum autem, qui & has ipsas artes, & earum artifices, & cuncta complectatur, consilii & rationis esse expertem putare? Quod si in Scythiam, aut in Britanniam Sphæram aliquis tulerit, hanc quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cujus singula

CAN any one number the Parts that are to be united, in order to produce one single Effect, the Sight, for instance? and yet the Existence of each of them is independent upon the others. Remove some of them: Their Effect will be no longer produced; but the others will subsist as before. Though we should lose our Eyes, yet the Light would be Light still; and if the Light was extinguished, our Eyes would be of no Use; but they would not vanish away.

IT is no less ridiculous to say, That the Eye was not made to see, but that it was used for that Purpose, because it happened to be proper for it. That Thought of the *Epicureans* is no less ridiculous than if one should say, That a Book was not written in order to be read, but that it was read, because it happened to be proper for that Use.

BESIDES, the inward Parts of the Body, unknown to most Men, were made for a certain End. Do we apply them to their proper Use, because it has been found out that they were fit for it?

THE Supreme Wisdom may have some Things in view, without designing all the Consequences of those Things. The ill Use Creatures would make of their Faculties, did not hinder the Supreme Being from bestowing them upon Men.

WE affirm, that a Thing is designed for the Use of another, and even may be destroyed by it; 1. When it is very inferior to the other. 2. When it would perish of it self, if it was not destroyed. 3. When there is a Necessity that the most Excellent should provide for its Preservation, by destroying that which is not so excellent. These Reasons justify Man in killing Animals for his Food; for if they were allowed to multiply, the Herbs and Fruits of the Earth would not be sufficient for Mankind, and all the Animals;

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gulae conversiones idem efficiunt in Sole & in Luna & in quinque Stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus & noctibus: quis in illa barbarie dubitet quin ea Sphaera sit perfecta ratione? Hi autem dubitant de Mundo, ex quo oriuntur, & fiunt omnia, casum ipse sit effectus, aut necessitate aliquâ, an ratione, an mente divinâ: Et Archimedes arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis Sphaerae conversionibus, quam naturam in efficiendis, praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta, quam haec simulata solertiùs. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. II.*

Caelestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio, & salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mentem putat, is ipse mentis expertus habendus est. *Id. ibid.*

and what happened in an Island of the *Archipelago*, would happen in the whole Earth. The Inhabitants of that Island would have been obliged to remove from it, if they had not killed the Partridges, which destroyed every Thing.

THE Nature of *moral* Things is known by the End for which they are designed. If you desire to know how they ought to be used; if you desire to know wherein their Perfection consists; consider what they are designed for. After having shewed why the *Ministry* has been established in the Church, the Duties and Rights of the Ministers will be well known. After having laid down that the Use of *Speech* has been established for the good of Men, the Questions about Lies, and the Obligation of speaking the Truth, will be easily determined.

WHAT is the End of *Science*? To improve common Sense. From thence I conclude that Men of the *greatest Genius* have the least Affectation, and the greatest Simplicity.

IF you desire to give a right Judgment about a Book, and to know its true Worth; consider, in the first Place, with what design it was written, and then see how far the Author has attained his Aim.

IF you desire to define *Eloquence*, and to know whether it appears in a certain Discourse; consider the End of Eloquence, and you will see that it is an Art of explaining an important Truth in the most proper Method to make it known, and to inspire a true Love for it.

IN order to judge rightly of the Worth of Things, it ought to be measured by their real Usefulness, rather than by a needless Use (*f*).

THE Desire of reaching one's Aim, makes one think of the *Means* proper for that purpose; and *Wisdom* appears in the Excellency of the Aim, and the Certainty and Facility, or, if you will, the Efficacy and Simplicity of the Means made use of to attain to it.

WHEN a Man is full of his Design, he will easily find out the Means of executing it. If a Preacher desires to be useful, he will be so. If he desires to be useful in drawing Characters, they will be just and inoffensive: He will please and mend his Hearers, without exasperating them. When Characters have an ill Effect, the Preacher has an ill Design, or knows not how to obtain his End.

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(*f*) *Affuefcamus à nobis removeve pompam, & VSU RERUM ORNAMENTA METIRI. Sen. de Tranq. Anim. cap. 9.*

IT is a surprising Thing, that Man, whose Capacity is so limited, and who upon that Account is often perplexed with a small Matter, should acquire so late that *Simplicity* which would prove so convenient to him. I am apt to think the Reason of it is, that Men are not sufficiently acquainted with Simple Notions: They get an Habit of proceeding quickly to compound Objects: They are wholly taken up with them, because they make a more lively Impression, and are more proper to satisfy Vanity and Curiosity. Wherefore the compounded Ideas, to which Men have been used, offer themselves first: And the Mind takes hold of them; and when it finds any Inconveniencies in the Execution, instead of parting with those Ideas, to look for a more convenient Method, it only endeavours to make up those Inconveniencies by new Additions. Men love and adhere to their Productions, and are better pleased to believe they have not seen every Thing, than to confess they have not seen well.

SIMPLICITY is so uncommon, that there is nothing more admired, even in Point of Eloquence; for a new Thought is the more affecting by its very Simplicity, because we are apt to wonder it did not come before into every Body's Mind.

IN point of Religion, as well as in all other Matters, Men will not arrive at *Simplicity* till after many Windings. Wherein they are the more to blame, because the Christian Religion began with Simplicity, as it appears from the Revelation, where Christianity should be only looked for. We commend the Christian Religion on Account of its Simplicity, and we reckon that Simplicity among the Proofs of its being derived from God. We ought therefore to conclude from thence, that whatever is added to Christianity, under Pretence of adorning that Religion, does actually disgrace it. Those who exclaim most against the Subtilties of Philosophers, are frequently Men whose Theology is still more clogged with Subtilties than Philosophy, but with this Difference, that they are less intelligible, less coherent and more difficult to prove.

XIII. It happens sometimes that the *Means* *Divisor of* have nothing in them that is commendable, *Final Causes.* but their Influence upon the End. Such are most Remedies made use of to recover one's Health; and then those Means are *simple Means*. Sometimes they deserve some Esteem; and then because they are used out of Love for them, and to be enjoyed, their Idea may be also

accounted a final Cause; and they are called *subordinate Causes*, because we don't confine our selves to them, but whilst we desire to be possessed of them, we are also willing to make use of them in order to go farther.

ALL Ends therefore are not pursued with the same Eagerness, and all final Causes have not the same Power. Thus there are *principal* and *inferior Ends*. But an End is call'd *Principal*, either in Opposition to *subordinate Ends*, which are like so many Steps towards the principal one, or in Opposition to *accessory Ends*, which are desired at the same time as the principal End, but however do not contribute to it, as they are not opposite to it neither. To live is a principal End: To eat with Pleasure is also an End, but a subordinate one: To improve in Knowledge is a principal End of Study: To live by that Means an easy Life, to get some Preferment, is an *accessory End*.

IT happens but too seldom, that Men invert the Order of Things, that they change the Principal into the Accessory, and the Accessory into the Principal; and what makes that Fault very difficult to be mended, is, that they own it is a Fault, and disapprove it; but the more they disapprove it, the more they believe they are free from it, even when they are guilty of it. A covetous Man, who places his Happiness in Riches, fancies he has a good and reasonable End, though it be far otherwise. A learned Man, who is resolved to domineer, and who, blinded by Ambition, cannot see Truth, when proposed by another Man, flatters himself that he is jealous of his Authority no farther, than it is necessary for the Preservation of Truth. Every body knows his Duty in general: He is well pleased to fancy that he performs it, and saves himself the Trouble of a painful and scrupulous Examination. If you ask a Prince why he loves to reign? He will answer with great Sincerity, that 'tis chiefly to make his Subjects happy, and to find his own Happiness in that of his People. But in order to be undeceived, the principal End ought to be compared with the inferior Ends, when they are opposite, when one of them ought to be chosen, and the other laid aside. Those Cases lay open the secret Springs of the Heart. Does a Man make his People happy by his own and his Mistresses Luxury, by his stately Buildings and ambitious Wars? Are they in a Condition to bear so much Charge? Can it be said, that those Things deserve to be purchased with the Lives and Fortunes of Subjects?

ASK a young Man with what Prospect he studies; whether it be only to get a good Income, or a Preferment, or rather to make himself useful to the Church and State. He will not scruple to answer, as Decency requires; and he will think his Answer is very sincere. But as soon as he has obtain'd the Dignity he had in view, does he go on with the same Ardour? and having attained the End, does he not begin to neglect the Means? He has got a large Income and great Privileges; he must make it his Business to preserve and encrease them, if he can. Why should he take more Pains to get more Learning, and to acquire a greater Merit? Is he not great enough without it? A Clergyman, whose only Design is to be promoted to some Dignity, takes Care to have an Appearance of Learning and Virtue; that Appearance will serve his Turn, and therefore he is contented with it. He goes no farther; he is resolv'd to make a Figure, and to domineer; he will succeed in it by imposing upon the World. In such a Case, a constant Gravity will be of greater Use to him than Virtue.

IT frequently happens, that a Man does not make it his Business to deserve a Dignity, and to enable himself to discharge the Duties of it, but when there is no other Way left for him to obtain it, and when the Advantages of Birth, Interest, and Recommendations, are already possess'd by others.

BUT the principal End does not exclude the accessory ones; and because they are dear to a Man, it does not follow that he confines himself to them. Most People apprehend Things only by Halves, and so confound together very different Relations. An honest Man aspires to a Place suitable to his Birth; he thinks it his Duty, that he may spend his Time, and use his Talents for the Publick Good. It plainly appears, that this is the true Motive he is act'd by; for he will supplant no body; and when a great Post is offer'd to him, for which he is not yet qualified, he scruples to accept of it; he names those whom he thinks proper for that Post; he will not be rais'd to it, but according to the Rules of the nicest Honour; and at last refuses it peremptorily, unless he be allow'd to discharge his Duty in that Station with an Exactness neglected by a great many People. And yet if that truly honest Man does not express a great Zeal for a Person, who thinks he deserves it from him, it will be sufficient to ask how his great Wisdom, so much admired, can be consistent with his exorbitant Ambition. We ought not to be too positive about the Motives by which other Men

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are determined; every Body must be contented to be in that Respect a severe Judge of himself.

WHAT is of no other Use but to bring us nearer an End, is a simple *Means*. What is lovely in it self, and besides serves to carry us farther, if both a Means and an End, 'tis a *subalternate* End. A Fruit nourishes and refreshes me: I am well pleased to see and eat it, independently upon the good Effects I expect from it. A fine Prospect rejoices me. Recreation encreases the Strength of my Mind, and enables me to apply my self to something of greater Importance. I open my Eyes, I eat, I walk, for Pleasure sake; but I don't confine my self to those Things. Those Ideas may clear some important Cases of Morality. We ought not to mind only *Creatures*; we must seek a Happiness greater than that, which they afford; and we ought to thank GOD for all the Comforts arising from them. But for that very Reason we must know and enjoy those Comforts; or else we should thank GOD for nothing, and our Thanks would consist only in Words. *Creatures* cannot be a Proof of the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of GOD, if they have nothing in them that is good, beautiful, and real. But, if they contain something, that is real, beautiful and good, they are valuable and lovely. 'Tis true, they must not take up the whole Extent of our Affection; a more worthy Object ought to have the first Place in our Souls; but it does not exclude the Ideas and Motions over which it prevails.

The Supreme End.

XIV. THE *Supreme End* is that, beyond which our Desires cannot reach: And this ultimate End is consider'd, either in our selves, or out of us. In our selves, it consists in a perfect *Felicity*; and out of us, it is to be found in GOD alone; for all other Objects not being infinitely Perfect, which soever of them we be possessed of, we may conceive, and consequently desire something better. Whatever Happiness we may enjoy in the Possession of a created Object, that Happiness may be greater still, if a more perfect Object becomes the Ground of it. That external Supreme End must necessarily be united to the internal. They cannot be separated without Nonsense. Whoever seeks an Object, desires to have a Sense of it. It is a Contradiction to seek an Object without desiring to enjoy it. To make an Object our ultimate End, is to look upon it, and desire it as the Ground of a perfect State, as being able to satisfy all Desires; and whoever thinks so, does not forget himself. To say, as some do, that we seek in GOD, who is the Supreme End, a Perfection of Holiness,

Holiness, Resignation and Obedience ; but not a Perfection of Contentment, the most delightful Sense, the highest Degree of Happiness, is to fall into the Mistake mentioned by me in the foregoing Chapters, which consists in separating what is inseparable. It is no less absurd to pretend to separate Things, that cannot be one without the other, than to suppose an Union between those that are inconsistent. A perfect Being, infinitely wise, happy, and good, who recommends to us above all Things Goodness, Gentleness, Beneficence, and Generosity, who proposes himself as the Model of those Virtues, and yet leaves in Misery and Sufferings a Man who worships and imitates him in the most perfect Manner, is a Heap of Contradictions, a chimerical Supposition ; and it would be a Piece of Extravagance to dwell upon that Supposition, were it but one Moment, far from making it the Rule of one's Conduct.

IT is no difficult Thing to be convinced, that GOD is the Supreme End, to which all other Ends lead us ; whoever reasons never so little, must acknowledge it. A Man, who lives at random, without any Aim, does not live according to his Nature. He, who makes it his only Business to grow rich, confines himself to the Means without using them. He, who places his Happiness in Honours, places it in Appearances. An ambitious Man has a great deal of Uneasiness, and little Satisfaction. Sensual Pleasures, when too much indulged, wear out the Taste and the Body (*b*). Does a Man resolve to be an honest Man, and to make himself useful to the Society ? But what Sort of Men does the Society consist of ? How often will a Lover of Virtue be mortified in the Commerce of the World ? And how can he preserve his Virtue, unless he strengthens himself with this Thought, That GOD sees him, and will reward him ?

THAT we may truly say, that we make GOD our great Aim, and our ultimate End, it is not necessary to have his Idea continually present to our Minds, and to think of him without any Intermision. This is impossible ; and our Duty requires we should now and then mind a great many Things, which take up all our Thoughts. But our Love for a certain End puts us upon chusing some Means to come to that End, and executing them. We actually think of the End, when we chuse the Means proper for it ; but when they are chosen,

(*b*) Quos voluptas habet, illi aut ejus inopiâ torquentur aut copiâ frangulantur. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. Cap. 14.*

chosen, we think of putting them in Execution. A Man, who resolves to travel in order to improve his Knowledge, does not think continually of that End during the whole Course of his Travels; he must mind a great many Things very different from his Aim, but, however, such as he cannot neglect without departing from that Aim.

IT is but a small Matter to know that the Soul of Man can have an Aim; that the Idea of that Aim is one of the internal Causes, which determine it to will and to act. It is not sufficient to know that one End leads to another; and that there is one beyond which we cannot go, because there is nothing beyond it, because it contains a perfect Felicity. What signifies all this Knowledge, if a Man lives at random? if, for want of tending to that End, and forming and constantly following a Scheme of Life proper to lead him to it, he departs from it continually? if he turns his Back to an infinite Happiness, that he may run after seeming Goods, which frequently prove real Evils?

LET a Man, who believes he is unhappy, ask himself the following Questions. What do I want? What do I desire? Wherein have I miscarry'd (i)? When he has recalled to mind what he intended to do, let him ask himself again, Whether did I design to go by that Means? And what was the Aim of that second Degree of Happiness? If that Gradation leads him at last to Light, to Wisdom, to GOD, who is infinite Light and Wisdom, and the eternal Reward of those who love Light and Wisdom; I will shew him a shorter and safer Way to arrive at that great

(i) Illud maximè revolve mecum; si corpus perduci exercitatione ad hanc patientiam potest, qua & pugnos pariter & calces non unius hominis ferat, qua Solem ardentissimum in ferventissimo pulvere sustinens aliquis, & sanguine suo madens diem ducat: quantò facilius animus corroborari possit ut fortunæ ictus invictus excipiat, ut projectus, ut conculcatus exsurgat? Corpus enim multis eget rebus, ut valeat: animus ex se crescit, se ipse alit, se exercet. Illi multo cibo, multa potione opus est, multo oleo, longâ denique operâ: tibi continget virtus sine apparatu, sine impensâ. Quidquid facere te potest bonum, tecum est. Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? velle. Quid autem melius potes velle, quàm eripere te huic servituti, quæ omnes premit, quàm mancipia quoque conditionis extremæ, & in his sordibus nata, omni modo exuere conantur? Peculium suum, quod comparaverunt ventre fraudato, pro capite numerant: tu non concupisces quancumque ad libertatem pervenire, qui te putas in illa natum. *Sen. Ep. LXXX.*

great End: I will make him sensible, that the best Aim is the easiest to attain to, that to know and desire it constantly, is already to come near it (*k*). But if the Projects of which he complains, because they have proved unsuccessful, did not tend to the great End, why does he vex himself for meeting with some Obstacles, which oblige him to go back in a Way wherein he would have been lost? 'Tis no wonder that most Men should not obtain what they would have; they will not have what they should desire to have, nay, most times they know not what they would have (*l*).

MOST Men have so little Reason to be pleased with themselves, and are actually so little pleased in that Respect, that they think only of concealing their own Faults from themselves, and appearing to others in a Disguise. They affect to commend most what pleases them least; they pretend to despise what they love best; and by degrees they know not what they do, nor what is proper for them. From thence proceed their Weariness, Inconstancy, and Uneasiness (*m*). When a Man is pleased with a Scheme, he has
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(*k*) Ad parata nati sumus: nos omnia nobis difficilia faciliū fastidio facimus. *Ep. XC.*

Tantum enim quantum vult potest, qui se, nisi quod debet, non putat posse, *Ibid.*

(*l*) "'Tis no wonder, says an Antient, that Chance should have so great a Power over us, since we live at a Venture. A Man, who has not in general directed his Life to a certain End, cannot order his particular Actions. A Man, who has not a Notion of a Whole in his Head, cannot place the several Parts of it together. To what Purpose should a Man provide himself with Colours, if he knows not what he is to paint? No one draws up a general Scheme of Life: we only make particular Schemes. A Bow-man ought to know first what he aims at, and then adapt to his Bow the String, and the Arrow. Our Designs miscarry, because they have no Aim. No Wind will serve a Man, who knows not what Port he is to go to." *Montagne, Book II. Chap. 1.*

(*m*) Quoties quid fugiendum sit, aut quid petendum, voles scire, ad summum bonum, & propositum totius vitæ respice. Illi enim consentire debet quidquid agimus; non disponet singula, nisi cui jam vitæ suæ summa proposita est. Nemo, quamvis paratos habeat colores, similitudinem reddet, nisi jam constet quid velit pingere. Ideò peccamus, quia de partibus vitæ omnes deliberamus, de tota nemo deliberat. Scire debet quid petat ille, qui sagittam vult mittere, & tunc dirigere, & moderari manu telum; errant consilia nostra, quia non habent quo dirigantur. Ignoranti quem portum petat, nullus suus ventus est. *Sen. Ep. LXXI.*

always something to do; and when it is well drawn up, he makes no Alteration in it; by which Means he is above Weariness and Inconstancy

Impulsive Causes, external and internal.

XV. THE Will of Man is also determined by other Causes, besides the final ones; it is determined by Causes different from the Idea of a Good we desire to enjoy. Thus the Discourse, the Air, and Tone of a Man, Musick, Walking, Reading, will make us good or ill-humour'd, easy or uneasy; (n) and according to those different States, we form different Projects, and are differently determined. Those Causes, which contribute to determine us in that Manner, are called *Impulsive*. Every final Cause is impulsive; but it appears by the Examples just now mention'd, that every impulsive Cause is not final. But it ought to be observed, that external Objects work upon us only by vertue of certain Dispositions agreeable to their Nature. Threatnings prevail upon a timorous Man; Benefits move a generous Soul. On the contrary, a courageous Man is exasperated by Threatnings; and good Offices do but increase the Haughtiness of those, who fancy that no body can do too much for them. Those internal Dispositions, from which external Causes derive their Efficacy, are called *Impulsive Causes internal*. 'Tis plain, those Causes cannot be separated, nor work without being united.

SELF-

(n) Circumcidenda est concursatio, qualis est magnæ parti hominum, domos, & Theatra, & fora pererrantium. Alienis se negotiis offerunt, semper aliquid agentibus similes. Horum si aliquem exeuntem de domo interrogaveris: QUO TU? QUID COGITAS? respondebit tibi: NON MEHERCULE SCIO: SED ALIQUOS VIDEBO, ALIQUID AGAM. Sine proposito vagantur, quærentes negotia; nec quæ destinaverunt, agunt, sed in quæ incurrerunt. Inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est; qualis formicis per arbusta repentibus: quæ in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur. His plerique similem vitam agunt, quorum non immeritò quis inquietam inertiam dixerit. Quorundam, quasi ad incendium currentium, misereberis: usque eò impellunt obvios, & se aliosque præcipitant: cùm interim cucurrerint, aut salutaturi aliquem non resalutaturum, aut funus ignoti hominis profecuturi, aut iudicium sæpè litigantis, aut sponsalia sæpè nubentis, & lecticam affectati, quibusdam locis & ipsi tulerint; deinde domum cum supervacua redeuntes lassitudine, jurant nescisse se ipsos, quare exierint, ubi fuerint, postero die erraturi per eadem illa vestigia. Omnis itaque labor aliquò referatur, aliquò respiciat. *Sen. de Tranq. Animi, Cap. 12.*

SELF-LOVE is the Ground of the Strength of all Motives; for if we did not love our selves, any State would be indifferent to us, and we should not prefer any Object to another. But according as Self-Love is more or less attended with Knowledge, we are acted by different Motives. The mere Knowledge of the Beauty of Virtue determines one Man to practise it: Another wants that the Majesty of the Legislator should be added to that Motive: A third will not yield to those Motives, unless they be attended with Promises. Some have got such strong Habits, that they cannot mend them without Threatnings. One Man, who holds out against remote Threatnings, yields to present Threatnings; and lastly, he, who cannot be prevail'd upon by Threatnings, will yield to Blows.

SELF-LOVE is concern'd in every Thing; and an Advantage has been given to the Libertines by asserting, that an Action cannot be truly virtuous, if Self-Love has any Share in it; for they take hold of that Principle to infer from it, that Virtue is a chimerical Thing, and that those who are accounted the best Men, have only an Appearance of it; whereby they impose upon themselves and others. *It is not out of Love for Chastity, but out of Self-Love, that a Man is offended at certain Expressions.* But would a Man, out of Self-Love, be offended at it, if he did not love Chastity; and out of Self-Love would he pretend to be offended at those Expressions, if he did not love to be accounted a modest Man? It is a Sophism to set Things in Opposition, which are indeed very different, but perfectly united.

THERE is a very great Difference between loving an Object, without a Prospect of reaping any Benefit from it, and loving it in such a Manner, that Self-Love is not at all concern'd in it. A Father does certainly love his Children in the first Sense, when being upon his Death-Bed, he gives them good Advice, and divides his Estate among them; and in general, a dying Man loves his Heirs in that Sense (o). But because he has some Satisfaction in loving them so, that very Satisfaction confirms him in the Love he bears to them. Love is an Esteem attended with Pleasure; and Self-Love has always some Share in the Pleasure we have, when we do what we think to be reasonable. When therefore it

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(o) *Liberis consultum volumus, etiam si posthumi futuri sunt, propter ipsos. Cic. de Fin.*

is said, that a Man loves an Object for it self, it is in the first Sense, and not in the second.

Occasion. XVI. WHEN we are determined to undertake a Design, because we happen to be in proper Circumstances for the Execution of it, that Sort of impulsive Cause goes by the Name of *Occasion*.

Merit. XVII. WHEN the Reasons, which determine us, are derived from the Qualifications of a Person, who is the Object of our Action, *Merit* is the impulsive Cause of it. The Word *Merit* is taken in a good or bad Sense; for Men deserve Punishments as well as Rewards. *Merit* is not so much an Effect of the Talents, with which we were born, as of the Use we make of them. *Merit* supposes those Talents, but those Talents do not perfect it. Far from perfecting *Merit*, they bear Witness against a Man, not only when he misapplies them, but even when he neglects to make a right Use of them.

Rule. XVIII. WHEN an intelligent and free Being governs himself by certain Ideas, the Cause, whereby he is determined, goes by the Name of *Rule*; and if it proceeds from a Superior, it is call'd a *Law*.

LIBERTY is so charming, and so noble a Present, that we need not wonder Men should be so fond and so jealous of it. The Laws whereby it is restrained, have for that very Reason something in them, which is painful and almost grievous. But in order to induce Man to obey the Laws, he ought to be made so sensible of their Agreeableness to the Excellency of his Nature, that his Obedience may be his own Choice. That Choice is the Perfection of Liberty. We have received Liberty to suspend our Judgments, till Evidence forces us to judge, and our Resolutions, till we are determined to them by Equity. Whoever carries Liberty farther, makes an ill Use of it.

WHAT is the Law? Sound Reason. What is to obey the Law? 'Tis to prefer the Glory of living like a rational Man to the Disgrace of being unreasonable. The Law is a Light, which enlightens us. What a Madness to prefer Darkness to it! Those who treat of Morality, should never lose the Sight of these Principles (p).

XIX. I

(p) *Lex est summa Ratio insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Cic. de Leg. Lib. III.*

Leges quoque proficiunt ad bonos mores: utique si non tantum imperant, sed docent. Sen. Ep. XCIV.

XIX. I HAVE already discours'd of *Example*; but I have not yet consider'd it as a Cause. A good Example sets before our Eyes, and makes us sensible of the Beauty of the Law, without laying any Constraint upon us. A good Man does not bid us to imitate him; he invites us to it, and so tacitly, that he leaves us the Pleasure of a free Choice (q). Nothing can be more proper than the Commerce of honest Men to remove our Prepossessions against Virtue. By such a Commerce we are convinced, that what appear'd to us disagreeable and difficult, is both amiable and easy (r).

*Seç. II. Ch. 3.
Example.*

AN Example is of great Efficacy, because it makes a more lively Impression than a Precept; for the Rule is only expressed in general Words, whereas an Example raises determinate Ideas, and sets the Thing before our Eyes. When an Example is bad, we are more sensible of the Heinousness of Vice; and when it is good, it moves us to an Imitation, because Man, either by the Disposition of his Machine, or through an Habit, or by a Consequence of his Education, is very apt to imitate. Self-Love will not yield to others; and Man's Laziness is inexcusable, when he sees that others have done easily and with Pleasure, what is required of him. I assign more than one Cause of the Power of Examples and Mens Propensity to imitate them. Many look upon it only as an Instinct of Nature, or an Effect of the Constitution of the Organs, and a mechanical Operation. I grant, that the Structure of the Organs does very much facilitate Imitation; but I question, whether it be the only Cause of our Inclination to imitate others. It is certain by a frequent and easy Experience, that those Motions, which have been produced at the same Time by the fortuitous Meeting of two Causes; do not easily separate, and arise again together without wanting the Presence of the two Causes

(q) *Naturâ contumax est animus humanus, & in contrarium atque arduum nitens, sequitur facilius quam ducitur. Sen. de Clem. Lib. I. Cap. 24.*

(r) *Nulla res magis animis honesta induit, dubiosque & in pravum inclinabiles revocat ad rectum, quam bonorum virorum conversatio. Paulatim enim descendit in pectora, & vim præceptorum obtinet, frequenter audiri, adspici frequenter. Occursus mehercule ipse sapientium juvat: & est aliquid, quod ex magno viro vel tacente proficias. Nec tibi facile dixerim quemadmodum proficit, sicut illud intelligam, profuisse. Sen. Ep. XCIV.*

Causes by which they were at first united. One of them is sufficient to revive the two Effects. Our Stomach rises at the Sight of a very neat Ragoo, which is somewhat like another, in which we have found some Nastiness. Some Resemblance in the Air of a Man, or in his Features, or in the Tone of his Voice, or the mere Colour of his Cloaths, brings into our Minds the Idea of a Person very dear to us, and prepossesses us in Favour of that Man, who is somewhat like him. Let us apply this Principle. A Child is hungry; they give him something to eat; he is well pleased, because he loves to eat when he is hungry. But at the same Time he eats, he sees other People eat; and one of those two Causes, which act upon him, will be afterwards sufficient to revive the Effect of the other. When that Child sees again some People eat, the Desire and Pleasure which that Sight was at first attended with, arise again. At first, he eat in the Presence of other People, who eat also; and at the same time he eat, because he was hungry. Afterwards, that Presence does no less revive the Desire of Eating, than if it was produced by mere Hunger. Again, when Children have a Mind to run, they are surrounded with other Children, whose Machine is in the same Disposition, and who would run, though they were alone. Afterwards the Sight of others who run, raises a Desire of running with them, which at first was only occasion'd by the internal Motion of the Spirits.

BUT because a good Example, an Example proper to be imitated, is the Execution of a Law, 'tis plain, that before we take an Example for a Model, we must examine it by the Law. This is seldom practis'd: Men should be directed by the Laws; but they are only directed by Examples. They are willing to suppose them to be good, when given by those whom they have a Love and Respect for. The antient Fathers of the Church ran into vain Subtilties, to justify whatever we read in the Scripture about those Men, who were eminent among the People of GOD; and 'tis a common Thing to justify one's self by the Example of great Men, as if they could not make a wrong Choice, though it be more difficult for them than for others to avoid Error, since they are dazzled with their own Grandeur, frequently ill-bred, and surrounded with dangerous Flatterers. When they distinguish themselves by noble Virtues, their Example ought to confound those who do not follow it, though they cannot sin with the same Impunity.

I GRANT, that Flatterers and Impunity contribute to set off the Virtues of great Men, and to make their Faults more excusable. But it is no less certain, that the contagious Influence of their Example upon others should make them more attentive to their Duty. It may be said, that by one single Fault they are guilty of many Sins.

WHILST some think themselves to be above Precepts, and others take for their Rule those who know no Rule at all, Men will argue very wrong. If the Reader minds this Observation, he will not wonder that I have so much enlarged, in the first Section of this Work, upon those ill Effects of Fortune in Men who are dazzled with it, whether they admire it in themselves, or in others.

SINCE Man is so much inclined to Imitation, it will be difficult for him not to be drawn by ill Examples, if they are frequent before his Eyes, and if he grows familiar with them. 'Tis true, an ill Example has a good Effect upon a Man who hates Vice; for Vice will appear more heinous to him, when it strikes upon his Senses, or when his Imagination, heightened by a lively and particular Description, represents it to him, as if it was present.

BUT an ill Example, in order to produce that good Effect, ought to be presented on its odious side, and never be proposed without making one sensible of its Heinousness. Nothing can be more dangerous than to speak of it indifferently, or only ridicule it, as one would ridicule a trifling Thing. Those who take Delight in Discourses of that Nature, use themselves by Degrees to entertain a more favourable Opinion of Vice, and to look upon it with an indifferent Eye, or as a small Weakness, or a jesting Matter. When a Man grows familiar with the Idea of Vice, he will quickly grow familiar with Vice it self; and as ugly People appear no longer so, when we are used to see them, the same may be said of Vice: The Ignorance of it is a great Help to Innocence (s).

By

(s) Tam bonorum quam malorum longa conversatio amorem induit. *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap. 1.*

Subducendus populo est tener animus, & parum tenax recti: facile transitur ad plures. Socrati, Catoni & Lælio excutere mentem suam dissimilis multitudo potuisset: adeo nemo nostrum, qui cum maximè concinnamus ingenium, ferre impetum vitiorum tam magno comitatu venientium potest. Unum exemplum aut luxuriæ, aut avaritiæ, multum mali facit: convictor delicatus paulatim ener-

By much seeing Evil, a Man is no longer affected with it: Evil appears by Degrees less odious to him, and at length it does not appear odious at all. Nay, a Man goes farther, he likes it, and either out of Complaisance, or Interest, is willing to imitate it. *Tell me whom you keep Company with; and I'll tell who you are:* 'Tis an antient Proverb. *You must needs smell of Soot, if you are always with those that are covered with it:* 'Tis a Sentence of *Epicletus*, He who avoids the Company of vicious Men, secures his Vertue. It has been ingeniously said, that *if a Buff's Letters. Man finds only naughty People in his Way, he will become a naughty Man.*

It requires no small Strength of Mind to be able to practise certain Maxims, when we are surrounded with People, who do not follow them, and even allure us to transgress them. A Man is afraid of going by himself: He hardly dares rely upon his own Notions, when they are disapproved by every body else (†).

ONE cannot sufficiently wonder at the great Influence of the Examples of Men in Authority, when he reads the following Words in *Seneca* himself: *Catonis ebrietas objecta est; at facilius efficiet, quisquis objecerit, hoc crimen honestum,*
quam

vat & emollit: vicinus dives cupiditatem irritat: malignus comes quamvis candido & simplici, rubiginem suam affricuit: quid tu accidere his moribus credis, in quos publicè factus est impetus? Necessè est aut imiteris, aut oderis. Utrumque autem devitandum est: ne vel similis malis fias, quia multi sunt; neve inimicus multis, quia dissimiles sunt. Recede in teipsum quantum potes: cum his versare, qui te meliorem facturi sunt: illos admitte, quos tu potes facere meliores. Mutuò ista fiunt, & homines dum docent, discunt.
Ep. VII.

Nam enim omnibus horis ferè aliquid atrociter fieri videmus aut audimus, etiam quia natura mitissimi sumus, assiduitate molestiarum sensum omnem humanitatis ex animo amittimus.

Id agere debemus, ut irritamenta vitiorum quam longissimè profugiamus. *Sen. Ep. LI.*

Hærebit tibi avaritia, quamdiu avaro fordidoque convixeris: hærebit tumor, quamdiu cum superbo conversaberis: nunquam sævitiam in tortoris contubernio pones: incendunt libidines tuas adulterorum fodalitia. Si velis vitiis exui, longè à vitiorum exemplis recedendum est. *Ep. CIV.*

(†) Ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas, & recta ire via te credas, nihil avocatus transversis multorum vestigiis passim discurrentium, & quorundam circa ipsam errantium viam. *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap. 2.*

quam turpem Catonem. “ Drunkenness has been objected against *Cato*; but it would be more easy to justify that Fault, than to condemn *Cato*.”

AN Historian may do a great deal of Mischief by presenting a vicious Example on a certain side, which conceals the Heinousness of it. *Quintus Curtius* makes *Alexander* a continual Object of Admiration. The restless Temper of that Prince, his insatiable Ambition, his Love of Slaughter, all those Things are Greatness of Soul, Vigilance, Intrepidity. By that Means he raised himself above the most common Weaknesses, the Fear of Pain and Death. This is sufficient to induce a fierce Man to imitate *Alexander*, and place his Glory in chimerical Things.

AN illustrious Man pretends that we ought to believe without any Examination. Another, whose Name is no less celebrated, runs into Scepticism and Irreligion. Some follow the one or the other, and fall into Superstition or Libertinism. Instead of an Examination, which would be easy and safe, they rather chuse to go upon a very obscure and uncertain Supposition, *viz.* that no Enquiry ought to be made after those whom they are pleased to admire. But, how do they know that Prejudices, Humour, Laziness, Precipitation, Vanity, the Pleasure of contradicting others, and Policy, have had no Share in the Opinions, which are thought to be sufficiently justified by the Names of their Authors.

'Tis only after many Reflections upon the Folly of Men, that I have at last understood how it comes to pass, that grave Men are not afraid of the ill Effects which the Obscenities to be found in Mythology, and the Poets, may have upon young People. It seems to me that it were better to make them sensible, by a modest Silence, of the Danger arising from those Things; but, on the contrary, they learn them from their Masters in Lectures; that begin with a Prayer. Does the *Latin* Tongue sanctify every Thing? Those who look upon it as the Language of the Church, will not say so, and much less those who profess to believe that it is not more holy than the most vulgar Languages.

A WRONG Use is made of the most holy Examples. The Apostles made an ill Use of the Example of *Elias*; and an ill Use has been also made of the Examples of Christ himself. *We read that he wept*, say some; *but we don't read that he did ever laugh*. They dare conclude from thence, that a Man must never laugh. They would be

well pleased, if we should draw the same Consequence ; for it would make their ill Humour venerable.

EXAMPLES ought to be examined by the Law, to make a right Judgment of them ; and the Sense of the Law ought not to be determined by Examples. Nay, tho' an Example appears to be without any Fault, all the Circumstances of it must be examined before we think our selves bound to imitate it. According to the Difference of the Circumstances, the same Action will be good, indifferent, or blameable. Christ reproved his Apostles for their Desire of imitating *Elias*. His turning out of the Temple those who profaned it, is an Action which Servants and Subjects cannot lawfully imitate. He was a Prophet, a King, a Victim, and a Priest. A Man should be invested with the same Characters, to have a Right to imitate what Christ did in those Capacities.

MEN are too apt to imitate others. It were frequently much better to follow one's Genius, and to improve it. Such a one might have become a Model, had he not been contented to take others for his Model. It is more easy to see what others do, in order to do the like, than to find out a new Way in order to do better (*u*).

THE same Laziness, whereby a Man confines himself to Imitation, is also the Reason why he imitates only what is most easy in the Model he has pitch'd upon. This is one of the Reasons why Copies are always inferior to Originals (*x*). The Disproportion frequently to be found between the Genius of the Model, and the Genius of the Copist, affords a second Reason of it. A Man is constrained, when he goes out of his Character, and consequently does every Thing wrong. Art shews it self too much, and cannot imitate Nature, when contrary to it.

IF

(*u*) Atque esse tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur, & suapte naturâ, quod velint, sine cujusquam similitudine consequantur : quod & in vobis animadverti rectè potest, Cæsar & Cotta, quorum alter inusitatum quidem nostris Oratoribus leporem quemdam & sâlem, alter acutissimum & subtilissimum dicendi genus est consecutus. Neque verò vester æqualis Curio, patre, mea sententia, vel eloquentissimo temporibus illis, quemquam mihi magnopere videtur imitari, qui tamen verborum gravitate & elegantia & copia suam quandam expressit quasi formam figuramque dicendi. *Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.*

(*x*) Ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas. *Id. Lib. III.*

IF we could use the Eyes of the Mind as easily as those of the Body, we should perhaps discover as many Differences between the Characters of Men, as between their Faces. *Cicero*, who had carefully studied the excellent Orators, found among those, whom he places in the first Rank, as many different Characters, as different Names. Now it is certain, that among that prodigious Variety of Characters, a Man pitches upon a Model long before he is able to know his own Character, or even the Character of the Author he designs to imitate. Chance generally determines what would require a very careful Choice. (y)

SOME imitate a Man, because 'tis their Interest to court him. Others imitate another Man, and look upon him as an accomplish'd Person, because he is the most eminent in the small Sphere, within the Bounds of which they would confine themselves. They fancy they will almost attain to Perfection, if they come near a Model, which happens unluckily to be very remote from it. Besides, every thing appears great and admirable to a Man of a shallow Genius, in an Object which seems to offer something great and admirable. He is highly pleas'd, if he can hit upon the most indifferent Characters of his Model, nay, he thinks he does Wonders, when he copies the Faults of his Original.

ONE must therefore begin with a careful Study of the *Rules*, and then perceive the excellent Effects arising from their Observation, in those Examples whereiu they have been followed. Those excellent Effects must be set in Opposition to the Faults occasioned by the Ignorance and Forgetfulness of the Rules. When a Man has got a Justness of Thought by the Study of the Rules, he will get a Taste by their Application to Examples.

SENECA is partly mistaken, when he says, *Longum est iter per precepta, breve & efficax per exempla*: "It requires a great deal of Time to be instructed by Precepts: Examples afford a shorter and more effectual Method." I grant that Examples afford a more effectual Method, but not shorter; for one must begin with Precepts to avoid being impos'd upon by Examples. SHALL

(y) Diligentissimequè hoc est eis, qui instituunt aliquos atque erudiunt, videndum, quo sua quemque natura maximè ferre videatur. Etenim videmus ex eodem quasi ludo summorum in suo cujusque genere artificum & magistrorum exisse discipulos dissimiles inter se, attamen laudandos, cum ad cujusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur, *Id. Lib. III.* H h †

SHALL I exprefs my felf obscurely, if I fay that there is a very great Difference between *Imitating* and *Copying*? A mere Copift borrows the Thoughts and Words of another, and repeats them like an Echo, or like a Looking-Glafs, which represents the Features, the Air and Motions of a Man. Nay, thofe fervile Copifts may be compared to thofe Glaffes, which diffigure more or lefs the Objects represented by them. But a true Imitator is like his Models, becaufe he has, as well as they, his own Character. He is alfo like them, becaufe penetrated with the fame Maxims, he follows them without any Labour; and becaufe inftead of pilfering up and down, he fetches every Thing from his own Genius, or from his own Subject.

*Sole Cause,
and conjoined
Caufes.*

XX. THE general Idea of *Cause* admits of many Determinations, whereby it is diftinguifhed into feveral Kinds. The Divifions of *Caufes* above-mentioned have been taken from their Nature. I fhall now divide *Caufes* into feveral Claffes, according to their *different Manners of acting*, when that Difference does not fo much proceed from the Difference of their Nature, as from the Difference of their Operation.

A CAUSE produces its Effect, either *alone* or *jointly* with others. A *Cause* produces its Effect *alone*, either *absolutely*, as God, when he created the World; or it is a *sole Cause in its kind*, when the others joined to it, are not of the fame Order, and do not act in the fame Manner. Such a *Cause* is therefore a *sole Cause*, not *absolutely*, but *in fome Refpect*. Thus the Construction of a Building is afcribed to one fingle Architect, though he was helped by many Workmen. A State is governed by one fingle Master, when the Supreme Authority refides only in one Perfon, though he follows the Counfels of many.

*Conjoined
Caufes, Co-ordi-
nate or Subordi-
nate.*

XXI. ALL conjoined *Caufes* do not bear that Name in the fame Senfe. Sometimes they are all of the fame Order, and act in the fame Manner; and they are called *Co-ordinate*. Thus all the Weights acting jointly upon a Board to break it, are *co-ordinate Caufes*; Each of them has the fame Power. Sometimes the Power of fome *Caufes* is occafioned by others; and they are called *Subordinate*. In a Mill, the fall of the Water occafions the Motion of a Wheel; that Wheel puts others into Motion; and fo there is a Subordination as far as the bruifing of the Corn. It appears from thence that the

fame

same Cause may be single in one Respect, and joyned to others in another Respect.

XXII. THAT Cause which puts the others into Motion, and without the Motion of which the others would not have acted, goes by the Name of *Principal Cause*, in Opposition to those that are set to work by it, and are called *less Principal*.

Principal Cause.

BECAUSE those Ideas have been entertained by the Vulgar, whose Language is very *Equivocal*, and because they have been treated of by the Schoolmen, who could not boast of being more exact than the Vulgar, there is hardly any Term upon that Subject, but what has more than one Signification. A Cause, for instance, may be also called *Principal*, when it has contributed most to the Production of an Effect, and the Success of an Enterprize, an Honour, which is sometimes due to one of the subordinate Causes. It frequently happens that an Enterprize is rashly formed; and its happy Success is only owing to an unforeseen Circumstance; and yet all the Glory, or at least the principal Glory of that Success, is often ascribed to the Author of that rash Project. And if those who had the greatest Share in that happy Circumstance, are few, or Men of no Note, they will not be so much as talked of. I have been informed by an Officer of great Merit and Wisdom, that one of the greatest Princes, and most celebrated Captains that ever was, taking a View of his Army from a rising Ground, told with a smile one of his Generals, whom that Officer attended as his Aid de Camp: "Do you see the Extent of that Army?" "'Tis thought that in a Day of Battle we direct all those Troops; and we are highly commended for a Victory, to which a Sergeant has perhaps contributed most." That Discourse was no less True than Modest. The Fault of a General may render the Skill of his Officers, and the Courage of his Soldiers useles: He will then be, in all Respects, the principal Cause of the Loss of a Battle. But when he is looked upon as the *Principal*, and almost only Cause of a signal Victory, 'tis rather out of Affection for him, than out of Knowledge. There is nothing more necessary than the Ability of a General, since one of his Faults is sufficient to spoil all; but what can his Capacity do, unless it be seconded?

THE *Romans* were obliged by a particular Reason to ascribe to their Generals the principal Part of a happy Event. Their Principle was not solid; but they argued consequent-

ly. Whether the General was present or absent, the Auspices were taken in his Name; and according as the Gods favoured his Person, those Auspices were happy, as well as the Event, which verified them. A Name less acceptable to Heaven would have altered the Face of Things.

BUT now, when Glory is distributed, and given to great Men in proportion to their Grandeur, many People would be at a Loss, if they were to justify their Praises. We love to hear of a great Event; for what strikes lively upon the Imagination, affords Pleasure; and because we concern our selves in it, we must needs praise it. But whom shall we praise? We are more affected with a great Name; and it seems there is more Glory in praising it; for when we commend our Equals, we seem to depress our selves; whereas the Elevation of a great Man is so much the more consistent with the Vanity of his Inferiors, as he appears to have a greater Merit, and to be more worthy of his Rank. And therefore we love to praise him, and to think he deserves the Encomiums we bestow upon him. This is a Privilege of great Men. What draws Hatred and Envy upon others, draws Love and Admiration upon them. Besides, it is the Interest of those, with whom they are surrounded, to court them; and others glory in thinking and speaking as Courtiers do; by which means Praises are repeated from Mouth to Mouth, and bestowed without Knowledge. Nay, the Happiness of a People, the Conquest of strong Places, and great Victories, are ascribed to a Prince, who spends the greatest Part of his Time in good Cheer, Musick, Love, Hunting, and Gaming. In the Commonwealth of Learning Men do not get a Name so easily, and purchase some Reputation at so cheap a Rate. Though a Man, plunged into Pleasures, should bestow Pensions and Libraries upon the Learned, yet in reading the Works to which he would have contributed by his Liberality, it would not be said of him, What a learned Man he is! As it is said of a Prince, What a Hero! What a Conqueror! Wherefore Prejudices and Passions are generally the Judges of Merit, and ascribe to a Cause the Honour of having more or less contributed to an Effect. But if we desire to judge of it out of Knowledge, we shall find the Questions of that Nature very much compounded. They may be considered in several Respects; and in order to determine them rightly, one must attend to the Rule of Comparisons, that is, compare together only Things of the *same kind*. I shall therefore compare an Attempt with an Attempt, a Danger with a Danger: I shall consider

consider how far the Wisdom of the Scheme has contributed to its Execution; what Efforts that Execution required; and what Dangers it was exposed to; that I may judge who contributed most to the Plan, who exposed himself most to execute it, and who made the greatest Efforts.

XXIII. THE *Equivocation* of the Words *principal Cause*, has almost carried me into a Digression. Sometimes many Causes are reciprocally looked upon as principal Causes; which happens when they act in concert.

Co-ordinate Causes all Principal.

IN such Cases, though many Causes have concurred to the Production of one single Effect, yet the whole Effect is ascribed to each of them, because each of them has not only contributed to the Production of part of the Effect, but besides, has been concerned in the whole Effect. Thus when many People run to put out a Fire, one of them saves a Beam, another a Door; but besides, each of them uses his utmost Endeavours to preserve the Whole. In like manner, when many Incendiaries set a House on Fire, each of them is answerable for the whole Loss, as if he was the sole Cause of it.

XXIV. AT other times Co-ordinate Causes act in such a Manner, that each of them is only the Cause of part of the Effect.

Total and partial.

Thus, though many Robbers should meet by chance to plunder a House, each of them would be only obliged to restore what he has taken away. I speak of the Obligation of restoring, which I distinguish from deserving to be punished. Co-ordinate Causes in this last Sense are called *Partial*, and the others just now mentioned, are called *Total*. But this last Word is still very *Equivocal*, and admits of several Senses; for, the Conjunction of Partial Causes, forms, as it were, one single Whole, which goes also by the Name of total Cause. Besides, that Name is bestowed upon the Cause, which is *single absolutely*, and upon the Cause which is the *only one of its Kind*, and of its Order, provided it contributes to the *whole Effect*; and in that Respect there may be many total Causes of one single Effect, but subordinate Causes. A Book is a total Production of one Mind; one Hand that writ it, is also the total Cause of it in a certain Sense; and so is in its kind one single Pen, that was made use of. The Influence of each of those Causes reached the whole Effect.

XXV. WHEN many Causes contribute to one Effect, those are called *immediate*, which Act upon the very Subject in which the Effect is produced, and so reach the Effect it self, and touch it. But those Causes, the Action whereof does not reach the Effect, but consists only in setting other Causes to work, are called *Mediate*; and among them, some are more *remote* than others.

XXVI. SOMETIMES remote Causes afford only to other Causes, less remote, a Matter to Act, or they facilitate the Occasions of Acting: These are *preparing* Causes. Nay, sometimes the whole Influence of a Cause consists only in removing the Obstacles, which might hinder the Action of the other Causes from producing its Effect. These are called, in the Schools, Causes *without which* the Effect does not happen.

XXVII. WHEN the same remote Cause has many different Effects, when it does equally Exercise its Power upon several Subjects; and that Power is differently diversified by the Agents to be found between that remote Cause and its Effects; such a Cause is called *universal*; and those which determine its general Power, are called *particular* Causes.

IN order to determine which of those Causes has the greatest Share in the Production of an Effect, one should in the first Place know the Nature and Manner of acting of each of those Causes, and then observe, by comparing them together, the Rules which I have laid down before. But Men are not so nice about it. Among many Causes, which act jointly, that which affects the Senses most, and by that means is the most easy to be discovered, is commonly more minded, and frequently the only one that is attended to. Thus we are mistaken about the Causes of Diseases incident to the human Body, and of the Disorders which disturb the Society and the Body Politick.

XXVIII. WHEN in a Subordination of Causes, each of them follows in its Motions the Direction of the principal Cause, that Subordination is called *essential*. But if some of them, by their own Activity, depart from the Direction of the principal Cause, and by that Means break the Series of the Motions designed to produce an Effect, that Subordination is looked upon as *accidental*; and what is defective in the Effect, is not imputed to the principal Cause, if it

was

was not in its Power to foresee the Inconveniencies, whereby its Design would be disordered ; or if having foreseen them, it was not obliged to suspend its Action, and to give over the Production of some important Effects, in order to prevent some Inconveniencies. Wherefore in such Cases, what is good in the intended Effect, ought to be of such a Nature as to deserve that one should overlook the Inconveniency which attends it, and which cannot be avoided without giving over an Effect more valuable and more necessary, as a Good, than the Inconveniency is odious, as an Evil. I say, it ought to be more proper and more advantageous to procure that intended Good, than to neglect it in order to avoid the Evil with which it is attended. It is better, for instance, to attack and sink Pirates, though some innocent Persons, whom they made Prisoners, will perish in the Attack, than to give them, under that Pretence, full Liberty to infest the Seas, and to encrease every Day the Number of unhappy Men.

BUT an Architect is blamed, and answerable for the Damage, when the Materials he made use of, occasion the fall, splitting or leaning of an Edifice, though otherwise raised according to all the Rules of Art ; because he ought not to mind only the Disposition of the Materials, but also their Nature.

IT is sometimes right, but sometimes wrong, to judge of a Project by the Event. When nothing happens but what was in the Scheme ; when no Part of the Event is owing to happy Circumstances, which could not be expected ; when every Part of the Success is an Effect of the Precautions and Attention of him, who is the principal Cause of it ; the Event is rightly looked upon as a Proof of his Ability.

BUT when a Man must necessarily resolve upon something, and does it by the most probable Appearances, for want of an infallible Certainty, which the Nature of Things does not permit him to have ; if some Circumstances, which could neither be feared, nor prevented, occasion the Mis-carriage of his Undertaking, the Event proves nothing against him. In such a Case, one may rightly say : *Omnium rerum consilium sapiens, non exitum spectat.* A rational Man does not mind so much what has happened, as what was designed to be done, and the Reasons for resolving upon it (d).

THAT

(d) Nunquam enim temeritas cum sapientia commiscetur: nec ad consilium casus admittitur. *Cic. pro M. Marcello.*

THAT Propensity of most People to judge of a Design only by the Event, does Good and Harm in the Society. It makes a Man wary: He will be sure of the Success, knowing how difficult it is to justify a Project, when it miscarries. But some Matters are not capable of an infallible Certainty: And upon those Occasions, the Fear of being overwhelmed with Reproaches, or Banter, for the ill Success of an Undertaking, makes a Man give over some Thoughts, which might have a noble Effect. One must have an uncommon Zeal to expose one self to the Hazard of being blamed, rather than neglect an Occasion of doing what will probably have a very good Success (e).

XXIX. BECAUSE little Care has been taken to bestow a true Name upon each Cause, I have been obliged to spend the greatest Part of this Chapter in clearing the Confusion brought into this Matter. I must go on with that Work. When Causes less principal have no Activity of their own, and act only as they are directed by the Principal, they are called *instrumental Causes*. Thus a Pen is an *Instrument*, because it writes only by being moved. It appears from thence that *intelligent Causes*, which are capable of Liberty and Choice, cannot be called *instrumental Causes*, but in a figurative Sense. In this Sense, a Man, who lays aside his own Activity, to be altogether governed by others, without any Examination, will be called an *instrumental Cause*. Wherefore we ought not to take in a literal Sense what is said of a Murderer, for instance, or a Poisoner, that he was an Instrument in the Hands of the first Cause, to put an End to the Life of an innocent Man; for the first Cause, infinitely Wise, Good, and Holy, has not directed such a wicked Man to execute that horrid Project. When it is said, upon such an Occasion, that we must not mind only the Stone that gave the immediate blow, but go back as far as the Hand which directed it, the meaning of those Words is this: We ought to bear a Misfortune as patiently, as if
the

Hoc plerumque facimus, ut consilia eventis ponderemus; & cui bene quid processerit, multum illum providisse; cui secus, nihil sensit dicamus, - - - ut jam nihil esse videatur, nisi divinare, sapientis. *Pro C. Rab. Post.*

(e) "Those Men (*says Montagne, Book II. Chap. 34. speaking of Alexander and Cæsar*) had more than a human Confidence in their Fortune. One of them said, *That Enterprizes were to be executed, and not debated.*"

the Blow was come immediately from the supreme Cause. The Reason of it is, that nothing happens without the Knowledge of the supreme Being; and since that Being, though Good, Holy, and averſe to Evil, has thought fit to permit it, we ſhould be certainly in the wrong to murmur about a Thing, which he tolerates with great Patience.

THE ſupreme Being, who is as Wiſe as he is Powerful, who loves Order and Equity infinitely more than the wiſeſt and beſt Men, does perfectly know the Thoughts of all Mankind, and has future Things in his Power. If our Knowledge could attain to the Knowledge of the ſupreme Being, we ſhould ſee that he diſpoſes of all Things for the beſt. And therefore whoever is grieved at what he orders and ſuffers, is wanting to the Reſpect due to him. It is always wrong to loſe our Time, of which we can never be too ſparing, in reflecting upon Events, that are not in our Power. Every Body has within his Cloaths a petty Kingdom; hard to be governed: Wrong Notions and Rebellious Thoughts ariſe in it. We muſt mend, reſreſs, fight, and triumph: We muſt be ſenſible ſometimes of the Shamefulneſs of a Deſeat, to riſe up again; and ſometimes of the Pleaſure of a Conqueſt, and the Charms of a Victory, to engage a new Battle. Beſides, a Man is ſurrounded with Inferiors, Equals, and Superiors. We owe an Homage to ſome Men: Others pay us a Tribute. We muſt be juſt to all, and uſeful to every Body, if it be poſſible. Thus we are a Compound of Meaneſs and Greatneſs, Knowledge and Ignorance. A wiſe Man is in his own Eyes, what Noveliſts will have their Heroes to be in the Eyes of the World. God orders, directs, and permits: In all thoſe Reſpects I am in the wrong to grow impatient. Wherefore I reſpect what is not in my Power, as if it came from the Hand of God; for he does not prevent it, and has ſome Reaſons not to do it.

IT is alſo evident, that Men make a very ill Uſe of the Word *Instrument*, and do not ſufficiently mind the true Notion of it upon a thouſand Occaſions. Though they are guilty, yet they pretend to juſtify themſelves by ſaying they have only acted as Inſtruments, and that if there is any Harm in what they do, the Cauſe which they obey is only anſwerable for it; as if Men were allow'd to renounce their Knowledge and Liberty, to make no Uſe of them, and to ſubject themſelves to the Will of another, without enquiring whether he commands lawful or unlawful Things. 'Tis certainly a horrid Scandal to ſee Chriſtians, that is, Men who call themſelves Diſciples of the GOD of Peace, and Children

of the Father of all Nations, sell themselves, in a manner, to plunder and to kill, without examining whether the Order for doing so be grounded upon Reason, or tends only to ravish what belongs to others, and to destroy with Fire and Sword those, who take up Arms in Defence of their Rights against unsatiabable Usurpers, and Disturbers of the Publick Peace (b).

HERE we may see how little most Men agree with themselves. One would think from their Words, that they adore their Princes; and yet at the least Signal from them, there is no Meanness, no Injustice, no Cruelty, but what they will be guilty of, without any Scruple, being persuaded that all those Things will be laid upon the Prince. The Truth is, they love no Body but themselves, wherein they use their Masters in their own Way; for, the latter pretend to love, and yet love no Body. One would think, they do not look upon other Men to be of their own Kind; for they use them like Dogs and Horses, which they kill by using them; and when they die, they are quite forgotten, and others supply their Room. Most Subjects likewise, without any true Love for their Masters, whom they seem to adore, think only of raising themselves. With that Prospect they flatter and obey with Eagerness; and because the readiest and blindest Obedience is generally the most acceptable, they perform it; and a mere Effect of an ambitious and unjust *Interest* is call'd a *Duty*, Fidelity, the Love of one's Country, though in many Cases, that blind Obedience be directly contrary to the Interests of the Prince and Country. Thus Vice is honour'd with the Name of Virtue. Those Inconveniencies might be prevented, if Men, instead of being satisfied with confused Pretences, would govern themselves by *clear Ideas*, and well defined Notions.

AN ill Use is made of Instruments, when they are used contrary to their natural and lawful Destination. Wine is designed to rejoice and strengthen: An ill Use is made of it, when a Man drinks so much, as to grow stupid and destroy his Health. The lawful Use of the Sword consists in defending one's self, and protecting the Innocent against their

(b) Ex quo pecunia in honore esse cœpit, verus rerum honor cecidit; mercatoresque & venales invicem facti, quarimus non quale sit quidque, sed quanti. Ad mercedem pii sumus, ad mercedem impii. Honesti, quamdiu aliqua illis spes inest, sequimur, in contrarium transituri, si plus scelera promittant. *Sen. Ep. CXV.*

their unjust Aggressors ; an ill Use is made of it by taking away a Man's Life, without having a Right to do it.

IT is a Query, whether the Use of Instruments ought to be laid aside by reason of the ill Use that is made of them. It ought to be laid aside, when the same End can be attain'd by other Means, and when the Danger, arising from the Abuse, exceeds the Benefit arising from the Use. But when Instruments are necessary for an important Use, and the Abuses may be prevented, what is more useful would be preferred to what is less useful, if the Use was laid aside to avoid an Abuse. Besides, one must examine whether an Abuse, being prevented one Way, may not creep in many other Ways; for why should wise Men deprive themselves of some comfortable Things, of which they can make a very lawful Use, if the Inconveniencies which they would prevent by yielding their Right, are brought in still by other Causes ?

IF those Rules be attended to, we shall be able to determine the following Questions : Whether it was lawful to forbid the Reading of the Holy Scripture ? Whether Men ought to enjoy the Liberty of a free Examination ? Whether it were better for the Clergy to renounce some of their Dignities, or part of their great Wealth ? or whether it be proper to restore them in those Countries, where they have been taken away. But upon these Subjects and many others, in order to avoid falling into Error, it is absolutely necessary to have a perfect Knowledge of the Things that are to be compared together ; otherwise, one might easily make a wrong Application of the Rule. An ill Use is made of Plays and Satire. The Question is, whether they ought to be suppressed by reason of those accidental Abuses ? Must all Vines be pluck'd up ? Must all beautiful Women hide themselves ? Must all Spectacles and publick Entertainments be forbidden ?

XXX. BECAUSE in the whole Course *Distinctions, less* of our Lives, and in the whole World, we *accurate.* perceive nothing but a continual Vicissitude of Causes and Effects, those Words being so common, and apply'd to so many different Subjects, and so many different Ways of acting, must needs have also very different Interpretations. Hence so many Distinctions, some of which are just and necessary, but the others are only grounded upon a wrong Way of viewing Things. Causes are distinguish'd, for instance, into *procreating* and *preserving* Causes. We are told, that the former produce something new, and make

some Alteration; and that the others do only maintain a Thing in its State. But how can that be a Cause, which produces nothing? 'Tis plain, that Distinction is not exact. Sometimes the Preservation of a Thing is ascribed to an Agent, which has only removed what might have done it some harm: But, exactly speaking, that Agent is only the Cause of that Removing. At other Times, the Preservation of a Thing in its State is ascribed to a Man, who takes Care to prevent all the Accidents that might alter it, because that Intention is look'd upon as an Effect. Lastly, at other Times, the Cause, that is call'd a *preserving* Cause, has really acted upon the Subject it has preserved; but what it has produced, not being very sensible, it is not minded, nor called, upon that Account, a *producing* Cause.

THE Distinction of Causes into *univocal* and *equivocal*, is not much better grounded. We are told that the former are like their Effects, and the latter different from them. I grant that intelligent Causes can produce very different Effects from themselves, since they can produce Motions by the Efficacy of their Will, which is not a Motion: But Bodies have no Action, and no Force, but by their Motion; and a Motion never produces but a like Motion. 'Tis true, that when many Causes are united to produce a compounded Effect, that Effect, consider'd in its Totality, will be different from each of its partial Causes; but each immediate Effect will always be like its immediate Cause, and bear the Character of it. The Action is the acting Cause, and the Effect is the Trace of the Action.

WE are convinced by our own Experience, that Thought can produce or determine Motion. We are also convinced, that a Motion produces only a Motion, that Figures produce only Figures, as Numbers, being united together, produce only Numbers. And therefore we think contrary to our Knowledge, when we fancy that Thought can arise from Extension, rather than believe that Thought is capable of modifying and disposing Extension.

Axioms. XXXI. THE Notions of Cause and Effect are very common and uniform: There are none that Men conceive more frequently, and more easily. Those clear and familiar Notions made all Men conclude, that *nothing is done without a Cause*; that every Being, every Reality, every State that can exist, or not exist, every Thing that can be one Way, or another Way, must have been determined by some Cause to be, rather than not to be; to be in a certain manner, rather than in another. What can be,

or not be; what can be in a certain manner, or in another; if it was not determined by some Cause to be, rather than not to be; to be in a certain manner, rather than in another; if nothing had made it, or if nothing had made it such as it is, rather than otherwise; its Existence, its Manner of Being, would be an Effect of Nothing.

ME N continually argue upon that Principle; their whole Conduct runs upon that Foundation. When they form a Design, they think of proper Means for the Execution of it: When a Thing happens, they ask how it came to pass. If a Man, driven by a Tempest upon an Island, where he sees Buildings, or only regular Grottoes, Trees planted in a Row, some mathematical Instruments, &c. if such a Man should admire the Caprice of Chance in imitating such a Regularity, he would be accounted a Man out of his Senses by every Body. And therefore it must be acknowledged, that a Man falls into a great Extravagance, when reflecting upon the Disposition of the Universe, he renounces a Principle which he always made use of, and by which he never was deceived. Certainly, nothing but a great Depravation hinders him from being sensible of his Folly.

THE same Knowledge, which teaches us that nothing is done without a Cause, does likewise teach us that *no one Thing can be produced of it self*, since a Thing must already exist to give Existence. The *Proportion of the Reality of Effects, with the Reality of their Causes*, is grounded upon these same Principles; for if there was more Reality and Perfection in the Effect than in the Cause, that Reality and Perfection, not proceeding from the Cause, in which they are not, would have no Cause at all, and would be the Work of Nothing.

AGAIN, from the same Principles we judge of Effects by their Causes, and of Causes by their Effects; because an Effect being the Impression of a Cause, it must be like its Cause. If your Virtue is only an Effect of some Fear, or of some Trouble in your Mind, it will last no longer than your ill Humour; and when it does not proceed from Knowledge, it must needs throw you into Extremes, and into Superstition. If your Zeal for those whom you call your Friends, has no other Principle but your Interest, it will last and end with that Interest.

XXXII. A MOUNTAIN, the Paths whereof being dark and full of Briars, are difficult to be found, and yet, notwithstanding those Difficulties, are frequented by People, who go up, and come down,

Discovery of Causes.

down, is a pretty exact Emblem of Philosophy, in which a Man ascends from the Effects to the Causes, or descends from the Causes to the Effects.

MEN are mistaken in those two Respects, which is the Reason of so many chimerical Systems, and vain Projects.

A MAN looks for a Cause, and is resolved to find it out. An Idea offers it self; he takes hold of it. However, it is not the best; it is only the most familiar to him, and the most agreeable to his Prejudices. 'Tis no Matter; he is pleased with it for that very Reason: He goes no farther.

SOME are contented to imagine a possible Cause, and then ascribe to it some Phænomena, and sometimes so hastily, that they only mind those which agree to their Conjecture, or those Circumstances that may be explain'd by it; they lay aside every Thing else. Thus the Course of the heavenly Bodies has been ascribed to moving Intelligences, and the Formation of organized Bodies to plastick Natures, without knowing what they are. It has been rightly said, that it is an easy Thing to imagine, but a difficult one to observe; because Men being impatient of imagining a Cause of the Effects which they observe, see nothing in those Effects but what favours the Conjecture of which they are fond.

A MAN takes hold of a Conjecture, as a Mason takes hold of a Stone, to lay it in a Building. One would think he has received a Commission to make the World according to his Ideas. He conceives that a certain Motion could produce certain Effects, and will have it to be so. I conceive, that if the fluid Matter, which surrounds the Earth, describes all manner of Ways, Circles, or Arches of Circles, having the Center of the Earth for their common Center, those Motions will cause the Fall of heavy Bodies; therefore I have found out the true Cause of that Fall. But is it not a precarious Supposition? What Proof have I of those Motions, so different by reason of the Difference of their Tendencies, and at the same time so uniform, because they are all Concentric? What Cause can I alledge of their Rise and Continuation?

WHEN out of Shame of being silent, or speaking after others, a Man has contrived an Hypothesis, he leaves nothing unattempted to defend it against very good Arguments; and rather than give it up, he fences it about with Nonsense.

IT is one Thing to prove the Truth of one's Conjectures, and another to adjust them so well, that they cannot be overthrown one by another.

THE Connexion of *Consequences*, makes a Man wish that the *Principles* be true, and disposes him to believe them; but it does not prove them.

A COMPARISON may serve to prove the Possibility of a Cause, by making it more intelligible; but it does not establish the Truth of it.

IN order to find out some Cause, we should consider its Effects with great Attention, enquire into and weigh the Circumstances according to the Maxims laid down above. *Chap. V.* It happens sometimes that the Cause we seek with that Method, is discover'd by the Senses themselves: But when it escapes their Penetration, and Conjectures must supply them, we ought, in the first Place, to examine the Possibility of the Causes of which we have an Idea; and the particular Ideas of which it is composed, must contain no Inconsistency among themselves, nor with our other Ideas, which are already known to be clear and just. Afterwards, we must be sure, by convincing Reasons, that the Cause which appears to us possible, does actually exist. Lastly, we must enquire whether it produces the Effect ascribed to it. To that end, the Subject upon which that Effect is produced, ought to be placed in Circumstances wherein that Cause cannot act upon it. It ought to be placed in other Circumstances, wherein it can act but imperfectly. The other Causes, to which that Effect might be owing, must be laid aside; and by those Observations we shall proceed from Probability to Certainty.

IF an Effect is only owing to a certain Cause, it will appear where that Cause is to be found; and it will not appear where that Cause is not observed. For instance, some have conjectured that the *Stamina* in Flowers serve for the purifying of the Juices; but in all Plants the Juices must be purify'd: And yet the *Stamina* do not grow upon those Plants that bear Seed, and always grow upon those that bear none.

THE Liquor of *Succinum*, being shaken in a Vial, takes a Purple-Colour. It is inferred from thence, that this Colour arises neither by an Addition, nor by a Substraction of Parts, and is owing to mere Alterations.

'TIS in vain to pretend to have discover'd the true Cause of an Effect, when that pretended Cause leaves us as much in the dark as before. It is a Query, for instance, how a Stone continues to move, as soon as it comes out of the Hand that throws it. 'Tis the Elasticity of the Air, say some, which is the Cause of that continued Motion. But

what is that Elasticity? What is the Cause of it? How comes its Motion to continue, and its Activity to be perpetual? A Body of Natural Philosophy will never satisfy the Mind, if it contains other Principles than mechanical Principles, and any other Thing be supposed in material Beings, besides Motion, Rest, Figure, and the Situation of the different Corpuscles of which they are composed. 'Tis in vain to explain some Phænomena by the Properties of Salts and Sulphurs, &c. for unless I have an Idea of those Salts, and of those Sulphurs, whereby I may know how they act, I am still in the dark as to the Causes of the Phænomenon. When I am told, and even shewn by Experience, that such and such Effects ought to result from the Action of Salts, Sulphurs, &c. I am inform'd of some Effects, but I am not taught how they arise. It is in vain to tell me, That acid Salts give the Form and Essence to all mix'd Bodies: That they are *the eldest Sons of the Sun; the Promoters of all Fermentation; the true Balsam of Nature, which preserves all Bodies, and the best and most valuable Things in the World.* I am by no Means instructed by a Language, which I don't understand.

THE more simple and evident those Rules are, the more shameful a Thing is it to neglect them. It is a Sign of a very contemptible Lightness of Mind to take Pride in some Conjectures, which an unruly Imagination may easily bring forth, and to call them a *System*, because, if they are supposed, one may explain to those, who readily grant them, some Circumstances of a Phænomenon. A Man gets a Name at a cheap Rate; he gets himself recorded among original Wits, and takes for a just Encomium whatever the Politeness of Men of Letters makes them say about those new Propositions, which, like political News, make some Noise for a Week, and then are altogether forgotten. A Man, being extremely desirous to get a Name, not only takes hold of every Thing that offers it self, but also stops there; and is so sincerely mistaken, that he does not scruple to make the Eyes of all other Men the Judges of his Discovery. He informs the Publick, out of Charity, that he has discover'd a Thermometer, sought long ago by the Royal Academy of Sciences, free from the Imperfections of other Thermometers, and containing all the Advantages that are only to be found separately in those that have been used hitherto. Another desires his Friends to inform the Publick, forthwith, of a new Discovery in Geometry, the Paralogism whereof is obvious.

XXXIII. In the Practice and Conduct of Life, the Discovery of the true Causes is frequently of the greatest Importance, because *In Practical Affairs.* to prevent an ill Effect, or to put a Stop to it, 'tis but taking away its fundamental Cause. Because the Events of human Life are generally very much compounded and complicated, Men easily fancy they know the whole Cause of an Effect, though they only know part of it: Nay, Circumstances are often looked upon as Causes. Interest and other Passions fix the Mind upon those Things with which it is affected, and hinder it from going farther. Men of a shallow Mind dwell upon partial Causes, and pretend to see every thing; but those who have a greater Extent of Wit, don't stop till they come to the Source. When a Man of a shallow Wit has a Design at Heart, he only sees his Aim, and does not perceive the Obstacles that lie in his Way. He runs so fast towards his Aim, that he stumbles, and frequently cannot attain to it.

THERE is nothing more common among Men, than to ascribe to their Misfortune what proceeds only from their own Fault. By that means they think they have a Right to be angry with those whom they do not love, or to inveigh against I know not what, instead of blaming themselves. A Man does not succeed in a Design of which he was very fond; whereupon, without enquiring into the Causes of his Miscarriage, he gives the obscure Name of Misfortune to a Cause unknown to him. It frequently happens, that a Man scolds at others, for no other Reason but because he is not well pleased with himself: And in general, Men lay their Faults upon others as much as they can. Deaf People complain that others speak too low: Dull Preachers groan by reason of the Lukewarmness of the Age.

MEN love to make Systems, and to raise vast Edifices upon a small Number of Suppositions: That Inclination does frequently move Historians to vent their own Imaginations as undeniable Facts. Out of some Strokes they form a compleat Character; and that Character, if we may believe them, influenced all the Actions of a Man; as if it was not a common Thing among Men to contradict themselves, to act at a venture, and to become the Sport of Circumstances (c).

(c) Montagne (Book III. Ch. 9.) alleges an Example of those Reformations, which do not remove the Evil, "However, I saw
" some

THE Society is disturbed by many Disorders : A Man undertakes to remove some of them. To that End, he perceives some Causes which contribute to a certain Disorder. A well-meaning Man, or a Man who desires to get a Name, is wonderfully pleased with that Discovery ; but, though that particular Cause be removed, it frequently happens that all the other Causes remain still ; and the Method that is made use of, is attended with many other Inconveniences that are no less grievous (*d*).

WHEN therefore something is to be mended, one must examine, 1. Whether it be a Disorder, and an Evil. 2. For what Reasons it is a Disorder, and an Evil. 3. One must go back from one Principle to another, as far as the first Cause of that Evil ; take a Survey of Men, and consider how they would live, if such a Cause was removed, and had no longer any Influence over them. Afterwards one must enquire, whether the Dispositions of the People would not be still sufficient to revive the same Inconveniency ; for Men do frequently make a great Noise about the pretended Remedy of a Symptom, which does not perfectly cure the Evil.

LASTLY,

“ some Years ago a Man, for whose Memory I have a great Respect,
 “ who, in the midst of our Evils, when there was neither Law,
 “ nor Justice, nor any Magistrate that performed his Office, no
 “ more than now, published I know not what sorry Reformatations
 “ about Cloaths, Cookery, and Pettifogging. They are mere Amuse-
 “ ments to please a People ill used, that they may not think they have been
 “ quite forgotten. Others do the same, when they forbid a People,
 “ given over to all sorts of execrable Vices, to Dance and to Play.
 “ It is not a proper Time for a Man to wash, and make himself
 “ clean, when he is sick of a violent Fever.”

(*d*) “ Considering the natural Instability of our Manners and Opinions, it appears to me frequently, that good Authors themselves are in the wrong, to pretend to form a constant and solid Contexture of Men. They pitch upon an universal Air, and interpret, according to that Image, all the Actions of a Man ; and if they cannot wrest them sufficiently, they have recourse to Dissimulation. *Augustus* escaped them ; for there is in that Man such an apparent, sudden, and continual Variety of Actions, during the whole Course of his Life, that the boldest Judges have not thought fit to meddle with him. There is nothing in Men I am more apt to disbelieve than Constancy, and nothing I believe more easily than their Inconstancy. In all Antiquity it would be a hard Matter to pick out twelve Men, who directed their Lives to a certain Aim, which is the principal End of Wisdom.” *Montagne, Book II. Chap. 1.*

Lastly, Though the Remedies should appear efficacious and certain, yet we must still examine whether they be lawful and useful; for the Remedy of an Evil does frequently occasion worse Evils, and more difficult to be cured. Those Enquiries are above a Man of a narrow Mind, who is not laborious, who has no clear Thoughts, who knows not how to be free from Prejudices, and does not judge of Things with all the necessary Calmness and Attention.

IN like manner, when some Good is to be procured; least we should be imposed upon, and prejudiced by its Advantages (*e*), we must in the first Place examine whether it be possible, and then whether it be useful. To that End, we must have a clear Notion of the Thing it self, weigh the Efficacy of the Means proper to bring it about, consider the Power we have over those Means, their Simplicity and Certainty, compare them with the Obstacles, and compare also the Usefulness of the intended Good with the Usefulness of what we part with to obtain it. That Comparison leads us to examine the Usefulness of the Thing it self; and that Examination must run upon three Things: 1. Whether it be Just; and why. 2. What Benefit will be reaped from it. 3. What Inconveniencies it will be exposed to. In each of those Considerations we ought to be attentive, and set Things before our Eyes, in order to apprehend, whether, supposing such and such Circumstances, such and such Consequences

(*e*) " An eager and violent Desire is rather an Obstacle, than a Help, to carry on a Design: It makes us very uneasy, with respect to Events that prove slow or contrary to our Expectation: It raises in us a Suspicion towards those with whom we deal. We never manage well a Thing by which we are possess'd and governed.

- - - *Malè cuncta ministrat
Impetus.*

" A Man, who uses only his Judgment and his Skill, goes on more cheerfully: He dissembles, he yields, and puts off, as Occasion requires. He misses his Aim, without being vexed at it, being ready for a new Attempt: He acts with Deliberation. A Man, who is moved by violent and tyrannical Desires, must needs betray a great Imprudence and Injustice. He is hurried on by the Impetuosity of those Desires: They are rash Motions, and of little Use, unless they be very much supported by Fortune." *Montagne, Book III. Chap. 10.*

quences will take place. A Man, who does not proceed in that cautious Method, will be apt to fall into chimerical Notions, and build Castles in the Air.

IF a Man happens to be prepossess'd with Affection and Desires, he must entreat some Persons, who are able to examine the Easiness and Difficulty of a Project with more Indifference, to enter upon that Examination. A great many Things will offer themselves to a Man free from Prejudices, which would escape a Man who is prepossess'd.

THE Method which I have propos'd to reason about a Project, appears to me essential; and one cannot depart from it, without running the Hazard of falling into Error. When a Man is very intent upon the Advantages arising from the Success of an Enterprize, he can hardly avoid being prepossess'd, and inflamed with Desires at the Sight of so many Advantages. He is resolv'd to attain his Ends: He only sees what can be serviceable to his Design; and all the Obstacles disappear, or, at least, he perceives them only at a Distance.

NOT only Men of a vehement Temper run too hastily into an ill-concerted Project, but the calmest People are also guilty of the same Fault. Being us'd to feed themselves with flattering Notions, as soon as they have form'd a Design, they shut their Eyes against every Thing that might make them uneasy, and disturb the Pleasure of their Hopes. Nay, those Men never mend, because the Desire of Quietness does not allow them to reflect upon their Faults, and to grow more wary by their Reflections.

IT happens but too often, that some Persons, full of Piety and Zeal, engage too easily in Projects, the Execution whereof would require that Men should be new moulded. Those Projects, wonderful in the Theory, occasion many Disorders, when a Man is resolv'd to execute them.

TIMOROUS People are only affect'd with Inconveniences; and bold Men consider only Advantages, and the Means of obtaining them. Happy is that Man, who indulging neither Fear, nor Rashness, can discover every Thing, and compare the Power of the Means with the Force of the Obstacles, that are to be overcome! It requires Tranquillity without Indolence, and a long Habit of reflecting upon what passes in the World, and comparing Events with their Causes.

FEW People can rightly judge of Things, without exaggerating the Facility or the Difficulty, according as Desire or Fear prevails in them. Men are us'd from their early
Years

Years to decide a great many Things which they never examined, and which are wholly or very imperfectly known to them. Those Decisions proceed from Passion. Reason has hardly any share in them. According as a Man is bold and daring, or timorous and wary, according as he is inclined or averse to a Proposition, he looks out for Arguments to prove or reject it. Those Arguments are not drawn from the Knowledge of the Subject, but from Passion. The Reasonings of most People discover only the Thing in Favour of which they are prejudiced, without clearing it.

The End of the FIRST VOLUME.



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